THE POLITICS OF PERSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY AT THE COURT OF SÜLEYMAN: SHAH QASIM AND HIS KANZ AL-JAVAHIR

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ABSTRACT

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The present thesis discusses Shah Qasim's (d. 1539-1540) Kanz al-javahir al-saniya
fi'l-futuhat al-Sulaymaniya (Treasure of the Brilliant Jewels among the Conquests
of Süleyman), a chronicle in Persian commissioned by Süleyman I (r. 1520-1566). It
claims that Shah Qasim produced this work to legitimize Ottoman rule in the eyes of
Persian speaking elites of Iraq and Iran. Süleyman and his court chose Shah Qasim
for this job because he was an emigre from Tabriz, who absorbed the Timurid way of
history-writing and was a master in the chancery style. While some historians have
pointed out to the significance of the Kanz al-javahir, none of them has examined
its stylistic, literary, and historical features thoroughly. Thus, this thesis aims to
present an oft-neglected Persian chronicle to scholarship and situates it in an age
when millenarian expectations and claims to universal sovereignty climaxed. In that
context, Shah Qasim's epithets to portray Süleyman as the ideal ruler gains new
dimensions. In addition, it examines the first years of Süleyman's reign in order to
understand how Süleyman had established his authority as the "Sultan".

ÖZET

SÜLEYMAN'IN SARAYINDA FARSÇA TARİH YAZIMI POLİTİKASI, ŞAH KASIM VE KANZ AL-JAVAHİR

FURKAN IŞIN

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Farsça Tarih-Yazımı, Şah Kasım, Kanz al-javahir, Siyasi Meşruiyet, Osmanlı Soyağaçları

Bu tez, I. Süleyman (h. 1520-1566) tarafından görevlendirilmiş Şah Kasım'ın (ö. 1539-1540) Farsça yazılmış Kanz al-javahir al-saniya fi'l-futuhat al-Sulaymaniya (Süleyman'ın Fetihlerindeki Yüce Mücevherlerin Hazinesi) adlı kitabını incelemektedir. Şah Kasım'ın bu kitabı, Irak ve İran'ın Farsça konuşan elitlerine Osmanlı yönetimini meşru kılmak amacıyla yazdığını iddia eder. Süleyman ve sarayının bu görev için Şah Kasım'ı seçmesinin nedenleri ise, onun Tebriz'den gelen bir göçmen, Timurlu tarih yazımı geleneğine hakim ve inşa sanatında uzman olmasıdır. Bazı tarihçilerin Kanz al-javahir'in önemine işaret etmelerine rağmen, bu eserin biçimsel, edebi ve tarihi özellikleri henüz derinlemesine incelenmemiştir. Bu nedenle bu tez, ihmal edilen bir kroniği literatüre sunmayı ve onu, binyılcılık beklentilerinin ve cihan hakimiyeti iddialarının doruğa çıktığı bir döneme konumlandırmayı hedefler. Bu bağlamda, Şah Kasım'ın Süleyman'ı tasvir etmek için kullandığı sıfatlar yeni boyutlar kazanır. Ayrıca bu tez, Süleyman'ın hükmünün ilk yıllarında Sultan olarak kendi otoritesini nasıl kurduğunu inceler.

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During my undergraduate and high school years, I acquainted friends of a life-

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NOTES ON USAGE

Arabic and Persian terms, texts, and book titles that appear in the body of the text are fully transliterated following a slightly modified version of the IJMES transliteration system. Ottoman Turkish terms are rendered according to the principles of modern Turkish orthography. The Only exception belongs to discussions of Ottoman genealogies. Since some historical names appear in histories written in different languages, these names are transliterated according to the Ottoman Turkish transliteration system, for the sake of consistency. For example, the grandson of Oghuz, Ḳayı, appears as Ḳayı, Qayī, and Qayigh, with respect to their mentions in different languages, Turkish, Persian, and Arabic. This thesis chooses to transliterate Ḳayı according to Ottoman Turkish principles. Terms that have entered regular English usage are used without any change (pasha, vizier, ghaza, jihad, etc.).

Major toponyms are rendered in their established anglicized form whenever possible (Tabriz, Istanbul, and so forth). Minor place names are transliterated according to the principles of the language that predominated in the area (e.g., Kastamonu, Marj Dabiq.).

Concerning names of individuals rendered in the Roman alphabet, this thesis draws similarly fine distinctions. Names of individuals generally follow the transliteration conventions of the language that they wrote in or dominated in their principal location of activity. Hence, although he worked at the Ottoman court, Shāh Qāsim's name is rendered according to Persian transliteration conventions. The names of rulers to scholarship are not transliterated (e.g. Süleyman I, Mehmed II, Shah Isma'il I etc.).

All names and titles of works are fully translated with macrons and diacritics in the footnotes and bibliography according to the transliteration principles of the language in which they were written. Dates are given in the Common Era unless the *Hijri* date is essential for the particular discussion.

LIST OF ABBREVIATONS

1.   INTRODUCTION

The present thesis discusses Shāh Qāsim's (d. 1539-1540) *Kanz al-javāhir al-sanīya fi'l-futuḥāt al-Sulaymānīya* (*Treasure of the Brilliant Jewels among the Conquests of Süleyman*), a chronicle in Persian commissioned by Süleyman I (r. 1520-1566). It claims that Shāh Qāsim produced this chronicle to legitimize Ottoman rule in the eyes of the Persian-speaking élite in the Iranian world. It contextualizes Shāh Qāsim's depiction of Süleyman as the ideal ruler and demonstrates how his chronicle functioned as a propaganda tool. Furthermore, it deals with how Ottoman historians may have contributed to the crystallization of an imperial discourse by the time Shāh Qāsim completed his work in the late 1530s. Investigating some of the stylistic, literary, and historical features of the *Kanz al-javāhir* within the parameters of broader Islamicate and Persianate traditions, it also discusses the place of the Persian language at the Ottoman court in the sixteenth century.

Considering the boom in history-writing in the early modern period, studies focusing on an intellectual and situating him or her in Ottoman history remain few. Historians have been recently attracted to the works of certain prominent Ottoman scholars, such as Idrīs-i Bidlīsī (d. 1520), Celālzāde Muṣṭafā (d. 1567), and Muṣṭafā ʿĀlī (d. 1600).[1] However, several works have hitherto been largely neglected, like Shāh Qāsim's (d. 1539-1540) *Kanz al-javāhir al-sanīya fi'l-futuḥāt al-Sulaymānīya* (henceforth: *Kanz al-javāhir*), which he started to write during the campaign of the Two Iraqs in 1533-1534 (H. 941).[2] The work covers the events from the succession of Süleyman in 1520 to the Vienna campaign in 1529. Indeed, several historians have pointed out the importance of the *Kanz al-javāhir*. Yet none of them has carefully examined its stylistic, ideological, and literary features by situating it into a context in which millenarian expectations and Ottoman expansionist policies reached their zenith. Therefore, this thesis aims to contextualize an oft-ignored Ottoman-Persian intellectual's work into the unprecedented political and social conditions of the sixteenth century.

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[1] I find the following books particularly important: Fleischer (1986); Kafadar (1995); Şahin (2013); Markiewicz (2019).

[2] Ottoman chroniclers dubbed this campaign as *sefer-i ʿIrāḵeyn* (The Two Iraqs Campaign) because the aim was to conquer both the Arab Iraq (ʿIrāḵ-ı ʿArab) and Persian Iraq (ʿIrāḵ-ı ʿAcem).

The Ottomans created an imperial discourse by combining the Byzantine, Turco-Mongol, and Persianate traditions (Yıldız 2012, 436). This amalgamation had a vital impact on the development of Ottoman historiography. With the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, Mehmed II (r. 1444-1446, 1451-1481) accelerated the empire-building process and patronized Ottoman histories written in Persian as an important element of this policy. Under his son and successor Bayezid II's (r. 1481-1512) patronage, history-writing emerged as a crucial tool to claim supremacy over geopolitical adversaries in Islamdom, namely the Mamluks, the Aqquyunlu, and the Safavids. This required Ottoman historians to produce sophisticated and elaborate works that could compete with the classics of the Persianate tradition (İnalcık 1964, 166). Thanks to an *émigré* from Tabriz, Idrīs-i Bidlīsī, who wrote an embellished chronicle for the Ottoman dynasty, the *Hasht Bihisht* (*the Eight Paradises*), the Timurid historiographical traditionhad entered the Ottoman context.[3]

With the short and eventful reign of Selim I (r. 1512-1520), the Ottoman enterprise came to be wholly integrated into the early modern Eurasian political-cultural zone and adopted new political, religious, and cultural agendas (Çıpa 2017, 12). The approach of the Hijri millennium pushed the Ottomans to accelerate their efforts to achieve universal sovereignty.[4] Thus, Ottoman histories that absorbed the Timurid historiographical tradition focusing on the life of Selim were penned to mark the uniqueness of the Sultan.

It seems that for the first thirty years of Süleyman I's rule, history production in Persian halted, with the significant exception of Shāh Qāsim's *Kanz al-javāhir*, down to the establishment of the *Shāhnāma-gūy* (*Teller of the Book of Kings*) post in the early 1550s. The task of this office was to produce a Persian chronicle that follows the tradition of Firdawsī's (d. 1020) *Shāhnāma* (*The Book of Kings*).[5] Süleyman's son and grandson, Selim II (r. 1566-1574) and Murad III (r. 1574-1595), continued to patronize official histories written in Persian. During this period, the Ottoman court closely supervised and monitored the writing process of Ottoman *Shāhnāmas*, and the texts had to be approved before their release (Woodhead 2007, 68). This clearly shows the propagandistic features of historiography that it was conceived to be a politically highly charged matter.

Although Süleyman and his successors' efforts to revitalize the Persian language in the Ottoman realm seemed promising, with the accession of Mehmed III (r. 1595-

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[3]For a wonderful survey on the Timurid sovereignty, see Binbaş (2016, 199-236).

[4]For millennialism discussions during the reign of Selim see Çıpa (2017, 120-151).

[5]For the development of this post, see Woodhead (2007, 67-80)

1603), Persian vanished from the Ottoman court as a language of choice for history-writing, and Ottoman Turkish emerged as the medium for Ottoman historians. The first and foremost reason behind this was Mehmed III's lack of interest and patronage for arts and literature. Second, because of tiresome and expensive wars against the Habsburg and the Safavids caused significant problems in the Ottoman treasury, the Ottoman court curtailed funding for Persian histories. These two reasons indicate that the life of the Persian language in the Ottoman realm was strictly bound to elite patronage and sponsorship. This state of affairs corresponds to Nile Green's depiction of the cultural geography of Persian in the medieval and early modern Islamicate world, who claims that Persian operated in a geographically extensive but socially shallow space (Green 2019, 2).

The gradual increase and demise of Persian at the Ottoman court coincided with the crystallization of the Ottoman imperial identity, with its unique language, Ottoman Turkish (Kim 2005, 5). Ottoman intellectuals became familiar with Persian works through either translation from that language to Ottoman Turkish or original works composed by Persian *émigré*s, such as Shāh Qāsim. In the wake of Idrīs-i Bidlīsī, Shāh Qāsim wrote his book, the *Kanz al-javāhir*, in an embellished Persian and deployed the Timurid vocabulary of sovereignty. However, unlike Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's *Hasht Bihisht*, Shāh Qāsim's work never became the subject of admiration in the Ottoman chronicle tradition. Hence this thesis offers a critical-historical framework to understand Shāh Qāsim's role as an *émigré*-historian and the *Kanz al-javāhir*'s lack of popularity among both contemporary and modern scholars as a chronicle written in Persian.

The first chapter deals with the life of Shāh Qāsim and the secondary literature on the *Kanz al-javāhir*. It elaborates on what it might have meant to be a Persian scholar and *émigré* in a period in which Ottoman Turkish gradually replaced the Persian language. The second chapter discusses the *Kanz al-javāhir*'s style, place in historiography, intended audience, and its portrayal of Süleyman. It situates the work in the Timurid historiographical tradition and investigates the possible intended audience. In addition, this chapter contextualizes Shāh Qāsim's epithets for Süleyman in an age when Ottoman claims for world dominion were very much alive. The third chapter contextualizes Shāh Qāsim's narrative about Süleyman's initial years of reign and brings new perspectives to the empire-building process. It examines textual differences between histories written in Ottoman Turkish and the *Kanz al-javāhir*, in order to demonstrate how language preferences and intended audiences shape history-writing. The last chapter focuses on Shāh Qāsim's version of Ottoman genealogy and provides a survey of Ottoman genealogies. It argues that on the one hand, various Ottoman genealogical discourses are the outcome of political

conditions and orientations, and, on the other hand, Shāh Qāsim's presentation of the "Esavitic" paradigm is a statement to appeal to Persian elements in Süleyman's empire.

2.   AN *EMIGRE* AND HIS WORK: THE LIFE OF SHĀH QĀSIM AND THE *KANZ AL-JAVĀHIR*

2.1 The Life of Shāh Qāsim

Shāh Qāsim was a native of Tabriz, where his father, Shaykh Makhdūmī, was a Sufi shaykh and learned scholar well-known for his expertise on exegesis and hadith, as well as his sermons and preaching in Persian, which reached Ottoman domains. One of his disciples, a man who would become instrumental in Shāh Qāsim's admission to the Ottoman court, was Ḥalīmī Çelebī, who came from Kastamonu and had been trained by a certain ʿAlā al-Dīn ʿArabī. The latter belonged to the Zayniyya dervish tradition (Mecdî 1989, 385), a Sunni order which was founded in the fifteenth century in Herat and quickly spread to central Islamic lands. Thanks to its well-educated adherents in religious law, it attracted a significant number of followers among both Sunni ulama and rulers (Öngüren 2010, 357-61). Upon his master's death in Kastamonu, Ḥalīmī completed his training under Makhdūmī in Tabriz, which suggests that Makhdūmī might also have been a Zayniyya shaykh or at least a follower of the Sunni tradition. It is quite possible that during this time, Ḥalīmī became acquainted with his master's son, Shāh Qāsim.

