Rethinking Architectural Historiography

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Was there really such a thing as ‘Ottoman’ architecture? Did it possess (or represent), always, everywhere and at all levels, a universal common language? The question itself has been repeatedly posed, and neither is my first approximation to an answer going to sound entirely original. The central canon that was established in the capital for the public, monumental embodiments of imperial institutions was disseminated virtually everywhere through a whole array of mosques and tombs, baths, khans or caravanserais, bridges, hospices and graveyards. As ultimate icons of the imperial legacy, Ottoman mosques seemed to reach for and to emulate the heavens with their domes and minarets, and, within their sacred interiors, royal loggias looked upon stately ceremonies extolling the grandeur of the patrimonial, absolutist dynastic state – whose sovereign, as captured in his idealized sixteenth-century portraits, became a patron of the arts for all times. The most sumptuous among these mosques were lavishly decorated with blue-and-white wall tiles, red or crimson silks and carpets, and woodwork and metalwork that bore the insignia of the court workshops. Under the patronage of Süleyman I (d. 1566), a genius like Sinan (d. 1588) played a crucial role in both the iterative making and the transmission of a readily accessible Ottoman identity, magnified and inscribed in stone, which separated the Ottoman realm from the rest of the world.

This imperial identity also constituted an ideal for the lesser members of the Ottoman ruling elite. As a plethora of state officials, in their capacity both as military bureaucratic or provincial governor-patrons, and as artists and architects, were incorporated into ‘the Ottoman way’, certain archetypes and artistic canons, as well as rituals, ceremonies, codes and manners, designed at the court and developed at the capital, were transported to the provincial centres, serving to spread the imperial image, to co-opt provincial elites, and to legitimate Ottoman rule. So successful was this ‘Ottoman-ness’ that, even when the grip of the central administration began to weaken, the established artistic and cultural order continued to serve as an instrument of consensus.
Thus, some forces that would emerge or be labelled as ‘centrifugal’ in later centuries, such as powerful landholders, self-aggrandizing local dynasties, or communities in search of autonomy, were not as comprehensively excluded or self-excluded as is commonly thought, but came to participate in various power-sharing arrangements with the central government.

**The conventional picture: decline, decentralization and loss of imperial identity**

Much as I agree with some of the key components of this vision, there are a few elements with which I take issue. The first has to do with a certain dichotomy that is established between public monumentality and the sphere of daily, private or residential use, a distinction that concerns architecture in particular. The second has to do with the long-term dynamics emanating from this ‘classical’ stasis. Furthermore, both weak links are interconnected in various ways.

The notion of an imperial canon limited to the sphere of the state and hence to monumental architecture is too restrictive. The dearth of residential architecture in Ottoman lands, of which only a very few eighteenth- and nineteenth-century examples have survived, plays a dual role in this approach. First, it enhances the position of (mostly, but not entirely religious) monumental architecture as the sole representative of Ottoman aesthetic/visual identity, which seems to swallow and subsume all the rest. Second, as it heightens the conventional understanding of the extant, omnipresent public buildings as ‘Ottoman’, at least in Turkey residential architecture comes to be contraposed to this as ‘Turkish’. This is a manifestation of Republican nationalist ideology built around the rejection of a hated ancien régime, coupled with an ethnocentric identity thought to be suitable for the nation-state. By the same token, elsewhere in the nation-states that were born in the process of the disintegration of empire, we are also supposed to have Greek, Bulgarian, Albanian, Serbian, Syrian, Egyptian, Lebanese, etc. ‘national styles’ embedded in their residential architecture(s).

Furthermore, what are generally regarded as the outstanding examples of the vernacular architecture of the Ottoman lands, whether in the eastern or the western provinces of the empire, are made to fall neatly within the current (eroded, but still dominant) historical paradigm that sets up a ‘Classical Age’ to be followed by ‘Decline’ and then ‘Collapse’: (1) as the centre became weaker, the lesser gentry are said to have taken over not just in politics but also in artistic patronage; (2) faced with military defeats and economic setbacks, both the centre and the provinces are perceived to have given in to modernization and westernization; and (3) the ruling elite is believed to have retreated into hedonism. The assumed demise of both the ‘genius’ and the ‘patron’ has resulted in a shallow neglect of, and even disdain for, post-sixteenth-century aesthetics and patronage. This has led to a treatment of all forms of Ottoman cultural expression, including literature, music, painting.
and the decorative arts, as undergoing a process of disintegration, of a relapse into disunity and incoherence, from which the loss of an artistically constructed imperial identity emerges as running parallel to and echoing the break-up of empire.

The challenges of a new historiography

The reappraisals currently underway in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ottoman historical studies are, unfortunately, largely bypassed in this overall approach. Debates around the formation of the modern state prior to the Tanzimat era, for example, or the redefinition of the relationship of the centre with the provinces, extending to the contraposition of a notion of the ‘reconquest’ of those provinces to the earlier and much more traditional idea of ‘decentralization’, as well as new perspectives on cycles of rebellion, repression and reinvention – these and other scholarly developments have been largely overlooked by art and architectural historians.\(^8\) This is a pity, for only if the idea of a certain reconsolidation (re-centralization) of collective rule en route to modern state-formation is fully taken into account, does it become possible to capture, fully and thoroughly, the post-classical cultural struggles that it entailed both at the Ottoman court and throughout the empire. Conversely, a fresh analysis of what was happening in the cultural sphere is capable of further explaining and elaborating political-institutional developments.

The standard historical view suggests that, from the early seventeenth century onwards, a process of partial breakdown followed by an (also partial) reconstitution of the power bloc ruling the Ottoman empire was set in motion. As various socio-economic conflicts surfaced among sub-groups of the one and only ruling establishment, their increased proclivity for contestation was reflected in a fierce cultural competition within the same class (which now included provincial notables as well as a new, non-hereditary but close-knit network of dignitaries at the centre). Thus there set in a deepening factional competition, which – it is true – initially made it more difficult to sustain a single corporate identity, a relatively homogeneous Ottoman-ness, because of all the changes that were taking place in the composition of the ruling elite (both at the centre and in the provinces). Instead, there developed a more open kind of intra-elite power struggle, which was waged in both real-political and cultural-symbolic terms.\(^9\)

This first phase of partial breakdown and decomposition, however, neither lasted forever nor resulted in complete and irreversible disintegration. Rather, it eventually led into a newly coalescing realignment. By way of their artistic and architectural patronage, the newfangled provincial elites of the later Ottoman centuries strove to insert themselves into a new kind of ‘imperial’ identity that was no longer so loaded with patriarchalism or absolutism (of the centre). It is this process that tends to be obliterated from two different ends by two diametrically opposed points of view. Thus, while it passes
unnnoticed by Turkish art and architectural historians adhering to the ‘decline’ paradigm, it is also implicitly rejected by non-Turkish nationalist discourses that cling to the notion of their local renaissances – national ‘awakenings’ said to have been preceded by the absence of any internal dynamics of significance. Traditionally, the former have sought comfort in the ephemeral brilliance of the so-called ‘Tulip Age’ and ‘Ottoman Baroque’ (both of which I regard as a misnomer), while the latter have chosen to ideologize and promote their respective national or regional styles. In between, there is supposed to be nothing but darkness and bleak stagnation.

