

HOUSEHOLDS IN OTTOMAN POLITICS: THE RIVALRY BETWEEN HUSREV
MEHMED PASHA AND MEHMED ALI PASHA OF EGYPT

by

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ABSTRACT

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History, M.A. Thesis, Spring 2013

Thesis Supervisor: Yusuf Hakan Erdem

This thesis aims to present an analysis of households in the Ottoman politics through rivalry of Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. Especially with the adoption of tax-farming system, households of the Ottoman ruling elite began to assume former functions of *timar* and *devşirme* systems as well as the palace school. Parallel to this development, the forming or the attachment to a powerful household became a necessity for the Ottoman bureaucrats for both obtaining office in the Ottoman administration and for gathering influence and wealth. Accordingly, intra-elite rivalries of factions formed around households and patronage networks left its mark on the Ottoman politics. One of the most important intra-elite rivalries in the first half of the nineteenth century was the contestation between Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. In this period, the Egyptian Question, the Morea Campaign, the military modernization, the Syrian Campaigns of Mehmed Ali, promulgation and implementation of Tanzimat were leading issues in Ottoman politics. Since the rivalry between Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha had considerable impact on the course of all these events, this thesis focuses on their interactions to create a better understanding of interconnectedness during the late Ottoman period.

Keywords: households, intra-elite contestations, Husrev Mehmed Pasha, Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt

ÖZET

OSMANLI SİYASETİNDE HANELER: HUSREV MEHMED PAŞA İLE MİSİR VALİSİ MEHMED ALİ PAŞA ARASINDAKİ REKABET

Azize F. Çakır

Tarih, Master Tezi, Bahar 2013

Tez Danışmanı: Yusuf Hakan Erdem

Bu tez, Husrev Mehmed Paşa ile Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa arasındaki rekabet üzerinden hanelerin Osmanlı siyasetindeki yerini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Osmanlı yönetici zümresinin haneleri özellikle de iltizam sistemine geçişten sonra, tımar ve devşirme sistemlerinin yanı sıra saray okulunun da işlevlerini bünyelerinde toplamaya başlamışlardır. Bu gelişmeyle birlikte, güçlü bir hane kurmak ya da güçlü bir hamiye sahip olmak, Osmanlı imparatorluk sistemi içinde güvenli bir mevki, nüfuz ve zenginlik edinmenin temel şartlarından biri olmuş ve haneler ile intisab ilişkileri etrafında şekillenen kişisel çatışmalar Osmanlı siyasetine damgasını vurmuştur. 19.yy'ın ilk yarısında, Osmanlı siyasetini belirleyen en büyük elitler arası çatışmalardan biri Husrev Mehmed Paşa ile Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa arasında yaşanmıştır. Mısır Sorunu, Mora Seferi, askeri modernleşme, Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın Suriye Seferleri, Tanzimat'ın ilanı ve reformların uygulanması gibi bu dönemin en önemli olaylarında belirleyici bir rol oynayan bu çatışmayı incelemek, bahsi geçen olayların birbirleriyle ilişkisini ortaya çıkarmaya da yardımcı olacaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: haneler, elitler arası çatışmalar, Husrev Mehmed Paşa, Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa

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Introduction

The first four decades of the long nineteenth-century Ottoman politics witnessed the challenge of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. Many historians¹ focus on the relation between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers while analyzing this internationalized crisis. Focusing on the international aspect, these researchers put forth the power shifts between the European Powers and the Porte, and their impacts on the latter. Although very insightful, they give scant attention to the internal dynamics of the Ottoman administration. A more complete research needs to focus not only the external but also internal factors. A closer look to the internal dynamics illuminates the importance of the intra-elite rivalries among the Ottoman ruling elites, as well as the struggle between them and the sultan. Indeed, these rivalries had a decisive influence in the development of the leading issues of the Ottoman politics.

The literature on intra-elite struggles shed lights on the different patterns of contestation among the members of the Ottoman ruling class. Some scholars take these struggles as contestation between the center and periphery; others emphasize the conflict between those who belong to the palace culture and those who belong to the culture of province; or between reformist and traditionalist bureaucrats.² Still others emphasize struggles among the Ottoman elites of different ethnic-regional and religious origins or the conflicts between the members of different departments of the Ottoman administration.³ Although the rivalries can be resulted from such group affiliations such as reformist vs.

¹ Schroeder W. Paul, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994; Clayton, G.D., *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli*, University of London Press, 1971; Cunningham Allan, *Eastern Question in the Nineteenth Century, Collected Essays: Vol. II*, Edward Ingram (ed), Frank Cass, London, 1993

² For the view of conflict among people of palace culture and those of provincial culture see., Mardin, Şerif, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol.11, no.3 (June 1969), pp.258-281 and for the view of struggle among province and center see., Hanioglu, Şükrü, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, Princeton University Press, 2008; for the debate of reformist and traditionalist Ottoman elite see., Berkez, Niyazi, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Routledge, NY, 1998

³ For the contestation of Balkan-stock bureaucrats (Westerners) and Caucasian-stock bureaucrats (Easterners) see., Kunt, İbrahim Metin, "Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 5, no.3 (Jun., 1974), pp.233-239; for the contestation between Muslim and non-Muslim bureaucrats, see., Lybyer, Albert Howe, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Harvard University Press, 1993 and for its critics see., Itzkowitz, Norman, "Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities," in *Studia Islamica*, no. 16 (1962), pp. 73-94

traditionalist or center vs. periphery, there have been times where the elite struggles within the same group take hand in shaping the unfolding of certain events such as the contestations among the reformist cadre of Selim III themselves.⁴ Indeed, these groups do not exemplify a monolithic structure and one needs to go beyond them to have a more nuanced account of the Ottoman politics at that period. This thesis takes the intra-elite struggle in the first four decades of the nineteenth-century Ottoman politics as household-centered personal rivalries. I am not the first to employ the household as a tool for historical inquiry.⁵ There are many other historians who explain both the empowerment of the Ottoman ruling elite and their contestation among each other through the household (*kapu/kapu halkı* or *hane/hane halkı*) and the patronage (*intisab*) relations. A literature survey of some of these studies would help us to question whether the concept of household may be used to understand the complex power relations underlying the Ottoman politics.

Metin Kunt's study of *The Sultan's Servants The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* published in 1983.⁶ In this work, Kunt analyzes career backgrounds and service term of the *ümerâ* (*sancakbegi* and *beylerbegi*). For the period of

⁴ For a detailed analysis see., Shaw, Stanford J, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Selim III 1789-1807*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, pp.366-377

⁵ For the rise of vizier and pasha households in the Ottoman Imperial system, see., Kunt, Metin, *The Sultan's Servants The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650*, Columbia University Press, NY, 1983; Abou-el-Hajj, Rifaat Ali, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report," in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol.94, no.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1974), pp. 438-447. For the growing interaction of the Ottoman central army members with the rising households of jurists and viziers after the adoption of tax-farming system see., Tezcan, Baki, *The Second Empire: the Political and Social Transformations in the Early Modern World*, Cambridge University Press, 2010. For the provincial households see., Toledano, Ehud, "the Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research," in I. Pappe and M. Ma'oz (eds), *Politics and Ideas: A History from Within*, London, Tauris, 1997, pp.145-162.; Akdağ Mustafa, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası (Celâli İsyanları)*, YKY, İstanbul, 2013.; Hathaway, Jane, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt The Rise of Qazdaglıs*, Cambridge University Press, GB, 1997.; T. Shuval, "Çezayiri Garp: Bringing Algeria Back into Ottoman History," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, vol.22 (2000), pp. 85-114; Shuval, "Households in Ottoman Algeria" *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 24/1 (2000), pp.41-64; for the household-building and networking activities of the Ottoman dynastic women and harem staff see., Pedani, Maria Pia, "Safiye's Household and Venetian Diplomacy," *Turcica*, vol.32 (2000), pp.9-32., and Pierce, Leslie, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford University Press, 1993.; Kunt, Metin, "Kulların Kulları," in *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, vol.3, 1975. For the Ottoman princely household, see., Rhoads Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image, and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800*, Continuum, London, and Kunt, Metin, "A Prince Goes Forth (Perchance to Return)," in Tezcan, Baki and Barbir Karl K. (ed.), *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World*, the University of Wisconsin Press, USA, 2007, pp.63-73. For the office-households of the Ottoman civil officers and the patronage relations of the scribes, see., Fleischer, Cornell H., *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600)*, Princeton University Press, 1986., and Findley, Carter V., *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*, Princeton University Press, 1980. For the marginalization of *kapusuz* people see., Barkey, Karen, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997

⁶ Kunt, Metin, *The Sultan's Servants The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650*, Columbia University Press, NY, 1983

1550-1650, he uncovers three interrelated but distinct developments: Protégés of leading bureaucrats at capital and graduates of the Palace schools began to take over provincial administration positions at higher ranks; the province replaced the district as the main administrative unit; household affiliations and patronage relations became dominant factor in this polity.⁷ He associates these developments and the growing importance of *ümerâ* households with obsolescence of *timar* system and its gradual replacement with tax-farming (*iltizam*) system. He then touches upon how the Porte's growing reliance on households of high-ranking bureaucrats in gathering soldiers and in levying taxes brought about the dilemma of 'well-fitted out household' (*mükemmel kapu*). Because slowing pace of territorial expansion, too many viziers and pashas began to compete for the same number of provincial posts and they spend more and more time between appointments. They, at the same time, had to maintain a large household even they were out of office because appointments went to pashas and viziers who had a well-fitted out household.⁸ Kunt then shows efforts of the Ottoman administration to supplement the *ümerâ* incomes vis-à-vis the dilemma of well-fitted out household such as assignment of fiefs directly to the member of viziers and pashas households and distribution of vacant timars to them.⁹ Kunt thus reveals how the large part of the imperial revenues was tied to political struggles with the rise of households, both as a requirement of running state affairs and as a political necessity in obtaining an appointment.¹⁰

Rıfaat Ali Abou-el-Hajj, in his article of "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report", deals with the increasing importance of the vizier and pasha households in the late 17th century and explores the growth and continued political dominance of Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's household.¹¹ He associates the beginning of growing influence of the vizier and pashas of the central administration with the transfer of grand vizierate outside the palace in 1654.¹² His study illuminates the finding that by the second half of the 17th century, nearly half of all appointments for high offices in the capital as well in the provinces were staffed by men who had been raised, trained or attached to the households of vizier and pashas.¹³ He proposes that this growing preponderance of the households of the leading bureaucrats was a sign of both the decline in the personal rule of

⁷ Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, p.95

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.84-85

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.99

¹¹ Abou-el-Hajj, Rıfaat Ali, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report," in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol.94, no.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1974), pp. 438-447

¹² *Ibid.*, p.439

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.438

the sultan and the down-grading of the palace as the sole training ground for public administrative experience.¹⁴ Regarding its impact on the personalization of the Ottoman politics, he argues that the sultan's denial of *de jure* and therefore institutional recognition of the enhanced position of vizier and pasha households kept them in a precious state and predisposed "the internal political history of the state to potentially violent struggles for ascendancy during political crises".¹⁵

Jane Hathaway's book of *The Politics of Households in the Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of Qazdağlıs* questions pattern of rupture and continuity between the institutions of Mamluk sultanate and Ottoman Egypt's military elite of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹⁶ In her revisionist interpretation, Hathaway expands the definition of household by including power relations of regimental leaders into the new concept of 'barrack-household'.¹⁷ Based on the official documents –such as register of salaries- and chronicles, Hathaway shows that household membership overshadowed slave status in identifying a person's position in Egyptian military society by the late 17th century and since then soldiers was defined by the patron of a household they followed.¹⁸ I think that her thesis is useful to reveal the household-building strategies of Mehmed Ali Pasha before he acquired the post of the governor of Egypt.

Carter Vaughn Findley has published two books and many articles emphasizing particular importance of the 'patrimonial households' in the organization of the Ottoman social and political life by employing the patrimonial model of Weber.¹⁹ After defining the palace of the sultan as 'metaphoric integration of the entire state into a single household

¹⁴ Ibid., p.443

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Hathaway, Jane, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt The Rise of Qazdağlıs*, Cambridge University Press, GB, 1997.; and see also, "Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History" in A. Singer (ed.), *New Historiographies of the Ottoman Mediterranean World*, special issue of *Mediterranean Historical Review* 19/1 (2004), pp.28-52; "The Household: An Alternative Framework for the Military Society of Eighteenth Century Ottoman Egypt" in K. Fleet (ed.), *Oriente Moderno* 18/1 (1999), pp.57-66; "Military Household in Ottoman Egypt," in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.27, no.1 (Feb., 1995), pp.39-52

¹⁷ Hathaway, Jane, "Military Household in Ottoman Egypt," in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.27, no.1 (Feb., 1995), pp.39-52, pp.41-3

¹⁸ Ibid., 39-52, p. 43

¹⁹ Findley, Carter V, "Political Culture and the Great Households," in Suraiya N. Faroqhi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603—1839*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp.65-81; "Patrimonial Household Organization and Factional Activity in the Ottoman Ruling Class," in Halil inalçık, Osman Okyar, and Ü. Nalbantoğlu (eds), *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071-1920)*, Ankara, 1980; *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*, Princeton University Press, 1980; *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*, Princeton Universty Press, 1981; "Factional Rivalries in Ottoman Istanbul: the Fall of Pertev Paşa, 1837," in *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, vol 10, pp.127-134.

establishment' he explains how the elite households divided by factional rivalries began to contest with the power of the sultan.²⁰ From Findley's point of view, the concentration of the dynastic life into the palace, the adoption of the principle of seniority in succession, and thus growing influence of the *vâlide* sultan gave rise to the palace factions rooting on the alliances of the sultan's son-in-law (*damad*) with dynastic figures and the palace staff.²¹ Apart from the palace groups, he analyzes office-households within the civil bureaucracy and states that

One of the most prominent features of the traditional scribal career patterns was the politicization of the higher ranks. This phenomenon had many dimensions. The most distinctive, in culturally conservative patrimonial polity, was the political activity revolved around issues of personality and unconditioned persona loyalty, rather than substantive policy questions. This personalization of politics produced a pattern of factionalism organized around the households and patronage-networks of prominent figures...Polity issues and inter-service rivalries were often at work in factional conflicts, but tended to remain secondary to issues of personal loyalty.²²

Within this framework in mind, I attempt to analyze the rivalry between Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt by taking household as a tool for my historical analysis.²³ A closer look to the interaction of these pashas illustrates a highly personalized form of politics in the first half of the nineteenth century, which supports the above-cited literature analyzing the empowerment and the contestations of the ruling elites

²⁰ Findley, Carter V, "Political Culture and the Great Households," in Suraiya N. Faroqhi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603—1839*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp.65-81, p.66

²¹ Ibid.

²² Findley, Carter Vaughn, "Factional Rivalries in Ottoman Istanbul: the Fall of Pertev Paşa, 1837," in *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, vol 10, pp.127-134, p.127.

²³ Husrev Mehmed Pasha (1756-1855) was Abkazian-stock slave who entered the palace service through his master *çavuşbaşı* Said Efendi's connections. In the reign of Selim III (1789-1807), he rose in rank and was integrated into the Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha's household. In 1801, he was sent to Egypt as a part of military campaign against the French invasion and after his military success he was bestowed the rank of vizier and appointed as governor of this province. There, he attempted to form a modern army to strengthen Ottoman position against local power blocks and irregular Balkan troops among which Mehmed Ali Pasha, an Albanian irregular soldier, posed a prominent challenge. In the following days, Mehmed Ali Pasha obtained the administration of Egypt and forced Husrev Pasha to leave the province. After several provincial tasks in the Balkan region, Husrev Mehmed Pasha was entrusted with military operation during the Ottoman-Russo War of 1806-1812 and obtained the rank of grand admiral in 1811 and 1822 where he and Mehmed Ali Pasha's son İbrahim Pasha administered a naval operation initiated against the Greek Rebellion. In the following years, Husrev Mehmed dealt with formation of the new army (*Asâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye*) and strengthened his position by placing his men into various posts in the army, navy and central administration –including grand vizierate- while Mehmed Ali Pasha established very effective administration in Egypt and in the 1830s, he attempted to expand his rule over Syria and Adana. For detailed biography see, İnalçık, Halil. "Husrev Paşa." İA (MEB) vol. V/I, pp.609-916, and Toledano, E.R., "Muhammad 'Ali Pasha," EI.2, vol.VII, pp. 423-431

through households. In the same line with Toledano, I take the power-elite status of the Ottomans as the status of those who are office-holders within the Ottoman Imperial household.²⁴ After Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha became the members of the Ottoman ruling elite with the mediation of their masters, they built their own households through which they did not only interact among each other but with the different segments of the Ottoman Empire which growingly interact with the European Powers. That is why I analyze their interaction at the juncture of these intertwined power relations.

Before questioning the interaction between Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha, I first contextualize the relations of the Ottoman Empire with the European Powers of that period. This contextualization is crucial in the sense that it provides the widest framework for the research in hand. To start with, the French Revolutionary Wars marked the beginning of new relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers. France had begun to threaten the European monarchies especially after issuing the Decree of Fraternity –promising to spread revolution into other countries – in 1792 and asserting a right to reach its ‘natural frontiers’ in the following year.²⁵ Then, its ongoing war with Austria and Prussia was extended to Britain, Low Countries, and Spain – the members of the First Coalition – whose disunity resulted in the victory of France: Preoccupation of Russia, Austria, and Prussia with the partition of Poland left Britain alone vis-à-vis the French until the formation of the Second Coalition in 1798.²⁶ This war also brought about the change in the art of warfare: Unlike traditional dynastic wars, this was ‘people’s wars’ based on the concept of ‘the nation in arms’.²⁷ It is also important to note that Napoleon Bonapart’s military career owed much to this shift, opening the army to new and talented officers.²⁸ With the military reform of 1793, the Revolutionary regime of France began to increase the size of its army dramatically by expanding the conscription to the whole population of the country and managed to supplement its larger army through its growing military industry.²⁹ As a result, War of the First Coalition (1792-1797) ended up with the decisive victory and territorial expansion of France that was recognized in the Treaty of Basle by Prussia and

²⁴ Toledano, Ehud, “the Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research,” in I. Pappe and M. Ma’oz (eds), *Politics and Ideas: A History from Within*, London:Tauris, 1997, 145-162, pp.150-159.

²⁵ Chapman, Tim, *The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results*, Routledge, London, 1998, p.9

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Wright, D.G., *Napoleon and Europe*, Pearson Education Limited, London, 1984, pp.5-6

²⁸ Chapman, *The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results*, p.9

²⁹ Ibid., p.10

Spain and then by the Austrians in the Treaty of Campo Formio on 18 October 1797.³⁰ After then, France diverted its attention to Britain which was now left to fight on alone.

In July 1797, Talleyrand, Foreign Minister of France, gave a public lecture on “The Advantages of Acquiring New Colonies” and proposed that France should find new colonies to replace those it had lost to Britain in the West Indies and he identified Egypt as a suitable substitute.³¹ When this plan was realized through the Napoleon’s expedition of Egypt in 1798, the Ottoman Empire made an alliance with Britain and Russia (the Triple Alliance) and became a member of the Second Coalition.³² In the first military action of the Second Coalition War, a joint Ottoman-Russo fleet was sent to the Ionian Islands under the French occupation.³³ Then the British forces landed to Egypt as an ally of the Porte against the French.

Considering that European had been driven out of Egypt and Palestine in 1291, the Napoleon expedition of Egypt was, actually, the end of nearly 500 years of non-involvement of the Europeans with the North Africa and the Levant as Biger states.³⁴ In the following years, the European intervention to these regions and to the affairs of the Ottoman Empire grew dramatically; In 1820s, they were involved with the Greek Revolt; in 1830, France seized over the Ottoman Algeria and in 1840, a coalition of European armies fought together with the Sultan against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt.³⁵ In fact one year before this military operation, the Sultan demanded from the European Powers to force Mehmed Ali Pasha to accept the following demands:

to restore the Imperial fleet; to renounce his pretensions to the hereditary government of Syria; to adopt more reasonable views with regard to the change of the Viziral office, -a change which depends entirely upon the will of His Highness; to cease endeavoring to stir up disorders; to agree

³⁰ Doyle, William, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution (second edition)*, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.213-7. According to the Treaty of Campo Formio, Austria ceded Belgium to France and recognized its rule over Bologna, Modena, Ferrara, and the Romagna and the Venetian Republic was partitioned as that France took the Ionia Islands while the Austrians took Istria and Dalmatia as well as Venice.

³¹ Shosenberg, James W., “The Battle of Pyramids: Futile Victory,” in Aryeh Shmuelevitz (ed.), *Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801 (Articles Presented at the 2nd International Congress of Napoleonic Studies)*, The Isis Press, Istanbul, pp.235-253, p.236.

³² Sakul, Kahraman, *An Ottoman Global Moment: War of Second Coalition in the Levant*, Unpublished PhD thesis, Georgetown University, 2009, pp.13-15

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Biger, Gideon, “Napoleon’s Expedition and the Return of Europe to the Middle East,” in Aryeh Shmuelevitz (ed.), *Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801 (Articles Presented at the 2nd International Congress of Napoleonic Studies)*, The Isis Press, Istanbul, pp.75-89, p.75

³⁵ Ibid.

that this affair should be negotiated and arranged here, through the medium of the Five Powers.³⁶

This quotation illustrates that the Ottoman politics in that period was not only about the Ottoman-European interaction, crystallized around the Mehmed Ali Pasha crisis. A closer look to the demands suggests that the rivalries between Husrev Mehmed, Mehmed Ali and Ahmet Fevzi Pasha deeply affected the course of Egypt crisis: the Ottoman Imperial fleet were brought to Egypt by Grand Admiral Ahmed Fevzi Pasha as a reaction to the coup d'état of Husrev Mehmed who captured the seal of the post of grand vizier in the succession ceremony of Abdülmecid.³⁷ Mehmed Ali's demand for the change of the Viziral office was also reaction to the overly empowerment of Grand Vizier Husrev Mehmed since he perceived him as the main obstacle for his hereditary claims over Syria.³⁸

These complex relations between Mehmed Ali Pasha, Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Ahmed Fevzi Pasha raise many questions about the positioning and interactions of the Ottoman bureaucrats during the first half of the 19th century: Which conditions led to such level of personalization of the Ottoman politics? How did Mehmed Ali Pasha concentrate such an extensive power against which the sultan had to ask help of the European Powers? How Mehmed Ali collaborated with Grand Admiral in regard to common hostility against Husrev Mehmed? What was the origin of these hostilities? How Husrev managed to appoint himself as the grand vizier? How the Sultan and his other bureaucrats reacted to Husrev's coup d'état? How intra-elite rivalries affected the running of the state affairs of the Porte in the first four decades of the 19th century? Did the rivalry of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali and their interaction with other leading Ottoman bureaucrats affect other issues in the Ottoman politics such as the Morea Campaign, the Syrian Campaigns of Mehmed Ali, promulgation of Tanzimat and the institutional modernization projects of the Porte? This thesis is motivated by these questions and attempts to answer them.

In doing so, this thesis is organized in four chapters. The first chapter focuses on the household strategies of the sultan as macro sphere of the Ottoman intra-elite relations and

³⁶ PP, 1841, XXIX, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 21 August 1839. Quoted in Kutluoğlu, Muhammed H., *The Egyptian Question (1831-1841) The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Paşa in Syria and Asia Minor and the Reactions of the Sublime Porte*, Eren Yayıncılık, 1998, p.146, fn.6

³⁷ Kutluoğlu, Muhammed H., *The Egyptian Question (1831-1841) The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Paşa in Syria and Asia Minor and the Reactions of the Sublime Porte*, Eren Yayıncılık, 1998, p.31

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.27

details how the Sultan organized their power relations through the distribute policy rooting on the division of tax-payer subject people and tax-exempted *kuls*. The chapter then analyzes the conditions which paved the way to the rise of ruling-elite households in this distributive policy and questions the impact of the replacement of *timar* system with tax-farming system. Then, it attempt to deal with the organization of ruling-elite households and their household-building strategies.

The second chapter details the power relations of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali in the context of the Ottoman Imperial campaign against the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt. Because this campaign became the first scene of their interaction, the chapter firstly studies the war strategies of Selim III. In doing so, it questions the impact of the war on the careers of the high-ranking bureaucrats who were in charge of the campaign. Then, it elaborates the interaction of both pashas with the local power holders of the region. Lastly, it tries to compare the household-building strategies of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali and search how the latter managed to seize the governorship of Egypt.

The third chapter analyzes the interaction of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali within the period of the Greek Revolt of 1821 and in the First Syrian Campaign. It studies how the interaction of Mehmed Ali and Husrev Mehmed affected the course of the Morea Campaign. Then it attempts to detail the impact of the Morea Campaign and Mehmed Ali's challenge over the military modernization of Mahmud II, and Husrev's appointment to the post of *serasker* of the *Mansure* Army.

The last chapter deals with the changing power balance between Mehmed Ali, Husrev Mehmed, and the Sultan and its transformative impact over the Ottoman administration from the beginning of the first Syrian Campaign to the London Agreement of 1840, with the special reference to the growing influence of the civil bureaucracy and representatives of European states.

In conducting this research, I benefit from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are largely based on the general histories covering the first half of the nineteenth century in which Husrev Mehmed Pasha's and Mehmed Ali Pasha's rivalry takes place. First primary source I employ is the chronicles of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. In his chronicle covering the period between 1774 and 1826, Ahmed Cevdet (1823-1895) narrates the ongoing events of that same period at the juncture of both European-Ottoman diplomacy

and the power relations within the Ottoman bureaucracy.³⁹ Another chronicle which enables us to trace their interaction is that of Lütü Efendi (1814-1907).⁴⁰ Lütü Efendi, the successor of Ahmed Cevdet in the post of official chronicler, helps to trace the relation between Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali Pashas after the year of 1826. The Imperial Edicts of Selim III with his leading bureaucrats constitutes another primary source which helps us to grasp the ongoing power relations in Egypt between 1798 and 1805; the period in which Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali first met each other.⁴¹ The edicts do this by covering the power relations surrounding the protector of Husrev Mehmed, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. Finally, I employ Helmuth von Moltke's travel account.⁴² Moltke, the Prussian instructor in the *Mansure* Army, lived through the period of military modernization during the Mahmud II's era; traveled to many places within the Ottoman Empire and took an active duty in the Imperial Campaign. His narration, thus, helps us to trace the intra-elite struggles among the Ottoman bureaucrats and officers; the empowerment of Husrev Mehmed Pasha as *serasker* and the reaction of the people to both the ongoing modernization project and Husrev Mehmed's extensive power.

There are two critical secondary works that provide ways of thinking about how Husrev Pasha and Mehmed Ali perceived the other. Yüksel Çelik's doctoral thesis on "Hüsrev Mehmed Paşa: Siyasi Hayatı ve Askeri Faaliyetleri (1756-1855)" has extensively drawn upon Ottoman archival documents and contemporary chronicles primarily for the career of Husrev Mehmed and his interaction both with members of his household and the other bureaucrats like Mehmed Ali.⁴³ Likewise Khaled Fahmy's seminal study, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt*, reveals Mehmed Ali's household-building strategies and his relations with the Porte and Husrev Mehmed by a detailed analysis of Egyptian National Archives and diplomatic correspondence.⁴⁴ The other critical secondary sources I employ are the studies of Stanford J. Shaw and Avigdor Levy which helps to analyze the intra-elite rivalries, of which Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali

³⁹ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, İstanbul, Matbaa-i Osmanî, 1309/1891-92 (tertib-i cedid)

⁴⁰ Ahmed Lütü, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütü Efendi Tarihi*, vol.IV-V and VI-VII-VIII (ed. Nuri Akbayar), Tarih Vakfı-Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999

⁴¹ Karal, Enver Ziya, *Selim III'ün Hattı Hümayunları*, TTK, Ankara, 1999

⁴² Helmuth von Moltke, *Türkiye'deki Durum ve Olaylar Üzerine Mektuplar*, TTK Basımevi, 1960, Ankara

⁴³ Çelik, Yüksel, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa; Siyasi Hayatı ve Askeri Faaliyetleri (1756-1855)*, PhD thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2005.

⁴⁴ Fahmy, Khaled, *All the Pasha's Men, Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt*, Cambridge University Press, 1997

Pashas took part, during both the reign of Selim III and Mahmud II.⁴⁵ Shaw demonstrates both solidarity and conflict patterns in the complex relation of the Ottoman ruling elite in the first half of the 19th century. He takes the view that Selim III secured his momentary power by splitting his reformist cadre into rival factions and played them off against each other.⁴⁶ Like Shaw, Avigdor Levy shows how Mahmud II manipulated intra-elite rivalries in order to prevent empowerment of certain factions within the army and other state offices.⁴⁷ Lastly, Muhammed Kutluoğlu's study on the Egyptian Question covers interaction of Husrev Mehmed, Mehmed Ali, the leading Ottoman bureaucrats of time, and representatives of the European states at the juncture of the international diplomacy and internal power dynamics of the Porte.⁴⁸ Having explained the structure of the thesis and the sources I employ, let us now turn to the theoretical framework which will help to understand importance of the elite households in the Ottoman politics.

⁴⁵ Shaw, Stanford J., *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Selim III 1789-1807*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971; Shaw Stanford J. and Shaw, Ezel Kaya, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, 1978; Shaw, J. Stanford, "The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan III," in *The Journal of Modern History*, vol.37, no.3, pp. 291-306; Shaw, Stanford J., "The Nizam-ı Cedid Army under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807," in *Oriens*, vol.18/19 (1965-1966), pp.168-184 and Avigdor Levy, *The Military Policy of Mahmud II, 1808-1839*, Unpublished PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1968; Levy, Avigdor, "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud's New Army, 1826-1839," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol.2, no.1 (Jan, 1971)

⁴⁶ Shaw Stanford J. and Shaw, Ezel Kaya, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, 1978, p.273

⁴⁷ Shaw, Levy, Avigdor, "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud's New Army, 1826-1839," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol.2, no.1 (Jan, 1971), pp. 21-39

⁴⁸ Kutluoğlu, Muhammed H., *The Egyptian Question (1831-1841) The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Paşa in Syria and Asia Minor and the Reactions of the Sublime Porte*, Eren Yayıncılık, 1998

Chapter I: The Sultan and His Servants

I.1: The Formation of the House of Osman

The analogy between family and nation occupies an extensive place in the discourse of nationalism. Theoreticians of nationalism, for example, constructed ‘imagined communities’ through familial references.⁴⁹ Within this discourse, the family is perceived as an unchanging sphere of disinterested love and solidarity, the discourse of ‘fraternity’ is one conception of the family as evidence in one of three principles of the French Revolution.⁵⁰ Contrary to nation states/national discourse, pre-modern empires, on the other hand, did not need to construct a family image in order to unify its people since they had actual dynastic families around which the ruling elites and societies gathered. In this regard, Duindam emphasizes centrality of family and household in pre-modern period as that “at all level of societies, households shaped reproduction, socialization and interaction. In a large share of human society, political organization, too, arose primarily in the context of family and household. The hierarchical pre-eminence of a single family or clan, continuing its hold on power over generations, led to development of dynasties.”⁵¹ Whether being Ottoman, Habsburg, Ming, Tudor or Romanov, the dynastic family was in the very centre of the imperial structures as Duindam suggests.

