DETERMINANTS OF OPPOSITION COORDINATION IN NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

by
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DETERMINANTS OF OPPOSITION COORDINATION IN NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

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ABSTRACT

DETERMINANTS OF OPPOSITION COORDINATION IN NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

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This thesis examines the relationship between the two driving forces that pose a threat to the survival of authoritarian regimes. I argue that a vertical threat (popular protests) increases the likelihood of a lateral threat (pre-electoral opposition coordination) in electoral authoritarian regimes based on three theoretical frameworks: *(i.)* Transforming a popular unrest, which is directed to the incumbent party, to an incentive for the members of opposition parties to deal with the authoritarian politics, *(ii.)* being open to hear new strategies on getting away with the incumbent party and making the dissatisfaction more vocal, and *(iii.)* highlighting the need for a pivotal actor in popular protests are the main theoretical mechanisms leading to opposition coordination on pre-electoral issues. The empirical findings on 97 elections from 42 countries demonstrate that popular protests increase the probability of observing pre-electoral opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes whereas the probability does not increase in competitive authoritarian regimes. Moreover, this statistical evidence is also provided for the other measures of protests such as violent and non-violent forms, but this effect is substantially more essential for peaceful protests. Lastly, investigation on the theoretical relationship between the two driving forces of the process of democratization provides analytical and empirical background to the contemporary literature on democratization.

ÖZET

DEMOKRATİK OLMAYAN REJİMLERDE MUHALEFET KOORDİNASYONUNUN BELİRLEYİCİ ETKENLERİ

AYŞEGÜL ATAŞ

SİYASET BİLİMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, AĞUSTOS 2020

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Muhalefet Koordinasyonu, Populer Protestolar, Rekabetçi Otoriter Rejimler, Hegemonik Otoriter Rejimler, Demokratikleşme

Bu tez, otoriter rejimlerin varlığına tehdit oluşturan iki itici güç arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Seçimsel otoriter rejimlerde tabandan oluşan bir tehdit (protestolar) üç teorik çerçeveye dayanarak yatay bir tehditin (seçim öncesi muhalefet koordinasyonu) oluşma ihtimalini arttırmaktadır. Seçim öncesinde muhalefet koordinasyonunun oluşmasına sebep olan başlıca teorik mekanizmalar, *(i.)* hükümete karşı beliren memnuniyetsizlikleri, muhalefet parti üyelerini otoriter siyasetle uğraşmaya teşvik ederek dönüştürmek, *(ii.)* hükümet partisini devirmek adına yeni stratejiler duymaya açık olmak ve bu memnuniyetsizlikleri daha da seslendirip duyulur hale getirmek ve *(iii.)* popüler protestolarda merkezi bir aktörün varlığına olan ihtiyacı vurgulamaktır. 42 ülkede yer almış 97 seçim üzerine yapılan ampirik analizler, protestonun hegemonik otoriter rejimlerde muhalefet partilerinin seçim öncesinde koordine olma ihtimalini arttırdığını gösterirken bu ihtimalin rekabetçi otoriter rejimlerde artmadığını göstermektedir. Ayrıca bu istatistiki bulgu şiddet içeren ve şiddet içermeyen protestolar için de geçerli olup, barışçıl protestolarda bu etkinin daha anlamlı olduğu görülmektedir. Son olarak demokratikleşme sürecinin iki itici gücü arasındaki teorik ilişkinin araştırılması, ileriki demokratikleşme çalışmalarına hem analitik hem de ampirik bir zemin sağlamaktadır.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In non-democratic regimes, opposition parties need to deal with authoritarian politics while engaging in day to day politics. The image that opposition parties in non-democratic regimes are incapable of creating a difference emerges from the fact that they also need to struggle with the characteristics of the authoritarian regime in addition to daily politics. Besides the electoral issues, if the opposition parties cooperate among themselves, they are better off in dealing with the authoritarian politics. Otherwise, repression on opposition parties will separately erode the oppositional cohesion. One of the expectations from opposition in non-democratic regimes is to liberalize the political environment in which democratic openings become a possibility. This possibility of democratic openings generally emerges with the electoral issues. However, opposition parties in non-democratic regimes do not have enough electoral power by which they can succeed. Hence, if the electoral procedures somehow promise democratic openings with the inclusion of electoral powers of the other opposition parties, primary emphasis becomes opposition coordination on pre-electoral issues. Otherwise, the incumbent party will benefit from fragmentation of the opposition on pre-electoral issues, and democratic openings will be less likely to achieve.

When the opposition in non-democratic regimes tries to coordinate on pre-electoral processes, they need to deal with the authoritarian politics. The incumbent party is aware of the possibility that the opposition can overcome certain electoral difficulties and lead to electoral turnover. According to Magaloni (2006), fragmentation among the members of opposition parties favors the incumbent party and its authoritarian rule. This awareness of the incumbent party implies further manipulations that would create unevenness for the members of opposition parties so that coordination on pre-electoral politics becomes harder to achieve.

Authoritarian politics is not just used to avoid opposition coordination, but it is also used to avoid defections from the ruling elite. Essentially, the process of government coalition building underlines the causal mechanism on how authoritarian regimes function. Geddes (1999), and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) argue that politics

among the ruling elite and the way an authoritarian regime functions make defections from the members of the ruling elite harder. Hence, government coalition is less likely to be interrupted when authoritarian politics is performed well. While this literature explains the starting point of authoritarianism, it fails to address why authoritarian regimes are persistent and not democratizing over time. To be able to direct the question of the survival of authoritarian regimes and the process of democratization, one needs to focus on the process of opposition alliance building while differentiating between different types of electoral authoritarian regimes (such as competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes). Hence, the fundamental need to focus on opposition coordination drives from two reasons: It will first provide substantial insights on the process of democratization and second highlight why and how authoritarian regimes are persistent.

Attempts to incorporate the literature on protest behavior into the democratization process have resulted in a need to create various linkages with the literature on opposition coordination. When *a demand from below* emerges, democratization is more likely to occur according to Teorell (2010). How popular protests lead to democratization becomes a weak theory indeed when opposition coordination is not analyzed in the context of popular protest. Primary expectation from this thesis is to address the gap on opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes with respect to the role of popular protests. Essentially, my main curiosity arises from the following question: *Can unevenness in non-democratic regimes be moderated by the presence of a movement from below which later leads to pre-electoral opposition coordination?*

Sato and Wahman (2019) refer to popular protests as "a vertical threat" and to opposition coordination as "a lateral threat" to authoritarian consolidation. Even though the literature on democratization intensively places its roots on both threats, the relationship between them are not examined in the context of non-democratic regimes. In other words, both threats are treated as two driving forces of democratization, but how a vertical threat affects a lateral threat is a gap in the contemporary literature. The effect of a vertical threat on a lateral threat may create a conditionality for democratization, and I have the theoretical purpose to unpack this substantial relationship. In short, the main research interest of this thesis is to analyze whether the presence of a credible vertical threat (popular protests) is a determinant of a lateral threat (opposition coordination).

The empirical findings of this thesis support the argument that a vertical threat in hegemonic authoritarian regimes increases the likelihood of a lateral threat based on three theoretical grounds: *(i.)* Social unrest among the attendees of protests

is evaluated as a political opportunity by the various members of opposition to be transferred as a demand for a regime change. With the treatment of protests as a dissatisfaction with the current regime, opposition in non-democratic regimes can commonly agree on a political opportunity in which pre-electoral coordination becomes possible. *(ii.)* Efforts of opposition parties to appeal to a group of population whose dissatisfaction with the regime is already active and to make their dissatisfactions more vocal are met with the audience when the upcoming election is near. Hence, coordination over popular protests becomes easy to achieve. Lastly, *(iii.)* absence of a main coordinator in popular protests leads to a search for the reflection of this popular movement in the political arena, and a coordinated opposition on pre-electoral issues becomes a perfect match for this reflection and also for achieving electoral turnover.

Once the underlying mechanism on the relationship between the vertical and lateral threats is analyzed, it will help us to understand democratization better. Essentially, the empirical findings on the relationship between the two driving forces of democratization raise further questions on democratization. In addition to explaining determinants of opposition coordination on pre-electoral processes in non-democratic regimes, substantial value of this thesis also rests on further theoretical implications for the democratization process.

The proceeding chapter of this thesis includes the literature review for democratization in the context of the vertical and lateral threats. While accumulating on the contemporary literature about pre-electoral opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes, causal mechanisms between mass mobilization and opposition coordination are reflected in the theory section of this thesis. After providing theoretical grounds on determinants of opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes, research design and empirical analysis are presented in Chapter 3. In addition to the discussion of limitations and further researches on opposition coordination, the last chapter summarizes the empirical findings on the hypothesized relationship between opposition coordination and protests in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

For the last 40 years, the number of multi-party elections has increased in non-democratic regimes as the role of international community on elections becomes prominent, according to Gandhi and Reuter (2013), and Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009). In non-democratic regimes, attributed meaning to multiparty elections is different than democratic regimes since survival of electoral authoritarian regimes mostly depends on electoral processes. This dependence allows opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes to operate on opportunities presented to them, and one of the presented opportunities is to coordinate on electoral issues and foster for political liberalization. As Levitsky and Way (2002) mention, political structure of competitive authoritarian regimes favors the incumbent party with the structure of *uneven playing field*. Moreover, relative weakness of autocrats in competitive authoritarian regimes creates a competition area for the members of opposition parties even though opportunities provided to them are not even according to Way (2015). In this regard, Way (2015) does not refer to the regime characteristics as an opportunity but as a struggle for the opposition parties. Even though the struggle creates *uneven playing field* for the members of opposition parties, it may create an opportunity for electoral turnover in electoral authoritarian regimes.

Moreover, Lust-Okar (2006) mentions that the conditionality of democratic openings depends on the authoritarian politics and the amount of political power distributed by the incumbent party to the members of opposition. Essentially, the amount of political power distributed by the incumbent party depends on the characteristics of political regimes. In hegemonic authoritarian regimes, the political arena provided to the members of opposition parties is narrower than the political arena in competitive authoritarian regimes. The reason is that the incumbent party in hegemonic authoritarian regimes has an overwhelming control over the political means through which it can create advantages for itself. Additionally, expertise in cooptation mechanisms for opposition parties has an essential role in findings ways to get out of the authoritarian politics. Even though Lust-Okar (2006) does not address the problem of oppositional autonomy in electoral authoritarian regimes, expertise in cooptation

mechanisms requires autonomy of opposition parties so that electoral turnovers in non-democratic regimes become a possibility.

