MOTIVATIONAL DYNAMICS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM:

ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVES

by AYŞE ÜSTÜNEL

YIRCALI

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MOTIVATIONAL DYNAMICS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM:
ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVES

APPROVED BY:

Prof. Dr. Şerif Mardin   ....

(Thesis Supervisor)

Assoc. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç   ....

Assist. Prof. Yusuf Hakan Erdem   ....

DATE OF APPROVAL:

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MOTIVATIONAL DYNAMICS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM: ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVES

ABSTRACT

There is no abundance in the quantity and quality of research realized in the area of suicide terrorism. Although suicide terrorism is as old a phenomenon as terrorism, the scope of research investigating the latter outweighs and usually encloses the former as a subtopic. The increasing trend in suicide terrorism and the high rate of casualties it inflicts on its target enemy raises significant questions such as what accounts for the rise in suicide terrorism, what kind of people and groups are involved in it, and what kind of measures should governments take to prevent its future occurrences.

In order to provide answers to some of these questions a small number of studies attempt to explore what kind of motivations lie at the source which feeds suicide terrorism. The available studies investigating the motives of suicide terrorism generally limit themselves to approaching the phenomenon from a particular angle, such as one that of organizational or individual motivations. The hypothesis of this study is that there need not be an exclusive angle to explaining the motives of suicide terrorism. In order to test this hypothesis, this study has explored two movements, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Islamic Resistance Movement, which have intensely utilized suicide attacks. To this end, these two cases were investigated with the aim of understanding the existing motives among these groups as well as their activists' for carrying out suicide attacks.

Indeed the findings of this survey showed that factors of both organizational and individual motivations are applicable and significant in understanding suicide terrorism. The findings of this research suggest that suicide terrorism should be studied in a framework that regards this issue as an act which is fed both by organizational and individual motives. Moreover, both organizational and individual motives also seem to interact among each other. While organizations base their logic on strategic goals, they are obliged to employ individuals and therefore individual motives, which they have learned to exploit in a very efficient manner. On the other hand, although feelings of relative deprivation, humiliation, and revenge can impel a person to sacrifice his life for the good of the whole, encouragement, training, and planning provided to him or her by the organization are essential for the mission.

Key words: Suicide terrorism, suicide attacks, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas

İNTİHAR TERÖRÜNÜN MOTİVASYONEL DİNAMİKLERİ: ORGANİZASYON VE BİREY AÇISINDAN YAKLAŞIMLAR

ÖZET

Bugüne kadar intihar terörizmi ile ilgili yapılmış araştırmaların ne sayısı ne de derinliği yeterli seviyede değildir. İntihar terörizmi terörizmin kendisi kadar eski bir hadise olsa da intihar terörizmi genel terörizm hakkında yapılan çalışmalar dahilinde bir alt başlık olarak değerlendirilmiştir. İntihar saldırıları olaylarında görülmekte olan yükselen trend ve bu saldırılar yoluyla yaratılan büyük zararlar sonucunda intihar saldırılarının sebepleri, ne gibi gruplar ve kişiler tarafından kullanıldığı ve hükümetlerin hangi önlemleri alması gerektiği sorulan daha çok sorulmak zorunda kalınmaktadır.

Bu sorulara cevap vermek amacıyla yapılan bazı çalışmalar intihar terörizmini besleyen kaynakta ne gibi motivasyonlar olduğunu araştırmak üzere yapılmıştır. Ancak şu ana kadar gerçekleştirilen çalışmalar motivasyon konusuna bakışlarında kendilerini ya organizasyonel ya da bireysel açılar ile kısıtlamıştır. Bu çalışmanın hipotezi intihar terörünün motivasyonlarını anlamak yolunda sadece bir açı ile kısıtlanmanın gereksiz olduğudur. Bu hipotezi test etmek için intihar saldırılarını yoğun olarak kullanan iki hareket incelenmiştir. Bunlar Tamil Eelam Özgürlük Kaplanları ve Islami Direniş Hareketi'dir. Bu iki grup hem organizasyon içi motivasyonları hem de bu organizayonların üyelerinin motivasyonlarını irdelemek amacıyla derinlemesine incelenmiştir.

Bu çalışmanın sonuçları intihar terörizmini anlamada hem organizasyonel hem de bireysel motivasyonların geçerli ve önemli olduğunu göstermiştir. Sonuç olarak intihar terörizminin hem organizasyonel hem de bireysel motivasyonlar ile beslenen bir eylem olduğu önerilmektedir. Dahası bu motivasyonların birbirleri aralarında da etkileştikleri gözlenmiştir. Organizasyonlar mantıklarını stratejik amaçlar" üzerine inşa ettikleri halde bireylere ve dolayısıyla bireysel motivasyonlara muhtaçtırlar, ve aslında bunları en etkili şekilde istismar etmektedirler. Diğer taraftan göreceli mahrumiyet, aşağılanma ve öç alma duyguları bireyleri kendi hayatlarını halkları için feda etmelerine sevk etse de, organizasyon tarafından sağlanan teşvik, eğitim ve planlama bir bireyin intihar saldırısı gerçekleştirebilmesi için zorunludur.

Anahtar kelimeler: İntihar terörizmi, intihar saldırıları, Tamil Eelam Özgürlük Kaplanları, Islami Direniş Hareketi, Hamas

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There is no abundance in the quantity and quality of research realized in the area of suicide terrorism. Although suicide terrorism is as old a phenomenon as terrorism, the scope of research investigating the latter outweighs and usually encloses the former as a subtopic. Nevertheless, it is eventually possible to mention an increasing research supply on this issue, and it seems like it took September 11, 2001 (9/11) suicide attacks against the United States to trigger the incentive. One cannot help but notice that the majority of the literature covered through this thesis is also written after 2001. The post 9/11 era, naturally, brings forward a whole range of global coverage on suicide terrorism, from newspaper articles, to television programs, to internet forums, to public discussions, and then to academic and semi-academic work. The western general public opinion, influenced by the media and politicians, initially perceived suicide terrorism completely as an irrational act of religious fanaticism undertaken by psychotic, homicidal maniacs, and there is a good majority that still do, a perception not leaving room for any further questions towards underlying reasons of the issue. On the other hand, however, there emerged investigative journalists and academics, who saw the need to delve into the explanatory factors of suicide terrorism, and their studies today give us something more than "craziness" as an explanation. The upcoming work by scholars on suicide terrorism, such as Robert Pape's "Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism" and Andrew Silke's "Suicide Terrorism" to be published in

May 2005 and March 2006 consecutively, stands promising for further exploration and understanding of the phenomenon.

The increase in the number of studies on suicide terrorism is not only due to the 9/11 attacks but is essentially a result of the remarkable rise in suicide terrorism, especially since the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Since the 1980s, terrorist organizations are increasingly using suicide attacks as a means to reach their goals. While the Palestinian movements, such as Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and recently the Al Qaeda are renown for their suicide attacks, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey, the Chechen rebels against Russia, and Indian organizations are among those who have in the last decade intensely built their activities on suicide attacks. Below is a table that demonstrates the number of attacks and the number of people killed by these attacks between 1980 and 2001.

Table 1.1 Suicide Attacks by Terrorist Organizations (1980-2001)

Group	Number of attacks	Number of people kille
LTTE	74	844
Hezbollah	28	659
Hamas	16	162
PKK	9	17
Al Qaeda	6	3329
Chechen Rebels	4	53
Kahsmir Rebels	3	45
Others	39	177

Source: Pape (2003)

The number of suicide attacks has increased from 31 in the 1980s, to 104 in the 1990s, to 53 in 2000-2001 alone (Pape 2003). These figures also show that 50% of total suicide attacks between 1980 and 2003 took place in the last four years.

Another reason that causes increasing interest in suicide terrorism is its higher casualty rate than other conventional methods of terrorism. In addition to several thousand people killed by the 9/11 attacks, showing bluntly how suicide terrorism can be highly lethal, Pape's (2003) calculations, derived from a set of terrorism data published by the U.S. Department of State, show between 1980 and 2001 while suicide attacks represented only 3% of all terrorist attacks they accounted for 48% of total deaths due to terrorism. Moreover, Moghadam (2003), basing his calculations on the statistics of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, states that between 2000 and 2002

suicide attacks represented only 1% of the total Palestinian attacks but they caused about 44% of the Israeli casualties.

Source: Pape (2003)

Figure 1.1 Number of Suicide Attacks

The increasing trend in suicide terrorism and the high rate of casualties it inflicts on its target enemy raises significant questions such as what accounts for the rise in suicide terrorism, what kind of people and groups are involved in it, and what kind of measures should governments take to prevent its future occurrences. In order to provide answers to some of these questions a small number of studies attempt to explore what kind of motivations lie at the source which feeds suicide terrorism. Reviewing the available literature, especially those of scholarly writing, one cannot escape but notice a current debate regarding what motivates suicide terrorism. On one side there are studies (Pape 2003, Sprinzak 2000, Reuter 2002) that perceive suicide terrorism completely and exclusively as an organizational phenomenon, and thus exclude any individual motive as being significant in explaining suicide terrorism. These studies usually concentrate on the political goals of organizations and argue that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic for the organization in order to coerce its enemies and achieve concessions. The scope of these studies regards the individual as the "last link" in the process of suicide terrorism and argues that organizations will almost never face difficulty in finding recruits to sacrifice their lives. On the other side of the spectrum there are studies that do take the individual in account (Merari 1990, Krueger & Maleckova 2003, Atran 2004, Stern 2003) and explore the motivations of the suicide terrorist. Although these studies investigate the significance of factors, such as

education, economic status, and psychological predispositions, the research in this area extends to further explanations like relative deprivation, feelings of revenge, humiliation, and injustice, as well as the appeal of organizations for the individual.

1.1. Research Question

Understandably suicide terrorism is a very complex phenomenon; since the act of killing oneself for a collective purpose is astounding to many. Discussion still seems to be ambiguous in terms of understanding what it is that makes a person, any person, kill himself as well as others in the name of a cause he believes in. Suicide terrorism is especially hard to explain in empirical terms due to lack of data directly collected from suicide terrorists, as when the suicide mission is completed the researcher loses his chance to ask questions. What remains is to investigate their biographies, talk to their families and friends, and with luck try to reach potential suicide terrorists or those whose missions had been left uncompleted. On the other hand however, scholars have come a long way in depicting individual motives through limited ways of collecting data. Profiling suicide terrorists, in terms of education, socioeconomic status, and psychological predispositions have proved worthwhile in explaining the extent of individual motives behind suicide terrorism. Furthermore exploring other individual motives such as political ideology, humiliation, feelings of revenge, relative deprivation, and organizational appeal seem meaningful ways of explaining suicide terrorism.

Regarding suicide terrorism as an organizational phenomenon and explaining it through the motives of the organization seems more straightforward since collecting empirical data on an organization and its motives for embarking on suicide attacks is less challenging than collecting data on deceased terrorists. Consequently, it is conceivable to state that organizational explanations to suicide terrorism sound more convincing due to the strength of empirical research beyond these arguments.

This study aims to find the extent to which both of these two arguments, of individual and organizational motives, can explain the phenomenon of suicide

terrorism. It will also try to examine whether any of the two arguments is more dominant in suggesting plausible explanations to this issue; is either one of the approaches more explanatory or is either one them is not at all significant as some analysts claim? Is it only the manipulation and indoctrination of terrorist organizations that can make any person sacrifice himself for a common cause or are there any significant root causes that propels an individual towards self sacrifice?

The hypothesis in this study suggests that these two arguments need not be regarded as contending theories of understanding suicide terrorism. Although, those scholars who claim suicide terrorism is exclusively an organizational phenomenon argue that individual motives are insignificant, the extent of both arguments can be combined to explain suicide terrorism as a multi-dimensional process. After all, it is not a moment of revelation that a person decides to become a suicide terrorist. It is rather a process, and in this process it is possible to speak of many factors; individual, social, political, economic, and organizational, all of which would have unique implications for different people. Consequently, it may prove useful to break this process down into few stages in order to understand the complex motivational dynamics involved behind a suicide operation.

1.2. Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of this study is to shed light on the motives of suicide terrorism by demonstrating and testing the findings of available research already conducted in this area. This survey aims to portray and explain in detail the contending theories used to explain suicide terrorism and to show that a combination of these explanations are better suited to understand the phenomenon. It also aims to inspire further research dedicated to understanding the motives of suicide terrorism in a multi-dimensional approach. More research is still needed to better understand the individual motivations behind

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[1] The author would like to express her awareness about the problematic usage of the terms "motivation" and "motive". Despite the debate between psychologists and political scientists on these terms, there are no better substitutes to use in the discourse of suicide terrorism. Although the usage of these terms can be criticized as being vague or misleading, they satisfy the intentions of this research.

suicide terrorism, in terms of profiling potential suicide terrorists, the process through which they make a link with terror organizations, and the effects of culturally rooted phenomena, such as martyrdom, sacrifice, and honor, on these individuals.

Despite the intensifying coverage of suicide terrorism, there is still a lack of sensible comprehension of its relevant aspects, especially in the western world. It is still possible to find statements that define suicide terrorism within a limited and shallow narrative such as the work of psychos, a barbaric practice, and wanton cruelty. Studies like the one in hand can persuade people to consider understanding and questioning the aspects of suicide terrorism in more coherent terms. This may in fact help achieve a discourse which may bring western societies closer to understanding the underlying mechanisms of societies and nations where suicide terrorism has recently originated from.

Further research by scholars will also help policy makers in the west to develop better targeted policies in order to counter and prevent suicide terrorism. Heavy bombing of the lands where suicide terrorists and terror organizations are located is obviously not helping much in preventing suicide attacks. Understanding the real propellants of suicide terrorism is essential in addressing the problems before they enter an inevitable path. Coming up with efficient policies is essential in order to implicate necessary measures to prevent further attacks.

1.3. Methodology

This thesis explores the motivations behind suicide terrorism. The complexity of the issue has rendered academic research in this area to be scarce. The available studies investigating the motives of suicide terrorism generally limit themselves to approaching the phenomenon from particular angles, such as one that of organizational or individual motivations. The first line of argument seems to limit itself to the strategic logic of suicide terrorism, a theory which chooses to ignore the individual motives of the suicide terrorist. On the other hand, individual explanations to motives of suicide terrorism are more scattered, and less concrete, mainly due to the difficulty of collecting data on

individual suicide terrorists. Once again, there is a paucity of research which attempts to discuss both angles of the phenomenon in considerable detail.

The hypothesis of this study is that there need not be an exclusive angle to explaining the motives of suicide terrorism. In other words, it may prove useful to develop a multi-dimensional theory to understand the motives of suicide terrorism, which encloses both the organizational and the individual motivations. In order to test this hypothesis, this study will explore two movements that have intensely utilized suicide attacks. The aim of this investigation will be to explore whether one of the two arguments is heavily more dominant than the other, to the extent that the other one can be regarded as insignificant in explaining the motivations apparent in these two organizations. The case study method will be used towards this aim.

1.3.1. Case Studies

King, Keohane & Verba (1994, 44-45) state "case studies are essential for description, and are therefore fundamental to social science" and emphasize that "the development of a good causal hypothesis is complimentary to good description." This thesis will jointly study two cases to describe the motivations of suicide terrorism. Each particular case will be examined to provide insight into the motivations of suicide terrorism and facilitate a testing of the hypothesis explained above. The reason for studying two cases is mostly based on the existence of different characteristics between the cases. It is believed that in contrast to analyzing one case, investigating two cases will lead to better understanding as well as better theorizing and generalizing. It will also be useful to examine whether the hypothesis is valid in one case and not the other. If the hypothesis holds validity in both cases, the analysis towards making generalizations will be strengthened. Although it is preferable to analyze multiple cases of suicide attacks in order to make a more significant generalization, investigating all organizations utilizing suicide terrorism is beyond the scope of this survey.

Two movements will be used as case studies with an aim to test the existence of indications for the theories discussed in the previous chapter. These are Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas),

consecutively originating from Sri Lanka and Palestine. Both of these organizations utilize suicide attacks and have been discussed in detail in the available literature on suicide terrorism.

1.3.2. Method of Research

This survey will implement a collective case study method. Stake (2000, 437) describes this method as "jointly study[ing] a number of cases in order to investigate a phenomenon, population, or general condition" and states that this method is indeed an instrumental case study extended to several cases. In retrospect, an instrumental case study method is the examination of a particular case to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization, with the case being a second interest, it plays a supportive role and facilitates the understanding of the phenomenon in discussion (Stake 2000). The selected cases for this survey will be examined in depth in order to develop an understanding on the subject of this thesis.

