The cultural and historical foundation of Turkish citizenship

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Introduction

Turkey's relations with Europe have a long and tiresome history. The constitution of a modern nation-state through the discourse of modernity as Westernization is the main outcome of this history. This chapter is an attempt to analyze historically the cultural foundations of Turkish modernity and its state-centric nature. In doing so, I will develop and then substantiate the argument that the republican understanding of citizenship has played a crucial role in the process of state-centric and the "top down" implementation of modernity in Turkish society since the inception of the Republic in Turkey in 1923. Moreover, in playing this crucial role, citizenship has involved not only a legal status, but more importantly a "sociological and cultural practice" by which the nation-state has attempted to transform its society on the basis of such fundamental principles of Western modernity as positivism, rationalism, and secularism. Thus, citizenship has constituted a coup de grâce for the nation-state in its top-down positivist transformation of society as a way to make it modern, rational, and secular.

It should be pointed out, however, that although Westernization has always been a defining element of Turkish modernity, citizenship has never been translated into the language of individual rights and freedoms. On the contrary, it has always functioned in the service of the nation-building process as a cultural and legal code for the historical and discursive construction of the Turkish national identity. In what follows, I shall attempt to provide a historical account of the central place that citizenship has acquired in Turkish modernity in its services for nation-building. This account will help us understand the historical fact that neither citizenship nor nationalism in Turkey is immune to modernization. On the other hand, it is mainly the process of modernization as Westernization that constitutes the basic determinant or ground on which Turkish citizenship acts as a crucial cultural code for the construction of the unity between the nation-state and the secular-modern national identity.

In this chapter I will first analyze the cultural background of the Westernization process of Turkey as a "civilizing process." Second, I will try to show that in order to understand the shortcomings of Turkish citizenship, one should look into the internal contradictions of Kemalism, which has been the dominant ideology of the state-centric Turkish modernity. As I will elaborate in the following sections, the cultural foundation of Turkish citizenship is over-determined by Kemalism as a self-concluding ideology that operates as a combination of liberalisms and nationalisms in its modern and state-centric constitution. Finally, in the concluding part of this chapter, I will focus on the present-day crisis of Turkish citizenship, and in doing so I will argue that the further democratization of state-society relations in Turkey requires a liberal and constitutional reconstruction of Turkish citizenship in a way that articulates both individual and group rights, and functions as a civic and democratic identity.

The civilizing process and the sources of Turkish modernity

The notion of citizenship is a child of the nineteenth century and is embedded in the process of modernity. In Turkish modernity, citizenship has played an important role in the process of nation-building which involved both the creation of an independent nation and the modernization of it through Westernization. In this sense, the basic aim of the state was to Westernize the country, but at the same time to make it powerful enough to resist the West. This double-mentality of the Turkish nation-state, which continues even today, started to shape itself by the year 1839, and has evolved in three periods: 1839/1876-1908; 1908/1923-1980; and the 1990s. While the first two of these periods created the implementation and institutionalization of Westernization, the last one was concerned with the deep transformation of the already existing norms and institutions of Turkish modernity to make it compatible with the West, especially with the European Union. In this context the first two periods might be qualified as the formal attempts whereas the third period is more a content-based phenomenon. In these three different time-periods there have emerged drastic social, political, cultural and historical changes that have generated important impacts on state-society relations in Turkey.

This history of Turkish modernity goes all the way back to the Reformation period which began in the year 1839 with the Gülhane Verdict. In an empire attached to completely different social and political norms and cultures, the birth of the idea of citizenship as this period demarcated a definitive transition to an entirely new political understanding whose margins can be found in the whole transformative processes of the West. What is epitomized as Westernization in the Gülhane Verdict are the following attempts for (i) the construction of a new political understanding that could be put as the birth of a new political reasoning; (ii) the long process of secularization as the outcome and raison d'être of the new political opening and, finally, (iii) the construction of a new identity as the constitutive agent of the new political domain, that is citizenship. This
Westernization is identified as the main process of modernization, functioning as the legitimizing foundation of the new identity. However, this new identity of the Gülhane Verdict was not considered within the context of citizenship. In the following section I will try to show how the early notions of Westernization and modernization are interconnected and how they have conveyed to the birth of the political realm as a separate entity geared toward the early conceptualization of the individual as a political agent and a cultural subject, which later gave rise to the emergence of the citizen.

