PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD: DO DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGS HELD BY THE PEOPLE SHAPE POLITICAL SYSTEMS?

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ABSTRACT

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PhD Dissertation

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Democracy does not have a uniform meaning. Ordinary people do not understand the same thing from democracy. Nevertheless, intellectuals and the political elite alike promote democracy as an ideal to be emulated. In addition, democracy literature does not extensively study the factors, which affect the ways in which ordinary people understand the term. A major goal of this research is to investigate how the context people occupy affects the ways in which they understand democracy. To do this, I use World Values Survey 6th wave, which was conducted between 2010 and 2014 and covers 60 countries. Analysis demonstrates that *GDP per capita (PPP)* is an important factor affecting the ways in which people define democracy. People in richer countries are more likely to consider procedural characteristics essential to democracy while people in poorer countries tend to consider economic characteristics as essential to democracy. This finding indicates the possibility of the presence of specific support to the regime in poorer countries and the presence of diffuse support to the regime in richer countries, making consolidation of democracy harder in poorer countries. Analysis also shows that in poorer countries authoritarian tendencies are higher among the people than among the people in richer countries. Analysis does not provide any evidence that the ways in which people define democracy shape the political regime. Comparative study of Egypt and Tunisia shows that two factors affect the outcome of transitions: *elite coherence* and *electoral system preference*.

ÖZET

PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD: DO DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGS HELD BY THE PEOPLE SHAPE POLITICAL SYSTEMS?

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Demokrasi, anlamı üzerinde konsensüsün olduğu bir terim değildir. Aksine literatürde bir çok demokrasi tanımı yer almaktadır. Buna rağmen entelektüel ve siyasi elit, demokrasiyi dünyada herkes tarafından kabul görmesi gereken bir ideal olarak tanımlamaya devam etmektedir. Ancak özellikle de sıradan insanların demokrasi denildiği zaman aynı şeyi anlamadıkları çok açıktır. Dahası sosyal bilimler literatürü, sıradan insanların demokrasi teriminden ne anladıklarını ve bu insanların kendi demokrasi tanımlarını yaparken hangi faktörlerden etkilendiğini kapsamlı bir şekilde çalışmamıştır. Bu çalışmanın amaçlarından birisi çevresel faktörlerin (context) insanların demokrasi tanımlarını nasıl etkilediğini araştırmaktır. Bu kapsamda 2010-2014 arasında altıncı dalgası 60 farklı ülkede yapılan Dünya Değerler Anketinden (World Values Survey) faydalanılmıştır. Analizler, *Satın Alma Paritesine göre Kişi Başı Gelirin*, değişik ülkelerdeki insanların demokrasi tanımları üzerinde etkisi olduğu göstermektedir. Bu değerin yüksek olduğu ülkelerde bireyler demokrasiyi prosedürel özellikler üzerinden tanımlarken bu değerin düşük olduğu ülkelerde insanların demokrasiyi ekonomik karakterler üzerinden tanımlamışlardır. Bu durum, ekonomik açıdan gelişmiş ülkelerdeki insanların demokratik rejime desteklerinin yaygın destek (diffuse support) şeklindeyken ekonomik açıdan gelişmemiş ülkelerde demokrasiye desteğin özel amaçlı destek (specific support) şeklinde olduğu ihtimaline işaret etmektedir. Analizler, bireyler arasındaki otoriter eğilimlerin ekonomik açıdan gelişmemiş ülkelerde daha yaygın olduğunu da göstermiştir. Bulgular birlikte değerlendirildiğinde ise ekonomik açıdan az gelişmiş ülkelerde, demokratik konsolidasyonda önemli problemler yaşanmasının daha olası olduğu sonucuna varılması mümkündür. Ancak araştırma, otoriter rejimden demokrasiye geçişte insanların demokrasiyi nasıl tanımladıklarının herhangi bir etkisi olduğuna dair bir bulguya varmamıştır. Mısır ve Tunus karşılaştırmalı çalışması *siyasi elit arasındaki bağlılığın* ve *seçim sistemi seçiminin* otoriter rejimden demokrasiye geçişte önemli etmenler olduğunu ortaya koymuştur.

<<>> To my family <<>>

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CHAPTER 1

1.1. Introduction

Democracy does not have a uniform meaning. It is an abstract, ambiguous, and highly idealistic label (Mishler and Rose, 2001). While the meaning of the term entails ambiguity, intellectuals and the political elite promote democracy as an ideal to be emulated by the rest of the world. However, ordinary people hardly understand the same thing from democracy. Besides, the literature on democracy does not say much about the factors that affect the ways in which ordinary people understand the term. This is an important weakness of the literature given that some research suggests political culture and people's attitudes in a given society is one of the important determinants of the regime type and quality of its institutions (Eckstein, 1966; Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993). One of the primary goals of this research is then to investigate how the context people occupy affects the ways in which they understand democracy and act upon it.

Therefore, one important motivation of this research is to understand the factors that influence the ways in which people understand and define democracy. A second motivation is to understand if individual attributes of the people interact with the context people inhabit. Third, this research aims to understand whether people's understanding of democracy has been one of the factors that determined the trajectory of political regimes in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings.

In parallel with these goals, this research is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on different conceptualizations of democracy and democratization. This chapter also establishes the conditions under which the political elite might be more receptive to political change in authoritarian regimes. Chapter 3 analyzes data from 60 countries. In this research, I use World Values Survey 6th wave (2010-2014) to test my hypotheses. Chapter 4 investigates the ways in which individual attributes of the people (age, income level, education, and religiosity) interact with the context that people inhabit. This chapter scrutinize if the individual attributes affect people's understanding of democracy in the same way in countries with varying levels of GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity, PPP hereafter). Chapter 5 studies Egypt and Tunisia and the political trajectory these countries followed after 2011. These two countries correspond to two diverse routes in the Middle East with regards to

democratization. Tunisia emerged as the only successful case to establish minimum requirements for a democracy after the Arab Uprisings that started in late 2010 (Stepan and Linz, 2013; Volpi and Stein, 2015; Szmolka, 2015). Egypt is a case where a revolution by the people is aborted by the Egyptian military (Volpi and Stein, 2015; Szmolka, 2015). Mubarak is ousted in Egypt but only to be replaced by another strong man in uniform. I argue that a comparative study of these two cases has the potential to reveal the dynamics that fostered a democratic accord in Tunisia and caused a reinstatement of authoritarianism in Egypt. Chapter 6 makes final conjectures and conclusions.

My analyses demonstrate that *GDP per capita (PPP)* is an important factor affecting the ways in which people define democracy. People in economically more developed countries are more likely to consider procedural characteristics as essential to democracy while people in economically less developed countries tend to consider economic characteristics as essential to democracy. This finding indicates the possibility of the presence of specific support to the regime in economically less developed countries and the presence of diffuse support to the regime in economically more developed countries, thus making consolidation of democracy much harder in economically less developed countries. Analyses also show that in economically less developed countries authoritarian tendencies are higher among the people than it is in economically more developed countries. In addition, analysis reveals that education and income, which according to Lipset (1959; 2003) two key variables for a democratic regime, do not have the same effect in every context. GDP per capita (PPP) is an important contextual factor shaping the ways in which these two variables affect people's definitions of democracy. However, my analyses do not present any evidence about the possibility that the ways in which people define democracy also shape the political regime. The comparative study of Egypt and Tunisia in chapter 5 shows that two other factors affect the outcome of transitions or the possibility of an incumbent takeover of democracy: *elite coherence* and *electoral system preference*.

CHAPTER 2

2.1. Conceptualizations of democracy

Gallie (1956) argues that democracy is an essentially contested term. Its uses and meanings include endless disputes, which make it almost impossible to find a clearly definable general use that would be identified as correct or standard in the field (Collier and Letivsky, 1997). Collier et al. (2006) suggest that democracy is an internally complex concept. Therefore, different users may view or define it in different ways (p. 216). According to Collier and Levitsky (1997), different perceptions of democracy yielded a proliferation of democracy with adjectives in the field. As a result, democracy studies suffer from the presence of hundreds of different definitions of democracy.

Doherty and Mecellem (2012) argue that scholars usually point to structural aspects of a political system when defining democracy. These scholars recognized essential elements of democracy to be some combination of procedural structures such as free, fair and periodic elections, access to alternative sources of information, freedom of expression.

Schumpeter is one of the first researchers to make a procedural definition of democracy in the aftermath of the terrible 1930s, as early as 1942. He defines democracy to be "…the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions where the executive acquires the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (2008, p. 269). In a similar fashion, Huntington (1991) defines a regime democratic "… to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates clearly compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote." Linz and Stepan (1978, p.5) also advocate a definition of democracy that puts its major emphasis on elections. They define democracy as the "…freedom to create political parties and to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without excluding any effective political office from direct or indirect electoral accountability".

Schumpeterian definitions of democracy are criticized for focusing too much on elections while simply ignoring other dimensions of democracy. It is true that any viable definition of democracy should entail elections and the principle of broad-based popular participation. The source of disagreements remains on what other aspects to

include (Knutsen and Wegmann, 2016). Diamond (1999) also thinks that free and fair elections are central to any democratic regime, nevertheless it is far from a sufficient condition and those studies that focus on elections seem to reduce the significance of civil liberties to irrelevance thus committing what Terry Lynn Karl (2000) calls a "fallacy of electoralism".

Dahl's (1971) definition of democracy, though still built on procedures, avoids the fallacy of electoralism. He argues that democracy is a system requiring the existence of a type of government, which has a continuing responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens who are considered as political equals. Dahl lists eight conditions that are critical for the establishment of two dimensions that he deems necessary for democracy's existence: *inclusiveness* (participation and representation) and *public contestation* (opposition). According to Dahl, those requirements for a democracy among large number of people to exist are as follows:

1. Freedom to form and join organizations
2. Freedom of expression
3. Right to vote
4. Eligibility for public office
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support
6. Alternative sources of information (freedom of information)
7. Free and fair elections
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (p. 3).

Dahl argues that no large system in the world is fully democratized. Therefore, he abstains from using the word democracy to indicate regimes that represent some degree of democratization. Instead, he refers to these systems as *polyarchies*, which may be thought of as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes. Dahl says that a polyarchy is substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation (1971, p. 8).

In Dahl's conceptualization of democracy, free and fair elections – despite its importance – are not enough to classify a regime as democratic. He argues that without a certain degree of political liberalization and guarantee of civil rights, free and fair elections cannot be held. Coppedge et al. (2008, p. 632) say that Dahl's definition of democracy has become the standard definition in the field. They demonstrate three-quarters of what the most commonly used indicators of democracy have been measuring

is variation on Dahl's two dimensions of polyarchy: *inclusiveness* and *contestation*. With a minor reservation, Schmitter and Karl (1991) also agree that Dahl has proposed the most generally accepted listing of which procedural minimum conditions must be present for political democracy. They suggest a ninth condition in addition to eight conditions of Dahl: In a democratic regime, popularly elected officials should be able to use their constitutional powers without being subject to overriding opposition from unelected officials (i.e. the Army) and the polity must thus be self-governing.

Dahl's procedural definition of democracy influenced other studies in the field. Rueschemeyer et al. (1992, p. 43-44) use a concept of democracy that is guided by three principles: 1) regular, free and fair elections of representatives with universal and equal suffrage; 2) responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected parliament; and 3) the freedoms of expression and association as well as the protection of individual rights against state action. They define first and second conditions as the essence of democracy while the dimension of civil rights does not itself constitute the exercise of democratic power. It is rather a factor stabilizing democracies and limiting exercise of state power over individual and collective rights. This liberal emphasis that is embedded Dahl's contestation dimension is present in other works as well. Zakaria (1997), for example puts liberalism at the heart of any truly democratic regime and further claims that a liberal autocracy is even more acceptable than an electoral regime with illiberal practices since civil rights of citizens are protected better in the former. In another study, Diamond (1999) claims that non-electoral features of a democracy deserve an equal consideration with free and fair elections for only within the presence of political liberalism can civil liberties be protected.

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) establish a link between political liberalism and citizenship principle. They explain that democracy's guiding principle is citizenship. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, a political democracy based on the principle of equal citizenship to exist a 'procedural minimum' is required. Secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability are all elements of this procedural minimum. However, O'Donnell and Schmitter continue, other institutions such as administrative accountability, judicial review, public financing for parties, unrestricted access to information, limitations on successive terms in office, provisions for permanent voter and absentee balloting, and compulsory voting are experimental extensions of the citizenship principle that makes a democracy more 'complete'.

O'Donnell and Schmitter also assert that a democracy without a guarantee of individual and group rights is limited and bears the risk of degenerating into formalism. Therefore, they champion a liberal democracy rather than a limited definition of democracy that is based on free and fair elections per se (1984, pp. 7-14). Along the same lines, Sartori (1995, p. 101) argues that the term "democracy is a shorthand, and a misleading one at that – for an entity composed of two distinct elements." Sartori discusses that democracy is about empowering the people whereas freeing the people from state oppression should be understood as liberalism. He says that liberal democracy consists of 1) demo-protection, meaning the protection of a people from tyranny, and 2) demo-power, meaning the implementation of popular rule. For Sartori, universal suffrage (demo-power) per se does not protect a people from state oppression. One needs the rule of law and liberal constitutionalism (demo-protection) to ensure that no one can be harmed by the coercive instruments of politics without due process.

Norris (2000, p. 4) as well, defines democracy with reference to political liberalism. She argues that democracy involves three dimensions, which she lists as:

1) Pluralistic competition among parties and individuals for all positions of government power;
2) Participation among equal citizens in the selection of parties and representation through free, fair, and periodic elections; and,
3) Civil and political liberties to speak, publish, assemble, and organize, as necessary conditions to ensure effective competition and participation.

Norris explains that her definition of democracy is a variation of Schumpeterian definition of democracy since first and second dimensions emphasize a democracy functioning through elections. The third dimension adds the liberal component to her definition of democracy thus making it travel a step beyond the Schumpeterian definition of democracy.

The reviewed research so far belongs to a tradition of defining democracy by references to institutions and procedures, which is the mainstream tendency in the field. For the proponents of procedural democracy, *the process* itself is what makes a democracy a democracy. Proponents of substantive democracy, however criticize this extreme emphasis on procedural aspects of democracy, which neglected the significance of *outcomes* for the people who are very much affected by the ways the procedures are applied.

Lawrence and Shapiro (1994, pp. 9-11) explain that studying substantive democracy requires a focus on opinion-policy relationship. They criticize mainstream study of democracy for this line of research assumes that democracy exists as long as voters and elites adhere to the rules of the game. Procedural definitions of democracy assume if the formal rules are followed, the connection between the public's wishes and government action is irrelevant. Therefore, Lawrence and Shapiro argue, formalistic conceptions of democracy discourage research on democratic substance of government activity between elections. As long as elected officials meet formal requirements, their conduct is accepted as democratic and is not evaluated in terms of its actual representativeness. Neglected here are the questions about the impact of citizens' preferences on their government and the tension between expanded government and the operation of liberal democracy. Lawrence and Shapiro say that a substantive theory of democracy claims to offer a correction to formalistic definitions of democracy by focusing on the content of actual governments and how their actions are affected by public opinion. Strong, sustained public preferences become autonomous forces in shaping policy-making agendas and determining government decisions (Lawrence and Shapiro, 1994, p. 14).

Heller (2000) argues that the difference between formal and substantive definitions of democracy has to be taken seriously especially in the context of developing countries. He says that persistence of acute social inequities compromises the basic logic of associational autonomy that informs the classical liberal claim for defending procedural democracy on its own merits. In many developing country cases, social and economic conditions conspired to limit the capacity of subordinate groups to secure and exercise their rights. Heller thinks that the ineffectiveness of formal democracy to eliminate these limitations creates extra social tensions, which in turn might create autocratic political responses. Hence, a democratic regime should be judged not only by its adherence to rules and procedures (*process*) but also against the *outcomes* it produces. It is in this context that proponents of substantive democracy argue that a certain level of minimum income is a prerequisite for people to exercise their political rights properly (Knutsen and Wegmann, 2016, p. 166). Therefore, for the proponents of substantive democracy, a distribution of resources and progressive redistribution should characterize democracy. Coppedge et al. (2011) define this type of democracy as egalitarian democracy.

Sartori (1995) seems to acknowledge and adopt this criticism of the proponents

of substantive democracy to a certain extent. He says that a century ago, democracy was only a political form, and the constitutional state was not expected to provide economic goodies. For over a century, he discusses, the case was never made that democracy's sustainability depended on economic growth and prosperity. According to Sartori, as Western democracies developed and became more advanced democracy-wise, the policy content of the liberal constitutional forms increasingly centered around distributive issues around "*who gets how much of what*" [emphasis added]. Then the fate of modern democracies increasingly becomes intertwined with economic performance. The case of Nordic democracies can serve as a supporting example for his argument.

Political systems in Scandinavia have adopted the principle of a progressive distribution to eliminate the kind of poverty that could prevent citizens from exercising their political rights. In this respect, Nordic democracies are a step closer to a substantive understanding of democracy. Blanc-Noel (2013) argues that correction of inequalities and redistribution of wealth through a very performing welfare state has been a key element of the Swedish democracy. Joshi (2013) also claims that the Swedish model should be seen as a different kind of democracy, something inherently different than the model that is defined by Dahl. According to Joshi, liberal democratic governments may differ in their kind and degree of democracy. In his classification, Sweden is a developmental liberal democracy (DLD) whereas the USA is a protective liberal democracy (PLD). He explains that the PLD is developed on the basis of negative freedoms (absence of state-led violence and predation) whereas the DLD emerged "as a response to certain perceived inequalities inherent in the PLD, conceiving of freedom as something for all to enjoy, not just inheritors of wealth" (p. 191). The PLD includes but does not aim at maximizing citizen involvement in government. However, the DLD empowers the citizen by trying to maximize her participation in government. In the DLD, the welfare state occupies a central role since the state mobilizes the least well-off members of society and integrates them into decision-making processes through institutionalized redistribution of wealth.

Discussions about substantive democracy are not limited to economic distribution. To give an instance Molino's (2002) definition of substantive democracy includes a discussion of the rights and liberties as well as an implementation of greater social, political, and economic equality. He says that every regime, which has at least universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one

political party; and more than one source of information is democratic. For Molino, meeting these minimum criteria is not sufficient though. For him, democracy has five dimensions. The first and second dimensions are procedural: the rule of law and accountability. The third dimension of variation is the responsiveness or correspondence of the system to the desires of the citizens and civil society in general. The last two dimensions of variation are substantive. The first is the full respect for rights that are expanded through the achievement of a range of freedoms. The second is the progressive implementation of greater political, social, and economic equality. Therefore, Molino's definition of democracy does not grant procedural democracy a complete status. He indicates that a good democracy is a broadly legitimated regime that completely satisfies citizens (*quality in terms of results*). In his definition of democracy, outcomes of democracy should have equal weight with the procedural aspects of democracy.

Welzel and Klingemann (2008, pp. 63-65; 68-70) as well go beyond the debate on income distribution while defining substantive democracy. They explain that democracy has a supply and a demand side. On the supply side, it becomes manifest when power holders institutionalize democratic freedoms. On the demand side it becomes manifest when people prefer democracy as a form of governance over other forms of governance. According to Welzel and Klingemann (2008), an essential quality of both the supply of democracy and the demand for it is its substantiveness, which they define as *the extent to which power holders and ordinary people are committed to the freedoms that define democracy* [emphasis in original]. Then, substantiation is "…*the process by which democracy becomes effectively respected on the supply-side and instrically valued on the demand side*" [emphasis in original]. Especially the supply side of their argument is significant. They say that democracy often lacks substance in the sense that democracy's defining freedoms are not effectively respected in the elites' daily practice of power. Though democratic freedoms are institutionalized through constitutional laws and rights, democratic freedoms cannot take place unless political elite respects these legal norms in their daily practice of power. Therefore, Welzel and Klingemann acknowledge the fact that presence of democratic institutions and rules do not amount to a democracy unless the *process* itself and *outcomes* resulting from the process are democratic as well.

Below is the table that summarizes main characteristics of procedural and substantive democracy types as they are defined by the literature.

