

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Turkey is located in one of the most strategic and problematic regions of the world and she has attracted the interest of foreign policy analysts from all around the world. The multi-dimensional nature of Turkish foreign policy has always provided researchers with a vast subject of research.¹ However, most of the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy is either of a descriptive or historical nature. Limited systematic work has been done on the decision and policy making mechanisms and processes that involve different interests of foreign policy actors, their conflicting views on foreign policy (political parties, bureaucratic organizations, state organs, public opinion, and strong leaders), and their inter-organizational negotiation process to formulate the foreign policy outcome of Turkey.² Thus, the central aim of this thesis is to analyze foreign policy making process and mechanism of Turkey with a concentration on how the conflicts among the foreign policy actors are waged and dealt with.

The foreign policy making mechanism of Turkey is one of the least studied aspects of Turkish foreign policy.³ The literature on Turkish foreign policy is mostly concentrated on her international and political domestic setting, systemic changes, and foreign policy outcomes. This thesis will analyze the conflicts that occur during the foreign policy making

¹For a detailed list of the studies on Turkish foreign policy see: İsmail Soysal, "Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri İçin Kılavuz" (İstanbul: Foundation for Middle Eastern and Balkan Studies, 1993); Mustafa Aydın and M.Nail Alkan, "An Extensive Bibliography of Studies in English, German and French on Turkish Foreign Policy (1923-1997)" (Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 1997); Mustafa Aydın, "World Expertise on Turkey and Turkish Foreign Policy Directory of Specialists and Institutions" (Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 2002)

²Leading studies on this subject could be listed as follows, , Esra Çuhadar- Gürkaynak and Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, "Decision making Process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases" Turkish Studies (Summer 2004), Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 43-78; Hüseyin Emiroglu, "Türk Dış Politikasının Oluşturulma Sürecinde Yasama-Yürütme İlişkileri," Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi [Journal of Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University](July-September 1999) Vol.54, No. 3, pp. 41-70; Ramazan Gözen, "Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alma Mekanizması, Turgut Özal ve Körfez Krizi", Yeni Türkiye (May-June 1996), Vol.2, No.9, pp. 286-302, Ali Karaosmanoglu, "Bürokratik Dış Politikayı Aşmak", Yeni Forum (October 1992), Vol. 13, No. 281, pp. 45-46; Gökhan Koçer, "Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alma Süreci ve Parlamento, Bir Kalite Analizi Denemesi," Kamu Yönetiminde Kalite 1. Ulusal Kongresi, Bildiriler, Ankara, Türkiye ve Orta Dogu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 1999. pp. 373-384; Mümtaz Soysal, "Dış Politika ve Parlamento" (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1964); İlhan Uzgöl, "Ordu ve Dış Politika: Kuşatılmışlıktan Kamplaşmaya Türk Dış Politikası", Mülkiyeliler Birliği Dergisi (December 1997), Vol. 21, No. 204, pp. 18-27

³ William M. Hale, "Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000," (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000) p. 205

process and their management mechanisms. The traditional decision-making system in Turkish foreign policy, in which the decisions are formulated relatively harmoniously among a few established actors, was challenged during the post Cold War era. Participation of numerous domestic actors in an issue reveals that the decisions and policies over the foreign policy issues were formulated not by a single rational actor but by the pulling and hauling among various domestic actors.⁴ Turkish foreign policy making is becoming more and more pluralist, open to conflicting interest of the actors during the making/formulation of foreign policy. Therefore, the foreign policy of Turkey has become a “negotiated order”⁵ which was not the case during the Cold War era. Thus, this change in the nature of foreign policy decision making mechanism of Turkey deserves to be analyzed.

Main research questions of this thesis could be listed as follows:

- 1) Which domestic actors are involved in the foreign policy making in each case and what are their interests and positions?
- 2) How do these foreign policy actors negotiate during the foreign policy decision making process and manage their differences?
- 3) What is the impact of the involved decision making units on the foreign policy outcome?

In order to explore these questions this thesis will undertake a comparative case study and will examine two cases and four decision occasions, two decision occasions under each case, in Turkish foreign policy. The first case is concerned with foreign policy of Turkey during the Gulf War (1991). In this case two decision occasions i) closure of the oil pipelines (Kirkuk- Yumurtalık), and ii) the US military deployment to Turkey will be analyzed. The second case is the US military intervention in Iraq (2003). For this case, the decision occasions of the US military deployment in Turkey, and the opening of the Turkish air space to US-led coalition in military intervention in Iraq will be analyzed.

⁴ For the discussion of the change in the domestic players see Philip Robins, “Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since The Cold War” (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003)

⁵ In decision making literature, the term “negotiated order” refers to the course of actions taken through the negotiations, rather than using power to force compliance with a focus on signaling, coalition-building, leadership, package-deals and compromise agreements. [Gary Alan Fine, “Negotiated Orders and Organizational Cultures,” Annual Review of Sociology (1984), Vol. 10, pp. 239–262]

This thesis is based on the following assumptions:

- 1-Turkish foreign policy making mechanism is a “negotiated order” between the conflicting interests of various foreign policy making actors.
- 2- There is an increase in number of the bureaucratic and institutional actors that are involved in the foreign policy making process; it is becoming more and more pluralist, open to conflicting interests of the actors.
- 3- The more actors participate in decision making, the longer and the more conflictual the decision making process becomes.

1. A) SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUBJECT AND CASES

Studies on foreign policy decision making literature are mostly concerned with the foreign policy of the US that is governed by a presidential system in which the president has strong power over foreign policy formulation. That makes generalization of the findings across nations very difficult because of cross-national validity.⁶ However, limited studies have been conducted with the countries administered through a parliamentary democracy or Westminster model in which the prime minister has limited power compared to a presidency in foreign policy decision making.⁷ Concerning the analysis of Turkish foreign policy making, there are two types of publications on this subject. The first type is the anecdotal evidence provided by influential journalists of Turkey who have close

⁶ Applicability of the findings of the studies conducted in the US setting to the different political settings is a problematic issue. The findings of the studies such as groupthink, bureaucratic politics, and impact of advisors in foreign policy making are product of the empirical evidences provided from the US setting; for better generalizations and validity of the findings more study on decision making is required and the findings are to be tested in different political settings.

⁷The following is the list of studies on foreign policy decision making in the countries governed by parliamentary democracy: Ranan D. Kuperman, “The Extent of Dissent: The Effect of Group Composition and Size on Israeli Decisions to Confront Low Intensity Conflict,” *European Journal of Political Research* (June 2002), Vol.41, No.4 pp.493-511; Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in British Foreign Policy Decision Making: Evidence from Korea, Suez, the Falklands, and Iraq 2003,” Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association-Midwest, St Louis, MO: 1-2 November 2004; Helen Butler, “Constraints on Prime Ministerial /Foreign Secretary Foreign Policy-making: the Case of Attlee and Bevin, 1945-1951”, paper presented in the Annual Conference of Political Studies Association (1991); Juliet Kaarbo, “Linking Leadership Style to Policy: How Prime Ministers Influence the Decision-Making Process,” in Ofer Feldman, Linda O. Valenty (Ed) “Profiling Political Leaders: Cross-Cultural Studies of Personality and Behavior” (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2001); William E. Paterson, “The Chancellor and Foreign Policy” in Stephen Padgett (Ed) “Adenauer to Kohl. The Development of the German Chancellorship,” (London: Hurst and Company, 1994)

connections to the policy making mechanisms and processes.⁸ The second type is academic writing. Existing academic literature on this subject is mostly descriptive analysis of one case, far from a comparative nature and not within a theoretical model.⁹ To have better understanding of the decision making mechanism of Turkish foreign policy, there is need for more comparative research within a theoretical model. This study aims to contribute to the literature on foreign policy decision making, particularly in the Turkish context taking a comparative approach using the “decision units” framework as the theoretical model.¹⁰

Following the dominance of the realist approach in foreign policy analysis in general, studies on Turkish foreign policy are carried out mostly from a realist perspective as well. So, the studies are concerned with the outcomes assumed to be formulated rationally and representing the national interest. The existing literature is narrow in focus, taking some part of bilateral, functional, regional relations, rather than viewing Turkish foreign policy in the round.¹¹ Foreign policy actors, policy formulation and implementation mechanisms, institutions are seldom studied, or they have been given secondary importance. To a great extent, this realist approach was adequate for Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War. However, the nature of Turkish foreign policy has changed in terms of substance, formulation and execution mechanisms; the process of foreign policy making has been somewhat chaotic¹² or a “contested domain”.¹³

⁸ For instance, Murat Yetkin, “Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü” (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003); M. Hulki Cevizoğlu, “Körfez Savaşı ve Özel Diplomasisi: Belgesel,” (İstanbul: Form Yayınları, 1991); Fikret Bila, ”Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Ankara’da Irak Savaşı,” (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2003); Mustafa Balbay, “Irak Bataklığında Türk Amerikan İlişkileri,” (İstanbul: Çağ Pazarlama Gazete Dergi Basım, 2004); Cüneyt Arcayürek, “Kriz Doğuran Savaş,” (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000)

⁹ Ertan Efeğil, “Foreign Policy-making in Turkey: A Legal Perspective” *Turkish Studies*, (Spring 2001), Vol.2, No.1, pp.147-160; Ertan Efeğil, “Körfez Krizi ve Türk Dış Politikası Karar Verme Modeli,” (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 2002); M. Fatih Tayfur and Korel Goymen,, “Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy: the Caspian Oil Pipeline Issue,” *Middle Eastern Studies* (April 2002), Vol.38, No.2; Mustafa Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991,” (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1998); Ramazan Gözen, “Amerikan Kışkacında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası,” (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2000); Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası (1990-91): 1998 Yılından Geriye Yönelik Bir Yeniden Değerlendirme,” (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1998)

¹⁰ “Decision units” framework will be introduced in the later part of this chapter.

¹¹ Robins, *ibid*, p.5

¹² Robins, *ibid*, p. 91

¹³ Robins, *ibid*, p.154

The cases to be analyzed in this thesis were selected according to the theoretical model of the thesis, the “decision units” framework. Both of the cases, the Gulf War (1990-91) and the US military intervention in Iraq (2003) are complex decisions in which the decision making actors and processes played a significant role, providing rich empirical evidence for the purpose of this thesis. In both cases, there is organizational and bureaucratic conflict among the players in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Parallel to the conflicts, both cases had impact on the re-positioning of Turkey within the newly emerging systems. For instance, the policy of Turkey in the Gulf War (1990-91) impacted her new role in the newly emerging “new world order”. In that case, Turkey came to the brink of an international war for which she was unprepared and unenthusiastic about since her establishment in 1923.¹⁴ After the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy followed the Western lead. Throughout the Cold War she was a distant outpost on the European periphery, a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, and a contributor to the security of Europe. During this period, Turkey ignored the volatile politics of the Middle East and in turn was mostly ignored by Southern neighbors. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the symbol of global ideological confrontation between socialism and capitalism, at first it was assumed that systemic breakdown would devalue even further the importance of Turkey that had only been peripheral significance during the Cold War. The newly emerging world system that effectively made it impossible for Turkey to follow her traditionalist foreign policy based on the relative safety and stability of Cold War politics. The Gulf War also had some long term implications for both Turkey’s future relations and global role, and on relations with her Western allies as well as Middle Eastern countries.¹⁵

¹⁴ The Cyprus intervention (1974) was a limited affair in which Turkey had right to intervene as a guarantor of the peace in the island in accordance with the international agreements (“Zurich Agreement” between Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers on February 11, 1959 and “London Agreements”, Memorandum Setting Out The Agreed Foundation For The Final Settlement of The Problems of Cyprus, between Government of the United Kingdom, Government of the Kingdom of Greece, Government of the Turkish Republic on February 19, 1959), and the only other military conflict Turkey was involved in was fought over the faraway lands of Korea in a desire to be a member of NATO (1950).

¹⁵The policy that Turkey followed in the Gulf War showed that she would continue her alliance with Western camp and give up her former neutral policy over Middle East. After Gulf War Turkey became an active player in Middle Eastern politics. Mustafa Aydın, “Ten Years After: Turkey’s Gulf Policy (1990-91) Revisited,” Ankara Paper, (2000) No.3, (published by Frank Cass, London for Eurasian Strategic Studies-ASAM, Ankara) p. 13

In the second case, the entire decision process took a long time of discussion, debate, and negotiation among the decision making actors (August 2002- March 2003) coinciding with the administration of four different governments (1st Ecevit, 2nd Ecevit, 1st Gül, and 1st Erdoğan cabinets:¹⁶ The first two of them were coalition governments with three parties while the last two of them were single party ones). In this case, there has been a fundamental conflict between the government and the Parliament that rejected the motion allowing the American troops to be stationed in the territory of Turkey for a military intervention in Iraq. Such a parliamentary decision is a rare case in Turkish foreign policy making mechanism. This case was in parallel to another decision making cases; negotiation for the Annan Plan towards a permanent peace in the Cyprus Island, and full membership negotiations with the EU, which means the decision making mechanism was under heavy pressure.

This thesis is organized in the following way. First, the methodological and theoretical framework for the thesis will be established, and then a detailed chronology of the two cases will be presented for a better analysis and meaningful picture of the entire decision. Then the authoritative decision unit for each occasion for decision will be determined. After this, the decision making process and dynamics for each occasion will be analyzed. In this part, the different and conflicting perspectives, interests, values of each foreign policy actor will be taken into consideration. The main focus in this part is the question of how the conflicts between these actors are reconciled or not among different policy making actors. In the last part of the thesis, the comparison of the occasions for decision in terms of type of decision unit and decision making process will be discussed. The findings from both cases will be discussed comparatively in this part.

¹⁶ 4 June 1999 – 11 July 2002 1st Bülent Ecevit government; 11 July 2002- 19 November 2002 2nd Bülent Ecevit government; 19 November 2002- 12 March 2003 Abdullah Gül government; 12 March 2003- present Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government (www.basbakanlik.gov.tr)

1. B) METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

For the comparative analysis of the four foreign policy decision occasions and illustration of the narrative, this thesis will undertake a structured- focused comparative case study and will follow the process tracing method. Below, the structured- focused comparative case study and process tracing method will be discussed.

1. B. 1) Structured, Focused, Comparative Case Study

Case study is one of the most frequently used methods in social science research, especially in the field of political science for the purposes of theory development and theory refinement. However, among the scholars there is not an agreement on the meaning of “case study.”¹⁷ In an attempt to provide a clear and comprehensive definition, Beasley and Kaarbo define “case study” as the method of obtaining a “case” or a number of “cases” through an empirical examination of a real-world phenomenon within its naturally occurring context, without directly manipulating either the phenomenon or the context, and “comparative case study” as the systematic comparison of two or more data points (“cases”) obtained through use of the case study method.¹⁸ “Method of structured, focused comparison” developed by Alexander George is one of the most useful guides for comparative case study.¹⁹ The comparison is “focused” because it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the historical case ...and “structured” because it employs general question to guide the data collection analysis in that historical case.”²⁰ “Structured” nature of a case study makes it possible to have systematic comparison of the findings from multiple cases; whereas the “focused” nature leads us to have a selective theoretical focus. For this approach, George identifies three steps. First, the study design and structure is

¹⁷ Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan Beasley, “A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method in Political Psychology,” *Political Psychology* (1999), Vol. 20, No.2, pp. 369-391

¹⁸ Kaarbo and Beasley, *ibid*, p. 372

¹⁹ Kaarbo and Beasley, *ibid*, p. 377

²⁰ Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," in (Ed) Paul Lauren, “Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and Policy” (Free Press, 1979) pp. 61-61 cited in Kaarbo and Beasley, *ibid*, p. 377

specified. Second, the individual case studies are carried out. Third, the findings of the case studies are compared.²¹

1. B.2) Process Tracing Method

Process tracing is a methodology designed to help identify and classify decision-making processes and also in linking processes and foreign policy outcomes. It is presented as a methodological solution to the problem of generating causal explanations with a small number of cases. It was advocated by Alexander L. George²² especially for the study of foreign policy decision making.²³

The general method of process tracing is to generate and analyze data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that link putative causes to observed effects.²⁴ Process tracing technique starts with the assumption that decision-making is best studied by collecting data while the decision is actually being made. Process-tracing is a strategy to estimate the presence of certain variables through a detailed reconstruction of “the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes.”²⁵ This seems to be an appropriate method to use since the empirical observations guiding the analysis also concern such decision-making processes, namely the context of political and legislative decision-making.

In the application of process-tracing, researchers follow through all the steps of the policy-making process including the actions of all actors involved in the process, up until the outcome (for example, a law, authoritative decision). Researchers who use this method

²¹ Alexander George, *ibid*, pp. 54-59

²² Alexander L. George, “The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-making Behavior: The “operational code” Belief System.” in (Ed) Lawrence S. Falkowski, “Psychological Models in International Politics,” (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979)

²³ Steven B. Redd. “The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Study,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (June 2002), Vol.46, Issue. 3, pp. 344-345

²⁴ Andrew Bennett, Alexander L. George, “Process Tracing in Case Study” Research Paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, 17-19 October 1997 (www.georgetown.edu/bennett)

²⁵ Alexander George and Tim McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational decision Making,” in (Ed) Robert Coulam and Richard Smith, “Advances in Information Processing in Organizations,” (Greenwich, CT. JAI Press, 1985), p.35

often can not rely upon written documents alone, because many critical steps do not leave a written trace and because the motivations of key actors remain unclear. Interviews with all possible political actors provide a crucial link in the analysis of the political process.

This study aims to analyze the conflicts in foreign policy making mechanism in Turkish context. In order to study this and reach some conclusions on the nature of the conflicts occur in the decision making mechanism and ways of handling those conflicts, two cases and four decision occasions were selected. The cases that will be analyzed in this thesis, the Gulf War (1991) and the US military intervention in Iraq (2003) were selected in order to be able to compare different decision units and how they generated different decision outcomes. They present different decision units, thus different key contingencies and decision outcomes. Both cases present rich empirical evidences to study this subject. In terms of methodology, structured, focused, comparative case study is employed in this study because it allows researchers to make a systematic comparison of two or more case for theory development and refinement. This method enables the researcher to deal selectively with only certain aspects of a case (conflict among the decision- makers in this study) and to have systematic comparison of the findings from multiple cases (the Gulf War and the US military intervention in Iraq). This study also follows process tracing method since the process tracing specifically designed for decision making process, it is the best methodology that fits to the nature of this study.

1. B. 3) Data Collection and Analysis

The research of this thesis is based on two types of sources. The first type is first hand sources such as archival and official news sources published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs such as Dışişleri Güncesi [Diary of Foreign Affairs]²⁶ and semi official publications of Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information²⁷ such as Ayın Tarihi [History of the Month],²⁸ Newspot²⁹, governmental and

²⁶Electronically available www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/Yayinlar/DisisleriBakanligiYayinlari/DisisleriGuncesi/

²⁷Electronically available: www.byegm.gov.tr/

²⁸ Quarterly news digest which summarizes on the daily bases all the turkish daily newspapers.

²⁹ Weekly (now bimonthly) newspaper

ministerial position papers, briefings, declarations, reports, official publications, press meetings, media appearances, proceedings of parliamentary debates, minutes of the meetings which are publicly available. The second type is the second hand sources: academic writings as well as qualified newspaper accounts, chronologies, memories of the people who involved in the decision making process and journalists who had close contact with the decision makers of the time.

In addition to the main data sources, two interviews were conducted in order to complement the information that was obtained via the study of official documents. The target group for interviews included people who were directly or indirectly involved in the decision making process. The first person that was interviewed was Mehmet Keçeciler who was the state minister responsible for the energy affairs and participant in the first decision occasion. The second person was the H.E. Retired Ambassador Güner Öztekin, the Turkish ambassador in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion.

1. B. 4) Methodological Problems Encountered in this Research

One of the most important problems that were encountered in this research was accessing data, especially primary official sources. Many documents being held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish General Staff are classified and therefore inaccessible. Many of the foreign policy issues for an authoritative decision in the Turkish Grand National Assembly are discussed in closed sessions and the proceedings of the closed sessions are classified for 10 years.³⁰ Therefore, for instance, the proceedings of the session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in which two authoritative foreign policy decisions were finalized for the last two decision occasions (the US military intervention in Iraq) still remain classified and inaccessible. However, some classified documents are

³⁰ Article 70 of the Internal Regulations of Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi İçtüzüğü), Official Gazette, 13 April 1973, Issue: 14506, Decision Number: 584, Decision Date: 5 March 1973. The full text of the internal regulation is available in the web site of TGNA: <www.tbmm.gov.tr/ictuzuk.htm>

accessible through the publications of the journalists.³¹ So, this research had to rely on the materials that were available so far.

Another difficulty in this research was reaching the data describing the process of decision making. The flow of the negotiations, and discussions among the relevant policy making actors were not clear for the researchers although it is possible to know the flow of the official meetings. Even though there is always an official or semi official statement after the meetings, it is hard to know the contribution of the meetings to the decision. In this case, this study has to rely on the open sources such as qualified newspaper accounts. Interviewing the decision making actors was another problem, especially for the second case. The people involved in the last case were not available for interview since they were still in the official positions or in other governmental position. However, the actors involved in the first case were more open for an interview. Unlike the US, in Turkey, former politicians and high ranking bureaucrats do not have tendency to write their memories. For instance, Colin Powell, the Chief of Staff of the US, and former President Bill Clinton published their memories.³² In the Turkish context, there is limited publication of this kind. The memories of General Necip Torumtay, who was the chief of Staff during the Gulf War and the memories of President Özal were written in interview format by a journalist who was very close to him were useful for this research.

1. C) LITERATURE REVIEW and THEORETICAL SKECTH

For the theoretical framework of this thesis, in an attempt to create a better understanding and an analytical framework for Turkish foreign policy and to establish background to this thesis, first the literature on foreign policy decision making will be reviewed. This attempt will help to locate this thesis in the pre-existing literature. Then the “decision units”

³¹ For instance secret document of “Memorandum of Understanding between government of Republic of Turkey and government of the United States of America, on the establishment and implementation of basic policy, principles, procedures, and to determine the status of forces provisionally deployed for the purposes of possible operations towards Iraq” was published by Fikret Bila. For the full text of the document see: Fikret Bila, “Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Ankara’da Irak Savaşı,” (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2003)

³² Colin L. Powell, “My American Journey,” (New York : Ballantine Books, 2003) and Bill Clinton, “My Life,” (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 2004)

framework will be explored. And finally, the literature on Turkish foreign policy decision making will be reviewed.

1. C.1) Foreign Policy Decision Making

The theoretical debate in international relations and foreign policy analysis used to be dominated by the structural-systemic perspective of the realist approach. Realists assume that all governments, whether democratic or authoritarian, big or small, developed or underdeveloped, pursue national interests in an international environment characterized by anarchy, where there is no overarching central authority. Realists suggest that, in order to understand why a state is behaving in a particular way, its relative capabilities and its external environment, balance of power system and alliances should be examined. This is because, in a realist understanding, those factors will be translated relatively smoothly into foreign policy behavior and shape how the state chooses to advance its interests in international politics. The realist argument concludes that since the foreign policy objectives of each state is apparently guided by a single set of values, preferences and objectives, which speak with one voice that is consistent with the national interest; domestic factors and decision-units do not make a significant difference. After all, the international system ultimately determines the behavior of states. Domestic factors and decision-making processes and effects of different decision units were given secondary importance in explaining foreign policy behavior, if they were not totally ignored.³³

However, this situation has been changing in the last several decades. Several assumptions of the realist paradigm have been challenged. Critical works by international relations and foreign policy scholars of liberal approach have all shown the importance of domestic factors and decision-making processes in foreign policy analysis. Liberals have included domestic variables, such as regime structure, role of interest groups, bureaucracies, political parties and decision-making processes in their explanations. This school of thought in international relations theory argues that the role of domestic political influences coming

³³ For the detailed analysis of the realist theory, see the pioneering work of realist approach see Hans Joachim Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace," (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993)

from political parties, interest groups and civil society organizations could be illustrated by negotiations among foreign policy actors.³⁴

Despite the obvious and long-standing interest of social scientists in decision-making processes, the concept of decision-making was not defined or developed in the analysis of international politics before the 1950s. Beginning in the 1950s and continuing in the 1960s and 1970s, several social scientists began to pay more attention to decision-making processes and brought new dimensions to the decision-making analysis. Assuming the states as not unitary actors, not rational actors, liberals and pluralists suggested a closer look at the decision making actors and processes. It was argued by this school of thought in international relations theory that foreign policy decision making process could be studied scientifically. Richard C. Snyder is one of the pioneers in this regard.³⁵ Snyder stated that the focus of international relations should be on the actions, reactions, and interactions of states. The state is specifically its “decision makers” and the state action “is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state”. He emphasized that in order to explain the behavior of the states, how the decision makers view the world should be taken into consideration. So, the subjective factors from the standpoint of decision makers and the decision makers setting should be discussed in the explanations of the actors of the state.

Decision-making is the act of choosing between competing alternatives. The alternatives are usually different strategies for solving a problem. The fundamental concept is that decision-making is a process of selection according to some criterion adopted by the decision-maker.³⁶ Decision-making is the process in which a decision-maker chooses the best action out of alternative possibilities given to him. The following elements describe the steps of the decision making process: i) Problem recognition and definition; ii) Search for

³⁴ For the detailed analysis of liberal approach see (Ed) Ian Clark, and Iver B. Neumann, “Classical Theories of International Relations” (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); (Ed) Hazel Smith, “Democracy and International Relations: Critical Theories, Problematic Practices,” (New York: St. Martin's Press; Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 2000); Robert Crawford, “Idealism and Realism in International Relations: Beyond the Discipline,” (New York: Routledge, 2000)

³⁵ Richard C. Snyder, et al, “Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics,” (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1954)

³⁶ Lerner W. Allan, “The Politics of Decision-Making,” (London: Sage Publications, 1976) p.8

alternative solutions; iii) Evaluation of the alternatives; iv) Implementation of the choice made and assessment of the results.

Following the study of Snyder, several theoretical models have been developed by the scholars of comparative foreign policy analysis. The bureaucratic politics, groupthink, operational code, two levels game and decision units framework are the most commonly referred theoretical models in this regard. In the following paragraphs, these models will be mentioned briefly.

The “bureaucratic politics” model which was developed by Allison and Halperin provides one such important framework in explaining the role of the decision-making process in the foreign policy making.³⁷ In the “bureaucratic politics” model, the domestic participants of the foreign policy do not focus on any one strategic issue, but on many “intra-national”, “intra-institutional” and “inter-personal” issues. In bureaucratic politics, decisions and policies do not emerge as a result of rational choice, but as a result of the pulling and pushing among the leaders of various domestic organizations, each with their own goals and priorities. In this environment, misexpectation, misperception, miscommunication and misinformation are very common. These leaders join the decision and policy-making process with some independent standing because of the decentralization of governmental power. Accordingly, government decisions and actions result from bargaining (political process) among these bureaucratic and organizational players. In this process, one group sometimes triumphs over others fighting for different alternatives. Sometimes, different groups promoting different alternatives, through the negotiations, produce a result distinct from what any person or group initially intended.

Another scholar of international relations, Irving L. Janis, examined the tendency for social pressure to enforce conformity and consensus in cohesive decision making groups. He called this tendency “groupthink” and defined it as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, and when the member’s striving

³⁷ Graham Allison, “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crises,” (New York: Harper Collins, 1971)

for unanimity override their motivations to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”³⁸ There are several factors that provide a ground for “groupthink” to take root. These include a group that is moderately or highly cohesive, group insulation from external expert information and critical assessment, an absence of an impartial leadership tradition in group deliberations, a lack of methodological procedures to carry out decision-making tasks, and stress among group members. Groupthink limits the discussion to only a few alternative courses of action. It leads to failing to reexamine initial decision and possible courses of action initially rejected, little attempt to seek information from outside experts who may challenge the preferred policy. According to Janis, any decision making impacted by groupthink, suffers from several problems; it relates to a limited search by the group of alternative courses of action; the groups fail to analyze the objectives to be met and the values associated with choice; it neglects to revisit the courses of action initially favored by most group members to examine risks and weaknesses that may have been overlooked; it leads to a failure to re-examine the cost and benefits of courses of action previously rejected; lack of contingency plan in the event that the decision is obstructed by political, bureaucratic or other barriers.

Another predominant study that focused on the impact of decision-makers’ belief system on foreign policy making is Alexander George’s “operational code” analysis.³⁹ This phrase first employed by Leites in his “The Operational Code of the Politburo” to refer to the precepts or maxims of political tactics and strategy that characterized the classical Bolshevik approach to politics.⁴⁰ Alexander L. George attempted to codify the approach of Leites into a more explicit and usable research model.⁴¹ He interpreted various components of the model of Leites and reconstructed it. This model assumes that there are important cognitive limits on the possibility of rational decision-making in politics; the model of rationality is subject to of the following constraints: i) the political actor’s information with which he must deal is usually incomplete, ii) his knowledge of end-means relationship is generally inadequate to predict the consequences of choosing one or another course of

³⁸ Irving L. Janis, “Victims of Groupthink,” (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972) p.9

³⁹ Alexander L. George, “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,” *International Studies Quarterly* (June 1969), Vol. 13, No.2 pp.190-222

⁴⁰ Nathan Leites, “The Operational Code of the Politburo,” (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951)

⁴¹ George, *ibid*, pp.191-192

action, iii) it is often difficult for the leader to formulate a single criterion by means of which to choose which alternative course of action is “best”.⁴² George argues that knowledge of the belief system provides one of the important inputs needed for behavioral analyses of political decision-making and leadership style; politics is particularly influenced by the actor’s assumption about the nature of political conflict and the actor’s image of opponents.⁴³

Another model emphasized the role of domestic factors in foreign policy making was proposed by Robert Putnam is the “two-level game.”⁴⁴ In his model, he challenges the assumptions of realist paradigm through the elaboration of the role of domestic political influences coming from political parties, interest groups and civil society organizations. He discusses how international negotiations resemble a “two-level game”, where the chief negotiator, must interact with and solve problems in two arenas: acceptable deals with the international partners, and ratification of any deal within the relevant domestic institutions. In addition to the constraints at the international level, the negotiator is also constrained at the national level by his or her domestic constituencies, who pursue their own interests for favorable policies. Putnam states that:

“At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among these groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressure, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision makers so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.”⁴⁵

This model is important because it captures the essential elements of the foreign policymaking process by suggesting that domestic politics affect the extent and the ability of a head of government (chief negotiator) to respond to constraints at the international level.

