

**THE LIFE ON THE MARGINS: EXPERIENCES OF CHILDHOOD WITHIN THE MILITARY
COMPLEX**

by
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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Key words: military, military family, militarism, childhood, governmentality, civil-military relations, school and education, military service.

Based on an ethnographic research drawing on in-depth interviews and field work, this thesis brings into view the lives of children raised in military families, within the military complex, between the years of 1990s and 2010s. This study presents the rather ‘ordinary’ lives and experiences of children of military families, while unfolding the patterns of socialization common and specific to their lives. While doing so, it argues that the childhood of these children can also be conceptualized as being beset, both spatially and temporally, with three institutions, namely the family, the school and the military.

After providing the reader with a historical context about the roots of ‘the military family’ as we know it today as well as the emergence of a new mode of governmentality in the military institution around the 1960s, this thesis forges connections between the universe of ideals upheld and disseminated by the military institution with regards to the members of military families and the lives of these members. Then it signals the dimensions wherein lies the significance and difficulties of the educational life for children and their parents.

Underlining the role played by the military institution of Turkey in the governance and regulation of internal tensions, this thesis seeks an answer to the question as to how the military, in order to render its services more effective and legitimate, comes to grips with its bulky outliers, consisting of the children, spouses and parents of military officers, in other words, with multitudes whom it hails under the singular rubric of ‘the military dependents’. More specifically, it explores the ways in which the military tries to govern the children of military families in ways which can produce nationalized, gendered and militarized subjectivities catering to its institutional interests.

Finally, this study concentrates on the ways in which the recent transformations of the military and its relationship to the political establishment and the society at large are being greeted and experienced by the children of military families. The narratives of the children in response to questions about the watershed political affairs which have precipitated major transformations in the public perception of the Turkish Armed Forces, shows that the military’s legitimacy and position in the relations of power depends much on its governing enterprises concerned with whom the institution hails as the military dependents.

ÖZET

KIYILARDA YAŞAMAK: ORDU KOMPLEKSİNDE ÇOCUKLUK DENEYİMLERİ

Anahtar Kelimeler: ordu, subay ailesi, militarizm, çocukluk, yönetimsellik, sivil-asker ilişkileri, okul ve eğitim, askerlik hizmeti.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerden ve saha çalışmasından faydalanarak yapılan bir etnografik araştırmaya dayanan bu tez çalışması, 1990 ve 2010 yılları arasında askeri komplekste büyüyen subay çocukların hayatlarını göz önüne getiriyor. Subay çocuklarının daha ziyade ‘sıradan’ hayatlarına ve deneyimlerine dair bir ipucu sunmaya çalışırken, bu hayatları ortaklaştıran bazı özgül izlekleri serimliyor. Bu esnada subay çocuğu olmak deneyiminin hem mekânsal hem uzamsal olarak aile, okul ve orduyla kuşatılmak üzerinden kavramsallaştırılabileceğini iddia ediyor.

Okuyucuya bugün bildiğimiz manasıyla ‘subay ailesinin’ tarihsel kökenlerine ve 1960’larda orduda ortaya çıkan yeni bir yönetimsellik biçimine dair tarihsel bir çerçeve sunulduktan sonra, bu tez çalışmasında subay ailesi üyelerinin yaşamları ile ordu tarafından bu üyelere yönelik tahkim ve tamim edilen idealler evreni arasındaki bağlantılar irdeleniyor. Akabinde çocukların eğitim hayatına odaklanılarak, eğitim hayatının çocuklar ve ebeveynleri için nasıl önem ve zorluklar teşkil ettiğine işaret ediliyor.

Bu çalışma Türkiye’de ülke içi gerilimlerin yönetilmesi ve düzenlenmesinde ordunun oynadığı rolün altını çizerek, kurumun eylemlerini daha etkin ve meşru kılabilmek üzere, tekil bir ifadeyle, ‘askeri personelin bakmakla mükellef bulunduğu kimseler’ olarak hitap ettiği subay çocukları, eşleri ve ebeveynlerinden oluşan çokluklarla nasıl yüzleştiği sorusuna cevap arıyor. Daha özelden ise, ordunun, kendi kurumsal çıkarlarını besleyecek millileştirilmiş, cinsiyetlendirilmiş ve militarize edilmiş öznellikler inşa etmek üzere subay çocuklarını hangi şekillerde yönetmeye çalıştığını ifşa ediyor.

Son olarak, bu çalışma ordunun siyasi düzenle ve toplumla ilişkilerinde yaşanan son dönemdeki dönüşümlerin subay çocukları tarafından nasıl karşılandığı ve deneyimlendiğine odaklanıyor. Çocukların Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin toplumda algılanışında büyük dönüşümler yaratan dönüm noktası niteliğindeki siyasi olaylarla ilgili sorulara verdikleri cevaplar, kurumun iktidar ilişkilerindeki yerinin ve meşruiyetinin, kendisine bağımlı kimseler olarak tanımladığı grupları yönetmeye yönelik girişimlerindeki başarısına ne denli bağımlı olduğuna gösteriyor.

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Without Nancy Karabeyođlu and other editors of the Writing Center of Sabancı University, you would have been condemned to read a less fluent thesis, replete with more simple mistakes.

And my thanks furthermore go to Çiçek İlengiz, Ezgi Şeref, Marlene Schäfers, Zeynep Ođuz, Nazife Şen, Köksal Şen, Mehmet Kentel and Cihan Yılmaz for being with me whenever I sought their assistance and friendship.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Entering the Field

The cab dropped me on a narrow street, squeezed from both sides by the fences and renowned warning plates of red colours, of the military institution. There was no one home. Tarik, my childhood friend from military lodgings, was away on a meeting to sort out something related to a business of his, which he started a year ago. His father and mother were at their workplaces, and would not return before sunset. I text-messaged and informed Tarik about my arrival. As I was waiting for his response, I raised my head to have a glance at my surroundings. There it was, rising before me, the housing blocks of lodgings with their jerry-built, monochromatic and monolithic looks. I was to spend three weeks there, for my field trip. There were three rows of housing blocks, and two adjacent apartments in each, planted perpendicular to the entrance. Everything about their appearance was more unkempt than usual, because there was a construction-work going on them. Perhaps for the first time I was seeing a construction of that scale in military lodgings. I rested my gaze on the posts, where conscripts usually keep watch. They were vacant, unlike the days of my childhood. It was not much to my surprise though, because I was not new to the place. The posts in this particular housing zone were vacant for a long time, but soldiers were still warding and patrolling in bigger lodgings down the road. Moments later, the voices of the workers, clinging to the next day on scaffolds, ringed in my ears. Now, there was something new to me, because they were speaking in Kurdish. Intrigued to have a short trip inside, before Tarik came home, I swept past the main entrance, without anyone took notice of me.

Only then I realized the bundle of insulating and sheathing materials piled up in corners and spread out over the ground. The construction was subcontracted, as I was to

learn from Tarık a couple hours later. I passed by the piles and reached one of the parking lots above a short hill. All numbered, and allocated to residents, the parking lot and its aluminium ceiling were overwhelmed by fallen leaves left unraked. The Renaults were in the majority as usual, but, I thought, not as much as in the past. The same went for the Goodyear tires and the stickers of Axa insurance company. There were other stickers on some though, of the drawings or signature of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, but arguably no more than what one would see on the roads of any big city of Turkey. A small, shoddy car, on which the yellow sticker of Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square and the signature of Mustafa Kemal stood side by side, then garnered and released my attention. There was a football pitch in the vicinity, but no one jostling around to watch there, much to my chagrin. Only some kids were riding the seesaw on the playground next to the pitch, as women, presumably their mothers were seated in a wooden gazebo nearby, some knitting and weaving, and all pretending to be indifferent to the kids. While I was covering the rectangle of the lodgings in a circular route, I saw the basketball court on the corner, looking ransacked and empty, and bumped into other posts on whose windows were written call numbers for emergency situations. Then a sudden shout interrupted my quiet and solemn tour. I turned around, only to meet the guy who rushed forward from the site of the construction in order to cease my transgressions, by asking me: "What are you looking for? Where do you live?"¹ Initially taken aback for being hailed as a complete outsider, I pulled myself together and pointed at the apartment where Tarık is living, while saying that I was a visitor. The guy in civilian outfits, the porter, as Tarık was to tell me later on, did not wait for the rest of my explanations before taking back to whatever his occupation was, after his curt reply: "I asked because I have not seen you before."²

I moved on, under the shade of trees to the building I pointed at. The apartment door was locked, so I sat on the bench across the entrance and watched the apartment. Sheets were strapped by the commissary directorate on the windows of its entrance door, announcing the working hours of commissaries. The plaster was flaking off its weary and worn-off walls. There were flowerpots and satellite dishes, almost in all balconies, but no

¹ In Turkish: "Neye bakmıştınız? Hangi binada oturuyorsunuz?"

² In Turkish: "Daha önce görmedim de ondan sordum."

hint of the blue canvas flipping in between the iron railings, one of the trademarks of military lodgings. After a cigarette, a woman left the building, carrying a purse in her hand. I knew her from my previous visits. She was the upper floor neighbour. She greeted upon seeing me on the bench. After exchanging kind questions about each other, she invited me to wait inside the building, lest I should catch cold. I declined the offer first, supposing that Tarik was to arrive any minute. But my shivering limbs, instantly warmed to the idea, and let my body inside. There were announcements pinned on the apartment board before the stairs. I decided to amuse myself probing them. The first bunch was coming from the directorate of maintenance and repair, reminding the residents of their responsibilities to keep flats serviceable. I rolled my eyes to another bunch, where the feeding of birds with bread scraps was regulated to avoid rat raids and visual pollution. I could not hold my giggle, because there were instructions for paragraphs long, informing residents in detail about how and where to feed birds within the lodgings area. As I was flipping the sheets on the board, I was coming closer to solve the mystery of the blue canvas. I found an announcement about it, and first reckoned that they have vanished because it was no longer necessary to have them. It took seconds for me to realize that, it was not lifting of an obligation. Now it was forbidden to have them on balconies, as it was forbidden not to have them in the past. Finished probing the board, I descended the stairs to the basement of the apartment. The smell of rust and dust permeated the air and invaded my senses. Onion and potato sacks were standing independently by the side of the door. I went around the mountains of rusting bed frames and putrid mattresses to make my way into the oodles of unwrapped, empty parcel packages, most probably left by the previous residents of the apartment. I climbed the stairs back to sit at the entrance, in fatigue of a series of infiltrations. Five minutes later, Tarik called me to ask where I was. As I said I was inside the apartment, he appeared in seconds on the entrance door with a phone in his hand and a smile on his face. I invited him inside, before he rummaged his pockets to seek key rings. We went up the stairs to the second floor. He said, "Welcome," while his keys were turning inside the key hole, and one of the never-changing flats of military lodgings was appearing before me. I entered home.

1.2. Motivations, Possible Contributions and Outline of the Thesis

I had several impetuses and questions which propelled me to choose the military field to work on. The first one is quite personal. As a son of a military judge father and a pharmacist mother, I was always intrigued by 'the life inside' the military complex. My sojourn inside the gates of the military institution was interrupted by the early retirement of my father from the military. Then my ties with the institution and my family became more distanced, as I left behind Çorlu for a boarding school in İstanbul. But I had made many friends and acquaintances from military lodgings, Officers' Clubs, military vacation camps, and even from military hospitals, with some of whom I still meet every now and then. Therefore, I wanted to bring into view the socialization patterns specific to the lives of many 'military brats'.

The second reason is more connected to a tradition in the social sciences, that is, filling some gaps. First of all, the children of military families constitute a large, yet unexplored population. Given that there are 38728 'active' personnel of the Turkish Armed Forces (hereafter TSK) as of 2014, working as officers in the Land Forces, Air Forces, Navy and Gendarmerie;³ the number of young people in contemporary Turkey who have been raised in military families is likely to be over 75.000.⁴ One could say, just the sheer number warrants the analysis of this social group. However big the population may be, their presence is hardly visible in public life and academic debates. Occasionally, we see some of them on the television screen, in the martyr funerals of their fathers, as they are standing beside their grieving mothers in silence, sorrow or confusion, sometimes donning military officer caps on their head, or holding toy guns in their hand, while bidding farewells to their fathers with the soldier's salute, or embracing the Turkish flag stretched

³ A.A. (2013, May 5). Genelkurmay başkanlığı personel istatistiklerini güncelledi. *Zaman Gündem*. Retrieved January 8, 2014, from http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_genelkurmay-baskanligi-personel-istatistiklerini-guncelledi_2061286.html

⁴ This remains to be a bold prediction without firm basis though. The primary reason for that shortcoming is the lack of data and study concerning the military families in Turkey, including their population.

on the coffin in order to reach the deceased father for the last time.⁵ The media often partakes in the visual regulation of these children in ways which propagate the most venomous and revanchist versions of hegemonic nationalism. Yet often, the lives of children in military families passes in more 'ordinary' conditions, if we are to use the word in the sense that, without martyr fathers, ear-ringing sounds of gunshots and grenades. In the media there are occasional reports about the male ones being favoured in drafts for compulsory military service.⁶ Or about their lives in lush conditions, on the bone-weary bodies of conscripts and exploited public resources, without doing much to earn them. There are counters against almost every accusation as such, available in web forums, newspaper columns and periodicals, where authors rather take on a romantic view to portray the lives of children, riddled with hardships, deprivation and terror.⁷ Therefore, this study is also written to give a sense of the 'ordinary' lives of the children of military families, without veering into either poles of interpretation. Furthermore, despite the increasing number of studies in Turkey concerned with the military institution and militarism, these children remain above the fray, without exception. Whereas in limited studies written on them abroad, generally they become the subject of the discipline of psychology, along with their mothers (Flake, Davis, Johnson & Middleton, 2009; Park,

⁵ To see some coverage of the children of military officer fathers in martyr funerals: Habertürk. (2012, June 5). Şehit babasını oyuncak silahla uğurladı. *Haberler Park*. Retrieved January 8, 2014, from <http://www.haberlerpark.com/haber.php?haberid=135065>; Kozan, Ü. (2009, July 17). Şehit albayı eşi ve oğlu asker selamı ile uğurladı. *Milliyet*. Retrieved January 9, 2014, from <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/sehit-albayi-esi-ve-oglu-asker-selami-ile-ugurladi/gundem/gundemdetay/17.07.2009/1118675/default.htm>; Milliyet. (2012, March 21). Bak baban gökyüzünde ona el sallla!. *Milliyet Gündem*. Retrieved January 9, 2014, from <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/bak-baban-gokyuzunde-ona-el-salla-/gundem/gundemdetay/21.03.2012/1517859/default.htm>; Demirci, R. (2012, February 15). Şehit subayı 5 bin kişi uğurladı. *Milliyet*. Retrieved January 9, 2014, from <http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/sehit-subayi-5-bin-kisi-ugurladi/gundem/gundemdetay/15.02.2012/1503543/default.htm>.

⁶ For example, see: Vakit. (2010, June 27). Paşa yakınlarına tatil gibi askerlik!. *HaberVaktim*. Retrieved January 9, 2014, from <http://www.habervaktim.com/haber/128348/pasa-yakinlarina-tatil-gibi-askerlik.html>

⁷ One remarkable example was written by Yılmaz Özdil, during the period of trials of Balyoz and Ergenekon: Özdil, Y. (2012, September 23). Baba yarısı. *Hürriyet*. Retrieved January 9, 2014, from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/21534549.asp>. Also entries in websites such as Ekşi Sözlük, İtü Sözlük and Uludağ Sözlük can be illustrating to observe the clashing views on being a professional soldier's child.

2011; Willerton, Wadsworth & Riggs, 2011; Posada, Longoria, Cocker & Lu, 2011). The halfness of their lives, their psychological struggles, breakdowns and resilience while waiting with the mother for the deployed father, a figure of coherence and determination, who will bring the lives of 'womenandchildren' (Enloe, 1990) (often articulated in a single puff of breath) into completion when he returns are regurgitated themes in the literature through and through. But the lives of those 'womenandchildren' do not only pass with waiting for the assigned father. I am thus also writing this thesis to give the children their due respect and voice, by writing against psychologization and theses reigning in the literature which postulates an automatic dependency of 'womenandchildren' on the 'men' of the military institution.

Yet, this study does not only attempt to fill some gaps but also seek answers to specific questions of importance. First of all, if we take into account the immense role played by the military institution in Turkey, in the governance and regulation of internal tensions along different axes, how does it govern the tensions arising and regulate the figures living *within* its own institutional boundaries to render its services more effective and legitimate? Let me solidify the content of this question with an example and couple of more questions deriving from my personal ruminations on the subject. As conscientious objection gained more visibility in Turkey, I came to wonder what would happen to military brats if they were to declare conscientious objection, thereby showing that *even* the children of professional soldiers are not born soldiers in a country where conscientious objectors are sent to jail for asserting that. I tried to imagine a group of children raised in military families announcing in public that they will not volunteer to the military, even though they already reside within the borders of the military. I had a hard time trying to imagine it. How would a military judge father who decreed dozens of verdicts about deserters and conscientious objectors before take it if his child were to be one of those whom he once tried? How would an officer from the army who dealt with many undisciplined privates in the barracks take trouble erupting in his own home? Would the mother be able to attend tea gatherings of military wives anymore? What would the decision of the child tell about the parents? Would it make them bad parents? Would it make the father a bad father or a bad soldier? Then I tried to reassemble those questions

into research questions: How do the military families and the military institutions live with the possibility that their children can become fugitives, rotten, deserters, conscientious objectors, or slip out of the matrix of compulsory heterosexuality, in an environment and a nation, where hegemonic modes of masculinity are privileged and “the myth of the military nation” (Altınay, 2004a) still prevails? In that regard, I maintain that the examination of the lives of the children of military families yields fruitful results in the understanding of different modes of “governmentality” (Foucault, 1991) employed by the military institution and efforts poured by military families into raising 'proper' children responding or even living up to the expectations.

Therefore, in the following section and chapters, I explore the different ways in which we can conceptualize the lives of children raised in military families and within the military complex. Arguing that the family, the school and the military institution are the three institutions which primarily shape the experiences of these children, I direct my attention to the ‘military family’ and trace its historical roots, which, I argue, coincides with the emergence of a new form of governmentality in the military around the 1960s.

In Chapter 1, I analyze the military family in order to have a better grasp on the lives of its members and models upheld by the military institution, throughout the first half of the first chapter. The second part of the chapter pertains to the second institution that shapes the experiences of these children and is dedicated to the lives of children in and related to the school.

In Chapter 2, I bring into view the third institution which has an impact on the lives of children, namely the military. While doing so, I examine the lives of the children in military settings, by focusing on institutional efforts to govern the children, and hence preempt the possibility of deviation from a set of predefined norms and institutional order. I try to understand the institutional attempts to control the children, and dimensions proven crucial in the process of producing subjectivities catering to the interests of the military

institution. In that regard, I try to demonstrate how the military tries to govern the children with means which are based less on repression and more on what I call ‘encompassion’.⁸

In the final chapter, I focus on the ways in which the recent transformations of the military and its relationship to the political establishment and the society at large are being experienced by the children of military families. Given that this thesis is written in the aftermath of military’s falling from grace, I present the views and voices of children concerning the watershed political affairs which have precipitated major transformations in the perception, position and operations of TSK in the past decades. I do so with the hope of developing a better understanding of the discourses, affects and reactions circulating within the military community as it undergoes a major political, social and economic transformation.

I expect this study to contribute to the studies proliferating on the military institution on several grounds. Restoring the places of ‘womenandchildren’ in the studies conducted on the military institution, where they are usually written off from the framework of analysis, is one of those grounds. I also think that this thesis will contribute to the studies on militarism and militarization, by proposing fresh outlooks on the militarization of the children of military families, who defy the divide that is usually posed between civilian and military worlds. Finally, I hope that the thesis’ focus on children will lend support, though indirectly, to the growing field of youth studies in Turkey and elsewhere.

1.3. Methodological Considerations

This study draws on multiple resources and can be described as a multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995). In this ethnography, I draw on online communities where the

⁸ I coin the term encompassment in order to signal the ways in which the military ‘encompasses’ the lives of children by providing them with material assets, incentives, prestige, security and care in a life world it has created. I claim that the means deployed by the military thus connote a sense of ‘compassion’ rather than repression.

children of military families gather,⁹ my own experiences as a child of a military officer father, several visits paid to military vacation camps and three Officers' Clubs in Çorlu, İstanbul and Ankara, sometimes only to be turned down from the entrance.¹⁰ But the backbone of this thesis is made up from in-depth interviews conducted with ten (five female, five male) interlocutors and a three-week long field study during which I stayed at the house of my childhood friend Tarık in military lodgings.

As for the interviews, first of all I should clarify that I conducted interviews only with the children of commissioned military officers (*subay*) and bracketed off the children of non-commissioned officers (*astsubay*), reserve officers (*yedek subay*), or civilian personnel working for the military institution in order to prevent the multiplication of parameters, caused by a set of disjunctions in terms of status, income, rights and responsibilities between commissioned military officers and aforementioned groups. A study that encompasses all these groups would have taken much longer and be beyond the scope of an MA thesis. Secondly, I conducted interviews with children who, in many ways, complied with the military institution. Put differently, I do not have any interlocutor who fell out of the military setting, by severely transgressing the institutional order imposed by the military. For example there are no children among my interlocutors who have asserted their homosexuality or declared conscientious objection. The interviews lasted from 45 minutes up to 2 hours. Averagely, they were at the length of 1 hour and 15 minutes. I conducted the interviews in three different cities. One interview was conducted through Skype.

⁹ See: Asker Çocukları. (2009). Retrieved January 9, 2014, from <https://www.facebook.com/askercocuklari>; Aşço Sözlük. (2008). Retrieved January 9, 2014, from <http://askercocuklari.sozlukspot.com/>

¹⁰ My visit to the Sıhhiye Officers' Club in Ankara was not a successful one, because the male children of military officers, when they are past the age 25 need to apply for a daily entrance card (Günübirlik Kart) to use military facilities. For that reason, I made an application, but it took more than 3 months to have the card in my hands. In the meantime, I was given a document, certifying my application and status as a military brat. But this was not enough for me to pass the gates of Sıhhiye Officers' Club, where the duty officer did not accept "a sheet of paper" for an entrance.

As for my interlocutors, the first thing I should note is that, they took on, or were given, pseudonyms according to gender in order to ensure their anonymity in the thesis. All of my interlocutors have lived in places related to the military institution for a considerable amount of their lives. All have seen transfers of their fathers¹¹ and followed them to wherever they were sent, with the exception of few occasional derailments. I was acquainted with three of my interlocutors beforehand. One was a childhood friend from the lodgings (Tarık), whereas I have known Kemal from my educational life. I also remember İrem, though barely, from the military lodgings as the daughter of our neighbours who went to another place when little. These acquaintances in particular and my identification as a ‘military brat’ in general helped me to find access and interlocutors in a hardly penetrable field. Just to name a couple of examples, my mother helped me to find İrem's trace again after more than twenty years by giving me her mother’s phone number. This then led me to reach Merve, the younger sibling of İrem, who accepted an interview as did her sister. Meanwhile, Tarık’s mother gave a phone call to Mustafa’s mother, who then told Mustafa the news of a student just arrived town and looking for interviews with ‘other military brats’. Relieved to hear that I was also a military brat, Mustafa responded positively to the call and I met with him immediately, before he returned to his post in the Navy. Moreover, my trips within the different spaces of the military complex would be impossible had I not have a “halfie status” (Abu-Lughod, 1988), certified by a military identity card and ‘a sheet of paper’ I was carrying in my wallet.

All of my interlocutors were born in mid to late 1980s or early 1990s into an era marked by the violent clashes between TSK and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK hereafter) and when having ties with the military institution was generally seen as a mark of privilege, prosperity and access, without carrying much of the negative connotations it has nowadays. The ages of my interlocutors range from 21 to 26,¹² which is indeed going

¹¹ I should note hereby that women also can and do volunteer in the military as officers since 1955, when the War College opened its doors to women (Altınay, 2011, p. 279). They cannot take the entrance tests for military high schools though. Although I may use the word ‘father’ as if it is a synonym for ‘military officer’ throughout the text, I will only do so for sake of convenience while writing, because none of my interlocutors has a military officer mother.

¹² I had interlocutors whose ages were 21 (1) , 22 (2), 23 (1), 24 (1), 25 (3) 26 (2)

against my initial intentions of finding interlocutors between the ages of 18 and 25. This little bump on the age range and the narrowed age interval unfortunately led to certain consequences. First of all, it resulted in the homogenization of the ranks of my interlocutors' fathers. For example, two of my interlocutors have lieutenant colonel fathers and one has a major general father, whereas the fathers of seven interlocutors were colonels. Second consequence of working on this particular age interval was the high rates of retirement from the military among fathers. For instance, of all my interlocutors, only one (Tarık) has a father who is actively working in the military institution, whereas the fathers of others are retired from the military. However, their retirements are rather recent, mostly after 2011, with the exception of Deniz whose father retired from the military when Deniz was in the secondary school. Leaving aside their ages, only two (İrem and Kemal) of my interlocutors are employed and working in private companies. One (Tarık) is running his own business, while considering a return to the university for getting a doctorate degree. One (Mustafa) decided to follow the footsteps of his father into the military and became an officer in the Navy. The rest of my interlocutors are students in different levels of the university education.

Another shortcoming of this study is the lack of interviews conducted with children whose fathers work in some branches of the military. Despite all efforts to maintain a balance between all of the branches of TSK while finding my interlocutors, I could not find any interlocutor whose father works for the Air Forces or as a military doctor. As for the fathers of my interlocutors, one father is from the military jurisdiction, one was from the Navy, one was from the Gendarmerie and the rest worked for the Land Forces. Two of the fathers in the army were infantry officers, three of them were artillery officers, one was in charge of the personnel and the other was in logistics. Furthermore, none of them have the title of staff officers. Eight out of ten fathers were graduates of both military high schools and War Colleges, with the only remaining exceptions being the fathers of Ayşe and Yasemin.

1.4. Conceptualizing the Childhood of the Children of Military Families

One may propose a myriad of frameworks to understand the childhood of military brats. However, I argue that, the constitutive role of three institutions should be taken into any attempt of analysis as the lowest denominator of military brats' lives. The family, the school and the military are the three institutions which shape the experiences of the children to a great extent. They are the primary agencies of socialization in military brats' lives. Therefore, it is indispensable to take into account the ways in which these institutions encompass the children of military families in order to make sense of their experiences. Of course, one can argue that these institutions impinge upon the lives of every citizen, in any nation-state. However, military brats depart from others, because they are beset with at least one of them constantly, namely the military, physically and almost all the time until their participation in working life (or even later) and unless the professional military officer in the family retires from service. Rarely can they step out of this triangle. Let me detour to broader generalizations to adumbrate the scope and great extent to which these institutions surround the children's lives.

Overall, the childhood of a military brat passes within a military setting, until the start of primary school. The child is usually born in a military hospital, sometimes in the absence of the father who is away for a military task. As the family is ordinarily settled in there, the child plays and socializes with other sons and daughters of military families in the playgrounds of military lodgings. Most likely they have their haircuts in lodgings or Officers' Clubs. The candies and chocolate bars are generally bought from commissaries within the housing sites. If they trip and bruise a knee somewhere, the military hospital where they are born is often the address to go. Friends, alongside their families come and go at a rapid clip. The children start over with new acquaintances. A time arrives, however, when it is them instead of other families who should go somewhere distant on account of relocations. They rinse and repeat in other places. Wherever they may go, the stories of 'askerabi'¹³ fascinate them, invoking fantasies in their minds about 'the life outside'.

¹³ In English: Soldier (elder) brother

In fact, they can always see other people roaming outside, in between the grids, behind the bars and beyond the guns of conscripts in khaki which segregate two zones of habitation: civilian and military. Some even dare to venture into the other world, by circumventing families and soldiers, and convey their extraterritorial excursions to intrigued friends. Nevertheless, in earlier stages of children's lives, the outside is usually nothing more than an intermediary space to get through, spanning various military facilities. The points of departure and destination in these travels may change. But the permutations are not manifold. An occasional trip to a dinner at an Officers' Club on a winter night, a weekly escape to a military vacation camp on a summer day, or a short visit paid to the military supermarket¹⁴ in the city can allow the children to have a sense of the life outside. But, typically, the child pursues an insularized existence within the borders of an archipelago of military zones, which attempt to simulate 'the life outside' in many aspects. The life outside, on the other hand, remains to be a matter of growing concern and curiosity:

"Çok kaotik gelirdi bana dışarısı. Böyle dışarıda belediye otobüsleri var, insanlar var, simitçi var, bilmem ne... Allahım ne kadar karmaşık bir dünya burası! Hâlbuki ben burada ne güzel ağaçlar, çiçekler... Her şey kare şeklinde kesilmiş, askerler var, çimleri biçiyorlar falan... Araba dediğin belediye otobüsü değil, herkesin nizami olarak bindiği sarı duraklar ve gri arabalar, servisler falan var. Çok düzenli gelirdi bana lojmanın içi. Dışarısı genelde çok karmaşık ve kaotik gelirdi sahiden de."¹⁵

"Genelde mesela lojmanın içindesin. Hani lojmandan markete gittiğimde çok heyecanlıydım gerçekten de, markete gideceğim şimdi, lojmanların dışına diye."¹⁶

¹⁴ Usually known as OYPA, such supermarkets which were owned by OYAK (Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Foundation) no longer exist under the ownership of the military.

¹⁵ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "The outside seemed too chaotic to me. There were buses, people and peddlers outside... Oh my god, what a mess the outside is! But it is so good inside with trees and flowers... Everything is trimmed to a rectangular shape. There are conscripts, mowing the grasses... There are no buses, but only cars. There are yellow stops, grey cars and shuttles inside, which everyone uses regularly. The lodgings appeared very neat to me. The outside was too complicated and chaotic indeed."

¹⁶ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: Usually you remain inside the lodgings. When I was going to the market from the lodgings, it was an excitement, like 'Now I will go to the market, outside the lodgings.'"

"Lojman içinde çocuk parkı sonradan yapıldı, orası boş bir alandı. Bir de topumuz türbeye kaçardı, bir türbe vardı lojman arazisinin içine doğru giriş yapmış. O topu almak konusunda her zaman sıkıntı yaşırdık. Bir korku hâsıl olurdu yani bünyede. O türbe değişik bir türbeydi, tam bir türbe yeşili duvarı vardı. Sokaktan gelen kısmında mum yakmak için yerleri vardı. İnsanlar dışarıdan mum yakardı, biz içeriden top atar, sonra almak için tırsardık. Bazen o bahçeden kemik memik çıkardı. İnsan kemiği mi hayvan kemiği mi bilemez korkardık. (Güler) Su kulesine tırmanırdık. Su kulesi vardı ama galiba faal değildi. Boruları moruları yoktu. Su kulesine tırmanır onun üzerine otururduk falan. *Dışarıyı seyrederdik*. Böyle küçük maceralarımız vardı, ama bizim için baya heyecan veriyordu."¹⁷ (emphasis mine)

"Acaba dışarı da böyle mi? diye bir merakımız vardı bizim açıkçası. Dışarıdaki insanlar da böyle mi? diye bir merakımız vardı. Ama zaten biz *okulla birlikte sosyalleştikten sonra* bizim kadar güçlü bağları olmadığını gördük."¹⁸ (emphasis mine)

As the last sentence of Zeynep's speech hints at, all these change a bit when the children hit school age. Apart from the family and military as sites of primary socialization, the school begins to take a hold in the children's lives. It breaks the monopolies of the family and military over the lives of children to an extent, by being the venue where the military brats come into contact and mingle with their peers nurtured in civilian families. The children get a foothold in the life outside through education, usually for the first time in their lives:

"Dediğim o bütün oyunlar, bilmem neler hep bir duvar içinde oynanan şeyler tabii. Okula gidince ne oluyor? Mesela ders verirdi sana elişi öğretmenin.

¹⁷ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "They built a playground in a free space inside the lodgings. Sometimes we were kicking the football to a shrine. There was a shrine, extending into the lodgings area. Retrieving the ball from there would be an issue for us. We would be scared. It was an interesting shrine. It had a green wall, typical of shrines. It had an area to the street side where people lit candles. People would light a candle and we would kick the ball from inside the lodgings. Then we would be afraid to bring it back. Sometimes we would find bones in the playground. We would be frightened, without knowing if they belonged to a human or an animal. (Laughing) We would climb the water tower. It was out of use I guess. It had not pipes or anything. We would climb and sit on one of the layers of the water tower. *We would watch the outside*. We had adventures as such, but they would give us a buzz." (emphasis mine)

¹⁸ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "We would wonder if the outside was the same. Were the people outside the same? *After we socialized through the school*, we nevertheless understood that they did not have ties as strong as ours." (emphasis mine)

Gidip onun malzemelerini alırdın. İşte okulun yanında kesin bir tane çakal bakkal olurdu. Yok işte leblebi tozu satar, jelibon satar, bilmem ne falan. Ona giderdin."¹⁹

However, the military always slips in, one way or the other, as I will try to show through the end of this chapter. In a nutshell, the military continues to buffer the contacts of these children with the life outside throughout their education. It endeavors to squeeze itself into every imaginable gap, temporal and spatial, opened up in children's lives throughout their years of education. It remains to be a constant in their lives, which continues to engulf the children into its institutional boundaries.

"Sabahleyin zar zor kalkardım. Uyku, sevdiğim şey. Askeriyenin servisi olurdu okula bırakan. O götürürdü [okula]. Sonra öğlene kadar ders dinlerdim. Fazla konuşkan bir çocuk değildim. Sesim çıkmazdı, hocayı dinlerdim. Öğle arasında yemeğimi yer, sonra bir daha derse girerdim. Doğru düzgün arkadaşım olmamıştır pek. Konuşursam da daha önceden [lojmandan] tanıştığım bir kişi, maksimum iki kişiyle konuşurdum. Sonra servisle geri dönerdim. Öyle geçerdi [bir ilkokul] günüm."²⁰

"Şöyle bir enteresan durum var. Yani aslında hep *onun* içindesin gerçekten de. Özellikle hani, işte servise biniyorsun, lojmandasın. Sonra servisten iniyorsun, gene lojmana bırakıyor falan. Böyle dışarıdaki dünyayı görüp sonra tekrar lojmana giriyorsun sürekli."²¹ (emphasis mine)

¹⁹ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "The games I mentioned and all were always played within the four walls. What happens then when you go to the school? Your handiworks course teacher would give you homework. You would go and fetch materials for that. There would always be a grocery next to the school. The trickster inside would sell jelly beans, ground chickpea and so forth. You would go there."

²⁰ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I would have a hard time waking up. I am fond of sleeping. There was a military shuttle that took us to school. I would listen to the teacher until the lunch break. I was a silent type. I would listen to the lecture, without saying anything. I would eat my lunch in the break and return to class. I never had many friends. I would speak to one or two persons, whom I already know from the lodgings. I would return with the military shuttle. Such was a day in the primary school."

²¹ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "There is an interesting thing. Actually you are indeed always *inside of it*. You would take the shuttle from the military lodgings. You would depart the shuttle to come to the lodgings. You would constantly return to the lodgings after briefly seeing the world outside." (emphasis mine)

Of course, these are snapshots, condemned to be flawed and subject to innumerable rectifications, just because there are many parameters to be factored in military brats' lives, which shape their experiences. I will try to outline them as much as possible as this study unfolds. However, I hope these snapshots can help the reader capture some hallmarks of life as a military brat in Turkey during the 1990s and 2000s. Leastways, they can signal the extent to which this institutional vicious cycle encapsulates the lives of children, usually until they start working 'outside.'

The institutional triangle, composed of the family, the school and the military is not any ordinary triangle. To begin with, according to Althusser (1994), the military is an element of the repressive state apparatus, whereas the other two belong to the category of ideological state apparatuses. Mosse (1983) addresses their pivotal roles in the reproduction and consolidation of nationalist ideologies. Therefore, they all have fundamental importance for activities of state-making and nation-constitution. However, another specificity of the triangle lies elsewhere.

Take the military for an example. The military has not only been the repressive apparatus of the state. Althusser (1994) also asserts that, "there is no such thing as a purely ideological or repressive apparatus" (pp. 111-112) but the ideological function of the military institution has been remarkably dominant in Turkey since the early republican years. Suffice it to recall the name of the chapter in *Medeni Bilgiler* [Civil Knowledge] (İnan, 1988 [1969]): "The Army Is School" (Ordu Mekteptir). Accordingly, the professional military officers, as Turan (2013) notes in an auto-ethnographical study on his military service, frequently refer to the barracks as the 'final school' (p. 298). Moreover, the military does not only present itself as a school, but also likens itself to a family. It is indeed in contention to constitute a modern model for other families in the society. The quotations below are drawn from an influential 1939 book, *Ordu Sosyolojisi Yolunda Bir Deneme* [An Attempt for Military Sociology] (Erker), approved by the general staff of the Republic of Turkey, and they might illustrate this point better:

"Orduda aile toplu olarak ifade edilirse, bir aile numunesidir. Müstakil müesseseler, birlikler aynı hukuki manayı taşır. Fakat biz orduda aile dediğimiz

zaman bir alayın içtimai hayatını ve bağlarını kastediyoruz. Hakikaten böyledir. Orduya yeni giren bir subay ve askeri şahıs, önce bir alayda askerliğin içtimai ve mesleki bilgiler ile pratik olarak terbiye edilir. Orduda aile her vasfile, her vazifesile tarih boyunca görülen aile tiplerinin bir mecmuasıdır. Aile komutanı ailenin başkanıdır."²² (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şen, 2011, pp. 90-91)

"Orduda fert denince aklımıza doğrudan doğruya sosyoloji kitaplarının tarif ettikleri ana, baba ve çocuklardan ibaret bir aile gelmelidir. Ordu sosyolojik hayatını kendi başına ayıran karakter budur. Öyleyse orduda fert bir mürekkep varlıktır. Fırsat düştükçe üstünde söz söyleneceği şekilde *modern aile tipinin ahlaki bağlarla en çok sıkışmış, en fazla daralmış ve böyle ferd manasına ulaşmış mükemmel örneğidir. Böyle olduğu için ordu hayatı daha medeni bir dünyadır. Gün gelecek cemiyet hayatında da aile, orduda olduğu gibi ferdleşecektir.*"²³ (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şen, 2011, pp. 42-43) (emphasis mine)

"Just as the army is a school, so is the school an army," (as cited in Altınay, 2004a, p. 119) says Kadri Yaman, an official of the Turkish Ministry of Culture in 1938. Accordingly, Altınay astutely lays bare the ways in which the military and the school have been the "two fronts of the nation" (2004a, p. 119) in Turkey. Then, the school, along with the military, is a disciplinary institution which increases the docility and utility of bodies (Foucault, 1979).

As for the family, first of all, its significance for the nation-state seems to derive rather from the constitutive roles it undertakes for the physiological production of population and primary socialization of children (Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 169). Apart from that,

²² "The regiment can be likened to a family within the context of the military. The self-contained units all have legal similitude. But what we mean by family in the military is the social life and bonds of a regiment. It's really like this. Every officer and person subject to military law newly entering the military receives his practical induction into military social life and profession in the regiment. The family in the military is in every way the corpus of family types seen throughout history. The family commander is the head of the family."

²³ "When speaking of person in the military, what should come to mind immediately is the family of sociology books comprised of a mother, father and children. This is the character that alone distinguishes the sociological life of the military. Therefore, the person in the military is a composite entity. It can be said that through its moral bonds, *the modern family type has reached its most concentrated and restricted form, and, therefore, is the most perfect example of what is meant by 'person.'* Therefore, *military life is a more civilized world. The day will come when the family in society, as is the case in the military, will become individualized.*" (emphasis mine)

it provides a metaphor extensively used to describe the military, the school and the nation. Conversely, just as the metaphor of the family is deployed with reference to schools, so the school often lends itself as a metaphor to identify the family. Althusser (1994) points out that the school, which has replaced the role of the Church as the dominant ideological state apparatus is coupled with the family today in the reproduction of the relations of production (pp. 119-120). Perhaps, as Belge (2012) warns us, it might not be reasonable at all times to conceptualize the realm of the family as a state apparatus, but one cannot downplay its importance and efficiency as an institution and a site of education for the reproduction and instilment of a particular ideology (p. 675).

The childhood of a military brat is a childhood played out against the backdrop of institutions, each of whose roles alternate with one another. From one perspective, it is a childhood played out against the backdrop of three schools. Looked at differently, it is a childhood confined within three families. One can as well formulate it as a childhood caught between the jaws of two primary disciplinary institutions, namely the school and the military. What happens to the children then? Do they turn into 'domesticated monkeys', who never stray from the designated rules wherever they are, as one user on the internet claims?²⁴ There is no definite response to these questions, as the interplay of disciplinary power in different historical and social contexts produce, yet not determine different subjectivities. However, we cannot but probe these institutions in order to come up with more refined answers. Let's take first in the queue of our research the family into which these children are born.

1.5. The Historical Roots of the Military Family

I should recall that the family which we speak of is a *modern* nuclear family, in which at least one of the parents is endowed with the knowledge of modern warfare, through an education taken almost always in War Schools, and commissioned to hold a position in the military institution as a professional military officer. As mentioned in the

²⁴ See: Arapbebek. (2007, November 20). Asker çocuğu olmak. *İtü Sözlük*. Retrieved December 27, 2013, from <http://www.itusozluk.com/goster.php/asker+%E7ocu%F0u+olmak/@2089801>

introduction, I also bracket off in this study the families of non-commissioned officers or reserve officers, for it would otherwise require an effort to bring into consideration various parameters that are disproportionate to the time, space and knowledge at my disposal.

Logically, the birth of the family in question cannot precede the efforts of military modernization in the Ottoman Empire. 1826, the disbandment of janissary corps by the Auspicious Incident (Vaka-i Hayriye) as well as the establishment of the Mansure Army (Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye) is a turning point in that regard. The second milestone in this early period of military modernization is the inauguration of the War School (Mekteb-i Ulum-i Harbiye). Afterwards, the new compulsory conscription system for all male subjects of the sultan²⁵ was implemented in the Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856 (Islâhat Hatt-ı Hûmâyûn-û) so as to keep abreast with the developments in Europe concerning the emergence of new types of armies (citizen army) and war-making (total war). These changes increased the demand of the Ottoman Empire for military officers as well. Nonetheless, it is impossible to claim that the military family that we trace has come into existence at its full force in this early period of modernization. The primary cause of this was the absence of a traditional social class in the Ottoman Empire, from which the Empire could raise loyal military officers (Berkes, 1978), unlike many European states where the withering aristocracy is also known for its indulgence into the swashbuckling side of life (Belge, 2012). Moreover, the rate of graduation from the War School was quite low. For example, only 29 officers were graduated from the War School in 1850 (Beşikçi, 2011, p. 50). Nor did the amount of graduates were to increase to a considerable number before the turn of the century (Beşikçi, 2011, p. 50). The temporary solution of the Empire to these problems was filling the slaves and eunuchs into the ranks as officers. But, despite all attempts to the contrary, the Ottoman Army relied heavily on rankers (alaylı)²⁶ to appease its shortage of officers for a long time. The army was an unorganized mass and a mess, commented Auguste de Marmont, the French General and Marshal, upon watching a

²⁵ However, this system was not implemented to the letter at those dates. It was only after 1909, the non-Muslim males of the Ottoman Empire were enforced to attend their military service, because the exemption fee (known as *iane-i askeriye* or *bedel-i askeriye*) was finally repealed (Hacısalıhoğlu, 2010).

²⁶ Literally: From the regiment

maneuver of the Ottoman troops, genuinely shocked to attest that the commander of a cavalry brigade (liva) was a black eunuch:

"Bu bir ordu değil, bir yığın... Erden alay komutanına kadar ödevlerinin ne olduğu hakkında en küçük fikirleri bile yoktu... Acele birçok alaylar kurulmuş. Fakat başlarındaki subaylar bilgisiz ve ehliyetsiz... Hiçbirinde kendine ve ötekilere güven yok. Komutanlık yapmıyorlar... Türkiye'de subaylığın vekarı düşünülüyor. Eski zamanın o gururlu, o görkemli, o yakışıklı Osmanlı komutanlarına ne olmuş diye insan şaşıyor. Bedence bir eksikliğin sebep olduğu bir aşağılık ve yüreksizlik içinde olan bir hadım nasıl liva komutanı olabilir? Böyle bir adam subaylarının ve erlerinin kafasında üstünlük kuramaz."²⁷ (Cited in Akyaz, 2009, pp. 21-22)

Later, the 1870s and 80s brought about a paradigmatic shift in the Ottoman Army (Tokay, 2010a; Özcan, 2010). No sooner had the army taken a defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the governing elites decided to abandon their struggle to implement reforms by making use of different military models (Güvenç, 2010). The Prussian army, which triumphed over French troops in the Franco-Prussian War, became the single model after which the Ottoman military was to be reorganized (Güvenç, 2010). The Prussian military mission arrived in the Empire in 1882 at the request of Abdul Hamid II (Tokay, 2010a).

The educated military officer deficit was an ongoing problem of the Empire for decades, and one of the main predicaments hindering military restructuring forays, and this was immediately noticed by the Prussian military mission. For example, a member of the mission, von der Goltz, the author of the well acclaimed and highly influential *Das Volk in Waffen* [the Nation in Arms], argued that the fate of the military reforms in the Ottoman Empire was contingent upon a change in officer classes (Tokay, 2010a, p. 39).

²⁷ "This is not an army, it's an aggregation... No one, from private all the way up to commander, had any idea about their duties... Many regiments were hastily put together. But the officers in charge are uninformed and incompetent... They have no confidence in themselves or others. They do not command... Officers in Turkey are not seen as dignified. People wonder what has happened to those proud, magnificent and handsome Ottoman commanders of the past. How can one who has suffered castration and is wallowing in baseness and timidity because of physical imperfection become the leader of a brigade? Such a man cannot be seen as superior in the minds of officers and privates."

Therefore, one of the priorities of the mission was to create a new class of military officers, while honing up those at hand through education so that there could be more officers equipped enough to detect how they can navigate the troops in their command to victory.

However, the strong impetus to create a new class of military officers, I claim, did not initially translate much into the fully-fledged appearance of military families which we seek for, for several reasons. On the one hand, we observe a steady increase in the numbers of graduate officers from the War College after 1880s. For example, while the sum of the graduates from the War College between the years 1834-1883 was 2.383, there were 353 graduates only in 1900 (Beşikçi, 2011, p. 50). However, the backbone of the Ottoman officer class was still composed by rankers. Beşikçi (2011) states that the rate of officers who had graduated from the War College was not even one-tenth of the whole Ottoman officer class in 1877, and only 132 of them were commissioned officers out of approximately 20.000 officers (p. 50). According to Tokay (2010a), the rate finally reached one-tenth in 1884 (p. 40). In 1894, Hale states, the Ottoman army still consisted of 85% ranker officers and one-third of the officers were still illiterate (Cited in Akyaz, 2009, p. 29). By 1900, the rate of the new type of educated officers was one-fourth of the officer class (Tokay, 2010a, p. 40). Overall, the officers who were graduates of the War College were still relatively few in numbers. Only after the discharges of 1909,²⁸ and in the wake of the Balkan Wars, were they to become on par with ranker officers, in terms of numbers. Laying the numbers aside for a moment, the conditions of the last quarter of the longest century of the Empire also do not seem particularly fit for the marriage of military officers and hence the formation of “military families.” Inadequate and irregularly paid salaries, lacking supplies in terms of gear and nutrition, coupled with long terms of service in severe conditions should have posed an obstacle for marriage. For example, Tokay imparts how soldiers and officers borrowed money at interest and discounted their salaries with commissions up to 40% at money lenders, in this last quarter of the century, during which

²⁸ Tokay (2010a) states that roughly 10.000 officers, most of whom were ranked officers, were dismissed from the military after 1909 (p. 43). Of all the discharges, the purge that took place in 1913, at the behest of Enver Pasha, was the most remarkable one. Although there is no consensus when it comes to numbers, it is believed that from 800 to 1100 officers fell under the axe at a moment's notice (Akyaz, 2009, p. 32). As one can expect, it was mostly the ranked officers who were pruned from the military.

the Ottoman Empire was mired in the throes of a nascent bureaucracy and scarcity of resources which paved the way to a series of harsh economic crises (2010a, p. 41; 2010b, p. 135).²⁹ Lastly, one might suspect that the military elites shared the military institutions' universally "mixed feelings about the institution of marriage" (Enloe, 2000, p. 154) back then. To the best of my limited knowledge, no study to date has unraveled if there were any bachelor requirements for recruitment in the military institution in the Ottoman times. In that regard, the gender-blindness of studies in the discipline of history, especially on military histories, applies to the Turkish context as well. It is not clear as to how and to what extent did the institution's perception of marriage and 'womenandchildren' effect the ruminations of military modernization. Nor do we know if the revulsion (or lack thereof) against the institution of marriage had turned into an institutional policy. However, we know, for instance, that the newly constituted Ottoman gendarmerie favored in employment those applicants who were bachelors and childless from 1840s to 1910, even though it was known to be one of the least implemented principals, owing to the dearth of 'human resources' to fill the ranks (Özbek, 2010, p. 61) or that the married applicants were not accepted to the gendarmerie by Corci Pasha (Tokay, 2010b, p. 130). In a nutshell, the concern was skulking there, within the heart of security apparatuses.

Yet, it was not perhaps a convenient time to be selective and concerned with the marriage of officers, as the Empire was faced with the threat of extinction in the advent of the Balkan Wars. The deep ambivalence of the military institution when it comes to the marriage of officers was still lurking there around the 1910s, but more immediate was the necessity to channel all the forces of the Empire for purposes of war preparation under the imminent possibility of war. The concern of the married military was thus submitted to the desire invested in the creation and proliferation of educated commanders, because the latter was what mattered to the policy makers most. Accordingly, the 'ideal officer' was indeed given a prominent place in the huge corpus of literature emerging after the Balkan Wars, where the authors were preaching myriad recipes for salvation. One of the most striking outputs of this literature is *Zabit ile Kumandan* [the Officer and the Commander]. Written

²⁹ This is despite the fact that the 40% of the state budget was reserved to military expenditures in the era of Abdul Hamid II (Tokay, 2010a, p. 41).

by Nuri Conker in 1913, appreciated and reviewed by Mustafa Kemal, this immensely significant book was calling for the replacement of the 'old officer', namely rankers, by the 'new officer'. Conker's call also reverberates in the review of the book, *Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal* [Dialogues with the Officer and The Commander], written by Mustafa Kemal in 1914:

“Ve demiştik ki, ‘Bir kıta ve özellikle de subaylar kurulu, yalnız iyi örnek olacak rehberlerle yetiştirilir...’ ... Ve rica etmiştik ki, ‘Bugün için girişilecek iş; kayıtsız ve hiçbir şeye göz yummadan, nitelik ve iktidar sahibi olmak yeteneği gösterenlerden bir *Komuta ve Subay Kurulu* oluşturmak olmalıdır.’ Ve açıklamıştık ki, ‘Ancak bilgili, iktidar sahibi, etkin, girişimci ve yetki sahibi bir ordu müfettişinin denetimi altında bilgisiz, ordunun talim ve eğitimindeki amaçtan habersiz kolordu ve tümen komutanları barınamayacakları gibi ... böylece, ancak gereken niteliklere sahip kolordu komutanlarının kolordularında; dinlenmeye muhtaç olan ve zararlı bir heykel halini almaktan başka orduya iyiliği olmayan tümen ve alay komutanları, kabul görmez ve bunların tembelliklerine göz yumulmaz’.”³⁰ (*Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal*, 2006 [1918], p.7)³¹

The book, *Zabit ile Kumandan*, has long stretches where the new type of ideal officer is delineated in detail. The officer in question resembles rather a reckless, selfless and virile beast, leading his troops to seek retaliation on behalf of the nation. The primary traits of this officer, according to Conker, are sacrifice and courage:

"Bu önemli görevin en ayırt edici, başta gelen koşulu yukarıdaki maddelerde yazıldığı üzere fedakâr ve cesur olmak, kendini ve hayatı hiçe saymaktır. Bir

³⁰ And we said: “‘Troops, officers in particular, are trained only by leaders who will set a good example...’ ... And we requested: ‘The task before us today is creating a *Council of Commanders and Officers* composed of capable individuals ready to do what needs to be done without turning a blind eye.’ And we explained: ‘However, just the overseeing of a sophisticated, strong, effective, enterprising and capable military cannot be left to military corps and division commanders who are uninformed and ignorant of the purpose of drill and training ... therefore, the military corps shall consist only qualified military corps commanders; the corps cannot tolerate the indolence of division and regiment commanders who are in need of being put out to pasture and have no other interest in the military than becoming a malign effigy’.”

³¹ The book, *Zabit ve Kumandan* is written by Nuri Conker in 1913 and first published in 1914. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal's *Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal* is written in 1914 and first published in 1918. The version that I am using in this thesis brings together these two books and has 2006 as its publication date.

subay, sanatı adına, hayatına ve varlığına hiç önem vermeyecektir. Gerek kendinin ve *gerek yanındakilerin hayat ve hatta rahatını* en iyi biçimde korumaya çalışacak, ancak sanatının ve işinin gerektirdiği anlarda bunları gözden çıkarmaya ve feda etmeye hazır bekleyecektir. Ve bu gibi anlarda bunları hiç düşünmeyecektir."³² (*Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal*, 2006 [1918], p.38) (emphasis mine)

Hereby, the emphasis on 'those nearby' is significant. For we see that the silent referent in question is many times none other than the family of the officer, including his own parents.³³ The existence of the family is thus acknowledged as a fact, but the same family is rendered utterly insignificant throughout the text. This indeed marks the place reserved to the family of the officer in those times, as the handmaiden of the military institution. The family, according to the military elites, had to be epiphenomenal to the profession itself. Perhaps, this approach is nowhere more evident than in the following lines, written by Mustafa Kemal in his review:

"Başarı için en emin aracın saldırı olduğunu anlamakta ısrar olunmaz; ancak saldırı ordusu kuracak milletin, Japonların *kyugeki zayşin* dedikleri saldırı ruhuna sahip olması gerektir. Bu saldırı ruhu, 1904 yılında;

Bin keder, bir üzüntü; fakat her şeye rağmen ileri!
Başka hiçbir şey düşünmek lazım değil
Cesedimi savaş meydanında gözler önüne sermek
İşte bu, Cenabıhakk'ın emeli!

şarkısını söyleyerek *Kazumaro* gemisiyle savaşa giden Albay Kujima'larda; Bu saldırı ruhu, Sasebo limanından savaşa çıkarırken ailesine, 'Bu andan itibaren benden haber beklemeyin! Görevimden başka bir şeye ilgilenmeyeceğimden sizden de haber istemem!' diye yazan Amiral Togo'larda; Bu saldırı ruhu, Nanşan Muharebesi'nde oğlunun göğsünden vurulduğu haberi üzerine, ailesine, 'Oğlumun külleri Tokyo'ya getirildiği zaman hemen gömülmesin! Yakında ben ve küçük oğlum da hayatı terk edeceğimizden, o zaman üçümüzü birden

³² "What most distinguishes this crucial duty is self-sacrifice and bravery under the conditions stated above and disregard of one's own life. Because of his vocation, an officer cannot attach importance to his life and existence. He will strive to the best of his ability to preserve *the life and even the comfort of himself and those nearby*, but he will stand prepared to disregard and sacrifice them the moment duty demands it. They will not even be considered." (emphasis mine)

³³ The father of the military officer does not take place in these narratives. It is the mother who comes to the fore as a body on which the honor of the (male) nation and the male officer is stamped.

gömersiniz!' emrini veren General Nogi'lerde; Ve bunları izleyenlerin hepsinde bütün aydınlığı, bereketiyle var olduğu içindir ki, narin Japonlar iri yapılı Ruslara meydan okudular."³⁴ (*Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal*, 2006 [1918], pp.15-16)

The family, in this account, seems to be a domain which should be jettisoned when the duty calls, as well as a site of procreation by virtue of which the nation raises its own prospective soldiers. Furthermore, it does not seem to be an element which should be regarded highly in the life of an officer. If anything, the narrative above highlights the family as a potential shackle inimical to the belligerence of officers. Therefore, the family is deemed disposable for the survival of the nation. Because, Conker propounds, the family survives if and insofar as the nation survives:

"Er geç ölüme mahkûm olan önemsiz ve tek bir hayat, bunlardan daha değerli midir ki, esirgensin? Savaş meydanlarında isteyerek feda etmekten çekinmeyeceğimiz can ve hayatımızın az sonra düşmanın ayakları altında aşığılama ve hararetle çığıneneceğini düşünmeliyiz. *Bu tek bir hayatın arasına subayın aile hayatı da dâhildir*. Subayın şehitlik rütbesine ulaşmasından sonra, diyelim ki hükümetin, ailesine hiç sahip çıkmayacağı kabul edilse bile, bütün bir memleket halkının sefaleti yerine yalnız kendi ailesi sefil olmuş olsa ne çıkar? Kaldı ki, subay, kendi ailesinin sefaletten korunması için bedenini ortaya atmaktan çekinecek olursa, sonrasında çoluk çocuğunun sefaletini görmekten

³⁴ "The best way to victory is attack; however, the nation that is to build an offensive army must have the spirit of attack the Japanese call *kyugeki zayshin*. This spirit of attack is exemplified in the song sung by Colonel Kujima as he was setting off for war in the warship Kazumaro in 1904:

Great suffering and sorrow; in spite of everything, forward!
There is no need of thinking of anything else
Lay my corpse on the battlefield for all to see
This is God's desire!

The same spirit of attack is seen in Admiral Togo, who on his way to war from the Port of Sasebo writes to his family, 'From this moment on, do not expect any word from me! As I cannot pay attention to anything other than my assignment, I do not want any news from you!' and in the order given by General Nogi during the Battle of Nanshan to his family when he gets word that his son has been shot in the chest, 'When my son's ashes are brought to Tokyo, do not bury them immediately! Because me and my young son are soon to die, too, bury the three of us all at the same time!'; And all of those following them were moved to greatness; they were so enveloped in their radiance and benediction that the slight Japanese squared off with the stalwart Russians."

başka bir sonuca ulaşamayacağı da apaçıktır. Subay, toplumun yararını düşünen en büyük varlık olmalıdır."³⁵ (*Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal*, 2006 [1918], p.43) (emphasis mine)

The discursive ambivalence of the military institution with respect to the institution of marriage was to remain intact in the following years, but with an additional twist. I propose that, in the early years of the Republic, and especially after 1927, the relationship between the family and the nation was redefined through a reversal. This time, it seems as if the nation survives if and insofar as the family survives. The imperative was now: "Procreate!"

"Her Türkün en büyük vazifesi Türkü korumak, Türkü çoğaltmak ve Türkü yükseltmektir. Türkü korumak için, Türkü çoğaltmak ve yükseltmek lazımdır. Bunun için de çocuk yetiştirmek, onları iyi, bilgili ve çalışkan olarak yetiştirmek lazımdır. Her Türk erkeği 18 yaşına varınca beğendiği bir Türk kıziyle nişanlanmalı, anlaşmalı ve evlenmelidir."³⁶ (Uluboy, 1945 as cited in Şen, 2011, p.99)

"Bir milletin derlenmesi, düzeni, selameti, millettaşların muayyen hedeflere doğru el birliğiyle yürümesi ile, her sahada itidal ile hareket ettirilmesi ile; onların yaşayış, duyuş, görüş tarz ve şekillerinin ahenkli bir hale getirilmesi ile temin olunur. Milleti çözüluştürten kurtarmak, onu çerçevelemek için en iyi çarelerden biri de ... evvelce söylendiği veçhile aile bağlarını kuvvetlendirmek, *aile reislerini zapturapt altına ve aile mensuplarını itaate alacak tedbirler düşünmek, mecburi evliliği kabul etmek ve bunu kolaylaştıracak tedbirler almak*, mümkün olduğu kadar, *memlekette bekâr bırakmamak, evlilere nüfus çoğaltmasına yardım edecek münasip bazı imtiyazlar vermek* ve nihayet

³⁵ "Is a single, inconsequential life doomed to die sooner or later so much more valuable than the lives of others that it be spared? It should be remembered that the life we do not hesitate to give up on the battlefields will soon be contemptuously and zealously trampled upon by the enemy. *This includes the life of the officer's family.* Even if the government won't come to the assistance of the family of an officer after he has been martyred in battle, wouldn't it be better for a single family to suffer than an entire nation? An officer may be reluctant to lay down his life with the intention of saving his family from a life of misery. But this decision may bring worse, unforeseen suffering afterwards. An officer should act in the interest of society as a whole." (emphasis mine)

³⁶ "The greatest duty of every Turk is protecting, procreating and exalting the Turk. To protect the Turk, the Turk must be proliferated and exalted. Therefore, children must be raised to be well-informed and hardworking. Every Turkish man should become engaged to and marry a Turkish woman to which he takes a liking when he turns 18 years old."

kuvvetli, ahlaklı ve imanlı bir gençlik yetiştirmek elzemdir."³⁷ (Yiğitgüden, 1941 as cited in Şen, 2010, p.153)

Perhaps, we should clarify here that the pro-natalist discourse was not an invention specific to this period. Such bio-political aspirations are shown to be endemic to nationalist and militarist discourses (Enloe, 2000; Lemke, 2013), both of which reigned since the Ottoman times. However, I propose that this period was when the pro-natalist position became hegemonic in the military, even though it remains to be a source of structural tension for the institution. Hence, I especially consider the year 1927 as a watershed moment in that regard. First of all, it was the year of the first census in Turkey, and the census is "one of the prerequisites for the successful introduction of a conscript army" (Lucassen & Zürcher, 1999, p. 10). Secondly, the first conscription law of the new nation-state was issued in the same year (Altınay, 2004a, p. 27). Two statistics can help the reader to grasp the sweeping transformations that take place in and through the military after 1927. First of all, Bozdemir articulates that, while the rate of those who learned how to write and read during military service was below 10% in 1927, the same rate was to increase to 70% in 1931 (Ünsaldı, 2008, p. 288). Secondly, heeding the calculations of Lerner and Robinson, Altınay states that, "there was a 900 percent increase in the number of conscripted soldiers between 1932 and 1939" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 28). These advancements make clear the great extent to which TSK operated as an ideological state apparatus to gel the various elements of the nation together, especially after 1927. The 'ideal officer' thus changed in concert with these developments as well. He was not any longer the guide of his command only in wartimes, but he was the guide of the whole nation, in war and peace.

