Clientelism and Patronage in Turkish Politics and Society

The concepts of clientelism and patronage have been widely used in the analysis of political and social relations. In contemporary political science literature, both concepts have increasingly come to denote a particular strategy of gaining political support by individuals or parties through the distribution of individual or collective goods to prospective voters. Although there is some degree of overlap between clientelism and patronage, the former is generally used with reference to a dyadic relationship between two individuals of unequal socioeconomic status, while the latter is more commonly understood as the distribution of state resources by office holders. In a clientelistic relationship, the more powerful individual, or the patron, may or may not be someone who holds an official position such as local party boss or deputy in the parliament. Consequently, the “favors” that he does for his clients may come from his own personal influence, status, and economic power and not necessarily from his access to public resources. The practice of political patronage, however, involves the distribution of individual or collective “favors” by a political party which controls governmental power and uses the resources of the state to gain votes and political support.

Political clientelism and patronage emerged as key analytical concepts in studies on social and political change by political scientists and anthropologists during the 1960s and 1970s. Their work offered empirical evidence based on ethnographic case studies as well as new analytical constructs and theoretical perspectives, especially on traditional patron-client relations in predominantly agrarian societies. The first wave of research on clientelist relationships underscored the dyadic and asymmetrical nature of the ties between individuals of unequal power and status such as those which existed between landlords and peasants in Southeast Asia. While the work on pre-industrial, agrarian societies largely emphasized the economic bases of clientelistic networks, studies on clientelism and patronage in Southern European countries such as Spain and Italy sought to explain clientelistic social and political
phenomenon with reference to both cultural and economic factors. The first wave of research on political clientelism nearly four decades ago also included several major studies which delineated the integration of the traditional patron-client ties, based on the personal relations between locally influential notables and their peasant clients, into the organizations of political parties as a result of political, social and economic changes. Consequently, the transition from traditional forms of clientelism to the more modern practices of party patronage received considerable scholarly attention.

An important feature of the early literature on political clientelism and patronage concerned their developmentalist and culturalist biases. The basic assumption of most of the studies was that economic development and industrialization would undermine the saliency of clientelistic practices since they were largely associated with pre-industrial societies. According to the then prevailing thinking, as countries became economically more developed, the influence of cultural traditions associated with “traditional societies” would gradually diminish. The developmentalist and culturalist approaches to clientelism and patronage also assumed that as a result of economic and social changes, horizontal group or class affiliations would replace the vertical ties of clientele networks as the primary bases of political preferences and electoral choice.

After a brief hiatus in the 1980s, political clientelism and patronage began to receive renewed scholarly attention during the 1990s. The studies carried out during the past two decades utilize some of the theoretical and conceptual approaches which had become fashionable two decades earlier. However, they also differ from the latter on a number of key issues. For example, the developmentalist and culturalist biases of the first wave of research is largely absent in the recent scholarship on political clientelism and patronage. It is now generally accepted that clientelistic practices exist in many contemporary societies which differ from one another significantly with respect to their level of economic development,
cultural attributes, and political systems. Recent studies have also raised questions about the validity of the previously held views concerning the transient and ephemeral nature of clientelism. As new research has underscored, political clientelism has shown remarkable durability and resilience by adapting to political and social changes. Adaptation implies the use of new strategies both by the suppliers (i.e., political parties and influential local patrons) and the consumers (i.e., citizens and clients) of political patronage and clientelism. As a result of their flexibility and resilience, varieties of clientelistic relations have survived over the years amidst social, economic, and political transformations.