⁴² George, *ibid*, pp. 197-198

⁴³ George, *ibid*, pp. 220, 221

⁴⁴ Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* (1988), Vol. 42, pp. 427-460

⁴⁵ Putnam, *ibid*, p.434

As far as the theoretical model used in this thesis is concerned, the “decision units” framework has a special status. “Decision units” framework is a contingency framework that integrates many foreign policy decision making theories that existed previously. It argues that who makes the decision (decision units) has an impact on foreign policy making process and foreign policy outcome. “Decision units” framework has some features that differ from the other models of foreign policy decision making; it enables a cross-national analysis of foreign policy decision makers; it is applicable to different types of political regimes; it provides a means for focusing on the key actors within a government involved in foreign policy decision occasion; and it facilitates the comparison and contrast between different types of decision units. These features make “decision units” framework more accessible theoretical model in the study of foreign policy decision making. Thus, this framework will guide the empirical analysis presented in the body of this study. In the following pages the “decision units” framework will be introduced.

1. C.2) “Decision Units” Framework


Based on the assumption that who makes decisions and how has an impact in foreign policy decision making, the “decision units” framework developed by Margaret Hermann will be employed in this thesis.⁴⁶ This framework provides the necessary tools to undertake a comparative analysis of the decision making process in both cases. “Decision units” framework seeks to understand how the decision makers shape foreign policy decision making across diverse situations and issues as well as different political settings.⁴⁷ It is built upon the existing research on foreign policy decision making that overviews decision making models including bureaucratic politics, group dynamics, and presidential advisory systems, governmental politics, leadership, coalition politics, and strategies for dealing with domestic opposition. This framework is an attempt to integrate this extant literature and to identify under which conditions which of these theories are more applicable.

⁴⁶ Margaret G. Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” *International Studies Review* (2001), Vol.3, No.2, pp.47–81.

⁴⁷ Hermann, *ibid*, p.48

The framework has several components: i) it views decision making as a response to a foreign policy problem which is compartmentalized into its occasions for decision, ii) it suggests that in all occasions for decisions, there is one of the three types of authoritative decision units (predominant leader, single group, coalition of multiple autonomous actors), iii) it suggests that these different decision units set into motion different decision making processes and outcomes, iii) it links these different decision processes to particular decision outcomes.⁴⁸ The figure below provided by Herman illustrates the connections between these components.

FIGURE 1: Process Stages of Decision Making Framework⁴⁹



“Decision unit” framework proposes that in one occasion there can be one of the three types of authoritative decision units. These units can be one of the following⁵⁰:

⁴⁸ Hermann, *ibid*, pp. 51-52

⁴⁹ Hermann, *ibid*, p. 52

⁵⁰ Hermann, *ibid*, pp. 56-57

1. **predominant leader:** this is the case when a single individual has the ability to influence the decision making and also has the power to make decision alone if necessary
2. **single group:** this is the situation when a group of individuals that are members of a single group make the decision
3. **coalition of autonomous actors:** in this case, the actors are separate individuals, groups, or representative of institutions and they come together to make a decision. None of them has the ability to decide by itself and force compliance on the other.

In this research, the decision unit for each occasion for decision will be determined before accounting for the ways in which the decision unit has affected the foreign policy making. This means that it will be first determined whether there is one individual with power and authority to commit or withhold the resources of the government (pre-dominant leader), a single group responsible for dealing with the problem (single group), or a different actor that has to negotiate before the resources of the government can be committed for such a problem (coalition of autonomous actors). For this purpose, “decision units” framework suggests that both formal and informal structure of decision-making mechanisms should be taken into consideration.⁵¹

Determining the authoritative decision unit


In order to identify the decision unit in each occasion for decision, this thesis will use the “decision units” tree developed by Hermann. Once the foreign policy problem is recognized, the first step is to assess whether the leader of the current regime is a predominant leader who has authority and is personally handling the foreign policy problem. In order to understand this, a series of questions are to be asked about the interest and active involvement of the leader in foreign policy issues, the leader’s perception of the importance of the problem, the evidence of the on-going participation of the leader in the decision making process, and the extent to which the leader shares decision making

⁵¹ Hermann, *ibid*, pp.57-58

responsibility with others. If the predominant leader does not exercise his/her authority, according to the framework the next possible decision unit is a single group.

A single group has the decision making authority in case it has been given responsibility for all problems, or when the question relates to an issue critical to the wellbeing of the political regime or state, or because within the hierarchy of groups, one group has the authority to make decisions that commit or withhold the nation’s resources. If the decision unit is neither a predominant leader nor a single group, then the decision unit is a coalition of multiple autonomous actors. The following figure shows us how the authoritative decision unit is determined according to the “decision units” framework.

FIGURE 2: Factors involved in determining the nature of the authoritative decision unit for an occasions for decision.⁵²



⁵² Hermann, ibid, p. 58

Following the studies of Hermann⁵³, Holsti⁵⁴, and Greenstein⁵⁵ on political leadership and foreign policy decision making, “decision units” framework suggests that there are conditions that favors a predominant leader to be the authoritative decision unit. These conditions could be listed as certain type of situations that guarantee personal involvement such as high level diplomacy, crises events, the personal features of leaders that push leaders to desire to control the problem, his/her interest on the issue, expertise and techniques for managing information and resolving disagreement.⁵⁶

Situation in which the government is not structured around a single individual and when one particular group, “in which the members have a stake in solving and have expertise in resolving foreign policy problem” has a role and responsibility to deal with the occasion for decision, then the authoritative decision unit is “a single group”.⁵⁷ One particular group, such as Politburo, or a cabinet, might have a role to deal with the type of occasion for decision that is facing the government. In a single group, there is a collective, interactive decision process in which all the group members participate.

If the authoritative decision unit is composed of multiple autonomous actors, two or more entities such as individual leaders, group of policymakers, bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, the authoritative decision unit is a “coalition of multiple autonomous actors”. In determining the type of decision unit, there is a necessity to consider whether or not there are separate, independent actors who have to work together in making a decision or nothing will happen.⁵⁸ If the decision unit is a coalition of actors, any of the actors can not commit resources of the government without the consent of the others. Actors form single or

⁵³ Margerat G. Herman “Circumstances Under Which Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy” in (Ed) James n. Rosenau, “In Search of Global Patterns,” (New York: Free Press, 1976); Margerat G. Herman, “The Role of Leaders and Leadership in the Making of American Foreign Policy” in (Ed) Eugene R. Wittkopf and Charles W. Kegley, “The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence” (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988)

⁵⁴ Ole R. Holsti, “Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making: Foreign Policy Actors Viewed Psychologically,” *American Behavioral Scientist*, (September-October 1976), Vol. 20, pp.11-32; Ole R. Holsti, “Foreign Policy Decision-Makers Viewed Cognitively,” in (Ed) Robert Axelrod, “The Structure of Decision,” (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976)

⁵⁵ Fred Greenstein, “Personality and Politics,” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987)

⁵⁶ Margaret G. Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” *International Studies Review* (2001), Vol.3, No.2, p. 59

⁵⁷ Hermann, *ibid*, p. 60

⁵⁸ Hermenn, *ibid*, p. 62

multiple coalitions to arrive at a decision.⁵⁹ Also, the presence of relevant actors outside the government can change the nature of the decision unit even if the formal structure of the government requires that the authoritative decision unit is predominant leader or a single group.⁶⁰

Decision unit dynamics

In each of the three decision units, there is a key contingency that sets different decision making dynamics into motion. In the following paragraphs, these key contingencies for each type of decision unit will be discussed.

According to Hermann, if the decision unit is a predominant leader, the first key contingency is the sensitivity of the leader to the information offered to him/her. If the leader is less sensitive to information, the leadership style becomes more important in determining what will happen. In this case, leaders are more interested in persuading others and carrying out their own agendas and programs than seeking advice or listening to the others. They want people who will implement their decisions and who will provide them confirming rather than disconfirming information.⁶¹ The leaders who are less sensitive to the political context act more like advocates. They intend to find information in the political environment that support their definition of the situation or position and overlook any evidence that may be disconfirmatory. Their attention is focused on persuading others of their position. Leaders who are advocates for a position use their times to build case and lobby others to their side. The leaders who are more sensitive to the political context are cue takers. They both define the problem and identify a position by checking what important others are advocating and doing. Such leaders are interested in information that is both discrepant and supportive of the options on the table at the moment.⁶²

⁵⁹ Hermann, *ibid*, p.62

⁶⁰ Hermann, *ibid*, p.62

⁶¹ Hermann, *ibid*, p.65

⁶² Margaret G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, Timothy M. Shaw, "Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals," *International Studies Review* (2001), Vol.3, No.2, p. 92

According to the “decision units” framework, the second key contingency in case of a predominant leader is whether the leader challenges or respects the constraints. Leaders who are relatively insensitive to the political context are more likely to meet a situation head on; to achieve quick resolution to the problems they are facing; to be decisive; to deal with what is perceived as the problem of the moment. To facilitate maintaining their influence over political events, these type of leaders work to bring policymaking under their control. According to Hermann, leaders who are more sensitive to the context have been found that they are i) emphatic to their surrounding, ii) interested in how relevant constituencies are viewing events and in seeking their support, iii) open to bargaining, trade-offs, and compromise, and iv) focused on the events on a case-by-case basis. These type of leaders need support from their political environment before making a decision. Constraints set the parameters for action of these type of leaders. Flexibility, political timing, and consensus building are viewed as important leadership tools in this case. The model states that while goal-driven (less sensitive) leaders are going to be more comfortable in a setting where they are in control and able to set the criteria for action (decision making), the contextually responsive (more sensitive) leaders will have increased tolerance for the sharing of power and the time involved in gaining the consent of the others in the government.⁶³

According to Hermann, the third key contingency that determines the nature of a predominant leader is the motivation of leader for action. The framework argues that different type of needs and incentives push people to assume leadership positions in politics. Political leaders are motivated either by an internal focus or by the desire for a certain kind of feedback from those in their environment. In the case of internal motivation, the leaders are pushed to act by ideas and images that they believe and advocate. In opposite case, they seek a certain kind of relationship with important others and are pulled by forces outside themselves to action. Leaders focused on problems and causes are less sensitive to the political context; they know what needs to be done and they do it. The

⁶³ Hermann, et.al, *ibid*, p.91

leaders interested in building relationships are more sensitive to the political context because it is only through interaction with others that they can be satisfied and fulfilled.⁶⁴

Knowledge about how leaders react to constraints, process information, and are motivated to deal with their political environment indicates that there is a wide array of leadership styles. The following table provided by Hermann displays the eight leadership styles that result when these three key contingency are interrelated.

TABLE 1: Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness of Constraints, Openness to Information, and Motivation⁶⁵

Responsiveness to Constraint	Openness to Information	MOTIVATION	
		Problem Focus	Relationship Focus
Challenges the Constraints (Becomes a Crusader)	Closed to Information (Becomes a Crusader)	<i>Expansionistic</i> (Focus is on expanding one's power and influence)	<i>Evangelistic</i> (Focus is on persuading others to accept one's message and join one's cause)
Challenges the Constraints (Is generally strategic)	Open to Information (Is generally strategic)	<i>Incremental</i> (Focus is on maintaining one's maneuverability and flexibility while avoiding the obstacles that continually try to limit both)	<i>Charismatic</i> (Focus is on one's agenda by engaging others in the process and persuading them to act.)
Respect Constraints (Inclined toward pragmatism)	Closed to information (Inclined toward pragmatism)	<i>Directive</i> (Focus in on personally guiding policy along paths consistent with one's views while still working within the norms and rules of the one's current position)	<i>Consultative</i> (Focus is on monitoring that important others will support, or not actively opposes, what one wants to do in a particular situation)
Respect Constraints (Is usually opportunistic)	Open to information (Is usually opportunistic)	<i>Reactive</i> (Focus is on assessing what is possible in the current situation given the nature of the problem and considering what important constituencies will allow)	<i>Accommodative</i> (Focus is on reconciling differences and building consensus, empowering others and sharing accountability in the process)

⁶⁴ Hermann, et.al, ibid, p.93

⁶⁵ Hermann, et.al, ibid, p.95

As far as the key contingency for a single group decision unit is concerned, according to the model, the key contingency is the techniques that are used to manage the conflict within the group. According to the decision units model there are three models to describe how single groups cope with the conflict:⁶⁶

- i) Members act to minimize the conflict by promoting concurrence (groupthink)
- ii) They acknowledge that disagreement is a fundamental part of the decision making and seek to resolve the conflict through debate and compromise (bureaucratic politics)
- iii) Members recognize that such conflict may have no resolution and enact a rule to govern decision making (winning majority)

Finally, for the “coalition of autonomous actors”, the key contingency is the nature of the rules and procedures guiding interaction among the decision making actors. If the rules are essentially absent, there is generally anarchy and instability in the government with different actors. If there are established rules, the nature of the rules and the theories of the coalition formation help researcher to ascertain the decisions that are likely to prevail. If the decision rules permit an authoritative decision when a group of actors in the coalition achieves an agreement on the course of action, a minimum connected coalition is possible. If the decision rules require unanimity among all the participants in the coalition, there is a “unit veto” system in which any single actor can block these initiatives of all others.⁶⁷ Table portrayed below summarizes these key contingencies applicable to different types of decision units.

⁶⁶ Margaret G. Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” *International Studies Review* (2001), Vol.3, No.2, p. 65

⁶⁷ Hermann, *ibid*, pp.65-66

TABLE 2: Key Contingencies in Decision Units Dynamics ⁶⁸

Decision Unit	Key Contingency	Theories Exemplify	Decision Process
Predominant Leader	Sensitivity to Contextual Information a) Relatively Sensitive (Goals and Means are Well-Defined) b) Moderately Sensitive (Goals Well-Defined, Means Flexible; Political Timing Important) c) Highly Sensitive (Goals and Means Flexible)	Personality Theory Theories based on the Person/Situation Interaction Theories Focused on the Situation alone	Principled Strategic Pragmatic
Single Group	Techniques used to Manage Conflict in Group a) Members Act to Minimize Conflict (Members Loyal to Group) b) Members Acknowledge Conflict Is Unavoidable; Groups Must Deal with It (Members' Loyalty Outside Group; Unanimity Decision Rule) c) Members Recognize Conflict May Have no Resolution (Members' Loyalty Outside Group; Majority Decision Rule)	Group Dynamics (Groupthink) Bureaucratic Politics Minority/Majority Influence and Jury Decision Making	Deny Conflict and Seek Concurrence Resolve Conflict through Debate and Compromise Accept Conflict and Allow for Winning Majority
Coalition	Nature of Rules/Norms Guiding Interaction: a) No Established Rules for Decision Making b) Established Norms Favor Majority Rule c) Established Norms Favor Unanimity Rule	Theories of Political Instability Theories of Coalition Formation Theories Regarding Development of Under-and-Over-Sized coalitions	Anarchy Minimum Connected Winning Coalition Unit Veto

Process Outcomes of the “Decision Units” Approach

According to the “decision units” framework, there are six possible outcomes in a decision making process. These are i) one party’s position prevails, ii) concurrence, iii) mutual

⁶⁸ Hermann, *ibid*, p. 67

compromise/consensus, iv) lopsided compromise, v) deadlock, vi) fragmented symbolic action.⁶⁹ The outcomes of the process indicate the final decision in terms of the preferences of the involved actors. When one party's position prevails, some of those in the decision process have their preferences accepted as the choice. In the case of concurrence there is a shared preference of every actors involved in the decision making process. It could be either results from the decision process or is evident in the preferences of those involved in the beginning of the process. A mutual compromise/consensus indicates that all parties in the decision unit have yielded some of their position in order not to lose out completely in the choice process. In contrast to this, in the case of the lopsided compromise, one party's preferences have prevailed but they have yielded a little to allow the others in the decision making process to save face. In deadlock, the actors can not agree, they "agree to disagree". Finally, fragmented symbolic action is a deadlock in which the disagreement explodes outside the decision unit with each participant in the decision unit trying to take action on their own and/or complaining about the others' behavior. The following table translates the type of decision units and the decision making mechanism into the one of the six process outcomes that forms the outputs of the "decision units" framework.

TABLE 3: Link between decision units, key contingencies and outcome⁷⁰

Decision Unit	Key Contingency	Outcome
Predominant Leader	Relatively insensitive to the political context	One Party's Position prevails
	Moderately sensitive to the political context	Inaction, concurrence, lop-sided compromise depending on feasibility of preferred option
	Highly sensitive to the political context	Mutual compromise
Single Group	Members act to minimize conflict	Concurrence
	Members acknowledge conflict is unavoidable; group must deal with it	Mutual compromise or deadlock
	Members recognize conflict may have no resolution so accept majority rule	One party's position prevails
Coalition	No established rules for decision making	Fragmented symbolic action
	Established norms favor majority rule	One party's position prevails
	Established norms favors unanimity	Deadlock or mutual compromise

⁶⁹ Hermann, *ibid*, pp.68-69

⁷⁰ Hermann, *ibid*, p.73

In the next section, this thesis will identify the domestic players in foreign policy making and emphasize the impact of each player's power on foreign policy making mechanism. For this end, the foreign policy making mechanism of Turkey will be introduced briefly in terms of constitution, and political culture for a better understanding.

1. C. 3) Literature on Turkish Foreign Policy Making

Traditionally, the decision and policy making process in Turkish foreign policy does not involve major conflicts among its participants. Rather, decisions are reached and policies are formulated through relatively smooth processes involving consultation and co-operation. However, this traditional structure and mechanism of Turkish foreign policy decision making changed starting with the military intervention in 1980 and especially in the post Cold War era in parallel to democratization of Turkey.⁷¹

There is a general agreement that foreign-policy-making in Turkey remains largely as the purview of the elite. There is a classical "tripod model" that traditionally shaped Turkish foreign policy, consisting of the foreign ministry, the prime minister, and the military. The foreign ministry runs day-to-day foreign policy and serves as a major source of expertise on issues that concern Turkey's international relations. The prime minister is a key political actor in the foreign-policy-making process but the involvement and influence of Turkish prime ministers in shaping their country's relations with the world have varied significantly according to the intensity of their interest in foreign affairs. For example, while Bülent Ecevit has always been keenly interested in international politics, Süleyman Demirel gave far more attention to domestic affairs when he served as prime minister in the 1960s and 1970s.⁷²

The military has often been an influential player in Turkish foreign policy making. Institutionally, it exercises its influence primarily through the National Security Council

⁷¹ For the elaboration on the domestic players of Turkish foreign policy see, Hale, *ibid*, pp. 192-195

⁷² Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, "Turkey's New World : Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy" (Washington, DC : Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000)

(NSC), half the members of which are military leaders.⁷³ Much of the military's authority derives from its moral leadership, particularly when military and security (including domestic security) issues are at stake, and from its ability to intimidate, based on its historic interventions in Turkish politics. It is widely assumed, for example, that the military takes the lead in decisions regarding Turkish policy in northern Iraq and the fight against the Kurdish separatism.⁷⁴

The classic "tripod" model of foreign policy has been modified since the early 1980s, with the emergence of presidency as a fourth major pole of decision-making mechanism. This was a consequence of the 1982 constitution, which increased the powers of the presidency. It also reflects changes in the mission of the National Security Council, whose power, and the powers of the president as its chairman, were enhanced by a law enacted in 1983.⁷⁵ If the importance of these changes did not become immediately clear, it may be because of the relatively low-profile manner in which the first president under the 1982 constitution, former Chief of Staff Kenan Evren (president from 1982 to 1989), assumed the office.

Traditionally, the Parliament is rarely a player in foreign policy making. Its foreign relations committee exerts no meaningful influence over day-to-day policy. Parliament does have a role in certain extraordinary situations. Specifically, parliamentary approval is constitutionally required to declare war, commit Turkish troops abroad, or allow foreign troops to use facilities in Turkey. (Article 92) However, these parliamentary prerogatives are likely to be invoked only rarely and mainly in circumstances in which the decision is a foregone conclusion. Moreover, in such urgent situations, parliament is likely to take its cue from the government leadership, as it did in January 1991, when, after some hand-wringing, it passed a war powers act granting the government authority to permit the US fighter jets to use Turkish territory in the war against Iraq. However, within the proposed

⁷³ The National Security Council was established 1962 in accordance with the article 111 of 1961 Turkish Constitution.

⁷⁴ Gencer Özcan, "The Military and the Making of Foreign Policy in Turkey" in (Ed) Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey in World Politics : An Emerging Multiregional Power (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) and (Ed) Baskın Oran, "Türk Dış Politikası : Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar" vol.2 (İstanbul : İletişim Yayınları, 2004)

⁷⁵ Law on National Security Council and Secretariat General of National Security Council, 9/11/1983, published in the Official Gazette, issue 18218 on 11/11/1983 The full text is available in <www.mgk.gov.tr/kanun.html>

process of change, parliament started to play a more active role in foreign policy making. In the last decade of the 20th century, it discussed the human rights issues, appointed committees to monitor elections, human right violation around the world, such as the Palestinian conflict. Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) actively involved in the EU integration process, and recently rejected a war powers act granting the government authority to permit the US troops to deploy in Turkish military bases and send Turkish troops to Iraq. Meanwhile, speaker of the Parliament started to express his view on foreign policy issues of Turkey more often ⁷⁶

Still, it can be safely said that the emergence of a stronger presidency and the National Security Council over the last two decades of the twentieth century increased the number of poles in Turkey's multi-polar decision-making mechanism. The primary reference points now seem to be the presidency, prime ministry, military, and the foreign ministry. With the increase in the decision making actors, and their involvement, the decision making process is becoming more open to the conflict and disharmony among the actors.

This chapter introduced the subject of the thesis, its methodology, sources, the review of the literature, the construction of the theoretical framework upon which the thesis is built. In the following two chapters, two cases will be discussed in detail with reference to the "decision units" approach.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Recent example is the statement of the Bülent Arınç, speaker of Turkish Grand National Assembly on 7 April 2005, on the possible modification of the constant "casus belli" policy of Turkey against Greece on the Aegean Sea. This statement stimulated a huge debate in Turkey. For the details of this debate, see Murat Yetkin, "Meclis Başkanı Dış Siyaset Konuşamaz mı?," *Radikal*, 9 April 2005

⁷⁷ The cases and decision occasions are presented in chronological order.

CHAPTER 2) CASE STUDY 1: THE GULF WAR (1990-1991) AND MAKING OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

In this chapter, first, a detailed chronology of the case will be presented. In this detailed chronology, the parts that were marked in the box represent important milestones during the entire decision making process. Then the description of the case will be represented. The case will be described briefly with a short note on the Turkish foreign policy making at the time. In the last part of the chapter, two decision occasions; the closure of the oil pipelines (Kirkuk- Yumurtalık) and the US-led coalition forces military deployment in Turkey will be analyzed in details. For each decision occasion, the background of the decision occasion will be presented, the authoritative decision unit will be determined, the decision making processes will be elaborated, and the decision outcome will be analyzed.

2. A) CHRONOLGYOF THE GULF WAR (1990-1991) AND MAKING OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY⁷⁸

- 2 August 1990: Iraq invaded Kuwait. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially declared that the occupation was unacceptable and urged Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
- 2 August 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 660 that demanded Iraq to withdraw immediately and unconditionally all her forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990; called upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences.
- 3 August 1990: The National Security Council convened in the Çankaya Palace. After the meeting, it was announced that Turkey would not close the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline.
- 3 August 1990: Council of Ministers convened under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut.
- 3 August 1990: President Özal had a phone call to President Bush. He was reminded about Turkey's position regarding the oil pipelines by Bush

⁷⁸ In preparation of this detailed chronology Ayn Tarihi, Newspot, Briefing, "The Chronology of Gulf War" and "Turkey and the Gulf War: Chronology" in Turkish Review of Middle Eastern Studies Gulf War special issue (1991), the official web site of United Nations (www.un.org), the daily news papers were benefited.

- 3 August 1990: Lev Veronin, Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister visited Ankara and had a meeting with President Özal. Officials from the Foreign Ministry participated to the meeting. After the meeting, Deputy Veronin stated that they had “common stance with Turkey” on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and on the resolution of the crisis.
- 4 August 1990: President Özal proposed a regional summit for the Gulf Crisis in order to find a diplomatic solution to the Gulf Crisis after consultation with leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and Syria.
- 5 August 1990: A technical committee meeting between the President, the Prime Minister, Foreign and Defense Minister, Undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and Chief of General Staff was held.
- 6 August 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 661 that imposed series of economic sanctions on Iraq and established a committee to monitor implementation of the sanctions.
- 6 August 1990: Iraq completely shut one of the twin pipeline (Kirkuk-Yumurtalık)
- 6 August 1990: President Özal had an urgent meeting with Ali Mo’ayyeri, special envoy of Iranian President Rafsanjani.
- 7 August 1990: The US ordered deployment of forces in “Operation Desert Shield” to protect Saudi Arabia from possible Iraqi aggression.
- 7 August 1990: Council of Ministers convened under the chairmanship of President Özal in the Çankaya Palace. After the meeting it was declared by government that the government decided to implement the UN mandatory sanctions over Iraq “in principle”.
- 7 August 1990: Turkey closed the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline completely, froze all Iraqi and Kuwait assets in Turkey and pledged to stop trade with Iraq.
- 7 August 1990: The US troops moved into Saudi Arabia to protect Saudi oil fields.
- 7 August 1990: Recep Ergün, chair of the Defense Committee of Turkish Grand National Assembly, stated that TGNA should convene to discuss the Gulf Crisis
- 8 August 1990: Iraq declared her unification with Kuwait.
- 8 August 1990: Cabinet convened under the leadership of President Özal to discuss the Gulf Crisis.

- 8 August 1990: Turkish Land Forces was put on alert.
 - 9 August 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 662 that decided the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void; called upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation.
 - 9 August 1990: President Özal invited political party leaders to the Çankaya Palace in order to discuss the recent developments in the Persian Gulf.
 - 9 August 1990: Secretary General of Chief of Staff stated that the military forces were made ready to any possible military strike to Turkey.
 - 9 August 1990: James Baker, Secretary of State of the US, came Ankara and visited President Özal, Prime Minister Akbulut and Foreign Minister Bozer
 - 10 August 1990: Murat Sungar, spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that Turkey did not give any guarantee to the US for military support for the military intervention in Iraq.
 - 10 August 1990: NATO decided to defend Turkey against any possible attack from Iraq in the meeting of Foreign Ministers of member countries.
 - 11 August 1990: President Özal stated that Turkey was playing a mediator role in Gulf Crisis and added that the US could use İncirlik air base in accordance with Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the US and Turkey (29 March 1980) for the interest of NATO and for the purposes of defense of Turkey.
 - 11 August 1990: Murat Sungar, spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirmed that Turkey had been protested by Iraq for the violation of Iraqi air space by a Turkish aircraft
- 12 August 1990: Parliament convened to discuss the Gulf Crisis. The proposal given by the opposition parties for a general discussion of the Gulf Crisis in the parliament was refused. The proposal of the government was brought to the agenda of the parliament and it authorized the government to declare war if Turkey is under attack. The draft resolution of government was unconditional authorization.

- 13 August 1990: Prime Minister Akbulut delivered a TV speech and stated that government would use the permission to go war for defense purposes and called for unity of the nation.
- 13 August 1990: Defense Minister Safa Giray, in his interview to *Cumhuriyet*, a Turkish daily, stated that Turkey would respond to any possible attack from Iraq.
- 14 August 1990: A meeting between Prime Minister Akbulut, Chief of Staff Torumtay, commanders of the armed forces, Foreign and Defense Ministers was held to discuss the Gulf Crisis.
- 14 August 1990: Turkish General Staff released a paper to governmental organizations to make the necessary preparations for mobilization, and demanded extra financial resources for military mobilization.
- 14 August 1990: Crown Prince Saad Abdullah El Salim El Sabah, Prime Minister of Kuwait, came to Ankara and visited Prime Minister Akbulut and President Özal. El Sabah stated that Kuwait might compensate for economic losses emerging from economic embargo to Iraq.
- 15 August 1990: Recep Ergün, chair of the Defense Committee of TGNA, stated that Turkey was following a rational foreign policy on the Gulf Crisis.
- 16 August 1990: President Özal and Prime Minister Akbulut had a meeting. Özal shared his talks with President Bush and Rafsanjani of Iran with the “crisis committee” that participated to the meeting.
- 17 August 1990: Oltan Sungurlu, Justice Minister, expressed his ideas on Gulf Crisis and stated government should be given authority to declare war since Turkey was one of the most influential country in the Gulf Crisis.
- 18 August 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 664 that demanded Iraq to permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and to release third state nationals.
- 18 August 1990: Foreign Minister Ali Bozer visited Tehran for official talks with Iranian authorities.
- 18 August 1990: President Özal held background information meeting with the journalists in the Çankaya Palace on the Gulf Crisis.

- 20 August 1990: President Özal stated, in his interview to *El Pais*, Spanish daily, that Turkey did not decide to send troops to Persian Gulf. He added that decision might change in the future depending on the developments.
- 22 August 1990: Council of Ministers convened to discuss the Gulf Crisis.
- 24 August 1990: Foreign Minister Bozer went to Damascus as the first step of his Middle East tour.
- 25 August 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 665 that called upon those member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990).
- 25 August 1990: President Özal had a phone call with USSR President Gorbachev.
- 26 August 1990: Foreign Minister Ali Bozer went to Amman, capital of Jordan, and had official talks with King Hussein and Crown Prince Hassan.
- 28 August 1990: Kaya Erdem, Speaker of the TGNA, stated that the TGNA was very sensitive on the issue of sending troops to Persian Gulf.
- 28 August 1990: Defense Minister Safa Giray stated that there was no necessity to move the land forces to border and no possibility of mobilization declaration.
- 28 August 1990: Foreign Minister Bozer returned from his Middle East tour. In his press meeting after his return, stated that there was not any threat against Turkey and it was early to decide to send troops to the region.
- 28 August 1990: Iraq declared Kuwait as her 19th province.
- 29 August 1990: State Minister Işın Çelebi had a meeting with Iraqi petroleum minister in Habur border gate to discuss the medicine demand of Iraq from Turkey.
- 30 August 1990: Cabinet convened under the leadership of Prime Minister Akbulut to discuss sending troops abroad and stationing foreign troops to Turkey. After the meeting, Akbulut stated that he had no dispute with President Özal on the policy to be followed towards the Gulf Crisis.

- 31 August 1990: The National Security Council convened in the Çankaya Palace.
 - 1 September 1990: President Özal in his opening speech of TGNA, advised deputies that parliament should provide the government with wider and unconditional authority including those enabling it to send troops to foreign countries and receive foreign troops in Turkey in accordance with article 92 of Turkish constitution.
 - 1 September 1990: Prime Minister Akbulut stated that cabinet would follow the advice of President Özal, and a new memorandum of Prime Ministry would be send to the Parliament in the following days.
 - 3 September 1990: Cabinet convened under the leadership of President Özal and adopted a new memorandum for parliamentary permission to send Turkish armed forces to foreign countries and allow foreign forces to be stationed in Turkey.
 - 4 September 1990: Memorandum of Prime Ministry was confirmed by the ruling Motherland Party Group.
- 5 September 1990: Turkish Grand National Assembly resolved that the Council of Ministers be permitted to send Turkish armed forces to foreign countries and allow foreign forces to be stationed in Turkey, the necessary limits and scope to be determined by the government. The authorization did not provide government use of forces and declaration of war
- 6 September 1990: The Council of Ministers convened under the leadership of Prime Minister Akbulut and discussed the parliamentary authorization to government and decided not to hurry to use this authorization.
 - 9 September 1990: President Bush and President Gorbachev had a summit in Helsinki. They agreed to call Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally.
 - 9 September 1990: President Özal, in his interview with Gannet News Service Agency, stated that Turkey did not plan to send troops to Persian Gulf.
 - 13 September 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 666 that expected Iraq to comply with its obligations under Security Council resolution 664 (1990) in respect of third State nationals and reaffirms that Iraq remains fully responsible for their safety and well-being in accordance with international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention.