³⁷ "The resilience of a nation is achieved by walking hand in hand towards order, security and the common goals of its citizens, acting with restraint in every sphere, and harmoniously coalescing their ways of living, perceptions, and standpoints. In addition, indispensable to protecting the nation from dissolution and supporting it ... is reinforcing family bonds, *thinking of what can be done to strengthen the head of the family and ensuring the obedience of family members to him; accepting compulsory marriage and taking measures to facilitate this; to the extent possible, seeing to it that no one remains single in the country; encouraging population increase by providing married couples incentives to have children; and, finally, raising strong, moral and religious youth.*"

As the military relatively reconciled with its worries concerning marriage, this prompted a new problem for the military elites. On the one hand, the officer had to be married if he were to be the guide of the nation and a true specimen to whom the rest of the nation should aspire to approximate. The pro-natalist discourse therefore gained prominence in the military. For example, the following quotations derived from *Ordu Sosyolojisi Yolunda Bir Deneme* seem to encourage the marriage of officers. The first one is pitting the Ottoman army against the Turkish military in the axis of marriage while doing so, whereas the latter underscores the obligation of officers to become fathers:

"Aileler kurup evlenmemiş bir ordu elbette bekârdır. Ve bekâr bir cemiyet gibi, bekâr bir adam gibi bütün zekâ olgunluğuna rağmen yarım bir varlıktır. Osmanlı ordusu evlenmemiş ordunun örneğidir. Er kitlesi üstünde, annelik şefkat ve ihtimamını kuramayan komutan, ferdleri yani subayları bir aile halinde birleştiremez. Ferdlerin münasebetlerinde aksayışlar inzibatsızlıklar, geçimsizlikler hatta ihanetler görülür. Çünkü komutan, bir aile kurarak ordu evine girmemiştir. Evet orduya girmek, orduda muvaffak olmak, fakat ordu evinin dışında kalmak..."³⁸ (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 190)

"Ordu bir Evdir: Bu ilmi kıymeti haiz terim ordunun içtimailiğini pek güzel ifade ediyor. Bunun için komutanlar, aileler kurmak suretiyle babalaşarak bu eve girmek mecburiyetindedirler..."³⁹ (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, pp. 190-191)

On the other hand, it was not easy for the military elites to shake off their professional doubts about marriage completely, because it would run the risk of diverting the attention of officers from the military to the family life. The presence of 'womenandchildren' could be detrimental to the conduct of operations, by diluting the male

³⁸ "An army without starting families and being married is, of course, a bachelor. And like a bachelor society... a bachelor... despite intellectual maturity, it is only a partial entity. The Ottoman army is an example of an unmarried army. The commander who is unable to extend maternal compassion and care to the privates under his command cannot bring individuals, i.e., officers, together as a family. Failings, lack of discipline, fractiousness, and even treachery, are seen in the relationships between individuals. This is because the commander starts a family but doesn't enter the home of the military. Yes, joining the military, being successful there, but remaining outside the military home..."

³⁹ "The Military is a Home. This precious term greatly expresses the social character of the military. Commanders must enter this home by establishing families and performing fatherhood..."

bonding in the military, while dividing the loyalty of the officer and obstructing his mobility (Enloe, 2000, pp. 156-157). The predicament is that the officer had to be a professional on the one hand⁴⁰ and he had to be married on the other hand. The rising tension between the discourses of pro-natalism and “radical professionalism” (Ünsaldı, 2008, p. 285) thus gave way to a compromise formation, embodied in the figure of a married staff officer. In the following quotations, we can observe how the military also discouraged the marriage of officers, prior to the attainment of the title staff officer:

"Ahlaki mükellefiyetleri Er kitlesi yetiştirmekle yüksek dereceyi alan kurmay subay, en doğru kararlarını, en açık emirlerini, sosyal moralin ideali olan ordudaki aile babalığının eşsiz vasıflarını verir. Bu sınavdan sonra subay artık ordu içinde içtimai bir insandır. Fakat ordu ferdlğine liyakatini en az 4 sene sonra isbat etmiş sayılır... Subay bu devreyi aştıktan sonra sabit bir karakter kazanıyor... Sabit karakter çağından sonra subay ferdlğini bütünlemek için evlenmeye izinli ad edilir. Bundan önce evlenmek zararlıdır."⁴¹ (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 188)

"Her kız mutlaka refahlı ve gönençli bir hayat içinde, istikbali parlak bir koca (metinde hoca) tahayyül eder. Buna göre ben meslekte sabit karakter kazanmadan bir genç kız hayali vaidlerle bağlayarak taliin sevkile layık olmadığı bir hayata sürüklemeye haklı değilim. Önce içtimai karakterimi tesbit

⁴⁰ It is widely affirmed that the Prussian model, alongside its rigid conception of discipline, adopted by the military was getting more and more consolidated during the early Republican period. Specifically, Akyaz and Şen addresses a transition in the Turkish military from an understanding of 'moderate discipline' to 'strict discipline' that took place around the 1930s (Akyaz, 2009; Şen, 2010). Apart from the ratification of a series of laws by which the personnel rights (*özlük hakları*) of military officers were regulated, they especially gather attention to the Military Penal Code (dated 15.06.1930) and Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law (dated 18.06.1935) as indicators of the concerted efforts to create the much desired new officer of the Republic. It is therefore quite possible to premise that, in the military, the discourse of professionalism was on the rise, much like the discourse of pro-natalism.

⁴¹ "A staff officer reaches his rank after having trained swarms of privates. He is in the position of family patriarch. The accompanying moral obligations require that he make the most appropriate decisions, give the clearest orders and maintain a high standard of social morale. After having passed this test, the officer is finally a social being within the military. But the military considers him deserving of personhood only after at least four years... Within this time, the officer acquires patience and upon reaching the age of fixed character, the officer is given permission to marry in order to complete his personhood. Marrying before this time is harmful."

etmeliyim. Kurmay subay olmam gayemdir. ... Mamafî bütün azmim eşime içtimai bir mevki hazırlamaktır."⁴² (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şen, 2011, p. 100)

As seen above, the title of the staff officer was the touchstone by which the professionalism of the officer was gauged, as well as the stage according to which the officer was tolerated to marry. However, there is little, if any, evidence at hand to assess if and whether the ambivalent discourse was approved and disseminated by the military elites of the period and how it was received in ranks lower than the staff officer. Did the military officers lend an ear to the suggestion and strive to be staff officers before they marry? Or did they ignore it? How did women perceive the idea of marrying with a military officer? Was it supposed to be a liberating or oppressing experience for them? How were their lives as wives of professional soldiers? How were the lives of the children of military families? Did the further functional differentiation of the military institution, with the births of the modern Navy and Air Forces (Barlas & Güvenç, 2010), entail the appearance of different types of military families? Or can we think of the military family rather as a homogenous category in this period? Unfortunately, the existing literature does not provide much material to address these questions. Still, that the family was to be held subordinate to the military profession in those years as it has hitherto been is an undeniable conclusion we can infer from the prevailing official institutional discourse.

In any case, the following years were to prove difficult for the marriage of military officers as well. Many studies concentrating on this 'exceptional period' (Bayramoğlu, 2004; Cizre, 2004) as well as the memories of officers embark on to depict the middle and low ranked officers as a hackneyed figure in decline, despair and frustration, stricken with the widening chasm between his soaring personal-professional expectations⁴³ and

⁴² "Every girl dreams of having an affluent life and a husband with a bright future. Therefore, without establishing myself professionally, I have no right to make unrealistic promises to a young woman and make her lead a life she doesn't deserve. I should form my social character. My aim is to be a staff officer. ... At the same time, I should with all my heart prepare a social status for my wife."

⁴³ The outbreak of the World War II, the American Military Aid to Turkey and international assignments given to them especially after the admission of Turkey to the NATO as a member state were primary reasons precipitating an increase in the professional

downward socio-economic mobility. The officer also seems to be torn by the discrepancy between the utmost symbolic significance attributed to him and his tragic fall from eminence.⁴⁴ The following part from a letter sent to the erstwhile Prime Minister Adnan Menderes by the name of an American military officer⁴⁵ may exemplify such portrayal of the Turkish officer, blighted by neglect within precarious conditions:

"Washington D.C.'deki Türk B.Elçiliği subaylarınıza hükümetçe para verileceğini bildirmişti. Altı ay boyunca onlar para gelmesini beklemişlerse de hiçbir yardım gelmemiştir. Onlar Amerikalı arkadaşlarından borç almak zorunda kalmışlar ve sonunda bu borçlarını ödeyebilmek için parmaklarındaki yüzükleri, fotoğraf makineleri v.s.'ye varıncaya kadar satmağa mecbur olmuşlardır. Kışın soğuk havada palto satın alıp giyemediklerinden dolayı içlerinden bazıları hasta olmuşlardır... Büyük bir teessür duyarak söylemek zorundayım ki içlerinden bazılarını yamalı pantolonlarla bile görmüş bulunuyorum. Şerefli Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'ni temsil etmekte olan subaylarınızı bu derece zaruret içinde görmek asla zevk verici bir şey değildir. Türk subaylarını bu derece ümitsiz, üniformalarını giymekten bu derece utanır ve bu derece fakir görmekten sonsuz derecede elem duymakta olduğumdan bu konuda size hakikati bütün açıklığı ile ve samimiyetle anlatmaya çalışıyorum..."⁴⁶ (Ağaoğlu, 1972 as cited in Akyaz, 2009, pp. 86-87)

Once cherished as a hope for change, the Democrat Party (hereafter DP), with its capital accumulation strategy based on agricultural growth and exportation, had stirred up disappointment in the larger and lower sections of the military (Akça, 2004; Ünsaldı, 2008;

expectations of the Turkish military officers, which largely remained unfulfilled (Ünsaldı 2008; Akyaz, 2009; Birand, 1986).

⁴⁴ Such memoirs should be read with a grain of salt though. Because it is obvious that some narratives are inflected by an inclination to justify the 1960 military coup on grounds of the worsening material conditions of military officers.

⁴⁵ Doğan Akyaz also specifies that, according to Samet Ağaoğlu, from whom he cites the text above, the letter was probably written by a Turkish military officer (2009, p. 87).

⁴⁶ "It was reported that money would be given by the government to officers at the Turkish embassy in Washington D.C. Despite waiting six months for the money, nothing came. They had to borrow money from their American friends and, in the end, to be able to pay off these debts, they had to sell whatever they could – their rings, cameras, etc. Some even got sick because they had no coats to wear in the cold winter weather because they had sold them... I have to state in sorrow that I even saw some wearing patched up trousers. There is nothing pleasurable about seeing your officers, who represent the honorable Turkish Armed Forces in a state of such enormous need. It caused me great mental anguish to see Turkish officers in such a desperate state, embarrassed by the condition of their uniforms and so impoverished. I am trying to sincerely present to you the heart of the problem..."

Akyaz, 2009; Birand, 1986). The majority of the officers had to manage their meager salary to keep up with the high rates of inflation (Akyaz, 2009, p. 86; Ünsaldı, 2008, pp. 59-64, Birand, 1986, p. 436). Their salaries had become 38% to 57% lower on average,⁴⁷ when compared with the single party period (Ünsaldı, 2008, p. 64). All of these were making marriage an unlikely exploit for military officers, especially for the lower ranking officers. For example, Birand (1986) discusses that the military officer was seen in the public as a person, "ineligible for renting a house, or giving away a daughter in marriage" (p. 436). Similarly, Akyaz (2009), citing Orhan Erkanlı, mentions that in 1954 the officers were simply deprived of material resources to be married (p. 86). In short, the distinguished officer had plummeted so much that he had turned into a figure subject to scorn and jokes of others, "for eating fried eggs all the time while drinking mineral water" (Yirmibeşoğlu, 1999 as cited in Ünsaldı, 2008: 64).

The snubbed officer struck at full force with the military coup of 1960, outside the chain-of-command.⁴⁸ This was also a defining moment, I suggest, which has given its current contours to the military family that we know today. First and foremost, it was a period during which the officer went from rags to riches. The socio-economic obstacles before marriage were thus removed by and large as the military officer regained its prestige and filled his pockets. In that regard, the establishment of the Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Foundation⁴⁹ (OYAK hereafter) right after the military coup, on 3 January 1961

⁴⁷ But the income brackets between general officers and other military officers were enlarging. Another development which caused a rift between general officers and others was that the chances of promotion were dwindling for middle and lower ranked officers as well, with the issued law no. 5611 (dated 20.03.1950). Ünsaldı (2008) also argues that, the cronyism of the Democrat Party elites did not help the situation either. For example, 16 generals and 150 colonels were dismissed from the military, upon the request of Adnan Menderes, with the accusation of planning a coup against the elected government party (Akyaz, 2009, p. 66).

⁴⁸ By no means, I want to contend that the cause of the 1960 military coup was solely the deteriorating socio-economic conditions of the military officers.

⁴⁹ In line with Akça (2006) we can define OYAK "as a collective capital group running productive, commercial and financial economic activities as much as or even more than being a social security organization" (p. 323). Therefore one should be careful while accounting for the relation between the enrichment of military officers and OYAK, simply because the very members of OYAK often vocalize their complaints out loud about the foundation, which has grown focus more on financial gains and less on the benefit of its

by a special law, as an institution of compulsory saving, auxiliary social security and a military holding (Akça, 2006, p. 319) as well as a money box of militarism (Altınay, 2006, p. 58) can be considered as the harbinger of the upper-middle class and gentrified (and even bourgeoisie for Akça (2004, p. 263) military family that was to transpire in subsequent years. Accordingly, the rise in the incomes of the military officers was off the charts between the years 1960-1971. For instance, when compared to previous decade, the relative revenues of the officers skyrocketed more than 500% in 10 years and it even exceeded 1000% in 1971 (Şaylan, 1978 as cited in Akyaz, 2009, pp. 383-384).⁵⁰ The figures become even more astonishing if we turn our attention from salaries to numerous privileges which are hardly quantifiable in terms of cash wages. For Şaylan's study (1978) cannot account for the impact of the burgeoning institutional complex, involving military lodgings, Officers' Clubs, vacation facilities and military hospitals whose construction, Birand informs, started right after the coup (1986, p. 440). In fact, only four days before the OYAK law, the law concerning the temporary overloads to meet the lodgings needs of military officers and employees was issued.⁵¹ Many facilities were erected in the following decade, in accordance with such laws and from the budget so much so that some senior members of the Justice Party, which was overthrown from power by the 1971 military coup, expressed their dismay with reference to this issue:

"Başbakan her istediklerini yaptı... Türk Ordusuna bizim kadar hizmet eden bir parti yok. Kışlasını biz yaptık Türk Ordusu'nun. Kışlasını, kışlasını... Lojmanını biz yaptırдық... Böyle bir şeyi [12 Mart'ı] tabii ki beklemiyorduk. Süleyman Bey'in kırgın olmaması mümkün değil."⁵² (Cited in Akyaz, 2009, p. 243)

members. For comprehensive studies on OYAK, see: Parla, 2004; Akça, 2004; Akça, 2006; Ünsaldı, 2008. For an earlier look to OYAK, see: Birand, 1986

⁵⁰ Akyaz (2009) also conveys that the rate of increase during the same years for the personnel of Ministry of Internal Affairs is 300% (pp. 383-384).

⁵¹ See: Subay, Askerî Memur ve Astsubayların Lojman İhtiyacı için Gelecek Yıllara Geçici Yüklenmelere Girişilmesi Hakkında Kanun. (1960). *T. C. Resmi Gazete, 10694*, December 30, 1960. Retrieved December 30, 2013, from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc043/kanunmbkc043/kanunmbkc04300186.pdf

⁵² "The Prime Minister has given them everything they wanted... No party has served the Turkish military as well as we have. We were the ones who built their barracks... We built

This brings us to the second quality which is usually ascribed to military families today. The military family was isolated, owing to the unprecedented emergence of a military complex which extended privileges to military officers and their families. As each coup cemented this isolation, the more the military family has "cocooned inside a militarized social world" (Enloe, 2000, pp. 165-166), demarcated from 'the life outside'. The following chapter takes a look at this family in question from within and surveys how it shapes the experience of military brats.

their lodging... Of course, we were not expecting such a thing [the military coup of March 12th]. It is not possible for Süleyman Bey to not be offended."

II. THE MILITARY FAMILY AND EDUCATION

2.1. Fathering the Nation, Fathering the Military, Fathering the Children

The children's experiences may vary according to their age, gender, class, ethnicity, religion and place of residence. Their fathers' rank and force in the military institution as well as their mothers' status of employment are other significant parameters to be factored in. Since we have not adequate data to pursue all sorts of relations between their experience and such parameters, I am bound to remain on a more descriptive level, where I will try to outline some common patterns deriving from the interviews.

As stated before, the child is surrounded by many families, including the (military) family into which they are born, the military institution, the school, and the nation to boot. Interestingly, sometimes their own family seems to be the most absent among all. If the father is on a watch or duty afar, and the child has a working mother regularly attending the events held in the military setting, the paths of family members do not intersect much. Yasemin is one of those children whose family experience in late 1990s fits to this description:

"Ben [...]’dayken babam Şırnak'ta görev yapıyordu. Onun dönüp dönmeyeceği belli değildi. Korkulu şeyler vardı. Geldikten sonra da babamı sabah görmedim zaten. Akşam görüyordum, yemek yiyorduk. Sonra yatıyor, sızıyor bir yerde kalıyordu. Fazla zaman ayıramıyordu, hafta sonlarını ayırabiliyordu sadece. Annem de öğretmendi. O da sabah gider akşam gelirdi hafta içi her gün. Akşam yemekler olurdu, yemeklere giderlerdi. Hep yalnız kalırdım evde. O sayede korkmamayı öğrendim."⁵³

⁵³ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: “When I was in [...], my father was stationed in Şırnak. It was not certain whether he was going to return. There were scary things. Anyway, after he returned I did not see my father in the morning. I would see him in the evening, we were having dinner. Afterwards he would lie down and fall asleep in some place. He couldn’t spare much time, only the weekends. My mother was

İrem also complains about calls of duty which separated her father from the family, even during leisure times:

"Yani babamla çok vakit geçiremedik. Çünkü [...]ta, [Doğu'da bir şehir]'da çok zor koşullarda çalışmıştı babam. Hatta bunaldığı zamanlar bile olmuştu yani. Babamı çoğu zaman göremiyorduk, sürekli nöbetlerde oluyordu. [...]tayken tatile çıktığımızda bile apar topar geri dönmek zorunda kalıyorduk. Çağırıyorlardı falan."⁵⁴

Even when the father is around, the endless chain of ceremonies, dinner invitations, proceedings of all sorts for which the parents should muster in does not make it easier for the child either. For instance, Zeynep mentions in the following how she took her elder sister for her mother, when she was a baby.

"Yani annen baban devamlı yemeğe gidiyor, devamlı bir davete gidiyor. ... Şey gibi görüyordum: O onların görevleri. Mesela ben annemi de fazla göremezdim açıkçası. Annem de benimle birlikte olmazdı pek. Çünkü o da subay eşlerinin günleri, işte bilmem ne komutanının eşi gelmiş onu karşılamaya gideceğiz... Bana zaten ablamlar bakmıştır. Ablamla aramda 11 yaş fark var. Mesela ilk anneyi ona demişim ben. Düşün yani devamlı onu gördüğüm için 'anne' diye ona seslenmişim."⁵⁵

Therefore, the military community as a family, instead of the biological family of the child often runs to the rescue and fills the void in his/her life. The following story

a teacher. She would leave in the morning and return in the evenings on weekdays. In the evenings there were dinners, they would go to these dinners. I would stay alone at home. That's how I learned not to be afraid."

⁵⁴ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "I mean we could not spend much time with my father. Because he was working under harsh conditions in [...] and [a city in the East]. There were even times when he was depressed. We hardly ever saw him, he would always be on guard duty. Even on holidays when we were in Cyprus, we would have to return all of a sudden, because they would call him back."

⁵⁵ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "I mean your mother and father constantly go somewhere, to dinners, to invitations. ... I saw it like that: It was their duty. Actually, I wasn't able to see my mother very often too. She wouldn't spend much time with me. Because there were these at-home days for the wives of officers, or, she would welcome the wife of such and such commander when arrived... It was indeed my elder sisters who looked after me. There are 11 years difference between me and my elder sister. For example, I first said 'mom' to her. Just imagine that. I saw her all the time, so I called her 'mom'."

written by a military wife is quintessentially indicative of the role undertaken by the military community as reinforcement:

"Bir akşam, bizim lojmanların erkek çocukları evimizin önündeki parka dolmuşlardı. On yaşlarında üç-dört çocuk, Levent'in bisikletinin üzerine eğilmiş, bağıra çağıra konuşuyorlardı. Bir yandan yemek yapıyor, bir yandan da mutfak penceresinden onları izliyordum. Bir ara sessizlik oldu. Levent, önce ana-avrat küfretti ve ardından beni hıçkırıklara boğdu: 'Ulan bir babamız da yok ki, şu bisikletimizi tamir etsin.' Elimdeki tabak düşüverdi. Pencereden dışarı baktım. O sırada servisten inen ve bu isyanı duyan subaylardan biri üniformasıyla çocukların arasına daldı ve yerdeki bisikleti onarmaya başladı. Mutfağın ortasına çöktüverdim. Saatlerce ağladım. Ve dışarıdan bana ulaşan konuşmaları dinledim: '-Koçum niye öyle diyorsun? Senin baban görevde değil mi?' '-İyi de amca, kaç ay oldu gelmedi ya. Bu bisikleti kim tamir edecek şimdi?' '-Ben yaparım aslanım. Ne oldu buna?' '-Bırak amca ya. Babam gelince...' '-Lan, yapsın işte. Bıraksana.' '-Amca, benim babam da Şırnak'ta, benimkinin de selesi oynuyo, yapabilir misin?' '-Yaparım tabii.' '-Amca sen nerede oturuyon?' '-Senin de çocuğun var mı?' '-Amca sen de Apo'cularla savaştın mı?'"⁵⁶

Not only passerby officers, but also other mothers, children and conscripts partake in the effort to soothe the desolate child. They pick up the slack left by the biological parents of the children, and become a supplementary family for them. Particularly the

⁵⁶ "One night the boys living in our lodgings gathered in the park in front of our house. Three or four kids about 10 years old were leaning on Levent's bicycle and shouting. I was cooking while watching them from the kitchen window. At one point it became silent. Levent first swore like hell and afterwards he made me break out in tears: 'Damn it, I don't even have a father who could repair that bike.' The plate I was holding suddenly fell from my hands. I looked out from the window. At that moment, one of the officers getting off from the service leaped into the huddle of kids in his uniform upon hearing the rebellion and started repairing the bicycle on the ground. I collapsed right there in the kitchen. I cried for hours. And I listened to the conversation outside: 'Hey lad, why do you say so? Isn't your father on duty?' '-Yeah sure uncle [informal expression in Turkish usually used by children to refer older man],⁵⁶ but how many months have passed since his departure. Who is going to repair this bike now?' '-I'll do it boy. What's wrong with it?' '-Don't worry about it. Once my father arrives...' '-Hey bro, why don't you just let him do it?' '-Uncle, my father is also in Şırnak. My bike's basket is also loose. Can you fix that as well?' '-Of course I can.' '-Uncle, where do you live?' '-Do you also have kids?' '-Uncle, did you also fight against the Apo followers?'" To see the whole story: Lojman. (2009). Retrieved December 21, 2013, from http://www.hakanevrensel.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5:gueneydoudan-oeykueler-2&Itemid=11

military lodgings provide a zone convenient to encounters and relationships whereby to quench the child's desire for care:

"Lojman hayatı boyunca anne babadan çok asker abi dediğimi hatırlıyorum ya."⁵⁷

"En çok o lojman ortamını özleyorum diyebilirim. Bir tek bende değil, mesela ablam da aynı şeyi söyler: 'Biliyor musun, [rüyamda] [...]taki [askeri lojmandaki] evi gördüm,' falan der. Demek ki onda da öyle bir etki bırakmış. Demek ki bize çok huzur vermiş. Gördüğüm rüyalar travmatik ya da huzursuz rüyalar değil. Gerçekten mutlu hissediyorum o rüyaları görerek uyandığım zaman. Demek ki gerçekten çok mutlu bir çocukluğum olmuş benim orada. O sırada annemin babamın evde olmayışı da çok dert değildi. *Çünkü annemle babam olmadığı zaman da benim orada bir ailem vardı. Ben öyle hissediyordum en azından.* Hiçbir zaman onların eksikliğini de hissetmedim açıkçası. Sen bana bu soruyu sorduğunda gerçekten annemle babam o zaman nasıldı diye düşündüm açıkçası. Geriye baktığımda, kendi kendime düşündüğümde, 'Çok yalnızdım ya, annem de babam da yoktu,' gibi bir şey hissetmiyorum. Orada ortamı da seviyordum, o asker abileri de seviyordum. Çok mutlu çok huzurluydu. Güzel bir çocukluktu benim için açıkçası."⁵⁸
(emphasis mine)

It is not only the family life, but also the kinship ties worn out by constant transfers that the military community comes to mend, if not replace. Many children repeatedly told that they are still unable to identify their relatives in family reunions that are typical of weddings, religious festivals or circumcision celebrations. They are unequivocal in narrating that the profession of their fathers has severely disarticulated their relationship

⁵⁷ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: "During my time in the lodgings I remember saying more 'asker abi' than mom or dad."

⁵⁸ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "I miss the lodgings atmosphere the most. It's not just me. My elder sister says the same thing as well. Sometimes she says, like: 'You know what, I dreamt of the house in [the military lodgings].' So she's been influenced in the same way. So it's given us a lot of comfort. My dreams aren't traumatic or uncomfortable. I really feel happy when I wake up from those dreams. It means that I really had a happy childhood there. It wasn't a big deal that my mom and dad weren't at home. *Because I had a family there, even though they were absent. That's how I felt at least.* Indeed, I never felt their absence. Actually, I thought how it was then with my parents, when you asked me this question. When I hark back, I don't feel something like thinking, 'I used to be so lonely, I didn't have my parents around.' I was fond of the atmosphere there. I was fond of 'asker abi's. It was very happy and very peaceful [there]. Actually, it was a nice childhood."

with their kin. For them, the primary cause of this is basically the physical distance engendered by relocations:

"Bu sürekli tayinlerden dolayı en çok etkileyen şey akrabalık ilişkileri. Ben [Doğu'da bir şehir]'de yaşadım; [Doğu'daki şehir]'den [...]’a babaannemin, dedemin yanına gitmek kaç saatlik yol. Bir de orada [Doğu'daki şehirde] mesela 3 tatilden birinde gidebiliyorsak, [daha Batı'da bir şehir]'deyken 6 saat tutuyor. İstedığımız zaman gidebiliyoruz. O yüzden çok etkiliyor bence, göremiyorsun edemiyorsun."⁵⁹

"Akrabalık ilişkilerini pek yaşamadım. Sürekli tayinler. Bütün akrabalarımız, anne tarafı da baba tarafı da [...]’de. Ama [...]’e sadece bayramdan bayrama gidiyorduk. Tanıştırıyorlardı, bir dahaki bayrama unuttuyorduk. Tanımıyorduk falan. Hâlâ çok sık gördüğüm insanların isimlerini unuttuyorum. Getiriyor, '[...] teyzen,' diyor; 'Kim?' diyorum. (Gülüşmeler) Hâlâ bir boşluk var orada. Onlar beni tanıyorlar ama ben hepsini bilmiyorum."⁶⁰

The physical distance does not seem to be the only obstruction though. For instance, Nuri conveys how his father's socialization in military schools since early childhood has influenced their kinship relations. For Nuri, his father's occupation is less a profession, and more a life-style. This is why, he says, they cannot get along with their relatives during family visits, especially on political grounds:

"Babam çok ufakken [askeri liseye] gittiği, ailesinden ayrıldığı için, ailesiyle [arasında] kültürel olarak olsun, ekonomik olarak olsun farklılar [oluşmuş]. Çok farklılar baktığımız zaman. ... Ama görüş çok farklılaşıyor. Baya bir görüş farklılıkları ortaya çıkıyor. E tabii bizde de ortaya çıkıyor. Bir de tabii çok fazla

⁵⁹ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "What's most affected by the constant transfers were the kinship relations. For instance, I lived in [the city in the East], do you how many hours does it take to go from [the city in the East] to my grandparents in [...]? While in [the city in the East] we could only go [to the grandparents] one out of three holidays. But it takes only 6 hours from [another city to the West]. We can go whenever we want. Therefore it affects [the kinship relations] a lot, because you can't meet and see them."

⁶⁰ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I never quite experienced kinship relations. Constant transfers. All of our relatives, both my mother's and my father's sides are in [...]. But we only went to [...] from one holiday to the next. They would introduce us with each other, but we would forget until the next holiday. We were not recognizing them. I still forget the names of people I see very often. They were introducing somebody to me, and telling, 'This is your aunt [...].' I'd say 'Who?' (Laughing) There is still a blank there. They know me, but I don't know all of them."

gidemiyoruz, göremiyoruz. Dolaşıyoruz sürekli, o da çok etkili. Hiçbir zaman geniş bir aile olamıyoruz yani. Baktığın zaman aslında siyasi görüş yönünden hâlâ sorunlar yaşıyoruz baya. Bakıyorsun amcamlara, babam bu aileden değildir herhalde dersin. ‘Evlatlık mı edinmişler?’ dersin yani. Çünkü çok değiştiriyor. Mesela asker olmasa bu kadar etkilemezdi akrabalık ilişkilerini. Özellikle o görüş diyorum ya hani. Ekonomik durumu bile farklı olsa, görüşleri aynı olabilirdi. Oradan [birbirlerini] yakalayabilirlerdi. Ama askeri lise... Dedim ya hani, [sadece bir] meslek değil askerlik.”⁶¹

While the kinship relations are not regarded highly, many children uphold a positive image of the military community as a site of solidarity, and even organic unity. Such and such a relative may be unapproachably distant, but the community swarms with people, to whom they can turn anytime to seek help, attention and affection:

"Asker ailesinden geçen çocukluk[ta], sonuçta lojmanda kalıyorsunuz. Komşuluk ilişkileri had safhada [oluyor]. Çok güzel komşuluklarımız oldu. Bayramlar olsun, özel günler olsun, resmi-dini bayramlar olsun hep iç içe, sıcak bir ortam oluyordu açıkçası. Bu yandan dayanışma vardı.”⁶²

"[B]iz okulla birlikte sosyalleştikten sonra [dışarıdaki insanların] bizim kadar güçlü bağları olmadığını gördük. Çok belliydi bu. Biz mesela, en basiti, birinin yardımına koşuyorduk. Ona yardım etmeye çalışıyorduk, uğraşıyorduk falan ama karşılığında biz onu alamıyorduk. Yine bizim yardımımıza koşan, o kadar

⁶¹ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “Because my father went there [to the military high school] when he was very young and separated from his family, cultural and economic differences have emerged between him and his family. They are very different when you look at it. ... It [military schools] differentiates views so much. This also has an influence on us. And of course we cannot visit them very often. We are constantly on the move and that has a big impact. So, we cannot become an extended family. We still experience troubles in terms of political views. If you’d look at my uncles, you’d say that my father probably does not belong to that family. You’d ask, ‘Did they adopt him?’ Because it [military education] changes [you] a lot. If my father were not a soldier, our kinship relations would not have been influenced that much. I mean especially that ‘view’. Even if their economic conditions had been different, their views still could have been the same. They could get along with each other somehow. But the military school... As I said, being in the military is not only a profession.”

⁶² Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “During a childhood spent in a military family, you stay in lodgings after all. Relationships between neighbors are at a peak level there. We had great relations with our neighbors. There was always a very close and warm atmosphere, whether it be on special days, official or religious holidays. There was solidarity.”

hevesi olan gene o bizim lojman arkadaşlarımızdı. Dayanışma daha kuvvetliydi. O açıdan tek geçerim lojman dayanışmasını."⁶³

Let's return to the biological nuclear family of the child and look at its members one by one. The military officer father actually constitutes a strange superimposition worthy of examination. The category of fatherhood is as much central to his business in the military as to his position in the family. Put clearly, the military officer, according to sources which designate his idealized versions, should be the father of all enlisted males in the military, as is he the father of his own children:

"Orduda Aile Babacı Aile Gibidir: Babacı ailede baba, ailenin hâkimi ve dini başkanıdır. Ordu ailesinde de baba, birliğin ve vazifenin teşkil ettiği dinin başkanıdır... Baba isterse ferdi, aileden (birlikten) kovabilir. Ferdi evlendirmek hakkı da vardır. Ferd evlenebilmek için babanın müsaadesine muhtaçtır."⁶⁴ (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 189)

Clearly, he is conferred with huge responsibilities and 'rights' over whom he holds sway in the barracks. But what does it take to be a father of the (male) nation? Of course, he should be a man first. In fact, he should be the epitome of masculinity:

"Manevi gücün sarsıldığını gösteren böyle bir durumda ortaya çıkacak olanlar, subaylardır. Subay, o sırada başı yukarıda ve göğsü ileride duruşuyla baştan ayağa sinir kesilerek, erkeklik damarları gevşemeye başlamış olan askerlerini derhal uyarır ve onları kendine getirir."⁶⁵ (*Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal*, 2006 [1918], p.39)

⁶³ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "After we socialized through the school, we nevertheless understood that they [the people outside] did not have ties as strong as ours. It was obvious. Just a very basic example, but we would run to help someone. We would try to help them and so forth but we would not get it [help] in return. Those who would come to help us, made an effort were again our friends from the lodgings. The solidarity was much stronger. In that respect, I hold nothing above the lodgings solidarity."

⁶⁴ "The Family in the Military is a Paternalistic Family: In a paternalistic family, the father has the final say and is the religious leader. The same is the case for the family in the military... If he wants, the father can banish the individual from the family (the unit). He has the right to marry off the individual. The individual requires permission from the father to get married."

⁶⁵ "When spirit is shaken, it is officers who rise to the occasion ... with their heads held up high and their chests emboldened, they stand firm and immediately warn their soldiers whose veins of masculinity has begun to falter to shape up."

Yet, commanding and muscling up the shrinking masculinity of his troops requires more than 'having' what it takes to be a man. He should be able to guide his men to manhood in particular and to subjecthood in general by means of training. He should be a great educator who is held responsible for the creation of the modern subjects of the (male) nation. In order to achieve this end, he should first conjure up a 'soul' in his men "as an instrument of power through which the body is cultivated and formed" (Foucault, 1979). This way, the military officer can sculpt the modern, nationalized subject out of the conscripted bodies:

"Şimdi, bizim yönlendireceğimiz ve yöneteceğimiz insanların emelleri, düşünceleri, ruhlarında saklı özellikleri nelerdir? Biz komuta edeceğimiz insanların hangi emellerini kendimizde ortaya çıkartıp somutlaştırarak onların kalplerini, güvenlerini kazanacağız? Ve onlara manevi güçlerin esin kaynağı olacak [hangi] araçları belirleyeceğiz? Ve insanlardaki, ancak hayal edilen amacın ve idealin bir araya geldiği görünmez özelliklere, görünür amaçlarla mı hitap edeceğiz? Herhalde askerlerimizin ruhunu kazanmak bizim için bir görev olduğu gibi; öncelikle onlarda bir ruh, bir emel, bir kişilik yaratmak da Allah'tan ve Medine-i Münevvere'de yatan Cenabı Peygamber'den sonra bize düşüyor."⁶⁶ (*Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal*, 2006 [1918], pp.13-14)

"Ordu komuta ve subay heyeti, umumi bir millet gençliğini yedi terbiyesinden geçirecek bir vaziyete girmiş bulunmaktadır. Binaenaleyh ruhiyatı takip etmek hak ve mecburiyetini taşımaktayız."⁶⁷ (Yığıtgüden, 1941 as cited in Şen, 2011, p. 45)

As Mustafa Kemal implies above, the military officer should be only second to gods and prophets in his qualifications to fulfill such expectations. His heavy tasks need him to be a perfect specimen, superior in every imaginable aspect to everyone who falls under his reach.

⁶⁶ "Now, what are the characteristics shrouded in the desires, thoughts and soul of people whom we are to guide and govern? Which of the desires of the people we are to command shall we embrace and concretize in ourselves to be able to win their hearts and trust? Can we designate the sources of inspiration for them? Shall we appeal to invisible qualities arising when goal and ideal come together, something that can only be dreamed of? Probably just as winning the hearts of our soldiers is a duty for us, after God and the Prophet, the responsibility of creating a soul, a desire, and a personality in them falls upon us."

⁶⁷ "The Council of Military Commanders and Officers has the duty to train the youth of an entire nation. Therefore, we have the right and obligation to monitor its psychological state."

"‘Subay nedir?’ sorusuna, Piyade Talimnamesi maddelerinden birinin verdiği ‘Subay, emrindeki erler için en iyi örnektir’ cevabının üstünde duran senin, ‘Subay komuta ettiği insanların kendi bilgi ve yetkinliğinden yararlanması için, emrindekilerin dayanıklılık ve yiğitliklerinin bileşkesinden daha fazla dayanıklılık ve yiğitliğe sahip olmalıdır’ sözünü her subay pek büyük dikkat ve ciddiyetle okumalı ve onun anlamını belleğine kazımalıdır.”⁶⁸ (*Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal*, 2006 [1918], p.12)

All these do not necessarily require the officer to exercise power over the bodies falling under his command. On the contrary, he is rather expected to treat his privates kindly, as though they are his own children. Only this way, he can be a better guide and a father to them:

"Erler, askerlik hizmeti sırasında subayların öz çocukları gibidir. Bir insan kendi çocuğunun yetişmesi için eğitim ve öğretimini, sağlığını, tavır ve davranışlarını nasıl gözetir ve bunların üstüne düşerse; subay babalar da er çocuklarının sağlık ve esenliği, görev ve sanatını güzel öğrenmesi, ahlakının düzgünlüğü, kısacası her şey için; aynı bağlılık ve özenle çalışacak ve bunları gözetecektir.”⁶⁹ (*Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal*, 2006 [1918], p.57)

"Gözü kanlanmış, benzi sararmış, dili paslanmış erlerle derhal tıpkı babaları gibi konuşmalı, bu durumun nedenleri aranmalı. Subay, erleri her sabah bu suretle bir kere yoklamaya mecburdur. Hastalığını saklayan veya ona önem vermeyen erler bulunur. Bunlar derhal hastaneye gönderilir. Bu gibi durumlar diğerlerine ders olur. Hastanelere gönderilen erler orada unutulmaz. Her hafta bir onbaşı veya çavuş ve bir iki er hastanedeki erlerin yüzbaşı adına hatırını sorar ve yüzbaşının selamını bunlara götürür. Hastanede yatışı uzayan erler varsa, ara sıra subaylardan biri veya bizzat yüzbaşı da gider ve gitmelidir. Bu sırada bir iki portakalcık veya bir paket tütüncük de götürülürse, erlerin dağlar kadar gönlü olur. Subaya olan bağlılığı çok güçlenir. Subay erin yemeğine yatağına, arkadaşlarıyla geçinmesine, çokça parası geliyorsa ne yolda

⁶⁸ “An answer to the question ‘What is an Officer?’ can be found in one of the articles of the Infantry Training Manual that you remind us of and highlight: ‘An officer sets the best example for the privates under his command.’ These words should be taken to heart: ‘To enable the men he commands to benefit from his own knowledge and competence, the officer should have greater durability and more bravery than all the durability and bravery of those he commands combined.’”

⁶⁹ "During their military service, privates are like their own children to officers. They should treat them the same. Whatever they would do to provide for the education and training of their own children should be done for the privates. Officer ‘fathers’ will work to ensure the health and happiness of their private ‘children’ and see to it that they learn their jobs well and maintain moral rectitude; in short, they will demonstrate the same commitment and care in their dealings with them."

harcadığına ve dışarıda kimlerle görüştüğüne, memleketteki işine ve ekmek kapısına, aile üyelerine, çamaşırına, temizliğine, saçına, tırnağına; kısacası her şeyine, her türlü haline bakacak, gerekenler hakkında öğütler verecek, yol gösterecek ve onları düzeltecektir."⁷⁰ (*Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal*, 2006 [1918], p.63)

Of course, these are moulds to which the military officers are expected to conform as much as possible. More often than not, there is little, if any correlation between the idealized image of the sublime military officer and the military officer we come across in streets every now and then, simply because the ideals are so hard, if not impossible to reach. This is also a valid statement for military wives or brats, for whom the institution charts out different moulds. Further, although in reality only few can "manage to squeeze themselves into these snug, idealized moulds," (Enloe, 2000, p. 164) many in the military community try to live up to the expectations tailored for them.

Therefore, I propose, since the officer is to be a quintessential model, true guide, and a proper father for everyone around him, we cannot but assume a continuum between his fatherhood in the military and his fatherhood in the house. Then, a series of questions gains immediate relevance: If the military officer is to raise his troops as his own children, how is he to raise his own children? Are they to be treated as if they are privates living in home? If so, how does he cope with a daughter? If the officer were to fail in molding his

⁷⁰ "Privates with bloodshot eyes, pale complexion and corroded tongue should be spoken to in a father-like fashion and the reasons for why they are like this should be sought. The officer must inspect them each morning for this purpose. Soldiers who are concealing illness or not taking it seriously should be found and immediately sent to the hospital. Situations of this type are instructive to the other soldiers. Soldiers sent to the hospital are not forgotten. Every week a corporal or sergeant and two privates inquire on behalf of the captain about the soldiers in the hospital and relay the captain's best wishes to them. In cases where the soldiers are in-patients at the hospital for an extended period of time, from time to time, one of the officers or the captain himself should go visit. In the meantime, if the soldiers are taken some fruit or a package of cigarettes, they will be made very happy. Their commitment to the officer is strengthened. The officer will ask about the food the soldier eats, his bed, how he is getting along with his friends, if he gets quite a bit of money, how he is spending it, who he sees from the outside, his work and how he makes a living back home, his family, his laundry, his hair and nails, in short, about everything. He will look at how he is doing and, if necessary, give him advice, show him the way, and correct him."

children into an ideal shape, what would happen to his status as father, both in the military and in the family? What happens to the children as he attempts to succeed, lest that a spoiled child should tarnish his status and reputation? How do the children wrest away a space of relief amidst all efforts to inform them? And is it possible to construe a military family independently from the military institution? Let's turn to the narratives to understand what takes place outside the realm of ideals.

First of all, it seems that, however much he may be wrapped up in his own work the father's authority goes unchallenged, without the slightest scuffle, when he is home. But the fathers hold this authority in different ways and they have different personalities. Roughly said, the children describe in their narratives two types of fathers. The dividing line between the two appears to be 'carrying work to home'. So much seems to hinge on fathers' conception of the military profession as well. The first type of fathers is known for the strict discipline and authority over familial matters. They demand undivided attention and obedience in their presence. Some children think that this attitude relates to their education and socialization in military schools:

"Babam Askeri Lise'de ve devamında Kara Harp Okulu'nda okumuş olmanın etkisiyle çok disiplinli bir insan. Yani disiplin ister istemez bizim üzerimize, ailenin üzerine de çok yansıdı. Hâlâ da yansımaya devam ediyor. Başta bu disiplinli yönüne dikkat çekebilirim. Ayrıca çok stresli bir insan. Olumsuz olarak kendi üzerimden bunları gördüğümü söyleyebilirim. Onun dışında genelde sakindir, hırslı bir insandır."⁷¹

"...[S]inirli bir adamdır. Öyle dokunsan ne oluyor diye patlar. ... Askeri Lise'de okumuş, Harp Okulu'na gitmiş, çok disiplinli. Her şey düzenli olmak zorunda, her şey planlı olmak zorunda."⁷²

⁷¹ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: "Because he received education from the Military High School and then from the War College, my father is a very disciplined person. It [his discipline] inevitably had an impact on us, on our family. It is still the case. First of all, I can draw attention to this quality in him. He is also a much stressed person. Negatively, these are what I've seen. In other times, he's usually a quiet and ambitious person."

⁷² Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "...He is an angry person. When you touch him, he explodes. ... He studied at the Military High School and then went to the War College, so he's quite disciplined. Everything always has to be in its proper place and order, everything should be planned."

Whereas, Mustafa believes that his father's strictness should have something to do with his adverse working conditions:

"Babam serttir. Kararlıdır. Çocukken pek görmezdim. Terör vardı, göreve giderdi, Doğu'da çatıştırdı. Biz de lojmandaydık, bazen gelirdi."⁷³

Kemal, on the other hand, particularly recalls how his father was enforcing studying and resting:

"Yani şimdi böyle çok vıcık vıcık, daha çocuk doğmadan Facebook'ta hesabını açan babalar var ya; [babam] öyle değil bir kere. Daha böyle geleneksel; baba dediğin işten gelir, pijamalarını giyer, mandalinasını soyar, televizyonun kumandası ondadır, otoriterdir, ondan izin alırsın, izin vermezse bir yere gidemezsin falan. Öyle geçti çocukluğum. Öyle bir babadır. ... Otoriterdi, o hiçbir zaman değişmedi. Biraz katıydı bazı prensipleri. Ders çalışılacaksa ders, mola verilecekse mola hesabı. Bu gece hiçbir şey yapmadın, yan geldin yattın, böyle bir dünya yok. Senin kaydardığını fark ederse elbet gelir, odanın kapısında biter o. Uyuyorsan uyandırır, zorla çalıştırır. Belki senin iyiliğin için yapıyordu bunu ama psikopatça yaptığı zamanlar oluyordu. Ben mesela ders çalışırken televizyon izlemek isterdim deli gibi. Çocuksun abi, televizyon izlemek istiyorsun. Televizyonda ne var dersene, *Bizimkiler* var yani. Çok süper bir şey de yok, ama istiyorsun. Duyuyorsun sesini uzaktan. Ama ders çalışman da lazım, test çözmek lazım falan. Gelirdi mesela, bir saat çalışırdım. On dakika mola [derdi, içeri giderdim]. Hakikaten 10. dakika dolduğu zaman babam televizyonu kapardı abi. Kapardı. 'Ben de izlemem o zaman,' derdi. Sen de kös kös odana dönerdin. O televizyon açılmazdı yani. Sen orada otursan da sabaha kadar açılmayacağını bilirdin. Geri dönerdin odana."⁷⁴

⁷³ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "He is strict. He is a man of firm decisions. I did not see him much when I was a child. There was terror and he'd be on duty. He'd fight in the East. We were in the lodgings, he would visit us sometimes."

⁷⁴ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "I mean, he is not the buddy-buddy type who create a Facebook account before the birth of his child. Well, he is not like that. He is rather traditional; he comes home, wears his pyjamas, peels his mandarin, holds the remote control, and has the authority, you ask permission from him and if he does not permit, you cannot go anywhere. He is that kind of a father. This is how my childhood passed. He was authoritarian and it never changed. Some of his principles were a bit strict. Like, when it's study time you study, when it's break time, you take a break. You did nothing tonight, just lied down. Such a world does not exist. If he'd realize that you are coasting, he'd appear at the door frame and that would be it. If you sleep, he'd wake you up and force you to work. Maybe he was doing so because he thought it was for my good. But there were times he did so like a maniac. For example, I would crave to watch the TV while studying. You are a child after all; you want to watch it, right? If you'd ask what was on the

The first type of fathers goes as 'soldierly fathers' for some interlocutors. All of them work for the Land Forces and they are graduates of military high schools and the War College. Therefore, some children whose fathers are falling under the rubric of soldierly fathers wish their fathers were from the Navy or Air Forces to be more at ease. But, these qualities alone do not determine fathers' demeanor. Nuri thinks that his father is soldierly and not at once, because and despite his experience in the army since his adolescence:

"Babam bir yönüyle baktığın zaman tipik asker, sert, belli kuralları olan birisidir. Ama bir yönüyle baktığın zaman da hiç askeriye uyumlu olan birisi değilmiş gibi geliyor aslında. Çünkü ilişkileri çok iyi birisi. Çok iyi iletişim kurabilen birisi. Genelde asker olan birisi oraya liseden beri gittiği için, artık onun için bir meslek değil de bir yaşam tarzı oluyor o. Bir yaşam felsefesi oluyor yani. Etkisinden çıkamıyorlar. Babam o tarzda bir insan değil. O yönden değişik birisi diyebilirim."⁷⁵

In the narratives, the relationship with soldierly fathers is usually characterized by an invisible and unsurpassable distance, as Deniz recounts in the following:

"Beklediğim sıcaklığı sonuçta göremedim diyebilirim çocuklukta. Elbette ilgilendi, sevdi, oynadı benimle. Ama sonuçta bir sınır var gibiydi. Nasıl anlatayım onu? Disiplinin vermiş olduğu bir şey mi diyeyim ne diyeyim bir

screed, there was *Bizimkiler*. It is not great but you want it. You hear its sound from a distance. But you also have to study. You have to practice for exams and so forth. He'd come for instance and I'd study for an hour. 'Ten minutes break,' he'd say [and I would follow him to the living room]. Man, exactly at the 10th minute mark my father would turn off the TV. He'd turn it off. 'I also won't watch,' he would say. And you would return to your room with your head down. That TV would not be turned on. You would know that even if you insist waiting till the next morning, it would not be turned on. So you would go back to your room."

⁷⁵ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "From a certain angle, my father is a typical soldier, a tough man with certain rules. On the other hand, it seems like he is the least person to be made for the military. Because he is very sociable. He has great communication skills. A typical soldier has usually been a soldier since high school, so it becomes something more than a profession; it becomes a way of life. I mean, a philosophy of life. They can't get their minds out of it. My father's not like that. That's why, I could say he is a different person."

sınır vardı aramızda. Hani bir yere kadar yakınlaşabiliyorduk. Bunun etkisini gördüm diyebilirim."⁷⁶

Nuri also feels this distance. He narrates how he prefers to turn into himself instead of overstepping the respect due to his father who seems to possess an awe-inspiring authority:

"Hani çok severim, belki de dünyada saygı duyduğum ilk insandır, ama bazı şeyleri hâlâ ona [babama] anlatamam. Çekinirim. Çok saygı duyarım. Mesela asla sesimi yükseltmem. Karşı çıkmam. Hiç sesimi yükseltmemişimdir bugüne kadar. Çünkü biraz da asker olmasından kaynaklanan [bir] korku var. Hani korkarsın böyle, çünkü ne yapacağı belli olmaz. Çok kızmaz ama kızdığı zaman da... Ben bir defa gördüm öyle çok kızdığını. O yüzden çok saygı duyarım. Asker olmasından da kaynaklanıyor. Bir sertlik vardır yani onda. ... [B]irbirimizi severiz ama özellikle babamla aramda bir mesafe vardır."⁷⁷

On the flipside, the second type which I call the 'unsoldierly fathers' does not resemble at first glance the former type at all. Unlike the callous 'soldierly fathers' who seem ready to gush out all sorts of pressures, they are remembered not so much with an aura of discipline and authority as with their congenial charm. The frequented adjectives to describe them are 'sweet', 'cotton-like' and 'soft'. They are thought to be amicable, benevolent guides. It is even assumed that they are less disciplined than their fellow officers. The children who have this type of fathers contend that there is no continuum

⁷⁶ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: "I couldn't receive the warmth that I expected when I was a child. Of course he took care of me, loved me, played games with me. But it seemed like there was a limit. How can I express that? A thing about his discipline or not, there was this distance between us. I mean, we could only grow close up to a certain extent. I can say that I felt the effects of this."

⁷⁷ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "I mean I love him a lot, perhaps he is the person whom I respect the most, but I still can't talk about certain things with him. I shy away. I respect him a lot. But I never raise my voice, for example. I never oppose him. I've never raised my voice in front of him. I have a fear that partially stems from him being a soldier. You know you're scared, because he is unpredictable? He rarely gets angry, but when he does... I saw him got mad like that once. That's why I respect him a lot. Its because he is a soldier. There is toughness in him. ... We love each other but there is especially a distance between me and him."

between their fathers' working life and family life. While the father is a soldier in his job, he is solely a father in home:

"Pamuk gibi diyebilirim. İnanılmaz. Ama dışarıdan görünüşüyle çok farklı bir insan. O büyük ihtimalle mesleğinin vermiş olduğu bir şey. Dışarıya öyle gözüküp, öyle olmak zorundayken evde çok çok farklı. Bağlarımız çok kuvvetlidir bizim. ... bizim babamın kafasında, bizim kolunun altında falan [olur]. Çok iyidir, pamuk gibi bir kalbi vardır diyebilirim."⁷⁸

For Ayşe, the fact that he did not go to the Naval Military College explains his father's unsoldierliness:

"Babam çok tatlıdır. ... Yumuşaktır biraz, daha sakin biridir. Agresif biri değildir. 'Denizci olduğu için böyle, yoksa askerler böyle değil,' falan derler mesela genelde babamı gördüklerinde. Ya da şey der herkes: 'Deniz Harp Okulu'nda okusaydı böyle olmazdı.' Babam sevecen bir insandır. İnsanlar genelde şaşırırlar: 'Allah allah, hiç asker gibi durmuyor,' derler mesela. Babam da çok sert biri olmadığı için çok sıkıntı yaşamadım galiba [bir] asker çocuğu gibi. Babam, 'Sen asker çocuğusun. Şunları yapmamalısın. Böyle davranmalısın,' falan gibi bir şey demedi bana. Genelde serbest bıraktı. Öyle olunca ben, 'Babam asker,' gibi çok bir şey hissetmedim. Tepemde bir baskı yoktu yani."⁷⁹

Whereas Tarık explains that it should be his father's branch in the military which helped his father to maintain a boundary between his job and family life:

⁷⁸ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "Like a cotton. He is incredible. But the way he looks from outside is different. It's probably a thing about his profession. He has to look tough, act tough, but he is very different when he's home. Our bonds are very strong. I mean, like one of us sleeps on top of his head, the other under his arm. He is really nice, he has a golden heart."

⁷⁹ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "My father is a very sweet person... He is a bit soft, calmer person. He is not aggressive. 'He is like that because he is a navy officer. Other soldiers are not like that,' people say upon seeing my father. Or they say: 'If he had gone to the Naval War College he wouldn't be like that.' He is a tender person. People tend to get surprised: 'How strange, he does not seem like a soldier at all.' Since my father is not a strict person, I didn't experience much difficulty during my childhood, as a usual soldier's child would do. My father didn't tell me things like: 'You are a military brat, you shouldn't do this, and you should not behave like that.' He usually let me free. That's why, I never felt much something like, 'My father is a soldier.' There was no pressure hanging over me."

"İş yaşamında karşılaştığı zorluklar varsa bile bize bunu fazla fark ettirmede, hissettirmede. Zaten yaşadığı iş hayatının, hâkimlik-savcılık, yani mahkeme görevi olması dolayısıyla, [babamın] askerlerle iç içe olma, araziye tatbikata çıkma, göreve gitme, orayı burayı teftişe gitme gibi ağır bir askerlik görevi yok. Örneğin bir karargâh subayıyla karşılaştırırsak, yine askerlerle içli dışlı olma, daha askerlik mesleğine yakın, fiziksel olarak zorlayan işler yapma gibi şeyler hayatımızda olsaydı belki etki edebilirdi."⁸⁰

Yasemin, having a retired general officer father, thinks that her father is not as soldierly as others too:

"Babamı normalde herkes sert sanır. Ama sert değildir kesinlikle. Boğuşuruz, güreşiriz. Benimle zaman geçirmeyi çok sever, oyunlar oynamayı çok sever. Babam benim için ayrı bir yerdedir her zaman. Diğer babalara hiç benzemez, her şeyi açıkça konuşabilirsiniz. Normalde erkek arkadaşınız olduğu zaman bir bayan kesinlikle babaya söylenmez. En son baba duyar. Ama bende ilk baba duyar. Kendisi bana rahatlamamı söyler. Bir şey olursa, 'Gel ilk önce bana söyle, ben bileyim. Sen ne yapıyorsan yap,' der. Askeri Lise'de okumadığı için, [askeriyeye] liseden sonra geçtiği için askeri yanları pek kuvvetli değil. Disiplin[i] falan diğer askerler kadar fazla değil."⁸¹

However, the line demarcating the unsoldierly fathers from soldierly ones can get thinner than one may initially suppose. The categories of soldierly and unsoldierly fatherhood are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it seems to be a false binary at times. For,

⁸⁰ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "Even if he had problems at work life, he didn't let us know about it or make us aware of it. Because of the professional life he has, being a judge or a prosecutor, he is at court on duty. He did not have demanding military duties like taking care of soldiers, performing military drills, inspecting this and that. For example, if when we compare him to officers working in headquarters, if there had been things in his life like socializing with conscripts, carrying out laborious tasks closer in essence to the routines of the military profession, it could have had an effect on us."

⁸¹ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Everyone thinks he is strict. But he is certainly not. We romp and wrestle. He loves spending time and playing with me. He always has a special place in my heart. Unlike other fathers, you can talk to him about everything. Usually girls do not tell their father when they have a boyfriend. Generally the father is the last one to hear the news. But my father hears it first in our family. He tells me to relax. If anything happens, he tells me: 'Come and let me know in the first place and then do whatever you want.' Since he did not go to the Military High School and joined the military in the War College, his military aspects are not so strong. He is less disciplined than other soldiers."

they are rather porous to each other. This does not mean that all fathers are equally soldiers in the home, and their children are equally privates in their presence. Nor does it mean that they all leave their profession hanging in the rack when they enter home. There are some fathers who may be less or more disciplined and disciplining than others. There can be fathers who are able to maintain a separation between their profession and family life better than others. However, nothing inheres in the qualities ascribed to unsoldierly fathers that make them lesser soldiers than soldierly ones. Because, I suggest, one should bear in mind that strict disciplining and benevolent guidance are in fact two sides of the coin of fatherhood assigned to the military officer. Belonging to any type does not detract from the fatherliness or soldierliness of the officer, neither in the military, nor in the family. Perhaps, the transitivity between the two types becomes most apparent in the juxtaposed accounts of two sisters. İrem considers that her father definitely belongs to the second type:

"Ailesine çok düşkündür babam. Bizsiz yapamıyor hayatta yani. Bizi aramadan ya da bizsiz vakit geçirmeden çok mutsuz bir insan oluyor yani. Evine çok düşkün. Ama asker babaları hep böyle sert olur, çok disiplinli olur falan. Babamda pek öyle yok. İşini eve getirmek şeyi yoktur yani."⁸²

On the other hand, Merve parts company with her elder sister over the issue, and proposes that hers is a soldierly father, owing to his socialization and education in the military:

"Babamın kendisi çok disiplinlidir. Her gün saat 5'te kalkar. Dolabında her şeyin yeri bellidir. Gittiğinde bir şeyi orada bulur ve her şey düzenlidir. Kendi açısından disiplinli ama bana bunu *hiç yansıtmadı*. 'Sen böyle olacaksın, şöyle yapmak zorundasın,' diye yansıtmadı. Ama sinirli bir adamdır. Öyle dokunsan ne oluyor diye patlar. ... Askeri Lise'de okumuş, Harp Okulu'na gitmiş, çok disiplinli. Her şey düzenli olmak zorunda, her şey planlı olmak zorunda. Bana bu yönünü *tamam yansıtmıştır* ama zorlama olmadı. Ama mesela benim hakkımda da bir sürü plan yapmıştır, her şey şu planda gidecek diye. Asker

⁸² Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "My father is a family man. I mean, he cannot do without us. He becomes miserable if he can't talk to us or spend time with us. He is so dedicated to his home. You know, officer fathers are supposed to be so though, so disciplined, and so forth. My father is not like that. He never brings work home."

olduğundan dolayı evet yansıtmış oluyor da baskı olmadı yani."⁸³ (emphases mine)

Apparently, there are several inconsistencies in Merve's narrative. She first utters that her father's strict discipline having its roots in the military does not have an influence on her. She then concedes that there may be certain reflections of it over her. But she definitely refrains from admitting that her father's disciplinary demeanour has amounted to repression over her life and choices, despite the following acknowledgement that her university preference form was indeed filled by her parents, against her wishes:

"[Üniversitedeki bölümüme] isteyerek girmedim. Fen çıkışlıydım. Hiç istemiyordum yani. Aslında ben sosyal, böyle daha TS'den girip, fotoğrafçılık, reklamcılık tarzında şeyler istiyordum. Ama babam, 'Öyle olunca para kazanamazsın ileride,' dedi. Ben istemeyerek, onlar benim tercihlerimi yaptı. Onlar benim tercihlerimi yaptı derken tabii ki şey değil... İyi niyetle. Benim iyiliğimi düşündükleri için yaptılar ama istemediğim çok şey vardı. Birisi geldi: [...]. Sondan bir önceki tercihimdi."⁸⁴

Then, we can conclude that, the line between both types is tenuous. As the children internalize the disciplinary measures and practices that are usually attributed to the military, the perception of fathers may tilt toward the unsoldierly edge.

⁸³ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "My father is a very disciplined person. Every morning he wakes up at 5 am. Everything has its own place in his wardrobe. When he looks for something he finds it immediately and he keeps everything tidy. He is well disciplined but he *never reflected* it upon me. He did not say, like, 'You have to be like this, you have to do that.' But he is an angry person. When you touch him, he explodes. ... He studied at the Military High School and then went to the War College, so he's quite disciplined. Everything always has to be in its proper place and order, everything should be planned. *Okay, maybe he reflected* this aspect of his upon me but he did not force me to anything. But, for example, he had made lots of plans about my future. Yes, because he is a soldier he reflects it, but there was no pressure I mean."

⁸⁴ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I didn't want to study in the department I registered in the university. I was a science student. Actually I was more into social stuff like photography, advertising and so forth. But my father said that, 'You cannot earn your life if you choose them.' Against my wishes, they made my preferences. When I say they made it, it's not like... They did it on good intentions, for my well-being. But there were many things in the preference list I was not fond of. I got into one of them: [...]. It was my next to the last choice."

2.2. Mothering the Nation, Mothering the Military, Mothering the Children

Now let's look at the second member of the military family, namely the mother. Just as the male military officer is assigned to be the father of the (male) nation and his own children in accordance with a set of ideals, so is a woman the mother of the (male) nation and has her own share of militarized ideals after which she is expected to strive. Cynthia Enloe, in her *Maneuvers*, (2000) sorts out a good deal of features which makes a model military wife. The crux of her arguments is that, "a woman's wifely femininity ... is valued by military officials only insofar as it enhances militarized masculinity" (2000, p. 156).