The relevance of Arel’s studies of Aegean magnates’ architectural patronage

To this conventional picture, a thought-provoking challenge has been mounted by the architectural historian Ayda Arel in her study of the architectural patronage of the Cihanog˘ulları, a provincial dynasty in Aydın. Arel describes the Cihanog˘ulları as having fostered a novel style marked with baroque and rococo embellishments of the so-called Italian school, but mixed with anachronistic gothic forms. Attributing the initiation of the hybrid style in question to Greeks fleeing to western Anatolia before and after the Morean revolt of 1770, Arel characterizes it as a ‘family style’ embodied both in the mosques and the mansions commissioned or used by the House of Cihan. In other studies on the fortified (müstahkem) estates or manors (çiftlik) of western Asia Minor, Arel explores the indigenous medieval roots of a particular type of walled-in residential complex featuring ‘towers’ (or keeps or donjons), and convincingly argues for such mansions as constituting a ‘local type’.

It is true that, despite their distinctively local decorative vocabulary, certain easily recognizable archetypes, such as ablution fountains (s¸adırvan), porticoes (revak) or royal loggias (mahfil), continue to mark provincial Aydın mosques (and their annexes) as ‘Ottoman’. However, the fortified mansions of western Anatolia are a class apart. Structurally comparable to European manor houses (if not full-fledged castles), or even to convents, but, at the time, part and parcel of thriving agricultural estates, they stand out as a conscious choice complementing the more mosque-based ‘official’ canon. In the absence of war or other major threats such as Celâlî-type insurgent activity, this raises the question of whether this particular choice represents a degree of continuity with a late medieval Turkish-Ottoman state tradition. This cannot be easily answered. But it is clear that, in terms of scale, there was no cash-supported effective demand or social patronage that could have aspired to and achieved comparable grandeur before the eighteenth century. The architectural type/style in question displays an unexpected degree of novelty and creativity simply because it is employed by (if not entirely new, then at least) freshly resurgent groups of provincial gentry and notables that are now coming out of the woodwork to reclaim a reconfigured place for themselves within the imperial matrix. Arel writes:
Since it is impossible to find a place for these building types in our established inventory of Ottoman architectural typologies, it becomes facile to regard them – superficially – as either regional innovations or anachronisms. Actually, however, they should be perceived as paradigms of local culture that were breathing relatively easily as pressure from the central administration slackened – as sedimentary layers of a cultural legacy that were just coming to the surface.¹²

Thus, she retrieves the study of the provincial, vernacular architectures of the Ottoman Empire from a ‘what is monumental is Ottoman, what is residential is local-national’ type of dichotomy, and provides such studies with a much more socio-political, i.e. much more historical, and therefore potentially more fruitful, theoretical-methodological basis.

**Ottoman geography reconsidered**

One reason why Arel’s work has not received the attention it deserves may be that the geography whose architectural output she has been studying falls within the borders of contemporary Turkey (even though she traces the origins of the decorative vocabulary of the Cihanoglu ‘family style’ to Chios, once a major trading emporium in the Aegean Sea). It is a case of not being able to please anyone: within the ‘decline’ paradigm of Turkish architectural historians, there should be no room for innovation in (western) Anatolia in the late eighteenth century, while, for nationalists elsewhere, the links that Arel suggests between fortified mansions in Asia Minor and comparable examples of residential architecture in many Balkan locations (ranging from Kamenicë in Albania through Melnik in Bulgaria to Mani in the Morea),¹³ are an anathema – in each and every case, these diverse local styles are supposed to be connected only vertically to specific medieval (read: national) precursors, and not horizontally to any shared Ottoman experience that might force nationalist historians to look for undesired parallels, offshoots or collaterals in the Ottoman ‘heartlands’ in Anatolia.

But where, really, were these Ottoman ‘heartlands’? How did the Ottomans themselves conceive of their geography, including their various regions? What did Rumelia and Anatolia mean for them? Was Anatolia itself fully and completely Turkish-Ottoman? Where was Turkistan?¹⁴ What was there beyond Rumelia and Anatolia, and what did the architectural traditions of all these diverse lands entail for the elite(s) of the Ottoman empire?

For any definition of separate regions with distinct architectural traditions, an understanding of the aspirations and scope of patronage, as well as of the ways and waves of transmission or dissemination of a given artistic vocabulary, are crucial.¹⁵ To judge from the cases of the Cihanogullari as well as the Karaosmanogullari or Katiboğullari in western Anatolia,¹⁶ at least some local dynasties would seem to have sought to relate to and to utilize (and therefore also to revive and to recycle) the available resources and traditions of
their own area in their quest for autonomy. The preferred legacies and patronage networks of comparable (provincial) power groups in Rumelia, too, as well as in most other parts of the empire, have yet to be investigated in the fashion set out by untiring Arel.

An additional, complicating factor is that not everything begins and ends with the leading families of the gentry and notables as mentioned above. Even within a relatively small sub-region like the Aegean coastal zone, a multiplicity of architectural types/styles is very much in evidence, ranging from the Italianate villas (built in faultless ashlar masonry with bands of red limestone) of the wealthy merchants of Kamps on Chios, through the fortified complexes of timber mansions and rubble-stone towers of the Aydin dynasty at Koçarlı, to the wooden multiple-storey residential complexes of prosperous tax-farmers or revenue-sharers at Birgi, Mudanya, Datça, Milas or Fethiye. All of these bear witness to what was going on behind the imperial façade: the interplay between the supply and the demand sides of vernacular architectures – between the building materials (and corresponding local skills) provided by the various micro-climates of the Mediterranean, and the varying tastes and ambitions at work in provincial communities.

The ‘Turkish’ house with an open hall: a contested patrimony

One among all these styles is the last of the above-named examples: the multiple-storey wooden house, characterized by an open hall (hayat), courtyard (avlu) and projections (çıkma), which we encounter in many localities, particularly in Rumelia/Rum-ili. Parallel to this wide geographical spread, it has been singled out as encapsulating the ‘Ottoman way’ in non-monumental architecture, and hence the Ottoman house type. Virtually in the same breath, therefore, it has also become a contested patrimony, variously nationalized (along with coffee, with sarma/dolma and many other aspects of Ottoman culture) as (originally and authenticly) Turkish, Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian or Albanian.

As against this retrospective parcellization of an imperial legacy, I would like to argue, first, that, although it may not have been a single type of house, and certainly not a single type of house that ‘travelled’ or was disseminated only outward from a single cultural centre, but, more correctly, a set of relatively coherent resemblances dictated both by patronage and by production conditions, and, while it had its material foundations in the life-style of Rumelian landlords, the ‘Ottoman house’ in question also accommodated an elite, Rûmî identity (of which more below) bestowed on these landlords by the state, i.e. from above. Let me note, even at this early point, that this entails not just a purely-from-the-centre, nor, conversely, a purely-from-below view, of this type of residential architecture. Instead, it proposes to address its formation in terms of a Bakhtinian circularity between the centre and the periphery, between the high culture of the Ottoman court and the lower or
outlying (but interconnected) culture(s) of the provinces. Second, even given
this loose definition of a common language in vernacular architecture, it is
all the more striking to note that, as one crosses the straits to proceed east-
southeast, all semblance of such commonality seems to disappear long before
one arrives in the Arab and Iranian lands.