Afterwards, Ḥalīmī returned to his hometown, Kastamonu, and most probably visited Selim, the governor of Trabzon at the time, who was impressed with him and appointed him as his tutor (Mecdî 1989, 386). It seems that Ḥalīmī was such a staunch supporter of Selim in the succession struggle at the end of Bayezid II's reign that after Selim's enthronement, Ḥalīmī's daily salary was raised to 200 *akçe* and he continued to be the Sultan's tutor. His apparently good standing at Selim's court, his reverence for Shāh Qāsim's father, and his personal acquaintance with Shāh Qāsim must all have been essential factors in Shāh Qāsim's transfer to Istanbul after the Ottoman victory at Chaldiran in 1514. It must have been Ḥalīmī's influence that led to the employment of Shāh Qāsim at the Ottoman court with

a 50 *akçe* daily stipend (ʿĀşıḳ 2018, 593).[1] Since ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī, Ṭaşköprizāde, and Mecdī Mehmed Efendi do not mention Makhdūmī in the aftermath of the Chaldiran campaign in 1514, he must have either been dead by then because of natural causes or killed by the Safavids due to his Sunni inclinations; or he might have simply stayed in Tabriz and may have even converted to Shiʿism.[2] Thus, like his father Makhdūmī and Ḥalīmī, Shah Qāsim was a Sunni disciple, but to escape the wrath of Shah Ismaʿil (r. 1501-1524), he might have concealed his Sunni identity and survived under Safavid rule.

As a student of Shāh Qāsim, ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī gives the most detailed information about Shāh Qāsim's life in Istanbul (ʿĀşıḳ 2018, 448). According to his account, once Selim I wondered aloud if Shāh Qāsim held the qualities that his father had possessed. On another occasion, Shāh Qāsim impressed the Sultan with his erudition and command of exegesis so much that the Sultan burst out in tears (ʿĀşıḳ 2018, 594). Moreover, Shāh Qāsim was known for his stylistic mastery of prose and avoidance of composing poetry,[3] which can be the reason for the absence of his poetic pseudonym throughout the *Kanz al-javāhir*. Or, he may have commissioned his students to compose poetry parts of the *Kanz al-javāhir*.

Shāh Qāsim continued to enjoy favors at the Ottoman court after Selim's death. Similar to his father, Süleyman appreciated Shāh Qāsim's intellectual abilities that Shāh Qāsim was commissioned to write the life of Süleyman as soon as the Sultan was enthroned. He showed several sections to the court, which led to an increase in his daily stipend to 70 *akçe*. Until the Campaign of the Two Iraqs in 1533-1534, Shah Qāsim kept producing further sections but was not ordered to compile his campaign journals into a book. During this campaign, he was officially instructed to compose his history. This fact is validated by Shāh Qāsim's claim who indicates that "it has been 240 years after the beginning of Osman I's (r. 1299-1326) conquests that this book was started to be written (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 7a)." Considering Shāh Qāsim's primary source is Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's *Hasht Bihisht*, which suggests that Osman accomplished his first conquests in 1299-1300 (H. 698)(Bidlīsī 3209, 53b), Shāh Qāsim points out to 1532-1533 (H. 938), which roughly corresponds to the Campaign of the Two Iraqs. Concurrently, his daily stipend was increased to 100 *akçe*. However, Shāh Qāsim was not able to finish his work because he died in 1539-1540 (H. 946).

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[1] For several biographical entries on Shāh Qāsim, see Appendix A.

[2] It is possible that Makhdūmī did not convert to Shiism and stayed Sunni, since there were plenty of Sunnis living in Safavid Iran. See Johnson (1994); Algar (2007).

[3] This lack of poetry may well have contributed to the neglect the *Kanz al-javāhir* was subjected to later, since poetry was super-important in the age.

Although ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī was a student of Shāh Qāsim and he venerates his master's scholarly abilities, he is very much dismissive of the literary and historical merits of the *Kanz al-javāhir*. ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī claims that commissioning Shāh Qāsim to compose a chronicle "was an excuse to promote him to the ranks of great servants, thanks to his merits (*Şānında mevālī-i iʿẓām riʿāyetine istiḥḳāḳı oldugın bilüp ʿulūfesin arturmaġa bahāne olmaġçun inşā-yı tārīḫi yüz itdiler* (ʿĀşıḳ 2018, 594))." The reason behind this is that Shāh Qāsim lived and wrote his work when the Ottoman court and intellectuals were gradually replacing Persian with Ottoman Turkish. By the time ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī completed his *teẕkire* (*Biographical Memoirs*) in 1568, the Ottomans had moved more fully to Ottoman Turkish (Green 2019, 27). Poets, bureaucrats, and scholars had to produce their works in Ottoman Turkish if they wanted to participate in cultural life, and obtain patronage, posts, and pensions (Kim 2005, 12-13). Thus, in the sixteenth century, the crystallization of Ottoman Turkish as the literary and bureaucratic language of the Ottomans accelerated. As a Persian *émigré* and writer in the Ottoman realm, Shāh Qāsim was caught in the midst of this transition. Besides, Süleyman and his grand vizier Ibrāhīm Pasha (d. 1536) patronized Shāh Qāsim to produce a Persian chronicle. Yet, Ibrāhīm Pasha's death and the waning influence of Persian left the *Kanz al-javāhir* unpromoted. Thus, subsequent Ottoman scholars like ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī disregarded the *Kanz al-javāhir*'s literary and historical features.[4]

2.2 Ġubārī Discussions and the Provenance of the *Kanz al-javāhir*

The first scholar to bring attention to the *Kanz al-javāhir* was Franz Babinger. He states that the long reign of Süleyman led to a considerable amount of literary production, and he lists the Ayasofya copy of the work as the first example. When presenting a certain ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbd Allāh (Ġubārī), the German scholar indicates that Ġubārī wrote a Persian chronicle entitled *Süleymānnāme* about the events of the reign of Süleyman in a chronological order, relying on the copy housed at the Manisa Muradiye Library. Babinger distinguishes the *Kanz al-javāhir* from Ġubārī's *Süleymānnāme* and argues that the author of the *Kanz al-javāhir* is anonymous (Babinger 2000, 83). Storey mentions three extant copies

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[4]The deficiency of Shāh Qāsim might led ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī to undermine the *Kanz al-javāhir*, who considered composing poetry as part of high society. There was also competition between local literati and Persian emigres, as is suggested by Muṣṭafā ʿĀlī, who complains that if you came from Iran you would land the best jobs, regardless of your merit. See Fleischer (1986, 154-157)

of the *Kanz al-javāhir* and indicates that these copies cover the period from Süley-
man's Hungarian campaign in 1521 to the campaign of Vienna in 1529. Likewise,
he agrees with Babinger that the author of these manuscripts is anonymous (Storey
1936, 417-418). Parmaksızoğlu adds the completion date of Ġubārī's *Süleymānnāme*
as 1551 and asserts that the title of the book is not *Süleymānnāme* but *Shāhnāme*,
because of a couplet in which the author says that Süleyman ordered him to finish
"this Shāhnāme". This is a mistake, as, on the one hand, such a designation might
simply mean that the work is about a ruler, and on the other hand, the first folio
of the Muradiye copy clearly states that the title of the book is *Tārīkh-i Ġubārī*.
Moreover, Parmaksızoğlu does not mention how he has concluded that the book
was written in 1551, which should make us look for other solutions to the issue
(Parmaksızoğlu 1950, 2).

Although these three historians successfully point out that Ġubārī's *Süleymānnāme*
and the *Kanz al-javāhir* are in fact two separate works, subsequent researchers pro-
posed Ġubārī as the author of the *Kanz al-javāhir*. Alpaslan argues that the Heki-
moğlu Ali Paşa and the Manisa Muradiye copies are the different editions of the
same book. Still, the latter misses some parts and seems to be incomplete (Alpaslan
1996, 168). After an analysis of the Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa and Manisa Muradiye's
copies, it appears that there is no relation between these copies. As stated earlier,
the title of the Manisa Muradiye copy is *Tārīkh-i Ġubārī*, whereas the Hekimoğlu
Ali Paşa copy's title is *Kanz al-javāhir*. Moreover, the Manisa Muradiye copy covers
the reign of Selim I, while the Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa manuscript starts with his death.
In his encyclopedia entry on the *Süleymānnāme* genre, Sağırlı disagrees with Par-
maksızoğlu and asserts that the *Tārīḫ-i Ġubārī* was not written by 'Abd al-Raḥmān
Ġubārī but by a certain Ġubārī Kireççizāde Maḥmūd Çelebī b. Aḥmed Çelebī
(Sağırlı 2010, 124-125). In addition to Alparslan, Sağırlı states that there are two
more copies of the *Kanz al-javāhir*, namely the Ayasofya and Üsküdar Hacı Selim
Ağa libraries' manuscripts. He gives detailed information about the *Süleymānnāme*
in question and points to the differences between these copies. The title of the
Ayasofya copy is indeed the *Kanz al-javāhir*; however, it is the complete version of
the Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa copy and therefore has no relation to the Manisa Muradiye
copy.

By investigating the Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa and Manisa Muradiye copies, Yıldız spec-
ulates that the book was not very successful and received little further attention,
because Süleyman desired a verse *Shāhnāme*. Furthermore, she indicates that the
book includes Selim's Safavid and Mamluk campaigns, as well as the early years of
Süleyman's reign. She confuses the two manuscripts, saying that the Manisa Mu-
radiye copy is a versified *Shāhnāme*, except for its section titles, and the Hekimoğlu

Ali Paşa does not mention the reign of Selim (Yıldız 2012, 470)

What Alparslan, Sağırlı, and Yıldız fail to recognize is that the Muradiye copy is a different work from the Ayasofya, Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa, and Hacı Selim Ağa copies. Ġubārī wrote the Muradiye copy; it bears the title *Tārīkh-i Ġubārī*, covers the campaigns of Selim and the first years of Süleyman's reign, and is written in verse. On the other hand, the author of the work preserved in the other copies is Shāh Qāsim, who completed his chronicle in the late 1530s, and titled it *Kanz al-javāhir al-saniyya fī futūḥāt al-Sulaymāniyya*, covering the period from the death of Selim in 1520 to the siege of Vienna in 1529.

Recently, Markiewicz has brought Shah Qāsim and the *Kanz al-javāhir* to the surface. He has successfully identified the author of the *Kanz al-javāhir* by comparing poetry attributed by ʿĀşık Çelebī to Shāh Qāsim with the poetry in the *Kanz al-javāhir*.[5] He argues that this history has been completely forgotten because it was composed in Persian. He claims that Shāh Qāsim was the chief heir to the legacy of Idrīs-i Bidlīsī at the Ottoman court because they were both raised in Tabriz and had Sufi inclinations. Even more important, they were both representatives and transmitters of Timurid notions of sovereignty to the realms of the Ottomans (Markiewicz 2019, 236-238).

2.3 Introducing the *Kanz al-javāhir*

There exist three copies of the *Kanz al-javāhir*: 1) Ayasofya no. 3392, 2) Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa no. 764, and 3) Hacı Selim Ağa no. 769 (Tauer 1924, 9-19). The Ayasofya copy is a well-preserved manuscript with 191 folios, in a very legible *Naskhī* script. The headings, Qur'anic quotations, and hadiths are executed in red, blue, and golden ink, respectively. The Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa copy has 146 folios and consists of two parts: the first 64 folios are written in the *Nastaʿlīq* script, the rest, on the other hand, is written in a poor *Naskhī*, raising the probability that there were two scribes involved in the execution of the copy. The headings, Qur'anic quotations, and hadiths of the first 64 folios appear in red ink, while this coloring disappears from the rest of the copy. These differences within the text lead Tauer to think that the second part of the Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa copy might be an autograph sketch of the

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[5]Compare the poetry attributed by Âşık Çelebī to Shah Qāsim with the poetry in *Kanz al-javāhir*: ʿĀşık (2018, 595); Shāh Qāsim (3392, 3a-3b).

author (*müsevvede*) (Tauer 1924, 11), but there is no hard evidence for that. The Hacı Selim Ağa copy comprises 80 folios. Its technical features resemble the first 64 folios of the Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa copy, which enables one to hypothesize that they both might be the product of the same scribe, or even Shāh Qāsim himself.

The title of the Ayasofya copy, as it appears on the cover, is *Kanz al-javāhir al-saniyya fī futūḥāt al-Sulaymānīya.*[6] It starts with gratitude to God and His prophets (1b-4a) and continues with the epithets, glorification, and description of Süleyman I (4a-34a). It then mentions the death of Selim I, enthronement of Süleyman, and the revolt of Cānberdī Ghazālī (34a-63a). This is followed by the Belgrade campaign of 1521 and the elimination of Şehsuvāroğlu ʿAlī Beg in 1522 (63a-122b). The account of the 1522 campaign of Rhodes ends abruptly in the midst of the the narrative (122b-135b), omitting the Hungarian campaign and the battle of Mohács in 1526, continuing from the midst of the campaign of Vienna in 1529, and finishing with the return journey of Süleyman from Vienna (136a-191b). The reasons behind this omission are presently unclear. By the time the scribe was copying the *Kanz al-javāhir*, these parts might have already been lost, or he might have intentionally excluded them. The matter needs further research.

The Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa copy is in concordance with the Ayasofya copy up to its folio 135b. However, unlike the Ayasofya copy, the Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa copy possesses the full account of the campaign of Rhodes, and from folio 120a to 146b, we can find the missing parts of the Ayasofya copy. On the other hand, the Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa copy also omits the campaign of Mohács and the entirety of the campaign of Vienna.

The Hacı Selim Ağa copy does not include the introduction, the campaigns of Belgrade and Rhodes, but deals with the Vienna campaign. It bears the title *Tārīkh-i Fatḥ-i Ungurūs* (*The History of the Conquest of Hungary*), which suggests that it served as a campaign journal and was written before the other copies. Several hints from the texts further buttress this claim. In the Ayasofya and Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa copies, the grand vizier Ibrāhīm Pasha's name appears only once. These mentions occur at rather inconspicuous places, while in the Hacı Selim Ağa copy, Ibrāhīm Pasha is an active character whose appointment as *ser-ʿasker* (*the general of the army*) is discussed through nine folios and his name is apparent throughout the text (Tauer 1924, 12). It seems that the Hacı Selim Ağa copy was produced before the execution of Ibrāhīm Pasha in 1536 and Shāh Qāsim may have originally dedicated his work to the deceased grand vizier.

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[6]The cataloger of the Ayasofya copy gives the title as *Kanz al-gavāhir al-saniyya fī futūḥāt al-Sulaymānīya*. Yet, the original title is *Kanz al-javāhir al-saniyya fī futūḥāt al-Sulaymānīya*, as it appears in the first page of the copy.