This, I propose, is equally true for the Turkish context. The military institution in Turkey "is prone to send out messages about what the ideal spouse should be," (Enloe, 2000, p. 162) and what is distinctive about militaries, when compared to other institutions that rely on employees who are married, is how clear and how patriarchally feminized that message is (Enloe, 2000, p. 162). First and foremost, the military discourse in Turkey pigeonholes women as mothers:

"Hislerin 30 yaşından sonra kuvvetlenen idrak çağında, erkek için en makbul kadın, anneliği en güzel temsil edendir. ... Kadın yalnız annedir ve bütün anlamile annedir. Baba annenin emeğini ancak çocuklarının hayatında arar. Evlenilirken arayacağı bir ahçı bir işçi değil, çocuklarına en iyi anne olabilecektir. Evlendikten sonra ise arayacağı isteyeceği ancak anneliktir. Bu günün boşanma sebeplerinden biri de erkeğin evde kadından annelikten başka vazifeler isteyişidir."⁸⁵ (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şen, 2011, p. 93)

The military elites promote women only and only as mothers; hence as the vehicles of the reproduction of the nation. Otherwise it would be a disaster, they suggest, leading to undesirable consequences such as divorce. Thus, the military wife should zealously devote

⁸⁵ "For a man, at some point in his thirties, when he becomes more aware of his feelings, the ideal woman is a woman who best represents motherhood. ... A woman is only a mother and is a mother in the fullest sense. A father looks for the labor of the mother only in the lives of his children. What he seeks when he gets married is not a cook or a worker but a good mother for his children. After marrying, all that he wants and asks for is motherhood. One of the reasons for divorce today is the men expecting duties other than motherhood from the woman."

herself to the upbringing of 'proper' children. Just as the 'proper' raising of each child turns into an insignia for officer fathers' competence for good guidance in the eyes of the military institution, as well as their masculinity (Enloe, 2008, p. 106), the wives too can prove their worth to the institution by selflessly performing nothing but good motherhood, thereby raising model children. The following quotation exemplifies the conception of wives as the 'angels of the house' (Enloe, 2000, p. 159):

"Ordunun hizmet dışı hayatı... orduevlerinde geçer. Bu esnada aile babası eşiyle musaveten ailenin başkanlığı ifa ederler. Fertler bu hayata karışırlar. Ailenin annesi, babaya olduğu gibi, sevgi ile sayılır. İçeri girdiği zaman oturanlar ayağa kalkarlar, yani itaat duyguları ondan esirgenmez. Çünkü o çok nazik, çok müşfik bir annedir... Hizmet esnasında sert, keskin babanın, bu anlarda o derin sevgisini ve yumuşaklığını temin ediyor... Fertliğin cüzülerine çocuk bakımının, evlat sevgisinin ve kocaya karşı munis duyguların okuludur... Ailenin resmi hayatı ve ideali uğrunda feragat, fedakârlık ve dayanıklılığın zevk halinde tecelli ettiği çehredir. Ödeve teşvik edişin, istemeden yalnız verişin, istetmeyişin misalidir... Ordu sosyal hayatına yeni girmiş cüzüleri o terbiye eder içtimai kaidelere alıştıtır."⁸⁶ (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 191)

The military elites maintain that, everything else should be left aside for the good of the children. Working life outside home is one of those major fields that the military wants to foreclose for wives, perhaps so that the wives remain to be 'dependent' on their husbands and thence to the military institution to which the husbands depend, not simply for their financial well-being, but for their very identity (Enloe, 2000, p. 155):

"Eşim adımla, mevkiimle iftihar etmeli ve iyi saygı itibar görmeli... Beni tamamlayacak eşim, ordu mesleğine ve Ordu Evi'ne olan sonsuz sevgiyle beni

⁸⁶ "In the military, time off-duty is spent at the homes of the military. Meanwhile, the officer performs equally with his spouse the role of the head of the family. Individuals intermingle in this life. The mother of the family, like the father, is met with fondness. When she enters, those seated stand up. She is greeted with deference. This is because she is a very a very gentle, loving mother... The father, stern and intense while on duty, is full of love and gentleness at these moments... She is the school for other members where personhood, childcare, a child's love and friendly feelings towards one's husband are learned... She encompasses renunciation, self-sacrifice at her countenance marked by the pleasure taken from endurance of the official life and the ideal of the family. She is a model of incentive to perform duty, delivery without asking... She trains members new to the social life and social rules of the military"

tamamlamalı. Böylece ordu sosyal hayatının hususi terbiyesiyle büyümüş olmalı. Bu hususta çok kuvvetli olması, Ordu Evi'nin kızı olması ile kabildir, yani bir asker kızı olmalıdır. Kurmay subay olacağıma göre, eşim bir üniversite tahsili yapar. Bu asker kızı, feragat, dayanıklılık gibi askeri hisleri, ilmi sebepler ile kıymetlendirerek kuvvetini ve cesaretini arttırmış bulunur. Evlenmem için finansal salahiyet gereklidir. Hali hazır kazancım buna yetmiyorsa eşim tamamlamak vazifesini temin eder. Ancak hayat alanında çalışarak değil... Belki gelirlerle."⁸⁷ (Erker, 1939 as cited in Şerifsoy, 2011, p. 192)

Perhaps needless to say, the 'proper' daughters are designated to be chaste mother prospects, while the 'proper' sons are patriotic professional soldiers waiting to happen so that a lineage of professional soldiers can be preserved in the family a la aristocracy:

"Subay gençliği en geniş temellere dayanmalıdır. Tek temel asalet, mülkiyet ve ortadan yukarı bir mesleki aileye mensubiyettir. Eskiden olduğu gibi babadan oğla intikal eden bir subay soyunu korumalı ve ihya etmelidir... En iyileri, sulhte arayıp bulmalıdır ve subay heyeti milli şuurunda bir en iyiler camiası olarak yaşmalıdır."⁸⁸ (Nadas, 1944 as cited in Akyaz, 2009, pp. 38-39)

Two consequences ensue from the militarization of motherhood as such. The former is the plain conceptualization of spouses' wombs as stations whereby to recruit (Enloe, 2000, p. 248) prospective praetorians of the nation. Second, if the military officers are to be conceived as an eminent coterie consisting of distinguishable individuals, and if their wives deserve their due credit as long as they live up to the expectations by raising prospective mothers and professional soldiers, then it follows from that, the wives are expected to

⁸⁷ "My wife should take pride in my name and position and enjoy respect... My wife should round me out with the eternal love for the military profession and the Military Home. She should have been brought up with the special civility of military social life. She must conform to this to the letter. She must be the girl of the Military Home ... that is, a military girl. Since I'm going to be a staff officer, my wife should have a university education. In addition to such soldiery feelings as self denial and resilience, this military girl will have strength and courage reinforced by her understanding of scientific explanations. I need to be financially prepared to get married. If my earnings are not enough, my wife will have to contribute. Not by working in life... but perhaps through other sorts of income which does not require working."

⁸⁸ "The officer youth should be based on the broadest of foundations. The fundamental nobility is belonging to a tenured professional family. An officer lineage that passes down from father to son, as it used to, should be revived and preserved... The best should be sought and found in peacetime, and the officers should be seen as the best in the national consciousness."

accomplish a consuming, albeit strange task. In the best case scenario, the wife can reproduce the copies of herself and her husband in the children. Because, in the military discourse the parents of the military family is situated as the ceiling to what the mother should elevate her children. It is only when the family comes to full circle the mother is seen to succeed in her task. Every other possibility condemns her to failure. Let's get out of this circular and quite narcissistic discursive universe of ideals for a moment and see what happens in reality via a detour to the narratives of interlocutors.

Initially, the mothers of my interlocutors are not exactly the 'angels of the house'. More than half of the mothers (6) are employed outside their houses, while the rest are working in the home as 'housewives'. All of those employed outside are teachers. This may seem to be a statistical aberration at first. But, it is in fact quite a widespread condition among wives of military officers, given that school teaching is one of the occupations which can get along with requirements originating from the constant relocation of husbands.

The mother is indubitably the most invisible member of the family in the narratives of the children. She occasionally comes forward to handle some tasks in the absence of the husband who has gone to his post nearby or afar on duty. As the husband returns home, she usually vanishes in the narratives. She ensures that the children are safe to school and back, they make good friends, have good grades, get good education, and keep good health and complexion. She may be reserved a trifling bit in memories of packing up or unpacking as well. In other cases, she seems to profess in silence whatever she is doing in wherever she is working, with one noticeable exception. She is often the inexhaustible attendant of what the children like to call 'the protocol'. She regularly participates in tea-hours, at-home days, conversations, and dinner invitations held in various military settings, usually on a rotational basis. She shows up with her husband, while dragging her children behind in a series of militarized rituals, including promotion ceremonies, change-of-command ceremonies, oath-taking ceremonies, weddings, circumcision feasts and funerals. She minds her manners in the presence of 'higher-ranked' wives, knows how to act according to 'the etiquette' and teach it to neophyte wives. In Enloe's words (2000), she is "quite comfortable

with social relations based on rank" (p. 164). Not all military wives fit to the descriptions above of course. But the majority of them consume remarkable time and energy to the requirements entailed by the protocol. For example, Zeynep recounts in the following that even though her mother was a house worker, she was away most of the time during her childhood because of the call of the protocol:

"Yani annen baban devamlı yemeğe gidiyor, devamlı bir davete gidiyor. ... Şey gibi görüyordum: O onların görevleri. Mesela ben annemi de fazla göremezdim açıkçası. Annem de benimle birlikte olmazdı pek. Çünkü o da subay eşlerinin günleri, işte bilmem ne komutanının eşi gelmiş onu karşılamaya gideceğiz..."⁸⁹

On the other hand, Mustafa complains about wives who live by the ranks of their husbands:

"Lojman dedikodu ortamı. Kadınlar lojmanda koca rütbesiyle yaşar. Sevmiyorum lojman ortamını."⁹⁰

Kemal aligns himself with Mustafa in stating that, the rank hierarchies between officer husbands figure in the social relations between their wives more than children:

"Günleri olurdu mesela annemlerin, subay eşlerinin bilmem ne. Mesela o şehrin en büyük komutanının karısına ne derlerdi ya... Hanımefendi derlerdi mesela. Sanki diğerleri hanımefendi değilmiş gibi. Onun [komutanın karısının] ismi ne olursa olsun o hanımefendidir. Mesela o şehirde en büyük [birlik olarak] alay varsa, alay komutanı albayın karısı hanımefendi olur. 'Hanımefendi geliyormuş,' falan [denir]. Gelecek gelecek bir tane pörsümüş, 60 yaşında bir karı gelecek. O hanımefendi oluyor diğerleri de subay karıları. Mesela onlar [subay eşleri] arasında [rütbe ilişkileri] vardı. ... Onlarda mesela subay karısı - astsubay karısı ayrımı da daha fazla vardır. Eminim yani. Çocuklar için yok, çok yok yani."⁹¹

⁸⁹ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "I mean your mother and father constantly go somewhere, to dinners, to invitations. ... I saw it like that: It was their duty. Actually, I wasn't able to see my mother very often too. She wouldn't spend much time with me. Because there were these at-home days for the wives of officers, or, she would welcome the wife of such and such commander when arrived."

⁹⁰ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "The lodgings are an environment of gossiping. The women in the lodgings live by the ranks of their husbands. I don't like the lodgings."

⁹¹ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "For example, my mother had these at-home days with the wives of officers. How were they calling the wife of the

Let's finally turn to the last member of the military family to outline what kinds of moulds they are expected to get into.

2.3. The Model Military Brat

Thus far, in our analyses of the members of the military family, we initially reflected on the ideal models and then, through the narratives of my interlocutors, moved on to what takes place in reality. The discourse of the military institution, when it comes to the youth of the nation, abounds with projections which draw on nationalist-militarist imaginations as well. In fact, the youth is one of the social categories that the military institution seems passionate about addressing. However, the military institution does not provide us with much discourse specifically aiming at the children of military officers, as it was the case with male military officers and their wives. Neither the books, nor the top-rank officers that I know of have publicly taken a stand and defined the distinctive characteristics of the model military brat. One could have concluded from this, that the child of a military officer deals with the burden of expectations, pressures and obstacles that are similar to that of the child of any other father. This condition, which applies to the lives of military wives as well, is indeed true to a great extent. On the other hand, we can appropriate the diagnoses of Enloe (2000) for the context of the children. As is the case for wives of officers, the child of an officer "has to cope with the demands peculiar to being a military [brat], s/he is defined by society not only by his/her relation to a particular father, but by his/her membership in a powerful state institution; s/he is seen not just as a particular soldier's child, but as a military brat" (p. 156). For example, Ayşe remarks that her father's profession appears to define her identity in the eyes of others. She thus keeps it to herself

highest ranked commander of the city... Ah, they'd say 'the lady', as if others are not. Whatever her [the wife of the commander] name may be, she is the lady. Or if the largest unit in the city is a regiment, then the wife of the colonel would be the lady. They'd say, 'The lady is coming,' and so forth. Who's going to come is indeed nothing but 60 years old wizened old woman. She is the lady though, while the others are just the wives of officers. For instance they had it. I mean their relationships were based on rank relations [of their husbands]. ... I am pretty sure that there was a stronger distinction between the wives of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. For children it was not that significant."

most of the time in order to prevent the prejudices surfacing in the minds of others the moment she shares that she is the daughter of a military officer:

"Çok fazla kişiye söylemem babamın asker olduğunu falan. Öyle bir durum hâlâ var. İlk söylediğinde, seni de belirliyor çünkü hani. Baban askerse sen de otomatik olarak o görüşlerle doğuyorsun gibi bir hadise oluyor. O yüzden, 'Hm, baban asker mi? Şey...' diye hafif bir tereddüt geliyor. Hâlâ [geliyor] yani. ... Mesela üniversitede birinci yılda herkese söylemiyorsun da samimi olduğun arkadaşlarla, 'Babam da asker,' diye muhabbet ediyorsun. Yani babamın mesleğini bir türlü söyleyememek hadisesi biraz sıkıntı yaratıyor. Ya da söylediğinde de en başta seninle ilgili de enteresan bir görüş oluşturuyor kafasında insanlar. 'Babam asker,' dediğinde sanki sen o zaman solcu olamazmışsın gibi bir şey oluyor. Ya da işte daha muhafazakâr çevrelerle görüşme yaptığımda, 'Baban askerse demek ki sen de asker kafalısın, milliyetçisin,' gibi şeyler oluşuyor kafalarında seninle ilgili."⁹²

Then, we can attempt to discern those demands that remain peculiar to the lives of these children, and this is exactly what I will try to do in the remaining part of this section. This time, in a reverse fashion, I will try to infer from the narratives at hand the ideal moulds set up for the children of military families. I will make use of Enloe's list (2000, pp. 162-166) featuring the characteristics of the model military wife to come up with my own list concerning children.

First, the model child takes pride in father and the institution which he works for:

"[Asker çocuğu olmak] gurur verici bir şey. İyi ki böyle bir ortamda büyümüşüm diyorum. İyi ki asker çocuğuyum diyorum. Çünkü dışarıdaki çoğu insan tabii bilmiyor yaşantımızı. Ama birçok şeyin içindesin ve daha çok bilgin

⁹² Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "I do not tell many people that my father is a soldier. I still don't. Because when you say that, it kind of determines who you are. As if you are automatically born with the views of your father if he is a professional soldier. People hesitate: 'Hmm, your father is a soldier? Well...' They still hesitate. You don't tell to everyone about your father in the first year of university, but you only converse with your close friends about it. The hardship of telling about your father's profession thus causes a bit of distress for me. When you say it, people begin to have prejudices about you. Like you cannot be a leftist when you say, 'My father is a soldier.' Or, when I interview more conservative people, they seem to think that, 'If your father is a soldier, then you are also military-minded and nationalist.'"

oluyor. Daha yakından görüyorsun bazı şeyleri. Bu da babam sayesinde oldu tabii."⁹³

"TSK her şey yani. Türk milletinin her şeyi diye düşünüyorum. Öyle de olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Çünkü zaten çok zor koşullarda bu durumlara gelebildik. Ülkemizin kurulmasından beri askerin de bu konuda çok yardımı vardır yani. Her zaman da olmuştur. Her zaman da hazırdır her şeye asker vatani için. Asker bizim için her şeydir ya. Ötesi yok yani, her şeydir."⁹⁴

"Bence asker ailesinde çocuk olmak, asker bir babanın olması gurur verici bir şey."⁹⁵

"[B]ence çok gurur verici bir şey Türk ordusu, Türk askeri. Sonuçta bu zamana kadar Türk tarihi diye bir şey var yani. Bu zamana kadar yaşanmış şeyler var. Onun içinde Türk askeri var, Türk ordusu var. O yüzden bence çok önemli, daha fazla değer verilmesi gereken bir şey."⁹⁶

"Şu an mesela ben hâlâ babamın subay olduğunu söylemekle gurur duyuyorum. Ama yine de söylediğim zaman karşı tarafın bakışını görebiliyorum. Mesela eskiden çok farklıydı, şimdi daha farklı oldu."⁹⁷

S/he acknowledges the hardships that the constant transfers of a soldier father cause in his/her life. But s/he embraces them as an advantage rather than a disadvantage. She takes them as opportunities helping to his/her maturation or self-realization. She

⁹³ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "[Being a military brat] is something to take pride in. I am so glad to have grown up in an environment as such. I am so glad to be a military brat. People outside do not know much about our lives. But you get involved in many circumstances when you are a military brat and it makes you knowledgeable. You see some things closer. Of course this has happened thanks to my father."

⁹⁴ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "TSK is everything. It is everything to the Turkish nation. And, I think, it should be kept this way. Military has been a great help since the foundation of the nation-state, as we struggled our way to today. It has always been so. Soldiers are always ready for anything for their fatherland. They are everything to us. Nothing can top them, they are everything."

⁹⁵ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I think that being a child of a military family, having a soldier father is a prideful thing."

⁹⁶ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "The Turkish military, the Turkish soldiers... These are things to take pride in. After all, there is something called as the Turkish history, isn't it? And there are lots of things into it, where the Turkish soldiers and the military have been involved. They are therefore very important and to be esteemed higher."

⁹⁷ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "I am still proud of saying that my father is a military officer. But I can see the looks in the eyes of others. It was different back then, it has become different nowadays."

subordinates the sorrow of broken relationships and bygone places to the curiosity of making new friends and exploring new places, even though s/he knows that his/her ties in wherever s/he goes may be no less transient than previous ones. She believes adaptation to be his/her forte, much to be praised:

"Tayin deyince önce biraz üzülüyorum. Çünkü alıştığım bir ortamı, arkadaşlarını bırakıyorsun. Ama sonra da heyecan verici bir duyguya dönüşüyor. Çünkü yeni bir yer tanıma merakı; acaba orada kimler var, nasıl bir ortamım olacak, okulum neresi olacak, orası nasıl bir yer... Gittiğimde de işte o merakla üzüntünü unutuyorsun zaten. Yepyeni bir hayata başlıyorsun."⁹⁸

"Asker çocuğu olmak zor bir şey. Devamlı taşınmak, yeni insanlarla tanışmak hem zor hem de güzel. Eğitimi etkiliyor, ama çok farklı insanlarla tanışıyorsun. Eğitimden daha çok, görerek insanları tanımaya başlıyorsun. Yapılarını anlıyorsun, nasıl bir insan olacağını tahmin edebiliyorsun. ... Mesela şöyle bir örnek vereyim. [...]’ta gittiğimiz evde piyano vardı. Ev tamamen döşeli bir evdi. O zaman piyanoyla tanıştım ben. Merak saldı, oturdum başına. Hiçbir şey bilmediğim halde, kimse bir şey demeden dangır dungur çaldım piyanoyu. Babam böyle görünce, ‘Piyano dersi alır mısın?’ diye sordu. Piyano dersi aldım bu sayede. Hem de ünlü bir piyanistin babası tarafından. İnsanlarla tanışma, değişik şeyler, mesela atletizm. [...]’ta çok önemlidir atletizm. Onun sayesinde atletizme başladım, spora böyle başladım. Türkiye’de atletizm diye bir şey yok. Atletizmle tanışmış oldum."⁹⁹

"En çok etkilediği kısım çok tayin olması. Aslında bence bu bir dezavantaj değil, avantaj. Çünkü seni daha çok küçük yaştan farklı şartlara adapte olmayı öğretiyor abi. Sen sadece bir şehirde ilkokul 1’den üniversiteye kadar okursan

⁹⁸ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “Transfers would initially sadden me a bit. Because you would leave your friends and environments you are used to. After a while, they would turn into an excitement though. Because you would become curious about your new place: Who lives there, what kind of an environment will you find there, in which school will you study, what kind of a place is it... You would forget your sadness by this curiosity and turn over a new leaf.”

⁹⁹ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "It is difficult to be a military brat. Constant transfers, meeting new people is simultaneously difficult and nice. It severely affects your education, but it makes you acquainted with very different people. You come to know people by seeing and living, rather than education. You become able to understand their kinds, and predict what they are up to. ... For example, the house we stayed in [...] was a fully furnished one, with a piano inside. This was when I first saw a piano. I grew an interest to the instrument. As I was hammering at it without knowing how to play, my father took notice and asked me if I would like to take piano lessons. And I took lessons, from the father of a famous pianist to boot. Furthermore, unlike Turkey, athletics is quite important in [...]. I started athletics and sports there thanks to that.”

başka kültürleri, başka insanları göremezsin. Üniversitede tanışırısın o insanlarla. Ama oradan oraya sürüklenince birçok yer görüyorsun. ... [H]asbelkader ortalama üstü yerlerde bulduysan avantajı çok. Şimdi biliyorsun zaten çeşitliliği desteklemek için bütün dünya götünü yırtıyor. Çeşitlilik, çeşitlilik, bilmem ne, diversity muhabbeti. Onu biraz yapıyorsun aslında asker çocuğu olarak. Çeşitliliğin bir parçası sen oluyorsun zaten çoğu zaman.”¹⁰⁰

"Tayinler bir bakıma olgunlaşmam için iyi oldu. Mecburen adapte oluyorsun. Eğitim için kötü ama olgunlaşmak için iyi bir şey." ¹⁰¹

S/he is willing to make sacrifices, especially in his/her education life, so that the family stays together after whatever uprooting the job of his father requires. S/he does not mind attending whatever schools s/he ends up, because s/he is capable anyway to warp the conditions s/he faces into his/her liking. Nor does s/he mind scaling down possibilities for him/her in terms of education. S/he is grateful to the father if he is the one who makes sacrifices by leaving him/her behind with other family members so that the children can pursue their education in their current schools and a safer environment:

"Lise Fen Lisesi oldu burada. İlginç olabilecek bir nokta şuydu: Babamın [Doğu]'daki görev süresi dolmuştu. Tayin isteyecekti, o dönemde sınavdan önce tercih yapılıyordu. Bana sordu: '[Batı'da bir şehir]'e mi gidelim, [Batı'da başka bir şehir]'e mi gidelim?' Bir yerde kendini yoklayıp, kendini kestirip ona göre cevap veriyorsun. Önceliği [...] 'ya verdik. [...] olsun, hem yaşaması biraz daha kolay, hem yakın yer gibi düşünerek Fen Lisesi ve arkasından [...] 'daki Anadolu liselerini yazdık. Neyse ki Allahtan [...] 'yı kazandım, geldim. " ¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "The transfers are the most impactful bit of it. In fact they are not drawbacks. I rather see them as an advantage. Because from very early ages, it teaches you to adapt to different conditions. You would not see other cultures and people if you would spend your educational life until university within a single city. You would meet them in the university. But when you are driven from pillar to post, you see a lot of places. ... If you live in above average places by chance, I see lots of advantages into it. You know, now the whole world is raving about supporting diversity. Diversity this, diversity that, so on and so forth. It is a big deal now. Actually, as a child of a soldier you do that. Most of the time, you become an element of diversity."

¹⁰¹ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "In a way, the transfers have proven good for my maturation, because you have to adapt yourself. They are bad for education, but good for maturation."

¹⁰² Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "I went to the Science High School here. The interesting thing was that, my father's term of office in [the East] was finished and he was about to ask for a transfer. Back then high school preferences were made before the high school entrance exams. He asked me: 'Do you want to go to [a city in

During the period of university preferences, which has a decisive impact on her future occupation, s/he gives way to the wishes of his/her parents, despite his/her initial inclinations. S/he surrenders him/herself to the true guidance of his/her parents and admits that it is for the greater well-being of everyone. S/he often finds consolation in the fact that s/he was too young to make better choices anyway:

"Ben ilk başta bunlardan [hukuktan] öte konservatuar düşünüyordum enstrüman çaldığımdan dolayı. Gitar, davul çalıyorum. İşte aile baskısı şu yönde gelişti: 'Konservatuarda ne yapacaksın, ne işine yarayacak? Gelecek planların arasında konservatuarla ilgili ne seçebilirsin, ne yapabilirsin? Aç kalırsın.' O mantıkla yaklaştılar. Ben de sonuçta abi avukat, baba [askeriyeden emekli olduktan sonra] avukat, onların etkisinde kaldım ister istemez. Hani hem maddi yönden, hem de rahat olurum mantığıyla [seçtim]. Baskı sonuç verdi diyeyim."¹⁰³

"Aslında ben sosyal, böyle daha TS'den girip, fotoğrafçılık, reklamcılık tarzında şeyler istiyordum. Ama babam, 'Öyle olunca para kazanamazsın ileride,' dedi. Ben istemeyerek, onlar benim tercihlerimi yaptı. Onlar benim tercihlerimi yaptı derken tabii ki şey değil... İyi niyetle [yaptılar]. Benim iyiliğimi düşündükleri için yaptılar. Ama istemediğim çok şey vardı. Birisi geldi: [...]. Sondan bir önceki tercihimdi."¹⁰⁴

the West] or [another city in the West]?' I asked myself and estimated an answer. We gave the priority to [...]. Because it was closer and it is easier to live in there. We thus gave the top priority to the Science High School and then wrote in the preference list all the Anatolian High Schools in [...]. Fortunately, I succeeded enough to get into the Science High School."

¹⁰³ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: "At first, I was thinking of attending the conservatory more than anything else. I was playing guitar and drums. But there was a pressure from the family: 'What will you do in the conservatory, what is its use? What can you do in the future with an education taken in the conservatory? You will end up starving.' They approached it like that. My brother is a lawyer, my father [after his retirement from the military] is a lawyer, and eventually I willy-nilly found myself drifting with the tide. I preferred the law school for material reasons and comfort. Well, the pressure yielded a result as such."

¹⁰⁴ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Actually I was more into social stuff like photography, advertising and so forth. But my father said that, 'You cannot earn your life if you choose them.' Against my wishes, they made my preferences. When I say they made it, it's not like... They did it on good intentions, for my well-being. But there were many things in the preference list I was not fond of. I got into one of them: [...]. It was my next to the last choice."

If a son, he seriously considers joining the military as a teenager. He takes the military schools exam, even if his parents may discourage him to be a soldier for some reason. He may not be an aspirant to become an officer, but at least he gives it a shot by taking the exam, perhaps out of his own fickle will or parental orientations:

"Küçükken ya subay ya otobüs şoförü olacağım dedim."¹⁰⁵

"[G]enelde asker çocukları[nın] hepsi askeri lise sınavına bir girer. Ben de girdim. Ben kazanamadım. Çok zordu."¹⁰⁶

If a daughter, she fantasizes being a soldier. She may not register in a military school, but she underlines that she would decide to take the exams and join the military if she were a male:

"[Erkek olsam] asker olmak isterdim. Kesinlikle ben de subay olmak isterdim. Çünkü senin rol modelin baban olacak haliyle. Onu örnek alacaksın. Onun her yaptığı senin için doğru olduğu için [sen] de onun yolunda gitmek isteyeceksin. Babam da öyle bir şey isteyebilirdi açıkçası erkek olsaydım. ... Evet. İsterdi yani. Babam çünkü mesleğine aşık bir insan. İnanılmaz seviyor. ... Babam da kesin isterdi. Ama ben de çok isterdim. Yani erkek olsaydım düşünürdüm. Ben zaten düşünmedim değil, düşündüm. Ama bir kadın olarak senin subay olman olanaksız. Yani olanaklı da bir yere kadar yükselebiliyorsun. Ne kadar başarılı olursan ol bir rütbeye kadar olabiliyorsun. Bir de erkek hâkim o camiaya. Pek fazla kadından söz edilmiyor. O yüzden belki de direkt kafamdan atmış olabilirim yani. Ama erkek olsaydım kesinlikle subay olmak isterdim."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "When I was little, I wanted to be a professional military officer or a bus driver."

¹⁰⁶ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "Generally, all children of military families take the military school tests. I took it as well. I could not succeed. It was very difficult."

¹⁰⁷ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "If I were a male, I would want to be a soldier. Definitely I would. Because your father is your role model. Whatever he does is true for you, so you would also want to follow in his footsteps, right? My father could have wanted it too, if I were a male. ... He would want it, because my father is in love with his job. He is immensely infatuated with it. ... He would want it. But I would want it too. Actually I gave a thought about it as well. As a female, it is impossible for you to be a military officer though. I mean it is technically possible, but you can be promoted to a certain rank, regardless of your success. Also, it is a male dominated field, where women are not visible much. Perhaps this is why I took it out of my mind. But I would definitely want to be a military officer, if I were a male."

"[Erkek olsam] belki babam asker olmam konusunda ısrarcı olabilirdi. Bunu dile getiriyor da zaten. Çünkü mesleğini çok severek yaparak bir insan. 'Bir daha yine dünyaya gelsem yine asker olurum,' diyen birisi. Belki bu konuda beni de teşvik etmek isterdi. Ama onun dışında, erkek olsaydım, kesin hevesim olurdu da. Çünkü lojmanda arkadaşlarımda bir ara furyaydı. Herkes lise zamanında bunun sınavlarına giriyordu."¹⁰⁸

"A yok, ben de [subay olmak] istedim yani. Kızları alsalardı lisede ben de isterdim. O çocukluk hevesi ama yani. Babana özendiğin için bütün asker çocukları ister tabii yani. ... Kesin değil tabii. Almama ihtimalleri de var da asker olurdum muhtemelen. İsterdim. Kesin o zaman lisede Askeri Lise sınavına girerdim, ama oradan da devam ederdim diye düşünüyorum."¹⁰⁹

S/he works in tandem with other family members as a supporting cast, providing emotional assistance, moral uplift and comfort to the tired and stressful father so that he performs his military job well. S/he loves his/her father for what he is and endures his shifting moods. However, the primary means of the child to help the father is to maintain his peace of mind, by ensuring that everyone around is safe and does not get into trouble. Most importantly, s/he should not leave the father's mind preoccupied (*aklı kalmamak*) with him/her. And the best way to obtain this objective is to immerse and traverse the self within the military setting. As the child stands aloof from the 'heart of darkness', where s/he can see the murmurs, shades and shapes of the civilians passing by, s/he usually subscribes to the widespread discourse of securitization and accepts the conditions of his/her confinement as logical and even desirable for his/her own security and well-being:

¹⁰⁸ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "[If I were a male] my father would have insisted that I become a soldier. He articulates this as well. Because he loves his job. He is a person who says that he would be a soldier, if he would be born again. Perhaps, he would have encouraged me to become a soldier. But if I were a male, I would be inclined to become so as well. It was once quite popular among my friends in military lodgings. Everybody was taking the military school tests."

¹⁰⁹ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Ah, I wanted to become a professional military officer as well. If only, they would accept females to military high schools. But it is like a childhood fad. You want to be like your father, so all the children want it. ... Of course, it is not guaranteed. They may not accept you to the military school. But still, I would have been a soldier. I would want it. I would take the military high school tests and proceed to become an officer."

"Sevmiyorum lojman ortamını. ... Ha ama bir avantajı var, o da güvenli [olması]. Eşim, çocuğum olsa isterim yani. *Aklım kalmaz geride. Çocuğunun nerede oynadığı belli. Karın onunla beraber.*"¹¹⁰ (emphasis mine)

"[Orduevi'nde] güvenebileceğin insanlarla bir aradasın yani. Sonuçta ailenin de *aklı kalmıyor* orada kaldığın için. Öyle işte amcalarla, teyzelerle oturuyorduk. Onlar da her gün orada, biz de her gün orada. Yani rahattı okuluma gidip gelme açısından. Ailem açısından da rahattı. Büyük bir fırsattı benim için yani. Ben de sonuna kadar değerlendirmiş oldum."¹¹¹ (emphasis mine)

S/he also does not put the father through hassle by pestering him to recite the tales of his exploits, unless the father wants to share them. S/he takes his prolonged absences as an integral part of the job, which s/he reveres and finds necessary:

"[Doğu'da babamın görev yaptığı yer]'e gittiğimde devamlı babamın makam odasındaydım. Onunla her yere gitmeye çalışıyordum. Tabii ki ne mümkün? Beni yine orada bırakıyordu, o kendisi gidip geliyordu. Tabii o sıralar nereye gidiyor, ne yapıyor bilmiyorum. Ama beni kandırıyordu. İşte, 'Denetlemeye gideceğim, asker abilerine bakacağım,' falan [diyordu]. ... Nereye gittiğini söyleseydi ben baya bir diretirdim zaten herhalde. Ağlardım, zırlardım. Ama o benim zaten öyle bir şey yapacağımı hissettiği için ve beni korkutmamak için hiçbir şekilde oranın kötü bir yer olduğunu [söylemedi]. 'Burası böyle, buna alışmak zorundayız,' gibi bir şey de yapmadı. 'Yani bunlar olur. Böyle bir dönem. Ama bunlar geçecek,' diye devamlı beni sakinleştirmeye çalışırdı."¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "I do not like the lodgings. ... But there is an advantage to it and it is the safety of lodgings. If I had a spouse and children, then I would want it. *I would not worry. You know where your children would be playing. You know your wife would be with them.*" (emphasis mine)

¹¹¹ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "You are with people whom you can trust [in the Officers' Club]. The minds of your parents are *not wrapped up in you* as you stay in there. We would sit in the Club with elder people. They were there every day, as we were. It was convenient for me to go to school. It was convenient for my family. It was a great opportunity. I welcomed it all the way." (emphasis mine)

¹¹² Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "When I went to [the father's station in the East], I was in my father's office all the time. I was trying to follow him to wherever he goes. It was impossible of course. He would leave me behind at the office. He would trick me, by saying things like, 'I am going to an inspection, I will check your soldier brothers.' ... Had he tell me his whereabouts, I would not let him. I would cry and whine. As he knew I was capable of doing such things, he did not ever say that it was a bad place, so as to not frighten me. He did not say, 'This place is what it is, and we have to get used to it.' He would try to soothe me all the time, by saying 'This is normal. Such are the times we live in. It will pass.'"

"[Doğu'da bir şehir]'den ilk geldiği zaman çok anlatmıyordu. Ama sonradan tabii ben de büyüyünce biraz anlatıyor işte. Orada çektiği fotoğrafları gösteriyor. Çok zor tabii."¹¹³

S/he keeps his/her siblings in check, lest that they should go astray in terms of education, habits and relationships:

"Ben de sıkılıyordum, dinleliyordum, geziyordum sınıfta falan. Çizgi çizdirirlerdi deftere, ben cetvelle çizerdim falan. Öğretmen [aileme] şikâyet ederdi. Mesela okula gidip gelme konusunda hiç net hatırladığım bir şey yok onun dışında. Ablam [İrem] vardı. Ablamla aynı okulda olunca o beni servise bindirirdi, dönüşte de alırdı. Servise tekrar binip eve gelirdi. Onun dışında pek bir şey hatırlamıyorum."¹¹⁴

If a son, he shall take the man-of-household mantle when his father sails away. He relinquishes the symbolic title when his father returns home. Although I do not have any narrative deriving from the interviews to demonstrate how the sons may be assigned to protect the honour of their fathers by keeping an eye on the female members of the family, I have come across the following statements after an hour of basic search in the internet:

"[Asker çocuğu olmak] babanın oğluna, 'Bak oğlum ben operasyona gidiyorum bir hafta yokum. Bu tabancayı gerektiği yerde kullanacaksın. Annen kardeşin sana emanet,' demesidir."¹¹⁵

"[Subay çocukları içinde] daha çocuk yaşta her operasyon öncesi bir odaya çekilip, 'Oğlum, bana bir şey olursa, annenle kardeşin sana emanet. Ben

¹¹³ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "When my father first returned from [a city in the East], he did not tell much. As I grew up, he began to tell more. Sometimes he shows the photos he has taken. It is very difficult of course."

¹¹⁴ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I was bored, not listening and wandering in the classroom. We would draw lines on our notebooks and I was using a ruler. The teacher would complain [to my family]. I do not really remember anything other than that. I had an elder sister [İrem]. She would put me to the shuttle and take me home when I return. She would get into the shuttle again to come back home [after she put me to the school]. Apart from that, I do not remember much."

¹¹⁵ To see the full entry: Commodore 69. (2013, July 30). Asker çocuğu olmak. *Uludağ Sözlük*. Retrieved January 1, 2014, from <http://www.uludagsozluk.com/e/20713242/>: "[To be a child of a soldier] is to hear from the father that, 'Look, son. I'm away for an operation until next week. You will use this gun if needed. I am entrusting your sibling and mother to your care.'"

yokken bu evin erkeği sensin,' türevi konuşmalara (çaresizlikten ve mecburiyetten de olsa) maruz kalıp, çocukluğu örselenenleri de vardır."¹¹⁶

Conversely, if a daughter, she protects her purity because, in streams of nationalist-militarist ideologies, the honour of the protective males as well as the nation is thought to be embodied in vulnerable women. When we bring into consideration that the daughter is the figure where the 'womenandchildren' of the nation coalesce (Altınay, 2004a, p. 79), she is extremely careful about preventing anything that would besmirch the honour of her father.

S/he outshines his/her civilian peers by manners, diligence, orderliness, wit and success. S/he makes parents proud of advances made in the field of education:

"Küçükken ya subay ya otobüs şoförü olacağım dedim. Birinci olurum genelde. [...] Dershanesi'ne gittim burada. Orada birinci oldum ki orada birinci olmak zordur."¹¹⁷

"Ben orada [Doğu'da bir şehirdeki okulda] 1 sene okudum. Sene sonunda şöyle bir muhabbet var. O zamanlar Milliyet gazetesi Türkiye çapında sınav yapıyordu, kupa veriyordu böyle. Bu Final [dershanesi] sınavları, Öz-De-Bir sınavları çıkmadan gazete sınavları vardı. O gün içinde Türkiye içinde yapılı, sonra sonuçları açıklanırdı. Ben ona girdim. İşte [şehir]'de 3. mü oldum, 2. mi oldum bilmiyorum. Kupa verdiler işte. Abi müdür bana bir yapıştı: 'Kupayı ver işte biz vitrine koyacağız, kupayı ver vitrine koyacağız.' Ben de müdüre demişim ki: 'Beni siz yetiştirmediniz. Ben burada bir bok öğrenmedim. Bildiklerimle yaptım.' Vermedim abi. Vermemek için de kupa [...] postanesine gidince ben okuldan önce gidip postaneden kendim almışım. Vermedim. Oradan bir kıl oldular zaten."¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ To see the full entry: Hayhay. (2007, March 3). Subay çocuğu olmak. *Ekşi Sözlük*. Retrieved January 1, 2014, from <https://eksisozluk.com/entry/10631242>: "There are some [the children of military officers] whose childhood is ruined by talks given in rooms to which they are dragged before each military operation: 'Son, if anything happens to me, you will look after your sibling and mother. When I'm away, you are the man of this house.'"

¹¹⁷ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "When I was little, I wanted to be a professional military officer or a bus driver. I was often ranked first. I went to the [...] Lesson School here. I was the top scoring student in exams and it is not an easy achievement in there."

¹¹⁸ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "I studied there [the school in an Eastern city] for a year. There was this thing at the end of the year. Back then, the newspaper, Milliyet was holding Turkey-wide exams. They were giving cups and all to

"Orada da [Batı'da bir Anadolu Lisesi] şöyle bir şey yaşadım. Okul birincisi muhabbetleri oluyordu. Şimdi ben geldim oraya, [Anadolu Lisesi]'ne, orada da şöyle bir sistem vardı: Mesela Fen dersi. Hani şey oluyordu hatırlar mısınız? Bir dönem kimya oluyordu, bir dönem biyoloji oluyordu, bir dönem fizik oluyordu. Öyle olunca da 4-5 sınıf varsa hepsine aynı sınavı yapıyorlardı, sonra herkesin genel puanlarını asıyorlardı. Sanki dershanedeki sınavlar gibi puanlarına bakıyorsun hesabı. Abi ben paso 100 alıyorum tamam mı; listenin hep en başındayım falan. Orada da bir başladı millet kıl olmaya falan. Orada da bir tane Arda diye bir eleman vardı, *ot*. O da ilkokuldan beri okulun birincisi. (Gülüşmeler) Böyle eski birinci. Abi ben geldim, çocuktan iyi alıyorum her şeyi. Bir Almanca'da şey yapıyorum [teklıyorum] falan. Sonra onu da topladım. Ondan da başladım 95 almaya falan. Sonra ortaokul bitti. Annem de sırf piçliğine müdüre sordu: 'Ya ne oldu, kim oldu okul birincisi?' Ben de boş ver diyorum falan. Onlarda da şey oldu böyle: 'Bir sene okudu, sayılmaz bununki' hesabı. Ben okumaya orta 3'ten başlamadım ki. Oraya gelirken de benim bir notum vardı. Burada da aldığım şeyler var. Öyle bir muhabbet oldu. Aslında ben birinciydim ama onu orada diyemediler."¹¹⁹ (emphasis mine)

S/he may be banished by his/her cohort in the school on the basis of being an outsider due to his/her recent arrival after relocations, but s/he cannot afford to be a loser

winners. Before the advent of Final [lesson school] or Öz-De-Bir exams, there were newspaper exams. They would be held in a single day and the results would be announced afterwards. Anyway, I entered the exam. I came second or third in [the city]. They gave me a trophy for it. But the headmaster of the school clung like a leech to me: 'Give us the trophy, we will showcase it.' It's said that, I told him: 'You did not raise me. I did not learn a lick of nothing here. I did what I did with what I knew before.' I did not give it. I grabbed the trophy from the post office before them. I did not give it. They were pissed."

¹¹⁹ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "And the following happened when I arrived there [an Anatolian High School in a Western city]. There was this deal about becoming the top student of the school. The system in that school was like this: Let's say you have a science course. I don't know if you remember, but in those times we were getting the courses of chemistry, biology and physics one by one, each for a term. They were making the same exams for all students studying in the same grade, and then they were announcing our total scores. You would see your score among others, just as you do in lesson schools. Man, I was on a roll for getting those 100s. Always at the top of the scoring list. People started to get irritated. There was this guy in the school, Arda, *a simpleton*. And he had been the top student there since the primary school prior to my arrival. (Laughs) The former winner. But, I came and started to get better grades than him in all courses. Only the German course was an itch. But I pulled it together and started getting like 95s in German too. Thereafter, the secondary school ended. My mother asked the headmaster on purpose that: 'Well, who is the top student?' I was telling her to let it go. Because they were thinking like: 'He studied here only for a year. It does not count.' But I did not start studying from the 8th grade, right? I had my grades before going there, and I had my grades over there. Actually I was the top student, but they could not make it public." (emphasis mine)

(*ezik olmak*) or simpleton (*ot olmak*) as a child of a family, that is presumed to be involving the ideal father and mother of the nation. S/he develops elegant tastes, but s/he does not drift away from the spaces where s/he can mingle with other members of the military community, while trailing behind sources to gratify him/herself. S/he has a distinctive 'habitus' (Bourdieu, 2010) that is indicative of his/her good nurturing and various sorts of capital at his/her disposal:

"Genelde subay çocukları, giyim olarak, ailenin verdiği şeyler olarak belirli bir kalitenin üzerinde olurlar. *Ezik olmazlar*. Bak mesela şu masaya (pencere kenarında 2 kız 1 erkek öğrencinin oturduğu masalardan birini gösterir); bence şu oğlan ezik. Kız da ezik. Ama gözlüklü kız onlardan farklı. Pembeliyle konuşmam, dost olmam. Ama diğer kızla tanışırım, istersem onu alır yemeğe çıkarırım. ... Kızın gözlüğünden belli. Ray-Ban'ın gözlüğü var, şu (model ismi anlaşılmıyor). Kenarları böyle (kendi güneş gözlüğünü gösterir). Her erkeğin dolabında bulunmalı. Cüzdan vardır böyle, müzik vardır, takım [elbise] vardır, her erkeğin dolabında bulunması gereken. Benim 5 tane güneş gözlüğüm var. Ama astsubay adamın mesela 30.000 TL'si var, araba alacak. Gider Honda Civic alırsın mesela değil mi? Adam gidiyor, Palio alıyor."¹²⁰ (emphasis mine)

"Ben her müziği dinlerim. Bak mesela sen anlıyorsun [müzikten] belli. Müzikte de şey vardır. Mesela sen ilkokul 2-3'teki bir çocuğa dünya klasiklerini okutamazsın. Ya da çok kitap okuyan, 40-50 yaşında biri *Beyaz Diş*'i okumaz. Müzik de böyle. En tepede jazz var, bir altında funk var. Daha aşağısı klasik rock. Lynyrd Skynyrd severim ben. Sonra Eric Clapton. Ama sen sokaktan tut birini çevir, Miles Davis dinletirsen anlamaz."¹²¹

¹²⁰ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "Generally, the children of military officers are above a certain level in terms of their attire and family training. *They do not turn out to be losers*. Look at this table (pointing towards three students sitting on a table nearby the window); that guy is a loser. So is that girl. But the girl with glasses is of a different kind. I would not talk to the one dressed in pinks. I would not be friends with her. But I would meet the other one. I would take her to dinner if I want. ... Her glasses speak for herself. She wears a Ray-Ban; you know this (mumbling the name of some model of Ray-Ban sunglasses). It has edges similar to this (showing his glasses). Every man should have it in his wardrobe. There are wallets, music, and suits essential to be a man. I have five sunglasses. But, let's say a non-commissioned military officer has 30.000 TL to spend on a car. You would buy a Honda Civic, right? The guy goes and gets a Palio." (emphasis mine)

¹²¹ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "I listen to all kinds of music. You seem to know about music as well. And there is this thing in music. For example, a primary school child at the second or third grade cannot read world classics. Conversely, a 40-50 years old bookworm would not read the *White Fang*. It is the same in music. Jazz is the ultimate peak. Then comes funk at the penultimate step. A step below,

"Ortaokula [Batı'da bir şehir]'e geldim. Ortaokulda aslında biraz ilk başlarda sıkıntı yaşadım gibi. [Önceki tayin yeri]'nden gelince, bilmiyorum nedense kendimi bir *ezik hissetme* durumu oldu. Çünkü [Batı'daki şehir] ufak bir yer. Herkes birbirini tanıyordu. Gelince böyle bir alışamadım. Hiç tahmin etmiyordum hani. Çok rahat olurum gene [diye düşünüyordum]. Çünkü hiç böyle bir sıkıntı yaşamamıştım. Böyle bir de asker çocuğu falan olunca, belki o zaman ilk defa tribe girmiş olabilirim. ... Genelde astsubay çocukları falan böyle... Onu hissedersin. Böyle biraz *ezik oluyorlardı*. Özellikle astsubay çocukları mesela. Ben de [Batı'daki şehirde okula ilk başladığımda] kendim nedense biraz öyle oldum. Ama ondan da çabuk çıktım yani. Biraz da belki derslerden de kaynaklanıyor olabilir. Derslere de uyum sağlayamadım. Baya zayıf kaldım. Ama sonra da toparladım. İlişkilerimi kurdum, rahat. Çok iyi arkadaşlar edindim. Yavaş yavaş bu [...]daki ortamı da tanımaya başladım."¹²² (emphases mine)

"Astsubay çocukları *ezik oluyorlar* biraz daha yani. Hani ekonomik durumdan da kaynaklanan, kıyafetleri olsun... Subay çocuklarının böyle daha kendine güveni oluyordu. Ha bazıları aşırı güvenden dolayı çok artist olabiliyordu tabii. Hemen hissedebiliyorsun onları. Astsubay çocukları daha böyle şey oluyordu... Konuşmaları... Astsubay çocuklarının aileleri biraz daha böyle yerel oluyordu nedense. Çok garip, ama öyle oluyordu bir şekilde. Onu belki tam anlatamam ama anlayabiliyorsun yani. O da tabii ilişkileri biraz değiştiriyordu."¹²³ (emphasis mine)

there is classic rock. I like Lynyrd Skynyrd, also Eric Clapton. But if you would pick people from the street, they would not understand what they are listening to, if you would make them listen to Miles Davis."

¹²² Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "I came to [the city in the West] for the secondary school. Actually, I struggled a bit at the beginning. I *felt like a loser* for some reason, after I came from [the former city of residence]. [The city in the West] is a small town. Everyone knows each other. I could not get used to it. I was not expecting that. I thought that I would be at ease once again, because I haven't had such trouble before. I was vexed, perhaps for the first time in my life and being a soldier's child did not help it. ... Usually, the children of non-commissioned military officers... You can sense it. It just occurs that, *they were losers* a bit. I mean, especially the children of non-commissioned military officers. [When I first started school in that Western city] I became like that. But I shook it off quickly. Perhaps the courses had a finger in it. I could not accommodate myself to the courses. I was doing poorly in the school. But I bounced back. I grew relationships, easily. I made great friends. Slowly, I came to know the place." (emphases mine)

¹²³ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "The children of non-commissioned military officers were more *losers*. It is also caused by their economic conditions, and their outfits... The children of commissioned military officers had more self-confidence. Sometimes they even had too much swag. You could easily notice them. However, the children of non-commissioned military officers were more like... I mean their speech... Their families were more local for some reason. It is strange, but it just

As seen above, his/her distinctive tastes seem to enact a "practical affirmation of an inevitable difference" (Bourdieu, 2010, p. 49), which testifies his/her eminent position in the society, especially by rendering the philistine and rustic non-commissioned officers and their meek children as others. But the child bears no enmity to his/her fellows with whom s/he lives and plays within the military complex. S/he will have no foe among children of other military families. S/he may question or even envy sometimes the privileges bestowed to the children of higher ranked, general-officer fathers. But s/he refrains from making a fuss about it. S/he keeps his/her dignity intact, if bullied by them:

"Onlar [general çocukları] daha bir el üstünde tutulurlar, aman bir şey olmasın hesabı. Sanki generallerin çocuğu, ataerkilmiş gibi, o da paşa olacakmış gibi davranılır. Hâlbuki çocuk gider gitarist falan olur saçma sapan. Öyle aptalca bir şey var. Onlar konutta kalır mesela. Onlar lojmanda kalmaz, ayrı bir konut vardır o şehrin en büyük komutanına tahsis edilen valilik konutu gibi hesabı."¹²⁴

"Mesela ben, [...]’tayken bizim komşu vardı, Gökhan. Mesela çocuk çok artistti. Asker çocuklarının bazıları çok takıntılı olur. Zaten o sonradan askeri liseye falan gitti. Belliydi zaten onun gideceği, o tarz bir şey olacağı. Seni aşağı görme durumları oluyordu yani, onu hissedebiliyorsun. ... Onun babası babamdan daha rütbeliydi. Ama ondan ziyade kişilikle alakalı bir durum. Beni hiçbir zaman öyle *ezen birisi* olmadı. Zaten subay olduğu için babam öyle hiçbir zaman şey olmadı, işte, ‘Seni küçük görüyorum,’ falan."¹²⁵ (emphasis mine)

happens to be the case. I cannot exactly name it, but you can understand what I mean. This was influencing our relations of course.” (emphasis mine)

¹²⁴ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “The children of general officers are held dear more than others. They are treated as if patrilineally they are meant to be general officers too. Then the child usually becomes a guitar player or something like that. It’s silly. For example, they reside in a house. They reside in a different house, reserved for the top ranked military officer of the city, unlike those who stay in military lodgings.”

¹²⁵ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “When we were in [...], there was this neighbor, Gökhan. The guy had an unbearable swagger. Some children of officers happen to be so obsessive. This guy went to a military high school afterwards. I knew that it was bound to happen. He was contemptuous, you’d feel it. ... His father had a rank on mine. But these things rather have to do with one’s personality. No one ever *trampled me down*. ‘I am looking down on you,’ said no one ever, as my father was also a military officer.” (emphasis mine)

Just as the mother, s/he is quite comfortable with social relations based on rank. S/he can be aware of the social and spatial segregations in life that the ranks of the officer fathers entail. However, s/he accepts them for what they are and acts accordingly:

"Çocuk olarak ben öyle bir şey [rütbe ilişkilerinin çocuklar arası ilişkilere yansımaları] çok hissetmedim. Bir tek general çocuklarını çok kayırırlardı. Biliyorsun, general masası ayrıdır. Hep boştur o böyle, generale ayrılmıştır, amirale ayrılmıştır falan. En manzaralı yerdeki masa hep boştur. Senin baban da gelip oturamaz oraya. Onların çocukları o açıdan çok kayırılıyor. Sınır olduğumuz da oluyordu o yüzden bizim mesela."¹²⁶

"Sadece şunu hissettim. Okuldan ziyade askeri kamplara falan gittiğimde astsubay, üstsubay, subay falan gibi farklı bölmeler olur ya; astsubayların denizi en kötü, en çakıllı yerdedir de üstsubayların denizi iskelenin ucundadır falan mesela. Orada yaşadım ben, ilk defa orada oldu. Bak işte astsubay masaları var, onların önünden havalı havalı geçiyorsun, bir de subay masası var. Ben küçükken babam herhalde subay kısmındaydık, yüzbaşı, binbaşı falandı. Sen oraya götürüyorsun işte. Denizin sadece o kısmı senin. Eğer bir adım ileri atarsan ya da havlunu diğer şezlonga koyarsan orası general şezlongu. Orada oturamazsın yani. Bunu en fazla orada yaşadım galiba, orduevlerinde ve askeri kamplarda. Sivil dünyada arkadaşlarımla beraber değil de askeri kamplarda masaların ve şezlongların farklılaştığını gördüğüm zaman."¹²⁷¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "As a child I did not feel that [the ranking hierarchies between military officer fathers influence the relations between their children]. Only, they were favoring the children of general officers too much. You know, the table of the general officer is distinct from others. It is always unoccupied, yet reserved for the general, or the admiral. The table with the best scenery always remains empty. No one can take a seat in that table, including your father. Their children are favored quite much. Sometimes this was thus getting to our nerves as well."

¹²⁷ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "I felt that in military vacation facilities rather than school. When you go to these facilities, you know, they are segregated according to whether your father is a non-commissioned military officer, commissioned military officer or higher ranked commissioned military officer. Non-commissioned officers swim in the worst part of the sea, with most pebbles under their feet, whereas higher ranked officers have a place by the pier. I first experienced it there. There are tables of non-commissioned officers where you prance by and there are tables of commissioned officers. When I was little, I suppose we were on the part of commissioned officers. My father was a captain or major back then. Only a part of the sea is yours. If you take an extra step or put your towel to the next chaise lounge, it belongs to a general officer. You cannot sit there. I guess I experienced it there the most; not with my friends in the civilian world, but in military vacation camps where tables and chaise lounges are differentiated."

S/he is proud of the father's rank. However, s/he does not spam it over others to exploit advantages in ways that would disappoint the father:

"Bazı çocuklar vardır, albayların, babasının rütbesiyle yatıp kalkar. Biz onlarla takılmazdık zaten. Çocuklar babayla övünmeyi sever. Ama kendin olarak var olacaksın. Babalar bazen çekerler zaten çocukları. Benim babam mesela, 'Kendin var olacaksın, rütbemi kullandığını duymayacağım,' demişti. Kimisi öyleydi bizimle oldu, kimisi babasının rütbesini kullanırdı, bizden ayrı oldu."¹²⁹

S/he occasionally attends the 'protocol' with his/her parents as a well-behaved member of the military family and the military institution as a family. S/he represents his/her family to the best of his/her abilities. His/her demeanours are attuned to the requirements of the protocol and ranking hierarchies. The father's reputation comes before his/her joy and comfort. S/he thus restrains him/herself if warned, so that s/he does not let down the father in the presence of others. S/he takes the full blunt of such restrictions if they are to help the father out in his profession:

"Askeri kamp [demek], ucuz, ucuzluk ve devamlı selam verme [demek]. Hâlâ protokolün sürmesi ama bir yandan da tatil yapma isteği. Rahat olamıyorsun. Yok şunu giyme, yok bunu giyme. Hem uygun bir yer tatil yapabilmek için, hem de kasılıyorsun. Tatil mi yapıyorsun, yapamıyor musun belli değil yani. Rahatlayamıyorsun. ... Ne yapsam kızardı babam. 'Yok öyle davranma, yok buraya gel, yok yaramazlık yapma, yok gitme.' Devamlı bir kontrol. Hani başkalarına karşı mahcup olmama düşüncesiyle kontrol ederdi."¹³⁰

¹²⁸ As of 2012, the spatial segregation of Officers' Clubs and military vacation facilities according to attaining the status of general officer (general), high officer (üst subay) and officer (subay) was abolished.

¹²⁹ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "Some children live and die by the ranks of their fathers. We were not hanging out with them anyway. Children like to boast with their fathers. But you have to learn existing as you are and not otherwise. Some fathers specifically warn their children to do so. For example, my father once said to me that, 'You will exist as yourself. I will not hear that you are exploiting my rank.' Those who do that came on our board, those who made use of their fathers' ranks drifted away from us."

¹³⁰ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Military vacation camp means cheapness and constant saluting to me. It means the clash between continuing protocol and desire for vacation. You cannot be at ease. Don't wear this, don't wear that. On the one hand, it is a convenient place to have a good vacation, but it is stressful. It is uncertain whether or not you are on holiday. You cannot relax. ... Whatever I was doing

"Orduevi deyince saçma sapan bir müzik eşliğinde oturan subay aileleri geliyor aklıma yemek esnasında. Besame [Mucho] falan çalıyor. (Gülüşmeler)"¹³¹

"Orduevi deyince orduevinde yılbaşı yemeği, dışarıda yemek yemek, bir orduevinde yemek yeme ritüeli geliyor aklıma. Yemek yemek hadisesi geliyor aklıma. ... Güzel giyinirsin, çatalları şuna göre kullanırsın, amcalar gelir müzik yapar falan."¹³²

"Mesela milli bayramlarda, yılbaşlarında, orduevlerinde kokteyl olur, eğlence olur, onlara katılır. Sen de *o ailelerin bir parçası olarak* istemesen de bazen zorla gidersin. Çünkü baban gitmek zorundadır, protokol hesabı. Bayramlar olur mesela. Normalde nasıldır? İnsanların arkadaşları vardır, bayramda birbirlerine giderler. Ama normalde bu insanlar denktir, arkadaşdır. Ama baban yüzbaşılıysa ve çalıştığı birliğin komutanı albaysa ve [eve] gelecekse evde bir telaş olur mesela. Çünkü albay geliyordur sana ziyarete. Ama senin dengin gelecekse daha rahat karşılar baban onu. Ama öbür türlü sen de o gerilimi baya böyle yaşarsın çocuk bile olsan. Sen de hareketlerini ona göre kısarsın. Çok cıvıma falan yoktu bizde mesela. Çok şımarıklık, bilmem ne hiç bilmem mesela. Çocukluğumda öyle bir şey yaşamadım. Hep böyle bir dizginleme hesabı."¹³³ (emphasis mine)

S/he facilitates the promotion of the father, primarily by behaving well and not getting into trouble. However, as Enloe (2000) reminds us via the story of an African

was making my father angry at me. 'Don't do that, come here, don't misbehave, don't go there.' Constant control. He was controlling me to avoid embarrassment."

¹³¹ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Officers' Club evokes in my mind the families of military officers sitting in dinner tables, accompanied by silly live music. I mean something like Besame [Mucho] (Laughs)."

¹³² Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "Officers' Club evokes in my mind things like the Christmas dinner, dining outside, and the ritual of eating in an Officers' Club. It evokes dining. ... You dress well and use your fork accordingly, while some people are making music in the background."

¹³³ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "On days like Christmas or national holidays, there are cocktails or festivities held in Officers' Clubs. *As a part of these families* you attend them, even though you may not want it. Because your father has to attend them. Let's say it is a feast day. What happens normally? People have friends and they visit each other. But these people are friends and they are equivalents of each other. But when your father is a captain and a colonel is going to pay a visit home, there is a rush in the house. Because it is a colonel who is going to pay a visit. If it is your rank equivalent, your father welcomes him at ease though. Although you are a child, you feel the anxiety of such things at home. You restrain yourself. For example, there was not much impertinence in us. We did not know what kicking over the traces was. I did not experience such things during my childhood. Always keeping a rein on yourself." (emphasis mine)

American woman once married to a soldier, "the general's son may be on the same [little league baseball] team as the corporal's son, so sometimes kids can be used to help advancement" (p. 158). If we re-appropriate the story in the Turkish context, s/he can take lesser roles as a defender and goalkeeper in a football pitch or as a glue-guy or substitute of the roster in a basketball game, as the higher ranked officer's child chucks shot after shot without any conscious whatsoever to the demise of team play and success.

S/he feels indebted to the military institution for providing material benefits and lush conditions for military families. However, s/he also assumes that these should not be spared from military officers and their families who devote their whole lives to the security, well-being and development of the nation. S/he holds onto them as if they are his/her natural rights more than being rewards that are specifically reaped by the members of the praetorian cast:

"Orduevi tabii ki de askerlere verilen bir imkân. Asker ve asker çocuklarına verilen güzel bir imkân. Yani sonuçta bu kadar hizmet etmiş, bu kadar emeği olan insanların da böyle şeylerden faydalanmasının normal olduğunu, hak ettiklerini düşünüyorum."¹³⁴

"Sivil bile olsam desteklerim ben askeri lojmanları. Göreve gidiyor adam. Ben her yurtdışına gidişimde ülkemi temsil ediyorum. Bunları subaylardan esirgememek lazım."¹³⁵

Although s/he may not join the military, s/he is fond of the idea of working for companies affiliated with the military institution:

"Her mühendisin istediği gibi bir Aselsan, Havelsan hayalim var. Olmazsa da bir şirkete girip ya Ankara ya İstanbul'da çalışmak istiyorum."¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "Officers' Club is an opportunity provided to soldiers. It is a nice opportunity provided to their children as well. I think it is normal for people who served so much and so well to benefit from such things. I think they deserve it."

¹³⁵ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "If I were a civilian I would still give my support for the military lodgings. These guys are performing their duties. I represent my country every time I go abroad. They should not be spared from military officers."

"Yani mesela girdiğim [...] şirketi eskiden OYAK'tı. Şimdi OYAK kalktı artık. Orada tabii asker ailelerine daha çok önem veriliyormuş. E mesela şimdi de görüşmeye gittiğimde, 'Asker çocuğuyum,' dediğimde insanların bir şekilde dikkatini çekiyor bu yani."¹³⁷

S/he is not troubled by his/her parents' absences, by coming to the conclusion that it is warranted for the well-being of his/her family. His/her grief and yearning for the parents simmer down as s/he embraces the military institution as his/her family, writ large. S/he sees him/herself as a member belonging to a distinguished society and a military family:

"Demek ki gerçekten çok mutlu bir çocukluğum olmuş benim orada. O sırada annemin babamın evde olmayışı da çok dert değildi. *Çünkü annemle babam olmadığı zaman da benim orada bir ailem vardı. Ben öyle hissediyordum en azından.* Hiçbir zaman onların eksikliğini de hissetmedim açıkçası. Sen bana bu soruyu sorduğunda gerçekten annemle babam o zaman nasıldı diye düşündüm açıkçası. Geriye baktığımda, kendi kendime düşündüğümde, 'Çok yalnızdım ya, annem de babam da yoktu,' gibi bir şey hissetmiyorum."¹³⁸
(emphasis mine)

S/he is proud of this distinct belonging and identity. S/he reifies them by uttering, claiming, and performing them. S/he believes that his/her experience as a child of a military family segues him/her into a better awareness and consciousness than his/her peers. She conceives that as a privilege which s/he would be deprived of otherwise, as a civilian:

"[Asker çocuğu olmak] bir farklılık da iyi yönde bir farklılık. Hiçbir anlamda kötü bir şeyini düşünmüyorum zaten. Bence asker çocukları dışarıdakilere göre daha bilinçli, daha oturaklı oluyor diye düşünüyorum. Çünkü babalarımız da

¹³⁶ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Just like every engineer, I am dreaming of Aselsan or Havelsan. I would like to work for a company in Ankara or İstanbul otherwise."

