

THE RISING POWER OF EXTREME RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE: THE ROLE
OF POLITICAL CULTURE

by

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RISING POWER OF EXTREME RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICAL CULTURE

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This research elaborates the role of political culture on the rising power of extreme right parties from 20 European countries between the time period of 2002 and 2012. Previous studies in the literature focuses on the effects of economic and political conditions to explain increasing vote share of extreme right parties. This thesis aims to introduce cultural explanations to provide an additional focus on value orientations of people and social cleavages behind their voting behavior.

With the above mentioned aim, this thesis tests the effects of political culture with the cross-national survey data from European countries to analyze the rise on extreme right voting. First, the effect of previously studied contextual characteristics and socio-political attitudes are introduced. Further, to measure political culture, different values such as; religiosity, political and social trust, tolerance, civic engagement, obedience and national pride are tested. As findings show; intolerance to immigrants and ethnic minorities is an important indicator for extreme right voting and religiosity, civic engagement or activism and political distrust have a positive impact on increasing votes of ERPs in Europe.

AVRUPA'DA AŞIRI SAĞ PARTİLERİN YÜKSELEN GÜCÜ: SİYASAL KÜLTÜRÜN ETKİSİ

Zülal Sunaçoğlu

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal kültür, oy verme davranışları, aşırı sağ partiler, Avrupa

Bu çalışma, 2002 ile 2012 yılları arasında 20 Avrupa ülkesi için siyasal kültürün aşırı sağ partilerin yükselen gücüne olan etkisini araştırmaktadır. Literatürde mevcut çalışmalar yükselen aşırı sağ parti oy oranlarının ekonomik ve siyasal koşullar sebebiyle oluşan etkilerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu araştırma sosyal ayrılmaların ve değer yargılarının Avrupa ülkelerindeki oy verme eğilimlerine olan etkilerine ek olarak odaklanmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Yukarıda bahsedilen amaçlara bağlı olarak, bu tez siyasal kültürün olası etkilerini birden fazla Avrupa ülkesini karşılaştırma imkanı sağlayan bir veritabanı kullanarak test etmektedir. Öncelikli olarak, literatürde çalışılmış olan içeriksel özellikler ve sosyo-politik davranışlar çalışmaya eklenmiştir. Buna ek olarak siyasal kültürü hesaplanabilir hale getirmek için dindarlık, sosyal ve politik güven, tolerans, sivil katılım, itaat ve ulusal gurur gibi farklı değerlerin etkileri test edilmiştir. Bunun sonucunda etnik kökeni farklı olan vatandaşlara ve göçmenlere karşı olan hoşgörüsüzlüğün aşırı sağ parti oy verme eğiliminde önemli bir belirleyici olduğu ve dindar, sivil katılımı ve aktifliğin ve politik güvensizliğin Avrupa'daki aşırı sağ partilerin yükselen oylarında etkili olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır.

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LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|--|
| ERPs | Extreme right parties |
| ESS | European Social Survey |
| ISCED | International Standard Classification of Education |
| EC | European Commission |
| ERIC | European Research Infrastructure Consortium |
| ISCED | International Standard Classification of Education |
| NSD | European Election Database |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Increasing vote share of extreme right wing parties is popularly debated among Europeans in the last decade, as it further ignited concerns over the increasing power of extreme right ideology. As a consequence, the number of academic studies on this subject has increased. While existing studies widely focus on the economic and political conditions of countries to explain increasing vote share of extreme right parties (ERPs), cultural explanations provide an additional focus on value orientations of people behind their voting behavior. It should here be noted that socio-political identities of individuals shape their political preferences while different sets of values shape these identities. This research contributes to the literature by testing effects of political culture among European countries, details of which will be elaborated in the fourth chapter. Furthermore, this study includes all European countries in its analysis and does not solely focus on Western European countries.

Political attitudes and democratic tendencies have been linked to political culture with Almond and Verba's (1963) famous concept of civic culture. Adopting the current arguments in existing literature, this research aims to define political culture with a broader sense as practiced political behavior and mindsets of people in political events. The mindset or psychology of voters is highly affected by their social and political identities. Most psychological research on political culture with approaches such as 'value' orientation highlight the importance of socio-political identities of individuals and prefer an observation method such as surveys. In this context, what is commonly

known as the post-materialist values, which Inglehart's (1997) highlights role of these values in shaping political preferences of individuals in the late modernization phase of industrial societies.

Voting blocs are clustered around historical cleavages and these cleavages are expected to reflect deep and persistent values of the people. Social cleavages are commonly accepted determinants of voting behavior as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) point out in their famous work focusing on the social cleavage theory. In this manner, it becomes significant to test social cleavages, specifically the parameters, which are assumed to shape socio-political identities and are expected to help researchers understand the tendencies of an individual in voting for extreme right parties. The parameters I examine in this thesis are as follows: religiosity, trust, tolerance, civic engagement, obedience and national pride. As a matter of fact, the results of this study will give an idea about the identity of societies which answers the question of why extreme right party (ERP) votes increase in European countries. Socio-political attitudes of European citizens have been discussed in this study to test what kind of values are effective in increasing votes of EPRs with an aim to further see whether there are possible emerging voting blocs (cleavages) or not.

Traditional values such as nationalism and religion also continue their role in creating social cleavages by supporting new anti-immigrant discourse and by dividing societies into two: us and others. On the one hand, traditional roles of religion or nationalism do not continue determining the social division, because their meanings and practices changed over the time. On the other hand, these traditional values further deepen new cleavages that are established. At this point, political culture and values define identities of public, which might be creating or supporting the mentioned new cleavages or voting blocs. As mentioned above and as a consequence, this research is conducted to explain political tendencies or voting preferences of European citizens through their political culture patterns.

In their work Werts et al. (2013) focus on social cleavages, role of religiosity, Euroscepticism and political distrust with their possible effect on extreme right voting.

They test socio-political attitudes, contextual variables and social background characteristics. This thesis aims to contribute their findings in a way that it broadens the social cleavage focus and add further test on value orientations to introduce political culture perspective to the literature.

Here it should be noted that this thesis recognizes the conceptual ambiguity of political culture and its limits. However, it ambitiously focuses on finding an efficient way of operationalizing the concept in order to present the cultural reasons behind increasing voting for the extreme right. In the first chapter, my research question as well as its place in electoral studies will be presented. Then, the political culture and voting behavior literature will be examined in detail to demonstrate the theoretical and motivational background behind the research aims of this study. In the third chapter, the research design of this thesis is explained and the data, as the quantitative aspect of this study are introduced. After covering the motivation of this study along with its theoretical foundation and the research design, I elaborate on the analysis and its results in the fourth chapter. Finally, concluding remarks on the study's implications are introduced in the fifth chapter with an additional discussion on the study's strengths and pitfalls.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAME

Extreme right parties (ERPs) started to emerge and gain electoral support in Western European countries in the last 30 years. This has been accompanied with an effort to add new empirical findings to the extreme right voting literature. Some have explained the success of ERPs; some explained unstable voting behavior among different countries of Western Europe whereas others focused on the question of why in some countries ERPs increased its popular support but not in others. Many scholars focused on the effects of unemployment and electoral institutions (Jackman&Volpert, 1996; Lewis-Beck&Mitchell, 1993; Knigge, 1998; Golder, 2003; Swank&Betz, 2003) and immigration (Anderson, 1996; Martin, 1996; Knigge, 1998; Golder, 2003), the role of media (Boomgarden, and Vliengenthart, 2007; Van der Pas et al., 2013), social background (Lubbers et al. 2002, Werts et al. 2013), as well as the role of Euroscepticism (Werts et al. 2013). Furthermore differences in electoral successes among countries are also examined (Eatwell, 2003; Golder, 2003; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Arzheimer, 2009; Art, 2011).

