THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY:
A COMPARISON OF THE SPANISH AND TURKISH CASES

prepared by
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Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Sabancı University
Spring 2007
The Role of the Military in Transitions to Democracy:  
A Comparison of the Spanish and Turkish Cases

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Zamansız kaybettüğim biricik teyzem Oya Kiran, ve aramızda olmayan sevgili dedelerim Sami Kiran ve Galip Ecevit’e ithafen,
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Studying at Sabancı University was not only about carrying a lap-top on your back, and logging in Internet from the remotest corners of the campus. Instead, it was a tough life, with sleepless nights, lots of commuting and a feeling of loneliness in the universe. By the time you graduate, you get used to use your laptop as a pillow, or a tea tray, or a dumble. On the other hand, the freedom of intellectual thinking, good friendships, and the comfort which you never find time to enjoy but expect to enjoy, makes your time in the university unforgettable throughout your life.

Earning a Master’s degree in Sabancı is not tantamount to earning an Oscar, however. Still, there have been many supporting factor that I feel myself obliged to appreciate. I would complete the thesis, anyhow, but their sincerity in their contributions to my life was more valuable than earning a graduate degree.

First of all, I would like to present my gratitude to my advisor Sabri Sayarı for agreeing to work with me on the title that I was committed to research. He, also, provided me extended freedom to present my views on the subject while giving wise comments everytime I consulted to him and timely warning whenever I turned to the wrong direction. He gave an impression that he was always welcoming to discuss my thesis and to knock his door. In addition special thanks to Ali Çarkoğlu who believed encouraged my application to the program and helped me to the utmost extent till the end of my graduate time in Sabancı. Most of my time in Sabancı passed in front of his door waiting in the line of graduate students, or looking for him in the building and eventually being exposed to some numbers related to social science with whom I have no idea what to do first, but have become more familiar with me than my family in a short period. Also, I would like to thank William Hale and Bahri Yılmaz for becoming my jury members and for their valuable comments for improving the content.

Secondly, I have to thank my parents, Ayfer and Gökhan Ecevit, for their wholeheartedly support and confidence in my academic pursuit. While my fellows were surfing in the internet for booking their travels, I would never be able to browse the electronic journals if they were not that supportive. I also thank my brother Erhan and his wife Müge, my grandmothers Şükran Kiran and Kaniye Ecevit for the friendly and comfortable environment they provided in my life.

I specially owe to my dear partner, Edgü Tanel, for her understanding during the time of the writing of this thesis when she almost forgot my face. She was the one behind the scenes, but inside my heart.

I would like to thank also to my unforgettable classmates, especially Ceren İşıl Cenker. She was; the one who made me smile during the most boring times of the program, the one who answered everycall I made at the most absurd time of the day; the one who encouraged me for the better; the one who advised me in any part of the academic study. I am delighted to have a classmate like her and will be in her service whenever she demands it during the remaining part of my life. I would like to appreciate Alp Arat, who accompanied me on the way between the
campus and the city with a notepad planning the schedule of my thesis week by week, and who was with me off-campus as well. He will be one of my true friends for the rest of my life.

Thirdly, I present my appreciation to Aylin Aydn who motivated me during the study with her harshest critiques. The parties in her house and her partnership in the SPS classes were indispensible parts of my life at Sabancı. I also thank Gözde Yavuz for her cooperative and helpful manner advising with sincerity through my study in Sabancı. Additionally, I can not forget Tuba Okçu and the pleasure of drinking beer in her lovely balcony with a Bosphorus view. And I also present my thanks to “the cool guy”, Alım Hasanov, in my office who worked as a software consultant to entire department. Last but most important, my dear friend Burcu Çulhaoğlu was almost in every part of my time in Sabancı when she helped me in everything, sang with me, chat with me, lectured with me... The Early Republican course would not be as hilarious as it was without her participation.

I also would like to thank my classmates in that hilarious course I ever took, “the Sources and Methods in Early Republican Era”. They made me walk into the class with the expectation of a perfect three-hours of time with lots of ideas and information flying in the room available for you, if you are awake enough to catch after writing your response paper to a reading package with an average of 300 pages per week till early in the morning. As the master of this orchestra, first I would like to thank Faik Gür. Then, I would like to thank Adam McConnell and Elif Aköz on the violin, on the bass guitar to Emre Sunu, on the Afghan saz to Hadi, on the trumpet to Ani, and for her vocal to Burcu Çulhaoğlu (for the second time). In this unbelievable orchestra, the most wonderful compositions were made.

To continue, special thanks to my departmental colleagues, my organization partner Evrim Taşkıın, my sps partner Aydoğan Ali, teammate Hakan Günaydın, officemates Berna Öztürk and Sibel Oktay, Sandra Finger, Gül Ceylan, Seda Çınar, Selin Türk eş, Sinan Ciddi, Gülden Budus.

Off the campus, I would like to present my gratitudes to my best friends who always believed in me and encouraged me to study and reach to the summit; Semih Turgay Bora, Ahmet Cemal Sürmeli, Celal Yıldırım, İdil Er, Didem Ersöz.

Finally, I am grateful for volunteer editors of my thesis, Victoria Palmer, Paul George Gunning and especially Lyle McClure.

With all these support, this thesis would be written by any author. Thus, I thank myself for being a friend of those people stated above.
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MA in Political Science, 2007

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Sabri Sayarı

Keywords: transitions to democracy, military, civil-military relations, Spain, Turkey

ABSTRACT

Transitions from authoritarian rule to fully-fledged democracy do not always proceed in a linear fashion. The complexity of the political systems in different countries prevents us from establishing one single model to explain their different experiences. However, comparative analyses of differing transitions to democracy give us insight into the conditions and actors influencing the processes.

This study aims to clarify the military’s influence over transitions to democracy in two Southern European countries: Spain and Turkey. Spain and Turkey shared an authoritarian past, and experienced a transition to democracy by the late 1970s in the former and the early 1980s in the latter. The military was a significant political actor in both countries. However, the Spanish military failed to influence the transition while their Turkish counterparts initiated and controlled the transition from above. These transitions differed not only in the initial conditions but also in the outcome. Spain, despite being ruled by an authoritarian regime almost a half-century, achieved a consolidated democracy while Turkey still struggles with different challenges to democratic consolidation, including the current influence of the military in politics.

This thesis helps to comprehend the conditions which led to different outcomes by focusing on one of the neglected actors in transitions to democracy: the military. Ostensibly, initial conditions explain the different outcomes, to a certain extent. Yet, this thesis concludes that conditions in the post-transition years were as influential as the initial conditions. Therefore, explaining the outcome only by referring to the initial conditions would be reductionist and misleading.
ORDUNUN DEMOKRASIYE GEÇİŞ SÜRECİNDEKİ ROLÜ: TÜRKİYE VE İSPAÑA ÖRNEKLERİ ÜZERİNDE BİR KARŞILAŞTIRMA

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Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Programı, 2007

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Sabri Sayar

Anahtar kelimeler: demokrasiye geçiş, ordu, asker-sivil ilişkileri, İspanya, Türkiye

ÖNSÖZ

Otoriter rejimlerden yerleşik demokrasilere geçiş her zaman çizgisel olarak ilerlememektedir. Farklı ülkelerdeki siyasal sistemlerin karmaşıklığı bizleri, farklı örnekleri açıklamak için tek bir model oluşturmaktan alıkoyar. Yine de, farklı demokrasiye geçiş süreçlerinin karşılaştırmalı analizleri, süreci etkileyen şartları ve aktörleri kavramamızı sağlar.

Bu çalışma, ordu, İspanya ve Türkiye gibi iki Güney Avrupa ülkelerindeki demokrasiye geçiş süreçlerindeki etkisini artırğa çıkmayış hangeflemektedir. İspanya ve Türkiye benzer bir otoriter geçmişe sahiptir. İspanya 1970’lerin sonunda, Türkiye ise 1980’lerin başında gibi demokrasiye geçiş süreçlerini yaşamışlardır. Ordu, iki ülkede de geçiş süreci öncesinde önemli bir siyasi aktör idi. Fakat İspanyol ordusu geçiş sürecini etkileyemeyen iken, Türk ordusu geçiş sürecini başlatmış ve geçiş tepeden kontrol etmiştir. Bu iki geçiş süreçleri sadece başlangıç şartlarında değil, sonuçlarında da farklılık gösternmiştir. İspanya, yarım yüzyla yakın bir süre otoriter bir rejim ile yönetilmiş olmasına rağmen yerleşik demokrasiye ulaşmış iken; Türkiye, halen ordunun siyasette halen var olan rolü de dahil olmak üzere, demokratikleşme sürecindeki sorunlar ile mücadele etmektedir.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**CHAPTER 1** ................................................................................................................................. 1  
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 1  
**CHAPTER 2** ................................................................................................................................. 5  
Transition to Democracy in Spain: 1975-1985 ................................................................................. 5  
  2.1 Roots of Democratic Opposition in Franco’s Spain ............................................................... 6  
  2.2 After Franco ......................................................................................................................... 14  
  2.3 The Elections ...................................................................................................................... 17  
**CHAPTER 3** ................................................................................................................................. 25  
Transition to Democracy in Turkey in 1980s ...................................................................................... 25  
  3.1 Political Decay in 1970s ............................................................................................... 27  
  3.2 Military Rule: 1980-83 ................................................................................................. 34  
  3.3 1982 Constitution Making Process .............................................................................. 38  
  3.4 The New Political System .............................................................................................. 41  
  3.5 A Brief Assessment of Transition to Democracy in Turkey ........................................... 50  
**CHAPTER 4** ................................................................................................................................. 52  
Role of the Military during Transition to Democracy in Spain ......................................................... 52  
  4.1 The Armed Forces in Franco’s Spain: ............................................................................... 53  
  4.2 Civilianization of the Regime ......................................................................................... 55  
  4.3 The Evaluation of the Armed Forces’ Role in the Transition ........................................... 58  
  4.4 Consolidation of Democracy .................................................................................... 66  
**CHAPTER 5** ................................................................................................................................. 73  
The Role of the Military in Transition to Democracy in Turkey ....................................................... 73  
  5.1 The Military’s Reluctance to Remain in Power ................................................................... 75  
  5.2 The Military’s Strategy for Transition ............................................................................. 78  
  5.3 Demilitarization of Turkish Politics ............................................................................... 88  
  5.4 Changing Power Balances in the Political Sphere ......................................................... 95  
  5.5 A Brief Assessment of the Military in Turkish Politics After 1983 ................................... 98  
**CHAPTER 6** ................................................................................................................................. 100  
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 100  
  6.1 A Comparison of Transitions to Democracy in Spain and Turkey ..................................... 101
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Periods of Deterioration and Decay in the Regime Before the Transition in Spain</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>The Main Actors in Spanish Politics After Franco</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>The Structure of the Spanish Cortes</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>The 1977 Election Results of Spanish Cortes</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Turkish Parliamentary Election Results in 1973 and 1977</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>The Governments of Turkey between 1974 and 1980</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>Composition of DM in Turkey</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>Turkish Parliamentary Election Results in 1983</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9</td>
<td>Turkish Parliamentary Election Results of 1987</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 10</td>
<td>Turkish Parliamentary Election Results of 1991</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 11</td>
<td>Left-Right Spectrum in Turkish Parliamentary Elections 1973-1995</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 12</td>
<td>Typology of Transitions from Authoritarian Regimes</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis comparatively analyzes the transition to democracy in two southern European states; Spain and Turkey. In both states transitions followed authoritarian rule; however the outcome of each transition differed. The political atmosphere in these countries differed significantly following the developments in early 1980s. Despite Turkey’s earlier experience with multiparty politics since 1950s, transition to democracy following military-rule in 1980-83 could only provide a partial democracy. On the other hand, Spain established a consolidated democracy in spite of the deep-rooted authoritarian past with extensive restrictions in political and civil rights for almost a half century. Notwithstanding differing dynamics and actors in their politics, the military institutions of both states were among the key political actors during the authoritarian regimes and transitions. Henceforth, I find it important to study the military components and their roles in the comparison of transitions to democracy for both theoretical and empirical reasons, as Stepan suggested.¹

Nordlinger argues that armed forces of all countries exert considerable political influence. The armed forces are naturally the symbols of state sovereignty and the primary defenders against possible external or internal attack against the government. Armed forces, generally, claim that their intervention aims to restore political and economical stability. In their perception, military officers are detached from the interests of particular class and communal groups, devoid of the political weaknesses,

and highly skilled in technical and managerial matters. This self-perception provides justification for their intervention into politics if appropriate political system and adequate potential for influence are present.

Therefore, transition to democracy in regimes with authoritarian elements is exposed to the armed forces’ interests. The modes of the intervention could be either a coup d’état or instruments of the privileged position stemming from the previous regime. These involvements aim to guarantee the civilians to take into account the interests of the military in the future decision-making calculations if other interventions are to be averted.

Focusing on the specific cases of this study, the different roles of the military in the transition processes are observed. Turkish military plays a pivotal role in transition to democracy in Turkey while Spanish military abstained from delineating and monitoring the policies or the leader of the government.

Transitions to democracy should satisfy different pillars of society, including military, in order to pave the way for consolidation of democracy. Because, an institution with certain powers would release its privileges only if its interests are guaranteed. Hence, a “positive consolidation” which refers to conscious, long-term efforts by civilian elites to devise policies and strategies aimed at a positive reincorporation of the military into the goals and institutions of the new democratic regime, enables the system to function properly towards consolidation after the transitions. If not, the dissatisfied party would disrupt the process towards consolidation and would challenge the functioning of the system in the new democracies. Evidently, the perceptions of democracy change among the key actors of the system. The military might perceive certain privileges as tools for better functioning of political system and enduring influence of military in politics while they generate a threat towards democracy for its antagonists.


3. Ibid, 7.


The scholarly works have attempted to analyze the differences of military influence in the politics in the post-authoritarian regimes. Stepan, revealed that the power of the military continues in the post-authoritarian regimes through the military prerogatives.\(^6\) While he adopts the strength of military in post-transition process as the source of this influence, some scholars preferred to explain the degree of military influence by concentrating on the influential actors during the transition process. According to their view, the primary actors during the transitions determine the power balance in post-transition periods. When the military is the dominant actor during the transition, it grants a strong and indefinite foundation for exercising political leverage to retain its institutional privileges in the post-transition era.\(^7\) Obviously, the transitions led by civilian actors are more inclined to consolidation of democracy. Either during the transition or following the transition, both authors claim that the influence is predetermined when the system starts to function and the institutions emerge. Thus, military will continue exerting influence in the new regime. On the other hand, several authors contested this view with findings from their researches focused in Latin America. As Hunter suggests, the enduring weight of these institutional restrictions are lessened by the rational human actions and potential for change. Her study allows for a more optimistic outlook for the future of democracy by challenging the claim that the regimes are destined to be influenced by the military in Latin American states.\(^8\) Pion-Berlin, acknowledged the potencies of the military in post-authoritarian regimes, but denied the claim that they are limitless. He believes that the possibility of failing while attempting to intervene in fragile issues shape those limits. The military is rather stronger in pursuing its own corporate interests.\(^9\) Apparently, Turkish military exerts influence on the issues outside its own corporate interests, too. Whereas, the Spanish military was only able to attempt a coup which failed because of the firm stance of the

\(^6\) Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 93.


civilian actors backed by King Juan Carlos, in 1981. This particular difference in post-transition provides inspiration for comparative studies of these two states. In this manner, this thesis aims to explain the difference in the pace of demilitarization and civilianisation in Spain and Turkey following the transitions to democracy in 1980s. Eventually, this study tries to evaluate to what extent the nature of the dominant elite and the rational behaviours of the influential actors play a role in the transition to democracy.

This study is intended to analyze the transition to democracy processes in Spain and Turkey by examining the main actors and dynamics during these processes. This type of a comparison will allow us to detect the comparative influence of military in the transitions to democracy of two states.
CHAPTER 2

Transition to Democracy in Spain: 1975-1985

The transition to democracy in Spain occurred between 1975 and 1985 following the death of General Franco. Among the different examples of transitions to democracy, the experience in Spain constitutes an ideal case where different parties in society were able to find a common ground upon which they could agree on the reform process, and establish a constitutional system based on democratic elections open to free competition. The main issue which arose prior to the constituent process concerned the question of whether a consensus of opinion or a lack of consensus would exist during the transition and constituent processes when Francoist regime’s authoritarian, corporatist and centralised decision-making authority would be challenged.\textsuperscript{10} The literature on the Spanish transition is enriched through various studies which analyse the actors and dynamics of the process by game-theoretical analysis\textsuperscript{11}, which focus on the Francoist regime’s inheritance on the Spanish transition and the party systems of Spain during and after the transition\textsuperscript{12}; which analyse the political economy of the regime and


\textsuperscript{12} José María Maravall and Julián Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe,
its consequences\textsuperscript{13}; which explain the dynamics of the politics of constitution making\textsuperscript{14} and through in-depth explanations of main events provided by historians.\textsuperscript{15} This chapter mainly aims to analyze how Francoist legacy affected the actors in the transition to democracy and to clarify the dynamics and the actors involved in the transition process in Spain. Thus, further chapters of this thesis which will analyse the role of the military, will be understood better when the role of other institutions or even individuals are examined in a comparative manner.

### 2.1 Roots of Democratic Opposition in Franco’s Spain

Evidently, the transition in Spain commenced with the crisis of the existing regime - Franco’s authoritarian regime. In other words, the dynamics and actors of the transition were inherited from Franco’s long-standing authoritarian rule following the Civil War in the late 30s. Political actors with contradictory views participated in the democratization process and produced a series of pacts and negotiations. The Spanish transition became a good example of transition occurring through agreement, consent and compromise during the political operation which allowed the replacement of the authoritarian regime with a democratic regime. The Spanish terms “ruptura pactada”\textsuperscript{16} and “reforma pactada”\textsuperscript{17} have become a part of the political science literature.

Franco’s authoritarian regime had suppressed competitive political parties on the grounds that partisan conflicts harmed the integrity of Spain. Censorship, restriction of rights of association and assembly and recruitment of political posts by appointment

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\textsuperscript{14} Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 42-71.


\textsuperscript{16} The term means the lack of political continuity between two regime types and the principles of legitimation that support them.

\textsuperscript{17} The term means the element of legal continuity through which the change was put into practice with a high degree of formal respect for the legality of Franco’s political system.
rather than mass suffrage were the practices and institutionalization of the regime to
entrench its power.18

Apparently, at the time of the Franco’s death the Francoist regime was different in
comparison to its initial stages following the Civil War. The regime itself had already
incorporated liberal elements in social and political lives. The regime attempted to shift
the course of events in the economic conditions of Spain in the late 1950s through a
series of liberalizing policies in the economy. This policy choice led to a growth in the
industrial sector and a rise in productivity and urbanization. These positive economic
indicators also allowed the regime to survive through a “passive consent” for at least
one more decade. As expected, urbanization and industrialization of the population in
large numbers became the inevitable consequences of the liberalized economy. As a
part of the liberalization of economy, a certain degree of liberalization in the industrial
sectors was required. That liberalization included rights for the industrial workers
ranging from flexibility of representation in the official syndicates to a reduction in the
penalties for strikers. Also, the growth of the industrial sector and the imbalanced
distribution of the social product caused a dramatic increase in industrial conflict.19
The liberalization of the economic relations gave way to a similar trend in political relations
in Spain. The Munich Convention in 1962, where leaders of democratic opposition in
exile gathered, epitomizes this democratic expansion.20 Nevertheless, it is hard to argue
that economic liberalisation, by itself, explains the level of political liberalisation in
Spain. As revealed by earlier experiences, the relationship between economic and
political liberalisation might be accidental or even negative. Contextual factors
including structural, historical, international and domestic factors are important in
explaining the process of economic and political change.21 China constitutes a very
recent example supporting the sceptics of liberalisation. Transition to market economy

19. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for
Democracy”, 75.
20. Ibid, 75.
21. Hamilton and Kim analyzes two different cases - South Korean and Mexican - of
economic and political liberalisation and concludes that economic liberalisation led to
different outcomes in democratisation of these two countries. They emphasised the
importance of contextual factors in determining the outcome of the transition process.
Nora Hamilton and Eun Mee Kim, “Economic and Political Liberalisation in South
and increasing international economic relations has not paved the way for democratisation in China, yet. 22 Hence, economic and political liberalisation does not necessarily occur simultaneously. Economic liberalisation may sometimes have this effect, but needs to be accompanied by loss of will by the previous elite to continue autocratic government, and/or agreement among civilian forces on the need for political liberalisation to have a positive effect on the process of democratisation. Apparently, Spanish case constitutes an example where the agreement among civilian forces accompanied the economic liberalisation toward political liberalisation.

The weakness of the bourgeoisie had been one of the characteristics of Spanish society. However, through the “Prussian” style of economic growth, where financial aristocracy and state were responsible for economic growth, the financial aristocracy played a considerable role in the construction of national industry. El Instituto Nacional de Industria (National Industrial Institution) helped the accumulation of capital and the creation of industrial infrastructure. Thanks to the “Prussian” style of economic development, a new industrial bourgeoisie and a wave of “new directors” in the government banking system and industry existed. Nevertheless, the liberal ideas existed even among these staunch collaborators of the Francoist regime, the financial aristocracy. Differing views about the economic development and the role of the state caused fragmentation within the ruling class, thus the relative strengthening of the middle class.23 The bourgeoisie was already facing difficulties in terms of interest representation within the Francoist Spain’s corporatism. The corporatist structure in Spain was a uniform structure, in the sense of being inserted into a state devoid of alternative representational forms.24 The labours’ interests could only be represented by these vertical organisations in which positions were dominantly filled by the members of the Movimiento Nacional25 (National Movement).26 As a whole, “the relative

23. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy”, 76.
25. Fascist inspired mechanism of Franco’s state which pretended to be the only cause of participation in Spanish Public life.
26. Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 44.
political disarticulation and predominantly conservative orientation of the bourgeoisie posed serious problems for the transition from authoritarianism to democratic rule”.  

During the Civil War, General Franco’s alliance with the Catholics and Falangists against the Second Republic had secured him a victory. Therefore, the inclusion of these parties in the state apparatus was not surprising. However, as he implemented his new economic policies in 1960s, the cooperation among the regime’s stronger parties worsened. Franco resisted the Catholic’s liberal projects and the Falangist’s endeavours to increase the authoritarian elements of the regime. Therefore, as the collaborators of the Francoist regime in the government lost their intimacy with the head of the regime, a new party, Opus Dei, became an effective actor in the Spanish political arena. Thus, the coalitional equilibrium in the Francoist government had shifted away from the Catholics and Falangists in favour of Opus Dei. The internal conflicts continued to grow throughout Franco’s life. In addition to changing dynamics within the coalition, the working class acted in an organized manner which eventually led to the reorganization of the democratic opposition against the regime. 

The positive correlation between the age of Franco and the internal factions caused the deterioration and decay of the regime especially in the last decade before the transition to democracy. Despite the deep-rooted authoritarian elements, the regime itself necessitated change as a remedy for economic and political decay. Maravall and Santamaria summarize the deterioration and decay in the regimes in three main stages, as depicted in the Table 1. The common characteristics of the three stages were the internal factions among the stronger parties of the regime, the reorganization of workers as a result of their requests for political rights and the succession problem of the regime.