The preceding pages portrayed two contending standpoints both of which attempt to explain the motivations for suicide terrorism. In the following chapter these standpoints will be discussed in more detail. Arguments under one of these stances are enclosed by the strategic logic theory, which is discussed and defended strongly by Pape (2003), and supported by other scholars and experts. As will be explained, there are three properties of suicide terrorism that are consistent with the strategic logic explanation: these are: 1) timing of suicide attacks - terrorist organizations choose the timing of the suicide attack campaigns in a strategic manner, i.e. when they can achieve maximum concessions, 2) nationalistic goals - suicide attack campaigns are directed at independence of homeland and are justified by high interests at stake, 3) target selection - suicide terrorism is employed against democratic states, which make vulnerable targets in the eyes of terrorists. The analysis chapter will explore the existence of these properties in the campaigns of the LTTE and Hamas. Accordingly, an exploration of timing strategies, goals of the organizations, and the characteristics of opponents of the two organizations will be examined in detail.

As for the other line of argument that puts the emphasis on the individual in explaining the motivations of suicide terrorism, factors under discussion are profiles of suicide terrorists, significance of relative deprivation, humiliation, and revenge, as well as the benefits and appeals provided by the organizations to the individual suicide terrorists. The existence of these factors among the perpetrators or potential recruits of the two movements will be investigated.

The investigation will be realized through available public resources, such as interviews, surveys realized among Tamils or Palestinians, journalistic and academic studies of the organizations, news reports and articles on the individual suicide terrorists, leaders of the organizations, and the movements themselves. Due to both time and financial limitations, the researcher is unable to collect data through interviewing this population.

1.3.3. Rationale for the Selection of the Cases

The proper selection of cases is important in a case study; first a case should offer an opportunity to learn about the subject under discussion, second the case is expected to represent some population of other cases so that some extent of generalizability is possible, third a case should be accessible (Stake 2000). Also for collective case studies, "balance and variety are important; opportunity to learn is of primary importance" (Stake 2000, 447).

The first case in this study, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers), is a movement, which is a world leader in the number of suicide attacks. Therefore it provides a significant opportunity to explore the properties of a high number of suicide attacks as well as characteristics and motivations of the perpetrators of these attacks. Moreover, this movement is considered to be a secular one, meaning that it does not utilize religious propaganda to recruit members or maintain support within its community, a characteristic which renders the case able to represent other secular movements, such as the PKK, Chechen rebels, and al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Since being the prominent movement among all cases in terms of the intensity of its suicide

attack campaigns, it is an accessible case, in terms of the literature and information available.

The second case is the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), a leader in the number of suicide attacks undertaken in the Middle East. Accordingly, it offers an opportunity to learn about the motivations of suicide terrorism, especially in the Middle East region, where suicide terrorism has recently been utilized intensively by many organizations. Furthermore, in contrast to the LTTE, Hamas makes use of religious propaganda in order to recruit potential suicide terrorists and to appeal to the feelings of its community to maintain the support it receives. Accordingly, it has a potential to represent many other organizations that use religious motives in the same respect. Due to its intensifying use of suicide campaigns against Israel, Hamas has been the center of attraction in the Middle East which makes it an accessible case, with a wide range of books, articles, interviews, news reports that have been published on this movement.

The balance and variety in this collective case study method is assumed to be appropriate, due to the existence of both similarities and contrasts between the two cases. Both cases are prominent in the world of suicide terrorism, providing good opportunity to learn from them. They have a contradicting character in terms of basing their ideology on religion, therefore they collectively constitute a representative population serving the aim of reaching generalizations. Finally, their prominence in suicide terrorism makes both cases accessible, rendering a good description of the motivations of suicide terrorism possible.

1.4. Overview of the Study

The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter II will cover the literature available on suicide terrorism. It will provide definitional explanations for suicide terrorism as well as an historical overview of suicide attacks, both in modern and pre-modern times, also

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[2] The author would like to note that while both the LTTE and Hamas are viewed as terrorist organizations by many nations in the world, they are also viewed as freedom or liberation fighters by other nations and people. The researcher's approach to both cases is that both the LTTE and Hamas are movements that intensively use suicide attacks while she refrains from putting a label on the organizations.

portraying the different societies that have used suicide operations. This will be followed with the description of the benefits of suicide operations for organizations and the strategic logic theory which argues that suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon receiving its motive from the underlying logic it drives from. The last section in Chapter II will delve into explorations that attempt to explain suicide terrorism from the point of the individual terrorist, also including a part on the role of organizations as an appealing factor for the suicide terrorist.

Chapter III will include two case studies; that of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a world leader in suicide terrorism which has embarked on hundreds of suicide operations in Sri Lanka, and the second one of Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), a Palestinian radical Islamic organization, which has executed most of the suicide attacks in Israel, causing more casualties than any other Palestinian organization. The discussion in this chapter will test the explanatory factors of both lines of arguments in the preceding one. This chapter will also provide a critical analysis of the cases and discuss the findings from the case studies.

Finally, Chapter IV will portray the conclusions of the research, as well as limitations of this study and recommendations for future studies.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 What is Suicide Terrorism?

Experts who study suicide terrorism generally agree on the definitional aspects of it; nevertheless they do bring forward cautionary limitations as to which types of actions constitute suicidal attacks. The Congressional Report (2003) on suicide terrorism suggests that among the many phrases that are used to describe the phenomenon the most widely accepted term is "suicide attacks". Other phrases such as "suicide bombings", "genocide bombings", "homicide attacks", and "martyrdom operations" are considered to be restrictive as these emphasize the criminal nature of the violence or approach the issue in relevance to religion rather than the emphasizing the self-inflicted death of the perpetrator.

Despite an overlap in the usage of above mentioned phrases in the literature concerning suicide terrorism, "suicide attacks" and "suicide terrorism" are the two most commonly used and most encompassing terms for the discussion of this phenomenon. This study, also, will follow the common usage of these terms, although other phrases will also be mentioned along the discussion when references are made to more specific acts of suicide terrorism.

Almost all definitions of suicide attacks include the following prerequisites: First, in a suicide attack, the success of the operation cannot occur without the death of the perpetrator (Cronin 2003). Accordingly, such a definition excludes high-risk military operations in which the perpetrator has a chance of survival. The second most important condition has to do with the "willingness of the perpetrator to die". In other-words, the perpetrator, in advance, is completely aware of the fact that he or she does not have any chance of survival. Such an approach makes a distinction between cases in which the perpetrator of the attack dies willingly and those cases where he is unaware of his death being a part of the plan (Dolnik 2003, 19). Furthermore another point of agreement among the students of suicide terrorism is that suicide attacks are carried out by terrorists "by which is meant nonstate actors whose goal is the threat or use of violence for political ends against noncombatant or civilian targets" (Cronin 2003, 2). Another exclusion criterion is when suicide happens to be part of the act of killing others, as in hostage cases where the terrorist kills himself after killing the hostages. Hunger strikes and cult suicides are also not considered as acts of suicide terrorism.

There are four main types of missions that are considered to be suicide attacks according to their modus operandi. These include carrying explosives by the suicide terrorist, using transportation means on land, air, and sea. Carrying explosives, such as bomb-belts or bomb-vests, are the most common means used in suicide attacks since such an attack requires the least planning and monetary spending. The suicide bomber can enter the territory of the enemy by disguising himself in an outfit which also helps to disguise the explosives wrapped around the body. This kind of attack has been used extensively by Palestinian terror organizations, as well as by the PKK in Turkey, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and by other organizations in India and Chechnya (Shay, 2004). Using transportation means on land as a form of suicide attack includes deployment of car bombs, and motorcycle, bicycle, animal, and cart bombs. The most common is the use of car bombs where the car or truck, or any vehicle, containing explosives is driven by the suicide attacker onto the target. The extent of casualties is higher with car bombs than with bombers carrying explosives since vehicles can contain more amounts of explosives to be detonated right onto the target. The Hezbollah was the first group to utilize a car bomb driven by a suicide attacker as a form of suicide attack (Shay 2004). The use of boat and airplane bombs is rarer due to the detailed planning they require to overcome security and technical obstacles. However they have been used many times by organizations and have been extremely successful for these groups both in terms of

casualties and also for the worldwide awe and attention these operations have raised. Among the most prominent examples to these attacks are the detonation of a boat bomb in 2000 near the American destroyer, USS Cole, in Yemen and the September 11, 2001 airplane attacks in the United States.

2.2. Historical Overview of Suicide Attacks

The internationalization of suicide terrorism (especially in the 1990s) and the increasing use of suicide missions in the Middle East by religious movements led to a Western approach towards suicide terrorism presuming that suicide terrorism is exclusive to Muslims and that it is a phenomenon that feeds on the *jihad* (holy war), martyrdom notion in the Quran, and the violence of Muslim people. Although these concepts will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, it is useful to mention some historic accounts and facts which prove that suicide terrorism, although used intensively by Muslim groups recently, is not a phenomenon exclusive to one culture or religion. One important point to mention is that some of the characteristics of historical examples to be accounted in the pages below do not precisely fit within the definition of suicide terrorism provided above. These examples are mentioned with a view to illustrate that sacrificing one's self for a common purpose is not a new phenomenon but has existed as some kind of a protest or a war tactic since the pre-modern times.

The use of suicide as a weapon dates back to almost two thousand years ago to the Jewish sects of Zealots and Sicarii (daggers) in the Roman occupied city of Judea (Atran 2003). Zealots and Sicarii groups were inspired by messianic hopes meaning that those who died in their struggle secured their places in paradise. This objective constituted a 25-year struggle against the large Greek population in Judea (today's Israel and Palestine) and the occupation of governing Romans (Rapoport 1984). Atran (2003), summarizing Josephus' account of the Jewish War, states that the Zealots and Sicarii embarked on suicide dagger attacks in public and in broad daylight against the Jews who collaborated with Romans, against the Greek who settled and desecrated the sacred soil of Israel, and against the Romans who ruled the land. The mass suicide of

hundreds of Sicarii families at the desert of Masada ended their ongoing revolt in 73 A.D. Atran (2003) and Rapoport (1984) both agree that this revolt, although short in time span, left a traumatic impact on Jewish consciousness and caused tragedy to become the central feature of Jewish consciousness until today.

Another historical example of using suicide, not as a mean of terror but rather as protest, is narrated by Armstrong (1992) which takes place in 850 in Cordova, the capital of the then Muslim state of al-Andalus. The events set off when a monk of the Christian community living under the order of Muslims cursed to the Prophet of Islam "as a charlatan, a sexual pervert and Antichrist himself out in the market place (Amstrong 1992, 22). With such an act being a reason for execution, the monk called Perfectus was taken to the *Qadi* (the Islamic judge) who asked him to take the curse back with a promise to forgive him. However, the monk despite being aware of his coming death once again denounced and insulted Muhammad in such crude terms that he had to be executed as according to the law. The monk's denunciation of Muhammad inspired a minority movement among a group of Christians who regarded him as a cultural and religious hero and dismembered his body and began to revere relics of their martyr. More interestingly, the suicidal act of monk Perfectus initiated a movement among these Christians whereby many presented themselves in the court of Qadi also denunciating Muhammad and proving their Christian loyalty by "a suicidal attack on the Prophet" (Amstrong 1992, 22). A total of 50 martyrs, who were argued to be soldiers of God bravely fighting for their faith, died in a period of few months. According to Amrstrong's account these martyrs did not have a single profile but came from all levels of society including men, women, priests, monks, laymen, simple people as well as sophisticated scholars. A common denominator was the feeling of disorientation and confusion which stemmed from the obligation of the Christian community to mix with Muslims or the urge to assimilate with the Islamic culture. This movement, which Armstrong argues can be explained by aggressive and defiant religiosity produced by the loss of culture roots, phased out by the death of a leading priest. In our attempts to understand today's suicide terrorism, Armstrong (1992, 23) directs our attention to this historical period: "Perhaps we should remember the martyrs of Cordova when we feel bewildered by the hostility and rage in some of the Muslim communities in the West and in other parts of the world where Western culture threatens traditional values."

One of the most renown group who have explicitly used suicide terrorism as a weapon to kill enemy are the Assassins, also known as Ismailis-Nizari, who lived between 11th and 13th centuries (Cronin 2003; Lewis 1967; Rapoport 1984). The Assassins are also one of the most thoroughly studied groups, since many of the historical accounts on them, many of which are products of myth and fantasy, have raised interest among historians to investigate their history in scientific methods. Most of the earlier stories about the Assassins are accounts of the crusaders which draw a demonic and drugged picture of this sect. A German chronicler's account from the 12th century, right after the Assassins found their first Crusader victim, is a good example of the earlier interpretations. Talking about the leader of the Assassins the chronicler says,

> This Old Man has by his witchcraft so bemused the men of his country... The most blessed, so he affirms, are those who shed the blood of men and in revenge of such deeds themselves suffer death. ...he intoxicates them with such a potion that they are plunged into ecstasy and oblivion, displays to them by his magic certain fantastic dreams, and promises them eternal possessions of these things. (Lewis 1967, 5)

There are more accounts similar to the German chronicler's, depicting the Assassins as ruthless, bloodthirsty drug addicts, who a in a stealthy manner kill their enemy in a most ruthless way. The earlier accounts like these have also been used to explain the origin of the word 'Assassin', which still seems to remain problematic. Lewis (1967) mentions that the greatest Arabic scholar of 18th century, Silvestre de Sacy, showed that the word Assassin came from the Arabic *hashish,* which means herbage and that the crusading sources used names for the Assassins that were based on the Arabic word *hashshash,* a hashish-taker.

> Silvestre de Sacy, while not adopting the opinion held by many later writers that the Assassins were so called because they were addicts, nevertheless explains the name as due to the secret use of hashish by the leaders of the sect, to give their emissaries a foretaste of the delights of paradise that awaited them on the successful completion of their missions. (Lewis 1967, 12)

Lewis (1967) on the other hand disagrees with Sacy to a certain extent and he claims that the likeliest explanation for the use of this name was the contempt for the wild beliefs and extravagant behavior of the Assassins rather than a description of their practices. Despite many discussions and investigations of the name of this sect, the word assassin is today an entry in dictionaries and is used as a noun in European languages, meaning a killer, especially of a political or religious leader. Furthermore, today we have more realistic and scientific investigations of the Assassins, who are

described as a radical sect in Islam that lived between 1090-1275 and also as one of the best known religious terror groups in history. The Assassins are a branch of the Ismailis, "an important dissident sect, and itself an off-shoot of the Shi'a" (Lewis 1985, 10). In the tenth century, the Ismailis became the greatest power in the Islamic world, as they established the Fatimid Empire, which at its peak included Egypt as its center, and expanded from Syria to North Africa, with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. A century later, due to internal problems in the Empire, the Fatimids faced a swift decline in their power which led to a split in the Ismaaili sect. When in 1094 it was time to choose a new caliph, Nizar or al-Musta'li, the sons of the deceased Caliph al-Mustansir, the Commander of the Armies of Egypt chose al-Mustali and had Nizar killed. This led to a breakup of Ismailis from the Fatimid Empire and the Ismailis in Persia chose to support the Nizaris, who supported Nizar's revolt before he was killed. The Ismaili-Nizaris (the Assassins) entered a renewed activity period at this time under the leadership of Hasan-i Sabbah, a Persian man who brought a new preaching and a new method to the sect. After many travels in Muslim countries, Hasan-i Sabbah spent three years in Egypt in the Fatimid Court, before he departed to northern Persia, where he began to concentrate his attention, especially on the highland region of Daylam (Lewis 1985). Hasan, in a short period of time, succeeded in creating a following among the Shi'ite population around the mountainous region of Northern Persia, acquired the castle of Alamut, established himself as the master of Alamut, won converts and possessed new castles. Under Hasan's leadership, the Ismailis sought to reach their political objectives; "their purpose was to fulfill or purify Islam" (Rapoport, 1984) and in this respect they fought the states of Sunni orthodoxy and the Turkish Seljuk Empire in Persia and Syria. Ismailis achieved their greatest successes in the art of assassination. An assailant - *fidayeen* (consecrated or dedicated ones) - would be chosen in order to kill sovereigns, princes, generals, governors, and religious figures that condemn Ismaili doctrines (Lewis, 1985). The *fida'is* would choose to kill their victims, always with a dagger, in venerated sites and royal courts, and usually on holy days when many witnesses would be present. Such a setting would inevitably prevent any opportunity of escape for the assassin. In any case, "the Assassins prepared the assailant for this circumstance by preventing him from even entertaining the idea that he might survive" (Rapoport 1984, 665). Killing with a dagger guaranteed that the assailant would be captured and killed. A German priest's account from the 14th century is revealing about the way in which the Assassins staged their murder: "Like the devil, they transfigure

themselves into angels of light..., hidden in sheep's clothing, they suffer death as soon as they are recognized" (Lewis 1985, 1). Rapoport (1984) mentions that Assassin education prepared the assailant to become a martyr, who he claims are deeply admired by the Muslims. By the twelfth century, Assassins lost their power as they lacked major intellectual figures and they ceased to pose a threat to the Sunni Islam. They remain in history as a state which for the first time "found its principle raison d'etre in organizing international terror" and used suicidal techniques to fight their enemies (Rapoport 1984, 666).

