

**MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY IN TURKEY: THE *TEZKERE* CRISIS OF
2003**

by

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**MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY IN TURKEY: THE *TEZKERE* CRISIS OF
2003**

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ABSTRACT

On March 1, 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) debated a bill that would meet the US requests and authorize the deployment of roughly 62.000 4th Infantry Division troops to Northern Iraq via Turkish territory. The parliament favored the deployment of the US troops by 264 to 251 with 19 abstentions. However, considering the abstentions, the bill failed to achieve the absolute majority required for its ratification by only three votes (267 votes). Despite the strong opposition on the public level and in the parliament, this outcome was largely unexpected for both Washington and Ankara. More importantly, this unexpected consequence, which is known as the “Parliamentary Bill Crisis”, has been regarded as a major turning point and set-back for US-Turkish relations.

This study explicates the newspaper coverage of the decision-making process that led to the “Parliamentary Bill Crisis”. With a content analysis of the media rhetoric during this process, this study aims to analyze how the media presented the issue and it also questions if a link exists between the media’s framing of the issue and the ideological positioning of newspapers in Turkey. Furthermore, this study discusses the role of the media in Turkish foreign policy in general. With this aim in mind, articles from three Turkish daily newspapers; *Milliyet*, *Yeni Şafak* and *Evrensel* between the period between 26 October, 2002 and 1 March, 2003 was subject to content analysis.

The results of the research suggest a clear division between the three newspapers in their framing of the issue and the effect of their ideological positions on this. This differentiation is mainly on the basis of, ideological-identity (leftist-religious) related factors on the one hand, and rationalist-cost benefit calculations (*realpolitik*) on the other. Lastly, the role of the media especially in relation to the Parliamentary Bill Crisis should be questioned via its role on affecting the domestic context in which the public debate took place, its rhetoric and its effect on the formation of the public opinion and directly its effect on the parliamentarians.

TÜRKİYE'DE MEDYA VE DIŞ POLİTİKA: 2003 TEZKERE KRİZİ

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ÖZET

1 Mart 2003'de, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Amerikan isteklerini karşılayacak ve Amerikan Ordusu'nun Türkiye toprakları üzerinden Kuzey Irak'a konuşlanmasını sağlayacak tezkereyi görüştü. Parlamento 264'e karşı 251 ve 19 çekimser olmak üzere Amerikan askerlerinin konuşlandırılması yönünde oy kullandı. Ancak, çekimserlerin de göz önünde bulundurulması ile, tezkere yalnız 3 oyla onaylanması için yeterli çoğunluğa ulaşamadı (267 oy). Hem parlamento içerisinde hem de kamuoyundaki güçlü karşıtlığa rağmen, bu sonuç hem Washington hem de Ankara için beklenmedikti. Daha da önemlisi, "Tezkere Krizi" olarak da bilinen bu beklenmedik sonuç Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde önemli bir dönüm noktası ve sorun kaynağı olarak görülmektedir.

Bu çalışma "Tezkere Krizi" ile sonuçlanan karar alma sürecindeki gazete içeriğini incelemektedir. Bu süreç sırasındaki medya söyleminin içerik analizi ile, bu çalışma medyanın olayı nasıl sunduğunu analiz etme ve medyanın olaya bakışı ile Türkiye'deki gazetelerin ideolojik konumlanması arasındaki bağı sorgulamayı amaçlamaktadır. Ayrıca, bu çalışma medyanın genel olarak Türk dış politikasındaki rolünü tartışmaktadır. Bu amaçla, 3 Türk günlük gazetesinin-Milliyet, Yeni Şafak ve Evrensel-26 Ekim 2002 ve 1 Mart 2003 tarihleri arasında köşe yazıları içerik analizine tabi tutulmuştur.

Araştırmanın sonuçları 3 gazetenin olaya bakışlarında açık bir farklılık ve ideolojik pozisyonlarının bunun üzerinde etkisinin olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu farklılaşma ana olarak ideolojik-kimlik (solcu-dinci) ile ilgili faktörler ve rasyonel-karar zarar hesapları (*realpolitik*) ile ilgili faktörler eksenindedir. Son olarak, bu çalışmanın sonuçlarına göre medyanın Tezkere Krizindeki rolü, kamuoyu tartışmasının yapıldığı milli kontekt üzerindeki etkisi, söylemi ve bunun kamuoyu oluşumu üzerindeki ve direk olarak parlamenterler üzerindeki etkileri açısından incelenmelidir.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Issue: Turkish Parliament's Rejection of Parliamentary Bill of 1 March, 2003

Starting with the US Vice President Dick Cheney's visit to Ankara in March 2002, Turkey and the US began to discuss the possibility of a US intervention to Iraq to overthrow the Saddam Regime. The US asked for Turkish assistance and the opening of a Northern Front via Turkish territory. The discussions, formal and informal talks about this request continued for nearly a year until the US intervention on 20 March 2003. Especially in January and February 2003, there were official bilateral negotiations between the two countries on economic, political and military related issues.¹ During this process, an initial agreement was concluded on 6 February, 2003 when the Turkish parliament passed a bill allowing the deployment of US military personnel and officers

¹ For a detailed analysis of this process, see: Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası [1 March Incident: Iraqi Parliamentary Bill and Afterwards]* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008); Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları [Iraqi Wars in Ankara]* (İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2007); James E. Kapsis, "The Failure of US-Turkish Pre-Iraq War Negotiations: An Overconfident United States, Political Mismanagement, and a Conflicted Military", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 10, No.3, (2006); Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü [The Bill: The True Story of the Iraq Crisis]* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004); William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq* (London: The London Middle East Institute, 2007).

to upgrade some Turkish equipment, military bases, airports and harbors.² Finally on March 1, 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) debated a bill that would meet the US requests and authorize the deployment of roughly 62.000 4th Infantry Division troops to Northern Iraq via Turkish territory.³ The parliament favored the deployment of the US troops by 264 to 251 with 19 abstentions. However, considering the abstentions, the bill failed to achieve the absolute majority required for its ratification by only three votes (267 votes).⁴ Despite the strong opposition on the public level and in the parliament, this outcome was largely unexpected for both Washington and Ankara. More importantly, this unexpected consequence, which is known as the “Parliamentary Bill Crisis”, has been regarded as a major turning point and set-back for US-Turkish relations.⁵

Initially, for Washington, the opening of a Northern Front via Turkish territory was a significant part of the war plans and considered essential for the success of the intervention to Iraq. The existence of strong historical ties between the two countries and the expectation of eventual compliance from the Turkish side was the main motive for the US.⁶ Thus, the decision aroused shock at both public and administrative levels in the US. For instance, many newspapers in the USA presented the result as disappointing and stated a sense of betrayal.⁷ Similarly, the Former USA Ambassador to Ankara, Mark Parris, defined the crisis as an “unmitigated disaster for US-Turkish relations”.⁸

² Philip Gordon, Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey on the Brink”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 29:3 (Summer 2006), p.6. See also, Andrew Mango, “Perplexed by Turkey”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 39:4 (2003), p. 207.

³ Aylin Güney, “An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From Cold War to War on Iraq”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6 No:3 (September 2005), pp. 350-351.

⁴ James Kapsis, “From Desert Storm to Metal Storm: How Iraq has spoiled US-Turkish Relations,” *Current History* (November 2005), p.383.

⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 383-4.

⁶ Philip Robins, “Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002: between a post-Islamist government and a Kemalist state”, *International Affairs*, 83:1 (2007), p. 295.

⁷ Cenk Sidar, “Turkish Islamic Identity and its role on Turkish Policy choices on Iraq, concerning the March 1, 2003 decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly”, MA Thesis, *Johns Hopkins University-SAIS*, Bologna Center (2006), p.1-3; Gordon & Taşpınar, *Turkey on the Brink*, p. 207.

There were also severe implications of this decision for Turkey. Initially, Turkey lost the opportunity to play a part both in the coalition forces during the intervention process as well as in the post-war arrangements and the opportunity to have a say concerning the future of Iraq. In addition to this, the vote in the Turkish parliament led to a deterioration of relations with the US as well as threats to crucial Turkish national security interests. These included the likelihood of regional instability, the possibility of a federal structure for Iraq, and the status of Kurds and Turcomans in Northern Iraq.

The parliament's critical vote has been one of the constantly debated issues in Turkey since March 1, 2003. This is simply due to the consequences of the issue on vital Turkish interest with respect to both foreign and domestic policy options.⁹ For instance, in his analysis of the implications of this decision, Deniz Bölükbaşı, who was the chief negotiator for the Turkish side on the political issues, claims that the increasing autonomy of the Kurdish groups and the current status of the Turcomans within the Iraqi political structure, the increasing terrorist activities of PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan or Kurdistan Worker's Party) via their bases in Northern Iraq and the deterioration of the relations with the US were some of the costs of the failure of Turkish Parliament to ratify the bill.¹⁰

The importance of the March 1 vote in the parliament both for Turkish foreign and domestic policy has been extensively analyzed. Furthermore, there has also been considerable discussion regarding the foreign policy decision-making process that took place in Ankara during this critical parliamentary vote. Several claims have been made on this issue. Some suggest that it is possible to explain this outcome with arguments

⁸ Hale, *Turkey, The US and Iraq*, pp.13; Robins, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002*, p.295.

⁹ For analysis of the consequences of this decision, see Mark Parris, "Allergic Partners: Can US-Turkish Relations be Saved?" *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol 4, No. 1 (Spring 2005), pp.49-58; Michael Rubin, "A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol 4, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp.69-80; Soner Çağaptay, "Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?" *Middle East Quarterly* (Fall 2004), pp. 43-52.

¹⁰ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp. 10-42.

such as the inability of the governing AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*-Justice and Development Party) to secure unity among its deputies; the divergence of the interest between two countries with respect to security concerns; or simply the miscalculation of the Turkish side over the possible costs and benefits of the decision.¹¹ However, it is not easy to devise a single explanation or the most influential factor.

As mentioned above, the result was the outcome of an almost year long process and a series of negotiations which included several factors, risks and opportunities that could not be foreseen and predicted in the first place. It also included the participation of several domestic and international actors with their own agendas and preferences. Thus, the complex structure of the policy formulation and negotiation process needs to be analyzed carefully.

1.2 The Focus of the Study

This study explicates the newspaper coverage of the decision-making process that led to the “Parliamentary Bill Crisis”. With a content analysis of the media rhetoric during this process, this study aims to analyze how the media presented the issue and it also questions if a link exists between the media’s framing of the issue and the ideological positioning of newspapers in Turkey.¹²

The main research question of this study is: “How do ideological discourses influence the newspapers’ framing of the Parliamentary Bill Crisis?” “Does any significant difference exist between Turkish daily newspapers in their framing of the issue?” Lastly, “Do any periodical changes occur in the media rhetoric?”

¹¹ See, Hale, *Turkey, The US and Iraq*, pp.160-172; Barak A. Salmani, “Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom” *Strategic Insights*, Volume II, Issue 7 (2003); Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp. 129-158.

¹² For a detailed analysis on framing theory, see, Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, *Journal of Communication*, 43:4 (1993), pp.51-58.

With this aim in mind, articles from three Turkish daily newspapers; *Milliyet*, *Yeni Şafak* and *Evrensel* between the period between 26 October, 2002 and 1 March, 2003 will be subject to content analysis.

This study applies a two step approach to the analysis of the media content. Initially, the focus is on the general media rhetoric with respect to salience of the concerns and interests related to the issue, of the actors involved in the process, and of the relative weight given to these dimensions. Furthermore, the change in the media content and framing of the issue over time is also to be elucidated.

More importantly, in the second step, the positions of the specific newspapers are to be analyzed. By identifying the convergence or divergence of the patterns among the media coverage of each newspaper, the link between ideological positioning and media rhetoric is questioned. How different ideological positions (for instance a leftist stance) articulate the issue, what sort of frames they use or emphasize is analyzed. This enables a discussion of the reflection of specific ideological discourses and a definition of the “basket of ideas/issues” related to it in the media rhetoric.¹³ For instance, *Evrensel* is defined as a leftist newspaper. However, what constitutes the “left” in the *Evrensel* context is subject to inquiry. Thus, this study questions whether ideological discourses affect the newspaper content analyzed (for instance, whether *Evrensel* is a leftist newspaper or not) and also provides a framework for understanding the characteristics of these ideological discourses in the Turkish context.

Despite the growing influence of the media as an independent actor in the Turkish foreign policy formation process and in galvanizing public opinion, there is a lack of systematic understanding of its role in the academic circles. This study forms a

¹³ Michael Freeden argues that the study of an ideology is both simple and complex. The complexity is due to various permutations of an ideology rather than being an homogenous set of beliefs and ideas. For instance, in the context of liberalism, Freeden defines “liberalism as a basket of ideals that inevitably come into conflict with one another if a serious effort is made to realize any one of them fully, let alone all of them simultaneously.” Similar to liberalism, every ideology can be regarded as a “basket of ideas” that needed to be analyzed and defined carefully. For a detailed discussion, see Michael Freeden, “The Grand Projects of Liberalism”, *Ideologies and Political Theory* (1998), pp.141-178.

preliminary work for further study on this linkage and it brings in conceptual tools for further inquiry of this linkage.

Thus, the initial step is the analysis of the media content by questioning the emphasized or ignored items in framing an issue. This is crucial due to the media's ability to inform the public and its role in defining and interpreting the social reality in which we live.¹⁴ Despite the existence of immense research in the Western literature, it is not possible to claim that the same link exists between Turkish media content and its actual effect on Turkish policy choices and public opinion due to the lack of necessary research in Turkey. Thus, this study provides an analysis of the content that is available to the public and proposes an understanding of the foreign policy presentation of the Turkish media via the use of Parliamentary Bill Crisis. The significance of the issue in the recent Turkish history as well as in Turkish-US relations and the complexity of the process involving both domestic and international level actors and factors provide rich material for the discussion of media rhetoric as well as ideological positioning.

Consequently, this study should be interpreted neither as an analysis of the process nor full account of the results and implications of this case, but rather as a study with the limited objective of questioning the link between the media's rhetoric and its ideological positioning in Turkey during this process and analyzing the media's interest in foreign policy events in general.

1.3 The period analyzed

The period analyzed in this study starts with 26 October, 2002 and ends with 1 March, 2002 in which AKP was the governing party. This period, on which the content analysis will focus, has two important characteristics. One is the fact that the single majority AKP government came to the power after the elections on 3 November, 2002 and was the main decision making unit throughout the process. The second issue relates to the intensification of the debate on both domestic as well as international levels. The increasing number of bilateral talks and visits between the sides and the fact that the

¹⁴ Keith Hindell, "The Influence of the media on Foreign Policy", *International Relations*, Vol.12 (1995), p.74.

intervention was approaching resulted in increasing attention of the public as well as the media on the issue.

1.4 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this study is all of the articles related to the issue written by columnists on a given day. Thus, the unit of analysis is each day starting with the October 26, 2002 and ending with March 1, 2003. There are in total 128 days under analysis for each three newspapers making 384 days worth of newspapers in total. The period included 3773 articles written by columnists in total: 1301-*Yeni Şafak*, 1746-*Milliyet*, 726-*Evrensel*.

Two main assumptions underlie this selection

1. Newspapers in Turkey are considered as one of the main sources of information in which ideological competition over the various issues takes place and articles are a centre point for the representation and reflection of this competition
2. In addition to the idea of the existence of a competition, the second assumption is that ideologies vary in their representation of an issue.

The unit of analysis for this study consist not only all the news presented in a newspaper on the issue but also the articles written / opinions expressed by the columnists. There are several reasons for this choice. First of all, the articles written by columnists in the daily newspapers can reflect easily identifiable patterns of their version of events and information. Furthermore, the columnists most of the time overtly represent the ideological positioning of the newspapers. For instance, Aslı Tunç reminds her readers of the importance of the permanent columnists in understanding the ideological positioning of the newspapers. She claims that the columnists in Turkish newspapers should agree with the ideological and political position of the newspaper in general and the chief editors are the ideological gate keepers in the

Turkish print press.¹⁵ Doğan Tılıç, similarly, point outs that columnists are subject to the highly hierarchical mechanism in the internal structure of the newspaper which is controlled by the owner of the newspaper or by the chief editor.¹⁶ However, the important point here is that articles written by columnists become a point of reference for the ideological position of the newspaper and provide valuable material for content analysis.

1.5 Selection of the Newspapers

There are nearly 40 newspapers available in the national arena in Turkey, 3 of which will be analyzed in this study. The choice of the newspapers again relates to technical features of computer driven analysis which necessitates soft/electronic format and availability of the data. As the data is analyzed with the assistance of a computer program, it is better to have the data electronically. Thus, only the newspapers with an online archive were taken into consideration. Out of a limited number of these kinds of newspapers, 3 were chosen to provide the necessary data for this study. These three newspapers are: *Milliyet*, *Yeni Şafak* and *Evrensel*. The main criteria have been a need to gather data from various ideological dimensions. *Milliyet* is one of the most popular and widely read newspapers in Turkey. It can be regarded in the center of the ideological dimension. Similarly, the choice of *Evrensel* and *Yeni Şafak* is mainly based on an ideological considerations and the need to bring data from various dimensions. *Evrensel*, is known as a newspaper with leftist tendencies while *Yeni Şafak* is known as related to the religious ideological camp.

1.6 Method

¹⁵ Aslı Tunç, *Faustian Acts in Turkish Style: Structural Change in National Newspapers as an Obstacle to Quality Journalism in 1990-2003* (2003), p.4 (Retrieved on June 26, 2003 from <http://soemz.euv-frankfurt-o.de/media-see/qpress/articles/pdf/atunc.pdf>).

¹⁶ Doğan Tılıç, *2000'ler Türkiye'sinde gazetecilik ve medyayı anlamak [Journalism in Turkey in the 2000's and Understanding Media]* (Istanbul : Su Publications, 2001), p. 12.

1.6.1 Content Analysis

Content analysis is a widely used method not only in media-communication literature but also in social sciences in general. The method is applied in various cases for different purposes such as comparing modes of party competition between American and British political parties and analyzing texts to identify propagandists during the WWI period.¹⁷ Additionally, the existent relationship between media rhetoric-content and reality has always been a research arena in which content analysis is widely applied. An example can be given from the studies of Robert Entman and Benjamin Page in which they tried to establish a link between the news coverage of the Gulf Crisis and public opinion.¹⁸

1.6.2 Thematic text analysis

This study applies a specific content analysis method, namely the “thematic text analysis which is a term for any text analysis in which variables indicate the occurrence (or frequency of occurrence) of particular concepts.”¹⁹ In other words, thematic text analysis involves the count of occurrence and co-occurrence of selected concepts within the texts involved in the analysis and enables the researcher to determine what and how frequently concepts occur in texts. The basic assumption in thematic text analysis is that there is a relation between the occurrence of themes and the interest in these themes by the producer.²⁰

Thematic text analysis is appropriate when

¹⁷ Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology* (London: Sage Publications, 2004), p. xvii.

¹⁸ Robert Entman & Benjamin Page, “The News Before the Storm”, in *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion and the US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 84.

¹⁹ Roel Popping, *Computer Assisted Text Analysis* (California; London : Sage Publications, 2000), p.17.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p.20.

- Explicit and unambiguous coding instructions can be formulated (for this study, a detailed coding procedure and search entries has been made and it is available in the appendix 1)
- The unit of analysis is the word or the delineated word phrase and inferences are to be based on frequency of occurrence. (This study involves the counting of the occurrence/co-occurrence of words within the frames that are established for the development of the theoretical linkages.)
- The analysis includes a large number of content concepts. (Details of the content concepts can be found in the appendix 1.)
- There is no reason to suspect beforehand that more than one coding operation will be necessary or that one data set will be used for a series of investigations²¹

The analysis of the variables in the thematic text analysis depends on the researcher's choice of instrumental and representational approaches. The distinction between the two is made on the basis of whether one chooses to apply one's own theory or one's sources' theories to the text under analysis.²² In the instrumental approach, the analysis of the texts is made on the basis of one's own theory which means that meanings that the text's authors may have intended are to be ignored. However, in the representational approach, texts are analyzed for authorial meaning. Therefore, researchers tend to focus less on specific wording rather than on the context within which the texts originated. In other words, in a representational approach, the social context of the text's origin becomes much more important for the accomplishment of the analysis. In this study, an instrumental approach will be used due to the fact that the focus will not be on the social and cultural setting that might affect the wording but on the framing of the texts by the columnists.²³

²¹ *Ibid*, p.41.