27. Maravall and Santamaria, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy”, 78.
28. the Falange was a fascist political organization founded by José Antonio Primo de Rivera in 1933 in opposition to the Second Spanish Republic. It also incorporated nationalist elements during the Franco regime.
29. Opus Dei was semisecret religious society and supported the new economic policy of Franco.
Table 1. Periods of Deterioration and Decay in the Regime Before the Transition in Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The periods of decay and deterioration</th>
<th>The regime itself</th>
<th>Main groups of conflict</th>
<th>The controversial issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965-1968</td>
<td>Tensions among the regime factions</td>
<td>Falangists versus Opus Dei</td>
<td>The future of the Falangist Movement and the succession problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1973</td>
<td>No internal cohesion in the regime</td>
<td>Opus Dei under General Carrero Blanco versus the rest</td>
<td>Succession Problem, Liberalization and Increasing unofficial violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1975</td>
<td>Inability of the regime to adapt to change</td>
<td>Liberalization versus “el bunker”</td>
<td>Statute for Political Associations which could abolish the restriction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Maravall and Santamaria, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy”, 77.

In the first period, between 1965 and 1968, the tension among the factions of the regime increased substantively. The economic role of the state and the institutionalization of the regime were the issues with diverging interests for the regime’s key actors. In order to determine the main components and the institutions of the regime the Ley Organica del Estado (Organic Law of the State) was approved by a referendum in December 1966. Ley Organica del Estado is a reference for the role and obligations of institutions in order to strengthen the Francoist structure. The main contrasting points between the Falangists and the Opus Dei were related to the future of the Falangist movement and the regime’s succession problem. The Falangists, obviously, attempted to institutionalize the movement into the regime and expected to wait for Franco’s death for the succession. However, the Opus Dei was in favour of the dissolution of the movement into a loose framework and the restoration of the monarchy prior to Franco’s death so that Franco would be present during the initial years of succession. This conflict between these two factions in cabinet ended with the dissolution of the cabinet in October 1969. 32

The second period, between 1969 and 1973, was administered by a “mono-color” government under the leading figure of General Carrero Blanco, a Francoist. During the government of Carrero Blanco, the Falangists had already passed away in its transformation into the Movimiento Nacional (National Movement). Carrero Blanco was the first president of the government during the Franco period and was aware that the death of Franco would also mean the end of the Francoist regime if the necessary precautions were not taken. In order to provide the internal cohesion of the regime repressive policies were applied not only to the working class as in the previous years but also to the universities, opposition groups and even to certain priests. Nevertheless, since there was only one effective party in the government, Opus Dei, the efforts for internal cohesion were fruitless. All levels of society became involved in the conflict. The condemnation of nine Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) militants to death by a martial court mobilized the political opposition. The protests were organized among the workers by Spanish political exiles residing in various European capitals. ETA retaliated with kidnapping an honorary consul in Bilbao. Despite the Spanish bishops and the Pope demanding that the condemned men should be pardoned, Franco only commuted the nine death sentences to life imprisonment. Nevertheless, that event signalled the ability of the mass population to become mobilized and exert influence over Franco’s government in favour of the militants against the regime itself in late 60s.

The Catholic Church demanded liberal openings in the regime. Nevertheless, repressive policies caused their further disenchantment with the regime. As a result, during this “mono-color” government of Carrero Blanco, the Catholic Church, a collaborator of the Francoist regime since the Civil War, explicitly acknowledged its error in taking sides with the Francoists. The Catholic Church had obtained certain privileges from Franco in exchange for Franco’s important role in the appointing of

33. By the early 1970s, it reduced to a Status of a patronage-dispensing bureaucracy with no political importance.
34. Alba, Transition in Spain, 234.
35. Ibid, 235.
36. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy”, 78.
Franco’s influence over the Catholic Church was already disturbing. As soon as they started losing their privileged position in the regime their discontent was voiced more than before.

The number of strikes in 1972 reached its peak during Franco’s regime. Taking into account all of these regime crises, the survival of the regime after Franco was seen to necessitate Carrero Blanco being appointed as the head figure. Nevertheless, the assassination of Carrero Blanco by ETA in December 1973 changed the dynamics of the government and risked the power of Opus Dei in the government.

Following the assassination of Blanco, Arias Navarro, the Minister of the Interior during the Blanco Government, was elected for presidency. Navarro’s government programme promised aperture (opening) which meant more freedom of expression, prospective free elections and political parties, all of which would allow Spain to enter the European Economic Community. The appointment of Navarro and his government’s programme signalled a rapid democratization of the regime sought by people under fifty who had not been involved with the Civil War in the late 30s. On the other hand, liberalization policies exacerbated the extremist supporters of Franco’s regime. The so-called “Bunker” or antiaperturistas (anti-opening), who were alive during the Civil War, were resistant to change in the regime. Nevertheless, the world economic crisis and the oil problem affected Spain and the strikes spread all around the country despite efforts toward apertura. The Leftists took advantage of the increased freedom to give a final impulse to its reconstitution as a political force.

Navarro’s government could not realize the liberalising reforms in order to reconstruct the social bases of Franco’s political system. The “bunker” succeeded in failing the Statute for Political Associations which aimed at legalizing the political associations. The failure of the government indicated the regime’s inability to adapt to cyclical tendencies. On the left, the number of strikes was increasing by large percentages in 1973, and various political alternatives emerged in Paris with correspondents in each provincial capital in Spain. As Maravall and Santamaría claim,

38. Alba, Transition in Spain, 235.
40. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy”, 79.
the democratic opposition became a “credible alternative” rather than a source of division. 41

Franco’s unexpected illness during Navarro’s government caused two negative developments both for the “opening” endeavours and for the prince Juan Carlos. Since the government became aware of its inability to adopt openings in the regime, they decided to resign on the condition that Franco would be asked to return to power despite his illness. This secret consent was transmitted to Franco by the “bunkers”. This event led to the resignation of the Ministry of Information and some loyal ministers in the cabinet. Even though the new members of the cabinet promised to continue opening, the suspension of magazines and books created an obstacle to the freedom of press. In addition, the prince who replaced Franco during his illness had to leave the office as soon as Franco was back. While this was a humiliating development for a prince, his silent consent provided him with a good reputation for his potential as Franco’s successor. 42 The removal of aperturistas (openists) from power stimulated the democratic opposition to support the old Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Worker Party- PSOE) in large numbers. The Communists organized an oppositional platform, Junta Democratica (Democratic Junta) in Paris, and supported Don Juan, the prince’s father, who delivered speeches emphasising democracy and liberal values. 43

The Armed Forces, despite their commitment to the Francoist regime, also contained opposition groups against the removal of openists from the government. In 1975, the government arrested eleven military men, captains and commanders, all of whom were also lawyers, engineers, or other professionals. These army members were accused of forming an alternative, Union Militar Democratica (Democratic Military Union-UMD) within the army. This development also could be intended in order to place barriers against politicization of the army in the future. Thus, the democratic opposition would be pleased to see the regime’s conflict with the army. 44

Violence had always been a characteristic of Spain but from 1969 it became a form of terrorism by small groups, especially ETA. There was a general feeling among

41. Ibid, 80.
42. Alba, Transition in Spain, 239.
43. Ibid, 240.
44. Ibid, 241.
the democratic opposition that the “bunker” used violence in order to justify the repression. The murdering of police in the Basque region caused the deterioration of relations between the government and the police. The government lost its authority over the police. In order to hide this fact, an Anti-terrorist Law went into effect in 1975. The execution of five members caused a reaction from Western states, especially Europe; if not the United States. Twelve European governments removed their ambassadors from Spain. The European Economic Community decided to suspend negotiations for a trade treaty with Spain. It was the biggest reaction against the Franco regime since 1948 when Spain was isolated by the United Nations. Therefore, by the end of the 1975 Spain came close to being isolated from international politics.

2.2 After Franco

At the end of November 1975, Franco died. His supposed successor Carrero Blanco had already been assassinated in 1973. Thus, as agreed during Franco’s last years, Juan Carlos de Borbon was crowned King Juan Carlos I of Spain on November 22, 1975. Since Juan Carlos replaced Franco before constitutional amendments, he held excessive powers for a constitutional monarch compared to his European counterparts. However, Juan Carlos lacked popular legitimacy. In order to achieve this, he would either resort to a referendum for his presidency or lead a democratic transformation. He had attempted to form closer relationships with different pillars of society when he was the prince. For example, the prince abstained from replacing Franco at one time, because of prior experience where he acted in a ludicrous manner. Instead of replacing Franco, he went to the Sahara where Spain had political problems with Morocco and told the army to support the Spanish stance by using force, if necessary. This sort of leadership naturally provided support for him within the army. This sympathy towards the prince among the members of the army would be a signal for the future cooperation of the two parties. In his first declaration at the presidency takeover he pledged to uphold “the principles inspired by the Movimiento Nacional”. He also promised the efficiency of the armed forces. After expressing his “respect and gratitude” for Franco, he added that “a just order, equal for all, would allow recognition, within the unity of

45. Ibid, 244.
46. Ibid, 246.
the kingdom, of regional characteristics.” Thus, the king pledged that all Spaniards would be heard and that none would be privileged. Still, the legislators gave Franco’s daughter a much longer ovation than they had given the king. This example can be seen as a discordant between the regime’s dynamics and the new monarch.47

As soon as the King replaced Franco, the liberals and democratic opposition voiced their concerns. The Catholic Church opted for liberal values through the declaration of the Cardinal Archbishop of Madrid, Monsignor Vicente Enrique y Tarancon, where he said that the church was ready “to speak out and shout if ever necessary on behalf of liberty and human rights”. The Church demanded an amnesty for political prisoners, but the King only settled for a pardon. Don Juan, the father of the new king, believed that the monarchy would only benefit society as a whole if it became an arbitrating power which would make it easier to surmount the effects of the Civil War, establish social justice, eliminate corruption, consolidate a pluralistic democracy, integrate Spain into the European Community and to afford the Spanish nation peaceful access to the national sovereignty. Otherwise, if these goals were not realized, all that would be achieved would be the replacement of Franco with a monarchy. 48 Hence, at the time of the Franco’s death, the main actors and their main concerns were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key actors</th>
<th>Main Concerns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Withdrew their support from the regime in 1971, ask amnesty and demand liberal values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falangists- transformed into National Movement</td>
<td>Aims to institutionalize the Falangist movement within the structure of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opus Dei</td>
<td>Dissolution of the Francoist elements and restoring the Monarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>Perceives the dictatorship as an obstacle to economic integration with Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Classes</td>
<td>Sees the democratic opposition as a credible alternative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Providing support for the regime, thus for the government through monopoly of repressive apparatus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


47. Ibid, 251.
48. Ibid, 252.
For any significant change in the system, Cortes (Spanish Parliament) and Consejo Del Reino (Council of the Realm) had to agree. Cortes and the Council of the Realm were functioning as the control mechanism for the Francoist regime. The power of the government was limited by the approval of the Cortes in important issues. Their inner structures of these institutions were as follows.

According to the structure in Table 2, only the 108 family legislators, the 30 representatives from professional associations and the 6 representative from Royal Academies were selected without the legal intervention of Franco, caudillo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Institution</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>How were they elected?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Around 20 ministers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council of the National Movement</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Elected by Franco or by institutions within the National Movement whose leaders are elected by Franco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The President of Supreme Court</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Elected by Franco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 high official and Bishops</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Elected by Franco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators (procuradores)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Named by the chief of state in consultation with the Council of Realm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Deans</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Subject to Franco’s approval for appointment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents of the royal academies</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives from professional associations</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union legislators</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>36 chosen by virtue of the position they held in the union organization, the rest were designated by union leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“family” legislators who formed the so-called family</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Named by heads of families and married women after first having been approved as candidates by provincial authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>Municipal and Provincial authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alba, Transition in Spain, 250-5
In addition the Council of the Realm, which was supposed to be the restricting force of the regime’s important institutions (the Parliament and the King), was comprised of the following members: the senior prelate (a member of parliament), the senior office of the armed forces, the head of the general staff of the armed forces, the president of the Supreme Court, the president of the Council of State (the chief of state’s consulting body), the president of the Hispanic Institutes, ten members of Parliament elected by the legislators, the president of Parliament. All of these members of the Council of Realm were subject to the head of state’s designations. Therefore, the head of state influenced the council to a large extent.49

One of the Council of Realm’s functions was to present the chief of state with a list of three candidates from which to select the president of government and the president of Parliament. In addition the Council of Realm advised the chief of state on whether or not he should veto a law approved by Parliament and also with regard to all the measures that affected the functioning of institution. As a result of these, Francoists’ consent seemed compulsory for a significant change in the system as a whole. To sum up, most of the positions within these two important institutions were filled by Francoists.50 Juan Carlos, by replacing Franco, without any constitutional and institutional change in the system would mean the transferring of powers to a new monarch. However, the events resulted in a different outcome.

2.3 The Elections

Following the death of General Franco, King Juan Carlos named Carlos Arias Navarro as the new head of government. Arias was the successor of Blanco. During his first government he had included openists in the government but he was indeed a continuist and never attempted to transform the regime into a pluralistic democracy. The Leftist had transformed their main pillars, Junta Democratica and Plataforma de Convergencia,(The Convergence Platform) into Coordinacion Democratica(Democratic Coordination) in order to exert influence over the government. Even though Arias disclosed his reformist project, his unwillingness to negotiate with the opposition caused the King’s unrest. Juan Carlos, who sought for popular legitimacy, knew that

49. Ibid, 252.
50. Ibid, 255.
only parliamentary democracy would firm his power and guarantee the reforms’ consolidation in the long run. The openists of the government attempted to persuade the continuist in the mixed Commission between representatives of the government and the Consejo Nacional de Movimiento (Council of National Movement) which included many Francoists. However, the pressure that the openists exerted over the continuists was insufficient and consequently the reform negotiations failed. Popular movements in the forms of strikes and demonstrations increased in Spain during this failed negotiation period. This failure ended with the replacement of Arias with Adolfo Suarez. Suarez promised to submit to the nation a project of constitutional reform which would include the general elections before June 1977. Suarez presented a bill for political reform and submitted it for the consideration of both the commanders of the armed forces and the Cortes. Suarez proposed the continuity of monarch in the person of Juan Carlos de Borbon, who had already been designated as Franco’s successor, the maintenance of the “unity of Spain” and the exclusion of the Communists. Suarez also accepted to reform the electoral system allowing representation in rural areas and the establishment of a second chamber elected by a plurality system with a certain number of senators designated by the king. Rather than Arias’ proximity with continuists, Suarez placed himself in an intermediate position between rupturists and continuists.

In order to prevent the intervention of the military into politics, the army chief of staff and Suarez’ collaborator Lieutenant General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, called for political abstention by all military commanders under threat of expulsion from the military. This threat proved to be real as Lieutenant General Fernando de Santiago was dismissed and relegated to the reserve when he expressed his disagreement with the government project on labour unions. Suarez’s concession was the prohibition of the Spanish Communist Party from the forthcoming elections. Suarez also pressured the members of the Cortes named by Franco not to vote against the reform by threatening them with the dispossession of their posts in state companies, and by making public the recordings of telephone taps the government secret services had made in their homes.

52. Ibid, 1292.
53. Ibid, 1293.
54. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy”, 82.
and offices and by the transmission on television of the nominal vote of their bill for reform in case they decided to vote “no”.55 Hence he provided the acceptance for the reform of the authoritarian regime by the Francoists in the institutions. Suarez had already formed an agreement with the Church and the financial aristocracy.56 Suarez was confident that the reform would not jeopardize the foundations of the capitalist system. A referendum was made on 15 December 1976 and 94 percent approved the Suarez’s constitution which aimed to create a transition to democracy. Hence, the eleven-month period since Suarez came to power provided important results for establishing a constitutional democracy satisfying all parties. The Suarez government declared amnesty for political prisoners, replaced vertical syndicates with class-based trade unions and disbanded the Movimiento Nacional with the purpose of establishing political parties. The Suarez government ensured that no political party or group would be able to complain about their role in the construction of the new regime.57 Suarez had considerable success in dealing with the resistance of the continuists “and in leading the democratic opposition to accept limitations, and the content and the procedures of “legal reformism”. That made Suarez the natural leader of the Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of Democratic Center-UCD) which would be the party comprising several actors of democratic opposition joining together under one party to enter into elections.58

The reformists within the government headed by Suarez were never able to establish cooperation with the rupturist opposition. Suarez only agreed to some of their basic demands such as extension of the political amnesty, a proportional electoral law, and legalization of the parties extended to cover the PCE (the Spanish Communist Party) and the dissolution of the Movimiento. 59

The rupturist opposition’s various parties joined together in the Plataforma de Organismos to defend the formation of a provisional government with the participation of the opposition. Their main concern was to convok elections without any advantage for one group along with the parallel establishment of regional governments in

59. Ibid, 87.
Catalonia and the Basque country, freedom of activity for all parties and the free choice by the constituent Cortes of the forms of state and government.60 This Plataforma sought to establish ground for negotiation with the Suarez government by designating a nine-man commission. However, Suarez’s sole concession was his consent on establishing direct conversation with the general secretary of the Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo for the legalization of his party. Suarez and Carrillo also agreed on the monarchy and the two-colored monarchical flag. Suarez, rather than compromising with the democratic opposition, used these conversations with the opposition as a threat against the continuists as a possible alternative if the continuists do not agree with Suarez’ reform proposals. Thus, according to Colomer, the Spanish transition was a reform pactada within the ruling bloc.61

Spain entered a new phase with the elections. Spaniards participated in the election with significant turnouts.62 In fact, the electors were moderate and by the time of elections 40 percent of the population placed itself in the middle position. The average position on the ideological scale from 1 to 10 was 5.47.63

As we see from the below figure, the first democratic elections held in Spain in 1977 provided positive results for the transition to democracy. Instead of the extremist factions in the society (Communists and Francoists) the centrist parties, UCD and PSOE gained majority of the votes.

61. Ibid, 1293.
62. Voting turnout was 78 % in total and 85 % in the larger cities.
63. Maravall and Santamaria, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy”, 90.
Table 4. The 1977 Election Results of Spanish Cortes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
<th># of seats in Cortes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCD</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Party names and acronyms: Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of Democratic Center-UCD), Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Worker Party-PSOE), Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of Spain - PCE), Alianza Popular (Popular Alliance - AP).

This preference indicated that Spaniards no longer felt the necessity of guardianship imposed by Franco which constituted the justification for his dictatorship and also implied an extension and renovation of the strategy of compromise and pact-making. An analysis of democratic legitimacy of Spanish transition reveals that Spanish political culture was not inherently undemocratic, or that it did not harbour politically significant pockets of anti-democratic sentiments during the transition.64 Between 1978 and 1994 the percentage of Spaniards who perceived the democracy as the best system of governance never remained below 69 percent. During the same period highest support for an authoritarian regime was only 12 percent among the Spaniards. Taking these numbers into account, it was very difficult to distinguish Spaniards’ support for democracy from other Western European countries. Considering the turbulent circumstances that surrounded the transition such as political violence and attempted coup and economic crises, solid support for democracy in Spain was noteworthy.65 In addition, Spaniards’ confidence towards their armed forces does not significantly differ from other Western Europeans. According to World Value Survey data collected in 1981, 63 percent of the Spaniards had confidence in their armed forces, while 58 percent of Swedes, 53 percent of the French, and 42 percent of the Dutch had

65. Ibid, 127-9 and 151.
confidence in their armed forces. The Spanish army’s historical affiliation with the Spanish monarchy until Franco’s era and the consequences of Spanish Civil War had provided military a privileged role in Spanish politics and a prestigious place among the Spaniards, nevertheless this was not adequate to convince Spaniards that an authoritarian regime would be more appropriate than a democratic one.

However, there were significant problems remaining which needed to be solved such as, drafting the new constitution, the struggle against the economic crisis, the institutionalization of regional autonomies. In addition, since UCD failed to gain majority of the seats in the Cortes, they required to compromise with other parties within and outside the Cortes in order to pass the reforms. The armed forces were suspicious about any concession made for the autonomy of the various regions since they adopted their role as the guard of the territorial integrity. On the making of constitution, the rightist and the leftist parties were divided. While the rightists demanded a short constitution, institutionalizing the monarch and empowering the cabinet with clear supremacy over the parliament, the leftist parties demanded a limited parliamentary monarch with well defined powers and rigidity for amendment procedure covering all possible revisions of a progressive and detailed bill of rights that was to preface the constitution. The Leftist also demanded the state’s powers in economic initiatives and proportionality in future electoral law. The two largest parties of the Left were traditionally opposed to the concept of the monarchy. In addition, the guarantees provided for the existence of a capitalist economy in order to satisfy the financial aristocracy and the special position of the Catholic Church and the armed forces within the Spanish state were recognized. The whole constituent process in 1977-78 included various types of negotiation and a political power game among the parties. Differing degrees of success and failure were reached during the negotiations according to

68. Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 45.
70. See Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 47.
different topics. While the parties reached a consensus on the post-Franco reform agenda, the position of the monarchy, the legalization of the political parties and constitutional enshrinement of basic civil and political rights; the parties lacked agreement on the Basque regional autonomy. In addition, over religious issues, the electoral law and economic matters the parties reached a satisfactory conflict regulation. Therefore, as Colomer argues, the agreement did not start as soon as the Franco died; instead it began with the rational decisions conditioned on the distribution of seats in the parliament following the first elections during the constituent process.

Therefore the party needed to seek coalition alternatives in order to realize the adoption of the new democratic constitution, the recognition of autonomous communities and the “Moncloa Pact” which was largely related to economic matters. In the pre-election period, the reformists within the government had preferred to cooperate with the continuists rather than the rupturist democratic opposition. Hence, the motive of the cooperation lied in the power distribution in the decision-making organ, rather than the enthusiasm for cooperation in order to democratize the modern Spain. Therefore the reformists of the government accepted the new constitutions which would be widely accepted in the new Cortes rather than their limited constitution proposal. The majority of the parties in the Cortes agreed on a new decentralization or creation of the “autonomous communities” and Moncloa Agreements in economic policies. In this process the rupturists who sought a democratic system without restrictions could be successful as a result of the power distributions in the Cortes. These concessions of the Suarez government as a result of the specific number of deputies obtained by each group made Suarez appear as the “traitor” according to the continuists. Suarez’s agreements with different opposition groups actually violated the pacts and consent

71. Ibid, 55-6.
73. “Moncloa Pacts” is a tripartite agreement among businessmen, syndicalists and government. It enclosed a package of economic and political measures between the main political forces in the Cortes in order to “renovate” the alarming economic situation in Spain. The pacts included the devaluation of the peseta, accompanied by a moderately restrictive monetary policy, and an income policy together with a commitment to begin structural reform. See Maria Fernandez Gonzales Rojas, “Transition to Democracy and the Accession of Spain in the European Community, An overview: 1975-1985”, Centro de Estudios Europeos (Center of European Studies, Working Papers 2, no. 6 (June 2004)
between the continuists Francoists.\textsuperscript{74} The proposal for the constitution was approved almost unanimously in Cortes and by a referendum of 87.8 percent of the voters approved, 32.3 percent abstaining. The parliamentary and municipal elections in the spring of 1979 installed the new regime.