Table 2.1. Procedural vs. substantial democracy

	Procedural Democracy	**Substantive Democracy**
Focus	• Procedures • Do representatives follow the procedures?	• Procedures and Outcomes • Do representatives follow the procedures? • Do representatives' policies reflect the will of their constituencies?
What Is Democracy?	• Free and fair elections; universal adult suffrage; civil and political liberties	• Free and fair elections; universal adult suffrage; civil and political liberties; and progressive redistribution of wealth
Economic Concerns	• None	• Goal: minimization of income inequality

In this research, I use Norris' (2000) definition of democracy with an added fourth dimension that includes a substantive concern. The definition of democracy I suggest has four major dimensions:

1) Pluralistic competition among parties and individuals for all positions of government power;
2) Participation among equal citizens in the selection of parties and representatives through free, fair, and periodic elections;
3) Civil and political liberties to speak, publish, assemble, and organize, as necessary conditions to ensure effective competition and participation;
4) Welfare programs by the state that would alleviate the kind of poverty hindering people from exercising their rights as they are listed above.

This definition of democracy goes beyond the aforementioned formalistic definitions of democracy by emphasizing individual rights and welfare of the citizens simultaneously. My definition of democracy accepts that establishment of democratic institutions and processes are important, however it also recognizes that the state should actively participate in policies aiming at elimination of extreme poverty that prevents people from enjoying their rights effectively.

2.2. People's definitions of democracy

Cho (2012, p. 198) explains that in advanced democracies, scholars identify three general types of political knowledge: *factual*, *procedural*, and *conceptual* [emphasis added]. Factual knowledge refers to observable facts including the names of politicians and political parties, the dates and locations of political events, and etc. Procedural knowledge is about how to get something done. It is the knowledge that ordinary citizens hold in the problem solving of political tasks that they face on a regular basis. Conceptual knowledge is the knowledge about abstract constructs and theories. This type of knowledge is different from factual knowledge in the sense that conceptual knowledge deals with what political concepts refer to, how they are interrelated with or differentiated from one another, and why the political world works the way it does. Even more powerfully than factual and procedural knowledge, it is conceptual knowledge motivating, guiding, and justifying human thinking and behavior. Knowledge about what democracy is clearly belongs to the realm of conceptual knowledge, and despite the importance of people's beliefs about what democracy is, the literature on democracy rarely considers the ways in which people define democracy.

Numerous surveys measure people's support for democracy, however the measures they use seldom explores what people understand from the term. For example, a relatively recent study reveals that 67% of Egyptians, 53% of Tunisians, and 56% of Turkish citizens do not support the adoption of Western political model for their countries while in all these three countries support for democracy as a political model is well above 90% (Middle Eastern Values Survey, 2013). This finding indicates that people in non-western societies might hold a different understanding of democracy than those in western societies. As Doherty and Mecellem (2012) explain, in order to understand the implications of responses to broad questions about support for democracy, one needs to question what people mean when they express their support for democracy. Then what is it that people understand when they express their support for democracy, and what political implications does it have if any at all?

A relatively recent literature on democracy is interested in these questions. According to this literature, people conceptualize democracy in multiple ways, each conceptualization focusing on more than one dimension of the term (Miller et al., 1997; Shaffer 1998; Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Dalton et al.,

2007; Shin and Cho 2010; and Carlin and Singer 2011). For instance, Schaffer (1998) demonstrates the distance between the ways in which Western observers and the Senegalese people understand democracy, concluding that people might adopt various non-Western conceptualizations when they refer to democracy. In another instance, in a study conducted in Uganda, Ottemoeller (1998, pp. 108-109, 118-119) shows that though Ugandans appear to be generally democratic in terms of behavior (i.e. interest in and participation in elections) and attitudes (i.e. willingness to endorse values generally associated with democracy and perceptions of political efficacy), there is evidence from the elections and in the survey data that Ugandans are not liberal in their approach to democracy. In response to the statement, '*Even if many people are involved in the local council, it will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything*', 76% of the Ugandan sample agreed while a mere 20% disagreed with this statement. Ottemoeller also states his finding that many Ugandans express that organized political expression is relatively unimportant in a democracy. This illiberal understanding of democracy in Uganda is an indicator that Ugandans are open to accept regimes that have free, fair elections absent important features such as freedom of organization and freedom of speech.

Bratton and Mattes (2001) suggest that people prioritize certain dimensions of democracy over the others depending on their own experiences. They explain that people's attitudes toward democracy very much depend on what they learn from their own experiences and the past performance of democracies. For example, they found that in some African countries instead of liberal values, people include economic components such as jobs for everyone, quality in education, and a smaller income gap in their definitions of democracy. Canache (2012, p. 1144) demonstrates that though meanings associated with a liberal understanding of democracy are common, alternative conceptions of democracy such as utilitarian views based on economic and social outcomes also abound in Latin America. For example, Baviskar and Malone (2004) reveal that people in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala equate democracy with more access to health and education, less poverty, and more equality. Knutsen and Wegmann (2016) also indicate that those who have more gains from redistribution (i.e. people with little education and hailing from lower classes) are more likely to count redistribution among the most important features of democracy. These definitions of democracy involve components that would not be covered by a procedural approach to democracy.

Research in the Middle East as well provides evidence that people's understandings of democracy vary. Research conducted by Tessler and Gao (2005) invites a reconsideration of what people mean in the Middle East when they express their support for democracy. They explain that their research in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco indicates high support for democracy, ranging from 88% in Algeria to 95% in Jordan. Moreover, this behavior is consistent across gender, education, or age. However, Tessler and Gao state that this support for democracy might not reflect a desire for Western-style, secular democracy. It is possible that most prefer a political system that, while elects its executives with democratic elections, does also make references to religion in the constitution. This argument is consistent with the findings of the aforementioned 2013 Middle Eastern Values Survey, which shows that people do not necessarily refer to a Western type secular democracy when they express their support for a democracy. In a more recent study Tessler et al. (2012) explain that just over half of the citizens in Algeria and Lebanon define economic characteristics such as low economic inequality and basic necessities for all as more essential to democracy than political characteristics such as free elections and freedom of speech. In Palestine and Jordan those indicating that economic characteristics are more important to democracy than political characteristics are even higher, with 58% and 62% respectively. This finding signifies that people in these countries might be more likely to conceptualize democracy in the language of outcomes (substantive democracy) rather than in the language of processes and institutions (procedural democracy).

Doherty and Mecellem (2012) find that individual level characteristics (education, interest and participation in the political arena, gender, and religiosity) influence the ways in which people define democracy in the Arab world. They argue that 1) knowledge-based factors (education, interest and participation in the political arena) increase the likelihood that an individual learns to define democracy in formal, procedural terms; 2) female respondents are more likely than male to see substantive outcomes (providing for the basic needs of the poor and reducing the income gap between the rich and poor) as the most important hallmarks of democracy; 3) individuals who read the Quran more frequently are more likely to define democracy in substantive terms; and 4) people in the Arab world project their substantive desires for improved economic conditions onto the term democracy. In another study, Andersen and Fetner (2008) conclude that both absolute and relative economic security is a major determinant of individual social attitudes. Overall economic prosperity promotes social

tolerance while high levels of economic inequality suppress tolerance (p. 956). Andersen and Fetner (2008) conclude that the primary aim of economically disadvantaged groups is trying to improve their material conditions, not promotion of liberal values.

I argue that this understanding of democracy by the economically deprived might indicate a fragile support to democracy as previous research demonstrates that these groups are more likely to define democracy with references to a solution of their economic troubles. The findings of this line of research show that people belonging to these groups might be expected to undermine the language of freedoms and liberties and instead emphasize economic benefits more while defining democracy. This premise is important in the sense that it also bears a possibility of the presence of a different kind of support for democracy in less developed parts of the world.

David Easton (1975) describes "support as an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively" (p. 436). Easton (1965; 1975) then continues to distinguish two types of support: *specific* and *diffuse support* [emphasis added]. He explains that specific support is related to the satisfactions that members of a system obtain from the *perceived outputs* [emphasis added] and performance of the political authorities. According to Easton, specific support is object-sensitive in the sense that it is directed to perceived decisions, policies, actions, or the general style of the authorities. The performance of the authorities will be evaluated according to the extent to which the demands of the members are perceived to have been met. He explains that specific support cannot be generated unless such behavior is apparent to the members the polity.

Diffuse support however, tends to be more durable than specific support (Easton, 1975, pp. 444-445). Easton argues that once formed, diffuse support is more difficult to weaken and more difficult to strengthen when it is weak. He explains that a change in diffuse support is slower since the sources of diffuse support are found in social learning and socialization. According to him, this kind of support typically arises from childhood and continuing adulthood socialization (1975, p. 445). Then, diffuse support must be independent of outputs and performance of political authorities at least in the short run. Instead, diffuse support represents an attachment to political objects for their own sake. Therefore, diffuse support will not be easily dislodged because of current satisfaction with what the government does. Underlying diffuse support is not the regime performance in the short-run but a sentiment of legitimacy (Iyengar, 1980).

Another difference between specific support and the diffuse support is that whereas the former is extended only to the incumbent authorities, the latter is directed towards offices themselves as well as their individual occupants. Easton argues that unlike specific support, diffuse support underlies the regime as a whole.

Easton's insight about these two types of support is important in the sense that it demonstrates the possibility that regime legitimacy in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is lower might rest on specific support rather than diffuse support. Specific support does not lend any legitimacy to the regime or its institutions. Instead, legitimacy in these contexts is a function of the authorities' or incumbents' ability to deliver. If this assumption is true, this could prevent democracy to take root once it is established. The members of political system might stop providing the authority with much needed legitimacy when her ability to deliver goods (material or immaterial) declines. This danger is especially acute if the economically deprived forms a substantial part of the society.

In this research, I argue that in parts of the world where wealth measured by GDP per capita (PPP) is lower, a people will have a higher tendency to define democracy in the language of economic benefits. This is a sign that these people's support for democracy is a specific kind of support making consolidation unlikely even if transition succeeds. In other words, their support for the regime does not indicate that they accept democracy as the only game in town. Przeworski (1999, p. 26) explains that democracy is consolidated only when it becomes self-enforcing. In a consolidated democracy, he says, all relevant actors find it best to continue to submit their interests and values to the uncertain interplay of the institutions. They do so even when they lose as a result of the democratic game. However, the legitimacy derived from specific support does not enable a consolidation of democracy since it is the democratically elected incumbent or the autocrat to whom legitimacy is assigned. Unlike the contexts where diffuse support is the source of legitimacy, people do not perceive institutions or the regime itself to be objects of loyalty. Therefore, the political actor is constantly judged with her ability to deliver. Her legitimacy will erode when she is not able to supply the members of the political system with the economic goods that the deprived parts of the society needs most.

It is in this context that I argue that in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is low, people tend to define democracy with references to economic benefits. This situation might also refer to a scenario where people provide the regime or the

government with specific support. However in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is high, people would be more likely to define democracy in procedural terms, which indicates a possibility that the people bestows upon the regime diffuse support, which is not temporary. It is this second kind of support that enables consolidation of democracy while transitions to democracy without diffuse support bear the risk of reversals. Therefore, my hypotheses are as follows:

$H1_0$: *there is no meaningful relationship between GDP per capita (PPP) of a country and the ways in which people define democracy in that country.*

$H1_1$: *people living in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP) are more likely to define democracy in terms of immediate economic benefits.*

$H1_2$: *people living in countries with higher levels of GDP per capita are more likely to define democracy in procedural terms.*

In this research, I also control for a series of variables that might be important to understand how people understand democracy. Below is a simple visualization of the possible factors that could shape a people's understanding of what democracy is:

Figure 2.1. Contextual factors and people's definition of democracy



I argue that individual characteristics such as education and income would not be sufficient to understand the ways in which people define democracy. I furthermore

suggest that GDP per capita (PPP) is a prime factor that influences the ways in which people define democracy. Therefore, we need to account for the effect of contextual factors. To give another instance, some argue that democracy and Islam are not compatible (Huntington 1993; Anderson 2004) while others argue that Islamic societies are not more likely than non-Muslim societies to be more authoritarian, and there is no inherent tension between democracy and Islam (Ahmad, 2011; Hanusch, 2013). In this respect, one cannot study democracy without taking into account the effects of contextual factors. Hence, income equality, prior democratization, and occurrence of democratic breakdown and share of Muslims in the society will be used as control variables in this research.

Though still a considerable enterprise, studying which factors influence people's definition of democracy does not produce any policy implications. Then, the next step is to investigate what causes democratization and democratic consolidation. Do different definitions of democracy held by people have any effect on the political system? The literature provides several answers for this question.

2.3. Which factors cause democratization and democratic consolidation?

Welzel (2007) argues that most of the democratization literature ignores the role of mass attitudes in a country's democratization though a long tradition in social sciences argues that political culture is important to attain democracy (Eckstein, 1966; Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1988; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Almond and Verba (1963) define political culture as "…attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the self in the system" (p. 13). Accordingly, "…The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation" (p. 15). Their major argument is that political culture, which is transmitted by a process that includes training many institutions such as family, school, peers, work, and the political system itself also shapes the behavior of its citizens and the political elite as they perform political actions and respond to political events. Almond and Verba conclude that a civic culture, which is a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality

exist and large numbers of individuals are competent as citizens, is most conducive to democracy.

Inglehart (1988) as well argues that the publics of different societies have different durable cultural orientations that sometimes have major political and economic consequences. If this is true he says, then effective social policy will be better served by learning about these differences and about how they vary cross-culturally and overtime (p. 1229). Inglehart explains that though mass democracy is almost impossible to realize without a certain level of economic development, it does not produce a democracy on its own. He furthermore says that unless specific changes do not happen in culture and social structure, realization of a democracy is far from certain.

It is in this context that Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that among various pro-democratic attitudes, a syndrome of self-expression values (interpersonal trust, tolerance of other groups, and political activism) is most conducive to democracy since it is self-expression values that promote democratic mass actions. They discuss that democracy is an essentially emancipative achievement since it is designed to empower people. Therefore, emancipative attitudes that emphasize people power should give people the most solid motivation to support democratic goals. People do not defend democracy unless they value the idea of people empowerment embedded in the concept of democracy.

In another study, Welzel and Inglehart (2008) assert their theory of democratization structured around ordinary people. They argue that although elite bargaining might be central when representative democracy first emerged, the development of effective democracy reflects the acquisition by ordinary people of resources and values that enable them effectively to pressure the political elite (p. 126). Cho (2010) as well says that the masses play a critical role in the establishment of a democracy. Public knowledge about democracy contributes to democratic development by improving the quality of democratic citizenship. Cho asserts that a committed support for democracy that proclaims it is preferable to any of the alternatives is a component playing the most significant role for the consolidation of new democracies. His research on South Korea demonstrates that knowledge about democracy raises democratic support. Citizens who are informed are also cognitively capable of developing and adjusting attitudes towards democracy. Besides, the citizens informed about democracy adopt positive messages about democracy and negative ones about non-democratic ones. Miller et al. (1997) find that in post communist countries, those

who were able to project proper meanings onto the concept of democracy hold more highly consistent pro-democratic beliefs than those people who were not able to do so.

According to Welzel (2007) the causal mechanism by which these mass attitudes operative in favor of democratization is *mass actions* [emphasis added]. He argues that proper pro-democratic attitudes motivate people to mass actions that aim at attaining democracy in less democratic societies and sustaining it in more democratic ones. Petitions, demonstrations, and boycotts overlap with pro-democratic emancipative attitudes. Once pro-democratic emancipative attitudes are in place, they translate into mass actions, irrespective of a society's level of modernization and democracy. Though it is difficult not to agree with Welzel on his point that pro-democratic mass attitudes encourage democratization in less democratic societies and sustain it in more democratic societies, his argument can be challenged in several ways.

First, the assumption that mass actions are the sole path to change overlooks the role of other important mechanisms and actors of change. Piven (2006) explains that petitions, boycotts, or demonstrations alone cannot achieve their ends. Second criticism, which is related to the first one, is that Welzel and political culture school rarely talk about the role of the political elite in inducing change. Tarrow (1998) explains that the role of the political elite is too important to ignore even in transitions where the mass action is the most decisive. Therefore, one needs to study the role of the political elite as well in order to have a more complete picture of transitional periods and understand why some transitions are reversed while others are successful. For example, Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2013) explain that normative preferences of the political elite are a major factor that determines breakdown or survival of democracies. After studying Latin America between 1945 and 2005, they conclude that a lack normative commitment to democracy among the political elite is a primary reason why democratic regimes did not survive political or economic crisis in Latin America. Welzel and Klingemann (2008) also assert that substantive democracy requires the power holders to respect the very freedoms that define democracy. Therefore, even from a political culture perspective, one needs to study political elite to understand transitions. Political elite manipulates other actors; they ally with some actors while excluding others; and they try to reverse the democratization process especially if a transition bears the risk of harming elite's immediate interests and prerogatives.

The literature on democratic transitions does not treat the political elite as a group whose members always sharing the same interests. For instance, in their classical study

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that there is not a single transition whose beginning is not the consequence of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, along the fluctuating cleavage between the hard-liners and soft-liners (p. 19). They discuss that soft-liners may not be distinguishable from the hard-liners as they would also be prone to use repression during the first reactive phase of the authoritarian regime. However, soft-liners increasingly become aware that the regime they helped to implant, and in which they occupy important positions will have to make use some degree or some form of electoral legitimation and introduce certain freedoms if its eventual legitimation is to be feasible (p.16). O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) cite Brazil and Spain as cases where the decision to liberalize was made by high-echelon members of the dominant regime in the face of weak and disorganized opposition. Dix (1982), after studying breakdown of six personalistic Latin American dictatorships between 1955 and 1961, also asserts that breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily require the presence of stronger oppositional forces. He says that before the breakdown, personalistic dictatorship has an inclination to undergo a narrowing process, which is a tendency to center both the decisions and perquisites of the regime on a smaller and less representative group of the dictator's inmates. This, according to Dix causes a legitimacy crisis resulting with the birth of a negative coalition within the regime that opposes the continuation of the regime (pp. 563-64). Therefore dictator's aggrandizing and isolative behavior alienates his own erstwhile supporters. This process eventually ends with a defection of regime elites, the defection of the military being the most significant one. Only then comes opposition coalescence during which several actors agree upon overthrowing the dictator (pp. 564-65; 566-67).

Sanchez (2003) as well thinks that a breakdown of the authoritarian regime is viable only where the regime suffers from 1) internal legitimacy problems, 2) an incohesive ruling elite, and 3) high mobilization of civil and political society. Sanchez argues that transition in Spain and Chile was made possible with elite settlements. These negotiated settlements paved the way for a transitional period where the parties from ruling and opposing groups agreed upon the rules of the game. Sanchez explains that a smooth transition requires the opposition elite to negotiate the terms of a peaceful and safe exit for some of the members of the old elite since a contrary situation would make the old elite feel threatened and could force them to try to reverse the process. Therefore, for Sanchez, the role the political elite plays is the most significant factor for the success of the transition.

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) as well emphasize the role played by pacts in the transitions led by the political elite. They define pacts as explicit agreements among a select set of actors, which seek to define rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual interests of all entering into it (p. 37). They explain that they do not regard pacts as a necessary element in all transitions from authoritarian rule. However, they are quick to add that "…pacts are not always likely or possible, but we are convinced that where they are a feature of transition, they are desirable – that is, they enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political democracy" (p. 39).

Encarnacion (2001) argues that the virtues of pacts in transitions to a democracy rest on their capacity to minimize uncertainty for all involved parties. As Schmitter (1992) explains pacts, by the virtue of including wide interests from a variety of actors, reduce uncertainty about substantial outcomes and reciprocally legitimate negotiating organizations and the government officials who brought them together. To give an instance, Encarnaciaon (2001) explains that the seven pacts between 1977-1986 were instrumental and successful in terms of convincing the old elite for a smooth transition and agreeing the old and the new elite to the rules of the game in Spain after Franco's death in 1975.

Research shows that elite settlements in the form of pacts can increase the chances of a successful transition to democracy. However pacted transitions received criticism for other reasons. Hagopian (1996), for instance argued that pacts are conservative and exclusionary since participation is limited to a few powerful actors. Even O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) at some point admit "modern pacts move the polity toward democracy by undemocratic means" (p.38). They discuss that pacts are negotiated among a small number of participants, who generally represent established groups or institutions. Therefore, O'Donnell and Schmitter say, pacts by nature distort the principle of citizen equality. Karl (1986) argues that democracies built upon pacts can institutionalize a conservative bias into the polity. According to her, this factor may prevent a deepening of democracy once it is established since a conservative elite might block further progress toward political, social, and economic democracy by excluding new social forces from exercising power in the future. Encarnacion (2001, pp. 351-352) asserts that Venezuela and Brazil are particularly suggestive examples demonstrating how pacts, though useful in introducing democracy, could also be damaging to democracy to which they gave birth. For instance, he says, the 1958 Pact of Punto Fijo

set economic boundaries that actors such as labor could not cross. Again, he argues that it was the political pacts in Brazil, which left the military with a substantial degree of power over civilians. Encarnacion therefore concludes that pacts though useful in introducing democracy in the initial stages of democracy might hinder deepening or consolidation of democracy in the longer run.

