TERRORIST ATTACKS' EFFECTS ON ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: THE CASE OF THE NOVEMBER 2015 TURKISH NATIONAL ELECTIONS

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ABSTRACT

TERRORIST ATTACKS' EFFECTS ON ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: THE CASE OF THE NOVEMBER 2015 TURKISH NATIONAL ELECTIONS

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Increasing terrorist attacks impact citizens in many countries. While governments try to deal with terrorist organizations, citizens react to terrorist attacks in different ways. In the terrorism and electoral behavior literature, the relationship between terrorist attacks and terrorism saliency in public opinion is disregarded. Therefore, this thesis studies the effects of terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency with the case of Turkey. During the period between the June and November 2015 Turkish national elections, the Turkish electorate witnessed an intensification of terrorist attacks which requires further attention. In this regard, I argue that terrorist attacks increase the level of terrorism saliency in the eyes of Turkish electorate. Not just the frequency of attacks, but the target selection of terrorist organizations also affects the level of terrorism saliency, where both attacks against civilians and security forces are expected to lead to increased terrorism saliency. Moreover, concentration of attacks in certain regions in accordance with their political aims and voters' support for right-wing parties are other relevant factors to analyze the effect of attacks on terrorism saliency. Empirical analyses are conducted by merging individual level data with terrorism data at the province level. The empirical results are in line with the theoretical expectations indicating that terrorist attacks increase terrorism saliency in the public opinion; and the target type, concentration of attacks, and supporting right-wing parties also affect terrorism saliency. However, concentration of attacks and supporting right-wing parties' effects on terrorism saliency are not conditional on increasing terrorist attacks.

ÖZET

TERÖR SALDIRILARININ SEÇİM DAVRANIŞI ÜZERİNDE ETKİLERİ: KASIM 2015 TÜRKİYE ULUSAL SEÇİMLERİ

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Anahtar Kelimeler: terörizm, saldırı, kamuoyu, Türkiye, seçimler

Artan terörist saldırıları birçok ülkede vatandaşları etkilemektedir. Hükümetler terör örgütleriyle mücadele etmeye çalışırken, vatandaşlar terör saldırılarına farklı şekillerde tepki vermektedir. Terör ve seçmen davranışı literatüründe terör saldırıları ile terörün kamuoyundaki önemi arasındaki ilişki gözardı edilmektedir. Bu sebeple, bu tez çalışması terör saldırılarının terörün kamuoyundaki önemine olan etkilerini Türkiye özelinde çalışmaktadır. Türkiye'deki Haziran ve Kasım 2015 genel seçimleri arasındaki dönemde seçmenler daha fazla dikkat gerektiren terör saldırılarının hızla yoğunlaşmasına tanık olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, terör saldırılarının Türk seçmenlerin gözünde terörün öneminin seviyesini artırdığını savunuyorum. Sadece saldırıların sıklığı değil, terör örgütlerinin hedef seçimi de terörün önemli olarak görülmesini etkilemektedir ve hem sivillere hem de güvenlik güçlerine yönelik saldırıların terörün öneminin artmasına yol açması beklenmektedir. Ayrıca, saldırıların politik amaçlarına uygun olarak belirli bölgelerde yoğunlaşması ve seçmenlerin sağ partileri desteklemeleri de saldırıların terörün önemli olarak değerlendirilme etkisini analiz etmek için diğer ilgili faktörlerdir. Ampirik analizler, bireysel düzeydeki verilerin il düzeyindeki terörizm verileriyle birleştirilmesiyle gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ampirik sonuçlar teorik beklentilerle paralel olarak terör saldırılarının terörün kamuoyundaki önemini arttırdığını; ve hedef tipinin, saldırıların belirli bölgelerde yoğunlaşmasının ve sağ partilerin desteklenmesinin de toplum tarafından terörün önemli bir sorun olarak görülmesini etkilediğini göstermektedir. Ancak, saldırıların belirli bölgelerde yoğunlaşmasının ve sağ partilerin desteklenmesinin etkileri artan terör saldırılarına bağlı değildir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my family

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1. INTRODUCTION

Many countries suffer from domestic and international terrorist attacks and try to deal with the increasing levels of terrorism. Although terrorist attacks have been marking the politics all around the world in the 2000s and 2010s, literature on terrorism dates back to the 1970s which have been focusing on its definition, empirical data collection, empirical analysis, and "avoiding the attribution of terrorism to personality disorders or 'irrationality'" along with the increasing importance of its impacts on politics and political behavior (Crenshaw 2000, 405). While there are distinctions on the types of terrorism as the 'old' and the 'new' terrorism (Crenshaw 2000), the literature has examined the concept of terrorism based on the differences in terrorist organizations, their aims and strategies, terrorist attacks' effects on governments, and political behavior of citizens. In fact, terrorist attacks' lead governments to decide on how to react to fight against terrorism and to prevent the vote loss in the following elections (Huddy et al. 2005). The impacts of terrorism on government reactions and political behavior of the voters are empirically examined for the cases of Israel, Spain, the US, France, Colombia, Ireland, and Turkey.

Regarding terrorism effects on voting behavior, there are three lines of studies in the literature. The first line of studies presents that in times of heightened levels of terrorist attacks, voters punish the incumbent government (Birnir and Gohdes 2018; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau 2008; Kıbrıs 2011; Michavila 2005). Voters hold the incumbent party responsible for its inability to deal with increased terrorist attacks regardless of the ideology of the incumbent party. On the contrary, the second line of studies argues that increased levels of terrorist attacks lead voters to support the incumbent government based on the rally-around-the-flag effect and terror management theory (Campbell 2005; Chowanietz 2010; Cohen et al. 2005; Hetherington and Nelson 2003). Accordingly, during the times of national security crises and mortality salience like 9/11 attacks, voters tend to support the incumbent government. The third line of studies indicates that high levels of terrorist attacks increase the support for the strong leaders or hard-line policies, conservative values and right-wing parties that have a hawkish stance against the issue of terrorism and

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oppose to give any concessions against terrorist organizations (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019; Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Kıbrıs 2011). Increased levels of threat for the voters lead them to support strong leaders and hard-line policies as voters' tendency increases towards more conservative values and opinion. Also, Affective Intelligence Model has been used in studies to examine how voters' emotional reactions affect their voting behavior, for instance information-seeking behavior and political participation is affected differently when people feel sadness, anxiety, fear, or anger after increased levels of terrorist attacks (Erişen 2016, 2018; Erişen and Erdoğan 2019; Vasilopoulos 2018; Vasilopoulos et al. 2018). Nevertheless, terrorist attacks' effect on the issue saliency of terrorism is understudied in the literature and only analyzed to a limited extent (Criado 2017).

Turkey faced with increased terrorist attacks committed mostly by PKK since the 1990s, in addition to the rise of "radical religious terrorist organizations" that are responsible of "a terrorist attack against two synagogues, the British consulate building, and a foreign Bank, through its Turkish branches in Istanbul on 20 November 2003" (Öcal and Yıldırım 2010, 480). The grounds on the rise of ethnic terrorism in Turkey could be found in "unrest in Iraq, as a consequence of the Gulf Wars, and the invasion of Iraq by the USA" (Öcal and Yıldırım 2010, 480). In addition, the presence and violence of ISIL in Syria further escalated the violence in the region and its spillover effects increased terrorist attacks in Turkey committed by both PKK and ISIL as well. Because the Kurdish people live in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran (Tezcür 2015), PKK and ISIL are in conflict with each other for the Kurds in Syria that also affects the Turkish government and the Kurdish population in Turkey.

According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), Turkey's GTI Score became 6.738 out of ten in GTI 2016 Edition that is 1.272 points higher than its score in GTI 2015 Edition (Institute for Economics & Peace 2016). Among 163 countries that GTI analyzes the impact of terrorism, Turkey was positioned at the 14th rank in the 2016 GTI Edition (Institute for Economics & Peace 2016). Moreover, the terrorist attack committed by ISIL in Ankara train station on October 2015 was listed among "the twenty most fatal terrorist attacks in 2015", in addition to ISIL being listed among "the four most deadly terrorist groups" (Institute for Economics & Peace 2016, 13-52). Although the terrorist attacks committed by ISIL between the period of the June and November 2015 Turkish general elections had a strong impact on the amount of fatalities and injured people, most of the terrorist attacks were committed by PKK that is listed as "the deadliest home grown group in the OECD in the last few years" (Institute for Economics & Peace 2016, 46). It is possible to observe that Turkey experienced an intensification of terrorism, especially in the four

months period between the two elections. Although most of the terrorist attacks were concentrated in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, metropolitan cities, like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, were also faced with the immediate threat of terrorism.

In the literature, Kıbrıs expected that if terrorist attacks would increase as the case in the 1990s, then "the government will lose a substantial share of votes in the coming elections" (Kıbrıs 2011, 242). However, this expectation was not actualized in the November 2015 Turkish general elections that was "a true victory for the AK Party, which was able to raise its total number of votes to an all-time high of almost 23.7 million" (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2015, 74). This puzzle enables scholars to further analyze this election period which will be examined in detail in the following sections. Regarding terrorism saliency in the Turkish case, Aytaç and Çarkoğlu conducted a research on the effect of terrorism saliency on the voting behavior in June and November 2015 national elections and found that as terrorism saliency increases, people tend to evaluate the incumbent party as more competent in solving the terrorism problem than other parties, and therefore vote for AKP (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019).

There is no research conducted in the Turkish case for the effect of terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency in public opinion. Overall, there is a lack in the current phase of the literature that the issue saliency of terrorism in times of heightened terrorist attacks is undermined. For the cases of other countries dealing with terrorist attacks like Turkey, terrorism saliency is also largely disregarded in the literature. Consequently, this thesis is focused on examining how the terrorist attacks affect terrorism saliency in the eyes of the Turkish electorate in the November 2015 Turkish national elections.

Based on Criado's research on terrorism saliency in the Spanish context (Criado 2017), I aim to analyze how terrorist organizations' target selection affects voters through dividing the target types generally as civilians and security forces. This allows me to observe how voters react to terrorist attacks targeting civilians and to terrorist attacks targeting security forces based on terrorism saliency. Although I expect that each terrorist attack increases terrorism saliency regardless of the target type, I argue that civilians would be more concerned when the target of terrorist attacks is civilians rather than security forces. Moreover, terrorist attacks mostly take place in the east and southeastern regions of Turkey with high levels of Kurdish population. Therefore, I argue that terrorism saliency will be lower for the Kurdish population than for the non-Kurdish population, where terrorism is not a sudden and novel threat for the Kurdish population living in southeastern region of the country.

In addition, I argue that attacks' effect on terrorism saliency will decrease for the Kurdish population as attacks increase. Furthermore, an argument in the literature suggests that terrorism saliency will be higher for the right-wing constituency than for the left-wing constituency due to right-wing parties' issue attention to terrorism regardless of the frequency of terrorist attacks (Criado 2017). In addition, it is expected that when the incumbent is a right-wing party, terrorism saliency will be higher among the voters than when the incumbent is a left-wing party, regardless of which party the voters support (Criado 2017). Because Turkey's incumbent party is AKP since 2002, I argue that terrorism saliency will be higher for the voters who support AKP or MHP than other voters, and attacks' effect on terrorism saliency will increase for AKP and MHP supporters as terrorist attacks increase.

To test my hypotheses, I merged two data sets for the empirical analyses. The data set on terrorist attacks are derived from the Global Terrorism Database (START 2019a), and the individual level data set is made available by Prof. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu from Sabancı University (Kalaycıoğlu 2017). Global Terrorism Database includes information on terrorist attacks beginning from 1970 until the end of 2018 for approximately 200 countries, and the data set lists 3.496 terrorist attacks in Turkey from 1970 to November 2015 (START 2019a). The individual level data set is compiled as a pre-November 2015 elections survey (Kalaycıoğlu 2017). However, the pre-November 2015 general elections data set is not publicly available yet. The individual level data set includes 1.508 observations across 57 provinces in Turkey. To the best of my knowledge, this research is the first to merge individual level data set with the data set on terrorist attacks at the province level to analyze the effect of terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency.

In the next section, the historical background is presented to give a general perspective on the Turkish case on terrorism and Turkish elections. The literature review section is aimed to present the current phase of the literature focusing on terrorism effectiveness, terrorism effects on political behavior and political behavior and terrorism literature focusing on Turkey, paving the way towards the understudied field of terrorism saliency. The theoretical framework section outlines the hypotheses which will be tested in the empirical research. The research design section provides the information on the research design and the data processes. The empirical findings section presents the results of the empirical results and the discussion on the empirical findings. Finally, the conclusion section concludes the thesis and discusses the limitations and the possibilities for further research.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Turkey has been facing terrorism in the last four decades. As Öcal and Yıldırım explained, "Kurdish separatist groups, radical Islamic terrorist groups, and leftist terrorist groups" committed terrorist attacks in Turkey (Öcal and Yıldırım 2010, 479). The leftist groups aimed to establish a communist state and paved the way toward clashes between terrorist organizations from leftist and rightist ideologies, especially in the 1970s; radical religious terrorist organizations aimed to establish an Islamic regime; and, Kurdish separatist groups aimed to establish an independent Kurdish state in the region including Turkey, Northern Syria, Iraq, and Iran where Kurdish separatist groups changed their positions on their political aims throughout years (Öcal and Yıldırım 2010; Sayarı 2010). To have a better grasp of the circumstances in the Turkish case on terrorism, this section will briefly introduce the historical background of the conflict between Turkey and PKK, the political parties in Turkey during the 1990s and 2000s as well as the pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey, the Kurdish issue, the Kurdish opening, and the June 2015 and November 2015 elections in sequence.

2.1 History of the Conflict between Turkey and PKK

Although there are terrorist attacks from several terrorist groups mentioned above, Turkey is mostly affected by PKK terrorist attacks focused mostly on eastern and southeastern regions of the country. Hence, Kurdish issue is frequently affiliated with terrorism among the Turkish society. The foundation of the Kurdish issue dates to the 1920s and 1930s with Kurdish uprisings against the central government of Turkey (Kayhan Pusane 2014; Satana 2012). After the suppression of these uprisings in the southeastern regions of Turkey, Kurdish issue started to be affiliated with "the leftist groups" in the 1960s (Kayhan Pusane 2014, 83). PKK was founded in 1978 with a

Marxist/Leninist ideology (Kayhan Pusane 2014). Despite the fact that PKK's main goal was "the establishment of an independent Kurdish state", the organization has been opened to other options through democratic means starting from the mid-1990s (Kayhan Pusane 2014, 83). Even though there was an intention of oppression and elimination of the ideological groups after the 1980 coup, PKK started its terrorist attacks in 1984 (Satana 2012). Moreover, PKK forces withdrew to Northern Syria after their leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was imprisoned in Turkey right after he was brought from Kenya in 1999, when Öcalan declared a cease-fire which lasted until 2004 (CNN Türk 2010).

First response to PKK terrorist attacks from the Turkish government was a military response including many operations in the southeastern regions of the country and beyond the Iraqi border; while the first effort to provide a political solution came from Turgut Özal during his tenure as both prime minister and the president between 1983 and 1993 (Kayhan Pusane 2014). Although the President initiated indirect meetings with Öcalan and worked on the usage of Kurdish language in public, the government increased military operations to northern Iraq and started evacuating the villages in southeastern region of Turkey after Özal's death in 1993 (Kayhan Pusane 2014). However, attempted openings in the 1990s opened the Kurdish issue to the discussion which caused strict opposition and criticisms as well as legal changes in the 2000s under the AKP regime (Somer and Liaras 2010). In general, the Kurdish issue tended to be framed as an economic issue related to low development of the southeast region of Turkey; thus, financial packages were proposed in the 1990s to enhance the southeastern regions' economy which could not be successful along with the continuing terrorist attacks in the region (Satana 2012). Nevertheless, the coalition government, including the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the Motherland Party (ANAP), initiated reforms to provide solution for the Kurdish question after Öcalan's arrest and the following cease-fire in accordance with the EU declaration on Turkey becoming an official candidate for membership declared in Helsinki Summit in 1999 (Kayhan Pusane 2014). In line with these initiations, the AKP government passed "five major EU harmonization packages" in 2003 and 2004, including the topics on freedom of expression, broadcasting in different languages, allowance of Kurdish names, and "Return to Village and Rehabilitation project" (Kayhan Pusane 2014, 85). In addition, the death penalty was completely removed from the Constitution in 2004 after the abolishment of the death penalty in 2002 (BBC News Türkçe 2018c). Furthermore, Leyla Zana was released from prison in 2004[1], the Prime Minister

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[1]Leyla Zana spoke Kurdish in the final part of her oath in the Parliament in 1991 that received high level of reactions. After her political immunity was abolished in 1994, she was arrested due to the illegal organization membership (PKK).

Erdoğan officially recognized 'the Kurdish issue' in his Diyarbakır speech in 2005 (Kayhan Pusane 2014; Satana 2012), and TRT6 was launched as "the first public channel broadcasting in Kurdish" in 2009 (Somer and Liaras 2010, 155).

2.2 History of the Political Parties in Turkey during the 1990s and 2000s

Between 1991 and 2002, eight coalition governments came into power in Turkey with an average survival period of less than a year (Sayarı 2007). During the 1990s, the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP) were the center-right parties, the Social Democratic Populist Party/the Republican People's Party (SHP/CHP united in 1995) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP) were the social democratic left parties, the Welfare Party/the Virtue Pary (RP/FP) were the Islamist parties, and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) was the nationalist far-right party (Sayarı 2007). The rise of the Islamist parties in Turkish politics since 1990s started with the RP, founded in 1983, gaining 7.2% of the votes in the 1987 election (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006). The RP gained the control of the "largest metropolitan centers" in the 1994 local elections, and gained 21.4% of the votes in the 1995 election as the largest party (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006, 372). Nonetheless, the RP was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1998 with the claim that the party "sought to undermine Turkey's secular institutions" (Sayarı 2007, 201). Although the RP leader Erbakan established another party called the Virtue Party (FP), this party was banned by the Constitutional Court in 2001 as well. Afterwards, Erbakan supporters established the Felicity Party (SP) and a group of people called 'the reformists' (yenilikçiler) established the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001 (Sayarı 2007).