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Studies on contemporary Turkish politics as well as the journalistic coverage of political life in the country often make references to varieties of clientelistic and patronage-based behavior. These range from the role that the influential patrons (tribal or religious leaders, landlords, members of notable families, etc.) in Eastern Turkey play in politics to the efforts of political parties to offer individual or collective benefits to voters in exchange for support in electoral contest. The Turkish media frequently carries reports which highlight these practices. For example, during the campaign for the local elections in 2008, there were widespread reports in the media about the free distribution of household goods such as refrigerators and dishwashers by the local officials to the inhabitants of Tunceli, one of the poorest provinces in the country. Television news coverage showed the recipients of these “gifts from the government” proudly displaying their newly-acquired possessions. Although many apparently did not have electricity in their homes, and some had never even seen an automatic dishwasher before, they were delighted about the unexpected turn of good fortune in their daily struggle to make a living. Clearly, this blatant display of political patronage stemmed from the efforts of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) to gain
political support in an electoral district where it had not done well against the opposition parties and independent candidates in the previous elections.

The Historical Roots of Clientelism:

Clientelism and patronage have been historically part of Turkish society dating back to the days of the Ottoman Empire. Studies on Ottoman social history have often emphasized the importance and pervasiveness of clientelistic ties between the local notables (ayan) and peasants. The ayan managed to accumulate considerable economic power by acquiring the right to lease state-owned lands and collect taxes with the disintegration of the traditional land tenure system during the 17th and 18th centuries. They were able to accumulate considerable economic and social power by acquiring the right to lease state-owned lands and collect taxes which had previously been in the domain of the fief holders. The absence of effective central authority over the periphery meant that the peasants became increasingly dependent on the notables for their personal safety and property. Their need for protection against the arbitrary acts and corruption of local officials also contributed to their dependency on the notables 1971). As a result, by the 18th century, the notables had emerged as “a significant social class mediating between the central government and its subjects.” During the course of the 19th century, the restoration of the Sultan’s authority in the provinces and the abolition of tax farming weakened the ayan. By the twentieth century, a new type of locally influential notables, namely, prosperous small town-merchants (eşraf) and large-landowners (ağa), had replaced the ayan in social influence. The agrarian elites and members of the leading notable families acted both as the protectors of the peasantry against the excessive and arbitrary acts of the officials and as channels of mediation between the central government and the local populations in the provinces.

In his seminal work on center-periphery relations in the Ottoman Empire, Şerif Mardin notes that “patronage and client relations had long permeated Ottoman politics, but a
structural transformation after the middle of the nineteenth century changed the total picture.”^7 According to Mardin, as a result of the center’s growing penetration into the periphery, the role played by the notables as the protectors of their clients’ interests and needs as well as channels of mediation between the center and the periphery increased significantly. Mardin also points out that in the latter part of the nineteenth century, a new group joined the ranks of the notables. They were “the provincial men of religion, a number of whom were property owners…[whose]… influence and leverage over the lower classes was also established through their involvement in religion and education. Faced with increasing secularization, these men became more clearly involved with the periphery.”^8

Clientelistic relations continued to be important aspects of Turkey’s social and political landscape in the early part of the twentieth century. With the emergence of political parties during the last decade of Ottoman rule, members of prominent notable families entered into politics as parliamentary deputies and local party bosses of the Committee of Union and Progress CUP). The CUP established its organization in the provinces by recruiting influential notables into its ranks through “systematic use of patronage and economic regulation.”^9 Following the establishment of the Republic, the newly-formed Republican People’s Party (RPP), which functioned as the “official party” of the authoritarian single-party regime (!923-46), similarly recruited notables from the leading local families of Anatolia to serve as parliamentary deputies and/or as leaders of the RPP’s local organizational units. The tacit alliance that the Republican leadership formed with the eşraf served the interests of both: It enabled the center to control the periphery via the notables who maintained clientelistic ties with their peasant clienteles, and it enabled the notables to maintain and strengthen their economic and social influence in the provincial cities and small-towns through their close ties with the Republican regime.
Mass Politics and Political Clientelism

Under the Ottoman Empire and during the formative years of the Republic, the clientelist system in Turkey displayed the characteristics of traditional patron-client relations that are found in predominantly agrarian or peasant societies. A traditional patron-client system is an exchange relationship in which “an individual of higher status (patron) uses his influence to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to patron.”  