Jackman and Volpert (1996) in their quantitative analysis show the unemployment effect in the success of extreme right parties. Furthermore effects of electoral threshold and multipartism within a proportional system on the success of ERP are tested. They test for 16 countries and 105 elections between 1970 and 1990. This research is significant since it is one of the earliest quantitative analyses of the success of ERPs. According to this research, higher unemployment and lower electoral threshold result in increasing electoral support for ERPs.

Golder (2003) tests “the unemployment, immigration and electoral institutions effects on success of extreme right parties”. In his findings, he firstly distinguishes neo-fascist parties and populist parties since they are affected by different factors. This division builds on the distinction between the two in the earlier literature (Ignazi, 1992, 2003; Betz, 1994; Taggart, 1996). Then he tests the possible effects of the mentioned variables and concludes that unemployment only matters when immigration is high. Furthermore, populist parties gain more support where the district magnitude is large.

Swank and Betz (2003) analyze the effect of welfare state institutions on ERP votes and asylum seekers number with its relation to the electoral success of ERP. As a result they find out that if number of asylum seekers is high ERP votes also increases whereas when welfare state is highly efficient then the electoral success of ERP is reduced.

Arzheimer (2009) focuses on two basic aspects in his research; unstable support for ERP and weak support to ERP. Levels of unemployment and immigration are once again tested but this time with the inclusion of other possible variables. As a result institutions of the welfare state are found to moderate the effects of unemployment where immigration as well as other contextual and individual variables are included for testing the hypothesis. As Arzheimer (2009) highlights, it is important to conduct an explanatory research of why ERPs votes are increasing in certain countries but not in others. In doing so, the role of political culture is one of the suggestions he makes in his remarks on further research.

The ERP literature mostly focuses on unemployment, immigration, but also examined the impact of many possible variables such as the role of globalization, Euroscepticism, social background characteristics, and the role of media. Many different possible explanations try to come up with a general pattern of who votes for the ERPs and why ERP votes increase in some countries. In this sense, it is significant to analyze the role of culture in this picture. Culture is an important tool to explain political or social events because it is a powerful factor that constructs and reconstructs ideas with its powerful roots. Culture is the source of identities of people and possible value identifications of individuals shape their way of life. Political behaviors of voters

are not always only shaped by unemployment, immigration rate, leadership, and media effects. Certain kinds of values and identities also lead to certain voting preferences. The effect of culture is inseparable from the previously examined factors in the ERP literature. Cultural values and value orientations define perspectives and perceptions of individuals which mean that effects of culture are always in the picture. Effects of globalization, Euroscepticism, leadership, or media shape voting behavior of people are significant but their effects are already defined by cultural orientations of individuals. At this stage it is important to see what kind of values identifications increase ERP vote share.

2.1. Approaches to Voting Behavior

2.1.1. Social- Psychological Approach

Voters psychologically feel closer to certain parties and their attitudes are also shaped by party positions. Campbell (1960) has a psychological explanation for voting preferences as voters identify themselves with parties through the socialization process. In this manner, socialization process and social group identifications of people become crucial for voting preferences. The position of a party becomes an outline for certain set of behaviors of individuals who identify themselves with this party.

According to the realistic conflict theory if there are scarce resources groups will compete for these sources and hostility will arise between them (Levine and Campbell, 1972). In this realist perspective, rational behaviors of groups are used to explain reasons behind feelings of hostility. Same goals and motives for different groups create tensions and conflict between them. Coser (1956) explained social conflicts through the categories of realistic and non-realistic conflicts (Art 2011). Non-realistic conflicts are more emotionally motivated conflicts whereas realistic conflicts have more materialistic reasons and means.

Blumer (1958) focuses on social processes and group position in racial relations which resulted in prejudice against certain race groups. There is hostility toward out groups that try to reach same goals (Coenders, 2001). Certain dominant groups form stereotypes and discrimination against other racial, ethnic groups. According to Coenders, Blumer and Coser's approaches comply with each other (Werts, 2010, p.22). They contribute to the literature with the argument that since each ethnic group in a society has a certain set of expectations, ideologies, and intentions over the scarce sources available to them; ethnic groups are more likely to have conflicting interests, so become adversaries in a society. As mentioned above, the reason behind the conflicting parties may be due to each group's understanding of power, social position, material resources or privileges that they have.

Social identity theory elaborates psychological reasons behind in-group favoritism and out-group hostility (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Members of the same groups tend to act similarly; positively towards each other and negatively to others. Tajfel (1970) focuses on psychology of inter-group hostility and explains this hostility through categorization of people. Some people are more likely to discriminate against others and competition is not a sufficient explanation for this discrimination that leads to prejudice. Social identities of individuals matter for their behaviors and self-categorization is the main reason for the creation of hostility.

When individuals identify themselves with certain groups, they form positive attitudes towards in-group and discrimination and prejudice towards out-group (Tajfel, 1970, p. 96). In this context, certain groups are more motivated to emphasize these negative feelings when competing with each other. In-group is generally characterized with national identification where out-groups are identified with immigrants, minorities or foreigners (Coenders, 2001). Extreme right parties position themselves with nationalistic tendencies and xenophobic, discriminative and negative stereotypes, as well as hostility feelings toward those who are categorized as others, be they immigrants, minorities and foreigners. Individuals who identify themselves with these ERPs are expected to be more intolerant and have lack of trust to outsiders or external groups.

Discrimination and hatred against outsiders are ways of expressing prejudice. These attitudes are formed by categorizations and psychology of individuals who identify themselves with certain social groups. Individual's behaviors are shaped by the socialization process that forms social identities and shapes socio-political behaviors. Voting behavior is clustered around political groups that are created by these identity formations.

2.1.2. Social Cleavage Theory and Extreme Right Voting

Understanding the increase in votes of ERPs is only possible through understanding why people choose to vote for certain parties. According to the cleavage theory that Lipset&Rokkan (1967) introduces party politics in Europe are formulated around the traditional cleavages which divide the society and create voting blocs.

People tend to identify themselves through certain values in which societal cleavages become the crucial shaping tools behind voting preferences. To understand the relation between the social cleavages and voting blocs, we should focus on how social cleavages determine political behavior. Social cleavages turn into political determinants when the alliances, coalitions evolve through party politics (Lipset&Rokkan, 1967, pp.116-117). In terms of achieving political power parties politicize social divisions to win votes. On the one hand, politics is defined through how people see themselves and how they request to be represented. In this manner major value divisions shape the voting blocs. On the other hand, parties try to build their alliances around existing cleavages and values which help them to fit party discourse to people who are closer and identify themselves with those parties due to their needs.

Cleavage theory and its classical relational explanation of voting preferences underline the effects of political parties on political processes. Political parties also construct and “actively naturalize identities and collectivities and integrate them into

coherent blocs” (Tugal et al. 2009, p. 196). Voting blocs that are explained to be clustered around social cleavages are also affected by political parties influence. Although historical cleavages as well as political culture construct value orientations, socio-political identities and political preferences, these processes are dynamic and reciprocal. Contexts shape individuals and individuals shape contexts.

Traditionally, party politics of Western European countries were formed around religious and class cleavages. Class based identification was visibly dominant during the Cold War Era. Right and left ideology has been the major determinant in the party politics and voting behavior literature since people chose to vote according to their ideologies. However, as argued by Spies&Franzmann (2011), “Analyzing only the general left–right dimension is not sufficient for understanding what happens in contemporary party systems (p.1061).” With the victory of Western democracy and liberal market economy, ideology formulations and societal cleavages also changed. Kitschelt (1997, p.2) states that; “post-industrial politics is characterized by a main ideological cleavage dividing left-libertarians from right-authoritarians”. People no more polarize around the traditional left and right spectrum. Once religion based politics was the driving force of the European politics which turned into class based one with the Industrial Revolution (Lipset&Rokkan, 1967, p.101). In this dynamic process of cleavage formation new issues are also introduced in the process. New social divisions around immigration, ethnicity or maybe the old cleavage of religion might now affect voting behavior. New values might be determining voting choices of people and voting blocs.

Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) in their ‘freezing hypothesis’ state that ‘1960s party systems’ are determined by ‘the cleavages of 1920s’ in Europe. According to this hypothesis, cleavages shape party systems and these systems create voting blocs. These party blocs are determined by value orientations that are shaping voting behaviors of people. In this thesis aim is to test these value orientations to see whether cleavages are frozen or not in the contemporary party system of Europe. In doing so, increasing extreme right voting is an important tool to determine these changing value orientations.

In the last decade, voting patterns have changed although the rise of the extreme right parties is not a new phenomenon in Europe. However, this time the reasons behind the increasing votes seem different. Ideas of right and left are very similar now that all mainstream parties follow similar policies. This creates new spaces for extreme parties to gain votes among Europe. For instance, in Germany the far left and in France extreme right parties gained votes. French Front National, Danish Progress Party, Austrian Freedom Party, Sweden Democrats, Belgium's Vlaams Belang are major extreme right parties of Europe that increased their votes. Since different countries witnessed different political behaviors, possible political cultural differences and similarities between these countries are very important to be evaluated

Extreme right discourse increasingly reached wider popular audience in last the 30 years within Western European countries. The context of this discourse has been shaped by the extreme right wing parties through their simple messages. Commonly, far right parties are divided as neo-fascist parties and populist parties or the "new right" (Ignazi, 1992, 2003; Betz, 1994; Taggart, 1996) in the literature. Populist claims follow anti-immigrant discourses and tend to accuse immigrants of taking the job opportunities away from non-immigrant citizens. These claims tend to be successful since mainstream parties fail to satisfy voters in certain situations and extreme right discourse is able to fill the gap and gain the protest votes. As Ignazi (1992, 2003) points out, when mainstream parties fail to satisfy voters in terms of immigration and crime policies, voters turn to ERPs. Furthermore, extreme right discourse blames mainstream parties for being the same and attack central right and left parties, which let them gain votes from them. In this thesis rather than dividing ERPs, they are categorized under one extreme right wing category by following the categorization of Mudde (1999); if their party programs highlight values such as nationalism, xenophobia, and political dissatisfaction, focus of law and order, discomfort with existing parties.

Extreme right movements are highly associated with nationalism and nationalistic attitudes towards foreigners within a country. Even though nationalism is a central issue for ERPs (Lubbers 2001), one should be aware that it goes far beyond the traditional nationalism understanding since it uses anti-establishment and anti-

immigrant discourse (Ellianas, 2007, pp.355-356). Populist claims highlight that certain identities cannot be integrated into the national identity. This very idea makes ERPs extreme and exclusionary but at the same time attractive to citizens who have strong notions of belonging.

There are more than economic reasons behind the increase of ERP voting. In certain countries ERPs do not increase their votes but in certain cases they do because the reason is not simply unemployment but more likely to be also related to cultural or societal divides that vary from country to country. In this sense, certain value orientations of voters from different European countries are likely to be determinants behind the increasing votes of ERPs. In the last decade, voting blocs are shifting and these shifts are affected by political culture. Different cultural orientations and identities of individuals shape voting preferences and social cleavages are reconstructed by this process.

2.2. Approaches to Political Culture

The study of political culture have been influenced by different disciplines; anthropology, sociology and mainly political psychology contributed to the field. Writings of Plato to Aristotle, Machiavelli to Marx influenced the political culture research through the history of political thought (Almond, 1980).¹ With the 1950s and 1960s the concept started to be studied empirically in which conceptual ambiguity tried to be overcome by new methodologies and data and an effort to test the political behaviors (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1988, 1997; Eckstein, 1988, Putnam, 1993).

¹Almond (1980) introduces the whole historical process of political culture and civic culture concept in his work. Political history, interdisciplinary influences and political theory with their relation to political culture are discussed.

Comparative politics literature has witnessed many debates about the difficulty of creating political culture concept. Modern political science has been trying to come up with a general pattern to explain why people act in certain ways in their political behaviors. Empirical research method has been used in operationalizing political culture with the help of psychological and cultural approaches (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1997; Eckstein, 1988, Pye, 1965). Mainly political psychology and survey data have been used to be able to measure political culture. The behaviorist approach focuses on attitudes and behaviors of individuals to come up with the generalizable idea of why and how people act in certain ways. The possibility of understanding the meanings of culture is very complex and impossible because psychology of individuals is very complex to be analyzed in their voting preferences. As a result, actions and behaviors of individuals become the concrete tools for us to understand and test how culture operates.

The anthropological influence on the definition of culture also dominated cultural theory. Culture is learned through socialization process and anthropology focuses on its symbolic characteristics and tries to evaluate culture through these symbols. Values, ideas and beliefs are all cultural factors in which way of life of individuals are pursued and their lifestyles affect their actions. “Culture is not power but rather a context in which social events, behaviors, institutions and processes can be attributed” (Geertz, 1973, p. 14). Culture provides a framework for predictability of political behaviors of individuals and “their acts are signs” (Geertz, 1973, p. 13). This context gives meanings to behaviors of people and defines sociopolitical identities. There are many ‘culture’ definitions which makes it hard for political scientists to operationalize the political culture concept. Geertz definition of culture has widely influenced the political culture literature since defining and testing symbols as characteristics of a given culture allow empirical testing.

With the 1980s political culture studies came under the dominance of rational choice theory similar to the whole political science field (Wildavsky, 1987; Inglehart, 1988; Eckstein, 1988; Putnam, 1993). Political psychology and measuring behavior and preferences through survey analysis started to dominate. Rational explanations of

political behaviors and modern scientific methods became crucial for reasoning political actions. Political culture provides a framework for political behaviors, political identity and political tendency of a society to be analyzed. In their famous work *The Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba (1963) introduce the term civic culture and make survey data analysis among five countries to understand political attitudes and their relation to democracy. This empirical research soon became the foundation for political culture studies.

Political culture helps us to understand why political behaviors differ among countries and why people choose to act in certain ways. The term political culture is defined as “political orientations- attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” by (Almond and Verba, 1963; p.12). Political orientations are shaped by culture and analyzing orientations of people is a way to understand cultures. Different cultures have different orientations and members of same cultures have similar political orientations (Eckstein 1988; 791).²

Political preferences are shaped by the way people “construct their culture in the process of decision making and their continuing reinforcement, modification, and rejection of existing power relationships teaches them what to prefer” (Wildavsky, 1987, p.5). When the political culture studies revived in 1980s the renaissance of political culture gave the field another phase. Inglehart (1988, 1990, 1997), highlighted the importance of civic culture with his emphasis on changing social, political and economic conditions of the world as well as changing values, which he called “postmaterialist values”.³ Inglehart (1997) expanded his political culture work and used World Values Survey (WVS) data sets to empirically support his research.

Huntington’s (1996) clash of civilizations is also another important contribution to political culture literature in the political science field. Huntington focuses on the

²Eckstein introduces the term “orientational variability” and he states that orientations are variables that are not only subjective but they are more culturally formed or in other words “learned” (Eckstein 1988; 791).

³Post Materialist values refer to interpersonal trust, personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction (Inglehart 1988; p.1203).

divisions which are cultural and come from primordial identities according to his theory and there are civilizations in the world that explain major camps in the world. Cultural focus on understanding sources of conflict highlights cultural identity's role in shaping actions. Identities are shaped similarly under the same culture since they share language, religion and historiography (Laitin 1988; p. 591).

Another important scholar, Putnam (1993), takes civic culture concept one step further in his work on culture to explain political conditions of Italy.⁴ Putnam uses a composite measure of political culture to explain differences in civic engagement of different regions in Italy. According to Putnam, the current political situation is rooted in the civic culture of Italy that provides proof that the political culture measurement explains political actions.