But when were the other two copies executed? Tauer suggests that the date is after 1558-1559. He calculates this on the basis of a passage from the *Kanz al-javāhir* which suggests that there were two-hundred and forty years between the reign of Osman to Shāh Qāsim's composition day. Tauer bases his calculation on the death of Osman in 1326 (H. 726)and comes up with the 1558-1559 (H. 966) thesis. Yet, Shāh Qāsim clearly says that his reference point is "the beginning (maṭlaʿ) of Osman's advance against the infidels (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 7a)," which corresponds to 1532-1533, as has been already shown. Moreover, the 1558-1559 thesis is not plausible, since Shāh Qāsim died nearly two decades earlier. Thus, the composition date of the *Kanz al-javāhir* is between 1533 and 1539-1540. Yet, it seems that the Ayasofya and Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa copies were significantly altered after the death of Shāh Qāsim. As Tauer argues that the Hacı Selim Ağa copy was produced when Shāh Qāsim was still alive. After comparing this copy with the Ayasofya copy, he suggests that the Ayasofya copy's language and style were changed by a scribe whose Persian skills did not match Shāh Qāsim's. Therefore, he concludes that the most reliable copy about the Vienna campaign is the Hacı Selim copy and the Ayasofya copy took its final form in 1558.[7] Indeed, I agree with Tauer that the Ayasofya copy was changed, yet I do not accept 1558-1559 as its copy date. Moreover, the alteration might be valid regarding the Vienna campaign section. Still, as the style of the introduction of the Ayasofya copy is flamboyant and lacks errors in grammar and vocabulary, which strongly suggests that it was not touched after the death of Shāh Qāsim and preserved as the original.

Shāh Qāsim indicates that his work stands on four pillars:

> "...a pinch of perfect the *ṣāḥib qirān*'s (i.e. Süleyman's) character, a description of the greatest Ottoman viziers and their glorious commands in the Imperial Council regarding the perpetual government, the number and structure of the army, and a commentary on the boundless territories of the empire in terms of its revenue systems and expenditures" (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 8b).

However, he only accomplished to give a detailed narrative on Süleyman's character; as for the other three, he only touches upon them superficially.[8] This likely means that while writing the introduction, Shāh Qāsim had an ambitious plan to include

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[7]Tauer (1935*b*, 508). I shall indicate that since I am deficient in German, I could not read this work. I thank Rhoads Murphey to summarize the ideas of Tauer to me.

[8]In that sense, it shares similarities with Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's and Celālzāde Muṣṭafā's plans. For Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's plan for the *Hasht Bihisht*, see (Markiewicz 2019, 237); for Celālzāde Muṣṭafā's plan for *Tabakat*, see (Şahin 2013, 167).

the hierarchy, organization, geography, and financial administration of Süleyman's empire, along with the military campaigns,[9] but he only managed to finish the introduction and the campaigns; the other subjects he promised were left unfulfilled.

The three extant copies of the *Kanz al-javāhir* and ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī's inclusion of the opening line and several couplets from the work prove it certainly circulated in the sixteenth century (Markiewicz 2019, 238). Yet, it never attracted as much attention as its most prominent contemporaries, Kemālpāşāzāde's *Tevārīḫ-i Āl-i ʿOsmān* and Celālzāde Muṣṭafā's *Ṭabaḳatü'l-Memālik ve Derecātü'l Mesālik*. This can be put down to two reasons. First, Shāh Qāsim was writing in Persian, unlike Kemālpāşāzāde and Celālzāde Muṣṭafā, who were writing in Turkish. Considering Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's problem with the Ottoman court (Genç 2019, 94), Bayezid's order to produce a Turkish history right after the presentation of the *Hasht Bihisht* and the subsequent marginalization of Persian in Ottoman literature by the midst of the sixteenth century, this reason seems plausible. Second, it appears that Shāh Qāsim was one of the protegees of Ibrāhīm Pasha. Upon the latter's execution, Shāh Qāsim might have fallen out of favor and his work might not have been promoted or welcomed by the Ottoman court as much as Kemālpāşāzāde and Celālzāde's.

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[9]Markiewicz points out the resemblance between Celālzāde Muṣṭafā's *Tabakat* and Shāh Qāsim's *Kanz al-javāhir* in terms of outline and content. In addition, he argues that these two authors followed the example of Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's methodology in narrating Bayezid's empire. See Markiewicz (2019, 237).

3. WRITING IN PERSIAN AT THE OTTOMAN COURT

The literature on Persian history-writing in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century has witnessed significant contributions in recent years. Unsurprisingly, several scholars were attracted by Idrīs-i Bidlīsī. In 2019, Christopher Markiewicz published *The Crisis of Kingship in Late Medieval Islam: Persian émigrés and the Making of Ottoman Sovereignty* in which he focuses on the life of Idrīs-i Bidlīsī and his masterpiece, the *Hasht Bihisht*. Throughout the book, Markiewicz discusses Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's works along with works of other *émigré* scholars, delineating a framework of intellectual fluidity and diffusion of ideas about sovereignty in the late medieval Islamicate ecumene (Markiewicz 2019). Interestingly, in the same year, Vural Genç released *Acem'den Rum'a Bir Bürokrat ve Tarihçi İdris-i Bidlisi* (*From Persia to the Ottoman Realm: A Bureaucrat and Historian Idrīs-i Bidlīsī*). Likewise, he concentrates on the life of Idrīs-i Bidlīsī and the *Hasht Bihisht* (Genç 2019). In 2012, Sara Nur Yıldız explored the phenomenon of history writing in Persian at the Ottoman court between 1400 and 1600. She examines several histories, demonstrating the role of the Persian language for the development of an Ottoman imperial discourse (Yıldız 2012, 436-502). In 2004, Abdüsselam Bilgen translated and transcribed Ādā-yi Shīrāzī's *Shāhnāma-i Salīm Khānī* (*The Book of Selim Khan*). This work is a successful example of a translation project from Persian to Turkish and underscores the importance of Persian at the Ottoman court (Şīrāzī 2004). Although these efforts seem promising, still the vast portion of Persian manuscripts about Ottoman history remains unpublished and neglected. Thus, this chapter aims to examine an oft-ignored Persian chronicle, the *Kanz al-javāhir*, its style, place in historiography, intended audience, and portrayal of Süleyman.

3.1 The Style of the *Kanz al-javāhir*

As ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī colorfully describes the elegant style of Shāh Qāsim, the *Kanz al-javāhir* is a *magnum opus* whose style can be compared to that of renowned Islamic scholars, such as Rāghib Iṣfahānī's (*fl.* the eleventh century) and Vaṣṣāf's (d. 1329) works (ʿĀşıḳ 2018, 594). Indeed, Shāh Qāsim conveys his ideas and knowledge through a well-articulated and delicate style of rhyming prose (*saj'*). Modern historians have dubbed this manner of history-writing as the chancery style because it ultimately harked back to the practice of Persian officials in the late twelfth century, who spread used rhymed prose, which they used in both public and private correspondence. The characteristic features of this style are the "poeticization of prose", internal rhyme, excessive usage of metaphors, and quotations from the Qur'an, hadith, and poetry (Meisami 2012, 21). This kind of history-writing aims to amalgamate the elegant artistic style with the didactic dimension of history. Subsequent historians adopted the chancery style; most notably Juvaynī (d. 1283), Vaṣṣāf, and Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī (d. 1454).

The Ottomans appear to have embraced this style in the last years of the reign of Bayezid II. The earliest Ottoman chroniclers chose to express their ideas in a relatively unembellished language. This manner in historiography was revolutionized by the migration of Idrīs-i Bidlīsī to Istanbul. His aim was to rival the works of the most highly regarded Persian historians of the preceding centuries. In this sense, Idrīs-i Bidlīsī transported the best literary qualities to new terrain and contextualized these for the Ottomans (Markiewicz 2019, 219). The reception and subsequent influence of the *Hasht Bihisht* prove that the Ottoman court was impressed by the chancery style. The patron of Idrīs-i Bidlīsī, Bayezid II, commissioned Kemālpāşāzāde to write a dynastic history just like Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's, but the Sultan wanted it to be composed in Turkish, not in Persian. Kemālpāşāzāde undertook this job and produced one of the most-detailed Ottoman dynastic histories. Although sometimes described as a translation of the *Hasht Bihisht*, the *Tevārīḫ-i Āl-i ʿOs̱mān* was an independent work which presents an analytical and elegant way of writing history (Fleischer 1986, 239). Kemālpāşāzāde's legacy was inherited by Celālzāde (d. 1567), who served as a chancellor for a long time, produced the most detailed account of Süleyman, the *Ṭabaḳatü'l-Memālik ve Derecātü'l Mesālik*.

We do not have sufficient knowledge about the professional background of Shāh Qāsim. It is fair to assume that he was a bureaucrat at either the Safavid or Ottoman court because nearly all historians who adopted the chancery style in their

works had official missions, such as Idrīs-i Bidlīsī, Kemālpāşāzāde, and Celālzāde. If we assume that he was an official, most probably he first used to worked at the Safavid court, since he was deficient in Turkish. Be that as it may be, Shāh Qāsim's *Kanz al-javāhir* is an excellent example of the Persian chancery style. He exhibited his mastery in prose with internal rhyming, especially in the introduction (*muqaddima*). As can be expected, his narrative on campaigns lacks these artistic skills and uses a plain and straightforward language.

As a scholar on exegesis and hadith (ʿĀşıḳ 2018, 593), Shāh Qāsim uses Qur'anic and prophetic quotations. These quotations are not random, but rigorously chosen pieces that are related to the topic which Shāh Qāsim is elaborating on in the given passage. He embellishes these references by relating his historical observations to astrology and philosophy, in order to convince his readers about the superiority of his patron.

3.2 A Historiographical Survey

Although Shāh Qāsim was patronized by Turkish-speaking Ottomans, his education and scholarly inclinations had been shaped by the Persian tradition. It is clear that he was the living heir of Idrīs-i Bidlīsī, and by extension, the Timurid historiographical tradition, in the Ottoman realm (Markiewicz 2019, 236). Moreover, Shāh Qāsim's presentation of the Sultan was inspired by the *Hasht Bihisht.* Yet, the context in which Shah Qāsim composed his work significantly differs from Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's that Shāh Qāsim wrote for a Sultan who, unlike his father, waged war against the West, conquered Arab Iraq, and felt apocalyptic apprehensions more than his father.

Idrīs-i Bidlīsī was not the first scholar to deploy such epithets in a chronicle. Timur's interest in history provided a stimulus for the rise of a new, eastern Iranian tradition of historiography in the fifteenth century in which stories of the life of the charismatic leader remained at the core of historical works (Woods 1987, 82). Under Timur and his successors' patronage, historians redefined existing notions of sovereignty and deployed new epithets to justify the rules of their patrons. Among significant Timurid scholars, Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī holds a special place because of his elegant style and impact on subsequent historians. Although Yazdī has been criticized by historians because for his literary and historical merits, his *Ẓafarnāma* brought new

perspectives to the concept of kingship. He praised Shahrukh as the religious renewer (*mujaddid*) of the ninth Hijri century and elevated Shahrukh's father, Timur, to the rank of the Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction (*ṣāḥib qirān*) through using astrological references in an embellished chancery style (Binbaş 2016, 263-264). As John Woods argues that Yazdī manipulated the historical narrative to legitimize his patron, Shahrukh (Woods 1999, 104). Indeed, subsequent pre-modern historians continued to use historiography as a legitimizing tool for their patrons, such as Shāh Qāsim.

Markiewicz successfully demonstrates the continuation between the Timurid and the Ottoman historiographical tradition in terms of the vocabulary of sovereignty. He argues that:

> "Persian *émigré*s introduced and promoted the Timurid vocabulary of sovereignty which was fully integrated during the long reign of Süleyman I and helped forge a lasting image of kingship for the Ottoman Sultans until the seventeenth century." (Markiewicz 2019, 278)

As a native of Tabriz, where he absorbed the Timurid way of elegance and epithet usage, Shāh Qāsim was the representative of the Timurid historiographical tradition in the Ottoman empire in the 1530s. Just like Yazdī had legitimized his patron's rule through deploying several epithets, Shāh Qāsim eulogized Süleyman as the centennial ruler who would bring the whole world under his sovereignty.

3.3 For whom to Write? The Intended Audience of the *Kanz al-javāhir*

Bayezid II and Selim I's reign had witnessed significant numbers of Persian chronicles, such as Qāżīzāde's *Ghazavāt-i Sulṭān Selīm* (*Sultan Selim's Holy Wars*), Ādā-yi Shīrāzī's *Shāhnāma-yi Salīm Khānī*, and Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's *Hasht Bihisht*.[1] Yet, until the establishment of the office of the *Shāhnāmagūy* in the sixteenth century, Süleyman's first thirty years as the Sultan did not witness a Persian regnal history, with the significant exception of the *Kanz al-javāhir*.

Political conditions at the time the *Kanz al-javāhir* was composed reveal its unique-

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[1] For details of these works, see Yıldız (2012, 462-469).

ness. After abandoning his father's hardline eastern policy to subdue the Safavids, Süleyman adopted milder relations with his Shiite neighbors. First, he abrogated his father's ban on silk trade with the Safavids (Murphey 2004, 233-234); second, he chose the Western front as his main direction of expansion. Indeed, this new orientation in the international arena accelerated after the appointment of Süleyman's close friend Ibrāhīm Pasha to the grand vizierate in 1523 and his close collaboration with the Venetian Alvise Gritti (d. 1534). Apart from politics, these two influential characters encouraged the Sultan to have himself portrayed as the wealthiest and mightiest monarch of the whole world, in order to show his magnificence, which they believed could challenge the imperial ambitions of Charles V (r. 1519-1556). Gülru Necipoğlu demonstrates that Süleyman and Ibrāhīm were avid collectors of Western, especially Venetian, artefacts and that the Venetian helmet-crown, acquired by Ibrāhīm for Süleyman in 1532, clearly proves that Ibrāhīm endeavored to depict the Sultan as a successor to the Roman Empire and a Western monarch (Necipoğlu 1992, 168). The "Ottomanization" in politico-cultural spheres appears to influence historiography too. The Ottomans preferred histories written in embellished Ottoman Turkish and patronage for dynastic history written in Persian was neglected until the reiteration of quarrels with the Safavids in 1533.