Nevertheless, many problems existed for the consolidation of democracy even after the elections and pacts. These problems were the political violence and the role of armed forces as a counter force, the international economic crisis in the 70s and the ongoing regional problems. The number of deaths caused by ETA’s actions continued to constitute an important number after the elections too. The concessions by the UCD which satisfied most of the nationalist groups in the Basque country, included the creation of a Basque police force and the restoration of the prior economic agreements according to which the Basque regional authority was obliged to collect and inspect all taxes and to retain for itself 67 percent of all revenues raised in the region in 1981. These concessions reduced the amount of the political violence. However, the concessions made to the Basque region triggered the armed forces and they attempted three coups in February and June 1981 and October 1982.\textsuperscript{75} The officers responsible for these attempts, Tejero and Milans del Bosch, were sentenced to prison for around thirty years. The harshness of these penalties was exceptional when compared to similar attempts in different states.\textsuperscript{76} Even though these coup attempts failed thanks to the King’s resistance supported by opposing factions within the army, the UCE and PSOE reached an agreement on an Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process, which would enforce restrictions in the autonomy of the Basque and Catalan regions.\textsuperscript{77} Spanish democracy, despite the existence of these problems and threats, experienced its new democratic elections in 1982 when the PSOE gained the majority of the votes and the democratic system in Spain continued to struggle with its internal problems afterwards.

\textsuperscript{74} Colomer, “Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way”, 1294.
\textsuperscript{75} Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 58-9.
\textsuperscript{76} Samuel Huntington, Üçüncü Dalga Yirmici Yüzyıl Sonlarında Demokratlaşma (Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century), translated by Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Ofset Fotomat, 2002), 229.
\textsuperscript{77} Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 58-9.
CHAPTER 3

Transition to Democracy in Turkey in 1980s

The experience of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in the 1980s marks the second major transition of the Turkish Republic. The first one was the transition from the charismatic early Republic under the founders, Atatürk and İnönü, to the post-traditional Republic. The transition in 1980s marked a shift from this post-traditionalism towards liberal modernism. However, the adoption of liberal democracy in Turkey was more challenging than was the case in the first transition. 78

Turkey’s experience with the multiparty electoral system dates back to 1950. Prior to Demokrat Parti’s (Democrat Party - DP) entry into the political system in 1946, several attempts with the intention of establishing opposition parties ended with absolute failure. 79 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party - CHP) ruled Turkey from 1923 to 1950 without any rival challenging its power. The first chief challenge to CHP’s rule was DP. DP gained the majority of the votes in the 1950 elections. 80 However, the establishment of opposition parties and the transformation of


79. Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republic Party) in 1924 and Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republic Party) in 1930 had been founded as opposition. See Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (The Establishment of Single-Party Government in Republic of Turkey), (İstanbul: Yurt Yayınları, 2005), 104-247 for the entrenchment of the single party regime in Turkey.

the single party system into a multiparty system fell short of consolidating the Turkish democracy. During the multiparty system, Turkish democratization has been interrupted several times by military interventions of various sorts. The first such intervention on May 27, 1960 led to a military rule for a year. Turkish politics has been under the scrutiny of the military since this very first intervention.  


This chapter firstly deals with the factors leading to the political decay during the 1970s. Although military rule was naturally an instrument restricting the individuals’ rights, its role in diminishing anarchy provided the passive consent of the Turkish society which had been suffering from political violence and an unstable economy. Secondly, this chapter will analyze the political actions during the military rule which had significant effects on the post-transition period. Having been influential in the drafting of the constitution, the military junta had thus shaped the social and political system in its aftermath. Thirdly, the transition to democracy process will be analyzed and its effects on the post-transition period will be evaluated. During the military rule, a new constitution was drafted and the head of the military intervention was named as the president of Turkey for the seven years following the military rule. Therefore, the effects of the transition process rigorously influenced the political atmosphere in the post-transition process.
3.1 Political Decay in 1970s

By 1980, the increase in the level and scope of political violence that spread to most parts of the country caused Turks to discuss the possibility of a military intervention. In different segments of society, including some of the civilian political elites, the military solution received open or tacit support.\(^83\) Turkish military had already presented a memorandum in January 1980 regarding the failures in Turkish economy and political life. However, the military preferred to wait and see the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party - AP) government’s policies and the results of the newly adopted economic stabilization program. Despite a clear warning from the military political parties failed to accommodate their interests and cooperate for the recovery of existing political and economic problems.\(^84\) Understanding the dynamics of the 1970s provides important clues for comprehending the reasons behind the military intervention in 1980. It is argued that, the collapse of the system was mainly caused by the inability of centrist forces in the 1970s to accommodate their interests and failures of the leadership of the parties to prevent the escalating crisis through cooperation. These failures eventually led to the polarization of the party system, the instability of the coalition governments, the parceling of bureaucracy into warring camps and the polarization of social cleavages. The violence and terror was unavoidable following this political atmosphere.\(^85\)

The reasons of the intervention can be summarized by increasing internal security problems, rising Kurdish secessionism, decay in the political system, a disastrous Turkish economy, populism and the rising threat of Islamic fundamentalism which ultimately caused a regime change in neighbouring Iran.\(^86\)

\(^84\) William Hale, Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset (Turkish Military and Politics), (İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1996), 203-8.
\(^86\) For a causal linkage between the intervention and the pre-intervention developments see Ibid; Hale, Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset; Erick-Jan Zürcher Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi (Emerging of a Modern Nation: Turkey), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000); Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy.
In the late 1970s, Turkey's economy was hit by the international crisis in world oil prices. Nearly all macroeconomic indicators revealed the trauma in the Turkish economy. In other words, civil governments were constantly failing to remedy the country’s economic crisis. Instead of long term economic policies, the parties in the government were striving to realize a relative increase during their short-term governments. Keyder adds that parliament’s inertia was not anymore able to silence the upheavals in society. Poor macroeconomic indicators alone are not sufficient to explain the reasons for military intervention, but they have an impact on rising unrest within society.

The major reason behind the inability of the government to adopt long-term policies instead of populist agendas was the intense competition between the major political parties, CHP and AP, for holding ministerial posts. It was widely held that the 1961 constitution had played an important role in the fragmentation of the party system through its emphasis on the pluralist thrust encouraging minor parties; the proportional representation after 1961 which allowed minor parties to gain parliamentary seats; and the shifts of electoral behaviour. The Turkish party system was thus fragmented in the 1970s.

The fragmented party system of the late 1970s revolved around two major parties- AP and CHP- and a few minor parties. AP, as successor of the DP, was placed in the centre-right. AP gained popular support from its skilful use of party patronage and manipulation of clientelist ties. Additionally, AP pursued the landed and business interests. The party’s appeal to religious and nationalist sentiments combined with its anti-Communist attitude provided the essential support to become a major party in the Turkish political arena. AP’s main rival, CHP, appealed to the mass through populist “social democracy” which addresses the workers, small peasants and urban marginal thereby defending the 1971 Constitution and the individual, associational and other civil

87. The inflation rate rose from 44 percent in 1978 to 107 percent in 1980. The deficit in the balance of payment increased to 3.4 billion dollars. Turkey’s foreign debt jumped from 1.9 billion dollars in 1970 to 14.6 billion dollars in 1979 in Hale, Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset, 204; Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi, 390.

88. Çağlar Keyder, “Türkiye Demokrasi’sinin Ekonomi Politiği” (Political Economy of Turkish Democracy) in Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye (Turkey in Transition), ed. Irvin Cemil Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1990), 75.

90. Ibid, 177.
liberties guaranteed within the Constitution. Considering the division within the leftist groups itself, populist social democratic discourse appears as the most rational way to collect the majority of the votes in the competitive race between CHP and AP. Among the minor parties, two more powerful ones, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party -MHP) and Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party-MSP), were representing the extremist nationalism in the former and extremist fundamentalism in the latter. With regards to the Islamic fundamentalist, MSP was regarded as a marginal political party with a trivial threat to the secular regime. The reality of establishing an Islamic regime in contemporary Turkey seemed impossible to the intellectual elite. Despite this accurate perspective depending on the data and developments until the early 1980s, the potentials of political Islam have been questioned in Turkish politics since 1980s. In 1970s, MSP was only empowered in Turkish politics as an alternative to become a coalition partner rather than from its ideological stance. To sum up, the party system in 1970s was characterized by increasing party fragmentation and a sharpening of ideological confrontation and polarization.

91. Ibid, 178.
Table 5. Turkish Parliamentary Election Results in 1973 and 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>1973 Elections</th>
<th>1977 Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>33,30</td>
<td>41,38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>29,82</td>
<td>36,88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>11,80</td>
<td>8,56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>3,38</td>
<td>6,42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2,83</td>
<td>2,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>5,26</td>
<td>1,87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>11,89</td>
<td>1,85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBP</td>
<td>1,14</td>
<td>0,39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TİP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>0,58</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The election results reiterated a party system with two major parties and several minor ones. Thus, electoral party competition was mainly polarized between two major parties. The ideological conflicts increased between these two parties as party elites preferred to win the competition at the expense of political stability. Even though the mass public of 1970s placed themselves near the centre of the party spectrum, the party elites and activists pronounced ideological polarization in order to strengthen their support. While AP opted for placing itself on the centre-right, CHP leader Ecevit’s “left of the centre” slogan gained public support. Despite this tendency towards the centre by slogans, this polarization could not be prevented. In conclusion, during the 1970s, the cooperation among the party elites seemed almost impossible; rather a bitter competition became a characteristic of politics. Two parties preferred to base their political arguments on the weakening of the other through “a mutual process of delegitimation”. This ideological polarization among the party elites was reflected to the mass level where various existing differences (e.g. religious, sectarian and ethnic) in
society were used as ideological warfare. Despite all of these destabilizing side-effects of the polarization, both parties continued blaming each other. This mutual secession empowered minor parties, since the only alternative available to reach a majority in parliament was forming a coalition with a major and a minor party. This tendency made the accommodation between AP and CHP almost impossible. In the Table 6, the governments between 1974 and 1980 (the year of military intervention) are shown. As observed, seven different governments in six years attempted to rule the country. Different forms of government existed from minority governments to coalition governments, nevertheless all of them failed to bring stability to the regime.

As I explained above, neither the political nor the economic conditions of the country were at a desirable level. However, another factor was unavoidable for the military: political violence. The rising political violence necessitated, in other terms legitimized military intervention. Dodd reveals that “The military, as always in any country, was sensitive in the extreme to the use of force by others when it alone was supposed to have the monopoly of violence”.

95. Ibid, 181.
96. Ibid, 180.
97. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, 29.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Party(ies) in the government</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reasons of failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecevit (CHP)</td>
<td>CHP and MSP</td>
<td>01.1974-11.1974</td>
<td>Disagreement between the coalition partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irmak (Independent)</td>
<td>Minority Government headed by a member of the Senate of Republic</td>
<td>11.1974-03.1975</td>
<td>Vote of confidence was not given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demirel (AP)</td>
<td>AP, MHP, MSP and CGP</td>
<td>03.1975-06.1977</td>
<td>1977 Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecevit (CHP)</td>
<td>CHP-minority government</td>
<td>06.1977-07.1977</td>
<td>Vote of confidence was not given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demirel (AP)</td>
<td>AP-MSP-MHP</td>
<td>07.1977-01.1978</td>
<td>Vote of confidence was not given following a non-confidence motion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecevit (CHP)</td>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>01.1978-11.1979</td>
<td>Ecevit’s resignation following the midterm elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demirel (AP)</td>
<td>AP-minority government</td>
<td>11.1979-09.1980</td>
<td>Military Intervention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The political violence spread from universities to the streets. One course of violence occurred between the politicized groups or organizations like Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (The Revolutionary Trade Unions - DİSK), Türk Öğretmenler Birliği Derneği (Turkish Teachers’ Association - TOBDER) and the forces of law and order. Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Nationalist Workers’ Union-MİSK) was also receiving support from the right wing. The right-left clashes in the streets had become widespread. In addition, as happened in Kahramanmaraş district, existing divisions within the society were politically exploited. Assassinations of political, military and police figures were equally worrying. Nevertheless, the

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question remains as to why the military intervened on September 12th and not earlier, if political violence was indeed more important than the political void.99

Here, I will not contest the arguments over the prevailing motive behind the military intervention. Possibly, the combination of these reasons caused the military intervention in September 1980.100

As a result of prolonging rivalry and reluctance for cooperation among political elites, Turkish political and economic circumstances showed no glimmer of hope for recovery by the end of 1970s. The influence of military in the politics had already become a characteristic of the Turkish political scene since mid-nineteenth century. Therefore, a military intervention into politics, when the political process is entirely in crisis, would not surprise majority of the public. Nevertheless, neither Demirel nor Ecevit were expecting a coup d’etat. As Hale suggested, several factors made the political leaders confident enough for the difficulties of realizing a coup d’etat. These were the failures of the semi-military regime during 1971-73, and the success of civilian initiative over the military in the 1973 presidential election when Fahri Korutürk was elected instead of military-supported candidate Cemal Gürler. In addition, the leaders’ confidence relied on their role over the appointment of high-ranking commanders in the last decade during the prime ministry of both leaders.101

Currently, even the harshest critiques of the 1980 intervention hardly deny the fact that the political violence had reached an unbearable level and any action ceasing this desperate situation would be acceptable. It still remains as a question whether the political parties in late 1970s could accommodate their interests in order to prevent the collapse of democracy and the adoption of authoritarian type of government. However, it is easily arguable that political parties have made less effort than they could. The deadlock in presidential elections is sufficient to prove the lack of conflict resolution measures undertaken between the parties. The reasons for this however are not under the scope of this study.


101. Hale, Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset, 207.
In addition to these conditions, several developments raised the tensions between the military and the government, thus pulled the trigger. Firstly, the number of the regions under martial law was increasing. The martial law was restricting the powers of the commanders. Because, according to the principle invoked by Ecevit martial law authority’s decisions also had to be approved by the government. The commanders, who were keen to stop anti-regime propaganda or to prevent violence, were not content. Secondly, the presidential election following the end of Korutürk’s term was deadlocked because of the rivalry between the CHP and AP for electing their favourite candidate. This deadlock was blocking the political activity of the parliament as well. Thirdly, MSP’s intention to inject religion into politics reached unavoidable limits for the military. MSP supporters’ disrespect to the national anthem in Konya on 6th of September and their leader Erbakan’s slurring speech about the Victory Day of Independence War on 30th of August helped the military to expedite their plans.

3.2 Military Rule: 1980-83

Military intervention in politics was not a surprise for any segments of the Turkish society. Military had already been one of the important actors of Turkish politics and had acted as the guardian of the Republican regime since the establishment in 1923. In addition, political experience in Turkey included military’s active role in politics. For some, military interventions should be categorized as “moderating coups” where military abstains from establishing a long-standing bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. Other perceive the military interventions as an obstacle for democratic consolidation since it pursues the interests of a certain class. Yet, a recent study reveals that the latter argument is not widespread among the Turkish people.

supports that argument and indicate that Turkish people, in general, have high confidence in their armed forces. The percentage of the Turks who are confident in their armed forces never remained below 80 percent since 1990. 106 This high confidence in the armed forces and civilians’ continuing rivalry leading to political decay before 1980 facilitated the military to intervene. Differing than the Western European States, the image of Turkish Military as the pioneer of modernisation force since late 19th century provides a dilemma for public opinion in Turkey. However, it is fair to admit that Turkish Political Culture paves the way for military to intervene into politics.

As I mentioned earlier, the priority concern of the military rule was the suppression of the escalating political violence in the country. Its second concern was founding a new political system where the mistakes of the past would not be repeated. This finding proves that the military desired a fundamental restructuring of the Turkish political system instead of applying partial measures.107 In addition to these two concerns, economic conditions of the country were in desperate need of long-term economic policies.

The composition of the Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council-MGK108) was changed in favour of the military. MGK was comprised of six members including Chief of Staff General Evren (as the chairman) and formerly Commander of the Land Forces General Saltik (as the Secretary) and commanders of the army, navy, airforce and gendarmerie. MGK would hold the executive and legislative powers. All the activities of the political parties, and two trade unions (DİSK and MİŞK) were suspended. The political party leaders were taken into custody in a military camp.

In the initial days of intervention, MGK promised a transition to democracy based on secularism, freedom and social rights, taking into account the rights and freedoms of

108. MGK was first mentioned in 1961 Constitution. It was formed to develop essential fundamental views on matters effecting national security and it should share those views with Council of Ministers to assist in the overall formulation of national security policy. See 1961 Constitution and National Security Law Code 129 for the legal base of the MGK before 1980. In 1983 the Code 129 was replaced with Code 2945 which empowers MKG in the Turkish politics and society. These codes are available at MGK’s website: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/kanun.html (accessed on May 24, 2007).
the people. Moreover, the military promised drafting a Constitution and an Election Law in alignment with democratic principles. In alignment with Turkish foreign policy, the junta government’s commitment to stay within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was reassured. Martial law was extended from twenty to sixty-seven provinces. The Constitutional Order Law aimed at a reduction in the number of violence experienced in the streets. The leaders of three political party leaders including Ecevit (CHP), Demirel (AP) and Erbakan (MSP) were taken into custody in a military camp in Gelibolu. In order to re-establish the impartiality of a politicized bureaucracy, wide administrative and penal punishments were applied to civil servants. In addition to the MGK, twenty-six members cabinet was appointed under the prime ministry of Bülend Ulusu, a former admiral. Other than Ulusu, four other military appointees existed in the cabinet including the Ministry of Interior, Selahattin Çetiner. Turgut Özal participated in the cabinet as the Minister of State and Economy. Özal was the chief economic advisor of Demirel before the military intervention. His appointment indicated that the generals entrusted economic policymaking to the principal architect of the stabilization program which was initiated by the AP government with the active support and cooperation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in January 1980. This stabilization program rejected the economic growth strategy pursued by the populist governments of the 1960s and the 1970s which were driven by import-substituting industrialization policies. Instead, Özal aimed at adjusting the economy to market-oriented measures to reach international competitiveness. The new economic policies brought considerable progress within a year. The political context where little room for opposition to the policies adopted by the government paved the way for the determined implementation of the economic plan. Dodd defines the military as “not etatist” because of their adoption of neo-liberal


110. Constitutional Order Law was adopted on 27th of October 1980.

111. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, 44.

112. Later, Özal-led Motherland Party won the first multiparty elections following the military rule and would become the president of the Republic of Turkey following Evren. He was identified more as a civilian than a military rule government’s minister.

economic policies led by Özal and interpretes the policy as a part of “seperating economy from politics”.\textsuperscript{114}

The numbers of deaths from political violence declined in a relatively short time as a result of the anti-terrorist campaign including mass arrests and extensive use of Martial Law by the military. The trials held against the major political players were criticized by international organizations as well as the European left.\textsuperscript{115} In addition to these precautions, the military junta applied strict control over radio and television broadcasts. The right to appeal was made more complicated. The political conflicts of 1970s had arisen in universities. Thus, the MGK also applied strict control over universities. For example, the Higher Education Council was established to assert government’s influence over universities. The legislation of the Council included many regulations from appointment of the rectors by the Head of State, prohibition of the membership of students and staff in political parties, and compulsory teaching services in less developed areas. The Council was empowered to supervise the administration of the universities. In order to de-politicize bureaucracy, the number of high ranking officials in each ministry was restricted. This would allow establishing a more satisfactory long-term control of bureaucracy. The in-take of the personnel was organized only by the State Personnel Council.\textsuperscript{116}

Therefore, the military rule was successful to reach its primary objectives. The incidents of political violence diminished very rapidly and the economic recovery plan bared its fruits within a short time. The success of the military rule was mainly determined by its distinctive characteristic in centralizing the decision-making structure. Differing from earlier example of military rule in 1960, the military operated according to its hierarchical structure. The executive organ, MGK, was freed from the civilian members and its authority has been strengthened by laws which restrict political opposition. Secondly, the power was centralized; there was no disagreement within the military. Even the top level commanders agreed not to make separate statements on vital issues. Thirdly, Ulusu government and the MGK were in total agreement.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{114} Clement Harry Dodd, “The Development of Turkish Democracy”, \textit{British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies} 19, no.1 (1992): 23
\textsuperscript{115} Dodd, \textit{The Crisis of Turkish Democracy}, 46.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, 49.
\textsuperscript{117} Hale, \textit{Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset}, 212.
Possibly, the difference between the two military rules was related to the severity of the problems prior to the coups. The conditions in the 1970s were far more destabilizing than the conditions which led to the 1960 coup or the 1971 intervention. Therefore military felt it necessary to infiltrate almost every segment of society.\textsuperscript{118}

Following those achievements stated above, the remaining objective of the military was the restructuring of the political system. That objective would be realized through a new constitution and additional laws pertaining to political participation.

### 3.3 1982 Constitution Making Process

As Evren promised in the early announcement of the military rule, the transition to democratic rule commenced as soon as political and economical stability were secured. Данışma Meclisi (National Consultative Assembly - DM) was established primarily for drafting a constitution, and in the meantime for performing necessary legislative functions.\textsuperscript{119} The composition of DM was mainly determined by the MGK's approval. Therefore, it was far from being a representative parliament.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of members</th>
<th>How were they elected?</th>
<th>Profile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120 members</td>
<td>MGK Selected from the list prepared by the provincial governors</td>
<td>Average Age: 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Heavily Representative of the Professions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 members</td>
<td>Selected by the MGK directly</td>
<td>Lacking in Controversial figures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kurucu Meclis Hakkında Kanun (Law on National Consultative Assembly): Code 2485 was adopted on June 29th 1981

MGK and DM constituted the Constituent Assembly which was primarily in charge of drafting the new constitution.\textsuperscript{120}

There was a general feeling among the military officers that the 1961 constitution which enforces political pluralism was not responding to real demands of the Turkish


\textsuperscript{119} Ergun Özbudun, Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı (Constitution-making in Transition to Democracy), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), 61.

\textsuperscript{120} Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, 44.
people, instead was contributing to the escalation of crises in the country. The 1982 Constitution was drafted by the Constituent Assembly and has been criticized since its coming into effect. Turkey’s constitution making process in 1980-83 constitute an example of “reform type” where the new constitution is drafted by the unrepresentative assembly. Özbudun argues that the politics of constitution making during the transition process provide findings in order to understand the character of the transition process and explains the level of stability in the post-transition process.

Procedurally, a committee selected by the Constituent Assembly drafted the 1982 Constitution. The draft was open to discussion but propaganda was strictly prohibited. Different groups ranging from universities to workers’ union Türk-İş (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Turkish Trade Union Confederation) and Türk İşveren Sendikası Konfederasyonu (Turkish Employer Syndicate Confederation-TİSK) presented their views on the first draft. The procedure of constitution-making was as follows: The draft was first subject to amendments of DM and later to the revision of the MGK. Finally, the constitution had to be approved by a referendum.