²² *Ibid*, p.20.

²³ *Ibid*, p.43.

1.6.3 Capturing framing via word searches

Thematic text analysis is carried out with the help of a computer program, MaxQda, which provides a lexical search of the words identified by the researcher. The benefit of computer assistance over hand-coded text analysis is that the computer helps to overcome coder reliability concerns. The involvement of the coder is limited to the thematic text analysis after the definition of concepts and creation of the lists of words. The program acts as a clerk unfamiliar with the concepts. When the concepts are defined, the program enables the researcher to conduct the analysis over large volumes of data with perfect inter-coder reliability²⁴. In addition, if not handled perfectly, problems concerning validity issues may arise in the thematic approach. Validity deals with the question of whether the findings in the investigation represent real events; or in other words, whether or not the results indicate what is intended to be measured. In the thematic text analysis, the question becomes an issue of the validity of the coding scheme and search entries used by the researcher. The search list used in this study is presented in the appendix 1 and created out of the concerns related to the issue in hand.

Consequently, the application of thematic text analysis involves several sequential steps in the analysis of the content of the newspapers. The initial step is the establishment of the coding units that are going to be counted by the computer program.

1.6.4 Coding Units

As mentioned above, this study focuses on the framing of the Parliamentary Bill Crisis. The frames are defined as concept categories which are “the existing words and phrases that are aggregated and that represent a theoretical concept relevant for the investigator’s theory” in thematic text analysis.²⁵ The design of these frames, creation and definition of concepts, and corresponding search entries involve the differentiation and theoretical ideas at the basis of the researcher’s investigation.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p.39.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p.42.

1.6.5 Meta-Frames/Frames

In this study, in order to define concept categories²⁶, the frame/meta-frame distinction has been used. In their analysis on the relationship between the so-called elite press and US policy in Bosnia, Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon define a meta-frame as “an analytic reference framework that should be used to categorize and analyze events and processes related to various issue areas.”²⁷ In their analysis, these issue areas included concepts such as world order, security, humanitarian or power-domestic politics. Additionally, the second concept, frames, is defined as a means of relating specific themes that are linked to a given issue area. For instance, Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon use frames such as “American role” or “Serb aggression” within the security meta-frame and “elections” within the domestic politics meta-frame.²⁸

In this study, a similar conceptualization will be applied. The sequential steps that build up to the thematic text analysis are as follows:

1. Introduction of the meta-frames: Meta-Frames are simply the categories and issues that initiate a general understanding of the issue/concerns and that are central in the discussion with respect to the Parliamentary Bill Crisis. These include concepts such as categories of domestic and international actors, domestic and international concerns, ideological connotations and perception of the issue.
2. Establishment of frames: Frames, which are the sub-headings of the meta-frames, provide a discussion related to a theoretical concept relevant to the issue. For instance, the “domestic actor” meta-frame includes frames such as

²⁶ Concept categories are also defined as “dictionaries” which include the single words or phrases that define that frame.

²⁷ Yehudith Auerbach & Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, “Media Framing and Foreign Policy: The Elite Press vis-à-vis US Policy in Bosnia, 1992-95”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42, No. 1, (1998), p.85.

²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 86-88.

“government, parliament and military” while “concerns/interests of the actors” meta-frame includes frames such as “domestic security, humanitarian and legitimacy concerns”. In this study, meta-frames/frames are defined as a result of a detailed analysis of the process that led to the Parliamentary Bill Crisis. The actors, the most important issues in both domestic and international level, the factors that could have an effect on the actors as well as on the process were taken into consideration. Thus, a list of meta-frames which is also available in the appendix is created.

3. Definition of corresponding search entries: Once the frames are introduced, the dictionaries are created which are the single words or phrases that define that frame. For instance, the dictionary of the “leftist” frame includes the words such a “emperyal (imperial), işçi sınıfı (proletariat), sendika (trade union), sömürü (exploitation). For each of the frames identified, the dictionary includes several words or phrases that provide the score for this frame. The computer program provided a list of the all of the words that exist in the articles that were analyzed. This enabled me to have an understanding of the concept categories. Thus, frames and search entries for these were defined and created according to the list of the words existing in the articles.
4. Measurement of the scores of each frame through lexical search: The scores are calculated through the computer program, MaxQData. For instance humanitarian concern as a frame is measured by the occurrence/co-occurrence of words such as “Ezilen (suffering), mazlum (oppressed), çocuk (child), masum (innocent), bebek (baby), insanlık (humanity), kıyım (slaughter), cinayet (murder)”. Similarly, the leftist ideology frame is measured by the occurrence/co-occurrence of words such as “Amerikancı (pro-American), kapitalist (capitalist), emperyalist (imperialist), burjuvazi (bourgeoisie), sömürgeci (exploiter), hammadde (raw material)”. Whenever any of these words is found within a text unit, the unit receives a score for the relevant frame. If Article A contains 3 ‘exploiter’s, 2 ‘raw material’s, 1 ‘capitalist’ and zero ‘imperialist’, the article receives a score of 6 for the leftist ideology frame.

If it contained none of the words such as “humanity, children, suffering”, it receives zero for humanitarian concern frame.²⁹

The scores of the frames for each text are the point of departure for the final analysis of the understanding of the framing of the issue.

1.6.6 Factor Analysis and Comparing Means

The only disadvantage that the thematic approach brings is the lack of depth in the analysis. In order to overcome this problem an ancillary tool is applied, which is factor analysis. Factor analysis enables the user to discover relations between concepts that are not coded in the first place and it can be used to identify frames that group together.

To do this, principal components analysis (PCA), which is “a method of data reduction that aims to produce a small number of derived variables that can be used in place of the larger number of original variables to simplify subsequent analysis of the data”, was used.³⁰ In order to extract the number of components, scree plots and eigenvalues which represent the amount of variation explained by a factor were used. Kaiser’s recommendation of retaining factors with eigenvalues over 1 was the criterion behind the selection.³¹ Once the factors were established, it became possible to calculate to what degree variables loaded onto these factors. To clarify the interpretation of the results, a technique called factor rotation was used to discriminate between factors.³² Varimax rotation, which attempts to maximize the dispersion of loadings within factors, was used in this study to establish the factor structure.³³ Within this factor structure, it is

²⁹ See Appendix 1 for frames and the search entries.

³⁰ Sabine Landau & Brian Everitt, *A Handbook of Statistical Analyses Using SPSS* (London New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2003), p.282.

³¹ Andy Field, *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS*, 2nd ed. (London: SAGE Publications, 2005,) p.633.

³² *Ibid*, p.634.

³³ *Ibid*, p.636-637; see also, Landau & Everitt, *A Handbook of Statistical Analyses Using SPSS*, p. 299.

important to decide which variables make up which factors. This was done via the statistical significance of a factor loading and “0.4 and above” values were considered as significant.³⁴

With the analysis of the frames through principal component analysis, the factors and the loading of the frames to these factors were identified. Lastly, a comparison of the mean scores of the newspapers within the established factors enabled the establishment of the link between the ideological positioning and media rhetoric.

³⁴ Landau & Everitt, *A Handbook of Statistical Analyses Using SPSS*, pp. 299-300.

2 THE ISSUE: “TEZKERE” CASE OF 2003

This chapter is an analysis of the process of the “Parliamentary Bill Crisis” and provides background information to it. The history of Turkish-US relations, the preferences of the actors, and the process that led to the event are given in detail. The aim is to provide a complete picture of the process that led to the issue so as to have an understanding of the role of the media.

2.1 History of Turkish-US relations

The US-Turkish Alliance, which was born out of a mutually shared concern of a Soviet threat in the immediate aftermath of WWII, has been in effect for more than a half of century.³⁵ Turkey’s strategic location and a basic premise of shared security perceptions have been influential in Washington’s interest in promoting close political and military ties with Ankara. As a result, Turkey has been a strategic ally and invaluable partner for the US with its membership in NATO, with examples of solidarity in the Korean War and support to the US in confronting and containing the Soviet threat during the Cold War years.³⁶ In return, the US provided the necessary economic and military aid as well as the security that Turkey needed.³⁷ Despite the

³⁵ Sabri Sayarı, “Turkey and the United States: Changing Dynamics of an Enduring Alliance” in Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydın, *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), p.27.

³⁶ *Ibid*, pp.29-30.

³⁷ Kemal Kirişçi, “ABD-Türkiye İlişkileri: Yenilenen Ortaklıkta Yeni Belirsizlikler,” in Barry Rubin & Kemal Kirişçi, *Günümüzde Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2002), p. 205.

emergence of problems in bilateral relations within this period especially in the 60's and 70's,³⁸ the basic commitment to preserving and strengthening relations had been maintained during the Cold War.³⁹

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the end of the bipolar international system and also the transformation of the Euro-Asian political landscape had resulted in fundamental changes in the international and regional context of the US-Turkish relations.⁴⁰ However, as Sabri Sayarı argues, “the relations between the US and Turkey displayed considerable resilience and strength in the aftermath of the Cold War”.⁴¹ The US considered Turkey as an invaluable member of NATO and strategically important country with the potential to influence vital US interests in key regions such as the Middle East (containing Iraq and Iran), the Caucasus and Central Asia (energy politics and relations with Russia), and the Balkans (regional stability).⁴² This interest was observable in several bilateral partnership areas and humanitarian missions in the 1990s. For instance, Iraq had been one of the most effective and significant areas of cooperation in Turkish-US relations.⁴³ The role of Turkey during the Gulf War in 1990

³⁸ See George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research ; Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1972); Alan Makovski, “US Policy Toward Turkey: Progress and Problems” in Morton Abramowitz (eds), *Turkey's Transformation and American Foreign Policy* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000), pp. 219-20.

³⁹ For a detailed analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy in general and the US-Turkish relations also see, William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (Portland: Frank Cass, 2002).

⁴⁰ Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish-American Relations in the post-Cold War Era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence”, in Mustafa Aydın & Çağrı Erhan (eds), *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 91.

⁴¹ Sayarı, “Turkey and the United States”, p.30.

⁴² Sayarı, “Issues of Convergence and Divergence”, p.92.

⁴³ For a detailed analysis of Turkish foreign policy in 1990-91 war, see: Sabri Sayarı, “Between Allies and Neighbors: Turkey's Burden Sharing Policy in the Gulf Conflict”, Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Ungar, *Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Gulf War* (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 197-218; William Hale, “Turkey, the Middle East, and the Gulf Crisis,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 4 (October 1992),

after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by joining the economic sanctions through shutting off the Iraqi oil exports via Turkey and by allowing US air strikes from the İncirlik Air Base located in the southern part of Turkey was essential for the US intervention⁴⁴. This cooperation continued in other areas such as Turkey's participation in the peace-keeping missions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosova as well as fighting the transnational crimes of drug/human trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism.⁴⁵ In return for this role, Turkey received economic assistance either directly or indirectly via the IMF. The US government's role in securing the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan (the leader of the PKK terrorist organization that is responsible for the death of civilians as well as military personnel especially in the South-East part of Turkey), their support with respect to the Turkey's EU membership application, the close military ties between two countries, and the US support in the creation of Turkey based energy corridors from Caucasus to Mediterranean and Europe have also been crucial parts of the strategic partnership between Washington and Ankara.⁴⁶ However, there still existed divergent views between the two sides on crucial issues ranging from the containment of Iraq and Iran to arms transfers from the US to Turkey. Especially the divergent priorities on the containment of Iraq were a crucial factor that had serious implications for the US-Turkish relations and for the Parliamentary Bill Crisis.⁴⁷

A major turning point for the US foreign policy was the attacks of September 11 and the fact that the US had been targeted at home. The national trauma induced by terrorist attacks generated a national climate of fear and anger that was orchestrated by the media and the Bush administration.⁴⁸ As a result, the initial strategy of the US

pp. 679-692; Cameron Brown, "Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003", *Turkish Studies*, Vol 8, No.1 (March 2007), pp. 85-119.

⁴⁴ Ziya Öniş & Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 59, No.2 (2005), p.8.

⁴⁵ F. Stephen Larrabee & Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 2003), p.167.

⁴⁶ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.90.

⁴⁷ Sayarı, "Convergence and Divergence", p.97.

⁴⁸ Micheal Hirsh, "Bush and the World", *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2002), p.18.

during the post-9/11 period has been characterized by an attempt to prevent rogue states threatening the US and using of weapons of mass destruction (WMP) as well as initiating the fight against terrorism.⁴⁹ With this aim, an initial attack was made on Afghanistan as the Taliban rule and the presence of Al Qaeda was seen as the source of terrorist attacks.⁵⁰ Turkey also showed its reliability as an ally with the US both during and aftermath of this war. Both the Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit declared that Turkey was “as ready as ever to cooperate”.⁵¹ In the initial phase, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) voted in favor of the motion that allowed the use of Turkish territory, airspace, and territorial waters for "Operation Enduring Freedom" on October 10, 2001. Furthermore Turkey decided on the authorization of the despatch of the Turkish forces to support the coalition troops in Afghanistan and Turkey commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from June 2002 for a six-month period.⁵²

2.2 The Path to Iraq War

The war on Afghanistan was followed by the inevitable war against Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein who was seen as the main source of the threat. In fact, the US had been planning to bring down the Saddam regime, which was seen as a source of instability, since the first Gulf War.⁵³ Despite the continuing economic embargo and sanctions, the idea that Saddam Hussein continued to acquire weapons of mass

⁴⁹ For the details of American strategy, see “Overview of America’s National Strategy” and “Prevent our Enemies for Threatening US, our Allies, and our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” speech by President Bush, West Point, New York (June 1, 2002).

⁵⁰ Richard Falk, “The Global Setting: US foreign policy and the future of the Middle East”, in Alex Danchev & John MacMillan, *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics* (Milton Park- Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p.27.

⁵¹ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.91.

⁵² *Ibid*, pp.91-92.

⁵³ Hakan Tunç, *Amerika'nın Irak Savaşı* (İstanbul: Harmoni Yayınevi, 2005), p.27.

destruction had made it into the cornerstone in the US foreign policy agenda.⁵⁴ When on 31st of October (1998) Saddam Hussein unilaterally announced that all the activities of UN weapons inspectors would cease, US finally decided take more severe measures against Iraq. With this in mind, the Clinton Administration declared the "Iraqi Liberation Act" which was a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq on 31 October 1998.⁵⁵ It was also at this time that, the first US request for cooperation from the Turkish side on a possible Iraqi intervention was made by the US President Clinton on 6 November, 1998.⁵⁶ Clinton requested military support and the active involvement of Turkey in a possible operation to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Süleyman Demirel, the former Turkish President, responded to this request by claiming that it would be risky and, in fact, a mistake to be involved in a war which would have a profound impact on the regional balances. Some sources even claimed that Demirel proposed the idea of a sort of "Palace Coup" in which Saddam Hussein would be replaced with a more desirable leader.⁵⁷ The immediate US reaction to the problem resulted in the "Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 in which the US and British planes used İncirlik Base to bomb some strategic points in Iraq.⁵⁸ However, the concerns over Iraq and the solutions were not settled in Clinton's term. The forthcoming presidential elections in the US and later the events of September 11 were among the reasons for delaying a full-scale military operation to Iraq. Similarly Turkey was facing a severe domestic crisis at the time which could have prevented possible Turkish cooperation. One reason was the 1999 earthquake which had resulted in the death of thousands of people as well as in the severe damages in the country's infrastructure and economy. Moreover, the 2001 economic crisis and the duration of its recovery prevented the idea of possible Turkish assistance or participation.

⁵⁴ Mohamed A. El-Khawas, "Post-Gulf War, Post-Desert Fox, and the post-Saddam Phase: US policy against Iraq and its impact in the Middle East" in *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War* (Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2006), p.171.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 172-76.

⁵⁶ John Davis (ed.), *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War* (Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2006), pp.1-2

⁵⁷ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, p.25.

⁵⁸ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.93.

The event that initiated the reigning strong US willingness to overthrow the Iraqi regime under the leadership of Saddam Hussein was the terrorist attacks of September 11. The September 11 attacks were also the occasion for attention being given to the pre-existing agenda of launching a high-profile policy of regime change for Iraq.⁵⁹ Thus, especially starting with the first days of 2002, the focus had begun to sway from Afghanistan towards Iraq.⁶⁰ Condoleezza Rice warned Iraq, claiming the existence of weapons of mass destruction on January 8 and US President Bush defined Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the “Axis of Evils” on January 29 implicitly demanding a regime change and democratization process.⁶¹ These statements intensified the debate over the possible US war on Iraq. Within this period, the Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit had a meeting with US President Bush on 16 January 2002 and he explained Turkish concerns over a possible US intervention in Iraq.⁶² However, the most prominent event, this paper suggests, occurred at the start of the decision-making process and was US Vice President Cheney’s visit to Ankara on 19 March 2002. In this visit, Cheney stated that the US was going to intervene in Iraq and demanded “full and complete cooperation” from Turkey.⁶³

2.3 The Issue in Hand: The Iraq War; Turkish-US Relations and the Interests of the Actors

During a possible intervention, the coalition with Turkey would have been crucial in the success due to her geo-strategic importance which would have enhanced the possibility of opening a Northern front and the use of the Turkish bases and

⁵⁹ John B. Budis, “Why Iraq”, *American Prospect* (March 2003).

⁶⁰ John Dumbrell, “Bush’s War: The Iraq Conflict and American Democracy”, in Alex Danchev & John MacMillan, *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics* (Milton Park-Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p.36.

⁶¹ Richard Falk, *The Global Setting*, p.27.

⁶² Yetkin, *Tezkere*, p.39.

⁶³ Bill Park, *Turkey’s Policy Toward Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives* (London: Routledge, for International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005), p.23.

airspace. The high US expectations and the significance of Turkey were best revealed in the words of the US Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz:

“Turkish participation, if it does come to the use of force, is very important in managing the consequences, in producing the result as decisively as possible, and also helping to make sure that the post-war Iraq is a positive force in the region, not a destabilizing one. So, it is very crucial to have Turkey intimately involved in the war-planning process”.⁶⁴

Thus, starting with Cheney’s visit in March 2002, the demands of US from the Turkish side and the Turkish position to meet these demands as well as the Turkish request from Washington in exchange for these demands were on the agenda of both sides.

2.3.1 General Concerns and Positions of the Actors

2.3.1.1 USA

The fact that the United States was attacked on its own soil and the fact that it was the single most destructive terrorist act in US history was considered a justification for the US intervention in both Afghanistan and later in Iraq. For instance, on January 28 2003, US President Bush said,

“Before September 11, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans-this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes.”⁶⁵

⁶⁴ United States Mission to European Union, “Wolfowitz on Turkey and the EU, Role in Iraq,”
<http://www.useu.be/Categories/US&EUEnlargment/Dec0202USTurkeyWolfowitz.html>, p.1

⁶⁵ David Dudge, *The War in Iraq and Why the Media Failed Us* (London : Praeger Publishers, c2006), p.11.