A more recent example of using suicide attacks by non-Muslim groups is the 19th century Russian revolutionary organization called *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will or People's Freedom). This organization regarded terrorist activities as the best means of forcing political reform and overthrowing the tsarist autocracy in Russia. The group members never refrained from locating themselves in close proximity to their targets in order to assure success, at the same time consciously seeking their own death. In those instances where the terrorist survived and was captured, they usually refused the offer of mercy for information and instead wanted their death (Crenshaw 2001). Among the *Narodnaya Volya* "dying for the cause was a highly valued fate, a source of legitimacy for the cause, and a rallying point for future recruits" (Cronin 2003, 4).

It is hard to ignore the Japanese *kamikaze* in an historical overview of suicide terrorism. Although the kamikazes were not non-state actors but were pilots of Japan, their acts during World War II were obviously suicidal. The kamikaze, meaning divine wind, were young and fairly well educated Japanese suicide attack pilots who deliberately flew their aircraft into the ships of Allied targets towards the end of World War II. The kamikaze were state sponsored, furthermore they were manipulated by the state that convinced these pilots for honor to die like "beautiful falling cherry petals" for their families, fellow pilots, the emperor, and the people of Japan (Atran 2003). Many of these pilots recognized the fact that Japan was not in a position to win this war with conventional warfare. When asked by their commander to volunteer for a collective attack on American ships, nearly 2000 kamikaze flew their fully fueled fighter planes into more than 300 ships, killing 5000 Americans "in the most costly naval battle in U.S. history" (Atran 2003, 1).

The history of modern suicide terrorism dates back to the beginning of 1980s. The majority of literature accepts October 23, 1983 as the turning point in history when "a new type of killing had entered the repertoire of modern terrorism: a suicide

operation in which the success of the attack depends on the death of the perpetrator" (Sprinzak 2000, 66). On this day, there were two simultaneous attacks carried out by the Lebanese Muslim extremist *Hezbollah* (Party of God) organization. One of these attacks destroyed the U.S. marine base near Beirut airport killing 241 off-duty U.S. soldiers and injuring more than 100 others (Cronin 2003). A simultaneous attack on the French peacekeeping compound killed 58 French paratroopers wounding 15 others (Cronin 2003; Sprinzak 2000). Both of these attacks were undertaken by suicide missions that involved volunteers who drove trucks loaded with bombs to the heart of the target area and exploded the bombs killing hundreds of people including themselves. As a result of these strikes American and French forces withdrew from Lebanon, a fact referred to as a solid gain on the part of organizations making suicide missions useful and effective tools for their ends.

There were actually two previous suicide mission occasions that took place before the October 1983 bombings. The one that occurred in December 1981 was the bombing of the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut killing 27 people, an attack claimed by *Al Dawa* (The Call) which is an Iranian-backed Shiia group that sought to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq (Dolnik 2003). Another attack, which is the first suicide attack against Western targets, occurred on 18 April 1983 when a Hezbollah member drove a van loaded with 400 pounds of explosives into the American Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people (Shay 2000).

All of the above mentioned instances, which stand as the first three suicide attacks of modern times, happened in Lebanon between 1981 and 1983. Accordingly, the modern practice of suicide attacks is said to have its roots in Lebanon (Dolnik 2003), the practice subsequently following the Lebanese example penetrated to many other countries, such as Sri Lanka, Turkey, Israel, Algeria, India, Kuwait, Northern Ireland, and Chechnya. Many of the suicide attacks that were employed in these countries targeted domestic conflicts, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s. Suicide attacks have been employed by a large variety of groups; some of these groups were religious, including Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, and Jewish organizations while some were secular such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka and the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) of Turkey.

A development that occurred after the early 1990s is the internationalization of suicide terrorism. The first suicide operation that took place in a foreign land happened in 1992 when a suicide terrorist, with links to Hezbollah, bombed the Israeli Embassy in

Buenos Aires, Argentina (Dolnik 2003). The LTTE also started to use suicide attacks out of Sri Lanka, one of the most memorable being the killing of Rajiv Gandhi, the former prime minister of India, by a belt-bomb girl, an attack that happened in May 1991 in India (Hudson 1999). Some of the later most distinguished events include the 1998 truck bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on U.S.S. Cole in 2000, all of which were acknowledged by the Al Qaeda network.

2.3. Logic of Suicide Terrorism

Pape (2003) claims that suicide terrorism is the most aggressive form of terrorism, as it seeks to kill the largest number of people. He argues that while such a consequence may increase the coercion caused among the enemy to the maximum level, the utilization of a group member as a weapon inflicts a great cost to the terrorists' community, a situation which may bring along the risk of losing support. An important question to answer at this point then is why terrorist organizations are increasingly using this most aggressive and challenging form of terrorism to create coercion.

2.3.1. The Benefits of Suicide Terrorism

The explanation to above question comes in impressively practical answers, which have been pointed out by several experts (Cronin, 2003; Dolnik, 2003; Ganor, 2000; Hoffman, 2003) on suicide terrorism. These explanations constitute of benefits and advantages of suicide attacks compared to other forms of violence and have clear implications related to the practical mechanism of such attacks and concrete consequences thereof making suicide terrorism attractive among terrorist organizations. The first and foremost of these advantages is that suicide attacks inflict the maximum amount of damage, especially in the number of casualties, against the target

enemy. According to Pape's (2003) calculations, derived from a set of terrorism data published by the U.S. Department of State, between 1980 and 2001 while suicide attacks represented only 3% of all terrorist attacks they accounted for 48% of total deaths due to terrorism. Furthermore, Rand Corporation's chronology of international terrorism shows that suicide attacks on average kill four times as many people as other teiTorist acts (as cited in Hoffman 2003, 42). Moreover, Moghadam (2003), basing his calculations on the statistics of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, states that between 2000 and 2002 suicide attacks represented only 1 % of the total Palestinian attacks but they caused about 44% of the Israeli casualties.

The second obvious benefit of suicide attacks is reliability. Even though a suicide attack is usually primitive and simple (Ganor 2000) the fact that it allows for the most appropriate time, place, and circumstances for the attack guarantees the success of the operation. The determined suicide terrorist's capacity to deliver the weapons to targets that would not be possible for someone hoping to stay alive results in a remarkable effectiveness of a suicide attack. The notion that the terrorist is determined to kill himself in order to kill others leads to another attractive aspect which is the elimination of an escape plan. Suicide attacks also remove any risk of capture and interrogation of the perpetrator, which is regarded as an extreme benefit by organizations since this eliminates the risk of passing on of information from the captured terrorist to the security forces, a situation which would harm the organization.

The third, and a striking, advantage of suicide terrorism is its cost effectiveness. Hoffman (2003) claims that it is impressively easy and cheap to create a suicide bomber by using nuts, bolts, screws, metal shards, or any piece of machinery packed together with homemade explosives and then wrapped around the body of a terrorist, the price of which cost no more than $150. The cost will of course be higher for those attacks that require a more complicated preparation, like the September 11 incident, however the cost of few plane tickets and flying license classes still seem minuscule compared to its grand impact. Obviously these expenses exclude the overhead costs of the organization for recruitment, training, and living expenses which result in a much higher level of financial requirements. On the other hand however, monetary rewards to organizations for utilizing suicide attacks can be large, as they can draw sympathy from their community, both locally and from distant lands (Cronin 2003). Hoffman (2003) mentions an instance when a Saudi telethon raised more than $100 million for the Palestinians following a supermarket bombing by an 18 year old Palestinian girl.

Another interesting example is provided by Laquer (2003) where he describes Tamil Tigers having received funds of $150 million annually from the Tamil Diaspora in Canada, Australia, and other countries.

A forth major benefit of suicide attacks is that they create extensive media coverage as they attract more publicity than other types of terrorist attacks. Wide media coverage will facilitate the display of the organization's great determination towards its cause and its inclination of self sacrifice for that cause. Thus the organization draws attention on itself and on its cause, which is a useful method in delivering their message both to their community and to the international community, the latter of which then has to start taking the organization's arguments into consideration. This might also lead to the creation of an image for the organization of committed believers, implying that the present environment that they live in is so humiliating that they find death preferable to life under these conditions (Dolnik 2003).

2.3.2. Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism

All of the aforementioned characteristics constitute a bundle of benefits and advantages of suicide attacks that makes them effective, popular, and attractive tools of violence for organizations. These are practical factors that are highly implicative for the increasing use of suicide attacks. In addition to looking into the benefits and advantages of suicide attacks, one needs to investigate the deeper motivations for their utilization, which is one of the main aims of this research.

In addition to the practical and concrete benefits of undertaking suicide attacks, many experts (Hoffman 2003; Pape 2003; Shay 2004) agree on the proposition that suicide terrorism can be explained by the strategic logic it operates within. More notably, Pape (2003) asserts that earlier studies on the motives of suicide terrorism, mostly concentrating on individual motives such as indoctrination, psychological predispositions, economic or social status of the suicide attacker fail to explain the phenomenon, and therefore excludes the individual in his discussion of suicide terrorism's motivations. Contrasting earlier and current explanations that take the individual suicide terrorist as the starting point with regard to explaining the motives of

suicide terrorism, Pape (2003, 346) discusses in his article entitled "Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism" that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, "one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions."

As mentioned above, one of the most important features of suicide terrorism is the maximum level of damage it inflicts on the target society. The enormity of the casualties causes both physical and psychological inflicting damage on the targeted society, causing enough pain to overwhelm their interest in resisting the terrorists' demands, thus pressuring the state to respond in the form of concessions or retaliations (Cronin 2003). Furthermore, in addition to the immediate panic instigated by a suicide attack, the most intimidating aspect of these attacks is the planting of fear in the society for future ones, which "tear at the fabric of trust that holds societies together" (Hoffman 2003, 40). Journalist Reuter (2002, 81) explains for example that "Israel's citizens have become besieged in their own country", with fear dominating public spaces, expecting an attack at any time; and such conditions turning the country's mood to "one of disappointment, bitterness, and anger but mostly of exhaustion." Hoffman (2003) states that the strategy of suicide terrorists is to make people paranoid and fearful of getting out of their homes, with the hope to compel the enemy society's acquiescence to their demands. As such, Pape (2003) argues that the "coercive leverage" generated by the immediate panic and future fear in the enemy society is the central logic of suicide terrorism's strategy. Furthermore, he explains that it is more the expectation of future damage than the actual damage that overwhelms the target state's interest in the issue of dispute and so to cause it to concede the terrorists' political demands. The logic of coercive punishment, to cause fear for future damage, manifests itself in the statements by the leaders of terrorist organizations. The most illustrious and renowned of such statements is by Osama bin Laden who says, "… to kill the Americans and their allies ... is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country ...We ... call on every Muslim ... to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it (quoted in Sageman 2004, 19).

Pape (2003) argues that the most important indicator of the strategic orientation of suicide terrorists is the timing of initiation and suspension of campaigns of suicide attacks, based on strategic decisions that further attacks would be productive or counterproductive to their purposes. Hezbollah, for example, began its suicide bombings in 1983 in Lebanon, with its major objective of Israeli withdrawal. Suicide

attacks became so effective in Hezbollah's campaign that they continued to use it for two consecutive years until 1985. With the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the decreasing effectiveness of this tactic, the leaders of Hezbollah ordered the end of systematic suicide bombing (Sprinzak 2000). Furthermore, Pape (2003) argues that gained concessions by organizations from their opponents, such as the start of negotiations between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank and release of the Hamas' leader, and withdrawal of American and French forces from Lebanon as a result of Hezbollah's attacks, have served as motivations on the part of organizations to intensify their suicide attack campaigns.

A second factor that justifies the strategic aspect of suicide terrorism is that it is used to achieve nationalistic goals, a highest interest to any group, which justifies the high cost of suicide operations (Pape 2003). According to statistics, every suicide campaign from 1980 to 2001 had as its central objective to coerce the opponent, which has military forces in what coercers see as their homeland, to take those forces out. The first major suicide campaign in the 1980s, initiated by the Hezbollah in Lebonan, aimed at having the American and Israelis withdraw their troops from the country. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have perpetrated more than 200 suicide attacks since 1987, against the Sri Lankan government to create an independent Tamil state. In Turkey, the PKK used suicide attacks from 1996 to 1999 to gain autonomy from the Turkish state. In Israel various movements, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have intensively embarked on suicide attack campaigns to have Israeli forces withdraw from Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Pape (2003) claims even Al Qaeda fits this pattern since their major objective is the expulsion of U.S. troops from the Saudi Peninsula.

A third factor that indicates the logic of suicide terrorism is that terrorist organizations use suicide operations only if the target is viewed vulnerable to punishment. Pape (2003) argues that suicide terrorism is employed against democratic states since they are thought to be especially vulnerable to coercive punishment and are viewed as soft on the grounds that their publics have low thresholds of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state policy. The term "spider-web" introduced by Hezbollah's secretary general Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah implicitly explains how these movements view their opponents as soft societies:

> The Israeli army is strong, Israel has technological superiority and is said to have strategic capabilities, but its citizens are unwilling any longer to sacrifice lives in

order to defend their national interests and national goals. Therefore Israel is a spider-web society: it looks strong from the outside, but touch it and it will fall apart, (cited in Hoffman 2003, 45)

In addition to the strategic logic theory, many experts of suicide terrorism maintain that individuals do not matter as suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon. A suicide terrorist is assumed to be the "last link" in an organization chain and therefore studying the individual motives behind suicide terrorism is futile. Sprinzak (2000) argues that individual suicide terrorists are only pawns of large networks that wage calculated psychological warfare to gain tangible benefits by using suicide attacks and he claims that the struggle against suicide terrorism should not be conducted on an individual level since individual motivations are not significant for the phenomenon. Reuter (2002, 9) also agrees with the inadequacy of the individual models that explain suicide attacks:

> Individual psychological models of interpretation are completely incapable of explaining why these attacks begin at a particular time, and in a particular place; why they spread throughout the world in very specific patterns; and why some militant organizations have employed them while others haven't.

Since the individual has yielded his or her own identity to the terrorist group, the role of the organization is considered a much more powerful factor than is the nature of the individual (Cronin 2003).

In his article titled "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism" Hoffman (2003, 1) claims that "terrorist groups have a strategy-to shrink to nothing the areas in which people move freely -and suicide bombers, inexpensive and reliably lethal, are their latest weapons." In his New York Times article published on March 31st, 2002, journalist Thomas Friedman states,

> Palestinians have adopted suicide terrorism as a strategic choice, not out of desperation. This threatened all civilization because if suicide bombing is allowed to work in Israel, then like hijacking and airplane bombing, it will be copied and will eventually lead to a bomber strapped with a nuclear device threatening entire nations. That is why the whole world must see this Palestinian suicide strategy defeated. (Friedman 2002, 218)

The above arguments approach the issue of suicide terrorism from the rationale of the organization. All of the practical benefits of suicide terrorism in comparison to other methods are valid motives for the organization. Furthermore, coercive logic being the central motive of suicide terrorism, strongly defended by Pape and previously and later stressed by others, denies any role to the individual suicide terrorists and his or her

predispositions thereof. Accordingly, it would not be wrong to define the theory of strategic logic as one that describes suicide terrorism as an organizational phenomenon, and not one of the individual.

2.4. What are the Motives of Suicide Terrorists?

Besides those analysts who define suicide terrorism solely as an organizational concept, there are others that put the emphasis more on the individual when studying the underlying motives of suicide terrorism. On the other hand, these studies, previous and recent, do not rule out the significance of organizational appeal as an explanatory factor, but frequently treat it as one of the important motives for the individual terrorist. As will be seen in the discussion below, the study of individual aspects regarding the motivations of suicide terrorism is not limited to profiling the suicide attackers in terms of education, economic status, and psychological predispositions. Available research has advanced to develop further explanations for individual motives, such as relative deprivation, feelings of humiliation and revenge, and the helplessness caused by injustice. Experts agree that these are important factors which act as motivations for an individual to become a suicide attacker.

One of the first studies done on the motives of suicide terrorism dates back to 1990, to the article of Ariel Merari entitled "The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East". A prominent argument raised in this article is that terrorist suicide is an individual concept rather than a group phenomenon, "it is done by people who wish to die for personal reasons. The terrorist framework simply offers the excuse (rather than the real drive) for doing it and the legitimation for carrying it out in a violent way" (Merari 1990, 206). Although Merari has revised the extent of his emphasis of the organizational aspect of suicide terrorism in later years, his work has been inspiring for those studying the motives of suicide terrorism, channeling them toward investigating individual motives.

