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ABSTRACT


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Key Words: CHP, U.S., media, WWII, culture, information, press, Ulus, Reader's Digest

Traditional accounts of Turkish-American relations point to the 1945-1947 period as the point at which political ties between the two countries became "important." However, when one looks at the information about the United States published by Ulus Gazetesi, the semi-official newspaper of the CHP, during that period, one sees a fully-developed pro-U.S. perspective, complete with many articles directly translated from U.S. sources. From this situation, we can infer that the Turkish-American alliance cemented after WWII had deeper roots than just the international situation following the war.

In an effort to determine exactly when the pro-U.S. outlook displayed in Ulus during WWII developed, this thesis identifies, traces, and assesses the information about the U.S. that the newspaper published during the war years. This thesis also evaluates Turkish-American relations during the 1930s and finds that the 1930s saw an advance in the relations between the two countries, and prepared the way for a more comprehensive political, economic, and cultural relationship. The role of Ulus in Turkish society, and the role of Reader's Digest, the primary source of Ulus' U.S.-sourced information, in American society and the U.S. government's WWII information efforts, are also examined.
The thesis concludes that U.S.-sourced information played an important role in *Ulus*' wartime publishing practices and that relations between the Turkish and U.S. governments during the 1930s and WWII need to be re-evaluated in order to explain *Ulus*' pro-U.S. attitude and the prevalence of pro-U.S. and U.S.-sourced information in the newspaper during WWII.
ÖZET

C.H.P., A.B.D. VE ULUS: A.B.D.’NİN ULUS GAZETESİ’NDE İKİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞ BOYUNCA YANSITILMASI

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Tezimin amacı, 2. Dünya Savaşı süreci boyunca Ulus gazetesiinde sergilenen Amerikancı bakış açısının tam olarak ne zaman ortaya çıktığını tespit etmek amacıyla, anılan süreçte Ulus gazetesiinde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’ne ilişkin olarak yayınlanmış bulunan bilgilerin izini sürerek, bunları göstermek ve değerlendirmektir. Bunun yanında, tezim,

Tezimin görüşü, Amerikan kaynaklı bilgilerin Ulus gazetesinin savaş sürecinde gerçekleştirdiği yayın faaliyetlerinde çok önemli bir rol oynadığı yönündedir. Buna ek olarak, Ulus'un Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne karşı sergilediği olumlu bakış açısı ile gazetede yer alan Amerikancı ve Amerikan kaynaklı yayınların yaygınlığını açıklayabilmek için Türk ve Amerikan yönetimleri arasında 1930'larda ve 2. Dünya Savaşı sırasında yaşanan ilişkilerin yeniden tahlil edilmesi ve değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AA: Anadolu Ajansı (the Anatolian Agency)

CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (the Republican People's Party)

CIA: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

FDR: U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt

NATO: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ONI: U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence

OSS: U.S. Office of Strategic Services

TBMM: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (the Turkish National Parliament)

U.K.: the United Kingdom

U.S.: the United States

USSR: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWI: World War One

WWII: World War Two
1.0 INTRODUCTION

Originally, this thesis was intended to examine Turkish press reaction to the Marshall Plan. When I began to read <i>Ulus Gazetesi</i> (<i>The Nation</i>) issues from early 1947, though, I encountered something that I had not expected at all: dozens of articles from American sources like <i>Reader's Digest</i> and <i>Life</i>, translated into Turkish and presented to the readers of <i>Ulus</i> as information about the United States or the World. I had expected to see articles from those magazines in Turkish publications later, in the 1950s, after the Turkish-American alliance had taken on much more serious dimensions through the Marshall Plan, Turkey's accession to NATO, and the full advent of the Cold War. However, I found myself looking at issues of <i>Ulus</i> from January 1947, before Truman had even given his famous speech before Congress, filled with American articles. “When did this begin, and how?,” I wondered.

In order to satisfy my curiosity, I went back first to <i>Ulus</i>’ issues from 1946, then 1945, and eventually 1944, in order to determine what kind of American-sourced articles were published in the paper during those years. I was surprised to find that, even in 1945, there were many more articles than I had expected. According to the historiography that I knew, there was no way to justify the appearance of these articles based on the contemporary political relationship between the Turkish and U.S. governments. All the accounts that I had read indicated that the Turkish-U.S. relationship did not really blossom until Truman's Congressional speech in March 1947, and even then, the U.S. government was reluctant to have closer ties with the Turkish government, something that would mandate more aid and commitments to an ally they knew little about.¹

Turkish-American relations began as the result of specific political and economic conditions that existed in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. At that time, British and French attentions were focused

on the Eastern Mediterranean, allowing the infant United States an opportunity to sell its manufactures in regions outside of great power interest. Subsequently, U.S. merchants, with governmental support, were able to make their first international economic forays on the Barbary Coast (today's Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) in the face of only weak resistance from the Ottoman authorities. Later U.S. involvement in the Ottoman empire generally involved trade in opium, tobacco, some foodstuffs and weapons, and educational/missionary endeavors. This situation continued until the end of WWI.

Following WWI, Woodrow Wilson's “Fourteen Points” gave courage to Turkish nationalists who desired to remain free of foreign subjugation. Correspondingly, the U.S. began to attract more attention from Ankara as the İstiklal Harbi turned into the struggle to develop an industrial nation-state in place of the former agriculturally-based imperial regime.

The Turkish-American partnership which developed in the years after WWII was the result of at least some long-term, rarely changeable factors such as geography and distribution of natural resources. Turkey's position on the Straits, near the Soviet Union, and between the Soviet Union and the oil fields of the Eastern Mediterranean and Southwest Asia, made it


3 Erhan, op. cit., p. 38.


5 Ibid. pp. 72-77, 83-92, 163-164, 171-179, 190-204. The U.S. protestant missionary schools in the Ottoman empire, by the end of the Nineteenth Century, were quite extensive, involved dozens of schools spread over all of Anatolia and the Levant, and were influential. A number of these schools continued their operations into the Republican era.


strategically vital for the U.S.’ anti-Soviet strategy.\(^8\) Turkey also overshadows the Eastern Mediterranean shipping lanes leading to and from the Suez Canal.

All the same, long-term historical factors such as geography do not fully explain why Turkish-American relations took such a sudden turn. If geography were the only factor, then the U.S. would have been trying to convince Turkey to become an ally, especially in the last months of WWII and 1945, not the other way around. Instead, actors inside of the Turkish and U.S. governments, the opinions they held, and the decisions they made, played a vital role in the development of the Turkish-American post-WWII alliance; the result of those decisions was that, in a brief span of time, the Turkish and U.S. governments metamorphized from distant acquaintances to close political cooperatives, even dostlar (“best friends”), as one would say in Turkish. Thus, in order to understand how and why the participants made the decisions that they did, the key period between 1927 and 1947, in which Turkish-American relations developed from low-level trade\(^9\) to a comprehensive political strategic alliance, must be examined more closely.

The only text I encountered which presented concrete indications that the post-WWII Turkish-American alliance had its roots in pre-WWII developments is Roger Trask's *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939*. Trask's study reveals that, if one looks closer, the first faint signs of interest in an alliance based on mutual needs, especially on the Turkish side, can be traced to the 1930s (even if the author tended to enthusiastically overemphasize the depth of Turkish-U.S. interwar relations).\(^10\) Recent books compiled by Rıfat Bali from U.S. government archives also point to interwar U.S. interest in Turkey, since the U.S. State Department commissioned several in-depth studies on 1930s Turkish society.\(^11\)

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9 Discussed in more detail below, in Section 2.2.


Exactly what reason those studies were performed for is not clear, although quotes such as Wilbur J. Carr's imply a larger information-gathering purpose. 1930s Turkish-American ties, however, paled in comparison to those which developed after Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan aid intended primarily for Greece.

1.1. The Literature

The vast majority of the works available that touch on Turkish-U.S. relations indicate that 1947, or at the earliest, 1945 was the point at which the present Turkish-U.S. “strategic partnership” began to form, a result of aggressive Soviet posturing in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea/Caucasus regions. If one looks only at formal political relations between Turkey and the U.S. in the 1945-1947 juncture, the emphasis most certainly seems accurate.

The basis for this opinion may stretch back to Thomas and Frye's *The United States and Turkey and Iran*, Kemal Karpat's *Turkey's Politics*, and to Bernard Lewis' now-dated text, originally published in 1961. The first book was the contemporary political guidebook for Americans who wanted to understand the U.S.' new political responsibilities in Southwest Asia. Part of the book's appeal came from its editor, former Undersecretary of State and close advisor to FDR, Sumner Welles. The Turkish half of the book was penned by Lewis V. Thomas, but he essentially leaps over the interwar period. Fortunately, he does mention FDR's December 1941 declaration that Turkey was essential to U.S. security and interests.14

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12 “This study has contributed materially to the department's understanding of Turkish mentality and institutions during the present period of transition and the department would be pleased to receive further reports of this nature. It is suggested in this connection that an interesting and valuable subject for report would be the position of religion in present-day Turkey.” Rifat Bali, ed. *U.S. Diplomatic Documents on Turkey, Volume III* (op.cit.). p. 9.


14 Ibid. pp. 139-152. For FDR's December 1941 declaration, see pp. 143-144.
Kemal Karpat devoted a large amount of space to events and developments in Turkey between the wars, but mentions America only in relation to the 1928 Bursa prosyletizing incident. Throughout Karpat's text, the U.S. is mentioned almost exclusively in postwar terms. Bernard Lewis linked the emergence of Turkish democracy directly to the critical 1945-1950 crossroads, when Turkey passed from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy while cementing partnerships with the democratic opposition to the Soviet Union, led by the United States. In his account, Lewis makes no mention of pre-war, or even wartime, developments in Turkish-U.S. relations, so he seems to suggest that Turkish-U.S. relations suddenly materialized in 1945-1947.

One text that remains important for its observations of Turkish development between the wars is Donald Webster's *The Turkey of Atatürk*. Although Webster was an American, his text focuses exclusively on the processes of social change initiated by the Kemalist state in the 1920s and 1930s (Webster was a sociologist). The only moment in which he mentions “American influence” is in reference to John Dewey, Columbia University's Teachers College, and Turkish elementary schools.

Another work that has remained influential is George Lenczowski's *United States Interests in the Middle East*. Lenczowski's text discusses interwar U.S. interests almost entirely in terms of oil, and contains the following canonical assessment: “The events of WWII finally brought the United States into major involvements in the Middle East that have continued until today.” The author also makes no note of interwar developments in Turkish-U.S. relations.


19 Lenczowski, George. *United States Interests in the Middle East*. American Enterprise Institute: Washington D.C., 1968. The quote is taken from p. 12; discussion of the Turkish
A number of important early articles also stressed the “new” nature of the Turkish-U.S. relationship. As an example, George C. McGhee authored an article titled “Turkey Joins the West,” the title of which refers to postwar, not interwar, developments, shortly after the end of his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey; the article takes it importance from its author and where it was published, in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs*. McGhee did discuss some of Turkey' domestic developments in the 1920s and 1930s, but none of the narrative touches on Turkish-U.S. relations during that period, so the reader receives the impression that Turkish-U.S. relations are a postwar phenomenon.\footnote{20}

The earliest academic texts to focus on Turkish-American relations were predominantly Turkish and began to appear by the early 1960s. A. Haluk Ülman, Türkkaya Ataöv, Oral Sander, Mehmet Gönlübol, and Fahir Armaoğlu are the foremost names of this first generation of Turkish scholars working on Turkish-U.S. relations, and without exception, these scholars focused on Turkish-U.S. relations as a wartime or postwar matter. A. Haluk Ülman, for example, published official documents on Turkish-U.S. relations encompassing the 1939-1947 period in 1961.\footnote{21} In his foreword, he states that the “ilk temelleri” (“first/original foundations”) of Turkish-American relations were laid in the 1945-1947 period.\footnote{22} In the text itself, the interwar period discussion focuses on the Lausanne and Montreux negotiations and includes extremely few details about other aspects of Turkish-U.S. ties during those two decades.\footnote{23}

Türkkaya Ataöv released a text titled *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* which takes as its starting point the postwar global situation.\footnote{24} Türkkaya did devote six pages to interwar (and non-Republic appears primarily on pp. 8, 11-16, and 59-60.


\footnote{22} Ibid. p. vii.

\footnote{23} Ibid. pp. 9-20.

Lausanne) Turkish-U.S. affairs, but none of the discussion involves the years between 1927, when diplomatic contacts were restored, and the beginning of WWII.  

Oral Sander's study, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: 1947-1964*, is the first major Turkish full-length work to focus specifically on Turkish-U.S. relations. However, as is obvious from the title, Sander also thought that Turkish-U.S. relations began with the postwar era; accordingly, he devoted essentially no space to describing Turkish-American interwar relations and summarizes the 1923-1939 years in two paragraphs.

Mehmet Gönlübol published a 1971 article which stated that “... relations between Turkey and the U.S.A., which originally took the form of foreign aid extended under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. ...”. In other words, he also attributes Turkish-American relations to the postwar situation. Gönlübol and Ülman also published a joint analysis of Turkey's foreign policy during the two decades from 1946-1966. In that essay Turkish-American relations were again understood as a postwar development, but at least one mention is made of the Turkish government's prewar tilt towards the Western European democracies. Fahir Armaoğlu, besides publishing works concerning Turkish-U.S. diplomatic relations,
published a 1966 article titled “Turkey and the United States: A New Alliance.” This analysis looked at Turkish-U.S. relations solely within the 1946-1966 framework.

By the 1980s American and other foreign academicians also began to look more closely at Turkish-U.S. relations. In 1973, the first major treatment of Turkish-American relations by an American scholar, George Harris, was published. Harris, like the other authors mentioned here, is content to pass over interwar Turkish-American relations in the briefest manner possible, and even states that, after 1923, “. . . Turkish interest in an intimate American connection rapidly evaporated.” Even though the author's focus, as evidenced by the study's title, purposefully focuses on the postwar alliance, the reader receives the impression that nothing of note happened in Turkish-American relations between the wars.

Bruce R. Kuniholm's well-known study, The Origins of the Cold War in the Middle East, is a classic political science text on the Cold War. This work is also important for its treatment of postwar developments in Turkey, Iran, and Greece, and the contextualizing that the author places those developments in. For this reason, this study's neglect of interwar developments in Turkish-U.S. relations has always attracted my attention.

Conferences on Turkish-American relations also became more frequent by the 1980s. The Heritage Foundation and the Foreign Policy Institute of Ankara, for instance, sponsored an October 1984 conference which saw papers presented on a wide variety of issues in Turkish-

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33 For Harris' discussion, see pp. 9-12. The quote is from p. 11.

American relations.³⁵ Of the thirteen chapters put forward as the conference's proceedings, five deal directly with Turkish-U.S. relations; none of the five touch on the interwar era.

Another text, appropriately titled *Turkish-American Relations: Forty Years of Continuity and Change*, documents the minutes and presentations of a 1986 conference.³⁶ As is obvious from the title, the conference itself treated Turkish-American relations as a post-war phenomenon. Of the papers presented at that conference, only one mentions, in a brief way, interwar developments in Turkish-American relations.³⁷

More recent works have not dramatically changed the dominant interpretation that interwar Turkish-American relations were inconsiderable. Ekavi Athanassopoulou's excellent *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952* devotes a considerable amount of space to interwar developments in Turkey's foreign policy.³⁸ However, because this text does not dwell exclusively on Turkish-U.S. matters, the topic does not receive a large amount of attention. On the other hand, Athanassopoulou uses, and points out the importance of, the correspondence of the U.S. Ambassadors to Turkey during the 1930s.³⁹ William Hale's widely-read study of more than 200 years of Turkish foreign policy also devotes an entire chapter to Turkey's interwar foreign relations.⁴⁰ Of the more than 30 pages in that chapter, only two contain even passing references to the U.S.⁴¹


⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 63, 70.
Recent Turkish scholars have also begun to look in more detail at certain aspects of Turkish-U.S. relations. Gül İnanç Barkay published a study of Turkey's role in U.S. diplomacy during the 1940-1943 period.\(^{42}\) Happily, this study contains more than four pages that are given solely to interwar Turkish-U.S. relations. Much of the author's discussion is general, but she did utilize U.S. government documents, and some interesting details about the early 1930s in Turkish-American affairs were included.\(^{43}\)

Probably the best-known recent Turkish scholarship on Turkish-U.S. relations is Nasuh Uslu's *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* (*Turkish-American Relations*).\(^{44}\) Despite the sweeping tone of the title, this text, like several others discussed above, treats Turkish-U.S. relations as a fundamentally postwar development since it makes no mention of interwar, or even wartime, Turkish-U.S. relations. This text also examines its topic purely from the perspective of political science.

Two other recent works simply divide Turkish-American relations at the traditional, and now out-of-favor, Ottoman Empire-Turkish Republic dividing line.\(^{45}\) A recent thesis written on Turkish media representations of the U.S. after WWII treats 1946 as the starting point for both

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\(^{43}\) Ibid. pp. 16-21.


\(^{45}\) 1) Armaoğlu, Fahir. *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri ( Açıklamali)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991. On p. ix the author states the opinion that Turkish-U.S. relations could be divided into two, at either the Ottoman-Turkish Republic change or at the post-WWII period. 2) Erhan, Çağrı. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001. This author, on pages 17-18, states that most works on Turkish-U.S. relations take 1945 as their starting point, and asserts that the interwar era contained many events that augured post-war developments. However, he ends his study with WWI, which seems to relegate interwar Turkish-American relations to non-relevance. My opinion, for reasons that will become clear in the coming pages, is that the interwar era in Turkish-U.S. relations has qualities that separate it from both the Ottoman and the post-WWII periods.
heightened Turkish-U.S. relations and U.S. “information” in popular Turkish magazines. Another thesis, on representations of the U.S. and U.S. culture in satirical Turkish magazines from 1945-1960, also places Turkish-American relations essentially in the postwar context. Finally, the other classic text on modern Turkish history, Erik Jan Zürcher's *Turkey: A Modern History*, also treats Turkish-U.S. relations as a purely postwar development. In the three pages that the author devotes to Turkey's interwar foreign policy, the U.S. is never mentioned.

The appearance of the previously mentioned *Reader's Digest*, et al., articles, however, indicated that there was more to pre-1947 Turkish-U.S. relations than I had understood from the studies that I had read. How had Turkish officials learned of *Reader's Digest* and the other publications?, I asked; how did they obtain those articles, and why? Most importantly of all, how did this happen at such an early date, long before the declaration of the Marshall Plan and when Turkish-U.S. relations were still at such a low level of importance for the isolationist-minded Americans?

Eventually I learned that no studies of U.S. information in Turkish publications during or immediately after WWII existed, so I decided that, in order to understand the Turkish political situation, I would have to look more closely at *Ulus*. *Ulus* was the mouthpiece of the ruling *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP, the Republican People's Party) and *Ulus'* writers generally

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49 Kuniholm, op. cit. p. 67, states that Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) “knew little about the Near East” and “was not especially interested in the area.” FDR's February 1945 agreement with Saudi Arabia does seem to complicate this issue, however.
reflected what İsmet İnönü wanted Ulus' readers to see. Thus, it should be possible to discern the CHP government's, and by extension İsmet İnönü's, attitude towards the U.S. during the war years by examining what was published in Ulus.

With that aim in mind, I examined all Ulus editions printed between January 1939 and August 1945, recording every mention of the U.S. or of issues related to the U.S. Subjects as diverse as advertisements and pictures were also noted, and special attention was given to information taken directly from U.S. sources such as Reader's Digest and Life.

My fundamental interest lies in the interactions between decision-making elites and the people, and the structures that each create and are subject to. Analysis of the information published by Ulus Gazetesi during WWII will provide insight into the ideas that Turkish officials, as well as U.S. officials, wanted Turkish people to absorb in relation to the United States. In other words, this is a partial history of a social, cultural, political, and informational project through which the Turkish people were provided with certain information by Turkish officials.


51 Here, “elites” refers to the small number of men in the upper echelons of the Kemalist state and U.S. government who made political decisions; “the people” refers to all those living inside the borders of the Turkish republic or the United States, regardless of class, religion, or ethnicity.
and American elites. That is, this thesis focuses on a point in time at which two nations, on their own long-term trajectories, became much more closely entwined.

Furthermore, because Ulus Gazetesi was the newspaper most closely linked to Turkey's governing party, it contains the best material for analyzing exactly what the project mentioned in the previous paragraph consisted of. Subsequent Turkish cultural and social formations were affected by this project, and Turkish citizens also reacted to this project in a variety of ways. These effects and reactions should be the subject of further study, especially because the relationship formed between Turkey and the United States during and after WWII currently seems on the brink of becoming “un-entwined.”

This thesis will first describe the quality of Turkish-American relations in the 1930s. Then, the role of Ulus Gazetesi in promoting the Kemalist project in Turkey will be explained, as will Reader's Digest's similar role in U.S. culture. Subsequently, the material published by Ulus concerning the U.S. during WWII will be presented in detail; special attention will be given to tracing and demarcating the important shifts in Ulus' publishing practices in order to determine what political causes may have triggered those changes. The American sources

52 Also relevant here is the idea of memes (coined in 1976 by Richard Dawkins), i.e. of cultural ideas which, once formulated and propagated into the culture, continue to spread and effect change; see, for example: Lynch, Aaron. *Thought Contagion: How Belief Spreads Through Society*. New York: Basic Books, 1996; or the first two chapters of Beck, Don Edward and Christopher C. Cowan. *Spiral Dynamics: Mastering Values, Leadership, and Change (Exploring the New Science of Memetics)*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. Whereas the idea of memes would be extremely useful for this study, memes have proven notoriously difficult to describe theoretically or to quantify in a meaningful manner (the main academic journal concerning memes, the *Journal of Memetics*, ceased publishing in 2005 because of this problem). Consequently, an attempt to use meme theory in order to trace the spread of certain ideas about the United States in Turkish society must remain outside of the scope of this study.

