

**BREAKING THE RIFLES
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE IN TURKEY
AND IN ISRAEL**

by

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**Submitted to Institute of Social Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

Sabancı University

July, 2017


BREAKING THE RIFLES: CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO
MILITARY SERVICE IN TURKEY AND IN ISRAEL

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DATE OF APPROVAL: 03.07.2017

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ABSTRACT

BREAKING THE RIFLES: CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE IN TURKEY AND IN ISRAEL

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Ph.D. Dissertation, July 2017

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Keywords: Conscientious objection, social movements, intersectionality, Turkey, Israel

This dissertation questions how conscientious objectors become agents of social, political, legal and institutional change in contexts where military, militarism and militarization impede their agencies through a comparative-historical analysis of the objection movements in Turkey and in Israel. Drawing on the acts of citizenship approach, it argues that the objectors become political actors through a process in which they take distance from the hegemonic conceptions of military, citizenship and war; put forth new political subjectivities with new claims and goals; and perform acts of civil disobedience in multiple sites and at multiple scales. Discussing the acts of citizenship approach through the lenses of the feminist intersectionality theories and the comparative-historical methodology, it further claims that the activist citizen is not a monolithic but intersectional subjectivity that comes into being through a reflexive and embodied process which differentiates the political agency and its relation to voice. The multiple, multilayered and intersectional identifications construct the acts of citizenship (and the social movements) through series of bargaining and negotiations that unfold in situated contexts of time and place. Specifically, the dissertation argues that the hegemonic conceptions of military, militarism and militarization affect the objections differently. Whereas they enable the early emergence of the conscientious objection as a reformist act of citizenship and with a higher scope in Israel, they limit the agencies of the objectors in Turkey. That said, the radical acts of objection still emerges, albeit delayed and with a smaller scope, in both countries since the intersectional dialogue between various identifications at the individual and collective level enable alternative conceptions of military, militarism and militarization.

ÖZET

SİLAHLARI KIRMAK: TÜRKİYE VE İSRAİL'DE ASKERLİK HİZMETİNE VİCDANİ RET

DOĞU DURGUN

Doktora Tezi, Temmuz 2017

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Emin Fuat Keyman

Anahtar Kelimeler: Vicdani ret, sosyal hareketler, kesişimsellik, Türkiye, İsrail

Bu tez, vicdani retçilerin ordu, militarizm ve militarizasyon nedeniyle failliklerinin kısıtladığı kontekstlerde nasıl sosyal, politik, legal ve kurumsal dönüşümün aktörleri olduklarını, Türkiye’de ve İsrail’deki vicdani ret hareketlerinin karşılaştırmalı-tarihsel bir analizini yaparak açıklamaktadır. Vatandaşlık aktı perspektifinden, vicdani retçilerin hegemonik ordu, vatandaşlık ve savaş anlayışından mesafe aldığı, yeni talepler ve amaçlara sahip yeni politik öznellikler ortaya koyduğu ve birçok yerde ve farklı ölçeklerde sivil itaatsiz eylemler gerçekleştirdiği bir süreç ile politik aktörler olduklarını vurgulamaktadır. Vatandaşlık aktları yaklaşımını feminist kesişimsellik teorileri ve karşılaştırmalı-tarihsel metot ile tartışan araştırma, aktivist vatandaşın monolitik bir özne olmadığını; politik failliği ve bu failliğin ses ile ilişkisini farklılaştıran refleksif ve bedensel bir süreç ile ortaya konan kesişimsel bir özelliğe sahip olduğunu savunmaktadır. Vatandaşlık aktları (ve sosyal hareketler) çeşitli, çok katmanlı ve kesişimsel kimlik kategorilerinin zaman ve mekana göre değişen müzakereler ve pazarlıklar sonucunda sürekli yeniden inşa edilmektedir. Tez ordu, militarizm ve militarizasyonun hegemonik anlayışlarının vicdani reddi farklı şekillerde etkilediği ortaya koymaktadır. Hegemonik söylem ve pratikler İsrail’de vicdani reddin görece erken, reformist bir çerçevede ve daha büyük bir ölçekte çıkmasını sağlamışken, Türkiye’de uzun süre vicdani reddin önünde engel teşkil etmiştir. Tabii bu radikal vicdani ret söylem ve pratiklerinin çıkmadığı anlamına gelmemektedir. Vicdani ret hem İsrail’de hem de Türkiye’de yakın dönemde çıkan ve küçük fakat giderek gelişen bir grup tarafından radikal bir çerçevede de ortaya konmaktadır. Kimlik kategorileri arasındaki hem bireysel hem de kolektif düzeyde gerçekleşen kesişimsel diyalog, ordu, militarizm ve militarizasyon karşısında alternatif söylem ve pratiklerin çıkmasını da sağlamaktadır.

To my beloved family

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people to whom I feel great debt of gratitude. Without their contributions, this dissertation could not be finished. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Emin Fuat Keyman for his guidance, mentorship, criticism, encouragement and patience. I feel very fortunate to have him as my supervisor. He believed in my project, and my academic capacity and ability to finish it; he pushed me to clarify and embolden my arguments; and he supported me with care during the difficult phases of writing. This work would not be possible without his help.

My sincere gratitude also goes to Ayşe Gül Altınay and Ayşe Kadioğlu, the members of my dissertation committee, who pushed me to widen, detail and structure my writing with their hard questions, inspiring comments and helpful advices. They have been very motivating throughout the writing process, and I could not have imagined finishing my project without their support. I also owe a great debt of gratitude to Bahar Rumelili and Ziya Umut Türem who kindly accepted to participate in my dissertation defense jury. Their invaluable feedbacks and hard questions helped me to improve the final draft, and contributed to the theoretical and empirical parts of the dissertation immensely.

I also would like to thank Nedim Nomer who read the first drafts of my research proposal, and helped me to reformulate my research question and the theoretical framework. Sabancı University has been an inspiring academic environment where I had the opportunity to meet with hardworking, encouraging, helpful and creative professors and students. I was fortunate to be surrounded by such scholars and fellow graduate students who contributed immensely to my intellectual journey.

I have been very lucky to be surrounded my beloved family members and friends. They have helped me go through the challenging process of researching and writing with their continuous support. Specifically, I would like to thank my parents and my brother, Barbod Tavasoli, Rela Mazali, Yasmin Yablonko, Inbal Sinai, Aydın Özipek, Patrick Lewis, Zeqine Sheshi, Magda Bakali, Anna Couturier, Amit Meyer, Anaïs Martin, and many others.

Throughout the research process, I have presented some sections of the dissertation in various colloquiums, conferences and workshops around the world. I

have benefited a lot from the feedbacks I have received from several junior and senior scholars, and graduate students.

Finally, I thank the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its generous support that allowed me to stay in Israel for eight months and to conduct my fieldwork.

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Introduction

‘War makes states and states make war’ (Tilly 1985). The history of the nation-state is the history of incessant wars and political violence which perpetuate military, militarism and militarization and structure nations around a militarized ethos. Many nation-states enact compulsory military service through which they aim to construct the soldiering duty as the hegemonic link between citizenship and national security, and in doing so, put to fore the ‘ideal citizen’ to secure the nation. Several studies analyze how military, militarism and militarization shape and reshape citizen identities, discourses and practices. The studies on the reverse side of the story; namely, how the dissent to military service shapes and reshapes the nation-state, are relatively scarce. In this dissertation, I aim at filling this gap by asking this question in the context of conscientious objection (CO) to military service: How does CO to military service emerge and transform the nation-state in contexts where military, militarism and militarization impede critical contestations? In other words, how do conscientious objectors become political agents that create change in highly militaristic contexts which impede their agencies?

I answer this question by conducting a comparative-historical analysis of CO to military service in Turkey and in Israel. A comparative perspective on both countries is illuminating since they represent cases where citizenship and politics are highly militarized. Turkey and Israel are both constructed as nations-in-arms in which national security is sought through people’s army. Secondly, both countries are located in the Middle East with strategic security ties to the West. Moreover, both countries have faced wars, militarized ethnic conflicts, and political violence since the formative years

of statehood; which has fed the military cultures and the national security discourses. In both countries, military service is praised as one of the most important citizenship duties and refusing the service has severe legal, social and political consequences. CO is not recognized by the Turkish law, and is granted to a narrow segment of the society in Israel. Both militaries consider CO as an existential threat. As a telling example, Gürcan's (2016) notes that the high number of officers (88.1 percent out of a representative sample including 1,401 officers of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF)) have a negative attitude towards the right to CO. Objectors cannot enjoy some of their citizenship rights and liberties, face consecutive prison terms, confront with difficulties in the job market, and are stigmatized in the society. In highly militarized contexts of both countries, their numbers remain marginal compared to the number of conscripts. Objectors further fail to establish powerful alliances, to acquire enough civil society support, and to receive enough media attention, except in cases of court-martials and imprisonments. Thus, they fail to enact the right to CO and many in fact do not expect to enjoy their rights in the near future. However, CO is a recurrent and resilient act of dissent which creates social, political, legal and institutional change in both countries. It dates back to the formative years of the nation-states, and gradually becomes a social movement through which individuals and groups promote change. As a matter of fact, Turkey and Israel are the only two countries with long-lasting objection movements in the region. Researching these groups would help scholars to have much fuller accounts of change which the nation-state goes through by incorporating the agencies of counter-hegemonic groups that operate at the margins of politics.

I aim at introducing theoreticals and methodological tools to analyze the politics of CO that receives scant attention in the academic literatures of both countries. I argue that objectors become agents of change through an embodied and reflexive process of subjectification in which they take a distance from the militaristic conceptions of various categories of identity/difference, put forth new political subjectivities claiming new rights and imposing new responsibilities, and perform their objections as acts of civil disobedience in multiple sites and at multiple scales. Theoretically, I frame my analysis within the acts of citizenship approach. In doing so, I differentiate CO from the acts of dissent against military service. Of course, CO represents an act of dissent insofar as the objectors resist the militaristic discourses and practices. Indeed, I employ

this notion to define CO throughout the dissertation. However, CO also differs from the acts of dissent since it performs one's political responsibility to community. Many objectors, including those with anarchist political orientations, explain their desire to be recognized by state, military and society through acts of civil disobedience. Some refuse any alternative civilian service; others accept it to fulfill their citizenship duties. However, all define CO as a political act that serves to create a better society. CO is assumed to contribute to the 'common good', which is defined as demilitarization, peace, and/or security. For the purposes of the dissertation, the acts of citizenship approach not only furnishes a conceptual framework to analyze a new case but also introduces theoretical insights to answer the main research question; namely, how do objectors become agents of change? In Chapter 2, I trace the historical trajectory of social movements and citizenship literatures in terms of structure/agency debate and decipher the shortcomings of systemic and early constructivist theories in analyzing the agencies of the objectors. I argue that both approaches are reductionist since they explain the change from a structural perspective. Systemic theories explain the causal factors of dissent and link them to political action through rationality assumption. Constructivist theories, on the other hand, explain the constitutive factors of dissent and relate them to political action through habitus. In both frameworks, change refers to an expected outcome of specific structural determinants, be it political opportunities or sedimented practices, and unfolds over longer periods of time. These theories fail to explain the unexpected change which is effectuated in relatively unfavorable contexts and over relatively short periods. The objectors transgress the political opportunity/threat structures and the established practices through their 'daring' acts, and create a change which has distinct temporal and spatial characteristics compared to the well-established and strong social movements. The objectors have relatively scarce political opportunities to seize upon; the costs of their acts outweigh their benefits, and their expectations for the change they aim to create are weak. In such a framework, they break away from the hegemonic practices of citizenship through tactical moves that are performed over relatively short periods of time and in sites that overlap, yet also differ from, the conventional venues for claim-making. There is a need to theorize these creative and innovative agencies to grasp the bottom up transformation of the nation-state by relatively weaker groups. As a matter of fact, it is through everyday and mundane acts of dissent that the objectors negotiate citizenship, create cracks in the

military discourses and practices, and, if any, push for legal and institutional change. Through these ‘less important’ acts, citizens engage with state and military in different ways and transgress ‘the myth of the military nation’ at multiple levels and scales (Altınay 2004).

I take up change in its social, political, legal and institutional aspects. I argue that although objectors push for legal and institutional change through conventional forms of political participation, i.e. litigation, their failure to achieve these goals should not cover the social and political aspects of the change that they bring about. Acts of citizenship approach gives valuable insights to conceptualize the change that these tactical acts of objection create. This approach explains change through creative and innovative acts that negotiate new political subjectivities, claiming new rights and imposing new responsibilities. Through their acts, objectors dissociate from the militaristic conceptions of the nation-state, citizenship and security, and put forward alternative ways of thinking about and doing politics. They denormalize what military, militarism and militarization normalize and articulate a reimaginative perspective which ‘create[s] a sense of the possible and of a citizenship that is “yet to come”’ (Işın and Nielsen, 2008: 4). I argue that objectors’ significance comes in and through this aspiration for what is ‘yet to come’. Although objectors do not succeed in enacting the right to CO, they put forth a socially and politically relevant critique of the military, militarism and militarization, disturb the routinized processes of politics, initiate a country-wide discussion, negotiate the right to CO with the state and the military, and transform the military discourses and practices. As a matter of fact, the reason why objectors employ litigation is mainly to acquire a voice to promote this social and political change they aim to realize. Although many do not expect to have the right to CO through legal struggle, they employ litigation as a tactical move to disseminate their subjectivities, claims and goals. Such a conceptualization introduces a much complete account of the change that the objectors, which constitute a weak and emerging social movement, generate in relatively unfavorable contexts.

The notion of performativity (Butler 1990) guides the theorization of change in the acts of citizenship approach. Işın and Nielsen (2008) shift our attention to the newly emerging subjectivities and in doing so conceptualize transgressive interruptions that the marginalized groups effectuate. This poses an important question for the acts of

citizenship approach: How do these subjectivities emerge? I argue that the acts of citizenship must incorporate a theory of subjectivity to extend its research agenda and the feminist theory gives valuable insights for such an endeavor with the notion of intersectional subjectivity. Specifically, acts of citizenship approaches need to incorporate a theory of intersectional subjectivity in order to discern how ‘activist citizens’ are constructed at the intersections of multiple and multilayered identifications; how the intersectional dialogue between these identifications enable, limit and diversify the acts, actors and actions; and how it affects coalitions, conflicts and negotiations between claim-makers and the powerholders. Drawing on the intersectionality theory, I argue that CO to military service becomes an intersectional social movement in and through which activist citizens negotiate multiple identifications with state, military, society and other objectors. Deconstructing the activist citizen in its relations to various categories of identity/difference, I contend that the activist citizen is not a monolithic entity but contains many conflicts and contradictions. The emergence of new social movements and collective identity depend on sustaining a creative and innovative dialogue between conflicting discourses, claims and tactics of different groups. The acts of citizenship emerge and are transformed through series of negotiations and bargaining between multiple, multilayered and intersectional identifications. I demonstrate how these subjectivities create different, yet overlapping, agencies and vary the quality, sites, scales and scopes of the objections and the change that these acts initiate. Through a comparative analysis on the emergence and transformation of the objection movements in both countries, I claim that coalitions and conflicts emerge around two main cleavages; namely total versus selective and secular versus religious objection.

The feminist theory and the intersectional approach not only extend the research agendas of the acts of citizenship approach but also improve that literature. Intersectionality stresses that different identifications lead to different agencies and problematizes the hidden assumption that the activist citizen succeeds insofar as s/he acquires a voice. On the basis of a comparative perspective on different subjectivities, I claim that acquiring a voice is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change. My inquiry into CO indicates that silent agencies matter and voice does not always lead to desirable political outcomes. Specifically, I argue that silent and everyday acts of grey

objection may create cracks and fissures in the hegemonic practices. Silent acts do not necessarily mean passive, disengaged, or disempowered agents (Gest and Gray 2015; Gray 2015). Grey objectors are active agents who perform various mundane tactics on a daily basis to avoid the military service (De Certeau 1984). They bend the rules and regulations, dodge the draft, desert the barracks, get legal exemptions or go abroad. Scott argues that ‘such a politics of hidden dissent, of disguise and anonymity, [...] is resistance of the most effective kind, for these subversive gestures eventually insinuate themselves, in disguised form, into the public discourse. They lead to a slow transformation of values, they nurture and give meaning to subsequent, more overt forms of resistance or rebellion’ (Bleiker, 2004:203). As the predominant form of objection in both countries, the silent agencies of this group push for procedural change in the military laws and regulations, i.e. laws on the draft dodging and legal exemptions. Incorporating a feminist intersectional analysis, I further argue that acquiring voice through conventional forms of political participation does not always lead to desirable outcomes. The positioning of agents in the historically embedded relations of power creates structural and political intersectionalities that limit the agencies of certain subjectivities. Specifically, I claim that the gendered nature of military, militarism and militarization silences the agencies of women in the objection movements or increases their voice only insofar as women’s objections are masculinized through prison terms.

Epistemologically, I derive my knowledge claims on conscientious objectors which operate at the peripheries of politics. Both the acts of citizenship approach and the feminist theories support such an epistemological choice (Andrijasevic 2013). They both take the marginalized, repressed and silenced groups as the ‘epistemic subject’ of their inquiry and problematize the knowledge production that discounts the agencies of the weak. The intersectionality approaches understand the politics from the vantage point of the groups that are silenced as a reason of various structural and political intersectionalities. They claim that the functioning of power is better grasped by analyzing those social groups that fail to acquire a voice in political struggles and institutions due to their intersecting identifications. Scholars aim at revealing the challenges that the subordinated groups face in the existing power relations. Although the acts of citizenship literature mostly takes migrants and other non-citizens as its topic

of research, I argue that applying the approach to objectors is illuminating since it helps to conceptualize the notion of citizenship from the vantage of point of those citizens who are located within the boundaries of citizenship yet operate at its margins. As a matter of fact, there is a certain resemblance between non-citizens who are outside of the circle of citizenship and the objectors who are stripped off their citizenship rights and liberties and subjected to ‘civil death’. As ‘outsiders within’, objectors demonstrate that the ‘ideal’ citizenship does not only demarcate boundaries between citizens and non-citizens but also those between ‘first-class’ and ‘second-class’ citizens. Such an inquiry, too, problematizes the knowledge production on the basis of hegemonic groups. The objectors represent a group of activists which are assumed not to have a significant impact in the ‘daily business of politics’ in both countries. However, objectors still put forth their bottom-up agencies and create cracks and fissures in the hegemonic conceptions even in highly militarized contexts of war and political violence. Shifting the focus to these acts of citizenship transforms the ways in which the nation-building, the nation-state formation and re-formation are conceptualized.

Methodologically, I contribute to the acts of citizenship and the intersectionality approach by introducing a comparative-historical analysis. CO is a multilayered and multilevel phenomenon. It represents an individual act, a social movement, and an internationally recognized human right. It involves many actors, with different identities, claims, interests, and power, which negotiate their moral and political subjectivities at the individual, organizational, societal, national and international levels. Thus, a research may be designed in many different ways, comprising various theoretical, conceptual and methodological approaches. And none of these approaches would be able to grasp the phenomenon in its entirety. In this research, I question the objectors’ side of the story. I draw my conclusions on a comparative-historical analysis of CO in Turkey and in Israel. The purpose of a comparative perspective is to come up with cumulative knowledge, albeit partial and situated. My comparative inquiry also aims at deciphering the processes and mechanisms which differentiates the acts of objections within and between countries.

Both the acts of citizenship and the intersectionality approaches necessitate an in-depth analysis of subjectivity that theorizes agency within its situated nature. In other words, there is a need to ask when, where and how certain subjectivities emerge as

claim-makers through a comparative analysis between countries and historical periods. In this dissertation, I claim that the activist citizen is an embodied and reflexive becoming that is situated at the intersections of multiple identifications that become politically and morally salient in situated contexts of time and place. The objectors reflect on their embodied experiences with state, military, society and other objectors, and transform their moral and political positionings vis-a-vis military service in critical historical junctures. CO emerges in contexts where war, militarism and political violence within and beyond borders shatter the national consensus; and is shaped by the changing nature of military, militarism and militarization. The comparative perspective indicates that the differences in the hegemonic conceptions of military, militarism, militarization and citizenship diversify the acts of objection. Tracing the historical trajectory of CO in both countries, I argue that hegemonic and competing discourses and practices of citizen-soldier enable and limit the agencies of groups of objectors differentially; vary the time, substance, scope, sites and scales; and differentiate the change that the groups of objectors bring about. In Israel, the objection emerges as a reformist (Zionist) act of citizenship quite early and in a relatively higher scope, and later transforms into a total act that represents radical positionings (anti-Zionism). In Turkey, on the other hand, the objection emerges as a radical and substantive critique of the nation-state, militarism and citizenship in a much later period, and keeps its radicality in the course of its evolution. Regardless of their social positionings, the objectors problematize the legitimacy of the Turkish military altogether. This difference demonstrates that hegemony and resistance are not dichotomous but entangled in the formation of the acts of citizenship. Objectors in Israel emerge from within the privileged segments of the society and become agents of reformist change that redress the state and the military in accordance with the hegemonic conceptions of war, citizenship and soldiering which enable such acts of dissent. The radical acts are performed first within the marginalized ethno-religious and ethno-national minorities, i.e. Druzes, and recently appropriated by the antimilitarist and feminist Jews. In the absence of such frames, the emergence of CO is delayed in Turkey. Like in Israel, the acts of objection emerge from the privileged segments of the society – mostly Turkish, middle-class and educated men – and are later appropriated by marginalized ethnic, gender, sexual and religious groups. Interestingly, although these subjectivities diversify the types of objections, discourses and claims, almost all of them put forth

radical agendas in the sense that they refuse the Turkish military and any alternative civilian service altogether, and they push the citizenship to its limits.

My comparative design relies on Mill's method of difference where Turkey and Israel construct similar cases with different outcomes. Turkey and Israel are both constructed as nations-in-arms in the first half of the twentieth century. They are located in the Middle East with strategic security ties with the West; namely, the U.S. and European countries. There is also a military alliance between each other. Turkish and Israeli militaries exchange material, know-how, and technology. Finally, both countries face protracted wars and militarized ethnic conflicts within and beyond their borders. Consequently, the militaries enjoy a considerable popular support and establish their hegemonies in the formulation and implementation of the national security policies. Both countries are social formations where military culture and national security discourses are strong. However, conscientious objectors constitute a group that persists over years and transform the nation-state through collective action. That said, despite the similarities in the formulation of the state, the military and the nation, the objection movements represent certain differences. To question how these differences emerge, I conduct a comprehensive research, which spans time and place, employing qualitative data at the individual and organizational (multi-level analysis). I gather my data mainly from the semi-structured and in-depth interviews with 67 individuals, including 23 self-declared objectors and four grey objectors in Turkey, an ex-soldier who worked in the Turkish General Staff Command between 2012 and 2014, an international journalist who worked on civil-military relations in Turkey, five ex-conscripts who served in the Turkish military, and 25 self-declared objectors and three grey objectors in Israel. The interviewees constitute a representative sample which includes objectors with different economic, political, and sociocultural identifications. Moreover, I conduct a literature survey and analyze the interviews of the objectors, published in books, such as *Asker Doğmayanlar* (Öğünç 2013), *Dissent and Ideology in Israel: Resistance to Draft 1948-1973* (Blatt et al., 1975) and *Refusnik! Israel's Soldiers of Conscience* (Kidron, 2005) and online websites, such as savaskarsitlari.org and <http://vicdaniret.org/vr-der/>. For the historical analysis, I employ secondary resources which have mostly been published by historians. My analysis also stems from

the legal documents, the court cases of objectors, and my participant observations in several conferences, in weekly meetings of activists, and in demonstrations.

I began my interviews with the same question: What sort of a life story brought you to CO? I started with such an open-ended and relatively vague question so that the objectors come up with their self-narratives about any happenings in their life trajectories that they consider important in their acts of objection. Through a discourse analysis of these narratives, I question how, when and why various categories of identity/difference are articulated into the acts of objections and to what extent they break away from the hegemonic conceptions of citizenship, soldiering and war. How do objectors construct their subjectivities? What are their claims and goals? Which discourses and practices enable and limit the claim-making? Moreover, I take up political subjectification not only as an individual but a collective process. As I have argued above, objection is an intersectional social movement in and through which agents negotiate multiple identifications with state, military, society and other objectors. Thus, I further asked questions to understand how CO is negotiated at the collective level: How do they position themselves vis-à-vis the multiple others, including the other objectors? What are different types and forms of objections? What are the unifying and dividing lines of these acts? How do identifications create and limit the sites of collaboration and conflict among the groups of objectors? The discourse analysis is complemented with an analysis of the practices of objectors in multiple sites, i.e. everyday life spaces, police stations, demonstrations, barracks, courts, prisons, etc., and at multiple scales: What kind of actions do the objectors perform? How do these actions transform the sites, scope and scales of objection? How do they differentiate the political agencies?

Limitations

One limitation of this research has been the inability to make in-depth interviews with the state and military officials, politicians, judges, or commanders. Thus, how CO is negotiated within the state and the military institutions is out of the scope of this dissertation. I decipher the cracks that the objectors create in the military discourses and practices through an analysis of laws, regulations, court documents, public statements and declarations of the state and military officials. However, an analysis of the changes in the discourses and practices of the military through in-depth interviews with officials

is crucial to understand the negotiations and bargaining that take place among the powerholders.

Another limitation stemmed from my lack of Hebrew. I have conducted my in-depth interviews only with the English-speaking objectors in Israel. Moreover, the limitation of language and the closeness of the community impeded an in-depth inquiry into the ultra-Orthodox objectors, except one interview which has been done online through a questionnaire and was translated from Spanish into Turkish. I have relied on secondary resources and the academic literature to include this group of objectors into the dissertation. The analyses of legal transformation in Israel were also based on the literature review and the legal documents in English.

Finally, it is important to note that I do not intend to explain all of the aspects of the social change that the objectors effectuate. I have not made any research on the various segments of the society and their perceptions on the CO. The term ‘social’ has a big baggage and my argument on that aspect of change stems from the above-mentioned role of the objectors that provide a re-imaginative perspective for the sociocultural identifications, the social roles, and the citizenship through their subjectivities. In the dissertation, social change refers to the subjectivities of the objectors that point at a society that is yet to come.

Outline

The dissertation proceeds in seven chapters. In Chapter 1, it starts with a historiography of CO to military service. I trace the evolution of CO both as a practice and an academic curiosity in Europe, U.S., Turkey and Israel. This chapter also introduces basic knowledge on the historical, theoretical and legal aspects of CO. I summarize the studies of CO to military service within specific lines of inquiry in order to situate my research. In doing so, the chapter aims at highlighting the contributions of this dissertation to the academic literature at the theoretical and methodological levels. I introduce these contributions in detail in Chapter 2. Throughout that chapter, I trace the social movements and citizenship theories in terms of the structure/agency debate and frame my analysis within the acts of citizenship approach. I then trace the historical trajectory of the intersectionality framework in terms of the structure/agency debate and incorporate its insights into the acts of citizenship approach. The chapter ends with a

discussion of the methodology. The following chapters substantiate my argument on the social and political change that the objectors create. The Chapters 3, 4, and 5 analyze the emergence and transformation of the CO in Turkey and in Israel. Chapter 3 constructs the historicities of the CO in both countries through an analysis of the early acts of objection. I demonstrate that CO is not a new phenomenon but dates back to the nation-state formation processes. I later turn to the transformations that the CO has been through in Turkey and in Israel separately. Chapter 4 traces the historical trajectory of CO in Turkey. Chapter 5 analyzes the trajectory of CO in Israel. After examining the social and political changes that different subjectivities create, I turn my attention to the actions of objectors in Chapter 6 in which I explain the sites, scales and scopes of the objections in each country. I take up CO as an act of civil disobedience, and decipher how these acts are performed differentially in situated contexts of time and place. This chapter also deciphers how everyday and mundance acts of dissent create legal and/or institutional change even in relatively unfavorable contexts. I trace the court cases of objectors, the legal documents on CO, and the discourses and practices of the state and the military authorities to demonstrate how objectors create cracks and fissures in the 'daily conduct of politics'. Chapter 7 gathers together the insights of the previous chapters to make a coherent and integrated comparative analysis of CO in Turkey and in Israel. In doing so, I substantiate the main and supplementary arguments that I have indicated above. To conclude, I summarize the main contributions and conclusions of the research, and point at the possible inquiries which would enrich the academic knowledge on CO, citizenship and agency.

Chapter I

Historiographies of Conscientious Objection

CO to military service has been a recurring phenomenon throughout the history. While the early cases of objection had been mostly individual and marginal, CO became a collective phenomenon during the nation-state formation processes as the standing armies and the compulsory military conscription were enforced by the authorities. Before and during the early modern period, the acts of objections mostly stemmed from the religious teachings of the early Christians. From the WWI onwards, secular and political conscience diversified the picture. The emergence of CO as a collective phenomenon guided the academic curiosity. In the second half of the twentieth century, scholars defined different types of objections to the service and put forth early questions, conceptualizations and theories of the phenomenon. During the same period, CO was also recognized as a right in most of the Europe. Many European countries granted the right to CO first to the religiously-inspired objectors and later to the secular objectors. The U.S., on the other hand, abolished the compulsory conscription and transformed its army to a professional one. Consequently, CO, which was mostly performed in the form of draft resistance, ceased to exist. From the early 1990s onwards, UN and the Council of Europe recognized CO as a human right, guaranteed by the protection of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The legal recognition of CO weakened antimilitarist and objection movements and the scholarly works gradually decreased in many countries. The decrease of attention to the topic among the U.S. and European scholars, however, went hand in hand with the growing interest in different parts of the world. CO to military service emerged as a social movement and an academic topic in countries, such as Turkey, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan. Scholars questioned it from different theoretical, conceptual and methodological perspectives.

In this chapter, I aim at introducing a historiography of CO to military service by tracing specific historical junctures and events, legal documents and scholarly works on CO in the U.S., Europe, Turkey and Israel. In doing so, I seek to explain the historical, conceptual and legal emergence of the objection, and situate my research within this newly emerging field of inquiry in Turkey. How is CO questioned and conceptualized? How does the literature on CO emerge and change? How does writing on CO relate to historical and political contexts? What are the continuities and ruptures in the literature? I answer these questions by categorizing the main axes of the literature on CO. I first introduce the writing of CO in the U.S. and Europe. I then proceed to the literature on CO in Turkey. And later, I switch to the academic literature in Israel. To conclude, I situate my research within and beyond these axes of inquiries, and explain how this research contributes to the existing literature.

I.I. Writing conscientious objection: Early questions, conceptualizations and theories

First known cases of CO to the military and war came from the historic peace churches. The earliest group which denounced the warfare was the early Christians (Moskos and Chambers, 1993: 9). As the Christians were forced to serve in the military as of mid-second century, they refused to bear arms. In 274, Maximilianus, who was the son of a military man, became the first publicly known case of CO when he refused to serve because ‘he owed his first duty to the teachings of Christ’ (Kurlansky, 2006: 23). Like most of the Christian objectors, Maximilianus was a pacifist and denounced the warfare as an evil practice. Religion-inspired conscience drove most of the CO during the middle ages too. Those who refused to bear arms retreated to monasteries. Many monastic orders and sects, i.e. Franciscans and Cathars, rejected to learn warfare and killing. CO was predominantly practiced by the Protestant sects. The Anabaptists in Europe, Mennonites in Holland, Spiritualists and Dunkers in Germany, Brethrens, Amish, and Quakers in England were among those who refused to take part in the militaries and warfare (Moskos and Chambers 1993; Brown 2007; Carnahan 2011). In nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Jehovah’s Witnesses (JW) and Seventh-Day Adventists followed these religious sects. These fractions differed in their positions against the militaries. For instance, the Mennonites offered to raise money for the king to support the war, or Quakers refused to participate in the armies in any ways. However, they united in their objections to bear arms and some even managed to put in

practice their teachings for some period. Although repressive strategies against religiously-inspired objectors persisted throughout the history, the members of historic peace churches were relatively accommodated in the American colonies in the 19th century (Moskos and Chambers, 1993: 11). The Quakers managed to create a nonviolent colony in Pennsylvania. This experiment went on for a while until the Quakers ceased to have power in the Parliament, and the experiment ended up with the newly emerging government's adherence to the militaristic defense policies of the other colonies.

WWI signified a critical historical juncture in which the content and scope of objections were diversified. CO gradually became a collective phenomenon which was framed by a secular discourse and performed as acts of civil disobedience (Moskos and Chambers 1993; Bröckling 2009). As of 1917, many individuals and groups were organizing the anti-war and peace movements in the United States. In 1921, War Resisters International was established in Holland. In doing so, the secular objectors began to institutionalize their action against the military. During the WWII, 42,973 men refused to fight in Europe and in the U.S. The final years of the Cold War witnessed another wave of objections. This time, the professionals in the army joined the civilian dissent. The numbers of objectors increased even more during the Vietnam and Persian Gulf War. The anti-war dissents contributed to the end of compulsory conscription in the U.S. during the Vietnam War. Meanwhile, CO to military service was gradually incorporated into the laws and regulations in Europe. After the WWI, Denmark, Norway, Holland and Switzerland recognized the right to CO for the members of historic peace churches. In many cases, the authorities sought ways to accommodate objectors by offering them noncombatant military services. After the WWII, Germany experienced the most dramatic change, explicitly guaranteeing the right to CO in the 1949 Constitution. In the second half of the twentieth century, the secular and political objections were recognized in many European countries, and the alternative civilian service was enacted.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, CO became an internationally recognized right. In 1987, United Nations Commission on Human Rights took important steps to recognize the right to CO. The Commission defined CO as 'a legitimate exercise of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion'. In 1998, it set up the minimum basic

principles, such as duration, time limits for CO application and alternative service. The basic tenets were similar to those defined by the Council of Europe. The Commission stated that ‘conscientious objection derives from principles and reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, arising from religious, ethical, humanitarian or similar motives’ and urged states ‘not to discriminate amongst conscientious objectors on the basis of their particular beliefs’ (Stolvjik, 2005: 4). United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), too, addressed the right to CO in numerous occasions. In 1989, the European Parliament recognized CO as a human right as well. Council of Europe Recommendation R(87)8 stated that ‘anyone liable to conscription for military service who, for compelling reasons of conscience, refuses to be involved in the use of arms, shall have the right to be released from the obligation to perform such service’ (Stolvjik, 2005: 4). In 1990, the Organization for Security and Cooperation for Europe ‘agreed on introducing civilian non-punitive alternative service for conscientious objectors’ (Ibid: 2). From the 1990s onwards, the integration of the Eastern European countries to the European Union led to a further increase in the number of countries which recognize the right to CO. In 2000, CO was entered to the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Although the right to CO for professional soldiers is still an unresolved topic, Council of Europe widened the right to these groups in 2001.

The practice of CO preceded the scholarly literature. From different fields of research, scholars introduced conceptual and philosophical explanations of CO. Among these studies, three aspects of CO prevail: CO as an individual and private moral act, CO as a political act of civil disobedience, and CO as a right. These categories of analysis are not mutually exclusive; they may overlap. However, each refers to different qualities of objection. CO as a private and individual act refers to the action of an individual who refuses to serve in the barracks to safeguard his/her moral integrity in the face of wrongdoings. CO as an act of civil disobedience signifies collective action against the service, exercised in public, to promote social and political change. Finally, CO as a right focuses on the relation between morality and law, and prospects and limits for the accommodation of CO into the laws.

One of the earliest discussions on CO was introduced by Webb. Webb differentiates between CO as an individual act ‘to keep of oneself unspotted from evil’

and CO as a political act ‘to destroy the evil all together’ (Webb, 1917: 420). Arguing that conscientious action does not always come from ‘the intuitive moral judgment we call conscience’, he warns the authorities to differentiate between objections in order to give proper responses to each case, and advice them to recognize the exemption when the objector truly refers to his/her conscience while rejecting the orders. In Thoreau, CO refers both to an individual moral act and an act of civil disobedience. Thoreau never explicitly defines his actions as CO or civil disobedience; but scholars mainly classify his action as an individual act (Arendt 1971a; Herr 1974). Troubled by the American-Mexican War and slavery, Thoreau refused to pay taxes to the U.S. government in 1842. It is plausible to argue that Thoreau’s objection was first and foremost based on his moral conviction that the war and slavery are wrong. Referred to a higher law, he aimed to wash his hands off these policies which he considered immoral. That said his action also incorporated some aspects of civil disobedience as it is understood in the literature. Thoreau confronted the law, accepted the jail term for his action, and disseminated his ideas in the Lyceum lecture on ‘the right and duty of citizen in relation to government’ in 1848 and in his essay, entitled as *Resistance to Civil Government*, in 1846.

Other scholars make a clear distinction between these two categories (Arendt 1971a; Rawls 1971 [1999]; Raz 1979; Schinkel 2007). The Vietnam War and antiwar voices among the U.S. citizens influence the proliferation of scholarly works on CO and civil disobedience. Acknowledging that CO might be performed as a political act of civil disobedience, scholars nevertheless note that it is inherently a personal and nonpolitical act. In these accounts, CO refers to an act of a single individual who wants an exemption from the law, rather than a change in it, for his/her individual integrity. Among the most known critiques of Thoreau, Arendt, for example, defines CO as ‘unpolitical’ (Arendt, 1971a: 60). This stems from Arendt’s conceptualization of conscience as by-product of consciousness which connotes an element of witness within – a ‘two-in-one’ (Arendt, 1971b: 442). Divine, human or afterthought, the individual refers to something (the witness) within which says what not to do (Arendt, 1971b: 444). Childress’s account is also conducive to an individual interpretation of CO, pointing to the marks of appeal to conscience such as its personal and subjective nature, its relation to a standard of judgment, guilt, and sanction (Childress, 1979: 318-

321). Raz defines CO as ‘a private action by a person who wishes to avoid committing moral wrong by obeying a (totally or partially) morally bad law’ (Raz, 1979: 264). In Rawls, ‘conscientious refusal’ is not necessarily based on political principles either, as long as ‘it is not a form of address appealing to the sense of justice of the majority’ (Rawls, 1971 [1999]: 324). On the other hand, CO as an act of civil disobedience is ‘political’ since it is exercised in public, with a group of people, aiming to negotiate the terms of relations between the citizens and the state. Civil disobedience signifies ‘a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law, usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government’ (Rawls, 1971 [1999]: 364). Schinkel’s differentiation between personal-experiential and public level also refers to this distinction. Whereas the element of ultimate concern, the element of the witness and the element of intimacy constitute the bases of CO at the personal-experiential level, relationality between the individual, the authority and the audience, the public reasoning and justification of the act, and the willingness to accept the consequences of the act form the characteristics of the phenomenon at the public level (Schinkel, 2007: 500-529).

Be it an individual act or an act of civil disobedience, all these scholars discuss CO as a right yet to be accommodated by the authorities. Following Dworkin’s distinction between having a right to do something and doing the right thing for oneself, one may argue that scholars consider CO as a right in the second category. However, they differ in recognition of ‘doing what one thinks right’ as a right in the strong sense of the term. Merging the CO and the civil disobedience, Thoreau conceptualizes the phenomenon as one’s right and duty to oneself ‘because we should be men first, and subjects afterwards’ (Thoreau, 1846: 6). That said he does not deny the existence of the government. ‘As a citizen’, he calls for a ‘better government’ in which one’s right and duty to remain loyal to what s/he thinks right is recognized, even when individuals wish to remain aloof from the government. Therefore, in Thoreau, there should not be any obstacle to recognize CO, of any sort, within the laws. Any objection that stems from conscience embodies a right in the strong sense of the term. On the other hand, others stress the balance between the individual conviction and the common good. Raz, for example, argues that the room for the right to conscientious objection stems from humanism that advocates the protection of self-respect, individual autonomy and

pluralism (Raz, 1979: 281). However, he also claims that the right to CO must be acknowledged ‘only very sparingly and only in the absence of better ways of protecting freedom of conscience. The main device for protecting freedom of conscience is and must in any case be the avoidance of laws to which people are likely to have conscientious objection’ (Raz, 1979: 288). Urging a public policy that grants exemption to the objectors, Childress claims limiting the number of exemptions for conscience since the state cannot get enough servants in cases of significant numbers of objectors (Childress, 1979: 332). Dworkin also puts limits to objection, and claims that the governments must protect the right to follow one’s own judgment as long as it does not make great damage to other policies (Dworkin, 1978: 215). In these accounts, CO tends to signify an individual interruption to the law; and, when it becomes significant in numbers, is evaluated in its possible damages to the common good. Contra to these scholars, Arendt argues that CO as an act of civil disobedience not only signifies individual actions, but the claims of a group of individuals which acts as voluntary associations when individuals lack trust to the normal channels of change, or are worried about illegal and unconstitutional change (Arendt, 1971a: 74). Thus, she urges the U.S. government to acknowledge the objectors as pressure groups which should hold significant place in the ‘daily business of government’. Finally, defining conscience as a ‘blanket name for the personal governing principles to which a man is ultimately committed,’ Cohen (1968: 276) excludes the CO which is performed as an act of civil disobedience and which does not recognize any alternative civilian service from his discussion, and argues that, as an individual and subjective act, the right to CO must be recognized by the law, and its application must be extended to the selective and secular objectors because ‘if a man thinks that he ought never to participate in making war, then, whether objectively right or wrong in that belief, he is subjectively right not to do so’ (Cohen, 1968: 270).

Contemporary debates over CO and civil disobedience conceptualize the shortcomings of the above-cited classical accounts. Contra to Rawls, Brownlee (2012) argues that civil disobedience may be animated by individual moral conscience. Civil disobedience, in her framework, means ‘a conscientious communicative breach of the law motivated by steadfast, sincere, and serious, though possibly mistaken, moral commitment’ (Brownlee, 2012: 23-24). The main dividing line between CO and civil

disobedience is the latter's communicable and dialogic aspect (Ibid: 29-46). That said without an individual conscientious conviction, civil disobedience cannot be shaped. Others criticize Brownlee's morality-oriented approach to civil disobedience (Cooke 2016; Petherbridge 2016; Scheuerman 2016). Scheuerman (2014; 2015; 2016) aims at improving the liberal accounts of civil disobedience by focusing on the legal aspects of the recent acts of individuals, such as Snowden. Contra to the anti-legal turn in studies of civil disobedience, Scheuerman follows Rawls's legalistic approach and argues that the theory of civil disobedience should not take the principle of fidelity to rule of law out of sight. On the basis of Snowden's case, he introduces a more fine-tuned understanding of this principle which does not insist on the acceptance of the punishment as a precondition of the legitimacy of civil disobedience (Scheuerman, 2014: 611).

Other scholars follow the Arendtian path which 'understands civil disobedience as an intersubjective act that is played out in the public political sphere [...] as a form of voluntary association and as collective action' (Petherbridge, 2016: 976). For Markovitz, civil disobedience, or 'democratic disobedience', signifies a democracy-enhancing practice that may correct the democratic deficits in law and policies that threatens the democracy (Markovitz, 2005: 1902). From a republican perspective, he argues that citizens resort to disobedience to introduce the preferences and ideals that have been excluded by the political authorities. Smith (2011), on the other hand, introduces a deliberative approach, rather than a republican one. Drawing on a Habermasian public sphere, he defends civil disobedience 'as a mechanism for publicising issues that, because of the stifling effects of prevailing orthodoxies, receive insufficient attention in the public sphere' (Smith, 2011: 146). In face of deliberative inertia, civil disobedience may create cracks in the hegemonic discourses that dominate opinion- and will-formation in public sphere. Celikates (2016) puts forth a democratic and political understanding of civil disobedience which is not reducible to individual conscience – moral aspect – or fidelity to the rule of law – legal aspect. He problematizes the basic tenets of the acts, such as publicity, civility/non-violence, and the appeal to the majority's moral sentiments. Instead of defining civil disobedience as 'a form of conscientious protest of individual rights-bearers against governments and political majorities that transgress the limits established by constitutionally guaranteed

moral principles and values’, Celikates conceptualizes it as ‘a democratic practice of collective self-determination [...] to rigidifying tendencies of state institutions’ (Celikates, 2016: 988).

The philosophical approaches to CO are complemented by more empirical case studies. Scholars conceptualize different types of objection (religious, secular, selective, absolutist, etc.), focusing on their contents, motivations, and justifications. Historical, legal and institutional emergence and transformation of CO are analyzed in the context of various countries (Sturm 1983; Brown et al., 1985; Lippman 1990; Moskos and Chambers 1993; Major 1992, 2001; Takemura 2009). As the U.S. and European countries witness the anti-war social movements, scholars discuss the limits and possibilities for the legal recognition of CO, and explain the structural causes of its emergence, evolution and transformation as a social movement (Cain 1970; Chambers and Moskos 1993; Lainer-Vos 2006).

With the legal recognition of CO in many of the European countries and in the U.S., studies on the topic significantly decrease in numbers. With the enactment of the professional armies in many Western countries, the debates over CO shift to the objection of the active-duty soldiers. Academic debates in the U.S. discuss CO and militarism with regard to the CO of professional soldiers and the consequences of all-volunteer professional army for the military composition, militarization, and antimilitarist and anti-war movements. Scholars decipher the ways in which militarism and antimilitarist resistance are shaped by the changing historical, political, legal, and institutional frameworks. Gutmann and Lutz (2010) point at the new strategies of the state and military elites to recruit the would-be soldiers from mainly disadvantaged groups and relatively poor segments of the society with the professional army. They argue that, beside idealistic reasons, the individuals enlist in the military as a reason of their financial aims. This, they claim, means that the dissent in the military can be explained by ‘the power of military advertising and the false front of the recruiting office’ (Gutmann and Lutz, 2010: 194). The soldiers, who come to realize the discrepancy between the discourses and practices of the state and military elites and the actual conditions of war, refuse the military. In this respect, joining the military becomes a radicalizing experience. Their antiwar and anti-military protests are shaped by their experiences within the military and in the war zones, such as Afghanistan and

Iraq. The process of volunteer army further shapes and diversifies the activism against military, militarism, and militarization. CO and the anti-war voices increasingly come from those soldiers who have participated in the war zones.

The decreasing attention on CO in the U.S. and European academia coincides with the increasing number of studies on CO in Turkey and Israel. In Turkey, scholars begin writing about CO from the mid-2000s onwards. In Israel, although there is an edited book on CO that was published back in 1975, scholars turn their attention to the phenomenon from the 1990s onwards. I will now turn to the emergence and transformation of the literature on CO in these countries in order to reflect on the continuities and ruptures in the academic debates between different contexts. As a matter of fact, scholars follow above-cited studies by questioning CO through legal, theoretical, conceptual and historical analyses. However, they also transform the former literature with the changing debates in social and political theory and the changing acts of objections. They put forth new categories of analysis, theoretical frameworks and empirical cases through which CO is questioned and conceptualized.

I.II. Writing conscientious objection in Turkey

Since 1990, there has been an increasing pool of research focusing on the CO in countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, South Africa, and Israel (Peri 1993; Linn 1995; Linn 1996; Keren 1998; Epstein 1998; Reznik 2002; Altınay, 2004; Selek, 2004; Can, 2005; Can, 2009; Moon 2005; Choi 2006; Cho 2007; Sevinç, 2006; Eren, 2006; Gürcan, 2006; Gürcan, 2007; Çınar, 2007; Çınar, 2009; Brett, 2009; Schneider, 2009; Boyle, 2009; Üçpınar, 2009; Nal, 2010; Kasımoğlu, 2013; Conway 2004; Conway 2008; Conway 2012; Lin 2010; Soo-Hyun 2012; Kwon 2013). These discussions have similarities with the previous research on CO, but also differ in terms of their theoretical and methodological frameworks which adopt to the changing scholarly debates, as well as to the newly emerging objections. While the philosophical and legal accounts of CO overlap with the interests of previous researches, feminist, critical and ethnographic analyses of CO flourish in these geographies.

Turkey witnessed the emergence of scholarly interest on CO about a decade ago. Almost a decade and a half after the first declared objectors came out in Sokak and Güneş magazines. The antimilitarists organized several national and international

meetings and workshops in the early 1990s, which initiated a ‘learning process’ for the activists and the scholars. The curiosity about the CO came along with an interest on the military, militarism and militarization in Turkey. The studies on CO were initiated by the feminist scholars who study militarism, war and peace (Altınay, 2004; Selek, 2004). In her study, Altınay (2004) traces then fifteen years of the struggle, discussing the meaning, possibilities and difficulties of the objection and its relation to the myth of military-nation. Through an ethnographic account of the objectors’ self-narratives, Altınay questions the process through which objectors frame their individual and political positions, the ways in which they form their antimilitarist language and tradition for political action, their forms of resistance, and the mechanisms through which the state and military respond to the challenge. In a parallel vein, based on oral history, Selek (2004) questions the discourses and practices of the objectors and give an account of unifying and dividing lines during the organizational efforts and the limits and possibilities for an anti-war movement in Turkey.

From mid-2000s onwards, the number of scholarly work on CO has increased significantly. The first international conference on CO was organized by the Human Rights Association at İstanbul Bilgi University in 2007. In the edited volume that came out of the conference, CO is studied through historical, legal, political and philosophical approaches. However, the main increase in numbers of studies stemmed from the rise of legal studies. In 2006, the ECtHR convicted Turkey in Ülke’s case, the first objector who endured long terms of imprisonment. This created a significant impact on the public discussion in a period when Turkey’s accession to the EU was widely debated. In this line of inquiry, the scholars compare the national legislation on the compulsory military service, alternative civilian service, and the right to CO with the legislation in the EU countries, as well as in other countries and in the international bodies; they conceptualize different types of objections, and question whether CO is a human right (Can, 2005; Can, 2009; Sevinç, 2006; Eren, 2006; Gürcan, 2006; Gürcan, 2007; Çınar 2007; Çınar, 2009; Brett, 2009; Schneider, 2009; Boyle, 2009; Üçpınar, 2009; Nal, 2010; Kasımoğlu, 2013). Can (2005, 2009) is the first who pinpoints the constitutional aspect of the CO in Turkey while criticizing the ECtHR’s reluctance to reform its interpretation. Drawing on the 1982 Constitution and laws, he argues that the Turkish Constitution is open to the exercise and manifestation of the right to CO and

urges the legislator to recognize it in cases where the objection includes the refusal of any armed action/service, an alternative civilian service, nonviolent action, and a genuine and sincere motivation.¹ By doing so, he puts forth the limits and possibilities for the phenomenon within the parameters of Turkish legislation. Contra to these scholars, Eren (2006) seeks to explain the non-recognition of the right to CO in Turkey by relying on the case laws of the Turkish Military Court of Appeals and the international agreements in which Turkey takes part. He stresses the fact that the wordings, as well as the precedents, of the ECtHR and UNHRC do not point at the recognition of the right to CO.

From a comparative legal perspective, Sevinç (2006) pinpoints the differences in the laws and regulations of the compulsory military service in EU, Russia, Israel, Turkey, and some ex-Soviet Republics. Tracing the historicity of compulsory military service, alternative civilian service and CO in Europe and analyzing the laws and regulations on compulsory military service and CO in Turkey, he proposes the enactment of alternative civilian service to solve the problem of inconsistency between the 1982 Constitution and laws. In a parallel vein, Çınar (2007, 2009) examines how the right to CO is regulated in the EU countries and in other countries and stresses the discrepancies between the Turkish, EU, and other international bodies' legislations. Defining CO as an internationally recognized right, he urges Turkey to comply with the necessities of international treaties in which it takes part. Other scholars follow him and demonstrate where Turkey stands vis-à-vis the ECtHR and UNHRC legislation, denounce the criminalization of the phenomenon, and propose the necessary steps to prevent human rights violations (Kardaş, 2006; Brett, 2009; Boyle, 2009; Schneider, 2009; Üçpınar, 2009; Gürcan, 2006; Gürcan, 2007; Nal, 2010; Altundiş, 2012; Kasımoğlu, 2013; Yıldırım, 2010). Scholars define the ECtHR's decisions on Ülke and Erçep as important steps for Turkey and, in the light of the case laws of the Court, argue that the right to CO is a human right, protected by the Convention. The reluctance to reform is explained as a result of the lack of political will, the current state of public opinion which prioritizes the 'common good' to the rights and freedoms, and the inherently militaristic nature of the state, judiciary and society in the country (Boyle, 2009; Can, 2009; Üçpınar, 2009).

¹ Retrieved from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/quotvicdani-retquot-anayasal-bir-hak-mi-872774/> on February 12th, 2016.

Another important line of inquiry is the divide between CO and civil disobedience. Although there are small differences in conceptualization, scholars unanimously conceptualize CO in Turkey as an act of civil disobedience (Kılınç, 2009; Altundiş, 2012; Başkır and Erdem, 2012; Mızrak, 2015). Kardaş (2006) makes a sociological account of the state and the military and puts forth CO as an antimilitarist act of civil disobedience. Drawing on Arendt's distinction, Kılınç, too, suggests classifying CO in Turkey as civil disobedience, rather than CO, performed as 'a deliberate, publicly declared and principled breach of law [...] often informed by the language of a radical "anti-militarism"' (Kılınç, 2009: 61). Through a reading of Arendt, Başkır and Erdem (2012) also argues that CO in Turkey helps problematize the grey area between the CO and the civil disobedience, that is to say the area between moral and political spheres. They claim that the phenomenon points to the transitivity of the concepts and the importance of factuality in questioning them. Finally, Mızrak (2015) differentiates between different categories of CO in order to assess whether or not the phenomenon can be considered as an act of civil disobedience. According to her analysis, whereas COs of Jehovah's Witnesses are not categorized as acts of civil disobedience, the majority of objections are conceptualized as civil disobedience. Other theoretical approaches (Parla 2009; Çol 2011; Erol 2013) delineate the ontological aspects of CO. For instance, Çol (2011) develops a critical discussion of CO to military service in accordance with Stirner's theory of ego and Foucault's conceptualization of modern subject, and comes up with an ontological theory of the objector's subjectivity. Another study is conducted by Erol (2013) who frames his research within the field of international relations. Drawing on critical security studies and Ranciere's theory of uncounted, Erol (2013) considers CO as an example of emancipatory-critical security thinking and practice that transform the ways in which the politics is thought of and done. Analyzing the discourses and practices of the objectors, he conceptualizes the objection movement as an agent of the idea of security as emancipation, and deciphers the corporeal acts of resistance through which objectors become agents of social and political change.

With the emergence of women and gay objectors, studies focus on the ways in which sex, gender, and sexuality are articulated into the discourses, practices and representation of CO. As Enloe puts it, the feminist curiosity about objection is a

political innovation which traces ‘the military conscription to its roots in militarism’ (Enloe, 2009: 87). From standpoint to poststructural approaches, scholars give feminist accounts of the objection movement, and the gendered nature of militarism, nation and the state. Altınay (2009) defines the claims of women objectors as a resistance against the ways in which women are positioned within the myth of the military-nation; namely obedient wives, sacrificing mothers and, in rare occasions, proud warriors. More than a declamatory support for the male objectors, she conceptualizes the public declarations of women objectors as political performances which stress the antimilitarist and antiwar conceptualizations of CO and make visible the ways in which gendered hierarchies of militarism and nationalism are embedded within the state, military, society, dissident groups and in our everyday lives. Through a discourse analysis of the women’s COs, Acara (2010) questions why and how women come out as objectors and how they oppose the male dominated definition of militarism and CO. She argues that women objectors extend the meaning of nonviolence, and construct a powerful gendered critique of the state, military and different social movements. Her contribution is valuable since it compares men and women objectors’ discourses, and deciphers the influence of feminism among the male objectors. In a parallel vein, scholars (Aktaş, 2009; Sancar, 2009; Altınay 2013) draw on masculinity studies to explain military, militarism, and CO through the notion of hegemonic masculinity. Based on semi-structured and in-depth interviews, Aktaş (2009) analyzes to what extent and how the male objectors challenge the hegemonic masculinity in the society. Focusing on the ‘pink reports’, Biricik (2009) brings about the question of gay sexuality in the institutional framework of the military. He deciphers the ways in which militarism excludes gay men from the barracks, and how these men put forth their agencies to avoid the service. His contribution is valuable, in that it brings up the question of grey refusal among the gay men without naming it as such.

Beside sex gender and sexuality, CO in its relation to categories of identity/difference is increasingly questioned by scholars with a focus on the citizenship. Although there are still few studies, scholars question how objectors transform the changing nature of citizenship in Turkey (Keyman, İşyar and Rumelili 2011; Başkır and Erdiñç 2012; Kesikli 2013; Alkan and Zeybek 2014). Başkır and Erdiñç (2012) stress the ways in which the objectors aim to transform the duty-based

social contract between citizens and state to a more egalitarian one. Keyman, İşyar and Rumelili (2011) defines CO as a multilayered act of citizenship which not only demand extended citizenship right from the Turkish state but also enact the objectors as European citizens. In their framework, litigation at the ECtHR level is considered not only a strategic choice, but a constitutive aspect of the identities of objectors as citizens which responsabilize and criticize the European institutions. On the other hand, Erdem (2012) claims that the ‘sacrificial mode of dissension’ eventually leads to the reluctant utilization of the international human rights law against the Turkish state.

There are also introduction of new conceptualizations of CO by historians. Züchrer (2009) initiates this line of inquiry through an analysis of refusing to serve in the late Ottoman Empire and early republican period. Without naming as such, his inquiry into different forms of objecting the service brings about the articulation of ‘grey objection’ into the studies of CO in Turkey. Alkan and Zeybek (2014) and Esmer (2012) further this inquiry by pointing the acts of Kurdish ‘bandits’ and Molokans during the nation-state formation period. I believe that these analyses are valuable to transform the ways in which we conceptualize the dissent to military service; yet they need to be complemented with the contextualization of the phenomenon in comparison with other conceptualizations of CO in different geographies and time. Such an inquiry is necessary to understand how these different processes of subjectivity formation bring about change. In this dissertation, I aim at questioning CO in its relation to various categories of identity/difference and, albeit to a lesser extent, to grey objections in order to shed light on the historicity of dissent to military service, its difference to declared objection, and the differences in the agencies of objectors in creating change.

I.III. Writing conscientious objection in Israel

Similar to the literature in Turkey, the individual and collective acts of objection preceded the scholarly curiosity in Israel. Although Israel has witnessed the acts of objection since the pre-state period, the academic interest first emerged in 1970s, and flourished in the 1990s and the 2000s. The literature first and foremost questions the meanings, definitions and forms of objection to military service. Drawing both on empirical and theoretical frameworks, scholars aim at defining what CO is. The first book appeared in 1975. Edited by Blatt, Davis, and Kleinbaum, it examines the evolution of the discourses of CO since the first years of the State of Israel until the

early 1970s. Drawing on in-depth interviews with various Jewish objectors, the authors assess the discourses of objection in their relations to Zionism, militarism, statehood and Judaism. Epstein (1998), too, focuses on the early years of the State of Israel and discusses the intellectual, religious and spiritual origins of Israeli pacifism. Based on in-depth interviews and the bulletins of the Israeli War Resisters Association, he analyzes the social, cultural, historical and political origins of the first generation of Israeli Jewish objectors, their claims, their discourses and practices. He stresses the political agenda to establish peaceful cooperation between Jews and Arabs as the main line of CO. Keren (1998) also focuses on CO during the early nation-state period by analyzing the case of Amnon Zichroni. He analyzes CO in the light of three ideal types, prompted by Thoreau, Dworkin and Rawls. He argues that real negotiations are context-bound. Actors employ different types of arguments, make strategic shifts between these three ideal types, and adjust their discourses in accordance with the historical, social, and political context in which they perform their objections (Keren, 1998: 124). Keren claims that ‘the effective use of the Thoreau argument requires a pluralist context, the Dworkin argument a clientalist context and the Rawls argument a contractual one’ (Keren, 1998: 135).