Furthermore, factual examination of thirty-six cases of suicidal terrorist attacks registered between 1983 and 1986 in the Middle East has enabled Merari (1990) to

reach conclusions on the constituents of suicide terrorism. These conclusions indicate that culture in general and religion in particular seem to be relatively unimportant in the phenomenon of terrorist suicide and that personal factors seem to play a crucial role in suicidal terrorism. Although these personal factors are not clearly spelled out in his study, due to the impossibility of studying terrorists' personal characters after their death, a broken family background is mentioned as an important constituent. Merari (1990) also mentions that the use of intragroup commitment may serve as an effective tool for inducing serial suicide attacks, a notion which has been examined in a deeper fashion by more recent studies. Merari (1990) is also one of the first scholars to approach the religious indoctrination aspect of suicide terrorism in a more neutral manner, than that of other hasty perceptions of suicide terrorism as religious fanaticism, arguing that in most of the cases the perpetrators sacrificed themselves in the name of a nationalistic rather than a religious idea.

2.4.1. Profiling Suicide Terrorists: Socioeconomic Conditions and Psychological Predispositions

More than a decade after Merari's article, Alan B. Krueger, a professor of economics and public policy at Princeton University, and Jitka Maleckova, an associate professor of Middle Eastern studies at Charles University in Prague have published a working paper on the root causes of terrorism. In this study, Krueger and Maleckova perform a detailed analysis of participation in Hezbollah in Lebanon, comparing the background characteristics of 129 group members who died in action between 1980s and early 1990s to the Lebanese population in general. Their main aim in this analysis was to find, if any, the correlation of poverty and poor education to terrorism. According to the data, the 33% poverty rate for the Lebanese population drops to 28% among Hezbollah militants and 38% secondary school attendance rate for the population increases to 47% for the terrorists. Their findings indicate that "poverty is inversely related, and education positively related, to the likelihood that someone becomes a Hezbollah fighter" (Krueger and Maleckova 2003, 3). In their general conclusions, evaluating the findings of their analysis, Krueger and Maleckova argue that affluent and educated

people can be more inclined towards suicide terrorism since they may care more about the political goals of their organizations, as high level of education is indicative of one's commitment to a cause as well his ability to undertake an operation. Moreover, with individual economic gains also not being the driving motives of suicide terrorists, they suggest the primary motivation is the suicide terrorist's passionate support for the ideas and aims of their movements. The findings of Krueger and Maleckova contradict the common misconception, among the western public, politicians, and the media, that portray terrorists under a common profile of poor and uneducated individuals. Supporting the findings of Krueger and Maleckova, other researchers, Basel Saleh and Claude Berrebi, also reach results in two other independent surveys which show that majority of Palestinian suicide bombers have a college education versus only 15% among the general public and that only less than 15% of suicide terrorists come from poor families where as more than 30% of the population lives under poor conditions (Atran 2004).

A recent research by Sageman (2004) examines today's global Salafi Jihad movement based on the biographies of 172 terrorists under the Al Qaeda network majority of whom are from Saudi Arabia and the rest from other Middle Eastern countries, with a few from England, Canada, and the U.S. Even though every one of these *mujahedin,* as called in the research, are not suicide terrorists themselves, most of them live with the acknowledgement that one day it may be their turn to become a martyr for the goals of their organization. Keeping this in mind, the findings of Sageman (2004) are illuminating in order to understand who these people are. His conclusions include that about three-fourths of global Salafi mujahedin are solidly upper or middle class, over 60% have had at least some college education (more educated than the average person worldwide) and there is a high rate of 73% of marriage among them (Sageman 2004).

In agreement, anthropologist Scott Atran (2004) also claims that poverty and lack of education are not among the root causes of suicide terrorism. In response to another common misconception that suicide terrorists are crazed fanatics that suffer major psychological disorders, Atran (2004, 76) further argues that not only suicide terrorists "on the whole have no appreciable psychopathology" but they also are "often wholly committed to what they believe devout moral principles." A congressional report entitled "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist

and Why?" used by the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Intelligence Agency in the U.S., concludes that

> ...there is little reliable evidence to support the notion that terrorists in general are psychologically disturbed individuals. The careful, detailed planning and well-timed execution that have characterized many terrorist operations are hardly typical of mentally disturbed individuals. (Hudson 1999, 30)

Sageman (2004) provides a detailed study of psychological explanations for the global jihad movement accepting the fact that lack of empirical data and the difficulty of collecting it usually leave this field open to speculations. The survey results of group members' selected biographical fragments indicate that most of the mujahedin have had normal childhoods, perpetrators of September 11 attacks had not shown any signs of belligerence, and that mental illness fails as an explanation for suicide terrorism (Sageman 2004). Furthermore, testing the claim that terrorists suffer from some form of personality pathology due to childhood trauma, mujahedin seem to have been ordinary good kids without any indication of antecedents of a narcissistic personality disorder, they had surprisingly little personal trauma in their lives and no pattern of paranoid personality disorder or lifestyle before joining the jihad (Sageman 2004).

These findings prove that an effort to create a common profile of suicide terrorists, in terms of education, economic, and psychology patterns is not viable. As for socioeconomic explanations for suicide bombings, surveys show that contrary to common misconceptions of suicide terrorists as poor, ignorant, uneducated brainwashed individuals, these people in general are educated and not poor. Furthermore, experts seem to agree that the problem of collecting empirical data on suicide terrorists constitutes a significant problem in identifying a common psychological predisposition for suicide terrorists. Nevertheless studies that have been realized so far suggest "there [is] no psychological profile for terrorism... [and that the] personal pathology thesis is not relevant to global Salafi jihad" (Sageman 2004, 91) as well as other movements that utilize suicide terrorism.

2.4.2. Relative Deprivation, Humiliation, and Revenge

Within their concluding remarks Krueger & Maleckova (2003, 5) especially address western policy makers in the sense that viewing terrorism as a response to poverty or ignorance is mistaken, instead they suggest terrorism is viewed as "a response to political conditions and longstanding feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economic circumstances." In addition to this arguement, Atran (2004) claims that many Muslims who support either Al Qaeda or Hamas despise U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Even the congressional report mentions that there is a clear correlation between suicide attacks and concurrent events and developments in the Middle Eastern area. Studies by both Atran (2004) and Krueger & Maleckova (2003) emphasize the fact that supporters of terrorist organizations involved in suicide terrorism are in fact not against American or Israeli principles of governance, i.e. individual liberties, democracy, human rights, but are opposed to their policies in the Middle East, and that this opposition serves as a motivation for suicide terrorism both at the societal and at the individual level. Atran (2004) states that especially the war in Iraq has energized many groups to embark on new suicide attack campaigns. A U.S. Defense Department Science Board Report stated that "historical data show a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States" (as cited in Atran 2004, 74). Atran (2004) also suggests that there is a direct correlation between U.S. military aid to politically corroded or ethnically divided states, human rights abuses by those regimes, and the rise in terrorism. Sageman (2004) on the other hand argues that the 1990-1991 Gulf War bringing U.S. troops to the Arabian Peninsula was interpreted as "an infidel invasion of the Land of the Two Holy Places", and that local movements that started spontaneously as a result of the resentment against the west was coordinated and supported by al Qaeda, breathing new life into the movement. The words of al-Zawahiri (as cited in Sageman 2004, 21), the second strongest man in al Qaeda, are representative of how the perception of western foreign policy in the Middle East can have an energizing role in terms of terror:

> The fact that must be acknowledged is that the issue of Palestine is the cause that has been firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation from Morocco to Indonesia for the past 50 years. In addition, it is a rallying point for all the Arabs, be they believers or non-believers, good or evil.

In line with the role of resentment against western foreign policies in the Middle East, the theory of relative deprivation conferred by some analysts seems to bring a valid explanation to suicide terrorism. Atran (2004, 78) claims that,

> ...recruitment for suicide terrorism occur[s] not under conditions of political repression, poverty, and unemployment or illiteracy as such but when converging political, economic, and social trends produce diminishing opportunities relative to expectations, thus generating frustrations that radical organizations can exploit.

Ted Gurr defines relative deprivation as "actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities", in other words "perceived discrepancies between expectations and capabilities with respect to any collectively sought value-economic, psychosocial, political-constitute relative deprivation" (Gurr 1968, 252-253). Gurr's basic premise is that "the necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation" (Gurr 1968, 252). The relative deprivation theory in general claims that in line with political developments, such as fair and free elections, peace negotiations, end of authoritarian regimes or dictatorships, people's aspirations and expectations for their lives also increase. However, when such political developments fail to succeed, followed by economic stagnation and social unrest, it results in diminishing opportunities for the future. Examples to such failed processes are many; such as the cancelled multiparty elections in Algeria in 1992, breakdown of Oslo peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine, and the denial of autonomy to Chechnya after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Atran 2004). Sageman (2004) also emphasizes relative deprivation as an important condition for joining a revivalist terrorist movement, especially for those who have left their homes to live in western countries with heightened expectations but have become isolated, lonely, and emotionally alienated, resulting in frustration caused by their situation of relative deprivation. The theory of relative deprivation can also be explanatory for the fact that suicide terrorists are in general more educated and well-off than the average society that they come from. Atran (2004, 78) explains that these people "increasingly experience frustration with life as their potential opportunities are less attractive than their prior expectations... and suicide terrorism gives some perceived purpose to act altruistically, in the potential terrorist's mind, for the welfare of a future generation."

In addition to the relative deprivation theory, the feeling of revenge also receives considerable attention from experts as a driving factor for individual suicide terrorists.

Atran (2004) mentions a study undertaken by Basel Saleh, who observed that a majority of Palestinian suicide bombers had friends or relatives who had been arrested or injured by Israel's army, causing a feeling of revenge that in turn motivates violence. Furthermore, Cronin (2003) points out that there seems to be an increasing number of women who undertake suicide attacks in recent years. This trend is explained by the wish to take vengeance for their loved one's violent death among widows or mothers, who have been left with a sense of hopelessness and grief by the loss of their family members. The increasing number of Chechen women who embark on suicide attacks is another good example of revenge driven explanations. Recently, there have been numerous attacks involving Chechen female suicide terrorists, who are called black widows, against Russian targets. Cronin (2003, 14) states that "the motivations for female Chechen suicide attackers are reported to be often related to the deaths of husbands, brothers, fathers and sons at the hands of Russian forces."

Continuous humiliation and injustice inflicted on one's community, ethnic group, or society are also seen as driving factors for suicide terrorism. Atran (2004) states that humiliation is among the most consistent sentiments expressed by recruits of suicide attacks. A survey data collected by Khalil Shiqaqi, from Center for Palestinian Research and Study, shows that humiliation caused by Israeli checkpoints that Palestinians have to pass through regularly may be positively correlated with the support for suicide attacks (as cited in Atran 2004). It should also be noted here that in suicide terrorism, "the coercer is the weaker actor and the target is the stronger" (Pape 2003, 346). Although Pape (2003) defines the coercer as the terrorist organization, individual members of the coercing party are also the weaker side, vis-a-vis their opponents, and the helplessness of being weak when combined with humiliation and injustice can have important implications on an individual to become a suicide terrorist. In an interview, Scott Atran's last words concluded that suicide terrorism emerged "when ideologically devoted people find that they cannot possibly obtain their ends in a sort of fair fight, and when they know they are in a very weak position" (Glausiusz 2003, 2).

2.4.3. Organizational Appeal as a Motive

As the previous discussion attempted to depict, the theory of strategic logic defines suicide terrorism as an organizational aspect, arguing that individual motives are insignificant where as the rationality of the terrorist organization, to use suicide attacks as a strategic weapon, is the main propellant of suicide terrorism. On the other hand, experts that explain the motivational aspects of suicide terrorism with an emphasis on the individual terrorist treat the organizational aspect of suicide terrorism as one of the other, but significant, factors.

Understanding the appeal of terrorist organizations for the suicide terrorist requires an overview of the process through which an individual joins an organization. As mentioned before, and by many analysts, the decision to embark on a suicide operation is usually not a momentary enticement. It is rather a process through which an individual is propelled towards such an action, including his recruitment by a terrorist organization and the kind of path he follows within it. Moghadam (2003, 69) calls the latter part of this process "the institutional phase" where the individual, coming entirely under the control of the organization, is indoctrinated and trained to execute a planned suicide attack.

Sageman (2004, 99) mentions that despite the impossibility of depicting a common profile for al Qaeda terrorists, there is one common element among them which is the fact that they have made a link to the terrorist organization. Similarly, most suicide terrorists in general execute suicide operations through joining a network. It is important to note here that not every suicide terrorist has a concrete decision to embark on a suicide attack from the very beginning, but goes through a motivational phase that propels him toward becoming one. During the "institutional phase" these motivations are generally strengthened by the training, indoctrination, encouragement, and support the individual receives from the organization. Accordingly, organizational appeal can be motivating for an individual, before he joins the group, through the public appearance of the organization, and also during the institutional phase, after the individual joins the organization. Since some of these factors are relevant for both stages, the discussion below will be simultaneous.

The organizations undertake a well calculated propaganda of their ideology that renders society support for suicide attacks effective which in turn increases the pool for

new recruits. The leaders of these organizations, using the media and the internet highly efficiently, declare statements aiming to deliver the message of the core ideology of the group to its supporting community helping to increase the motivation of members, as well as serving to energize the support base. The renowned declarations by Osama bin Laden, as video tapes or written fatwas, make their way immediately to the public through televisions and the internet which discuss in detail the political ideology of al Qaeda, as well as include timely reactions to the actions of western countries, calling people all around Muslim lands to join the jihad. In addition to frequent declarations, terrorist organizations also deliver and propagate their messages in more elaborative ways such as books or meetings. A good example is a book written by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the top aid to bin Laden, entitled "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner" which elaborates the global Salafi Jihad. In this book Zawahiri puts jihad struggle into conceptual, historical, and religious framework and brings it to date by describing the injustices being done to the Muslim people and explain what should be done in order to stop this.

> The masters in Washington and Tel Aviv are using the regimes to protect their interest and to fight the battle against the Muslims on their behalf....the Jewish-Crusade alliance, led by the United States, will not allow any Muslim force to reach power in any of the Islamic countries. It will mobilize all its power to hit it and remove it from power. Toward that end, it will open a battlefront against it that includes the entire world. It will impose sanctions on whoever helps it, if it does not declare war against them altogether. Therefore, to adjust to this reality we must prepare ourselves for a battle that is not confined to a single region, one that includes the apostate domestic enemy and the Jewish-Crusade external enemy. (as cited in Sageman 2004, 23)

In order to mobilize people around their political ideology, these organizations provide services among their support community to preach, educate, and indoctrinate potential recruits. The words of al-Zawahiri are again enlightening in this respect, as he states,

> We must win the people's confidence, respect and affection. The people will not love us unless they feel that we love them....We must not blame the nation for not responding or not living up to the task. Instead we must blame ourselves for failing to deliver the message, show compassion, and sacrifice. (as cited in Sageman 2004, 21).

Effective dissemination of ideology undertaken by these movements serves their purpose at two levels; 1) to create and increase support among the public as well as to recruit new members with the appeal of political messages conveyed addressing grievances, humiliation, and the feeling of revenge already existent among people, 2) to

continue keeping an individual attached to the network through indoctrination and energize the member towards the final goal of embarking on a suicide mission.

Another appealing aspect used by terror organizations is the "celebratory process" prepared for the suicide terrorist before his mission. This custom is common among many organizations dignifying the suicide mission candidate before launching his or her attack, granting him a glorified position, albeit shortly, among his community. Such customs include the organization of a glorious and crowded funeral after the mission is completed, putting pictures of the suicide attacker at public places with joyful reactionary words, circulation of posters and leaflets carrying names and photographs. The individual who is about to embark on his mission usually enjoys a celebratory meal with the leader, and leaves behind a farewell letter and a videotape, to be shared with his community and relatives after death, eventually becoming a "living martyr" in the eyes of his community. All these celebratory events not only further motivate the individual for his mission but also "makes it virtually impossible to back out of an attack without losing honor and a place in society" (Cronin 2003, 11). The kind of glory earned before and after death can be motivating for many other individuals within the community to join the organization for an opportunity of earning the same glory.

In addition to the glory earned by the individual, a suicide terrorist's mission will also provide his or her family not only glory, but also financial benefits. The social status of the family will be elevated within their community which views them as having lost a martyr at war. The family will receive several thousand dollars from the terrorist organization to compensate for their loss. Such a financial compensation has sometimes involved third parties like Saddam Hussein, raising the stake of financial benefit. Although the issue of financial benefits to the suicide bomber's family is generally mentioned as an individual motive for suicide terrorism, it does not seem to be one of the most significant explanations, especially in light of the findings that suicide terrorists are usually not economically deprived people.

