Creator/Author/Editor: Barlo, Mehmet

2012

Barlo, Mehmet and Özdoğan, Ayça (2012) Team beats collusion. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

Alioğulları, Zeynel Harun and Barlo, Mehmet (2012) Entropic selection of Nash equilibrium. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:10.5900/SU_FASS_WP.2012.18910

2011

Barlo, Mehmet and Özdoğan, Ayça (2011) Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2011/0008

Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme (2011) Strategic behavior in non-atomic games. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2006/0006

Barlo, Mehmet and Ürgün, Can (2011) Stochastic discounting in repeated games: awaiting the almost inevitable. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2011/0001

Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme and Sabourian, Hamid (2011) The bounded memory folk theorem. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2011/0005

Filiztekin, Alpay and Barlo, Mehmet and Kıbrıs, Özgür (2011) Türkiye'de bölgesel kalkınma: farklılıklar, bağıntılar ve yeni bir mekanizma tasarımı. Research Report. Türkonfed, İstanbul.

2010

Barlo, Mehmet and İnci, Eren (2010) Banks versus venture capital when the venture capitalist values private benefits of control. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2010/0003

2009

Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkıran, Aygün Nuh (2009) Epsilon-Nash implementation. Economics Letters, 102 (1). pp. 36-38. ISSN 0165-1765

Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme and Sabourian, Hamid (2009) Repeated games with one-memory. Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (1). pp. 312-336. ISSN 0022-0531

2008

Afacan, Oğuz Mustafa and Barlo, Mehmet (2008) Cooperation cannot be sustained in a discounted repeated prisoners' dilemma with patient short and long run players. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2007/0011

2007

Atasoy, Özgün and Barlo, Mehmet (2007) Investor's increased shareholding due to entrepreneur-manager collusion. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2007/0014