Political culture and political structure define each other in a closely related and harmonious way. Political structures can be seen as reflections of political culture but they also shape political culture (Pye, 1965). Political structures shape political patterns and political patterns form political preferences. Different set of values such as, "...patriotism, community loyalty, religious values, and simple habit and tradition obviously enter into the explanation of political structure and legitimacy" (Almond, 1980, p. 184). Political structure and political culture relation is reciprocal in which political culture shape political structure and vice versa.

The behavioral approach has been used to understand political behaviors and attitudes of individuals through survey methodology. The approach borrows from political psychology and uses individual level data. As individual values and beliefs change, the electoral results in a country change as well. Ideals, norms, beliefs, religion, symbols and customs shape value orientations and stand points of individuals and in a broader sense, societies have different value orientations that define their political culture. Orientations are shaped by socialization process and internalization of culture (Parsons, 1951). Value orientations are shaped by political culture and our cognitive knowledge about culture. Political culture is learned through socialization processes and

⁴Social capital as a concept to explain current political situation of Italy.

shared norms, values and beliefs define political participation (Almond and Verba, 1963). Value orientations differ from country to country that contributes to explain the increasing votes of extreme right parties in Europe.

Party identification is highly related with the cultural values, religion and social class. Party preferences of individuals are shaped by cultural boundaries of that individual. In the past, people were more likely to vote according to their cultural standings, social classes and religious preferences which were more dominant in social and political life of people. In the last few decades, new issues started to gain votes such as; environmental protection, political participation, sex related issues and immigration issues and they are now on the agenda of new parties (Deegan, 2006, pp. 6-7). Post-materialist issues are on the rise among Europe which is partly a result of the increase in vote shares of green parties and ERPs. Some countries witness significant increases in votes of extreme right parties, whereas some loss power of major parties. Extreme right parties mainly gain votes with their anti-immigrant standing and discourse.

2.3. Operationalizing Political Culture

Concept of the culture is hard to agree on since there are many differences between cultural practices of different countries and subcultures within those cultures. Shared values are not enough to understand political tendencies because people with opposing views can be under the same culture (Laitin, 1988, p.590). In this sense, individual level analysis is crucial to understand political attitudes but also applying individual behaviors to society level is necessary to be more comprehensive in making sense of general patterns in the culture of an existing country.

Individuals exist within culture but also produce culture. In this sense, society level analysis is crucial because there are many subcultures that affect perceptions and above all there is a society level culture which also forms roots of general tendencies of

individuals that live under a given society. Culture is unconsciously internalized by people and it shapes our way of life, thinking, concepts, perceptions and behaviors in our social and political actions.

Studying political culture as an independent variable gives researcher a more testable concept to understand the ambivalent individual choice of political action. Political culture can help us as an independent variable to explain the patterns of political behaviors to make sense of why people tend to shift their votes. It might be problematic to use political culture as an independent variable because it comes from the individual values which tend to change over the time but this is not a problem for this thesis because it aims to explain these changes and try to find their roots. Since basic values are not that unstable over time they can explain the revival of extreme right party votes. Survey data can help it to strengthen.

In order to measure political culture materialist and post-materialist values such as; “cultural traditions and values; traditional values; religion, national pride, obedience and survival values; security, quality of life, self-expression, happiness, trust, tolerance, civic activism” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p.52) become parameters in survey data analysis. Secular values, traditional values, political values, religious values all draw country profile and political culture. Certain values define certain countries more than others and give us an idea about political tendencies of these countries. In this context, there are many democracy and political culture studies which focus on values that affect democratic tendencies as discussed above. Extreme right party votes are also an issue to be elaborated through analyzing possible effects of different values of different countries.

Religiosity with its possible effects is included in ERP studies (Ven der Brug et al. 2000; Arzheimier et al. 2009; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Werts et al. 2013). Religiosity is not included as a composite measure but rather different dimensions to find different effects on ERP voting (Arzheimier et al. 2009, p. 988). Arzheimier concludes that religiosity does not have a positive or negative effect on ERP voting but he remarks religious people as potential voters. Although religious people still are attached to their religious parties such as Christian Democratic and conservative parties,

those parties are losing their power and as a result due to their traditional and conservative value systems these people might become potential voters of ERP in the near future.

Political culture is set of different values which are shared by individuals and draws the profile for countries and political preferences. This research aims to measure values of religiosity, trust, civic culture, tolerance, political interest, national identity, and national pride to come up with an empirical measure of political culture concept and its relation to extreme right party voting. In other words, this thesis aims to test whether there is a pattern of certain values that affect extreme right party voting in Europe.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This thesis adopts one of the quantitative research methods, details of which will be discussed in this chapter, since this study aims to study the concept of culture by testing individual behavior through the help of already existing quantitative data. Accordingly, survey analysis based research follows the studies of Almond&Verba 1963, Inglehart 1997, Eckstein 1988 and Putnam1993 on political culture, which adopts quantitative techniques in answering their research questions. Confirming my approach, ERP studies usually follow the quantitative method tradition as cited in Arzheimer 2009, Golder 2003, Lubbers et al. 2002, and Boomgarden&Vliegenhart 2007.

This research aims to test the general political culture tendency through logistic analysis. Furthermore, the casual effects of different values as defined previously, are crucial to make sense out of individual cases (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994,p. 78). In order to prevent selection bias, all available European countries with extreme right wing votes are included in the research. Additionally, case study based research designs might test the effect of political culture further and deeper, since ‘culture’ as a concept by itself is very complex. While all cultures have their unique parameters this research aims to present a comparable and generalizable analysis of culture with its relevance in voting behavior literature.

3.1. Research Design of the Study

This study evaluates the possible association between political culture and extreme right party voting behavior. While doing so, it also examines the possible effects of different values such as religiosity, trust, tolerance, obedience, civic engagement, national pride as well as happiness, life satisfaction.

A number of studies in the literature used survey data to measure ‘political culture.’ As discussed previously, difficulty of such a research design comes from the ambiguity of the political culture concept and measuring the effects of culture on voting for the ERP. Studies focusing on the importance of political culture stem from the empirical methods in which survey questions are generally used to test different values and the effects of political culture.

As this research aims to test the effects of political culture on voting behavior, individual level analysis emerge as crucial dimensions. On the one hand, while individual behavior and values shape each individual’s socio-political identities and these values constitute the voting patterns of specific countries; on the other hand, individuals within shared cultures are more likely to have similar behavior compared to those with whom they do not share the same culture.

To reduce the risk of partial explanations of the independent variables, control variables are needed to be introduced to test the casual link between the dependent and independent variables (Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000, pp. 50-51). With an aim to overcome this problem, this research adopts age, marital status, education, and gender as individual level control variables.

3.2. Data

The European Social Survey (ESS) dataset is used in this research.⁵From the 2000s, the surveys have been held every two years in European countries. There are six rounds of cross-national survey data starting from the first round of 2002 until 2012, as the latest round. The ESS received an ERIC status⁶ and it is funded by the European Science Foundation, European Commissions' (EC) Framework programs, and national councils. The surveys have been designed to reach high standardized cross national data. Accordingly, the current methodology of the ESS surveys have been achieved by conducting steps such as pre-testing, sampling, data collection, reduction of bias, comparability among countries, and reliability. The project aims to cover changing values and attitudes over years under different themes across Europe.

The ESS cross national survey, with its rich and variety of survey questions, allows researchers to identify and compare possible values and identities of individuals which create a tendency in voting for the ERPs. The dataset is very large and emerge as suitable to conduct analyses both at individual and country levels. Moreover, survey questions comply with the aim of this research, which is to measure value orientations of European citizens and measure political culture.