As explained in more detail above, the members of the DM were not directly elected, rather appointed by the MGK. On the contrary, DM had no authority over the appointment of MGK members. According to the law, members of the former political parties were prohibited to become members of the DM. As the political party members were dismissed, the majority of the members of the DM have been selected from among the bureaucrats. MGK had the authority to amend or veto the articles proposed by the DM. The amendments of the MGK would be adopted without a second reading by DM. The articles were amended by the MGK members. The adoption of the constitution was conditioned to a referendum, however the procedure following a possible “no” vote in the referendum was not mentioned. It is still a question whether the military rule would lead to an uncertain date following a possible “no” vote, but it would not be irrational to argue so. According to a provisional article of the constitution, the head of the MGK would be appointed as the new president for the next

121. Özbudun, *Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı*, 50-8.
122. Ibid, 50-8.
123. The Committee of fifteen members were led by Proffessor Orhan Aldıkaçtı.
124. The selection of the DM member was determined by a law adopted by the MGK. Code 2485.
125. Özbudun, *Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı*, 63.
seven years.\textsuperscript{126} Prior to the referendum a law obligating the people to vote was also passed in order to provide the popular legitimacy for the constitution. The opposition to Evren’s speech in favour of the constitution was also not allowed. Eventually, the referendum was held on November 7\textsuperscript{th} 1982. 91.37\% of the voters approved the constitution. Only in Southeast Turkey, the “no” votes were relatively higher.\textsuperscript{127}

The referendum was expected to provide popular legitimacy for the constitution; but the restrictions on the propaganda against the constitution raised doubts over the constitution’s legitimacy. Özbudun also argues that the 1982 constitution involves articles challenging the democratic consolidation in Turkey. In particular, the articles of the constitution empowering the president implied that the influence of the MGK would continue during the presidency of General Evren. In addition, a provisional article of the constitution banned the existing political parties and their members prior to 1980 intervention for 5 to 10 years. The prominent members of the military rule and their decisions were granted judiciary exemptions.\textsuperscript{128}

Consequently, a new Constitution was made under the substantial influence by the military through its presence within the MGK, and their strengthened advisory power over the constitution making process. The end result, the 1982 Constitution, brought a transition to democracy process as promised in advance, but with certain restrictions in political participation, and with a new president which would challenge the elected governments during the initial years of the transition. The 1982 Constitution attempted to establish institutional pluralism, albeit not as extensive as 1961. In order to decrease the number of categories of state elites, the Constitution strengthened presidency and MGK at the expense of the powers of the higher courts and the autonomy of the universities. Another significant development was the changing perception of Atatürkism paving the way for further scope for politics.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{126} Provisional Article 1 states that the head of MGK will be the next president. But the following president would be elected according to the principles of the Constitution which presents that the Parliament will select the president.

\textsuperscript{127} Özbudun, \textit{Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı}, 67; Zürcher, \textit{Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi}, 409.

\textsuperscript{128} Özbudun, \textit{Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı}, 68.

3.4 The New Political System

According to the new constitution, the strengthened power of the president founded a two-tiered regime where there is “a state divorced from politics and a depoliticized society”.\textsuperscript{130} Isolating society from politics was a political choice of the military. The military wished to prevent politicization of associations. They also expected to de-politicize the bureaucracy and put it under the care of the strong president.\textsuperscript{131} At the opening day of DM, Evren clearly stated that he was in favour of strengthening the presidential powers to a level more than merely signing decrees.\textsuperscript{132} Dodd assumes that a two-tiered regime with a strong president as the “representative of the state” and an elected prime minister would ensure the co-existence of modernism and “traditionalism”, and therefore maintain the order and security.\textsuperscript{133} The President was provided excessive executive, legislative and judiciary powers. These powers included appointment of the cabinet and the Chief of Staff, heading MGK, representing the Commander in Chief. The president also was given the responsibility to guard the Constitution by a strengthened veto power. He held the option to submit the Constitutional amendments to referendum when the Assembly insists against his objections. In addition, the appointment of the members of Constitutional Court, the Council of State, the Military Court of Cassation, the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors and the High Court of Appeal were the important judiciary responsibilities of the President. The Appointment of Higher Educational Council and State Supervisory Commission were also included in the list of President’s tasks.\textsuperscript{134}

Initially, there have been several restrictions in the freedom of expression and on the social and economic rights and duties. The restrictions in freedom of expression was justified by the purpose of “protecting youth from harmful currents of thought and for preventing the dissemination of false and untimely news which would adversely affect the economic life.”\textsuperscript{135} The right to assemble and demonstrations of public associations

\textsuperscript{130} Sunar and Sayari, “Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects”, 183.
\textsuperscript{131} Dodd, “The Development of Turkish Democracy”, 22.
\textsuperscript{132} Dodd, \textit{The Crisis of Turkish Democracy}, 77-8.
\textsuperscript{133} Dodd, “The Development of Turkish Democracy”, 22-3.
\textsuperscript{134} Article 104 in the 1982 Constitution states the presidential powers.
\textsuperscript{135} Dodd, \textit{The Crisis of Turkish Democracy}, 71.
and trade unions were also restricted. The unions’ linkages with the political parties were prevented. None of them, could support or be supported by political parties. 136

To sum up, the universities were supervised, the political parties were restricted to form auxiliary branches, civil society including the university faculty member and trade union members were disengaged from politics, and the publications were only published under the permission of the government. Political Parties were closed and new party and election laws were designed to favour the centrist parties. 137 The Political Party Law, adopted in March 1983, banned political parties and their former leaders in the 1970s. According to these laws, the opening of new parties was conditioned to the approval of the founders of the party by the MGK. With the help of the martial law throughout the country, the MGK realized strict control over political activity. Competitive election campaigns in the elections among the political parties before the 1980 military intervention were not observed prior to November 1983 elections. 138 The Electoral Law adopted in June 1983 included thresholds. One of them was the country threshold of ten-percentage which implies that only the parties which gained more than ten-percent of the votes would have members in the parliament. The other threshold was the constituency threshold. 139 The main rationale behind the electoral law was eliminating the minor parties which disturbed the stability of the coalition governments in the pre-1980 period. The military aimed to leave the political system to two major parties closer to center so that the stability would be reached. Other than the political party law and the electoral law, the Law on Pacts, Strikes and Lock-out and Syndicates Law were widely criticized as including restrictions on political participation in the post-1983 period. 140 The motive behind strengthened presidential powers and restricted


137. Sunar and Sayari, “Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects”, 183-4; Siyasi Partiler Kanunu (Political Parties Law) was first published in Resmi gazete (Official Newspaper) on 24 April 1983 and Seçim Kanunu (Electoral Law) was first published in Resmi Gazete on 13 June 1983.


139. Seçim Kanunu 2839 (Electoral Law no. 2839), Article 33, 34; Constituency threshold is determined by dividing the number of parliamentarians allocated to that district to the numbers of electors.

political participation was retaining military’s political influence after an eventual transition to electoral politics.\textsuperscript{141}

Between March 1983 and November 1983 fifteen parties were established. Two of them, \textit{Sosyal Demokrat Parti} (Social Democrat Party - SODEP) and \textit{Doğru Yol Partisi} (True Path Party - DYP), were perceived by the military as the successors of the CHP and AP, respectively. Therefore, the military excluded these parties from the competitive elections race by rejecting to approve their founders. Overall, MGK allowed only three of the fifteen parties to enter the elections. Over 700 candidates for members of parliament were dismissed by the MGK. Another restriction during the election propaganda period was restriction of criticizing the MGK’s actions during the military rule. The extended martial law also allowed MGK to monitor the political activity very closely.\textsuperscript{142}

Finally, only three parties participated in the elections. These parties were: \textit{Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi} (Nationalist Democracy Party - MDP) led by Turgut Sunalp-former general, \textit{Halkçı Parti} (Populist Party) led by Necdet Calp-former member of CHP and \textit{Anavatan Partisi} (Motherland Party - ANAP) led by Turgut Özal-the minister of state in the early years of junta government. MDP was claimed to represent the centre right and was favoured by the armed forces. HP was supposed to form a loyal opposition as a centre-left party. In the meantime, ANAP espoused a commitment to liberal economic policies and conservative cultural values.

Two days prior the elections, President Evren implied his support for the NDP through a TV speech where he exactly stated his opinion on the coming elections. Evren invited the voters to vote for the party which will continue the success of MGK and will prevent Turkey to fall into anarchy as it happened before the MGK government.\textsuperscript{143} The election resulted with the ANAP’s comfortable win. Despite the armed forces’ unease and Evren’s implication in favour of the Sunalp’s MDP, the authority of government transferred from soldiers to civilians. Özal government was formulated and obtained vote of confidence on December 24\textsuperscript{th} of 1983.

\textsuperscript{142} Hale, \textit{Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset}, 228.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid, 228-9.
Table 8. Turkish Parliamentary Election Results in 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HP</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To sum up, the generals orchestrated the initial phase of the political liberalization. Turkish politics, at least, returned to a semi-competitive electoral process. The outcome of the elections was different than the military’s expectation. The party which was identified with the military, MDP, became the third party. On the other hand, ANAP, as the most distant party from the military among the existing ones in the elections, received the highest percentage of the votes. This electoral result gave support for Özal to lessen the military’s influence over the civilian cabinet during the ANAP government.

Even though the military rule was replaced with an elected cabinet, the consolidation of democracy required more than a semi-competitive election. However, Özal at least had a comfortable majority in the parliament that provided him with the opportunity to establish a single party cabinet without seeking a coalition partner. ANAP had already incorporated elements of a centre-right coalition. Özal’s party was a mixture of three rightist groups of the 1970s: the conservative liberals, Islamists and the radical nationalists. During Özal’s government between 1983 and 1987, Turkey enjoyed an intermediary phase where Turkish politics moved from authoritarian rule toward gradual political opening accompanied by the strengthening of civil society by political liberalization. Özal skilfully used a calm discourse against the military and president. Rather than vital issues, he preferred to make public speeches on economic


issues, where military was already comfortable with civilians’ primacy. Furthermore, Özal continued the economic stabilization and liberalization policies initiated in the early 1980s thanks to the strong parliamentary support for his government. Özal ambitious economic policy based on economic growth through export-promotion received much governmental emphasis and support. The expansion of Turkey’s exports contributed to the maintenance of growth rates. Özal’s economic policies increased foreign investment in Turkey and improved the country’s economic infrastructure. However, his attitude toward technocratic, centralized and personalized policy-making caused unrest within the bureaucratic echelons. They responded with delaying tactics, excessive emphasis on legal measures, and insistence on established bureaucratic procedures. Although the Özal government was weakened as a result of this clash between the political elites appointed by Özal and the statist elites within the bureaucracy, this process contributed to the freeing of the former from the supervision of the latter.

Especially absence of SODEP and DYP in the elections raised doubts over the representative character of the new parliament. Therefore, the municipality elections in 1984 would indicate the actual popular support for the government. The importance of these municipality elections was the legal participation of SODEP and DYP in the elections. Özal’s ANAP won the elections while SODEP came second, and DYP third. The election results had important implications for the political parties Firstly; the results indicated that support for ANAP did not diminish despite another centre-right party’s (DYP) participation in the elections. Secondly, even though the prominent leaders of former political parties were suspended, SODEP and DYP offered an organizational link with the precoup parties, CHP and AP respectively. Thirdly, since MDP and HP gained less than 10 percent of the votes in the municipality elections, they realized that their existence contributed little to the competitive party system and the

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147. See John Waterbury, “Export Led-Growth and Center-Right Coalition”, Comparative Politics 24, no. 2 (Jan 1992), 127-145 for the export-led growth strategy of the ANAP.


150. Hale, Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset, 234.
military’s intentions on establishing two centre parties in accordance with their values. Hence, HP opted for merging with SODEP, and they changed their name as Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democrat Populist Party-SHP). On the other hand, former CHP leader Ecevit appeared again in politics by a new party Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party-DSP). He was banned from political activities; therefore his wife head the party. As expected he was closely affiliated with the party just as Demirel was with DYP. The affiliations of those old leaders with these parties proved that the banning of political leaders would not guarantee their full exemption from the political system. In May 1987, the government proposed constitutional amendments including the lifting of the provisional ban in the 1982 constitution which suspends the leaders of the precoup political parties. The Parliament adopted the resolution that lifting political bans would be decided by a referendum. The referendum results brought a slight victory in favour of political liberalization. (50.2 % voted in favour, 49.8 against). Immediately after the referendum, Ecevit and Demirel became the heads of the DSP and DYP respectively. Özal, believing that the 49.8 of the votes implied support for his party, declared early elections to be held in November 1987.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHP</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MÇP</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Turkish Parliamentary Election Results of 1987


151. Ibid, 234.
152. Ibid, 235.
The result of the election, depicted in Table 9, proves that despite a declining trend in the support for party; ANAP was once more able to gain the majority of the seats in the parliament. This majority was sufficient enough for Özal to establish a single party cabinet for the second time consecutively. ANAP’s second term in the government was challenged by economic difficulties, particularly the rising inflation and unemployment rates. The balance between the rich and the poor shifted in favour of the former. ANAP failed to respond to the inflation problem, but instead applied populist economic policies by increasing public expenditures before the referendum and the national elections in 1987.\textsuperscript{153} As the elections and referendums became more frequent, the “economic policies became less coherent, macroeconomic instability increased, and a number of structural adjustment measures either stalled or reversed.”\textsuperscript{154} Although ANAP continued in the footsteps of the AP, it was a new entity emerged in 1983. Therefore, the party faced a “problem of constituting and subsequently consolidating a solid electoral base.”\textsuperscript{155} The results of the municipality elections in 1988 proved that ANAP was losing countrywide support. ANAP could only become the third party in the elections following SHP and DYP.\textsuperscript{156} The declining popular support caused division of the centre-right coalition within ANAP itself. The discontent between the liberal and conservative wings of the party has become visible by 1988.\textsuperscript{157} The conservative wing of the party was informed by an explicit Islamic ideology. The differences between these wings were not only political but also economical. The liberals wished to proceed with the program of economic liberalization while at the same time maintaining monetary and fiscal discipline. On the other hand, conservatives favoured using discretionary powers of the state as an instrument to broaden the electoral base of the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{154} İkay Sunar, State, Society, Democracy, refers to Stephan Haggard and Robert Paufman, The Political Economy of Transition to democracy, Manuscript, University of San Diego: Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, nd.113. \\
\textsuperscript{155} Ziya Öniş, “Redemocratization and Economic Liberalization in Turkey: The Limits of State Autonomy”, Studies in Comparative International Development 27, no.2 , (Summer 1992): 12 \\
\textsuperscript{156} ANAP received %22 of the votes, while SHP received 28\% and DYP received 25\%. \\
\end{flushright}
Evren’s term would end in 1989, and Özal elected as the new president by the parliament in which majority of the seats were held by ANAP. Özal delegated the authority of establishing a new cabinet to his former Interior Minister, Yıldırım Aktuna. However, thanks to the excessive political power granted to the President in Turkey, Özal acted as an active and influential president during his presidency. Later, Aktuna was replaced by Mesut Yılmaz, a member of ANAP’s liberal wing in party congress in 1991. Mesut Yılmaz decided to resort to early elections to gain power to implement his strict economic policies. Therefore early elections were held in October 1991. The results of the elections were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>27,03</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>24,01</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHP</td>
<td>20,75</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>16,88</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>10,75</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>0,44</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>0,13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


None of the parties gained the majority of the seats in the parliament to form a single party government. DYP and SHP formed the coalition after intense negotiations. Following Özal’s sudden death in April 1993, the seat of the presidency was a matter of debate again. Demirel was elected as the new president. Instead of him, Tansu Çiller was elected as the new head of DYP. Demirel’s presidency and Mrs. Çiller’s prime ministry signal certain changes in the Turkish political milieu. Demirel, a politician who has been overthrown by two military interventions in 1971 and 1980, became the

159. Hale, Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset, 238.
president of the state thus the commander-in-chief of the military. Hale defines this change as one of the signs of civilianisation within the regime. On the other hand, the prime ministry under Çiller as a Western and liberal woman was a turning point in a Muslim country. During all of these governments formed by ANAP, SHP and DYP, the political elites aimed at further democratizing the regime by decreasing the role of the civil bureaucracy, the president and the military. The power of the bureaucracy was curbed by economic liberalization, privatization and decentralization.

Another significant shift from the statist values was observed in Turkish foreign policy making. The Turkish foreign policy was conducted by the statist elites within the bureaucracy prior to Özal’s government. Özal sustained this trend in the initial years of the transition. He stayed distant with President Evren who willingly exerted influence over the foreign and security policies. Rather, Özal was concentrating on economic policies. As I explained above, Özal appointed technocrats in economic policies. He preferred to use the same strategy to empower the role of civilians in the foreign ministry. Therefore he appointed a new generation of younger, educated technocrats who were familiar with his dynamic and reformist approach. Moreover, Özal was skilled at adjusting the level of tensions between his government and the military. His rejection of the military’s candidate as the new chief of staff, in 1987, indicated his ability to assert the primacy of civilian control in politics. Later, Özal avoided the chief of staff in crucial diplomatic meetings with the chiefs of the other state. Then CGS, Necip Torumtay, had nothing to do but resign after Özal’s behaviour. These events proved that Özal’s overriding personal approach in Turkish foreign policy was being consolidated. When Özal lost his political power, he bequeathed a legacy of weakened foreign ministry which would lead to a weakening of Turkish foreign policy by the mid 1990s. Thus, as a result of the power vacuum within the foreign affairs, the military started to become more influential again by the mid-1990s. MGK’s advisory powers were helping the military to influence the foreign policy. In short, despite initial cautious behaviour of the Ö zal against the president, he gradually exerted civilians’ primacy in foreign policy making after 1987.

162. Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, (London: Hurst &Company, 2003), 52-68 and 75-9 for the military’s influence in foreign policy making.
3.5 A Brief Assessment of Transition to Democracy in Turkey

Transition to democracy in 1980s, started a new era in Turkish politics. Heper argues that before 1980 “the fate of the transition to democracy in Turkey rested upon the outcome of the conflict between the statist elites and the populist political elites. Whereas the former considered democracy as an end in itself- as a technique to find the best solution for the problems the country faced- and argued that Atatürkism should become the sole source for public policies, the latter tried to substitute national will for Atatürkism.”

Heper continues that this struggle appeared in the three military interventions where the statist solution prevailed or in the purely political formula where democracy was debilitated. Each solution attempted to establish a different sort of institutional monism in which either a self-appointed guardian or anti-statist, populist political elites controlled the centre. Rustow sees the post-1983 developments as releasing unprecedented social and political forces, including the rise of a new business class and a concerted attack on the entrenched etatist bureaucracy. Birtek argues that Turkish political institutions were on the verge of a possible radical restructuration that could lead to a new consensus, a new political grammar, and a new political discourse. By the end of the transition, a reasonable question could be raised as to whether a party-dominated democracy working in the absence of a public body, (which used to be the Atatürkist bureaucracy), could effectively protect public interest. The gradual replacement of state elites with political elites eventually contributed to the

164. Ibid, 19.
development toward an autonomous civil-society including Islamists, liberals, the new left, women etc. \footnote{168 Nilüfer Göle, “Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey” in \textit{Politics in the Third Turkish Republic}, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 222.}

Overall by the early 1990s, the institutional monism had been largely eroded; however, the expected level of pluralism was still not reached.

The problems of democratic consolidation remain and attract attention of numerous intellectuals, the international organisations and human rights activists. Özbudun argues that several factors including the elements of the 1982 Constitution, the role of the military, the party system and recently Political Islam and Kurdish Nationalism challenge the democratic consolidation in Turkey.\footnote{169 Ergun Özbudun, \textit{Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation} (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 1-13.}

Therefore, O’Donnell’s notion of “two transitions” is particularly useful for properly comprehending Turkish democracy since 1980s. He states that

“the first is the transition from the previous authoritarian regime to the installation of a democratic government. The second transition is from this government to the consolidation of democracy, or, in other words, to the effective functioning of a democratic regime. The second transition will not be any less arduous nor any less lengthy; the paths that lead from a democratic government to a democratic regime are uncertain and complex, and the possibilities of authoritarian regression are numerous.”\footnote{170 Guillerme O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes” in \textit{Issues in Democratic Consolidation}, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 18-24.}

Apparently, Turkish democracy could complete the first but the second transition. At the beginning of the 21st century, Turkey is struggling between democratic challenges from within the society and openings for democracy with unsteady pace in purpose of reaching a full-fledged liberal democracy.
CHAPTER 4
The Role of the Military in Transition to Democracy in Spain

In Chapter 2, I analyzed the transition to democracy in Spain by giving emphasis to both the sequential developments and the role of various institutions and actors during the process. As I mentioned, the transition in Spain sets a precedent in transition to democracy in 1980s with the level of agreement among the influential parties. In this milieu, the armed forces, as an important pillar of the Francoist society, found itself in a position where they had little room to maneuver. The military ultimately consented to the changes during the transition even though it voiced its firm preferences in advance. Those preferences were not open to discussion for the armed forces before the transition. However, the outcome of the transition was clearly unexpected by the bulk of the military officers.

As most of the researchers of civil-military relations complain, studying military as a component together with the other democratic institutions has been neglected by scholars. Stepan argues that the military is probably “the least studied of the factors involved in new democratic movements.”171 While the study of military was neglected within the theoretical approaches as a whole, it is not surprising to encounter only few studies focusing specifically on the role of military in the Spain’s transition to democracy, where military’s role was at a very low level because of the some important developments, especially the coalescence of the civilians.172 Nevertheless, in the last

171. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 8

172. Many prominent scholars agree that the democratization process in Spain is controlled by the political elites. It was a process of series of pacts and reforms initiated from above. Fred A. Lopez III, Bourgeois State and the Rise of Social Democracy in Spain in Transitions from Dictatorship to Democracy (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 1990), 17-73 ; Jose Maria Maravall, Transition to Democracy in Spain (London,
couple of decades different developments in Southern European and Latin American states indicated that the behavior of the militaries is not monolithic and it has significant influence over the transition to democracy. This chapter examines the role of the military in the Spanish transition to democracy during the late 1970s.

4.1 The Armed Forces in Franco’s Spain:

When the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s ended with the success of General Franco-led military and Catholic Church coalition, the features of the new political system were shaped in accordance with the winner side’s preferences and their post-Civil War influence. Later, the Francoist Spain was ruled by a three-pillared structure with military, the Falangists and the Catholic Church. The charismatic leadership of Franco, the caudillo, was the essential figure for the cohabitation of these actors during his reign. By the end of the regime, this coalition was dissolved by the Catholic Church’s abstention as explained in the previous chapters of this study. However, the cooperation of these institutions during the Civil War let them to voice their preferences in the Francoist political system. The detailed study of this three-pillared structure or the role of each of the institutions in the society is beyond the scope of this analysis. Nevertheless, the role of the military and the tools empowering its influence over the politics and the society deserve attention to understand the military’s preferences and strategies during the transition era.