53 See: Burke, Peter. “Overture. The New History: Its Past and its Future.” *New Perspectives on Historical Writing, 2nd Ed.* Peter Burke, ed. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. p. 11; I have in mind the ways in which political events, in this case the processes which led to the formation of the Turkish-American alliance and the subsequent Cold War years, allowed the United States to influence Turkish society through a variety of channels. This is not to suggest that the Turkish people were passive receptors of U.S. culture -- some were, but many were not and developed various means of resistance in response -- but there is also little doubt that U.S. culture has had a lasting impact on Turkish culture, life, and society.
of that information will be examined for context, content, and intent. Finally, conclusions concerning why the CHP leadership chose to publish the kind of information that it did, and what U.S. intentions in providing that information were, will be explored.
2.0 TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE 1930s

“... I confidently believe in the future of the Turkish Republic...” 54

Initially, Turkish-American relations in the interwar period, continuing as they had in the previous 150 years, gave little indication of the situation that would emerge after WWII. In the aftermath of WWI, no official relations existed between the Turkish nationalist forces in Anatolia and the United States government. Because the U.S. never declared war on the Ottoman Empire (nor vice versa), the U.S. maintained a High Commissioner, Rear Admiral Mark Bristol, in Istanbul from 1919 until 1927, when exchange of notes and ambassadors finally re-established official relations. 55 Other minor diplomatic questions were solved through mutual agreements in 1929, 1931, and 1934. 56

2.1. Interwar Turkish-American Political Relations

Immediately following WWI, the U.S. became a subject of discussion among the Turkish political and intellectual elite, largely because of U.S. involvement in settling post-WWI issues. During the post-WWI negotiations, the U.S. sent two commissions, the King-Crane Commission and the Harbord Commission, to the Eastern Mediterranean. The King-Crane Commission examined the situation in Syria and Palestine in June-July 1919. The Harbord Commission was more important to the Turkish nationalists because it was tasked with evaluating the potential for a U.S. mandate in Eastern Anatolia.


55 For a detailed account of the long process that accompanied the foundation of post-war Turkish-U.S. diplomatic relations, see Trask, op. cit., pp. 21-64.

56 For the text of the 1929 Commerce and Navigation, see Armaoğlu, op. cit., pp. 113-116. For the settlements of the residence, WWI and Independence War claims, and extradition problems, see Trask, op. cit., pp. 194-216.
The Harbord Commission traveled to Eastern Anatolia in September 1919 and decided in favor of a U.S. mandate for all of Anatolia.\(^57\) The Commission's affirmative answer sparked a short-lived debate among Turkish nationalists and intellectuals concerning whether a mandate should be pursued. Some Istanbul-based intellectuals and liberal nationalists, such as Halide Edip (Adıvar) and Rıza Nur, favored an American mandate; a Wilsonian League had been founded in Istanbul in 1918, and some believed that an American mandate was the only way to, at the same time, resist the Great Powers and develop Turkish society.\(^58\) The idea of a U.S. mandate expired quickly, however, because the U.S. Senate rejected U.S. membership in the League of Nations and the Turkish nationalists did not officially request the U.S. mandate.\(^59\)

Another issue which marred and stunted attempts to deepen Turkish-American ties during the 1920s was the efforts of Armenian activists in the U.S. Starting almost immediately after WWI, some segments of the American-Armenian community began intense anti-Turkey lobbying and press campaigns.\(^60\) This campaign, inspired by the Ottoman state's 1915-1916 deportation of Armenians from Eastern Anatolia, was carried to the point that when official Turkish-U.S. ties were restored in 1927, the Turkish Ambassador to Turkey, Ahmed Mouhtar, arrived in the U.S. under the threat of violence.\(^61\) However, with the June 1934 death of Vahan Cardashian, the primary instigator of post-WWI anti-Turkish fervor in the U.S., a main impediment to enhanced Turkish-American relations disappeared.\(^62\)

Throughout the 1930s, political relations between Turkey and the U.S. remained subdued. Joseph C. Grew, the able diplomat charged with officially reviving Turkish-U.S. relations in 1927, stayed in his post for five years. Grew's tenure in Turkey was an early high point in Turkish-U.S. relations as he worked tirelessly for the betterment and interest of both

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\(^59\) Mango, op. cit., p. 248.

\(^60\) Trask, op. cit., pp. 20-21, 37-39; see also below, section 2.4.

\(^61\) Ibid. pp. 60-62.

\(^62\) Ibid. pp. 210
countries. Grew was succeeded, however, by General Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, an apparent political appointment who was more interested his own hobbies than Turkish-U.S. affairs.

Only two more U.S. Ambassadors were posted to Turkey before WWII. Robert Peet Skinner served from 1933 to 1936 and was, according to Trask, an excellent diplomat who worked to further Turkish-U.S. relations. The last U.S. Ambassador posted to Turkey before the war, and who stayed on through the negotiation of the Turkish-American Trade Agreement signed in 1939, was John Van Antwerp MacMurray. MacMurray evidently found the position in Turkey agreeable despite difficulties concerning the embassy residence. MacMurray also had to navigate through the problems caused by the approach and advent of WWII.

Interwar Turkish-U.S. relations involved major questions of international politics on several occasions. The first was Turkey's enthusiastic support for the U.S.' ill-fated Kellogg-Briand Pact. Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) even made an arrangement with Grew for a lightning notification of the Senate's ratification of this treaty, so that Turkey could be the first nation to follow the U.S. in doing so.

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64 Trask, op. cit., p. 75.

65 Ibid., pp. 76-77.

66 Until MacMurray's term, the U.S. Embassy had essentially switched between Ankara and Istanbul according to season. During MacMurray's term the Ankara Embassy was made more permanent, land for a new U.S. Embassy residence in Ankara was purchased in 1939, and the Istanbul residence was converted into a Consulate General. See: Trask, op. cit., 80-82.

67 For the text of the Kellogg-Briand Pact's first two articles (there was a total of three, but the first two were the essential articles of the Pact), see: Paterson, Thomas G., ed. Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, Vol. 2 (since 1914). 3rd Ed. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989. p. 125.

The negotiations over the 1936 Montreux Convention also brought Turkish and U.S. interests together. The U.S. was not involved in the talks surrounding the Montreux Convention, but it was concerned with the rights of U.S. commerce in the Turkish Straits. For that reason, the U.S. followed developments closely and was pleased when the result not only safeguarded Turkish security but also preserved American interests.\textsuperscript{69} Furthermore, the U.S. government expressed approval of the 1937 Saadabad Pact\textsuperscript{70} and concern over the well-being and preservation of American archaeological expeditions during the 1938-1939 resolution of Hatay's status.\textsuperscript{71}

Joseph Grew, when he left his post as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey in 1932, was able to remark on a “vast improvement” in Turkish-U.S. relations.\textsuperscript{72} He attributed this improvement to the fact that the U.S. was “one of Turkey's most 'disinterested' friends.”\textsuperscript{73} Such disinterest, of course, has both positive and negative aspects. Because the U.S. did not see Turkey as important to its national interest, the U.S. government, as well as other U.S. institutions, was reluctant to make any sort of commitments to Turkey. Where Turkey needed commitment most between the wars was in economy.

2.2. \textit{Interwar Turkish-American Economic Relations}

Following WWI, the Turkish economy was in dire condition. Little industrialization had been accomplished under the Ottoman government, and Anatolia had been devastated by the war's ravages; subsequently, the new nationalist government set about creating and/or encouraging a national economy, industrialization, investment, and a Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{74} Foreign

\textsuperscript{69} Trask, op. cit., pp. 227-233.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. pp. 234.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. pp. 234-236.

\textsuperscript{72} Trask, op. cit., p. 74. See also: Grew, op. cit., pp. 916-917.

\textsuperscript{73} Trask, op.cit., p. 74. Grew, op. cit., p. 916-917.

investment was also initially encouraged.\textsuperscript{75} After the advent of the Great Depression, the world-wide economic problems forced the Kemalist regime to develop other means for developing the economy. These efforts included more government involvement in industrial development, which was institutionalized as Devletçilik ("etatism" or "statism"), one of the CHP's six basic ideological tenets.\textsuperscript{76} These efforts did result in economic expansion during the 1930s, but the Turkish economy still remained largely agricultural at the end of the 1930s.\textsuperscript{77}

Thus, throughout the interwar period, the Turkish government tried to find ways to encourage domestic investment, industrialization, and production without leaving the economy in the hands of foreigners, as it was during the Ottoman Empire's last decades.\textsuperscript{78} This meant that foreign trade was encouraged, but approached cautiously. Correspondingly, the Turkish government attempted to attract foreign technology that would benefit Turkey's domestic industrialization process.

The U.S. was one of the countries which had technology and products that the Turkish government recognized as potentially beneficial for Turkish development. However, a number of obstacles prevented Turkish-American economic relations from blossoming in the 1920s and 1930s. A primary impediment was simply the lack of official U.S. attention to Turkey. Despite the efforts of U.S. Ambassadors, and despite the 1929 Turkish-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, trade with Turkey was not given emphasis by the U.S. government.

When the Turkish leadership began a rearmament program in the mid-1930s to counter the growing Italian menace, for example, one of the nations they turned to was the U.S. The U.S. State Department, however, unpersuaded by entreaties from the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey,

\textsuperscript{75} Owen and Pamuk, op. cit., 14.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid. 18-20.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid. 21-22.

from U.S. companies, and from Turkish representatives of U.S. business interests like Ahmet Emin Yalman, refused to grant permission for the sale of U.S. military products to Turkey.\textsuperscript{79} The U.S. State Department was reluctant even to allow the U.S. Ambassador to promote U.S. business opportunities in Turkey at all.\textsuperscript{80} Only at the end of the 1930s, when problems in exchange payments cropped up, did U.S. officials begin to show more attention.\textsuperscript{81} A further reason that the U.S. government did not make Turkish-American trade a priority was the fact that the Turkish Straits issue, however important it may have been to European politics, was not a major component of the U.S.' foreign policy or commerce.\textsuperscript{82}

On the Turkish side, worries about trade and exchange balances, as well as bureaucratic hurdles, obstructed mutual trade.\textsuperscript{83} Between 1929 and 1931, the Turkish government implemented a tariff system which caused some inconvenience to U.S. merchants.\textsuperscript{84} After 1931, a system of quotas on imported goods was instituted which also regulated the outflow of exchange.\textsuperscript{85} Neither of the trade regimes that Turkey implemented during the 1930s caused serious problems for U.S. merchants, but those regimes also did not encourage trade with the U.S. In actuality, though, Turkish-American trade was not vital to either country, even if it was more important to Turkey.\textsuperscript{86} Although Turkish-U.S. trade saw a gradual increase throughout the 1930s, by the outbreak of WWII it still had not reached the levels of the temporary “boom” that occurred in 1919-1922.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{79} Trask, op. cit. 100-101. Trask explains that the State Department was under pressure at that time because of investigations into the U.S. munitions industry.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid. 98-100.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid. 102-104. Exchange shortages were also an issue in the negotiations over the 1939 Turkish-American Trade Agreement.

\textsuperscript{82} See: Howard, Harry N. "The United States and the Problem of the Turkish Straits: A Reference Article." \textit{Middle East Journal}. 1, 1947. pp. 59-60.

\textsuperscript{83} Trask, op. cit., 94-98.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. 96-97.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid. 97-98.

\textsuperscript{86} See statistics presented by Trask, op. cit., pp. 105-107.
An important feature of Turkey's Twentieth Century development process was the Turkish need for investment and technology. At the beginning of the 1930s, the Turkish leadership had tried to attract American investment, but the amount of American finance in Turkey remained, as it had been in the 1920s, miniscule. Şükrü Saraçoğlu even spent two months in the U.S. during late 1931 looking for sources of investment willing to venture capital in Turkey.

Much of the reason for this lack of U.S. investment is traceable to the questions surrounding the Turkish government's repayment of the Ottoman debt and to whether Turkey had the ability to repay debt taken on to fund industrial or infrastructure projects. Although U.S. loans to Turkey were suggested and pursued by both sides, only one project resulted in Turkish receipt of U.S. funds, and only a small number of U.S. firms founded operations in Turkey. Turkish government regulations concerning banking and labor provided further disincentives to American investment.

Significantly more successful was the knowledge provided by U.S. technicians and advisors during the 1930s. Turkish interest in U.S. technical help extended back to 1923, but the

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87 Ibid. p. 104. See also: Tunçay, Mete. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması 1923-1931*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005. Page 206, note 35, of this text mentions that the post-war boom in Turkish-American trade was possibly connected to inflows of humanitarian aid and Europe's brief inability to meet Turkey's need for certain products. Once these situations normalized, trade between Turkey and the U.S. even dropped below pre-war levels.


91 Ibid. 132-137. That loan, however, was not fully paid, and the Turkish government did not completely repay the capital that it did receive.

92 Ibid. 137-139.

93 Ibid. pp. 131-132.
number of U.S. advisors and technicians greatly expanded during the 1930s. U.S. advisors were especially vital to the formulation of Turkey's first Five-Year Plan, and in the provision of advice and technical know-how on other issues.

The Turkish leadership's pursuit of development help led them to seek aid from multiple governments. In 1934, for example, Turkey received an eight million USD credit from the USSR for a development project in Kayseri. Turkey's first Five-Year Plan was influenced by both the U.S. and Soviet methods of development.

Turkey's main economic partner between the two wars was actually Nazi Germany, until Hitler's policies began to threaten Turkey's sovereignty. At the beginning of the 1930s, the U.S. and Germany held nearly equal shares of Turkey's foreign commerce. However, between 1932-1934, the percentage of Turkey's imports and exports held by Germany, already on the increase since the late 1920s, showed a massive increase, nearly tripling in the case of exports. The increase continued throughout the 1930s until, by 1938, Germany accounted for more than 40 percent of Turkey's exports and nearly 50 percent of Turkey's imports.

The Turkish leadership, however, was disconcerted by Germany's March 1938 Anschluss with Austria, Hitler's annexation of the Südetenland, and the Nazi Lebensraum ideology. Additionally, Italy was Turkey's foremost security concern at that time, but Hitler gave tacit approval to Italy's April 1939 invasion of Albania and then signed the May 1939 Steel Pact

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94 Ibid. pp. 139-145.
95 Ibid. pp. 140-143, 144-145.
with Mussolini. Thus, towards the end of the decade Ankara began to examine political and economic alternatives to Germany.\(^{100}\) One result of this search was the Turkish-American Trade Agreement, which followed the trilateral agreement signed between Turkey, Britain, and France in October 1939.

The 1939 Turkish-American Trade Agreement's roots actually extended back to 1936 when “a Turkish official” suggested the possibility of replacing the 1929 Turkish-U.S. Commerce and Navigation Agreement.\(^{101}\) In 1937, the U.S. State Department “. . . decided that a basis existed for trade negotiations with Turkey,” and talks concerning the new agreement were initialized in March 1938.\(^{102}\) The agreement itself was finalized on 1 April 1939.

Two points concerning this agreement are worth mentioning. The first is that the contemporary U.S. press saw this agreement as having political significance, i.e. U.S. trade ideas had influence in Turkey in opposition to German practices.\(^{103}\) This meant that some in the U.S. were interested in how much influence the Nazis had in Turkey, but this interest seemed to be directed towards ideals rather than more practical questions of political influence or military power.

The 1939 Turkish-American Trade Agreement's other important feature was that it did not solve the obstacles preventing the expansion of Turkish-U.S. trade. German merchants actually benefitted from this agreement, because they were able to offer better prices for Turkish products, but the central difficulty continued to be exchange. Since Turkish products were mostly being sold to Germany, the expected amount of USD exchange did not enter into the Turkish market. As result, the Turkish government had continual difficulties making


\(^{101}\) Trask, op. cit., p. 115.

\(^{102}\) Ibid. 116-117.

\(^{103}\) Ibid. 122.
exchange available for sales to U.S. importers. Moreover, this problem remained unsolved during the war years.  

Therefore, the 1939 Turkish-American Trade Agreement produced the same results that Turkish-U.S. trade during the interwar period produced in general: some steps forward, but in essence not the end that was envisioned by either side. Turkish-U.S. trade between the wars was marked by a desire on both sides to expand trade and exchange technology, but for a variety of reasons those wishes were never fully realized. Possibly the most important aspect of the 1939 agreement was that it signified a mutual interest in expanded relations.

2.3. Interwar Turkish-American Social and Cultural Exchanges

One feature of Turkish-American relations that has been important since the Nineteenth Century, in addition to trade, is social and cultural interaction. As is well-known, U.S. Protestant missionaries began to arrive in the first half of the Nineteenth Century with the aim of founding schools and proselytizing the Ottoman Empire's Christian minorities. By the beginning of WWI, American schools had been founded in Istanbul and many Anatolian locations.

In terms of social interaction, at the end of WWI the main source of Turkish-American contact was still the American missionary endeavors initiated in the previous century. During the following two decades, American technicians and advisors would broaden this contact somewhat, but American schools remained the primary vehicle through which Turkish people became familiar with the U.S. Furthermore, even though a number of U.S. schools were

104 Ibid. 122-125.

105 This process officially began in 1829-1831 with the foundation of the first U.S. Protestant mission in Istanbul (see: Erhan, op. cit., pp. 90-92) and the signing of the 1830 Ottoman-American Trade Agreement (see: Armaoğlu, op. cit., pp. 1-6 for the text of the agreement; see also: Erhan, op. cit., pp. 120-128, and Trask, op. cit., p. 4-7).


107 A small number of students, such as Ahmet Emin Yalman and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer had gone to schools in the U.S. before WWI, but until WWII, very few Turkish students had seen education in the U.S. Trask, op. cit., p. 168, states that “thousands of young Turks” received education at U.S. schools in Turkey between the wars. Another notable example of Turkish
forced to close because of financial difficulties caused by the Great Depression, generally
American schools in Turkey were able to adapt to the new Turkey and continue educating
Turkish citizens in a secular manner.\textsuperscript{108}

One little-known event, which may have had a founding influence on the Turkish educational
system, was John Dewey's two-month 1924 sojourn in Turkey. With Mustafa Kemal's
personal invitation, Dewey traveled to Turkey, studied and observed the Turkish education
system's conditions, and prepared an extensive report on reforms needed, which was
subsequently submitted to the Turkish government.\textsuperscript{109} Even though the exact extent of the
influence of Dewey's reports (as well as the reports of other experts) on the nascent Turkish
Republic's education system has yet to be quantified, it is possible that the Village Institutes
established in the 1930s may have reflected Dewey's concepts.\textsuperscript{110} Dewey's reflections on
Turkish society and its education system are also extremely informative.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{108} See: Trask, op. cit., pp. 147-169. Grew, op. cit., mentions the issue of U.S. schools
frequently; see, for example: pp. 741, 746-747, 748-747, 754-795, et al. Only two incidents,
the Bursa proselytizing incident and the closure of the Izmir International School, marred the
relationship between American schools and the Turkish state in the 1920s and 1930s, but both
were caused by the personnel of the schools involved. In general, if U.S. schools faced
difficulties, they were the same difficulties that other international schools faced in the new
Turkish Republic.

\textsuperscript{109} Anton, John P. and Pınar Canevi, eds. \textit{Cumhuriyet, Eğitim Reformu ve Dewey/The
Republic, Educational Reform and Dewey}. İstanbul: Forum İstanbul Enstitüsü Yayınları,

\textsuperscript{110} See: Carpenter-Kılınc, Sarah. “The National Education Board Conferences and Political
Transition: 1939-1960 -- Changing Perceptions of Schooling and Dialogue of
Kılınc explains, citing Şevket Gedikoğlu, that Mustafa Kemal left the decisions regarding
what educational ideas or techniques would be utilized to “local advisors and researchers.”

\textsuperscript{111} See: Anton, John P. “Dewey'in 1924 Türkiye Ziyareti ve Mevcut Arayışlar/Dewey's 1924
Visit to Turkey and the Present Quests.” \textit{Cumhuriyet, Eğitim Reformu ve Dewey/The
Republic, Educational Reform and Dewey}. John P. Anton and Pınar Canevi, eds. İstanbul:
Outside of educational efforts, there were a handful of social or cultural projects that brought Americans to Turkey. Trask lists U.S. medical programs, archaeological expeditions, and relief programs as the most important social or cultural contacts between Turkey and America between the wars. Of those three, Trask states that medical facilities, especially hospitals, were second in importance only to American educational projects in terms of the institutional work that U.S. citizens performed in Turkey during this period.\(^{112}\) The archaeological expeditions required the least effort from U.S. diplomats and U.S. relief efforts created much Turkish goodwill towards the U.S.\(^{113}\)

2.4. *Interwar Turkish-American Relations: A Paradigm*

Interwar Turkish-American relations can be characterized by the ill-fated, and infamous, Chester Project. The Chester Project was a railroad-construction project with a long, winding, but little-known history. The project's idea was dreamed up by U.S. Admiral Colby M. Chester, whose attention was first brought to the Ottoman Empire when he traveled there in 1900 as captain of the U.S.S. Kentucky, on a mission to obtain reparations for claims related to the Armenian massacres of 1894-1896.\(^{114}\)

Admiral Chester, with the help of several backers, created the Ottoman-American Development Company in 1909 in order to pursue investment opportunities in Anatolia, and subsequently attempted to gain approval from the Porte for the company's proposed projects. In 1911, however, several backers withdrew support, causing embarrassment for the U.S. State Department. Further attempts in 1912 and 1913 to secure State Department support for other Chester projects thus proved fruitless.\(^{115}\) The Chester Project was resurrected after WWI and

\(^{112}\) Ibid. p. 171. Grew composed a speech concerning the American Hospital in Turkey, see: pp. 856-857.

\(^{113}\) Ibid. pp. 177-181, 183-186. For a summary of U.S. interests in Turkey between the wars, see: DeNovo, op. cit., pp. 253-273.

\(^{114}\) This information is extracted from Trask, op. cit., p. 14. See also: Denovo, op. cit., pp. 58-87.