¹³⁷ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "The [...] company I am working for was OYAK back in the past. Now there is no OYAK. Military families are given more importance in the company of course. When I say that 'I am a child of a soldier,' it attracts attention in the job interview."

¹³⁸ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "So, I really had a very happy childhood there. The absence of my parents was not much of an issue. *Because I had a family in there, even when my father and mother were away.* Leastways, this is what I was feeling. I never felt their absence. When you asked me this question, I really gave a thought about it. When I think, in hindsight, I do not feel that 'I was very alone, away from the care of my father and mother.'" (emphasis mine)

daha gündemle ilgili olsun, Türkiye'de yaşananlarla ilgili olsun çok şey öğretiyorlar bize. Bir kere babalarımızın yaşadığını görüyoruz. Yaşanan olayları görüyoruz. Bakış açılarımız çok farklı oluyor dışarıdaki insanlara göre. Ortamı görüyoruz. Sonuçta çok zor koşullara onunla birlikte gidiyoruz biz de. Biz de görüyoruz ne koşullarda yaşadığını ve daha farklı bakabiliyoruz olaylara. Bu hani gündemde herhangi bir olay olmasa da, farklı bir olayda bile [olsa], o yönümüz ortaya çıkabiliyor diye düşünüyorum."¹³⁹

2.4. Education of the Children

At the beginning of this chapter, I have hinted that education marks the beginning of a different phase in the lives of children of military families. With the advent of educational life, a new institutional contender, namely the school, emerges as a force to be reckoned with. The children substantially and systematically come into contact with zones and people outside the military complex, or in the words of my interlocutors, with 'the life outside'. Therefore, the school often weakens the monopolies of the family and the military over the lives of children. And this weakening is where the primary importance of education for the children of military families derives. However, two points deserve to be highlighted in that regard. First, the school in its effects of normalization may or may not be at odds with the family and the military. It is not as if the school entices and then whisks away the children from their inhabitations, or inculcates in them unorthodox teachings, equips them with new lenses to see life completely anew and induces alienation from the former institutions. Put differently, there is no guarantee that the school breaks away the effects of normalization of the family and the military. Quite the contrary, a strengthening of ties that the children establish with their families and the military is possible as well.¹⁴⁰ Schools can ossify the convictions of children which preliminarily derive from multiple

¹³⁹ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “[Being a military brat] is a difference, though a positive one. I do not ever see any downside to it actually. I think military brats have more awareness and dignity than those outside. Our fathers teach us lots of things about what happens in Turkey, contemporary or not. We are seeing what they are going through. We are seeing what is happening out there. Our viewpoints become so much different from that of people outside. We are following our fathers into very harsh conditions. We are seeing the conditions within which they live and we can thus bring in different perspectives to events. Although it may not be about a contemporary thing, I think that this quality of ours can surface in many events.”

¹⁴⁰ The reader may want to look at several studies drawing attention to the militarist content of education given until and even in universities. See: Altınay, 2004a; Altınay, 2004b; Altınay, 2009; Kancı & Altınay, 2007; Kancı, 2008; Ünder, 1999

sources most of which are embedded in the military complex. Secondly, I have also argued at the beginning of this chapter that, the military institution in particular always finds a way to slide and glide into the educational life of the children. The family and the military institution never lose their grips on children completely, as the children ebb and flow between military lodgings and schools. For example, leaving aside its subtler interventions for a moment, the military provides transportation to schools by military shuttles where (sometimes armed) soldiers, mothers and children enjoy a peculiar trip. The military grants scholarships and dormitories to many military brats who pursue their university education.¹⁴¹ It reserves rooms for students in the Officers' Clubs of some bigger cities.¹⁴² It may encourage them to be professional soldiers, by giving extra score or quota to military brats at military schools examination.¹⁴³ In some larger military lodgings, there are even kindergartens, so that the children can remain within the institutional boundaries of the military for another year. Sometimes the military creeps into spaces where children take education in subtler ways, as Ayşe recounts in the following:

"Benim ilkokulumun adı Donanma İlköğretim Okulu'ydu. Biz [...]’nda oturuyorduk. Donanma Komutanlığı o sırada [...]’teydi. Donanma Komutanlığı'nın yanında olduğu için ilkokulumun adı Donanma İlköğretim Okulu'ydu. ... Öyle olunca üniversitede iyice dalga konusu oluyor, ‘İlkokulda Donanma Sualtı Taarruz Eğitimi aldılar,’ falan diye."¹⁴⁴

Further, it is not as if the children are hurled all the time from their life world into completely alien worlds, where they have and will have no acquaintances or friends. Most

¹⁴¹ One of my interlocutors, Deniz, has stayed in a dormitory of the Turkish Armed Forces Education Foundation (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Eğitim Vakfı), during his university years. He was staying in an Officers' Club beforehand, then he moved to the dorm, because ‘the discipline matters less in the dorm than an Officers' Club.’

¹⁴² Irem is one of them, who spent five years in different Officers' Clubs in sum, during her education process.

¹⁴³ One of my interlocutors, Mustafa, said to me that, at the year he entered the Naval High School, he got an extra score in the exam just for being a military brat. There was also a quota, he said, allocated to the children of military families those days.

¹⁴⁴ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: “The name of my primary school was the Naval Primary School. We were staying in [...]. The fleet command was in [...] and my primary school was next to it, hence its name. ... This became a joking matter in university years. ‘She took special underwater training in primary school,’ my friends were saying.”

of the time, they have many friends in their classroom whom they know from the playgrounds of military lodgings or other military facilities. Sometimes, their neighbors in the lodgings become their teachers in the school:

"Okul lojmanların dışındaydı, ama lojmanlara çok yakındı. Okula gelen arkadaşlarımın da yüzde 70'i falan asker çocuğuydu. Bizim sınıfın yüzde 60'ı falan asker çocuğuydu. Zaten hocamızın da eşi askerdi, o da yine subay birisiydi. İşte okulun gri bir tane servisi vardı. Servisi asker kullanıyordu, içinde de tüfekli bir asker oturuyordu. Biz böyle minik minik servise doğru, 'Bu ne böyle, tüfekli bir adam?' diye [biniyorduk]."¹⁴⁵

Secondly, the importance of education in the lives of the children of military families basically stems from the importance ascribed to the education by military families. But, we should not think of it as a condition specific to the fracture of military families. It is rather typical of middle classes in Turkey to invest high hopes and resources in children's education in Turkey, as Tarık remarks:

Tarık: "Annemin her zaman söylediği bir şey vardır, kendisi de öğretmen. Asker çocuğu olanların genellikle daha iyi bir akademik performans sahibi olabildiğini, ama belki biraz daha şımarıkça olabildiklerini [söyler]. Belki ailelerin eğitime verdiği önemden kaynaklanıyor. Bizden de biliyorsun. Epey bir zorlandık yani beklentilere cevap verebilmek noktasında. Epey sıkı çalıştık. Belki bu olabilir. Ailelerin bilinç seviyesi yüksek olduğu için, eğitime de bir inanmışlık olduğu için..."

Sertaç: "Peki bunu daha çok ne ile bağlantılandırıyorsun? Ailenin asker ailesi olması mı [etmen] sence? Yani asker aileleri mi böyle yapıyor, yoksa daha farklı bir etmen mi var?"

Tarık: "Ben burada asker ailesi olmanın bir parametre olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Türkiye'de orta sınıf diyebileceğimiz bir kesim ne kadar var, ne zamandan beri var bilmiyorum. Ama bir miktar okumuş aydınlanmış bir kesimin eğitime önem verişinin çok çok eskiye gittiğini görebiliyoruz bu konuda yapılan çalışmalarda. ... Yani eğitimin memleketin kara bahtını değiştireceğine dair yoğun inanç bizim için çok içselleştirilmiş bir şey. Çok çok

¹⁴⁵ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "The school was outside of the lodgings, but it was very close. 70% of my friends coming to school were children of soldiers. 60% of the students in our class were children of soldiers. Our teacher was married to a military officer. We had a grey school shuttle, driven by a soldier, and protected by an armed soldier. We as weenies were embarking on it like, 'What's that, why there is a guy inside, holding a gun?'"

derinden gelen bir şey. Hiç asker ailesiyle ilgili olduğunu düşünmüyorum yani."¹⁴⁶

However, we should not think of the middle class here as a social group which exists as a pre-given in reality. The category of middle classes is rather an intractable one, and necessarily an ill-defined entity (Wacquant, 1991). The middle class position of military families, just as other families "should be constituted through material and symbolic struggles waged simultaneously over class and between classes" (Wacquant, 1991, p. 57). At this juncture, the education of children emerges as a field, and becomes one of the favorite fronts for the middle-classes of Turkey where the competition intensifies more and more as the families invest more resources to differentiate themselves from lower classes, reproduce and reify their class positions, while preserving hopes for upward class mobility (Rutz & Balkan, 2009; Erdoğan, 2012). Bora also puts forward that the middle classes in Turkey, whether they are old and new, are defined rather through education and working (Bora A. , 2012, p. 182). And military families prove no exception to that. Accordingly, all my interlocutors are pursuing or have pursued education at least in the university degree. Three of them hold a master degree in various fields; one is about to earn her master degree in a year; and another is bustling about in a doctorate program abroad.

The exception concerning military families rather derives from conditions precipitated by a family member working for the military. As the constant relocations scatter the children across the map in haphazard ways, dragging them to different regions and encounters, chances are jeopardized for the family to raise a well-educated kid who is

¹⁴⁶ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: Tarık: "My mom, who is also a teacher, always says that the children of military families usually perform better academically, but they can be more mischievous. Perhaps it is because of the importance given by families to education. You know it from us. We struggled much to meet the expectations. We studied hard. Maybe this is the reason. Maybe it is because the families have a better awareness and dedication for education." Sertaç: "So what does it related to? Having a military family? Is it specific to military families or do you think there are other things to be factored in?" Tarık: "The military family is not a parameter here. I don't know for how long and since when we have middle-classes in Turkey. But the importance attached to education by somewhat educated and enlightened people dates quite back. ... I mean, the belief in education to mend the ill-fortune of the country has been internalized by us. It is a very deep belief. I don't think it has anything to do with military families."

seen destined to get a good diploma, a decent job and a high salary in the future. Impelled by the teleological middle-class mandate to win a place for their child in one of the better schools to ensure their future prospects, yet imperiled by the looming requirements of the military job, many parents thus engage in damage-control maneuvers for the education of their children, according to the accumulation of multiple capitals at their disposal, as they are sleepwalking into further crises concerning education, entailed by being periodically tossed back and forth within the country.

Let's proceed to the narratives in order to understand how these dynamics have played out in the lives of my interlocutors. To begin with, it is impossible to talk about the experience of a single military brat in ways applicable for the whole population of children of military families, as is always the case. But, there are converging patterns in the narratives concerning the educational life of children which we can reflect on, even though they are hardly generalizable for other children's experiences. Take the impact of transfers for example. There are basically two groups of children in the narratives with respect to the issue at hand. First, there are those whose educational lives were severely interrupted by their fathers' transfers. It is quite common to attest such narratives among children of military families:

"İşte [şehir 1]'de 1. sınıfı okudum. Sonra [şehir 2]'de 2 sene okudum. Orada bir köy okulunda okudum hatta. Feciydi. Ondan sonra [şehir 3]'e gittim. Geri kalan 4-5. sınıfı [şehir 3]'te okudum. ... Ortaokula [şehir 3]'te başladım. 2 yıl [şehir 3]'te gittim. Son yıl da [Şehir 4]'e gittim."¹⁴⁷

Yasemin: "İlkokulda 1. sınıfı [şehir 1]'de okudum. 2-3-4'ü [şehir 2]'de okudum. 5'i de gene [şehir 1]'de. ... Ortaokul çok sıradan olmadı. Çünkü [şehir 3]'teydik."

Sertaç: "Peki ortaokulda tekrar okul değiştirdin mi ayriyeten?"

Yasemin: "Evet. Orta 1'de şeydeydim, [şehir 3]'te. Pardon, yanlış oldu ya. Orta 1 [şehir 1]'da, orta son [şehir 3]'te."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "I studied the first grade in [city 1]. Then I was in [city 2] for two years. I went to a village school there, it was terrible. Thereafter, I went to [city 3]. I studied the rest of the primary school in [city 3]. I started the secondary school in [city 3] and spent two years there. In the last year, I went to [city 4]."

¹⁴⁸ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: Yasemin: "I studied the first grade in [city 1]. Second, third and fourth grades were in [city 2]. I returned to [city 1] in the fifth grade. ... The secondary school was not ordinary. Because we were in [city 3]."

"İlkokul 3-4'e kadar zorlandım. Her sene okul değiştirdim ilkokul 4'e kadar. İlkokul 1 [şehir 1]'de, 2 [şehir 2]'de, 3 [şehir 3]'te."¹⁴⁹

But there are also those who consider themselves 'lucky' on grounds that the flurry of transfers did not interfere much with their educational lives. Sometimes this luck is based on the transfers coinciding (*denk gelmek*) with the thresholds of education:

"Benim 1-2. sınıf [şehir 1]'deydi. O zaten 1-2. sınıf hani. O zaman zaten arkadaşlarımdan ayrılıyorum diye çok bir şey anlamıyorsun. Üçüncü sınıftan ortaokulu bitirene kadar [şehir 2]'deydim. Tam en yakın arkadaşım döneminde falan okul değiştirmedim. Sonra liseye geçtiğimde de işte tam o aralıkta [şehir 3]'e geçtim. [Şehir 2] bitti liseye geçtim, lise bitti zaten hani. Öyle okul değiştirme şeyim olmadı yani. ... Ben çok yaşamadım ama arkadaşlarım var. Lise 3'te tayini çıkıyor, lise 4'ü gidiyor başka bir yerde okuyor. O kötü yani. Bana denk gelmedi. Ben bu yönden şanslıyım. Ama dediğim gibi babam başka bir şey olsaydı; havacı olsaydı, denizci olsaydı böyle şeyler olmayacaktı. Yani daha da az [tayin] olacaktı belki."¹⁵⁰

As Merve hints, the branch for which the father works in the military institution usually has a decisive impact in that respect, basically because the officers working for the Gendarmerie and Land Forces see more frequent transfers within a wider range than other officers. Ayşe owes her luck to a strange combination of having a father employed in the Navy and a catastrophe, namely the 1999 Gölcük Earthquake:

Sertaç: "Did you switch schools again in the secondary school?" Yasemin: "Yes. In the sixth grade I was in [city 3]. Sorry, I made a mistake. The sixth grade was in [city 1], the eighth grade was in [city 3]."

¹⁴⁹ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "I struggled until the third or fourth grade. I switched schools every year until the fourth grade. First grade in [city 1], second in [a school in city 2], third in [another school in city 2]."

¹⁵⁰ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I was in [city 1] for the first two grades. And you know, they are the first and second grades. At that time, you do not understand that you are leaving your friends behind. From the third grade to the end of the secondary school I was in [city 2]. I did not change schools in this best-friends period. When I proceeded to high school, we moved to [city 3]. [City 2] ended and I proceeded to high school. Then the high school ended. Therefore I did not switch schools much. ... I did not experience it, but I have friends who experienced it. They finish the eleventh grade and then they go to another city in the twelfth grade. It is bad of course. But it did not befall me. I am lucky in that regard. But if my father were to be something else, if he were to be a marine, we could have seen fewer transfers."

"Okul deęiřtirmek zorunda kalmadım. O çok güzel denk geldi. Tabii güzel denk gelmedi de, řöyle: 99 yılına kadar [...]’te yařadık biz. 99 depreminden sonra [tayinle] [...]’a tařındık. 99 da benim tam ortaokulun hazırlık yılını bitirdiđim, orta 1’e bařlayacađım yılı. O yüzden ben beř yılı blok aynı sınıfta okudum. Hiç sınıf deęiřtirmek zorunda kalmadım."¹⁵¹

But the branch alone does not determine whether or not the child will be lucky. For example, Tarık, whose father works in the field of military jurisdiction, thinks that the transfer of his father hit him at a critical period of his education:

"Fazla tayinimiz çıkmadı. Ama benim için çok kritik bir yerde tayin çıktı. Örneđin bugün iyi bir iř, iyi bir hayat için iyi bir üniversite öngörülüyor. İyi bir üniversite için de iyi bir lise olsun falan diye geriye dođru giden bir süreç bu. Artık anaokullarında bile millet kurayla birbirinin üstüne çıkıyor. Biz tam ilkokuldan sonra sınav olacak mı, olmayacak mı, ne olacak derken önemli bir ortaokul eđitimi döneminde [Dođu’da bir řehir]’e gittik. Yani ben o zaman farkında deđilim olayın, ama annemin sıkıntıya girdiđini düşünüyorum. Eđitim adına çok önemli kullanılacak bir dönemi orada harcamak aslında çok istenilecek bir řey deđil."¹⁵²

Sometimes, the early retirement of the father from the military brings luck to the children, as in the case of Deniz:

Sertaç: "Peki hep [...]’da mı okudun? Aynı yerde mi bitirdin?"
Deniz: "Evet, evet. Ortaöđretimi de orada bitirdikten sonra lise."¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Personal interview with Ayře, conducted on 24.11.2013: "I did not have to change schools. It was a great coincidence. Of course it was not great, but it was like that: We lived in [...] until 1999. After the earthquake we were transferred to [...]. 1999 was the year when I finished the prep school and about to start the sixth grade. Therefore I stayed in the same class for 5 years, without changing it."

¹⁵² Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "I did not see many transfers. But we were relocated at a critical moment. Nowadays, it is envisioned that you have to get into a good university in order to have a good job and a good life. And you can take this argument back a step, because this is a process where you should get a good high school education to get into a good university. People are now stepping on each other for the education of their children even in the preschool level. At a time when we did not know whether there will be an exam after the primary school, we moved to [a city in the East]. I was not aware of the situation back then, but I think my mother was stressed out. One would not want to spend a crucial time for education over there."

¹⁵³ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: Sertaç: "Did you study in the same school? Did you finish there?" Deniz: "Yes indeed. I finished the secondary school there, and then came the high school."

Another possibility is that, the parents may decide to scatter the family, instead of being scattered together to somewhere remote, in order to prevent harm to the educational life of their children. Zeynep is the youngest daughter of one of those parents, who took lessons from their experience with elder daughters:

"Yok, benim şansım oydu. Ben hiç okul değiştirmedim. İlkokul, ortaokul hep aynıydı. ... Zaten ablamlar aynı şeyi yaşadığı için; ablamların mesela belirli bir diploması yok. Devamlı bir sene, iki sene, üç sene hep farklı okullarda okumuşlar. Annemle babam da bunu bildikleri için beni özellikle böyle bir şeye maruz bırakmamak için çok uğraştılar yani. İstemediler. O yüzden babam tayin dönemlerinde, ne olursa olsun, neresi çıkarsa çıksın, 'Siz burada kalacaksınız, ben gidip geleceğim,' derdi."¹⁵⁴

Generally, the possibility of a transfer is seen by the families as a bad omen for the children's education, especially if it is to the Eastern regions at a time of an armed-conflict between PKK and TSK. However, some children also narrate that not all transfers are menaces to their education. Sometimes, not lifting the nose from textbooks may anchor a life characterized by the ephemerality of things. Almost every attachment that the military brats can have to anything in life can be condemned to rapid changes, but one can find refuge in the perennial universe of studying. Tarık is one of those children who feel motivated by relocations:

"[B]elki benim kişisel deneyimimden kaynaklanıyor olabilir, ama üç yıllık bir yerdesin. Üç yıllığına bir yerde olduğunu biliyorsun, oranın görev süresi belli. Bu sana bir motivasyon sağlıyor. Ya işte şuradaki zamanımda çalışayım edeyim [diyorsun]. Veyahut belki çok sevmeyeceğin bir şehir, kısıtlı bir süre orada kalacağını bildiğin için oranın iyi, güzel yanlarına odaklanıyorsun. Kötü tarafları varsa da pek görmüyorsun ve o geçmişte senin için güzel bir anı olarak kalıyor. Eğitim anlamında da aynı şekilde. Yani devamında daha iyi olması için orada biraz dışını sıkarak çalışıyorsun."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "No, I got lucky. I did not change any schools at all. The primary school, the secondary school, all in the same and one place. ... Because my elder sisters went through that. They do not have a particular diploma. They always studied in different schools for couple of years. As my parents knew it, they specifically did not want me to go through that, which is why, my father was telling in transfer periods that, 'Whatever happens, you will stay here. I will go and return.'"

¹⁵⁵ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "Perhaps it was my personal experience, but let's say you are sent to a place for three years. You know that it will last only three years, until the end of your father's term of office. This motivates you. You say

Or, the transfer of the father may mark the opportunity of a transfer to a better school, as in the case of Yasemin:

"Liseyi [Doğu'da bir şehir]'de kazandım gene. [Doğu'daki şehir]'e alışmışım, güzel bir ortamım oldu. Rahattım bu sefer. Herkes tanıyor beni. Rahat takılıyordum. Lise hazırlıktan sonra Lise 1'de [Batı'da bir şehir]'e tayinimiz çıktı yine. Bu sefer oraya gittim. Bu sefer yatay geçiş yaptım, baya iyi bir okula yatay geçiş yaptım. İlk 5'in içerisindeki bir Anadolu Üniversitesi'ne gittim."¹⁵⁶

However, being transferred to a better school does not by itself equal to better consequences in terms of education. Let's hear the rest of what Yasemin has to say about her experience in this well-respected Anatolian High School:

"Çok zorlandım. İlk 5'in içerisindeki bir Anadolu Üniversitesi'ne gittim. Eğitimim zaten zayıf. Arkadaş ortamı desen, tekrar baştan. Bir de [Doğu'daki şehir]'deki sıcaklığı hiç kimsede bulamadım. Orada insanlar içinde olduğu gibi davranıyorlar sana. [Batı'daki şehir]'e geldiğim zaman böyle değildi, herkes sanki seni arkandan bıçaklayacakmış gibi hissediyordum. Güvensizlik vardı."¹⁵⁷

Most of my interlocutors also seem to accord with Yasemin in articulating that the relocations of their father have proven quite inimical to their educational life. They particularly attract attention to three sources of distress, the first of which regards the changing and often worsening quality of education.

that, 'Well, I should better be sticking to my studies during this time.' Or maybe it is a city which you will dislike. As you know that your days are numbered there, you focus on what is good and beautiful. You gloss over the bad things and the city remains a nice memory to you. It is the same for education. For things to be better in the future, you just grit your teeth and study."

¹⁵⁶ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I was accepted to a high school in [a city in the East]. I was habituated to there, I had a good company. I was comfortable. Everybody knew me. I was hanging out. After the prep year of the high school, we were transferred back to [a city in the West]. Then I went there. I was transferred to a very good school. It was one of the top five Anatolian High Schools."

¹⁵⁷ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I struggled hard. My education was already weak and as for the friends, I started over. Also, I could not find the warmth of [the city in the East] in [the city in the West]. The people of [the city in the East] treat you sincerely. It was different in [the city in the West]. It was as if everyone was going to backstab me. I could not trust anyone."

"[...]’daki okula gelirse, önce bir devlet okuluna gittim. Fakat ilk bir ay ve son bir ay dersin işlenmediği, hocaların bulunmadığı falan lakayt bir kurumdu."¹⁵⁸

"[Batı’da bir şehir]’deki okulum çok iyiydi benim. İyiymiş yani, sonradan algılıyorsun bunu. Sonra [Doğu’da bir şehir]’e gittim. Çok kolpa geldi dersler bana. Orası biraz daha laylaylom bir devlet okuluydu."¹⁵⁹

"[B]izim [şehir 1]’de eğitimimiz çok iyiydi. O yaşta bile sürekli elimizde test kitaplarıyla dolaşıyorduk. ‘Sen şurayı bitirdin mi, ben burayı bitirdim,’ diye tatilde bile soru çözüyorduk, ders çalışıyorduk yani. [Şehir 2]’de böyle değildi. Zaten konuşmalarına adapte olmam biraz vakit almıştı. Ders sistemi falan çok farklıydı. Farklı hocalar geliyordu farklı derslere. Onlara adapte olmak zordu. Çevreye çok adapte olamadım. Bir de tabii köy okuluydu, orada imkânlar kısıtlıydı yani. 2 yılda bana çok bir şey katmadı açıkçası [şehir 2]."¹⁶⁰

Secondly, many interlocutors discuss the ever-stirring problem of adaptation to new surroundings in educational life, as the family moves to its new settlement. Most of them seem fed up with starting from the scratch, being at the bottom, and arriving as the 'new kid' of the class over and over. Entrapped in the hectic cycle of adjust-set sail, Yasemin and Nuri mention in the following how their educational performances have declined because of the problem of adaptation prompted by ceaseless transfers:

"Notlarım hep kötüydü. Çalışkan bir çocuk olmadım. Çünkü hep gidiyordum bir ortama, ortama alıştım diyordum, bu sefer derslerime yoğunlaşacaktım.

¹⁵⁸ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: “As for the school in [...], I first went to a state school. It was a frivolous institution, where the courses were wasted in the first and last months of the school year and teachers were not showing up.”

¹⁵⁹ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “My school in [a city in the West] was great. I mean, later on you come to the realization that it had been great. Then I went to [the city in the East]. The courses were piece of cake to me. It was rather a frivolous state school.”

¹⁶⁰ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “Our education in [city 1] was great. We were walking around with test books in our hands, even in those ages. We were studying, solving test questions even on holidays: ‘Did you finish this, I finished that.’ [City 2] was a different story. It already took some time for me to adjust to the vernacular. The tutorial system was also very different. We had separate teachers for each course. It was hard to adapt to them. I could not adapt to the environment. Also it was a village school and their resources were scarce. I did not learn much there.”

Gene tayinimiz çıkıyordu. Ortama alışana kadar çalışma süresi gidiyordu. Derslerle alakam olmuyordu bu sayede."¹⁶¹

"Bir sürü yer dolaşıyorsun, oraya alışayım derken dersler var. Derslere alışayım derken... Onlara çok zor adapte oluyorsun. Onlar çok kötü etkiliyor yani. Alışamıyorsun yani, çok zor adapte oluyorsun. O yönden çok etkileniyor yani."¹⁶²

The children usually find difficulty in blending in and for some the experiences of alienation, exclusion and even discrimination is not uncommon. Such experiences seem to have roots in three sources. First is related to the basic status of outsidersness. Usually the children are able to overcome the initial setbacks caused by that, as they are accustomed to their surroundings:

"Hocan değişiyor, arkadaşların değişiyor. Mesela gidiyorsun 10 senedir arkadaş oradakiler. Dışlanıyorsun."¹⁶³

Second is related to the social, economic and cultural disjunctions between them and their new inhabitation which lead to feelings of alienation and exclusion. For example, Kemal articulates in the long quotation below how he stood like a sore thumb in wherever he went during his secondary school years:

"Tam ilkokulu bitireceğim, çat [Doğu'da bir şehir]'e gittik. ... Mesela 1 sene okudum orada. Orası daha travmatikti. İki yönden travmatikti. Bir kere [Doğu'daki şehir]'e gitmiş Alman bebese gibi bir tip düşün. Herkes esmer, sen sapsarımsın. Ben küçükken çok sarıydım. Zaten bırak asker çocukluğunu falan, zenciler arasındaki beyaz gibi duruyorsun. 100 metreden parlıyorsun. Bir de

¹⁶¹ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "My grades were always stinking. I have never been a hardworking student. Because just as I was getting used to a new place, while telling to myself that I was going concentrate on my courses this time, another transfer was coming on its way. Getting used to a new place was consuming my time for studying. Therefore, I was not interested in courses."

¹⁶² Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "You travel lots of places. While you are getting used to a new place, you realize that there are courses to study. While you are getting used to your courses... It is very hard to adapt yourself. They make a negative impact. It is hard to accommodate or adapt yourself. It affects too much in that respect."

¹⁶³ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "Your teachers change, your friends change. Let's say you are going to a new place, but people over there are friends for 10 years. You are excluded."

hepsi birbirine alışmış [oradakilerin], sen gidiyorsun 5. sınıfta cart diye aralarına giriyorsun. Dünya görüşü olarak da biraz farklılar. [Doğu'daki şehir]'in kitlesiyle senin oğlunun arasında hakikaten bariz fark var yani. ... Orta 2'yi de orada bitirdim. Tam oraya alıştım, çevre edindim falan filan, haydi oradan da tayin. Bu sefer de tam tersi oldu bu [Doğu'daki şehir]'e geldiğimde yaşadıklarımın. Mesela, [Batı'da bir şehir]'den, daha büyük bir yerden gelip [Doğu'daki şehir]'de daha rahatken, [Doğu'daki şehir]'den bu sefer İstanbul'a geldim. Oradakilerin bana bakışı şey oldu: Hani ben [Doğu'daki şehir]'den gelmişim, sanki orada doğup büyümüşüm gibi oldu. O zaman da mesela orta 3'e başlayacağım. ... Sonra [İstanbul'da bir Anadolu Lisesi]'ne girdim. Oranın 1 seneymiş hazırlığı. Sıkıntı olmadı, oraya gittim. Orada da şunu yaşadım. [Doğu'daki şehir]'den gelen cahil köylü muhabbeti oldu. Şimdi [Anadolu Lisesi]'ne geldim; hakikaten bambaşka bir ortam. [Doğu'daki şehir]'de paltolarla gezip, işte kösele ayakkabılar, hafif bıçaklama olayları falan [derken], oradan gelip bir anda Barbiri montlar, Burberry bilmem neler... Yani abuk subuk bir ortam. Bir anda Bağdat Caddesi kavramları üzerine bir tokat gibi [iniyor]. Bebelerin çoğu Bağdat Caddesi'nde falan oturan tiplerdi. İşte şimdinin Ugg giyen kızları o zamanlar oralardan yetiştiler. Bir karış etekler falan, bir kültürel şok geçiriyorsun yani. ... Oraya gittik öyle bir şok yaşadık bu sefer. [Doğu'daki şehir]'den gelmiş, bir boktan anlamaz hesabı."¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “When I was just finishing the primary school, we were suddenly sent to [a city in the East]. ... I spent a year in that school. It was more traumatic for me. It was traumatic in two ways. First of all, try to imagine a German kiddo who went to [that city in the East]. Everybody is brown and you are so pale. When I was little I was even paler. Let alone being a military brat, I was already like a white among blacks. I was glowing from miles away. And the children over there know each other for years and you instantly intercalate yourself among them. They are also a bit different in terms of their worldview. I mean, there is a clear gap between your son and the people of [that Eastern city]. ... Anyway, I finished the seventh grade there as well. Just as I was blending in, making friends, another transfer popped up. This time it was the other way around. Coming from a bigger city such as [a city in the West], I was more comfortable in [the city in the East]. Now, I was going from [the city in the East] to İstanbul. Those in İstanbul perceived me as if I was born and raised in [the city in the East]. I was about to start the eighth grade back then. ... Thereafter, I was admitted to [an Anatolian High School in İstanbul]. They had a one year preparation school. They did not cause any trouble, so I went there. This time, I was seen like an ignoramus peasant from [the city in the East]. It was a wholly different environment indeed. From [the city in the East] where mild-stabbing incidents were occurring, as we were clad in coats and lousy oxfords, I came to [the Anatolian High School] where I found myself among Barbiri coats, Burberry whatever. It was ridiculous. Notions like the Baghdad Avenue smack you in the face. The kids in the school were usually types living on the Baghdad Avenue. The Ugg wearer girls of today raised from there and I was a witness. Micro-skirts and all these make you go into a culture shock. I had a turnaround, as a low-brow guy from [the city in the East].”

The second reason is related to a set of prejudices and stereotypes based on their identification with reference to their father's profession. Some children narrate that they were treated differently not because they were only newcomers, but also because they were military brats. Sometimes these prejudices take the form of simple, verbal exchanges between classmates, as Tarık conveys in the following one of his friendly quarrels with his friends in the secondary school:

"Örneğin bir din dersi. Din dersinin sözlüsü, yazılısı nasıl olur? [Öğretmen] dua okutur, bir şey yapar. Sözlüde dua okutuyor mesela. Yanına çağırıyor, sınıf kendi halinde takılıyor. Sırayla adamları çağırıp şey yapıyor. İşte beni de çağırdı, okutuyor falan. Bir iki uzun dua seçmişim herhalde ki onları okuyorum falan. Arkadaşın biri şey demişti mesela: 'Ya hadi hatim mi indiriyon, ne biçim Atatürkçüsün sen,' falan demişti. Yani bu ölçüde, çok böyle yüzeysel, alabildiğine şekilci, atışma şeklindeydi."¹⁶⁵

Zeynep's story on the other hand, speaks of a little more than a harmless friction among peers. She figures that, she was treated unjustly by her teacher, after he learned that she is a child of a military officer:

"[Asker çocuğu olduğunu öğrendiklerinde] öğretmenlerin bir algısı değişiyordu. ... [K]imisi mesela takıyordu. Çok iyi hatırlıyorum, Diyarbakırlı bir edebiyat hocam vardı. Asker çocuğu olduğumu öğrendikten sonra 180 derece değişti diyebilirim."¹⁶⁶

Kemal, always a successful student in his class, recites a similar story, where he thinks that he was wronged by his teacher in his religion and ethics course. He maintains that he was a victim of the stereotype, the ominous spawn of an irreligious institution:

¹⁶⁵ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.01.2013: "Let's say it is a religion and ethics course. How do they make oral or written exams in the religion and ethics course? You recite some prayers, right? The teacher calls you and other students keep messing around. The teacher picks students one by one. Anyway, the teacher called me and I began to recite. I suppose I was reciting one of the longer prayers, so one of my friends heckled me: 'Hey, what kind of a Kemalist are you, reading the Quran from beginning to end?' I mean, there were superfluous, completely shallow quarrels as such."

¹⁶⁶ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "[When they learned that I am a child of a soldier] the perception of my teachers was shifting. ... Some of them were picking on me. I remember very well. There was this literature teacher from Diyarbakır. When he learned that I was a child of a soldier, his attitude completely flipped around."

"Şimdi ben asker çocuğuyum ya; bunlar dinle hiç alakan yok zannediyor. Baya ateist falan [zannediyorlar]. Öyle bir dünya yok aslında. Herkes kadar bayram kutluyorsun, herkes kadar şey yapıyorsun. Sadece yaşam biçimi açısından belli semboller yok yani. Aslına bakarsan anne babanın yaşamı yine bildiğin klasik muhafazakâr Türk ailesi. Ne fark var işte? Kadınların başı kapalı değil. Öyle bir fark var. Yani dışarıdan bakıp gördüğün şeyler yok sadece. Ama karşıdan öyle gözükmüyor. Yani [Doğu'daki şehir]'deki o adamlar için, Müslümanları kılıçla kesmeye gelmişler hesabı bir şey var. Bizim ilkokul 5'teki sınıf öğretmeni, aynı zamanda bütün derslerin öğretmeni[ydi]. Bir öğretmen var, her şeyden anlıyor. Öyle bir öğretmen. Mesela Din Kültürü dersine giriyordu. Neredeyse Yasin'i ezberleyecek hale geldim, herif inatla bana 4 veriyor. Şimdi bizi de öyle yetiştirmişler, hep 5 olacak, hep başarılı olacaksın bilmem ne diye. Bu bana ilk dönem 4 verdi. Sonra ben hocaya şey demişim, din min ayakları yapıyor ya: 'Hocam sen benim hakkımı yedin, ben de seninle öbür tarafta görüşeceğim,' demişim. Bu dediğim de ilkokul 5 falan oluyor yani."¹⁶⁷

The narratives of my interlocutors are also replete with instances in which a certain hesitation or a moment of silence sets in between friends when their friends learn that they are acquainted with a child of a professional soldier. More often than not, such hesitations disappear as the others come to the realization that it is not the child, but the father is a military officer:

"Hazırlığa ilk başladığımda, en yakın sıra arkadaşım muhafazakâr bir aileden geliyordu hatta. Anneannesi başörtülüydü, babası da muhafazakâr biriydi falan. Öyle olunca, böyle enteresan; ilk defa orada yüzleşmiştim hani. O da hani, 'Aa, baban asker mi?' falan diye biraz daha temkinli yaklaşmıştı falan. Sonra tabii

¹⁶⁷ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "Just because you are a child of a military officer, people suppose that you have no relation whatsoever to religion. They regard you as an outright atheist. There is no such thing of course. You celebrate religious festivals, you engage in religious stuff as much as the next person. Only some symbols affiliated with religion and observable from outside do not exist in your lifestyle. The life of your parents is indeed the same with any classical, conservative Turkish family. Only, your mother does not wear a head scarf. That is the only difference. But it does not seem like that from an external perspective. For those guys [in the city in the East], it is as if we are on a crusade mission. Our class teacher in the fifth grade was the teacher for all courses. There was this single teacher, who presumably understands it all. Such was the man I'm talking about. He was coming to our religion and ethics course. Although I was on the verge of memorizing all the verses of Yasin, the guy kept grading me 4 out of 5. But I was raised to be a successful student, to get the full grades all the time. He gave me 4 out of 5 in the first school term. Then, as he was putting on a religious act, I told him that, 'What you did is unjust. I will see you in the afterlife.' I was like in the fifth grade when I said that."

birbirimizi tanıyıp, birbirimizi biraz daha gördükten sonra, asker olan neticede ben değilim, babam diye anlaşmaya başladık."¹⁶⁸

On the other hand, there are those who may think that these are the general symptoms of a condition, caused by the distance between the two life worlds, a condition which influences not only particular individuals coming from military families, but the all children raised by these families:

"[S]ivillerin her zaman 'asker çocuğu' diye bir tabirleri vardır, sanki tamamen farklı bir dünyadan geliyormuşuz gibi. Ama bir nebze de haklılar, çünkü lojmanda büyüdük. Lojmanda tamamen arkadaş ortamları farklı, yaşadığımız şeyler farklı, devamlı [orada] yaşadığımız için gördüğümüz şeyler farklı. Onlar hep aynı yerde büyüüp, ne gördülerse etraflarında ona göre davranıyorlar. Biz de onlara benzemediğimiz için değişik görüyorlardı bizi. O yüzden dışlanma gibi şeyler söz konusu olabiliyordu."¹⁶⁹

"Sonuçta lojmanda yaşıyorsunuz. Yaşadığınız yer farklı, öğrenim gördüğünüz yer farklı. Öğrenim gördüğünüz yerde sivil insanlarla birlikte bu ilişkiyi yürütüyorsunuz. Bu durumda subay çocuğu olmanız, nasıl diyeyim, sanki böyle toplumdaki dışlanmış[lık] hissi veriyor bazen insana. Yani bazı çevreler tarafından. Bunun etkisini ben de gördüm. Lisede başlayan etkisini halen üniversitede görüyorum. ... Ya dışlanma demeyeyim de... [M]esela subay çocuğu olduğumu öğrenen bazı arkadaşlarım bana şey yaptı. Dışladı mı diyeyim ne diyeyim? Farklı bir gözle bakmaya başladılar. Başlayan kesim oldu açıkçası. Bu da benim üzerimde olumsuz bir etki yarattı. Sonuçta babamın mesleği üzerinden benimle ilgili bir sonuca vardı arkadaşlarım."¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "In the preparation year, my desk mate was coming from a conservative family. Her mother was wearing a head scarf and her father was a conservative person. It was the first time I faced with it. She was cautious like, 'Oh, is your father a soldier?' As we got acquainted with each other, we started to get along, since it was not me, but my father who was a soldier."

¹⁶⁹ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "The civilians always have had this term, 'the military brat'. As if we are coming from an alien world. Actually, they are right about it in a sense. Because we have grown up in lodgings. The friends we made, the experiences we had, the things we saw while living there are different. They are raised in the same place, and they behave in accordance with what they see in that place. We did not resemble them, so they were seeing us with different eyes. Sometimes this was leading to ends like exclusion."

¹⁷⁰ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: "All in all, you live in military lodgings. The place where you live and the place where you get education are distinct. You are with civilian people in your educational life. Because of that, being a child of a military officer can make you feel like excluded sometimes. I mean, excluded by some people. I went through that since the high school and I still experience that in the university. ...

Much as the children may encounter alienation, exclusion and outright discrimination in and through their educational lives, the reverse can also be true many times. In other words, the children may have their share from the polarized views and prejudices pertaining to the military institution. While their identification through their father's belonging to the military institution may repel such and such a teacher or a friend, others may favor them for the very same reason in turn. In some cases, it seems that the positive perception of the institution may take the form of basic sympathy, without any strings attached. In others, the children may be privileged over others just for being the child of a military officer. Those who favor these children are sometimes none other than teachers whom the children know from lodgings as wives of male military officers:

"Hocamın kendi de asker eşi olduğu için, mesela sanki o da asker çocuklarını daha çok severdi. Hep bir en öne otururduk falan. Öyle bir hava vardı, hissediyordum onu ben. O zaman rahatsız olmuyorsun ama tabii, 'Aa, ne güzel işte en önde oturuyoruz,' falan diyorsun yani."¹⁷¹

Of course, it is not necessarily a teacher wife of an officer who may privilege the children of military families over others, as Zeynep informs us:

"[B]abamın mesleğiyle ilgili öğretmenlerimin ayrıca bir ilgisi oluyordu. Arkadaşlarımdan yana değil, ama onlar daha çok saygı duyuyordu. Daha bir ciddileşiyorlardı diyeyim. Hani ne bileyim subay dediğin zaman, asker dediğin zaman hep daha çok ilgi gösteriyorlardı, o bir gerçek. Yani bir ayrıcalık gibi bir durum vardı. O da tabii öğretmenlerle alakalı."¹⁷²

Perhaps, I should not have called it exclusion. ... Some friends who learned that I'm a child of a military officer did... I don't know if I should call it exclusion, but they started to perceive me with different eyes. And this had a negative impact on me. After all, they judged me by my father's profession."

¹⁷¹ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "My teacher was married to an officer and she seemed to like us more than others. We were always sitting at the front of the classroom. I was getting this vibe. It does not disturb you when you are a child. 'Oh great, we are sitting at the front,' you say."

¹⁷² Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "My teachers were taking a special interest in my father's profession. Not my friends, but my teachers had an utmost respect for it. They were getting more serious I mean. When you say that your father is a professional soldier, they pay more heed to you, to tell the truth. It was like a privilege, depending on the teachers."

Apart from the problems of adaptation and the changing quality of education because of transfers, the problems in bureaucratic procedures emerge as the third source of distress, which may plague the educational life of children as well. For example, Mustafa mentions in the following how he had to deal with registration problems after transfers, which delayed his start at school during his years in the primary school:

"Ben hep en dipte başladım, ama hep şansına iyi okullara gittim. Çok çalışırdım, dershaneye de giderdim. Dershane şart zaten. İlkokul 4'te okula gittiğimde flüt bilmiyordum. 4 hafta İstiklal Marşı ezberleyecekler mesela, ben 2-3. haftada gidebiliyordum okula. Biliyorsun öyle okul değiştirence pat diye başlayamıyorsun. Kayıt problemleri oluyor, geç başlıyorsun."¹⁷³

As the child advances in education, more serious problems may occur, concerning the registration of children at schools they want to attend. Especially the matter of 'equivalence' comes to the fore as a potential obstruction in that regard. Although the child may be adept and successful enough to pursue his/her education anywhere, school principals may not figure if the child is capable enough to be invited to the school the family applies for. Kemal, for example, was rejected from an Anatolian High School, because he was not given a chance to prove his merits:

"Mesela orta 3'e başlayacağım. İşte Anadolu Lisesi arıyorlar bizimkiler, annemle abim. Önce [...]ya baktılar. Fakat [...]nün götü biraz kalkıktı. Onların 2 sene İngilizce hazırlığı var ya, sen de [Doğu'da bir şehir]'den gelmişsin, sanki sen beginner'sın, onların hepsi advanced. 'Sen anlamazsın, siktir git,' hesabı var yani. Hatta annem demiş: 'Madem öyle, sınav yapın çocuğa.' Öyle bir şey ki ben [Doğu]'daki Anadolu Lisesi'ni ya 1. ya 2. kazanmıştım. Orada başka okul yok, nereye gideceğim? Bunu da zaten dereceyle kazanmışım. Elinde başka imkân yok, nasıl kanıtlayacaksın ki? Kanıtlayamıyorsun işte."¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "I always started at the bottom but I went to good schools by chance. I was working hard. I was also going to a lesson school but it was like an obligation anyway. When I was starting the fourth grade, I did not know how to play the flute. Let's say the students were going to learn and sing the National Anthem by the fourth week of the school term, but I was only able to go to the school no sooner than the second or third weeks. You know, you cannot start whenever you want. There are registration problems when you switch schools."

¹⁷⁴ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "I was to start the eighth grade. My mom and elder brother were seeking an Anatolian High School. They first investigated the [...]. But they [those at the administration of the school] were jerks. They

The constant transfers of the father may lead to farcical bureaucratic ends for children as well. For instance, Yasemin articulates in the following how and why she holds two primary school degrees:

"Hatta şöyle bir şey. 5. sınıfta ilkokul diploması aldım. [şehir 1]'de 5'te ilkokul biter. Sonra geldim [şehir 2]'deyken gene ilkokul diploması aldım. Orta sonda ilkokulla birleşti ya ortaokul. Ben de ilkokul diploması aldım. İki tane ilkokul diplomam var yani."¹⁷⁵

Then, how do the parents and children try to cope with these difficulties? How do the parents reconcile with the tension between their desire to provide better education for the children and requirements arising from military duties? What kind of strategies do they deploy to get back in the track en-route to the projected schools which are envisioned to eventually lead the children to promised lands?

Most of the military families are bound to live by the inevitable unpredictability that haunts them with the impending possibility of a transfer. They seem condemned to lag behind others in the competitive field of education for the reason that it is almost impossible to settle an exact itinerary for children's education. Nevertheless, they often show willingness to send their children to the best available options wherever they go. At the same time, they also prioritize the security of their children and want them nearby.¹⁷⁶ The latter concern may trim down the possibilities which are already slim because of the former. The second difficulty stems from time constraints, which hasten them to decide

had a two years English prep school and they did not admit me, just because I was coming from [a city in the East], as if I was a beginner unable to have a grasp on the language, while all the other students had an advanced proficiency. Like, 'you don't understand, so bugger off.' My mother even had replied them: 'Well then, take him to a test or something.' I had gotten into the [the city in the East] Anatolian High School as the first or second best student. There was nowhere better for me to go. And I got into that school with a degree. How was I to prove myself, when I did not have any other chance? You cannot prove it."

¹⁷⁵ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "As a matter of fact, it was like this. I received my primary school diploma in [city 1], at the end of the fifth grade, because in [city] the primary school ends there. Then I came to [city 2] and got myself another diploma. Because you know, when I was in the eighth grade, they changed the system and merged the primary and secondary schools. And I received a primary school diploma again, which means, I have two of them."

¹⁷⁶ From my field notes, after the personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013

which school the children should go to in a place about which they usually have little if any knowledge.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, they may recourse to practical solutions, such as surveying pamphlets for school preference and picking the hardest school to get into as the target. For example, Kemal recounts in the following the half-baked and ill-advised schemes his family made use of when the decision times came up:

"Aslında bizimkilerin kafasında hep şey vardır: Gittiğin şehrin en iyi okulu hangisiyse, en yüksek puanla girilen okulu hangisiyse orada olman gerekiyor. Hani aslında bambaşka bir okul olsa da oraya gideceksin. Belki çok iğrenç bir okul, ama herkes oraya gidiyorsa sen de oraya gideceksin. Çünkü bilmiyorlar okulun içini, ne olduğunu, ne olabileceğini, nereye gideceğini. Hani o bilgi yok. Tek bilgi şey: '-Aa, en yüksek puanı alanlar buraya gidiyor.' '-Ulan niye gidiyor?' '-Bilmiyoruz.' Koyun hesabı herkes birbirini takip ediyor. Daha ben orta 3'e başlarken babam dershaneye yazdırırken, 'İşte Fen Lisesi'ne gidecek bu çocuk,' falan diyordu. Ulan daha yeni gelmişim [...]'a. Fen Lisesi'nden haberim bile yok. Adını bile bilmiyorum [...]daki Fen Lisesi'nin. Ama ille de ona gitçekmişiz de bilmem ne."¹⁷⁸

Overall, the parental strategies to win a place for their children in better schools do not seem to differ much from other middle-class families in their content. Perhaps, it is the intensity of the efforts that differs. For instance, all of my interlocutors, some from very early ages were sent to lesson schools.¹⁷⁹ Three of them state that they took private tutoring in order to compensate the damages caused by transfers. Six of them registered to foundation universities either for their university education or to get a master degree. There are even parents, who enforce their children into foundation universities, out of guilt trips:

¹⁷⁷ From my field notes, after the personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013

¹⁷⁸ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "Actually my parents always have in their mind that I should go to the school which admits students with the highest scores, to the best school in wherever we go. It may be a terrible school, but it does not matter. If everyone is going there, I had to go there. Because they did not have any clue about schools. They did not know anything. Only thing they knew is: '-Oh, those who have better scores in entrance exams go there.' '-Alright, but why?' '-We don't know.' Everybody thus flocks there. When I was to start the eighth grade, my father was telling that, 'My boy will go to the Science High School,' while he was registering me to a lesson school. Man, I just arrived to [...]. I did not even know the name of the Science High School in [...]. But I had to go there."

¹⁷⁹ Lesson schools (in Turkish: Dershane) are private tutoring institutions.

"Babam en son baktı, bu deneme sınavı sonuçlarını gördü. 'Benim yüzümden bu haldesin,' dedi. 'O yüzden ben sana özel ders aldıracağım,' dedi. Özel ders dediğim bir tane özel ders aldım. O da matematik. Matematik sınavda daha önemli diye. ... Ben devlette bir yerde okumak istiyordum çünkü zaten son sene, özel derstir falan baya bir yük oldu babama para açısından. Para açısından yük olunca bari devlete gideyim dedim. Devlette bir bölüm kazanayım, orada devam ederim, en azından bir mühendislik olsun, nerede tutarsa dedim. Şehir dışına falan çıkmak istedim. Üniversite sonucum geldi, normalde beklediğimden 30 puan düşüktü. İstedğim yerler rahat gelmiyordu. İşte babamla oturduk, konuştuk. Babam, 'Kazanamaman gene benim yüzümden,' dedi. 'Özeli yaz, ben seni okuturum. İstedğin bölümü oku. Mühendislik istiyorsun, [...] Mühendisliği istiyorsun özellikle, yaz,' dedi. 'Özelden ben seni okuturum,' dedi. Ben karşı çıktım falan ama o kendisi bütün bu tercih listesini sildi baştan aşağı. Özel okullardaki mühendislikleri yazdı. Kendisi yazdı yani. Öyle gönderdi beni."¹⁸⁰

But the paid educational alternatives prior to university years appear to be rarely adopted. Only one of my interlocutors, Tarık was sent to a private school, after her mother saw in his state school in an Eastern city that the courses were wasted, because the school teachers were not showing up. Perhaps, the most genuine strategy deployed to cope with the difficulties in educational life of the children is, in Tarık's words, the military family think-tanks (*Asker Ailesi teati örgütleri*)¹⁸¹:

"...Asker ailelerinde daima bir aman dersane, okul neymiş, ne değilmiş, hangisi iyi, [diye] birbirleriyle arasında bir fikir teatrisi vardır. Ana gündemlerden biri çoluğun çocuğun eğitimidir. Tabii rütbe seviyesine göre değişir. Bugün artık çoluğun çocuğun işi bizim babalarımız arasında

¹⁸⁰ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "My father went over the exam results. 'This is entirely my fault. I will hire private tutors for you,' he said. I took private tutoring only for a course. It was for mathematics, because it had an overwhelming significance in the university entrance exams. ... I was willing to study in a state university, because the expenses made for my education in the last year had been a financial burden on my father. I said to myself, let's first go to a state university, at least for an engineering department in any of them, and then you will sort it out. I wanted out of the city. Then my results came, quite lower than I expected. It was impossible for me to enter the schools I wanted to. I talked with my father. My father said that: 'It is again my fault. Write the private ones into your preference list. Just study whatever you want. I can support you. I know you want to study engineering, especially [...] Engineering. Don't shy away. I can send you to a private university.' I objected to him, but he filled the preference list from top to bottom. He filled it with engineering departments in private universities. He filled it by himself I mean. He sent me that way."

¹⁸¹ From my field notes, after the personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013

konuşulan. İşi, düğünleri, şusu busu. Ama o yaşlarda: 'Hangi okul, hangi dersane? Şu hoca iyiymiş, şurada şu varmış.' Onlar da belki bir yerde belki onların yüzünden oluşan bir dezavantaja karşı bir çaba gösteriyorlar, bunu bastırmak için."¹⁸²

The likelihood of sending the children to schools elsewhere than the location of transfer seems low, but not improbable. I have already mentioned Zeynep, who was 'left behind' with her sisters and mother in their previous house in the lodgings, when her father went to his station in another city alone. The other option is to send the children to better schools in cities other than the location of transfer. However, none of my interlocutors had an experience as such. It was only after the retirement of their fathers from the military, some disembarked the family boat (sometimes only to embark on the military boat while getting education) and went to schools in cities different than their parents' place of residence. Also gender seems to take part in the decision to break the family for purposes of education, as Deniz suggests in the following:

Deniz: "Subay kızı olsaydım, babamı baz alarak konuşursak, herhalde üniversitede [...]a gelmeme falan belki izin vermeyebilirdi veya korkuyor olabilirdi. Onun dışında cinsiyet farkının çok bir etkisi olacağını düşünmüyorum."

Sertaç: "Aileden uzak kalmaman için mi diyorsun?"

Deniz: "Evet, evet."

Sertaç: "Erkek olunca bu bir avantaj mı oluyor?"

Deniz: "Evet."¹⁸³

Then, as Deniz suspects, it may be less likely for girls to move away from their family during their fathers' active duty years, whereas boys would be allowed occasionally

¹⁸² Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "Military families constantly exchange information about lesson schools, better schools, etc. with each other. One of the primary agendas of theirs is always the education of children. Of course, much hinges on the rank of the father. Today, our fathers are rather talking about the jobs, weddings and whatever of the children. Back then, they were discussing like: 'Which schools and lesson schools provide the best education? I heard that the guy is a great tutor.' In a way they attempt to compensate for damages probably caused by them."

¹⁸³ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: Deniz: "If I were a daughter, my father would not probably allow me to come to [...] for the university. Or he could be afraid. Having a different sex would not take part in any other case I think." Sertaç: "You mean he would not allow you in order to keep you close to the family?" Deniz: "Yes." Sertaç: "Being a male gives you an edge in that case?" Deniz: "Yes."

to venture into the life outside for their education. But the children are not given free rein to explore this other world all the time. In some cases, economical considerations and heightened concerns for security render the military facilities, such as Officers' Clubs or dormitories of the Turkish Armed Forces Education Foundation,¹⁸⁴ as the ideal destinations for accommodation. The military present itself as the optimal choice, sometimes not only to the parents, but also to the children. For example, İrem recites in the following how her eerie experiences in a house she rented with her sister gave her the heebie-jeebies, for no apparent reason. Some months later, they were to move together in an Officers' Club:

"Kardeşimle eve çıktık ben yüksek lisansa başladığımda. O zaman tabii askeri bir ortam değil. Orada evde yalnız kaldığımızda hiçbir zaman korkmazdık yani. Çünkü bizi koruyan birileri vardı. Lojman ortamında zaten hiçbir şey olmazdı. Ama dışarıda en ufak bir ses duysan korkuyorsun, ürperiyorsun, 'Ne oluyor

¹⁸⁴ To the best of my knowledge, there is no comprehensive study on the foundations established by the Turkish Armed Forces. There are some studies (Akça, 2004; Akça, 2006; Parla, 2004; Ünsaldı, 2008) attracting attention to and concentrated on the Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces (TSKGV). However, the Turkish Armed Forces Education Foundation is one of those foundations which have hitherto remained unexplored. Founded on the 16th of March, 1957 by the name of 'The Facility for the Support of Education of the Children of Military Members' (Ordu Mensupları Çocuklarının Tahsiline Yardım Tesisi), with a founding capital 52.000 TL, the foundation now runs 8 dormitories in 4 cities, presumably following a downsize in the previous years, from 13 dormitories in 7 cities. Its name was changed to 'The Foundation for the Support of the Education of the Children of the Turkish Armed Forces' Members' (TSK Mensupları Çocuklarının Tahsiline Yardım Vakfı) in 13.10.1998, and another change followed in 21.03.2006 to its current name. It seems that the foundation took a boost after the 1960 military coup (see: 1964 Yılı Bütçe Kanunu. (1964). *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, 11645, February 29, 1964. Retrieved January 2, 2014, from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc047/kanuntbmmc047/kanuntbmmc04700438.pdf) and its capital now exceeds a not too shabby amount of 26.000.000 TL. It invests in and makes association with few companies, it has an alumni association (TAÇ-DER) which runs an office in İstanbul, and it even aims to establish 'educational institutions including universities'. I assume that a little less than 2000 children of military families stay in its dormitories, under the auspices of the military institution, while their university education. Another striking point which pertains to gender is that the majority of dormitory capacities are reserved for the daughters of military officers. If we add the untraceable number of those who are accommodated in Officers' Clubs, the magnitude of operations and efforts invested by the military institution to plaster over the gaps caused by the educational life of the children may be perceived better.

acaba?’ diye. ‘Daha önce böyle bir şey yaşamadım, ne ki bu...’ diyorsun yani.”¹⁸⁵

Another probable militarized solution to the problem of education is encouraging children, especially the sons, to take the military schools tests. This also means that the parental orientation towards military schools may not be ideologically charged, if we were to define the word ideology in a narrower sense. Because, this way, the parents can entrust their children to an institution which provides decent education and future prospects, and an environment as safe as it can get. Nonetheless, perhaps despite the common-sense perception of military families, not all parents advise their children to take this route. They can discourage their children from joining the military as well. This is exactly what Deniz experienced when he wanted to take the test:

"Askeri Lise sınavlarına girdim ben. ... Mülakat oldu, sağlıkta elendim. Gerçi şöyle bir durum var; babam pek istemiyordu askeriye girmemi. Niye bilmiyorum, ama onaylamadı hiçbir zaman. Ben çok istiyorum diye sesini çıkarmadı diyebilirim. Denemek için değil, ben ciddenden istiyordum denizci olmak. Ama olmayınca o da şey yapmadı sonra. En başından beri desteklemediğini biliyorum. Hissettim diyelim. Her zaman derdi, ‘Ben sizin yerinize de askerlik yaptım, ne yapacaksınız boş verin.’ Zorluklarıyla başa çıkmanın zor olması [nedeniyle] olabilir yani.”¹⁸⁶

Deniz's story prompts the question of why the children might desire to give military schools a shot. We can approach the question at hand from different directions. The child

¹⁸⁵ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: I moved into a house with my sister when I started my masters degree. Of course it was a different environment than the military setting. Back there, we would not be afraid when we were alone in the house. Because there were people protecting us. Nothing would happen in military lodgings anyway. But at the outside, you shiver when you hear a cracking noise. ‘What is going on there? I haven’t experienced this before, what was that?’ you say.