- 16 September 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 667 that demanded the immediate release of those foreign nationals as well as all nationals mentioned in resolution 664 (1990); demanded that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its international obligations under resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) of the Security Council.
- 18 September 1990: Iraq proposed Turkey to provide free oil. It was rejected by Turkey.
- 20 September 1990: President Özal had meeting with Prime Minister Akbulut. Secretary General of National Security Council General Nezihi Çakan participated to the meeting. After the meeting, President Özal met with Tugay Özçeri, undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 21 September 1990: The National Security Council convened in the Çankaya Palace.
- 22 September 1990: Defense Minister Safa Giray stated that number of the combatants in the Second Army located in South East of Turkey was increased from 60,000 to 100,000
- 23 September 1990: President Özal left from Turkey for his official visit to the US for 10 days.
- 24 September 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 669 that entrusted the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the task of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action.
- 25 September 1990: President Bush and President Özal had a meeting in White House. Özal omitted Foreign Minister Bozer from the substantive talks with President Bush in the White House.
- 25 September 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 670 that called upon all States to carry out their obligations to ensure strict and complete compliance with resolution 661 (1990); decided that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait; decided that each State shall take

all necessary measures to ensure that any aircraft registered in its territory or operated by an operator who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in its territory complies with the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) and the present resolution; reminded all states of their obligations under resolution 661 (1990) with regard to the freezing of Iraqi assets, and the protection of the assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies, located within their territory and to report to the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) regarding those assets.

- 25 September 1990: Spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Turkey would implement the UNSC Resolution 670.
- 25 September 1990: President Özal, in his speech delivered in National Press Club, Washington, stated that Turkey would give necessary support to a possible military intervention in Iraq.
- 29 September 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 674 that required Iraq to comply with the provisions of the present resolution and its previous resolutions, reposed its trust in the Secretary-General to make available his good offices and, as he considers appropriate, to pursue them and undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis on the basis of Security Council resolutions 660, 662, and 664.
- 2 October 1990: President Özal stated that in his interview to *Newsweek*, Turkey would support any possible UN resolution for military intervention in Iraq.
- 2 October 1990: Chief of Staff Torumtay stated that Gulf Crisis was not in the military stage.
- 11 October 1990: Foreign Minister Ali Bozer resigned from his post.
- 12 October 1990: Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin was appointed as the new Foreign Minister
- 13 October 1990: President Özal started his 5 day trip to Middle East.
- 18 October 1990: The National Defense Minister Safa Giray resigned from his post.
- 13-18 October 1990: President Özal visited Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, and Syria.
- 28 October 1990: Hüsnü Doğan was appointed as the new Defense Minister.

- 29 October 1990: President Gorbachev of USSR declared a military solution unacceptable and proposed an inter-Arab conference to solve the Gulf Crisis.
- 30 October 1990: The National Security Council convened in the Çankaya Palace.
- 3 November 1990: President Özal stated that Turkey would benefit from the Gulf Crisis.
- 6 November 1990: Secretary of State Baker visited Turkey as the last stop of his Middle East tour.
- 8 November 1990: William Webster, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, visited Ankara.
- 9 November 1990: Nüzhet Kandemir, Turkish Ambassador in Washington, stated that Turkey would give any support in accordance with the UN resolutions. He added that the promised aid to Turkey has not been materialized yet.
- 20 November 1990: President Özal, President Bush of the US, Prime Minister Thatcher of UK, President Mitterand of France, President Gorbachev of USSR had summit in Paris to discuss Gulf Crisis.
- 29 November 1990: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 678 that authorized the states cooperating with Kuwait to use “all necessary means” to uphold Resolution 660; ordered Iraqi withdrawal by 15 January 1991.
- 30 November 1990: The National Security Council convened in the Çankaya Palace
- 30 November 1990: Council of Ministers convened under the leadership of President Özal to discuss the United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.
- 1 December 1990: Crisis Committee composed of President, Prime Minister, Defense and Foreign Minister, Chief of Staff convened in Çankaya Palace.
- 3 December 1990: Chief of Staff General Necip Torumtay resigned from his post
- 6 December 1990: General Doğan Güreş was appointed as the new Chief of Staff.
- 19 December 1990: A meeting between Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs was held in the office of Chief of Staff to discuss the issue of NATO deployment in Turkey.
- 19 December 1990: Defense Minister Hüsnü Doğan declared that Turkey initiated deployment of NATO forces in South East of Turkey for the defense of Turkey.

- 21 December 1990: Foreign Minister Alptomaçın stated that a NATO force composed of 42 airplanes and 676 soldiers were to be stationed in Turkey.
- 26 December 1990: Doğan Güreş, Chief of Staff, stated that the political authority would decide to let the US to use the İncirlik air base.
- 28 December 1990: National Security Council convened in the Çankaya Palace.
- 30 December 1990: Prime Minister Akbulut stated that Turkey would not open a second front in Iraq.
- 2 January 1991: NATO Defense Commission authorized the deployment of aircrafts to Turkey to protect from any Iraqi attack.
- 3 January 1991: Foreign Minister Alptemoçin stated that Turkey would not participate in a war in Gulf unless attacked.
- 8 January 1991: Council of Ministers convened to discuss the Gulf crisis. After the meeting, Prime Minister Akbulut stated that Turkey did not send any battle ship to Persian Gulf.
- 12 January 1991: The US Congress voted to permit the US offensive against Iraq to liberate Kuwait.
- 12 January 1991: Council of Ministers convened under the leadership of President Özal.
- 12 January 1991: TGNA Defense Committee Chair retired General Recep Ergun, proposed to form a permanent “crisis management center.”
- 13 January 1991: Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister of UK Douglas Hurd visited Turkey.
- 14 January 1991: President Özal delivered nation-wide radio-TV speech and stated that Turkey would not intervene in Iraq unless Iraq attacks to Turkey.
- 14 January 1991: After the meeting Council of Ministers, Prime Minister Akbulut stated that there was still no decision of cabinet for the İncirlik air base.
- 15 January 1991: President Özal had a meeting with deputies of ruling Motherland Party, and advised them to support government for additional authorization for the Gulf Crisis.
- 15 January 1991: Akbulut stated that Turkey would not open a second front to Iraq.
- 15 January 1991: TGNA convened to discuss to the Gulf Crisis.

- 17 January 1991: (01.30 am) Operation “Desert Storm” started. President Özal was informed by President Bush before the operation. Just after the operation, a meeting between President Özal, Prime Minister Akbulut, Chief of General Staff Güreş, National Defense Minister Doğan, and Foreign Minister Alptemoçin in the Çankaya Palace. After the meeting, Akbulut stated that the government would request new authority from TGNA to enable operations beyond the borders of Turkey.

- 17 January 1991: Murat Sungar, Spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the US aircrafts in the İncirlik were stationed in accordance with the “Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement” (DECA) between the US and Turkey (29 March 1980), and the participation of those airplanes in the military campaign against Iraq required authorization of Turkey.

- 17 January 1991: (10.00 am) The National Security Council advised the government to request the relevant additional authorization from the TGNA in accordance with constitution and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

- 17 January 1991: Council of Ministers convened under the leadership of President Özal in the Çankaya Palace and decided to request a new authority from the TGNA.

- 17 January 1991: The memorandum of the Prime Ministry, giving authority, valid during the Gulf Crisis and its aftermath, to use the Turkish Armed Forces abroad and for foreign military forces to be stationed in Turkey, was approved by the TGNA, in accordance with Article 92 of Turkish constitution and UNSC Resolution 678.

- 18 January 1991: American Air Forces started to use İncirlik air base.

2. B) DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

The Gulf War was an international crisis that started with invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The crisis ended with the liberation of Kuwait through the UN economic sanctions and the

military intervention of the US-led international coalition composed of 32 countries⁷⁹ which started on 17 January 1991, and ended on 28 February 1991.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was declared by the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein as a response to the overproduction of oil in Kuwait.⁸⁰ This had cost Iraq an estimated \$14 billion a year when oil prices fell. While, the Arab League⁸¹, in its meeting in Cairo on 2 August 1990, demanded Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. PLO and Libya rejected this resolution. The US President George Bush declared the US policy for Gulf Crisis on 8 August 1990 in four stages: i) the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, ii) the restoration of the former government in Kuwait, iii) safety and protection of the lives of American citizens, iv) keeping security and stability in the Gulf region.⁸² The first two steps were realized through the economic sanctions and the military campaign of the international coalition. NATO considered the crisis out of its area and shied away from military intervention despite of letting the members to send military force to the Persian Gulf on their own. Also, NATO guaranteed the security of Turkey. The UN Security Council convened within hours of the Iraq's invasion and unanimously adopted resolution 660 (for the first time in its history) in accordance with Articles 39 and 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Resolution 660 demanded Iraq to immediately and unconditionally withdraw all her forces to the position before the occupation and called on Iraq and Kuwait to begin intensive negotiations to resolve their differences.⁸³

The UN Security Council returned to action on 6 August 1990 and adopted resolution 661 (1990) which imposed (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on Iraq and decided not to recognize any regime set up in Kuwait by

⁷⁹ Members of the coalition are as follows: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, The United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

⁸⁰ For the detailed analysis of why Saddam invaded Kuwait See Laurie Mylroie, "Why Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait," *Orbis* (Winter 1993), Vol. 37, Issue. 1, pp. 123-135

⁸¹ Composed of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Morocco, Somali, Lebanon, Cibuhi,

⁸² Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress*, April 1992, p. 22

⁸³ Department of Public Information of the United Nations, "The United Nations and the Iraq- Kuwait Conflict 1990-1991" (New York, The UN Blue Book Series, 1996), p.167

the occupying power. The Council also established a committee to monitor the implementation of the sanctions, which covered the sale and supply of all products and commodities, including weapons and other military equipments as well as the transfer of funds.⁸⁴ On 7 August 1990, a coalition of UN member states cooperating in the defense of Kuwait began to send military forces to the Gulf region. Following the resolutions 660 and 661, the UNSC adopted resolutions 662 (9 August 1990) deciding Iraq's annexation of Kuwait is "null and void," 664 (18 August 1990) demanding Iraq to release "third state nationals", 665 (25 August 1990) imposing a shipping blockade, 666 (13 September 1990) giving the Security Council responsibility for determining when "humanitarian circumstances" had arisen, 669 (24 September 1990) asking the Sanctions Committee to consider requests for economic assistance from countries harmed by the sanctions on Iraq, 670 (25 September 1990) strengthening and clarifying the embargo, 674 (29 September 1990) reminding Iraq that she is liable for any loss as a result of the invasion of Kuwait. Finally, the UNSC adopted resolution 678 (29 November 1990) which authorized member states to use "all necessary means" to end Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and ordered Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. Military intervention of the US-led international coalition started on 17 January 1991 with air bombing raids on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait, continued with the land operation that started on 24 February 1991, and finally ended with the liberation of Kuwait on 26 February 1991.

2. C) MAKING OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

The Gulf War was a critical turning point in the making of Turkish foreign policy in terms of its formulization process, policy outcomes, and long term impacts. The Gulf Crisis, as a regional dispute that was internationalized with the involvement of international actors, was not a dispute that Turkey could disengage. The crisis presented some inescapable problems to Turkey such as a potential change in the regional balance of power. Turkey came under pressure to act against Iraq due to her strategic location, the question of long term relations of Turkey with the region, and involvement of the US and European allies in the crisis

⁸⁴ Department of Public Information of the United Nations, *ibid*, p. 168

would affect her future relations with Western allies.⁸⁵ It provided a new challenge to the principles of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East that could be listed as (i) non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Middle Eastern states, (ii) non-interference in disputes between states in the area, (iii) the development of bilateral relations with all the states in the region, (iv) continued fragmentation of the Arab state system, (v) maximization of trade and economic relationships, (vi) the separation of the Middle East from Turkey's role within the Western alliance, (vii) scrupulous balance in her approach to the Israel-Palestine question.⁸⁶ Turkey showed that it would not follow her former policy of remaining neutral to the Middle Eastern conflicts and non-intervention in the internal disputes of the countries of the region that was followed during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, by successfully implementing the economic sanctions to Iraq and closing pipeline which was carrying half of Iraq's oil export in accordance with the UNSC resolution 661.

In this crisis, Turkey faced several questions that shaped her foreign policy: first, whether she would close pipelines and implement the economic sanctions; second, whether she would send troops to join coalition forces in the Gulf; third, whether she would open a second front against Iraq; and fourth, whether she would allow the coalition powers to use İncirlik air base for attack on targets in Iraq.⁸⁷ To answer those main foreign policy questions, Turkey made a series of decision throughout the Gulf Crisis. For the purposes of this research, decision making process during the following two authoritative decision occasions; the closure of the oil pipelines (Kirkuk- Yumurtalık) and the US military deployment in Turkey will be analyzed.

2. D) DECISION OCCASIONS

In this part, two decision occasions during this crisis will be analyzed in chronological order with reference to "decision units" framework in the following pages.

⁸⁵ Philip Robins, "Turkey and the Middle East," (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991) pp.67-68

⁸⁶ Robins, *ibid*, pp. 65-67

⁸⁷ Hale, *ibid*, p. 220

2. D.1) Decision Occasion 1: The Closure of the Kirkuk- Yumurtalık Oil Pipelines

2. D.1. a) Background of the Occasion

For many decades, the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline, officially known as the “Iraq-Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline System”, connecting Kirkuk with Yumurtalık (on the eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey) has been a major oil transport route and carried nearly half of the Iraqi oil along with Kirkuk –Syria, Tripoli (Lebanon), Kirkuk-Banais (Syria) Minal Bekr and Kohrol Amaya (Persian Gulf) pipelines. When the Gulf route (Minal Bekr and Kohrol Amaya pipelines) was closed to oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, almost 100 per cent of Iraq’s oil (80 million tones annually) was exported by the pipeline to Yurmurtalik.⁸⁸ Kirkuk-Yumuratlik pipelines transport the oil produced in Kirkuk and other areas of Iraq to the Ceyhan (Yumurtalık) Marine Terminal. The pipeline system with an annual transport capacity of 35 million tons was commissioned in 1976. Turkey financed most (640.3 km) of the construction of the common pipeline (985.3 km). The first tanker was loaded on 25 May 1977. The capacity of the line was increased to 46.5 million tons/year through the “First Expansion Project,” the construction of which was started in 1983 and completed in 1984. With the completion of the Second Pipeline, which is parallel to the first one, the annual capacity reached 70.9 Million Tons as of 1987.⁸⁹ Turkey had a strong interest in this twin pipeline system because it was providing roughly the 60 per cent of the oil demand of Turkey at reasonable prices, and Turkey was receiving an annual rent of \$250-300 million.⁹⁰

After the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces, there was a strong pressure on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. In order to force Iraq to withdraw, certain measures were carried out by the international community, especially the United Nations Security Council and the US. The first idea was to solve the issues by peaceful and diplomatic means. This policy option was considered by the international actors until 29 November 1990, the date the

⁸⁸ Amikam Nachmani, “Turkey and the Middle East,” Security and Policy Studies (May 1999), No. 42 (Tel Aviv: Begin Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University), p. 4

⁸⁹ BOTAS(Petroleum Pipeline Corporation), “1998 Annual Report” (www.botas.gov.tr/eng/reports/98.asp)

⁹⁰ Aydın, *ibid*, p. 18

United Nations Security Council adapted Resolution 678 in which Security Council authorized to use “all necessary means” to uphold UNSC Resolution 660 and ordered Iraqi withdrawal by 15 January 1991.⁹¹ On 6 August 1990, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 661 (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter). In resolution 661, the Security Council imposed a series of economic sanctions on Iraq and established a committee to monitor the implementation of the sanctions. Turkish implementation of this decision, especially the closure of the Kirkuk Yumurtalık pipeline was very crucial in the success of the UNSC resolution since Turkey was the main trading partner of Iraq and the pipeline was one of the main oil exporting channels of Iraq. Hence, the closure of the pipelines and an economic embargo by Turkey over Iraq would lead to a strong pressure on Iraq. Thus, the US administration requested Turkey close the pipelines several times during the early days of the crisis through the frequent phone calls between President Bush and President Özal. President Özal insisted that the US administration have a UNSC resolution preceding the closure of the pipeline. As a result, the UN SC Resolution 661 (6 August 1990) generated an “occasion for decision” for the Turkish decision makers.

2. D.1. b) Determining the Authoritative Decision Unit

In determining the authoritative decision unit, the first question to be asked is, “is there a single individual who qualifies as a predominant leader?” When we ask this question for this decision occasion, we observe that President Özal acted as a predominant leader in this occasion. According to the “decision units” framework, there are several conditions that facilitate the emergence of a predominant leader; situations that guarantee personal involvement such as high level diplomacy, crises events, personal features of leaders that push leaders to desire to control the problem such as his/her interest, expertise and techniques for managing information and resolving disagreements. The position of President Özal suited to most of these conditions; it was a crisis event, he had desire to control the issue (closure of the oil pipelines), he had expertise in foreign policy. He had high level communication with the world leaders, especially with President Bush. He had desire to control the domestic and international politics of Turkey. He had expertise in foreign affairs, and ability to manipulate the events, and information for his own sake. All

⁹¹ For the full text of the UNSC resolution 661 visit: <www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm>

these factors led to his emergence as a predominant leader for this decision occasion. Through using his own domestic and international connections and his expertise on foreign policy coming from his career in the Turkish bureaucracy and international organizations, he manipulated the other actors and did not let them to participate in this decision. In the following paragraphs, these conditions will be discussed in detail.

The decision to close the pipelines was personally given by President Özal without prior consultation with other relevant decision making actors and bypassing regular decision making channels. The decision to close the pipelines was institutionalized by Özal through converting the decision to a cabinet decision. While doing this, Özal used his influence over the Prime Minister Akbulut who had a low profile involvement in the process and other cabinet members. The traditional foreign policy actors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Ministry, Chief of Staff, were excluded from the making of this decision which was important for the national security of Turkey. The decision to close the pipeline was initially opposed by the military establishment and foreign ministry. This created a disharmony and conflict among the decision making actors especially due to the high profile involvement of President Özal and his style of foreign policy making. His style was generally against the tradition of Turkish diplomacy that is based on a cautious and less risky foreign policy orientation, consultation, consent and coordination of the state organs. In the traditional foreign policy making process, there was a division of labor where the Foreign Ministry had an exclusive place; acting in both formulation and implementation process of the foreign policy. It had also an advisory role in the decision making process due to its expertise. After the UNSC Resolution 661 (6 August 1990) imposing comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq, the conflict among the decision makers was mainly concerning the timing of such a decision. The main source of conflict after adaptation of UNSC Resolution 661 was not whether Turkey should close the pipelines, but how and what time the decision should have been reached, and whether the decision making process was legitimate or not.

2. D. 1. c) Decision Making Process

Turkish decision makers faced the following questions in order to reach the final decision for this decision occasion:

1. Should Turkey impose the economic embargo like other Western countries, especially the US?
2. If Turkey closes to the pipeline when should she do that? (Timing of the decision; should Turkey close the pipelines before Saudi Arabia does?)

On 7 August 1990, Turkey announced that she closed two pipelines just after the UNSC Resolution 661. During this 5 day time period between 2 August 1990 and 7 August 1990, several developments in international and domestic politics affected the decision-makers. For better elaboration of this decision, this process will be traced in the following pages.

When the news of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was announced to the world, President Özal was in vacation in Marmaris, a summer resort in the Aegean coast of Turkey. Foreign Minister Ali Bozer was in Cairo and returned to Ankara at 18.30 on 2 August 1990. The TGNA was in summer recess. When the invasion was announced, the official reaction of Turkey was made by Ministry of Foreign Affairs which declared that the occupation of Kuwait was unacceptable and urged Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Just after the invasion, President Özal returned to Ankara and called the members of the National Security Council for a meeting at the Çankaya Palace. The National Security Council convened in the Çankaya Palace at 21.00 under the chairmanship of President Özal.

From the early official declarations of Turkey, it could be seen that Turkey took a very cautious position; she did not show any sign that she will be a part of this inter-Arab dispute, and declared her desire to reach a solution through diplomatic means. For instance, after the meeting of the National Security Council, it was announced that Turkey would not close the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline that was carrying half of Iraq's oil export and would not take steps against Iraq.⁹² Other statements by the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and

⁹² Milliyet, 4 August 1990

Ministry of Foreign Affairs were in line with this statement. They all stated that Turkey was not ready to impose an embargo against Iraq and advocated a “wait and see” policy.⁹³ On 3 August 1990, the Council of Ministers convened under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Akbulut. The statements after this meeting were also parallel to the early statements. According to these decision making actors, the Turkish closure of the pipelines required a common action of the USSR and the Arab world.⁹⁴

However, on the other hand, President Özal started a “telephone diplomacy” in which he had phone calls with the US President Bush and leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and Syria. President Özal was reminded about Turkey’s position regarding the oil pipelines by the US President Bush in a telephone conversation that took place on 3 August 1990.⁹⁵ Özal replied that the US should go to the UN and have a UN resolution first in order for Turkey to impose an embargo.⁹⁶ He also proposed a regional summit for the Gulf Crisis, “Summit of Five”, after consultation with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and Syria to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis.⁹⁷ After the consultation with the Western and regional leaders, President Özal concluded that Turkey should be on the side of the US-led international coalition. He had several reasons in his mind. The most important aspect of his conclusion was the connection of the crisis with the oil resources and prices. He perceived that G7 countries (the USA, USSR, Italy, UK, France, Canada, and Japan) were large oil importers dependent on the Middle East oil resources. If the Western powers let Iraq to stay in Kuwait, then Saudi Arabia and other small Gulf States would fall in the hands of Saddam.⁹⁸ Then, with her large and well-equipped armed forces, missile technology, non-conventional weapons capability, Iraq would launch a bid for the regional hegemony. They would not like to see any change in the balance of power in the Middle East, which would bear upon their oil interests. A powerful Iraq could manipulate the oil

⁹³ The statements of these actors were gathered from Cumhuriyet, 3 August 1990

⁹⁴ Cumhuriyet, 4 August 1990

⁹⁵ Briefing, 6 August 1990, p.4

⁹⁶ Mehmet Barlas, “Turgut Özal’ın Anıları,” (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1994) p.118 (In this book, Barlas published the memoir of President Özal as interviews with him. He was very close to Özal, the interviews took place in Marmaris, summer resort in the Egean coast of Turkey, where Özal used to spend his summer vacation.)

⁹⁷ Ayın Tarihi, August 1990, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1990/agustos1990.htm>

⁹⁸ Barlas, *ibid*, p.124

prices for increased revenues within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). For Özal, it was apparent that these countries would not allow Saddam to dominate the oil market and would intervene in the situation to reverse Iraq's invasion. He argued that the intervention of the international coalition would definitely result with their victory over Iraq. So, it was not logical for Turkey to be on the looser side.⁹⁹

On 6 August 1990, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 661 that imposed a series of economic sanctions on Iraq and established a committee to monitor the implementation of the sanctions.¹⁰⁰ The first Turkish official reaction to the UNSC Resolution 661 was negative. The State Minister in charge of energy policy announced that since Turkey had to give priority to its own needs and interest, Turkey would not close her two pipelines as long as the pipeline through Saudi Arabia continued to operate.¹⁰¹ Unilateral closure of the twin pipelines by Turkey would not be effective as long as the Saudi pipeline was operating. The Foreign Ministry argued that Turkey whose national interests were not in immediate danger should not close the pipeline while a directly threatened Arab country, Saudi Arabia, was operating the pipeline.¹⁰² So, initially, according to the Energy Minister and Foreign Ministry, Turkey should have adopted a “wait and see” policy.

In the morning of 7 August 1990, the Council of Ministers convened under the leadership of President Özal in the Çankaya Palace. It was reported that President Özal opened the session of the Council of Ministers by stating that he would not open the issue to the discussion of the members of the Council and stated that the relevant initiatives had been taken by him.¹⁰³ After the meeting, the government spokesperson Mehmet Yazar declared that the government decided to implement the UN sanctions over Iraq “in principle”. He added that what actions to be taken in practice were “only details”¹⁰⁴ From this official statement, it was not clear whether Turkey would shut down the twin pipeline or not. After

⁹⁹ The Press meeting of President Turgut Özal, 11 August 1990, Çankaya Palace, Ayın Tarihi, August 1990, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1990/agustos1990.htm>

¹⁰⁰ For the full text of the UNSC resolution 661 visit: <www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm>

¹⁰¹ Interview with Mehmet Keçeciler, State Minister in Charge of Energy Affairs, 8 June 2005, Ankara

¹⁰² Saudi Arabia closed the pipelines just after the official announcement of Turkish closure of pipelines.

¹⁰³ Cumhuriyet, 8 August 1990

¹⁰⁴ Briefing, 13 August 1990, pp. 6

meeting of the Council of Ministers, there was a second meeting among a smaller number of ministers and military officials in Çankaya Palace between 13.35 and 14.30 in which the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister participated. After this second meeting, there was no announcement concerning the pipelines and there was no political instruction to the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS)¹⁰⁵ to close the pipeline. After the other ministers and military officials left the Presidential Palace, President Özal had a special meeting with Mehmet Keçeciler, state minister in charge of energy affairs. In that meeting, President Özal made his decision to close the pipelines. He ordered Keçeciler to go to the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), check the position of the pipeline once again and to declare that Turkey closed the pipelines. After the meeting, Minister Keçeciler left the Çankaya Palace and moved to BOTAS. He had a meeting with Oktay Vural, the director of BOTAS.¹⁰⁶ After the meeting, at around 19.00, he announced the formal closure of the twin pipelines, suspension of all commercial links with Iraq and Kuwait, and freezing all of Iraqi assets in Turkey. He clearly stated that “We informed the Iraqi authorities at 17.00 pm that there will be no loading from Yumurtalık.”¹⁰⁷

Four events triggered President Özal’s decision to close the pipelines:

1) The visit of the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan to Turkey on 5 August 1990: After the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan’s visit to Turkey on 5 August 1990, it was clear that Iraq would not withdraw from Kuwait.¹⁰⁸ He brought the letter of Saddam Hussein to Özal that reminded him of the friendship that both countries shared, and asked Turkey not to take side with the “imperialist West.” On these official talks between President Özal and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan, President Özal advised Ramadan to withdraw from Kuwait. However, Ramadan

¹⁰⁵ BOTAS, Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, was established as an affiliated company of Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) on August 15, 1974 in order to transport Iraqi crude oil to the Gulf of Iskenderun. In 1995, the company was restructured as a State Economic Enterprise <www.botas.gov.tr>

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Mehmet Keçeciler, State minister in charge of energy affairs, 8 June 2005, Ankara

¹⁰⁷ Briefing, 13 August 1990, p. 4

¹⁰⁸ For the details of the conversation between President Özal and Ramada, see the proceedings of the prees meeting of Turgut Özal in 18 August 1990, in Çankaya Palace, for the full text see: Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası (1990-91): 1998 Yılından Geriye Yönelik Bir Yeniden Değerlendirme,” (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1998)

did not pay attention to the advice of Özal.¹⁰⁹ He warned that “the closure of the oil pipeline may create an atmosphere of mistrust between the two countries”.¹¹⁰

2) The state of operations of the pipelines: The state of the operation of the oil pipeline had a great influence on the decision of President Özal. The Turkish authorities were closely following the developments concerning the operation of the oil pipeline and movements of oil tankers in the pipeline area. Before the decision to close the pipeline, it was observed that two oil tankers anchored off-shore the Yumurtalık loading terminals were not approaching the pier to load oil and some tankers were leaving without taking oil from Yumurtalık.¹¹¹ Thus, there was a marketing problem of the Iraqi oil. Under these conditions, Iraq decided to close one of the oil pipelines on August 6, 1990.¹¹²

3) The announcement of the US on 6 August 1990 of a forthcoming official visit of the US Secretary State James Baker to Turkey on 9 August 1990: On 6 August 1990, the US authorities informed Turkish Foreign Ministry that on 9 August 1990, the US Secretary of State James Baker would visit Turkey. In parallel to this official visit to Ankara, the US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney was visiting Saudi Arabia on 6 August 1990. As Minister Keçeciler states, it was clear that Secretary Baker was coming to Turkey to ask the closure of the oil pipeline and would try to exert influence on Turkey. Such a pressure would not be good for the image of Turkey as an independent country. Therefore, President Özal thought that it was better to lift such pressure that could be applied by the Secretary Baker on Turkey.¹¹³

4) Adoption of the UNSC resolution 661 on 6 August 1990: The UNSC Resolution 661 was the most important development for this decision occasion that solved the “legitimization problem” of the decision. Before the economic embargo was mentioned in the resolution of the UNSC, the US administration had asked Turkey to impose an

¹⁰⁹ Later, it was revealed in the press that he was allowed to enter President Özal’s presence carrying a hand-pistol on his belt. Cumhuriyet, 6 August 1990.

¹¹⁰ Newspot, 9 August 1990, p.1

¹¹¹ Interview with Mehmet Keçeciler, State Minister in Charge of Energy Affairs, 8 June 2005, Ankara

¹¹² Cumhuriyet, 7 August 1990

¹¹³ Interview with Mehmet Keçeciler, State minister in charge of energy affairs, 8 June 2005, Ankara

economic embargo on Iraq.¹¹⁴ In his three phone calls with President Bush prior to the UNSC Resolution 661, Özal had advised President Bush go to the UN and adopt a resolution for the economic embargo over Iraq.¹¹⁵ The UN resolution 661 created pressures from the international community on Turkey to take a tougher line. President Özal noted that *“it should be noted that Security Council resolutions were taken unanimously and for the first time in history, the entire world united against an aggression.”*¹¹⁶ In line with that, he stated that *“there were no divergent views in the world: the Soviet- American joint declaration is very clear... thus it is not reasonable to have such an action in an era which there has been growing agreement among the superpowers”*¹¹⁷

2. D. 1.d) The Decision Outcome

There were two divisions among the decision makers involved in this decision occasion. The first line represented by President Özal advocated the immediate closure of the pipeline. The second line advocated a more cautious policy represented by the Turkish Military Forces and the bureaucracy of Foreign Ministry. In principle, since there was a mandatory UNSC resolution, both of them agreed on the imposition of the embargo decision. The disagreement was on how to do it and when to put it into practice.