Twenty European countries were selected according to availability and relevance of the data, considering 36 participant countries. Countries were chosen according to if they have participated at least in two rounds of the ESS. Furthermore, countries were chosen if the ERPs gained more than 0.5% of the votes in one of the rounds, because it has become necessary to see the tendency and relevance of the ERP voting with enough voters from each country (Previous studies also use logistic

⁵<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

⁶ ERIC (European Research Infrastructure Consortium) status refers to European Research Infrastructure membership which is for joint research infrastructure establishment and it is under the legal framework of European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/research/infrastructures/index_en.cfm?pg=eric

regression and 0.5 threshold for ERP vote shares to analyze the relevance of ERPs such as Lubbers et al., 2002, Werts et al., 2013). With the help of previous studies (Arzheimer, 2006, pp. 425-426, Golder, 2003, p. 448, and Werts et al. 2013, p. 191) and the analysis of party programs helped me in this study to create a list of the ERPs in Europe. Table 1¹ presents the complete list of extreme right parties from twenty selected European countries with their average ERP vote shares in the six ESS rounds. 16 countries were excluded from the research, because either they did not have enough votes of ERPs, or they did not participate at least two rounds of surveys.

Table 1: Detailed list of extreme right parties

| | |
|----------|---|
| Austria | FPÖ: <i>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</i> (Freedom Party of Austria), BZÖ: <i>Bündnis Zukunft Österreich</i> (Alliance for the Future of Austria) |
| Belgium | VB: <i>Vlaams Blok</i> (Flemish Interest), FN: <i>Front National</i> (National Front) |
| Bulgaria | <i>Ataka</i> (Attack), NFSB: <i>Natzionalen Front za Spasenie na Bulgaria</i> (National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria) |
| Croatia | HSP: <i>Hrvatska stranka prava</i> (Croatian Pure Party of Rights) |
| Denmark | FRPd: <i>Fremskridtspartiet</i> (Progress Party), DFP: <i>Dansk Folkeparty</i> (Danish People's Party) |
| Finland | PS: <i>Perussuomalaiset</i> (Finn's Party-True Finns) |
| France | FN: <i>Front National</i> (National Front), MNR: <i>Mouvement National Républicain</i> (National Republican Movement) |
| Germany | REP: <i>Republikaner</i> (the Republicans), NPD/DVU: <i>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (National Democratic Party of Germany) / <i>Deutsche Volksunion</i> (The People's Union). |
| Greece | LAOS: <i>Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós</i> (Popular Orthodox Rally), <i>Chrysí Avgí</i> (Golden Dawn). |
| Hungary | MIEP/Jobbik: <i>Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom</i> (the Movement for a |

| | |
|-------------|--|
| | Better Hungary). |
| Italy | LN: <i>Lega Nord</i> , MS-Ft : <i>Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore</i> (Tricolour Flame Social Movement) |
| Netherlands | LPF: <i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i> (Pim Fortuyn List), PVV: <i>Partij Voor de Vrijheid</i> (Party For Freedom). |
| Norway | FRPn: <i>Fremskrittspartiet</i> (Progress Party) |
| Poland | LPR: <i>Liga Polskich Rodzin</i> (League of Polish Families), KNP: <i>Kongres Nowej Prawicy</i> (Congress of the New Right) |
| Portugal | PNR: <i>Partido Nacional Renovador</i> (National Renovator Party), CDS/PP: <i>Centro Democrático Social/ Partido Popular</i> (People's Party) |
| Slovakia | SNS: <i>Slovenská národná strana</i> (Slovak National Party) |
| Slovenia | SNS: <i>Slovenska nacionalna stranka</i> (Slovenian National Party) |
| Sweden | SD: <i>Sverigedemokraterna</i> (Sweden Democrats) |
| Switzerland | SVP/UDC: <i>Schweizerische Volkspartei</i> (Swiss People's Party), SD: <i>Schweizer Demokraten</i> (Swiss Democrats), EDU/UDF: <i>Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union</i> (Federal Democratic Union), FPS/PSL: <i>Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz</i> (Freedom Party of Switzerland), TL: <i>Lega dei Ticinesi</i> (Ticino League), PNOS/PNS: <i>Partei National Orientierter Schweizer</i> (Swiss Nationalist Party), MCG: <i>Mouvement Citoyens Genevois</i> (Geneva Citizen's Movement). |
| Turkey | MHP: <i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i> (Nationalist Movement Party), BBP: <i>Büyük Birlik Partisi</i> (Great Union Party) |

This study also benefitted from an alternative data source, Eurostat⁷. Eurostat is the European Commission's statistical database that provides standardized, reliable, and objective data at the European level. In the Eurostat database, many types of data, which are derived from European countries, are offered for various types of analysis. The

⁷<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/>

observations for unemployment rate, asylum seekers, immigration rate, and energy consumption variables were taken from Eurostat database in this research.

In accordance with my preference, Werts et al. (2013, 194), who focused on the effects of Euroscepticism in explaining the increasing vote share of the ERPs in Europe, also appear to use the same data source of ESS for his analysis. Following the previous study, I add individual background characteristics, socio-political attitudes, and contextual characteristics to this research to contribute Werts et al. (2013)'s previous study and I came across with to understand the effect political culture on extreme right-wing voting.

3.3. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is extreme right voting behavior and it is based on the answer of the party preferences question in the ESS. This question asks the 'party voted for in last election' in each six rounds. The answer of this question, the variable was recoded according to the two categories: 'voting for other parties' and 'voting for ERPs'. A binary variable was created and recoded as "0" if individual voted for other parties and recoded as "1" if individual voted for ERPs. People, who did not vote, do not remember which party they voted or did not state their party preferences were excluded from the analysis. Twenty participant countries were included in the dependent variable measurement that met the condition of (1) sufficient extreme right party vote share and (2) sufficient data from the ESS for analysis.ⁱⁱ Table2 presents the list of extreme right parties of the twenty countries with their proportion of received votes in ESS database and average national election results that are derived from NSD European Election Database. Comparatively, ESS survey vote proportions are lower than actual national elections results for analyzed countries since survey participation is based on voluntary answers.

Table 2: Extreme right parties and proportion of votes among European countries

| Countries | Extreme Right Party | Average votes in ESS (%) | Average votes in national elections (%) |
|-------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|---|
| Austria | FPÖ, BZÖ | 6.71 | 8.39 |
| Belgium | VB, FN | 6.34 | 11.68 |
| Bulgaria | Ataka | 3.62 | 9.36 |
| Croatia | HSP, HNO | 1.66 | 3.29 |
| Denmark | FRDd, DFP | 8 | 13.22 |
| Finland | PS | 3.5 | 5.15 |
| France | FN, MNR | 4.9 | 8.25 |
| Germany | Republikaner, NPD/DVU | 0.65 | 1.81 |
| Greece | LAOS, Golden Dawn | 1.66 | 5.37 |
| Hungary | MIEP, Jobbik | 2.25 | 5.81 |
| Italy | LN, MsFt | 1.34 | 7.50 |
| Netherlands | LPF, PVV | 7.28 | 8.82 |
| Norway | FRPn | 14.22 | 19.87 |
| Poland | LPR | 2.36 | 4.22 |
| Portugal | PNR, CDS/PP | 2.26 | 9.27 |
| Slovakia | SNS | 4.44 | 6.18 |
| Slovenia | SNS | 3.3 | 4.46 |
| Sweden | SD | 0.54 | 5.70 |
| Switzerland | SVP, SD, EDU, FPS, TL, MCG, SN | 15.75 | 29.23 |
| Turkey | MHP, BBP | 5.63 | 11.83 |

Source: European Social Survey, NSD European Election Database (2002-2012)⁸

⁸http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/

3.4. Independent Variables

3.4.1. Marital Status

To see the effect of being single or married, the effect of marital status is included as part of individual's background/characteristic. In the first two rounds there were five categories as the answer of the question related to marital status, which are as follows: "married," "separated," "divorced," "widowed," and "never married." To follow Werts et al. (2013)'s data formulation, I recoded them into four categories as "married," "divorced/separated," "widowed," and "never married." In the third and fourth waves categories were raised to nine as; "married," "in a civil partnership," "separated (still legally married)," "separated(still in a civil partnership)," "divorced," "widowed," "formerly in civil partnership, now dissolved," "formerly in civil partnership, partner died," and "never married and never in civil partnership." These categories again recoded to comply with the first four categories. The first category was created from "married" and "in a civil partnership" categories. The two distinct categories of being "separated" and "divorced" were recoded into "divorced/separated" category, "widowed" category was formed by the sixth, seventh, and eighth categories. Last category remained the same and "refusal", "no answer" and "don't know" answers were excluded from the analysis. In the last two rounds, six new categories recoded into four categories as; "Legally married" and "In a legally registered civil union" into a "married," "Legally separated" and "Legally divorced/civil union dissolved" categories were recoded as "divorced/separated", "Widowed/civil partner died" remained as "widowed" and "None of these" remained as "never married.". Following the replication of Werts et al. (2012)'s analysis, married people were taken as a reference category and other categories were taken apart to measure the effect of singles by these categories.