Although, as noted earlier, the emergence of Ottoman political parties at the turn of the 20th century witnessed the first examples of party patronage, its scope remained limited. This was also true for the authoritarian one-party period. The regime did seek the support of the notables in the provinces and provided them with political and economic rewards. However, in the absence of competitive elections based on mass suffrage with multiple parties, the RPP did not feel the need to distribute patronage to large numbers of people in exchange for political support.

Political clientelism and party patronage began to play a much greater role in Turkish politics following the transformation of the country’s political regime and the emergence of a multi-party system in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Studies on local politics and patron-client relations show that with the beginning of party competition in the late 1940s, clientelistic relations between the locally influential patrons and their peasant clients became an important, though clearly not the only, vehicle for electoral mobilization in many parts of rural Turkey where more than two-thirds of the eligible voters lived. At the same time, the clientelist networks built around factional divisions among prominent notable families served as the foundations for local party organizations. The recruitment of the locally influential notables into the two major parties, the RPP of the former authoritarian regime, and the Democratic Party (DP), the newly-formed main opposition party, facilitated the rapid
extension of their organizational networks to the provincial small-towns and villages of Anatolia. Hence, the formation of voter alignments among Turkey’s predominantly rural electorate during the late 1940s and early 1950s, was accomplished largely through a process of vertical mobilization. Political parties concentrated their efforts in recruiting members of notable families and faction leaders who used their networks of clientelist relationships with the peasants to mobilize electoral support. This form of vertical mobilization in the first phase of Turkey’s mass politics contrasted sharply with the history of democratization in Western Europe where horizontal solidarities based on common class or group affiliations had played an important role in shaping the emerging political loyalties.¹²

During the 1950s, political clientelism and patronage increasingly became established facts of Turkish political life. With the exception of eastern and southeastern Turkey, where traditional patron-client relations prevailed and individual patrons (landlords, merchants, leaders of tribes and religious orders), exercised considerable control over their clients,¹³ democratization brought about greater reciprocity and choice in clientelistic relationships and practices. Competition between patrons who were affiliated with different political parties meant that clients could demand greater benefits and assistance from them in return for political support at election times. Moreover, the 1950s witnessed an important change in clientelist politics: As parties established their dominance in national and local politics, the distribution of individual or collective benefits to potential voters increasingly began to take place through the organizations of the political parties rather than traditional patron-client ties. Unlike the traditional clientele relationships between notables and their clients, the distribution of state resources through party organizations in exchange for political support became an important means of gaining popular support.¹⁴ The DP, which came to power in 1950 and remained the governing party for a decade, played a major role in the growth of party-directed patronage in Turkish politics.¹⁵ The DP’s leadership understood the importance
of party patronage and used its access to state resources to broaden its popular support by rewarding rural communities which voted for it (or pledged to vote in the next elections) with new roads, electricity, water, and various public works. Similarly, the DP also mastered the art of punishing those constituencies which voted for the political opposition by withholding similar rewards from them. The DP’s electoral successes in the 1950s demonstrated, among other things, the effectiveness of distributing patronage in exchange for votes. The growing importance of party patronage also led to the emergence of a new type of party worker, someone who was adept at performing various brokerage functions for the voters in return for political support. The DP’s local party organizations attracted large numbers of individuals who acted as intermediaries in helping the largely peasant electorate in the small-towns and villages in numerous ways, most typically in their encounters the local authorities and bureaucrats. In the cities, the DP also sought to increase its votes through the distribution of various forms of patronage, most commonly by providing its followers and potential supporters with jobs in the public sector. The main opposition party of the 1950s, the CHP, however, had a difficult time in adapting itself to the exigencies of patronage politics. Unable to transform its organization after decades of functioning as an “official” party of an authoritarian regime, it continued to rely more heavily on traditional patron-client relations than on patronage politics in rural Anatolia, especially in the less developed Eastern provinces. The fact that it failed to come to power during the 1950s also limited its ability to distribute political patronage through access to state resources. It took sometime for the CHP to adapt itself to the game of patronage politics and to recruit individuals who were skilled in performing the role of the broker into its local organizations.\(^{16}\)