The focus on early objectors of the 1950s, who have pacifist and total understandings of objection, was later shifted to the selective objectors in the 1970s as these groups came to constitute the largest group among the objectors in Israel. Many studies do not mention the first attempts to organize an objection movement during the establishment of the State of Israel. Interestingly, such a historical analysis comes to the fore only in the 2010s (Hermann 2010; Simoni 2013). Hermann (2010) transforms the historiography of the establishment of the State of Israel by pointing out the antimilitarist and pacifist voices during that period through analyses of Ihud and Israeli War Resisters Association, and through two figures, Joseph Abileah and Nathan Hofshi. The article sheds light on the existence of groups and individuals who promoted the ideological option of antimilitarism and/or pacifism in the period preceding the birth of the State of Israel and during its first decade. Similarly, Simoni discusses the history, organization, networks and political outlook of Israel’s first declared objectors in the 1950s, and the challenges they confront, both individually and as a group (Simoni, 2013: 73). In doing so, she demonstrates how ‘the history of the

first Israeli COs break a number of assumptions, albeit contradictory ones: on the one hand it strengthens the image of Israel as a militaristic country; on the other, it shows that institutions were in Israel more tolerant towards COs than other countries; it shows that COs were the supporters of a non ethnically homogenous society and, most of all, that, even in a decade such as the 1950s, a different and deep voice was trying to make itself heard' (Simoni, 2013: 73).

Studies inquire on conceptual, historical-institutional and political explanations of CO, its motivations and justifications, and its meaning for citizenship from the 1990s onwards. Peri (1993) evaluates the underlying historical context, discourses and practices of Israeli governments to analyze the legal developments and the evolution of CO. He considers phases of objections by differentiating the early years of the State of Israel, post-1967 years, post-Lebanon War and Intifada, and explains how the practices of Israeli regime in different social and political contexts lead to the emergence of different types of objections. Linn (1995) also elaborates on the types of CO in terms of motivations and classifies three aspects of the phenomena: moral, political and personal/pragmatic. In her account, the motivation behind the act is essential for the assessment of the punishment. Linn (1996) also gives an account of the profiles of the objectors in different periods. She questions socio-psychological incentives behind the objections, and further links them to the moral development of the individuals on the basis of Kohlberg's model.

Other studies mainly draw on historical-institutional factors in explaining the emergence of selective objection. Based on in-depth interviews, Helman (1999) demonstrates how conscientious objectors reinterpret the hegemonic discourses of citizenship and war. Through the discourses of participation, involvement and obligations, the objectors put forth alternative conceptions of citizenship which opens up a civic space to reformulate the meanings of citizenship obligations and national security. Therefore, Helman points to the enabling discourses of citizenship, which reformulates the social contract between the individual and the state from an unconditional to a partial one. In doing so, the objectors, argues Helman, aim to create a new political identity and a new right in the Israeli society. Weiss (2011) demonstrates how hegemonic discourses, as well as privilege, work in different ways, that is, elite dedicated soldiers are most likely to resist the state through military refusal by virtue of

their state-encouraged investment in the national narrative and the state-sponsored sacrificial economy of military service. Similar to Helman's account, this demonstrates that acceptance of and identification with the state supported hegemonic ideal does not preclude resistance to the state. Because these individuals had the most uncompromising identification with the heroic and mythic sacrifice, the discrepancy between the ideal and their experience causes a moral crisis. Thus, the sacrificial moral economy and not the state as supersubject, or state policy as such, is the ideal that is inculcated in these young people. Levy (2011) also argues that 'the status of each group in the military plays an important role in patterning the mode of collective action' (Levy, 2011: 58). He claims that the social status, one may also say privilege, cannot explain the collective action that actors choose 'unless it is correlated with the resources offered in the military arena' (Levy, 2011: 58). When the republican contract is violated, these actors employ their resources, which are functions of their military status, in order to contest the discourses and practices of the IDF.

In a parallel vein, Friedman (2006) analyzes the institutional discourses and practices of groups, such as Yesh Gvul, and puts forth the legal-institutional framework that enables the selective objectors to pursue their cases. Specifically, he questions how selective objectors make use of competing sources of authority as part of their argumentation in just war theory tradition. Rival religious, political and secular allegiances are employed to justify selective objection in the IDF. Again based on an analysis of selective objectors, Reznik (2002) considers the emergence of objection in terms of a counter-thrust to the hegemonic culture represented by Labor Movement. Comparing Jewish Underground and CO movement in Israel, he argues that since the emergence of Likud to power and the signing of peace treaty with Egypt, a new political culture has emerged in Israel. On the basis of Gramsci's hegemony, he argues that the emergence of selective objectors signifies a substantive change, typing a new, post-hegemonic political culture that 'expanded the repertoire of ideas, identity, and citizenship concepts, and patterns of political participation' (Reznik, 2002: 361). In his account, objectors signify a post-militarist stance in the relationship between state, military, and society. A much broader institutional analysis is conducted by Zemlinskaya (2008). Zemlinskaya (2008) compares Yesh Gvul, Courage to Refuse, Shiministim, and New Profile in order to sketch the trajectory of CO and draft

resistance in Israel. Following the previous studies, she highlights the profiles of the members, the discourses and practices they employ, and the types of refusals they construct. In doing so, she contends that there are two different critical discourses and patterns of refusal within the Israeli society. In her account, these signify a transformation from contractual militarism to anti-militarism and from Zionism to post-Zionism.

With the emergence of total objectors, antimilitarists and women objectors, studies question CO in its relations to sex, gender, race and ethnicity in the 2000s (Segal 2008; Firro 1999, 2001; Gaynor 2006; Rimalt 2007; Mazali 2003, 2004, 2007, 2012; Cohen 2010; Natanel 2012). The political campaigns of women objectors go hand in hand with the efflorescence of scholarly works on feminist interpretations of militarism. Segal (2008) questions the link between gender and militarism through the emergence of the New Profile. She investigates the cost of militarism, the military nature of the Israeli society and its links to racism and sexism. In a parallel vein, drawing on the military budget and the number of sexual harassment cases targeting women in the IDF, Mazali (2003, 2012) claims that the cost of maintaining the security state leads to quantitative and qualitative costs to both Jewish and Palestinian populations. She further delineates the boundaries of the gendered division of labor in maintaining militarism in the country (Mazali, 2007). In this perspective, “‘boys must be boys,” and women and children are constructed as objects of protection’ (Mazali, 2004: 22). She draws on the activities of New Profile, and demonstrates how the organization questions the education, the internalization of gender roles, and mass media to decipher the inherent militarization process that goes on in the country, and to create a ‘truly civic space in Israeli political culture’ (Mazali, 2007: 304). Mazali further demonstrates the classical distribution of militarized gendered roles within the objection movements (Mazali, 2004: 23). Similarly, Rimalt (2007) investigates the process by which the inherent constraints of the contemporary legal discourse promoting gender equality masculinize women’s CO. Moreover, Natanel (2012) evaluates the efficacy of feminist resistance in the organized refusal movement. Through an ethnographic research on the experiences of feminist conscientious objectors, Natanel makes visible significant tensions in the objection movement in Israel; namely the militarized understanding of political voice, the position of privilege

and the potential elision of feminist agendas under the priority of agendas against occupation. In doing so, she argues that resistance may be considered both multiple and a diagnostic of power, allowing activists not only to envision new avenues for social change but also to recognize their constraints.

Moreover, scholars focus on the ethnically diverse structure of the resistance to military service. In this line of inquiry, Firro (1999, 2001) traces the military conscription policy of Druze male community, and how this policy is implemented so as to divide and rule the Palestinian Arab population in Israel. He claims that the negotiation between Druze sheiks and Zionists in the early years of the state formation contributed to the establishment of Druze as a distinct nationality, different from Arabs. He reveals the dissenting voices to such a strategy in the Druze community since the 1950s and the 1960s. In his account, resistance to military draft constitutes one aspect of these protests. Similarly, Cohen (2010) analyzes the negotiations and bargains between Zionists and Druze sheiks during the enactment of the military conscription for Druzes in the early nation-state period. Without naming as CO, Cohen puts forth the resistance to the military conscription, as well as to other policies of the Jewish and Druze leaders. These studies give valuable historical insights on Druze resistance to the IDF, there no studies focusing on CO to the IDF among the Druze community in Israel.

Scholars further analyze the legal framework of CO in Israel. Although the legal and institutional structure of the military law has been a recurrent theme in some of the above-cited works, it is Rimalt (2007) and Aviram (2008) who base their researches mainly on the legal and judicial discourses. Aviram (2008) analyzes the legal and judicial discourse through the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, and demonstrates how the courts divide CO on the basis of a distinction between individual act and an act of civil disobedience. She claims that the courts aim to maintain legitimacy for its decisions by reducing complex personalities and situations into monolithic, mutually exclusive categories, and they facilitate workable classifications of the offenders for normative purposes. In doing so, they preserve the ethos of military service and discourage ideological dissent. From an anthropological perspective, Weiss also points to the ambivalent classification of CO by the state and military authorities. Weiss (2012) discusses pathologization of pacifism by the Conscientious Committee. She argues that the liberal pacifist applicants' principled objections to violence, which

challenge the state and the hegemonic moral order, are rejected by the military review board while pacifist CO embodied in visceral revulsion to violence does not challenge the state and moral order and is thus granted exemptions. In doing so, the Committee depoliticizes pacifism and the actions of those pacifists who engage politically with the state and the military. Rimalt (2004) analyzes the limitations of legal framework for the women objectors. She claims that, although the High Court's decision to imprison women selective objectors in 2004 contributes women draft resisters to acquire a voice, it creates the masculinization of women's draft resistance. In doing so, the redefinition of the citizenship in a non-militarized vein through women's former participation in the alternative civilian service is undermined. On the other hand, Hofnung (2009) demonstrates that the national litigation is not necessarily a false premise for the legal recognition of CO. Analyzing the role of national courts in settling the civil-military disputes, he shows that the High Court of Israel goes through an interesting transformation, from a court enforcing universal conscription policy to an arbitration tribunal used by groups and individuals to attain personal rights and career ambitions. Objectors challenge the conscription policies of the IDF as the High Court of Justice liberalizes its standing doctrine in the 1980s.

I.IV. Situating the research

CO to military service and war is a form of dissent which dates back to the third century. Whereas religiously-inspired moral convictions constitute the nature of the CO in the pre-modern era, CO is later constructed along secular and/or political convictions. Objection gradually becomes a social movement with campaigns and political claims, and is institutionalized through associations such as War Resisters International. This activism initiates the academic curiosity in the second half of the twentieth century in the U.S. and Europe. Mainly based on the political theory, scholars define the boundaries of CO by questioning its justifications, and its normative and practical implications. They develop conceptual schemes to differentiate the meanings and types of CO, its relation to civil disobedience, morality and politics, and explain what CO means for citizenship, political decision-making and law.

As we approach to the late twentieth century, objection is enacted as a right in many European countries and recognized by international and supranational organizations, such as UN and EU. The right is granted first to those from historic

peace churches and later to secular objectors. In most of these countries, the practice is to offer an alternative civilian service to those who refuse to serve in the barracks. With these changes in Europe and the transmission to the professional army in the U.S., both public and scholarly attention on the phenomenon decreases. CO is now discussed in the context of professional soldiers and in its relation to the anti-war movements in the U.S. The relative fall of the U.S. and European academic curiosity, however, goes hand in hand with a revival of the interest on CO in countries such as Turkey, Israel, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan. The practice precedes the academic works here as well, and the writing of objection is mainly precipitated by the legal struggles that the objectors perform. The literatures on CO in Turkey and Israel pursue legal, historical and conceptual analyses of CO. Many studies differentiate CO as an individual act and CO as an act of civil disobedience and, in both countries, scholars focus on its civil disobedient character. In Turkey, scholars refer to the early generation of declared objectors. Legal studies compare Turkey within the UN and EU legislation and explain the prospects and limits for the right to CO in the Turkish law amid Turkey's EU accession process. In Israel, there is a much wider literature on CO, with relatively few legal studies. As a reason of the institutional reform on CO, these studies discuss the ways in which CO is constructed by the Conscientious Committee, the IDF and the military courts. The objection is mainly analyzed within the framework of selective objectors from Ashkenazi backgrounds. Legal studies give valuable insights on legal and institutional change the objectors bring about but fail to acknowledge its social and political aspects. There are few yet growing studies on CO and identity. Scholars explain the objectors' reasons, motivations and claims, and question their discourses and practices of citizenship. They question CO in its relations to various categories of identity/difference in both countries. These are mainly framed within feminist studies of CO. In both countries, there is scant attention to other social groups, including ethnic, national and religious minorities. Scholars predominantly focus on the declared objections of certain groups, excluding the declared and grey objections of others. To explain how, through which mechanisms or to what extent the objectors become agents of change, there is a need for a comparative analysis of various subjectivities, claims and goals within and between countries in different time periods. It is through such an inquiry that we may grasp the nature, substance and scope of the change the objectors bring about.

With this study, I seek to make one theoretical and one methodological contribution to the literature. Theoretically, I frame my analysis within the acts of citizenship approach. Methodologically, I conduct a comparative-historical analysis of CO in Turkey and in Israel. I argue that the acts of citizenship approach must incorporate an intersectional theory of subjectivity and a comparative methodology to fully understand the change that the objectors bring about. I extend the acts of citizenship agendas on subjectivities and claim-making through a feminist and comparative analysis between different periods and geographies. A comparison on Turkey and Israel remains as an unexplored phenomenon in the literature, except one master thesis (Belder 2013). Comparative insight is only incorporated by legal scholars. However, these studies remain descriptive, explaining the legal framework without contextualizing it within its historical, social and political context. Moreover, these studies make their comparisons between lagged historical periods of different countries which do not have much in common. My comparative perspective relies on Mill's method of difference and in doing so seek to make a rigorous analysis of similar cases with different outcomes. A comparative-historical perspective also sheds light on the unifying points and cleavages among various groups of objectors, and helps to acquire a cumulative knowledge on the nature of the phenomenon. It demonstrates the variations in types and forms of objections; how these are shaped by historical, legal and political contexts; and through which mechanisms they transform the military legislation, discourses and practices.

Chapter II

Theoretical Framework

‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past’ (Marx, 1869: 10).

How do social movements transform the world in which they live? From various theoretical and methodological approaches, scholars have been asking this question in order to understand the extent to which the agents create a change in the existing structures, such as state, military, citizenship, and so forth. This question becomes even more interesting when it is asked in the context of the weak, repressed and marginalized movements, with relatively less power and radical agendas, which operate in the social and political contexts that impede their agencies. In this dissertation, I ask how such social movements become political actors when the very structures, which they aim to change, impede their capacities in the context of CO to military service. Specifically, I question how the objectors become the agents of change in the contexts where military, militarism and militarization affect their capacity to act negatively. This question guides my theoretical leanings. I argue that the agency of the weak is not fully grasped by the structural theories of social movements and citizenship. Scholars need to incorporate an agency-focused theory to understand the change that the marginalized groups bring about. In this chapter, I first trace the historical trajectories of the citizenship and social movement theories with respect to structure/agency debate. After demonstrating several shortcomings of the systemic and the early constructivist theories of action, I argue that the change that the objectors put to the fore is better grasped by the acts of citizenship approach. However, this necessitates extending the acts of citizenship approach’s agenda on political subjectification. I argue that the feminist theory in general and the intersectionality approach in particular give valuable insights to question how multiple, multilayered and intersectional identifications co-construct

new political subjectivities. I claim that the activist citizen is not a monolithic entity but an intersectional subjectivity with conflicts and contradictions. I argue that the activist citizen, as well as the members of social movements, situated at the intersections of various socicocultural, economic and political identifications, such as sex, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship, religion, etc., and the intersectional dialogue between these identifications diversifies subjectivities, claims and goals of the activist citizens. This, I argue, creates many possibilities and conflicts for collective action. New social movements, their claims and goals emerge through series of negotiations and bargaining at various levels. In other words, the emergence of new social movements and collective identity depend on sustaining a creative and innovative dialogue between conflicting discourses, claims and tactics that different identifications lead to.

I define political subjectification as an embodied and reflexive process in and through which the activist citizens negotiate multiple and multilayered identifications at the individual and collective levels and with multiple actors, i.e. state, military, society and social movements. I argue that incorporating the feminist intersectional theory not only extends the acts of citizenship approach but also problematizes its certain assumptions. A feminist curiosity on subjectivity problematizes the implicit assumption of the acts of citizenship approach that relates political agency to voice. Drawing on the insights of intersectionality theories, I claim that the activist citizens are situated at multiple structural and political intersectionalities that differentiate the ways in which voice affects the agencies. The silent acts of citizenship may indeed create new political subjectivities and push for social, political, legal and institutional change and the activism through voice does not always leads to desirable political outcomes. My inquiry into the women and grey objectors indicates that the acts of citizenship approaches must problematize the dichotomy between silence and voice in questioning agency.

The chapter proceeds in four parts. It will first summarize social movement and citizenship literatures that aim at introducing structural, systemic and causal determinants of political action. The second section will be consecrated to the agency-focused approaches and will summarize the analytical categories that these approaches come up with in order to explain political change. Then, it will situate my framework

within the acts of citizenship approach to understand the unexpected change that the objectors bring about in highly militarized contexts. The chapter will later proceed to the intersectionality literature to substantiate the processes of subjectivity formation and to shed light on the negotiation, coalition-building and conflict within and between various categories of identity/difference. The chapter will end with a theory of human agency as an embodied and reflexive process of becoming that is situated yet open to creation and innovation.

II.I. Quest for a grand theory of action: Systemic theories of social movements and citizenship

The early theories of collective behavior conceptualize the dissent as spontaneous, unorganized, non-institutionalized and irrational forms of political action (Le Bon 1897; Smelser 1962; Feierabend and Feierabend 1966; Gurr 1970). They prioritize structures over agencies, and link them to political action through emotional, affective and psychological processes. Scholars argue that the dissent emerges as structural conduciveness or strains form or activate citizens' beliefs on the problems, their causes and their solutions. Individuals and social groups feel anxiety, fear, hostility, fantasy, frustration or aggression, and mobilize under precipitating events, situations, or persons to correct their discontent and grievances within the regimes in which they take part (Aslanidis 2012). More recent literatures on social movements, i.e. the resource mobilization and the political process theories, emerge as a critique to the basic characteristics of these early theories. That said they follow the structural and causal understandings of their predecessors. The resource mobilization theorists put forth availability of resources, preexisting organizations of preference structures and the role of organizations and networks as the main determinants of political action (Oberschall 1973; Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kerbo 1982; Jenkins 1983). Social movement activity is related to resource aggregation, entrepreneurs, organizations, costs and rewards which depend on the structure of regime and the activities of political authorities (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1216). In a parallel vein, the proponents of the political process theories introduce the concept of political opportunity/threat structures to explain the dissent and political action (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978). They claim that 'elements in the environment impose certain constraints on political activity or open avenues for it' (Eisinger, 1973: 11-12).

These structural and macro-level processes are linked to political action through the rationality assumption. Unlike the early theories of collective behavior, scholars emphasize that the dissent is a rational and organized phenomenon which ‘is not markedly different from other forms of institutionalized behavior’ (Braun and Koopmans 2014). Both resource mobilization and political process theories assume that individuals and groups are rational actors. In the resource mobilization theories, the agents are able to see available resources, calculate costs and benefits, and mobilize the masses. In the political process theories, they are further able to seize ‘openings, weak spots, barriers, and resources of the political system itself’ (Eisinger, 1973: 12). In these frameworks, the agents are supposed to see the political opportunities and threats and to calculate the costs and benefits of their collective action objectively. The agents act as the presumed benefits of their action outweighs its costs. Their behaviors are strategic and have specific targets, such as institutions, groups or laws. Political change occurs insofar as the agents succeed in transforming these targets in accordance with their goals within the enabling and limiting conditions of the structural factors.

The resource mobilization and the political process theories construct the grand theories of the dissent and political action, aspiring for predictability, certainty and systemic knowledge that could explain citizens’ mobilization in diverse historical and cultural settings (Bleiker, 2004: 115). And, to a certain extent, they are successful in such an inquiry. They explain the anticipated, ordinary and patterned ways of protest and claim making. However, the quest for predictability leads to deterministic and static models, reluctant to conceptualize variation and change in the forms of dissent and political action in different time and places. With the cultural turn in social sciences, scholars begin to conceptualize the agential factors to overcome the shortcomings of these theories. Through their theoretical contributions, they aim at bringing back the social into the study of dissent and political action. With the increasing critiques, the political process theorists advocate dynamic and relational models to question citizens’ active engagement in forming the dissent. They introduce ‘explanatory mechanisms and processes’ and trace the causal sequences between different determinants of what they call ‘contentious politics’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 4; Tarrow 2011). Scholars argue that ‘social interaction, social ties, communication, and conversation [are] not merely as expressions of structure,

rationality, consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change' (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 22). Their interactive and relational approach focuses on the attribution of threat and opportunity, social appropriation, social construction, and innovative collective action rather than the opportunity structure, mobilizing structures, and strategic framing in explaining the mobilization processes. It stresses the 'dynamic, contingent interaction among actors that are themselves undergoing continuous creation and transformation' (Ibid: 190). This focus enables an analysis of transgressive contentions in which 'at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-identified political actors, and/or at least some parties employ innovative collective action' through disruption (Ibid: 7-8). Dissenting groups 'break with routine, startle bystanders, and leave elites disoriented, at least for a time' (Piven and Cloward 1977), and transgress the structural and hegemonic orders 'through the invention of innovative ways of performing protest' (Tarrow, 2011: 101).

The incorporation of these critical insights is to make the preceding models more dynamic. Tilly pursues such an inquiry through his concept of the repertoires of action. The repertoires change when the connections between claim-making and everyday social organization changes, when contention produces cumulative changes in the signaling system, and when the political opportunities and threats offered by the regime change (Tilly, 2006: 56; Tarrow, 2011: 33). On the basis of his historical-institutional perspective, the formation of the states becomes the critical historical juncture through which broader social and economic changes are infiltrated by the agents who later create, transform and sustain social movements as the distinct forms of collective action (Tilly 1990, 2004). The alterations of social, political, and economic changes influence the repertoires; but their effects filter through location of regimes with respect to democracy and governmental capacity (Tilly, 2006: 72-81). State authorities, power holders and groups of ordinary people bargain rights and responsibilities; a process which is crystallized in the formation, reproduction, and transformation of citizenship. As the process unfolds, the repertoires of contention change. Citizenship regimes shape the contours of collective action by delineating what is im/possible in a given polity, and multiply the forms and contents of the dissent. They represent 'ideal' forms that enable and limit the repertoires of action of goal-oriented agents.

These 'ideal' types are divided into two by the early theories of citizenship which are based on the historical and theoretical analyses of the ancient Greece and the Imperial Rome: Civic-republican and liberal-individualistic (Walzer 1989; Pocock 1995). This divide is also conceptualized as a divide between citizenship as practice and citizenship as status (Oldfield 1990). Civic republicanism assumes the moral priority of community to the individual. It conceptualizes citizenship first and foremost in terms of duties, responsibilities, and obligations to the community. In the republican public sphere, individuals come together and collectively engage with the achievement of the common good. Activities and practices, such as work, military service and taxes, determine the main tenets of their relation to the state and the community. Thus, citizenship presupposes the active participation of the individuals in the public sphere. It is in this sense that citizenship is envisioned as practice. In the modern sense, it is the French Revolution which crystallizes these ideas by closely connecting citizenship, virtue, and public spirit and by suggesting a commitment to the political activity on behalf of the community (Walzer, 1989: 211). Liberal-individualistic tradition, on the other hand, is founded upon the primacy of the individual (Rawls 1972; Dworkin 1977; Pocock 1995). It emphasizes the individual needs and entitlements of the citizen. It conceptualizes citizenship as a legal status based on the membership to a political community. Marshall (1964) defines it as the 'full membership in the community', based on civil, political, and social rights. Drawing on Great Britain, he puts forth an evolutionary trajectory in which civil rights are developed along with the establishment of the courts in the eighteenth century; political rights are introduced along with the implementation of the parliamentary system; and finally social rights come to the fore with the welfare state. In most of the liberal-individualistic accounts, however, rights are granted to individuals by virtue of their essentiality in human condition. Citizenship is thus envisioned relatively in passive terms in which a minimal state guarantees the rights and freedoms; and individuals choose whether or not to engage in certain practices.

Although relevant to the understanding of modern societies, Marshall's analysis, however, remains teleological, evolutionary, and Anglo-Saxon, and it says little about the variation of citizenship types. It is criticized because of the lack of focus on other intervening variables that shape the regimes. Based on comparative analyses, scholars

stress the crucial role that the state and the ruling elites play in the development of citizenship (Mann 1987; Turner 1990). Mann (1987) takes up citizenship as a notion which is the result of various strategies that the ruling classes implement to handle the class struggle in advanced industrial societies. He states these strategies as liberal, reformist, authoritarian monarchist, fascist, and authoritarian socialist. Thus, his comparative-historical analysis leaves room for explaining variation. Mann, however, conceptualizes the ruling classes in a Marxian logic as the main driving forces behind the top-down processes of the citizenship formation (Turner, 1990: 199). Contra to Mann, Turner emphasizes 'social struggles as the central motor of the drive for citizenship' (Turner, 1990: 193). Drawing on a broader notion of struggle, he considers the state as the stabilizer of social space. This, argues Turner, explains better the growth and the variation of different citizenship regimes. By combining the public/private and the above/below distinction, Turner develops a heuristic typology of four political contexts for the creation and the institutionalization of rights and responsibilities; namely revolutionary, liberal pluralist, passive democratic, and plebiscitary authoritarian.

Like the theories of social movements, the classical theories of citizenship mostly focus on the structural determinants of citizenship formation. Putting the tension between the growth of citizenship and the rise of capitalism as the main analytical scope in *Citizenship and Social Class*, Marshall claims that the economic logic of capitalism necessitates introducing civil, political and social rights respectively. Mann argues that 'ruling class strategies tended to determine the nature of the social movements generated by bourgeoisie and proletariat, especially whether they were liberal, reformist or revolutionary' (Mann, 1987: 340). Geopolitic and military influences become macro-level factors which lead to the durability of regime strategies. In other words, 'what evolves depends on changing geopolitical configurations' (Mann, 1987: 351) and long-term macro-sociological changes in geopolitical warfare, cultural organization of public space and the gradual development of institutions, such as constitutionalism (Turner 1990).

If we articulate Tilly's insights into the theories of citizenship, the political action is determined by the repertoires of action which are predominantly determined by the citizenship regimes that structure the interests of actors, the costs and benefits of their

action, and the prospects for success or failures in accomplishing the goals and interests. And these regimes are results of long-term macro-sociological, historical and institutional processes that unfold in a top-down manner by the political elites. Hence, dissenting political action become the results of accumulated, sedimented and layered processes which are mainly guided by structural factors. Although valuable in explaining the expected and ordinary processes of change, these frameworks are less equipped to theorize change through human agency, creativity and innovation. Thus, they cannot answer how the structures, such as citizenship regimes, political opportunity/threat structures and repertoires of action, emerge in the first place. In Tilly's framework, for instance, 'repertoires vary from place to place, time to time, and pair to pair. But on the whole, when people make collective claims they innovate within limits set by the repertoire already established for their place, time, and pair' (Tilly, 2006: 35). But how do these repertoires emerge in the first place? Goldstone (2010) claims that such a focus neglects an analysis of the processes and mechanisms through which individuals and groups break with the repertoires, invent new ways of doing politics and constitute new subjectivities with new orientations, strategies and technologies. To overcome the shortcomings of the concept, Tarrow introduces 'modular performances and repertoires of collective action', claiming that the determinants of social movements are not imagined as externally established structural categories but 'culturally inscribed and socially communicated' (Tarrow, 2011: 29). He stresses the transformation of tactics in response to changing opportunities and constraints, and in doing so, puts forth the constitutive role of human agency in social and political change. He contends that 'individuals need to *perceive* political opportunities and to be *emotionally engaged by their claims* if they are to be induced to participate in possibly risky and certainly costly collective actions; and they need to *perceive* constraints if they are to hesitate to take such actions' (Tarrow, 2011: 12). That said Tarrow still prioritizes political opportunity structures over ideational processes, such as framing processes and identity construction, because, he claims, 'to relate text to context, the grammar of culture to the semantics of struggle, we need to turn from framing, identity construction, and emotions to how movements intersect with their contexts [and] to examine, in particular, the structure of opportunities and the constraints in which they operate' (Tarrow, 2011: 156).

Theorized either as objectively or subjectively determined categories of analysis, there are certain structural forms that determine the political actors and the course of their actions. Political opportunity/threat structures, which reflect the nature of the existing citizenship regimes, enable or limit the formation of the dissent. Individuals and social movements make rational calculations about their environments, interests, and goals, and put forth their strategic action to transform the very regimes in which they take part. However, their structural bias and the rationality assumption are not sufficient to grasp the dissent. Change also occurs through bottom-up processes in which individuals and social movements manipulate, contest, and transform the hegemonic discourses and practices and the repertoires of action. To question such examples, we need to incorporate a better account of human agency. This is to say that we need to bring back the individuals/groups and their creative and innovative capacities into the analyses of change. I will now turn to the constructivist theories of social movements and citizenship which aim at explaining the bottom-up processes of the dissent, political action, and in doing so, conceptualize the role of human agency in social and political change.

II.II. How to introduce agency? The construction of dissent along axes of identity/difference

The late 1980s and early 1990s witness the introduction of constructivist approaches to theorize the political change. Their articulation is influenced by the emerging social movements, also called as 'new social movements' (NSMs), which have sprung around the globe from the 1960s onwards. The African-American civil rights movement, the anti-war movements, the free speech movement, the opposition to nuclear weapons, the environmental movement, the feminist and gay liberation movements are some examples. Scholars introduce critical accounts of the existing literature by focusing on the characteristics and the particularities of these newly emerging politics. Although their novelty is criticized (Weir 1993), these movements precipitate the cultural turn in social sciences; and they lead scholars to conceptualize social movements and citizenship through new analytical categories. The NSMs are defined as modern struggles against bureaucratic autonomy, centralization, commodification of social life, state action and capitalist modernization processes (Offe 1985; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Melucci 1980). Main differentiating line, scholars claim, are the locations of the NSM in a postindustrial society (Melucci, 1980: 210;

Touraine 1985). Offe (1985) differentiates the NSM by issues, values, modes of action, and actors. Whereas the new social movements are concerned with identity and autonomy, and choose informal and spontaneous organizations with low levels of horizontal and vertical differentiation, the old ones are concerned with the security and the distribution of income, and choose formal, large-scale, and representative organizations. The NSMs have an emphasis on sociocultural issues rather than sociopolitical and economic ones (Touraine 1985, 2002; Melucci 1980). Many argue that there is a shift from class, race and other traditional political issues to the cultural ones. Touraine (1985) points to the self-realization and creativity of these newly emerging dissenting voices. Similarly, Melucci (1980) puts forth identity, autonomy, convergence of public and private spheres, and independence as their main characteristics.

With this shift, scholars conceptualize the dissent through analytical categories, such as identity, framing and/or emotions. They question ‘how people make sense of their world, how they relate to texts, practices, and artifacts rendering these cultural products meaningful to them’ (Melucci, 1996: 68). Identities, scholars claim, provide lenses through which individuals and social movements perceive the relations of power, make sense of the world, and conceptualize the issues at stake, depict those who are responsible of these issues, and establish their strategies. Hence, the political opportunity/threat structures, interests, and goals are constituted by their values, beliefs, and perceptions. Agents are not carriers of external ideas and meanings that grow out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies, but they actively engage in production, maintenance, and manipulation for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers (Benford and Snow, 1988: 198). They construct their identities, claims, and goals through different framing processes; namely diagnostic, prognostic, and action mobilization (Benford and Snow 2000: 631-632). Actors ‘negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615). Four determinants – problem identification, flexibility, rigidity, inclusivity, exclusivity, scope, and resonance of frames – vary the nature of movements. Among these determinants, resonance stands as the most important

constitutive factor of frames. Two important aspects for the resonance stand out: credibility and salience. Scholars claim that the credibility of frame articulators, the apparent fit between the framing and the events, the congruency between actors' beliefs, claims, and actions, as well as centrality and congruency of frames to the targets of mobilization affect the emergence and transformation of the dissent (Benford and Snow, 2000). The cultural resonance of beliefs, claims, and actions works as discursive opportunities that may be employed as tactics and strategies by the actors. Ferree (2003), however, claims that the cultural resonance does not necessarily account for the choices of radical discourses and practices among various social movement actors. By a comparative-historical analysis of legal abortion debates in Germany and U.S., she argues that 'the gradient of opportunity still allows actors to opt for radicalism rather than resonance' (Ferree, 2003: 305). Agents who aim to challenge the hegemonic ideas substantively may orient towards radical frames since choosing culturally resonant discourses entail political costs, such as silencing some portions of repertoire of ideas and failing to represent interests of some constituencies.

These newly emerging theories bring back the social to the studies of the dissent and political action. Social relations become 'an analytic space which precedes the notion of class relations and from which these relations can be deduced' (Melucci, 1980: 210). Melucci claims that the social movement theory must be 'freed from its historical ties to industrial society and made to correspond more closely to the conditions of production prevailing in post-industrial capitalism' (Melucci, 1980: 210). Production, according to him, is a process of production of meaning and social relations. In advanced capitalist societies, the control reaches beyond the productive structure into the areas of consumption, services, and social relations. Agents construct individual and collective identities out of an 'an interactive process through which several individuals or groups define the meaning of their action and the field of opportunities and constraints for such an action' (Melucci, 1996: 67). These interactive and communicative processes are both cognitively and emotionally framed through active relationships (Melucci, 1996: 71). Interests, incentives, rationality, and reforms are not objective givens but socially constructed and depend on identities (Polletti and Jasper 2005). Scholars increasingly examine 'how they [identities] are formed and maintained' through interrelational processes (Melucci, 1996: 63).

Bleiker argues that identities ‘provide the individual with opportunities to escape the suffocating impact of hegemonies, seek out its cracks and weaknesses, and explore the enabling potential that lingers in the discursive void’ (Bleiker, 2004: 199). Social movements increasingly deconstruct citizenship in its relations to various categories of identity/difference, such as sex, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, class and disability (Okin 1992; Kymlicka 1995; Yuval-Davis 1997; Lister 1997, 2007; Weeks 1998; Richardson 2000; Lister 2007; Plummer 2001; Wheeler 2005; Morris 2005). As individuals and social groups put forth claims for justice and recognition, citizenship is thought as a process of stratification between these identities. Seyla Benhabib contends that ‘to want to exclude the outsiders or to close one’s doors to newcomers is always accompanied by the need to discipline the outsiders within and to prevent reform, innovation, dissent, and transformation within the walls of one’s own parish’ (Benhabib, 2004: 173). Brubaker states that citizenship is an institution whose terms are framed and shaped by certain cultural idioms, that is, ways of thinking and talking about nationhood that are reinforced and activated in specific historical and institutional settings (Brubaker, 1992: 16). These frames contain historically embedded relations of power which is constantly challenged and negotiated. The projection by dominant groups of their particularities as universal leads to the construction of certain groups as different and excludes them from ‘value-neutral’ and ‘universal’ conceptions of citizenship. According to Young, universal citizenship conceptualizes equality as sameness, universality as generality and universality as equal treatment (Young, 1989). In doing so, it defines citizenship as a notion that expresses the general will that transcends the individual and group differences, and a notion that tends to prioritize homogeneity of citizens. Hence, those individuals and groups who do not adopt, or are not capable of adopting, the general point of view are excluded from the first-class citizenship. To counter this, scholars, as well as social movements, deconstruct the public/private divide and the conception of common good from the standpoints of various identities. For instance, feminist studies demonstrate the gender-blindness of citizenship theories by enlightening women’s experiences. They claim that the classical distinction between public and private spaces is based on a wish to emancipate men, who are supposed to be the agents of politics, from the basic necessities of the household. And this presupposes ‘to treat the vast majority of people [women and slaves] more or less as things’ (Okin, 1992: 62). Walby (1994) notes that social

citizenship is structured by changing gender relations, as much as class relations. For instance, Marshall's evolutionary logic of civil, political, and social rights must be criticized since women's obtainment of civil right was only possible with the obtainment of political rights. Other scholars, on the other hand, demonstrate the implicit racist and ethnicized conceptions of citizenship which privileges 'whiteness' or national identities over people of color, ethnic minorities, or immigrants (Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Fortier 2005).

Identity question refine the early theories of citizenship. The proponents of civic-republican framework give significant importance to the political engagement of groups to pursue democracy in the public space (Dietz 1987; Phillips 1993). Although acknowledging the group differences, these accounts stress the importance of getting beyond one's immediate sphere in public space (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 142). They stress the importance of the participatory ideal while retaining an inclusionary conception of citizenship (Okin, 1992: 217). Miller (1995), for instance, argues that the societies must commit to the 'weak ideal of impartiality' to accommodate differences. He contends that a citizen does not have to leave aside his/her particular aims and preferences completely for a substantial degree of consensus on the issues of common concern (Miller, 1995: 445). Social movements engage in political dialogue and elaborate on the reasons of their proposals, which might concern their particular interests, necessities, and values, so as to persuade others. The proposals may include particular demands but their degree of persuasion will be the function of their reference to the 'general political ethos of the community'. To do so, the nation-state model, argues Miller, must accommodate democratic decision making and a deliberative democracy (Miller, 2000).

Stemming from liberal individualistic tradition, liberal cosmopolitans respond to cultural pluralism and identity question by reviving the human rights discourses. Based on a pre-political conception of rights, they argue that everyone has 'the right to have rights'. In this logic, no one is, in principle, excluded from the circle of citizenship. In his cosmopolitan model of democracy, Held (1995) states that people enjoy membership in diverse communities and the multiple and overlapping networks of power at local, regional, and global levels affect their lives. Thus, he claims for the extension of citizenship to membership in cross-cutting political communities, from the local to the global (Held, 1995: 272). The incorporation of cosmopolitan democratic

law into the constitutions, the extension of the influence of international courts, and the establishment of transnational legislative and executive institutions at regional and global levels become the necessary mechanisms through which these rights are established, implemented, and enforced.

Other critiques recognize the possibility of common good but argue that a pre-determined common good carries out certain power relations to the public discussion, and impedes the success of the marginalized groups. Young (1989) introduces the concept of differentiated citizenship which allows for groups to be recognized with their differences in the decision-making processes in a participatory and democratic fashion. She stresses the importance of special rights, and proposes to create mechanisms to encourage group representation. Tracing the revisionist historiography on Habermas's public sphere, Fraser also takes up a similar stance. She calls into question 'the assumption that it is possible for interlocutors in a public sphere to bracket status differentials and to deliberate as if they were social equals' (Fraser, 1992: 117-118). To promote the ideal of participatory parity, Fraser claims for the creation of the arrangements that accommodate 'subaltern counterpublics' in which individuals and groups ease the relations of domination and subordination, discuss their interests and needs, and form their social identities. Hence, contra to what Miller argues, Young does not necessarily position her critique in a complete opposition to the civic republican tradition, but aims to correct it with appropriate mechanisms. Her concept of differentiated citizenship does not refute but accentuate a common ethos, that is, 'commitment to the need and desire to decide together the society's policies [that] fosters communication across these differences' (Young, 1989: 258). Fraser's counterpublics also carry out public-spiritness, that is, they assume publicist orientations which 'aspire to disseminate one's discourse to ever widening areas' and become building blocks for participatory democracy (Fraser, 1992: 124). However, the common concern, or the general ethos of the community, is not conceptualized as a pre-determined ideal but as a process of negotiation through discursive contestation.

Constructivist theories of social movements and citizenship explain the agential factors of social and political change through of identity. Change occurs through practice that is co-constructed by the ideational norms, values and beliefs. In these frameworks, citizenship is conceptualized less as a top-down result of the elite

consolidation than a dynamic, interrelated and socially constructed process, in which its ideal types are contested, challenged and negotiated by various social movements through collective action. However, although they develop agency-oriented theories, their approaches to change tend to be relatively structural insofar as they take up identities as historically embedded and sedimented entities that are constructed over longer periods of time through practices. Identities are conceptualized prior to the formation of dissent, political action and change. Like states constructing hegemonic discourses and practices of citizenship, individuals and social movements create a dissenting habitus which unfolds in a relatively longer period of time and in doing so create change. Thus, they fail to conceptualize how these identities, as well as change, emerge in the first place. Identities are not fixed and bounded entities but fluid becoming which are constantly negotiated by agents who put forth new and novel ways of being citizen. Conceptualizing change necessitates a theoretical framework to account for the moments of rupture in and through which individuals and social movements break away with the established orders over relatively shorter periods of time. I will now turn to the acts of citizenship literature to question these ruptures.

II.II.I. Citizenship as acts

Citizenship is a contested phenomenon. Individuals and social movements reproduce, negotiate, and challenge the hegemonic ideals of citizenship through their acts, and create continuities and changes in the regimes in which they take part. Scholars come up with different explanations to understand how this process unfolds. Early theories of social movements rely on a dualistic and reductionist approach that assumes distinct ontologies for structure and agency and prioritize structures in explaining the formation of dissent. They introduce the independent variables which are prior to and causally linked to action. These accounts neglect the role of agential factors. Agency appears only in the form of rational calculation and as an implicit assumption. Rational calculation is also the process through which agents infiltrate the structures into action. Individuals and social movements see the political opportunities and threats, evaluate the available resources, calculate the costs and benefits of their action and seize upon the opportunities. The desire to construct a systemic theory of action leads to reductionism and makes these theories ahistorical. Agency disappears in their models as the dissenting political action is conceptualized not endogenous to the

agents but structured by the exogenously determined interests and political structures. Accordingly, they fail to explain change through creative human agency. The dissent and the change it creates depend on macro-level determinants, such as citizenship regimes, repression/facilitation, power, and opportunity/threat and the repertoires of action, which explain the patterned and anticipated courses of action.

Constructivist theories of action problematize the limited conception of human agency in early theories of social movements and citizenship. Scholars bring to the fore the human innovation and creativity by incorporating the active involvement of individuals and social movements in the formation of political action and citizenship regimes. According to these theories, agents perceive the structural opportunities and constraints, construct their identities and framing strategies and change the ways in which citizenship is negotiated through practice. The constructivist ontologies conceptualize interests, opportunities and threats as socially constructed categories that are endogenously determined. In these frameworks, structures and agencies are not distinct and mutually exclusive entities; they are mutually constituted. The dualism of the early theories of the dissent, they argue, leads to the prioritization of structure over agency. Scholars accentuate less the causal mechanisms and processes than constitutive aspects of identity that lead to political action. Change occurs as the agents actively manipulate, challenge and transform the existing orders in which they take part. In doing so, scholars aim at introducing the bottom-up processes in which various social identities initiate collective action and create change. Their values, beliefs, and norms guide their identities which eventually become mobilizing factors in promoting social and political change.

Agency-focused theories bring to the fore the identity as an analytical category to question change. However, these accounts tend to take identity as group identity to which individuals adhere and which gives them certain scripts of action. However, these identity positions, claims and goals are ever contested, negotiated and fluid. Change also occurs in and through these contestations and negotiations. Individuals and social movements create moments of rupture from the established discourses and practices of citizenship and in doing so construct new political subjectivities with new claims and goals. Theorizing citizenship through acts give valuable insights on these moments of rupture in which citizens break away with the hegemonically imposed

identities and put forth the unexpected, unordinary and unanticipated. (Işın and Nielsen, 2008: 17). Işın and Nielsen argue that it is impossible to imagine change without these creative moments. Acts are related to habitus but also distinct from them. They signify creative ruptures that citizens and social movements put forth in much shorter periods of time than habitus. The difference is also a qualitative one that ‘breaks habitus creatively’ (Işın and Nielsen, 2008: 18). The creativity is derived from the acts’ unforeseeability and contingency, and their aspiration ‘to transcend the limits imposed by habits (even if momentarily) in order to disrupt the static and sedimented dimensions of human action’ (White, 2008: 46). In doing so, acts of citizenship create a sense of the possible and of a citizenship that is ‘yet to come’ (Işın and Nielsen, 2008: 4). They ‘affirm the unpredictable and contingent by provoking encounters that disrupt one’s habitual tendencies’ (White, 2008: 54).

Işın and Nielsen (2008) aim at transcending the structural bias in theories of citizenship as status and as practice. Their framework sheds lights on creative processes through which new political subjectivities are formed, reformed and transformed. According to Işın and Nielsen, ‘acts of citizenship [...] help organize public presentations or appearances of often-contradictory statements from actors who claim rights or impose social responsibilities’ (Işın and Nielsen, 2008: 10). ‘Activist citizens’ create new ways by which people enact their citizenship and enable new groups to engage as citizens who were not engaged before (Işın, 2009: 368; Lee, 2014: 903). The emergence of these subjectivities ‘is implicated in the emergence of new “sites”, “scales” and “acts” through which “actors” claim to transform themselves (and others) from subjects into citizens as claimants of rights’ (Işın, 2009: 368). Bodies, streets, media, bureaucracies, courts are deployed at local, national and international levels and become sites of resistance in and through which the acts of citizenship are performed. In this framework, it is not the identities that produce acts but acts produce identities in multiple sites and at multiple levels. It is through these acts, and the subjectivities they introduce, that individuals and social movements become agents of change.

Acts of citizenship framework is widely employed in migration studies (Puggioni 2014; Müller 2016; Çağlar 2016). As non-citizens whose status or practice do not necessarily meet with the institutionalized orders of their host societies, their right claims are envisioned as acts that constitute these groups as new political subjectivities.

It is illuminating to employ this framework for those ‘citizens’ who break with the hegemonic conceptions of citizenship. As a matter of fact, there is a certain resemblance between the objectors acting under the ‘civil death’ conditions in Turkey and the non-status immigrants without citizenship rights in their host countries, in that objectors constitute the outsiders within. Although the objectors differ from immigrants – they are citizens and have relatively more resources to act and are placed within the national collectivity – they still position outside the legitimate boundaries of politics as a reason of their acts. In other words, they demonstrate frontiers of and within the system. Işın (2012) describes frontier as involving non-physical action such as opposition and thwarting. Furthermore, it does not only denote ‘an action but also that which it produces: a path, track, or trace [...] that we can recognize, and follow’ (Işın 2012). These frontiers have fluid spatiality and can be located within the ‘center’ (Çağlar 2016). Thus, frontiers are ‘the zones where the fissures in the workings of the socio-political spaces and laws and the state power are acted out and become visible’ (Ibid: 660). Acts of citizenship may not only illustrate those acts of individuals and groups who are ‘outsiders’ to the system but also of those ‘insiders’ whose acts put them in a liminal space between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Through their acts, citizens ‘make visible the limits and *confinement* of the categories of the taken-for-granted order with which people operate’ (Çağlar, 2016: 656).

It is through various acts that individuals and social movements become agents of change. They create new political subjectivities which negotiate and bargain their intersectional and multilayered identifications with the state and society. Being at the intersections of multiple sociocultural and political identifications, agents re-construct their identities anew through a reflexive and embodied process of subjectivity formation. Citizens give new meanings to their identifications through an inner and externally-oriented dialogue in situated contexts of time and space (Harraway, 1988). Agents negotiate their claims, concerns and goals within themselves and vis-à-vis others (Chalari, 2009; Mouzelis, 2010; Vandenberghe, 2005). Through acts of citizenship, subjects emerge not as beings but as ‘active and reactive ways of being with others’ (Nyers cited in Işın and Nielsen, 2008: 7). In doing so, they create multiple selves and others. I will now turn to the intersectionality literature to question subjectivity formation in its relations to various categories of identity/difference. Such

an inquiry is necessary to understand how agents come up with new political subjectivities, how these subjectivities create possibilities for coalition-building and conflict, and how they create change.

II.III. Deconstructing identity: Intersectionality and subjectivity

Since its introduction, intersectionality has generated a growing debate over the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of its subject matter, its levels of analyses, and its theoretical, practical and normative leanings. Either conceptualized as a ‘framework’, a ‘heuristic device’, or an ‘analytical sensibility’ (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall, 2013: 795), intersectionality has traveled to many disciplines and geographies, and appraised as a ‘buzzword’ and ‘a brain child’ in feminist studies (Davis 2008, Nash 2008, McCall 2005, Lykke 2010). Although scholars develop various genealogies for the concept (Lykke 2010; Bilge 2013; Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013), its articulation is introduced by Crenshaw – a critical race, feminist, and legal scholar who seeks to demonstrate the limits of the antidiscrimination laws and anti-racist and feminist politics in questioning structural and political inequalities that manifest themselves at the intersection of multiple axes of power differentials, and their consequences for people concerned (Crenshaw 1989, 1991). Her inquiry into the structural and political intersectionalities initiates considerable amount of work on how specific inequalities and hierarchies structure institutions such as law, nation, family, and marginalize women of color, LGBTIs of color, etc. Crenshaw follows footsteps of her contemporaries who take gender and race as categories of analyses in deciphering social hierarchies (Angela Davis 1981; hooks 1981; Hull et al. 1982; Lorde 1984; Rich, 1986; Riley 1988). Her interruption comes in a period in which the category of women is increasingly deconstructed in scholarly literature. From different perspectives, scholars question gender in its relations to other categories of difference such as sex, sexuality, class, race, ethnicity, age, disability, etc. (Mohanty, 1988; Fraser, 1995; Connell, 1995, 1998; Halbertsam, 1998; Mellström, 2002 and 2004).

II.III.I. Structural intersectionalities

Either described as additive/cumulative, systemic, or structural (Yuval-Davis, 2006; Prins, 2006), the early proponents of intersectionality have similar ontological, epistemological and methodological leanings. This camp takes up intersectionality as

an analytic invested not primarily in identities or subjectivities, but in political and structural inequalities. (Nash, 2016: 15; Cho, Crenshaw and McCall, 2013: 797; Chun, Lipsitz and Chin, 2013: 923) Drawing on her analogy of traffic in an intersection, Crenshaw gives distinct ontologies to categories of difference. The emphasis is on systemic hierarchies and inequalities which shape and reshape the positioning of the most marginalized groups. McCall differentiates this approach in terms of its methodology as intracategorical complexity which focuses on ‘particular social groups at neglected points of intersection’ (McCall, 2005: 1774). Crenshaw takes up black women as her epistemological subject to problematize antidiscrimination laws and political groups that are uncritically taking one axe of power as their reference in achieving their social justice claims. She points to the silencing of black women’s experiences at legal and political institutions. Although black women may experience discrimination in ways that are similar to the experiences of white women or black men, Crenshaw claims that sometimes their experiences differ from those categories in that ‘they experience double discrimination – the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex’ (Crenshaw, 1989: 149). Similarly, third-world women are granted by Mohanty an ‘epistemic privilege’ since ‘this particular marginalized location makes the politics of knowledge and the power investments that go along with it visible so that we can then engage in work to transform the use and abuse of power’ (Mohanty, 2003: 511). Mohanty (1988) questions how western feminist texts exercise power employing a discourse which ignores the complexities of the experiences of women in the ‘third world’. She claims that the assumption of women as an already established and coherent group with identical interests and desires ignores the differences in the experiences of women with different class, ethnic and racial location. (Mohanty, 1988: 64) Homogeneous understanding of women’s subordination produces reductive and homogeneous notions of third-world difference – the image of an average third-world woman which in turn contributes to the self-representation of western women ‘as educated, modern, and as having control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the ‘freedom’ to make their own decisions’ (Mohanty, 1988: 65).

In these accounts, power differentials become structural categories, with distinct ontologies, which define intersectional identities, and the relations between them.

Identities are shaped through the intersections of multiple, overlapping, yet distinct, categories of difference and inequality. Their ontological priority in defining human identity comes from the presumption that categories have meanings and consequences. There are particular values attached to them and those values foster and create social hierarchies (Crenshaw, 1991: 1296-1297). In this respect, Crenshaw distinguishes her ontology from antiessentialist critiques which tends to disintegrate all categories around which groups may conglomerate. According to Crenshaw and Harris (2009), categories are necessary 'to unveil the processes of subordination and the various ways those processes are experienced by people who are subordinated and people who are privileged by them' (Crenshaw and Harris, 2009: 2). Many other scholars adhere to similar ontological and epistemological understandings. Fraser (1995) proposes a set of analytical distinctions between cultural and economic injustices, recognition and redistribution constituting two poles of the continuum. In her account, sexuality and class relates to cultural and economic sphere respectively, and gender and race become bivalent categories which 'intersect with one another in ways that affect everyone's interests and identities [since] no one is a member of only one such collectivity' (Fraser, 1995: 92). Similarly, Yuval-Davis (2006) argues that there are 'different kinds of differences' which are constructed by each other, and relate in specific ways to the political and subjective construction of identities in particular locations and contexts. Thus, 'the field methodology should carefully separate, and examine separately, the different levels in which social divisions operate in the communities where they work and which were discussed earlier, i.e. institutionally, intersubjectively, representationally as well as in the subjective constructions of identities' (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 205). What Anthias and Yuval-Davis stress is that 'the ontological basis of each of these divisions is autonomous, and each prioritizes different spheres of social relations' (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 200-201). Verloo also problematizes the 'assumed similarity' among multiple inequalities in the context of the European Union policies. She points to differences between categories which are time- and place-specific in terms of their locations, their conceptualizations of inequalities, their institutionalizations, and their framings. That said scholars do not take these categories as fixed and stable, but dynamic, interdependent, and interconnected (Verloo, 2006: 224; Yuval-Davis 2006).

The categories of identity/difference emerge within a complex causality, requiring the ‘recognition [and examination] of categories that are multiple [and] mutually constitutive at both the individual and institutional levels’ (Hancock, 2007: 252). This should be done ‘not by simple adding together mutually exclusive analyses of the individual and the institutional levels but by means of an integrative analysis of the interaction between the individual and the institutional levels of the research question’ (Hancock, 2007: 251). In Ferre’s interactional definition of intersectionality, each axe of inequality ‘takes up its operational meaning in any given situation in part from the multiple institutions in play (such as family or nation) and in part from the other dimensions of inequality that are also engaged in given meaning to each other and to the institutional context’ (Ferre, 2009: 91). This approach resembles to Walby’s which

‘introduces complexity theory to develop further this idea of intersectionality as an active ‘system’ with both positive and negative feedback effects, non-linearity of relations and nonnested, non-hierarchical overlaps among institutions. In such a complex system, gender is not a dimension limited to the organization of reproduction or family, class is not a dimension equated with the economy, and race is not a category reduced to the primacy of ethnicities, nations and borders, but all the processes that systematically organize families, economies and nations are co-constructed along with the meanings of gender, race and class that are presented in and reinforced by these institutions separately and together’ (Ferre, 2009: 87).

Scholars argue that systemic theorizings of intersectionality are not well equipped to question the complexity of these entanglements. They are further criticized because of their conceptualization of identifications as distinct and static forms of power and their focus on specific groups of individuals as ‘epistemic subjects’ out of whom scholars seek to grasp the functioning of power. With the constructivist turn, scholars decenter the epistemic subject of intersectionality studies and demonstrate the complex and interdependent nature of different categories of identity/difference. s

II.III.II. Constructivist turn

Critical constructivist approaches are based on ‘a methodology which deconstructs analytical categories, takes social life as a complex process with multiple and fluid determinations of subjects and structures’ (McCall, 2005: 1773). Categories of differences are not ontologically distinct; but they are entangled. Individuals resist

the pull-and-push of traditional categorizations in a multilayered and contradictory fashion (Prins, 2006: 286). Either defined as constitutive, constructionist or interactive intersectionality, these scholars (Prins 2006; Ferre 2009; Ferguson, 2016: 43) conceptualize oppression/subordination as internally relational and dynamic processes in which multiple axes of difference and inequality co-constitute one another. For instance, Butler points to the constitutive role of sexuality in the politics of distribution stressing its importance in ‘the social reproduction of persons’ (Butler, 1997: 40). In her account, queer struggles are not ‘merely cultural forms that contemporary social movements have assumed’ (Butler, 1997: 38), but belong both to the cultural and the economic and, ‘the practices of sexual exchange confound the distinction between the two spheres’ (Butler, 1997: 43). Categories do not have distinct ontologies, and this complicates additive analyses of intersectionality. In these accounts, categories are analyzed as ‘interlocking components’ (Staunaes, 2003: 102). Intersectionality is employed to conceptualize a process of doing ‘where concrete intersections, hierarchies and elaboration are not predetermined’ (Staunaes, 2003: 102), but inherently interdependent. Scholars urge us to question ‘the doing of the relation between categories, the outcome of this doing and how this doing results in either troubled or untroubled subject positions’ (Staunaes, 2003: 105).

Against this interdependent ontology, these scholars further the ‘epistemic subject’ of intersectionality by incorporating each and every individual/group. This shift is an extension of the debate over the troubling structuring of ever-growing categories of difference and inequality. Ehrenreich claims that intersectional analyses of identity politics struggle with an ‘infinite regress problem’ in which ‘all identity groups [...] split into ever-smaller subgroups, until there seems to be no hope of any coherent category other than the individual’ (Ehrenreich, 2002: 267). The long list of axes of difference and inequality, which is crystallized in the ‘etc.’ clause (Butler, 1990: 143), adds to the complexity of researches: Which one of these axes matters more in which context? How to choose between ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ categories of difference? Is the choice simply a question of its applicability to the research questions? Or should a researcher be guided by the individuals, groups, social movements, or civil society organizations? Scholars urge to ask whether ‘in any particular historical condition, specific and limited numbers of social divisions that construct the grid of power

relations within which the different members of the society are located' (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 203). They ask 'which differences make difference in situated contexts of time and space' (Lewis, 2013: 882). Caratathis argues that 'there is no sense in which individuals "are" intersectional subjects prior to a political discourse that assigns them to that location' (Caratathis, 2008: 29). Thus, scholarly literature is not immune from reifying structural relations of power in which subjects are implicated. One need to explore 'which categories speak to the differences that matter in any given context' or 'on what ground the integrity of the term intersectional might be achieved' (Lewis, 2013: 883). Scholars with constructivist leanings (Ludvig 2006; Prins, 2006; Buitelaar 2006) focus on the individual level to shed light on 'who defines when, where, which, and why particular differences are given recognition while others are not', and how global and local relations of power are integral to the functioning of the categories of difference (Ludvig, 2006: 247). Critical discourse analysis, narrative analysis, and life-story interviews are employed as methodologies (Prins, 2006; Buitelaar, 2006). These analyses point at the complex, multiple and multilayered ways in which power works in identity/subjectivity formation. They shift the epistemic focus to each and every individual, and challenge the 'epistemic privilege' given to multiply-marginalized groups. In doing so, they examine how individuals find themselves in both dominant and subordinated positions in multiple levels.