The campaign of the Two Iraqs was the first eastern march of the Sultan during the "Qizilbash interregnum" after the death of Shah Isma'il in 1524, after a period when no single attack had been made by the Ottomans on Safavid territories, except for small frontier skirmishes (Roemer 1997, 239-240). The primary motivation behind this campaign was Ibrāhīm Pasha's effort to repair his reputation, which was damaged after the inconclusive and burdensome campaigns of Vienna in 1529 and Germany in 1532 (Şahin 2013, 94). The Grand Vizier set out without the Sultan; Süleyman joined him approximately a year later, in September of 1534 (Uzunçarşılı 2011*b*, 351-352). The Ottoman army took control of Baghdad in the following month, and Süleyman and his court rigorously worked on land registers and administrative matters for four months to ensure Ottoman rule there. Meanwhile, Süleyman commissioned Shāh Qāsim to write a chronicle ('Āşık 2018, 594).

The four months' sojourn of Süleyman and his actions during that time reveal the main motivation behind the assignment of Shāh Qāsim to write a Persian regnal history. Apart from administrative arrangements to govern his newly acquired territories, Süleyman undertook religious and cultural missions to legitimize the Ottoman rule in the eyes of both Shiite and Sunni inhabitants of the former center of the caliphate, Baghdad. First, he had the grave of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767), the founder of the Sunni Hanafi legal school, discovered and built a splendid tomb and mosque to honor him (Mustafa 1981, 258b-259a). Second, he visited the shrine of

Imam Mūsā al-Kāżim (d. 799)(Uzunçarşılı 2011*b*, 352), who is revered by Sunnis for his scholarly talents, and also the seventh Imam of the Twelver Shiism. This move of Süleyman proves his intention to rule not just Sunnis but also Shiites. Third, he associated with several intellectuals from Arab Iraq, most notably the Turkish-Shiite poet Fużūlī (d. 1556), who presented his eulogy of Baghdad to the Sultan during the latter's visits to the holy shrines (İnalcık 2019, 61). Such activities suggest that Süleyman and his court desired to establish permanent rule in Arab Iraq by presenting the Sultan as the embracer of religious and intellectual figures who belonged to both sects. In that context, Shāh Qāsim was ordered to write a regnal history in Persian, which suggests that the intended audience of the book was the educated residents of Iraq who understood Persian. This feature explains the *Kanz al-javāhir*'s unique character as the sole history written in Persian in the first thirty years of Süleyman's reign, as the ruler wanted his *ghaza*s and victories to be known for to his Persophone subjects.

Several hints in the *Kanz al-javāhir* confirm this claim. First of all, the general tone Shāh Qāsim adopts in his book is relatively more didactic than other historical works of the time. He wants to instruct his readers about the great deeds of the Ottoman Sultans. Also, through his references, he desires to show that the *Rūmī* lands (i.e. the Ottoman territories West of the Euphrates and in the Balkans) are indispensable parts of the greater Islamicate ecumene, as Muslims had a well-established culture and history in these territories. For instance, Shāh Qāsim devotes a lengthy section to Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī (d. 674) and his importance to the Islamic tradition. Al-Anṣārī was a close companion of the Prophet Muhammad, took part in one of the first sieges of Constantinople by Muslims, and died in 674 near the walls of that city. Upon conquering Constantinople, Mehmed II built a tomb, mosque, madrasa, and bath to venerate this Islamic legend. Muslim residents of Istanbul embraced al-Anṣārī as a celebrated religious figure (Ṭūrsūn 1912, 75); and before embarking on his first campaign to Hungary in 1521 and his second campaign to Rhodes in 1522, Süleyman visited al-Anṣārī's tomb even before his father's and ancestors'. Considering the fame of al-Anṣārī in the Ottoman realm, Shāh Qāsim gives details about the saint's life, such as where he was from, what he had done, and what he was known for, instances which other Ottoman chroniclers of the time omit (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 67b). Delineating al-Anṣārī in detail proves that Shāh Qāsim was likely not writing for the Ottoman élite, who had been familiar with al-Anṣārī. Instead, his intended audience was Persian-speaking courts and societies across the central Islamic lands, especially Arab Iraq, where the legacy of al-Anṣārī was forgotten or even not known.

Second, Shāh Qāsim's didactic tone is strongly felt in his presentation of Süleyman's household (qapū khalqi). He says that:

> "Twenty thousand qualified soldiers, in the name of the qapū khalqi, hold quality and they are permanently in attendance and service to the king's heaven-like court. Every man, be he from the cavalry or infantry, slave or free, is paid 2000 Ottoman -*akçe*, even some are paid even more. The total amount of the aforementioned payment is about 700 kharvar of Ottoman *akçe*s. And according to the calculation of the lands of Persia, it is thirty-two thousand Tabrīzī tūmāns." (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 29b-30a).

Kharvar is a unit of measurement that is equal to a hundred *Tabrīzī* maunds, while a *tūmān* means both ten thousand and an unofficial currency in Iran, even today. By describing the Sultan's expenditures for his household in Tabriz measurements, Shāh Qāsim hints that his intended audience is the Safavid and Iraqi élite. Most probably, except for Ottoman merchants, this currency and measurement meant nothing to people living in Ottoman domains.

Thirdly, Shāh Qāsim devotes a lengthy part to the trade ban and blockade against the Safavids by Selim and the abolishment of these as one of the first acts of Süleyman upon his succession (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 19a-22a). Selim applied this policy to the Safavids, in order to cripple their economy and force Shah Isma'il to submit to his requests. Kemālpāşāzāde argues that Selim issued this decree in order to cut the flow of firearms to the Safavids (Kemalpaşazade 1996, 40-44), which later would play to the advantage of the Ottomans in the battle of Chaldiran. However, it appears that in addition to the Safavids, Ottoman merchants were also severely affected by the decree, because the flow of silk and other materials was banned, too (Herzig 2015, 238). Shāh Qāsim agrees with Kemālpāşāzāde and adds "the Sultan only banned the trade of firearms, but the guardians of thoroughfares demanded all comers and goers to pay a huge amount of custom tax (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 20b)."

Moreover, he mentions how "the frustrated merchants were paid according to their financial losses, upon their objections to Selim (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 21a)." Although Shāh Qāsim refrains from historical narratives in his introduction, he pays particular attention to this event. He subtly argues that the Sultan banned trade in order to subjugate the "infidel" Qizilbash by preventing them from obtaining firearms, intending to lift the ban after he achieved his goal. In the meantime, he compensated merchants for their losses with "a lofty sense of justice." Apparently, Shāh Qāsim targeted to exonerate his patron's deed in the eyes of Iraqi merchants.

Last but not least, Shāh Qāsim clarifies the reasons behind Selim's campaign against

fellow Muslims, i.e. the Safavids and the Mamluks. Waging war against a Muslim power had always been a significant concern for Ottoman ulama and soldiers. The Ottomans came up with two solutions to justify it: first, they accused other Muslim polities of preventing the Ottomans from safely conducting *ghaza* against Christian powers. For instance, Murad I (r. 1362-1389) justified a campaign against the Karamanids, who had pillaged Ottoman territories while the Sultan was in the Balkans, by saying to the Karamanid envoy, "Unless I beat you, I cannot conduct *ghaza* in peace. The biggest *ghaza* is the *ghaza* against the obstacle of a *ghaza*."[2] This is how the Ottomans sought to justify warfare against Turkish principalities in their formative years. Second, the Ottoman religious authorities declared some of their Muslim opponents apostate, which meant it was a religious duty to fight them, and it was legally permissible to Muslims to take away their properties and homes. Champions of this opinion were Ḥamza Ṣarī Görez (d. 1521) and Kemālpāşāzāde who argued that Shah Isma'il and his followers openly insulted the first three caliphs and the wife of the Prophet, 'Āʾishah (d. 678); burned the Qurʾan; and rescinded the religious law (Çıpa 2017, 6). While mentioning the background of the Hungarian campaign in 1521, Shāh Qāsim justifies Selim's campaign against the Safavids and the Mamluks by juxtaposing these two reasons. He argues that:

> "Although the House of Osman preoccupied themselves with waging holy war against infidels and sought divine confirmation all the time, Selim had to fight with the Safavids, who followed the path of anarchy and deviation and with the Mamluks, who helped the Safavids overthrow the Ottomans. Because of these incidents, the Ottomans could not wage war against the Hungarians and unfold the banners of jihad and *ghaza* (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 23b-24b)."

Shāh Qāsim claims that the Ottomans only paused holy wars when other Muslim powers posed a greater danger to them, and whenever the Ottomans felt they were safe from the East, they turned their attention to the West. This is unlike Celālzāde, who, like Shāh Qāsim, narrates the reign of Süleyman solely, does not consider it necessary to justify Selim's actions in the East. This difference might also stem from the intended audience. Celālzāde was writing for an audience who had already been acquainted with Selim's and his ulama's approval of these wars. On the other hand, Shāh Qāsim's intended audience was the Iraqi élite who might have found the Ottomans and their championship of the idea of the *ghaza* hypocritical. However, they waged war against Muslims, one of them being the guardians of two holy cities,

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[2]"Seni kam itmeyince, ben huzur ile gaza idemezin. Nice barışmak ki mâni-i gazâya gazâ, gazây-ı ekberdür. Hazır ol vaktına, işte vardum"(Neşri 2008, 219).

Mecca and Madinah. Cognizant of this, Shāh Qāsim deliberately included Selim's motivation behind his actions, in order to justify Süleyman's campaign of the Two Iraqs. It is thus that he hints that Süleyman conquered Iraq in order to be able to continue his *ghaza* activities against the West.

3.4 The Sultan of the Earth:
The Portrayal of Süleyman in the *Kanz al-javāhir*

Shāh Qāsim deploys a wide range of vocabulary in his portrayal of Süleyman. Predominantly, he calls him as the *ṣāḥib qirān*, i.e. the Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction. Azfar Moin describes *ṣāḥib qirān* as the indications of great events, such as a change in royal authority (*mulk*), or dynasty (*davla*), or a transfer of royal authority from one people to another. He argues that the formulations and manifestations of early modern notions of sacral kingship were prevalent in the sixteenth century Islamicate sultanates and had their roots in Timurid speculations about astrological determinism (Azfar Moin 2012, 23-55). Timur was allegedly born at the time of the conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter, and his fortune was said to be destined by the combined power of these planets. Medieval astronomers had already established that the conjunction of these planets was the harbinger of great events, such as the birth of a world conqueror. However, with Timur and his successors, this term became the manifestation of sacral kingship in the post-Mongol era (Binbaş 2016, 251). Similar to the Safavids and Mughals, the Ottoman Sultans were depicted as *ṣāḥib qirān*s which reflected universalist notions of politico-religious leadership and eschatological expectations because of the imminence of the Hijri millennium. With its powerful messianic overtones, the use of the epithet *ṣāḥib qirān* represented Ottoman claims to the universal monarchy and world conquest; therefore, the title is widely applied to Süleyman in the first decade of his reign (Şahin 2012, 62). In the same fashion, Shāh Qāsim considered his patron's *ṣāḥib qirān* identity as the most distinctive one; and throughout the *Kanz al-javāhir*, he extensively deploys it to refer Süleyman. Comparing Süleyman with the other rulers who were classified as *ṣāḥib qirān*, Shāh Qāsim claims that "Süleyman is the worthiest ruler among them as the *ṣāḥib qirān* because of the wideness of his domains, the abundance of his wealth, and the number of his soldiers. Thus, whenever Süleyman is mentioned, the Sultan will be dubbed as the *ṣāḥib qirān* (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 11a)."

After exalting God and his prophet Muhammad in the first pages of his book, Shāh

Qāsim devotes a lengthy part to the qualities and epithets of his patron. Süleyman is portrayed as:

> "...the shadow and vicegerent of God in the world, the champion of holy warriors who are aided by God, enforcer of the evident faith (i.e. Islam), the leader of the Muslims, and the commander of believers, whose sun-like residence of dominion in the divinely assisted dynasty of the Ottomans, sits on the tenth and highest mansion of the planets as the tenth Sultan." (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 9b).

Although the shadow of God *(ẓill Allāh)* does not appear in the Qur'an, it has a strong prophetic tradition that designated rulers as possessors of divine authority and governance endowing rulers all the godly traits applicable to earthly rulership (Yılmaz 2018, 186-188). In Islamic literature, *ẓill Allāh* was a qualifier to distinguish between higher and lower levels of rulership. A ruler may bear the title of *ẓill Allāh* just because of his sheer military might; however, the real Shadow of God should possess four cardinal virtues: justice, courage, restraint, and wisdom (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 13a-13b). Shāh Qāsim elevates the rank of his patron to *ẓill Allāh* because he claims that Süleyman had both military power and the four cardinal virtues. However, his enumeration of these differs from the traditional view of equipoise. For Shāh Qāsim, "the revered viceregency of Süleyman is built on the Sultan's justice (*ʿadālat*), courage (*shajāʿat*), religiosity (*diyānat*), and munificence (*sakhāvat*)." He maintains that religiosity and munificence are the outcomes of wisdom (*ḥikmat*) and restraint (*ʿiffat*) (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 13b). By impersonating God with a worldly feature like a shadow and claiming Süleyman is the *ẓill Allāh*, Shāh Qāsim deliberately asks all Muslims to obey and follow the Sultan. Besides, *khalīfa* denotes nearly the same as *ẓill Allāh* in the post-Mongol Islamicate world, along with *Imām al-Muslimīn* and *Amīr al-Muʾminīn*. The influence of the caliphate was decisively terminated following the murder of the last Abbasid caliph at the hands of Mongols in 1258. Since then, the number of Muslim rulers to consider themselves caliphs increased significantly. Yılmaz argues that:

> "The idea of the caliphate, reinterpreted in response to profound changes taking place in the broader Muslim community, regained its prominence in Islamic political discourse, and, with the rise of the Ottoman Empire, became the linchpin of imperial ideology in the sixteenth century". (Yılmaz 2018, 1).

The Ottoman idea of the caliphate in the sixteenth century had both mystical and universalistic connotations. Accordingly, the Sultan was regarded as the deputy of God, who would ensure the application of religious law and the triumph of Islam over other religions. The imminence of the tenth Hijri century and the enormous Ottoman conquests were construed as the divine appointment of Süleyman as the Messiah. Having had Sufi training and familiarity with eschatological expectations, Shāh Qāsim designated Süleyman as not just the caliph but the caliph of the world (*khalīfa fi'l-ʿālam*). Thus, while Shāh Qāsim was writing his book, the ultimate goal to be a world sovereign and unifying all Muslims under the leadership of Süleyman was still prevalent at the Ottoman court.