\(^{115}\) Trask, ibid. Denovo, ibid. DeNovo states on p. 58 that “[h]ad the ambitions of the Chester syndicate materialized, they might well have altered the course of American relations with the Middle East, and even the course of Turkish history,” but adds that the Project turned out to be a “colossal and embarrassing failure.”
accepted by the TBMM on 9 April 1923, but doomed to failure when the the companies entrusted to carrying out the project could not maintain mutual cooperation.116

For the U.S., the Chester Project is notable primarily because it was one of the first American attempts to invest in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and also one of the first U.S. attempts to gain access to oil fields in northern Mesopotamia. On the Turkish side, the Project provided opportunities for the Turkish government to obtain investment and possibly political support from a power outside of Europe, but later became the subject of argument during the 1930 election race between the CHP and the Serbest Fırkası (Free Party), and during debates concerning foreign investment in Turkey that occurred in the late 1960s.117

As a result, a U.S. desire to invest abroad, and an Ottoman/Turkish need for economic investment and development, intersected both before and after WWI in the Chester Project. The project met with ultimate failure because of Ottoman bureaucracy and Great Power politics before the war, and because of a lack of U.S. carry-through after the war.118 Similarly, Turkish-American relations in the 1930s were marked by Turkish ambition to obtain investment and technology from abroad, but the U.S. side did not find enough interest, despite the efforts of several capable Ambassadors and pro-Turkish groups in the U.S., to help Turkey in a truly meaningful way. During the 1930s America, besides a traditional tendency to

116 Armaoğlu, op. cit., p. 31; Armaoğlu also mentions that the failure of the partners to carry out the concession resulted in the project's annulment by the TBMM in December 1923. Mango, op. cit., p. 380, offers a slightly different reason for the project's failure. Trask, op. cit., p. 130, seems to agree more with Armaoğlu. Denovo, op. cit., 210-228. Denovo, on p. 210, states that the reason that the Chester Project was taken up after WWI was the U.S. need for petroleum. On pp. 226-227, Denovo cites the delays caused by “internal wrangling” amongst the Ottoman-American Development Company's partners as the cause for the concession's cancellation by the TBMM. Selim İlkin adds British and French reaction to the Project's approval by the TBMM as a further obstacle to the Project's implementation; see: “1922-1923 Yılları Türkiye'sinde Bir Yabancı Sermaye Girişimi: Chester Demiryolu Projesi.” Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Modernitenin Altyapısı Oluşurken. İllhan Tekeli ve Selim İlkin. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004. op. cit., p. 265.


118 There was also some opposition from the Turkish side; see: ibid. pp. 254-263.
isolationism, also had its own economic problems and internal opponents of improved Turkish-American relations.\textsuperscript{119}

In parallel, the Turkish government, because of previous experiences such as the Ottoman capitulations, shied away from aid involving excessive conditions or concessions.\textsuperscript{120} The Chester Project fiasco, and the “representatives” of foreign businesses that flooded into Turkey after the Republic was proclaimed,\textsuperscript{121} deepened Turkish suspicion of foreign economic entanglements. Other difficulties, such as bureaucracy and problems in the Turkish legal system, deterred U.S. businesspeople from becoming involved in the Turkish market.\textsuperscript{122} Apparently, unilateral rejection of signed agreements on the part of Turkish institutions created suspicion, warranted or not, of Turkish bureaucratic and business practices and gave ammunition to Turkey's enemies in the U.S.\textsuperscript{123} Together, these factors kept Turkish-U.S. contacts in a nascent state.

2.5. \textit{Interwar Turkish-American Relations: Summary and Conclusions}

One important point that has always captured this researcher's attention is that Mustafa Kemal, at certain points in the interwar period, expressed admiration for the U.S. and even held it up as an example for Turkey to follow. For instance, Mustafa Kemal, during a dinner gathering that received note in official U.S. documents, told guests and representatives that he

\textsuperscript{119} See: Trask, op. cit. \textit{passim}. Trask mentions especially the political and public opinion problems caused by the U.S.' domestic Armenian lobby throughout the 1920s and 1930s.


\textsuperscript{121} See: Tunçay, op. cit., p. 207. These foreign businesspeople, who included Americans, were apparently little better than carpetbaggers.

\textsuperscript{122} See: Trask, op. cit., p. 95.

preferred the American model of development.\textsuperscript{124} Mustafa Kemal had also, as early as 1923, addressed messages directly to the U.S. and U.S. citizens.\textsuperscript{125}

Several months after his meeting with Von der Osten, Mustafa Kemal apparently expressed his preference for U.S. investment to an unofficial U.S. representative.\textsuperscript{126} In the well-known documentary/film on Mustafa Kemal made by Fox Films, the Gazi expressed a highly positive evaluation of America and the ties between the two countries.\textsuperscript{127} In July 1931, when two U.S. pilots flew non-stop from New York to Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal sent a warm telegram to U.S. President Hoover praising not only the aviators, but the U.S. as well.\textsuperscript{128} Mustafa Kemal met U.S. General Douglas MacArthur in late September 1932 in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{129} On at least one occasion, Mustafa Kemal sent a Turkish official to the U.S. in order to obtain agricultural technology.\textsuperscript{130} Furthermore, Turkish schoolbooks published between 1921 and 1933, which

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{124} Bali, Rıfat N., ed. \textit{U.S. Diplomatic Documents on Turkey Volume IV: New Documents on Atatürk -- Atatürk as Viewed through the Eyes of American Diplomats.} Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2007. pp. 183. The event was recorded by Dr. Hans Henning von der Osten, the head of an American archaeological expedition working in Turkey. The U.S. government official who prepared the document mentioned specifically that “. . . the Chief of State [Mustafa Kemal] prefers to emulate America rather than Europe” (p. 181).
\item \textsuperscript{125} İlkin, op. cit., p. 247.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Tekeli and İlkin, op. cit., p. 184-186.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Grew, op. cit., pp. 895-896. Grew termed Mustafa Kemal's telegram as “unusually expansive” and “long and cordial,” and in a telegram to Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü (Aras), Grew called Mustafa Kemal's telegram “absolutely unprecedented for [its] warmth and cordiality” (ibid. p. 897).
\item \textsuperscript{129} For a discussion of the legends surrounding this event, see: Akalın, Cüneyt. \textit{Atatürk-MacArthur Görüşmesinin İçyüzü: Bir Soğuk Savaş Yalanı.} İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2006. The chat between Mustafa Kemal and General MacArthur took place at the initiative of U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Sherrill (ibid. p. 39).
\item \textsuperscript{130} Tekeli, İlhan ve Selim İlkin. \textit{Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Köktenci Modernitenin Ekonomil Politikasının Gelişimi.} İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004. p. 297.
\end{itemize}
must have had consent from Mustafa Kemal and the circle around him, devoted a surprising amount of space to America, its history, and its important historical figures.\textsuperscript{131}

On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal's professed admiration for the U.S. was not immediately apparent from the projects that he carried out. In other words, the projects pursued by the Kemalist government during the 1920s and 1930s are not obviously identifiable as “American,” even if İsmet İnönü referred to the Hines-Dorr-Kemmerer Report as “very valuable” to the Turkish government's development programs.\textsuperscript{133} Only in the 1950s did Turkish government projects, and their emphasis on agriculturally-based development and asphalt road projects instead of railroads clearly begin to carry a mark of U.S. influence.\textsuperscript{134} As a result, historians have to guess whether the admiration Mustafa Kemal voiced for the U.S. was genuine, or whether he was simply speaking politically or flattering foreign guests.

\textsuperscript{131} See: Sınar, Alev. “1921 ile 1933 Yılları Arasında Yayınlanan İlkokul Okuma Kitaplarında Amerikan Tesiri.” 500. Yılında Amerika. Recep Ertürk ve Hayati Tüfeckcioğlu hazırlayanlar. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1994. pp. 55-60. Alev Sınar's essay contains several extremely interesting quotes; she notes, for instance, that one 1930 Turkish schoolbook described the U.S. as “... dünyann en kuvvetli, en medeni, en mamur, en müterakki, en yüksek diyalardan biri, belki birincisi” (“one of, maybe the foremost, of the world's most powerful, most civilized, most developed, and most progressive nations”) -- p. 57. The schoolbooks contained not only predictable and positive information about American figures like George Washington or Benjamin Franklin, but also about contemporary industrialists like Ford and Rockefeller (p. 56). Additionally, the author notes that the early Republican-era's most pedagogically successful books were written by Sabiha Sertel (in cooperation with Mim Sertel and Ercüment Ekrem), who had lived in America and who generally expressed a positive assessment of American culture.

\textsuperscript{132} What is meant is that the development projects carried out by the Turkish government during the 1930s bore the influence of many countries, because many countries contributed their help and or support to Turkey during this decade, and especially were affected by the Devletçilik ideology that even “New Deal”-supporting Americans would have found difficult to endorse. See Trask, op. cit., pp. 128-129, for a list of countries that gave aid to Turkey during the 1930s.

\textsuperscript{133} Trask, op. cit., p. 144.

One way to approach this problem is to examine the attitude of Ulus Gazetesi towards the U.S. As will be explained in more detail below, Ulus was, by the first days of 1939 (shortly after Mustafa Kemal's November 1938 death), already extremely pro-American. This seems to indicate that Mustafa Kemal had already instructed a pro-U.S. stance in Ulus' pages. Moreover, Ulus continued this stance after Mustafa Kemal's death, which suggests that İsmet İnönü agreed with Mustafa Kemal's ideas on this subject. However, this particular problem requires research in the issues of Hakimiyet-i Milliye\textsuperscript{135} and Ulus from the 1920s and 1930s.

Therefore, at the end of the 1930s and on the brink of world war, Turkish-U.S. relations remained traditionally low-level. Despite initiatives from both sides, Turkish-American trade also remained at its historically "normal" slow pace. On the other hand, at least one side of this pair, Turkey, had begun to see the other side as a potential ally which could fill the role of overseas balancer that Germany and Bolshevik Russia had recently filled. Coupled with increased cultural and technical interaction, the stage was set, given the right conditions, for a mutually-beneficial relationship that would finally take on the weight of formal alliance and cooperation in international politics.

3.0 ULUS GAZETESİ, TURKISH SOCIETY, AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT

“Dündar Öğretmen Ulus Okuyor


Ulus Gazetesi has long been understood as the semi-official mouthpiece for the CHP during the era of single-party rule in Turkey. The single-party regime began with the declaration of the Turkish Republic in November 1923 and continued until the CHP was unseated in 1950, in Turkey's first truly free and transparent elections. Ulus continued publication, through some politically-motivated closures in the 1950s, until it closed in 1971.

Ulus, consequently, was more than just a newspaper -- it was an outlet for the official viewpoint of the CHP, and was a prime source of information for the first generation of the Turkish Republic. This fact is illustrated by the quote included at the beginning of this chapter, from Adalet Ağaoğlu's Ölmeye Yatmak (To Lie Down to Die). Dündar Öğretmen is the prototypical Kemalist village teacher of the early Turkish Republic. His aim is to create good Turkish citizens that will take the young nation into the future. He also symbolizes the role of the Turkish Republic's first generation as teachers to the following generations. Most importantly, however, his source of information and ideas about the world is Ulus.

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136 Ağaoğlu, Adalet. Ölmeye Yatmak. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006. p. 24: “The teacher, Mr. Dündar, is reading Ulus: The editor-in-chief is Mumtaz Faik Fenik. The lead columnist is Nasuhi Baydar. The domestic issues columnist is Yaşar Nabi. The international affairs columnist is Ahmet Şükrü Esmer. Hatay has embraced freedom. The Hatay National Parliament will convene the following day. . .” (author's translation).

137 Bakacak, op. cit., 15; Gürkan, op. cit., 49; Topuz, op. cit., 164.

Dündar Öğretmen is also an excellent example of the influence that the information which appeared in Ulus had. The ideas written in Ulus were intended to educate and indoctrinate its readers, who would then pass those ideas on to others, as Dündar Öğretmen did to his students in Ağaoğlu's novel. A detail vital to understanding this aspect of Ölümeye Yatmak is that the novel is semi-autobiographical: Ağaoğlu was born in a village 150 kilometers from Ankara in 1929. Her description of Dündar Öğretmen reflects what she experienced from her village elementary school teacher as a child. Consequently, Ağaoğlu portrayed Dündar Öğretmen as a reader of Ulus to illustrate allegorically from where those who felt a responsibility to spread the Kemalist doctrine received their information.

This is not to suggest that Ulus was the only source of information for the Kemalist elite, because there were certainly other publications, but it was a leading and prestigious source. In order to understand the level of influence that Ulus had in forming the intellectual life of early Republican Turkey, several different facets of Turkish life, politics, and society should be examined.

The first consideration should be Ulus' daily readership. According to numbers provided by Weisband, Ulus enjoyed the second-greatest readership, 12,000 daily copies, of all Turkish

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139 Ağaoğlu indicates that, as a writer, she is interested in historical changes and processes; see: Andaç, Feridun, ed. Adalet Ağaoğlu Kitabı. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2005. pp. 123-124.

140 For Dündar Öğretmen's Kemalism and mission, see: Erol, Sibel. “Sexual Discourse in Turkish Fiction: Return of the Repressed Female Identity.” Edebiyat. Vol. 6. p. 192. The indoctrinal character of Kemalist education was not unusual since educational systems are, generally, one way that a society controls the information received by that society's citizens. In 1930s Turkey, indoctrination was a particularly pressing issue since there was not only the need for education and development, but also the need for a binding ideology that could provide unity to a culturally, linguistically, and ethnically heterogeneous nation. As a result, Dündar Öğretmen should be read as an expression of one way this indoctrination was carried out. The commentator referenced above also asserts that all of Ağaoğlu's novels can be read as attempts to represent Turkey through allegory; see: Erol, Sibel. “Toplumsal Diş Gerçekçilik ve Kişisel İç Şair: Adalet Ağaoğlu'nun Romanlarındaki İnce Ayar.” Hayata Bakan Edebiyat: Adalet Ağaoğlu'nun Yaptılarına Eleştirel Yaklaşmalar. Esen, Nüket and Erol Köroğlu, eds. İstanbul: Böğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayını: 2003. p. 7.

141 Bakacak, op. cit., p. 7.
newspapers during the second half of WWII.\footnote{142} If Ahmet Emin Yalman's statement concerning the relationship between actual newspapers sold and the real numbers of a newspaper's readers\footnote{143} can be considered factual, then \textit{Ulus} reached around 60,000 readers daily. Most of those readers would have been the educated Kemalist elite, composed essentially of bureaucrats, military personnel, and other civil servants like teachers, that supported the regime's ideological programs.

A second consideration is the power that Kemalist ideology, and thus any ideas associated with the Kemalist government and its projects, exercised over Turkey's developing society. In 1923, Turkey, under the aegis of the Kemalist regime, began a new program for cultural, economic, social, and political development.\footnote{144} This program necessarily included the formation of a national ideology, since the idea of a “Turkish nation” had little more than fifteen years of maturation after the two initial Ottoman attempts to form an unifying ideology for the empire, usually labelled respectively as “Ottomanist” and “Pan-Islamic,” failed.\footnote{145}

\footnote{142} Weisband, Edward. \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics}. U.S.A.: Princeton University Press, 1973. p. 74. \textit{Cumhuriyet}, which Weisband, op. cit., characterizes as “favoring German interests during the war” (p. 78) and which featured writers of “pro-Axis sympathies” (ibid.) enjoyed the greatest circulation, at 16,000 (p. 74). Thus, using the same criteria expressed by Yalman (see Footnote 143), \textit{Cumhuriyet}'s total readership can be estimated at 80,000 for the same period.

\footnote{143} “Our circulation of 20,000 meant at least 100,000 readers because 1,000s of coffeehouses subscribed for their patrons' benefit.” \textit{Turkey in My Time}. Norman, Oklahoma, USA: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956. p. 194. Yalman also mentions other reasons, which would have been applicable to any newspaper of the time, for his estimate.


In order to construct a national ideology, the Kemalist leadership turned to the school system and the media in order to create public awareness of the national project. Because the level of education amongst the previously Ottoman populace was extremely low, the Kemalist leaders could inject national ideology directly into the population using the educational system.\footnote{Yeşilkaya, Neşe. \textit{Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık}. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003. pp. 68-78. For an early theory concerning media and its influence on development and culture, see: Lerner, op. cit., 52-65. For criticism of Lerner's theory, see: Karpat, Kemal H. “Structural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization, and the Role of Social Groups in Turkish Politics.” \textit{Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis}. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973. pp. 22-24.} The first generation of Kemalist teachers, like \textit{Dündar Öğretmen}, thus had an notably powerful position in Turkish society since the only real competition for their pupils' minds was the village Islam, mixed with millennia-old cultural traditions, that had dominated Anatolian life for centuries.\footnote{This is especially important since more than 70 percent of the Turkish population lived in rural areas, which expanded, or more accurately, recovered between the wars. See: Owen and Pamuk, op. cit., pp. 22-28. Therefore, at a time when the state formulated a national ideology for its citizens, and education, which was intended to spread that ideology, began to spread to villages, the national population also expanded. The vast majority of Turkish citizens, if they received an education at all during the Republic's first decades, would have experienced an education similar to that of Adalet Ağaoğlu. Yeşilkaya, op. cit. p. 70-71, describes how the Nineteenth Century Russian Narodniks were seen as an example for the Kemalist regime's education efforts in the 1930s.}

Schools were not the only institutional project which aimed at spreading nationalist ideology amongst the Turkish citizenry. The \textit{Türk Ocakları} (\textit{Turkish Hearths}) movement was also intended to reinforce the formation of an enlightenment and Pan-Turkist mentality in the Turkish people. After being initiated by Pan-Turkists in the Ottoman empire's waning years, the \textit{Türk Ocakları} were tolerated for a short period by the Republic's leadership.\footnote{See: Landau, Jacob M. \textit{Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism}. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1981. pp. 40-41.} In 1931 the \textit{Ocakları} were closed and then re-opened as the \textit{Halkevleri} (\textit{People's Houses}) in 1932.\footnote{Yeşilkaya, op. cit., 64-65; Zürcher, op. cit., p. 188.} The \textit{Halkevleri} had the same indoctrinational aims as the \textit{Türk Ocakları}, but without the Pan-Turkist hues.\footnote{Yeşilkaya, op. cit., 61-68.} Consequently, the \textit{Halkevleri}, as another educational/indoctrinational
institution, were more under the control of the Kemalist government and taught ideology more compatible to Kemalism.

Amongst the Turkish citizens who were already educated, the media served as a channel through which the Kemalist regime could provide the information that it wanted Turkish citizens to consume. In 1930, for instance, İsmet İnönü discreetly supported a newspaper, İnkılap (Reform) to provide media opposition to the Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republican Party).\textsuperscript{151} To provide balance to the right-wing İnkılap, İnönü also supported the left-wing Halk Dostu (Friend of the People) and Hür Adam (Freeman).\textsuperscript{152} The seminal journal Kadro (Cadre), a creator and propagator of the early 1930s Kemalist Devletçilik ideology, also published information written by İsmet İnönü concerning policy and ideology.\textsuperscript{153}

This use of media as an informational tool also extended to Ulus. Edward Weisband referred to Ulus and its lead editor/writer during WWII Falih Rıfkı Atay as İsmet İnönü's “other voices.”\textsuperscript{154} Metin Heper, while discussing İsmet İnönü's efforts to prepare a generation to succeed him, mentions that Nihat Erim, who began writing for Ulus during WWII and later became Turkish prime minister, was one of the foremost examples of that generation.\textsuperscript{155} Erim was also made a head writer at Ulus shortly after the war's conclusion.\textsuperscript{156} The potential that President İnönü saw in Erim must be the reason why Erim was given an important position at Ulus, and further underlines the “educational” role that İsmet İnönü envisioned for Ulus.

\textsuperscript{151} Tunçay, op. cit., pp. 275-276.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid. 276-277.
\textsuperscript{153} Köker, op. cit., p. 193.
Finally, President İnönü's ideas concerning the media's role in informing society were published in a Turkish newspaper on at least one occasion.157

Correspondingly, the Turkish state kept close control over all newspapers published during the one-party era.158 During the 1930s, a series of regulations were enacted and organizations were founded by the Turkish government with the intent of controlling more strictly the Turkish press' activities.159 Any newspaper which did not toe the Kemalist line was punished through suspensions or closures.160 Mustafa Kemal himself was extremely aware of the influential role that the press could play in the formation of the young Republic's social and cultural life:161 sometimes cautioning the Turkish press to be responsible,162 at other times he acted in an almost fatherly way towards the journalists themselves.163 Mustafa Kemal even had experience as a journalist from his years in military school and from the time he spent in Istanbul before heading to Anatolia to lead the nationalist struggle.164

The control over Turkish media and schooling, and the oppression of alternative ideologies (like Islam, communism, or Pan-Turkism), should not obscure the fact that many citizens of

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157 In a note sent by President İnönü to Ulus, in response to a note from Falih Rıfkı Atay, the President specifically emphasized that the paper had a cultural as well as political role: “Ulus, memleketimizin siyaset ve kültür hayattında sağlam bir temeltaşı halindedir” (“Ul" is a solid cornerstone of our homeland's political and cultural life”): Turan, İlhan, hazırlayan. İsmet İnönü: Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşiler 1944-1950. Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, 2003. p. 9. According to the text, President İnönü's note was published in Cumhuriyet on 13 January 1945.

158 See, for example, the press-related jailings and closures carried out by the Turkish government in reaction to the Şeyh Sait rebellion: Mango, op. cit. pp. 424, 426-427. Tunçay, op. cit., pp. 149-152. Zürcher, op. cit. 179-180.

159 İnuğur, op. cit., pp. 159-160.