Although some criticize this turn as 'whitening of intersectionality', subsuming systemic analyses, and obscuring crucial power relations as a reason of the coupling of neoliberal knowledge economies and postmodernism (Bilge 2013; Mohanty 2013), the early proponents of intersectionality also welcome such a broadening of the methodologies (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall 2013). Nash (2016) defines this transition as one from 'ethics of redress' to 'ethics of inclusivity'. Intersectionality is increasingly employed in the individual-level analyses of subjectivities (Ehrenreich 2002; Hancock 2007; Carbado 2013). Hancock takes up intersectionality as an important analytical tool to question causal complexity in studying individuals/groups other than women of color (Hancock, 2007: 251). In her symbiotic analysis, Ehrenreich (2002) divides pure and hybrid cases of intersectionality to go beyond the doubly-burdened individuals as 'paradigmatic representatives' of intersectional analyses. According to Ehrenreich, the tendency to 'look to the bottom' ignores that the combinations of subordination and

domination also construct one another, and ‘produce a new reality which is more than the sum of its parts’ (Ehrenreich, 2002: 273). Thus, she urges scholars to explore the ‘complex implications of that approach for cases of hybrid intersectionality’ including white women, white gay men, etc. (Ehrenreich, 2002: 274). Through a ‘majority-inclusive approach’, Staunaes claims that ‘social categories and the intersectionality between social categories do not constitute a theme exclusively related to ethnic (racialized) minorities or women’ (Staunaes, 2003: 102). In this approach, social categories are not perceived as special minority issues, but also ‘count as conditions for the more privileged and powerful people’. (Staunaes, 2003: 105) Her approach leaves room for ‘troubled subjectivities’. Moreover, according to Carastathis (2008), the focus on hyper-oppressed groups contributes to the fact that individuals privileged on axes of gender and race do not see themselves as gendered or racialized. In those accounts, the intersectionality of white men is erased. Assuming the whiteness and maleness, unless otherwise specified, is conducive to think white man as a unified subject. To support this claim, ‘colorblind and gender-blind intersectionality’ are introduced by Carbado (Carbado 2013). He demonstrates how whiteness and masculinity come to operate as the natural and unmarked racial and gender social positions, rather than as particular representations of them in the antidiscrimination law, as well as in certain law and civil rights advocacy. In doing so, he illustrates how white male heterosexuality works as ‘the normative baseline against which the rest of us are intersectionally differentiated’ (Carbado, 2013: 841). From a different perspective, Prins (2006) takes up constructionist interpretations of intersectionality to counterbalance the systemic case studies’ focus on the groups who are positioned on the fringes of the society by ‘ordinary’ cases in which ‘the effective operation of multiple axes of inequality can only be accounted for by the narration of multilayered stories’ (Prins, 2006: 282).

Constructivist approaches are more equipped to question the processes of human agency and creativity by which individuals resist, challenge, and transform the inequalities they are subject to. Taking up categories as fluid negotiations, their theoretical frameworks are more helpful to conceptualize a dynamic subjectivity formation. They point to the human creativity and innovation in transgressing the categories. Individuals become the author and co-author of the categories which are not ‘merely exclusive and limiting forms of categorization, but simultaneously provide

narrative and enabling resources' (Prins, 2006: 280). They invent and transgress the traditional conceptions. This enables 'to grasp the unexpected, the differences, the ruptures, [and] the ambivalence in subject positions' (Staunaes, 2003: 109). For instance, in Buitaleer's account, identity is not the sum of different identifications, but a process in which various voices, each of which is embedded in field-specific repertoires of practices and discourses informed by specific power relations, co-construct one another through a dialogue within the self (Buitelaar, 2006: 273). Drawing on Bakhtin's concept of dialogical self, Buitelaar (2006) takes up subjectivity formation as an intersectional process of 'orchestrating the voices within ourselves that speak from the different I-positions between which we shift' (Bell and Gardiner cited in Buitelaar, 2006: 261). In Buitelaar's framework, identity is dialogically constructed:

'We make use of the ways in which the meaning of words is embedded in field-specific repertoires of practices, social capital, characters and discourses that characterize the various modalities of the identity categories through which we are constituted. [...] When we speak, however, we actively co-construct these collective voices. We innovate rules and conventions as we apply them' (Buitelaar, 2006: 261).

Categories, in these accounts, are not only structural entities from which marginalization, oppression and subordination stem, but 'important and difference-making parts of subjectivities' that intersect in the lived experiences of subjects (Staunaes, 2003: 102). It is in and through this dialogical process that individuals and groups give meanings to their surroundings and come up with new subjectivities, claims, and strategies. These identity positionings and their constant negotiation at multiple levels help to conceptualize an agency-oriented focus on the political dissent and change.

II.III.III. Identities as sites of coalitions and conflicts

An intersectional perspective on subjectification sheds light on alliance-building, collaboration and conflict within the social movements. Identifications, and their intersections, create various identity positions, and create possibilities and pose challenges to act collectively. They become sites in and through which new groups emerge, negotiate and diversify the issues, questions, and strategies of the movements. Taking categories of identities as ontological entities, systemic approaches to intersectionality stress the strategic, time- and space-specific coalitions between distinct

groups against particular institutions that uphold power inequalities. Crenshaw's traffic metaphor is one example of such accounts. On the other hand, constructionist approaches consider categories as inherently coalitions within the individual, and also emphasize coalition-building between identities, groups, and struggles against both visible and more subtle working of power at multiple levels. Contra to Crenshaw's traffic metaphor which assumes coalitions as strategic alliances, Ehrenreich put forth a symbiotic analysis in which the house-of-cards metaphor conceptualizes coalitions as entangled to one another in multiple ways: 'Unlike intersectionality's separate vehicles operating independently and coming from opposite directions, the sets of cards exist in relation to each other and mutually reinforcing; they hold each other up'. (Ehrenreich, 2002: 279) Her metaphor takes into account the possibility of coalitions between differentially subordinated groups since the pulling of a group of cards would have a significant effect on the subordinating systems. In this logic, an identity group which fails to recognize the interests of its doubly subordinated members reinforces the system of subordination which it attacks. (Ehrenreich, 2002: 282)

Conceptualizing identity as a process of doing coalitions within various orchestrating voices, Carastathis's account of Va'zquez further illustrates the importance of the intersectionality within one's identity to build alliances among social movements (Carastathis, 2013: 944). Thinking about identity as coalitions puts the focus on the fact that groups are already heterogeneous within, which in turn leads to ever-changing coalitions. It leads one to 'cross boundaries imposed by systems of oppression' (Carastathis, 2013: 959-960). This leads to a different understanding of coalition building which brings about an 'integrated struggle against interlocking systems of oppression' (Carastathis, 2013: 953). The existential challenge of constructing bridges within embodied self goes hand in hand with the construction of bridges between political movements. Thus, the focus on diversity, fluidity, complexity, and heterogeneity of identities/structures does not necessarily lead to abandon coalitions among individuals/groups. Rather, unity is not inherent in one's membership to any group, but temporary, that is, it is generated through constant negotiations among individuals/groups. In her radical democratic model, Mouffe contends that recognizing the intersections of identities paves the way to subvert totalizing discourses and create a chain of equivalence among the different democratic struggles and their

respective right-claims. Individuals and groups, in such a view, are more open to create 'a democratic alternative whose objective is the articulation of the struggles linked to different forms of oppression' (Mouffe, 1992: 370).

An intersectional look to identity and movements brings about not only possible coalitions but possible conflicts as a reason of hybrid positionings. By producing privilege and subordination simultaneously, overlapping subordinating systems play a productive role in the creation of the individuals which in turn may employ their privilege to resist their subordination (Ehrenreich, 2002: 299-303). That said hybrid intersectionality may also makes it difficult for them to resist various axes of difference and inequality as a reason of what Ehrenreich calls compensatory subordination (Ehrenreich, 2002: 276). In such a space of collaboration and conflict, Butler argues that 'the only possible unity [among and within social movements] will not be the synthesis of a set of conflicts, but will be a mode of sustaining conflict in politically productive ways, a practice of contestation that demands that these movements articulate their goals under the pressure of each other without therefore exactly becoming each other' (Butler, 1997: 37).

II.IV. Conceptualizing change through acts

In this study, I explain the change that the objectors bring about through questioning their acts of objections. I take up CO to military service as an act of citizenship in and through which individuals and groups become agents of change by putting forth new intersectional subjectivities in multiple sites and at multiple scales. These subjectivities are reflexive and embodied becoming. Individuals and groups reproduce, negotiate, and/or transgress structurally imposed identities, such as hegemonic conceptions of citizenship, soldiering, and objection, by reflecting on their embodied experiences in situated contexts of time and space. In doing so, they vary the content, types and forms of the objections. Change occurs through these subjectivities which take varying distances from the hegemonic orders and construct alternative, be it hybrid or counter-hegemonic, subjectivities, claims and goals. Social reproduction and deconstruction of norms, values and beliefs is a matter of degree, and the extent of change unfolds in accordance with the claims and goals of the agents and the political structures in which they take part.

The emergence and transformation of acts are historically embedded, in that the embodiment of hegemonic ideals of citizenship may enable the agencies in critical historical junctures with specific political opportunity structures. Citizenship regimes create a national habitus; namely, ‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be [...] can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor’ (Bourdieu, 2013 [1977]: 72). Hegemonic discourses and practices of citizenship ‘exists internally in subjects’ minds, consolidated in systems of dispositions that [...] have the potential to guide action’ (Caetano, 2015: 67). This brings to the fore ‘the principle of continuity and regularity’ (Bourdieu, 2013 [1977]: 81), and explain the expected, anticipated and ordinary acts, including the conventional forms of dissent. For Caetano, the dispositionalist approach ‘makes it possible to take account of this pre-reflexive element of practices, embodied in schemes of perception and interpretation that have the potential to guide human conduct’ (Caetano, 2015: 67). Individuals are ‘embedded within the fabric of our ordinary relationships and it is from within these that we come to feel and think about them and the ambivalences within them, our emotional connections to others forming a central element of our agency that sometimes is pre-reflexive or only partially reflexive’ (Burkitt, 2016: 332).

Embodiment of hegemonic discourses and practices in and through acts, however, do not only enable but also limit the dissent. I turn to acts to theorize the possibility of creative and unexpected interruptions to the hegemonic orders, leaving room to account for the role of counter-hegemonic agencies. Even in relatively less favorable political opportunity structures, individuals and social movements put forth various acts of resistance to pursue their agendas. They reflect on their embodied experiences, give new meanings to the situations they encounter, and transform their subjectivities, collective identities and the ways in which acts of dissent are performed. Archer, one of the main proponents of critical realism, introduces the concept of reflexivity in order to account for the varying forms of subjectivity. I think that reflexivity is a useful concept to explain the moments of rupture with the national habitus. However, it needs to be re-conceptualized in order not to reify structures and the self as distinct entities with specific qualities. Like the early theories of dissent,

Archer assumes a dualistic approach to structure and agency, and takes up reflexivity as an analytical category that explains ‘how the causal power of social forms is mediated through human agency’ (Archer, 2017: 157). She relies on the ‘inner dialogue’ metaphor to analyze this process. Reflexivity ‘is held to depend upon conscious deliberations that take place through internal conversation’ (Archer, 2017: 166). Through ‘reflexive inner dialogue’, individuals become ‘active agents’ who delineate their ultimate concerns, define their projects, and determine their practices in society (Archer, 2017: 177). They put in practice an ‘agential reflexivity’ that ‘mediates between our structurally shaped circumstances and what we deliberately make of them’ (Archer, 2017: 177). Agency is constructed by Wiley as an inner dialogue too. For him, ‘action is the work of the dialogical self conversing with itself in the arena of inner speech’ (Wiley, 2010: 17). Sayer (2010) also puts forth the crucial role of reflection and reason in mobilization and action.

Critical realist accounts of reflexivity, however, is criticized as a reason of the conceptualization of an egocentric self and ‘non-social self-consciousness – that bottom level of his or her stratified self that is supposed to develop early in life and remain forever “proofed against language” and other sociocultural influences because rooted in our embodied, non-social “Humanity, as a natural kind”’ (Piiroinen 2014). For constructivists, the self is essentially social. King (2007) contends that ‘even the most personal forms of agency are in fact the product of collective action’ (King, 2007: 212). Instead of Archer’s undersocialized concept of self and mind, these scholars conceptualize the self as a relational one; for ‘individual is permeated through and through by social influences, down to the internalized conversations that makes up our conscious minds’ (Collins, 1986: 260). In this study, I take up a critical constructivist approach which reconceptualizes reflexivity and habitus not mutually exclusive but intertwined processes of political subjectivity and claim formation. Several scholars aim at improving these theories by incorporating these frameworks. Decoteau (2016) contends that ‘no account of social action necessitates the positing of a pre-discursive, naturalized sense of self; that conscious action is not necessarily required for social change; and that it is because social selves are always situated at the intersection of multiple fields that they are capable of reflexivity’ (Decoteau, 2016: 304). Individuals can make reflexive deliberations while embodying the habitus of past structures. This is

because, Decoteau argues, people are at the intersections of multiple and overlapping identities and fields ‘which provide them resources and perspectives that allow for reflexivity’ especially in times of crisis (Decoteau, 2016: 309). Hence, unlike Archers’s account, habitual and embodied actions may also bring about change. Reflexivity, in this account, arises from field positionality and individuals’ slipping between various fields rather than an ontological pre-social self. Self is not fully autonomous being but embedded in specific relations of power that are shaped and reshaped by the hegemonic orders. Hence, individuals ‘act out of habit or are not fully conscious of all the contingencies that form the context of their action, yet still create an intervention that produces a particular effect’ (Burkitt, 2016se: 338).

Citizens and social movements put forth new subjectivities and create change in and through such a reflexive and embodied process. They negotiate multiple, multilayered and intersectional identity positionings in multiple sites and at multiple levels, and bring about new subjectivities with new claims and goals. Which one of these identifications matters more depends on time, place and the issues at stake. Some become central and salient; others become peripheral. Their intersections open up possibilities for coalition among various social groups or create conflicts that limit the collective agencies. Activists negotiate these identifications through a dialogue within oneself, with other activists, and with the institutions, such as state, ECtHR and military. In doing so, they not only challenge the hegemonic conceptions but also the movements in which they take part. In a period of disaggregated citizenship, individuals ‘develop and sustain multiple allegiances and networks across nation-state boundaries, in inter- as well as transnational contexts’ (Benhabib, 2004: 174). Individuals navigate in and through multiple democratic iterations, that is, ‘complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society’ (Benhabib, 2004: 179). This is what Benhabib defines as ‘jurisgenerative politics’, that is, ‘iterative acts through which a democratic people that considers itself bound by certain guiding norms and principles reappropriates and reinterprets these, thus showing itself to be not only the *subject* but also the *author of the laws*’ (Benhabib, 2004: 181). It is this ‘reflexive experimentation’ and this space

between transcendent norms and will of democratic majorities that forge human agency and creativity in the reconfiguration of identity and citizenship. I will demonstrate how these sites and scales are transformed and how they affect the citizen engagement and social movements.

One important aspect of acts of citizenship literature, however, should be refined before finishing this section and turning to methodology. Articulating a feminist theory of subjectivity into the acts of citizenship approach problematizes basic assumption of the approach on voice and agency. The acts of citizenship studies implicitly assume that the constitution of political subjectivities involves and necessitates voice (Nyers 2010). As activists citizens, individuals and social movements break with the silent majority, ‘conventionally understood to be a silent community that forms a majority of the population, but does not express views in public, [...] does not act overtly in a collective manner, [...] does not automatically engage in public displays, does not organize street parades, does not regularly express its views on television chat-shows, and does not write opinion columns for the serious press’ (Turner, 2015: 514). It is the contention of study that, at least in the context of CO in Turkey and Israel, acts of objection is predominantly understood as acts of civil disobedience which breaks the silence covering draft dodging and desertion. However, it is also important not to ignore the agencies of the silent majorities in effectuating change. Silent acts do not necessarily mean passive, disengaged, or disempowered agents (Gest and Gray 2015; Gray 2015). Grey objectors are active agents who perform various mundane tactics on a daily basis to avoid the military service (De Certeau 1984). They bend the rules and regulations, dodge the draft, desert the barracks, get legal exemptions or go abroad. Scott argues that ‘such a politics of hidden dissent, of disguise and anonymity, [...] is resistance of the most effective kind, for these subversive gestures eventually insinuate themselves, in disguised form, into the public discourse. They lead to a slow transformation of values, they nurture and give meaning to subsequent, more overt forms of resistance or rebellion’ (Bleiker, 2004:203). Within this framework, I demonstrate that silent and everyday acts of dissent may create cracks and fissures in the institutions and hegemonic orders. Incorporating a feminist intersectional analysis further indicates that acquiring voice through conventional forms of political participation does not always lead to desirable outcomes. The positioning of agents in

the historically embedded relations of power creates structural and political intersectionalities that affect the agencies of different subjectivities differently. Specifically, I claim that gendered nature of military, militarism and militarization silences the agencies of women in the objection movement or increases their voice insofar as women's objections are masculinized through prison terms. This complicates the assumption that voice brings achievements. It urges scholars to employ an intersectional perspective to question how acquiring voice may have its own pitfalls for the different groups within the social movements.

II.V. Methodology

Similar to the subjects of research, the researcher is an embodied and reflexive becoming that sees, perceives and understands the world in which s/he lives from his/her standpoint. S/he has a specific agency in asking questions, analyzing the data and coming up with conclusions. Thus, s/he constructs the research from a specific vantage point. However, this is not to say that we cannot make substantive knowledge claims due to the relativity of our visions. It simply indicates that all knowledge claims, including those of this research, are 'situated and embodied knowledges' (Haraway 1988). If we consider researching as an act, ontology of this act is constituted by the embodiment of our visions. Haraway's point is important in this process as a methodological and epistemological framework, that is, one should expect partial objectivity from the vantage points of the particular, and their conversations to sustain critical knowledges. Researchers are located and positioned, always 'complex, contradictory, structuring, and structured' (Haraway, 1988: 589). Research has 'a kind of agency on its own, because the decisions we take during the research design, the topic, the way we ask the questions, our empirical choices, all empower certain choices while silencing other ones' (Erol, 2013: 14). The choices also stem from the possibilities and limitations in the conduct of the study. Is there enough available data to draw certain conclusions? How is it possible to reach the sources from which we acquire the data? How does the positioning of the researcher vis-à-vis the topic of research affect the reinterpretation of the data in hand? Being aware of these possibilities and limitations, as well as the embodied and reflexive aspects of claim-making, is the starting point of this research.

CO is a multilayered and multilevel phenomenon that includes many actors with different identities, goals, interests and power, and is performed at individual, societal, national, supranational and international levels. As a political act, CO is introduced, negotiated and transformed by the objectors, is enabled or curbed by national and international institutions, is discussed and constructed by media, and is advocated by various civil society actors. Objectors seek to pressure the military through media, political elites, national and international litigation and civil society. Thus, a research on the phenomenon may be designed in many different ways, comprising various theoretical, conceptual and methodological approaches and questioning different actors involved. And none of these ways would be able to grasp CO in its entirety. The research I conducted may be described as the research of the dissent. This is to say that I questioned the objectors' side of the story. I conducted a comprehensive research, which spanned time and place, employing qualitative data at the individual and organizational levels (multi-level analysis) in Turkey and in Israel. Multi-level method aimed at questioning the emergence and transformation of subjectivities and claims at the individual level and the series of bargaining, negotiations and change at the organizational, national and supranational level. I conducted a comparative analysis comprising different historical periods in Turkey and in Israel. I questioned CO from a historical perspective in each country and between these countries. The purpose of a comparative look at CO was to come up with cumulative knowledge, albeit partial and situated, on the phenomenon. Furthermore, it was also to reformulate the questions, ask new questions that are not necessarily asked in one context, and come up with more rigorous analytical explanations on each case. The comparisons have been made between similar time periods in Turkey and in Israel and between different time periods within each country.

As an individual who was not socialized with objectors before my fieldwork, I am not an 'insider' per se; however I conduct a 'social research of the familiar' since I have been familiar to the activist circles and civil society organizations. I did not make any in-depth interviews with the state officials, politicians, decision-makers, judges, etc. This constitutes one of the limitations of the research. My inferences on the perception of CO among the political and military elites came from official documents and statements in the media. I traced laws and regulations; public statements and

declarations of state and military officials, the Chief of General Staff, military and civilian judges, prosecutors; and the court cases of objectors in order to assess the emergence, classification and conceptualization of CO at the state and military level. Due to the limitation of language, the analyses of legal transformation in Israel were based on literature reviews. That said I also analyzed those legal documents that were translated into English.

I conducted a fieldwork on conscientious objectors and the movements' activists through semi-structured and in-depth interviews with 67 individuals, including 23 self-declared objectors and four grey objectors in Turkey, an ex-soldier who worked in the Turkish General Staff Command between 2012 and 2014, an international journalist who worked on civil-military relations in Turkey, and five ex-conscripts who served in the Turkish military, and 25 self-declared objectors and three grey objectors in Israel. The shortest interview took half an hour and the longest one three hours. That said almost all of them were around one and a half hour. Except four interviews, all the interviews were recorded, transcribed and shared with the interviewees who would like to read them. The objectors, with whom I conducted the interviews, constitute a representative sample which includes objectors with different social, economic, political, and cultural identifications. The interviews with ex-conscripts were not employed throughout the research. As someone who has not been in the barracks, the purpose of these was to better grasp the service from the vantage point of individuals with different socioeconomic, sociocultural and political identifications. Moreover, I conducted a literature survey and analyzed the interviews that were published in books, such as *Asker Doğmayanlar* (Öğünç 2013), *Dissent and Ideology in Israel: Resistance to Draft 1948-1973* (Blatt et al., 1975), and *Refusnik! Israel's Soldiers of Conscience* (Kidron, 2005); on newspapers and magazines; and online websites, such as *savaskarsitlari.org* and <http://vicdaniret.org/vr-der/>. For historical analysis, I employed secondary resources that had been published by several scholars on this topic. My analysis also stemmed from my participant observations in several conferences that were organized by objectors, in weekly meetings of activists, and in demonstrations that were organized by activists.

I employed textual/discourse analysis as an epistemological and methodological framework. I consider discourse analyses suitable to the questions I asked throughout

the study. My methodology stemmed from the central role that the categories of difference/identity to answer the main research question. Specifically, I questioned subjectivity formation through self-narratives of the objectors: How do the objectors construct their subjectivities? How do they position themselves vis-à-vis the others? How do they construct their claims; and which discourses and practices enable and limit these claims? Discourses, their entanglement and their constant dialogue with one another become important in assessing what objection means, how it emerges and transforms within series of bargaining and negotiations. I began my interviews with the same question: What sort of a life story brought you to objection? I started with an open-ended and relatively vague question to let the objectors to come up with their self-narratives about any happenings in their life trajectories that they considered important in their paths to objection. Then, I analyzed how these narratives frame CO in its relations to the categories of identity/difference, such as sex, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship, and religion. I deciphered how they conceptualize notions, such as militarism, organized violence, self-defense, and objection; and in what ways these categories and conceptions enable the acts of objection. I further asked questions to understand how CO unfolds at the organizational level: Where and how do the objectors position themselves vis-à-vis the other objectors? Do they engage in dialogue with objectors with different subjectivities, claims and goals? The discourse analysis was complemented by an inquiry into the practices of objectors. Discourses and practices are not mutually exclusive, but complementary to understand the acts of objections. I investigated the acts that the objectors performed in sites, such as everyday spaces, courts, state and military bureaucracies and hospitals. I analyzed the legal documents, the court cases, the laws and regulations, the ‘unfit reports’, the administrative notifications and the discourses and practices of the state and military officials. I further relied on my participant observations in the demonstrations, panels, associations, and in several encounters during my fieldwork.

Throughout the study, I employed various concepts and differentiate between different types of objections. These concepts do not represent fixed totalities. I take up them as categories that, albeit fluid and changing, help to create a structure the acts of objections. Grey objection means silent and hidden acts of dissent in and through which individuals and groups refuse to serve in the military without constructing their

objections as acts of civil disobedience. In this research, I do not make a research on grey objection per se, but take it as an analytical category in order to put forth the historicity of CO to military service. Incorporating the everyday and mundane acts of grey objectors demonstrates that, although dissent to military service has been recurrent since the formative years of statehood, CO emerges in situated contexts of time and place. Grey objectors further problematize the acts of citizenship approach that assumes the importance of voice in political agency and change. I further employ categories such as total, selective, secular and religious objections. Selective objection signifies those acts that refuse the military service, or specific wars or missions, without the rejection of organized violence for just causes. Total objection refers to those acts through which individuals and groups refuse the military service, armed resistance, or other sorts of organized violence in all circumstances. It differs from pacifism, in that it does not preclude the use of violence in cases of self-defense; the self understood as an individual self. That said the positioning of total objectors vis-à-vis the alternative civilian service may change. Total objection includes both the acts that refuse such a service and those that accept it. Religious objection is the act that constructs religious subjectivities, claims and goals. Secular objection, on the other hand, signifies the act of refusing the military service due to non-religious identifications, such as moral positions and/or political ideologies.

II.V.I. Turkey and Israel in comparison

My comparative methodology is based on Mill's method of difference which designs the research on similar cases with different outcomes. Turkey and Israel have similarities in their domestic and international politics and in their citizenship regimes; yet the acts of objection differ. Both of the countries are constructed as nations-in-arms amid wars and militarized ethnic conflicts; they are both located in the Middle East with strategic security ties to the West; and their citizenship regimes links citizenship and national security through compulsory military service. That said, the CO emerged quite early in the Yishuv period and has traveled to many segments of the society, i.e. soldiers, right-wing *kippah serugot*, antimilitarists, and feminists, in Israel. Plus, it has a much larger scope; and a reformist and Zionist stance constitutes the predominant groups of objectors. In Turkey, on the other hand, objectors face the hostile attitude of authorities. The CO emerged in a much later period (in the 1990s) and has later been

appropriated by mostly radical and left-wing groups, i.e. feminists, LGBTs, Kurds, Jehovah's Witnesses and Muslims. It has a much smaller scope; and, regardless of these subjectivities, it represents a much radical act of dissent that seeks to abolish the Turkish military altogether. I argue that the difference in the timing, scope and substance of the movements stem from the differences in the hegemonic conceptions of military, militarism and militarization.

Turkey and Israel are both constructed as the nation-states which are located in the Middle East with strategic security ties to the West; namely, the U.S. and European countries. With the end of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey's founding as a republic, the republican elites sought to be a part of the Western civilisation – represented by its Westernising reforms and its Western-oriented foreign policy that made it a part of institutions such as NATO in 1952 and OECD in 1961. Turkey became the thirteenth member state of the Council of Europe in 1950. This process increased its pace as Turkey was selected as an official candidate country to EU with the 1999 Helsinki Submit. Israel also has strong military ties to the West. In 1962, U.S. agreed to sell missiles to the country. In 1981, two countries signed the Strategic Cooperation Agreement. Today, Israel is a major purchaser and user of U.S. military equipment. Israel is also an associated state of European Union. The relations between the two are framed in the European Neighborhood Policy, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the Union for the Mediterranean. These ties are not only between each country and the West; Turkey and Israel also establish military alliance between each other. The militaries exchange material, know-how, and technology.

After the WWI and the War of Independence, the memories of dismemberment and Independence War led to a greater demand for security in Turkey. Israel, on the other hand, emerged amid the militarized ethno-religious conflict with the Palestinian Arabs and the neighboring Arab countries. Following the Western colonial projects, Israel settled in Palestine as a colonial-settler nation. The militaries have struggled with the security threats throughout the history of the nation-states. Turkish military fought against internal threats, i.e. Sheikh Sait Rebellion, Menemen uprising, Ararat Rebellion, and Dersim Rebellion, until the late 1930s. It was further deployed against the radical leftist armed struggles in the 1970s. From the 1980s onwards, Turkish military have been fighting with the PKK, the armed organization of Kurdish nationalists, except for

short periods of cease-fire. Israel, on the other hand, has a long lasting conflict with the Palestinian Arabs. The IDF struggled with Palestinian ‘infiltrators’ who were entering the country from Syria, Egypt, and Jordan in the 1950s and 1960s. The control over the West Bank and Gaza has fueled the ethnic problems within and beyond the Green Line since 1967. Today, the main security threats in both countries stem from the ethnic conflict they face within their borders. Both countries have further fought wars beyond their borders. Turkey has participated in the Korean War, carried out Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and is still deploying its military in the American-led intervention in Iraq and in the Operation Euphrates Shield. Israel has participated in Suez Crisis, and fought the Six Days War, the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War, the first Lebanon War, the first and second Intifadas, the 2006 Lebanon War, the Gaza War, the Operation Pillar of Defense, and the Operation Protective Edge.

In the context of protracted wars and militarized ethnic conflict, military-cum-politicians constructed the nation-state as nation-in-arms in each country. Since the formation of the nation-state, the military has enjoyed a considerable popular support and established its hegemony in the formulation and implementation of the national security policies in various ways in each country. The military elites have considered themselves as the ‘guardians of the Republic’ in Turkey (Cizre 2004; Jenkins 2007; Heper 2011). This resulted in several military coups, interventions and coup attempts in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 and 2016. Although the military’s role was revised during the civilianizing efforts of the early 2000s (Güney and Karatekelioğlu 2005; Michaud-Emin 2007; Toktaş and Kurt 2010; Gürsoy 2011), the National Security Council still represents an institution through which military elites exercise their role in Turkish politics. The influence of military over Israeli politics has been relatively indirect. The ex-military leaders have benefited from their military careers to be appointed in important political positions as their second careers (Peri and Lissak 1976; Vardi 1991; Ben-Ari and Rosenhek, 2001: 164). Peri argues that protracted wars blur the boundaries between civilian and military spheres, and intensify the military-political partnership (Peri, 2006: 29). Others define the Israeli society as an intrinsically militaristic culture (Kimmerling 1993; Ben-Eliezer 1995). The IDF exercises its influence over Israeli politics through Military Intelligence Directorate (MID), Planning and Policy Directorate (PPD), and the officers’ roles in diplomatic negotiations (Peri 2006).

Furthermore, due to its specialized knowledge in security matters, the military enjoys relative autonomy in the application and implementation of the political echelon's directives (Michael, 2007).

In both countries, militaries were designed as tools to construct the 'ideal' citizenry within a republican ethos that prioritizes duties over rights (Üstel 2004; Kadioğlu 1994). That said, there are certain differences between the citizenship regimes. Though not universal, the Ottoman conscription signified a new conception of the male citizen which was obliged to perform his temporary soldiering duty to the Empire. The first conscription law of the Republican period was issued in 1927. The law projected the 'ideal citizen-soldier' within a civic-republican notion of citizenship (Kadioğlu 1998; Keyman and İçduygu 2003). The military has been envisioned as a 'melting pot' in which male citizens of the Republic, with different sociocultural, religious and economic backgrounds, would 'learn to be citizens'. The compulsory military service has been designated first and foremost for male citizens. Today, the duration of service is 15 months for noncommissioned officers. Those who are graduated from a higher education institution may do their service for 12 months if they choose to be reserve officers and for 6 months if they serve as noncommissioned officers. The women have been imagined as the bearers of the nation and excluded from the barracks.² In a parallel vein, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals, who do not conform to the hegemonic masculinity codes, have been excluded from the barracks via unfit reports (Connell 1995; Biricik 2009, 2012; Başaran 2014). Others are exempted from the service only in cases of health problems, and these procedures are relatively strict. The citizens may also postpone their service until the age of 29 in case they pursue their educations. In specific periods, governments enacted military service by payment and allowed individuals who were older than a certain age to be exempted from the barracks with a certain amount of money. Individuals are exempted if brother or father of the conscript dies during the military service. Turkish law does not recognize the right to CO. Although the right is not precluded by the Constitution, the Article 45 of the Law on Military Service impedes the exercise of the freedom of conscience, religious belief, conviction, thought and opinion against the compulsory

² That said, women were integral to the construction of the military service. Some were even included in the barracks, albeit only after a series of negotiations over their sex, gender and sexualities (Altınay, 2004: 33-52).

military service in Turkey. It states that ‘individuals may not evade military service, and penalties may not be revoked, for religious or moral reasons’.

In Israel, the military service has been constructed within an ethno-republican conception of citizenship. Enacted in 1949 and revised several times since 1986, Military Service Law has defined the recruitment to the IDF within a Zionist framework. Labor Zionism designated the Jewish men from Ashkenazi background as the bulk of the service while the Mizrahim, and Ethiopian and Russian Jewish immigrants and Jewish women fulfill lower ranks in the IDF (Levy, 1997: 41-42; Kimmerling, 2001: 101). Today, the duration of service is three years for men, and a bit less than two years for women. The IDF is composed of a reserve system which obliges male conscripts to fulfill their soldiering duties for one month in each year until the age of 50 and women until the age of 24. The Paragraphs 39 and 40 of the Defense Service Law exempts married, pregnant, and/or religious women, and mothers. The law further recognizes the right to CO for women. However, this is resulted more from patriarchal discourses and practices of the state elites than liberal values, and changes in 2004 (Rimalt 2007). Jewish men are not granted any right to CO with the exception of yeshiva student who dedicate their lives to the reading of Torah. Negotiations between the religious and secular elites lead to the exemption of yeshiva students and religious women from the military service. A similar exemption is granted to Druze men who pursue religious studies. The gays and lesbians have never been legally banned from the IDF because of their sexual orientation. However, the known homosexuals had usually been discharged before 1980 (Belkin and Levitt, 2001: 543). This policy changed in 1993 so that LGBT citizens can serve in the IDF openly and on equal footing with the heterosexuals (Kaplan and Ben-Ari, 2000: 401). Although there are no laws regarding the conscription of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, the Ministry of Defense is granted an administrative function which exempts all of them from the military service. That said the military sought to establish links with the community leaders in Bedouin and Druze collectivities in order to accommodate them in Israeli citizenship regime. The negotiations led to the voluntary conscription of Bedouin to the IDF in 1948 and the compulsory conscription of Druze in 1956. Moreover, Circassian men were conscripted to the military. The right to CO is not granted to Jewish and Druze men, and later Jewish women. Conscripts are excluded from the barracks only in

cases of medical exemptions. According to the paragraph 5 of the Defense Service Law, a medical committee is authorized to grant exemptions to the would-be conscripts on grounds of physical and or mental health. Called as Profile 21, the exemptions are given to those conscripts who are considered physically or mentally unable for soldiering. Although the Ministry of Defense establishes a Committee for Granting Exemptions from Defense Service for Reasons of Conscience (Conscientious Committee), it is indicated that the Committee grants exemptions extremely rarely, and only in cases of non-political pacifist objectors.

The countries further differ in their nationalisms and militarisms. Zionism pursued a colonial-settler ideology and a divide-and-rule policy that sharpened the resentments among the Jewish and Druze segments of the society in the context of militarized ethno-religious conflict between Jews and Arabs. Yet Zionism is a wide ideology with religious and secular understandings and these differences in the reinterpretations enabled the emergence of objectors in an early period. Spiritual teachings of Zionisms left room for antimilitarism and pacifism. The secular interpretations of Zionism delineated the roles of the citizen-soldier within specific ethical codes; and the military and civilian judiciaries have been eager to enforce these codes. On its website, the IDF defines these codes as purity of arms, defensive military strategy, black flag of illegality, safeguarding Jewish and democratic character of Israel, and protecting human dignity. These codes are framed as the ‘spirit of the IDF’ and guide the discourses and practices of the citizen-soldier. The military and civilian judiciaries have enforced these codes within the ranks. As early as 1956, border police men, who committed the 1956 Kafr Qasim massacre, were court-martialed. At the end of the trial, the judges introduced the terms ‘manifestly unlawful order’ and ‘black flag of illegality’ into Israeli military law (Orbach 2013). They cited that ‘a person shall not be criminally liable according to Articles 122 (disobeying an order), 123 (failure to follow an order), and 124 (negligence to follow an order) if it is manifest that the order given to him is unlawful’ and rescinded ‘the soldier's duty to obey and charge him with criminal accountability for his actions’. The IDF has later been scrutinized by the civilian authorities in several occasions. With the increasing level of public protest and sufficient media attention, the IDF’s involvements in the massacres or war failures have been investigated by the Agranat Commission on the 1973 War, the Kahan

Commission on the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres and the Shamgar Commission on the 1994 Hebron killings. Such an institutional framework and judiciary has been non-existent in Turkey. These differences have been influential in the differences in the CO between these countries.

Chapter III

Historicity of Conscientious Objection in Turkey and in Israel

CO to military service is mostly associated with the antimilitarist, anarchist and anti-war activists who put forth their total objections as acts of civil disobedience in the 1990s in Turkey. In Israel, on the other hand, CO is identified with the active-duty and reserve soldiers who put forth their selective objections to specific wars and missions of the IDF from the 1970s onwards. However, dissent to military service has a longer history in both countries. It dates back to the nation-state formation periods in which political and military elites impose the soldiering duty over the people. In this chapter, I question the emergence of objection, both in its grey and declared form, in the formative years of the statehood in Turkey and Israel to understand the change that these groups seek at the margins of politics. What sort of subjectivities, claims and goals do the acts of objection introduce? How do the objectors perform their dissent? And what do their agencies mean for the historiographies of the nation-building? I answer these questions by analyzing the discourses and practices of the objectors in a comparative fashion.

I argue that dissent to military service has specific historicities in Turkey and Israel. It emerges in similar historical junctures in which Turkey and Israel are constructed as nations-in-arms amid wars and political violence. The objectors construct pacifist, antimilitarist and/or anti-war subjectivities, with varying claims and goals, through various acts of dissent. In doing so, they negotiate multiple identifications, i.e. religious, ethnic and/or national, with the state, the military and the society. Objection emerges and is predominantly performed in its grey form, i.e. hidden and silent, in both countries. That said, objectors also articulate their refusals as acts of civil disobedience, seeking to promote legal, social and political change, since the

Yishuv period in Israel. The differences in the substances and forms of the objections are context-dependent, in that available scripts in a given regime and the military response differentiate the ways in which the objection is framed.

The chapter proceeds in three parts. First, it explores the historicity of objection to the military service in Turkey. Given the lack of data on the grey objectors, my analysis mostly relies on the secondary resources. I demonstrate the significance of grey objection in numbers, and trace moral and political subjectivities and claims through rare examples in which would-be citizens raise their dissenting voices in the country. The chapter then proceeds to Israeli case. I base my analysis on the discourse analysis of the interviews, published in the 'Dissent and Ideology in Israel'. Edited by Martin Blatt, Uri Davis, and Paul Kleinbaum, the book comprises the testimonies of the Jewish declared objectors between 1948 and 1973, including the activists of the Israeli War Resisters Association. Given the lack of data, I question Druze objection through secondary resources. To conclude, the chapter summarizes the similarities and differences between two countries, deciphers the reasons of this differentiation, and explains how these early acts of objection transform the historiographies of the nation-building.

III.I. Refusing in silence: Early acts of objection in Turkey

Turkish Republic was formed out of the Ottoman Empire which came to the edge of being dismembered by the European powers in the early twentieth century. As an agent of modernization, the Ottoman military paved the way for the emergence of secular, westernized and republican elite, who fought the Independence War and established the modern Turkey. The war and violence vividly present in their memories, the military-cum-politicians aimed to construct Turkey as a nation-in-arms. They enacted the compulsory military service for all the male citizens of the Republic in 1927. Through soldiering duty, elites tied the citizenship and to national security. The service was based on Article 72 of the Turkish Constitution and Article 1 of the Turkish Military Penal Code. Article 72 states that 'national service is the right and duty of every Turk. The manner in which this service shall be performed, or considered as performed, either in the Armed Forces or in public service shall be regulated by law'. Although there is not an explicit association of national service with the military service by law, Turkish state and military authorities declare that national service must be

understood as military service in their foreign correspondences (Çınar, 2014: 236). Article 1 of the Turkish Military Penal Code obliges men to serve in the military. Neither non-Muslims or pious Muslims or ethnic minorities are granted exemptions. The Law abolishes the wide range of exemptions, which had been granted to religious functionaries and students, residents of Istanbul, etc. in the Ottoman conscription system. An assimilationist policy is prompted by the authorities vis-à-vis the ethnic and religious minorities. The military service is imagined as a ‘melting pot’ in which men leave their individual identifications in the private sphere and assimilate to the Turkish citizenship. In doing so, the authorities aim at forming the citizen-soldiers of the newly emerging nation-state.

Grey objectors refuse to align with this citizenship imagery by prioritizing their individual and/or collective convictions over their duties. Their objections are performed in silence, that is, they avoid the service by dodging the draft, deserting the barracks, going abroad and/or getting exemption without making their dissent public. They do not seek purposive political action for legal, social and political transformation. Grey objectors constitute a significant number among those who refuse to serve in the military. Historians point to the high number of draft dodgers and deserters since the first attempts of establishing military conscription. During the wars, the Sultans’ incentives and orders were not enough to convince the common people to join the ranks. For example, from Asia alone, not above two or three thousand men answered the call of the Porte during the War of 1828-29 (Şimşek, 2005: 36). In the periods of enlistment, men hid on the mountains and in forests, sought the help of the local powers, or gave bribes (Şimşek, 2005: 71; Zürcher, 1998). Some even mutilated themselves to escape the enlistment (Ma’oz, 1968: 82-83).

After the enactment of specific laws and regulations during the Tanzimat period, many men also employed the legal clauses for exemption. The well-to-do sent substitutes. Others went to pilgrimages in Mecca or sought religious education (Şimşek, 2005: 73; Zengin quoted in Bein, 2006: 286; Zürcher, 1998). Bein states that the number of students in the medreses of Istanbul increased from approximately 3,000 in the early 19th century to over 5,700 in 1869 and to over 7,000 on the eve of military reforms in 1886 (Bein, 2006: 289). In 1892, this number rises up to 12,000 (Zengin quoted in Bein, 2006: 289). Non-Muslims, who were unwilling to serve in the Ottoman

military, paid a tax to avoid the enlistment (Davison, 1954: 856). As the Young Turks tightened their control, many non-Muslims left the country or got a foreign passport (Zürcher, 1998). Objectors avoided the military service through desertion too. Given the poor health conditions, low salaries and long terms of service, those, who joined the military, fled from the barracks. Many recruits came from *reaya*, including the unemployed, peasants and tribesmen, a population which did not possess the same military training that *askeri* had. They had difficulties in adopting the military environment (Shaw, 1965: 301). Şimşek states that 20,000 soldiers deserted the *Asakiri Mansure Muhammediye* between 1826 and 1837 (Şimşek, 2005: 74). The number of deserters increased during the World War I (WWI) and the Independence War. Zürcher (2009) states that there were 300,000 deserters in the Ottoman Army as of December 1917. By the end of the WWI it was four times that of the soldiers (Zürcher, 1998: 447).

Grey objectors have performed their acts in silence. Still, there were instances in which objectors were relatively vocal in their refusals in modern Turkey's history. Molokans, a Christian sect which became subjects of the Ottoman Empire after the peace negotiations between Soviet Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1918, refused the service due to their religiously-inspired pacifism. Following the teachings of Jesus Christ, many declared their total objections to the military and war, and rejected violence in any circumstance.³ Moreover, Alkan and Zeybek (2014) mention the Kurdish 'rebels' who refused to be soldiers of the new Republic. Given the difficulty in consolidating the universal military service in the formative years of the nation-state, Turkey witnessed the emergence of 'bandits' in some southeastern and eastern regions, populated by Kurdish citizens of Turkey. Through their collective action, Kurds rejected the monopolization of the use of violence in the hands of the republican elites

³ The doctrine of Molokans spread among peasants, from lower and middle classes, in the 17th century in Russia. Following the policy of Nicholas I of Russia which aimed at purifying central Russia from 'deviant' religious sects, Molokans were forced to immigrate to Caucuses from 1830 onwards. They were exempted from the military service in condition that they were displaced from central Russia. When the Russian military draft became mandatory in 1889, some Molokans made another deal with the Russian authorities and immigrated to the borders of the Caspian Sea and Turkestan. Others immigrated to Canada and the United States in 1890 and in 1905-1912. Those who did not immigrate set up villages at the borders of today's Armenia, Georgia and Turkey. They were placed in Kars and Erzurum after the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 (Denisenko 2009). Hür (2008) argues that the Molokans were total objectors due to their religious teachings (Retrieved from <http://www.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/ayse-hur/her-turk-asker-mi-dogar/2922/> on October 17th, 2014). Their theological doctrine rejects the state which challenges the authority of God. However, this statement should be taken in caution. There have been occasions where Molokans willingly helped military units by providing food and shelter. Çetinoğlu (2012) quotes the second-hand witnessing of Denisenko as follows: 'They have provided warm bread, fresh meat to the Turkish military that camped in the Çakmak village for days. I have been told that the villagers look after the soldiers like their children. The Molokans from Çakmak village have organized feasts for those soldiers who have been under the order of Kazım Karabekir' (Retrieved from <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim/makale.aspx?mid=816> on October 17th, 2014).

(Üngör, 2012) and avoided the military service. Their objections were not to all militaries and violence, and they indeed bore weapons against the Turkish state and the military. The claims of Molokans and Kurdish ‘bandits’, however, were not translated into political action and were eventually suppressed by the republican elites. After the authorities tightened the controls, some Molokans joined the military ranks and others immigrated abroad in 1922, 1962 and 1964 respectively. Kurdish resistance, on the other hand, was dispersed with the consolidation of the one-party rule in the late 1930s.

Dissent to the military, however, persists by incorporating different subjectivities and claims throughout the history of contemporary Turkey. According to the Ministry of National Defense, the number of draft dodgers and deserters amounts to 600,000 as of 2013.⁴ Military courts deal with 60,000 cases of draft evaders per year (Stolwijk, 2005: 72). Beside ethnic and religious identities, grey objectors introduce humanist, leftist, anarchist, antimilitarist and/or antinationalist subjectivities and claims. However, these individuals do not perform their objections as acts of civil disobedience, claiming rights and imposing new responsibilities. The dissent remains hidden and is not translated into purposive political action. Grey objectors engage in silent citizenship practices to avoid the service but they do not develop alternative citizenship agendas against the hegemonic conceptions of the citizen-soldier. Their agencies remain at the individual level. Many draft dodgers and deserters perform various acts of dissent on a daily basis to avoid any encounter with the state and the military:

I prefer public transportation. The police frequently control private cars. [...] I can't have any expression of anxiety if I face the cops. If I need to ask for an address, I directly go to the police and ask them. [...] If I am with a female friend, I feel more comfortable; it looks like we are family and they don't bother us.

I try not to pass by police stations. Each time I see a cop, I cover my face with a hat; I walk as if I have a hunchback, and I don't look around. I am trying to be with my girlfriend when I go out at night. I try not to have an attire that would attract attention. I mean, I try not to be abnormal.

Others find legal ways, such as going abroad and/or getting legal exemptions. In Mater's book, an ex-soldier explains how he got an ‘unfit’ report because his humanist and leftist convictions did not allow him to continue the military service in the midst of

⁴ Retrieved from <http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/erdogan-600-bin-asker-kacagi-var.V2W7cyTDyEKQcD5Ng2pgWA> on September, 10th, 2015.

war between the Turkish military and the PKK. Not knowing CO, he lost weight during his service and received exemption by the military doctors:

I checked all the laws and regulations concerning the military service and went over each and every line. [...] The only option was hunger strike. [...] I didn't touch the bread; no rice, no pasta, no paste. Without bread and rice, my weight dropped to 46 kg. (Mater, 2012: 34).

Many grey objectors do not attach any political significance to their refusals. For one interviewee objector, for his act to be called as an objection, 'it [objection] has to be a political act in his eyes'. According to him, his act rather stemmed from his personal interest than a political ideology. He stressed that his action is not CO because he did not speak it out loud:

I do not refuse [the military] with an ideology as such. There are maybe elements of ideology in it; but it is, for me, more of a personal decision. Of course, personal and political don't have to be so separated. But, in my eyes, to be an objector, you have to really have a strong ideology behind it. And yeah I don't consider my refusal necessarily as a political act. [...] It has to be that the person who does it has to see what he does as a political action. For me, it was a personal action, not a political action. [What makes an action political?] You can make a political action silently. But once you put a label on yourself, like, an activist, then the actions also, in my eyes, should be more than just silent, it should be louder and I never do loud actions.

Others are alienated from the language of right and citizenship and do not seek legal recognition. Kerem refused the military service based on his firmly established anarchist and antimilitarist identifications. After consecutive terms of postponement through education, he finally moved to South America for good. His motivation to avoid the service by going abroad was to prevent any contact with the state and the military. When I asked him if he considers himself as a conscientious objector, he refused such a definition. In this discourse, CO was not constructed as a right claim and he refused to identify with the legal language of rights and citizenship:

Objectors believe in law and rights. I mean, they say: 'I don't believe in your law but in international law'. Or, 'I believe that I have rights as an individual. I confront the state and the military without any fear on the basis of these rights and universal reason. I am ready for the punishment because I know that people will see that this punishment is not right'. This is what I understand from CO. I mean, they believe in law and rights. They believe that CO is a right that should be recognized by the state. First of all, I do not believe in law. I have never resort to the help of cops or courts. I have tried

to solve my problems by myself; without inviting the state into my business. I do not believe in my rights either. Of course, I have rights and I try to use them. But changing the law is not a motivation for my struggle. I think that anyone who has the power violates the law anyhow. This has always been like this and it will be the same. [...] This is why I am not comfortable with a rights-based struggle. Although hundreds of objectors weaken the military in Turkey, I think that millions of draft dodgers and deserters contribute to the weakening of the military as much as the objectors, and even more maybe. Noone believes in the idiom ‘every Turk is born a soldier’, except a handful of fascists. I think that the movement should not only take shelter in the law but crash it altogether. Extra-legal struggles seem to work well.

Others refrain from acts of civil disobedience because of its legal and social consequences. Harsh measures which are enacted by the republican elites limit the political representation of the subjectivities and claims by grey objectors in Turkey. The republican elites put forth strict measures in an attempt to curb objection to military service. The Grand National Assembly in Ankara discussed the establishment of Independence Tribunals to fight against the deserters as of July 1920. Following the rise of the number of deserters, the Law on Deserters was issued on 11 September 1920. The law penalized deserters, those who cause desertion, and those who help and/or hide deserters. The deserters and their supporters were imprisoned, executed or whipped by the authorities. Many objectors fear from social consequences of these legal charges and remain silent in their acts:

If I don’t work; if I don’t take care of myself; what will I do? I don’t have a rich father who will take care of me and fix me a job in his company. And if I sit in prison and attract attention, noone would hire me. [...] They would recognize my face. ‘Oh you are the refusing guy; we don’t want to hire you’.

The historical emergence of CO dates back to the nation-state formation in Turkey when grey objectors and a small group of declared objectors emerge against the compulsory military service. Since then, grey objectors has constituted the predominant form of objection to the service in the country. It is performed as an individual, non-public act that is performed through various legal or extra-legal acts of resistance at a local scale. Grey objectors do not introduce CO as a right claim and a tactical political act for radical social and political change. Only publicly known cases of objection to the service are discerned in the acts of Molokans who safeguard their Christian conscience against the compulsory conscription. Although various moral and political

subjectivities and claims exist, they are not introduced to the public sphere as acts of civil disobedience. In Israel, the picture is quite different. Like their counterparts in Turkey, the objectors harbored new moral and political subjectivities, constructed through an intersectional dialogue between religious, ethnic, and/or national identifications. Their objections, however, have been performed as acts of civil disobedience since the pre-state period. By doing so, individuals and groups perform their objections as acts of civil disobedience that seek to promote legal, social and political change.

III.II. The early acts of objection in Israel

Like Turkey, Israel was constructed as a nation-in-arms in which citizens contribute to national security through compulsory military service (Gal and Cohen, 2000). The memories of Holocaust and the WWII were present among the pioneers who came to Palestine during the Second Aliyah (1909-1914). They aimed at creating a nation-state for all the Jewish people in order to fend off the dangers that they had been exposed to in history. Labor Party defined Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and sought a homeland in which Jewish people constitute the dominant majority. The military conscription was imagined as a tool through which the ‘weak’ and ‘victimized’ Jew was transformed into a citizen-soldier. The military service was designated along ethno-national lines (Levy, 1997: 39). The Defense Service Law assigned soldiering duty first and foremost to the Jewish men and women, except married, pregnant and religious ones, in 1949. Zionist leaders incorporated Druze men to the service in 1956 while excluding Palestinian citizens of Israel by an administrative decree. Bedouin, Circassian, and Christian Arabs were incorporated to the IDF on voluntary basis. In doing so, the Law defined the ‘proper’ citizens (Üstel 2004) and their roles and positions in the Israeli society. Jewish men and women were constructed as the natural backbone of the military. Druze men, on the other hand, were constructed as ‘loyal’ allies of the newly emerging regime. Early generation of objectors refused to embody these images of citizen-soldier. Jewish objectors put forth pacifist and antimilitarist subjectivities and claims. Their ethno-religious identifications with spiritual Zionism and Judaism constructed these subjectivities and claims. Druze men, on the other hand, reclaimed their Palestinian Arab identities against the Zionist nation-building project,

which distinguished the Druzes from other Arabs as a distinct ethno-religious community.

III.II.I. Spiritual Zionism, pacifism and conscientious objection

Early Jewish objectors were mostly East European-born immigrants to Palestine in the 1940s. In the 1950s, Israeli-born middle-class Jewish men also joined them. Objectors defined themselves as Jewish and Zionists. As settler-immigrants, many were the agents of Zionist nation-building project in Palestine. Most of them have lived in kibbutz in certain periods of their lives and contributed to agriculture and other activities in the community. Many did not reject the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine because ‘nation-state may impede the persecution of Jewish people’ (Blatt, Davis and Kleinbaum, 1975: 56). However, their Zionism differed from the state-centric and militarized conceptions of Zionist elites. They reinterpreted their embodied experiences with wars and political violence, i.e. WWII and the Palestinian/Jewish conflict, through the teachings of some spiritual Zionists, and bring about pacifist, nonviolent, and/or antimilitarist subjectivities and claims. Thinkers such as Gandhi, Tolstoy, Ahad Ha’am, A.D. Gordon, Martin Buber, Judah Magnes and Ernst Simon influenced their acts. For Joseph, pacifism was a ‘revelation of the Godly sparkle in the human heart’ which he felt after some Palestinian Arabs, who were ordered to kill any Jewish person, cannot kill him during the Arab Revolt of 1936:

‘[...] when I thought about the hole staring at me from the depths of the well I had this revelation of the Godly sparkle in the human heart which was lit in the very moment when they could not follow the order which they had received to kill any Jewish person that they met. [...] I saw I was saved by the power of nonviolence. Many other times the great force of nonviolence has made itself clear to me’ (Blatt, Davis and Kleinbaum, 1975: 48).

Many were disenchanted from the Labor Zionism after they settle in Palestine as it failed to construct a ‘collective kibbutz where the ideals of brotherhood among the nations will be implemented’ (Blatt, Davis and Kleinbaum, 1975: 41). Contra to the Labor Zionist project that envisioned a secular and Jewish state, they defended a type of spiritual Zionism which aimed at establishing a binational state that would have included Jews and Arabs on an egalitarian basis. They did not dispute the right of both collectivities to the land. The Palestinian Arabs had been living there for hundreds of

years and Jewish people had sought to find ‘a refuge from persecution after they had suffered so much’ (Blatt, Davis and Kleinbaum, 1975: 41). However, objectors claimed that the Jewish people’s right to return to the land must have been evaluated in line with the Judaic tradition which stresses the importance of working the land, coexistence, social equality and justice:

‘Herzl – he says – understood quite clearly that Zionism means the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state, which directly leads to the disregard of the political and social rights of the people who happen not to be Jews but happen to have live there... Certainly the State is a product of Zionist ideology. [...] Judaism in a sense is one source of Zionist ideology. However, you could argue Judaism without a secular Zionism. Judaism does not require unequal status for the Arabs. [...] Judaic philosophy emphasizes social justice, not only for Jews, but for all humans, including Arabs’ (Blatt, Davis and Kleinbaum, 1975: 39-40).

‘The collapse of Judaism into Zionism has meant the collapse of the Jewish tradition into support of oppressive political policies and aims’ (Blatt, Davis and Kleinbaum, 1975: 90).

Many perceived Jewish people’s immigration to Palestine as an opportunity to construct an exemplary practice of Judaic tradition to the world:

‘I think that the Jewish people have a mission: to bring an example of a culture to the world. By culture I mean the example of living with your neighbor in peace. These teachings were started with the Ten Commandments. [...] in the later centuries you had the practice of forgiveness and all the ethics, which eventually summarized in the Sermon on the Mount. In Jewish thinking, the mission of Zionism was to live the Judaic law and to live in peace’ (Blatt, Davis and Kleinbaum, 1975: 52).

A similar ethical mission was also promoted by Nathan Chofshi, who has been the head of the Israeli War Resisters Association until the late 1960s. For him, Jewish people might establish an ethical example to the Jewish Diaspora and to the world in their new home. Inspired by the ‘religion of labor’ of Ahad Ha’am, Nathan sought to achieve this ethics by ‘working and cultivating the land’ and ‘helping the Palestinian Arabs in improving their farming techniques’. He wrote in 1955 that the State of Israel suffered from a duality – on the one hand it considered itself to be the fulfillment of the vision of the ancient prophets, but on the other hand it was established:

‘in blood and fire and by robbing the Arab inhabitants of the land. One sin leads to another. Now the stolen property must be guarded by means of the

total militarization of Israelis in the land of Israel, man and woman, boy and girl, fire burning round us and under our feet' (Keren, 2002: 34).

The Jewish objectors performed their objections in public. As early as 1954, they put forth political subjectivities that prioritized their individual rights over the duties to the nation. Amnon Zichroni, for instance, constructed his objection within a liberal-individualistic conception. After he was enlisted to the military, he came to the conclusion that his convictions went against the use of violence and the participation in the military:

'I am a war resisters and as a war resister I oppose the use of arms, because in my opinion there is no need to bear arms. It is a negative element that regresses reality. [...] When I was drafted, I was a person with pacifistic convictions... I said to myself I cannot be drafted. I don't know why I agreed to be drafted, maybe I wanted to be correct. Despite the fact that I was drafted, I wasn't ready to take the oath because I couldn't. I found the solution to my pacifism over time. The starting point of my thinking is the individual. I consider the individual to be the anchor of all social phenomena. I consider the individual as the end [rather than the means]' (Keren, 2002: 39).