Many analysts have emphasized the network characteristics of terrorist organizations that use suicide terrorism. Scott Atran and Marc Sageman are among those experts who have elaborated on the importance of group dynamics among individual terrorists. Sageman (2004, 135), having studied the process of an individual joining al Qaeda and the social networks within the organization, claims that social bonds among the group members "facilitate the process of joining... through mutual emotional and social support, development of a common identity, and encouragement to

adopt a new faith", adding that as in all intimate relationships in-group love serves as the glue in the group. In his survey Sageman shows that the al Qaeda network operates in "cliques" which are dense, small networks of friends who usually reflect common backgrounds in terms of education, family background, wealth, and beliefs. Scattered around the world, they live or spend most of their time together, discussing ideology, politics, and goals of the organization at large. Sageman (2004, 153-154) argues that cliques play a significant role in "transforming potential contributors into full-fledged mujahedin" since they serve "as the social mechanism that puts pressure on prospective participants, defines a social reality for the ever more intimate friends, and facilitates the development of a shared collective social identity and strong emotional feelings for the in-group." The anthropologist Atran (2004, p.79) elaborates on the phenomenon of the tightly knit, small, closeted cells explaining that they are purposely formed by terrorist organizations as a "family of cellmates who are just as willing to sacrifice one another as a parent for a child." According to Atran organizations create these tightly knit brotherhoods to create a fictive family based on the theory of "kin altruism, the theory that individuals are willing to sacrifice their lives to save closely related kin" (Glausiusz 2003, 3).

2.4.5. Is Religion a Motive?

Although the role of religion, especially of Islam, is deeply discussed in the literature covering suicide terrorism, it is important to note most experts agree on the view that suicide terrorism is not exclusive to any one religion. There are many instances in the far and near history, some of which has been discussed in earlier sections, which show the existence of suicide attacks among people who are not Muslims. In the modern history of suicide terrorism the world's leader in the number of suicide attacks undertaken is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, an organization whose ideology is based neither on religion nor on Islam. Furthermore even in the Middle East many of the suicide attack campaigns were undertaken by secular organizations, such as the al-Aksa Martyrs' Brigade. However, the increasing rate of using suicide operations by

Islamic groups, especially recently by the al Qaeda network, renders the discussion of religious interpretations necessary.

Perceptions of suicide terrorism, especially in the west, construct an inevitable correlation between Islam and suicide terrorism, which accordingly lead to media reports, television programs, and even extensive books that illustrate suicide terrorism to receive its motivation mainly from Islam, overlooking most of the other significant factors for the phenomenon. While the role attributed to Islam as a motivational factor for suicide terrorism cannot be overlooked, this research will treat it as an element that is used, to the level of manipulation, by organizations to legitimize and justify their actions, as well as to exploit people's religious beliefs in order to gain confidence and support.

"Whereas the Western culture uses the term suicide operations, Islamists refer to the phenomenon as *Istishad* (martyrdom) and self sacrifice in the name of Allah" (Dolnik 2003, 22). Using the term martyrdom is naturally preferred by Muslim clerics since suicide is strictly forbidden by the Quran. An example to set the point is of Sheikh Yussuf Al-Qaradhawi's (a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood) statement where he warns "he who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit" but "he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation" (as cited in Atran 2004, 76). In such an understanding although a suicide operation requires the death of the *shahid* (martyr), it is not the goal of the operation, it is rather self-sacrifice in the *jihad* (holy war) against the enemy.

Shay (2004) mentions that Imam Khomeini and other Shiite clerics were the first individuals to pass a religious ruling permitting self sacrifice on behalf of Islam encouraging the Shiites in Iran against Iraq and in the Lebanese arena in the 1980s. In later years, leaders of other organizations declared that a suicide bomber should not be considered as a person who committed suicide for personal reasons but rather as a shahid who fell for jihad. Although Islamic scholars continue to debate the legitimacy of suicide attacks, Shay (2004, 9) claims that "moderate Islamic religious establishments have been forced to change their stand from total opposition to qualified support."

Despite certain reservations among Islamic clerics about the phenomenon of suicide operations, organizations continue to use martyrdom in full fledged manner as a way to motivate and legitimize suicide attacks. Leaders of these organizations, who are themselves usually religious figures, develop a system of rewards to encourage potential

martyrs which promises the shahid to receive the blessings of Muslim clerics and an eternal life in paradise. It is even argued that suicide attackers "have left behind the traditional interpretations of religion in order to exploit only selected aspects of religion (Reuter 2002, 16). Furthermore, "juxtaposing western cowardice with Muslim courage" prevails a readiness and a willingness to die contrary to the death fearing infidels (Shay 2004). Atran (2003) claims that such a religious indoctrination by organizations seems crucial to creating intimate cells of fictive kin whose members commit to willingly die for each other.

On top of all this, Dolnik (2003, 22) mentions that in fact "any religion has the potential of being used to justify suicide tactics because the ideas of sacrifice and martyrdom are focal points of religiosity itself." In fact, it is also possible to claim that these ideas have become so universal that religion may not be necessary to motivate such instincts. Cronin (2003, 7) mentions that "the tradition of heroic martyrdom, where the hero sacrifices to save the life of his community, nation, or people, is a powerful element in many secular traditions." This may explain why suicide terrorism is such a major phenomenon in secular groups such as the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades.

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Overview of Case Studies

3.1.1. Case I: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Hudson (1999), in a Library of Congress report, recognizes the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (also referred to as LTTE or Tamil Tigers) as the world's deadliest and fiercest group and as the only organization that has realized the assassination of three heads of government; former prime minister of India Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, president of Sri Lanka Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993, and former prime minister of Sri Lanka Dissanayeke in 1994. In addition to these assassinations, all of which were suicide attacks, the LTTE has attempted to undertake suicide missions with an aim to kill many other prominent politicians in Sri Lanka, such as the Sri Lankan presidential candidate Chandrika Kumaratunga, who has survived the attack with major injuries. Since its foundation in 1976, the LTTE's main goal has been to create a separate Tamil homeland in eastern and northern provinces of Sri Lanka, which still is not established to this day. The available sources on the LTTE provide varying statistics on the number of suicide

operations the group has carried out so far; from 74 attacks between 1980 and 2001 (Pape 2003) to over 200 attacks since 1987 (Dolnik 2003), while most of the data concentrates on the upper end of this spectrum.

The island of Sri Lanka, which lies just in the south of India, has a population composed of a majority of Sinhalese who constitute 74 percent of the total and a minority of Tamils making up around 18 percent, which is then subdivided into Sri Lankan Tamils (12.6 percent) and Indian Tamils (5.6 percent) (Tambiah 1996). The majority of Sri Lankan Tamils live in the northern and eastern parts of the island, heavily concentrated in the northern part of Jaffna peninsula, where they have been settled for several thousands of years. The "plantation" or Indian Tamils, on the other hand, reside in the central areas of Sri Lanka (Joshi 1996). There are other Indian Tamils, who live in southern India, mainly in the state of Tamil Nadu, the initial location from where the Tamil Diaspora has originated. The religion of Tamils (most are Hindu) and the Tamil language set them apart from the majority Sinhalese who are largely Buddhist and Sinhala speaking people (CFR n.d.). This ethnic mix among the Sri Lankan population and the related politics which have caused an increasing rift between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority lie at the source of Tamil militancy.

Despite the apparent tension between the two groups in the earlier years, ethnic problems in Sri Lanka have intensified after the island's independence from the British colonial rule in 1948. The new parliament passed The "Ceylon Citizenship Act" in the same year, depriving a million Tamils of Indian origin from citizenship, which was followed with amendments that deprived the Tamils of their franchise as well (Tambiah 1996). In 1956, the government enacted the "Sinhala Only Law" which abolished the use of Tamil as an official language in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, in 1970s, the government of Bandaranayake introduced standardization of education policy which required higher marks from Tamil students for university admissions (Joshi 1996).

The enforcement of anti-Tamil measures by subsequent Sinhalese governments caused enormous turbulence among the Tamil minority, which were not only attributable to political powers but also to the general Sinhalese population. Tamils have been victims of the violence initiated by the Sinhalese, the most significant of which took place in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981, and 1983 (Tambiah 1996). During the riots of 1983, noted as the most violent and extensive, thousands of Tamils were killed, thousands were displaced from their homes and settled in refugee camps in Tamil Nadu,

and many Tamil business establishments were destroyed (Tambiah 1996). Much of the occurrences were deployed by civilian Sinhalese against civilian Tamils as a reaction to the killing of thirteen soldiers of the Sri Lankan Army by the Tamil insurgents. Tambiah (1996) claims that certain Sinhala politicians, as well as organized crime figures, and businessmen seeking to eliminate Tamil rivals were involved in directing and manipulating the violence, while the Sri Lankan security forces stood by during the riots.

Already during the 1960s and 1970s, many reactionary groups among the Tamils had started to organize against the Sri Lankan governments. Demands towards an independent Tamil state to be established in the north and eastern part of Sri Lanka surfaced during these years. Besides some Tamil political parties, such as the Federal Party (Matthews 1986), that chose to implement their struggle in the parliamentarian framework, most groups organized as militant alternatives. Even though the number of these militant groups is quoted to have reached more than thirty, five major organizations took the lead during the 1970s: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Liberation Front, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization, the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students, the Peoples' Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (Mathhews 1986).

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was established in 1976 by a young man named Valupillai Pirabhakaran who had been involved in many of the radical groups, but founded his own organization following his assassinating the Tamil mayor of Jaffna (Joshi 1996) and a successful bank robbery, achievements that provided prominence and financial opportunity to Pirabhakaran to start his own movement (Manoharan n.d.). The LTTE turned out to be the most ferocious among militant Tamil groups and the only one to utilize suicide operations, although their first suicide mission was accomplished more than a decade after its foundation. On the other hand, however, suicide has been a common practice in the group since the beginning, with the renowned cyanide capsules carried by group members. This custom came into use as a result of the capture of LTTE's several senior members in 1981, who through interrogation revealed information to the security forces about the organization (Gunaratna 2000). In order to prevent this from happening again, the LTTE leadership decided that each group member carry a cyanide capsule, small glass tube containing potassium or sodium cyanide, so that an LTTE fighter consumes this capsule at risk of being injured or captured.

The 1983 riots, mentioned above, served as a key impetus to Tamil militancy, which led to thousands of refugees fleeing to India and settling in Tamil Nadu (Joshi 1996). This has also been an important turning point as it led to the involvement of India in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict as many of the Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, were trained and sustained by Indian intelligence agencies. Joshi (1996) argues that the motives India had in supporting the activities of Tamil militants was based on satisfying Tamil minority in the south Indian state of Nadu. According to opinion polls conducted by Indian newspapers, only a minority of Tamil Nadu considered the LTTE to be terrorists while more than 45 percent viewed them as freedom fighters, and likewise 45 percent supported the demand for an independent Tamil state (Hellmann 1988). On the other hand, however, the Indian attitude took a shift in 1984 due to disturbing occurrences on the part of militant Tamils, which led the Indians to start playing an "honest broker between the Tamils and the Sinhala-dominated government of Sri Lanka" (Joshi 1996, 24).

During these years, between 1983 and 1986, the LTTE used the assistance provided by Indian organizations very efficiently and became acknowledged as the most powerful and influential group among all Tamil militants, establishing itself as a party, representing the majority of Sri Lankan Tamils, besides India and Sri Lanka. Since its establishment, it has been able to institute itself as the most independent organization, strengthening its ideology of Tamil nationalism. A majority of Tamil Sri Lankans supported the LTTE, despite its fierce actions, because they were the most nationalist among all militants, as the group never lost any of its determination towards an independent Eelam (homeland, Tamil name for Sri Lanka (Kapferer 1988)). Many references can be found in the LTTE literature to the "ancient glory of the Kingdom of Jaffna, Tamil tradition, culture and language, and the Tamil homeland, all of which need to be preserved and protected from the Sinhalese" (Hellmann 1988, 612). All cadres of the LTTE have been carefully indoctrinated with Tamil nationalism based on the position that they are fighting against a discriminatory Sinhala majority for a separate Eelam for which fighters should "banish all fear of death from their minds and be prepared to lay down their lives fighting the government forces, or consume the cyanide pill fastened around their necks when capture is imminent" (South Asia Terrorism Portal n.d.). Throughout 1986, the LTTE, having prospered under the Indian assistance in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, started criticizing India by "denouncing Rajiv Gandhi's weak stand and India's failure to help the Tigers" (Hellmann 1988,

608). When Rajiv Gandhi publicly declared that "the most that the Ceylon [Sri Lankan] Tamils might aspire to would be a Sri Lanka styled on the Indian federal model, in which they might enjoy a state or union territories status" (Matthews 1986, 40), he lost credibility among the LTTE which accepted this declaration as an insult to their main aspiration of an independent Tamil state. At the end of 1986, the LTTE leader Prabhakaran left India to return to Jaffna for good, a departure which stands as a turning point after which the insurgency of Tamil Tigers took more hostile forms, both towards India and Sri Lanka's Sinhalese majority. Just around the time of Prabhakaran's return to Jaffna, the Sri Lankan armed forces started Operation Liberation I with an aim to destroy militancy which had reached intolerable levels of atrocities in northern Sri Lanka. The first suicide attack of Tamil Tigers occurred during this period as a reaction to Sri Lankan armed forces' large scale operations in Jaffna with the objective of preventing the Sri Lankan troops from advancing further in the Jaffna peninsula. This suicide attack was conducted in June 1987 by an LTTE member called Millar who volunteered to drive a truck filled with explosives into an army camp of the Sri Lankan forces, an event which caused the death of forty government troops and many other physical and material damages (South Asia Terrorism Portal n.d.). Millar "was posthumously raised to the rank of 'captain' by the LTTE in recognition of his act" (Gunaratna 2001).

Just one month later, India decided to become a party in the conflict, mostly due to the increasing demands from Indian Tamils to intervene in Sri Lanka to end the hostilities. Joshi (1996) argues that one of the real underlying aims of India's intervention in Sri Lanka was India's caution to prevent the aggressive assertion of a Tamil identity in Sri Lanka from having a reflex influence in Tamil Nadu. The second actual aim of India was to ensure keeping foreign powers out of Sri Lanka in order to extend its own geopolitical significance. Accordingly, the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was signed in July 1987 by Rajiv Gandhi and President Jayewardene "which declared that the traditional Tamil homeland [the northern and eastern provinces] have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples who have at all times lived together in the territory with other ethnic groups" (Wilson 1998, 120). The Accord provided for a temporary merger of the two provinces which Gandhi claimed to have "secured everything that the Sri Lankan Tamils had demanded short of breaking Sri Lanka's unity" (Wilson 1998, 120) and that "approximately one third of Sri Lanka's territory will be made into a single province where the Tamils will have a clear

majority... and regional autonomy" (Wilson 1998, 120). With the signing of the Accord, Sri Lankan president invited an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) of 70,000 soldiers to enforce the cessation of hostilities and surrender of all arms in the possession of Tamil militant groups.

On the other hand however, Indian and Sri Lankan authorities missed a crucial point, which resulted in the failure of the Accord and the Indian peace keeping mission in Sri Lanka. They made a fatal mistake to exclude the LTTE in the negotiation talks, failing to understand that without the LTTE's consent any political solution would be difficult to achieve due to the wide popular support the group had achieved (Hellmann 1988). Despite other Tamil militant groups' approval of the Accord, the LTTE was relentlessly opposed to it, skeptical of India's real devotion for Tamil independency. Moreover, the Accord stopped short of satisfying or providing hopes for a separate Tamil nation which constituted the fundamental goal of the LTTE and formed the basis for its wide support. Therefore shortly after the signing of the Accord, the LTTE returned to its military violence with an aim of systematically sabotaging it, which naturally led to a confrontation with the IPKF, who launched an assault on Tamil Tigers in the Jaffna peninsula (Joshi 1996).

Between 1987 and 1989, the LTTE did not undertake any suicide attacks since they were fighting in the jungles out of Jaffna, where they had been pushed to by the IPKF raids, making it extremely difficult for the Tamil Tigers to mount surveillance or gather information. Joshi (1996) states that although this period has proved to be the most dangerous times for the LTTE, adapting well to jungle fighting made the organization stronger and provided greater depth and experience. It was during these times that the LTTE established a special suicide operations unit called the "Black Tigers" which comprised of the most devoted and able volunteers selected out of the group's toughest combat units. Through this period, the organization also achieved an increase in its popular support among the Tamils since it was the only group which did not cooperate with the IPKF, but on the contrary continued the fight of the Tamil people. However being badly hurt by the IPKF actions, the LTTE realized that it was imperative to get the Indians out of Sri Lanka and that the only way the Indians would leave was the way they came in, at the request of the Sri Lankan government (Joshi 1996). In order to achieve this, the LTTE entered into negotiation talks with the Sri Lankan government and skillfully persuaded them to call for a ceasefire which was gratefully accepted by the Indians in 1989 (Joshi 1996). Following this strategic truce

between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE reestablished itself in the eastern region, consolidated its network, and carried out fundraising activities in Sri Lanka, India, and other countries. In June 1990, the truce between the two parties was terminated as the LTTE initiated a campaign of suicide attacks against the Sri Lanka government.