In the 2002 election, the turnout rate was 79.10% which was the lowest since 1977, and the AKP came into power with 34.42% of the votes and 365 seats in the parliament, while the CHP became the main opposition party with 19.42% of the votes and 177 seats in the parliament (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006; Habertürk 2002). After the economic crisis in 2001, vote shares of the incumbent parties (including Democratic Left Party (DSP), Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and Homeland Party (ANAP)) decreased and AKP received protests votes by the voters who "were adversely affected by the dismal economic conditions that prevailed in Turkey" (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2009, 377). Consequently, the 2002 election started a new era in Turkish politics and a return to the single-party government

while all the other parties are left out of the parliament. In the 2007 election, the MHP also entered into the parliament with 71 seats, whereas the CHP remained as the main opposition party in the parliament with 112 seats (Habertürk 2007). The AKP increased its vote share to 46.58% with 341 seats in the parliament in the 2007 elections, while the party increased its vote share to 49.83% of the votes with 327 seats in the parliament (Habertürk 2007, 2011). The CHP gained 25.98% of the votes with 135 seats in the parliament, while the MHP gained 13.01% of the votes with 53 seats in the parliament (Habertürk 2011). In the Turkish electoral system, there is 10% national threshold to enter into Parliament. This threshold creates an important obstacle for small or regional parties that are mostly pro-Kurdish parties concentrated in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey. Therefore, members of the pro-Kurdish parties mostly ran as independent candidates in elections to be able to enter into Parliament. Regarding the independent candidates' seats in the parliament since 2002, 8 independent candidates entered into parliament in the 2002 election, while 26 independent candidates entered into parliament in the 2007 election, and 35 independent candidates entered into parliament in the 2011 election (Habertürk 2002, 2007, 2011).

2.2.1 History of the Pro-Kurdish Political Parties in Turkey

Regarding the political party history of the Kurdish ethnicity in Turkey, the 10% electoral threshold and banned political parties are important obstacles for the political representation of the Kurdish ethnicity. The People's Labor Party (HEP), founded in 1990 as the first Kurdish ethnic party, formed an alliance with the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) in 1991 and gained 21% vote share in the 1991 elections (Satana 2012). After its banning in 1993, Democratic Party (DEP) was founded in the same year without entering into any election, and it led to the foundation of the People's Democracy Party (HADEP) in 1994 (Satana 2012). Although HADEP gained only approximately 4% of the votes in 1995 national elections, the party gained the control of 38 municipalities in 1999 local elections (Satana 2012). HADEP was banned with the claim that "it had ties to the PKK", and Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) became its successor and gained 6.14% of the votes in 2002 national elections (Satana 2012, 175). After DEHAP dissolved itself after the 2004 local elections, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) was founded in 2005 and ran in the 2007 elections as independents which resulted in 5.32% of the vote with 22 seats in the parliament (Satana 2012). DTP was banned by the Constitutional Court in 2009 for "being a focal point for terrorism and undermining the indivisible

integrity of the unitary state" (Celep 2014, 371). KCK trials started in 2009 and paved the way towards banning DTP, where the trials were based on the claims that KCK directs its supporters including DTP members as well as some of the mayors, and KCK uses the resources of those municipalities in the benefit of their political aims (BBC News Türkçe 2009). KCK is the political organization that aims to implement Öcalan's 'Democratic Confederalism' ideology, and the trials brought up this organization to the agenda of the Turkish media and politics since 2009 (Bianet 2011).

In the meanwhile, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) was founded in 2008 (Al Jazeera Türk 2013). After DTP gained the control of 99 municipalities in 2009 local elections, BDP and some other leftist parties formed the Labor, Democracy and Freedom Bloc (EDÖB) which its members ran as independent candidates and gained 36 seats in the parliament in 2011 national elections (Satana 2012). Afterwards, BDP decided to join the Peace and Democracy Party (HDP), originally founded in 2012, in 2014 (Grigoriadis 2016).

2.3 The Kurdish Issue

Regarding the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish opening, Rumelili and Çelik argued that the end of the Kurdish opening process and the escalation of violence was because of the ontological insecurity (Rumelili and Çelik 2017). The authors claimed that in ontologically asymmetric conflicts, the peace initiation can be immediately turn into a "dramatic return to violence" which was the case between 2009 and 2015 Kurdish opening process (Rumelili and Çelik 2017, 279). Although the Kurdish public strongly supported the peace initiation, the Turkish government's inability to create "new narratives" and the government's "doublespeak strategy" disappointed the Kurdish population (Rumelili and Çelik 2017, 290). Although Erdoğan acknowledged that there is a Kurdish problem in Turkey in 2005, Erdoğan also stated in 2015 that there is not a Kurdish problem for them anymore (NTV 2015). As a result, this doublespeak strategy gave mixed messages to both the Kurdish and the Turkish population. In addition, AKP tried to highlight 'Islamic brotherhood' as an identity to unite the Kurdish and the Turkish population (Rumelili and Çelik 2017), which is a similar case with the 1990s' the Welfare Party (RP) trying to unite the Kurdish and the Turkish people "under the greater umbrella of Islam" (Kıbrıs 2011, 232-233). Likewise, Geri analyzed the causes of the "securitization of the Kurdish

issue" by the Turkish government beginning from the summer of 2015, and found that it could be based on "the low level of ontological security of the state; the fear of losing the power by the AKP ruling elite; and the threat to the political ideology of the AKP posed by the HDP", in addition to its electoral threat once it passes the electoral threshold and enter into Parliament (Geri 2016, 187). Hence, it can be argued that both the incumbent government and the Kurdish side had ontological insecurity which led to the escalation of violence in a short-time period again.

2.3.1 The Kurdish Opening Process

Interior Minister Beşir Atalay declared the Turkish government's plan on the Kurdish issue in July 2009 by rejecting Öcalan's announced roadmap to provide a solution to the Kurdish issue in Map 2009; and, another process for the opening started generally called as "the Kurdish opening", "democratic opening", or "national unity plan" (Somer and Liaras 2010, 155). The Kurdish opening included an "amnesty for PKK rebels, public instruction in Kurdish (beginning at the university level), the changing of Turkicized local place names in the east and, significantly, a new and more democratic constitution" (Somer and Liaras 2010, 155). Turkish government faced with the harsh reactions by both the political parties and the Turkish society when 34 PKK members entered into the country from the Habur border in "combat uniforms" (Rumelili and Çelik 2017, 288). CHP opposed to the government by claiming that the Kurdish opening threatens "the national unity and territorial integrity of the country", while MHP accused AKP of "committing treason and encouraging separatism in the country" (Kayhan Pusane 2014, 88). Besides, the Kurdish population also started to question the Kurdish opening process when the Constitutional Court shut down DTP shortly after the KCK trials started in 2009 (lasted until 2012) which resulted in prosecution of "thousands of Kurdish politicians, activists, journalists, and academics" (Rumelili and Çelik 2017, 288). Moreover, conflicts on the Kurdish opening process further intensified with PKK killing 13 Turkish soldiers with the claim of self-defense on 13 July 2011, and the Democratic Society Congress' declaration of "democratic autonomy" in the next day (Rumelili and Çelik 2017, 289). In addition, 34 Kurds were killed in Roboski/Uludere on 28 December 2011 by the Turkish air forces in which the Turkish government claimed that it was a mistake based on false information related to the terrorists at the border (Rumelili and Çelik 2017). This incident caused harsh opposition from both the Turkish and Kurdish population.

Another wave of the Kurdish opening started in 2013 when the Turkish government initiated communication with PKK and Öcalan; and, BDP deputies delivered Öcalan's ceasefire message to PKK in Diyarbakır during the Newroz on 21 March 2013 (Rumelili and Çelik 2017). However, after an autonomous Kurdish region is established in northern Syria in January 2014, the tension between the Turkish state and PKK started again. In the meanwhile, the ongoing violence of ISIL created another obstacle, especially in Syria. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant declared a caliphate in 2014, and ISIL started committing terrorist attacks in Turkey since 2014 (Habertürk 2016). The clashes in Syria also increased the tension in Turkey when Öcalan said that if Kobane would be lost to ISIL, it could directly affect the ongoing Kurdish opening process with Turkey (BBC News Türkçe 2014*a*). Due to the clashes in Kobane against ISIL, there were various protests for Kobane in many cities of Turkey demanding for the Turkish government's support against ISIL in Kobane resulted in at least 12 people dead and several people wounded which increased anxiety and tension even further in relation with the Kurdish opening process in addition to ISIL (BBC News Türkçe 2014*b*). The end of this wave of the Kurdish opening process came when Erdoğan nullified the agreement formed by HDP and the Turkish government in February 2015 that led to the acceleration of the violence afterwards (Rumelili and Çelik 2017). It should be also noted that the last wave of the Kurdish opening's timing is crucially important because it was just before the June 2015 national elections.

2.4 The June 2015 and the November 2015 Elections

During the time period between the 2011 and June 2015 national elections, Gezi Park protests in 2013 and the corruption allegations against the AKP government in December 2013 further polarized the political environment in Turkey in addition to the Kurdish opening (Ete 2014). Besides, two important elections were held before the June 2015 general elections in Turkey which were the 2014 local elections and the 2014 presidential elections. The 2014 local elections resulted in AKP gaining 43.2% of the votes, CHP gaining 26.6% of the votes, MHP gaining 17.7% of the votes, and BDP gaining 4.2% of the votes, where the turnout rate was 89.1% (Habertürk 2014*b*). The 2014 presidential election resulted in Erdoğan receiving 51.79% of the votes, İhsanoğlu (supported by CHP and MHP) receiving 38.44% of the votes, and Demirtaş receiving 9.77% of the votes, where the turnout rate was 74.2% that is

lower than the turnout rate in the 2014 local elections (Habertürk 2014a). The 2014 presidential elections also showed Demirtaş's increasing importance as a political figure. Demirtaş presented himself as not only appealing to Kurdish voters, but also appealing to all voters who do not support right-wing parties where he also gained "sympathy among those CHP sympathisers who considered their party's candidate too far to the right for their taste" (Kalaycıoğlu 2015, 164). In addition, Demirtaş was seen as successful when he received one million more votes in the 2014 presidential elections than HDP received in the 2014 local elections (Kalaycıoğlu 2015, 172).

Based on these developments, economic concerns of Turkish voters reflected in the June 2015 elections resulted in AKP losing the majority in the parliament which was seen both as an opportunity for a representative system and a danger of returning to "the weak and unstable coalition governments of the 1990s" (Kemahlıoğlu 2015, 445). AKP received 40.9% of the votes, CHP receives 25% of the votes, and MHP received 16.3% of the votes in the June 2015 general elections (Habertürk 2015a). Moreover, while BDP gained 4.2% of the votes in the 2014 local elections, HDP gained 13.1% of the votes in the June 2015 national elections (Habertürk 2014b, 2015a). As a result, HDP exceeded the 10% national threshold to be able to enter parliament and AKP lost its majority to form a single-party government. Vote shares of the four main parties were estimated to be translated into seats as AKP would have 258 seats, CHP would have 132 seats, and both MHP and HDP would have 80 seats each (Habertürk 2015a).

There were six possible coalition governments to be found after the June 2015 general elections which one of them including all four main parties, one of them including a "grand coalition" between AKP and CHP, and one of them including all main parties other than AKP (Sayarı 2016, 265). However, Bahçeli, MHP leader, declared shortly after the election results that MHP will not be a part of any coalition governments (BBC News Türkçe 2018b). Likewise, HDP was not interested in joining the coalition government so that the party could stay in the opposition (Sayarı 2016). Unlike MHP and HDP, CHP wanted to form a grand coalition with AKP; and, although the talks between the leaders of the two parties, Kılıçdaroğlu and Davutoğlu, took place, the result was unsuccessful to form the government (Sayarı 2016). Consequently, the President Erdoğan declared snap elections on 1 November after the 45 day is passed on 24 August, and the President appointed Prime Minister Davutoğlu in charge of the "caretaker government" until the November 2015 elections (Sayarı 2016, 269).

In the meanwhile, two bombs exploded in Diyarbakır during HDP's rally resulted in five civilians' death and hundreds of people were wounded two days prior to

the June 2015 elections which the attacks were attributed to ISIL in addition to other small terrorist attacks before the June 2015 elections (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2015; T24 2016). However, the period between the June and the November 2015 general elections was disastrous in terms of terrorist attacks committed by both PKK and ISIL. According to the Global Terrorism Database (START 2019a), there were 314 incidents occurred between the two elections in Turkey regardless of the terrorist organizations and the target types. After ISIL attacked to Suruç on July 20 and killed "34 activists who had been carrying humanitarian aid to Kobani", PKK started to attack against both ISIL, the Turkish government, and civilians (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2015, 61). In addition to Suruç bombing, ISIL's attack in Ankara targeting a peace rally on October 10 left 100 people dead and 391 people wounded (BBC News Türkçe 2018a). Moreover, the ongoing conflicts in Syria started to have effects in Turkey as well, since PKK is in close relations with the Democratic Unity Party (PYD) which fights against ISIL in Syria (Sayarı 2016). Hence, there were exchange and usage of armed members, military equipment, and tactics like "digging deep trenches on city streets to block the movement of tanks" between PKK and PYD (Sayarı 2016, 270).

Consequently, the parties were able to hold a few rallies where HDP cancelled all of its rallies after the Suruç bombings due to the fear and anxiety among the Turkish society with the increased terrorist attacks (Sayarı 2016). In November 1, approximately one million voters went to the ballot box who did not vote in the June 2015 elections, and 48.5 million voters voted in the November 2015 elections in total (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2015). The declared results state that AKP received 49.5% of the votes, CHP received 25.3% of the votes, MHP received 11.9% of the votes, and HDP received 10.8% of the votes in the November 2015 elections (Habertürk 2015b). In addition, AKP gained 317 seats, CHP gained 134 seats, MHP gained 40 seats, and HDP gained 59 seats in the parliament (Habertürk 2015b). As a result, HDP could enter parliament in this election again; still, AKP gained back its majority in the parliament to form a single-party government.

Throughout decades, the conflict between Turkey and PKK played an important role in the Turkish politics which also had a strong impact on the citizens of Turkey. While intensified terrorist attacks during the first half of the 1990s were during the periods of coalition governments, heightened levels of terrorist attacks in the period between the June and November 2015 general elections were during the AKP's single-party government. Despite the fact that AKP, as the right-wing incumbent party, initiated Kurdish opening that ended shortly before the June 2015 general elections, the incumbent party did not lose votes in the November 2015 general elections after increased levels of terrorist attacks. Therefore, this period creates puzzles

on the Turkish case that the period includes not only terrorist attacks committed by PKK, but also terrorist attacks committed by ISIL which created a huge impact among the Turkish society that requires further attention.

Beginning from the 1990s, an important number of pro-Kurdish parties were banned based on the claim that they are in a strong relationship with PKK. In addition, the 10% electoral threshold prevented small pro-Kurdish parties to enter into Parliament. These conditions resulted in the underrepresentation of the Kurdish population living in Turkey until 2015 when HDP could pass the electoral threshold. Overall, it might be argued that the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish opening process affected Kurdish population's voting behavior and political participation through different means compared to Turkish population's voting behavior. Furthermore, the Kurdish population was also highly exposed to high levels of terrorist attacks that concentrated on the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey in the last four decades. Because the Kurdish population mostly live in these regions, they had to deal with an everyday threat of terrorism. Thus, it could be expected that their opinions, reactions, and behavior might be different than the Turkish population. Likewise, Kurdish population's perceptions on terrorism saliency might be affected by increasing terrorist attacks differently than Turkish population's perceptions on terrorism saliency. However, this puzzle on how terrorist attacks' effects on terrorism saliency differ between the Kurdish population and Turkish population in the period between June and November 2015 elections and across other elections is understudied and should be further examined.

3.   LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature on terrorism and electoral behavior have been studied from different perspectives across various cases which will be evaluated in this section. After the literature on the definition of terrorism and its effectiveness, the effects of terrorism on political behavior will be discussed based on the cases like the France, Spain, Ireland, Israel, Turkey, and the US. Following upon that, the effects of terrorism on political participation and emotional reactions of the voters will be evaluated. Next, literature on terrorism and voting behavior in Turkey will be discussed. After a brief introduction on the political behavior literature in Turkey, the literature on terrorism and the June and November 2015 elections will be evaluated separately.

3.1 Literature on Terrorism and Its Effectiveness

To begin with, the definition of terrorism is distinguished from the definition of guerilla warfare in Ganor's study where guerilla warfare signifies "deliberate use of violence against military and security personnel in order to attain political, ideological and religious goals", terrorism signifies "the deliberate use or the threat to use violence against civilians in order to attain political, ideological and religious aims" (Ganor 2002, 288). These definitions indicate the main difference between the attacks against the military/security personnel and the attacks against the civilians, although the notion of terrorism might be sometimes perceived as it includes the attacks against the military/security personnel as well as the civilians like the Turkish case discussed in the following sections (Kıbrıs 2011, 2014). Besides, there has been another discussion on the concept of 'new terrorism' versus the 'old terrorism' (Crenshaw 2000). Crenshaw argued that old terrorism aims "revolution, national liberation, or secession", while new terrorism aims to "transform the world" (Crenshaw 2000, 411). However, this differentiation does not reflect a left-right ideological

dimension, but the new terrorism appears with the radical Islam in the Middle East that emerged since the 1980s and the Shi'ite Hezbollah faction (Crenshaw 2000). Also, the concerns over the new terrorism is increased along with the 9/11 attacks in the US and several terrorist attacks committed by ISIL in the European countries.