A simple perspective of the US intervention to Iraq can be a security based one that would argue the necessity for preventing terrorist activities. However, one might analyze the broader picture and in that case, should take into account the dynamics behind the US foreign policy making.⁶⁶

For instance, Francis Fukuyama argues the emergence of a neo-strategic doctrine of “pre-emptive strike, a doctrine of preventive war- that would take the fight the enemy, rather than relying on deterrence and containment”.⁶⁷ He continues to argue a pre-existing foreign policy agenda of neo-conservative intellectuals⁶⁸ “involving concepts such as regime change, benevolent hegemony, uni-polarity, preemption and American exceptionalism”.⁶⁹ Similarly, in the shadow of the terrorist attacks, John Ikenberry defines the emergence of a new paradigm according to which “America is to be less bound to its partners and to global rules and institutions while it steps forward to play a more unilateral and anticipatory role in attacking terrorist threats and confronting rogue states seeking WMD. The United States will use its unrivaled military power to manage the global order.”⁷⁰ This new paradigm consists of several items such as

- a fundamental commitment to maintaining a uni-polar world in which the United States has no peer competitor
- dramatic new analysis of global threats and how they must be attacked

⁶⁶ For a detailed analysis of US foreign policy decision making process, see, Bob Woodward, *Bush Savaşta [Bush at War]* (İstanbul: Arkadaş, 2005).

⁶⁷ Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neo-Cons: America at the Crossroads* (Suffolk: Yale University Press, 2006), p.1.

⁶⁸ For neo-conservative effect on the US foreign policy, also see, John Davis, “The Ideology of War: The NeoConservatives and the Hijacking of US Policy in Iraq”, in John Davis (ed.), *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War* (Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2006), pp.29-61.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p.3.

⁷⁰ John G. Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition: The rules of Pre-emption”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, Issue 5 (Sep/Oct2002), p.2.

- a new offensive understanding of deterrence
- recasting of the terms of sovereignty in countries which harbor terrorists, either by consent or because they are unable to enforce their laws within their territory, effectively forfeit their rights of sovereignty; a general depreciation of international rules, treaties, and security partnerships
- a need for the United States to play a direct and unconstrained role in responding to threats
- only little concern related to consequences of the US actions on international stability⁷¹

This new understanding of the international environment and US foreign policy is directly related to the US intervention in Iraq. Initially, in order to maximize its interests, several conditions needed to be met for the US. These included the defeat of militant Islamic fundamentalism, helping Middle Eastern Arabs and Muslims, to forge a modern mindset, pre-empting any security threats such as acquisition, transfer and usage of weapons of mass destruction, ensuring of the free flow of oil and the free flow of trade in the Persian Gulf, and ensuring a viable settlement.⁷² Based on these conditions, the US intervention to Iraq could be analyzed within the “US geo-economic interests in oil and national security interests in establishing a new bridgehead in the region and dealing with the perceived –if seemingly mistaken- threat posed by a hostile regime in possession of WMD”.⁷³ Overthrowing the Saddam regime and encouraging the spread of democracy in Iraq was essential in preventing a new generation of terrorists emerging in the region, and in integrating Iraq into world capitalist system which would provide lucrative opportunities for American business.

⁷¹ Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition”, p.1-7.

⁷² George Schwab, “US National Security Interests Today”, *American Foreign Policy Interests* , 25 (2003), p.362.

⁷³ Alex Danchev and John MacMillan (eds.), *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics* (Milton Park- Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p.12.

Turkish participation was crucial in the success of the US intervention to Iraq. Thus, Washington requested from Ankara:

- Deployment of the US military forces in Turkey in order to open a Northern Front: For this aim, Washington requested the deployment of 60.000 US military personnel and 250 US aircrafts in Turkey
- Opening of the Turkish airfields and the ports: The airports requested were: Adana-İncirlik, İstanbul-Sabiha Gökçen, Batman, Antalya, Diyarbakır, and Gaziantep as the main ones and Afyon, Balıkesir, Erzurum, Erzincan, Muş, İzmir-Çiğli, Konya and Malatya for support based use. The ports requested were: İskenderun, Mersin, Samsun as the main ones and Trabzon, İzmir.
- Opening of Turkish airspace for the coalition air forces ⁷⁴

The US aimed to finish three main stages in order to reach the capacity she needed before the start of the intervention: These three stages were:

1. Site inspection: In the first stage, the US Military would first inspect bases, ports and communications in Turkey
2. Site preparation: This stage included the improvement of these bases, ports and communications in order to meet the US needs and demands
3. The stationing of the air and land forces in Turkey ⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp.24-25.

⁷⁵ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.102.

2.3.1.2 Turkey

Turkish interests and positions on the bargaining table were influenced by many factors. The strategic partnership that had been ongoing for a long time had many reflections on the definition of Turkish interest and its strategic calculations. A possible rejection of US demands could have resulted in the deterioration of the relations and could have serious implications such as:

- Loss of US support for issues such as Turkey's EU membership, issues related to Cyprus and Armenia
- Loss of the support of the Jewish lobby
- Loss of help with Turkey's increasing internal and external debts
- Loss of a say on the fate of Iraq which could have serious implications for Turkish territorial and security interests⁷⁶

Apart from the factors related to Turkish-American relations, it is also possible to talk about several other factors that were related to Turkish interests in general with the respect to Iraqi war. These can be defined as political, economical and military based concerns.⁷⁷

2.3.1.2.1 Political Concerns

⁷⁶ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp.79-80.

⁷⁷ There are many books and articles written on the negotiation process and as well as on the issue. I will use Deniz Bölükbaşı's book (*1 Mart Vakası*) as the primary reference in the thesis simply due to the fact that he was the chief negotiator for Turkish side in the political matters and he could provide valuable information on behind the door matters.

The political concerns can be given as the “red-lines” defined by the Major General Kalyoncu on 6 January 2003⁷⁸:

1. Prevention of the establishment of an ethnically-based Iraqi federal state: Turkey requested the protection of territorial integrity, national unity and political structure of the existing Iraqi state after a possible intervention. One of the possible outcomes of this intervention was the establishment of a more autonomous Kurdish political entity in the Northern Iraq which could intensify Turkish problems with its own Kurdish minority. This also could lead to increasing Kurdish separatist activities via terrorist organizations or through having a direct impact on the Kurdish people living in the South-Eastern part of Turkey⁷⁹
2. Protection of the rights of the Iraqi Turcoman: Turkey requested the protection of the social, political, economic and legal rights of the Turcoman living in the Northern Iraq. The aim was to prevent the Kurdish control over the Musul-Kerkük area which would both enhance the autonomy of Kurdish groups via the control of the petroleum reserves and damage the status of the Turcoman living in this area.
3. Prevention of the presence of terrorist organizations in the Northern Iraq: This was a major concern for Turkey since it is known that the PKK has its bases of operations in Northern Iraq. Turkey requested preventive measures to counter these terrorist activities.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pp.66-67.

⁷⁹ For a detailed analysis of current debates on Turkish ‘Kurdish Problem’ and its reflection on Turkish foreign policy see, Kemal Kirişçi, “The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy”, in Lenore Martin & Dimitris Keridis (eds.), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, London: The MIT Press, 2004), pp.277-314.; Philip Robins, “Turkey and the Kurds: Approaching a Modus Vivendi”, in Morton Abramowitz, *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need* (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2003), pp.85-109.

4. The need for the international legitimacy for the intervention: Turkey constantly requested the need for the UN resolution in order to intervene Iraq. This would both legitimize the action in the eyes of international actors as well as in the eyes of domestic constituents.
5. Prevention of the mass population movement: Lessons learned from the first Gulf War revealed that there could be a massive immigration to Turkey.⁸⁰ This time the creation of the refugee camps in Northern Iraq and deployment of military forces were suggested as preventive solution⁸¹

2.3.1.2.2 Economic Concerns

On the economic side of the issue, Turkey asked the US to provide financial aid to help protect the Turkish economy in the event of a war against Iraq. It was widely believed that the war could be destructive to Turkish economy. The example of the first Gulf war, its effect on the Turkish economy and existence of unfulfilled expectations was crucial in the Turkish decision-making circles.⁸² For instance, the estimated cost of the Turkish participation in the 1st Gulf war ranged from 45 to 120 billion dollars.⁸³ Turkey was thus very insistent on compensation for possible losses due to the intervention. For that reason, there were bilateral talks between the two countries about the economic package that would satisfy the Turkish demands.⁸⁴

2.3.1.2.3 Military Related Concerns

⁸⁰ Kapsis, “From Desert Storm to Metal Storm”, p.382.

⁸¹ For an analysis of the effect of Gulf War of 1990-91 on Turkey, see, Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak and Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner. “Decisionmaking Process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp.43–78.

⁸² Güney, “From Cold War to War in Iraq”, p.346.

⁸³ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, p.152.

⁸⁴ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp.68-69.

Lastly, Turkish concerns on the military side of the intervention included⁸⁵:

1. Turkish active involvement in the war: This included Turkish participation in the Coalition Forces in order to secure its interests in Northern Iraq. The prevention of Kurdish autonomy in the region and the status of the Turcoman as well as the PKK activities were among the major concerns.
2. The presence of Turkish troops in Northern Iraq: The aim was to contain a spillover and secure Turkey's own security. Turkey requested to place Turkish troops to form a secure line in order to prevent these concerns from becoming a reality..
3. Status and Involvement of Kurdish Groups in the Intervention: The US attack plans involved the support of the Kurdish involvement to fight against the Saddam regime. Because of this certain kinds of weapons were to be given to Kurdish Groups (such as Barzani and Talabani). Regarding this, Turkish concern was over the acquisition of weapons by Kurdish groups, their training and their involvement in intervention process. Turkey tried to ensure that this would not threaten its security interests and ensure the disarmament of the Kurdish forces after the war.
4. Prevention of conflict in Northern Iraq: This included the prevention of conflict especially in the Musul-Kerkük area of Northern Iraq and between Kurdish Groups and Turcoman.
5. Humanitarian purposes: Turkish military could serve peace-keeping missions in the post-war environment.
6. Technical and Legal Issues: A large US military presence in Turkey involved many technical and legal issues such as the status of US personnel in Turkey and Turkish logistical support to them.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, pp.39-62.

2.3.2 Domestic Level Analysis/Preferences of the Actors

2.3.2.1 Bülent Ecevit

In the 1999 elections, the Democratic Left Party (DSP) under the leadership of Ecevit emerged as the biggest party with 22 percent of the vote and 136 seats in parliament. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) was second with 18 percent of the vote and 129 seats, while the Motherland Party (ANAP) followed them with 13 percent of the vote and 86 seats. These three parties formed the coalition government with Ecevit as the Prime Minister.⁸⁶

Ecevit is best known as the *Conqueror of the Cyprus (Kıbrıs Fatih)* as he was the Turkish Prime Minister of the time who decided on the deployment of Turkish troops in Cyprus in 1974⁸⁷. As the Prime Minister, Ecevit supported the Turkish-US strategic alliance during his short office term. This became apparent in the Turkish agreements with the IMF, relations within NATO and bilateral relations with the US and his quick response to the US call to the war in Afghanistan.⁸⁸ However, in the case of the Iraq intervention, Ecevit had a much more critical stance towards the US intervention from the beginning. He made it clear that although he did not support the regime in Iraq, there was a need for peaceful solutions to the issue rather than military intervention.⁸⁹ He claimed that military intervention could have serious implications on regional balances as well as on Turkish interests at both domestic and regional levels. In his meetings with US representatives and talks with President Bush, Ecevit constantly

⁸⁶ For details of the 1999 elections, see <http://www.belgenet.com/secim/secim1999.html>.

⁸⁷ For details of the issue, see Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*; Baskın Oran, *Kıbrıs Meselesi: Uyarılar ve Teorik Dersler* (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2004); Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar-Cilt1 1919-1980 [Turkish Foreign Policy: Issues, Documents and Comments From the War of Independence to Today-Volume 1 1919-1980]* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002).

⁸⁸ Gökçen Keskin, "Bülent Ecevit", in Ali Faik Demir (eds.), *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler [Leaders in Turkish Foreign Policy]* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2007), p.293.

⁸⁹ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, p.83.

suggested the use of diplomatic means. Furthermore, when the war drew closer, Ecevit emphasized the need for UN resolution and prioritized legitimacy-related concerns.⁹⁰

2.3.2.2 Justice and Development Party (AKP)

The single majority AKP government came to power after the elections on 3 November, 2002 as the successor of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government. AKP won 363 of the 550 available seats with a 34.3 % of the votes. However, because of the continuing ban on the participation of Tayyip Erdoğan in politics, the party was led by Abdullah Gül who became the Prime Minister until Erdoğan's election as the representative of Siirt on 8 March, 2002.

Despite the fact that there were debates about AKP's image as having a more Islamist stance, AKP was not seen as a monolithic entity due to the existence of diverse views within the party⁹¹. Within this heterogeneous group, it is possible to find three main camps.

The first one can be given as the one represented by Erdoğan. His basic assumption was the fact that the war was inevitable and Turkey should act accordingly. Erdoğan followed a pragmatic approach which aimed at avoiding a possible deterioration of the relations between Turkey and USA. At the same time, Erdoğan emphasized the need to protect Turkish interests such as maintaining the territorial integrity of the country, prevention of the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish state, compensation for any economic losses and preserving the position of the Turcoman in Northern Iraq in the inevitable case of war.⁹²

⁹⁰ Keskin, "Bülent Ecevit", p. 293.

⁹¹ Saban Kardaş, "Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis: JDP Between Identity and Interest", in Hakan Yavuz (eds.), *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and AK Parti* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), p.323.

⁹² Philip Robins, "Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq", *International Organization*, Vol. 79, No. 3 (2003), pp.560-62.

The second group can be given as the Prime Minister Abdullah Gül and his followers. Gül. He was critical of the war and the US actions and he opposed and tried to prevent a possible intervention. Thus, Gül always suggested the need for peaceful solutions to the issue.⁹³ Despite making early efforts and displaying a cooperative attitude, Gül was aware of the difficulty of the situation and tried to slow down the process by delaying the site preparation works by American engineers and by launching a Middle East Initiative in January and February 2003. However, when the war began to approach and the inevitability of it was understood, similar to Erdoğan, he had also a pragmatic stance and did not want to alienate US. Gül's position on the support of US was conditional upon the satisfaction of certain political, economic and military related requirements.⁹⁴

The last group within the AKP can be identified as those who were represented by the President of the parliament, Bülent Arınç. This group was the most skeptical of the US intervention in Iraq and strictly opposed both the war and Turkish participation in this process.⁹⁵ On the other hand, the AKP position in general, especially the positions of Gül and Erdoğan, was affected by electoral concerns. Public opinion and the role of media were influential in that sense. This point was mentioned in the later stages of the parliamentary bill crisis and it is claimed that Gül tried to find ways of sharing the responsibility of attacking a Muslim country.

2.3.2.3 Republican People's Party (CHP)

CHP emerged as the main opposition party in the 2002 elections with 19.4 percent and 178 seats in the parliament. The party was established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (founder of Turkish Republic) and it claims to be the representator and protector of Kemalist principles. The party has a harsh critique on the AKP of which

⁹³ *Ibid*, p.320.

⁹⁴ Kardaş, "Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis", pp.317-18.

⁹⁵ Barak A Salmani, "Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom" *Strategic Insights*, Volume II, Issue 7 (July 2003).

they claim has a hidden Islamist agenda.⁹⁶ Contrary to the divergences within the AKP establishment, the main opposition party, CHP, had a clear view and position against the war. Based on the outcome of Gulf War I and the possible economic, political and humanitarian costs of this war, CHP totally opposed the Turkish participation and possible US intervention in Iraq. This position claimed to be based on two factors: one, the CHP principle to be in line with the traditional Turkish foreign principle of non-involvement in regional problems; two that CHP did not want to support a bill that would strengthen AKP's position with the public.⁹⁷

2.3.2.4 Turkish President-Ahmet Necdet Sezer

Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the former head of the Constitutional Court in Turkey and who was elected as the country's President for a seven-year term in 2000 was associated with a strong commitment to Kemalist principles.⁹⁸ President Sezer had also stated the need for peaceful means of solving the problem and the need for UN resolution in case of a possible intervention. President Sezer did not want to alienate the US but at the same time tried to find a way to secure Turkish interest. In addition, President Sezer constantly emphasized the TGNA's responsibility to decide the issue. His main point was that the intervention needed international legitimacy.⁹⁹

2.3.2.5 Turkish Armed Forces

The Turkish Armed Forces is often viewed as the protector/guarantor of the Turkish secularist structure and vital national interests and sees itself as "legitimately

⁹⁶ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.304.

⁹⁷ Idris Bal, "Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri ve 2003 Irak Savaşı'nın Getirdikleri" [Turkish-US Relations and the Outcomes of the 2003 Iraq War], in *21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası [Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century]*, Idris Bal (eds.) (Istanbul: Nobel, 2004), p.173.

⁹⁸ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.303.

⁹⁹ The Speeches of President Sezer is available in the web site of Presidency: www.cankaya.gov.tr.

concerned not only with the defense against external and internal threats but also with the active promotion of the country's ability to achieve its national objectives".¹⁰⁰ The amount of its influence over the Turkish politics can be highlighted with the examples of military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 as well as the military declaration against the Welfare Party on 28 February, 1997.¹⁰¹ The military establishment had a clear understanding of the issue which can be seen in the emphasis it gave to the importance of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Iraq, the prevention of the establishment of a possible autonomous Kurdish state and the prevention of Kurdish control especially in areas in which Turkish minorities lived. The Turkish General Staff (TGS) was willing to participate in the war in joint command of action in Northern Iraq in order to secure Turkish interests in terms of both the Kurdish issue and the Turcoman living in Northern Iraq.¹⁰² In addition, the TGS wanted the US to guarantee to disarm the Kurds and argued for the necessity of the UN resolution.¹⁰³

Within the decision-making process, the military can channel its influence through National Security Council (NSC)¹⁰⁴ which is ostensibly an advisory body to the government but functions as a principal decision making body on foreign and security matters.¹⁰⁵ Since its establishment in 1949, the NSC's overall authority has steadily

¹⁰⁰ Ergün Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p.109.

¹⁰¹ Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin, *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980's* (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1988), p.137. Also see, George Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey: Guardians or Decision-Makers?", in in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin, *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980's*, p.179.

¹⁰² Edward Erickson, "Turkey as Regional Hegemon-2014: Strategic Implications for the United States", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp.25-45.

¹⁰³ For the speech of Head of Turkish General Staff Hilmi Özkök on the issue before the parliamentary bill, see; Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp.115-118.

¹⁰⁴ See the web site of National Security Council for details: <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/kanun.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Gencer Özcan, "The Military and the Making of Foreign Policy", in Barry Rubin & Kemal Kirişçi (eds.), *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p.17.

extended and its present form was established with the 1982 Constitution. The Council is composed of the prime minister; the chief of the General Staff; the ministers of national defense, interior and foreign affairs; the commanders of the army, navy and air forces; and the general commander of the Gendarmerie under the chairmanship of the president of the republic.¹⁰⁶

On the issue, especially in the last NSC meeting, the TGS had a neutral position towards Turkish support for the US demands. However, after the vote in parliament on March 1, the Head of Turkish General Staff Hilmi Özkök declared that rejection of the bill was not in the best interest of Turkey on March 2, 2003. One can interpret this as the military having preferred the bill to have been passed.¹⁰⁷ One explanation to this change of position before and after the veto can be the uneasiness between AKP government and military. The suspicions of the military about the Islamic identity of the AKP government could have led to the neutrality of the military. The military, skeptical of the AKP's secularist orientation, did not openly support the AKP's position in order to not strengthen their position vis a vis the public. On the other hand, the military did not want to share the blame of the possible political and economical consequences of the war.¹⁰⁸

2.3.2.6 Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA)

The TGNA was the main institution for the decision with respect to the deployment of the US forces in Turkey and sending Turkish forces abroad. This is simply due to the fact that the deployment of foreign armed forces on Turkish land, and Turkish armed forces in foreign lands is under the regulation of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in accordance with Article 92 of the Constitution. This request for deployment required a Parliamentary vote in favor of the motion by a clear majority, namely more than 50% of the total votes.

¹⁰⁶ Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, p.108.

¹⁰⁷ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, pp. 186-187.

¹⁰⁸ Kapsis, "The Failure of US-Turkish Pre-Iraq War Negotiations".