Objectors further initiate their dissent as in the form of collective action. They sought to initiate an anti-war and antimilitarist movement. Before their objections, the objectors had been active in peace associations and political parties, such as HaOlam HaZeh, Brit Shalom, Ihud and Matzpen. In 1945, they established Israeli War Resisters Association. They organized demonstrations, signed petitions, and launched campaigns. In 1944, Joseph Abileah, one of the early objectors, submitted a plan to the British High Commissioner of Palestine for a binational state covering the area of Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The objectors further took action against the land acquisitions and the expulsion and destruction of homes of Arab inhabitants. They organized a protest march from Acre to Deir al-Asad and a campaign to protest against the confiscations of the Arab lands. Meanwhile, Druze men also began to voice their objections in the mid-1950s. They organized mass protests, petitioned the authorities to abolish compulsory military conscription of Druze men, and established associations, such as Druze Initiative Committee. I will now turn to this much neglected phenomenon in the scholarly literature on CO in Israel. I believe that such an inquiry is inspiring since it urges us to reevaluate the historicity of CO and historiographies of nation-state formation in Israel.

III.II.II. Druze men refusing to serve

Druze men have declared their objections to the military service since the first attempts by the Labor Zionists to enlist them to the IDF. They refused to serve in compulsory military service first in the reserves (in 1953) and then in the regular army (since 1956). As the Resolution 181 of the UN failed and the war was launched between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries in May 1948, the Zionist cadres aimed at incorporating the Druzes, who had been so far neutral, into their forces. Moshe Dayan, then chief commander of IDF, proposed a special unit based on voluntary recruitment of the Druze men (Firro, 1999: 50). Accordingly, Israeli authorities established a 'Minorities Unit' in the IDF and began to recruit the Druzes in exchange of free access to their fields, good salaries and free (or low cost) medical services. In 1949, the Minorities Unit 'had grown to a number of 850 officers and other ranks – 400 Druzes, 200 Bedouin, 100 Circassians, with 150 Jewish officers and professionals' (ibid: 57). In the early June 1953, the IDF issued the Recruitment of Joint B of reserve soldiers among the Druze community. Finally, in 1956, Druze men were legally granted the right and duty of soldiering.

The primary aim of the conscription was to divide Druzes from Palestinian Arabs.⁵ Israeli authorities designated the Druzes as a distinct community through various strategies (Cohen, 2010: 167; Firro, 1999: 168). The official recognition of the Druze identity as an independent ethno-religious community came into effect in 1963. The Interior Ministry began issuing identity cards to Druzes on which 'nationality Arab' was replaced by 'nationality Druze'. Since then, the Druze men have been perceived as the loyal soldiers of Israel by the Labor Zionists. Their military contribution has been praised by statespersons and Israeli media. This image has also been promoted by the Druzes themselves. Many Druze men sought jobs in the military ranks after the completion of their three-year mandatory military service. Khaled, a Druze male objector from a much later period, explained his frustration with such an image as follows:

⁵ A document produced by the Minorities Battalion states this explicitly: 'The direct effect [of the minorities unit] has been to bring the Druze community closer and to tie it to us, impairing relations between the Druze and Muslims in this country and undermining trust in the Druze outside the country'. Israel did not want to relinquish this achievement. In the mid-1950s it sought to broaden the "use" of the Druze, and the Minorities Battalion commander proposed using his unit for interior security and intelligence missions' (Cohen, 2010: 163-64).

We are portrayed as war heroes in the media. When a Druze is doing something ‘wrong’, it is portrayed as Arab. For example, in the recent war in Gaza, I have counted over 150 articles mentioning the Druze commander who was injured and went back to fight and he was called as a hero. [...] He was as war criminal among Palestinians. I wrote an article against him, claiming that he represented the army; he did not represent the Druze community; and he represented himself. That was of course not published in Israeli media.

Druze objectors refused the state-centric and militarized construction of Druze identity. Interestingly, their objections have not received attention in the scholarly literature. All of the works over objection concentrate on the selective objection of Jewish segments of the society which emerged as a widespread phenomenon during the first Lebanon War. When the Druze resistance to the conscription is mentioned in rare occasions, it is further not considered as a form of CO. As a matter of fact, in an encounter during my fieldwork in Israel, I was told by a prominent scholar of the Druze social and political history that the resistance of Druze to the military service could not be considered as CO since they mainly stemmed from socioeconomic reasons rather than political ideologies. This is partly true since there are cases of grey objection by which some Druze men refuse to serve in the IDF to accomplish their socioeconomic priorities. Without any public declaration, they avoid the service through legal exemptions. However, there are also those individuals who have performed their objections as acts of civil disobedience and enacted themselves as the Palestinian citizens of Israel who refuse to embody the Zionist imagery of ‘loyal’ and ‘courageous’ Druze citizen-soldier since the late 1950s. Their ethno-national identifications become politically significant in the midst of war, ethnic conflict, and political violence between Jewish and Palestinian Arabs. Most of the young draft-age Druze men criticize the state, the military and the community’s leadership, who collaborate with the Labor Zionists.

Cohen mentions that ‘out of 197 Galilean Druze called up at the beginning of 1956, only 51 voluntarily reported for service [and] of the 117 eligible young men from the Druze villages on Mt. Carmel, only 32 reported’ (Cohen, 2010: 160). Two months before the enactment of the compulsory service for Druze men, a protest began in the villages, claiming that the Druzes are Arabs so they should have not been enlisted to the military (Firro, 1999: 158). Towards the end of 1956, some sheiks, such as Sheik Farhud Qasim Farhud, organized mass protests in the villages. On 22 March 1957,

Sheik Farhud wrote to the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defense and to the Knesset, presenting them a series of demands that later became the core of the political discourses of the Druze objection. Petitioners from the village of Abu Snan rejected the law 'because it had been motivated by political considerations of some leaders who sought to be rewarded by the authorities' (Firro, 1999: 158-159. In 'Isfiya, the people tried to reach Zionist leaders, such as Abba Hushi, to reverse the law. The strongest opposition came from Shafa'amr, the resident town of Sheikh Salih Khnayfis, where sixteen youngsters sent a petition to the Prime Minister, asking to reverse the decision (Ibid). In the letter, they claimed that they were first of all Arabs and that they would not fight against their 'brothers' under any circumstances. That said they underlined their wish to perform all the obligations that civil law imposed on them. The authorities used incentives, i.e. the grant of gun licenses to Druze who encourage enlistment, as well as brute force to increase the number of recruitments. In cases of failure, they arrested the draft dodgers and deserters. Criminal files were opened up against young men who refused to serve; the objectors were imprisoned; and they were released only after they agreed to be enlisted.

The protests of Druze objectors were sporadic and informally organized in the formative years of the state. They became institutionalized during the 1960s. The impact of mass media in 1950s and the rise of Jamal Abd al-Naser in Egypt increased the pace of nationalism spreading in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the social, economic and political changes in the 1950s paved the way for the emergence of new intelligentsia among the Druzes. In 1958, Free Young Druze Movement was formed. The members of the movement refused to serve in the IDF. Samih al-Qasim, who was a well-known Palestinian poet and one of the founders of the group, was put in jail in 1960. Together with other Arab-Palestinian intellectuals, he advocated that the Israel pursued a 'divide-and-rule' strategy vis-à-vis the Druzes. After a meeting in 1963, Druze Youth Organization was established and functioned until the end of 1964 when it was closed down due to the challenges from the community leaders and the state. The association explicitly stated the abolishment of military conscription for Druze in its statute. It pointed out the discriminatory policies of Israel in labor market, the land expropriations, the lack of development in Druze towns and villages, and stressed that

the government continued to treat Druzes as Arabs although they simultaneously tried to differentiate them from the other Arabs.

The Druze objectors later gathered around the RAKAH – the Israeli Communist Party. On 10 March 1972, this group established Druze Initiative Committee. Local branches of the organization were set up in several villages. Their aims were to end the compulsory military service, to oppose the confiscation of Druze land, to prevent the interference of the State of Israel in matters of nationality and religion, and to enhance democracy and human rights.⁶ They contested the official historical narrative and sought to rewrite their collective memory as part of the Arab nation:

We don't learn the history of Druze in the Druze schools. We learn the Jewish history, Islamic history but nothing about the Druze history. There is a class called 'Druze Heritage' where you study this sheik or that figure; but ask any Druze youth in school right now what the Druze did between 1900 and 1948. No idea... They don't know that the Druze led the revolution against the French colonization. The Druzes were the first to make a movement against the British Mandate in 1929. It was a guerilla movement. The Druzes in 1948 did not collaborate with the Israeli army, like Israel portrays it up to day. Actually there were around 40-50 people who died in fighting against Israeli army. [...] The claim that the Druze go along with the ruler is common. But it is totally wrong; and its falsity is proved by those resistance movements that emerge from within the Druze communities in Syria, Lebanon and here before 1948 (Khaled).

III.III. 'Revealing the silences': Nation-in-arms building at its limits

Trouillot argues that 'the ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility' in writing history (Trouillot, 1995: xix). The incapacity to express the unthinkable and the reluctance to accept its significance produces silences in historiographies. Questioning the unthinkable of Haitian Revolution both by the contemporary philosophers and later historians, he argues that some historical facts are silenced or trivialized since they do not fit to the existing conceptual frames of reference. These facts challenge the very framework within which scholars question the related phenomena in a way that is not familiar to them. It is on the basis of such an argument that I conduct an inquiry into the CO during the nation-state formation periods in Turkey and in Israel. Uncovering the acts of objections in early years of Turkey and Israel constitutes an academic curiosity which 'reveals the existence of competing alternatives for envisioning the nature of the

⁶ Retrieved from <http://www.wri-irg.org/node/2497> on February 10th, 2015.

nation or state in formation and of a multiplicity of social groups and actors as taking part in this process' (Verdery cited in Altınay, 2004: 52). This poses a challenge to the official historiographies, which erase the 'other' by transgressing the 'myth of military-nation' (Altınay 2004).

The national historiographies construct Turkey and Israel as nations-in-arms in which a people's army is established to secure the nation. Accordingly, compulsory military service is put in practice to create the citizen-soldier. Republican elites in Turkey construct the service within a civic-republican framework. They enact the military conscription for all male citizens of the Republic, including Kurds and pious Muslims, while exempting women from the barracks. In doing so, they aim to assimilate ethnic and religious minorities into Turkish citizenship. In Israel, on the other hand, Zionist leaders follow a 'divide-and-rule' policy vis-à-vis the ethnic and religious minorities. Citizen-soldier is constructed along ethno-national lines. Soldiering is first and foremost assigned to Jewish men and women, and later to Druze men while Palestinian citizens of Israel are exempted from the service. In doing so, Zionist elites seek marginalization and hegemonic control, rather than assimilation, of the Palestinian Arab population (Peleg and Waxman, 2007: 434). Druzes, on the other hand, are welcomed to the 'ideal' citizenship.

Acts of objection emerge parallel to the nation-state formation and in accordance with these differences in the citizenship regimes. Objectors become agents of change through a process in which they refuse the militaristic conceptions of citizenship, put forth alternative subjectivities with new claims and goals, and perform these subjectivities through various acts. Multiple and intersecting identifications enable objectors to break away with the state-centric and militaristic conceptions of various categories of identity/difference. In the midst of wars and political violence, which are intrinsic to the nation-state formation, religious, ethnic and/or national differences become morally and politically salient and construct pacifist, anti-war and/or antimilitarist subjectivities. Christian, Jewish, Druze and/or Zionist identifications enable objectors with scripts to break away with the national habitus, which is hegemonically constructed as soldiering duty, and frame their objections. Notwithstanding the differences in the reasons, motivations and justifications, the acts of objections demonstrate that top-down construction of the citizen-soldier is an ever

contested, negotiated and challenged status and practice. Citizens transgress the limits of citizenship through their acts of objections in multiple sites and at multiple scales. They challenge civic-republican and ethno-national construction of the citizen-soldier through alternative scripts that construct their subjectivities. It is through these subjectivities that they negotiate and transgress the hegemonic ideals and create change.

The objection emerges and persists mostly in its grey form in both countries. Grey objectors perform hidden and silent acts of objection at the local scale. Their dissent is constructed as an individual act without any right claims. Grey objectors dodge the draft, desert the barracks, employ various tactics on a daily basis, get legal exemptions or go abroad to avoid any encounter with the state and military officials. That said, Israel projects a much different picture compared to Turkey. A group of 'activist citizens' have broken away with the hegemonic discourses and practices through acts of civil disobedience and sought legal, social and political change through collective action since the Yishuv period. The introduction of CO as a right claim in the Israeli political lexicon is enabled by the accommodative approach of the political and military elites. Unlike Turkey, Israel discusses the right to CO during the enactment of the Military Defense Law. CO is brought to the Knesset by different social groups. After a series of bargaining and negotiations, yeshiva students are exempted from the service in exchange of the Orthodox parties' support to Ben Gurion and his followers. Interestingly, the Law also recognizes the right to CO for women. Similar exemptions are not granted to Jewish and Druze men. That said, notwithstanding the criminalization of CO, the objectors are allowed to form their associations. Both Jewish and Druze objectors institutionalize their acts and initiate their collective action to transform the nation-building process. Labor Zionists relatively accommodate the objectors by allowing their institutionalization through Israeli War Resisters Association in 1945, the Free Young Druze Movement in 1958, and the Druze Initiative Committee in 1972. Objectors establish formal and informal networks, organize demonstrations, and sign petitions. A similar stance is far from being practiced in Turkey. Objection to the military service is not tolerated by the republican elites. With the consolidation of the monopoly of violence, Molokans, who is the only group of declared objectors due to their public status, are forced to emigrate and the Kurdish

'bandits', which constitute a group of grey objectors, are dispersed with the consolidation of the one party rule.

I argue that a historical inquiry into the objection contributes to the historiographies of the nation-state formation in both countries in an important way. Many studies employ structural, elite-centred and top-down analyses to examine the nation building processes. By doing so, they explain the emergence and perpetuation of the hegemonic conceptions of war, nationhood and citizenship. A bottom-up approach demonstrates that objectors have advocated alternative conceptions of war, militarism and citizenship since the formative years of both nation-states. Studies on CO in Turkey and Israel also neglect the early acts of dissent to military service. Scholars mostly start their analyses with the declared objection that has been introduced to Turkish politics since 1989. An inquiry into the early acts of objection demonstrates that Molokans, Kurdish 'rebels' and grey objectors precede the declared objectors and indeed reflect certain continuities with later generations of objectors. For instance, there is a similarity between the acts of Kurdish 'rebels' and the selective objections of Kurdish citizens of Turkey which emerges in the late 2000s. Moreover, notwithstanding the quick dispersion of Molokans and Kurdish 'bandits', grey objectors persist in the later periods and have transgressive and subversive powers. They open up cracks in the hegemonic discourses and practices of citizenship. My analysis, which will be elaborated in Chapter 6, demonstrates that such acts of dissent may create legal and institutional change. Briefly, grey objection becomes an important issue to tackle with in the transformation of the Turkish military and the IDF.

A historical analysis of objection to the military transforms the literature on the nation-state formation in Israel as well. Except a handful of studies, the early generation of Jewish and Druze objectors are not mentioned in the literature on CO. Scholars mainly focus on the selective objectors of active-duty or reserve soldiers with Jewish backgrounds, and recently on the total objections of antimilitarist and feminist Jewish women and men. However, Jewish and Druze objectors have performed their collective action in and through which they negotiate alternative subjectivities, rights and responsibilities since the formative years of Israel. Associations, such as Israeli War Resisters Association and Druze Initiative Committee, demonstrate that public acts of dissent to military, militarism and war exist in the form of civil disobedience, and shape

the dividing lines of objections, such as Zionism/anti-Zionism, in later periods. As I will explain in the following chapters, the divide between selective objectors, who refuse to serve in the occupied territories, and antimilitarist Jewish and Druze objectors are shaped along this divide. Selective objectors follow the early objectors by framing their acts and subjectivities within Zionism, albeit in a secular fashion. An inquiry into the early objectors further problematizes the statist, collectivist and centralist nature of state-society relations in the country. Studies argue that Israeli civil society is allowed to raise its voice insofar as it pursues the political agendas of the ruling elites in the formative years of the state. This argument is partly affirmed in my inquiry. It is worth mentioning that, from a comparative perspective, Israel seems more accommodative towards objection than Turkey. Although authorities employ various measures to curb the political agencies of objectors, such as imprisonment, refusal to issue passport, or refusal to grant food stamps, etc., the Jewish objectors are allowed to establish associations with antimilitarist and anti-war agendas.

Chapter IV

A Difficult Path to Navigate: The emergence and transformation of conscientious objection in Turkey

Compared to Israel, the emergence of CO as a collective act of citizenship is delayed in Turkey. Turkey witnesses CO as an act of civil disobedience from 1989 onwards. The objectors deconstruct the link between the citizenship and national security by refusing to serve in the barracks. In the existing political opportunity/threat structure, CO is a ‘daring’ act that transgresses the basic tenets of the ‘social contract’. Turkey is a country where the military culture and the security discourses are strong. Objectors break away with the citizenship habitus, i.e. soldiering duty, and problematize the military, militarism and militarization for the first time in Turkish politics. In this chapter, I question how this unexpected, unordinary and unanticipated change occurs. In doing so, I aim at explaining the social and political change the objectors bring about. How do the objectors become social and political agents of change in a relatively less favorable context? What kind of subjectivities, claims and goals that the acts of objections put forth? How does the substance of change evolve over time? What are the unifying and diverging aspects of the acts of objections? I answer these questions through an in-depth inquiry to the political subjectivities, claims and goals of the objectors. I argue that social and political change emerges in and through these subjectivities that refuse the militaristic conceptions of citizenship, negotiate multiple and multilayered identifications with the military, the society and other objectors, and produce new political subjectivities. I further argue that the objection becomes an intersectional social movement in and through which individuals and groups become agents of radical change in the country. Regardless of different subjectivities, claims and goals, objection represents an act of citizenship which seeks to deconstruct the state, the nation, and the military, and to abolish the soldiering duty.

CO first puts forth antimilitarist subjectivities and claims in the 1990s, and it later travels to different individuals and groups from the early 2000s onwards. I explore these travels, starting with the first declared objectors and then tracing the objections of women and LGBTs, Kurds and religious groups. I claim that, in critical historical junctures, the objectors create change through their reflexive deliberations on their embodied experiences with the military, militarism and militarization. Their positionality at the intersections of multiple identifications constructs alternative scripts to re-evaluate the citizenship, war and the nation-state, and initiate new repertoires of action in the country. Tracing the historical trajectory of CO, I demonstrate that the objection movement goes through significant transformations as new subjectivities, claims and goals are negotiated within the changing conditions of militarism, war and political violence. The acts of objection diversify along two cleavages; namely, total versus selective and secular versus religious divides. I claim that the different acts of objections create conflicts between groups of objectors due to political and sociocultural differences. The collective agencies of the movement are curbed as they fail to sustain a creative and intersectional dialogue between different groups of objectors.

The chapter will proceed in five sections. It first explains the change that the acts of antimilitarist and anarchist objectors bring about. It then proceeds to the articulation of feminist and queer subjectivities and claims into the objection movement. In the third section, it turns to the emergence of selective objection. Tracing the ethno-national and religious conceptions of objection, I demonstrate the differences of these newly emerging groups from the early objectors and the common scripts, such as self-defense and just war, which construct the selective objections of some Kurdish and Muslim citizens. In the concluding section, I trace the sites of collaboration and conflict between different acts of objections.

IV.I. An antimilitarist interruption: The emergence of conscientious objection

CO as an act of civil disobedience emerged for the first time in 1989 in Turkey. Tayfun Gönül declared his objection to the state, military and society in *Sokak* magazine. Although the term was new for Turkish political lexicon, as I have argued in the previous chapter, there have been unwillingness, ambivalences and resistance to join the barracks since the first attempts to enact the military conscription in the late

Ottoman period. Defined as grey objectors, individuals and groups have performed their objection in silence. The novelty of Tayfun was to declare his objection in public. For him, this was precisely where he differed from his past and others who were resisting the barracks in silence. Aiming to generate a public discussion over military, militarism and militarization, Tayfun publicized his noncompliance with the soldiering duty and invited others to do the same. In doing so, they sought to be recognized as political agents. Many declared objectors did not see such a possibility in the acts of draft dodgers, deserters, and those categorized as postponed or exempted:

The state demands many things from us. It wants my right to life. And I say: 'I am not giving this to you'. And I first say this to myself. But then the state takes me and I insist on my objection. Let's say the state decides to give me an 'unfit' report. What will be my attitude? The difference is here. Morality is both an individual and a collective thing that is related to politics, political responsibility and public sphere. I mean, one of the basic concepts of morality is responsibility. [...] I am responsible of my moral conduct, and I have to declare it to the others. Draft dodgers or deserters cannot be conscientious objectors because they do not take the responsibility of their acts. Or they take it only partially. [...] Is it possible to talk about a closeted gay? Could it be an identity? [...] When you don't say a word, you would exist peacefully in your integrity. You may feel all right. But I would not know about it! I mean, it is not enough. You must be open to the public to enact the political responsibility. [...] Without taking the responsibility of your word, your morality cannot pass into the political sphere. (Vedat)

When a person says that s/he is an objector only to me, s/he does not perform an act of confrontation. And, without direct confrontation, we cannot create a social and political change. You need to confront with the state, the society or the family. For instance, if even your father does not know about your objection, what would be the significance of the act? What I mean is when I confront, I get in a dialogue. I discuss why the militaries and the wars are bad. I tell why we must refuse the military service. I do politics... politics of objection. You do not have to do this politics at the state level. You may do it at a café. Our existence, the subjectivities we perform or the identity categories are political but they do not have a political value unless we discuss or exchange our ideas. It is in this moment that we do politics. [...] We perform our objections as an act of civil disobedience, promoting social and political change. (Mehmet)

I think we need to say: 'You impose these on me but I am here. And I refuse.' I think that it is important to show this position. It is important to show it physically. Maybe the one whom I confront with will not see me but I am here and I am an individual. You have your own reality, you have your own lived experiences, and you have a life. This is what is real and

important. [...] The public declaration mostly brings about this motivation.
(Merve)

The acts of objection came as a surprising and ‘daring’ act against the Turkish military in a period where political violence and militarized ethnic conflict left its traumatic mark in the society. In a period of increasing civil society activity and the emergence of political violence between the Turkish military and the PKK, the objectors gave new meanings to their embodied experiences of the pre- and post-1980 military coup, creatively engaged with the hegemonic conceptions of war, soldiering and citizenship, and became agents of radical change through introducing new political subjectivities and claims. Their acts signified a radical break with the citizenship habitus, which was conceptualized within the framework of nation-in-arms and the civic-republican citizenship. They constituted the ‘unexpected’ in Turkish politics where military culture and security discourses have been strong. The military has stepped into politics many times, including in 1960, 1971, and 1980 coups, along with various other forms of interventions and the latest coup attempt in 2016. The 1980 military coup significantly curtailed the civil society activity and in doing so sought to install order and stability. The 1982 Constitution was the state’s response to the rising rights claims of both leftist and rightist political movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

It is only after a decade of relative silence that civil society began to regain its strength and confidence. Paradoxically, the neoliberal policies installed by the 1980 military regime opened up the space for political liberalization in the 1990s. Many collectivities, such as Alevis, women, and Kurds, began to raise their right claims through associations, initiatives and campaigns. After the suppression of the radical left by the military regime, the new generation of activists abandoned the use of violence as a form of dissent and began to voice their politics through NGOs and human rights organizations. These efforts transgressed the civic-republican logic underlying the citizenship regime in Turkey by pushing forward a more liberal framework in which individual and collective rights were prioritized over the national duties. Strengthening ties with the European Union also contributed to this transformation. The nonviolent politics of civil society, however, did not mean that the armed resistance was over. Ethno-national claims of some Kurds paved the way for a Kurdish separatist movement soon after the military coup, and Turkey witnessed a violent struggle between the Turkish military and the PKK, which came from a Marxist-Leninist tradition of the pre-

1980 period. The organization has since then employed a highly militarized and collectivist power structure in its violent guerilla warfare. The conflict, which had led to more than 2500 deaths until 1990 since its inception in 1984, increased the degree of militarization and brought about the competing nationalisms in the country (Kadioğlu and Keyman 2011). This was the first time that Turkey witnessed a war-like situation within its borders. Moreover, Turkey began to involve in conflicts beyond the borders. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of new security threats in the Middle East further led Turkey to pursue a more proactive policy in the region, to the point that it took part in wars against neighboring countries, such as Gulf War in the 1990.

The acts of objections emerged in the historical-political context outlined above. Objectors were all men, mostly with Turkish, secular and middle-class backgrounds. Almost all of them were university students or graduates with leftist political orientations. Many previously took part in armed or non-armed socialist groups in the 1970s. However, after the 1980 military coup, their critical engagements with their personal pasts led them to challenge the militarized and authoritarian tendencies of the movements in which they took part, and to reflect on the ways in which they could pursue their revolutionary politics. For example, Tayfun recalls that he began to criticize socialism but his revolutionary motives remained intact. Similarly, Vedat remembers his mood as follows: ‘We were just out of the 1980 coup; we had been through a lot; the question for us was if we could comply with the system or not?’ (Öğünç, 2013: 36). Their objections radically differed from the repertoires of action that characterized the leftist groups, they hailed from, where no critical attention was paid to issues such as militarism, authoritarianism, and hierarchy in general and the compulsory military service in particular:

There was a divide between me and the people in the organization. I once told them that I would not do the military service. They were surprised. They told me that their main struggle was the class struggle. I mean, in their perspective, class struggle continues on and, meanwhile, there are processes such as military service which is a private and an individual problem. They do not care. You solve this problem. Or you go and do your military service and come back to strengthen the movement. I mean, am I going to leave my personality over there? Am I going to take part in this system? For them, these questions were not important. The important thing was the necessities of the party. I mean, if we need to distribute pamphlets somewhere and, if I am a draft dodger or deserter, I would not be able to distribute them. [Did you discuss your concerns about this?] Yes, we did; very important

discussions... At the end of the day, they devaluated my concerns. They said: ‘What does CO mean? You are a revolutionary objector; this is not something that you can explain with conscience.’ Then, we had a big separation. I was like... ‘What is this? First of all, I am an individual... I devoted my life to the party. And this is a problem that many of us face. But you take this as a private problem’. This is the general attitude of the socialist movement anyway. They see CO as a light problem next to the big politics they do. (Şendoğan)

I mean, no one explicitly said anything but I felt some sort of a hierarchy there [in leftist organizations]. I mean, I was a newcomer; I had come from a small town, etc. These made me a reserved person. There was a pressure, in a sense. My father was a soldier; we followed the military discipline at home. So, you know, I was a child that tended to be submissive. For that matter, the association [İSKD] was very important for me. For the first time, I felt that I belonged to a place where I might do politics.

This self-reflexive attitude led the objectors to advocate ‘a new moral revolutionary position based on individual initiatives’ (Öğünç, 2013: 31), and many found this position within the anarchist movement.⁷ Anarchism provided them with a space wherein they could safeguard their individuality while simultaneously pursuing their revolutionary agendas within political organizations. Their individualism was not apathetic or atomized, but sought to transform the relations between citizen, state and society through collective action. Within such ideological leanings in mind, objectors constructed their acts as an antimilitarist act that refuses any military, war or organized violence. They were civilians who performed their objections in the form the draft resistance. To disseminate their ideas, objectors began to publish the journal called *Amargi* in 1991. The group later oriented itself with human rights advocacy which was considered as ‘the most desirable sphere to do politics, given the human rights violations in Turkey’ (Öğünç, 2013: 40). The War Resisters Association (SKD) was established in İzmir in December 1992, followed the next year by another in Istanbul. The SKD brought together environmentalists, anarchists, socialists and human rights

⁷ Anarchism was not a widely known political ideology in Turkey in 1990s. It consisted of some magazines, i.e. *Kara* and *Efendisiz*, and projects, i.e. *Atölye A*. The main goals of these initiatives were to discuss the theoretical leanings of anarchism and to establish communication between anarchists in the country. Ahmet Kurt, the editor in chief of *Kara*, explains their main motivation as the problematization of Marxism. Kurt and his friends first established *Sokak Publications* and translated certain classical books and utopias about anarchism in 1984. In 1986, they started to publish *Kara*. Tayfun Gönül contributed to the magazine with his writings. Although the authors were discussing the actual events, *Kara* was mostly composed of theoretical discussions about anarchism. Kurt explains that the group called themselves as libertarians, instead of anarchists, due to the negative connotation of the word in the post-military coup period (Baskent, 2011, *Kara Dergisi Seçkisi*, 11-13). The authors problematized the authority and hierarchy in every aspects of life, i.e. work, family, schools, and social movements such as Marxism, feminism. In its declaration, *Kara* identified itself as an antiauthoritarian, antimilitarist and anti-sexist group which was against any sort of authoritarianism. Their visions were novel, and many members of social movements labelled them as petit bourgeois or apolitical.

activists.⁸ Objectors advocated that social and political change starts at the individual and organizational level, and, thus, formed their associations, initiatives, and campaigns in a bottom-up, horizontal and non-hierarchical fashion. The SKD had a horizontal structure in which the consensus was reached through an anti-hierarchical and nonviolent form of communication among the members. The organization did not have any fixed executive or representative branches; it was composed of several working groups specializing on certain topics along with a termly secretary dealing with the organizational matters.

Through their acts, objectors became agents of radical change in the country. They put forth antinationalist, antimilitarist and anti-war subjectivities in opposition to the dominant ethno-national and civic-republican conceptions of citizenship. Most of them refused to define themselves in ethnic or national terms. Coming from Turkish families, many denounced Turkishness as an ethno-national identity. When I asked an activist of that period about her ethnic identification, she refused to identify herself with any ethnicity by saying that – if she did so – she would be a ‘white Turk’ (*beyaz Türk*), which has the negative connotation of the ‘privileged citizen’. His refusal, Tayfun argues, meant a ‘betrayal’ to the state since it served his ethnic, gender, and class interests. Conceptualizing ethnicity and nationality as social constructs which creates a divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’, most of the objectors distanced themselves from Turkishness:

I don’t know when I have decided but I have never identified with Turkishness. I am sure that I had a Kemalist period. During the primary and middle schools... But it was a short period. I had already stopped being identified with Kemalism at the high school. [...] My mom is a hardcore Kemalist. She was hanging flag at home. This was the main dispute between two of us. [...] Each time I tried to put it down, she asked me whether I was one of ‘them’. Them? Who are they? (Ceyda)

I don’t identify with any ethnicity because I did not choose it. More importantly, I thought that I was coming from a Turkish family six years ago. Then I learnt that we were Jewish. I figured this out as a reason of a book I found at home. After this incident, I understood that ethnicity was a slippery ground. So what is this belonging? I have never lived as a Turk. [...] I do not feel like Jewish either. [...] I don’t have any ethnicity.

⁸ For a detailed account of the organization, see Barışamadık (Selek, 2004: 395).

That said others, like Oğul, reappropriate a conception of Turkishness for tactical purposes:

You know what I like to dream of. I was here when these people came from Central Asia on their horses. They came here and said: ‘from now on, you are a Turk’, and I said yes. When I am asked about my ethnicity, I first think about what my parents tell. Then I think the contexts of the question. I define myself as a Turk when it is necessary. For example, there is a necessity in these days. I always say that there are many ethnicities in Turkey. And there are Kurdish people who have acquired their political identities since 1980s and 1990s. We talk about peace. This occupies the public debate. So, with whom are we going to make that peace? None of the self-declared Turks want to make peace with Kurds. So, it may be good to say that I am a Turk who wants peace. If not, I definitely prefer to define myself as ‘from Turkey’ (*Türkiyeli*).

The non-adherence to an ethno-national identity was also present among those who grew up in Kurdish families. For example, having been born to an ‘assimilated’ Kurdish family, one of the activists in İSKD did not put any political significance to her Kurdish identity. It was illuminating the extent to which she stopped judging the Kurdish nationalism from her point of view, that is ‘from outside’, when I asked what she thought about the Kurdish movement. Although she became aware of her ethnicity during her university years, she never felt close to the pro-Kurdish organizations and groups:

I think that I am an assimilated Kurd. My awareness about my ethnicity began when I was studying at the university. For example [...] cops were asking IDs all the time back in those days, and no one could go out without an ID card. I was afraid of being asked my ID card more than someone who came from the West because I knew that cops could bother me more when they learned about the city I was born in. This affected my everyday life very much. I heard about pro-Kurdish debates in leftist groups. But I never felt that these organizations were my places.

The objectors thought that nationalism perpetuates the perception of friend vs. foe within and beyond the borders, and leads to the militarization of social and political conflicts between different communities. Through their acts, they began to produce antinationalist subjectivities that refuse to take sides and in doing so they sought to promote nonviolence, peace, freedom and justice. Moreover, their anarchism denounced the civic-republican or liberal-individualistic conceptions of citizenship. They refuse to embody the citizen-soldier imagery that was assumed to protect the nation from internal and external ‘threats’. They rejected any alternative civilian service

which was imposed by the state and the military. They claimed that they ‘did not owe any service to the state and society’ and, in fact, their objections constituted a service to the community by promoting peace, justice, and security. In doing so, they problematized the hegemonic constructions of Turkish citizenship which puts the citizen duties, i.e. soldiering, over the individual rights, liberties, and freedom. They claimed that states and militaries perpetuate multiple social hierarchies and repress individual freedoms. Their acts of objection indeed constituted a site of anarchist resistance in and through which they aimed at deconstructing the nation-state.

The political and moral identifications of objectors resided in antimilitarism and nonviolence which was considered a necessity for the enjoyment of individual freedoms and autonomy for the reorganization of their relations with others, human and non-human alike. Although some did not refute violence in certain cases, such as spontaneous and unplanned violence in cases of self-defense, all were against organized and institutionalized violence. The SKD organized nonviolent trainings with the help of an international network of activists in Foça, İzmir. CO was the main axe of their nonviolent stance. To promote it, objectors initiated a campaign of objection in 1993.⁹ They condemned state violence, proposed a peace walk to Diyarbakır, and formed a commission in February 1993 in collaboration with the Human Rights Association (İHD) to follow human rights violations in events such as Newroz in Van, Diyarbakır and Mardin. They also condemned the violence of the PKK. In view of an intensified military conflict between Turkish and Kurdish forces, they refused to serve in the Turkish military, in the PKK or in any other armed organization, and said: ‘Neither to the military nor to the mountains’. Objection was indeed introduced as an antimilitarist action to ‘reduce the human resources of any war’. That said, activists still differentiated between the violence conducted by the Turkish military and the PKK. They followed the motto: ‘The violence of the oppressor is a crime and the violence of the oppressed is tragic’. Advocating the necessity to choose the means of struggle in accordance with its ends, they claimed that the armed struggle of the oppressed reproduces the hegemonic norms of the oppressor and, in turn, legitimizes the state’s and military’s repressive and violent actions:

⁹ Six male members of the SKD declared their objections (Bakaya, 1993: 6).

Unjust war, just war, bad war, good war... I cannot define war or violence as just or unjust. [...] I would provide legitimacy to violence if I conduct my political strategy in a violent manner. So, I have to choose my means differently. I cannot introduce an alternative politics if I reproduce the tools of oppression. Then, I would resemble to the oppressors to which I oppose.

The PKK conducts an armed struggle. It is a militarist organization. Its organizational structure is similar to a military structure. My point of view may be criticized [...] But I believe that this [using violent means] creates a vicious circle of violence. I understand that they are subjected to violence and they resist; but they also strengthen the state and the military that they confront. (Reha)

Even those, who earlier adhered to militarist ideologies, believed in the importance of nonviolence and antimilitarism at the time of their declarations. Mehmet Bal, a nationalist-cum-objector, and Halil Savda, an ex-combatant of the PKK, are two cases in point. Mehmet differed from his predecessors, in that he was not known by the activists and he was serving as a soldier at the time of his declaration. The only person who knew him was Osman Murat Ülke (Ossi), an objector whom he had met in prison while Ossi was serving time for his refusal. Mehmet grew up in a conservative and religious lower-middle-class family with ‘typical Anatolian rural characteristics’ (Mehmet quoted in Altınay, 2004: 102). He was engaged in ultra-nationalist circles during his young ages. After being involved in a robbery where an individual was killed, he enlisted to the military to cover the incident. However, he found himself in the military prison when one of his friends was captured and confess his name to the authorities. He first spent some time in the military prison and was later sent to a civilian prison. Lost in his thoughts and feelings, Mehmet first turned to Islam. He became a devoted Muslim. However, he has been profoundly transformed in the prison as he met with gay, socialist, anarchist individuals who he had until then been told as ‘bad’. Ossi was one of these individuals who were very influential in Mehmet’s path to objection. Reading many texts and books, Mehmet gradually came to a different state of mind which praises the value of nonviolence and antimilitarism. In the meantime, his conviction came to an end and he was sent back to his military unit. He managed to serve in the military without bearing arms for nine-and-a-half months. However, he could not bear the service after that time and declared his CO in 2002:

‘Militarism, in essence, accepts destruction as a way to solve problems. [...] Another aspect of militarism is total submission. [...] The wars, waged by militarism and its proponents, do not only harm people. What kind of a

necessity legitimizes the nuclear and biological weapons that harm and destroy the nature? [...] I declare that I can no longer deny the voice of my conscience given the painful experiences I have been through in my life and the experiences I have acquired during nine-and-a-half months [of military service]. I declare my conscientious objection to any act which is imposed by a person, an institution or structure, be military or civilian, local or global' (Bal in Başkent, 2011: 22).

In a parallel vein, Halil, an ex-combatant of the PKK, declared his total objection in 2004.¹⁰ Through his objection, he denounced his violent past and projected the similar antimilitarist line of İSKD and İstanbul Antimilitarist Initiative (İAMI) which was established in the late 1990s. Halil was born to a Kurdish family in Cizre. He first encountered the PKK militants when he was 16-17. Whereas he did not have an awareness of the political significance of his ethnicity in his adolescence years, he recalls that he 'felt very close to them':

'I do not recall very well the date; it might be 1982 or 1983. [...] They collected all the men of the village. [...] They also got my father. [...] They said: 'We know that you all have weapons; each house will bring us one weapon'. [...] There have been villagers who brought weapons. Those who did not do so have been tortured. [...] They also tortured my father. [...] My uncle was shot in 1985. Soldiers shot him. [...] After all these stories, I began to sense that there is an injustice. Although my Kurdish consciousness was not very pronounced, I understood that there was an injustice. There is an institution which creates these injustices. That institution is the state, and the state means the military. [...] So, it is good to know that there are those young people who say 'no' and who fight side by side' (Öğünç, 2013: 92).

The clashes between the Turkish military and the PKK intensified dramatically in Turkey's southeast in the early 1990s. The PKK launched attacks to the state buildings and the Turkish military intensified curfews and arrests. As a telling example from the period, 94 people were killed and many were injured in 1992 Newroz celebrations. Cizre was one of the spots where intense clashes took place during this period that led to the politicization of many Kurdish individuals. Halil took part in the PKK in this period until he was convicted for two years and ten months in prison in 1993. He took the decision to join the PKK in his arrest where he was tortured for a month. Soon after

¹⁰ There were other self-declared Kurdish individuals who refused the military service but all were living in Germany. They established Savaş Hizmetini Reddedenler Girişimi (SHRG) in Cologne in 1992. This was followed by a group of Turkish and Kurdish objectors in Frankfurt in 1994. Their emergencies brought about the debates over selective objection, in that some did not refuse the armed struggle of the PKK while condemning the Turkish military. However, these individuals were not connected to the antimilitarist activists in Turkey. Thus, the axes of antimilitarism and total objection were not shifted in the country.

he was released, he was conscripted to the military in 1996; but he deserted the barracks in the same year only to be arrested again a year later and be convicted of the PKK membership for seven years in prison.

In the meantime, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was convicted in 1999 and the Kurdish nationalist movement changed its course of action to find a democratic solution to the conflict. Güneş (2012) argues that these changes are the reflections of the ‘strategic transformation’ of the organization in the light of the international and national developments of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, the military losses of the PKK in the early 1990s and the rise of Turkish nationalism all forced the movement into a transformation. The PKK abandoned the agenda of establishing a separate socialist state and began to develop a discourse of democracy and peaceful solution, with a stronger emphasis on coexistence and national reconciliation (Güneş, 2012: 125). This desire was gradually consolidated as the PKK’s leader Öcalan was sentenced to life imprisonment. Although the PKK kept its armed forces on grounds of ‘legitimate defense’, it began to emphasize the importance of civil disobedience for the political mobilization of Kurdish citizens (ibid: 138-9). Halil heard about notions such as nonviolent struggle, pacifism and civil disobedience at this juncture while he was in prison doing collective readings with his friends. This process, however, led him to a much different path than his friends as he ended up declaring his CO following his release in 2004. Refusing both the Turkish military and the PKK, he clearly rejected any sort of violence, including ‘legitimate defense’. Similar to the ISKD activists, he claimed that those organizations that employed violence against their oppressors would eventually resemble to the very institutions which they claim to fight against:

‘Kurds are fighting a just struggle. [...] The Kurdish movement has an important mission: transforming Turkey into a democratic and free country. But violent methods are wrong. It is obvious that violent and armed resistance would not bring success. The democratic struggle of Kurdish people is only possible if they abandon violent means’.¹¹

The acts of objections perform antimilitarist, antinationalist and anti-war subjectivities amid the militarized conflict between the Turkish military and the PKK in

¹¹ Retrieved from <http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=1&ArsivAnaID=29635> on October 11th, 2014.

the 1990s. In doing so, they represented a critical interruption for the ways in which the politics was thought and practiced in Turkey. They refused to embody the citizen-soldier imagery and promoted nonviolent means of doing politics. Their antimilitarist interruption introduced a performative political act that deconstructed the militaristic conceptions of citizenship in its relations to various categories of identity/difference in the country. These acts of objection put forth women, LGBTs, Kurds, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Muslim subjectivities that negotiated the meanings of military, (anti)militarism and objection. The nature of the change that the objectors aimed to bring about differed significantly with these newly emerging contestations. I will now turn to these negotiations and transformations, starting with the change that women and LGBT objectors called for from the early 2000s onwards.

IV.II. Gendering the resistance: Women and LGBTs speak out

Feminist and queer critiques of military, (anti)militarism and objection emerged in the early 2000s in Turkey. Mehmet Tarhan, the first self-declared gay objector, declared his objection to the military service in 2001. Women followed him and declared their objections in the *Militurizm* Festivals, organized by objectors and antimilitarists for three consecutive years between 2004 and 2006. The newly emerging objectors were connected to the anti-war and antimilitarist movement of the 1990s. Many were engaged in ISKD and/or IAMI as active members; some were friends and partners of the previous male objectors. Through their objections, they came to possess antimilitarist subjectivities that refuse all forms of war and military. Specifically, their objections were conceptualized as a political act against the US-led war in Iraq and the war between the Turkish military and the PKK. Furthermore, they contest patriarchal, masculinist and heterosexist discourses and practices of war, militarism, and the objection movement. Women refused to embody the roles of obedient wives and sacrificing mothers who support and raise would-be conscripts (Altınay 2009). Mehmet Tarhan refused to be labeled as 'rotten' through the 'unfit report' by which gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals are exempted from the service, and emphasized that he did not object the service because of any 'unfitness' but his antimilitarism (Biricik 2009).

Mehmet experienced war and political violence during the period in which he worked as a veterinary health technician between 1995 and 2000 in Lice, Diyarbakır.

His first-hand witnessing of war, violence and military policies over the Kurdish population, i.e. curfew, evacuation and/or burning of villages, were very influential in his path to objection. Mehmet is in fact Kurdish on his father's side. Although he has acknowledged his Kurdish ethnicity since his adolescence, he stated that he had not had much information about Kurds until he started to work in Lice. He had not felt discriminated due to his ethnicity either. Lice, however, transformed him profoundly. He remembers that he increasingly felt close to the Kurdish movement, although he never saw himself as a Kurdish patriot. He retrospectively thinks that he could have participated in the PKK after his Lice experience. However, among others, there was one thing which – he thinks – may have had an influence in his nonparticipation. Mehmet is gay and he feels detached from the PKK which does not recognize different sexualities:

Almost all the villages were empty... I started to work in such an environment. I experienced curfews. I saw the attitude of military and cops to the people, etc. [...] And I said: 'The reason of war is the military. I understood the militarist structure. [...] The period of 1995 and 1996 was very difficult. I looked after the people who needed health services by passing from one neighbor's house to another. Things like changing the serums or giving and injection. A fuse exploded in the hand of a child. He recovered at home, and his serum needed to be changed. And I thought: 'why is there a fuse in the hands of a child?' I went to a village and constructed a garden to raise a new type of grape. I provided development services. Then an armed conflict occurred 10 km. away of the village, the village was emptied. It seemed like these things would not happen if the military had not been there. So I sympathized with anarchist ideas. I have also sympathized with Kurdish movement; but I have never identified myself as a patriot. I have never been engaged that much. Back in those days, the organization was not an institution that recognizes my sexuality. I mean, I am queer. I could not be part of that liberation movement. Maybe I would have been on the mountains if I were not gay after all these things that I have witnessed. My sexuality held me back.

Detached from the discourses and practices of the Turkish military and the PKK, Mehmet read about Ossi in a newspaper and felt close to the way in which the objectors challenged military, militarism and militarization. After Lice, he moved to Ankara where he encountered a group of anarchists and LGBT activists at Kaos GL. He was a gay rights activist at the time of his declaration which he read at 'May 15 Conscientious Objection Activities' in Ankara. His refusal is a method of denouncing the violence and militarism of both the PKK and the Turkish military.

Most of women objectors did not experience war and violence as Mehmet did. Women were not assumed to embody the citizen-soldier imagery; thus they were exempted from the military. The gendered and sexualized anxieties of the republican elites led to the exclusion of women from the barracks. Scholars document widely the space which the republican elites carve up for women/femininities and men/masculinities (Arat, 1994; Arat, 1997; Altınay, 2004; Kadioğlu, 1994; Kandiyoti, 1987; Selek, 2008). Women are first envisioned as the symbols of the modernizing nation. Their place is imagined within the modern family as the bearers of would-be soldiers. Through the military conscription, the republican elites institutionalize sex/gender differences, relegating men to 'first-class citizenship' (Altınay, 2004: 34). Accordingly, objection was first and foremost considered as an issue of men who face the conscription within ISKD and IAMI. The absence of legal obligation of soldiering duty leads women to be considered as the supporters of the male objectors and silenced their voices. Through their objections, women claimed that they were not just the supporters but active agents of resistance to military, militarism, and militarization (Altınay 2009).

Many women objectors explained that their lived experiences in everyday life led them to have 'resentment against military uniforms'. Some were raised with soldier fathers; others have experienced the repressive environment of the post-1980 period in their youth; or others were second-hand witnesses of the Turkish war on terror in the 1990s:

The question was the reason why I wanted to engage in an antiwar resistance. Because my father is a retired non-commissioned officer and he has worked in conflict zones since my childhood. [...] He always worked in the borders. So I grew up in military housing. I have witnessed the absurdity within the military system since I was 5-6. I could not give meaning to them because I was a child. There was the Iraq crisis back in those days. I remember that there was a gas mask at home; the suitcases were ready closeby the door. My father was commissioned. He did not come home at night. My mom with her three children was waiting the phone call. If any, they would take us to burrow. The nights passed like this. I worried about my father during the Turkish-Kurdish war. I was watching TRT 1 [the state-owned TV channel] to learn whether or not he becomes a martyr. I grew up like this. So there are two ways to deal with these traumas: either I was going to become an ultra-nationalist, like, viva Turkish military, which protects our nation or, the opposite, an antiwar activist. I mean, it was very difficult to remain neutral. (Hilal)

As a woman, my experience with militarism is very different than that of a man in every day life. There is a hierarchical relationship, even at home. I remember very well. We could not throw on foot before our father. My father was a soldier by the way [She laughs]. I lived in the military housing in a military zone for a while. We were also subjected to the military rules. This is the most dangerous part, I think. There were military rules and my father executed them. And we went along with it because we did not have power. We did musters, cleaning the zone like we were in an armed zone. The roles were very well defined. But I came here, I became lovers, housemates, I got married. [...] There is still a power over me. But it is not named. It is very difficult to fight against something that you cannot name. [...] Everyday life experiences, relations, or not being able to go out at nights... These all result from this hierarchical structure. I am already in a subordinated position. I don't enjoy my rights; someone gives them to me or not. [How did these affect your objection?] Look, the logic of militarism or military is the same. There is a private, noncommissioned officer. This is the side that we see clearly. And it is possible to fight with it. However, if you experience such hierarchies in everyday life or in relations, we need women objectors.

Like the objectors in the 1990s, women objectors believed that the road to peace passed through antimilitarist and nonviolent resistance of which objection was an important method. Similar to the first declared objectors, they believed that doing politics starts with transforming oneself. Thus, they argued that the dissenting voices must choose their means in accordance with the ends:

Dirty war, good war, just war, unjust war... There were discussions on these matters. But, personally, I cannot separate wars or violence as just or unjust. For a while, I worked with women who have experienced violence. These women were violent to their children. I tried to discuss with them how her use of violence, her slap, created a legitimate ground for violence that was conducted towards women; how she ou made it acceptable. They were saying, for instance, 'but he did this or that'. And I was explaining that her husband was saying the same when he was violent to her. Everyone can come up with reasons that are deemed just. If you use violence as a just mean, then you also legitimize the right of others to use it against you. And we cannot solve this problem.

When we discuss violence, when we discuss its legitimacy, the problem starts when we say 'but'. This 'but' actually invites violence. There may be a 'but' for you, or there may be a just reason for you, but you open up the door to other buts and other just reasons and you welcome the very mechanism that reproduces violence. (Hilal)

However, objections did not only construct Mehmet Tarhan and women objectors as antimilitarists but also gay and feminist activists. Through their acts, they negotiated their sex, gender, and sexuality with state, military and other objectors. They

challenged patriarchal, masculinist, and heterosexist conceptions of militarism and objection. Mehmet problematized heterosexism in laws and regulations by denouncing ‘unfit’ reports which exempt gays and transgenders from the service. As an LGBT activist, he constructed the process as ‘a humiliating and discriminatory practice towards LGBTs’. He refused to take that report he was given him as a ‘right’ and considered it the ‘unfitness of the system itself’. Mehmet did not denounce those who take ‘unfit reports’ to avoid the military; but he did not choose to do so because it was a ‘conformist’ and ‘opportunist’ act, not a resistance:

Those who take rotten reports get away with the military, by using the very state structure which insults you. They avoid the service easily while other men have difficulties to do so. [...] Instead of looking for other ways to resist the state, they take unfit reports. I do not say that they have to do conscientious objection. They may find other ways. But it is not resistance when you accept the opportunity that the state gives instead of finding other ways to resist the hegemony. The state offers it as a possibility. It does not want you in the military anyway. Instead, saying that I am gay and I want to be treated same as other men sounds better to me. I would go to the military. Being queer within the military may deconstruct it. That said I don’t object anyone who wants to get a ‘rotten’ report.

Addressing the state and military, he emphasized that his sexuality did not signify any inability to do the military service but he refused it because of his moral and political convictions:

The court non stop dealt with my sexuality... It asked whether I can be examined medically or not. And we have always stressed the notion of conscientious objection. [...] At the end, the court ruled that depriving me from the right and duty of the military service as a reason of my sexuality contradicted the equality principle. This is a logical legal argument. No one can be thrown away from the military, or anywhere else, because he is gay. [...] I mean, if he does not want to do it, he should not do it. But I would not say that a person should not do the service because he is gay. I think that no one should do the service. In that respect, I may say that gays, too, should not do it. But I would not come up with a holistic argument.

Meanwhile, women began to discuss their positions within ISKD and IAMI in the early 2000s. They formed a group called Antimilitarist Feminist (An-Fem) to discuss the relation between feminism and (anti)militarism:

We wanted to organize an international women conference on violence, militarism, and gender. I think it was 2002. [...] As women, we got together. That conference idea was canceled; but the meet-ups for the preparation of the conference had continued and we liked these meetings.

We were experiencing something new. And then, these meetings helped us to realize that our problems within our mixed political group were not personal. We did not have any feminist claim until then. Our main problem was antimilitarism; we did not make any emphasis on women and gender because we thought that antimilitarism would solve women's problems. But we later realized that it is the opposite. Feminism opens the doors to antimilitarism. I mean, when we develop a feminist consciousness, we begin to improve ourselves in many ways. It kept us awake in the path to an antimilitarist world. (Hilal)

Through their discussions, women deciphered the relation between sex, gender and militarism. They linked the oppression of women in their everyday lives with the perpetuation of militarism. They stated that women were raped, killed, and traumatized by war and political violence. They further contributed to the militarization of the society through their roles as sacrificing mothers and obedient wives who raise and support the would-be conscripts. Through their acts, women objectors refused to be neither victims nor perpetrators of militarism. Their objections were announced through public declarations during the *Militurizm* Festivals which were organized in 2004, 2005, and 2006. In these performative events, the objectors visited to train stations, military barracks, military hospitals, war monuments, shopping malls for would-be soldiers and companies which are owned by the military. By doing so, they demonstrated the extent to which city space was militarized. The invisibility of the militarist elements in these places, they claimed, contributed to the normalization and perpetuation of militarism. Like the arguments and motives behind *Militurizm* Festivals, women conceptualized their objections as antimilitarist acts which reveal the hidden aspects of militarism that do not stay stay in the barracks but extends to the entire society. Specifically, they problematized militarism as an ideology that marginalizes women and relegates them into subordinated gendered roles. Through their objections, they put forth themselves as women, mothers, daughters, partners, or wives who refused to be neither victims nor perpetrators of militarism:

I do not want to be enclosed because I am the honor of someone; I do not want to be the property of someone; I do not want to be beaten up or killed because I am a woman. I do not want to be controlled by men and society who take me under their tutelage with the labels such as 'mother', 'wife', 'daughter'. I do not want to lose my right to my life, identity and body just because I am a woman. I do not want to be 'rewarded' (!) by harrasement or rape because of my smile or because I walk on the street at night. I do not want to be killed. Similarly, I do not want a gay, transgender or any other person to be killed, exploited, or beaten up because of their sexual

identity. I refuse any violence, either organized or non-organized. I do not want to kill or be killed in wars. (Nazan)

As a woman who has been subordinated by birth, I refuse and I won't be silent before the discrimination and sexism that is perpetuated by militarism. Although I do not have a problem of conscription, I won't be silent before the obligation that is imposed on my brother, my father, my partner or my friend. I believe that harassment, rape and 'honor' killings of women and the humiliation of sexual minorities by rotten reports result from militarist ideology. I take military service as my problem and refuse it because, as a woman, I know that I am considered valuable only when I get old and become a mother as a reason of the duality between soil and homeland (fertile-sacred). I refuse because I take attacks in Iraq, tortures and rapes, bombs in Afghanistan, genocide against Jews, racism, Palestinian children playing with guns rather than toys, and destruction of the nature as my problem. The problem is that we do not see these as problems. I would be complicit if I remain silent. I do not want to be complicit in this crime and I do not want to watch silently the imprisonment of our lives, minds or our dreams. (İnci)

I think that the agents of this struggle are men and it should not be changed. Likewise, the agents of feminism are women. [...] So I have always supported conscientious objection movement. But I never thought that I had a right to say a word until they wanted my son, the person who I gave birth... when they wanted him to be a soldier. [...] At that moment, I said: 'This is not a thing that is reserved to men'. Because it also touches my life... Either I will play the role of a mother who raises soldiers or I will do something to prevent my child from going there. [...] I do not say this on the basis of a motherhood that we use today in the society. [...] I have criticized motherhood a lot as an institution of exploitation. I declared my objection as a woman, not as a mother. I mentioned my motherhood because I felt the need to demonstrate how militarism affects my life through my son.

However, gendering the resistance was challenging since the CO had so far been associated with heterosexual men who 'paid the price' of their acts through imprisonment. There were doubts about where to situate women who were not obliged to serve in the military or gays who were exempted from the military by 'unfit' reports. Their objections were seen as acts that might reduce the civil disobedient character of CO since these groups did not 'pay the price' of their declarations. Mehmet remembers that period as follows:

There have been discussions before my objection. There had already been some discussion over women objection. When I declared my objection publicly, women were coming to Ankara to declare theirs. But they have been persuaded by male objectors because it might reduce the seriousness of the act. [...] I have also been considered as a fake objector by male

objectors until I was imprisoned. They said: ‘the military would give him the rotten report anyway. [...] They thought that I would not be taken into the military anyway. In their perspective, the appropriation of the act by us was reducing the value of the act. [...] Refusing the rotten report in my declaration also addressed to these discussions. I refused such a report in advance.

Similarly, one of the woman activists from this period remembers how they, as women, struggled to position their differences among the objectors:

Women were always within the association but we always had doubts. Everyone says it in Turkey: ‘You are not men, you are not obliged to serve in the military, why do you declare your objections?’ These questions were also questions that we were asking. [...] The perception that women were supporters of the movement was widespread. This was not only a belief of leftist groups and organizations that were outsiders but those who were close to the conscientious objection movement were also asking these questions. So our process became a process to prove ourselves. This is a case for all women. You declare your objection, OK, but do you pay the price? This question was very heavy for me. How do we account for the price? Is it going into the prison? Is it being tortured? Our price was actually this: Trying to explain ourselves to those people with whom we were side by side.

Hence, women’s and Mehmet’s objections were also to negotiate their subjectivities with other objectors. In doing so, they did not only become agents of counter-hegemonic change in the militaristic discourses and practices of citizenship but also transformed CO. With their objections, they problematized the notion of ‘paying the price’. Although they might have not paid the price because of the legal framework, they claimed for the value of their objections as antimilitarist acts and were willing to confront the state and the military by publicly declaring their positions. Their objections generated a form of reflexivity that impedes the militarization/masculinization of the antiwar and antimilitarist movement. The declarations denoted a critique against patriarchal and masculinist discourses and practices among the objectors:

The act gradually became a masculine act through which men dare to confront the state. Men became the heroes because the decision of objection affects their lives dramatically. I mean, there is bravery there but what is the limit to this? It produces a kind of heroism. This heroism also reproduces the militaristic culture. So we thought that there should be a political reflex against this. A reflexivity that stops masculinization of the movement; a reflex that keeps machoist culture of heroism away. (Hilal)

Women and LGBT objectors developed similar antimilitarist, antinationalist and anti-war subjectivities and claims and construct their objections as total objections. They refused to embody militaristic conceptions of sex, gender, and sexuality. However, there have been also women and LGBTs who negotiate the meanings of antimilitarism, militarism, and objection from the late 2000s onwards. As ethno-national and religious identifications became politically salient, Turkey witnessed the emergence of selective objection. Through selective objection, objectors negotiated their Kurdish and Muslim subjectivities, with claims to recognition, self-defense and just war. I will now turn to these acts of objections, and explore how these subjectivities and claims are constructed, negotiated at the individual and organizational level.