For there, there is no such thing as a typical (wooden) ‘Ottoman house’
that marks the old quarters of Urfa, Diyarbakir, Antep, Mardin, Aleppo, Cairo
or San’a.20 The connective tissue of a common vernacular makes way for
many different localisms, against which the element of unity residing in the
imperial canon of monumental religious architecture radiating outward from
İstanbul stands in starker contrast. Nevertheless, even here, within this broader
range and variety of localisms, there are certain convergences to be perceived.
As virtually autonomous local dynasties kept investing in architecture as a
means of constructing an identity of their own, in contrast to the Rumelian
type, a single-storey stone house, incorporating Georgian, Armenian, Arab or
Iranian building traditions and decorative repertoires, seems to have emerged
and to have come to symbolize provincial power. In a way, this is the common
denominator between the tripartite İşhak Paşa Palace of the Çıldıroğulları
crowning a hilltop in Doğu Beyazid,21 and the palatial urban residences of
the provincial centres of upper Mesopotamia.

Further afield, this single-storey stone house or palace, too, disappears, but
a comparable socio-political use of architecture remains. Thus, the ‘kethüda
style’ in eighteenth-century Cairo, too, testifies to a conscious turning to a
pre-existing architectural stock in search of a more independent assertive-
ness.22 Even in far-away provinces such as Tunisia, local gentry came to invest
in residential architecture as a means of constructing an autonomous iden-
tity.23

The beginnings of a Rûmî consciousness

This overall view, involving a multiplicity of residential types inhabiting small
areas, with these small areas then making up two or three big regional patterns,
comprising at least (a) the Balkans and western Anatolia, (b) eastern and
south-eastern Anatolia, and perhaps also (c) even more distant, outlying terri-
tories, all of them conceived in varying degrees of emancipation from the
centre, does not really comply with architectural historians’ accepted norm.
It is true that, to a certain extent, its main (north-west and west vs. south
and south-east) division coincides or overlaps with a geo-specific and climate-
specific split between stone and timber architecture that has been identified
as constituting, and accounting for, the two main zones of ‘Ottoman archi-
tecture’.24 But, useful as this notion might be, it also embodies a certain
material-technical determinism that does not fully take into account the
cultural problems and choices involved. More specifically, it does not do justice
to the extent to which the Ottoman elite of the imperial centre was not
neutral or equally balanced between its north-west and south-east – that is
to say, to the true scope of Rumelia and the Rûmî identity that the Ottomans tailorod for themselves, and which provided a ground to build Ottoman-ness upon.

Between being named from the outside and naming themselves, where did the Ottomans stand? From the twelfth century onwards, it was as ‘the land of the Turks’ that neighbours or adversaries came to regard this geography. Nevertheless, this terminology was not appropriated by its referents. First, the Greater Seljuks, in contact and conflict with Byzantium before and after Manzikert (1071), regarded Anatolia as ‘Bilad al-Rûm’, that is to say the land of the Romans. Then the Seljuk main line’s Anatolian offshoot came to be called the Seljuks of Rûm. At another step along the same line, the Ottomans, too, were denoted as Rûmî – that is, peoples of the lands of (eastern) Rome – both by themselves and those closest to them:

This was primarily a geographic appellation [says Cemal Kafadar], indicating basically where those people lived, but it did not escape the attention of the geographers and travellers that the Turco-Muslim populations of Rûm, a frontier region from the point of view of the central lands of Islam, had their own peculiar ways that distinguished them from both the rest of the Muslim world and from other Turks.

The conquest of Constantinople, through which the Ottomans staked out their claim to world power, was followed by expansion both east and west, all of which had ushered in an overbearing, all-consuming dynastic self-confidence by the sixteenth century. It was at this time, too, that dynastic designations for the state, such as Āl-i Osman, devlet-i Āl-i Osman or (referring to the well-protected domains of the Ottoman dynasty/state), memleket/memâlik-i mahrûse (-i Osmanî[ye]), were formulated. Sounding a majestic note, the Āl-i Osman version was abridged into devlet-i Âliye, which as devlet-i ebed-müdded was also pronounced eternal. Simultaneously, formulations emphasizing Islam (memâlik-i İslam[iye]) and the Roman legacy (memleket/memâlik-i Rûm/diyâr-i Rûm/mülk-i Rûm/hüm-i Rûm/iklîm-i Rûm/kurûm-Rûm) continued to be employed to refer to the Ottoman lands, but their small-time, faith-specific or geography-specific use reveals that, at this stage, at least, it was the (all-encompassing) imperial claim of the dynastic state that mostly defined and identified the Ottoman polity.

Nevertheless, the sultan was frequently referred to in terms of the territories that he ruled over, as in sultan-ı rûm, padişah-ı rûm or han-ı rûm (pl. mülûk-i rûm), which was also the case when it came to speaking of elite identities, such as suarâ-ı rûm for the poets, ubebâ-ı rûm for the belletristes, ulemâ-ı rûm for the religious scholars and zurefâ-ı rûm for the genteel people, of the lands that had been inhabited by the Romans. Hence, too, the historian Selânikî (d. after 1600) spoke easily of the state and the reign as devlet-ü saltanat-ı Rûm, as did the bureaucrat and intellectual Gelibolulu Mustafa Âli (d. 1600) of its capital: pay-i taht-ı Rûm, i.e. İstanbul.
In terms of his political-ideological concerns, Âli was preoccupied with articulating and examining the ideals and realities of the ‘Ottoman way’ embodied in kanun-i Osmanî, the Ottoman code. He regarded kanun as governing matters ranging from taxation to court ceremonial, or from officials’ salaries to the paths by which they might be promoted. For Âli, as well as for his peers, kanun was prescriptive as well as descriptive; insofar as it defined the structure of government and the nature of Ottoman society, it was kanun that enshrined the empire’s ideals and made it distinctively Ottoman.\(^{31}\) Hence, it becomes all the more striking for him, too, to refer to many other aspects of imperial rule (including the throne and the capital) on the basis of Rûm. In fact, there is only one other area to which this general Rûmi inclusivity did not extend, and that has to do with language.

What was it that the Ottoman elite spoke and wrote most of the time? Only on the eve of the Tanzimât did it evolve into lisân-i Osmanî.\(^ {32}\) Before (and even after) the pressing demands of the 1800s, the official language of the state, of its ruling house and household, was not called Ottoman but Turkish. Overflowing with borrowings from the neighbouring (Muslim) cultures – i.e. Persian and Arabic – but ultimately based on West Turkish and Çagatay, lisân-ı Türki defined the linguistic identity of the political elite.\(^ {33}\) Not only the state papers, but Ottoman literary production, too, was in lisân-ı Türki. Although other terms like lisân-ı Rûmi, Rûmi sohbet, zebân-ı Rûmi or Türki-zebân, or even the composite lisân-ı Türki-i Rûm\(^ {34}\) were also in use, when it came to language the ethnonym of a singular ethnicity, contrary to all other practices of the empire, seems to have been preferred over the others.