¹⁸⁶ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “I entered the exams for military high schools. ... I passed the interview but I was eliminated in the health tests. In fact my father was not much a fan of my decision. I don’t know why but he did not approve my choice. He remained silent though, perceiving that I was eager. I really wanted so much to be a marine. It was not simply a matter of giving a shot. It did not happen though and he did not say anything about it. But I know that he was not supporting the idea since the beginning. Let’s say I felt it. He was always saying, ‘I served in the military on behalf of you too. Just forget about it.’ Perhaps it was because he knows about the hardships of overcoming difficulties entailed by being a soldier.”

whose life is riddled with transitivity and unpredictability, because of the transfers of his father, may want to anchor his/her life by registering to a military school. This may give a relative fixity to the identity, relationships and surroundings of the child by putting an end to the vicious cycle of 'adjust-set sail', which requires the child to perpetually adapt.¹⁸⁷ In this sense, the military institution may run to the rescue of some children to cushion the blow indeed inflicted by the institution itself. But the children, as well as their parents, may see the military schools as a desirable option, not only because of transfers, but also because of the sinking horizons of future in the working life. As the Keynesian macroeconomic logic and the welfare state recede globally, only to be superseded by a model characterized by neo-Taylorism, financialization, precarization, and flexibilization (Bora & Erdoğan, 2012), the traditional middle-class groups feel threatened, if not possessed by a fear of falling (Ehrenreich, 1989; Newman, 1988). The more the market conditions swiftly change and the transition from a "hot-air balloon society" to "hourglass society" (Lipietz, 2001) gains pace in Turkey, the more the children and parents become prone to turn to the military institution, which grants resilience to those who stay within the bubble it has summoned, by providing decent wages and welfare opportunities. But the very same bubble often prevents the familiarization of military families with the market into which the children will venture in some later time. For example, the following narrative of Kemal, in response to a question concerning the advantages and disadvantages of being a child in a military family, dwells on this predicament:

“Mesela biz [Doğu’da bir şehir]’den [Batı’da bir şehir]’e yaz tatiline geliriz. Babam 20 gün yıllık iznini alıyor, arabayla tek şöför geliyoruz. Mecbur bir yerde kalması lazım. Ya Amasya’da ya Samsun’da kalırdık. Yüzde 100 orduevine gider kalırdık. (Gülerek) ‘Samsun’da 7 yıldızlı otel var, ama 10 liraya gecesini’ desen bile babam gitmez abi, gidemez yani. Körleşmiş adam ya, onu duymaz bile. Kolundan çeksen gitmez. Gidecek o orduevine. Maalesef öyleydi. Avantajları şöyle: Daha kötüsünü düşünürsek, babam maaşlı başka bir yerde çalışıyor olabilirdi. Mesela senin orduevinde gördüğün imkânları sana sağlayamayabilirdi. Orada tika basa yediğin şeyleri dışarıda yapmaya çalışsan çok daha masraflı. Ya da kampa gidersen; şimdi nerede nasıldır bilmiyorum, ama benim çocukluğumda biz mesela Bodrum’da askeri kampa gittik, Antalya’da Karpuzkaldıran’da askeri kampa gittik. Buralar bildiğin 5 yıldızlı bir

¹⁸⁷ From my field notes, after the personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013

tatil köyünün verdiği imkânları veriyor sana. Hiç yok pahasına falan böyle. Sen daha çocukken bunları yaşayınca sana çok kolaymış gibi geliyor. Ama kendin piyasaya çıkıp çalışıp, bir tatil ayarlayıp kendine uçak bileti falan alınca bu işlerin aslında çok masraflı olduğunu anlıyorsun. Avantajları, dediğim gibi, *bazı sabit yaşam koşulları paket olarak sana geliyor*. Hani işe girerken *sosyal haklardan* bahsedersin ya, ‘Maaşın + ne var?’ diye; bu adamların da [subayların] 'o'su var. Plus kısmı belli başlı şartlar. Çok lüks değil bu şartlar, ama belirli bir ortalamanın üstünde. Mesela biz Fenerbahçe'deydik. Fenerbahçe'nin havuzuna dışarıdan gelmek isteyenler kendini yırtardı oraya gelmek için, ‘Günlük kart çıkarsam, bir şekilde beni içeri alsa da girsem,’ diye. Senin için hiçbir özelliği yok. *Zaten fiks gelen bir şey*. Öyle olunca sen gitmezdin mesela, dışarıdan gitmeye çalışan kastırırdı falan. Sen alışık oluyorsun zaten. *Belirli şeyleri görüyorsun tabii, hayatta bir vizyon sahibi oluyorsun. Ama belirli şeyleri de hiç görmüyorsun*. Mesela evinin en ufak bir tamirat işi olduğu zaman, ustayla münasebet, birilerini bulmak, kendin bir şeyler yapmak falan böyle şeyler yoktur askerlerin hayatında. Asker gelir yapar. Bir şekilde halledilir yani. Subayların dışarıdaki adamla alakası yoktur. Ama askeriyenin içinde belirli bir yüzde 5'lik bir kısım, bunları tamamen aşmış insanlar da var. Onlar mesela çok öyle lojmanda kalmaz, dışarıda kalır. Onlar da genelde subaylardan çıkmaz. Ya astsubaylardan çıkar, ya uzmanlardan çıkar. Ama subaylar öyle değildir abi. ‘Hadi el ele verelim, hepimiz subayız, aman dışarı çıkmayalım, hepimiz burada böyle takılalım,’ falan. Biraz öyledir. Avantajları böyle abi. *Belli başlı şeyleri sana sağlar*. Dışarıda baban aynı parayı alsa, mesela İstanbul'da, Fenerbahçe'de ben [...] sene oturdum, oturduğumuz daire deniz manzaralıydı; git şimdi bakayım Fenerbahçe'de deniz manzaralı bir daire tutabilecek misin? Neredesinden tutacaksın?”¹⁸⁸ (emphases mine)

¹⁸⁸ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “For example, we were coming on summers from [a city in the East] to [a city in the West] for vacation. My father was taking his annual leave from the military for 20 days. He was the only driver, so we had to pull in somewhere on the road to take a rest. We were resting either in Samsun or Amasya, always in Officers’ Clubs. (Laughing) If you’d tell my father, ‘There is a 7 stars hotel in Samsun, charging its customers only ten Turkish liras for a night,’ he would not go there. I mean he could not. He was blinded so much that he could not even realize the no-brainer. He would not go there even if you would pull him by the arm. He had to go to the Officers’ Club. Sad but true. As for the advantages, it could have been worse for us. My father could have been working for another salary job. He could have been unable to provide as much as what one can enjoy in Officers’ Clubs. If you were to try doing at the outside what you have done in those places, your expenditures would soar. For example, I don’t know how it is now, but once we went to a military vacation facility in Antalya, Karpuzkaldıran. It was not much different than a 5 stars holiday village in terms of what it offers. At a bargain price too! When you see that as a child, you consider that the life will be easy. But when you come into the market and work, when you plan a vacation and buy plane tickets, you realize how much everything can cost you. The upside is that, *you receive some fixed living conditions as a package*. You know how they talk of *social rights* before getting a job, like ‘What is your salary + benefits package?’ These guys [military officers] have that package. The plus side is an accompanying set of living conditions. Not luxurious

Kemal was an engineer until he came to the rude awakening that he was fishing in an ocean, with his parents, in pursuit of the unfulfilled hope that the time will come to reap the promised rewards, after all the years of hard work, that even the transfers of his father could not interrupt. Perhaps it was too late for him to try his chances in the military as a professional soldier. Perhaps he did not even think of it. He instead switched his career path to finance. But it seems that both the parents and children may find relief in military schools, because they can get rid of unpredictabilities of many kinds by embracing the option, instead of fishing in an ocean about which they remain blithely ignorant, more often than not:

Nuri: "[G]enelde asker çocukları[nın] hepsi askeri lise sınavına bir girer. Ben de girdim. Ben kazanamadım. Çok zordu."

Sertaç: "Kazansan gitmek ister miydin?"

Nuri: "Ben de onu düşünüyorum, 'Kazansaydım gider miydim?' diye. Çünkü şu anda [...] yaşına geldim, hâlâ kendim ne yapacağımı [bilmiyorum]. Mesleğinde, kafanda soru işaretleri varsa, ufakken, 13-14 yaşında belki de giderdim hiç düşünmeden. Bir deneyebilirdim yani."

Sertaç: "Peki tüm asker çocukları askeri lise sınavına girer dedin. Sence bu neden oluyor? "

Nuri: "Bir deniyorlar kendilerini. Mesela asker olmak istemeyenler vardır da çoğu asker olmak ister yani. Çünkü alışmışsın artık o yaşama. O yaşam standardına. Daha kolay geliyor sana yani. Sonuçta insanlar daha kolay

maybe, but always above a certain average. For example, we were staying in Fenerbahçe. People outside were imploring to use the pool inside the Fenerbahçe Officers' Club, like 'Only if I had a daily entrance card to step in.' But it means nothing to you. It is *something already given in your life*. Just because you are already used to it, you would not care, while people outside were endeavoring to get inside. [When you are a military brat] *you see certain things in life and they all give you a certain vision. But you remain blind to certain other things*. Let's say there is something that requires repair in the house. Officers do not bother with handling it by themselves, or finding a repairman and relating to him. The conscripts arrive and repair for them. Things sort themselves out anyway. Military officers thus have no correspondence with the men outside. But there is also a group of people in the military, maybe like, the five percent of the whole population, who is above all these things mentioned. Usually, they don't stay in military lodgings. They rather rent a place outside. They usually emerge from non-commissioned military officers and qualified sergeants. But commissioned military officers are a different story. They rather happen to be like, 'Let's join hands, we are all officers, let's never venture out and hang inside together.' That's somewhat the case. These are the advantages, as I told you man. It provides you *certain resources*. I stayed in a sea-view house in Fenerbahçe for [...] years. Well, let's see if you could handle renting that house, had your father worked at the outside for the same wage? Let's see how much of it you could handle?" (emphases mine)

olabilecek şeyleri seçer, zoru seçmez kimse yani. Çoğu insan seçmez. O yüzden alıştığın için asker olmak istiyorsun. Kafandan geçiyor en azından. Şimdi dışarıdaki bir insanın, bir doktorun çocuğu ya da başka bir memurun çocuğunun hiç aklına bile gelmeyebilir askeri lise sınavlarına gireyim diye."¹⁸⁹

2.5. Chapter Conclusion

The first day of the school. I was standing still in the school yard, with my parents, waiting for my initiation to educational life. A chaos that I was not much familiar with descended upon me. Now, I found myself right inside the Grand Guignol which had intrigued me for so long and I was nothing if not regretful. The coarse noises of cars parking by the school and the happy screams of children running pell-mell after each other invaded my ears. I felt that I did not have enough sense organs, or a neural system capable enough to funnel all that's going around into my understanding. I was deprived of even the most tentative illusion of perspicacity. I was yearning for the military lodgings, where everything was orderly, where everything was spick and span despite their crude appearances. How I could disembroil myself from all of that and return back there? There were cars and children running around in military lodgings too, but something was not clicking here. I started whining and crying. For the next two months, my mother was going to mediate my transition to education, by escorting me to the school, appearing at the door every school bell if she was not already sharing a desk with me in the classroom, and waiting for the class to be dismissed. Nearly twenty years later, my memories of the first day of the school came flooding back as Deniz told me of his:

¹⁸⁹ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: Nuri: "Generally, all children of military families take the military school tests. I took it as well. I could not succeed. It was very difficult." Sertaç: "Would you want to go if you could succeed?" Nuri: "This is what I am contemplating on. I'm 22 now. I still don't know what to do in life. If you have doubts about your profession, perhaps you could have gone to a military school when you were 13-14 years old, without thinking twice. I mean I could give it a try." Sertaç: "Well, you said that all children of military families take the military school tests. What do you think is the reason?" Nuri: "They try themselves. There may be some who do not want to be soldiers, but the majority wants to. Because you are used to that life and standards accompanying it. It comes easier to you. People choose what comes easy to them, right? Nobody takes the hard path. Most people do not take the hard path. And you want to be a soldier, because you are used to it. Leastways, it glimpses in your mind. The children of people outside, I mean, the child of a doctor or a civil servant may not be even thinking about taking the military school tests."

“Lojmanda hani küçük de olsanız belirli arkadaşlarınız var. Sabahtan akşama kadar onlarlasınız. Ertesi gün yine onlarla olacağınızı biliyorsunuz. Bir anda yabancı bir yere [ilkokula] geçince ben, şok etkisi mi oldu diyeyim, ne diyeyim. Hani içime kapandım, kimseyle konuşmadım. Tek başıma oturdum hatta, öğretmenleri annem ikna etmişti. Onlara alışamayacağım gibi geliyordu.”¹⁹⁰

However, I also have interlocutors who did not have any trouble in adapting themselves to school life. For example, Mustafa narrates how he easily overcame the trouble of adaptation during his transition to school life as follows:

“[Okula başladığımda] [z]orlanmadım. Evde baban, okulda öğretmenin oluyor. [Okulda] [a]rkadaşlarım vardı. Lojmanda da arkadaşlarım vardı. Lojmandan dışarı çıkamazdık, okuldan da dışarı çıkartmazlardı zaten. Öyle baktığım zaman bana yabancı gelmedi.”¹⁹¹

So, what would have happened if I, or Deniz, were to be born out of the military setting? What would be the reference of our desires, when we found difficulty in adapting to school life? Or would it make any difference for Mustafa, whose transition to school became easier once he started drawing similarities between the disciplined ways of living in the military setting and school? What would have happened if he had lacked such an initial reference of discipline deriving from his experiences in the military setting? In fact, both types of narratives signify how the military continues to stand in the lives of children as a strong framework of reference to which the children turn to make sense of various spheres in life. Let’s then turn to the third of institutions, namely the military to understand why it may be so.

¹⁹⁰ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: “Even though you are little, you have certain friends in lodgings. You are with them the whole day. You know that you would be with them the next day. Suddenly shifting to an unfamiliar place [primary school] makes you stunned. I did not talk to anyone. I even sat alone, after my mother convinced my teachers to permit so. It was like I would never get used to them.”

¹⁹¹ Personal interview with Mustafa, 08.11.2013: “I did not have any difficulty [when I started school]. You have a father in home, just as you have a teacher in the school. I had friends [in the school]. So had I in the lodgings. We could not leave the lodgings area, neither could we leave the school area. When I perceived it that way, it [the school] did not look unfamiliar to me.”

III. GOVERNING THE CHILDREN AND THE MAKING OF MILITARY DEPENDENTS

3.1. Why to Govern, How to Govern?

"Ama yok işte istihkâmcılar, personeller, bilmem neler, dağıtımcılar, askeriyenin içindeki leş birlikler falan. Yani manasız abi. Manasız bir büyük. O yüzden idare etmesi, kontrol etmesi zor. Sırf o yüzden böyle saçma sapan kurallar var, çok değişik fraksiyonlar oluşmasın ordunun içinde diye. Tek bir görüşten olsun, bizim olsun hesabı. Mesela ben babamın, asker benim babam, ne silahla bir şey yaptığını gördüm, ne silahtı, askerlikti, manevra kabiliyeti, strateji kurma... Hani anlatabildim mi? Askerliğe dair şeyler yaptı mı yapmadı mı emin değilim. Benim babam 40 sene askerlik yaptı. ... [B]enim gördüğüm 15-20 senelik kısımda askerliğe dair hiçbir şey yok abi. O yüzden ben istiyorum ki bu tarz insanlara istihdam yaratmaktan çok gerçekten profesyonel olarak işi bu olacak. ... Onu [profesyonel askeri] baştan aşağı, full teçhizat donatacaksın. *O zaman zaten, bu adamlar dallanıp budaklanıp, aile kurup bilmem ne adamlar olmayacağı için bu tarz problemler olmayacak. Ama sen böyle çok büyük, 'bulk' bir kitle yaratıyorsun anladın mı? E bir de onların aileleri, çocukları, anaları, danaları bilmem ne... O zaman milyonlarca kişilik bir zümre oluşuyor. Nasıl kontrol edeceksin?* Belli kuralları olması lazım. Soru neydi?"¹⁹² (emphasis mine)

¹⁹² Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "But military engineers, staff, distributors and so forth, I mean, the ridiculous units of the military. It's meaningless bro. It is unnecessarily big. It is therefore hard to manage and control. For that reason, there are ridiculous rules to prevent the emergence of different factions and viewpoints within the military. For example, I did not ever see my father doing anything to do with guns, military, maneuverability, strategy development, if you catch my drift. I am not sure whether he did anything in particular about the military job. My father served in the military for 40 years. ... As far as the last 15-20 years which I know are concerned, he did nothing about the military. That's why I rather want the military to be professional, instead of creating jobs to such people. ... But you have to equip these guys [professional soldiers] from top to toe. *Then, these guys would not spread out by starting families, so there would be no such trouble. But, you know, when you create a huge bulk of people, their families, children, mothers and oxen come along ... Then you have in your hand a community with*

While asking 'what was the question', Kemal of course did not have the slightest intention of helping me out in formulating a beginning for a chapter. He was rather busy with calling for a "transition from an institutional to an occupation model" (Segal, 2006, p. 357) in TSK, a transition, which he assumed, would arrive with the enactment of a professional army. The question he sought to remember was: "What would happen if you were to be born today as a child of a military officer?" Obviously, his response is, by and large, quite oblivious to what I asked. But it signals an even more scorching question, which has guided my research, since the beginning: How does the military institution in Turkey come to grips with its own bulky outliers, in Kemal's unfettered words, consisting of families, children, mothers and animals? Now let me rewind the question in order to concretize its significance to the issue at hand, before grappling with it thoroughly.

The emergence of the modern nation-state goes hand by hand with the diversification in techniques of power that are put into circulation to achieve the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations (Foucault, 1990). In this sense, one may claim that, the modern state has become less reliant on violence and its repressive apparatus, as it is endowed with various means to penetrate into wider regions and populations. Accordingly, there is a theoretical stream which posits an inversely proportional relationship between the increasing and effective reach of the state by the growth as well as diversification of state practices, and its use of coercion (Paker & Akça, 2010, p. 3). As the optimist theoretical approach goes, wars, militaries and militarism will be dumped into the garbage of history, when industrial society, market economy, free trade and liberal democracy gain more footholds in our lives (Paker & Akça, 2010, p. 4).

But none of these have been heretofore thrown into any garbage let alone the garbage of history, despite the advancements shown in industrial capitalism and different techniques of power deployed by nation-states, which were supposed to be catalysts to more peaceful societies. The repressive apparatus of the state has undergone under a succession of tempests and transformations, but it has not evaporated. Another stream of

millions of people. How will you control it? You need to have some ground rules to achieve control. What was the question again?" (emphasis mine)

theory connects this outcome to the interrelation between war-making and state-making, by reversing some of the premises proposed by the proponents of the theses of peaceful capitalism (Paker & Akça, 2010, p. 8). According to the theory, the primary function of the state is not simply economic, but rather the state is an entity predicated on warfare (Tilly, 1985). In other words, war-making and war-preparation are constitutive of the nation-state (Tilly, 1985; Giddens, 1985). Just because they are integral to the constitution and centralization of state formations, neither wars, nor the militaries to make wars, nor the militarism to ensure both will disappear as long as the nation-states which hinges on them to survive continues its existence. Accordingly, nation-states are still preoccupied with the question of mobilizing the consent of populations to sustain organized violence anywhere in the world. Because, from different Marxist perspectives, the military is still one of the most convenient provinces of accumulation for nation-states to overcome the crises of capitalism, they are invited on many occasions to regulate various sorts of internal tensions, along the lines of class, ethnicity, gender, religion and modernization and they are the primary means to fulfill imperialist aspirations (Paker & Akça, 2010, pp. 5-7).

Of all its uses in and for the nation-state, I argue that, one of the most salient features of the military institution in Turkey has been its (sometimes self-) invitation to regulate the tensions inside. Although one of the conditions that is seen emblematic of nation-states is the separation of the inside and outside in the use of coercion, or in Giddens' terms (1985), 'internal pacification', the breadth of operations undertaken by the military institution of Turkey in subjugating the masses that are deemed peripheral to the nation has been nothing short of astonishing. Often, the military endeavoured to regulate the tensions inside the country by functioning as an ideological state apparatus (Şen, 2010; Altınay, 2004a; Ünsaldı, 2008). Numerous times, as in the Dersim massacre of 1937-38 or through the unacknowledged internal war waged to put an end to "the Kurdish Question," the military thumped its iron fist. It has become more than an instrument of power in the hands of ruling classes (Akça, 2004), while it was "protecting and watching over the Republic."¹⁹³ It has played an immense role among (and sometimes in place of) all security apparatuses

¹⁹³ With the changes ratified on 30.08.2013 in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, the mission of the military 'to protect and watch over the Republic' has been finally repealed.

of the nation-state in the governmentalization of the modern nation-state and controlling of the populations, especially those who reside at what is located to be the peripheries of the nation.

Then, if the military institution is to play an effective role in the governance and regulation of internal tensions, in favour of the centralization of power in the nation-state, how does it govern the tensions arising and the figures living within its own institutional borders, despite not being deemed essential to the proceedings of the military? How does it cope with them to render its services more effective and legitimate? Particularly, how does it deal with multitudes that are hailed through the conceptual lens of the military as 'military dependents'?¹⁹⁴ As Lutz (2001) suggest that, perhaps “[we are] all military dependents, wearers of civilian camouflage” (p. 9). However, the militaries specifically situate the spouses and children of military officers in a liminal space, by hailing them as military dependents. As Lutz (2001) puts it, "by cultural definition, a *dependent is someone* not fully mature or capable. In a society that values independence and individualism, a dependent has an ambiguous status, perhaps even less than full cultural citizenship" (p. 209). The ambiguity of the term echoes in the status of spouses and children of military officers as well. Because, the term military dependent, on the one hand, certifies an authentic relation between the institution and whom it describes as 'military dependents'. On the other hand, it withholds full membership, by underlining their shortcomings as military 'dependents'. Then again, how does the military attempt to plaster over the cracks that can emerge in and through its bulky outliers which the institution itself addresses as ‘the military dependents’? What routes does the institution take before these cracks widen and threaten the efficacy and legitimacy of its operations?

Of all the figures deemed peripheral to the institution, I propose that, the spouses and children are one of the most permanent elements which pose the question of 'governmentality' (Foucault, 1991) to the institution elites most persistently. I have tried to

¹⁹⁴ In Turkish: [Askeri] Personelin kanunen bakmakla mükellef bulunduğu kimse. I should also remind that the term is not only specific to the military institution, but applies to all public servants. The term military dependent is also not specific to the spouses and children of military officers. It can include other family members of the military officers as well.

insinuate the scope of the problematic in the introduction, while discussing the historical roots of the military family, and I have marked 1960 as a turning point. Only then did the military institution, I suggested, introduce a new form of governmentality for the management of these multitudes, beyond officially discouraging officers from marriage. Only then did the financial and discursive disincentives for officers to marry were gradually removed. Instead of casting out the spouses and children, the institution encouraged the burgeoning military families to be nested within its borders. But these changes also resulted in the institution's extending reach and control over spouses and children. As the military invited in 'womenandchildren', they became more of an administrative issue for the institution. Professional soldiers, for example, still need the permission of the general staff of the Republic of Turkey to marry with foreigners.¹⁹⁵ Marrying or living with an unchaste person has been a ground for dismissal from the institution, according to the Turkish Armed Forces Discipline Act.¹⁹⁶ Even a facile search in the database of verdicts given by the Military High Administrative Court (AYİM hereafter) brings numerous cases into view testifying that the issues of military wives and children have been routinely handled within administrative and judicial frameworks. There are officers discharged from the military, because of not straightening the attire and ideological views of their spouses.¹⁹⁷ There are families whose dismissal from military lodgings for conducts in violation of the order and life of the military community were rescinded at the last moment by the AYİM.¹⁹⁸ The military may dispose of officers if their wives continue what the military regards as

¹⁹⁵ See: Yabancı Uyruklu Kişilerle Evlenen Subay, Astsubay, Sözleşmeli Subay, Sözleşmeli Astsubay, Uzman Jandarma, Uzman Erbaş ile Sözleşmeli Erbaş ve Erler Hakkında Yönetmelik. (1997). *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, 22931, March 12, 1997. Retrieved January 5, 2014, from <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.5922&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=>

¹⁹⁶ See: Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Disiplin Kanunu. (2013). *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, 28561, February 16, 2013. Retrieved January 5, 2014, from <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/02/20130216-1.htm>

¹⁹⁷ See the 1st Chamber of the Military High Administrative Court's verdict with the case number 1999/754 and the decision number 2000/205 dated February 22, 2000.

¹⁹⁸ See the 1st Chamber of the Military High Administrative Court's verdict with the case number 1994/81 and the decision number 1994/1068 dated September 13, 1994.

“immoral behaviours” despite numerous warnings.¹⁹⁹ Children also take their share from the administrative lens of the military. Families can be thrown out from military lodgings, if their children do not comply with the principles to abide by.²⁰⁰

As seen above, it is quite obvious that, by "controlling the soldier, the army controls others" (Lutz, 2001, p. 188), with the reverse, I assume, being equally true as well. The military exercises institution control over 'womenandchildren' (Enloe, 2000, p. 157). But this institutional control does not merely draw on "technologies of domination" to subjugate its intended subjects (Foucault, 1988). It does not simply take the form of policing over bodies. If the institutional measures were simply to be an external constraint over the bodies, it would be rather easy to deal with them. Those women and children would try to run away from the external constraints that act upon them (Massumi, 2002, p. 223). But the majority, however, do not. On the contrary, many interlocutors repeatedly underscore that the setting provided them by the military institution is quite 'comfortable'. In the interviews, comfort and ease (*rahat olmak*) are perhaps the most recurring of all adjectives and verbs. Then how are we to account for the juxtaposition of the 'ease' (*rahat*) and 'peace' (*huzur*) that my interlocutors feel within the borders of the military institution, with a 'total institution' (Goffman, 1961) identified rather by the command of 'attention!' (*hazır ol*) and 'warfare'?

This is why I use the notion of 'governmentality' instead of domination, because the former is useful in the investigation of "the connections between the technologies of the self and technologies of domination" (Lemke, 2000, s. 2). I claim that, understanding the control of 'womenandchildren' within the military complex requires an emphasis less on institutional prohibitions and injunctions and more on productive aspects of power. The military does not simply enclose the bodies of 'womenandchildren', forbid certain things that are thought to be inimical to the well-being of the institution, and sack them if they do

¹⁹⁹ See the Chamber Council of the Military High Administrative Court's verdict with the case number 1994/81 and the decision number 1994/1068 dated September 13, 1994.

²⁰⁰ See the 1st Chamber of the Military High Administrative Court's verdict with the decision number 2001/545 dated January 22, 2002. To reach another complaint of a non-commissioned officer's wife: Alyans. (2008, March 14). Askeri lojman [Msg 1]. Message posted to <http://www.hukuki.net/showthread.php?35527-Askeri-Lojman>

not show compliance. Prohibitions, though important, constitute only one part of the story. Rather, the military "encloses them in order to find ways of producing more regularity in the[ir] behaviour ... and to find ways of doing the same thing without the enclosure" (Massumi, 2002, p. 224). It seeks to induce regularities in ways to produce subjectivities which cater to the interests of the institution.

Therefore, I will employ a two-pronged approach to tackle the issue at hand. In the following section, I will first look at the more prohibitive aspects of power, by analyzing the lives of my interlocutors within the military complex. Then, I will examine more productive aspects of power, and mention three crucial dimensions (nationalizing, gendering and militarizing bodies) in the production of subjectivities which contribute to the well-being of the military institution.

3.2. Living in a Bell-Jar

The control of children begins even before their birth, as the military institution attempts to take a hold on the lives of their fathers and mothers. The construction of each lodgings, Officers' Club, vacation facility and military hospital partakes in the control of children. For example, according to the Public Housing Regulations,²⁰¹ the military officers who are married with children are more advantageous than others to be accommodated in military lodgings allocated by a scoring scale (*sıra tahsisli lojman*).²⁰² The regulation gives officers 3 extra scores for each child (up to 2 children though) and 6 extra scores for being married.²⁰³ Such regulations, I suspect, may also have bio-political implications for families. Although a very small sample size, 9 out of 10 interlocutors of mine are two siblings. This condition also surprises some children:

²⁰¹ See: Kamu Konutları Yönetmeliği. (1984). *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, 18524, September 23, 1984. Retrieved January 6, 2014, from http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/18524_0.html

²⁰² There are four types of housing available to public officers: Allocated specially (*özel tahsisli*), allocated by assignment (*görev tahsisli*), allocated by a scoring scale (*sıra tahsisli*) and allocated by service (*hizmet tahsisli*).

²⁰³ See: Kamu Konutları Yönetmeliği. (1984). *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, 18524, September 23, 1984. Retrieved January 6, 2014, from http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/18524_0.html

"Bize [...]’ta müstakil ev tahsis etmişlerdi. Orada komşularımızın çocukları da hep askerdi. Şansıma da hep böyle, 2’şer çocuklu asker. 2’si de erkek böyle. Öyle denk geldi. Hepsi de benim yaşlarımda ve aynı sınıfta oluyorduk."²⁰⁴

Unlike the military institution prior to 1960s, the institution encourages the families to be hosted in its borders. At this juncture, one may duly ask what differentiates military families from other families in which at least one parent works as a public officer. First, there is a matter of facts and figures. Facilities allocated to TSK far outnumber those which are offered to any other branch of public service. For example, as of 2001, İnel (2004) announces that half of the non-commissioned and commissioned military officers is housed in military lodgings, whereas the ratio is one to fourteen for members of the Ministry of National Education (p. 51). The ratio of lodgings/personnel of TSK even exceeds the ratio for institutions such as the Turkish Council of State, the Court of Cassation, the Court of Accounts and the Constitutional Court (İnel, 2004, p. 51). Secondly, the wide range of services usually offered in cheaper prices by TSK within the military complex surpasses other public institutions. Also there are many differences in terms of spatial organization between facilities provided to the personnel of TSK and other public institutions. Just to name one, often the conscripts ensure the security of facilities belonging to the institution.

The military lodgings in particular offer great zones amenable to the control of children. Usually, they have a rectangular formation, fenced from all sides, and in the middle of which resides an immense space for children to indulge in plays and pastimes. Usually, there is only one entrance to the lodgings, and in this main entrance (*nizamiye*) the soldiers keep their watch in sentry posts. As the children are immured within lodgings, prancing around, riding bicycles, kicking the football, hustling and bustling on 'the street', the intersecting gazes of soldiers and families can pierce their bodies anytime. The spatial organization of military lodgings also exposes the children to the constant possibility of interpellation by their elders:

²⁰⁴ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “We were accommodated in a separate house in [...]. The children of our neighbors were all military brats. Luckily, all of them were two siblings, both male. It was a coincidence. We were the same age and class.”

"Lojmanda bisiklet sürerdik, basket oynardık. Bir defasında sabah baya erken saatte, 5-6 gibi, tak tak topu sektirerek basket oynamaya çıktığımı ve nöbetçi askerin korkunç bir şekilde, 'Ne oluyor burada!' diye geldiğini ve 'Git şimdi, sonra oynarsın,' diye beni kovaladığımı hatırlıyorum. Çünkü basket sahası lojmanların, lojman binalarının ortasındaydı. Ses gidiyor diye herhalde..."²⁰⁵

It is not much possible for children to go 'out' without parents and soldiers wiser to their presence. Some interlocutors state that they were not able to leave the military setting, because it was forbidden. When I asked who was forbidding it, they replied that sometimes it was the parents that prohibited an exit:

Ayşe: "0-6 yaş öyle. [...] baya soğuktu tabii. Ama dışarı çıkmak falan yine de güzeldi. Lojmanlar da güzeldi aslında, çevresi falan iyiydi. O sırada çok fazla şuurulu olmadığınız için her şey güzel geliyor zaten."

Sertaç: "Peki dışarı dediğin daha çok lojmanın bahçesi mi? Yoksa lojmanın dışına da oynamaya çıkıyor muydunuz?"

Ayşe: "Yok yok. Lojmanın içi canım. Dışarıda 0-6 yaş çocuğun ne işi var? Çıkarmaz annem. Hayatta çıkarmazdı."²⁰⁶

Sometimes, the military institution itself blocks the exit, as Nuri informs in the following:

Sertaç: "Nasıl yasak ya, dışarı çıkamıyor muydunuz siz?"

Nuri: "Ya mesela bizim [...]dayken şeydi. Bir yer vardı, oradan hiç dışarı çıkamıyordun. Harp Okulu'na giriş vardı."

Sertaç: "Harp Okulu'na girişi mi geçemiyordun?"

Nuri: "Hı hı. Öyle şeyler vardı."²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "We would ride bicycle and play basketball. I remember that once I was bouncing the basketball quite early in the morning and a conscript chased me away, like 'What the heck is going on! Go away now, you will play later on.' Because the basketball court was in the middle of lodgings area. [He chased me away] [b]ecause of the noise I guess..."

²⁰⁶ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: Ayşe: "0-6 ages were like that. The weather was quite cold in [...] of course. But it was nice to go outside. Actually military lodgings and its surroundings were nice. When you are not much aware of anything, everything is nice to you anyway." Sertaç: "Do you mean the lodgings yard when you say outside? Or would you go outside of the lodgings?" Ayşe: "No. It is the yard of course. The outside was out of question. My mom would not allow that. She would never ever let me."

²⁰⁷ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: Sertaç: "What do you mean, it was forbidden? Were you not allowed to go out?" Nuri: "When we were in [...], you

Or, the soldiers may not allow the children to plunge themselves into the life outside, as Mustafa acknowledges:

Mustafa: "[Asker çocuğu olmak] ... [a]nnenin seni büyütmesi demek. Anneye çok bağlı oluyorsun. Baba pek etken olamaz. *Bir fanus içinde büyürsün. Pek dışarı çıkamazsın.*"

Sertaç: "Ailen mi, başka bir şey mi? Yasak mı çıkmak?"

Mustafa: "Askerler de çıkarmaz. Ancak çok nadiren bisiklet sürmeye çıkarırsın. Çok çevren olmaz."²⁰⁸ (emphasis mine)

At times, the children do not step out of the bell-jar within which they continue their existence, for no apparent cause, other than self-imposed restrictions. For example, Zeynep cannot recall any substantial reason other than parental pressure as to why she did not go out. She is not sure if it was the parents who forbid going out either:

Zeynep: "[B]iz o sırada çocuğuz, canımız ne istiyorsa onu yaparız. Ama şöyle bir şey vardı, biz o lojmanın dışına çıkamazdık. O bizim için belki de bir merak uyandırabiliyordu. 'Neden dışarı çıkamıyoruz?' İşte diğer arkadaşlarım mesela bizim lojmana gelmezdi."

Sertaç: "Yasak mıydı [dışarı çıkmak]?"

Zeynep: "Yok yasak değildi de bilmiyorum. Benim arkadaşlarım da öyleydi hani, çıkmıyorduk. Onların da aileleri izin vermiyordu galiba. Hiçbir zaman sormadım, ama belki de küçük olduğumuz için izin vermiyorlardı diye düşünüyorum."²⁰⁹

know... There was a place which you could not trespass. It was the entrance of the War College." Sertaç: "And you could not pass the entrance?" Nuri: "Yep. Such was the case."

²⁰⁸ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: Mustafa: "[Being a military brat]... is to be brought up by mother. It makes you tied to the mother. The father is not a factor. *You grow up in a bell-jar. You cannot go out much.*" Sertaç: "You mean, because of parents or something else? Was it forbidden to go out?" Mustafa: "Conscripts would not allow us to go out as well. Maybe for a bicycle ride, but rarely [we would go out]. You would not have many friends." (emphasis mine)

²⁰⁹ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: Zeynep: "We were children and we would do whatever we want. But we could not go out of the lodgings. It would make us curious as to why we could not go out. My other friends would not come to the lodgings as well." Sertaç: "Was it forbidden?" Zeynep: "No, it wasn't. But I don't know. My friends were like that too. We would not go out. Perhaps their parents did not allow them to go out. I never asked, but I presume that it was because we were very little."

Consequently, the military lodgings seem to offer an *almost* perfect place for leaving the minds of parents *unpreoccupied*, by ensuring an effective control over the bodies of children:

"Bir kere bizim lojmanda hani kocaman bahçe [vardı]. İstedğini yap. Annenin babanın *aklı kalmıyor* yani, nerede olduğunu biliyor[lar] sonuçta. Şimdi burada dışarı adım atsan, her yerden araba geçiyor, bir şey var. Ne top oynayabilirsin, ne bisiklete binebilirsin. Biz daha *rahat* bir çocukluk geçirdik diye inanıyorum."²¹⁰ (emphases mine)

"Lojman tabii *güvenli* bir yer olduğu için genelde sabah çıkıp akşam eve dönmek *rahat* oluyordu. ... [S]onuçta *nerede olduğun, nerede oynadığın belli*."²¹¹ (emphases mine)

However, as the above quotations imply, some children do not find the conditions of their isolation oppressive, despite the constant possibility of surveillance over their bodies. It seems as if they do not mind much as long as they can gleefully continue running around. Some even delineate those conditions which bring about the effective control of 'womenandchildren' in terms connoting comfort and emancipation, instead of discipline, imprisonment or disempowerment. For example, the following narratives shed light on the two-faces of military dependency (Lutz, 2001, p. 209; Enloe, 2000, p. 154):

"Yani bir de lojmanda oturuyorsun, etrafın tellerle çevrili, her tarafta askerler var, dışarıdaki çocuğu senin ailen tanıyor. Mesela lojmanda istediğin saate kadar, 1-2'ye kadar otur, hiçbir sıkıntın olmaz. Lojman *rahattır*."²¹² (emphasis mine)

²¹⁰ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "We had a huge yard in the lodgings where you could do whatever you want. Your parents *would not be preoccupied*, because after all, they would know where you are. However, here at the outside, if you step into the street it is swarming with cars and so forth. You can neither play, nor cycle. I think we had a more *comfortable* childhood." (emphases mine)

²¹¹ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: "It was *comfortable* to stay out late as the lodgings are *safe*. ... After all, *it is known where you are and where you play*." (emphases mine)

²¹² Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I mean you stay in lodgings covered by fences. There are conscripts everywhere and your parents know the children outside. You can stay up late until whenever you want, until 1 or 2 AM, without any trouble. The military lodgings are *comfortable*." (emphasis mine)

Much as the children may describe their experience in the military complex by evoking comfort, peace and even liberty, they also seem aware of the constant possibility of surveillance. Their narratives gives us the clues of "the dialectics of control" (Giddens, 1999), and brings testimony to that the concerted efforts to exercise control over children do not simply determine docile bodies incapable of resistance (Foucault, 1990; Butler, 1997a). On the contrary, the narratives suggest some ways in which the children try to thwart their controlling. They try to let themselves off the hook of gazes, by skulking around back alleys, climbing idle water-towers and trees, creeping into hollows, playing on the dirt, mud and mess, and seeking furtive pleasures in every nook and cranny of the lodgings. They escape to "awkward corners" (Turan, 2013, pp. 296-297), turning them into playgrounds and play in those spaces that are far less convenient than the pristine centre of the lodgings:

"Ağaçlara çıkardık. Lojmanda. Arkada orman vardı. O ormana arada girerdik, çıkardık. Böyle heyecanlı işler yapardık."²¹³

"Mesela bizde 3 tane birleşik apartman yan yanaydı. Yan tarafında kocaman bir boşluk vardı ve binanın yan tarafı bu tuvalet kısmına geliyordu ve hafif içeri dönüktü, içeri kıvrımı vardı. Oraya kale yapardık, futbol oynardık."²¹⁴

"Lojmanın arka bahçesi tabir edebileceğimiz orta avlu vardı ve avlunun arkasındaki arka bahçelerde, sonradan kömürlük falan yaptıkları yerlerde bisiklet sürerdik. Daha bakımsız yerlerde, doğal ortamışçasına bisiklet sürerdik."²¹⁵

One can argue that, almost all children play hide-and-seek. But my interlocutors recite that they invested much profound meaning, time and energy to the game. Some

²¹³ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "We would climb trees. There was a forest at the back. We used to go in and out of the forest. We would do such stuff which would excite us."

²¹⁴ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Three blocks were adjacent to each other in our lodgings. To the side of the blocks there were huge spaces neighbored on the toilets of the end blocks. They were slightly sloped inwards. We would turn them into goal posts to play football."

²¹⁵ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "There was a backyard in the lodgings. At the rear side of that backyard, which was used afterwards to store coal, we would ride bicycle. We would ride bike in those wilderness as though it was a natural cycling track."

children even identify the game with the military lodgings, and their childhood. It indeed seems as if the game has a different charm, when it is played within the military complex. They play it fervently, in hordes, for hours, after the dark, with variations.

"[Çocukluğumdan] hatırladığım saklambaç yani. Çok klasik lojman şeyidir o. Sürekli saklambaç oynardık. ... Lojmanlar deyince çocukluk, saklambaç. Lojmanın sahasında, varsa, tabii var hepsinde, yaptığımız maçlar. Ama benim tek bir şeyim vardı kalıplaşmış. Hangi lojmana gidersem gideyim, saklambaç vardır yani. Bütün lojmanlarda, lojmanın içinde nereye gidersen git saklanabilirsin yani. Hiçbir sınır yok yani. Bütün çocukluğum öyle geçti. Herhangi bir lojmanda saklambaçla yani."²¹⁶

Deniz: "Genelde lojmanda oynadığım oyunlardan bahsedecek olursak, bizim lojmanın stratejik konumunu göz önüne alırsak saklambaç diyebilirim."

Sertaç: "Stratejik konum derken peki, biraz daha farklı bir lojman mıydı?"

Deniz: "Yani böyle nasıl diyeyim, tepeler, ormanlık alan falan yoğundu."²¹⁷

Some, for example Zeynep, play it *with* their beloved 'askerabi's:

"Bir de kukalı saklambaç vardır bilir misin? Akşam oynanır. Topla oynanır. Topu uzağa fırlatırsın, ebe onu alana kadar sen saklanırsın. Ondan sonra aramaya başlar, karanlıkta oynanır. Asker abiler de bizim oynardı. Onların kulübelerine saklanırdık mesela. O tabii tüfek tutuyor haliyle, mesela tıngır tıngır onun sesini duyardık."²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "What I remember from my childhood is hide and seek. It is a classic in lodgings. We would play hide and seek all the time. ... The military lodgings reminds me of childhood, hide and seek and football matches. But one thing was a constant in my childhood. Whichever lodgings I would go, we would play hide and seek. You could hide anywhere within the lodgings. There were no boundaries I mean. I spent all my childhood playing hide and seek. In any lodgings, I mean."

²¹⁷ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: Deniz: "As for the games I played in the lodgings and as far as the strategic position of our lodgings is concerned, I would say hide and seek [was my favourite]." Sertaç: "What do you mean by strategic position? Was it a different residence?" Deniz: "I mean, ours was rich in hills and woods."

²¹⁸ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "Do you know how to play hide and seek with a ball? It is played in the evening with a ball. You would kick the ball away and hide, before 'it' catches the ball. Then 'it' would begin searching in the dark. Soldiers would also play with us. We would hide in their sentry posts. We would hear the rattling noise of the guns they hold while hiding there."

Whereas some play it *against* them. Possessed by the atmosphere of secrecy surrounding the institution, and fascinated by the possibility to evade everyone's attention before grasping the awe-inspiring secrets of the military institution, Tarık explains the version of hide-and-seek he played in the following:

Tarık: "Orduevinde askerlerden saklanmaca oynardık. En eski, en kadim oyunumuz budur."

Sertaç: "Nasıl bir oyundu mesela?"

Tarık: "Omurtak Salonu vardı orduevinde. (Güler) Amaç, askerler görünülmemesi gereken, yani bunlara görünmeden orduevinin en derin, en gizli köşelerine ulaşmak şeklinde bir amaçtı. Bizde bu amacı tetikleyen de Omurtak Salonu'nun kapılarının katlanır kapı olmasıydı, yani perde gibi açılan kapanan. 'Ne var içeride?' diye manyakça bir merak içindeydik. Ve o noktaya ulaşmak için bütün 'stealth' özelliklerimizi kullanarak en alt katlardan başlayıp yukarılara doğru çıkıyorduk."²¹⁹

The soldiers with and against whom they play hide and seek are of utmost significance for children, also because they are the gatekeepers between their lives and the life outside. Therefore, some children also seek allies among them so that they can gain the "right of passage" in military spaces composed of various thresholds and gateways which they have little access on their own:

Nuri: "Asker abi. (Gülerek) Nedense öyle bir şey var yani asker çocuklarında. 'Asker abi, asker abi!' [diye] peşinden koşarsın. Ve o nedense hiç değişmez. Nedense hep asker abi. Başka bir şey demeysin. Hani hiç tanımadığına asker abi [dersin], hemen muhabbeti kurarsın asker abi[yle]. Hani samimi olsan da, ismini bilsen de asker abi. Sürekli biz de derdik asker abi diye."

Sertaç: "Peki nasıl insanlardı? Küçükken nasıl canlanırdı sizin için bir asker abi?"

Nuri: "Bazıları, işte onlarla, nizamiyedekilerle samimi ilişkiler kurmaya çalışırdık ki sanki hayatımızı böyle daha kolaylaştıracakmış gibi. Arada bir

²¹⁹ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: Tarık: "We would play hiding from soldiers in the Officers' Club. It is the oldest and most ancient game we have ever played." Sertaç: "What kind of a game was that?" Tarık: "There was this Omurtak Hall in the Officers' Club. (Laughing) The objective was to reach the most secret and deepest corners of the Officers' Club, without being seen by any of the roving soldiers. The curtain-like folding doors of the Omurtak Hall were the propelling reason for us to do so. We were dying from curiosity to see what's inside. We would use all of our 'stealth' abilities to sneak from ground to the upstairs in order to reach the Omurtak Hall."

bisikletle çıkardık hani. Normalde yasak işte böyle şeyler. Girerdik, çıkardık. Onlarla samimi ilişkiler kurmaya çalışırdık."²²⁰

But prohibitions and evading prohibitions, as I said, constitute only one part of the story. Let's look at the other part, which pertains to the more productive aspects of power. As I have noted before, nationalization, gendering and militarization are the three interrelated dimensions indispensable to the process of subjection in concert with the well-being of the military institution. Here, I will discuss not discuss all of the ways in which the subjection of children with respect to these dimensions takes place. Because, children's experiences in schools, in the family and in the daily encounters outside the military setting may also participate in their subjection along these lines, in ways common to more or less everyone living in a given nation-state. Therefore, I will not address, for example, how the gendering of children's bodies begins through the matrix of gender relations which are prior to their birth, continues in the family, in the schools, streets and achieved performatively all the time by the expressions of gender (Butler, 1999, p. 33). By the same token, nor will I pursue the effects of the militarization of education in the lives of my children in this context, because it is an issue from which almost none of the children receiving education are exempt. In the following sections, I will rather examine conditions common and specific to the experiences of children entailed by having a military officer parent.

3.3. Nationalization of the Children

Our first dimension regards the nationalization of children. By nationalization, I mean the array of practices, arrangements and conditions which results in a "positive imagining of a national self and community" (Anderson, 1991). In that regard, first and

²²⁰ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: Nuri: "Asker abi. (Laughing) I don't know why, but all the military brats run after conscripts by shouting that: 'Asker abi, asker abi!' And for some reason it never changes. It is always asker abi and not something else. It does not matter if you don't know any of them one iota or know them by name. We would also call them asker abi and start a conversation." Sertaç: "Well, what kind of people were they? How would you imagine them in your minds when you were little?" Nuri: "Some would try to keep it on good terms with soldiers, especially with those at the main gates, as if it could facilitate our lives. We would occasionally go out cycling. Normally, such things were forbidden. We would enter and leave the lodgings. We would try to establish better relations with them."

foremost, the transfers of the father should be mentioned. All my interlocutors have been relocated at least once, before the age of 7. The one who has seen the least number of transfers is Deniz with only two because of his father's early retirement from the military. On average, my interlocutors moved to four or five different cities, owing to the transfers of their father, and the number may even reach up to 8. I claim that, the experience of relocations, starting from very early ages, to different places across the country, because of a military officer father who is assigned by TSK to “protect the nation from threats,” have an impact on turning the children into national subjects. As they are dispersed with their families from one city to another, some of the children do not grow attachments even to their birthplace. In turn, a “more generalized sense of the nation” may replace one's affiliation with a hometown. Then, the relocations become important moments in children's lives through which they learn about their nation as their hometown, while also "learning about their nation as a community and their homeland as a territory" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 70). The motto of a Facebook group, named "Military Children" (*Asker Çocukları*) which have more than 13.000 members perfectly summarizes my point. The group presents itself as the biggest community (in Facebook) where military families meet and it makes a call to other military brats "who have learned the love of the nation, not by reading from books, but by living it."²²¹ From the narratives, these dynamics become most apparent in the following statements of İrem:

"4 yıl [Doğu'da bir şehir]'de kaldım ben. Daha doğusuna gitmedim, bilmiyorum. Ama [o şehir] bile bir tane caddesi olan bir şehir. Koskoca şehir güya, ama gidip de görülmesi gereken bir yer diye düşünüyorum. *Bir sürü tarihi yer var yani. Orası da senin ülken, orada da yaşanmışlıklar var yani ve o tarihi eserleri gördükçe yani işte 'A bu da olmuş,' diyorsun.*"²²² (emphasis mine)

²²¹ See: Asker Çocukları. (2009). Retrieved January 6, 2014, from <https://www.facebook.com/askercocuklari>

²²² Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “I spent 4 years in [a city in the East]. I never travelled to the east of [that city], so I don't know how it is. [The city in the East] is supposedly one of the bigger cities, but even it has a single main street. It is must-visit though. Lots of history over there. *It is also a part of your country, there are lots of memories to that place and as you see these historical artifacts, 'Oh, so it happened then,' you say.*” (emphasis mine)

"[Asker çocuđu olmak] bir farklılık da iyi yönde bir farklılık. ... Çünkü babalarımız da daha gündemle ilgili olsun, *Türkiye'de yaşananlarla* ilgili olsun çok şey öğretiyorlar bize. Bir kere *babalarımızın yaşadığını* görüyoruz. Yaşanan olayları görüyoruz."²²³ (emphases mine)

I should draw attention to a contradiction here. As one can discern in the last quotation, there is a certain tension lurking in the statements of many children who lay claim to higher levels of awareness and knowledge than others, with regards to the “truths” of the nation-state. For example, instead of talking about her direct experiences concerning those truths, İrem says that, she saw them in what her father was living. This is actually a quite typical pattern in the narratives of many interlocutors. On the one hand, these interlocutors seem to argue that it is their constant moving, or institutional nomadism, that brings various sorts of revelations to their lives. On the other hand, this is rather an isolated nomadism after all, because they also confirm that they did not so much step out of the borders of the military complex, especially those of the lodgings, during their childhood. Suffice it to recall how Mustafa described his life as a military brat through the metaphor of "living in a bell-jar". Nevertheless, the same Mustafa thinks that he has seen it all, the terrorist and the martyr, the friend and the foe, the truth and the lie. For example, he despises in the following those who 'talk', without seeing 'it':

Sertaç: "Peki Dođu deyince ne geliyor aklına?"

Mustafa: "Kale. Kaledir yani. Herkes baskı altındadır. Küçük yaşta şehidi, teröristi görürsün. Şehit cenazesine gitmeyen tipler konuşur, ama kaledir Dođu."²²⁴

The obvious question is: How could he possibly have seen ‘it’ all while living in a bell-jar? It seems that, often the body of the father arriving home, pale and torn, is the

²²³ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “[Being a military brat] is a difference, though a positive one. ... Our fathers teach us lots of things about *what happens in Turkey*, contemporary or not. We are seeing *what they are going through*. We are seeing what is happening out there.” (emphases mine)

²²⁴ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: Sertaç: “What does ‘the East’ evoke in your mind?” Mustafa: “Castle. It is a castle. Everybody is under pressure. You see the martyr and the terrorist there at early ages. Those who have never attended martyr funerals talk nonsense, but the East is a castle.”

surface where many children decipher the codes of the truth of the nation. The talks of the parents, broken and anxious, are where they derive a sense of 'it'. The funeral of martyrs, and other militarized rituals orchestrated by the military institution and its supporters, by which the various affects gushing out of one's dead body is brokered into the nationalist economy of pain (Açıksöz, 2013, pp. 471-472), amidst revanchist clamors for vengeance, is where they come to learn about 'it'. So, the military institution plays huge part in the emergence of a sense of belonging to the nation, and in the prevention of the disruption of this sense, also by demarcating the children from what remains beyond its institutional borders, thereby positioning the elements in the life outside as potential intruders, while instilling in these children the sense of distinctions between inside and outside, ally and enemy.

However, the transfers of the father does not equal to the emergence of this sense. In some cases, the sights that the children bear witness themselves in those regions, may alienate them from an understanding of the nation as an organic community, living and working together in peace for the good of the nation:

Tarık: "[Doğu'da bir şehir]'e gittiğimde fark ettiğim şeylerden biri, oradaki gündem ve yaşamla, yani yaşam pratikleriyle ülkenin genel gündemi ve farkındalığı arasında baya fark olduğuydu. Bu farkın bugün de devam ettiğini düşünüyorum."

Sertaç: "Nasıl bir farktan bahsediyoruz mesela burada?"

Tarık: "Yani mesela o zaman [...]nin [Tarık'ın kardeşi] sürekli söylediği şöyle bir şey vardı. Tabii o zaman 8 yaşında. 7-8 yaşlarında bir çocuk işte devamlı '[Doğu'daki şehir]'de böyle miymiş?' derdi. (Gülerek) Çok basit bir şey olabilir yani, çok çok basit. Kaleye gidersin, [şehrin] kalesine. İşte orada güzel bir kaynak suyu vardır, su doldurursun getirirsin. Buna '[Doğu'daki şehir]'de böyle miymiş?' der mesela. Oradan tut da genel ana akım medyanın konuştuğu şeylere bakarsın, Türkiye'nin gündemine, kamuoyu gündemine. Bir de oradaki vaziyete bakarsın, oradaki insanların dünyaya bakışına, oradaki insanların kendi içindeki kamuoyuna, kendi gündemine. Ve bunların birbirleriyle pek alakası olmadığını görünce, 'Ya demek ki biz burayı tanımıyormuşuz, bilmiyormuşuz. Böyle bir durum varmış,' diyorsun. Geliyorsun [geriye], aynı ülke gündeminin devam ettiğini görüyorsun."²²⁵

²²⁵ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: Tarık: "One of the things I realized when I arrived to [a city in the East] was the disjuncture between the prose of life and agenda in [that city] and the rest of the country. The difference still continues, I think." Sertaç: "What kind of a disjuncture are we talking about here?" Tarık: "I mean, my sister

Another experience common and specific to these children which results in the development of a “nationalist structure of feeling” (Anderson, 1991) consists in the encounters of children with 'askerabi's. Conscripts take different shapes and meanings throughout the lives of children. Sometimes they are the kind saviors to call when they run into trouble. Sometimes, as I have shown, they are the gatekeepers with whom the children should negotiate to gain the right of passage. Sometimes, they may become the servants of children when the children anticipate that the rank of their fathers give them a leverage over soldiers. Sometimes, they are the figures to play with and against. They remain mostly anonymous to children, as they head back to their hometown and the next bunch takes the watch from them. They always seem replaceable with one another. Only one of my interlocutors is able to remember a name of a conscript whom she met, and it is probably because he was the gardener of a house which was given to the general officer father. However, one of the distinctive features of 'askerabi's for children is their storytelling. They carry the stories of their hometowns, their lovers and families to children. As the soldiers tell, the children listen and give wings to their imagination. The warmth of feeling attached to people whom they do not know, but related through the stories of their 'askerabi's envelop them:

"Asker abi [şehir 1]'i çağrıştırıyor, [şehir 2]'yi çağrıştırıyor. Asker abi vardır ya, hayatımda vardır yani. Mesela [şehir 1]'de asker abi dediğimiz, adını hâlâ bilmiyorum, sadece asker abidir o, giderdik böyle yanına, saçma sapan hikâyeler anlatırdı, 'Şu kadar günüm kaldı, bu kadar günüm kaldı,' falan diye. Şu an olsa başka da ben o zamanlar anlamıyorum tabii. Dinlerdik asker abinin yanına oturup. ... Zaten benim hatırladığım [kadarıyla], bütün asker abilerin anlatacak uzun hikâyeleri vardı. [Şehir 1]'dekilerin de vardı, [şehir 2]'dekilerin de vardı. Hep böyle hayatımı anlatır. Oturup dinliyorsun yani. Belki şu an yolda görsen, 'Ne anlatıyor bu,' diyeceksin, 'Bana ne,' diyeceksin. Ama yok işte kız

was 7-8 years old and she had a saying. She used to say frequently, 'Oh, then is this how it's done in [this city]?' (Laughing) It could be a very simple thing, a trifle. We would go to the [city] castle to bottle and drink the nice spring water flowing there and there she'd go, 'Oh, then is this how it's done in [this city]?' You'd look over the news, public opinion and the agenda of Turkey in the mainstream media. Then you'd see the circumstances there, the worldviews of the local people, their own public opinion and agendas. When you figure out that there is not much connection between the two, you say that 'So, we had not known about this place. We had been unfamiliar to [this city]. There has been this issue then.' But when you return [to the Western part of the country], you see that the same old agenda of the country still prevails."

arkadaşını anlatıyor, memleketini anlatıyor. Oturup dinliyorsun böyle saatlerce."²²⁶

"Onlarla [asker abilerle] biz çok uğraşırdık. Daha doğrusu çok severdik. Onlar da bizi çok severdi. Devamlı oyunumuza dâhil olurlardı. Mesela mutlaka memleketleriyle ilgili şeyler anlatırlardı. Devamlı sevgililerini anlatırlardı. Ve onları dinlerdik. Düşünsene onlar orada kulübede nöbet tutuyor, biz etrafında oturmuşuz, onu dinliyoruz. Ama neyi dinliyoruz bilmiyoruz yani. Bizim için o aşk ne anlama geliyor, onun o yaşadığı yer nasıl bir yer, ailesi nasıl? O anı düşünmüyorsun. O anda böyle oturuyorsun, bakıyorsun. Kafanda, herkesin kafasında başka şeyler canlanıyor eminim yani. Hayal dünyası işte."²²⁷

3.4. Gendering the Bodies of the Children

Gendering is perhaps the most important dimension of all the three, first because gender is constitutive of nationalist constructions (Altınay, 2011, p. 19). The sense of nation that the children grasp should be accompanied by a process of gendering which results in the production of males who see themselves as the protectors of the family and the nation, and females who represents the honor of the nation which they reproduce. But the never-ending process of gendering is significant, not only because of its crucial positioning in the nationalist constructions, but also because its importance in the

²²⁶ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Asker abi reminds me of [city 1]. It reminds me of [city 2]. ... There is really such thing as asker abi. Asker abi has existed in my life. We would simply call them 'asker abi'. For example, in [city 1], we would go to one of them. I still do not know his name. They were simply 'asker abi's to us. He'd recite ridiculous stories and say 'I have so and so days left.' I guess it would be different now, because back then, I was not aware of what they were telling us. We would sit down and listen. ... As far as I can remember, all soldiers had long stories to narrate. Those in [city 1] had them, so had those in [city 2]. They'd always tell their lives. You would just sit and listen. If you would come across one of them on the streets now, 'What the heck is he talking about?' you'd perhaps ask to yourself. 'Who cares?' you'd say. But back then, he would tell his girlfriend, his hometown. And you would be all ears, for hours and hours."

²²⁷ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "We would mess with soldiers. Actually we would love them so much. They would love us too. They would participate in our games. They would definitely tell stories about their homelands. They would speak of their lovers all the time. And we would listen. Imagine a soldier on guard duty, and children sitting around him, listening. But we did not even know what we were listening. What does his love meant to us, what kind of a place was he living in, what's his family like? We would not think of the moment we were living in. We would just sit down and look. I am sure that everyone was imagining different things. But such is the world of imagination."

militarization of the nation. As Enloe (2000) states, "masculinity has been intimately tied to militarism, yet the two sets of ideas are not inseparable" (p. 235). The military institution has to control men to ensure that its ranks will be filled in a country which insists on male-only conscription. The more they are militarized, the better it is for the institution which "can have a hard time getting all the manpower they think they need" (Enloe, 2000, p. 235). However it is not only men, but also women have to be controlled effectively by those in order to sustain the need of manpower they think they need (Enloe, 2000, p. 235). Otherwise, men's participation in the military enterprise cannot be guaranteed. But if men and women are to be controlled to ensure the success of the military enterprise, the bodies of children should be materialized within a heterosexual matrix of power, and gendered as males and females first. Especially for the military institution, which upholds idealized imaginations of masculinity and femininity, and in a setting where "compulsory heterosexuality", that is, the "dominant order in which men and women are required or even forced to be a heterosexual" (Salih, 2002, p. 49) prevails, the process of gendering the bodies of children gains utmost importance.

The military lodgings offer convenient zones for the gendering of children, by providing spaces to engage in games specifically predicated on distinctions between us and them winners and losers. Almost in all lodgings, there are large fields to play football, basketball, and many other sports depending on the size and residents of the lodgings, by virtue of which the children can and do compete with each other. In some cases, when opportunities to play such games are obstructed, the children and their parents may roll up their sleeves and repair, or even construct themselves zones of competition.²²⁸ Perhaps needless to say, many boys take these games seriously, as Kemal imparts in the following:

"Futbol çok oynardım ben. O zamanlar gözlük takıyordum. Her yaz bir gözlük kırılmışlığım vardır. Kesin suratımda böyle top patlar, ortadan ikiye ayrılırdı gözlük."²²⁹

²²⁸ From my field notes, after the interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013

²²⁹ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "I would play football so much. I had eyeglasses back then. I would break one each summer. The ball would always hit me in the face and my glasses would be torn asunder."

Of course nothing inheres in football, basketball or in any other sports which makes them men's sports. But, I argue that, taking serious the games which sublimate and simulate warfare, and characterized by a will to triumph and challenge modeled after warfare, or in Bourdieu's (2001) words, 'libido dominandi', is the linchpin of an 'illusio' constitutive of manhood (Bora T. , 2013, p. 492). There is an additional case which complicates things though. As the lodgings abound with zones to engage in competitive games and sports, the daughters of military families too often chime in and play football or basketball with boys. On the one hand, there are some girls who were happy to play in home with their dolls:

"Oyuncaklarım da tam klasik kız çocuk oyuncakları gibi tarif edebileceğim oyuncaklar vardı, bebek falan."²³⁰

"Bir sürü Barbie'lerim vardı. Onları böyle dizerdim, sürekli Barbie biriktirirdim. En çok Barbie biriktirirdim zaten. Çiftliğim falan vardı, onları hatırlıyorum."²³¹

However, many prefer to go out and kick the football or shoot the basketball with boys in a setting where masculinity is privileged. For example three of my female interlocutors stated that they played football and basketball for a long time, even after the high school. Two of them were even licensed players:

Yasemin: "Ben biraz erkek gibi takıldığım için, kızlarla takılmazdım. Erkeklerle futbol maçı oynardım."

Sertaç: "Hep erkeklerle mi oynardın?"

Yasemin: "Hep erkeklerle takılırdım evet. ... Hatta şöyle bir şey. Futbolda iyi oynadığım için, takımlarına seçmeye çalışıyorlardı, kavga çıkıyordu aralarında, 'Benim takımıma gel, hayır benim takımıma geleceksin,' diye."

Sertaç: "Baya oynadın mı futbol?"

Yasemin: "Evet, oynuyordum. Sadece bir sene lisanslı futbolcu oldum. Onda da kalecilik yaptım. Onun dışında şu anda basket oynuyorum."²³²

²³⁰ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "I had typical girl toys, like dolls I mean."

²³¹ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "I had so many Barbie dolls that I could align them in a line. I would collect Barbie dolls the most. I had a farm [toy set of Barbie], I remember that."

²³² Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: Yasemin: "I was more like a boy so I would not hang around with girls. I would play football with boys." Sertaç: "Did you play with boys all the time?" Yasemin: "Yes. ... Actually, I was quite good at football and boys would fight with each other to pick me on their teams, like 'Come to our team, no

"Futbol çok oynardım. Genellikle arkadaşlarım erkekti. Kızlar da vardı ama kızlar da futbol oynardı. Hatta şöyle söyleyeyim, benim lise 2'ye kadar falan futbol oynamışlığım var."²³³

Although not desirable, the parents may tolerate the mischief of their daughters until later periods. One can argue that, the opposite, for example, boys who play with the dolls of their sisters and show 'feminine traits', would not be tolerated as much. Because, in a setting where the cohesion of a straight male community should be maintained as a priority, it is even more crucial to bring boys within the boundaries of hegemonic masculinity which contours and defines their body. On the other hand, the girls also seem to take notice that their behavior is not given a free-pass, but only excused for some time. For instance, Merve links her naughtiness during childhood to her engagement in practices which transgress traditional gender divides:

"Ya ben zaten çok yaramaz bir çocuktum yani. Şu an benim çocukluğum benim yanımda olsa şımarık bir şey der atardım yani, o derece şımarıktım. Çok yaramazdım. Hiç kız arkadaşım yoktu çevremde. Sürekli erkeklerle top oynardım. Mavi önlük var etekle hani, çıkıp oynardım."²³⁴

In later periods though, the effort of parents for the 'proper' gendering of the bodies of their daughters seems to intensify. Ayşe argues that, especially after the age of 15, the parents invest more energy and thought for that end. She acknowledges that this condition is not only endemic to those who live in a military setting, but she suspects that the intensity is doubled, if one happens to be a daughter of a military officer:

"[S]ubay kızı olmak deyince en fazla şey geliyor aklıma. Daha büyüdün ve 15 yaşından sonra aileden daha fazla baskı alıyormuşsun gibi oluyor sanki baban

she has to play for our team.'" Sertaç: "Did you play it often?" Yasemin: "Yes, I did. I was a licensed player in football, only for a year though. I was a goalkeeper. Apart from that, I currently play basketball."

²³³ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "Generally I had male friends. I had female friends as well, but they would play football too. Actually I was playing football quite frequently until the tenth grade."