160 Gürkan, op. cit., 73-92 passim.

161 Gürkan, op. cit., 75-76, especially Footnote 19.

162 Mango, op. cit., 436.


164 İnuğur, op. cit., pp. 15-22.
the early Turkish Republic were sincere supporters of the Kemalist project, and for obvious reasons. The Turkish nationalist/Kemalist forces had rescued a large section of the former Ottoman empire from foreign occupation and provided the opportunity for the resulting nation-state to develop on its own terms. Consequently, the power and influence of Kemalist ideology resulted not just from control over media and schooling, but from the support of the majority of its citizens (exceptions among the Islamically- or Kurdish nationalist-inspired segments of the population need not be discussed here). Support for Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish nationalists was so ingrained that even Turkish communists have mostly remained staunchly nationalist to this day, an effect traceable to the early Republican era.\textsuperscript{165}

Consequently, that some Turkish journalists spoke openly of trying to express their Kemalist ideals in their journalistic endeavors should not be surprising, and two examples can be provided of Turkish journalists who either openly, or through their compositions, expressed pro-U.S. opinions to their readers. Ahmet Emin Yalman, who was editor of \textit{Vatan} during WWII, wrote repeatedly of trying to inject his journalism with the ideals that he embraced.\textsuperscript{166} Despite the fact that \textit{Vatan} was considered an oppositional newspaper, Yalman was a staunch Kemalist and progressivist, and used his position to criticize the regime within the boundaries permitted by the government's censors. Yalman's paper was still repeatedly penalized for the opinions that it expressed.\textsuperscript{167}

Yalman's colleague Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, who studied journalism at Columbia with Yalman,\textsuperscript{168} was the Foreign Affairs Editor for \textit{Ulus} during WWII. Yalman mentions that


\textsuperscript{166} Yalman, \textit{Turkey}. . ., \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{167} In only the 1939-1945 period, \textit{Vatan}'s daily publishing was suspended nine times; see: Güvenir, O. Murat. \textit{2. Dünya Savasında Türk Basım}. İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1991. pp. 120-123. Koçak, Cemil. \textit{Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi, Cilt 2}. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003. p. 139. According to Güvenir's list, \textit{Ulus} was never suspended during WWII.

\textsuperscript{168} Yalman, \textit{Turkey}. . ., p. 135.
Esmer “established and developed the Turkish Information Office”\(^{169}\) in New York, which suggests that Esmer, like Yalman, felt a proselytizing urge in his chosen career. Both Yalman and Esmer received scholarships from the Ottoman government (a total of five students obtained the same scholarship) to study in the U.S. in 1911-1913.\(^{170}\) Thus, that Esmer, like Yalman, would have had positive opinions concerning the U.S., and a wish to express those positive opinions of the U.S. to *Ulus*’ readers, is likely. Esmer would also have had direct connections to information sources in the U.S. as the founder of the Turkish Information Office.

One event can provide direct evidence of Esmer's pro-U.S. efforts. Both Esmer and Yalman were included in a group of five Turkish journalists who toured the U.S. in late 1942.\(^{171}\) This delegation, in addition to touring various U.S. war production facilities and Hollywood, were allowed meetings with FDR, Vice President Henry Wallace, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, among other U.S. officials; Yalman recounted that both FDR and Hull praised Turkish war efforts.\(^{172}\)

This tour must have made a strong impression on these journalists, especially since less than a year had passed since the U.S. entered WWII, and U.S. war production had increased to full capacity. Correspondingly, all of the reports published in *Ulus* concerning this journalistic contingent were markedly positive, as were Yalman's recollections.\(^{173}\) Additionally, Esmer wrote a series of articles while traveling with the delegation that were mostly published in the third-page space where his foreign affairs column generally appeared.\(^{174}\) After returning to

\(^{169}\) Ibid. p. 30.

\(^{170}\) Ibid.

\(^{171}\) The delegation of Turkish journalists consisted of Abidin Daver, Esmer, Zekeriya Sertel, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, and Yalman. Esmer was an *Ulus* staff member, but articles by Yalçın and Daver, who were not, also appeared in *Ulus* from time-to-time during WWII. The journalistic delegation's activities were detailed by a series of articles in *Ulus*, appearing on 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 22 October and 23 November, 1942.

\(^{172}\) Yalman, *Turkey.* . . , p. 199.

\(^{173}\) For the *Ulus* articles, see footnote 171; see also: Yalman, *Turkey.* . . , pp. 191, 193, 199.

\(^{174}\) These articles appeared in *Ulus* on 8, 16, 20, 22, 23, 31 October and 1, 6 November, 1942. The 8 October article was a front-page feature.
Turkey, Esmer published a series of columns that consisted of the diary he kept while on the journey. Overall, this information expressed a strikingly positive assessment of the U.S. government, its position in the war, and of U.S. society.

For all of the above reasons, the influence of Ulus should be considered greater than just its circulation numbers. Because Ulus represented the CHP, and as a result, the ideals of Mustafa Kemal and the national project, the information in Ulus had considerable cachet among the portions of Turkish society which supported the national project and/or Kemalist ideals. In turn, those who believed in those Kemalist ideals often tried to transmit to or impose those ideals on other Turkish citizens, and teachers and journalists were often willingly involved in that dissemination. For this study, the important point is that information presented by Ulus writers such as Ahmet Şükrü Esmer consistently held up the U.S. as a positive example for Turkey.

During WWII, an important component of the Turkish-American relationship was information. Because wartime conditions limited trade, and because Turkey was not officially a participant in the war, information became a way for the Turkish ruling party to, at the same time, remain “neutral,” support the Allied cause, and express the viewpoint of the Allies to its population. The accuracy of this statement will become more clear later in the fifth section of this study, where information concerning the contents of Ulus during WWII will be presented.

Naturally, it is extremely difficult to quantify exactly how much influence Ulus had on Turkish minds, but it is clear that, despite opposition to the Kemalist project among several small segments of the Turkish populace, the information presented to the public in the pages of Ulus must have had a lasting effect on the ideological and cultural composition of Turkish society. Consequently, the extent of Ulus' likely influence on Turkish society is a prime

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175 These columns appeared in Ulus on 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 December 1942 and on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 January 1943. A note informing Ulus' readers that Esmer's diary notes would be published in the following days appeared on page one on 10 December 1942. From 11 December to 27 December 1942 the diary entries dealt mostly with England, where the Turkish journalists stopped before continuing to the U.S.

176 This point will be fully explored below in Section 5.0.
reason that it is valuable as insight into the aims of the Kemalist government during WWII and into the changes in Turkish society following that conflict.
The Turkish government was not the only government during the 1930s that used the media for its own “informational” purposes and advantages. As is well-known, governments such as the Nazis began to use media, especially the relatively new medium of radio, in new ways in order to affect and control the kinds and the quality of the information their citizens came into contact with. Eventually this activity took on international scope.

At the beginning of WWII, the U.S. government was not experienced in overseas intelligence operations. The U.S. State Department had always obtained overseas intelligence through its ambassadors, but the real movement towards analytical intelligence gathering began only in the 1880s when the U.S. navy established its Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). The ONI used overseas attachés to collect information about “. . . the character of foreign navies, especially the size, power, and other capabilities of foreign shipping and naval armaments.” By 1929, however, “. . . no U.S. agency conducted clandestine foreign operations abroad and 'no U.S. agency had foreign intelligence as its primary interest or activity. . .’.”

The U.S. government, occupied with the Great Depression and FDR's New Deal economic recovery program, and faced with a public opinion dominated by the U.S.' traditional isolationism, did not give prime importance to foreign intelligence throughout the 1930s.

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178 Ibid. This means that Admiral Mark Bristol, who was the Naval Attaché in Istanbul from 1919 until formal diplomatic relations were established between the Turkish Republic and the U.S. in 1927, had intelligence as well as diplomatic responsibilities.

179 Ibid.

180 Pisani, op. cit., pp. 17-30. On p. 18, Pisani states, “. . . before Pearl Harbor, intelligence in the United States tended to take the form of independent efforts prompted by American diplomatic personnel.” This author has not been able to learn the exact motivation for the intelligence gathering carried out in Turkey during the 1930s by U.S. diplomats and citizens (mentioned above in Section 1.0, especially Footnotes 11 and 12). For information on FDR's and the American public's isolationism during the 1930s, see: Divine, Robert A. “Roosevelt the Isolationist.” *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, Vol. 2 (since 1914), 3rd Ed.* Paterson, Thomas G., ed. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989.
This attitude changed permanently after 7 December 1941. According to Pisani, William J. Donovan, who had long worked to convince FDR of the need for an U.S. overseas intelligence division, finally won FDR over after the initial Japanese attack, which was rumored to have been aided by subversive tactics. The concerns over Japanese subversion added to worries about Nazi fifth-column activities in Europe, which were credited as the source of Hitler's early WWII successes. The department established by FDR's consent became known as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS officially started operations in summer 1942 with Donovan as its head; Allen Dulles was the head of its European branch in Bern, Switzerland.

By establishing the OSS, the U.S. government displayed its recognition that information would be an important component of the war. This realization, however, came from a new strand in U.S. political life: interventionism. Most of the personnel attracted to the OSS were convinced that the U.S. should overthrow its isolationist traditions and play an active role in world affairs. OSS interventionism, during WWII, took form mostly in paramilitary matters, but its responsibilities also included research, analysis, and propaganda. These responsibilities, notably, were applied outside of the United States, in order to positively affect the world's impression and understanding of the U.S., its government, its culture, and its war effort.

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181 In 1942, Donovan met and offered Ahmet Emin Yalman money to write “information” for him; Yalman claims to have refused on ethical grounds. See: Yalman, Gördüklerim... pp. 1199-1202. The meeting between Yalman and Donovan took place during the 1942 tour by Turkish journalists of the U.S. It was after this tour that the first openly cited Reader’s Digest article appeared in Ulus; see, below, section 5.1.5. According to Yalman, Donovan had, on at least one previous occasion, traveled to Ankara.

182 From Pisani, op. cit., pp. 27-28. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), both in personnel and in character, was the direct descendant of the OSS; see: Saunders, Frances Stonor. The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. New York: The New Press, 1999. pp. 32-36. The OSS was disbanded by President Truman in September 1945, and the CIA was established by Presidential order in July 1947.


184 Ibid. pp. 30-33.

185 Ibid. pp. 30, 32.
Reader's Digest was one tool which the U.S. government found useful in spreading U.S.-related information at an early date. However, this does not mean that Reader's Digest was not a legitimate magazine in its own right. Reader's Digest has a fascinating history as a publication that was built from the foundations up, from an idea, by a husband-and-wife team, DeWitt and Lila Wallace.

4.1. The Genesis of The Reader's Digest: 1920-1945

Reader's Digest was created by DeWitt Wallace in the early 1920s and was an almost overnight success. DeWitt Wallace's concept was unique because he came upon the idea of condensing articles from other sources in order to make the articles more accessible and less time consuming for readers; he had realized during his travels and attempts to sell farm almanacs that a magazine which condensed articles for easy and fast reading would find a ready market in the U.S. Wallace was quickly proved correct.

Wallace's success was not just in filling a need for accessible information in the U.S. media marketplace. Wallace also intended the magazine to evince his personal beliefs and values, i.e. Wallace also wanted the digest to reflect what he found important. On the surface, composing a mass-market publication around one person's belief system would seem to be a sure road to failure, but Wallace's idea proved successful. The reason that this formula worked is that Wallace's own ideas reflected the values held by a broad swath of U.S. society, that of the middle and lower classes, predominantly Protestant, and of northern European or Anglo-Saxon heritage. This was a bias already present in the U.S. media:


187 Ibid. pp. 37, 41-42.

188 Heidenry, op. cit., p. 42.

“From the beginning, his [Wallace's] political bias was conservative. His education came mostly from what he read, and what he read mostly was magazines. Since the magazines of the day were themselves mostly conservative in outlook -- attacking big government, opposing social reforms, extolling self-reliance -- it is not surprising that his political views developed along similar lines.”\(^{191}\)

The articles in *Reader's Digest*, therefore, reflected Wallace's values until the 1970s because he maintained essential editorial control over the magazine up to his retirement.\(^ {192}\) Eventually Wallace's desire to have articles that he considered “suitable” for the magazine produced the practice of “preprinting,” the sponsorship of original, not adapted, pieces tailored to the readership's tastes.\(^ {193}\)

During WWII, Wallace's political biases made *Reader's Digest* useful for the U.S. government's “information” efforts. Wallace, however, needed no convincing to utilize the magazine in this capacity since he saw supporting the war effort through his magazine as “a patriotic duty.”\(^ {194}\) This means that Wallace was fully cognizant of his magazine's ability to influence the minds of both Americans and foreign readers. Accordingly, the “war effort” from *Reader's Digest* had a psychological aspect, because Wallace purposefully published articles which emphasized positives.\(^ {195}\)

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190 Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 52-53 details the ways in which *Reader's Digest* reflected conservative American Protestant culture. The same text, on page 67, mentions some of Wallace's early anti-Catholic articles.

191 Canning, op. cit., p. 62. Heidenry, op. cit., p. 54, also supports this view.


195 Canning, op. cit., pp. 91-92. Articles reflecting Wallace's opinions also completely outnumbered those which presented “the other side” of an issue; see: Heidenry, op. cit., p. 118-119.
The other main feature of *Reader's Digest*’s “war effort” was the launch of several foreign editions during the war. The Spanish edition prepared for South America, for example, was aided by the U.S. State Department. An Arabic edition was launched and, though not as successful as the Spanish edition, greatly exceeded expectations. According to one author, these editions were launched “in cooperation” with the U.S. State Department.

A Turkish edition of *Reader's Digest* was envisioned during the war, but was not realized. Albert Cole and Fred Thompson were charged with establishing a Turkish edition on the same journey in which they created *Al-Mukhtar min Reader's Digest*, the magazine's Arabic edition. The U.S. Office of Wartime Information directly supported Cole and Thompson's trip, during which they spent six weeks in Turkey. The Turkish version, however, was abandoned because of paper supply problems: the Nazis threatened to cut off paper supplies if *Reader's Digest* appeared.

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196 *Reader's Digest*’s first foreign edition was published in Britain at the end of 1939: Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 150-152. Portugese, Finnish, Swedish, and other editions followed; special editions for distribution among U.S. and British soldiers were also published. See: ibid. pp. 155-163.

197 Canning, op. cit., p. 91. Heidenry, op. cit., p. 121. Heidenry also relates how the Spanish language edition received encouragement directly from the U.S. State Department's Cultural Relations Office, including a face-to-face meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and *Reader's Digest* business manager Albert Cole: op. cit., p. 154. The Spanish edition was launched despite the fact that financial losses were expected from the edition: ibid. p. 153-155.


199 Heidenry, op. cit., p. 473. Canning, op. cit., p. 95, states that *Reader's Digest*’s foreign editions were “greatly aided” by the U.S. government.

200 Husband of Lila Wallace's niece.

201 Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 157-158.


203 This apparently happened in 1944, but neither Canning nor Heidenry provide specific dates for these events. Canning indicates that the pair tried to establish the Turkish edition before the Arabic edition. See: Canning, op. cit., pp. 92-93. Heidenry, op. cit., p. 158.
4.2. Reader's Digest, *U.S. Culture, and the U.S. Government*

Joanne Sharp's study, titled *Condensing the Cold War*, elaborates on exactly why *Reader's Digest* became such a useful tool for U.S. governmental “information” efforts. Sharp explains that *Reader's Digest* constructed a “imagined geography” in which the United States was juxtaposed against the Soviet Union in an “us” versus “them” dichotomy that defined the world for its readers. The result is that *Reader's Digest* had an important role in both reflecting and forming the U.S.’ national identity during the Twentieth Century.

According to Sharp, *Reader's Digest* formulated a vision of the U.S. which had a strong effect on the U.S.’ national identity. The magazine accomplished this through its expression of a world geopolitical system in which the U.S., “us,” was confronted by an inimical “them,” the USSR. This perspective was constructed through several techniques. Firstly, *Reader's Digest* used objective language and wrote articles which were planted in other magazines so they could be used in *Reader's Digest* in order to reinforce the magazine's objectivity. The magazine also contextualized its articles, and added a moralistic lesson that the reader should take away from each piece that he or she read.

Furthermore, and maybe most importantly, DeWitt Wallace's formula for *Reader's Digest* articles emphasized three qualities that can be closely identified with American cultural ideals: common sense, individualism, and optimism. Finally, the articles themselves created an atmosphere of personal communication and repetition which made the articles more “popular” and easier to assimilate.

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204 Sharp, op. cit., p. x-xi.

205 Ibid. pp. 22-23, 47.

206 This discussion takes place over pp. 24-54.

207 Ibid. pp. 36-38.

208 Ibid. pp. 38-41.

209 Ibid. pp. 41-44.

210 Ibid. pp. 49-54.
*Reader's Digest* also had an essential role in transforming the U.S. public into receptors of interpreted information from “experts” who informed the readers concerning what was important and the ways in which the readers should understand the world.\(^{211}\) Correspondingly, the readers metamorphized into consumers of information.\(^{212}\) As noted above, *Reader's Digest*'s founder, DeWitt Wallace, purposefully set out to influence the minds of U.S. citizens with the content of his magazine, but he also succeeded in changing their role as readers.\(^{213}\)

Beginning shortly after its inception, *Reader's Digest* became one of the U.S.'s most widely read magazines.\(^{214}\) This means that its cultural influence was large and remained so for a span of 70 years, i.e. before and during the Cold War. As a result, Sharp terms *Reader's Digest* as probably the most important magazine in relation to, and overall one of the most important formative influences on, U.S. culture.\(^{215}\)

In relation to *Ulus*, the important aspect of *Reader's Digest* is that the qualities identified in *Reader's Digest* by Sharp were present even before WWII.\(^{216}\) This means that the innovative qualities of composition and presentation, the tone, and the messages were all present when *Ulus* began publishing *Reader's Digest* articles during WWII. In other words, articles that were designed to have a specific effect upon American readers were translated and included in a Turkish newspaper; Turkish readers thusly read articles from a newspaper considered the official viewpoint of the Turkish state, at the same time ingesting a perspective and mentality

\(^{211}\) Ibid. pp. 4-6, 45-46.

\(^{212}\) Ibid. pp. 7.

\(^{213}\) Sharp, op. cit., pp. 11, 21. Heidenry's op. cit., p. 154 reference concerning Wallace's patriotism can only be interpreted as showing that Wallace believed he had the power to influence people.

\(^{214}\) *Reader's Digest* had the U.S.' largest circulation by the mid-1930s (Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 82-83, 150) and eventually reached the immense circulation of sixteen million domestic and 27 million international readers: Sharp, op. cit., p. xiv.

\(^{215}\) Sharp, p. 47. Heidenry, op. cit., p. 13, echoes this sentiment and asserts on p. 122 that, by the outbreak of WWII, *Reader's Digest* had “become indisputably an American institution.”

\(^{216}\) An interesting exception that Sharp mentions is that *Reader's Digest*'s categorical anti-Soviet stance did not truly emerge until directly after WWII, when the bipolar world system took shape; see pp. 70-72, 81.
that was fundamentally American, and which can even be traced back to one person, DeWitt Wallace.\textsuperscript{217}

As stated above in Section 3.0, \textit{Ulus Gazetesi}, because of its status as the semi-official publication of the ruling \textit{CHP}, had an effect on the political and cultural formation of Turkish society. Even though this effect is probably impossible to determine exactly, and should not be overstated, there is no doubt that the ideas and information published in \textit{Ulus} did have important influences on Turkish society. \textit{Therefore, if some of the information in Ulus had foreign sources, and some of those sources, Reader's Digest being the foremost example,\textsuperscript{218} are known to have not only supported identifiable and analyzable opinions and perspectives, but were also composed with methods intended to influence their readers in certain identifiable ways, then the content, tone, and effect of these sources need to be analyzed for their potential effects on Turkish readers and on Turkish culture and society.}

After WWII, \textit{Reader's Digest} became one of the most important domestic and international mediums through which pro-U.S. information was broadcasted. This role was so evident that, by 1947, critics had already begun to call \textit{Reader's Digest} a “government puppet.”\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Reader's Digest} has never had any “official” agreements with the CIA, or other U.S. government “informational” departments,\textsuperscript{220} but the magazine had many informal contacts, such as the fact that several top post-war \textit{Reader's Digest} executives, including two of the most senior editors, served in the OSS, the precursor to the CIA, during WWII.\textsuperscript{221} Sharp provides the important reminder, however, that \textit{Reader's Digest} should not simply be labelled U.S. government

\textsuperscript{217} This is where the quote included at the beginning of Section 4.0 takes on double importance: the time frame may not be the same, but the readership of \textit{Ulus} continued to be large throughout WWII, the period which this study concentrates on. By the end of WWII, as will be illustrated in Section 5.0, \textit{Ulus}' readers were regularly encountering information from \textit{Reader's Digest}, as well as from other U.S. publications.

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Time} and \textit{Life}, as well as other U.S. magazines, should not be ignored, but are outside of the scope of this study.

\textsuperscript{219} Canning, op. cit., p. 95.

\textsuperscript{220} Sharp, op. cit., p. 21.

\textsuperscript{221} Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 473-474. See also: Canning, op. cit., p. 95.
propaganda, because it definitely was never owned, operated, or supported by the U.S. government. On the other hand, the methods with which the magazine was composed made it a powerful expression of U.S. culture and especially useful for disseminating the American perspective abroad; like Ulus, Reader's Digest was a “site of knowledge production.”

As will be explained below in Section 5.0, articles from U.S. sources, both attributed and unattributed, appeared in Ulus after the beginning of 1943. Since U.S. informational efforts did not receive official Presidential sanction until mid-1942, the coincidence of the dates may indicate a connection between Turkish officials and U.S. informational efforts from 1942. All articles from U.S. sources published in Ulus during WWII, attributed and unattributed, may fit the definition of what Pisani labels “gray propaganda”: “... the United States government connection is not acknowledged but is concealed and attribution is made to some other source within or outside the United States. ... or no attribution of the source is made.”

U.S. information bureaus were established in Ankara and Istanbul during WWII, so they would be a likely source for the U.S.-sourced information published in Ulus. Finally, a delegation of Turkish journalists toured the U.S. shortly after the OSS was established, and at least one of those journalists, Ahmet Emin Yalman, met with the head of the OSS during that tour.

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223 Heidenry mentions that, during WWII, Reader's Digest turned down offers of materials and financial support from the U.S. Office of War Information: op. cit., p. 157.

224 Ibid. p. 54, 172. On p. 173 Heidenry notes that DeWitt Wallace, along with Henry Luce, sat on the board of the National Committe for a Free Europe, which sponsored the known CIA fronts Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; see: Saunders, op. cit., p. 91.