The exorbitation of ‘Turkishness’ from language to other spheres of culture

In time, and in manifold, complicated ways, this has led to an invalid or misleading ethnic characterization of phenomena outside the sphere of language. Ottoman poetry was one of the channels of the creation and dissemination of such confusion. As already indicated, it was written in lisân-ı Türki. At the same time, however, it borrowed enormously from Persian poetry – including all sorts of clichés about the male homosexual beloved (mahbûb) as an unruly Turk. As a result, these and other derogatory remarks regarding Turks have come to abound in Ottoman poetry, giving rise to a confusing, contradictory situation, and eventually triggering nationalist reactions of all kinds. One option has been to try to explain away such pejoratives as purely political, or tactically motivated in a short-term situation.\(^ {35}\) Another has been to regard such imperial contempt for Turks as a sign of external pollution or contamination. A third has been to extend the Turkish dimension implied by the use of lisân-ı Türki to retrospectively Turkify the various non-linguistic elements or dimensions of Ottoman society.
Both the second and the third options may be seen to be at work in certain archetypal interpretations of both Ottoman poetry and architecture. The perception that Ottoman poetry was a foreign (meaning Persian) accretion, and the product of a small elite, had already taken root among late Ottoman intellectuals of the Tanzimat era in the nineteenth century. Building on and elaborating this view, first E. J. W. Gibb,36 and then Fuad Köprülü, attuned to Kemalist Republicanism, were certain that court poetry did not concern itself with the human condition in general – with the daily circumstances, the pains and tragedies, and the spiritual wounds of broader sections of society. When it came to ‘folk’ (or non-court) literature, of course, Köprülü was a pioneer in terms of regarding it as part and parcel of ‘social history’.37 In doing so, however, he rejected the Rûmî identity of court poets writing in lisân-ı Türkî. Instead, he reserved this Rûmî identity only for Anatolian Turks, projecting this supposedly pure and uncontaminated ‘folk’ as the true repository of Turkish identity.38

The same Republican insistence on Turkishness as against Ottoman-ness also leads the architectural historian Doğan Kuban to comprehensively ethnicize, Anatolianize and Turkify key elements or dimensions of Ottoman vernacular architecture.39 He first takes the multiple-storey wooden house and simply names it a Turkish house, more specifically the hayatlı Türk evi, or ‘the Turkish house with an open hall’ (or with an extended, covered upper floor balcony) – thereby identifying its basic form and layout as peculiarly and distinctively Turkish. Second, he locates its heartlands in Turcoman (i.e. unadulterated) Anatolia. Third, he relates its presence in Rumelia, too, purely to the spread of Turkish settlement. In the end, therefore, we do get something like a common language in vernacular architecture, but one that is focused on Anatolia (as indeed the modern Turkish state came to be), and identified not with Ottoman-ness but with Turkishness.40 This then becomes an influential paradigm. In her recent study of the subject, the architectural historian Nur Akın, for example, uses ‘Ottoman’ rather than ‘Turkish’ in her title, but throughout her text keeps equating Ottoman with Anatolian-Turkish.41

Identity through shared characteristics vs. identity through exclusion

‘The worst consequence of continuing this ethnicization of the Ottoman tradition,’ says Kafadar, ‘is that it masks the imperial character of Ottoman history.’42 Yes, particularly in the heyday of the Ottoman empire, this imperial character had come to be embodied in a certain Rûmî identity that at the outset had been more narrowly geographical, but which by the sixteenth century had come to be embraced by the ruling class(es) of a much larger area – stretching from Yemen to the Crimea, from Bosnia to Basra, and from Morocco to the Caucasus. It imparted a high sense of belonging, and also required the full acceptance and observance of imperial norms and customs,
from both the members of the ruling house and its servants, as well as the population at large. And, yes, this is important enough in itself; it is a necessary safeguard against the historian’s cardinal sin of anachronism, which in this case manifests itself as a retrospective nationalism. But, by the same token, it is also in the nature of a negative, cautionary measure. Should we stop there? In a more positive, exploratory or investigative sense, was this all there was to the definition, the formation or crystallization, of Ottoman identity?

It is worth noting, in this connection, certain methodological insights being provided by the current state of the art in Cultural Studies. Thus, Stuart Hall, for one, differentiates between a naturalist conception of identity as ‘a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group’, and ‘a discursive approach that sees identification as a construction always in process’. He continues:

> Although a constant continuity of construction does not necessarily suggest that identities can be lost or won at any time, it indicates a state of conditional existence. On the other hand, the conditions under which identities are sustained depend on difference and exclusion, rather than internal sameness. Therefore, they are constructed not outside, but through difference, through a relation to what they are not; and this process should be understood as the product of specific times and specific discursive formations. That is to say, while identities are formed through a process of closure, the norms that determine the exclusion of the other and the different are subject to historical change.43

Applied to Ottoman historical studies, this line of thinking would mean that ‘Ottoman-ness/Rûmilik’, first discussed and hypothesized in the course of the Köprülü–Wittek debate, and further elaborated through the contributions of Halil İnalcık, Norman Itzkowitz, Cornell Fleischer, Gülru Necipoğlu, Cemal Kafadar, Michel Balivet and, most recently, Salih Özbaran, can no longer rest on the understanding of only those elements that were woven into a transcendent dynastic identity. In the long run, a more refined, more pluralistic approach to the multiple socio-cultural and historical determinants of Ottoman identities is needed.

**Looking below the surface: the sub-cultures and hybridities of Ottoman society**

Presently, however, we are still suffering from a scarcity of research concerning the various sub-cultures and the corresponding identity constructions of Ottoman society. We do have lots of clues concerning a complex, criss-crossing web of ascriptions and descriptions lurking beneath the surface, but we have yet to take a good, long, systematic look at them. We know, for example, that people living inside the Ottoman empire thought a lot in terms of religious or ethno-religious groups, as indicated by denominations like
(Sünnî) Müslüman, Ermeni, Ysevî/Naserî/Mesihi(yye), Yehudi, Kiptî, Dönek, Kızılbaş, Çingâne, Tatar, Kürt, Bulgar, Çepni or Habeş. With regard to müte-çekkin urban elites in particular, they also referred to individuals’ home towns through adjectives like Bursevî, Birgivî, Konevî or Selânîkî. (Other nicknames could extend to (original) profession, to literacy, to eating and drinking habits, or to physical shape, height or obesity.)

Together with references to class, gender, dress codes or rules of etiquette, these could gel into certain broadly regional identities that both coexisted with, and were counterposed to, the dominant Rûmi self-perception and the set of values and obligations that it entailed. The uncouth Turks (el-etrâk) constituted one such contraposition, as well as the Arabs and the Acems, who were regarded as foreigners (eeñebi), or not belonging to the group (ecânib) over the fourteenth–seventeenth centuries. This is also reflected in the inscription on the Sultan’s Pool fountain in Jerusalem, which refers to Süleyman I (r. 1520–66) as the sultan al-rûm wa’l-arab wa’l-ajam. Ruler of the lands of Rûm, of Arabia and of Persia: this phrase serves well to identify the lands and peoples beyond Rûm-ili (including Anatolia) that the Ottomans brought (sometimes) under their jurisdiction, but which they continued to regard as distinct and not part of the core of that overarching sovereignty.