In the Ottoman case, servants of the dynastic household were *kuls* of the sultan, who mediated for their master’s relations with the rest of society and with other states in the administrative, fiscal, military, diplomatic, and judicial terms. Ottoman imperial structure depended on the division of tax-exempt ruling class (*askerî*) and tax-payer subject people (*reâyâ*). In the patrimonial framework, modeled on the supervision of the head of family over his household, the sultan was the head of dynastic family and members of ruling class were the servants of this family while subject people as well as state lands were seen as being

⁴⁹ Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London and New York, 1991, pp.143-4

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Duindam, Jeroen, Artan Tülay, and Kunt, Metin (eds), *Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires; A Global Perspective*, Brill, Boston, 2011, p.1

entrusted by God to the guardianship of the sultan.⁵² Regarding the hierarchy of the central administration, top level administrators of state departments represented the royal authority in the imperial council and after participating to council meetings they held councils in their own residences to organize affairs of their own office. Among these administrators, the grand vizier was the supreme representative of the sultan and his absolute deputy. Servants of the imperial household (*askerîye*) were classified under four categories: military-administrative service (*seyfiyye*), religious service (*ulema*); scribal service (*kalemiye*), and the palace service. To understand the interaction of these servants with the sultan and *reâyâ*, the Ottoman Circle of Justice may be used:

It is justice which is necessary for the world; the world is a vineyard and its wall is the state; state is governed by the sharia; the sharia cannot be maintained without a king; the king cannot govern without soldiers; he cannot congregate soldiers without wealth; it is reaya who accumulate wealth; and its justice which makes the reaya the servants of the padişah of the universe.⁵³

As this formulation suggests, legitimacy of the sultan was rooted on his ability in distributing justice through the allocation of imperial tax sources collected from *reâyâ* to the expenses of *askerîye* who were supposed to maintain order and justice as representatives of the imperial household. *Dirlik*, i.e. livelihood, was the basic income for the members of *askerîye* class. *Dirlik* refers to the state revenues in a particular locality bestowed to an official who is obliged to collect those revenues and fines (*niyabet*) from *reâyâ*, supervised agricultural and economic activities and maintained public order within his place of duty.⁵⁴ Varied in value and size, *dirliks* were grouped in three categories: *timar* with revenues up to 20.000 *akçes*, *zeâmet* from 20.000 to 100000 *akçes* and *hâs* with revenues over than 100.000 *akçes*. Regarding to the relations between these *dirlik*-holders, *timar* and *zeâmet* were self-contained administrative units in which the authority of their holder was coextensive with the limits of their *dirliks* as there was no hierarchical relation between them but with the governor of

⁵² Findley, Carter V., *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*, Princeton University Press, 1980, p.7

⁵³ Kinalızade's formulation: "Adldir mucib-i cihan; cihan bir bagdir divarı devlet; devletin nazımı seri'attır; şeri'ata haris olamaz illa melik; melik zaptylemez illa lesker; leşkeri cem' edemez illa mal; mall cem' eyleyen re'ayadır; re'ayayı kul eder padişah-ı aleme 'adl'" Qoted by Ergene, A. Boğaç, "On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations in Conflict (1600-1800)", *Islamic Law and Society*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2001), pp. 52-87, p.57 fn.13

⁵⁴ Kunt, Metin, *The Sultan's Servants The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650*, Columbia University Press, NY, 1983, p.9

district, *sancakbegi*.⁵⁵ In military terms, the *sancakbegi* was commander of the provincial cavalry, *dirlik*-holders of his *sancak*, who provided a fully equipped cavalry (*cebelü*) in return of income of each 3000 *akçes* for lower ranks and of 5000 *akçes* for holders of high *dirliks*. At the top of hierarchy, the governor of province (*beylerbegi*) supervised *sancakbegis* and because of difficulty in mobilizing troops in Europe and Asia simultaneously; two separate *beylerbegiliks* were formed in Rumeli and Anatolia. In the provincial administration, apart from officers of *dirlik*, representatives of legal-administrative system, *kadis* in cities, *zâims* or *subaşıs* in towns and in larger villages, served under the supervision of the two *kadiaskers* at the capital, one responsible for Rumelia and the other for Anatolia.⁵⁶

The imperial order (*nizâm*) was rooted on the continuity of this distributive system. Therefore social mobility between *askerîye* and *reâyâ* was subject to restriction. The central place of the sultan in this imperial order was supported by his religious titles and duties such as Protector of the Holy Cities, *gazi*, conqueror of infidel lands added to the adobe of Islam (*dârüislâm*), and caliph. Likewise, relics such as the Standard of Prophet, his Mantle and Sword played important roles in the legitimacy of the sultan especially in the accession ceremonies (*cülus*).⁵⁷ As Findley states, the concept of sultan rooting on both the Iranian tradition of absolute kingship and the Turkic ideal of quasi-divine monarchy was, however, contradicting with the Islamic ideal of caliphate that was to compensate through ostentatious respect to Islamic law and religious-judicial scholars; unprecedented development of state's legislative functions by means of the promulgation of *kanunnâmeler*; the sultan's power to issue these codes extensively, and by the inclusion of religious-judicial scholars into the imperial apparatus.⁵⁸ Apart from the religious and judicial services, the sultan and his servants interacted with the subject people in fiscal and military spheres as well. The house of the sultan, the Topkapı Palace, was the essential organizational unit for all these interactions. Besides, the education and training given in the palace played key role in the construction of *kul* identity. To understand social standing of these *kuls*, it seems now necessary to detail their way of inclusion to the Ottoman administration.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.13

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.12

⁵⁷ Riedler, Florian, *Opposition and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire Conspiracies and Political Cultures*, Routledge, NY, 2011, p.6

⁵⁸ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp.8-9

I.2: Recruitment of *Kuls* into the Imperial Household

Formation of an alienated administrative-military bureaucracy seems to be one of the main concerns of the Ottoman governmentality. In this regard Kunt argues that caliphs and sultans -differently from their European counterparts relying on the main national element as administrative and military servants- opted for distancing themselves from the main ethnic groups in society by forming household troops composed of outsiders.⁵⁹ Furthermore, these outsiders were imported as enslaved, deracinated warriors owing sole loyalty to their master that made them perfect troops for dynastic empires.⁶⁰ Apart from this, *nökership*, a common practice among the Eurasian nomadic societies, was also developed by the house of Osman. Conscripted from nomadic groups, usually subdued tribes, the *nökers* (retainer or client) were free individuals who were trained and supported by the ruler and served him as bodyguards.⁶¹ As Piterberg argues, the Mamluks and Ottomans brought perfection to *nökership* since they recruited *nökers* to their households as slaves. In this context, Kunt interprets the existence of a household cavalry's section called *gurebâ* (outsiders/strangers) in the house of Osman as a continuation of the *nöker*-like phenomenon since majority of Osman's household members were of *kul* origin.⁶²

Concerning the origins of the *ghulâm* system practiced in the house of Osman, İnalçık argues that the principle of training young slaves for the service of palace and state was inherited from the Seldjuk Sultanate of Rum. However, the Ottomans, unlike Seldjuks employing *ghulâms* in merely military service, opened all influential administrative posts to the slave-origin members of imperial household from the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481) onwards.⁶³ Concerning the recruitment methods of these *kuls*, the original place of location of the house of Osman, which was one of the dynamic frontier regions (*udj*) between the Byzantine Empire and Muslim Turkic principalities, enabled the Ottomans to increase their human sources through *ghaza* practices. According to the Sharia, Muslim rulers were entitled

⁵⁹ Kunt, İ. Metin, "Turks in The Ottoman Imperial Palace" in Duindam, Jeroen, Artan Tülay, and Kunt, Metin (eds), *Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires; A Global Perspective*, Brill, Boston, 2011, pp.289-312, p.289

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Piterberg, Gabriel, "The Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite in the 18th Century", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug., 1990), pp. 275-289, p.280

⁶² Kunt, "Turks in The Ottoman Imperial Palace," p.290

⁶³ İnalçık, Halil, "Ghulâm", El.2, vol.II, p.1086

with the right for enslavement of the prisoners of war due to their *harbi* status -non-Muslim population living outside the territory of *DârüIslâm*-. From the reign of Bâyezîd I onwards, young boys of non-Muslim population in newly-conquered regions also became subject to recruitment (*devşirme*).⁶⁴ This practice, i.e. enslavement of the sultan's non-Muslim subject peoples, may be called in a sense the Ottomanization of *ghulâm* system that was to form the backbone of the Janissary troops. Compatibility of the *devşirme* system to Sharia has been questioned extensively since the *zimmîs* -People of the Book living under the administration of a Muslim ruler- were not subject to enslavement according to the Islamic jurisprudence. Regarding this issue, Erdem draws attention to the distinction between *harbî* and *zimmî* status as he states that people in *harbî* status do not gain *zimmî* status automatically but by their recognition of superiority and authority of an Islamic state.⁶⁵ This recognition -of the social contract of *zimmî* status (the *zimmî* contract)- was manifested with voluntary submission to the Ottoman authority and in the refusal to submit; forcefully conquered *harbîs* or *zimmîs* rebelling against the Ottoman rule may be subject to enslavement practices on the ground of their violation of the *zimmî* contract.⁶⁶ Regarding the distribution of enslaved *harbîs*, one-fifth share (*pencik*) of the prisoners of the war was the ruler's right. Apart from *pencik* tradition and *devşirme* system, the imperial purchases at slave markets, slaves sent by some tributary states and by leading bureaucrats and sons of local nobilities constituted additional human resources for the sultanic household.⁶⁷

As Kunt states, the *devşirme* system was, by far, a more effective way of recruitment than human booty of raids since it provided the Ottoman administration with an element of choosing.⁶⁸ Accompanied by a scribe, a Janissary officer –generally a *yayabaşı*- with his authorization *berat* visited *kadîs* of regions which were subject to levy and selected best of the children of the ages eligible.⁶⁹ Upon arrival at Istanbul, these children were examined according to the science of physiognomy and then the best were taken into the Palace service or distributed to prominent bureaucrats while others were hired to Turks in Anatolia and Rumelia to work in the agricultural production and to learn Turkish language and Islamic

⁶⁴ V.L. Ménage, "Devshirme", EI.2, vol.II, p.210

⁶⁵ Erdem, Y.Hakan, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 1800-1909*, Palgrave, NY, 1996, p.2

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire; Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, Oxford University Press, NY, 1996, pp.23-4

⁶⁸ Kunt, "Turks in The Ottoman Imperial Palace" pp.289-312, p.292

⁶⁹ Ménage, V.L, "Devshirme," IE.2 vol 2, p.211

culture (*Türk üzerinde olmak*).⁷⁰ Muslim subjects –except Bosnian families converted to Islam- were not subject to *devşirme* practice as the *Kavânîn-i Yeniçeriyân* of the 17th century explains: “If they [Muslim Turks] were to become slaves of the sultan, they would abuse this privilege. Their relatives in the provinces would oppress the reâyâ and not pay taxes. They would oppose the sanjak beyis and become rebels. But if Christian children accept Islam, they become zealous in the faith and enemies of their relatives”.⁷¹ Contrary to these assumptions, the system did not cut off the *devşirmes* from their all former associations. Nevertheless, it provided a relatively high degree of loyalty of the *devşirmes* to the persona of sultan.⁷²

Newly-conscripted *devşirmes* taken into the palace service were called *içoğlan* and after two to seven years education under the surveillance of eunuchs a second selection distributed the most talented pages to the Greater and the Lesser Chambers while others were sent to the *kapıkulu* cavalry divisions.⁷³ *Ak ağas* –white eunuchs of the Palace- serving under the *kapı ağası* supervised education of these palace pages covering physical education, sport activity, fine arts or crafts, literary arts, and religious teaching. *Ak ağas* played a determinant role in the appointment and promotion of these pages since they made recommendations to the sultan as his absolute deputy in the palace hierarchy.⁷⁴ After graduation from inner service (*Enderun*), some pages proceeded to the second and first courts for Outer Service (*Birûn*) which provided access for palace services, six *sipahi* elite household cavalry regiments, and military offices for various divisions of lower-ranking household troops, palace scribal service, chancery or treasury, palace art studios and workshops.⁷⁵ Lastly, palace pages might be appointed to the provincial post. In there, they served as *ümerâ* commanders who worked together with provincial administrators and *kadis* of *ulema* hierarchy and if they earned enough success, they might attain the office of district governor (*sancakbegi*) and then reach the rank of a province governor (pasha).⁷⁶

I have hitherto introduced how the *kuls* were integrated into the Ottoman imperial household and emphasized that the Ottomans developed enslavement methods of pre-modern

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Quoted by İncalcık, Halil, *The Ottoman Empire The Classical Age 1300-1600*, Phoenix Press, GB, 1973,

⁷² For the debate about the success of the *devşirme* system in forming alienated servants see., Kunt, Metin İbrahim, “Ethnic-Regional (*Cins*) Solidarity in the Seventeenth Century Ottoman Establishment,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol.5, no. 3 (Jun., 1974), pp.233-239.

⁷³ İncalcık, Halil, *The Ottoman Empire The Classical Age 1300-1600*, Phoenix Press, GB, 1973, p.79

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Kunt, “Turks in The Ottoman Imperial Palace” p.295

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.296

administrations by opening all administrative offices to the *kul*-origin servants and by including their own non-Muslim subject people into the *devşirme* practices. Since several types of enslavement coexisted in the Ottoman society, distinctive aspect of *kuls* should be noted. Although they were theoretically subject to main laws of slavery defined in Sharia, *kul* status, in reality, referred to the attachment to imperial household. For instance, sultans could confiscate their property and may sentence them to death but alongside these slave-origin *kuls*, free-born Muslims in *kul* status (with the exception of *ulema*)⁷⁷ were also subject to these practices. *Kul* status, on the other hand, referred to privileges, setting apart the administrative-military servants from the rest of society. Having being chosen for talent, ability, and physical qualities, these servants perceived their status as a source of pride and prestige.⁷⁸ Being accepted to the imperial household was the first step in their career and in order to be able to maintain their administrative-military post they were supposed to do what their master did: to form their own households which would be resilient to power struggles.

I.3: Rise of the Households

The *devşirme* system gradually lost its importance and the latest record of a *devşirme* recruit dates to 1705.⁷⁹ If the imperial household gave up this system, then how did it manage to find new men for administrative and military offices? Apparently, servants of the sultan, heads of ruling elite households, took over the responsibility for staffing the state offices from the palace in time. Regarding to this issue, Findley states that

The decline of the child levy and of the palace school, and implication of institutional decay and territorial loss for the possibilities of appointment and promotion obviously introduced changes into this picture. Still, the decline of such highly institutionalized recruitment system as the child levy and the acquisition of certain elements of the ruling class of the some of the attributes of self-perpetuating elite kept alive an altered form of the “patrimonial style in recruitment”. This emphasized discretionary or even

⁷⁷ İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin (ed.), *History of the Ottoman State, Society & Civilization*, vol.I, IRCICA,İstanbul, 2001, p.260. As İhsanoğlu states, tax exemption and privileges of *ulema* was much greater than other members of the ruling class mainly because of religious and judicial roles of this group. Accordingly, the worse punishment given to the members of *ilmiye* was either dismissal or exile.

⁷⁸ Ze'evi, Dror, “Kul and Getting Cooler: The Dissolution of Elite Collective Identity and the Formation of Official Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire,” *Mediterranean Historical Review*, vol 26, pp.177-195, p. 184.

⁷⁹ Ménage, V.L., “Devshirme”, IE.2, vol.II, p.212

capricious use of patronage and heavy reliance on the kind of relationships through which the grandee households were put together.⁸⁰

Considering that the houses of the members of ruling class functioned as state offices in general until the bureaucratic reforms of the 19th century, it seems difficult to distinguish personal retinue of Ottoman bureaucrats from the staff of their office. Besides, distributive policy of the empire had formed fiscal and administrative dependency between a head of such office and his men. Likewise, in the absence of a salary system –until the 1830s- gift-giving economy was an important income item for the Ottoman bureaucrat that was mainly rooted in the exchange of money or valuable articles among the members of the imperial household. In light of all these practices, patronage relations seem not new for the ruling elite households but an established constituent of them. What changed with the decline of the *devşirme* system and palace school is that heads of elite households began to gather their own men autonomously as they less and less relied on the imperial recruitments and appointments as a pool of human sources, as Findley emphasizes. Consequently, households became main centers of training and socialization for the candidates of administrative posts. In the residence of leading bureaucrats, family and household members of officers obtained knowledge of bureaucratic correspondence, bookkeeping and other administrative-military skills as the interaction with experienced members increased the expertise and knowledge of newly-recruited members.⁸¹

To understand the growing importance of these households within imperial structure, it seems necessary to analyze the late 16th and the 17th centuries of the Ottoman Empire in which the imperial distribution policy dramatically changed in favor of the ruling class households. In the 1630s, Koçi Beg⁸² (?-1650) diagnoses this change as that

...contrary to the tradition, vacant timars and zeamets began to be distributed by Istanbul. Leading notables and bureaucrats bestowed vacant places upon their men and relatives and thus some of the best timars and zeamets in Islamic lands were transformed into private properties and waqfs; some were included to the royal domains; some were allocated as pension to

⁸⁰ Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, p.36

⁸¹ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, p.32

⁸² Koçi Beg was the writer of treatises on statecraft, who entered palace service as a *devşirme* during the reign of Ahmed I and served under successive sultans until his retirements in the early years of Mehmed IV's reign. For further biographical notes see., C.H. Imber, "Koci Beg," *El.2*, vol.V, pp.248-250

those who did not gain pension rights yet. These corruptions put the most reputable soldiers of the state into trouble.⁸³

In a similar way, anonymous chronicle of the *Kitâb-î Müstetâb* criticizes monetarization of *dirlik* system; the purchase of *mansıbs* and the title of military posts by the members of *reâyâ*; decreasing role of the palace service along with school military-administrative service and experience in the appointment to the state offices.⁸⁴ As Koçi Beg and the *Kitâb-î Müstetâb* point out, transformation in the distribution of *dirliks* profoundly changed power relations among the servants of the sultan and contributed to the rise of new ruling elite households which would be the basic units of politics, administrative-military and fiscal system, contestation, and cooperation within the Ottoman imperial structure.

Being intertwined with each other, factors such as the impact of the price revolution of the 16th century, European advancement in the fire-arms, inability and reluctance of the *timarlı sipahis* in adopting new weapon technology, growing demand of the Porte to the cash flow, population growth, and slowing pace of territorial expansion brought about a gradual shift from *timar* to tax-farming (*iltizam*) system since the late 16th century onwards.⁸⁵ When *timar*-holder *sipahis* were a very essential part of the Ottoman army in the mid-16th century, 30 to 40 percent of military expenses were met by the *sipahis* themselves who collected revenues in rural regions; after their traditional weapons proved inadequate against European musketeers the palace increased the number of the standing infantry troops.⁸⁶ Meanwhile, as *timar* system was gradually abandoned for tax-farming, auctioning off the collection of the rural taxes to the highest bidders became prevalent in order to meet cost of this shift.⁸⁷

⁸³ Danişman, Zuhuri (ed.), *Koçi Bey Risalesi*, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İstanbul, 1972, p.33 “Boşalan timar ve zeâmetler de eski kanunlara aykırı olarak İstanbul tarafından verilmeye başlandı. İleri gelenler ve vükelâ, boşalan yerleri adamlarına ve akrabâlarına verip, İslâm memleketlerinde olan timar ve zeâmetin seçmelerini şer’i şerife ve yüksek kanuna aykırı olarak kimini paşmanlık yaparak, kimini pâdişah Has’ına katarak, kimini mülk olarak kimini vakıf olarak, kimini vücudu sıhhatte olan kimselere emeklilik olarak verip, bütün zeâmet ve timar ileri gelenlerin yemliği oldu. Bu bozukluklar, devletin en şecaatli, güçlü, şan ve şevkete sebep olan askerinin harap olmasına sebep oldu”.

⁸⁴ Yücel, Yaşar, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatına Dair Kaynaklar: Kitâb-î Müstetâb, Kitabu Mesâlihi’l Müslimîn ve Menâfi’i’l-Mü’minîn, Hırzû’l-Mülûk*, TTK Basımevi, Ankara, 1988, p.8 “Meselâ bir içoğlan on ve on beş yıl sâraylarda kötek yiyüp zahmet ve mahbûsluk çekmeğe... ve sâ’ir hidmet-i mu’ayyenelerde hidmet eyleyüp dirlik iç belâ ve zahmet çekmeğe ihtiyâc kalmayub, şimdikihâl olur olmaz re’âyâ bir çift öküzünü satub akça kuvvetiyle kimi sipâhi ve kimi yeniçeri olup istedikleri dirliğe ve mansıba geçer olmuşlardır.”

⁸⁵ Pamuk, Şevket, “The Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire,” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1 (February, 2001), pp. 69-89, pp.82-85

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.84

⁸⁷ İnalçık, Halil, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” in *Archivum Ottomanicum*, vol. VI (1980), pp.283-337

Thanks to this shift, the Ottoman ruling class which formerly generated income directly or indirectly from military campaigns and conquests, found a new income channel: participation in the tax-farming (*iltizam*) system. In addition to *iltizam*, adoption of the life-term tax-farming system (*malikane*) in 1695 helped the Ottoman ruling class to increase their share over the provincial tax sources because of their control over the auction of *malikanes*.⁸⁸ Mustafa Nuri Paşa (1824-1890) illustrates the outcomes of this shift through gift-giving practices: “it was a tradition for viziers and commanders to provide the sultan with gifts extracted from newly conquered lands and from booties. This gift-giving tradition -rooting on the material acquisitions of military campaigns- has gradually disappeared since viziers and *beylerbegis* have begun to present gifts to the sultan on the occasions of their return [from provinces] to Istanbul”.⁸⁹

The more imperial household relied on the tax-farming system as a source of wealth – in forms of gift or money-, the harsher contestation seemed to occur among different parties of the Ottoman ruling class over the provincial tax sources subject to *iltizam* system.⁹⁰ In this process, the power relations between the dynastic household, pasha households in the capital, provincial power locii, and *reâyâ* changed dramatically as the imperial centre became more closely connected to its provinces. It was a highly complex process of change where monetization and demilitarization of the distributive policy, blurring border of ruling class and subject people, elite households’s takeover of the functions of *timar* and *devşirme* systems, and of the palace schools, transformed power relations on the imperial scale. It seems that as the tax-farming system increased economic and political dependency between all parties, it also diversified bonding patterns among people of different segments of the Ottoman society.⁹¹ Accordingly, in this growing dependency and interaction, the dynastic household and its servants in the different department of the imperial administration exercised varying degree of influence over each other in composite settings as elite households gained more inclusive form in general.

Members of the dynastic family and central administration, provincial magnates, military commanders, and *ulema* were drawn into the financial and political attraction of tax-

⁸⁸ Pamuk, Şevket, “Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800,” in *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. 35, no.2 (Autumn 2004), pp.225-247, p.240

⁸⁹ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât Kurumlarıyla Osmanlı Tarihi*, (ed. Yılmaz Kurt) vol I-IV, Birleşik Yayınevi, Ankara, 2008, p.142

⁹⁰ Tezcan, Baki, *The Second Empire: the Political and Social Transformations in the Early Modern World*, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.55

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp.14-17

farming system and of provincial posts.⁹² To understand how these figures included themselves into the tax-farming activities, it seems necessary to analyze changing pattern in the appointment of provincial offices whose sources of income and responsibilities were redefined as they absorbed former roles of *timar*-holders in their body. In his detailed study, Kunt summarizes the results of declined *timar* system as following: officers of central administration began to take over provincial administration posts at higher ranks; the province replaced the district as the essential administrative unit; and patronage relations along with household affiliations became determinant factors in the polity.⁹³ In other words, upon the declining role of *timarlı sipahis* in the army, the military and administrative obligations of *timar*-holders were replaced with fiscal duties that made experience gained in the provincial administrations redundant for the candidates. As a consequence, in the end of the 16th century, servants of the sultan who were trained in the palace and in the households of bureaucrats at the capital began to be appointed to the higher ranks in the provincial administration in the growing numbers. Appointment lists in the Kunt's study shows that not only their numbers but also that of members of their households were on the rise when compared with those of the preceding century. This trend, extended channel from central administration to the provinces, included members of central army as well. Upon the decline of *timarlı sipahis*, the central army troops began to play more important roles in the suppression of internal disturbances in the provinces where they began to be numbered among the local notables with extensive economic dealings.⁹⁴ Another factor, making intra-bureaucratic contestations more competitive was the brief office terms. As Kunt states;

Because tenure in one post was shorter, the expenses involved in moving households and retinues from one post to another were more often incurred. More seriously, the *ümerâ* were left without official revenues during the increasingly longer periods spent out of office between appointments. Furthermore, even when out of the office the *ümerâ* were forced to keep large retinues, because at a time when there was a greater competition among increasingly greater number of candidates for not many more, maybe even fewer, offices the officers who attended campaigns with large households had a better chance of earlier appointment or promotion. The paradox was that the candidate who could afford a large retinue while

⁹² McGowan, Bruce, "the Elites and Their Retinues," in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.) *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II (1600-1914), Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.658-680, pp.659-662

⁹³ Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, p.95

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.83

out of the office could get position and therefore have official revenues with which to increase his household.⁹⁵

As might be expected, bureaucrats facing with this dilemma of strong households found several solutions varied with the economic, military, and manpower potentials of their posts. Involvements in commercial activities, investment into the waqf-making, formation of intra-household alliances were some of these solutions.⁹⁶ Besides, the central administration was well aware of this dilemma and adjusted to its promotion and distribution policies accordingly while alliances between the bureaucrats in the center and in the periphery manipulated these policies in favor of their own interests, as Kunt states.

Inclusion of vacant *timars* to the *arपालik* of *ümerâ*, their entitlement with the right of levying additional taxes on reaya, assignments of state revenues directly to the member of *ümerâ* households, granting some state revenues to officials on the permanent basis (as *ber vech-i çiftlik*, *bi-resm-i çiftlik*) -regardless of where they happened to be serving at a given time- and placement of member of *ümerâ* households into the palace service were some of these solutions central administration adopted to lighten growing expenditures of elite households.⁹⁷ As these policies show, *ümerâ* households became the main unit in the imperial structure since the late 16th century onwards. In another words, the Ottoman Empire was adjusting its military and fiscal systems to the necessities of the time -such as replacement of cavalries with infantry troops, monetization of distributive policy- by relying on *ümera* households. Despite these acquisitions, shortening office terms still posed difficulty for the *ümerâ* who were now held more liable for levying taxes, and for maintaining security and order in the provinces. As Pamuk points out, especially levying taxes through tax-farming and *malikane* systems necessitated coalition of central elites and provincial notables: Many provincials began to acquire and transfer their shares of state revenues as long as they remained in the good graces of local administrators or their Istanbul sponsors.⁹⁸ As he states, well-connected individuals in the capital city and in the provinces established mutually

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.77

⁹⁶ For the economic efforts a vizier to cover expenses of his household see., Kunt, Metin, "Derviş Mehmed Paşa, Vezir and Entrepreneur: A Study in Ottoman Political-Economic Theory and Practice," in *Turcica*, 9/1, 1977, s. 197-214. For the waqf-making practices see., Faroqhi, Suraiya, "Pious Foundations in the Ottoman Society of Anatolia and Rumelia: A Report on Current Research," in Michael Borgolte and Tilmann Lohse (eds.), *Stiftungen in Christentum, Judentum und Islam vor der Moderne*, Academia Verlag, Berlin, 2005, pp.226-256

⁹⁷ Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, p.84-85.

⁹⁸ Pamuk, Şevket, "Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800," in *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. 35, no.2 (Autumn 2004), pp.225-247, p.241

profitable relations in order to obtain government tax revenues which was more lucrative than investing in agriculture, manufacturing or trade.⁹⁹

To grasp the degree of dependency between notables (*âyân* and *eşrâf*) and the agents of imperial centre, it is necessary to compare their power basis. In Istanbul, there was no local countervailing power independent from the central government since the city had not existed as a Muslim city with an Islamic society and its natural leaders -in established families who inherited social prestige- before the conquest.¹⁰⁰ The cities of Arab provinces and Anatolia, however, witnessed the existence of influential Muslim families as urban notables who had formed their regional power basis long before the Ottoman sovereignty. Hourani analyzes politics of these notables in terms of “patriciate” that arises when the following conditions exist: first, society is organized according to the relations of the personal dependence; secondly, society is dominated by urban notables, by great families, reside usually in urban areas, draw their main influence there, and because of their positions in cities are able to dominate also a rural hinterland; and thirdly these notables have some freedom of political action.¹⁰¹ As he states, this freedom may take the form of self-government of cities by the notables or the city may be subject to a monarchical authority on which the urban population wishes and is able to impose some limits or exercise power as in case of many Arab and Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, the political influences of these notables rely on two factors: they have to possess access to authority, and thus be able to advise, to warn and to defend interests of locals and secondly, they must have some social power of their own which is not dependent on the sultan and gives them a position of accepted and natural leadership.¹⁰² The Ottoman administration recognized the natural leadership of *âyân*s with the decree of 1726 opening path for the appointment of provincial power-holders as governors of *sancaks* and provinces.¹⁰³ As intermediaries between the local populace and the Porte, their service consisted of relaying complaints of *reâyâ* about

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Hourani, Albert, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” in Polk and Chambers (eds), *Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East The Nineteenth Century*, The University of Chicago Press, 1968, Chicago, pp.41-69, p.47

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.45

¹⁰² Ibid, p.46

¹⁰³ Akdağ, Mustafa, “Osmanlı Tarihinde Âyanlık Düzeni Devri, 1730-1839,” in *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, VII-XII (1970-1974), Ankara, pp. 51-61, p.51

administration to the centre; assisting to guard towns; overseeing the practice of law; regulating monetary adjustments and food provision for the town.¹⁰⁴

While analyzing the rise of *âyân* and *eşrâf*, Mardin concludes that growing number of them opted for canalizing their wealth into the tax-farming since this system provided more profit when compared with productive enterprise.¹⁰⁵ For instance, Mü'minzade Abdülmümin Efendi, a wealthy member of the *ulema* in Yenişehir, invested his money to influence government office to appoint him to a higher office and then through gift-giving economy he harassed religious officials in the lower ranks and secured lucrative tax-farming privileges.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, Toledano emphasizes the inclusive impact of the tax-farming system over the local notables throughout the empire in the 17th and 18th centuries. He even associates the delayed emergence of Middle East and North African nationalism with the successful inclusion of their local elites into the imperial administration through mainly tax-farming system and the resulting rise of Ottoman-Local elite households:

Mechanism to assess and levy legitimate and illegitimate taxes (*iltizams*) transferred to office-holders considerable revenues collected in the name of the state. However, with the rise of the *kapi* (elite household), a growing portion of the state revenues appropriated by such office-holders remained in the province to maintain those large and costly establishments. A wide range of local people found employment and protection in *kapis*, becoming *kapihalki*, or protégées, but also a focus of one's identity.¹⁰⁷

As his statement suggests, with the adoption of tax-farming system, local magnates and population began to form intense dependent relations with centrally appointed state agencies as growing portion of state revenues remained in the local elite households in order to maintain the system. In the 18th century, most district governors began not to reside in provinces and they appointed local notables as their agents (*mütesellim*). Contrary to brief service time of *vâlis*, local notables hold the post of *mütesellim* for 40-50 years that led to their hereditary claims over the provincial posts.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, p.60

¹⁰⁵ Mardin, Şerif, "Power, Society, and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol.11, no.3 (Jun., 1969), pp.258-281, p.267

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Toledano, Ehud, "the Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research," in I. Pappe and M. Ma'oz (eds), *Politics and Ideas: A History from Within*, London:Tauris, 1997, pp.145-163, p.156

¹⁰⁸ Özkaya Yücel, *18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Toplumı*, YKY, 2010, İstanbul, p.204

The study of Hathaway, dealing with the rise of local elites of the 17th and 18th century Egypt, reveals similar Ottomanization and localization trends. Regarding the interaction of the Ottoman administration with the former Mamluk practices, Hathaway shows that the Ottomans replaced the Mamluk system of cavalry-supporting assignments of usufruct, or *iqtâs*, with the regime of centrally appointed tax collectors known as *âmins* that gradually transformed to the tax-farms during the 17th century.¹⁰⁹ Parallel to this, diffusion of the imperial power necessitated intra-household alliances in which ambitious locals sought favor with imperial center by participating to the households of imperial functionaries; agent of the centre in turn employed their clients to the households of local magnates; local magnates even channeled members of their households into elite households of the imperial capital.¹¹⁰

In the Arab provinces, the leading households were the Qazdağlıs of Egypt, the Ebuziyades of Iraq, the Azms of Syria, the Husaynis of Tunis and the Karamanlıs of Libya.¹¹¹ In the late 18th century, Ali Pasha of Janina controlled southern Albania and Epirus; Pazvandoğlu of Vidin in western Bulgaria and parts of Wallachia and Serbia; Tirsınlı İsmail Aga and his successor Alemdar Mustafa Pasha of Rusçuk, controlling central and eastern Bulgaria and some parts of eastern Thrace; Karaosmanoğlu family present in southwest Anatolia; Çapanoğlu in central Anatolia.¹¹² While some of provincial households were constructed by the local magnates, others were formed by centrally appointed administrative-military officers who had, in time, gained local characters.¹¹³ Not surprisingly, dynasty and members of ruling class in the capital re-organized and extended their households accordingly. Above all, predominance of palace figures, viziers, Istanbul *ulema* over the auctions of the tax-collection and *malikane* contracts made networks around the central administration indispensable associates for the provincial figures.¹¹⁴

Abou-el-Hajj draws our attention to the growing influence of vizier and pasha households in the late 17th century. His study illuminates the finding that by the second half of the 17th century, nearly half of all appointments for high offices in the capital as well in the

¹⁰⁹ Hathaway, Jane, "Military Household in Ottoman Egypt," in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.27, no.1 (Feb., 1995), pp.39-52, p.39

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.44

¹¹¹ Toledano, *As If Silent and Absent; Bonds of Enslavement in The Middle East*, Yale University Press, London, 2007, p.28

¹¹² Shaw, J. Stanford, "The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan III," in *The Journal of Modern History*, vol.37, no.3, pp. 291-306, p.303

¹¹³ Toledano, "the Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research," pp.155-6

¹¹⁴ Salzman, Ariel, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire," in *Politics & Society*, 1993 21:393, pp.393-423, p.402

provinces were staffed by men who had been raised, trained or attached to the households of vizier and pashas.¹¹⁵ According to the appointment list of 1683-1703, the balance between the palace graduates and associates of vizier and pasha households changed in favor of the latter which secured about fourth of central offices and a little over a third of provincial posts.¹¹⁶ As Abou-el-Hajj explains, grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's unprecedented influence over the Ottoman politics played an important role in the empowerment of this post and in the above-mentioned shift of the appointment patterns. As with this case, the dynastic household tried to control ambitious bureaucrats by supporting their rival households in the administration. It is also important to note a common pattern seen in both grand vizier household and provincial households: growing inclusion of non-askeriye people into the Ottoman administration through patronage (*intisab*) relations offered by the head of state offices. For the interaction of central and provincial elites, Abou-el-Hajj suggests that the vizier and pasha households of the late 17th century might have served as the second [after the sultan's household] and actual model for growing number of ambitious *âyâns* and *derebeys* (provincial military) of the 18th century.¹¹⁷ In brief, the transformation in the distributive policy gave way to the rise of ruling elite households. A closer look to their recruitment methods, composition, functions and official recognition may help us in grasping importance of 'ruling elite households' within the Ottoman politics.

I.4: Organization of Households

The Ottoman term for the household, the gate (*bab/kapı*), refers to official and domestic, the public and private settings. As Göçek shows, the office/residence of grand vizier was named as "exalted gate" (*Bâb-ı Âlî*) as this term was fashioned after that of the imperial household (*Bâb-ı Hümayûn*) in which household members were united symbolically "behind the gate of the household head" with most members residing within the complex.¹¹⁸ The rise of office-households began with the expansion of the administration out of the palace in the second half of the 17th century in which Grand Vizier Derviş Mehmed Pasha

¹¹⁵ Abou-el-Hajj, Rifaat Ali, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report," in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol.94, no.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1974), pp. 438-447, p. 438.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p.443

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p.446, n.37

¹¹⁸ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, p.23

brought his office to his own residence.¹¹⁹ Building complex of households varied according to the ruling elites' place of duty and function of their office. For instance, viziers residing in the capital used to have farms (*çiftlik*) around the city apart from their main residences. Considering that viziers assumed military tasks in war times, these farms were also used as storage for war materials. According to the account of Mustafa Nuri Pasha, viziers of the 16th century had nearly 2.000 men some of which resided in these farms and made a living from agricultural production and live-stocking activities conducted there while animals of the household were kept in their barns.¹²⁰ Evliya Çelebi gives the account of 1060 vizier farms with approximately ten armed employees (*devlet âyânı çiftlikleri esnafı*) for his time.¹²¹ Aktepe also provides us with a description of building complex of Grand Admiral Kaymak Mustafa Pasha (1721-1730) as that “a large mansion for the official and his harem, with two smaller houses near it, in addition to a bath house, coffee room, cellar, some additional buildings for household members on a higher bank, flower and fruit gardens, and yet another house at a corner of the garden”.¹²² In time, households of high ranking bureaucrats in the central administration lost their residential characters; only their administrative offices and staff began to be referred to “gates” such as the gates of finance (*Bâb-ı Defterî*), of war (*Bâb-ı Seraskeri*), and of religious administration (*Bâb-ı Meşihat*).¹²³

Regarding households of viziers, Mustafa Nuri Pasha provides us with a full picture of an average vizier household for the period of 1687-1774.¹²⁴ Leading members of household, such as treasurer, steward (*kapı kethüdası*), *divân efendisi*, *mektûbcu*, *kethüdâ katipleri*, *imâm ve harem kethüdâsı* dealt with bureaucratic affairs of the pashas.¹²⁵ The steward (*kapı kethüdası*) was responsible for the coordination of his master with the central administration.¹²⁶ Similar to the hierarchy of the palace, *iç oğlans* served under the supervision of *ağas* such as *silahtar ağa* in the vizier households. Viziers and pashas usually relied on their slaves and young recruits for important posts.¹²⁷ In these replicas of sultanic household, some members (*tütüncü başı*, *ibrikdar ağa*, *kilerci başı*, *macun ağası*, *mikramacı başı*, *sofracı başı*, *mirahor*, *seccadeci başı*, *peşkir ağası*, *kahvecibaşı*) served viziers' persona

¹¹⁹ Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*, TTK Basımevi, Ankara, 2009, p. 249

¹²⁰ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, p.144

¹²¹ Kahraman, Seyit Ali and Dağlı Yücel (eds.), *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, vol.I/II, YKY, 2008, p.515.

¹²² Quoted in Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, p.23

¹²³ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, p.23

¹²⁴ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, pp.374-377

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.374

¹²⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*, p. 209

¹²⁷ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, p.374

and his other men in the guild-like hierarchy since they possessed *gedik* and they were responsible for the service and training of *yamaks*.¹²⁸ *Gedikli iç oğlans* had their own servants (*zobular*, *koğuş uşakları* and grooms). In the promotion rituals, *ağa* provided a horse, equipments, and dress for his *zobu* and arranged a banquet for manifestation his servant's promotion to the rank of *ağa*: In this ceremony, a newly promoted *ağa* was bestowed a quilted turban (*kavuk*) and in case of removal from the service, *ağas* commissioned a meeting in where they retook *kavuk* of accused member and punished him accordingly (*keçe külah idilir*).¹²⁹ Apart from these servants, viziers had military retinues of 100-150 men covering infantry troops (*piyâde*) and cavalries (*süvârî*) under the supervision of *tüfenkcibaşı* and *deli başı*.¹³⁰ While some members of vizier households received salary, others made a living from gift-giving economy. For instance, tax-collectors and local administrators paid traditional subsidy, 'mübaşiriye', to *ıçağas* sent to provinces.¹³¹

I.5: Household-building Strategies

Household (*kapı halkı* or *hane halkı*) contained domestic, administrative and military protégés and clients gathered around nuclear or extended family of the founder. Members of a certain bureaucratic households were alternatively called as *dairesine mensub*, *maiyetinde müstahdem*, *takımından*, *tâbi*, *havadarları*, *bendeleri* or *mensubanı*.¹³² Regarding their recruitment, enslavement, friendship, gift-exchange, patronage (*intisab*), kinship, conjugal arrangement were common methods while forming a household. In some cases, a member of household was attached to the founder through more than one of these connections such as with the marriage of a slave-origin member to the daughter of the household's head. Marriage was not only used in attaching members of the same household but also in intra-household alliances such as marriage of the sultan's daughter with a man of leading bureaucrats (*damad*). In other cases, the sultan married his pages off to a daughter of high-ranking bureaucrats. As Göçek points out, when these pages were appointed to administrative posts,

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.375

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid., p.376

¹³² Halaçoğlu, Yusuf (ed.), *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa: Ma'rûzât*, Çağrı Yayınları, İstanbul

the sultan gave them some slaves and servants that shaped the nucleus of the page's own household.¹³³

Ethnic-regional ties also played important role in the household-building strategy. Common culture and language helped members of a household in constructing more intimate ties with their patron. As Kunt explains, the Ottoman term of *cins* referred to origin; the words *hemşehri*, *hemcins*, and *mücânese* were used to remark a communality or origin; solidarity rooted on a common origin was expressed with *bi-hasb el-mücânese*, *bi-hüküm el-cinsiyye*, *hemcinsiyet takribiyle*, or *gayret-i cinsiyet muktezâsınca*.¹³⁴ Bureaucrats in the capital seemed to use their regional ties to the extent that they were frequently criticized for staffing state offices with their *hemcins*. Kunt draws attention to such *cins*-based polarization among westerners (Balkan-stock bureaucrats) and easterners (Caucasian-stock bureaucrats) in the 17th century.