²³⁴ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I was very mischievous as a child. I was spoiled so much so that if my childhood version were to appear in front of me, I would instantly get rid of him. I was quite a scamp. I had no female friends. I would always play football with boys. I would play in a blue school uniform and a skirt, without thinking twice."

subay olduđu zaman. Ama bence onun genelde Türkiye'de kız çocuđu olmakla daha fazla alakası var. Belki [babam] asker olduđu zaman bir de ikileniyordur o hadise. Küçükken subay ođlu olmak diye bir şey var bence gerçekten de. Onun böyle bir gazı, söylemek gerekirse, erkeklerin içine daha farklı bir şekilde yansıyor yani. Onlarda daha bir rekabet alanı oluşturuyor galiba."²³⁵

Zeynep's experience in those ages, appear to confirm the evaluations of Ayşe. She recounts in the following how she turned down the offer of a prestigious sports club, because she was preparing for the Fine Arts exams, an intrigue awakened after her mother's exhortations:

Zeynep: "Futbol devam ediyor ama bu sırada. Lise sona kadar boş zamanlarımda yine futbol oynuyordum yani. O benim için çok güzel bir deneyimdi. İki yıl oynadım ben basketbol. Hatta profesyonel bir kulüpten, Fenerbahçe'den falan da teklif geldi de istemedim. Bu sırada Güzel Sanatlar Fakültesi'ne hazırlanma aşamam oldu. İşte şan, solfej dersleri almaya başladım. Çok farklı oldu, çok yoğun oldu benim için."

Sertaç: "Güzel Sanatlar mı istemeye başlamıştın o dönemde?"

Zeynep: "Evet."

Sertaç: "O ilgi nasıl uyandı mesela?"

Zeynep: "O çok tesadüf eseri. Annemin arkadaşının kızı konservatuar öğrencisiydi. Bir gün bize gelmişlerdi. İşte annem de '[Zeynep] de acaba olabilir mi?' diye hep sorardı zaten. İşte kız şey yaptı, sesli denemeler olur ya hani, nota çıkarmaya çalışırsın falan. Öyle başladı. Sonra dedi ki: 'Çok yatkın, ben hocalarımla görüşeyim.'"²³⁶ (emphasis mine)

²³⁵ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "Being the daughter of a military officer means... I mean, it feels like being more repressed by your parents past the age of 15. I think that this condition has more to do with being a daughter in Turkey however. Perhaps it is redoubled if your father works for the military. When little, there is really such thing as being a military officer's son though. Boys happen to be more pumped up about it. As if it reverberates differently for them. It creates a competition zone for boys I suppose."

²³⁶ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: Zeynep: "I was still engaged in football. Actually I played football in leisure, until the end of the high school. It was a great experience. I played basketball for two years. I even received an offer from a professional sports club, Fenerbahçe, but I did not accept. Meanwhile, I was preparing for the Fine Arts exams. I was taking singing and solmization lessons. These were hectic and different times for me." Sertaç: "Were you getting interested in Fine Arts back then?" Zeynep: "Yes." Sertaç: "How did it occur to you?" Zeynep: "By a pure coincidence. The daughter of my mom's friend was a student in the conservatory. She visited us one day with her mother. My mom *would always ask* if I could be one [student in the conservatory]. Anyway, the girl [the daughter of the mother's friend] gave me a vocal trial. Then she said, 'She has talent. Let me talk to my teachers.'" (emphasis mine)

The second point which contributes to the gendering of bodies along a heterosexual axis of gender relations is the discourses of military institution on homosexuality. The military setting is not only the one where masculinity is privileged and femininity is usually degraded, especially if it does not give way to the enhancement of militarized masculinity (Enloe, 2000), but also one where homosexuality is strictly forbidden. The military has an institutionalized way of dealing with homosexuality. Accordingly, in the judicial term, "unnatural intercourse" (*gayri-tabii mukarenet*) has historically been a ground for dismissal from the military. But the prohibition of homosexuality in the military should not be understood as a simple ban, by which the homosexuality is constrained to utter invisibility and silence. On the contrary, the military rather regulates the homosexuality within its repose, by immensely producing discourses on what it seeks to proscribe. Homosexuality in the military is thus never renounced completely, but rather, it is "retained in the speaking of the prohibition" (Butler, 1997b, p. 117). In Butler's words, "the military does not merely confront the homosexual as a problem to be regulated and contained, but it actively produces this figure of the homosexual, insisting that this homosexual be deprived of the power of self-ascription, remaining named and animated by the state and its powers of interpellation" (Butler, 1997b, p. 122). Perhaps this is why the most frequented swearwords in the military institution usually derive from the figure of the homosexual. For example, my father would passionately shout at the television the word 'faggot' when irritated, whether it be a politician, singer, talk-show host, ordinary citizen, commentator or a football analyst appearing on the screen, irrespective of their assumed sex. After his retirement, when he opened up a lawyer office with his fellow military judges who have a law degree and retired from the military as well, all would gather and passionately swore at 'faggot' horses and jockeys which lost them money in horse-races. In line with Butler, I thus claim that, the military discourse animates the figure of the homosexual consistently and in graphic terms, only to prohibit the very same figure it produces, so that the construction of the "masculinist citizen" (Butler, 1997b, p. 121) becomes possible. Perhaps the simultaneous production of both crystallizes best in the following narrative of Mustafa, where he tells the times he spent in a home he rented a few years ago:

"İki tane ev tuttum. İyi ama laubali çocuklardı. Çocuklardan ayıracaktım evi, ama ayırmadım. Pişman oldum. İbneliğin bini bir para. [Ama sonraki evimde]

bir tane süper ev arkadaşım vardı. Şurası dağılmayacak deriz, dağılmaz. Evde sigara içilmeyecek deriz, içilmez. Eve arkadaş çağırılmayacağız deriz, kimse gelmez. Her zaman dürüstüzdür. Evde yemek yaparız, dışarıda yemeyiz. Disiplini bozmayız."²³⁷

3.5. Militarization of the Children

Now we have to look at the third crucial dimension of subjection, namely militarization. First, I should give definitions of militarism and militarization. Roughly, the widespread definition of militarism goes as the unquestioning embrace of military values, ethos, principles and attitudes above other considerations in ways which shape one's daily practices and blur the distinctions between peace and war, military and civilian (Vagts, 1959 [1937]; Belge, 2013; Öztan, T., 2013; Altınay, 2004a; Sjoberg & Via, 2010). It is an ideology, "a set of ideas and structures that glorify practices and norms associated with militaries" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 2). Accordingly, we can define militarization as a social and gendered process (Enloe, 2000) by which the militarist ideology becomes transposed onto other realms of life and institutionalized (Altınay, 2004b; Altınay, 2009). But is it possible to define both militarism and militarization in a specific way which would help us to have a better grasp on the militarization of 'womenandchildren' of military families? Because, just as the social process of militarization cuts across the binaries of state/civil society, centre/periphery and inside/outside (Paker & Akça, 2010, p. 32), the 'womenandchildren' in military families also cuts across such divides, but most importantly, the one between what is civilian and military. The 'womenandchildren' are seen on the one hand relevant enough by the military institution to let them into its own borders, but not so much, on the other hand, to confer them with full membership, because the institutional discourse pinpoints them as military dependents. At this juncture, I especially find Enloe's definition of militarization suitable for taking a more nuanced look at the case of children in our context. According to Enloe (2000), "militarization is a step-by-step process by which a person or a

²³⁷ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "I rented a house two times. [In the first one], [t]hey [the flat mates] were good but saucy kids. I thought to move out somewhere else, but I did not. I regretted that decision. Faggotry was off the charts. [But in the next rental] I had a great flat mate. When we say that a particular place in the house will be kept tidy, it is kept tidy. When we say no smoking in the house, no one smokes. When we say no friends will be invited to the house, no one comes. We are always honest. We cook home. We do not eat outside. We keep the discipline."

thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military *or* comes to depend for its-well being on militaristic ideas" (p. 3). Enloe's emphases on control and dependence in her definition are quite crucial and relevant to the content of this research for proposing a distinguished formulation for the militarization of 'womenandchildren' of military families. I claim that, the militarization of the 'womenandchildren' of military families is a process by which their bodies are made subjects dependent on the military institution. The militarization of them is to make them military dependents. It is to forge correspondences between the bodies that the judicial discourse of the military law pigeonholes as military dependents and the institutional and judicial discourse itself. Then, the question that we have to answer is as the following: What are the practices common and specific to the experience of childhood within the military complex by which the children are brought into the institutional and judicial discourse?

First of all, we can again address the games. For example, sometimes the children play games with toys which replicate war equipments:

"O zamanlar işte silahlar falan yok. Boncuklu tabanca. O şeylere falan sarardık. Onlarla ilgilendirdik."²³⁸

"Benim oyuncaklarım direkt arabalardı ve asker, hani minyatürler vardır ya, onlardandı. Çok severdim. Ben pek oyuncakla oynamayı da sevmem açıkçası. Bebek, işte evcilik falan onları hiç sevmiyorum."²³⁹

"Benim çocukluğumda doğum günü klişesi çok yaygındı. Mesela doğum günün olacak, bir önceki gün gidip bütün arkadaşlarının evine annelerinden izin istersin. ... Onlar da gider sana kıyırık bir hediye alır. Kitap alır, kalem alır. Genelde kitap, oyuncak. Hatta bir doğum gününü hatırlıyorum, 3 tane aynı oyuncak gelmişti. Oyuncak da polis seti, kask, plastik cop, kemer. Plastik bir şey için büyük, gösterişli duran bir hediye yani. Plastikten olduğu için değeri yüksek değil, ama kocaman. Aynı şeyden üç tane gelmişti. Her rengi vardı.

²³⁸ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "There were not much guns to play with back then. [There were] air soft toy guns. We would indulge in such things. We'd be interested in them."

²³⁹ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "I had toy cars and soldiers. You know these plastic miniature soldier figures, right? I'd love them so much. Actually I don't like much playing with toys. I hate dolls or playing house."

Sonra ne yapıyordun? İki tanesini açmıyordun. Bir sonraki doğum gününde belki alan çocuğa geri veriyordun."²⁴⁰

But, it is not as if only the children of military families play with toy guns and engage in militarized games. We should bring into consideration the spatial organization of the military complex, which offers quite favorable conditions to indulge in games, which are not imitable in the life outside easily. For example, military lodgings often provide the opportunity for children to simulate the conditions of warfare in a large-scale, as Kemal narrates in the following:

Kemal: "İşte bu külah yapıp ufak borulardan hani silah gibi yaparsın."

Sertaç: "Tüftüf!"

Kemal: "Tüftüf hesabı. Onu çok oynardık lojmanın içinde olduğumuz için. [...]’da 12 blokluk bir lojmanda oturuyorduk. İşte basket sahası, voleybol sahası, kömürlük mömürlük bir sürü yer vardı o tarz şeyler oynamak için. Bir de belki bilirsin böyle, askeri lojmanlarda klasik, birinci katın balkon hizasında, kapının üstünde çıkma yerde bir beton kısım vardır. Onun üstüne çıkabilirsin falan. Oradan aşağıdakini vurursun bilmem ne. İşte onu oynardık."

Sertaç: "Boruları siz de bakkaldan falan mı yaptırıyordunuz?"

Kemal: "İşte orada, çarşıdan yaptırırsın, kestirirsin. Mesela iki tane boru alırsın. İki boru arasına kibrit kutusu alır bantlarsın, ikili olur mesela o. Kendince tasarım uydurursun işte. Onun mesela üstüne bir şey koyarsın dürbünlü olur mesela. Onun içinden bakarsın dürbünlü olur hesabı."

Sertaç: "Baya kalabalık mı oynuyordunuz peki?"

Kemal: "Aynen. Çok kalabalık oynuyorduk ve arazi olarak da çok büyük bir yerde oynuyorduk biz. Öyle bir tane apartmanın köşesinde değil de baya tüm lojman hesabı."²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "During my childhood, birthday parties were quite widespread. Let’s say you have a forthcoming birthday. You would visit the mothers of your friends a day before and ask for permission. ... Then they’d go and buy you crappy gifts, you know, like books or pencils. Usually they’d buy books or toys. I remember one birthday where I got three of the same toys. It was a police kit with a helmet, plastic baton and belt. For something plastic, it kind of looked flashy. It would not worth much though, as it was out of the plastic. But it was huge. I received three of the same, in all possible colors. So what would you do next? You would not unpack the two and in the next birthday you would perhaps give it back to the child who bought it to you."

²⁴¹ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: Kemal: "We would make cones out of small pipes and use them as guns." Sertaç: "Blowpipes!" Kemal: "Yeah, like blowpipes. We would play it in the lodgings. We were staying in the military lodgings of [...] where there are twelve blocks. There were coal yards, basketball and volleyball courts to play such things. Maybe you know it. In the military lodgings, there are places made of concrete above the entrance doors of each blocks, at the first floor level, protruding to the

Mustafa, on the other hand, while talking about the games he played acknowledges that he would not be an officer had he not seen the chain of command in his childhood:

"Yani çocuklar oyundan ne anlayacak zaten. Askercilik oynuyorsun. Emir-komuta zincirini görüyorsun. Emir-komuta çok hoşuma giderdi. Belki subay olmazdım asker çocuğu olup görmesem."²⁴²

As Mustafa confirms, knowing the hierarchies embedded in the institution, ranks of officers, chain-of-command, names of guns and vehicles and many other things related to the military and warfare makes an impact on the life course of children. But more important to their militarization in particular and subjection in general, I suggest, is the institutionally constructed conditions of children's isolation. Because, ensured by the effective control over their access to the life outside, by virtue of gateways and fences installed by the military institution all over the place, their isolation also amounts to the institutional control over the "convergence with other discursive regimes, whereby inadvertently produced discursive complexity" *may* "undermine the teleological aims of normalization" (Butler, 1997a, p. 93). Put differently, discursive convergences constitute one venue where the possibility of subversion and resistance to normalization appears (Butler, 1997a, p. 93). And military institution's governmentality concerning children is rather based on the minimization of such convergences. This is by no means to argue that the military institution offers these children a setting where there is no heterogeneity, or discursive complexity. But it is one thing to argue that there are heterogeneity and discursive complexity involved in military settings, and quite another to posit that they overlap with the heterogeneity and multitudes in the life outside. Therefore, I conclude that, by

outside. You could climb there and shoot those below. We'd play that game." Sertaç: "Did you get the pipes from the grocery too?" Kemal: "From here and there. You could find them downtown and have them cut. For example, you'd get two pipes and tape a matchbox in between. Then it would become a double gun. You can design however you want. You would add something to the top of the pipe and make it a sniper. You would look through it." Sertaç: "Did you play it with a crowd?" Kemal: "Exactly. We would play it in hordes and on a zone range spanning a huge tract of land. We would play it across the whole lodgings area, not just in the corner of some apartment."

²⁴² Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "What do children know about playing games anyway. You play soldiers. You see the chain of command. Seeing the chain of command had an appeal. I would not be a military officer perhaps, had I not been a military brat."

controlling convergences, the military institution controls the possibility of resistance and subversion. This is why, many children, when exposed to the life outside, usually through their education or working life, feel disenchanting:

"Bana o zamana [ilkokula başlayana] kadar herkesin babası askermiş gibi geliyordu. Yani hiç sorgulamamışım o zaman, anladın mı? Sanki herkesin babası üniforma giyip çıkıyor evden gibi geliyordu. ... Babası asker olmayan çok fazla arkadaşım yoktu yani. Yakın, sık sık vakit geçirebileceğim arkadaşlar hep asker çocuğuydu."²⁴³

"[B]u askeri ortamdan çıkıp normal sivil hayata başlayıp, bu genelde üniversiteyle birlikte başlar, bir süre sonra diyorsun ki: 'Bambaşka bir hayat varmış dışarıda.' İşin içindeyken anlamıyorsun bunu. 15 yaşındayken bunu fark etmiyorsun. Ama şu anda fark ediyorum. O zamanlar dışarıdaki insanlarla çok barışık olmuyorsun. Ama sen gidip kendine bir yaşam görüşü oturtuktan sonra bazı şeylerle barışıyorsun. ... Şimdi mesela bana çok daha normal geliyor daha muhafazakâr insanlar, daha kapalı insanlar. Umurumda değil daha doğrusu, öyle söyleyeyim yani. Böyle insanlar olduğunun da bilincindeyim. Ya da tam tersi insanlar olduğunun da bilincindeyim. Yani o zaman daha kapalı bir çevrede olduğun için herkes seninmiş gibi geliyor, senin ailenmiş gibi. Öyle yaşıyorlarmış gibi. Herkes 30 Ağustos'ta baloya gidiyormuş falan gibi geliyor da öyle bir dünya yok abi. Kimisi için bir nefret nedeniyken kimisi için sevinç nedeni. Ama o zamanlar öyle hissediyorsun. Aslında onu hissetmiyorsun da, şimdi öyle olduğunu düşünüyorsun. Kısırmış biraz diyorsun. Hayatın bazı tatları, renkleri yok. Yani ne bileyim, bazı şeyleri bilmiyorsun işte. Dışarıdaki insanların esnaf muhabbetini bilmezsin. Ya da çok zengin insanların hayatını bilmezsin. Çok fakirliği bilmezsin. Selamünaleyküm, aleyküm selâm muhabbetini bilmezsin falan. Bunlardan hep ayrık yaşarsın. Kendin hayata karıştığın zaman öğreniyorsun bunları yani."²⁴⁴

²⁴³ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "Until the primary school, it seemed to me that everyone has a soldier father, leaving home in uniform. Prior to then, I had not questioned it, you know. ... I had not many civilian friends. My close friends were always among children of military officers."

²⁴⁴ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "When you leave the military setting and enter the civilian life, and it generally takes place through the university, after a while you say that: 'The life outside is a whole new ball game.' You don't dig it when you are around 15 years old and inside [the military setting]. But I dig it now. Back then, you are not in peace with the people outside. Only after settling on a world-view, you can come into reconciliation with some stuff. ... For example, I regard conservative people as ordinary now. I don't care, to be more honest. I know that these people or the opposite of these people do exist. But when you live in an enclosed environment, you suppose that everyone is like you, as if they are the family. As if everyone attends a ball on August 30, the Victory Day. There is no such thing of course. [The Victory Day] is a source of repulsion for some and a source of joy for others. Back then, you feel like that though."

This brings us to another crucial conclusion to draw. The effects of normalization, both in and outside the context of the militarization of children, take a foothold in the lives of children, less through prohibitions, injunctions or indoctrinations, and more through the *en-compassion* of their lives by the institution. The majority of children comply with the conditions within which they live. This happens not because they are enforced or brainwashed to do so, through constant checks, injunctions and prohibitions, but basically because the experience of 'military dependency' can be empowering and disempowering at once.

Central to the dialectics of empowerment and disempowerment are economical considerations. The advantages offered by the military institution, on the one hand, relieve the children from anxieties concerning the hardships and costliness of the life outside. The life seems cheaper within the military complex, and it appears to remain so for a foreseeable future, if one accords well:

"[Askeri kamp] valla güzel ya. Böyle 3 liraya 5 liraya Sex on the Beach falan içtiğin, hakikaten süper, ultra ucuz imkânları olan [bir yer]. Güzel ya, güzel zamanlardı yani. Çocuksun ve hoşuna gidiyor yani. Mesela ben bu sene yazın askerden sonra bir tatile gittim kendim. Dışarıda böyle iyi bir otele falan gittim. Dünyanın parasını verdim abi. O imkânları sağlamak kolay değil yani. Yok uçak bile biletiydi, yok bir gece kalma, 300 lira, bilmem ne..."²⁴⁵

"Asker çocuğu olmak bence şu şekilde güzel: Sağladığı olanaklar bakımından paha biçilemez bir şey bence. Şu an yurdundan faydalanıyoruz yani, lojmanlar

Actually you don't feel it in the past, but you come to think of it later on. You say, it had been a bit barren. You say, certain flavors and colors of life had been lacking. I mean, you don't know about certain things. You don't know about the shopkeepers talk. You don't know the lives of very rich people. You don't know the poverty. You don't know how to say '-Selamünaleyküm,' '-Aleykümselâm.' You live in a discrete world. You come to learn about those when you become involved in life."

²⁴⁵ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "(Sarcastically) [The military vacation camp] is good indeed. [It is a place where] you can drink Sex on the Beach for a penny. It is ultra cheap. Those were good times. You are a child and you like it. For example, I went on a vacation on my own dime in the previous summer, after finishing the military service. I stayed in a nice hotel. Man, I spent money like water. It is not easy to provide yourself the means offered by the military. [You have to pay for] [t]he plane tickets, 300 TL hotels fee a night and so forth."

olsun, orduevleri olsun, kamplar olsun, bu yönden ele alınca muazzam geliyor bana ki hâlâ faydalanmaya devam ediyoruz."²⁴⁶

"Oo! [Ordu Pazarı deyince bir şeyler] çağrışmaz mı hiç! Ordu Pazarı deyince aklıma genelde ucuz abur cubur geliyor. Çocukken çılgınlar gibi Ordu Pazarı'na gider, cips, çikolata falan alır sonra dönerdik mesela."²⁴⁷

"Rahat olurduk. Askeriyede mesela kantin vardır. Oralar mesela çok ucuzdur. Askeriyenin en büyük şeyi odur zaten. Herkes, dışarıdaki insanlar da, 'Sizin oralar çok ucuz ya, bir şeyler getirsene,' falan derler. Hep o muhabbet olur yani. Ama gerçekten de öyle. Çok ucuzdu yani. O yönden de bir sıkıntısı olmazdı."²⁴⁸

On the other hand, the routine practice of cheaper consumption also may have backlashes for these children. They may find difficulty in adjusting to the economic conditions outside, as Nuri articulates in the rest of his statements, whose beginning was quoted above:

"Oradan hemen dezavantajlara bağlayacak olursam, hani ekonomik durumdan, işte çok ucuz ya her şey, ona göre endeksliyorsun kendini ve bu çok büyük dezavantaj olabiliyor dışarıdayken. ... [D]edim ya, o ucuzluğa alışılırsın. Her şey ucuzdu. Lokantalar ucuz, her şey ucuz yani. Yarı fiyatına diyebilirim yani dışarıdaki fiyatına göre her şey. Oradan çıkınca, tabii [bir de baba] emekli olunca ekonomik olarak düşüyorsun. E [baba] bir de iş bulamayınca... Tabii ondan da bahsetmek lazım aslında. Genelde asker emeklileri çok iş bulamaz hani. Yapamaz öyle özel sektörde. Alışamaz ona. O yüzden hani böyle asker çocukları dışarıya, [dışarının] ekonomik durumuna çok fazla ayak uyduramıyorlar, zorlanıyorlar. Bir dezavantajı o."²⁴⁹

²⁴⁶ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: "I think being a military brat is great in the sense that the means provided by the military are unmatched. I stay in its dormitories. It has lodgings, Officers' Clubs and vacation facilities. In that regard, it is really incredible so I still benefit from them."

²⁴⁷ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "Ah! Of course it [the military supermarkets] rings a bell! It reminds me of inexpensive junk food. When I was a child, I'd go there and went berserk over chips and chocolates."

²⁴⁸ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "We were comfortable. For instance, there were commissaries in the military. The prices there were really cheap. As a matter of fact, that's the most important thing of the military. Everybody, I mean, the people outside would say, 'Everything is so inexpensive in there. Please bring us something.' It's ever the case. But they really are [inexpensive]. It was very cheap. So it gave us no trouble."

²⁴⁹ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "If I jump to the disadvantages, growing accustomed to the inexpensiveness of everything can turn into a disadvantage

Coupled with the limited affiliation with the market until later ages because of their isolation and jobs of parents, the children's insecurity against the economic conditions of the life outside may occasion their sinking into the military complex, or a painful sobering, as Kemal suggests in the following:

"Senin baban hiçbir zaman boyundan büyük borç almamış. Ya da bilinmeyen sulara yüzmemiş. Soru işareti olan şeyleri denememiş. Girişimcilik ruhu denilen şeyden haberi bile yok. Garanti. Hep garanti, hep garanti, hep garanti. 'Aman çocuğum aman. Aman, aman, aman, aman...' Ee, böyle aman aman yetiştin mi sen de aman aman oluyorsun yani. Sen nasıl bu sarmaldan çıkacaksın ki yani? Birden vahiy mi gelecek sana 20 yaşına gelince, 'Oğlum çok süper bir şey geldi [aklıma], bütün hayatımı riske atacağım, şöyle yapacağım,' falan [diye]? Yapamıyorsun bunu, anladın mı? Böyle görünmeyen zincirlerin var aslında senin. Bu sadece askerliğe özgü değil. Bu tarz hayatlara özgü bir şey. Yani benim hayatta, mesela şöyle olsaydı diyeceğim bir tek şey böyle olabilirdi. Annem babam mesela farklı meslek gruplarından, kendi mesleklerini yapan, atıyorum mesela en basitinden bir pastane sahibi olsa. Çay ocağı işletse bile olur. En azından insan ilişkilerini bilir, müşteri ilişkilerini bilir. Bunu tanım olarak bilmez, ama uygulama olarak bilir. Yapar ama bunun literatür tanımını bilmez. Sen de gidersin eğitimini öğrenirsin, tanımını öğrenirsin, babandan da işi öğrenirsin, başka bir işe kalkarsın. Mesela bunu görmediğin zaman hep zannediyorsun ki okul okuyacaksın okuyacaksın, bitince böyle birden bire bir şey olacak. Çalışacaksın para verecekler. Ee çıkıyorsun, öyle değilmiş abi hayat. Bambaşkaymış."²⁵⁰

when you are outside. ... As I said, you get used to that inexpensiveness. Everything was cheap. Restaurants were cheap, everything was cheap. Maybe for the half price when compared to the outside. When you leave that place and your father retires from the military, you decline economically... Actually one should address that as well. Usually the retired military officers cannot find jobs. They cannot manage in the private sector. They cannot get used to it. The children of military officers thus find difficulty in keeping up with the economic conditions of the outside life. They struggle. It is one of the disadvantages."

²⁵⁰ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "Imagine that your father never borrowed money beyond his capacity. He never swam in unknown waters. Never tried things with question marks on them. He is completely ignorant of what is called the entrepreneurial spirit. He always takes the guaranteed route. Always the guaranteed route, always. 'Oh my dear, be careful. Be very careful.' When you are raised like that, you also become prone to go: 'Oh my dear...' How are you going to get out of this loop? Will you have a revelation when you turn 20, like: 'Oh man, a great idea occurred to me last night, I will risk all my life to do this and that.'? You cannot do it, you feel me? You have invisible chains pulling you down. It is not only specific to the military. It applies to all lives similar to this. I mean, the only way I could have been better off would be something like this. Let's say my parents have a different profession, like running a patisserie. Even a tea house

Many children also feel anxious to be discriminated in their applications to work in public offices and private companies, especially since the last decade. This may also entail their turning to the bubble of the military institution, where they know that they can find economical relief, as long as they meet conditions to enter and comply:

"Mesela şu an kamuda bir yere girmek istesem çok mümkün olacak bir şey değil yani. Şu an zaten askere bakılan gözle benim bir yere girmemin pek olasılığı yok diye düşünüyorum. Ama böyle olmalı mı? Bence olmamalı. Sonuçta kimse öyle ben asker çocuğu olarak doğmak istiyorum diye bir tercih yapmıyor. Ayrıca bundan da hiçbir zaman pişmanlık duymadım, gurur duyuyorum. Ama işte insanın kendi kişisel gelişimine, kendi eğitimine bakmak yerine bu tür şeylere bakıyorlar maalesef."²⁵¹

"Mesela şu an bir devlet dairesinde işe girmek istesen, önce bir geçmişini araştırdıkları için, geçmişi değil de hani saçma sapan sorular soruyorlar ya... Asker çocuğusun diye işe almayacak yerler var bence. Ben henüz iş aramadım ama çevremden duyduğum şeyler bunlar. Ben de mezun olacağım, aynı şey benim de başıma gelecek diye düşünüyorum."²⁵²

Zeynep: "Hâlâ onun doruk noktasını yaşıyorum, 'Acaba yanlış bölüm mü seçtim?' diye. Yanlış bölüm mü seçtim derken tabii ki çok mutluyum okuduğum bölümden. Ama benim için bir gelecek sağlayacağını düşünmüyorum açıkçası. En azından bu ortamda. O da babamın mesleğiyle alakalı."

Sertaç: "Nasıl zorluklarla karşılaşacağını düşünüyorsun mesela tam olarak?"

would do it. They'd have at least known about human relations, or customer relations. They would not have known it by the book definition, but by practice. Then you'd go and learn the job from your father. Then you'd learn the book definitions by getting education and try something else. When you have never experienced it, you suppose that you will study enough in the school, something miraculous will happen. You will work and they will pay you. But then you come out and realize that the life is a whole different ball game."

²⁵¹ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "Nowadays it seems impossible for me to work in the public sector. With the country's current perception of the military, I have little to zero chances. Should it be that way? I don't think so. After all, no one chooses to be the child of a military officer. And I have never regretted that. I am proud of it. Unfortunately, they take into account such things instead of people's education and self-improvement."

²⁵² Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Now, I guess I cannot work in public offices for being a military brat, because you know, they are making background checks and asking ridiculous questions in job interviews. I did not start looking for a job yet. I heard it around though. I will graduate from school and I think I will also go through that."

Zeynep: "Yani direkt ayrımcılık. Bunun başka bir açıklaması yok. Benim öyle subay çocuğu arkadaşım çok var. Asker çocuğu diye işe alınmayan çok var, o kadar başarılı olmasına rağmen. Özel şirketlerde de öyle. Mesela büyük holdinglerde babasının mesleğini soruyorlar, öğrendikleri anda 'Biliyorsun işte durumları, o yüzden seninle iş yapamayız,' deyip geri çevirdikleri oluyor. Bunu da etraftan gördüğün için benim mesela şu an iş aramamda da seçici davranmamın nedeni o olabilir. Çünkü ben biliyorum. Alınmayacağımı, kabul edilmeyeceğimi biliyorum. Benim bilgi birikimime bakmadan beni direkt eleyeceklerini biliyorum. O daha yeni yeni olmaya başladı açıkçası."²⁵³

However, the causes of their turning to the military complex do not only boil down to economical considerations. Another thing that I should attract attention is the prestige the children may enjoy within the borders of the military institution. The downfall of the military in public perception since the last decade may also entrench the children's desire to stay inside the complex. The children may be unemployed, unsuccessful in the school, lacking confidence, perhaps no more than wandering somebodies in the life outside, but they know that they can command a modicum amount of respect within the military complex, especially from conscripts, if they can 'maintain a certain balance'. Unlike the cafes outside where they have to order a service to avoid the contemptuous looks and receive the recognition of waiters and shopkeepers, they can prefer perching on a chair as much as they want in an Officers' Club, without being disturbed and disrespected. They can cling once more to the sense of being an elite member of a society in which this sense seems slipping away quite fast these days for those having ties with the military institution. As they age, they can be hailed by conscripts as 'commanders'. They can build up their

²⁵³ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: Zeynep: "Right now I am at the peak of it, asking myself: 'Did I choose the wrong career path?' Don't get me wrong. I am quite happy to choose it, but I think it will not make a good future. I mean, at least under current conditions. And this is related to my father's profession." Sertaç: "Specifically, what kinds of difficulties do you think you might face?" Zeynep: "I mean, flat out discrimination. It has no other explanation. I have many friends who are children of military officers. There are many among them who were not employed, despite their success. The private companies are also the same. For example, the bigger holdings ask you the job of your father. As soon as they learn it, they turn you down by saying: 'You know how it is nowadays. Therefore we cannot work with you.' I see it around and perhaps this is why I am selective in looking for a job. Because I know what will happen. I know that I will not be accepted. I know that they will eliminate me, with no regards to my knowledge. It is a recent thing."

confidence and mood, while requesting a cup of tea in the process as well, for the half price too:

"Hiçbir zaman çocuklara kötü davranıldığını görmedim ben askerler tarafından da. Anlaşırdım bir şekilde. Ama senin de götün kalkmayacak. Dengeyi tutturacaksın. Sen rica etmeyi bileceksin o yapmak zorunda olsa da, sana hizmet vermek zorunda olsa da. Ben hep rica eder gibi davranırdım yani. Yoksa öbür türlü olduğu zaman lahmacunun içine sığar yani. Öyle bir dengeyi tutturacaksın, kendi iyiliğin için yani."²⁵⁴

Finally, the securitization of the lives of children may increase their dependence to the military institution. Indeed, in some narratives, the concerns of my interlocutors for their safety, security and trust to civilian life seem quite exaggerated. As these interlocutors perceive the life through the lens of security, by subscribing to the pervasive discourse of security also disseminated by the military institution, the spaces offered by the institution, with its fences, walls, sentry posts and guards, become better destinations for them to respite from the complexity, disorder and insecurity of the daily life outside. Accordingly, in those narratives the words comfort and ease often go hand-in-hand with the words trust and security:

"[...]’da ilk defa eve çıktığımda lojman dışında bir yerde kaldığımda ben bocalamıştım, ‘Nasıl oluyor?’ falan diye yani. Hâlbuki dışarıdaki bir insanın bütün hayatı öyle geçer. Bizim ilk defa böyle bir deneyimimiz oluyor yani. [Askeriyede] Her şey sana daha *güvenli* geliyor. Kendini daha *rahat* hissediyorsun. Ortamı biliyorsun çünkü. Bir şeyden çekinmene korkmana gerek yok. Ama dışarıdaki hayat sana bir anda daha korkutucu gelebiliyor."²⁵⁵
(emphases mine)

²⁵⁴ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: “I have never seen a soldier who treats the children badly. I would get along with them anyhow. But you should not get ahead of yourself. You should find the balance. You have to know how to request, even though he is under obligation to serve you. I would always approach them in a requesting manner. Otherwise, they’d take a shit on your lahmajoon. You should find the balance, for your own good.”

²⁵⁵ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: “When I first rented a house in [...], I was confused, like ‘How on earth...?’ In fact, the people outside pursue all their lives like that. But I was going through that for the first time. [In the military] you feel more *in security*. You feel more *comfortable*. Because you know the place. You don’t need to be afraid of anything. The life outside can appear more frightening.” (emphases mine)

"Lojman bir kere *güvendi* her şeyden önce. Aile demekti benim için. Çünkü bütün arkadaşların orada, bütün çevren orada. Herkesle muhabbetin var. Bir şeyden korkmuyorsun, bir sıkıntın yok. Dışarı çıkıp girme saatinde... *Rahat* bir ortam. Basket sahasıdır, şudur budur, olanakları çok fazla. Seni kısıtlayacak hiçbir şey yoktu hani. '*Hapis gibi buraya da tıklandık kaldık,*' diyecek hiçbir şey yoktu. *Çünkü imkânları vardı hani.* Aile ve güven ortamı diye tanımlayabilirim."²⁵⁶ (emphases mine)

"[Subay çocuğu olmanın] avantajları, hani ilişkilerde bir kere *güven sorunu* olmuyor. Tanıyorsun, çok *rahat* [ilişki] kurabiliyorsun."²⁵⁷ (emphases mine)

To recapitulate, as the children feel that their empowerment 'inside' outweighs their disempowerment inside and outside, they become more prone to feel at ease within the military institution, which turns into a 'heart of a heartless world'²⁵⁸, as it were. The more they find themselves at ease and in peace, without feeling any pressure whatsoever on them, the more they come to depend on it:

"[TSK deyince] direkt lojmanlar geldiği için [aklıma] bana huzur veriyor. *Huzur* demek, *bağlılık* demek."²⁵⁹ (emphases mine)

And those who succumb into the military complex peacefully usually lose contact with the discursive complexity of the life outside. They may even prefer to ignore it, because they feel that it offers nothing for their identity, self-improvement or well-being, unlike the military institution:

²⁵⁶ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "The military lodgings meant *trust* above all else. It meant family to me. Because all your friends, all your acquaintances are there. You can talk to everybody. You are not afraid of anything. You don't have any problems. In the check in or check out times... I mean, it is a *comfortable* place. It provides many opportunities, like basketball courts and so forth. There was nothing to limit you. *There was nothing to make you say, 'We are trapped in here like a prisoner.'* Because it had many opportunities. I can define it as an environment of family and trust." (emphases mine)

²⁵⁷ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "The advantages of being a child of a military officer are... I mean, you don't have *trust issues* in your relations. People know each other and you can *easily* establish relationships." (emphases mine)

²⁵⁸ A Turkish saying which is generally used in the context of family.

²⁵⁹ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "As the TSK immediately reminds me of military lodgings, it gives peace to my mind. It means *peace* and *loyalty*." (emphases mine)

"Ben *orada benliğimi bulduğum için* direkt huzur geliyor. Orada işte insanlarla olan bağlılığım geliyor. Birbirimizle olan diyaloglarımız, yaşadıklarımız, deneyimlerimiz, paylaştıklarımız... Benim için hep olumlu şeyler geliyor. Şu son dönemlerdeki şeyleri o yüzden pek umursamıyorum açıkçası. Şey gibi düşünüyorum: 'Aman kim ne konuşursa konuşsun, kim ne düşünürse düşünsün.' Ben bu camianın içindeyim ve bütün 25 yılımda buranın içinde büyüdüm. Ben büyüdüm diyorum ve umursamıyorum. Huzur geliyor ya aklıma, başka hiçbir şey gelmiyor açıkçası. Mutluyum yani ben."²⁶⁰ (emphasis mine)

Sometimes, militarization may make its way into the process of subjectivation to the extent that, some even find themselves unable to imagine 'a life otherwise':

"[Asker çocuğu olmasam] böyle bir hayattan haberim olmazdı yani. Bu kadar bilinçli olmayabilirdim. Bu kadar lojman hayatı, kamp hayatı, böyle çok güzel şeylerim olmayabilirdi. Düşünmek bile istemiyorum. Bilmiyorum, çok da güzel olmazdı herhalde. İyi oldu böyle."²⁶¹

3.6. Chapter Conclusion

After returning from my field trip, I was sitting in a café in İstanbul at night, sipping my drink and reading the transcriptions of the interviews I conducted. There were five people, three males and two females in their early twenties, sitting at the table next to mine, reminiscing over past memories with fervor in a loud conversation whose bits were extending to my ears. I diverted my attention from the transcriptions to the conversation nearby upon overhearing the story told by one of the males, without the slightest intention to eavesdrop. In a spirited manner, he was conveying to others a story about some bullet shells he found with his friends while playing hide and seek in the lodgings where he

²⁶⁰ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "It means peace to me *because I found my inner self there*. It reminds me of my attachment to people there. It reminds me of our dialogues, experiences and what we've shared together... It always evokes positive things. Therefore I don't care about the recent events. I think this way: 'No matter what they say or think, I am a part of this community and I spent 25 years here growing up.' I grew up and I don't care. It really means peace and not something else. I feel happy." (emphasis mine)

²⁶¹ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "I would be unaware of this life [were I not a child of a military officer]. I could not be as aware as I now am. I would not have had such beautiful memories in military lodgings and vacation facilities. I do not even want to think about it. I don't know. I guess it would not be good. It is fine as it is."

stayed in Mardin. At least this was what I presumed. At first, I thought that my senses were playing tricks on me, as I have never been a reliable eavesdropper anyway. After cleaning my ears and checking myself for a moment to understand whether I was still sane, I began to listen, all ears to find out if he was specifically talking about military lodgings or something else. As I was trying to squeeze the best out of my eavesdropping skills, they went out for a cigarette. I followed the group to the street where the other four were listening to the rest of the story, or perhaps already to the next one. The next moment, the storyteller's full sentences ringed in my ears: "How many people would see a terrorist alive in their entire lifetime? I did." Then I was convinced that the storyteller was one of the people whom I had searched for months to conduct interviews. Although I was finished with the phase of interviewing and willing to start writing, my curiosity overwhelmed me. I approached in an excusing manner and asked: "I am sorry, but I just lent an ear to your conversation. Are you a military brat?" Silence hung in the air for a moment, in an awkward way which propelled me to continue with a proper introduction of myself: "I am studying at Sabancı University and writing a thesis on military brats." Raising his eyebrows, he replied me: "In which department?" After answering the question, I decided to pull the trick that helped me out of such grave moments of suspense many times: "I am interested in it, partially because I am also a military brat. My father was a military judge." A trace of smile pervaded the faces in front of me, which confirmed my admission into the group. Then he answered: "Yes I am. My father is a gendarmerie colonel. But actually I am not the only military brat here. We are all military brats." Then I learned that, they were university students, using an Officers' Club nearby as a dormitory from where they went out for a drink. I grabbed a seat and they asked me about my father's rank, his transfers, the places I've seen through and so forth. And I asked their in return, as mutual trust between both parties grew to relieve us of our hesitations. I left them my cell phone number, in case they want to participate, perhaps in a later study. Then we parted ways, for them to avoid any trouble entering the Officers' Club at a late hour. None of them called back, maybe because they felt insecure about carrying a random encounter to a step forward.

So, what is the moral of the story? What particularly intrigued me in this encounter was the reception of my claim to the identity of the military brat. All of a sudden, my

'halfie' status in the field smoothened over the tensions and hesitations, at least for a moment and to an extent enough to make a lively conversation possible. It is intriguing, because the children of military families, on the one hand, with their liminal existence within the military complex, neither as fully recognized members of the military institution, nor as complete outsiders, can help us to put into question many binaries, including the one posed between military and civilian spheres. However, on the other hand, the assumed ruptures between the two life worlds, namely the life inside and the life outside, alongside their inhabitants seem hardly bridgeable and taken for granted in the narratives of many interlocutors, as were they in the random encounter I transferred above until my identification through the military institution. Accordingly, one of the most interesting things that I took notice during the interviews I conducted is the readiness, if not willingness, of many interlocutors to espouse the identity of "the military brat," or "the military child," while pitting the military "us" against civilian "them". For instance, my interlocutors never overtly addressed themselves as part of the civilian world outside. Instead, they enacted themselves in the narratives as part of the military world inside, often with an appeal to the term military brat, regardless of their father's retirement from the military. This quality is evident in Nuri's following narrative:

"Orduevi deyince aklıma yine böyle ucuzluk aklıma geliyor. Her şey ucuz. Hani öyle bir yer ki, gidiyorsun ve insanlar hep aynı. Bazen hep aynı yerlerde oturuyorlar. Böyle bir şey sanki, Erzurumlular lokali. (Gülüşmeler) Herkes aynı yani, hiç değişmiyor böyle. Dışarıdan [tayinle] birileri gelir, onlarla tanışırısın. *Onlar da bir anda senden olur.*"²⁶²

Keeping alive the binary oppositions between "us" and "them", military and civilian, male and female, I claim, is one of the dimensions wherein lies the fate of the military's

²⁶² Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "The Officers' Club reminds me of inexpensiveness. Everything is so cheap. It is a kind of place which you find the same with same people sitting there whenever you go. Sometimes, they [the people in the Officers' Club] always sit on the same place. As if it is a lounge for people coming from the same place, like the lounge of the people from Erzurum. (Laughs) Everybody is the same, nothing changes. Sometimes some people would come from outside [through transfers] and you'd get acquainted with them. *All of a sudden, they, too, would become one of you.*"

enterprise to produce subjectivities which cater to its institutional interests. However, it is not the military, but the children who often pick up the slack and keep these oppositions alive, by blithely responding to the military institution which hails them as military dependents. Otherwise, the military brat as a distinct identity, and indeed a strong one to lay claim would not exist as it does. Just as there are no 'police brats', 'judicial brats' or 'educational brats', there would be no reason for the 'military brat' to not disappear. Therefore, I claim that, the term 'the military brat' is rather about performing, expressing, claiming and doing an assumed identity instead of simply being the result of being born into a family with a military officer parent. And this is perhaps the major cause which keeps the military boat afloat, despite being loaded by its bulky outliers.

IV. CHILDREN EVALUATING POLITICS AND THE MILITARY

4.1. The Relative Normalization

In their preface to the *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu* [A Social Group, A Political Party: Army in Turkey] compilation, Bayramoğlu, İnel and Laçiner (2004) identify TSK as an institution that talks much more than the militaries of other countries, but is disturbed by talks about itself (p. 9). Contrary to the military's silent position in democratic countries concerning political and social affairs, they suggest, it is not the military, but the society that is expected to remain mute in Turkey, unless it is to acclaim the institution (p. 9). Almost a decade has passed since their diagnosis. Meanwhile, Turkey has arguably seen the most dramatic changes ever to occur in the field of civil-military relations, most particularly with regards to the military's role in politics. Unlike the times during which Bayramoğlu, İnel and Laçiner wrote, today the tables seem to have turned. Soldiers at the top of the military hierarchy no longer seem as much willing to partake in discussions concerning the social, political and economic conditions of the country, whereas the military as an institution, along with the 'controversial' deeds committed by its personnel has gained much more centrality, visibility and criticism in media and public discussions. The current chief of the general staff Necdet Özel's recent response to those who were asking the reasons of his silence can be illustrative in that regard. Özel's emphasis on his position as a public servant who ought to refrain from speaking as much as possible is indicative of the growing reluctance to issue statements, at least on part of the top rank military officers, on affairs other than those directly related to the military.²⁶³

²⁶³ A.A. (2013, October 21). Genelkurmay başkanı Necdet Özel: konuşmuyorum çünkü. *Radikal*, Retrieved December 7, 2013, from http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ozel_konusmuyorum_cunku-1156469

Many settled with considering the period, roughly starting with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (hereafter AKP) into power and the EU harmonization process, as a period of 'normalization'. It may be indeed safe to concede a relative normalization in Turkey, especially in the field of civil-military relations, after due legal and institutional reformations. But it is worthwhile to draw attention to two conditions with respect to the process of relative normalization. On grounds of these recent changes, some popular opinion leaders have rushed to make a premise for the end of the military tutelage and even militarism,²⁶⁴ at the expense of delimiting militarism to the militarization of the political field, thereby leaving intact the more subtle, albeit baleful implications of militarism in the interrelated social, cultural, economic and political domains. It would not be far-fetched to contend that the 'generalized discursive erethism' within the Turkish society around the political autonomy of the armed forces, the trials that hold accountable the military officers for their deeds and the mechanisms established to ensure the democratic monitoring of the armed forces have not yet given way to a rigorous critique of militarism (Öğünç, 2013, pp. 21-22; Sünbuloğlu, 2013a, p. 33).

Perhaps as equally important, those developments that have opened up cracks in the military's shield of invincibility and aura of sanctity do not directly translate into the transparency of the military institution. For instance, Mehmet Ali Birand (1986) in his pioneer foray to the erstwhile and ever murky field of military sociology, narrates in the following how he overcame his initial despair and impasse for conducting a study on TSK:

"...[B]u çalışmama başlarken ümitsizdim. Yakın dostlarım, 'Sen yapılmayacak işlere kalkışıyorsun, Türkiye buna daha hazır değil,' diyorlardı. Ordunun tabuluğuna dikkat çekiyorlardı. En basit yolu denedim. Bir dilekçe yazıp Genelkurmay Başkanlığı'ndan, yapacağım inceleme için gerekli bilgilerin verilmesi ve yardımcı olunmasını istedim. Yanıt beni doğruladı. Ordu tabu olmak istemiyordu."²⁶⁵ (p. 14)

²⁶⁴ Altaylı, F. (2012, September 25). Bu dava militarizmin sonudur. *Haber Türk*. Retrieved December 7, 2013, from <http://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/fatih-altayli/779368-bu-dava-militarizmin-sonudur>

²⁶⁵ "...I wasn't optimistic when I began my work. My close friends were telling me: 'You're trying to do what can't be done; Turkey isn't ready for this yet.' They were calling attention to the taboo of the military. I took the simplest route. I wrote a petition and asked

Birand wrote these lines right after the pinnacle of the military reign, in the mid 80s, when the military governing elite supposedly withdrew to their barracks from the political scene. Two decades after, the atmosphere of secrecy and closure surrounding the field still comes to haunt the researchers, who complain, perhaps more than Birand, about the lack of data and access to the field (Belge, 2008, p. 7; Ünsaldı; 2008: pp. 16-19; İnsel, 2004, pp. 46-47; Biricik, 2013, p. 389). For example, Murat Belge (2008), in his foreword to Ünsaldı's *Türkiye'de Asker ve Siyaset* [the Military and Politics in Turkey] (2008), writes:

"Türkiye'de asker üstüne çalışma yapmanın ne kadar güç bir iş olduğunu yazar 'giriş' bölümünde özetlemiş. Bunun nedenini Ordu'nun çok katı bir biçimde içine kapanmasında görüyor: 'Bu yüzden, kimi Batı Avrupa ülkelerinde, özellikle İngiltere ve Fransa'da ve daha da önemlisi Kuzey Amerika'da askerî sosyoloji alanında olağanüstü sayıda, kimi zaman etkileyici boyutlarda inceleme ve veri bulunuyorken, Türkiye'de askerî olgunun sosyolojik anlamda ciddi bir incelemesi söz konusu olduğunda, kapsamlı bir araştırmanın izine bile rastlanmamakta...' diyor. Bu tabii çok doğru. Askerî herhangi bir yerin, mahut eli tüfekli asker resmi ve 'fotoğraf çekilmez' vb yazılarla donanmış tabela ile bir 'yasak bölge' haline getirilmesinden, askerî herhangi bir konunun bir devlet sırrı olarak görülmesine, savunma bütçesinin tam ne olduğunun bile bilinmemesine uzanan yığınla tedbir, dünyanın başka herhangi bir yerinde görülmemiş bir gizlilik atmosferi yaratmaktadır."²⁶⁶ (p. 7)

Then, interestingly enough, drawing information about this hardly penetrable field seems no more possible these days than it was in the past. And the possibility of having an insider look at the military still lies beyond likelihood, unless the researcher has a member

the General Staff to help me get the information I needed for my investigation. The response affirmed me. The military did not want to be a taboo."

²⁶⁶ "The author summarizes the difficulties of conducting research on the military in Turkey in the introduction. He believes that the reason for this lays in the severity of the way the military shuts itself off from the outside: 'Therefore, while there are an extraordinary number of studies, some quite impressive, and data in the field of military sociology in Western Europe, particularly England and France, and, more importantly, in North America, the same cannot be said for the military in Turkey; it is impossible to find even the traces of a serious comprehensive study in the field...' This is very true of course. Military zones are marked with the notorious picture of a rifle-wielding soldier and the written warning 'Taking photographs is forbidden,' turning them into 'forbidden zones.' Any information about the military is seen as a state secret; nearly insurmountable obstacles face efforts to learn the exact size of the defense budget. This creates an unprecedented secrecy surrounding the military not seen anywhere else in the world."

status. It is hard to proclaim that "the discrepancy between the military's strong presence and visibility" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 3) has disappeared over the course of time. In sum, the field seems no less murky today, nor does it seem more inviting to willing researchers who try to scratch and crawl their way into the field, sometimes only to find limited or unreliable data at their disposal. One can even argue that, as the civil-military relations takes on its path of relative normalization and military officers - once confident enough to loquaciously talk about themselves, the institution and politics - succumb to reticence, conducting a research on the military is becoming harder.²⁶⁷ One of my interviewees, Mustafa, addresses this additional thick layer of mist descended upon the field to the demise of researchers in the below:

"Ya sen aslında Kara Harp Okulu'na gitsene. Bir sürü insan bulursun orada. Öğrenci Bölük Komutanı'na git. Nöbetçi subaya gitme sakın. Karacılarda kime geleceğin çok önemli. Gerçi 10 yıl önce olsa konuşacak insan çok rahat bulurdun. Şimdi korkarlar konuşmaya. Belki asker çocuğu olduğunu söylersen anca [konuşurlar]."²⁶⁸

Accordingly, those who subscribe to the theses of normalization in the literature usually dwell on institutional and legal aspects of the transformation. However, the repercussions of the relative normalization process in the larger segments of "the military society" (Ünsaldı, 2008, p. 170), mainly consisting of professional military officers ranked lower than general officers, alongside their wives and children, remain largely unknown. Although few existing studies argue for the existence of a positive change in the attitude of military officers as one of the steering factors that shape and facilitate the transition to a

²⁶⁷ Nevertheless, I would advise the reader to take caution from buying into the argument that conducting a research on the military institution has become harder than it was ten years ago. This study, apart from Mustafa's statements quoted below, cannot provide much to back up such a claim as well. However, I personally believe that conducting a research on the military institution has not become much easier than it was ten years ago either, despite the relative normalization process.

²⁶⁸ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013: "Why don't you go to the War College? You can find many interlocutors over there. First go and see the Student Company Commander. Don't ever go to the Duty Officer. In the Land Forces, it is crucial whom you run across. Actually if it'd been 10 years before, you could have found people to interview with ease. They are afraid to speak now. [They may accept an interview], if you introduce yourself as a military brat."

more normalized phase of civil-military relations (Gürsoy, 2012, pp. 29-37), there is no substantial study to date that examines these populations' reception of the normalization process, their perception of the recent shifts in the power relations of the country as well as the 'dirty' fragments of the past of which the military is an inseparable part. Then the following questions gain relevance in the context of this study. What do these segments of the military community think of the military in the past and now? How do they conceive the current political scene in Turkey? Has the process of normalization been perceived as 'normal' and easily greeted by these masses? If not, how do they come to grips with it?

At this juncture, the narratives of the children of military families concerned with watershed political affairs which have occasioned major transformations in TSK can be of help to better understand the prevailing discourses circulating in the military community. But these verbal accounts are not significant only owing to their 'Trojan' quality in an inaccessible field. They also yield results propitious to our understanding of the interactions between the disciplinary effects of certain institutions within the boundaries of which a childhood is spent, namely, the school, the military and the family, thereby helping us to grasp in its diversity the experience of being a child in a military family. Finally, some of the narratives can shed light upon grounds which are put into use to challenge or legitimize militarism. Therefore I devote this final chapter of my thesis to the narratives of children about the military and politics. Their views on particular topics and the discursive analysis of these views will be on the scope. Topics included will be, respectively, military coups, compulsory military service, the trials of Balyoz (Sledgehammer) and Ergenekon, the Kurdish Question and the Peace Process.

Before delving further into the narratives, I should convey some of my field observations. More than half of my interviewees stated that they have been familiar with politics since their childhood, mainly because of the enthusiasm commonly invested into politics in military families at dinner tables and living rooms. Of all the questions asked during the interview, those concerning contemporary politics constituted a section for which my interviewees were either least or/and most engaged to provide answers. One of them, Mustafa, decided to skip this part on professional grounds, as a military officer who

should not respond directly to questions with a manifest political content.²⁶⁹ In some cases, their readiness and willingness while sharing their opinions were enmeshed in conflicting emotions of frustration, withdrawal and hesitation which interrupted their speech. Especially two conditions were decisive in their level of irritation. Firstly, as the interviewees lay a claim for a privileged insider status whereby they contend that there is injustice involved in the topic at stake, their frustration escalated quickly. Sometimes the children's claim for higher consciousness than 'ordinary' civilians entrenched their frustration. For example, let's look at how İrem responded to a question about the Balyoz-Ergenekon trials, as an intense wave of furore chimes into her statements:

"Çok sinir oluyorum. Yani çok sinir oluyorum. Çok doluyum bu konuda. *İçinde olunca yediremiyorsun yani, biliyorsun öyle olmadığını.* Hepsinin bir oyun olduğunu biliyorsun. Zaten asker bırakmadılar, asker kalmadı yani. ... Aslında [insanlar] öyle bir şey olmadığını biliyorlar ama insanın gözüne soka soka, sen bunu bilsen de, doğrusu bu olsa da, 'Bak ben sana bunu yapabiliyorum, benim gücüm bu kadar,' diyebilen birisi var."²⁷⁰ (emphasis mine)

Secondly, the children whom I interviewed seem to be thrown into confusion and frustration especially when the normalizing effects of institutions that surround the child's life coalesce, yet conflict with the hegemonic public view in a given subject. For example, Merve, in a sense of sheer astonishment, states the following in relation to the 1980 coup:

"... 'O zaman iki taraf da, sağ taraf da, sol taraf da askerın gelmesini istiyordu,' derler. ... [T]amam, ben o zamanı yaşamadım. Ama durması için [oldu]. Ama şimdi bakıyorsun, 'Yok o adam darbe yaptı,' bilmem ne. Yani ya bana etrafımda anlatılanlar yanlış, evde anlatılanlar yanlış, benim okuduklarım yanlış, okulda öğrendiklerim yanlış; ya da insanlar çok büyütüyor bazı şeyleri."²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Personal interview with Mustafa, conducted on 08.11.2013

²⁷⁰ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "It [the trials] makes me furious. It really makes me furious. It plagues me. *When you are involved, you know otherwise.* You know that it is all a game. They already left no soldiers. I mean, there are no soldiers left. ... They [the people] also know that it is not true. But there is a person who pushes the issue by saying, 'See what I am capable of doing to you. I have such power,' despite what you know and truth is." (emphasis mine)

²⁷¹ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "They say that, both the right-wing and the left-wing wanted soldiers to come. ... Alright, I did not live those times. But

Interestingly, Merve's argumentation above eerily resembles Alparslan Türkeş's defence in the Racism-Turanism trial of 1944:

"Milletimin, Türklüğün büyüklük ve üstünlüğünü ben önce anamdan, babamdan öğrenmişim. Sonra bulunduğum bütün okullarda öğretmenlerim söylediler. Askerî hayatım başlayınca kıt'alarda kumandanlarım ve maiyetinde vazife gördüğüm bütün generaller bu gerçeği daima tekrarladılar..."²⁷² (Cited in Bora T. , 2004, pp. 166-167)

Of course, I draw on this parallel not to suggest that Merve has political views akin to Türkeş, but to demonstrate the extent to which three primary institutions, between which the children commute to and fro, may have an impact upon their political views, especially if each institution feeds on the others' effects of normalization. However, these effects should not be considered as ultimately informing the children. In other words, they do not cause the subject irreversibly and in its entirety. Such a perspective would amount to render the subject as mere reflections of effects relayed by structures, thereby foreclosing agency to the subject. Also, the effects of these institutions are far from being homogeneous and singular. For instance, Kemal addresses in the below that his perception of the process of normalization has changed positively during his compulsory military service:

"Eskiden bazı şeyler askeriye açısından da saçmaydı. Hele askeriye gidip askerliğini yapınca bunu daha çok anlıyorsun. Bu AKP tayfasının normalleşme dediği şeyin doğruluk payı var aslında. Çünkü hiçbir görüş odağı yüzde yüz doğrudur diye bir şey yok abi hayatta."²⁷³

it was better off for things to come to a halt. You now hear speeches like, 'This guy made a coup,' though. I mean, either what they told me in the house, in the books and schools are wrong or people are exaggerating some stuff."

²⁷² "I learned about the grandeur and superiority of my nation and Turkishness first from my mother and father. Afterwards, it was from my teachers in all the schools I attended. This fact was continually repeated by the general officers under whom I served under..."

²⁷³ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "Some things in the past were also disadvantageous to the military. You realize it much better when you do your military service. In fact, there is some truth in what the AKP people call normalization. No viewpoint is 100% right."

In a similar vein, Tarık, regards his father as one of his sources of inspiration, while talking about his prolonged escape from the compulsory military service:

"Babam da bir defasında demişti: 'Bizde askerlik olmaması ne iyi, iyi ki bizde askerlik yok,' gibi bir şey demişti. (Gülerek) Biz de gülmüştük. Adam asker yani ama, 'İyi ki yok,' diyor buna. Herhalde yeterli bir cevap olmuştur yani."²⁷⁴

Lastly, the effects of these institutions do not always add up to each other. Much as they can lend themselves to easy amalgamations which may inflect the political itinerary of the children to nationalist-militarist trajectory, they can also disrupt the effects of each other. For example, education may cause disconcertments within the family over political affairs:

"Lisede çok fazla tansiyon oluşturmuyor tabii. Ama üniversite boyunca ve özellikle de daha da şimdi şimdi... Babamın işini yaptığı kurum beni artık rahatsız ettiği için onu sorgulamaya başlıyorsun. Onun üzerinden yaptığım sorgulamalar biraz tansiyon yaratıyor. 'Sen üniversitede hep böyle oldun,' gibi tartışmalar dönüyor falan."²⁷⁵

4.2. The Military Coups

Military coups have a central place in a literature focused on civil-military and politics-military relations in Turkey. Despite this centrality, little do the studies taking on their scope the military coups in the history of Turkey convey the perceptions and interpretations of agents within the military field, with few noticeable exceptions (Akyaz, 2009). Most of the time, it is the general officers and those who orchestrated the coups, irrespective of their rank, who acquire a voice in these studies. But the more we climb down the ladders of hierarchy to search for voices in the military community, the less we

²⁷⁴ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "My father once said something like, 'It is good that we don't have to do compulsory military service. Luckily we don't have it.' (Laughing) Then we had laughed. The man is a soldier but he says that it is better without the compulsory military service. I guess that will do for an answer."

²⁷⁵ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "It does not cause much tension during the high school, but during the university years and especially now... As you grew disturbed by the institution your father works for, you start questioning it. And questioning it causes some tensions, like 'The university has changed you.'"

can find to hear. I hope this study will have a modest contribution in filling this gap in the literature.

I launched my set of questions about military coups, without making differentiation any differentiation between coups, except occasional references to the 28 February 1997 'post-modern' coup. The main motive behind this deliberate choice was to observe whether the children were going to feel any need to differentiate between coups. None of them did so, except Zeynep who explicitly reserved a different place and meaning for the 1980 coup:

"Yani şimdi 80 darbesini ben kesinlikle tasvip etmiyorum. Ben Kenan Evren'i de sevmem ayrıca. Bana gerçekten çok narsist bir adam gelir ve narsistliğinden kaynaklı düşünürüm bu tavırları açıkçası. O [80 darbesi] ayrı yani. TSK ayrı, 80 darbesindeki o kadro ayrıdır her zaman benim için. TSK o demek değildir. Ama şimdi öyle farkındaysan. Kiminle konuşursan konuş direkt 80 darbesini öne sürerler. Direkt o yönden seni vurmaya çalışırlar. ... [B]ence 80 darbesinin kadrosu TSK'yı anlatan bir kadro değil açıkçası. Çünkü onun içinde benim babam gibi, birçokları gibi çok farklı düşünen ve onlardan ayrılan insanlar var. O yüzden çok ayrı tutuyorum 80 darbesini. Asla ve asla tasvip etmiyorum."²⁷⁶

At first glance, this statement may strike one as a harsh denunciation articulated by Zeynep, resting on a personalized and psychologised account of the 1980 coup, with emphases on the distinction between cadres of this particular coup and the rest of TSK, and the heterogeneity of TSK to boot. However, the selection of the 1980 coup in particular as an unacceptable coup, one that was committed by aberrant military officers, leads us nowhere other than to the redemption of the military institution and other military coups. Also, Zeynep's 'externalization' of the remaining members of TSK while addressing the 1980 military coup seems rather odd, since the 1980 military coup was carried out in chain-of-command unlike the previous coups, including the unsuccessful attempts (Akyaz, 2009,

²⁷⁶ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "I definitely do not approve of the 1980 coup. I don't like Kenan Evren either. He strikes me as a narcissistic man and I think it all boils down to his narcissistic attitude. That [the military coup of 1980] is different I mean. The Turkish Armed Forces is one story and the cadres of the 1980 coup is quite another. TSK is not those cadres. Not anymore though, if you noticed. Whomever you talk to immediately brings forward the 1980 military coup to hurt you. ... I think the cadres of the 1980 military coup do not represent the Turkish Armed Forces. Because in TSK there are many people who think differently and are distinct from them, like my father. Therefore I keep the 1980 coup separate and do not approve of it, ever."

p. 12). Then, in Zeynep's case, the appeal to the motifs of personalization, psychologization and externalization does not only give legitimacy to certain forms of military coups, but is also driven by an urge to preserve an immaculate image of the military institution.