IV.III. The right to ‘self-defense’: The ethnicity, nationality and conscientious objection

In September 2015, at the last conference of a two-day long symposium on CO, we, the audience, witnessed a hotly debated Q/A session. Entitled as ‘Resistance, Self-Defense, and CO in Geographies of War’, the organizers of the conference aimed to discuss the position of CO movement vis-à-vis violence, nonviolence, war, self-defense (*özsavunma*) amid the militarized conflict between the Turkish military and the PKK. The discussion mostly revolved around the il/legitimacy of armed resistance against an oppressor. Some speakers described objection as a ‘passive’ act of resistance which does not effectively counter the violence of the state and military. They argued that violence can be conducted for the purposes of self-defense. This argument was criticized by some individuals in the audience. They problematized the fact that a discussion over the legitimacy of violence in the form of self-defense was initiated in a CO conference. Following the antimilitarism of the early generation of objectors, they argued that the objectors should not legitimize war and organized violence on the basis of just cause or self-defense because that would legitimize the use of force by an oppressor and create a vicious circle of violence. The atmosphere of the room became quickly tense as people raised their voices and interrupted each other to make their points. The speakers denounced the accusations. That said some left room for organized violence as a last resort, and pointed to the fact that some objectors, mostly with pro-Kurdish agendas, have indeed engaged in armed resistance in recent years. In such a context, they argued that CO movement should discuss its stance vis-à-vis violence and self-defense to develop perspectives to question the current context.

This debate reflects the unsolved tensions between selective and total objectors. Although selective objection include different groups of objectors, the emergence of self-declared Kurdish objectors bring the discussion of just and unjust war to the fore. In the late 2000s, Turkey witnessed the formation of initiatives such as Conscientious Objection Platform for Peace (Barış için Vicdani Red Platformu) in 2009 and Kurdish Conscientious Objection Initiative (Kürt Vicdan Red Hareketi) in 2010. CO events were extended from Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara to other cities. For example, the Platform formed connections in Diyarbakır, Mersin and Hakkari. In 2013, Keskesor LGBT and Dut Ağaıı Kolllektifi organized a two-day long conference on CO in Diyarbakır. In the same year, Conscientious Objection Association (VR-DER) was formed in Istanbul. Although these organizations did not solely represent selective objection, some included those who were selectively refusing the Turkish military. Newly emerging objectors condemned policies of the Turkish state and military in the southeast of the country as a ‘colonial-nationalist endeavour’. In such a context, many legitimized the existence of armed resistance on the basis of a just war doctrine, self-defense, and the structure and ultimate aim of the armed struggle. Specifically, they acknowledged the use of organized violence when it pursues ‘self-defense against an oppressor’; when it is based on voluntary recruitment; and when armed struggle is a mean for an end. Through their acts, they negotiated their ethno-national identifications with the military. They mostly framed their objections within competing nationalism, i.e. Kurdish nationalism, and became agents of counter-hegemonic change in the country. With these newly emerging subjectivities and claims, objection no longer meant rejecting any war, military, or armed resistance but advocated a contractual understanding in which citizens choose their participation in militaries and wars after evaluating whether they are just or unjust.

After the dissolution of İSKD and İAMİ, savaskarsitlari.org became the main site on which objectors keep their contact in the late 2000s. As a web-based initiative, savařkarřıtları.org followed the antimilitarism and total objection of the previous organizations. Refusing the divide between just and unjust war, activists were against any war, military, and armed organization. However, this point of view gradually came under pressure by certain members of the group amid increasing militarization in the late 2000s, such as the attack to Gendarmerie Station in Aktütün, attacks to police

stations in Diyarbakır, lynch attempts to Kurdish in Altınova and the launching of operations against the PKK. In such a context, a group of activists was not satisfied by objectors' stand vis-à-vis the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Thus, they sought to raise 'a much clear voice' about the war between the Turkish security forces and the PKK. Through their objections, these individuals contested the policies of the Turkish state and the military in the southeast of the country. Their ethno-national identifications with Kurdishness were the main constitutive factors of their selective objections. They refused to take part in a war that targets 'their people'. In the context of asymmetric power relations, they did not reject 'legitimate defense of the oppressed against an oppressor'. These discussions led to a split in savaskarsitlari and paved the way for the emergence of Conscientious Objection Platform for Peace in 2009. The group aimed to introduce CO to different segments of the society. Therefore, they made connections with individuals in the cities, mostly populated by Kurds. Ercan retrospectively explained this period as follows:

Some among us thought that being an objector means to be against any war. They perceived it as being against both Turkish military and the PKK. We never came to that point. We never made a declaration such as 'no to the military, no to the mountains'. I personally did not advocate this either. We were in a different position. We do not put aside all of our political and anti-system identities after we identify with objection. We do not put them in a fridge. I hold my political identity as it is. Should an individual, who believe in class revolution, put aside this belief when he becomes an objector? Or will an anarchist, who believes in the use of violence in certain cases, become a pacifist, passive individual? I would not take part in any hierarchical organization, wear a uniform or bear arms; but there are certain occasions to use violence and I believe that I can use it in cases of self-defense. Do I have to put all these aside when I become an objector? Conscientious objection means being against the military service. Other identifications, such as anti-system, apolitical, political, patriotic, anarchist, socialist, should not prevent conscientious objection. But some friends had a different perception. They advocated that when you become an objector, you have to put other identifications aside. We experienced this conflict a lot.

The ethnic identifications of newly emerging subjectivities differentiated their acts of objection. The first- and second-hand witnessing of war, political violence, and marginalization were influential in this process:

'First of all, my Kurdishness is influential in this decision. The state's history with Kurds is clear cut. My conscientious objection is actually a confrontation with the Turkish Republic. It is about the state's ignorance of

Kurds not only today, but since its establishment. There have been so much pain and so many deaths. Going to the military would be as if I legitimize them. Legitimizing the authority that did these... [...] I cannot be a soldier of this state. I do not want to be soldier of any other state either' (Öğünç, 2013: 187-189).

[...] Because those military officials imposed military service upon us and burned our villages. We have been deported to unknown metropolises. Our childhood passed with traumas. They took away our belonging. We witnessed extrajudicial killings when we defended our rights. The commanders of militarism ignored our language and our culture; they ignored even the most humane demands we have. Today, they want us to bear arms and to fight with our brothers and sisters. We have so many reasons to refuse.¹²

'I was a very thoughtful and observing person. I thought about the Kurdish society. The economic and social problems, the difficulty of life [we experience]. [...] The state is a monster. It does not encourage discussion. It does not have a brain or feelings. It crushes us. We see it well: villages are burned, arrestations, bombings, massacres... In such a context, anti-violent and pacifist resistance sounds like: 'Mr. Monster, could you please stop?' If it was a bit democratic and humane, I would understand [such a stance]' (Öğünç, 2013: 141).

Their lived experiences differentiated their relation to violence and transformed the acts of objections. Some had engaged in armed organizations. Rosi's story is a case in point. Rosi was born to a Kurdish family and grew up in Diyarbakır. His refusal was not framed within pacifism or antimilitarism of his predecessors. In effect, he had engaged in the PKK and was convicted for being a member of an armed organization before he met with CO. He mentioned certain childhood experiences as influential steps in his decision to join the organization:

I had an uncle who became martyr on the mountains. I thought I should do something about it. The other event which affected me a lot was the killing of Uğur Kaymaz. I witnessed the killings of other children like Ceylan Önkol. Maybe it was the feeling of revenge which led me to the mountains. [...] I remember things from my childhood. A person from my village was tied to a car and they took him to the police station by sweeping him on the ground. Do you think that it is normal that a child has these memories? [...] You are subjected to forced immigration because they burn villages. You come to the city. In school, teachers stigmatize you as Kurdish. And then they ask why you go to the mountains. I was born and raised within this psychology.

¹² Retrieved from <http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=8&ArsivAnaID=59455> on August 24th, 2015.

However, his participation in the PKK was problematic for many due to his gay sexuality. Thus, after he was assigned to various roles, such as breeding the animals, logistics, etc., he was sent to the city, and was captured and convicted by the authorities. After he was out of prison, he declared his objection by which he negotiated his ethnic, national and sexual identifications with the Turkish military. He claimed that he was not ‘rotten’ but a gay and Kurdish conscientious objector who refused to embody the state-centric conception of his ethnicity, nationality, and sexuality. Rosi was critical of the PKK as a reason of the lack of recognition of his sexuality. However, this did not lead him to refuse the organization’s agenda altogether because of his ethno-national identification; Rosi rather aimed at transforming it from within. He negotiated his sexuality with both institutions; but his ethno-national identification led to the competing conceptions of militarism, antimilitarism and objection and framed his act within the selective objection.

Competing conceptions of nationalism were also discerned in other initiatives. In 2010, the Kurdish Conscientious Objection Initiative was launched. The initiative was established to support the ceasefire that is launched by the PKK. The members of the initiative addressed to ‘the militarist authorities which introduced themselves as the only owner of the country’ with a common declaration. They refused all types of militarist solutions which do not take people’s demands into consideration. Many members of the platform remained anonymous; so the declaration was made collectively without names. These newly emerging objectors contested these ideas about militarism, antimilitarism and war. Halil Savda is also an ex-combatant of the PKK, but he had a much clearer stance on antimilitarism at the time of his declaration, that is, refusing to serve in any war and military, The Kurdish Conscientious Objection Initiative, however, stated that they were against militarism but there were doubts about the extent to which they considered themselves as antimilitarists. For example, Ahmet claimed that they were not antimilitarist so long as they advocated the ‘legitimate defense’ of the people and explained: ‘I am not sure if antimilitarism defends legitimate defense. I don’t find realistic to oppose every war. Thus, we don’t consider ourselves as antimilitarist’.¹³ Hence, they framed their objections within the hegemonic discourses and practices of Kurdish nationalist movement:

¹³ Retrieved from <http://bianet.org/biamag/ifade-ozgurlugu/129978-muazzam-bir-gelisme> on August, 24th, 2015.

The PKK does not impose weapons on me; it does not oblige me to be a militant. If there is no force, refusing becomes meaningless. I am against the compulsory military service and militarism. It is the policies of the Turkish Republic, the policies of ignorance, which leads to such an armed resistance. [...] Those who were engaged in objection activities in Diyarbakır clearly said: ‘Are we going to refuse both sides? If so, we won’t be conscientious objectors’. They said: ‘We would not refuse both sides because we side with one side’ (Öğünç, 2013: 187-188).

The negotiation over the meanings of militarism, antimilitarism, and war became more complicated with those self-declared antimilitarist objectors who did not reject all wars and all forms of organized violence. Rosi, a self-declared antimilitarist objector, explained the legitimacy of just war, stressing that ‘war sometimes brings peace’:

Some people do not understand it. ‘War sometimes brings peace’. You sometimes have to kill in order not to be killed or to reduce the number of deaths. [...] As an objector, I do not see armed resistance as a militarist organization when it is a people’s movement, when it does not attack but defend itself. I don’t find it militarist. [...] I perceive it as a movement which is obliged to kill because it has to protect the essence of the people. This is a legitimate defense. [...] That violence is not actually violence, it is self-defense.

Given the ‘historical, social and psychological circumstances in which [he] grew up’, he legitimized certain methods of the PKK and did not consider it as a militarist organization due to ‘the lack of compulsory nature, the notion of self-defense and the aim of protecting its own people’. A similar understanding was also present in other objectors:

I do not take it as a 100 per cent militarist institution. Because [...] all spheres of life are not shaped by it [armed resistance]. It is a temporary situation. It is observed in some parts of life. What they want is to end it. They have discussions over art and music there... These people are doing these activities when there are no war planes or bombs. There is a life that is being constructed. But that life is not 100 percent based on militarism. There is not the institutionalization of military or the enlargement of military. As a matter of fact, they want to take it out of their lives. So I cannot say ‘armed resistance has uniforms and arms, so they are also militarist organizations’. I do not think that militaries and armed organizations are the same (Ercan).

These individuals were not members of any armed organization at the time of their declarations. Their claim to self-defense was theoretical, in that they legitimized it by the ‘qualitative and quantitative characteristics of an existential threat’. Total objectors, except pacifists, also legitimized a certain level of violence, i.e. spontaneous

and non-institutionalized violence, if conducted in the name of self-defense. However, unlike these objectors, the ‘self’ among the newly emerging group was not an individual self who aims to prevent an immediate threat to his/her existence. The self, here, signified a community of which Kurdishness constitutes the ethno-national bond. Selective objections framed their discourses within a patriotic framework. Kurdishness was not only considered as a distinct ethnicity but signified an ethno-national community with a right to self-government and self-determination. Through their objections, they refused to ‘bear arms against their people’. Following the Kurdish nationalist movement’s claims to ‘self-defense’, they legitimized the violence and the nationalism of the oppressed as a method for ‘self-realization against the militarist policies of the state and military’. Unlike the antimilitarist and anti-war activists, they did not conceptualize the methods of the PKK as the reproduction of the norms of the oppressor but a necessity to realize Kurds’ legitimate demands to collective rights.

Meanwhile, Turkey also witnessed Muhammed Serdar Delice who put forth Turkish, nationalist and Muslim subjectivity. Muhammed is the only publicly known case of selective objection from within the hegemonic discourses and practices, in that he is much similar to the selective objectors in Israel. Muhammed framed his objection within the Turkish-Islamic synthesis which has been the hegemonic conception of the Turkish citizenship after the 1980 military coup. After experiencing the military environment, he deserted the barracks and declared his objection in 2010:

‘We have been raised with Galipoli stories in this country. We have taken Ottoman Empire as an example; we have taken Koran as a reference. And we said: ‘God is one, ummah is one’. We learned about tolerance and loyalty from Atilla and Selahattin-I Eyyubi. We have ruled three continents for years. But neither with guns nor with despotism... We looked after nations with faith, morale and tolerance. But we forgot our past; we are corrupted. We created imaginary enemies. We targeted our Kurdish brothers. We lied to our youth for years... Now, the masks are fallen down. Five months of military service made me see what is right and wrong. I do not want to be a member of a non-Muslim military. Silence against injustice is injustice’.¹⁴

Muhammed grew up in a conservative and nationalist family in Kastamonu. In his young age, he received religious courses and sympathizes with the ideology of Nationalist Action Party (MHP). He did not consider military service as an imposed

¹⁴ Retrieved from <http://vicdaniret.org/muhammed-serdar-delice/> on June 2nd, 2017.

obligation, but his duty. However, the military service transformed him profoundly. Muhammed's witnessing made him believe that the hegemonic conceptions of the military and soldiering were myths. He problematized the fact that he could not 'even hold a gun until the end of his probation period'. He was further assigned to the duties that 'had nothing to do with soldiering', witnessed the maltreatment and the violation of human dignity of soldiers, and felt that he did not have any importance in the eyes of the commanders and other soldiers:

'You get in the barracks, you are searched from head to toe. If you do not trust me, why do you take me to the military? Cell phones are forbidden. Why? There may be an information transfer. So, you do not give me information that might be dangerous for my country. If you don't trust me, how are we going to fight together if we need to do so one day? [...] You make your soldier clean the toilets, collecting the garbage, washing the dishes... I mean, this is not soldiering. [...]Who am I? I am nothing. Soldiering has a definition; a soldier is someone who is squeezed between boots and cap, and who takes his strength with bandolier. What I experienced there is uselessness. I left my mom, dad, my children, my place; did I come here for this?'¹⁵

Muhammed did not oppose to the existence of the Turkish military. But his loyalty and participation were conditioned by military's ability and desire to take him as an agent. In effect, he did not reject to serve in a different military setting. Furthermore, he accepted an alternative civilian service:

'I could do anything but not soldiering and violence. I am the most acceptable objector, the one who is the most closest to the state. If they say clean here or there, I would wear the clothes, and do it. I would not see it as a punishment; I would say that I am cleaning my nation' (Öğünç, 2013: 160).

The hegemonic narratives about state, military and soldiering enabled the very possibility to refuse the service. Muhammed refused to be a passive and obedient soldier; and instead, sought active participation in the decision-making processes. His experiences and observations led him to question the extent to which the state and military valued his input to the nation. This process led him to further question the official narratives. For example, he criticized the state and military's discourses, practices and representations of the Kurdish citizens of Turkey: 'I saw some documents

¹⁵ Retrieved from <http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=1&ArsivAnaID=56394> on August 18th, 2015.

about the southeast. When I have researched, I lost the love of nation' (Öğünç, 2013: 157).

With the political salience of ethnicity and nationality, the acts of objections put forth counter-hegemonic subjectivities which deconstructed the state's right to monopoly of violence, and introduced the right claims to self-determination and self-government. These acts transformed the discourses and practices of militarism and citizenship. They promoted a contractual relation between the citizens and the state where citizens have a say in their participation in wars and political violence. Selective objectors adhered to the just war doctrine, and framed their acts within competing nationalisms. In doing so, they became agents of counter-hegemonic change in Turkey from the late 2000s onwards. The emergence of these voices further led to negotiations over the meaning of antimilitarism, and transforms the objection movement. Selective objectors deconstructed the ethnicized nature of the movement and argued that the discourses of antimilitarism should take into account the lived experiences of Kurds. On the other hand, such a change was not only resulted by one's political identification with Kurdish, Turkish or any other ethnicity. In similar times, many self-declared Muslims objectors formulated religious subjectivities that believed in the legitimacy of organized violence in face of an immediate existential threat while problematizing the military service. In the following section, I turn to explore these contestations.

IV.IV. 'God is the only sovereign: The religious men and women resisting the draft

Religiously-inspired objections came to occupy the public debate in the mid-2000s. Turkey has witnessed the objections of male members of Jehovah's Witnesses with the ECtHR's decisions on their cases from 2004 onwards. In a parallel vein, self-declared Muslim women and men have declared their objections since 2007. Newly emerging objectors unite in their prioritization of God's command over the state and military's. JWs formulated pacifist Christian subjectivities through their acts. Hence, they reject war and violence in any circumstances. War is perceived as a political enterprise to which they remain neutral. That said, many are willing to serve in an alternative civilian service which has no connection to the military. Muslim women and men promoted new political subjectivities that refuse to embody state-centric and militarized conceptions of Islam. In doing so, they aim to transform the state, military

and the Islamic community (*mahalle*). Unlike antimilitarists or JW, many Muslim objectors legitimize the partial acceptance of war and violence on just war and self-defense on the basis of jihad.

JWs constitute a Christian sect which dates back to 1930s but comes to be known during the 1970s in Turkey. They were recognized as a distinct religion by a decision of the Court of Cassation in 1996 and received the legal recognition as a religious association in 2007. The Holy Book and the life of Jesus Christ indicate that they should love one another, love enemies, be neutral in political affairs, not bear weapons for warfare and not learn war.¹⁶ As one of the JW explained: ‘The commandment comes from the Holy Book [...] God is love and it is not possible to fight in the name of God’. Many do not perform their objections as acts of civil disobedience since that would jeopardize their neutral stance vis-à-vis political affairs. Their associations do not pursue any political agenda to disseminate objection. They are reluctant to publicize their acts through public declarations/campaigns or to establish links with any initiatives or associations working in the promotion of CO. Their faith clearly denounces to get involved with politics. Politics is considered as a worldly practice which is of limited capacity, wicked and impossible to change from within.¹⁷ It does not substitute the principles of the heavenly Kingdom of God. One JW explained it as follows:

We do not believe in politics. Politics is a human product. No types of government bring about happiness. It is the God who gives happiness. We believe in the God’s doctrines. [...] We are not against the state. We are not against public service. I can look after elderly or ill people. I can collect garbage.¹⁸

Hence, many refuse to serve in silence and consider penalties as their price to pay to pursue their Christian conscience:

Accepting imprisonment and staying powerful necessitates a powerful faith. Our strength comes from the Holy Book, the word and the love of God. Knowing the truth gives us strength to resist.

¹⁶ Retrieved from <http://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/why-dont-you-go-to-war/> on October 14th, 2015.

¹⁷ Retrieved from <http://wol.jw.org/en/wol/pc/r1/lp-e/1200274067/12/0> on October 10th, 2015.

¹⁸ Retrieved from <http://wol.jw.org/en/wol/pc/r1/lp-e/1200274067/12/0> on May 10th, 2014.

That said some male JW's refused to be a draft dodger/deserter and took action in order to be able to hold their faith intact. The Public Relations Office of the Jehovah's Witnesses was careful to stress that the appeals of their members to the ECtHR did not make any political statement but were to safeguard their religious conscience.¹⁹ It stated that international litigation was a method to reduce the impediments over their individual conscience, rather than to transform the state, military, and society. The court cases extended the scale of the movement into the international sphere, and negotiated the right to CO through supranational litigation. Yunus Erçep became the first publicly known JW objector in Turkey. Yunus had been struggling with the military service since 1998. However, as a reason of his reluctance to make his process visible, he did not received any public attention until 2004 when he applied to the ECtHR in 2004. Other male members of JW's followed him. Feti Demirtaş, Çağlar Buldu, and three other JW's apply to the Court in 2007 and 2008. In a parallel vein, Arda Sarkut and Cenk Atasoy appealed to the UNHRC in 2008.

In the meantime, Turkey met Enver Aydemir, the first publicly known Muslim male objectors, in 2007. Like many JW's, majority of Muslim men have refused to serve in silence. Enver was the first publicly known figure. From then on, there have been other Muslim women and men who refused to serve in the military publicly. Muslim objectors do not have a specific organization. This is partly due to their low numbers. As a matter of fact, their numbers remain marginal in the *mahalle*. That said they establish networks and forums where they discuss Islam, CO, (anti)militarism, etc. They organize meetings and make public statements. In 2012, 3rd Convention of Muslim Students was organized solely on CO. They meet in different initiatives and organizations, i.e. Anticapitalist Muslims, Mazlum-Der, and Özgür-Der. Unlike JW's, their faith gives them a lens through which they make sense of every aspects of life, including the politics.

Enver grew up in a well-to-do conservative and religious family. When I met him, he defined himself as a Muslim Kurdish, although he never explicitly discussed his Kurdish background. Enver remembers the feelings of discrimination due to his ethnicity. However, he claimed that this was partial because he had an upper-middle

¹⁹ Retrieved from <http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=5&ArsivAnaID=40108> on October 14th, 2015.

class background. His father is a mullah and sent him to religious school. During his education, he began to question the worldly authorities. The principle of *tevhid* left room for one true authority: Allah. And it was crucial in his objection to the Turkish military. After his high school education, Enver began a course to prepare for the university exams. Enver met with anarchists, leftists and socialists in a coffeehouse where he used to go in those years. He first learned about Ossi in that coffeehouse:

‘The guy comes out and says: ‘I won’t be your soldier’. That echoed a lot in my brain. [...] But I could not understand it very well. When someone is captured by some political movements, s/he moves away from the most practical, most natural thing, the first thing which comes in the mind’ (Öğünç, 2013: 119-120).

Some of his university years passed in Kyrgyzstan, but then he went to Iran and Syria to learn Arabic, to deepen his knowledge about Islam and Islamic law. It, however, took time for Enver to articulate his ideas on Islam and military service. When he came back to Turkey, he first sought ways to avoid the service and attempted to get ‘unfit report’. Unsuccessful in his attempts, he later became firmer in his thoughts and declared that he could not be the soldier because of his religious beliefs in the military recruiting office.

There are other Muslim objectors who followed Enver. Muslim objectors refused to embody state-centric and militarized conceptions of Islam. They argued that the inherent structure of the Turkish state and military is secular, and they use Islamic concepts, such as martyrdom, jihad, and the prophet’s heart [*peygamber ocağı*], for the statist, nationalist, and militarist purposes (Kemerli 2015):

‘Soldiering becomes a condition of jihad when you merge modern nation-state and Muslim notions within a Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Dying becomes *shahadet*. Barracks become the prophet’s heart. [...] We are Muslims and of course we believe in *shahadet*. We are not against war completely. We may fight for self-defense or against an injustice. However, it is important to know why, for whom, and on which constitutional principles we fight. We need to discuss Kurdish question. We also need to discuss the exploitation of our sacred. They are interrelated’.²⁰

²⁰ Hasat. (2013). Özgür Açılım Platformu 2012 Yılı. (pp. 39-40). İstanbul: Mavi Ofset. Retrieved from <http://issuu.com/ozguracilim/docs/hasat> on August 8th, 2015.

Jihad had to be for God's sake, not for 'money, petrol, Turkish hegemony, nationalism'.²¹ In the secular Turkish military, the warfare was subjugated to politics, rather than to the will of Allah. For Muslim men and women, war could only be pursued to protect the 'victimized':

Jihad can also be this. For example, imagine that you are in Turkey and Turkey is an Islamic state. A state where there are Muslims. Let's say there is Syria closeby. People are dying there. You may go and help them. You may protect the people and children there. (Mehmet Ali)

Muslim objectors questioned the extent to which the military was the prophet's heart due to the lack of organization of life around the Islamic customs, rules and traditions:

'A Muslim can join to the prophet's heart but a place in which people uses curses, humiliates, and commit injustices cannot be the prophet's heart. It is not the prophet's heart when you cannot make just objections to the injustices. It is delusion or trick to call a place, in which nationalism and racism are present, as the prophet's heart. We cannot accept it as such if there is so much waste, including waste of human beings and time'.²²

The critique of state- and military-centric Islam was pursued in their reinterpretation of martyrdom as well. Mehmet Ali explained that martyrdom was misinterpreted by statecraft:

In Islam, martyrdom is not about dying but living. It is actually witnessing. [...] We are witnesses of God. I mean, we are here to witness the religion and the justice of God. This is the God's command. We need to live as witnesses of God, truth, religion, and Islam. This is what shahid means. If you witness through dying, you become martyr. We do not satisfy any of these. [...] There is no martyrdom in unjust wars.

They doubted the status of martyrdom for soldiers who fought against other Muslim communities. Muhammed explained this as follows: 'who would be a martyr in a place where no one cares about praying, Islam? This army is fighting against other Muslims. Who would be the martyr between those Muslims?'.²³

²¹ Mehmet Ali Başaran, personal interview.

²² Retrieved from <http://mehmetlibasaran.com/2013/02/28/degilim/> Retrieved from August 8th, 2015.

²³ Retrieved from <http://www.yenidenatilim.com/?pnum=6106&pt=%E2%80%98Milliyet%C3%A7i%20imani%20ret%C3%A7i%E2%80%99%20%20Muhammed%20Serdar%20Delice%E2%80%99nin%20hikayesi%E2%80%A6> on August 18th, 2015.

Through their acts, Muslim objectors did not only challenge the state-centric and militarized conceptions of Islam but also aimed to transform their *mahalle*. They denounced ‘the articulation of Islamic circles to the state under the AKP rule’ and pointed to its ‘harmful effects for Islam’. They urged members of the *mahalle* to take a clear stance against the compulsory military:

Muslim notions cannot be exploited. But, today, the ruling party says that they are Muslim and they are in power, and move all the sensibilities aside. There is an articulation to the state, gendarmerie, and military. These people were all neutral before because they did not see the state as their state. The state was a secular one which committed injustice to Muslim, Kurdish, and Armenian people. Is there any community to which it did not commit injustices? No. Muslim become very statist. [...] because they think that the party in power represents them. They think that the AKP rules the country in Islamic way. [...] Conscientious objection led me and my friends to distance from the state and power. I value this distance. (Mehmet Ali)

Muslim objectors reinterpreted the Islamic discourses and practices in alternative ways by demonstrating examples from within the Islamic history. In doing so, they linked Islam to the notions, such as antimilitarism and civil disobedience. When I asked Mehmet Ali what he thought of the claim that CO and civil disobedience was a ‘Western invention’, he refused this argument and told me the story of Imam-i Azam Ebu Hanife, claiming that civil disobedience has historical, cultural and legal foundations in Islam. Ebu Hanife, who was an intellectual, refused to work with Ibn Hübeyra, who represented the political power of that period, because he did not want to be a tool to be used for injustices. Ebu Hanife did not perceive the members of political authorities as moral and conscientious, and refused to share his knowledge with them. Mehmet Ali noted that Hanife performed a passive resistance against the demands of the authorities, and incited his students to do the same.

Muslim women further incorporated a gender perspective within their *mahalle*. In 2010, Nebiye Arı, a self-identified Muslim and antimilitarist woman, declared her objection and became the first Muslim women objector. Nebiye heard about the CO with Enver’s objection and felt very close to the idea. As a matter of act, her experiences throughout her life made her develop a critical stance towards the state and its institutions. Nebiye grew up in Konya in a religious family from a Salafi tradition. That said she clearly stated that her understanding of Salafism was very different from jihadist groups, such as ISIS. Her Salafi roots were influential in her distance to the

state. Many male members of her family dodge the draft or postpone their military service until ‘they get caught by the authorities’. She first engaged in politics through the headscarf protests. As early as twelve years old, she was going to demonstrations with her family to defend the freedom to headscarf. Later, she studied theology in a ‘pirate university’ because she could not take the university exams with her headscarf. These personal encounters with the state institutions led to the ‘sharpening of her Muslim woman identification’:

Even if I don’t put myself in a position, the state did put me in a place. I mean, it said that I could not go to the university or to public service, or this or that job. So, I developed a sensitivity, an identity on the basis of my headscarf. A Muslim women identity.

After meeting with the CO, she made research online and met with women objectors. She decided to make a public declaration to take a positioning against the injustices (*zulüm*) that the military committed to Muslims:

They do not come and take me to the military. But there is an injustice (*zulüm*). Others are taken to the service forcefully. This is why I am interested in this issue. [...] Compulsory military service affects me through my brother, my friend, my husband or my son. Of course, it also affects me, as a woman, because of its sexist structure. But I feel it less; I feel it indirectly. I declared my objection predominantly because I was feeling this pressure as a wife and a mother. [...] Beside, although the structure of the military changed, it still excludes women with headscarfs from the military. It is an institution that perceives me as a threat. I wanted to take part in a struggle against these injustices. I wanted to be more active in this movement. I wanted to make CO known in my own *mahalle*.

Her emergence opened up a different path for Muslim and non-Muslim women objectors. Similar to the women objectors I have discussed above, Muslim women, too, put forth themselves as women, wives, and/or mothers who refuse the compulsory military service. In doing so, they constructed themselves as the active agents of the dissent to the military. That said, they also performed different subjectivities. They did not reinterpret their experiences through feminism. Koran and the life of Mohammed gave them the perspective through which they made sense of their sex and gender:

I am a woman who read Quran and the words of the Prophet. I have also read people like Seyd Uzun, Ali Sheriadi. But my ideas have been mostly shaped by Quran and the tradition. I do not feel any belonging to any other ideology. In my opinion, my religion shapes my whole life. [...] This is why I define myself Muslim. This is the reason why we, as Muslim

objectors, create another axe in the objection movement. I do not participate in the events of other women objectors because they have a different discourse and I had reactions due to my own identity. [...] As far as I understand feminism, I am not a feminist. For instance, their perception about family is not appealing to me. Of course, the family is not sacred for me either but I value it a lot. I value being a mother. Of course, they also debate these. I do not follow all these debates so I cannot say that feminists say this and I say that. But I feel different than many of them in many aspects.

Muslim objectors framed their acts as selective objections. They refused the compulsory military service but also claimed their right to participate in wars that are just and necessary. Although none of them participated in any war or armed organization, they accepted the legitimacy of armed resistance in cases of self-defense and/or to protect victimized people (*mazlum*) on the basis of their conceptions of *jihad*. Their adherence to armed resistance, however, did not envision a compulsory conscription, but a temporary and voluntary submission to God's will.²⁴ Some Muslim objectors refuted antimilitarism as a 'utopic' idea. Others negotiated its meaning with the early generation of objectors, claiming that antimilitarism does not preclude armed resistance:

What is antimilitarism exactly? I read it like this. Refusing to fight in any circumstances. I think that this is a wishful thinking. Wars should not occur. But, I mean, there will be wars. There will always be a struggle for power when there are two individuals. Even wife and husband have a struggle for power in the family. Who will govern the house? Even the child gets into this power relation. So, there will always be a fight between the just and unjust. We believe in this. When you look at the world, there are only 36 years there have not been a war. Maybe there are wars in 80 places in the world right now. Everyone fights. 'Let's don't make war, don't hold weapons, etc.'. These are wishful thinking. God knows this. That's why God says that we need to fight, die or kill if it is necessary. But antiwar activists refuse any war. [...] There may be a just war. There may be a war to protect your honour and glory. We may fight to protect children, victims and poors. Killing someone is not an injustice per se. (Mehmet Ali)

I believe that *jihad* is a notion that is related to injustice. If there is an injustice, if we are obliged to get involved, if it is closeby – for example ISIS does injustices to Yezidis – we need to stop it. In these cases, we may bear arms and use them for self-defense. We may create units. But I would not defend a regular army. I defend a military setting, in which people educate themselves in fighting only in times of necessity. I do not believe that we need to create standing armies. [...] I am not a pacifist anyway. I

²⁴ Retrieved from <http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/haber-reddetmisim-dunyayi-58651/> on August 20th, 2015.

think that violence exists in the world. And we can stop violence only through violence in some circumstances. [...] I define myself as an antimilitarist. But someone may come and tell me that I am not because of my adherence to jihad. But I define militarism as a structure in which military affects every aspect of life. For example, walking in order with national anthems in schools, making an oath... These are militaristic. I consider myself as an antimilitarist because I think that these should not exist. (Nebiye)

With the articulation of religious and/or ethno-national identifications into the objection movement, the meanings of militarism, antimilitarism and CO have been transformed from the late 2000s onwards. The objectors negotiated their religious identifications with the military, the *mahalle* and other objectors. They put forward new subjectivities that deconstructed the militaristic conceptions of citizenship and religion, and became agents of counter-hegemonic change in the country. They made links with CO, civil disobedience and Islam, and transformed the discourses and practices of other objectors. Through their acts, they took radical distance from the hegemonic construction of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which was consolidated under the AKP rule. With the emergence of multiple, multilayered and intersecting identifications, acts of objection framed new issues, claims and goals, and widened the quality and scope of change that the CO puts forth. CO became an intersectional social movement in and through which individuals and groups contest, challenge and transform the militaristic conceptions of citizenship. The intersectionality of identifications brought about new critiques of the military, militarism and militarization, and created sites of collaborations and conflicts between various acts of objections. I will now turn to the coalitions and conflicts within the movement.

IV.V. The objection movement as a site of negotiation and bargaining in Turkey

Historical trajectory of CO demonstrates that objection is transformed from an antimilitarist, secular and total act of dissent to the one with multiple and overlapping subjectivities, claims and goals. Objectors reflect on their embodied experiences in specific historical junctures, give new meanings to their sociocultural and political identifications, and break away with the hegemonic militaristic discourses and practices of citizenship. Their emergence reflects broader changes Turkey went through. Scholars demonstrate that, with the globalization and Europeanization processes, the state-centric model has increasingly been criticized by the gender, religious and ethnic identity politics (Kadioğlu 1998; Keyman and İçduygu 2003; Keyman and İçduygu

2005; Keyman 2005; Keyman 2007; Keyman and Öniş 2007). These processes have brought about the contestation of the republican model by a liberal democratic reconceptualization since the 1980s (Keyman and İçduygu 2005). Newly emerging acts of objections are active agents of this process of deconstructing the Turkish citizenship. They do this deconstruction in the field of the military and national security. Articulating an identity politics, they refuse to embody the citizen-soldier imagery. In doing so, objectors transform the ways in which citizenship, war, military and militarism is thought of and practiced in Turkey. Social and political change occurs with the introduction of these new political subjectivities with multiple claims and goals. My analysis demonstrates that these acts have predominantly been radical in their discourses in Turkey. The objectors become the agents of counter-hegemonic change by introducing a radical rupture with the hegemonic conceptions of citizenship, nationalism and soldiering and put forth alternative subjectivities with total or selective acts of objection. In doing so, the CO becomes an intersectional social movement that negotiates various identifications with the state, the military, and the society. The coalitions and conflicts within the movement emerge along two main cleavages: total versus selective and secular versus religious objection.

Intersectionality carves out a space for collective action among various social groups in the country for a specific cause. Individuals and groups, with diverging political subjectivities, claims and goals, unite in their right claims to CO. Feminist and queer claims are incorporated relatively easily into the antimilitarist claims of the objectors. From then on, many women and LGBTs declared their objections in panels, events, and campaigns. In a period of cease-fire between the military and the PKK, objectors mostly converge in their total and antimilitarist objections. However, identifications also create sites of conflicts between the objectors and limit the collective action. In a period of increasing militarization of Turkish-Kurdish conflict and increasing articulation of Islam with state and military under the AKP rule, objectors construct alternative Kurdish and Muslim identifications which believe in the legitimacy of armed struggle for a 'just cause' and 'self-defense'. The total objectors are alienated by the emergence of the selective objectors. In a parallel vein, the selective objectors feel distance from the pacifism and/or antimilitarism of the total objectors:

There are certain blindspots or impasses of conscientious objection, especially for the Kurdish conscientious objectors. Either our conscience is so principled or it is far away from the reality of Kurds. It is difficult to understand. I would like to discuss the growing violence in the region and how we could exist and position ourselves against this violence. I feel these impasses in the texts of CO and in the discussions between activists. Kurdish people have a different understanding of objection. I remember similar conflicts and disputes in the discussions over civil disobedience in 2009 and 2010. I think that we need to re-think militarism, self-defense, pacifism and conscientious objection in the new situation that occurred in the Middle East. As a Kurdish objector, I contradicted myself a lot during the Syrian conflict. Conscientious objection was insufficient to explain my feelings. I could not express myself in these days. Now, this situation is the status quo in the cities and streets. We don't know how many objectors fight in Syria, Silvan or Nusaybin.

In the context of the Syrian War, some, who were total objectors, transform their positions vis-à-vis organized violence. This is not to say that total objection does not exist or it changes its content and form. It is rather to say that sociocultural and political identifications are not fixed and stable but socially constructed in situated contexts of time and place. For instance, when I asked Mehmet Tarhan how he thinks about armed resistance, he told that his ideas have changed since he declared his objection:

I think that violence should be a tool that we need to abstain from using. [...] [But in cases of asymmetrical violence] it may be used for self-defense. [...] If I was in Shengal and faced ISIS, I might flee maybe, but I might stay and fight too. I think we should not approach the topic from an essentialist point of view. I cannot tell that wars are bad to someone who fights with ISIS. S/he may kill me and s/he is right to do so if I do such meanness. [...] [Did you think similar about self-defense when you did your objection?] No, not in this way... Back in those days, the movement had a different discourse. I could not say this as easily as today. Yes, I was acknowledging the asymmetry between an oppressor and an oppressed but I could not make this phrase as easily as I do today.

Other objectors have similar ambiguities. Many interviewees also stressed that their ideas about violence changed over time. For instance, Ceyda argued that there might be just violence in certain circumstances. She claimed that she was in a 'glass bell' before and she came to think about violence differently after Gezi protests. A similar discourse was also discerned in Oğul:

I don't know why but my pacifism has somewhat been broken in the last one, one and a half year. Maybe it is because of Gezi, maybe my anger grows... I do not legitimize armament but I think that there may sometimes be just violence. [...] I feel anger inside me. We go on the streets to

demonstrate. I cannot be in the frontlines because of my fears to get hurt or to hurt someone. But if I face the danger in person and if I need to defend myself, I would. [...] I cannot say ‘don’t throw stones’ anymore. Before, I said clearly ‘don’t throw them, you cannot do that’ (Ceyda).

During Gezi protests, I was confused about this issue. I am an antimilitarist; I am against violence; so how is it possible that cops make me go towards violence programmatically. I did not believe that they could increase the level of violence that much. I did not have any other choice. Either I will be drawn in tear gas or I will use a limited and low-level violence to stop this, you know, I could not understand those people who were saying ‘don’t throw stones, etc.’ during the protests, for instance (Oğul).

The divide between secular and religious objections constitutes another important cleavage within the movement. Muslim objectors refrain to build coalitions with secular objectors whose secular discourses of secular and leftist objectors alienate many Muslim men and women:

We write certain texts, we discuss them. I explain everything through Islam. This is normalized in my life. [But] the texts are written in a secular language there. Speeches, public declarations and demonstrations are also constructed in such a language. I stay there with my own identity so to speak but I am actually not there. My Muslim identity does not exist there. There is not any influence of my identity. [...] This bothers me. That’s why I do not participate in the association. There is no any other reason. But I participate in some demonstrations or when there is a need for a direct support (Nebiye).

VR-DER is actually very postmodern. For example, they say ‘you can be anarchist, anti-state, Kurd, gay, it doesn’t matter for us’. They accept each and every identity. I mean, they say ‘everyone should get together’. I do not think like this. I believe that there is one truth. I believe in God. I believe that there is one Islam. I believe that Islam is the last religion and it has a superior understanding than others. So, I do not advocate their stance. [...] They think and act differently; they have a non-religious understanding (Mehmet Ali).

Mehmet Ali Başaran further stated – in fact from the very beginning of our interview without me asking anything on the matter – that pro-LGBT stances of the secular objectors were problematic for him:

There is a worry in our community. Who are these conscientious objectors? Anarchists, antimilitarists, leftists, Kurds... They say: ‘Let’s don’t solidarize with them. We would project a wrong image if we sided with them’. We have traditional and conservative values... I think that this is not right. For example, I am not a member of VR-DER but I can come to

the association and discuss with other objectors. I follow them. But as a Muslim, I worry about the pro-LGBT stance of the association. I think that a Muslim cannot approve LGBTs. That's why I am not a member of the association.

LGBTs, too, are sensitive to the religious objectors' stance vis-a-vis their sexual identifications and doubt about their political alliances:

I know that we cannot agree on certain issues. During Gezi protests, we have met with some groups with which I did not agree on in certain issues. We worked together with people with whom we might not get together and drink on the same table. I believe that we can also be together with Muslims. I need to believe in this. I need to do this. This is my process of growing up. I mean, we need to sit down and discuss. I respect them. They would probably not accept my lesbian identity; they would not probably come closer; this has happened many times before. I have been hurt because of that many times. We have solidarized with them in the demonstrations for the liberation of headscarf. But just after two months, they left a semposium at Boğaziçi University because there were LGBTs in the room. You know, we were solidarizing with them two weeks ago and they did not say anything; they were OK with us being there. They do not want to be together in equal terms. I wish that they could say that they respect me. Then, there would not be any problem. Maybe we will go to many different paths. I do not ask for full acceptance. They must fully accept me but I am still OK with a relative acceptance (Ceyda).

The objectors promote their collective action within these limits. They seek to sustain a creative dialogue between various identifications that differentiate the subjectivities, claims, and goals of the objectors. Conscientious Objection Association (VR-DER) emerged out of such an effort in 2013. The idea of VR-DER came from a group of antiwar, antimilitarist and leftist women and men, which were active in the Platform of Conscientious Objection and the Conscientious Objection for Peace in Istanbul. Activists aimed at creating a platform in which total, selective, religious, secular, and women and LGBT objectors organize their collective agencies to pursue a common goal, enacting the right to CO. However, the heterogeneity of the group gradually dissolved due to the ideological and ideational differences. Consequently, the association continues on by a small group of anarchist activists who are mainly from similar organizations and initiatives; a fact that further alienates other objectors. Within these limitations, objectors cannot pursue well-organized and influential campaigns. They mostly unite in the CO Day demonstrations and panels, and pursue collective action mostly in cases of imprisoned male objectors.

Chapter V

From ‘Contractual Militarism’ to Antimilitarism: Emergence and transformation of conscientious objection in Israel

The CO to the military service changes in substance and scope from the 1970s onwards in Israel as the country witnesses the emergence of the selective objection among the active-duty and reserve Jewish soldiers. The selective objectors do not refuse to serve in the IDF altogether but object to some of its policies, such as the military rule in the occupied territories, the Yom Kippur War, and the first and second Lebanon War. In doing so, they construct reformist stances that seek to redress the IDF through their civic and political engagement when the institution contradicts with its basic principles. Thus, unlike their counterparts in Turkey, they embody the citizen-soldier imagery and frame their discourses within the confines of Zionism. The active-duty and reserve soldiers reflect on their embodied experiences during their services; refuse immoral, illegitimate and illegal military policies and practices; and put forth new moral and political subjectivities, promoting legal, social and political change. In the early 2000s, total objections of the antimilitarist and feminist Jewish and Druze men and women are introduced to Israeli politics. Of course, as I have argued in the Chapter 3, the total objections of Jewish and Druze men date back to the formation of the nation-state. However, its emergence as a collective phenomenon, which attracts public attention, occurs from the 2000s onwards. Recently, the ultra-Orthodox Jews raise their voices against the demand for the conscription of yeshiva students to the IDF. All these differences between groups create a vivid conscientious objection movement in Israel.

I claim that CO becomes an intersectional social movement in and through which individuals and groups perform new political subjectivities and change the ways in

which citizenship, occupation, militarism and soldiering are thought and practiced. Objectors reflect on their embodied experiences with the state, society and military, promote Zionist, anti-Zionist, antimilitarist, ethno-national, religious, feminist and other subjectivities through their objections, and in doing so, they become the agents of social and political change. In this chapter, I explore these subjectivities, their claims and goals within the changing historical-political contexts in Israel. How do the acts of objection evolve? How does historical-political context shape the course of this evolution? How do the newly emerging objectors create change in the hegemonic conceptions of citizenship, soldiering and militarism and in the objection movement? Through the answers to these questions, I demonstrate the significant transformations that the objection movement goes through. Like in the previous chapter, I argue that the objection to the military service come to embody two main cleavages around which main conflicts and coalitions emerge; namely, selective vs. total and religious vs. secular objection. Like their counterparts in Turkey, the objectors in Israel face challenges to sustain a creative dialogue between these cleavages. Tracing the historical trajectory of the declared objection, I further argue that CO has a much reformist stance and a relatively higher scope in Israel compared to Turkey. The societalization of the movement occurs with the selective objectors, framed within Zionist discourses and practices. Israel witnesses the emergence of the radical acts of objection first among the ethno-national and ethno-religious groups, i.e. Druzes, and later among the antimilitarist and feminist Jewish men and women, which represent a marginal yet growing group of objectors in the country.

The chapter proceeds in five sections. It firstly explores the emergence of selective objections among active-duty and reserve soldiers from the early 1970s onwards. It then proceeds to the re-emergence of the total objections in a different garb from the 2000s onwards. Given their intertwined introductions to the Israeli political lexicon, it questions the total objections of the antimilitarists and the feminists together. The chapter later turns to the objections among the Druze men and women that re-emerged in a slightly different fashion in recent years. In conclusion, it explores the main fault lines of the movement together with the emergence of *kippah serugot* and ultra-Orthodox Jewish objectors in the 2000s.

V.I. ‘We don’t shoot, we don’t cry, and we don’t serve in the occupied territories’: The selective objections to the occupation and wars in the IDF

The course of objection changed after Israel extended its military control to the West Bank and Gaza. In 1967, Israeli forces fought the Six Day War with Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and seized the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Although the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt with the 1978 Camp David Accords that followed the Yom Kippur War, Israel continued its hold over the rest of the territories. During and after the Yom Kippur War, many Israelis came to the conviction that long-term national security depends on political rather than military solutions (Hermann, 2002: 100). Many cases of civil disobedience and massive post-war protests of soldiers sprung up. Selective objections emerged in that historical context against the military rule over the ‘occupied territories’ and the wars with neighboring Arab countries. Embodied experiences in the occupied territories, the Yom Kippur War, the first Lebanon War and the first Intifada would come to transform the moral and political convictions of the active-duty and reserve Jewish soldiers.

The emergence of selective objection reflected broader political, economic, and social processes that transformed the relations between individual, state and society in Israel. From the late 1960s onwards, numerous Jewish citizens of Israel began to problematize the ethno-republican project of Labor Zionism in general and the soldiering duty in particular. The decline of Labor Zionism partly resulted from the economic liberalization that Israel went through in the 1980s and 1990s. The modernization period overall ended in the late 1960s, and Israel gradually integrated into the global markets. Although there were recessions during the wars, Israeli economy grew at an increasing pace in the 1970s. In 1985, the authorities launched an economic liberalization program that transformed the political economy drastically in the following two decades. Similar to the developments in Turkey, state-centered and protectionist economic policies were transformed to open and neoliberal ones (Shafir and Peled 1998; Ram 2000). Economic liberalization brought about a certain degree of political liberalization in the country. The most important result of the process was the enactment of two Basic Laws (Freedom of Occupation and Human Dignity and Freedom) in 1992, the principle of judicial review of primary legislation and an activist High Court of Justice, and the path to Oslo process (Peled, 2007: 102).

Scholars argue that these changes led to the emergence of a new class of elites, comprising business community, politicians, academics, journalists, and civil servants (Shafir and Peled, 1998; Peled, 2007). The military-industrial complex which had been built up since the beginning of the 1970s declined in prestige and a differentiation between military and civilian high-tech industries took place (Shafir and Peled, 1998: 419). The middle and upper classes of the Israeli society, which is mostly composed of Ashkenazim, shifted their careers to more attractive opportunities in the civil society and market (Ram, 2000: 227). Parallel to these developments, the prestige of military service and the motivation to serve gradually decreased in the 1970s and 1980s (Shafir and Peled, 1998: 409). Ram (2000) notes that ‘a military committee which examined the “motivation” problems of the youth concluded that the “traditional values” of settlement, Jewish immigration and security, have lost their appeal, and the youth are much more interested in personal fulfillment than in societal contribution’ (Ram, 2000: 227). Hermann (2002) too argues that generational differences were influential in this process. A new generation of Israeli-born activists, who were identifying less with the Holocaust and post-WWII atmosphere, came of age and opted for alternative ways to politically engage with the security policies of the state and the military. With a relatively stronger self-security compared to their parents, citizens began to promote a pro-peace stance in Jewish-Palestinian conflict. Many anti-war and peace groups were formed, i.e. Strength and Peace (mid-1970s), the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace (1976), Peace Now (1978), Parents against Silence during the 1980s; East for Peace (a Mizrahi group) during the 1980s, Women in Black (1988), Bat Shalom (1994). The pro-peace stance of Rabin-Peres government and the ‘New Middle East’ vision of Shimon Peres indicated that these changes occurred at the state level too. The peace process was conceptualized as a necessity for economic prosperity and democracy. Coupled with the first Intifada, the cost of occupied territories became high and the members of this group increasingly lacked the willingness to pay the material, political, and moral cost of the military occupation.

Coming from mostly European backgrounds which were privileged and burdened the most by the Zionist nation-building process, the selective objectors declared their acts of objections against this backdrop. Shafir and Peled argue that ‘the resources they [the Ashkenazim] had accumulated under the collectivist regime enable them [...] to

act independently of the state and of the corporatist structures which they have come to regard as obstructing, rather than supporting, their interests' (Shafir and Peled, 1998: 421). These objectors embodied hegemonic conceptions of Zionism, citizenship, and soldiering. Their objections were to uphold the basic principles that they were told in schools, family, and society; namely, the ethical norms of the IDF (black flag of illegality, the purity of arms, defensive military mobilization and desire to avoid war for political ends), Jewish and democratic character of Israel, and the national security. They introduced selective objection as a 'civic virtue' through which they sought to transform the state and military policies which they departed from the ideals of Labor Zionism (Helman 1999). They believed that certain actions of the IDF, which are deemed immoral, illegal, and illegitimate, must be resisted if Israel wants to keep security, democracy and human rights intact.

In 1967, ninety people signed a petition against the IDF's practices in the occupied territories. In 1970, a group of high school students sent a letter to then Prime Minister Golda Meir in which they announced that, once inducted into the army, they intended to refuse to serve in the territories because they did not believe the government's policies were directed to achieve peace. In 1978, one hundred students declared that, in the event of war, they would refuse to defend the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories (Peri, 1993: 151). In 1980, a group of twenty-seven soldiers sent a letter to Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman, stipulating their intention to refuse to serve in the territories because of their 'opposition to the occupation and suppression of the Palestinian people' (Ibid: 150-151). That said the major increase in the scope of objection came with the first Lebanon War in 1982. Many draftees, reserve and on-duty soldiers perceived this war a 'war of choice' that was waged for the narrow political interests by the ruling elites. Selective objectors institutionalized their claims with the establishment of Yesh Gvul (There is a Limit), in 1982. Members of Yesh Gvul refused to serve in Lebanon and in the occupied territories. They rejected the 'shoot-and-cry syndrome' and instead stressed that: 'We don't shoot, we don't cry, and we don't serve in the occupied territories!'²⁵ Their aim was to 'combat the misuse of the IDF for unworthy ends, and terminate the occupation.'²⁶ They managed to collect 1470

²⁵ Retrieved from <http://www.yeshgvul.org.il/en/about-2/> on January, 18th, 2014.

²⁶ Retrieved from <http://www.yeshgvul.org.il/en/about-2/> on January, 18th, 2014.

signatories in a year (Peri, 1993: 153). Similar organizations were established during and after the second Intifada. In 2002, following the Combatants' Letter signed by 52 combat officers and soldiers, Courage to Refuse (CtR) was formed. Pilots and commandos joined the combatants in 2003 with Pilots' Letter and Commandos' Letter respectively. In December 2004, more than 100 parents declared their support to selective objectors.²⁷ The members of Breaking the Silence (BtS) and Combatants for Peace (CfP) followed these organizations in 2004 and 2005. Whereas Yesh Gvul, CtR and Breaking the Silence were composed of Israeli commanders, soldiers and reservists, CfP was a binational movement uniting the Israeli soldiers serving in the IDF and the Palestinian combatants fighting to free Palestinian territories.

The organizational structures of these associations were similar to the structuring of the military. They mostly projected a top-down, hierarchical, and centralist feature with a leadership, representatives and membership. The organizations collected thousands of signatures of reservist and on-duty soldiers, published booklets, testimonies, leaflets and posters to raise the public awareness on war, violence and occupation, organized demonstrations, seminars and panels, and morally and financially supported the imprisoned objectors and their families.²⁸ They organized trips to the occupied territories. CtR further promoted a campaign for the confiscation of settlers' guns. As of December 2014, many segments of the Israeli society and the soldiers – 623 combatants from all units of the IDF and from all sectors of the Israeli society – signed their letter.

Selective objectors were men who were mostly coming from Ashkenazi families with middle-class backgrounds, although there was a gradual increase in the number of Mizrahi and mixed Jewish objectors over time. Whereas some grew up in kibbutz, others were from cities. As the 'cherished sons of the Republic', some had a hard time to conceptualize their objections to the service. For example, one objector explained

²⁷ Parents stated that they raised and encouraged their children to be good and caring citizens, to obey the law and to serve in the IDF in order to defend Israel. It was, they claimed, these values of civil responsibility which led them to write this letter: 'If you decide to refuse immoral commands that contradict your consciences, if you decide not to take part in the occupation's wrongs and the human rights violations, if you decide to thus fight for Israel's democracy and its morality, we will lovingly and proudly stand behind you' Retrieved from <http://www.couragetorefuse.org/english/article.asp?msgid=227&type=news> on January 20th, 2014.

²⁸ Retrieved from <http://www.yeshgvul.org.il/en/about-2/> on January 18th, 2014.

that it was very difficult to tell his ideas about objection to his family members who were mostly military officers:

I knew that eventually I would do it [objection]. But it was hard to actually do it because I come from... Almost all of my family was officers. Even my mother was an officer. She was back then in the army. My grandfather was the commander in the Israeli navy. [...] It was very hard for me to tell my father. I never actually told my grandfather. I just told that I moved to another unit and they never asked why. In the Israeli society, I am sure in every society, objection puts you in very specific place. I now feel very comfortable in this place but getting there... You know, you step out of the camp. And it is a hard thing to do. Again especially me, I come from a very Zionist background and the army establishment. I grew up in a kibbutz. It was a hard decision. I remember feeling very relieved when I finally did it.

Selective objectors embodied the basic tenets of Zionism. Some identified with a Zionist leftist stance; others were ‘on the borderline between radical left and Zionist left’, and others gradually took a much radical tone in their critique of the state and the military over years. They did not problematize the Jewish character of Israel and the importance of the IDF. However, these should not preclude the democratic nature of Israel. For Zionism should not mean deprivation of the human rights of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and during the wars. They introduced their claims on the basis of a delicate balance between national security, democracy and human rights.

As Ishai Menuchin says, selective objectors ‘take this [Israeli] citizenship seriously’. (Kidron, 2005: 15). Their contributions as soldiers or reservists were to prove their patriotism and love of the state and the society, and they were willing to make sacrifices in cases of existential threats. They finished their compulsory military service of three years. Some even continued on their military duties for more than three years in high-rank posts in prestigious units. They were well integrated into their military environment, and well respected by their commanders and colleagues. As a matter of fact, some felt the responsibility to tell his ideas about objection to their commanders and colleagues before declaring it to the authorities so that the unit would not have any adaptation problems:

I felt responsible for other officers because I knew that if they call us to the unit and I wouldn’t show up, someone had to do the job. And it could mean more job load to the rest of the officers. I let them know in advance. And what was interesting, now that I recall it, I wrote an e-mail to all the

people in my platoon. I mean, to my comrades. And it was very interesting because it was a quite diverse population but many of them accepted it [objection] very well.

They described their relations with their commanders as ‘friendly’ and ‘close’; some even shared similar political opinions to a certain extent and saw each other outside the military setting. But their participation in the military was conditional, in that they wished to safeguard their moral convictions against the actions of the IDF which they considered immoral, illegitimate and illegal:

I had a reserve service in the West Bank and we did patrols with jeeps. Once we stopped an old man with a donkey. And we took his ID. And I had to check him. It was ridiculous. It was an old farmer, like my grandfather on a donkey. I was trying to be very nice to him. I gave him water and I was acting very humane but I felt awful. Nothing happened. All the checking was all very useless and not objective and just. They [these experiences] taught me about the every day life of the occupation.