As with the sultan's household, enslavement was of crucial importance for the elite's household-building strategies. Considering that 4/5 of war prisoners remained in the hands of the military class, territorial expansion and conquests had provided bureaucrats -especially those who attended to military campaigns- with slave-stock new members.¹³⁵ In some cases, bureaucrats added them to their entourage while other times they exchanged slaves as gift or sold them to other bureaucrats in order to strengthen their intra-household alliances. For instance, the *tereke* register of *bâb üs-saâde ağası Cafer Ağa* (d.1557) shows that majority of his 122 men (*bendeleri*) were either sold or given as present by various bureaucrats such as *sipahis*, pashas, and viziers.¹³⁶ Self-enslavement also used to access imperial household. Evliya Çelebi illustrates that Abkhazian-origin officials in the 17th century often sent their newborn babies to families in Abkhazia for more than ten years in order to obtain the ways of the hometown and come back as a simulation of purchased slaves.¹³⁷ Albert Bobovi -the captive who witnesses power relations in 17th century Ottoman palace- recounts similar trend adopted by Muslims as that "the exclusion of native Turks from the service often means that

¹³³ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, p.26

¹³⁴ Kunt, İbrahim Metin, "Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 5, no.3 (Jun., 1974), pp.233-239, p.235

¹³⁵ For the integration of a war prison into the household of a janissary *ağa* see., Çamuroğlu, Reha, *Son Yeniçeri*, Everest Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009. This novel successfully describes the manners in which a war prison and his master established multiple ties through *damadlık*, conversion, gift-giving practices, lodge and *ocak* rituals.

¹³⁶ Kunt, Metin İ., "Kulların Kulları," in *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, vol.3, 1975, pp.27-42, p.28

¹³⁷ Ze'evi, "Kul and Getting Cooler," p.184

the principal officers of the palace take the children of their friends and offer them as Christians and tribute children.”¹³⁸

Gift-giving economy was also an essential part of household-building strategies. The heads of households provided economic protection to their members through salary; placement to the offices in the administration; gift-giving economy or with combination of them. In some cases, the founder of the household himself or his men in the higher positions bestowed gifts for their protégés while other times members of other households provided them with presents/tips (*bahşiş*) as a sign of their friendship. Mustafa Nuri Pasha explains how even janissary service pay (*ulûfe*) became subject to gift-giving practices among bureaucrats in the period of 1739-1768. Vacant *ulûfes* at the disposal of Janissary *ağas* were either sold or distributed among his men and members of friendly households. A certain amount of these *ulûfes* given to those under protection of leading bureaucrats and of palace servants were called as *kapulu ulûfesi*.¹³⁹ Besides, there were various extra taxes, such as *imdad-ı seferiye and hazariye*, bestowed upon the head of bureaucratic households.¹⁴⁰ For instance, *kapı altı hasılatı* (in other words *tayyarat* or *bad-ı hava*) was one of the income items covering *tahsiliye*, penalty fines, and traditional presents given by tribal communities to the bureaucrats in the high-ranking provincial posts.¹⁴¹ Likewise, ‘devr’, ‘kaftan-baha’, ‘zahire-baha’, ‘öşr-i diyet’, ‘imdad-ı seferiye’, ‘kudumiye’, ‘tekalif-i şakka’, ‘ikramiye’, ‘hediye-baha’, ‘konak masrafı’, ‘dem öşrü’, ‘mefruşat baha’ were extra taxes covering expenses of households of higher ranking bureaucrats.¹⁴² It should also be noted that bureaucrats were obliged to pay exorbitant sums for the appointment to the higher positions. For instance, Hamamcı Pasha paid 65 purses to buy the office of the Erzurum governorate while Küçük Paşamakcızade obtained governorship of Selanik in return for 18 purses in the second half of the 17th century.¹⁴³ Apart from appointment expenses, the transportation of household to the assigned regions and mobilization of military retinue to the theater of war were main financial difficulties which led to bureaucrats to impose these extra taxes and to apply gift-giving economy.

¹³⁸ Quoted in Brummett, Palmira, “Placing the Ottomans in the Mediterranean World: The Question of Notables and Households,” in *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi*, vol.36 (2010), pp.77-96, p.84

¹³⁹ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, p. 379

¹⁴⁰ Cezar, Yavuz, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi (XVIII.yydan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih)*, Alan Yayıncılık, 1986, pp.53-60

¹⁴¹ Özkaya, 18. *Yüzyılda Osmanlı Toplumunu*, pp.200-6.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid, p.192

Besides its economic function, the gift-giving practice embodies an extensive symbolism such as commitment, loyalty, trust, respect, and reward. As with other issues, ruling elites seem to model their gift-exchange on the practice of imperial household in terms of its ceremony, materiality, hierarchy, and meaning. The gift-giving practice of Tirsinikli İsmail Ağa –one of leading *âyâns* of the 18th century Balkans- provides a perfect example for this modeling/interaction. Tirsinikli used ceremonial fur coats (*hil'at*) and gold purses while appointing his junior alliances to the offices and in awarding military success of his *silahdar* Alemdar Mustafa, exactly in the same manner as did the sultan in the promotion (*terakki*) and appointment rituals of his servants. By giving these fur coats, Tirsinikli manifested his superiority over the region as he provided his men with prestige, recognition, and reward. When he made, however, the same offer to Manav İbrahim, the favorite man of his rival Osman Pasha, the latter declined the offer and manifested that his loyalty to Pasbandoğlu, his master, was not something purchasable with a gold purse.¹⁴⁴ Even though Tirsinikli could not win Manav İbrahim, he had such loyal men whose commitment continued even after the death of his master: Alemdar Mustafa assured the central administration about discharging Tirsinikli's debts (*efendimi borçlu yatırmam*).¹⁴⁵ As might be expected, there were numerous factors shaping degree of loyalty between master and his men such as term of service, manner of recruitment, and ability of the master in creating wealth for his household.

Lastly, the founder of households used patronage to find new members. Since patronage relations were established within highly diverse settings, various connotations such as “Aladdin’s lamp effect” (Mardin) or “wheel of fortune” (Findley) were attributed to the term. Evliya Çelebi gives numerous examples about how a would-be member and a head of household might come together: Being a poet of an impressive poetry, a performer of enjoyable fireworks, the luck of being a handsome boy, a demonstration as a talented artisan, all these could obtain a secure position –regardless of their competence to task- even in the sultan’s household. Influenced by Timurid tradition, the Ottoman palace and the leading bureaucrats provided artistic patronage for artists, handicraftsmen, scholars and men of letters. Considering that men of letters sometimes penned the ‘mirror of princes’ genre (*nasihatname*) in order to disfavor rivals of their patron or to glorify his success in the eyes of

¹⁴⁴ Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı, *Meşhur Rumeli Âyanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail, Yıllıkoğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa*, TTK, Ankara, 2010, p. 19 “...ben akça aşığı değilim, tamam yoktur. Uzun zamandan beri Pasban zadenin gayretkeşiyim ve uğruna canımı feda ederim; lakin beni Tirnovaya nasp ve güvendelerim ile oturmağa ruhsat verirsen tarafunuza varıp resim üzere kürk giyerim ve illa bin kese akçe virsen Paspan zadedden ayrılmak ihtimalim yoktur. Manav İbrahim tâbii Osman Paşa...”

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p.41

the sultan, artistic patronage was an effective political tool for bureaucrats.¹⁴⁶ For instance, Tanındı's study, 'Bibliophile Aghas (eunuch) at Topkapı Palace', details the leading *bâb üs-saâde ağaları*'s involvements with literal productions, and shows how their artistic patronage manipulated the context of the miniatures and chronicles.¹⁴⁷ Especially poetry and literary texts played an important role in the access to elite households where men of letters as 'mürebba' of the patron received ethics and culture of *adab* through private lessons and meetings.¹⁴⁸ Even for those who were not such lucky, factors such as kinship, neighborhood relations, membership to guilds, lodges, *Sufi* orders, waqfs, charity organizations, and even Friday prayers at mosques provided socialization for their access to a household. The founder of households provided political and economic protection to their members in return to their services that developed in self-perpetuating quality: the more members provided growing influence for the head; the stronger the head provided higher ranks with better incomes to his members; more potent members secured higher position for their patron in the imperial structure. They were bound to the each other to the extent that members of a certain bureaucrat in the administration were usually dismissed upon disfavor of their master or vice versa. To reduce the risk of such removals, the ruling elites did not only trust to members within their own households but also in that of rivals.

Spies (*çaşıtlar*) placed in the rival networks collected information about conspiracy plans against their master; lobbied for him; conducted smear campaigns against foes. As Mardin states, in the Ottoman political culture, "popular rebellion" followed a typical pattern from gossiping to demonstrations and to armed intervention as a last resort.¹⁴⁹ This pattern seems also suitable for intra-elite rivalries since gossiping, intrigues and aspersion played important roles in superseding rivals. That is why spies were an invisible but yet indispensable part of elite households. Especially when bureaucrats were appointed to the provinces, their spies and informants in the centre had to be more careful about possible conspiracy plans targeting to instigate the sultan against their master.¹⁵⁰ Evliya Çelebi shows

¹⁴⁶ Faroqhi, Suraiya, *Osmanlı Tarihi Nasıl İncelenir?*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999, İstanbul, pp.216-217

¹⁴⁷ Tanındı, Zeren, "Bibliophile Aghas (Eunuchs) at Topkapı Saray," in *Muqarnas*, vol. 21, *Essays in Honor of J. M. Rogers* (2004), pp. 333-343

¹⁴⁸ İnalçık, Halil, *Şâir ve Patron Patrimonyal Devlet ve Sanat Üzerine Sosyolojik Bir İnceleme*, Doğu Batı, 2010, Ankara, p.16.

¹⁴⁹ Quoted in Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy*, p.9

¹⁵⁰ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, pp.26-7

that bureaucrats in the capital or in the provinces, sometimes, hired spies in order to get information about their foes in the different locality.¹⁵¹

Another important strategy was to form intra-household alliances through social networks. In the 18th century, the most common way of social interaction for the bureaucrats in İstanbul was attending each other's informal courts and receiving days where they discussed state affairs, gained supports for the execution of particular matters and exchanged information on the availability of offices and related appointments.¹⁵² Apart from appointments, intra-household alliances provided parties with security against punishment practices. For instance, when one bureaucrat heard about the sultan's order to execute an acquaintance, he would send his own men ahead to inform him as to escape while other friends would then intervene for modifying the sentence.¹⁵³ As with other forms of socialization, gift-giving practices were of crucial importance in forming intra-household alliances.

Regarding the hierarchy of the elite households, they seem as complex as the imperial household itself. For instance, a female family member, a lower rank associate, the most senior or most trusted member or heads of other household could all take over leadership upon the death of founder. This seems also true for appointment patterns. Among the members of the same household, a cook may be promoted to the rank of vizier while highly-trained favorite members could not find any place in the administration. Moreover, a member might obtain higher position in the imperial administration than his master have. Husrev Mehmed Pasha's petition, written for sending his other slaves (in the rank of viziers) to the military service in the place of his cook, provides us with an extreme example.¹⁵⁴ Whoever the *damads* of the sultan were, grand admirals of imperial navy or even the grand vizier; they were still in the lower status than Husrev Pasha within his own household hierarchy.

In short, the household became the main unit of attachment for the Ottoman society especially after the gradual replacement of *timar* system with tax-farming. While forming their own households, military-administrative servants and local notables imitated the

¹⁵¹ Kahraman, Seyit Ali and Dağlı Yücel (eds.), *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, vol.1/1, YKY, 2008, p.194

¹⁵² Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, p.54

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul, vol2, p.601 fn2. "Taleb olunan aşçı tabiatıma muvafık lâpa ve mahallebi yapmaktadır. Bedeli aynî alınmak kanunen caiz olduğundan Damad Halil Paşa'nın, yahut ıtkınameleri henüz verilmeyen kölelerimden diğer bir vezirin –aşçıya bedel olarak- kabul buyrulmasını reca ederim."

imperial household on a smaller scale. As with imperial household, members of elite households developed loyalty to the persona of their master that shaped the course of Ottoman politics. Patronage relations, gift-giving economy, ethnic-regional solidarity, marriage, kinship, and enslavement practices were the main strategies in constructing household-based personal loyalties. While ruling elite households competed for administrative posts and control of imperial revenue sources, they also constructed alliances. As mentioned before, the Porte adjusted its promotion and appointment regulations to the growing expenditures of households which now assumed the functions of *devşirme* and *timar* systems along with palace school. The Porte, at the same time, tried to keep economic and political power of these households in control through three practices: depleting their resources by allocating them less than what was necessary to maintain their household, confiscation their economic sources and by instigation of intra-household competitions.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, some members of the imperial household developed wider interests which sometimes conflicted with that of the Porte as with the case of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. The next chapter will detail the contestation between Mehmed Ali and Husrev Mehmed Pasha by comparing their household-building strategies.

¹⁵⁵ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, p.56

CHAPTER II: The *Kethüda* and the *Tüfengcibaşı* in Egypt

II.1: Wars and the Changing Power Balance

When Selim III acceded to the throne in 1789, he devoted most of his energy to the ongoing Russian and Austrian Wars (1787-1792) in order to make his accession as a herald of victorious sultan. Since the annexation of the Crimean Khanate by the Russians in 1783 created a legitimacy crisis for the administration, Abdülhamid I closely dealt with the war efforts and appointed Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha to the command of the army while Gazi Hasan Pasha in the post of grand admiral assumed naval operations.¹⁵⁶ After the death of Abdülhamid I in April 1789, Selim III seems to have expressed the same determination to end up in victory as his war time correspondences suggest.¹⁵⁷ Accordingly, he penned edicts to appoint Ziya and Hasan Pashas to the less-important offices (respectively, the post of border *serasker* and that of *serasker* of Özi) on the ground of their poor performance at the ongoing war.¹⁵⁸ Apparently, issuing an edict (*ferman*) was not enough to convince, at least, Hasan Pasha since he stipulated four conditions to leave the post of the grand admiral: deferral of his appointment to the spring, to keep his title until that time without taking over the title and ceremonial fur of *seraskerlik*, appointment of Ali Pasha, governor of Anatolia, to Wallachia, and lastly not to be appointed back to navy before concluding his projects in the new office.¹⁵⁹ After negotiations, the grand admiral accepted to leave his post to Giritli Hüseyin Pasha (1791/2), predecessor of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha –the protector of Husrev Mehmed.

This very telling story provides insight not only for the rise of Husrev Mehmed Pasha's patron in the administration but also for the recurring theme of the reign of Selim III: growing autonomy/demand of the sultan's servants in the war times in which the Porte became more and more dependent to their military and economic powers. Whether it was the Russian war or Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, Selim III encountered with the same dilemma:

¹⁵⁶ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, p. 427

¹⁵⁷ Karal, Enver Ziya, *Selim III'ün Hattı Hümayunları*, TTK, Ankara, 1999, pp.23-46

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p.30

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

he would either give extensive authority to his already powerful bureaucrats or trim off their power by reinforcing political standing of their rivals or he would give some privileges to one of the great powers in return of its political and military backing of the Ottoman Empire against the others. Although all these policies helped the sultan to overcome difficulties of the war times, they created greater problems in the post-war periods. As might be expected, the main problem was that allies of the sultan -whoever they were *âyâns*, Europeans, high-ranking bureaucrats or non-élite power blocks- were reluctant in leaving re-gained/controlled territories or in abandoning their war-time privileges and manners. In such cases, the Porte was applying the same methods but this time with other allies against its war-time associates. If we adopt Findley's term for remittent power relations, the Porte was spinning *wheel of fortune* in the war-times and after than in the post-war periods and the Egypt expedition against the French threat as we will detail below.

When news about Napoleon's invasion of Egypt reached the capital, Selim III dismissed his Grand Vizier İzzet Mehmed Pasha on the ground that the Pasha had not fulfilled his duties such as construction of the necessary fortifications during his governorship of Egypt and because of his inability in anticipating the attack of the French.¹⁶⁰ Along with the new Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya, Cezzar Ahmed Pasha¹⁶¹, tax collector of Tırhala region Köse Mustafa and Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha were appointed to the campaign with extensive authority.¹⁶² In addition to them, the Porte approached Britain and Russia in order to gain their military and political support against the French. This was the war-time spin of *wheel of fortune*. When the French threat came to the end with the evacuation treaty of 1801, the war-time allies turned into new sources of danger to the Porte: Mehmed Ali, commander of Albanian irregulars in the military retinue of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha captured the governorship of the province from the hands of centrally appointed officers; the British protected the Mamluk begs against the sultan; Cezzar Ahmed Pasha turned into semi-autonomous governor etc.¹⁶³ The Porte, this time, made the post-war alliances in order to eliminate its ally-cum-rivals. An imperial edict of Sultan Selim about his rejection of

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p.55

¹⁶¹ Cezzar Ahmed Pasha (1720-2/1735?-1804) entered into the service of Grand Vizier Hekimoğlu Ali Pasha. With his master, he went to Egypt in 1756 and two years later he became a protégé of Abdullah Beg, one of the leading trustees of Bulut Kapan Ali Beg. Upon the deterioration of his relations with Bulut Kapan Ali Beg in 1768, he fled from Egypt and in the following years, he managed to consolidate his power in Sayda where he hold the post of *vâli* for nearly 30 years. For further biographical notes see., "Ahmed Paşa (Cezzar)", in *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi*, Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, vol.1, pp.142-3

¹⁶² Karal, *Selim III'ün Hattı Hümayunları*, pp.61-3

¹⁶³ Ibid., pp.138-142

dismissal of Cezzar Ahmed reflects this vicious circle as that “Dismissing him is useless if his successor would not be powerfull. A powerfull successor becomes another Cezzar and then we will have two of them. In such case, what is supposed to do with the old Cezzar?”¹⁶⁴ Ironically enough, the sultan appointed Cezzar Ahmed Pasha to the campaign because of his extensive power which then enabled him to gather more power and to be one of the most important figures of the region in the post-war period.¹⁶⁵

Napoleon’s invasion brought about a power shift not only in Egypt but also between different branches of the Ottoman administration. In the face of the French invasion of Egypt, the Porte gained support of Britain and Russia through intense diplomatic negotiations conducted by officers familiar to European languages. As sizable reports of Ali Efendi -the Ottoman ambassador to Paris- suggests, the Porte expanded its communication lines with the European capitals.¹⁶⁶ Besides, Sultan Selim initiated military reforms in the peace period between the Russian War and the French invasion. Since these reforms were modeled on the European war methods, weapons, and training the Porte invited European instructors and officers to its army. Apart from Russian renegades of the Ottoman-Russo War, four French infantry officers –Lieutenant-General Menant and Lieutenants Luzin, Ranchoup and Pierce Laroque-Monteil- along with six sergeants sent by the French Ministry of War trained new Ottoman crops while the Porte imported new-style rifles from France, Britain, and Sweden.¹⁶⁷ Parallel to the growing volume of diplomatic and military relations with the west, Europeans began to be included into both imperial and elite’s households. Selim III, however, did not rely on only the European instructors but also elite households while forming the New Order (*Nizâm-ı Cedîd*) Army.

Between the years of 1792-1806, 22,685 men and 1,590 officers were enrolled into the *Nizâm-ı Cedîd*, majority of which were sent by provincial governors and notables, and after six-month training they returned back in order to form their local militias.¹⁶⁸ Beside their support to the new army, leading bureaucrats and notables played important roles in the conscription of irregular troops. Since 1768 onwards, *miri levandats* (state-financed infantry and cavalry regiments) were used in Ottoman campaigning in great numbers, but differently

¹⁶⁴ Karal, *Selim III’ün Hattı Hümayunları*, p.138

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, p.63

¹⁶⁶ For the examples of Ali Efendi’s reports see., Karal, Enver Ziya, *Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1797-1802)*, Milli Mecmua Basımevi, İstanbul, 1938.

¹⁶⁷ Shaw, Stanford J., “The Nizam-ı Cedid Army under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807,” in *Oriens*, vol.18/19 (1965-1966), pp.168-184, p.170-5

¹⁶⁸ Shaw, “The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform,” p.300

from Janissaries or household troops (*kapı halkı*), they were levied by local magnates-cum-officials and financed by the central treasury.¹⁶⁹ In other words, bureaucrats and notables provided necessary man power while European instructors and states supplied modern weapons and military training for the *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* Army.

As Fahmy points out, the military success of Mehmed Ali Pasha, for instance, owes much to the French instructors and officers occupying high-ranking positions with extensive authority in the command of his army.¹⁷⁰ Contrary to Mehmed Ali, Selim III and his successor Mahmud II were reluctant in appointing European officers to the executive posts although they benefited from knowledge and expertise of foreigners as instructors. On the other hand, it was the diplomatic success of the imperial household, which turned military acquisitions of Mehmed Ali in the Nezib War to zero. Accordingly, European allies and clients expanded their influence over the Ottoman politics that brought about new type of factionalism within the bureaucracy as different cliques developed intimacy with different European states and their representatives, particularly of the French, British, and Russian.¹⁷¹

To sum, it was another war-time spin of *wheel of fortune* which enabled Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali to rise in the Ottoman administration while growing interaction of the Porte with Europeans brought about an essential shift in the household strategy of the ruling class. This was such a striking shift that Mahmud II, contrary to his predecessors, allied with Christian powers in order to suppress one of his Muslim governors, i.e. Mehmed Ali Pasha. To understand the beginning of this shift and how the contestation between Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali emerged, it is necessary to describe military operation of the Porte against the Napoleon's invasion of Egypt.

¹⁶⁹ Aksan Virginia, "War and Peace," in Suraiya N. Faroqhi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603—1839*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp.81-118, p.98

¹⁷⁰ Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, pp.80-82. As Fahmy states, chief among the French officers was "Colonel" Sèves, known as Süleyman Paşa, who became second-in-command of the army ranking only below İbrahim Paşa.

¹⁷¹ Shaw, Stanford J, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Selim III 1789-1807*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, pp.368-373

II.2: Egypt: First scene of Husrev Mehmed-Mehmed Ali Rivalry

Egypt had remained under the Mamluk rule until Selim I's campaign in 1517. After the conquest, substantial numbers of Ottoman forces -composed of Anatolian Turks, Balkan *devşirmes*, and Turkish and Kurdish tribal levies- remained in the provinces while centrally appointed bureaucrats settled to Cairo with their households and worked with holdovers from Mamluk bureaucracy.¹⁷² As Hathaway points out, Selim I adopted an inclusive policy towards the Mamluk begs and their troops in order to balance rebellious attempts of the Ottoman soldiers stationed in Egypt. Beside this military concern, demographic and administrative characteristics of Egypt played determinant role in the conquest policy of the central administration. According to Karal, the Porte did little change in the provincial administration because of three reasons. First, majority of local population and Mamluk begs were Muslims that led the Ottoman administration to adopt a more inclusive policy when compared with the non-Muslim subjects. Second, Mamluks had already established an effective administration to adopt. Lastly, the distance between the Ottoman capital and Egypt made Mamluk begs unalienable for the Ottoman sultans.¹⁷³ In sum, the sultan could only maintain his authority over Egypt through inclusion of Mamluks into the provincial administration.

Apart from the Mamluks, a centrally appointed governor (*vâli*), leaders of the local garrisons and ulama assumed intermediary role between the Porte and local population. Provincial council (*dîvân*) was the main unit of interaction for these representatives of the sultan and locals. In Cairo, a centrally appointed governor (*vâli*) presided over the grand and lesser *dîvân* adopted by the Mamluks. The lesser council was similar to the personal entourage of governor, covering his agent (*kethüda*), treasurer (*defterdâr*), janissary *ağas* and leading members of *ulema*. Apart from them, amir al-hajj, centrally appointed *kapûdan begs* (captains of Alexandria, Suez, and Damietta) and *kadı* along *ağas* of military corps and community leaders were members of the grand council that was supreme authority to which

¹⁷² Hathaway, Jane, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt The Rise of Qazdağlıs*, Cambridge University Press, GB, 1997, p.8

¹⁷³ Karal, Enver Ziya, *Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1797-1802)*, Milli Mecmua Basımevi, İstanbul, 1938, p.21

vâli had to obey.¹⁷⁴ Despite of the consultancy tradition embodied in *dîvân* and continuous struggle among *ağas*, *vâli*, real power actually remained in the hands Mamluks.¹⁷⁵

Hourani associates dominant position of Mamluks with their successful household strategies creating common interests and ambition to protect these interests (*asabiyya*). Despite of their connections with Muslim merchants and with the rural population and their control of waqfs and of their prestige derived from religious ancestry and learning, the *ulema* did not provide necessary *asabiyya* because of their long-term experience of military rule.¹⁷⁶ Inclusion of locals into regiments and relaxation of military discipline among soldiers prevented leaders of the seven regiments from establishing this *asabiyya* which was necessary for people who wished to seize and hold power.¹⁷⁷ Contrary to the *ulema* and *ağas*, Mamluks succeeded in gathering sufficient number of members/followers who zealously identified their interest with that of their leaders as following:

These [Mamluke households] were not military crops but élites created by men possessing political or military power and inheriting prestige, composed of freedmen trained in the service of the current heads of the household, and held together by a solidarity which would last a lifetime. The training and tradition of household produced individuals who knew how to make of it a core around which could be combined religious leaders, the commanders of the regiments, popular guilds, and behind them the great loose of combinations of Egypt, *Nisf Haram* and *Nisf Sa'd* and then, with this combination, to secure real power –to obtain for themselves and their followers from the governor of the rank of *bey* and therefore access to the great offices to which *beys* were appointed, and to seize control of the tax-farms.¹⁷⁸

As Hourani emphasizes, the residences of Mamluk begs became the center place for concentration and distribution of power through the interaction of their members with the rest of society. After the sixteenth century, Circassian Mamluk households of Qasimiyya, Faqariyya, and then Qazdağlıs gained dominance in Egypt.¹⁷⁹ For the most part of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a troika of Faqariyya faction of Hasan *Ağa* Bilifya, his son-in-law Ismail Beg, and his protégé, the Janissary officer Mustafa Kâhya al-

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p.15

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p.24

¹⁷⁶ Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," p.50

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p.50

¹⁷⁹ P.M. Holt, "Misr (the Ottoman Period 1517-1798)" El.2, vol.VII, pp.177-180, p.178

Qazdağlı controlled Egypt, as Hathaway states.¹⁸⁰ Then, the province witnessed the rivalries among two sub-factions of Qazdağlıs: Mamluks belonging to Muhammad Beg following either İbrahim Beg or Murad Beg contested with the followers of Bulut Kapan Ali Beg.¹⁸¹ Although the Porte sent Grand Admiral Ghazi Hasan Pasha to Egypt in 1786 to curb the power of the contesting Mamluk begs, they re-established their authority over again after the early leave of the Ottoman forces due to the outbreak of the Russian War.¹⁸²

Although the vigorous challenge of the Mamluk begs compelled the Porte to grant them some sort of autonomy, this challenge was not as alarming as the landing of French troops to Alexandria in 1798. This was an unexpected development for Selim III who had always maintained friendly relations with the French even before his accession. In the relative freedom of his princehood, he had corresponded with Louis XVI and sent one of his men, İshak Bey, to France in order to acquire information about war technology, weaponry and drilling methods of the French army.¹⁸³ Furthermore, there were French officers dealing with the formation of Army of the New Order (*Nizâm-ı Cedîd*) in the Ottoman capital when Napoleon carried out an attack to Egypt. Another reason for the Ottomans's quandary was that Napoleon pursued the preparation of campaign in a great secrecy in order to preempt possible British intervention. Although the Ottomans monitored the French press and the naval preparations held in Toulon's docks through Ali Efendi, French foreign minister Talleyrand refuted the rumors and assured Ali Efendi that the target of the naval expedition was Malta.¹⁸⁴ In essence, an Egypt expedition was one of the much-debated issues in the context of revolutionary France's war against Britain. Talleyrand, who was appointed to the post of foreign minister in July 1797, soon submitted several memoirs, advocating an Egypt campaign as a part of prospective colonial policy while Napoleon put pressure on the Directory in August 1797 to capitalize on the capture of the Ionian Islands by extending

¹⁸⁰ Hathaway, *The Politics of Households*, p.14

¹⁸¹ Crecelius, Daniel, "Egypt in the Eighteenth Century," in Daly, M. W (ed.), the Cambridge History of Egypt, volume II, Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, GB, 1998, pp.59-87, pp.82-3

¹⁸² P.M. Holt, "Misr (the Ottoman Period 1517-1798)" *EI.2*, vol.VII, pp.177-180, p.179

¹⁸³ Karal, *Selim III'ün Hattı Humayunları*, p.12

¹⁸⁴ Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, p.83-84. A captain, Greek-Orthodox subject, witnessed to the French landing to Alexandria in 1 July and after arriving to Rhodes he came across a ship of the Imperial navy and informed its crew about what he saw in Egypt. Apparently, the Porte heard about the French landing not before 17 July where the report of the captain arrived to the capital. Even though the *muhassıl* of Cyprus-informed by the French council of the Island- sent a report to the capital in 10 July, the Porte extenuated this information and did not initiate any war effort before the arrival of the former report.

French activities over the Ottoman territories, including the seizure of Egypt.¹⁸⁵ Apparently, the Egypt campaign was an output of a more ambitious plan, namely direct invasion of Britain. When the French administration acknowledged the difficulty in actualization of such a grand plan, military plans were canalized to the colonies of Britain. In order to threaten the India trade, being vital part of British economic power, and to cut Britain's support line with its continental allies, the Directory concluded positively about the Egypt campaign in the early March of 1798 and instructed Napoleon on April 12 to make necessary dispositions.¹⁸⁶ In the context of the French interests over the Ottoman territories, the Treaty of Campo Formio, partition of the Republic of Venice between France and Austria, should also be mentioned since it made France neighbor to the Ottoman Morea in October 1797.

According to the Treaty of Campo Formio, France obtained the Venetian possession in Adriatic, such as the Ionian Islands (Corfu, Paxos, Lefkas, Ithaca, Kefalonia, Zante, and Kythira) and in Dalmatia and soon after tried to expand influence over the adjacent Ottoman Morea as well. In the following year, expansionist policy of the French further threatened the Porte: Napoleon personally commanded the landing to Alexandria in July 1798 at the expense of the long-termed Ottoman-France alliance. These two states had maintained amicable terms so much so that Napoleon would try to curb resistance of centrally appointed officers and locals by claiming that he has landed to Alexandria with the approval of the sultan.¹⁸⁷

II.3: The Rise of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Patron of Husrev

When the news of the landing reached the Porte, Selim III made new appointments - including replacement of Grand Vizier İzzet Mehmed by Yusuf Ziya Pasha- and sent the imperial navy to Egypt under the command of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha.¹⁸⁸ According to *Sicill-i Osmani*, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha had entered the service of Silahdar İbrahim Pasha as a Circasian-stock slave and then he was introduced to Mustafa III in 1767.¹⁸⁹ In the following

¹⁸⁵ Dykstra, Darrell, "The French Occupation of Egypt" in Daly, M. W (ed.), *the Cambridge History of Egypt, volume II, Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, GB, 1998, pp. 113-139, p.116

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 69

¹⁸⁸ Karal, *Selim III'ün Hattı Hümayunları*, pp.55 and 77

¹⁸⁹ Sicill-i Osmani "Hüseyin Paşa (Küçük)", Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, vol.3, p.724

years, he seems to have gained the trust of Prince Selim while serving him as a member of his princely household during the cage period.¹⁹⁰ When his new patron ascended to the throne in 1789, Küçük Hüseyin became one of the most influential figures in the palace. In the accession ceremony, the new sultan integrated members of his princely retinue to the key posts in the palace hierarchy. In this process, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha obtained the title of *başçukadar*.¹⁹¹ The year of 1792 marked another important shift in the career of Küçük Hüseyin: He was promoted from *başçukadarlık*, a personal service of the sultan, to one of the leading administrative posts. Selim III did not only appoint Küçük Hüseyin Pasha to the post of grand admiral but also honored him with the title of *damad* by mediating for his marriage with Esmâ Sultan, the daughter of Abdülhamid I.¹⁹² In April 1792, he was sent to a long naval expedition to the Mediterranean. As Shaw states, the appointment of Küçük Hüseyin to the post of grand admiral and his following expedition was also result of an intra-elite rivalry.¹⁹³ A closer look to Selim's balance policy may help us to grasp the background of this rivalry.

In fact, Selim III mainly relied on approximately twenty men who, one way or another, supported reforms and effectively participated in the decision making process through consultancy mechanism. Along with Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Efendi (slave-origin spiritual teacher of the sultan), Yusuf Ağa (a Cretan slave, serving as lieutenant of the *Vâlîde* Sultan), Mahmud Raif Efendi (he entered the bureaus of the Sublime Porte and then became protégé of the *Reisülküttâb* Mehmed Reşid Efendi), Tatarcıkzade Abdullah Efendi (the son of a member of *ulema*, who served as the judge in Jerusalem, Cairo, and Medina), Ebubekir Ratip Efendi (son of a judge, who was educated in the Treasury and a close friend of Selim in his princehood), İbrahim Nesim Efendi (the son of a former chief treasurer), Mehmed Reşid Efendi (son of a scribe in the offices of the Imperial Council), Arabacızade İbrahim Efendi (the son of an imam at Hotin) formed the cadre of Selim III's reformist retinue.¹⁹⁴ After the dismissal of Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha (3 May 1792), this reformist cadre began to dominate over the Ottoman politics although they could not

¹⁹⁰ Karal, *Selim III'ün Hattı Hümayunları*, p.61

¹⁹¹ Başçukadar -known also as başçuhadar- was a master of ceremonies, who was responsible for the preservation and transportation of the clothes of the sultan; throwing gold coins into the crowd in the imperial ceremonies and festivals; escorting to people visiting the sultan. For the further information see., Özcan, Abdullah, "Çuhadar," İA (DİA), vol.VIII, pp.381-2.

¹⁹² Karal, *Selim III'ün Hattı Hümayunları*, p.164

¹⁹³ Shaw, Stanford J, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Selim III 1789-1807*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, pp.369-70

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp 87-91.

maintain solidarity and unity for a long time.¹⁹⁵ In order to balance their contestation or because of the instigation of rival subgroups, Selim III made constant appointments and dismissals. In this framework, it was the coalition of Yusuf Ağa and Mihrişah Vâlîde Sultan (1745-1805), which impelled the sultan for the appointment of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha to the post of grand admiral and for sending him to a long naval expedition in the Mediterranean in order to use his absence to end his influence.¹⁹⁶ But contrary to their expectation, the post of grand admiral provided Küçük Hüseyin Pasha with more influence and prestige.