On the whole, this was also a situation hugely suitable to the emergence and projection of what have come to be regarded, through Cultural Studies but also, and especially, through Post-colonial Studies, as métissages: hybrid or patchwork identities. Something like the colonial or post-colonial approach may also provide fruitful insights in the case of the outlying provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Take the case of the famous poet Fuzûlî (d. 1556). He was born, and lived virtually all his life, in the town of Kerbela close to Baghdad; he was emphatically a Shiite; absolutely fluent in Persian, Arabic and Ottoman Turkish, and writing in both Persian and lisân-ı Türkî, he achieved fame as Fuzûlî of Baghdad – though hardly any of these crucial facts are adequately accounted for in Turkish textbooks on Turkish literature. Yet they are absolutely indispensable for a proper understanding of Fuzûlî, who alternately eulogizes Shah Ismail Safevid and (after the Ottoman capture of Baghdad in 1534) Süleyman I and his leading dignitaries – who, in his yearning for the capital and the court-city of İstanbul, the lands of the zârifan or zurefâ-yı Türk, displays the high esteem of provincial intellectuals for the centre, and simultaneously keeps referring to Turks in a derogatory fashion. This is neither political survival skills nor schizophrenia, but a genuine case of multiple identities.

Marginalization of Turks and Turkishness extending into the eighteenth century

Apart from dimensions of hybridity, a particular point that comes out of all this is the extent to which the peoples of the vilayât-ı şark or the diyár-ı şark
(the Arab and Acem lands), including ethnic appellations like Turks or Turco-
mans, or urban groups referred to as Diyarbekirlüs or Baghdadis, were often
set in, or set themselves in, opposition to those of the Rûmî lands. With
the sole exception of linguistic usage, the inclusion of Turks in this broad
group served to emphasize that the civilizing imperial culture, of Rûmî
identity, perceived the non-elite as suspicious and ‘low’.

Such contempt or dislike actually grew from the sixteenth into the seven-
teen and eighteenth centuries. As tensions increased between the different
factions of the ruling elite (and their supporters in and out of İstanbul), the
competition for elite identity also intensified. Discordant sounds were heard
more frequently. To some extent, Turks appear to have been caught in
between, as not only provincials like Fuzûlî or Nâbî, but even official chronic-
iclers at the centre, or eyeing the centre, began to put them down in a
more comprehensive, more strident manner. Thus the Risâle-i Garibe, an
eighteenth-century Book of Manners (or Curses), lists various clichés through
which Istanbuliote Turks were looked down upon as belonging to the lower
classes. As such, opprobrium was said to attach not only to them but also to
all those who mingled with them. Simultaneously, Turks from central and
western Anatolia, from Madanşar (?), Karaman, Siga(ła) or Gerede, were casti-
gated for speculation and profiteering. Turks were, however, only one of
those races, faiths or classes that could be recognized by their bad manners.
But it was not all one way. For example, since the Turkish language still
played a pivotal role in determining and allocating elite status, those who did
not learn Turkish, or had still not perfected their Turkish pronunciation, or
those who, while fluent in Turkish, immediately reverted to their own mother
tongue whenever they saw one of their own (unbeliever) kind, were all harshly
criticized.

In both its anti-Turkish dimensions and its defence of lisân-ı Türkî, the
Risâle-i Garibe may be said to reflect the view from the top, though it contains
no direct reference to any code of Ottoman-ness. Moreover, in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, in either court or folk poetry, any explicit
references to an Ottoman identity are purely negative in tone, identifying it
only in the context of reproaches and laments targeting the state or the ruling
elite as oppressors. Before the advent of nationalism(s), in other words, it is
difficult to come across manifestations of an all-inclusive cultural Ottoman-
ness, which seems to have developed only in a defensive context en route to
Tanzimat modernization.

The search for a new idiom from mode to style

Referring to a comment in Tursun Beg’s Târih-i Ebü’l-feth that, after the
conquest of Constantinople, architects and engineers came from the lands of
Arab-u Acem-i Rûm to work for Mehmed II, Gülru Necipoğlu rightly took
Rûm as referring to the existing Ottoman territories. Tursun Beg also
happens to mention an ‘Ottoman mode’ in architecture as early as the 1460s.
Speaking of the pavilions built in the outer gardens of the Topkapı Palace, he identifies the only surviving one (the present Çinili Köşk) as

a ‘tile palace’ (sırça saray), constructed in the mode of Persian kings (tavr-i ehâsire); the other, across from it, was a pavilion (kasr) constructed in the Ottoman mode (tavr-i Osmanî). This last one was a ‘wonder of the age’, embodying the science of geometry.  

At the end of the sixteenth century, we find that ‘building style and essential image (tarz-ı binası ve resm-i esası)’ of mosques built in Cairo during the rule of Ottoman sultans were not in the style and image of the mosques of Arab lands; but they were ‘in the style and image of Ottoman mosques (diyâr-ı Rûm cevâmi tarz ve resminde)’. In Cafer Efendi’s 1614 Risâle-i Mimariyye, the only Ottoman treatise on an architect (namely, the life and works of Sedefkâr Mehmet Ağa), which is also a treatise on the science of geometry and a compilation of trilingual (Arabic, Persian, Turkish) terms having to do with architecture, there is only a single reference (as resm-i Osmanî) to any kind of Ottoman manner or style in any branch of the arts, and then only in the context of the paging of a monumental Koran. Later in the seventeenth century, Evliya Çelebi referred to congregational mosques in the provinces, sponsored by Ottoman sultans and governors, as in the ‘Ottoman style’ (tarz-ı Rûm).

This is why, in the heyday of Ottoman architectural grandeur (when there was no need to engage in any comparisons with ‘foreign’ influences), the tavr-ı Osmanî was rarely acknowledged as it came to be rivalled by localisms only in a very few cases. Its sway was so complete that the court itself felt free to experiment with vernacular styles without perceiving of them as such. This was the case with the Baghdad Kiosk (1635) and the Revan (Erevan) Kiosk (1638), put up to commemorate Murad IV’s (r. 1623–40) conquest of the cities after which they were named. In opting for the differing architectural modes of the domains that he had newly conquered – says Necipoglu – Murad IV was following in the footsteps of Mehmed II, who had not only incorporated new kingdoms into his world empire but had also incorporated their artistic representations, as garden pavilions, into the grounds of his new palace.

So this was all safely within the bounds of tradition. When further change came, however, it was duly noted. On the same marble terrace of the Fourth Courtyard occupied by the Baghdad and Revan Kiosks, Murad’s successor İbrahim (r. 1640–8), too, decided to build in 1641–2.

He ordered a lofty and high pavilion to be made

In an new, joyful manner that should not be in the old style,

says the relevant inscription in the present Circumcision Room, attesting to a consciously innovative intention. The further pursuit and unfolding of this
intention over the next fifty years or so, however, becomes difficult to demon-
strate through concrete examples simply because architectural output over the
rest of the much-troubled seventeenth century diminishes in terms of both
numbers and real grandeur while routinely (and dully) repeating the estab-
lished imperial idiom.