Regarding the effectiveness of terrorism, Abrahms' study revealed that the terrorist organizations could achieve "their forty-two policy objectives only 7 percent of the time"; and the target selection is an important determinant of terrorist organizations' success, where the terrorists attack civilians more than military personnel, they could not achieve their policy objectives (Abrahms 2006, 43). Moreover, Abrahms applied correspondent inference theory on the cases of "Russia to the September 1999 apartment bombings, the United States to the September 11 attacks, and Israel to Palestinian terrorism in the first intifada" and found that when terrorists target civilians, targeted governments believe that terrorists have "maximalist objectives", like ideology and values, and this belief results in unwillingness of giving concessions (Abrahms 2006, 57). Likewise, Abrahms conducted another research on terrorism effectiveness based on "the target selection of 125 violent substate campaigns" (Abrahms 2012, 366). The similar results are reported that when the terrorist organizations target civilians, it is less effective than targeting military personnel for political concessions.

Unlike Abrahms' results, Kydd and Walter's study claimed that "terrorism often works" to induce governments to gain political concessions (Kydd and Walter 2006, 49). The ultimate goals of most of the terrorist organizations are listed as "regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance" (Kydd and Walter 2006, 52). Furthermore, the authors claimed that terrorism is "a form of costly signaling by which terrorists attempt to influence the beliefs of their enemy and the population they represent or wish to control" (Kydd and Walter 2006, 78). This costly signaling depends on two determinants, the first one is the information about the target of signaling and the second one is the regime type which the effectiveness of costly signaling methods differs between democratic and undemocratic regimes (Kydd and Walter 2006). Besides, Abrahms, Beauchamp, and Mroszczyk studies the causes of terrorist attacks against civilians based on a content analysis on terrorist propaganda videos through a principal-agent framework, where the principal is terrorist organizations leaders and the agents are the terrorist organizations' lower members (Abrahms, Beauchamp, and Mroszczyk 2017). In the research, the results indicated that terrorist organizations leaders are in favor of "less indiscriminate violence than their operatives actually commit" (Abrahms, Beauchamp, and Mroszczyk 2017, 899). These results also shed light into the internal communication and different tendencies within terrorist organizations.

Overall, the literature focused on the effectiveness of terrorism on gaining concessions from the governments to achieve their political aims. However, the effectiveness of terrorism is not studied to analyze how terrorism is effective in changing citizens' perception of terrorism. It should be expected that there might be different reactions from the voters when terrorist organizations target diversed groups like civilians and security forces. Likewise, it can be also argued that the concepts of old terrorism and new terrorism could affect how citizens evaluate terrorist attacks throughout different periods and countries. Where each terrorist organizations differ in their strategies, target selection, organizational structure, and political aims, it can be expected that citizens' reactions and perceived terrorism saliency will be affected by terrorist attacks. Thus, I think that the puzzle on the determinants on terrorism's effects on citizens' terrorism saliency perception should be further analyzed.

3.2 Literature on Terrorism Effects on Political Behavior

Terrorism effects on political behavior of voters has been analyzed by the scholars with cases from various countries and time periods. To begin with, a cross-sectional research based on 115 countries and more than 800 elections in the period between 1968 and 2002 showed that terrorism causes the replacement of the incumbent government as "the magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the terrorist attack" (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau 2008, 126). Another empirical research based on 1990 Peruvian elections indicated that the incumbent government is punished by the electorate at the ballot box for its inability to stop insurgent violence, whereas the radical left coalition in Peru affiliated with the insurgents is not punished by the electorate except for the provinces experienced high level of violence (Birnir and Gohdes 2018). Besides, Weintraub, Vargas, and Flores' empirical research based on the 2014 Colombian presidential elections showed an "inverted-U relationship" between insurgent violence and the President Santos' vote share, who initiated formal negotiations with the FARC in 2012 (Weintraub, Vargas, and Flores 2015, 1). The inverted-U relationship reflects that the president gained more votes from regions with moderate level experienced violence and gained less votes from regions with both very low and very high level of violence; whereas the President's opponent had the opposite pattern on receiving votes (Weintraub, Vargas, and Flores 2015).

In the case of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are various empirical research on

terrorism effects on voting behavior (Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014). Initially, Berrebi and Klor's conducted analysis on the period between 1990 and 2003 revealed that right-wing party support increase in times of high level of terrorism, and left-wing incumbent party experiences more terrorist attacks than right-wing incumbent party (Berrebi and Klor 2006). Moreover, the empirical findings indicated that when there is high level of terrorism, right-wing party increases its votes even if the party is the incumbent party at that time (Berrebi and Klor 2006). In addition, the authors also mentioned that there is an interaction between the level of terrorism and electorate outcomes which means that electoral outcomes can be a determinant on the level of terrorism (Berrebi and Klor 2006). Berrebi and Klor conducted another research on the period between 1988 and 2003, and found that a terror attack increases 1.35 percentage points of that locality's support for the right bloc within three months of elections (Berrebi and Klor 2008). Also, a left-leaning locality supports the right bloc when there are "local terror fatalities", but if there are terror fatalities outside of a left-leaning locality, then the left bloc's vote share increases in that locality (Berrebi and Klor 2008, 279). In a right-leaning locality, local terror fatalities do not affect the vote share of the right bloc; but, terror fatalities in other localities increase the vote share of the right bloc. In addition, right bloc support increases in "regional capitals, population density, the locality's percentage of Jews, the percentage of individuals with an Asian/African background, and percentage of immigrants from the former Soviet Union" (Berrebi and Klor 2008, 288). Furthermore, Getmansky and Zeitzoff analyzed the relationship between rocket ranges during the period of 2001-2009 and vote shares of the left-wing and right-wing parties, and found that right-wing parties' vote shares are "2 to 6 percentage points higher" in localities within the rocket range that also showed that even "the mere threat of an attack affects voting" (Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014, 588). However, if there is a right-wing incumbent party, the party is neither punished nor rewarded as right-wing party is rewarded when the incumbent party is a left-wing party (Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014).

In the case of Spain, the literature on terrorism mostly focuses on the 3/11 Islamic terrorist attacks in 2004 and the terrorist attacks committed by the ETA. Firstly, 3/11 attacks took place three days prior to the 2004 congressional election which resulted in the conservative incumbent party losing power (Michavila 2005). Michavila analyzed the terrorist attacks' effects on the 2004 election based on 3.3% of the voters who sent their votes before the attacks through the two kinds of postal vote, "one by Spaniards registered as living in Spain (CER) and one for residents living abroad (CERA)" (Michavila 2005, 7). The results showed that the attacks' effects on the 2004 election could be found in four complementary hypotheses: "(1) a latent

desire for a change of government; (2) the shock caused by the attacks; (3) a desire to punish the government for its position on the war in Iraq; and (4) a dual manipulation of information – by the government and against the government" (Michavila 2005, 3-4). Furthermore, Montalvo empirically analyzed the 3/11 attacks' effects on voting based on the votes of "Spanish nationals abroad", since they casted their votes before the Islamic terrorist attacks took place in Spain which makes them "a control group" (Montalvo 2011, 1146). Similar to Michavila's findings, the findings suggested that the attacks significantly affected voting in the 2004 election as the attacks created "an important electoral impact" (Montalvo 2011, 1146).

Secondly, a conducted research on ETA attacks' effects on the support for its political wing Batasuna indicated that attacks against security forces decrease the support for Batasuna (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2013). In addition, if there is a high level support for Batasuna in a municipality, then "the more likely members of the security forces will be killed there" (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2013, 94). Regarding the attacks against civilians, ETA attacks civilians in municipalities where Batasuna does not have a high level of electoral support which reflects a curvilinear relationship (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2013). Also, it is indicated that ETA attacks against informers and drug-dealers increase the support for Batasuna, whereas ETA attacks against non-nationalist politicians decrease the support for Batasuna (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2013). Besides, McGrath and Gill's research analyzed the Provisional IRA (terrorist organization in Ireland) and ETA attacks' effects on the support for their political wings, Sinn Fein and Batasuna (McGrath and Gill 2014). The analysis on the PIRA is conducted based on the period between 1970 and 1998, and the results indicated that PIRA decreased its attacks when it is an election year, and this increased the support for Sinn Fein in the ballot box (McGrath and Gill 2014). On the contrary, the analysis on ETA, conducted based on the period between 1978 and 2005, revealed that ETA increased its attacks when it is an election year, yet this did not change the support for Batasuna in the ballot box significantly (McGrath and Gill 2014).

In the literature, the rally-round-the-flag effect is mostly affiliated with the 9/11 attacks' effects on voting for Bush in the US 2004 presidential elections. The approval rates for President Bush was 90% on September 22, 2001, and it was still 68% in November 2002 that shows a strong electoral impact in a long time period (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). Approximately 17 million more voters casted their votes in the 2004 presidential election than voters in the 2000 presidential election; and, among "more than 122 million Americans", 51.2% of the voters voted for Bush and 48.8% of the voters voted for Kerry which reflects the sharp increase in political participation and support for the President Bush (Campbell 2005, 219). Since

the Islamic 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US is perceived as a sudden international threat to the country, rally-round-the-flag effect is observed on the support for the President Bush in the following presidential elections. Besides rally-round-the-flag effect, Cohen analyzed the 9/11 effects through terror management theory (Cohen et al. 2005). The results suggested that the control group supported Kerry over Bush, whereas "a reminder of death" created mortality salience and led to support for Bush over Kerry in September 2004 (Cohen et al. 2005, 177). Moreover, Branton and Meernika conducted research on the 2016 Colombian peace referendum at the municipal level and found that if there is a high level of violence in a municipality or its surrounding municipalities, then the support for both the peace referendum and President Santos increases (Branton and Meernika 2019).

Chowanietz conducted a research on 181 terrorist events in France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the US based on the period between 1990 and 2006 to empirically analyze the rally-round-the-flag effect on political parties' responses to terrorism (Chowanietz 2010). Chowanietz defined the rally-round-the-flag effect as "a very large movement of public and elite support in favour of the government that aims at defending the country in times of peril" (Chowanietz 2010, 675). The results indicated that repeated attacks resulted in harsh criticism by the political parties as well as "the magnitude of the act" increased the rallying effect among the political parties. Moreover, attacks from terrorist organizations originated abroad and "a formal anti-terrorist pact between the parties" increased "the likelihood of rallies" (Chowanietz 2010, 693).

Regarding the attacks' effects on prejudice, a research analyzed the 3/11 attacks' effects on prejudice with the two independent samples "contacted before and after the Islamic terrorist attacks" took place (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006, 259). The findings showed that there is a high level of prejudice against both Arabs and Jewish people, and there is an increase in tendency towards traditional conservative values and authoritarianism (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006). Nonetheless, another research analyzed the Charlie Hebdo attacks' effects on public opinion in Europe after January 2015 through analyzing the European Social Survey data (Castanho Silva 2018). The results showed that there is not a significant impact on several issues "from xenophobia to ideological self-placement and immigration policy preferences" (Castanho Silva 2018, 1). Likewise, the Paris shootings in November 2015 also do not show a public opinion change on immigration policies (Castanho Silva 2018).

Regarding the clarity of policy responsibility, a conducted research using "a unique data set of quarterly executive approval for 18 presidential countries in Latin Amer-

ica" highlighted that security policy and economic voting have opposite predictions on policy responsibility (Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2014, 3). The empirical findings suggested that when the clarity of responsibility is high with a simple institutional context, terrorist attacks did not decrease the support for the president; on the contrary, the attacks created a rally effect for the support of presidents due to executive's ability to "control the narrative surrounding the terrorist attack" (Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2014, 14).

Criado analyzed terrorism saliency using a database from "monthly public opinion surveys in Spain from 1993 to 2012" and initially found that terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency is more when attacks target civilians or politicians than when attacks target security forces (Criado 2017, 197). Moreover, terrorism saliency is lower for both left-wing and right-wing voters when the incumbent party is a center-left party than when the incumbent party is a right-wing party. In addition, when the incumbent government is a right-wing party, terrorism saliency is more among the right-wing voters than among the left-wing voters (Criado 2017). The author argued that it is because the right-wing incumbent party is "more capable of setting the political agenda" (Criado 2017, 208). Nevertheless, the empirical findings indicated that in times of high levels of unemployment and low levels of GDP growth, terrorism saliency is lower than the salience of unemployment (Criado 2017). Also, individual-level controls showed that "the more educated, elderly people and males attach more importance to terrorism than the less educated, young people and women" (Criado 2017, 210).

It can be said that the frequency of terrorist attacks plays an important role in their impacts on governments and voters. The literature includes empirical analyses on the effects of terrorism on voting behavior as terrorist attacks influence voters' decision on voting in the upcoming elections and punishing (or not punishing) the incumbent government for the increased terrorism. While the vote shares of political parties after increased levels of terrorist attacks received high attention in the literature, how terrorist attacks affect voters' perception of the importance of terrorism is understudied. For instance, I think that this should be empirically analyzed where it is argued that the support for right-wing parties and conservative values increase when terrorist attacks increase. This relationship might be a two-way relationship where terrorist attacks might increase voters' support for the right-wing parties, the support for the right-wing parties might also increase voters' perception of terrorism saliency. Although Criado's research (Criado 2017) provide an empirical analysis on the Spanish case, this presents another puzzle to further examine across different periods and cases. Initially, we should be able to empirically observe terrorist attacks' effects on voters' perception of terrorism saliency so that we can further examine

terrorism effects on voters' feelings, opinion, and behavior.

3.2.1 Literature on Political Participation and Emotional Reactions

Literature on the terrorism effects on political participation have been studied based on both the formal (like voting) and informal (joining boycotts, rallies etc.) forms of political participation. An empirical study conducted to analyze the terrorist attacks' effects on political participation based on the elections between 1989 and 1997 in Spain (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa 2018). The results indicated that "both lethal and nonlethal terrorist attacks significantly increase individuals' intent to participate in a future democratic election", yet there is no change for incumbent party support (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa 2018, 10624). In addition, when terrorist attacks target civilians, there is more impact than terrorist attacks targeting police officers or military personnel (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa 2018). Furthermore, Bellows and Miguel analyzed the effects of Sierra Leone civil war between 1991 and 2002 on political participation and found that "individuals whose households directly experienced more intense war violence are robustly more likely to attend community meetings, more likely to join local political and community groups, and more likely to vote" (Bellows and Miguel 2009, 1144). Surprisingly, people who experienced high levels of violence personally perceived other people from outside of their community as more trusting (Bellows and Miguel 2009).

In the Colombian case, Gallego used a panel data for the period between 1994 and 2006 Senate elections and found that "guerrilla violence decreases turnout, while paramilitary violence has no effect on participation, but reduces electoral competition and benefits non-traditional third parties" (Gallego 2016, 1). In the Spanish case, Bali found that the 3/11 attacks politically mobilized voters who "are traditionally less likely to participate in politics" and who are young, less educated, and who have tendency towards the center and the left ideologies (Bali 2007, 669). In the Israeli case, Berrebi and Klor analyzed that the turnout rate is not affected by the local terror fatalities, but the total terror fatalities might have a negative effect on the turnout rate (Berrebi and Klor 2008). Besides, Robbins, Hunter, and Murray applied Affective Intelligence model across 51 countries and found that anxiety caused by increased levels of terrorism led to increased voter turnout in the upcoming elections (Robbins, Hunter, and Murray 2013). In the French case, Vasilopoulos analyzed the terrorist attacks' effects on information-seeking and political participation based on the January and November 2015 attacks using the Affective Intel-

ligence Model; and found that fear increased information-seeking but did not affect voting decision, while anger restrained information-seeking but it improved "the intention to participate in political rallies" (Vasilopoulos 2018, 1). Likewise, another research revealed that information-seeking is higher when voters have the emotions of enthusiasm and anxiety, while information-seeking is lower when voters are angry (Valentino et al. 2008).

Regarding the anxiety and high level of threat perceptions, it is explained that 9/11 attacks led to high level of threat perception for many people and anxiety for a smaller group of people in the US; and high level of threat perception caused voters to support Bush and antiterrorism policies, while anxiety caused voters to support American isolationism as opposed to antiterrorism policies and the Bush administration (Huddy et al. 2005). What is more, perceived threat is analyzed in another research based on the data conducted in 2012 in France, the US, and Turkey which indicated that "reading about terrorism increases anger, and this in turn increases support for drone strikes, while the effects for fear are generally small to null and are less consistent" (Fisk, Merolla, and Ramos 2019, 978). Lastly, Vasilopoulos conducted another research to analyze 2015 Paris terror attacks' effects on the 2015 regional election and found that the support for the far-right party, the Front National, increased when voters felt anger, while the support for the far-right party decreased when voters felt fear (Vasilopoulos et al. 2018).

The literature on terrorism effects on political participation suggests that there are different empirical results across cases. On the one hand, it is argued that terrorism decreases turnout rate in some cases, and on the other hand, it is claimed that terrorism mobilizes voters to vote in the upcoming elections. These contradictory results show that factors which have an impact on voters' voting intention in the upcoming elections should be further analyzed. One of the factors might be voters' perceived terrorism saliency so that voters might perceive terrorism as highly important and tend to cast their votes in the upcoming elections to express their stance against terrorism in the ballot box. Moreover, emotional reactions to increased levels of terrorist attacks should be also further examined. Firstly, different emotions like fear, anxiety, and anger might lead to different perceptions on terrorism saliency, and terrorist attacks might trigger voters' emotions differently. This creates a puzzle that different emotions might result in different evaluations on terrorism saliency. Secondly, voters' perceived terrorism saliency might be affected from attention and participation to political campaigns, and the literature on emotional reactions indicate that emotional reactions determine how voters seek information, follow political campaigns and support antiterrorism policies. Therefore, the effects of emotional reactions caused by increased terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency through atten-

tion and participation to political campaigns should be further analyzed. Overall, these puzzles show that terrorism saliency should be empirically analyzed as the initial step of the further empirical analyses on the relationship between terrorism and voting behavior.