To understand the importance of this appointment in the career of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, it seems necessary to detail the status of the grand admiral (*kapûdan pasha*) within the imperial administration. After the conquest of Constantinople, the navy assumed two key responsibilities: to control and regulate sea trade for provisioning the population and to protect sea routes.¹⁹⁷ Parallel to the expanded functions of the navy, Selim I had ordered Cafer *Kapûdan* the construction of new fleet at the new arsenal (*Tersâne-i Âmire*) at the capital in 1517.¹⁹⁸ Thus, contrary to the limited naval activities at Gallipoli, former naval base, the new arsenal witnessed vigorous construction facilities to the extent that the imperial (*Donanmay-ı Hümayûn*) began to set sail on the yearly basis in order to protect Mediterranean and Black sea coasts from pirates. With the expanded functions of the navy, the office of grand admiral gained mighty prestige especially after the entrance of Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha to the service of Süleyman I in 1534. Regarding to livelihood (*mansıb*) of the grand admiral, Barbarossa were bestowed Algiers, future seat of the *kapûdan* pashas, to which the *sancaks* of Kocaeli, Sughla, and Bigha from the *beglerbeglik* of Anatolia and Eghriboz, Aynabakthi, Karheli, Mizistre and Mytilene from the *beglerbeglik* of Rumelia were also added while Gallipoli remained the *sancak* of *kapûdan* pashas.¹⁹⁹ Parallel to the new conquests, the *eyâlet* of *kapûdan* pasha reached to twelve *sancaks* including two *sancaks* of Cyprus along with Chios, Naksa, and Mehdiye in the first half of the 17th century. Residing in *divanhane* of the arsenal in the capital, the *kapûdan* pashas were now responsible for the

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p.369

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, pp.369-370

¹⁹⁷ Kuru, Mehmet, *Relations Between Ottoman Corsairs and the Imperial Navy in the 16th Century*, Unpublished M.A thesis, Sabancı University, 2009, p.30

¹⁹⁸ Özbaran, Salih, "Kapudan Pasha", El.2, vol.4, p.572

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

supervision of the arsenal and of all issues related to the Ottoman fleet; administration of twelve *eyâlets*; and administrative control over the navy hierarchy.²⁰⁰

In the peace period between the Russian war and the French invasion, Selim III dealt with the reformation of the army and the navy. To be able to conduct this project, the sultan staffed the high-ranking military posts with his reformist cadre as with the appointment of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha to the post of grand admiral.²⁰¹ Before going through the contributions of Küçük Hüseyin to the projects of his master, it seems necessary to touch upon ‘reform-minded’ bureaucrats and ‘traditionalists’ of the period. As Riedler points out, historiography of the reformation period has evaluated the power struggles and contestation of bureaucrats mainly in the line of reformists and traditionalists. Contrary to this evaluation, Riedler’s study dedicated to the key political conspiracies of the 19th century shows the importance of personal relationships that take precedence over questions of ideology.²⁰² This seems also true for the reign of Selim III. As the contestation between the Yusuf Ağa-Mihrişah *Vâlide* Sultan coalition and Küçük Hüseyin implies, main intra-elite rivalries emerged among reformist bureaucrats themselves since Selim III staffed them to the leading offices. Adolphus Slade’s detailed memoir narrates the role of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha in the naval reform as that

No capitan pasha did so much for the navy as Kutchuk Huseyin, the favorite, and son-in-law of Selim III, whose disinterestedness and liberality seconded his master’s projects. Though no sailor, he had common sense to direct him in the pursuit of knowledge. He procured architects from France, with whose aid he resuscitated the arsenals of Constantinople, of Sinope, and of Rhodes, supplying the first with two wet docks, and all other necessaries for the equipment of a large fleet; and in a short time he had twenty sail of the line, built on the newest models, anchored before the windows of his palace. He reformed Galiondgis, built barracks for them, and encouraged the naval school, -the professor of which, when I was there, was a young Englishman named Redhouse.²⁰³

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Karal, *Selim III’ün Hattı Humayunları*, p.164

²⁰² Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire; Conspiracies and Political Culture*, SOAS/Routledge, 2011, p.85

²⁰³ Slade, Adolphus, *Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, &C. and of A Cruise in the Black Sea with the Capitan Pasha, in the years 1829, 1830, and 1831*, vol.1, Elibron Classics, 2005, pp.105-6.

As Slade recounts, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha's effort in reforming navy increased his prestige in the eyes of the sultan. More importantly, the navy provided him with new trustees who protected his interests against rival power blocks in the capital. In 1796, the leading trustees of Selim III were divided into three factions led by Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Yusuf Ağa and İzzet Mehmed. İngiliz Mahmud Raif, Ebubekir Ratip Efendi and Ishak Efendi were in the Küçük Hüseyin's group which favored the French; Yusuf Ağa with *Vâlîde* Sultan, Çelebi Mustafa Reşid and Mehmed Reşid were supporting the Russians and the British; İzzet Mehmed, his trustees, and many members of the lesser council remained impartial towards European ambassadors in the capital.²⁰⁴ Because these three factions were kept in balance by the palace and the Porte, they tried to strengthen their position through out-palace alliances: Yusuf Ağa and *Vâlîde* Sultan collaborated with the Janissaries and the *ulema*; Çelebi Mehmed depended on the soldiers of the *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* Army and reformed artillery troops; Küçük Hüseyin relied on the sailors in his fleet.²⁰⁵ In other words, the post of grand admiral helped Küçük Hüseyin in finding new trustees out of the palace.

Apart from naval reforms, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha dealt with the suppression of Pazvandoğlu's revolt, a magnate of Vidin, until the news of Napoleon's expedition reached to the Porte.²⁰⁶ Then, his success in the Egypt campaign in 1801 provided him with opportunity to consolidate his powerful standing within the imperial household. As a victorious grand admiral and highest-ranking bureaucrat just after the grand vizier in the theatre of war, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha's position was strong enough to secure appointment of his household's member to the prominent posts of the Egypt administration.²⁰⁷

II.4: The *Kethüda* and the *Tüfengcibaşı* in the Retinue of the Grand Admiral

In the late March of 1801, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha arrived in Egypt with 70 ships and nearly 6.000 men. As *kethüda* of the grand admiral, Husrev Mehmed was accompanying his master. A *tüfengci* named Mehmed Ali also arrived in Egypt as a second in the command of

²⁰⁴ Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p.371

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Karal, *Selim III'ün Hattı Hümayunları*, p.120

²⁰⁷ His *kethüda* Husrev Mehmed was appointed to the post of *vali* of Egypt while Hurşit, another leading protégé of Küçük Hüseyin became tax collector of Alexandria. For details see, Çetin, *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın Mısır Valililiği*, p.21 and İnalçık, Halil, "Husrev Paşa", İA, vol.V, pp.609-616, p.610.

Albanian irregulars sent by the tax collector of Kavala region.²⁰⁸ Ironically enough, Mehmed Ali, Husrev's future rival would be part of this retinue in the following days although his way of arrival to Egypt was diametrically opposite: he benefited from kinship ties while Husrev Mehmed began his career as Abazha-stock slave (*kul cinsi*) of Çavuşbaşı Said Ağa. With the mediation of his patron, Husrev was accepted into the palace service during the reign of Abdülhamid I and after serving in the treasury chamber under the patronage of Arnavud Yahya and Süfyan Ağas, he became the apprentice (*çırak*) of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha.²⁰⁹ Ethnic-regional solidarity may have been a determinant factor in the patronage relations of Husrev. Like Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya and his patron Küçük Hüseyin Pashas, Husrev was a Caucasian-stock bureaucrat who was included into the palace service as a slave. Although it seems difficult to conclude that Caucasian-stock bureaucrat -the Easterners- established dominance in the administration of the period, the two most important posts –grand vizier and grand admiral- were in the hand of this group. Besides, Selim III's mother Mihrişah Sultan was also of Georgian-stock. Based on her correspondence, she seems to have established cordial relations with Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya who had Georgian origins as well.²¹⁰ As we will touch upon the contestation of Yusuf Ziya and Küçük Hüseyin, of these two easterners, personal ambitions would contradict with ethnic-regional solidarity at other times. That is why long lasting trust relation between Küçük Hüseyin and Husrev cannot be explained by merely their common origin. It rather seems that among many other factors, common origin played a partial role in Hüseyin Pasha's networking activities. Husrev gradually rose in the household hierarchy of his patron and until the Egypt campaign he obtained the title of sealkeeper and then of *kethüda*.²¹¹ It is also important to note that the grand admiral -unlike the other high-ranking bureaucrats- was allowed to appoint his *kethüda* among his own men rather than relying on centrally appointed one, according to the code of 1793 (*Vüzerâ Kânunnâmesi*).²¹²

Mehmed Ali, on the other hand, was not a member of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha's inner household but that of Kavala *hakimi*, a relative of his wife.²¹³ As with this case, kinship ties remained an essential strategy in the household-building of Mehmed Ali. Before Kavala

²⁰⁸ Çetin, Atillâ, *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın Mısır Valiliği –Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre-*, İstanbul, 1998, p.28.

²⁰⁹ Tayyâr-zâde Atâ, *Osmanlı Saray Tarihi (Tarih-i Enderun)* vol.II, (ed.Mehmet Arslan), Kitabevi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, p.118

²¹⁰ Karal, , *Selim III'ün Hattı Humayunları*, p.164

²¹¹ Sicill-i Osmanî "Husrev Mehmed Paşa", *Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları*, vol.2, p.682

²¹² Gökçe, Turan, "Vüzerâ Kânunnâmesi," *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, vol.VIII (İzmir 1993), pp. 99-125, p.117

²¹³ Altundağ, Şinasi, "Mehmed Ali Paşa" İA (MEB), vol.VII, pp.566-7

hakimi, Mehmed Ali had benefited from patronage of his uncle Tosun Ağa -tax collector of Kavala region- upon his father's –*bekçibaşı İbrahim Ağa*- early death.²¹⁴ After his uncle's execution he entered the service of a French tobacco merchant –Monsieur Léon.²¹⁵ Except Léon, Mehmed Ali seems to have preferred patronage of his relatives. When he constructed his own household, he mainly relied on his own family members. Apart from kinship ties, an unexpected development helped Mehmed Ali in expanding his own power basis: When the commander of his patron's Albanian troops –Ali Ağa- returned home, Mehmed Ali took over command by proxy.²¹⁶

In sum, when Husrev and Mehmed Ali arrived in Egypt, the former was in more influential status as *kethüda* of the grand admiral. Mehmed Ali, on the other hand, was a member of a middle-ranking provincial household and his patron was not in the battle field. Although Napoleon left Egypt in August 1799, large numbers of French troops had remained in the province. Regarding the evacuation of these soldiers, the Porte and France signed the convention of al-Arish on January 24, 1800. While all parties were in expectation of a peaceful evacuation, the British intervention, especially their insistence on the transportation of French prisoners of war to Britain, caused resentment of French that lighted the fuse of a new clash of arms.²¹⁷ Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and his naval force arrived at Abuqir at this stage of war and British land forces joined them. Hüseyin Pasha instructed Husrev Mehmed with the capture of Rozetta and after a four-day siege of Rosetta castle with the help of British land troops, French forces submitted on 20 April 1801.²¹⁸ After a successful pinching movement of the grand admiral, the grand vizier, Mamluk begs, and the British, the Ottoman-British joint army seized the control of Cairo by July 1801.²¹⁹

Regarding the subsequent diplomatic negotiations, France and Britain signed the treaty of Amiens in March 1802 and agreed on the restoration of the Ottoman territories to the pre-war status and on the recognition of independence of the Ionian Islands. On 25 June 1802, France and the Porte signed the Treaty of Paris which guaranteed restoration of the peace, renewal of the previous treaties including trade privileges in articles I, II, and III. Article IV was about the Porte's recognition of the Treaty of Amiens while the rest were

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Altundağ, Şinasi, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı Mısır Meselesi 1831-1841*, vol.1, TTK, 1988, Ankara, p.22

²¹⁶ Ibid., p.24

²¹⁷ Karal, , *Selim III'ün Hattı Humayunları*, p.76

²¹⁸ Çelik, Yüksel, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa; Siyasi Hayatı ve Askeri Faaliyetleri (1756-1855)*, PhD thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2005, p.14

²¹⁹ Ibid., p.15

dedicated to the mutual guarantees, exchanges of prisoners, return of confiscated properties, and renewal of the favored nation status for each state.²²⁰ In sum, Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt was recognized at the diplomatic level. Despite this, realities of post-invasion period proved that re-establishment of this suzerainty could not be as easier as Selim III expected.

First, nearly three-year long disturbances and military struggles brought difficult times to the local population, especially the urban masses of Cairo since the army troops, rarely paid on time, resorted to force in order to get their salaries or resorted to methods to meet their material needs more directly.²²¹ In this context, composition of the grand vizier's military retinue became main focus of critics. Karal, for instance, describes this retinue as following: "that army of 60.000 men [the grand vizier Yusuf Ziya's army] had no importance in reality because it was a useless crowd consisting of tribe people and worthless slaves taken en route ...most of the men came to Arish for the looting..."²²² Similarly, Fahmy argues that the Janissary troops in the grand vizier's entourage was one of the main obstacles which prevented the sultan in re-establishing effective control over Egypt: These troops which the British defined as a "medieval horde" was completely deprived of training and discipline.²²³ When compared with them, some troops in the retinue of the Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, was, by far, superior in terms of equipment, training, and discipline. As mentioned before, the grand admiral had dealt with military and naval reforms with the assistance of European instructors since 1792. When he arrived in Egypt to assist the grand vizier and the British, there were nearly 4,000 troops under his command and 1,200 of them was trained and disciplined along modern lines under the surveillance of European officers.²²⁴ The rest of his military retinue, however, was a collection of irregular troops among which Mehmed Ali was a member of Albanian recruits. Despite of military superiority of the grand admiral, the grand vizier was still in the highest rank within the Ottoman bureaucracy. Accordingly, Selim III seemed very attentive to obtain consent of Yusuf Ziya Pasha while making new appointments for the administration of Egypt.²²⁵

²²⁰ Karal, *Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı*, pp.141-143

²²¹ Dykstra, "The French Occupation of Egypt," pp.113-139, p. 133

²²² Karal, *Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, pp.122-123

²²³ Fahmy, Khaled, "the Era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha" in *the Cambridge History of Egypt, volume II, Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of the Twentieth Century*, Daly, M. W (ed.), Cambridge University Press, GB, 1998, pp. 139-180, p.142

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Karal, *Selim III'ün Hattı Humayunları*, pp.140-1

As his correspondence with Yusuf Ziya suggests, Selim III ascribed significant meaning to the appointment of a mighty governor who would suppress the Mamluk begs. In this context, the sultan told his grand vizier about that Hakkı Pasha, the governor of Kandiye, would be most proper candidate because of his loyalty, obedience, and authoritarian way of rule, which was especially necessary for the re-establishment of the order in Egypt.²²⁶ Nevertheless, the Sultan and Yusuf Ziya could not reach an agreement on Hakkı Pasha. According to Karal, Yusuf Ziya Pasha probably had another name in his mind for the post of governor that might be the reason behind this disagreement.²²⁷ The correspondences of Selim III with the other bureaucrats suggest that Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha had also a nominee for the governorship of Egypt and the Sultan's approval of this nominee (Husrev Pasha) may be evaluated as the lessening influence of Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya Pasha over the appointments.²²⁸

Yusuf Ziya, as one of the leading trustees of the sultan appointed to a provincial mission, suffered from several smear campaigns conducted by his rivals at the capital.²²⁹ As mentioned before, a bureaucrat's disgrace or rise mainly depended on his or his patron's ability in direct accession to the sultan. That is why keeping influential spies or followers back in the capital and having information about lobbying activities of rival households were of vital importance for those who were sent to provinces. Correspondences between Selim III and the grand vizier in Egypt show that Yusuf Ziya was well-informed by his men in the capital regarding various palace gossips.²³⁰ Apart from hostile networks in the capital, Yusuf Ziya had to cope up with the lobbying activities of bureaucrats in Egypt, especially that of Küçük Hüseyin. Cevdet Pasha associates the distrust between these two bureaucrats with their contesting foreign policies: Yusuf Ziya had reported the Porte about Küçük Hüseyin's proximity to the French.²³¹ Besides, he said that Hüseyin's distrust to the British made the coordination between his own troops and those of the grand vizier and the British difficult.²³² Apparently, Selim III sided with Küçük Hüseyin in this contestation and Yusuf Ziya resented

²²⁶ Ibid., pp.140-141 "İnşallahütaala Aminen Mısıra dahil olup dilhamız üzre tahtı rabıtaya koyup nizam veresin, lakin Mısıra ikamet için bir uslu terbiyeli sadık Mısır valisine muhtaçsın. Mevcudu mülâhaza eyledim, Kandiye valisi Hakkı Paşa oldukça cerbezeli ve sadık ve şedit adamdır. Gerçi başka mahallere el vermez amma Mısıra şeditçe olduğundan vakte göre cümleden münasıptir...sen dahi münasip görürsen..."

²²⁷ Ibid., p.141

²²⁸ Ibid., p.147

²²⁹ Ibid., p.70

²³⁰ Ibid., p.72

²³¹ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, İstanbul, Matbaa-i Osmanî, 1309/1891-92 (tertib-i cedid), vol.VII-VIII, p.113

²³² Karal, *Selim III'ün Hattı Humayunları*, p.72

the sultan for his direct correspondence with the grand admiral: “You probably know that *Kapûdan* Pasha did not write anything against you. *Kapûdan* Pasha’s nature and your good behavior are known. Even if *Kapûdan* Pasha writes about you, I don’t take it into consideration.”²³³ Although the sultan tried to placate his grand vizier, Yusuf Ziya’s resentment was not baseless: the grand admiral’s leading members in his inner household were soon appointed to highest ranks in the provincial administration of Egypt. Thank to the mediation of his master, Husrev Mehmed, thus, obtained the title of governor of Egypt in September 1801 while Hurşit, another protégé of Küçük Hüseyn, was appointed to the post of tax collector of Alexandria.²³⁴

Apart from the growing influence of the grand admiral, strategic and military considerations might have been determinant for the decision of the sultan. Napoleon had invaded Egypt through a naval attack. Besides, the British did not leave Alexandria yet. In other words, if one of these states attempt to take Egypt in future, only a well-organized naval and land defense would repulse the rival. Since Husrev was a protégé of the grand admiral, they would coordinate such a defense in harmony. Furthermore, Egypt was responsible for provision of flax yarn, patent leather, and saltpeter (*güherçile*) for the imperial navy while captains of Alexandria, Dimaetta, and Suez assumed to construct necessary ships for the navy.²³⁵ Considering that, another fiscal burden of Egypt was to ship sugar, rice, coffee, lentil, and wheat for the provision of Istanbul’s population. This shows us the intertwined ties of this province, the imperial navy and the imperial capital. In addition to these, custom taxes of Egypt were newly included for the financing of the autonomous treasury of *Îrâd-ı Cedîd* which was supposed to cover expenses of military and naval reforms.²³⁶ In light of all these, the appointment of a protégé of the grand admiral to the administration of Egypt seems as a necessity for the Porte, aiming to exploit sources of the newly re-captured province effectively. However, it was neither a naval attack of a European state nor a Mamluk Beg but a newly-arrived commander of Albanian troops of small number who would pose grave danger to Husrev Mehmed Pasha.

²³³ Ibid., p.147

²³⁴ Çetin, *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın Mısır Valiliği*, p.21 and İnalçık, Halil, “Husrev Paşa”, İA (MEB), vol.V/I, pp.609-616, p.610

²³⁵ Karal, *Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, p.18

²³⁶ Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa*, p.24

II.5:How to Exchange Governors: Barrack-Household versus Office-Household

Power struggles over Egypt were not confined to the contestation of the grand vizier and grand admiral. The latter's household might have obtained highest ranking posts of the province but it turned out that keeping this posts in the hand would be much more difficult than obtaining them since the Porte, Britain, Mamluk Beks, *ocak ağas*, irregular troops, and rival households of centrally appointed bureaucrats had contesting plans. Worse still, plans of all parties were subject to constant change that made all alliances suspicious and ephemeral. For instance, Selim III, in the beginning, was very determined to remove all Mamluk beks from the administration of Egypt as his correspondence indicates.²³⁷ Since the sultan was ruling an empire of extensive territories, appointment of local figures to the central administration or to provinces –remaining out of their influence- was one of the most common practices in curbing regional powers of rebellious locals. This policy, however, did work out on Mamluks and the sultan attempted to carry out a more ambitious plan aiming an overall destruction of beks in a ship massacre.²³⁸ This plan could not be realized -until Mehmed Ali's castle massacre in 1811- and worse still, the Mamluk beks lost their confidence with the Porte after learning the details of this plot. This event and other excluding policies of the Porte eventually resulted in a British-Mamluk alliance. As a result, Britain strengthened its standing by providing patronage to the Mamluk beks who, in return, provided their new patron with regional knowledge and influence. After then, the sultan had to take steps backward to the extent that he even reconsidered appointment of a Mamluk bek to the post of governor.²³⁹

As such, all parties were constantly adjusting their power relations according to emergent polarizations. Husrev, as an inexperienced governor, seems to have difficulty in keeping pace with these power shifts. His failure especially in winning the support of Albanian irregular troops strengthened hands of Mehmed Ali who already began to constitute his own power base modeled on the barrack-households of former beks. Like other groups in the Ottoman society, members of army relied on the household-building activities in order to

²³⁷ Karal, *Selim III'ün Hattı Humayunları*, p.141 "Before the French, Egypt was not under Ottoman rule in a sense, it was administered by tyrants called bey. Now, we've captured the region again by God's will; if one of these beks stays here, establishment of order would be impossible, situation may be worse. It is a crucial point that we must pay attention. From now on, I'm determined that none of them stays in Egypt... I'll give titles such as kapucubaşı if they want, but I don't want even one of them in Egypt..."

²³⁸ Ibid, p.143

²³⁹ Ibid, p.149.

provide protection, solidarity, and wealth. Qazdağlıs were the par excellence of barrack-household which dominated over Egypt for much of the 18th century through the placement of their regimental clients to the leading administrative posts.²⁴⁰ Based on the official documents –such as register of salaries- and chronicles, Hathaway shows that household membership overshadowed slave status in identifying a person’s position in Egyptian military society by the late 17th century and since then soldiers was defined by the patron of a household they followed.²⁴¹ She also puts emphasis on the strong connections between barracks’ groups and trade networks in cities by stating that patrons of barrack-based households, regimental officials, relied on urban tax-farms contrary to the Mamluk begs depending on the rural tax farms until the early 18th century where clients of military households began to be included to the rural tax-farming system as well.²⁴² In the light of chronicles, Mehmed Ali seems to have used the pattern of barrack-based households while constructing the nucleus of his own power basis in Egypt as we will detail below.

Although Husrev was appointed to the governorship of Egypt in September 1801, the real power, in essence, remained in the hand of the grand vizier until his return to Istanbul in early January of 1802.²⁴³ As mentioned before, British intervention had prevented the Porte’s plan aiming overall destruction of the Mamluk begs who then fled to the Upper Egypt. As a measure against the threat of these begs, Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya left a great number of his military retinue back in the province while returning to Istanbul. One of his men, Tahir Pasha was the head of the Balkan irregulars. To Cevdet Pasha, ethnic origin of Tahir Pasha played an important role in this appointment since he was an Albanian like the majority of Balkan irregulars.²⁴⁴ It seems that ethnicity-based solidarity also played role in Mehmed Ali’s promotion to the *serçeşmelik* of these troops. As with other leading bureaucrats, we have very limited information about the early career of Mehmed Ali. To Çetin, the oldest official record referring to *serçeşme* Mehmed Ali dates to November 1802 and covers his appointment by Husrev to lead military operation against the Mamluk begs.²⁴⁵ Based on the narratives of Mouriez and Mengin, he argues that Mehmed Ali began to rise in the military hierarchy under the patronage of Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin that he obtained through the mediation

²⁴⁰ Hathaway, *The Politics of Households*, p.27

²⁴¹ Hathaway, “The Military Household,” pp. 39-52, p. 43

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Çetin, *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa’nın Mısır Valiliği*, p.25

²⁴⁴ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol.VII-VIII, p.216

²⁴⁵ Çetin, *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa’nın Mısır Valiliği*, p.30 for the original document see., BA H.H 3449/K. After detailing the military operation of *serçeşme* M. Ali against the Mamluk Begs, Husrev pointed out Mehmed Ali’s satisfactory performance in the battles [M.Ali’nin gayet iyi çalıştığına].

of Hasan Ağa (an officer in the retinue of *Kapûdan*) and thus secured this title even before the departure of the grand admiral for Istanbul.²⁴⁶ If this was the real case, Husrev's laudatory evaluation for Mehmed Ali's efforts in the oldest official record may have aimed to inform his patron about his well coordination with his other favorites.

Regarding the post of *serçeşme*, it was exclusive to the extensive households of governors of big provinces such as Erzurum, Diyarbakir, Mosul, Bagdad, and Damascus. Unlike the ordinary vizier households having only one infantry and cavalry unit under the command of only one "tüfencibaşı" and "deli başı" respectively, these governors had more than one unit that necessitated a post of a supreme commander called *serçeşme* who was responsible for the coordination of several tüfencibaşıs and deli başıs.²⁴⁷ Mehmed Ali as the *serçeşme* of the Balkan irregular forces was assisting Tahir Pasha. According to Cevdet Pasha, Tahir did not show interest in political and military issues while Sufism and fraternizing with sheikhs occupied an extensive place in his daily life that made Mehmed Ali a prominent figure among the Balkan irregular troops.²⁴⁸ In other words, Mehmed Ali seemed to fulfill the power vacuum of Tahir in the eyes of irregular soldiers. Although these soldiers helped Husrev Pasha in his struggle against Mamluk begs, the Porte seems to have perceived their excessive number as a source of disorder as early as November 1802 and issued a decree in order to keep their number in a manageable size.²⁴⁹ It is also important to note that the Porte's decision in reconciliation with Mamluk begs under the protection of the British rendered presence of large numbers of irregular troops unnecessary. After the settlement of Mamluk begs to Aswan (*Asuvan*) the British forces left Alexandria in late February, 1803.²⁵⁰ With the elimination of threats of Mamluk and British, Husrev began to involve with administrative and military regulations until the late April of 1803 where an armed resistance of irregular troops caused his abdication from the post of *vâli*.²⁵¹

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p.29

²⁴⁷ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, pp.375-376

²⁴⁸ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol.VII-VIII, p.216

²⁴⁹ Çetin, *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın Mısır Valiliği*, p.33

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p.34

²⁵¹ Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa*, p.41

II.6: The *Serçeşme*, the *Vâli*, and the Unpaid Irregular Troops

Husrev's report to the Porte, dated 13 January 1803, sheds light on his ambivalent feelings about the irregular troops: He complained about disorder among these troops and financial difficulty in meeting their excessive expenditures while, at the same time, admitting that their military existence is necessary for intimidating inimical power blocks (*bazı hainler ve urban taifesi*) in Egypt.²⁵² He also added that after removal of these blocks, he would send majority of irregular troops back. Based on this report and the abovementioned imperial edict -restricting further arrival of irregulars- the Porte and Husrev Pasha seem to be of one mind about the necessity of the evacuation of these soldiers. Discontent, however, was not one-sided since these soldiers suffered from ill-payment. As a solution, Treasurer Recâî Efendi convinced Husrev Pasha to pay the accrued salaries (*güzeşte ulûfe*) on the condition that those soldiers who receive salary should leave Egypt.²⁵³ Although Husrev Pasha borrowed some money from leading merchants, he could not find enough founding to cover all accrued salaries of the irregular soldiers who, in return, refused to leave until receiving the full amount. On 23 April 1802, they gathered in front of the residence of Treasurer Recâî Efendi after which everything went out of control.²⁵⁴ Since chronicles have given quite diverse accounts for Husrev's reaction to the events, it seems necessary to present rest of the story within a comparative perspective based on the narratives of Cevdet Pasha, Câbî Efendi, and Tayyartzade Âta Efendi.

To start with, Cevdet Pasha depicts events as following:²⁵⁵ Treasurer Recâî Efendi evaded soldiers by stating that Mehmed Ali was retaining the salaries. When soldiers arrived to Mehmed Ali's residence, he informed them that the treasure did not send any money to him and right after, tension rose, the two parties joined battle until an announcement which assured the soldiers that salaries would be paid within a week.²⁵⁶ When they went to the treasurer's residence six day later, Recâî Efendi informed them that he had not enough money and sent a letter to Husrev Pasha in order to get financial support for payments but received unfavorable reply (*bir akçe vermem ve birşey verilmesine ruhsatım dahi yoktur*).²⁵⁷ Then,

²⁵² Çetin, *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın Mısır Valiliği*, p.34

²⁵³ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol.VII-VIII, p.216

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 217

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.216-237

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.217

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

when the treasurer asked the pasha to deal with soldiers surrounding him, the latter began to bombard Recâî Efendi's residence without making any effort to rescue the treasurer himself. Although Janissaries *ağas*, *ocaklıs* and some locals suggested strengthening the fortification of the castle, Husrev rejected this proposal in a quite hostile fashion as he accused them of planning to divide his military strength (*siz benim askerimi tefrik etmek istiyorsunuz*).²⁵⁸ Then, Tahir Pasha tried to communicate with Husrev but his answer was discouraging again.

Next day, Husrev send his own soldiers – in the *Nizâm-ı Cedid* order – over irregular troops some of which managed to transport the treasurer with the salary records and official documents from the besieged residence to Tahir Pasha's mansion.²⁵⁹ However, Husrev's troops were defeated mainly because of their involvement with plundering instead of fighting. Tahir Pasha joined revolting soldiers as his nephew in the castle helped Albanian soldiers to take the control of citadel.²⁶⁰ The following day, they bombarded Husrev's residence; arrested some of his slaves in Qasr El-Einy (Kasr-ı 'Aynî), plundered his men' (*paşaya müteallik olanlar*) houses in Azbakiyah (Özbekiye), at the end, Husrev with his household covering family members, his troops, and his slaves fled from Cairo.²⁶¹ On 6 May 1803, a divan meeting was held with the participation of sheiks and *kadıs* (*meşâyih* and *kadı-i belde*) who appointed Tahir Pasha to the post of *vâli* by proxy and informed the Porte about this decision. After then, some followers of Husrev were arrested but they were soon released with the mediation of sheiks and *kadıs*.²⁶²

In this narrative, Husrev is portrayed as an irreconcilable person although Cevdet Pasha does not explain why Husrev positioned against Treasurer Mehmed Recâî Efendi and Tahir Pasha at the beginning of the event. Nevertheless, his narrative is replete with important information about power relations of Recâî Efendi that may be reason for Husrev's hostile stance against him. Recâî Efendi had worked in the *Mektûbî* Chamber and then served Yusuf Ziya Pasha as his divan scribe in Maden (a district of El-aziz).²⁶³ Upon his master's promotion to the post of grand vizier, they returned to İstanbul where Recâî obtained the rank of *kalyonlar kâtibi* and in the time of the Egyptian campaign he was appointed as the

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 218

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p.219

²⁶¹ Ibid., p.220

²⁶² Ibid., p.221

²⁶³ Ibid., p.225

treasurer through which he generated significant income.²⁶⁴ Although he was dismissed because of his misconduct, he retrieved the post upon the resignation of Şerif Efendi. In brief, he was serving Husrev as the treasurer although he was a protégé of Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya Pasha. Considering that the grand vizier and the grand admiral, the master of Husrev, were in rivalry, Recâî Efendi might have deliberately aimed to put Husrev in trouble by suggesting sending the irregular troops without covering all accrued salaries. Or, Husrev might have suspected that Recâî Efendi has taken the irregular troops' side in order to unseat him. This might be also true for Husrev's refusal for Tahir's request for help since he was known as a protégé of grand vizier too.

Lastly, one of the recurring themes in Cevdet Pasha's narrative is that Tahir, Mehmed Ali and the irregular troops showed a maximum effort to protect artisans and city dwellers of Cairo from possible damages the armed conflict against Husrev might give rise to.²⁶⁵ We may associate distrust of Husrev toward locals with this amity and cooperation they established with revolting soldiers. Apparently, Husrev Pasha seems to have trusted exclusively his own household, especially his military retinue in suppressing the revolt. His men were, however, stationing in different locations such as the castle, Qasr El-Einy and Azbakhayah that might have obstructed their well-coordination. Even worse, there were some irregular soldiers in these places, who cut of communication among protégés of Husrev Pasha.

In brief, the narrative of Cevdet Pasha suggests that the events leading to the fall of Husrev began as a reaction to the irregular soldiers to Treasurer Recâî Efendi's decision of cutting salaries. In the course of events, the uncompromising manner of Husrev, however, united irregular troops, Recâî Efendi, Mehmed Ali, Tahir Pasha, and the local power blocks into one camp. In the light of this polarization, we may conclude that Husrev could neither organize his own household effectively nor include leading figures of Cairo to his power network although this strategy was a must for a centrally appointed governor. Regarding the role of Mehmed Ali, Cevdet Pasha does not mention any direct contestation between him and Husrev. He rather suggests that Mehmed Ali adopted anti-Husrev stance as a result of pasha's exclusive policy. In other words, the fall of Husrev was not a consequence of intra-household

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p.219 "Bunun üzerine ahâli bî- taraf durdu ve birinin hakkında askeri cânibinden taarruz vûku bulmadı ve askeri taifesi tüccar ve esnaftan ne alsalar tamamıyla akçesini verip asla ğadr u ezâ etmediklerinden ahâli öyle vahşi askerden böyle hilâf-ı me'mul bir muâmele-i âdilâne gördükleri gibi memnun ve tamamıyla emîn ve mutmain olmalarıyla..."

competition between him and Mehmed Ali although the latter would benefit from this event in consolidating his influence over artisans, city-dwellers of Cairo, and irregular soldiers.²⁶⁶

Contrary to Cevdet Pasha, Tayyazade Atâullah Beg puts the blame of all events on Husrev Pasha.²⁶⁷ After emphasizing the quarrelsome personality of Husrev, Atâ Beg criticizes him for his disrespectfulness toward Tahir Pasha; cutting salaries of Albanian soldiers; his negligence in protection of the castle; his reluctance in winning other government officers such as Mehmed Ali and Recâi Efendi; his negligence in establishing order in the province; and his failure in winning the local population.²⁶⁸ In this narrative, Atâ Beg touches upon neither financial difficulty in salary payments nor excessive number of irregular troops in disorder. What is more to the point; he does not mention about the role of Recâi Efendi in cutting salaries.

Then, in the chronicle of Câbî, Husrev is depicted as a victim of opportunist irregular soldiers.²⁶⁹ Câbî Efendi points out two main problems of the army: Mass of irregular troops (*sekbân*) and lack of control over the payment rolls of soldiers.²⁷⁰ As we have witnessed above, Atâ Bey presented Husrev as irresponsible and incompatible governor while Câbî depicted him as mere victim of disobedient soldiers. Finally, Halil İnalçık gives two different accounts for the Cairo days of Husrev Pasha in two different encyclopedic entries of two Islamic Encyclopedias, published respectively by the Turkish Ministry of Education (MEB) and by the Turkish Religious Foundation (DIA). In the latter edition, İnalçık only recounts critics of Ceberti and Atâ Beg about misconduct of Husrev without adding any comment. In

²⁶⁶ Ibid., pp.219-226

²⁶⁷ Tayyâr-zâde Atâ, *Osmanlı Saray Tarihi; Târih-i Enderûn*, vol.II, p.146 "...Husrev Pasha hakikatü'l-hâl ashâb-ı şecâat u besâletten cerî vü cesûr ve dirâyet ü cerbede ile meftûr olup fakat evâil-i hâlinde esker-i umûrda kendi rey'ine kâ'il ve nâ-be mahal inâd ve icrâ-yı agrâza mâ'il olup ez-cümle Tâhir Paşa'ya olan hakâreti ve Arnavudların bî-vakt harcını kesmesi ve kal'anın emr-i muhafazasına adem-i dikkati ve Mehmed Ali Paşa gibi bir ser-çeşme-i âkili ve Recâi Efendi gibi devlet me'mûrını ele almağa râğbet itmemesi ve öyle henüz herc ü merceden birçok zâyi'âta uğramış ve güç hâl ile yakayı kurtarmış olan ahâlinin icrâyı taltifiyle kalben devlete meylü mahabbet itdirmeye çalışmaması ma'mûriyet-i beldeye lüzûm u memûl kadar himmet itmemesi ve bu şeyleri ihtar eden hayr-hâhânını dinlememesi encam-ı kâr Mısır'dan sıfru'l yed avdetini netice vermiştir."