225 Pisani, op. cit., p. 129.

226 Yalman, in Turkey in My Time, p. 196, mentions Leo Hochstetter as the chief news editor of the Istanbul office.

227 See above, Footnote 181.
By the end of the 1930s, Turkey's economic problems had not been solved, and the world political situation was rapidly deteriorating towards WWII. To make matters worse for Turkey, Mustafa Kemal died on 10 November 1938 after a protracted struggle with cirrhosis of the liver. İsmet İnönü, one of Mustafa Kemal's long-time comrades and Turkish Prime Minister between 1925 and 1937, but who had fallen out with Mustafa Kemal over policy in 1937, replaced Mustafa Kemal at Turkey's helm. President and Milli Şef (National Leader) İnönü subsequently guided Turkey through the treacherous war years and then sponsored the country's transition to true democracy by allowing second parties to emerge in 1945. This process culminated in Turkey's first free and transparent election in 1950.

Debate still continues concerning exactly why President İnönü allowed the Turkish political system to become truly democratic in the aftermath of WWII. Some commentators opine that İnönü had wanted to open Turkey's political system from the time that he acceded to power; others argue that he was forced to make the transition to democracy by the post-WWII international political situation, or by the dire domestic political conditions.


Whereas this study will not attempt to discuss the exact reasons why President İnönü decided to allow the maturation of Turkish democracy, the topic that it concerns is relevant to that vital question in Turkish historiography. The U.S. was the country to which Turkey turned for aid against the looming Soviet threat after WWII. Even if the U.K. had, for historical reasons, closer understanding of Turkey's political situation vis-a-vis the USSR, after February 1947 the U.K. was no longer viable as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. Furthermore, the U.S., at the conclusion of WWII, was the world's foremost example of a democratic and republican political system and possessed the world's most powerful military, in addition to the nuclear bomb. Therefore, that İsmet İnönü's ideas concerning the U.S. had an effect on the policies that he followed is highly probable.

Unfortunately, İsmet İnönü's attitude towards the U.S. is an open question. Whereas Mustafa Kemal had expressed favorable opinions of the U.S., U.S. culture, and U.S. democracy, İsmet İnönü made fewer statements on the topic. Normally, researchers would turn to memoirs or official documents for enlightenment concerning a statesman's personal opinions, but İsmet İnönü's memoirs say almost nothing about the U.S., its government, or its culture. The second unfortunate reality is that most Turkish government documents concerning the U.S. and WWII are still not available. In lieu of more traditional sources, researchers working on question related to this period in Turkish politics are thus forced to turn to sources like newspapers for information. This is the reason why looking at the information in Ulus is essential for understanding the Turkish government's policies during WWII: Ulus' publishing tendencies can help one understand what the İnönü government

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233 See above, Section 2.5.

234 Two works that can be considered his memoirs have been published, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's *İkinci Adam* (*The Second Man*) and his own *Hatıralar* (*Memoirs*).

wanted Turkish citizens to understand in relation to the U.S. and, by inference, what the İnönü government's opinion of the U.S., and the U.S.' political system, was.

The first important result obtained from examining Ulus' publishing practices is that, in the period between January 1939 and August 1945, there is no point at which Ulus could be evaluated as an “anti-American” newspaper.\(^{236}\) For that entire time period, Ulus consistently expressed positive opinions towards the U.S. and towards the U.S. political system.\(^{237}\)

The second result is that, during WWII, Ulus underwent a transformation in the kind of information that it published concerning the U.S. At the beginning of WWII, Ulus published essentially no information that was directly sourced from U.S. publications. If there was an occasional note or article from a U.S. source it came from an article in a European newspaper which used that U.S. source. Any other U.S. sources were reported as summaries from Anadolu Ajansı.

Anadolu Ajansı (AA), or The Anatolian Agency, was the original Turkish government news agency established by the Kemalist leadership in 1920. Most foreign news published in Ulus between 1939 and 1945 came from the AA. For example, New York Times articles were filtered through the AA into Ulus, not directly translated. Events in other countries were also normally reported in Ulus with the AA listed as the source.

The main exceptions to this practice, both before the beginning of WWII and during the first years of the conflict, were articles taken from European sources, translated, and published in Ulus as foreign articles. During the majority of 1939, for instance, a regular feature called “Ulus Postası” printed translated versions of articles from a variety of European sources, usually British, French, and German.\(^{238}\) The articles published usually were comments on the

\(^{236}\) In fact, the Turkish press was so adamantly anti-German that it became a diplomatic issue. See: Erkin, Feridun Cemal. Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl: Anılar-Yorumlar, I. Cilt. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1980. p. 121. Ulus was no different than the rest of the Turkish press.

\(^{237}\) The information presented below will make this point more clear.

\(^{238}\) The order does not reflect frequency of articles which appeared from those countries.
current European political situation but sometimes concerned other topics. The situation that existed until the war's outbreak can be exemplified by 10 January 1939's newspaper: in that edition, *Ulus* printed articles translated directly from *Le Figaro*, *Deutsche Allegemeine Zeitung*, and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.\(^{239}\)

After the beginning of the war, in September 1939, *Ulus Postası* disappeared from the newspaper's pages; subsequently, articles taken directly from foreign sources became more infrequent. The shortage of newsprint caused by the war\(^{240}\) must have contributed to the reduction of foreign-sourced articles since the amount of space in *Ulus* for those articles was greatly reduced.

On the other hand, once the German military settled on Turkey's borders, and articles from European sources began to appear again, those articles that did appear had a different character.\(^{241}\) Often they came from Swiss, in other words neutral, sources. Occasionally articles from British or German sources were also published, but not as frequently as in the pre-war or early war years.

Not until 1943 did articles, both referenced to U.S. sources and not referenced but apparently from U.S. sources, begin to appear frequently. The following sections will relate in detail the kinds of U.S.-sourced information that appeared in *Ulus* between January 1939 and August 1945. Conclusions concerning this U.S. information will be explored in Chapter 7.

This explanation will utilize several terms to describe the articles that were examined: 1) a *note* is something extremely short, usually no more than one paragraph and consisting of under ten column lines; 2) an *article* is a longer text, often several paragraphs; 3) *long articles* are any text that was longer than three or four paragraphs, or which extended over more than one page.

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\(^{239}\) Printed on pages four, five, and eight respectively.

\(^{240}\) See: Koçak, op. cit., pp. 135-136.

\(^{241}\) Over the course of 1942.
Also, U.S.-sourced articles lacking a purely news-based reason for their appearance are referred to as “informational” features. These are articles which do not have a direct tie to the events or news reports of the previous day and include anything from Reader's Digest articles about the possibility of organ transplant and reuse\textsuperscript{242} to news about the lives of Hollywood movie stars.\textsuperscript{243} “Informational” articles also include articles which referred to a person, place, or event that was in the news, but did not concern the actual reportage of that person, place, or event, or the reason why they were in the news. For example, on 16 February 1945 a translation from Reader's Digest on U.S. efforts to eradicate malaria\textsuperscript{244} appeared on Ulus' second page; this translation was directly related to the Turkish government's own efforts to battle malaria, which were given wide coverage throughout the months in 1945 that I examined. The Reader's Digest article, however, had no specific link to an event or person that was in the news on 15 or 16 February 1945.

5.1. Information published in Ulus Gazetesi concerning the U.S. during WWII

5.1.1: 1939

During 1939, Ulus' presentation of the U.S. was dominated by three tendencies, none of which was taken directly from U.S. publications. The most important U.S.-oriented article type was intermittent notes, almost never very large, usually about the U.S.' industrial capacity or military strength, but also about the U.S.' foreign policy. These notes were almost always credited to the AA. For example, on 5, 19 January, 15, 18 February, 20, 29, 30 March, 19, 24 April, 1, 6, 20 May, and 4, 13, 23 June 1939\textsuperscript{245} Ulus published notes and/or articles concerning U.S. military strength, spending, and/or construction activities. All of these

\textsuperscript{242} See: 14 January 1945, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{243} Such Hollywood news appeared throughout 1939 until the outbreak of war.

\textsuperscript{244} The author was listed as Paul De Kruif, but no translator was credited. The article published in Ulus on 16 February 1945 is a translation of the De Kruif article titled “Atrabrine Fully Vindicated -- Malaria Scourge Of Mankind Can Be Licked” published in the December 1944 edition of Reader's Digest (pp. 22-27).

\textsuperscript{245} Notes about U.S. military strength and industrial capacity continued throughout the war years.

The next major source of information about the U.S. was Neşet Halil Atay. As a part of the Turkish delegation to the 1939 World's Fair in New York, Atay wrote a series of letter-format columns, which were intended to inform Turkish readers about the Turkish exhibit's reception at the World's Fair, about his experiences in New York, and about what he saw and learned while driving across America after the World's Fair's conclusion, for *Ulus*. These letters were supplemented several times by columns from Vedat Nedim Tör, the head of the Turkish World's Fair delegation.

Lastly, the regular pages devoted to Hollywood or cinematic news were a source of information about the U.S., even if not serious. These pages usually featured pictures of various movie stars, from both Europe and the U.S., along with socialite news (no more than gossip) that was never credited to a source. After appearing at least twice a month from the beginning of the year, these features disappeared by the end of WWII's first month.

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246 According to Niyazi Berkes, Neşet Atay did not know English: op. cit. p. 136.

247 These column/letters were published on 8 February, 1, 2, 4, 23 May, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 June, 3, 6, 7, 14, 15, 19, 21, 27, 28, 31 July, and 1, 2, 5 August, and expressed almost unanimously a glowing impression of the U.S., U.S. society, and U.S. culture. Later in 1939, Neşet Atay's letter-column series continued in a more prominent second-page position; this second group of letter-columns appeared on 29, 30 November 1939 and then on 31 January, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 February, 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28 March, 1, 2, 6, 12, 13, 15, 21, 26, 28, 30 April, 2, 3, 10, 13, 15, 17, 20, 27 May, and 2, 3, 8, 9 June 1940 under the title of “Amerika'dan Mektüpları” (“Letters from America”). These columns were published in 1941 as a 239-page book titled *Buhran Yıllarında ve Harp Karşılarında Amerika* (*America in the Depression Years and Facing the War*) with strong advertising support from *Ulus* itself (see, for example, the 2 July 1941 issue, which both announces the book's publication and recommends that *Ulus*' readers buy the book). Neşet Atay's book subsequently went to a second printing (see the 31 March 1943 *Ulus* edition).

248 See, for example, 1 July 1939, p. 6 and 2 July 1939, p. 2.

249 An example is the large Shirley Temple article published 2 March 1939 on *Ulus*' page seven.
There were several exceptions to these general tendencies that deserve mention, but these exceptions were also not sourced in U.S. publications. The first was İsmet İnönü's radio address to the U.S. on 26 February 1939. *Ulus* presented this event with several days of anticipatory articles, wide coverage the day of and the day after the radio address, and several days of columns about the event afterwards. This event should be compared to *Milli Şef* İnönü’s interview with a British newspaper and direct messages for the British public in July 1939, which received relatively much less coverage from *Ulus*. The impression that the reader receives is that *Ulus* thought President İnönü's address to the U.S. was much more important that his address to the U.K.

Another exception was the columns on issues involving the U.S. written by regular *Ulus* staff writers like Ahmet Şükrü Esmer or Falih Rıfkı Atay, both of whom were also TBMM members. Esmer, as the foreign affairs columnist, wrote columns that generally appeared with other foreign news. Esmer wrote a number of columns dealing with the U.S. which were

250 The day following the event, on 27 February 1939, *Ulus* featured a front-page picture of İsmet İnönü standing while the *Star-Spangled Banner*, the U.S. national anthem, was played. President İnönü gave the radio address from Ankara. The same day Nasuhi Baydar wrote a long column explaining U.S. history to *Ulus*’ readers. On 28 February 1939, Falih Rıfkı Atay and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer continued the theme with columns, both of which concerned President İnönü's speech, the U.S., and Turkish-U.S. relations. More columns, with the same themes but by different writers, appeared on 1 and 3 March 1939.

251 The Turkish-U.S. Trade Agreement was signed on 1 April 1939, so one could argue that İsmet İnönü had those negotiations in mind while giving his radio address to the U.S. President İnönü's address to the U.K., on the other hand, occurred after the joint Turkish-English Declaration was signed in May 1939, but while negotiations on a more concrete Turkish-English-French tripartite pact were still continuing. Aydemir, op. cit. pp. 114-116, also notes the activities of German Ambassador to Turkey Franz von Papen, who was energetically encouraging Turkish neutrality during the same time frame. Consequently, arguing that on-going negotiations had an influence on *Ulus*’ coverage of President İnönü’s respective addresses to the U.S. and the U.K. is either untenable because of the complex situation, or must be supported by other sources. The issue of İsmet İnönü's U.S. radio address and its possible relation to his famous “Demokrasi Müjdesi” (“Tidings of Democracy,” to use Cemil Koçak's term) speech at Istanbul University ten days later will be discussed below in Section 6.0.

almost uniformly positive. During 1939, before the war's initial hostilities, Esmer wrote
concerning the U.S. more frequently than Atay.

Falih Atay was *Ulus*' head editor during the war years, so his columns appeared on the front
page; his contributions, like Esmer's, should be understood as an “official” opinion since he
was a member of the *TBMM*. He wrote extensively concerning the U.S. throughout the war
years. Other columnists also occasionally wrote U.S.-themed pieces.

On two occasions in 1939, “*Ulus Postası*” published articles from U.S. papers. The first, on
29 June, was a *New York Times* article about the Turkish exhibit at the World's Fair. The
second exception occurred on 5 August 1939 when an Associated Press reporter based in
Istanbul, named Elmer Peterson, wrote an article about Turkey for U.S. readers. A further
example was the articles, published on 2, 7, 14 April, 9, 10, 17 May, and 5 June 1939, which
explained to *Ulus*' readers the signing process, products included, goals, benefits, and even
results of the recently signed trade agreement with the U.S. Naturally, these articles all
presented a positive assessment of the U.S.

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253 See, as examples, the 23, 29, 31 July 1939 *Ulus* issues.

254 Bakacak, op. cit., p. 5.

255 Bakacak, op. cit., pp. 6, 17. Falih Atay was a member of Mustafa Kemal's inner circle and
had close relations with important figures in the CHP government. See, for example: Erkin,
op. cit., p. 91.

256 For an example from 1939, see *Ulus*' 5 November 1939 edition.

257 Such as Burhan Belge (17 April 1939), Cemal Kutay (5 July 1939), Hazım Atıf Kuyucak
(6, 31 July and 5 November 1939), Necip Ali Küçüka (17 April 1939), and Selim Sirri Tarcan
(24 September 1939).

258 The same *Ulus* issue also featured an article about the *New York Times* article!

259 On 17 May 1939, a page two *Ulus* article stated that the new Turkey-U.S. Trade agreement
had increased U.S. imports to Turkey by 300,000 lira in just one week and increased Turkish
exports to the U.S.

260 For the text of this agreement see: Armaoğlu, op. cit., pp. 117-124.
A final, somewhat strange, occurrence was the printing of Turkish stamps that commemorated the U.S.' 150 years of independence. These stamps were brought to the attention of *Ulus*' readers on at least five different occasions and the stamps' likenesses were published once. One stamp featured side-by-side portraits of George Washington and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, another featured the same presentation of FDR and İsmet İnönü, and a third featured the Turkish and U.S. flags side-by-side. Apparently, these stamps were meant to show a historical parallel between the leaders and the two countries, and it should especially be noted that the first announcement concerning these stamps was made on the same day that President İnönü gave his live radio address to the U.S.

In sum, *Ulus*’ 1939 coverage of the U.S. was dominated by bits of information from the AA about the U.S.' industrial and military capacity, as well as about U.S. foreign policy. Information about U.S. culture came almost exclusively from the letters and columns written by Turkish representatives to the 1939 New York World’s Fair. Taken together, these articles can be understood as the stance of *Ulus* towards the U.S.

5.1.2: 1940

In 1940, the information published about the U.S. continued in a similar vein: most information concerning the U.S. still came from the usually brief notes and/or articles concerning U.S. military activities, its industrial and economic strength, and foreign policy.

261 26 February, 4, 9, 16 July, and 1 August 1939.

262 16 July 1939, page two.

263 Also mentioned in Denovo, op. cit., pp. 229-230. DeNovo notes that the calculation on 150 years of U.S. independence was actually incorrect. Possibly the date referred to the U.S.’ first presidential election, or was simply a late commemoration of 1776 or 1783.

264 During 1939, advertisements for U.S.-made products like Caterpillar, John Deere, Kodak, or RCA generally did not indicate that the products were from America. By 1943, however, most advertisements for U.S.-made products would trumpet that status.

265 Some examples: 16 February (U.S. military spending), 28 February (U.S. aeronautical exports), 25 March (on the high quality of U.S. bombers), 12 April (U.S. aid to the Allies), and 18 May (U.S.’ energetic military preparations). Dozens of similar articles appeared throughout 1940 and were, almost without exception, sourced from AA.
The activities of U.S. officials, such as FDR, Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles and Republican Presidential candidate Wendell Willkie, were closely followed. Another way that *Ulus* called attention to the U.S. was by noting when groups of Turkish students went to the U.S., and by mentioning what those students intended to study. Few, if any, such notes concerning students heading to Germany to study were published.

The most important aspect of this information concerning the U.S. is that both the quality and the quantity of this information completely overshadowed the information presented concerning Germany or Adolph Hitler. Hitler's picture rarely appeared, as opposed to the common inclusion of FDR's picture; Cordell Hull's picture was also more common than Joachim von Ribbentrop's. The information concerning America usually conveyed a sense of strength and ability, whereas the information about Germany was, at best, neutral. Another way *Ulus* expressed this favoritism for the U.S. was by frequently using U.S. terms, translated by loan to Turkish, for certain armaments. The U.S.' B-17 bombers, known popularly as "Flying Fortresses," were referred to in *Ulus* as “Uçan Kaleler;” a calque from the English term. In stark contrast, neither the original words nor calques of well-known German military or armament terms, like blitzkrieg or panzer, were often used.

The exceptions to *Ulus*' general U.S.-related information publishing patterns were also similar to those present in 1939, and a prominent example was once again a series of columns by

266 FDR's speeches and press conferences always warranted *Ulus*' notice: examples can be found in *Ulus*' 5 January, 18 March, 14, 16, 22 April, 9 May, 13 June, 13 September, and 30 October 1940 (among many others) issues. Cordell Hull's occasional comments were also reported; for examples, see the 1 March, 31 May, 7 July, 26 August, 29 September, and 27 November 1940 (amongst others) editions of *Ulus*. *Ulus* reported Sumner Welles' early 1940 tour through Europe on a nearly daily basis between 18 February and 30 March 1940. After Willkie was declared FDR's opponent in the 1940 elections, his activities also began to receive attention from *Ulus*; see: 29 June, 18 August, 2, 4, 10, 11, 14, 30 October, 9, 13 November. *Ulus* continued to report on Willkie's statements and activities in 1941 and 1942.

267 See, for example: 17 December 1940.

268 Von Ribbentrop's picture actually appeared more often than Hitler's, which can probably be counted as a negative for the Nazis since von Ribbentrop looked somewhat unbalanced in the picture that was normally published.

269 See: 14, 16 November 1940. Later in the war, *Ulus* used terms like bazooka and V-I directly because they could not be expressed as a calque.
Neşet Halil Atay. In addition to the previously mentioned columns, Neşet Atay, later in 1940, wrote more columns relating his experiences in the U.S. These columns were published under the heading “Hulasa ve Birkaç Not” (“Summary and a Few Notes”) and were numbered. The impression that the reader receives from Neşet Atay's columns on the U.S. is that absolutely as much information as possible was squeezed from his experiences in order to provide material for Ulus. These columns also marked one of the few occasions where the U.S. was openly criticized by information in Ulus: the second and third installments of this series condemned U.S. racial segregation and policies supporting that segregation.

Columns concerning U.S.-related topics from regular contributors to Ulus, especially Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and Falih Rıfkı Atay, continued to appear. Esmer, for example, wrote on topics as diverse as FDR's 4 January 1940 Congressional speech, on the U.S. election, on U.S. policy in the Far East, and on U.S.-USSR relations. Atay wrote on topics such as the U.S. attitude towards the war in Europe, the situation in post-election America, and the Anglo-

270 See above 5.1.1.

271 These columns were published from 15 September to 25 September 1940, and reached eight installments.

272 Naturally, the possibility that his brother was doing him a favor also exists, but seems unlikely, or at least not the primary motivating factor, to this author. On the other hand, an article published by Ulus on 20 September 1939 summarized an article by French academician Andre Maurois, who had travelled around the U.S. between February and May 1939; the Maurois article may well have been the source of the idea to send Neşet Atay on a road trip around the U.S., all the while keeping a diary which could then be used as material for Ulus. Another possible source for the idea was the long Ottoman Seyahatname tradition.

273 16, 17 September 1940.

274 See: 6 January 1940.

275 More than one of Esmer's columns commented on the November 1940 U.S. election. See, for example, 11 April, 5 November (the U.S. Election Day in 1940), and 7 November 1940.

276 See: 2 July 1940.

277 See: 4 December 1940.

278 See: 9 June 1940.

279 See: 7 November 1940.
Saxon character of U.K.-U.S. cooperation. Some other columnists that wrote on U.S.-related topics included Mümtaz Faik Fenik, Hazım Atıf Kuyucak, Hüseyin Sami, and Selim Sırrı Tarcan.

One columnist published in Ulus during 1940, unconnected to Ulus but who had made acquaintances with Turkish journalists, merits mention. Nilla Gram Cook met Turkish journalists attending the New York World's Fair in 1939, and later wrote several columns that were translated and included in Ulus. Cook was an American adventurist who spent her childhood in Greece, was a former resident in Mohatma Gandhi's ashram, and apparently converted to Islam some time in the late 1930s. Possibly the most interesting aspect of Cook's articles is that she was not trained as a journalist, but her chosen religion and interest in Turkey got her articles published not only in Vatan, but also in Ulus.

280 See: 18 December 1940.

281 See: 24, 28 September, 14 October, and 19 December 1940.

282 See: 11 September and 4 December 1940.

283 See: 7 September, 7 October, and 22 December 1940.

284 See: 8 September 1940.

285 The first Cook column published in Ulus appeared in December 1939; later, Ulus would publish more of her columns, but infrequently. See: 26 December 1939 and 21, 23, 24 January 1940.