Authoritarian politics, which are briefly explained above, gets institutionalized when democratization through opposition coordination is tried to be achieved since electoral repression and other kinds of manipulations, as Schedler (2002) mentions, become essential tools to avoid electoral turnovers. Hence, engaging in politics in non-democratic regimes creates both electoral and non-electoral barriers for opposition coordination and the process of democratization.

In this vein, the following section of this thesis presents the literature on democratization in the context of opposition coordination. How a lateral threat leads to democratization is examined, and it will be essential in explaining the relationship between the lateral and vertical threats that are two driving forces of democratization.

2.1 Role of Opposition Coordination on Democratization

The linkage between opposition coordination and democratization has a problematic aspect. Factors affecting coordination of opposition in non-democratic regimes are not analyzed in detail. Therefore, contemporary literature on opposition coordination proposes controversial empirical findings on democratization. One camp argues that democratization is predicted when opposition coordination is achieved whereas the other camp argues that the linkage is endogenous. The second camp states that the contemporary literature only focuses on opposition coordination when it leads to democratization. Dynamics behind the formation of opposition coordination are not underlined in detail and hence, it may create problems regarding the endogeneity with respect to democratization. In other words, Wahman (2013) and Gandhi (2008) point out a potential endogenous relationship between opposition coordination and democratization, and both studies reverse the question back since it may be more likely to observe opposition coalition in cases of democratic openings.

Essentially, opposition coordination in electoral authoritarian regimes is not studied by referring to different types of electoral authoritarian regimes. In other words, pre-electoral opposition coordination in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes is not differentiated. Hence, this may lead to contradictory empirical findings when scholars elaborate on the relationship between opposition coordination

and democratization. To be able to provide essential insights on the relationship between opposition coordination and democratization, opposition coordination in different electoral authoritarian regimes needs to be unpacked. In this thesis, I first distinguish electoral authoritarian regimes as competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes and second study the causal association between protests and pre-electoral opposition coordination.

Precedents of the first camp on the relationship between opposition coordination and democratization are mainly proposed by Howard and Roessler (2006). The authors emphasize that opposition coordination, which is defined as a formal coalition on a ballot, proposal of a presidential candidate, or campaigning together, is an important signal against the incumbent party in non-democratic regimes because it gives an operating area to the members of opposition parties for possible democratic openings. The authors test their hypothesis by examining 50 cross sectional elections and conclude that electoral turnover is a way out of competitive authoritarian regimes when opposition is coordinated. Therefore, incumbent party's primary objective in non-democratic regimes is to keep opposition fragmented and hence, avoid electoral turnovers. This mechanism signifies how essential is to understand the determinants of opposition coordination because political process is more likely to end up with democratization when opposition is coordinated. The authors examine the Russian case and state that "Unified opposition sends more consistent and bigger signals to the targeted dictator than a divided opposition." (Armstrong, Reuter, and Robertson 2020, 1). The regime receives the threat when *loyal* opposition parties start to cooperate with the others that do not benefit from the authoritarian system. In this regard, united opposition whose political actions are not limited to the network of the state poses a credible challenge to electoral turnovers.

Donno (2013) also argues by analyzing 177 elections between 1990 and 2007 that the probability of democratization depends on two things; external conditionality and opposition coalition. Here, it is essential to emphasize that the role of elections in non-democratic regimes is not facades, and it is not present just to create a perception on legitimacy of the political regime. Rather, it creates a way out for democratization according to Donno (2013). However, one problematic aspect is the differentiation among different types of authoritarian regimes. In hegemonic authoritarian regimes, the likelihood of democratization is lower than the competitive authoritarian regimes even when opposition is coordinated, and external conditionality is viable. Sato and Wahman (2019) accumulate on the study by Donno (2013) and extend that the presence of popular protests fosters for democratic change when opposition coordination and external conditionality simultaneously exist. In this respect, one camp in the contemporary literature on the relationship between oppo-

sition coordination and democratization realizes the causal association as a positive one.

The other camp regarding the relationship between opposition coordination and democratization stresses the authoritarian manipulation on electoral processes and how the incumbent party deals with it. As Levitsky and Way (2010) emphasizes that the manipulative structure of authoritarian politics makes the process of democratization with the electoral turnover harder and hence, opposition parties need to be dealt with the incumbent party if their primary objective is to cooperate on pre-electoral processes. Schedler (2002) and Golder (2006) argue that the incumbent party constantly checks for electoral control over opposition parties and hence, it creates difficulties for opposition parties to overcome the fragmentation problem. Therefore, it is even harder to achieve opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes than democratic regimes. Why electoral turnover and cooperation on electoral procedures become harder to achieve can easily be understood by the concept of 'menu of manipulation' as Schedler (2002) refers. One of the 'menu of manipulation' is electoral repression, and it is used as a control variable in the empirical analysis of this thesis.

In short, the relationship between opposition coordination and democratization has contradictory empirical conclusions in the current state of literature. For this inconclusive literature, the research question in this thesis proposes a substantial value. Before starting to build my theoretical arguments, it is essential to present the literature on the determinants of opposition coordination.

2.2 Determinants of Opposition Coordination

The literature on opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes has its roots from the literature on opposition coordination in democratic regimes. Therefore, starting with presentation of the linkages between the two literatures will contribute to understand why some hypotheses hold in cases of democratic regimes but not in non-democratic regimes.

Boundaries of the causal mechanisms explaining determinants of opposition coordination on pre-electoral processes are mostly drawn with respect to democratic regimes. Bunker (2019) contributes to the literature on coalition formation in democratic regimes by analyzing 18 democratic presidential regimes in Latin America.

The author concludes that weak presidential leaders, constraint electoral rules of competition, and highly fragmented party systems lead to coalition formation in democratic presidential regimes. According to Magaloni (2006), fragmented party systems founded to be a determinant of opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes. Additionally, Kellam (2017) analyzes the way opposition coalition building process in presidential systems takes place. The author concludes that presidential systems positively affect pre-electoral alliances. In short, since government systems and fragmented party systems found to be the determinants of opposition coordination, they are controlled in the empirical analysis of this thesis.

Moreover, Barbera (2013) questions whether the arguments of Duverger (1954) and Cox (1997) also hold for non-democratic regimes. By analyzing both democratic and non-democratic regimes, similar consequences of electoral rules apply for authoritarian regimes and "... create incentives for opposition parties and voters to coordinate in non-democratic elections" as Barbera (2013, 26) argues. In other words, pre-electoral opposition coordination also depends on what kind of electoral rules is available in a given political setting. While proportional representation increases the probability of opposition coordination, plurality and mixed systems are likely to decrease this probability.

Additionally, Golder (2006) states by analyzing 20 industrialized parliamentary democracies that ideologically closer opposition parties are more likely to form alliances with each other on pre-electoral matters. In other words, Golder (2006) emphasizes that the predicted probability of observing opposition coalition in democratic regimes increases when the members of opposition parties are ideologically closer to each other. This hypothesis needs to be revisited for non-democratic regimes since political opportunities provided to political actors are shaped by characteristics of regime types. In democratic regimes, only reference point of opposition coordination is ideological and ethnical dispersion among the members of opposition parties. However, coalition politics in non-democratic regimes are not totally free from the incumbent party and hence, it needs to be reframed in relation with the incumbent party. In other words, both ideological distance among the members of opposition parties and ideological distance from the incumbent party need to be accounted when opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes is examined as Wahman (2011) indicates.

The necessity of reframing the hypothesis for non-democratic regimes emerges since the agenda setting power and political opportunities of opposition parties partially depend on the incumbent party in non-democratic regimes. Even when opposition parties try to damage the legitimacy of the incumbent party by referring to non-

democratic political environment, they generally do so by following the discourses produced by the incumbent party according to Márquez (2016). The author argues that legitimacy can be damaged as long as the authoritarian regime allows it to be damaged. Actions available to opposition parties are limited but not totally dependent on features and objectives of the government party since coordination requires contribution of various members of opposition parties. This duality, which is the partial dependence on the incumbent party and on the other members of opposition coalition, complicates the authoritarian politics and needs to be addressed when analyzing pre-electoral opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes. In this thesis, the dual nature of opposition coordination will be addressed when several measurements, such as party system fragmentation and ideological polarization, are employed.

Cleavage-based voting also works in non-democratic regimes, and the opposition leaders in the Russian case who are already loyal to the authoritarian regime also try to seem "responsive to the grievances to their members and potential sympathizers" (Armstrong, Reuter, and Robertson 2020, 5). Moreno (2019) further argues that the left-right cleavage does not always confirm itself in the formations of party systems. Rather, authoritarian-democracy cleavage also has an explanatory power in explanations of party systems. One of the cleavages in non-democratic regimes can be the cleavage of democracy, and the way this cleavage gets instrumentalized is essential in the context of opposition coordination over the public protests. In this vein, the contemporary literature on cleavage-based voting in non-democratic regimes directs the discussion to the importance of popular protests on opposition coordination. Engagement in protest activities is more likely to be observed when there is a particle of the cleavage of democracy. If this is the case, popular protests propose an explanatory power on pre-electoral opposition coordination. Essentially, activation of the cleavage of democracy can happen through pre-electoral coordination over political protests since the members of opposition parties in non-democratic regimes can act upon a social unrest that grows in the society and reflects itself in the form of popular protests.

As Strøm, Müller, and Bergman (2008) argues, political parties in democratic regimes have their distinctive policy preferences and objectives on office seeking. Hence, the politics of opposition and government formation constantly revolve around these preferences and objectives. Moreover, opposition parties in non-democratic regimes are also political institutions and have their own political agendas. However, in the literature on non-democratic regimes, assuming that the only objective of opposition parties is to hold office is not an appropriate vision towards authoritarian politics since opposition coordination in electoral authoritar-

ian regimes is evaluated as an essential opportunity for democratic improvements. Therefore, other objectives of opposition parties such as pre-electoral coordination can be essential too. In other words, they also seek office with pre-electoral opposition coordination, but the primary purpose of the coordination is to create political openings in the present electoral authoritarian regime. Additionally, since the political opportunities available to opposition parties depend on the restrictedness of the regime, I differentiate between competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes when analyzing opposition coordination in electoral authoritarian regimes. In this regard, treatment of opposition parties needs to be critically addressed when the type of political regime is not democracy.