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Beyhan, Mehmet Ali (ed.), *Câbî Târihi, Tarih-i Sultan Selim-i Salis ve Mahmud-ı Sani*, 2 vols, TTK, Ankara, 2003, p.88 "Mısır Vâlisi Hüsrev Paşa hazretlerinin ber-muktezâ-yı vakt dâire-i devletlerinde sekbân nâmıyla Türk ve ehl-i beled ve tâife-i Arnabud izdihâm-ı oldukdan başka, on beş âdemi başına cem eden binbaşıyım ve yüzbaşıyım deyü kayd olunup, bin veya yüz tayîn ve mâhiyye otuzar guruşdan bu kadar mâhiyye ve mande matlûbiyle edâsı katı müşkil ve Arnavud tâifesi; "aylık tayînâd ve bahâlarımız, üç dört aydır verilmedi" deyu Hüsrev Paşa'yı tâzyik ve edâsı mümkînatdan olmayüp, akla ve kaleme gelir olmamağla, gittikçe birbirleriyle dahi, ecnâs-ı asâkir ve dağlı Çatak makûlesi, nihâyetü'l-emr Hüsrev Paşa'yı Mısır'dan âskerî tâifesi, bazı beylerin dahi iğfaliyle İskenderiye'ye götürüp ve mâlını yağma ve İskenderiye'de mukim mîr-i mîr-i kirâm Hurşîd Paşa'yı Mısır'a vali edüp..."

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

the MEB edition, he criticizes Husrev for searching every possible ways to increase the revenue of his extravagant master instead of focusing on his administrative duties.²⁷¹ In a similar way, Atâ Beg criticizes Küçük Hüseyin Pasha -master of Husrev- for his appropriation the wealth of reaya (*halktan irtikâb itdiği mebâlig-inâ-meşrû'nın*).²⁷² Like other leading bureaucrats, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was, probably, in the hope of gaining further wealth and influence while placing members of his household into administrative posts. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to determine to which extend his financial demands led his protégés to adopt oppressive rule against *reâyâ* as Husrev Pasha was said to had done. Whether the main reason for Husrev's failure was his own misconduct, fiscal pressure of his master, his irreconcilable manner or his overconfidence for his own household, especially for his military retinue, he was soon eliminated from power struggle for the post of governor. Consequently, Husrev Pasha could not succeed in establishing reliable alliances to maintain his position and he was thus outrivalled through an armed contestation where all leading figures of Cairo began to positioning against him.

II.7: How a *Serçeşme* becomes the *Vâli* of Egypt?

After the fall of Husrev, Tahir Pasha, commander of the Rumelia irregular troops took the rule of Egypt on himself. As with Husrev's case, unpaid soldiers revolted against Tahir that brought an end not only to his administration but also his life. Janissaries who resented the discriminatory and exclusive manner of Tahir Pasha allied with Ahmed Pasha, commander of Medina of the Hijaz region.²⁷³ Meanwhile, Mamluk begs in the Upper Egypt were closely monitoring power struggles in Cairo. They got in contact with Tahir who, in return, invited them around Cairo to guarantee their help in case of need.²⁷⁴ On 26 May, some Janissaries gathered in front of the Tahir's residence in order to demand salaries; after receiving negative reply, two parties began to fight in which Tahir was assassinated. To restore the order, Ahmed Pasha invited Husrev –at this point still residing in Damietta – to

²⁷¹ İnalçık, Halil, 'Hüsrev Paşa', İA (MEB), vol.V/1, pp.609-615, p.609. "Fakat hiç bir zaman iyi bir idareci olamayan Husrev müsrif efendisinin hazinesini doldurma çarelerini aramaktan başka birşey düşünmedi, Nitekim kötü idaresi yüzünden Mısır'da tutunamamış..."

²⁷² Tayyâr-zâde Atâ, *Osmanlı Saray Tarihi*, vol.II, p.229

²⁷³ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol.VII-VIII, p.222

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.221

Cairo and then asked the sheiks to convince Mehmed Ali to obey his instructions.²⁷⁵ Regarding the sheiks and the religious figures of Cairo, Marsot states that Sayyid Umar Makram (an active politician who had galvanized a popular resistance against the French in 1800), Shaikh al-Sadat (the influential head of Sufi orders in Egypt) and Shaikh al-Sadat (the head of Sufi fraternities) were the most influential leaders of whom Mehmed Ali tried to gain support.²⁷⁶ According to Marsot, especially Sayyid Umar Makram helped Mehmed Ali in gaining support of locals: *Ulema*, the notables and merchants, led by Sayyid Umar Makram made a common cause with Mehmed Ali in order to re-establish the order in both the public affairs and the trade activities.²⁷⁷ Mehmed Ali, meanwhile, tried to gain consent of the Porte as well.

With the death of Tahir, Mehmed Ali gained recognition as the sole leader of irregular troops from Rumelia. To maintain this leadership, he seems to have made a deliberate effort to remain in a legitimate position vis-à-vis the Porte while negotiating with its agencies. He, for instance, replied the call of Ahmed Pasha as that “Ahmed Pasha was not *vâli* of Egypt. He is a guest there...Tahir Pasha, on the other hand, had been appointed commander for Egypt by the Porte. That is why we obeyed him and made him *kaymakam*. Hence Ahmed Pasha is not in such a position, it would be better if he leaves Egypt [ie.Cairo] along with the Janissaries”.²⁷⁸ Meanwhile, the Porte appointed Trabluslu Ali Pasha to the post of *vâli*. Like Husrev, Ali Pasha had organic ties with Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and the imperial navy. Ali, as a slave of Algeria *beylerbegi* Mehmed Pasha, had firstly joined to *Cezayir-i Garb* (Algeria) and then with mediation of his brother Seyyid Ali – an influential person in the Imperial Shipyard – he was introduced to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha who appointed Ali to the post of *beylerbegi* of Trablusgarb (Tripoli).²⁷⁹ In the time of the *vâli* crisis, he volunteered to fulfill power vacuum in Egypt but soon after his arrival, he was killed by the Mamluk begs. The Porte subsequently appointed Hurşid Pasha in Alexandria to the post of *vâli*.²⁸⁰

Mehmed Ali had made a coalition with Mamluks under Bardisi Beg. When Elfi Beg, a rival of Bardisi, returned to Egypt from Britain on February 1804, Mehmed Ali began to

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p.223

²⁷⁶ Al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp.44-45

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol.VII-VIII, p.223

²⁷⁹ Ibid, p.228-229

²⁸⁰ Çetin, *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın Mısır Valiliği*, p.88

play on the old factionalism and rivalry between these two Mamluk begs.²⁸¹ In the face of the joint attack of Mehmed Ali and Bardisi, Elfi fled to the Upper Egypt and then, he began to gather supporters in order to organize a resistance against Bardisi.²⁸² Mehmed Ali, this time, refused to help Bardisi unless his Albanian troops were given all the back pay due them from the treasury that forced Bardisi, acting *kaymakam* in the absence of the governor, to impose heavy new tax on the population of Cairo to raise the demanded money.²⁸³ When people of Cairo, in return, revolted against Bardisi, Muhammed Ali gained their trust by proclaiming an end to the tax and then used this popular support in his attempt to force Bardisi to flee to Upper Egypt.²⁸⁴ Then, Mehmed Ali planned to release Husrev and restore him as *vâli* in order to legitimize his own position but upon the opposition of his troops, he proposed Hurşid Pasha.²⁸⁵ Hurşid Pasha's measures to re-establish the order in Cairo made population of Cairo as well as Mamluks and Albanian troops resented against him, who asked the Porte to appoint Mehmed Ali as a new *vâli* of Egypt.²⁸⁶

In the face of these developments, the Porte could not do anything but approve the governorship of the winning party. Because of the long distance between Istanbul and Cairo, the central administration was receiving the news about the current power shifts in Egypt after several days. Therefore Sâlih Beg as an envoy of the Porte arrived in Egypt in May 1805 with two imperial edicts for Mehmed Ali and Hurşid Pasha, one for the appointment and one for the removal. After evaluating the current power relations (*icâb-ı hale göre*), Sâlih Bey would give the decree for appointment (*velâyet fermanı*) to the most proper candidate, and he opted for Mehmed Ali.²⁸⁷ According to the records of Ottoman foreign affairs, personal relations played important role in the decision of Sâlih Bey: In his previous visits to Egypt, he had received kindness and respect of Mehmed Ali.²⁸⁸ Thus, the Porte appointed Mehmed Ali as governor of Egypt and obliged him to pay the annual tribute of the province and to take measures to suppress the Wahhabis in the Hijaz region.²⁸⁹ Because Mamluk begs in the Upper Egypt maintained to challenge his authority, Mehmed Ali was reluctant to leave Cairo for the suppression of Wahhabi revolt that resulted in the Porte's attempt to depose him in

²⁸¹ Fahmy, "the Era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha," p.143

²⁸² Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p.287

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p.288

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammed Ali Pasha," pp.139-180, p.144

²⁸⁷ Râgıp Raif and Rauf Ahmed, *Bâb-ı Âli Hâriciye Nezâreti Mısır Meselesi*, Fırat Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011, Elazığ, p.7

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.36

June 1806.²⁹⁰ Although the Porte allied itself with Mamluks against him, the support of Umar Makram, leading notables and *ulema* enabled Mehmed Ali to restore favour of the Porte on the condition of paying tribute and sending his son İbrahim as a hostage.²⁹¹ Lastly, the death of Bardisi Beg on November 1806 and Elfi Beg in 1807 left Mamluks vulnerable to Muhammad Ali's intrigues, as Fahmy states.²⁹²

In brief, Husrev and Mehmed Ali rose in the Ottoman administration during the Egypt campaign of Napoleon. As the rivalries between the grand vizier, the grand admiral, Janissaries, irregular troops and Mamluk begs suggest, servants of the imperial household did not only fight against a foreign enemy but entered into conflict among themselves. In these struggles, all parties resorted to various household-building strategies. The Porte, for its part, tried to balance its military weakness by relying on the irregular troops of elite households and by establishing diplomatic relations with European states. Meanwhile, the sultan initiated military and naval reforms and sent some of newly trained *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* troops alongside the irregular soldiers to Egypt. The Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, for his part, gained further favor of the sultan and staffed members of his household to the leading posts of Egypt. Husrev, as *kethiida* of the grand admiral, obtained the title of *vâli* through his master's mediation. As with other Easterners, slavery and ethnic-regional solidarity played important role in his access to the Ottoman administration. During his short-term office, he could not win the support of local power foci in Cairo that led to his deposal. Mehmed Ali, on the other hand, arrived in Egypt as part of the military retinue of the local-elite household of the Kavala region. Contrary to Husrev, Mehmed Ali was a free-born Muslim and benefited from kinship and marriage ties. In Egypt, he became a part of barrack-household and gained supporters through ethnic-regional solidarity of Albanian troops. As a head of barrack-household, he also developed the alliances with the urban population of Cairo. In the next chapter, we will detail how his barrack-household transformed into family-based household. Apart from family members, European experts and instructors helped him in consolidating his power. Meanwhile, the Porte was changing its household strategies towards more centralized state with modern/standing army as well. In this process, Husrev managed to remain in the high-ranking echelons of the Ottoman administration through his support for the military reforms.

²⁹⁰ Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammed Ali Pasha," pp.139-180, p.145

²⁹¹ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.36-7

²⁹² Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammed Ali Pasha," pp.139-180, p.145-6

Chapter III: The Grand Admiral and the *Vâli* of Egypt in the Morea Campaign

III.1 Changing Household Strategy of Mehmed Ali after 1805

Mehmed Ali obtained the post of *vâli* through his control of power relations in Cairo. In order to secure this position, he had to expand his authority over entire Egypt. The French occupation, lasting three years did not only exhaust power of Mamluks but also introduced modern tools of administration which provided inspiration for the centralization projects of Mehmed Ali. It is true that the imperial household was also expanding its communication channels with the West. For instance, one of the reform proposals (*islahat layihaları*) submitted to Selim III was prepared by Bertrand –a European expert- while the reports of Ebubekir Ratip Efendi (who introduced the term of *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* into the Ottoman political vocabulary) was based on his observation over the Austrian army and administration.²⁹³ But different from Selim III, Mehmed Ali had the opportunity to personally observe colonial administration of a European state. In other words, he witnessed implementation of modern administration over the Ottoman subjects living within the Ottoman territory.

For the Egyptian campaign, Napoleon included a well-organized civilian, scientific and technological commission of 167 people, consisting of technical experts, civil engineers surveyors, cartographers, surgeons, pharmacists, archeologists, architects, artists, mineralogists, zoologists, and businessmen to his retinue.²⁹⁴ The mission of these people was to study the run of the state of affairs of Egypt and to pass on the achievement and knowledge of French sciences and arts to the local population.²⁹⁵ During the occupation period, Napoleon opened two schools; published newspapers (*Décade Egyptienne* and *Le courier d’Egypte*); supported artistic and scientific activities by establishing a theatre hall, an

²⁹³ Shaw, *Between Old and New*, pp.90 and 105. For the details of Ebubekir Ratip Efendi’s observations and reports, see., Yeşil, Fatih, *Aydınlanma Çağında Bir Osmanlı Katibi Ebubekir Ratip Efendi (1750-1799)*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011

²⁹⁴ Karal Akgün, Seçil, *The Impact of the French Expedition to Egypt on Early 19th Century Ottoman Reforms*,” Aryeh Shmuelevitz (ed.), *Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801 (Articles Presented at the 2nd International Congress of Napoleonic Studies)*, The Isis Press, İstanbul, pp.25-34, p.31

²⁹⁵ Gichon, Mordechai, “The Peculiarities of Napoleon’s Oriental Campaign: An Introduction,” in Aryeh Shmuelevitz (ed.), *Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801 (Articles Presented at the 2nd International Congress of Napoleonic Studies)*, The Isis Press, İstanbul, pp.13-25, p.15

institute, an observatory house, and a chemistry lab.²⁹⁶ More importantly, a new tax system imposed by the French weakened the control of Mamluks over *iltizams* that made it easier for Mehmed Ali to replace this system with a more centralized one, and thus to curb the economic power basis of the Mamluks.²⁹⁷ In addition, Mehmed Ali, in his military and naval reforms, used the service of the French soldiers and technicians who choose to remain in Egypt after the evacuation treaty.²⁹⁸

Beside colonial administration of the French, Mamluk household tradition and kinship ties also helped Mehmed Ali in expanding his control over Egypt. In the previous chapter, we had already detailed how barrack-household tradition and ethnic-regional solidarity among Albanian troops were successfully used by Mehmed Ali. After he obtained the title of governor, he gradually reduced the roles of Albanian troops in favor of locally conscripted soldiers. It is also important to note the impact of Husrev Pasha's *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* troops over Mehmed Ali's military reforms. During his term of office in Egypt, Husrev Pasha had trained some of the Mamluk troops along French lines after enlisting in his service those French officers who remained in Egypt and he also formed a Sudanese regiment trained in the French style.²⁹⁹ As Fahmy states, Husrev's borrowings from the French influenced Mehmed Ali when he introduced new tactics and training drills to the Albanian troops, forming main man power of his military retinue until the 1820s when he began to gather slaves from Sudan and conscript the fellahin of Egypt.³⁰⁰ Besides them, family members began to assume most important tasks in the household of Mehmed Ali after 1805.

Mehmed Ali invited his family and friends to Egypt and gave them important positions in the administration as with the appointment of his 16-year-old son, İbrahim, to the command of Citadel in Cairo.³⁰¹ Mehmed Ali and Amina, his only legal wife, had three boys and two daughters: İbrahim (1789/90), Ahmed Tosun (1793), İsmail Kamil (1795), Tevhide (1797), and Nazlı (1799).³⁰² Ahmed Tosun served as commander-in-chief of expeditionary forces sent to the Hijaz region until his early death in 1815 and İsmail Kamil helped his father in the conquest of the Sudanese territories (between 1820 and 1822) at the expense of his own

²⁹⁶ Altundağ, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa*, p.21

²⁹⁷ Hourani, "Ottoman Reforms," p.55

²⁹⁸ Karal Akgün, "The Impact of the French Expedition to Egypt on Early 19th Century Ottoman Reforms," pp.25-34, p.29

²⁹⁹ Fahmy, Khaled, *All the Pasha's men*, p.80

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad Ali Pasha," p.145

³⁰² Al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, p.27

life.³⁰³ After the early death of his two brothers, İbrahim remained as the only supreme commander of the Egyptian army. Apart from his sons, Mehmed Ali relied on his relatives: Muharrem Bey, Pasha's son-in-law, was the head of the navy in the Morea War; then Mehmed Said Pasha, his son, was appointed to the post; his nephew İbrahim Pasha Yeğen was the head of infantry forces; Abbas Pasha, one of his grandsons, was the head of cavalry forces; Mehmed Şerif Pasha, another nephew, would be appointed to the governorship of Syria etc.³⁰⁴ In other words, Mehmed Ali's army was actually an "household army" in which Pasha's blood relatives, his son-in-laws, and his slaves occupied higher ranks, as Fahmy states.³⁰⁵ To sum, the mixture of French colonial administration, Mamluk household tradition, Selim III's military reforms, and kinship ties formed basic elements of household strategy of Mehmed Ali after the year of 1805.

III. 2:Husrev Mehmed Pasha's Career after 1805

While Mehmed Ali expanded his power in Egypt in the early 1800s, Husrev Mehmed Pasha was having most difficult times of his career. The death of his protector, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, in 1803 did not only affect Husrev's career but also the deposition and then the murder of Selim III. Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya encountered with resistance upon his effort to form a *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* contingent in the Balkans. Because of the resentment of Balkan notables, Janissaries and the *ulema* leaders to the expansion of military reforms, Selim III replaced him with Hafız İsmail Pasha who was originally a man of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha but now a secret opponent of reformers.³⁰⁶ According to Uzunçarşılı, insolent attitudes of bureaucrats of the *Irâd-ı Cedîd*, were main reasons for Hafız İsmail's anti-reformist stance, who supported the Balkan notables and Istanbul reactionaries, leading to the Edirne Incident of June 1806.³⁰⁷ As a result, Selim III abdicated for Mustafa IV in May 1807 and he was killed upon Alemdar Mustafa Pasha's effort to restore him to the throne in July 1808. Uzunçarşılı emphasizes that the death of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha in 1803 retarded reforms and left Selim III defenseless against his opponents.³⁰⁸ After the death of his patron, Husrev

³⁰³ Toledano, E.R., "Muhammad 'Ali Pasha," El.2, vol.VII, p.425

³⁰⁴ Fahmy, Khaled, *All the Pasha's Men*, p.176

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p.373

³⁰⁷ Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli Ayanlarından*, p.64

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

benefited from the patronage of Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha³⁰⁹ who was the son of *çavuşbaşı* Said Efendi –first patron of Husrev.³¹⁰

During the Ottoman-Russo War of 1806-1812, Husrev assumed military tasks and dealt with the suppression of some Balkan *âyâns*. Like the Egypt expedition, this war witnessed various intra-elite contestations, including that of Yusuf Ziya and Husrev. As detailed in the previous chapter, Yusuf Ziya and Küçük Hüseyin Pashas were in rivalry during the Egypt expedition and the death of the latter did not bring an end to this contestation since men of Küçük Hüseyin continued to suffer from the enmity of Yusuf Ziya. During the war efforts, Husrev was appointed governor of Bosnia (1806), of Tessaloniki (until 1808), and of Silistra with charge of commander of Danube Front (1809).³¹¹ When the defeat of Rasvat exhausted economic power of Husrev, he penned a petition and asked to be appointed to a remunerative (*nemaluca*) *dirlik* in order to compensate the loss of his wretched household.³¹² Contrary to his expectation, Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya allocated the non-profitable *sancak* of Karahisar and instructed Husrev to administer this *dirlik* directly (*bizzat zapt-ı idaresi*).³¹³ As Çelik points out, this deliberate decision aimed to weaken the power of Husrev Pasha since he was a man of Küçük Hüseyin, former rival of Yusuf Ziya. Mahmud II, however, did not approve the grand vizier's decision and backed Husrev in order to prevent possible damage of this rivalry to the war efforts.³¹⁴ Sultan Mahmud maintained his support to Husrev by appointing him to the post of grand admiral in January 1811. After seven years in office, Husrev was, this time, dismissed mainly because of another rivalry between his new protector Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha and Hâlet Efendi.³¹⁵ Then, he served in a number of provincial governorships until the outbreak of Greek Revolt.³¹⁶

³⁰⁹ For the power relations of Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha see., Şeref, Abdurrahman, *Tarih Söyleşileri (Musahabe-i Tarihiye)*, Sucuoğlu Matbaası, İstanbul, 1980, pp.11-14

³¹⁰ Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa*, p.140

³¹¹ İncalcık, Halil, "Husrev Paşa", İA (MEB), vol.V/I, pp.609-616, p.610.

³¹² Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa*, p.90

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid, p.91

³¹⁵ İncalcık, Halil, "Husrev Paşa", İA (MEB), vol.V/I, pp.609-616, p.610-11 and Şeref, *Tarih Söyleşileri (Musahabe-i Tarihiye)*, pp.11, fn.3. According to Şeref, Hâlet resented to the rapid rise of Rauf Pasha to the grand vizierate in 1815 and managed to make him deposed in the following days. Although Hâlet made a great effort to make Rauf Pasha executed, he could not succeed in it. As İncalcık points out, Hâlet also targeted the protégés of Rauf as well and caused the dismissal of Husrev from the post of grand admiral in February 1818.

³¹⁶ "Khosrew Pasha" IE.2, vol.V, p.35

III.3: Greek Revolt of 1821 and Intra-elite Contestations

Atâ Efendi associates the outbreak of the Greek Revolt with Küçük Hüseyin Pasha's unlawful appropriation of the Morean people's wealth as to increase his own fortune. According to his narrative, resentment of Greek-orthodox subjects to the unjust conduct of Küçük Hüseyin, after 18 years, manifested itself in the form of Greek Revolt of 1821.³¹⁷ Although not sufficient to cover main dynamics of the revolt, his argument leads us to reconsider decisive role of intermediaries in the relations of subject people and the Porte. For the Greek-Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, main intermediaries are the Patriarchate –representative of Orthodox millet-, Phanariorate Greeks of Istanbul, and provincial administrators of Greek-populated regions.³¹⁸ All these people did not only interact with Greek-orthodox subjects but also with leading bureaucrats of the Porte, like Hâlet Efendi.

Mehmed Said Hâlet Efendi (1761-1823) was one of the most influential bureaucrats in the early years of Mahmud II's reign: After his success in the suppression of the rebellious governor of Bagdad, Küçük Süleyman Pasha, he gained the favor of Mahmud II to the extent that he was appointed as steward of the sultan's court (*kethüda-ı rikab-ı hümayun*) and then as *nişancı* of the Imperial council in 1815.³¹⁹ In the early days of his career, he had served as secretary to certain Ottoman dignitaries, such as the Phanariot Kallimakhi.³²⁰ Before detailing the impacts of his established relations with Phanariots, and his rivalry with Ali Pasha of Janina over the events of Morea, it seems necessary to touch upon economic, political, and ideological roots of the Greek Revolt of 1821.

The Egypt expedition and the French's seizure of the Ionian Islands contributed to the spread of revolutionary ideas on Morea. More importantly, French and British fleet's involvement with these wars enabled Greek merchants and entrepreneurs to develop their own fleets and to gain a stronghold over the Ottoman seas that gave impetus to the industrial and agricultural growth in Morea.³²¹ Coupled with the growth of Greek merchants' colonies in the Mediterranean and Black sea, European thoughts contributed the rise of intellectuals and foundation of Philiki Hetaria (1815) which found wide audience under the leadership of

³¹⁷ Atâ Efendi, *Osmanlı Saray Tarihi*, vol II, p.229

³¹⁸ Adanır, Fikret, *Makedonya Sorunu*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996, İstanbul, pp.47-53

³¹⁹ Kuran, E., "Hâlet Efendi," El.2, vol.III, pp.90-1

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.17

Alexander Ipsilanti, member of a Phanariote family.³²² As Shaw states, Ali Pasha of Janina, Albanian-stock leading notable of the region, posed the main obstacle for the activities of Philiki Hetaria and Hâlet Efendi, probably at the instigation of the Phanariotes, got the sultan to ignore the Hetairia and instead to concentrate on curbing Ali Pasha's power.³²³

According to Ahmet Cevdet, Hâlet's intimacy with Janissaries also played role in his instigation against Ali Pasha. In İstanbul, Janissaries could gather a decisive weight to tip the scales in favor of one political faction and Hâlet Efendi allied himself with these troops.³²⁴ Sultan Mahmud II was planning to reform the Janissaries and in order to divert his attention, Hâlet brought the threat of Ali Pasha into the forefront.³²⁵ As detailed, he had also intimacy with Phanariotes who supported his smear campaign against Ali Pasha with the secret agenda that the following power vacuum in Morea could provide an ideal setting for the revolt of Greek-orthodox subjects.³²⁶ Consequently, Hâlet Efendi convinced Mahmud II for the elimination of Ali Pasha that led to rebellion of the latter to the Porte.

Resistance of Ali Pasha of Janina could not be controlled until the late 1822 and the Porte seemed to have difficulty in distinguishing concurred rebellion of Greek-Orthodox subjects on Morea from Ali Pasha's event at the beginning. When the sultan and the administration acknowledged that Hâlet Efendi's claim –Ali Pasha was responsible for the uprising of Greek subjects- was not true and that Hâlet's personal hostility drew the Porte into trouble in Morea, he became target of harsh criticism.³²⁷ Main associates of Hâlet, Janissaries and Phanariots, also lost prestige in the eye of the sultan during the Morea crisis. Furthermore, this crisis made Hâlet devoid of the economic support of Phanariot rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia and therefore he could not canalize money to the Janissary *ağas* that cut off main economic basis of his networking activities.³²⁸ Finally, Hâlet Efendi was executed in November 1823 as his associates were removed from administration. The list of his leading associates subject to appropriation and banishment gives idea about diverse

³²² Ibid., pp.17-8

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol.XI-XII, p.56

³²⁵ Ibid., p.45 "...Sultan Mahmud Hân-ı Adlî hazretlerinin aksâ-yı emeli yeniçerilerin terbiyesi olup bu ise Hâlet Efendi'nin işine elvermediği cihetle bunu tehir için her vakit taşralarda bir vakıa ihdâs ile zihn-i hümayunu işgal ettiği gibi bir vakitden beri bir Tepedelenli gâilesi çıkarıp da onunla dahi biraz vakit kazanmak isterdi..."

³²⁶ Ibid., "...Rumlar ise Mora cihetinde muzmer-i zamirleri olan fitneyi uyandırabilmek üzere Ali Paşa'nın zevâlini arzu ederek bu husus da Hâlet Efendi'yi iğfâl kaydında olup o dahi Feneliler Mektebi'nden çıkma olduğu cihetle onlara aldanır ve onların münâfıkâne sözlerine inanır idi..."

³²⁷ Ibid., p.54-57

³²⁸ Ibid., p.56

composition of his network: member of his household and their clients (his treasurer Ahmet Ağa, sealkeeper Ziver Efendi, *kapu çuhadarı* İzzet Ağa, his *sarraf* Haskel and his brother, kaftancı Abdulhamid Ağa and his brother Abdülhalim Ağa, voyvoda of Urla –member of İzzet, *Voyvoda* of Menemen –rikap kethüdası of Hâlet-, Filibe nazırı Mehmed Ağa –former mehter başı of Hâlet) and his close friends such as Tophane *nazırı-matbah emini* Tekirdağlı Ahmet Ağa.³²⁹ Covering both central and provincial administrators, title of *ağas* and efendis, this list remind us that power shifts in the Ottoman administration could be confined to the intra-office contestations or to the tension between centre and periphery but rooted on contesting loyalties of the members of leading bureaucrats. The execution of Hâlet opened a path for the rise of his rivals, including Husrev Pasha who expanded his power basis during the Morea campaign as the grand admiral of the navy.³³⁰

III.4: The Morea Campaign

Like the Egypt expedition, Albanian irregular troops played an important role in the military campaign of Morea. Accordingly, payment issue maintained to produce conflict between irregular soldiers and administrative-military servants of the imperial household. In July 1822, Hurşid Pasha, as commander-in-chief of Ottoman forces in Rumelia, wrote a letter to grand vizier asking money to cover salaries of Albanian irregular troops. As Erdem analyzes, lack of discipline, dissatisfaction and reluctance of Albanian soldiers to fight – unless they are paid in advance – are labeled as “treason of Albania tribe” by Hurşid Pasha and during the Morea campaign the issue of military dependability and political loyalty of Albanians took a form of distrust of the Porte toward its Albanian subjects especially during the grand vizierate of Mehmed Reşid Pasha, a leading member of Husrev’s household, in the years of 1829-1833.³³¹ Apart from the difficulty in mobilizing irregular troops effectively, intra-elite rivalries and factionalism produced numerous problems among centrally appointed commanders and local magnates, participating to the military campaign of the Porte.

³²⁹ Ibid., p.57-8

³³⁰ Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa*, p.209

³³¹ Erdem, Yusuf Hakan, “ ‘Perfidious Albanians’ and ‘Zealous Governors’: Ottomans, Albanians, and Turks in the Greek War of Independence,” in Antonis Anastasopoulos – Elias Kolovos (eds.), *Ottoman Rule ans Balkans, 1760-1850. Conflict, Transformation, Adoption, Rethymno 2007*, pp.213-240, p. 216

Yusuf Pasha of Siroz, for instance, in his report to the Porte criticized the late Hurşid Pasha (d.1823) for favoring members of his household at the expense of the resentment of others. Hurşid was said to appoint his own slaves as military commanders “without ever thinking whether all these great commanders, receivers of the sultan’s great titles, would accept the command of this page of a man” and he also complained about Hurşid’s exclusive manner in which he employed and consulted only “a few frivolous slaves” (*birkaç sebükmağz köle*) and pages of his own household, as Erdem states.³³² What made intra-elite contestations more complicated was that the campaign was conducted by both land forces and navy and commanders of these two forces constantly accused each other for military failures. For example, Yusuf Pasha, on his part, was complaining about the ineffectiveness of the navy. To make matters worse, Husrev Pasha, as grand admiral of the Ottoman navy, was supposed to get on with his sworn enemy Mehmed Ali Pasha and his son İbrahim Pasha, commanding the fleets sent from Egypt. As might be expected, the rivalry between İbrahim and Husrev, however, left its mark on the naval operations.³³³ Before contextualizing this rivalry within the Morea campaign, it seems necessary to question the motives of Mehmed Ali in sending his fleet to Morea.

Mehmed Ali from the beginning onwards showed interest toward Syria and interfered in its power relations since the early days of his rule in Egypt. The security of Hijaz region and the suppression of the Wahhabi movement were of great importance for the sultan whose legitimacy depended partly on his ability in providing security for the hajj and holy cities of Islam. Since Mehmed Ali became the most powerful *vâli* of the neighboring region, the Porte intervened to the Hijaz region through Mehmed Ali’s army that provided him with influence over the hinterland of Egypt.³³⁴ While his army encountered with difficulty in suppressing the Wahhabis in 1813, he, for instance, sent a letter to the grand vizier and told that he could offset the reverses suffered from by his army’s Arabia campaign only if he was given the province of Damascus in addition to Egypt.³³⁵ Two years later, he repeated the same demand and complained about how the *vâli* of Damascus damaged his campaign against the Wahhabis by not sending sufficient number of camels for the final attack on the Saudi capital Dar’riyya.³³⁶ Apart from camels, Syria region was famous for its raw materials, particularly

³³² Ibid., p.217

³³³ Levy, Avigdor, *The Military Policy of Mahmud II, 1808-1839*, Unpublished PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1968, p.229

³³⁴ Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, p.46-8

³³⁵ Ibid., p.48

³³⁶ Ibid.

for timber and wood which would cover material necessities of Mehmed Ali in building a fleet and industrial infrastructure. Besides, his conscription policy and wars pulled away considerable man power from agricultural production, whereas heavily populated Syria region would fill this gap. Lastly, as Fahmy points out, Mehmed Ali was well aware of that his position as *vâli* of Egypt rooted on his personal strength rather than Mahmud II's satisfaction and if the sultan decided to remove him by force, Syria would be a base for such an attack.³³⁷ Due to these reasons, Mehmed Ali was keen to expand his rule over Syria, and his military support to the Morea campaign would guarantee consent of the sultan for this plan.

III.5: Father and Son, Patron and Slave in the Morea Campaign

The Porte's attempt to suppress the Greek Revolt with militias of local magnates and troops under the command of centrally-appointed bureaucrats did not bring success; increasing frustration led Mahmud II to call help of Mehmed Ali in the late 1823. Especially military failure in capturing Missolonghi and withdrawal of Mustafa Pasha to İşkodra alarmed Mahmud II for taking immediate measures.³³⁸ As usual, difficulty in mobilizing irregular Albanian troops and intra-elite contestations played decisive role in the failure of the siege of Missolonghi. Mustafa Pasha of İşkodra, for instance, reported to the Porte that he retreated from Missolonghi mainly because of ineffectiveness of irregulars while contestation between the tax collector of Tirhala region, Mehmed Reşid and Ebulebud Mehmed Efendi, -*vâli* of Morea- wore out land operation and produced endless correspondences, putting military failures on each other's shoulders.³³⁹ Mahmud II soon acknowledged that only military help of Mehmed Ali would change the balance in favor of the Porte.

In 1824, the Sultan sent an imperial order to Mehmed Ali, appointing him to deal with the Greek Revolt and five months later, the Egyptian forces -comprising 17.000 infantry troops and 700 men with four artillery batteries- landed to Morea, as Fahmy states.³⁴⁰ Mehmed Ali, at the same time, emphasized the importance of gathering all military authority in his son İbrahim Pasha's hand for guaranteeing victory. Accordingly, he stated that he

³³⁷ Ibid, p.51

³³⁸ Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa*, p.217

³³⁹ Ibid., pp.217-8

³⁴⁰ Fahmy, *All the Pasha's men*, p.55

might not send military help unless the Porte appoint İbrahim as both *vâli* of Morea and the grand admiral as to unite command of land and naval operations effectively.³⁴¹ As might be expected, the Porte did not indulge this demand but found a compromise, rooting on the separation of command between İbrahim and Husrev: the former, as autonomous commander of Egyptian fleet (*Donanmay-ı Mısriyye Seraskeri*) were assumed to conduct naval operation in the islands of Hydra and Spetses (Çamlıca and Suluca) while Husrev, as the grand admiral of Ottoman navy, was responsible for suppression the rebellions in the islands of Samos and Psara (Sisam and İpsara).³⁴² In other words, the Porte adjusted entire chain of command in the navy in consideration of the Mehmed Ali-Husrev contestation.

Surprisingly, Husrev showed amicability to İbrahim Pasha when they came together in Halicarnassus in September 1824.³⁴³ In there, Husrev and İbrahim agreed on the joint operation of the Ottoman and Egypt fleets in Morea, Koron, Moton, and Sisam that invalidated the previous agreement based on the separate operation of these navies.³⁴⁴ After having success in the battles of İstanköy and Kazıklı Körfez, they soon dropped the idea of joint operation for Sisam on 1 October because of difficulties in gathering soldiers and in provisioning the navy for further operations and then, Husrev sailed for Istanbul in order to conduct futher preparations in the Imperial arsenal while İbrahim departed for Morea.³⁴⁵

İbrahim was supposed to provide naval support to the land operation conducted by Derviş Pasha, *vâli* of Rumelia. Apart from delayed arrival of İbrahim, Albania troops and their payment issue put Derviş into the trouble and consequently, he was replaced by Reşid Mehmed Pasha, the commander of Vidin, on 13 October 1824.³⁴⁶ With this appointment, command of both land and naval operation of the Porte was gathered in the hands of Husrev and his slave Reşid Mehmed. Contrary to Mehmed Ali relying mainly his sons and relatives, Husrev trusted his slaves among which Reşid Mehmed and Halil Rifat had privileges status. Georgian-stock Reşid Mehmed (1780-1836) entered the retinue of Husrev as a slave and after receiving education in his patron's residence, he began to rise in the Ottoman administration

³⁴¹ Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmed Paşa*, p.222

³⁴² *Ibid.*, p.205

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.232

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.233

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.233-4

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.236

especially after his success in the military campaign against Ali Pasha of Janina.³⁴⁷ Although Husrev aimed to balance influence of İbrahim at Morea by appointing Reşid Mehmed to the governorship of Rumelia, the relations between two parties underwent into unexpected shifts such as Husrev's backing İbrahim vis-a-vis Reşid.