3.3 Literature on Political Behavior in Turkey

Within the Turkish context, there are mainly two dimensions discussed in the political behavior literature. The first dimension is on left vs. right that can be evaluated in line with Mardin's center vs. periphery divide (Mardin 1973), as Mardin claimed that 'the center' is the Ottoman Empire state with the bureaucrats around the Sultan and 'the periphery' is "peasantry, small farmers and artisans" (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006, 374). The second dimension is on nationalism vs. Kurdish ethnicism which was also presented in Çarkoğlu and Hinich's empirical analysis based on a survey conducted with the urban population in 2001 (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006). In addition, there can be another dimension in Turkish politics which is the sectarian one on Sunni vs. Alawite divide (Kalaycıoğlu 2016). Besides, Kalaycıoğlu claimed that the "Turkish Islamic Synthesis" aimed to combine nationalism with Islamism since the 1980s (Kalaycıoğlu 2007, 278). Likewise, Yavuz wrote that shifts between nationalism and Islamism could be possible in the Turkish political culture as the two are "two sides of the same coin" (Yavuz 2002, 216).

Regarding the protest behavior in Turkey, Kalaycıoğlu conducted a survey in 2002 and analyzed that religiosity, age, and gender are important factors for people to attend conventional and unconventional forms of participation (Kalaycıoğlu 2007). The author found that religious people do not have "protest potential" where unconventional forms of participation, like attending to rallies, are mostly preferred by the young people (Kalaycıoğlu 2007, 283). In addition, the analysis revealed that women tend to follow and react to the political developments in the country less than men do due to the Turkish traditional culture (Kalaycıoğlu 2007). Likewise, Chrona and Capelos' analyses based on the 2012 World Value Survey suggested that as people get older, they tend to use conventional forms of participation more than unconventional forms of participation (Chrona and Capelos 2016). Similar to what Kalaycıoğlu found, religious and traditional people tend to use conventional forms of participation like voting instead of unconventional forms of participation (Chrona and Capelos 2016).

Regarding the importance of incumbent performance evaluations, Çarkoğlu used three waves of survey conducted in 2002, 2007, and 2011 (Çarkoğlu 2012). The analyses presented that ideology was the main important factor for voters in the 2002 election, and its importance was increased in both the 2007 and 2011 elections. Also, economic performance evaluation was increased from the 2002 election to the 2007 election; yet, it lost its importance in the 2011 election. In addition, voters with high levels of religious practice tended to choose the incumbent government in the 2007 elections (Çarkoğlu 2012). Similarly, Gidengil and Karakoç's findings based on a survey conducted in 2011 suggested that the incumbent party AKP's success was due to religiosity, party performance on social services, economy, democracy, and its leaders' popularity (Gidengil and Karakoç 2014). In another research, Arıkan Akdağ analyzed the effective number of parties in the provinces with Kurdish population between the 1995 and the 2011 elections and found that the competition in those provinces is between the AKP and the pro-Kurdish parties with a varying degree (Arıkan Akdağ 2015). In addition, the decision change to vote for AKP or the pro-Kurdish parties is mostly based on religiosity (Arıkan Akdağ 2015).

Fisunoğlu and Sert created a dataset on Turkey's 81 provinces on social and economic variables between 2006 and 2015 to empirically analyze the effect of major refugee populations in cities with a varying degree on election results, especially after 2012 (Fisunoğlu and Sert 2019). The results suggest that its impact on AKP is insignificant, although negative. Moreover, it is found that economic growth has a positive effect on voters' vote decision; yet, unemployment did not affect votes for the incumbent party (Fisunoğlu and Sert 2019). Lastly, the incumbent government's social services has a positive effect on voting for AKP (Fisunoğlu and Sert 2019).

3.4 Literature on Terrorism in Turkey

Studies on the terrorism effects in Turkey started to draw attention in the last decade which needs further empirical research. To begin with, Öcal and Yıldırım analyzed terrorism effects on economic growth in provinces between 1987 and 2001, and the results presented that terrorism had a negative effect on economic growth across Turkey, especially in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey where PKK concentrated its terrorist attacks (Öcal and Yıldırım 2010). Besides, the study also revealed that these eastern and southeastern provinces' economic growth speed were faster than the western provinces because of "the development plans administered as

a part of regional policy aiming to attract new investments to these provinces" (Öcal and Yıldırım 2010, 478). Moreover, Onat and Çubukçu's research showed the impact of the conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurdish insurgents in areas with predominantly Kurdish population that there were "widespread devastation of homes and infrastructure in addition to the loss of hundreds of lives" (Onat and Çubukçu 2019, 164). Furthermore, Tezcür conducted a time-series cross-sectional analysis for the elections between 1983 and 2011 to study political violence effects on voter behavior, and found that the political violence caused by the conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK led to rural displacement which reduced voter turnout (Tezcür 2015). Because of the conflict, the Turkish government evacuated many villages in eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey and people living in those villages became "internally displaced persons" (Tezcür 2015, 76). This resulted in people's inability or unwillingness to cast their vote in the ballot box and reduced voter turnout in the elections. Besides, the 10% electoral threshold created the "pattern of disenfranchisement" for the pro-Kurdish parties' supporters; hence, the Kurdish population felt that their votes were wasted and they were underrepresented in the parliament (Tezcür 2015, 70). Therefore, the electoral threshold caused a decrease in voter turnout, especially in the provinces with Kurdish population.

Kıbrıs conducted the first empirical research on terrorism effects on voting behavior in Turkish elections by analyzing the period between the 1991 and the 1995 general elections (Kıbrıs 2011). The author's empirical analysis is based on an original dataset which consists of the police and military casualties between the 1991 and the 1995 elections, because the police and military personnel died during conflicts between the Turkish government and PKK have been seen as "terror martyrs" (Kıbrıs 2011, 223). As terrorist attacks committed by PKK and casualties increased, the terrorism issue became more salient in the eyes of the Turkish society. Therefore, Kıbrıs argued that "Turkish voters are highly sensitive to terrorism" and this affected their decision on their vote choice (Kıbrıs 2011, 220). The empirical results suggested that voters punish the incumbent government for increased terror attacks and casualties, and voters favored right-wing parties over left-wing parties in the case of increased terrorism (Kıbrıs 2011). The reason to favor right-wing parties is that right-wing parties are found to be more 'hawkish', whereas left-wing parties are found to be more 'dovish' as they are more concessionist than right-wing parties (Kıbrıs 2011). Consequently, Kıbrıs claimed that voters turned towards more 'hawkish' stance than a 'dovish' one when it comes to terrorism and 'terror martyrs', and punished the incumbent government at the ballot box (Kıbrıs 2011). Moreover, Kıbrıs conducted another empirical research with a new data set to analyze the effects of the conflict between PKK and the Turkish government on electoral behavior

between the 1995 and the 1999 elections (Kıbrıs 2014). The empirical findings presented that the conflict increased the political polarization "along ethnic nationalist lines", where the ethnic Kurdish voters vote for the pro-Kurdish parties, the ethnic Turkish voters vote for the Turkish-nationalist parties (Kıbrıs 2014, 492).

Bayer and Kemahlıoğlu conducted an empirical research on terrorism effects on the political parties' vote shares in the 2011 elections (Bayer and Kemahlıoğlu 2014). On the contrary to the literature, the authors expected that terrorism would not lead to an increase in all the right-wing parties' vote shares, and found that AKP's vote share was decreased where the voters experienced a terrorist attack since the last election (Bayer and Kemahlıoğlu 2014). In addition, CHP's vote share neither increased nor declined, and BDP's vote share other than the southeastern regions of Turkey were not affected (Bayer and Kemahlıoğlu 2014). Furthermore, Arı, Bayer, Kemahlıoğlu, and Kural conducted another empirical research on incumbent party organization's effects on the parties vote share in times of terrorist attacks with the cases of the AKP period in Turkey between 2002 and 2015, and the Chilean case in the early 1990s (Arı et al. 2019). The authors argued that the incumbent parties have strong ties with the local people through their local organizations which helps them to "offset negative electoral results at post-terror locations", either through media or direct communication with the local people (Arı et al. 2019, 2). The empirical results presented that terrorist attacks led to a decrease in the incumbent party's vote share in opposition controlled municipalities in all elections; but, this was not the case when the incumbent party controlled the municipality (Arı et al. 2019). Furthermore, the authors analyzed only the selected eastern and southeastern municipalities and found that AKP was able to cancel out the terrorist attacks' impact in the 2007 and November 2015 elections (Arı et al. 2019). When PKK attacks were analyzed only, it is reported that "the interaction between the logged number of terror attacks perpetrated by PKK and municipality incumbency of AKP is negatively associated with AKP's vote share" in the June 2015 elections (Arı et al. 2019, 27). In addition, terror attacks increased the turnout rate between the 2011 and June 2015 elections, whereas terror attacks decreased the turnout rate between the June and November 2015 elections (Arı et al. 2019).

3.5 Literature on the June and November 2015 Turkish Elections

Regarding the June 2015 elections, Kemahlıoğlu's empirical analyses showed that the incumbent party lost votes due to the economic conditions of the country (Kemahlıoğlu 2015). Moreover, it is reported that CHP increased its vote share in the June 2015 elections where the party controlled the municipality which this advantage of local government control was not seen in the cases of other parties' vote shares (Kemahlıoğlu 2015). Besides, the results suggested that HDP's vote shares was decreased as "provincial unemployment increased between 2011 and 2013", whereas the party received its votes mostly from "less socio-economically developed municipalities and provinces" (Kemahlıoğlu 2015, 458).

Özen and Kalkan conducted spatial analysis between the 2002 and the November 2015 elections to analyze the party concentration and competitiveness in Turkey (Özen and Kalkan 2016). The results suggested that there was a stabilized concentration and competitiveness in the western regions, whereas it was not the case for the eastern and southeastern regions (Özen and Kalkan 2016). Moreover, the analysis revealed that in both June and November 2015 elections, the geographical dependence increased so that AKP became "the party of all regions", where other three main parties displayed "a narrowing geographical appeal" (Özen and Kalkan 2016, 1). Furthermore, Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım conducted another research to analyze the "geographical patterns of voting across the country" and the differences between the June and November 2015 elections (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2015, 57). Like Özen and Kalkan's findings, Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım found that the incumbent party increased its vote share in all regions (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2015). Only CHP received approximately more than half a million more votes than the June 2015 elections (Habertürk 2015*a,b*). The results also revealed that MHP and HDP lost votes between the two elections "mostly in the coastal regions", where MHP mostly lost its votes in the Aegean and eastern Marmara regions (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2015, 64). In the case of HDP, although the party receives its votes mostly from the eastern and southeastern regions, the party lost its votes between the two elections more from the coastal regions than from the eastern and southeastern regions (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2015). In addition, HDP's loss of votes came from the conservative-prone districts where the votes might fluctuate between AKP and HDP (Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2015). Moreover, Tuncer and Sağdıç conducted a research on public expenditure's effects on political behavior employing a spatial analysis for the period between the June and November 2015 elections (Tuncer and Sağdıç 2017). The empirical results indicated that regional distribution of public expenditure increased the incumbent party's votes on a regional level which means that the AKP used the public expenditure to manipulate the Turkish electorate (Tuncer and Sağdıç 2017). Moreover, Çarkoğlu and Aksen found that the apportionment method

and 10% threshold to enter into Parliament put AKP in an advantageous position to form a single party government as the largest party for the period between 2002 and 2015 (Çarkoğlu and Aksen 2019).

Erişen conducted an empirical research to assess the political behavior of the Turkish electorate between the June and November 2015 elections (Erişen 2016). The empirical results, in addition to questions on the Kurdish issue mentioned in the previous chapters, showed that after the June 2015 elections, 37% AKP, 23% CHP, and 31% MHP voters disliked HDP voters (Erişen 2016, 52). In the research, Erişen differentiated the personal threat from the societal threat, where the personal threat is related with a felt threat in a person's daily life in the regions with high level of terrorist attacks, and the societal threat is related with the social cohesion across the country and terrorist attacks effects on country's overall security, economy, stability, and democracy (Erişen 2016). For instance, the Turkish lira lost "approximately 20 percent of its value" between the two elections along with other developing country currencies (Erişen 2016, 55). Likewise, increased terrorist attacks', committed by PKK and ISIL, effects on the Turkish economy led to the questions on economic stability in the eyes of the Turkish electorate. Along with the increased fear and anxiety about terrorist attacks not only in the eastern and southeastern provinces, but also in the other regions and metropolitans like Istanbul or Ankara, and the uncertainty related to the lack of government formation after the June 2015 elections and decision to go for a 'snap election' in November led to "a fear-oriented society" between the two elections in Turkey (Erişen 2016, 55).

During the period between the June and November 2015 elections, HDP was highly criticized in relation with the increased terrorist attacks, especially the ones committed by PKK. Although HDP is not directly affiliated with PKK and they are not in a hierarchical relationship with each other, HDP has been mostly seen as having ties with PKK (Erişen 2016; Martin 2018; O'Connor and Başer 2018). While HDP tried to establish a bridge between the Turkish government and PKK during the Kurdish opening process, the party could not differentiate itself from the terrorist activities of PKK in Turkey, especially after the end of the Kurdish opening process, thus the party was evaluated as the political representative of PKK in Turkey (BBC News Türkçe 2015; Erişen 2016). This image of HDP was further consolidated with the fact that HDP leader Demirtaş's brother was "an active member of the PKK" which also decreased Demirtaş's favorability as HDP leader (Martin 2018, 10). Furthermore, it is claimed that in the eyes of the Turkish electorate, the "elite level discourse" created ambiguity regarding the HDP voters as if all HDP supporters also support PKK that led to the ambiguity of differentiation between "the PKK and non-violent Kurdish actors and between politically mobilized Kurds and Kurds

in general" through the media (O'Connor and Başer 2018, 9). Although the and its supporters also suffered from ISIL's terrorist attacks, like the Suruç bombings in July 2015, the Turkish government merged these two different and opposite terrorist organizations into one group as "terror threat" and tried to present HDP as equal to PKK, especially between the two elections (Martin 2018, 9).

Kalaycıoğlu conducted an empirical research to analyze voting behavior in the June and November 2015 elections using a panel data set (Kalaycıoğlu 2017). Initially, the empirical results presented that economy was the main issue for the Turkish electorate in the June 2015 election, while terrorism was the main issue for the Turkish electorate in the November 2015 election in addition to economy because terrorism gained more attention and salience than economy (Kalaycıoğlu 2017). In the June 2015 elections, AKP gained its votes from conservatives and religious Sunni voters who placed themselves in the right-side of the ideological spectrum, while CHP received its votes from secular and non-Sunni voters who placed themselves in the left-side of the ideological spectrum as in previous elections (Kalaycıoğlu 2017). Also, the voter profiles of MHP and AKP is similar in terms of religiosity and ideological stance, but the voters are distinguished from each other on "ethnic nationalism and perception of economic satisfaction" (Kalaycıoğlu 2017, 11). In the November 2015 elections, it is observed that voters changed their ideological position from center to the right, also AKP gained the support of more right-wing voters who voted for other right-wing parties in the June 2015 election (Kalaycıoğlu 2017). Moreover, it is indicated that Kurdish voters who were affected by the increased terrorist attacks and the threat on national security seemed not to support HDP, and seemed to support other parties, especially AKP (Kalaycıoğlu 2017). Besides, the Turkish electorate started to perceive the leaderships of CHP, MHP, and HDP more problematic during the time period between the two elections, and AKP as "the more feasible and even desirable option" (Kalaycıoğlu 2017, 12).

After the June 2015 elections, Erişen studied the determination of the voters' least-liked groups and their opinions toward the Kurdish issue (Erişen 2016). The results presented that 69% of AKP voters and 72% percent of HDP voters supported the Kurdish opening process, while 66% of CHP voters and 62% of MHP voters did not support the process (Erişen 2016, 48). Furthermore, public polarization was increased between the two elections in addition to the end of the Kurdish opening process, where citizens choose to engage in the information in line with their ideological position and political attitudes so that their own selection of communication channels further increase the intensity of their beliefs and attitudes (Erişen 2016). In terms of the least-liked groups, HDP voters appeared as "the first least-liked groups by voters for other parties" which MHP voters were the least tolerant voters toward

the HDP voters (Erişen 2016, 52). Moreover, Erişen conducted another research on voters' emotional reactions on "the general track of the country, the Kurdish peace process, and the economy" (Erişen 2018, 82). The results showed that economic standing caused more anxiety than the other two issues; and while the economic conditions are associated with "greater anger about the Kurdish peace process", anger is not associated with the general track of the country (Erişen 2018, 82).

Erişen and Erdoğan conducted an empirical research on "the behavioral indicators of intolerance" between the two elections based on two waves of survey, and the authors found that perceived threat and prejudice were the main indicators on public intolerance (Erişen and Erdoğan 2019, 1). The empirical results indicated that tolerance was decreased from 2.48 to 2.27 on a 1-5 ranged scale between the two elections (Erişen and Erdoğan 2019). Also, both the level of prejudice towards and perceived threat from the least-liked groups was "at an alarming level" (Erişen and Erdoğan 2019, 11). Moreover, Erişen's empirical research regarding the emotional reactions against the political leaders, mentioned in the previous chapters, showed that feeling anger to a political leader decreased "the likelihood of voting for that leader's political party" (Erişen 2018, 108). In addition, if a voter feels anxious about Erdoğan, then this would decrease voter's likelihood of voting for AKP; but, if a voter feels enthusiasm about Erdoğan, then this would increase voters' likelihood of voting for AKP (Erişen 2018). Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu, and Bahçeli had similar effects on a voter's likelihood of voting for their parties regarding the feelings of anxiety and enthusiasm, yet the likelihood to vote for MHP had another determinant which is "scoring high on the nationalism scale" (Erişen 2018, 103).