If singling out unacceptable military interventions to politics is one way to undermine, if not accept, certain forms of military coups, another one to justify them is ignoring the coups whereby the military did not directly seize control of the government. Accordingly, I observed that some of my interlocutors were inclined to identify a coup through the physical visibility of soldiers on streets and governmental levels. Thus they often evoked 'old-school' coups in their narratives while elaborating their opinions on military coups. Especially the longest and most visible coup of all, 'the coup' of 1980 took the lead in their narratives, as though the word 'military coups' in my question was an indirect reference to it. Nevertheless, such framing of military coups in a way which gives priority to physical and visual elements tends to overlook the legal and institutional structures which brought about the "continuous coup regime" (İnsel, 1997, p. 15; Akça, 2004, p. 254) in Turkey. Often the condition that I am referring to materialized in the reiterating sentence: "I/We have not seen a military coup." In some interviews, it seems as if it is not a military coup until and unless tanks are rolling through the solemn streets of a city, while a colonel is announcing the coup from a radio station. Particularly, this narrative turns a blind eye to the coup of 28 February and e-memorandum of 2007, both of which took place in the lifetime of the interlocutor:

"Darbe yaşamadım bir kere. Sen de yaşamadın, ben de yaşamadım. Olmayanı üfürme metodu yapmak saçma geliyor bana. Yaşadığım şey hakkında, bilgi sahibi olduğum şey hakkında konuşurum abi. Bir fikrim olur [ama] yaşamadığın bir şey hakkında ne kadar doğru yorum yaparsın bence tartışılır yani. Karşıt olanlar da, darbeci olanlar da... Adam gerçekten bunun ızdırabını falan çekmişse eyvallah, saygı duyarım. [Ama] hiçbir bok görmemiş, işkembe-i kübradan sallıyorlar falan, onu sevmiyorum. Bilmediğim bir şey. Ha, ister miyim böyle bir şey olmasını? İstemem abi."²⁷⁷

²⁷⁷ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "I have not experienced any military coup. Neither have you. I think it is ridiculous to talk through the hat. I talk about things I have experienced or know. I can have opinions without knowing, but they'd be open to debate. It is the same with those who oppose or support coups... If the guy has suffered from a coup, okay, let him talk. I respect the guy. But I don't like those drawing a

The ending of Kemal's speech marks another pattern that recurs in some other interviews as well:

"Darbenin tabii ki şu an olmasını istemem yani. İsteyen birisini de bilmiyorum. Varsa da yani şu an nasıl bir düşünce tarzı içinde onu bilmiyorum... Tabii *şu anki dönemde darbe olmasını falan istemem yani. O saçma sapan bir süreç. Niye olsun yani durup dururken.*"²⁷⁸ (emphases mine)

"...[S]açma buluyorum. *Bugün olmasını istemem yani.* Devamlı başında şey yapan [biri] seni böyle; 'Şunu yapmayacaksın, bunu yapmayacaksın.' Hiç hoş bir şey değil."²⁷⁹ (emphases mine)

The more the sentence, "I would not want it to happen today" was repeated, the more I began to think about its implications. Were there any people in the world, waking up in their beds and calmly saying: "Until yesterday I was against it, but I guess it's enough already. I'd be glad to have my military coup today."? Also, the absurdity of the coup process comes to the fore at above quotations as the major cause as to why 'the coup today' is rejected. Therefore, I claim that, those seemingly anti-coup statements fall short of a categorical rejection of military coups, by implying the existence of presumed conditions with the fulfillment of which military intervention may become not only possible, but also reasonable. These conditions which confer the coup with an aura of reason were rarely qualified by my interlocutors in a direct manner. Only Yasemin explain them overtly in the following:

"Darbeler genel olarak çok gerekli olduğu zaman, gerçekten devlet yıkılma boyutuna geldiyse, parçalanma boyutuna geldiyse bir nebze belki olabilir derim. Ama o da bizim ülkemizi, devletimizi koruyacaksa [olabilir]."²⁸⁰

long bow, without seeing anything in life. It is something I don't know. Would I want it to happen though? Of course I would not."

²⁷⁸ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I don't want it to happen now of course. I don't know anybody else who would want it either. Even so, I don't know what they are thinking. ... Of course *I don't want a coup in this period.* It is an *absurd* process. Why should it happen for no reason?" (emphases mine)

²⁷⁹ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I find it *absurd.* I mean, *I would not want it to happen today.* [There'd be] [s]omeone always watching, prodding you with a cane, like: 'Don't do this, don't do that.' It is not nice at all." (emphases mine)

Apart from the worries pertaining to the survival, the following quotations provide the most deployed framework for rationalizing military coups:

"Mesela ama 80 [darbesi] için şey derler: 'O zaman sağcı-solcu olayları vardı. Sağcılar solcuları vuruyordu.' Yani normal bir kavga değildi, silahlandılar. 'O zaman iki taraf da; sağ taraf da, sol taraf da askerin gelmesini istiyordu,' derler. O zaman istiyorlarmış herkes birbirini öldürüyor, o onu öldürüyor, bu bunu öldürüyor diye. O zaman herkes *mantıklı* bakmış. Şimdi 'Yok o zaman siz darbe yaptınız, gene yapacaksınız,' [diyorlar]. İnsanlar bazı şeyleri unutuyorlar bence."²⁸¹ (emphasis mine)

"Ama kimi insanlar da diyor ya: 'O zaman bu darbenin olması gerekiyordu.' Sen de illa ki duymuşsundur: 'Böyle bir şey gerekiyordu, o zaman çok kötüydü,' vesaire [diyorlar]. Şimdi olayın içinde olmadığım için [bilemiyorum]. Mesela annem de babam da konuştuğumuz zaman hep şey der: 'O zaman gerçekten dışarı çıkamıyorduk, darbe oldu ve öyle rahatladık.' Annem, 'Bu iyi ya da kötü bilmiyorum, ama *gerçekten nefes aldık*,' derdi."²⁸² (emphasis mine)

The former interlocutor presents almost a democratic portrayal of the 1980 coup as the culminating point of the collective desire, whereas the latter imbues the coup with an emancipating quality. Both highlight the dire conditions that inevitably precipitated the coup. The underlying premise in both narratives is that the military successfully stepped into the breach at a time when the dearth of civilian political measures could not prevent the

²⁸⁰ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Overall, the military coups could be possible only if they become very necessary, only if the state is drifting to the brink of dissolution. [They can take place] [o]nly if they are to protect our country and the state. "

²⁸¹ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "For the 1980 coup, they say, 'Back then, there were clashes between rightists and leftists. The rightists were shooting the leftists on sight.' It was not a normal fight. They were armed. They say that, both the right-wing and the left-wing wanted soldiers to come. In those days they had wanted it to happen, because people were killing each other. Everyone had deemed it as *rational*. Now they say, 'You staged a coup back in the day. You will do it again.' People forget certain things." (emphasis mine)

²⁸² Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "But some people also say: 'It had to happen.' You should have heard about it too: 'That was necessary. It was really bad back then.' I cannot know, because I did not see it. When I talk with my mom and dad they always say though: 'We could not even go out. We relieved after the coup.' My mom would say: 'I don't know it's for the better or worse, but we *really heaved a sigh of relief* [after the coup]." (emphasis mine)

disintegration of the public order and possibility of a civil strife. As Altınay (2009b) duly notes, this framework holds civilians responsible for coups, while presenting the coups as inevitable and legitimate shelters to take against the irreversibly deteriorating conditions (p. 1249).

This framing also assumes that military coups were successful on different grounds. The attribution of success to the 1980 military coup is most salient in Zeynep's mother's 'sigh of relief' after the intervention. This sigh echoes in some academic approaches to military coups infested with "methodological militarism" (Altınay, 2009b, p. 1250) as well. For example, Altınay (2009b) imparts William Hale's interpretation of the 1971 military coup:

"1972-1973 yıllarında sıkıyönetim, terörü bastırmayı ve günlük yaşamda kanun ve düzeni makul ölçülerde sağlamayı başardı. Böylece Türkiye'ye siyasî şiddetten kurtulup *nefes alma* imkânı verdi."²⁸³ (Hale, 1996 as cited in Altınay, 2009b, p.1250) (emphasis mine)

In such accounts, the coups appear as a remedy, palliative and relieving in its effect, despite all undesired consequences. Therefore, the viewpoint foregrounding the success as the corollary of military coups is often accompanied by an inclination to undermine their 'undesired consequences' (Altınay, 2009b, p. 1251). Zeynep mentions those consequences indeed, but refers to the capitalization of coups as a political stake for gaining ground on rivals as the undesired consequence, whereas İrem trivializes the plight of those upon whom the coup wreaked havoc:

"Ama bunun [1980 askeri darbesinin] yarattığı enkazları günümüzde de, görüyoruz artık. Bundan siyaset yapılmaya başlandı."²⁸⁴

"Ben askerin yaptığının çok yanlış olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Tamam, kötü şeyler yaşanmış evet, o hapis olayları, ceza olayları falan. Tabii ki de

²⁸³ "The state of emergency in 1972-1973 managed to suppress terror and to bring a reasonable return of law and order. By doing so, Turkey was given respite from political violence and the opportunity to *breathe*."

²⁸⁴ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "But we are seeing the wrecks of it [the 1980 military coup] today. They began to do politics out of it."

yaşanmaması gereken çok şey olmuş ama birilerinin de bir şeylere bir şekilde dur demesi lazım. Bundan anlıyorsa eğer böyle olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum."²⁸⁵

İrem is also the only interlocutor who categorically approves military coups. Her justification is predicated on the long-tradition of thought in Turkey which installs a binary between professional soldiers who are qualified enough to govern the nation without holding their personal, class or corporatist interests over national interests and incompetent politicians who seek after their personal and group interests to the detriment of the nation:

"Ya ben aslında darbeye pek karşı bir insan değilim. (Gülerek) Değilim. Çünkü askeri eğitim gerçekten dışarıya göre çok farklı oluyor yani. Özellikle [eğitim] liseden beri geliyorsa [çok farklı oluyor]. Orada insanlara vatan millet sevgisini, tarihini çok güzel anlatıyorlar. Çok güzel ifade ediyorlar. Ve insanlar *doğruyu* öğreniyorlar. Ama [ülkenin] başına gelen insan sadece orada rant kavgası [yapıyor]. 'Ben işte şunu oldum,' diyen bir insanın da ülke yönetmesini bekliyoruz. Yönetemiyor, bilmiyor çünkü. O oraya sadece, 'Ben oldum,' demek için geliyor çünkü."²⁸⁶ (emphasis mine)

Pitting soldiers against politicians, this stream of explanation often depicts the military institution as a graceful saviour who, when required, plunges into the swamp that we usually call politics, where politicians are dabbling in the mud, backstabbing each other, splattering lies and slithering their way into prizes offered by politics. Far from being a meddling presence, the military as a legitimate guardian of the republic is ascribed a regulatory character. Hovering above politics as the arbiter of all sorts of truths (Bora T., 2004, pp. 174-176; Sünbuloğlu, 2013a, p. 13; Birand, 1986, p. 146) and the guide of the

²⁸⁵ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "I don't think that what the military did is wrong. Ok, bad things happened, like imprisonments and punishments. They should not have happened of course, but someone had to put a stop to that. I don't know if they get it, but I think it's the way it should be."

²⁸⁶ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "Actually I am not much against military coups. (Laughing) I am not. Because military education is really different than the education taken outside, especially if it extends back to the [military] high school. There [in military schools] they are exceptionally good in teaching the history and love of nation. They express them very well. And people learn what is *true*. But the [civilian] person ruling the country only considers his own interests. We are waiting to be ruled by a person who says, 'I have become the ruler.' He cannot rule, because he doesn't know how to. He is simply there to say, 'I rule.'" (emphasis mine)

masses, the military institution emerges as the representative of the national consciousness in the last instance (Bora T., 2004, pp. 169-171; Öztan G. G., 2013, p. 87). İrem also annexes educatory functions to the military in the above quote, while privileging the education given in military schools in a way which hints at the militarization of knowledge (Altınay, 2004a, p. 79).

İrem is not the only one who carves space to TSK as the supra-political watchman of the state. Nuri, despite his initial contestation of the military coups also subscribes to the thesis that the Turkish military has a special position and mission:

"... [Askerler] tabii ki Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin koruyucularıydılar. Tabii bazı görüşlerden dolayı, bir tehlike sezdikleri zaman bir darbe yoluyla bunun önüne geçmek istiyorlar. Darbeler o şekilde oluyor yani. Ama şu anda o kırıldı yani. Değişti."²⁸⁷

As I tried to show, contesting and legitimizing military coups can and does go hand in hand in the narratives of many children. Some of my interlocutors were more rigorous in their rhetoric while rejecting coups though. Kemal was one of them, criticizing the military coups for interrupting the natural flow of things:

"Şu anda mesela şu tarz gelişmeler oluyor; daha bir İslamlaşma, kapanma, içine kapanma. İranlaşma tarzı. Olsun abi. Yapmak istiyorlarsa yapsınlar. Sonuçta bunlar da seçilmiş adamlar. Türkiye'nin bugüne kadarki sıkıntısı hep şeydi: Bir şeyi düşündükleri anda bir darbe. Öyle olunca bu adamlar mağdur oluyor. Adam aslında çok yanlış bir düşüncede [olabilir], ama ona rağmen mağdur oluyor. Mesela bir adam birini öldürecek, ama sen adamın kafasında o fikir var diye gidip onun kolunu bacağını kesiyorsun. Yahu belki yapmayacaktı. Belki yapsa cezasını çekecekti, başkaları da bunu görüp yapmaktan vazgeçecekti. Doğal süreci hep kesmişler bir yerde. Şimdi de öyle. Bırak yapsınlar. Bırak bakalım. Bakalım gerçekten alkolü %100 yasaklayacak mı ülkede? Yapabilecek mi bunu? Yapınca ne olacak? Bir kere kendimizi test edelim. Türkiye olarak herkes kendini bir test etsin, bunu istiyor muyuz, istemiyor muyuz diye. Belki istemiyor büyük çoğunluk. Bilmiyoruz ki... Bir

²⁸⁷ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "Of course the military is the protector of the Turkish Republic. Because of some views, when they sense a threat they want to interfere by means of a coup. Coups take place that way. But it has changed now."

şeyler sınırına kadar gelsin, yaşansın. Ak göt kara göt ortaya çıksın, ondan sonra herkes pozisyonunu alır."²⁸⁸

However, Kemal's appeal to liberal majoritarianism for lambasting the trigger-happiness of military elites for staging coups can be self-marring, given that the approval of the 1982 constitutional referendum in a landslide is one of the favourite arguments of those who want to bail out the military coup of 1980. Tarık is another interlocutor who condemns coups. But he does so in a manner too ambiguous to tell on which grounds he raises his objections. He acknowledges that the military coups may invoke sympathetic feelings in earlier stages of life, when children are mostly confined to the military setting. But he does not take this as an excuse:

"Belki küçükken zararsız, olumlu bir noktada görülmesi olası olabilir. Ama tabii iyi kötü büyüyüp, bir şeyler okuyup düşünebildiğin zamanlar - ki bunun ortaokulu çok geçmemesi lazım - neyin ne olduğunu herkes görüp fark eder herhalde diye düşünüyorum."²⁸⁹

Of all my interlocutors, Ayşe is the one whose principal objection to military interventions to politics is most obvious. She is categorically rejecting the military coups:

²⁸⁸ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "Nowadays, things are rather trending towards Islamization, isolation, like Iranization. So be it. If this is what they want, let it be. After all they are elected people. You know what has been the problem of Turkey thus far? As soon as a thought crossed the minds, it was immediately followed by a coup. Then these guys become victims. Maybe they have had false thoughts, but they become victims despite that. Let's say a guy plans to kill somebody, but you mutilate his limbs before he commits the crime because he thought of it. Maybe he was not going to do it. Maybe he would have been punished and others would have drawn a lesson from that. The natural flow of things has always been disrupted [in Turkey]. It is the same today. Let them do. Let them do for a moment and see if they will really prohibit alcohol consumption. Let's see if he is able to do it? Let's see what will follow if he does that? For once, let's try ourselves. As Turkish people, let's all ask if we really want this or not. Perhaps the majority does not want it. Let things play out and come to a certain limit. Let them be experienced. Let everyone show their flags, and then everyone will take a stance."

²⁸⁹ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "They [the military coups] may be perceived as harmless and positive, when little. But when one grows up enough to be able to read and think - and this should not be so much later than the secondary school years - everyone would realize them for what they are."

"Ben darbelere tabii ki karşıyım. Darbenin iyisi, kötüsü olmaz. Her türlü darbeye karşıyız. ... Üçüne birden karşıyım; üçüne, dördüne, beşine [birden karşıyım]. Post-modernine de karşıyım, post-modern olmayanına da karşıyım."²⁹⁰

4.3. Compulsory Military Service

In a literature dominated by the analyses of the relation between military and political fields, it is both pleasing and promising to see that the compulsory military service in Turkey has garnered attention from scholars. Apart from the studies which take the military service within their scope in order to lay bare the grounds on which the Turkish Armed Forces gain its legitimacy and political autonomy (Şen, 2010; Ünsaldı, 2008), its constitutive roles in the establishment of the modern Turkish nation-state (Altınay, 2004a; Zürcher, 2003; Beşikçi, 2010; Paker & Akça, 2010; Dogra, 2010; Ateş, 2012; Belge, 2012) in the configuration and reproduction of gender roles (Altınay, 2004a; Altınay, 2011a; Altınay, 2011b; Çınar & Üsterci, 2008; Selek, 2013; Akgül, 2011; Kaptan, 2009; Sünbuloğlu, 2013a; Sancar, 2012; Biricik, 2013; Açıksöz, 2013; Çoban, 2013; Turan, 2013; Ögünç, 2013; Speck, 2006), in the diffusion of militarist ideology and practices (Çınar & Üsterci, 2008; Şen, 2010; Şen, 2011; Altınay, 2004a; Altınay, 2011b; Öztan G. G., 2013; Turan, 2013) have been explored. Some scholars highlight the ways in which the compulsory military service caters to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production (Altınay, 2004a; Şen, 2010). Military service also constitutes a locus from which scholars can trace the transformation of citizenship since the beginning of modernization efforts, as well as the changing relations between subjects, military and the state (Dogra, 2010; Hacısalihoğlu, 2010; Aykaç, 2013; Bali, 2008; Bali, 2011; Belge, 2013; Zürcher, 2003; Altınay, 2004a). Accordingly, modernizing, civilizing, gendering, nationalizing, disciplining, subjectivating, citizenizing, standardizing and militarizing effects of the compulsory military service have been discussed through and through by many. Nevertheless, as Turan (2013) notices, research that draws on micro perspectives for the

²⁹⁰ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "I am against coups of course. There is no such thing as a good coup. We are against all sorts of coups. ... I am against all three four, five of them. I am against postmodern coups as I am against usual ones."

analysis of the compulsory military service in Turkey is still scarce (pp. 261-262). Therefore, the narratives of the children with whom I conducted interviews can be taken as a minor contribution to the literature in that respect.

The views of the children on the compulsory military service are as diverse as their views on military coups. Many narratives parallel the findings derived from the studies referenced above. Let's start with the narratives of the interlocutors who support the continuation of the conscription system as it is.

Yasemin, initially straddling between supporting and challenging the use of the compulsory military service, eventually deems it necessary on the basis of its nationalizing impact:

Yasemin: "... [H]em gereksiz, hem de gerekli."

Sertaç: "Niye gereksiz, niye gerekli?"

Yasemin: "[Gereksiz, çünkü] çocukların hayatını değiştiriyorsun. Tehlikeye atıyorsun, hayatları söz konusu oluyor bir yerde. Gerekli, çünkü vatan, millet sevgisini askeriyede daha fazla alıyorlar. [Önceden] [v]atan-millet nedir bilmezken, o sırada kalbi pırpır [atarak], 'Vatanımı koruyorum,' diyor."²⁹¹

Many scholars address that "the filling of national consciousness into (male) citizens" (Bora T., 2004, p. 165; Şen, 2010, pp. 55-62) has been one of the major functions of military service. The nationalizing effect of the barracks, they add, is often attended by a modernizing one. Eugen Weber, in his *Peasants into Frenchmen* (1976), also diagnoses the nationalizing and modernizing effects of conscription. According to Weber, in the early years of the French Republic, "by teaching the French language, literacy, civilization (diet, lodging, bedding, hygiene, dress, etc.), as well as what is meant to be a French citizen, the military turned out to be an agency for emigration, acculturation, and in the final analysis,

²⁹¹ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: Yasemin: "It [the compulsory military service] is both necessary and unnecessary." Sertaç: "Why is it necessary and why not?" Yasemin: "[It is unnecessary, because] you change the life course of these children. You put their lives on the line. It is necessary because they learn the love of nation and fatherland more deeply in the military. While knowing no such love before, they get butterflies in their stomachs there for protecting the nation."

civilization, an agency as potent in its ways as the schools" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 68). In an interview, İrem describes the military in very similar terms to Weber as "the school of the fatherland" (Weber, 1976, p. 298) as she defends the compulsory military service on several grounds:

"Olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Yani askere hiçbir zaman gidemeyeceğim için tabii ki de orada yaşananları bilemem. Ama ben de askeri bir ortamda yaşadım askere gitmesem de, o ortamın içinde bulundum yani. Babamın anlattıklarından biliyorum, kendi gözlerimle gördüğüm şeyler var. *Her vatandaşın, her Türk erkeğinin diyeyim* gidip orada eğitim alması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Eğitim süresiyle ilgili bir yorumda bulunamıyorum. Aslında bununla ilgili en iyi yorumu eğitimi verenlerin söylemesi gerekiyor yani. Herkesin kafadan 15 gün olsun, 20 gün olsun demesiyle olacağını sanmıyorum. Çünkü orada eğitim veren insanlar var. Bu konunun uzmanı olan insanlar var. Ne kadar eğitim verilmesi gerektiğini onlar bilirler. Ve o *Doğu'daki insanların* askere gidip de çok şey öğrendiğini biliyorum yani. Okuma-yazmayı bilmeyen askerde okuma yazma öğreniyor. Bir meslek sahibi oluyor, eline bir şey alıyor, bir şey öğreniyor. *Bir şey oluyor neticede. Çok faydalı bir şey olduğuna inanıyorum.*"²⁹² (emphases mine)

Obviously, İrem does not address the possible benefits of the military side of the education given in barracks during one's time of conscription. She instead praises the military as an institution where males learn through their compulsory military service several sorts of know-how required for their integration to an industrialized society. In her statements, the military does not appear as a coercive apparatus of the state in the least. Rather, she puts forward the civilizing and modernizing missions of the military institution in Turkey as an ideological state apparatus. Four points deserves to be highlighted with

²⁹² Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "I find it necessary. Since I cannot be drafted, I cannot know exactly what happens in the barracks. But, I have also been in a military setting. I know about it from what my father tells and I was witness to certain things. I think *every citizen or let's say, every Turkish man* should receive education there. I cannot comment on the length of the military service. It is better to leave it to the trainers [in the military]. Just because some people says so does not mean that it should last 15 or 20 days. There are trainers in the military. There are experts. They know how much it should last. And I know that *the people in the East* learn so many things during their military service. Those who are illiterate learn to read and write there. They get a profession; they get a job and learn something. *They end up as someone/something.* I think it [compulsory military service] is a very *useful* thing." (emphases mine)

reference to İrem's speech. First of all, İrem hints at the relationship between power and the process of subjectivation. To elaborate, İrem's speech rather dwells on the productive dimension of disciplinary power. This disciplinary power serves to the formation of docile and productive bodies (Foucault, 1979). Put differently, what is at stake in İrem's comments on military service is not so much a *power above*; as it is a *power to* (Massumi, 2002, p. 223). In quite a Foucauldian vein, she underscores the aspects of disciplinary power that does not so much 'repress' subjects, as it 'informs' them (Massumi, 2002, p. 223). This materializing aspect of the disciplinary power is most evident in the somewhat vague ending of her remarks: "Those who go there [barracks] end up as something/someone". In a nutshell, İrem seems to suggest that power makes us subjects. Then, her remarks concerning the compulsory military service accords well with Helman's (1997) definition of the military service as an array of disciplinary practices constituting the subjectivity of individuals (p. 309). Secondly, as İrem goes on to talk about the possible benefits of the education taken in barracks, she pays more heed to the education of people living in the East, by suggesting higher rates of illiteracy and unemployment among them. Therefore, I think, she seems to be subscribing to the stream of modernization theses which postulate that the military can turn into an agent "in the network of power that bring the 'poor', the 'underdeveloped', the 'malnourished', and the 'illiterate' into the domain of development" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 65; Akça, 2006, p. 52), especially in underdeveloped countries.²⁹³ Also,

²⁹³ Two statistics which I will share here can hopefully help the reader to understand the great extent to which the military institution has operated in that regard. First, Güvenç (2010) states that, "[t]hrough Law no. 291, 16 Literacy Schools for Privates were opened in 1959. From 1959 to 1975, a total sum of 532,266 privates received an education in these schools. Of these, 392,777 successfully learned to read and write." (p. 268). Secondly, Şen (2011), while writing about vocational courses given in the barracks transfers the statistics that, "[i]n courses held in 1966, 2,800 motor vehicle operators, 38,000 drivers, 200 tractor operators, 316 compressor operators, 75 grader operators, 500 work machine machinists, 60 work machine repairmen, 220 draftsmen, 500 workshop specialists, 350 welders, 3,000 sanitation technicians, 200 blacksmiths, 240 band members, 819 motorists, 500 electricians, ironsmiths, 450 plumbers, 108 machinists, and 126 fitters were trained. In addition to these courses, privates also received general culture lessons in their units and took a number of other courses one month before their discharges. In 1966, of the privates taking these pre-discharge courses, 3,508 were trained in agriculture and fruit growing, 1,094 in animal husbandry, and 2,000 in beekeeping and poultry rearing." (p. 106). Ünsaldı (2008) seems to suggest that the function of the military institution as an ideological apparatus of the state still continues today, perhaps no less than in the past. He shares that

her emphatic remarks on contributions of military service to the lives of people of the East can be read as an implicit acknowledgement of the role played by the security apparatuses of the state in the "governmentalization of the modern nation-state and colonization of periphery" (Özbek, 2010, p. 51). Obviously, the compulsory military service is one of the main pillars helping to that cause by forging direct or indirect connections between central government and people in areas that remain within the boundaries of the nation-state, while residing beyond the effective reach of its infrastructural power. This function is also recognized by Şen (2010), who imparts that one of the main missions of the military, for whose accomplishment the compulsory military service has been proven useful has always been the abolition of the conflict between tradition and modernity, rural and urban, periphery and centre (p. 88). Thirdly, İrem discusses that the compulsory military service helps males to have a profession by increasing their docility-utility. It follows from that, equipped with professional skills which could have lacked otherwise; males who underwent conscription are prepared for jobs and can thus enter market relations with more ease than those who evade the compulsory military service or defined ineligible to attend it. We can draw two conclusions from there. First, as the compulsory military service increases the docility-utility of male bodies, it may also increase their compliance to the capitalist modes of production. Second, the compulsory military service often functions as a social placement mechanism, according to which male subjects who perform their gender roles by serving in the military are assigned to more privileged positions in society and market. This conclusion brings us to the fourth point, that is, the connection of the compulsory military service to the contexts of citizenship and gender. While citizenship is a status which ensures that all citizens are to be treated as full and equal members of society, İrem uses the words 'citizen' and 'Turkish man' interchangeably in the above quotation, as though women are less citizens than are men. This demonstrates how the compulsory military service militarizes the conceptualization of citizenship by introducing hierarchies into the concept

between the dates of 8 February 2000 and 30 September 2002, a total of 231.939 conscripts received education on different topics, while the number of conscripts attending literacy courses during the same span is 66.667 (p. 288). Predicting a 1/3 turnover rate, the rate of people attending literacy courses per year in this period more or less corresponds to the 1960s.

on the basis of one's sex and conformity to assigned gender roles (Altınay, 2004a, p. 77; Altınay, 2008, p. 116).

İrem is not the only interlocutor whose comments demonstrate that gender and military service are imbricated to each other. Merve's thoughts also exemplify the conceptualization of military service as a masculinizing citizenship practice (Altınay, 2004a, p. 62):

"Benim ... asker çocuğu olup, 'Ben askerlik yapmak istemiyorum,' diyen arkadaşım da var. *Bir erkek olarak, asker çocuğu olmasına rağmen* nasıl böyle bir şey söylüyor [bilemiyorum]. Yani bence 5.5 - 6 ay, en azından üniversite mezunları için, çok da uzun bir süre değil. Baş edilebilir bir süre. *Acıtmaz yani.* Niye bu kadar komik[çe], 'Hayır askerlik olmasın, kalsın. Yok paralı olsun,' [diyorlar] anlamıyorum. Anlamıyorum yani, anlamıyorum neden çekinip korktuklarını."²⁹⁴ (emphases mine)

In Merve's case, the experience offered to males by the military is designated to be a masculinizing one. For her, it is incomprehensible to see that, any male with enough discretion and age would deprive himself of the experience of serving in the military. The only possible reason that comes to her mind for their hesitation is fear. For Merve, they are fleeing because they should be afraid. Merve sees their manhood in jeopardy, until they become conscripts, by asking, "how can a man refuse the military service?". "It is not a long time," she says. "It is manageable, it would not hurt". By saying, "it would not hurt," a phrase most common in use, ironically, to soothe the male children when they are circumcised, Merve brings into consideration how the militarized discourse invites to barracks those who refuse the military service, by inciting their masculinity. Also, her statement connotes that military service is integral to the construction of the category of man, and thence woman, by being another "rite of passage" (Altınay, 2004a, p. 77; Selek,

²⁹⁴ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I have a military brat friend as well, saying, 'I don't want to go to military service.' I don't understand how he can say that *as a male and a military brat*. 5.5-6 months, I mean, it is not a very long time, at least for university graduates. It is manageable. *It would not hurt*. I mean, I don't understand why they say ludicrous things, like: 'No, there should not be a military draft. It should be abolished. It should be paid.' ... I really don't get it. I really don't understand what they are afraid of." (emphases mine)

2013, pp. 10-11; Turan, 2013, p. 321; Öztan G. G., 2013, p. 88; Speck, 2006, p. 51) in men's life. She demonstrates how through the military service men's manhood is constructed in relation and contradistinction to women and children (Turan, 2013, p. 279; Çoban, 2013, pp. 195-196; Altınay, 2004a, p. 79). To recapitulate, Merve's comments illustrate how the military service is one of the agents constantly circumscribing the ambit of hegemonic heterosexual masculinity. It seems that to participate in the military for men is to engage in an array of practices offered by the military which allow males to perform masculinity and seal their manhood.

Nevertheless there is also an additional cause which adds up to her perplexity. She seems to presuppose that the children of military families should have a penchant for being conscripts. Nuri is another interlocutor who shares Merve's conviction in that regard:

"Benim için, asker çocuğu olduğum için, öyle ekstrem bir olay değil [zorunlu askerlik]. Çok garip bir şey gibi gelmiyor bana. Ama dışarıdaki insanları gözlemlediğim zaman, çok şey yapıyorlar. İşte, 'Ne yapacağız, ne edeceğiz?' falan. Bende nedense öyle bir şey yok. Asker çocuklarında o olmaz yani. Çok daha rahat olurlar. ... Ve şöyle diyeyim hani: Bedelli askerlik olsa veya zorunlu askerlik olmasa ben yine [de] giderdim, gidebilirdim yani. Çok koymaz bana yani."²⁹⁵

As we will return to the thesis which suggests a correlation between one's status as a child of a military family and his readiness for military service, let's hear first what Nuri has to say more about the compulsory military service:

"...Geçen hafta liseden yakın arkadaşarımdan birisini askere yolladık. Dediğim gibi, kutsal bir meslek olduğu için onu [zorunlu askerliği] çok çabuk

²⁹⁵ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "It [compulsory military service] does not strike me as an extreme thing, as I am a military brat. It is not something odd for me. When I observe the people outside, they make a fuss about it though, like, 'What are we going to do?' I don't feel that way somehow. I mean, military brats do not feel that way. They happen to be very comfortable with it. ... Let me put it this way: Although it would be paid or removed, I would still go to serve in the military. I mean, I could. It would not bug me."

kabullenebiliyorsun. Bundan dolayı mutsuzluk hissetmiyorsun. Tabii biraz garip bir şey.”²⁹⁶

Nuri naturalizes the compulsory military service by assuming sanctity to the military profession. In this way, he puts the military service in a zone which extends beyond the reach of any question directed at its legitimacy. In fact, neither Merve nor Nuri bother much with providing arguments for purposes of legitimizing the compulsory military service. Cut adrift from its rationale and implications, they simply take it as a natural phenomenon to which all Turkish men should oblige and muster in, regardless of their differences in thought, shape, and social origins, by dragging their (un)willing bodies to barracks where they will have given rewards and punishments falling to their lot in the common experience that we call the military service. As seen in their narratives, they think that there is not much use in invoking hue and cry over an impending event of nature.

But how common is the common experience of military service? The nationalist-militarist imagination likes to depict the compulsory military service as a force towards which all the males of the nation equally gravitates as the bells of conscription begins to chime, a homogenizing force by virtue of which the differences among conscripts in terms of class, religion and ethnicity eventually melt away under the waving flag of the nation, and within the uniforming embrace of barracks. In this instance, the military appears as an isolated setting, a cauldron full of seething sentiments invested for the nation and wherein all tensions normally existing in the outer world are left to stew, only to be placated and dissolved through the common experience of military service. A speech of Seyfi Kurtbek, a soldier and a statesman, known for his unimplemented plans aiming at military reformation and for his service as a minister of national defense under the DP government, deserves a special mention to instantiate this viewpoint. Kurtbek enacts his nationalist-militarist imagination at a radio talk, just before the general elections of 1950:

²⁹⁶ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: “Last week we sent one of my close friends from high school to the military service. As I said, just because it is a sacred profession, you can accept it [compulsory military service] easily. You do not feel unhappy about it. It is a bit odd though.”

"Demokrat Parti Silahlı Millet teorisini, demokrasinin askeri ifadesi sayar. Milli varlığı korumak için asker sivil farkının kaldırılması ve Millet'in Ordulaştırılması lazımdır. Millet'in bütün ekonomik kaynakları, Milli Savunma için teşkilatlandırılmalıdır. Milli Eğitim, Adalet, Maliye ve İdare ve Ulaştırma hizmetleri kâmilten Milli Savunmadaki yerlerini alırlar."²⁹⁷ (Cited in Özcan, 2010, pp. 214-215; Akyaz, 2009, pp. 67-69)

Kurtbek's speech is nothing short of phenomenal and simultaneously cringeworthy, in its efforts to promote Prussian militarist ideals in the garb of democracy. However, his attempt to reconcile democracy and the theory of nation-in-arms is significant, because at the intersection point between them, he has to locate the compulsory military service as a democratizing and homogenizing vehicle. Yet, the reality seems a far cry from Kurtbek and his conceptualization of the military service. Let alone being a democratizing agent, in studies where we can hear the voices of soldiers, it becomes clear that the military service is not a homogenizing force. On the contrary, military service even intensifies in many cases the inequalities and injustices endemic to social life (Mater, 2012; Altınay, 2004a; Turan, 2013).²⁹⁸ In line with Turan (2013), I assert that the promise of equality given by the military service on the basis of its uniforming and standardizing effects is nothing but a colossal myth (pp. 268-269). As Altınay (2004a) proclaims, military service does not offer bare and singular experiences to all males; "there are various differences - mainly along the lines of class, education, ethnicity, and religion - which disrupt that bareness" (p. 77).

The continuum of the differences between the life outside the barracks and life inside the barracks, as well as the injustices embedded in the conscription system are actually

²⁹⁷ "The Democrat Party considers the armed-nation theory as the military expression of democracy. Abolishing the military-civilian distinction and the Militarization of the Nation are necessary to preserve national existence. All of the economic resources of the nation should be organized for National Defense. The services of National Education, Justice, Finance and Transportation take their wholly roles in the National Defense."

²⁹⁸ This problem even seems to extend back to the Ottoman times. Although the conscription ballot system was instituted in order to remove the differences between rich and poor in their military service, in an official report of Dâr-ı Şura-yı Askerî (Military Council) dating back to 1848, it is stated that there is not even one child of *eşraf* (notable, rich families) among those who arrived for their conscription through the ballot (Hacısalıhoğlu, 2010, p. 85).

affirmed in some interviews. For example, Yasemin finds the injustice in the arbitrariness of the system:

"Yani aslında çok adaletsiz bir şey. Çünkü hani bazıları gidiyor Doğu'ya bazıları Batı'da kalıyor. Hiçbir adaleti yok bunun."²⁹⁹

On the other hand, Merve refrains from acknowledging the influence of class and status by instantly shifting to a third person narrative. Despite her resort to depersonalization, she seems to imply in the following sentences that the paid military service would exacerbate the injustices already existing in the current conscription system by systematizing them. However, she turns this predicament into an argument in favor of the continuum of the conscription system as it is:

"...[Z]aten tamamen karşıyım bedelli askerliğe. Yani bu sefer parası olmayan tamamen şey olmuş olacak... Hani derler ya: 'Yok general çocuklarının, parası olanın [askerliği] hiçbir zaman Doğu'ya çıkmaz.' Bu sefer de bunu iyice sistematikleştiren bir şey olacak."³⁰⁰

Similarly, Deniz objects to the paid military service by stating that it would entail discrimination and inequality on the basis of one's class. As the lesser of two evils, the current conscription system once again earns the halo of reason and gets his nod:

"Zorunlu askerlik hizmeti bence mantıklı bir uygulama. Bu işi bedelli yaparsınız biraz ayrımcılık oluyor gibi geliyor bana. Sonuçta ... bedelli askerliği karşılayabilen aileler var, karşılayamayacak aileler var. Bu yönde bir eşitsizlik söz konusu olabilir."³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "In fact it is quite unfair. Because, you know, some go to the East, some stay in the West. There is no justice to it."

³⁰⁰ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I am completely against the paid military service. Then people who do not have the money will be like... You know how they say: 'The sons of general officers and rich people are never sent to the East.' It [the paid military service] would systematize that further."

³⁰¹ Personal interview with Deniz, conducted on 05.12.2013: "I think the compulsory military service is a rational implementation. If you make it paid, it would lead to

Zeynep too acknowledges some problems in the current conscription system. Differently from others though, Zeynep is also the only interlocutor who churned out multiple arguments to legitimize the compulsory military service on several grounds:

"Bu bizim *geleneğimiz* ya, ben bunu böyle görüyorum. Biz Amerika değiliz. Biz *sonradan kurulu bir ülke ya da devlet değiliz*. Onlar kadar rahat da değiliz. Bizim *jeopolitik konumumuz* da öyle, siyasetimiz de öyle. Bak bence bizim her zaman dış politikamız başka ülkelerin yönlendirmesiyle oldu. ... Bu ülkenin güvenliğe gerçekten ihtiyacı var... [B]u zorunlu askerlik olayı zaten çok önceden gelen bir şey, *kuruluşumuzdan gelen bir şey*."³⁰² (emphases mine)

The first thing that we encounter in between these lines is the good old "myth of the military nation."³⁰³ The thrust of the thesis of the military nation is that, "Turks" have always fostered a different kind of affiliation with the military, since their foundation. As a corollary, they have a special knack and predisposition for soldiering and combat. In this framework by which soldiering as well as sets of values related to the military institution are ethnicized, dehistoricized, essentialized and thence naturalized, the military and the nation is seen coeval with each other. More importantly, the myth of the military nation displaces the military service from a legal and institutional register according to which the civic duty of conscription is incumbent on all male citizens, to a social and cultural one where soldiering turns into a practice of one's (male) culture and citizenship rights (Altınay, 2004a, pp. 29-30; Altınay, 2004b, pp. 187-188; Altınay, 2008, pp. 114-115; Şen, 2011, pp. 35-36). Accordingly, Zeynep assumes a distinction between Western countries like the United States where soldiering is not part and parcel of the nation and Turkey where it is ingrained in the tradition.

discrimination I guess. After all ... there are families who can afford it and others who cannot. It [the paid military service] would create inequality in that regard."

³⁰² Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "It is our *tradition*. This is how I see it. We are not the United States. We are *not a state or a country established recently* or later than others. We are not as comfortable as them either. This is how *our geopolitical position* and politics are as well. I think our foreign policy has always been guided by other countries. ... This country really needs security... And after all, this compulsory military thing dates back to a long time ago, *to our foundation*." (emphases mine)

³⁰³ For an extensive study on the genealogy, use and implications of the myth of the military nation, see: Altınay, 2004a

Zeynep also adds to her arsenal of arguments "the discourse of geopolitics"³⁰⁴ to justify the compulsory military service. Instead of the commonly frequented theme of 'the dislike for a strong Turkey' to combine with 'the geopolitical significance of the country' (Kancı & Altınay, 2007, pp. 59-65), she resorts to 'the impotence of Turkey in foreign policy' in order to underline the geopolitical vulnerability and security deficit of the country.

However, her take on the myth of the military nation varies from more orthodox deployments of it. Zeynep does not subscribe to a static understanding of culture. She leaves a room for the slight possibility of change, despite her contentment with the way things are going as it is. For her, the possibility of change is dependent on developments in the arena of international politics where Turkey has no power for setting its own agenda. Eventually, she advises to 'take it slow' though, lest that the society, which is assumed to be unprepared for such a change of normalization, should lag behind the pace of change:

Zeynep: "Şu an [zorunlu askerlik için] kötü bir uygulama demeyebilirim, demem. Ama ileride dönüşeceği durumlarda neler gerektirir? Zorunlu askerlik olayı kalkabilir. Kalkamaz da. Bilmiyorum. Bunun tamamıyla bizim dış politikamızla alakalı olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bu tamamıyla yapısal olarak dönüşmeye bağlı bir şey. Ama dediğim gibi bizim dış politikamız da bence dış ülkelerin politikalarıyla alakalı. Biz kendimiz yön veremiyoruz. Biz yönlendiriliyoruz. Ben bunu tipik komplo teorikiler gibi, 'Amerika bizi yönlendiriyor,' bilmem ne diye söylemiyorum."

Sertaç: "Ama gündem belirleyici gücümüz yok diyorsun."

Zeynep: "Kesinlikle. Biz gündem belirlemiyoruz yani, yönlendiriliyoruz. Bu kadar basit. Zorunlu askerlik şu anda mecburi; olması gereken [de bu]. Bunu sen bir anda dönüştüremezsin. Bir anda, tepe taklak, 'Kaldırıyorum,2 diyemezsin. Çünkü zaten askerinin ordunun çok hâkim olduğu bir ülkede yaşıyoruz. Eskiden inanılmaz[dı] hani. Son 10 yıldır o yavaş yavaş ortadan kalkıyor. Sen bu uzun dönemde askerinin etkisini, zorunlu askerli[ği] de bu bağlamda [ele alırsak], bir anda ortadan kaldıramazsın. Bu anca dönüşerek, zaman içinde [olacak]. Değişim hızı bunda çok önemli. Değişim hızına toplumun da ayak uydurması lazım. Ama tabii ki önden gidersen çatlaklıklar

³⁰⁴ For a study on the utilization of the geopolitical discourse for purposes of legitimization with respect to the modern nation state's monopolization of violence, see: Bilgin, 2010

illa ki olur. Bu olmayacak bir şey değil. Tabii ki kaldırılabilir, ama şu anda normal."³⁰⁵

On the flipside, the compulsory military service, alongside the thesis that being a child in a military family smoothens male children's transition to barracks, is heavily contested in other narratives. Military service may indeed be "the greatest engine the world has yet seen for the manufacture of a particular type of human intellect and body" (Cited in Altınay, 2004a, p. 62), as the British General Sir Ian Hamilton put it in 1910. Nevertheless, Bröckling notes (2008), the militaries do not only produce docile, obedient and courageous soldiers equipped with technological skills. Deserters, pacifists, rebels, defectors, war neurotics and self-mutilating soldiers feigning trouble are also the products of the militaries (pp. 26-27). Military brats prove no exception to this. The following narratives shatter the image of a military brat, prepared and looking forward to fulfill his obligations to the nation by serving in the military.

To begin with, Ayşe, once again, raises her fundamental objections, this time from an anti-militarist standpoint. Without any compromise, she opposes the military service as well as any other alternative that may be called to fill the vacuum left after the abolition of the compulsory military service, in case that happens:

³⁰⁵ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: Zeynep: "I would not call it [compulsory military service] bad. I don't. But what would follow in case it is transformed? The compulsory military service may be removed. Or may not. I don't know. I think it all boils down to our foreign policy. It all boils down to a structural change. However, our foreign policy depends on other countries as I said. We cannot navigate it on our own. We are guided by others instead. I am not saying it like typical conspiracy theories, arguing 'the Americans rule us.'" Sertaç: "But we are deprived of the power to set the agenda, you say..." Zeynep: "Absolutely. We cannot set the agenda. We are rather guided. It is that simple. The compulsory military service is currently compulsory and this is how it should be. You cannot change it overnight. You cannot instantly announce that, 'I am abolishing it.' We are already living in a country where the military is powerful. Its power was even more incredible back then. Now it is withering away since the last decade. If we take into account the deep-rooted influence of the military, you cannot instantly remove the compulsory military service. It will only take place through time. The pace of change is crucial here. Society has to keep up with the pace of change. If you outpace the society, there will be ruptures for sure. The change is not impossible, but what we have is normal for the time being."

Ayşe: "Ona da [zorunlu askerlik] karşıyım, zorunlu askerliğe de karşıyım."
Sertaç: "Peki profesyonel ordu tadında bir şey mi alternatif olarak gördüğün yoksa..."
Ayşe: "Yok ben tamamen orduların olmadığı, sınırsız, savaşızsız bir dünya taraftarıyım."³⁰⁶

For Tarık, the military service is a looming obstacle, standing adamantly between his present and future. He thus reflects mainly on strategies rather typical of the middle classes to dodge the military service, considering even desertion as an option:

"O [zorunlu askerlik] orada durduğu sürece ya bir an önce gideyim halledeyim veyahut da olabildiğince erteleyelim diyorsun. Örneğin ben geçtiğimiz yıl kendi işimi kurdum, ama kendi işimi devam ettirebilmek için bir engel olmadan ya [işe] kısa bir süre ara vermem ya da [işimi] bir an önce birilerine devredip gidip gelmem gerekiyor. Onun da böyle bir sürüncemede kalmaması gerekiyor. 'Şu zaman gideceğim ve geleceğim,' diyebilmem gerekiyor. Atıyorum gittim; uzun dönem çıktı. Böyle bir sürprizin olmaması gerekiyor. Ya da olabildiğince erteleyebilmem gerekiyor akademik eğitime, hayata devam ederek. Yahut da ne bileyim, bakayaya kalıp kaçarak, şudur budur..."³⁰⁷

On the other hand, Kemal is the only interlocutor who finished his service in the military. In his narrative, we can bear testimony to the self-subverting characteristics of power (Foucault, 1979; Foucault, 1990) and observe the ways in which military service can have transformative impacts on people in such ways that undermine, if not thwart, disciplinary power's own "teleological aims of normalization" (Butler, 1997a, p. 93). Kemal stated repeatedly during and after the interview how he grew impatient with the military

³⁰⁶ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: Ayşe: "I am also against it. I am against the compulsory military service as well." Sertaç: "Then do you see any alternative to that, like the paid military service?" Ayşe: "No, I am in favor of a world without militaries, borders and wars."

³⁰⁷ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "As it [compulsory military service] hovers above your life, you think of overcoming it by registering for the draft as soon as possible or postponing it as far as possible. For example, I set up my own business last year and I have to suspend or hand over the business to someone else during that time in order to keep things afloat. There should be no lagging. I should be able to tell when my departure and return are due. Let's say I draw the short straw and become a conscript for long-term. There should be no such surprises. Or I should postpone it as much as possible by pursuing further academic education or, I don't know, by evading the draft and so forth."

institution since his service. His was "a short-term one, easy and a perfectly normal stint in the West,"³⁰⁸ he recites, but took enough tolls on him, inducing him to mobilize reverse-discourses. He informs that, the military service has strengthened his liberal beliefs.³⁰⁹ When asked what comes to his mind when he hears the words TSK, the army or the military, he erupts as he goes on to answer the question, chuckling and shaking his head in disapproval at once:

"Benim için büyük bir komedi sahnesi geliyor. Ama bu asker çocuğu olduğum için değil, *askerliği yaptıktan sonra daha da idrak ettiğim bir şey*. Mesela KBRN diye bir şey vardır askeriyenin içinde; Kimyasal-Biyolojik-Radyoaktif-Nükleer diye bir şey. Onların kısaltması, kısaltması bile komik. Abi o kadar komedi ki biz denetlemelerde KBRN timiyiz, tamam mı? Eğitim falan alıyoruz güya. O kadar saçma şeyler ki; mesela nükleer saldırı olduğunda belirli bir pozisyonda yatıyorsun, postallarını dikiyorsun yere falan. O seni koruyormuş. Saçma sapan, hiçbir fiziksel gerçekliğe dayanmayan, safsatadan ibaret, sırf şekil olsun diye [yapılan şeyler]. Nükleer tatbikat yani. İşin komik yanı, albay geldi: 'Sizin,' dedi 'gaz maskeleriniz kaç tane?' Sordu böyle. (Gülerek) Komutan da dedi ki: 'Bir tane.' Bütün karargâhta bir tane. Komedi ya. Dalga mı geçiyorsun yani! Kim takacak onu? Bir tane var, onu da takmış koluna duruyor. Çok büyük bir komedi sahnesi. Daha geçen gün haberlerde vardı: 'Türk Ordusu Kimyasal Saldırlara Hazırlanıyor.' İşte [askerler] KBRN eğitimi alıyor falan diye yalandan bir video çekmişler. Çadırın içini gazla doldurmuşlar, maskelerle içine girip çıkıyorlar falan. Ama işin içine girince, komedi ya... İçindeyken gülemiyorsun ama gerçekten büyük bir komedi yani. Oradaki bütün komutanlar da farkında. Bazı şeyler çok hantal, değişmesi zaman alıyor, ama değişecektir yani. Çok saçma, çok komik yani aptalca bunu iyi bir şey olarak düşünmek. Zannetmiyorum, bu kadar aptal olamaz insanlar."³¹⁰

³⁰⁸ From my field notes, after the personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013

³⁰⁹ From my field notes, after the personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013

³¹⁰ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "It evokes in my mind one big comedy stage. Not because I am a military brat, but *I had a better grasp of it after finishing the military service*. For example, there is something called the KBRN squad in the military. KBRN is the abbreviation for Chemical-Biological-Radioactive-Nuclear. Even the abbreviation is ridiculous. It is all ridiculous man. We are the KBRN squad in inspections, alright? We are getting trained for that and so forth. In case there is a nuclear strike, you take a position lying down with your boots facing the sky. It is supposed to save you from a nuclear strike. Now, all there is to them is stupid nonsensical gimmicks, going against the simple laws of physical reality. The funny thing is, one day the colonel came and asked: 'How many gas masks do you have?' He asked that. (Laughing) And the commander said: 'One, sir.' Only one gas mask for the whole military quarters. It is a farce.

Out of 214 words in his Turkish speech, Kemal manages to use the words comedy and comic 9 times. It is all staged according to him, where the farcical spectacle continues incessantly and the curtain never falls down as newcomers always replace those who depart:

"Bir komedide rol alıyorsun, sonra biri senin yerine giriyor, oyun devam ediyor hep yani. Büyük bir perde yani."³¹¹

Kemal's poignant delineation of his military service brings to mind Çoban's (2013) conceptualization of "the militarist spectacle power" (pp. 189-194), in which everything operates through an 'as if' rationale. For Kemal, his military service was a waste of time.

"Ömrümden çalınmış bir seneyi ifade ediyor [zorunlu askerlik]. Şu anda mesela 1 sene daha tecrübeli olabilirdim yaptığım işte. Ya da bir level daha yukarı çıkmış olabilirdim. Tamamen zaman kaybı ya, tamamen zaman kaybı. Bir de insanın özgüvenini törpüleyen bir şey. Çok saçma ya. Sadece okumuş insanlar için değil, okumamış insanlar için de saçma. Eskiden belki ulaşım imkanları, iletişim imkanları yokken birileri için bir şey ifade ediyor olabilir. Belki insanlar okuma-yazma öğrendi, şehir ne onu gördü falan. Artık bence hiçbir anlamı yok ya. Herkes için zaman kaybı. 15 ay uzun dönem [askerlik yapan] lise mezunu çocuklar için de zaman kaybı. Onlar da mesela gidip bir yerden bir kariyer başlatabilirler yani. İlla üniversite okumaları gerekmiyor. Onlar da iki senesini kaybetmiş oluyor. Belki o bir yere girecekti, en tabandan girecekti. Belki bir level yukarı çıkacaktı. Ama onun için de zaman kaybı abi. Herkes için öyle ya. Çünkü kimse orada asker olmuyor."³¹²

Are you kidding! Who will wear that mask? There is only one and he is already holding it in his hands. It is just one big comedy stage. Few days ago I saw in the news: 'The Turkish Military is Getting Prepared for Chemical Threats.' They took footage of soldiers feigning training, diving with gas masks into tents full of gas and so forth. When you become involved, you see that it is ridiculous though... You cannot laugh inside, but it is pure comedy. All the commanders also know it. They know there are many sluggish things in the military. It takes time to change them, but they will change. It is ridiculous so much that it'd be stupid to think that as something good. I believe people cannot be that dumb."

³¹¹ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "You take part in a big comedy stage, then someone replaces you and the play goes on. It is a big act."

³¹² Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "It [compulsory military service] means to me a year stolen from my life. I could have been a year more experienced in my job. Or I could have been a level higher. It is a complete time-waste. It also hurts your self-confidence. It is ridiculous. Not only for educated, but also for uneducated people."

Two points are worth attention in Kemal's narrative. First is Kemal's riposte to İrem that the civilizing and integrating functions of the military as the school of the fatherland has expired. His position anticipates Şen's contention that the pioneer position of the military institution and the function of the military as an ideological state apparatus in Turkey dwindles as the "infrastructural power" (Mann, 1993) and the "administrative power" (Giddens, 1985) of the nation state grew enough after 1980s to enable its reach to regions where it had little if any control before (2010, pp. 166-174). Kemal thus articulates that, the military service is proven useless not only for him, but for everyone. Secondly, he attracts attention to the inadequacy of the military training given in barracks, in a manner quite antithetical to the myth of the military nation. "Nobody becomes a soldier there," he concludes, while seeing the resolution of the predicament in a transition to a professional army:

"Ben liberal görüşlü bir insanım. Hiçbir şeye aşırı bir tutkum, sempatim yok. Ama bu işin oluru nedir biliyor musun? ... Bu sistem nasıl yürür biliyor musun? Dediğim gibi [profesyonel] askerler yaratırsın, onlara da parasını verirsin. ... Bu işin gerçekten profesyonelleşip, böyle büyük bir kitle ordusu halinden çıkıp, askerliğin içindeki angarya kısmını çıkartıp, yani oradaki kadroları elimine edip sadece işi gerçekten askerlik olan profesyonel insanların istihdam edilmesini isterdim ben. O zaman zaten bu tarz problemler olmaz. Hani bu filmlerde gördüğün özel birlikler gibi adamlar yetiştirirsen; o tarz adamlar, yaşlanınca da onların komutanı olacağı daha kemik birlikler..."³¹³

When there were little to no means of communication or transportation back in the old days, perhaps it meant something for some people. Perhaps people learned how to read and write, saw a city for the first time in their lives and so forth. But it has no longer any meaning to it. It is a time-waste for everyone. It is a time-waste for high school graduates on long-term service for 15 months as well. They could start a career in that two years they lose. One doesn't have to graduate from university to do that. Maybe he was going to get a job and start from the bottom. Maybe he was going to get a promotion in what he does during that time span. It is also a time-waste for him, for everybody. Because nobody becomes a soldier there."

³¹³ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "I am a liberal person. I don't have excessive passion or sympathy for anything. You know what would be doable? ... You know how it would work out? [It would work out] [i]f you create [professional] soldiers and pay them. ... I would like this job to become professionalized instead of being a huge mass military, its drudgerous parts to be removed, by the elimination of lousy units in the military alongside their cadres, and the employment of professional people whose job will regard only and only the military. Then there would be no such problems, if you were

I should add a caveat here with reference to Kemal's arguments. Unlike Ayşe, Kemal's loud protests against the military institution do not much amount to a critique of militarism. Kemal rather calls for the end of mass military so that it can be replaced with a smaller and more concentrated, highly mobile, precisely striking, outsourcing, flexibly organized and even exportable professional army, consisting of well-equipped and trained mercenaries of the modern age, and engaging not so much in conventional wars as in peace operations, 'humanitarian' interventions, crime on missions and counter-insurgency acts (Bora T., 2006, p. 26; Laçiner, 2004). As these changing patterns, whose emergence have been referred by many as the birth of the "post-modern" (Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000) or "post-Fordist military" (King, 2006), are appropriated for the Turkish context, Kemal believes that the system will work with less frictions. Because the efficacy of the new organizational pattern, Kemal thinks, would pry loose the military institution and nation state by releasing the burdens that the compulsory military service lays on them in terms of financing, administration and governmentality. But Kemal is a proponent of the professional army on another ground as well. He supposes that it should relieve the tensions in civil-military relations of Turkey:

"Hem de böyle soru işaretleri olmaz kimsenin kafasında abi. 'Aman orada [askeri tesislerde] bedava yaşıyorlar; aman böyle aman şöyle yapıyorlar' [demezler]. Kapat gitsin abi. Oraya harcayacağın paraya çekirdek bir ordu kur, onlara 10 kâğıt maaş ver abi. Adam da nerede ne bok yemek istiyorsa yıllık izninde yapsın. Milletın ağzından, dilinden de bu laflar kalksın abi."³¹⁴

Basically, Kemal propounds in the above statement that, reshaping the tasks and organization in accordance with the market rationale may also help to the secularization of the military in public perception (Bora T. , 2006, p. 26). But more importantly, the

to create special units just like you watch in movies. I mean that kind of guys working in core units, where they will become commanders as they get older..."

³¹⁴ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "Then there'd be no question marks on people's minds as well. They would not say: 'Oh, they are living there [in military facilities] for free. They are doing this and that.' Shut them down already. Create a core [professional] military instead and pay them good. And let these guys do whatever the heck they want to do during their annual leave, so that such words in the mouths of people should disappear."

annoyance of Kemal by the 'words in the mouths' and 'question marks on the minds' of others in fact mark the dimension which makes the rejection of the military service even harder for the children of military families. Because they are obliged by laws to serve in the military, like every other male citizen, yet in their case expectations soars even higher. In the public imagination, they all feast on lush conditions provided them by the military. However, *even they* procrastinate their inevitable military service. Suffice it to remember, one way to refer the injustices of the military service is stating that, as Merve denoted: "*Even they* (especially, the sons of general officers) do not do their military service in the East." Then, harking back to one of our original questions which motivated and guided this study: What happens when a military brat decides to be a fugitive, rotten,³¹⁵ deserter or a conscientious objector? What happens if these children slip out of the heterosexual matrix and become ineligible for their military service? Conscientious objection is already a blow knocked against the myth of the military nation, by showing that no one is born a soldier. What happens if this blow comes from a child brought up within the military community, by a military family? Their resistance would not only be understood as an act which endangers the security of the nation, or a riot against the legitimacy of the state (Beşikçi, 2010, p. 148), but also as an outlandish rebellion and a fundamental objection raised against the myth of the military nation. The discursive universe on which the whole myth is predicated would be put into disintegration even more radically. For they would show that *even* the children brought up within the military community as members of military families of a supposedly military nation are not born soldiers. Therefore, it is of immediate significance for the military and defenders of the myth of the military nation to contain these children within a heterosexual matrix and manufacture their consent in order to keep intact the pillars on which the myth rises. Otherwise, these children would not only cast a shadow of doubt on their own masculinity, citizenship and loyalty to the nation, but also on the myth of the military nation, even more than other conscientious objectors, simply because they are its softest belly. Since it is also *arguably* harder to marginalize and criminalize these children than other conscientious objectors on ethnic, religious or socio-economic grounds as well, it is also probably better for the military elites to see that people

³¹⁵ The word "rotten" (*çürük*) has been substituted by "those ineligible for military service" in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, with the changes ratified on 27.10.2013

keep and spread 'the word' out in the streets and 'the question mark' in their heads, about how the son of a general officer in their town lazes away his military service in such and such a military post of a Western city, rather than beholding in fear that 'the eminent and true children of the nation' turn into 'flies hard to swallow' (Öğünç, 2013, p. 161) and completely refuse to turn themselves in to the military. As their sting would be doubly impactful, fraught with more significations and implications, they should have been rendered doubly invisible. Perhaps this is why, we do not hear much from Ferda Ülker, whose invisibility is tripled as a female conscientious objector.³¹⁶ Perhaps this is why another troubling figure like the children of military officers, Yuri, who was once strolling within the institutional borders of the military as a young cadet, has not been taken to the court for his offenses as a conscientious objector unlike numerous others.³¹⁷ And perhaps this is also why Tarık, after our interview and while driving us home, told me how he will most probably yield to the relentless "interpellation of the military" (Turan, 2013, pp. 310-311) in the long run. After a moment of silence, he began talking again, as he stared at the brake lights of the cars ahead us, waiting for the stoplight to turn green. "The pressure is too high," he said with aplomb, "to take other routes."³¹⁸ I first took his words as a regular apology issued for the city's usual afternoon traffic jam and dull scenery. Then I realized that maybe the ambiguous sentence spilled from him, because he was bereft of the hope that he could dodge military service. I still do not know in which context he used the sentence. I did not ask what other routes were available for him. Whatever they may be, Frost's "roads less traveled" (Altınay, 2004a) seems destined to be the "paths almost unbeaten" for children of military families if and insofar as the wind, whispering the words 'even they', continues to blow by the dilapidated road sign on which is written 'en route to the zones of discomfort'.

4.4. The Trials of Balyoz and Ergenekon

Another burning issue which has galvanized the public opinion on the military institution is the cropping up of legal cases, namely the controversial Balyoz and

³¹⁶ To learn more about Ferda Ülker's story, see: Öğünç, 2013, pp. 104-113

³¹⁷ To learn more about Yuri's story, see: Öğünç, 2013, pp. 48-59

³¹⁸ From my field notes, after the personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013

Ergenekon trials, in which the military was seated on the dock. The trials were unprecedented and paradigmatic in the sense that they symbolized the widening fractures in the military's shield of invincibility (Maktav, 2006, pp. 81-84; İnsel, 2004. p. 47), a shield that is especially renowned for its capacity to hold at bay any interventions coming from the field of law.³¹⁹ The columns written on these trials are dime a dozen. However we did not get to learn much about how the legal process put a dent in the military organization, even after the cathartic closures of the trials in 2012 (Sledgehammer) and 2013 (Ergenekon). Nor do we know the ways in which it has been perceived by the military community, except the public statements of some angry general officers and resignation letters of military officers pouring in hordes from all quarters.