I can’t say exactly what brought me to this. But when I was sixteen, there was Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. It was a very dramatic incident for me. First of all, because thousand people died... It was the first time I heard these numbers here in Israel. Before, there were only small operations. I saw a very very strong racist wind among my friends. During the operation, everybody became super racist. This gave me a real shock because my friends were all very normal and humanist people. Many of them are still my friends. But often during the operations you see everyone being drifted away like this. People become more extreme in what they say. So this gave me a big shock. This is the thing that really triggered my thoughts about refusal. (Nathan)

Their embodied experiences in war zones and occupied territories transformed them significantly. Soldiers reflected on the immoral, illegitimate and illegal practices of the IDF, and put forth new moral and political subjectivities. They came to the conclusion that the actions of the Israeli government were harming the security, strategic interests and defense of the State of Israel. Their refusal worked as a ‘civic virtue’ for the establishment of common good which was defined as peace and security (Helman 1999). For instance, the initiators of CtR, Captain David Zonshein and Lieutenant Yaniv Itzkovitz, who served for four years in compulsory service and eight years in the reserves, including long periods of active combat in Lebanon and in the occupied territories, transformed their political convictions during their reserve service in Gaza in the second intifada.²⁹ Their motto ‘refuse for Israel’ demonstrated their

²⁹Retrieved from <http://www.couragetorefuse.org/english/movement.asp> on January 19th, 2014.

patriotic discourses. Zonshein explained that he ‘refused in the name of the Zionist values and the values of the army in which I had been educated’:

‘My parents instilled in me the notion that I must do everything for the state. In Israel, serving in the army is a central expression of that ethos. When I was a high school student, it was not only obvious to me that I would go to the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), but it was also vital that I become a paratrooper and serve in a special unit. It was also clear to me that my service to the state and my patriotism would require that I participate in an officer's course and serve an extra year. [...] After two years of deliberation and many sleepless nights, I came to the inescapable conclusion that Zionism is not what the zealots have made it. Zionism is not about occupation and territories; it is about obtaining a secure and internationally recognized home for the Jewish people. While some in Israel view refusal as betrayal, I refuse to betray the basic values and goals of Zionism. The continuing occupation imperils the future of the Jewish state. We must choose between land and legitimacy and between occupation and democracy’.³⁰

I think that having an army is something crucial for a society to protect itself. [...] I still think that people are bad. Not all of them are nice. Look at the history. I look at Europe 60 years ago. Now Daesh and look at what is going on in Syria, in Iraq, in Far East, in South America. They are killing everyone here. They do not protect the democracy, they protect their oil. So, I trust no one. We have to have an army to protect us. But I don't think that we are doing as much as we can to prevent war. We are contributing to the fight between us and Palestinians. And I disagree with that. [...] Even though we have to protect ourselves, we have to maintain our dignity, think of ourselves as moral human beings and consider the civilians and all the people around us as equals. We cannot control nations; we cannot divide people by borders. There is an apartheid regime here. In Judea, there is a road for settlers and other roads for the Palestinians. I cannot agree on such a thing. I cannot agree that there is a different law for Arab Palestinians and for the settlers. I cannot accept that. (Daniel)

Objectors relied on a balance between civic-republican ethos which accepts the necessity and legitimacy of the soldiering duty, and liberal democratic tradition which respects individual rights and liberties. The objectors claimed for the independence of Palestinian Territories – the West Bank and Gaza – from the occupation. They advocated a ‘two-state solution’ in order to establish peace and security in the region. CtR activists claimed that Israel is giving away its commitment to democracy and human rights by perpetuating the occupation since the military regime impedes the enjoyment of fundamental human rights by Palestinians. Against this backdrop,

³⁰Retrieved from <http://www.couragetorefuse.org/english/article.asp?msgid=191&type=article> on January 28th, 2014.

objectors put forth their refusals as acts that preserve the moral and democratic characteristics of the State of Israel and redressed the IDF when it contradicts with these hegemonic 'ideals':

'We refuse in the name of democracy, because democracy means more than just majority rule. The democratic system is a full set of values, and these values preclude the items listed above. We refuse to be sent, "in the name of democracy", to implement things that are so blatantly undemocratic.'³¹

Like their counterparts in the first Lebanon War, the members of the group framed the war for settlements as a 'war of choice'. They did not accept the settlements as parts of the State of Israel. By insisting on the occupation, they claimed, the government contributes to the political, moral and economic costs that the nation suffers.

Selective objectors further embodied the legal and institutional norms of the IDF. They articulated hegemonic conceptions of the citizen-soldier and war-making, as well as universal human right documents and national verdicts, into their discourses. They framed their objections as an act to safeguard the ethical norms of the IDF, that is to say the purity of arms, defensive military mobilization and desire to avoid war for political means. In other words, their refusals were to 'be faithful to their oath'. (Kidron, 2005: 15) Their positions as 'insiders' gave them certain leverage in making recognize their immediate demands. For example, Daniel, who declared his refusal and was jailed during the first Lebanon War, explained that he avoided some missions before his actual objection because he was 'a good soldier who the commanders appreciated [his] ideas':

The first time [I objected] was during my military service. The officer asked me to do few things that I did not want to do. It was during the Arab protest in 1976. They [the protestors] were protesting against the Israeli policy towards Israeli Arabs up north. They [the authorities] sent soldiers to eliminate the protesters. And I refused. I didn't want to be involved in this kind of an action because I considered myself a soldier who came here to protect the borders. I told them I was not a policeman. I did not want to be involved in such a thing. I think that those Arabs were right. There was and is discrimination against the Arab society in Israel.

³¹Retrieved from <http://www.couragetorefuse.org/english/faq.asp> on January 19th, 2014.

That said his sporadic objections to the assigned missions did not stop him to participate in the IDF. As a matter of fact, Daniel went to serve in his reserve duty during the first Lebanon War. His first-hand witnessing of the IDF's actions in Lebanon however transformed his moral and political convictions. The invasion of a foreign country and interfering to its internal affairs were perceived as illegitimate within the hegemonic war discourse which advocates war only against an existential threat and in a defensive manner:

When my service is over, I was in the reserves. During the war in Lebanon, we came to believe that we were tools in the hands of Sharon and Menachem. We found ourselves in the middle of a fight which we were not part of. They wanted to be involved in conflict between the Christians and the Palestinians in Lebanon. They wanted us to support the Christians and they started a war which was not a war to protect our borders. We invaded Lebanon. And I didn't want to be there. As a soldier, we found ourselves in Lebanon, doing a lot of policing work than protecting our borders. I was involved in actions that were against human rights. [...] They wanted to bomb a civilian neighborhood where the Palestinians resided. They bombed a mosque, a neighborhood. With a lot of big tractors, they started to destroy the neighborhoods [...] There was a lot of children... a lot of dead children. Then I said: 'No more'. And I refused.

Objectors argued that 'black flag of illegality' flied over these policies. Black flag of illegality is a term which was coined by the judges after the Kafr Qasem massacre on 29 October 1956 when Israeli Border Guards killed 47 Palestinian civilians who did not know that their village were under curfew. The verdict became integral to the rules and ethics of the IDF and it 'rescinds the soldier's duty to obey and charges him with criminal accountability for his actions'. (Kidron, 2005: 2) Avi Mograbi, member of Yesh Gvul and one of the founding members of Breaking the Silence, explained the importance of their refusal for the principles of the State of Israel and the IDF as follows:

What I have learned in high school was that if you serve in the military, you must be very cautious with what I do. Every individual has the right to spot the black flag about certain acts. He has not only the right but the obligation to refuse to participate in those acts. This is Israel; it is supposedly a democracy and democracy involves, you know, civil rights and human rights. Israel is supposedly based on that. And also there is a very important verdict here, the Kfar Qasim verdict. Do you now the story? In 1956, Israel declared the curfew on Arab villages. And in Kfar Qasim, people didn't know that there was a curfew. The soldiers, who were at the checkpoint, killed them. And there was a big trial where the soldiers were

convicted because they should have realized that there was a black flag about this order. And they shouldn't have implemented it. This is not part of our constitution but it is a very important law in this country. Each and every soldier has the obligation to refuse to implement orders that have a black flag.

Objectors further pointed to the Charter of Independence which backed their claims. Danny Zamir, who refused during the first Intifada, explained that 'a land, a third of whose inhabitants have been subjected to extended military occupation for over 20 years – which means restriction of rights and a different code of law for the Jewish and Arab residents of the selfsame land – is not a democratic country. As such, it consciously denies its basic and substantive commitments (to itself and its inhabitants) as proclaimed and declared by its first prime minister – that declaration which serves to this day as the basis of its fragile democracy' (Kidron, 2005: 47):

'The state of Israel... shall rest upon foundations of freedom, justice and peace, in the light of vision of the prophets of Israel; the state shall maintain complete social and political equal rights for all citizens, irrespective of religion, race or gender; it shall ensure freedom of religion, conscience, education and culture; protect the Holy Places of all religions and be faithful to the Charter of the United Nations'.

In sum, the selective objectors harbored Zionist Jewish subjectivities that refused the state and military policies, such as the occupation of West Bank and Gaza, Yom Kippur War, first Lebanon War, or the IDF's responses to the first and second Intifadas. Their Zionism, however, differed from that of the ruling elites. Selective objectors sought to safeguard the liberal and democratic tradition of the state without problematizing its Jewish character. Through their acts, they promoted peace and justice between Jews and Palestinians, and, in doing so, sought to contribute to the national security. They constituted the predominant form of objection to the IDF in Israel. Their number reached high levels and received higher civil society support and media attention to their acts. Unlike the Turkish case, the acts of objections initiated reformist change that take a distance from the soldiering habitus to safeguard its basic tenets. They demonstrated that hegemony and resistance do not work in dichotomous ways and the hegemonic conceptions of citizenship enable a reformist rupture with the soldiering habitus. Objectors performed counter-hegemonic subjectivities, with radical claims and goals relatively late in Israel. Druze objectors, with their small number, constituted the only cases of counter-hegemonic change until the early 2000s. From the

early 2000s onwards, Israel witnessed the emergence of a small, yet growing, number of Jewish and Druze men and women who refused to serve in the IDF altogether. These newly emerging groups created a radical change by constructing anti-Zionist, antimilitarist and anti-war subjectivities which resembled to the total objectors in Turkey. It is these contestations to which I turn in the following section.

V.II. The radicalization of objection: The antimilitarist and feminist interruptions

Israel witnessed the emergence of total objection as a collective phenomenon in the early 2000s. Unlike the selective objectors, total objectors were all civilians who refused the IDF altogether. Through their acts, they produced antimilitarist, feminist, anti-occupation and anti-Zionist subjectivities, with radical claims and goals. Like the total objectors in Turkey, they created a radical break with the soldiering duty. Acts of total objections became a collective phenomenon in the Jewish segments of the society during the second Intifada. Israel witnessed the establishment of the New Profile, an antimilitarist and feminist organization in 1998, and Shministim Letters have taken a much radical distance from the hegemonic discourses and practices of citizenship, soldiering and war from the early 2000s onwards. Objectors defined the military as an institution that oppresses, dominates and marginalizes various categories of identity/difference, such as sex, gender, ethnicity and nationality. They negotiated the meaning of (anti)militarism, occupation and objection and transformed the ways in which the politics is thought of and practiced in Israel. They claimed that any participation in the IDF perpetuates the occupation by ‘helping the machine work’. They extended the issues from the compulsory military service per se to the demilitarization of the society, and demonstrated the ways in which the military, militarism and militarization might be resisted, challenged and transgressed. Feminist subjectivities informed the anti-Zionist and antimilitarist discourses. Women and LGBTs have constructed half of the total objectors; and they deconstructed the military, militarism and objection in its relations to gender hierarchies.

Radicalization of objection was a response to the end of the peace process that had started between Israeli government and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) with the Oslo Accords in 1993. The Accords led to the recognition of PLO as the legitimate representative of Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. They created a Palestinian interim self-government, which later became the Palestinian

National Authority by the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement. It was planned that many issues, such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security, and borders, would be resolved within a five-year interim period. However, after a last attempt to promote the Middle East peace process in the 2000 Camp David Summit, the process failed to bring a substantive peace between two parts, and second Intifada, also known as the al-Aqsa Intifada, broke out with the Ariel Sharon's visit to Temple Mount. The Intifada left its traumatic mark in the Israeli society. Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli targeted killings killed more than 4000 people, including military and civilians. The belief that the occupation was 'benign and enlightened' gradually lost its appeal. Total objectors reacted to the end of the peace process. Almost all of the total objectors, who I have interviewed, explained that they had been told by their parents that they would not serve in the IDF when they would grow up because there would not be compulsory military conscription as the security dilemma of Israel would be resolved. Their disappointment transformed their discourses and practices since many believed that, without a much radical voice, they would not reach peace and security.

Newly emerging objectors were either kibbutzim or came from cities, such as Tel Aviv. Their lived experiences with military did not stem from their experiences as soldiers in the territories or in wars. They came to oppose the IDF after being socialized with Palestinians, making visits to West Bank, and through their everyday life observations. Haggai, for instance, remembered his involvement in politics with Prime Minister Rabin's assassination. He defined the event as an important moment in which he 'started to ask questions and tried to understand what the occupation was all about'. At the age of 15, he began to socialize with Palestinian citizens of Israel. They exchanged their stories during summer schools and other social encounters. During the second Intifada, Haggai engaged in convoys which were regularly going to the villages in the West Bank for political and humanitarian reasons. These experiences led him to declare his total refusal to the IDF in 2002:

The more I went there, the more I met Palestinians, the more I saw what soldiers were doing in the occupied territories, occupation became clear to me. At first, I said: 'OK I am not going to do these specific things. I am not going to attack nonviolent demonstrators like myself'. And then it gradually grew into 'I won't serve in the occupied territories; I will go to the army but won't do anything that supports the occupation'. Eventually it was 'OK I

can't be in the army at all because what the army does is to maintain the occupation'. So I decided to refuse. And I did this not by myself. At that time, I got to meet with people of my age, in the communist party youth, in the convoys to the West Bank. [...] I think that the process of deciding to refuse was in part personal but also collective because we were talking about it, we were growing up together, seeing things. People that were three years older than us started to be jailed. And, you know, that affected us. So when I decided to refuse, I was part of that group and we decided to make it political with the seniors' letter – the Shministim. I was one of the people who organized it.

Udi also explained that he came to ask questions about occupation and his role in it as he met with the Palestinians:

I studied for 8 years in an Arab-Jewish mixed school. Until 8 years old. My parents sent me there. There are not many schools like that. It was half public and half private. Arabs and Jews were studying together. It was in the Galilee. [...] When I was 16 or 17, as the time of the military service approached, I started to read books, to talk to people. I understood that going to the army was to burn all the years which I spent in the mixed school. It meant to occupy my friends. [...] Then, one and a half year ago, I went to a group, it was a group of Israelis and Palestinians; the group was called vacation from war. It was organized by a German organization which took groups from Israel and Palestine to Germany for two weeks. And they were trying to make us meet and discuss. And at the end of two weeks, we simulated sort of a negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians. It was the first time I met Palestinian from West Bank. [...] I was 19. [...] And after this meeting, I postponed my military service for a year. There is this option here. I volunteered and studied. At the moment of the enlistment, it was clear to me that I would refuse to serve in the IDF.

Others came to problematize military and militarism through their reflexive engagement with their everyday encounters with soldiers in Israel:

Not just in the Israeli-Palestinian context, but I don't see any military that does something right in anywhere. [...] I don't like the idea of sitting in the bus next to someone with a gun. It is really something that is not natural to me. [...] I knew that I didn't like the concept of occupation. The predominant reason of my objection was the occupation. [...] When I was at the high school, I got my first call to go to the army. My classmates were talking about it and were obsessed about which job they would do in the military. Because it was very actively around me, I had to think about it more. I first started thinking about militarism back in those days. I also began thinking about who I was because I come from a Jewish-Druze family. I was asking myself whether or not I was a Palestinian? Would I occupy my own people? I didn't feel like I am part of the Palestinian nation. So where did this position me? You know, and I started to think who I was and where I stood in all this. (Yasmin)

Their reflexivity led to antimilitarist and anti-Zionist subjectivities. Shministim Letter, which is organized in 2001 during the second Intifada, accused the State of Israel and the IDF of an ‘aggressive’ and ‘racist’ policy which commits ‘crimes’ and ‘terrorist acts’ against the Palestinian people. (Kidron, 2005: 74) Haggai, one of the organizers of the letter who was later court-martialed and imprisoned even declared in his letter to Sharon and other ministers that the overall situation pointed to an ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘fascism’. (Kidron, 2005: 76) The following Shministim Letters (2008, 2009, 2010 and 2014) pursued the former letter’s critical discourses as well. The letters further called for demilitarizing the everyday life, education system, and workforce; they condemned the discrimination against minorities within and beyond the pre-1967 borders; they accused Israel of being an ‘apartheid state’ and ‘dictatorship’, and they defined the IDF an ‘aggressive occupation force’. New Profile published booklets, testimonies of objectors, reports about child recruitment in Israel and in the occupied territories, made available the knowledge about laws and regulations to avoid the military service, and provided financial, legal and psychological support for those who refused to serve in the IDF in any way for any reason. It organized summer camps in which the young men and women discussed militarism. New Profile came to have an increasing influence on Shministim Letters, in 2001, 2002, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2014, through which high school seniors aimed to stop the occupation and the resulting human rights violations such as land expropriations, arrests, executions without trial, house demolitions, torture, etc.

The activists not only contested the occupation of West Bank and Gaza, but challenged the militarization of the Israeli society within the pre-1967 borders. They deciphered how the IDF and militarism constructed sex, gender, ethnic, and national hierarchies. The establishment of New Profile in 1998 by antimilitarist and feminist men and women was very influential in the proliferation of this critique. Objectors argued that the IDF perpetuates not only occupation but also the hegemony of Jews, mostly Ashkenazim, over other ethnicities, nationalities and religions. They denounced the Zionist construction of Israel which prioritizes ethno-national conceptions of citizenship over its civic and universalistic conceptions. They claimed for the right of Palestinians to the land and right of Palestinians and many others minorities to self-determination and recognition. They refused to take part in the Zionist hegemonic

endeavor and put forth their total objections to the IDF. Objectors advocated nonviolence and antimilitarism and in doing so promoted justice, peace, and security. Although some self-declared antimilitarists accepted the legitimacy of armed resistance in cases of self-defense and liberation, many refused violent means as illegitimate ways of doing politics. However, given their privileged backgrounds, some Jewish objectors took a more ambivalent position when I specifically discussed the Jewish-Palestinian conflict. Although they did not explicitly condemn the violence of the oppressed, all refuted the possibility and success of a Palestinian armed resistance amid the unequal power relations:

Generally my instinct and my starting point isn't a general objection to violence. While saying that, I also think that criticizing the Palestinian violent struggle is problematic. I feel that when you are in a position of power and privilege, to judge those who are desperate for means to protect themselves and to free themselves isn't fair. I don't think that I have the right to criticize. [...] At the same time, I don't think being violent is effective. If I were in a position where I felt that I had the right to tell anybody what to do, then that's what I would say. I would say that it is ineffective and if all the movements in Palestine would reject violence, it would be a lot easier for the Palestinians to be in a legitimate position. But as long as they are still being violent, you can use this against them theoretically and they are screwed. (Kela)

We, as Israel, are moving in a direction and there is hardly anything that can change that. And it is so frustrating. I am not even sure that an armed resistance can do much to change it. But then I am obviously really frustrated with what's going on. It feels like we are in storm and we head towards God knows what. Nothing can move us from that and it is scary. I can understand why Palestinians would resort to armed resistance. I can understand their frustration but with that, I am, kind of, having a hard time with violence. But Israel is using so much violence as well. What are you supposed to do with that kind of thing? It feels like more and more there is no right answer. (Amit)

For me, I am not a pacifist. I support armed struggle or armed resistance in different situations, in the Palestinian issue for instance. I am not saying that I am an activist of armed resistance. And I think that currently armed resistance for Palestinians is more harmful than helpful. But I do recognize certain historical situations in which armed resistance against an occupying force, not against civilians but against an occupying force, can be legitimate. In certain situations, such as fighting against fascism or Nazism... (Haggai)

The counter-hegemonic change the objectors brought to the fore also stemmed from their feminist positioning. Women constructed a significant group among the total

objectors of New Profile and Shministim. WRI claims that 40 percent of all liable women are not recruited in the IDF, and this figure has been gradually increasing since the late 1980s.³² From the late 1990s onwards, women have asked feminist questions to problematize the military and the objection movement. In 2002, Shani Werner, then member of New Profile, wrote a letter asking the following feminist question: Where are the women in militarism and in the politics of objection? The letter problematized gender discrimination within the IDF. Shani stated that, although women are included in the barracks, they have been employed in subordinated roles and status, i.e. ‘coffee-serving’ soldiers. Jewish women have been formally granted with the right and duty of soldiering in Israel since the enactment of the Defense Service Law in 1949. However, until the Equality amendment to the Military Service in 2000, they had been banned from front-lines in the IDF. They have been predominantly assigned technical and administrative roles, as secretaries, nurses, instructors, clerks and telephone operators.

Through their acts, women objectors refused to accept these subordinated gendered roles. They argued that these roles not only created their subordination and marginalization but also perpetuated occupation. For many, the occupation did not stop in the occupied territories. Their feminist curiosity extended the meaning of occupation to the Israeli society by incorporating a critique of the militarism as an ideology that created hierarchies between various categories of identity/difference. Women’s objections pointed to the subtle ways in which military, militarism and militarization affected our everyday lives and performed their objections to demilitarize the society. They demonstrated how the IDF contributed to a patriarchal and masculinist society through gender discrimination. They pointed to the high number of sexual harassment cases in the IDF. In doing so, they argued that inclusion of women into the ranks did not bring equality, but perpetuated the gendered roles of women in and beyond the military.

Being in a militarized society, at least here, means being in a masculinist society. Very very clearly... Our society is sickly patriarchal. It is terrible to be a woman on a daily basis. To be very misogynistic is very acceptable. I think that has a lot to do with the fact that all those people go to the army. [...] One of the things that come out of this militaristic thinking is hierarchy within the jobs that you do in the military, within different types of experiences. It is a hierarchy of suffering, hierarchy of giving and

³² Retrieved from <http://www.wri-irg.org/co/co-isr-03.htm#fnB11> February 25th, 2017.

selflessness. When you are talking about women, since most women don't do combat, their roles are considered as less of the core of the army. And then women also have a lot less reserve duty. Military produces these gender-based hierarchies, patriarchy and masculinity in the Israeli society. (Kela)

Women further questioned their positioning vis-à-vis the male objectors. Like their counterparts in Turkey, they claimed that women objectors were marginalized to the supporter status in the politics of objection. Interestingly, although women and male objectors articulated similar discourses and practices of total objection in similar periods, only male objectors acquired a voice in the Israeli society. Objection was brought to the public debate when a male objector was imprisoned in military prisons or court-martialed. This reduced the capacity of women to raise their voices. In 2001, during the court-martial of the five, Shani reacted to this process of marginalization. Women objectors refused to embody the supporter roles and put forth themselves as active agents of the movement. Shani claimed that there was a similar underlying gendered patterns of thought behind militarism and the politics of objection in the sense that 'a woman hoping for the swift release from prison of the male draft resister' was the mirror image of 'a woman awaiting the return of "her" soldier from the front':

My refusal to enlist in the army, which I used to see as a political-public act, has now become private. ("The personal is the political" – the mantra runs through my head. But the personal only becomes political when it is allowed a voice!) As public discourse is unaware of it, as the discourse of the Left ignores it, the draft resistance of girls-women remains personal, not to say silenced. It's precisely as easy for us to ignore women's draft resistance as it is for the IDF to ignore women's military service. If women's service in the army is seen, in any case, as desk work and serving coffee, and given that the IDF allows girls exemptions from service relatively easily, our resistance is treated like "coffee serving resistance," which even the army accepts (and if the army doesn't need us, unlike the imprisoned boys, then can our resistance have any significance?).³³

Their acts aimed to reveal the hidden aspects of militarism beyond the barracks. Women put forth their objections as antimilitarist acts of resistance which not only refused the occupation but also rejected the militarization of society. They became agents of change by refusing to embody the militaristic discourses and practices:

I think that not being educated by the army, like, not letting it to shape me is the most political thing because even now – I am 30 years old, many

³³ Retrieved from <http://www.newprofile.org/english/node/258> January 19th, 2016.

years have passed already – when people around me speak in military language – which is really common; it is all over the place in our language – I don't understand! I keep refusing to learn, so I keep asking: 'What are you saying? I don't understand what you mean'. When many things seem logical to people who went to the army because they learned to think in that way, they still don't make any sense to me. It is really important for me not to be part of it. Not to contribute to the reproduction of this system and not to let it infect me. It is infecting any way regardless of whatever you do; but, you know, try to protect myself as much as possible. (Shani)

Women criticized the male dominance and masculinist discourses and practices of the organizations such as Yesh Gvul, CtR and CfP. They claimed the objection was predominantly defined as an act of civil disobedience, performed by a politics of confrontation including consecutive prison terms, and problematized this because it perpetuated a method of doing politics which put so much value on courage, sacrifice and 'paying the price'; the notions that are highly associated with the masculinist, patriarchal and militarized society. As discerned in their names, the former associations employed a militaristic repertoire in their languages, stressing their 'courage to refuse for Israel' or their 'combats for peace'. Women argued that the objection should be freed from this masculinist language. The conceptualization of objection through 'paying the price' depends on the privileges that one has in terms of sex, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, class, etc. and should not be equated to a masculine experience:

Not everyone is 'man' enough to be in prison. Not everyone can pay that price. Some people would have no home to come back if they do it. I think that even if I could do it – I come from a home that would accept me if I do it – I don't know if I mentally would feel OK with going to prison. I don't feel that it is supposed to be anyone's business whether I pay or do not pay the price because I do pay a price by being an outsider already. It is the same social price that anyone else pays. So, I don't feel that objection is about paying a price. It is about what you do with it. I do feel like taking risks, not to stay in the safe zone and to be active in what is important to you are important. But everyone can take the kind of risk they can bear. It is not all about being in prison or stating your refusal publicly. (Yasmin)

The women's draft resistance movement, a movement of dozens of young, feminist objectors of conscience, no longer exists. We're no more than a team of cheerleaders. Accompanying the boys as they go into and out of prison, formulating petitions and letters, demonstrating, visiting the prisoners. Our singularity, as girls who are actively resisting, has been obliterated. Like other Leftist women, we are busy supporting the incarcerated resisters, and our own action has lost its meaning. We were taught our roles long ago, in kindergarten: the men fight at the front; the

women support them back home. While the male resisters don't fight, they still spearhead the struggle. And the young women? Wearing our civics we stay and offer support from behind. Just substitute "to prison" for "flying," and "prisoners" for "fliers" in the old saying, and you'll get: "The best men go to prison; the best chicks go to the prisoners." [...] If women's service in the army is seen, in any case, as desk work and serving coffee, and given that the IDF allows girls exemptions from service relatively easily, our resistance is treated like "coffee serving resistance," which even the army accepts (and if the army doesn't need us, unlike the imprisoned boys, then can our resistance have any significance?).³⁴

I think that part of the discussion about refusal is how much we make it publicly, how much you make it politically or, to rephrase it, how much you are willing to suffer and sacrifice for the right reasons. Now going to the army in the Israeli society [is] the thing you should do because you need to put the national goals higher than your needs. You need to sacrifice for the country, security, state and nation. Refusing is a political act opposing this but it also employs the same way of thinking. To be sincere or to be effective, you need to sacrifice for the ideals you believe in. Like, when the friends of mine were more than one year in prison, they were willing to sacrifice for what they believed, which is the same thing that many soldiers do. For me, refusing is also saying that I am more important than the state. While making a decision or a choice, it is OK to be led by what is important for me, for my life, for my needs and not for the goals of the military. I think this is what refusing the militarized way of thinking is. (Shani)

The question of privilege came to occupy the discussions over objection with the efforts of feminists. Many objectors, who I have met during my fieldwork, put high significance on this discussion. Some activists, who acknowledged the importance and necessity of the question, even argued that it was overrepresented in the movement. The activists claimed that CO should not be de/valued by measuring the price because certain privileges (and lack thereof) might lead differences in one's im/possibility or un/willingness to pursue direct confrontation with the military. For example, the less privileged segments of the society have much to lose, suffer and sacrifice if they decide to declare their objections in the Israeli society. Grey objections were thus supported by these groups as a tactical move:

I think one of the important things for New Profile is that the refusal is not only about the declared refusal. And when it happens in the form of getting a psychiatric discharge or spending most of the military service behind bars because you keep running away, it is also essentially an antimilitarist *stance de facto*. Even if people don't want to politicize it, it is political given the context. (Sergeiy)

³⁴ Retrieved from <http://www.newprofile.org/english/node/258> January 19th, 2016.

Unlike their counterparts in Turkey, the LGBT community constituted an important part of this newly emerging group, but did not articulate queer critiques of the IDF. The legal inclusion of LGBT sexualities into the ranks of the IDF in the 1990s limited the articulation of such a discourse in Israel. Many LGBT interviewees did not feel discriminated against within the military setting. A gay objector, who refused to serve in the reserves, explained his experience in the IDF as follows:

[Did you ever feel discriminated in the society?] No, and I am having a really hard time with it because in a way I am fighting against something that I am not sure I fully understood. And, in a way, I should be happy that I have never been discriminated... I don't know. The worst thing I can say that I am gay; but I never had any issues with that in the military. [Do you think that this has much to do with the legal recognition of LGBTs into the ranks?] Everything you hear about rights they give to LGBTs in Israel is mostly bullshit but yes, I didn't have a hard time. I don't know; I am very fortunate not to feel that I have been discriminated against. But I feel like I am fighting against something that I know was there but I don't feel like I have lived with myself. [...] I was at a place where there were 20 gay colleagues. And being gay was not a big deal. I don't know, personally, I never made a big deal out of it (Amit).

The IDF became institutionally and legally more open to the LGBT community in the 1990s. Gal and Cohen (2000) argues that the IDF moved 'from an early stage (before 1980), in which homosexuals usually were discharged from the military duties, to a phase in which they were drafted selectively and on a restricted basis (1983-93). Current policy neither restricts nor exempts gays and lesbians who are drafted or who volunteer their services' (Gal and Cohen, 2000: 236). This process mostly occurred through high-profile individuals who publicly challenged the discriminatory practices of the military against the sexual minorities. For instance, in 1993, Professor Uzi Even, then chairman of Tel Aviv University's Chemistry Department, testified that he was stripped off his officer ranks and barred from further 'sensitive' research in the 1980s. In a parallel vein, Adir Stenir, who was the long-time partner of the head of the IDF's Medical Corps training program, sued the IDF when the military refused him to grant military pensions of his deceased partner. As a result of these high-profile cases, in 1997, a Tel Aviv District Court ruled that the IDF must recognize same-sex partners in the military. The LGBT activists were also successful in changing the procedural aspects of the IDF. For instance, in case of any possible security risk, the LGBT soldiers were stopped being investigated by mental health units but by the Field

Security Department. In such a context, there were no public queer critiques of the IDF among the LGBT members of the movement; even within an increasing discussion on ‘pinkwashing’ – the strategic and instrumental use of the LGBTs in the promotion of the Israeli democracy in the world in order to conceal the occupation – among the wider community of activists in the country. Legal-institutional inclusion of LGBTs impeded the emergence of a counter-hegemonic queer critique of the IDF, militarism and militarization in Israel.

V.III. ‘Refuse, your people will protect you’: Druzes refusing to serve in the IDF

The counter-hegemonic change that the anti-Zionist and antimilitarist objectors brought about also stemmed from the increasing number of total objections among the Druze youth. As I have argued in Chapter 3, Druze men refused the draft and initiated mass protest in their villages in the formative years of the state. During these uprisings, there were also a handful of objectors who declared their acts in public. These efforts were institutionalized with the Druze Initiative Committee in 1972. According to a report published by the Druze Initiative Committee, ‘since 1956 about 5,000 Druze have been imprisoned for refusing to serve in the IDF’ (Amnesty International, 1999: 17). Recent surveys found out that the recruitment is less than 50 per cent among the Druze men.³⁵ According to a survey, conducted by University of Haifa, only 36 per cent of the youth who took part in the poll supported compulsory military service while 47 per cent argued that it should be voluntary. Furthermore, 17 per cent argued that current policy should be revoked. Notwithstanding these high numbers of grey objectors, number of declared objectors remained scarce. CO was mostly associated with the selective and total objections of Jewish segments of the society. Recently, the Druze objectors constructed their objections as acts of civil disobedience against the military law and revived the institutionalization of the movement.

The newly emerging Druze objectors followed the path of Samih Al-Qasim and aimed at reviving the counter-hegemonic political discourses and practices among their community. However, they also differed from their predecessors. Established in 2013, Urfod differed in organizational structure from the Druze Initiative Committee; it has a non-hierarchical and horizontal structure. The Committee was criticized ‘because they

³⁵ Retrieved from <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20140310-increasing-numbers-of-palestinian-druze-refuse-to-serve-in-israeli-army/> on December 12th, 2016.

are only men, they are old, and they are only Druze'. Urfod perceived the Druze objection to the military service 'not as a Druze issue but a Palestinian issue'. In that the activists aimed at uniting Druze with other Palestinian Arabs, such as Christian Arabs, Palestinians in the occupied territories or in the refugee camps, etc. The association was open to objectors with different ethnic and political identifications. Activists followed the antimilitarist and feminist line of New Profile and Shministim Letters, and articulated the objections of Druze women, who are not legally obliged to serve, into their repertoires. The institutional change reflected the radicalization of Druze youth activism. The Druze Initiative Community worked as an affiliate to the Communist Party and operated within the boundaries of the State of Israel. Urfod activists, however, were more alienated from the state and military system. Insomuch that some mostly did not vote for any party in the Knesset, even if they pursued a pro-Palestinian/Arab political agenda, since 'it is the same bad face of occupation' and 'it means to accept the Israeli system'. They did not sign letters, addressing to the Prime Minister or Ministry of Defense either. Their main goal was to reveal the silences on the Palestinian Druze history and to disseminate their subjectivities, claims and goals among the Palestinian Arab community.

Druze objectors deconstructed the 'national-colonial' endeavor and its consequences for ethno-national minorities, refused the Zionist construction of Druze identity, and formulate Palestinian Arab subjectivities with counter-hegemonic claims and goals. In doing so, they challenged the state, the IDF, and the Druze community simultaneously. Through their acts, they constructed Druze as the parts of the Palestinian Arab nation. Against the hegemonic construction of Druze as a distinct ethno-religious identity, they claimed that their Druze identification was only a religious one; and they identified with the Palestinian nationalist subjectivities. They employed patriotic symbols in their discourses and practices such as martyrdom, Palestinian flags, Palestinian national anthem. Urfod explained its mission as follows:

'Our youth are being drafted to fight their own people, to fight in a system that oppresses them! So our duty is not only humane, but it is national, because we fight for the freedom of our people and against those who are preventing us from it!'

Many objectors came from families and villages with strong ties to their Palestinian nationality. During our meeting, Khaled explained how his family and community influenced his objection:

My family is one of the families, which is connected to its Palestinian identity, to its Arab indigenous culture. I grew up in that atmosphere. It was obvious for me that I was not going to the army, which was different from my brother's opinions. He is eight years younger. He studied in a Druze village. He grew up in a different atmosphere and he went to the army. I studied in a mixed village, the village of al-Qasim. [...] For me, going there, fighting against and arresting my nation do not make sense. I don't know; I am maybe pacifist on some levels. But maybe if I had grown up in a normal country, I would go to the army.

I was raised in a patriotic home; my parents raised me by different political and social opinions than others. When I reached high school it was obvious that I was not going to serve, and my identity was firm. It was clear to me that I am part of the Palestinian people. [...] It is important for every person to be aware of the reality, especially since the educational system hides the facts and creates a different identity. It is important that the Druze community gets exposed to a different reality, one that it has never heard of. On the other hand, it is important to raise awareness amongst other Palestinians that the Druze are victims, and they did not approve of recruitment, and that they are part of the Palestinian people"³⁶ (Samer)

Their ethno-national identifications became politically salient through their reflexive engagement with their embodied experiences with the state and the military. They came to identify with Palestinian Arabs during their high school years. As they became aware of alternative narratives of Druze history, culture, and politics, they gave new meanings to their identities:

I was born in a Druze home. That means that I have to go to the army at the age of 18. I have six brothers; they were all at the army. So my plan was already written; I had to go to the army. In some ways, it was my dream to be there. I was inspired by the role-model of the soldeir. All of the people around me belonged to the army. But when I was 17, I discovered a video on the internet. I was surfing on the internet when I randomly ran into a video where a dog was biting a Palestinian woman and none of the soldiers were helping her. That video made me ask questions. 'Will I do the same if I serve? Is that even normal?' [...] This scene made a total switch. [...] And there were shoots about the Israeli army, Palestinian lands and people. [...] From then on, I showed the video to people around me and I was surprised to see that their reaction was not similar to mine. Why did I feel that way and they did not? [...] Then I started to ask my sister if my brothers were

³⁶ Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/urfod/posts/1737921636484212:0> on December 12th, 2016.

doing the same. And I realized that I was born to a big lie. [...] I remember that I had to stand that Israeli anthem. The flag of Israel was at my room. I took a part of this lie. The lie that I and my brothers have to go to the army despite that we belong to the Palestinian people who are occupied. [...] I discussed with people until I understood the Palestinian issue, and I reached to the conclusion that I would not serve in the IDF. (Raafat)

Like other Druzes, I have listened to Hebrew music; I was only writing in Hebrew and speaking in Hebrew in my village, in my Arab school. When I was young, I asked my father to put an Israeli flag in our car for the Independence Day because I saw that my friends were doing it. And he said that we could not do such a thing. I asked: 'Why? I want to be like my friends'. But he did not explain me. I didn't understand why. So I started reading our history. And, when I was 16, my history teacher started to tell us about how the State of Israel was established. She told us about the Nakba. For the first time of my life, I heard about Nakba. [...] In 2008, there was the war of Gaza. One day, I wore kafiyah and went to the school. I was 18. The students in my school were also wearing kafiyah, but the colorful ones, not the national one. It was fashionable. I wore the national kafiyah, the one in black and white, and went to the school. They did not allow me to get in the class. I asked why I could not enter the class while the other students with colorful kafiyahs could. They answered: 'Because we don't want this fashion in our school'. [...] I knew that the reason was not the fashion. I asked if it was because of its national connotation. They said: 'Yes, and you have to choose. You either enter without kafiyah or stay outside'. I asked the principal what his grandfather was wearing. He said he was wearing this kafiyah and, in the end, they gave up, I went to the class. The teachers and students called me terrorist. I started to feel alienated to the school, to the students. In that time, I met with an organization in Haifa which was working for the Palestinians. It was a place which I felt belonged to. [...] As I met other Druze people who thought like me, I gradually developed a political awareness. (Maisan)

Druze objectors argued that Israel pursued a divide-and-rule policy to separate their community from their Palestinian Arab roots through the military service. Their objections were constructed as a right claim to self-determination and self-realization as Palestinian Arabs. They defined the IDF as an 'army of occupation'. Druzes has traditionally been recruited in border police units in the military. As a reason of their units' functions, they have been in direct contact with the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Objectors took the Palestinian Arabs as 'their own people' and refused to bear weapons against them:

'I refuse because I am a man of peace and I hate all forms of violence, and the military institution represents for me the peak of physical and psychological violence. [...] I couldn't imagine myself wearing military uniform and participating in the suppression of my Palestinian people or

fighting my Arab brothers. I oppose the recruitment to the Israeli military and any other military for conscience and nationalistic reasons. I hate the injustice and oppose the occupation; I hate intolerance and restriction of freedoms. I hate those who detain children, the elderly and women. [...] I am from a community that was unjustly treated by an unjust law, how can we fight our relatives in Palestine, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon? How can I hold arms against my brothers and people in Palestine? How can I be a soldier standing at Qalandia checkpoint or any other checkpoint, after I experienced the injustices at these checkpoints? How can I prevent someone from Ramallah to visit his city, Jerusalem? How can I guard the apartheid wall? How can I be a jailer to my own people while I know that the majority of prisoners are freedom prisoners and seekers of rights and freedom?' (Omar Saad)

I went there and told them: 'I am not going to serve in this army; your defense army is an army of occupation, army of discrimination which commits war crimes'. I was very clear about this. [...] because I am Palestinian... [...] Some of them were shocked: 'What is this! A Druze guy tells us that he is an Arab Palestinian'. [...] [But] for me, it was an absolute fact. To be in an army which kills the same people whom I belong to is impossible. (Hisham)

'In the memorial of the Nakba: we refuse to serve in the colonial army of the occupation state! We will protect our Arab national identity! We will not rest until our refugees are back in their homes'.³⁷

It was obvious to me that I would not go to West Bank with a gun and fight, or work at a checkpoint by which the Palestinian people cross. As a Palestinian Arab, I didn't have this image in my mind at all. (Watan)

Moreover, their objections were to protest the Israeli policies towards the Druze and other Palestinian Arabs within the Green Line. For them, the meaning of occupation did not stop in the occupied territories but extended to the pre-1967 borders:

We refuse to serve in the army because we are Palestinian and we cannot take part in a military which oppresses our people. But also we cannot imagine of a two-state solution. What if they establish Palestine in West Bank? I will still be living in Israel. So I will still have to serve. For me, the occupation will continue on. It won't be finished. (Maisan)

Sadly, there are people who serve in the police forces, in the army and in the prison services, and these people who are actually victims of the occupation and the confiscation of lands. This shows another kind of occupation, which is the occupation of our minds, and our campaign fights against this. (Khaled)

³⁷ Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/pg/urfod/posts/> on January 12th, 2016.

‘Palestinians are targets to the Israeli police forces and soldiers. Palestinians are being killed on a daily basis whether in West Bank, Gaza and inside the "green line" (Palestinian citizens of Israel). We refuse to be part of this! We refuse to serve our oppressor! We refuse to hold weapon against our people!’³⁸

Objectors argued that although Israeli citizenship regime imposed military duty on Druze men, this did not bring equality to their Jewish counterparts. They highlighted the political, economic and social injustices that the Druze community faced despite their compulsory military recruitment. They argued that, although serving in the military, they were treated as Palestinian Arabs in Israel. This indicated the general trend in the perceptions of Druze. In a survey, 47 per cent of Druzes did not see any difference between them and other Arabs in terms of their conditions in the State of Israel; the majority (83 per cent) believed that they were worse off than Jews; and 27 per cent claimed that their situation was even worse than other Arabs in Israel.³⁹ Objectors argued that, although there were some advantages to the recruits, Druzes were relegated to second-class citizenship and suffered inequalities in municipal budgets, education, and employment. Their first- and second-hand witnessing of discrimination against the Druze people consolidated their decisions:

I was looking at my place and my village. And I was trying to compare it with a Jewish town or city. The majority of the people in my village went to the army. They were killed or injured; but these streets in Carmel are different. In the kibbutz, their schools are more beautiful. Or in the Jewish towns, they have sports complexes, football fields. But in our place we don't have anything. Thinking about these differences, my home, and my activity in the Druze youth movement led me ask questions. And, around the same time, I heard about the term discrimination. The Jewish majority and the discriminated minority... It made so much sense to me. That was the concept that described the situation of Druze in Israel. (Hisham)

Many of the youth from my community completed the compulsory service in the army, what did we receive? Discrimination in all areas, our villages are the poorest, our lands were confiscated, there are no master plans, and no industrial zones. Percentages of university graduates in our villages are the lowest in the region, the unemployment rates in our villages are the highest. This mandatory law has kept us away from our Arab connection. (Omar Saad)

³⁸ Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/pg/urfod/posts/> on December 12th, 2016.

³⁹ Retrieved from <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20140310-increasing-numbers-of-palestinian-druze-refuse-to-serve-in-israeli-army/> on May 30th, 2017.

‘Whilst the Palestinian Druze youth are serving in the Israeli army after falling victims of a Zionist project that aims on separating them from their own nation, they go back home after three years of service to find their homes destroyed by the same system that convinced them that serving in the army grants them rights! Again, this just comes to show that being a Druze means being a Palestinian, and being treated as any other Palestinian. Also, No, serving in the army does not grant you rights!’⁴⁰ (Urfod)

Hence, for many objectors, their refusals were a way to contest the injustices which the Druze and Palestinian citizens faced in Israel. They stressed the discrepancy between their duties to the state, i.e. military service, and their rights to recognition and redistribution (Fraser 1995). Their objections demonstrated both ‘an alienation from the Israeli system’ and a request for self-recognition:

Our claim is self-determination. It is not only about us being Palestinians; it is also about our own identity. I want to decide what my identity is. I don’t want Israel or their institutions to construct my heritage, my culture and my language. That [objection] is, for me, a sort of self-determination, fighting for collective identity, or choosing to connect to a certain identity. That [being Palestinian Arab] was natural before 1948. But since then with all these things have happened, it is not only that Druze community is not connected to Palestinian heritage. In many cases they even lose their Arab culture. And that is even worse because you can’t really change your language, your food or your heritage. [...] They would say: ‘I am a Druze Israeli’. It doesn’t make sense. (Khaled)

If I have the Israeli passport and I am an Israeli citizen, I should have rights. When we go back in history, we see that I have been here. My narrative is that I was here, my grandfather and grandmother were here; they were here before this country was established. You came to my land; you took my family land; we lost many lands in the Galilee in the North. You built your country and you fought against my people. And you are racist against me and my people. We feel the racism on a daily basis. And, after all this, you come to me and say: ‘you should pay your duties’. It is a fucked up logic. (Watan)

Druze objectors further sought to challenge their community from within by demonstrating that there were those who refused to embody the imagery of loyal Druze soldier that was perpetuated by the community’s leadership. In doing so, they sent a message to the Druze community, to the leadership, and to Arabs from various nationalities that they were part of their nation:

⁴⁰ Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/pg/urfod/posts/> on December 12th, 2016.

We know that there are 25 Druze objectors in one of the jails right now. But no one knows about them. We are revealing that there are Druzes who refuse to serve. Last year, one of the most attended lectures in [...] university was our lecture just a few months ago. I think that, a few months before we started, if the people had heard a Druze had been coming to lecture in that university, there would have been a protest in front of the campus. For example, last summer, there was a car run over a few soldiers at a train station. Three of the victims were Druze and one among them died. And one guy, a very well known activist from a hardcore place in Jerusalem, wrote: ‘Screw you Urfod, You totally mixed me up, I am feeling sad for the first time for this Druze guy even though I have always been cursing the Druze and considering them as traitors. You totally perplexed me right now; I don’t know what to think. I am feeling confused’. In Nabi Saleh, Belin, they [the Palestinians] saw our posters in weekly protests. They write about us in Gaza which is a place we can’t even have access. Lots of people are still cursing the Druze, saying that they are betrayers. But, now, I don’t have to argue with them. I tell them: ‘Look, there are other voices, read about Urfod’ (Khaled).

Our campaign is not only about lifting the mandatory service for the Druze men but it is also about our identity; it is about connecting to your identity, to the land, and to your heritage. Here comes the part ‘your nation will protect you’. We actually go and do lectures in West Bank and in other non-Druze villages because there is a big stigma attached to Druze among the Palestinian community right now. We try to break this stigma first by showing that there are other voices and second by showing the reality is something that was imposed and planned over generations. We tell how they brainwashed us in schools, not only in the military service itself.

‘Our purpose is to increase awareness of our Palestinian identity among the Druze youth. Not only this; but also to increase awareness among all the Palestinian people regarding the fact that the Druze community is a victim of a colonial project that aims at separating us. We are all Palestinians and part of one nation, and that is the feeling that we try to strengthen’.⁴¹

Contra to the early generation of Druze men, newly emerging Druze objectors included women and feminist claims. Urfod activists collaborated with New Profile and they had a feminist stance in the politics of objection. As a matter of fact, their core group was composed of four women and five men. Although Druze women are not called for military service, they claimed to have a right to have a say on military conscription. Maisan, who was a board member of Baladna Association for Arab Youth, an activist in alQaws for Sexual and Gender Diversity in Palestinian Society, and a founding member of Urfod at the time of our meeting, stated that reason was because ‘it [objection] is not a Druze but Palestinian issue’:

⁴¹ Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/urfod/> on December 12th, 2016.

In Urfod, we gather together as men and women, Druze or not Druze, from everywhere, from Palestine and outside of Palestine for one reason: we believe that forcing the Druze to serve in the Israeli army in 1956 is not a Druze issue. It is a Palestinian issue and Israel puts forth this step to separate the Palestinian Arabs and to make them hate each other. So, yes, that's why, even if I am a woman and I do not have to serve, it is my issue because it is an issue about my people.

'After fifty-nine-years since the imposition of the compulsory military service, some Druze families gear their children towards the fields of security or the police, thus contributing to the preservation of a patriarchal misogynistic society: the young Druze man working in the security field enjoys an increase in pay when he marries. By virtue of his work, he may be absent for many consecutive weeks, thus forcing the wife to maintain the traditional caregiving role for the house and the children, not to mention the impossibility of working outside of the home, or reaching effective professional positions. In the long term, conscription reproduces the patriarchal dynamic and maintains a traditional society'.⁴²

Women further transgressed the traditional gendered conceptions of womanhood in the Druze community:

Because of religious reasons, they [the Druzes] don't accept Druze women who are political activists. The Druze community does not only devalue my work because I don't have to go to the army but also because, as a woman, I cannot be an activist. I cannot be political. For them, it is not even acceptable for me, as a woman, to go to demonstrations. [...] They fight with me and with my family. For example, last summer in 2014, they wrote an article about me and published it in a local newspaper. They called me traitor. The title was: 'Who is this Druze woman who betrays her religion or her country?' They try to stop my political activity by pressuring my family.

In sum, Druze men and women became agents of counter-hegemonic change by negotiating their Palestinian Arab identifications with the military, society and the Druze community. Through their total objections, they protested the state policies against the Druzes and Palestinians, and claimed for their right to recognition, redistribution, and self-determination. Like the antimilitarist Jewish men and women, they framed military service as a process that perpetuated war, violence, and patriarchy. In doing so, they created a radical break with the soldiering habitus that was hegemonically constructed among the Druze youth and wrote a counter-hegemonic history of Palestinian Druzes in Israel.

⁴² Retrieved from <http://kohljournal.org/compulsory-military-service-and-gender/> on December 12th, 2016.

V.IV. The objection movement as a site of collaboration and conflict in Israel

The CO to the military service changes its substance and scope with the emergence of the selective objection of the reserve and active-duty soldiers from the 1970s onwards in Israel. Selective objectors frame their resistances within a Zionist discourse which in turn increases the scope of objection. In doing so, they become agents of reformist change that does not problematize the legitimacy of the IDF; but seek to redress it when its policies contradict with the hegemonic 'ideals'. They constitute the predominant type of declared objection. Israel witnesses the radical acts of objection as a collective phenomenon late. These acts have been first performed by the Druze men, and later by the Jewish men and women, who construct antimilitarist, anti-Zionist and feminist subjectivities, claims and goals. They constitute a minority within the movement; yet their numbers have gradually been increasing since the early 2000s. The Druze objectors construct their subjectivities and claims within an ethno-national discourse that stresses their Palestinian Arab roots. And they put forth their total objections to the IDF. The Jewish total objectors, on the other hand, frame their discourses within an antinationalist rhetoric which accuses Jews, mostly Ashkenazim, of marginalizing several social groups through the military conscription. The New Profile and the Shministim Letters crystallize this development. Unlike the selective objectors, these groups refuse the IDF altogether because any participation is considered as an act that perpetuates occupation in the broad sense of the term. With these newly emerging subjectivities, claims and goals, CO becomes a social movement in and through which objectors negotiate their multiple and multilayered identifications with the military, society and other objectors in Israel.

The coalitions and conflicts emerge along two main cleavages within the movement; namely selective versus total objection and secular versus religious divide. The objectors struggle to sustain a creative dialogue between different acts of objections. The divide between the selective and total objectors occurs as a reason of their diverging understandings of (anti)militarism, gender and resistance. The newly emerging total objectors refuse the militaristic and masculinist discourses and practices of the selective objectors. The selective objectors, on the other hand, accept the legitimacy of the IDF on the basis of self-defense and just war doctrine. Their agendas also differ; whereas the selective objectors aim at ending specific policies of the state

and the IDF, such as the occupation, the total objectors aim at ending the occupation, demilitarizing the society, and fighting against patriarchy. The differences also emerge at the organizational level; the total objectors are alienated from the vertical and hierarchical structuring of the institutions of the selective objectors. As a reason of these differences, the collaboration between these two groups remains marginal. In our meeting, Nathan, a selective objector, stressed that the New Profile and the Shministim do not represent well his opinions about doing politics. Nathan defined himself as a Zionist leftist who would do the military if there was no occupation of West Bank and Gaza. He believed that differences in political ideology are difficult to reconcile:

After my refusal, I tried to be part in this group, you probably heard of it, the Shministim. So, I was part of it a bit; but I became less involved over time for a number of reasons. [What were the reasons?] First of all, I think that New Profile has a big influence on this group and New Profile is not really advocating my political beliefs... They work with everyone who don't want to go to the army for any reason, and all of its policy operates around this. But, this should not be the only thing that connects us. [...] I think that we are not very similar ideologically. [Do you mean political ideology?] Yes, and you know, is the question of refusal political or do we work together with people who don't feel like going to the army? [Where do you position in this?] I think that we should work only with people who are refusing for the same reasons. There is no point in cooperating with others.

Furthermore, the recent developments also introduce the secular and religious objections as another fault line of the movement in the country. Haredi Jews declare their objections to the IDF as the military authorities aim to conscript yeshiva students. Gal and Cohen states that, as of 2000, 'each year, some 20,000 ultra-Orthodox males now receive deferments on the understanding that "the study of Torah [Jewish law] is their profession"' (Gal and Cohen, 2000: 237). Yeshiva students have been exempted from the service as a reason of a series of negotiations and bargaining between the Zionist leadership and the ultra-Orthodox parties during the nation-state formation. Objections of Haredi men have stemmed from their religious identifications. Unlike the spiritual Zionists, many Haredi objectors, however, do not introduce pacifist and antimilitarist moralities. As a matter of fact, there have been instances where Haredim used violence in their demonstrations and advocated violent measures against the Palestinians during the second Intifada. In theory, they denounce the secular nature of nation-building and Zionism. According to their belief, Haredim wait for the Messiah

to return to the Promised Land, Eretz Yisrael. Hence, they refuse the authority of the State of Israel that aim at replacing God, and at initiating the return of Jews to the Holy Land within a secular state structure. However, they have remained silent about these contestations as the Zionist leadership granted their collective rights to religious beliefs, rituals, and practices since the formation of the state of Israel. Exemption from the IDF is one of these concessions. Ben Gurion and his followers considered Haredim crucial for the ethno-national construction of the nation. As the religious symbols of the Jewish nation who had been subjected to the horrors of WWII and the Holocaust, Haredim were incorporated into the state and citizenship in exchange of the ultra-Orthodox parties' support to the Zionist endeavor. The Haredim appropriated a nationalist-militaristic discourse that constructs them as the 'spiritual corps of the nation'. They do not refute the legitimacy of the IDF, and indeed define themselves as the 'other-worldly soldiers', that is, soldiers with a spiritual vocation who are the 'secret weapon of the people of Israel' (Stadler and Ben-Ari, 2003: 19, 27). They argue that they contribute to the national security and the success of the IDF through their prayings: 'Other than the Torah we have no security; without it, neither soldiers nor the IDF will save us' (Cohen, 2008: 131).

Although the IDF have historically refrained from discussing legal exemptions of Haredi community from the service, it began to voice its criticism over high numbers of exemptions in the community publicly in the late 1990s. In 1998, in Rubinstein v. Minister of Defence case, the High Court of Justice ruled that exemptions of yeshiva students were invalid without further recommendations. It urged the political authority, the Knesset, to enact legislation. This process led to Tal Committee which took measures to integrate Haredi males to military conscription. Yeshiva students constitute high numbers compared to the early nation-state period, and their incorporation into the IDF reflects a strategy to integrate these increasing numbers into the state structures. Stadler and Ben-Ari argue that 'a certain recognition of the state, the importance and need for the IDF, and the existence of apparently significant numbers of young men with a willingness and sometimes eagerness to serve' contributes to this process (Stadler and Ben-Ari, 2003: 38). Moreover, the pressure of some secular Jewish to conscript members of Haredi communities influences the decision of the Court. For instance, in 1999, three organizations, Conscientious Objectors in Israel, New Profile,

and Druze Initiative Committee, wrote to Ehud Barak, then Prime Minister, requesting representation in Tal Committee. They claimed that:

‘In the existing political status quo there are several groups who enjoy the special status of a collective agreement enabling them to be exempt from service: Yeshiva students, Jehovah Witnesses and Orthodox Druze are three such groups. These collective agreements gravely discriminate against those who are unable to serve in the army due to their conscience - for religious, moral, national or ideological reasons - and who do not belong to the above groups covered by the collective agreements. According to the existing conscription law, there is no option for men to be exempted from military service on moral grounds, nor are women able to actualize this right easily’ (Amnesty International, 1999: 6).

After the Committee’s work, a bataillion, Nahal Haredi, was formed to enable Haredi male conscripts to pursue their military service within a segregated unit respecting their religious identifications in 1999. The Committee recommended that yeshiva students should decide whether they stay in the Yeshiva or obtain employment after a short period of military or civil service. Haredi Jews put forth their objections to the IDF in this political context.

Meanwhile, Israel also witnessed challenges of nationalist-religious segments of the IDF; namely *kippah serugot*, which demonstrates that the objection to military service is societalized in the Israeli society insofar as it is appropriated by the right-wing political protest groups. The right-wing selective objection emerged after the first agreement between Israel and the PLO in 1993 (Gal and Cohen, 2000: 238). In 1995, some Rabbis called on conscripts to refuse to dismantle Jewish settlements. During the summer 2005 when Israel discussed the disengagement operations from Gaza and Northern Samaria, nationalist-religious leaders called ‘on those of their disciples who served in the IDF to refuse whatever orders they might receive to participate in disengagement operations’ (Cohen, 2007: 106). Although their objections were prevented by the state through several measures (Cohen 2007), this did not stop some who declared their selective objection to the disengagement process in the grey form. Many engaged with their immediate commanders to be assigned for different units. Cohen mentions that 50 conscripts – 24 of whom served in the framework of the *yeshivot hesder*, 5 petty officers, and 3 other ranks in professional service, and 5 reservists – were replaced on trial during that period (Cohen, 2007: 107). National-religious soldiers of the IDF not only problematized the disengagement plan but also

'the relative merits of military service vis-à-vis torah study, Sabbath observance whilst on duty, inter-personal relations with secular troops, and gender relations in military units' (Cohen, 2007). Thus, as in the cases of the Haredim, some feared from the secularizing effect of the IDF, and refused their service although they predominantly were Zionists who did not refute the legitimacy of the IDF.