As previously noted, opposition parties in non-democratic regimes need to be treated differently than in democratic regimes since political opportunities provided to opposition parties are different in two regime types. In democratic regimes, coordination purely depends on political agendas of opposition parties whereas in non-democratic regimes, coordination depends on ideological polarization of opposition parties with respect to the incumbent party. In cases where different political agendas between the opposition and government parties exist, it is more likely to observe opposition coordination since features of authoritarian regime also canalize the focus to the incumbent party. It means that the reference point of opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes is both the incumbent party and the members of opposition parties.

Discourse of opposition coordination also depends on the political rule setters, and the rule setter in this case is the incumbent party. For instance, Wahman (2011) argues that if opposition parties in non-democratic regimes have a different policy agenda than the government party, this difference pushes the opposition parties to coordinate on pre-electoral processes with the other members of the opposition. The reference point of coordination in Wahman's (2011) study is the dispersion on preferences of policy agenda, and the dispersion among opposition is conditional on the position of the incumbent party. As previously stated, the role attributed to the incumbent government is essential since authoritarian politics does not purely allow opposition coordination being contingent on the members of opposition since it is affected by feature and actions of the government party. In other words, policy division between the members of opposition and the incumbent party creates an incentive for opposition to coordinate on pre-electoral politics.

Besides policy division between the incumbent and opposition parties, Van de Walle (2006) argues that opposition coordination in the African context depends on the perceptions of the members of opposition parties on the probability of success of

electoral turnover. The main arguement proposed by Van de Walle (2006) is for the African case and not tested with the large-scale empirical analysis. Moreover, Wahman (2011) argues that if the perception of the opposition parties on an electoral success is positive then, this positive perception is a substantial determinant of opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes. In other words, Wahman (2011) argues that the probability of observing opposition coordination increases as the members of opposition perceive the available political environment as an opportunity for their electoral victory, which then may be translated as a democratic transformation. In this regard, positive perception of the opposition parties on possible electoral success increases the likelihood of opposition coalition on pre-electoral politics.

Gandhi and Reuter (2013) examine 413 legislative elections held between 1946 and 2006 in non-democratic regimes to be able to analyze the causal mechanism that leads to incentives for pre-electoral coalitions. The authors coded an action as a pre-electoral coalition only if the political actors agreed and announced that their parties will not compete in the upcoming election. This action of coalition can take three different forms; coordination on campaigning activities, not running against candidates of other political parties or agreeing on a candidate after observing the election's results of the first round (if it is a second or multi-round election). The authors find that repression in electoral processes and stability of main opposition party, which is the age of the main opposition party, lead to formation of opposition coalitions in non-democratic regimes. Essentially, electoral process in non-democratic regimes is the main survival of the democratic clues that are not just facades. When opposition parties observe that one last remaining area of democracy is damaged by electoral repression, they find a common ground to agree on and hence, opposition coordination becomes possible with references to this common ground.

As one can see that the linkage between popular protests and opposition coordination is not directly referred in the context of electoral repression. However, it indirectly leads the audience to ask about responses of citizens to the electoral repression. In other words, the literature mentions about electoral repression as a trigger for opposition coordination, but it does not focus on electoral repression as a concern of citizens in non-democratic regimes. In this vein, the linkage needs to be rephrased with respect to the presence of popular protests while referring to competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes as two types of electoral authoritarian regimes.

Additionally, the other determinant of opposition coordination proposed by Gandhi and Reuter (2013), which is the stability of the main opposition party, enables some

explanations based on political party systems. The authors argue that if the main opposition party is stable, which is mostly measured by its age, opposition coalition is expected to be built. As the stability of the main opposition party increases, it gains expertise in politics. By benefitting from the accumulated expertise of engaging in politics, the stability of the main opposition party provides advantages in the process of coordination.

According to Gandhi and Reuter (2013), economic performance of the incumbent party is not a determinant of pre-electoral coalition. Perception of the economic performance in non-democratic regimes can easily be manipulated in favor of the incumbent party. This manipulation weakens the possibility of perception of the economic performance being a determinant of pre-electoral coalition. On the other hand, Wahman (2011) argues that the weak economic performance of the incumbent party pushes the members of opposition to coordinate on pre-electoral processes since it will direct the voters to vote economically and increase the chance of an electoral turnover. In short, the possible impact of economic performance of the incumbent party on pre-electoral opposition coordination needs to be further analyzed due to not having an agreement in the contemporary literature.

Here, essential link with my main research question needs to be formed because weak economic performance of the incumbent party in non-democratic regimes, which is likely to trigger popular unrest in the society, may indirectly affect opposition coordination. However, causal mechanism is not referred as such in the contemporary literature on pre-electoral opposition coordination. Hence, economic performance of the incumbent party in electoral authoritarian regimes is controlled in the empirical analysis since it may indirectly affect pre-electoral opposition coordination.

As it is said in the literature on opposition coordination in democratic regimes, ideological closeness of the opposition members is a determinant of pre-electoral opposition coordination. Regarding opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes, variation does not only come from the ideological polarization among the members of opposition, but it also comes from the ideological polarization between the opposition members and the incumbent party.

Essentially, due to the structure of the presidential elections, it is more likely to observe opposition coordination since bargaining over the elected president is not possible. In parliamentary elections, possibility of bargaining in the post-election period stays as an option since in the post-election period, policy implementation will still be a content of the opposition politics. Kellam (2017) questions how the contribution into an opposition coalition building process in presidential systems functions by emphasizing that the possibility of the elected presidents is constrained

by pre-electoral alliances. In this regard, analyzing the question of "Does different government systems affect opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes?" becomes an essential necessity in the context of non-democratic regimes. Beyond the bargaining issue, there is another concern which also requires a detailed examination of this question. The concern is that the endogenous structure of political institutions poses a problem to the stated question above because capacity of the authoritarian regimes tends to allow switching between different types of government systems.

Haugbølle and Cavatorta (2011) focus on a case study and conclude that the previous attempts of opposition coordination affected the way opposition coordination took place in Tunisia. In this study, cooperation is treated as a repeated interaction within the members of opposition parties. The authors argue that the intra-opposition competition during the post-coordination period makes the upcoming pre-electoral coordination among the opposition parties of Tunisia harder since previous negative experience of intra-competition of opposition decreases the possibility of a recent deliberation over pre-electoral processes. Hence, electoral turnover is less likely in Tunisian case as the opposition gets familiar with the post-coordination failures.

All in all, the literature on opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes mostly concentrates on factors such as opposition parties having distinctive policy preferences with respect to the government party, perceptions of the members of opposition parties on electoral success, repression in electoral processes, electoral rules, government systems, and ideological dispersion with respect to the incumbent party. These are founded as the main determinants of opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes. Regarding the perception of economic performance of the incumbent party and election type, there is no agreement in the literature. Hence, testing the impacts of economic performance and election type on the probability of observing opposition coordination indicates a substantial meaning to the present puzzle in the literature. It is also crucial to note that the role of mass mobilization on pre-electoral opposition coordination is not referred in the current literature. However, factors named as the determinants of opposition coordination need to be reframed so that causal mechanisms on the determinants of opposition coordination become critical to investigate. In this context, the next chapter will first provide the scholarly studies on the relationship between popular protests and democratization. Then, I build my main arguments on the effect of popular protests on pre-electoral opposition coordination in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes.

3. THEORY & EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Svolik (2012) emphasizes that popular dissatisfactions with the authoritarian regime are a threat to its survival. However, those threats do not always trigger democratization. To be able to analyze under which circumstances popular dissatisfactions with the regime lead to democratization, causal mechanisms need to be analyzed. The following section first presents how protests lead to democratization. Moreover, in the proceeding parts of this thesis, the relationship between popular protests and opposition coordination will be analyzed based on the causal mechanisms that are informed by the literature on popular protests and democratization.

3.1 Role of Public Protests on Democratization

As I emphasize in the previous chapter, achieving opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes is hard since opposition parties also need to deal with the authoritarian politics that introduces *a menu of manipulations* (Schedler 2002). The same hardship persists for the emergence of popular mobilizations. According to Hellmeier and Weidmann (2020), cost of collective actions is increased by autocratic leaders who need to avoid popular mobilizations. Otherwise, consolidation of its political power will be at stake.

A demand from below received enormous attention when the causal mechanisms of democratization are explained. The first framework regarding the effect of protests on democratization rests on the idea of protests being a *spontaneous movement from below* as Linz and Stepan (1996), and Bunce and Wolchik (2006) treat. The argument in this camp is about "the citizens being the pivotal actors in non-democratic settings" (Marino, Donni, Bavetta, and Cellini, 2020, 1), and process of democratization happens with popular movements. It means that it actually happens with the desires of individual actors. But why? Mechanisms leading to democratization

need to be unpacked in this context.

Essentially, protests in the Eastern European case lead to democratization but not through the electoral processes. In other words, protests can also lead to democratization even though elections do not take place. However, framing on protests in the context of non-electoral means will not provide insights on the main purpose of this thesis since the primary concern of this thesis is pre-electoral opposition coordination and its determinants. On the other hand, it is essential to note such instances of democratization.

The scholarly literature on the relationship between protests and democratization firstly relies on the existence of electoral repression. According to Sato and Wahman (2019), protests in electoral authoritarian regimes can decrease the frequency of electoral manipulations with de-facto supervision of protestors over the electoral processes. In other words, the electoral manipulations are minimized by de-facto checks of protests on the electoral manipulations, and electoral turnovers are likely to be obtained by popular mobilizations as the authors indicate. According to Sato and Wahman (2019), and Bunce and Wolchik (2010), protests increase the cost of the electoral manipulation by publicizing any kind of electoral fraud and damaging the legitimacy of the leader. In competitive authoritarian regimes, the supervision of protestors limits the electoral fraud and is more likely to lead to democratic developments. Hence, reactions of protestors to obvious electoral manipulations in competitive authoritarian regimes increase the vertical threat to the authoritarian survival and tend to lead to democratization. Moreover, as Collier (1999) argues, democratic transitions can also be initiated by political mobilization since political mobilization creates intra-elite split and weakens the present political power of the regime.

On the other hand, Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) state that electoral turnovers, which can be a result of the de-facto supervision of protesters over the electoral manipulations, do not always lead to democratization. Rather, they just result in democratic improvements. If these electoral turnovers are not supported by rule of law, developed culture of political competition, and power alternation, they just end up with democratic stagnation but not with democratization. The authors argue that prerequisites of democratization are not restricted to elections and hence, protests being a pushing factor to avoid the electoral manipulations are not enough for triggering democratization. In this vein, there are contradictory empirical conclusions regarding the role of popular protests on democratization.