After the elections in November 2002, the TGNA was composed of mainly two parties and independent parliamentarians. AKP won 363 seats with 34.3 % of the vote, CHP won 178 seats with 19.39 % of the vote, and the remaining 9 seats were won by independent candidates. The factions within the parliament and the dynamics behind it were crucial in the decision. A more detailed analysis of the importance of the TGNA will be discussed in the following sections.

2.3.2.7 Interest Groups and Public Opinion

Independent from the formal decision-making process, interest groups and public opinion served as influential actors on the preferences of especially political parties and parliamentarians. To start, the main influential interest groups can be given as business organizations such as TUSIAD (Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen), MUSIAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen), ATO (Ankara Trade Association) and Turkish Iraq Business Council. Only TUSIAD was in favor of the bill due to the expectations of the financial aid from US and also TUSIAD's reliance on the vitality of the Turkish-US relations.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, other organizations emphasized the possible economic costs of the intervention such as its negative impact on trade and tourism. Their calculations were mainly based on the impacts of the 1st Gulf war of 1990-91, especially related to economic issues.

Additionally, the public arena served as both as an influential factor on the actor's positions as well as an arena in which the different opinions were observed. From the beginning of this process, a strong opposition to war in Iraq was reflected in polls of public opinion as well as in the media coverage of public opinion. For instance, the polls showed that the opposition within the public reached 90 percent when the vote got closer.¹¹⁰ Additionally, there were many strong protests against the war with the cooperation of many groups such as NGOs and the broader public in many cities. A

¹⁰⁹ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, p. 216.

¹¹⁰ Marcie J Patton, "Voices from Turkey's Southeast", *Middle East Report*, No. 227 (2003), p.43; also see, Pew Research Center, Press Release: "How Global Publics View: Their Lives, Their Countries, theWorld, America," (December 4, 2002), <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165>.

very important and large anti-war demonstration was held in Ankara on March 1, 2003 with nearly a hundred thousand demonstrators who emphasized the costs of the Gulf War and death of innocent civilians.¹¹¹

There were various points of departure to this opposition within the larger public. Some emphasized the fact that Iraq as a Muslim country created a sense of sympathy while others portrayed the intervention as an imperialist aim of US. Additionally there was the stance that emphasized the humanitarian costs of a war which could have catastrophic impacts on both human and certain state mechanisms and functions in Iraq.¹¹²

Within the process itself, the increasing pressure of the US on the Turkish side had also profoundly affected the public attitude. Similarly, there were caricatures in the US media which portrayed Turkey as a cheap negotiator and were offensive to Turkey. These were also reported by the Turkish media before the debate on the bill which was also influential in the formation of the negative attitude towards the US. The fact that US media coverage had portrayed Turkey as a simple bargaining country trying to get as much as economic aid as possible could have also been influential in the creation of outrage at the social level.¹¹³ Public opinion influenced the parliamentarians as well as the AKP ruling elite.¹¹⁴ The electoral concerns of the parties forced the politicians to consider the opinions of the public in their votes.

2.3.3 The Process until Parliamentary Bill Crisis

2.3.3.1 Background Information

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² Kapsis, “The Failure of US-Turkish Pre-Iraq War Negotiations”.

¹¹³ The Brookings Institution, *The Iraq Crisis: What does the World Think about the Diplomatic Wrangling at the UN?*, (2003), pp.12. Also available on <http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/20030313.htm> (accessed on April 20, 2007).

¹¹⁴ Robins, *Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad*, p.564.

Before going into the details of this period, a brief summary of the period between March 2002 and November 3 2002 should be included as background information.

It was mentioned that the discussion on a possible military intervention to Iraq dated back to the Clinton era. However, the issue turned into a much more serious and heated debate with US Vice President Dick Cheney's visit to Ankara in March 2002. This visit, which could be interpreted as the significance of Turkey in the eyes of US, was the starting point for the Cheney's "attempt to rally the region for regime change in Iraq".¹¹⁵ This visit was followed by the visit of Paul Wolfowitz and leading Marc Grossman to Ankara in July. The meeting with Turkish government officials presented Iraq as the official target and the US asked for the Turkish cooperation on the issue.¹¹⁶ The general picture was that Prime Minister of the time, Bülent Ecevit had a negative stance towards Turkish cooperation with the US due to the possibility of economic problems and destabilization of the Kurdish region which would reflect upon Turkish security interests. Instead of going to war, the Turkish side suggested the need for a peaceful means of solution and need for the UN resolution.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, it was confirmed by Turkish Foreign Minister Güler that, in this meeting Turkish side had negotiated with US for support in Cyprus case and EU membership in return of Turkish cooperation in Iraq.¹¹⁸ In the following period, both formal and informal talks between the two sides and meetings continued. These included talks about the opening of a Northern Front and the details of a possible operation such as the deployment of US forces and use of the ports and airports. However, at that point, the Turkish side was unsure about the possible effects of the intervention on Iraq. The US pressured Turkey in the meantime to give an immediate answer; however a memorandum of understanding could not have been reached. The National Security Council (NSC) meeting of October 2002 basically summarized the reasons for this with the position of

¹¹⁵ Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002", p.20.

¹¹⁶ Hürriyet, "Wolfowitz Irak için Geliyor" (13 June 2002), available on <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2002/07/13/151683.asp>.

¹¹⁷ Keskin, "Bülent Ecevit", p.293.

¹¹⁸ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, p.64.

Turkey on the issue. Turkey needed promises on the issues with respect to Kurdish issue and Kerkük as well as the support of US on Cyprus and EU membership. Additionally, the need for a UN resolution was also a pre-requisite for Turkish cooperation.¹¹⁹

The US gradually clarified its demands and intensified its pressure on Turkey within this period. However, Ecevit's government tried to delay the decision as much as possible due to several domestic context related factors. While Ecevit and the Military had been dealing with US demands and trying to negotiate on some ground terms that would satisfy Turkish interests, at the same time they had to face great challenges in the domestic arena. Ecevit's own health problems were a serious problem that resulted in divisions within his party. Some suggested that Ecevit should resign from his post as he was incapable of directing the country anymore.¹²⁰ The result was the resignation of 58 party members including the Foreign Minister İsmail Cem which had meant the loss of governments' majority in the parliament.¹²¹ This was one of the most critical events of the Turkish-US negotiations simply due to the fact that it was not possible for the government to reach the necessary vote in the parliament in the case of a motion being presented. Even if both countries had agreed on the terms, it still would have been quite unlikely for the bill to have been passed by parliament. Because of this, it is possible to argue that Ecevit's government tried to gain time until the elections. A critical maneuver in this period was the Turkish allowance for the start of U2 flights for intelligence purposes over Northern Iraq. Furthermore, Turkey allowed the activities of CIA operatives in South-Eastern part of the Turkey again for intelligence purposes related to Northern Iraq.¹²²

¹¹⁹ For a detailed chronology for the process, see; Mustafa Oğuz, "Conflict within the Turkish foreign policy decision making mechanism: the cases of the gulf war and the USA military intervention in Iraq", Unpublished MA Thesis, Sabancı University (2005).

¹²⁰ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.87.

¹²¹ See reports in *Hürriyet*, 4 May 2002; NTV web site, 13, 17 and 17 May; 10 June and 31 July 2002.

¹²² Mustafa Balbay, *Irak Bataklığında Türk Amerikan İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet, 2004), p.17

Additionally, Turkey had been in a very busy period debating the issues with respect to EU membership in August. The debate on the laws that would abolish the death penalty and the debates on the future of Cyprus were at the heart of the Turkish public debate. These items were crucial in the sense that they were related to vital Turkish interests. The heated public debate on these issue as well as the forthcoming elections in November resulted in silencing the issue and it could not be discussed again until the AKP period.¹²³

2.3.3.2 AKP period

After the elections, it was not until December 3 that the issue was back on the agenda and a serious step was taken by both sides. During the first days of government, the AKP leadership had to deal with serious domestic and international issues. Initially, the minor crisis of the government formation had been solved on November 16 when President Sezer appointed Abdullah Gül to form the government and the new cabinet of Gül received a vote of confidence on November 28. Additionally, the declaration of the Annan plan for permanent peace in Cyprus on November 10 and EU Copenhagen Summit on November 12-13 were the foreign policy priorities of the time.¹²⁴ Following these important events, the visit of the US Defense Secretary Wolfowitz and Deputy Secretary of State Grossman to Ankara, brought the debate on the Iraq War back to the agenda and into public debate. In this visit, the US officially stated its demands on the basis of its three stage plan. For the first stage, a team of 150 technicians was given the permission to work in Turkey.¹²⁵ This was followed by AKP leader Erdoğan's visit to the USA to have a meeting with Bush on December 10.¹²⁶ This visit was interpreted differently from several angles. Some emphasized the fact that this invitation showed the US support to Erdoğan and AKP which resulted in the uneasiness within the

¹²³ Kardaş, "Turkey and Iraqi Crisis", p.309.

¹²⁴ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, pp. 88-90.

¹²⁵ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp. 28-29.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, pp.146-147.

military.¹²⁷ On the other hand, others emphasized the possibility of Erdoğan's commitment to the possible US operation.¹²⁸

Until December 28, several meetings that emphasized Turkish concerns and demands were held. While the US was pushing Turkey to decide on the issue, at the same time, the Turkish side continued to state its concerns over the issue. AKP announced the need to look for peaceful solutions to the problem as well and also referred to the need for UN legitimacy. Similarly, new CGS (Chief of General Staff) Özkök said that: "a peaceful solution to the Iraq problem must be pursued.... But if a military operation proves unavoidable, it must be undertaken on internationally legitimate grounds."¹²⁹ The statement which was delivered by the Turkish Prime Ministry emphasized the fact that there was no agreement with the US on the Iraq case and also the fact that the right to decide belonged to parliament.¹³⁰ No further step had been taken before the end of 2002. The debate was still revolving around issues such as unfilled promises in the First Gulf War, economic losses, the scope of the involvement of the Turkish army in the operations and the number of US troops that would be allowed on Turkish territory.¹³¹ In addition to this, one other factor that was mentioned was the continuing dominance of certain issues such as the elections in November, the issues with respect to EU membership and Cyprus up until January 2003. As Robins argues, "efforts only began in earnest in January 2003 to decide the basis on which Turkey would cooperate with the US".¹³²

On December 27, a memorandum of understanding between the two countries was made and it was decided to start the official negotiations on the basis of five US

¹²⁷ Salmani, "Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies", p.4.

¹²⁸ Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002", p.19.

¹²⁹ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp.115-118.

¹³⁰ Hürriyet, "Başbakanlık: ABD'ye üs sözümüz yok" (4 December 2002), available on: <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2002/12/04/216231.asp>.

¹³¹ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, p.29.

¹³² Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002", p.20.

demands from Turkey and red-lines drawn by Turkey. Three separate committees were established in the military, political and economic spheres.¹³³ For the Turkish side, the military negotiations would be handled by the Turkish Chief of Staff, the economical ones to be handled by the Ministry of the Treasury and the political ones to be handled by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For political issues, the US side was represented by Ambassador Marisa Lino, who was known as a fierce negotiator while Turkish side was represented by Ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşı, who was also known for his capability in negotiations.¹³⁴

In the following days, it was possible to witness the increasing number of meetings between officials from both sides as well as meetings between the domestic actors. Arduous negotiations went on between the two sides. While negotiations were continuing, at the same time, Prime Minister Gül continued his efforts of finding a peaceful solution to problem and the prevention of the war. Gül mentioned that there should be no doubt of the existence of weapons of mass destructions in Iraq if a possibility of war was to be entertained.¹³⁵ He also visited the Middle Eastern countries in order to reach common ground in the first two weeks of the January. The need for the results of UN inspections in Iraq, the indivisibility of the territorial integrity of Iraq and the importance of peaceful means were mentioned by Gül as common points for the Middle Eastern countries.¹³⁶ However, he could not find either the support or a solution to the problem as a result of these visits as well as the meeting that was held in İstanbul on January 24. At the end of the January, the NSC again emphasized the necessity of a UN resolution for Turkish cooperation. It, furthermore, called upon the government to seek parliamentary approval for military measures with regard to Iraq in accordance

¹³³ For the Turkish and the US's committees in the negotiations, see; Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, ek-1 and ek-2, pp.179-180.

¹³⁴ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, p.33, p.66; also see, Kapsis, "From Desert Storm to Metal Storm", p.303.

¹³⁵ Hürriyet, "Gül: Ortak Hareket Edeceğiz" (06 June 2003), also available on: <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/01/06/230857.asp>.

¹³⁶ Hürriyet, "Ortadoğu'da Barış Ortaklığı" (12 January 2003), also available on: <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/01/12/233651.asp>.

with the requirements of the Constitution. However, the NSC did not propose any date for a possible parliamentary meeting on the issue.¹³⁷

As the war drew closer, US pressure on Turkey had begun to increase as well. An initial agreement was concluded on 6 February when Turkish parliament passed a bill that allowed the deployment of US military personnel and officers with the aim of upgrading some Turkish equipment, military bases, airports and harbors.¹³⁸ Meanwhile, Prime Minister Gül continued his efforts to finding a peaceful solution while also indicating that Turkey would be a reliable partner for the US. Gül also saw the need for the cooperation between UN inspectors and the Iraqi government for the prevention of war.¹³⁹ However, there was still an emphasis on the UN resolution even in the aftermath of this bill when the AKP leader talked to the media on 12 February. When Turkish Ministers Ali Babacan and Yaşar Yakış came back from the USA from their negotiations on the economic issues, they stated that US forces should wait for the passing of the parliamentary bill until February 18. They explained that some agreements had been made on the issue of economic aid but differences especially with respect to the amount of aid and some military issues still existed¹⁴⁰. However, the deadline passed due to the intense negotiations between the two countries over the conditions of the agreement. The debated issues included the size of American aid package, numbers and legal/judicial status of US troops in Turkey, the extent of TAF deployment in Northern Iraq, the status of Kurdish Peshmerga as well as disarmament of these groups; and the guarantees for Iraqi Turcoman.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Yetkin, *Tezkere*, p.147 and 151; Hurriyet, 18 and 27 January; NTV website, January 2003.

¹³⁸ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, p.34; Radikal, 7 February 2003.

¹³⁹ Hürriyet, “Gül: Günah bizden gitti” (5 February 2003), also available on: <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/02/05/244647.asp>.

¹⁴⁰ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p. 107; Hürriyet, *ABD Türkiye’den bu gece cevap bekliyor*, (20 February 2003), also available on: <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/02/20/251092.asp>; Yetkin, *Tezkere*, pp.151-58

¹⁴¹ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp.35-78.

Due to severe US pressure, government decided to pass the bill to parliament on 25 February.¹⁴² There was also fierce Kurdish opposition to Turkish involvement in the war which delayed a possible agreement in the negotiations.¹⁴³ In addition to this, it is mentioned that there was a need to convince the parliament thorough aid packages. The vote, which was scheduled for 27 February was delayed by Prime Minister Abdullah Gül in order to wait for the National Security Council meeting on 28 February. However, the NSC did not make further comment and suggestion on the issue.¹⁴⁴

Despite the lack of agreement on the issue and existence of various views to the contrary, Deniz Bölükbaşı, who was the chief negotiator for political issues, claimed that the countries had reached a satisfactory memorandum of understanding on all of the three levels before the parliamentary vote. The agreement basically consisted of these items:

- Military Side: According to Bölükbaşı, Turkey succeed in taking all the necessary precautions in order to secure vital Turkish national and security interests. This involved agreement on the details of the deployment of Turkish forces in Northern Iraq and on the conditions under which Turkey would use military force; on the details “Yağmur Hattı”¹⁴⁵ through which Turkey was allowed to occupy a “buffer zone” up to 30 km within the Northern Iraqi border in order to secure Turkish territory as well as prevent PKK activities; on the details of Air Strike and the protection of the status and rights of Turcoman; on the conditions about the armament and disarmament of Kurdish groups; and on the legal

¹⁴² See Bölükbaşı for the Parliamentary Bill of 25 February: Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, ek-8, pp.193-195.

¹⁴³ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, pp.110-111; also see NTV web site, 25 February 2003; Robins, “Confusion at home, Confusion Abroad”, p.563.

¹⁴⁴ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.113; Yetkin, *Tezkere*, pp.168-69, *Hürriyet*, 28 February 2003..

¹⁴⁵ For the details and map of the “Yağmur Hattı”, see: Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, ek-4, p.181.

and technical issues such as the judicial status and taxation of US personnel¹⁴⁶.

- Economic Side: American calculations had predicted the cost of the war for Turkish side as being between 6-15 billion dollars. Bölükbaşı claimed that during the negotiations their offer was 15 billion dollars including 10 billion dollars credit, 3 billion dollars military and economic aid, 1 billion dollars for petroleum as well as the upgrade of the bases in Turkey. This offer was valid upon the condition of full Turkish cooperation and approval of American demands and of Turkish meeting the demands of IMF economic program. Apart from this, the agreement which was concluded on 25 February included financial agreements between the two countries, measures with respect to trade, regulations with respect to the Turkish private sector operations in Afghanistan and American assistance in Turkish petroleum deals¹⁴⁷.
- Political Side: The agreement on the political issues was in general parallel to the “red lines” of Turkey. This included protection of territorial integrity and national unity of Iraq regardless of the dominance of any ethnic group, the preservation of the Turcoman identity and recognition of it as a founding element of the Iraqi nation and the prevention of the terrorist activities originating from Northern Iraq.¹⁴⁸

Under these conditions, the parliamentary bill, which gave the government the right to deploy the Turkish Army in foreign lands as well as the deployment of American troops in Turkey, was debated in parliament on 1 March 2003. Out of 533 parliamentarians who attended the vote, 264 voted in favor of and 251 voted against the bill while there were 19 abstentions. As a result, the parliamentary vote failed to achieve the majority (267 for this case) which was necessary for its ratification.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp.62-64.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp.68-74.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, pp.65-68.

2.3.4 Assessment of the Decision-Making Process

Especially in the last period, Turkey had to face increasing pressure at the international level as well as clear-cut demands from the US side. The inevitability of the war was understood and there were negotiations in terms of political, military and economic terms. However, there were still problems at both domestic and international levels which impacted on the possibility of the vote being passed by the Parliament.

The arduous negotiations at the international level were not completed under the last minute. In case of Turkish acceptance of US demands such as the deployment of the forces, use of ports and airports as well as the opening of the airspace; the US guaranteed the Turkish deployment of forces in Northern Iraq to occupy a “buffer zone” up to 30 km.; preservation of Turcoman identity and recognition of it as a founding element of the Iraqi nation; prevention of the occupation of Musul and Kerkük by Kurdish militias; protection of the unity of the country; and nearly 15 billion dollars in compensation for economic losses.¹⁴⁹ It can be suggested that this guarantee seemed to satisfy Turkish needs and demands in the first instance; however, it was not enough to secure parliamentary support.

It was known before the vote that CHP would vote against the bill. However, AKP alone had the necessary majority in the parliament to secure the ratification. Prime Minister Gül was aware of the divisions within his party and because of this he had constantly reminded the US during the negotiations at the international level that he would need to make the case as persuasive as possible. However, a combination of several factors resulted in the failure of AKP to reach the necessary majority in the parliament:

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, pp.35-70, Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.110.

- Divergent views and interests of the two countries with respect to Iraq, the Kurdish issue involving armament/disarmament and the issue of PKK as well as Kurdish autonomy and status of the Turcoman¹⁵⁰
- The US guarantee and the agreement were reached too late to be influential in the eyes of the parliamentarians¹⁵¹
- Existence of factions within the AKP with very strong nationalist and religious sentiments who opposed the war and the bill¹⁵²
- The decision of AKP leadership not to impose party policy in favor of the bill and the decision to have a secret ballot during the session¹⁵³
- The lack of a UN resolution for the issue which would provide the legitimacy of the issues in the eyes of both domestic constituencies such as the President, parliamentarians and also public at large¹⁵⁴
- The inexperience of the AKP leadership which resulted in “confused priorities, limited attention and the capacity to overload”¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ For the divergence of interest between Washington and Ankara, see; Sayarı, “Issues of Coverage and Divergence”; Kapsis, “From Desert Storm to Metal Storm”, p.381; Güney, “From Cold War to War in Iraq”, pp.348-349; Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*.