Between 1990 and 1994, the LTTE embarked on a heavy campaign of suicide attacks, which they called Eelam War II, with an aim to pressure the Sri Lankan government to open negotiations with the Tamils for independence. As can be seen from the table below, the LTTE undertook 14 suicide attacks during these five years, killing 164 people, among whom prominent political figures, such as the president defense minister of Sri Lanka were included.

Table 3.1

Campaign of Suicide Attacks : LTTE vs. Sri Lanka (1990-1994)

Date	Weapon	Target	Killed
Jul 12, 1990	Boat bomb	Naval vessel	6
Nov 23, 1990	Mines	Army camp	0
Mar 2, 1991	Car bomb	Defense minister	18
Mar 19, 1991	Truck bomb	Army camp	5
May 5, 1991	Boat bomb	Naval vessel	5
May 21, 1991	Belt bomb	Rajiv Gandhi	1
June 22, 1991	Car bomb	Defense ministry	27
Nov 16, 1992	Motorcycle bomb	Navy commander	1
May 1, 1993	Belt bomb	President of Sri Lanka	23
Nov 11, 1993	Boat bomb	Naval base	0
Aug 2, 1994	Grenades	Air force helicopter	0
Sept 19, 1994	Mines	Naval vessel	25
Oct 24, 1994	Belt bomb	Presidential candidate	53
Nov 8, 1994	Mines	Naval vessel	0

Source: Pape 2003

In May 1991, the LTTE succeeded in assassinating the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, through a suicide attack. One underlying motive of this assassination had to do with taking revenge as the LTTE leader "never reconciled to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 and felt that he had been 'stabbed in the back' by India" (Joshi 1996, 30). Another motive was based on the probability of Gandhi's winning the election and once again becoming into power, which was unattractive for the Tamil

Tigers since they had suffered severely under the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, initiated by Gandhi (Gunaratna 2001). This suicide operation, which has become the hallmark of LTTE suicide attacks, happened at a public meeting in India's Tamil Nadu, where Gandhi was delivering a speech to the Tamils of India. "A young woman named Dhanu approached Gandhi as one of many party supporters at the election meeting and then detonated the explosive strapped around her waist, killing Gandhi, herself, and seventeen others" (Joshi 1996, 29), including other LTTE Tigers who were there to provide support to Dhanu and document the operation. In the following two months, twenty five LTTE members, involved in the planning of this operation, committed suicide to escape interrogations as they were cornered by the Indian intelligence agencies.

The LTTT increased the intensity of its suicide attacks in the second half of 1994, as a result of which the Sri Lankan government decided to hold negotiations with the Tamil Tigers (Pape 2003). In other words the strategy of initiating a heavy use of suicide attacks by the LTTE resulted in gained concessions from the Sinhalese government. During the presidential elections of Sri Lanka in November 1994, candidate Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga mentioned a redrawing of boundaries in the island's northeast provinces to satisfy the Tamil demand for a separate homeland (Pape 2003). The statements of the presidential candidate which circulated news agencies all over the world have been seen as a net gain by the Tamil Tigers: "We definitely hope to begin negotiations with the Tamil people, with their representatives-including the Tigers-and offer them political solutions to end the war...[involving] extensive devolution" (as quoted in Pape 2003, 352). In January 1995, the Sri Lankan president and the LTTE leader signed an agreement, however in four months time the Tamil Tigers decided to withdraw from the peace process on a number of issues, initiating a new campaign of suicide attacks which convinced the Sri Lankan president Kumaratunga to offer another resolution package to the Tamil minority in August 1995. This package, enabling the emergence of a unified northeastern region which would have a majority of Tamil residents, satisfied Tamil demands more than the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in terms of devolving power to this regional authority. However Kumaratunga's insistence on the prerequisite of LTTE's laying down of arms for them to be involved in the negotiations was viewed by the LTTE as a declaration of war against the Tamils, which led to the diminishing of all hopes for resolving the conflict in a near future.

Tamil Tigers' third suicide campaign started with the termination of negotiation talks in 1995 and has continued for many years. The popular support for Tamil Tigers did not decrease since they were viewed as the only sincere representative of the Tamil cause. In the earlier years, the above mentioned policies of Sinhalese governments against the Tamil minority have been significant for an overall disgruntlement of the Tamil people. The Sinhala Only Act enacted in 1956, which abolished the use of Tamil as an official language, was seen as a "betrayal" of the two language policy of Tamil and Sinhalese until then. The Tamil sources state that the Tamils viewed the Sinhala Only Act as a master stroke by the majority Sinhalese to deprive jobs in the government and state corporations, which humiliated them to a degree that left generations to feel socially as outcasts and politically second class citizens (Eelamweb n.d.). Furthermore, the standardization of education policy, introduced in 1970, caused a deep frustration especially among the Tamil youth who felt discriminated as inferior against the Sinhalese students, and was seen as a political alienation of Tamils creating a deep wedge between the Tamils and the Sinhalese (Eelamweb n.d.). The frustration caused among the Tamil youth can be an explanation for the high ratio of youngsters among the Tamil Tigers. An assessment of the LTTE fighters that have been killed in combat showed that 40 percent of its fighting force were both males an females between nine and eighteen years of age (Gunaratna 1998). In a Library of Congress report, Hudson (1999) mentions that a large pool of educated but unemployed young people joined Pirabhakaran's group in the late 1970s as a reaction to the government policies. The fact that Tamils viewed all these discriminating policies as "enslavement" in their own homeland (Eelamweb n.d.) increased the public support for the LTTE and eased the LTTE course in recruiting combatants.

Nationalism remained the driving force behind the Tamil Tigers as more than two generations of Tamil youth have been indoctrinated with seperatism (Hudson 1999). More importantly, the Tamil population has become "disillusioned with the repeated failure of political negotiations concerning the place of the Tamil language (and indirectly Tamil culture and the notion of a Tamil homeland) in Sri Lanka" (Matthews 1986). From 1948 up until the 1980s, the Tamils carried out their struggle in a parliamentarian framework, their attempts at maintaining their cultural and political place in Sri Lanka proved unsuccessful. The violence against the Tamils by the Sri Lankan security forces in the 1970s humiliated the population, which until then never had to fear the police. Mathhews (1986, 31) argues that the Tamils turned to militancy

"only when the last chances for devolution of power and political compromise seemed irrevocably lost in the early 1980s." Meanwhile, the LTTE established itself as the representative of the Tamil minority and started acting as the authority in Tamil regions. The LTTE operated schools, factories, and even a military academy, organizing public life along its own lines in the Jaffna peninsula which served as a propagating and recruiting ground for the organization (Hellmann 1988). This protection and organization of daily life appealed to the Tamils to continue their support of the LTTE and encourage their children to be a part of the movement. In terms of economic status, the majority of LTTE members belonged to the lower middle class, with almost all LTTE cadres recruited from the lower-caste strata of Jaffna community (Hudson 1999).

On the other hand, Francis (2000) argues that the motivation for suicide attacks among the LTTE "seems to be a kind of en masse cult hysteria that the LTTE consciously cultivates by rituals like Martyrs' Week promoting a cult of martyrdom." The promise of honor beyond death is assumed to be attractive to those who do not have much to gain from this life, a propaganda which becomes easily acceptable to the LTTE cadre, majority of which come from lower middle class backgrounds (Francis 2000). It is also possible to see a resonance of the "fictive kin" ideology within the network of the LTTE. Francis (2000) also claims that a powerful motivation for the Black Tigers is that the LTTE connects its ideology with

> a judicious use of symbols rooted in Tamil myth such as the tiger, the symbol of one of the most favorite Tamil gods...It was the emblem of the ancient Chola emperors, the concept of maram (wrath), the concept of the brave mother (vira tayar) and the vira pen (brave woman) who sacrifice their loved ones for the war.

The cult of martyrdom, mentioned above, naturally concentrates on the Black Tigers, the suicide squad of the organization, to whom the suicide mission provides an elite status within the larger organization the rest aspires for (Chandran 2001). The glorification of the Black Tigers by the LTTE through celebrations, monuments, and cemeteries render being a member of this group highly prestigious, making it attractive for all cadres of the LTTE to become a Black Tiger (Chandran 2001). The celebration of July 5th every year as the day of the Black Tigers, on which the first suicide mission of the group was committed by Captain Millar in 1987, is still one of the most important events in the Tamil region. "On this particular day, an eternal lamp is lighted in front of the tombstone of every Black Tiger, who had lost his or her life. The LTTE flag is hoisted and the parents of the Black Tigers, who had sacrificed their lives, are honored"

(Chandran 2001). After each attack the LTTE announces the bravery of the Black Tiger through its radio broadcasts honoring every sacrifice. The LTTE built monuments to celebrate the Black Tigers which increased the prestige and glorification of those who sacrifice themselves for the group's cause "play[ing] a critical motivational role for the bombers" (Dolnik 2003, 24).

Furthermore, the phenomenal leader of the LTTE, Pirabhakaran, turned into a folk hero during the 1980s at the time when his organization fought the fiercest riots of the Sinhalese majority against the Tamils. "Only through supreme sacrifice, [Pirabhakaran insisted], could the Tamils achieve their goal of Eelam, or a separate homeland" (Hudson 1999, 96). The LTTE cadre has turned fanatically loyal to their leader, asserts Francis (2000), an aspect of the LTTE ideology which has deep roots in Tamil myths, where the practice of ancient Tamil warriors sacrificing themselves for the leader was considered an ultimate tribute. The Black Tigers, being the lead in most of the military operations of the LTTE and having the highest success rates among other groups in the organization, enjoy an advantage of meeting the demi-god leader Pirabhakaran while seeing him is a lifetime goal for many young cadres of the LTTE, an image Chandran (2001) argues carefully cultivated by Pirabhakaran himself. Before their mission, the Black Tigers have their "last super" with their leader eulogizing them as a group with overt glorification ensuring the continuous inflow of Black Tigers Chandran (2001).

According to the U.S. State Department, the LTTE has about 8,000 to 10,000 armed members, with a core of 3,000 to 6,000 trained fighters and about 500 belong to the suicide mission group, the Black Tigers (CFR n.d.). The suicide campaigns of the LTTE has continued with intensity until 2002, with some interrupted periods. On the other hand, according to a report of the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the post-9/11 policy response of the international community to criminalize and prosecute terrorist groups has created a significant pressure on the LTTE and made it extremely difficult for the organization to raise funds for its activities, heavily dependent on international finances. According to this report, Sri Lanka has been free of violence, with the exception of a few incidents, since February 2002, when the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities under the Norwegian facilitation. Manoharan (n.d.) claims that "the intense international pressure is believed to be the main reason behind the ongoing talks."

3.1.2. Case II: Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)

In the last decade, and still to this day, the Israel-Palestinian conflict has been heavily dominated by suicide attacks, inflicting heavy costs to all parties that have been involved. While the suicide missions perpetrated by Palestinian groups have caused immense casualties on Israel, they have also troubled the Palestinian Authority (PA) in its endeavors to carry out peace negotiations, also hurting its legitimatization in the international arena.

According to Atran (2004), from 1993 to 2003, 311 Palestinian suicide attackers have detonated themselves against Israeli targets. A majority of these attacks occurred during the heightening of Israel-Palestinian hostilities in late 2000, with the number of attacks increasing from 61 to 250. Hamas has been the leading Palestinian group not only in terms of the high degree of lethality in its attacks but also with the number of suicide attacks it has perpetrated, claiming 43 percent of all suicide attacks during the second Palestinian *intifada* (uprising) against Israel that broke out in 2000 (Moghadam 2003).

Figure 3.1 Percentage of Suicide Attacks by Organization (Oct 2000-June 2002)

Source Moghadam (2003)

Hamas's establishment dates back to the first Palestinian intifada that occurred in December 1987, however the roots of the organization have well been established many decades before that. Scholars who study this group state that Hamas is a creation

or an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic revival group which has been founded in Egypt in 1928 with a goal of transforming society to "approximate as closely as possible to that established by the Prophet Muhammad...[entailing] the establishment of an Islamic state, with no distinction being made between religion and government, and with the Quran and the *sunna* serving as the basis for all aspects of life" (Abu-Amr 1993, 6). As will be seen below, this fundamental goal of Muslim Brotherhood has been maintained by Hamas at its foundation. Since its establishment the Muslim Brotherhood expanded its activities throughout the Arab world, opening its first branch in Jerusalem in 1945, mostly concentrating on "the upbringing of an Islamic generation" building a social network by establishing religious schools, charity associations, and social clubs (Abu-Amr 1993). After the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank in Gaza, the Brotherhood strengthened its place in the Palestinian society, especially with the establishment of *al-Mujamma' al-Islami* (the Islamic Center) in 1973, which in time took control of all religious organizations and institutions within the Brotherhood network, including the Islamic University in Gaza (Abu-Amr 1993). The person who established al-Mujamma, an Islamic scholar and an influential young man from the refugee camps, was Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, who later became the leader of Hamas in 1988. Mishal & Sela (2000, 19) note that the period between Israel's occupation and the first intifada was "marked by the meticulous construction of the MB's (Muslim Brotherhood) institutional and social infrastructure" which later served as the network which Hamas built its structure on.

Despite the strength and social support achieved by the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, there emerged disillusionment among the Palestinian people towards the group's shortcomings in supporting the heightening resistance against the Israeli occupation. When the Palestinian intifada erupted in December 1987, the prominent leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood considered it as an opportunity to be involved in the resistance and announced the foundation of Hamas in January 1988. Hamas, meaning "zeal" in Arabic and standing as an abbreviation of *Harakat al-Muaqawama al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Resistance Movement), achieved to emerge as an alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the intifada (Mishal & Sela 2000) and later to the Palestinian Authority established in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas issued its charter in August 1988, spelling the organizations aims and strategies and describing the philosophy, as well as explaining its stance on many other issues, like social welfare, role of women in society, and other Arab movements. Abu-

Amr (1993) states that although Hamas acknowledges itself as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and does not differ from its positions, it pays less attention to the Brotherhood's main goal of transforming the society and upbringing of an Islamic generation. Instead, the main emphasis is on the Palestine problem and the concept of *jihad* (holy war), through which Hamas was able to combine religious doctrine with national liberation (Mishal & Sela 2000). Article 9 of the Hamas charter, titled "Objectives", declares:

> The goal of the Islamic Resistance Movement...is to conquer evil, crushing it and defeating it, so that truth may prevail, so that the country may return to its rightful place, and so that the call may be heard from the minarets proclaiming the Islamic state. (The Hamas Charter, Article 9)

The Charter proclaims that the solution to the Palestine problem lies in extinguishing Israel and establishing an Islamic State in its place, a goal which will be reached through jihad. Aware of the impossibility of achieving this goal, Hamas leaders later portrayed the establishment of an Islamic State as a long term goal and announced an intermediate objective of Israel's withdrawal from West Bank and Gaza (Hroub 2000). Article 13 of the Charter declares "There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except through jihad" which is described as "an individual religious duty on every Muslim; and in confronting the unlawful seizure of Palestine by Jews, it is necessary to raise the banner of jihad." Further emphasis on jihad throughout the text shows Hamas to strongly relate the concept of jihad to the objectives of the Palestinian national movement (Milton-Edwards 1992). It is important to note that by such a standpoint, combining the notion of jihad with national liberation, Hamas was able to differentiate itself from the PLO as well as other Islamic organizations. According to Mishal & Sela by conferring an Islamic meaning on its version of Palestinian nationalism, Hamas confronted the PLO's secular nationalism with an Islamic national concept. Furthermore, Hamas also differentiated itself from other Islamic groups by linking the call to jihad to the liberation of Palestine from Israeli occupation as an end product, instead of associating it with the "eventual restoration of the Caliphate in all Muslim countries" (Milton-Edwards 1992).

During the intifada Hamas has established itself as a political power and emerged as an alternative to Arafat's PLO. It seems that one of the most important reasons for this was the fact that Hamas's message of jihad served as a powerful answer to the Palestinian's rage at Israel's violence, especially after the incident where the Israeli police killed seventeen Palestinians in October 1990 (Mishal & Sela 2000).

Moreover, the atmosphere of oppression, deprivation, and hopelessness has contributed to the spread of an Islamic climate among the Palestinians (Abu-Amr 1993). Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1991, Hamas established the battalions of *Izz al-Din al-Qassam*, forming the organization's official military apparatus (Mishal & Sela 2000). The unrest among the Palestinians propelled by Hamas and the call to masses to cooperate with the jihad increased the violence and attacks inflicted on the Israeli military and civilians. The result was Israel's expulsion of more than 400 Islamists, including the leading figures of Hamas, to Lebanon in December 1992. Experts agree that this marked an important turn in Hamas's role in the Israel-Palestinian conflict as Hamas activists were able to receive training in Lebanon from the Hezbollah, a group which have used suicide operations effectively in the last decade. When Hamas activists returned in December 1993, as a result of international pressure on Israel, they were met with a more unified and supportive Palestinian people outraged at this exile (Kristianasen 1999).