Secular and religious objectors have not been eager to cooperate. The objectors in each side have certain reservations against the others based on the diverging political agendas and ideational reasons:

I went to one demonstration in front of the military prison that was organized by orthodox Jews. I dressed very modest. I had a long sweater and long jeans. I didn't wear skirt especially. My hair was obviously that way [she holds them on the back]. They made a speech about how Zionist regime is really bad and is taking Judaism into a bad place, and how they take their boys and prevent them to study religion. We stood aside to express solidarity with them. When the demo was over, they passed by us. Most of them did not look at me because they are not allowed to look directly at the women. Some of them even cursed us. [...] After they saw what's written on our placards, they were very surprised. They tried to speak only with the men among us. [...] It [the communication] was really hard. On the one hand, I want to express my solidarity and I want to have some sort of a collaboration. On the other hand, we were, I think, 3 women and 5 men, and one of them was like 'oh my god maybe you should cover your hair'. I was like 'you can cover your hair as much as you want. I am born that way'. I express solidarity but I am not going to be like you. [...] I do think that it is really hard for me, as a woman, to see how any kind of collaboration would work. [...] both groups don't want to go to the military, don't want to take part in the occupation, and maybe even want to abolish the Zionist establishment. But, in the end, what we are going to make after these is really difficult to grasp. [...] It is really hard to separate things [her agenda and theirs] in your mind but I do think that the best thing is to collaborate as much as we can. But I know it is hard. (Yasmin)

Joining forces with the ultra-orthodox, I don't see any of reasoning to do that because here is nothing in common between them and us except the fact that both groups don't go to the army. So I don't think there is much in common and I don't think there is any point in cooperation. [Do you think that there is a point in their refusal? Or is it problematic?] I think it is problematic. Haredim support the army but they believe that he can get out of the army as long as he prays. So, security will occur by itself without him going to the army. Obviously I think it is wrong. I think it is immoral what they do. What a Haredi Jew does actually is not going to the army and I am also against it. But there is no point in cooperating with them or supporting them because it is a different issue. There is no point to group together different people with different ideological leanings just because

they refuse the army. People refuse the army not for the same reason and there is no real connection. (Nathan)

In sum, with the changes in the warfare, conscription policies, and the Israeli society, newly emerging groups construct their acts of objections differently. In doing so, they become agents of social and political change differently. The quality and scope of the change the objectors effectuate differ in accordance with the political subjectivities. Whereas the selective objections of Jewish citizens become the agents of reformist change that seek to redress the state and military policies when they are diverted from the hegemonic 'ideals' of soldiering, the total objections of the antimilitarist Druze and Jewish citizens develop a radical critique of the military, militarism, occupation and objection. Israel further witnesses the divides between religious and secular forms of objection in recent years. This puts another layer on the diversification of subjectivities and limits their collective agencies.

In both countries, objection represents an intersectional social movement in and through which citizens and social groups become agents of change by constructing reformist or radical subjectivities, claims and goals. Different political subjectivities, concerns and agendas create two main cleavages within the movement, and limit the collective agencies. Although there are overlapping issues, claims and methods among these groups of objectors, their cooperation is loose. Despite these differences, conscientious objectors in Turkey and in Israel unite in their acts of civil disobedience, understood in the broad sense of the term. The acts of civil disobedience lead them to acquire a voice in the wider public, and promote not only the social and political but also the legal and institutional change. I will now turn to question CO as an act of civil disobedience, and explain the sites and scales of CO which create change in the legal-institutional frameworks of the militaries.

Chapter VI

Claiming Disobedience: The sites and scales of conscientious objection in Turkey and Israel

Throughout the previous chapters, I have analyzed in detail the discourses and practices of the objectors. I argued that the objectors give new meanings to their sociocultural and political identifications with the military, militarism and militarization in critical historical junctures and negotiate their subjectivities in and through their acts of objection. I claimed that it is through these re-constructions of the meanings and subjectivities that the objectors create the social and political change. However, these acts are more than a production of meaning that occurs through discursive deconstruction. It also includes specific actions which perform these political subjectivities in multiple sites and at multiple scales (Işın and Nielsen 2008). In doing so, the objectors become not only the agents of social and political but also legal and institutional change. The sites and scales of objection differ in accordance with the identifications, and domestic and international developments through which the nation-state goes. What kind of acts do the objectors practice to enact their subjectivities? How do their subjectivities, claims and goals transform their tactics, sites and scales of the objection? What are the possibilities and pitfalls of these moves? In which sites and at which scales do they perform their resistance? In this chapter, I answer these questions through an analysis of the actions of different groups of objectors in Turkey and Israel.

I argue that objectors become the agents of change through performing acts of civil disobedience. Focusing on their actions at various sites and scales, I further argue that the change that the marginalized and weak groups create emerges out of actions which are deemed 'less important' due to their non-institutionalized nature. Turning the attention to these everyday and mundane acts of dissent explain how the objectors create the legal and institutional change through their bottom-up agencies. These

agencies, however, are not the same; they differ in situated contexts of time and place. Different subjectivities enable different agencies that unfold in multiple, sometime overlapping sometimes diverging, sites and scales whose boundaries are hegemonically determined by the structural and political intersectionalities that the military, militarism and the objection movement create. As Mehmet Ali explained in our meeting, the objectors' voices 'hit several walls' and they need to break through these impediments through their creative and performative agencies. In doing so, the objectors effectuate change in the military discourses, laws and practices, leading to a country-wide discussion over the military, militarism and CO in which different political actors, be it the government, the opposition parties, the civil society organizations, the media or international actors, put forth pros and cons of the CO. The objectors enact their subjectivities through national, supranational and international 'democratic iterations' (Benhabib 2004). That said, national litigation has two main pitfalls. First, the change the legal struggle brings about is not substantial; the military finds ways to avoid the enactment of CO. Moreover, litigating at the courts affects the groups of objectors, which are embedded in multiple and differing relations of power as a reason of their identifications. Specifically, I argue that the litigation leads the objectors to acquire a voice only through a sacrificial and masculinist form of politics, which silences the agencies of women or increases their voices only insofar as their acts are masculinized and militarized. Thus, incorporating a feminist intersectional framework problematizes the basic assumption of the acts of citizenship literature that relates voice and political agency. Moreover, on the basis of an analysis of grey objectors, I claim that silence does not necessarily represent a negation; but silent agencies may create change although the agents do not intend to do so.

The chapter proceeds in two sections. It first explains the acts of objections in Turkey through which I question the historical trajectory of the sites and scales of objection among different groups of objectors; namely, grey, declared and women objectors. It then turns to the Israeli case. In each section, I analyze the extent to which the everyday and mundane acts of objections, as well as other forms of political participation, effectuate change in the legal and institutional frameworks of the military.

VI.I. Civilly dead but civically alive: Performing objection in Turkey

CO is not recognized as a right in Turkish law making the latter the only country among the members of the Council of Europe, that does not recognize the right to CO. Hence, male objectors, be it grey or declared, are legally defined and treated as draft dodgers or deserters. This leads many to live ‘a clandestine life’ which the ECtHR calls as ‘civil death’. Objectors cannot enjoy many of their citizenship rights, i.e. right to travel, right to accommodation, and right to a job with social security, since any encounter with the state and military officials may cause deprivation of liberty through custodies and administrative fines. As ‘activist citizens,’ objectors aim at making recognize their claims by displaying their bodies publicly to the legal challenges resulting from ‘civil death’. Their resistance comes from their civic and political engagement with this situation. Like grey objectors, most of them seek to find remedies to the challenges they face on a daily basis. As civically engaged individuals, they further introduce their subjectivities and claims through civil society organizations, demonstrations and campaigns. In doing so, they enact themselves as citizens, claiming the right to CO and promoting legal, social and political change.

Conscientious objectors put forth their agencies in and through the ‘scenes’ that unfold in multiple sites and at multiple scales. The novelty of their acts is to claim disobedience through acts of civil disobedience. They publicly disclose their subjectivities in these sites and in doing so address their claims to the state, military and society. The publicity of objections differs in scope. Enver Aydemir and many JWs, for instance, address solely to the military by individually notifying their objections in the recruiting offices; others send a letter to the office, notifying their refusal to enlist. Others send e-mails of their declaration to the groups and associations. Many read their objection texts in panels or events. Some further put these declarations online, either as a text or a video. These events and demonstrations are sometimes organized in front of military institutions, such as Harbiye Military Headquarters, or police stations to demonstrate that they do not hide from the authorities. The reading of declarations is complemented by performative and nonviolent demonstrations. For instance, in 1993, objectors organized a street theatre in which they exploded a fake bomb in a park in İzmir and layed down with their faces painted in black and white on the street. In the meantime, they distributed leaflets, saying ‘You’re responsible!’ to the audience. They

organized a peace walk to Diyarbakır when the military operations were at their peaks in the summer of 2016 while others burnt their official notifications in front of police stations.

The objectors organize collective action by establishing associations, running campaigns, projects, and disseminating their ideas via press releases and media. In the early years of the movement, military authorities targeted the organizational efforts. SKD was shut down in 1993 due to the word ‘antimilitarism’ in their statute. Despite the military officials argued that there is no militarism in Turkey, the measures continued as SKD Istanbul was also closed down after they organized a press conference under the name ‘No to Compulsory Military Service’ on 17 May 1994. The attempts to reestablish the association were rejected by authorities due to the word ‘antimilitarism’ in their statute.⁴³ The activists countered the authorities by referring to the right to form associations. Consequently, SKD was re-opened in İzmir under the name of İSKD and continued on its activities until its self-dissolution in 2002. The military would also take measures to curb the media attention to the debate. Doğan Güneş, the then General Chief of Staff, initiated a legal action against the former president of SKD, Aytek Özel, and a conscientious objector, Menderes Meletli, who discussed the military, militarism, and militarization on a TV channel in 1993. They were charged by Article 155 and their cases would constitute a precedent for the legal context on the matter. From then on, objectors and their supporters were trialed in the military courts, which would result in longer imprisonments.

In this relatively unfavorable political structure, objectors furthered the sites and scales of their acts through litigation. They enacted their subjectivities at the military and civilian courts, and more recently at the Constitutional Court, and extended their claims to the national scale. For instance, objectors, who are charged by Article 155 due to their public declarations and statements, consciously go to their trials to claim that they indeed seek to ‘alienate people from the military service’. Male objectors further attended their trials and accepted the prison terms. They were penalized according to the existing laws and regulations that criminalize ‘failure to obey the rules’, ‘persistent failure to obey the rules’, ‘alienating people from the military service’, ‘breaking the

⁴³ In 1994, Istanbul Governor’s Office refused to recognize the association due to the Article, explaining the aim of the association as ‘establishing alternative culture of peace and freedom and fight against militarism, chauvinism, exploitation, racism and war’.

national strength' and/or 'desertion'. These legal proceedings are conducted within the military and change in cases of draft dodgers and deserters. Military may further penalize the objector on the basis of Article 88 of the Military Penal Code which criminalizes failure to obey the rules before a group of recruits, i.e. Mehmet Tarhan's case. In cases of imprisonments, objectors resist the military discipline by various acts of resistance. They refuse to wear uniforms, participate in muster in the barracks, or get 'unfit reports' in the military hospitals. In face of harsh treatment, some further employ hunger strikes to get their demands recognized. Objectors face criminal and disciplinary proceedings, i.e. ban on sending and receiving letters, making phone calls, solitary confinement, due to their disobedience to rules in the military prisons.

The first court-martial of an objector, which received a wide public attention, occurred with Osman Murat Ülke.⁴⁴ In a trial targeting the organizers of the press conference titled 'no to compulsory military service', the judge ruled that Ossi must enlist in the military. Ossi refused to obey the order and instead declared his objection in a press conference in 1995. He was put under arrest and sent to his military unit in 1996. Ossi received repetitive penalties as he refused to take orders in his military unit and consciously went to his trials. Ossi's persistent refusal led him to go through a vicious circle between military unit, military court, and prison for more than two years. Many other objectors, i.e. Mehmet Bal, Mehmet Tarhan, Halil Savda, Enver Aydemir, İnan Süver, and Muhammed Serdar Delice, went through the same process. During the trials, the courts refer to Article 45 of the Law on Military Service which impedes the exemptions from the service on grounds of conscience. Article 10 of the Constitution, the principle of equality, is also invoked by the judges, claiming that granting CO to specific individuals or groups would privilege some citizens over others. The officials further legitimize their reasoning within a national security discourse as 'territorial integrity, public safety and public order' are invoked as reasons for the lack of constitutional guarantees for CO. In a brochure published in 1999, the Armed Forces stated this point as such:

⁴⁴ Interestingly, military takes less harsh measures to counter the declared objectors before Ossi. As first declared objectors, Tayfun and Vedat are charged from 'alienating people from the military service' on the basis of the Article 155 of the Turkish Penal Code.⁴⁴ Vedat is acquitted whereas Tayfun receives three months of imprisonment which is later transformed to a monetary penalty. Six objectors, who put forth their total objections within an ISKD campaign in 1993, do not receive any legal proceedings.

‘In our laws there are no provisions on exemption from military service for reasons of conscience. This is because of the pressing need for security, caused by the strategic geographical position of our country and the circumstances we find ourselves in. As long as the factors threatening the internal and external security of Turkey do not change, it is considered to be impossible to introduce the concept of 'conscientious objection' into our legislation’.⁴⁵

The objectors, on the other hand, claimed the recognition of their rights to CO on the basis of freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction, and freedom of thought and opinion, guaranteed by the Article 24 and 25 of the Constitution. These freedoms are further guaranteed by Article 13, 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The objectors further invoked the right to free trial and the right to be tried by civilian courts since they do not consider themselves as soldiers but civilians. International legal treaties further frame their legal arguments. Turkish Constitution leans the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms on the international agreements in which Turkey takes part. Turkey has been one of the founding countries of the United Nations (UN) and a member of the Council of Europe since 1949 while it signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1949, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1952 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2000. All the international documents, including the decisions of ECtHR, are given the force of law by Article 90/5 of the Constitution. Having amended in 2004, the Article states that ‘in the case of a conflict between international agreement, duly put into effect, concerning fundamental rights and freedoms, and the laws due to differences on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail’. Although these international human rights agreements do not explicitly state the right to conscientious objection, they recognize the freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction, and consider the right to conscientious objection under this rubric.

With the Europeanization process, the objectors have turned towards supranational litigation at the ECtHR. Their appeals were part of the general trend in the increasing number of complaints at the ECtHR by the Turkish citizens in the late 1990s and 2000s. Turkey’s increasing relations with the EU opened up a space for maneuver to pressure the government through the ECtHR. Ossi’s case was brought up

⁴⁵ Retrieved from <http://www.wri-irg.org/co/rtba/turkey.htm#sdfootnote12sym> on Februray 10th, 2013.

to the European Commission of Human Rights in 1997 and to the ECtHR in 1998. In a parallel vein, in 1999, the members of ISKD applied to the ECtHR. They sue Turkey on grounds of their rights to freedom of association and to peaceful assembly being violated when some members of the association were sentenced to penalties due to their attendance of international meetings in 1994.⁴⁶ In the same year, Ahmet Ergin, the editor of the newspaper *Günlük Emek*, further sued Turkey at the Court on grounds that Turkey violated his right to freedom of expression and right to free trial. Ergin was trialed due to a publication on giving the conscripts a send-off. In 1997, public prosecutor at the Military Court of the General Staff charged him on the basis of Article 58 of the Military Code and Article 155 of the Criminal Code. The General Staff Court pointed out that military service was a constitutional duty and that the applicant denigrated the struggle against the PKK which killed soldiers, police officers, teachers and civil servants by denigrating military service. It further stated that the offending article contained terms contra to morality and public order. In 1999, the Military Court of Cassation further upheld the first-instance judgment. The Government claimed that the article was offensive to the wounded and the families of conscripts who were killed during their military service and that its criticisms of military service were contrary to the public interest. As a civilian, Ergin was supposed to be tried by a civilian court but he was tried by a military court. Consequently, he brought his case to the ECtHR. In 2006, the Court ruled in favor of Ergin and opened up a precedent for the prosecution of Article 155. Many intellectuals, journalists and objectors, such as Perihan Mağden, a well-known columnist, and Bülent Ersoy, a famous Turkish singer, Halil Savda, Ahmet Aydemir and Fatih Tezcan, who have been charged by that Articles, have been acquitted by the civilian courts from 2008 onwards. Although the prosecutors invoked the national security framework, courts decided that objectors enjoyed their freedom of expression which was a basic principle for a tolerant society with diverse voices,

⁴⁶ Ossi and other activists in SKD receive trials and penalties in 1996 because of international meetings they attended in 1994. In January 1994, various members of the ISKD travel to Germany to attend meetings organized by an association of lawyers and Greenpeace. Ossi also travels to Colombia and Brazil to attend other meetings. "On 5 June 1996 certain members of the association were sentenced by İzmir Criminal Court under section 43 of Law no. 2908 to three months' imprisonment as they do not seek permission to leave the country from the Ministry of the Interior. That judgment is quashed by the Court of Cassation on the ground that the Criminal Court fails to commute the prison sentences into fines. The case is remitted to the Criminal Court, which complies with the Court of Cassation's judgment on 14 July 1997" Retrieved from <http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/CaseLaw/Hof.nsf/0ad4f5ba6f6a119bc125668f004c455e/e920c6420643711cc1257122005340a0?OpenDocument> on November 21st, 2013.

referring to Articles 18 and 19 of the ICHR, Articles 9 and 10 of the ECHR and Article 25 of the Constitution.

Ossi sued Turkey on grounds that it breached the Article 3 (prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the Covenant. The activists did not only use the ECtHR as a tactical venue to pressure the military and political elites but also acted as active citizens of EU, forcing the Court to rethink its policies concerning the CO (İşyar, Keyman and Rumelili 2011). Hülya Üçpınar, Ossi's lawyer and a İSKD activist, recalls that they thought hard to change the way in which the Court interpreted the right to CO back then:

ECtHR were not considering CO as a right back in those days. It was discussing it in terms of forced labor. The recognition of the right was left to the member states. I mean, it was not discussing CO under the Article 9 but under other Articles. We knew this and got in touch with an academic in England to prepare our case rigorously. The preparations took a year. We applied to the Court in 1997. [...] We asked ourselves how we might change the ways in which the Court handled the issue of objection. How could we change the perspective of the Court on CO? We thought about strategic points. Should we defend our cause under the unlawfulness of military courts? Should we defend it under the freedom of expression? Should we discuss the freedom of conscience? Finally, we decided to base our claims under the Article that penalizes maltreatment and torture.

The Ossi campaign indeed transformed the way in which the ECtHR reinterpreted the right to CO. In 2006, the Court convicted Turkey from violating the Article 3 of the Covenant but did not examine the complaints under the Article 5, 8 and 9. It pointed at the lack of any regulation that governed those who refused to wear uniform on grounds of conscience or religion, and condemned the repetitive penalties. The Court coined the term 'civil death' to account for the 'clandestine life' of Ossi. 'Civil death' means that the objectors cannot use most of their citizenship rights due to their possible arrest, once they face state and military institutions.⁴⁷ Getting a passport, working in public

⁴⁷ Article 75 of the Military Penal Code states that 'those who incite soldier persons to flee or who aid and abet them, or those who knowingly employ deserters, those without permission, draft evaders, call evaders, hideaways and reserve officers and soldiers who fail to show up for duty, in private or state service or those who hide them or those who employ them for whatever reason in state, municipal or city departments and any institutions under these or in banks or occupational institutions and associations for the public good and those who do not dismiss them in the event of notification by the government shall be convicted for periods of from three months to a year and from one to three years for repetition of the crime in peace time, six months to two years in times of mobilization and states of emergency and up to seven years if the crime is repeated in times of mobilization and states of emergency'.

sector, having a job with social security, taking a plane or staying in a hotel would lead objectors to face repetitive punishments. Furthermore, since the draft dodgers and deserters are registered in the general information system (GBT), objectors may face arrests in cases of regular ID controls of police forces on the streets. The Court condemned these practices. After the decision by the Court, the Committee of Ministers (CoM) has regularly urged Turkey to take necessary steps for the prevention of the violation of the Article 3.⁴⁸

2011 turns into a decisive year for the legal struggle in Turkey. In 2011, the Court further convicted Armenia on the basis of the Article 9 due to its rejection to grant the right to CO to a member of Jehovah's Witnesses. Changing the precedent, it began to convict Turkey from violating the freedom of conscience, religion, and political conviction in the cases of objectors. The first case that resulted in conviction was Erçep v. Turkey. The Court claimed that Yunus put forth his objection not for his personal interest and convenience but for his genuinely-held religious belief. It decided that Turkey needed to enact a legal reform, to establish a mechanism by which one's application to objection could be investigated, and to create an alternative civilian service. It further invoked that the government officials were disproportional in their assessment of a fair balance between the common good and the objector. In Mehmet Tarhan's case, too, the Court decided that Turkey violated the Article 3 and 9 of the Convention in 2012. In Halil's case, it convicted Turkey for violating the Articles 3, 6/1 and 9 in 2012.⁴⁹ It further convicted Turkey on the basis of Article 3, 9 and 6/1 of the Covenant in the cases of other JWs, i.e. Demirtaş in 2012 and Buldu and his three friends in 2014. In a parallel vein, UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions concluded that Halil's imprisonments were arbitrary on the basis of Article 9 and 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 9 and 18 of the ICCPR in 2008. In 2012, the UN Human Rights Committee decided in favor of two male

⁴⁸ Since the first interim decision on the case in 2007, the CoM regularly urged Turkey to take the necessary precautions to put an end to rights violations of Ossi in the context of ECHR and to make necessary legislative changes to prevent similar violations of the Convention. In 2009, it *strongly* urged Turkey to take necessary measures to execute this judgment and insisted that Turkey informs the Committee of the legislative measures required in time before the December DH meeting, including their content and their time table for adoption. In June 2011, the Committee set a due time for Turkey to adopt the necessary legislative measures after the general elections of June 2011.

⁴⁹ Retrieved from <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22%3A%5B%22001-111414%22%5D%7D> on October 7th, 2015.

members of Jehovah's Witnesses, Arda and Cenk, and urged Turkey to provide these individuals with an effective remedy, as well as to avoid similar violations in the future.

As a reason of these convictions, the Turkish military courts began to cite the decisions of ECtHR and acquitted one member of Jehovah's Witnesses on the basis of his religiously-held beliefs. In 2012, Barış Görmez was acquitted after four years of imprisonment. Referring to Bayatyan's and Erçep's decisions of the ECtHR and Article 90 of the Constitution⁵⁰, the court decided that Barış's refusal was based on his genuinely-held religious beliefs which rejected any sort of violence and war. Accordingly, the members of JWs are regularly allowed to perform unarmed military service within the armed forces and they comply with this practice in recent years.⁵¹ The recognition of CO is nevertheless not extended to other objectors. The military court indicated that Halil possessed a gun when he was stopped in November 1997 and he was a member of the PKK, an armed organization. Hence, they refused to recognize him as an objector who is supposed to refuse to bear arms in any circumstances. In 2012, in Muhammed's case, referring to the decisions of ECtHR, the Malatya military court recognized the possibility of the right to CO but did not see Muhammed as eligible. The court claimed that his willingness to serve in the military for five months nullified the consistency of his objection. Furthermore, his Islamic and nationalist values and beliefs had already existed before his draft, and these values and beliefs do not contradict with the military service. According to the court, CO could not be based on an individual reinterpretation. The judges indicated that Muhammed's adherence to Islam and nationalism precluded the objection to military service. They did not find a unique, consistent and unitary motivation behind Muhammed's act, and revoked his psychological and economic problems as the main reasons of his refusal. Furthermore, the court argued that his selective refusal and the willingness to serve in a Muslim army demonstrate his willingness to bear arms in certain situations. Referring to Bayatyan's case, the court decided that Muhammed's case was not convincing, consistent and serious enough to be considered as a CO.⁵² He was exempted from the service by an

⁵⁰ With the amendments in 2004, Article 90 of the Constitution states that the international covenants are superior and legally binding in Turkey.

⁵¹ Stolwijk quotes the spokesman of the Jehovah's Witnesses (Stolwijk, 2005: 71).

⁵² TC Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı 2. Ordu Komutanlığı Askeri Mahkemesi, Malatya, Esas no: 2012/98 Karar no: 2012/40, 24 Şubat 2012.

‘unfit report’, claiming that ‘Muhammed’s conscientious objector status harmed the integrity of his military unit’.

Thenceforth, in case of persistent trials, the authorities gave medical reports to exempt the objectors from the military service, and, in doing so, impeded further complaints at the Court. Male objectors received exemptions based on ‘antisocial personality disorder’ or ‘advanced antisocial personality disorder’. The military did not recognize subjectivities and claims of the objectors and, instead, found the reasons for their unwillingness to serve in the military service in their pathologies. The objectors’ characteristics, such as difficulty to social adaptation, intolerance to the authority and illegal activity, were recognized as symptoms of a psychological condition rather than the reflections of their antimilitarist politics. Exemptions by medical reports would prevent future trials in national and international courts and a precedent for the right to CO. Military authorities pursued their strategic silencing by giving objectors exemptions on grounds of incompatibility or dealing with their cases individually. For instance, Ossi’s arrest warrant was abolished in 2012. However, his legal situation remained the same and he was still regarded as a deserter. In its response to the Committee in 7 September 2012, the authorities stated that, due to the ‘legal security policy’, Ossi’s deserter status could not be lifted until there was no regulation in the Parliament. However, the state authorities also declared that his limitations of civil rights, i.e. getting a passport, freedom of travel, had been prevented due to the withdrawal of his name from police and gendarmerie search engines and the abolition of his arrest warrant.⁵³ Mehmet Tarhan explained that his arrest warrant was ‘simply evaporated’.

Notwithstanding the changes, the legal struggle represents certain pitfalls. It is true that national and supranational litigation extended the movement to the national scale by disseminating the claims into the wider society. Without the imprisonment cases, however, objectors would fail to acquire a voice and their acts of objections were remained at the local scale. With ECtHR’s decision on Ossi, objectors no longer faced the vicious circle of military barracks, courts, and prisons in these occasions. However, they face custodies, official notifications that urge them to go to their military units, and administrative fines due to their noncompliance with the law. They refuse to sign

⁵³ Retrieved from <http://www.connection-ev.de/article-1760> on September 30th, 2015.

official notifications or administrative fines that are handed over in above mentioned encounters, or sign them while also noting that they are conscientious objectors:

I went to get a passport to attend the agroecology training in India. Although everything was normal for a while, the woman police officer later understood that I am a draft dodger and told me with surprise: ‘We have to dispatch you to the office’. [...] I told them that I knew the legal procedure, that they could not take me (or anyone else) to the military unit forcefully. I explained her that I would not draft the service, and I have played this scene before and all these were meaningless. But I could not do anything; the screen did not allow us to pursue my file. [...] I told them that I was a conscientious objector, I did not have any intention to do the military service and I would not sign any document unless I notify this situation. [...] I wrote the petition and said: ‘Is it all right now? Am I not a draft dodger? Can I get my passport?’ The woman police officer got slightly angry and said: ‘Is such a thing ever possible? You are still a deserter...’ and I got angry; I opened my arms and asked them: ‘Who is a deserter, look, I am here, I don’t run away; I openly declare that I am not going to the military and my place is known. What you do is to violate my right to travel’. [...] Meanwhile, the document I need was ready and I ran to the passport office. And I did my passport application at 17:00. I will get my passport next week. So, objectors, draft dodgers, deserters, we can have our passports; just we need to know what we want and explain ourselves clearly. And also, more importantly, explain anytime and anywhere why we don’t serve in the military. It does not matter if you are a deserter, do the same. In my opinion, don’t run away, if you do not want to serve, tell it out loud and let them get used to us. The people who listen to their conscience and don’t serve in the military are everywhere.⁵⁴

Objectors refuse to take any document, such as travel allowances, given by the military in the encounters win recruiting offices. Another objector who was stopped by the police officers when he was staying in a hotel explained his confrontation with the officers as follows:

- You will be paid 86 TL for your travel expenses. You may use this to go to the military recruiting office in which you are registered and complete your process.
 - I declare that I am not taking this money. Continue please.
 - This is just your travel allowance. There is no problem to take it.
 - This is unnecessary. I will not take any document from your institution. I will not sign any document that you ask me to sign. I will not take any allowance. I do not recognize your institution.
- [...]

⁵⁴ Retrieved from <https://yesilgazete.org/blog/2015/08/31/vicdani-bir-retcinin-basina-gelenler-inan-mayis-aru/> on February 23rd, 2017.

- Won't you take the travel allowance? 86 TL. It won't cause any problem to you. If you don't want to go to your military unit, that's your decision.
- I have already declared that I would not take it. I won't take it even if you do not ask for my signature.
- [...]
- But this is yours. There is no problem to take it.
- Anything that is given to me by the military is military's. You may keep it. Take care of yourself (While I was leaving the office, the woman officer screamed behind me)
- Take the allowance, and you would throw it later.
- I cannot throw anything that belongs to you. I am not a thief. If you wish, you may throw it away. Adieu!⁵⁵

Litigation as a tactical move affects the groups of objectors differently. Their agencies are enabled or limited in accordance with the subjectivities and the intersectionalities in which the objectors find themselves. The structural and political intersectionalities curb the agencies of women objectors. The intersection of soldiering and masculinity at the legal code impedes the court cases against the women activists. Interestingly, although male objectors, columnists, editors-in-chief or artists, who supported the dissent to the military service, were charged by Article 155, women objectors have never received any court hearings as a reason of their public declarations either. Neither military elites nor the society consider the women's voices relevant to the discussion of the military, militarism and militarization. Women counter these silences through their performative acts of objections. They turn our attention to the everyday and mundane ways in which military, militarism and militarization may be contested. In that, their emergence in the *Militurizm* Festivals was not a mere coincidence. It demonstrates how the tactics and strategies of the objectors are entangled with the subjectivities and the relations of power in which they are embedded. In these festivals, the objectors put forth women's claims through performative demonstrations. They argued that militarism does not remain in the barracks but shapes the society in a much hidden and subtle ways. To decipher the hidden ways in which the military shapes our lives, they organized city tours in which the participants visited barracks, military hospitals and prisons. To protest against the (hetero)sexist logic underpinning the military, they brought a case, full of fresh and rotten tomatoes, for the military doctors to detect the 'rotten' ones. They decorated the cannons, which are exposed in front of the military museums, with flowers. They

⁵⁵ Retrieved from <http://vicdaniret.org/vicdani-retci-demiroglu-hic-bir-evraki-imzalamadi-serbest-birakildi/> on February 23rd, 2017.

further visited OYAK to show the extent to which capitalistic production processes and consumption are integral to the construction of the hegemony of military, militarism, and militarization in the Turkish society. Objectors showed how buying a product of TUKAŞ Company, i.e. a tomato paste, has a militarizing effect on the society by channeling the financial resources to the military. They also made visits to neighborhoods such as Kadifekale in İzmir that had been very much affected by the military policies. The declarations in Kadifekale showed how WWI destroyed the multicultural atmosphere of the neighborhood, and pointed at the forced immigration which the war between Turkish security forces and the PKK led to.

Women's voices against the military, militarism and war, however, have been relatively weak compared to the male objectors. In a masculinist context, women mostly managed to have an impact mostly within the objection movement. As a matter of fact, male objectors have increasingly articulated pro-feminist discourses and formulate a gender critique of the hegemonic masculinity that is imposed through the soldiering duty:

Ever since my birth, I have been assigned to specific roles because of my sex. The society, which has a masculinist vision, both vested me with little privileges and imposed on me the soldiering duty for the security of the bigger social system. This [the masculinist vision] has always been present; while I am working, talking, exchanging glances, or in any other ways of communication. I have been more hurt by my closest and beloved ones who expect me to fulfill these roles. [...] I declare to the state, to the society and to those who are feeding upon this domination: I am not serving! (Fikret Yetişener, 2005)

I understand being a man as a biological classification. I am a man but this does not mean that I will accept the hegemonic masculinity. This societal role has repressed me many times in my life. What represses me are not men who play these gendered roles; instead the masculinity that is expected from me. I have lived the tension and stress of this a lot. One of my friend lives in Balat. I told him that I could not walk freely there. He thought the same. [...] When I pass by the neighborhood at night, I straighten my back and my shoulders. My walk is masculinized. This is something that I have lived during my middle school years too. When I was a teenager... Those roles, that sociality, that hierarchy, looking for an approval, surviving... It was like a nightmare... Military service is exactly this. (Oğul)

Performing CO as an act of civil disobedience unites Muslim, women, gay, anarchist, total or selective objectors. In doing so, the objectors acquire a voice and

disseminate their subjectivities and claims to the society. This is what differs many of the conscientious objectors from the grey objectors. However, it is worth mentioning that the silent agencies of grey objectors also create change without any intention to do so. Grey objectors put forth their agencies on a daily basis to find legal or extra-legal remedies to the challenges that result from this situation. They face difficulties in enjoying many citizenship rights as a reason of the registration of their non-compliance in police. They practice hidden and silent acts of objection to avoid any encounter. They do not enact themselves as citizens claiming the right to CO and promoting legal, social and political change. That said, their numbers constitute a significant majority which became an important issue to tackle with during the institutional transformation of the Turkish military. The military authorities changed the laws and regulations for draft dodging in the early 2010s. The prosecutions for draft dodging were gradually eased, albeit only in the peace times. Declared objectors contributed to this transformation through enacting themselves at the ECtHR. The procedural changes occurred at the same when the ECtHR was urging the military to take measures to prevent the objectors. As a matter of fact, in responding to the ECtHR in Erçep's case, the government cited these changes in draft dodging regulations, and claimed that Erçep and other objectors no longer face the deprivation of their liberty. However, it is plausible to argue that grey objectors also constituted an important push for this transformation.

In 2006, the authorities ruled that the objectors could not be trialed in the military courts, except in cases of 'failure to obey the rules' and 'desertion'. The Act No. 353 on the Establishment and Trial Procedure of Military Courts was amended. In 2008, the Directorate General for Criminal Affairs in the Ministry of Justice ruled that the arrest warrants of draft dodgers could only be pursued by the decision of a judge/civil jurisdiction.⁵⁶ Subsequently, their data were removed from police sight in regular ID checks on the streets.⁵⁷ That said, the practice is implemented on and off, and persists

⁵⁶ Retrieved from <http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/belgeler/site/dergi/yrgdergi/Temmuz2009/Temmuz2009/assets/flash/pages/page0083.swf> on September 21st, 2015.

⁵⁷ As a result of the application of Smuggling, Intelligence and Coordination Board to the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry ruled that the country-wide arrests of these individuals are constitutional in 2009. Finally, according to the protocol which was signed between the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense on 4 December 2012, the practice of registration of people who do not serve in the military in the General ID checks was put in force again in 2013. Today, no one can be forcefully taken to his military unit.

as a regulatory mechanism which is employed by the authorities in different times. With the amendments in Military Criminal Law on 31 March 2011, the measures against draft evading no longer mean the deprivation of liberty but lead to an administrative fine. According to the new procedure, under Article 86 of Military Law, draft dodging is considered not as a crime but a minor offense if the related person faces with the authorities for the first time. A criminal investigation is pursued when the dodger faces with the authorities for the second time. However, contra to the practices in the 1990s and 2000s, no one can be forcefully taken to the barracks. The objectors are freed by a notification, explaining his obligation to go to his military unit, and the monetary penalties in case of failure to obey the notification. The Law further provides that the appeals may be lodged against the administrative fines after exhausting the remedies envisaged in the Misdemeanour Law.

VI.II. 'Good' versus 'bad' objectors: Performing objection in Israel

Like their counterparts in Turkey, the conscientious objectors in Israel also perform their objections as acts of civil disobedience. They make public statements, addressing the Office of the Prime Minister and the IDF, disseminate their objection texts through the internet and other media, establish associations, and organize campaigns and demonstrations. Some male objectors further declare their acts of objections in the military units, recruiting offices, barracks, courts and prisons. The Defense Service Law penalizes CO. Article 46 regulates the failure to fulfill a duty imposed by law; and objectors, who do not report for the service, may be imprisoned for up to two years. If a person commits this offence with intent to evade military service, s/he may be sentenced to up to three years in prison. Objectors are further penalized on the basis of 'refusing to swear the oath of allegiance', 'failure to wear a uniform' or 'failure to obey the rules'. Being absent without permission means desertion and is also prosecuted in the cases of objectors. Objectors are penalized by consecutive terms in prison that is put in force by their commanders within their units on the basis of Article 122 of the Military Justice Act. These cases are resolved through disciplinary procedures without a trial. The commanders pursue the proceedings with the presence of a camera but in the absence of a judge, witness and attorney. A similar procedure is also followed in cases of selective objectors who declare their objections after they are enlisted to the military.

Some are further court-martialed. The first case occurred when Amnon Zichroni refused to serve in the IDF in 1954 after he was enlisted to the service. Military did not welcome his objection. Moshe Dayan, the then Chief of Staff, declared that ‘the special security position of the State of Israel demands, in our opinion, treating the war resisters problem very severely, and in any case treatment must be on an individual basis and not as a recognized group’. Pinhas Lavon, then Minister of Defense, accepted the military’s stand, and called Zichroni as a ‘moral parasite’. (Keren, 2002: 38-44) The IDF aimed to contain the contestation by treating it on an individual basis without making any attempt to create a precedent to recognize the male objectors as a legally recognized group. From then on, the IDF court-martialed objectors occasionally, i.e. Giora Neumann, Gadi Algazi, Ya’acov Shine, the case of the five from the 2001 Shministim Letter, and Jonathan Ben-Artzi. During their trials, objectors claimed their right to freedom of conscience, religion and conviction, guaranteed by the international treaties. Selective objectors further invoked laws and regulations of the IDF. They considered occupation as immoral, illegal and illegitimate ‘in opposition to customary international law, fundamental principles of law, as well as the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty’.⁵⁸ They stressed the principle of ‘black flag of illegality’ which was coined after the Kafr Qasim massacre in 1958. According to the verdict, soldiers are not obliged to obey an order that is ‘manifestly unlawful’ (Orbach 2013). Judges ruled that some orders should not be obeyed, and rescinded ‘the soldier’s duty to obey and charges him with criminal accountability for his actions’: ‘A person shall not be criminally liable according to Articles 122 (disobeying an order), 123 (failure to follow an order), and 124 (negligence to follow an order) if it is manifest that the order given to him is unlawful’ (Orbach, 2013: 497). This principle was firmly acknowledged by the military institution after that massacre. Then IDF Chief of Staff, Haim Laskov, indeed stated that:

‘Based on my authority according to the military code of criminal procedure [*hok ha-shiput hatseva_i*], I have recently approved the verdict of the military court of appeals that convicted a battalion commander, a platoon commander and a squad commander of the Border Police of murder, and five other privates of attempted murder [...] of 43 innocent, helpless Arab villagers, including seven boys and girls aged 8–14, and nine women, one of them 66 years old. The Kafr Qasim affair atrociously

⁵⁸ Retrieved from <http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Zonstien%20v.%20Judge-Advocate%20General.pdf> on April 7th, 2017.

undermined the sublime, humane principles of the sanctity of life and purity of arms, and seriously violated the legislation of the state of Israel. The following letter aims to explain to commanders, and through them to every soldier in the IDF, the implications of the Kafr Qasim affair on the question of military discipline' (cited in Orbach, 2013: 507).

When failed at the military courts, objectors pursued their cases at the High Court of Justice. The political liberalization of the 1980s opened up a space of maneuver. With the political liberalization and activism of the High Court of Justice, objectors increasingly employed the Court as a venue for claim-making and pushed the IDF for institutional reform. The gradual liberalization of the standing and justiciability doctrine of the Court in the 1980s gave the individuals the right to petition to the High Court of Justice (Hofnung, 2009: 103-104). Objectors petitioned at the Court. Although the Court first accepted the decisions of the IDF, it gradually came to take a much activist stance vis-à-vis the military in the 1990s. In 1980, Gadi Algazi challenged the IDF at the Court as his request to selective objection was not accepted by the commanders and he was sent to consecutive terms in military prison. Gadi described this policy as an illegal discrimination. He claimed that, although there had been selective objections of the IDF soldiers who had received recognition since 1967, his request was differentially treated. The IDF's council reacted to the Gadi's objection due to its civil disobedient nature:

'Army authorities had assured objectors that they would be stationed according to their wishes as long as act of refusal was an isolated phenomenon. Now the policy has changed. What had once been sporadic instances of refusal that IDF was willing to tolerate has changed in its nature and become an organized protest whose aim is to turn the IDF into the battleground for a kind of confrontation which the army should not be associated with' (Medina, 2002:78).

The Court followed the IDF's decision and rejected the Gadi's petition on grounds that 'no military organization can tolerate the existence of a general principle according to which individual soldiers can dictate their place of service, be it for economic or social reasons, or for reasons of conscience' (Epstein, 2002). The deputy president of the High Court of Justice, Justice Haim Cohn, wrote:

'Because this matter is not enacted in the laws governing the army, but is an army order, functioning as only an internal army guideline... we must make note of the change in army policy: we must assume that since that decision was made, the general rule of not granting an exemption from

service in the territories to a soldier for reasons of conscience is permanent and consistent' (Peri, 1993: 151-152).

Contra to the claims of objectors, the IDF claimed that 'the objective of the activities in the area [occupied territories] is to preserve public order and defend the nation against an unrelenting wave of brutal terrorism'.⁵⁹ The Court recognized that selective objection might indeed be as conscientious as pacifist total objection.⁶⁰ However, it also stated that selective objection would jeopardize the unity of the IDF and Israel, which is a polarized society; damage the IDF's impartiality and competence, and create 'an intense feeling of discrimination "between blood and blood"',⁶¹:

'The phenomenon of selective conscientious objection [...] would affect security considerations, since a group of selective objectors would tend to increase in size. Additionally, in a pluralistic society such as ours, recognizing selective conscientious objection may loosen the ties which hold us together as a nation. Yesterday, the objection was against serving in South Lebanon. Today, the objection is against serving in Judea and Samaria. Tomorrow, the objection will be against vacating this or that settlement. The army of the nation may turn into an army of different groups comprised of various units, to each of which it would be conscientiously acceptable to serve in certain areas, whereas it would be conscientiously unacceptable to serve in others. In a polarized society such as ours, this consideration weighs heavily'.⁶²

With high numbers of objectors, litigation enabled the objectors to become agents of institutional change. Their collective acts extended the sites of objection as the IDF established the Committee for Granting Exemptions from Defense Service for Reasons of Conscience (Conscientious Committee) in 1995. From then on, male objectors have applied to the Committee to receive exemption. However, the exemptions have been extremely rare. Avriham notes that only 8% of the petitions succeeded in receiving exemptions whereas 81% were rejected between 1995 and 2003. For the rest of the cases, the Committee recommended 'eased service conditions' (ibid: 21). The low level

⁵⁹ Retrieved from <http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Zonstien%20v.%20Judge-Advocate%20General.pdf> on April 7th, 2017.

⁶⁰ The High Court of Justice stated that 'we assume that the selective objector – like his fellow 'full' objector – acts based on grounds of conscience. The point of departure in principle is that the selective objector's refusal to serve in a particular war or take part in certain actions is based on true reasons of conscience, like the refusal of the full objectors' Retrieved from <http://www.wri-irg.org/news/2004/israel0204-en.htm> on February 4th, 2016.

⁶¹ Retrieved from <http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Zonstien%20v.%20Judge-Advocate%20General.pdf> on April 7th, 2017.

⁶² Retrieved from <http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Zonstien%20v.%20Judge-Advocate%20General.pdf> on April 7th, 2017.

of acceptions is also noted by War Resisters International which indicated that only 9 out of 114 cases were accepted by the Committee as of 2000.⁶³ The IDF stated that among 115 applications, which were submitted to the IDF between 1998 and 2000, 11 were accepted, amounting to 9.5 percent.⁶⁴ The Committee examined the life trajectories and claims of those who refused to take part in the IDF. The IDF recognized the exemptions of women from the military on grounds of conscience and had such a Committee that dealt with the women objectors. However, the Committee for men was established only after a critical number of objectors, be it total or selective, refused the service and enacted themselves at the High Court of Justice. The internal dynamics, rules and regulations of the Committee are not known by the general public, neither its establishment is publicly announced (Aviram, 2008: 19). The Committee was composed of soldiers, including an officer from the personnel unit, a legal representative from the Military Attorney General Unit and members of regulation and behavioral science units. After the recommendations of the High Court of Justice, a philosophy professor was added as the civilian member in 2002. Moreover, the Committee is not vested by the final decision but has the right to recommend the Chief of Personnel Unit. It is the military which decides whether one is referred to the Committee or not.⁶⁵ The Committee's definition of CO can be discerned in the court cases of objectors. CO is narrowly defined as a pacifist act. Pacifism is conceptualized as a non-political ideology that refuses violence in any circumstances. The Committee asks several questions to measure the sincerity of the objections. For instance, Yonatan Ben Artzi, a self-declared pacifist, was asked whether he was against occupation and whether he would use violence against Nazis in the WWII. He declared that he would use violence in such a case and he was against occupation. He also stated that his opposition to occupation was resulted from his pacifist beliefs and was part of his total objection to the military service. However, he did not receive any exemption because the Committee argued that he was 'not a true pacifist but a conflictive person whose objection stemmed from his unconformity to the authority and the military'. Similarly,

⁶³ Retrieved from <http://www.wri-irg.org/co/co-isr-03.htm#fnB11> on February 25th, 2017.

⁶⁴ Retrieved from <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/pacifists-are-fighting-hard-against-the-draft-1.51499> on June 7th, 2017.

⁶⁵ Between 1998 and 2000, 115 conscientious objectors were referred to the committee - of these only nine were fully accepted, and 10 were offered some sort of unarmed service in the military. Retrieved from <http://peacenews.info/node/3590/support-conscientious-objectors-israel-get-involved-war-resisters-internationals-campaign-> on January 10th, 2016.

in 1998, the Committee refused to grant objection to Yehuda Eagos, an anarcho-pacifist, and informed the Ministry of Defense that:

‘The Committee did not find that the above-mentioned person is unable to serve due to pacifism. He raised various political arguments concerning the IDF policy in the [Occupied] Territories etc., that are closer to the field of selective refusal. Even his principled arguments against serving are less relevant to pacifism than to an unwillingness to serve and also ideological and political positions’ (Amnesty International, 1999: 18).

Objection is further defined as an individual act. The military rejects to grant exemptions to those who perform their objections as acts of civil disobedience. In 2001, the prosecutor of five objectors from Shministim Letter argued that the objectors were ‘ideological and idealistic criminals’ who ‘broke the law, flout its authority and blackmailed the government’. The civil disobedient nature of objections was considered as a ‘threat’:

‘There is a difference between Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience. Conscientious Objection is a purely personal act, carried out in silence, without publicity, aimed merely at getting exemption for one particular person from acts which he finds intolerable, incompatible with his personal conscience. He does not seek to involve others, does not ask anybody to follow or emulate him. Civil Disobedience is the complete opposite - a pernicious, seditious act of a group which seeks maximum publicity, maximum complicity and participation in its effort to hamper the elected government in carrying out its policies. And what have we here, in this group of five accused? They have all signed a letter, the Shministim Letter, a letter signed by hundreds of youths and addressed to the Prime Minister, The Defence Minister, the Army Chief-of Staff, and to the press. Yes, to the press, especially to the press! And what did they write in that letter of theirs? Let me quote: ‘We refuse to become the occupation's soldiers’. The word ‘refuse’ is underlined in the original, please note that in the minutes. Yes, ‘We refuse to become the occupation's soldiers. When the elected government tramples upon basic democratic values, we have no choice but to obey the dictates of our conscience and refuse’. And here comes the crux, note this well: ‘We call upon our contemporaries and upon the soldiers - whether conscripts, reservists or career military personnel - to do as we do’. Need I add anything? These words speak for themselves. These five are no Conscientious Objectors, they are agitators involved in Civil Disobedience, in trying to overturn Constituted Authority, an attempt which cannot be tolerated’.⁶⁶

According to the military, the objectors should be punished severely not only because of the High Court’s decisions in the cases of previous objectors, but also

⁶⁶ Retrieved from <http://www.wri-irg.org/news/2004/israel0204-en.htm> on February 3rd, 2016.

because of the detrimental consequences of their act to the security and social unity of Israel:

‘If political refusal is legitimized, there will be chaos. Soldiers will choose which orders to obey and which not, there will be total anarchy and the army will go to pieces. And it will not stop with the army. Citizens will choose which laws to obey and which not, and always the lawbreakers will claim they are acting according to their conscience. For example, if there is a special tax to finance the Separation Fence, some people may refuse to pay it and justify this by their conscience. The very idea - everybody understands that refusal to pay taxes is a political act, not an act of conscience’.⁶⁷

In the end, the judges found a middle way between hardliners and softliners, and sentenced the five objectors to one year in prison. The final verdict read as follows:

‘From analyzing the testimonies of the accused we have come to the conclusion that their acts are mainly motivated by the wish to extend opposition against government policy in the Territories and draw a stream of others to follow in their footsteps, either by refusing to enlist or refusing to serve in the territories. [...] The accused made their refusal public so as to put in question the justification for the army's operations and the morality of taking part in the army. Further, by so doing they undermine the international legitimacy of the state's actions and help hostile nations by providing them with new arguments. [...] The accused refused to be numbered among the ranks of the IDF and share in the burden of defending their country out of their thoughts that the acts of the state and the army immoral and illegal. In this way they are putting their own moral criteria above those of the other soldiers who do serve in the army, above those of their commanders, and even above those of the political echelon which guides the activity of the army. [...] Freedom of speech is guaranteed by the law, but some forms of it are still illegal. [...] Making use of military service - and refusal to it - as part of the freedom of speech is also illegal. [...] In the case of the offence here under discussion, an offence committed for the specific purpose of drawing the general public into mass law-breaking, when there is a concrete reason to worry about a large number of people, and in that way causing incalculable damage to the army and the state, it is undoubtedly justifiable to mete out a more severe punishment, in order to let the masses at whom the accused directed their call see and understand that the price of refusal is a severe and painful punishment’.⁶⁸

National litigation is a fruitful process for institutional change; yet it also has its pitfalls. Like in Turkey, claiming CO through litigation and imprisonment silenced the women’s voices. Given the legal recognition of the right to CO, women objectors

⁶⁷ Retrieved from <http://www.wri-irg.org/news/2004/israel0204-en.htm> on February 3rd, 2016.

⁶⁸ Retrieved from <http://www.wri-irg.org/news/2004/israel0204-en.htm> on February 3rd, 2016.

received their exemptions on grounds of pacifism from the Conscientious Committee relatively easily. They displayed many corporeal and discursive agencies to make recognize their pacifist subjectivities. Many stated that they were vegetarians, vegans, feminists, and refuse violence in any circumstances, or simply ‘not fit’ to the services:

I have been to weekly demonstrations in West Bank. I didn’t feel that they were violent demonstrations. Throwing rocks to the Wall was not violence. It was symbolic and nobody was being hurt except the demonstrators. And I feel that it is not my place to judge how Palestinians handle their struggle. I can only choose what I am doing. And I wanted to be there as an ally. [...] the first time when I went to West Bank was the fourth year anniversary in Belin. Then I went to the fifth anniversary. What I told the Committee was that I went to demonstration once and it felt too violent [She laughs] and never went again, which was false. I kept on going. [So your pacifism is different than their understanding of pacifism] Of course, I am leftist, I am against the occupation. [But] you cannot be leftist, actively act against the occupation, or acknowledge that there is an occupation and expect to be exempted by the Committee because they would say you are against the acts of the government. You are not against the idea of military. They would find this political. So, of course, I went there and I told them everything to get my release. [...] I played the game. I told them that even if somebody attacked me on the street, I would not react. And even if I was in Nazi Britain, I wouldn’t join the British forces against the Nazis or to rebels. I told them I was against the police which is true. [So was your predominant stance pacifism or anti occupation?] I still think that they are the same thing. Because I am a pacifist, I am against the occupation, violence and oppression. That’s why I am an anarchist, feminist, vegan and that’s why I act for animal rights. All come from the same roots, being against hierarchies, oppressions, abuse of power and everything else. I cannot separate these from one another. I am against the occupation because I am against violence, I am against militarism. (Shahaf)

You should be a girl. Boys can’t really claim pacifism. I think that’s mainly because the army needs them to fight. [...] I sent a letter explaining my pacifist objections, like, why I could not join the military, why it was against my opinions. I had a lot of information from New Profile about what this letter should consist of. I shouldn’t say that I am against the occupation. Otherwise, I would be a political objector. I said that the army was violent, as all armies are, and the IDF was not different than any army in the world. [...] I object to violence because it is not the way to solve the problems. I explained that we could not really get out of this circle of violence with more violence. I said that, in my daily life, I did not commit violent acts. I am vegan, and I also said that feminism was a reason to do that [objection]. [Wouldn’t caliming feminism make you a political objector?] Feminism is quite a pacifist movement. And, for them, it is in the private sphere so it is OK. I said that military was a male dominated institution and that violence was a practice of men. [Were you against occupation?] Yes, actually, back in those days, I thought that if there had

not been occupation then I would have joined the military because I wouldn't have cared much. But as I saw the pictures from Gaza and West Bank, I knew that I couldn't serve in the military. [...] They asked me questions, like, tell about yourself, why are you a pacifist, what does it mean that you can't join the military? Why did you go to school for twelve years which is an oppressive and violent system? I told them that the army was inherently violent, but the education system was not. And also I started to go to school when I was six [She smiles]. They accepted my answers. [...] I think I kind of fit the profile that they were looking for. I am white, middle class, educated, and a girl. Being vegan also helped. [...] From the first time I got into the Committee, I told them that I would not join the army and they were wasting their time. And I made a big mess. The process has a lot of stages. They asked me many questions. And I refused to answer them. [...] I was, like, 'you are wasting your time because I am not going to answer you'. And then lying, saying the worst answers possible. I did the tests very badly. . [...] They asked me questions in Hebrew. Like, fill in the blanks etc. and there I wrote 'army sucks'. [She laughs] [...] So she [the officer] had to write somewhere that I was problematic. And they don't want problematic people. Finally, I got the lowest score possible in the tests.

Interestingly, the Committee granted objections to those women who stated their anti-occupation and political stances. Shani explained that she was granted exemption by the Committee although she explicitly stated her identity as 'a political feminist refuser', and never defined herself as a pacifist. In 2001, male objectors denounced this practice on ground of gender equality. Within a legal-pragmatist argument, they claimed that the IDF discriminated against male objectors by differentially treating the objections of women and men. Gender equality argument, however, did not lead court to decide in favor of male objectors. From then on, women objectors, who are not qualified as pacifists by the Committee, have faced prison charges. The Committee refuses to grant the status to women whose acts are deemed as 'political'. The first woman 'victim' of this new decision was Laura Milo. Laura was denied exemption because she believed that the IDF was an occupying military force. She could not receive any exemption by the Committee and was sent to prison in 2004. The Military Court ruled that '[a]s to the claim of discrimination, we accepted the explanation of the prosecutor that the positive discrimination [of women] resulted from mistake... and not from a purposeful policy'.⁶⁹ Women objectors brought up the case to the High Court of Justice where they claimed that the court should apply the original interpretation of the

⁶⁹ Intermediate Decision at 18, MilC (GS) 151,174,205,222,243/03 Military Prosecutor v. Matar [2004] (unpublished decision) (on file with the author). (Rimalt, 2007: 132)

Article 39, invalidating the new interpretation that is implemented in 2004. The military authorities' decision was supported by the Court. The High Court stated that 'women's separate right to conscientious exemption should be abolished, since the principle of sex-based equality required formal equality between men and women' (Rimalt, 2007). This led to the elimination of reason of conscience as an independent ground for exemption in the Article 39. Thereafter, the women's right to CO has only been partially recognized under the Article 39(c) and 40 of the Defense Service Law, which permits exemptions on grounds of conscience only if they are religious. Paradoxically, women objectors acquired voice after they lost their right to CO under the law on gender equality. Legal-pragmatist arguments worsened off the condition of women objectors who put forth their objections against the occupation and militarization.

In the failure of an activist Committee, many objectors pursue grey form of objection. The feminist critique of objection and the question of privilege influence the ways in which activists perform their objections. Although many are very vocal in their political activities against the military, they choose to receive exemption from the military through Profile 21, a military code that defines those individuals who are 'physically or psychologically' unsuitable for the service. Through various corporeal and discursive tactics, objectors deliberately fail the tests during the recruitment process in order to be unqualified for the military service. These grey acts of objections constitute the predominant form of objection in Israel. With the decline in the motivation of would-be conscript, Sandler states that grey objectors constitute roughly 55-57% of their age group among Israeli citizens.⁷⁰ Objectors construct themselves as 'demotivated' individuals who are physically, emotionally or morally troubled by violence and soldering. They claim exemptions due to unsuitability under the Article 36 of Defense Service Law. Yasmin is one of these objectors who I met during myfieldwork in Israel. She was one of the organizers of the 2014 Shministim Letter and is now a member of Mesavrot, a newly-funded organization which provides social and psychological support for objectors. Throughout the interview, she declared that performing CO through the imprisonment was a choice which was embedded in one's acquired privileges. Although she had a firm political conceptualization of objection as

⁷⁰ Retrieved from <https://www.wri-irg.org/es/node/2481> on May 23rd, 2017.

an antimilitarist, feminist and anti-occupation act, she chose to receive ‘unsuitability’ report to avoid the service:

I first went to the Committee but they did not release me. They told me that I had to be recruited in three days. So I went to a psychologist that my parents knew. He wrote me a report stating that I was having an identity crisis. I went with that report to the recruitment office and they let me see the military psychologist. I cried a lot during the interview. She asked me a lot of questions. [Why did you cry?] First of all, I was very nervous. Second, I knew that crying would help. So I did not sleep before that day. I was really trying to express my depression. I cried, cried, and again cried. Before I went to the interview, I tried to imagine myself in a war-like situation. I imagined how I was going to be beaten in the girls’ prison. I made myself really panicked, intentionally but I was also too stressed. The psychologist tried to give me chocolate. I told her I did not want to eat. She asked if I had eaten before; I said I had not eaten since the day before. This was half true because I skipped breakfast to be really weak. [...] I told her I had nightmares. [...] Then she gave me a recommendation for release. [...] And I got my release. (Yasmin)

In sum, the sites and scales of objection differ in accordance with the subjectivities and the political-institutional context in which these subjectivities are performed. Objectors formulate their objections as acts of civil disobedience. They perform their subjectivities in the barracks, courts and prisons, and disseminate the CO to the wider society. In Turkey, Europeanization process enables objectors to further extend the objection to the international scale. In doing so, objectors, even with small number, manage to create cracks in the military discourses and practices. In Israel, on the other hand, objectors constitute a significant minority, and push the IDF for institutional reform. In both countries, women’s voices are curbed as a reason of the association of hegemonic masculinity with the soldiering. Women perform various tactics to reveal the structural and political intersectionalities, and become agents of change. In Turkey, in the absence of court cases and imprisonment, they do not receive enough attention, yet transform the discourses and practices of other objectors and the objection movement. In Israel, women objectors make a patriarchal bargain (Kandiyoti 1988) in which acquiring voice comes in exchange of their enjoyment of the right to CO.

Chapter VII

Breaking the rifles: Conscientious objectors as the agents of change

The history of the nation-state is the history of incessant wars and political violence. Although its characteristics change, war-making remains integral to the state formation and re-formation. Turkey and Israel are no exceptions. They are constructed in and through wars within and beyond their borders. Protracted wars and militarized ethnic conflicts lead to strong military cultures in which the citizens are assumed to embody the citizen-soldier through compulsory military service. Many studies explain the processes and mechanisms that enable such a construction (Peled 1992; Peled and Shafir 1996; Jacoby 2003; Cizre 2003; Altınay 2004; Kanaaneh 2005; Kancı and Altınay 2007; Sasson-Levy 2007; Levy, Lomsky-Feder and Harel 2007; Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008; Payne 2010; Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder 2011; Turan 2013; Başaran 2014; Onbaşı 2016). In most of these accounts, citizen-soldier imagery is embodied by agents through various legal, sociocultural, political, economic and educational processes. Scholars explain how military service structures the citizen identities and the relations between them. There are fewer studies on the reverse side of the story; namely, how dissent to military service and to the hegemonic conceptions of the citizen-soldier shapes and reshapes citizenship and the nation-state. In this study, I fill this gap with an inquiry through a comparative-historical analysis of CO to military service in Turkey and Israel. Specifically, I ask how conscientious objectors become agents of change in societies with strong military culture, such as Turkey and Israel.