¹⁵¹ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, p. 133, Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.166.

¹⁵² Saban Kardaş, “Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis”, pp.313-14; Kapsis, “The Failure of US-Turkish Pre-Iraq War Negotiations”; Kapsis, “From Desert Storm to Metal Storm”, p.384.

¹⁵³ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, p. 132; Kapsis, “The Failure of US-Turkish Pre-Iraq War Negotiations”; Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, pp.165-67.

¹⁵⁴ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, p.132.

¹⁵⁵ Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p.167; Kapsis, “From Desert Storm to Metal Storm”, p.384

- The existence of strong opposition in the public at large and the failure of AKP to produce an effective public policy to inform them as well as the failure of Turkish diplomacy in handling the media¹⁵⁶
- The existence of different views within the important actors such as the lack of clear military support, the neutral stance of President Sezer and CHP opposition within the parliament¹⁵⁷
- The US's disregard of the rising voice of public opinion and the opposition within the formal domestic constituencies and her failure to use diplomatic and media means in order to decrease tension at the public level¹⁵⁸
- The US's constant demands of the Turkish military disregarding the formal structures of Foreign Ministry¹⁵⁹

2.3.5 Conclusion

The Parliamentary Bill Crisis was a result of a rapidly changing, troubling and chaotic process which involved many obscure, un-foreseeable and unthinkable risks and opportunities. For instance;

- It involved a huge military operation involving air strikes, cross-border operations to a foreign country which was new not only for Turkey but also many countries

¹⁵⁶ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp.132-36, Hale, *Turkey, the US and the Iraq*, p.167; Güney, "From Cold War to War in Iraq", p.348.

¹⁵⁷ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp.132-36, Güney, "From Cold War to War in Iraq", p.350.

¹⁵⁸ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp.132-36.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

- It was the first time that Turkey was getting involved in an multi-national military operation against one of her neighbors
- It was the first time that an army of this size was going to be deployed in Turkey
- It was the first time Turkey would deploy such a big force in a foreign country
- The possibility of any loss during the military operations could impact the public opinion¹⁶⁰

All of these factors complicated the process which resulted in the parliament's veto of the bill. An attempt to give a clear and complete picture of this process was made in order to have a full understanding of the factors related to the framing of the media. With this aim in mind, the following sections will be devoted to the analysis of the media rhetoric on the issue and a discussion of its possible role.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 163-164.

3 THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ON THE MEDIA CONTENT

3.1 Research on the Media and Foreign Policy Relation

This chapter provides an analysis of the results of the content analysis of the newspaper rhetoric. Despite the fact that this study does not aim to provide a link between the media rhetoric and public opinion, this chapter starts with a brief discussion of the media's effect on public opinion. The concepts related to the three classes of effects discussed below are useful in analyzing the media rhetoric and reaching a meaningful understanding of the framing of the issue.

3.1.1 Three classes of media effects on public opinion

The research on the effects of the media on the public has been mainly based on studies on the Western media. The events leading up to Gulf War and extensive coverage of the media provided useful means for a natural experiment in order to analyze the effects of the media on public opinion as well as on the policy choices.¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ For the examples of these studies, see Lance Bennett & David Paletz (eds), *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion and the US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Brigitte L. Nacos & Robert Y. Shapiro & Piarangelo Isernia (eds.), *Decision Making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (Lanham, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, Herbert Schiller (eds), *Triumph of the Image: the media's war in the Persian Gulf* (Boulder CO: Westview, 1992); Brian Buckley, *The News Media and Foreign Policy* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1998).

The studies revealed three classes of media effects.¹⁶² These are briefly; agenda setting- which points out the ability of the news media to define the significant issues of the day; priming- which is interested in the relationship between patterns of news coverage and the criteria with which the public evaluates the politicians; framing- which links the coverage of the issue to the public opinion. Now the focus will be on these three classes of the media effects.¹⁶³

3.1.1.1 Agenda setting

In many settings, issues come to the attention of the public in a very dramatic and rapid fashion. Some of the issues become very popular and “media-ized” but some of them remain silent. What makes the difference is generally the attention of the media to the issue and its extensive coverage. Media interprets the issues, gives some of them more or less coverage and signifies some events over the others.¹⁶⁴ Thus, the research suggests that the amount of news coverage on a political issue can dictate the degree of importance the public attaches to that issue as well.¹⁶⁵ This chain of events is generally referred as the agenda setting function of the media in the literature.

3.1.1.2 Priming

Priming simply means the ability of news coverage to affect the criteria by which political leaders are judged. Priming is defined as “an extension of agenda-setting, and addresses the impact of news coverage on the weight assigned to specific

¹⁶² David Paletz, “How Public Opinion is Shaped by the News” in Lance Bennett & David Paletz (eds), *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion and the US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, p. 167.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, pp.167-175; Also see, Shanto Iyengar & Adam Simon, “News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing”, *Communication Research*, Vol 20, No3 (June 1993), pp.365-383.

¹⁶⁴ Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media”, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1972), p. 176.

¹⁶⁵ B. Dan Wood; Jeffrey S. Peake, “The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 1. (1998), pp. 173-74.

issues in making political judgments”.¹⁶⁶ The more attention or importance attached to an issue, the greater weight it has in political judgments.

Research on the priming effect focuses on the evaluation of the performance of a wide range of political actors in terms of their assessment of their political performance and of a/their political leader’s personal traits. It is argued that stronger priming affects are observed in the area of performance assessments while weaker ones are observed in the area of personality as a result of news coverage. An example of priming effect again mentioned by Iyengar and Simon is “A recent study based on national survey data found that the public’s support for U.S. intervention in Central America became twice as influential as a determinant of President Reagan’s popularity in the period immediately following the disclosure that funds from the sale of arms to Iran had been used to finance the Contras”¹⁶⁷. Similarly one can analyze a shift in the weight that the public accord foreign policy issues rather than economic or social issues as a result of the priming effect.

3.1.1.3 Framing

Framing involves selection and salience and as Entman suggests, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”.¹⁶⁸ As the definition suggests, framing is to select and highlight some bits of information rather than the others, making them more noticeable, more meaningful/understandable or more memorable to the audience. It does not automatically mean that the framed item will be received or noticed by the audience but

¹⁶⁶ Shanto Iyengar & Simon, “How Public Opinion is Shaped by the News”, p.170.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication*, 43 (4), (Autumn 1993), p.52.

it is true to suggest that framing enhances the probability that the receiver perceives the message, discerns the meaning, thus processes it.¹⁶⁹

In terms of a media studies perspective, framing becomes a crucial link between the news content and the audience, in our case within the media- public opinion- politician triangle. Depending on the context analyzed, the frame becomes a mechanism that determines what the most people notice and how they understand/evaluate and remember a problem. At the same time, framing also means that it directs attention away from other possible alternatives of defining, explaining, understanding or evaluating a phenomenon. Because of this, what is included in news content or what is omitted becomes vital in people's understanding of an issue since their responses are clearly affected by the information they receive.¹⁷⁰ An example that indicates how framing works can be given as follows:

“the effect of framing is to prime values differently, establishing the salience of the one or the other. (thus) ..a majority of the public support of the rights of the persons with AIDS when the issue is framed (in a survey question) to accentuate civil liberties considerations- and supports ...mandatory testing when the issue is framed to accentuate public health considerations.”¹⁷¹

Framing will be an important part of this thesis due to the fact that the analysis is on each newspapers' framing of the issue, their commonalities and differences from each other as well as an attempt to understand what is left out of the picture.

3.2 Results

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p.54.

¹⁷⁰ Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg, “Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News”, *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 50 (2000), pp.93-93 (109).

¹⁷¹ Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock, *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.52.

3.2.1 Distribution of the Issues in Articles written by columnists

The period that is analyzed in this thesis is between 26 October 2002 and 1 March 2003. One consideration is the distribution of the issues in the articles written by columnists within this period. The period included 3773 articles written by columnists in total: 1301-Yeni Şafak, 1746-Milliyet, 726-Evrensel.¹⁷² There are mainly 6 categories in order to differentiate the issues represented in the articles written by columnists: foreign policy (including the two categories of Turkish foreign policy in general and the Iraq War specifically¹⁷³);




Figure 1: Issues of Articles Written by Columnists

¹⁷² The articles on art and sports related issues were not taken into account in the analysis.

¹⁷³ The issues with respect to Parliamentary Bill Crisis are given under the heading of Iraqi War. These articles are also the ones included in the analysis.

economy; domestic politics; international¹⁷⁴; other¹⁷⁵; religion¹⁷⁶. The most salient issues were in general foreign policy related issues which included Turkish foreign policy matters (13%) as well as the Iraq War (25 %) and domestic politics related issues (32 %). The issues related to Turkish foreign policy mainly included discussions on Turkish-EU relations and Cyprus. The European Council meeting on 12-13 December, 2002, attracted considerable attention from the media due to its discussion on the start of the negotiations with Turkey¹⁷⁷. Similarly, the declaration of the Annan Plan regarding the future of the Cyprus on November 11, 2002 was the other main focus area of the media.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ International issues included foreign country specific issues which are not related to either Turkish foreign policy or Iraq War.

¹⁷⁵ The category of other included issues such as an article about a famous person or about an historical event which does not relate to other categories.

¹⁷⁶ Due to the existence of several articles on religion, the category of religion is specific to *Yeni Şafak*. The analysis indicates that such a specific category do not exist for other newspapers.

¹⁷⁷ For the December 2002 European Council *Presidency conclusions* see: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf.; Also see Atila Eralp, "Turkey and European Union," in Lenore Martin & Dimitris Keridis (eds.), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy* (London, Cambridge: The MIT Press), p.81; Kemal Kirişçi, "The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey. Is it an Historic Turning Point?," *The Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.8, No 4, Article 8 (December 2004).

¹⁷⁸ See James Wilkinson, "The Cyprus Problem: The Last Act", in Morton Abramowitz (eds.), *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2004), pp.173-206.




Figure 2: Issues of Articles (All Three Newspapers)

Initially, *Yeni Şafak*'s articles are mostly on domestic politics (32%), the Iraq War (25%), and on foreign policy issues (13%). The religion category also is 9 percent of the total articles written by columnists.



Figure 3: Issues of Articles-Yeni Şafak

Similarly, *Milliyet* included articles mostly on domestic politics (30%) and the Iraq War (24%). However, the share of the articles written on economy (17%) and on the category of other(16%) had a much more prominent role in *Milliyet* than *Yeni Şafak*.




Figure 4: Issues of Articles-Milliyet

Lastly, *Evrensel* mainly focused mostly on the Iraq War (41%), domestic politics (30%) and economy related issues (14 %). Furthermore, *Evrensel* reveals comparatively less interest in foreign policy issues and comparatively more interest in the Iraq war.




Figure 5: Issues of Articles-Evrensel

3.2.2 Parliamentary Bill Crisis and its representation in the media

The overall structure of the distribution of the issues in the newspapers is given above. We see that within almost a four month period, $\frac{1}{4}$ of the articles were written on the “Parliamentary Bill Crisis”. Only the issues on domestic politics which included variety of areas from party politics to discussions on policy options on health, the education system and the environment exceeded the number of the articles written on the Iraq War. This clearly signifies the salience of the issue in the public arena. Furthermore, the issue became even more visible in the final two month period.



Figure 6: Distribution of Issues in Articles in January-February 2003 Period

The start of the official negotiations and the approaching war resulted in an increase in the media attention towards the issue. For instance, the amount of articles on the Iraq war is 25 percent of the total within the four months period. However, in the January-February period this increases to 45 percent while the domestic politics category falls to 19 percent from 32 %. Similarly, a time-scale analysis of each newspaper reveals the increasing attention of the media on the issue.




Figure 7: Distribution of Issues Over Time-Yeni Şafak




Figure 8: Distribution of Issues Over Time-Milliyet




Figure 9: Distribution of Issues Over Time-Evrensel

As can be seen from the graphs above, attention shifts significantly towards the US intervention in Iraq especially in February. This signifies the popularity of the issue among the column writers and the fact that the issue is highly media-ized. It is also a reflection of the intensity of the debates on the issue at both administrative and public levels. It is not possible to draw a direct link between the media coverage and its effect on the public; however, it can be argued that the amount of news coverage could dictate the degree of importance the public attaches to that issue. One conclusion that can be derived from these statistics is that the Parliamentary Bill Crisis was a significant issue and this points out the agenda setting function of the media.

3.2.3 Framing of the Issue

The role of the media in a foreign policy crisis or decision-making process can be invisible or difficult to be understood. In general, there are various factors that can affect the degree or visibility of its influence. Because of this, one must put together various characteristics and dynamics in order to have a full account of the issue. One crucial dimension of the research on media-foreign policy relation is the analysis of regular patterns of press-government relations and news organization-audience relations which revealed certain dynamics that are peculiar to the foreign policy reporting of the

issues (when compared to reporting of other political issues). Because of this, in an analysis of the media's role in a foreign policy issue, one must focus on these differences in the reporting of the issue:

- the diversity of the actors who make the news
- the diversity of policy options, actors, issues reported in the news and the weight given to those
- the measures of accountability established for decision-makers, both short and long term¹⁷⁹

Thus, this thesis concentrates on and presents an analysis of the newspaper content in these dimensions. How the issue is framed in general and how the framing of each newspaper differs from the others is the central concern.

3.2.3.1 Framing of the actors

The Second chapter provided a detailed analysis of the process that led to the Parliamentary Bill Crisis and the various actors involved in the process with specific interests, preferences and policy choices with respect to the Parliamentary Bill Crisis. Now the focus is on the presentation of these actors by the media. The analysis revealed the following results:

¹⁷⁹ Lance Bennett, "The News About Foreign Policy", in Lance Bennett & David Paletz (eds), *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion and the US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, p.20.




Figure 10: Distribution of Scores of the Actors Frame

The most referred to actor is the USA (#6986)¹⁸⁰ which is closely followed by Turkey (#6759) and Iraq (#4214). This result is not surprising due to the fact that they are the main sides in the debate and central actors in the decision-making process.

Among the domestic actors, the government (#3424) leads, while domestic forces (#2001) which basically represents public opinion and public forces is second and the parliament (#1018) and the military (#823) are third and fourth. The least referred to domestic actors are the opposition party (#393-CHP in this case), the president (#241), other political parties (#145) and civil society and pressure groups (#105) including actors such as TÜSİAD and non-governmental organizations.

It is also not surprising that the government is the most cited domestic actor due to its central role in the decision-making process. The negotiations as well as formal and informal talks were handled by the government. Furthermore, during the process, public opinion manifested itself in several ways such as the meetings and protests both at the domestic level and worldwide. This is clearly reflected in the articles of the columnists

¹⁸⁰ # refers to the score of the frame

analyzed in this study. Similarly, the parliament, which was the main institution that decided on the issue, is a central point of the discussions. However, the military scored less than the public and the parliament. This is quite shocking both due to its significance in Turkish foreign policy making structure as well as in Turkish politics and due to the existence of military related issues. Additionally, the relatively low importance of civil society organizations and political parties including the main opposition party (CHP) is also resulted in their low level of citation in the articles.

Furthermore, at the international level the most referred to actors are; the EU and European countries (#2349); international institutions such as the UN, IMF and World Bank (#1373); Saddam Hussein (#1349); and the Middle Eastern countries and actors (#1132). At the bottom of the list, there are the non-European countries (#562), Israel (#514) and the Kurdish Groups (204). Especially the legitimacy of the intervention (which relates to the UN resolution), the existence of worldwide anti-war movements, and the discussions on the participation of NATO members to the intervention process and on the costs of the war were crucial points of discussion in the international arena. The scores of the international actors indicate that these were also considered in the articles analyzed.

One clear result of the analysis is that international actors have a higher score than most of the domestic ones. For instance, the European countries, international institutions, the Middle Eastern countries and Saddam Hussein are cited in the articles more than crucial domestic actors such as the parliament, the military and the president. During the times of the intensification of the debate in the international arena, this is also reflected into the scores of the international actors. This is simply due to the fact that the intervention is beyond the domestic arena and the discussions on the legitimacy of the issue and on the intervention had been discussed in the international arena with participation of several actors. Similarly, a detailed analysis reveals a parallel conclusion for the scores of the domestic actors with a closer look at the last month of the process.¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ Distribution over time scores are calculated via the following formula: the score of the frame in a given day / the total number of words in that day




Figure 11: Comparison of Decreasing-Increasing Actor Frames, 15.02.2003-01.03.2003

As the table above indicates, within the last two weeks, the scores of domestic actors such as the president and the parliament increased. Especially, during the final week, the parliament's score is above all the other categories while the president's score nearly tripled when compared with his initial scores. One can also observe a dramatic decrease in the scores of both international institutions and Europe. This signifies the intensification of the debate in the domestic arena with respect to Parliamentary Bill (voted on March 1, 2003).

One additional observation is related to the scores of the main decision-making units which are; the US, Turkey, Iraq and the government. Despite the existence of various fluctuations in specific




Figure 12: Distribution of Scores of Main Actors Over Time

periods, the overall distribution of the data indicates a straight pattern.¹⁸² This is due to their centrality in the decision-making process and continuous relation to the issue and decision setting. Thus, the scores of these actors are higher than all of the others and generally occupy the top of the list.

3.2.3.2 Framing of the interests, policy choices and historical background

The framing of the foreign policy issues involves also the diversity of the policy options, actors and issues reported in the news, and the weight given to those as well as the degree of historical background established in the news coverage. Various actors, interests, preferences and options complicated the process that led to the Parliamentary Bill Crisis. Thus, the content analysis of the newspapers in this study revolves around this complex structure and aims to capture their presentation in the media and the weight given to them. To analyze these dimensions, several frames are established:

IDEOLOGICAL CONNOTATIONS	INTERESTS/ CONCERNS	PERCEPTION OF THE ISSUE	PERCEPTION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS	RELATED HISTORY	CRUCIAL DIMENSIONS
Leftist	Domestic Security	Neutral	Critical (Pejorative)	Domestic	Opposition to War
Nationalist	World Security	Negative	Realist	International	Parliamentary Bill
Religious	Humanitarian	War	Pejorative Image		Negotiations
Regime Change: Democratic	Interest Oriented Approach				
	Legitimacy				
	Economic Cost				
	Economic Aid				

Table 1: List of Frames and Meta-Frames

¹⁸² Distribution over time scores are calculated via the following formula: the score of the frame in a given day / the total number of words in that day

The “Ideological Connotations” meta-frame measures the occurrence of concepts that have connotations related to the four frames given above. The frequency of words related to the leftist (occurrence/co-occurrence of words related to imperialism and Marxism), religious (occurrence/co-occurrence of the words related to Islam) and nationalist stances towards the issue are analyzed within this category. Additionally, as a fourth category, “Regime Change: Democratic” frame captures the US argument of overthrowing the Saddam regime and the spread of democracy/liberal principles.

The “Interests/concerns” meta-frame focuses on the issues crucially related to the preferences of the actors at both domestic and international levels. For instance, the “domestic security” frame measures the frequency of the words related to the Turkish domestic security concerns/interests, i.e. PKK, the increasing Kurdish autonomy; whereas the “world security” frame is about the US security interests and the perceived threat of weapons of mass destruction/terrorism. The “Humanitarian” frame relates to the costs of war and its effects on the Iraqi population. Moreover, “Legitimacy/diplomacy” frame provides a measure of the discussions on the necessity of UN resolution for the intervention. Finally, economic interests/concerns are captured by three frames of “economic cost” relating to Turkish discussion of the costs of the war; “economic aid” involving the aid package proposed by the US; and the “interest oriented approach” discusses the US interest in the oil reserves in the Middle East. All of these are related to different concerns and interests defined for the actors (Turkey and the United States)

The “Perception of the Issue” meta-frame analyzes the way in which the issue-US intervention in Iraq is defined in the articles. While the “neutral” frame represents the definition of the US war in Iraq as “müdahele (intervention), operasyon (operation), hareket (operation)”, the “negative” frame focuses on definitions such as “vahşet (brutality), yıkım (destruction), katliam (slaughter)” and the “war” frame measures the frequency of the word, “war”.