The Spanish military had already been involved in politics since the 19th century when the political convulsions wracked the country of Spain. The country’s political history in 19th century involves civil wars and numerous colonial confrontations where

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military intervened according to its self-assumed roles such as guarding the state from internal conflicts and external enemies. Spanish politics has experienced 30 coups since 1850s. The military appeared as strong man in the national life of Spaniards with its roles during the country’s crises. Not surprisingly, the success of General Franco paved the way for the military to become one of the dominant forces in the Spanish politics following the Civil War. The Falange, as the single party, was an influential actor as well. However, differing from other dictatorships, the Spanish politics have never allowed the Falangists to dominate politics. Rather, the power rested in the government or the Council of Ministers in other terms. In the composition of the Council of Ministers, the military officers, the politicians and the technocrats were the three main categories. Especially in the initial years of the regime the number of the military officers was higher than the others, which decreased in the later periods and technocrats replaced them in their expertise posts. Military’s influence in the state was empowered by the appointments in the public administration which allowed dramatic increase in the number of bureaucrats compared with army personnel. This bureaucratic participation also affected the academic literature where most of the studies examined the Spanish military as a bureaucratic institution. In addition to the expansion in bureaucracy the occupational inheritance allowed independence on the organizational level to the military. By the help of these potentials, the military played an important role for the Spanish society in two ways; the budgetary and

178. See Ibid for details of ministerial elite in the Franco era.
normative. Military jurisdiction and compulsory military service empowered the normative role. The military was also allocated a large portion of the budget during the Franco’s rule. The percentage of the military spending on the overall national budget never remained below 20%. Military’s proportion in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was in reality lower than the neighboring European Countries. In addition, the military was, in comparison to those neighboring countries, poorly equipped. One important aspect in the allocation of budgetary resources was the high financial contribution to army in comparison to the navy and the air force. The distribution of resources among different branches of the armed forces implies that the threat was perceived from inside. Otherwise, it would be wise to finance the navy in a peninsula country. In addition to its role over the society, the military influenced the politics through important posts in the government, in the representative organ (Cortes) and association with the private and public companies.

To sum up, Franco’s own words define best the importance of the armed forces in the Franco’s authoritarian regime: “Much is said about the [Nationalist] Movement, trade unions, etc., but the reality is that the whole device is held together solely by Franco and the army.”

4.2 Civilianization of the Regime

The number of posts held in the council of ministers by the military officers had been declining simultaneously with the liberalization of the Franco since 1960s.

182. Ibid, 277.
183. Ibid, 283.
185. For the military, “any person or group that presumes to question the legitimacy of the particularly organizational form of domination is a threat.” Rafael Banon Martinez, “The Spanish Armed Forces During the Period of Political Transition” in Armed Forces and Society in Spain Past and Present ed. Rafael Banon Martines and Thomas M.Barker (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) , 314.
188. Francisco Franco Salgado Araujo, referred in Ibid, 249.
However; the manifestation of military political power remained relatively stable throughout the whole period of the Francoist system. The industrialization which naturally brought the liberalization of the political and economic rights required civilianization of the regime in 1960s. The civilianization of the regime is clearly indicated in the number of military bureaucrats and ministers in the government’s apparatus. The ministers with military origins formed 32.8% of the total number of ministers during the whole Franco regime. In comparison to authoritarian regimes in South America, the weight of the ministers with military origin is lower. However, the main reason of this average percentage is the civilianization in the last decade of the regime. While the percentage of the ministers in the first government in Francoist political system was 41.6%, that number dropped to 21% in the last cabinet appointed by the king Juan Carlos. Similar decline is also observed in the number of military parliamentarians as percentage of total number of parliamentarians in Spain’s Francoist Cortes. The percentage of the number of the military parliamentarians in the Cortes dropped from 19.1% in the 1943-46 Cortes to 11.3% in 1971-76. Despite the liberalization and modernization trends during the Franco regime which eventually led the civilianization of the political institutions, the armed forces was one of the institutions most resistant to the pressures of modernization and liberalization. Franco, himself, also avoided modernization of the Spanish armed forces, prevented any unpopular reform of the bureaucratic military structures. Though highly inefficient, seniority was the main principle in promotion. Agüero believes that this failure in democratization caused the military’s distance with the other elites for moving toward a consensus that occurred during the transition to democracy process.

Other than the cabinet and the national assembly, the military participated in the other major organs of state and regime such as the Council of the Realms, the National Council of the Movement, the National Defense Board, security agencies and local

189. Ibid, 298.
190. Ibid, 295.
191. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 46.
192. Ibid, 49.
193. Share, The Making of Spanish Democracy, 64.
194. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 10.
The military also had police functions either directly or indirectly by delegating them to separate military groups that employ the means of legitimized violence on a day-to-day basis by Guardia Civil (Civil Guard), and the State Security Bureau (Dirección General de Seguridad). Franco had already attempted to civilianize the regime to a certain extent immediately after his designation as the “Chief of the Government of the Spanish State” on September 1936 by la Junta de Defensa Nacional, (National Defense Junta) formed upon rebelling against the Republic in 1936. Franco took precaution against over-involving the armed forces through periodic changes of regional commands, removal of any potential political challengers, the use of promotions and retirements to isolate dissenters, and cooptation of dissident military figures into the government. Franco replaced la Junta de Defensa Nacional with Technical Junta and eventually with a regular cabinet of his government. Despite the big numbers of military officers within the Junta, the power rested in the hands of the Franco. His dominance was proved when military officers requested the revival of monarchic Spain in 1943. Franco declined the requests of the armed forces, because he simply believed that it was too early for the restoration of the monarchy. Franco’s rejection of this offer by the military officers’ received no opposition or faced any discontent from the officers. That was the only corporate attempt by the military during the Franco regime. The next would be after his death when the legalization of the Communist Party was a matter of discussion during the transition to democracy process. Therefore, while the armed forces exert significant political influence during the Franco regime owing to filling of key posts in the regime’s political institutions, the armed forces was neither the single decision-maker nor the dominant actor in the Spanish politics. In addition, according to the numbers of posts within important political institutions the Spanish politics had already been in civilianization trend in the demise of the regime.

195. Ibid, 50.
197. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 54.
199. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 55.
4.3 The Evaluation of the Armed Forces’ Role in the Transition

Franco’s illness had started the debates for the succession of the head of state. Blanco’s assassination left the prince Juan Carlos as the strongest candidate. Thus, as agreed by Franco and the armed forces in the final years of the Franco, Juan Carlos de Borbon was crowned King Juan Carlos I of Spain on November 22, 1975. His first declaration in favor of the National Movement and the armed forces increased popular support for his presidency.  

However, the succession of Franco was not the only matter of debate in Spanish politics. Many other political issues raised the tensions among the actors of the Spanish politics. The armed forces’ preferences were apparent prior to the transition process. The armed forces sought to protect its privileged position within the politics. In addition, they were against the legalization of the leftist Unions which would open the door for legal return of militant Communist and Socialists. Inherited from their civil war memories, the armed forces were firmly opposing the legalization of the Communist Party. Also, Spanish army as the staunch supporter of the national unity of Spain stood against the recognition of nationalities in the Constitution which would bring the autonomous nationalities, such as Basques and Catalans, back to the Spanish political arena.  

Other than these political concerns of the military, the armed forces also had an institutional consideration which is related to the democratic opening of the new government. The government’s proposed amnesty law would include former members of the UMD. Therefore, this amnesty law would mean the reincorporation of UMD members into the army. The military’s main concern was keeping the internal discipline.  

Pardoning previously expelled members of UMD would cause discontent of the remaining members of the army and would encourage the oppositions in the military.

200. Alba, Transition in Spain, 240.
201. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 92.
202. As noted earlier, the UMD was a clandestine organization within the military in favour of the democratic opening.
203. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 93.
When we analyze the influence of military only by considering the level of realization of these institutional preferences, we would find out that the military was unsuccessful in influencing the outcome except the amnesty law. The reasons for this ineffectiveness may be interpreted differently. However, the influence of the military on the determination of the agenda explicitly influences the post-authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the level of democracy in the post-transition would naturally be affected by the role of military in the transition. Agüero’s main argument asserts that:

“A transition controlled by a unified military conducting the authoritarian exit is likely to result in a new arrangement in which military prerogatives are larger than in a full-fledged unrestrained democracy. A civilian-controlled transition......is likely to lead to new, post authoritarian arrangement that starts out with fewer military prerogatives.”

Therefore the evaluation of the level of military’s influence or ineffectiveness during the Spanish transition provides insights for understanding the successful transition to democracy.

The military’s inability to influence the overall outcome rested on several factors. Agüero argues that those reasons were the dominance of civilians in setting the agenda for the transition which helped to pre-empt stronger military against democratization took place; military’s excessive and unfounded confidence in the influential elites’ (e.g. the king and Adolfo Suarez) commitment to Francoist credentials; and the high level of coalescence among the civilian elites which was empowered by the legitimate public support via referendums and elections. Zaverucha explains the military’s ineffectiveness by evaluating its autonomy during the transition process. Through testing the military prerogatives suggested by Stepan, he concludes that Spain’s success in achieving civilian control over the military was resulted from the developments in the transition.

The political reform plan was first announced in September 1976 by the president Adolfo Suarez. The legislation of the reform plan required the approval of the

204. Ibid, 38.
205. Ibid, 68-81.
206. Zaverucha, “The Degree of Military Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentina and Brazilian Transitions”: 283-299 ; See Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 93 for the military prerogatives.
Cortes. However, the approval of the political reform was almost equal to a “institutional suicide” by the corporatist Cortes. The armed forces’ and Francoist system’s participation to Cortes was noteworthy. Therefore, the Law for Political Reform needed to grant the approval of the Francoists as well. Before the voting of the law on September 10th, Suarez preferred to explain the reform process to the military staff. The reform process would set the elections for the new Congress prior to June 1977 and the newly elected Cortes would decide upon the issues such as the autonomy for the historic regions, trade union reform and other reforms. Suarez met the armed forces’ generals two days prior to the announcement of the political reform plan. The meeting concluded positively and military consented to the reform plan by voicing their reservations on the potential drawbacks for the national unity and the legalization of the Communist Party. However, the navy minister Veiga’s quote confirms that the military was confident enough for the realization of the reforms in coherence with Francoist legality.

The confidence of the military staff in the democratic reform process’ harmless conduct rests upon the service ministers within the cabinet and the king’s strength inherited from the Franco. Thus, as long as the important positions were filled by the Francoists the armed forces’ members felt no need to intervene into the democratic process.

The level of change in the Spanish politics and the confidence rested upon the Francoists within the government provide a confusing case. It is hard to explain how the military was incapable of influencing the rapid democratization process while holding important institutional power. Agüero believes that the level of democratization in


208. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 74.

209. Ibid, 75.

210. “My conscience is at peace, because democratic reforms will proceed from Francoist legality.” Ibid, 75.

211. Each military service was represented by a minister within the cabinet. Thus, there were three military ministers in the government.

212. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 77.
Spain was itself “democratization by surprise”. In fact, the democratization could only happen as a surprise to democracy, because the Franco’s regime had built complete institutional and constitutional structure. Thus the rupture with Franco’s system was not really a feasible alternative. A rupture in the regime could cause an involution or political repression. Thus, the elected Cortes would deal with the problems of stateness\(^{214}\) and economic crisis.\(^{215}\)

Therefore, we may deduce that despite the relatively significant position of the military in Spanish politics during the Franco era, or in the initial stages of the transition period, the outcome simply was not influenced by the armed forces. To a certain extent the civilianized character of the outgoing regime could explain this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is obvious that other factors existed during the Spanish transition which favored and facilitated the transition to democracy.

To understand the democratization took place, it is crucial to explain why the military did not react to the reforms effectively. The armed forces had exerted pressure on the intelligence services, thus they were able to receive information on political developments. During the Franco’s rule, there were eleven different intelligence agencies. Within the Stepan’s prerogatives, the control of the peak intelligence service constitutes an important one. Suarez’s initiatives aimed to curb the military’s influence over the intelligence service. Suarez attempted to create a central intelligence agency Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa (Superior Center of Defense Information-CESID) under civilian government. However, CESID started reporting to the armed forces instead of the government. Only after the first failed coup in February 1981, the full control of the CESID was given to the civilians. In the post-transition process, this tendency continued and parliament gained the upper hand in the civilian control over the intelligence flow.\(^{216}\)

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213. Ibid, 68.

214. “Stateness problem” is suggested by Linz and Stepan (1996), and they call a “stateness” problem when there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of citizenship in that state. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Transition to democracy and Consolidation*, (Baltimore : John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 16.


As an example to the contradictions between the armed forces and the reform process, the legalization of the non-official trade unions aligned with Communists and Socialists had raised doubts among the military officers about how far Suarez government’s democratization reforms could reach. Vice president Santiago resigned from his post and received support from the armed forces. Suarez appointed Lieutenant Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, army chief of staff to the vice presidency. Mellado was criticized within the armed forces because of his support for political and military reforms. Another example of the military’s ineffectiveness was the legalization of the Communist Party. The military firmly rejected the legalization of the Communist Party. But Suarez expected to legalize the party in order to increase the popular legitimacy of the prospective Cortes elections which would take place in June 1977. The crisis even led to resignation of the navy minister Veiga. The armed forces prevented further resignation of the other military ministers in the cabinet in purpose of avoiding Suarez to appoint civilians to the cabinet which would totally pacify the military within the cabinet. Instead, the military issued a strong statement reminding his duties regarding the unity of Spain, the crown and the flag. The Communist Party, in response, issued a conciliatory statement in their first press conference with the leaders appeared surrounded by the Spanish flag and pledged not to oppose the monarchy or the unity of Spain. The legalization of the Communist Party contributed to political pluralism but obviously decreased the level of confidence between the military and rest of the political actors in the Spanish political system. This lack of confidence would stimulate the military to become more proactive and attempt to become aware of the secret agenda of the civilians prior to the realization of the reforms. In addition, that was a signal to the military that even they declare their rejection as a corporate they might not affect the outcome in a favorable way. While the military faced such difficulties in a regime where the formulation of the political institutions is in favor of itself, the newly elected institutions could present major challenges to the military’s interests. With this experience in failure to pursue corporate interests, the military acted in solidarity against

217. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 80.
218. The navy was the most harmed service within the military during the Civil War by the Republicans. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 82.
219. Ibid, 84-5.
the amnesty law that could include the UMD members. The military voiced their concerns prior to the decision this time and the Congress acknowledged them. The level of consensus in the army around this issue prevented the civilians to confront military in that manner for the next decade on the amnesty of UMD members. Thus, even though the Cortes was democratically elected, and the Spanish politics witnessed a free and competitive election including previously suspended parties, the influence of the military remained at a certain extent. Therefore, the most important part of the new Cortes’ agenda, the new constitution, would start under this contest among the parties in the Spanish politics.

The issues within the constitutional debates included highly contradictory elements such as the recognition of the autonomy of the nationalities, the place of the church or the prerogatives of the monarchy. The military was represented with a single defense minister in the cabinet. In addition, the constitutional committee in the Cortes was unwilling to discuss the issues with it. Therefore, the military could not possess enough leverage in the constitution making to enforce its preferences. However, the military was not totally marginalized. While ETA members were causing the military discontent in order to realize their expectations, the military was insistent on the unity of Spain. Therefore Article 2 in the constitution added the “indissoluble unit of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards.” to the recognition of right to autonomy of the nationalities.

All of these events occurred during the transition process indicate that the military abstained from intervention into the politics even though crucial issues were at stake. Only exception to this fact was the uncovering of a major coup plot led by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero and Captain Ricardo Saenz de Ynesterillas in the fall of 1978. The conspirators were arrested but the punishments were less harsh than expected. However, that never implies that military had internalized returning to the barracks. Because the later coup attempt in the consolidation process showed that, the military in

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220. Ibid, 86.
221. Ibid, 87.
222. Ministry of Defense was established in July 1977. The three ministries were replaced with a Single Defense Ministry.
223. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 89.
fact considered a military rule as an alternative to civilian government. Thus, it is a question why the armed forces haven’t intervened into politics, for example amid the legalization of the Communist Party or the recognition of the nationalities. Agüero argues that the military instead opted for the least harmful choice rather than its preferred position in those cases.\textsuperscript{225} Both a military takeover and the resignation of the defense minister would be the alternatives for the military. However, both would have drawbacks as well. If the defense minister resigned, then the government could appoint a civilian which would totally exclude the military from the transition agenda. The second option, the military takeover, would deteriorate the relationship between the king and the military. The existence of monarchy was more than a heritage of Franco; it also meant the continuation of the respect for the Francoist institutions to which the king has shown utmost respect since his reign started. Hence, we may find out that the military acted rationally in those manners to become the influential actor again in the Spanish politics without an aggressive move that would attract discontent from within the society and international society. The elections had just been held, and the removal of the elected bodies would decrease the popular legitimacy of the Spanish military’s plans.

The high level of unity among political elites was another characteristic of the Spanish transition among other transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe. Frequent resort to public support through referendums and elections always became the instruments for the high level of public support for the reforms. The turnout in the referendums were relatively high and the “yes” votes dominated the “no” votes. In the Cortes elections, the centre parties UCD and PSOE were supported instead of the extremist parties. Other than this mass level support, the Moncloa Pact, the attitude of press in favor of the reform process supported the government and discouraged the military to intervene.\textsuperscript{226} The risks were perceived as higher than the potential benefits; hence military abstained from a takeover. Then what has changed from these years to the time when the military attempted a coup by Captain Tejero and Guardia Civil. The motives behind the coup would explain the rationale of the military initiators. The coup was planned to start in Cortes and the image of Tejero reflected in the TV would initiate

\textsuperscript{225} Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 93.

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid, 97.
the other officers to conduct the rest of the coup plan in other regions. One of these officers was captain general of Valencia, Milans Del Bosch. Del Bosch implemented the plan in Valencia, yet as a result of several factors explained in this study, the coup attempt failed. The coup attempters mainly mentioned the unity of Spain and the importance of the king. Nevertheless, the official investigations following the coup attempt reached various findings about the goal of the attempters. According to these findings, one scenario suggests that the coup makers might have been hard-liners within the military who were inspired by the 1980 coup in Turkey which replaced democracy and its major accomplishments. The other scenario suggests that the attempters were the retired lieutenant generals who sought to establish a military junta in favor of the monarchy. The third scenario included the continuity of the parliamentary monarchy but limit the excesses of the process of state decentralization, to harden the counterterrorist struggle and to enhance the institutional position of the armed forces. These differences in objectives were a major setback for the success of the coup. The internal divisions within the military caused a failure.

Agüero also argues that the military’s internal disunity caused the ineffectiveness in the transition process. The UMD crisis had already proven that the Spanish military was not a monolithic institution. The expelling of UMD members strengthened to internal unity nevertheless, at the time of the transition three groups within the military prevailed. Agüero categorizes these groups as the hard-liners, conservatives and the liberals according to their tolerance to the limits of transformation and their eagerness to exert influence if the outcome is different than they expected. Conservatives were tolerant for the transformation as long as the role of the military is preserved and the autonomy of the regions was not provided. The internal disunity of the military contributed to the transition for two important reasons: Firstly, the military hardly formed a stance in order to pressure the government for the reform plans, secondly the

227. Ibid, 163.
229. Ibid, 103.
230. Ibid, 106.
government always found liberals within the army to appoint them to important posts at the time of liberalization and modernization.231

4.4 Consolidation of Democracy

Even though the transition to democracy was completed with the passing of Law for Political Reform in 1977, completion of first democratic elections and the making of new Constitution, the role of military in Spanish politics were not eradicated. For example, Article 8 of the new Constitution reveals that the armed forces are comprised of “army, navy and air force”. This definition only excludes the “Public Order Forces” character of the armed forces defined by the previous Organic Law of State.232 This was partly related to demilitarization of the police. Demilitarization of the police was one other important aspect of civilian supremacy over the military. During the Franco era, Public Order Forces had a military character by virtue of their juridical definition and organic dependence. The general staff of the Guardia Civil was drawn from army cadres. In short, public order was a function of military men under Franco. The armed forces of that period were composed not only of army, navy and air force, but also included the agencies of public security. Thus, militarization of the police had been a permanent characteristic of the Spanish constitutional system.233 The old agents of repression had to be transformed into the guardians of the democracy. Firstly, 1978 Constitution separated police forces from the military and established Fuerzos y Cuerpos de Seguridad (Security Bodies and Forces). Suarez renamed the Policia Armada (Armed Police) as the Policia Nacional (National Police). PSOE leader Felipe Gonzales’ government urged the training of the police in their own academies. The Guardia Civil was subordinated to the Interior Ministry in peace time, and to the Defense of Ministry. In 1986, a civilian was appointed to head the Guardia Civil for the first time in the last 150 years.234 In addition to tendency to demilitarization of the

231. Liberal officers appointed to the important posts were Mellado as the national defense minister and Cassinello as the head of the intelligence service. Ibid, 125.

232. Felipe Agüero, “La constitucion y las fuerzas armadas en algunos paises de America del Sur y Espana” (Constitution and the armed forces in different South American states and Spain), Revista de Ciencia Politica 8, no 1-2 (1986): 116


police, Article 8 states that the armed forces were charged with the protection of the constitutional order of democratic Spain instead of the institutional order of the Francoist state.\textsuperscript{235} The armed forces’ failure to influence the transition process is not tantamount to its disappearance from the political arena. Instead, exclusion of the military from the elite consensus that characterized the Spanish transition presented the military as the most potent threat to the democracy.\textsuperscript{236} Apparently, Spanish military as a whole could not offer a democratic alternative as Portuguese military did.\textsuperscript{237} Therefore, curtailing the assertiveness of Spanish military was a prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy. Various Constitutional changes during the transition even enhanced the military’s actual power. For example the establishment of Joint Chiefs provided the collective voice the military had previously lacked.\textsuperscript{238}

The transition was not capable to solve all the divisive issues in the society. The implementation of transformed norms and institutions remained pending. The judiciary system, the system of autonomies and the role of the military in the post-transition were left to be determined by organic laws.\textsuperscript{239} One important aspect of civilian supremacy is the military personnel’s judgment by the civilian courts. 1978 Constitution established the principle of single jurisdiction for both civilian and military offences. The Organic Laws 12 and 13 in 1985 regulated the Military Penal Code and determined that involvement in a coup or lack of respect for civilian authorities would bring the officers into the civilian court.\textsuperscript{240}

The new openings in the regime in favor of the recognition of autonomous nationalities raised the tensions between the military and the government. The military was critical of vice-president Mellado and his alignment with the reformists. Thus even

\textsuperscript{235} Agüero, “La constitucion y las fuerzas armadas en algunos paises de America del Sur y Espana”, 116.

\textsuperscript{236} Agüero, \textit{Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective}, 139.


\textsuperscript{238} Agüero, \textit{Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective}, 136.

\textsuperscript{239} Ibid, 137.

\textsuperscript{240} Zaverucha, “The Degree of Military Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentina and Brazilian Transitions”, 295 ; also see Jesus Valenciana Almoyna, “La reforma de la justicia militaren espana durante la transicion” (The Reform of Military Justice during the Transition) \textit{Revista de Investigaciones Sociologicas} 36, (1986): 141-152.
the appointment of the chief of staff led to a crisis between the government and the military. While the constitutional amendments were being made for autonomous regions, the numbers of ETA activities increased. Military perceived the tension between territorial autonomy and terrorism as a trend toward regional independence and national disintegration. ETA’s main goal was separatism and not autonomy. Especially the assassination of the Madrid’s military governor by ETA and increasing the attacks against the military officers stimulated public protests in the funerals which called for empowering the army. On these occasions, despite the deaths of military officers and the inevitable difficulties of creating Spain’s quasi-federal state, none of the important statewide interest groups of parties engaged in blaming democratization. The military’s discontent for the civilian-led reforms was displayed when the mid-level officers in charge of planning an operation to capture the cabinet in the Moncloa Palace were arrested. The softness of the punishment for the interventionist in comparison to indiscipline within the armed forces by UMD members proves that the military tolerated the attempts for political intervention but the internal indiscipline. The increasing terrorist attempts and public protests in the funerals encouraged hard-liners to regroup within the armed forces to avoid the threats to the mission and institution of the armed forces. The military intervention started to be discussed among the military members following the unavoidable speed of the reforms and increasing ETA activities. Therefore, both the military men involved in the abortive coup d’etat of February 23, 1981 and Manifesto of the Hundred were sharing the perception that the national unity of Spain was under threat by the tendency toward autonomous independence.

241. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 141.
244. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Transition to democracy and Consolidation, 99.
245. Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 142.
246. A statement on 6th December 1981 by officers attached to both armed forces and police units that inveighed against civil subordination and freedom of expression.
In addition to unrest in the military, the military retained its strength in the political system by the creation of Joint Chiefs. The creation of a defense ministry instead of three military ministers in the cabinet was an attempt to decrease the efficiency of the military.\(^{248}\) Suarez established the first ministry of defense in July 1977. He appointed Mellado as the defense minister of the cabinet. Mellado was a liberal within the armed forces. The military was critical of his reformist attitude undermining the concerns of the armed forces. Mellado has been the only minister of defense with military origin. In 1978, Suarez appointed a civilian, Augustin Rodriguez Sahagun.\(^{249}\) Another important variable an effective transition to defense ministry was the number of educated civilians for defense studies. Franco’s Spain had already educated certain numbers of civilians within the CESEDEN (Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional - Centre of Higher National Defense Studies) The percentage of civilians in the higher military studies was more than the percentage of each branches of the armed forces in the later years of Franco.\(^{250}\)

However, creation of the defense ministry and appointing a civilian was not sufficient to subordinate military to the civilians. Newly established Joint Chiefs’ importance increased. In contrast to other transitions in southern Europe, the military in Spain remained institutionally intact \(^{251}\) and resurfaced with renewed vigor to press its corporate claims.\(^{252}\) Surprisingly, instead of weakening of military in the government after the transition, the slowness of modernization and the blocking of reincorporation of UMD members and assertiveness of the hard-liners prove this argument.\(^{253}\) Besides the discontent within the army for the government, the ruling party had also internal


\(^{249}\) Zaverucha, “The Degree of Military Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentina and Brazilian Transitions”, 289 ; Defence minister Sahagun contributed to the discussion with an article titled “La reforma Militar de los Gobiernos de Suarez” (Military Reforms of Suarez Government) Revista de Investigaciones Sociologicas 36, (1986): 189-194.

\(^{250}\) Martinez, “The Spanish Armed Forces During the Period of Political Transition”, 321.

\(^{251}\) Share, The Making of Spanish Democracy, 169.

\(^{252}\) Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, 152.

\(^{253}\) Ibid, 153.
problems and public support for UCD was declining. Suarez’s resignation followed this crisis.

Even though the transition was not under military’s control, the fear of a coup d’état was limiting the democratization.254 The military’s influence in politics continued until the failed coup attempt in February 1981. The civilian supremacy of the regime was not attained by the transition to democracy. Military’s resistance for change was transformed into assertiveness as a response to increasing ETA activities.255 King Juan Carlos supported and encouraged military to fight against the separatists. King’s backing was perceived by the military as a support for military’s role in politics. That caused military to miscalculate King’s actual support for the military.256 Suarez’s reforms had reached beyond the expectations of military; therefore military’s support for Suarez’s democratization project was declining. Vilanova’s findings indicate that the percentage of officers hostile to democracy in 1983 were more than it was in 1975 when many soldiers accepted the idea of peaceful, gradual change and under the King’s direction.257 Thus on the day of the election of the new presidency, Colonel Tejero occupied the Cortes with heavily armed Guardia Civil. However, the armed forces did not receive the support they expected from the king and from the public. Moreover, the hard-liners had no plan for the governance and could not avoid deep divisions within themselves. The officers who attempted the coup were sentenced to prison and expelled from the armed forces.258 The failed coup attempt was followed by the first ever


government without military participation since 1939 by Calvo Sotelo. \textsuperscript{259} Share finds the failure of the coup as an encouragement for democracy even though it implied the fragility of the democracy as well.\textsuperscript{260} Majority of the Spanish Political elite, from right to left, had criticized the coup attempt unambiguously. That signals that unity among political elites supporting for democratic rule constituted the ultimate protection for democracy.\textsuperscript{261} Maravall, in his analysis of public opinion during the transition to democracy, states that only 4 percent of the Spaniards were in favor of the coup and 76 percent was against it. Moreover, 47\% stated that if the coup had been successful they would have come to the defense of democracy. This tendency was a much bigger trend in France when rumors of army intervention spread in 1968. Only 9\% of the French people claimed their support for democracy following a coup.\textsuperscript{262}

Following this failed coup attempt, the elections were held in 1982, and resulted with the success of the PSOE. As expected from the Socialists, they presented strong commitment to the civilian supremacy. They invigorated the defense and military reform. PSOE opted for NATO membership which facilitated the reforms for the defense sector. Military has started becoming central defense structure instead of a political institution.\textsuperscript{263} The Socialist Government guaranteed the civilian supremacy in the second term of its government. The appointment of the former health minister as the defense minister signals the supremacy of the civilians over the military in 1991.

Within the new formulation of democratically elected Cortes less military members than ever existed. Only the appointed members of the military by the king could enter into Cortes, which was supposed to initiate the drafting of the new Constitution. Also, creation of the single defense ministry in 1977 had decreased the physical attendance of the military in the cabinet. Former Francoists in the government were pushing for the reform process. The military, even though a little late, realized that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{259} Zaverucha, “The Degree of Military Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentina and Brazilian Transitions”, 289.
\item \textsuperscript{260} Maravall, \textit{Transition to Democracy in Spain}, 68. Maravall argues that the military coup was one of the determinants of the fragility of democracy in Spain; Share, \textit{The Making of Spanish Democracy}, 172 agrees but still sees the failure as an encouragement.
\item \textsuperscript{261} Share, \textit{The Making of Spanish Democracy}, 173.
\item \textsuperscript{262} Maravall, \textit{Transition to Democracy in Spain}, 98.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Agüero, \textit{Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective}, 211.
\end{itemize}
only direct and non-legally prescribe pressure could protect its interests and preferences.\(^{264}\)

The Cortes’ supremacy over the government and the military was attained by Organic Law 6 approved in July 1980. The law allows the regulation of the national defense and military organization by the Cortes. Another Law approved in June 1981 allocated the sole right of appointing or dismissing the military authorities to uphold the order. The supremacy of Parliament was finally guaranteed in 1984 by increasing the Prime Minister and Cortes’ authority in declaring war and debating the general lines of defense policy. In accordance, the defense minister would only be able to perform the tasks of the Prime Minister on defense and military policy with the authorization of the Prime Minister. Parliament was given the authority to approve defense laws and budgets and promotions in the military structure.\(^{265}\) As a result of the civilian supremacy, the parliament decides whether the military would intervene or not and military has no control over the specific areas of economic activity.\(^{266}\)

In conclusion, the transition through agreement among civilians avoided the armed forces to become influential during the process. The necessary reforms were made, and the civilians’ confidence in the sustainability of democracy increased. However, the consolidation was delayed until the failed coup attempt of the armed forces in February 1981 and PSOE’s commitment to civilian supremacy and democratization following their election victory in 1982. The 1982 elections, with a high voting turnout (around 80%), was interpreted as a real plebiscite in favor of democracy.\(^{267}\) That increased the confidence and legitimacy of the PSOE government. Nevertheless, as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue the failed coup attempt and the supportive reaction from within the military and the society to the imprisonment of leaders of coup attempt was crucial for the consolidation of democracy in Spain. Otherwise, as they suggest, the oppositions within the military might have continued to challenge the Spanish transition to democracy.\(^{268}\)

\(^{264}\) Ibid, 79.
\(^{265}\) Ibid, 291.
\(^{266}\) Ibid, 298.
\(^{267}\) Maravall and Santamaria, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy”, 98.
\(^{268}\) Linz and Stepan, Problems of Transition to democracy and Consolidation, 108.
CHAPTER 5

The Role of the Military in Transition to Democracy in Turkey

The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Turkey took place after the military rule in 1980-83. As I explained in Chapter 3, the Turkish military intervened to suppress the rising political violence and prevent further political instability. The political elite, namely the major political parties, failed to overcome the problems of the country. Dissoluble coalition governments, societal cleavages, left-right clashes in the public spaces, and populist public policies characterized the Turkish Politics in late 1970s. The deadlock in the 1980 presidential elections confirmed that civilians were no longer able to cooperate in political matters; instead their rivalry contributed to an escalation of the crisis. The Turkish military, according to the Internal Service Act \(^{269}\), was in charge of protecting and guarding the Republic of Turkey formed by the Constitution. In accordance with this legal basis, the military undertook the governmental powers on 12\(^{th}\) of September. In the early days of the coup, General Evren promised a transformation back to the democratic principles as soon as the political environment reached the desired level. In other words, the military junta did not consider remaining in power too long.\(^{270}\) Transition from authoritarian to civilian rule was initiated and controlled by the military. MGK initiated a political liberalization with restrictions on political participation; later by the efforts of civilian political elite the redemocratization followed the political participation.


\(^{261}\) Kenan Evren’s statement to the Turkish People on 12\(^{th}\) of September, referred in MGK, 12 September in Turkey: Before and After (Ongun Kardeşler: Ankara, 1982), 231.
The first elections following the military rule were held in 1983, by excluding the prominent political parties and their leaders of 1970s. In the absence of these political parties and with MGK’s authority of conclusive approval of new party applications the military was unrivaled at the outset of the transition process.

The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Turkey was rather a process of reform than a rupture with the past. The reform mode of transition is characterized by a transition process which is initiated and controlled by the authoritarian power holders.\textsuperscript{271} In general, transition through reform allows the authoritarian power holders to determine the conditions of releasing their power in the government and obtaining \textit{exit guarantees} in the new democratic political order.\textsuperscript{272} In accordance with these theories, the Turkish military could take its place within new institutional design of the political system and exert political influence, albeit limited, in the post-military rule years.\textsuperscript{273} Transition to democracy in Turkey presented different outcomes than the military’s initial expectations. The desired political stability for economic and political recover was only achieved during the first decade after the military rule, and eventually the fragmentation in political party system led to rise of political Islam in mid 1990s.

The military held a significant degree of autonomy in state affairs due to the 1971 and 1973 constitutional amendments.\textsuperscript{274} Nonetheless, the military’s autonomy

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{271} Samuel P. Huntington, \textit{Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century} (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 124 - 142.
\bibitem{274} This autonomy includes exemption of the military from the audition by the Court of Accounts (Article 127); creation of Supreme Military Administrative Court charged with judicial review of administrative acts and actions involving military personnel, thus exempting the military from review by the civilian administrative court (Article 140); allowing military martial law courts to try cases involving crimes committed at most three months prior to the declaration of a state of siege and to continue such trials until the end, and even after termination, of the state of siege (Article 32 and Transitory Article 21); establishing mixed courts composed of civilian and military judges (State Security Courts) to deal with crimes against the security of the state.
\end{thebibliography}
in Turkish Politics has become more sensible after the 1982 constitution. Cizre-Sakalloğlu argues that the absence of any alternative power preserving the status quo and the lack of pact-making culture in Turkish Politics left the military unchallenged even after the civilianization of the regime.\(^{275}\) Additionally, the military rule bequeathed a legacy, the 1982 constitution, including political prerogatives and judicial exemptions for the military.\(^{276}\) The civilianization of the regime after the military rule started earlier than expected, but Turkey is still distant from achieving civilian supremacy over the military, a desirable condition in a liberal democracy.\(^{277}\)

### 5.1 The Military’s Reluctance to Remain in Power

The military rule in 1980-83, as I explained in Chapter 3, immediately responded to two major challenges of Turkey, namely the rising political violence and worsening economic situation. Despite this relative success, the military abstained from remaining in power. Instead, as Evren promised in the first press conference following the coup, the military returned to its barracks and transferred its

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276. For example the military was exempted from the oversight of State Supervisory Council (Article 108). Supreme Military Council is a body composed of four-star generals and admirals and charged with the important task of making final decisions concerning the promotion and retirement of top military personnel (Article 125) Other than this, the decision of the Supreme Military Council was made unavailable to be appealed. In addition to these, The Law on the State of Siege stated that no judicial appeals could be made before administrative or civil law courts against decision of martial law commanders. See Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, 112.

277. Turkey has been criticized for the influence of military within the politics by the European Union’s progress reports. Especially these critics have risen after Turkey was officially announced as candidate for full membership. For example see European Union, *Turkey 2006 Progress Report* available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/Nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf (accessed on July 12, 2007) and also see Wim van Eekelen, “Turkish Civil-Military Relations and the EU: Preparation for Continuing Convergence” *Final Expert Report*, (November 2005) available at: www.cess.org, (accessed on June 1, 2007) for a discussion of the evolution of civil-military relations towards the democratic standards.
powers to an elected civilian cabinet and a strengthened president. Therefore, rather than staying in power the military mainly aimed to restructure the political system and revamp the party system so that the mistakes of the past would not be repeated. The reluctance of generals to stay in power can be explained by several reasons.

First, the military preferred to act in accordance with Atatürkist legacy. During the early republican years, a constitutional principle which regulated the soldiers’ legal participation in politics had been adopted. According to the rule “no person may be a deputy and hold office under the Government at the same time.” This law was strictly obeyed until the 1960 military intervention. Therefore, staying out of politics was an Atatürkist legacy to which the commitment of the Turkish military is well known. However, the military rule in 1960-61 and 1980-83 indicates that the legacy only influenced the soldiers to a limited extent. Simply, Atatürkist legacy was not adequate to explain the generals’ reluctance to stay in power.

Second, Turkey’s international commitments played a role in returning the country to democratic rule. Turkey was a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Council of Europe. Turkey had been immediately suspended from the membership of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe after the coup d’état. In addition, Turkey had signed an Association Agreement with the European Community which was intended to lead to full membership. Turkish government required to reach European standards of democracy to obtain EC membership. The Turkish Military was committed to maintaining ties with the West, and therefore took seriously the Western views presented through trade unions, human rights organizations, and politicians in the European Parliament. Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue that Turkey returned to democratic rule because of the international pressure. It is fair, however, to claim that

278. General Evren’s Press Conference on 16th of September referred in MGK, 12 September in Turkey: Before and After, 290-300.


280. Article 23 of the 1924 Constitution.
the military junta was not ignorant of the expectations of their international allies.  
Evren’s press conferences mentioned numerous times the virtues of democracy and the
Turkish military’s commitment to it. Evren also stated that they would be committed to the United Nations charter, NATO responsibilities and good relationships with any organization composed of democratic member countries, particularly the European Economic Community and the Council of Europe.  
Third, the 1980 intervention was not the first military takeover in contemporary Turkish Politics. The military, therefore, acted in accordance with the lessons derived from past experiences. The Turkish military attached importance to its institutional unity and hierarchical order. Indeed, Evren attempted to prevent the minor members from participating in the coup to firm the hierarchy within the institution. Evren’s warning to young officers to stay out of politics seems contradictory, but it had a rationale. The reasoning behind this approach was the internal discipline and hierarchical order of the armed forces were crucial for empowering the military and thus for guarding the regime. This was necessary to prevent young and radical officers from attempting a coup within a coup. Evren frequently visited the troops to convince them to support for MGK’s actions. Nevertheless, despite all these precautions, the top commanders were aware that interventions would have adverse

282. MGK, 12 September in Turkey: Before and After, 299.
283. Evren, in his speech to War Academy on September 30th 1982, gives the example of Balkan Wars during the Young Turks period. Evren states that the major reason of loss in the war was the deterioration of discipline within the military. Also, during the 1960-61 military rule, there existed strong disagreement within the Milli Birlik Komitesi (National Unity Committee). Some middle-rank officers, known as “the fourteens” attempted a coup within a coup. See Hale, “Transitions to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective”, 165-6.
285. Hale, Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset, 213.
effects on the military’s professionalism and combat effectiveness. In order to firm
the hierarchical decision-making, MGK took control of the state, and Chief of
General Staff (CGS) Evren became the head of the state with his four force
commanders. Evren agreed with these commanders not to make separate statements
on political matters. The concentration of the power at the top level facilitated the
decision to return to civilian rule. The risk of ideological polarization or
 politicization of the forces is correlated to the length of the stay in power. In
accordance with these reasons, the military aimed to restructure the political system
to prevent future crises dragging the military into politics. Only then, the military
becomes able to improve its operational capability to defend the Republic from
internal and external threats.

5.2 The Military’s Strategy for Transition

Political and economic decay were undeniable by the end of the 1970s. Therefore, the military had a chance to preplan the involvement in detail. This plan
included the details of the intervention and later the details of the new political
system. As a result of this necessity, the military seemed to have determined the
basic constitutional principles that would be enacted, the type of institutions that
would be established, and the division of labor between the “state” and the

287. İlter Turan “Cyclical Democracy: The Turkish Case” (paper delivered at the
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 11-14 April
1984) referred in Metin Heper, “Trials and Tribulations of Democracy in the Third
Turkish Republic” in Politics of Third Turkish Republic, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet

164.

289. Ibid, 165 ; Heper, “Trials and Tribulations of Democracy in the Third Turkish
Republic”, 232.

290. According to Birand, the individual officers’ responsibilities during the takeover
and after were planned in detail. Mehmet Ali Birand, 12 Eylül: Saat 04.00 (General’s
Coup in Turkey, an Inside Story of September 12), (İstanbul: Karacan Press, 1986), 225-
233.
government, and the sort of mechanisms that would be needed to ensure smooth functioning after the return to civilian rule.291

The Turkish Military, since the early Republican era, had been identified with statist political elites, particularly the CHP, until the 1971 memorandum. Karpat argues that 1971 memorandum revealed the process of alienation because it exposed the divergence of opinions on social classes, Atatürk, nationalism, secularism and reformism. CHP, under the leadership of Ecevit, attempted to transform itself into a truly socialist party, and rejected the concept of nation-state and nationality. 292 One major confrontation between civilians and the military in 1970s during the presidential election in 1973, which prevented the election of the candidate, Cemal Gürler, favored by the military, instead ended with a civilian compromise between AP and CHP on the election of another candidate, Fahri Korutürk. The election of Korutürk represented a shift in the relative weights of the civilians and soldiers. 293 The presidential election was the first major confrontation of the civilians since the military rule in 1960-61. Following this sign of civilian supremacy over the military, CHP and AP assumed that civilians became strong enough to avoid the military influence in the politics. 294 The dissolution of the alliance between the military and the various civilian statist groups continued until 1980 coup. Ultimately, military intervention in 1980 differed from the earlier examples by its non-partisan character. Karpat argues that, this character increased the popular support towards military junta. The coup marked a new period of modernization with “division of labor” between the state and the government. 295 Most probably, the alienation between the political elite and the military necessitated this division of labor. The bureaucracy

and the intelligentsia were also divided as a result of the turbulence in the country. Instead of the political elite familiar with the military, a strong president would represent the state and protect its interests in the post-1983 years.

With all these existing variables, MGK determined a strategy of political liberalization rather than an immediate democratization. According to the military, political parties were responsible for the crisis in the 1970s. Political parties, instead of responding to the needs of the society, weakened the state, divided the citizenry and promoted enmity among them. The minor parties (MHP and MSP) used their seats in the parliament as a political leverage to impose their radical preferences on the policies of the major ones (AP and CHP) who were strongly in need of a coalition partner because of their obstinate competition. Evren, almost in every occasion, blamed the oligarchic structure and the leaders of the political parties who failed to avoid the country from corruption and political violence.

Nevertheless, MGK was still in favor of appointing a civilian cabinet subordinate to MGK. Firstly, they asked Turhan Feyzioglu to preside over the cabinet. Feyzioglu conditioned this offer to the inclusion of major parties’ (AP and CHP) moderate members within the cabinet. Inclusion of moderate members of AP and CHP would correspond to MGK’s demands as well. MGK expected to increase popular legitimacy of the cabinet through these civilian members. However, the moderates of AP and CHP declined to participate in a cabinet subordinate to MGK. The members’ attachment to their party leaders in custody prevented them from joining the cabinet. Thus, MGK lost patience and their remaining confidence in the civilians. Delaying the formation of the cabinet could lead to chaos. Therefore, ex-Admiral Bülend Ulusu was given the authority to form a cabinet. The new cabinet

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298. Evren’s memoirs support this claim in Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları (Kenan Evren’s memoirs) vol.1 (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1990), 525-6
299. Feyzioglu was the leader of the Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Reliance Party - CGP) which had 4 seats in the parliament. CGP was a party seperated from within the CHP.
with twenty-seven members, including six retired generals and neutral bureaucrats and academics, was announced in September 21st.  

The disagreement over the formation of the cabinet indicated that cooperation between military and political elites is unlikely. Also, the formation of an alternative cabinet proves that the military was able to adopt a new strategy when the plan proceeded unpredictably. The military immediately picked its second choice and formed a cabinet with non-political actors and former generals.

MGK’s main objective for the post-coup period was establishing a political system which would bring stability to the regime, so that they would not have to intervene into politics. From these early experiences of military rule with existing political parties’ reluctance to cooperate with military junta, MGK deduced that only centrist parties with prevailing Atatürkist ideology would bring stability to the regime. Furthermore, they believed that the new consultative assembly in charge of drafting the constitution should be free of old and failed politicians. Only then, the legal foundations of the new political system; namely the Constitution, Political Parties Law and Election Law would be drafted without the politicians who were blamed for being too entrenched in their political positions to reflect popular will.

Consequently, the military determined an ambitious project that aimed at transforming the institutional pillars of Turkish Politics and revamping the traditional political party system. The military’s project involved prohibition of all existing parties and banning their leaders from political activity for five to ten years. They aimed to promote a new centrist party with close ties to the military and to rewrite the legal, constitutional, and electoral rules governing the Turkish political system. The military also believed that democratic political stability in Turkey required the establishment of a new party system that would be based on two moderate, centrist parties and exclude the extremist parties of the radical left, ultranationalist right, and Islamic fundamentalism. The new party system with changes in electoral system towards a majoritarian system instead of proportional one would pave the way for a single party government ensuing democratic stability.

301. Bülend Ulusu had retired from Commander of the Naval Forces a month ago.
With all these purposes in mind, political parties of the pre-coup period were immediately banned from political activities on September 12th. However, they were not dissolved until October 1981. Although the military lost confidence in pre-existing political parties which led the country into political, economic and social crises, they were looking for a gradual transition to new party system. Instead of the political parties as a whole, the leaders of the parties received harsher treatment. For example, Erbakan (MSP) and Türkeş (MHP) were arrested in 1981; Ecevit (CHP) and Demirel (AP) were both held in custody for a month. Demirel remained silent following his release; however Ecevit attempted to exert influence in the Turkish politics as an editor of a journal, Arayış (Search), and gave interviews to foreign newspapers and broadcasting organizations. Both Demirel and Ecevit continued to influence their party members. These endless endeavors of political leaders to remain in the politics tempted the military to the idea of a complete restructuring of the political party system. Then, a provisional article in 1982 Constitution stated that the major staff of the political parties would stay out of politics for a considerably long time.