The first period, 1839/1876-1908

As has been verified by Niyazi Berkes, the early attempt to understand Western civilization was made by Sadık Rifat Paşa, who transferred the word “civilization” into the Ottoman language and left it “untranslated in its French form” (Berkes 1998: 131). Sadık Rifat Paşa, in his writings, had anticipated the principles of the Reformation period long before its promulgation. In his Essay, written before 1837, he mentions “that European civilization was based on the fullest realization of human rights, the freedom and security of life, property and honor” (Berkes 1998: 131). Rifat approaches European civilization as the foundational ground for modernization. However, insofar as modernization involves fundamental changes taking place both in polity and society, how to maintain the privileged status of polity over society in the process of modernization becomes the crucial question for the state. For this reason, Rifat’s approach to European civilization as modernization also constitutes the beginning of the double-mindality of the Turkish state in that it aims at modernizing its society, but at the same time attempts to maintain its power over societal actors. Thus, modernization in Turkish history also gives rise to a fundamental split between state and society, that is, a split between the societal call for liberalism and decentralism on the one hand, and the statist and centralized preferences of state elites for control and stability on the other. Hence, the clash between the state and its citizens occurs: “There the governments are for the welfare of the citizens and not the citizens for the sake of the governments. It is because of this that the governments are run according to the rights of the people (millet) and according to law” (Berkes 1998: 131).

Şerif Mardin, in his seminal work, analyzing the Selected Works of Rifat, clearly indicates that he advised a new system of law, “the essence of which would determine the limits of the permissible in a way that would preclude the exercise of ‘personal whims’” (Mardin 2000: 183). In this framework, Rifat was proposing a new system that would depend on the rule of law. At the time he wrote his Essay, as Mardin puts it succinctly, this was a courageous step. What was obvious in his ideal system of law was that the Sultan would still be the source of the legitimacy, but on condition that he obeys the rule of law. Three points could be made regarding Rifat’s ideas in this context: (a) he comes from a Metternichian tradition (Mardin 2000: 178-82); having rather a “reactionary” position according to the European students of political theory; (b) Rifat, in this conservative approach, is in search of a system that relies on the efficiency of the bureaucracy rather than tackling and developing the “abstract” notion of liberty, as Mardin emphasizes (2000: 179); and (c) no matter how relatively new, his ideas cannot be seen as purely original in the sense that Rifat stays within the limits of the existing system and continues with constant reference to the Ottoman-Islamic system of law.

The first clash: Mustafa Fazıl, the dead-child of the liberal decentralist group

The challenge to the suggestions of Rifat’s program comes from the writings of a less prominent figure among the Young Ottomans, Mustafa Fazıl Paşa. Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, in the Letter he wrote to Abdüllaziz in 1867, eleven years after the proclamation of the Reform Edict, clearly draws attention to the “function” and “position” of religion. In a surprisingly daring way Fazıl writes that

> religion rules over the spirit, and promises other worldly benefits to us. But that which determines and delimits the laws of the nation is not religion. If religion does not remain in the position of eternal truths, in other words, if it descends into interference with worldly affairs, it becomes a destroyer of all as well as of its own self. (Berkes 1998: 208–9; emphasis added)

It was an open call for the separation of the sacred and the secular. With this call Fazıl was trying to emancipate the state from the hegemony of religion and place it in the domain of the worldly (Berkes 1998: 277). This approach prepares the fault line and the “famous” crack in the process of “constitutionalism,” the dichotomy between state and religion.

Thus, Mustafa Fazıl differs from Rifat in that he favors de-centralized authority and a less-straying state. Whereas Rifat argues that

> public opinion and the inclinations of the people are like an overflowing river, and there are two situations which are impossible to overcome, one of them being religious belief and the other public opinion. Since to oppose them is dangerous and difficult, in the case of uprisings and stirrings of public opinion, the state should act accordingly to the currents of nature. (Mardin 2000: 187)

Fazıl challenges this argument by stating that “efficiency in the state machinery could not be obtained by a mere increase in control ... but, on the contrary, by decreasing the grip of the state over the citizen” (Mardin
The second period, 1908/1923–1980: plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose

If one ever looked for the most important and burning question in the history of Turkish politics, it would be whether the period of mass transformations of the post-1923 era has been able to constitute a notion of citizenship. The period is vastly characterized by the idea of modernization as Westernization, and involves the implementation in Turkish society of the basic political and social norms and institutions of the West. In this context the period is considered to be the real basis for the transition to a verified notion of Westernization, enabling the conditions for the birth of civil citizens and the emergence of the autonomous political sphere. This procedure is read by a large group of students of Turkish politics as secularism.