The dominant idea supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Armed Forces was that Kuwait issue was an internal dispute of the Arabs and Saddam had invaded Kuwait with the permission of the US.¹¹⁸ These actors thought that Saddam was not a real

¹¹⁴ Interview with president Özal, Newsweek, 8 October 1990, appeared in Turkish in Dis Basin ve Turkiye, 5 October 1990

¹¹⁵ The proceedings of the press meeting of Turgut Özal in 18 August 1990, in Çankaya Palace, for the full text see: Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası (1990-91): 1998 Yılından Geriye Yönelik Bir Yeniden Değerlendirme,” (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1998), pp. 110

¹¹⁶ Adress of Turgut Özal at the opening of Turkish Grand National Assmably on 1 September 1990. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Journal of Proceedings of the Parliament), Term: 18, Volume :47/1, Legislation Year:4, 1 September 1990

¹¹⁷ Statement of Presidet Özal to the press in Ankara, 4 August 1990.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Mehmet Keçeciler, State minister in charge of energy affairs, 8 June 2005, Ankara. Minister Keçeciler, as the founding member of Motherland Party, was very close to President Özal in his capacity as the minister responsible for the energy affairs; he participated in all the meeting for this decision occasion, he later announced the official Turkish closure of the pipelines. [On 25 July 1990, President Saddam Hussein summoned the United States Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, to his office in the last high-level contact between the two Governments before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. In this talks, Glaspie had told Saddam that the dispute between was their internal issue, US would not interested

threat for Turkey and Iraq was one of the main trading partners of Turkey. They were also suspicious that the Western world would come and liberate Kuwait. So, they thought Turkey should take a cautious policy on the crisis.¹¹⁹ The changing perception of Western powers on Turkey was very much influential in the development of this thinking. The newly emerged general perception in the mind of NATO members, and their attitudes over the national security interests of Turkey was alarming these decision makers. Members of NATO and NATO officials were giving signals that NATO would not assume the defense of Turkey against a threat or aggression to Turkey. For instance, in an interview conducted by a Turkish journalist in May 1990, General Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and his deputy, General Eide stated that in the case of a possible armed clash between Turkey and one of her neighbors, NATO would not get involved in the armed conflict, evaluate it as an own problem of Turkey, would not provide collective security to Turkey.¹²⁰ The defense expenditure of Turkey in 1989 was 3,8 per cent of the GNP; the lowest percentage in the region making Turkey vulnerable in the region.¹²¹ Moreover, during the 1980s, Turkey had to monitor the build up of the Iraqi military arsenal, including strategic weapon systems and chemical, nuclear capabilities with growing concern. It was the Turkish military conclusion that during the 1980s, Turkey was overpowered qualitatively and quantitatively by superior armaments of the two aspiring regional countries which were Syria and Iraq.¹²² Having these fragile conditions in the region, this line advocated a cautious foreign policy option for Turkey.

On the other hand, for President Özal, imposition of the embargo by Turkey was an “unavoidable process”. In a press conference in New York on 1 October 1990, he explained why it was an “unavoidable process” with the following words:

in that. After this talk Glaspie left from Baghdad. Moreover, US did not warn the Iraqi administration for her military deployment in the Kuwait border. This was evaluated as a “green light” to Iraq in her invasion of Kuwait. For the full text of excerpts of Saddam and Glaspie talk, see The New York Times International, 23 September 1990 for the full text of excerpts of Saddam and Glaspie talk.]

¹¹⁹ Interview with Mehmet Keçeciler, State minister in charge of energy affairs, 8 June 2005, Ankara

¹²⁰ Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Türkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikası (1990-91): 1998 Yılından Geriye Yönelik Bir Yeniden Değerlendirme,” (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1998) p. 6

¹²¹ Necip Torumtay, “Turkey’s Military Doctrine,” Foreign Policy, (1990) Vol.15, p.26

¹²² Duygu Sezer, “Turkey’s Grand Strategy Facing Dilemma” International Spectator (January- March 1992) Vol.. 27, p. 29 For the details of the military capabilities of Iraq, see Mike Eisensatd, “The Sword of the Arab: Iraq’s Strategic Weapons,” The Washington Institute, Policy Papers, (1990) No. 21 and Department of Defense, Conduct of Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, April 1992, pp. 8-20

“It was impossible for Turkey to remain neutral on the Iraqi issue... Use your judgment. Is such a thing possible? This is not Iran Iraq war. We have to either apply the embargo or not. If you do not apply the embargo, you are siding with Iraq. If you apply it, you are siding with the United Nations... we have to accept the fact that we are the key country in the embargo and have no other alternative and for this reason, resentment from Iraq could well continue after the crisis.”¹²³

Thus, the ultimate decision in this decision occasion came as a result of a struggle between these two lines of foreign policy preferences. Eventually, the personal decision of President Özal prevailed. So, in this decision occasion, the decision outcome is one party's position prevails. This is one of the six possible outcomes in the “decision units” framework in which some of those in the decision process have their preferences accepted as the choice.¹²⁴ Some other foreign policy decision making actors concerned with the situation were unaware of the decision. The announcement that favored Özal's position came out during a press conference by Foreign Minister Ali Bozer. In this press conference, Bozer was briefing the journalists about the cautious policy of Turkey regarding the UN embargo over Iraq. He was stressing that Turkey had agreed to sanctions in principles and how they would be put into practice was still unclear. During the press conference, he learned about the closure of the pipeline from the journalists he was briefing when they received the news of the closure of the pipeline from the Anatolian News Agency.¹²⁵ The Chief of Staff, General Necip Torumtay, was also unaware about the decision of President Özal to close the pipelines. He learned about it from the news on TV. According to Torumtay, such a decision required extra security and intelligence precautions on the Iraqi border. So General Torumtay thought that he had to be consulted before such a decision.¹²⁶ General Torumtay stated that Turkey should have thought on the issue very seriously, calculate the cost of that decision, and should have some measures in order to compensate the economic losses from the closure.¹²⁷

¹²³ President Özal's press conference on 1 October 1990 in New York at the end of his 10-day visit to United States. Quoted in Ramazan Gözen, “An Analysis to Close the Oil Pipelines in Gulf Crises 1990- 1991: From Procrastination to Co-operation” PhD Thesis, University of Reading , p. 258

¹²⁴ Hermmann, *ibid*, pp.68-69

¹²⁵ Briefing, 13 August 1990, p. 6

¹²⁶ Necip Torumtay, “Orgeneral Torumtay'ın Anıları,” (İstanbul : Milliyet Yayınları, 1994.) pp. 102-103

¹²⁷ Necip Torumtay, “Değişen Stratejilerin Odağında Türkiye,” (İstanbul : Milliyet Yayınları, 1996) p.46

In the making of this decision, the leadership style of President Özal helped him to emerge as the predominant leader and had influence both on the formulation process and the decision outcome. The importance of Özal's leadership style requires us to examine the key contingencies in the case of predominant leader. In the following paragraphs, these contingencies will be analyzed in details.

The first key contingency for the predominant leader is the leader's sensitivity to information. We observe that President Özal was not sensitive to the information from the other actors. For example, he did not rely on the information provided by the Foreign Ministry and Turkish military forces. He mostly relied on his own personal sources of information, mostly gathered through his "telephone diplomacy". He wanted to get information that would support his goals and political desires. He did not take information or advice from the Foreign Ministry or Turkish Military Forces. President Özal controlled the communications with the international actors, particularly with President Bush and had close personal connections with the world leaders. Apart from his close advisors and officers, other state actors those are traditionally part of and responsible for those types of communications and correspondence especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was mostly unaware of his communications. With President Özal, Turkey, for the first time, was introduced to the notion of "telephone diplomacy." President Özal had frequent phone calls with the leaders of the worlds, especially the US President Bush - a close friend of President Özal. In one occasion, a phone call by President Özal to Washington caught President Bush in the middle of a press conference, which immediately ended because "President Özal of Turkey was on the line" ¹²⁸ As Morton Abramowitz, the US ambassador to Ankara during the Gulf War, notes President Özal and Bush talked on the phone more than 50 times between August 1990 and July 1991, perhaps as much or more than Bush talked with any foreign leader on the phone in any comparable period.¹²⁹ However, he excluded the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister from his "telephone diplomacy" and did not consult them about the content of his phone conversations.

¹²⁸ Mustafa Aydın, "Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991," (Cairo, Egypt: American University in Cairo Press, 1998) p. 3

¹²⁹ Morton Abramowitz, "American Policy Making on Turkey," *Insight Turkey*, (October -December 2000), Vol. 2, No.4, p. 28

The second key contingency for a predominant leader is the responsiveness of the leader to the constraints. President Özal acted as a leader who challenged the constraints. His interest and expertise in foreign policy enabled him to challenge the constraints. As a former international officer in World Bank and high level bureaucrat, he gained expertise on foreign relations, especially in international economic affairs. The invasion of Kuwait was not a surprise for President Özal as well as Turkey. President Özal had warned the US President Bush to be careful about Saddam Hussein in an unofficial visit to the US in January 1990, seven months before the invasion of Kuwait.¹³⁰ He urged Bush to lead an international effort to rid the world of Saddam.¹³¹ President Bush listened to Özal carefully. However, the US policy toward Iraq at that point was “constructive engagement” and Bush did not change much until Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait.¹³²

As example to how President Özal challenged the constraints can be in his political maneuvers to get what he wanted. In order to have his own preferences accepted, President Özal manipulated other domestic actors, kept them out of the decision making mechanism and defied the traditional ways of foreign policy decision making. Otherwise it could take a long time to get a quick decision on this issue. For Özal, it would be a late decision, and would not be a gesture to the US administration.

Another example of constraints challenging style of President Özal is the exclusion of Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the decision making process. Traditionally, Foreign Ministry acts as one of the most influential decision-making bodies in the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of Turkey. It also acts as an advisory body. The announcement related to a pipeline closure, an important foreign policy issue, was not made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but a state minister. Özal did solely rely on the information about crisis coming from the Foreign Ministry, but also relied on news coming through the foreign televisions such as CNN and through foreign news agencies such as

¹³⁰ “Çankaya Fırtınası”; Memeries of Ergin Güner, advisor of President Özal during the Gulf War, *Milliyet*, 19 February 1998

¹³¹ Morton Abramowitz, “The Complexities of American Policymaking on Turkey” in (ed) Morton Abramowitz, “Turkey's Transformation and American Policy” (New York : Century Foundation Press, 2000) p.154

¹³² Morton Abramowitz, “American Policy Making on Turkey,” *Insight Turkey*, (October -December 2000), Vol. 2, No.4, pp.4

Reuters, Ajans France Press, and Associated Press.¹³³ Özal believed that the news was coming faster than the normal channels, namely Foreign Ministry. For instance, he criticized Foreign Ministry for its secret note to him about the official visit of Secretary of State James Baker, when he learnt it from CNN before the note of Foreign Ministry concerning the visit of Baker.¹³⁴ He believed that Foreign Ministry was not in a position to produce swift and expedient response to events outside the world. He stated that events should have been closely watched, instantly analyzed, and the decision should have been taken with such speed that classical diplomatic channels would remain behind these speedy developments in a high technology and telecommunications age.¹³⁵

Özal's constraint challenging leadership style also led him to rearrange the domestic politics in non-traditional way. Turgut Özal succeeded Kenan Evren as President of the Republic in November 1989. Although his election was perfectly constitutional, it was highly criticized by the opposition parties on moral grounds.¹³⁶ Özal's presidential election differed from the elections of the former president in that he was an important politician in his own right rather than a politically insignificant candidate. He was the first civil president of the Republic. In the Turkish political tradition, the presidents had mainly played a symbolic role and the main executive power was left to the prime minister and the cabinet, the constitution required the president be impartial in the political realm. However, President Özal made it clear from the beginning that he would not even pretend to be impartial between the political parties and would continue to exercise the predominant power over the government form behind the scenes. He broke the mold of the "above-parties" presidency that took hold after the 1961 constitution, when the office was largely ceremonial and invariably held by retired high ranking military officers.

¹³³ The heavy reliance of Ozal to the informations gathered through the unofficial channels bothered the officials from the Military and Foreign Ministry. Necip Torumtay, "Orgeneral Torumtay'ın Anıları," (İstanbul : Milliyet Yayınları, 1994.) pp. 108-109

¹³⁴ Mehmet Barlas, "Turgut Özal'ın Anıları," (İstanbul : Sabah Kitapları, 1994) p. 118

¹³⁵ Adress of Turgut Özal at the opening of Turkish Grand National Assmeby on 1 September 1990. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Journal of Proceedings of the Parliament), Term :18, Volume: 47/1, Legislation Year: 4, 1 September 1990

¹³⁶ As a consequence of this stance of the opposition parties, the members of the opposition parties did not come to the opening session of TGNA in order not to listen the opening speech of President Özal on 1 September 1990. Arcayürek, 2000, p.7

In addition to his ambition to exercise his power, a weak Prime Minister led to his high profile involvement in the foreign policy decision making mechanism. The new Prime Minister, Yıldırım Akbulut, who was elected as the chairman of the Motherland Party by the influence of President Özal after heated debates in the party and appointed as Prime Minister. Yıldırım Akbulut was the first prime minister who did not have Western education and could not speak any Western languages. He did not oppose the meddling of President Özal within governmental affairs. During the entire decision making process, his involvement was low in profile. He participated with the crisis decision-making process from time to time during this time period and he usually maintained stony silence at the meetings.¹³⁷ During this time period, he mostly spent his time in the domestic politics. Unlike President Özal, he did not cancel his planned domestic visits. For example, he had a meeting with the Social Security Minister and the leaders of business and labor groups on August 4 to discuss their problems. On August 5, the Prime Minister inaugurated the Ankara Organized Industrial Area. He gave a talk about fighting inflation. On August 5, he attended the public meetings in Etimesgut and Eryaman in Ankara to make an address in connection with the upcoming local elections. Therefore, he did not participate in the crucial meeting between President Özal and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan at the presidential palace in Çankaya. On August 6, he went to Kars, a province in the North Eastern border, to participate in the starting ceremony of the construction of the Kars Sugar Factory.¹³⁸

The third key contingency for the predominant leader is the motivation of the leader meaning whether he or she is a “problem focused” or “relationship focused” leader. President Özal was a problem focused leader. His main concern was the task, which was the closure of the pipelines to show to the international community that Turkey was on the side of Western camp and that Turkey was an important parameter in the imposition of the embargo, and in the preservation of the Western interests in the region. The following statement of President Özal best explains his orientation:

“The changes in the world have enlarged the parameters of Turkish foreign policy. The most typical example of this is that by moving hastily Turkey imposed an

¹³⁷ Necip Torumtay, “Orgeneral Torumtay'ın Anıları,” (İstanbul : Milliyet Yayınları, 1994) p. 109

¹³⁸ Cumhuriyet, 7 August 1990

economic embargo soon after the adoption of the United Nations Security Council resolution 661 to impose the embargo. Such a move increased our country's prestige in the world, and put Turkey ahead in the eyes of the world public opinion. Taking embargo decision one or two days later would lessen the positive influence we have had. Besides it would lead to an impression that we imposed the economic embargo under pressure. Now everybody understands our key role in the effectiveness of embargo against Iraq. The effective imposition of the economic embargo against Iraq also increased the possibility that the crisis will be resolved without resorting to a hot war. This will be to the interest of both Turkey and the other countries concerned.¹³⁹

Apart from his leadership style and characteristics, an important situational factor influenced his decision: The recess period of the TGNA helped President Özal to emerge as a predominant leader. During this time period, the TGNA that reflect the views of the various segments of the society and a source of important pressure on the government was in summer recess as the Turkish Constitution required. According to the constitution, during adjournment or recess, the TGNA may be summoned by the President of the Republic either on his own initiative or at the request of the Council of Ministers. The Speaker of the Assembly may also summon the Assembly either on his own initiative or upon the written request of one fifth of the members.¹⁴⁰ With the written request of 130 deputies, member of the opposition parties, the TGNA convened on 12 August 1990 to discuss the Gulf Crisis. However, the proposal of the opposition for the general discussion for the Gulf Crisis was rejected with the votes of the member of the ruling Motherland Party. So, there was not a chance for the TGNA to take part in the decision making mechanism for this specific decision occasion.

Analysis of this decision occasion shows that President Özal exhibited an “expansionist” type of leader who challenges the constraints, is closed to information and is problem focused.¹⁴¹ President Özal challenged the constraints through creation of a weak political setting, appointing a weak prime minister, and excluding the Foreign Ministry from the decision making process. He was close to information that is presented to him by the Foreign Ministry and related specialized governmental institutions and instead he relied on

¹³⁹ Address of President Turgut Özal at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 1 September 1990

¹⁴⁰ Article 93 of Turkish Constitution

¹⁴¹ The table displaced by Hermann and et.al and presented in the first chapter of this thesis (table ...) guides reserachers to differentiate the type of the leader. (Herman, et.al. p.95)

his own sources of information that would support his preference. He controlled the information related to the issue on the table and manipulated for his own stake. As decision units framework suggests, as an “expansionist” type of leader, he focused on expanding his power and influence and emerged as a predominant leader in this decision for occasion.

2. D. 2) Decision Occasion 2: The US-led Coalition Forces Military Deployment in Turkey

2. D. 2. a) Background of the Occasion

During the Cold War, the US established several military bases in Turkey to contain USSR. At this time, the US also began the construction of the İncirlik air base, 7 miles east of Adana, in the spring of 1951. The United States Air Force (USAF) initially planned to use the base as an emergency staging and recovery site for medium and heavy bombers. Since Turkey shared 360 miles of common border with the Soviet territory, Strategic Air Command (SAC) planners considered it as an important location. The years to follow would prove the value of İncirlik's location not only in countering the Soviet threat, but also in responding to crisis in the Middle East.¹⁴² In the summer of 1958, İncirlik air base was used by the US, when a crisis in Lebanon broke out. With the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) between the US and Turkey signed on 29 March 1980¹⁴³, the US retained the use of 12 most vital bases in Turkey, including İncirlik air base and of the essential intelligence gathering stations.¹⁴⁴ This agreement provided a comprehensive framework for the US-Turkish relations particularly in the defense-cooperation area. With the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990, the role of İncirlik airbase in the Middle East once again took on great significance.

For historic reasons, the issue of allowing foreign forces to deploy in the Turkish territory has been highly problematic in Turkey. For instance, during WWI, two German warships

¹⁴² GlobalSecurity.org: “İncirlik Air Base”: <www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/incirlik-history.htm>

¹⁴³ The full text of the agreement is available in Official Gazette, issue. 17238, 1 February 1981. The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) expired in 1990 and was extended until December 1998. on the yearly bases.

¹⁴⁴ Hale, 2000, p. 123

(Goben and Breslau) while escaping from British warships, were transferred to the Ottoman navy and renamed as *Yavuz* and *Midilli* with their crew and commander. The Ottoman Empire entered into WWI with the unprovoked attack of these ships to the Russian Empire under the Ottoman flag and under the German Command with the conspiracy of Enver Pasha, without the knowledge of the rest of the cabinet members. After that event, the possibility of being dragged into a war without its own will due to a conspiracy became part of the consciousness of the Turkish nation and the decision makers.¹⁴⁵ In addition, Turkish public opinion has always been sensitive to such use of Turkish territory by the US that rapid deployment forces or other units might make use of facilities on Turkish territory for non-NATO purposes. As the only Muslim country in NATO, Turkey has been generally determined to avoid giving open support to controversial or unpopular actions by the United States in the Middle East. For example, the Turkish government did not permit the use of the bases for the US operations during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and allowed only nonmilitary supplies to be shipped via Turkey to the US-led multinational contingent in Lebanon in 1983. Turkey allowed the US to use her facilities only in 1958 for the Lebanon Crisis. Therefore, allowing the US and allied forces to deploy and use İncirlik and other military bases against a Muslim country that Turkey had good commercial ties with was a hard decision for Turkish authorities. Allowing the US and allied forces to use İncirlik and other military bases located in Turkey for non-NATO operations requires authorization from the parliament according to the article 92 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.

2. D. 2. b) Determining the Authoritative Decision Unit

Allowing the US-led international coalition to use the Turkish military bases, especially the İncirlik Air Base, for a non-NATO operation was not a decision that the government could make by itself through an executive request. Although Özal desired to be the dominant actor in the decision making mechanism in this occasion as well, he could not be very influential. He was very enthusiastic to deploy foreign military forces to Turkish territory. He blamed the others as traditional and supporting the status quo. He was again eager to

¹⁴⁵Mustafa Aydın, "Ten Years After: Turkey's Gulf Policy (1990-91) Revisited," Ankara Paper, (2000) No.3, (published by Frank Cass, London for Eurasian Strategic Studies-ASAM, Ankara) p. 24

challenge the constraints and openly stated that “some generals are not keeping in steps and are acting to preserve the status quo. While we are taking brave steps forward, they are trying to put brakes on.”¹⁴⁶ However, the type of the decision was not suitable for the emergence of a “predominant leader” as a decision unit. A single group such as National Security Council, the Crisis Committee formed for this crisis composed of the President, the Prime Minister, Foreign and Defense Minister and Chief of Staff was not in a position to make the authoritative decision. This ad hoc Crisis Committee was not an authoritative decision maker since it did not have constitutional and legal bases. The committee was formed for consultation purposes for this crisis. The Parliament was not in recess, and the TGNA had to be part of the decision making for this decision occasion according to the Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution for the political authorization. Since it was a security matter, the consent of the military and coordination with military forces was essential too for such a decision. The permission to use the Turkish military bases and the deployment of allied forces in Turkish territory was a result of series of discussions, negotiations, several authorizations from the parliament (Decisions of 12 August 1990, 5 September 1990, 17 January 1991), and compromises among the various actors of foreign policy making. So, the decision unit was “coalition of multiple autonomous actors” composed of the President, the Prime Minister, Council of Ministers, Turkish military forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Grand National Assembly.

At the very beginning of the crisis, there was no demand from the US to deploy the US-led allied forces in Turkey. It was thought by President Özal that such a decision would give flexibility to government in conducting foreign policy and empower government in international negotiations. His initiative taking personality was influential in bringing up such a request. The first request of the government with the influence of President Özal was voted in Parliament on 12 August 1990. When a government proposal was brought to the parliament for the political authorization, a considerable group within the ruling Motherland Party led by former foreign minister Mesut Yılmaz opposed to the proposal along with the opposition parties. Such a proposal empowering the government to send Turkish troops abroad and permit foreign troops to deploy in Turkey without military attack

¹⁴⁶ Milliyet, 7 December 1990

to Turkey and allowing Turkish bases to be used by allied forces for out-of-area operations was evaluated as a request to wage war against Iraq. This group thought that no clear national interests seemed to require direct involvement in a war in the Gulf. This group thought that such an involvement was for the interest of the US in the region. Since the decision unit was a coalition of multiple autonomous actors in this occasion, in the next section, the dynamics set by this type of decision unit will be discussed.

2. D. 2. c) Decision Making Process

If the decision unit is a coalition of autonomous actors, the key contingency is the nature of the rules and procedures guiding the interaction between these actors. According to the decision-unit framework, there are three possibilities of rules guiding the interactions in coalitions:

- i) no established rules for decision making (anarchy model)
- ii) rules favoring majority (minimum connected winning coalition model)
- iii) rules favoring unanimity (unit veto model)¹⁴⁷

For this decision occasion, the governing decision rule within the coalition of autonomous actors favored unanimity in which one single actor could block the initiatives of all others. The political approval of the Turkish Grand National Assembly was essential for the deployment of foreign forces and the use of the Turkish bases by the US according to Article 92 of Turkish Constitution which stated that:

“The Power to authorize the declaration of a state of war in cases deemed legitimate by international law and except where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by the rules of international courtesy to send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey, is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. If the country is subjected, while the Turkish Grand National Assembly is adjourned or in recess, to sudden armed aggression and it thus becomes imperative to decide immediately on the deployment of the armed forces, the President of the Republic can decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces.”¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Hermann, *ibid*, p. 66

¹⁴⁸ The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey: available in the official web site of TGNA visit: <www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/constitution.htm>

For such an initiative, the issue had to be discussed in the Turkish General Staff and Ministry of Foreign Affairs for technical preparations, and then in the National Security Council. If the National Security Council advises the government in this direction, the Council of Ministers decides to write a memorandum for such an initiative, and then the memorandum is voted in the TGNA. Since the issue is related to the security and defense, the consent of the military was essential.

Turkish military officials were reluctant to give permission to the US to use the Turkish military bases on Turkish soil. There was a reluctance to engage in a non-NATO operation in many officials in Turkish administration after Iraqi troops entered Kuwait. It was asserted that to commit to a US-led war against Saddam would give the United States the capacity to permanently damage Turkey's economic and diplomatic relations with Iraq. According to the military, over the last ten years, Iraq has accounted for as much as 18 percent of total Turkish imports and 13 percent of total Turkish exports. Eventually, Iraq would remain a neighbor with a large-and needy-economy. Iraq was not in a position to attack Turkey.¹⁴⁹ The Turkish armed forces were firmly attached to Turkey's traditional neutrality policy towards the Middle East and were against an adventurous involvement in the Gulf War. According to military, Turkey should preserve neutrality in disputes and crisis of the Middle Eastern region as long as the national interests of Turkey was under threat. Involvement with the intervention in Iraq would create hostility between Turkey and the Arab world after the long crisis is ended and the international coalition returned to home.

However, contrary to the military's position, in Özal's inner circle, there were indications of a willingness to take a tough stand against any potential aggression from the South. The groundwork was determined in a meeting of Turkish emissaries in Vienna in December 1989, in which the foreign minister Mesut Yılmaz met with 17 Turkish ambassadors to examine the effects of developments in Eastern Europe on Turkey and the implications of better relations between East and West. At that meeting, the broad outline of a future

¹⁴⁹ Torumtay, 1994, p.113

foreign policy for Turkey was devised. It was decided that Turkey would definitely remain in NATO while establishing closer ties with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. Moreover, it was decided that the major threat to Turkey now came from the Southeast: Iraq and Syria.¹⁵⁰ Quantitatively, military forces of Iraq and Syria were superior to the Turkish Military forces¹⁵¹ and Iraq was possessing weapons of mass destruction. From the beginning of the 1980s, both Syria and Iraq started to support PKK, Kurdish separatist guerilla organizations, as a part of water issue of Tigris and Euphrates. In parallel to this threat perception, in January 1990, seven months before the invasion of Kuwait, Özal told President Bush in the Oval office that Saddam was the “most dangerous man in the world”. He urged Bush to lead an international effort to rid the world of him.¹⁵²

Having these conditions for President Özal and his close fellows, it was impossible to be neutral in this crisis. Therefore Turkey should be on the side of the international coalition, and have maximum contribution to the international coalition. He perceived Saddam as a threat to Turkey and region; he wanted to keep strategic relations with the US, increase the geopolitics role of Turkey in world politics that is supposed to decrease with the end of cold war. His foreign policy choice for the entire Gulf War, particularly for the decision occasion was based on the following assumptions:¹⁵³ i) Saddam would not survive; ii) The map of the Middle East would be re-drawn¹⁵⁴; iii) Turkey would take her place at the table where the future of the Middle East would be determined; iv) Turkey should be compensated by the Gulf states for her losses due to the Gulf War; v) In return for her stance during the crisis, Turkey would get from Europe and the US additional aid, more credit,

¹⁵⁰ Kuniholm, *ibid*, pp. 40-41

¹⁵¹ For the military comparison of military forces of the Middle East see the table “The Regions’s Military Lineup” *Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations*, Annual 6, 1991 Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBIV) p.213

¹⁵² Morton Abramowitz, “American Policy Making on Turkey,” *Insight Turkey*, (October -December 2000), Vol. 2, No.4, p.4 and “Çankaya Fırtınası”; *Memories of Ergin Güner*, advisor of President Özal during the Gulf War, *Milliyet*, 19 February 1998

¹⁵³ Arcayürek, *ibid*, pp. 27-28 [this was an account of Arcayürek as the recollection of the statements, closed background meetings of President Özal as Ankara representative of Cumhuriyet, Turkish daily]

¹⁵⁴ According to President Özal, this change in the border of Iraq would create opportunities for Turkey in Northern Iraq. General Torumtay, Chief of Staff of the period who resigned later, writes that President Özal brought the issue of North Iraq to the meeting of the Crisis Committee composed of President, Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister; expressed his desire to have a cross border operation in North Iraq, noting that Mosul and Kirkuk was originally in the borders of Turkey drawn in “National Oath.” (*Misak-i Milliye*) However, the military rejected the proposal of Özal on Northern Iraq. See Torumtay, 1994, pp.115-116

support for her EC membership and her policies towards Greece and Armenia. According to Keçeciler, Özal based his Iraqi policy based on the following three principles:¹⁵⁵

i) preservation of the territorial integrity of Iraq, ii) having full cooperation with the US, iii) preventing the emergence of any possible hostility between Iraqi and Turkish society.

Given this division within the Turkish decision makers, they had to decide upon the following request of the US administration. The US administration wanted three things from Turkey during the Gulf War: ¹⁵⁶

1. The use of bases for a sustained air campaign in northern Iraq;
2. The movement of more Turkish troops to the Turkey-Iraq border to help deter Saddam from moving his troops in Southern Iraq;
3. The dispatch a Turkish battalion to Saudi Arabia to join allied forces assembling there.

The essential requirement for the US administration in their military campaign over Iraq was the ability to use the Turkish military bases. Therefore, this request constituted a “decision occasion” for Turkey. For this decision occasion, the most important point was the use of İncirlik base by the international coalition. For this end, decision makers had to answer the following questions in order to reach a final decision:

1. Would Turkey allow the deployment of the forces of international coalition?
2. Would Turkey allow international coalition to use the NATO military bases in Turkey for an out-of-area operation?
3. If yes, for what purposes the international coalition would use the Turkish military bases: for their operations targeting Iraq or just for logistic purposes?
4. Which decision making process would be followed? (the necessity of a political authorization from the parliament)

On 9 August 1990, James Baker, Secretary of State of the US came to Ankara and visited President Özal, Prime Minister Akbulut, and Foreign Minister Bozer. They discussed the

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Mehmet Keçeciler, State minister in charge of energy affairs, 8 June 2005, Ankara

¹⁵⁶ Abramowitz, 2000, p.5

issue of the closure of the oil pipelines and the possible military contribution of Turkey to the newly emerging international coalition. It was reported that the issue of military bases was just discussed in the Özal- Baker meeting rather than in the early meetings of Secretary Baker with other Turkish officials¹⁵⁷ The US officials, before they left Turkey, stated that they did not expect any problems regarding the use of Turkish bases for a possible war against Iraq. They thought that it was their right to use the bases within the framework of NATO agreements.¹⁵⁸ However, the following day, Murat Sungar, spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, renounced the statement of the US officials. Sungar stated that the issue of military bases was not on the agenda of bilateral talks with Secretary Baker and Turkey did not give any guarantee to the US for military support in the military intervention in Iraq.¹⁵⁹

Özal was thinking that the crisis would eventually lead to a military intervention phase.¹⁶⁰ So, he had the idea that in order to have flexibility and maneuvering capability in implementation of foreign policy, the government should get authorization from the parliament.¹⁶¹ Fast decision making and dynamic policy was essential for full benefit from the crisis. For Özal, political authorization by the TGNA was necessary in order to send Turkish military forces abroad and station foreign military forces on the Turkish territory.¹⁶² Therefore, he advised Prime Minister Akbulut and other members of the cabinet to get the necessary political authorization from the TGNA.