Another widely deployed epithet for the Ottoman sultans is "the sultan of champions and holy warriors" (*sulṭān al-ghuzzā val-mujāhidīn*). This means the sultan is the lord of Islamic warriors who pillage, raid or conquers the land of infidels to spread the word of God and true faith, Islam. Wittek found this particular aspect of the Ottomans significant and put forth his celebrated "ghazi thesis" arguing that the early Ottomans were "a community of ghazis, of champions of the Mohammedan religion; a community of Moslem march-warriors, devoted to the struggle with the infidels in their neighborhood (Wittek 2012, 33-45)." The Ottoman enterprise attracted a huge number of followers especially from Turkmen tribes migrating into Anatolia in the fourteenth century, because of economic and social benefits that *ghaza* presented. The identity of Ottoman sultans being champions of holy war never disappeared from the Ottoman tradition. For instance, even the Ayasofya copy of the *Kanz al-javāhir* mentions its acquisition by Mahmud I (r. 1730-1754) and refers to Mahmud as the sultan of holy wars (*al-Sulṭān al-maghāzī*) (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 13b). Indeed, this epithet was widely used in the whole Islamic ecumene, and Shāh Qāsim was aware of the importance of presenting a ruler with a ghazi identity. More importantly, emphasis on *ghaza* in the context of the *Kanz al-javāhir* justifies the campaign of the Two Iraqs in the eyes of Shāh Qāsim's intended audience. He aimed to show that the Ottomans had indeed preoccupied themselves with *ghaza* against the Christian West, which they had to support with fighting occasionally against Muslims on some occasions to provide better conditions for their activities in Europe.

In addition to the Arabic epithets such as *ẓill Allāh*, *khalīfa fi'l-ʿālam*, *Imām al-Muslimīn*, *Amīr al-Muʾminīn*, and *Sulṭān al-ghuzzā vaʾl-mujāhidīn*, Shāh Qāsim deploys Persian designations for Süleyman, in which he alludes to universal sovereignty. He states that "[during the time of Süleyman] elevated the sublimely fortunate rank of the throne of world-conquering and universe-acquiring reached the zenith of the Ninth Heaven. (*Pāya-yi takht-i ʿālī bakht-i ʿālam-gīrī va jahāndārī rā bar ūj-i falak-*

i tāsi' rāfi' āmada) (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 9b-10a)." With this astrological reference, he points to Süleyman's father, Selim, who was the ninth Ottoman Sultan. Because Shāh Qāsim emphasizes Süleyman's tenth rank in the Ottoman dynasty, the reference to the "ninth sky" can only allude to Selim.

Selim's enormous and swift conquests in his short reign met with great concern upon the succession of him, since the Ottoman ulama and court did not regard Süleyman as a worthy son to Selim's legacy. Therefore, they did not expect him to pursue claims to universal sovereignty (Turan 2007, 48-52). However, Süleyman proved them wrong, and he succeeded on the suppression of the Cānberdī Ghazālī revolt (1521), the conquests of Belgrade (1521) and Rhodes (1522), and the victory at Mohács (1526).

In addition these expectations he had to meet, Süleyman faced serious challenge from Charles V and his universal ambitions in the international arena. Charles inherited such a vast portion of Europe and the Americas in the late 1510s that the Catholic ecumene regarded him as the Messiah who would capture England, Italy, Constantinople, and Jerusalem (Parker 2019, 490-491). Concurrent with the initial victories of Süleyman, Charles conquered much of Italy and captured one of his great rivals, the French King Francis I (r. 1515-1547), in the Battle of Pavia in 1525. These accomplishments strengthened the rule of Charles and positioned him as the savior of Christendom from the "infidel Turkish" threat which was strongly felt in Central Europe and the Mediterranean. Charles used the Turkish fear to unite all Christians under his banner (Turan 2007, 46). On the eastern side of the Mediterranean, Süleyman and the grand vizier Ibrāhīm Pasha (d. 1536) were alarmed by these events; and the coronation of Charles by the Pope as a Holy Roman Emperor in 1530 called for a response against universal claims of Charles. Thus, Shāh Qāsim's portrayal of Süleyman in the *Kanz al-javāhir* has a deliberate emphasis on world conquest and sovereignty.

In his use of titles and historical references to Süleyman, the chronicler celebrates the Persian, Islamic, and Turco-Mongol historiographical traditions in an Ottoman context. For instance, he compares his patron to the legendary Sasanian kings, which had been known from the Persian literary tradition. Although the Sasanians were a pre-Islamic Persian dynasty that competed with the Muslim empire in the seventh century, the Samanids incorporated Sasanian historiographical and cultural traditions into their cultural profile in the ninth and tenth centuries.[3] Their literary

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[3]The importance of the Sasanians for Islam is not so much their short-lived resistence against the Muslims, as their political and cultural traditions which were adopted into Islam. In addition, it was not just the Samanids that conveyed the Sasanian tradiitons over to Islam; the entirety of Iraq was also a very important scene.

tradition draws heavily on both Islamic and Persian imagery. They linked their rulers to Khosrow, Rustam, Gāyūmarth, and other Persian heroes. Peacock argues that:

> "The use of these extravagant epithets comparing rulers to the Sasanian kings or Iranian heroes does not mean that they were intended to be taken seriously as a political manifesto. Rather, they were just forms of poetic hyperbole more readily available to a poet writing in Persian than Arabic." (Peacock 2007, 38).

The significance of the Sasanian connection had increased with the composition of the *Shāhnāma* (*The Book of Kings*) by Firdawsī in the eleventh century. References to Sasanian kings and legends had become an such indispensable part of Islamicate literature that Shāh Qāsim celebrated this tradition in his book. Apart from that, Süleyman ordered Shāh Qāsim to write a chronicle in Baghdad that is situated very close to the old Sasanian capital, Ctesiphon. Because of these reasons, Shāh Qāsim may refer to the Sasanian kings and Persian heroes (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 14b), to celebrate the pre-Islamic history of the conquered subjects.

3.5 Ten Qualifications of the Tenth Sultan

Up to that point, Shāh Qāsim's epithets and adjectives to praise Süleyman may seem mere repetition of the historiographical tradition. Indeed, the chronicler did not initiate something new in literature, even in the Ottoman context. Yet, he brought new perspectives and comments to the existing notions and gave solid examples from the life of his patron and his dynasty to prove that Süleyman was the *khalīfa* of the earth and was the *ṣāḥib-qirān*. To that end, he juxtaposes ten qualifications of Süleyman, in order to demonstrate that not only is Süleyman the tenth Sultan of the Ottomans but he is also the religious renewer (*mujaddid*) of the tenth century (Markiewicz 2019, 284). Although his epithets and qualifications to praise Süleyman were inspired by Timurid historiography and are not original, Shāh Qāsim developed this encomium in a new context in which Messianic expectations and competition for the world sovereignty dominated ideologies across the Mediterranean. In that context, Shāh Qāsim's portrayal of Süleyman gains new dimensions.

The first qualification of his patron's that the chronicler discusses is that his glorious and God-chosen dynasty and his rank as the tenth and the last Sultan. Shāh Qāsim indicates that "all Ottoman Sultans were aided by God and raised the banner of Islam in infidel lands." Then, he highlights the eponymous founder of the Ottoman dynasty, Osman I (r. 1299-1326), and flashes out his genealogy as going back to Esau, son of Isaac, son of Abraham. Shāh Qāsim asserts that "the ancestors of Osman, with the divine will (*irāda-i subḥāniya*), suppressed the injustices of infidelity and anarchy (*ẓulūmāt-i kufr va ʿiṣyān*) and spread the light of the faith (*nūr-i īmān*) across the Turkic lands (*Tūrān*) (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 25b-27a). This narrative intends to prove that the predecessors of the Ottoman house were Muslims, and they were dealing with infidels to spread the name of God, just like the Ottomans had been doing in the Balkans and Europe. Süleyman is the last and current ruler of this glorious and pious lineage and his qualifications and deeds outrank those of his ancestors. Shāh Qāsim links his patron's talents to the number ten:

> "It is written in the scriptures of people who know the secrets of the methods of numbers and their combination; that the base set of numbers is 9, because it contains all variations of them: odd and even, odd of odd, even of even, odd of even, even of odd. And since it is clear to all researchers and experts that the completeness after perishing of every being, is that after attaining all levels of possible attainments, again that being returns to its root. Thus, the completeness of these principles of number is subject to its return to the root of every number, which is one. And from that return, the number ten, which has the perfect attainment is bound to acquisition." (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 23b-24a).

The chronicler this esoteric sentence with Qur'anic quotations that highlight the importance of the number ten. For example, God promises "whoever comes (on the Day of Judgment) with a good deed will have ten times the like thereof (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 24a)." This quotation from the Qur'an and esoteric reference to the science of numbers are indicators of his Timurid education in Tabriz.

The second qualification is in fact a historical reference. Shāh Qāsim points out the regularity in the Ottoman succession system and argues that the Ottoman sultans inherited their fathers' kingship without a rupture. Although he seems to disregard the interregnum after the Battle of Ankara in 1402,[4] the Ottomans successfully handled the problem of corporate sovereignty. This Turco-Mongol notion refers to the division of the polity among all male relatives of the deceased king. Because of that,

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[4]For the period of "interregnum", see Kastritsis (2007, 41-194).

Timur's vast empire was divided among his sons in which the successors to Timur's legacy competed for power and patronized history-writing to prove that they were the fittest to rule. This problem is apparent under the Aqquyunlus, the Safavids, and the Mughals, too.[5] Yet, the Ottomans appear to be more successful than these polities, in that the Ottoman Empire was never divided between brothers, except for a decade after the Battle of Ankara in 1402. Still, there were significant battles between brothers to ensure enthronement in Ottoman history. For instance, Süleyman's father, Selim, both warred against his father, Bayezid, and elder brother, Aḥmed (d. 1513). Moreover, he killed his sons before embarking on the Chaldiran campaign, to provide a secure succession to Süleyman. Likewise, Bayezid confronted his brother Cem (d. 1495) in Yenişehir but failed to kill him, which transformed into a real international crisis for the Ottomans (Uzunçarşılı 2011*b*, 161-178). Nevertheless, in all these cases, the Ottoman polity stayed intact and undivided, which Shāh Qāsim celebrates by saying "Conjunction of the line of kings and solid arrangement of succession has never happened in this manner in case of any other family and the sultans of the past and today (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 26b)."

The third qualification is a canonical reference to a pious tradition (hadith). Süleyman was born in 901 according to the lunar calendar. Shāh Qāsim quotes a hadith which suggests that "at the beginning of every century Allah will send to this community (i.e. the Muslims) someone who will renew its religious understanding (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 27a)." Thus, centennial revivalism had made its way into the Islamic tradition and being a *mujaddid* had been attributed to various Sultans in the central lands of Islam, especially after the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 1258. With the partition of Timur's empire among his sons and grandsons, this notion was used as a legitimizing tool by Shahrukh's historians to cast him as the preeminent ruler of his time (Binbaş 2016, 261-265). With scholars like Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū (d. 1430) and Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī, this term gained wider acceptance and importance in Islamic polities.[6] However, the first Ottoman chroniclers, such as ʿĀşıkpāşāzāde (d. 1484) and Neşrī (d. 1520), do not mention this epithet in their chronicles to praise their patron, Bayezid II.

Centennial revivalism was known to Ottoman intellectuals from the middle of the fifteenth century. Yet, it is Idrīs-i Bidlīsī who introduced it as an indispensable component of kingship and a Timurid notion of sovereignty (Markiewicz 2019, 180). Although Idrīs-i Bidlīsī regarded Bayezid II as the *mujaddid* of the ninth hijrī century, subsequent Ottoman historians did not share his conformity to attribute this

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[5]For the Aqquyunlus, see Woods (1999, 125-149); for the Safavids Newman (2006, 26-27); for the Mughals Richards (1995, 151-164).

[6]On Ḥāfiż-i Abrū, see Woods (1999, 104); on Yazdī, see Binbaş (2016, 263-264).

title to the Ottoman Sultans. As a renowned historian and grand vizier of Süleyman, Lütfī Pasha (d. 1564) formulated the rank of *mujaddid* for every lunar century. He argues that the *mujaddid* of the seventh century was Osman who stopped Mongol domination over Muslims; the *mujaddid* of the eight century was Mehmed I (r. 1413-1421) who renewed the religion after Timur's destruction of the Muslims; and last, the *mujaddid* of the ninth century was Selim I, who freed Islam from the infidelity of the Safavids (Lütfī 2001, 147-153). Similar to Lütfī Pasha's argumentation, Shāh Qāsim refers to the birth of Süleyman in 901 and suggests that "he is the real renewer of the religion of the tenth century (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 27a)." Here, emphasis on real (*ḥaqīqī*) is significant, since other rulers, too, asserted that they were *mujaddid*s. This might be a mystical reference, too, in which case a *mujaddid-i ḥaqīqī* would mean a spiritual, esoteric, or *bāṭinī* renewer.

The fourth qualification of Süleyman is his uniqueness as a result of divine appointment. Shāh Qāsim claims that Süleyman's title of singularity, which is the most substantial reason for dubbing him as the shadow of the God (*ẓill-i khudā*), stems from his unprecedented power and perfection. Since God chose Süleyman, he was the vicegerent and the shadow of God on Earth (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 27b). This kind of portrayal of a ruler is a well-versed example of sacral kingship. According to this model, "the king or worldly ruler (*sultan, padshah*) is chosen directly by God, who makes him the repository of sovereignty on earth, raising him above the rest of humanity and endowing him with the charisma of universal rule (Woods 1999, 6)." In the same fashion, throughout the *Kanz al-javāhir*, Shāh Qāsim always reminds his readers about the divine favor of his patron and his mighty sultanate.

The fifth qualification is yet another historical reference. Ottoman monarchs practiced fratricide to secure the succession of the next sultan to an undivided empire. Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) was to first to commit to fratricide in the Ottoman dynasty. After the assassination of his father on the plains of Kosovo in 1389, Bayezid and his courtiers deceived Bayezid's brother, Yaʿḳub Çelebī (d. 1389), to make him come to his father's tent where he was assassinated, too (Neşri 2008, 305). Mehmed I, Murad II (r. 1421-1444 and 1446-1451), and Selim I maintained this custom.