Regarding the mainstream media and social media usage of the parties during the June and November 2015 general elections, Balcı found that the incumbent party AKP used both TV commercials and newspapers during its political campaign more than other three parties during both elections (Balcı and Olkun 2017, 119). This is not surprising where it is usually argued that if the incumbent party is a conservative one, the incumbent is at a more advantageous position than other parties in setting the agenda and more likely to increase the terrorism saliency (Criado 2017, 211). This argument can be supported with Güneyli's study on political leaders' social media (Twitter) usage between the two elections, the author found that one of the priorities given to the terrorism by Erdoğan, Davutoğlu, Kılıçdaroğlu, Bahçeli, Yüksekdağ, and Demirtaş (Güneyli, Ersoy, and Kıralp 2017). It was observed that terrorism was mentioned in these six leaders' Twitter accounts in "34.39% of Bahçeli's messages, 39.13% of Davutoğlu's messages, 8.33% of Demirtaş's messages, 20.75% of Yüksekdağ's messages, 32.94% of Kılıçdaroğlu's messages and 36.08% of Erdoğan's messages" (Güneyli, Ersoy, and Kıralp 2017, 265-266). Therefore, it can be said

that attention to terrorism was at high levels in the agendas of the political parties and leaders, and media coverage of terrorist attacks, political leaders' reaction, and political parties' campaigns can further increase terrorism saliency at the national level. Consequently, media and political campaign exposure during the period between the two elections highlighted the importance of security not only in provinces where terrorist attacks took place, but also in other provinces. Still, it should be also examined that media and political campaign exposure might be at different levels for the voters in provinces where terrorist attacks took place and for the voters in other provinces.

Lastly, a recent study was conducted by Aytaç and Çarkoğlu to analyze the issue saliency and party competence effects on the voting behavior in the June and November 2015 general elections (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019). The authors argue that heightened security related considerations along with the increased terrorist attacks between the period of two elections resulted in the increased support for the incumbent party AKP which was seen as more competent than other parties to deal with voters' security related considerations (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019). Furthermore, the authors analyzed switching votes between parties and explained that MHP voters switched their vote to AKP which canceled out the argument for the right-wing party support after increased terrorism in the literature. In addition to increased terrorism saliency for voters, the empirical results suggest that people tend to turn toward strong, charismatic leaders after increased terrorism, where leader favorability ratings increased for AKP leaders among those "who switched their votes to the AKP from the pre-June to post-June period" (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019, 2). This study is the first to conduct research on terrorism saliency and party competence in the Turkish case of the June and November 2015 elections with an individual-level data. However, terrorist attacks' effects on terrorism saliency is not empirically studied in the Turkish case for any elections, which shows a lack in the current phase of the literature.

The period between the June and November 2015 Turkish national elections present several puzzles on the relationship between terrorism and voting behavior. Contrary to what Kıbrıs found (Kıbrıs 2011), increased terrorist attacks did not result in voters' punishment of the incumbent party and all right-wing parties' vote shares did not increase in the November 2015 general elections. This might be because of the rally-round-the-flag effect or voters' perceived party competence on solving terrorism (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019). Nonetheless, I think that the effects of heightened levels of terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency should be empirically analyzed as an initial step to observe whether terrorism saliency is affected by terrorist attacks directly or by other factors like media exposure, political participation, political parties'

agendas etc. In addition, emotional reactions to increased terrorist attacks should be also analyzed to understand whether there are differences on emotional reactions between voters who live in a province with increased terrorist attacks and voters who live in a province without any terrorist attack experience. If there are differences on emotional reactions to terrorism between the two groups, then it might be also expected that their effects on voting behavior will be different from each other. Although I do not aim to analyze all of the puzzles I discussed in this study, it can be understood that the Turkish case raises important puzzles to be tackled that are based on the effects of increased terrorist attacks on voters' perceived terrorism saliency. Consequently, I think that studying terrorist attacks' effects on terrorism saliency with the Turkish case of November 2015 national elections is a good start to contribute to the literature focusing on the relationship between terrorism and electoral behavior.

4.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Terrorist attacks are not novel experiences for many countries. Although each terrorist attack affects voter behavior and most likely increase terrorism saliency, the factors on how terrorist attacks increase terrorism saliency in countries with high levels of terrorist attacks should be further analyzed. Despite the fact that terrorist attacks are not novel to Turkish citizens, we do not know the effects of attacks and the determinants on terrorism saliency in the eyes of the Turkish electorate. It is important to understand what and how citizens react to terrorist attacks so that the government could take action against terrorism and the political parties could direct their political agendas accordingly. When attacks increase, everyone starts feeling more threatened and insecure than before and react to this increased threat differently. I think that we should be analyzing how voters are affected by increased terrorist attacks even though they did not experience those attacks personally. Then, the effect of voters' reactions to terrorist attacks could be examined to determine how their reactions affect their political behavior. Consequently, terrorism saliency should be initially studied further as one of the most important signs from which we can understand how voters react to increased terrorist attacks.

Regardless of terrorist attacks' impact on achieving their aims through concessions from the governments, terrorist attacks result in heightened levels of anxiety, fear, and anger in the eyes of societies where personal and psyhical proximity plays a crucial role. Thus, voters could form their opinions in accordance with the increased levels of attacks. Criado examined the Spanish case focusing on the period from 1993 to 2012 and claimed that the type of victim and incumbent's ideology could also explain the increase in the level of terrorism saliency (Criado 2017). In addition to the amount and intensity of attacks, the author made a division between attacks which resulted in fatalities from civilians, fatalities from politicians, and fatalities from security forces to analyze the effects on terrorism saliency by claiming that "civilians will likely feel less threatened if they are not the target and, on the other hand, the media will tend to downplay the coverage of attacks on members of the security forces as compared to attacks on civilians" (Criado 2017, 200). Hence,

public opinion formation on terrorism might be affected by increased attacks that should be further examined for the Turkish case as well as the Spanish case.

As discussed in the Literature Review chapter, terrorist attacks' effectiveness is studied by Abrahms which indicated that terrorism is less effective when the attacks target civilians than when the attacks target security forces (Abrahms 2006, 2012). The author claimed that it was because the governments' reaction for the terrorist attacks against civilians is resulted in the avoidance of concessions (Abrahms 2006). Another research was conducted based on the ETA's terrorist attacks' effects on the support for its political wing Batasuna in the Spanish case with the differentiation of terrorist attacks against civilians and security forces (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2013). Furthermore, the differentiation between terrorist attacks' targets has been studied to analyze the political participation and it has been found that targeting civilians has more impact than targeting security forces (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa 2018). However, this differentiation between attacks targeting civilians and attacks targeting security forces is understudied both in their effects on the terrorism saliency in the literature and in the Turkish case on terrorism studies. Therefore, I argue that terrorist organizations' strategies in target selection might affect the public opinion on terrorism saliency.

Turkey suffered from high levels of terrorist attacks in a short period between the June and November 2015 national elections. The case of four months of heightened

Figure 4.1 The Histogram of Terrorist Attacks in Turkey between 1970-2015

terrorist attacks was unfamiliar for the Turkish society even though the country experienced terrorist attacks since 1970s. Figure 4.1 shows terrorist attacks occurred in Turkey between 1970 and 2015. It can be said that the peaks in terrorist attacks during the first half of the 1990s and around 2015 is highly distinguishable in the graph. That is why, I focus on dramatically increased terrorist attacks between the June and November 2015 national elections to observe whether the attacks have an effect on how people consider terrorism as the most important problem in the country.

Figure 4.2 The Map of Frequency of Terrorist Attacks

Frequency of Terrorist Attacks per City

Figure 4.3 The Map of Frequency of Fatalities

Frequency of Deaths per City

It can be observed that terrorist attacks, especially against security forces, were mostly concentrated in the southeastern region of Turkey. However, re-escalation of PKK attacks after the end of the Kurdish opening and the rise of ISIL attacks took place not only in the southeastern region of Turkey, but also in other cities, including metropolitan cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 presents the terrorist attacks occurred between the period of the June and November 2015 national elections and fatalities resulted from the attacks. The first map shows that terrorist attacks mostly occurred in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, still there were terrorist attacks in other regions. The terrorist attacks in the

metropolitan cities are likely to affect voters where the notion of terrorism becomes a closer threat to people who live in the western regions as well as people live in the eastern regions of Turkey. Thus, it is expected that terrorism issue becomes one of the most important issue for the Turkish society during these four months.

The studies on terrorism saliency in the Turkish context is limited and requires further attention. Aytaç and Çarkoğlu analyze terrorism saliency effects on the voting behavior in the November 2015 national elections and claim that terrorism saliency increased support for the incumbent party because it was perceived as more competent than other parties during the period between June and November 2015 national elections (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019). However, to the best of my knowledge, terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency has not been empirically analyzed in the Turkish case of 2015 national elections yet; and I think that it is important to analyze public opinion formation on terrorism as the most important problem of the country after increased terrorist attacks. To begin with, terrorism saliency is expected to increase when there is a terrorist attack. Even if Turkey experiences terrorist attacks for a long period, personal proximity and physical proximity to terrorist attacks still affect people directly. Although attacks against security forces are not usually considered as terrorist attacks, which was mentioned in the Literature Review section, police officers, military personnel, and civilians killed during a terrorist attack are considered as 'terror martyrs' in Turkey (Kıbrıs 2011). Likewise, media coverage of terrorist attacks includes not only attacks against security forces, but also attacks against civilians. Consequently, terrorist attacks are perceived in Turkey as the total of attacks against all types of victims. Thus, the first hypothesis tests this argument:

H1: If terrorist attacks increase in a province, then the terrorism saliency will increase.

The division between terrorist attacks against civilians and security forces is still needed to be analyzed separately to observe their effects on terrorism saliency in the Turkish context. Following upon Criado's study (Criado 2017), I argue that the target selection of terrorist organizations plays an important role in determining terrorism saliency. First, there is a strong emphasis on terrorist attacks targeting security forces (including police officers and military personnel) in the Turkish context. Kıbrıs conducted an empirical analysis on terrorist attacks' effects on voting behavior by using a data set on the security forces killed during attacks committed by PKK (Kıbrıs 2011). Likewise, the strong emphasis on calling people who died during terrorist attacks as 'terror martyrs' in Turkey is expected to create an effect on the public opinion. Hence, I expect terrorism saliency to increase with the

increasing terrorist attacks which target security forces. Second, I also argue that voters feel more threatened when a terrorist attack is targeting civilians where the attacks took place in the province they live in. Thus, I expect that voters will perceive both personal and societal threat and react accordingly when terrorist attacks target civilians which will increase the terrorism saliency. In general, it might be expected for all countries that highly increased terrorist attacks lead to increased security concerns and sensibility for terrorism for civilians. In the Turkish case, terrorist attacks committed by PKK and ISIL in four months of period were not only in the eastern and southeastern regions, but also in the western regions, which is expected to affect civilians to perceive terrorism as the most important problem in the country. These are hypothesized as the following:

H1a: If increasing terrorist attacks target security forces, then the terrorism saliency will increase.

H1b: If increasing terrorist attacks target civilians, then the terrorism saliency will increase.

The maps show that terrorist attacks are concentrated on the east and southeastern parts of the country where the Kurdish population is concentrated as well. Therefore, it might be argued that Kurdish voters are more accustomed to terrorist attacks in the provinces they live in. This could result in terrorism saliency to be lower for the Kurdish voters when compared with the non-Kurdish voters. In addition, I argue that the effect of increasing terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency will decrease for the Kurdish voters. These are hypothesized as:

H2: Terrorism saliency is expected to be lower for the Kurdish voters than the non-Kurdish voters.

H2a: Terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency will decrease as terrorist attacks increase for Kurdish voters.

Lastly, it has been argued that when the incumbent party is a right-wing party, its agenda setting capacity increases the level of terrorism saliency in comparison to an incumbent left-wing party (Criado 2017). In the literature, right-wing parties are considered as partly the issue owner of terrorism and the right-wing constituency is expected to be more concerned about terrorism regardless of the level of terrorist attacks. Although terrorism becomes more salient as a general concern for each political party and for everyone during the periods of highly increased terrorist attacks, the level of terrorism saliency is expected to be higher for the right-wing constituency than the left-wing constituency (Criado 2017).

AKP and MHP are the two right-wing parties in the Parliament during the June and November 2015 national elections. MHP is well-known for its strong stance against terrorism and the party's decline on giving any concessions to PKK, thus it is expected that terrorism saliency will be higher for its supporters. Despite AKP's initiations on the Kurdish opening process, AKP's stance after the end of this process reflects fighting with terrorism against both PKK and ISIL during the period between the two elections in 2015. Moreover, AKP holding the incumbency since 2002 as a right-wing party and its high capacity to set the political agenda lead to the expectation that terrorism saliency will be higher for its supporters as well. I acknowledge the fact that terrorist attacks were among the top priorities before the November 2015 elections and all the four main political parties and their leaders' speeches and social media messages include terrorism at high levels (Güneyli 2017), and this is most likely to lead the increase of terrorism saliency in the public opinion. On this point, I argue that the level of terrorism saliency is higher for right-wing party supporters than for the other voters, and increasing terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency will increase for the AKP and MHP partisans. Because AKP and MHP were the two right-wing parties in the Parliament with a strong stance against terrorism during the period, I include other small right-wing parties among other voters. Moreover, after June 2015 general elections, AKP and MHP were the "non-compromising parties toward the establishment of a coalition government" (Kalaycıoğlu 2016, 34). In addition, it was argued that AKP and MHP were demonizing HDP by claiming that HDP is "the legal face of the PKK" (Kalaycıoğlu 2016, 34). What these mean is that between the period of two elections, AKP and MHP started to form an alliance against coalition government formation, PKK, ISIL, and HDP. Hence, I will compare voters who support AKP or MHP in comparison to other voters who do not support AKP or MHP to examine whether the effect is different in the two groups.

H3: Terrorism saliency is expected to be higher for the AKP and MHP voters than other voters.

H3a: Terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency will increase as terrorist attacks increase for AKP and MHP voters.

5.   RESEARCH DESIGN

5.1 Data

In this section, I will provide details on the research design and operationalization of the dependent and independent variables for the empirical analyses. In the empirical analyses, logistic regressions will be employed with robust standard errors clustered at the province level. The unit of analysis is individual level and the data on terrorist attacks at the province level are merged with the individual level data.

The individual level data set for the pre-November 2015 period is made available by Prof. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu from Sabancı University who conducted the field research in October 2015 and the data set is "weighted to conform to the gender and education ratios in the Turkish voting age population" (Kalaycıoğlu 2017, 6). In total, 1508 respondents completed the pre-November 2015 survey in 57 provinces out of 81 between 3rd and 28th of October 2015. This dataset was merged with the GTD dataset on terror attacks, fatalities, and target types for the given period.

The data on terrorist attacks is obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) that is created by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland since 2011 (START 2019a). In the GTD Codebook, a terrorist attack is defined as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (START 2019b, 10). All the terrorist attacks included in the database have the three criteria; first, the attack must be done on purpose; second, the attack must contain violence or threat of violence; and third, the attacks must be committed by sub-national actors and not by states (START 2019a). Also, each coded attack in the database should have at least two of the three criteria to be evaluated as 'a terrorist attack' in accordance

with its definition. First, the attack must contain "a political, economic, religious, or social goal"; second, it must be proven that the attack's target is not just the immediate victims but also a larger audience with an intention to "coerce, intimidate or publicize"; and third, the attacks must be excluded from "the context of legitimate warfare activities" determined by international humanitarian law (START 2019*b*, 11).

The GTD contains data on terrorist attacks for the period between 1970 and 2018 across more than 200 countries, but the focus of this study is the period between the June and November 2015 Turkish national elections. Hence, the data used in this study is restricted to terrorist attacks in Turkey between the period of June 7, 2015 and November 1, 2015. Consequently, the data set on terrorist attacks include 314 incidents during the period. The GTD categorizes the 314 incidents in accordance with the target type as business, government (general), police, military, government (diplomatic), educational institution, journalists & media, NGO, private citizens & property, religious figures/institutions, terrorists/non-state militias, tourists, transportation (other than aviation), unknown, and utilities.

5.1.1 Variables

The main dependent variable for the issue saliency of terrorism was generated as the combination of two questions in the dataset. The first question asks about what the most important problem of Turkey is, and the second question asks about what the most important political problem that Turkey will be facing with in the upcoming general elections on the 1st of November 2015 is. First, two dummy variables were generated for each question where '1' corresponds to indicating terrorism as the most important (political) problem and '0' corresponds the other answers. In the original dataset, the first question on the most important problem included the other answers like unemployment, democracy, weak economy, the Kurdish issue, Syria, justice, health, and freedom in addition to terrorism. Besides, the first question on the most important political problem included the other answers like coalition, inability to form the government, politics, AKP, the Kurdish issue, peace, HDP exceeding the threshold, and democracy in addition to terrorism. In addition, the category of '99' for the answers 'I do not know' were recoded as missing for both dummy variables. Then, a new dummy variable was generated to merge the two dummy variables to include observations which the respondents indicated terrorism as the most important problem in at least one of the questions. Thus, the new variable is

coded as '1' when a respondent indicated terrorism in either one of the questions or in both of them, and it is coded as '0' when a respondent gave any other answers than terrorism to both questions. An alternative variable was generated which puts the answers to the two questions in order where '0' indicates other answers, '1' indicates declaring terrorism to only one question out of two, and '2' indicates declaring terrorism as the most important problem in both question. The OLS regressions and ordered logistic regressions employed using this alternative variable, and the results are presented in the Appendix.