**Party Patronage and Clientelist Politics**

Since the initial phase of democratization and party competition more than half a century ago, political clientelism and patronage remained among the major characteristics of
Turkish society and politics. The manifestations of political clientelism and patronage are observable in many different aspects of Turkey’s political environment. The large number of people who flock to the Grand National Assembly building in Ankara on any given day in search of personal assistance and favors from the parliamentary deputies is a stark reminder of the importance attached to clientelist relationships.\textsuperscript{17} However, the nature of this particular clientelism has undergone changes over the years. In the early days of electoral politics, the visitors to the parliament were largely peasants from the rural areas who wished to see the deputies from their electoral districts. Nowadays, most of the people who knock on the doors of the offices of the parliamentarians are typical brokers or middlemen who work for political parties or independent deputies. Their main task is to facilitate the distribution of particularistic goods and favors to the supporters (or potential supporters) of a deputy and his/her party. The nature of the particularistic goods have not changed significantly since the beginning of multi-party politics: jobs and employment, favorable treatment from the bureaucrats and state officials, assistance in finding medical care in Ankara, and influence peddling in a variety of different issues.\textsuperscript{18} It has also become a common practice nowadays to directly contact government ministers by visiting them in their offices to request these particularistic favors.\textsuperscript{19} While the demand for such favors has steadily grown, there has been a corresponding rise in the efforts of the deputies to actively recruit new clients through the use of brokers.\textsuperscript{20}

Turkey’s culture of political clientelism and the constant search for personal “connections” and particularistic favors manifests itself in other ways as well. For example, according to the official website of the President’s office in Ankara, 11, 973 people appealed directly to the country’s President—the highest political office in the country—for assistance between 2007 and 2009. 4,542 of these individuals asked for help in finding jobs while 7,431 wanted financial aid.\textsuperscript{21} A similar picture concerning direct appeals for help and assistance
from political leaders emerges from a study of the Social Democratic Party (SHP) during the early 1990s when it was in power through a coalition partnership. Between November 1991 and March 1993, Erdal İnönü, the leader of the SHP and Deputy Prime Minister of the coalition government, received 110,889 personal petitions from the Turkish public. 33,795 of these (or 30.5 percent) asked for a job, while another 7,740 (6.9 percent) requested monetary help. Petitions regarding policy issues such as tax reform or privatization, ranked far beyond those about personal favors. Most of the petition writers emphasized that they had been staunch supporters of the SHP (some claiming that their political loyalty goes back to the days when İsmet İnönü, Erdal İnönü’s father, led the RPP), that they had voted for the party in every election, and hence deserved to be “helped”. Others complained that while those parties which had come to power before the SHP had found jobs for their supporters in the public sector, the SHP had failed to do so for its supporters. Some openly asked that the SHP’s leader use his political clout to influence the outcome of the exams for job applicants in municipal government. The analysis of the petitions that were sent to the SHP’s leader by the people offer strong evidence about the pervasiveness of the clientelist culture in Turkey in which people constantly search for personal connections with those in positions of authority and political power with the expectation of receiving a variety of favors and rewards.

The precedent which was set by the DP in the use of state resources for political patronage has been followed, with varying degrees of success and effectiveness, by all other parties which have come to power since the early 1950s. Turkish parties have sought to use their access to the resources of the state for distributing collective goods, such as roads, electrification, and various public projects, in exchange for support in the national and local elections. Depriving those communities which support their rivals in party competition from these collective goods and rewards has been a favorite strategy of the parties in power. The most important source of party patronage has been employment in the public sector. Party
colonization of the state has enabled the governing party (or parties serving in a coalition arrangement) to provide jobs for their existing and potential supporters in the expectation that they will vote for the party in the elections. Allocation of jobs through patronage resources have ranged from high-ranking positions in key state agencies to employment as workers in the state-run industries. In addition to collective goods and employment, the rewards offered by parties have also covered a wide range, from packets of food and coal for the urban poor living in the *gecekondu* districts of the major cities, to lucrative contracts and favorable zoning arrangements to businessmen and construction companies. Control of the municipal governments in Turkey’s major cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, and Adana, has increasingly gained in importance for political parties during the past three decades since municipal administrations have considerable patronage resources, particularly with respect to employment in municipal services.