On the other hand, the enthronement of Süleyman did not witness such events. As is put by Shāh Qāsim, "all great sultans had to use their swords to ensure the dismissal of rebellion from amongst their relatives (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 28a)." Whereas, Süleyman did not commit such an act because he was the only living prince when his father died. Therefore, this feature of Süleyman was essential for Shāh Qāsim that his patron's world illuminating kingship was not built upon the royal blood spilt (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 28b-29a).

The sixth qualification stands on Süleyman's protection over his subjects. Shāh Qāsim portrays the Sultan "as the protector and provider of certain goods to people, such that the dust of dishonor has never reached them under Süleyman's protection (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 29a)." This theme is in concurrence with the Sultan being the shadow of God (*ẓill Allāh*) and His vicegerent (*khalīfa*), which suggests that Süleyman is the mediator between God and his servants. He feeds and protects people, as he is supposed to do, following the divine favor and obligation.

The seventh qualification is a more detailed version of the sixth one. Shāh Qāsim argues that:

> "...all great rulers use their treasures of generosity to turn and warm the hearts of their subjects. Süleyman is undoubtedly the most generous ruler, which makes him the best ruler in the eyes of the subjects." (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 29a).

Proceeding to present the royal expenditures of Süleyman for his household (*qapūkhalqi*), he says that, "there were twenty-thousand courtiers of Süleyman to whom eight hundred kharwār akçes were paid (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 30a)." Shāh Qāsim aimed to impress other Persian speaking courts with the inclusion of this sum and show the richness of the Ottoman treasury and economy.

The eighth qualification is built on the third and fourth ones. The hadith about *ẓill Allāh* is not detailed and suggests that the Sultan is the shadow of God. This quotation means that any sultan can become the shadow of God and thus, Shāh Qāsim intermingles this with the other epithets of Süleyman to prove that he is the only shadow of God on earth. Then, Shāh Qāsim argues that "because of the width of his territories, number of soldiers and cavalry, and abundance of treasures and goods, no ruler of the past and the present is a match to his patron (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 30b)." Again, Shāh Qāsim refers to the material aspects of Süleyman's magnificence.

The ninth qualification is a religious and military reference. Shāh Qāsim states that religious conquests that had happened in the reign of this Sultan have no equal in history (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 31b). Indeed, Süleyman's first years witnessed great victories and conquests, such as the capture of Belgrade, Rhodes, and Baghdad. Nevertheless, there are a lot of examples in which a sultan conquered more lands in fewer years than Süleyman. The most recent case for Shāh Qāsim was Selim. Yet, to a non-Ottoman audience, exaggerating the victories and successes of Süleyman may have created the influence Shāh Qāsim had desired.

The tenth and last qualification of Süleyman is his inheritance from his father. Se-

lim I waged wars against the Safavids and the Mamluks during his rule. For Shāh Qāsim, the primary motivation behind these campaigns was "to relieve Muslims from oppression and injustice (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 32a)." The importance of these campaigns for Süleyman is bound to two outcomes. First, the Ottomans took possession of these states' treasuries, weapons, and soldiers which strengthened the rule of Süleyman. Second, the Ottomans were able "to extend their justice to the conquered people (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 32a)." The second outcome is very significant because Shāh Qāsim promotes the Ottoman conquest to his audience. He subtly infers that if the Ottomans had waged war against Muslims, their aim would have been to relieve Muslims from oppression and assure the rule of justice. Choosing this qualification of Süleyman as the last one is a deliberate act to convince his readers that Süleyman came to Baghdad because the inhabitants of the city were being "oppressed by heretics and not ruled according to justice." If the Sultan had not been there, he would be in the West, fighting infidels.

4.   SÜLEYMAN BECOMES THE "SULTAN": INITIAL YEARS OF HIS RULE

Süleyman's first years on the throne were marked with his efforts to consolidate his rule over both newly conquered territories and his father's élite. Indeed, the first half of the sixteenth century witnessed such processes of empire-building. The main rivals of the Ottomans at that period, the Habsburgs and the Safavids experienced enormous territorial expansions which were followed by political and ideological consolidations. Through marriages, Charles V sat on the thrones of Spain, the Low Countries, Austria, Naples, Northern Italy, and the Americas. In his initial years, he travelled across his vast empire relentlessly to strengthen his rule in Europe and compete against the French claims to be the guardian of Christianity.

Similarly, Tahmāsb (r. 1525-1576) spent a considerable amount of time to ensure his control over various Qizilbash tribes and promote the official sect of the Safavids, Twelver Shiism, throughout his domains (Newman 2006, 36-38). The religious challenges and political confrontations between these monarchs led to a period of constant fighting and institutionalization of religions. The Ottomans championed Sunni Islam, the Habsburgs advocated Catholicism, and the Safavids promoted Shiism. Confessional borders were redrawn, especially between the Ottomans and Safavids, and the central governments alienated Shiite and Sunni elements of those empires. As an *émigré* from Safavid Iran to the Ottomans, Shāh Qāsim truly reflects the empire-building process of the Ottomans and imperial consolidation of Süleyman in the *Kanz al-javāhir.*

Shāh Qāsim's narrative on the first two years of Süleyman focuses on the military challenges faced by the Ottomans. As soon as Süleyman acceded to the throne, Cānberdī Ghazālī (d. 1521), a former Mamluk commander and thought he could become independent from the Ottoman rule, rebelled in Syria. After suppressing this revolt, Süleyman embarked on his first Hungarian campaign and captured Belgrade. Then, he eliminated the Dhu'l-Qadrid ruler ʿAlī Beg (d. 1522) and appointed an Ottoman governor to that area. Last, he conquered Rhodes, where situated in the naval roads between Constantinople and Egypt. Although the Ottomans suffered from several rebellions and military setbacks even after these accomplishments, it

can be argued that Süleyman successfully established himself as an authoritative Sultan who had achieved territorial integrity. Following his intended audience's expectations, the prevalent ethos for Shāh Qāsim in these events is *ghaza*. By emphasizing Ottoman efforts in the Western front, Shāh Qāsim subtly indicates that the Ottomans endured these hardships for the spread of Islam. Therefore, this chapter will contextualize the narratives of Shāh Qāsim about the events from the succession of Süleyman to the conquest Rhodes, demonstrating how Shāh Qāsim justified the campaign of the Two Iraqs in the eyes of Persian speaking élite.[1]

4.1 Succession and Imminent Rebellion: Revolt of Cānberdī Ghazālī

Selim I died in 1520, and this news was hidden from the public for nine days when Süleyman came to Istanbul from his princely governorship from Manisa. The succession of Süleyman did not witness bloody civil wars between princes, like Bayezid II and Selim I's accession, and considered as an auspicious event (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 28b-29a). Nevertheless, the accession of a sultan always meant changes in the ruling élite, because the sultan promoted his household who faced challenges from the previous sultan's household (Şahin 2013, 33). In that sense, Süleyman was not an exception. Three problems awaited Süleyman after his succession. First, he did not prove himself on the battlefield against his brothers that the Janissaries and the élite did not believe in his martial reputation. Second, his father's victories over the Safavids and the Mamluks left an unbeatable legacy that Süleyman had to continue. Last, Süleyman ought to spend time and resources to consolidate Ottoman rule in the newly acquired territories in the East (Turan 2007, 16-71). Especially, the last challenge quickly evolved into a rebellion by a former Mamluk official, Cānberdī Ghazālī, who was the governor of Damascus at the time.

Cānberdī Ghazālī changed sides after the victory of Marj Dabik in 1516 and joined to the Ottomans with the expectation of getting a governor position. Khayr Beg (d. 1522), the first Ottoman governor of Egypt, recommended him to the Ottomans to govern Damascus (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 53a). It seems that Ghazālī was supported by his fellow Mamluks who considered the succession of Süleyman as a chance to achieve independence from Ottoman rule. Shāh Qāsim recounts this in his account

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[1]Although Shāh Qāsim ends his account with the campaign of Vienna, I have not included that part, because there is nearly a six years gap between the Rhodes and Vienna campaigns that Shāh Qāsim does not cover.

and resembles Ghazālī to a swelled child (*ṭifl-i āmāsīda*) who thought he could sub-jugate the fortress of Aleppo (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 54a). The Ottomans responded to this revolt swiftly and decisively. The *Kanz al-javāhir* does not present an insider view about this event, on the other hand, Celālzāde Muṣṭafā's account illustrates Pīrī Pasha's (d. 1536) successful handling of the problem and newly enthroned Sü-leyman's inexperience (Şahin 2013, 36). Indeed, according to the Venetian reports, Ghazālī's cause seemed so promising that he was expected to march to the Straits and threaten the very existence of the Ottomans (Turan 2007, 42-43).

In this atmosphere, Ferhād Pasha crossed to Üsküdar. Shāh Qāsim says that Ferhād Pasha had four-thousand cavalry, two-thousand Janissaries, and fifty can-nons (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 54b). In contrast, Muṣṭafā ʿĀlī recounts four-thousand Janissaries and two-hundred cannons under the command of the Pasha (ʿAlī 2019, 543). Most probably, Shāh Qāsim's numbers are correct since he was the contem-porary of this event. Ferhād Pasha met with several Anatolian forces during his march to Syria and finally defeated the forces of Ghazālī in the winter of 1521 in the outskirts of Damascus (Yurdaydın 1961, 36). The general tone of Shāh Qāsim in his narrative of the Ghazālī revolt is quite epic; he demeans Ghazālī's arrogance and ignorance about the might and capability of Süleyman, and he points out the well-performance of the Ottoman war machine.

4.2 Beginnings of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry: Conquest of Belgrade

Relatively peaceful reign of Bayezid II and eventful years of Selim I in the Eastern Front of the Ottomans created a truce between the Ottomans and the Hungarians, albeit minor frontier skirmishes. After the victory over the Mamluks in 1517, Selim concluded another peace pact with the Hungarians, which hints out his intention to march eastwards again, probably to the Safavids. However, his unexpected death in 1520 and the enthronement of his son Süleyman rescinded all treaties that belonged to Selim's era, following the Ottoman custom. After burying his father, Süleyman dispatched envoys to other rulers to inform his accession and renew the previous peace agreements with some of them, such as King Louis II of Hungary (r. 1516-1526). It appears that Süleyman ordered Bālī Beg (d. 1555), the governor of Bosnia, to send an envoy to Louis for the renewal of peace (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 64b). Venice's *chargé d'affairs* in Buda reported the arrival of the envoy to Venice on December 10 and added that Süleyman wished to extend the peace for another three years

(Szakaly 1994, 48). However, Louis kept the envoy in custody that prepared a pretext for a declaration of war, according to Ottoman chronicles.[2] Yet, it seems that the issue was more complicated than that. Thus, the main aim of this part is to claim Süleyman had a conscious strategy to subdue the Hungarian Kingdom, and the campaign of Belgrade was the first deliberate action to execute this protracted plan.

Historians have discussed the motives behind the campaign of Belgrade and the gradual occupation of Hungary by the Ottomans.[3] Pal Fodor, who completed his work in the beginnings of 1990s, asserts that the Ottomans attacked Hungary simply because they were their neighbors (Fodor 1991, 271). This hints out the Sultans had to find appropriate territories to plunder; to acquire land to distribute as a military fief; to keep the army occupied; to enlarge the *dār al-islām* (*lands of Islam*) to satisfy different strata of the society which made a living out of the war. Furtherly, he claims that the imprisoned envoy, Behram Çavuş, was not the cause of the offence, but the pretext for the sultan's move (Fodor 1991, 287). A few years later, Ferenc Szakaly claims that the detention of the envoy by the Hungarian government surprised even the Ottomans because the Ottoman government did not request something that may insult the sovereignty of an independent country. He states that Louis and his advisors chose stonewalling tactic since they were expecting Papal aid and heard the revolt of Cānberdī Ghazālī in Syria to the Ottoman rule, following the accession of Süleyman. Therefore, he maintains the Ottomans took advantage of this humiliating act to declare war against the Hungarians (Szakaly 1994, 49). Ebru Turan points out to the prevailing holy war notion in contemporary chronicles and argues that the Ottoman élite pushed Süleyman to wage war against an infidel and reopen the doors of *ghaza*, which remained closed in the reign of Selim. Furtherly, she stresses Ottoman imperial ambitions and rivalry with the Habsburgs over the world dominion that Süleyman, like his father, desired other rulers to acknowledge his superiority. Since Louis repudiated the Ottoman supremacy and the Habsburg threat felt gravely in the Ottoman court, Süleyman turned his attention to the Western front and waged war against Hungary (Turan 2007, 72-83). Recently, Kaya Şahin criticizes these views and asserts that these arguments were formulated ex post facto, in the light of later developments in Ottoman imperial ideology. Hence, he claims that Süleyman warred against the Hungarians to prove his worth on the battlefield to assert his dominion over the Ottoman court and compensate his father's failure in the European front (Şahin 2013, 37). In the light of Shāh Qāsim's account on

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[2]Lütfi (2001, 244); Peçevi İbrahim (1981, 44); Shāh Qāsim (3392, 60b); ʿAlī (2019, 544). Kemalpaşazade does not mention this incident; merely he states that Süleyman waged war against Hungary because of the religious duty of fighting with the neighbouring infidels. See Kemalpaşazade (1996, 47-49).

[3]For a comprehensive literature review: see Fodor (1991, 274-279).

the Belgrade campaign, it appears that Süleyman had been planning to conquer Hungary from his princely governorship in Manisa. As soon as he acceded to the throne, he executed this plan by marching to Belgrade.

The overall tone of Shāh Qāsim regarding the Belgrade campaign is pretty different from other Ottoman chronicles. Kemālpāşāzāde, for example, stress on the Ottoman might and Hungarian inability to defend their castles and appear on the battlefield (Kemalpaşazade 1996, 245-248). Only, he reflects the amazement of Süleyman when he saw the strong and high fortifications of Belgrade. His manner suggests that the Ottoman army and its Sultan were capable of easily defeating armies and capturing strong fortifications in several days. Yet, Shāh Qāsim emphasizes the might of the Hungarian side which they had increased during Selim's eastern campaigns. He says that, "their soldiers, weapons, and power were doubled, and their impregnable fortresses have reached to the utmost firmness (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 64a)."