Although Reşid and İbrahim were performing well for recapturing Missologhi, they were in need of reinforcement in terms of war material and provisions. Because Mahmud II mainly relied on Mehmed Ali for the provision of the Ottoman fleet, he sent the imperial navy to Alexandria to be repaired and replenished with necessary equipments.³⁴⁸ On August 1825, Husrev, thus, arrived at Egypt for watching over the transportation of requested materials to Morea.³⁴⁹ At the beginning, Mehmed Ali welcomed Husrev affably; in return, Husrev praised him for his support to the ongoing campaign. Because shipping of supplies took up time, Husrev extended his visit and friendly atmosphere between these old enemies took the form of mutual accusations in the following days. Mehmed Ali, for his part, accused Husrev for cowardliness of captains in the Ottoman navy and for his deliberate neglect in provisioning İbrahim's army.³⁵⁰ He then asked Husrev and captains in his retinue to take an oath to fight effectively and he also announced that he might call his son back to Egypt unless Husrev take necessary measures.³⁵¹ For whatever the reason is Mehmed Ali's threat or not, Husrev went on with İbrahim, following to his arrival to Morea.

In the theatre of war, Reşid Mehmed, like all former *vâlis* of Morea and Rumelia, encountered with difficulty in satisfying demands of Albanian troops that hindered land operations. Contrary to these irregular troops, discipline, order and efficiency of *Cihadiye* army under the command of İbrahim evoked admiration of Mahmud II to the extent that he instructed İbrahim for the re-capture of Missolonghi. On 2 December 1825, Husrev, Reşid Mehmed and İbrahim held a meeting to discuss plans of military operation.³⁵² In the meeting, Husrev and İbrahim harshly criticized Reşid for his failure in Missolonghi and its neighboring area. In his defense, Reşid touched upon the disorder among Albanian troops but

³⁴⁷ For further biographical notes see., Sicill-i Osmanî "Reşid Mehmed Paşa", vol.V, p.1381, and Yılmaz, Mehmed. "Reşid Mehmet Paşa" *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi*, Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, vol.II, pp.456-457

³⁴⁸ Fahmy, *All the Pasha's men*, p.56

³⁴⁹ Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa*, p.244

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.245-6

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

³⁵² *Ibid.*, p.250

his statement was far from placating his master and İbrahim.³⁵³ Worse still, they refused to send *Cihadiye* troops to the service of Reşid in order to protect these disciplined soldiers from the possible harms of irregulars. Husrev and İbrahim, in an irreconcilable manner, offered three options to Reşid: he may either demobilize Albanians or lead them the defense of Salona; lastly, he may announce his resign.³⁵⁴ Due to a lacuna in the documents, we may only speculate intentions of Husrev in siding against his own slave: He might have aimed to exclude himself from military failure of Reşid or he might take threat of Mehmed Ali seriously. Anyway, he and İbrahim showed hostility toward Reşid who, in return, directly corresponded with the Porte. At the end, the Porte approved the demand of Husrev and İbrahim and appointed them to the defense of Missolonghi and instructed Reşid to lead his Albanian troops to Salona.

In Salona, delayed salaries of Albanian irregulars continued to produce major trouble for Reşid. As a solution, he wrote a report to the Porte, asking to send a treasurer in order to solve the payment issue.³⁵⁵ The Porte, in return, sent Hüsni Bey and Necip Efendi, the agent of Mehmed Ali, to the theatre of war in order to supervise the operations of the joint command of Reşid, Husrev, and İbrahim.³⁵⁶ According to reports of Hüsni Bey and Necip Efendi, Husrev and İbrahim were in irreconcilable manner and that the only solution was to appoint them to separate military operations after guaranteeing the re-capture of Missolonghi.³⁵⁷ In addition to this discomfort, Reşid's Albanian troops began to envy the success of the *Cihadiye* troops and insisted that they would have realized the same military success if they were allowed to participate the assault of Missolonghi.³⁵⁸ İbrahim Pasha did not wanted to make Reşid resent too much and thus charged him with the command of a bastion near to Missolonghi but soon after, Albanian troops lost discipline while most of them deserted the battlefield and *Cihadiye* troops completed this mission successfully.³⁵⁹ After nearly five years, Missolonghi, symbol of the Greek Revolt, was recaptured by the Ottomans on 23 April 1826.³⁶⁰

³⁵³ Ibid., p.251

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., p.248

³⁵⁶ Fahmy, *All the Pasha's men*, p.57

³⁵⁷ Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa*, p.253

³⁵⁸ Ibid., p.256

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.19

III.6: Dismissal or Promotion: Husrev Mehmed Pasha at the Command of the *Mansure* Army

When the news about victory in Missolonghi reached the Porte, Mahmud II bestowed Husrev, İbrahim, Reşid and Mehmed Ali Pashas with various imperial gifts as euphoria dominated over the Ottoman capital. Despite of this mood of optimism, rivalry between Husrev and İbrahim continued to shatter war efforts in many ways. For instance, İbrahim asked Husrev to send sufficient number of ships to Egypt for the transportation of reinforcement materials but the latter did not fulfill this demand.³⁶¹ Upon Husrev's neglect of this mission, İbrahim informed the Porte about the suffering of his troops.³⁶² In return, Husrev defended himself by stating that he had sent sufficient number of vessels, and necessarily kept other ships in the Morea for the suppression of ongoing threats of rebellions.³⁶³ Moreover, he criticized İbrahim for conducting operations without counseling him and for instigating Reşid on sending a joint letter to Porte, asking dismissal of Husrev.³⁶⁴ Apart from letters circulating between Morea and Istanbul, Mehmed Ali was also sending numerous letters to the Porte. Like his son, Mehmed Ali's main complaint was the setbacks in provisioning *Cihadiye* troops stationed in Morea and that Husrev should be dismissed since his neglect caused the suffering of his troops.³⁶⁵ In his letters, Mehmed Ali emphasized that his complain about Husrev does not root on his personal hostility but the grand admiral's irresponsibility, paralyzing the war efforts. In the end, Husrev was dismissed from the office of grand admiral and called back to Istanbul in 1826.³⁶⁶ And yet, despite Mehmed Ali and his son's satisfaction, Husrev's dismissal did not necessarily mean his fall from grace. As Levy states, Husrev was informed of Janissary rebellion and its suppression, and foundation of the new army while he was in Morea and soon after his return to İstanbul, he assumed important task in the foundation of *Mansure* Army.³⁶⁷

In essence, the Greek Revolt changed the relations between Mehmed Ali and Sultan Mahmud dramatically. As we will touch upon in the following part, Mehmed Ali attempted to compensate his losses in Morea by sizing over Syria and his expansionist project posed

³⁶¹ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol.XI-XII, pp.127-8

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa*, p.266

³⁶⁴ Ibid., p.263-8

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Kutluoğlu, *The Egyptian Question*, p.26

³⁶⁷ Levy, *The Military Policy of Mahmud II*, pp.230-1

grave danger to the Ported throughout 1830's. In other words, Syria campaign was a direct result of Mehmed Ali's resentments to Mahmud II's distrust to him during the Morea campaign. More importantly, the Greek Revolt seems to change the power relations in the imperial scale. Regarding these changes, Erdem associates state centralization, replacement of Janissary troops with conscript army, ideological adjustments, redefinition of state and subject people's relation with the Greek Revolt.³⁶⁸ Among these developments, particularly abolition of Janissaries had a direct link with the rise of Husrev's household in the Ottoman administration.

Although Sultan Mahmud was not content with the performance of Janissaries for a long time, these troops established organic relations with other segments of society as we witnessed in the case of Hâlet Efendi. In other words, Mahmud II had to win broad segment of society in order to be able to abolish these troops. As Erdem points out, poor performance of these soldiers along with irregular troops during the Morean campaign and imminent threat of Russia were fully exploited by Sultan Mahmud and his reforming cadre in weakening ulema's support to their traditional allies.³⁶⁹ As assassination of Selim III suggests, it was a must for the sultans to keep sufficient number of supporter in the capital to cope with opposition of unsatisfied segments of society, especially in times of radical imperial projects. Accordingly, Mahmud II seems to call back his leading trustees, including Husrev, to Istanbul to be able to realize his reform project. In this framework, appointment of Husrev to the command (*seraskerlik*) of the new army (the Trained and Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad) soon after the abolishment of Janissaries does not seem surprising.

In 1836, Moltke, Prussian officer in the service of the Ottoman army, portrayed Husrev's power as following:

Husrev had participated to the siege of Missologhi. Since then, he gained favor of the sultan and became indispensable ally for him because of two reasons; he was chief guard of the Ottoman capital and he patronized reforms... People who want to conduct business in İstanbul funnel great deal of money to Pasha. For a vali, everything should be sacrificed for having such a patron in the capital. Without consent of Husrev, it is impossible to get success in any great business. Edict (ferman) of Husrev is necessary whatever the issue is building or renovating a Church or another thing. He superintends promotion of people to the highest rank in the army. Unchallengeable influence of this commander manifests itself even out of the military issues. In Turkey, actually,

³⁶⁸ Erdem, Yusuf Hakan, "The Greek revolt and the end of the old Ottoman order", *The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event*, Pizaniens, Petros (ed.), Istanbul: Isis 2011, pp. 257-264, p.257

³⁶⁹ Ibid, p.260

people, at the administration of state offices, were much more important than the prestige of the offices themselves.³⁷⁰

As Moltke perfectly captures, Husrev gained unprecedented power between the years of 1827 and 1836 mainly because of his contributions to the military reforms following to the abolition of Janissaries. The success of Mahmud II in eliminating these troops owed much to his networking activities in which he appointed his trustees to the key points of the military and civil administration. Hüseyin Ağa -commander of Janissaries-, artillery troops, and the garrisons protecting the Bosphorus were among these trustees who sided with the sultan and participated to his brutal persecution targeted other segments of Janissaries. Hüseyin Ağa, for instance, eliminated some opponent Janissary troops from the army by sending them the military retinue of Sultan Mahmud's trustees, such as Husrev's fleet during the Morea campaign where they left for dead in the desolate coasts.³⁷¹ Mahmud II awarded loyalty of Hüseyin Ağa by appointing him as the first commander (*serasker*) of *Mansure* Army with extended authority such as policing Istanbul. Resolution of the sultan in destroying all power networks supporting to Janissaries and conscription of the young male population of Istanbul to the new army did not only make the public order of the capital one of the most delicate mission for the *serasker* but also assumed him a political power.³⁷² It was this political power which would be base for the dominance position of Husrev in the Ottoman administration upon his replacement of Hüseyin Ağa in 8 May 1827.³⁷³ When compared Hüseyin Ağa, Husrev was much more knowledgeable about modern methods of training and weaponry since he had been in the household of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, one of leading practitioners of new order in navy. Besides, Husrev had a chance to observe British and French armies in Egypt and modernized *Cihadiye* Army of Mehmed Ali in the Morea.³⁷⁴ In essence, Sultan Mahmud had asked help of Mehmed Ali Pasha as well. In August 1826, he requested Mehmed Ali to send twelve offices but his reply was not affirmative: Pasha reported that his Egyptian officers were not yet sufficiently prepared while his European drill masters had used to high salaries and expensive uniforms, and their presence in Istanbul would be

³⁷⁰ Helmuth von Moltke, *Türkiye'deki Durum ve Olaylar Üzerine Mektuplar*, TTK Basımevi, 1960, Ankara, p.22-3

³⁷¹ Yıldız, Gültekin, *Osmanlı Kara ordusunda Yeniden Yapılanma ve Sosyo-politik Etkileri (1826-1839)*, Unpublished PhD thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2008, p.5, fn.13

³⁷² Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II, p.23

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.24

³⁷⁴ Levy, *The Military Policy of Mahmud II*, pp.230-1

obstructive to the Ottoman army.³⁷⁵ Like Mehmed Ali, many European officers abstained from helping the Porte mainly because of their pro-Greek stance vis-à-vis ongoing Morea question. As a consequence, Mahmud II had to rely on mainly his own household in forming the *Mansure Army*.

Although conscription of the young population of Istanbul provided necessary number of the rank and file, the Porte faced with difficulty in forming the officer corps of new army. To solve this problem, Mahmud II established the battalion of the *Ağas* of the Court's inner service (*Enderun-i Hümayun Ağavâtı*) in which the sultan's young slaves, free born Muslim servants, and sons of grandees were trained in infantry and cavalry troops (150 people in total) by the July 1826 but their poor performance during the war with Russia (1828-1829) led to Mahmud to abolish this institution in May 1830.³⁷⁶ Even though short-lived, the Court Battalion established quantitative dominance against Husrev's slaves, amounting to between 70-80 men. Husrev balanced influence of Court Battalion by appointing his slaves, including Halil Rifat, to the more prominent positions while three of first four officers rising to the rank of colonel (*miralay*) were also his protégés (İskender, Sa'dullah, and Hayreddin Mehmed *Ağas*).³⁷⁷ Halil Mehmed Rifat (1795-1856) had entered the household of Husrev as Georgian-stock slave and then served him as treasurer before his access to the *Mansure Army*.³⁷⁸ It is very obvious that Husrev favored Halil Rifat over other members of his household especially in 1830s. In 1834, he, for instance, managed to include Halil Rifat into the dynastic family by mediating his marriage to Saliha Sultan, daughter of Mahmud II and two years later, Halil Rifat would take over the post of *serasker*.³⁷⁹

Husrev, at the meantime, maintained to gather new slaves and protégés for his own household. As we touched upon, wars and military campaigns were the source of slaves for the Ottoman ruling elite and the Greek Revolt was not an exception. According to the Sharia, non-Muslim subjects rebelling against the Muslim ruler might be subject to enslavement. Apparently, Husrev enslaved or purchased some Greek boys during the Morea campaign. Because of the selective nature of Ottoman prospography -focusing merely on people of high

³⁷⁵ Levy, Avigdor, "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud's New Army, 1826-1839," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol.2, no.1 (Jan, 1971), pp. 21-39

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.27

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.29

³⁷⁸ Sicill-i Osmani, "Halil Mehmed Rif'at Paşa", *Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları*, vol.2, pp.580-1., and for his patronage relations with Husrev Mehmed Pasha see., Slade, Adolphus, *Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, &c. and of a Cruise in the Black Sea with the Capitan Pasha, in the years 1829, 1830, and 1831*, vol I, Elibron Classics, 2005, pp.478-480

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

ranking- it is difficult to estimate total number of Greek boys added to his household. Regarding to those who promoted, at least, to the higher ranks, *Sicilli Osmanî* covers İbrahim Edhem Pasha, Kara Selim Paşa and Sücûdi Hüseyin Efendi.³⁸⁰ Career of İbrahim Edhem suggests that Husrev's strong position in the Ottoman administration owes much to his ability in adapting Mehmed Ali's novelties, such as the sending his protégés to France for education.³⁸¹

Although plenty of historical researches have focused on the interaction of the Porte and European states in the modernization period of the Ottoman Empire, few of them emphasized how Mehmed Ali's reforms functioned as laboratory for this interaction. It is true that challenge of Mehmed Ali put Mahmud II into trouble in many ways especially after the Greek Revolt. His Syria campaign of 1831-33 and the Nezib Battle of 1839 did not only exploit military power of the Porte but also made its legitimacy suspicious in the eyes of Muslim population who deeply resented the Sultan's call for help of Christian powers against his rebellious yet Muslim *vâli*. But it is also true that Mehmed Ali contributed to legitimacy of Mahmud's reforms by introducing first successful example of westernization/modernized army to the Ottoman society, especially to its Muslim segment who was formerly suspicious about compatibility of western technology and knowledge to Muslim societies. For instance, it was partly brilliant performance of Mehmed Ali's *Cihadiye* troops at the Morea that made it easier for Mahmud II to replace janissaries with the *Mansure* Army. It is also important to note that Mehmed Ali's impact was not restrained to the military reforms of the Porte. To set example, Mahmud II established *Takvim-i Vakayi*, first official gazette of the Porte, in 1831, just after three years of Mehmed Ali's *Vakayi-ül Misriye* while Husrev sent İbrahim Edhem along with his three slaves to France (in 1831) following to Mehmed Ali's dispatch of 44 students to Paris in 1826.³⁸² In light of this interaction it seem that Husrev managed to remain in the high-ranking bureaucracy throughout the reign of Mahmud mainly for two reasons: He was successful in implementing military reforms along the same line with Mehmed Ali - though with time lag-, and he curbed influence of the latter over the Porte since he lost the competition over the governorship of Egypt to Mehmed Ali. Although Husrev had started his career in the Palace, it is obvious that the Palace School contributed so little his intellectual

³⁸⁰ Sicilli Osmanî, "Süçüdi Hüseyin Efendi" vol.V, p.1523 and "Selim Paşa (Kara)" vol.V, p.1492

³⁸¹ İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*, Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul, vol.II, "İbrahim Edhem Paşa", pp.600-636.

³⁸² Kural, Ercüment, "Sultan II. Mahmud ve Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın Gerçekleştirdikleri Reformların Karşılıklı Tesirleri," in *Sultan II. Mahmud ve Reformları Seminerleri*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, İstanbul, pp.107-113, p.109

development that he was one of the illiterate members of the Ottoman bureaucracy -needless to say his lack of Western languages and culture. Therefore he generously invested into the education of his household's members.³⁸³

Husrev provided his slaves İbrahim Edhem, Abdüllatif, Ahmed and Hüseyin with European-education by sending them to France. In Paris, they first attended the Institute Barbet and after obtained French language; they entered to the university for technical training. İbrahim Edhem graduated from *Ecole des Mines* (mining faculty) while Hüseyin, Ahmed and Abdüllatif attended different branches (artillery and maritime) of military academy.³⁸⁴ Gözlüklü Reşid Mehmed, another leading trustee of Husrev, followed them in 1832 and after his education he appointed to post of *Tophane-i Amire Feriki*.³⁸⁵ Although he sent limited number of his slaves to France, rest of his men went through in-residence education for which Husrev hired numerous instructors specialized especially in administrative book keeping and military drill. Although he thus placed large number of his slaves and protégés into the *Mansure* Army, Husrev was not the only bureaucrat searching to expand his influence in the military bureaucracy.

In the summer of 1826, Ağa Hüseyin Pasha, first *serasker* of new army, İzzet Mehmed Pasha, Grand Admiral in between February 1827 and October 1828 and subsequently grand vizier, Papuççu Ahmed Pasha, grand admiral until January 1830, enrolled significant number of their household slaves into *Mansure* Army in order to sustain their influence in military and over state affairs in general.³⁸⁶ Since Mahmud II was well aware of the intra-elite contestations over the highest ranks of the new army, he introduced a new promotion system rooted on an examination in the end of 1831. Nevertheless, the exam could not eliminate favoritism and even Sultan Mahmud himself made direct appointments to the top ranks: He placed his eunuchs and courtiers to highest military ranks as the appointment of Said Mehmed Ağa, *mabeyinci* of the sultan, to the brigadier-general in the cavalry that opened path for his promotion to *seraskerlik* in 1838.³⁸⁷

To sum, monopolization of highest ranks by the leading bureaucrats' households prevented professionalization within the *Mansure* Army until the delayed establishment of

³⁸³ Çelik, *Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa*, p.442

³⁸⁴ Şişman, Adnan, *Tanzimat Döneminde Fransa'ya Gönderilen Osmanlı Öğrencileri, 1839-1876*, TTK, 2004, Ankara, pp.5-6.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Levy, Avigdor, "The Officer Corps," pp.21-39, p.30

³⁸⁷ Ibid., p.27

military academy in 1834. Although Husrev Mehmed Pasha remained in the post of *serasker* until 1836, protégés of other bureaucrats also diffused to the administration of the new army. As might be expected, contesting interests of these subgroups continued to immobilize military actions in the imperial campaigns. While leading bureaucrats worked at high pressure to secure posts in the new army, the Morea campaign did not yet terminate the disturbances on the peninsula. Worse still, heavy losses of Greek-Orthodox subjects in the Missolonghi diverted further attraction of European public opinion onto politics of the Porte. Even though successful in recapturing Missolonghi, The Porte could not re-establish its dominance over Morea because of the European intervention. Resulted in the destruction of Ottoman-Egypt joint navy in Navarino, European involvement did not only open a path for the emergence of modern Greece but also worsened the relation between Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali Pasha.

Success of the *Cihadiye* Army of Mehmed Ali in the Morea was closely monitored by Europeans, particularly by Russians. Upon the death of Czar Alexander, Nicholas I ascended to the throne in 1825 since then Russian politics in the Morea and Greece took more interventionist form. Because Nicholas was willing to expand Russian influence over orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, the idea of possibility of Mehmed Ali's seizure over Morea discomfited him.³⁸⁸ The British, on their part, were willing to mediate a settlement in Morea in conjunction with Russia to prevent a new Ottoman-Russo war which might be disastrous for the Porte. In March 17, 1826, growing aggression in the Russian politics manifested itself in the form of ultimatum to Sultan Mahmud: Czar demanded full restoration of the privileges of the Principalities and the autonomy of Serbia as settled in the Treaty of Bucharest and Mahmud II, under British pressure, did nothing but met the request of Czar by adding recognition of Russian dominance over Caucasus and allowing free access of Russian ships in all Ottoman waters and Straits.³⁸⁹ In essence, the abolishment of Janissaries put the Ottoman military forces temporarily in disarray and the Porte, thus, could not resist new demands of Russian: In the Convention of Akkerman (October 7, 1826) Russian position as the protector of the region of Serbia and Romania was acknowledged that gave Russia the right to interfere in their domestic affairs.³⁹⁰ Although these were significant acquisitions, Russia yet maintained to pressure the Porte for the Greek subjects of Morea. In the face of the

³⁸⁸ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.29.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Jelavich, Charles and Barbara, *the Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920*, University of Washington Press, USA, 2000, p.49

Russian aggression, the Porte began to debate whether the sultan should wage a new war against Russia. Husrev along with Galib Pasha and the grand vizier Selim Pasha did not support the idea of war and stated that the Porte still lacked men and sources to battle Russians effectively while faction of Âkif Efendi advocated the opposite in order to regain lost territories and prestige.³⁹¹ In the end, Sultan Mahmud adopted the latter idea and manifested his determination in maintaining the military campaign. In response, joint forces of Britain, France and Russia destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian navy at Navarino in October 20, 1827.³⁹²

When compared the Porte, Mehmed Ali and his son İbrahim Pasha seemed to have adopted more cautious manner towards the thread of European joint forces. For instance, when İbrahim informed the grand vizier regarding to his concern about the presence of a combined forces of French-British-Russian fleet so close to the Ottoman-Egypt navy in Navarino, the latter advised him to ignore such feeble threads and to rely on formidable power of the Ottoman state.³⁹³ Just few hours before the disaster, Mehmed Ali wrote a letter to his agent Necip Efendi in İstanbul and asked to convince the Porte to accept principle of Greek independence and to seek Austrian meditation since he was neither prepared nor willing to encounter with Europeans.³⁹⁴ The Porte, however, refused İbrahim's demand for the withdrawal of his troops to Egypt. In the face of such irreconcilable manner of the Porte, Mehmed Ali, on his own, signed a treaty with Europeans in order to guarantee the safety for İbrahim's withdrawal from the Morea.³⁹⁵ As if these were not enough, Sultan Mahmud did not make any effort for rewarding Mehmed Ali's military contribution to the Morea campaign. Contrary to Mehmed Ali's expectation that governorship of Syria would be bestowed upon him, Sultan Mahmud gave him Crete in which ongoing resistance of Greek-Orthodox population may consume further wealth of Mehmed Ali, let alone generating necessary income to compensate his wrecked fleet.³⁹⁶ In sum, the Morea campaign ended with the resentment of Mehmed Ali to Mahmud II that will be base for his Syria Campaigns in 1831 and 1839.

³⁹¹ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.30

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammed Ali Pasha," pp.139-180, p.159

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., p.160

³⁹⁶ Ibid. p.160

Chapter IV: The *Serasker* and the *Fermanlu Vâli* in the Syrian Campaigns (1831-1833 and 1839)

After the Navarino Battle, growing tension between the Porte and Russia ended up with Nicholas' declaration of war in 28 April 1828. Until the middle of May, Czar's troops marched into Moldavia as well as eastern Anatolia as his Mediterranean fleet began to provide great amounts of weapons and ammunitions to the Greek insurgents.³⁹⁷ Because the *Mansure* Army was yet in the establishment phase, Mahmud supported his new army with irregular troops for the military operation in the Balkans. As with the Morean campaign, the sultan also asked Mehmed Ali to send *Cihadiye* troops. In his response, Mehmed Ali offered just some money and stated that he would send troops if he was given a governorship in Anatolia.³⁹⁸ In the end, they could not reach to an agreement that rendered Mehmed Ali to devote all his energy and time into modernization projects. In fact, absent of *Cihadiye* troops was not only reason for the defeat of the Ottoman troops in the Russian War. Intra-elite contestations, such as the rivalry of Husrev Pasha and Hüseyin Ağa, maintained to harm the war efforts of the Ottomans.³⁹⁹

To start with, rivalry between Husrev and Grand Vizier Selim Mehmed Pasha resulted in the appointment of Hüseyin Ağa to the command of the Imperial Army on the Balkans. As Levy points out, this was very controversial appointment because the grand vizier or his stand-in, *serasker*, commands the Imperial Army according to military tradition. Since Husrev replaced Hüseyin Ağa in the previous year, he or grand vizier Selim Mehmed should have assumed the command of army. Because Husrev and Selim Mehmed were in rivalry, none of them wanted to leave capital for fear of losing ground to his rival and thus command of army fell to Hüseyin Ağa, as Levy states.⁴⁰⁰ Despite his title of independent commander-in-chief (*müstakil serasker*) Hüseyin could not exclude himself from intrigues of Husrev and Selim Mehmed during the campaign. At first, Halil Rifat Pasha, protégé of Husrev, appointed

³⁹⁷ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.30

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.31

³⁹⁹ İnalçık, Halil, "Husrev Paşa", İA (MEB), vol.V/I, p.612

⁴⁰⁰ Levy, "Officer Corps," pp.21-39, p.37

as Deputy Commander-in-chief (*Ordu Ser Askeri Kâimmakamı*) at Hüseyin Ağa's camp and he reported directly to his patron on the regular basis.⁴⁰¹ Later on, Said Efendi, an old rival of Hüseyin Ağa was appointed as Superintendent of the army (*Ordu Nâzırı*) and in that capacity he easily corresponded with the grand vizier directly.⁴⁰² Needless to say, they sent numerous letters to the palace, accusing each other for incompetence and for military failures.

Coupled with inexperience of *Mansure* troops, spread of plague and resulting food shortage, the campaign ended up with defeat and the Porte asked European ambassadors in Istanbul to mediate for a peace treaty.⁴⁰³ To the account of Slade, Husrev Pasha advocated the idea of armistice and in his meeting with French and British ambassadors in the sultan's palace at Therapia he confessed that "we are so beaten...we cannot be beaten more; resistance is useless".⁴⁰⁴ Following day, in 13 September 1829, the Porte signed the Treaty of Adrianople. Thanks to mediation of the Britain and France, military acquisition of Russia was reduced to the control of the mounts of Danube with the right of free trade while Czar conceded to evacuate his troops from south of Pruth –Principalities, Dobruca, and Bulgaria.⁴⁰⁵ Although the Russian War of 1828-9 put Mahmud II into trouble, the greatest threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was found to come from Mehmed Ali Pasha: His Syria campaign of 1831-1833 challenged Mahmud's authority in most part of Syria, Adana, and Hijaz region.

IV.1: Mehmed Ali and the Sultan's Unsatisfied Subjects

After the Morea campaign, Mehmed Ali Pasha revitalized his army by initiating a new wave of conscription that encountered with resistance of the Egypt population some of who fled to the districts of Jerusalem, Nablus, and Gaza, within the *paşalık* of Acre.⁴⁰⁶ Using the

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.31

⁴⁰⁴ Slade, Adolphus, *Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, &c. and of A Cruise in the Black Sea with the Capitan Pasha, in the years 1829, 1830, and 1831*, vol I, Elibron Classics, 2005, p.386

⁴⁰⁵ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.32

⁴⁰⁶ Kutluoğlu, Muhammed H., *The Egyptian Question (1831-1841) The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Paşa in Syria and Asia Minor and the Reactions of the Sublime Porte*, Eren Yayıncılık, 1998, p.53-8. As Kutluoğlu states, Syria was not a single administrative unit: It consisted of the seperate provinces (*eyâlet, paşalık*) of Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli and a fourth *paşalık* which sometimes known as Sayda and sometimes as Acre. Because the boundaries of these provinces were not permanently fixed, the sub-provinces were sometimes transferred from one province to another one. In 1821, Mehmed Ali began to encourage Abdullah Pasha of

pretext of some 6000 peasants who had escaped to Abdullah Pasha of Acre to evade taxes and corvée, Mehmed Ali started the Syrian expedition on November 2, 1831.⁴⁰⁷ Because this campaign pitted Muslim soldiers in the Egypt army against their coreligionists in the Ottoman imperial army, Mehmed Ali made great effort to gain legitimacy for all his military actions. Nevertheless, his pretext of fugitive Egyptians did not convince the sultan who branded Mehmed Ali and his son İbrahim Pasha as rebels (*fermanlu*) and sent his troops over them. As with the Napoleon expedition of 1798, local governors organized the defense on their own until the delayed arrival of the Imperial Army because of the long distance between Istanbul and Syria. In the initial phase of the campaign, Abdullah Pasha sent a letter assuring his district governor of Jerusalem that the Imperial navy was en route for the defense of Acre and Syria and condemned Mehmed Ali in the strongest terms such as the evil one (*al-khabûth*), the rebel (*al-khâraj*), depraved villain (*al-shaqi al-khâsir*), and the devil (*al-la'in*), as well as “the enemy of God” and “enemy of the Sultan”.⁴⁰⁸ At first glance, Abdullah Pasha’s maledictory language for Mehmed Ali might be seen as an ordinary accusation targeted to a rival bureaucrat in contestation. Rood, however, brings to light the growing importance of propaganda and legalizing activities that differentiated Mehmed Ali’s position in the eye of Syrian and Anatolian population from that of other governors -including Abdullah Pasha.⁴⁰⁹ In Morea, Mehmed Ali had militarily supported Sultan Mahmud against his non-Muslim subjects. This time, he and his Muslim soldiers were to fight against the sultan’s Trained and Victorious “Soldiers of Muhammad”. In other words, this war was among Muslims. Furthermore, the theatre of war was Muslim-dominated Syria and Adana regions. Considering all these, it is not surprising to see that both party –the sultan and Mehmed Ali- did not only use arms but also the discourse of Muslim solidarity to win the battle.

Acre to expand his authority over Damascus. Next year, Abdullah Paşa forged an edict of the Porte and instructed Emir Beshir, his sub-governor of the Druses of Mount Lebanon, to advance on Damascus. The Porte, in return, mobilized the Pashas of Aleppo, Adana, and Damascus against Abdullah Pasha who then sought the help of Mehmed Ali. Thanks to Mehmed Ali’s mediation, the Porte forgave Abdullah Pasha in exchange of 30.000 purses for his pardon. Furthermore, Mehmed Ali borrowed 11.000 purses to Abdullah for this pardon payment. In 1823, the relation between these two pashas, however, began to deteriorate when the latter did not allow Mehmed Ali’s mission (its target was to recruit new supporters) to enter Acre. In the following years, the issue of 11.000 purses debt and Abdullah Pasha’s maltreatment to Egyptian merchants further increased this tension.

⁴⁰⁷ Fahmy, “The era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha,” pp.139-180, p.166

⁴⁰⁸ Rood, Judith Mendelson, “Mehmed Ali as Mutinous Khedive: The Roots of Rebellion,” in Jane Hathaway (ed.), *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002, 115-128, p.124

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.124-6

Besides, Mehmed Ali was still a governor of the Ottoman administration and his administrative-military servants were also members of the Ottoman imperial household and its culture. İbrahim Pasha managed to capture Gaza, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa and Acre within a short time.⁴¹⁰ In this rapid advance, not only commanders but also civil officers in the household of Mehmed Ali played decisive roles. In fact, these officers were members of the Ottoman culture through which they easily interacted with locals and diffused into power networks of magnates and local administrations that enabled Mehmed Ali to be accepted as legitimated ruler for many people of the region. Regarding the governing-elite in the Mehmed Ali's household Toledano states that

Core members of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite spoke Turkish; shared values and heritage of Ottoman culture; were mostly, though not exclusively, Muslim; came from various parts of the empire, though some were born in Egypt, and from various ethnic backgrounds; were committed to serve in Egypt under an Ottoman-Egyptian dynasty; held office either in military or in the bureaucracy.⁴¹¹

As seen above, the household strategy of Mehmed Ali bears great resemblance to the Ottoman imperial household: Like the sultans who distanced themselves from the main ethnic groups in society through *kul* system, Mehmed Ali staffed high-ranking offices with Turkish-speaking elites instead of Egyptians in order to curb influence of traditional leaders of Egyptian society and to prevent the emergence of new local power foci. In similar way, Fahmy shows how Mehmed Ali deliberately reserved high-ranking positions in the army to Turkish-speaking officers: Nomination for promotion of upper, in general, stated place of birth of candidate, to make clear that he was a "Turk" and he instructed İbrahim not to promote "Arabs" even in the case of short supply of "Turkish" officers.⁴¹² Paradoxically, this household strategy-relying on the exclusion of Egyptians from the administration-would function as an inclusive policy beyond the territories of Egypt. For instance, İbrahim captured Tyre (Sur), Sayda, Beirut, Tripoli, and Damascus without armed contestation while support of Emir Beshir also contributed to the spread of pro-Mehmed Ali sentiments in these regions.⁴¹³ İbrahim also managed to recruit some 15.000 men among various tribes in Syria (including Bedouins and Druses), Nablus, and Jerusalem by the summer of 1832.⁴¹⁴ Of

⁴¹⁰ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.33

⁴¹¹ Toledano, Ehud, *State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.16

⁴¹² Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, p.247

⁴¹³ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.75

⁴¹⁴ Altundağ, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı*, p.63

course, discontent of the subject people to the Porte should also be considered while explaining the rapid march of İbrahim.

Akşin suggests to question the possible links between this discontent and sultan Mahmud's post-1826 policies. According to him, abolishment of janissaries and the following oppression regime and military modernization might have triggered three types of opposition: 1) conservatist reaction to the western-style reforms, 2) libertarian reaction to the growing despotism and oppression, and 3) economic reaction to the growing tax-burden.⁴¹⁵ In the previous part, we mentioned how Mahmud's attempts to suppress all possible pro-Janissary oppositions in the capital resulted in the empowerment of Husrev as the chief guard of Istanbul. As Moltke states, many Janissaries had fled from Istanbul on the face of the oppressive city administration.⁴¹⁶ These people may have contributed to the spread of anti-Mahmud feelings in the provinces. İbrahim tried to win these people along with their relatives and friends by reviving the Janissary troops as did he in Aleppo.⁴¹⁷ More importantly, İbrahim's advance to Syria and Adana regions resulted in the Porte's imposition of extra taxes over the subject people who had already in economic difficulty because of the centralization projects and the military defeats. This was a part of the vicious circle in which the more Mahmud II encountered with the threat of dissolution of the empire the more economic, psychological, and ideological pressure he put on the subject people. On the face of this growing pressure, some of Ottomans allied themselves with Mehmed Ali that led to the Porte to act with further suspicion toward the rest of society.