Although it seems that the Kemalist period is radically different from the preceding ones, there is a strong element of continuity. This is quite understandable when the notion of “derivative discourse” is recalled. Chatterjee asserts in this context that in transition from one political and historical stage to the other, the discourse developed in the preceding one stays dominant, although it does not appear overt (Chatterjee, 1993). This statement forces us to analyze the Kemalist period and its relation to the Second Magnyret (Constitutional) period, i.e., the period of the Young Ottomans. In this section I will attempt to show a remarkable continuity and similarity between the Kemalist period and that of the Young Ottomans. This will enable me to demonstrate convincingly the fact that Kemalism has fallen short in its attempt to create a civil notion of citizenship in the Western sense, although Westernization is the basic characteristic of the Kemalist period.

The man of transition and all seasons: Ziya Gökalp of 1908 and 1923

The main link between Kemalism and the Young Ottomans is nationalism as defined by the main theoretician of the period, namely Ziya Gökalp. He can be taken as the constitutive figure of the basic tenets of 1908 and 1923 in terms of both the way he defined Westernism and the way he handled the notion of Turkism. The basic concern of Gökalp was twofold. He was not only trying to find a mid-way or a synthesis between Westernism and Turkism, but also he was in an unending struggle to make the process of Westernization a cultural project which later was accepted and adapted by Kemal Atatürk. Citizenship, on this ground, once again is pushed back and given secondary importance, even though the cultural project of Westernization provides a secular, “enlightened” social agent as the bearer of the process. This paradoxical situation can be explained by focusing on Gökalp’s understanding of modernity and culture.

According to Gökalp, the notion of Westernism should be handled with care. The idea can be split into two parts: West as ideology and as technology. Between them there should be no hesitation, pertaining to the incorporation of the “Western mind” and significantly the technology it produced, because technology is identical with civilization and should be comprehended likewise and it is universal. Gökalp is extremely confident in his ideas and clearly argues that attaching to Western civilization is the only salvation:

There is only one road to salvation: to advance in order to reach – that is in order to be equal to – Europeans in the sciences and industry as well as in military and judicial institutions. And there is only one means to achieve this: to adapt ourselves to Western civilization completely.

(Gökalp 1959: 276, emphasis added)

At this point, Gökalp starts criticizing the “makers of Tanzimat” by arguing that “however, whatever they wanted to take from Europe, they always took not fully but by half” (Gökalp 1959: 276). This important essay, called “Towards the West”, first appeared in the year 1923 then was reprinted in his famous and groundbreaking book Principles of Turkism, published in the same year. In it, Gökalp develops his criticism further by stating that the Europeanization of the Tanzimat was not a “real” one for it was a sort of Westernism relying on a formal basis. This was a new approach because, as Hanioğlu clearly shows, after World War I there was a group in Turkey calling for Westernization despite Europe (Hanioğlu 1985: 363). However the question turns out to be related to the limits of Westernization. In this context, Gökalp proposes a smart solution to the problem. It is the differentiation between culture and civilization. Coming from a Durkheimian origin, Gökalp formulates the relation between culture and nationalism (Parla 1985). According to Gökalp, civilization is universal whereas culture is national (Gökalp 1959: 281). Next, Gökalp tries to bring out the difference between cosmopolitanism and internationality by way of arguing that it is a mistake to believe that “there is only one civilization, common to all men, whose members are not nations but men” (Gökalp 1959: 281). He insists that this is cosmopolitanism and “this view of civilization is irreconcilable with that of the nationalists” (Gökalp 1959: 281).

This framework constitutes a significant attempt aimed at unifying the West and the nationalists. In this context, Kemalist ideology conceives the West as a technological source to be used. Yet Kemalism also considers that Western civilization is the “ideal civilization.” This understanding of Gökalp is “repeated” by Atatürk himself. In a speech he delivered in 1934 Atatürk
states: “Nations are different. However the civilization is unique and a nation in the course of progress should get united with it” (Atatürk 1954: 66). The crucial point here is that Kemalism, differing from the preceding period, comprehends the social and political norms of the West as part and parcel of “the technology” and civilization, at large. Westernism, under these assumptions appears merely an “agent of legitimization” of Kemalism’s modernization project. Under these assumptions it is clear that even the “social and political” West is not a matter of culture but of civilization.

The nature of the Kemalist model

The “Kemalist reforms” appear to be the implementation of Western social and political norms for the transformation of society. The most important of them is the translation of the Swiss Civil Code into Turkish. This move can be seen as the first step in the construction of a civil society based on the notion of rights which would convey to citizenship. It is also the first move in the implementation of secularism. The Civil Code introduces the idea of contractualism and as a result, on face value, it is a further step in the institutionalization of a positivist-secular understanding. This framework also provides for the birth of the “new citizen.” However, in what follows, I will try to show how Kemalism encompasses a set of contradictions and disables the advancement of a civil notion of citizenship as an intended objective.

