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Segmented switchers and retailer pricing strategies

Koçaş, Cenk and Bohlmann , Jonathan (2008) Segmented switchers and retailer pricing strategies. Journal of Marketing, 72 (3). pp. 124-142. ISSN 0022-2429

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.72.3.124

Abstract

Empirical studies reveal a surprisingly wide variety of price promotion strategies among retailers, even among Internet sellers of undifferentiated homogenous goods such as books and music CD’s. Several empirical findings remain puzzling, particularly that within the same market some small retailers decide to deeply discount, while other small retailers forgo the price-sensitive switchers and price high to play their niche. We present theoretical and empirical analyses that address these varied pricing strategies. Our model of three asymmetric firms shows that under multiple switcher segments, where different switchers compare prices at different retailers, firm-specific loyalty is not sufficient to explain the variety of retailer pricing strategies. We demonstrate that a retailer’s pricing strategy is driven by the ratio of the size of switcher segments for which the retailer competes to its loyal segment size. The relative switcher-to-loyal ratios among retailers explain when a firm is more or less inclined to discount deeply or frequently. We thereby identify when a small firm finds it optimal to play the niche and price high, despite having few loyals, or to discount and go for the switchers. Our analysis reveals several interesting findings, such as a small firm that benefits from strategically limiting its access to switchers. The results of two empirical studies confirm our model’s predictions for varied retailer pricing strategies in the context of Internet booksellers.

Item Type:Article
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
ID Code:9526
Deposited By:Cenk Koçaş
Deposited On:23 Oct 2008 00:51
Last Modified:25 May 2011 14:09

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