After this review of the literature on democracy, its conceptualizations as well as democratization and the introduction to the research question and hypotheses, now I will turn the attention to the original question asked at the beginning of this chapter: What are those factors that affect the ways in which the people define democracy? My particular focus in the next chapter will be on wealth measured by ***GDP per capita (PPP)***. Does wealth measured by GDP per capita (PPP) influence the ways in which people define democracy?

To do so, I will benefit from the World Values Survey 6th wave, which was conducted in 60 countries between 2010 and 2014. My analysis shows that GDP per capita (PPP) affects the ways in which people define democracy. In countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher, people are more likely to define democracy in procedural terms than people in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP). Analysis also shows that compared to people in higher GDP per capita (PPP) countries, in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is lower, people are likely to value economic characteristics of democracy higher. Furthermore, analysis demonstrates that in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is lower, people are more likely to have authoritarian tendencies than people in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher.

CHAPTER 3

This chapter investigates how wealth in a country influences the ways in which people define democracy in that country. To do this, this chapter benefits from a series of multi linear regressions. In this research, I measure wealth by GDP per capita (PPP). The data used in this chapter and the following chapter comes from World Values Survey (WVS) 6th wave that was conducted between 2010 and 2014 in 60 countries. See the *Appendix* for the list of the countries that were included in the last wave of the WVS.

3.1. Dependent Variables

World Values Survey asks the following 10-point scale question to measure people's understanding of democracy. '*Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy"*'. The participants are expected to provide a score between 1 and 10 for each option.

In accordance with the goals of this research, these nine options were categorized into three sub-categories: ***Economic Characteristics***, ***Procedural Characteristics*** and ***Authoritarianism***. Then relevant options under each category are summed to create a new variable. By using this method, three new variables are constructed. Each new indicator is a continuous variable varying between 3 and 30.

In this categorization, the label ***Economic Characteristics*** approximates substantial definitions of democracy that calls for definitions of democracy, which incorporates outcomes such as economic benefits in its conceptualizations. Therefore, this category measures people's willingness to adopt economic goals in their definition of democracy. A high support for economic characteristics might also signify the presence of *specific support*. ***Procedural Characteristics*** label concentrates on procedural characteristics of democracy that is related to political processes and institutions. Free and fair elections, institutions such as a legal framework protecting people from the state oppression, and an equal citizenship principle guides this

category. A preference for procedural characteristics of democracy might also indicate the presence of *diffuse support* since people who emphasize procedural characteristics also signal a preference for institutions and processes. The last category ***Authoritarianism*** measures people's authoritarian tendencies. It measures people's willingness to accept authoritarian arrangements in the political life. Below is the table demonstrating these variables and listing the indicators used to construct these variables.

Table 3.1. Dependent variables

Economic Characteristics	Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor
	People receive state aid for unemployment
	The state makes people's incomes equal
Procedural Characteristics	People choose their leaders in free elections
	Civil rights protect people from state oppression
	Women have the same rights as men
Authoritarianism	Religious authorities interpret the law
	The army takes over when government is incompetent
	People obey their rulers

3.2. Independent Variable

In this research, I use ***GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP)*** as the independent variable. *GDP per capita (PPP)* is a better indicator of wealth than GDP per capita (current $US) since it takes into consideration country-specific costs and taxes while determining wealth per capita. For instance, GDP per capita (current $US) was $10,515 in Turkey while *GDP per capita (PPP)* was $19,200 since cost of living in Turkey is cheaper in comparison to countries such as Sweden where GDP per capita (current $US) in 2014 was $58,938 and *GDP per capita (PPP)* was $45,183 for the same year. The World Bank website defines GDP per capita in the following way:

> "PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for

depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources" (2016).

While using *GDP per capita (PPP)* as the independent variable in this study, the populations of rentier states were omitted from our sample since rentier states do not rely on tax revenue to rule. Therefore, rentier states rarely feel responsible to the citizenry, and guarantee citizens' obedience with extensive benefit programs and side payments. Support, which is a vital factor for the survival of a regime, has a secondary importance in rentier states. In this respect, rentier states are also expected to be less sensitive to citizen demands than non-rentier states where tax revenues are central to the survival of the state. Beblawi (2016, pp. 51-52) defines a rentier economy is one where rent situations dominate, and argues that a rentier economy (1) relies on substantial external rents, (2) only a few are engaged in the generation of this wealth (rent), and (3) government is the principal recipient of the external rent. In this research, I define rentier state as an economy, which generates more than 60% of its revenues from the sale of crude or refined oil, natural gas or precious minerals such as diamonds and gold. To determine rentier states, MIT's *the Observatory of Economic Complexity* is used. The project website provides a detailed account of economic composition for each country.

Below is GDP per capita (PPP) in US dollars for each country. See the figure below for GDP per capita (PPP) (2014) by country.

Figure 3.1. GDP per capita (PPP) (2014), by country



Source: World Bank

Note: World Bank does not provide the data for GDP per capita (PPP) for Argentina. Therefore, GDP per capita (PPP) for Argentina is extracted from CIA World Factbook. Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, and Yemen are rentier states. World Bank does not calculate GDP per capita (PPP) for Taiwan.

3.3. Control Variables

Control variables used in this research are ***Age***, ***Sex***, ***Income***, ***Education***, ***Religiosity***, ***Income distribution in the country [Gini Score]***, ***prior level of democratization in the country [Democracy Score]***, ***share of Muslims in the country [Muslim %]***, and ***observation of a democratic breakdown after 1992 [Breakdown]***.

I control for the effect of these variables for a variety of reasons. Age, Sex, Income, Education, and Religiosity are important individual-level variables that need to be considered in any empirical study. Lipset (1959; 2003) argues that income and education are two key variables that determine people's attitude vis-à-vis democracy. Bratton and Mattes (2001) also assert that education has a positive impact on people's awareness of democracy. Other research suggests a relationship between individual characteristics and their understandings of democracy as well. For instance, Carrion (2008) argues that in Latin America, men are more likely than women to endorse liberal democracy. In this context, controlling for the effect of demographic variables is

important. Therefore, demographic variables will form my baseline model in this research.

This study also controls for the effect of ***income distribution in the country***. In countries where income distribution is unequal, people at the negative end of the income spectrum could be more likely to define democracy in substantive terms or could be more likely to have authoritarian tendencies. Lipset (1959) for instance argues that lower class people go through material insecurities that might make them undermine liberal values. Knutsen and Wegmann (2016) also discuss that people belonging to lower classes are more likely to see redistribution among the most important features of democracy. Tessler et al. (2012) say that over half of the citizens in Algeria and Lebanon define economic characteristics such as low economic inequality and basic necessities for all (substantive features) as more essential to democracy than political characteristics such as free elections and freedom of speech (procedural features). In this respect, I control for the effect of income distribution since it bears the possibility of being an intervening variable that could distort the effect of ***GDP per capita (PPP)***, which is the major concern in this study.

My motivation to control for the effect of the ***prior level of democratization*** stems from the literature, which claims that democracy, is more likely to survive in countries where a democratic culture is prevalent. For instance, Almond and Verba (1963) argue that a political culture, which is transmitted by a process that includes training by many institutions such as family, school, peers, work, and the political system, shapes the behavior of its citizens. They explain that a civic culture, which is a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality exist and large numbers of individuals are competent as citizens, is most conducive to democracy. Putnam (1993) claims that social capital that is measured by factors such as generalized trust is important to understand the success of democratic institutions. One may as well argue that living in countries where democratic standards are already high make people to adopt attitudes that would flourish democratic values such as respect for rule of law, and a concern for equality of male and female. It is in this context that I control for the effect of prior level of democratization to ensure that it is not an intervening variable in the models.

By building upon the same literature, which claims that political culture is important for the survival or the quality of democracy in a country, it is possible to argue that in countries where a breakdown of democracy occurred before, people would

be less likely to possess democratic values and be more likely to hold authoritarian tendencies compare to people where no such breakdown occurred. Therefore, this study controls for this possible effect as well by including ***observation of a democratic breakdown after 1992*** as a control variable.

Kuru (2014) explains that among countries with populations higher than 200,000, the proportion of electoral democracies is 56% (98/174) worldwide, whereas it is only 20% (10/49) in Muslim- majority countries. Many argued that Islam and democracy are not compatible to account for the low percentage of democracies in Muslim-majority countries. For instance, Huntington (1993, p. 193) argues that "democratic prospects in Muslim republics are bleak" Anderson (2004, p. 197) says that Islam is fixed on a religious text and quasi-legal ordinances, an emphasis on divine sovereignty, and a lack of distinction between the religious and political realm. Critics of Islam claim that these characteristics of Islam make it an infertile ground for Western type of democracy. There are also scholars who argue that democracy and Islam are not inherently incompatible. Ahmad (2011) says that his case study of Jamaat-e-Islami shows that democracy and Islam work in practice. Hanusch (2013) also suggests that Islamic societies are not intrinsically more likely to be autocracies. He argues that many Islamic societies happen to sit on large reserves of oil. Hence those studies, which claim to demonstrate a negative relationship between Islam and democracy, are actually measuring the effect of natural resources, not religion. Hanusch asserts that natural resources are a curse in most countries because they undermine the quality of institutions and foster dependence on and repression by the state. Kuru (2014) also suggests that it is not Islam but the combined effects of rentier states and regional diffusion providing the best explanation for the disproportionately low rate of democracy in Muslim societies. Therefore, this study controls for the ***share of Muslims in the country*** to understand if there is a meaningful relationship between religious affiliation (Islam) and attitudes towards democracy.

World Values Survey data provides ***Age*** of individuals in years. I use this variable in the regression analysis without performing any further operations. In this research, ***Sex*** is coded as follows: 1= Female; 0= Male. The name of this variable in analyses is ***Female***. To measure people's *Income* group, World Values Survey asks the following scale question: '*On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages,*

salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in'. The respondents are asked to place themselves on a 10-point scale where 1 denotes *lowest income group* and 10 represents *highest income group*. In this research, I use ***Income*** variable without making any changes.

World Values Survey asks the following question to measure people's level of *Education*: '*What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]'*. Participants were provided with nine options. (1 = *No formal education*; 2 = *Incomplete primary school*; 3 = *Complete primary school*; 4 = *Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type*; 5 = *Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type*; 6 = *Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type*; 7 = *Complete secondary: university-preparatory type*; 8 = *Some university-level education, without degree*; 9 = *University-level education, with degree*). This variable was recoded in the following way: First category ***Education1***: (1 = *No formal education* and *Incomplete primary school;* 0 = Others); second category ***Education2*** (1 = *Complete primary school*, *Incomplete secondary school*, and *Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type; 0* = Others); third category ***Education3***: (1 = *Complete secondary school* and *Complete secondary: university-preparatory type;* 0 = Others); and fourth category ***Education4***: (1 = *Some university-level education, without degree* and *University-level education, with degree*; 0 = Others). These dummy variables will be entered to the regression analyses separately to observe the effect of education on the ways in which people understand democracy better. Note that in the analyses, ***Education1*** is used as the reference category.

Religiosity is a dummy variable. World Values Survey asks the following question to determine people's religiosity: '*Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are …*'. Participants were then given the following options: (1 = *religious person*; 2 = *not a religious person*; and 3 = *an atheist*). To construct ***Religiosity*** variable, this variable was recoded (1 = *religious person*; 0 = *all others including atheists*). Thus newly constructed variable ***Religiosity*** allows us to use the religious category as a reference point.

To determine country's ***level of prior democratization***, I benefit from the Economist Intelligence Unit the Democracy Index (EIU the Democracy Index), which is based on five categories: *electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture*. One advantage

of EIU the Democracy Index over other well-known indices is that it provides a considerable differentiation of scores, including among full democracies (Kekic, 2007). This feature of EIU the Democracy Index makes it particularly useful for this research since differentiation of scores allows the researcher to determine differences between countries in a more precise manner. The name of this variable in regression analyses is ***Democracy Score***.

Below is the figure displaying the scores of the WVS 6th wave countries based on EIU the Democracy Index. See the Appendix for Table: the EUI The Democracy Scores (2014) that provides democracy scores for each country.

Figure 3.2. EUI the democracy scores (2014)



Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
Note: EUI the Democracy score uses a 10-scale to determine the quality of democracy in any given country. Higher scores indicate a higher level of democratization.

In this research, ***Income Distribution in the country*** is measured by ***Gini Score***. First developed and used by Italian sociologist Corrado Gini, the Gini index is a measure that enables researchers to see how much income distribution among households within the same economy deviates from an equal distribution.

The World Bank defines the Gini index on its website:

> "Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini

index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality" (2015).

For research purposes, I use a reversed *Gini Score* that again varies between 0 and 1. Therefore, in this research, higher *Gini Score* represents a more equal income distribution in the country.

See the figure below for the *Gini Score* of countries. See the Appendix for Table: the Gini Scores by Country that displays Gini scores for each country.

Figure 3.3. Gini scores, by country



Source: The World Bank

Note: In this research, the Gini Score is a number between 0 and 1. To change the scale, first all Gini scores were divided by 100. Then, the new number was subtracted from 1. After these steps, the score reversed. In this table, lower scores mean more unequal income distribution and high scores mean a more equal income distribution in a country. World Bank does not provide Gini score for the following countries: Bahrain, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, New Zealand, Qatar, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Trinidad, and Zimbabwe.

Another variable used in this research is the share of Muslims in a country. I use the ***Share of Muslims*** in each country as a continuous variable. It is a continuous variable varying between 0 and 1 depending on the percentage of Muslims in the society. The name of this variable in the analyses is ***Muslim %***.

Figure below demonstrates the share of Muslims for the countries included in the WVS 6th wave. See the Appendix for Table: Share of Muslims (%), by Country (2010) that provides share of Muslims in the society for each country.

Figure 3.4. Share of Muslims (%) (2010), by country



Source: Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project

Notes: In some countries where Muslims form less than 1% of the population, the project website do not provide a specific number or percentage of Muslims living in that country. In these cases, I accepted 0.1% as a base figure. In other cases such as Zimbabwe where the project website indicates a number of Muslims living in that country, a percentage was calculated by hand.

The last control variable used in this research is ***observation of a democratic breakdown after 1992***. The name of this variable is ***Breakdown***. According to Huntington (1991), there have been three waves of democratization. The first wave was roughly between the mid-19th century and early 1920s and the second wave was between 1943 and early 1960s. Huntington argues that democratic transitions, which started with Portugal in 1974 and continued well into the early 1990s and during which more than thirty countries in southern Europe, East Europe, Latin America, and East Asia became democracies, form the third wave of democratization. In this research, I use 1992 as a cutting point. Those countries that underwent a democratic breakdown after 1992 (including 1992) were coded as 1. Otherwise the country was coded as 0. 1992 was chosen as the cutting point because with some minor exceptions such as South Africa, which became a democracy in 1994, the third wave of democratization was over by 1992.

Below is the table showing the observation of a democratic breakdown after 1992.

Table 3.2. Democratic breakdowns after 1992

Country	**Breakdown (post-1992)**	Country	**Breakdown (post-1992)**
Algeria	1	Morocco	1
Argentina	0	Netherlands	0
Armenia	0	New Zealand	0
Australia	0	Nigeria	1
Azerbaijan	1	Pakistan	1
Bahrain	1	Palestine	1
Belarus	1	Peru	1
Brazil	0	Philippines	0
Colombia	1	Poland	0
Cyprus	0	Qatar	1
Chile	0	Romania	0
China	1	Russia	1
Ecuador	1	Rwanda	1
Egypt	1	Singapore	1
Estonia	0	Slovenia	0
Georgia	1	South Korea	0
Germany	0	South Africa	1
Ghana	1	Spain	0
Hong Kong	1	Sweden	0
India	0	Taiwan	1
Iraq	1	Thailand	1
Japan	0	Trinidad	0
Jordan	1	Tunisia	1
Kazakhstan	1	Turkey	0
Kuwait	1	Ukraine	1
Kyrgyzstan	1	United States	0
Lebanon	1	Uruguay	0
Libya	1	Uzbekistan	1
Malaysia	1	Yemen	1
Mexico	1	Zimbabwe	1

Source: Svolik, Milan. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://campuspress.yale.edu/svolik/the-politics-of-authoritarian-rule/

3.4. Results

Regression analyses in this section use three steps. First step (Model 1) includes demographic variables ***Age***, ***Female***, ***Income***, ***Education***, and ***Religiosity***. It is the baseline model. The second step (Model 2) introduces other control variables ***Income***

distribution in the country [Gini Score], ***prior level of democratization in the country [Democracy Score]***, ***share of Muslims in the country [Muslim %]***, and ***observation of a democratic breakdown after 1992 [Breakdown]***. The major goal in Model 2 is to observe the effects of control variables before the introduction of ***GDP per capita (PPP)***, which is the independent variable. In the third step (Model 3), I introduce the independent variable ***GDP per capita (PPP)*** to see if it has a significant effect in the model after the introduction of all our control variables.

3.4.1. Procedural Characteristics

Model 1 shows that age has a positive effect on the dependent variable. Older people are more likely to define democracy with procedural references ($p < 0.001$). Females are also more likely than men to think that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.05$). This finding might be due to the fact that females see procedural characteristics as protective barriers in a male dominated society. Model 1 also demonstrates that in comparison to people in Education1 group (no education or incomplete primary education), more educated people are consistently more likely to define democracy in procedural terms. As the table indicates, the relationship between Education1 group and other education groups is a monotonic relationship. The more educated one is, the more likely one is to think that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. These findings are also significant at $p < 0.001$ level. This finding confirms Lipset's hypothesis that the more educated is more likely to have norms that support democracy. According to Model 1, religious people are less likely to think democracy in procedural terms ($p < 0.001$). However, income has no significant effect on the dependent variable ($p > 0.05$). This finding is also important since Lipset (1959) argues that higher income people would be more likely to have democratic norms. Therefore, Model 1 does not provide support for Lipset's thesis.

Model 2 introduces control variables ***Democracy Score, Breakdown, Muslim %,*** **and** ***Gini Score*** to the regression. Analyses show that age has a positive effect on the dependent variable meaning that older people have stronger tendencies to define democracy with procedural characteristics ($p < 0.001$). When compared to males, females are also more likely to think that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.05$). Model 2 supports the finding that in comparison to people with

no education or incomplete primary education, people with more education are more likely to think democracy in procedural terms ($p < 0.001$). Religiosity has a negative effect on the dependent variable. Therefore, religious people are less likely to think that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). Democracy score has a negative effect on the dependent variable. In countries with higher democracy scores, people have weaker tendencies to define democracy with procedural references ($p < 0.001$). This is an interesting finding, which requires more probing. One possible reason might be that people in countries with higher democratic scores give more informed answers while people in countries with lower democratic scores tend to score every option higher. However, this claim requires more research, and it is an endeavor beyond the scope of this work. Again, where a breakdown of democratic regime is observed after 1992, people are less likely to refer to procedural characteristics when defining democracy ($p < 0.001$). Model 2 also indicates that in societies with a higher percentage of Muslims, people have weaker tendencies to indicate that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). This finding supports arguments by Huntington (1993) and Anderson (2004) who assert that Islam does not provide a favorable habitus for liberal democracies. Lastly, Gini Score seems to have a positive effect on the dependent variable ($p < 0.001$). People in countries with more equal income distribution are also more likely to score procedural characteristics higher. As in the previous model, income variable has no significant effect in the model.

In Model 3, the independent variable ***GDP per capita (PPP)*** is introduced to the regression. This model allows us to see any significant effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable after the effect of all other variables are controlled for. The independent variable GDP per capita (PPP) has a positive effect on the dependent variable. This finding is robust. People in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) are more likely to think that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. Regressions also show that age has a positive effect on the dependent variable ($p < 0.001$). Older people are more likely to think that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. The control variable Female loses some power in this model, however its effect is still positive ($p < 0.05$). Females are more likely than males to consider procedural characteristics as essential to democracy. Model 3 shows that more educated people have stronger tendencies than the less educated to argue that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). As in Models 1 and 2, the relationship is a monotonic one. As one moves in the ladder

of education, she becomes more likely to perceive procedural characteristics as essential to democracy. Religiosity's effect on the dependent variable protects its negative sign in this model as well ($p < 0.001$). Religious people are less likely to think that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. In countries with high democracy score, people are less likely to define democracy with procedural characteristics ($p < 0.001$). According to Model 3, if a country experienced a breakdown of democratic regime after 1992, the people in that country have weaker tendencies to refer to procedural characteristics as essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). The model also demonstrates that the share of Muslims in a society is negatively correlated with the dependent variable ($p < 0.001$). The higher the share of Muslims in a given society, the less likely it is that people in that society define democracy in procedural terms. Lastly, regression analyses indicate that Gini Score and the dependent variable are positively correlated. That is in countries with more equal distribution, people are more likely to define democracy with procedural characteristics.