The key to understanding the constitutive elements of this inadequacy derives to a large extent from the interchangeable character of two concepts, i.e. the sacred/profane and the religious. This is to say that the notion of sacred or profane continues to exist and to be dominant over “the people.” Here Kemalism replaces the profane with the state by attributing to it a transcendental connotation. In other words, in the Kemalist period the (secular) state as the supplier of all the rights and the organizer and regulator of the political realm fulfills the role of the transcendental power. In this way a strong gemeinschaft is created over the gesellschaft by empowering the state over the communal spirit. To understand this further one should compare Kant’s and Gökalp’s notions of “rights” and “reason.”

In Kant, as Seligman points out, and I argued elsewhere, (Kahraman, 2002)

Right [Recht] embraces both personal “rights” and the very notion of justice and is ensured through the autonomous and agentic individual subject following the dictates of Reason which in its universality, bridges the distinction between private and public, individual and social.

(Seligman 1993: 149, emphasis added)

This is where the both Scottish idealism of private and public and the French tradition of “natural right” breaks. Instead, Kant begins the differentiation between private and public and he supports the idea that civil society is separate and autonomous from the state. In a synthesis, according to Seligman, that Kant formulated through the relations between the Right and the Ethical he clearly argues that, quoting Seligman, “private sphere of morality and ethics is thus divorced from the representive vision of society as juridical community” (Seligman 1993: 150–1). “No specific approach contradicts the Kemalist understanding of state and society because in the Turkish case the state is set against the citizen with famous motto by Gökalp: “there is no right but duty” (hak yok ve vaaden) This is by all means contradictory to the principals of Enlightenment (Gökberk 1984: 281–334), even in the sense that it is upheld by Atatürk himself. It is Atatürk who declares that the only “guix science and calls for society to reject any belief beyond Reason. This is put it in another framework, the birth of the hidden communitarianism the Kemalist state that would hinder the development of a civil society an emancipated notion of citizenship.

This communitarian spirit develops further in the “single-party era, both statism as the state-controlled economy and the solidarist-corporal understanding of the state were chosen under the influence of the totalitarian regimes of 1930s Europe as the main ideologies by which the state was to govern its society. The catchphrase of these ideologies has always been “a united society of no privilege and class.” On the other hand, Inegemont discourse has also continued and stressed that there is not a lack of class differentiation in the society but only a plurality of diverse professions all running for the good of the society. The remarkable point is that Gökalp has developed his ideas during the 1908 period on basis of Turkism as the dominant ideology of the era. The perpetuation of the same ideas in the subsequent years shows the heritage that Kemal took from Gökalp and also indicates once again the state-centric nature its citizenship regime. However, to understand this, one needs a rather advanced understanding of the Kemalist republican model of citizenship.

The anatomy and structure of Kemalist citizenship

In order to provide a deeper understanding of republican citizenship, I employ Turner’s, Tilly’s, and Brubaker’s approaches to citizenship. As been argued by Turner, a quick glance at the existing literature on citizenship reveals that there are two systems of citizenship, namely those of citizenship from above and citizenship from below (Turner 1993: 55). As Kadioglu clearly demonstrated in her analysis of Turkish citizenship, the model in Turkey in the early republic relates to “citizenship from above” (Kadioglu 1990: 52–72). The crucial point here is that this model indicates that construction of Turkish citizenship aims at fortifying the strong position of the state over society. Thus, citizenship is not considered in terms of language of rights. Instead, it becomes positioned toward the Kemalist to modernity as civilization, and in this sense citizenship involves duties
services to the state rather than rights and freedoms. Citizens are expected to act as the expressions of modern life in that they give primacy to the national interest over their own rights and freedoms. In this sense, in the process of its construction from above, citizenship serves as an ethical device by which the strong-state legitimizes its dominant position over society. Thus, Turkish citizenship operates both as a way of implementing modernity from above into a traditional society and as an obstacle to the process of the creation of civil society.

On the other hand, in discussing the various different models of citizenship-building procedures in modernity, Tilly uses two different models. Accordingly, Tilly's matrix concludes that there are two categories that have emerged in the process of citizenship-building, namely those of the "exclusive" and "inclusive" models (Tilly 1996a: 10). Furthermore, these models can also be defined as "primordial" and "learned" in their origins. Approaching this point of view, Kemalist republican citizenship can be classified as a "learned exclusive" model. It should be pointed out in this context that Kemalist citizenship as a "learned" and exclusive category does not involve ethnic and territorial references. Rather, it is "citizenship as a legal status." If this classification is taken into account as a general framework for understanding different models of the process of citizenship building, according to Tilly, we can move toward a more concrete level of analysis. At this level, one can differentiate the two statusus of citizenship as "think" and "thin."

citizenship can then range from thin to thick: thin where it entails few transactions, rights and obligations; thick where it occupies a significant share of all transactions, rights and obligations sustained by state agents and people living under their jurisdiction.