Positioning the discussion of protests and democratization with political parties is essential for the main research question of this thesis. Dynamics in mass protests,

which are highly likely to lead to democratization, might also be contingent on political parties and provide insights on the relationship between protests and opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes. In authoritarian regimes, relationship between protests and democratization is also affected by how protests relate to political parties. How political parties create an arena for protests depends on the degree of authoritarianism of the regime. Semenov, Lobanova, and Zavadskaya (2016) argue that political parties based on their level of party institutionalization provide different opportunities to protest movements that already exist. Since the level of party institutionalization is limited in hegemonic authoritarian regimes, it provides less capabilities for the continuation of protests. Additionally, the networks, which are provided by political parties, ease the protestors' supervision of the electoral manipulations and provide alternative channels. In this regard, collective action problem can be moderated by the networks of political parties.

Essentially, theoretical arguments are mostly made in the context of electoral authoritarian regimes. The same causal mechanism does not hold for non-electoral authoritarian regimes. Here, one intervening variable is the frequency of using regime's coercive capacity. Non-electoral authoritarian regimes rely on repression more than electoral authoritarian regimes and manage to control popular protests as Schedler (2013) argues. Hence, control over mass mobilization through the regime's coercive capacity and the use of extensive electoral repression are the two main reasons of deviation from democratization in non-electoral authoritarian regimes.

Marino and her colleagues (2020) theorize on the impact of political protests on the democratization process. While doing so, violent and non-violent protests are differentiated since the authors and the accumulated literature on democratization attribute differential roles to violent and non-violent protests. Attributed opportunity costs to the violent and non-violent forms of political protests lead to different effects on democratization. A violent response of the regime to a peaceful protest signals a certain type of regime characteristic than a response to a violent protest. Moreover, non-violent protests receive higher number of attendees than violent protests due to the reduced cost of participation. Therefore, using a coercive apparatus to suppress a popular protest with many participants is less likely to be observed than with less participants. It demonstrates that the authoritarian regime is contingent on its repressive capacity but has different frequencies of using it to different types of protests. Therefore, the contemporary literature treats the effects of violent and non-violent protests on democratization differently.

Schock (2005), Teorell (2010), Celestino and Gleditsch (2013), and Marino, Donni, Bavetta, and Cellini (2020) conclude that the frequency of violent protests has a

statistically significant and negative effect on democratization. It means that the existence of violent protests such as strikes presents a cost on consolidation of democracy and favors authoritarian backsliding. For the non-violent demonstrations, there is a statistically significant and positive effect on democratization as Marino, Donni, Bavetta, and Cellini (2020), and Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) elaborate.

As reflected above, it is essential to review the relationship between popular protests and democratization from the perspective of political parties and their conditional role because it will provide insights on the relationship between protests and opposition parties in non-democratic regimes. In the next section, I will construct my main argument on the relationship between popular protests and opposition coordination on pre-electoral issues by benefiting from the conditional role of political parties and different types of electoral authoritarian regimes (such as competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes).

3.2 Theory on Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination in Non-Democratic Regimes

The primary purpose of this section is to theorize on the relationship between opposition coordination and protests. Causal mechanisms on the following question will be reflected in the proceeding section: *Why do protests increase the likelihood of opposition coordination on pre-electoral issues in electoral authoritarian regimes?*

3.2.1 How Do Protests Trigger Opposition Coordination on Pre-Electoral Issues in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes?

I offer a theoretical argument on the relationship between protests and opposition coordination in electoral authoritarian regimes. By referring to the puzzle on the lateral and vertical threats of democratization, I argue that the presence of a vertical threat (popular protests) increases the probability of observing a lateral threat (opposition coordination) in electoral authoritarian regimes. *(i.)* Social unrest among the protestors encourages the opposition actors to actively deal with the authoritarian politics, and one way to deal with the authoritarian politics is to avoid opposition

fragmentation in pre-electoral processes. The members of opposition parties in non-democratic regimes find the courage to unite against the authoritarian rule when there is a popular unrest reflected itself in the form of protests. Political actors that constantly deal with the authoritarian rule can easily utilize the popular dissatisfaction with the current regime as an instrument for the emergence of opposition coordination. In short, social unrest among the protestors creates an awareness and incentive among the opposition actors to actively deal with the authoritarian politics and results in experience of dealing with *the menu of manipulations*.

The members of opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes also find the courage to unite against the authoritarian rule when there is a popular unrest reflected itself in the form of protests because opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes also have an objective to maximize their vote shares as rational actors will do. However, they know that electoral turnover in authoritarian regimes is harder to achieve by themselves. In the light of this awareness, *(ii.)* the members of the opposition parties try to appeal to a population whose dissatisfaction with the regime is already active and increase the possibility that dissatisfaction with the regime becomes more vocal. To be able to benefit from the dissatisfaction, the opposition in electoral authoritarian regimes is generally open to hear new strategies on getting away with the incumbent party. When various actors among the opposition approach to the attendees of protests with the desire to attract their votes and to make their dissatisfactions more vocal, they can commonly agree on the need to unite as the camp of opposition in electoral authoritarian regimes. In short, to be able to benefit from the dissatisfaction and increase their vote shares, the opposition in electoral authoritarian regimes is generally open to hear new strategies on getting away with the incumbent party and making the dissatisfaction more vocal.

The presence of a lateral threat increases as a vertical threat is observed since *(iii.)* absence of a main coordinator in popular protests can be balanced by the existence of a political support of various opposition actors to the protest movements. Hence, opposition coordination can easily be created by promising to satisfy the demands of the protestors and by indicating that opposition coordination in the upcoming election is needed to actualize all these demands. In such kind of a case, non-existence of a pivotal actor among the protestors highlights the role of oppositional actors. In other words, promise to satisfy the demands of the protestors does not become meaningless if there are united oppositional actors that act as a pivotal player. In this regard, pre-electoral opposition coordination over a protest has a two-way linkage: The protestors need the existence of a pivotal actor for transformation of their unrest with the current political regime, but the members of opposition in non-democratic regimes also need a group of people whose cleavage of democracy

is active and supported by the existence of opposition coordination. Hence, non-existence of a pivotal actor reinforces the existing attributes to both sides by creating a mutual dependence between the protestors and the members of opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes. Thus, the third theoretical component creates a suitable political environment in which pre-electoral opposition coordination over protests can emerge.

In short, simultaneous combination of all these three theoretical frameworks pushes the members of opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes to unite based on a popular dissatisfaction and to reflect this unity in the upcoming election.

As previously noted, the defacto supervision of electoral processes by protestors plays a crucial role in explaining how protests lead to pre-electoral opposition coordination. Hence, this supervision needs to receive enormous attention in hegemonic authoritarian regimes because the magnitude of electoral repression in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is broader than the magnitude of electoral repression in competitive authoritarian regimes. Secondly, the ultimate concern of the opposition parties in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is to avoid authoritarian consolidation since the incumbent party in hegemonic authoritarian regimes has more extensive political capabilities than the incumbent party in competitive authoritarian regimes. Hence, opposition parties in hegemonic authoritarian regimes are more concentrated on the characteristic of the political regime since *the menu of manipulation* becomes easy to implement for the incumbent party and is more likely to lead to a consolidated authoritarian regime. When the present alternatives in the political settings are already limited, *a demand from below* becomes critical as it is the ultimate way to get out of the authoritarian survival. Otherwise, *a demand from below* in competitive authoritarian regimes is not the last call for democratic improvements since the available actions are not completely restricted when it is compared to hegemonic authoritarian regimes. Therefore, while theorizing on the relationship between popular protests and pre-electoral opposition coordination, there is an essential need to distinguish between different types of electoral authoritarian regimes (such as competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes).

As stated previously, opposition politics in electoral authoritarian regimes comes with a cost on the members of opposition parties due to the nature of authoritarian politics which pushes the political actors to deal with the 'menu of manipulation' as Schedler (2002) puts forward. Hence, opposition coordination on pre-electoral issues is hard to achieve without the presence of a pressure from below. In this context, the first hypothesis of this thesis can be stated as such;

Hypothesis 1: In electoral authoritarian regimes, the probability of pre-electoral op-

position coordination increases as the number of protests increases.

As it is clearly indicated, expectations on pre-electoral opposition coordination needs to be differentiated when competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes are analyzed. Hence, first sub-hypothesis of this thesis can be stated as such;

Hypothesis 1a: The probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination increases as the number of protests increases, and the effect of protests is larger in hegemonic authoritarian regimes than competitive authoritarian regimes.

After exploring the general theory on the relationship between popular protests and pre-electoral opposition coordination in electoral authoritarian regimes, showing why protests need to be differentiated as violent and non-violent forms when opposition coordination is analyzed is crucial.

3.2.2 Differential Roles of Violent and Non-Violent Protests in Non-Democratic Regimes:

The role of violent protests on opposition coordination needs to be theorized differently than the role of non-violent protests on opposition coordination since the causal mechanisms leading to opposition coordination in both scenarios are different. According to LeBas (2013), *a demand from below* increases the cost of cooperation among political actors when it violently expresses itself.

As Bunce and Wolchik (2006), and Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) argue, different opportunity costs are attributed to violent and non-violent protests. As stated in the literature review on the relationship between protests and democratization, the opportunity costs of violent and non-violent protests affect the causal association of protests with the democratization process. As previously noted, the attributed costs to violent protests are associated with their expertise in violence. Therefore, it is highly costly to build the process of democratization on the basis of a violent protest in a non-democratic regime. The similar causal mechanism also holds for opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes. It can be theorized in this framework that initiating opposition coordination over violent protests creates a cost on post-coordination period. In this vein, contributors of the coordination need to appeal to the same group that previously used violent methods in their protests since their unrests will be transferred to the political arena. In this regard, engaging with the same social group on the basis of a common agreement on violent tactics is likely to pose a threat for the nature of the opposition coordination. Just to repeat,

approval of a violent tactic and coordination over a violent content risk the survival of opposition coordination and hence, the members of opposition parties in non-democratic regimes are not likely to be triggered by violent public demonstrations. However, the survival of opposition coordination triggered by non-violent protests does not receive the same threat since the expertise of these social events is not in violence.

In short, nature and methods of the protests affect the political opportunity structure available to the political environment and hence, to the members of opposition parties through the impact over opposition coordination. There is an essential need to distinguish between violent and non-violent protests. This differentiation poses a critical aspect on the first hypothesis provided above. In this regard, violent protests are not supposed to be social movements that increase the likelihood of opposition coordination on pre-electoral processes since the theoretical arguments made above require approval of various actors. In other words, opposition coordination requires approval of various actors within the opposition, and coordination on a violent substance is not likely to be observed due to unlikeliness of commonly approval of violence. In this context, the second hypothesis of this thesis can be stated as such;

Hypothesis 2: In electoral authoritarian regimes, the probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination decreases as the number of violent protests increases.