Table 3.3. Procedural characteristics

Predictors	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	21.425	.135		0.000	20.159	.299		0.000	21.765	.303		0.000
Age	.035	.002	.097	.000	.022	.002	.061	.000	.014	.002	.039	.000
Female	.178	.052	.015	.001	.147	.052	.012	.005	.106	.051	.009	.039
Income	-.018	.013	-.006	.153	.007	.013	.002	.597	-.006	.013	-.002	.648
Education2	.688	.096	.053	.000	.426	.095	.033	.000	.198	.095	.015	.037
Education3	1.225	.094	.099	.000	.861	.095	.069	.000	.514	.096	.041	.000
Education4	2.191	.101	.155	.000	1.615	.103	.114	.000	1.178	.104	.084	.000
Religiosity	-.892	.056	-.070	.000	-.621	.057	-.049	.000	-.286	.058	-.022	.000
Democracy Score					-.707	.202	-.021	.000	-3.666	.230	-.111	.000
Breakdown					-1.247	.074	-.104	.000	-.740	.076	-.062	.000
Muslim %					-.463	.086	-.028	.000	-.440	.085	-.027	.000
Gini Score					5.090	.303	.086	.000	3.518	.307	.060	.000
GDP per Capita (PPP)									7.423E-05	.000	.180	.000
Adjusted R2	0.025				0.046				0.058			

Dependent Variable: Procedural Characteristics of Democracy

3.4.2. Economic Characteristics

Baseline model (Model 1) shows that age has a positive effect on the dependent variable meaning that older people are more likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). Analyses also indicate that females are more likely than males to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). This finding might be due to the fact that males tend to have more economic power than females causing females to emphasize economic characteristics of democracy stronger than males. Analyses show that low-income people are more likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). This finding supports the argument of Knutsen and Wegman (2016) who assert that lower class people are more likely than upper class people to define democracy in economic terms. According to Model 1, when compared to people in Education1 group (no formal education and incomplete primary school), people in Education2 (complete primary education or incomplete secondary education) and Education3 (complete secondary education) groups are less likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.05$). In comparison to Education1 group, people in Education4 (some university level education, without degree or university education with degree) are also less likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. This finding is more robust than the findings pertaining to Education2 and Education3 groups ($p < 0.001$). Lastly, Model 1 reveals that religious people are less likely to define democracy with economic characteristics.

Model 2 introduces control variables *Democracy Score*, *Breakdown*, *Muslim %*, and *Gini Score*. After introduction of these new variables, Education2 and Education3 variables lose their significance. Regressions show that Gini Score also has no significant effect in the model. In Model 2, age has a positive and robust effect on the dependent variable ($p < 0.001$). Older people are more likely define democracy in economic terms. Analyses also indicate that females are more likely than males to discuss that economic characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). High-income people however, have weaker tendencies to think that economic characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). In comparison to Education1 group, people in Education4 group are less likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). Democracy Score has a negative effect on the dependent variable ($p < 0.001$). People in countries with higher democracy scores are also less

likely to define democracy with economic references. In countries where a breakdown of democratic regime occurred after 1992, people have weaker tendencies to refer to economic characteristics as essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). However in countries where Muslims form a higher share of the society, people are more likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$).

Model 3 introduces the independent variable ***GDP per capita (PPP)*** to the regression. Education2, Education3, and Gini Score have no significant effect in the model. The independent variable GDP per capita (PPP) has a significant and reverse effect on the dependent variable ($p < 0.05$). That is in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher people are less likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. Age has a positive effect on the dependent variable ($p < 0.001$). Older people are more likely to define democracy with economic characteristics. In comparison to males, females are more likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). Income still has a negative effect on the dependent variable ($p < 0.001$). High-income people are less likely to see economic characteristics as essential to democracy. When compared to people in Education1 group, people in Education4 group are significantly less likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy ($p < 0.001$). Analysis demonstrates that Democracy Score has a negative effect in the model ($p < 0.001$). Where democracy score of a country is higher, people have weaker tendencies to define democracy in economic terms. A democratic breakdown after 1992 has a negative effect on the dependent variable ($p < 0.001$). Lastly, analyses show that people living in countries with a higher share of Muslims in the society are also more likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. When we merge this finding with our results from the previous analysis about procedural characteristics of democracy, one can say that Muslim societies are more likely to define democracy in economic terms and less likely to define it in procedural terms than people in countries where Muslims do not form the majority. This finding might also indicate that in societies where Muslims constitute a higher share of the society, people's support for the regime might be in the form of specific support rather than in the form of diffuse support. This finding can also hint at one factor that could explain why predominantly Islamic societies experience problems in their consolidation of democracy.

Table 3.4. Economic characteristics

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	20.067	.147		0.000	24.713	.323		0.000	24.497	.330		0.000
Age	.008	.002	.019	.000	.015	.002	.039	.000	.016	.002	.042	.000
Female	.277	.057	.021	.000	.271	.056	.021	.000	.277	.056	.021	.000
Income	-.068	.014	-.022	.000	-.115	.014	-.037	.000	-.114	.014	-.037	.000
Education2	-.329	.104	-.023	.002	.065	.103	.005	.527	.096	.104	.007	.355
Education3	-.311	.103	-.023	.002	.074	.103	.006	.469	.122	.104	.009	.242
Education4	-1.693	.110	-.110	.000	-1.197	.111	-.078	.000	-1.138	.113	-.074	.000
Religiosity	-.448	.061	-.032	.000	-.660	.061	-.048	.000	-.706	.063	-.051	.000
Democracy Score					-6.990	.218	-.195	.000	-6.591	.250	-.184	.000
Breakdown					-1.300	.080	-.100	.000	-1.368	.083	-.105	.000
Muslim %					1.550	.093	.087	.000	1.547	.093	.087	.000
Gini Score					-.217	.328	-.003	.509	-.004	.334	.000	.991
GDP per Capita (PPP)									-1.005E-05	.000	-.022	.001
Adjusted R2	0.012				0.052				0.052			

Dependent Variable: Economic Characteristics

3.4.3. Authoritarianism

In Model 1, control variable Female has no significant effect on the dependent variable. Age has a negative effect in the model ($p < 0.001$). That is older people are less likely to support authoritarianism than younger people. Higher-income people however are more likely to support authoritarianism ($p < 0.001$). Again this finding contradicts with Lipset (1959) who claims that lower class people would be more likely to have authoritarian tendencies. However, regressions indicate that in comparison to people in Education1 group (no formal education or incomplete primary school), higher education groups are consistently less likely to support authoritarianism ($p < 0.001$). The relationship between education and the dependent variable is a monotonic one. That is as one moves up in the ladder of education, her aversion for authoritarianism strengthens. This finding confirms Lipset (2003) who suggests that the more educated one is the less likely one is to have authoritarian tendencies. Model 1 also shows that religious people have stronger tendencies to support authoritarianism ($p < 0.001$).

Model 2 introduces further control variables to the model. Control variable Female has no significant effect in the model. Age has a significant and reverse effect on the dependent variable ($p < 0.001$). Older people are less likely to support authoritarianism than younger people. According to regressions, higher-income people are more likely to support authoritarianism than lower income people ($p < 0.001$). As in Model 1, education and the dependent variable has a monotonic relationship. That is people in higher education groups are significantly less likely to support authoritarianism than people in Education1 group ($p < 0.001$). However, religious people are more likely to support authoritarianism than people who expressed that they are not religious ($p < 0.001$). In Model 2, people in countries with higher democracy scores are also less likely to support authoritarianism ($p < 0.001$). This is a finding supporting arguments of Almond and Verba (1963) and Putnam (1993). It is probable that living under democracies for longer years make the peoples of these countries more averse to authoritarianism. Where a breakdown occurred after 1992, people are also more likely to support authoritarianism ($p < 0.001$). Compared to countries where Muslims constitute a lower share of the society, authoritarian tendencies are higher in countries where Muslims form a higher share of the society ($p < 0.001$). This finding also supports Huntington (1993) and Anderson (2004) who argue that Islamic societies are more prone to authoritarian ideologies. Lastly, Gini score has a significant and

negative effect in the model ($p < 0.001$). That is in countries where income distribution is more equal; people also have weaker tendencies to support authoritarianism.

Model 3 introduces the independent variable ***GDP per capita (PPP)*** to the model. The control variable Female has no significant effect on the dependent variable. The independent variable GDP per capita (PPP) has a robust and negative effect ($p < 0.001$). That is compared to countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP), in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher; people are less likely to support authoritarianism. Model 3 also shows that younger people are more likely to support authoritarianism ($p < 0.001$). Regressions indicate that higher-income people are more likely to support authoritarianism as well ($p < 0.001$). In comparison to people in Education1 group, people in Education2 group (complete primary school or incomplete secondary school) have weaker tendencies to support authoritarianism ($p < 0.05$). Analyses also demonstrate that people in Education3 (complete secondary education) and Education4 (some university level education, with or without degree or university level education) groups are more averse to authoritarianism than people in Education1 group ($p < 0.001$). However, religious people are more supportive of authoritarianism than irreligious people ($p < 0.001$). People in countries with higher democracy scores have weaker tendencies to support authoritarianism ($p < 0.001$), but people living in countries where a breakdown of democratic regime occurred after 1992 are more likely to support authoritarianism ($p < 0.001$). In societies where Muslims form a higher share of the society, people are more likely to score authoritarianism higher ($p < 0.001$). Lastly, regressions show that in countries with more equal income distribution, people are less likely to support authoritarianism ($p < 0.001$).

Table 3.5. Authoritarianism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	17.035	.151		0.000	27.577	.312		0.000	25.954	.317		0.000
Age	-.057	.002	-.142	.000	-.016	.002	-.039	.000	-.008	.002	-.020	.000
Female	-.066	.058	-.005	.255	.004	.054	.000	.943	.042	.053	.003	.436
Income	.186	.014	.058	.000	.075	.013	.023	.000	.087	.013	.027	.000
Education2	-1.473	.107	-.100	.000	-.500	.099	-.034	.000	-.273	.099	-.018	.006
Education3	-2.500	.105	-.178	.000	-1.241	.099	-.089	.000	-.894	.099	-.064	.000
Education4	-4.505	.113	-.284	0.000	-2.589	.107	-.163	.000	-2.150	.108	-.136	.000
Religiosity	2.310	.063	.159	.000	1.329	.059	.092	.000	1.017	.060	.070	.000
Democracy Score					-5.990	.214	-.159	.000	-3.061	.243	-.081	.000
Breakdown					1.368	.077	.101	.000	.869	.079	.064	.000
Muslim %					2.527	.089	.137	.000	2.517	.089	.136	.000
Gini Score					-16.051	.312	-.243	0.000	-14.529	.316	-.220	0.000
GDP per Capita (PPP)									-7.219E-05	.000	-.156	.000
Adjusted R2	0.085				0.223				0.233			

Dependent Variable: Authoritarian Characteristics

3.5. Discussion

Analysis shows that compared to people in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP), people are more likely to consider procedural characteristics essential to democracy in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher. This finding is robust after controlled for demographic indicators, prior level of democratization of the country, occurrence of a democratic breakdown after 1992, share of Muslims in the society, and income equality. This finding might be an indicator that in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP), people lend *diffuse support* to the democratic regime for they think that institutions and processes are more essential to democracy than economic goodies. However, in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is lower, people are less likely than people in high GDP per capita (PPP) countries to consider procedural characteristics more essential to democracy. Therefore, one can argue that this finding is in parallel with the alternative hypothesis $H1_2$ stating that *people living in countries with higher levels of GDP per capita (PPP) are more likely to define democracy in procedural terms.*

Another finding that supports this view is that when compared to people in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP), people in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher are also less likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. This finding is also robust after it is controlled for demographic indicators, prior level of democratization, occurrence of a democratic breakdown after 1992, share of Muslims in the society, and income equality. This finding provides support for the hypothesis $H1_1$ stating that *people living in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP) are more likely to define democracy in terms of immediate economic benefits*. Therefore, one can argue that people from economically less developed countries are more likely to give specific support to the democratic regime whereas people in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) lend diffuse support to their democratic regime. These two findings reject our null hypothesis $H1_0$ stating that '*there is no meaningful relationship between GDP per capita (PPP) of a country and the ways in which people define democracy in that country*.

Analyses where authoritarianism was the dependent variable also provide empirical evidence that support these arguments. As regressions demonstrate there is a negative relationship between GDP per capita (PPP) of a country and people's support

for authoritarianism in that country. That is in countries where GDP per capita is higher; people are significantly less likely to support authoritarian regimes. Note that our data excludes populations of rentier states where the government and its institutions do have a higher level of autonomy from the society and a lesser need for their support for survival due to the revenue generated by sales of oil, natural gas or precious metal. If one evaluates these results in conjunction with the previous findings pertaining to procedural and economic characteristics of democracy, it is possible to argue that people in economically more developed countries express their preference for procedural characteristics of democracy, and they are also more averse to authoritarian regimes. People in economically less developed countries who express their preference for economic characteristics of democracy are also more likely to prefer autocracies to democracies.

I argue that this is because people in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) provide their regime with *diffuse support*, and they are willing and able to support the democratic regime even when it fails to provide economic benefits in the short term. However, those who are more likely to prefer economic characteristics to procedural characteristics probably evaluate the performance of the democratic regime with the economic benefits the regime is able to generate (*specific support*). When the democratic regime is unable to provide economic growth, employment, or other side benefits such as unemployment insurance or subsidies for the poor, people might shift their allegiance and prefer an autocracy to a democratic regime if they believe an authoritarian regime would be better in providing economic benefits that the democratic regime failed to generate. This is a good example of how specific support that is based on outputs could also be a curse for the democratic regime and might lead to its eventual breakdown should it fail to create economic goods that could sustain society's support for the political authority. Indeed, research shows that economic recessions are a robust predictor of the breakdown of democracy especially in young and poor democracies. When democracies break down, 9 in 10 do so when they are younger than 20 years old or when their annual GDP per capita is less than $4,900 (Svolik, 2013).

In this context, I argue that people's support for democracy in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) makes it invulnerable to breakdowns while the future of democracy is uncertain in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP) levels. Przeworski et al. (2000) argues that a GDP per capita of $6,055 (that of Argentina in 1975) is a threshold above which no democracy ever fell. Svolik (2008, p. 155) also find that the

level of economic development determines the extent to which a democracy is susceptible to the risk of reversal. He says that wealth improves the odds that a democracy is consolidated. I argue that this observation of Przeworski et al. and Svolik might be due to different kinds of legitimacy that the regime in these two extremes enjoys. In countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP), the regime seems to have diffuse support that is directed toward institutions and not likely diminish with the regime's economic performance in the short or medium run. In other words, in economically more developed countries people are able to make a distinction between the regime in abstract and its performance and do not change their adherence to the regime when it fails to provide. For instance, Teixeira et al. (2014) show that in Portugal people's support for democracy is not seriously undermined by the economic crisis, despite the living standards in Portugal decline rapidly. They argue that the presence of diffuse support in this country makes a quick decline in regime support in Portugal unlikely[1].

In cases where GDP per capita (PPP) is lower, people provide the regime and its actors with specific support that causes democracies to linger in an uncertain territory, which delays the consolidation of the democratic regime, and might result with breakdown when an authoritarian option promises more economic growth and stability. Therefore, this research supports arguments by Lipset (1959), Przeworski et al. (2000) who argue that a more well-to-do nation has greater chances to sustain its democracy. However, my findings do not support the view that a country is more likely to become a democracy as its wealth increases. Instead, findings of this research presents evidence that democracies are more likely to survive in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) since peoples of these countries are more likely to lend diffuse support to the democratic regime.

Analyses also show that highly educated people are more likely to argue that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy when compared to people with no education or incomplete primary education (Education1). In addition, people with

[1] In the same study, Teixeira (2014) explain that there are signs that the levels of diffuse support for the regime might be in decline in Greece. However, they state that they cannot draw conclusions with the same degree of certainty as in Portugal because of data limitations.

The recent developments in Greece show that citizens' support for democracy remains firm despite major crises with the EU over debt issue which forced the Tsipras government to call for early elections in September 2015, just 7 months after the legislative elections in Greece. In both elections, the turnout rates were over 55% (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction 2015). In addition, a refugee crisis, which overwhelms an economic crisis ridden Greek state, has been a major problem for Greece at about the same period. Despite these problems, Greece democracy does not seem to suffer from any credible threat to the regime, though one should note that fascist Golden Dawn had seen a major surge of its votes in 2012 elections from 0.3 % in 2009 elections to 7% in 2012 elections.

university education with or without degree (Education4) are significantly less likely to define democracy in economic terms. The analyses also demonstrate that more educated have weaker tendencies to support authoritarianism than people with no education or incomplete primary education. Another important finding in this research is that religious people are less likely to think that procedural and economic characteristics are essential to democracy, and they are less likely to support authoritarianism. Regressions also indicate that people in high-income groups are more likely to support authoritarianism and less likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. When compared to younger people, older people are more likely to define democracy in procedural and economic terms and less likely to support authoritarianism. However significant these findings might be, they do not tell us about how these individual attributes of people interact with the context. In other words, they do not answer the question if a high-income person would behave or believe the same in an economically more developed or a economically less developed society.

A long tradition in social sciences discusses the relationship between individual characteristics and democracy. For instance, Lipset (2003) quotes James Bryce saying that education does not necessarily make people good citizens, however it makes it easier for them to become so. According to Lipset, the higher the education level of a country, the better the chances for democracy because the higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support its practices (p. 58). However, Lipset does not take into account the relationship between education and the context. In other words, would a university graduate behave the same or hold the same attitudes towards democracy in a high GDP per capita (PPP) country and a country with a low GDP per capita (PPP)?

This same question could be extended to other individual level variables such as age, income, and religiosity as well. For instance, my analyses show that high-income people are more likely than low-income people to give higher scores for authoritarian options. This finding falsifies Lipset who argues that lower income people would be more likely to hold authoritarian values. Therefore, one major question that needs to be asked is the following: Do Lipset's observations about the relationship between education and attitudes towards democracy as well as the relationship between income and attitudes towards democracy are independent of the context? In other words, would a high-income person hold the same attitudes towards democracy in an economically more developed country and in an economically less developed country? Again, would

a religious person define democracy in the same way independent of the society she is living in? The next chapter looks for an answer to these questions by investigating how individual attributes income, education, and religiosity interact with GDP per capita (PPP) of a country. The specific focus will be on two key variables: income and education and how they interact with wealth measured by GDP per capita (PPP).

CHAPTER 4

Lipset (2003) argues that economic development favors democracy. He says that various aspects of economic development such as urbanization, industrialization, wealth, and education are closely correlated with democracy. For Lipset, average wealth, degree of industrialization, and urbanization is much higher for the more democratic countries (p. 50). For instance, he says the more democratic nations in Europe have the lowest literacy rate of 96% while it is 85% for the less democratic countries of the continent. In Latin America, less dictatorial nations have an average literacy rate of 74% while it is as low as 46% in more dictatorial states of Latin America (p. 55). Lipset concludes that the more educated one is, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices (p. 56). Indeed, my analysis also demonstrated that the more educated is more likely to argue that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. Regressions also indicate that the more educated is less likely to support authoritarianism. Therefore, my first set of hypotheses in this section is as follows:

$H2_0$: There is no relationship between education and the ways in which people define democracy.

$H2_1$: The more educated one is, the more likely one is to define democracy in procedural terms than the less educated.

$H2_2$: The less educated one is, the more likely one is to support authoritarianism than the more educated.

In another study that he conducted with university students, Lipset (1959) argues that upper middle classes are more likely to accommodate values that are associated with Western-type democracy (i.e. toleration) whereas university students from lower classes are less likely to hold values associated with liberal democracy. Lipset explains that the mechanism behind different attitudes of students of stems from the fact that lower class people go through a material insecurity that lets them undermine liberal norms whereas upper middle classes do not feel threatened by other groups. Andersen and Fetner (2008) are agree with Lipset when they argue that economic prosperity promotes social tolerance while high levels of economic inequality suppress tolerance (p. 956). They say that the primary goal of the economically disadvantaged is to

improve her economic conditions, not the promotion of liberal values. However, my analysis shows that high-income people are more likely than low-income people to give high scores to authoritarianism. In this respect, there is a need to study if Lipset's observations about income are independent of the context. Therefore, my second set of hypotheses in this section is as follows:

$H3_0$: There is no relationship between income and the ways in which people define democracy

$H3_1$: Higher-income people are more likely to define democracy in procedural terms than lower income people.