The main independent variable is retrieved from the GTD for the period between 7th of June and 1st of November 2015. To determine in which cities terrorist attacks took place, I created the 'attack' variable to observe the sum of the attacks in each province when merged with the individual level data set. Also, I added two new variables to distinguish attacks against civilians and security forces. In the case of attacks against security forces, the 'security' variable is created by adding the police and military target types; and in the case of attacks against civilians, the 'civilian' variable is created by adding all the target types except for police and military. Moreover, I created another variable on fatalities in attacks to include in the analysis as control variable. The GTD contains variables for fatalities where the 'nkill' variable contains the information on total amount of fatalities including both target and attackers, the 'nkillterr' variable contains information on the fatalities for the attackers (START 2019a). Therefore, I generated the new 'death' variable so that it contains information only on the fatalities among the targets in each province. In addition, I added another variable for city 'id' corresponding to the plate numbers of each cities to merge the data set with the shapefiles of Turkey to draw maps presented in the previous chapter as well as to merge with the individual level data set.

314 terrorist attacks were listed for the period between the June and November 2015 Turkish national elections, but 2 attacks were excluded from the analyses since the cities where the terrorist attacks took place are unknown. 101 of the 312 terrorist attacks were deadly attacks which resulted in 319 deaths in total between the two elections. Because the field research took place between the 3rd and 28th of October 2015, I excluded those dates from the data set. Although the restricted period includes 276 terror attacks in 29 provinces out of 81 in the GTD data set, the individual level data set includes observations from 57 provinces; therefore, the merged data set includes 152 attacks that took place in 18 provinces out of 57. When the attacks are categorized as attacks against civilians and against security forces, there are 43 attacks targeting civilians and 104 attacks targeting security forces while 5 terrorist attacks' targets are unknown. The independent variable for

'death' includes the number of fatalities among the 152 terrorist attacks, where 43 of them included fatalities and 109 of them did not. 43 terrorist attacks resulted in 102 deaths in total, where 10 of the attacks targeted civilians and resulted in 45 deaths in total, 33 of the attacks targeted security forces and resulted in 57 deaths in total.

Socioeconomic independent variables include variables for gender, age, education, and marital status. For each variable, 'I do not know' responses coded as '99' was recoded as missing and excluded from the analyses. In the original dataset, the gender variable was coded as '1' indicating male and '2' indicating female. The variable for gender is recoded as a dummy variable as '0' indicating male and '1' indicating female. The variable for age is generated by subtracting respondents' birth year from 2015. The range for the age variable is between the ages of 18 and 90. In the education variable, '0' indicates no received formal education, '1' indicates people who continued primary school but did not finish it, '2' indicates primary school graduates, '3' indicates people who continued secondary school but did not finish it, '4' indicates secondary school graduates, '5' indicates people who continued high school but did not finish it, '6' indicates high school graduates, '7' indicates people who continued university but did not finish it, and '8' indicates university graduates. The variable for marital status is a categorical variable and coded in the original data set where '1' corresponds to people married and living together, '2' corresponds to people whose spouse died, '3' corresponds to divorced people, '4' corresponds to people who are engaged, '5' corresponds to people who are divorced but living separately, and '6' corresponds to unmarried people.

The question for religiosity asks about respondents' frequency of pray (namaz) and the variable is coded in the original dataset where 1 indicates the highest frequency of pray and 7 indicates lowest frequency of pray. The religiosity variable is re-coded where '1' indicates almost never, '2' indicates less than once in a year, '3' indicates during religious holidays (bayram), once/twice a year, '4' indicates during Ramadan and Islamic days (kandil), '5' indicates once in a month, '6' indicates once in a week (Fridays), and '7' indicates more than once in a week. Ideology variable reflects survey respondents' ideological self-placement on a scale where '0' indicates the leftist ideological stance and '10' indicates the rightest ideological stance. Regarding the ethnic identity, the Kurdish language variable was coded as '1' for the Kurdish language speakers and '0' for the non-Kurdish speakers. An alternative variable for H2 is used in the empirical analysis presented in the Appendix where voting intention to HDP in the November 2015 general elections was coded as '1' and voting intention to other parties was coded as '0'.

Income variable is a continuous variable and it is included in the analyses in the log-transformed version because the distribution of the variable is highly skewed. The employment question asks about the current level of working for living and the variable is coded in the original data set as '1' indicating working in a full-time job, '2' indicating working in a part-time job, '3' indicating working less than 15 hours per week, '4' indicating helping the family members, '5' indicating those who worked previously but not working currently, and '6' indicating not working in any kind of job.

Regarding the negative economic evaluations, I generated a new additive variable from five questions on economic evaluations. Following upon the coding procedure in Aytaç and Çarkoğlu's latest work (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019), the new variable was generated as an index of five questions on economic evaluations which ranges from 0 to 10 and answers below 5 for each question is regarded as negative economic evaluations. The first question asks about the effect of the government's policies on the economic condition of the respondent's family in the last year. The second question asks about the effect of the government's policies on the economic condition of Turkey. The third question asks about how much the respondent is satisfied with his/her current economic condition. The fourth question asks about how his/her family's current economic condition will be in the upcoming year. The fifth question asks about how Turkey's current economic condition will be in the upcoming year. The new variable includes the answers below 5 for each five questions by creating an additive index for the number of negative economic evaluations.

Partisanship question asks about whether the survey respondents are a partisan of a political party. In the original data set, the variable is listing 17 political parties coded from 1 to 17, '90' indicates others, '96' indicates no partisanship to any political parties and '99' indicates 'no idea/do not know/no answer'. I recoded the variable as '1' corresponding to AKP, '2' corresponding to CHP, '3' corresponding to MHP, '4' corresponding to HDP, '5' corresponding to all other political parties (including the category of '90'), and '0' corresponding the non-partisans in the category of '96'. Next, I generated the main partisanship variable where '1' signifies AKP and MHP partisans, '0' signifies others including other partisans and non-partisans. In the main empirical analyses, I included the main partisanship variable, but I checked for the first variable where I included the first variable in full regressions that are presented in the Appendix. In addition, I generated another variable on partisanship to check for the supporters of other small right-wing parties, where '0' signifies others including other partisans and non-partisans, '1' signifies AKP and MHP partisans, and '2' signifies partisans of other small right-wing parties. The results are presented in the Appendix.

In addition to individual level data and the data on terror attacks and fatalities, aggregate level data on population, illiteracy rate, and vote shares of AKP and MHP in the June 2015 national elections were also included in the empirical analyses. The data at the province level were retrieved from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK 2015). Population variable includes population for each province in the log-transformed version, the illiteracy rate variable is generated by dividing the number of illiterate people in each province to the total amount of people in the literacy data. Another variable was generated by adding the vote shares for AKP and MHP in the June 2015 elections for each province which the vote shares are calculated by dividing the total votes each party receives to the total of valid votes at the province level. Lastly, NUTS1 level data were also retrieved on poverty and unemployment rates for each region as control variables. The full model regressions including poverty and unemployment variables for robustness of the empirical results were presented in the Appendix.

Lastly, I divided the attacks into three in accordance with their timing and created three new variables for each period counting attacks for each period at the province level. The first period includes terrorist attacks which took place between 8th of June and 16th of July, 2015. The second period includes terrorist attacks which took place between 17th of July and 24th of August, 2015. The third period includes terrorist attacks which took place between 25th of August and 2nd of September, 2015. Likewise, I divided attacks targeting security forces and attacks targeting civilians into the same three periods. Since the period is limited to four-months between the two elections, I included these regressions on the effect of timing of the attacks on terrorism saliency to the Appendix. In addition, I created a dummy variable where '1' indicates provinces located in the southeast region of Turkey and '0' indicates provinces in other regions for further control purposes. I controlled the analyses without the southeast region sample because terrorist attacks concentrated in the region, and these regressions are presented in the Appendix.

6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The empirical analyses are presented in Table 6.1 and logistic regressions were used across three models. Model 1 tests the first hypothesis where the main independent variable is the attack variable. Attacks' effect on terrorism saliency is positive and statistically significant at 99% confidence level. This means that when attacks took place in a province, terrorism saliency increases in the eyes of the Turkish electorate. Model 2 tests the second hypothesis where the main independent variable is attacks targeting security forces. Model 2 suggests that the effect of attacks against security forces on terrorism saliency is positive and statistically significant at 95% confidence level. Model 3 tests the third hypothesis where the main independent variable is attacks targeting civilians. The results present that the effect of attacks against civilians on terrorism saliency is positive and statistically significant at 99% confidence level.

Three models and their predicted probabilities reflect that terrorist attacks affect voters' opinion on the issue saliency of terrorism. When the target type is divided as security forces and civilians, there is statistical significance in both target types. Effect of attacks against civilians is greater than effect of attacks against security forces where the coefficient in Model 3 is higher than the coefficient in Model 2, which was expected where civilians would feel more threatened when the target in terrorist attacks is civilians rather than security forces. Still, attacks against security forces also affect people's opinion on terrorism saliency as it was presented in Model 2. In each graph for the predicted probabilities presented in this section, relevant variables are fixed at their means or medians, and only the variable of interest is allowed to vary.

Figure 6.1 presents the predicted probabilities on terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency with an overlaid histogram of the attack variable used in Model 1, which the control variables are fixed at their means for continuous and ordinal variables and at their medians for categorical variables. The graph shows that defining terrorism as the most important problem in Turkey increases as the number of attacks in a province increases, which supports the first hypothesis.

Table 6.1 Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency

DV: Terrorism Saliency - I	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Attacks	0.054***		
	(0.015)		
Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.057**	
		(0.024)	
Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.170***
			(0.054)
Death	-0.037	-0.030	-0.028
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Gender	-0.074	-0.075	-0.095
	(0.225)	(0.224)	(0.222)
Age	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education	-0.009	-0.014	0.002
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.056)
Religiosity	-0.122*	-0.123*	-0.122*
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.070)
Ideology	0.016	0.016	0.019
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Income	-0.059	-0.036	-0.089
	(0.210)	(0.208)	(0.212)
Employment	-0.027	-0.028	-0.018
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Negative Economic Evaluations	0.028	0.022	0.031
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Marital Status	-0.045	-0.042	-0.053
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Kurdish Language	-1.349***	-1.331***	-1.293***
	(0.249)	(0.247)	(0.250)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.852***	0.824***	0.869***
	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.281)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	2.442**	2.352**	1.956**
	(1.047)	(1.144)	(0.908)
Population	-0.089	0.039	-0.279
	(0.147)	(0.133)	(0.201)
Illiteracy Rate	-15.876	-14.288	-15.886
	(11.195)	(11.374)	(10.402)
Constant	2.893	1.034	5.914*
	(2.899)	(2.798)	(3.547)
N	863	863	863
Pseudo R^2	0.157	0.151	0.164
Log Likelihood	-399.009	-401.655	-395.505

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 6.1 The Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Terrorism Saliency

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.2 presents the predicted probabilities on the effect of terrorist attacks against security forces effects on terrorism saliency with an overlaid histogram of the security variable used in Model 2. Like Figure 6.1, the second graph suggest that when terrorist attacks against security forces increase in a province, terrorism saliency also increases at 95% confidence level. Figure 6.3 shows the predicted probabilities on the effect of terrorist attacks against civilians on the issue saliency of terrorism with an overlaid histogram of the civilian variable used in Model 3. There is an increase in voters' opinion on terrorism as the most important problem in the country. These results are in line with H1, H1a and H1b that terrorist attacks increase terrorism saliency as well as both target types increase terrorism saliency individually.

In Table 6.1, we can observe across all three models that the Kurdish language variable appears as negative and statistically significant at 99% confidence level. Although there are only minor differences between the target types, this means that Kurdish speakers are less likely to state terrorism as the most important problem in Turkey than the non-Kurdish speakers. This could be expected because an important share of terrorist attacks, especially those committed by PKK over several decades, have been concentrated on the east and southeast regions of the country with high levels of Kurdish population. Hence, terrorist attacks against security for-

Figure 6.2 The Effect of the Target Type on Terrorism Saliency - I

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.3 The Effect of the Target Type on Terrorism Saliency - II

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

ces and civilians are not novel experiences for these voters and they might not prioritize terrorism as the most important problem from their perspective. Hence, it is possible to say that the coefficients for the Kurdish language variable across all models in Table 6.1 empirically support H2 that terrorism saliency is lower for the Kurdish speakers than the non-Kurdish speakers.

Figure 6.4 illustrates conditional marginal effects of attacks on terrorism saliency for non-Kurdish and Kurdish speakers. Accordingly, for both Kurdish speakers and non-Kurdish speakers, terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency decreases as terrorist attacks increase. It can be observed that attacks' effect on terrorism saliency is higher for the Kurdish speakers than the non-Kurdish speakers.

Figure 6.4 Conditional Marginal Effects of Terrorist Attacks on Terrorism Saliency for the Non-Kurdish vs. Kurdish Speakers

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.5 illustrates conditional marginal effects of attacks against security forces on terrorism saliency for the non-Kurdish and Kurdish speakers. The effect of terrorist attacks which target security forces on terrorism saliency decreases for both Kurdish speakers and non-Kurdish speakers as terrorist attacks increase. Like Figure 6.4, the effects on terrorism saliency is higher for the Kurdish speakers than the non-Kurdish speakers, and the confidence intervals overlap with each other between the groups.

Figure 6.5 Conditional Marginal Effects of the Target Type on Terrorism Saliency for the Non-Kurdish vs. Kurdish Speakers - I

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.6 Conditional Marginal Effects of the Target Type on Terrorism Saliency for the Non-Kurdish vs. Kurdish Speakers - II

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

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
Similarly, Figure 6.6 illustrates conditional marginal effects of attacks against civilians on terrorism saliency for the non-Kurdish and Kurdish speakers. Again, as terrorist attacks increase, the effect of terrorist attacks which target civilians on terrorism saliency decreases for both Kurdish speakers and non-Kurdish speakers. Like Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5, the effects on terrorism saliency is higher for the Kurdish speakers than the non-Kurdish speakers, and the confidence intervals overlap with each other between the two groups. These figures suggest that there is partial empirical support for H2a where terrorist attacks' effects on terrorism saliency decreases for both Kurdish voters and non-Kurdish voters as terrorist attacks increase.

Table 6.1 also indicates that AKP and MHP partisanship is positive and statistically significant at 99% confidence level across three models. This means that AKP and MHP partisans are more likely to state terrorism as the most important problem in Turkey than the others. Hence, it is possible to say that the coefficients for the partisanship variable across all models in Table 6.1 empirically support H3 that terrorism saliency is higher for AKP and MHP partisans than the others. Figure 6.7 illustrates conditional marginal effects of attacks on terrorism saliency for AKP/MHP partisans and others. The figure suggests that for both AKP/MHP partisans and others, terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency decreases as terrorist attacks increase. It can be observed that attacks' effect on terrorism saliency is higher for

Figure 6.7 Conditional Marginal Effects of Terrorist Attacks on Terrorism Saliency for the Others vs. AKP+MHP Partisans

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

52

Figure 6.8 Conditional Marginal Effects of the Target Type on Terrorism Saliency for the Others vs. AKP+MHP Partisans - I

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6.9 Conditional Marginal Effects of the Target Type on Terrorism Saliency for the Others vs. AKP+MHP Partisans - II

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

53

others than AKP/MHP partisans. Figure 6.8 presents conditional marginal effects of terrorist attacks targeting security forces on terrorism saliency for AKP/MHP partisans and others. Likewise, the effect of terrorist attacks which target security forces on terrorism saliency decreases for both groups as terrorist attacks increase. Lastly, Figure 6.9 shows conditional marginal effects of terrorist attacks targeting civilians on terrorism saliency for AKP/MHP partisans and others. Similarly, it can be observed that as terrorist attacks increase, the effect of terrorist attacks which target civilians on terrorism saliency decreases for both groups. Consequently, these empirical results suggest that there is no empirical support for H3a.

Regarding the other independent variables listed in Table 6.1, religiosity is negative and statistically significant at 90% confidence level, meaning that the level of terrorism saliency for more religious people is lower than the level of terrorism saliency for less religious people. Moreover, the vote shares of AKP and MHP at the province level is positive and statistically significant at 95% confidence level for all three models. As the vote shares of AKP and MHP increase at the province level, terrorism saliency increases as well.

Overall, the empirical analyses suggest that my hypotheses found partial empirical support. As terrorist attacks increase, terrorism saliency increases as well. Terrorist organizations' target selection is also statistically significant for both target types. In addition, the most robust empirical finding is that increased terrorist attacks which target civilians increase terrorism saliency, because only attacks targeting civilians are statistically significant even when I excluded the southeast region from the empirical analyses (presented in the Appendix). Furthermore, Table 6.1 suggests that terrorism saliency is lower for Kurdish speakers than non-Kurdish speakers. However, terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency decreases for both Kurdish speakers and non-Kurdish speakers as terrorist attacks increase. Moreover, Table 6.1 indicates that terrorism saliency is higher for AKP/MHP partisans than others. Nevertheless, terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency decreases for both AKP/MHP partisans and others as terrorist attacks increase, which do not show empirical support for H3a.

7. CONCLUSION

Terrorist attacks create an impact on not only its immediate victims, but also on the public in general. As the security concerns increase, this affects how citizens react to terrorist attacks. This thesis aimed to study the causal relationship between increased terrorist attacks and terrorism saliency with a case-study on Turkey. Turkey experienced an exceptional period after the June 2015 national elections. Heightened terrorist attacks after the elections and early elections to be held in November 2015 further increased security and stability concerns of the Turkish electorate. Through media coverage of terrorist attacks, political leaders' speeches and messages on terrorism, and political parties' campaigns before the November 2015 general elections, terrorism concerned everyone even though most of them did not personally experienced a terrorist attack. Also, terrorist attacks took place not just in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country, but also in other provinces in the western regions and in metropolitan cities which further intensified people's attention to terrorism in times of rising fear and anxiety.