As indicated above, expectations on pre-electoral opposition coordination are different when competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes are studied. Hence, second sub-hypothesis of this thesis can be stated as such;

Hypothesis 2a: The probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination decreases as the number of violent protests increases, and the effect of violent protests is smaller in hegemonic authoritarian regimes than competitive authoritarian regimes.

Non-violent protests that can be framed as *a peaceful demand from below* create a content on which the members of opposition parties can commonly agree due to all three theoretical basis stated above. Even though the contents of non-violent protests may not be approved by various opposition actors, the way these contents are demonstrated is more likely to be approved by various opposition actors since it does not include violence as a substance. As a result, pre-electoral opposition coordination is more likely to exist. In this context, the third (sub-) hypothesis of this thesis can be stated as such;

Hypothesis 3: In electoral authoritarian regimes, the probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination increases as the number of non-violent protests increases.

Hypothesis 3a: The probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination increases as the number of non-violent protests increases, and the effect of non-violent protests is larger in hegemonic authoritarian regimes than competitive authoritarian regimes.

Lastly on the main theoretical arguments of this thesis, persistence of public protests measured by the multiplication of the number of protests and the protest days is also expected to increase the likelihood of opposition coordination on pre-electoral issues. The persistency of protests signals to the members of opposition parties that the pressure from below is quite stable and creates an area on which the agreement of various partners of opposition is possible. Hence, the last (sub-) hypothesis of this thesis can be stated as such;

Hypothesis 4: In electoral authoritarian regimes, the probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination increases as the persistency of protests increases.

Hypothesis 4a: The probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination increases as persistency of protests increases, and the effect of protests is larger in hegemonic authoritarian regimes than competitive authoritarian regimes.

In short, the hypothesized causal associations between opposition coordination and protests are based on three points; encouragement of the realization of social unrest among the protestors, efforts of opposition parties to appeal to a population whose dissatisfaction with the regime is already active and to make the dissatisfaction with the regime more vocal, and absence of a main coordinator in popular protests. In the proceeding sub-sections, research design and empirical findings on the related hypotheses will be presented in a consistent manner.

3.3 Research Design

In this section, I will describe the structure of data and, the dependent and independent variables of this thesis. Probit models are employed in the empirical analyses, and the unit of analysis is country-election year. Cross sectional time series (CSTS) data are employed, and the sample is shaped based on the data available for the dependent variable. Howard and Roessler (2006) release data on pre-electoral opposition coordination for 50 observations. For the extension of coding of Howard and Roessler (2006), Donno (2013) relies on LexisNexis database. Following the same coding criteria with Howard and Roessler (2006), Donno (2013) extends the obser-

vations to 670. Among 670 observations, I select my unrestricted sample, which is composed of 156 observations, based on regimes that are coded as competitive or hegemonic authoritarian regimes. When the main independent variables are added to the model specifications, my effective and restricted sample includes 97 observations.

The dependent variable of this thesis, opposition coordination, is coded as 1 if the members of opposition parties coordinated on "a formal coalition on the ballot", "united oppositional candidate in presidential elections", or "campaigning together". The demarcation point to the question of *"Who is a prominent contributor to opposition coordination?"* is the following: It is stated that "Coalitions of small parties which exclude one or more large opposition parties are not coded as coalitions; conversely, a case is coded as a coalition if it includes all major opposition parties even if one or more minor parties do not join in." (Donno 2013, 716). In this vein, essential point in the coding procedure of opposition coordination is contributions of the main actors since coordination of minor actors will not indicate a lateral threat to the survival of authoritarian regimes.

The independent variables related to the main hypotheses proposed in this thesis are *the number of protests*, *the number of violent and non-violent protests*, and *the persistancy of protests*. For the several measures of protests, Mass Mobilization Protest Data are used. The data include every protest event in which there are minimum 50 participants with the discourse that directly targets the government. Even though the data include many observations, I do not build on the complete sample provided by Mass Mobilization Protest Data. As mentioned earlier, observations taken from Mass Mobilization Project Data are included in my restricted sample based on the sample selection process of having a competitive or hegemonic authoritarian regime.

The independent variable called *the number of protests* is a measure of the sum of all protests (both violent and non-violent protests) that occurred one-year prior to the election date. The same measurements are applied for the other measures of protests. *The number of violent (non-violent) protests* sums all violent (non-violent) protests that also occurred one-year prior to the election date. With the last measure on protests, the intention is to capture *the persistency of protests* which is a multiplication of the protests days (duration) and the number of protests. This measure is also adjusted for the timing of the election. The reason for one-year rule in the measurement of various types of protests is that the existence of opposition coordination may trigger mass protests after the election date, and this is not the measurement I want to seek in this thesis. Hence, one-year rule in these measurements is applied. Additionally, all the main independent variables are included in

the model specification with the logarithm function *(ln)* since there is no theoretical differentiation between the higher values of all measurements of protests.

Control variables employed in this thesis are mostly informed by the previous literature on opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes. Firstly, regime characteristics as being competitive or hegemonic is highly likely to provide different opportunities to opposition parties and create conditionality on the relationship between protests and pre-electoral opposition coordination. Hence, regime characteristics (being a competitive or hegemonic authoritarian regime) is controlled in the empirical analysis. The variable called HAR is a dummy variable created by Donno (2013) and takes 1 if the regime is hegemonic authoritarian regime and 0 if the regime is competitive authoritarian regime.

Essentially, the effect of electoral systems on pre-electoral opposition coordination is also controlled with the inclusion of a dummy variable of proportional representation. The variable is provided in *Database of Political Institutions* by Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini (2016). It takes the value of 1 if the electoral system is proportional representation and 0 if the electoral system is plurality or mixed system. Moreover, previous vote share of the government party, which is another control variable in the model specification, is also provided by this dataset. However, missing observations on vote shares are mainly obtained from the prominent websites[1] of political science. In addition to the type of electoral systems, the effect of government systems is also controlled by inclusion of a dummy variable of presidential system in the model specification. The dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the government system is presidential and 0 otherwise.

For the other control variables regarding the party system fragmentation and ideological dispersion, *Database of Political Institutions* by Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini (2016) is also employed. The data provide information on votes shares of political parties and their ideological positions, and they are used in the empirical analyses. For the party fragmentation measure on vote shares, Laakso and Taagepera (1979)'s measure is employed. Moreover, I create the ideological dispersion measure with certain nuances. As previously stated in the literature review section of this thesis, the real rule setter in non-democratic regimes is the incumbent party. Hence, politics among the opposition in non-democratic regimes is not independent from the incumbent party because of its agenda setting power. Ideological dispersion with respect to the incumbent party is one of the determinants of pre-electoral opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes and hence, included in the model

[1] Missing observations on vote shares of political parties are coded based on information available from the prominent websites such as A. Carr's Election Archive, African Election Database, Election Guide, and Trans-Saharan Election Project.

specification below.

As Gandhi and Reuter (2013) argue that electoral repression is one of the main reasons of opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes. In this vein, Clean Elections Index, which takes values between 0 and 1, is included as a control variable in the model specification below. It is an index provided by *Varieties of Democracy* to measure the level of free and fair elections in a given country and a given year. The index is created based on several criteria. Electoral frauds and violence, systemic unfairness by the incumbent party, and vote buying are the main factors considered in this measure. Civil society repression is another control variable included in the model that intends to measure to what extend civil society organizations are repressed by the government party. The measure is again provided by *Varieties of Democracy.*

Autonomy of opposition parties is another control variable and a measure provided by *Varieties of Democracy.* It accounts for the independence of opposition parties from the ruling actors. The lower values of the variable indicate lower levels of autonomy of opposition parties, and the higher values indicate higher levels of autonomy. Previous year's GDP per capita and GDP growth rate are the other factors controlled in the empirical analysis, and the measures are again provided by *Varieties of Democracy.* Lastly, duration of the current regime, which is a measure provided in the *Authoritarian Regimes Dataset* by Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013), measures the total years during which the incumbent party has stayed in power. It is included in the empirical analysis since years spent as the incumbent party pose an essential insights on opportunities available to the members of opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes.

The following model specification for the empirical analysis in the proceeding section is used;

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\text{Opposition Coordination}_t = \beta_0 + \\
&\beta_1 \text{ ln (The Main Independent Variables on Protests)}_{t-1} + \\
&\beta_2 \text{ ln (The Main Independent Variables on Protests)}_{t-1} \times HAR + \\
&\beta_3 \text{ HAR (Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime)} + \\
&\beta_4 \text{ Proportional Representation}_t + \\
&\beta_5 \text{ Previous Vote Share of the Largest Government Party} + \\
&\beta_6 \text{ Party System Fragmentation} + \\
&\beta_7 \text{ Ideological Dispersion w.r.t the Largest Government Party} + \\
&\beta_8 \text{ Clean Elections}_{t-1} + \\
&\beta_9 \text{ Presidential System} + \\
&\beta_{10} \text{ Civil Society Repression}_{t-1} +
\end{aligned}
$$

β_{11} GDPpc$_{t-1}$ +
β_{12} GDP Growth$_{t-1}$ +
β_{13} Duration of Current Regime +
β_{14} Autonomy of the Opposition Parties$_{t-1}$ + e

For the main independent variables on protests, measurements such as *the number of protests*, *the number of violent protests*, *the number of non-violent protests*, and *the persistency of protests* are employed. In the next section, empirical analysis on the determinants of opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes will be presented.

3.4 Empirical Findings

All models are estimated with probit regressions using robust standard errors clustered by countries. In Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the independent variables informed by the previous literature on opposition coordination are included as well as the independent variables on protests. The unrestricted sample on Model 1 in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 includes 156 observations with 54 country clusters and from years between 1990 and 2007. The restricted sample on the other models in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 includes 97 observations with 42 country clusters. The reason why it is a restricted sample depicts from missing observations of the main independent variables on protests.

Before focusing on the main hypotheses proposed in this thesis, I will present the empirical findings on the control variables. The empirical findings reached based on the restricted sample support some of the proposed arguments in the literature on pre-electoral opposition coordination. In Figure A.9, the predicted probabilities are estimated based on Model 5 in Table 3.2. As the previous elections get cleaner, the predicted probability of opposition coordination slightly increases. Essentially, this increase is substantially important for the higher values of the Clean Elections Index.

