On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

Alkan, Ahmet (2001) On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings. Review of Economic Design, 6 (1). pp. 99-111. ISSN 1434-4742

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Abstract

This paper studies the structure of stable multipartner matchings in two-sided markets where choice functions are quotafilling in the sense that they satisfy the substitutability axiom and, in addition, fill a quota whenever possible. It is shown that (i) the set of stable matchings is a lattice under the common revealed preference orderings of all agents on the same side, (ii) the supremum (infimum) operation of the lattice for each side consists componentwise of the join (meet) operation in the revealed preference ordering of the agents on that side, and (iii) the lattice has the polarity, distributivity, complementariness and full-quota properties.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Stable matchings, revealed preference, choice function, lattice
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Ahmet Alkan
Date Deposited: 04 Feb 2011 09:48
Last Modified: 29 Jul 2019 14:47
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/16338

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