The “Perception of Bilateral Relations” meta-frame provides an analysis of the understanding of the US-Turkish relations by the media. While the “critical” frame is interested in a critical definition of bilateral relations which suggests a power

differentiation between the actors such as “piyon (tool), uşak (servant), tasma (collar)”, the “realist” frame defines the bilateral relations on the basis of a mutual interest such as “ittifak (alliance), stratejik ortaklık (strategic partnership), partner (partner)”. Finally, the “pejorative image” frame is interested in the words with negative connotations that are used to define an actor such as “çete (gang), haydut (bandit), pis (filthy), sefil (poor)”.

The historical dimension is composed of two parts focusing on the domestic and international events/issues that could have an effect on the decision-making process. The “domestic” frame relates to issues such as the costs associated with the Gulf War of 1990-91 and “international” frame relates to the events of September 11.

The last meta-frame category, “crucial dimensions” represents the issues that were vital in the process. All of these categories, “Opposition to war”, “parliamentary bill” and “negotiations”, measures their frequency.

3.2.4 Analysis of the results




Figure 13: Distribution of Scores of the Interests-Concerns Frames

The table summarizes the distribution of the scores of the frames. One clear indication is the dominance of the “opposition to war” in the newspaper content. The Turkish public was clearly against both the use of Turkish bases and troops by the American forces and to the American intervention in Iraq. The polls showed that nearly 90 per cent of the public was in opposition.¹⁸³ The content analysis revealed a parallel result as the most cited frame is “opposition to war”. This is followed by the “domestic security” frame. A conclusion drawn by only looking at the total score of the frames is inadequate and can be misleading. Thus, to have a better understanding of the framing of the issue by the newspapers and to interpret the results, initially the meta-frames should be analyzed.

3.2.4.1 Interests/Concerns Related to Parliamentary Bill Crisis




Figure 14: Distribution of the Scores of the Main Interests/Concerns

The most referred to concern is the “domestic security” frame. This is not surprising simply due to the Turkish sensitivity towards the Kurdish issue and the territorial integrity of the republic. Thus, the newspapers also reflected the general Turkish concerns involving the threats associated with the US intervention. This is

¹⁸³ Christopher Brewin, “Turkey: Democratic Legitimacy”, in Alex Danchev and John MacMillan, *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics* (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), p.96.

followed by the “humanitarian” dimension of the issue which basically is the effect of the war on the Iraqi people. This can relate to Turkish sensitivity towards the Muslim as well Turkic people living in the neighboring country¹⁸⁴ and to the destructiveness of the war. Additionally, as the third highest scored frame, the continuous debate of the legitimacy of the US intervention is also reflected in the discussions of the articles. This is related to the demand for a peaceful means of solution to the problem and the opposition to war. The legitimacy concern is followed by the focus on the US interests in the region and the economic costs of the intervention. There is a clear tendency in the newspapers to focus more on the economic costs of the war than the aid proposed by the US. Lastly, even though it could have a direct effect on Turkey, world security interests occupy a smaller space when compared to domestic security concerns.

3.2.4.1.1 Ideological Connotations




Figure 15: Distribution of the Scores of Ideological Connotations Frames

A war against a Muslim country which threatens vital security as well as domestic interest is expected to be discussed around more nationalist and even religious lines. However, the results indicate a high level of reference to leftist connotations to

¹⁸⁴ For a discussion of the public opinion effect on Kosova and Bosnia, see Stephen Larrabee & Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, pp.34-35; Also see, William Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası: 1774-200 [Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2002]* (İstanbul: Mozaik, 2003), pp.276-282.

the issue in the newspapers. Comparing mean scores of the ideological connotations across the newspapers analyzed provides an explanation.

Textgroup		Regime Change:			
		Leftist	Democratic	Nationalistic	Religious
Evrensel	Mean	21,42	5,75	3,42	1,92
	Std. Deviation	24,738	9,708	5,727	3,627
Milliyet	Mean	2,28	3,18	3,35	2,3
	Std. Deviation	3,139	5,01	5,172	4,437
yenisafak	Mean	3,13	3,28	1,96	5,35
	Std. Deviation	4,675	4,69	3,059	9,819
Total	Mean	8,94	4,07	2,91	3,19
	Std. Deviation	17,075	6,948	4,827	6,724

Table 2: Comparison of Mean Scores of Leftist Connotations Among Three Newspapers

As can be seen from the table, the leftist ideological connotations are cited in high frequency in *Evrensel*.¹⁸⁵ This is why leftist connotations occupy the top level in the ideological connotations meta-frame. The second is the “regime change: democratic” frame which signifies the focus of the newspapers on the nature of the Iraqi regime and democratization. The nationalist and religious frames are at the bottom of the list.

3.2.4.1.2 Perception of the Issue

¹⁸⁵ Neither of the any other categories had a wide range of differentiation across the newspapers.




Figure 16: Distribution of Scores-Perception of the Issue Frames

There is a clear tendency in the newspapers to present the issue as a war rather than using more negative or neutral terms. However, the fact that negative terms such as massacre or destruction are used more than neutral ones such as intervention relates to the high level of opposition to war.

3.2.4.1.3 Perception of Bilateral Relations

The words used by the newspapers to define the Turkish-US bilateral relations does not show a significant differentiation due to the relatively similar scores of the critical (552) and realist (611) understanding of the issue. Additionally, the pejorative adjectives for defining actors also had a high level score (540).




Figure 17: Distribution of the Scores-Perception of Bilateral Relations Frames

3.2.4.1.4 Related History and Crucial Dimensions

It is mentioned above that the content analysis indicates a high level of opposition to the war in the newspapers. Additionally, there is also considerable reference to the historical issues in both domestic and historical dimensions. It can be seen that crucial issues such as the parliamentary bill and negotiations are also mentioned but their scores are relatively less. The reason for this is to be understood in a time-scale detailed analysis.




Figure 18: Distribution of the Scores- Related History and Crucial Dimensions Frames

3.2.4.2 Analysis of the Overall Framing of the Issue

The table below indicates the distribution of the overall score of the main frames emphasized in the media content. Despite the fluctuations in November and December, a relatively stable pattern is observed in terms of the salience of the frames on each day in January and February.




Figure 19: Distribution of the Scores of Main Frames Over Time

In conclusion, the analysis revealed that the discussion of the issue revolved around opposition to war, domestic security/humanitarian/legitimacy concerns, economic cost associated with the war as well as an interest oriented approach. Additionally, the negative perceptions of the issue by the newspapers as well as leftist, religious, nationalist and democratic as well as pejorative connotations are also observed. Thus, it is safe to assume that the media perception of the issue revolved around the concerns and interests of the actors with respect to especially crucial Turkish priorities but also American interests. The ideological connotations are relatively less emphasized by the newspapers. However, the existence of strong negative and pejorative definitions links to the discussion of both opposition to war and anti-Americanism in Turkey. Thus, the media discourse, in a way, mainly defined the issue on rationalist basis focusing on costs/benefits of the issue rather than identity related ideological connotations.

One should also consider the scores of the frames and discourse of the media especially in February in which the debates intensified and the vote on the

Parliamentary Bill approached. The analysis of this period revealed crucial issues regarding framing.




Figure 20: Scores of the Decreasing Interests-Concerns, 01.02.2003-01.03.2003




Figure 21: Scores of the Increasing Interests-Concerns, , 01.02.2003-01.03.2003

As the tables above indicates, there is a decrease in the scores of the frames “regime change: democratic”, “religious”, “world security” and “history international” while the scores of “economic aid”, “negotiations”, “parliamentary bill” and “domestic security” frames increase. One clear conclusion is the decrease in the ideological

connotations (democratic, religious) as well as internationally related frames (international history and world security). Instead, the newspaper agenda shifts to domestic concerns and factors and especially in the second half of the February. For instance, the domestic security frame displays a considerable increase in the last two weeks before the parliamentary vote. A similar increase in domestic concerns is also observed around February 5 when the Turkish parliament concluded the bill allowing the deployment of US military personnel and officers to upgrade Turkish military bases and equipment. Furthermore, while the economic cost frame reveals a stable pattern within this period, there is a significant increase in the economic aid frame. A similar pattern can also be observed in the increase in negotiations frame. Both of these relate to the domestic discussions of the inevitability of the war and the need to compensate the possible costs associated with it. Moreover, the results confirm an expected/predictable increase in the parliamentary bill frame. The forthcoming parliamentary bill was among the extensively debated issues by the media within the last period.

3.2.5 Frame Clustering and Comparing Means

Principal component analysis enables the researcher to study the patterns of relationships among the frames and meta-frames. It reduces the dimensionality of a large number of variables to a smaller number of factors by analyzing the existing patterns, their characteristics and involvement with each other. Thus, to understand which frames cluster together and how they are affected by ideological positions, principal components analysis is used.

3.2.5.1 Analysis of the actors

Initially, the actors frame is analyzed. The table below indicates the existence of three main factors as a result of principal component analysis.

Rotated Component Matrix(a)			
ACTORS			
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Iraq	0,799		
Israel	0,774		
America	0,774		
Middle East	0,737		
International Institutions	0,733		
Europe	0,72		
Non-EU Countries	0,688		
Turkish Parliament		0,821	
Turkey		0,747	
Kurdish		0,68	
Government		0,614	
Opposition Party		0,548	
Turkish President		0,535	
Military		0,531	
Saddam Hussein		0,464	
Domestic Forces			0,629
Political Parties-not in the Parliament			0,587
Media			0,414
Civil Society			0,409

Table 3: Factor Scores of the Actors

These factors are:

1. International Actors: This group includes the international countries and actors such as Iraq, Israel, America, the Middle Eastern Countries, International Institutions and EU-European Countries
2. Primary Turkish Political Actors-Iraqi Domestic Actors: This group includes the Turkish actors which have an ability to exert an influence on the outcome and policy choices such as the Parliament, Turkey, the Government-AKP, the Opposition Party-CHP, the President and the Military. Moreover, Iraqi domestic

actors such as Saddam Hussein and Kurdish groups also defined within this factor.

3. Secondary Turkish Actors: This group includes the actors that have no direct involvement in the decision-making process and that exert their influence outside the formal mechanisms. Turkish political parties that are not in the parliament, the media, non-governmental organizations as well as public opinion are considered within this category.

3.2.5.1.1 Comparing Means of the Actor Scores

Principal component analysis revealed the existence of three different factors, which are clustered mainly on the basis of the differentiation between the domestic and international arenas and the ability of the actors to directly become involve in the decision-making process. Comparing the mean scores of these factors would enable a meaningful understanding of their relation with the newspapers content even without a discourse analysis.

Mean Scores of the Actor Factors				
		Factor 1 International Actors	Factor Score 2 Primary Turkish Political/Iraqi Domestic Actors	Factor Score 3 Secondary Turkish Actors
Evrensel	Mean	-0,3257096	-0,2876942	0,3735022
	Std. Deviation	0,37517028	0,36118107	1,02767085
Milliyet	Mean	-0,2937558	0,5035829	-0,0891814
	Std. Deviation	0,47867191	1,34711401	0,94075165
Yeni Şafak	Mean	0,6169008	-0,2181541	-0,2813798
	Std. Deviation	1,43614865	0,82307875	0,92080073

	Deviation			
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Table 4: Mean Scores of the Actor Factors

The table above indicates the mean scores of the 3 factors related to the actor dimension of the Parliamentary Bill Crisis. The data suggests that; factor 1, which is the international actors, is more salient in *Yeni Şafak*; factor 2, which is the primary Turkish actors and Iraqi domestic actors, is more salient in *Milliyet*; and finally factor 3, which is the secondary Turkish actors is more salient in the *Evrinsel*. Comparing means of actor factors alone does not provide an in-depth analysis. Thus a discussion is to be made on the factors related to the concerns/interests dimension of the issue.

3.2.5.2 Analysis of the concerns/interests related to the issue

The principal component analysis revealed four main factors of concerns/interests related to the crisis.

Rotated Component Matrix(a)				
Concerns/Interests Related to the Issue				
	Factor 1 Critical Left - Nationalist	Factor 2 Rationalist- Interest Oriented	Factor 3 Rationalist- Security Oriented	Factor 4 Religious
Leftist	0,821			
Perception Negative	0,789			
Opposition to War	0,677			0,387
Perception-Pejorative Image	0,653			
Perception-Bilateral Critical	0,641			
Humanitarian	0,611			0,458
Regime Change:				
Democratic	0,563			
War	0,534			
Negotiations		0,846		
Economic Aid		0,834		
Parliamentary Bill		0,779		
Economic Cost		0,667		

Interest Oriented Approach	0,41			
Nationalistic	0,412	0,485		
International History			0,829	
Domestic History			0,746	
Perception-Neutral			0,734	
World Security			0,676	
Domestic Security			0,548	
Religious				0,828
Perception- Bilateral Realist				0,662
Legitimacy/Diplomacy				0,559

Table 5: Factor Scores of the Concerns/Interests

According to the table, these factors are defined as:

1. **Critical Left/Nationalist:** This factor represents a critical-leftist/nationalist stance and a clear opposition to the issue. Within a leftist discourse, the war is framed as the tool of the US imperial aims of controlling oil reserves in the Middle East and liberalization/democratization of the region. Similarly, within a nationalistic discourse, the use of Turkish territory by the US for imperial aims is harshly criticized. Thus, through the pejorative and negative definition of the issue, bilateral relations and the US actions this factor reveals an anti-American discourse and focuses on the humanitarian costs of the war.
2. **Rationalist-Interest Oriented:** This factor is a clear representation of a rational approach to the framing of the issue focusing on the costs-benefits associated with the intervention. Both the negotiation frame and parliamentary bill frame relate to the discussion of the degree of involvement of Turkey in the process, Turkish interests involved in the issue and US compensation of the costs related to it. Similarly, the economic cost/aid and interest oriented approach frames are discussions of the economic costs and benefits. All of these costs and benefit are Turkish-centric and framed with nationalistic connotations.
3. **Rationalist-Security Oriented:** This factor, similar to the second one, provides a rationalist analysis of the issue with a specific focus on the security dimension.

The frames in this category include the domestic and world security frames which measure the threats associated with the issue such as terrorism, Kurdish separatism and PKK, and weapons of mass destruction. The international and domestic historical frames provide background information related to these security concerns in relation to past incidents such as the September 11 attacks, the 1990-91 Gulf War and the increasing autonomy of Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq as well as the refugee influx to Turkey. One crucial dimension of this factor is the definition of the US intervention not in pejorative or critical but much more neutral terms.

4. Religious: This factor (similar to Evrensel), on the basis of a strong opposition to war, frames the issue by questioning the two crucial debates on the intervention. One is the legitimacy critique and the need for a UN resolution on the one hand and especially the need for peaceful solutions to the problem on the other. This relates to the second concern, the humanitarian dimension, which signifies the destructiveness of the war. Furthermore, humanitarian/legitimacy concerns which are framed around the religious factor indicate that the war is presented around cultural-religious sentiments and a feeling of affinity with the Iraqi people. This relates to the idea of Islamic unity and solidarity against the US with the aim of preventing the war.

3.2.5.2.1 Comparing means of concerns/interests factor scores

As can be seen, there are clearly four factors that differentiate the frames and categorize them. The effects of ideological connotations are visible especially in the “Critical Left -Nationalist” and “Religious” factors. “Rationalist-Interest Oriented” factor is also related to nationalistic discussions. This is important in questioning the effect of ideology in shaping the framing of a newspaper on an issue. One step further is providing a link between these factors and the actual newspapers and defining which factor is given a relatively higher weight in which newspaper. Because of this, a comparison of the means of the factors’ scores of these categories will be given.

Mean Scores of the Concerns/Interest Factors					
		Critical Left/ Nationalistic	Rationalist- Interest Oriented	Rationalist- Security Oriented	Religious
Evrensel	Mean	0,734363	-0,14813	-0,36817	-0,32346
	Std. Deviation	1,271045	0,506542	0,69603	0,635906
Milliyet	Mean	-0,46214	0,31593	0,322201	-0,12706
	Std. Deviation	0,43956	1,438168	1,171857	0,700108
yenisafak	Mean	-0,27222	-0,1678	0,045967	0,450522
	Std. Deviation	0,611206	0,734752	0,956439	1,339789

Table 6: Mean Scores of the Concerns/Interest Factors

Principle component analysis and a comparison of the means demonstrate the factors involved in framing the issue and differentiate the positions of the three newspapers. The mean scores reveal that, *Evrensel* positions itself as “critical left - nationalistic”, *Milliyet* as “rationalist-interest related”, and *Yeni Şafak* as “religious” in their presentations of the issue.

3.2.6 Overall Analysis of the Results

3.2.6.1 Evrensel

The analysis indicates that *Evrensel's* framing of the issue revolves around a critical leftist discourse with nationalistic connotations. There were many critiques and opposition to the US intervention in Iraq and Turkish participation in it. One concern was about the lack of a UN resolution that would give the US legitimate grounds. However, even if the UN could have agreed on the resolution, the destructiveness of the

war and humanitarian concerns related to it were the main sources of opposition and they underpinned the emphasis for the need for peaceful solutions. Within these opposition groups, the leftist critique of the US actions and the war occupied a crucial place. It is true to argue that, *Evrensel*'s position is in line with the "dependency theory" understanding of international relations. Based on a Marxist analysis of the economic disparities between the actors in the world system, dependency theory argues that resources flow from a "periphery" of underdeveloped states to a "center" of wealthy states which enriches the latter at the expense of the former.¹⁸⁶ Within this system, center states use mechanisms of economic sanctions or military force to prevent any counter attempts that would unbalance the system. Within this framework, the American war in Iraq was considered as the US means of securing both its status as the central state and oil resources in the region.

An example passage from *Evrensel* highlights this critical-leftist as well as other frames defined in this factor:

AKP executives and the government, instead of saying "NO" to American-English aggression that would lead to catastrophe in the region and to the murder of people in a neighboring country via our territory and instead saying "NO" to the closing of the harbors, bases, airports, airspace and the Straits to their military, continues to warn the target of the attack. This is clearly not a policy that would prevent the war. But it also true that the political-military representative of the collaborator- retrogressive partnership are in a paradox and have doubts. At this point, it is even more important for Turkish proletarians to turn every piece of the country's territory to an opposition front against the herds of imperialist bandits. (...) Opposition to the war, prevention of the region and the country becoming an arena of war and suffering the destructiveness of war can certainly be possible with the leadership of the proletarian and the labor class leading the main sections of the mass.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein, *the Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 347-57.

¹⁸⁷ For its original Turkish version, see Cihan Soylu, "Gurga'lığı Önleyecek Olan", *Evrensel*, (15 January 2003): "AKP yöneticileri ve hükümet, bölgeyi yıkıma ve topraklarımız üzerinden komşu ülke halkını katletmeye hazırlanan Amerikan-İngiliz saldırılarına "Dur" diyeceklerine ve limanları, üsleri, hava sahasını ve boğazları onların ordularına kapatacaklarına, saldırı hedefindeki "uyarma"ya devam ediyorlar. Bunun savaş önleyici bir politika olmadığı kesindir ama, işbirlikçi gericiliğin politik-askeri temsilcilerinin açmaz ve tereddütlerinin olduğu da bir diğer gerçektir. Bu

The definition of the US-UK partnership as “işbirlikçi gericilik” (collaborative retrogression) and “emperyalist haydut sürüsü” (a herd of imperialist bandits), Turkey as the political-military representative (politik-askeri temsilci) are clear examples of the negative image that the leftist, the pejorative-bilateral relations and negative perception (murder, catastrophe) frames have. Additionally, the focus on the destructiveness of the war and the emphasis on the use of Turkish territory to aid this in such terms as “topraklarımız üzerinden komşu ülke halkını katletmeye” (murder the people of a neighboring country via our territory) relates to humanitarian and nationalist frames.