The social, economic, and political changes which took place in Turkey since the beginning of mass politics have had several major consequences for political clientelism and patronage. As noted earlier, during the initial phase of democratization and multi-party politics in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Turkey had a largely agrarian economy and society. The majority of the newly-enfranchised citizens were peasants who worked on the land and lived in villages and small-towns. However, the massive migration to the cities from the rural areas, coupled with economic development and industrialization, has transformed these characteristics of Turkish society. As a result of the rapid increase in urbanization rates since the 1960s, more than two-the people now live in the cities whose populations have dramatically grown over the years. The explosive growth of the cities and their populations has changed the nature of the Turkish electorate from one that was largely rural into one which is predominantly urban. Today, the country’s three largest cities, Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir, collectively account for close to one third of the eligible voters.24
Political clientelism during the early days of party competition was largely associated with the agrarian nature of Turkish society. Networks of vertical ties between the locally influential patrons and their peasant clients formed the basis of the clientelist system which existed in many parts of rural Turkey. In small-towns and villages, much of political activity, including the work of party organizations, centered on these networks of clientelistic relations. When party-directed patronage began to replace traditional patron-client relations, the main goal of the parties was to gain the backing of the peasant voters through the distribution of particularistic and collective goods to rural communities. Varieties of rural-based political clientelism and party patronage continue to be practiced today. In parts of Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, traditional patron-client ties between the locally influential individuals (religious and tribal leaders, members of notable families, large landowners) and their followers or clients continue to be used for electoral mobilization. However, migration to the cities have led to a serious decline in the number of clients and the emergence of Kurdish-based ethnic political parties have posed a serious challenge to the authority and influence of the traditional patrons. Party patronage also remains a fact of politics in the rural areas where the main work of the local party organizations involve the particularistic demands by the individual voters and collective goods (roads, schools, price subsidies for agricultural products, etc.) by the rural communities. But the swelling of the city populations has increased the scope and importance of political clientelism in the urban areas. The migrants from the rural areas, who make up a sizeable segment of the urban poor, have created a large pool of poor people who need assistance in finding jobs, medical help, and access to municipal services. Consequently, party organizations in the large cities seek to win the political support of the urban poor by assisting them to cope with a myriad of social and economic problems. In this respect, Turkey’s pro-Islamist parties have proved to be far more effective and successful than their pro-secularist rivals. Their success is partly due to the fact
that they have managed to replace vertical ties of clientelism with a new form of networking among the people. As practiced initially by the Welfare Party, and later developed further by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), it involves frequent face-to-face interaction between party workers (most of whom are females) and their neighbors who live in the same neighborhood. Unlike the vertical clientelist ties, these are horizontal relationships which are based on the imece (or mutual help) tradition in Turkish society.\textsuperscript{25} Coupled with the distribution of particularistic goods through the party organization to the voters, the new networks of clientelism established by the AKP have proved to be a potent formula for electoral success among the urban poor.

\textbf{Conclusions}

Political clientelism and patronage have long been important components of politics and society in Turkey. The onset of mass politics within a multi-party system and free elections following World War II expanded the scope of political clientelism and increased its importance in the emerging party system. While traditional patron-client relationships were widely used by parties seeking to entrench themselves in local political arenas, they were gradually replaced by party-controlled patronage in which particularistic and collective goods were distributed in exchange for political support in the elections. Given the importance which they attach to patronage as an effective strategy for winning votes, political parties have fought hard to come to power and control the patronage resources of the state. In particular, the allocation of jobs in the public sector to their loyal supporters and potential backers has been the most important goal of Turkish political parties regarding the benefits of controlling governmental power. However, several recent developments, such as the reforms implemented under the aegis of the IMF following the 2001-2002 financial crisis and the adoption of merit-based hiring principles for jobs in the state bureaucracy, have limited the
patronage resources of the governing party (or parties in a coalition) concerning employment in the public sector.