$H3_2$: Lower-income people are more likely to have authoritarian tendencies than higher-income people.

Therefore, Lipset establishes a positive link between personal income and education on the one hand and support for liberal democracy on the other hand. However, he ignores or undermines the effect of context on individual attributes. This chapter investigates the effect of the context on individual attributes education and income while testing these hypotheses. The question is if two people who have similar education levels and who belong to the same social class in their societies but living in countries with different levels of GDP per capita (PPP) would hold the same attitudes towards democracy and authoritarianism. To do that, this chapter interacts *GDP per capita (PPP)* with individual characteristics. In analyses below, interactions of GDP per capita (PPP) *Age*, *Female*, and *Religiosity* will also be studied but the main focus of this chapter will be on interactions of GDP per capita (PPP) with *Income*, *Education2*, *Education3, and Education4*. In these models, *Democracy Score*, *Breakdown*, *Muslim %*, *Gini Score*, and *GDP per capita (PPP)* are control variables.

4.1. Procedural Characteristics

In analyses where *Procedural Characteristics of Democracy* is the dependent variable, interactions of *Age*, *Education4*, and *Religiosity* with *GDP per capita (PPP)* have no significant effect in the model.

Figure 4.1. Predicted values of procedural characteristics for males and females



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30.

In Model 4, *Female* has a positive effect in the model. That is females are more likely to see procedural characteristics as essential to democracy. However, when moderated by GDP per capita (PPP), one sees that this effect is positive only until the GDP per capita level is around $25,000. Regressions also show that after the threshold GDP per capita around $44,000, males are somewhat more likely to define democracy in procedural terms. This finding might be due to the fact that in lower GDP per capita (PPP) countries such as India, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Palestine male-female equality is an acute problem and females support procedural characteristics of democracy as protective barriers in a male-dominated society. In high GDP per capita (PPP) countries such as Australia, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden gender equality problem is not as acute; therefore females feel less need to emphasize procedural characteristics of democracy.

Figure 4.2. Predicted values of procedural characteristics for income groups



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30. A low-income person is represented by a value of 2 on income scale varying between 1 and 10. A high-income person is represented by a value of 8 on an income scale varying between 1 and 10.

Income has a negative effect in the model. That is high-income people are less likely to argue that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. However, after interacted with GDP per capita (PPP), one observes that the effect of income on the dependent variable is not always negative. The effect of income in the model is negative until one reaches GDP per capita (PPP) around $16,000 level whereas income has a positive effect in the model after GDP per capita (PPP) around $25,000 level. After this level, compared to low-income people, high-income people are more supportive of procedural characteristics. This finding provides a conditional support for Lipset's thesis, which asserts high-income people would be more likely to provide support for liberal values.

Figure 4.3. Predicted values of procedural characteristics for education groups



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30.

Figure demonstrates that education matters most in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is lower. That is in these countries, compare to the less educated, the more educated is also more likely to argue that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. However, the gap between education groups in terms of the ways in which they consider procedural characteristics of democracy closes as we move up in the ladder of GDP per capita (PPP). Regardless of education levels, people in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) become more likely to hold the same beliefs about procedural characteristics of democracy. In fact, after the threshold of around $48,000 GDP per capita (PPP) level, there is almost no difference in terms of the ways in which people in Education2 and Education3 evaluate procedural characteristics of democracy whereas people in Education1 group become more likely to think that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. Note that people in Education1 group give the lowest scores to procedural characteristics of democracy in economically less developed countries. Therefore, analysis demonstrates empirical support for Lipset's thesis about the relationship between education and support for democracy in economically less developed countries while the power of this claim weakens in economically more developed countries.

Below is the table demonstrating the details of the analysis:

Table 4.1. Procedural characteristics

Model 4				
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	21,971	,354		0,000
Age	,010	,003	,029	,000
Female	,318	,086	,027	,000
Income	-,108	,021	-,038	,000
Education2	,516	,152	,039	,001
Education3	,955	,151	,077	,000
Education4	1,011	,162	,072	,000
Religiosity	-,197	,104	-,015	,057
Democracy Score	-3,651	,234	-,111	,000
Breakdown	-,747	,076	-,062	,000
Muslim %	-,427	,085	-,026	,000
Gini Score	3,629	,311	,062	,000
GDP per Capita (PPP)	6,140E-05	,000	,149	,000
AgexGDP per Capita (PPP)	1,759E-07	,000	,025	,098
FemalexGDP per Capita (PPP)	-1,026E-05	,000	-,024	,004
IncomexGDP per Capita (PPP)	5,239E-06	,000	,076	,000
Education2xGDP per Capita (PPP)	-1,901E-05	,000	-,036	,024
Education3xGDP per Capita (PPP)	-2,490E-05	,000	-,053	,003
Education4xGDP per Capita (PPP)	2,233E-06	,000	,005	,793
ReligiosityxGDP per Capita (PPP)	-4,310E-06	,000	-,010	,268
Adjusted R Square	0.060			

Dependent Variable: Procedural Characteristics

4.2. Economic Characteristics

In regressions where *Economic Characteristics of Democracy* is the dependent variable, all interactions with GDP per capita (PPP) have a significant effect in the model.

Figure 4.4. Predicted values of economic characteristics for age



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30. A young person is represented by the age of 25 in this figure. An old person is represented by the age of 65 in this figure.

Analysis shows that *Age* has a positive effect on the dependent variable. Older people are more likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. However when moderated by GDP per capita (PPP), the effect of *Age* on the dependent variable takes a reverse direction after the threshold of GDP per capita (PPP) around $33,000. That is after this level, young people are more likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy.

Figure 4.5. Predicted values of economic characteristics for sex



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30.

Figure above demonstrates that compared to males, females are more likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. Analyses also show that the gap between males and females slightly increases as GDP per capita (PPP) increases. That is in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher, in comparison to males; females assign even more importance to economic characteristics of democracy. This finding might be explained with the fact that females feel less secure than males in economic terms even when they have the same level of wealth. This fact in turn might be explained with the presence of a negative discrimination against females in economic life. Just to give an instance, Institute for Women's Policy Research (2016) explains that on average female full-time workers made only 79 cents for every dollar earned by men in 2015. This indicates a gender wage gap of 21%. The same report furthermore asserts that females, on average, earn less than males in every single occupation for which there is sufficient earnings data for both men and women to calculate an earnings ratio. In this context, women's consistent support for economic characteristics of democracy could also be seen as a plea for gender equality in economic arena.

Figure 4.6. Predicted values of economic characteristics for income groups



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30. A low-income person is represented by a value of 2 on income scale varying between 1 and 10. A high-income person is represented by a value of 8 on an income scale varying between 1 and 10.

Analyses show that compared to high-income people, low-income people are consistently more likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. The effect of income on the dependent variable seems to be stronger in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP), and the difference between low-income and high-income people in terms of their perception of economic characteristics of democracy increase in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher. This finding supports Andersen and Fetner (2008), who argue that lower class people would be more likely than upper class people to define democracy with economic references such as redistribution.

Figure 4.7. Predicted values of economic characteristics for education groups



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30.

Analysis demonstrates that compared to people in Education1, Education3 and Education4 groups, people in Education2 group are less sensitive to changes in GDP per capita (PPP). Figure also shows that as one moves up in the ladder of GDP per capita (PPP), people in Education2 group become slightly more likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. Figure indicates that compared to other education groups, people in Education1 group become more likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy in countries that are above the GDP per capita (PPP) around $13,500 level. Another important findings is that when interacted with GDP per capita (PPP), people belonging to Education3 and Education4 groups in countries with higher GDP per capita become less likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to democracy while they become more likely to define democracy with economic characteristics in economically less developed countries ($p < 0.001$).

Figure 4.8. Predicted values of economic characteristics for religiosity



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30.

Above figure shows that irreligious people are more likely to define democracy by using economic references. This observation holds for countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is below the threshold around the $48,000 GDP per capita (PPP). After this level, irreligious and religious people approach each other in terms of their evaluation of economic characteristics of democracy.

See Table 4.2 below for the details of the regression analysis where *Economic Characteristics of Democracy* is the dependent variable.

Table 4.2. Economic characteristics

Model 4				
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	22,575	,385		0,000
Age	,038	,003	,097	,000
Female	,084	,093	,006	,368
Income	-,037	,023	-,012	,110
Education2	,445	,165	,031	,007
Education3	1,194	,163	,089	,000
Education4	,458	,176	,030	,009
Religiosity	-1,138	,112	-,082	,000
Democracy Score	-6,374	,253	-,178	,000
Breakdown	-1,346	,083	-,103	,000
Muslim %	1,615	,093	,091	,000
Gini Score	-,021	,338	,000	,950
GDP per Capita (PPP)	,000	,000	,252	,000
AgexGDP per Capita (PPP)	-1,141E-06	,000	-,147	,000
FemalexGDP per Capita (PPP)	9,849E-06	,000	,021	,011
IncomexGDP per Capita (PPP)	-3,615E-06	,000	-,048	,000
Education2xGDP per Capita (PPP)	-4,205E-05	,000	-,074	,000
Education3xGDP per Capita (PPP)	-8,172E-05	,000	-,160	,000
Education4xGDP per Capita (PPP)	,000	,000	-,200	,000
ReligiosityxGDP per Capita (PPP)	2,167E-05	,000	,046	,000
Adjusted R Square	0.059			

Dependent Variable: Economic Characteristics

4.3. Authoritarianism

In regressions where authoritarianism is the dependent variable, interactions of *Female*, *Education2*, and *Education3* variables with *GDP per capita (PPP)* have no significant effect in the model.

Figure 4.9. Predicted values of authoritarianism for age



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30. A young person is represented by the age of 25 in this figure. An old person is represented by the age of 65 in this figure.

Analysis indicates that older people are more likely than younger people to have authoritarian tendencies. However, when interacted by GDP per capita (PPP), the effect of *Age* on the dependent variable becomes negative after the threshold GDP per capita (PPP) $15,735. That is in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is around $16,000 or higher, younger people are more likely to have authoritarian tendencies. Note that regardless of age people are less likely to have authoritarian tendencies in countries with higher GDP per capita.

Figure 4.10. Predicted values of authoritarianism for income groups



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30. A low-income person is represented by a value of 2 on income scale varying between 1 and 10. A high-income person is represented by a value of 8 on an income scale varying between 1 and 10.

The figure above shows that high-income people are more likely than low-income people to support authoritarianism in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is low. However, as one moves up in the ladder of GDP per capita (PPP), income groups approach each other in terms of their perception authoritarianism. After around GDP per capita (PPP) $44,000 level, low-income people become more likely than high-income people to have authoritarian tendencies. This finding shows that Lipset's thesis about the relationship between high income and support for liberal values becomes irrelevant in economically more developed countries. Besides, analysis shows that in poorer countries, it is not low-income people but high-income people who are more likely to support authoritarianism. This finding might be due to the fact that high-income people in economically less developed countries want to protect their economic and political privileges by providing support for authoritarianism. In other words, in economically less developed countries, richer people might have more to lose from a possible democratization, which makes them more willing to support authoritarianism. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also argue that the elites controlling the political system might be unwilling to accept those policies and institutions (i.e. extending voting rights to lower classes) that could result with transfer of political and economic power to a greater part of the society. Therefore, my findings provide empirical support for the

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), who assert that the elite will challenge democratization on the grounds that it might harm their economic and political privileges.

Figure 4.11. Predicted values of authoritarianism for education groups



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30.

Above figure shows that people in economically more developed countries are less likely than people in economically less developed countries to endorse authoritarianism regardless of their education level. Figure also demonstrates that compared to people in Education1 group, people in Education4 group are less likely to have authoritarian tendencies. However, in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher, the difference between Education1 and Education4 groups in terms of the ways in which they perceive authoritarianism decreases. That is in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher; people in Education1 and Education4 groups also become more likely to hold same beliefs towards authoritarianism whereas in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP), people in Education1 group are more likely than people in Education4 group to have authoritarian tendencies.

Figure 4.12. Predicted values of authoritarianism for religiosity



Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 and 30.

As the above figure shows, in higher GDP per capita (PPP) countries, people are generally less likely to endorse authoritarianism than people in lower GDP per capita (PPP) countries. Regressions also indicate that in general religious people are more likely to have authoritarian tendencies than irreligious people. However, when moderated by GDP per capita (PPP), there seems to be an increase in the difference between the ways in which religious and irreligious people consider authoritarianism. That is irreligious people are more averse to authoritarianism, but in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP), irreligious people become even more averse to authoritarianism than religious people.

See the below table for the details of the analyses where authoritarianism is the dependent variable.

Table 4.3. Authoritarianism

Model 4				
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	
	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	24.505	.369		0.000
Age	.017	.003	.043	.000
Female	-.101	.089	-.007	.257
Income	.182	.022	.057	.000
Education2	-.393	.157	-.027	.012
Education3	-1.021	.156	-.073	.000
Education4	-2.573	.167	-.162	.000
Religiosity	.537	.107	.037	.000
Democracy Score	-2.619	.247	-.069	.000
Breakdown	.931	.079	.069	.000
Muslim %	2.549	.089	.138	.000
Gini Score	-14.084	.320	-.213	0.000
GDP per Capita (PPP)	0.000	.000	-.063	.008
AgexGDP per Capita (PPP)	-1.224E-06	.000	-.153	.000
FemalexGDP per Capita (PPP)	0.000	.000	.014	.063
IncomexGDP per Capita (PPP)	-4.751E-06	.000	-.062	.000
Education2xGDP per Capita (PPP)	0.000	.000	.018	.219
Education3xGDP per Capita (PPP)	1.003E-05	.000	.019	.243
Education4xGDP per Capita (PPP)	0.000	.000	.045	.006
ReligiosityxGDP per Capita (PPP)	2.311E-05	.000	.047	.000
Adjusted R Square	0.235			

Dependent Variable: Authoritarianism

4.4. Discussion

Lipset argues that higher income people are more likely than lower income people to have values that support democracy. However our analyses demonstrate that this observation holds only in countries where GDP per capita is around $25,000 or above. Analysis also show that in countries where GDP per capita is (PPP) is around $16,000 or lower, high-income people are less likely than low-income people to define democracy in procedural terms. Therefore, one can conclude that Lipset's observation is only partially true.

This observation is also supported by our findings about the support for authoritarianism. In his research with university students, Lipset (1959) claims that lower classes are more likely than upper classes to have authoritarian values. However, analyses about the support for authoritarianism show that higher-income people are more likely than lower-income people to have authoritarian tendencies in countries where country's GDP per capita (PPP) is around $36,000 or below. After this level, lower-income people are more likely to have authoritarian tendencies. Again, Lipset's observation seems to hold only in economically more developed countries. Consequently, our alternative hypotheses stating that "*$H3_1$: Higher-income people are more likely to define democracy in procedural terms than lower income people*" and "*$H3_2$: Lower-income people are more likely to have authoritarian tendencies than higher-income people"* are falsified for economically less developed countries whereas these hypotheses hold in economically more developed countries. This finding might also provide support for Przeworski et al.'s (2000) claim that no democracy with a GDP per capita over $6,055 (that of Argentina in 1975) ever fell. The reason that economically more developed countries are more resilient to democratic breakdowns than economically less developed countries might be the presence of a larger middle class in richer countries, which favors procedural characteristics of democracy and has a strong dislike for authoritarianism. However, more research is required before reaching a conclusion about the factors, which make economically more developed countries more resilient to breakdown of democracies.

Lipset (2003) also suggests that the more educated people are more likely to support democracy. However, my analysis indicates that this claim has more power in economically less developed countries whereas in economically more developed countries people are more likely to hold similar beliefs with respect to procedural characteristics of democracy. Therefore, one can argue that our alternative hypothesis stating that "*$H2_1$: The more educated one is, the more likely one is to define democracy in procedural terms than the less educated.*" holds only in economically more developed countries whereas it is falsified in economically less developed countries. Analyses also show that Lipset's observation about the relationship between education and tendency to have authoritarian values is correct. However, one should again note that in economically more developed countries the gap between different education groups in terms of their tendency to have authoritarian values decrease considerably. That is the less educated and the more educated become almost equally averse to

authoritarianism in economically more developed countries. Then, alternative hypothesis stating that "*$H2_2$: The less educated one is, the more likely one is to support authoritarianism than the more educated.*" is failed to be falsified only in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is around $43,000 or above. In countries where GDP per capita is higher than this level, people increasingly become more likely to have similar beliefs with respect to authoritarianism. That is the less educated and the more educated become almost equally hostile to authoritarian regimes in economically more developed nations.

My analyses in this chapter and the previous chapter demonstrated one of the root causes of breakdown of democracy in economically less developed countries. In these countries, people are more likely to give specific support to the regime, which is conditional and sensitive to the economic performance of the regime. Therefore, a breakdown of democracy becomes more likely as the economic performance of the regime declines. Analysis also shows that in economically more developed countries, people are more likely to extend diffuse support to the regime, which increases the chances of a democratic consolidation once a successful transition occurs. The level of wealth that might not be vital factor during transition to democracy; then becomes a significant factor for consolidation of democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000).

My analysis in this chapter also shows that income and education (two key variables of modernization theory) do not have the same effect in economically less developed and economically more developed countries. The more educated people are more likely to support procedural characteristics of democracy in economically less developed countries while evidence suggests no difference in terms of the ways in which people consider procedural characteristics as essential to democracy in economically more developed countries. That is in economically less developed countries only the more educated people are likely to provide the democratic regime with diffuse support while in economically more developed countries people provide the regime with diffuse support regardless of their education levels.

Findings in this chapter suggest that in economically less developed countries, high-income people are less likely than low-income people to argue that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. However, in economically more developed countries, compared to low-income people, high-income people are more supportive of procedural characteristics. Therefore, in economically less developed countries, low-income people are more likely than high-income people to have diffuse support whereas

high-income people are more likely to have diffuse support to the democratic regime in economically more developed countries.

The findings in this chapter and the previous chapter establish the conditions under which a consolidation of the democratic regime is more likely. As Przeworski et al. (2000) and Svolik (2013) explain, economically more developed countries are more likely than economically less developed countries to consolidate their democracies. I argue this is because the masses in wealthier countries are more likely to present the democratic regime with diffuse support whereas the people in economically less developed countries provide the regime with specific support, which is not durable and based on a constant evaluation of the regime in terms of the material benefits it generates. When the regime fails to provide economic benefits in economically less developed countries, specific support to the regime evaporates paving the way for authoritarian options.

While my findings support the previous findings that wealth support consolidation of democracy, they do not explain the conditions under which transitions to democracy succeed or an incumbent takeover of democracy does not occur. To do that, next chapter studies two cases: Egypt and Tunisia after 2011. As I explained at the beginning of this study, these two countries correspond to two diverse routes in the Middle East with regards to democratization. Almost five years after the Arab Uprisings, many cite Tunisia as a case, which was able to establish minimum requirements of a democratic regime (Kienle, 2012; Stepan and Linz, 2013; Volpi and Stein, 2015; Szmolka, 2015). Egypt however is a case, which failed to complete its transition to democracy (Brown, 2013; Mietzner, 2014; Volpi and Stein, 2015; Szmolka, 2015). Mubarak is replaced with another dictator who also hailed from the ranks of the military just like Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. Studying these three cases might reveal those dynamics that enabled a democratic outcome in Tunisia while reinstated authoritarianism in Egypt. Next chapter turns to this question.

CHAPTER 5

Egypt and Tunisia were shaken by internal strife in the 2010s that ousted previous dictators in both countries. The political trajectory these countries followed after the uprisings differed considerably. Tunisia as of 2016 is the only country in the Arab world with credible democratic credentials. Egypt has returned to its old ways, not with the aging Mubarak but with a different leader, Al Sisi who also donned the military uniform before becoming the president like all other leaders of Egypt since 1952. Studying these cases with diverging paths will shed light on those factors that become effective during transitions or takeover of democracy by an incumbent leader. The other reasons why I picked these three countries are as follows:

First, all countries had a problematic relationship with democracy in the past. Autocratic governments ruled Egypt and Tunisia since they acquired their independence from their colonial masters. In none of my cases, democracy is ever consolidated. However, the recent course of events seems to put Tunisia into a different path. According to Freedom House (2016), Egypt and Tunisia correspond to very different levels of democratization. Freedom House defines Tunisia a *free* country with a score of 79/100, which is the first Arab country to be defined as free by Freedom House[2] whereas Egypt is defined as a *not free* country with a score of 27/ 100. Different levels of democratization in these two cases allow us to contrast those factors that set these countries into different paths in the aftermath of their political crises.