In order to get this authorization, in the meeting of the Council of Ministers, the government decided to prepare a memorandum of Prime Ministry for Parliamentary authorization. This authorization would allow the government to send Turkish troops abroad and to permit the stationing of foreign troops in Turkey without being attacked first. This was considered as a declaration of war for many decision makers. The government

¹⁵⁷ Cumhuriyet, 10 August 1990

¹⁵⁸ Cumhuriyet, 10 August 1990

¹⁵⁹ Ayın Tarihi, August 1990, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1990/agustos1990.htm>

¹⁶⁰ The proceedings of the press meeting of President Turgut Özal in 18 August 1990, in Çankaya Palace, for the full text see: Aykan, *ibid*, pp. 100-101

¹⁶¹ The proceedings of the press meeting of Turgut Özal in 18 August 1990, in Çankaya Palace. For the full text see: Aykan, *ibid*, p. 110

¹⁶² *ibid*. pp. 111

prepared the memo in a way that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not informed of such a proposal. The senior diplomats of the Foreign Ministry learned the proposal of the government just as they arrived to the TGNA to watch the general discussion on Gulf Crisis from the journalists on 12 August 1990. They stated their reservations to such a proposal. According to the diplomats in the Foreign Ministry, in the absence of an imminent threat to Turkey being attacked from Iraq, such a decision of the TGNA would increase the risk for Turkey.¹⁶³ After the heavy discussion among the deputies in the closed session of the parliament on 12 August 1990, there was a compromise between the government and the parliament. They adopted a revised bill that gave the government “permission”, not “authority” to declare a state of war, only “in case of aggression against our country” and “with the aim of retaliating immediately.”¹⁶⁴ Along with the opposition parties and Foreign Ministry, some members of the ruling Motherland Party opposed to the initial proposal of the Parliament as well. They were led by the former Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz, who had resigned in February 1990, and was running for the leadership of the Motherland Party. If the government insisted on the initial proposal and initial proposal was accepted in TGNA, there was a possibility of emergence of a domestic political crisis.¹⁶⁵ The revision of the initial proposal by the government prevented such a political crisis.

Despite the decision of the Parliament, President Özal was not satisfied with the current nature of the decision. He thought that it was meaningless and not operational for their foreign policy aims.¹⁶⁶ So, he tried to persuade the members of the parliament through his personal connections and putting pressure on the deputies for an unconditional authorization that would give him control over the decision. In his opening speech for the TGNA, he criticized the members of the parliament saying that “those who think that Turkey’s foreign policy could be conducted with hesitant indecisiveness” for not seeing what was really happening in the region. He stated that international developments were moving very fast. The traditional diplomacy could be too slow to handle these international

¹⁶³ Cumhuriyet, 13 August 1990

¹⁶⁴ The proceedings of this closed session is now available. For the proceedings of this session see: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Journal of Proceedings of the Parliament), Session Number: 126 (extraordinary), 12 . 8 . 1990 Monday, Term: 18, Volume: 46/1, Legislation Year: 3

¹⁶⁵ The statement of former foreign minister Mesut Yılmaz, Cumhuriyet, 14 August 1990

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Mehmet Keçeciler, State minister in charge of energy affairs, 8 June 2005, Ankara

developments and it did not have ability to maneuver in order to take quick decisions when it was essential. He added that Turkey would not enjoy the full benefits of her stance against Iraq unless she joined the coalition build-up in the Gulf.¹⁶⁷ He advised the parliament to transfer to the government those necessary powers mentioned in the article 92 of the constitution with the exception of the power to declare a state of war.

After the opening speech of President Özal, Prime Minister Akbulut stated that the cabinet would follow the advice of President Özal, and a new memorandum of Prime Ministry will be sent to the parliament in the following days. On 3 September 1990, Council of Ministers convened under the leadership of President Özal and adopted a new memorandum of Prime Ministry to be sent for parliamentary permission. On 4 September 1990, memorandum of Prime Ministry was confirmed by the ruling Motherland Party Group. The members of the Motherland Party were persuaded by president Özal and other influential members of the Motherland Party.¹⁶⁸ However, still 30 deputies from the Motherland Party who opposed the motion of the government for this decision occasion did not participate in the session of the parliament on 5 September 1990. The deputies believed that President Özal wanted to strengthen his hand and gain power his coming visit to the US.¹⁶⁹ On 5 September 1990, Turkish Grand National Assembly resolved that the Council of Ministers be permitted to send Turkish armed forces to foreign countries and allow foreign forces to be stationed in Turkey of which the necessary limits and scope to be determined by the government even if Turkey was not attacked. (Decision no 108)¹⁷⁰ This decision opened the way for the usage of the Turkish air bases by the allied forces for a non-NATO operation for the first time since 1958.

During the process, as a typical “expansionist” leader, President Özal continued to challenge the constraints in order to realize his desire for this decision occasion, control the

¹⁶⁷ For the text of the speech Cüneyt Arcayürek, “Kriz Doğuran Savaş,” (Ankara : Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000) pp. 7-14

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Mehmet Keçeciler, State minister in charge of energy affairs, 8 June 2005, Ankara. There are some arguments that Mesul Yılmaz was persuaded to support the government bill by Ozal through giving his consent for the leadership Motherland Party and premiership. For such an argument, see: Arcayürek, *ibid*, pp. 14 and 379.

¹⁶⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 3 September 1990

¹⁷⁰ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Journal of Proceedings of the Parliament), Term: 18, Volume:47/1, Legislation Year:4, 5.9.1990

decision making mechanism. He focused on the task, allowing the US to deploy in Turkey and use Turkish military bases. He tried to change the domestic political setting in order to personalize and dominate foreign policy making. The first mechanism to change the domestic political setting was forcing some decision makers who would oppose to his decision and foreign policy aims to resign from their positions in the decision making mechanism.

The first resignation was that of the Foreign Minister Ali Bozer after the official visit of Turgut Özal to Washington in September 1990. On 25 September 1990, President Bush and President Özal met in the White House. In this meeting, Foreign Minister Ali Bozer was excluded from Özal's meeting with Bush. In that meeting Secretary of State, James Baker was participating in the meeting in the US side. On the Turkish side, just Nabi Şensoy, a personal advisor of Özal was in the meeting. None of them had legal responsibility to the parliament, and therefore to the Turkish nation. The meeting took place between four people and there was no record of such a meeting that the important issues were discussed. So, the Foreign Minister Bozer felt that he was increasingly left out of the decision-making process and resigned from his post on 11 October 1990. After the resignation of the Foreign Minister Bozer, on 12 October 1990 Ahmet Kurtçebe Alptemuçin, an engineer by profession, was appointed as the new Foreign Minister. He had never had any post related to the foreign affairs priority. As a sign of this, after his appointment, when he was questioned by a journalist about the Gulf Crisis, he told the journalist to direct these questions to the President.¹⁷¹ This showed that his involvement in the decision making mechanism would remain limited and of low profile.

Similarly, on 18 October 1990, National Defense Minister Safa Giray resigned from his post just after the return of President Ozal from his visit to Gulf States between October 13 and 16 just before planned meeting of Minister Giray with Manfred Woerner, NATO-Secretary General. He stated that "I have reached the firm conclusion that the relationship

¹⁷¹ Briefing, 17 December 1990, p.8

of trust that exist between us has been damaged” in his resignation letter written to the Prime Minister.¹⁷²

Question of which decision making process would be followed for the use of Turkish bases, especially the İncirlik air base, was an important point of disagreement among the decision making actors. The Foreign Ministry was arguing that it was possible to allow the US to use İncirlik air base within the framework of “Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement” (DECA) between the US and Turkey (29 March 1980). On the other hand, the General Staff was against this idea because the opening of the Turkish military bases to the deployment of the foreign troops, it was an aggression against Iraq according to the article 3 (f) of the annex to the UN General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, on the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁷³ Moreover, the Chief of Staff was willing to have an additional agreement with the US for purpose of military deployment in Turkey for intervention in Iraq to liberate Kuwait.¹⁷⁴

The coordination of the possible foreign military deployment to Turkey between Chief of Staff and government was a source of conflict in this process. The Chief of Staff could not get the relevant political directives required military preparations to be taken by Turkish Military Forces from the government. Chief of Staff was not comfortable with the lack of political directives from the government until 1 December 1990, nearly four months after the invasion. Chief of Staff received written political directives from the office of the Prime Minister without necessary signature of the ministers; it was just signed by the undersecretary of the Prime Minister. After this correspondence that was non-professional and un-protocol like, he decided to resign from his job.¹⁷⁵ On 3 December 1990, he resigned from his post. He stated that in his resignation letter “I am resigning of my own free will because with my principles and my understanding of what the state should be, I

¹⁷² Briefing, 22 October 1990, pp.5-6

¹⁷³ The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations , Adopted by the General Assmebly, During the General Asembly its 25th Session, 24 October 1970, <www.un.org/documents/ga/res/25/ares25.htm>

¹⁷⁴ Necip Torumtay, *Değişen Stratejilerin Odağında Türkiye* (İstanbul : Milliyet Yayınları, 1996) p. 57

¹⁷⁵ For the detailed story of his resignation see the memoirs of the Genearal Torumtay. Necip Torumtay, *Orgeneral Torumtay'ın Anıları* (İstanbul : Milliyet Yayınları, 1994.) pp.107-136

cannot continue to serve.”¹⁷⁶ Another example of the coordination problem between the President and General Chief of Staff that had impact in his resignation was his appointment as “liaison officer” to the US officials without informing him. He was very much upset to this and he writes that “Turkish Chief of Staff is not a liaison officer, but the highest commanding post, as a representative of a dignified state, can not accept any correspondence other than another Chief of Staff of a friendly state.”¹⁷⁷

On 29 November 1990, United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 678 that authorized the states cooperating with Kuwait to use “all necessary means” to uphold UNSC Resolution 660 and ordered Iraqi withdrawal by 15 January 1991. After the adoption of this resolution, the issue was discussed in the National Security Council, Council of Ministers, and Crisis Committee which was composed of the President, the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and Chief of Staff. The actors had different views on the issue. President Özal and the newly appointed Foreign Minister Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptomaçın were supporting the use of the Turkish bases by the Coalition.¹⁷⁸ The Prime Minister was in a position that the US participation in the war did not required Turkish involvement.¹⁷⁹ Nüzhet Kandemir, Turkish Ambassador to Washington, in a conference organized in Washington on 20 November 1990, was stating that, for the use of Turkish bases there was a necessity of additional NATO decision along with the UNSC Resolution.¹⁸⁰ Some members of the cabinet were thinking that the UN SC resolution 678 was not adequate and Turkey should not participate in a possible war in the Persian Gulf. Some ministers had some reservation about the commandership of the international coalition.¹⁸¹

On 15 January 1991, the deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait had passed. In the same day, President Özal had a meeting with the deputies of ruling Motherland Party and

¹⁷⁶ For the full text of his letter, Necip Torumtay, “Orgeneral Torumtay'ın Anıları,” (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994) p. 130

¹⁷⁷ Torumtay, *ibid*, p.119

¹⁷⁸ Cumhuriyet, 6 Aralık 1990

¹⁷⁹ The Speech of Akbulut in TGNA, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Journal of Proceedings of the Parliament), Term: 18, Volume:51, Legislation Year 4, 5 December 1990

¹⁸⁰ Ayın Tarihi, November 1990, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1990/kasim1990.htm>

¹⁸¹ Cumhuriyet, 2 December 1990

advised them to support government for additional authorization during the Gulf Crisis. However, in these days, still there was no decision regarding the question of whether government would allow the use of the İncirlik base in a war against Iraq. The US administration was requesting “full cooperation” from Turkey. The last demand for the US military deployment had come from Secretary of State James Baker in his visit to Turkey as a part of his Middle East tour in November. After the meeting of Council of Ministers on 14 January 1991, Prime Minister Akbulut stated that the cabinet did not have a decision regarding the use of Turkish bases by the US although the TGNA authorized the government to allow deployment of foreign troops in Turkey. He added that if necessary, the government would allow the US to use Turkish military bases.¹⁸² The early authorization of the TGNA on 5 September 1990 was to give the government flexibility in its foreign relations and conduct swift and dynamic foreign policy. This statement of Akbulut gave the signal that government would ask a new authorization from the TGNA specifically giving reference to the Gulf War and the UNSC Resolution 678.

On 17 January 1991 around 01.30 am, Operation “Desert Storm” started. President Özal was informed by President Bush before the operation. American authorities wanted from President Özal to have over flight rights over Turkey and open Turkish air bases for the use of American forces to bomb targets in Iraq. President Özal replied that it required political decision of the TGNA.¹⁸³ Just after the operation, a meeting was held at Çankaya Palace, between President Özal, Prime Minister Akbulut, Chief of General Staff Güreş, National Defense Minister Doğan, and Foreign Minister Alptemoçin. After the meeting, Prime Minister Akbulut stated that the government would request new authority from the Turkish Grand National Assembly to enable operations beyond the borders of Turkey if needed.

On 17 January 1991, Murat Sungar, Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the US aircrafts in the İncirlik was stationed in accordance with the “Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement” (DECA) between the US and Turkey (29 March

¹⁸² Ayın Tarihi, January 1990, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1991/ocak1991.htm>

¹⁸³ Abramowitz, 2000, p. 3

1980), and the participation of those airplanes in the military campaign against Iraq required authorization of Turkey.¹⁸⁴

On 17 January 1991, at 10.00 am, National Security Council convened in the Çankaya Palace to discuss the Gulf Crisis. National Security Council advised the Council of Ministers to request the relevant additional authorization from the Turkish Grand National Assembly in accordance with the constitution and the United Nations Security Council resolutions. After the meeting of the National Security Council, Council of Ministers convened under the leadership of Özal in the Çankaya Palace and decided to request a new authority from the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In the aftermath, the TGNA convened to discuss to Gulf Crisis. The memorandum of the Prime Ministry, giving authority, valid during the Gulf Crisis and its aftermath, to use the Turkish Armed Forces abroad and for foreign military forces to be stationed in Turkey, was approved by the Assembly, in accordance with Article 92 of Turkish Constitution and UNSC resolution 678. (Decision number 126) As it was in the previous voting for the Gulf Crisis on 5 September 1990, 52 of the deputies was absent in the closed session on Gulf Crisis. This decision of the TGNA was giving reference to the UNSC Resolution 678 and giving government to allow the US to use Turkish bases. The previous two authorizations of TGNA were on the possibility of war in the Persian Gulf. The prior aim for these two authorizations was to send military forces abroad. President Özal wanted government to be ready for sending troops abroad for such a possibility and pressured on the cabinet and the TGNA for the authorization. This last authorization on 17 January 1990 was resolved just after the war started in the Gulf; was not based on the possibility of war. One day after this decision, on 18 January 1991, American Air Forces started to use İncirlik air base.

2. D. 2. d) The Decision Outcome

The decision outcome of this decision occasion evolved from “a mutual compromise” which indicates that all parties in the decision unit have yielded some of their position in order not to lose out completely in the choice process to “one party’s position prevails”.

¹⁸⁴ Ayin Tarihi, January 1991<www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/1991/ocak1991.htm>

The first decision made on 12 August 1990 “a mutual compromise” between two lines of foreign policy preferences. The first line was called “traditionalist”, represented by Turkish Military Forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some members of the parliament and cabinet that proposed a cautious foreign policy in an understanding of traditional foreign policy making and values. The second line of foreign policy preferences for this decision occasion was those who called “revisionist”, represented mainly by President Özal that advocated an active, ambitious, and risk taking foreign policy. When the government brought a proposal for unconditional authorization, the first line opposed to the motion and the government had to revise its proposal in order to prevent a domestic political crisis. If the government insisted on its initial nature of the proposal, the motion would be possibly rejected by the Parliament.

Unlike the previous decision occasion, Özal could not emerge as a predominant leader to make this decision alone. He tried to challenge to constraints however, unlike the previous decision occasion, the type of the decision occasion and the decision rule was not suitable for his emergence as a sole decision maker. However, finally his position prevailed and Turkey allowed the US to use Turkish military bases which was position of President Özal. So, gradually the decision outcome of this decision occasion was “one party’s position prevails” The leadership style of President Özal contributed to the gradual evolution of the decision from “a mutual compromise” to “one party’s position prevails.” In the following paragraphs, his impact on the decision outcome will be elaborated.

Turgut Özal, after assuming power after 1983 elections, he started to expand his power; initiated a change the foreign policy making of Turkey. He started to rule the foreign policy with his close advisors and fellows. He attempted the de-bureaucratization of the Foreign Ministry. He frequently criticized the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry as being passive agents. He re-designed the Foreign Ministry; the roles of the Foreign Ministry were shared by the new institutions such as Treasury and Foreign Trade Undersecretary for the economic relations of Turkey.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ Treasury and Foreign Trade Undersecretary (Hazine ve Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı) was established on 13 December 1983 with an executive order of Council of Ministers, and directly connected to the Prime Ministry. (DIŞ TİCARET TEŞKİLATI TARİHÇESİ, www.dtm.gov.tr/organ/tarih.htm)

After he succeeded President Evren in 1989, he continued to influence on foreign policy. He justified his involvement in the foreign policy with the constitution. Article 104 of the Turkish constitution gives the president the following duties: ratifying and issuing international treaties; appointing and dismissing, upon a demand from the prime minister, the foreign minister like other ministers; recalling and presiding over the meeting of the Council of Ministers and the National Security Council; accrediting Turkish diplomatic envoy abroad, and issuing agreement to foreign diplomatic envoys; acting as a Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the Parliament; and appointing the Chief of General Staff who is accountable to the prime minister in the exercise of his duties.¹⁸⁶ And moreover Article 92 gives president right to dispatch the Turkish Armed Forces abroad at the times when the Parliament in recess.¹⁸⁷ He had the broader interpretation of his rights and responsibilities in the field of foreign policy:

“It is true that I have a big role to play in the crisis policy. Since in the formulation of this policy the executive has got the role, I, the president, am the most important wing of the executive. Look at the constitution... whose provisions are not like those of the 1961 Constitution. The president may summon the Council of Ministers any time. Many decisions are taken under his chairmanship... the president is the Chief of the Army, and the head of the National Security Council, and empowered with the mandate of the Parliament to authorize the Turkish troops when the Parliament in recess. All this indicates that the President has got wide powers.”¹⁸⁸

Having this leadership style, for this decision occasion, in order his position to prevail, President Özal, as a typical expansionist leader, challenged the constraints through changing the domestic political setting, applying pressure on the cabinet members and deputies, and using his personal connections in order to maneuver freely in the international politics in order to realize his foreign policy aims. If he did not challenge the constraints and engineer the domestic political setting in a way that his position prevails, the decision outcome would be different from the gradual decision in for this decision occasion. For instance, in

¹⁸⁶ Article 104 of Turkish Constitution, The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey: available in the web site of TGNA visit: www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/constitution.htm

¹⁸⁷ Article 92 of Turkish Constitution, The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey: available in the web site of TGNA visit: www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/constitution.htm

¹⁸⁸ President Özal, Interviewed with Altemur Kılıç, Tercuman, 8 December 1990, cited in Ramazan Gözen, “An Analysis to Close the Oil Pipelines in Gulf Crises 1990- 1991: From Procrastination to Co-operation” PhD Thesis, University of Reading, p. 297

the first vote of the TGNA for this decision occasion, the government made a compromise with the deputies. The result of the compromise, the decision was the conditional authorization to the government. After this authorization, President Özal applied pressure on the deputies who were elected during his leadership of Motherland Party, and asked government to get an unconditional authorization from the TGNA with a new memorandum. The deputies of ruling Motherland Party were elected in the general elections in 1987 in which they were nominated by Özal as the Prime Minister of the time and leader of Motherland Party. So, the deputies of Motherland Party had personal attachments to Özal. They were mostly loyal to the Özal as the founding leader of Motherland Party. They listened to the advices of Özal, voted in his favor in the coming sessions of the TGNA on the Gulf Crisis. The government prepared a new memorandum and got the unconditional authorization to allow the US to use the Turkish military bases. After this decision, he changed the some of the decision making actors. As discussed above in details, the foreign minister Ali Bozer, Chief of Staff General Necip Torumtay, and Defense Minister Sefa Giray had to resign from their post after having disputes on the foreign policy of Turkey for the Gulf Crisis. The new actors that were appointed were not in a position to oppose the foreign policy orientation of Özal. The new actors who had little experience on foreign policy and low profile involvement in the decision making process help prevailing of the President Özal's position.

This chapter analyzed two decision occasions in Turkish foreign policy during the Gulf War (1991) within the "decision units" framework. Two decision occasions had different type of decision units, different foreign policy making process and decision outcome. The decision unit for the first decision occasion was the predominant leader and the decision outcome was one party' position prevails. In the second case, the decision unit was the coalition of multiple autonomous actors and the decision outcome was one party' position prevails too. From the analysis of the two decision occasion, we have seen the impact of a strong leader on the foreign policy making of Turkey. In the first occasion, a strong leader, President Özal, made the final decision by himself through manipulating the other actors and challenging the constraints that he faced in the decision making mechanism. In the second decision occasion, although President Özal was not the sole decision maker, his

position gradually prevailed due to his leadership characteristics had impact and political maneuvers.

In the following chapter, the two decision occasions from Turkish foreign policy during the US military intervention in Iraq (2003) will be analyzed as the second case study of this thesis.

CHAPTER 3) CASE STUDY 2: THE US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ (2003)

In this chapter, like the previous chapter, first, for better understanding of the entire picture of the case, a detailed chronology will be presented. In this chronology, the parts that were marked in the box represent important milestones during the entire decision making process. Then, there will be the description of the case and a short note on the Turkish foreign policy making of the time. In the last part of the chapter, two decision occasions; the US military deployment in Turkey and opening of Turkish air space will be analyzed. For each decision occasion, first the background of the decision occasion will be presented, second the authoritative decision unit will be determined, third the decision making process, the dynamics, and decision outcome will be analyzed.

3. A) CHRONOLGY OF THE US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ (2003) AND MAKING OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY¹⁸⁹

- 16 November 1998: The US Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited to Ankara and requested military support of Turkey to overthrow Saddam regime.
- 15 December 1998: The US started “Operation Desert Fox” in Iraq; the US airplanes used İncirlik Air Base.
- 28 September 1999: Prime Minister Ecevit and President Clinton talk in White House. The US intervention in Iraq was on the agenda. Prime Minister Ecevit shared the Turkish concern with President Clinton.
- 11 September 2001: Terrorist attacked to the US.
- 19 September 2001: A meeting in the office of Prime Minister for Turkish foreign policy over Afghanistan between Minister of Foreign Affairs, Undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and Chief of General Staff was held.
- 20 September 2001: A foreign policy meeting in the Çankaya Palace under the leadership of President Sezer with participation of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit,

¹⁸⁹ In the preparation of this detailed chronology, *Ayın Tarihi*, Newspot, the official web site of United Nations, the daily news papers, “Iraq timeline: July 16, 1979 to January 31, 2004”, *The Guardian*, (www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/page/0,12438,793802,00.html) were benefited.

Deputy Prime Ministers Devlet Bahçeli and Mesut Yılmaz, Chief of General Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, Undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization (MİT) Şenkal Atasagun, Secretary General of the President Kemal Nehrozoğlu, former undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry Faruk Logoğlu, the newly-appointed undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry Uğur Ziyal and Presidential foreign policy adviser Tacan İldem .After the meeting it was declared that Turkey would cooperate with the US administration in struggle against terrorism.

- 21 September 2002: The US administration officially requested Turkey to open her air bases and air space for the “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan.
- 22 September 2001: Prime Minister Ecevit sent a letter to President Bush. It was stated that Turkey would give full support to the US in the fight against terror.
- 2 October 2001: A meeting between Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and Chief of General Staff was held. During the meeting, official demand from the US for the Turkish military deployment in Afghanistan arrived to Ankara.
- 10 October 2001: The Turkish Grand National Assembly granted full war powers to the government, empowering it to dispatch troops abroad or host foreign troops on Turkish territory and to allow the use of Turkish territory, airspace, and territorial waters for “Operation Enduring Freedom.” In this session, 422 deputies participated, 319 favored the motion, and 101 opposed with 2 abstentions.
- 30 October 2001: The National Security Council monthly meeting in the Çankaya Palace
- 31 October 2001: Technical Committee Meeting between Chief of Staff, Foreign Minister and Undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization (MİT) was held.
- 1 November 2001: Council of Ministers decided to send Turkish military forces to Afghanistan.
- 9 November 2001: Chief of Staff Özkök expressed his opposition to possible strike on Iraq by the US in Diyarbakır by emphasizing that Turkey had suffered financially because of former operations against Iraq.

- 20 November 2001: Council of Ministers decided to write a memorandum of Prime Ministry for sending Turkish Military Forces to Afghanistan
- 5 December 2001: Secretary of State, Colin Powell visited Ankara. He offered the commandership of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Turkey.
- 16 January 2002: Prime Minister Ecevit met with President Bush in Washington: Ecevit explained the Turkish concerns on a possible intervention of the US in Iraq.
- 29 January 2002: President Bush declared Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the “axis of evil”
- 1 February 2002: Prime Minister Ecevit wrote a letter to Saddam Hussein in order to warn Iraqi administration on the possible intervention of the US.
- 7 February 2002: Saddam Hussein replied to the letter of Prime Minister Ecevit.
- 6 March 2002: General Tuncer Kılınç, Secretary General of National Security Council stated that Turkey should cooperate with China, Russia, and Iran.
- 19 March 2002: The US Vice President Cheney visited to Ankara. He told that the US was going to intervene in Iraq. He demanded “full and complete cooperation” from Turkey.
- 20 June 2002: A meeting on the possible US military intervention in Iraq with the participation of Deputy under Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of staff, Undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization (MİT), and experts from the Special Forces of Turkish Military Forces in Foreign Ministry to draw possible scenarios and red lines of Turkey regarding Iraq.
- 11 July 2002: Foreign Minister İsmail Cem resigned. Şükrü Sina Gürel was appointed as the new Foreign Minister. The Under Secretary of Foreign Ministry, Uğur Ziyal and Deputy Chief of Staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt briefed the new foreign minister and determined the official Turkish reply to be presented to the US delegation on 16-17 July. The decision was that “Turkey did not want a military intervention in Iraq”
- 16-17 July 2002: The US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and Deputy State Secretary Mark Grossman visit Ankara. The official negotiations took place in the Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel, head of the Policy Planning Department of the General Staff Reşat Turgut, Turkey's ambassador to

Washington Faruk Loğoğlu, Undersecretary of Foreign Ministry Uğur Ziyal and advisers of the Prime Minister participated in the talks. The conditions of Turkish support to the US in military intervention in Iraq were decided. Chief of Staff and Foreign Ministry after the negotiations with the USA concluded that; 1-the US needs Turkish support in her intervention in Iraq, 2-in the case of Turkish support, the intervention will be easier, 3-the ruling party in Ankara might change in the coming elections, and the new Turkish administration could be persuaded within the context of traditional US-Turkish friendship for the necessary support to the US.

- 29 July 2002: Russian Federation proposed Turkey to cooperate in Iraq against the US military intervention.
- 9 August 2002: The US invited Kurdish groups of Iraq to Washington for meetings for the post Saddam era.
- 26 August 2002: Uğur Ziyal, Under Secretary of Foreign Ministry visited to the US. Rumsfeld, the US Defense Secretary, for the first time, talked about the northern front in Iraq. Uğur Ziyal explained Turkish concerns on Iraq. He told the US officials that Turkey could support her 50-year old ally in Iraq with some guarantees.
- 16 September 2002: Iraq accepted the unconditional return of the UN inspectors.
- 16 September 2002: Chief of Staff requested political directive from the government for the US demands from Turkey.
- 30 September 2002: UN negotiators and an Iraqi delegation met in Vienna. After three days talks they agreed for resuming weapons inspections. However, talks left eight presidential compounds off-limits. The US rejected inspectors' return without a new Security Council resolution.
- 4 October 2002: "Short and Middle Term Policies of Turkey on Iraq" meeting in the Çankaya Palace under the leadership of President Sezer was held with the suggestion of Turkish Military Forces and Foreign Ministry. Chief of Staff, Undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization (MİT), Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commander of Operations in Chief of Staff, and Secretary General of the Çankaya Palace participated to the meeting.

- 7 October 2002: Government ordered to Chief of Staff to start detailed negotiations with the US without giving any guarantee.
 - 10 October 2002: The US administration sent her demands to Turkey through European Command. The US demands included deployment of 90 thousand US soldiers in Turkey, permission to use Turkish military bases, sea ports, air bases, and opening of Turkish air space to the US.
 - 21 October 2002: The US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander visited to Ankara.
 - 24 October 2002: President Bush and President Sezer had telephone call.
 - 3 November 2002: Justice and Development Party (AKP) got the majority in the TGNA General elections in Turkey. Tayyip Erdoğan, leader of the AKP, was barred from standing for elections because of a previous conviction for inciting religious hatred.
 - 3-10 November 2002: Chief of Staff and Deputy Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited to the US.
 - 8 November 2002: United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 on the renewal of inspections in Iraq.
 - 10 November 2002: “Annan Plan” for a permanent peace in the Cyprus Island was declared by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.
 - 13 November 2002: President Saddam sent a letter to the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, accepting the UN resolution.
 - 16 November 2002: Abdullah Gül was appointed to form the new government by President Sezer.
 - 18 November 2002: United Nations weapons inspectors arrived in Baghdad to re-launch the search for weapons of mass destruction.
 - 20 November 2002: President Sezer met with President Bush in Praque. Sezer dealt with the legitimacy concern of Turkey for military intervention in Iraq.
 - 28 November 2002: New cabinet of Gül received confidence vote from the TGNA.
- 3 December 2002: The US Defense Secretary Wolfowitz and Deputy State Secretary Grossman visited to Ankara. Wolfowitz and Grossman met Prime Minister Gül and other Turkish military and civilian officials in order to seek the

position of the newly elected administration in Turkey on Iraq. They had three staged cooperation proposal to Turkey: 1- site inspection, 2- site preparation, 3- the US military deployment. For the first stage, a team of 150 technicians was allowed to work in Turkey.