At this point, the military’s hesitation regarding the party system reveals that, the military was in favor of continuity with existing parties through appointing their moderate members in the cabinet. The end result was total closure of the parties in October 1981. Hence, we may argue that the military’s plans over the party system changed according to the developments during the military rule. The political party members’ reluctance to cooperate with MGK rule caused the military to become harsher against the political parties. Moreover, the political parties’ continuous efforts to appeal to the masses with remarks criticizing the implementations of the military junta convinced the military that establishing a stable political system was not possible with the existence of these parties and their leaders. Finally, the


306. Provisional Article 4: “the Chairmen, General Secretaries and other senior office holders in the former political parties could not form join or have any kinds of relations with future political parties or stand for election (even as independents) for ten years”.

307. Karpat, “Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980”, 153. Karpat also argues that the decision on the dissolution of the political parties was made after the nationalist wing among officers favoring stronger military
leaders’ involvement in the proposition of the candidates for the DM was the straw that broke the camel’s back. 308

As MGK totally abandoned the idea of transition to new political system with existing parties, they renewed their strategy. Thus, the new Constitution and the Political Party Law determined the character of the political parties. Political Party Law strengthened the Provisional Article in the Constitution and outlawed Marxist, Kurdish separatist and Islamic fundamentalist parties, as well. All of the parties were obliged to remain attached to the “principles and reforms of Atatürk”.309 As I explained in the Chapter 3, establishment of a new party, participation in the elections and the methods of propaganda were subjected to strict supervision of MGK. Ultimately only three political parties (ANAP, MDP and HP) could compete in the elections. By restricting twelve of fifteen parties applied for the elections, MGK aimed to provide a new party system which would provide a stable and effective government. MDP was claimed to represent the centre right and was favoured by the armed forces. HP was supposed to form a loyal opposition as a centre-left party. In the meantime, ANAP espoused a commitment to liberal economic policies and conservative cultural values.

The making of 1982 Constitution was under close monitoring of MGK, too. Despite the existence of a DM in charge of drafting a constitution, as I explained in Chapter 3 of this study, MGK held the full authority in the appointment of DM members and in the amendments to the draft constitution.

According to the new constitution, the new political system was a two-tiered regime where the state is “divorced from politics”.310 The President has become the “representative of the state” with the authority to maintain the territorial integrity and security of the state and the modernist features of the regime and to exercise a mild

rule gained the upper hand. General Necdet Ürüğ became the Secretary and Coordinator of the MGK by replacing General Haydar Saltık. Karpat supports his argument by referring to the rumours claiming that the replacement of the General Saltık was mainly because of his lenient treatment to the leftists. General Saltık was later sent to complete his field duty as commander of the First Army in control of Istanbul, the Straits and Thrace.

309. Siyasi Partiler Kanunu 2820 (Political Parties Law 2820), published in Resmi Gazete on April 24, 1983.
form of tutelage over the government. Parliament, bureaucracy and the cabinet, were
designed to conduct day-to-day affairs of the government within the framework set
by the state through Constitution and certain laws. 311 In addition, many provisions of
the 1982 Constitution referred to the territorial and national integrity of the state and
to the modernizing reforms of Atatürk. Inclusion of these types of values cherished
by the military within the Constitution provides an example for the tutelary powers
of the military in the post-coup period. 312 Another example of the laws empowering
the tutelary powers of the military is the law on MGK. 313 The national security was
defined broadly as “the protection of the constitutional order of the state, its national
existence, and its integrity; of all of its interests in the international field, including
political, social, cultural, and economic interests; and of interests derived from
international treaties against all external and internal threats”. Therefore, the
military’s responsibilities reached beyond the external and internal threats, included
also the “promotion of country’s ability to achieve its national objectives”. 314 Also,
by electing the former General Evren as the new president, or the representative of
depoliticized state, the military ensured continuity with military rule. Evren took
responsibility over all matters which are considered as important by the military such
as “high politics” issues and higher education matters. 315 The president and the

311. Karpat, “Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and
After 1980”, 154.
312. Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic
Consolidation, 106 refers to Valenzuela argues that the constitution incorporates exit
guarantees including tutelary powers, reserved domain, and manipulation of the
electoral process.
313. MGK Kanunu 2945 (Law for National Security Council no. 2945), adopted on
November 9, 1983.
315. The President’s Powers included appointing Prime Minister and accepting his
resignation, presiding over the meetings of Council of Ministers whenever he deems it
necessary, proclaiming martial law and state of emergency in collaboration with
Council of Ministers, appointing the Chairman and members of State Supervisory
Council as well as the Board of Higher Education, appointing the Chief of the General
Staff, and appointing rectors. See Ergun Özbudun “The Status of President of the
Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982” in Politics of Third Turkish Republic,
military were content to leave the economical issues to the government. Evren was also granted a strengthened veto power over the constitutional changes which required a three-fourths majority of the Parliamentarians to pass the law. The Government operated strictly according to this division of labor. Özl’s consent to this sort of a cooperation raised doubts over the civilian and democratic character of his government during the first term of ANAP’s government. Other than Evren, five members of the Junta would constitute the Presidential Council. The Presidential Council had only advisory powers; however, they enjoyed full parliamentary immunity.

Prior to elections in November 1983, the military abstained from openly favoring a party. However, Evren’s TV speech two days before the elections implied that the military was in favor of the MDP. MDP, led by a former general Turgut Sunalp, was expected to represent the centre-right. HP, led by Necdet Calp, was considered to be a moderate opposition left party. The third party allowed to compete in the elections was Turgut Özal’s ANAP. Özal acted as the economic advisor of Demirel and minister of economy in the Ulusu cabinet. Özal had resigned from his post in the Ulusu cabinet upon a replacement of Minister of Finance. His alienation from the Ulusu cabinet could positively affect his popularity in the elections. Upon a meeting between Evren and Özal after ANAP won the elections, General Evren professes that he misperceived Özal’s political views and would not


317. Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, 118.


320. Hale questions the influence of the Presidential Council in the politics. Instead of an influential authority of the Junta members in the politics, he interpretes the Council as a honourable retirement years for the Generals following the military rule. The Counsil was abolished in November 1989, Hale, Türkiye’dede Asker ve Siyaset, 220.

321. Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, 114.

let him to establish his party if he knew them in advance. Nevertheless, closing his party prior to elections could harm the democratization endeavors in Turkey. MGK, by approving these three parties in the elections, expected a lenient MDP government which would conduct day-to-day administration of the state in cooperation with the president conducting the “high politics” issues. The president would also supervise the government to stay in accordance to the principles of Constitution. HP was expected to constitute a loyal opposition, so that competition between the parties would not become a source of instability. The former political leaders were already banned from political activities for ten years by a provisional article in Constitution. Since MGK perceived these prominent leaders as the main source of conflict, expected the public support to decrease by the time their political bans are lifted. In addition the electoral law adopted prior to 1983 elections included rules favorable to major parties. The law included high thresholds to prevent minor parties from gaining seats in the parliament. Finally, elections were held on November 6th, 1982 and ANAP gained majority of the seats in the parliament.

The military was indeed surprised with ANAP’s clear victory despite Evren’s public support for MDP. The conduct of civil-military relations during the ANAP government would play an important role for the regime’s stability. ANAP was a coalition of various rightist groups of the 1970s. The party included former members of MSP and MHP. Thence, the military was suspicious about ANAP’s character. In order to avoid this unrest between the government and the statist elites, the president took responsibility over highly sensitive issues including internal and external security, as well as foreign affairs and higher education. Evren acted as the

323. Kenan Evren, *Anılar*, vol.4, 24-6. In that meeting, Özal demanded favor for Head of Religion Affairs and amnesty for a religious sect leader

324. *Seçim Kanunu* 2839 (Electoral Law no: 2839), Article 33, 34; Constituency threshold is reached by dividing the number of parliamentarians allocated to that district to the numbers of electors


head of the cabinet when these issues are on government’s agenda. On the other hand, Özal was involved with economic issues. 327

In conclusion, the military’s initial plan of transition to a new party system with existing parties fell to the ground. Former political party leaders continued to exert influence on politics through their attachment with members of their parties. Moreover, the following expectation, with a lenient government in coherence with military’s strategy under MDP during initial years of the post-coup period, was not realized, either. ANAP’s victory in elections indicated that Turkish voters preferred to be represented by one of its own, rather than a military-backed party. 328 This tendency was revealed again in the results of 1984 municipality elections. As SODEP and DYP participated in elections, HP and MDP could only become fourth and fifth parties, respectively.

Another challenge for the military was the demands for lifting the political bans of former political party leaders. The military was aware that, both Ecevit and Demirel sustained their linkages with DSP and DYP, respectively. These leaders participated in every part of the political life, except designating themselves as the leader of the party. Early in 1986, Evren agreed to lift the ban on public speaking, but retained the bans on their political participation. 329 This gradual shift towards political liberalization ended with Evren’s consent to lifting the bans completely. The bans were lifted by a slight majority in a referendum in 1987, and both leaders returned to lead their parties. 330 The referendum marked as the starting of the new phase, re-democratization, in Turkish politics. 331

In conclusion, these events indicated that, the military’s strategies to restructure a new party system by excluding the former parties and their leaders were unlikely to be implemented. Civilians responded to these efforts in various occasions. During the military rule, former members of CHP and AP declined to participate in a cabinet subordinate to MGK. Later, as soon as the new elections were announced, fifteen

329. Ibid, 32.
330. Hale, Türkiye’dede Asker ve Siyaset, 250.
new parties applied for election. This trend indicated that fragmentation in party system was likely to continue. Even though military tried to prevent this outcome by limiting the numbers of the parties to three, the party which was least identified with the military’s preferences won the majority of the votes and the seats in the first elections. The results of the elections proved that Turkish people demanded to be represented by a civilian political party rather than a military-backed party. The results of municipality elections in 1984, reiterated that the artificial party system planned by the military would not comply with the political tendencies of the Turkish people. Despite the bans on political expression and political participation of the former leaders, Demirel and Ecevit’s insistence to stay within politics by retaining their linkages with political parties indicated that the political restrictions have not benefited to a stable party system, at all. Eventually, the referendum results over the political bans reflected that people, in other words civilians, demanded the politics to become civilianized.

5.3 Demilitarization of Turkish Politics

Although the influence of the military continued in the initial years of the transition the military repeatedly announced that they were preparing to return to their barracks. Then CGS, General Necdet Ürüş, pointed out that the military would return fulfilling only its operational duties at the end of 1985. Martial Law was gradually lifted from the beginning of 1984. 332

As I explained above, political elites’ determination to remain within politics, and people’s support for civilians through frequent elections and referendums convinced the military that they need to co-exist with civilian elites in the political system. The influence of military gradually diminished in Turkish politics till early 1990s. This transition process has occurred more tranquil than expected. First civilians and soldier enjoyed a *modus vivendi* where operated in a division of labor, and finally the civilians started to prevail in politics.

The election of Özal as the new president of Turkey in 1989 implied a major change in Turkish Politics. Özal was the first ever civilian president since the

overthrown of Celal Bayar in 1960. Later, Demirel’s election as head of state in 1993 was more striking since he had experienced two military interventions during his prime ministry. The significance of the president’s powers for military and for the guardianship of the state has already been mentioned above. Therefore, military consented to civilians to presidency which they empowered as the representative of the state as a guardian to civilians’ corrupted politics. The developments from the end of the military rule to the election of Demirel as president explain the gradual civilianization of the regime and facilitate it to understand the process.

First of all, the military was in total agreement with Özal’s economic policies. The military had already ceased to adopt Import Substitution Industrialization policy applied before 1980s and agreed with the interventionist development strategies of Özal. Hence the economic issues would not constitute a source of conflict between the civilians and the soldiers.

ANAP’s majority in the parliament following the 1983 elections was questionable because of restrictions in political participation. Özal demanded to lift the political bans prior to municipality elections in 1984. Evren declined the parliamentary decision in accordance with Özal’s demands. However, the parliament adopted the law with absolute majority and the municipality elections were held in March 1984. The reasons for Evren’s rejection are ambiguous. Following the decision, Özal opposed amnesty for thousands of people involved in violence during the years of the military rule and kept military content. This event provides an example that military consented to a resolution on a political issue considering its interest in a legal matter and also an example for the supremacy of the parliament over the president. Another outcome of this example was Evren’s commitment to constitutional principles despite his discontent with the proposal.

The first major problem between the government and the military emerged following Özal’s remarks over the concept of “civil society”. Özal referred to transformation from religious communitarianism to nationalism during Atatürk’s period and questioned the notion of “people for the state”. Özal’s remarks raised doubts about his party’s fundamentalist wing and their influence. MGK immediately presented a report concerning the fundamentalism in Turkey. Özal responded to

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334. Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkey: Guardians or Decision-Makers?”, 198.
comments spread all over the media by implying that the fundamentalism was a problem faced by both sides; the military and the government. 335 Thus, Ö zal’s moderate discourse avoided escalation of crisis. Özal was absolutely aware of the MGK’s sensitivities and abstained from raising tensions between his government and MGK. Therefore, it is arguable that the government conceived the limits of politics, and preferred a moderate discourse at the time of the rumors of a new intervention spread around.

Another example for civil-military conflict during Ö zal’s government was related to promotion of a new CGS. Özal replaced General Üruğ with General Torumtay instead of General Öztorun who was the favorite candidate of the General Staff. The president consented to the change by signing all necessary decrees.336 That replacement signaled both the increase in the power of civilian governments vis-à-vis the military and the alienation of the state (with the president as its representative) from the military. Earlier attempts in 1970s had already proved that the military was hesitant to release its power on promotion of senior officers. For Ö zal, the appointment of Torumtay was a signal of normalization in civil-military relations where prime minister has the final say to nominate the candidate to the president. A similar practice showed in the following years under DYP’s leader Çiller’s government provided that incumbent CGS’s willingness to stay in the power for an extended period of time was welcomed by the government.337 It is arguable that despite existing laws which allow the appointment of CGS by the president upon prime minister’s proposal, the influence of incumbent CGS is sensible. In addition to the appointment procedure of the CGS, constitutionally the General Staff was responsible to the prime ministry instead of the defense ministry.338 Hale argues that,

338. Very recently, the events following the presidential debate in April 2007 showed that even the subordination of the CS to the prime ministry is debatable. General Staff’s memorandum published on their website received complaints from the government in the following day. The declaration read by the Government spokesman Cemil Çiçek felt the necessity to declare the government’s surprise on the e-memorandum. He also reminded the subordination of the military to the prime ministry. Referred in “Hükümet Daha da Sert” Radikal, 29 April 2007.
during the initial years of civilianization following the military rule, defense ministry functioned as the secretary services of the military instead of guiding defense policies. 339 Although Özal promised to change this structure during the election campaign prior to 1987 elections, the results of the elections did not provide him a comfortable majority to amend the constitution without other concerns 340. However, the government has been involved more in the defense matters, albeit far from standards in Western democracies.341

The forthcoming elections in 1987 supposedly affected Özal’s relations with the military. As experienced before, political parties in close affiliation with the military failed to win the elections. MDP was the most recent example of this trend. As Özal government’s power became more visible simultaneously with the military’s gradual strategy of civilianization, Özal started applying a policy curtailing the influence of the military on public policy. The government started introducing new legislation allowing collective bargaining, strikes, public meetings and demonstrations, the right to form associations and to make collective petitions. The military liaison officers in each ministry were lifted, death sentences passed by the military courts were not approved by the Parliament and restrictions on the establishment of new political parties were lifted. The martial law was due to expire in the entire country in July 1987. Government’s alternative plan was establishing regional governorship headed by a civilian with extraordinary power to coordinate and implement counterinsurgency measures against separatist guerrillas in eight southeastern provinces.342

In addition to the influential role of a President with military origin, the military expected to be influential through a political party, MDP, in the post-1983 years. However, MDP’s failure in two consecutive elections, 1983 and 1984, indicated that this option was not viable. Thus, the military retained considerable influence over governmental authority through the formulation of the MGK members in favor of the military. The responsibilities of the MGK indicated that it has been an

341. Özal referred to the Western Democracies as the proper functioning of defence matters. Evin, “Demilitarisation and Civilianization of the Regime”, 34.
instrument for the tutelary power of the military in the post-coup period. The Council of the Ministers was required to give priority consideration to the decisions of the MGK. In other words, MGK was filling the gap between the political parties and the military. MGK’s influence has been widely debated since 1980. Inclusion of MGK within the institutional design raised doubts over the military’s perception of democracy. For the military, a non-elected body’s interference with politics, MGK in this case, was tolerable. MGK’s presence also raised doubts about the reach of the civilianization in the Turkish politics. In a democratic setting, the existence of MGK would only be acceptable as long as its concerns are limited to national security. However, the definition of national security as stated above encompasses more than defense matters in Turkey. Therefore MGK, in 1980s, voiced its concerns on ideological issues, especially on the secularism-Islamism cleavage. Nevertheless, it is fair to admit that MGK exerted less influence over the politics than expected during the 1980s. MGK inclined to limit its recommendations on the defense matters.

The disagreement on the role of Turkey in the Gulf War constitutes an example for comparing the power of MGK and government in early 1990s. Turkey’s foreign policy during the Gulf War was mainly determined by Öztal’s preferences and strategies. One incident was the resignation of CGS Necip Torumtay because of his disagreement with the government on the operation to Northern Iraq. Öztal had demanded the military to be prepared for an operation, while Torumtay presented his concerns over the policy. This resignation implies the changing power relations between the government and the military. Even on a subject where the military’s

343. Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, 108.

344. Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution.


347. Hale, *Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset*, 244.

348. Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy)* vol. 2, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 256.
expertise is undeniable, the military acted as subordinate to civilians. The military preferred to advise rather than imposing a policy on the debate.\textsuperscript{349} MGK’s influence in Turkish politics was felt increasingly since mid 1990s. The numerical composition of MGK members and their responsibilities changed over time due to the constitutional arrangements in alignment with political reforms. Although the reforms are perceived as curbing the power of the military in politics, their outcome in practice hardly deny the role of MGK in Turkish Politics up to current date. Obviously, it is not likely that simply changing the role of MGK in the Constitution guarantees the strengthening of the civilians vis-à-vis the military. As a recent study reveals, a whole array of multifaceted variables including cultural, political and economic factors should not be ignored when the power of the military is evaluated in the politics. The recommendations of MGK are presented to the Council of Ministers through consensus in the MGK. Therefore the numerical composition of the MGK is not tantamount to the weight of different actors.\textsuperscript{350} In short, as Cizre-Sakalloğlu argues, MGK helps to “crystallize and spearhead the consolidation of military autonomy”.\textsuperscript{351} Nevertheless, it is fair to say that MGK’s influence until mid-1990s was not a major challenge to the transition to democracy process.

The control of the peak intelligence service is also a tool for military’s influence in politics. Even though \textit{Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı} (Central Intelligence Service-MİT) was responsible to the prime minister, the head of the agency was a uniformed general appointed by MGK. Therefore MİT had close contacts with the Office of the General Staff. Özal’s endeavors to civilianize MİT caused contradiction between the military and government. Ultimately, government declared that discriminating civilians and military was a mistake and the issues were not crucial for civilianization of the regime.\textsuperscript{352} The first civilian appointment as the president of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{349} Philip Robins, “Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adventurist or Dynamic?” in \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects}, ed. C.H. Dodd (Hull: Eothen Press, 1992), 70-87
\item \textsuperscript{350} Linda Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization Package and its Ramifications for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, \textit{Turkish Studies} 8, no.1-2 (March 2007): 32.
\item \textsuperscript{351} Ibid, 157-8. She refers to newspaper articles debating the role of the MGK in the early 1990s. She states that decisions of MGK cover an unprecedented spectrum from education to election system etc.
\item \textsuperscript{352} Ibid, 37.
\end{itemize}
MİT was in 1992. Nonetheless, transparency of relationship between MİT and the military remains to be a problem for civilian control of intelligence services.

Another factor, as I explained in Chapter 3, was the appointment of technocrats familiar with Özal’s policy choices to important posts within the bureaucracy. Even though the bureaucracy responded to Özal’s challenge by certain bureaucratic tactics, eventually that allowed the civilian’s supremacy in politics rather than the statist elements within the bureaucracy to become dominant.

To sum up, civilian political elites opted for a cautious civilianization of the regime. Instead of adopting a pro-active role to shift the institutional design of the 1982 Constitution into a civilianized system, they proceeded gradually. Özal adopted the division of labor between his government and the president during the initial years following the coup. The military also, because of international commitments and increasing confidence in ANAP government’s cooperation with statist elements, adopted a moderate stance against civilian governments. The military perceived the constitutional arrangements as adequate to protect the principles of the Republic. They were already reluctant to stay in power for reasons stated above. The political process realized the difficulty of establishing the party system they desired. Therefore, the military was required to co-exist with existing political parties. MGK was empowered to fill this gap. Yet, except an Islamic fundamentalism threat, they remained silent in political issues.

Thanks to this moderate atmosphere between political elites and military, Özal proceeded toward civilianization of the regime through appointments to important posts within bureaucracy and challenging military’s influence in foreign affairs and senior promotions. Meanwhile, former political party leaders insisted to remain in politics through their linkages to their parties. By 1987, it was understood that restricting prominent political figures benefited nothing, and they were lifted by a referendum.

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353. First civilian president of the MİT is Sönmez Köksal, the information on the background of the MİT presidents are available on MİT website at: http://www.mit.gov.tr/mustesarlar.html.
5.4 Changing Power Balances in the Political Sphere

In conclusion, transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Turkey occurred in three phases. Military rule in 1980-83 was followed by a political liberalization initiated and controlled from “above” till 1987 and by a redemocratization. It is hard to say that military ultimately accomplished its objectives. As I explained above, military had expected that a centre-right party with close ties to the military would govern the country in the post-coup years. Indeed, a centre-right party gained popular support following the military rule; however, it was Özal’s ANAP rather than MDP. Apparently ANAP benefited from the process, because prominent leaders of 1970s were banned and the new parties affiliated with former ones were not allowed to compete in the 1983 elections. This allowed ANAP a favorable atmosphere for implementation of economic reforms as a single-party government without major challenges. ANAP’s leader Özal became a prominent politician from early 1980 until his sudden death in April 1993.

Another outcome of this transition from above was, indeed surprisingly, the political Islam in 1990s. Beginning with the military regime and during the ensuing ANAP governments from 1983 to 1991, state policy toward Islam underwent radical changes in style and substance. Cizre-Sakallioğlu argues that, in a dynamic state-society relationship where tensions produced by economic liberalization aggravated the growing influence of ethnic and Islamic social and political forces, the state “had to reestablish its legitimacy on a new basis, rooted less in the insularity of the secular-modernist project (through bureaucratic domination) and more willing to incorporate the most important marker of local identity, Islam, into the official discourse.”


communism in universities. The relationship between incorporation of Islam into the state ideology or instruction of religious education into schools and the rise of political Islam is not straightforward. However, the strategy of “Islamization of Secularism” in the post-1980 period and the revamped political party system facilitated the rise of political Islam and the victory of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party-RP) in the 1995 elections. As observed in Table 11, the political Islam increased its popular support following the military rule in Turkey. In addition, the fragmented party system following the redemocratization by lifting political bans, contributed RP’s victory in the 1995 elections. RP received only 21.4 percent of the votes however became an influential actor in coalition-building negotiations. Even thought centre-right votes remained at a level around 40 percent, and the centre left votes at 30 percent, the fragmentation within the blocs allowed RP to win the elections in 1995. DYP-RP coalition and the rise of fundamentalism in Turkey eventually led to MGK’s memorandum in February 1998. Since the early 1990, Turkish democracy has been challenged by political Islam.