Meanwhile, the increasing violence between Palestinians and Israeli forces, terrified both parties and resulted in the negotiations of Oslo Accords. Kristianasen (1999, 22) states that at the time of the singing of Oslo Accords, "Hamas set itself as the champion of resistance to Arafat's 'sell-out of Palestine' through jihad and reiterated calls to resume the spent intifada." Hamas's declarations in its Charter concerning peace solutions and initiatives formed the fundamental basis of its protest against the peace process.

> The initiatives, what is called a 'peaceful solution' and 'international conferences' to resolve the Palestinian problem, are contrary to the ideology of the Islamic Resistance Movement, because giving up any part of Palestine is like giving up part of religion...Because the Islamic Resistance Movement's awareness of the parties participating in the conference,..., it does not believe that conferences are capable of meeting demands, restoring rights, or giving justice to the oppressed. Those conferences are no more than a means of forcing the rule of unbelievers in the land of Muslims. (The Hamas Charter, Article 9)

Furthermore, Hamas concretely announced its main principles in a communique that would lead to a solution of the Palestinian problem.

> 1. The unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist occupation forces from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including Jerusalem.
> 2. The dismantling and removal of settlements and the evacuation of settlers from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem.
> 3. The holding of free general elections for a legislative body among the Palestinian people inside and outside [Palestine] so that they can choose their own leaders and their real representatives. (Hroub 2000, 76)

Hamas's first suicide attacks actually coincided with the return of its activists from exile in Lebanon just a few months before the signing of Declaration of Principles in Washington at the end of 1993. Basing its activities on the above mentioned principles for any negotiation, Hamas criticized the PLO during the Oslo negotiations for its plans of establishing a Palestinian state that would coexist with the state of Israel (Abu-Amr 1993). On the other hand, however, the first suicide campaign initiated by Hamas came after the 1994 Hebron Massacre, when the Israeli settler doctor Baruch Goldstein murdered more than 30 praying Palestinians and wounded some 200 others in the Ibrahimi mosque. "Determined to avenge the deaths of their countrymen" (Sprinzak 2000, 71) and "to respond to the outrage shared by all Palestinians" (Kristianasen 1999, 23), Hamas activists immediately initiated their first suicide campaign against the Israelis, announcing that there would be a total of five high lethal suicide attacks in the next months. Pape (2003) on the other hand argues that Hamas only carried out two of these attacks for retaliation and cancelled the rest three. Indeed, after the first two attacks were carried out Sheikh Yasin, in a press interview, announced that Hamas could consider a truce if Israel withdrew from the occupied territories and dismantled its settlements (Kristianasen 1999). When Israel, horrified with the losses incurred by the first two suicide attacks, agreed to withdraw more promptly than expected, Hamas decided to forgo the three remaining planned attacks "into being more forthcoming in the withdrawal negotiations" Pape (2003, 353).

However, as Israel started missing its deadlines spelled out by the schedule of Oslo Accords, Hamas decided to initiate a new suicide attack campaign from October 1994 to August 1995, to compel Israel to make further withdrawals (Pape 2003). When in September 1995 Israel announced that it would withdraw from the West Bank towns in December suicide attacks stopped. This resulted in the signing of the Taba agreement, also known as Oslo II, in September 1995 and an undeclared moratorium on the part of Hamas of its armed attacks (Kristianasen 1999). The working effect of suicide attacks on political decisions was seen in the statements of both Hamas and Israeli leaders. While Hamas leaders argued that suicide operations contributed to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel's Prime Minister Rabin "explained that the decision for the second withdrawal was, like the first in 1994, motivated in part by the goal of reducing suicide terrorism" (as cited in Pape 2003, 354).

On the other hand, however, Israel put great pressure on the Palestinian Authority (PA), now established in Gaza as a result of the Oslo Accords. Due to the

increased cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security services, the PA started to inflict a high level of restriction on the activities of Hamas. When the Israeli forces assassinated Qassam Brigade's chief operative Yehiya Ayash (known as the "engineer") in January 1996, the peaceful period was terminated. This assassination caused immense anger among Palestinians, which gathered nearly a hundred thousand people at Ayash's funeral (Kristianasen 1999). Hamas, angered and humiliated, resumed its suicide attacks immediately following the assassination, which according to Mishal and Sela (2000) must be considered the worst assault on Israel in terms of casualties, horror, and the long term affects on the Israeli population. Sprinzak (2000) claims that the suicide attacks of this campaign changed Israel's political mood about the peace process leading to the defeat of Peres's pro-peace government in 1996 elections, followed with Israel's reinforcement of its closure on the territories.

Mishal & Sela (2000) state that during these years the intifada turned into a way of life for the Palestinian population. Years of controlled checkpoints, work permits and curfews increasingly reinforced frustration among the Palestinians (Kushner, 1996). Jessica Stern (2003, 32), a scholar at Harvard University, have carried out interviews in Gaza to explore "how real or perceived national humiliation of the Palestinian people by Israeli policies, and often by Israeli individuals, has given rise to desperation and uncontrollable rage." From the narrative data Stern (2003, 32) obtained, she concluded that Palestinians were "engulfed in an epidemic of despair" to the level that parents of suicide terrorists proclaimed their joy and honor of their son's or daughter's martyrdom. The Palestinians she spoke to portrayed a world of relentlessly humiliating occupation by a vastly superior power explaining her that "until you have been forced out of your own home, until you have watched the police beat your child, you can never understand the Palestinians' pain" (Stern 2003, 32). Mental health doctors at the Palestine Red Crescent explained that "a suicide bomber acts because of accumulated trauma, going back generations, in some cases back to 1948" (Stern 2003, 54).

Meanwhile, Hamas, having built its structure on the socioreligious network of Muslim brotherhoods, was heavily involved in communal work within the Palestinian refugee camps as well as educational and social activities based on mosques and local community groups (Hudson 1999). Hamas's outreach to large number of Palestinians through social activities provided the group with massive grass roots support, not always for the violent actions it embarked on but for the support it offered to the community. On the other hand, Hamas's communal infrastructure created a fertile soil

from which the organization could designate candidates that seemed susceptible to intense religious indoctrination and training. The increasing socioeconomic and political pressures due to the conditions of the Israeli occupation rendered many young Palestinians more inclined towards terrorism. Kushner (1996, 332) suggests that the refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza "provided an endless flow of Islamic recruits raised under Israeli occupation, as their questionable futures can fuel feelings of hopelessness and anger."

Psychologist Brian Barber, who surveyed 900 Muslim adolescents between 1987 and 1993, found high levels of participation in and victimization from violence (Atran 2004). His data showed that 66 percent suffered physical assault and 63 percent were shot at. Between 1996 and 1999, Nasra Hassan, a Pakistani relief worker, interviewed 250 recruiters and trainers, failed suicide bombers, and relatives of deceased bombers. According to her findings, suicide terrorists were aged between 18 to 38, and they were generally educated and deeply religious but not desperately poor or depressed, a profile which spanned the normal distribution of the Palestinian population. Ariel Merari's investigation of 36 suicide attack cases between 1993 and 1996 portrayed similar results. Merari found that the average age among suicide terrorists was 22, they were generally single and religious, but none suffered from a psychiatric illness, although there were some indications that they were more marginal people, more influenced by the social atmosphere and the group (Shay 2004).

By 1997, it was possible to see a moderation in Hamas ranks concerning suicide attacks. One of the main reasons was the likelihood of release of prominent Hamas leaders from Israeli jails, including Sheik Yasin who had been imprisoned for 10 years. Furthermore, the Wye Memorandum in October 1998 between Israel and the PA phased Israeli redeployment conditional upon PA measures against terrorist groups. This led to the arrest of some 300 Hamas activists by the PA after a failed suicide attack that month. This vigorous crackdown on Hamas operations compelled Hamas to scale down its armed activities. On the other hand, Netanyahu's term as Israeli prime minister during 1996-99 was a setback for the peace process and people began to despair for Oslo. This provided Hamas with a breathing spell and strengthened its argument with respect to the need for armed operations (Hroub 2000).

In September 2000, the Arab-Israeli peace process faced a sudden cessation when Ariel Sharon, then a candidate of the Likud government, announced his aims of reaffirming the Jew's ancient claim to Jerusalem, taking a first step in a deliberate

strategy to undermine the logic of Oslo Peace Accords (Kepel 2004). In retaliation Arafat instigated protests among the Palestinians, which Israel repressed in a violent manner, leading to the Al Aqsa intifada, the second uprising named in reference to Haram Sharif's principal mosque (Kepel 2004). The pace of events led to a total loss of hope among both societies for the continuance of peace process as the conservative Likud government won the elections in 2001. At this time, Hamas came back onto the scene by initiating a new suicide attack campaign in October 2000 which still continues to this day. When Israel made its incursion into the West Bank in spring 2002 it became easier for Hamas to mobilize the frustrated young Arabs from the camps as well as radicalized students, who felt a depth of bitterness along with powerlessness. Shay (2004) explains that intensification of suicide attacks also came with the green light received from the Palestinian Authority. Being aware of the inability of Palestinian forces to fight the Israelis "frustrated citizens, and especially young people, began to look for other means of resisting Israel" (Kepel 2004, 21). Furthermore, Kepel (2004) explains that a growing number of Muslims began to see suicide attacks as the only valid reply to the overwhelming superiority of Israel's technology and to Sharon's use of terror to crush the Al Aqsa intifada. According to a report of Council on Foreign Relations (n.d.) Hamas leaders openly took pride in the suicide bombings, as "great success" and hailed the weapon of suicide bombings as the "F-16" of the Palestinian people. In May 2002, Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, a senior representative of Hamas declared, "As long as Jews continue to massacre Palestinians, we will strike in Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Afula. If a Palestinian child is hurt, we will strike back. That is the formula" (as cited in Shay 2004, 65).

By the start of the second intifada, Palestinians have lost hope for a peaceful settlement after an unsuccessful and a violent decade following the Oslo peace accords of 1993. Rising aspirations for peace during the signing of Oslo peace accords and negotiations with Israel proved to fail and have turned into diminishing expectations, leading to social frustration. A Palestinian told Stern (2003, 57) that "you can't forget that there are generations of Palestinians that have been dispossessed for fifty years. A large part of our people are still in occupation." Furthermore, perceptions of historical injustice combined with personal loss and humiliation at the hands of Israeli occupiers have resulted in high rates of popular support for suicide attacks. Researcher Basel Saleh observed that many of the young suicide shooters had family members or close friends who had been arrested or injured by Israel's army (Atran 2004). According to

another survey carried endorsement of suicide attacks had increased to 70-80 percent among Palestinians by 2002 (Atran 2004). A majority of the people surveyed note that 60 percent of Palestinians believes suicide attacks against Israeli civilians have helped to achieve Palestinian rights in a way that negotiations could not have (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003). This popular support is expressed in the manifestations of joy after each suicide attack, crowded gatherings at the funerals of martyrs, circulating their pictures and farewell letters in the streets, elevating those who have sacrificed their lives as national heroes and martyrs in the Palestinian media. Most interestingly, Stern (2003, 53) states that martyrdom operations have become part of the popular culture reporting that "on the streets of Gaza, children play a game called *shuhada,* which includes a mock funeral for a suicide bomber. Teenage rock groups praise martyrs in their songs." On the other hand, Khalil Shiqaqi, a researcher in Center for Palestine Research and Studies, says his survey data shows popular support for suicide actions can be positively correlated with the number of check points Palestinians have to pass through every day as well as the problems and delays they face at these points, instigating feelings of humiliation. On the other hand, the earlier research undertaken to understand the profile of suicide terrorists was repeated after the break of second intifada showing that the earlier findings were still relevant almost a decade later. Krueger & Maleckova (2003) found that while one third of Palestinians live in poverty, only 13 percent of Palestinian suicide bombers are poor, while 57 percent have education beyond high school versus 15 percent of the population of comparable age.

Under these circumstances, Hamas, which has infiltrated Palestinian society during the last decade, seems to have no difficulty in finding candidates to deploy suicide attacks. Having the capability of reaching out to masses, it has been able to propagate its nationalistic and religious discourse among the Palestinian youth in schools and mosques that serve as recruiting grounds for the group. Recruiters that are already employed in these institutions approach suitable young Palestinians, regarding their excitement about jihad and anger against the Jews. With the acceptance of the recruit, Hamas clusters a few of them in small group of three or five, which start representing a cult, mentally isolated from family and society (Kushner 1996). At this point a heavy indoctrination of these people is instigated, focusing on the verses of Quran and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, idealizing the glory of dying for Allah and promising a heaven with gold palaces, feasts, and virgins not only for the candidates but also for their family members. Lessons of history and stories of pain,

injustice, and humiliation inflicted on Palestinians are recount repetitively to boost the hatred and rage in the candidates against the Israelis. A heavy indoctrination coupled by training is carried out in a very restricted small cell, so that there can be a highly proactive relationship between the group members to feel as a family ready to sacrifice their lives for each other. The most challenging aspect during this process for Hamas is the backing out of a candidate, which the group tries to avoid by making videotapes of a candidate's last message and organizing farewell events, which would make it extremely shameful for the candidate to walk out. A team of experts including intelligence representatives and psychologists were able to question 20 surviving suicide attackers between 2002 and 2003 to analyze their motives. Their findings indicated that hatred for the Jews and Israel, personal, emotional, economic distress and revenge as well as emulation of the martyrs among the Palestinian society stood as significant motives among these suicide attackers (Shay 2004). When Ehud Barak, responded to an interviewer who asked whether he would have joined a Palestinian guerilla group if he had been born a Palestinian replied "What else could I say? If I were a young Palestinian immersed from birth in the Palestinian ethos, I'd have become a third-grade teacher?" (as cited in Hroub 2000).

3.2. Critical Analysis of the Cases

The literature survey in Chapter II showed that there are three main indicators which prove the strategic logic of suicide terrorism. The most important indicator of the strategic orientation of organizations that use suicide attacks is the timing of initiation and suspension of suicide attack campaigns. Such timing is argued to be based on strategic decisions whether further attacks would be productive or counterproductive to their purposes. This means that suicide attacks are carried out in an organized manner rather than randomly timed incidents. This argument also involved the point that the success of groups in gaining concessions through suicide attacks constitutes a further motive for increasing the number of suicide attacks. In the case of the LTTE, the suicide operation that assassinated Gandhi in 1991, although carrying an aspect of revenge on

the part of the LTTE leader, mainly aimed to prevent Gandhi's reelection as prime minister since he had proved to act against the goals of the LTTE earlier. Furthermore, the LTTE's first major suicide campaign which started in 1994 with a view to pressure the Sri Lankan government to open negotiations with the Tamils for independence indeed brought about gained concessions to the group. This resulted in a signed agreement between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE in 1995. It is also possible to talk about the relevance of timing for Hamas suicide attack campaigns. The first suicide attacks of Hamas occurred during the Oslo peace negotiations in 1993 with an aim to thwart the deal since Hamas was against Arafat's political stance. When in 1994, Hamas's suicide operations inflicted great losses on the Israelis, the Israeli government accepted to start withdrawal from occupied territories as a result of which Hamas dropped the rest of the attacks planned within that campaign. The group's campaign between October 1994 and August 1995 was based on an objective to compel Israel to make further withdrawals from the occupied territories. The success of this campaign was evident in Israel's announcement in September 1995 of its withdrawal from the West Bank towns in December. At this time Hamas purposefully froze its suicide attacks realizing that further attacks would be counterproductive. This led to the signing of the Taba agreement (Oslo II) in September 1995 for withdrawal of Israel and an undeclared moratorium for Hamas's armed attacks. On the other hand however, not every suicide attack carried out by Hamas was concretely based on a strategy to coerce the opponent for concessions. The retaliatory suicide operations after Hebron Massacre in 1994 and the assassination of Hamas chief operative Yehiha Ayash in 1996 were based on the enraged reaction of the masses and revenge on the part of Hamas. Nevertheless, a strategic orientation in terms of timing is evidently present for both the LTTE's and Hamas's suicide operations.