A clear effect of leftist understanding in *Evrensel*'s framing of the issue is observed in the primary role given to the labor class in preventing the war and galvanizing public opinion against the US-UK partnership. Similarly the definition of the US-UK partnership as a herd of imperialist bandit and prevention of the imperial aims relates to Wallerstein's understanding of the international system. This also relates to the discussion of the clusters of the actors. It is stated above that the secondary domestic actors are more salient in *Evrensel*'s presentation of the issue. These are the Turkish political parties that are not in parliament, the media, non-governmental organizations as well as the public opinion. The importance attached to the domestic level actors as well as the public is critical in *Evrensel* and is also observed in this analysis.

3.2.6.2 Milliyet

durumda, Türkiye emekçilerinin, ülkenin her karış toprağını emperyalist haydut sürüsüne karşı direniş mevzisine çevirmeleri daha da önem kazanmaktadır. İşgal sürülerinin topraklarımız üzerinden Arap halklarına saldırıya girişmelerinin, bugünkü türden küçük ve etkisiz protestolarla önlenemeyeceği; aynı anlama gelmek üzere hükümet ve generallerin ülkenin genç kuşaklarını emperyalist sömürgecinin önüne “gurka” rolünde sürmelerinin durdurulamayacağı açıktır. Sendika ve diğer kitle örgütü yöneticilerinin ertelemeci-beklentici tutumlarının işyerleri, fabrikalar ve semtlerden destek alan ve ülke düzeyine yayılan kitle protestolarıyla aşılabileceği, bugüne kadar gerçekleşmiş halk eylemleri pratiğiyle kanıtlanmıştır. Savaş karşıtlığı, ülkenin ve bölgenin savaş arenasına dönüşmesinin ve savaşın getireceği yıkımın önlenmesi, kuşkusuz öncelikle ileri işçi ve emekçilerin sorumlulukla ileri çıkmaları ve kitlelerin ana kesimlerinin önüne düşmeleriyle mümkün olacaktır. Bunun için ilk silahların patlaması beklenemez.”

The analysis revealed that the discussion of the costs-benefits related to the Parliamentary Bill Crisis with respect to Turkish security and economic concerns are more salient in the *Milliyet's* framing of the issue. Thus, *Milliyet* is defined as rationalist-interest/security oriented. This involves a discussion of the costs and benefits of the US intervention to Iraq on the Turkish economy and security interests, the negotiation process as well as the debates on the parliamentary bill. Turkey as a rational actor, within this system of interaction, tries to reach an ultimate outcome. *Milliyet*, in a way, provides the exploratory and descriptive analysis of the preferences, threats and opportunities involved in the process from a Turkish-centric nationalistic perspective. This is in a way similar to a *realpolitik* understanding of foreign policy options and international relations. *Realpolitik* refers to politics based primarily on actual considerations rather than ideology related conceptions or ethics.¹⁸⁸ The emphasis is on rational options and self-interest oriented issues rather than nationalistic sentiments or humanitarian concerns with respect to issue. An example passage is taken from *Milliyet* to clarify this framing pattern:

The bill will be voted on today in the TGNA. If it is rejected, these are the future scenarios:

- 1) The economic aid (parliamentary bill money) will not be given.
- 2) The war will break out anyway.
America will hit Saddam with a higher cost, with a delay and in a harder way. Thus, no tourists will come to Turkey, Oil prices will increase. Exchange and interest rates will decline.
In other words, due to the rejection of the parliamentary bill, the Turkish economy will worsen. Because, we will not be able to compensate for the costs of the war without the economic aid given by the US.
- 3) Northern Iraq will happen again!
Due to the rejection of the bill, if Turkish military entry to Northern Iraq with the US military is also rejected, many of the threats against the Turkish national security and political interests that Ankara fears will occur... A Kurdish migration similar to the 1991 one.. The establishment of a Kurdish state.. Kurdish control over Kerkük and its oil resources.
- 4) What will happen in the post-Saddam era?

¹⁸⁸ *Realpolitik* understanding of the international relations can be tied back to Machiavelli and his famous book titled, "The Prince." The advocate of the *realpolitik* understanding can be found in history in the examples of Otto Van Bismarck and Henry Kissinger. For details of *Realpolitik* understanding, Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

Ankara, which rejected the bill which resulted in the deterioration of relations with the US, will have a limited role in the post-war formations in Iraq. This is important not only in relation to security considerations but also in relation to economic relations with the new Iraq in the post-war environment.

5) The relations with the US will deteriorate!

The deterioration of the relations is against the interest of the both countries. Despite the Turkish rejection, both sides can try to minimize the costs. But the relations definitely will deteriorate and in the short run the costs will be higher on Turkey.

I want peaceful solutions to the problem. But, in consideration of the points that are discussed above, I perceive that a vote in favor of the bill, the continuation of Turkish-American strategic relations and the collapse of the Saddam regime are in the best interest of my country.¹⁸⁹

Several dimensions are visible in this article. The scenarios regarding the rejection of the bill focuses three main dimensions. Initially, its impact on the Turkish economy is discussed. Then the focus shifts to its relation to the future of the Iraqi

¹⁸⁹ For its original Turkish version, see Hasan Cemal, "Tezkere TBMM'de: Hayır' mı, Evet'mi?", *Milliyet* (1 March 2003).

"Tezkere bugün TBMM'de oylanıyor. Sırasıyla olabilecekler:

(1) Tezkere parası gelmeyecek! (2) Savaş yine çıkacak!

Amerika, daha büyük bir bedel ödeyerek, daha zorlanarak, belki biraz da gecikerek Saddam'ı yine vuracak. Böylece, Türkiye'ye turist yine gelmeyecek. Petrol fiyatları yine yükselecek. Kur, faiz ve borsa yine düşecek.

Bir başka deyişle:

Türk ekonomisi, TBMM tezkereyi reddetti, ABD'ye İkinci Cephe izni verilmedi diye iyiye gitmeyecek. Tersine, daha kötüye gidecek. Çünkü, Amerika'dan hibe - kredi gelmeyeceği için uğrayacağımız zararları telafi etmek mümkün olamayacak.

(3) Kuzey Irak yine olacak!

Reddedilen tek tezkereyle, Amerikan askeriyle birlikte Türk askerinin de Irak'a girmesine hayır denirse, Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenliği ve siyasi çıkarları açısından Ankara'nın korktuğu birçok tehlike yine fazlasıyla gündeme gelecek. Yani 1991'dekine benzer bir Kürt göçü... Kürtlerin devletleşmesi... Kerkük ve petrolünde Kürt denetimi...

(4) Saddam sonrası ne olacak?

Ama tezkereye hayır deyip Amerika'yla bozuşan bir Türkiye'nin, Saddam sonrası barış masasında çok cılız bir söz hakkına sahip olacak.

(5) ABD ile ilişkiler bozulacak!

Türk - Amerikan ilişkilerinin bozulması her iki ülkenin de çıkarlarına aykırıdır. TBMM'nin ret kararına rağmen, her iki taraf da zararı en aza indirmeye çalışabilir. Ama ilişkiler mutlaka bozulur ve bundan en büyük zararı, özellikle kısa vadede Türkiye görür. Barışçı çözümden yanayım.

(Continuing-reference number 186): Başkan Bush yönetiminin eleştiriyi hak eden tutum ve davranışları elbet var. Ancak, sayın milletvekilleri, yukarıdaki altı noktayı alt alta sıralayınca, tezkerenin kabulünü, Türk - Amerikan stratejik ilişkisinin devamını ve Saddam'ın sahneden yok oluşunu ülkemizin çıkarlarına daha uygun buluyorum."

Savaşı ben de istemiyorum.

political structure and its effects on Turkish national security interest. Lastly, a possible change in the dynamics of Turkish-US relations and its costs to Turkey are given. A reference to Gulf-War of 1990-91 also relates to the historical dimension of the cost-benefit analysis. Thus, the security, economic aid/cost, negotiations, parliamentary bill, and domestic history frames are all evident in this discussion. Additionally, the lack of any pejorative definitions or any leftist ideological connotations are the other main reference points to differentiate *Evrensel* and *Milliyet*.

A final discussion about *Milliyet*'s framing of the issue relates to the discussion of the actor factors. *Milliyet*'s mean scores defined the "Primary Turkish political and Iraqi Domestic Actors" as the more salient ones in its framing. This is also in parallel with the discussion above which defined *Milliyet* as focusing more on the negotiation process, the economic/security related costs benefits and the parliamentary bill. Thus, *Milliyet*, in its presentation of the issue, mentions the central-decision makers such as the government, the president, the parliament, the military, the US, the main opposition party-CHP, the Kurdish groups and Saddam which all have the ability to exert considerable power to shape the outcome of the process and to have an influence on the Turkish national interests.

Consequently, it is clear in *Milliyet*'s presentation of the issue that the focus is on the *realpolitik* discussion of the foreign policy options. The content reveals that *Milliyet*'s rhetoric was based more on pragmatic concerns of economic and security related issues, rather than any reference to ideological connotations or humanitarian concerns. This does not suggest that these frames are non-existent but the *realpolitik* concerns are more salient and visible.¹⁹⁰ Additionally, the national dimension of *Milliyet*'s rhetoric does not just relate to an ideological dimension of national sentiment but to a conception of national interest in Turkey.

¹⁹⁰ One important dimension of the *realpolitik* is the concept of "power" and its effect on the preferences of the actors. The conceptualization of this concept in a thematic analysis is impossible to attain. Thus, it can not be included in the analysis. The rhetoric and *realpolitik* relation in this study is based on the rational-self interested actor model and lack of an ideological dimension.

3.2.6.3 Yeni Şafak

The frames in the religious factor are more salient in the *Yeni Şafak* than any other newspaper analyzed in this study. With clear opposition to the war, this included a focus on the humanitarian and legitimacy dimensions of the intervention with reference to religious connotations. The lack of a UN resolution as well as the war against a neighboring Muslim country clearly attracted the attention of the columnists in *Yeni Şafak*.¹⁹¹ Clear examples can be given as follows:

Apart from a couple of “loyal US supporters”, the world is resisting this war. After the yesterday’s closed session in the UN Security Council, all of the countries except England declared that there is no justification for attacking Iraq. The global block under the leadership of Germany, France, Russia and China is gaining strength.¹⁹²

Are you going to be a partner of the US murderer?

At least 250 thousand died in the Gulf War. Red Cross reported the death of 113 civilians in the first six weeks of the attack. 60 per cent of these were children. The USA reported the death of 100.000 Iraqi officers. Will the same happen again? Hundreds of thousands will die. When Kabil or Baghdad is bombed, it will be same as bombing Istanbul. Thus, Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia will resist this invasion. Because this war is a part of a global movement against Islam and against Muslim resources.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ This idea is also visible in the Gulf War of 1990-91. See, David Kushner, ‘Turkey: Iraq’s European Neighbor’, in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin (eds.), *Iraq’s Road to War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 212.

¹⁹² Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Ben Seni Ellerin Olsun Diye mi Sevdim!”, *Yeni Şafak* (1 Mart 2003)

ABD'nin birkaç "sadık destekçi"si dışında dünya bu saldırganlığa direniyor. BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin önceki günkü kapalı oturumu sonrası İngiltere dışındaki bütün ülkeler, "Irak'a saldırının gerekçesi yok" derken Almanya, Fransa, Rusya ve Çin önderliğinde oluşan küresel blok güç kazanıyor.

¹⁹³ Nazlı Ilıcak, “Amerika'nın cinayetine ortakçı mı yazılacaksınız?”, *Yeni Şafak* (28 aralık 2002)

Amerika'nın cinayetine ortakçı mı yazılacaksınız?

Körfez Savaşı'nda en az 250 bin insan öldü. 43 gün süren bombardımanın ilk 6 haftasında Kızıllıhaç'a göre 113 bin sivil öldürüldü. Bunların yüzde 60'ı çocuk. ABD'ye göre 100 bin Irak askeri öldürüldü. Yine aynı olacak? Yüzbinlerce insan ölecek.. Kabil veya Bağdat bombalandığında İstanbul'un bombalandığını düşünürüz.

Bu yüzden, Fas'tan Endonezya'ya kadar Müslümanlar, bu istila hareketine direnecek. Zira bu savaş İslam'a ve Müslümanlar'ın kaynaklarına yönelik küresel hareketin bir parçası.

The focus on the historical dimension and its relation to the destructiveness of the war, the idea of a war against a Muslim country and the Muslim world, and the lack of legitimacy of this act has been discussed above. Similar to *Evrensel* position of an ideological opposition to the war, *Yeni Şafak*'s position is fed again by ideological connotations. Thus, religious references in *Yeni Şafak*'s framing of the issue are visible. Furthermore, the international actors are more salient in *Yeni Şafak*'s presentation of the issue when compared to other newspapers. This is again related to legitimacy discussions, religious connotations and opposition to war. For instance, *Evrensel*'s focus on the secondary domestic actors is related to their priority in galvanizing public opinion to stop the war. Similarly, the focus on international level actors has two main roots in framing in the *Yeni Şafak*. One is the fact that the legitimacy of the issue relates to the UN decision and to the international level actors. This includes the members of the UN Security Council as well as broader public opinion that could stop the war. The second is related to the references to the Muslim world and Middle Eastern countries and people.

Similar to the critical leftist-nationalist attitude of *Evrensel* and the *realpolitik* understanding of *Milliyet*, *Yeni Şafak*'s rhetoric on the issue is placed in a broader Islamic understanding of Turkish foreign policy. Political Islam in Turkey traditionally has opposed the Western political, economic and cultural domination which appeared in the form of colonialism and exploitation of the non-Western.¹⁹⁴ For instance, the capitalist system is rejected due to its negative consequences of economic exploitation, poverty and extreme disparities of income. Instead, an Islamic alternative challenging and resisting this system via a rival culture and religion is proposed.¹⁹⁵ This anti-Western stance is combined with advocating an alternative Islamic international system

¹⁹⁴ Sencer Ayata, "Changes in Domestic Politics and the Foreign Policy Orientation of the AK Party", in Lenore Martin & Dimitris Keridis, *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy* (Cambridge-London: The MIT Press, 2003), p.268.

¹⁹⁵ Sencer Ayata, "Perceptions of Foreign Policy and International Relations in the Islamic Press," workshop paper, *Washington Institute of Near Eastern Studies*, July 25-27, (1997).

based on economic, political and security cooperation.¹⁹⁶ This anti-Western discourse is clearly reflected in the Yeni Şafak's framing of the issue. The definition of the US War as a part of the larger project for the establishment of American hegemony or Western hegemony in Muslim lands¹⁹⁷, an emphasis of the existence of little difference between several Muslim cities¹⁹⁸, a strong affinity with the Iraqi people and the call for unification within the Islamic world against the West are all evidence of this..¹⁹⁹

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter provided an analysis of the media rhetoric on the Parliamentary Bill Crisis. A descriptive analysis of the media content over a four month period of the articles written by the columnists; the framing of the issue and the weight given to several frames; the salience of the frames over time; a factor analysis that revealed the clusters and a comparison of these clusters among the newspapers was given.

Consequently, an initial conclusion was the importance of the issue in the Turkish media. Secondly, the focus was mainly on domestic security, humanitarian and legitimacy concerns. And finally, the analysis revealed several important points with respect to the ideological positioning of the media. One important dimension is the differentiation between the newspapers of the basis of several ideological connotations. This is both reflected in the salience of the actors that were mentioned in the articles and in the focus of analysis of the newspapers related to the concerns/ interests defined above. For instance, *Evrensel's* position, which is parallel to Wallerstein's critique of the international system, is clearly affected by a leftist discourse which resulted in negative perception of the issue as well as the pejorative definitions. Similarly, a

¹⁹⁶ Ayata argues that this Islamic understanding of foreign policy has changed during the last couple of years. For details, see, Ayata, *Changes in Domestic Politics and the Foreign Policy Orientation of the AK Party*.

¹⁹⁷ "Global movement against the Islam and Muslim resources" quoted in Ilıcak, *Amerikan Cinayetini Ortakçı mı Yazılacaksınız*.

¹⁹⁸ "When Kabil or Baghdad is bombed, it will be same as bombing Istanbul", quoted in Ilıcak, *Amerikan Cinayetini Ortakçı mı Yazılacaksınız*.

¹⁹⁹ Also see, Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu [Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Situation]* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2002).

religious discourse, which is parallel to political Islam's understanding of the international system, was influential in *Yeni Şafak*'s perception of the problems and the concerns. In this sense, both *Yeni Şafak* and *Evrensel* positioned themselves via identity-related frames of leftist and religious persuasions. *Milliyet*, on the other hand, emphasized a much more interest related approach focusing mainly on the central decision makers as well as the decision making process. This also relates to *realpolitik* concerns of international relations. The most salient issues were related to the economic and security related costs and benefits of the issue.

4 CONCLUSION

4.1 Results

This study provided a content analysis of the three Turkish daily newspapers (*Milliyet*, *Yeni Şafak* and *Evrensel*) on the process that led to the Turkish parliament's veto of the deployment of US forces in Turkey on 1 March 2003, which is known as the Parliamentary Bill Crisis. The four month period starting with 26 October 2002 was analyzed with the aim of questioning the link between the ideological positioning of the newspapers and their rhetoric in framing this issue. Additionally, the general presentation of the issue, the changes in the content over time, the convergences and divergences among the newspapers and the characteristics peculiar to each of them was discussed. Thematic text analysis, as a way of capturing the discourses from the media content, and principal component analysis, as a way of clustering these discourses across the newspapers analyzed, were the main methodological approaches applied in this study. Consequently, the analysis revealed the following conclusions:

- 1) Saliency of the Issue: There is a clear saliency of the issue in all of the three newspapers. Within the four months period, 25 percent of the articles written by columnists and in the last month 45 percent of the articles by the columnists were on the issue. This is one of the most important results of this study due to the fact that it points out the domestication of foreign policy issues and interest of the public at large.
- 2) Framing of Actors: Apart from the high score of the domestic forces in the final analysis, actors that are mostly referred to are the central decision makers in the process such as Turkey, the US, Iraq and the government. Furthermore, the ideological differences were reflected in the newspapers' choice of the actors to focus on. This is mainly based on differentiation between the domestic and international arenas and on the ability of the actors to become directly involved in the decision-making process. While *Milliyet* mostly focused on the central decision makers (USA, Turkey, the parliament, the military and the government etc..) and Iraqi actors, *Evrensel* focused more on the domestic actors (the public in general) and *Yeni Şafak* focused more on the international actors (UN, IMF, the Middle Eastern and European Countries).
- 3) The most salient issue is the opposition to the war which is contested with leftist, religious and nationalist connotations on the basis of humanitarian and

legitimacy concerns. Following the opposition to the war the next most salient issues are the Turkish domestic security concerns as well as the economic costs of the war. This signifies the fact that Turkish concerns over the costs of the war were of primary interest in the newspapers. The concerns over the status of the Kurdish population and Turcomans within the new Iraqi political structure, the issue of increasing terrorist activities of PKK via their bases in Northern Iraq, and the costs of the war on Turkish economy were the main dimensions of this debate.