3.4.2. Perceived Deprivation

This category is Werts et al. (2012)'s individual level variable and it measures the effect of "feeling about source of household's income nowadays." Respondents categorized their feelings according to the answers: "living comfortably on present income," "coping on present income," "finding it difficult on present income," and "finding it very difficult on present income."

3.4.3. Education Level

The ESS data used the ISCED coding frame consisting of five categories to measure the highest level of education among European countries. This coding frame allows the standardization of different education levels and types of different countries. In our analysis, the ISCED coding frame was followed and categories were created such as "less than lower secondary," "lower secondary," "upper secondary," "advanced vocational, sub-degree," and "tertiary education."

3.4.4. Control Variables

Furthermore, age and gender measures were included in the study as control variables at individual level. Age was calculated with the help of the ESS dataset for each country and accordingly this variable was included in the analysis.

3.4.5. Contextual Variables

Contextual variables that are used by Werts et al. (2012) were also included in the analysis. Unemployment rates, immigration rate, asylum seekers application, and energy intensity were derived from the Eurostat. Data were organized parallel to the conduct years of the six ESS rounds for each country. Change in immigration rate and unemployment rates were calculated as the difference of the rates between ESS round year and the year before.

The number of asylum seeker applications was also derived from the Eurostat. Additionally, the annual data of asylum applications was used in the analysis. Energy intensity data was computed by gross inland consumption of energy that is divided by GDP of countries. Energy intensity of the economy was used for modernization proxy for included countries (Werts et al., 2013).

3.4.6. Socio-Political Attitudes

This section explains the variables that are the measurements of the research of Werts et al. (2013) and the variables included in this thesis in order not to undermine previously used ESS data analysis on extreme right voting. Accordingly, ethnic threat, subjective victimization, law and order, social isolation, attachment to traditions, political distrust, and euroscepticism were tested.

Ethnic threat that is caused by immigrants according to respondents were calculated by two distinct questions from the ESS surveys. Response of people on answers such as “country’s cultural life is enriched by immigrants” and “country’s economic life is enriched by immigrants” were taken into consideration and a scale was constructed through factor analysis and included in my logistic regression model.

This subjective crime perception is a measurement of the question of whether “feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark,” which respondents scaled their feelings from “very safe,” “safe,” and “unsafe” to “very unsafe”.

Law and order scale was used as a proxy for authoritarianism. Three questions were included in this scale through factor analysis to measure the effect of the authoritarianism. Respondents answered “important to behave properly,” “important that government is strong and ensures safety,” and “important to do what is told and follow rules” questions with answers such as “very much like me” to “not like me at all.” This 1 to 6 scored scale was recoded as follows: “not like me at all” as 1 to “very much like me” as 6. This is due to the way of measurement of the effect of authoritarianism, e.g. “very much like me” answers would mean high support for law and order.

Furthermore, attachment to traditions was also tested. With the same scale of 1 to 6 people chose their attachment to traditions by answering the related question with the answer: “important to follow traditions and customs.” This scale was also recoded and reversed. New scale is coded from “not like me at all” to “very much like me” to test the possible traditionalist effect on extreme right wing voting.

Another scale, political distrust scale was used to test political trust level. This scale included three different measurements; “trust in politicians,” “trust in country’s parliament,” and “how satisfies with the national government.” Three questions had 0 to 10 scales for the respondents including answers changing from “not trust at all” to “complete trust” and for the last question the answers on the scale also varied from “extremely dissatisfied” to “extremely satisfied.” This scale was reversed since the effect of distrust aimed to be computed and the new scale went from “complete trust” to “not trust at all” and “extremely satisfied” to “extremely dissatisfied.” Factor analysis was used to compute the effect of these three variables on political distrust scale.

The social isolation was measured according to the responds of individuals to the question of how often they meet with their friends, relatives and colleagues. On the scale of 1 to 7 respondents choose “never” to “everyday” to state their social situation.

This variable was also recoded from “everyday” to “never,” because it is expected that if people are less social they are more expected to vote extreme right parties.

The effect of euroscepticism was the main concern of the research of Werts et al. (2012). This thesis includes euroscepticism, which is measured with a set of the survey questions of the ESS data. Respondents were asked about their “trust in the European Parliament” and answers were scaled from “not trust at all” to “complete trust.” These codes of 0 to 10 were reversed to be able to measure the effect of distrust level. As a result scale now became “complete trust” to “not trust at all”.

3.4.7. Political Culture Variables

3.4.7.1. Religiosity

To test the effect of religion on extreme right voting, church attendance parameter was included in the analysis following the previous works in literature such as Werts et al. (2013) and Scheepers et al. (2002). People were asked how often they attend religious services apart from special occasions. Answers on the scale varied from “everyday” to “never” and this was reversed and recoded in this study from “never” to “every day.” The possible effect of church attendance is that if people attend church more, then they are more likely to vote for the ERPs.

Secondly, to see the possible effect of praying was also included. Religious practice was tested by the question of “how often people pray apart from at religious services.” This variable was also recoded from “never” to “everyday” to test whether people are more likely to vote for ERPs if they pray more. Lastly, the religiosity variable was computed by the religiosity level of people. Respondents scaled themselves from “not at all religious” to “very religious” on a 0 to 10 scale.

3.4.7.2. Trust Level

Political distrust was also included in my analysis. To develop trust level analysis, I added three separate social trust parameters to the model. First, people were asked if they find “most people trusted or you can’t be too careful” and respondents scaled their opinions from “they can’t be too careful” to “most people can be trusted.” Secondly, the respondents were asked if they think “most people try to take advantage of them, or try to be fair” and they scaled themselves from “most people try to take advantage of them” to “most people try to be fair.” Third parameter was measuring if people mostly look out for themselves or people mostly try to be helpful. Answers were scaled from 0 to 10 and scale was reversely recoded for all three parameters, because this research expects people to be more likely to vote for the ERPs if people are socially distrustful.

Tolerance level was analyzed through three separate parameters. To measure whether people are tolerant or not, I choose to include the effect of tolerance to immigrants or gay and lesbian people. In the first place tolerance to gays and lesbians was computed by asking respondents if they see “gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish.”

Other two parameters were included to test tolerance to immigrants. Respondents were asked about their preferences to “allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority” and “allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe.” Answers were scaled from 1 to 4 as people positioned themselves in one of the choices of “allow them to come and live here,” “allow some,” “allow few,” and “allow none.”

3.4.7.3. Civic Engagement

The measurement of civic engagement was analyzed by several political participation questions that are asked to people if “they are member of a trade union or similar organization,” “they contacted politician or government official last 12 months,” “they worked in political party or action group last 12 months,” “they worked in another organization or association last 12 months,” “they wore or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months,” “they take part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months,” and “they signed petition last 12 months.”. These questions were ‘yes’ and ‘no’ questions and their answers were recoded as 1 if the answer is ‘yes’ and as 0 if the answer is ‘no’ to analyze the effect of political interest on extreme right voting.