Duration of the current regime plays an essential role in the determinants of opposition coordination. Figure A.10 is estimated based on Model 5 in Table 3.2 and represents the predicted probability of observing opposition coordination across the range of the duration of current regimes. The predicted probability of opposition coordination decreases as the duration of current regime increases in its in-sample range, and this is in line with the empirical findings reached in the literature on

opposition coordination. Moreover, the duration of current regimes is also substantively significant when the magnitudes of the predicted probabilities in Figure A.10 are considered. Predicted probability of opposition coordination in electoral authoritarian regimes slightly increases as the level of autonomy of opposition parties increases. However, this is not substantially significant since the magnitude of the probability is quite low as it can be seen from Figure A.11. In Figure A.12, the predicted probabilities are also estimated based on Model 5 in Table 3.2. As the previous vote share of the government party increases, the predicted probability of observing opposition coordination slightly decreases.

Additionally, lagged measure of GDP per capita seems to be a statistically significant determinant of opposition coordination when tested with the unrestricted sample. However, the same arguments do not find a statistically significant support when they are tested with the restricted sample. To note, the reason why this is a restricted sample causes from the missing observations of the main independent variables in the unrestricted sample. Moreover, economic growth, government type, and electoral rule are also not a statistically significant determinants of opposition coordination with both restricted and unrestricted samples.

Besides the arguments on protests, another essential implication of this thesis relies on the relationship between the incumbent and opposition parties. As previously stated in the literature review section, the real rule setter in non-democratic regimes is the incumbent party. Hence, politics among the opposition in non-democratic regimes is not independent from the incumbent party because of its agenda setting power. However, actions available to opposition parties do not totally depend on features and objectives of the government party since coordination requires contribution of various members of opposition parties. As one can see from the unrestricted and restricted samples in Table 3.2, the variables on the party system fragmentation (with respect to vote shares) and ideological polarization are not a determinant of probability of observing pre-electoral opposition coordination in electoral authoritarian regimes.

Here, there is an unexpected empirical finding considering the literature on opposition coordination when compared to the empirical findings of this thesis. Wahman (2011) argue that the members of opposition parties, which have ideological distance to the incumbent party, are more likely to coordinate on pre-electoral processes. I do not find any statistical evidence in favor of this argument. This finding is also applicable for the party system fragmentation. In the literature on opposition coordination in electoral authoritarian regimes, there was no agreed accumulated finding on the effect of the party system fragmentation on the predicted probability of ob-

serving opposition coordination, but I find no statistically significant effect of the party system fragmentation on the probability of observing opposition coordination.

After interpreting the effects of the control variables on the predicted probability of observing pre-electoral opposition coordination, I will focus more on the main independent variables and their statistical effects on the dependent variable. For each independent variable, the predicted probabilities of observing pre-electoral opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes will be showed. Moreover, marginal effects of these independent variables will be interpreted by referring to their substantial significance.

Table 3.1 Multivariate Probit Regressions on Opposition Coordination (I)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln(Protests)			0.498*			
			(0.288)			
ln(Violent Protests)				-0.227		
				(0.225)		
ln(Non-Violent Protests)					0.667***	
					(0.195)	
In(Persistency of Protests)						0.200*
						(0.112)
HAR	0.301	0.727	0.907*	0.661	1.003*	0.836*
	(0.313)	(0.457)	(0.492)	(0.454)	(0.532)	(0.478)
Proportional Representation	-0.295	-0.426	-0.610	-0.427	-0.822	-0.590
	(0.279)	(0.448)	(0.562)	(0.422)	(0.578)	(0.543)
Previous Vote Share of the Largest Govern. P.	-0.827	-1.360	-1.498	-1.418	-1.666*	-1.266
	(0.590)	(0.925)	(0.931)	(0.922)	(0.955)	(0.882)
Fragmented Party System (based on Pre. Vote Share)	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ideological Dispersion wrt Largest Govern. P.	-0.037	-0.120	-0.117	-0.138	-0.150	-0.111
	(0.100)	(0.134)	(0.155)	(0.125)	(0.162)	(0.149)
Clean Elections Index $_{t-1}$	0.061	1.999	2.144	2.285*	2.930*	2.146
	(0.797)	(1.409)	(1.606)	(1.281)	(1.600)	(1.582)
Presidential System	-0.279	-0.937**	-1.008**	-1.082***	-1.295***	-0.957**
	(0.269)	(0.367)	(0.419)	(0.377)	(0.472)	(0.402)
Civil Society Repression $_{t-1}$	-0.392**	-0.696***	-0.696***	-0.750***	-0.890***	-0.666***
	(0.170)	(0.173)	(0.211)	(0.165)	(0.231)	(0.207)
GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP Growth $_{t-1}$	-0.304	2.849	4.348*	2.941	5.719**	3.868*
	(1.531)	(2.260)	(2.273)	(2.274)	(2.385)	(2.280)
Duration of Current Regime	-0.043***	-0.054***	-0.056***	-0.063***	-0.075***	-0.056***
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Autonomy of Opposition Parties $_{t-1}$	0.327**	0.351*	0.399*	0.337	0.462**	0.383*
	(0.152)	(0.208)	(0.212)	(0.209)	(0.197)	(0.211)
Constant	0.515	0.798	-0.162	1.267	0.229	-0.114
	(0.595)	(0.845)	(1.037)	(0.910)	(0.832)	(0.967)
N	156	97	97	97	97	97
$PseudoR^2$	0.165	0.306	0.336	0.315	0.378	0.333
Log-likelihood	-64.969	-32.304	-30.895	-31.862	-28.963	-31.061
AIC	155.937	90.609	89.790	91.725	85.926	90.123
BIC	195.586	124.080	125.836	127.771	121.972	126.169

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.2 Multivariate Probit Regressions on Opposition Coordination (II)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln(Protests)			0.046			
			(0.320)			
HAR × ln(Protests)			1.343***			
			(0.489)			
ln(Violent Protests)				-0.123		
				(0.359)		
HAR × ln(Violent Protests)				-0.246		
				(0.470)		
ln(Non-Violent Protests)					0.271	
					(0.249)	
HAR × ln(Non-Violent Protests)					0.980**	
					(0.404)	
In(Persistency of Protests)						0.085
						(0.120)
HAR × In(Persistency of Protests)						0.312
						(0.191)
HAR	0.301	0.727	-1.689	0.890	-0.445	-0.402
	(0.313)	(0.457)	(1.117)	(0.592)	(0.882)	(0.969)
Proportional Representation	-0.295	-0.426	-0.754	-0.412	-0.889	-0.676
	(0.279)	(0.448)	(0.660)	(0.422)	(0.599)	(0.593)
Previous Vote Share of the Largest Govern. P.	-0.827	-1.360	-1.529	-1.485	-1.701	-1.184
	(0.590)	(0.925)	(0.950)	(0.939)	(1.073)	(0.926)
Fragmented Party System (based on Pre. Vote Share)	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ideological Dispersion wrt Largest Govern. P.	-0.037	-0.120	-0.127	-0.111	-0.067	-0.128
	(0.100)	(0.134)	(0.174)	(0.137)	(0.168)	(0.161)
Clean Elections Index $_{t-1}$	0.061	1.999	2.092	2.489*	3.237*	2.209
	(0.797)	(1.409)	(1.813)	(1.286)	(1.657)	(1.689)
Presidential System	-0.279	-0.937**	-1.281***	-1.080***	-1.290***	-1.055***
	(0.269)	(0.367)	(0.423)	(0.385)	(0.498)	(0.394)
Civil Society Repression $_{t-1}$	-0.392**	-0.696***	-0.719***	-0.753***	-0.954***	-0.664***
	(0.170)	(0.173)	(0.247)	(0.170)	(0.258)	(0.222)
GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP Growth $_{t-1}$	-0.304	2.849	5.689**	3.191	7.079***	4.310*
	(1.531)	(2.260)	(2.439)	(2.308)	(2.681)	(2.274)
Duration of Current Regime	-0.043***	-0.054***	-0.062***	-0.066***	-0.088***	-0.061***
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.012)
Autonomy of Opposition Parties $_{t-1}$	0.327**	0.351*	0.597**	0.277	0.477**	0.445**
	(0.152)	(0.208)	(0.243)	(0.232)	(0.190)	(0.221)
Constant	0.515	0.798	0.843	1.209	0.825	0.381
	(0.595)	(0.845)	(1.001)	(0.996)	(0.959)	(0.900)
N	156	97	97	97	97	97
$PseudoR^2$	0.165	0.306	0.384	0.318	0.417	0.348
Log-likelihood	-64.969	-32.304	-28.678	-31.751	-27.149	-30.360
AIC	155.937	90.609	87.356	93.502	84.297	90.720
BIC	195.586	124.080	125.977	132.123	122.918	129.341

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

To empirically test the hypotheses indicated in the theory section of this thesis, measurements on protests are separately included in the model specifications, and the number of observations is dropped with the inclusion of these variables. In

Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the restricted sample includes 97 observations with 42 country clusters that adjust for the standard errors associated with parameters. To note, the main independent variables on protests are employed with the logarithm function in all empirical models, predicted probabilities, and average marginal effects. However, I plugged-in the non-transformed values for all the main independent variables on protest in the x-labels of all figures below.

In Table 3.1, present model specifications are included without the interaction terms of the main independent variables and hegemonic authoritarian regime. As the coefficient estimates of the main independent variables on protests indicate, there are empirical supports for the *Hypotheses (1), (3), and (4).* The coefficient estimates of *In(Protests)* and *In (Persistency of Protests)* are statistically significant at 90% confidence level. Essentially, the coefficient estimate of *In(Non-Violent Protests)* is statistically significant at 99% confidence level and provides an empirical support in favor of the *Hypothesis (3).* As previously noted, the method of non-violent protests provides a substantial significance to the relationship between pre-electoral opposition coordination and protests. Lastly, I do not find an empirical support in favor of the *Hypothesis (2)* as the coefficient estimate of *In(Violent Protests)* is not statistically significant.

Figure 3.1 Predicted Probability of Observing Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Competitive and Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes (I)



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities.

