title   
  

A Revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems

Kıbrıs, Özgür (2008) A Revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2008/0001

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Abstract

We interpret solution rules on a class of simple allocation problems as data on the choices of a policy-maker. We analyze conditions under which the policy maker’s choices are (i) rational (ii) transitive-rational, and (iii)representable; that is, they coincide with maximization of a (i) binary relation, (ii) transitive binary relation, and (iii) numerical function on the allocation space. Our main results are as follows: (i) a well known property, contraction independence (a.k.a. IIA) is equivalent to rationality; (ii) every contraction independent and other-c monotonic rule is transitive-rational;and (iii) every contraction independent and other-c monotonic rule, if additionally continuous, can be represented by a numerical function.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:Rational, contraction independence, weak axiom of revealed preferences, strong axiom of revealed preferences, continuity, monotonicity.
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:8629
Deposited By:Özgür Kıbrıs
Deposited On:06 Jul 2008 09:37
Last Modified:06 Jul 2008 09:37

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