Conceptualizing change is one of the main questions of social movements and citizenship theories. Scholars develop different theoretical, epistemological and methodological approaches to explain its dynamics. Early theories of dissent argue that social movements effectuate change only insofar as the political opportunity/threat

structures enable strategic political action. These theories take structure and agency as separated categories of analysis with distinct qualities, and link them through assumptions of rationality. Within this framework, agents calculate the costs and benefits of their action, see the opportunities in a given citizenship regime, and seize upon these openings to pursue their exogenously determined interests. With its determinist and static nature, such a perspective is not well-equipped to explain the change that conscientious objectors bring about in Turkey and in Israel. The objections represent unexpected and ‘daring’ acts of dissent that cannot be easily understood by the political opportunity structures in either country. In highly militaristic contexts, the cost of objection overweighs its benefits, and there are no, or very rarely, available opportunities for objectors to pursue strategic political action. The number of conscientious objectors is statistically insignificant compared to those conscripts who are drafted to the military each year; and they do not achieve their main goals, i.e. enacting the right to CO. Yet, the acts of objection have persisted since the formation of Turkey and Israel and have articulated a socially and politically relevant critique of the military, militarism and militarization. In this research, I explore how they create change in the hegemonically constructed citizenship habitus, i.e. soldiering duty, in highly militaristic contexts through an inquiry into the emergence and transformation of the objection movements.

To account for the ‘unexpected’ change that the CO brings about, I turn to the agency-oriented theories. I take up a critical constructivist approach to the structure/agency question to explain how different acts of objections create change in the citizenship, the military, and the nation-state in Turkey and in Israel. Constructivist theories are better equipped to question that change insofar as they conceptualize it not through a top-down and rational formation of strategic action but a bottom-up and constitutive process of identity formation. Within these frameworks, change occurs as social movements institutionalize ‘supportive and relatively enduring practices’, which introduce a new citizen identities and a new citizenship habitus (Işın and Nielsen 2008: 17). Consequently, it unfolds over relatively longer periods of time during which these newly acquired identities come to guide the discourses and practices of critical number of individuals and groups in a society. These frameworks bring to the fore the conceptualization of dissent as a socially constructed process in which individuals and

groups manipulate, negotiate and transform meanings by their creative and innovative agencies. Conceptualizing identity as a sedimented process of being, these studies, however, fail to theorize how these novel citizen identities come into being in the first place. They focus more on slow transformation of values that creates routines, rituals, customs, norms and habits for action than those agentic ruptures which are performed over relatively shorter time periods. However, change also necessitates these momentous ruptures which construct the identities anew. As a matter of fact, identities are contested and fluid sites of becoming in which multiple, multilayered and intersecting identifications are negotiated within oneself and with others. Thus, individuals and groups constantly transgress the well-established forms of being citizen, woman, men, Muslim or Jewish and re-construct new political subjectivities from bottom-up.

Recent theorizing of the acts of citizenship approach seeks to overcome the limitations of these theories by focusing on acts rather than actors. Taking up identities as performative processes of becoming, scholars explain the unexpected, unordinary and unanticipated forms of dissent that come into being through acts over relatively shorter periods of time, and transgress the dispositional hegemonic ideals. It is from within this framework that I turn to the CO to military service in Turkey and in Israel. Through acts of objection, citizens break away with the militaristic constructions of citizenship and formulate alternative political subjectivities, with new claims, concerns, and goals. The change emerges in and through these subjectivities which unfold in critical historical junctures and negotiate multiple, and intersecting, identifications with the state, military, society and other objectors in multiple sites and at multiple levels. In that, CO refers not only to a strategic action targeting the military law but also a tactical one promoting change at multiple directions and scopes. The comparative perspective indicates that identifications become politically salient in situated contexts of time and place. Changing conceptions of the military, militarism and citizenship transform the embodied and reflexive processes of political subjectification, and affect the substance, sites and scales of objections. Objectors put forth their agencies to invent new ways in which they perform their political subjectivities, and become agents of social, political, legal and/or institutional change.

Official historiographies in Turkey and in Israel silence acts of dissent that operate at the margins. They define the nation building as a top-down process in which the military-cum-politicians construct the citizenship habitus within the framework of nation-in-arms. Interestingly, many studies on CO also neglect a historical perspective, implicitly suggesting that CO is a relatively recent act of dissent. Scholars mostly discuss total objection that emerges from 1989 onwards in Turkey and selective objection that is introduced to Israeli politics from the early 1980s onwards in Israel. Of course, these periods are important moments of rupture in the historical trajectories of objection. In these periods, CO becomes a collective phenomenon by the ‘activist citizens’ who construct their dissent as acts of civil disobedience. However, a historical perspective indicates that CO first emerges during the Turkish and Israeli nation-building processes in the first half of the twentieth century. A historiographical account which is more sensitive to these agencies demonstrates that the top-down constructions of nation-in-arms and the citizen-soldier have been contested from bottom-up since the formative years of the nation-state. Revealing these early acts re-conceptualize the historicities of CO and the nation-state formation, and understand how, when and in which ways the objectors become agents of change.

Early acts of objection problematize the argument that Turkey and Israel are statist, collectivist and centralist in the formative years of the statehood. It is true that objectors in Turkey only scarcely make their subjectivities, claims and goals public. However, these accounts overlook various ways in which citizens perform their counter-hegemonic acts in the relatively less favorable and repressive context of the nation-state formation. In doing so, they silence the agencies of grey objectors, who manipulate or bend the rules, pursue extra-legal means, and perform their dissent in silent and hidden fashion, and Molokans, who declare their CO to the military service to the state, military and society but do not pursue any purposive political action. The argument becomes more problematic in Israel where CO has been introduced as an act of civil disobedience, claiming legal, social and political change since the establishment of the state. Notwithstanding the penalties, punishments and difficulties, the political regime has been comparatively more tolerant and allowed objectors to institutionalize their claims since the Yishuv period. Objectors form civil society organizations and initiatives, organize campaigns, sign petitions, and make demonstrations to disseminate

and make recognize their subjectivities, claims and discourses. The silences over these acts of objection are constructed over years. They are erased from the nation's collective memory insomuch that even the later generations of objectors do not remember these early acts that problematize the ways in which the nationhood, citizenship and security are framed.

An inquiry into the political subjectification demonstrates how the objectors become agents of reformist and radical change. The comparative analysis between two countries demonstrates that the hegemonic conceptions of military, militarism and citizenship regimes enable or limit the emergence of the acts of objection. Competing nationalism of Palestinian Arabs and competing religious or secular reinterpretations of Judaism and Zionism, and the accomodative approach of the authorities towards the objectors enable the emergence of CO to the military service as an act of civil disobedience quite early in Israel. Jewish objectors have negotiated their ethnic, national, pacifist, antimilitarist and/or religious identifications with the state, the IDF and society through individual and collective action since the Yishuv period. Their emergence demonstrates that hegemony and resistance are not dichotomous, but entangled in the formation of the dissent. The change which Jewish objectors bring about stems from within Israeli ethno-nationalism. Either total or selective, Jewish objectors construct their subjectivities, organizational discourses and practices, claims and goals within the confines of Zionism. Objectors reflect on their embodied experiences with the military, militarism and war, re-imagine the nation-building in the light of Zionist scripts, and declare their objections to the IDF in critical historical junctures. They do not refute the Jewish framing of the nation; however condemn its colonial and exclusionary policies. In doing so, they pursue a reformist agendas that do not seek to abolish the IDF altogether but redress the state and military when certain policies, i.e. human rights violations against Palestinians, land acquisitions, expropriation of Palestinian lands, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, 'political wars', or immoral orders, contradict with the basic ideals on which Israel is/ought to be founded.

The early Jewish objectors produce political subjectivities that refuse the militaristic and secular conceptions of statehood, citizenship and Zionism, and promote antimilitarist, pacifist and nonviolent ways of constructing the nation. Specifically, their

aim is to contribute to the peace and justice between Jews and Palestinians. They construct their moral and political subjectivities at the intersections of spiritual Zionism and nonviolent and pacifist Judaic discourses and practices, and negotiate these identifications through their acts of civil disobedience. Their Zionist identifications lead many to refuse the military service altogether and advocate service to the community in civilian ways. They establish Israeli War Resisters Association in 1945, advocate a binational state, and protest the acquisition of Palestinian lands and human rights violations against Palestinians Arabs. From the late 1960s onwards, selective objection of active-duty and reserve soldiers join these objectors. This group puts forth secular, leftist and Zionist subjectivities that seek to end the occupation and 'political wars', such as the Yom Kippur War, the first Lebanon War and the first and second Intifadas. The embodiment of the 'ideal' citizen-soldier enables a reflexive agency that leads Jewish soldiers to break away with their soldiering duty when they come to believe that the state and military policies contradict them. The hegemonic conceptions of citizenship, soldiering and war, Zionism and legal, ethical or institutional codes of the IDF construct the frames of selective objections.

Their acts came in a specific historical juncture; namely, the Six Days War, which was fought between Israel and neighboring states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967. At the end of the war, Israel took the control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The war led to the perpetuation of enmities and a coalition of Arab States, Egypt and Syria launched war against Israel in 1973. During the Yom Kippur War, 2,569 Israeli soldiers were killed, 7,500 wounded, and 301 taken prisoner. After a peace process, the Camp David Accords was signed in 1978. Israel gave the Sinai Peninsula back to Egypt, and normalized the relations between two countries. However, the relations between Israel and other neighboring Arab countries were far from stable. The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, has determined the security agendas. The military rule over the Palestinian Arabs in these regions has been one of the major sources for other political conflicts, i.e. the first and second Intifadas, and led to the first Lebanon War in 1982. Israel invaded the southern Lebanon to stop the activities of the organization Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and had 650 fatalities within the IDF.

Protracted wars with the neighboring Arab countries and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza create cracks in the national consensus. This predominantly starts with the failure of the IDF and the resulting death toll in the Yom Kippur War. The war shatters the national euphoria, which peaked after the Six Days War, and many Israeli citizens come to the conclusion that war and military dominance does not necessarily bring about security (Helman 1999). Soldiers, who are deployed in ‘unjust wars’ and in the occupied territories to police the civilian population, to guard the settlements or the borders with Jordan and Egypt, transform their moral and political convictions significantly. They consider these missions outside of their assigned duties, and more importantly illegal, illegitimate, and immoral. They are witnesses and perpetrators of human rights violations and political violence towards civilians, which creates crises of consciousness. They reflect on their embodied experiences within the military service or reserve duty, come to the conclusion that the security policies of the IDF harm the basic principles of the IDF, and selectively refuse to serve in certain missions and roles of the IDF. Their commitment to the IDF, the national security interests of Israel, and the human rights and democracy form their subjectivities. The shift first emerges in a group of men, mostly Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, who have been privileged and burdened the most by the Labor Zionists. Their acts of objections construct them as ‘responsible’ citizens who embody the ethical norms of the IDF, such as purity of arms, defensive military strategy, human dignity; the legal codes and verdicts, such as black flag of illegality and manifestly unlawful orders; and the basic principles of Zionism, such as safeguarding the national security and the Jewish and democratic character of Israel.⁷¹ They seek to redress the state and the military when their policies are diverted from these hegemonic ‘ideals’ through their civic and political engagements.

Purity of arms obliges the soldiers to use their weapons ‘only for purpose of their mission, only to the necessary extent and [only to] maintain their humanity even during combat’.⁷² It prevents the soldiers to use weapons against non-combatants or prisoners of war. Soldiers are expected to be careful not to harm the lives, bodies, dignity and properties of civilians as much as possible. The defensive military strategy means that the IDF does not have territorial ambitions. This strategy is firmly established over

⁷¹ Retrieved from <https://www.idfblog.com/about-the-idf/idf-code-of-ethics/> on March 4th 2017.

⁷² Retrieved from <https://www.idfblog.com/about-the-idf/idf-code-of-ethics/> on March 4th 2017.

time, as the IDF accustoms to a region ‘that was menacingly antagonistic but reassuringly familiar’ and its strategy is increasingly based deterrence, preemptive attacks, and short wars’ (Gal and Cohen, 2000: 227).⁷³ Moreover, soldiers are expected to adhere to ‘the laws of the state and norms of human dignity’.⁷⁴ These principles are enforced by the military and civilian authorities. For instance, as early as 1956, border police men, who committed the 1956 Kafr Qasim massacre, were court-martialed. At the end of the trial, the judges introduced the terms ‘manifestly unlawful order’ and ‘black flag of illegality’ into the Israeli military law (Orbach 2013). They cited that ‘a person shall not be criminally liable according to Articles 122 (disobeying an order), 123 (failure to follow an order), and 124 (negligence to follow an order) if it is manifest that the order given to him is unlawful’ and rescind ‘the soldier's duty to obey and charge him with criminal accountability for his actions’. The IDF was later scrutinized by the civilian authorities in several occasions. With the increasing level of public protest and sufficient media attention, the IDF’s involvements in the massacres or war failures were investigated by the Agranat Commission on the 1973 War, the Kahan Commission on the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres and the Shamgar Commission on the 1994 Hebron killings.

These discourses and practices of the IDF enable the emergence of the selective objections of Jewish soldiers. Objectors begin to produce a reformist change through their reflexive deliberation on the citizen-soldier habitus in the context of war and the occupation. This, however, does not mean that the acts of objections emerge only if the structurally imposed citizenship norms, values and beliefs are conducive to such a reinterpretation. The objectors emerge and become agent of radical change even in the absence of such enabling discourses and practices, albeit in much later periods, in Turkey. Historical trajectory of the objection movement indicates that a radical and substantive change may emerge through novel and unexpected acts of objection in unfavorable political contexts where hegemonic conceptions of citizenship and soldiering limit the dissenting voices. Turkey does not witness the emergence of CO as a collective act until the early 1990s. Dissent to the military service is mostly performed in its grey form. During the formative years of statehood, the only publicly known

⁷³ Retrieved from <http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IDF%20doctrine%20translation%20-%20web%20final2.pdf> on March 4th, 2017.

⁷⁴ Retrieved from <https://www.idfblog.com/about-the-idf/idf-code-of-ethics/> on March 4th, 2017.

cases of objections, Molokans, performed their acts at a local scale and as individual acts in and through which they aimed at receiving legal exemptions from the authorities to safeguard their Christian conscience against the immorality of war and violence (Arendt 1972). And they ceased to exist as they were forced to emigrate in the following decades. The republican elites did not tolerate the acts of objection. Unlike in Israel, there have not been any favorable legal-institutional frameworks or ethical codes of soldiering and war-making that might construct the subjectivities, claims and goals of objectors either. The TAF has not enacted laws that leave room for the soldiers to judge the orders which they are given. There have not been any written ethical norms or the principles of soldiering and warfare. The acts of objection emerged in a post-coup period in which the military was holding the upper hand in the domestic and international policies and its security policies were beyond political debate. Although there have been several liberalizing reforms concerning civil society from the late 1980s onwards, the TAF, its legislation and its policies have not been scrutinized by the civilian authorities after dramatic events. The military has been a black box, and its transformation through civilian pressure has been problematic.

In such a context, objectors articulated a substantive and radical critique of the military, militarism and militarization and became agents of counter-hegemonic change in the country. Theorizing such relatively unanticipated acts necessitates a closer look to the ways in which these individuals and groups put forth their agencies. The cases indicate that the positionality of individuals at multiple, multilayered and intersecting identifications enables reflexive deliberations that create ruptures with the soldiering duty in the context of militarized ethnic conflict and wars within and beyond borders. The acts of objection emerged among radical, leftist, antimilitarist and antinationalist activists as total objection in the 1990s. The critical period that precipitates the acts of objections is the emergence of militarized ethnic conflict between the TAF and the PKK. Turkey witnessed the armed struggles of socialists, radical leftists and ultra-nationalists during the Cold War period and this led to the 1980 military coup and the 1982 Constitution. 1980 coup was the second military coup that the country experienced so far. Several military interventions and coup attempts in and through which the military holds an upper hand in the domestic and international policies have occurred throughout the republican period. Through these events, the military elites

have constructed themselves as ‘the guardians of the Republic’ (Cizre 2004; Jenkins 2007; Heper 2011). The 1982 Constitution aimed at constructing a docile and tamed civil society and sought order and security. The regime limited the civil society activity and many activists were jailed, persecuted or executed in the aftermath of the coup. This did not mean that the resistance to the state was absent though. In 1984, the Kurdish nationalist movement launched its armed resistance for the national liberation. The militarization of ethnic conflict left more than 2500 death until 1990.

Total objectors form their acts of dissent against the ongoing war to stop the ‘vicious circle of violence’. Advocating nonviolence as an organizing principle, total objectors construct antimilitarist, antinationalist and anti-war subjectivities that promote an anarchist morality and politics. Activists problematize the republican contract between the citizen, state and military and decipher the inherently hierarchical, authoritarian and stratifying structure of the compulsory military service. They reflect on their embodied experiences within the leftist organizations during and after the 1980 military coup, and come to the conclusion that these organizations’ authoritarianism and militarism have been the main reason for the failure of the leftist social movements to create a systemic transformation. Coupled with the liberalizing reforms, this reflexivity orients them to civil society organizations and human right advocacy as strategic and non-violent venues of doing politics. Their anarchist moral and political identifications define the ways in which they think about and do politics. Military, war and political violence are denounced as authoritarian processes in and through which individual freedom and liberty are repressed; the world and nations are demarcated into ‘friends’ and ‘foes’; and social hierarchies between different groups are perpetuated. Considering ethno-national identifications as social constructions, objectors follow the motto: ‘No nations, no borders’. As mixed group that has Turkish and Kurdish backgrounds, they refuse to identify with any nationality. That said many objectors, coming from Turkish backgrounds, acknowledge their privilege vis-à-vis the Kurdish citizens of Turkey and struggle for the recognition of the collective rights of Kurds. And many Kurdish objectors also hold a strong sense of Kurdishness attached to their objections.

Through their objection, they formulate political subjectivities that safeguard their individuality while initiating collective action against authoritarianism, militarism and

hierarchy. Their goals are to demilitarize the society, to end the militarized conflict between the TAF and the PKK, and to transgress the civic-republican contract. They further denounce the interventionist and active foreign policy of the state and the military in the Middle East and the world. They believe that peace, justice and security are possible only if they embody nonviolent and antimilitarist subjectivities that refuse war and organized violence in any circumstances. Stressing the importance of the compatibility between means and ends, they advocate total objections and refuse to serve neither in the Turkish military nor in the PKK-like armed organizations. Their anarchist orientations also lead them to refuse any alternative civilian service that the state and the military may propose in exchange of the soldering duty. They accentuate that they do not have any duties to the state but the state has an obligation to safeguard their right to CO because their conscience 'refuses to kill or to be killed in the name of the nation'. However, this does not mean that the objectors take citizenship unseriously. They relate to the state, the military and the society through their acts of civil disobedience, and seek to make recognize their subjectivities and claims. Many indeed believe that their objections constitutes a 'service' to the society by realizing their political responsibility, or their 'civic duties', to safeguard the common good, i.e. peace, justice and security.

Change through counter-hegemonic subjectivities, with radical claims and goals, is relatively scarce in Israel. The limits of counter-hegemonic change are shaped along ethno-national lines for a long period of time. The hegemonic discourses and practices of soldiering and Zionism enable the reformist change relatively early among the Jewish active-duty and reserve soldiers; but anti-Zionist subjectivities, claims and goals emerge as a collective phenomenon among the Jewish segments of the society only recently in the early 2000s. Before, the total objections that constructed the anti-Zionist subjectivities and claims mostly occurred among the Druze men who negotiated their ethno-national identifications with the Zionist nation-state formation. Yet, given small number of declared objections, CO in the Druze community does not acquire voice throughout the history. Druze objectors become an organized group in the 1970s with the Druze Initiative Committee, and attract media and public attention from the 2000s onwards. Druze men perform their objections against the Zionist national-colonial endeavor. Through their objections, they denounce the Jewish framing of the nation-

state and the Zionist imageries of the Druze identity. Their ethno-national identifications become politically salient in the context of war against the Palestinian Arabs and the inequalities which the Druzes are subject to. Their acts are to demand their right claims to self-determination and recognition. They problematize the 'loyal ally' imagery that is prompted by the Labor Zionists. Objectors claim that Zionists employ a 'divide-and-rule' strategy to detach the Druze community from its Palestinian Arab identity. They refuse to take weapons against their people, to participate in the occupation, or to contribute to the state structure that discriminates against their community. Many further argue that the IDF incorporates Druze into the ranks but this does not bring equal citizenship. They claim that they are considered as second-class citizens although they share the burden of the national security. Hence, acts of objection bring to the fore anti-Zionist subjectivities, with counter-hegemonic claims and goals that are constructed at the intersections of competing conceptions of nationalism.

Such radical breaks with the citizenship habitus emerges late among the Jewish segments of society. Within the changing historical-political context, objectors reflect on their embodied experiences with the military, war and soldiering, and put forth new subjectivities which negotiate their ethnic, national, sex, gender and/or political identifications in the early 2000s. Their emergence introduces a radical critique of the military, militarism, and militarization. The end of the Oslo peace process and the eruption of second Intifada are the critical junctures in which Jewish objectors develop their radical acts of objections. Israel made peace agreements with Jordan, and began the peace talks with the Palestinians in the early 1990s. The Accords led to the recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza by Israeli authorities. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement provided for the creation of a Palestinian interim self-government, which later became the Palestinian National Authority in 1994. It was planned that many issues, such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security, and borders, would be resolved within a five-year interim period. However, after a last attempt to promote the Middle East peace process in the 2000 Camp David Summit, the process failed to bring a substantive peace between two parts, and the second Intifada, also known as the al-Aqsa Intifada, broke out with the Ariel Sharon's visit to Temple Mount. The end of the Oslo process dissolved the hopes of pro-peace camps which have been increasing with

the beginning of peace talks in the 1990s. The second Intifada left its traumatic mark within the Israeli society. The Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli targeted killings led to more than 4000 death, including the soldiers and civilians. The process created further dramatic events, such as Rabin's assassination, that left their marks in the objectors' memories. Individuals and groups, including some of the former selective ones, began to perceive the IDF as the ultimate cause of the end of the process. Almost all of the total objectors, who I have interviewed, explained that they had been told by their parents that they would not have to serve in the IDF when they would grow up because 'there would not be any compulsory military conscription as the security dilemma of Israel would be resolved by the Oslo Process'. The hawkish stances of the consecutive Israeli governments created disappointments and transformed the perceptions of the Jewish youth. Objectors gradually came to believe that, without a much radical voice, they would not reach peace and security. This led them to antimilitarist, anti-Zionist and anti-war subjectivities. Many began to question what the occupation means for them, for various social groups, and for the Palestinians as they approached to the enlistment period. They began to go to weekly protests in the occupied territories for political and humanitarian reasons during their high school years. They faced the IDF and made contacts with the local Palestinian population in these protests and demonstrations. Others contacted with the Palestinian citizens of Israel in several sites, such as mixed schools, summer camps or associations, and discussed the occupation and their roles in its perpetuation. These encounters have been constitutive of their self-reflexivity and the formation of the total objections.

Similar to the acts of their predecessors, their objections first and foremost stem from their political opposition to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. That said they further argue that the occupation does not stop at the pre-1967 borders but extends to the Israeli society. They claim that the militarism makes Israel an 'undemocratic, racist, colonial and an apartheid regime'. The radicalization of these acts reflects broader change of political discourse within the Israeli left. Objectors bring anti-Zionist and feminist ideologies to the fore. The critiques not only problematize the Zionist ideology in its relations to Palestinian-Jewish ethnic conflict but extend their critiques to all of the country, including multiple and multilayered hierarchies between Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, Russian and Ethiopian Jews, women and men, and Jewish and

Palestinian citizens of Israel. Total objectors criticize the Jewish framing of the nation-state and the ultimate right of Jewish people to the land. Instead, they claim that Palestinians have a right to return and all of the citizens should be incorporated into the system on equal terms. They problematize the privileged position of Ashkenazim within the Zionist ideology. Instead of an ethno-national and civic-republican framings, citizenship is constructed within civic and universalistic terms (Shafir and Peled 1998).

Unlike Israel, Turkey witnessed the acts of objection that negotiate ethno-national and religious identifications relatively late with the emergence of Kurds, Muslims and Jehovah's Witnesses in the mid-2000s. Civic-republican conceptions of citizenship incorporated the ethnic and religious minorities into the republican project through assimilation. Political and military elites silenced any counter-hegemonic conceptions of religion and competing nationalisms among the citizens. Although based on a secular nationalism, Sunni Islam has been integral to the Turkish military. The republican elites constructed the 'proper' conceptions of Islam in accordance with their nationalistic and militaristic agendas (Kemerli 2015). Kurdishness was erased from the public sphere (Yeğen 1999; 2004; 2007; 2009). Kurds were invited to Turkishness through various processes and mechanisms, of which compulsory military service constitutes an important part. As mentioned before, Kurds has began to negotiate their social positioning with the militarization of the ethnic conflict from the 1980s onwards. The emergence of the PKK transformed the subjectivities, claims and goals of the Kurdish nationalists significantly. It brought to the fore the ethnicity question and the right claim to self-determination and recognition. The militarization of the conflict had impeded the emergence of CO among Kurds for a decade after the emergence of total objections. Kurdish citizens came to negotiate their ethno-national identifications through the acts of objection in a period of 'strategic transformation' that the Kurdish nationalist movement went through. With the political changes in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the movement problematized the armed resistance as an effective method for liberation. Although militaristic discourses and practices are far from being deconstructed within the PKK, i.e. retaliation and legitimate defense, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the ideological shifts and the heavy losses during the clashes led the movement to transform its repertoires of action. It was in this context that Kurdish activists formed their acts of objection. Kurdish activists read about civil disobedience,

nonviolent resistance, and Gandhi during those years. Although many read them to challenge the Turkish state and the military by inventing new ways of doing resistance, some came to further problematize the militarism of the Kurdish nationalist movement and formulate a much radical act; namely, the total objection to the Turkish military and the PKK. In doing so, they constructed nonviolent and antimilitarist subjectivities that negotiate their ethno-national differences with the state, military, society, and the Kurdish movement.

The nature of ethnic conflict in each country diversifies the political subjectivities, claims and acts of objection among ethnic minorities. The ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy and the incorporation of the Druzes into the Zionist state building through hegemonic control rather than assimilation have led to the emergence of the Druze objection to the IDF since the enactment of the compulsory service. Like the Druze objectors, the Kurdish objectors have refused to bear arms against their people, sought to make recognize their ethno-national identifications, and aimed to end the militarized ethnic conflict through promoting nonviolence since the formative years of the statehood, i.e. Kurdish ‘bandits’. However, the nature of ethnic conflict impedes the acts of CO among the Kurds until the mid-2000s. In Turkey, Kurds first deconstruct the ethno-national constructions of citizenship in Turkey through armed resistance; and CO as a nonviolent act of civil disobedience emerge relatively late as the armed resistance of Kurdish nationalists begins to transform its discourses and practices. However, this also creates contradictions and conflict between the objectors, and further differentiates the Kurdish from the Druze objectors. Some Kurdish citizens of Turkey formulate selective objections that negotiate a competing conception of nationalism and militarism, resembling to Jewish active duty and reserve soldiers. Protracted war and the intensification of militarized conflict create ambivalent positionings vis-à-vis organized violence, war and justice. With the intensification of war, many Kurdish and pro-Kurdish identifications diversify the meaning of (anti)militarism, war and objection. The novelty comes from their adherence to a just war doctrine. They argue that wars and organized violence can be pursued in cases of self-defense and the defense of the victimized and the weak. Thus, the difference between objections of ethnic minorities in Turkey and in Israel is not only a temporal but a qualitative one. Although the Druze objectors identify with an ethno-national project of Palestine, they

possess antimilitarist subjectivities, claims and goals. In the absence of an armed resistance with national claims to Palestine, Druze men and women do not articulate any notion of self-defense into their discourses, claims and practices. When I asked an activist from Urfod, who came to give a talk in a panel on self-defense and CO in Turkey, what she thinks about the debates over the self-defense, she told that she did not exactly understand what self-defense means and what the intentions of the organizers were when they invited her to talk in such a panel. Unlike in Turkey, the question of self-defense does not exist among ethnic minorities but Jewish soldiers in Israel. Druzes do not claim their right to self-defense. Instead, they conceptualize their objections within the right claim to self-determination and recognition.

Muslim women and men later join the selective objectors, refusing to serve in the Turkish military yet accepting the organized violence in cases of self-defense against an oppressor or an immediate threat. The discourses of Muslim objectors differ from those of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi Jews) in Israel. Ultra-Orthodox Jews accept the legitimacy of the state. They are integrated into the Zionist nation-building on the basis of an ethno-national and ethno-religious conception of citizenship. During the formative years of the state, Labor Zionists aimed at protecting the yeshiva students, whose numbers had decreased with the Holocaust, and incorporated them into the citizenship regime as ‘spiritual corps of the nation’. They exempted yeshiva students from the service and, in exchange, received the support of ultra-Orthodox parties for their Zionist endeavor. When this bond began to be shaken as a reason of the growing number of yeshivas in recent years, Haredi Jews formed their protests not from within an anti-Zionist framework. They believe that they are the ‘spiritual soldiers of the nation’ that protect Israel through their prayers. In Turkey, Muslim men and women refuse the secular characteristics of the state and the nationalistic, militaristic and state-centric conceptions of Islam and put forth antinationalist and anti-secular subjectivities through their acts. Hence, comparatively, their acts of objections are framed within the hegemonic discourses and practices of statecraft and do not reject the military and violence in cases of just war and national defense. Interestingly, although pious Muslims refuse to serve in the military in silent and hidden fashion throughout the republican period, their emergence occur in the late 2000s; in a much later than that of religious objectors, i.e. spiritual Zionists and ultra-Orthodoxs, in Israel. Religious

objections emerge mostly from within Christian sects and remain underground. Muslim objectors come to refuse the soldiering duty as acts of civil disobedience in a period when Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which has constructed the ‘ideal’ citizenship since the 1982 Constitution, begins to be consolidated by a conservative-nationalist bloc under the AKP rule. Objectors refuse to embody the state-centric conceptions of Muslimhood and dissociate them from the process of re-articulation of these two into one another with the changing relations between the government, military and Islam. Islamic claims come to be negotiated by the young members of the *mahalle* as the state and military structures and Islam are entangled. Objectors refuse that a state and military, which is subject to secular nationalist and political ideologies, can be Islamic. They perform an act of dissociation from this newly emerging hegemony. They reinterpret the Islamic texts and the teachings of Prophet Mohammed, and refuse the state-centric and militarized conceptions of jihad, the prophet’s heart, and martyrdom. In doing so, they become agents of counter-hegemonic change in the society and in the *mahalle*.

Meanwhile, women become agents of counter-hegemonic change in both countries in the early 2000s. With the increasing appeal of feminist politics, women perform feminist, antimilitarist and total acts of objections to deconstruct the military in its relations to sex, gender, patriarchy and masculinism. New Profile, Urfod and Shministim in Israel and An-Fem in Turkey institutionalize their claims. The organizers of these newly emerging initiatives are predominantly women. Antimilitarism opens up a path to re-conceptualize militarism as an ideology that extends the barracks and infuse its logic into the society. Women objectors decipher the hidden aspects of militarism in our everyday lives and in the ways in which objection is thought of and performed. In doing so, they seek to demilitarize the society. As women, mothers, partners, or wives, they refuse to embody the gendered conceptions of militaristic citizenship. In Israel, they further demonstrate that the legal inclusion of Jewish women into the ranks does not necessarily bring about gender equality. They point to the secondary roles that are assigned to women and to the sexual harassment cases in the IDF. Structural and political intersectionalities, which the military, militarism and objection movement construct, impede the quality, scope and scale of women’s objections. Whereas their voices are silenced by the recognition of CO for Jewish women and the relative ease in receiving legal exemptions on grounds of pacifism by the Conscientious Committee,

they are marginalized by the exclusion of women from the barracks in Turkey. The intersection of soldiering and hegemonic masculinity militarizes the movement as objection is valued to the extent that the objector ‘pays the price’ of imprisonment. They frame their objections as performative acts to reveal these silences, expand the antimilitarist critique, and transform the meaning of (anti)militarism and objection in the country. Through their objections, women argue that ‘paying the price’ depends on the privileges one acquires from his/her sociocultural and political positioning within the society. Women claim that they already pay the price but in different ways, such as subordination, marginalization and silencing of their voices. They refuse to be relegated into a marginal status through masculinist discourses and practices of objection, and construct themselves as active agents of change.

The articulation of LGBT subjectivities, claims and goals differ in accordance with the legal-institutional framework of the military in each country. The legal exclusion of LGBT individuals from the barracks shapes the queer critiques of the military, militarism and militarization in Turkey. With the increasing voice of LGBT movement, gay, bisexual and transgenders refuse to be defined as ‘rotten’ or ‘unfit’ by the military hospitals and promote antimilitarist and anti-war subjectivities that refuse the soldiering duty. In doing so, they deconstruct the heterosexist conceptions of the citizen-soldier in Turkey. LGBT objectors further challenge the heterosexist conceptualization of objection, which values the dissent on the basis of paying a price. LGBTs in Israel, on the other hand, advocate feminist and pro-feminist stances against the occupation without any articulation of queer critiques of the military, militarism and militarization. The recognition and accommodation of their sexualities within the IDF’s legal-institutional framework in the 1990s limits the scope of their critique. During my fieldwork, I have met with many LGBT objectors; and none of them reflect on their sexual differences and how it shapes their anti-war and antimilitarist subjectivities. On the contrary, many LGBT objectors, who served in the military, explain that they have not felt discriminated as a reason of their sexualities within the ranks. Some gay objectors even explain that their military environment was relatively LGBT-friendly and that they had openly-LGBT friends in their units. Out of these observations, it is plausible to argue that the tolerance of military setting towards marginalized sexualities

impedes the deconstruction of the IDF, militarism and militarization in its relations to sexuality.

The quality of change differs in terms of these identifications that the objectors negotiate with the state, military, society and other objectors. From the 2000s onwards, CO becomes an intersectional social movement in and through objectors deconstruct the 'ideal' citizen-soldier in its relations to sex, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship, and religion. These identifications are not mutually exclusive; they represent categories of identity/difference which intersect in and through an internally-oriented (individual level) and externally-oriented (organizational level) dialogue in situated contexts of time and place. They position objectors differentially vis-à-vis the military, militarism and militarization. Change varies in accordance with the distance the acts of objections take from the soldiering duty. They create coalitions and conflicts between the objectors. These cleavages gather around two main divide; namely, total versus selective and religious versus secular objectors. Except the selective objections of Jewish soldiers and ultra-Orthodox in Israel, many of these positionings effectuate a radical and substantive change in the ways in which citizenship, security and the military is thought of and practiced.

Total objectors seek a substantive and radical change by rejecting any sort of soldiering duty. Their aims are to demilitarize the society and end the human resources of any war and political violence. In Turkey, CO is mostly performed in its total form. It unites many women, LGBT, anarchist, Jehovah's Witnesses and Kurdish objectors in antimilitarism, antinationalism and nonviolence. In Israel, it unites many Druze and recently emerging groups of Jewish women and men in antimilitarism, nonviolence and anti-Zionism. Selective objection becomes a recent development in Turkey and unites some Kurdish and Muslim objectors in their rejection of the Turkish military while adhering to the legitimacy of violence in certain circumstances. In Israel, on the other hand, objection is predominantly performed selectively by the dominant ethno-national and religious majority, i.e. active-duty and reserve Jewish soldiers and Haredi Jews, to redress the state and the IDF when they contradict with the terms of social contract. Competing conceptions of nationalism and religion construct, and are constructed by, the objectors who conceptualize militaries or organized violence as necessary for self-defense against an oppressor and/or an immediate threat. The right to self-defense

derives from various scripts. The Muslim objectors construct this right on the basis of the notion of jihad; the Kurdish objectors claim for the legitimacy of self-defense due to the ‘violence of the oppressor’; and the Jewish soldiers demand their right to self-defense on the basis of their Zionism. However, they all unite in their adherence to the just war doctrine, one that the total objectors reject due to its role in perpetuating the vicious circle of violence. Many total objectors do not refuse the possibility of violence in cases of an existential threat to the self; however the self, here, is constructed as an individual self that resort to spontaneous violence, not a collectivity which is organized in a communitarian fashion.

Different identifications perform different, yet overlapping, agencies to promote legal, social and political change. They differentiate tactics and strategies, sites, scopes and scales of the movements; and enable and limit collective agencies. Despite the differences in the subjectivities, claims and goals, objectors perform and disseminate their objections as acts of civil disobedience in both countries. The objectors employ various ‘democratic itineraries’ through legal and political institutions and through civil society organizations (Benhabib 2004). They perform their creative agencies in multiple sites and at multiple scales within domestic and global transformations that the nation-state goes through. In doing so, they start a negotiation and bargaining process with the state, military and society. The construction of CO as an act of civil disobedience differs between groups of objectors who perform their agencies within different structural and political intersectionalities that the citizenship regimes construct. Specifically, sex and gender becomes important categories of difference that differentiate the sites and scales of objection, and transform agencies of women and men within the movement. It further differentiates the tactics and strategies of women objections between two countries.

Objectors read their declaration texts in the demonstrations, panels and events and disseminate them through changing media tools, i.e. magazines, newspapers and the internet. These events are organized in human right associations, in front of military institutions or police stations. Some further perform their objections in the military recruiting offices, hospitals, barracks, courts and prisons. In these encounter, they declare that they are not draft dodgers or deserters but conscientious objectors. They declare their objections in police stations when they want to obtain a passport or when

they are taken into custody during routine ID checks or while staying at a hotel. They refuse to sign administrative documents and to take notifications that are handed them by the police. They refuse to take allowances, to receive medical examination, to obey orders, to wear a uniform or to hold a gun. Objectors enact national litigation by consciously going to their trials at civilian and military courts and extend their claims at the national and international scales. With a well-organized campaign around the cases of imprisoned objectors, objectors manage to acquire a voice in the wider society and break the silences of the state and military officials.

In Turkey, the Europeanization process has enabled objectors to pursue their rights at the ECtHR. From the late 1990s onwards, objectors enact supranational litigation and extend the scales of objection to the European scale (Keyman, Rumelili, and İşyar 2011). They perform their creative agencies to transform the ways in which the Court treats CO, and in doing so push the military and political authorities to discuss and negotiate the right to CO. The case of Turkey demonstrates that the objection movement, which is weak in domestic political alliances and number of activists (around 425 as of July 2017), may still have an impact on the military with the back of powerful international allies. The court-martials of objectors initiate a country-wide discussion, including government officials, MPs of opposition parties, columnists, academicians and civil society organizations. During Ossi's imprisonment, The Human Rights Association in Turkey awarded the Human Rights Prize to Ossi in 1997. The Amnesty International described him as a 'prisoner of conscience' in 1998. Several columnists and journalists wrote about imprisoned objectors' cases in the mainstream newspapers such as Radikal, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Sabah and Hürriyet. The objectors also established links with political parties in the parliament, such as DTP, BDP, or HDP, or some liberal politicians. MPs gave voice to the objectors' claims through parliamentary procedures. In 1994, Zübeyir Aydar, the deputy of DEP, proposed a draft bill for the right to CO. In the same year, 25 parliamentarians from SHP wrote another draft bill to stop civilians to be judged at the military courts. In 2008, Akın Birdal, DTP parliamentarian, brought to the fore a draft bill to recognize CO for both civilians and active-duty soldiers. The court-martials and imprisonments further incited the support of international society. Objectors established links with the War Resisters International and German antimilitarist groups. UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

concluded that Ossi's trials counter the principle of *ne bis in idem*. That is to say, nobody shall be persistently pronounced punishments on the basis of the same crime. The Association of German Protestant Churches and Missions awarded the İSKD with a human rights prize. Civil society actors further declared their support for the imprisoned objectors, including Spain, Germany, Croatia, Switzerland, France, Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, and U.S.A.

After the ECtHR's decision on Ossi, the Ministry of Defense first indicated that the decision should be treated on an individual basis and not be related to the compulsory military service:

Military service and how it shall be fulfilled are regulated by law. Each and every Turkish male citizen is subjected to compulsory military service. The ECtHR's decision is a decision on an individual case. It does not include the abolishment of the compulsory military service. Relating this decision to the military system is not right because it would cause misunderstandings within the public. The Ministry continues on the recruitment of conscripts in line with the laws and regulations.⁷⁵

The General Staff maintained its silence, stating that 'the topic is not solely a military but also a political one. [...] So, we make do with waiting and watching'.⁷⁶ In 2006, however, the General Staff for the first time made a statement on the CO and indicated that they discuss the phenomenon. Sabah, a well-known newspaper, announced it as follows:

The General Staff fears that the ECtHR's decision on Ossi may be exploited and may lead to further indemnities. It decided to take special measures for conscientious objectors. The Legal Counsel of the General Staff demanded from the military courts to prepare the list of all the conscientious objectors and Jehovah's Witnesses who applied for the status in recent years. It also demanded the legal proceedings and decisions of the courts.⁷⁷

The main public discussion on CO, however, occurs in 2011. As a reason of the deadline the ECtHR gives to Turkey, Sadullah Ergin, the then Minister of Justice, declares that the government will take the CO to the Council of Ministers. Parliamentarians, journalists, academicians and politicians stated the pros and cons of

⁷⁵ Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/bakan-aihm-karari-kisisel-3844780> May 30th, 2017.

⁷⁶ Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/bakan-aihm-karari-kisisel-3844780> May 30th, 2017.

⁷⁷ Retrieved from <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2006/03/13/gnd114.html> May 30th, 2017.

the CO for the national security. The CO has been uttered in the public statements of government officials, as well as the MPs of other political parties. Whereas CHP and BDP recognized it within the right to freedom of conscience, thought and belief, MHP took a harsher position. Devlet Bahçeli, the head of the MHP, stated that the proposition is ‘indecent’ because of the ‘troubles’ Turkey faces with in its environment. Özcan Yeniçeri, too, described the CO as a dangerous step that would start the dissolution of TAF. The opponents mainly advocated that the right to CO would harm the national security in an environment of ‘war on terror’. On the other hand, Akın Birdal and Sebahat Tuncel from BDP put forward a legislative proposition concerning the CO in the TBMM in 2011. In 2012, a group of objectors proposed a draft for the right to CO to the TBMM Reconciliation Committee for Constitution (TBMM Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu) which was established to draft a new Constitution. However, these propositions were not pursued by the Parliament since the Committee could not ‘come to a shared conclusion due to the differences in the opinions’.

Although the law does not recognize CO as a right or establish any institution to evaluate the cases of objectors, the military courts began to discuss the right to CO as a concept and practice in their verdicts and decisions in the 2010s. The military first sought to contain the challenge through the legal exemptions on the basis of ‘unfitness’. Since 2008, as a reason of the ECtHR’s decision on Ossi’s case, the military has been granting the objectors ‘unfit reports’ on the basis of ‘antisocial personality disorder’ after consecutive prison terms. Ignoring the claims to the CO, this finds the ‘incapacity’ and ‘unwillingness’ of objectors to adapt to the military discipline and orders in the mental and psychological conditions. Exemptions by medical reports prevented future trials in national and international courts without establishing a precedent for the right to CO. The ECtHR’s decision on Bayatyan v. Armenia case, however, pushed the TAF to negotiate the right to CO in 2012. The military courts began to discuss the basic tenets of the right. Barış Görmez, a male member of Jehovah’s Witnesses, was acquitted after four years of imprisonment. Referring to Bayatyan’s and Erçep’s decisions of the ECtHR and Article 90 of the Constitution, the court decided that Barış’s refusal is based on his genuinely-held religious beliefs which reject any sort of violence and war. In recent times, the JWs have been allowed to perform unarmed military service within the armed forces in recent years, and many comply with this

practice. Other objectors, on the other hand, still face what the ECtHR calls as ‘civil death’.

In Israel, objectors extend their acts to the national and international scale through their acts of civil disobedience in the barracks, courts and prisons. They constitute significant minority; although the exact numbers of declared objectors are unknown to the public, they reached more than 4300 as of 2014.⁷⁸ Their reformist stances and Zionist frames lead many reservists and active-duty soldiers to sympathize with the CO. Objectors manage to establish alliances with the left-wing and Arab parties in the Knesset. Hadash, Balad, Raam, and parts of Meretz support the cause of objection. As the military courts do not solve their cases in their favor, they pursued their cases at the High Court of Justice. As the High Courts of Justice changed its regulations in the 1990s, the court-martialed objectors employed the Court as a venue to enact the right to CO. Their agencies pushed the military authorities to establish an institutional mechanism, known as the Conscientious Committee, in 1995. Although the exemptions of the Committee have been quite rare among male applicants as a reason of the narrowly defined conception of objection, such an institutional reform opened up a path towards the recognition of CO for men in Israel and diversified the sites for the political contestations of the male objectors. In 2014, the re-structuring of the Constitutional Court further allowed the objectors to pursue their objection at the CC in Turkey. However, the Constitutional Court did not represent a fruitful venue for an institutional reform so far. Only four cases of objectors have been sent to the court as of 2017. In 2014, in Kanatlı’s case, the Court decided that the military law does not contradict with the Article 23 and 24 of the Constitution.⁷⁹ In the absence of an activist stance, the CC does not constitute a viable option; on the contrary, it blocks the agencies of objectors to pursue their cases at the ECtHR since the objectors cannot apply to the Court until all of the domestic legal remedies are not exhausted.

⁷⁸ A report in Haaretz stated that the number of objectors, who gathered around the War Resisters Association in Israel, were 100 in 1954 (Simoni, 2013: 80). The petition of Yesh Gvul to Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon was signed by 3000 reservists in 1982. The petition of Courage to Refuse was signed by 633 reservists. Commandos’ Letter and Pilots’ Letter were signed by 13 and 27 reservists in 2003. In 2014, Unit 8200 addressed a letter, signed by 43, to the authorities. Groups of high school students, called as Shministim, have signed several letters since 1967. Shministim Letter was signed by 100 students in 1978, 123 in 2001, 62 in 2002, 250 in 2005, 100 in 2009, 88 in 2010. (Retrieved from <http://december18th.org/2008/11/25/shministim-history/>; <https://www.wri-irg.org/fr/node/706>; <http://december18th.org/about/> on May 27th, 2017.

⁷⁹ Retrieved from <http://vicdaniret.org/anayasa-mahkemesinin-vicdani-retci-kanatli-karari-y-yesilada/> on May 16th, 2017.

The civil disobedience in the barracks, courts and prisons has been an important tactic for objectors to acquire a voice. As marginalized and weak groups of activists, objectors expose their bodies to the legal proceedings resulting from their objections, and in doing so, they disseminate their subjectivities and claims to the society, in that, they take seriously the assumption of the acts of citizenship approach, advocating that agency is a function of voice. That said the relation between political agency and voice is not as straightforward as it is claimed in the literature. It is true that objectors become agents of change as they acquire a voice through their acts of civil disobedience. However, this argument partially explains the processes of change by drawing its conclusions on the experiences of specific group of objectors; namely, male objectors. Activist citizens are reflexive and embodied subjects that find themselves at the intersections of various identifications that in turn reflect the relations of power in a given society. Incorporating a feminist perspective, which questions the experiences of women objectors, problematizes the relation between political change, agency and voice. My inquiry indicates that women are differentially affected by the politics of objection which is based on a specific form of civil disobedience, which relies heavily on courage, sacrifice and imprisonment. Specifically, women fail to acquire a voice in the society or receive enough attention only insofar as their acts are masculinized and militarized. The hegemonic conceptions of citizen-soldier limit the agencies of women objectors to the extent that it associates soldiering/objection with men/masculinity. In both countries, objection first emerges as a masculine act of resistance to military service. In Turkey, military is legally defined as an obligation for male citizens. Thus, women objectors do not receive any legal proceedings. The military authorities do not open court cases to penalize women's declarations or activities either. This in turn decreases the scope of their acts. Women mainly perform their acts at the local scale. Women in Turkey put forth their performative acts to break through these silences. Demonstrating the hidden and subtle ways in which militarism affect the dissent, they organize *Militurizm* Festivals in and through which they diversify the sites of the struggle. They perform the mundane and everyday life resistance to the military, militarism and militarization as important aspects of social and political change. Given the lack of legal proceedings and enough civil society and media attention, their agencies effectuate change mostly within the objection movement. Male objectors gradually articulate feminist discourses, problematizing the hegemonic masculinity that

the military constructs. In Israel, on the other hand, although Jewish women are obliged to serve in the IDF, the recognition of CO for women and the relative ease in acquiring the objector status at the Conscientious Committee curbs the voices of women objectors. And acquiring voice through litigation has a negative affect on their enjoyment of their right to CO. Paradoxically, women's voices are heard only after they lose the enjoyment of this right as the authorities re-structure the Conscientious Committee and imprison women who formulate their objections as acts of civil disobedience from 2004 onwards. The experiences of women objectors in Israel indicate that voice does not necessarily lead to positive results. It may indeed curb the political agencies of the relevant actors under specific circumstances. In a country like Israel where gender equality has been gradually established with laws and regulations, the argument of male objectors to gender equality is reversed, and the women objectors can no longer enjoy their rights to CO when they frame their resistances as a political act contesting the government and the military policies.

Conclusion

This research was an attempt to answer the following question: How do the conscientious objectors to military service become political agents in the contexts where military, militarism and militarization impede their agencies? In other words, how do the groups, which are placed outside of the hegemonic circle, put forth their agencies to transform the very structures that marginalize them? I conducted a comparative-historical analysis on Turkey and Israel to answer this question. Turkey and Israel constructed two cases which are similar in their domestic and international politics with differing outcomes. Although both countries have similarities in the construction of the nation-state and the citizenship, face militarized ethnic conflicts and wars, and are located in the Middle East with strategic security ties to the West, the objection movements differ in their historical trajectories. Whereas the CO to the military service in Israel emerged quite early, with a relatively higher scope, and in a reformist fashion, it emerged in a much later period as a weak but radical movement in Turkey. I argued that the differences in the hegemonic conceptions of military, militarism and militarization explain the differences in the emergence and transformation of CO to military service in both countries. In doing so, I did not, however, introduce a structurally-oriented explanation of change but an agency-oriented one. In the line of my inquiry, it is the bottom-up agencies of the objectors in reformulating the hegemonic and competing conceptions of citizenship, militarism, soldiering and war which make reformist or radical acts of objections possible. Tracing the theories of social movements and citizenship, I turned to the acts of citizenship as a

theoretical framework to grasp the different types of change that the objectors bring about. In this framework, individuals and groups become agents of change in and through acts that put forth new political subjectivities, claiming new rights. I conceptualized change in terms of social, political, legal and institutional aspects. The social and political change resides in the acts of objection that perform new political subjectivities in multiple sites and at multiple scales. I deciphered the change, and the sites and scales of objection through an in-depth inquiry into the embodied and reflexive processes of political subjectification. In the context of war and political violence, individuals and groups reflect on their embodied experiences with the military, militarism and militarization, and formulate new subjectivities refusing the military service, militarism and/or war through acts of civil disobedience. In doing so, they transform the ways in which the nation, the citizenship, and the soldiering are thought of and practiced in both countries. Through non-conventional and conventional forms of dissent, the objectors extend their resistance to the national and international scales, and create not only social and political but also legal and institutional change. Specifically, their everyday and mundance acts of dissent and the litigation at the courts open up a discussion on the military, militarism and militarization in the society, begin a negotiation process between the objectors and the powerholders, and transform the military discourses and practices. That said, I also argued that acts, which assume a straightforward relation between voice, agency, and success, must be problematized. In the acts of citizenship approach, activist citizen is assumed to be a speaking and acting subject that confronts the hegemonic institutions in a confrontational manner. I argued that this line of thinking does not take into account various intersectionalities at which the activist citizen finds him/herself. Claiming that the activist citizen is a reflexive and embodied agent, I demonstrated that different categories of identity/difference differentiate the agencies of the groups of objectors in effectuating the change. Specifically, incorporating sex and gender into my analysis indicated that silence may work in different ways for male and women objectors in specific circumstances. As Göker argues, ‘silence is a concept rich in paradoxes; it complicates general notions about what constitutes political and democratic action and the symbolic meanings that are attributed to voice and visibility’ (Göker, 2011: 122). In the context of the CO to military service, acquiring voice and visibility meant the masculinization and

militarization of women's objection, and, in the Israeli case, had negative effects for the enjoyment of their rights to CO.

The relation between voice and agency is further complicated by the incorporation of grey objection into the analysis. In this research, I took up grey objection as an analytical category and did not make a comprehensive analysis on the matter in Turkey and in Israel. I mostly concentrated on the acts of declared conscientious objection. In that, the research assumed that becoming a political agent necessitates acquiring a voice. However, an inquiry into these grey forms of dissent would help us to grasp how silent agencies matter in conceptualizing change. A multi-level inquiry into the subjectivities, claims, goals and tactics of grey objectors is a fruitful topic of research to widen the scope of an analysis on objection to military service. A brief look demonstrates that grey objectors are silent but not passive bearers of the established norms, values and beliefs and their agencies effectuate change although they do not intend to do so. Their silent acts do not mean that they are disengaged or disempowered (Gest and Gray 2015; Gray 2015). In Turkey, they dodge the draft, desert the barracks and receive various legal exemptions. There are several ways to receive these exemptions in Turkey. Health reasons, education, living and working abroad or being extremely thin or fat are some of the reasons for legal exemptions. Many grey objectors employ these methods to avoid the service. Those who dodge the draft or desert the barracks further display various acts of resistance in order to avoid any encounter with the state and military officials and bureaucracies since these encounters result in problems. Many do not make a contract with landlords, or use cell phones under the name of their friends. They use social media and other internet sites to learn and avoid the places where there are police controls. They work in jobs without social security and insurance. They further put forth various corporeal acts of resistance, such as caring their attire, avoiding the streets with police stations, issuing fake ID cards, etc. In Israel, grey objection is predominantly performed in the form of misbehaving the orders, being the 'troublemakers', not showing up in the reserve duty, changing the military unit, claiming religious status, getting exemptions on the basis of 'unsuitability' or, for women, getting married. Legal exemptions are granted on the basis of Profile 21 that signifies one's unsuitability to the military. Through various corporeal and discursive tactics, the objectors deliberately fail the tests during the

recruitment process in order to be exempted for the military service. With the decline in the motivation of would-be conscript, Sandler states that grey objectors constitute roughly 55-57% of their age group among Israeli citizens.⁸⁰ Objectors construct themselves as ‘demotivated’ individuals who are physically, emotionally or morally troubled by the military environment, violence and soldering. They claim exemptions due to unsuitability under the Article 36 of Defense Service Law.

These silent agencies push militaries for procedural changes. Turkish military closely follows the number of draft dodgers and deserters which reaches to 600,000. There are 60,000 cases of draft dodgers that are proceeded in the military courts each year. High numbers of grey objectors transform the military practices. The high number of draft dodgers urges the military to change their practices. In 2008, the law on the Establishment and Trial Procedure of Military Courts was amended. Subsequently, their criminal records were removed from the police sight in general ID checks. The practice of handing draft dodgers in their military unit was abolished in 2011. With the amendments in Military Criminal Law (Article 86 of Military Law), draft dodging is considered not as a crime but a minor offense if the related person faces with the authorities for the first time. The objectors are freed by a notification, explaining his obligation to enlist his military unit, and punished by the monetary penalties in cases of failure to obey the notification. A criminal investigation is pursued when the dodger faces with the authorities for the second time. In Israel, grey objection became widespread from the Yom Kippur War onwards and their high numbers led the IDF to gradually facilitate the legal exemption procedures. The military have granted the Profile 21 relatively easily from the 1990s onwards, and many grey objectors received their exemptions by deliberately failing the military tests during the recruitment process. Hence, although grey objectors do not initiate any purposive political action, their silent agencies still create an impact in the military procedures and practices. An inquiry incorporating these forms of dissent would shed light on the ways in which hidden and silent agencies bring about the legal, social, political and institutional change in both countries.

Another possible line of inquiry is to question CO in its relations to security. There are few scholars who have conducted such researches. Erol (2013) aims to

⁸⁰ Retrieved from <https://www.wri-irg.org/es/node/2481> on May 23rd, 2017.

introduce such a study by conceptualizing CO from within the Critical Security Studies framework. Helman (1999), on the other hand, does not delve into security theories; yet she demonstrates that the objectors put forth a newly emerging civic and political engagement with the national security policies in Israel. However, these researches concentrate only on a specific group of objectors. Erol excluded the selective objections and how these objections (de)construct multiple security discourses and practices. Helman mainly focused on the selective objection of the IDF soldiers during the first Lebanon War, and excluded the total and antimilitarist Jewish and Druze objectors. However, the objectors put forth multiple subjectivities that reframe the 'referent objects' of security in accordance with their identifications. Through their acts, they discuss how hegemonic security discourses and practices create insecurities for various individuals and groups. They denounce the framing of the security in national, militarist and statist terms and promote a re-imaginative perspective that advocate security through demilitarization, antimilitarism and/or partial (and just) militarization. The variation of the security frameworks is a function of the sociocultural and political identifications. The objectors represent intersectional subjectivities with diverging security claims, agendas and practices. Total objectors promote security through nonviolence and demilitarization; or selective objectors advocate the legitimacy of the militaries in 'just' cases, such as 'self-defense', the self understood here as the individual, community and/or nation. Women, LGBTs and ethnic minorities diversify the claims, discourses and actions. An inquiry into these newly emerging groups of objectors offers insights to discuss the critical approaches to security, such as feminist, postcolonial, securitization/desecuritization theories, through an empirical case study. A comparative perspective between different situated contexts of time and place would be illuminating to question an important puzzle in critical security studies: How do individuals and social movements discuss, experience and practice security? How do these different framings of security speak to one another? What does the dialogue and conflicts between the categories of identity/difference tell us about the intersectionality of critical security theories and praxis?

With these possible lines of inquiry in mind, conscientious objection to military service constitutes an inspiring topic which would explain how individuals, groups and social movements think of, experience and practice the citizenship and security in the

nation-state. It represents the history of the peace and anti-war movements, nonviolent resistance, and antimilitarism in the transformation of the nation-state. In doing so, it provides a topic through which scholars may understand the functioning of power from the vantage point of the marginalized and unrecognized groups. It is through such inquiries that we may fully grasp the change which the nation-state goes through.

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