(Tilly 1996a: 8)

The "Turkish citizen" can then be seen as falling into the category of "think" citizenship with a congregation of rules and obligations.

Third, one could observe that the citizenship-building process in Turkey has been largely part and parcel of the nation-building process. In other words, the dominant mode of understanding of Turkish citizenship has always been over-determined by the discussions about what constitutes an organic linkage between the different segments of society in a way to make it a nation. Here, one could speak of two models of nation-building which have given rise to two different understandings of citizenship. The preference here is between the French model which acts on the basis of the principle of jus soli, to use the term popularized by Brubaker, that is, citizenship embedded in a spatial territoriality, and the German model operating on the basis of the principle of jus sanguinis that privileges the criterion of noble descendancy (Brubaker 1992). The German model, in this case, is exclusionary and differentialist and Volk-oriented, whereas the French model is assimilationist and territorial (Tilly 1996b). Kadioglu, taking this distinction, states that the Turkish model of citizenship depends mainly on the French model and takes the principle of territoriality as its basis (Kadioglu 1999: 64).

However, it also involves references to ethnicity and in that case it refers to a specific version of the German model. Thus, Turkish citizenship turns out to be partially ethnic-based, exclusionary and once again state-oriented (Yıldız 2001). The combination of these models ends up giving meaning and expression to the peculiar character of Turkish citizenship, which can be seen in the frequently quoted statement of Atatürk, "what happiness to the one who says I am a Turk." The meaning of this sentence is still under debate in Turkey, for it is not clear whether it connotes an ethnic and exclusionary understanding or an inclusive political one. Certain scholars have different views on this issue. While one group argues that Turkish citizenship does not have a blood and biological foundation and in this sense it has a cultural-assimilationist model, the other group stands for the idea that it, mostly during the 1930s period of single-party rule, has developed an ethnic view of citizenship and become more and more exclusionary. According to Işıkgüloğlu et al., both arguments are partially correct in their own right, and this has to do with the ambivalence embedded in the Kemalist construction of republican citizenship that "suggests that citizenship is formal, legal membership of a state, implying loyalty to the state rather than the nation, and it is also important for both symbolic and practical reasons to put emphasis on the latter" (Işıkgüloğlu et al. 2000: 191).

As can be seen at every level, Kemalist republican citizenship is definitely state-centric, operating from above, involving a thick notion of loyalty to modernity and combining the elements of the French and German models (Tilly 1996b: 233). Kadioglu argues in this sense that the reason for this multi-dimensional character of Turkish citizenship lies in the strong-state tradition and its defining characteristics: modernity as "a state in search of its nation" (Kadioglu 1995). On the other hand, we should not forget the fact that in this search the state also employed ethnic references. Yıldız argues that Turkish citizenship has a Germanic character in the sense that "the blood notion" has played an immense and effective role in the formation and institutionalization of citizenship (Yıldız 2001). Both arguments are valid and this condition remarkably shows the eclectic character of citizenship under scrutiny. This peculiarity makes Turkish citizenship itself a significant identity, attaching it to blood ties, giving it a nationalist character rather than being an agent or an element of the identity gaining a transcendental sense. In this context, using Tilly's terminology, Turkish citizenship might be called a "conceptualized citizenship" (Tilly 1996a), insofar as it is constructed by way of symbols, by using certain rhetoric and through the state-based secular education system.

In this sense, the republican model of citizenship with all these procedures and conditions should be comprehended as the constitutive element of
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Turkish modernity if not itself an outcome of this "long lasting future." However, in the course of its history, this model has faced serious challenges, as Turkish modernity has begun to undergo serious changes and transformations since the 1980s and especially the 1990s. The state-centric, secular, thick, and inclusive aspects of citizenship have been challenged by various sources, operating as identity claims, as recognition claims, and as calls for democratization. These challenges have played an important role in Turkey's relations with Europe, in the process of rethinking the idea of modernity as Westernization and with the emergence of the increasing societal will to democratization and the establishment of the language of rights in Turkey. All of these developments together constituted the third period in Turkish modernity as Westernization in the 1990s. In what follows, I shall analyze this period.