Second, all these countries underwent important political crises during which millions of people poured into the streets in these countries. During these uprisings, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine El Abidin Ben Ali in Tunisia were ousted from power.

Egypt with its 82.5 million people is the biggest Arab country and since the coup of Free Officers in 1952, this country has been cultural and political leader of the Arab world. Tunisia, with its relatively bigger middle class in the region and the

[2] To understand the success of Tunisian story, a comparison with the past state of Tunisian political regime is due. The 2004 Arab Human Development titled 'Towards Freedom in the Arab World' extensively talks about breach of basic liberties and rights in Tunisia. Twelve years before the publication of Freedom House 2016 report, Tunisia was defined as a case where journalists were regularly prosecuted for expressing their opinions; the freedom to form associations was violated; the principle of free and fair elections was violated; and the impartiality and fairness of courts were contested (pp. 88-91).

smoother transition period it went through, is seen as the country in the region with best prospects for consolidation of democracy.

5.1. Do mass actions bring about democratization?

One strand in the literature argues that mass attitudes matter in a country's democratization (Inglehart, 1988; Miller et al., 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2007; Welzel and Inglehart, 2008; Cho, 2010). Inglehart argues that different societies have different cultural orientations that could have important political and economic implications. According to Inglehart, unless certain changes do not take place in culture and social structure of a society, democratization in that society is far from certain. Miller et al (1997) assert that their research in post-communist societies shows that people who project proper meanings onto the concept of democracy hold more highly consistent pro-democratic beliefs than those people who were not able to do so.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that it is a syndrome of self-expression values (interpersonal trust, tolerance of other groups, and political activism) that will create a fertile ground for democracy. For Inglehart and Welzel, self-expression values promote democratic mass actions. They state that democracy is an essentially emancipative achievement that is primarily designed to empower people. It is in this context that emancipative attitudes that emphasize people power give people the most solid motivation to support democratic goals. According to Inglehart and Welzel, people will not defend democracy unless they value the idea of people empowerment embedded in the very concept of democracy. Welzel and Inglehart (2008) explain that the development of democracy reflects the acquisition of resources and values by ordinary people, which allowed them to put pressure on the political elite. Cho (2010) also argues that the masses play an important role during the transition to democracy. He says that citizens who are informed are cognitively capable of developing and adjusting attitudes towards democracy. According to Cho, informed citizens adopt positive messages about democracy and negative ones about non-democratic ones.

Welzel (2007) says that it is the mass actions through which these mass attitudes operative in favor of democratization. Proper pro-democratic attitudes encourage people for mass actions, which bring about democratization in less democratic societies and

consolidate the existing democracy in more democratic ones. Welzel claims that once pro-democratic emancipative attitudes exist, they translate into mass actions, regardless of a society's level of modernization and democracy. In this theoretical framework, boycotts, demonstrations, and petitions become the instruments of the masses in their quest for democratization.

The uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia might serve laboratories to test Welzel's claims. Table 5.1 below shows people's preferences for different regime types in six countries. WVS 6th wave asks the following scale question to learn about people's regime preferences: *"I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (Read out and code one answer for each option)"*. Then, participants are asked to provide a score between 1 (*Very Good*) and 4 (*Very Bad*). For research purposes, I reversed this scale. Therefore, in the table below 1 refers to *Very Bad* and 4 means *Very Good*.

Table 5.1 also shows the mean scores for Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden. These countries have the highest three scores on EIU the Democracy Index 2014 among the 60 countries that were included in the 6th wave of WVS. A comparison of these three countries with Egypt and Tunisia will inform us about cognitive capabilities of people in terms of developing and adjusting their attitudes towards democracy. I argue that those people who are able to provide informed answers about their political system preferences should have significantly higher preferences for a democracy while having a dislike for authoritarian political systems.

See Table 5.1. for the mean scores of six countries:

Table 5.1. Political system preferences

Country		Having a strong leader	Having experts	Having the Army rule	Having a democratic political system
Australia	Mean	1.8972	2.4477	1.4462	3.4432
	N	1443	1438	1434	1436
	Std. Deviation	.94372	.92831	.68530	.74823
New Zealand	Mean	1.6894	2.2456	1.2145	3.4734
	N	747	745	774	714
	Std. Deviation	.92619	.95606	.49368	.78912
Sweden	Mean	1.8864	2.2247	1.5148	3.6630
	N	1151	1152	1161	1170
	Std. Deviation	.93920	.89238	.68031	.59092
Tunisia	Mean	2.5541	3.0565	2.2139	3.5321
	N	1054	1026	1066	1107
	Std. Deviation	1.16061	.95801	1.11213	.72267
Egypt	Mean	3.6204	3.4218	---	3.6926
	N	1523	1518		1518
	Std. Deviation	.68661	.79166	---	.48564
WVS Average	Mean	2.3839	2.6570	1.9312	3.3058
	N	78727	77986	76961	80170
	Std. Deviation	1.04528	.91872	.95364	.78199

Notes: The question is a scale question varying between 1 (Very Bad) and 4 (Very Good). The options as they are stated by the WVS 6th wave are: 1) *Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections*; 2) *Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country*; 3) *Having the army rule*; and 4) *Having a democratic political system*. The last row named WVS Total demonstrates the mean scores for 60 countries that are included in the 6th wave of WVS. The survey does not ask '*Having the army rule*' option in Egypt.

A comparison of mean scores hints that people in Egypt and Tunisia do not have informed preferences about political systems. Egyptians rate democracy option even higher than citizens of Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden. However, participants in Egypt also provide quite high scores for authoritarian options such as '*Having a strong leader*' and '*Having experts*' options. Both scores are well above the WVS 6th wave averages. The same trend is observable in Tunisia as well. Tunisians who rated '*Having Experts*' well above the WVS average also provide an above-the-average score for '*Having a democratic political system*' option. While citizens in Egypt and Tunisia provide high scores both for authoritarian and democratic options; Australians, New

Zealanders, and Swedes consistently rate democracy above the WVS 6th wave average and rate authoritarian options consistently lower than the WVS 6th wave averages. These findings demonstrate that citizens of three advanced democracies (Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden) approximate what Cho (2010) defines as informed citizens who are cognitively capable of developing and adjusting their attitudes towards democracy. Citizens of Egypt and Tunisia however do not present a consistent attitude in their defense of democracy as a political regime. The table below is another example demonstrating citizens' inability in Egypt and Tunisia to project proper meanings onto the term of democracy.

Table 5.2. summarizes the mean scores for the following question: '*Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy"'*. This is the question that was used to create dependent variables in Chapters 3 and 4. Also note that in this research, I argued that a support for procedural characteristics could be perceived as an indicator of diffuse support. It is the presence of diffuse support, which makes consolidation more likely once democratization is completed.

Table 5.2 shows that people in advanced democracies (Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden) highly rate procedural characteristics of democracy while their scores for authoritarianism considerably lower than the WVS average. Thus one can argue that citizens in advanced democracies are more informed about their preferences, and they are able to project proper meaning onto the term of democracy. Citizens in Egypt and Tunisia have high ratings for procedural characteristics though their scores for male-female equality is somewhat lower than the scores of advanced democracies. However, the publics in these three countries also provide above the WVS average scores for authoritarianism. That is the citizens in these two countries are more likely to argue that authoritarian practices are essential to democracy showing their relative inability to project proper meanings onto the term democracy. See the table below for a summary of scores.

Table 5.2. Characteristics of democracy

Country	Procedural Characteristics			Authoritarianism		
	People choose their leaders in free elections.	Women have the same rights as men.	Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression	The army takes over when government is incompetent.	Religious authorities interpret the laws.	People obey their rulers
Australia	8.83	8.93	7.50	3.33	2.35	5.12
New Zealand	8.73	8.82	7.45	3.32	2.31	4.83
Sweden	9.25	9.49	8.61	2.37	2.06	3.55
Tunisia	**8.56**	**7.29**	**8.24**	**4.85**	**4.52**	**6.86**
Egypt	**8.79**	**7.44**	**8.10**	---	**6.19**	**7.39**
WVS Average	7.95	7.83	7.36	4.51	4.28	6.02

Notes: The question is a scale question varying between 1 (not at all an essential characteristic of democracy) and 10 (an essential characteristic of democracy). The last row named WVS Total demonstrates the mean scores for 60 countries that are included in the 6th wave of WVS. The survey does not ask 'The army takes over when the government is incompetent' option in Egypt.

These findings provide a dilemma for Welzel's (2007) thesis with regards to the relationship between mass actions and democratization. Welzel argues mass attitudes operate in favor of democratization through mass actions such as boycotts, demonstrations, and petitions. However, the way the publics in Egypt and Tunisia understand democracy is not particularly informed. They are willing to extend support authoritarian systems and democracy simultaneously or consider authoritarian practices such as religious authorities interpreting the laws as essential to democracy. If Welzel's thesis about the relationship between mass actions and democratization was valid, one should have observed Tunisians being particularly informed about their political system preferences and being able to project proper meanings onto the term democracy. However, analysis shows that Tunisians, just like Egyptians, are not cognitively informed about their political system preferences and likely to include authoritarian features in their definitions of democracy. Therefore, one needs to go beyond the perspective of the mass attitudes, and look at other factors to understand the divergent paths Egypt and Tunisia took after 2010.

A perspective solely focusing on the role of mass actions suffers from other weaknesses as well. First, it overlooks the role of other important mechanisms and actors of change. As Piven (2006) says mass actions alone cannot achieve their ends even if the public is informed about its preferences. Second, this approach undermines

the role the political elite plays in bringing about democratization. As Tarrow (1998) argues, the political elite plays a crucial role even in cases where the mass action might be the most decisive factor. In their study of Latin America between 1945 and 2005, Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2013) conclude that normative preferences of the political elite are major factors that determine the regime type. They discuss that if the political elite lacks a normative commitment to democracy, the chances that the democratic regime will survive major economic or political crises is slim. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) also argue that divisions within the regime itself, along the fluctuating cleavage between hardliners and soft-liners are an important reason for the success of a transition. It is in this context that I argue that the relatively successful transition to democracy in Tunisia and its failure in Egypt cannot be understood without studying the role political elite played during political crises in both countries.

To understand diverging paths of Egypt and Tunisia one needs to study two factors: *cohesion of the elite* and *electoral system preference*. I argue that elite cohesion is a major factor that determines the chances of survival of the regime during major political crises. However, as Landolt and Kubicek (2014) argue leadership change does not necessarily lead to democratization. It is the electoral system preference, which makes democratization feasible at the end of the transition.

5.2. The Role of the Political Elite

A large literature in social sciences argues that the political elite plays a major role that determines the shape of the political regime after transitions (Dix, 1982; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Schmitter, 1992; Hamann, 1997; Stepan, 1997; Crescenzi, 1999; Encarnaciaon, 2001; Sanchez 2003). For instance Dix (1982) talks about the birth of a negative coalition within the regime that paves the way for an eventual democratization. In their much-cited work, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that a precondition for a transition to democracy is a division of the ruling elite along the lines of hard-liners and soft-liners. Crescenzi (1999) as well suggests that the role hard-liner and the soft-liner political elite plays and the nature of the interaction between the political elite and the opposition are important factors to understand why democratization occurs in some cases while failing in others. When discussing the role

of the elite during transitions, Hamann (1997) argues that in the case of Spain elite pacts reduced uncertainty during the transitory phase; thus paving the way for a smooth transition. Sanchez (2003) also explains that a transition to democracy is made possible when the regime suffers from internal legitimacy problems, an incohesive ruling elite, and a highly mobilized civil and political society. According to Sanchez, the political elite plays a pivotal role that determines the success of transition.

I argue that division among the elite is a necessary but an insufficient condition for transition to democracy. If the electoral system does not stimulate cooperation and negotiation among the political elite, leadership change might not necessarily lead to a democratic regime. Carey (2013) for instance suggests that electoral systems should disperse power and foster inclusiveness at constitutional moments to sustain the momentum for democratization. Therefore our second condition for a transition to a democracy to be successful is the presence of an electoral system that induces cooperation and consensus among the political elite.

5.3. Electoral System Preference

Ishiyama (2012) suggests that the evolution of political system is not only the result of contextual factors such as economic, social, cultural, and international environments. He argues that human choices affect political systems as much as contextual factors do. It is in this context that electoral system preference should be considered as a significant factor in the building of political democracy. Ishiyama suggests that electoral system is a method by which voters make a choice between different options. He says that it is comprised of a set of crucial choices such as who is to be elected and how (2012, p. 158). Norris (1997) argues that electoral systems proved to be one of the most stable democratic institutions in the past. She asserts that until recently wholesale and radical reform of the basic electoral system has been relatively rare. Despite this inherent conservatism of electoral systems, once established they have major implications on political systems of countries. Therefore, a closer investigation of electoral systems has the potential to reveal why some transitions to democracy fail while others succeed. Before discussing the effects of electoral system preference on political democracy and how they shaped the course of events in Egypt and Tunisia, a

brief discussion of different electoral systems is due.

Ishiyama (2012, p. 159) explains that in terms of electoral formula, there is a distinction between proportional, majoritarian, and plurality formulae. The plurality system is also called for first past the post system. In this system, the candidate who has the most votes (but not necessarily the absolute majority) wins the election. Great Britain and its former colonies such as Canada, India, Kenya, Nigeria, and the United States are countries where this system is used. The majoritarian system is associated with run-off elections. If no candidate can garner 50% plus 1 of the votes, a run-off round with the top two finishers from the first round is squaring off is held in a subsequent date. This system is mostly used to elect the top executive of the nation such as in Argentina, France, Poland, and Russia. Proponents of this system argue that the most important advantage of this system over proportional representation system is government effectiveness for majoritarian electoral system produces single-party governments (Norris 1997). Once elected with this system, the cabinet can pass the legislation they feel necessary during their term as long as they carry their own backbenchers with them.

The proportional representation system, which is also known as PR aims to maximize representativeness by reflecting the party strength in the legislature (Ishiyama, 2012, pp. 159-160). Proponents of PR argue that majoritarian systems (including plurality formula) put small parties in a disadvantaged position by failing to represent them. Proponents also argue that there is a greater incentive for people to turn out to vote in PR because fewer voters are wasted in this system (Norris, 1997). Therefore, PR is mostly defended on the grounds that it tends to produce legislatures that are more representative than the Westminster type parliaments. Though PR system has more representative power, some nations use regional or national thresholds to limit number of parties sending representatives to the legislature. A well-known example to this practice is Turkey, which introduced a 10% national threshold in 1982 constitution. The major logic underlying this practice is a will to prevent extreme fragmentation and polarization in the legislature.

A second important factor that needs consideration in any electoral system is the district magnitude, with the basic difference being between single-member districts and those employing multi-member districts. Single-member district system is generally associated with plurality or majoritarian systems. In single-member districts, the country is divided into electoral districts, and each district will elect one representative.

Therefore, in this system there is no compensation for coming in the second place. Proponents of this system argued that single-member districts allow voters to identify their representative clearly and hold her responsible and accountable for her actions. It is also argued that this system has a moderating influence on political competition since candidates have the incentive to win as many votes as possible, and they gravitate towards the ideological center of the political spectrum to appeal the median voter. Critics of single-member districts argued that this system could produce distortions in the national legislature. For instance, a party, which consistently occupies a second place throughout the nation, could end up with no members in the parliament. It is also argued that this system also provides significant advantages to bigger parties to the detriment of smaller parties (Ishiyama, 2012, pp. 160-161).

Multi-member districts are generally associated with PR systems. Unlike single-member districts, multi-member districts elect more than one representative, which often vary in size. The major advantage of multi-member districts over single-member districts is that it maximizes representative power by giving other candidates a chance to be elected even if they do not occupy the first place (Ishiyama, 2012, p. 161). Thus this system also protects smaller parties, and enables them to have seats in the legislature.

Duverger (1986) suggests that the plurality rule (including majoritarian systems) encourages a two-party system while PR systems lead to a multi-party system. Lijphart' (1994) study provided some evidence for this thesis. After studying 27 industrialized democracies between 1945 and 1990, he concluded that plurality systems on average have 2.0 effective parliamentary parties, 2.8 in majoritarian systems, and 3.6 effective parliamentary parties in PR systems. It is partially in this context that proponents of plurality and majoritarian electoral systems argue that these systems produce relatively stable and effective governments since a single party tend to become the government while PR tend to produce coalition governments. In this respect, one can also argue that PR systems tend to produce legislatures that reflect the composition of the electorate better than plurality and majoritarian systems (Norris, 1995).

Others argue that electoral system preference plays a key role in fostering a democratic process. According to Reilly (2001, p. 20-22), two schools of thought predominate. The scholarly orthodoxy argues that some form of PR is all but essential if democracy is to survive in divided societies. Divided societies need PR to give minorities adequate representation, discourage parochialism, and force moderation on

the political parties (Lewis, 1965, p. 73). Lijphart (1977) also suggests that some sort of power sharing among the political elite is necessary to protect democracy. He argues that consociationalism, which includes representation of all significant groups in the society; proportional representation of different groups in the distribution of parliamentary seats; segmental autonomy via federal arrangements; and a veto power of minority groups over key decisions. Against this scholarly orthodoxy, centripetalists argue that an electoral system that could mitigate the negative effects of fragmentations in a society should not simply replicate the same divisions in the legislature. They suggest that electoral systems should encourage cooperation and accommodation between rival groups. For instance, the system used in Nigeria to elect the president requires the winning candidate to gain support from different regions, thus breaking down the claims of parochialism and regionalism (Reilly, 2001).

Both schools of thought agree that electoral system should stimulate cooperation between different groups if democracy is to survive during the transitional phase. Carey (2013) argues that it is particularly important at constitutional moments for systems of representation to disperse power and foster inclusiveness. I also suggest that electoral systems should be designed in such a way that it must induce compromise and an eventual cooperation especially between actors at different ends of ideological spectrum. To do this an electoral system should prevent one of the actors to dominate the political scene during the transition. My short survey of Egyptian electoral systems yields that electoral formulas adopted in Egypt in 2011 and 2014 was complex and allowed first Islamists and then Mubarak-era figures to dominate the parliament resulting with exclusion of secular/ liberal actors from the decision-making mechanisms. Therefore, one can argue that 2012 and 2014 Egyptian constitutions were not the results of negotiation and consensus. Instead of promoting democratization and peaceful coexistence of different actors, these constitutions reflected the power of dominant actors and polarized the Egyptian society even further. On the contrary, the Tunisian electoral system adopted in 2011 did not allow the largest party to form a majority in the assembly. Thanks to use of PR formula with largest remainder principle, Islamist Ennahda had to form pacts with other political actors to draft the new constitution and rule the country between 2011 and 2013. As a result, contrary to the situation in Egypt, the 2014 Tunisian constitution accompanied the demands and concerns of various actors in the society, making it a more long lasting social contract.

The rest of this chapter studies how the actions of the political elite during

uprisings and electoral system preference after the uprisings affected political systems in Egypt and Tunisia.

5.4. The Political Elite and the Uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia

The uprisings that shook the foundations of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East caught observers of the region off guard. Just seven years before the Arab Uprisings, a respected scholar was writing that authoritarianism in the Middle East was robust (Bellin, 2004). However, only a couple of months after Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest the humiliation inflicted upon him by the Tunisian municipal police, the 'robust regimes' in Tunisia and Egypt were swept away by the people forcing the same author to reassess her position (Bellin, 2012).

The spark that ignited the Arab Uprisings was the self-immolation of a street vendor, Muhammad Bouazizi, in front of the local government building in Sidi Bouzid on 17 December 2010 (Gelvin, 2015). Earlier in the day, a policewoman confiscated his wares and humiliated him. The protests reached the Tunisian capital by 27 December, and Ben Ali fled the country when the Tunisian military refused to fire on protesters, leaving the country in the hands of a caretaker government.

The waves that shook Ben Ali off his seat reached Egypt in January 2011. The organizing groups '6th April' and 'We are all Khaled Said' (a group that was formed in reaction to the killing of an everyday Egyptian youth by the police in Summer 2010 because he refused to be an informant for the police) asked their supporters to march to the downtown Cairo on the Egyptian Police Day (Osman, 2013; Gelvin, 2015). The date of the call for demonstrations was not coincidental. Organizers chose 25 January as their 'day of rage' to protest Mubarak's 2009 decision to declare this day as a day of celebration of the police forces, which was arguably the most hated institution in Egypt. By 28 January 2011, hundreds of thousands of protestors were defying the regime and its leader not only in Cairo, but also in Alexandria, Suez, and other cities in the Nile Delta (Osman, 2013). On 11 February 2011, Vice-President General Suleiman announced that President Mubarak abdicated his seat, leaving hundreds of thousands of Egyptians jubilant all along the Nile Delta.