The dynasty’s return from Edirne to İstanbul

In the seventeenth century the long-cherished Persianate aesthetic was finally
exhausted, leading to the formulation of a more clearly and explicitly Ottoman
way in music, literature or the decorative arts. Simultaneously, patronage
systems were also becoming more pluralistic, with members of a new elite of
high-ranking dignitaries coming to participate more and more in what had
hitherto been a virtual monopoly of the sultans. Also, over the second half
of the seventeenth century, the sultan and his court had been sojourning in
Edirne, where they had been forced to take refuge in 1658. This self-exile
also amounted to a hiatus in royal rituals and architectural patronage – until
1675. Then there came yet another, protracted crisis, punctuated by the two
disasters of defeat at Kahlenberg (1683) and the Edirne Incident (1703).
Their cumulative impact was such as to force the court to return, albeit reluc-
tantly, to Istanbul. By then, a new oligarchy was in positions of power. The
ruling elite’s self-image had become blurred, and the monolithic (Rûmî) iden-
tity that had been adopted and projected since the sixteenth century seems
to have lost its definitional distinctiveness. The dynasty was faced with the
massive problem of a major reconfiguration and re-legitimation of power.

The challenges of re-inscribing the dynasty into the space and society of
the old imperial capital, and of re-creating its symbolic rites of power, had
implications for architecture. What immediately emerges is, first, an emphatic
reaffirmation of the desire for novelty, for a new style or manner as first
implied by Ibrahîm I sixty-odd years earlier, and, second, a drive to move
outside the Topkapı Palace in order to render the sultan and other key
members of his household increasingly visible to the populace of Istanbul.
The chronicler Râsid testifies to Ahmed III’s preference for residential as
opposed to monumental religious architecture, as well as for ephemeral timber
as opposed to more durable stone construction.

With the court ensconced once more in the urban matrix of Istanbul, a
fusion of the monumental and the residential was realized in the waterfront
palaces of the royal princesses who were often married to leading dignitaries.
But what were the social (and perhaps also cultural) dynamics behind this
new, enhanced role accorded to residential architecture, to the point of
bestowing on it a degree of monumentalization? In court poetry, over a few
centuries there had been a growing number of voices calling for a simpler
language, for a Türkî-i basît, though it was only with Nédim that they finally
won the day at the court. Was residential architecture coming to play the
same role of a modernity-related simplification and vernacularization? Or, as
in music, which had been largely emancipated from Persian models and repertoires, was architecture in both the capital and the provinces turning to local resources to create a new but still imperial idiom that would suit the need for re-legitimation in the eyes of rising power groups, including the new dignitaries at the centre as well as the provincial gentry and notables.\textsuperscript{63} I would argue that it was both – and that this fusion of the monumental and the residential corresponded to, and reflected, something that I hypothesized earlier: a partial breakdown followed by (also partial) reconstitution of the power bloc ruling the Ottoman empire.

Not Anatolia but a broader Rumelia as the core area of the Ottoman empire

This can be taken as yet another manifestation of the extent to which the richest heartlands of the Ottoman Empire were in Rumelia. In various ways, the Ottoman ruling elite was in and of Rûm-ili.\textsuperscript{64} The early Ottoman principality expanded primarily into Rumelian space, where they learned to tax sedentary peasantries as they went along, and where the timar system grew and developed through successive amalgamations of previous or contemporary land régimes. Simultaneously they absorbed bashtina and pronoria into their mukataa units, just as they absorbed particularly the lesser but numerous elements of the Christian warrior nobilities into their sipahi caste or class. Between Edirne and Belgrade, Muslim and Christian (or former Christian) lords alike acquired (or retained) their best and largest holdings, which they tried to privatize and render hereditary as much as possible in the form of mülks, mülk timars (freeholds) or vakıfs (pious foundations). Then, after the court settled in Istanbul, the devsirme system, too, got going in this same region, establishing a new channel for recycling ‘Byzantino-Balkan aristocrats into grand viziers’,\textsuperscript{65} though as numerous names or nicknames would suggest (e.g. Sokolovic/Sokollu), local affinities were never entirely erased through such attempted kapıkulu deracinations. Still later, royal women and their high-standing husbands, as well as a host of lesser dignitaries, started competing with one another for the lucrative çiftlik and tax-farms of the Balkans. And as the iltizam (tax-farm) and malikâne (life-farm) systems of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries could operate only through chains of intermediaries extending from the capital all the way down into the provinces, both voyvodas and kocabasşs started travelling increasingly frequently between the centre and its Rûmelian periphery as part of the whole process of local factions acquiring patrons in the capital and İstanbuliote factions looking for allies among the gentry and notables.\textsuperscript{66}

Shortly after the introduction of malikâne in 1695, established as an attempt to cope with the century-long crisis of tax-farming, the most lucrative lands or revenue-districts were redistributed among the female members of the royal family. Hadice the Elder was the sister of Ahmed III. A complete
register of this Hadice’s revenue-districts (or appanages) provides a relatively full account of the revenues accruing to her from some thirty tax-farms in Thrace, western Anatolia and south-east Anatolia over 1713–30. This list, indicative of the long-lasting Ottoman interest in the agricultural and other revenues of Thrace and the Balkans and beyond, would be repeatedly assigned and reassigned to other royal women in decades to come.

The correlation between royal tax-farms and the Rûmî vernacular of ‘the Ottoman house’ in southeast Europe

Even at first sight, there seems to be a rather striking correspondence between a provisional map of such royal and sub-royal tax-farms, on the one hand, and an equally provisional map of the spread of a common language of vernacular architecture, on the other. In other words, that distinctly recognizable vernacular architecture that we encounter again and again in Rumelia (in Chios and Rhodes in the Aegean, in Shkodra, Ergeri and Berat in Albania, in Thessaly and the Morea, in Skopje, Monastir, Ochrid, Melnik and Plovdiv, in Yenişehir/Larissa, Kavala, Kafayerye/Verria or Kesriye/Kastoria, etc.), to the point where it has come to be called ‘the Ottoman house’ and then to be claimed as their very own by Turkish and other, rival, nationalisms, as repeatedly explained above, is precisely the vernacular architecture the spread and coverage of which turns out to be quite closely correlated with the spread of royal and sub-royal tax-farms over that same Rûmelia. For all of the towns or cities named above were located in districts where the most remunerative mukataas coveted by princesses, grand viziers and other high-ranking bureaucrats were located. As the same revenue districts or tax-farms kept passing from one royal woman to another, this picture speaks very strongly for the importance of elite patronage, and of chains and movements of administrative, tax-farming intermediaries in transmitting cultural patronage between the imperial centre and the provinces.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the royal women in question succeeded one another as absentee/rentier overlords at definite localities. In short, the Ottoman royal and sub-royal elites mainly coveted, competed for, and were relatively firmly enracinated in the Balkans, where they also exercised a culturally much more interactive kind of patronage – interactive not only between İstanbul and the provinces, but also between different ethno-religious communities or elements. Here Ottoman Turkish could develop for a time into a lingua franca; here, too, Muslim as well as non-Muslim townsmen or landholders could commission Greek, Serbian or Turkish architects to build their houses using Bulgarian stonemasons and Albanian workers. Ultimately, combined with a particularly strong patronage focus, it was this mobility and interchangeability that created and sustained a common language of vernacular architecture – which, for want of a better word, we can only call Rûmelian...
or Rûmî – that also spread to Bursa, Mudanya, Göynük, Konya, Kula, Ankara, Beypazarî, Amasya, Tokat, Kastamonu, Safranbolu, Muğla, Dağda, or İzmir where, apparently, the royal house was in search of alliances of various kinds.