Moreover, throughout the narrative on Belgrade, he continually points out the difficulties the Ottoman army faced and how the Ottoman military machine successfully dealt with them. For instance, when Süleyman decided to cross the Sava river to help the siege of Belgrade, he ordered to build a bridge that was demolished because of flood and heavy rains. He mentions "because of the divine order the bridge was destroyed, and Süleyman commanded to prepare a chain of ships which enabled them to pass the river in two days (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 88a)." These two quotations suggest that Shāh Qāsim deliberately underlines burdensome operations of Ottoman armies in the West and investments of a lot of human resources and wealth to spread the word of God. Other aforementioned Ottoman chronicles do not present the Hungarians as a strong nation but emphasize their "infidelity" and "arrogance". Indeed, Shāh Qāsim, too, speaks about the arrogance (*maghrūr gashta*) of the Hungarian king, Louis II, and infidelity of the Hungarians (*Ungurūs-i bī-dīn*) (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 64a). Still, he wants to instruct his readers that Ottoman accomplishments in the West were not easily won. Considering the intended audiences of Kemālpāşāzāde, Celālzāde, and Shāh Qāsim, latter's reference to the Hungarian power can only point to his intention to convince the Iraqi élite that the Ottomans did experience hardships in their Western front.

The context in which Shāh Qāsim talks about the Hungarians strengthened their positions and fortifications against the Ottomans hints another message to his audience. He argues that:

> "...while Selim was extinguishing the fire of the Shah Isma'il's sedition, removing the rebellion of the Qizilbash, and conquering the land of Arabs

and territories of Egypt because the king and the rulers of those places had had enmity towards Selim, the Hungarians increased their amount of soldiers, weapons, and territories." (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 64a-64b).

Shāh Qāsim's reasoning and historical reference are, again, intimates that if the Ottomans had to deal with their eastern neighbors, i.e. the Muslims, the Christians left unchecked and grew stronger. This claim is further bolstered by the fact that the Ottoman sultans never waged war on the Hungarians since the unsuccessful siege of Belgrade in 1456 by Mehmed II. If the Hungarians were to strengthen themselves, they could have made use of these long truce. Indeed, Shāh Qāsim mentions this incident, yet in another context where he talks about previous Ottoman sieges to Belgrade (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 80a-80b). Omitting this information and referring to solely Selim's times served to two purposes: first, Shāh Qāsim justified the campaigns of Selim in the eyes of fellow Muslims; second, Shāh Qāsim presented that the main focus of the Ottomans is on the West.

4.2.1 How to Justify a War?

Contemporary Ottoman chronicles to the Belgrade campaign do not present a unified reason for waging this war (Yurdaydın 1961, 15-16). Muṣṭafā ʿAlī points out to an envoy who was sent to demand tribute from the Hungarians but was refused (ʿAlī 2019, 544). Kemālpāşāzāde adds that it had been a while since the Ottomans did not snub the Hungarians and left them unchecked (Kemalpaşazade 1996, 52-53). Celālzāde remind the expired treaty between Louis and Selim. For him, the "rebellion" of the Hungarians was proved when Süleyman sent an envoy to renew peace upon his father's death, but the Hungarians kept the envoy (Mustafa 1981, 31b). Bostan Çelebī indicates that Süleyman's desire to turn his attention to the north and continue *ghaza* (Yurdaydın 1961, 15).

Shāh Qāsim opens his narrative with a Qur'anic quotation that suggests that "fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day." He argues that the Ottomans were every time on the path of *ghaza* and jihad.[4] The prevalence of *ghaza* as the first reason clearly shows their aim to promote the Ottoman enterprise as a Muslim entity who fights against unbelievers, i.e. the Christians. Afterwards, Shāh Qāsim reveals the particular cause (*bāith-i khāṣ*) of this campaign yet with another verse from the Qur'an saying "indeed, I will make upon the earth a successive authority

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[4]Shāh Qāsim (3392, 63b). This ethos is apparent in Kemālpāşāzāde who quotes "fight those unbelievers who are near to you."Kemalpaşazade (1996, 52).

(Shāh Qāsim 3392, 63b)". He maintains "the turn of accession to the kingly throne has reached to this *ṣāḥib-qirān* whose voice of sultanic drum has become known to the people of the East and West (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 63b)." Grounding the Ottoman expansion on *ghaza* ideology and emphasizing universal ambitions for particularly the Belgrade campaign, Shāh Qāsim revealed his patron's aim to claim the world sovereignty.

This idea of universal sovereignty is based on the memories of the nomadic Chinggisid and sedentary Abbasid precedents, with more remote Alexandrian legends (Fleischer 1992, 160-161). It made its appearance and showed its imminence in:

> "... the age that witnessed the Fall of Constantinople, the Fall of Granada and imposition of confessional uniformity in Spain, the Columbian discoveries the Lutheran Reformation, and Ottoman victories on all fronts were nothing if not an era in which events were perceived as having universal, and hence revelatory eschatological, significance." (Fleischer 2018, 20).

Most notably, the Habsburgs and the Ottomans of the sixteenth century regarded their ruler as the expected Messiah and universal monarch. These two rulers considered themselves "emperors", defenders of their religion, namely Catholicism and Sunni Islam, and the most powerful sovereign. Thus, their rivalry unfolded several decades which concluded with mutual recession and adoption of more humble policies by the midst of the sixteenth century.

Because of Charles' political power, he was regarded as the Last Universal Monarch who would free Christianity from both the Lutheran heresy and Ottoman infidelity (Voss 2016, 83). Moreover, the court of Charles had an ambitious expectation from Charles after the victory at Milano in 1525. In Alfonso de Valdes' words:

> ". . . so that after the end of these civil wars (for that is what they should be called, since they are among Christians), he could seek out the Turks and Muslims in their lands and, exalting our Holy Catholic faith as his ancestors had done, win the empire of Constantinople and the Holy City of Jerusalem, which are occupied because of our sins, so that (as many have prophesied) under this most Christian prince everyone may accept our Holy Catholic faith, and the words of our Redeemer may come true: let there be one flock and one shepherd." (Parker 2019, 151-152).

Charles was seen as a shepherd who would guide the Christians to the true path at the end of times. More importantly, he would reclaim the holy cities of Christendom, Istanbul, and Jerusalem, and drive the Muslims away. On the Eastern side of the Mediterranean, similar political, religious, and social events happened. Süleyman inherited a vast empire that stretched from the vicinity of Belgrade to Eastern Anatolia; from the deserts of Arabia to the Crimean shores, along with a dominant land army and navy, thanks to his father's swift conquests. Just like the Lutheran split, Shah Isma'il and his descendants advocated Shiism, as a rival to the Ottoman Sunnism, and attracted huge numbers of followers from Ottoman subjects. With the approaching of the tenth lunar century, the Ottoman élite and Selim regarded himself as the universal sovereign, because he successfully defeated the Safavids and the Mamluks (Fleischer 2018, 45). Yet, with his sudden death, this mission passed to his only surviving son, Süleyman.

Indeed, considering Süleyman and Charles' rivalry as a battle between cross and crescent would undermine their global visions, political alliances, and geographical positions (Murphey 2001*b*, 199). Their interests clashed mainly in three locations; Central Europe, the Mediterranean, and North Africa. The first confrontation happened in Central Europe, where Süleyman marched with his army to capture Belgrade, the key to the heartlands of Europe. Ebru Turan points out to a Venetian intelligence which informed the Ottomans about the Hungarian intention to organize a crusade, after the death of Selim (Turan 2007, 77). Alarmed by this event and the growing power of Habsburgs, Süleyman had chosen Belgrade Hungarians as his first fortress to strike. Thus, the Hungarian campaign of 1521 can be regarded as the preparatory episode of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry that will continue at least for thirty years.

4.2.2 Anatomy of a War Preparation

In this agenda and political environment, Süleyman and his court decided to attack Hungary. Before the Janissaries set out their march to the West, messengers were dispatched to governors of the Ottoman empire. Governors in the Balkans "were informed to order raiders ($\bar{A}qinj\bar{\imath}$) who were in the lands of Russians, Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, and Croats, to pass the Danube (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 65b)." Then, Sa'ādet Girāy Khan was commanded to raid into the Russian and Pole territories to prevent them from attacking the Ottomans from the rear (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 65b).

Governors in the Anatolian and newly acquired provinces were strictly instructed to remain in their cities. If danger from Shah Isma'il arouses, they should join forces with the third vizier Ferhād Pasha, who had just suppressed the Cānberdī Ghazālī revolt and seated in Kayseri (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 66a-67a). This apprehension from the East was strongly felt in both Shāh Qāsim and Kemālpāşāzāde (Kemalpaşazade 1996, 58-61) that the Ottoman court was frightened by an assault from Shah Isma'il or internal rebellion.

Shāh Qāsim devotes a lengthy part to the pre-war rituals of the Sultan. On the 17th of May 1521,[5] Süleyman visited the tomb of al-Anṣārī where he gave 30 thousand *akçe* to the poor of that district (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 67b). Then, Süleyman proceeded to visit his father's grave, which was under construction at the time. To maintain the complex, Süleyman bestowed a waqf in which poor people were fed, and students were taught. Following these, Süleyman venerated his great-grandfather Mehmed II and grandfather Bayezid with prayers and bestowed 30 thousand *akçe* to the inhabitants of those districts (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 68a). This piece of information is not presented by Kemālpāşāzāde, Celālzāde, or even by Feridun Bey (d. 1583), who wrote a detailed campaign diary.

4.2.3 The Ottoman Army in Motion: Conquest of Belgrade

After these preparations, the Ottoman army marched to Belgrade on 17 May 1521 (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 67a). Although some historians have argued that the Ottoman high command did not have any specific aim to conquer whilst they departed from Istanbul (Fodor 1991, 2), Shāh Qāsim clearly says that Süleyman intended to capture Belgrade. However, according to the narrative of Shāh Qāsim, it seems that fraction within the Ottoman high-command led to a change in the final destination. The Grand Vizier, Pīrī Pasha, proposed a rational and well-planned capture of Hungary whose key was Belgrade. On the other hand, during the march, the governor of Rumelia, Aḥmed Pasha (d. 1524), altered the Sultan's view with a more ambitious plan in the council meeting in Sofia: first, conquering Šabac (Böğürde-len) and then marching to Buda, the Hungarian capital (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 81a-81b). Thus, Pīrī Pasha was ordered to besiege Belgrade; Aḥmed Pasha continued to Šabac (Kemalpaşazade 1996, 77-78).

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[5]I relied on Shāh Qāsim's account, for debates of this date, see Yurdaydın (1961, 22-23).

Then, Süleyman camped near the Sava river and commanded to build a bridge that the army could enter the island of Srem and march towards Buda. Süleyman had been calculating to defeat the Hungarians on the open battle and easily capture fortresses he left behind (Kemalpaşazade 1996, 81). Yet, three incidents left this plan unfilled. First, the bridge was destroyed due to heavy rains and demoralized Süleyman and his army (Yurdaydın 1961, 29). Second, intelligence reports suggested that Louis was unable to prepare for an open battle (Lütfi 2001, 246). Indeed, the King's ability to charge against the Ottomans was prevented by the divided prelates and barons (Engel 2001, 267). Last, Pīrī Pasha's insistence and Bālī Beg's influence over the Sultan about the importance of Belgrade made Süleyman yield. Shāh Qāsim, too, recounts this aspect of Belgrade and dubs this city as the key of Hungarian territories (*kilīd-i mamālik-i Ungurūs*) and after, he indicates that Süleyman just postponed the capture of Buda (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 79a).

During Süleyman and Pīrī Pasha were distant from each other, Shāh Qāsim reports happenings in Belgrade only when a messenger from Pīrī Pasha arrived at Süleyman's camp (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 90a), which proves that Shāh Qāsim was in the entourage of Süleyman. But when Süleyman also joined the siege of Belgrade, Shāh Qāsim's account truly reflects all dimensions of the campaign. Unlike other chronicles which only mention the failed siege of Belgrade by Mehmed II in 1456, Shāh Qāsim provides a full-fledged history of the Ottomans on the western side of the Sava (i.e. the Srem island). He says that Yıldırım Bayezid had passed the Sava and warred there several times, but he never intended to siege Belgrade because of its firmness (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 80a). Then, he mentions Murad II's three years long Hungarian and Serbian campaign in which he captured six castles. These years coincided with the death of Sigismund and the rise of the Jagellonian dynasty and created a power vacuum in the region that Murad II exploited as best as he could.

Consequently, he narrates the siege of 1456 and the reason for failure. He blames some viziers who acted imprudent on their defense of the Danube and let Hunyadi Janos (d. 1456) break their lines easily (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 80b-81a). After giving this historical background of Belgrade, Shāh Qāsim presents how Süleyman felt about these failures in the Hungarian front and his willingness to "open the path of *ghaza* by eliminating the infidels (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 81b)."

Indeed, with the arrival of Süleyman and the main army before the walls of Belgrade, the siege had entered into a new phase, and Belgrade's fate was sealed. Pīrī Pasha was attacking from the south, second vizier Muṣṭafā Pasha from the north, and Aḥmed Pasha from the West (Yurdaydın 1961, 30). It seems that heavy bombardment caused breaches in the wall and filled the deep moats of the city. Although

the Ottomans quickly captured the outer citadel of the city, the inner citadel did not give up for twenty days. Süleyman ordered general assault (*yuriyish-i ʿām*) twice in which defenders were able to repel the Ottoman soldiers (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 96b). Eventually, after arduous attempts of the Ottoman sappers, a tower called "Neboysa" was destroyed, and thus city defenders surrendered.

Days following the victory, Süleyman rigorously supervised the repair of the city walls. Shāh Qāsim dedicates a long passage to the fate of the conquered people of the city. Since they had chosen to surrender to the Ottomans, he argues that, it was forbidden to pillage the town and take captives among the inhabitants, according to religious law. He says that the ruler of the city had already known about this custom and therefore they approached the Sultan with a request: providing safe transportation to both living and deaths to Hungary. Süleyman accepted it, but he sent the Serbian inhabitants of the city who belonged to serf status to the capital, Istanbul, upon their choice (*ikhtiyār*) (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 104b-105a). Shāh Qāsim's meticulous and detailed, nearly two folios, mention to this well-known custom and Ottomans' tolerance to surrendered nations indicate that he subtly suggests that prospecting conquered peoples, i.e. the Safavid subjects, to abandon resistance and join peacefully to the Ottoman side. The delayed conquest of Belgrade was a turning point for the Ottoman imperial ambitions in Europe. Rhoads Murphey argues that:

> "With the capture of Belgrade in 1521, Suleyman secured the Danube waterway and completed the communications, transport, and defense requirements of the sub-Danubian and broader lack Sea region of his empire. His capture of Rhodes in the following year secured the sea routes between the Anatolian provinces and linked Istanbul with the main centers of commerce in the southern Mediterranean. At this juncture, the empire was ready to enter an age of unprecedented economic prosperity, commonly referred to as the Pax Ottomanica and characterized by domestic plenty, a stable monetary system and budgets providing enough revenue to contribute to steadily mounting reserves. Suleyman had an ambitious program of domestic building and urban renovation, and he made generous disbursements, not just for the beautification of his capital, but also in the provinces." (Murphey 2004, 65-66).