One major factor that made Egyptian Hosni Mubarak and Tunisian Ben Ali vulnerable to large-scale protests was the divisions among the ruling elite in these countries. In Egypt and Tunisia, the ruling elite did not protect its cohesion in the face of large-scale protests causing a leadership change in both countries.

Stepan (1986, p. 72) says that in any authoritarian regime, the security apparatus especially the military plays a major role. For example, the Spanish military was a major pillar of the Francoist regime just like the Spanish judiciary (Nassif, 2016). Major work in political science also shows that the military plays important roles both in transitions to democracy as well as in breakdown of democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1978; O'Donnell et al., 1986; Stepan, 1988). In this respect, a discussion the role the military played in these two cases is essential to understand what happened. Kienle (2012) argues that the military, which was important components if not major pillars of the *anciens regimes*, facilitated the course of events both in Egypt and Tunisia.

5.4.1. Egypt

The reason why Egyptian military intervened to the crisis prompted by large-scale protests was to protect its own institutional interests. The Egyptian military is a key economic actor, which has its own industries (Kienle, 2012), which are institutionalized and well integrated with the Egyptian economy (Mietzner, 2014, p. 448). The Egyptian military might be controlling as much as 40% of the economy, and according to the IMF, it oversees around half of all Egyptian manufacturing. It has investments in a variety of sectors ranging from production of consumer goods (like washing machines and refrigerators) to dairy and real estate businesses (Gelvin, 2015). Washington sends about $2 billion a year to Cairo, most of which used for the Egyptian Army (Cambanis, 2015, p. 25).

Mubarak decided to deploy the military on 28 January 2011 when his Ministry of Interior allegedly refused his order to authorize the police to use live ammunition (Gelvin, 2015). The military was deployed across Cairo and most large cities to 'restore order and protect constitutional legitimacy'. Unlike the police forces, the Egyptian army was revered and trusted by the people. (Osman, 2013, p. 4). It was enjoying high levels of popularity throughout the Mubarak years, setting it apart from other regime institutions including the president himself. Mietzner (2014) argues that this popularity

of the Egyptian military was partly due to Mubarak's strategy of excluding the military from the regime's apparatus of repression. In addition to that the Egyptian military enjoys a legitimacy, which was inherited from its partial success during the 1973 war with Israel. Over the years, Mubarak became the representative of a new power structure dominated by some of the country's most powerful financial centers instead of being the military establishment's representative, which actually was the case especially during the Nasser years (Osman, 2013, p. 212). In this context it was not surprising that upon the military's arrival to downtown Cairo, the protesters welcomed their presence with 'The army and the people are one hand' chants. The Egyptian military distanced itself from the regime immediately by declaring that they would not shoot at the protesters. However, they were not willing to abandon Mubarak right away either. Indeed, faced with the January protests, the Egyptian army first tried to contain the events by marginalizing some regime actors such as the National Democratic Party (NDP), the police, and the state media (Kienle, 2012).

As Cambanis (2015, p. 65) explains the army brass did not intend to back Mubarak but it was not going to join the revolution either. Its interests demanded a peaceful solution to the protests, which would not harm their economic interests and privileged position in the state apparatus. However, the military decided to turn its back to Mubarak when it was understood that its interests are best served without Mubarak, who was not able to diffuse the crisis and whose abdication was the primary demand of the protesters (Kienle, 2012; Mietzner, 2014; Cambanis, 2015). Therefore, they forced the resignation of Mubarak on Friday, 11 February 2011. The Vice-President announced on live TV that the President delegated his authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (the SCAF). Over the next 18 months, the SCAF ruled the country until a new president was elected in Egypt's first-ever free presidential elections. In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) became the first civilian president of the country with slightly over 51% of the votes in the second round of the elections. The election process itself was highly controlled by the military. For example, the MB's first choice for the presidential seat, Mohammed Khairat Saad el-Shater, a wealthy businessmen and the financier of the MB was vetoed by the military. The military also passed some important decrees such as the one that would avoid any civilian oversight of the military budget (Kienle, 2012; Cambanis, 2015). Osman (2013, p. 244) explains that the détente between the MB and the military signified a meeting of interests between the two most powerful actors in the post-

Mubarak era. The military wanted to protect its political privileges and economic interests that faced a possible harm during the uprisings while the MB finally wanted to match its economic and organizational might with political authority that would allow them to herd the Egyptian society into the path of an Islamic society.

5.4.2. Tunisia

Tunisian military is the exact opposite of the Egyptian army. It was established in 1956. Unlike neighboring Algerian and Moroccan militaries, the Tunisian army did not fight an independence war with the French. Instead the founding father of Tunisia, Bourguiba negotiated independence from France on behalf of the Tunisians (Gelvin, 2015, p. 68). Again unlike the Egyptian military, the Tunisian military is highly apolitical. Despite its small size and modest resources, the Tunisian military has a reputation for being well-managed and professional since the country gained its independence. The officers of the military mostly belong to Tunisia's educated, politically conscious middle class, and their family background lies with the country's urban elite (Jebnoun, 2014). As an example testifying to professionalism of the armed forces, the Tunisian military did not stage a coup d'état when the police forces were unable to contain large-scale protests in 1978, 1980, 1984, and 2008 (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012). Tunisian leader Ben Ali's regime rested on the police forces, which exceed 120,000 people, in contrast to Tunisian army's 35,000 men. Therefore, in a contrasting example to the Egyptian military, the Tunisian military was small but it was a professional institution just like its counterpart in Egypt (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012; Lynch, 2013; Gelvin, 2015).

Jebnoun (2014) argues that it was not thousands who were responsible for the success of the Tunisian uprisings. He says that the demise of the old autocrat was the outcome of "… his misreading of the civil–military relations, as well as his own ambiguous perception of the military as a protector and potential threat that led to a lack of loyalty on the side of senior army officers" (p. 296). Lynch (2013) explains that the endgame in Tunisia rested with the decisions of the independent military, which first refused to use live ammunition against the protesters, then moved to push Ben Ali out of power (p. 79). During the most critical hours of the uprising, the Army Chief of Staff of the Tunisian military, General Rachid Ammar materialized his support for the

uprising by yelling through a megaphone to more than 1,000 protestors near his office: "Our revolution is your revolution. We will protect the revolution". Shortly after this statement, the military withdrew from its positions defending the capital city Tunis; and a day later on 14 January 2011, Ben Ali left the country for Saudi Arabia with his much-despised wife. The military's decision to side with the protesters was visible even before this announcement as it protected the civilian protesters from violence in the hands of the police several times (Kirkpatrick, 2011).

Jebnoun (2014) argues that Ben Ali's marginalization of the armed forces and his extreme reliance on the police forces was a major factor that alienated the military from the regime and undermined its support of Ben Ali during the uprisings. Gelvin (2015) says that like his predecessor Bourguiba, Ben Ali also deliberately kept the army small and out of politics even though he was also coming from the military ranks. During his reign, Ben Ali depended on security forces he controlled directly or indirectly. The fact that the military and the state apparatus did not share any common interest, that conscripts did not fire on their relatives and neighbors, and there was no brotherly love between the military and the regime made the military defect from the regime and side with the protesters during the darkest hours for the Ben Ali regime, thus putting an end to his regime in a matter of days.

5.5. The Fate of Democracy in Egypt and Tunisia

Landolt and Kubicek (2014) could not be more correct when they argue that democracy is not the inevitable outcome of transitions. They explain that transition and consolidation are two distinct moments that are separated by a significant time period, during which the final outcome is uncertain. A strong factor that prevents a return to an autocracy during a transition is the electoral system preference.

5.5.1. Egypt

Egyptian electoral system that was adopted in 2011 did not enhance cooperation in the post-Mubarak Egypt. On the contrary, the law enabled the MB to dominate the

parliament, and polarize an already divided society even further. The fact that electoral system did not see much improvement in terms of its ability to foster cooperation and negotiation among major political actors of the Egyptian political theater was a major reason underlying the failure of the Egyptian transition.

Before the uprisings, a report in 2011 argued that electoral system in Egypt had serious flaws causing important problems for holding of free and fair elections in this country (Democracy Reporting International, 2007). First, there was a state of emergency declared in 1981, which did not allow opposition actors to enjoy a full enjoyment of their political rights such as freedom of assembly, association, and expression. In Mubarak's Egypt, elections for the lower legislative body employed a modified nation-wide single-member district system (SMD), in which two winners were chosen from each district (Faris, 2012). As Faris explains, the SMD system has important flaws in its application; gross and intentional malapportionment being the most significant one. Just to give an instance, rural areas were privileged with small size district sizes while urban centers such as Cairo, Alexandria, and Aswan were given fewer representatives per person because these large cities were more likely to accommodate liberal parties. The Mubarak-era party system was also hyper-personalized and devoid of any ideological struggles. Politicians were mainly focusing on providing material benefits to their home districts to the detriment of any kind of legislative platform (Faris, 2012, p. 141). The whole electoral system was designed to give a competitive edge to Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP), which was a non-programmatic party, offering voters nothing but executive competence and stability in the political and economic system. In 2005, constitutional amendments allowed some room for a multiparty system but elections continued to remain uncompetitive for both the parliament and the presidency (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2016).

In the post-Mubarak era, major actors understood that election rules would deeply influence the outcomes and shape of the political struggles to come. While the revolutionary actors pushed for a change in electoral system and replacement of the SMD system with PR, the SCAF suspended the 1971 constitution paving the way for new legislation on 13 February 13 2011. However, despite the pressure of the revolutionary actors, the SCAF implemented a more complex system, which employed the majoritarian system and PR at the same time.

The electoral system that was implemented after the 2011 uprisings was extremely complicated (The Carter Center, 2012). On 25 September 2011, the SCAF

introduced an amendment to Article 38 that introduced a mixed system using PR and majoritarian system simultaneously. The new law stated that 2/3 of the legislature (332 seats) was to be elected with PR in closed and blocked lists. Only registered political parties were allowed to compete for these 332 seats. The remaining 1/3 of the legislature (166 seats) was to be elected with the SMD system where each electoral district elected two members (Szmolka, 2014). Both party members and independents were allowed to contest for these seats. Each two-seat majoritarian district had to elect at least one candidate who was either a worker or a peasant. The same rule was applied to the candidates who were elected through PR as well; at least 50% should be either workers or peasants (The Carter Center, 2012). The new legislation also introduced a judiciary supervision of all elections in Egypt (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2013). Consequently, in 2011 parliamentary elections, 332 lower house seats were elected by proportional representation. The remaining 166 seats were chosen with the SMD system (Reuters, 2011). In 2011 parliamentary elections, the SCAF opted for 0.5% threshold (the lowest of its kind) for proportional list districts, which was an attempt by the SCAF to disincentivize the formation of electoral coalitions (Tavana, 2012). This strategy of the SCAF seems to work out as more than 40 parties competed in 2011 parliamentary elections. The top five political parties (Freedom and Justice Party, Al Nour, Egyptian Bloc, Al Wafd, and Al Wasat) received 84.6% of the popular vote. Other than Egyptian Bloc that received 8.9% of the votes in 2011 parliamentary elections, the other parties were either affiliated with actors such as the MB (Freedom and Justice Party) or Salafis (Al Nour Party) who already had a formidable presence in Egypt before the uprising or they were political parties which had its roots back in pre-uprising era. Therefore, the Egyptian Bloc, the only party, which could claim some revolutionary credentials, did not show a strong presence in the first free elections of Egyptian history.

Tavana (2012) argues that the electoral system formula designed by the SCAF had the unintended consequence of providing an electoral cushion to the strongest party in the country. Trager (2011) argues that the largest remainder system[3] that is used Egypt made it virtually impossible for smaller parties to compete against larger and mostly illiberal parties since only those parties that meet or exceed the quota of votes

[3] Lijphart (1994) explains that in largest remainder system the first step is to calculate a quota of votes that entitles parties to a seat in the parliament. A party will get as many seats as it has quotas of votes. Then any unallocated seats are given to those parties having the largest number of unused votes (largest remainders).

for a given district will be able to win seats in this system. According to him, the system significantly hampers newer parties in the parliamentary elections as makes it unlikely that small and still-forming parties will be able to compete effectively. In addition, Trager suggested that the closed party-list structure that was envisaged for the election of 2/3 of the legislature might significantly advantage the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party, which was the only political force with organizational capabilities after Mubarak's NDP was abolished.

The results of the November 2011 parliamentary elections proved Trager right. Freedom and Justice Party despite getting 36.4% of the vote controlled 45.2% (235 seats out of the 498 contested) in the 2011 parliamentary elections. After the elections, two biggest parties the FJP and Al Nour Party controlled 70% of the parliament; thereby eliminating any chance of a meaningful party competition in the legislature. Smaller liberal parties, which were unwilling to cooperate with the Salafist Al Nour Party, could not successfully challenge the hegemony of Freedom and Justice Party. Therefore after the first free elections of the Egyptian history, there would be no legislation by consensus or even minority consultation. The MB's Freedom and Justice Party and Salafis' Al Nour installed supermajorities on every committee; thus excluding liberal/ secular actors from the policy-making right from the beginning (Cambanis, 2015, p. 169). The situation became even more untenable after Morsi's election to the presidency in June 2012 with slightly over 51% of the votes in the second round of the presidential elections. Especially after this victory, Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party, which won both elections became even more uncompromising, and excluded liberal/ secular actors from the political process between 2011 and 2013 thereby effectively blocking any chance for a negotiated transition to democracy.

To sum up, several features of the 2011 electoral system made it less of a useful tool to promote a smooth transition to democracy. First, it was extremely complex. The system accommodated both PR and majoritarian system simultaneously. 2/3 of the legislature was elected with PR while the rest was elected with majority run-off formula where each district elected two candidates. The system also enforced a quota for farmers and peasants in districts where majority run-off formula was used. In addition, the largest remainder system in districts where PR was used provided large and illiberal parties such as FJP and Salafist Al Nour Party with important advantages over small parties. As a result, the MB's Freedom and Justice Party did not feel the need to negotiate the terms of the transition with liberal/ secular actors. This created a political

atmosphere where Islamists dominated the legislature and the constituent assembly that drafted the 2012 Egyptian constitution (Cambanis, 2012; Gelvin, 2015). This situation in return alienated secular actors letting a considerable part of the Egyptian society to support the Tamarod (Rebellion) movement, which emerged in 2013 with the support of the military intelligence and the police as well as funding by the Mubarak-era business tycoons (Stacher, 2015, p. 268). This organization that allegedly collected more than 22 million signatures demanding a resignation of Morsi, took it to the streets in 30 June 2013, which was the first year anniversary of inauguration of Morsi as the new president. The clashes between the supporters of the MB and the Tamarod continued for several days. The military used these clashes and Morsi's increasingly authoritarian tendencies such as his 23 November 2012 presidential decree granting him powers to issue any decision or law without any alternative authority in the country having the power to oppose or revoke it (Sabry, 2013) as excuses to stage a coup against him in July 2013 putting an end to Egypt's short experiment with democracy. Therefore, the electoral system that was implemented after the uprisings hardly stimulated cooperation and negotiation among the major political actors of Egypt. Instead, the 2011 electoral system strengthened divisions between Islamists and seculars and furthered polarization in the Egyptian society.

The second electoral system that was used after the 2011 uprisings was implemented in 2014; one year after June 2013 military coup which overthrew Morsi, the first civilian president of Egypt. Morsy (2014) explains that the new law again establishes a mixed electoral system and increases the number of representatives from 508 to 567. Of these 567, 420 members will be elected as individuals while the rest (120 members) will be elected from closed lists wherein the winning list in a district takes all seats in that district. The 2014 law also states that the president will appoint 27 members to the parliament. This new law was perceived as a setback for democracy by several analysts (Dawoud, 2014; Morsy, 2014; Morsy, 2015; Volkel, 2015). Dawoud (2014) argued that the new electoral law was a major upset for people who hoped to build a genuine democratic, pluralistic system. According to him, the law-makers deliberately designed the new election law since its emphasis on the individual system gave them greater leverage on who stands a chance to enter the parliament, amid a wide crackdown against the MB. Morsy (2014; 2015) suggested that the new electoral system and district divisions tainted by suspicions of gerrymandering gave individuals who were associated with Mubarak's National Democratic Party the upper hand in the

elections. He argues that these actors were recognized as the most organized and experienced group after the suppression of the MB not only because of their good relations with the state institutions and but also thanks to their links with the prominent tribes and families of the Upper Egypt. Morsy (2014; 2015) also explains that the 2014 electoral law caused a further weakening of political parties because the system stipulated that a great majority of the members of the legislature would be elected through the individual candidate system. Therefore, the new system empowered old networks of the Mubarak era, which were based on family and business ties, at the expense of political parties. Besides, for 120 seats allocated to political parties, the 2014 electoral law preferred closed lists to proportional lists. In this formula, a winning party or coalition could win all seats in the designated district if it takes 50%, plus one vote. If no party or coalition can garner enough votes, two lists with the highest number of votes will compete in a run-off round. It is in this context that Morsy (2014) argues that application of the electoral law signifies a major departure from the principle of popular representation and the people's vote.

The extremely low turn out rates in 2015 parliamentary elections might be an indicator that Egyptian people lost their confidence in elections. Volkel (2015) explains that the turn out rate after the first two days of elections was a mere 2.27%. After the first round of the elections, the turn out rate was 16%, which then was raised to 26.6% by the officials. Volkel asserts that a significant number of voters decided to vote only after the authorities paid them. In addition, the state decided to give public employees a half-day off in order to encourage them to participate in elections. Among other reasons such as the election fatigue (Egyptians ratified two constitutions; elected one parliament and two presidents between 2011 and 2015), one can also argue that the confusing electoral system prepared by a committee, which is controlled by Al Sisi alienated a significant part of the Egyptian society. Volkel also suggests that the fact that organized party lists make up only around 20% of the legislature prevented a stronger mobilization of voters for programmatic reasons. Independent candidates in the 2015 elections tried to appeal to the voters through their personality or promise of economic benefits instead of a political program that could target a genuine democratization. Hence, there were almost no public debates about Egypt's important problems ahead of elections that could boost Egyptian people's participation in elections.

5.5.2. Tunisia

While Egyptian political elite's choice of electoral systems alienated the voter; polarized the political spectrum; and obstructed transition to democracy, Tunisian political elite established an electoral system that paved the way for a smoother transition process.

Boubakri (2015, pp. 141-142, 144) explains that Tunisia became one of the few Arab countries in 1956 to recognize full suffrage and granted the women right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections. The 1959 Tunisian constitution also recognized political rights including election rights, which if fulfilled would prove to be a historic opportunity to build a democratic system based on political inclusiveness. However, says Boubakri, political opposition was reduced to façade first by Bourguiba (1959-1987) and then by Ben Ali (1987-2011). Bourguiba banned all political opposition between 1959 and 1981 while Ben Ali created political parties that would serve as loyal opposition his Constitutional Democratic Rally Party (CDR). During that period, the regime used a majoritarian system with a party block vote to win all seats in every constituency, as the CDR always got the majority of the vote. In addition, electoral fraud was common, and falsified results always secured more than 90% of seats for the ruling party. As a result, the opposition did not win a single seat between 1956 and 1989. For example, in the first multi-candidate presidential elections in 2004, Ben Ali won with an overwhelming majority of more than 90% of the vote.

According to Boubakri (2015), political exclusion during the Ben Ali era made demands for genuine inclusiveness and effective participation in public life one of the major targets of the Tunisian uprising. Accordingly, the interim government led by Beji Caid Essebbi (later leader of Call of Tunisia and president-elected since December 2014) set up a new legal and institutional framework. The new law on elections was adopted on 10 May 2011 with Decree Law 2011-35, which had important implications for the 2014 Tunisian constitution and Law 2014-16 of 26 May 2014 on elections and referendums (Boubakri, 2015, pp. 143-144).