A second factor that justifies the strategic sense of suicide terrorism is that it is used to achieve nationalist goals, a high interest to any group, which would justify the high cost of suicide operations. Accordingly, this argument brings forward the idea that the central objective of suicide operations is to reach these nationalistic goals, through pressuring the opponent to take its forces out of what these movements conceive as homeland. As we have seen above, the LTTE's main goal, since its foundation in 1976, has been to create a separate Tamil state in eastern and northern provinces of Sri Lanka, which is perceived as the homeland of Tamils. The LTTE insisted on a separate independent Tamil state for any negotiation to be accepted, rejecting offers for a federal

structure which would only provide autonomy to the Tamils. This was evident in the LTTE's opposition to the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord signed in 1987, since the Accord stopped short of satisfying or providing hopes for a separate Tamil nation. The agreement reached between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in 1995 promised more than the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in terms of devolving power to the Tamils, however the LTTE did not refrain from breaking it, in a very short time, since it failed to fulfill the group's goal of independence. Hamas's ultimate goal was spelled out in its Charter as extinguishing the state of Israel and establishing an Islamic place in its place, which has been represented as the long term goal of the organization. On the other hand, Hamas depicted an interim goal of achieving an Israeli withdrawal from West Bank and Gaza, which according to Hamas leaders would render the fight possible for the long term objective. As we have seen above, the Hamas Charter depicts an ideology based on a combination of religious doctrine and national liberation, arguing that the problem of Palestine can only be solved through a holy war. The suicide operations of Hamas have been carried out with an aim of coercing Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territories, underlining the nationalistic objectives in the use of suicide attacks. An important note here is that the promise of national liberation, through suicide operations, rendered both organizations able to receive sustained support from their communities despite the high cost of suicide attacks.

A third factor that was shown as an indication of the logic of suicide terrorism is that organizations use suicide operations only if the target is viewed vulnerable to punishment. Pape (2003) argues that suicide terrorism is employed against democratic states since they are thought to be especially vulnerable to coercive punishment and are viewed as soft on the grounds that their publics have low thresholds of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state policy. Although Sri Lanka has become a democracy more recently and has been rated as partly free by the Freedom House index, in fact, Israel, India, and Sri Lanka have all been democracies (Pape 2003). The LTTE perceived both India and Sri Lanka being vulnerable to the heavy costs inflicted on them by the suicide attacks, since such high costs led to criticisms from the opposition parties in both countries as well as increased reaction from the publics. Hamas especially viewed Israel as soft and the Israelis as materially spoiled people who feared death and adored the joy of life in contrast to the willingness of death among the brave Palestinians. Such discourse is often repeated in the announcements and interviews given by Hamas leaders.

Besides portraying the motivations of suicide terrorism in terms of organizations' strategic logic, the literature survey chapter also brought forward those motivations relevant to the individual suicide attacker. The studies covered showed that poverty and ignorance are not among the significant factors that motivate people to undertake suicide missions. On the other hand, it is even discussed that a high rate of education seems to increase a person's consideration for conflicts. These arguments are based on studies that have been carried out to understand the profile of suicide attackers that showed these individuals were neither poorer nor less educated than the average society. A majority of LTTE activists have been young Tamils, most of who have been frustrated with the limitations brought forward by the Sri Lankan government that prevented them to attend universities. Although, there are not many surveys regarding the economic status of LTTE activists, no studies revealed that LTTE suicide attackers are any poorer than the average Tamil population. On the other hand, there are more available surveys regarding the socioecomic status of Palestinian suicide attackers showing that the poverty rate among them is not lower compared to the general Palestinian public. Moreover Palestinian suicide attackers are not any less educated than the average. Actually a study found that they received more education than the average Palestinian and had lower rates of poverty than the average Palestinian society. Regarding their psychological predispositions, there is a lack of data for the Black Tigers. A few number of surveys investigating Palestinian suicide attackers show that there are no concrete indications for a psychiatric illness among them.

Rather than poverty, unemployment, or illiteracy, many experts argue that relative deprivation, which occurs when converging political, economic, and social trends produce diminishing opportunities relative to expectations, generates frustrations that radical organizations can exploit. Atran (2004) claims that frustrated with the future, suicide terrorism gives some perceived purpose to act altruistically in the potential terrorist's mind. Especially repetitive failure of peace processes leads to hopelessness for the future on the weaker of the conflicting sides which then leads to frustration and helplessness. This trend is seen both among the Tamils and the Palestinians. Demands towards an independent Tamil state surfaced more than four decades ago during which there have been many attempts on the part of Indians, Sri Lankans, and the LTTE to reach a negotiation on the conflict. However, all these failed attempts first raised positive expectations among Tamils, especially in 1987 with the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and in 1995 with the Sri Lanka-LTTE agreement, but then led

to eradication of hopes for an independent Tamil state. Furthermore, Tamils were also disillusioned with the repeated failure of political negotiations concerning the place of the Tamil language (and indirectly Tamil culture and the notion of a Tamil homeland). The same process has been experienced by the Palestinians, especially since 1993 with the Oslo Peace Accords. The last decade was spent with intervals of rising hopes towards a settlement of negotiations but then leading to failure, with each setback raising the level of frustration among the Palestinian people.

In addition to the relative deprivation argument, the feeling of revenge also receives considerable attention from experts as a driving factor for individual suicide terrorists. The historical review of Tamil insurgency shows that Tamils have perceived themselves as victims of violence initiated by the Sinhalese, especially during the riots that took place between 1956 and 1983. It was after the 1983 riot, the most violent and extensive one, did the Tamils turn to militancy, having experienced immense affliction from the Sinhalese. On the other hand, surveys carried out observed that a majority of Palestinian suicide bombers had friends or relatives who had been arrested or injured by Israel's army or themselves suffered physical assault or were shot at, causing a feeling of revenge that in turn motivates violence. Also on a collective level, there have been many suicide attack campaigns by Hamas where the driving motive was based on revenge rather than a political concession. The attacks that have been carried out as retaliation to 1994 Hebron Massacre and the 1996 assassination of Yehiya Ayash are examples to revenge driven campaigns of the organization. Public announcements by Hamas leaders following Israeli attacks on Palestinians aimed to appeal to feelings of revenge, calling for a strike back or an eye for an eye.

Furthermore, continuous humiliation and injustice inflicted on one's community, ethnic group, or society are also seen as driving factors for suicide terrorism. Many experts agree that humiliation is among the most consistent sentiments expressed by recruits of suicide attacks. We have seen that the discriminating policies of Sinhalese governments were viewed by the Tamils as "enslavement" in their own homeland. Especially with the standardization of education policy, which brought further requirements to the Tamil students to enter universities, caused a deep frustration among the Tamil youth who felt discriminated as inferior against the Sinhalese students and many of whom joined the cadres of LTTE. The fact that Tamils have been exposed to violence by the Sri Lankan security forces during the riots humiliated the population, which until then never had to fear the police, to such a degree that they felt irreversibly

outraged. Also for Palestinian suicide attackers, humiliation seems to explain how people can be motivated towards suicide terrorism. We have seen that years of controlled checkpoints, work permits and curfews increasingly reinforced frustration among the Palestinians. The refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza provided an endless flow of Islamic recruits raised under Israeli occupation. The work of psychologists showed that many of the suicide terrorists have been humiliated by the Israeli forces through physical or fire attack.

In addition to the above discussed motivations, such as relative deprivation, revenge, and humiliation, many analysts of suicide terrorism agree on the significance of the organization that have proved extremely competent in harnessing these individual and collective aspects to encourage people to become suicide terrorists. The significance of the organizational network is evident in both cases. It is especially striking that both the LTTE and Hamas have based their structure on a communal network of schools, hospitals, and youth clubs, delivering services to the community which the authorities lacked to bring. Such a network gave the opportunity of gaining the support and trust of the society for both organizations, and at the same time served as a feeding ground where they could propagate their ideology and find suitable recruits. The package of training, encouragement, and indoctrination provided by these terrorist groups to candidates is also part and parcel of the process, usually guaranteeing that the candidate does not back out. We have also seen that the celebratory processes, such as massive funerals, distribution and broadcasting of the martyr's bravery, or honorary cemeteries, all of which are organized to glorify suicide operations have been extremely significant to create a culture of martyrdom. Moreover, both Hamas and the Tamil Tigers have purposely constructed tightly knit, small, closeted cells to form families of cellmates who are just as willing to sacrifice one another as a parent for a child. The Black Tigers of the LTTE and the suicide schools of five or less in Hamas constructed tightly knit brotherhoods to create a fictive family.

As mentioned before, the notion of religious beliefs serving as a motivation for suicide terrorism is a much debated issue. It is apparent that Hamas suicide recruits are highly religious people, however surveys show that these people are not any more religious than the general Palestinian public. Heavy religious indoctrination seems to come subsequent to a person's recruitment for a suicide attack and to be used in propelling or encouraging an individual who has already entered the path of a suicide operation. On the other hand it is possible to argue that the "call to jihad" and the

"promise of heaven" with martyrdom, messages intensely advocated by Hamas among the Palestinians, do serve as motives to many candidates. The LTTE on the other hand is a secular organization that does not base its ideology or propaganda on any religion. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that an aspect of the LTTE ideology has been based on Tamil myths, where the practice of ancient Tamil warriors sacrificing themselves was considered an ultimate tribute. The use of symbols rooted in Tamil myths who sacrifice their loved ones for the good of the whole promises honor beyond death, also feeding into the fictive kin discussion. Moreover, both Hamas and the LTTE, by using either religion or mythical beliefs, were able to create a "cult of martyrdom", which made suicide operations a culturally rooted phenomenon.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

4.1. Discussion

The purpose of this qualitative study was to examine the motives of suicide terrorism. To this end, two case studies were investigated with the aim of understanding the existing motives of groups as well as individuals that carry out suicide attacks. This thesis sought to understand the level of relevance of explanations for motives of suicide terrorism brought forward by analysts, who have different points of view on the phenomenon. The aim of the study was to determine whether any of the contending explanations appeared to be more dominant in elucidating the motives of suicide terrorism. In this section, I will relate the findings from the cases to the literature reviewed and note places in which the findings support, contradict, or reveal gaps in the current literature. I will also relate the findings to my original speculations about which factors are significant in terms of motivating people towards suicide terrorism.

The critical analysis of the LTTE and Hamas cases showed that the three major characteristics of suicide terrorism; namely timing, nationalistic goals, and democracies as opponents, which prove its strategic logic, were applicable in both cases. First, the initiation and suspension of suicide mission campaigns of both the LTTE and Hamas were based on calculated strategies, considering whether a campaign would be

productive or not in terms of serving their goals. Second, the main objective of both organizations to use suicide attacks was constituted of nationalistic goals, as both the LTTE and Hamas strived and aspired for the liberation of their homeland. Third, the opponents of both organizations, India, Sri Lanka, and Israel, were democracies, even though consolidated at different levels, a fact which rendered suicide terrorism effective in the eyes of the LTTE and Hamas to coerce their opponents.

The applicability of all three characteristics can persuade some analysts to perceive suicide terrorism to be solely based on the strategic logic of organizations, leading them to conclude that individual motivations are insignificant to explain suicide terrorism. However, this argument seems to lack the understanding that such a rationality cannot be attributed to the individual who actually carries out the suicide mission. An individual does not decide to carry out a suicide attack, considering its strategic logic. In the previous chapter, I have attempted to show that individual motivations such as relative deprivation, humiliation, revenge, and frustration with injustice seem to be significant in explaining suicide terrorism for both the LTTE and Hamas activists. Additionally, although religion does not seem to be a motive at initiation it serves as a significant propeller on the path to suicide operations.

The findings of this research suggest that suicide terrorism should be studied in a framework that regards this issue as an act which is fed both by organizational and individual motives. Moreover, both organizational and individual motives also seem to interact among each other. While organizations base their logic on strategic goals, they are obliged to employ individuals and therefore individual motives, which they have learned to exploit in a very efficient manner. On the other hand, although feelings of relative deprivation, humiliation, and revenge can impel a person to sacrifice his life for the good of the whole, encouragement, training, and planning provided to him or her by the organization are essential for the mission.

On the other hand, it is not possible to gauge which one of these set of motivations are more dominant or significant in explaining suicide terrorism. Accordingly it is best to view these particular motivations as intertwined elements that constitute a bigger set of motivations. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that while nationalistic goals and relative deprivation stand out as fundamental elements, others act as significant factors that strengthen the unity of the bigger set. Most importantly, it seems that the more of these elements are compiled, the stronger can the set act in terms of motivating suicide terrorism. In other words, if those relatively deprived groups of

people that accommodate strategically motivated organizations also contain deep sentiments of humiliation, revenge, and outrage, the utilization of suicide attacks will be more likely.

There is one problem that remains unanswered in this discussion and that is the question of "drive"? What makes some individuals in a group to act on given motivations while the rest remain dormant, or only supportive? What is it in a person that makes him a doer, in this case sacrifice his life for a cause? The answer to this question obviously lies in psychoanalytical research, which some view as futile, but one that remains to be explored. As Mook (1996) reports, the most influential theory of human motivation stemmed from Freud's writings. The drive discussed here refers to Freud's term "trieb", translated as drive, which stands to mean an inborn, intrapsychic force motivating human behavior (Liebert & Spiegler 1994). An attempt to answer this question is beyond the scope of this survey. However, interested readers might find it useful to study Freud's drive theory and the progression of his ideas. For example, in his fourth and final version of drive theory, Freud speculated that the sexual and aggressive drives serve to regulate human beings' two regulatory tendencies. Freud referred to them as anabolism- "to build up and synthesize" versus catabolism- "to conserve or tear down", in other words, life versus death instincts (Holzman 1995, 130). Although psychoanalytic explanations can assist in a deeper understanding of such motives, analysis from psychoanalytic theory continues to be a difficult task due to the lack of data on suicide attackers. The difficulty of obtaining information from a suicide mission candidate, due to restrictive circumstances and secrecy of organizations, render future research on this issue not easily attainable. Nevertheless some meaningful remarks come from Jessica Stern who has been able to interview many Palestinians during 1999. From the narrative data that she obtained, Stern (2003, 282) concludes:

> They start out feeling humiliated, enraged that they are viewed by some Other as second class. They take on new identities as martyrs on behalf of a purported spiritual cause. The spiritually perplexed learn to focus on action. The weak become strong. The selfish become altruists, ready to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives in the belief that their deaths will serve the public good. Rage turns to conviction. What seems to happen is that they enter a kind of trance where the world is divided between good and evil, victim and oppressor.

As a result this study contradicts the view that suicide terrorism is an exclusively organizational phenomenon, which regards the individual as the last link in the process. Although the strategic logic theory seems to be highly explanatory in terms of suicide

terrorism's motivations, it need not, and should not ignore the individual aspects of the issue. Such ignorance would only strengthen the common misconception that a suicide terrorist is just one of those homicidal maniacs and prevent the deepening of understanding the important aspects of suicide terrorism in terms of its social, political, and historical context.

On the contrary, the findings of this study suggest that suicide terrorism should be perceived in a multi-dimensional manner, by which both organizational and individual motivations are considered to be significant in explaining the phenomenon. Theories, with different views of the issue, do not need to be contending each other, ignoring the other aspects of suicide terrorism.

4.2. Limitations of the Study

The present study comes with certain limitations. First, the research methodology presents a limitation to the research. In order to test the hypothesis in this study, two movements, which have intensely utilized suicide terrorism, were investigated. The aim of this investigation was to explore whether one of the contending arguments seemed more dominant than the other. One limitation of case study method is that it does not allow for broad generalizations about the group being studied. In other words the generalizability of motivations for suicide terrorism found in these cases is limited.

Second, the investigation has been realized through available public resources, such as interviews, surveys realized among Tamils or Palestinians, journalistic and academic studies of the organizations, news reports and articles on the individual suicide attackers, which may carry the subjective views of the writers. Furthermore, the researcher was not able to collect data through interviewing among the groups that have been investigated.

Furthermore, one of the cases is evidently more studied by researchers compared to the other. The lack of field research regarding the psychological predispositions and socioeconomic status of suicide attackers in Sri Lanka can be viewed as one for the shortcomings of this survey.

4.3. Future Recommendations

Considering the exploratory nature of the present research, some studies may want to further explore and investigate forthcoming themes in this study. Research from this thesis might consider duplicating the present study with other groups, such as the secular Palestinian organization al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades or the recently elevated Al Qaeda. Moreover, research towards understanding how psychological and cultural relationships interact in terms of binding many people for the same phenomenon in different parts of the world would be an interesting exploration. For this, investigative research to deepen our knowledge about communities and the mechanisms of organizations would be highly valuable. Furthermore, as I have mentioned in the previous sections, psychoanalytical research among candidate or deceased suicide terrorists seem to be missing, nevertheless such a survey may be considered to fall out the scope of political science.

4.4. Conclusion

This study presented an exploration on the motivations of suicide terrorism. A preliminary assumption was that motivation of suicide terrorism could not be limited to either organizational or individual motivations. Accordingly, the hypothesis of this survey was that contending theories or explanations suggested by analysts so far could be combined in a multi-dimensional approach to understand the motives behind this phenomenon.

Indeed the findings of this survey showed that factors of both organizational and individual motivations are applicable and significant in understanding suicide terrorism. Accordingly, it is suggested that further research should investigate this phenomenon in an attitude which takes into account the multi-dimensional characteristic of suicide terrorism. This would render an understanding, especially among western societies,

capable of discussing this highly debated issue beyond the discourse of total craziness or religious fanaticism. An improvement of the discourse can bring forward more efficient policy recommendations that would help decision makers in formulating policies to prevent or weaken the formation of underlying motives of suicide terrorism.

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