The 1990s: the new consciousness of democracy

The new period involves a tension between the strong-state tradition and the language of identity/difference voiced by the peripheral voices and civil society organizations. Thus, the resurgence of Islam, the rise of Kurdish nationalism, the emergence of civil society, the calls for liberal individualism, all emerged in this period (Göle 1994). They all became the internal elements of the changing nature of Turkish modernity, of the emergence of the politics of identity and recognition, and consequently of an increasing antagonism between the state and these forces. The 1990s bear the mark of this antagonism.

Beginning in the early 1990s, the newly founded Islamist party, the Welfare Party (Refaeli Partisi), with an energetic opposition to the governments of the center-right and left parties, started to reflect the demands of a certain part of the periphery. These demands were related to identity issues. The Islamist wing, for the first time in the history of the republic, voiced strong calls for a change in the notion of Islamism, and demanded that the state refrain from intervening in religious affairs. It argued that religious identity could be manifested on the public realm, and it was this condition that would certify the existence of democracy. This argument not only started the identity debates in Turkey, but also put Kemalists tenets under discussion together with the existing norms of modernity.

Another condition which can be analyzed in the context of the widespread effect of identity politics in Turkey is the radical ethno-Turkish nationalist demands backed by the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi). Organized as a reaction, in the 1970-80 period, to the radical leftist uprising, this group made another start in the late 1990s in reaction to Kurdish nationalism. The party openly takes a nationalist and introverted position in international affairs. Especially during the coalition government between 1999 and 2002, the bloc formed by the Democratic Left Party and the National Action Party against the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) used Kurdish nationalism also in their indirect and implicit reaction to the EU. The National Action Party argued that it is for Europe as long as it means modernity, but against it if it means democracy, for the European understanding of democracy in its multiculturalist discourse contributes to the emergence of the politics of identity/recognition, the most dangerous of which is ethnic identity (Arıkan 2002).

In this sense, what has defined the new path of relations with Europe in the 1990s has always been the debate over democracy. It first started, as mentioned above, with the arguments concerning secularism in the context of political Islam. Elsewhere I have argued that political Islam stands for, in Turkey, "actual progressive movement" and this clearly denotes the change of roles (Karaman 1993; 1995). It was no longer the central state elites running for a progressive understanding but rather the periphery symbolized in the context of Islam. This situation, taken as a radical challenge to the establishment by the central agents, continued throughout the 1990s with a gradually increasing intensity, and it finally faced the united intervention of the army. After the formation of the 1998 coalition government between the (Islamists) Welfare Party and the True Path Party, the army first criticized the government for its anti-secular moves in supporting religious sects and promoting the religious fundamentalist discourse of the Islamic state, and then finally intervened in Turkish politics by asking in a forceful fashion for the resignation of the government. This intervention, known as "28 February coup," was construed as a "postmodern coup" both in public and academic circles. This postmodern coup forced the government to resign, demanded normalization and stability in political affairs that meant the exclusion of political Islam from governing, and ended with the constitutional closure of the Welfare Party.

While the postmodern coup affected negatively the process of democratization, there emerged nevertheless within society new civil calls for the need to transform the state into a more effective, efficient and democratic governing structure capable of creating the language of rights and freedoms in Turkey. Interestingly, these calls were voiced strongly by the Turkish bourgeoisie and its main organization, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (known as TÜSİAD). The Turkish bourgeoisie, for the first time in its history, and in addition to its main identity as an economic pressure group, started to act as a civil society organization promoting liberal rights and freedoms. Bourgeoisie as a class in Turkey has a significant characteristic. It is not only the urban bourgeoisie which is considered as one of the historical carriers of the social transformations, but also the provincial bourgeoisie, which is usually considered to be the backbone of conservatism. The flow of international finance capital and its search for articulation with the local is the main factor in this development. The urge for unification has forced the Turkish bourgeoisie out of its closet, and required it to put aside its national feelings which have generally committed it to introverted and closed relations with the state. This framework has defined
the new targets for the Turkish bourgeoisie, the most important of which is Turkey-EU relations (Müftüler-Bag 2002).

In this long history of Turkey's direct and institutionalized relations with the EU, the last crossroads was the decision of the Helsinki Summit of 10 December 1999 that demarcates the fourth stage of enlargement (Elgin-Kahraman 2000). In that decision, Turkey was accepted as a candidate member. In order to be accepted as a full member, Turkey is expected to fulfill the necessities of the Copenhagen criteria. As a part and parcel of this process, on 8 November 2000 Turkey published the National Participation Document, which declares both the will and the duties of the Turkish Republic. The last step was the National Program that was declared on 21 March 2000. It widely depends on the concretization of the process of democratization, which includes the necessary amendments of various laws and a sort of radical change concerning the state structure. It foresees amendments to fifty-three laws by 2001, and sixty by the end of 2004. In this regard, the Turkish bourgeoisie started to take a more pro-EU position, and the end of the 1990s is marked by the tension between it and the various "compartments" of the Turkish Republic, where the army is the central figure (Karabellias 2000).