Despite the fact that clientelist practices and patronage-ridden politics have been commonplace in contemporary Turkish politics, the scholarly literature on these phenomena remains remarkably thin. There is urgent need for studies that would address the following questions: First, how are clientelistic relations and patronage networks structured in Turkey’s urban environments? The few case studies on clientelism and party patronage in Turkey are based on studies of small-towns in Anatolia. However, we have only limited information about clientelistic transactions between parties and voters in large cities. Given the fact that majority of the voters now live in the cities, it is important to carry out research on the characteristics and practices of urban clientelism and patronage. It would be especially useful to learn about the brokers and intermediaries in party organizations who work among the urban poor and provide assistance in exchange for electoral support. Secondly, how significantly are partisan loyalties and political preferences influenced by clientelism and party patronage? Although many observers and politicians assume that patronage is critical for electoral success, governing parties in Turkey, with few exceptions, have not managed to emerge victorious from two successive elections. Does this mean that distributing particularistic and collective goods is not necessarily critical in the electoral choices of the voters. Or do the governing parties fail to stay in power because they can not adequately meet the demands of the voters for particularistic and collective goods? Thirdly, how do clientelism and patronage affect the internal workings of political parties in Turkey? Turkish party leaders have traditionally exercised a great deal of control over their organizations. At the same time, major and minor parties have periodically experienced factional divisions and splits in their ranks. It would be important to know how party leaders use the power of patronage to reward their loyal supporters and punish their critics within the
party organizations. It would also be useful to learn about the clientele networks that exist between the party elites at the center and their followers in local organizations. Fourth, what has been the impact of the emergence and growth of ethnic parties in Turkey on clientelist and patronage-driven practices? The political ascendancy of the pro-Kurdish parties in the Southeastern and Eastern provinces has significantly altered the electoral geography and voting patterns in these regions. Studies that can shed light on the relationship between clientelism and ethnicity in Turkey would be a welcome addition to the literature on contemporary Turkish politics.

Endnotes


2 For a useful review of the literature where the concepts of the first and second waves of research are introduced, see Luis Roniger, “Political Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy,” *Comparative Politics* vol. 36, no. 3 (April 2004), 353-375. Some of the major studies of the work on clientelism and patronage in the 1960s and 1970s are included in Steffen W. Schmidt, Laura Guasti, Carl H. Lande, and James C. Scott (eds.), *Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

3 On recent approaches and theories concerning the study of clientelist politics, see Herbert Kitschelt and Steven L. Wilkinson (eds.), *Patrons, Clients, and Policies* (New York:


8 Ibid, p.


17 According to a survey among the parliamentarians, more than half report that they receive between 50 to 300 visitors each week. İlter Turan, “Parlamentosun Etkinliği ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi,” in *Devlet Reformu: TBMM’nin Etkinliği* (İstanbul: TESEV, 2000), p.25.

18 For a personal account by a former parliamentary deputy, see Emre Kocaoğlu, *Acemi Milletvekilinin Ankara Anıları: Sözüm Meclisten İçeri* (İstanbul: Karakutu Yayınları, 2003), 50-53.


20 This may explain why many deputies express the wish they had more time “taking care” of their constituents. Turan, “Parlamentosun Etkinliği ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi” p. 25.

21 Based on the figures provided by the President’s Office in Ankara in
www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/cumhurbaskanligi/orgutsel/Basvurulara_iliskin-Yapilan_Islemler.pdf


23 Ibid, p. 128.


25 This was explained in detail in a talk given by Jenny B. White at the Foreign Service Institute in Washington, DC, in April 2003.


27 For an important study which seeks to analyze this issue, see Özge Kemahlıoğlu, *When the Agent Becomes the Boss: Intra-Party Politics and Patronage Jobs in Argentinna and Turkey* (Doctoral Thesis, Columbia University, 2008).