By the same token, it was these two fundamental, social dimensions of architecture that appear to have been missing beyond Rûm-ili, including Anatolia. That the new Turkish nation-state came to be Anatolian-centred should not cause any retrospective, anachronistic confusions in this regard. Neither should one be misled by the relative Turkish-Islamic continuum extending into Anatolia. Such homogeneity does not connote dynamic interaction, and – to repeat – what we are talking about here are not the national blocs of a later era but the court vs. provinces juxtapositions of a traditional empire. Thus, first, royal holdings became less and less frequent in going from west to east within and especially beyond Anatolia, and, second, the postings and prebendal allotments here were much more temporary in nature; the interactions between local elites and the servitors of the Porte were both looser, and did not allow so much scope to the latter as transmitters of the capital’s influence.69

**Ottoman architectural history vs. the history of Ottoman architecture**

In conclusion, I would argue that we do face a real choice between talking about Ottoman architectural history and talking about the history of Ottoman architecture. It is the second phrase that is the more problematic, tending as it does to posit a single ‘Ottoman architecture’ as a cohesive entity. This is also loaded with imperial aspirations of the so-called Classical Age, namely with patriarchalism, absolutism and relative centralization. The first phrase, on the other hand, is potentially looser and more flexible, capable of being understood as the historical study of the totality of architectural output within the Ottoman Empire. It is capable of better coping with critical notions that are mentioned but then decidedly kept in the background in the more orthodox approach – notions about the extent to which ‘the imperial cultural tradition was polymorphous, a juxtaposition more than a coherent blending of elements from the traditions out of which it had been forged’.70

It is not difficult to understand the whys and wherefores of such suppression or self-censorship. Having, from the late 1920s onwards, proclaimed something of a cultural revolution against the Ottoman ancien régime, even when they were moving beyond their most Jacobin, most nihilistic phase, the Kemalists (or Kemalist ideology) could not admit of a direct and frontal reconciliation with Osmanlılık, Ottomanitas, the Ottoman way. Instead, they had to resort to special channels, excuses or pretexts. Basically, they dealt in differential fashion with two main groups of phenomena: what could be regarded as really and truly past, and therefore treated as a historical category, and what was still a living legacy. ‘Ottoman miniatures’, for example, were ‘dead’, and hence there was no danger in referring to them as Ottoman miniatures.
It was the same with literature. But music was alive, and so was residential architecture. Both, therefore, had to be explained and named as other than Ottoman. In the case of residential architecture, this has meant referring it to this or that ‘folk’ identity. It is time for it, too, to be re-explained on the basis of a new sociology of empire.

Notes

Earlier versions of this paper, provisionally called ‘The Imperial vs the Local in Ottoman Architecture. Patronage: What Difference?’, exploring the localisms in Greece and Bulgaria respectively, were presented in: Localities and Empire—Approaches to Ottoman/Greek Civilization, Chios Workshop organized by the Program in Hellenic Studies, Princeton University, 23–26 September 2000; and Economy, Society and Culture: XVIIth–XXth Centuries, Workshop on the Balkan Provinces of the Ottoman Empire, University of Sofia, St Kliment Ohridski, 5–7 October 2001. The present text has been read and commented upon by Halil Berktay, Hakan Erdem, Suraiya Faroqhi and Metin Kunt, for which I am grateful, though responsibility for what remains is entirely mine.

1 This essay takes as its starting point a congress held in 1999, and a corresponding volume published by the Chamber of Architects of Turkey. This was on the occasion of the so-called 700th anniversary of the founding of the Ottoman Empire, and the theme in question was Seven Centuries of Ottoman Architecture: ‘A Supranational Heritage’ (N. Akın, A. Batur and S. Batur, İstanbul, 1999). It is interesting to note that, while the organizers and editors prudently qualified only the legacy as ‘supranational’, such niceties would seem to have been lost on quite a few participants, who were not able to refrain from talking of the historical reality itself as – anachronistically – ‘supranational’. And yet, to some extent this danger is present whenever we abide by the custom of talking, not of the architecture(s) of the Ottoman lands, but, in a much more homogenizing, reifying way, of the totality of ‘Ottoman architecture’.


6 R. Ousterhout, ‘Ethnic Identity and Cultural Appropriation in Early Ottoman Architecture’, Muqarnas, VII,


9 See various articles by R. Abou-el-Haj, as well as his Formation of the Modern State, 14 and note 19.


14 With reference to Koçi Bey, Hakan Erdem argues that it was the vicinity of Istanbul that was known as Turkistan.

15 In addition to the numerous articles by both authors, see: D. Behrens-Abouseif, Egypt’s Adjustment to Ottoman Rule: Institutions, Waqf, and Architecture in Cairo, 16th and 17th Centuries, Leiden, 1994; M. Kiel, Studies on the Ottoman Architecture of the Balkans, Aldershot, 1990.


17 F. Aneroussi and L. Mylonadis, The Kampos of Chios in its Heyday: Houses and Surroundings, Nea Smyrni, n.d., includes, among the villas and mansions that it deals with, that of the Mavrocordatos family in the eighteenth century, a family of the most influential official court translators.

18 Rûm-ili refers here not to the Ottoman administrative unit, eyâlet or province, which in the sixteenth century included Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, Thessaly, Albania, southern Serbia and western Bulgaria, but to a wider geography comprising the lands of the previous Roman empire.


26 C. Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State, Berkeley, CA, 1995, 1–2. That these Turks were different, and were differentiated from the orthodox Sunni Muslims of the larger Islamic realm, is attested to by terms such as abdalan-ı Rûm/gaziyan-ı Rûm, referring to the


29 Not to be confused with the Eyalet-i Rûmeli (Rûm-ili), an administrative unit: see S. Özbaran, Bir Osmanlı Kimliği. 14.–17. Yüzyıllarda Rûm/ Rûmi Aidiyet ve İmgeleri, İstanbul, 2004, 49.


31 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, 93–4: Celâlzâde and Ramazanzâde, fully educated, worldly, pre-eminent littérateurs, distinguished themselves in the service of the state by virtue of their learning and devotion to codifying and creating the ‘Ottoman way’.

32 And even then it was known that Ottoman was not an all-inclusive language, but a certain ‘dialect’, or only one of the languages that the peoples of the empire spoke. Hence ‘Lehçe-i Osmani’ was the name given by Ahmed Vefik Paşa to his dictionary published in 1872–3. See also: F. Köprüülü, ‘Saz Şairleri, Dün ve Bugün’, in Edebiyat Araştırmaları, Ankara, 1986, 199; B. Lory, ‘Parler le turc dans les Balkans au XIXe siècle’, in F. Georgeson and P. Dumont (eds), Vivre dans l’Empire ottoman: Sociabilités et relations intercommunautaires (XVIIe–XXe siècles), Paris, 1997, 237–49; J. Strauss, ‘La conversation’, in F. Georgeson and P. Dumont (eds), Vivre dans l’Empire ottoman, 251–318.