286 Ahmet Emin Yalman indicated that Cook was a Muslim when he met her at the American Islamic Association (in New York) in 1939; see: Gördüklerim... pp. 1110-1112. At the beginning of WWII, Cook found work as a correspondent for Liberty magazine, spent time in Greece and Turkey, and wrote several columns for Vatan: ibid. pp. 1117, 1120-1121. Yalman blames the small number of her columns published on official censorship.

287 Whether her nationality also had something to do with the preference shown for her columns can only be speculated on (Yalman does not suggest it), but it is difficult to imagine that an individual like Cook, but from a country like Brazil, China, or even France, would have been granted the same opportunities by Yalman and other Turkish journalists.
5.1.3: 1941

In 1941, Ulus' previous publishing patterns endured unchanged for the year's first few months. For the entirety of 1941, numerous small notes and/or articles from the AA continued to express a positive impression of the U.S., its industrial strength, increasing military preparedness, and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{288} After the Nazi occupation of Greece, though, the coverage of the war did become more subdued. Correspondingly, the number of articles that could be interpreted as strongly pro-U.S. decreased. That more subdued atmosphere did not result in a concurrent increase in pro-German articles, which still remained few and far between, but Hitler's speeches did begin to see greater attention. Articles such as the one that appeared on 13 October 1941, which was a report on a Chicago Tribune article criticizing FDR, were extremely rare.

Throughout 1941 Ulus' staff writers reflected a positive assessment of the U.S. Ahmet Şükrü Esmer\textsuperscript{289} and Falih Rifki Atay\textsuperscript{290} continued to write regularly, and positively, on U.S.-related topics. Also continuing the pattern set in previous years were a number of other contributors, such as Nüzzet Baba,\textsuperscript{291} Abidin Daver,\textsuperscript{292} Necdet Erzen,\textsuperscript{293} Mümtez Faik Fenik,\textsuperscript{294} Necip Ali

\textsuperscript{288} For examples, see: 17 January (multiple articles about U.S. military-industrial production), 7 February (U.S. military aid and activities, U.S. foreign policy), 12 March (U.S. military aid, spending, and production) 10 April (U.S. naval strength and anti-Nazi comments from U.S. Vice President Henry Wallace), 24 May (U.S. military production and foreign policy), 11 July (U.S. military production and foreign policy, plus a picture of U.S. Navy Secretary Frank Knox), 16 September (U.S. weapons production and foreign policy), 16 October (picture of FDR with articles concerning the U.S. and the war).

\textsuperscript{289} For examples (amongst many others), see: 8 January, 18 February, 18 April, 16 May, 11 July, 23 September, 11 October, and 9 December 1941.

\textsuperscript{290} For examples (amongst many others), see: 8 January, 10 March, 29 May, 16 June, 7 August, 15 September, 16 November, and 13 December 1941.

\textsuperscript{291} See: 24 January and 30 August 1941.

\textsuperscript{292} See: 18 November and 7 December 1941.

\textsuperscript{293} See: 13 March and 20 June 1941.

\textsuperscript{294} See, amongst many others: 10 January, 15 March, 29 September, 1 December, and 11 December 1941.
Küçüka, Hüseyin Sami, and Kemal Turan, who wrote infrequent columns concerning the U.S. Nilla Cook also wrote a brief series of columns, three in total, about Turkey that were published in Ulus between 1 and 7 October 1941.

Another writer without any connection to Ulus, but who had knowledge of the U.S., began to be published in Ulus' pages, similar to the appearance of Nilla Cook's columns in Ulus during December 1939 and January 1940. This writer was a Turkish woman named Nezahat Nurettin Ege. Nezahat (or Nezahet) Nurettin Ege had traveled widely in the U.S., and was apparently an idealist concerned with social service. As a result she knew the U.S. well enough to write a series of columns for Ulus, many of which were eventually used to compile and publish a book entitled Demokrasi Cihanında Kadın (Women in the Democratic World). The title page of this book indicates that Ege used materials that she obtained in English, so she apparently added her own knowledge and comments, and turned them into columns written in Turkish.

See: 18 and 23 May 1941.

See: 14 January and 30 May 1941.

See: 15 February and 19 March 1941.

The columns appeared on 1, 4, 7 October 1941.

The columns were published on 28, 29 March, 5, 8 April, 10, 19 June, 23 July, 26 August, 7, 16, 18 September, 1, 16, 24 November, and 26 December 1941.


On the title page “İngilizceden iktibas eden: Nezahat Nurettin Ege” (“excerpted from the English by Nezahat Nurettin Ege”) is written, but the columns are obviously not directly translated from English. The book is composed entirely of short chapters -- generally four-to-five pages in length -- each concerning an American woman or an issue that American women face(d). The columns published in Ulus were sometimes exactly the same as what was published in the book, but others had more diverse themes. For example, Ege's column published on 26 August 1941, on “Tung Trees,” is a direct translation of an article on the same topic by Roy L. Pepperburg in the April 1939 issue of Reader's Digest (see: “Tung Trees – the South's New Cash Crop” on pp. 101-103 of that issue). The “Tung Trees” column was not included in Ege's book.

This author has not been able to ascertain exactly how Ege ended up writing columns for Ulus.
Another event which has gained historical interest was the conference on theater given by English playwright/journalist Derek Patmore on 13 March 1941. Patmore was the The News Chronicle's Istanbul reporter during WWII and, even though Patmore was not an American, Patmore was apparently in contact with U.S. officials in an intelligence capacity. Ulus gave extensive page one coverage to Patmore's conference, which was unusual in that the conference was not an event of any special occasion. Recently, Rıfat Bali found a document indicating that Patmore was in contact with U.S. officials concerning wartime intelligence and that he actually forwarded suggestions for propaganda activities in Turkey to U.S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt in 1942. Because of that document, the attention given to Patmore's conference becomes highly suspect, and one wonders exactly what sort of connections Patmore may have had with Ulus' staff and/or the American and Turkish governments. However, until more official documents come to light, this subject will remain in the realm of speculation.

At least one notable occasion was not included in Ulus' pages. President İnönü was featured on the cover of the 19 May 1941 issue of Time magazine, but the article was not only not published in Ulus, it was not even mentioned. Possibly this was a result of the German military forces newly lodged on Turkey's doorstep in Greece, but more likely it was a result of the article's generally condescending tone and several untoward comments on Mustafa Kemal ("died of over indulgence"), President İnönü ("deafness has often been, and is today, his greatest asset as a statesman;" "a Moslem Asiatic"), Turks ("Turks bred hatred and fear far and wide") and Turkey ("scarcely a single good road"). To top off the article, the cover

303 See the 13, 14 March 1941 issues of Ulus.

304 See: Bali, Rıfat N. “II. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye'de Amerikan Propagandası.” Toplumsal Tarih. Şubat 2007, Sayı 158. pp. 74-75. Also see below, Section 5.1.7.

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portrait had a religious theme (minarets behind President İnönü's bust). Thus, the absence of the *Time* article from *Ulus* pages is not difficult to comprehend.

Even after 3 December 1941, when FDR declared that Turkey was vital to U.S. security and opened the Lend-Lease Program to Turkish participation,* Ulus* did not change its publishing practices with regard to the U.S. On the other hand, small changes did occur in *Ulus* pages after the U.S. entered WWII; apparently it then became more difficult for *Ulus* to publish pro-Allies material since the U.S. was now included. This did not mean that pro-U.S. material became less prominent than pro-German material, though.

Pictures especially portrayed an obvious pro-Allied bias, with FDR pictures (and other U.S. officials) still greatly outnumbering those of German officials. Hitler's picture became again slightly more common, but still nowhere near as prevalent as pictures of FDR, who was even pictured with his mother.* Ulus' attitude vis-a-vis the U.S. and Germany was published shortly after 7 December 1941. Following the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. quickly joined the Allied cause, which resulted in Germany and Italy declaring war on the U.S. on 11 December 1941. On 12 December 1941, *Ulus* juxtaposed two page one pictures in a remarkable manner. One picture is of Hitler, apparently declaring war on the U.S. Directly next to Hitler's picture is a picture of several U.S. aircraft carriers. A picture of U.S. military vessels was not such an unusual event, even in 1941 and 1942; what was unusual was that the

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305 Another possibility is that *Ulus* staff did not know about this article, but that would be difficult to imagine, especially when *Ulus* staff had contacts with foreign journalists. On the other hand, it would be easy to understand if they were ordered to not include anything about the *Time* article in *Ulus*. Furthermore, İsmet İnönü knew English well enough to read magazine articles comfortably (see: Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, p. 241) so the possibility that he read *Time*'s article, formed his own opinion of it, and told *Ulus* writers to not mention it, exists. Finally, this article on President İnönü was not attributed to any author and can be accessed through *Time*'s on-line archives.


307 See: 1 February 1942.
picture was shot from below, which inspires the feeling that the ships are bearing down on the observer. However, because the picture was placed next to the picture of Hitler, the reader receives the impression that the ships are looming over Hitler, about to run him down.

The positioning of these pictures is unlikely to have been accidental, since Ulus quietly maintained a pro-U.S. tone throughout the darkest days of WWII. Politics even played itself out in Ulus' “Cinema” page, which reappeared only days before the U.S. entered WWII. This section carefully balanced the numbers of pictures of American and German film stars until the end of January 1942, when that section began to be dominated by Hollywood idols.\footnote{308}

5.1.4: 1942

In 1942, the first wartime signs of a change in Ulus' publishing habits regarding the U.S. began to emerge. Despite the dire military situation in the early and middle months of 1942, with Germany already ensconced in Greece and the Aegean islands, Nazi allies in Bulgaria, instability in Iraq and Syria,\footnote{309} and the German panzers speeding towards the Caucasus mountains in the north and Cairo in the south, Ulus did not become a voice for pro-German propaganda. Instead, articles from European newspapers and magazines, having been discontinued shortly after the war's start, began to appear regularly again. The articles usually were from Swiss (i.e. neutral) sources and were sometimes about the U.S.\footnote{310} In parallel, the same sort of small notes and/or articles about U.S. foreign policy and industrial and military production that had always been a part of Ulus' coverage of the U.S. were now joined by more frequent notes on worldwide U.S. military activity.\footnote{311}

More pictures of Adolph Hitler appeared in Ulus during 1942's first five months than in the previous three years combined. However, this is not such a radical statement because Ulus\footnote{308} See: 3, 9, 16, 23 December 1941, 6, 13, 20, 28 January, and 4 February 1941.

\footnote{309} Both had been under the control of pro-Axis forces as recently as May-June 1941.

\footnote{310} For examples, see: 18 February and 6 September 1942 (French), and 22 November 1942 (Swiss).

\footnote{311} For typical examples, see: 27 January, 8 February, 13 April, 23 May, 9 June (the Battle of Midway), and 27 August 1942. 
had printed so few pictures of Hitler during those three years. Another interesting, Hitler-related front page was presented to *Ulus*' readers on 21 April 1942. That day, the front page featured a picture of a U.S. B-17 Flying Fortress higher on the page than a picture of Hitler. Thus, *Ulus* commemorated Hitler's birthday by essentially showing him under attack by U.S. bombers. Front page pictures of this sort served to emphasize the implied message first laid out in the pictures included on *Ulus*' 12 December 1941 front page.\(^{312}\)

On 2 Nisan 1942, *Ulus* went so far as to print news about an uprising amongst German soldiers in Bohemia on page one; that same day there was wide coverage in the entire edition of the trial of Franz von Papen's would-be assassins. Since news about an insurrection amongst German soldiers is one of the last things that von Papen would have wanted in Turkish dailies, one wonders how *Ulus* was able to commit such an affront.

However, when one examines *Ulus*' contents, the conclusion that von Papen did not have nearly as much influence over the Turkish press, even in Germany's most powerful WWII years, that one might suppose becomes inescapable. Feridun Cemal Erkin, who was a high-ranking official in the Turkish foreign ministry throughout the 1930s and 1940s, wrote that von Papen "Türkiye'nin samimi bir dostu olmuş."\(^{313}\) In spite of other possible interpretations for that statement, the combination of Erkin's warm relations with von Papen and the friendly feelings that von Papen supposedly had for Turkey apparently worked in tandem to keep the pressure on *Ulus* to publish pro-German information from being excessive. Good relations between the Turkish Foreign Ministry and von Papen would also help to explain why *Ulus* was able to remain pro-U.S. throughout the war.

\(^{312}\) See above, Section 5.1.3.

Columnists associated with *Ulus* continued to pen commentary, nearly always laudatory, on the U.S. Falih Rıfkı Atay⁴ and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer⁵ continued with the same tenor as in the previous years. *Ulus'* cadre of occasional writers, like Nüzhet Baba (19 July 1942), Abidin Daver (25 April, 15 May, 10 June, 12 August 1942), Sadreddin Enver (2 May, 17 July 1942), Mümtaz Faik Fenik (26 November 1942), and Hazım Atıf Kuyucak (27 April, 13 May 1942) also wrote pro-American pieces. Nezahat Nurettin Ege's columns on various aspects of American life and society also continued.⁶

1942's *Ulus* editions featured several several attention-grabbing, U.S.-related incidents. On 30 June 1942, i.e. during the high point of Nazi success during WWII, *Ulus* printed the first of several advertisements for Turkish-language radio broadcasts of U.S. news. These advertisements listed the times and wavelengths for the Turkish-language programs and were printed by *Ulus* in its advertisements section. The first advertisement was a half-page spread and all of the advertisements had the same “*Lütfen bu listeyi kesip saklayınız*” admonishment at the bottom. At that point in the war, publishing such blatantly pro-U.S. information must have seemed like an act of defiance.

Another important event was the trip to the U.S. taken by a delegation of Turkish journalists in late 1942 (mentioned above in Section 3.0). After stopping briefly in London, the journalists continued on to the U.S. where they went on a cross-country tour of important U.S.

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⁴ See (amongst many others): 8 January, 10 April, 13 May (on the Battle of the Coral Sea), 20 June, and 25 August 1942. Atay wrote his 13 September column as a reflection on a picture in the most recent copy of *Life* that he had received.

⁵ See (amongst numerous others): 8 January, 12 February, 10 April, 11 June, 12 August, and 7 September (Wendell Willkie in Turkey) 1942.


⁷ German forces were pressing El Alamein in Egypt and had reached the Caucasus Mountains' foothills.

⁸ These advertisements were printed on 30 June and 15 July 1942. There were also later advertisements for broadcasts in French and English. Consequently, three of Germany's main enemies had their viewpoints broadcast in Turkey, and not only in the language of the enemies, but also in Turkish.

⁹ "*Please clip and save this list.*"
economic, industrial, and cultural locations. The detailed columns written by Ahmet Esmer presented a powerful image of a nation fully engaged in all-out war. Esmer devoted one piece, on 8 October 1942, to FDR's reminiscences of his letter correspondences with Mustafa Kemal. Furthermore, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Laurence Steinhardt accompanied Esmer on the return trip to Turkey.

Similarly, Wendell Willkie's visit to Turkey while on his round-the-world tour as FDR's representative received intense, and positive, coverage in Ulus between 7 and 12 September 1942. One other occasion of note was U.S. Air Attache Robert Creswell Brown's reception of a parachuting certificate from the İnönü Air Camp, illustrated with a picture in Ulus' 27 October 1942 edition.

5.1.5: 1943

The tour of the U.S. taken by the Turkish journalists may, as far as Ulus is concerned, have been the turning point in the war as much as the Battle of Midway, the Second Battle of El Alamein, or Stalingrad was in the military realm. The first article from Reader's Digest was published on 13 January 1943, directly after the Turkish journalistic delegation returned from the U.S. The particular article in question was not immediately followed up by more Reader's Digest pieces, but it foreshadowed later Ulus publishing trends. Other articles

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321 See Ulus' 17, 18, and 19 January 1943 editions.

322 As explained above in Section 4.0, Reader's Digest was important because of its role in U.S. government “information” activities.

323 Yalman and Yalçın returned to Turkey in the first week of December 1942, but Daver, Esmer, and Sertel stayed for a slightly longer period of time; see: Yalman, Gördüklerim. . . , p. 1208.

324 Originally taken from the American Medical Association's health and medicine journal Hygeia, the article concerned blood donation and blood banks. The author was listed as Myron Stearns and the translator as Celal Ertuğ.
translated directly from Reader's Digest and various U.S. publications, this time greater in number but yet again limited in duration, appeared later in 1943.  

Continuing alongside this new U.S.-sourced information were the continual small notes and/or articles on U.S. government, economic, and military issues. As always, Falih Rıfkı Atay and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer produced a steady output of pro-U.S. information while other columnists such as Nüzhet Baba (27 January 1943), Abidin Daver (9, 17 April and 2 May 1943), Hasan Halef Işıkpinar (3 May and 22 June 1943), and Esat Tekeli wrote...

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325 These articles appeared on 13, 17, 18, 23, 27 October and 4, 6, 13, 15 November 1943. None of these articles were credited to Reader's Digest, but Ulus staff members obtained at least five of the nine articles from Reader's Digest. The 4-6 November two-part article attributed to Dorothy Thompson is the same article as that titled “Germany Must be Salvaged,” published by the same author in Reader's Digest's July 1943 edition (pp. 51-56); the 13 November article was actually a book excerpt, and is exactly the same (even similar portions of Ulus' article were italicized) as the article published in the September 1943 Reader's Digest edition (pp. 71-73) as “Getting Rid of the Nazis Is Not Enough.” The author, Henry J. Taylor, was credited by Ulus. The 23 October article was credited to Carl Crow and is a direct translation of the article, called “The Philippines Under the Japanese Boot Heel,” published by Reader's Digest and credited to Crow in its September 1943 edition (pp. 25-28). The article attributed to Clark Lee on 15 November is a direct translation of the article credited to the same author, titled “Japan Has Already Won Her War!,” published by Reader's Digest in its July 1943 edition (pp. 29-32).

326 For typical examples from 1943, see: 18 January, 14 March, 13 May, 28 July, 20 September, and 29 November 1943.

327 Falih Atay did not write on U.S. themes during the first half of 1943, but in May 1943 he began to touch on the topic. See, amongst others: 20 May, 4 June, 2 August, 31 October, and 4 December 1943. His 31 October column, titled “İyi Dostlarmız Var Dur” (“We Do Have Steadfast Friends”), is especially notable because it discusses former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Joseph Grew and the Turkish-U.S. friendship.

328 Esmer continued to write foreign affairs articles on U.S.-related themes after his return from the U.S. See, amongst many others: 12 February, 10 March, 18 April, 3 July, 15 September, 23 October, and 7 December 1943.

329 This article was essentially a summary of a New York Times article on the military use of dogs.

330 See: 31 March, 24, 29 April, 7, 9, October , 18 November, and 2, 16 December 1943. Several of Tekeli's contributions included notes on economic news published as a regular feature.
infrequent, but also pro-U.S., columns. Nezahat Nurettin Ege wrote several more columns in 1943 as well.\textsuperscript{331}

Added to these columns were some translations by staff members of articles that were about the U.S., but for which no U.S. publication was cited as a source. Most of these articles are probably from \textit{Reader's Digest}, \textit{Life}, or \textit{Time}, but only a search of the magazine archives for these articles will define exactly where they came from. Occasional column writers like Nezahat Nurettin Ege (9, 10 March 1943\textsuperscript{332}) and Nüzhet Baba (7, 16, 24 May 1943) contributed to this effort.

In some exceptional cases, the writer of, but not the source of, these translated articles was identified. The authors listed for these articles suggest that the articles were extracted by \textit{Ulus}' writers from \textit{Reader's Digest}. On 29 and 30 September 1943, for example, an article attributed to Frederick C. Painton was published in two installments in \textit{Ulus}. From the tables of contents listed for 1943 \textit{Reader's Digest} editions, one learns that Frederick C. Painton sometimes had as many as two articles included in a single edition of that magazine.\textsuperscript{333}

In 1943, \textit{Time} once again made Turkey the subject of a cover, this time composing a somewhat strange picture of Şükrü Saraçoğlu against a weather vane with symbols representing the four great warring powers – the U.S., the U.K., the USSR, and Nazi Germany, suggesting that Turkey's decision depended “on which way the wind was

\textsuperscript{331} See: 16 January and 6, 12 March 1943.

\textsuperscript{332} The 9-10 March two-part article series, credited to Karl Detzer, was almost certainly from \textit{Reader's Digest} since Detzer was a “roving editor” for \textit{Reader's Digest} starting in 1940; see: Heidenry, op. cit, p. 124.

\textsuperscript{333} See, for example, the September 1943 edition of \textit{Reader's Digest}. Some Internet sites sell back issues of magazines; I found pictures of the front covers and content lists for various \textit{Reader's Digest} editions in some of these sites. \textit{Reader's Digest}, notably, always listed its contents on its front cover. Other authors that were published in \textit{Ulus} during the time frame covered by this study, such as Andre Maurois and Paul De Kruif, were frequent contributors to \textit{Reader's Digest} during WWII. De Kruif was, like Detzer, a “roving editor” for \textit{Reader's Digest} during WWII. Unfortunately, De Kruif published medical articles that were of questionable accuracy; see: Heidenry, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
As should be obvious from the information presented in this study, the İnönü government clearly, but indirectly, showed a preference for the Allied side; this was never in doubt. Thus, simply the suggestion present in the *Time* cover was probably enough for the result: that article was also never mentioned or excerpted in *Ulus*. Saracoğlu's picture, like the portrait of İsmet İnönü used by *Time* in 1941, was framed by a minaret.

The *Time* article itself was notable for several things. Firstly, it described Saracoğlu in a generally positive light, effusing that, "[Saracoğlu] is more like an American politician than anyone else in European governments," and that “... there can be no question that [Saracoğlu] would like to see the Allies win.” Furthermore, the article noted that Saracoğlu and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Laurence Steinhardt were “friends,” that Saracoğlu's closest relationship was with the British Ambassador to Turkey, and that Saracoğlu was “scrupulously correct, but impersonal” when interacting with German Ambassador to Turkey Franz von Papen. Overall, despite the use of the word “totalitarian” to characterize Turkey's government, the article was much more positive in tone than the 1941 *Time* article on President İnönü. However, these positive aspects were apparently not strong enough for it to warrant mention in *Ulus*.