Regarding the sub-hypotheses, Figure 3.1 indicates the predicted probability of observing pre-electoral opposition coordination in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes across the in-sample range of the logarithm of the number of protests. The predicted probabilities in Figure 3.2 are estimated based on Model 3 in Table 3.2. While calculating the predicted probabilities, all other covariates of Model 3 in Table 3.2 are set to their representative moments. For instance, if the variable is a categorical variable, it is set to its median value. If the variable is a continuous one, it is set to its mean value. In a ceteris paribus condition, the predicted probability of observing opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes non-linearly increases as the logarithm of the number of protests increases. On the other hand, there is no increase in the predicted probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination in competitive authoritarian regimes as the logarithm of the number of protests increases. Therefore, I find an empirical support in favor of the *Hypothesis (1a)* stated in the theory section of this thesis. Across the range of the number of protests, the predicted probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is larger than the predicted probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination in competitive authoritarian regimes as it can be seen from Figure 3.2.

Moreover, Figure A.5 demonstrates the marginal effect of the logarithm of the number of protests on opposition coordination in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes with an overlaid histogram of the number of protests in its effective sample. The predicted marginal effects in Figure A.5 are estimated based on Model 3 in Table 3.1 which does not include the interaction term of the logarithm of the number of protests and hegemonic authoritarian regime. Other control variables are set to their representative moments to be able to satisfy the ceteris paribus condition for the average marginal effects. The average marginal effect of the logarithm of the number of protests on opposition coordination in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes is positive but not statistically significant at any value of the number of protests. In other words, the marginal effect of the logarithm of the number of protests on opposition coordination is not statistically significant, and I do not find an empirical support in favor of the *Hypothesis (1a)* when the interaction term of the logarithm of the number of protests and hegemonic authoritarian regime is not included in the model specification as in Table 3.1.

However, empirical findings differ when the interaction term of the logarithm of the number of protests and hegemonic authoritarian regime is included in the model as in Table 3.2. In a ceteris paribus condition, the marginal effect of the logarithm of the number of protests on opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is not statistically significant for the lower values of the number of protests.

It becomes statistically significant when the number of protests prior to the election date is 5 or more. Moreover, the marginal effect first shows an increasing and then a decreasing pattern for the higher values of the number of protests. In other words, the marginal effect of the logarithm of the number of protests on opposition coordination is positive and decreases in magnitude across the in-sample range of the independent variable when the number of protests is at its higher values (such as between 12 and 32). One reason for this, as the number of protests increases, the act of protest gets normalized, and the opposition parties are less likely to treat these social events as a one-time political opportunity in which coordination is possible. Marginal effects of the number of protests on pre-electoral opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes are also substantially significant when their magnitudes are considered. For competitive authoritarian regimes, the marginal effects are not statistically significant for any value of the logarithm of the number of protests.

Figure 3.2 Marginal Effect of ln (# of Protests) on Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Competitive and Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effects.

Considering the distinctive meanings of violent and non-violent protests, there is an essential need to analyze them separately. Figure 3.3 indicates the predicted probability of observing pre-electoral opposition coordination in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes across the in-sample range of the logarithm of the

number of violent protests. The predicted probabilities in Figure 3.3 are estimated based on Model 4 in Table 3.2. In a ceteris paribus condition where all other covariates are set to their representative moments, the predicted probability of observing pre-electoral opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes decreases as the logarithm of the number of violent protests increases but stays constant for competitive authoritarian regimes. Across the range of the number of violent protests, the predicted probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is higher than the predicted probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination in competitive authoritarian regimes as it can be seen from Figure 3.3. However, the average marginal effects of the number of violent protests on opposition coordination are not statistically and substantially significant across in-sample range of the independent variable as it can be seen in Figure 3.4. Moreover, Figure A.6, which is estimated based on Model 4 in Table 3.1, also shows that *Hypothesis (2a)* is not empirically supported. The average marginal effect of the logarithm of the number of violent protests on opposition coordination is negative but not statistically significant at any value of the number of violent protests.

Figure 3.3 Predicted Probability of Observing Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Competitive and Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes (II)



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities.

Figure 3.4 Marginal Effect of ln (# of Violent Protests) on Opposition Coordination in Non-Democratic Regimes | Competitive and Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effects.

In short, empirical findings on the number of violent protests demonstrate that there is no statistically significant effect of violent protests on pre-electoral opposition coordination. Therefore, I do not find an empirical support in favor of the *Hypotheses (2)* and *(2a)*. Here, theoretical explanation can be made in the following form: Substance of violent protests does not establish a ground on which the members of opposition parties can commonly agree since violence is not an appropriate political tool to be defended and agreed by various oppositional actors.

Figure 3.5 indicates the predicted probability of observing pre-electoral opposition coordination in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes across the in-sample range of the logarithm the number of non-violent protests. The predicted probabilities in Figure 3.5 are estimated based on Model 5 in Table 3.2. While calculating the predicted probabilities, all other covariates from Model 5 in Table 3.2 are set to their representative moments. In a ceteris paribus condition, the predicted probability of observing opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes non-linearly increases as the logarithm of the number of non-violent protests increases whereas the probability stays constant for competitive authoritarian regimes. Hence, I find an empirical support in favor of the *Hypothesis (3a)* since across the range of the number of non-violent protests, the predicted prob-

ability of pre-electoral opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is larger than the predicted probability of pre-electoral opposition coordination in competitive authoritarian regimes as it can be seen from Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5 Predicted Probability of Observing Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Competitive and Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes (III)



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities.

Moreover, Figure A.7 demonstrates the marginal effect of the logarithm of the number of non-violent protests on opposition coordination in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes with an overlaid histogram of the number of non-violent protests in its effective sample. The marginal effects in Figure A.7 are estimated based on Model 5 in Table 3.1. The average marginal effect of the logarithm of the number of non-violent protests on opposition coordination is positive and statistically significant after the number of non-violent protests being equal to 2 in hegemonic authoritarian regimes. It non-linearly increases as the logarithm of the number of non-violent protests increases. For competitive authoritarian regimes, there is not statistically significant effect of the logarithm of the number of non-violent protests. It means that I find an empirical support in favor of the *Hypothesis (3a)*.

Figure 3.6 Marginal Effect of ln (# of Non-Violent Protests) on Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Competitive and Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effects.

Empirical findings on the effect of non-violent protests do not differ when the interaction term of the logarithm of the number of non-violent protests and hegemonic authoritarian regime is included as in Model 5 in Table 3.2. In a ceteris paribus condition, the marginal effect of the logarithm of the number of non-violent protests on opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is not statistically significant for the lower values of the number of non-violent protests. It becomes statistically significant when the number of non-violent protests prior to the election date is 2 or more. Moreover, the marginal effect first shows an increasing pattern, but it demonstrates a decreasing pattern after the number of non-violent protests being 7. In other words, the marginal effect of the logarithm of the number of non-violent protests on opposition coordination is positive and decreases in magnitude across the in-sample range of the independent variable when the number of non-violent protests is at its higher values (such as between 7 and 20). It is possible that as the number of non-violent protests increases, the act of protest gets normalized, and the opposition parties are less likely to treat these social events as a one-time political opportunity in which coordination is possible. Marginal effects of the number of non-violent protests on pre-electoral opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes are also substantially significant when their magnitudes are

considered. As previously noted, substance of the non-violent protests can easily be defended by various opposition actors since not engaging in a violent tool while protesting in a non-democratic regime receives a special attention by politicians. For competitive authoritarian regimes, the marginal effects are not statistically significant for any value of the logarithm of the number of non-violent protests. Therefore, I find an empirical support in favor of the *Hypothesis (3a)*.

Figure 3.7 Predicted Probability of Observing Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Competitive and Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes (VI)



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities.

Lastly on the measurements of protest activity, persistency of protests needs to be considered, and it is a multiplication of the number of protests and the protests days. Figure 3.7 indicates the predicted probability of observing pre-electoral opposition coordination in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes across the in-sample range of the logarithm the persistency of protests. The predicted probabilities in Figure 3.7 are estimated based on Model 6 in Table 3.2. While calculating the predicted probabilities, all other covariates from Model 6 in Table 3.2 are set to their representative moments. In a ceteris paribus condition, the predicted probability of observing opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes non-linearly increases as the logarithm of the persistency of protests increases whereas the probability mostly stays constant for competitive authoritarian regimes.

Moreover, Figure A.8 demonstrates the marginal effect of the logarithm of the persistency of protests on opposition coordination in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes with an overlaid histogram of the persistency of protests in its effective sample. The marginal effects in Figure A.8 are estimated based on Model 6 in Table 3.1 which does not include the interaction term of the logarithm of the persistency of protests and hegemonic authoritarian regime. Figure A.8 is estimated for two different authoritarian regime types, namely competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. In competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes, the marginal effect of the logarithm of the persistency of protests on pre-electoral opposition coordination is positive but not statistically significant at any value of the independent variable. It means that I do not find statistically significant support in favor of the *Hypothesis (4a)* when the interaction term is not included in the model specification.

Figure 3.8 Marginal Effect of ln (Persistency of Protests) on Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Competitive and Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effects.

On the other hand, empirical findings differ when the interaction term is introduced in the model specification as in Table 3.2. In a ceteris paribus condition, the marginal effect of the logarithm of the persistency of protests on opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is not statistically significant for the lower values of the independent variable as Figure 3.8 indicates. It becomes statistically significant when the persistency of protests prior to the election date is 148 or more. Moreover,

the marginal effect first shows an increasing and then a decreasing pattern for the higher values of the persistency of protests. In other words, the marginal effect of the logarithm of the persistency of protests on opposition coordination is positive and decreases in magnitude across the in-sample range of the independent variable when the number of protests is at its higher values. One reason for this, as the number of protests increases, the act of protest gets normalized. For the higher values of the independent variable, marginal effects of the number of protests on pre-electoral opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes are also substantially significant when their magnitudes are considered. For competitive authoritarian regimes, the marginal effects are not statistically significant for any value of the logarithm of the persistency of protests.

For robustness checks of the empirical findings, random effect logistic regressions on pre-electoral opposition coordination in non-democratic regimes are estimated, and the similar statistical results are obtained as it can be seen from Table A.2.

In conclusion, the main hypotheses of this thesis are tested with various model specifications in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Essential insights on the empirical findings can be summarized as such: All three hypotheses on electoral authoritarian regimes find an empirical support whereas the hypothesis on violent protests do not find an empirical support. Moreover, statistical findings are substantially significant for the effect of the number of non-violent protests. Some of the sub-hypotheses also find an empirical support as it can be seen from the figures presented above. Essentially, the number of protests and non-violent protests, and persistency of protests in hegemonic authoritarian regimes increase the probability of opposition coordination whereas they do not increase the probability of opposition coordination in competitive authoritarian regimes.