- 4) The framing of issue changes over time, as indicated by the analysis, especially within the last month of the process. Increasing attention of the media on domestic security concerns and domestic actors such as the parliament and the president is visible in the final analysis while a decrease is observed in the scores of the international level actors and issues such as regime change and world security.
- 5) There is a clear division between the three newspapers in their framing of the issue and the effect of their ideological positions on this. This differentiation between newspapers is mainly on the basis of, ideological-identity (leftist-religious) related factors on the one hand, and rationalist-cost benefit calculations (*realpolitik*) on the other.
- 6) *Evrensel*'s rhetoric is mainly a leftist critique of US actions and intervention in line with the Wallerstein's understanding of the international system and the notion of central and periphery. A harsh critique of the war, which is defined as the tool of the imperial center to dominate the periphery and maintain control over its resources, the salience of pejorative connotations, the focus on imperial aims, the labor class as the main force of opposition, the concern over the humanitarian dimension of the war and the critique on the deployment of US forces on Turkish territory constitutes the main bases of this critical-leftist nationalist stance.
- 7) *Yeni Şafak*, similar to *Evrensel*, focuses on the opposition to war via the legitimacy and humanitarian concerns. Both newspapers' arguments are

primarily based on ideological/identity related discourses. However, how the opposition is framed differs due to the different ideological discourses of the newspapers. While *Evrensel* is more in a leftist camp, *Yeni Şafak* reveals a religious critique of the intervention. Both newspapers define the US as an imperialist country with the aim of domination over Iraqi resources. However, while *Evrensel* defines this hegemonic relation in a center-periphery discourse, *Yeni Şafak* focuses on an Islamic discourse and relates the issue to a struggle between the West and the East and domination over an Islamic culture or identity.

- 8) Lastly, *Milliyet* differs from the ideological positions of both *Yeni Şafak* and *Milliyet* and relates to a *realpolitik* understanding of international relations. Thus, the rhetoric of *Milliyet* is based on actual considerations of security and economy related to costs and benefits related to the issue.

4.2 Limitations

The analysis revealed three competing patterns of framing of the Parliamentary Bill Crisis. Thus, the influential role of the ideological positioning has been made visible in the media rhetoric. In parallel to the initial expectations, *Evrensel* and *Yeni Şafak* position themselves in clear ideological discourses, leftist and religious. However, in this study analyzing this given understanding of the newspapers and providing a definition of what is included in this left perspective of the *Evrensel* and this religious perspective of the *Yeni Şafak* is crucial. Additionally, the results indicate a definition of *Milliyet*'s rhetoric as, in a sense, ideology-free *realpolitik*.

Thematic text analysis and the use of words as a means of measuring frames and concepts have their limitations. For instance, an understanding of the ideological discourses is difficult when only the frequency of certain words is focused on. This is overcome in the analysis of the leftist and religious frames because the defined words within these categories such as the “imperialist, proletariat” for the leftist and “Muslims, Allah (god) and Islam” for the religious are clear cut. However, providing an understanding of the nationalist frame has been difficult. This is due to complex

nature of the nationalist framing involving various dimensions of cultural and socio-political issues. This is reflected as different understandings and conceptions of nationalist ideology and discourses.²⁰⁰ Furthermore, nationalisms of all kinds are based on a “we” and “the other” rhetoric.”²⁰¹ The history of each nation includes the presence of significant others, whose threatening presence has influenced the development of its identity.²⁰² Especially, with respect to this study it is difficult to capture this “we-other” dichotomy of nationalism. This can be seen as forms of definitions such as “our land”, and “we” as a way of defining “Turkish people”. One way of dealing with this problem could be the inclusion of a newspaper with nationalistic tendencies to the study. A content analysis would lead to a further understanding of the nationalistic frame. However, the unavailability of the online archive on a nationalistic newspaper was the main reason for not including it.

A second limitation is related to the religious identity of the *Yeni Şafak*. As discussed above, the anti-Western discourse of political Islam and its general understanding of the West is reflected in the *Yeni Şafak*’s presentation of the issue. However, it is not possible to reach a general conclusion on the Islamist stance towards Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-US relations in general. For instance, Ali Çarkoğlu, similar to the results provided in this study, points out the cleavage in public opinion in the Muslim world about Turkish-US relations and policies related to Iraq.²⁰³ However, an important segment of the Islamic movement has made a major Western turn in

²⁰⁰ For the details of different forms of nationalism, see, Umut Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000), pp.37-51; Chatterjee, *Nationalistic Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, (New Jersey: Zed Books, 1986); John Hall, “Nationalism Classified and Explained”, *Daedalus*, 122(3) (1993), pp.1-28.

²⁰¹ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and state*. (New York: Saint Martins, 1985).

²⁰² Ioanna Kosterella, “Framing the Other: Turkey in the Greek Media”, *Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition* 2(1) (Spring 2007), p.26.

²⁰³ Ali Çarkoğlu, “The New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey: Bases of the Justice and Development Party in Changing Electoral Space”, in Hakan Yavuz (eds), *The Emergence of New Turkey: Democracy and AK Parti*, p. 181.

foreign policy orientation in recent years.²⁰⁴ The effect of this turn on the media rhetoric has to be re-considered.

Lastly, despite the importance of the military in Turkish politics and Turkish foreign policy making in general, a satisfactory answer to the low salience of the military frame is not provided in this study. This can be related to a methodological measurement error in the thematic text analysis. The words in the search entries can be unrelated or not enough to represent the military frame. A further study should take this into consideration.

4.3 Discussion and Recommendations for Further Study

This paper does not account for the analysis of the link between media rhetoric and its effect on the policy choices and public opinion. However, a final discussion is made on the possible link between these dimensions that would be a guide to further study on the role of the media in Turkish foreign policy.

Since the Gulf War, public opinion and the media have been increasingly important factors in Turkish foreign policy. One crucial influence in this development has been the expansion of the private media and its growing role in shaping the public opinion. During this process, the proliferation of media outlets has brought a more diverse set of voices to the Turkish political arena. In some cases, the media became a vehicle for ideological struggle as well as a mechanism for pressure.²⁰⁵ More importantly, the existence of a more active and diverse media has resulted in the rise of public opinion as a factor within the traditionally closed world of Turkish foreign policy structure. In a close examination of this process, one can come up with several factors that led to this independent and growing influence. For instance the costs associated with the Gulf War of 1990-91 (insufficient compensation from the West, the loss of revenue from the closure of pipelines and trade) and most importantly the changes in the status of Kurdish people in Northern Iraq which directly impacted on Turkish

²⁰⁴ Ayata, "AK Parti Foreign Policy Orientation", pp.274

²⁰⁵ Larrabee & Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, pp. 33-34.

domestic and security resulted in public's critical stance towards the issue.²⁰⁶ Due to this memory of 1991, public opinion remains a major constraint towards Turkish policy-making toward Northern Iraq.²⁰⁷ Moreover, public opinion was influential on Turkish policy towards several countries with Muslim minorities. For instance, the events in the Bosnia and the sympathy of the Turkish people towards Bosnian Muslims similarly galvanized public opinion and encouraged a more active and multilateral approach from Turkey.²⁰⁸ Turkish public opinion towards the Chechnya, Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts all reflect similar tendencies.²⁰⁹

One additional observation in this period is the rise of distinct lobbies in Turkey which have ethnic identities and which attempt to influence policy options and preferences especially related to minorities and Turkic people in Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia.²¹⁰²¹¹ Bosnian and Azeri Turks have been particularly important examples of the groups that try to shape Turkish policies towards these countries and

²⁰⁶ Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*, p.18.

²⁰⁷ For Kurdish Question and its impact on Turkish foreign policy, see, David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); Robert Olson, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1996); Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (London: Cass, 1997).

²⁰⁸ For Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans, see, Şule Kut, "Turkey in the post-Communist Balkans: Between Activism and Self-Restraint," *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 3 (1996-1997).

²⁰⁹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, pp. 277-279; also for Turkish interest in the Caucasus, see, Gareth Winrow, "Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus", in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds), *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (Boulder-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), pp.173-188.

²¹⁰ Larrabee & Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, p.35; Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*, p.81, p.87.

²¹¹ Mustafa Aydın, "Between Euphoria and RealPolitik: Turkish Policy Toward Central Asia and the Caucasus", in Tareg Ismael & Mustafa Aydın (eds), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 139-160.

their problems.²¹² Especially, when these are considered in relation to national sentiments, growing public opinion has been an influential factor in Turkish policy-making especially where Turkey's partners were inactive in situations such as Bosnia.²¹³ Lastly, the Imia/Kardak Affair²¹⁴ of 1996 that was driven and initiated by the strong media coverage/involvement as well as public opinion and the hijacking of Turkish Black sea ferry by Chechen extremists in the same year in which the media became involved in a dramatic fashion during the negotiations process are clear examples media involvement in foreign policy process. Turkish policy-makers, who are unused to such kind of media involvement, face new kind of challenges that affect the domestic environment during a crisis management process.²¹⁵

One should still keep in mind that the role of the media on a foreign policy issue is very contextual and generally ambiguous. It is not only the effects of factors such as the framing, extensive coverage and public opinion that triggers the media's impact on the politicians as well as the public at large but also one should keep in mind that media's effect is more influential and visible through the interplay of several conditions. For instance, as the research indicates, the news media appear to impact on the policy makers

“during periods of real or perceived emergency; when policy lines are still undeveloped, uncertain, or contested; when their influence can be transmitted through individuals or groups with direct access to decision makers (parliamentary caucus members,

²¹² *Ibid*, pp.35-6; see also, Şaban Çalış, “The Turkish State's Identity and Foreign Policy Decision Making Process,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, C.6, no.2 (Bahar 1995), pp.133-155.

²¹³ Tanıl Bora, *Bosna Hersek: Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Av Sahası* (İstanbul: Birikim, 1994), pp.308-311.

²¹⁴ For detail of the crisis, see, Micheal Jacobides, “The Inherent Limits of Organizational Structure and the Unfulfilled Role of Hierarchies: Lessons From a Near War”, *London Business School Working Paper* v 1.5 (July 5, 2005), pp. 16-18; Michael Robert Hickok, “The Imia/Kardak Affair, 1995-96: A Case of Inadvertent Conflict.” *European Security*, vol.7, issue 4 (1998); Ali Çarkoğlu & Kemal Kirişçi. “The View From Turkey: Perceptions of Greeks and Greek-Turkish Rapprochement by the Turkish Public,” in *Turkish-Greek Relations in an Era of Détente*, edited by Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (Herndon: Brassey's, 2000).

²¹⁵ Larrabee & Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Age of Uncertainty*, pp.34-35.

selected non-governmental organizations, or other specific interest groups); and when the subject matter of their accounts is capable of generating strong emotional response within the public at large”²¹⁶

During these times, the media can have the capacity to force an item on to the policy agenda or to give greater importance to one already there. Similarly, the media can compress the timetable of decision-makers for the debate and decision for the policy or the media can scrutinize the implementation of the policy adopted. One way to do this can be through an influence on the public opinion which may force the decision makers. Especially when it is difficult to formulate a coherent policy for decision-makers, the emotive stories by the media can be useful in promoting certain kinds of policy options.²¹⁷

Consequently, an analysis of the Parliamentary Bill Crisis reveals the interplay of several of these factors. Firstly, it is argued above that the memory of the 1990-91 Gulf War was a major constraint for Turkish policy towards Northern Iraq. Similarly, in the Parliamentary Bill Crisis, the issues and concerns relate to crucial Turkish domestic security concerns which relates to sensitivity towards the issue. Moreover, the idea of an attack to a Muslim community via Turkish territory on the basis of unjustified imperial aims increased sensitivity at the public level. This was parallel to the Bosnia and Kosova Crisis in which increasing public and media attention were among the factors that initiated Turkish attempts for a solution. Thus, clear opposition to the war and increasing attention to issue were observed both in the protests and opinion polls regarding the issue as well as in the media coverage. Some myths such as the US troops would not leave Turkey and the negotiations were not concluded²¹⁸ as well as the

²¹⁶ Brian Buckley, *The News Media and Foreign Policy*, p.40

²¹⁷ Eric Louw, *The Media and Political Process* (London: Sage Publications, 2005), p.31

²¹⁸ Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök commented on the issue in an interview as follows: “Gazetelerde bazı yazılar çıktı. O konuda, gazeteci olarak sizin değil, o konuda görüşü söyleyen arkadaşımızın boş bulunması oldu. Öyle birşey söyleyince, bana aktarılan, pek çok vekil, madem komutanlar arasında görüş birliği yok, biz de hayır diyelim demiş. Bunlar ne kadar doğrudur hiç tahkik etmedim. (...) Cahilin hayalinne yetişmenin imkanı yoktur (.). Bir defa tezkereyi nasıl çıkarırsanız öyledir. Uygulama da öyle yapılır. Geldim gitmem diyen, bu gücü kendisinde bulan da zorla gelip girer oraya.

American media's humiliating articles and caricatures about Turkey which was also published in Turkish media were also influential on the negative stance of the public during the process.²¹⁹

Despite the existence of the clear opposition of the public, the effect of it is better understood in relation to the political context. The discussions with respect to the parliamentary bill included many obscure, un-foreseeable and unimaginable risks. It also included factors that were new for Turkey such as the participation in a multi-national military operation against a neighboring country involving air strikes, cross-border operations and the deployment of a huge foreign army on Turkish soil. Additionally, due to its possible effect on vital Turkish national interests, the Parliamentary Bill Crisis created risks and challenges for the decision makers. The negotiations on the issue continued until the last minute and so did Prime Minister Gül's attempt to stop the war. One day before the vote in the parliament, the NSC council meeting was unable to come to a clear decision on the issue. The newly elected AKP leadership faced a serious challenge in overcoming the opposition from the public as well as within the parliament both from CHP and from its own members. Additionally, the electoral concerns and the humanitarian dimension of the issue combined with the inexperience of the AKP leadership in managing the crisis, its inability to present the issue convincingly to the broader public, and AKP's decision to not to impose party policy were among the factors that resulted in the failure of the bill.

In conclusion, the role of the media especially in relation to the Parliamentary Bill Crisis should be questioned via its role on affecting the domestic context in which the public debate took place, its rhetoric and its effect on the formation of the public opinion and directly its effect on the parliamentarians. Similarly, the public opinion dimension should be questioned via the additional burdens it imposes on the decision-makers, such as electoral concerns. Thus, especially with respect to issues that are sensitive to public opinion and that create an emotional response, the issues that have links to crucial Turkish national interests, and the issues that are discussed during time

Gelip de gitmemeyi göze alacak güç varsa.”, Fikret Bila, “Interview with Hilmi Özkök”, *Milliyet*, 1 October 2007.

²¹⁹ Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası*, pp. 141-43

of crisis, further empirical study is needed to question the proposed or theorized links within the triangle of the media-public opinion and the decision makers.

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APPENDIX 1-SEARCH ENTRIES FOR THE FRAMES/ META-FRAMES

IDEOLOGICAL CONNOTATIONS	INTERESTS/ CONCERNS	PERCEPTION OF THE ISSUE	PERCEPTION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS	RELATED HISTORY	CRUCIAL DIMENSIONS
Leftist Amerikancı Emperyalist	Domestic Security Etnik	Neutral Harekat Operasyon	Critical (Pejorative) Uşak	Domestic 1990 1991	Opposition to War Savaşa Karşı

Kapitalizm Sınıf Kapitalist Emperyalizm İşgücü Hammadde Sömürgeci İşçi Emekçi Burjuvazi Tekelci Burjuva Sistem Egemen Sistem Eşitlik Eşitsizlik Bağımlı Sermaye Sömürü Devrim Sendika	Bölünme Kürt Kürtler Terör OHAL Musul Kerkük Bölge İstikrar Toprak Bütünlüğü Kuzey Irak	Müdahele	Tasma Şakşakçı Piyon Hegemonik Hememonya Boyun Eğme Zayıf Güçlü	Körfez Krizi Özal Terör	Savaşa Hayır Savaşa Red İtiraz Red Hayır Karşı Karşıt Anti Veto Savaş Karşıtı Miting Protesto Pankart Barış
Nationalist Vatan Yurttaş Yurtsever Yurdunu Yurdum Türklük Toprak Ulusal Hain Türkmen	World Security 11.Eyl Terör Taliban Kitle İmha Kimyasal Biyolojik BM Denetçi El Kaide Silahsızlan Uranyum Nükleer BM Güvenlik	Negative Saldırı İstila Şiddet Katliam Yıkım İşgal Vahşet Felaket Tecavüz Şeytan	Realist İttifak Dostluk Stratejik Stratejik Ortaklık Partner	International 11.Eyl Terör Taliban Kitle İmha Kimyasal Biyolojik BM Denetçi El Kaide Silahsızlan Uranyum Nükleer BM Güvenlik	Parliamentary Bill Tezkere
Religious Türbe Bayram Müslüman Allah Din Dini İman İnanç Yeşil İslam İslam Coğrafyası İslamcılık Filistin	Humanitarian Ezilen Mazlum İnsan Çocuk Kadın Ölüm Kan Hak İnsan Hakları Kurban Kesme Yoksul Bebek	War Savaş	Pejorative Image Çete Haydut Barbarlık Hain Pis Sefil Vatan Haini Kirli Ağır Haksız	Saddam Saddam İraq İrak Saddam Bağdat İrak'ı İrak'a İrak'ta İrak'ın İrak'tan İraqi Kurds Barzani	Negotiations Pazarlık Müzakere Mutabakat KarşılıklıÇıkar Pazarlık

Kutsal Cami Namaz Dua İslami Müslim Münafık Cemaat Cenab-ı Cenabı Dinsiz	Yaşlı İnsanlık Can Kanlı Cinayet Kıyım Zulm Zulüm Masum			Talabani Kürt Grupları Zebari	
Regime Change: Democratic Demokrasi Özgürlük Demokrat Rejim Değişiklik Yönetim Demokratikleşme Diktatör Yönetim Biçimi	Interest Oriented Approach Rant Çıkar Emel Petrol Menfaat	Government Tayyip Erdoğan Abdullah Gül Başbakan Erdoğan Gül Yakış Ali Babacan Bakan AKP Adelet ve Kalkınma Vecdi Güven Tayyip Bey Dışişleri Bakanı Arınç	USA Amerika Myers Washington Rumsfeld Bush Cheney Powell Pentagon CIA Rice ABD Grossman Wolfowitz	Media Medya Gazete Basın Yayın Televizyon Haber Kanal Radyo İnternet Dergi Köşe Yazısı Haber	EU AB İngiltere İngiliz Avrupa Alman Fransa Belçika İsveç Avrupa Birliği Fransız Danimarka Hollanda Berlin İspanya Portekiz Polonya
	Legitimacy Meşru Hukuk Kurum BM Birleşmiş Milletler Denetçi Diplomatik Kanat İstihbarat	President Sezer Necdet Cumhurbaşkanı Çankaya Sezer'in Sezer'e Sezer'i Çankaya'nın Çankaya'yı Çankaya'ya	Military Ordu TSK Genel Kurmay Mehmetçik Subay TSK General Emekli General Türk Silahlı Kuvvet. Özkök Çevik Büyükanıt Kuvvetler Yüksek Askeri Şura Yaş Yaş'ı Yaş'a Yaş'ta Türk Ordusu	Middle East Ortadoğu İran Arap Suriye Lübnan Mısır Ürdün Kuveyt Suudi Umman Yemen Emirlikleri Tahrir Şam Dubai Kahire	International Institutions Nato BM Birleşmiş Milletler Nato Annan IMF Dünya Bankası Bm'yi Bm'nin Bm'ye Milletler'i Milletler'in Milletler'e Bankası'nın Bankası'na

	Economic Cost Ekonomi Ekonomik Mali Yoksulluk Resesyon İşsizlik Durgunluk Açlık Maliyet Borç Faiz Ücret Enflasyon Fiyat Fatura Bilanço Kriz Yoksullaş	NGO/Interest Groups Tüsiad Sivil Toplum Müsiad STK Baro Tabib Odalar Mimarlar TOBB ATO Doktorlar	International Other Rusya Çin Japon Putin Pekin Asya Latin Hindistan Pakistan	Other Parties ANAP MHP DSP DYP Bahçeli Çiller Mesut Yılmaz Anavatan Ecevit	Israel İsrail Yahudi Mossad Sharon Telaviv
	Economic Aid Miktar Yardım Kredi Rakam Hibe	Domestic Forces Halk Halklar Kumuoyu	Türkiye Türkiye Ankara	Meclis Meclis TBMM Milletvekili	Opposition Baykal CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Baykal