Political explanations for the appearance of U.S.-sourced articles in *Ulus* during 1943 can only be ventured on. The first article in January 1943 can easily be linked to the return of the Turkish journalistic delegation from its U.S. trip. However, during the middle months of 1943 Swiss publications were the openly cited sources. Only in October 1943 did *Ulus* begin to frequently and openly cite U.S. publications.

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334 This issue of *Time* was published 12 July 1943, and can also be accessed through *Time*'s on-line archives. No author was credited for this *Time* article, although it is obvious that the author had interacted with Saracoğlu personally.

335 The same treatment that the 1941 *Time* issue on İsmet İnönü, mentioned above in section 5.1.5, received.

336 The covers of these *Time* editions are also accessible through *Time*'s on-line archives.

337 For examples, see the 17 August and 4 September 1943 editions of *Ulus*. On 29 September 1943, *Ulus* listed “from an American magazine” (“Amerikan bir mecmuadan”) as a source for a two-part article.
One possible reason for this behavior could have been more German pressure. A Turkish-German trade agreement was signed in April 1943; between that point and the Allied invasion of Italy, which began on 3 September 1943, several translated articles appeared that were probably from U.S. sources, and one more article was translated from the *New York Times*.\footnote{Examples of these translated but uncredited articles appeared on 7, 24 May and 6 June 1943, and the *New York Times* article on 21 July 1943. Another article, published on 16 May 1943, was attributed to a *New York Times* writer.}

After the invasion of Italy, *Ulus* almost immediately began to utilize a significantly larger amount of material openly cited as coming from U.S. sources.

5.1.6: 1944

In 1944 *Ulus* preserved the trends concerning U.S.-sourced information that had appeared in 1943, in addition to continuing the patterns that had existed since early 1939. The favorable notes and small articles concerning U.S. military and economic strength, foreign policy, and politics continued apace,\footnote{For a representative sample drawn from the multitude of instances, see: 3 January, 12 February, 13 April, 30 June, 1 August, 4 October, and 14 December 1944.} as did the generally pro-U.S. columns from Falih Rifki Atay\footnote{For examples, see: 15 January, 4 March, 11 April, 10 August, and 9 November (on the U.S. election) 1944.} and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer.\footnote{For examples, amongst numerous others, see: 8 January (on the approaching U.S. election), 2 February, 24 March, 24 October (on the approaching U.S. election), and 8 December 1944. For an example of Esmer criticizing U.S. foreign policy, see *Ulus*’ 9 January 1944 edition. Esmer also went to Philadelphia for the International Labor Conference in 1944 and wrote a series of columns concerning that experience which appeared on 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 September and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 October 1944. The column published on 3 October was notable for its enthusiastically pro-U.S. stance.}

Complementing these articles and columns were the occasional columns written by other *Ulus* contributors.\footnote{Such as Abidin Daver (12 February 1944), Kasım Gülek (6 September 1944), Esat Tekeli (9 February, 31 July, 13, 29 August, 16, 21 September, and 21 October 1944), and Kemal Turan (28 February 1944).} As in 1942 and 1943, *Ulus* also included
infrequent notes concerning U.S. war losses, but usually these notes were sourced from the AA and taken from the regular U.S. government press releases.  

In 1944, a handful of articles translated directly from U.S. sources did appear. The sources Ulus cited for these articles included Air Facts, Collier's, the New York Times, and USA Magazine. More translated articles which listed an author but no source also appeared, and at least one of these, the 2 January 1944 piece credited to Don Wharton, was from Reader's Digest. Ulus' other interesting publishing decisions during 1944 included an article on Abraham Lincoln by Carl Sandburg, an article concerning the publication of a Turkish version of Wendell Willkie's One World, an uncited article on malaria by U.S. government medical researcher Lyle Goodhue, and an article on the post-war situation by FDR aide Harry Hopkins.

In April 1944, the U.S. began to put pressure on Turkey over its neutrality; one aspect of this pressure was cuts in U.S. economic aid. Even though this pressure did achieve the end of Turkish chrome shipments to Germany in that same month, and the eventual end to Turkish-German relations in August 1944, it did not have a positive echo in Ulus' pages. U.S.-sourced

343 For examples, see: 2 January, 19 February, 20 August, 21 October, and 11 November 1944.

344 For the Air Facts article (translated by Nüzhet Baba), see 29 August 1944; for the Collier's articles, see 14, 15 February and 28 November 1944; the New York Times articles appeared on 2 May, 21 June, and 14 October 1944; the USA Magazine article appeared on 3 May 1944 and was attributed to Eleanor Gilchrist.

345 This article, titled “Bir İstila Nasıl Hazırlanır?” (“How is an Invasion Prepared?”) is a direct translation of the article titled “How The North African Campaign Was Organized” from the February 1943 edition of Reader's Digest. Don Wharton was a regular contributor to Reader's Digest. For other examples of unsourced articles, see 9, 18 February and 7 November 1944.

346 See: 13 February 1944. No source or translator was cited for this article.

347 See: 2 March 1944.

348 See: 3 March 1944.

349 See: 9, 10 March 1944. This article is similar to, but not the same as, the Hopkins article titled “You Will Be Mobilized” published in the February 1943 edition of Reader's Digest.
information essentially disappeared after the first week of May 1944 and did not re-emerge until January 1945. If any change did result from the cut in Turkish-German relations, it was an increase in advertisements for imported U.S. products and companies.\textsuperscript{350}

No apparent change in \textit{Ulus}' publishing patterns occurred after the June Allied invasion of Normandy, either. On 24 June 1944 \textit{Ulus} did note the beginning of Turkish-American radio program exchanges, and seemed so desperate for information concerning the U.S. that an article on a storm in the U.S. was published on the 26 June 1944 edition's front page. On 17 July 1944, \textit{Ulus} noted a Laurence Steinhardt comment to the effect that “talks” between Turkey and the Allies had begun in late June 1944 but, again, no difference can be noted in \textit{Ulus}' publishing patterns immediately after late June 1944.

Towards the end of 1944, however, various notes, features and/or articles signalling a broadened Turkish-American relationship began to appear. These included an official announcement concerning an opportunity for qualified students to study in the U.S. and the U.K.,\textsuperscript{351} an article concerning the expansion of official Turkish trade representation in New York and London,\textsuperscript{352} and the government decision to give greater preference to the U.S. dollar.\textsuperscript{353} \textit{Ulus} noted on 20 August 1944 that the first U.S. cargo ship in five years arrived in Mersin, a Turkish delegation went to the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago,\textsuperscript{354} and İsmet İnönü gave a speech in which he mentioned a need for closer relations.

\textsuperscript{350} During 1944, advertisements for Consolidated Vultee Airplanes, RCA, Remington, and U.S. Steel were especially common.

\textsuperscript{351} See: 11 October 1944. This notice was followed up by other notes, published on 7 November and 24 December 1944, regarding the same topic.

\textsuperscript{352} See: 15 October 1944.

\textsuperscript{353} See: 15 November 1944; the article states that the U.S. dollar will be given preference in order to expand trade with the U.S. In 1943 and 1944, mutual trade with the U.S. was already increasing; see: Oran, Baskın. “Dönemin Bilançosu.” \textit{Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar}. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004 (10. baskı). p. 393. Aydın, Mustafa. “İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye, 1939-1945.” \textit{Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar}. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004 (10. baskı). p. 466.

\textsuperscript{354} This conference was held between 1 November and 7 December 1944. \textit{Ulus} published a number of articles concerning this conference; see, for example: 17, 19 October, 11, 23, 24 November, and 10 December 1944. Several of these articles were penned by B. Şükrü Koçak,
with the U.S. At this point, notes specifically concerning Turkish-U.S. trade also began to appear more frequently, and two Turkish trade/economic delegations went to the U.S. for inspections and negotiations in November 1944. Even sport was included in this development as a group of U.S. boxers came to Turkey in November 1944 and held matches with Turkish boxers.

5.1.7: 1945 -- January through August

After several fitful starts for information culled from U.S. sources, the final turning point came immediately after the New Year in January 1945. On 3 January 1945, the TBMM voted to cut political and economic ties with Japan. Within two days, Ulus began a new wave of American-sourced information. The difference this time was that the wave did not fade as had similar occurrences of U.S.-sourced materials over the previous war years. In fact, even though American “informational” materials were once again openly published starting from 6 January 1945, U.K. materials were actually more prevalent for several weeks. By the end of January 1945, however, U.S. materials had become more frequent and lengthy than the U.K. materials, and were dominated by magazines like Reader's Digest, Life, Time, and Atlantic Monthly.

Whether the cutting of diplomatic and economic ties with Japan was the key event is not immediately determinable, but the change in Ulus's pages was apparent immediately after that decision. The cutting of ties with Japan also seems to be a more likely trigger than simply the

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355 See: 3 November 1944.

356 For examples, see: 19, 25 November and 8, 11, 15, 24, 26, 31 December 1944.

357 Articles concerning these delegations were published on 21, 29 November and 6, 31 December 1944. According to the articles, one delegation was charged with procuring railroad infrastructure and the other, composed of three Turkish banking heads, with securing industrial development credit.

358 The articles concerning the U.S. boxers and their matches in Turkey were published on 29 October and 4, 9, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19 November 1944.
Furthermore, *Ulus*'s information effort in January 1945 appeared to be coordinated with political developments, in stark contrast to the aftermath of ceasing ties with the Nazis the previous August. After the *TBMM* voted to cut ties with Germany, there was no perceivable change in the kind of information presented to Turkish readers about the U.S. On 3 August 1944, the *TBMM*'s vote to cut relations with Germany was announced, and in the following days *Ulus* included only articles, generally *AA* summaries of U.S. or U.K. newspaper reports, relating how pleased various Allied countries were.

The five months that elapsed between the cut of relations with Germany and the cutting of ties with Japan seem to have made all the difference. *Ulus*’s reaction to cutting ties with Japan was, for only one day, similar to that displayed the previous August. On 5 January, a first-page article noted that FDR was pleased that Turkey cut ties with Japan. Pictures of U.S. military personnel, a routine occurrence, also were printed.

The next day, however, the first *Reader's Digest* translation in twelve months appeared; notably, that article described how terrible life was for Japanese women (!). On the page facing the *Reader's Digest* article was an excerpt from *Life* on three American women who lived through the war in Leipzig. The *Life* excerpt was massive, taking up three-fourths of page five, a size usually reserved for important speeches by Turkish governmental figures.

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359 January 1945 also coincided with a change in font and page layout in *Ulus*.

360 U.S. and U.K. on 4 August 1944; more reaction and a related article from the *New York Sun* on 5 August 1944. A *New York Times* article, along with some other U.S. journalistic reaction on the same topic, was noted on 10 August 1944. On 11 August 1944 there was a large article summarizing U.S. press reaction to the break in Turkish-German relations.

361 The Don Wharton article which appeared in January 1944 was not cited by *Ulus* as coming from *Reader's Digest*. The 6 January 1945 article was the first article openly attributed to *Reader's Digest* in two years, since 13 January 1943. Overall, in the period from 1939-1945 this was only the second article that *Ulus* labelled as sourced from *Reader's Digest*.

362 The author was listed as Helen Moscicki and is the translation of the article called “The Unhappiest Women In The World” by Moscicki which appeared in the December 1944 edition of *Reader's Digest* (pp. 19-21).

363 Such as speeches by President İsmet İnönü or the modern-Turkish version of the Turkish Republic's Constitution, which was published in full in *Ulus* on 11 January 1945.
In other words, suddenly a previously unseen amount of U.S.-sourced “informational” features began to appear in *Ulus*, only two days following the *TBMM* decision to cease ties with Japan.

The new “informational” features were also granted, in terms of the space used to print them, a high place of importance. In the years previous to 1945, pages four through six in *Ulus* were usually devoted to classified advertisements or to the occasional economy or art feature. From January to April 1945, however, pages four and five were regularly filled by, especially, “informational” features from U.S. sources or, less frequently, U.K. or French-language sources.

In the middle of April 1945 the amount of U.S.-sourced information declined dramatically, but these U.S.-sourced articles still appeared, on a monthly basis, with greater frequency than in the previous six years. The 1945 January-August amounts of American “informational” features included in *Ulus* are as follows (the numbers from October, November, and December 1944 are also provided as comparison to the following months):

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>October 1944:</th>
<th>November 1944(^{364}):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reader's Digest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (28 November(^{365}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (unidentifiable)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (7 November(^{366}))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{364}\) *Ulus*’ 26 and 27 November 1944 editions are missing from the bound volume at the *Milli Kütüphanesi* in Bayazıt.

\(^{365}\) A summary, not a translation, of a Harold Ickes article from *Collier's*.

\(^{366}\) A large article on FDR and Thomas Dewey relating to the U.S. election; the translator is listed as Nermin Suley.
December 1944:
  Reader's Digest -- 0
  Life -- 1\textsuperscript{367} (5 December)
  Other Sources -- 0
  Others (unidentifiable) -- 0

January 1945:
  Reader's Digest -- 4 (6, 14, 27, 30 January)
  Life -- 1 (6 January)
  Other Sources -- 0
  Others (unidentifiable)\textsuperscript{368} -- 6 (15, 18 -- 2 articles, 27, 31 January -- 2 articles)

February 1945:
  Reader's Digest -- 3 (8, 9, 16 February)
  Life -- 0
  Other U.S. Sources -- 6 (2, 16, 19, 20 -- 2 articles, 27 February)
  Others (unidentifiable) -- 16 (1, 3, \textsuperscript{69} 4 articles, 7, 9, 10 -- 2 articles, 12 -- 2 articles, 14, 15, 16, 19 February)

March 1945:
  Reader's Digest -- 3 (5, 8, 13 March)
  Life -- 2 (2, 30 March)
  Other Sources -- 9 (5 -- 3 articles, 6, 9, 10, 22, 28, 30 March)
  Others (unidentifiable) -- 4 (3, 8, 13, 28 March)

\textsuperscript{367} Article originally from \textit{Life} but actually taken from the Cairo publication \textit{Images}.

\textsuperscript{368} This includes some features which were almost certainly from U.S. sources, such as the 31 January article on a Washington squirrel living as a domestic pet, or articles on animals in U.S. zoos (see: 15 and 16 February), but which were not attributed to a source by Ulus's staff. I have also included under the “other” category a number of articles which strongly resemble, both in the type of information presented and the format, typical articles from Reader's Digest or \textit{Life}, but which were not attributed to any source. An example of this type of article is the 6 February article on tornadoes in the U.S. The only way to determine these articles' source would be to search the archives of these magazines and others. I included “informational” articles (but not public addresses) by U.S. officials (e.g. the half-page 6 March commentary by Edward Stettinius on the Dumbarton Oaks agreement). I did not include articles from non-U.S. sources; a source like Magazine Digest, which carried articles that were definitely useful as pro-U.S. “informational” materials, was not included in the article statistics because it was published in Toronto. Also not included were the many anecdotes, almost certainly from Reader's Digest, that frequently appeared in Ulus' “Dünyada Olup Bitenler” (“What's Happening in the World”) feature, which appeared almost daily.

\textsuperscript{369} One of these articles, a story by Kressman Taylor called “Address Unknown,” was published in Reader's Digest in January 1939.
April 1945:
  Reader's Digest -- 0
  Life -- 2 (3, 7 April)
  Other Sources -- 6 (4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 29 April)
  Others (unidentifiable) -- 0

May 1945:
  Reader's Digest -- 1 (1 May)
  Life -- 0
  Other Sources -- 2 (13, 15 May)
  Others (unidentifiable) -- 3 (3, 4, 27 May)

June 1945:
  Reader's Digest -- 0
  Life -- 0
  Other Sources -- 1 (10 June)
  Others (unidentifiable) -- 3 (11, 15, 29 June)

July 1945:
  Reader's Digest -- 0
  Life -- 0
  Other Sources -- 3 (2, 5, 22 July)
  Others (unidentifiable) -- 3 (6, 13, 29 July)

August 1945:  
  Reader's Digest -- 0
  Life -- 0
  Other Sources -- 4 (17 -- 2 articles, 21, 26 August)
  Others (unidentifiable) -- 4 (1, 7, 9, 21 August)

Starting from the middle of April 1945, the U.S.-sourced information suddenly begins to slacken. The most likely explanation is that the nexus of political events in the middle of April 1945 -- FDR's death and Truman's accession to the Presidency (and the resultant shuffling in U.S. official positions), the chaotic flood of information surrounding the approaching end of WWII, and the departure of Laurence Steinhardt, who apparently had a close working relationship with the Turkish press, from Ankara -- resulted in this lowered pace of U.S.-sourced information. After May 1945, the articles that were cited as coming from

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August 1945 is notable because a short story by an American author, O. Henry, appeared on 23 August; this was the first story by a U.S. author published in Ulus in the period I examined. O. Henry was known for his clever and entertaining portrayals of everyday American life and culture.

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See: 17 February 1945; see also above, Section 5.1.4.
U.S. sources were often in the weekly *Arts* feature.\(^{372}\) However, a comment in the 1 May 1945 “*Dünyada Olup Bitenler*” feature clearly shows that *Ulus* had access to, at least, *Reader's Digest* in these months.\(^{373}\) The source of these issues, whether *Ulus* was obtaining these issues through its own means or if the issues were being provided to them, is not clear.

Steinhardt's replacement, Edwin Wilson, did not arrive until June 1945, but even then there is not a notable increase in U.S.-sourced information. Wilson seems to have focused on other activities, since *Ulus* began to feature pro-U.S. information more prominently after Wilson took up his post.\(^{374}\) This information was the same kind of information that had always appeared concerning the U.S., i.e. the quality or nature of the information did not change, only the emphasis changed. An Ankara *Halkevi* also opened an exhibit of U.S. art and architecture shortly after Wilson's arrival.\(^{375}\)

On the other hand, after mid-April 1945, other *Ulus* writers begin to write more frequently about the U.S. This may have been because Falih Atay went to the U.S. for the San Francisco conference, but mid-April also coincides with the span of time in which Nermin Suley's translations of English-language articles became more common.\(^{376}\)

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\(^{372}\) See 13 May and 2 July 1945 as examples.

\(^{373}\) The always-anonymous compiler of this feature states “... *yeni gelen sayılarda gözümüze çarpan fıkralar şunlardı*” (“these are the anecdotes from the newly-arrived issues that caught our eye”).

\(^{374}\) Edwin Wilson arrived in Ankara on 4 June 1945 and presented his credentials to President İnönü on 11 June 1945; the following day Wilson met with Şükrü Saracoğlu (see: 12, 13 June 1945). The *Ulus* editions on 4, 5 July 1945 were notable for the manner in which relatively unimportant events related to the U.S., and unrelated to Turkey, were given page one headline status. These headlines were published only a week after Wilson met with Turkish journalists at the Ankara U.S. War Information Bureau (see 27 June 1945).

\(^{375}\) See: 30 June 1945. The opening for this exhibition was attended by Wilson and a number of Turkish officials.

\(^{376}\) See, for example: 2 May and 6 August 1945. Suley's translations often did not cite a source.
Other publishing patterns established by Ulus remained unchanged. The positive-toned short notes and/or articles on various U.S.-related topics continued unabated. The notes on U.S.-Turkish economic activities which began to be prominent in 1944 also proceeded. Falih Rıfkı Atay and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer continued their pro-U.S. columns. Other Ulus contributors, such as Mümtaz Faik Fenik (14, 27 April, 27 May, and 1, 8 August 1945), Hazım Atıf Kuyucak (11 June), Esat Tekeli (7, 26 April and 6 July), Osman Nuri Uman (19 April and 4, 17 May), and Kemal Turan (15 April) also contributed pro-American features.

Other notable events included the arrival of a U.S. press delegation, the publication of a “question-and-answer” list prepared by Edward Stettinius on the Dumbarton Oaks agreement, and the lowering of Turkish flags to half-mast after FDR's death. An entire page of Ulus' 14 April 1945 edition was devoted to pictures and articles on FDR to commemorate his death, and the 16 April 1945 edition noted that all Turkish football matches from the previous day were begun with a moment of silence for the same reason. Finally, Turkish and foreign journalists met U.S. Representative Everett Dirksen at the Istanbul U.S. War News Bureau.

377 Amongst the many examples, see: 3 January, 1 March, 8 April, 2 June, 9 July, and 13 August 1945.

378 For typical examples, see: 9 January, 1 February (on the price of Turkish carpets in the U.S.), 24 February (extension of Turkish-U.S. Lend-Lease Agreement), 17 March (a shipment of U.S.-made portable grain silos arrives in Iskenderun), 2 April, 10, 25 May, 3 June, 27 July, and 2 August 1945.

379 See, amongst others: 3, 28 March and 16 August 1945.


381 See: 20, 21, 22, and 27 February 1945.

382 See: 11 April 1945.

383 See: 14 April 1945.

384 See: 17 April 1945. Dirksen later met with Şükrü Saraçoğlu and observed a TBMM session; see: 19 April 1945. Nermin Suley interviewed Dirksen for the 20 April 1945 edition of Ulus.
After Şükrü Saraçoğlu was made an honorary member of the Mark Twain Society, an entire page in *Ulus*’ 27 May 1945 edition was devoted to Mark Twain's life and writings. Similarly, after President Truman declared 1 August Air Forces Day, *Ulus* devoted several articles and an entire page of its 1 August 1945 edition to articles concerning the U.S. air sector. Finally, *Ulus* noted on 20 June 1945 the departure of 28 Turkish students for studies in the U.S.

Several questions are either answered or raised by the January 1945 change in *Ulus*’s publishing preferences. One question that is apparently answered concerns Derek Patmore's 1942 request to Laurence A. Steinhardt to increase U.S. propaganda efforts in Turkey. The answer is that, judging from the articles published in *Ulus* from 1942 to the end of 1944, Patmore's suggestion was not taken up. Why that suggestion was not taken up is a question that is raised. Whether Patmore's suggestion had an influence on the January 1945 *Ulus* is doubtful since at least two years passed between the time that Patmore forwarded his letter to Steinhardt and a greater application of American “information” to *Ulus*’ pages.