- 3 December 2002: Grossman and Wolfowitz visited Tayyip Erdoğan and had a special meeting in Ankara. Egemen Bağış, Cüneyt Zapsu, and Ömer Çelik, special advisors of Erdoğan participated to the meeting. A letter from Bush inviting Erdoğan to the US was delivered.
- 7 December 2002: Iraqi officials presented the UN with a 12,000 page dossier disclosing Iraq's programmes for weapons of mass destruction, as demanded by UN resolution 1441.
- 9 December 2002: Erdoğan started his visit to the US
- 10 December 2002: Erdoğan met with President Bush in White House.
- 17 December 2002: Meeting between President Sezer, Prime Minister Gül, Chief of Staff Özkök was held in the Çankaya Palace. They decided not to give full support to the US, decided to wait for the regional summit in 23 January. Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, Presidency Secretary-General Kemal Nehrozoğlu, Prime Ministry Undersecretary Fikret Uçcan, Prime Ministry military advisor General Köksal Karabay, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Uğur Ziyal and President's foreign policy advisor Tacan İldem also participated to the meeting.
- 18 December 2002: Military base permission was given to the US.
- 21 December 2002: Prime Minister Gül met with the US Ambassador Pearson. Pearson submitted the message from President Bush to Gül, and told Turkey to decide on Northern Front in 3 days.
- 23 December 2002: In foreign policy meeting in the office of Prime Minister, the options on Iraqi policy of Turkey were decided: i-No support to the US, ii-To open the air space, ii-In addition to air space, to open the sea ports and air ports to the US, iii-Addition to air space, open Turkish territory for the US military deployment, iv-Giving full support, including sending Turkish Military Forces to Iraq.
- 25 December 2002: Council of Ministers convened.

- 26 December 2002: Foreign Minister Yakış briefed the Committee of Foreign Relations in the TGNA.
- 26 December 2002: The Military Supreme Council (YAŞ) convened and decided that Turkey can not prevent the US intervention in Iraq and should not be out of the equation.
- 27 December 2002: The US Treasury Undersecretary John Taylor and Deputy Secretary of State Marc Grossman visited Turkey to assure its support on a war against Iraq, to confirm some compensation for economic loss, and to ease Turkey's serious concerns over the establishment of a possible Kurdish State in Northern Iraq.
- 27 December 2002: Turkey announced its consultation wish with regional countries on Iraq.
- 27 December 2002: The National Security Council convened in the Çankaya Palace No decision regarding Iraq was declared after the meeting.
- 28 December 2002: Grossman and Taylor met with State Minister Ali Babacan, Undersecretary Uğur Ziyal. The US representatives had 5 demands from Turkey: 1- site inspection, 2-site modernization, 3-opening of the air ports and sea ports, 4- permission for the US soldiers to deploy in Turkey, 5- opening of the Turkish air space. It was decided to start official negotiations between the US and Turkey.
- 4 January 2003: Middle East tour of Prime Minister Gül including Syria, Egypt, and Jordan started.
- 6 January 2003: Chief of Staff gave a briefing to Committee of Foreign Relations of the TGNA on Iraq.
- 9 January 2003: The “rules of engagement” of the inspection team of 150 people was determined. It was decided by Gül on 3 December 2002 that the inspection team to start inspection on 15 January 2002. (A delay of nearly one month.)
- 13 January 2003: Foreign Trade Minister Kürşat Tüzmen visited to Baghdad.
- 15 January 2003: Turkey requested NATO to defend Turkey against possible Iraqi attack.

- 16 January 2003: Site inspection to upgrade Turkish bases and ports started. Prime Minister Gül articulated Turkish desire to have legitimacy for the military intervention in Iraq at least based on the NATO decision.
- 20 January 2003: Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited to Ankara. He was informed that the degree of Turkish support to the US to be decided by the TGNA.
- 22 January 2003: President Bush replied the letter of Prime Minister Gül dated 16 January 2003.
- 24 January 2004: Prime Minister Gül replied to the letter of President Bush.
- 24 January 2004: Istanbul Summit of six countries neighboring to Iraq was held. Turkish, Egyptian, Iranian, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian and Syrian Foreign Ministers attended to the summit.
- 25 January 2004: Secretary of State Powel met with Erdoğan in Davos, Switzerland
- 27 January 2003: Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), submitted his report on inspection of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
- 31 January 2003: The National Security Council discussed pros and cons of possible impacts of an American operation on Iraq on the Turkish economy and the pressures of Washington to allow use of Turkish territory.
- 1 February 2003: “Rules of Engagement” was decided. Turkish soldiers in North Iraq would be involved in the war in the cases of self defense; clash with PKK terrorist groups; Kurdish intervention in Mosul and Kirkuk.
- 3 February 2003: Iraqi deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan and Foreign Minister Naci Sabri were brought to Turkey. Prime Minister Gül had a secret meeting with them to persuade Iraqi administration to cooperate with the UN inspectors.
- 4 February 2003: Council of Ministers decided to divide the memorandum of Prime Ministry into the pieces.
- 5 February 2003: Secretary of State Powel talked to the UNSC on Iraq to persuade other members to pass a resolution for the intervention

- 6 February 2002: The TGNA allowed the arrival of the US troops for renovation of military bases in Turkey to be used in the military intervention in Iraq.
- 8 February 2003: Foreign policy meeting was held in the office of Prime Minister. It was decided to directly talk with Washington. An appointment was requested from President Bush.
- 14 February 2003: Turkish delegation composed of Foreign Minister Yakış, State Minister Babacan, Foreign Policy advisor Davutoğlu talked with President Bush in White House.
- 14 February 2003: Hans Blix submitted his latest report on Iraqi compliance with resolution 1441 to the UN Security Council. The report did not provide any clear *casus belli*.
- 16 February 2003: Coordination meeting in the office of the Prime Minister was held. It was decided to send the memorandum of the Prime Ministry to the parliament.
- 20 February 2003: Higher Electoral Board approved Tayyip Erdoğan as a candidate for a elections on 9 March 2003 in Siirt province.
- 24 February 2003: Council of Ministers decided to send the memorandum to the TGNA.
- 25 February 2004: Parliamentary group meeting of ruling AKP.
- 28 February 2003: Hans Blix's interim report to the UN was released. The report gave a mixed assessment of Iraqi cooperation with weapons inspectors but hailing Saddam Hussein's commitment to comply with tomorrow's UN deadline for the destruction of Iraq's illegal Samoud 2 missiles.
- 28 February 2003: The National Security Council discussed the troop deployment, but did not announce any recommendation on the issue.
- 1 March 2003: The TGNA voted in a close session for the memorandum of Prime Ministry empowering it to allow the deployment of foreign troops and sending Turkish troops abroad. The TGNA rejected the memorandum.
- 5 March 2003: Chief of Staff, Özkök in stated in Diyarbakır that view of Turkish Military Forces on Iraqi policy was similar to that of the government.

- 8 March 2003: Foreign policy meeting in the office of Prime Minister.
- 9 March 2002: Leader of Ak Party, Erdoğan elected as the deputy of Siirt.
- 11 March 2003: President Sezer appointed Erdoğan to form a new government.
- 13 March 2003: The US ambassador Pearson visited Erdoğan: Pearson demanded Turkey to open Turkish airspace for the US.
- 13 March 2003: Chief of Staff Özkök, Prime Minister Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Gül came together to discuss the recent developments.
- 13 March 2003: (18.30) Erdoğan told The US Vice President Cheney that government could not open air space since such a decision requires parliamentary authorization. The US started to implement her B Plan in Iraq.
- 14 March 2003: The UNSC did not pass a resolution for military intervention in Iraq.
- 14 March 2003: Uğur Ziyal, Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Deputy Undersecretary Baki İlkin, visited President Sezer in the very early hours of Friday morning to ask him to approve the new Turkish cabinet formed by Tayyip Erdoğan on that was supposed to be approved on Monday.
- 14 March 2003: New cabinet was approved by President Sezer. Abdullan Gül was appointed a Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.
- 16 March 2003: President Anzar of Spain, Prime Minister Blair of UK, and President Bush of the US came together in Azor for military intervention in Iraq.
- 17 March 2003: (20.00) President Sezer, Prime Minister Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Gül, Chief of Staff Özkök, undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ziyal had a meeting in the Çankaya Palace and agreed to open Turkish land to the US.
- 18 March 2003: Council of Ministers convened.
- 18 March 2003: President Bush gave Saddam 48 hours to leave Iraq or face invasion.
- 19 March 2003: Iraqi opposition groups convened in Ankara with Turkish and American officials. The final statement of the meeting (Ankara Declaration) said that the parties agreed on the preservation of Iraq's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity.

- 19 March 2003: Council of Ministers decided to send a new memorandum of Prime Ministry for the opening of Turkish air space to the US.
- 20 March 2003: The US military intervention in Iraq started. The US demanded Turkey to open air space.
- 20 March 2003: The Turkish parliament allowed government to give partial support to US to open a northern front against Iraq. Parliament passed a government motion allowing the United States to use Turkey's air space and cross to Iraq for airborne attacks.

3. B) DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

The Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein, who was not overthrown by the US in the Gulf War (1991), was evaluated as a regional threat to the US national interest in the Middle East. Despite the economic embargo and the international sanctions, the US viewed that the Iraqi regime was continuing its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. It was reported by various US agencies that Iraq was supporting international terrorism through providing military bases and financial assistance.¹⁹⁰ Ending the Saddam regime had been continues foreign policy aim of the US in the aftermath of Gulf War. During the Clinton administration, the US House of Representatives passed the “Iraqi Liberation Act” on 31 October 1998 in order to establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq. “Iraqi Liberation Act” gave authority to the President in order to provide assistance to the Iraqi democratic opposition organizations including radio and television broadcasting, military education and training for such organizations, and humanitarian assistance and enabled the President to spend certain funds for that.¹⁹¹

After the terrorist attacks on US in 11 September 2001, the US started her campaign of “war on terror” and the US initiated an intervention in Afghanistan in order to topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This was a NATO operation (Operation Enduring Freedom)

¹⁹⁰ For instance for such reports see: The US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism during 1900s. The reports are electronically available on the web site of the State Department: www.state.gov

¹⁹¹ For the full text of “Iraqi Liberation Act” see: www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/ILA.htm

and justified as a collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Charter. After the Operation Enduring Freedom, the US administration signaled her sincere desire to intervene in Iraq. President Bush, in his “state of the union” address on 29 January 2002 declared Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the “axis of evil”. Once again, the US deployed her military forces to the Persian Gulf and tried to gain the support of an international coalition to that end. This unilateral intervention of the US in Iraq based on the assumption that Iraq was possessing weapons of mass destruction faced strong opposition from the actors of world politics and led to the deterioration of the Trans-Atlantic relations. It also created a split between the EU members who could not formulate a common Iraqi policy.

3. C) MAKING OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

For the US administration, Turkish involvement in the intervention in Iraq was critical for the following reasons: to gain international support for regime change; to prepare for the battlefield; to accelerate the speed of the military operation; to fix Iraqi forces and enhance defections in the North; to maintain the coalition control of the post-Saddam environment by the coalition forces; to maintain long term stability and reconstruction; to reduce risks for the coalition forces; to protect the major ethnic groups.¹⁹² However, the desire of the US for Turkish involvement in Iraq for strategic and psychological reasons presented a hard and challenging foreign policy formulation process. The US, a close ally of Turkey for nearly 50 years, from the very beginning requested Turkish involvement in the operations over Iraq as it was the case in Afghanistan by allowing the US forces to deploy in the Turkish territory for the northern front and to open the Turkish air bases for the US military forces.

The making of the entire Iraqi policy took a long time, which fell under political responsibility of four different cabinets. The process contained long domestic debate and negotiations in parallel to the negotiations with the US administration. Different views,

¹⁹² “Iraq: Political-Military Strategic Plan; Breifing to Turkey Delegation” 15 October 2002, classified document, published by Mustafa Balbay, “Irak Bataklığında Türk Amerikan İlişkileri,” (İstanbul : Çağ Pazarlama Gazete Dergi Basım, 2004) pp.426-440

interest, positions of various actors came to the picture and shaped the foreign policy making process and the policy outcome.

The decision making period for the Iraqi issue was the period in which Turkey was preoccupied with a loaded agenda especially concerning Cyprus, the EU integration process, economic reforms, and IMF relations. The issues were often interconnected and they were in a capacity to influence each other. During the first part of this period, there was political instability in Turkey due to the internal debates and struggles of the parties that formed the coalition government. In the latter part, after the general elections in November 2002, a strong single party government came to the power and recovered Turkey from the political and economic instability. The new government of AKP, a former Islamist party, who had a little experience in foreign policy, faced with reservation from the various factions of the Turkish politics, especially from the military and civil bureaucracy, and the media establishment.

The entire issue contains many authoritative decisions concerning site inspection, site preparations, military deployment, opening of the air space, sending Turkish military forces to Northern Iraq, sending peacekeeping forces to Iraq after the fall of the Saddam regime. However, for the purposes of this thesis, two decision occasions are selected and will be analyzed in details. These are the decisions concerning the US military deployment to Turkey, and the opening of the Turkish air space.

3. D) DECISION OCCASIONS

3. D.1) Decision Occasion 1: The US Military Deployment in Turkey

3. D. 1. a) Background of the Occasion

As a part of the military operation plan against Iraq, the US administration had the following demands from the Turkish authorities: i) the US military forces deployment to Turkey in order to open a second front in the North of Iraq, ii) opening of the Turkish airfields and ports, iii) opening of the Turkish air space for the aircraft of the coalition.

During this entire crisis, Turkish foreign policy makers made several decisions regarding the permission for Northern Iraq Liaison Units (NILE) of the US to pass through Turkey; site survey, site modernization and preparation, opening the Turkish air space, and sending Turkish Military forces to Iraq as a peacekeeping force.

This occasion was an important foreign policy decision case for Turkey. Decision makers had to decide whether Turkey would continue her hesitant support to the US in her Iraqi policy since the Gulf War (1991) or change the policy. Turkey had fears about a possible intervention in Iraq. The cost of the previous involvement of Turkey in the Gulf War was very high in terms of political and economic considerations as well as security concerns. Turkey had gone through a very bad experience in the Gulf War when her trade with Iraq was disrupted, 500,000 Kurdish refugees fled to Turkey, and northern Iraq became a no-man's land without authority in which the terrorist separatist organization could find a base. Turkey had huge economic losses due to the Gulf War that were supposed to be compensated by the international coalition. The negative experience in the Gulf War (1991) had influenced the decision makers. Iraq has become a sensitive issue for Turkey in terms of domestic and foreign policy considerations. It was an issue Turkey, as a neighbor of Iraq and close ally of the US, could not be out of the game, left out of the international equation. Therefore, alternatives for Turkish foreign policy and the consequences of each policy choice had to be discussed and analyzed well.

3. D. 1. b) Determining the Authoritative Decision Unit

In her military campaign against Iraq, the US planned to open a northern front through military deployment in the Turkish territory.¹⁹³ The US administration officially demanded to use Turkish territory and this demand was negotiated with the US by four different Turkish governments. For this occasion, there was no individual who qualified as a predominant leader. When the initial demand from the US administration arrived to Ankara, there was a coalition government composed of three parties. In addition, Prime

¹⁹³ Bob Woodward, "Saldırı Planı (translated from the English by Melih Pekdemir, Şefika Kamcez.) (İstanbul: Arkadaş Yayınevi, 2004) pp. 330-331 and "Iraq: Political-Military Strategic Plan; Briefing to Turkey Delegation" 15 October 2002, classified document, published by Mustafa Balbay, "Irak Bataklığında Türk Amerikan İlişkileri," (İstanbul : Çağ Pazarlama Gazete Dergi Basım, 2004)

Minister Ecevit had serious health problems and was mostly dealing with his party affairs and domestic politics. During this period, the Foreign Ministry and the Chief of Staff worked on the issue. In the later stages of the crisis, there was a single party government, but Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the AK Party, was banned from politics, did not have formal position in the government. He could be involved in decision making process in his capacity as the leader of ruling party. Prime Minister Gül did not have power to qualify as a predominant leader. Unlike Özal in the previous case, President Sezer did not have an interest in foreign affairs and did not have expertise in foreign policy. Therefore, did not desire to qualify as a predominant leader for this decision occasion. There was not a single group handling the problem in this occasion.

This decision making process involved many actors including Turkish military forces, National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Council of Ministers, the Parliament, and the President. Like the previous decision occasion, Article 92 of Turkish Constitution required the authorization by the Turkish Grand National Assembly for this initiative. After long negotiations and debates with the US and among the foreign policy making actors, the Turkish government decided to allow the US to deploy her military forces in Turkey. However, the Turkish Grand National Assembly did not give political authorization to the government for such deployment. Therefore, the decision unit was a “coalition of autonomous actors” composed of actors representing different views and interest for this issue and single of them was capable of committing the resources of the state itself. The actors involved in this occasion could be listed as the President, executive and its leader, Turkish Military Forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council, leader of the ruling party, Speaker of Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

3. D. 1. c) Decision Making Process

The key contingency that shapes the decision outcome for a coalition of multiple autonomous actors is the nature of the rules and procedures guiding the interaction between the coalition actors. For this decision occasion the governing decision rule within the

coalition of autonomous actors favored unanimity in which one single actor could easily block initiatives of all others. The TGNA as a decision making actors was in a capacity to block the US military deployment to Turkey. The final authorization of the Parliament was required according to Article 92 of the Turkish constitution after a consensus is reached by the other relevant actors. For the government, the consent and advice of the military and the National Security Council were crucial since the subject was a security matter.

The decision to participate the US military intervention in Iraq through allowing the US military deployment was a sensitive issue for the decision making actors. The final decision, labeled as a “historic decision”, was a product of long discussions and negotiations between the domestic foreign policy actors and their US counterparts. The final decision was a result of the conflicting interest and values of the different actors in the decision making mechanisms. The conflict of “real politik” and “ideal politik”, in other words the conflict among the decision making actors on the definition of Turkish “national interest” over Iraq shaped the process and the decision outcome.

In order to open a second front in Northern Iraq, the US planned to deploy her military forces in Turkey. The US administration demanded this as a part of “full and complete support” from Turkey, a 50 year old ally. The first American demand to Turkey was made in the President Bush -Prime Minister Ecevit meeting in the White House on 16 January 2002. During Prime Minister Ecevit’s talks with President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Treasury Secretary O’Neill and other high level officials were present. Prime Minister Ecevit explained the concerns of Turkey concerning a possible military intervention of the US in Iraq.¹⁹⁴ Following this meeting in Washington, on 29 January 2002, President Bush declared Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “axis of evil” in his “State of the Union Address”.¹⁹⁵

Turkey was alarmed with these developments concerning Iraq. A military intervention was not a good option for Turkey. So, Prime Minister Ecevit decided to write a letter to

¹⁹⁴ Newspot, No : 31 January - February 2002

¹⁹⁵ The full text of President Bush is available in the official web site of White House <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

Saddam Hussein in order to warn the Iraqi administration on the possible intervention of the US. Ecevit wrote that Iraqi administration should take the necessary measures to appease the international community and state she does not have weapons of mass destruction. He sent his letter to Saddam Hussein on 1 February 2002. Ecevit requested the Iraqi leader to be more cooperative with the United Nations, permit arms inspectors, and stop developing weapons of mass destruction.¹⁹⁶

The US Vice President Richard Cheney visited Ankara on 19 March 2002, as part of his tour to the Middle East that was designed to foster Arab support before the military intervention in Iraq. In this meeting, Cheney officially told Turkey that the US was going to intervene in Iraq and demanded “full and complete cooperation”. Turkey faced this demand with discomfort. During the visit of the US Vice President Richard Cheney to Turkey, the Turkish government expressed to him that the Iraqi issue was an integral part of the Middle East problem and a lasting solution should be based on Iraq’s territorial integrity. They added that Turkey would like Iraq to comply with all the UN Security Council resolutions, so that she can integrate with the international community and achieve stability in the region. It was said that instability in Iraq could upset the already fragile balances in the Middle East resulting from the clashes between Israel and Palestine.¹⁹⁷

Turkey did not want to be dragged directly into a military conflict, which might have very serious consequences for her economy and her relations with regional Arab countries. However, Turkey was a strategic ally of the United States, along with Israel, and thus had obligations to Washington. However, during this period, it was very difficult for Turkey to make a decisive decision on the issue. There was a three-party coalition government formed by ideologically very different parties [(Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Motherland Party (ANAP), and Democratic Left Party (DSP)]. There was strong disagreement among the coalition partner that was in its last days of rule. The serious health problems of the Prime

¹⁹⁶ Turkish Daily News, 2 February 2002

¹⁹⁷ Newspot, No.32, March - April 2002

Minister Ecevit heavily contributed to the crisis in the government and led to the election decision of the government after the resignation of the deputies from DSP.¹⁹⁸

The bureaucratic institutions, the especially Turkish military forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were working on the issue in coordination. In June 2002, the Turkish Embassy in Washington sent a message to Ankara on the possible intervention of the US in Iraq; the message evaluated the situation as follows: i) the US is going to intervene in Iraq, ii) the US is going to intervene in Iraq even without relevant UN authorization, iii) the US desire to have the support of Turkey in such an intervention, iv) the US is going to intervene even if Turkey does not support the US.¹⁹⁹ On 20 June 2002, a meeting at the Foreign Ministry on the possible US military intervention in Iraq with the participation of Deputy under Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of Staff, Undersecretary of National Intelligence Organization (MİT), and experts from the Special Forces of Turkish Military Forces took place in Ankara. Possible scenarios and red lines of Turkey on Iraq were drawn in this meeting.²⁰⁰ The red lines of Turkey were determined as the territorial integrity of Iraq, the preservation of the unitary state nature of Iraq and the protection of the rights of the Turcomans in Northern Iraq²⁰¹. These red lines were communicated to the US officials in the coming negotiations.

In order to continue the efforts to convince Turkey to cooperate, the US Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz and Deputy State Secretary Grossman visited Ankara on 16-17 July 2002. The official negotiations took place in the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel, head of the Policy Planning Department of the General Staff Reşat Turgut, Turkey's ambassador to Washington Faruk Loğoğlu, Undersecretary Uğur Ziyal and advisers of the Prime Minister participated in the talks. The US side was represented by Wolfowitz, Grossman and General Joseph Ralston, commander of the US

¹⁹⁸ This process was well analyzed in : Fikret Bila, "Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Ankara'da Irak Savaşı," (Ankara; Ümit Yayıncılık, 2003)

¹⁹⁹ Yetkin, 2004, p.51

²⁰⁰ Yetkin, 2004, p.51

²⁰¹ Protection of the of the rights of the Turcomans in Northern Iraq has been a constant dimension of Iraqi policy of Turkey in 1990s. Turkey established the Iraqi Turcoman Front as an umbrella organization of the Turcomans.

European Command and the US ambassador to Ankara Robert Pearson. The conditions of Turkish support to the US in military intervention in Iraq were decided. In addition to the red lines of Turkey concerning Iraq, Turkey wanted the US support in her EU integration, especially in the coming Copenhagen Summit of EU²⁰² and in Cyprus issue. At this meeting, it was the conclusion of Turkish decision makers that the US was determined to intervene in Iraq. For instance Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz stated that the US might attack Iraq, even though Turkey does not welcome the move. Yılmaz, speaking on the CNN Turk TV program, “Siyaset 2002”, Yılmaz said that Turkey's attitude toward the Iraq operation was well known by everyone.²⁰³ Chief of Staff and Foreign Ministry after the negotiations with the US concluded that; i) the US needs Turkish support in her intervention in Iraq, ii) in the case of Turkish support, the intervention will be easier, iii) the ruling party in Ankara might change in the coming elections, and the new administration could be persuaded within the context of traditional Turkish-US friendship for the necessary support to the US.²⁰⁴

Since there was not a strong political authority in Turkey at that time, the US administration started to contact to the civil and military bureaucracy of Turkey, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of Staff for Iraq. On 26 August 2002, Uğur Ziyal, Under Secretary of Foreign Ministry visited the US. He received a special interest from the US administration. He met with US Deputy Secretary of State Marc Grossman at the US State Department. Deputy Secretary of Defence Wolfowitz and Secretary of State Powell also attended the meeting.²⁰⁵ Rumsfeld, for the first time, talked about a northern front in Iraq. Ziyal explained the Turkish concerns in Iraq and stated that with some guarantees Turkey could support her 50 years old ally in Iraq.

During this time period, the military and the MFA were influential in the process. On 16 September 2002, Turkish Chief of Staff requested political directives from the government

²⁰² In the Copenhagen Summit, the leaders of the EU would give decide on the starting date of the full membership of Turkey.

²⁰³ Turkish Daily News, 17 July 2002

²⁰⁴ Murat Yetkin, 2004, p.64

²⁰⁵ Turkish Daily News, 29 August 2002

for the relevant US demands and how to respond to these demands.²⁰⁶ In order to determine Turkey's Iraq policy, on 4 October 2002, "Short and Middle Term Policies of Turkey on Iraq" meeting at the Çankaya Palace took place under the leadership of President Sezer with the suggestion of Turkish Military Forces and the Foreign Ministry. Chief of Staff, Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) under secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commander of Operations in Chief of Staff, and Secretary General of the Çankaya Palace participated to the meeting.²⁰⁷ After the meeting, it was declared by Tacan İldem, spokesmen of the Çankaya Palace that more time should be deserved to find a peaceful solution in Iraq. In his statement after the meeting, İldem called Iraq to cooperate with the international community. İldem emphasized that an operation without international legitimacy was not acceptable for Turkey.²⁰⁸

On 10 October 2002, the details of the US demands from Turkey were sent to Turkey through her European Command. The US demands included 90 thousand US soldiers deployment in Turkey, permission to use the Turkish military bases, sea ports, air bases, and opening of the Turkish air space to the US. On 21 October 2002, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Tommy Franks visited Ankara. General Franks gave a briefing to the Turkish commanders and requested support from Turkey.²⁰⁹ In the meeting General Özkök expressed Turkish concerns in Iraq, especially over Northern Iraq.²¹⁰ Since there was political instability and lack of political power in Ankara, MFA and the Chief of Staff decided to wait for the elections to have political will for the critical negotiations with and decisions on the Iraqi issue.

Following the 3 November 2002 elections in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) received 363 seats in the 550-seat TGNA. Only one other party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), exceeded the 10 % vote threshold to enter Parliament. However,

²⁰⁶ Ayın Tarihi, September 2002, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/2002/eylul2002.htm>

²⁰⁷ Since the proceedings of the meeting were not available, it is not possible to know what happened in the meeting. It is not clear whether the statement made after the meeting made by the spokesperson of the Çankaya Palace was the consensus of all participants or not. But it should be noted that, it was a technical committee meeting.

²⁰⁸ Ayın Tarihi, October 2002, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/2002/ekim2002.htm>

²⁰⁹ The briefing document was reprinted in Balbay, 2004, pp.426-440

²¹⁰ Radikal, 22 October 2002

AKP Leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was banned from becoming a parliamentarian and Prime Minister due to his still continuing five-year ban from politics after being convicted of inciting hatred among religious groups. On November 16, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer gave the mandate to Abdullah Gül, Deputy Chairman of the AKP to set up the new government. Abdullah Gül announced his cabinet on 18 November. Members of the AKP government took office on 19 November. The program of the government was read out in the session of Parliament on 23 November, debates on the program were held on 26 November and the new government received a vote of confidence from the Parliament on 28 November.

During this election and formation of the new government, between 3 and 10 November 2002, Chief of Staff and Deputy Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited the US again. They had talks with the US Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other top officials for talks on Iraq. They also met National Security Council advisor Condoleezza Rice and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers.²¹¹

Following the US President Bush's address to the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002 that called on the UN to urge Iraq to fully comply with the UN resolutions, the Security Council began to work on a new resolution. The US and Great Britain assumed a hard stance and proposed that a military operation to be launched in Iraq while the Security Council's other permanent members, led by France, Russia and China, supported a two-stage resolution allowing further deliberation before any military action is taken. After two months of intense diplomatic debate, the members of the Security Council agreed on a common stance and passed a new resolution (UNSC Resolution 1441) on the renewal of inspections in Iraq on 8 November 2002 unanimously (included Syria's vote as an Arab country). Resolution 1441 outlined an enhanced inspection regime for Iraq's disarmament to be conducted by the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).²¹² Following the

²¹¹ Turkish Daily News, 8 November 2002

²¹² The full text of the resolution is available on the web site of UN:
<www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm>

adoption of resolution, on 13 November 2002, Iraq accepted the UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and informed the UN Secretary General that it will work with the resolution. Adoption of resolution and the positive response of the Iraqi regime gave more time to the Turkish decision makers to make a decision on the US military deployment to Turkey.

However, the US administration was imposing strong pressure on Turkey for their support. The frequency of the bilateral talks of different levels increased. On 20 November 2002, General Tommy Franks, head of the US military operations in the Persian Gulf, and General Joseph W. Ralston, the US Air Force general commanding NATO forces in Europe, arrived in Ankara to seek Turkish support against Iraq.²¹³ On the same day, President Sezer and President Bush met in Prague at the NATO Summit. President Sezer expressed with the “legitimacy” concern of Turkey for an intervention in Iraq.²¹⁴

The new AKP government took office on November 19. The foreign policy preference of the new government in Iraq was a big question for the newly formed government. AKP declared European Union integration as its top foreign policy priority in their electoral campaign; however their Iraqi policy was not clear. In their “election declaration”, there was just one paragraph on Iraq calling for the territorial integrity of Iraq and the resolution of disputes through peaceful means.²¹⁵ On 3 December 2002, US Defense Secretary Wolfowitz and Deputy State Secretary Grossman visited Ankara in order to meet with the new government. Wolfowitz and Grossman met Prime Minister Abdullah Gül and other Turkish military and civilian officials seeking the position of the newly elected administration in Turkey on Iraq.²¹⁶ They had a three-staged cooperation proposal to Turkey: i) site inspection, ii) site preparation, iii) the US military deployment. For the first stage, a team of 150 technicians was allowed to work in Turkey. On the condition that the technicians were from the İncirlik military base, Turkey did not need to get the

²¹³ Turkish Daily News, 21 November 2002

²¹⁴ Turkish Daily News, 21 November 2002

²¹⁵ Election Declaration of Justice and Development Party, www.akparti.org.tr

²¹⁶ Ayın Tarihi, December 2002, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/2002/aralik2002.htm>

authorization from the Parliament. This had been decided with President Sezer and Chief of Staff Özkök, during the previous state summit.

However, the US delegation was not satisfied with the meeting with their official counterparts in Turkey. In the evening of the same day, they had a special meeting with AKP leader Erdoğan. Egemen Bağış, Cüneyt Zapsu, and Ömer Çelik, special advisors of Erdoğan, participated to the meeting as well. A letter from Bush inviting Erdoğan to Washington was delivered by Wolfowitz to Erdoğan at this meeting.