Decree 2011-35 replaced the majoritarian system in place with a closed-list proportional representation system. Seats were allocated in regional districts using the largest remainder method. Therefore, unlike the Egyptian electoral law of 2011 and 2014, the Tunisian election law avoids employing PR and majoritarian formulas

simultaneously. Instead, the lawmakers in Tunisia opted for a simple PR method that would reflect the choices of the electorate without confusing them and while preventing bigger parties to dominate the parliament. For instance, the Islamist Ennahda (Renaissance), which is an offshoot of the MB in Tunisia won 41% of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly (NCA) in the 2011 elections while the same percentage allowed FJP to control 45% of the legislature in Egypt; thus forcing the Ennahda to negotiate the terms of a coalition with two social democrat parties after the 2011 elections; namely Congress for the Republic and Democratic Forum for Labor & Liberties, which got 8.7% and 7% of the votes respectively.

Another major difference between the Egyptian and Tunisian electoral systems is the fact that the Tunisian electoral law excluded remnants of the old system while especially the 2015 Egyptian election law re-incorporated Mubarak-era figures into the system. Decree Law 2011-35 provided two kinds of exclusion to eliminate actors affiliated with Ben Ali. First, more than 100 people who were relatives of Ben Ali and people who had unduly gained assets due to their connection with the family were denied voting rights. Second, a larger number of people who were involved with the Ben Ali regime were made ineligible to be candidates in the 2011 elections (Boubakri, 2015, p. 155). Last but not the least, Decree Law 2011-35 included clauses to enhance the representation of the economically marginalized regions of the country. Traditionally, the interior regions of Tunisia were economically, socially, and politically marginalized. For example, Mohammed Bouazizi, who self-immolated himself, hailed from Sidi Bouzid a relatively small city in a marginalized region. In addition, these impoverished regions were also subject to direct central government interference in nominating and selecting local officials. Therefore, integration of these regions into the decision-making processes formed a top priority for the lawmakers in the post-Ben Ali era. Article 33 of Decree Law 2011-35 took into the demands of the interior regions, and granted additional seats in order to enhance their representation in the NCA. As a result, some marginalized regions such as Tatouine and Tozeur doubled their representation in the assembly compared to the 2009 parliament (Boubakri, 2015).

Carey (2013) says that his examination of the district-level data demonstrates that had Tunisia employed the other most commonly used electoral formulas, the largest party Ennahda would have been awarded a super-majority in the NCA and been in a position to impose a constitution without any assistance from other political parties. Carey et al. (2015) explain that if Tunisia' 2011 NCA elections had been conducted

with using one of the so called “divisor” or “highest averages” methods, Ennahda would have earned seats ranging from 47% (under the divisor system) to 69% (under the D’Hondt divisor[4]). They assert that the choice of largest remainder system allowed Islamist Ennahda to capture only 41% of the seats forcing it to forge coalition with actors from the other end of the political spectrum.

Carey et al. (2015, pp. 24-25) argue that another key difference between Egypt and Tunisia in terms of their electoral systems is that the Tunisian electoral system is the result of a bargain between Tunisian political parties and civil society while the 2011 and 2014 Egyptian electoral systems were imposed by the mighty Egyptian army. The Egyptian military decided to preserve electoral institutions that operated during the Mubarak era. For instance, the individual candidacies system that was associated with patronage and personalities rather than policies and programs was kept intact both in the 2011 and 2015 electoral systems. On the contrary, Tunisian political elite decided to overthrow the old electoral system, and opted for a PR system that would empower political parties in the post-Ben Ali Tunisia. This decision contributed to a balance of power between Islamists and seculars in the Tunisian NCA; hence fostering a political atmosphere in the country that necessitated dialogue, inclusiveness, and an eventual cooperation between these actors despite the presence of historical suspicions.

After the 2011 NCA elections, the lslamist Ennahda agreed with two social democrat parties (Congress for the Republic and Democratic Forum for Labor & Liberties) to share top three positions in the country. Hamadi Jebali of Ennahda became the prime minister. Moncef Marzouki of Congress for the Republic became the president while Mustafa Ben Jaafar of Democratic Forum for Labor & Liberties became the new assembly's speaker (BBC, 2011). Major players of the Tunisian political theater continued to cooperate after the October 2014 parliamentary elections as well. In these elections the secular Call of Tunisia (Nida Tounes) garnered 37.6% of the votes to be followed by Ennahda with 27.8% of the votes. The third party was another secular party Free Patriotic Union with 4.1% of the votes. Contrary to the expectations of Wolf (2014), the victorious Nida Tounes chose to form a unity government that also includes a members from the rivaling Ennahda and other opposition parties (Al Jazeera, 2015).

[4]According to Gallagher (1991), the D’Hondt system is likely to give larger parties a larger share of seats than their share of the electorate in the elections. The major goal of this method is to guarantee that a party with a majority of voters will get at least half of the seats in the legislature.

These coalitions were marriage of convenience. They were necessitated by the election system that allowed neither Ennahda nor Call of Tunisia a majority in the legislature. Unlike the Egyptian constitution of 2012, which was the work of a committee dominated by Islamists, the 2014 Tunisian constitution was the work of a coalition, which negotiated the terms.

CHAPTER 6

6.1. Conclusions

A major target of this research was to study the factors, which affect the ways in which ordinary people understand the term democracy. Benefiting from the 6th wave of World Values Survey that was conducted in 60 countries between 2010 and 2014, this research examined how the context people occupy affects the ways in which they understand democracy. In chapter 3, I used *GDP per capita (PPP)* as the independent variable measuring wealth. Analysis demonstrated that GDP per capita (PPP) is an important factor affecting the ways in which people define democracy. Compared to people in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP), people are more likely to consider procedural characteristics essential to democracy in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP). I argued that this finding might indicate people in economically more developed countries are more likely to provide their democracies with diffuse support for they value institutions and processes of democratic regime more than they value the economic goods the regime could provide. However, in economically less developed countries, people are less likely than people in economically more developed countries to consider procedural characteristics essential to democracy.

Analysis also showed that when compared to people in economically less developed countries, people in countries in economically more developed countries are less likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. Hence, one can argue that people in economically less developed countries could be more likely to provide the democratic regime with specific support whereas people in economically more developed countries lend diffuse support to their democratic regime.

Chapter 3 also demonstrated that there is a negative relationship between GDP per capita (PPP) of a country and people's support for authoritarianism in that country. That is in countries where GDP per capita is higher; people are found to be significantly less likely to support authoritarian regimes. If we evaluate these results in conjunction with the previous findings about procedural and economic characteristics of democracy, it is possible to claim that people in economically more developed countries express their preferences for procedural characteristics of democracy, and are more averse to authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, people in economically less developed

countries expressing their preference for economic characteristics of democracy are also more likely to have authoritarian tendencies.

I argued that this is because people in economically more developed countries provide their regime with *diffuse support*, and they are willing and able to support the democratic regime even when it fails to provide economic goods in the short term. Those who are more likely to prefer economic characteristics to procedural characteristics evaluate democracy's performance with the economic benefits the regime is able to generate (*specific support*). Therefore, when the regime is unable to provide economic growth, employment, or other side benefits such as unemployment insurance, people might shift their loyalties and prefer an autocratic alternative to democracy if they believe an authoritarian regime would perform better in providing economic benefits.

Thus, people's support for democracy in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) makes it invulnerable to breakdowns while this is not the case in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP). In countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP), the regime has diffuse support that is directed toward institutions and unlikely to diminish with the regime's economic performance in the short or medium run. Therefore, in economically more developed countries people are able to make a distinction between the regime in abstract and its performance and do not change their adherence to the regime when it fails to provide economic goods. In economically less developed countries, people provide the regime and its actors with specific support that causes democracies to remain unconsolidated, and might result with breakdown when an authoritarian option promises more economic goodies. Hence, this research finds support of the arguments by Lipset (1959) and Przeworski et al. (2000) who argue that a more well-to-do nation has greater chances to sustain its democracy. However, my findings do not show any evidence for the view that a country is more likely to become a democracy as its wealth increases. Instead, analysis provides evidence for the view that democracies are more likely to survive in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) since publics of these countries are more likely to lend diffuse support to the democratic regime.

In chapter 4, I studied how the context interacts with individual attributes. My analyses in this chapter demonstrated that income and education (two key variables of modernization theory) do not have the same effect in economically less developed and economically more developed countries. The more educated people are more likely to support procedural characteristics of democracy in economically less developed

countries while there is no difference in terms of the ways in which people consider procedural characteristics essential to democracy in economically more developed countries. In economically less developed countries only the more educated people are more likely to provide the democratic regime with diffuse support while in economically more developed countries people provide the regime with diffuse support regardless of their education levels.

Chapter 4 also suggests that in economically less developed countries, high-income people are less likely than low-income people to argue that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. In economically more developed countries, compared to low-income people, high-income people are more supportive of procedural characteristics. Therefore, in economically less developed countries, low-income people are more likely than high-income people to have diffuse support whereas high-income people are more likely to have diffuse support to the democratic regime in economically more developed countries. These findings demonstrate that Lipset's research on the relationship between income and the tendency to hold pro-democratic values do not hold in economically less developed countries whereas his claim has more power economically more developed countries. Evidence shows that in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is low, it is not the rich but poor who are more likely to define democracy in the language of procedures and institutions. In economically less developed countries, high-income people might be willing to extend support to authoritarian systems to protect their economic and political privileges in the face of threatening working class whereas the latter might be willing to support democratic institutions to acquire economic and political power that is captive in the hands of the rich. Therefore, one can conclude that the democratic elite in economically less developed countries needs the support of the poor most if democracy is ever to be consolidated in these cases.

Analyses in chapter 4 also demonstrated that Lipset's theses about the relationship between income and attitudes towards democracy as well as the relationship education and attitudes towards democracy need a significant revision. My analyses suggest that people in same education or income groups are likely to display important differences in their perceptions of democracy in economically more developed and in economically less developed countries. Therefore, one needs to account for the effect of the context on individual attributes when studying people's attitudes towards democracy.

The findings in chapters 3 and 4 reveal the conditions under which a consolidation of the democratic regime is more likely. Przeworski et al. (2000) argue that economically more developed countries are more likely than poorer countries to consolidate their democracies. I argue that this is because the masses in economically more developed countries are more likely to present the democratic regime with diffuse support whereas the people in economically less developed countries provide the regime with specific support, which is episodic and based on a constant evaluation of the regime in terms of the economic benefits. If democracy fails to provide economic benefits in economically less developed countries, specific support to the regime evaporates thus paving the way for authoritarian options.

These findings might also hint a direction for economically less developed countries, which experience difficulties in the consolidation of the democratic regime. At the beginning of this study, I defined democracy as follows:

1. Pluralistic competition among parties and individuals for all positions of government power;
2. Participation among equal citizens in the selection of parties and representatives through free, fair, and periodic elections;
3. Civil and political liberties to speak, publish, assemble, and organize, as necessary conditions to ensure effective competition and participation;
4. Welfare programs by the state that would alleviate the kind of poverty hindering people from exercising their rights as they are listed above.

I furthermore argued that this definition of democracy is superior to procedural definitions of democracy for it includes procedural concerns along with a concern for outcomes. My research has shown that people in economically less developed countries are more likely than people in economically more developed countries to define democracy with economic references. People in economically more developed countries however are more likely than people in economically less developed countries to emphasize procedural characteristics of democracy. Then, consolidation of democracy in economically less developed countries is uncertain since citizens in these countries are more likely to provide the democratic regime with specific support to the regime as economic benefits seem to be more important than procedures and institutions of democracy for these people. It is in this context that I argue that those policies that promote procedural aspects of democracy while overlooking substantive dimensions do not provide a fertile ground for democracy in economically less developed countries. As

long as policy-makers in economically less developed countries do not develop welfare policies that will enable the citizens to enjoy their rights effectively, a breakdown of democracy will be more likely as citizens could shift their loyalties to an authoritarian option, which promises more economic goodies. In this respect, policies that promote welfare of the citizens in economically less developed countries will prolong the life of the democratic regime by guaranteeing the continuation of support to the regime in the short-run. This will give the democratic regime the breathing space to build the institutions of the democratic regime and socialize its citizens with a democratic culture, which in turn will flourish diffuse support. Therefore, presence of a concern among the ruling elite for the welfare of the citizens in young democracies could be an important factor preventing a breakdown of democracy in the short run and bringing about its consolidation in the longer run.

However, my analyses do not establish the conditions when transitions to democracy succeed or an incumbent takeover of democracy does not take place. To provide an answer to this question, Chapter 5 studied Egypt and Tunisia after 2011. In this chapter, I argued that two factors were instrumental: elite cohesion and the electoral system preference. In both Egypt and Tunisia, it was the military's split from the regime during the uprisings that brought about the end of dictatorial regimes. I also suggested that electoral system preference in Egypt and Tunisia played a key role determining the course of transitions in both countries. The excessively complex Egyptian electoral systems did not foster a culture of cooperation between Islamists and seculars. These electoral systems also failed to include different actors in the process during the transitional phase. It was these deficiencies of the 2011 and 2014 electoral systems that contributed to further polarization of the political scene and the eventual collapse of democracy in Egypt. The Tunisian electoral system did not allow major actors to dominate the legislature. As a result, major political actors had to form coalitions and move forward with significant compromise between 2011 and 2014, which in turn democracy as the most preferred outcome for all major actors since none of the actors was strong enough to monopolize power in its own hands. This fact also left its imprint on the 2014 Tunisian constitution making it a product of negotiation and consensus between different actors.

Democracy as a political system has the potential to capture the imagination of everybody, educated and non-educated as well as rich and the poor. However, the term is essentially contested as Gallie (1956) defined it. Despite that quality of the concept,

scholarly community and the Western political elite promotes democracy as the ideal and the natural that should be adopted without questioning. However, democracy is a socially constructed term, and we have only little understanding about the ways in which ordinary people define democracy. Without more research that would enable us to study how people understand democracy and why they define it this way rather than that way, attempts to promote democracy in non-Western parts of the world may prove futile. In this context, this research was an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the ways in which ordinary people understand the term. Understanding those factors will help us to advance democracy studies and aid the international community in its efforts to promote democracy as a political system.

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Appendix A: List of countries included WVS 6th wave

Table. List of countries included WVS 6th wave

Country	Country	Country	Country
Algeria	Georgia	Morocco	South Korea
Argentina	Germany	Netherlands	South Africa
Armenia	Ghana	New Zealand	Spain
Australia	Hong Kong	Nigeria	Sweden
Azerbaijan	India	Pakistan	Taiwan
Bahrain	Iraq	Palestine	Thailand
Belarus	Japan	Peru	Trinidad
Brazil	Jordan	Philippines	Tunisia
Colombia	Kazakhstan	Poland	Turkey
Cyprus	Kuwait	Qatar	Ukraine
Chile	Kyrgyzstan	Romania	United States
China	Lebanon	Russia	Uruguay
Ecuador	Libya	Rwanda	Uzbekistan
Egypt	Malaysia	Singapore	Yemen
Estonia	Mexico	Slovenia	Zimbabwe

Appendix B: GDP per capita (PPP) (2014), by country

Table. GDP per capita (PPP) (2014), by country

Country	GDP per capita (PPP)	Country	GDP per capita (PPP)
Algeria		Morocco	7,491
Argentina	22,400	Netherlands	47,663
Armenia	8,070	New Zealand	36,391
Australia	43,930	Nigeria	
Azerbaijan		Pakistan	4,811
Bahrain		Palestine	4,509
Belarus	18,185	Peru	11,989
Brazil	15,838	Philippines	6,969
Colombia	13,357	Poland	24,745
Cyprus	30,873	Qatar	
Chile	22,346	Romania	19,401
China	13,206	Russia	
Ecuador	11,372	Rwanda	1,661
Egypt	10,530	Singapore	82,763
Estonia	26,946	Slovenia	29,963
Georgia	7,582	South Korea	34,356
Germany	45,802	South Africa	13,046
Ghana	4,082	Spain	33,211
Hong Kong	55,084	Sweden	45,183
India	5,701	Taiwan	N.A.
Iraq		Thailand	15,735
Japan	36,426	Trinidad	31,967
Jordan	12,050	Tunisia	11,436
Kazakhstan		Turkey	19,200
Kuwait		Ukraine	8,666
Kyrgyzstan	3,322	United States	54,630
Lebanon	17,462	Uruguay	20,884
Libya		Uzbekistan	5,573
Malaysia	25,639	Yemen	
Mexico	17,108	Zimbabwe	1,792

Appendix C: EUI the democracy index scores, by country

Table: EUI the democracy index scores, by country

Country	Score (2014)	Country	Score (2014)
Algeria	3.83	Morocco	4.00
Argentina	6.84	Netherlands	8.92
Armenia	4.13	New Zealand	9.26
Australia	9.01	Nigeria	3.76
Azerbaijan	2.83	Pakistan	4.64
Bahrain	2.87	Palestine	4.72
Belarus	3.69	Peru	6.54
Brazil	7.38	Philippines	6.77
Colombia	6.55	Poland	7.47
Cyprus	7.40	Qatar	3.18
Chile	7.80	Romania	6.68
China	3.00	Russia	3.39
Ecuador	5.87	Rwanda	3.25
Egypt	3.16	Singapore	6.03
Estonia	7.74	Slovenia	7.57
Georgia	5.82	South Korea	8.06
Germany	8.64	South Africa	7.82
Ghana	6.33	Spain	8.05
Hong Kong	6.46	Sweden	9.73
India	7.92	Taiwan	7.65
Iraq	4.23	Thailand	5.39
Japan	8.08	Trinidad	6.99
Jordan	3.76	Tunisia	6.31
Kazakhstan	3.17	Turkey	5.12
Kuwait	3.78	Ukraine	5.42
Kyrgyzstan	5.24	United States	8.11
Lebanon	5.12	Uruguay	8.17
Libya	3.80	Uzbekistan	2.45
Malaysia	6.49	Yemen	2.79
Mexico	6.68	Zimbabwe	2.78

Appendix D: Gini scores, by country

Table. Gini scores, by country

Country	Gini Score	Country	Gini Score
Algeria	0.647	Morocco	0.593
Argentina	0.577	Netherlands	0.72
Armenia	0.685	New Zealand	N.A.
Australia	0.651	Nigeria	0.57
Azerbaijan	0.834	Pakistan	0.704
Bahrain	N.A.	Palestine	0.655
Belarus	0.74	Peru	0.553
Brazil	0.471	Philippines	0.57
Chile	0.495	Poland	0.676
China	0.579	Qatar	N.A.
Colombia	0.465	Romania	0.727
Cyprus	0.657	Russia	0.584
Ecuador	0.527	Rwanda	0.487
Egypt	0.692	Singapore	N. A.
Estonia	0.668	Slovenia	0.744
Georgia	0.600	South Africa	0.366
Germany	0.699	South Korea	N.A.
Ghana	0.572	Spain	0.641
Hong Kong	N.A.	Sweden	0.727
India	0.661	Taiwan	N.A.
Iraq	0.705	Thailand	0.607
Japan	0.679	Trinidad	N.A.
Jordan	0.663	Tunisia	0.642
Kazakhstan	0.736	Turkey	0.598
Kuwait	N.A.	Ukraine	0.754
Kyrgyzstan	0.726	United States	0.589
Lebanon	N.A.	Uruguay	0.581
Libya	N.A.	Uzbekistan	0.647
Malaysia	0.537	Yemen. Rep.	0.641
Mexico	0.519	Zimbabwe	N.A.

Appendix E: Share of Muslims (%), by country

Table. Share of Muslims (%), by country

Country	Muslim (%)	Country	Muslim (%)
Algeria	0,979	Morocco	0,99
Argentina	0,01	Netherlands	0,06
Armenia	0,001	New Zealand	0,012
Australia	0,024	Nigeria	0,488
Azerbaijan	0,969	Pakistan	0,964
Bahrain	0,703	Palestine	0,976
Belarus	0,001	Peru	0,001
Brazil	0,001	Philippines	0,055
Colombia	0,001	Poland	0,001
Cyprus	0,253	Qatar	0,677
Chile	0,001	Romania	0,001
China	0,018	Russia	0,1
Ecuador	0,001	Rwanda	0,018
Egypt	0,949	Singapore	0,143
Estonia	0,001	Slovenia	0,036
Georgia	0,107	South Korea	0,001
Germany	0,058	South Africa	0,017
Ghana	0,158	Spain	0,021
Hong Kong	0,018	Sweden	0,046
India	0,144	Taiwan	0,001
Iraq	0,99	Thailand	0,055
Japan	0,001	Trinidad	0,059
Jordan	0,972	Tunisia	0,99
Kazakhstan	0,704	Turkey	0,98
Kuwait	0,741	Ukraine	0,012
Krygyzstan	0,88	United States	0,001
Lebanon	0,613	Uruguay	0,001
Libya	0,966	Uzbekistan	0,967
Malaysia	0,637	Yemen	0,99
Mexico	0,001	Zimbabwe	0,08