3.4.7.4. National Pride

People were asked about their “satisfaction with the national government” to measure national pride. The question was answered through 10 levels ranging from 0 to 10 which was ordered from “extremely dissatisfied” to “extremely satisfied.”

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

4.1. The Basic Model

In order to test the effect of political culture on extreme right wing voting, logistic regression is used to test the two models. First model is the replication of research of Werts et al. (2013) in which he measured the effect of different parameters on extreme right wing voting in Europe by using the same data source (ESS). I included his parameters not to undermine his findings but contribute his analysis with the effect of political culture. First model is inclusion of variables that he used in his research.

Logistic regression is preferred because of the binary dependent variable. Dependent variable enables the research to differentiate extreme right party voting from voting for other parties. The dichotomous variable is coded as 0 if people voted for other than extreme right parties and as 1 if they voted for ERPS.

The results of logistic regression are represented in the table 3 for the first model. Analysis are conducted from N= 69,045 respondents from 20 countries and six years of survey. Firstly, results indicate that men, divorced/separated and young people are more likely to vote for ERPs. Ethnic threat, political distrust and behavior have an effect on extreme right voting. People, who are Eurosceptic, have a perception of ethnic threat and political distrust are more likely to vote for extreme right wing. Perceived deprivation, unemployment, change in unemployment, immigration rate, change in immigration, asylum seekers, energy consumption which is a proxy for modernization seem to have a negative effect on ERP voting. Furthermore, law and order, subjective

victimization are not statistically significant. Surprisingly people with traditional attachments are not significant in the model and socially isolated people are not likely to vote for ERPs.

Table 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Extreme Right Party Voting (Model 1)

| | Model 1 |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|
| Gender (male = 1) | 0.487 (12.57)** |
| Age | -0.006 (4.00)** |
| Education | -0.079 (4.78)** |
| Percieved deprivation | -0.105 (4.14)** |
| <i>Marital status</i> | |
| Married (ref) | - |
| Divorced/Seperated | 0.327 (5.56)** |
| Widowed | -0.134 -1.67 |
| Never married | -0.032 -0.63 |
| <i>Contextual Characteristics</i> | |
| Unemployment | -0.056 (6.68)** |
| Δ unemployment | -0.098 (4.62)** |
| Immigration rate | -0.004 (24.37)** |
| Δ unemployment | 0 (3.48)** |

| | |
|---------------------------|--------------------|
| Asylum seekers | -0.001 (7.24)** |
| Energy consumption (/100) | -0.003 (8.58)** |
| Ethnic threat | 0.612 (29.10)** |
| Subjective victimization | 0.017 (-0.67) |
| Law and order | 0.038 -1.85 |
| Social Isolation | -0.036 (2.87)** |
| Attachment to traditions | -0.006 -0.41 |
| Political distrust | 0.086 (3.40)** |
| Euroscepticism | 0.084 (8.61)** |

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

4.2. Final Model

In this model the effect of political culture on extreme right party voting is tested through different parameters such as religiosity, trust, tolerance, civic engagement and life satisfaction.

Religiosity is tested by three parameters. As a result religious people ($B: 0.021$) are more likely to vote for ERPs but on the other hand people who go to church (-0.161) are less likely to vote for ERPs. Praying parameter is statistically not significant for this research.

Trust analysis is focused on measuring distrust in people's actions ($B:-0.03$). As a result people, who "think people are more looking out for themselves", are more likely to vote for ERPs. Furthermore, other parameters of social trust are not statistically

significant in the model. Further research should be done in social trust parameter to come up with a possible effect with a different model and parameters.

To measure tolerance level parameters about immigration tolerance and gay/lesbian tolerance are tested in the model. Intolerance to gay and lesbians is statistically not significant. Not surprisingly, people who are intolerant to immigrants who does not share same ethnicity and race ($B: 0.187$) with the respondents and immigrants from poorer parts of Europe ($B: 0.278$) are more likely to vote for ERPs. Furthermore, people who thinks immigrants share same ethnicity and race ($B: -0.119$) are not welcome to the country are less likely to vote for ERPs. In this sense we can conclude that intolerance to immigrants leads to increase in extreme right wing voting.

Civic engagement is measured by variables of political participation. Surprisingly, civic engagement is an effective value for the extreme right party vote preferences. People who contacted with politician or official government ($B: 0.141$) and signed petition ($B: 0.333$) are more likely to vote for ERPs. Furthermore, boycott participation ($B: 0.169$) and membership of a trade union ($B: 0.303$) positively affected the extreme right party voting. Only, demonstration participation ($B: -0.273$) above them have a negative effect on extreme right party voting. In sum, extreme right parties gain more votes from people who have political participation.

Lastly, life satisfaction, national pride and happiness do not have an effect on extreme right party voting according to this analysis. Further analysis with different possible interactions and variables should be conducted to analyze the possible effect of these parameters.

Table 4: Logistic Regression Analysis of Extreme Right Party Voting (Model1&Model2)

| | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Gender (male = 1) | 0.487 (12.57)** | 0.462 (9.36)** |
| Age | -0.006 | -0.008 |

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| | (4.00)** | (4.32)** |
| Education | -0.079 | -0.112 |
| | (4.78)** | (5.21)** |
| Percieved deprivation | -0.105 | -0.105 |
| | (4.14)** | (3.15)** |
| <i>Marital status</i> | | |
| Married (ref) | - | - |
| Divorced/Seperated | 0.327 | 0.323 |
| | (5.56)** | (4.50)** |
| Widowed | -0.134 | -0.055 |
| | (-1.67) | (-0.56) |
| Never married | -0.032 | -0.045 |
| | (-0.63) | (-0.7) |
| <i>Contextual Characteristics</i> | | |
| Unemployment | -0.056 | -0.047 |
| | (6.68)** | (3.89)** |
| ΔUnemployment | -0.098 | -0.123 |
| | (4.62)** | (4.81)** |
| Immigration rate | -0.004 | -0.004 |
| | (24.37)** | (18.92)** |
| ΔImmigration | 0 | 0 |
| | (3.48)** | (2.18)* |
| Asylum seekers | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (7.24)** | (3.59)** |
| Energy consumption (/100) | -0.003 | -0.001 |
| | (8.58)** | (2.85)** |
| Ethnic threat | 0.612 | 0.49 |
| | (29.10)** | (16.02)** |
| Subjective victimization | 0.017 | 0.002 |
| | (-0.67) | (-0.07) |
| Law and order | 0.038 | 0.009 |
| | (-1.85) | (-0.34) |
| Social Isolation | -0.036 | -0.041 |
| | (2.87)** | (2.60)** |

| | | |
|---|----------|----------|
| Attachment to traditions | -0.006 | 0.028 |
| | -0.41 | -1.5 |
| Political distrust | 0.086 | 0.111 |
| | (3.40)** | (2.20)* |
| Euroscepticism | 0.084 | 0.097 |
| | (8.61)** | (7.89)** |
| <i>Religiosity level</i> | | |
| Religiosity | | 0.021 |
| | | (1.98)* |
| Religious practice | | -0.029 |
| | | (-1.78) |
| Church attendance | | -0.161 |
| | | (6.96)** |
| <i>Trust level</i> | | |
| Social distrust in people | | 0 |
| | | (-0.02) |
| Social distrust in people's intentions | | -0.016 |
| | | (-1.23) |
| Social distrust in people's selfishness | | -0.03 |
| | | (2.55)* |
| <i>Tolerance level</i> | | |
| Intolerance to gay and lesbians | | 0.027 |
| | | (-1.24) |
| Intolerance to immigrants with same ethnicity and race | | -0.119 |
| | | (3.48)** |
| Intolerance to immigrants with different race and ethnicity | | 0.187 |
| | | (4.03)** |
| Intolerance to immigrants from poorer countries | | 0.278 |
| | | (6.69)** |

| <i>Civic Engagement</i> | | |
|--|--------------------|---------------------|
| Contact with politician or government official | | 0.141 (2.27)* |
| Signed petition | | 0.333 (5.96)** |
| Demonstration participation | | -0.273 (2.49)* |
| Boycott participation | | 0.169 (2.73)** |
| Membership of trade union | | 0.303 (6.01)** |
| National pride | | 0.02 (-1.21) |
| Life dissatisfaction | | -0.017 (-1.14) |
| Unhappiness | | -0.033 (-1.92) |
| _cons | -1.397 (9.20)** | -2.525 (11.49)** |
| N | 69,045 | 49,825 |