The AKP leader visited the US after the invitation by Bush to Washington. In his first day in the US capital, he delivered a speech to the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS). The next day, on December 10 2002, Erdoğan met the US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Afterwards, he was received at the White House by President Bush and Vice President Cheney. Following their 45-minute meeting, Bush said that the US stood “side-by-side” with Turkey in its quest to join the European Union, and he offered his moral support on the issue to a likely key ally in the event of a war with Iraq. After the meeting with President Bush, Erdoğan told reporters that Turkey had asked the US to provide financial aid to help protect the Turkish economy in the event of a war against Iraq. It was reported that the Bush administration was considering providing up to \$800 million annually over five years in economic assistance.²¹⁷

On 17 December 2002, President Sezer, Prime Minister Gül, Chief of Staff Özkök had a summit. They decided not to give full support to the US and decided to wait for the regional summit in 23 January 2003 for the degree of Turkish support to the US. Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis, Presidency Secretary-General Kemal Nehrozoğlu, Prime Ministry Undersecretary Fikret Uçcan, Prime Ministry military advisor General Köksal Karabay, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Uğur Ziyal and President's foreign policy advisor Tacan İldem also attended this summit.²¹⁸

²¹⁷ Newspot, No.36, November - December 2002

²¹⁸ Radikal, 18 December 2002

On 23 December 2002, there was another summit in the office of the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Abdullah Gül chaired the meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Abdüllatif Şener, state ministers Mehmet Ali Şahin, Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, Ali Babacan and Beşir Atalay, Interior Minister Abdulkadir Aksu, Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül, Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök, Deputy Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt, Prime Ministry Undersecretary Fikret Üçcan, Foreign Ministry undersecretary Uğur Ziyal, Turkish Intelligence (MIT) Undersecretary Şenkal Atasagun, and Prime Ministry military chief adviser Köksal Karabay attended the occasion. The meeting was described later as “an evaluation meeting.”²¹⁹ At this meeting, the options on Iraqi policy were identified which were i) No support to the US, ii) To open the air space, iii) In addition to air space, opening the sea ports and air ports to the US, iv) in addition to air space, opening the Turkish territory for the US military, v) Giving full support, including sending Turkish armed forces to Iraq.

On 26 December 2002, Military Supreme Council (YAŞ) convened in Ankara and in this meeting, it was decided that Turkey can not prevent the US intervention in Iraq, and should not be left out of the equation.²²⁰ On 27 December 2002, the US Treasury Undersecretary John Taylor and Deputy Secretary of State Marc Grossman visited Turkey again to assure its support on a war against Iraq to confirm some compensation for economic loss and to ease Turkey's serious concerns over the establishment of a possible Kurdish State in Northern Iraq.²²¹ They had 5 main demands from Turkey: i) site inspection, ii) site modernization, iii) opening of the air ports and sea ports, iv) permission for the US soldiers to deploy in Turkey, v) opening of the Turkish air space.

On 27 December 2002, Turkey announced her consultation wish with regional countries over Iraq. The Prime Ministry issued a statement that Turkey attached special importance to the consultations with the countries in the region on a possible Iraq operation and other regional developments. On 27 December 2002, there was a regular monthly meeting of the National Security Council. After the meeting, there was no announcement about the US

²¹⁹ Turkish Daily News, 25 December 2002

²²⁰ Radikal, 27 December 2002

²²¹ Turkish Daily News, 28 December 2002

military deployment to Turkey. The statement after the meeting called for a UN resolution for international legitimacy to intervene in Iraq.²²²

In order to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Iraq, Prime Minister Gül decided to consult with the regional leaders. He started his Middle East tour including Syria, Egypt, and Jordan on 4 January 2003. On 9 January 2003, the “rules of engagement” of the inspection team of 150 people was decided by Gül and Wolffowitz. They had decided on 3 December 2002 that the inspection team to start inspection in Mersin, İskenderun, Samsun, Trabzon seaports and Sabiha Gökçen, Gaziantep, Diyarbakır, Muş, Batman airports on 15 January 2002.²²³ With a delay of nearly one month, on 16 January 2003, site inspection by US technicians to upgrade Turkish bases and ports to be used in the military campaign over Iraq started. Prime Minister Gül articulated Turkish desire to have legitimacy for the military intervention in Iraq at least based on a NATO decision.

On 24 January 2004, the ministerial level meeting with the participation of six countries neighboring Iraq was initiated by Turkish the Prime Minister Abdullah Gül in order solve the Iraqi crisis peacefully. Turkish Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi, Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faysal and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Shara attended the meeting. Six Foreign Ministers approved the “Istanbul Declaration on Iraq”,²²⁴ The declaration urged Iraq to show “more active” cooperation with the UN arms inspectors, and embark on policies to inspire confidence in its neighbors. The declaration noted that “The specter of war in Iraq is looming large. The countries of this region do not wish to live through yet another war and all its devastating consequences. War should not become an option to resolve this crisis.” The declaration called for involvement of the United Nations in solving the Iraqi crisis, saying the UN involvement in the process “must be full, inclusive, and persistent”, which “must also be in full recognition of the need to fulfill the objectives of the ongoing UN inspections in Iraq.”

²²² December statement of National Security Council <www.mgk.gov.tr/basinbildiri2002/27aralik2002.html>

²²³ Gaziantep, Diyarbakır, Muş, Batman airports were very close to Turkish Iraqi border and were in distance that could be hit by the Iraqi missiles; constituting threat to Turkey.

²²⁴ “Istanbul Declaration on Iraq”, 24 January 2003, İstanbul, www.mfa.gov.tr

On 31 January 2003, the National Security Council discussed the pros and cons of possible impacts of an American operation in Iraq on the Turkish economy and the pressures of Washington to allow the use of Turkish territory for war on Iraq. After the meeting, the official statement noted that “The National Security Council recommends ... that peaceful means continue to be sought, and on the other hand that parliament take steps in accordance with Article 92 against unwanted developments and activate military measures necessary to protect Turkey's national interests.”²²⁵

On 3 February 2003, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan and Foreign Minister Naci Sabri were brought to Turkey. Prime Minister Gül had a secret meeting with them to persuade Iraqi the administration. However, it was not a successful attempt.²²⁶

On 4 February 2003, in the meeting of the Council of Ministers, it was decided to divide the memorandum of Prime Ministry into two sections. The first one would be a memorandum of Prime Ministry for military site preparation. The second memorandum would deal with military deployment. A memorandum of Prime Ministry was written for the site preparation and send to the TGNA on 5 February 2003. Following this, a parliamentary vote in closed session for the Memorandum of the Prime Ministry was held. The memorandum proposed the arrival of the US troops for renovation of the military bases in Turkey to be used in the military intervention in Iraq for three months on 6 February 2002. The Parliament voted in favor of the motion to allow the US military personnel to modernize bases in Turkey for use in a possible attack against Iraq.²²⁷ So, the first memorandum passed and approved by the Parliament.

Following this action, Prime Minister Abdullah Gül said the period between 8 and 18 February (the planed date for the approval of the second Memorandum) should be used by the Iraqi administration of President Saddam Hussein to prevent war by actively

²²⁵ <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/basinbildiri2003/31ocak2003.html>

²²⁶ Yetkin, 2004, pp.143

²²⁷ The full text of the deciison of TGNA: http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/tbmm_759.html

cooperating with the United Nations arms inspectors and convincing the international community that Iraq had given up its weapons of mass destruction.²²⁸

Meanwhile, in parallel to the negotiations with the US delegation for the “Memorandum of Understanding” concerning the US military deployment in Turkey continued just after the approval of the Memorandum in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. On 8 February 2003 a summit in the office of the Prime Minister was organized to discuss the recent developments on Iraq. Chief of Staff, Özkök, Foreign Trade Minister Kürşat Tüzmen, State Minister Ali Babacan, Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül, the MFA undersecretary Uğur Ziyal participated to the meeting.²²⁹ In this meeting, it was decided that direct talks with Washington would be conducted and an appointment was requested from President Bush.

Consequently, State Minister Ali Babacan, Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, and Chief Foreign Policy Ahmet Davutoğlu met with the US president Bush in Washington in order to have direct negotiations with the US administration on 14 February 2003. Before President Bush, they also met with the US Chief of Staff Richard Myers and the National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. At the end of a round of intense negotiations in Washington, it was reported that the Bush administration offered to expand its aid package, including about \$6 billion in grants and up to \$20 billion in loan guarantees, to secure Ankara's support in a possible invasion of Iraq.²³⁰ After the meeting, Foreign Minister Yakış organized a press meeting at the Turkish Embassy and stated that the next memorandum would be voted in TGNA around 18 February 2003. He added that, the US is determined to intervene in Iraq even without Turkish support.²³¹

Parallel to these developments, the Turkish and US delegation headed by Ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşı and Ambassador Mariso Lino respectively were negotiating to reach an agreement for the establishment and implementation of basic policy and procedures and the

²²⁸ Turkish Daily News, 9 February 2003

²²⁹ Ayın Tarihi, February 2003, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/2003/subat2003.htm>

²³⁰ Turkish Daily News, 17 February 2003

²³¹ Ayın Tarihi, February 2003, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/2003/subat2003.htm>

status of forces to be deployed in Turkey (Memorandum of Understanding). Just before the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 24 February 2003, Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış said that an “agreement in principle” had been reached on the political and military conditions of the deployment, but a few outstanding issues remained on the economic aid package that would compensate Turkey for any losses incurred in a war.

At the meeting of meeting of the Council of Ministers on 24 February 2003, after hours of discussion contained conflicts, a decision was reached to send the memorandum of the Prime Ministry to the Parliament. A group of ministers opposed the proposal of the government. Especially Deputy Prime Minister Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır along with the Culture Minister Hüseyin Çelik, the Minister of Public Works and Settlement Zeki Ergezen, the State Minister Mehmet Aydın opposed the memorandum.²³² Yalçınbayır openly declared that there would be benefits if the authorization was not approved. He added that “If the memorandum is not approved, democracy would be strengthened”²³³ However, Prime Minister Gül persuaded them to sign the memorandum and let the TGNA to make this historic final decision.²³⁴

In order to persuade the deputies to vote in favor of the government motion, AK Party leader Erdoğan organized a party group meeting on 25 and 26 February 2004. In his speech to the party members, he asked them to vote in favor of the memorandum. In order to show the consent and strong support to the military the government initiated to ask for a second advice from the National Security Council in its regular monthly meeting on 28 February 2004. However, President Sezer opposed the demand on the ground that NSC has the mission to advise only to the government, not the TGNA and NSC had declared its advice the government in its prior meeting. It was the TGNA to make the final decision on the memorandum. So, President Sezer did not put the Iraq issue to the agenda of the meeting as

²³² Hürriyet, 24 September 2003

²³³ Turkish Daily News Archive Wednesday 26th of February 200

²³⁴ The text of the memorandum is avalibale on <www.belgenet.com/yasa/izin_250203.html>

the chair of the Council.²³⁵ Therefore, there was not a second advice to the government in the declaration of the NSC.²³⁶

Hours before the vote, party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with party members to persuade them to back the US troop deployment. He told the deputies to put the country's interests ahead of their personal feelings and think of the nation's well-being. However, AKP administration did not take a “group decision” for the US deployment which could be binding on deputies. On 1 March 2003, the TGNA voted in a close session for the memorandum of Prime Ministry which was concerning the deployment of foreign troops and sending Turkish troops abroad. Turkish Parliament rejected the government motion with a vote of 264 to 251 with 19 abstentions. The vote was initially considered as an approval, but was challenged by the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP). After reconsideration, the Parliament Speaker Bülent Arınç agreed that the “yes” vote was three votes less than the required 267 votes required for the approval.

This final decision that blocked the initiative of the government was the product of conflict among the two alliances representing two opposing policy preferences for Turkey in this decision occasion; the alliance supported the Turkish involvement of Turkey in the military campaign of the US in Iraq and the alliance that opposed to such an involvement. Some members of the Council of Ministers, the National Security Council, Turkish Armed Forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AKP leader were in the first alliance whereas the President, Turkish Grand National Assembly, some ministers, TGNA Speaker Bülent Arınç were in the second alliance. In the following pages, these two alliances will be elaborated in details.

Pro-deployment Alliance

This foreign policy line argued that Turkish “national interest” over Iraq was under threat due to the US intervention. Turkey was not in a position to prevent the war in Iraq.

²³⁵ Hurriyet, 25 September 2003

²³⁶ February declaration of the NSC: <www.mgk.gov.tr/basinbildiri2003/28subat2003.html>

Therefore, Turkey should be part of the operations in order to take share in the post-Saddam environment. Among the participating actors some members of the Council of Ministers, the National Security Council, Turkish Armed Forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AKP leader were advocating this foreign policy line.

The main reason of this alliance to support the troop deployment could be listed as follows:

- 1-The US could stop supporting Turkey's EU membership,
- 2-Turkey's increasing domestic and external debt burden,
- 3 -The threat regarding the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq,
- 4-The danger of losing historical rights in Mosul and Kirkuk,²³⁷
- 5-The danger of losing the support of the Jewish lobby in the US for Armenian issue,
- 6- The danger of losing support of the US administration in Cyprus.

Therefore Turkey, could not prevent, and can not be out of the campaign due to her national interest although it is not a legitimate and valid action legally since the international legitimacy issue is a very ambiguous issue.

AKP leader: Although Erdoğan was banned and he did not have a formal post in the Turkish administration, he participated in the decision making process in his capacity as the leader of ruling party. The Foreign Ministry appointed a senior diplomat as a foreign policy advisor to Erdoğan and briefed Erdoğan on foreign policy very frequently. Just after the election victory of AKP, on 6 November 2002, undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Uğur Ziyal and Secretary General for EU Affairs Volkan Vural gave a briefing to the AKP leader and other executive board members on Iraq, EU and Cyprus.²³⁸ His *sui generis* status made him a decision maker, although he was not holding a formal post. Erdoğan supported the motion for troop deployment, tried to persuade deputies of his party, but he did not take group decision for the motion.

²³⁷ Mosul province that covered the entire territory that is known today as Northern Iraq including Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyya was included in the "National Oath" that was declared by Mustafa Kemal in the first Turkish Parliament in 1920 during the War of Liberation against the occupying powers. Following to the Proclamation of Republic of Turkey in 1923 as a result of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey conducted intense negotiations with Britain until 1925. But she failed to convince the League of Nations that Mosul province should belong to Turkey.

²³⁸ Milliyet, 7 November 2002

His personal characteristic was not available for his emergence as a predominant leader. As “decision units” framework suggests, in order to examine the leadership style of a predominate leader following three questions should be asked:

- i) How the leader reacts to the political constraints?
- ii) How open the leader is to the incoming information?
- iii) What motives leader to act?

In an answer to these questions, we see that Erdoğan did not challenge the constraints; instead he had to respect the constraints. He was open to information and listened and cared about information coming from every actor, especially from the military. He worked with a group of advisors in foreign policy since he did not have experience. This long discussion and negotiations in order to evaluate the policy options were understood as the indecision of Erdoğan regime and has been heavily criticized by the opposition. He was a task oriented leader rather than relationship focused. His motivation was to adopt a foreign policy that would give the minimum loses to Turkey. It was his conclusion that Turkey had to support the US, a 50 years old ally, in Iraq in order not to deteriorate the relations. He tried to persuade his ministers and deputies to support his foreign policy orientation, but could not achieve it. Given his profile according to the table on “Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness of Constraints, Openness to Information, and Motivation” introduced in the first chapter of this thesis, Erdoğan exhibited an “opportunistic” leadership style for this particular occasion for decision. This type of leader had to assess what was possible in the current situation given the nature of the problem and considered what important constituencies will allow him. He had to respect the expertise of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Armed Forces on foreign and defense policy, listen to their advises that made military an important player in foreign policy making. However, he could not realize his foreign policy orientation since the TGNA was in a capacity to veto the decision.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Military Forces: The traditional foreign policy of Turkey on Iraq after the Gulf War was mainly formulized by the Foreign Ministry in

coordination with Turkish military forces. The main principles of this policy are listed as follows:

1. The independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and national unity of Iraq should be preserved.
2. The future of Iraq should be determined through the full participation and free consent of the Iraqi nation as a whole.
3. The natural resources of Iraq must belong to the Iraqi people as a whole.
4. Iraq should be at peace with herself and with her neighbors. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities must be eliminated. Iraq must fulfill all UN Security Council resolutions.
5. Mass population movements must be prevented and, if need be, all measures must be taken for emergency relief. Civilians must be protected from all forms of persecution.
6. The rich Iraqi cultural heritage and the environment must be protected.²³⁹

Prior to the US intervention, Ministry of Foreign Affairs made several assessments on the war in Iraq and Turkish policy towards this possible war. According to the Foreign Ministry assessment, Turkey's "active support" to the US operation was needed because:

- 1- Turkey wanted a neighboring Iraq which has maintained its political and territorial integrity and which is in good neighborly relations with Turkey. Turkey wants postwar Iraq to adopt the Turkish model.²⁴⁰ Turkey is against any federal setup in that country. Thus, Turkey must be involved this operation.
- 2- Turkey must actively support the US operation to make sure that the natural resources of the country belonged to the entire Iraqi people.
- 3- The presence of Turkish troops in Iraq is needed in order to contain a spillover and secure Turkey's own security. Turkey's presence in Iraq will be for humanitarian aid and self-defense purposes.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Turkey's Iraq Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 March 2003, www.mfa.gov.tr

²⁴⁰ Turkish model stands for unitary Iraq in her existing territorial integrity.

²⁴¹ "Irak Politikamıza İlişkin Öncelikli Önlemler", Report of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, May 2001, *Cumhuriyet*, 13 Mayıs 2001 and *Radikal*, 13 May 2001; Iraq Report of Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted to the office of Prime Minister, 14 August 2002, *Bila*, 2004, pp.166-171

National Security Council: As an advisory decision organ on foreign and security policy composed of high ranking military and civilian decision makers, the NSC declared its position for this decision occasion in its January 2003 monthly meeting. It advised government to take steps in accordance with Article 92 against unwanted developments and activate military measures necessary to protect Turkey's national interests.”²⁴²

Anti- Deployment Alliance

This alliance believed that there was no Turkish “national interest” in Iraq that required to be part of a war against a Muslim neighbor. Plus, the intervention was against the international law and without any legitimacy. President Sezer, Turkish Grand National Assembly, some ministers, TGNA Speaker Bülent Arınç were in this alliance.

The main arguments of this alliance could be listed as follows:

- 1-The war is destructive for Turkish economy,
- 2-The possibility that the US soldiers may not leave Turkey once they enter the country²⁴³,
- 3-Possible reaction of the Islamist constituency of the government,
- 4-Turkey being dragged into the position of being a “strategic satellite” of the EU from being the “strategic partner” of the US,
- 5-The possibility of shifting to a process of a military regime as the war process will make the military more powerful,
- 6-Public opinion was against the military intervention in Iraq,
- 7-EU membership would be put into risky since there was a split among the EU members,
- 8-Intervention was against international law and it was not legitimate unlike in the Gulf War (1991),
- 9-The re-establishment of the “state of emergency” in the Southeastern Anatolia²⁴⁴

²⁴² January 2003 Declaration of the NSC: www.mgk.gov.tr/basimbildiri2003/31ocak2003.html

²⁴³ This was argument was anticipated from the position of the foreign soldiers in Turkey as a part of Operations Provide comfort and Northern Watch. They were deployed in Turkey for a short time after Gulf War but their permission was renewed every six months. This was very sensitive issue for the public opinion.

²⁴⁴ Later on Deputy Prime Minister Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır states that the government planed to re-establish the “state of emergency” in the Southeastern Anatolia in the case of US military deployment. See “1 Mart Tezkeresi ve Sıkıyönetim,” Orhan Birgit, Cumhuriyet, 7 April 2005

President Sezer: As a former judge, he had strict adherence to international law and respect for legitimacy. Although he did not have an experience and special interest in foreign policy issues, from the very beginning he made it clear that there was necessity of international legitimacy for the military campaign in Iraq and Turkish involvement. He articulated this in all speeches. For instance, in his phone call to President Bush on 24 October 2002, and his meeting with President Bush in Prague on 20 November 2002, he articulated his legitimacy concerns to his US counterpart. Since he does not have a practice to speak to the public, apart from ceremonial occasions, he continuously declared his concern over the US military intervention in Iraq and Turkish participation to such an operation through his spokesperson Tacan İldem²⁴⁵

TGNA Speaker Bülent Arınç: Even though he was not a formal decision maker and could not vote in the Parliament, he was influential on the deputies through his speeches as the founding member of AKP and Speaker of the TGNA. Through his speeches, often emotional, in different occasions, he expressed his opposition to the US troop deployment during the entire decision making process. Just before the voting at the TGNA, on 25 February 2003, he called the government to send the budget plan of the New Year, not the memorandum regarding troop deployment. In doing so, he tried to influence the business flow of the government.²⁴⁶ He was criticized to intervene in the on going process of the executive body.

Some members of the Council of Ministers: Several members of the cabinet (Deputy Prime Minister Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, Culture Minister Hüseyin Çelik, Minister of Public Works and Settlement Zeki Ergezen, State Minister Mehmet Aydın) opposed the US military deployment.

Among these ministers, Yalçınbayır was the most influential one who opposed to the motion. He believed that there would be benefits if the authorization was not approved and

²⁴⁵ His statements and press meetings are available in the web site of Presidency: www.cankaya.gov.tr

²⁴⁶ Radikal, 25 February 2005

in the case memorandum was rejected, democracy would be strengthened and the prestige of Turkey would rise. He was stating that intervention was not on legitimate grounds.²⁴⁷

Similarly, during the last meeting of Council of Ministers in which the memorandum was passed to the Parliament Culture Minister Hüseyin Çelik stated that the war option did not have legitimacy and it was unilateral act of the US. Minister Çelik thought that the US was far from Iraq and Turkey was a permanent neighbor of Iraq, and Turkey should have good relations with Iraq. Plus, allowing the US to deploy after intense bargaining would give an impression that Turkey was hiring its land to the US.²⁴⁸

Another minister opposing the memorandum was Zeki Ergezen. In the same meeting he stated that Turkey should not be the broker of the bombing of a Muslim country, and he had opposed the Turkish involvement in the Gulf War (1991) through giving reference to the Islamic values and sensitivity.²⁴⁹

Finally, Mehmet Aydın who was the State Minister opposed the memorandum. As a philosopher and professor of theology, he refused to sign a war power act since he worked for peace throughout his life and received several peace awards and stated he could resign if necessary.²⁵⁰

The opposition of some of the ministers was important since the passing of the memorandum to the Parliament required the signature of all ministers. In the Council of Ministers meeting, Prime Minister Gül found an integrative solution. He asked them to sign the memorandum and give parliament chance to decide on the motion. They were persuaded and signed the memorandum and then it was passed to the parliament.

Turkish Grand National Assembly: The TGNA, as an institution reflects the voices of the public opinion. The opinion polls conducted by different universities, and institutions

²⁴⁷ Radikal, 25 February 2005

²⁴⁸ Hürriyet, 24 September 2003

²⁴⁹ Hürriyet, 24 September 2003

²⁵⁰ Hürriyet, 24 September 2003

reflected that the majority of the public was against a war in Iraq.²⁵¹ This view of public reflected was represented in the votes of the deputies.

3. D.1.d) Decision Outcome

The final decision for this decision occasion, the rejection of the US military deployment in Turkey, was a result of long discussions and negotiations among two alliances that was analyzed above in details. During this process of negotiations among the autonomous actors, they found out some integrative solutions to manage the disputes. The first one was to allow the US to give necessary permissions step by step, instead of giving a complete permission for troop deployment. First the site survey permission was given, and then the US was allowed to modernize and upgrade the military sites. The final one would allow the US troop deployment in Turkey. During this step by step approach, it was thought that all the peaceful means were to be exhausted before a military campaign was launched against Iraq. After it was clear that the initiatives of the government and the efforts of international community, namely the UN, were fruitless, there would be a war in Iraq.

The alliance that supported the US troop deployment to Turkey tried to persuade the other line for the final decision, for the approval of troop deployment by the Parliament through some instruments. The first instrument was the having some guarantees and compensation to Turkey from the US if the intervention was necessary. To do so, the US administration offered a financial aid package to Turkey. For the political, military and economic condition of the Turkish support to the US, a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) between the US and Turkey was signed. It provided some political and military guarantees for the interests of Turkey.²⁵² Another mechanism to persuade the skeptics was the request by the government to have second support statement from the National Security Council just before the vote. A second support message in February meeting, like the one in the

²⁵¹ For instance, according to an opinion poll conducted by Istanbul University, the 96,3 per cent of the people were against a war in Iraq. (NTV News, 4 December 2002, <www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/191075.asp>)

²⁵² “Memorandum of Understanding between government of Republic of Turkey and government of the United States of America, on the establishment and implementation of basic policy, principles, procedures, and to determine the status of forces provisionally deployed for the purposes of possible operations towards Iraq” Fikret Bila, “Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Ankara’da Irak Savaşı,” (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2003)

January meeting would be influential especially on the deputies. However, it was not realized with the intervention of President Sezer, who opposed the motion.

Ultimately, in this occasion, the actors in favor of the US military deployment could not persuade the skeptics to support the motion. The actors in the coalition of multiple autonomous actors failed to reach a common decision. The result was the rejection of the government motion. Turkey did not participate in the military campaign against Iraq, and the US could not open the northern front.

The decision outcome of this decision occasion could be analyzed in two layers. In the first layer, the decision of the Council of the Ministers to send the memorandum of the Prime Ministry concerning the US military deployment in Turkey was a fragmented symbolic action in which the disagreement explodes outside the decision unit with each participant in the decision unit trying to take action on their own and/or complaining about the others' behavior. For this decision Council of Ministers, there was a split among ministers and they could not reach a consensus regarding the memorandum for the US troop deployment. Some ministers totally opposed the proposal. In order to send the memorandum to the Parliament, they were persuaded to sign the memorandum to let the parliament to make the final decision for this decision occasion.

In the second layer, the final decision outcome could be considered as the "one party's position prevails", in which the preference of the alliance of Turkish Grand National Assembly, the President, and some ministers was accepted as the choice of Turkey. The TGNA blocked the initiative of the alliance of military, Foreign Ministry, National Security Council and the executive that supported the motion of troop deployment.

3. D.2) Decision Occasion 2: Opening of the Turkish Air Space

3. D. 2. a) Background of the Occasion

The decision of the Turkish parliament strained the Turkish-American relations and seriously jeopardized the US planning for a northern front against Iraq. However, after the

final decision of the Parliament, the US officials gave the signs that they still hold out for a positive decision from Turkey to deploy the US troops to the Turkish soil. For instance, Gen. James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said he remained hopeful that American troops would be able to deploy through Turkey into northern Iraq and said military planners were still working on a basing concept in southern Turkey.²⁵³ Accompanied with this hope, there was intense pressure to the government from the US administration to resubmit the motion to the TGNA. However, the US started to implement her B plan in which she did not need Turkish territory for military deployment. But, the US still needed the Turkish air space. Therefore just before the operation over Iraq started, the US administration demanded Turkey to open her air space and military bases for the US war planes.

3. D. 2. b) Determining the Authoritative Decision Unit

Like the last decision occasion, there was not an individual who could qualify as a predominant leader even though there has been a change in the premiership. In the parliamentary elections Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as a deputy of Siirt and assumed the premiership. He was not in a position to make this decision by himself. In this case he was both leader of the ruling party and prime minister which put him in a more powerful position than then the previous decision occasion. However, he did not have enough experience in foreign policy. He could not speak any foreign languages. He had to be more sensitive to the information provided by the Foreign Ministry and the Chief of Staff. So, his personal features were not enough to qualify as a predominant leader.

The nature of the decision was not suitable for a single group either. Council of Ministers or the National Security Council could not make the decision alone. Like the deployment of the foreign military forces to Turkey, opening of the Turkish air spaces required the authorization of the Turkish Grand National Assembly according to the Turkish Constitution. After the discussions in the ad hoc summit participated by the President, Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, and the Chief of Staff, in National Security Council and the Council of Ministers, government proposed to open the air space

²⁵³ Turkish Daily News, 4 March 2003

to the US. The Parliament convened and gave the necessary political authorization with a new memorandum. Therefore, in this occasion, the decision unit was “coalition of multiple autonomous actors”.

3. D. 2. c) Decision Making Process

The key contingency that would shape the decision outcome for coalition of autonomous actors is the nature of the rules and procedures guiding interaction. For this decision occasion, the governing decision rule within the coalition of autonomous actors favored unanimity in which one single actor could block the initiatives of all others. The TGNA as a decision making actor was in capacity to block opening of the Turkish air space. The final authorization of the Parliament was required according to the Article 92 of the Turkish constitution after a consensus is reached by the other relevant actors. For the government, as a security matter, the consent and advice of the military and National Security Council were also crucial. The established rules did not give flexibility for policy makers to take actions based on the majority decisions.

Since the former decision of Turkey led to a crisis between the US and Turkey, there has been an attempt to recover from the damage of the Parliamentary decision to the relations with the US.

The most important pressure to fix the relations with the US came from the Turkish military forces who were blamed not to be very active for the approval of the motion in the Parliament by the US officials. Chief of Staff, General Özkök, signaled the support of the Turkish military forces for the troop deployment. Chief of General Staff General Hilmi Özkök issued a statement on 5 March in Diyarbakır extending support of the military to the government in “its option to open a second front against Iraq in the event of war would shorten the conflict and minimized casualties. Turkey’s support of the US would also reduce the harm to its economy.” Clarifying that it was the right of the Parliament to reject the proposal to station the US forces in Turkey, he expressed that “the Turkish Armed Forces’ view is the same as the government’s.” He noted that the same losses would be

suffered whether or not Turkey participated in the war. Turkey's losses would be compensated if it helped US. He believed that with Turkish participation the war would shorten it and unexpected developments would not take place if a front was opened from the north of Iraq. He concluded that “We can not make our calculations by supposing that war will not break out. We should evaluate our move in case of a war. Unfortunately, our choice is between the bad and worse, not between the good and bad. We should either totally stay outside or join the process by helping those who fight. These two moves have been evaluated systematically in coordination with all the institutions and organizations for months,”²⁵⁴

However, AKP leadership thought that a second rejection of the motion would be disastrous for a government facing overwhelming popular opposition to the war. Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the ruling AK Party, thought that such an initiative to reintroduce the motion would risk his electoral success in Siirt and his smooth passage to the premiership since there was a possibility of a second defeat of such a motion in the TGNA. So, he decided to wait for the elections in Siirt on 9 March 2003.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the general elections in Siirt province on 9 March 2003. After the elections in Siirt, the domestic political context changed. With the election victory in Siirt, AKP Leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the new Prime Minister while Abdullah Gül became the new Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in the new government.²⁵⁵ In this new cabinet of Erdoğan, Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, former deputy prime minister who opposed the motion was not appointed as minister.