Regarding the growing economic pressure, the Russian War of 1828-9 and Mehmed Ali crisis cut off the Porte's connection with Moldova, Wallachia, and Egypt, which were the main supplier of the grain for the consumption of Istanbul and other leading cities. The following shortage of the grain did not only trigger the inflation but also increased the economic pressure over the peasants of the other provinces.⁴¹⁸ This economic pressure doubled by the mobilization of the Ottoman Army over İbrahim: the Porte provided the supplies of the troops locally. Because of the distance between Egypt and Adana region, İbrahim also relied on the local markets in the provisioning his troops but he paid equity to

⁴¹⁵ Akşin, Sina, "1839'da Osmanlı Ülkesinde İdeolojik Ortam ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin Uluslararası Durumu" in Halil İnalçık – Mehmed Seyitdanlioğlu (eds.), *Tanzimat, Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012, Ankara, pp. 133-145, p.143

⁴¹⁶ Moltke, *Türkiye'deki Durum ve Olaylar*, p.322.

⁴¹⁷ Altundağ, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı* p.62

⁴¹⁸ Moltke, *Türkiye'deki Durum ve Olaylar*, pp.39-40

local producers who agreed to provide necessary materials.⁴¹⁹ In other times, Mehmed Ali and İbrahim seemed to provide people more than the economic wealth. Story of Tahmişciođlu Hacı Mustafa Ađa, the magnate of Kastamonu region implies that political patronage of Mehmed Ali also played a role in the rapid advance of İbrahim in the Adana region. When Mustafa Ađa and his brother Hacı Ahmed had been involved in crime in their hometown, they were put into the prison and after they were released with the mediation of some of their friends, they had escaped to Egypt to secure their lives.⁴²⁰ When Hacı Mustafa Ađa returned back, he sided with İbrahim by submitting the following letter to him;

Mütesellims who were appointed by Serasker Husrev Pasha as to administer this region, have conducted oppression of the worst kind. People in their retinue are impious; they have done opposite what Islam and sharia order to do. When all things went beyond the limits of tolerable, we told the situation to mütesellim but he did not pay attention to our complaints. Worse still, he -with the instigation of people in his circle- informed the Porte against the honest and peaceful people of our community. While deserving the city with his retinue, he initiated a battle against inhabitants (*ehali*), in which he conducted all kinds of tyranny: He killed people; pillaged their possessions; set their houses on fire. Muslims under the command of Hacı Mustafa Ađa battled with these burglars, killed mütesellim and captured some of his men. Inhabitants of all regions are against them... We, as the people of this region, have decided to leave the [Ottoman] government which did not make any effort to provide us with security and order of which your people have taken advantage. We would like to announce our loyalty to you and hope that you shall allow us to enjoy your patronage. If you consider appointing a new mütesellim, you might appoint Hacı Mustafa Ađa who is known with his humanity and his experiences...⁴²¹

Whether it was written by Hacı Mustafa himself or by one of the scribes in İbrahim's retinue, the discourse of this letter might still be used to analyze the main themes of Mehmed Ali's propaganda activities. First, the letter associates oppression and disruption of order with the *mütesellim* and emphasized that he was appointed by Husrev. In the second chapter, we touched upon extensive authority bestowed upon bureaucrats during the war times. In another words, Husrev, in the capacity of *serasker* of the army, might have directly appointed the aforementioned *mütesellim* of Kastamonu. Even this was not the real case; his extensive power of appointment might have been used as the basis for the smear campaign of İbrahim, aiming to discredit Husrev in the eyes of both people of the region and the sultan. Though the

⁴¹⁹ Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.IV p.722

⁴²⁰ Altundađ, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı*, p.78

⁴²¹ *Ibid*, p.79

letter briefly touches upon the relation of Husrev and *mütesellim*, it puts the latter's cruelty against the people of the region at the very center of critics. Akşin shows that the war-time tax for the naval efforts (*kalyoncu bedeliyesi*) and the Porte agencies' seizure of the possession of local people for provisioning their retinues with supplies and forage played role in the outbreak of Tahmiscioğlu Revolt.⁴²² In light of this information, Hacı Mustafa seems to use economic reaction of the people to the tax collectors of the Porte as the base for his collaboration with İbrahim. Second, the letter accuses *mütesellim*'s men for their disrespectfulness to sharia and tells how "Muslims" gathered under the command of Hacı Mustafa against them. Since legitimacy of the sultan mainly depended on his role in dispensing justice through appointing just administrators respectful to sharia, the letter, actually, implies the sultan's violation of social contract and thus legalizes the departure of Muslim subjects from the Ottoman rule. According to the letter, the people of the region decided to leave the [Ottoman] government and to ask İbrahim to provide them security and order. This statement perfectly reflects the message of Mehmed Ali and his son: Muslims now have an alternative administration other than the sultan's 'oppressive' rule.

Mehmed Ali had gained prestige among Muslim population of the region long before his Syria campaign. The sultan had relied on Mehmed Ali's army in eliminating threat of Wahhabis. In other words, Mehmed Ali's presence in Egypt made the neighboring Hijaz region more secure for the hajj journey. Besides, the hajj provided him with the socialization place where he met with many members of the Ottoman administration, especially of its religious institutions. As Mustafa Nuri Pasha points out, many sheikhs, upper-ranking *ulema*, and leading Ottoman bureaucrats made their hajj journey via Egypt where Mehmed Ali hosted them, exchanged the gifts, offered his patronage and discussed the state affairs.⁴²³ Furthermore, Mehmed Ali published manifestos in Arab countries, especially at Mecca and Medina, stating that Sultan Mahmud imitated non-Muslims in his doings and was not fit for the Ottoman throne and for serving as caliph of the Muslims.⁴²⁴ Besides these propaganda activities, disunity within the Ottoman army affected the course of the campaign.

As Levy points out, Ottoman forces in both 1832 and 1839 lacked of coordination between commanders as movements of different army corps in the field were totally

⁴²² Akşin, Sina, "1839'da Osmanlı Ülkesinde İdeolojik Ortam," pp.133-145, p.143. fn.6

⁴²³ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, p. 502

⁴²⁴ Kutluoğlu, *The Egyptian Question*, p.70

unrelated to each other.⁴²⁵ Among many reasons for the lack of harmony in 1832 was a personal rivalry between *Serasker* Husrev and Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, the commander of the guards. To the account of the French ambassador, these two commanders relentlessly countermanded each other; disputed each other's instructions; discredited other's efforts before the Sultan.⁴²⁶ Mahmud appointed Ahmet Fevzi, avowed enemy of Husrev, to the military commander of guards with the title of *Ferik* and with independent capacity of command to balance Husrev's influence in the army as Levy states.⁴²⁷ Thus, the Guards became center of opposition to Husrev within the army and Ahmed's resentment to the Husrev reached to the peak in June 1839 where he led the Ottoman fleet to Egypt upon Husrev's seizure of the rank of grand vizier.⁴²⁸

Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that all intra-elite contestations were disadvantageous to the Ottoman army. In some cases, Mahmud II curbed Mehmed Ali's influence by playing on such rivalries successfully as with the appointment of Mehmed Pasha. When Mehmed Ali started the Syrian Campaign, Mehmed Pasha was the governor of Rakka and Aleppo. As a protégé of Husrev Pasha, he did not give credence to propaganda activities of his patron's nemesis. As a result, İbrahim faced with staunch resistance in Rakka and Aleppo under governorship of Mehmed Pasha when compared with the other regions of Syria under the influence of Emir Beshir, a supporter of his father.⁴²⁹ Having regard to loyalty of Mehmed Pasha to his protector, Sultan Mahmud appointed him as a commander of the Ottoman forces in February 1832.⁴³⁰ In the meantime, the reports of Hüseyin Ağa -commander of another army in Adana- was, however, suggesting that intra-elite alliances of Mehmed Ali would rebut all military efforts of the Porte. For instance Menemenciöglü, *âyân* of Adana region and supporter of Mehmed Ali, organized a defense against the Ottoman troops around Adana: His attacks did not only repulse Hüseyin Ağa to Ereğli but also demoralized his troops who were deeply frustrated by the resistance of "subjects of the sultan" against the soldiers of sultan.⁴³¹

When Hüseyin Ağa's and Mehmed's forces were defeated, Mahmud II sent another army under the command of another protégé of Husrev namely, the grand vizier Mehmed Reşid Pasha. In the Konya Battle (21 December 1832), İbrahim defeated the Sultan's army

⁴²⁵ Levy, Avigdor, "The Officer Corps," pp.21-39, p.38

⁴²⁶ Ibid., p.37

⁴²⁷ Levy, Avigdor, *The Military Policy of Mahmud II*, p.474

⁴²⁸ Ibid., p.476

⁴²⁹ Altundağ, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı*, p.55

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Ibid, p.66

and captured his grand vizier.⁴³² It appears that this battle led many people to ask that whose household is the strongest one within the Ottoman territories? Different answers given to this question seem to shape contesting politics of all parties. For İbrahim, his father's household was stronger than that of Mahmud II. Therefore he asked his father for permission to march in Istanbul and to declare his independence.⁴³³ In the meantime, he tried to gain further support for his ambitious plan by applying to legitimizing tools such as *fetwa*. As Rood reveals, İbrahim obtained a *fetwa* questioning "If the *imam* of the Muslim oppressed the *umma*, is it legal to depose him? the answer was, "it is, on condition that the *umma* is composed of 12.000 men who are all in agreement."⁴³⁴ As Rood explains, this number was the symbolic size of the Ottoman army sent against Mehmed Ali and defeated by him. At the end, İbrahim could not convince Reşid Mehmed to lead this army to Istanbul to dethrone Mahmud II.

İbrahim, nevertheless, managed to transfer some officers in the Ottoman army into his military retinue. He offered three choices to the captured officers and soldiers: to return their countries via Alexandria; to join the Egyptian army; to attend one of the schools at Cairo.⁴³⁵ For instance, Arif Beg, a captive officer of the Konya Battle, was appointed as colonel and commanded a new regiment created out captured soldiers at the same battle while other officers were appointed as lieutenants and captains over the soldiers who had captured them.⁴³⁶ Beside captured soldiers, nearly 500-600 Albanians in the army of Reşid Mehmed voluntarily joined İbrahim's forces.⁴³⁷ The Porte, in return, became more suspicious about loyalty of Albanians along with the Bosnians in the Balkans and took measures to delay the arrival of the news of the Ottoman defeat to Rumelia.⁴³⁸ As these cases show, during and after the Syria campaign loyalty to the sultan was questioned by many people, including Mehmed Ali himself. For him, the Sultan's household is still strongest household partly because of its European allies. As Fahmy points out, Mehmed Ali made great effort to remain within the Ottoman imperial system and asked officials in Istanbul to mediate for sultan's forgiveness and for having his consent on legal title to the lands he had acquired by force

⁴³² Fahmy, *All the Pasha's men*, p.67

⁴³³ Fahmy, "The era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha," pp.139-180, p.141.

⁴³⁴ Rood, "Mehmed Ali as Mutinous Khedive," pp.115-128, pp.124-5

⁴³⁵ Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, p.247

⁴³⁶ Ibid, p.248

⁴³⁷ Altundağ, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı*, p.63

⁴³⁸ Ahmed Lütüfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütüfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.IV-V (ed. Nuri Akbayar), Tarih Vakfı-Yapı Kredi Yayınları, p.737 ""Boşnaklar sebük-mağzdır yani soğuk beyinlidir, Arnavudlar isyana müsaidir. Bu havadisın Rumeli taraflarına geç yayılması için Rumeliye geçecek bozgun askerlere bir müddet ...ruhsat verilmemesi.."

instead of raising the issue of independence.⁴³⁹ He, at the same time, tried to expand his influence over the sultan's subjects.

In sum, Mehmed Ali's household seems to provide an alternative place for those who were one way or another, unsatisfied with the Ottoman administration and sought for the protection of another Muslim ruler. As with the Morea Campaign, non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan may gain support of Christian states. For the Muslim subjects, however, there was not any Muslim state whose power could and would contest with that of the sultan. For instance, one of the concurring themes in the Muslim imagination was the legendary image of the Crimean Khan who was believed to be the only savior that would rescue the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire in case of troubles. Considering that this Khanate was under the Russian rule since the year of 1774, Mehmed Ali might have fulfilled the place of the khan for many Muslims. In similar way, Mustafa Nuri Pasha explains success of networking activities of Mehmed Ali –rooting mainly on gift-giving economy- as that many people began to believe that he was a gift of God and he would rescue the Crimean Khanate.⁴⁴⁰ For the restless Muslims vis-à-vis the Russian expansion, Mehmed Ali might be the only savior. For unpaid Albanian soldiers, he would pay better. For Hacı Mustafa, only Mehmed Ali would restore him to the seat of the tax collector of Kastamonu region since he was in the *fermanlu* position within the Sultan's administration. For unsatisfied Muslim subjects, only Mehmed Ali might restore just rule of an Islamic administration. As we will touch upon below, Egypt would be the only place for Ahmed Fevzi Pasha to escape from the intrigues of Husrev Pasha. On the other hand, Mehmed Ali had initiated the Syria campaign on the pretext of 6000 Egyptians for whom Syria had been the only alternative to the cruelty of his rule. Since the Syrian Campaign resulted in a wide scale power shift in most of Syria and Anatolia, it is now necessary to analyze its impact on the Porte's politics.

IV.2: The Sultan, Civil Bureaucrats and European Allies

After the Konya Battle, Mahmud II accelerated his diplomatic relations to balance military success of Mehmed Ali. In essence, Mahmud had mainly relied on his army to suppress the thread of his rebellious *vâli*. Since both army and navy were mainly dominated

⁴³⁹ Fahmy, "The era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha," pp.139-180, p.167

⁴⁴⁰ Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyicü'l-Vukû'ât*, pp.502-503

by Husrev's protégés and that Husrev was the *serasker* of the Imperial army during the Syrian campaign, the Ottoman defeat at the Battle of Konya was, in one sense, Husrev's household's debacle against Mehmed Ali and his son İbrahim. This defeat led Mahmud II to give more importance to the European instructors and to establish a military academy in 1834.⁴⁴¹ These new measures gradually decreased Husrev's influence within the army although he maintained the competition with other leading bureaucrats -including Pertev Pasha, protector of Mustafa Reşid- of the Ottoman administration.⁴⁴² It was partly these contestations which shaped the course of events in the period between the Konya Battle and the promulgation of Tanzimat Edict in 3 November 1839. A closer look to diplomatic relations of the Porte, European states and Egypt may help us to grasp changing power balance between Husrev's faction and Mustafa Reşid.

After the Konya Battle, İbrahim asked his father for his consent to advance into Anatolia and upon receiving the positive reply; he mobilized the army on 20 January and soon arrived to Kütahya.⁴⁴³ From there, İbrahim wrote a letter to the Porte, asking the Sultan's permission to advance to Bursa in order to supply his army with provisions that alarmed Mahmud II to accelerate his diplomatic efforts.⁴⁴⁴ In the face of this threat, the Porte had first asked the help of Britain. Although British foreign secretary to the Porte of the time, Lord Palmerson, tried his best to convince the cabinet, his efforts remained inconclusive mainly because of Britain's preoccupation with elections at home and problems in Belgium and Portugal.⁴⁴⁵ Unlike Britain, Russia was closely monitoring the advance of İbrahim's army. As Shaw states, Czar Nicholas sided with the Porte against Mehmed Ali in order to prevent establishment of a strong Middle Eastern state which would resist to Russian penetration better than the Ottomans had been able to do.⁴⁴⁶ Upon the agreement on the Ottoman-Russian alliance, a Russian fleet anchored before Büyükdere on the Bosphorus and in May, Russian troops landed on the shores of Asia as allies of the Ottoman Empire that strengthened the Porte's position vis-a-vis Mehmed Ali.⁴⁴⁷ After guaranteeing the Russian

⁴⁴¹ İnalçık, Halil, "Husrev Paşa," İA (MEB), vol.V/I, p.613 and Fahmy, *All the Pasha's men*, p.272

⁴⁴² Findley, Carter Vaughn, "Factional Rivalries in Ottoman Istanbul: the Fall of Pertev Paşa, 1837," in *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, vol 10, pp.127-134

⁴⁴³ Altundağ, *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa İsyanı*, p.78

⁴⁴⁴ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.93. Kutluoğlu states that İbrahim's real intention was to capture the towns along the coast of the sea of Marmara to use them as maritime bases, and to conduct propaganda activities there, thus persuading the Porte to make a peace on his father's terms.

⁴⁴⁵ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.33

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ Hanioglu, Şükrü, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, Princeton University Press, 2008, p.66

support, the Porte gave impetus to the peace negotiations with Mehmed Ali, in which civil bureaucrats began to take more active role.

Composition of the diplomatic envoy sent to Egypt captures the beginning of the changing power balance in the central administration of the Ottoman Empire: Halil Rifat Pasha, one of leading protégé of Husrev, was accompanied by Mustafa Reşid Bey (*amedî-i hümayun*) in January 1833 and they submitted two letters on behalf of their own offices –of *seraskerlik* and the Sublime Porte.⁴⁴⁸ As Lütfi Efendi states, the involvement of foreign states into Mehmed Ali question necessitated appointment a civil servant who has a good grasp of the European diplomacy (*bu iş yalnız hizmet-i tahrîriyeye münhasır olmayıp Mısır ve Avrupa'nın ahvâliyle muâmelât-ı düvelliyeye vukufu olup*).⁴⁴⁹ After the early death of his father, Mustafa Reşid (1800-1858) grew up under the protection of his uncle Ispartalı Seyyid Pasha and following to his training at the scribal office, he took part in the Morea Campaign as the seal keeper of the commander-in-chief Seyyid Ali Pasha.⁴⁵⁰ Upon dismissal of his master, he was also forced to out of office according to the tradition of *intisab* but after a while he managed to find a position as an army clerk during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828 and then he served as scribe for the Ottoman delegation conducting peace negotiation with the Russians in Edirne.⁴⁵¹ After then, two events seem to shape his career: his attachment to the circle of Pertev Pasha and his expertise in the Mehmed Ali crisis. His first mission in the Mehmed Ali crisis was to restore the relations of Sultan and Mehmed Ali after the Morea Campaign: In the summer of 1830, Mustafa Reşid had assisted his protector Pertev Pasha in the envoy sent to Egypt.⁴⁵²

Since Pertev Pasha's power relations had profound impact on the career of his disciple Mustafa Reşid, it may be necessary to give some biographic information about him. Pertev (1785-1837) rose in the central administration through the bureaus of the Sublime Port where he served first in the Office of the Imperial Divan, then in the corresponding secretariat (*Mektubî*) and the Receiver (*Amedî*) before serving as chief scribe (*reisülküttâb*) from 1827 to 1830.⁴⁵³ His patron, Galib Pasha, was among the pro-British group within the reformist cadre of Selim III. Like his patron, Pertev adopted pro-British ideas about the foreign affairs and

⁴⁴⁸ Altundağ, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı*, p.102

⁴⁴⁹ Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.IV-V, p.722

⁴⁵⁰ E, J, Zürcher, "Reshid Mustafa Pasha," *El.2*, vol VIII, pp.484-5

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵² Kutluoğlu, *The Egyptian Question*, p.28

⁴⁵³ Findley, "Factional Rivalries in Ottoman Istanbul: the Fall of Pertev Paşa, 1837," p.127

established close relations with the British ambassador, John Ponsonby.⁴⁵⁴ As Zürcher suggests, this tradition may have influenced Mustafa Reşid's pro-British politics as well.

In January 1833, Mustafa Reşid accompanied Halil Rifat to Egypt for negotiations with Mehmed Ali.⁴⁵⁵ They informed Mehmed Ali about the sultan's forgiveness for his former acts and invited him to obey his authority (*tahtı itaata girmesi*) and not to allow shedding further blood among Muslims.⁴⁵⁶ They tried to convince Mehmed Ali to accept the following demands:⁴⁵⁷

- to decline his claims over Şam-ı Şerif and Aleppo and Adana
- to send taxes of Sayda, Trablus-Şam, Jerusalem and Nablus, which he captured in the Syria Campaign
- to send the grand vizier Reşid Mehmed back to Istanbul
- to return Ottoman war material and soldiers he had captured
- to retreat his troops and to pay tribute of Egypt to the imperial treasury and not to mint further money in the minthouse of Egypt.
- to replace sheriff Mehmed (one of supporter of Mehmed Ali) of Hijaz with Abdulmuttalib

These demands show the Porte's despair vis-à-vis Mehmed Ali crisis: the Syrian Campaign made the Sultan devoid of tax incomes of not only Egypt but also most of Adana and Syria under İbrahim's occupation. Taxes of the other regions were canalized into the military operations. Besides it deeply challenged legitimacy of the Sultan in many ways. Hijaz region -one of the pillars of the sultanic legitimacy- was, now, under Mehmed Ali's influence and grand vizier -the absolute deputy of the Sultan- was in the hand of İbrahim. Although Mehmed Ali adopted moderate stance in the negotiation, he informed Halil Rifat and Mustafa Reşid about the necessity of the consulting to his son before reaching the decision. When Mustafa Reşid returned to Istanbul, he firstly informed Husrev Pasha about the peace negotiation, and after visiting *mabeyin* together, they introduced the issue to the advisory council held in the Supreme Porte.⁴⁵⁸ In light of this information, it seems that

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., p.128

⁴⁵⁵ Kutluoğlu, *The Egyptian Question*, p.90

⁴⁵⁶ Altundağ, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı*, p.102

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., p.101

⁴⁵⁸ Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.IV, p.722

Husrev was still the most dominant figure of the central administration and even the bureaucrats of the Sublime Porte had to put him above their own offices.

After the issue was debated with the French and British ambassadors at the Supreme Porte, Mustafa Reşid was sent to Kütahya to make a peace settlement with İbrahim. In the meantime, France and Britain maintained to send their own representatives to Mehmed Ali. General Mouarviev, Russian envoy, arrived at Egypt a week before Halil Rifat and told Mehmed Ali that Russia would oppress him by force if he persisted in advance to Istanbul while French envoy sent his message of support to Mehmed Ali vis-à-vis the Porte.⁴⁵⁹ Apparently, Mehmed Ali used disunity of European states in his attempts to present himself to the Porte as favorable *vâli*. According to Lütfi Efendi, he told Halil Rifat that “European powers approved and encouraged my independence but I did not give them credence because of my great loyalty [to the Porte]”.⁴⁶⁰

In May 1833, Mustafa Reşid and İbrahim signed the Kütahya Truce on the following conditions: Province of Egypt reinstated to Mehmed Ali in addition to Hijaz and Crete; İbrahim appointed as *vâli* of Syrian sub-provinces of Acre, Damascus, Tripoli, and Aleppo; İbrahim was named as *muhassil* of Adana.⁴⁶¹ In his career, Mustafa Reşid was exposed to the danger of death in many times and the first one happened because of the Sultan discontent of this treaty: Mustafa Reşid recognized İbrahim claims over Damascus, Aleppo and tax collection right of Adana region without the consent of the Sultan. Upon informed about Reşid Mehmed’s decision, Mahmud II ordered him executed but then forgave his life thanks to the mediation of *Darbhâne Nazırı* Şehîd Ali Rızâ Efendi.⁴⁶² After this event, Mustafa Reşid became very unpopular in Istanbul and next year he was sent to Paris as special envoy with the mission of regaining Algeria for the Porte.⁴⁶³ Nevertheless, Mahmud II was not the only person who was discontent with the Kütahya Truce.

The Kütahya Truce, as Fahmy illustrates, was an agreement neither Sultan nor Mehmed Ali put his signature; its terms were be renewed on the yearly basis and it obliged the latter to pay annual tribute to the Porte.⁴⁶⁴ In other words, the sanction power of the

⁴⁵⁹ Fahmy, “the Era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha,” p.167

⁴⁶⁰ Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak’a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.IV, p.724 “... düvel-i fâhime benim istiklâlimi tasdik ve teşvîk ediyorlar. Ben ise kemâli sadâkatimden kabûl etmiyorum...”

⁴⁶¹ Fahmy, “the Era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha,” p.168

⁴⁶² Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak’a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.IV, p.724

⁴⁶³ E, J, Zürcher, “Reshid Mustafa Pasha” El.2 vol VIII, pp.484-6

⁴⁶⁴ Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, p.287

Kütahya Truce was nothing but Mahmud II's personal will to renew it. Fahmy states that Mehmed Ali was uneasy about the presence of Husrev as *serasker* in the capital and his proximity and easy access to the Sultan made Mahmud particularly susceptible to his intrigues.⁴⁶⁵ Mehmed Ali, therefore, put pressure on the Sultan by proposing that he would pay his tribute regularly along with a great part of demanded arrears in case of removal of Husrev from the councils.⁴⁶⁶ As Kutluoğlu states, Mehmed Ali, thus, took advantages of the rivalry between himself and Husrev while refraining from fulfilling his fiscal obligations to the Porte.⁴⁶⁷

As mentioned before, the Russian military support played important role in the conclusion of Mehmed Ali crisis. After the Kütahya Truce, the Porte and its ally signed a mutual defense pact (Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty) on 8 July 1833. Since this treaty had profound impact over the power shift in both the Ottoman administration and in European diplomacy, it is necessary to detail its context and representatives of the Porte who signed it. The treaty consisted of six public articles and one secret article. The public articles announced the peace and friendship between Russia and the Porte and provided for mutual assistance in case of independence of either part was threatened.⁴⁶⁸ According to the secret article, the Porte would protect Russia against the attack from the south by closing Dardanelles to any foreign vessels of war in the event of armed contest.⁴⁶⁹ In the international level, the issue of the Straits alarmed European capitals for taking immediate measures against the growing influence of Russia over the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, diplomatic traffic of the Porte witnessed unprecedented growth which contributed the rise of civil bureaucracy, and in the following peace period of 1833 and 1839, influence of both Britain and Mustafa Reşid increased.

Regarding the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi's impact on Husrev's power relation, he was one of three bureaucrats who signed it on behalf of the Porte. In fact, the Treaty was held in the residence of Husrev who with Âkif Pasha and Ahmet Fevzi Pasha* represented the Porte. In that time, Âkif Pasha was the chief scribe and his was in rivalry with Pertev who was steward to grand vizier Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha**.⁴⁷⁰ As Findley states; because Mahmud

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid, p.288

⁴⁶⁷ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.27

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., p.106

⁴⁶⁹ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, p.66

* Ahmed Fevzi was the commander of guards whose rivalry with Husrev had damaged the military operation during the Syrian Campaign

** Second protector of Husrev after Küçük Hüseyin Pasha

II tried to bend on controlling the government from the palace by replacing Reşid Mehmed with Mehmed Emin who was known with colorless character, the rivalry between Âkif and Pertev, bureaucrats of the two top posts at the Sublime Porte after the grand vizierate, affected bureaucracy at its highest level.⁴⁷¹

In the summer of 1836, British Ambassador Ponsonby demanded dismissal of Âkif Pasha on the ground of his maltreatment of W.Churchill, a British subject who was imprisoned for shooting an Ottoman boy while hunting.⁴⁷² When Ponsonby caused the dismissal of Âkif Pasha from the post of foreign minister, Âkif-Pertev rivalry gained the form of polarization between pro-British and pro-Russian bureaucrats. Subsequently, the other two signers of the Russo-Ottoman treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi were also removed from the power: Husrev dismissed from the post of *seraskerlik* in January 1837 while Ahmed Fevzi lost his proximity to the sultan.⁴⁷³ As this event suggests, influence of European ambassadors to the Porte began to play determinant role in the intra-elite rivalries by the middle of 1830s. Owing much to his network, Âkif re-established his influence to the extent that he suggested changing title of his post (*umur-ı mülkiye nazırı*) to interior minister (*dahiliye nazırı*) in order to gain an equal position to his nemesis Pertev at the post of foreign minister (*hariciye nazırı*) and succeeded in it.⁴⁷⁴ After then, he began to put pressure on Mahmud II for making Pertev executed. In this showdown, support of Husrev seems to play important role.

Regarding Husrev's involvement with the Âkif-Pertev rivalry, Findley states that he initiated double intrigue: He tried to gain Pertev's good will, in case the latter should somehow remain in power, while, at the same time, collaborated with associates at the palace and with Âkif to topple Pertev.⁴⁷⁵ To the report of Ponsonby, *Serasker* Halil Rifat and Husrev deceived Pertev for expressing his concerns about inability of the state to meet expense of

⁴⁷⁰ For the origin of this rivalry see Findley, Carter Vaughn, "Factional Rivalries in Ottoman Istanbul: the Fall of Pertev Paşa, 1837," in *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, vol 10, pp.127-134 and Findley, V. Carter, "The Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: The Beginning of Bureaucratic Reforms under Selim III and Mahmud II," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol.3, No.4. (Oct., 1972), pp.388-416. Findley states that Akif-Pertev rivalry went far back to contestation of their patrons Mustafa Mazhar Efendi and Galib Pasha under whom they served together as clerks (hulefa) in the Amedi office of the Sublime Porte. Through kinship ties and patronage, Pertev expanded his influence over the Palace by the mid-1830s: His son-in-law Vassaf Efendi was a secretary at palace and a favorite of Mahmud II. His brother Emin Efendi served as supervisor of military supply (*mühimmat-ı harbiye nazırı*) while some of the leading proteges of Pertev served under Akif, in what became in the year of 1836 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁷¹ Findley, "Factional Rivalries in Ottoman Istanbul: the Fall of Pertev Paşa, 1837," pp.127-134, p.129

⁴⁷² İnalçık, Halil, "Âkif Paşa," İA (MEB), vol.I, pp.242-246, p.243

⁴⁷³ Findley, "Factional Rivalries in Ottoman Istanbul: the Fall of Pertev Paşa, 1837," pp.127-134, p.131

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., p.132

regular army and for supporting maintenance of a militia (*redif*).⁴⁷⁶ Damad Said Bey, another protégé of Husrev, told Perteve that Sultan Mahmud was of the same opinion about disbanding the regular troops but wanted to consult Perteve first. At the end, this intrigue concluded with the execution of Perteve when the Sultan was convinced that Perteve was an opponent to military reforms.⁴⁷⁷

Levy, on the other hand, argues that Perteve's opposition to the formation of further regular troops was not result of Husrev's intrigue. To the author, Perteve deliberately tried to curb excessive power of military. In 1835, a special law equalized hierarchical order and gradation of honorific titles of military (*seyfiyye*) with that of administrative (*kalemiye*) and religious-judicial (*ilmiye*) branches of the state organization.⁴⁷⁸ Worse still, the military establishment outnumbered the religious and civil hierarchy and bureaucrats in the other department of the administration resented to Husrev for this trend.⁴⁷⁹ Levy associates Perteve's opposition to the formation of new troops and his efforts in reduction its number with this resentment.⁴⁸⁰ Although they give different account about the role of Husrev's intrigue, both author links the fall of Perteve with his opposition to the empowerment of army. All in all, Mahmud seemed to perceive Perteve as an obstacle for his military reforms while the latter was well aware of that rise of army means further influence of Husrev over the other branches of state apparatus. In light of this event, it might be argued that institutional modernization of the state apparatus intertwined with the intra-elite rivalries, which gained more complex form especially after the inclusion of the European ambassadors into the network of leading bureaucrats.

IV.3: Mustafa Reşid and the Centralization Projects

Execution of Perteve Pasha had profound impact on his disciples, including Mustafa Reşid. Therefore it is not surprising that Mustafa Reşid put both Âkif and Husrev on trial on the ground of their involvement in "bribery" just three years after the death of Perteve.⁴⁸¹ In

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., p.133

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁸ Levy, Avigdor, *The Military Policy of Mahmud II*, p.475

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid, p.476

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Kırılı, Cengiz, "Yolsuzluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi," in *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, vol.IV (Autumn, 2006), pp.45-119

these three years, Mustafa Reşid's contributions to centralization projects enabled him to gather enough power to eliminate rivals of his the late protector. Regarding his rise in the administration, Cevdet Pasha states that: "When the Ottoman Empire was divided into two parts [during the second Syrian Campaign], the foreign minister Reşid Pasha overcame kölemen Mehmed Ali and forced him to put his sword back into its sheath, thus he rescued the state from this danger".⁴⁸² What is striking in his statement is that Cevdet Pasha attributes heroic roles of men of sword (*seyfiyye*) to Reşid Pasha while describing his diplomatic success through metaphor of sword and fight. In other words, Reşid seemed to take over the responsibility of *Serasker* Husrev in the Mehmed Ali crisis by conducting both reforms and diplomatic relations.

After the Konya defeat, Mehmed Ali crisis led the Porte to attempt to replace households with western-style institutions. This was a reversal of the state-led empowerment of households since their all functions were gradually transferred to the newly-established institutions during the period. In the first chapter, we detailed how elite households assumed former functions of *devshirme* system, *timar* system and the palace school. In 1833-1834, the modernization projects tried to transfer all these military, educational, fiscal, and administrative functions of the households to the western-style institutions. In this process, all the ties through which a head of household and his men established mutual-loyalty were weakened. Accordingly, main precept of household tradition, attachment to the persona of master, went through dramatic change and the sultan as the head of imperial household was not an exception. In this transformation period, Mustafa Reşid gained influence as the leading supporter of the centralization projects and then he used this influence in his attempt to eliminate households from the Ottoman politics. A closer look to the centralization project of the period may help to detail these shifts in relation with Husrev-Mehmed Ali rivalry.

First, establishment of the military academy in 1834 reduced the influence of households -especially that of Husrev- within the army. Mehmed Namık Pasha, founding father of the officer's school, met with M. Maison –commander of French forces replacing the *Cihadiye* Troops in Morea in 1828- and recounted the latter's observations about the differences between Mehmed Ali's army and that of the Porte to the Sultan.⁴⁸³ For him, lack of schools and the ignorance of senior and junior officers which consisted of son of

⁴⁸² Baysun, Cavid (ed.), *Cevdet Paşa Tezâkir* 1-12, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1991, p. 8 ". "Hariciye nâzırı Reşid Paşa kölemen Mehmed Ali Paşa'ya galebe ederek onun kılıcını kınına kondurdu ve devleti bu muhataradan kurtardı."

⁴⁸³ Levy, "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud's New Army, 1826-1839," pp. 21-39, p.32-3

dignitaries and of the slaves of the viziers were main reason for the ill performance of the Ottoman troops when compared the *Cihadiye* Army of Mehmed Ali.⁴⁸⁴ This observation was, actually, suggesting the placement of household tradition with military colleges in gathering and training new officers. Despite Husrev's objection on the ground of economy, School of Military Sciences (*Mekteb-i Ulûm-u Harbiye*) was established in the summer of 1834 and its battalion directly attached to Namık Pasha's brigade of Guards and placed under the command of the *Hâssa* headquarters in order to evade Husrev's interference.⁴⁸⁵ In the next step, Husrev was dismissed from the post of *serasker* in January 1837 and Halil Rifat replaced him. For Moltke, Husrev's dismissal surprised people of Istanbul for many reasons:

It was said that Damad Halil and Said are among the people whose intrigue resulted in the fall of Husrev. Damad Halil Pasha was former slave of Husrev and became son-in-law of the Sultan through his master mediation. Said Pasha recently married little daughter of the sultan, for which Husrev spend nearly half million thaler. Since Husrev was as strong as to make his thirty two slaves appointed as Pasha and governor of various provinces, the Sultan's dare in dismissing him without the execution "*kellesini koltuğunun altına verdirmeden*" signifies a new development that was impossible in the past.⁴⁸⁶

As Moltke narrates, Husrev formed very composite and extensive network covering many provincial governors, two *damads* of the sultan, and numerous high-ranking officers in the army. It seems that Mahmud attempted to reduce this extensive influence of Husrev through divide and rule policy in which he sided with Halil Rifat and Mehmed Said against their former patron. Considering that, many of Husrev's protégés were in the high-rank positions of the army and they gained expertise for nearly 10 years; overall exclusion of his household might paralyze the ongoing centralization projects. Rather than taking such risk, Mahmud seemed to keep some of these people in their place as far as he could distance them from Husrev. This concern might also be the reason behind Mahmud's avoidance of sending Husrev to death. After three years of his dismissal, Husrev was, for instance, appointed to the chairmanchief of Reform Committee (*Meclis-i Vâlâ*) and Engelhardt associates this appointment with Mustafa Reşid's similar concern: He called Husrev to active duty in order

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., p.32

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., p.33

⁴⁸⁶ Moltke, *Türkiye'deki Durum ve Olaylar*, p.78

to use his influence over the provinces, thus making provincial reforms easily accepted by the locals.⁴⁸⁷

Second, the foundation of officer's school was followed by the educational reform for civil officials. In the departments of civil bureaucracy, master-apprentice relation had been the basis of training for the young scribes. New regulations eliminated the entry of apprentices into the rank of bureaucracy (with the exception of Translation Office) before the age of 18 and thus educational functions of the departments were gradually transferred to the imperial colleges.⁴⁸⁸ For the new candidates of the state offices, the *School of Education (Mekteb-i Maarifi Adliye)* and the School of Literary Education (*Mekteb-i Ulum-ı Edebiyye*) were established, providing French, Arabic, history, political science, geography, and mathematic lessons.⁴⁸⁹ With the formation of these institutions, the role of the education given in the residence of leading bureaucrats and in the state offices began to decrease. Accordingly, the intermediary role of households in the access to the bureaucracy began to lose its former importance. Göçek analyzes the outcome of this shift as following: "As the sultan and his immediate palace household utilized western-style educational institutions to prepare a new social group with which to replace office-households and provincial households, they, in turn forced to relinquish their power to this new group of Ottoman bureaucratic bourgeoisie."⁴⁹⁰ She adds that the education reforms and centralization attempt of Mahmud II did not only weaken the power of households but also changed the balance between the Palace and the graduates of the newly-established schools.⁴⁹¹ In similar way, Findley associates these reforms with "the end of the age of households" in which adoption of salary system and abolition of annual appointment system reduced the dependent relation between the head of office-households and officials.⁴⁹² Since these reforms developed in relation with Mehmed Ali crisis, it is now necessary to touch upon the impact of the Second Syrian Campaign (1839) over the centralization projects of the Porte.