In the late 1990s, the Turkish bourgeoisie began to be active in pressuring state to initiate political reforms to upgrade the quality of democracy and economic stability. In this regard, as a strong economic pressure group, promoting the globalizing economic interests of the private sector, TÜSİAD prepared two main reports criticizing the "established and valid notion of democracy" and calling for measures to be taken for its enlargement and reinforcement. The democracy reports aimed to modify the 1962 Constitution and called for a restructuring of civil-military relations along democratic lines, criticizing the position of the army in the National Security Council, and demanding a set of political reforms for the promotion of civil rights and freedoms. Thus, for the first time in the history of Turkish modernity, the Turkish bourgeoisie has made serious demands for further democratization and an effective state.

The significant point here is that both democracy and the effective state depend on the transformation of the republican model of citizenship. This transformation has already been demanded by societal forces and the Copenhagen criteria of the EU. The transformation entails a new understanding of citizenship in Turkey as a matter of identity and rights that operates in relation to the values of the post-nationalist order. Identity politics at every level will undoubtedly benefit from this progress. However, it is at this point that the internal clash surfaces. While most of the center parties with a pro-nationalist propensity reacted and, together with other central actors such as the army and the state bureaucracy, the demands of the EU, the societal and peripheral forces attempted to resist this reaction and point out the importance of the EU for the further democratization of Turkey.

The outcome of this clash was twofold. First, in August 2002 the Turkish parliament unexpectedly ratified all laws necessary for the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. Second, the national election was announced. In the November 3rd national election, both the coalition-government parties and the opposition parties lost the election and found themselves no longer in parliament. The winner of the election was the (Islamic) Justice and Development Party. The possibility of a democratic Turkey lies in the success of the Justice and Development Party in governing Turkey effectively and efficiently, as well as in taking Turkey forward to the accession negotiations with the EU.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that Turkey’s "experience" and "adventure" in terms of citizenship and European integration consist of a set of historical periods, in each of which Turkish modernity as Westernization has taken different but nevertheless interrelated forms. The other component of this long and tiresome journey is democracy, and this is also interconnected with the political transformation that is usually referred to as modernization. As has been analyzed in a thematic fashion, this history unfolds in three periods. The first period refers to the late Ottoman Empire and the beginning of Turkish modernity; the second period covers the Kemalist construction of the Turkish Republic as a modern nation-state, and the last period concerns the late 1990s and the changing nature of modernity. While in the first two periods of modernity via Westernization the idea of the individual has been neglected, it is in the third period that there have emerged societal calls for democratization of the strong-state tradition. In this last period, modernity as Westernization has become subject to a process of reconstruction in which the main aim was, and still is, to transform the state in such a way that it approaches society on the basis of individualism and the protection of individual rights and freedoms. This is, as I have argued in this chapter, one of the most important outcomes of Turkey's long association with Europe.

In this context, the development of citizenship shows a noteworthy transformation toward democratization and the emergence of the language of rights in the process of modernization as Westernization. Whereas the first period takes the notion of rights as a natural and transcendental entity, in the second period it was comprehended not as a natural entity but as a notion having secondary importance to the state and its interests. It is only in the third period that the notion of rights in terms of the process of democratization constitutes the focal point in the crisis-ridden interactions between the state and the individual. In this period of the 1990s, the notion of rights is considered neither natural nor secondary, but as a secular and political concept involving individual freedoms and directly related to the possibility of the further democratization of Turkey.
This chapter has also demonstrated that the constitutive elements of the process of modernity as Westernization have not remained the same. On the contrary, they have been re-defined, re-described and re-constructed historically in the course of Turkish modernity and its dissemination throughout society. These changes have also been reflected in the processes of modernization and democratization. Accordingly, in the first period the West stands for the constitution of a modern notion of state in the total absence of the notion of democracy. In the second period, the West functioned as a main reference point for the Kemalist will to civilization that understood modernity as modern nation-state building without democracy. It is only in the final and present period that the West is referred to as a source for the process of democratization, which goes hand-in-hand with the critique of the strong-state tradition. Thus the long history of Turkish modernity as Westernization reveals the fact that the state in search of its society has eventually found itself in a situation in which it is negated by its society in search of a democratic state that functions primarily as the institutional guarantor of individual rights and freedoms. In this transformation, which marks the nature of the present time in Turkey, the West, understood as the process of European integration, plays a constitutive role, especially with respect to the possibility of creating a democratic Turkey.