By transforming a popular unrest, which is directed to the incumbent party, to a cleavage of democracy, making the dissatisfactions more vocal, and highlighting the need for a pivotal actor, popular protests (especially non-violent protests) lead to pre-electoral opposition coordination in hegemonic authoritarian regimes. In other words, empirical findings support the argument that *a vertical threat* triggers *a lateral threat* in hegemonic authoritarian regimes. However, this triggering does not take place when the protests are violent in competitive or hegemonic authoritarian regimes.

4. CONCLUSION

Opposition coordination on pre-electoral matters creates opportunities for electoral turnover of the incumbent party in electoral authoritarian regimes. The literature on democratization has benefitted from the explanations of *a demand from below* and *elite approach*. The two driving factors of democratization are treated as exogenous factors to each other. However, my main purpose in this thesis is to refer to the theoretical gap on the relationship between a vertical threat and a lateral threat to the survival of authoritarianism.

Substantial value of this thesis depicts from its linkage with the democratization literature because if causal mechanisms leading to pre-electoral opposition coordination are underlined, it will help us to understand democratization better. By indicating three theoretical grounds, showing how protests trigger opposition coordination on pre-electoral processes in non-democratic regimes becomes a small but a valuable contribution to the literature on opposition coordination.

The theoretical explanation of the effect of protests on opposition coordination can be stated as such: Encouragement of the members of opposition parties by focusing on social unrest among the protestors, which is caused by a dissatisfaction with the current regime, leads to better mechanisms in dealing with the electoral authoritarian regime and its rule. Opposition parties in non-democratic regimes also have a purpose to maximize their vote shares. However, maximizing vote shares by themselves is quite hard in the context of authoritarian politics as Schedler (2002) indicates. When there is a dissatisfied group of people, opposition parties know where to go if they want to actualize their objective. They do not appeal to this population by themselves since they have an experience on how hard it is to achieve electoral turnover. With the experience of dealing with the mechanisms of authoritarian politics, opposition parties attribute a meaning to the popular protests as a political opportunity in which contributors will benefit by coordinating over it. Moreover, appealing to a population whose dissatisfaction with the current regime is already active increases the possibility that dissatisfaction with the regime becomes more vocal.

Lastly, absence of a primary coordinator in popular protests can be balanced by the existence of a political support of various opposition actors to the protest movements. The protestors need existence of a pivotal actor for transformation of their unrest with the current political regime, but the members of opposition in electoral authoritarian regimes also need a group of people whose cleavage of democracy is active and supported by opposition coordination. Hence, non-existence of a pivotal actor reinforces the existing attributes to both sides by creating a mutual dependence between protestors and the members of opposition parties in non-democratic regimes. In short, basket of all three theoretical grounds separately but simultaneously triggers the opposition to coordinate on pre-electoral issues when the vertical threat to authoritarianism is present.

In the empirical analysis, the findings on the relationship between protests and opposition coordination need a special attention. The effect of various measures of protests in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is founded to be a statistically significant determinant of opposition coordination (except the effect of violent protests). In short, the empirical conclusion of this thesis indicates that the lateral threat in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is more likely to emerge when there is a vertical threat to the authoritarian rule. However, this probability is not likely in competitive authoritarian regimes.

Besides the small contribution to the literature, this thesis also has certain limitations. One of the limitations of this thesis is inability to study the relationship between opposition coordination and protests in the context of the protest magnitude which can be measured by the number of attendees to popular protests. In the Mass Mobilization Protest Data, there is no standardization in terms of coding the number of participants to protests. Hence, this study has limitations on that matter. If the data on the number of attendees to protests are coded, the conclusions derived from this measurement would have implications for the robustness of the hypothesized relationships above.

The other limitation of this study is about factors that I cannot control in cases of the presence of intensive violent protests. In cases where violent protests happen in a frequent way, there may be other factors that are not controlled in the model specification of the empirical analysis. To the extent that it was possible, variables that could simultaneously lead to more protests and make opposition coordination more possible (such as indicators of economic performance and repression) were included in the regression analysis. Still, there could potentially be omitted factors that made both popular protests and opposition coordination possible. Future studies would deal with this possible problem. For further studies, this thesis can easily

be extended by building on these limitations and the association with the process of democratization.

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APPENDIX A

Data Sources Employed for the Empirical Analysis:

For the measure of the dependent variable, *opposition coordination*, replication data provided by Donno (2013)[1] are employed.

For the measures of protest, *Mass Mobilization Protest Data*[2] is used.

The control variables are mainly provided by *Varities of Democracy*[3], *Authoritarian Regime Dataset*[4], and lastly *Database of Political Institutions*[5].

Essentially, the sample in the empirical analysis is selected on the criteria of being a competitive or hegemonic authoritarian regime in the dataset provided by Donno (2013). The effective sample includes Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Paraguay, Peru, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Togo, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe over 17 years (1990-2007).

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Descriptive Statistics & Scatterplots:

Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Restricted Sample

	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Opposition Coordination	0.19	0.39	0	1	97
ln(Protests)	1.88	0.70	0.69	3.50	97
ln(Violent Protests)	0.81	0.81	0	3.14	97
ln(Non-Violent Protests)	1.48	0.87	0	3.04	97
In(Persistency of Protests)	3.58	1.66	0	7.38	97
Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime (HAR)	0.41	0.49	0	1	97
Proportional Representation	0.39	0.49	0	1	97
Previous Vote Share of the Largest Govern. P.	0.64	0.24	0.07	1	97
Fragmented Party System (based on Pre. Vote Share)	1694166.63	9518004.90	0.83	65749720	97
Ideological Dispersion wrt Largest Govern. P.	1.19	1.29	0	3	97
Clean Elections Index $_{t-1}$	0.32	0.19	0	0.87	97
Presidential System	0.79	0.41	0	1	97
Civil Society Repression $_{t-1}$	0.43	0.87	-1.47	2.41	97
GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	5175.30	7625.17	658.00	71115.00	97
GDP Growth $_{t-1}$	0.02	0.10	-0.35	0.33	97
Duration of Current Regime	19.06	9.37	1	47	97
Autonomy of Opposition Parties $_{t-1}$	0.33	0.95	-2.24	2.41	97

Figure A.1 Scatterplot of Opposition Coordination and Total Number of Protests



Note: Figure includes observations from the restricted sample.

Figure A.2 Scatterplot of Opposition Coordination and Total Number of Violent Protests



Note: Figure includes observations from the restricted sample.

Figure A.3 Scatterplot of Opposition Coordination and Total Number of Non-Violent Protests



Note: Figure includes observations from the restricted sample.

Figure A.4 Scatterplot of Opposition Coordination and Persistency of Protests



Note: Figure includes observations from the restricted sample.

Figures:

The following figures (Figure A.5, A.6, A.7, and A.8) are estimated based on models (Model 3, 4, 5, and 6) in Table 3.1.

Figure A.5 Marginal Effect of ln (# of Protests) on Opposition Coordination in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effects.

Figure A.6 Marginal Effect of ln (# of Violent Protests) on Opposition Coordination in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effects.

Figure A.7 Marginal Effect of ln (# of Non-Violent Protests) on Opposition Coordination in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effects.

Figure A.8 Marginal Effect of ln (Persistency of Protests) on Opposition Coordination in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted marginal effects.

Figure A.9 Predicted Probability of Observing Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Clean Elections $_{t-1}$



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities.

Figure A.10 Predicted Probability of Observing Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Duration of Current Regime



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities.

Figure A.11 Predicted Probability of Observing Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Autonomy of Opposition Parties $_{t-1}$



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities.

Figure A.12 Predicted Probability of Observing Pre-Electoral Opposition Coordination | Previous Vote Share of the Government Party



Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities.

For Robustness Checks:

Table A.2 Random Effect Logistic Regressions on Opposition Coordination

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln(Protests)			0.099			
			(0.622)			
HAR × ln(Protests)			2.390***			
			(0.925)			
ln(Violent Protests)				-0.219		
				(0.652)		
HAR × ln(Violent Protests)				-0.393		
				(0.842)		
ln(Non-Violent Protests)					0.487	
					(0.474)	
HAR × ln(Non-Violent Protests)					1.674	
					(2.057)	
In(Persistency of Protests)						0.149
						(0.227)
HAR × In(Persistency of Protests)						0.563
						(0.358)
HAR	0.527	1.226	-2.967	1.487	-0.737	-0.789
	(0.554)	(0.830)	(1.950)	(1.023)	(2.158)	(1.784)
Proportional Representation	-0.512	-0.847	-1.624	-0.784	-1.747	-1.419
	(0.499)	(0.878)	(1.506)	(0.823)	(1.976)	(1.266)
Previous Vote Share of the Largest Govern. P.	-1.503	-2.453	-2.634	-2.681	-3.062	-1.975
	(1.069)	(1.817)	(1.923)	(1.840)	(3.528)	(1.875)
Fragmented Party System (based on Pre. Vote Share)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ideological Dispersion wrt Largest Govern. P.	-0.067	-0.239	-0.320	-0.209	-0.178	-0.293
	(0.174)	(0.248)	(0.382)	(0.257)	(0.377)	(0.320)
Clean Elections Index $_{t-1}$	-0.087	3.587	4.193	4.351*	6.116	4.223
	(1.447)	(2.707)	(3.749)	(2.387)	(6.740)	(3.373)
Presidential System	-0.440	-1.593**	-2.314**	-1.817***	-2.299	-1.871**
	(0.476)	(0.670)	(0.952)	(0.693)	(1.887)	(0.798)
Civil Society Repression $_{t-1}$	-0.672**	-1.195***	-1.252**	-1.304***	-1.664	-1.135***
	(0.322)	(0.327)	(0.490)	(0.305)	(1.269)	(0.440)
GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP Growth $_{t-1}$	-0.438	4.907	10.306**	5.517	12.319	7.513*
	(2.693)	(4.073)	(4.592)	(4.111)	(14.033)	(4.024)
Duration of Current Regime	-0.074***	-0.095***	-0.108***	-0.115***	-0.153	-0.106***
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.139)	(0.024)
Autonomy of Opposition Parties $_{t-1}$	0.590**	0.571	1.024**	0.454	0.754	0.740*
	(0.281)	(0.408)	(0.465)	(0.456)	(0.521)	(0.428)
Constant	0.958	1.517	1.430	2.204	1.565	0.669
	(1.080)	(1.709)	(1.867)	(1.943)	(2.298)	(1.730)
N	156	97	97	97	97	97
Log-likelihood	-65.162	-32.655	-28.834	-32.138	-27.469	-30.643
AIC	156.324	91.311	87.667	94.277	86.938	91.286
BIC	195.972	124.782	126.288	132.898	128.133	129.907
Random Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Robust St. Errors	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$