⁴⁸⁷ Engelhardt, (trans. Ayda Düz), *Türkiye ve Tanzimat Hareketleri*, Milliyet Yayınları, p.58

⁴⁸⁸ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp.38-39

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, p.52

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., p.138

⁴⁹² Findley, Carter Vaughn, "Political Culture and the Great Households," in Suraiya N. Faroqi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603—1839*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp.65-81, p.80

IV.4: The Second Syrian Campaign

One of the main reasons of the military reforms was to re-gain losses of the Kütahya Truce. Although Mahmud II was eager to initiate another campaign as early as 1834 British and Russian pressure dissuaded him. British Foreign Secretary Palmerston was opposing Mehmed Ali because of his alliance with the French but he discerned that it would be disastrous for Mahmud to attack before the military reforms had been given time to develop some real substance in the army.⁴⁹³ Therefore both the Ottomans and Palmerston searched for alternative solutions. Çelik's study reveals that Gözlüklü Reşid Mehmed Beg's –one of Husrev's slave who was in France for the education- proposed a plan for the assassination of Mehmed Ali in the year of 1836.⁴⁹⁴ According to the intrigue, Reşid Beg will offer his service to Mehmed Ali by stating that the fall of his patron made it impossible for him to find an office in the Porte and if he receives a positive answer, he would go Egypt and then poison Mehmed Ali.⁴⁹⁵ When the Grand Vizer of the time, Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha, asked Mahmud II for his opinion, the Sultan approved this assassination plan and instructed him to inform the Foreign Minister Mustafa Reşid if necessary.⁴⁹⁶ This plan, though not realized, may give an idea about the complexity of the Porte's reaction to Mehmed Ali crisis: the Porte seemed to apply to every possible ways ranging from an assassination plan to the search for the support of European states.

Mustafa Reşid was informed about the details of this plan when he was in Britain. In the previous year (1835), he was in Paris to solve the Algerian Question. He served as ambassador of Paris until September 1836, then he was transferred to London and in July 1837, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs with the rank of Vizier.⁴⁹⁷ In this period, Mustafa Reşid was concurrently Foreign Minister and Ambassador to Britain. As Findley recounts, Russian Ambassador Baron von Stürmer reported that Foreign Ministry in 1837 existed nominally since its minister Mustafa Reşid was away from Istanbul, its undersecretary Nuri Efendi was in Paris and *Beylikçi* Sârim Efendi was *en route* to

⁴⁹³ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.50

⁴⁹⁴ Çelik, Yüksel, "Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın Bâbiâli'ye Karşı Tutumu ve 1836'da Kendisi için Hazırlanan Suikast Planı," in *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* 20, İstanbul, 2009, pp.69-100

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., p.96

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid., p.92

⁴⁹⁷ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.28

London.⁴⁹⁸ In light of these, personal relations rather than corporate decision-making of the foreign ministry seem to shape the Ottoman diplomacy of the time. In this context, particularly collaboration of Palmerston and Mustafa Reşid seems to have profound impact on the course of Mehmed Ali crisis.

While introducing the main nemesis of Mehmed Ali, Fahmy says that it “was not Sultan Mahmud, not even Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, but Mehmed Husrev Pasha”. What made Palmerston one of three men on this list was the contesting interests of Mehmed Ali and Britain. Palmerston, apart from his personal hostility, perceived Mehmed Ali as the main obstacle for the British interest in Asia, especially after the first Syrian Campaign, expanding his rule far beyond the borders of Egypt.⁴⁹⁹ According to Fahmy, the fear that Mehmed Ali’s expansion toward Asia would bring about an Egyptian-Russian alliance led Parmerston to find a way of confining Mehmed Ali’s power into Egypt without, at the meantime, enhancing the influence of Russia in Istanbul or the French in Cairo.⁵⁰⁰ Because his government was unwilling to provide the Porte with military support, Palmerston tried to curb Mehmed Ali’s power through economic sanctions, such as the abolition of monopolies -the main financial source of the Egyptian army.⁵⁰¹ In London, he closely collaborated with Mustafa Reşid in order to convince the sultan to realize this plan. Although Palmerston allied himself with Mustafa Reşid to expand his influence over the Porte, the latter had numerous rivals in Istanbul. According to Çelik, even Mustafa Reşid’s appointment to the embassy to London was the result of Âkif Pasha’s intrigue.⁵⁰²

Mustafa Reşid dealt with the reform drafts covering the abolishment of *müsadere*, corvée (angarya), prohibition of bribery, and the implementation of a new taxation system in the pilot area of Hudavendigâr and Gelibolu.⁵⁰³ Âkif Pasha and other opponents of reforms, convinced Mahmud II that these reforms would restrict his sultanic authority and they made Mustafa Reşid appointed to London in order to use his absence to end his influence.⁵⁰⁴ Meanwhile, a new development alarmed the Porte to take immediate measures: On May 25,

⁴⁹⁸ Findley, “The Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: The Beginning of Bureucratic Reforms under Selim III and Mahmud II,” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.3, No.4. (Oct., 1972), pp.388-418, p.408

⁴⁹⁹ Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, p.304

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p.300

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid*.

⁵⁰² Çelik, Yüksel, “Tanzimat’ın İlanı,” *Liberal ve Muhafazakâr Kanatlar Arasında Nüfûz Mücadelesi (1839-1855)*,” in *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi*, vol.19, İstanbul, pp.285-6

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, 285-6

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid*.

1838, Mehmed Ali manifested his intention to establish himself an independent monarch to guarantee that his heirs would take over his post after his death.⁵⁰⁵ In the face of this threat, the Porte mobilized its army while Palmerston and Mustafa Reşid convinced the sultan to agree commercial treaty of Balta Limanı (August 1838), abolishing all monopolies throughout the Ottoman Empire.

Besides, Husrev was recalled to active duty and thus he began to preside over the councils of Egypt crisis held in his residence.⁵⁰⁶ As usual, Mahmud II seemed to bring Husrev into the forefront to maintain his supreme position vis-à-vis Mehmed Ali. For me, this strategy was part and parcel of the Ottoman political culture, which provided the sultan and his bureaucrats with a theatre stage to conduct their interactions on a legitimate ground. Moltke, for instance, describes the positions of Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali in the period of two Syria Campaigns as following: “they were just two equal wrestlers giving an illusion of inactivity although they were in a struggle with full force”.⁵⁰⁷ Mahmud II seems to try to reverse this image by presenting Mehmed Ali’s challenge as an intra-elite rivalry between his two bureaucrats. I am not saying that Husrev-Mehmed Ali contestation was totally constructed/imagined. As detailed throughout this thesis, Selim III and Mahmud II splitted the bureaucrats into rival factions and played them off against each other. Thus they aimed to maintain their supreme positions by preventing overly empowerment of a certain bureaucrat. Mahmud II, for instance, balanced the power of Mehmed Ali in the Morea Campaign by appointing his nemesis Husrev as the grand admiral as did he to balance influence of the latter in the *Mansure* Army by appointing Ahmed Fevzi to the commands of guards. Although this policy helped the sultans to maintain their central position in the Ottoman imperial structure, the intra-elite rivalries paralyzed the running of all state affairs. For instance, one of the main reasons behind İbrahim’s advance was intra-elite contestations in the army, which rendered well-coordination of the commanders impossible. As we will detail below, Abdülmecid, the successor of Mahmud II, and the leading bureaucrats of his time acknowledged that the unique solution of Mehmed Ali crisis was to urgently conduct reforms in the harmony/unity especially after the military defeat at the Nezib Battle.

Unlike the first Syria Campaign, all European powers were closely monitoring the Porte-Mehmed Ali tension in 1839. Because they were against an armed conflict, the Porte

⁵⁰⁵ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.50

⁵⁰⁶ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.27

⁵⁰⁷ Motke, *Türkiye'deki Durum*, p.314

tried to evade Mehmed Ali's threat by stimulating a general uprising among the population of Syria under the rule of İbrahim.⁵⁰⁸ Meanwhile, the Ottoman army under the command of Hâfiz Pasha was stationed at eastern Anatolia and the reconnaissance troops collected information about İbrahim's army. According to the reports of the Ottoman officers and the British consul of Bagdad, Mehmed Ali was gathering new soldiers to capture the Basra region.⁵⁰⁹ Worse still, Ali Rızâ Pasha, governor of Bagdad, reported that Mehmed Ali's military activity stimulated Iran to plan an attack to the border region across Bagdad and he asked the Porte to send reinforcements.⁵¹⁰ Subsequently, the European powers decided to arrange a meeting to discuss Mehmed Ali crisis while the Porte accelerated its war preparations. Apparently, the Porte maintained its diplomatic relations with the representatives of Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia while, at the same time, attempting to solve Mehmed Ali crisis on its own by mobilizing its troops in secrecy.⁵¹¹ It is also important to note that the Porte made a great effort to conduct this war effort within the framework of new reforms as with the mission of İzzet Efendi.

For the fortification of Konya, the Porte sent necessary money to Hacı Ali Pasha, governor of the city, and then dispatched Hacı İzzet Efendi to inspect the preparations and to inform Hafız Pasha about the propaganda activities in the Cebel-i Lübnân region.⁵¹² The Porte used its central treasury to cover the expenditures of this mission and instructed Hacı İzzet not to impose any extra taxes of the old order (*usûl-i atîka üzere şuradan buradan alınan akçe ve hediyeye*) over the subject people.⁵¹³ As this case implies, the Porte attempted to bring the interactions of its agents with the subject people into the line of new reforms during the Second Syrian Campaign. There were various reasons for this changing governmentality. As mentioned above, the Porte's main goal was to solve the Mehmed Ali crisis without the European intervention. To be able to realize this plan, the Ottoman administration had to win support of the society for reforms and for the struggle against Mehmed Ali. The new adjustment made for Friday sermons may help to grasp this point:

Normally, Friday prayer sermons had been exclusively religious guidance speeches given in Arabic language which was not understandable

⁵⁰⁸ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.50

⁵⁰⁹ Ahmed Lütüfî, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütüfî Efendi Tarihi*, vol.VI, p.993-4

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., p.999 "...kendi göbeğini kendi keserek eyâdî-i ecnebiyyenin müdahaleden kesilmelerini emel etmiş oluyor"

⁵¹² Ibid., p.994

⁵¹³ Ibid.

by most of the Turkish speaking people...Sheikh efendis delivering these speeches are now instructed to translate sermons into Turkish containing now religious, worldly and mystic advices fitting the period that they live in, and leading people to beneficent calls of the sultanate. It is such a great service and tradition, to announce imperial declarations to the public through the proper language considering all people from any walk of life, especially when it comes to fight against enemies of Islam.⁵¹⁴

Judging by this adjustment it seems that the Porte acknowledged inefficiency of its army in eliminating the threat of Mehmed Ali and began to consider the possibility of waging a total war. In order to be able to mobilize the subject people in such war, the Porte should firstly conflate the interest of the subject people with that of empire. In other words, the Ottoman administration should eliminate arbitrary treatments of its agents to the subject people to form a common front. Actually, this was an attempt to make a peace settlement with its subject people. As we will detail in the context of the Tanzimat Edict and the following reforms, the Porte admitted these arbitrary treatments by defining them as 'usûl-i zulmiyye'. It is also important to note that the Porte could not materialize this total war as a pitched battle at Nezib but as the empowerment of the empire by implementation of reforms with the growing participation of the subject people and with the well-coordination of bureaucrats. In April 1839, Hafiz Pasha advanced toward Aleppo to instigate a general revolt against İbrahim but could not win the support of locals. As Shaw states, Mehmed Ali established so effective civil and military bureaucracy in Syria that enabled him to rebut the Porte's propaganda activities.⁵¹⁵ Two months later, İbrahim's troops defeated the Ottoman army at Nezib (June 24, 1839). This defeat was followed by a political turmoil: On 30 June, Mahmud II died and Husrev staged a coup d'état in the accession ceremony of Abdülmecid.

IV.5: Coup d'état of Husrev Pasha and the Promulgation of the Tanzimat

After seizing the seal of authority of grand vizier from the hands of Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha, Husrev appointed himself as the grand vizier and placed his men to the key

⁵¹⁴ Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.IV, p.1005

⁵¹⁵ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.50 Kutluoğlu details some revolts against İbrahim Pasha such as the upheaval of Druses against İbrahim Pasha's method of conscription and adds that the Sultan could not take direct steps to take advantage of this revolt because Britain and France had warned him to show restraint. For further details see., Kutluoğlu, *The Egyptian Question*, p.124

positions, restored Halil Rifat to the post of *serasker*.⁵¹⁶ This coup d'état deteriorated Mehmed Ali crisis in many ways. Above all, Grand Admiral Ahmed Fevzi, nicknamed traitor (*hain/firari*), handed the Ottoman fleet to Mehmed Ali. According to rumor, towards the end of the reign of Mahmud II, Husrev along with some bureaucrats tried to depose the Sultan, who suffered an incurable illness, in favor of Abdülmecid.⁵¹⁷ A group led by Ahmed Fevzi tried to save the Sultan by killing Abdülmecid.⁵¹⁸ When Abdülmecid, Husrev and his protégé Halil Rifat came to power, Ahmed Fevzi escaped to Egypt to save his life. As might be expected, Ahmed Fevzi's statement was quite different: the fear that Husrev, the main nemesis of Mehmed Ali, might use his new power to turn the fleet over Russia in preparation of joint attack drove him to do so.⁵¹⁹ When Ahmed Fevzi encountered the French fleet, on his way to Egypt, he even told the French captain that Sultan Mahmud had been murdered by Husrev and Halil Rifat Pashas, who were planning to surrender the Ottoman Empire into the hands of Russian.⁵²⁰ Husrev, in return, sent letters to senior officers in the Ahmed Fevzi's fleet, in which he asked them to arrest Ahmed Fevzi and to return the fleet to Istanbul.⁵²¹ When Mehmed Ali was informed about these correspondences, he sent two letters (on 27 June and on 16 August, 1840) directly to Husrev, calling upon him to resign his office and retire to private life.⁵²²

In the first letter, Mehmed Ali used the case of Ahmed Fevzi in his attempt to present Husrev as the main responsible for the ongoing crisis. Accordingly, he stated that the lack of security (*emniyyetsizlik*) in the Ottoman administration, resulting from the presence of Husrev, was the main reason which led many officers and leading bureaucrats to jointly decide to bring the fleet to Egypt.⁵²³ Then, he emphasized that these people -like he himself- were not opposing or revolting to the Ottoman state but they were expressing their discontent to Husrev.⁵²⁴ He went on by stating that Husrev's resignation would be beneficent for both the Ottoman Empire and Muslims.⁵²⁵ In the second letter, Mehmed Ali especially complained about Husrev's treatment putting him in the place of a foreigner by ignoring his successful

⁵¹⁶ Ibid., p.55

⁵¹⁷ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.29

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

⁵¹⁹ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.56

⁵²⁰ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.142

⁵²¹ Ibid., p.143

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ Ahmed Lütüfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütüfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.VI, p.1015

⁵²⁴ Ibid., 1014-5

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

efforts for the well-being of the Ottoman state and Muslims.⁵²⁶ As Kutluoğlu states, Mehmed Ali used the issue of the Ottoman fleet as a bargaining chip in order to convince the Porte to recognize his hereditary rule over the territories under his administration and to occasion the removal of Husrev.⁵²⁷ Thus, the rivalry of Mehmed Ali and Husrev, once again, complicated the Egyptian problem and brought deadlock to the negotiations between the Porte and Mehmed Ali.⁵²⁸

In these turbulent times, Mustafa Reşid was in Britain. After he was informed about the death of Mahmud and the following coup of Husrev, he wrote his concerns to Palmerston. In his letter, Mustafa Reşid emphasized the importance of establishing a new system (un système immuablement établi) rooting on immutable/unchangeable principles.⁵²⁹ According to Mustafa Reşid, there were close links between the replacement of person-based rule with this system; confinement of autocracy; growing loyalty of people to state; their support to reforms; and the resurgence of the Ottoman Empire.⁵³⁰ When Mustafa Reşid returned to Istanbul to pay homage to the new sultan, he realized once again that overly personalized Ottoman politics was not only threatening the empire but also his own life. According to Mehmed Galib, Husrev reminded Abdülmecid that Sultan Mahmud had ordered the execution of Mustafa Reşid and advised him to fulfill his father's will but could not convince the new sultan.⁵³¹ Besides, Mustafa Reşid's protector, Pertev Pasha, was executed just two years ago and Husrev's coup d'état led some bureaucrats to think that their lives would end in the same way. Having connected to each other, the defeat at Nezib Battle, the death of Mahmud, coup d'état of Husrev, the growing aggression of Mehmed Ali, Ahmed Fevzi's surrendering of the imperial navy to Egypt, drove the Ottomans into a great pessimism.⁵³² It was this state of crisis which united formerly contesting bureaucrats on the common cause that they could save their own lives and that of the Ottoman Empire by urgently solving Mehmed Ali crisis.

Regarding this issue, Ahmed Cevdet states that even those bureaucrats who were not content with the reforms gave consent to the promulgation of the Tanzimat in order to solve

⁵²⁶ Ibid, p.1016

⁵²⁷ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.27

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ Mardin, Şerif, "Tanzimat Fermanı'nın Manâsı: Yeni Bir İzah Denemesi," *Tanzimat, Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012, Ankara, pp.145-169, p.150

⁵³⁰ Ibid.

⁵³¹ Quoted in Kaynar, Reşat, *Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Tanzimat*, TTK, Ankara, 1991, p.160-1

⁵³² Kaynar, Reşat, *Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Tanzimat*, TTK, Ankara, 1991, p.160

Mehmed Ali crisis.⁵³³ Thus, on 3 November 1839, the Foreign Minister Mustafa Reşid could proclaim the Tanzimat Edict (*Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu*) promising the establishment of new institutions that would guarantee the sultan's subjects' security of life, honor, and property; form a regular system to assess and levy taxes, and to develop new methods to assure a fair system of military service. This edict was, actually, embodiment of what Mustafa Reşid called as 'un système immuablement établi'. In similar way, Lütfi Efendi depicts the outcome of Tanzimat Edict as the subjection of the Ottoman Empire to law (*Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye âdetâ Devlet-i Aliyye'yi bir kanun-ı cedîde rabt u tesvîk eylemiştir*).⁵³⁴

Because the threatening state of Mehmed Ali's issue and the crisis atmosphere prevalent in the Porte opened a path for the promulgation of Tanzimat, the edict primarily focused on the issue of security. The edict, for instance, associated the escape of Ahmed Fevzi with the lack of security.⁵³⁵ In order to protect the bureaucrats and the running of state affairs from the danger of intra-elite rivalries, the consultancy tradition (*meşveret*) was institutionalized. First, the Council of Judicial Ordinances (*Meclis-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye*) was made the sole consultative and legislative body, supplanting the Council of the Porte.⁵³⁶ Second, the rule of unanimity voting was adopted and the bureaucrats were supposed to pledge loyalty to the decisions of the council. Regarding the capital punishment, it was announced that "until the pleas of the criminal are examined and adjudged publicly, in accordance with the laws of the sharia, no one shall be executed, secretly or publicly."⁵³⁷

For the security of subject people, the edict promised to replace the tax-farming system with new system in which tax-payers were assigned to pay suitable tax according their ability and possessions. While explaining the necessity of this shift, the edict associated oppression of old order with *mütesellims*. Like the letter of Tahmisçioğlu, the Tanzimat Edict condemned *mütesellims* in the strongest possible terms ("pençe-ü cebr ü", cemî-ı harekât ü sekanâtı gadr u zulmden") and stated how tax-farming system resulted in the concentration of political and economic power at the hands of such oppressors in detrimental way to the

⁵³³ Baysun, Cavid (ed.), Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir* 1-12, p.7

⁵³⁴ Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.IV-V, p.1048

⁵³⁵ Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.VI, p. 1027 "şöyle ki dünyada candan ve ırz ü nâmustan e'az bir şey olmadığından bir âdem anları tehlikede gördükçe hilkat-i zâtiyye ve cibilliyet-i fitriyyesinde hiyânete meyl olmasa bile muhafaza-i cân u nâmusu için elbette ba'zı sûretlere teşebbüs edeceği ve bu dahi devlet ve memlekete muzır olageldiği müsellemler olduğu misillü..."

⁵³⁶ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.61

⁵³⁷ Ibid., p.60-1

subject people.⁵³⁸ Considering that İbrahim was the *mütesellim* of Adana region at that time, the Edict might have aimed to illegitimate his position in the eyes of subject people. After emphasizing the link between the just rule and patriotism of people, the edict stated that “if property is fully secure, then, the individual would care for his own affairs and his zeal for state and *millet* and love of motherland will increase daily...”⁵³⁹ Then it made promises for regulation of military services and abolishment of bribery through the expansion of salary system to all bureaucrats and stated that these new regulations would cover all subject of the Empire.

We may now question to which degree Tanzimat edict altered the power relations between the sultan, bureaucrats, and subject people. The power of the sultan over the property, the life and death of bureaucrats were transferred to the Council of Judicial Ordinances that marks a rupture from *kul* system. Thus, the bureaucrats gained more secure position vis-à-vis sultan but, at the same time, their control over the imperial tax sources were also reduced through the abolishment of the tax-farming system. It is also important to note that high-ranking bureaucrats and *vâlis* began to receive salary equivalent to their former wealth they had generated from the tax-farming system. As Kırılı points out, the fear that the cutting off salaries would alienate these bureaucrats to the reforms led the administration to adopt this policy.⁵⁴⁰ The change was that the gift-giving economy was included into the framework of bribery and centrally appointed *muhassıls* began to collect taxes directly.⁵⁴¹ Although deficiencies in *muhassılık* system forced the central administration to return to old system within two years, high-ranking bureaucrats began to loose their connections with local power focii.⁵⁴²

Apart from the implementation of reforms, the Porte maintained its diplomatic relations with European powers vis-à-vis the challenge of Mehmed Ali. After the removal of Husrev from the post of grand vizier in May 1840, Mehmed Ali and his French alliances also accelerated the diplomatic negotiations with the Porte in order to convince the Ottomans to

⁵³⁸ Ahmed Lütfi, *Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi*, vol.VI, p.1027-8 “...hiçbir vakitte semere-i nafi'ası görülemeyen iltizâmât usûl-i muzırması el-yevm câri olarak bu ise bir memleketin mesâlih-i siyâsiyye ve umûr-ı mâliyyesini bir âdemin yed-i ihtiyârına ve belki pençe-i cebr ü kahrına teslim demek olarak ol dahi eğer zaten bir iyice âdem değil ise hemen kendi çıkarına bakıp cemî-i harekât ü sekenâtı gadr u ve zulmden ibâret olmasıyla ba'dezîn ahâlî-i memâlikden her ferdin emlâk u kudretine göre bir vergi-yi münâsip t'yin olunarak...”

⁵³⁹ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.II, p.60

⁵⁴⁰ Kırılı, Cengiz, “Yolsuzluğun İcadı,” p.77

⁵⁴¹ Ibid., pp.49-61

⁵⁴² Ibid.

settle the peace without the involvement of the other Powers.⁵⁴³ In the end, the Porte resolved Mehmed Ali crisis with the joint intervention of European states. On 12 July 1840, representatives of the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Britain, Prussia, and Austria signed the London Agreement: Europeans agreed to support the Porte against Mehmed Ali in return for its agreement to close the Straits to battleships in war and peace.⁵⁴⁴ Soon after the agreement, they gave Mehmed Ali an ultimatum to withdraw from Syria, Adana, Crete and Arabia and forced him to deal with the sultan. According to the Imperial edict of 1 June 1841, the sultan named Mehmed Ali as governor of Egypt for life and recognized hereditary rights of his male descendants in return his reduction the size of Egypt army to 18.000 in war times and obliged him to execute treaties signed between the Porte and the European powers in Egypt.⁵⁴⁵

This final settlement of Egyptian crisis marks the beginning of the new era for many reasons and Cevdet Pasha perfectly depicts them. First, he narrates how the rivalry of Mehmed Ali with Husrev Mehmed lost its importance in the former's negotiations with the Porte: Mehmed Ali now tried to make the amount of tribute of Egypt reduced by offering a bribe Mustafa Reşid.⁵⁴⁶ As detailed, internalization of Mehmed Ali crisis contributed to the rise of civil bureaucracy in the Ottoman administration, which would dominate over the Ottoman politics until the reign of Abdülhamid II. In this Tanzimat era, Mehmed Emin Âli and Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad -disciples of Mustafa Reşid- with other leading reformists tried to expand reforms in order to bring all branches of the governmental apparatus into more centralized and professionalized line.⁵⁴⁷ Was this end of the influence of household tradition and intra-elite contestations over the Ottoman politics? Many Tanzimat bureaucrats, although they were associated with reform, rationalization and rule of law, were actually patron pashas who were frequently criticized for their arbitrary decision and favoritism, as Riedler states.⁵⁴⁸ Ironically enough, Cevdet Pasha criticizes Âli Pasha for not to train personel, namely not to be patron for new candidates of the scibal offices.⁵⁴⁹ Considering that Cevdet Pasha himself was one of the leading Tanzimat bureaucrats, his criticis perfecty captures how deeply household and patronage tradition entagled in the political culture of

⁵⁴³ Kutluoğlu, *the Egyptian Question*, p.158. Regarding the dismissal of Husrev, Kutluoğlu touches upon the rumor about the intrigues of the Sultan's mother and her trustees, who were suspected of being in alliance with Mehmed Ali.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.57

⁵⁴⁵ Fahmy, *All The Pasha's Men*, p.291

⁵⁴⁶ Baysun, Cavid (ed.), *Cevdet Paşa Tezâkir*, vo.1-12, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1991, p.8

⁵⁴⁷ Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy*, p.4

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.7

⁵⁴⁹ Halaçoğlu, Yusuf (ed.), *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa: Ma'rûzât*, Çağrı Yayınları, İstanbul, p.1

reformers. This seems also true for Midhad Pasha, another leading Tanzimat reformer, who mainly relied on the members of his own household while practicing reforms.⁵⁵⁰ Furthermore, the composition of Midhad Pasha's household suggests that some former protégés of Husrev and their relatives included themselves into the Tanzimat bureaucracy: İbrahim Edhem's son Osman Hamdi was in the retinue of Midhad Pasha.⁵⁵¹ This leads us to question careers pattern of Husrev's other protégés after the resolution of Mehmed Ali crisis.

As mentioned before, the relation of Husrev with his leading protégés Halil Rifat and Mehmed Said began to deteriorate in 1837. Although Husrev lost his power upon his dismissal from the post of grand vizier in 1840, and his following trial -prohibiting his contact with other bureaucrats- Mehmed Said and Halil Rifat seemed to remain in power through their intimate connections with the palace.⁵⁵² In the following years, Mahmud Celaledin, the son of Halil Rifat also became a *damad* of the dynastic family and his son Prince Sabahaddin played active political role in the movement of Jeune Turks.⁵⁵³

Regarding the relation of Mehmed Ali and the Porte, the resolution of Egypt question opened a new era for the growing traffic between Cairo and Istanbul. In this framework, Cevdet Pasha narrates how the consumption habits of relatives of Mehmed Ali were imitated by some bureaucrats of the Porte.⁵⁵⁴ Cevdet Pasha, then, touches upon the importance of external borrowing which enabled these bureaucrats to compete with the luxurious lifestyle of the Egyptians in the Tanzimat era.⁵⁵⁵ This new phenomenon, the external borrowing, seemed to provide the Tanzimat bureaucrats with an alternative source of wealth other than the provincial revenue sources. In this framework, the impact of the Egypt crisis over the growing political and financial dependency of the Tanzimat bureaucrats to the European powers and its repercussions in their relations with the society need further investigation, beyond the scope of this thesis. Lastly, the growing traffic between Cairo and İstanbul may be traced in the inclusion of Mehmed Ali's grandson Mustafa Fazıl Pasha (1829-1875) into the Ottoman central administration: He assumed important tasks in the financial affairs of the Porte until his dismissal upon his opposition to the financial policies of Fuad Pasha in

⁵⁵⁰ Ortaylı, İlber, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, p. 146.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵⁵² Ebu Manneh, Butrus, "Âli ve Fu'ad Paşaların Bâb-ı Âli'deki Nüfuzlarının Kökenleri (1855-1871)," in Halil İnalçık and Mehmed Seyitdanlıoğlu (eds.), *Tanzimat, Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012, Ankara, pp.325-335, pp.326

⁵⁵³ Alkan, Mehmed Ö., *Prens Sabahattin (Gönüllü Sürgünden Zorunlu Sürgüne)*, YKY, İstanbul, 2007

⁵⁵⁴ Halaçoğlu, Yusuf (ed.), *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa: Ma'rûzât*, Çağrı Yayınları, İstanbul, p.7

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid.

1866.⁵⁵⁶ After this struggle and the alteration of Egyptian succession rule in favor of his brother's son, he went to Paris where he maintained his criticism of the Porte claiming he was the head of a large party called Young Turkey (la Jeune Turquie).⁵⁵⁷ It is also important to note that in the alteration of Egyptian succession in 1867, the Porte conferred the title of khedive on the heirs of Mehmed Ali Pasha.⁵⁵⁸ In sum, the household of Mehmed Ali maintained its existence as the Khedivate of Egypt while the household of Husrev Mehmed was scattered upon his death although some of his protégés managed to keep their influential positions in the Ottoman administration.

⁵⁵⁶ Mardin, Şerif, *the Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, Princeton University, 2000, pp. 28-30

⁵⁵⁷ Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy*, p.28

⁵⁵⁸ Rood, "Mehmed Ali as Mutinous Khedive: The Roots of Rebellion," p.126

Conclusion

This thesis examined the rivalry between Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha within the framework of household. After they became the members of the imperial household with the mediation of their masters, they built their own households through which they did not only interact among each other but with the different segments of the Ottoman Empire. That is why I analyzed their interaction at the juncture of these intertwined power relations. Accordingly, the first chapter of this thesis focused on the household strategies of the sultan as macro sphere of the Ottoman intra-elite relations and detailed how the sultan organized their power relations through the distribute policy rooting on the division of taxpayer subject people and tax-exempted *kuls*. The chapter, then analyzed the conditions which paved the way the rise of ruling-elite households in this distributive policy and concluded that with the gradual replacement of *timar* system with tax-farming system, they began to assume functions of *timar* system, *devşirme* system and palace schools. Since these institutions helped to the sultan in attaching their servants to their persona, the rise of ruling elite household was, in one sense, re-personalization of the Ottoman administration.

The second chapter of this thesis traced how this personalization produced rivalries and factionalism among the households of the Ottoman bureaucrats and patronage networks by analyzing the contestation of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali over the governorship of the province of Egypt. The events in this chapter suggested that Selim III divided the bureaucrats into rival factions and played them off against each other. Thus he maintained his supreme position by attempting to prevent overly empowerment of a certain bureaucrat despite of the devastative impacts of this policy over the war efforts. In another words, the sultan's servants went through two-folded alienation: alienation from the rest of society as detailed in the chapter I, and alienation from each other through balance policy of the sultans. Second, this chapter detailed the impact of the master's power relations over the household-building strategies of their members. Because the household was main unit of interaction for the Ottomans, socialization culture of the head of households left a deep imprint on their members. Mehmed Ali, for instance, relied on his family members as did his protector and uncle Tosun *Ağa* while Husrev Mehmed, similarly, emulated his master Küçük Hüseyin Pasha in finding new trustees through slavery. This chapter then stressed on the interaction of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali with the composite power networks in Egypt and touched

upon the importance of intra-household alliances in the latter's success in taking the control of Cairo. Regarding the expansion of his control over entire Egypt, the last part of this chapter touched upon how he benefited from the French colonial administration, Mamluk household tradition, Selim III's military reforms, and kinship ties.

The third chapter covered the interaction of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali within the period of the Greek Revolt and the First Syria Campaign. Having connected each other, the Greek Revolt, the successful modernization projects of Mehmed Ali especially in army, the abolishment of janissaries and the formation of *Mansure* Army determined the general framework of their interaction. In this dialectic process, the Greek Revolt and empowerment of Mehmed Ali become the main driving force for the military modernization of Mahmud II. In order to be able to conduct this project, the sultan increased his economic and political pressure over the society. In this process, Husrev accumulated significant power in his hands in the capacity of *serasker* of *Mansure* Army and as the head guard of Istanbul. Mehmed Ali, in his part, dealt with the ways to expand his power over the hinterland of Egypt. In the first place, he tried to convince Mahmud II to give consent to his expansion to Syria -by sending his troops to the Morea Campaign. That Mahmud II did not fulfill Mehmed Ali's expectation and he lost his fleet at Navarino opened a new era: Mehmed Ali initiated the first Syria Campaign.

The last chapter dealt with the changing power balance between Mehmed Ali, Husrev Mehmed, and the sultan and its transformative impact over the Ottoman administration and society from the beginning of the First Syria Campaign to the London Agreement of 1840. The First Syria Campaign both revealed and manipulated the discontent of subject people and bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire to the Mahmud's way of rule. The military superiority of the Egypt army was not the only reason behind İbrahim's rapid advance in Syria and Adana regions: Mehmed Ali managed to gain the support of different segments of the Ottoman society for many reasons. Especially after the defeat of Konya Battle and the Porte's call the help of a Christian state against Mehmed Ali made legitimacy of the Ottoman administration more suspicious for many people. Mahmud II had associated the survival of the empire with the formation of modern army. Idealization of this army was coupled with stigmatization of janissaries; persecution of pro-janissaries intensified political control over society; Husrev gained an extensive power as the *serasker* of the new army; expenditures of the new army resulted in the imposition of heavy taxes; upon the failure of this new army against a Muslim

vâli the Porte asked the help of Russia. This chapter then detailed how Mehmed Ali tried to win the heart of people who one way or another blamed Mahmud II and Husrev for all these events and the resulting vicinity circle in which growing pro-Mehmed Ali tendency drove Mahmud II to adopt more exclusive policy.

Then, second part of the chapter presented the rise of the civil bureaucracy and the British influence over the Ottoman politics after the Konya Battle and Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty. This power shift was followed by the expansion of reforms and the establishment of imperial colleges that weakened the mediatory role of households in the access to the state offices. Lastly, I detailed how the defeat at the Second Syria Campaign and following political turmoil –including coup d’etat of Husrev- led to the leading bureaucrats to reach a consensus on the implementation of Tanzimat reforms urgently. As Tanzimat edict and the following laws suggest, the survival of the Ottoman Empire was now associated with the implementation of reforms. In this process, Husrev lost his former influence in favor of Mustafa Reşid and other civil bureaucrats who contributed to the resolution of the Egyptian Question through the intense diplomatic negotiations with the European Powers.

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