33 For Âli’s description of ‘the astonishing language current in the state of Rûm’: Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, 22–3.

34 Özbaran, Bir Osmanlı Kimliği, 110.

35 For a critique of those who have argued that linguistic scorn for Turks was no more than a reflection of Ottoman–Safavid conflict, see: Özbaran, Bir Osmanlı Kimliği, 109–14. For an exhaustive coverage of offensive words used for Turks in Ottoman poetry see: M. Kalpaklı, ‘Osmanlı Edebi Metinlerine Göre Türkülük ve Osmanlılık’, in Tarih ve Milliyetsizlik. 1. Ulusal Tarih Kongresi, Mersin Üniversitesi, 1997, 75–90. Pejoratives of the same kinds and frequency can also be found in the chronicles. Taş Köprülüzade’s Mevzîat-i Ülûm, a biographical history, is a case in point. For various other uses of ‘Turk’ as an ethnonyms in early Ottoman chronicles see: H. Erdem, ‘Osmanlı Kaynaklarından Yansıyan Türk İmaj(lar)ı’, in Ö. Kumrular (ed.), Dünyada Türk İmgesi, İstanbul, 2005, 13–26.

36 It was Gibb again who, in the introduction of his 1901 History of Ottoman Literature, formulated a periodization of the old (Ottoman) and the new (Turkish) literature, and, while devaluing the ‘old’ (Persianate) mode, glorified the ‘new’, post-nineteenth-century (western) models. For a resurrection of Gibb’s premises, see: T. S. Halman (ed.), Turkey: From Empire to Nation. Review of National Literatures (series ed. A. Paulucci), New York, 1973. For a critique of Gibb, see: V. R. Holbrook, The Unreadable Shores of Love: Turkish Modernity and Mystic Love, Austin, TX, 1994, 28–31.

37 For the image of Ottomans in folk poetry, see: Kalpaklı, ‘Osmanlı Edebi Metinlerine Göre Türkülük ve Osmanlılık’, 88–90.

38 Köprüülü, ‘Saz Şairleri, Dün ve Bugün’, 198–9; F. Köprüülü, ‘Milli Edebiyat
Cereyanının İlk Mübesirleri’, in Edebiyat Araştırmaları, Ankara, 1986, 290–2. For the making of the court poet and the tension between those of Arab and Acem, as well as those at the centre, see: H. İnalcık, Şair ve Patron, Ankara, 2003.


40 For historians ranging from Mustafa Akdağ to Michael Winter, or linguists from Andrea Tietze to literary historians like Fuat Köprülü or Orhan Şak Gökyay, all of whom have read ‘Rûmî’ as Turkish, see: Özbaran, Bir Osmanlı Kimliği, especially 89–108, 109–14. The modern claim for the Turkishness of the dynasty and the state rests on such mistaken or careless readings, further coloured at times by Republican ideological preferences for the negation of Ottoman inclusiveness. Equally misleading is the reading of the term as referring to Greeks. In the same section referred to above, Özbaran cites examples from: A. Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration around Sixteenth-century Jerusalem, Cambridge, 1994, 127, 189; H. Lowry, ‘Süleyman’s Formative Years in the City of Trabzon: Their Impact on the Future Sultan and the City’, in H. İnalcık and C. Kafadar (eds), Süleyman the Second and His Time, Istanbul, 1993, 22–4; H. Gerber, ‘Palestine and Other Territorial Concepts in the 17th Century’, IJMES, 30: 4, 1998, 568.


45 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, 253–72.


47 İnalcık, Şair ve Patron, 13–14, 38–9.


49 Özbaran, Bir Osmanlı Kimliği, 106–8.

50 This is not to say that all provincials were anti-Turkish. Nâbi (d. 1712) for one, a court poet originally from Urfa, strove not only to make a career in İstanbul, but yearned to be able to write poetry in ‘Türkî’. Just as he expressed his dislike for Arabic, he was also complaining for having been forced to spend twenty-five years of his life in Aleppo. Nâbi exemplifies the world of his contemporaries, and establishes a link with the eighteenth century, when an even larger set of multiple identities was established. Never-
Nevertheless, Turks continue to be denigrated in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century court and folk poetry. See: Kalpaklı, ‘Osmanlı Edebi Metinlerine Göre Türkülük ve Osmanlılık’, 75–90.

Even the official chronicler Nâima, like many Arab-speaking provincial notables and litterati, looked towards İstanbul, though he continued to speak Arabic while he wrote in Ottoman. See: S. Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire*, New York, 2000, 80, 81.

51 Even the official chronicler Nâima, like many Arab-speaking provincial notables and litterati, looked towards İstanbul, though he continued to speak Arabic while he wrote in Ottoman. See: S. Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire*, New York, 2000, 80, 81.


53 Develi, *XVIII. İstanbul’a Dair Risale-i Garibe*, 41, 22, 33.


55 Necipoğlu, *Architecture, Ceremonial and Power*, 210. Necipoğlu also cites Angioletto with reference to the pavilions in questions. Angioletto identified the first of these as being in the Persian mode (alla Persiana), decorated in the mode of the country of Karaman, and covered with wattle and daub; the second as being in the Turkish mode (alla Turchesca); and the third as being in the Greek mode (alla Greca), and covered with lead.

56 Ç. Kafescioglu, “‘In the Image of Rûm’”, 70; after Mehmed Âşık bin Omer Bayezid, *Menazirü’l-Avalim*, Süleymaniye Library, Halet Efendi 616, fol. 228r.


59 Necipoğlu, *Architecture, Ceremonial and Power*.


63 Some local musical genres continued to exist independently of the centre, while others were direct borrowings of the new experientialism at the court. Some local changes took place in indiscernible fashion, while others were striking. Nevertheless, closer links between the music of the centre and the provinces were established. The Anatolian mode (makam), called Hüseyni (Kürdî), became predominant at the court together with several popular local rhythms.


67 Başbakanlık Archives, MAD 7137 (1125–1142).

68 T. Artan, ‘Boğaziçi’nin Çehresini Değiştiren Soylu Kadınlar ve Sultanefendi Sarayları’, *İstanbul Dergisi*, III,
Exceptions in this regard are Cairo, Aleppo and Damascus, where we do get town houses of a distinctive character. And, on closer inspection, these turn out to be the rather monumentally imposing town houses of local families founded by members of the capital’s devshirme elite who settled here for good, so that the case of the ‘Arab house’ is likely to be the proverbial exception that proves the rule.

Very probably the same is also true of the suggestion embodied in Nancy Stieber’s contribution in this volume, which seems to weigh in favour of a ‘Cultural History of the (Ottoman) Built Environment’.

In addition to ‘divan literature’, terms such as ‘Classical Ottoman literature’, ‘Ottoman elite literature’, ‘Ottoman upper-class literature’, ‘medieval Ottoman literature’, ‘Ottoman court literature’, ‘Ottoman court poetry’ or ‘Islamic Turkish literature’ are often used.

Names given range from alaturka musiki (music alla turca) to ‘Turkish Music’, ‘Classical Turkish Music’, ‘Traditional Music’ and, finally, the absurdly vacuous ‘Turkish Art Music’ (Türk Sanat Müziği).