Let's proceed now to the narratives of the children to better understand the reception of the trials which caused a tremor in the military as well as to observe if the trials prompted a change in the perception of the children with respect to the institution. I did not advertently separate the trials while asking my questions, once again to see whether my interlocutors were going to feel the need to pose a distinction. No one felt such a need. This shows how the trials are welded together in the perception of the children whom I interviewed.

I can roughly divide the approaches of the children to the trials into two categories. The metaphor of 'game' predominates in the former group. In the first approach, the metaphor is deployed to exhibit the artificiality of the whole process:

"Çok ispatlanmış şeyler varmış [Balyoz ve Ergenekon'un] olmadığına dair. Ama sonuçta askerler içeride. Ya zaten Ergenekon diye bence çok saçma sapan yaratılmış bir şey var. ... *Oyun* mu diyeyim, ne diyeyim..."³²⁰ (emphasis mine)

³¹⁹ For the historical analysis of the dicephalous character of the judicial apparatus in Turkey, which caters to the autonomy of the military institution, see: Kardaş, 2004

³²⁰ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "They say there are many things proving that they [Ergenekon and Balyoz] do not exist. But soldiers are behind the bars anyway. There is already something called the Ergenekon, which is nothing but a ridiculous invention. ... Shall I call it a *game* or what..." (emphasis mine)

"Çok doluyum bu konuda. İçinde olunca yediremiyorsun yani, biliyorsun öyle olmadığını. Hepsinin bir *oyun* olduğunu biliyorsun. ... Askeri bitirmek için çok güzel bir oyun kurdular. Hatta o ... saçma sapan iddianamelerin bile ne kadar geçersiz, ne kadar saçma olduğu, ne kadar anlamsız olduğu bile ortaya çıkarılmasına rağmen [iddianameler işleme konuluyor]."³²¹ (emphasis mine)

Nuri's narrative also revolves around the same metaphor. He makes use of it, again to attract attention to the possibility that the trials may be concocted in their nature:

"Asker çocuğu olduğum için 'Balyoz, Ergenekon, böyle şey olmaz,' demektense her zaman her şeye eşit yönden bakmaya çalışıyorum. Ben böyle şeyler olduğuna çok inanmıyorum. Bir *oyunmuş* gibi geliyor. Ama çok da hani böyle masum da değillermiş gibi geliyor bir yandan da."³²² (emphasis mine)

Differently from İrem and Merve, Nuri suspects that convicts may not be innocent. At the presence of such doubts the theme of the 'rotten apples in the barrel' is often introduced to the conversations. Zeynep is another interlocutor who thinks that the trials are bogus, while conceding that some of the military officers can be guilty. According to her, they are throwing the baby out with the bathwater:

"Düzmece. Direkt. ... [B]azı şeyler o kadar açık ki. Şöyle düşünüyorum: Evet, belli bir kaç kişi var suçlu [olan]. Belki de 10 kişi. Her neyse. Ama bunları göstererek bir torba davaya dönüştü bu [hukuki süreç]. Bu dava adı altında, bu suç adı altında masum insanları oç alma pahasına yargılıyorlar. Daha doğrusu ölüme terk edecekler yani. Benim düşüncem bu. Ben asla ve asla inanmıyorum."³²³

³²¹ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "It [the trials] plagues me. When you are involved, you know otherwise. You know that it is all a *game*. It is a set up to do away with the military. Even despite the ridiculous accusations are proven wrong and meaningless [they run the charges]." (emphasis mine)

³²² Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "Rather than saying, 'There are no such things as Balyoz and Ergenekon,' because I am a military brat, I always try to take an equal distance from varying perspectives. I don't believe such things exist. It seems to me as a *game*. However, it also seems to me that they are not much innocent." (emphasis mine)

³²³ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "It is nothing but a fraud. ... Some things are so obvious. I think this way: Yes, there are few guilty people. Perhaps ten, whatever. But they turned it into a mass trial to pack everyone into prison under the guise

The interlocutors in the first group more or less concur on certain motives navigating the legal process. For them, the primary motive behind the contrived trials is to sap the strength of the military, by capturing or defaming it:

"Tamamen *askerleri indirme*, askerleri geri çekme ve polis devleti oluşturma gibi bir amaçları var bence. O yüzden bence nasıl çekebiliriz dediler. Olmayan bir şeyi ortaya atıp bütün askerleri toplamak en iyi çözüm. İçeride ne yapabilirler? Hiçbir şey yapamazlar."³²⁴ (emphasis mine)

"Tamamen asker düşmanlığı, *askeri aşağılamak için* yapılmış küçük bir şey yani. Oyun mu diyeyim, ne diyeyim."³²⁵ (emphases mine)

"Ben Genelkurmay Başkanları dâhil, [askerlerin] darbe yapacaklarını çok düşünmedim. Belki geçmiştir. Belki böyle bir düşünce geçmiştir [akıllarından]. Olabilir. Ama [bu düşüncenin] çok uygulanabileceğini düşünmüyorum. Belki onu yakalamışlarsa işte hazır fırsat diye... Çünkü *ele geçiremedikleri tek güç* asker kalmıştı."³²⁶ (emphasis mine)

"Hepsinin bir oyun olduğunu biliyorsun. Zaten *asker bırakmadılar, asker kalmadı* yani. Kalanlar da sürekli istifa ediyorlar. Çünkü gururlarına, onurlarına yediremiyor insanlar. Çok da haklılar. 'Ben bu insanlara mı hizmet edeceğim?' diyorsun yani. 'Niye edeyim ki? Niye uğraşayım, niye kendi canımı ortaya koyayım ki?' diyorsun. İşte *askeri bitirmek için* çok güzel bir oyun kurdular."³²⁷ (emphases mine)

of judging them [few guilty people]. Innocent people are put into trial just for sake of revenge, in the name of justice. In fact, they will be left for dead. This is what I think. I never ever believe it."

³²⁴ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "They simply aim to *overthrow the military* and create a police state instead. Thus they thought how they can accomplish it. The best solution is to make up something in order to collect all soldiers. What can they do behind the bars? Nothing." (emphasis mine)

³²⁵ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "It is done out of enmity towards the military in order to *insult the military*. Shall I call it a game or what..." (emphasis mine)

³²⁶ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "I never thought that the soldiers, including the General Staff, are going to stage a coup against the government. Perhaps it crossed. Perhaps it crossed their minds. It is possible. But I don't think it is doable. Maybe they caught it [the idea] and capitalized on it... Because the military was *the only force they could not conquer*." (emphasis mine)

³²⁷ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "You know that it is all a game. They already *left no soldiers*. I mean, there are no soldiers left. As for the rest of them, they continuously resign. Because their pride and honor cannot take it anymore. And they are right. 'Will I serve these people?' you ask. 'Why should I bother? Why should I put my life on the line?' It is a set up *to do away with the military*." (emphases mine)

In these narratives the military institution sometimes appears as the last bastion, remaining unconquered and untarnished under the expansionist aspirations of the current government party, until the legal process. However, more often, it seems to be the victim who falls prey to the power which emanates from a summit wherein reside all the current prime minister's men, without compromising their absolute power.

"Bu iktidarın olduğu yerde darbenin olabileceğine ne olursa olsun inanmıyorum. Çünkü *çok güçlüler*."³²⁸ (emphasis mine)

This power attributed, usually to the Prime Minister Erdoğan, is not only absolute, but also mesmerizing:

"Tabii onun [davanın] içinde bir sürü gazeteciler var, şunlar var, bunlar var. Ama hepsinin düşünceleri bir yerde aynı yere çıktığı için adam, 'Tamam o zaman. Ben böyleyim, o zaman siz de Ergenekoncusunuz,' dedi. 'Sizin darbe planınız var,' dedi. Der yani. *Adamın gücü var*. Yüzde 50 oy alıyor adam. İnsanlar da ağzı açık bir şekilde onu dinliyor. 'Ha, tamam o zaman,' diyorlar."³²⁹ (emphasis mine)

"İnsanımızda şöyle bir şey var. Ne söylenilirse ona inanıyorlar, *özellikle başbakana*. Yaptıkları şeyi göre göre dediklerine inanıyorlar. Öyle olduğu için, Balyoz'dur falan böyle işlere giriştiler. Adamları aldılar, hâlâ, 'Adamların yaptığı bir şey yoksa neden içerdelere? İçerdelerse bir şey yapmışlardır,' diyor insanlarımız."³³⁰ (emphasis mine)

³²⁸ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "I don't believe that there will be any military coup as long as the current government stays in power. Because they are *too powerful*." (emphasis mine)

³²⁹ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "In this law case, there are many journalists who are tried and so forth. But because their ideas more or less reach to same ends, the guy said, 'Well then. This is who I am and you are members of the Ergenekon.' He said, 'You are devising coup plans.' He says because he can. *He has power*. He gets the half of votes. And people admiringly listen to his trumpet. 'Well, alright then,' they say." (emphasis mine)

³³⁰ Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Our people believe whatever is said to them. They believe *especially to the prime minister*. They continue to believe what he says, despite seeing what he's done. That's why they [the government party] engaged in such things like Balyoz. They sent soldiers to prison and our people still say, 'If they did nothing, why are they imprisoned? If they are imprisoned, they surely have committed something.'" (emphasis mine)

Moreover, some children also seem to think that those who wield this absolute power enjoy practicing it on the military so that they can showcase its sheer magnitude:

İrem: "Aslında herkes her şeyi biliyor. Aslında öyle bir şey olmadığını biliyorlar. Ama insanın gözüne soka soka, sen bunu bilsen de, doğrusu bu olsa da, 'Bak ben sana bunu yapabiliyorum, *benim gücüm bu kadar,*' diyebilen birisi var."³³¹ (emphasis mine)

"Ben [Ergenekon ve Balyoz iddianamelerinin] hepsini okumadım haliyle. Ama inanmıyorum ya. Kesinlikle öç alma meselesi, başka bir şey değil. *Ben öndeyim, bunları da yapabilirim* davası."³³² (emphasis mine)

In sum, what we see in these accounts is nothing but a castrated military institution. The institution emerges as the lamented victim who has no choice but to buckle eventually down against the onslaught of the hostile government party. Then, the game metaphor to which the children in the first group often appealed does not denote a game in which players start competing fairly by devising strategies according to the rules of the game and decks dealt in their hand. Rather, for them, this is a rigged game, whereby the military institution, ousted from the reticulations of power, is enforced to take a chair in the card table, only to be condemned to perpetual defeat under the unmitigating power of its ill-willed foes. Perhaps this is the reason why many interlocutors in the first group employ a legalist perspective so as to show the injustices, ambiguities and incoherence embedded in the judicial process. They are mostly preoccupied with legal and technical considerations, emphasizing the flimsiness or fictitiousness of evidence used in the trials. An impression I had from the interviews is that the children who are related to the Balyoz and Ergenekon trials via friends whose fathers were adjudicated seemed more inclined to employ the legalist viewpoint. Zeynep's narrative in the following exemplifies this point:

³³¹ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: İrem: "Actually, everyone knows everything. They [the people] also know that it is not true. But there is a person who pushes the issue by saying, 'See what I am capable of doing to you. *I have such power,*' despite what you know and truth is." (emphasis mine)

³³² Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "I did not read all of them [the charges in the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials]. But I don't believe. It is definitely a matter of getting revenge and nothing else. It is a trial of '*I have the edge, so I can do that to you.*'" (emphasis mine)

"Benim arkadaşım Dursun Çiçek'in kızı. Yani arkadaşım dediğim şöyle. Tanışıklığımız yok. [...] Üniversitesi'nden mezun. Biliyorum, aynı ortamda oluyorduk falan. ... E delilleri çıkıyor işte. TÜBİTAK bilirkişi raporunu belki okumuştundur. O kadar çok şey var ki. Ve bunlara [rağmen] hiçbir açıklama yapamıyorlar. Bir defa avukatları davaya almıyorlar. Adamın orada avukatı o ya; nasıl almazsın ki sen bunu? Bir defa [hukuka] aykırı ya. Hukuk devletiyim diye geçiniyorsun ama senin yaptığına bak. Mesela iddianame üzerine de benim konuştuğum hocalar devamlı aynı şeyi söylüyor, İddianamenin evirip çevirip aynı şeyin üzerinde durduğu, ama kesinlikle bir yargıya varılamadığı söyleniyor. Muğlâklıklar var."³³³

On the other hand, such legal and technical considerations also seep into the narratives of interlocutors falling under the second group. They also keep their reservations with regards to the justice and persuasiveness of the trials. These narratives, also teemed with people who are suffering and wronged due to the judicial process, do not look much different from the first group of narratives in those respects. For example, Kemal tells in the following how he has lost his faith in the judicial system of Turkey:

"[A]ma çok üzüldüğüm şeyler oldu. Bir kere bu polisin sorgulamalardaki delil yaratma, insanların hayatının karartma muhabbeti çok ciddi bir şey. Türkiye'de ben artık hukuk mukuk olduğuna inanmıyorum. Gerçekten inanmıyorum. Her şey adalet sisteminden başlıyor abi. Öyle Başbakanlığa bağlı adalet sistemi falan, komedi bunlar abi. Patagonya uygulamaları bunlar. ... Bazı insanlara öyle ceza[lar] verildi ki, mesela adama babalık haklarından mahrumiyet diye ceza verdiler. Ulan böyle bir şey olabilir mi ya? Hangi azılı suçluya böyle bir ceza verilmiş?"³³⁴

³³³ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "My friend is the daughter of Dursun Çiçek. When I say friend, I don't know her personally. I know her though. Because she has graduated from [...] and I was around. ... The evidences come out one by one. Maybe you read the expert report of TÜBİTAK. There are so many things in it. And they do not release any statement despite all of that. Before everything else, they do not let the lawyers into the courtroom. He is their [the accused party] lawyer for god's sake. How dare you disallow him? First of all, it goes against the law. You pretend to be a country governed by the rule of law, but look at what you are doing. The teachers I talked to also say the same. They say the bill of indictment dwells on the same stuff, without reaching to any conclusion. There are ambiguities."

³³⁴ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "But there were things which made me sad. The lives of some people fell apart by evidences fabricated by the police and it is something quite serious. I believe there is no longer any law in Turkey. I really don't. It all starts from the judicial system. Can you believe that the judicial system is held

However, they differ from the first group of interlocutors in their conceptualization of power relations. They do not deny power to the military institution while accounting for the events, irrespective of the conclusions they draw at the end. Instead, they render the trials as a moment within a succession of events during which two actors, vying with each other, strive for power. Therefore, they do not hastily relegate the institution to the position of victimhood, by relocating the military within the networks of power. Accordingly, the phrase linking the second group of narratives is 'power struggle':

"Askerler tarafından AKP'nin komplosu olarak algılanıp, AKP tarafından da, 'İşte kesin bunlar darbeci,' şeklinde algılandığı için şöyle düşünüyorum: Eğer bu AKP ile ordu arasındaki bir *güç savaşıysa* ... ordunun dünyanın en temiz kurumu olmadığı da bir gerçek sonuçta. Böyle bir şey mümkün."³³⁵ (emphasis mine)

"Çok basit bir *güç savaşı* olarak görüyorum. İyi kötü, er geç bir yerden döneceğine ve bugün mağdur edilenlerin yarın taltif edileceğine inanıyorum."³³⁶ (emphasis mine)

"Bu işler siyasi olaylar abi. Tamamen dış geçirme muhabbeti anladın mı? Ben sana dış geçiriyorum, yarın öbür gün sen bana dış geçiriyorsun falan. *Güç savaşı* yani."³³⁷ (emphasis mine)

As they designate the power relations reciprocally, without assuming a perfect asymmetry of power between the actors involved in the process, the affect that creeps into the narratives is rather an apathetic anticipation, instead of resentment or an elegiac mood.

responsible to the prime minister's office? It is ridiculous. It is Patagonian. ... Some people got such sentences, for instance, they deprived the guy of his paternal rights. Can you believe it? Even the most wretched and violent criminal would not get such a sentence."

³³⁵ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "As soldiers perceive it as the conspiracy of AKP and AKP perceives soldiers like, 'They are definitely rooting for a coup,' this is how I think: If it is a *power struggle* between AKP and the military ... it is quite obvious that the military is not the cleanest institution of all. It is possible." (emphasis mine)

³³⁶ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "I see it as a *simple power struggle*. I believe that the honor of those who are victimized now will be eventually restored somehow." (emphasis mine)

³³⁷ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "Man, this is political stuff. It is like arm wrestling, dig it? I am pinning your arm onto the table today, you are pinning mine some another day. It is a *power struggle* I mean." (emphasis mine)

Another reason which results in the lack of identification with the 'victims' of the trials is that the interlocutors in the second group are not acquainted with anyone who has undergone the legal process. Tarık puts this in the following:

"Bizim etrafımızdan bu soruşturmalar dâhilinde mağdur olan çok fazla insan yok. Mesela benim hiçbir arkadaşımın babası bunlardan dolayı bir ceza almış, gözaltına alınmış değil. Belki bundan dolayı, [soruşturmaları] kişiselleştirilmiş bir şekilde, kendime ait hissettiğim bir kimliğe ya da alt kültüre bir saldırı olarak algılamıyorum. [M]ağdur olanların tecrübeleriyle de çok özdeşleştiremiyorum kendimi."³³⁸

All the interviews hint the great extent to which the trials of Balyoz and Ergenekon are eclipsed by the controversies surrounding the judicial process. Despite their pivotal implications, it seems unlikely that these trials, riddled with blind-spots, question marks and opacity, will lend themselves in longer terms to a substantial critique of the military institution and militarism within the military community. Nor will they seem to contribute to the normalization process in these circles, unless the stumbling blocks hindering access and understanding to the trials are removed so that everyone can get a better grasp on them, instead of watching the spectacles of two bulls fighting, or a giant trampling its victims.

4.5. On the Kurdish Question and the Peace Process

Finally, I asked the children about their assessments on the Peace Process. Besides Mustafa, who, on professional grounds, swallowed his comments concerning the major political events which have entailed sweeping transformations with regards to TSK, Deniz is another interlocutor who preferred to "tread lightly on such a delicate subject" upon which he does not find himself knowledgeable enough to issue comments. Most of the children whom I interviewed spent some time in the East, some in OHAL regions or neighboring provinces, due to the relocations of their fathers. Some of them have more

³³⁸ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "I don't have many people around me who suffered from these investigations. For example, none of the fathers of my friends was sentenced or detained. Perhaps this is why I don't take it personal, as an offense against an identity or a subculture to which I feel attached. I cannot put myself in the shoes of those who are suffering either."

vivid recollections, whereas Deniz and Nuri hardly remember their time in the East because they were still babies when their fathers left their posts 'over there'. On the other hand, Ayşe have never been 'there' as a daughter of a commissioned naval officer, since there is not any naval post or assignment in the area for which her family could be relocated. Zeynep is another one whose stay in the region was relatively short. Because her father decided to leave the family behind, when he was assigned to duty in an Eastern city, where Zeynep paid monthly visits to him in order to see 'if he is doing okay'. Overall, the children I interviewed are in agreement with each other on the necessity of 'doing something' about the East. Tarık articulates in the following how the experiences of the children of military families in the East give way to the actualization of an exigent necessity to do something:

"Dediğim gibi, oraya giden herkesin [ağlında] bir şeyler yapılması gerektiği hususunda bir düşünce oluşur diye düşünüyorum yani. Biraz sağına soluna bakan herkesin, [durumun] bu şekilde çok uzun, çok sürdürülebilir bir şekilde devam etmeyeceğini fark etmesi gerekir diye düşünüyorum. Dolayısıyla bir şeyler yapılmalı mı? Evet, yapılmalı."³³⁹

However much they concur with each other on this necessity, the solutions the children propose to the burning issue of whose causes they diagnose in different registers are as diverse as their experiences. Their experiences in the East impinge on their judgments concerning the Kurdish Question and the Peace Process; and these experiences, just like their experiences in other places, are mostly shaped by the material conditions within which they lived in the region. These experiences vary across the region, depending on many parameters, including the ones such as their age, grade of education, ethnicity, class and gender. Other than that, their fathers' place of duty, rank and force should be brought into consideration to account for the diversification of these experiences. Further, the policies of the Turkish state and the military concerning the Kurdish Question and Kurdish armed struggle have a lot to say in the formation of these material conditions. Lastly, as stated in the previous chapter, the military institution, through its organizational

³³⁹ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "As I said, everyone who goes there would come to the idea that something should be done. I think that anyone who takes a look around for a little bit should realize that the situation is not sustainable as it is. So, should something be done? Yes, it should."

and spatial arrangements often has a funnelling and homogenizing effect on the array of experiences the children could have had in the region. On the other hand, the school sometimes emerges as the site which disrupts these effects, by being the major site of contact between the children and locals. However, as stated again in the second chapter, to conceptualize the effects of the school as always at odds with the military or family setting would be to overstate its significance in that regard. Because the children are often sent to schools in the region where the composition of students are relatively homogenous in terms of class, status, language and ethnic identity. Accordingly, Tarık recounts how his experience in the school of an Eastern city induced him to mull over the Kurdish Question, by engendering a rupture in his mind:

"75. yıldı o gittiğimiz sene, 1998 yılı. O zaman 75. yıl rozetleri falan modaydı. Asker çocuğu mu hatırlamıyorum, sınıfta bir kız vardı. Asker çocuğu değildi galiba. [...]da bir galeri sahibi ya da bir sermayedarın, bir kapitalistin kızıydı diyelim. Bir Rus romanı tadı yakalayalım böylece. (Gülüşmeler) Oydu yanılmıyorsam, 75. yıl rozeti takmış[tı] işte. Oğlanın biriyle atışmıştı. 'Ben Cumhuriyet çocuğuyum,' demişti kız. Oğlan da işte 'Ben de PKK çocuğuyum' mu 'Apo çocuğuyum' mu ne bir şey demişti. Ben de, 'Niye böyle düşünüyor ki bu eleman? PKK veya Apo ona ne verebilir ki?' diye şaşırmıştım. Yani bununla ilgili bir şey düşündüğümü hatırlıyorum. İşte bunu düşündüğümde orta 1 öğrencisiydim, ne kadar derin düşünebilirim yani... Ama en azından *algıda bir çatlak*, bir şey yaratıyor. 'Niye böyle?' diye soruyorsun. '[...]da böyle miymiş?' diye soruyorsun bir yerde."³⁴⁰ (emphasis mine)

Despite all the efforts of the military elites and their supporters to plug it, the rupture mentioned by Tarık actually transpires in other narratives as well, as a force which propels

³⁴⁰ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "We arrived there in 1998, in the 75th anniversary of the Republic. 75th year badges were quite widespread at that time. I don't know if she is a military brat, but there was this girl in the class. She isn't a military brat I suppose. She was the daughter of a rich dealer or something. Let's say she was the daughter of a capitalist to have the tenor of a Russian novel. (Laughs) It was her if I'm not mistaken, wearing one of those 75th year badges. She got into a quarrel with one of boys. She was saying, 'I am a child of the Republic.' Then the guy said to her something along the lines of 'I am a child of PKK' or 'I am a child of Apo.' I was surprised, thinking, 'Why does he think this way? What can PKK or Apo give him?' I mean, I was thinking something about it. It was the sixth grade and to what depth could I possibly think about it in that age... Even so, it engenders *a rupture in your mind*. It makes you ask, 'Why is it this way?' It makes you ask, 'Is this how it happens in [that city]?'” (emphasis mine)

the children to reassess the frames of interpretation they use to understand social reality. But the ways in which they come to grips with this crack in order to bring it into limits of intelligibility differ from each other. Let's now capture how the interactions between ruptures and cover-ups figure within the contexts of the Kurdish Question and Peace Process.

It is possible to sort the narratives of the children gave in response to my questions about the Peace Process in four groups. The first group regards those who do not think that it will solve any problems, basically because the Kurdish Question does not genuinely exist. One of the common grounds which link these narratives to each other is that they all claim that there has not been much problem between Kurds and Turks until the intrusion of the actors, who arrived to the scene in order to reify the content of the Question, to the detriment of the national unity. The most notable actor among all which marks a rupture between the times of peace and conflict is PKK. Accordingly, these narratives argue that the Kurdish Question is manufactured. In fact, some suggest, it has been nothing but the PKK Question since its beginning. For nothing in the world would the ties between Kurds and Turks have severed, had they not been gnawed by agents who were extrinsic to the relations between them. Merve's narrative in the following illustrates this claim:

"Tabii belki bu biraz benim cahilliğim, ama ben önceden hiç Kürtlerle Türkler arasında illa bir şeyin çözülmesi gerektiğini veya 'Siz Kürdistan'ı kuracaksınız, biz ayırız,' diye bir şey olduğunu hatırlamıyorum. Diyorum ya, belki bu benim cahilliğimden [kaynaklanıyor], ama bilmiyorum. Bu sorun şeyden çıktı. Biraz büyüdü. Tamam, gene PKK problemi vardı. Ama Kürt-Türk diye bir problem yoktu bence."³⁴¹

Zeynep agrees with Merve's contention that the Kurdish Question has been invented and thence blown out of proportions by the efforts of PKK. She also takes the implicit

³⁴¹ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "Perhaps it's my ignorance but, have you ever heard before that there is something to be settled between Kurds and Turks? Or I don't remember something said like, 'You will establish Kurdistan and we are distinct from you.' As I said, perhaps it's my ignorance. I don't know though. The problem is caused by, or I mean, the problem has gone a bit bigger. Ok, the PKK Problem was ever there. But I think there was no 'Kurdish-Turkish Problem' before."

assumption in Merve's speech a notch up and confessedly states that the Kurd is an imagined identity, without questioning the authenticity and originality of the Turkish national identity which she takes for granted:

"Sen bu zamana kadar, tırnak içinde söylüyorum, 'Kürt Sorunu' diye bir şey duydun mu? Şahsen ben duymadım. Ben [Doğu'da bir şehir]'e de gittim. O zamanlar ki en hareketli zamanlardı. Ben hiçbir zaman 'Kürt Sorunu' ya da 'Kürt' diye bir şey duymadım. O zaman her zaman için, babamın annemle konuşmalarında, iş arkadaşlarıyla konuşmalarında duyduğum PKK'ydı. Hiçbir zaman Kürt lafı geçmezdi, 'Bunlar Kürt, Kürt bilmem neler,' falan diye. ... [Bunlar] ailede devamlı da konuşulan mevzular, ama bu zamana kadar ben hiçbir zaman Kürt Sorunu diye bir şey duymadım. Ama şu anda [o şehire] gitsem bu benim karşıma çıkacak. Eminim diyecekler ki: 'Bizim o zamanlarda bilmem kaç tane kardeşimiz katledildi.' Biliyorum ben bunu. *Çünkü böyle bir algı yaratıldı.* Bence bu bir algı. ... *Ben böyle bir algı içinde yetişmedim.* Ama mesela şimdi biriyle tanıştığında, 'Nerelisin?' diye sorduğumda kafamda, 'Acaba Kürt mü?' diye bir soru işareti yanıyor direkt. Ama eskiden böyle bir şey yoktu, Neden son zamanlarda çıktı ki yani? Ben bu konularda devamlı okuyan da bir insanım, ki bölümümle de alakalı bir şey bu [konu]. Bu zamana kadar öyle bir şey çıkmadıysa neden sen bu zamanda çıkarıyorsun, ediyorsun?"³⁴² (emphases mine)

Of course, these are assimilationist narratives, par excellence. They deny the existence of a distinct Kurdish identity, by replicating some of the primary motifs of the

³⁴² Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "Have you ever heard, I'm saying it within quotation marks, something as 'the Kurdish Problem' before? Personally I have not. I went to [the city in the East] too. Those were the most heated times. I never heard there such a thing as 'the Kurdish Problem' or 'the Kurd'. What I always heard was PKK. I heard it in the conversations of my father with my mother and his work workmates. They have never mentioned anything like, 'They are Kurdish, they are this and that.' ... We also discuss these matters in the family, but I have never heard something as 'the Kurdish Problem' before. But if I were to go there now, I know that I will encounter it. I am sure that they will say, 'Such and such brothers of ours were massacred then.' I know that. *Because such a perception was created.* I think it is just a perception. ... *I did not grow up with such a perception.* But when I meet someone and ask, 'Where are you from?' a question mark pops up in my brain, asking, 'Could s/he be Kurdish?' But it [the question mark] was absent in the past. Why did it appear recently? I also read a lot on such topics, because they are related to my field. If there was no such thing in the past, then why do you make it up now?" (emphases mine)

mainstream nationalist state discourses³⁴³ deployed before and during the times of 'low-intensity conflict'.

Another salient characteristic of these accounts is that they designate a "mythical time" (Ahiska, 2003, p. 367), preceding the souring relations between Kurds and Turks. They uphold an idyllic account of the past, according to which Kurds and Turks had always lived in peace, without any conflict or discrimination prior to the intrusion of PKK. The bitter past of the nation-state, replete with bloody stories of repression, violence and dispossession brought by the dual and inseparable projects of nation-constitution and modernization, with their homogenizing accompaniments such as ethnic cleansing, social and demographic engineering, is displaced by these accounts. Instead, they perceive the birth of the nation as an "immaculate conception" (Berktay, 2004, p. 16). Therefore, the years of the Independence War turns into a repository from where the interlocutors draw support to their construction of a pristine past. Accordingly, İrem puts into circulation the brothers-in-arms rhetoric to allege that the Kurdish Question is a problem without real historical origins:

"[Barış Süreci'ni] çok saçma buluyorum. Çok saçma bir şey. Zaten Kürt ile Türk'ü düşman ettirmek kadar saçma bir şey olacağını aklım hayalim almıyor. Onlar da bu ülkenin vatandaşı. Birlikte kurtardık bu ülkeyi, birlikte savaştık. Hiçbir zaman da Kürt-Türk ayrımı yapılmamıştır."³⁴⁴

As a consequence of the construction of such a gilded age, the Kurd thus emerges in these master narratives as a figure who has little if any capacity to act as a "subject endowed with a sense of history" (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 40). Sometimes the colonial imagination lurking in these narratives leaks out more explicitly. For instance, İrem is particularly keen on casting the Kurd as a 'figure of lack', grievously incomplete and in dire

³⁴³ For a comprehensive analysis of the Turkish state discourses in relation to the Kurdish Question, see: Yeğen, 1999

³⁴⁴ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "I find it [the Peace Process] ridiculous. It is nonsense. I cannot imagine a single thing as ridiculous as making the Kurd and the Turk enemies. They are also the citizens of this country. We saved the country together, we fought together. There has never been a distinction made between Kurds and Turks."

need to be educated and "worlded" (Spivak, 1990) vis-a-vis the Turk who is already consummated in form and substance throughout history. For her, deprived of consciousness, and unaware of its own past, the Kurd is often an uneducated and gullible figure, perhaps a noble, albeit rudimentary soul who seems vulnerable against the seductive powers of PKK. Thus, İrem's recipe to resolution for the Kurdish Question seems to be the "dissemiNation" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 157) of education as a vehicle of "colonial doubling" (Bhabha, 1994). Only this way, İrem believes, the Kurd can recover itself from the confines of false consciousness and can come to the realization that its persistence for the recognition of difference cannot but be a result of a grave misrecognition.

"Hâlbuki oraya [Doğu'ya] da bir şeyler yapılsa... Her şeyin başı eğitim zaten. İnsanları bilinçlendirilse korkulacak bir yanı yok zaten. ... Ama bazı insanlar maalesef bizi ayırtırmaya çalışıyorlar. Bunların gene eğitimden kaynaklandığını düşünüyorum. Bilinçli olmadığın sürece kandırılman çok kolay. Cahillikten dolayı oradaki insanları bir şekilde kandırıyorlar, ayaklandırıyorlar. Sonra da diyorlar ki işte: 'Siz çok kavga ediyorsunuz. Siz ayaklanıyorsunuz. Gelin biz sizi barıştıralım.' Aslında böyle bir şey yok. Aslında dış etkenler olmasa ya da başımızdakiler kavga çıkarmasa biz zaten kardeş kardeş yaşayacağız. Ama maalesef buna izin verilmiyor."³⁴⁵

Apparently, there is a certain ambivalence in these first group of narratives, in the sense that the Kurd seems to be simultaneously present and absent in them. In other words, they oscillate between the recognition and disavowal of the difference of the Kurd. On the one hand, the Kurd is sometimes recognized independently from the Turk as an unruly being, resistant to change. What is meant by 'change' here is often tantamount to a possibility of the actualization of colonial doubling. On the other hand, in these narratives, the Kurd is also robbed of existence. The Kurd indeed appears to be just another Turk, a

³⁴⁵ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "If only something would be done there. Education comes first. If the awareness of the people there is raised, then there is nothing to fear. ... But unfortunately, some people are trying to separate us from each other. I think that these [problems] have their source in education as well. If one is not aware enough, then it is easy to be manipulated. Because of ignorance, they trick these people in the region somehow and make them rebels. Then they say: 'You fight too much, too often. You rebel. Come on, let us bring you to peace.' As a matter of fact, if it weren't for the outside external factors or our rulers who instigate such things, we will live without fighting, in a brotherly way. But it is not allowed."

tenuous figure waiting for its further Turkification as well as realization of its authentic identity. The Kurdishness of the Kurd comes into existence only as a fiction, in between the fissures of Turkishness. Overall, in these narratives, the Kurd often appears as a "*subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite*" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 86). Accordingly, Yeğen duly coins the term "prospective Turks" (2006) to account for the ambivalent positioning of Kurds either within or at the margins of Turkishness. This ambivalent construction of the Kurd, I propose, gestures towards a desire for "colonial mimicry" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 86), a desire which is perhaps most evident in Zeynep's speech where she projects the charges of ethnic nationalism onto Kurds, while stating that there would be no problem, if only the Kurds would think like her:

"Şu anda aslında onlar, ben öyle bir ayırım yapmak istemiyorum ama, tırnak içinde 'biz' diye söylüyorum; bizi suçluyorlar ya hani ırkçılıkla, milliyetçilikle, bilmem neyle, vesaire... Aslında milliyetçilikle suçlama adı altında bence onlar kendileri Kürt milliyetçiliği yapıyorlar. *Onlar da benim gibi düşünse aslında böyle bir sıkıntı olmayacak.*"³⁴⁶ (emphasis mine)

Therefore, I think that, the primary link between the narratives of the interlocutors in the first group is their mobilization of a colonial discourse. Heeding Bhabha's minimal definition of the colonial discourse (1994), this discourse is "an apparatus that turns on the recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences" (p. 70). It is a discourse which incorporates a functional ambivalence so that it can always produce "its slippage, its excess, its difference" (Bhabha, 1994, p. 86) in order to maintain a distinction between the authentic-superior Turkish identity and inauthentic- inferior Kurdish identity. Furthermore, there is a dissonance at the very heart of the colonial discursive enterprise, Bhabha reminds us, which makes the complete domination of the colonized an impossible quest to fulfill (2004, p. 1167). However, it is not only ambivalence that inheres in the colonial discourse. For Bhabha, the colonial discourse is also marked by an anxiety. As the colonized imitates

³⁴⁶ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "I really don't want to make any distinction, but I am saying this within quotation marks. You know how they are accusing 'us' of racism, nationalism and so forth... Actually, it is them who propagate Kurdish nationalism, while accusing 'us' of nationalism. *If they were thinking like me, there'd be no such trouble indeed.*" (emphasis mine)

the colonizer, it endangers the very difference that the colonizer tries fervently to install in the colonial situation in order to legitimize its rule and authenticate its identity. Then, the colonial doubling and mimicry comes to trouble the self-image of the colonizer as well. Just because the interlocutors in the first group imply that the colonial doubling has failed in the case of the Kurdish Question, it is hard to follow in these accounts the inklings of such anxieties integral to the colonial discourse. Nevertheless, there are some moments in which something comes to spook the image of a coherent and authentic self-identity assumed by the interlocutors. For example, Zeynep, perhaps in a moment of alienation from what she believes to be her true identity, confesses that the Turkish identity to which she clings may not be as authentic as she presumes. A moment later, she brushes her doubts away, before relapsing into further contemplation about the construction of the Turkish identity, and continues to complain about the resolute attachment of people to an imagined, distinct Kurdish identity:

"...[Doğu'da bir şehir]'e gitmeyi çok istiyorum açıkçası. Gitmeyeli çok uzun zaman oldu. Gidip gezmeyi, görmeyi istiyorum. Ama oradakilerin kafasının değişmediğini bildiğim için... Hâlâ farklı algılar yaratılıyor demeyeyim de, işte onların beyninde farklı algılar var. Bir algı içinde büyümüşler. *Belki de biz de öyleyiz. Ama ben öyle olmadığımın farkındayım. Ben öyle değilim en azından. ... Ben böyle bir algı içinde yetişmedim.*"³⁴⁷ (emphases mine)

Although the interlocutors in the first group raise their objection to the Peace Process on a more fundamental ground, by refuting history and reality to the Kurdish Question, anxieties concerning the indivisibility of the nation-state and loyalty of other minorities usually complement their primary objection. Accordingly, both Merve and İrem maintain that any negotiation with Kurds which would result in territorial losses would set a bad precedent for other ethnic minority groups whose loyalty to the nation is dubious. For them, the Peace Process may trigger an avalanche, under the burden of which the nation-state

³⁴⁷ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: "...Actually, I really want to go to [the city in the East] again. It's been a long time since my last visit. But because I know the way people think there has not changed... I don't want to say various perceptions are created, but in any case, they have a certain perception in their minds. They grew up with that perception. *Perhaps we are like that too. But I am aware that I am not. At least I am not like that. ... I was not raised in such perceptions.*" (emphases mine)

might be torn to pieces eventually. This is quite apparent in their slippery slope argumentation, which I would like to call 'the argumentum ad Laz-Circassian':

"Ona bakarsan Laz'ı var, Çerkez'i var bir sürü. O zaman herkes birlikte ayaklanıp ufak ufak şehirler kursa, koloniler halinde yaşasa yani."³⁴⁸

"Yani bu çok klasiktir, herkes söyler: Türk var, Kürt var, Laz var, Çerkez var, şu var bu var. Sonuçta biz bu zamana kadar hep böyle yaşamışız. Bundan sonra neden Kürtler ayrı bir devlet, Lazlar ayrı bir devlet kursun? Öyle bir şey olduktan sonra neden Laz'ın biri çıkıp, 'Haydi biz de ayrı bir devlet kuralım,' demesin ki? Çok yanlış bence yani."³⁴⁹

On the other hand Kemal stands at a diametrically opposed edge, from where he recounts how he lost interest in politics, ever the acerbic.

"Ya bir süre sonra öyle bencilleşiyor ki insan, ben aynı işi yapıp aynı düzeni sağlayabileceğim, yemin ediyorum İstanbul'dan sonrasını cart diye ayırırsınlar, 18'e bölsünler, 180 bayrak koysunlar sikimde olmaz, anladın mı? ... O eski militarist duygular, milliyetçi duygular, bilmem neler. Geçti abi o işler. Neden biliyor musun? Herkes cebine girene bakıyor abi. Öyle bir devirdeyiz ki, sistemden bir an çıksan, bir an tökezlesen borç gırtlığa kadar çıkar. Geberip gidersin açlıktan. ... Diyarbakır'ı bağlasınlar abi şeyE [Kürdistan'a], umurumda değil. Zaten gitmiyorum ki. Gitmediğim yer benim değil ki zaten. Ben gitmeye ihtiyaç duymuyorum ki. Benim olan yerler, gittiğim sevdiğim yerler, okey, eyvallah. Ama zaten gitmiyorum. Trabzon'u mesela, bir kere gittim gördüm. Bir daha da görmem zaten. Onu da Pontus yapsınlar. Çok merak ediyorsam, gerekirse vize alır giderim. O açıdan hiçbir şey kalmadı bende. Tamamen sıfırlandı. Hiç umurumda değil ya. İsteyen istediğini yapabilir."³⁵⁰

³⁴⁸ Personal interview with İrem, conducted on 03.12.2013: "If you look at it that way, there are Laz, there are Circassians and so forth. Then why don't everyone rebel and establish small cities on their own, living in colonies?"

³⁴⁹ Personal interview with Merve, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I mean it is a classic thing told by everybody: There are Turks, Kurds, Laz, Circassians and so forth. All in all, we have always lived like that. From this time forth, why should Kurds establish a different state? If so, why would not a Laz come out and announce: 'Let's establish our own state too.' I think it is very wrong."

³⁵⁰ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "After a while you become so selfish to the extent that, if I can do to same job and maintain the same status, I swear to God, I don't give a damn if they would shred the rest of the country from Istanbul; split it to 18 parts and plant 180 flags, you feel me? Those old militarist feelings, nationalist feelings, and all the other stuff. Those are over man. You know why? Everyone cares about what

Unlike Merve and İrem, Kemal does not mind in the least, if one decides to gift-wrap the rest of the country to supposedly covetous minorities as long as he can see to himself within the maelstrom of working life where conditions of workers are getting more precarious with each passing day. We can situate his statement under the second group of narratives where one can trace a blending of apathy and mistrust towards the Peace Process. Put differently, this group rather consists of cynical accounts. On the one hand, the interlocutors falling under this group claim indifference to the unfolding of the process; but on the other hand, their indifference does not automatically evolve into a free pass given for the actualization of the Peace Process. It remains unclear as to whether they support the Peace Process. If so, it would be still hard to pinpoint on what conditions and for which reasons they would support or decline it. Only seldom do they reflect on the Kurdish question unlike the interlocutors belonging to the first group. Rather, these interlocutors grapple with the Peace Process by questioning its 'sincerity'. For example, despite his claimed apathy, Kemal goes on to vent his complaints in the following, where he expresses that the Peace Process is more populist razzle-dazzle than substance:

"Komplo teorisi gibi [olacak], ama herhalde 10-15 senelik bir plan çizilmiş, oynanıyor abi şu an. Yalan bu işler abi. Ne oldu? Hayvan gibi saldırılar oldu, ne oldu birden durup dururken? Ne oldu hani, geri gidenler vardı, dönenler vardı? Ne oldu? Kim görüyor, kim biliyor? ... Komedi abi ya. Şimdi görüyorsun adam 3 sene önce bir şey demiş, 3 sene sonra gönülden inanarak tam tersini söylüyor. Düşün, ben üç sene önce sana ana avrat küfrediyorum, 3 sene sonra, 'Sen benim en iyi arkadaşımın.' Böyle bir şey olabilir mi ya? Olabilir mi yani? Olamaz abi. Tamam, siyaset belki biraz palavra sıkmaaktır. Ama bu kadar değil abi. İkiyüzlülüğün, *samimiyetsizliğin* bokunu çıkardılar

goes in and out of the pocket. We are in such times that if you would step out of the system even for a second, if you would trip for a moment, you would be buried in debt. You'd kick the bucket and starve to death. ... Let them make Diyarbakır a part of Kurdistan, I don't care. I already never go there. A place that I don't go to is not mine anyways. I don't feel the need to go there. If those were places I like, places I go, alright. But I am off those places in any case. Trabzon for example, I went there and saw it once. I won't see it again. Let them make it Pontus for all I care. If I get really curious, I'll get a visa and go. Nothing is left in me in that regard. I am through with it. It really doesn't matter to me. Everyone can do as they please."

Türkiye'de. Bir gün adam cemaatçi oluyor, öbür gün ateistten yana oluyor, öbür gün gayden, travestiden yana oluyor, öbür gün..."³⁵¹ (emphasis mine)

Kemal is not the only one who feels insulted by the 'insincerity' of the government elites who is responsible for carrying out the Peace Process. Yasemin also considers that the Peace Process is a sham, simply because she has no trust for Erdoğan. Despite all the good wishes she makes for her fellow-citizens, she does not seem to embrace the Peace Process, as she interrogates the sincerity of the prime minister in the following:

"Ben başbakanın yaptığı hiçbir şey hakkında bir şey söylemek istemiyorum. Şu an başbakanı sevmiyorum. Yaptığı her şeyin altında bir bit yeniği var. *Samimiyetsiz* buluyorum. Her yaptığı şeyin altında kendi çıkarıyla ilgili bir şeyi vardır mutlaka."³⁵² (emphasis mine)

On the other hand, Nuri is the only interlocutor whom I think belongs to the third group of narratives. He does not tackle the Kurdish Question within a frame of security. Rather, his take on the issue is economically driven. For Nuri, the permanence of the Kurdish Question does not bode well with the progress and welfare of the nation. Therefore, he acknowledges the urgency of a solution regarding the Kurdish Question from a developmentalist viewpoint:

³⁵¹ Personal interview with Kemal, conducted on 23.11.2013: "I know this is going to sound like a conspiracy theory, but perhaps there is a plan for the next 10-15 years which is being played out right now. This is all a sham man. What happened? There were brutal attacks. What happened all of sudden? What happened? There were those who were going back, who were returning? What happened? Who sees it, who knows it? ... It is a comedy man. You see the guy saying something 3 years ago, 3 years later he tells the opposite, wholeheartedly. Think about it, 3 years ago I swear a blue streak at you; 3 years later I tell: 'You are my best friend.' Can something like that happen? Is it possible? No, it is not man. Ok, being a loud mouth and spinning a yarn may be a part of politics. But not this much man. They went on a binge of hypocrisy and *insincerity*. The guy supports the Gülenists today, the next day he roots for the atheist and another day he sides with gays and transvestites, and another day..." (emphasis mine)

³⁵² Personal interview with Yasemin, conducted on 30.11.2013: "I don't want to talk anything about the prime minister does. I do not like the prime current minister. Whatever he does, there is a hidden catch attached. I find him *insincere*. There is always something involved in whatever he does, catering to his own interests." (emphasis mine)

"Bu ülkede bir yerde barış sağlanmalı. Mesela terörizm artık bitmeli. Çünkü ileri gidemiyoruz. Dediğim gibi, Doğu'daki insanların yaşam standardı çok düşük. Onları da yükseltmek lazım. Hepimiz bu ülkede eşitiz ama öyle değil yani. Eşit değiliz. O insanlara yaşıyor denmez yani. Hem tiplerine baktığın zaman, hem giydikleri kıyafetler olsun çok zor şartlarda yaşıyorlar. Orada yapılabilecek bir sürü ekonomik gelişmeler [var]. [Bunlar] Türkiye'yi daha çok rahatlatılabilir. Bu yönden destekliyorum. Boşu boşuna kaç senedir bu ülkede terörizm var yani."³⁵³

Although Nuri downplays them by proclaiming the utter uselessness of terrorism, he does not completely bracket off in his considerations the possible causes which have given way to the armed struggle of the PKK. Unlike the previous interlocutors, Nuri grants that citizenship rights do not guarantee the equality of all citizens in Turkey. He delineates the Kurd as a figure, barely living under harsh conditions in which s/he is less equal than others. His interpretation parallels Yeğen, who points out that the Kurd has been perceived in Turkey as a "pseudo-citizen" (2006), as a result of a discursive shift seen around the new millennium. Therefore, Nuri finds merit in the Peace Process, for it can improve the conditions within which Kurdish populations live. However, Nuri's conception of equality is couched in an economical framework. He presents the Kurdish Question as a problem of regional backwardness whose roots are buried within the economic underdevelopment of the East. He hardly addresses the systematic disinvestment and violence directed at the Kurdish population. Nor does he refer their cultural rights. In fact, some of these rights demarcate his 'red-line' that should not be crossed through the Peace Process:

"Ama oradaki şey şu: Evet, Barış Süreci önemli. Ama ne gibi bir bedel ödeyeceğiz bu Barış Süreci'nde? Bu bedel ne? O bence çok önemli. Ne veriyoruz hani? Tamam, işte teröristler, barış, silahları çekin falan ama onlara ne veriyoruz? Bir şey vermeden, [teröristlerin] bir anda ellerini kollarını sallayarak çıkacaklarını düşünmüyorum. Ha eğer Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin

³⁵³ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "The peace should be sustained at some moment in this country. For example, terrorism should come to an end. As I said, the living standards of the people in the East are very low. They [the standards] should be raised as well. We are all equals in this country, but it is not like that. We are not equals. These people [in the East] cannot be said living. Their appearance, their clothes, I mean they are living under harsh conditions. Many economic developments can be achieved there. These [economic developments] would relieve Turkey. I support it in that way. I mean, there has been terrorism in this country for how many years, for no reason."

çıkarlarını etkileyebilecek bir şey verdiysek Barış Süreci olmasın diyorum. ... Bölünmezlik, özerklik falan, bunlar bence kırmızı çizgiyle çizilmesi gereken şeyler."³⁵⁴

In the last group of narratives, perhaps the issue of cultural rights as well as ethno-political dimensions of the Kurdish Question, which have been consistently silenced in state discourses (Yeğen, 1999, p. 222) continues to remain above the fray. Perhaps the Kurdishness of the Kurdish Question is not acknowledged (Yeğen, 1999), more than do the previous groups of narratives. The difference rather stems from the unconditional support that the interlocutors give to the Peace Process. Although they have their own share of reservations concerning the process on different grounds, both Tarık and Ayşe seem to cherish the possibility of a solution. Tarık's reservation emerges even in the first moment as he heads to a response through negating a negative. But his hesitation rather stems from hopelessness about the results of the process. Because he seems to propose that if there is to be a substantial and effective resolution, it should come rather from below, in the interstices of daily practices and encounters, and through empathy. While doing so, he does not turn his hesitations into an argument in opposition of the Peace Process.

"Temel olarak çok olumsuz bakmıyorum. ... Bildiğim tek şey, bu mesafeden bakıldığında hiçbir şeyin doğru anlamayacağı. Oralara gidip şöyle bir hafta, 10 gün dolanıp, çay içip gezmenin de çok etkili olmayacağı. Yani insanın orada yaşayıp, oranın insanı gibi, kendini oraya sunulan hizmetin odağına koyması lazım. Yani oradan hizmet alması lazım. Sen bugün devletten hizmet alıyorsan, bir Van, Siirt, Bitlis mukimi bir insan olarak hizmet alman lazım. Oranın hastanesine gideceksin, postanesine gideceksin ki bir fikrin oluşsun."³⁵⁵

³⁵⁴ Personal interview with Nuri, conducted on 16.11.2013: "But the deal there is this: Yes, the Peace Process is important. But what is the price we will pay? This is very important I think. I mean, what do we give in return? Ok, the terrorists, peace, ceasefire, it is all good, but what do we give them? I don't think they [terrorists] will simply give everything up and walk away. If we are giving something going against the interests of the Turkish Republic, I could live without it [the Peace Process]. ... Indivisibility of the state, autonomy and so forth, they are things which should be crossed out."

³⁵⁵ Personal interview with Tarık, conducted on 09.11.2013: "Fundamentally, I don't view it [the Peace Process] in a negative light. ... All I know, you cannot get anything right from a distance like this. Or going to those places and wandering around for a week or 10 days and drinking tea wouldn't do the trick as well. The person should be as if living there, and place the self at the center of the service provided there. One should get the service from there. If

On the other hand, Ayşe gives her support to the process, for quite a simple reason. Life, instead of death, she suggest, will win if the process unfolds without any obstruction:

"Barış Süreci'ne olumlu bakıyorum tabii ki. Ateşkes olduysa eğer bir yerlerde güzel oldu tabii. Özellikle hani senin de bir yerlerde arkadaşların oluyor askere gitmesi gereken, arkadaşlarının askerlik zamanı geliyor falan. Öyle olunca birilerinin askere gidip ölmeyeceği düşüncesi mutluluk veriyor tabii. Diğer taraftan da daha fazla Kürdün ölmeyeceği düşüncesi mutluluk veriyor tabii."³⁵⁶

4.6. Chapter Conclusion

Despite the overall public perception, I hope I could show that in the entire of this last chapter, it is not possible to do away with the political views of the children of military families simply as derivations of Kemalism. I believe that the diversity of the narratives of children in this final chapter indicates the limits of normalization and diversity of experiences one can have as a child of a military family. Although the diversity in political subjectivities to the extent even including anti-militarist stances, I also think that one particular, yet essential dividing line which connects certain narratives thematically to each other, while differentiating the rest, strikes the eye throughout these narratives. To elaborate on this dividing line, as the children come to identify and express themselves through their ties with the military institution, it seems that their reactions, feelings and arguments in the face of the developments which have changed the military and its relationship to the political establishment and the society at large ossify and intensify in favor of the military institution. Perhaps, at this juncture, it is worth to remind the reader of Tarık's response to the question about his perception of the trials of Balyoz and Ergenekon, perhaps as the most indicative expression of this dividing line. Tarık stated that, he does not take the trials

you are being served by the state, you should get it as a person who lives in Van, Siirt, Bitlis. You should go the hospital, the post office there in order to get a sense of things."

³⁵⁶ Personal interview with Ayşe, conducted on 24.11.2013: "Of course I look at it [the Peace Process] positively. If there is a ceasefire in anywhere in the world, it is a good call. Especially, when you have friends who have to go to the military service, it makes you happy to know that they will not go and die there when their time [for the draft] comes. On the other hand, the idea that the Kurds will no longer die also makes you happy."

of Balyoz and Ergenekon as an offense committed against him in person, or against a particular identity or subculture to which he feels attached. However, this is exactly how some of my interlocutors approach the issues. The sentiments arousing in their narratives are resentment, frustration, disappointment, withdrawal and nostalgia, occasionally gesturing toward a lamenting over the downfall from the halcyon era of the military:

“Şeyi özledim: Tamam, ben büyüdüm, başka bir çevrem oldu, başka bir ortamım oldu. Ama yine de herhalde ben orada [lojmanlarda] olsaydım şu zamanda, illa ki ben o bahçeye çıkıp otururdum. Orada ben huzurumu bulurdum ya. Çünkü orası benim yuvamdı.”³⁵⁷

As those children yield to the colonization of their everyday life by succumbing into the military setting at ease and in peace, they also lose contact with other discursive regimes which would undermine the military’s aim of normalization. Especially those interlocutors who identify their political subjectivities mostly in a dialogue with the military seem to be engulfed into arguments that have been deployed by the military elites. In their narratives, the military institution is often rendered outside the power relations and as a victim falling prey to those who possess the power, as is apparent in some reactions concerning the trials of Balyoz and Ergenekon. Or these narratives tend to whitewash or normalize the past deeds of the military, as in the cases of the Kurdish Question and military coups. Or in the case of compulsory military service, they grant normalcy to the militaries, soldiers and militarism as inevitable and even beneficial facts of life.

³⁵⁷ Personal interview with Zeynep, conducted on 22.11.2013: “I missed it: Ok, I grow up and had different relations and friends, I had a different setting. But if I were in there [military lodgings] now, I would definitely go out and sit in that garden [of military lodgings]. I would find peace there. Because it was home to me.”

V. CONCLUSION

Written on a topic which remains largely, if not completely, unexplored this thesis perhaps raises more questions than that it answers, while seeking an understanding of a field and signalling its prospects awaiting the attention of other researchers. Let's begin with the easier task that pertains to remembering the findings of this thesis chapter by chapter, before delving into some of the questions this thesis prompts.

In the introductory section written to give a broader sense of being a child in a military family and within a military setting, roughly between the 1990s and 2010s, I attempted to conceptualize the childhood of the children raised in military families in several snapshots and then proposed that there are three crucial institutions not only involved in, but also spatially and temporally surrounding the great portion of the lives of the children of military families. The institutional triangle, all of whose members are known for their normalizing effects, consists of the family, the school and the military. Then I proposed that they are the institutions without the examination of which one could hardly make sense of the experiences entailed by being a child raised in military families. I noted that, the specificity of the institutional triangle in the context of Turkey lies in the claims made by each institution regarding the roles of the other. Meanwhile, I also emphasized that the normalizing effects of these institutions should not be taken at absolute value, denying agency to the subjects in question; nor should they be deemed as always working with each other for the ultimate subjection of the children. Therefore, I tried to distance myself from an adamant structuralist outlook so as to reserve more wriggle room for the subjects, while embarking on my analyses on the children.

In the latter section of the introduction, written on the historical roots of the military family in Turkey, I tried to provide the reader with a historical context for the military

family. While doing so, I extended back to the first military modernization efforts in the Ottoman Empire, and traced the emergence of military families. What I found was that the fully fledged formation of the military family as we know it today delayed until the 1960s for several reasons, among which the structural tension between marriage and the military profession embedded at the heart of the institution takes the lead. After highlighting the growing tensions between the rise of a pro-natalist discourse with the foundation of the Turkish nation-state and the deep-rooted institutional aversion towards the marriage of officers, I marked the 1960s as a turning point, signalling at shifts towards a new form of governmentality in the military. And I asserted that the emergence of the military family coincides with the emergence of this new form of governmentality. In this new mode of governmentality, the financial and discursive disincentives for military officers to marry were gradually removed and the military, instead of discouraging the military officers from marriage, embraced the military families to be cocooned inside the demarcated zones of the institution, mushrooming quickly after the 1960 military coup, with the accelerating construction of military lodgings, Officers' Clubs, military vacation facilities and military hospitals.

After contextualizing the construction of the military family, in the first part of Chapter 1, I first looked at the military family in question, which has transpired after the 1960 military coup. I attracted attention to the forceful discourses disseminated by the military with regards to the members of the military family and analyzed the universe of ideals upheld and disseminated by the institution concerning these members. Then I attempted to forge connections between this universe of ideals as well as imaginations circulating in the institution and the life in military families with recourse to the narratives of my interlocutors. Seeing upon the shortage of discourses provided by the military specifically aiming at the children of officers, unlike the cases with male military officers and their wives, I tried to conceptualize the distinctive characteristics of a “model military brat”, by drawing on the analytical frameworks used by Cynthia Enloe in her book *Maneuvers* (2000). I underscored that, the most significant role tailored for the children of military families is working in tandem with the other members of the family to assist the father, mostly in his military job and the primary way suggested to achieve this end is seen

as not leaving the minds of the parents preoccupied, by immersing the self within the military complex. Thereafter, I directed attention to the educational life of the children of military families and outlined the tensions between the significance invested by military families in the educational lives of children in order to reproduce and reify their social position, while preserving hopes for upward class mobility and the obligations originating from the military profession. Accordingly, I proceeded to demonstrate a set of strategies employed in military families to reconcile with this particular tension.

In Chapter 2, I took on my scope the concerted efforts of the military to govern its multitudes, largely consisting of “womenandchildren,” and to handle the tensions arising within its institutional borders, while pursuing the workings and implications of a new form of governmentality whose emergence was noted in the section on the historical roots of the military family. Underlining the role played by the military institution of Turkey in the governance and regulation of internal tensions, I sought an answer to the question as to how the military, in order to render its services more effective and legitimate, comes to grips with its bulky outliers consisting of the children, spouses and parents of military officers. I proposed that the military institution exercises institutional control over the bodies of children, with the caveat that this control should not be only understood along the lines of “technologies of domination.” Otherwise, I suggested, we would run the risk of bypassing the juxtaposition of the ‘ease’ and ‘peace’ that many of my interlocutors feel within the confines of an institution identified by its strict discipline, the command of ‘Attention!’ and ‘warfare’. Rather, I argued, the enclosure of these multitudes has to do less with a desire to repress subjects and more with producing regularities in subjects, or in other words, producing nationalized, gendered and militarized subjectivities catering to the interests of the military institution, who do not find the conditions of their enclosure undesirable or oppressive. Therefore, I claimed, if we want to have a better grasp on the ways in which the military exercises institutional control over children, we have to put the emphasis less on the prohibitions, injunctions, indoctrinations or punishments which might rather act upon bodies, and more on what I called “encompassion,” a neology pertaining rather to the productive aspects of power which inform bodies. Accordingly, I first explored the interplay of restrictions and resistance within the military complex, through the narratives

of my interlocutors. It was followed by an examination of the three cornerstones in the process of subjection, namely nationalization, gendering and militarization which proves essential to the military's aim of producing subjectivities which feed its institutional interests. During these examinations, I brought into consideration the conditions common and specific to the experience of children in military families and within the military complex and concluded that the encompassment of the lives of children amounts to an attempt to control the possibility of resistance and subversion, by controlling convergences with other discursive regimes to prevent discursive complexity. Meanwhile, I also formulated a nuanced definition of the social and gendered process of militarization in the case of the children of military families. I argued that the militarization of these children hinges on forging linkages between the bodies that the judicial discourse of the military pigeonholes as "the military dependents" and the discourse itself.

In the final chapter, I traced the subjectivities emerging out of the field described above, by presenting and analyzing the perceptions and voices of my interlocutors concerning the watershed political affairs which have occasioned major transformations in the position, perception and practices of TSK. I tried to understand the reception of the process of relative normalization in civil-military relations by my interlocutors, while sharing their viewpoints on the recent shifts in the power relations of the country. I have done so, by trying my best to represent the due complexity and diversity of their narratives. I realized that, neither the process, nor the political affairs were greeted easily by many of my interlocutors. Especially those interlocutors, who identify their subjectivities in a dialogue with the military institution, seemed to be engulfed into the set of arguments deployed by the institutional elites. As they narrated, I came to the conclusion that the military's legitimacy and position in the relations of power indeed depends so much on its governing enterprises concerned with whom the institution hails as the military dependents.

Finally, I would like to mention some shortcomings and further prospects offered by the field. First of all, this study is predicated on interviews conducted with children who were born in mid to late 1980s and early 1990s. Therefore, I argue that my interlocutors grew up in a period during which the military's spatial organizations as part of its new mode of governmentality could yield more effective results. However, understanding the

continuing shifts taking place in the field would benefit from a study conducted with younger interlocutors. Just to name an exemplary question: As new media technologies penetrate our lives and dismantle many spatial and temporal barriers existing before, does it require more than the organization of space for the military to ensure the control of children? If so, how do new media technologies influence the governmentality employed by the military institution? How does the military adapt itself to it? How do these developments alter the distinctions imposed and perceived between the lives inside and outside of the military setting, by connecting us at will to the rest of the world? Secondly, I conducted interviews with interlocutors who, in many ways, complied with the military institution. However, those who fell out of the military setting, by transgressing the institutional order imposed by the military are still required to be lent an ear. The juxtaposition of their narratives to that of those who complied would expand our understanding of military governmentality with regard to children. Last but not the least, if we take into account that some of the narratives in response to the Kurdish Question or military coups rely on discursive frameworks that are mostly abandoned, even by many political elites pursuing very obvious nationalist agendas, what does the stream of responses provided by the children of military families tell us in the context of youth studies? How do the efforts of the military to squeeze itself into every imaginable gap, temporal and spatial, opening up in these children's lives, echo in the generation to which they belong? Is it possible to claim that the military's mode of governmentality results in significant gaps among people whom we assume belonging to the same generations, along axes related, yet irreducible to class and gender? If so, how do such disjunctions contribute to the maintenance of the boundaries between the lives inside and outside? I hope that these questions, and more, will garner the interest of researchers to grow a better understanding of the field.

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