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

4.3. Analysis

The effect of political culture with its' different levels is tested through two models with logistic regression analysis. Different values of people are expected to have different outcomes for extreme right party voting. As a result, results of this research is appropriate to previous work of Werts et al (2012) in terms of the effect of perceived deprivation, ethnic threat, political distrust, Euroscepticism. However, this research did not find significant effect of attachment to traditions that was differently found in research of Werts et al. (2012). In this manner, possible reasons for change can be the last two years of surveys and included different countries such as, Croatia, Finland,

Portugal and Sweden. In Werts' research energy consumption is not found significant but in this research this modernization proxy has a negative effect (B: -0.003) on ERP voting. In other words high modernity levels mean fewer votes for ERPs.

Contrary to findings of (Arzheimer, 2009), religiosity has an effect on extreme right voting behavior. Following the previous literature, it is found that religious people are more likely to vote for ERPs (Werts et al., 2013). Yet, the results show that people who attend to church are less likely to vote for ERPs. In his final model Werts (2013), the results of religiosity is statistically not significant and church attendance has a negative effect. In his research social disintegration theory (Werts et al. 2013, pp. 186-187, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007) is used to explain this relation. According to this theory, if people belong to certain group they tend to follow their norms and values. In this sense, people who go to church belong to certain community and follow their norms and values which effect to their voting preferences. Contrary to previous study of Werts, religiosity has an effect on ERP voting. On the one hand, people are attached to their church community and more likely to vote for conservative, center right parties. On the other hand, people regard themselves as religious are likely to vote for ERPs. Furthermore, this theory implies that socially isolated people or people with fewer attachments to community or social group are more likely to vote for extreme right wing. In his analysis, results show that religiosity and social isolations are not significant parameters for ERP voting but church attendance has a negative. According to final model, social and religious people are more likely to vote for ERPs. In here we can conclude that social disintegration theory does not sufficient to explain extreme right wing voting.

Civic engagement or activism has a positive impact on increasing votes of ERPs. People who are participant of boycotts, signed petition, member of trade unions and contacted with the politician or government official are more likely to vote for ERPs. However, people who are participated demonstrations are less likely to vote. On the one hand, it is likely that extreme people to be more participant in politics and this overlaps with the results. People who vote for ERPs can be more active and involved in political life to express their needs more than majority. This reciprocal process shows that value

orientations shape voting behavior but at the same time voting preferences shape value orientations. On the other hand, demonstration participation results do not suit with the expectations and other parameters of civic engagement. Further research can be conducted to see in which ways demonstration participation can be differentiated from other civic engagement actions.

According to the results, social trust does not have an impact on ERP voting. When respondents are directly asked about their trust to people statistically significant relation with ERP voting was not found. Only, people who think people are looking out for themselves vote more for ERPs. This finding is suitable to my expectations because people, who have a negative perspective about helping others and expecting help from others, tend to be more individualistic and more likely to become more extreme in party preferences. Furthermore, political distrust means higher votes for ERPs. In sum, people who have distrust in political manners and believe people are looking out for themselves, are more likely to vote for ERPs.

Tolerance towards “others” is a very crucial issue in extreme right wing literature. As it is expected, people with high level of distrust tend to vote for ERPs more than other parties. Especially intolerance to immigrants leads an increase in votes of ERPs. ERPs have an anti-immigrant stand point of view and anti-immigration or intolerance to immigrants go hand in hand. When we look at the results, important differentiation has been done by people about intolerance to immigrants. Citizens tend to welcome immigrants that belong to their own ethnicity and race from majority but they are very intolerant to immigrants from other ethnic and race groups and from poorer parts of Europe. People are more likely to accept people to their in-group if they share same ethnicity and race.

Due to nature of extreme right parties are more likely to get votes from people who are less tolerant and have less trust to immigrants or “others”. Discrimination, xenophobia hostility feelings are attached with the ERP nature which explains the intolerant and less mistrustful people identify themselves with these parties. In addition to this, people tend to discriminate immigrants that are outside of their own group as

Coenders (2011) points out; there is a hostility tendency towards out groups which is also supported by the results. This hostility is identified with people who are intolerant to out-group immigrants. People tend to welcome and accept immigrants belong to their in-group in which they share ethnicity and race.

Other important values national pride, law and order or obedience, social trust and happiness do not have significant effects on ERP voting and these values are expected to be elaborated furthermore in the future. Different proxies and measurements can be introduced by different models and different data for further testing.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis provided a cultural explanation to extreme right party voting by including value parameters to the literature. The analysis included a set of different values that are affecting voting preferences of people in choosing ERPs. Values of religiosity level, distrust, intolerance, civic engagement or activism, law and order or obedience, national pride and happiness are tested. These set of values shape socio-political identities of people and their voting behaviors.

However, traditional values are expected to lose power in effecting voting preferences the role of religion as continues to shape determining who to vote in Europe. On the one hand, religious people are more likely to vote for ERPs whereas people who attend to church are not voting for extreme right parties. Church attendance mean community based religious practice and unique socialization process and this socialization might effect to party preferences. Community groups are likely to vote for closer groups to themselves due to their community belongings and this does not necessarily mean that religious people are not voting for ERPs. On the other hand national pride, as a proxy for nationalism does not have an effect on ERP voting behavior. In this sense effect of nationalism can be elaborated through different proxy parameter and it should be further analyzed.

While these findings imply that anti-immigrant discourse and hostility towards “others” go hand in hand with preferences of ERPs. Intolerant, religious and politically participant but distrustful people are expectedly more voting for extreme right parties.

These voters adopted mentioned values to their socio-political identities through their socialization processes. Extreme right parties with their xenophobic, anti-immigrant and ultranationalist stand points are suitable for these people who has hostility towards “others” and “outsiders”.

Trust level is also another important value orientation of voters to be identified. The results indicate that political distrust is an explanation for extreme right wing voting. When people are uncomfortable with existing politics and political structures they tend to search options other than main stream parties. ERPs are attracting people with their new and passionate discourse if there is distrust to parties of majority.

With this research, we can strongly conclude that intolerance to immigrants and ethnic minorities is an important indicator for extreme right voting. Less educated, young people, divorced/separated, men, religious, intolerant people and people who are happy with their income, distrustful to politics, have higher level of civic activism are background values for extreme right wing voting. Political culture with its complex and rich context is shaping values of people and people with different set of values prefer to vote for ERPs. Although there are some unexpected results in our model, according to this research certain values do have an effect on voting preferences. To test other possible effects and parameters of political culture further research is necessary since there is not much analysis on political culture and its effects on extreme right wing voting.

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ⁱ Countries that are excluded from the research are Czech Republic, Britain, Spain, Iceland, Luxembourg, Albania, Cyprus, Israel, Russia, Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Kosovo and Ukraine. Ireland, Iceland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Britain, Spain, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia are removed from the analysis because they did not have enough votes for ERPs at least in two rounds. Kosovo, Albania, Luxembourg are excluded because they did not participated at least two rounds. Russian Federation, Israel and Cyprus dropped due to geographical reasons. For the case of Ukraine, there are party blocs in the elections and Svoboda joins to The Union for Ukraine “Fatherland”. Although extreme right party Svoboda is part of this bloc, Ukraine was not included because the bloc is not defined as extreme right and its features should be analyzed further before including the country.