In this chapter, apart from the above-mentioned conditions, I have also made a set of suggestions regarding the question of Turkey's long association with Europe. These suggestions can be summarized as follows:

1. The idea of Europe, as well as Turkey-EU relations, functions as a main point of reference both for the definition of Turkish modernity as Westernization and for the societal critique of the constitutive epistemology of Turkish modernity, namely Kemalism. This is so far as the idea of "Europe" involves references to both modernity and democracy. Thus, while it is taken by the state to mean modernity, it also has its place in the recent societal critiques of the strong-state tradition, but this time it is taken to mean democracy. However, whether it means modernity or democracy, the idea of Europe remains the constitutive image of Turkish modernity as Westernization.

2. One of the sites at which we can observe the manifestations of the idea of Europe as modernity and as democracy is Turkish citizenship. In this context, the idea of Europe plays an important role both for the strong-state tradition and for its recent critiques. For the strong-state tradition, Europe as modernity functions as a source of legitimacy for the state in its attempt to view citizenship on the basis of services and duties, to the extent that these services and duties are positioned by the state against civilization and modernization, that is, against the construction of a modern nation aiming at reaching the level of contemporary European civilization. On the other hand, the idea of Europe as democracy is articulated into the recent critique of the strong-state tradition, and in this sense functions as a source of the language of rights and freedoms.

In this context, the idea of Europe becomes an internal element of the liberal and constitutional understanding of Turkish citizenship. In this sense, both nationalism and liberalism make use of reference to the idea of Europe in different ways; and

Thus, Europe becomes an agent of legitimization for different agents and actors in Turkey. In this regard, as much as it gives meaning to modernity, civilization, and nation-building, Europe also gives legitimacy to the recent politics of difference, identity and recognition. Both the state-centric attempts to create stability, normality and civility, and the calls for democracy, pluralism and liberalism employ the idea of Europe in constructing their own visions of society.

It can be argued consequently that the history of Turkish modernity cannot be understood without taking into account Turkey's long and tiresome relations with the West and its changing forms and contents. To the extent that the idea of Europe defines Turkish modernity, it also defines the cultural foundation on which the republican model of citizenship was constructed. Likewise, to the extent that the idea of Europe defines the crisis and the changing nature of Turkish modernity, it also defines the cultural foundation on which societal calls are being made for the language of rights and freedoms, carried out by the new, democratic and liberal citizens. It can be suggested, therefore, that Europe constitutes one of the defining elements of a democratic Turkey, the possibility of which lies in the reconstruction of state-society relations on the basis of the language of rights and freedoms.

References


4 European Union-Turkish relations and the question of citizenship

Deniz Vardar

Introduction

The European Union (EU) summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 was a turning point in relations between the EU and Turkey. The EU is preparing to expand from 15 to 25 members in 2004 and, possibly, 27 (with Bulgaria and Romania) in 2007. Turkey lobbied actively before and during the Copenhagen Summit in order to start accession negotiations. It had also initiated a set of almost revolutionary legal, constitutional and institutional changes in the summer of 2002 to make its political system compatible with that of the EU. Although the European Council proposed in its Svisel meeting (2002) that a new decision should be taken at the Copenhagen Summit about Turkey’s candidacy, Turkey’s efforts to obtain a date for joining other candidates on course for integration were not completely successful. Instead, the EU decided to re-examine Turkey’s case at the end of 2004. If, by then, Turkey fulfills the EU criteria, accession negotiations will be started “without delay.” In these circumstances, the current government and the main political actors are aware that they can no longer postpone the democratization process in Turkey if they want to be included in the next wave of EU enlargement. In this context, the government declared 2003 as the “year of reforms” and 2004 “the year of their application.” Turkey responded to the latest Accession Partnership Document of the EU Commission, which recalled Turkey’s shortcomings in its attempts to meet the Copenhagen criteria (April 2003), by announcing a renewed National Program (July 2003) and a series of democratic reform packages.

The issues surrounding Turkey’s possible accession to the EU stem not only from the country’s problems adapting to the criteria set down for all candidate countries, but also from some other implicit issues. They are related, first, to the identity problems inherent in Turkey’s “Europeanness” and, second, to the question of Europe’s future borders. For this reason, the questions of citizenship and democracy constitute a significant issue in EU-Turkish relations. Moreover, the question of citizenship is also key to the future of democratization in Turkey. Thus, the relationship between European and Turkish citizenship is at the center of the debate in Turkey.