Another possible reason for the delay in *Ulus*’s change to more active American “information” sources is that there were still German forces in Greece, within striking range of Turkey, when the *TBMM* cut ties with the Nazis; in January of 1945 that situation no longer existed. Since German forces could, potentially retaliate against Turkey for an essentially hostile action, or for any excessive provocation, *Ulus* would still have to have been more circumspect in what it published in August 1944. By January 1945 the need for such circumspection no longer existed since Germany had evacuated the Aegean islands in September 1944, and in October 1944, Bulgaria had been occupied by the Red Army while Greece had been invaded by the Allies.

However, the change in the German position in Greece was not of a quality which could fully account for the dramatically different reaction by *Ulus* to the cutting of ties with the two Axis powers. After all, in early August 1944, two months after D-Day and only two weeks before Paris's liberation, Germany was well on its way to defeat. The German threat to Turkey, though still present, had already been drastically reduced from the dark days of 1942. Furthermore, if the German threat was the entire reason that *Ulus* had not immediately begun publishing massive amounts of American “information” in August 1944, then why did *Ulus*

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385 See above, section 5.1.3.
not begin to publish that “information” after the German threat was entirely removed in October 1944? Consequently, reasons for the different reactions of *Ulus* in August 1944 and January 1945 are apparently more complicated than just the German threat.

Another change was the appointment of Joseph Grew to a more important post in the U.S. State Department. After Edward Stettinius replaced Cordell Hull as State Department Secretary in December 1944, Grew became Undersecretary of State and often took on Secretary of State responsibilities while Stettinius attended the many conferences that occurred in the first half of 1945. Grew, a former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, was known as a strong advocate of pro-Turkey policies.\(^{386}\) Another factor may have been the approaching February 1945 U.N. conference in San Francisco.

A final intriguing possibility is an event that received only a small, passing mention in *Ulus* on 3 November 1944. In that edition, a small page three note related a cocktail party given the previous evening in Ankara. Cocktails were apparently a fashion at that time since such parties, whether among society or government officials, received regular mention in *Ulus*. This cocktail was different, however, since it was hosted by American intelligence officials stationed in Turkey's capital and attended by Turkish journalists and press officials.\(^{387}\) This

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\(^{386}\) See above, Section 2.1.

\(^{387}\) The article was entitled “M. Damon Dün Akşam Bir Kokteyl Verdi”:

“Amerikan istihbarat dairesinden M. Damon, Amerika'ya gitmekte olan istihbarat dairesi şefi M. George Britt ve ödünç verme ve kiralama reisi M.H. Fedler şerefine dün akşam bir kokteyl vermiştir.


Çok samimi bir hava içinde geçen toplantında riyaseti-cumhur hususi kalem müdürü Süreyya Anderiman da bulunmuştur.”

(“Last Night Mr. Damon Held a Cocktail”: “Mr. Damon, from the American intelligence bureau, last night held a cocktail in honor of intelligence bureau chief Mr. George Britt and lend-lease head Mr. H. Fedler, both of whom are going to America. The meeting was attended by press representatives, Press and Publishing general manager Nedim Veysel İlkin, *Anatolian Agency* general manager Faik Hozar, and French and Czech political representatives. Joining the *Anatolian Agency* and Press and Publishing heads were Turkish, British, American, and French journalists and representatives from the British and American embassies.)

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event, and relationships that sprang from it, may have contributed to the coordination between U.S. “information” sources and the articles that began to appear almost exactly two months later in Ulus.

Naturally, full answers to these questions will only come from government archives.

5.2. Conclusions

Thus, by August 1945, Ulus, a newspaper which was always pro-U.S. but which published essentially no information directly from U.S. sources, began to freely publish articles translated from U.S. sources. A source from a U.S. publication directly translated, published, and credited to that source in Ulus was extremely rare from January 1939 until January 1945, when a virtual explosion of U.S.-sourced materials appeared in Ulus' pages. Even though the amount of U.S.-sourced information decreased after April 1945, comparatively more U.S.-sourced information still appeared on a monthly basis than in the months and years preceding 1945.

The comparative randomness with which “informational” articles were chosen from U.S. sources also contrasts to the heavy pro-U.S. content of the articles in early 1947. For example, the 3 April 1945 Life article on a California cemetery would almost certainly not have appeared in early 1947. A possible reason for the difference in the content of the U.S.

The manager of the President of the Republic's Secretariat, Süreyya Anderiman, also joined the gathering, which took place in a very warm and friendly atmosphere.

388 There was a tiny handful of instances during that time frame of articles that were probably translated directly from a U.S. source, but which were not attributed to a source, an author, or even a translator. For examples, see the 15 May 1939 and 15 September, 1 November 1941 editions of Ulus.

389 Compare, for example, October 1944 with July 1945, both of which are presented in the article statistics listed above in Section 5.1.7.

390 Also, Ulus seemed to have a more organized publishing pattern by early 1947. In January 1947, 57 U.S.-sourced articles were published. Of those, 37 were a series of excerpts from a book by Sumner Welles and a book on Eisenhower's war years; series of articles or stories appeared in Ulus throughout the war, but the source was never American. Three Reader's Digest and one Life article appeared in January 1947, but all of those Reader's Digest and Life
“informational” articles published in Ulus could be that the first months of 1945 were a period of new and closer cooperation between Ulus' staff and the U.S. officials who were providing “informational” articles to them (if such cooperation did actually exist).

Previous to January 1945, if an article in Ulus pertained to the U.S., it was usually from the AA, and thus compiled or summarized from foreign press services or information that was written by Ulus staff; especially Falih Rıfkı Atay and Ahmet Şükrü Esmer wrote numerous columns, often concerning the U.S., that had definite “educational” or “informational” aims. I assume that the reason for this was that the effort to inform Turkish readers about the U.S. was one-sided, i.e. the Turkish side wanted to provide some information about the U.S. to its readers, but did not have much material from actual U.S. sources, possibly because of a lack of coordination or help from the U.S. side, but also possibly because of German pressure to not publish blatantly pro-U.S. materials. Consequently, Ulus had to create its own materials on its own terms and with its own methods. The diaries of travels around the U.S., first from Neşet Halil Atay, then from Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, were a notable result of this situation.

Apparently, near the end of 1944, the cooperation became better and the articles both submitted by U.S. officials and chosen by Ulus staff, with time, became more uniform. The more consistent nature of the “informational” articles in 1947 would be a logical result of both sides gaining experience with providing and choosing the information they wanted Ulus' readers to see. After all, the U.S. was also in the beginning stages of developing its overseas espionage and informational efforts at that time.

The change in the intensity of U.S.-sourced informational features, beginning from approximately the middle of April 1945, must be attributed to a variety of factors, probably all working together: FDR's death and the accession of a new President, the chaos of the war's end in Europe, and the departure and replacement of a long-standing U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. After the early June 1945 arrival of Edwin Wilson in Ankara, no change is apparent in the amount of U.S.-sourced informational articles in Ulus; however, several events accompanied his arrival and Ulus' front-page focus on the U.S. role in events seemed to intensify.

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articles were published in Sunday editions, which had expanded to more than ten pages by that time. Five of the January 1947 U.S.-themed articles had no source.
Thus, over the course of WWII, Ulus experienced a change in its content but, according to my analysis, it did not experience a dramatic change in its ideological position since even in January 1939 it was pro-American and showed evident sympathy for the “Western” democratic powers. Ulus' sympathy for the Western democracies can even be inferred from its coverage of the Spanish Civil War. In the issues from early 1939 that I scanned, Ulus was sympathetic to the Republicans until the victory of the Frankist forces was certain, at which point the newspaper became more neutral. This sympathy for the Republicans caught my attention; I expected more positive references to the Spanish fascists since the Kemalist regime, even if it saw an enemy in Mussolini, utilized ideology that had some similarities to that of the fascists.

Sometime between the end of August 1945 and the last months of 1946, the amount of U.S.-sourced information once again increased. There are number of possible reasons for this: 1) the establishment of cooperation between U.S. information services with Turkish journalists after Edwin Wilson arrived as Ambassador; 2) the increasing Soviet threat to Turkish sovereignty; 3) the increasing U.S. government realization that the USSR constituted a threat to Turkey's sovereignty; and 4) an increasing anti-Soviet stance on the part of U.S. publications.

One 1945 event can summarize the changes in Ulus' wartime publishing practices in regard to the U.S. On 4 July 1945 the Turkish Foreign Ministry's General Secretary Ambassador Cevat Açıkalın gave a radio address to Turkey; the aim of this address was to explain the U.S.' 4 July celebrations to Turkish citizens. The text of Açıkalın's speech was subsequently published in full, on Ulus' front page, the following day. The Turkish government then, as if to emphasize the point, had the Turkish Ambassador to the U.S., Ragıp Baydur, speak on the radio to

391 The Soviet threat was noted long before the end of the war, however, so evidence supporting exactly why this threat was not countered by American propaganda more strongly in the waning months of WWII needs to be identified. The most likely reason is that the U.S. government had not understood exactly how the struggle with the USSR was going to be carried out. Only in the middle of 1945 did U.S. intelligence capacities, which were in their infant stages, begin to identify the “informational” and “ideological” nature of the coming conflict; see: Saunders, op. cit., p. 17.

392 Reader's Digest, as mentioned above in section 4.0, did not become truly anti-Soviet until after WWII's conclusion.
Turkish citizens concerning the U.S.’ 4 July celebrations; Baydur's address was reported on page one of Ulus' 6 July 1945 edition. In 1939, there was only one small article concerning the U.S.’ Independence Day celebrations, and on 4 July 1939 the only notice given to the U.S. holiday was an announcement concerning the publishing of Turkish-American stamps commemorating the U.S.’ 150 years of independence.

These radio addresses give closure to the period in which I examined Ulus’ pages because the first event that came to my mind, while reading about Açıkalım's radio speech, was İsmet İnönü's February 1939 radio address to American citizens. In other words, more than six years later, radio events involving America were still page one news, so the importance of the event to Ulus' publishing practices had not changed. The difference in this event was that a Turkish official used the occasion of an American holiday to present information about America directly to the Turkish people. Thus, the radio address must be understood as an effort by the Turkish government to influence and control what Turkish citizens understood concerning the U.S., and an already pro-U.S. publication became overtly, blatantly pro-U.S. as the war progressed to its conclusion.

393 5 July 1939, page 3.

394 Detailed above in Section 5.1.1.
6.0 CONCLUSIONS

In summary, *Ulus Gazetesi* followed extremely pro-U.S. publishing patterns from January 1939 until the end of August 1945. In the early part of this period, very little information that was identifiable as coming from U.S. sources was published, but beginning in 1943 information that can be identified as sourced in U.S. publications, especially *Reader's Digest*, became more prominent. The importance of this information lies in the facts that *Ulus* was the mouthpiece of İsmet İnönü's CHP government, that *Reader's Digest* was a purveyor of conservative American culture, and that these *Reader's Digest* articles may be understood as an increasingly pro-American stance on the part of the Turkish state.

The essential issue that emerges from this study is that Turkish media has been given only superficial treatment by scholars of Turkish-American relations. This lack of attention, however, must be remedied if we are to more fully trace how Turkish and American public perceptions of “the other side” have developed since WWI, and how elites and special interests on both sides have tried to mold public perception of Turkish-American relations, and connected issues, to their own tastes and concerns. Currently, pundits on both sides opine freely on the role of both countries' media in shaping perceptions of this issue, but little concrete research has actually been done.

Furthermore, the search for the roots of Turkish and American perceptions of each other must be pursued in a wider variety of fields than just politics if we are to gain a more comprehensive understanding of why Turkish-U.S. relations have traveled a “rocky” road since the late 1950s. Consequently, a main question that remains to be answered is, if *Ulus* was already pro-U.S. by the beginning of 1939, can we quantify in definite terms when and why this pro-American tone began? Can we trace the development of pro- and anti-American feelings in Turkish society to the interwar, the WWI, and/or the Ottoman eras?

Another vital problem that remains to be explained is exactly why the U.S. government was so reluctant to commit aid to Turkey after WWII. Some researchers have ventured, even stated, answers to this question, but none so far has been truly satisfactory. Given the post-
WWII world geopolitical situation, simply that Turkey had not joined the Allies in an expedient manner, or that the U.S. did not want to get involved in what they saw as Britain's sphere of influence, does not offer fully convincing or logically consistent reasoning for the U.S. government's actions.

For example, the U.S. government should have been aware that Ulus had been steadfastly pro-U.S. throughout the war, as illustrated by this study. The U.S. government should have been aware that the Turkish government had, when possible, provided covert aid to Allied forces in Turkey's coastal waters. The U.S. government should have been aware of the poor condition of the Turkish military and economy. If the problem of “Turkish democracy” was the issue, a raft of articles extolling the virtues of the Turkish government and its democratic aims, and written before, during, and after the war, were easily obtainable.395

Thus, as a first step to a more comprehensive and convincing explanation for the U.S. government's behavior towards Turkey after WWII, this researcher would suggest that at least two currents, pro- and anti-Turkey, existed in the U.S. administration both during and after the war. Exactly who these camps may have consisted of has yet to be determined, but at least one probable anti-Turkey member, Henry A. Wallace can be identified, and at least one pro-Turkey member, Joseph Grew, can be assumed.396


396 Wright, op. cit., p.359, attributes the following quote to Wallace, “[m]any Allied divisions were immobilized throughout the war because we never knew on whose side this [Turkish] army was preparing to fight,” and then states emphatically that Wallace's words had “not the
A less directly relevant issue that overshadows the discussion in this thesis is whether İsmet İnönü decided to allow a second party (and thus real democracy) almost immediately after WWII as a result of international developments following the war, as a result of pressure from the victorious allied governments, or because he had already wanted to open the Turkish political system but was forced to wait for the war to run its course.

This researcher, while reading Ulus day-by-day for the length of the war, received the impression that the CHP government was, if not in actuality, at least ideally pro-democratic. The amount of pro-American and pro-British information that appeared in Ulus might be justified by the fact that Nazi Germany posed a direct threat to Turkish sovereignty, but the degree of pro-American information, especially the extremely positive portrayals of FDR, is hard to justify with that reasoning. Ulus was already publishing extremely positive coverage of the U.S. well before the initial hostilities of WWII, when the U.S. was a rising power but was not yet at the point to which it rose during and following WWII. Ulus's coverage of the Spanish Civil War, recounted above, can even be cited as supporting evidence. Consequently, this author finds it difficult to believe that such positive reflections of the U.S. in the pages of Ulus had merely strategic roots.

Then there is also the extremely interesting note published by Ulus after İsmet İnönü's still-controversial 6 March 1939 Istanbul University speech. Not only some later researchers interpreted İnönü's speech as hinting about democracy -- the Nazi foreign office also interpreted it that way. A note from a German newspaper, essentially condemning İsmet İnönü's supposed reference to democracy, was published in Ulus on 10 March 1939. Murat Esat Bozkurt shortly thereafter defended İnönü's apparent reference to democracy in a 20 March 1939 column, saying that Turkey's democracy was unique. Therefore, less than two

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397 The column appeared on page three.

398 The column appeared on the front page.
weeks had elapsed after President İnönü's speech and observers were already bickering over its interpretation!

This author would also like to make a suggestion that may not have been put forth anywhere else: if İsmet İnönü did seem to hint at democracy in his Demokrasi Müjdesi speech, is it possible that he was still feeling the positive reverberations of his 26 February 1939 radio address to the U.S.? The coverage of President İnönü's U.S. speech was effusive, to say the least, and the Istanbul University speech took place only ten days after the radio address. He also seems to have been well-greeted in his trip to Istanbul and was making a speech in front of university students. Is it possible that he got caught up in the moment and maybe hinted at something that he did not totally intend?

A point which should be added is, if the debate around President İnönü's speech concerns whether he hinted at democracy or not, we need to define more clearly what is meant by “democracy.” Cemil Koçak suggests that İnönü's speech was actually more of a sign that internal changes in the CHP were in order. Here we should try to detail which kind of democracy is being discussed because, if by “democracy” President İnönü meant more tolerance for opposition in the one-party system, the reforms President İnönü suggested, and which are defined by Cemil Koçak, could be interpreted as “more democracy.” The Müstakil Group was allowed to emerge at the CHP's 5. Kurultayı in May 1939, shortly after President İnönü's Istanbul University Speech. Whether the group was truly oppositional or whether it was totally composed of CHP members is not important; the vital point is that a group that, in some way, provided opposition to the policies and ideology of the CHP ruling party was allowed to exist. This is a step, no matter how minute, towards democracy.


400 Koçak, op. cit., pp. 72-82, 89-90. See also: Aydemir, op. cit., p. 117.

Later, after the result of WWII was no longer in doubt and the Turkish government needed to move closer to the soon-to-be victorious Allied Powers, President İnönü would return to the “democracy” topic. For example, Milli Şef İnönü emphasized Turkey's democratic parliamentary system in a speech given to open the TBMM in 1944;\(^{402}\) in a May 1944 address, he used similar themes and was apparently trying to convince other CHP leaders of the need for a more democratic system.\(^{403}\) On 9 July 1945, in a speech given at Dolmabahçe Palace, President İnönü specifically mentioned U.S. democracy, but stated that Turkish democracy would not resemble American democracy (or the others that he mentioned) because, “[h]er memleket, kendi bünyesine göre tedbirlerini altır, demokrasi yapar.”\(^{404}\) However, President İnönü quickly added that Turkey was not yet ready for democracy and that Turkey's passage to democracy would take some time.\(^{405}\)

6.1 The Literature

The debate around Turkey's transition to democracy is a relevant topic with which to begin determining where this study fits in the literature on Turkish Republican history and Turkish-American relations. The area most immediately germane is, of course, the studies surrounding the foundation of Turkish-American relations. This thesis provides new information concerning the official Turkish government perspective on the U.S. during the Milli Şef era. Furthermore, this study makes apparent the need for far more work on the pre-WWII and wartime sources of the Turkish-U.S. alliance that emerged after WWII. Turkish government documents are difficult to access, but possibly U.S. official documents that have not been sufficiently scoured exist. Media in both countries also need to be more comprehensively examined in order to ascertain more definitively Turkish and American official and public attitudes toward each other in the pre-WWII and wartime periods. This


\(^{404}\) “Every land does what is best for its own needs and conditions while moving towards democracy.” Turan, op. cit., p. 43.

\(^{405}\) Ibid. Another discussion of this issue can be found in Heper, op. cit., pp. 116-147, 168-171.
study also provides some new information on Turkey's transition to democracy, and on İsmet İnönü's attitude towards that transition.

Academic study of Turkish media is a nearly non-existent field, despite its power and the role that the Turkish media play in every day Turkish life. This study provides some insight into why the Turkish media need to be examined in more detail, and from different perspectives. As an illustration, this author was surprised to learn that studies on WWII-era Ulus editions, despite the fact that it was the semi-official CHP newspaper, can be numbered on one hand. Much new information about Turkish politics and society awaits researchers who create new ways of analyzing and reading Turkish media.

This study also has a place in the burgeoning literature surrounding the construction and content of Turkish nationalism. Sharp states that the U.S. is considered the foremost example of an “imagined community,” where “. . . national identity. . . has been organized around the impetus of the 'articulation of danger, the specification of difference and the figuration of Otherness.”[^406] This sentence struck me because the “constructed” nature of the Turkish nation has, especially in the last decade, steadily gained understanding in Turkish academia and, more slowly, in Turkish society. In the context of WWII, the death of the national father, the re-emergence of the Russian threat, and the struggle to build an industrialized nation-state, did information from Reader's Digest, as well as from other U.S. publications, provide a solidly constructed worldview that was useful to the Turkish authorities and to the formulation of Turkish national identity? Consequently, this thesis also has a place in the expanding research around Turkish national identity and its formation, specifically, the role or roles that U.S. “information” may have played in influencing, aiding, or even solidifying that identity.

Finally, because of the content of the study, this study also may prove useful to general Turkish cultural studies. In general, multidisciplinary academic analysis of Turkish culture still does not receive sufficient attention, although more and more Turkish and foreign researchers are taking up the topic. This author hopes that this study can show the usefulness of studying Turkish culture, history, media, literature, and politics in a cross-disciplinary way, while staying rooted in one discipline.

An appropriate conclusion to this study is provided by a curious series of crimes, reported in May 1945, committed by three young, dreamy Ankara youths. According to the details in Ulus, the three delikanlı (“crazy kids”) had decided that they wanted to go to Texas, buy land, and then become cowboys as a way to achieve Hollywood stardom. In order to get money for the travel expenses and land in Texas, they committed a string of robberies. The source of these ideas must be obvious: these three young men had watched Hollywood films and wanted the same starry life depicted in those films. In other words, they had been so influenced by the U.S. films that they went so far as to make detailed plans and commit crimes in order to fulfill their “dreams.”

This situation, of course, illustrates the power that media has to influence the thoughts and emotions of those who consume it. Apparently, by 1945, U.S. media, in this case motion pictures, had already begun to affect Turkish society strongly enough that young people were being influenced to criminal acts in pursuit of the images they saw on the silver screen. Consequently, that U.S. media had begun to affect Turkish society is not hard to prove; the challenge is to quantify more exactly through what channels the influences came, the extent of the effect experienced by Turkish society and culture, and the reactions and/or oppositions developed by Turkish people to that influence.

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407 _Ulus_, 8 Mayıs, 1945, p. 3.

408 This does not ignore the acrimonious debate concerning exactly how much power the media has to influence. This author thinks it is safe to say that, if those youths had not seen Hollywood films, they most likely would not have been committing crimes with the sole intention of going to the U.S. That does not mean, however, that they would not have committed crimes for some other reason.
APPENDIX

A) List of January 1939 – August 1945 *Ulus* issues missing from the bound volumes in the Bayazıt Milli Kütüphanesi:409

1939:  8 May, 3 December

1940:  29 December

1941:  1 March, 19, 26 April, 26, 31 May, 30 June, 12, 27, 29 August, 13 September

1942:  8 March, 20 July, 3, 18, 19 August, 20, 27, 28, 29, 30 November

1943:  30 March, 7 April, 18, 25, 26, 28 May, 26 June, 17, 29, 31 July, 1, 31 August, 10, 19, 23, 25 September

1944:  17, 28 January, 21 February, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 March, 23 July, 30 September, 26, 27 November

1945:  21, 29 January, 24 March

409 The bound volumes containing three or four months each are not the only source for *Ulus* at the library in Bayazıt: there are also single-month volumes bound in brown paper which must be requested.

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