A recent study by Aytaç and Çarkoğlu conducts a research on the effect of terrorism saliency on voting behavior and presented that people tend to vote for the incumbent party as they perceive the party as more competent in solving terrorism than the other parties (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019). However, there is a lack in the literature to analyze the effects of terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency based on various factors. This is the case not only for the literature on Turkey, but this causal relationship should be empirically analyzed in other cases as well. Increased levels of terrorist attacks can be also connected with issue voting where voters might vote for political parties based on issues they perceive as the most important problem, and terrorist attacks might increase issue voting in accordance with their increased security concerns. Criado conducted a research focusing on the Spanish case to analyze the effects of terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency and found that the target type, ideology of the incumbent party, and the divide between right-wing vs. left-wing voters are the factors to explain the increase of terrorism saliency (Criado 2017). The research argues that increased terrorist attacks result in increased terrorism saliency,

and attacks targeting civilians affect voters' perceived terrorism saliency more than attacks targeting security forces (Criado 2017). Following upon this research, this thesis aimed to analyze whether increase of terrorist attacks, terrorist organizations' target selection, the division between non-Kurdish speakers and Kurdish speakers, and the division between AKP and MHP partisans and others plays an important role on specifying terrorism as the most important problem of the country with the increased terrorist attacks between the June and November 2015 national elections. Terrorist attacks' effect on voters' perception on terrorism saliency can be evaluated as an initial step to study political behavior as it was studied by Aytaç and Çarkoğlu to empirically analyze terrorism saliency's effects on issue voting, party competence, voting for the incumbent party, and leaders' favorability ratings (Aytaç and Çarkoğlu 2019). Thus, I aimed to empirically analyze public opinion formation on terrorism saliency as an initial stage.

Empirical results show partial support for my hypotheses. The results suggest that the increase in terrorist attacks result in the increase in terrorism saliency. When we look into target types, both attacks against security forces and against civilians increase terrorism saliency statistically significantly. Indeed, attacks against civilians increases terrorism saliency more than attacks against security forces. This result can be explained with the fact that civilians might feel more concerned about their security when they find out that terrorist organizations target civilians and not only security forces. It leads to anxiety and fear when people keep hearing about the increased terrorist attacks in a short period in the news and in their social environment. Therefore, the empirical results are in line with my expectations that target type is an important factor on the level of terrorism saliency.

Concentrated terrorist attacks in the east and southeastern regions of Turkey allowed me to discuss the effects of the terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency with a high level of Kurdish population living in the regions. The table of the main empirical analysis showed that terrorism saliency is lower for Kurdish speakers than non-Kurdish speakers. This is most likely due to the concentration of terrorist attacks, where people have to continue living under the permanent threat of terrorism. Still, when the terrorist attacks increase, terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency decreases for both groups. Lastly, I compared the change in terrorism saliency with the increase in terrorist attacks for AKP and MHP partisans and others who are either partisans of other parties or non-partisans. The results are in line with my theoretical expectations when we look at the table of the main empirical analysis suggesting that terrorism saliency is higher for AKP/MHP partisans than others. However, when terrorist attacks increase, terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency decreases for both AKP/MHP partisans and others. These results show

partial empirical support for H2a and H3a where I argued that the effect of attacks on terrorism saliency will decrease for Kurdish voters and its effect will increase for AKP/MHP partisans as terrorist attacks increase. Nevertheless, this is a good start to support the argument which claims that right-wing parties make terrorism more salient than left-wing parties and this result in the increase of terrorism saliency for the right-wing constituencies, especially this effect is argued to be greater when the incumbent party is a right-wing party than when the incumbent party is a left-wing party (Criado 2017). Although I did not compare a right-wing incumbency and a left-wing incumbency in the Turkish case, the argument on the right-wing supporters' terrorism saliency to be higher than the others under the AKP incumbency is supported with the empirical results.

Overall, I think that my research contributes to the current phase of the literature focusing on Turkey regarding public opinion formation, where I empirically analyzed terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency based on terrorist organizations' target selection strategies, concentration of terrorist attacks to a region, and voters' support of right-wing parties. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the first to merge individual-level data set with terrorism data set at the province level and include aggregate level control variables to empirically test the relationship between terrorist attacks and terrorism saliency in Turkey. This line of research should be replicated in other cases and further extended with the analysis of other factors on the effects of terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency.

Limitations should be discussed to pave the way toward future research in terrorism and voting behavior literature. The November 2015 national elections were snap elections, therefore the lack of data at the individual level constitutes an important limitation to study this period. The unavailability of a panel-data set at the individual level to merge with the data set on terrorist attacks only allowed me to analyze the data set compiled as pre-November 2015 data set. Because I analyze a four-months of period which ended with the November 2015 snap elections, I acknowledge the fact that limitations include analyzed terrorist attacks in the limited period which should be extended for the previous and following elections to analyze terrorist attacks' effects on electoral behavior in many elections. The lack of data for this period results in a limited opportunity for conducting empirical research. Thus, I limited my research to terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency before the November 2015 general elections. I had to exclude terrorist attacks from the data set when the surveys are conducted which resulted in the exclusion of the terrorist attacks on October 2015. Future research might include an empirical analysis of terrorist attacks' effect on the voting behavior using a panel data set at the individual level to analyze whether and how terrorist attacks alter voters' issue saliency before

and after the June and November 2015 national elections. Furthermore, terrorist attacks' effect on political participation and voting decision in the November 2015 national elections should be further analyzed. Post-November 2015 data set at the individual level could present the change in the electoral behavior after the June 2015 national elections. Also, all terrorist attacks between the two elections could be included to the empirical analyses with the post-November 2015 individual-level data set. Although I obtained terrorism data from the Global Terrorism Database, alternative data sets can be obtained from databases like Suicide Attack Database (CPOST 2019) or Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP 2019). The main reason for me to obtain data from the GTD is that it includes the information about the terrorist attacks, number of fatalities, target type, location at the province level, and sources to be able to check the information on attacks if needed.

I limited my research to the period between June and November 2015 snap elections due to the intensification of terrorist attacks in the country in such a short period, but future research should also test across elections in Turkey how terrorism saliency is affected by terrorist attacks. The change between the level of terrorism saliency of the right-wing party supporters and the other party supporters should be further analyzed including other elections in Turkey as well. Moreover, the period could be extended to cover not only the period between two elections, but also the previous elections as well to observe whether there is a difference on terrorist attacks' effect on terrorism saliency between when a right-wing party is the incumbent and when a left-wing party is the incumbent party in other cases. Individual-level data on terrorism saliency could be unavailable for the Turkish context since AKP is the incumbent party since 2002 to compare left-wing and right-wing governments, yet this argument can be tested in other countries like Criado did for the Spanish case (Criado 2017). Moreover, the effects of terrorist attacks on the issue saliency of the Kurdish issue and Kurdish peace process can be empirically analyzed in the future research in addition to the effects of terrorist attacks on terrorism saliency. Across several elections, an empirical analysis can provide us to examine whether increasing terrorist attacks change voters' perception of the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish opening process as the most important problem in the country.

The time limitation in my research resulted in the examination of terrorist attacks mostly committed by PKK, although there were some crucial terrorist attacks committed by ISIL with a huge impact in the eyes of the Turkish electorate. However, ISIL's attacks intensified after the November 2015 general elections which increased the public concern over the national security. Thus, future research could separately analyze or compare terrorist attacks committed by PKK and ISIL in the Turkish case to examine their effects on the voting behavior as well as terrorism saliency

in the following local, national, and presidential elections. While comparing PKK and ISIL attacks' effects on terrorism saliency and voting behavior, two terrorist organizations' target selection strategies can be also further analyzed. Target types can be divided into civilians and security forces or into civilians, politicians, government officials, police officers, military personnel etc. Besides, the timing of the terrorist attacks and their proximity to upcoming elections should be analyzed in the further research. Four-months of period in my research and pre-November 2015 data set limits to observe whether terrorist attacks' increase terrorism saliency due to attacks' proximity to the elections.

Future research should be also focusing on analyzing terrorist attacks' effects on terrorism saliency through media coverage, political parties' and leaders' reactions, social media interaction, political campaign strategies, and campaign attention, in addition to terrorist organizations' target selection strategies for both the Turkish case and other cases as well. Survey experiments can be conducted to empirically analyze how other factors play a role in the level of terrorism saliency on public opinion. Emotional reactions can also play a crucial role in the level of terrorism saliency which can be analyzed based on attention and participation to political campaigns' effect on terrorism saliency in the future research. The media might have an emphasis on determining voters' perception of terrorism as the most important problem in the country, where both conventional media and social media were widely used by both the voters and the political leaders between the June and November 2015 general elections with a strong emphasis to terrorism (Balcı and Olkun 2017; Güneyli, Ersoy, and Kıralp 2017). Although I could not include variables related to media into the empirical analyses due to unavailability of the related data for this period, further research should include media consumption and political interest variables to analyze the role of the media. Lastly, major terrorist attacks, like Ankara Railway Station bombing in October 2015, can be analyzed to observe whether major attacks affect voters' perceived terrorism saliency more than small-scaled terrorist attacks do. It might be expected that major terrorist attacks impact voters not only through direct confrontation with the attack but also through national security concerns emerging after the attack more than small-scaled terrorist attacks.

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Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Terrorism Saliency - I	0.717	0.451	0	1	1508
Attacks	5.372	9.631	0	49	1508
Attacks Targeting Security Forces	2.786	6.203	0	36	1508
Attacks Targeting Civilians	2.334	3.962	0	12	1508
Death	2.243	6.623	0	37	1508
Gender	0.513	0.5	0	1	1508
Age	39.518	14.742	18	90	1497
Education	4.076	2.232	0	8	1493
Religiosity	5.728	1.793	1	7	1347
Ideology	5.904	2.955	1	10	1261
Income (Logged)	7.352	0.680	1.792	10.714	1162
Employment	3.851	2.239	1	6	1474
Negative Economic Evaluations	1.887	2.073	0	5	1508
Marital Status	2.486	2.209	1	6	1487
Kurdish Language	0.178	0.383	0	1	1474
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.502	0.5	0	1	1402
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	0.568	0.163	0.15	0.862	1508
Population (Logged)	14.29	1.256	11.506	16.5	1508
Illiteracy Rate	0.04	0.022	0.015	0.099	1508
Poverty	11.702	1.737	8.300	14.5	1508
Unemployment	10.41	3.173	5.100	16.7	1508
Partisanship - I	1.59	1.338	0	5	1402
Partisanship - II	0.541	0.536	0	2	1402
Terrorism Saliency - II	1.038	0.777	0	2	1508
Southeastern Region	0.11	0.313	0	1	1508
1st Period - Attacks	0.109	0.312	0	1	1508
2nd Period - Attacks	4.032	6.71	0	27	1508
3rd Period - Attacks	1.231	3.503	0	21	1508
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces	0.008	0.089	0	1	1508
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces	2.047	3.832	0	20	1508
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces	0.731	2.726	0	16	1508
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians	0.071	0.257	0	1	1508
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians	1.777	3.021	0	8	1508
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians	0.487	1.047	0	5	1508

Table A.2 Logistic Regressions for Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency - Without the Income Variable

DV: Terrorism Saliency - I	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Attacks	0.040***		
	(0.012)		
Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.042**	
		(0.017)	
Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.143***
			(0.043)
Death	-0.011	-0.009	-0.007
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Gender	0.080	0.076	0.075
	(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.199)
Age	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	0.024	0.022	0.031
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Religiosity	-0.083	-0.083	-0.082
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.056)
Ideology	0.016	0.016	0.018
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Employment	-0.014	-0.016	-0.009
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Negative Economic Evaluations	0.022	0.016	0.027
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Marital Status	-0.038	-0.037	-0.045
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Kurdish Language	-1.289***	-1.262***	-1.251***
	(0.260)	(0.254)	(0.269)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.817***	0.787***	0.841***
	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.231)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	3.004***	2.879***	2.617***
	(0.926)	(1.022)	(0.745)
Population	-0.096	0.007	-0.286
	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.180)
Illiteracy Rate	-18.265**	-16.707*	-19.385**
	(9.069)	(9.152)	(8.687)
Constant	1.766	0.438	4.559
	(2.189)	(2.187)	(2.872)
N	1038	1038	1038
Pseudo R^2	0.174	0.170	0.180
Log Likelihood	-494.871	-497.249	-490.987

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variable for Population is log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.3 Full Logistic Regressions

DV: Terrorism Saliency - I	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Attacks	0.075***		
	(0.015)		
Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.093***	
		(0.021)	
Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.197***
			(0.056)
Death	-0.046	-0.041	-0.027
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Gender	-0.017	-0.001	-0.049
	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.216)
Age	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	-0.011	-0.017	-0.002
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.056)
Religiosity	-0.103	-0.104	-0.104
	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.070)
Ideology	0.018	0.009	0.028
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Income	-0.053	-0.024	-0.084
	(0.235)	(0.233)	(0.237)
Employment	-0.040	-0.045	-0.028
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Negative Economic Evaluations	-0.010	-0.009	-0.015
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Marital Status	-0.046	-0.039	-0.059
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.044)
Kurdish Language	-0.608**	-0.633**	-0.560**
	(0.252)	(0.257)	(0.241)
Partisanship=AKP	0.310	0.267	0.363
	(0.308)	(0.303)	(0.315)
Partisanship=CHP	-0.330	-0.444	-0.200
	(0.341)	(0.349)	(0.325)
Partisanship=MHP	0.913**	0.819*	1.043**
	(0.459)	(0.459)	(0.465)
Partisanship=HDP	-1.826***	-1.878***	-1.584***
	(0.493)	(0.494)	(0.468)
Partisanship=Others	-0.784	-0.847*	-0.640
	(0.504)	(0.502)	(0.510)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	2.061*	2.067	1.332
	(1.169)	(1.281)	(0.977)
Population	-0.034	0.114	-0.211
	(0.170)	(0.166)	(0.216)
Illiteracy Rate	-9.347	-8.419	-8.714
	(11.198)	(11.387)	(10.647)
Poverty	0.084	0.065	0.071
	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.089)
Unemployment	-0.111	-0.100	-0.109
	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.083)
Constant	2.405	0.398	5.466
	(3.865)	(3.934)	(4.270)
N	863	863	863
Pseudo R^2	0.183	0.176	0.187
Log Likelihood	-386.620	-389.623	-384.849

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.4 Logistic Regressions with Kurdish Identity Variable as the Propensity to vote for HDP in the November 2015 General Elections

DV: Terrorism Saliency - I	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Attacks	0.060***		
	(0.017)		
Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.072***	
		(0.025)	
Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.182***
			(0.063)
Death	-0.054**	-0.051**	-0.044*
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Gender	0.074	0.080	0.042
	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.219)
Age	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education	-0.005	-0.012	0.005
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.052)
Religiosity	-0.104	-0.104	-0.106
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Ideology	0.014	0.012	0.019
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Income	-0.083	-0.061	-0.115
	(0.220)	(0.218)	(0.222)
Employment	-0.051	-0.054	-0.041
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Negative Economic Evaluations	0.039	0.033	0.043
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)
Marital Status	-0.015	-0.011	-0.026
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.043)
Propensity to Vote for HDP	-2.390***	-2.372***	-2.223***
	(0.500)	(0.481)	(0.470)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.650**	0.630**	0.671**
	(0.290)	(0.291)	(0.287)
AKP+MHP Voteshares	0.846	0.801	0.436
	(1.454)	(1.552)	(1.284)
Population	-0.100	0.029	-0.283
	(0.159)	(0.144)	(0.220)
Illiteracy Rate	-5.807	-4.707	-6.017
	(11.691)	(11.845)	(11.114)
Constant	3.483	1.607	6.412*
	(3.132)	(3.058)	(3.878)
N	844	844	844
Pseudo R^2	0.149	0.143	0.155
Log Likelihood	-396.220	-398.838	-393.230

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.5 Logistic Regressions with Partisanship Variable Differentiating Small Right-Wing Parties

DV: Terrorism Saliency - I	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Attacks	0.051***		
	(0.016)		
Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.054**	
		(0.025)	
Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.164***
			(0.055)
Death	-0.033	-0.026	-0.025
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Gender	-0.075	-0.076	-0.095
	(0.233)	(0.232)	(0.230)
Age	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education	-0.005	-0.010	0.005
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.056)
Religiosity	-0.118*	-0.118*	-0.118*
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.069)
Ideology	0.038	0.036	0.041
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Income	-0.073	-0.049	-0.104
	(0.212)	(0.210)	(0.213)
Employment	-0.023	-0.024	-0.015
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Negative Economic Evaluations	0.017	0.011	0.020
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Marital Status	-0.042	-0.040	-0.049
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Kurdish Language	-1.330***	-1.313***	-1.276***
	(0.250)	(0.247)	(0.251)
Small Right-Wing Parties Partisanship	0.544*	0.525*	0.560*
	(0.288)	(0.283)	(0.294)
AKP+MHP Voteshares	2.688**	2.585**	2.231**
	(1.100)	(1.182)	(0.965)
Population	-0.069	0.052	-0.255
	(0.147)	(0.131)	(0.203)
Illiteracy Rate	-15.355	-13.802	-15.484
	(11.311)	(11.450)	(10.592)
Constant	2.504	0.743	5.459
	(2.925)	(2.800)	(3.610)
N	863	863	863
Pseudo R^2	0.150	0.144	0.157
Log Likelihood	-402.353	-404.838	-398.880

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure A.1 Conditional Marginal Effects of Terrorist Attacks on Terrorism Saliency
- Others vs. AKP+MHP Partisans vs. Small Right-Wing Parties

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.2 Conditional Marginal Effects of the Target Type on Terrorism Saliency
- Others vs. AKP+MHP Partisans vs. Small Right-Wing Parties - I

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

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Figure A.3 Conditional Marginal Effects of the Target Type on Terrorism Saliency
- Others vs. AKP+MHP Partisans vs. Small Right-Wing Parties - II

Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Table A.6 Logistic Regressions for Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency without the Southeast Region - I

DV: Terrorism Saliency - I	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Attacks	0.039		
	(0.034)		
Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.041	
		(0.077)	
Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.149**
			(0.060)
Death	0.091	0.155	0.040
	(0.120)	(0.203)	(0.073)
Gender	-0.028	-0.044	-0.037
	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.232)
Age	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education	-0.008	-0.008	0.000
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Religiosity	-0.097	-0.088	-0.098
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.074)
Ideology	0.025	0.029	0.025
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Income	-0.079	-0.020	-0.119
	(0.226)	(0.217)	(0.229)
Employment	-0.030	-0.027	-0.024
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.057)
Negative Economic Evaluations	0.041	0.018	0.044
	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.092)
Marital Status	-0.021	-0.017	-0.027
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Kurdish Language	-1.309***	-1.179***	-1.305***
	(0.242)	(0.241)	(0.235)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.841***	0.774***	0.860***
	(0.294)	(0.289)	(0.291)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	1.638	0.913	1.321
	(1.115)	(1.354)	(1.005)
Population	-0.125	0.049	-0.295
	(0.227)	(0.200)	(0.245)
Illiteracy Rate	-14.715	-7.352	-14.759
	(12.354)	(13.118)	(10.955)
Constant	3.611	0.998	6.386
	(3.972)	(3.545)	(4.249)
N	807	807	807
Pseudo R^2	0.090	0.088	0.099
Log Likelihood	-375.824	-376.613	-371.919

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.7 OLS Regressions for Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency - II

DV: Terrorism Saliency - II	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Attacks	0.017***		
	(0.005)		
Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.012	
		(0.009)	
Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.061***
			(0.017)
Death	-0.017*	-0.012	-0.015*
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Gender	-0.025	-0.025	-0.034
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Age	0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.007	0.005	0.010
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Religiosity	-0.027	-0.026	-0.027
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Ideology	-0.012	-0.013	-0.011
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income	0.015	0.026	0.002
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Employment	-0.000	0.000	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Negative Economic Evaluations	-0.022	-0.025	-0.020
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Marital Status	-0.002	-0.001	-0.004
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Kurdish Language	-0.439***	-0.429***	-0.415***
	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.107)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.281***	0.270***	0.288***
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.088)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	0.722*	0.635	0.605*
	(0.367)	(0.392)	(0.322)
Population	-0.035	0.012	-0.117*
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.067)
Illiteracy Rate	-4.665	-3.836	-4.951
	(3.903)	(3.915)	(3.581)
Constant	1.383	0.716	2.643**
	(0.904)	(0.928)	(1.066)
N	863	863	863
R^2	0.163	0.153	0.181

Notes: OLS regressions are employed.

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Table A.8 OLS Regressions for Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency without the Southeast Region - II

DV: Terrorism Saliency - II	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Attacks	0.019		
	(0.012)		
Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.013	
		(0.032)	
Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.063***
			(0.020)
Death	0.024	0.050	0.004
	(0.043)	(0.067)	(0.026)
Gender	-0.014	-0.012	-0.021
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.007	0.006	0.010
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Religiosity	-0.023	-0.018	-0.024
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Ideology	-0.011	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Income	0.005	0.032	-0.010
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.050)
Employment	0.001	0.002	0.003
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Negative Econonmic Evaluations	-0.017	-0.025	-0.016
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Marital Status	0.005	0.007	0.003
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Kurdish Language	-0.435***	-0.380***	-0.420***
	(0.122)	(0.127)	(0.114)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.285***	0.265***	0.287***
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.090)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	0.546	0.270	0.411
	(0.452)	(0.473)	(0.411)
Population	-0.075	0.004	-0.142*
	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.080)
Illiteracy Rate	-5.283	-2.539	-5.052
	(4.541)	(4.595)	(4.020)
Constant	2.038	0.835	3.119**
	(1.228)	(1.157)	(1.244)
N	807	807	807
R^2	0.094	0.087	0.114

Notes: OLS regressions are employed.

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Table A.9 Ordered Logistic Regressions for Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency - III

DV: Terrorism Saliency - II	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Attacks	0.052***		
	(0.017)		
Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.039	
		(0.029)	
Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.173***
			(0.050)
Death	-0.049	-0.032	-0.041
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.026)
Gender	-0.108	-0.103	-0.135
	(0.176)	(0.171)	(0.173)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	0.016	0.010	0.028
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Religiosity	-0.077	-0.075	-0.078
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.061)
Ideology	-0.039	-0.039	-0.037
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Income	0.042	0.076	0.010
	(0.140)	(0.144)	(0.137)
Employment	0.004	0.004	0.010
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Negative Economic Evaluations	-0.062	-0.072	-0.058
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Marital Status	-0.007	-0.005	-0.012
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)
Kurdish Language	-1.213***	-1.175***	-1.149***
	(0.333)	(0.344)	(0.312)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.748***	0.712***	0.782***
	(0.229)	(0.231)	(0.228)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	2.099*	1.846	1.732*
	(1.115)	(1.191)	(0.976)
Population	-0.115	0.029	-0.330*
	(0.152)	(0.145)	(0.189)
Illiteracy Rate	-13.803	-11.196	-14.257
	(10.932)	(10.946)	(9.950)
Constant			
Cut-1	-2.228	-0.156	-5.564*
	(2.477)	(2.430)	(2.947)
Cut-2	-0.344	1.710	-3.648
	(2.501)	(2.444)	(2.973)
N	863	863	863
Pseudo R^2	0.083	0.077	0.092
Log Likelihood	-852.186	-857.720	-843.300

Notes: Ordered logistic regressions are employed.

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.10 Ordered Logistic Regressions for Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency without the Southeast Region - III

DV: Terrorism Saliency - II	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Attacks	0.051		
	(0.032)		
Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.035	
		(0.086)	
Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.170***
			(0.053)
Death	0.070	0.139	0.021
	(0.111)	(0.181)	(0.071)
Gender	-0.063	-0.053	-0.082
	(0.178)	(0.172)	(0.176)
Age	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Education	0.018	0.011	0.028
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Religiosity	-0.059	-0.047	-0.062
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.061)
Ideology	-0.034	-0.029	-0.033
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Income	0.025	0.102	-0.017
	(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.136)
Employment	0.007	0.008	0.011
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.041)
Negative Econmic Evaluations	-0.050	-0.072	-0.048
	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.065)
Marital Status	0.015	0.020	0.011
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Kurdish Language	-1.139***	-0.999***	-1.112***
	(0.332)	(0.344)	(0.316)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.754***	0.696***	0.773***
	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.230)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	1.427	0.644	1.092
	(1.222)	(1.273)	(1.113)
Population	-0.201	0.009	-0.384*
	(0.209)	(0.197)	(0.217)
Illiteracy Rate	-14.162	-6.652	-13.790
	(12.096)	(12.197)	(10.782)
Constant			
Cut-1	-3.602	-0.419	-6.582**
	(3.189)	(3.018)	(3.281)
Cut-2	-1.718	1.454	-4.666
	(3.223)	(3.049)	(3.312)
N	807	807	807
Pseudo R^2	0.046	0.042	0.057
Log Likelihood	-816.236	-819.362	-807.240

Notes: Ordered logistic regressions are employed.

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.11 Logistic Regressions for Timing of the Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency - I

DV: Terrorism Saliency - I	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
1st Period - Attacks	0.452		
	(0.533)		
2nd Period - Attacks	0.096**		
	(0.046)		
3rd Period - Attacks	-0.038		
	(0.083)		
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.683	
		(0.709)	
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.133	
		(0.086)	
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.072	
		(0.123)	
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			1.844***
			(0.392)
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.320***
			(0.120)
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			-0.229
			(0.254)
Death	-0.021	-0.015	-0.027
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Gender	-0.083	-0.068	-0.055
	(0.228)	(0.226)	(0.222)
Age	-0.008	-0.007	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education	-0.007	-0.012	-0.011
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.056)
Religiosity	-0.125*	-0.124*	-0.123*
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.068)
Ideology	0.012	0.013	0.014
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Income	-0.065	-0.070	-0.032
	(0.210)	(0.217)	(0.195)
Employment	-0.027	-0.030	-0.028
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.052)
Negative Economic Evaluations	0.027	0.032	0.012
	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Marital Status	-0.050	-0.043	-0.051
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.046)
Kurdish Language	-1.306***	-1.286***	-1.394***
	(0.245)	(0.238)	(0.258)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.854***	0.869***	0.806***
	(0.287)	(0.288)	(0.281)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	2.565**	2.093*	2.121**
	(1.127)	(1.251)	(0.890)
Population	-0.209	-0.083	-0.450**
	(0.208)	(0.202)	(0.223)
Illiteracy Rate	-16.239	-15.780	-17.298
	(11.424)	(11.630)	(11.056)
Constant	4.541	3.130	7.917**
	(3.792)	(3.877)	(3.808)
N	863	863	863
Pseudo R^2	0.159	0.154	0.177
Log Likelihood	-397.883	-400.394	-389.426

Notes: Logistic regressions are employed.

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.12 Logistic Regressions for Timing of the Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency without the Southeast Region - I

DV: Terrorism Saliency - I	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
1st Period - Attacks	0.264		
	(0.696)		
2nd Period - Attacks	0.109*		
	(0.061)		
3rd Period - Attacks	-0.347		
	(0.398)		
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-2.852**	
		(1.174)	
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.057	
		(0.097)	
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.762	
		(0.565)	
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			2.122***
			(0.385)
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.239
			(0.188)
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.103
			(0.680)
Death	0.118	0.199	0.085
	(0.107)	(0.149)	(0.059)
Gender	-0.059	-0.054	0.004
	(0.236)	(0.240)	(0.233)
Age	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education	-0.002	-0.004	-0.016
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Religiosity	-0.097	-0.073	-0.101
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.072)
Ideology	0.021	0.026	0.018
	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.044)
Income	-0.078	-0.041	-0.064
	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.205)
Employment	-0.025	-0.024	-0.031
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Negative Economic Evaluations	0.032	0.018	0.027
	(0.089)	(0.086)	(0.091)
Marital Status	-0.025	-0.014	-0.024
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Kurdish Language	-1.128***	-0.880***	-1.404***
	(0.232)	(0.255)	(0.239)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.836***	0.825***	0.798***
	(0.292)	(0.295)	(0.288)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	1.017	-1.264	1.275
	(1.514)	(1.810)	(1.157)
Population	-0.210	-0.171	-0.555**
	(0.240)	(0.254)	(0.235)
Illiteracy Rate	-10.171	2.128	-17.003
	(13.176)	(12.858)	(11.641)
Constant	5.005	5.132	9.818**
	(4.082)	(4.450)	(4.089)
N	807	807	807
Pseudo R^2	0.097	0.106	0.116
Log Likelihood	-372.945	-368.959	-364.779

Notes: Logistic regressions are employed.

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.13 OLS Regressions for Timing of the Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency - II

DV: Terrorism Saliency - II	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
1st Period - Attacks	0.245*		
	(0.134)		
2nd Period - Attacks	0.048***		
	(0.016)		
3rd Period - Attacks	-0.056*		
	(0.028)		
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.152	
		(0.254)	
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.057*	
		(0.032)	
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.067	
		(0.043)	
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.444***
			(0.133)
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.120***
			(0.043)
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			-0.090
			(0.090)
Death	-0.003	-0.002	-0.010
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Gender	-0.035	-0.028	-0.026
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.057)
Age	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.008	0.007	0.007
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Religiosity	-0.029	-0.028	-0.028
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Ideology	-0.014	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Income	0.008	0.007	0.015
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Employment	-0.000	0.000	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Negative Econonmic Evaluations	-0.021	-0.019	-0.023
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Marital Status	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Kurdish Language	-0.395***	-0.385***	-0.435***
	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.108)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.286***	0.289***	0.275***
	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.085)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	0.742**	0.538	0.630**
	(0.348)	(0.406)	(0.312)
Population	-0.126*	-0.058	-0.178**
	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.076)
Illiteracy Rate	-5.081	-4.743	-5.464
	(3.873)	(3.888)	(3.784)
Constant	2.679**	1.878	3.423***
	(1.179)	(1.223)	(1.180)
N	863	863	863
R^2	0.176	0.164	0.191

Notes: OLS regressions are employed.

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.14 OLS Regressions for Timing of the Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency without the Southeast Region - II

DV: Terrorism Saliency - II	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
1st Period - Attacks	0.195		
	(0.187)		
2nd Period - Attacks	0.057***		
	(0.017)		
3rd Period - Attacks	-0.183*		
	(0.103)		
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.804***	
		(0.293)	
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.029	
		(0.032)	
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.284**	
		(0.124)	
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.542***
			(0.142)
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.094
			(0.071)
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.045
			(0.266)
Death	0.043	0.067	0.018
	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.023)
Gender	-0.028	-0.019	-0.011
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Age	0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education	0.010	0.010	0.005
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Religiosity	-0.024	-0.017	-0.025
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Ideology	-0.013	-0.011	-0.013
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Income	0.006	0.019	0.005
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Employment	0.002	0.003	-0.000
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Negative Economic Evaluations	-0.020	-0.024	-0.019
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Marital Status	0.004	0.008	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Kurdish Language	-0.322***	-0.221*	-0.446***
	(0.110)	(0.116)	(0.113)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.284***	0.280***	0.270***
	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.086)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	0.288	-0.417	0.409
	(0.458)	(0.478)	(0.443)
Population	-0.132	-0.078	-0.222***
	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Illiteracy Rate	-3.358	0.415	-5.506
	(4.349)	(3.828)	(4.318)
Constant	2.900**	2.355*	4.178***
	(1.236)	(1.225)	(1.165)
N	807	807	807
R^2	0.118	0.124	0.130

Notes: OLS regressions are employed.

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.15 Ordered Logistic Regressions for Timing of the Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency - III

DV: Terrorism Saliency - II	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
1st Period - Attacks	0.722*		
	(0.382)		
2nd Period - Attacks	0.136***		
	(0.045)		
3rd Period - Attacks	-0.153*		
	(0.083)		
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.462	
		(0.743)	
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.157*	
		(0.083)	
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-0.184	
		(0.120)	
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			1.243***
			(0.384)
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.332***
			(0.121)
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			-0.207
			(0.256)
Death	-0.006	-0.004	-0.031
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.037)
Gender	-0.147	-0.118	-0.122
	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.168)
Age	0.001	0.003	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	0.022	0.019	0.015
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Religiosity	-0.084	-0.080	-0.083
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.059)
Ideology	-0.046	-0.041	-0.044
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Income	0.037	0.025	0.058
	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.146)
Employment	0.004	0.006	0.002
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.037)
Negative Economic Evaluations	-0.061	-0.058	-0.070
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Marital Status	-0.013	-0.008	-0.013
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Kurdish Language	-1.110***	-1.057***	-1.222***
	(0.311)	(0.319)	(0.319)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.775***	0.767***	0.766***
	(0.223)	(0.227)	(0.223)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	2.175**	1.602	1.814*
	(1.105)	(1.250)	(0.961)
Population	-0.364*	-0.159	-0.516**
	(0.209)	(0.194)	(0.220)
Illiteracy Rate	-14.879	-13.586	-15.797
	(11.097)	(11.188)	(10.727)
Constant			
Cut-1	-5.687*	-3.239	-7.947**
	(3.218)	(3.192)	(3.278)
Cut-2	-3.781	-1.357	-6.012*
	(3.219)	(3.221)	(3.265)
N	863	863	863
Pseudo R^2	0.090	0.082	0.099
Log Likelihood	-845.681	-852.631	-837.465

Notes: Ordered logistic regressions are employed.

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.16 Ordered Logistic Regressions for Timing of the Terrorist Attacks' Effects on Terrorism Saliency without the Southeast Region - III

DV: Terrorism Saliency - II	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
1st Period - Attacks	0.577		
	(0.551)		
2nd Period - Attacks	0.187**		
	(0.074)		
3rd Period - Attacks	-0.732		
	(0.559)		
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-2.728***	
		(0.840)	
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		0.106	
		(0.082)	
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Security Forces		-1.112**	
		(0.450)	
1st Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			1.465***
			(0.415)
2nd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.270
			(0.185)
3rd Period - Attacks Targeting Civilians			0.086
			(0.701)
Death	0.144	0.204**	0.063
	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.064)
Gender	-0.120	-0.090	-0.068
	(0.176)	(0.172)	(0.173)
Age	0.002	0.003	0.001
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Education	0.028	0.030	0.011
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.050)
Religiosity	-0.058	-0.038	-0.069
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Ideology	-0.038	-0.028	-0.043
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Income	0.042	0.061	0.037
	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.145)
Employment	0.011	0.018	0.003
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Negative Economic Evaluations	-0.064	-0.080	-0.060
	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.064)
Marital Status	0.010	0.018	0.011
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Kurdish Language	-0.823***	-0.556*	-1.196***
	(0.314)	(0.331)	(0.319)
AKP+MHP Partisanship	0.755***	0.733***	0.758***
	(0.225)	(0.228)	(0.223)
AKP+MHP Vote Shares	0.387	-1.685	1.105
	(1.350)	(1.310)	(1.219)
Population	-0.388*	-0.277	-0.628***
	(0.234)	(0.226)	(0.223)
Illiteracy Rate	-7.606	2.937	-15.501
	(11.469)	(9.660)	(11.876)
Constant			
Cut-1	-6.515*	-5.715	-9.804***
	(3.409)	(3.493)	(3.279)
Cut-2	-4.585	-3.764	-7.859**
	(3.410)	(3.525)	(3.260)
N	807	807	807
Pseudo R^2	0.061	0.067	0.066
Log Likelihood	-803.133	-798.653	-799.568

Notes: Ordered logistic regressions are employed.

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

The variables for Income and Population are log-transformed.

Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01