Meanwhile, President Bush said the US had contingency plans in place if Turkish Parliament insisted on not allowing in the US combat troops to open a northern front against Iraq in a veiled warning to Turkey that it might end up with missing its chance to have a say in the future of Iraq and lose a multi-billion dollar aid package to protect its economy from the negative impact of a war.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁴ The full text of the speech of General Özkök was reprinted in Balbay (2004) pp.168-172

²⁵⁵ Newspot, No: 37, January - April 2003

²⁵⁶ Turkish Daily News, 8 March 2003

To decide on the Turkish policy after the rejection of the government motion by the Parliament, on 8 March 2003, a foreign policy meeting in the office of Prime Minister took place. Prime Minister Gül, AKP leader, Tayyip Erdoğan, Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül, Foreign Minister Yakış, Undersecretary of Foreign Ministry Uğur Ziyal and Ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşı, chief negotiator with the US, participated in this meeting. After the meeting, Foreign Minister Yakış stated that for a second memorandum for the troop deployment, government would make its own assessment and would make the decision.²⁵⁷

On 13 March 2003, the US ambassador Pearson visited Erdoğan and gave the message of President Bush that demanded Turkish authorities to open the Turkish airspace for the US. Just after the meeting with Pearson, Prime Minister Gül, the AKP Leader Erdoğan, and Chief of General Staff Özkök came together in the office of Prime Minister and evaluated the last US request. In the aftermath, Erdoğan had a phone call with the US Vice President Cheney in which the same demand was placed by Cheney. Erdoğan told Chaney that technically he could not do that until new cabinet reached a confidence vote from the parliament.²⁵⁸

Even though there was time pressure for the decision for Turkish air space and political authorization, there was not a government to make decision and send the memorandum to the TGNA. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not comfortable with the situation. So, on 14 March 2003, Uğur Ziyal, undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Deputy Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Baki İlkin, visited President Sezer in the very early hours of morning to ask him to approve the new Turkish cabinet formed by Erdoğan on Friday instead of regular procedures scheduled for Monday.²⁵⁹ In the afternoon, the new cabinet was approved by President Sezer. Prime Minister Gül was appointed as the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in the new cabinet. Deputy Prime Minister Yalçınbayır who opposed the memorandum of the government in the previous decision occasion was not appointed as minister in this new cabinet.

²⁵⁷ Ayın Tarihi, March 2003, <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/2003/mart2003.htm>

²⁵⁸ Radikal, 14 March 2003

²⁵⁹ Yetkin, 2004, 193

In the Azor summit of President Aznar of Spain, Prime Minister Blair of UK, and President Bush of the US on 16 March 2003, after the failure of UK and the US to gain a second Security Council Resolution on 14 March 2003, they decided to initiate the military campaign unilaterally. The decisiveness of the US administration alarmed the Turkish decision makers. On 17 March 2003, a meeting was held to evaluate the recent developments in Iraq under the leadership of President Sezer with the participation of the new Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, and his undersecretary Uğur Ziyal. After the meeting, the spokesperson of the President declared that Turkish air space would be opened to the US. In the following morning, Council of Ministers convened and decided to send a new memorandum to the TGNA for the opening of Turkish air space.²⁶⁰

Meanwhile, just before the vote in the TGNA for the new memorandum a change in the political context took place that would have impact on the voting behavior of the deputies. On 19 March 2003, Iraqi opposition groups convened in Ankara. The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), Constitutional Monarchy Movement (CMM), Iraqi National Accord (INA), Iraqi National Congress (INC), Iraqi Turcoman Front (ITF), Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Turkish and American officials attended the meeting in Ankara. The final statement of the meeting (Ankara Declaration) said that the parties agreed on the preservation of Iraq's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity. The statement did not mention the federal structure in Iraq which had fueled a debate between Turkey and the Kurdish factions in northern Iraq.²⁶¹ Ankara Declaration provided guarantees for Turkish decision makers.

The US military intervention in Iraq started on 20 March 2003 and the US demanded Turkey to open air space again. In the same day, the Turkish parliament allowed the government to give partial support to the US to open a northern front against Iraq.²⁶²

²⁶⁰ Ayın Tarihi, March 2003 <www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/newspot/newspot.htm>

²⁶¹ For the full text of the declaration see Bilâl N. Şimşir, "Türk-İrak İlişkilerinde Türkmenler," (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2004) pp.278-280

²⁶² The text of the memorandum is available in <www.belgenet.com/yasa/tbmm_763.html>

Parliament passed the government motion allowing the US to use Turkey's air space and cross to Iraq for airborne attacks. The passed motion authorized the government to dispatch troops to northern Iraq, in order to prevent refugee flow that the US attack could trigger, and to prevent the creation of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Over flight rights would not allow the fully-fledged "northern front" Washington had hoped to launch from Turkey, but the authorization would allow the US warplanes to conduct bombing missions and land Special Forces in northern Iraq to engage Iraqi forces and to secure oil fields Washington feared of being sabotaged.

3. D. 2. d) Decision Outcome

As a process, the outcome of this decision occasion was a consensus that was reached between the two alliances that was described in the previous decision occasion. The decision to give permission the US to use Turkish airspace in their attack against Iraq after the rejection of the government motion that allow the US military deployment was the result of a change in the "national interest" perception of the autonomous actors in the decision making mechanism. Several factors between 1 March 2003 and 20 March 2003 led to this perception change.

The first factor was the declaration of the Turkish military forces that they strongly supported the Turkish involvement in the US intervention in Iraq. The above mentioned declaration of General Özkök was very much influential on the other decision makers. Such a recommendation from the military was expected, but could not be realized in the February meeting of the National Security Council.

The second factor was the developments in Northern Iraq against the Turkish interest. The rejection of the war power act by the TGNA forced the US to resort to an alternative plan that heavily relied on the militia-like units of the Kurdish forces in northern Iraq. (The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Masood Barzani and Patriotic Union of Jalal Talabani)

Since possibility of creation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq was a red line of Turkish Iraqi foreign policy, nearly all the decision making actors were sensitive to the issue. The demonstration of Kurds against Turkey and burning of the Turkish flags during the demonstrations staged by Kurds in Northern Iraq alarmed Turkish authorities. The Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq were uncomfortable with the possible Turkish involvement in the Iraqi war. For instance, Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party stated that:

“We had reached an agreement in Ankara. The Turkish troops were to be a few thousand and their mission would be limited to humanitarian aid. Later we heard that tens of thousands of troops were going to cross into Northern Iraq and that they were going to arm the Turkomans and disarm the Peshmerga, hence the eruption of these reactions.”²⁶³

The developments in Northern Iraq led to the emergence of the view that Kurds would be the strategic ally of the US, instead of Turkey which they would make them more powerful in the post-Saddam era and put them into the control of the Mosul and Kirkuk, and possibly help them to establish their own independent state while Turkey will be watching.

The third factor was the US decisiveness in her attack against Iraq without an international coalition or unilaterally without a resolution of the UNSC. The decision of US, UK and Spain leaders in Azor summit, the declaration of the US President that they had a contingency plan in place if Turkish Parliament insisted on not allowing the US combat troops to open a northern front against Iraq led to the actors to rethink and re-evaluate their positions.

Although the decision outcome is a consensus of the actors for opening of Turkish air space, on the other hand, the final decision was the compromise between two foreign policy alliances described in the previous occasion in details. The questions in this time period were whether reintroduce a new motion for the full deployment or just allow the US to use Turkish air space to protect the Turkish interest in Iraq. Coinciding these new developments and change in the domestic political context, the actors re-evaluated their position to the Turkish involvement to the war in Iraq. The final decision was not to

²⁶³ Jalal Talabani, live interview by Mehmet Ali Birant, in “Manşet” program, CNN Turk, 4 March 2003

introduce a new memorandum for the US troop deployment in Turkish soil and open the Turkish air space to the US in order not the totally left out of the developments in Iraq. With this decision, Turkish administration did not allow the US to deploy in Turkey, but allowed her to use Turkish air space in her military campaign against Iraq that would make the Turkish involvement in the war limited.

The Foreign Minister Gül evaluated the decision in his speech in the Turkish Foreign Ministry budget debates held at the Parliamentary Plenary Session on 23 March 2003 as it aimed at safeguarding current relations with the allies, at taking measures against possible negative developments, at ending the Iraq war as soon as possible, at establishing peace in the postwar period, at protecting Iraq's territorial integrity and at preventing possible aggressive stances which may threaten both Turkey and the whole region.²⁶⁴ This statement of the Foreign Minister Gül best represents how the decision fell into middle of the two foreign policy alliances.

This chapter analyzed two decision occasions during the US military intervention Iraq within the "decision units" framework. Two decision occasions had same type of decision unit and different foreign policy making process and decision outcomes. The decision unit for the first decision occasion was coalition of autonomous actors and the decision outcome was fragmented symbolic action and one party' position prevails consequently. In the second occasion, the decision unit was the coalition of multiple autonomous actors and the decision outcome was consensus. From the analysis of the two decision occasions, we have seen the role of leadership and the TGNA on the foreign policy making of Turkey. And also, the alliance building and finding ways to manage the differences among the actors were important features of this case.

After having analyzed four decision occasions in two cases, the following chapter presents the findings from analyzes. The cases will be compared within the framework of "decision units" model.

²⁶⁴ Newspot, No. 37, January - April 2003

CHAPTER 4) DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

From the analysis of these four decision occasions, we can draw a pattern in the conflicts in the foreign policy making mechanism. The nature of the conflicts among the actors in the foreign policy making formulation and the ways to manage the differences will be analyzed below as two categories which are the sources of the conflicts among actors in foreign policy formulation and the ways to manage the conflicts.

4. A) THE SOURCES OF THE CONFLICTS AMONG ACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

1) Structural Conflicts:

a) Constitutional conflict:

The Turkish constitution is not clear on foreign policy formulation. Although the current Turkish Constitution is a very detailed constitution in many aspects, the roles of the actors in foreign policy are not well defined and open to interpretation. Although there are some articles concerning foreign policy such as Article 92 on the “Declaration of State of War and Authorization to Deploy the Armed Forces”, Article 90 on “Ratification of International Treaties”, Article 118 on the “National Security,” articles related to how to formulate foreign policy and which institution or individual is to be dominant in the decision making process are not open in the constitution. Traditionally, the conduct of foreign policy is often to be shouldered by the executive body of the state; the government. However, head of the executive is not clear in the constitution either. The ambiguity concerning the head of the executive often leads to the conflicts during foreign policy formulation.

For example, the Turkish constitution gives broad rights and responsibilities to the President. According to the constitution, the President has the right to call and chair the meeting of the National Security Council if he wishes. The agenda of the NSC is shared

between President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff. He has the right to chair the Council of Ministers. According to the Article 104 of the constitution which enhanced the role of the president, President has duties such as ratifying and issuing international treaties; appointing and dismissing upon a demand from the prime minister, the foreign minister; recalling and presiding over the meeting of the Council of Ministers and the National Security Council, accrediting Turkish diplomatic envoy abroad, and issuing agreement to foreign diplomatic envoys; acting as a Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the Parliament, and appointing the Chief of General Staff who is responsible to the prime minister in the exercise of his duties.

These rights and responsibilities are open to interpretation. The role of the President and its degree of involvement largely depend on the domestic political setting and the leadership style of president. A strong ambitious President, such as Özal, could act like a Prime Minister and might manipulate the offices of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister by using the NSC and the Council of Ministers meetings. Alternatively a strong Prime Minister and a foreign minister can block the involvement of the President in foreign policy by not asking his advice. Therefore, the Constitution is flexible and the power of president is vague. The president can interpret its power in his advantage. The vagueness of the 1982 Constitution and the absence of strict rules with regard to the foreign policy making made the leadership style of the President and the Prime Minister even more important variable in Turkish foreign policy making.

In the analysis of the four different decision occasions, we see that in the first two decision occasions, the closure of the pipelines and the US military deployment, the President had conflict with the other actor. In the first decision he made the decision by himself without consultation with the Prime Minister and with Foreign Minister through manipulation. In the second decision occasion, he could not manage to make the final decision alone. However, he could manage the process and still be a dominant actor through a broader re-interpretation of his constitutional right and manipulation of other actors. In these first two decision occasions, the domestic political configuration was suitable to such a broader interpretation and manipulation. More importantly, Özal's leadership style was critical in

how this decision occasions were made. He constantly challenged the constraints including the rules about constitutional rights. However, in the last two decision occasions, the political power structure was not suitable for such a behavior of president. Unlike Ozal, the leadership style of President Sezer did not allow him to act in a decisive way. He was not interested in getting too much involved; he did not challenge the situation to reinterpret his constitutional rights. Although he had disagreement with the government on foreign policy, he could not be decisive in the decision making mechanism, had to let the government and the Parliament what they want to do.

In the aftermath of these two cases, the role of the president, his right to intervene to the foreign policy, was opened to public discussion. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, President Özal opened the presidential system for Turkey to the discussion, instead of parliamentary system, as part of his desire to convert presidency into an independent source of policy and power. Like Özal, after the conflicts with president Sezer, the AKP administration opened “presidential system” to public discussion.

b- Inter-organizational Conflicts:

There are conflicts between the President and Council of Ministers, Parliament and the Council of Ministers. In the first occasion, there was a conflict of interest between Council of Ministers and President in the decision to close the pipelines. In the second occasion, there was conflict that resolved through compromise between the government and the parliament. In the first occasion of the second case, there was a conflict both between the President and cabinet and between cabinet and the Parliament ended with the rejection of motion of the cabinet. The Parliament is more open to the view of the people where as the government is in a position to protect the “national interest” and has some “real politik” considerations. Government tries to persuade or manipulate the Parliament through the arguments of international duties, international law, and national interest.

2- Split in the ruling party:

In all these four decision occasions, there was a split in the ruling party. In the first two decision occasions, Motherland Party was in the power. During the formulation of these two decisions, the Motherland Party were divided into two; the group of deputies led by the former Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz opposed to the decision of the Prime Minister and other ministers. This split pushed for a compromise among the coalition of multiple autonomous actors.

In the last two cases, some ministers disagreed with the rest of the cabinet. In the preparation of the war power act and opening of Turkish air space, four ministers, Deputy Prime Minister Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, Culture Minister Hüseyin Çelik, Minister of Public Works and Settlement Zeki Ergezen, State Minister Mehmet Aydın, opposed the foreign troop deployment; they were against the Turkish involvement to the military campaign in Iraq. But they were not very influential after all.

3- Conflict between “state policy” and “party policy”

Although the term “state policy” is not clear (who determines and how), it gives the impression that there are some constant policies applied by every government. Governments often feel the necessity to declare that they are applying the state policy.

Although there are differences in the party program and party policy of the government which are quite normal for a democratic system, politicians do not want to clash with some traditional policies of the state. There is an understanding among the politicians that the foreign ministry staff is well endowed and staff of the Foreign Ministry will prevent important mistakes from being made.²⁶⁵ The “state policy” could be read as it was formulated with the consent and coordination of all other related actors, especially the Turkish military forces, Foreign Ministry, and the Nation Security Council. For instance, during the entire decision making process of last two decision occasions the government

²⁶⁵For such an argument, see Turkey and Democratization in the Middle East: A TPQ Exclusive Interview With Süleyman Demiral, by Nigar Göksel, Turkish Policy Quarterly (Summer 2005), Vol.4, No: 2

often stated that “Our Iraq policy is a state policy”. In the first two decision occasions government needed to state that it was implementing the “pre-determined state policy”

4-Conflict in foreign policy making style of different actors

The foreign policy making styles and preferences was another source of conflict. In the first two occasions, the difference between the traditional organs of Turkish diplomacy i.e. the MFA and the PM’s office and the foreign policy making style of President Özal was the source of many domestic conflict. Traditional policy required a long process of continuous consultation and coordination among the state organs seeking to sustain equilibrium. It is usually cautious and slow by its nature. However, President Özal preferred making decisions in short time periods that often carry high risk and include rapid response to the issues and more direct diplomacy through non-conventional means. He tried to dominate the decision making process through manipulating other actors, using his personal connections and friendships, good communication skills, and keeping some actors out of the decision making mechanism, especially through his “telephone diplomacy”. His way to conduct foreign policy and make decisions led to deep conflicts and ended with the resignation of two ministers and one Chief of Staff.

In the last two decision occasions, the some practices of the new government led to domestic conflicts. The position of the ruling party leader was a source of the conflict. The US administration had direct connections with Erdoğan trough back channels and special advisors aside the traditional mechanisms. Although he did not have a formal post in the government, he was part of the process. He was invited to the US by President Bush and received great respect from the US administration. The influence of some special foreign policy advisors on the communication and negotiations with the US administration was criticized by other actors.

5-Making foreign policy in secrecy

Traditionally, Turkish foreign policy is made by the political elites of Turkey and is not open to the public in order to prevent the harsh pressure from the public. In all the

occasions analyzed in this study, closed sessions were held at the Parliament. Before the presentation of the motion of the government, government offered a close session in order to discuss the issue and make the decision in comfort.²⁶⁶

In addition to this traditional secrecy, some actors preferred to keep secret the issues and decisions secret from other actors. Such a practice was very frequent during the presidency of Özal. He did not keep the records of the foreign policy meetings, although in traditional diplomacy every meeting was recorded. This was a source of conflict. The situation was similar the last two decision occasions. For instance, for the US military deployment, the “Memorandum of Understanding between government of Republic of Turkey and government of the United States of America, on the establishment and implementation of basic policy, principles, procedures, and to determine the status of forces provisionally deployed for the purposes of possible operations towards Iraq” was kept secret even from the TGNA in the name of national security. The other actors were not comfortable with this confidentiality and it influenced their behavior. The military issues were a sensitive issue, and often not shared with the civilian actors. However, in the last two occasions, the decision making was more transparent. MFA and Turkish General Staff briefed the members of the Parliament in different occasions.

4. B) THE WAYS TO MANAGE THE DIFFERENCES

1- Exclusion from the decision making mechanism:

The actors that generated conflict with other actors are often taken out of the decision making mechanism when the context becomes suitable. Instead a new actor that is known to work in harmony is appointed like in the case of Foreign Minister Alptemoçin’s appointment. The ministers who had conflict with the cabinet, with prime minister or president are forced to resign or not appointed again. For instance, Foreign Minister Ali

²⁶⁶ For the arguments of the cabinet to have a close session see TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Journal of Proceedings of the Parliament), Session Number: 126 (extraordinary), 12 August 1990, Sunday, Term:18, Volume: 46/1, Legislation Year: 3 and TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Journal of Proceedings of the Parliament), Term:18, Volume: 47/1, Legislation Year:4, 5 September 1990, Wednesday

Bozer and Defense Minister Sefa Giray had to resign from their posts. Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, who opposed the government motion, was not appointed again as a minister in the new cabinet of Erdoğan. The Chief of Staff General Özkök had to resign from his post in order to protest President Özal. A new general, Doğan Güreş, who was more in favor of the proposed policy line, was appointed to the post. AKP İstanbul Deputy Göksel Küçükali was sent to the discipline committee of the party due to his position the government motion concerning Iraq.

2- Persuasion of other actors:

Another way of managing conflicts is through persuading some of the opponents. The international law and international obligations, real politik, and danger of threat to “national interest”, having certain guarantees are the typical argument used by the decision makers to convince the skeptics.

a) International law and international obligations

As a founding member of the UN, respecting international law is one of the main principles of Turkish foreign policy.²⁶⁷ One of the conclusions from the analysis of four decision occasions was that international obligations of Turkey and the international legitimacy were influential in the management of the differences among the actors.

During the Gulf War, President Özal and Prime Minister Akbulut, frequently declared that Turkish foreign policy towards Gulf respected the decision of the UN. For instance President Özal said that “Our entire policy has been formulated in parallel to the UN Security Council resolutions”²⁶⁸ The ministers were persuaded with the resolution of UNSC 661 in the decision of the Council of Ministers before the decision to impose an embargo was formulated. In the last two occasions, in order to persuade the opposing actors, the government decided to wait for the decisions of the Security Council and waited for the

²⁶⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy”, <www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Synopsis/>

²⁶⁸ Interview with Turgut Özal by Uğur Dündar, 18 Ocak 1991, TRT1 Hodri Meydan Programı

report of the UN inspectors in Iraq. The government searched for an international legitimacy at least in the NATO framework. Absence of a UN mandate for the war slowed down the decision making in the last two occasions.

The table below indicates that in the last two occasions where the decision-making process was too slow, there was no UNCS resolution that justified a military intervention in Iraq. This contributed to the slowing down of the Turkish decision making process.

TABLE 4: Occasions for Decision and Existence of International Legitimacy

Occasions for Decision	Existence of International Legitimacy
Closure of the Oil Pipelines (Kirkuk-Yumurtalik) in Gulf Crisis (1990)	UN SC Resolution 661
USA military deployment to Turkey (1991)	UNSC Resolution 678
USA military deployment to Turkey (2003)	No UNSC Resolution
Opening the Turkish Air Space (2003)	No UNSC Resolution

b) Using the threat of “national interest”:

In the absence of the international legitimacy and international obligation, the argument of “national interest” was often used to convince the skeptics. In the US intervention in Iraq, there was no legitimate ground to intervene. However it was argued that if Turkey lacked the power to prevent the war, it was better to support the US and remain a good ally than to disappoint the USA and lose the ability to have a say in the post war reconfiguration of Iraq. A substantial portion of the Turkish military and political leaders long suspected the US and Israel of sympathizing with Iraqi-Kurdish statehood. So, if Turkey did not involve in the war in Iraq, the possibility of an independent Kurdish State could be realized which was against the Turkish “national interest.”

c) Buying off the Skeptics

Having certain guarantees for the compensation of economic and financial losses of Turkey and the guarantees for the interest of Turkey were often used for persuasion as well. During the Gulf War and the US intervention, the security of Turkey was guaranteed under the collective defense umbrella of NATO. In the Gulf War (1990), Patriot missiles were stationed in Turkey to protect Turkey from the Scud missiles of Iraq. In addition to this, NATO Allied Command Europe Mobile Air Force was deployed to Erhaç and Diyarbakır before the Gulf War

In the second case, since the compensation guarantees of international society were not realized after the Gulf War (1990), after intensive negotiations, the US administration agreed to offer a generous package of financial compensation for the economic losses that Turkey would face as a result of the war. In addition to a financial aid package, the political concerns of Turkey over Iraq (“red lines” of Turkey in Iraq) were guaranteed in the “Ankara Declaration” of 19 March 2003.

3-Finding Integrative solutions:

In order to continue the search for a peaceful resolution to the crisis and negotiations with the US on possible war in Iraq, an integrative solution was found out. This was to divide the permission of the military deployment into two sections and taking a step by step approach. If all the means for peaceful resolution has been exhausted in the meantime giving full permission was going to be reconsidered. First site survey, then site modernization permission was given to the US. Another integrative solution was to offer ministers to sign the motion that they oppose in order to pass it to the Parliament and to reject in the close voting.

4. C) CONCLUSION

TABLE 5: The Comparison of the Decision Occasions

decision occasion	decision unit	Key contingency	Decision outcome
The closure of the oil pipelines (Kirkuk- Yumurtalık)	Predominant leader	leadership Style of President Özal	Özal's position prevails
US-led Coalition Forces Military Deployment in Turkey	coalition of autonomous actors	rules favoring unanimity	a) a mutual compromise b) Özal's position prevails
US military deployment in Turkey	coalition of autonomous actors	rules favoring unanimity	a) fragmented symbolic action b) one party's position prevails
Opening of the Turkish Air Space	coalition of autonomous actors	rules favoring unanimity	a)consensus b)a mutual compromise

As the deeper analysis of the four decision occasions demonstrates that Turkish foreign policy is a “negotiated order” among the various domestic decisions making actors. Different views, foreign policy making styles, world views, and interests shaped the foreign policy making mechanism and the foreign policy output. The actors try to balance various domestic values and interest, and conflicting policy considerations. The analysis shows that the decision makers do not seek to have a consensus on the foreign policy issues. If the power structure and political setting is suitable, a predominant leader emerges and does not hesitate to make decisions by himself in the favor of his interests and position, at the expense of clash with other actors.

The leadership style of the leader is an important determinant in the decision making process and outcome. The analysis of the two cases showed that leadership in the decision making mechanism influences both the foreign policy making process and foreign policy outcome. In the first case President Özal acted as a predominant leader while in he second case neither President Sezer nor Prime Minister Erdoğan qualified as a predominant leader

which led to different foreign policy outcome. Both leadership features of Özal, Sezer, Erdoğan and the political context contributed to these different decision outcomes.

President Özal was an “expansionist” type of leader; he did not refrain from challenging constraints, he was task oriented and was closed to the information presented to him on the policies to be conducted. Instead he relied on his own private sources of information and expertise. His orientation was to “engage in an active foreign policy”. He tried to design the political setting in a way that expands his power and influence and often criticized the others who favored more cautious and less risky foreign.

His presence as a predominant leader in the decision making mechanism influenced the foreign policy of Turkey during the Gulf War that would be different without his involvement. For instance, in the first decision occasion, there were three policy options:

- 1- close the pipeline before the Saudi Arabia
- 2- close the pipeline after Saudi Arabia
- 3- close the pipeline after an agreement with US and other Arab countries for the compensation of the economic loses of Turkey due to close of the pipeline

If the skeptics had a more say in the making of the first decision, if the decision unit was not the predominant leader but a coalition of actors, the other actors, especially the Turkish Armed Forces and the Foreign Ministry would generate a different decision outcome. The involvement of President Özal, his emergence as a predominant leader, and manipulation of the political environment and the decision making process led to the adoption of the first option as the foreign policy outcome.

In the second decision occasion of the first case, the US military deployment required a parliamentary authorization according to the constitution. However, Özal was not comfortable with this rule either. He wanted to change this rule with a new one and tried to engineer a new decision making rule that would make him the sole decision maker for this decision occasion as well. President Özal believed that Turkish administration could allow the US to deploy in Turkey in accordance with the “Defense and Economic Cooperation

Agreement” (DECA) between the US and Turkey (29 March 1980). However, the Turkish military forces and the Foreign Ministry rejected this idea and insisted on a parliamentary authorization. As a result of task orientation, Özal continued to exercise his power for the Turkish involvement in the campaign to accomplish his policy objectives even though the decision unit was a coalition of autonomous actors. Although he was not the sole decision maker, he still managed to dominate the process and persuaded the other actors, especially members of the cabinet and the deputies of the ruling Motherland Party, to support his foreign policy line.

In the second case, President Sezer and Prime Minister Erdoğan could not emerge as a predominant leader. Unlike Özal, President Sezer was not in such a capacity. He did not have interest in foreign policy issues; he could not speak foreign languages. To be able to conduct direct personal diplomacy with foreign leaders, he rarely had foreign visits as the President of Turkey. Unlike Özal, he did not have frequent communication with the world leaders. Rather, as a person of law, he respected the constraints and favored a “state policy” that would emerge as a result of consensus among the relevant state institutions. He was also open to information; and received information through his foreign policy advisors Ambassador Tacan İldem.

Along with President Özal, Tayyip Erdoğan, leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party, later on the Prime Minister, could not qualify as a predominant leader either. He had to work with the political constraints for these two decision occasions. The issue of Turkish participation in the war in Iraq was directly related to other foreign policy issues facing Turkey. Each of the foreign policy issues that Turkey was handling during this time period was in a capacity to influence the other one.

The first foreign policy issue that constituted a constraint was the European Union integration of Turkey. The Justice and Development Party had declared the EU as the top foreign policy priority. During the negotiations with the US, Turkey was negotiating with the EU for the full membership. Possible Turkish involvement in the military campaign in Iraq would lead to the further opposition of France and Germany for Turkish EU

membership. The second foreign policy issue was the Cyprus issue. In parallel to the negotiations with the US for Iraq and with the EU for full membership, Turkey was dealing with the Cyprus issue. The proposal offered by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for the reunification of the island for a lasting peace was negotiated by the Turkish and Greek sides. The US support to Turkey in the Cyprus issue was crucial and Turkey feared that she might lose the US support in case if she does not support the US in Iraq. Another international constraint was the relations with the Muslim world. Turkey would suffer from her support to the US in her military intervention in Iraq which was perceived as illegitimate on moral ground by the Muslim world. The deputies of the Justice and Development party who wanted to have closer relations with the Muslim World were very sensitive to such an issue.

The domestic political setting provided some constraints to Erdoğan as well, which he chose to respect rather than challenge. The newly established and elected Justice and Development Party, formerly Islamist, had to be very cautious in its relations with the established domestic political actors, especially the secular Kemalist establishment. Tayyip Erdoğan had been banned from politics for five years due to his Islamist political background and therefore could not be elected as a deputy at the first place, and could not assume the Premiership initially. This fragile domestic situation put him in a position in which he respected constraints and have become more accommodating towards the other actors.

In addition to these domestic and international political constraints, Erdoğan did not have experience in foreign policy. He was banned from politics, during this decision making process, he did not have a formal position and he participated in decisions as the leader of the ruling party.

When there is not a person who could qualify as a predominant leader, the actors often seek to reach a consensus or compromise. There are permanent actors such as the National Security Council, Turkish Armed Forces, and Turkish Grand National Assembly to be consulted or persuaded. In the three of the four decision occasions, the role of the Turkish

Grand National Assembly was crucial since it had the power to block the initiatives of the other actors. So the governments had to persuade the deputies to get their policy option accepted, or find a compromise solution. There are several ways to persuade the actors like persuasion through the international law and obligations, preservation of vital national interest of Turkey, and some guarantees. The table below summarizes the comparison of the two cases and four decision occasions.

The involvement of more actors makes the decision making process longer. In the first decision occasion, President Özal, as a predominant leader made the decision in a shorter time period. For the second case, the decision unit was a coalition of autonomous actors and the decision making process took longer since the other actors that were involved in the decision making process preferred a more cautious policy option.

This thesis presented a comparative analysis of Turkish foreign policy decision making in a theoretical model. Theoretical foundation of this thesis was built on the “decision units” framework advanced by Margaret G. Herman. It applied this framework to four decision occasions to investigate who made foreign policy decisions and how this influenced foreign policy behavior of Turkey. The first case was foreign policy making of Turkey during the Gulf War (1991). In this case two decision occasions; closure of the oil pipelines (Kirkuk-Yumurtalık) and the US military deployment to Turkey were analyzed. The second case was Turkish foreign policy making during the US military intervention in Iraq. For this case, the decision occasions of the US military deployment in Turkey and the opening of the Turkish air space to the US-led coalition in military intervention in Iraq were analyzed. After analysis of four decision occasions, this thesis concluded that the type of decision units as the “decision units” framework suggested had impact on the decision made by Turkey. Different decision units required different foreign policy making processes and led to different decision outcomes. The foreign policy of Turkey was a product of the conflicting views and interests of the various decision making actor. The actors find different ways to manage their differences in order to reach a final decision. The leadership played an important role in the decision making.

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