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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centre-Right</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>29.8</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
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<td>45.1</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centre-Left</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>33.30</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>HP</td>
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<td>30.5</td>
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<td>SHP</td>
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<td>24.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>33.30</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Islamists</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalists</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
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</table>


As observed from the table, the percentage of the centre-left votes declined gradually after the military rule. In addition to this declining trend, Ecevit’s appearance under a new party, DSP, caused the division of the votes in the centre-left. Military’s anti-communist stance and appeal to Islamic elements was another factor decreasing the influence of the leftist groups.
Another party losing power was the statist bureaucracy which was replaced with managerial cadres in accordance with market economy’s considerations. Especially Özal’s insistence on collaborating with technocrats rather than bureaucrats facilitated this change.

5.5 A Brief Assessment of the Military in Turkish Politics After 1983

The military’s role within the society changed after all these developments. Military intervened politics when the political elites were in conflict. Therefore, rather than an arbiter role it has played before 1980s, the military, itself became a key political actor in the Turkish politics. Military permitted ANAP’s entry to the elections unlike the other parties (SODEP and DYP) which have been perceived as the successor of the AP and CHP. In the post-1983 years, military and government maintained the division of labor without major challenges during Özal’s prime ministry. In addition to that, the relationship between the political executive and the president helped military to be less concerned about the conduct of political affairs. Therefore, military could return to its barracks as planned. Apparently, the international pressure and the inclination of the intelligentsia and politicians caused the military to accept a diminishing role in politics. The military’s confidence in the president’s role as guardian of the statist institutions let the military to concentrate more on the operational matters. The President responded calmly to the critics over his reign and the influence of military within the politics. Eventually, the politics has become civilianized in 1989 with the election of Özal as the first civilian president since the 1960. Özal’s presidency closed the gap between the statist elites and political elites. Özal’s successor would again be a civilian, Süleyman Demirel. Election of Demirel was another signal for the civilianization of the regime after the Torumtay’s resignation as a result of his disagreement with Özal. Özbudun argues that, instead of formal change in institutions, the practice indicated that the regime has started to become civilianized but was still a little distant from a full-fledged

360. Ibid, 40.
civilian democracy. For example, the February 1997 meeting of the MGK declaring the threat perception for the secularism and General Staff’s e-memorandum in April 2007 in a softer but similar discourse proved that the military finds the necessary means to intervene when the political events concern its interests, particularly the continuity of secular-democracy. This indicates that the democracy has not been consolidated yet, in other terms the military still considers its interference into the politics as legitimate as long as the values of the state cherished by the military as territorial integrity and secularism were challenged.

361. Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, 119.
In this study, transitions to democracy in Spain and Turkey have been analysed. I find it necessary to refer to typologies of transitions to democracy to make a comparative analysis of these two transitions. Obviously, modes of transition vary for each country. Thus, the discussion about an accurate typology for categorizing transitions to democracy is very dynamic. For example, O’Donnell and Schmitter find it appropriate to distinguish between, on the one hand, transitions initiated by successful, confident regimes which control the rhythm and scope of liberalization, and, on the other hand transitions initiated by the opposition, which generally occur where the regime has failed. Therefore, O’Donnell and Schmitter believe in the primacy of the initial conditions of the transition. Stepan contributes to the debate with a typology which distinguishes transitions to democracy as “initiated by the wielders of authoritarian power” and as changes in which “oppositional forces play the major role”. He emphasizes the nature of the dominant elites leading the transitions as being either civilian or military. Mainwaring offers another typology in which he places importance on the extent to which the transition process is influenced by the outgoing


authoritarian regime. Authoritarian regimes exert less influence following a defeat, and more when they introduce the process of liberalization and remain a decisive actor throughout the transition. He defines the intermediary category as “extrication” in which an authoritarian government might negotiate crucial features of the transition, even though the government holds a weaker position than in other examples of transition through transaction.\(^\text{364}\) Unlike these typologies based on a single dimension, Agüero offers a two-dimensional categorization where the nature of the dominant elite during the transition and the extent to which the outgoing regime and type of transition matter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Dominant Elite</th>
<th>Extent of Influence by Outgoing Regime, and Type of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Very Low (Collapse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intermediate (Extrication)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High (Transaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Hungary Poland</td>
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<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Bulgaria Poland</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Soviet Union SPAIN</td>
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<td>Military</td>
<td>Argentin Paraguay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>TURKEY Brazil</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
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6.1 A Comparison of Transitions to Democracy in Spain and Turkey

Initial Conditions. The initial conditions in the transitions in Spain and Turkey were different. For instance, the Spanish case constituted an example of “transition through transaction”, where the transition was conducted under an authoritarian


365. Agüero’s typology might not be adopted universally. Yet, it helps us to distinguish the main characteristics of Turkish and Spanish cases. That is why, I added Turkey into this table originally suggested by Agüero.
constitution, enabling authoritarian elites to command high levels of influence over the transition. Nevertheless, the nature of the dominant elite during the transition in Spain was civilian. The Spanish political system was already civilianised in the later years under Franco. Meanwhile, the transition in Turkey was initiated under similar conditions where authoritarian arrangement limited political and social rights. However, unlike the transition in Spain, the military elite was dominant. The Spanish civilians’ relative advantage over the military in influencing the transition was mainly caused by the crisis in the outgoing regime - Franco’s authoritarian regime. As discussed earlier in this study, Franco’s regime had internal divisions which disturbed stability and prevented the taking of the necessary precautions for stabilising the political and economic conditions. In addition, civilianisation and liberalisation within the regime were already underway. By the time of Franco’s death, the liberals and the democratic opposition within the country were able to emerge to demand further liberalisation which would be followed by democratization. Therefore, despite the influence of conservative parties within the regime, the support for democratic reforms had already been widely favoured by society. The rising number of strikes and incidents of political violence indicated the discontent within society towards authoritarian rule. On the other hand, three years of military rule in Turkey had started as a result of political decay in civilian governments. Thousands of people lost their lives in political violence, and economic conditions were worsening. The military acted quickly to solve these problems and overcame them. The military’s success provided popular legitimacy for the regime. The failures of the civilian government which led to the country into a political turmoil were not easily forgotten.

In addition to these, the MGK had limited the degree of political participation in elections and constitutional debates. Therefore, the military kept itself in a privileged position during the initial years of the transition. The confident regime in Turkey determined the rhythm of political liberalisation. The high level of support for the proposed constitution proved that the public consented to the initial conditions established by the military. These factors caused the difference in the dominant political elite in the transitions in Spain and Turkey. Agüero’s findings from South

366. The counter argument claim that the uncertainty after a possible “no” vote for the constitution urged the voters to a “yes” vote for the constitution. Yet, the influence of this factor can not be evaluated. Even though it is rational, it is not sufficient to form a solid counter argument.
American and Southern European cases reveal that transitions dominated by civilians were more likely to achieve democratic consolidation.\textsuperscript{367} The military’s quest for institutional autonomy limits democratization.\textsuperscript{368} The conditions during transition might allow the military to guarantee prerogatives outside its own interests. The unity of civilians challenges the military’s influence in transitions. The experiences in South America indicate that the military perceives party politics as a threat to its institutional cohesion, and also sees it as disruptive and divisive for the whole nation, whereas the military itself (supposedly) presents a picture of national unity against internal and external enemies.\textsuperscript{369} In both of the cases studied in this thesis, the military preserved its institutional autonomy during the transition process. However, the Spanish case differed from the Turkish case where the military preserved tutelary powers, e.g. strong presidential powers, constitutional arrangements. In Turkey, civilians were unable to unite against the military’s entrenched position. The transition was initiated and controlled from above, and political participation was limited by constitutional provisions. On the other hand, civilians in Spain reached agreements among themselves during the transitions; hence they were able to prevent the military from exerting influence over the transition process. Civilians did not feel obliged to make pacts with the military. Therefore the initiative was left entirely in the hands of civilians for the future.\textsuperscript{370} In short, initial conditions differed in these two cases. The military in both countries voiced their preferences and demanded guarantees for them in the post-transition years. However, those civilian agreements in Spain provided a favourable atmosphere for democratic advancement.\textsuperscript{371} Hence, initial conditions played an important role in the democratic consolidation, the Spanish and Turkish cases reveal. Yet, initial conditions by themselves explain only a part of the whole picture.

\textit{Developments in the post-transition period.} Democratic consolidation requires favourable developments in the post-transition period, too. The military might challenge

\textsuperscript{367} Agüero, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America”, 148.

\textsuperscript{368} Agüero, “The Military and the Limits to Democratization in South America”, 155.

\textsuperscript{369} Ibid, 166.

\textsuperscript{370} Agüero, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America”, 150.

democracy even after the transition phase. To give an example from our specific cases, the transition to democracy in Spain failed to prevent a coup attempt by Colonel Tejero in February 1981. Failure of the coup attempt signalled the consolidation of democracy in Spain. Civilian political elites and different segments of the military united against this attempt, thereby emphasising the supremacy of civilians in Spanish politics. The plotters were punished. The current role of the military in Turkish politics confirms the military’s ongoing effectiveness in challenging the political supremacy of civilians. The relations between civilians and the military have always been a focal point of constitutional reforms. In particular, the role of the MGK and its memorandum about the rise of political Islam in Turkey, indicate the ongoing influence of the military on civilians. Although political Islam itself challenges the democratic process in Turkey, it is fair to argue that the military also challenges democratic advancement in Turkish politics. However, Turkey’s transition to democracy experience allows us to argue that the military’s influence vis-à-vis civilians diminished, especially during the second term of the ANAP government between 1987 and 1991.

Several factors, as suggested by Agüero, are more or less favourable for democratic advancement. These factors include: the unity of civilians, the legitimacy of successor governments, policies and strategies in the area of the civil-military relations process, and international factors. 372

Public Support for Successor Government: Agüero claims that “the capacity of governments to advance democratic policies regarding the military is strongly influenced by their ability to maintain high levels of public support. The military finds it harder to impose non-democratic prerogatives and to resist government policies when the government is visibly backed by a wide array of popular political forces.” 373 Support for the ANAP government in Turkey was gained through the first multiparty election after military rule, albeit in a semi-competitive fashion, in 1983. Despite president Evren’s support for the MDP, the ANAP achieved a comfortable victory in the 1983 elections. However, public support for the government was adversely affected by two factors. First, the elections were not truly competitive. Therefore the voters were left with few options when the major parties of the 1970s or their successors were excluded

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373. Ibid, 151.
from the elections. Thus the representativeness of the parliament and the legitimacy of Özl’s government were questionable. Özl was able to overcome this problem in the 1984 municipality elections when successor parties were allowed to compete, but the real test was the 1987 elections when former leaders of the 1970s were allowed to lead their parties. The other factor was the popularity of President Evren. In addition to his personal charisma as a top military commander, his appointment to the presidency through a provisional article in the 1982 Constitution was approved by an overwhelming majority in the constitutional referendum. Thanks to strengthened presidential powers, Evren acted as the head of state and the cabinet in controversial issues. The government meanwhile conducted day-to-day administration of state affairs and dealt with economic issues. However, Özl’s autonomy in economic issues helped him to increase level of public support. The handling of the economy is an important determinant of public support for the government. The stabilizing reforms initiated in the early 1980 and Özl’s export-led growth strategy brought economic recovery, thanks to the limited room for political participation, or opposition in other words. Without opposition, the government comfortably implemented economic policies and advice. Özl’s popularity increased as a result of these positive developments in the economic sphere. Özl’s confidence in appointing Necip Torumtay as CGS instead of the military-supported candidate, General Üruğ, in July 1987 might be explained by growing popular support. Another example of this linkage between popular support for the government and democratization policies regarding the military was related to the subordination of the CGS to the defence ministry. Although Özl’s election campaign included this structural change, he decided to delay implementation, as popular support for his party declined in the 1987 elections. A similar trend in Spain also supports the main argument. The decline in support for Suarez’s government during 1980 because of high unemployment rates and rising terrorist activities (including the targeting of military figures) caused the military’s discontent with the regime. Suarez’s excessive democratization reforms were disliked by the military, and, combined with the decline in popular support for Suarez; the result was the failed military coup in 1981. This trend in popular support for the government was reversed by the PSOE’s clear victory in the 1982 elections. The Socialist party achieved a homogenous and stable government majority and so it was able to implement significant reforms in the military and in the general organization of defence. Therefore, both cases prove the theory about the role of
popular support for government and the pace of reforms, particularly in civil-military relations.

*The Timing and Pace of Reforms:* Preventing the interference of the military into politics is a major step in the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, it needs to be accompanied by the prominence of civilian government officials in the defence sector. The reforms in the defence sector are conditioned by two considerations. Firstly, the government should act cautiously, to avoid a situation where the military might take a firm stance against reforms, and secondly, reforms should be accomplished before the military institutionalizes its influence in the post-transitional setting. Gradual reforms generally seem more sensible from the viewpoint of civilian elites because of several factors. Firstly, civilians’ inexperience in the initial phase of the democratization may cause them to give higher priority to other important policy areas. Secondly, mutual confidence between civilian and military elites increases when reforms are postponed. Thirdly, civilians would gradually gain expertise in defence and military affairs. However, this tendency to delay the reforms might become detrimental to the seizure of opportunities for the expansion of democratic prerogatives. Therefore, determining the right time and pace of the reform are crucial for achieving civilian supremacy. During the transition to democracy in Spain, the secondary role of the military in the transition was accompanied by the alienation of civilians from the military’s internal affairs. As discussed earlier, senior promotions within the military establishment caused conflicts between civilians and soldiers. The gradual reform within the defence sector was initiated by General Mellado, a member of the liberal wing of the military cadres. However the military was dealing with rising terrorist activities by ETA, and internal reforms only constituted a secondary role in the military’s agenda. The failed coup attempt was a major turning point which symbolized the military’s declining role in Spanish politics. Despite favourable conditions for civilian supremacy over the military, including liberal attitudes within the military, substantial reforms in the defence sector were not implemented until the PSOE became confident of its electoral support. The major changes in the government’s attitude towards a reform in the defence sector appeared in 1984, almost two years after the PSOE’s victory in the 1982 elections. Therefore, Spanish civilians waited patiently until gaining adequate power and

accumulating expertise on defence issues. In Chapter 4, I referred to Martinez’s study in which he analyzed the presence of growing numbers of civilians in CESEDEN. This tendency might have facilitated the civilians to feel confident enough in the mid-1980s to restructure the defence policy of Spain. To sum up, the timing of reforms significantly affected the success of the civilianisation of the defence policies. If initiated earlier than the failed coup attempt or before the PSOE gained a comfortable majority in Congress, the military might have reacted against the reform attempts with a stronger corporate stance. Hence, the civilians’ impatience might have adversely affected the attempts for democratization as a whole. Therefore, the timing of the defence sector reforms appears as perfectly scheduled within the whole calendar of democratization in Spain. In Turkey, on the other hand, during the political liberalization phase and ANAP’s first term, the civilian government consented to a *modus vivendi* with the military. Therefore, any attempt to provoke the military was avoided until Özal’s interference in senior promotions within the General Staff. The defence ministry functioned as an administrative organ for the General Staff. The General Staff reported to the Prime Minister instead of the defence ministry. Özal promised a change during the 1987 election campaign, but felt weakened after the election results. Although he achieved a majority of seats, which allowed him to establish a single party government, Özal preferred not to provoke the military while his government’s popular support was declining. The 1991 election and its aftermath showed that the party system was fragmented again. Coalition governments replaced single-party government. Therefore, reforms in controversial areas such as the defence sector were delayed. In conclusion, the civilian officials’ satisfaction with a situation of peaceful coexistence with the military caused a failure in incorporating the defence sector into the main framework of the reform process during the transition to democracy in Turkey. Certain limited changes in alignment because of the EU accession criteria only recently have been achieved.

**International Factors:** The International environment and membership of international institutions occasionally play a facilitating role in democratization. Two prominent international institutions, NATO and the EC, influenced both Spain and Turkey during their democratization. However, in comparison, their influence on Spain was greater. Turkey was already a member of NATO. Therefore, the Turkish military did not require a radical modernisation or transformation. NATO was reluctant to voice concerns over domestic issues in both countries. Nevertheless, Spain’s NATO
membership campaign was given priority consideration by the PSOE government as soon as they came to power. Spain became a member of NATO following a referendum in 1986. NATO membership transformed Spanish military’s mission away from previous domestic concerns towards external professional concerns. The transformation of the Spanish military facilitated democratisation. In Spain, efforts toward civilian supremacy were intensified by NATO membership whereas in Turkey the effect of NATO membership during democratisation was not so obvious. Yet, the Turkish military was experiencing an endogenous transformation in convergence with NATO’s objectives, too. For example, by 1992, in accordance with NATO’s policies toward professionalism, the Turkish military adopted a gradual transformation including a decrease in the length of the conscription period to twelve months.\(^{375}\) This would gradually shift the balance within the military in favour of trained professional soldiers rather than young conscripts. Although this transformation marked one of the most significant shifts in the Turkish military for decades, the impact of NATO membership on civilian supremacy was less influential than in Spain. On the other hand, Spain’s environment was strongly supportive of democracy. After Franco, ongoing economic integration among the European states under the umbrella of the EC attracted Spain to become a part of this integration. The industrial bourgeoisie in Spain was strongly in favour of membership of the EC. Membership of the EC also helped governments to impose unpopular measures at home under the supranational policies of EC.\(^{376}\) Compared to the favourable conditions for Spain, Turkey’s international environment was less conducive to democratisation. The democratic performances of Turkey’s neighbours’ were considerably poorer than that of Spain’s neighbours. Nevertheless, the Turkish military was aware of international commitments. They publicly confirmed their loyalty to democratic norms in their declarations. In addition, Turkey’s membership of the EC was more problematic than Spain’s. Turkey’s official application for membership in 1987 was declined by the EC in 1989. The EC complained about human rights violations and the level of minority rights in Turkey. The Turkish government had to take this development into consideration in order to integrate Turkey into Europe. Even though this development urged governments to take the necessary

\(^{375}\) Hale, *Türkiye’de Asker ve Siyaset*, 247.

measures for democracy, it is difficult to decide what extent these democratisation endeavours helped to achieve the supremacy of civilians over the military. The international environment, especially following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, would not favour military rule. Therefore the risk of a coup d’état was diminished by the early 1990s. However, it is not sufficient to identify the political system with civilian supremacy. To sum up, Spain’s international environment was more conducive for achieving civilian supremacy over the military.

The difference between the Spanish case and the Turkish case might be explained by Pridham’s different definitions of democratic consolidation. According to Pridham, consolidation can be negative or positive. Negative consolidation includes “the solution of any problems remaining from transition process and containment or reduction, if not removal, of any serious challenges to democratization.” 377 Whereas positive consolidation “refers to wider or deeper levels of the overall process…..includes the inculcation of democratic values at both elite and mass levels, and, therefore, it involves some remaking of the political culture in a direction that is a system supportive for a new democracy.” 378 The Turkish case proves that the civilian political elite was satisfied with negative consolidation. Following a period of military rule, Özal came to power with his centre-right party (ANAP) and adopted the principle of coexistence with the military. During his first term, he adopted a moderate discourse, especially on subjects sensitive for the military. Therefore, he continued with economic reforms. He used a moderate discourse in order to relieve tensions with the military and President Evren at the time of a possible conflict. Considering the Turkish generals’ reluctance to stay in power, the civilian leadership might have found the grounds to push for a positive consolidation to create a political culture supportive of democracy. During the initial years of political liberalization, other civilian political elites were interested in getting permission from the MGK for their parties and their leaders to participate in elections. As soon as they get permission, they sought political competition. They were quite satisfied with the military’s acquiescence in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, this satisfaction was followed in February 1998 by the military’s publicly-announced reaction against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Apparently, the military’s practice contrary to democratic ideals was mainly caused by the combination of two factors. The

378. Ibid, 169.
first factor was the fragmentation of the civilian political elite, which facilitated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and secondly, those elites were content to remain at a level of negative consolidation rather than positive consolidation. The military, with legal tutelary powers in the new democracy, voiced its concerns over the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, the Spanish political elite insisted on civilian supremacy over the military. Initially, civilians dominated the transition, through agreements and pacts among different parties of the society. Hence, they prevented the military from imposing its preferences on sensitive issues for democracy, e.g. the legalization of the Communist party and greater autonomy for certain regions. In addition, they diminished the number of ministers representing each branch of the institution to a single defence ministry. This change also contributed to the military’s institutionalization within the new democratic regime. The unity of the civilians as a response to the coup attempt in 1981 was another factor in the failure. Following the failed coup attempts, the PSOE government pursued NATO membership with determination. Therefore, Spanish civilians succeeded in securing civilian supremacy alongside adequate institutional autonomy for the military for efficient pursuit of its mission. In conclusion, the Spanish and Turkish cases differed in the level of consolidation pursued by civilian elites. The Spanish military acted in a more assertive manner than the Turkish military. The Turkish military never attempted a coup during the political liberalization and transition to democracy phases despite unexpected developments such as Özal’s attempt to by-pass bureaucracy and top commanders in foreign policy, or political liberalisation earlier than expected. Rather, they were aware of the negative impact of a coup attempt on internal unity of the military and on international commitments of the country.

In summary, Spain and Turkey experienced transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. Transition in Spain was followed by democratic consolidation, including civilian supremacy over the military, whereas transition to democracy in Turkey failed to pave the way for democratic consolidation. The nature of the dominant elite during the transition explains this difference between Spain and Turkey, to a certain extent. Although transition in Turkey was initiated and controlled from above, it would be hard to claim that the military was able to reach all of its objectives. Instead, the power struggle between the civilians and the military provided unexpected outcomes as in the case of the very first example of failing to establish a civilian cabinet during the military rule and in the case of political liberalisation. Thus, it is not sufficient to explain the
whole process by referring to initial conditions. The process displayed more dynamism than this sort of a scenario could offer. The transition in Turkey would be better explained by referring to rational interest calculations for each of the actors. Different actors pursued their own preferences and shaped the institutional design of the political system in the aftermath of the transition to democracy. Özal contested the military and possessed considerable capacity for leading political reform process, especially in his second term, even though the military entered the period of civilian rule from a position of strength. Özal’s efforts to by-pass bureaucracy and determine senior promotions within the military were significant examples of his contesting of the military’s influence during the transition. Similarly, banned political leaders challenged the restrictions on political participation and achieved their wish to lead their political parties legally. Therefore, the Turkish case supports Hunter’s argument that rational interest calculation determines the actions of military and civilian elites during transition to democracy. According to her, the mode of transition affects the balance of power in the new regime; however, its impact is much weaker and more short-lived than expected.379 Despite the complaints of civilians over the role of military in the post-authoritarian era, their disunity and ambiguous attitude toward civilian supremacy explain the low level of military subordination to civilians in Turkey. However, it is also fair to argue that if the rational interests of military and civilian institutions comply with the premises of democracy, civilian supremacy over the military might be achieved in Turkey, as well. To conclude: contrary to the claims of some analysts, the performance of Turkey in the transition to democracy has been satisfactory and the situation regarding further progress in this sphere is far from hopeless.

379. Hunter, “Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthorization Brazil”, 439. She studied Brazil as an example of transitions to democracy and explains the process in Brazil depending on the premises of the rational-choice institutionalism.
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