Moreover, this conquest had a historical significance that Süleyman accomplished what his "conqueror" great-grandfather had failed. This success gave confidence to the young Sultan that he started slowly to demean his father's men in the Ottoman administration. Pīrī Pasha's position was significantly weakened because of his unsuccessful leadership during the siege and hindering Süleyman from marching to

Buda which led his nemesis Aḥmed Pasha's appointment as the vizier (Şahin 2013, 40). However, this friction within the court ended up with an unprecedented event: the appointment of Ibrāhīm Agha (d. 1536), the head of Privy Chamber, to the grand vizierate in 1523 and the rebellion of Aḥmed Pasha as governor of Egypt in 1524.

Kaya Şahin argues that the capture of Belgrade was the "unintended" consequence of the campaign because the dynamics behind it were humbler (Şahin 2013, 41). Ebru Turan conveys a quotation from Mario Sanudo's *I Diarii* which indicates that Süleyman's dignitaries, led by the Grand Vizier Pīrī Pasha, convinced and even encouraged the Sultan to undertake a campaign against Hungary (Turan 2007, 76). Considering Pīrī Pasha's relentless efforts to remind the importance of Belgrade and pressure to besiege it and the absence of Aḥmed Pasha while the court was discussing the intended aim of the campaign in Istanbul, it is most probable that when the Ottoman army left Istanbul, they aimed to conquer Belgrade. This claim is further supported by Shāh Qāsim's statement that Süleyman left Istanbul to subjugate the strong castle (*taskhīr-i ḥiṣār-i matīn*), Belgrade (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 67a). Yet, the influence and ambitions of Aḥmed Pasha, who joined the army in Edirne, altered Süleyman's mind and made him think he would defeat the Hungarian army and capture Buda. Still, Süleyman did not have the sufficient authority to force Pīrī Pasha to penetrate deeper into the Hungarian territories that Pīrī Pasha laid siege to Belgrade. In the end, Süleyman abandoned his ambitious plan and joined forces with Pīrī Pasha before the walls of Belgrade.

4.3 Between Belgrade and Rhodes: Imperial Consolidation Continues

On the way back to Istanbul, Süleyman received the news of his son's, Murād, death at the age of seven. Süleyman got upset with this, ordered all his entourage to change their military uniforms, and gave them precious dresses (*khilʿat-i fākhira*) to honor them and ease his pain (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 112b). Upon arriving in Istanbul, Süleyman lost another son, Maḥmūd, and buried these two sons next to his father's tomb (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 113b). The shock of these two incidents was even more intensified with the rebellion of Iskandar in Yemen. Luckily for the Ottomans, Iskandar was killed by his men. In the meantime, the Ottoman court arranged the peripheral organization of the empire by appointing new governors (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 115a-116a).

After these arrangements and successful stifling of several rebellions, still, Süleyman had not achieved territorial consolidation is his vast empire yet. The Ottomans adopted the custom of appointing conquered rulers to their newly conquered territories, especially in Anatolian principalities. They thought this tradition would ease consolidating their sovereignty over these polities. The Dhu'l-Qadrids was one of such principalities to which the Ottomans appointed its former ruler, after the full annexation followed by the Battle of Turnadağ in 1515. The Dhu'l-Qadrids was founded by Qaraca Beg (r. 1337-1353) in Elbistan and Maraş. Because of their position, the Mamluks interfered affairs of this principality, and they killed the first three rulers of Dhu'l-Qadrids (Mordtmann 1997, 553-554). With expansionist policies of Bayezid I over Anatolian territories, the Dhu'l-Qadrid entity had become a constant buffer zone between the Ottomans and the Mamluks, where they tried to appoint their protegees and supporters as rulers. This exercise of influence ended with the total annexation with Selim's conquest of the region in 1515.

Selim I appointed Şehsuvāroġlī ʿAlī Beg (d. 1522) as the ruler of the Dhu'l-Kadir principality who found asylum in the Ottoman realm during the reign of Bayezid II and made significant contributions to the Ottoman army during the Chaldiran campaign. After this appointment, he continued to serve Selim I in his Egyptian campaign and attended to the battles of Marj Dabiq (1516) and Ridaniya (1517). ʿAlī Beg was present in the Süleyman's reign, and he effectively helped Ferhād Pasha to crush the rebellion of Cānberdī Ghazālī. Some historians claim that Ferhād Pasha got jealous of ʿAlī Beg's success and petitioned Süleyman to kill ʿAlī Beg and his sons (Mordtmann 1997, 558), and Ferhād Pasha was given permission and choked the Dhu'l-Kadir ruler in 1522.

Shāh Qāsim's narrative of this affair resembles his method of describing the Belgrade campaign. First, he explains the reasons behind the execution of ʿAlī Beg; Second, he provides the history of the Dhu'l-Kadir principality; Last, he elaborates on the execution of ʿAlī Beg and the results of this action (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 116b-121a). For Shāh Qāsim, ʿAlī Beg was punished because of his arrogance (*ghurūr*), oppression (*ẓulm*), hostility (*ʿudvān*), tyranny (*jūr*), and sedition (*ṭughyān*) during the stifling of the Ghazālī rebellion. Besides, Shāh Qāsim mentions petitions sent from qadis and governors of that region, even before this event, in which they complained about ʿAlī Beg's opposition towards the *qānūn*(the sultanic law) and ill-treatment (*sitam*) over the inhabitants of those cities (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 116b). Given these, Shāh Qāsim's justification of the execution of ʿAlī Beg is similar to that of the campaign of Belgrade and the revolt of Cānberdī Ghazālī that Shāh Qāsim explicitly accused of these two rulers' arrogance and tyranny.

The same theme exists in the accounts of Kemālpāşāzāde and Celālzāde who mention the arrogance (*kibr*) and rebellion (*ʿiṣyān*) of the Dhu'l-Kadir family to the Ottomans (Kemalpaşazade 1996, 141-142) (Mustafa 1981, 77a-77b). This concordance between the contemporary chronicles proves that Ottoman men of the pen created the official discourse by the 1530s on this issue. Yet, when it comes to elaborating on the background of an event, the authors made different choices. Celālzāde, for example, skips the whole history of the Dhu'l-Kadir principality. In contrast, Kemālpāşāzāde and Shāh Qāsim choose to present the relations of ʿAlī Beg and his ancestors with the Ottomans. Both historians argue Şehsuvār (d. 1472), the father of ʿAlī Beg, was aided by Mehmed II to acclaim the kingship. But as soon as he was crowned, "he raised the banner of rebellion and filled with arrogance." Besides, these two authors mention several battles between the Mamluks and the Dhu'l-Qadrids, in which the Dhu'l-Qadrids won six or seven times (Kemalpaşazade 1996, 141-142). However, Shāh Qāsim includes the services of ʿAlī Beg, during Selim's Safavid campaign and adds because of ʿAlī Beg's function, Selim complimented this Dhu'l-Qadrid prince. He continues these services of ʿAlī Beg did not rescue him from death since he had haughtiness (*nakhvat*) and evilness (*shirrat*) which caused him to oppress his people (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 119b). Overall, the inclusion of arrogance, oppression, and betrayal of the predecessors of ʿAlī Beg to the Ottomans show Shāh Qāsim's deliberate attempt to legitimize the execution of ʿAlī Beg and his sons.

It seems that Ferhād Pasha was behind the deaths of ʿAlī Beg and his sons. Because during the rebellion of Cānberdī Ghazālī, Ferhād Pasha realized and informed Istanbul about the oppression and tyranny of ʿAlī Beg and his removal became "obligatory for the imperial justice" (*ʿadālat-i sulṭāniya wājib gardīd*) (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 119b). Since Süleyman was dealing with the campaign of Rhodes, Ferhād Pasha was permitted to execute the order in Tokat (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 119b-120a). The execution of ʿAlī Beg demonstrates Süleyman's distrust to his father's men (Selim I appointed ʿAlī Beg in 1515 as the prince of the Dhu'l-Kadiris) and his attempt to achieve imperial consolidation through altering the peripheral administration of his vast empire (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 120b).

4.4 Süleyman Establishes Himself as the "Sultan":
The Capture of Rhodes

The campaign of Rhodes in 1522 can be seen as a continuation of imperial consolidation. The island is situated at the heart of the Aegean Sea and very close to the Anatolian lands. With the capture of Egypt and the Levant, Rhodes and its rulers, the Order of Hospitallers, became a significant threat to the Ottoman empire. As Shāh Qāsim reports, the Knights Hospitallers attacked Ottoman merchant and pilgrimage ships which were coming from Egypt and took captives among them (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 121a). Moreover, the capture of the island would "secure the sea routes between the Anatolian provinces, and link Istanbul with the main centers of commerce in the southern Mediterranean (Murphey 2001*a*, 66).

However, Ottoman chronicles do not touch upon the strategic importance of the conquest of Rhodes. They state that Süleyman intended to war against the Hungarians and capture Buda with the arrival of spring. Yet, Süleyman was frustrated with the misbehaviors of the Knights Hospitallers and delayed his plan to conquer Hungary (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 121a). It seems plausible, but the Knights Hospitallers had been a significant trouble for the Ottomans since the Mehmed II's reign (Setton 1984, 146; 172; 206-210). As Celālzāde reveals, the Christians were not in a position to bring help to Rhodes (Mustafa 1981, 66a), because of the rivalry between the Habsburgs and the French, sudden death of Pope Leo X in 1522, and Süleyman's peace with the Venetians broke the unity in Christendom against the Ottomans (Turan 2007, 95). Thus, Süleyman and Pīrī Pasha exploited these favorable conditions to capture Rhodes and provide security in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Shāh Qāsim's narrative on the campaign of Rhodes reflects the impregnability and strength of the castle. He meticulously builds up the history of Rhodes in which he argues that after all failed sieges by the Mamluks and the Ottomans, the Knights Hospitallers strengthened their posts and made the city even more impregnable. Their efforts were aided by the Europeans (*mardum-i faranj*) who were well aware of the importance of the Rhodes for checking and threatening the Ottoman empire (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 125a-132b). Indeed, the fortification of Rhodes and its stable positions were acclaimed by the other Ottoman chronicles. Yet, Shāh Qāsim vividly and lengthily (nearly seven folios) describes towers, walls, and vestibules of Rhodes to prove the Ottomans fought burdensome wars in the West for the sake of *ghaza*, just like he had done in his narrative on the campaign of Belgrade.

After visiting the tombs of al-Anṣārī and deceased Ottoman Sultans, Süleyman

and his army marched to Rhodes in June.[6] Although Ebru Turan claims that the first mention to Ibrāhīm Agha, the favorite of Süleyman and the future grand vizier, in the Ottoman chronicles is in Kemālpāşāzāde's the *Tevārīḫ-i Āl-i ʿOsmān* where he talks about a dispute during the siege of Rhodes, Shāh Qāsim introduces Ibrāhīm Agha when he was in the retinue of Süleyman, camping near Üsküdar (Shāh Qāsim 764, 124b). As expected, Shāh Qāsim keeps his impartiality between the Ottoman Pashas, but it seems that the Ottoman high command had different ideas regarding the leadership and tactics of the siege. The whole campaign was marked by factional struggles between the grand-vizier Pīrī Pasha and the fourth vizier Aḥmed Pasha. Aḥmed Pasha wanted to be the general, but upon the request of Pīrī Pasha, the second vizier Muṣṭafā Pasha was elected for that position (Yurdaydın 1961, 36). Then, since Muṣṭafā Pasha experienced difficulties and lost a massive number of soldiers, Aḥmed Pasha convinced the Sultan to institute him as the general (Yurdaydın 1961, 36) (Şahin 2013, 43). Yet, this appointment did not bring immediate success, and Pīrī Pasha and Aḥmed Pasha heated the imperial councils with their debate over the siege tactics. The fortifications were resistant to cannon fire, and Pīrī Pasha proposed to breach the walls by building towers and use them as trenches to fight against the defenders on the top of the castle (Turan 2007, 97). In the end, Aḥmed Pasha's tactic proposal carried the day, and finally, the Ottomans broke the resistance of the defenders, and they surrendered on the 17th of December. The capture of Rhodes increased the prestige of Süleyman in different ways. First, he conquered a fortress which Mehmed II failed in 1480. Second, he reinstituted his imagery as a ghazi Sultan who dominates and subjugates Christian powers. Last, he secured the sea routes for Muslim merchants and pilgrims. Except for the latter, outcomes of the conquest of Rhodes are similar to that of Belgrade.

In addition, this success gave Süleyman enough authority to establish himself as a capable Sultan who would successfully maintain his father's charismatic leadership. Now, he had enough power to depose his father's men and finish court fractions between Pīrī and Aḥmed Pashas. Süleyman chose to appoint his childhood friend, Ibrāhīm Pasha, as the grand vizier, in order to ensure loyal support to his rule. Moreover, conquests of important castles and suppressions of serious rebellions helped the Ottomans to consolidate their enormous empire after Selim's occupations. After these years, the Ottoman enterprise entered a new phase in which militaristic, literary, cultural, and historical traditions were redefined.

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[6]Yurdaydın (1961, 37); Shāh Qāsim (764, 123b). The Ayasofya copy of the *Kanz al-javāhir* ends abruptly right after the section about the passing of soldiers into the island and continues with the Vienna campaign (fol. 126a). The Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa copy, on the other hand, maintains its narrative about the Rhodes campaign.

5.   WHO IS THE ANCESTOR OF THE HOUSE OF OSMAN?

Ottoman genealogies of the early modern period do not necessarily state the mere lineage of ancestors, but rather, emphasize political orientations of the dynasty and expectations of intended audiences. Most of the chronicles accept Japheth as the ancestor of Osman,[1] whereas a significant number of historians are for their Esavitic descendance.[2] However, all histories accept the "Oghuzian" genealogy of the Ottomans. Paul Wittek states that Oghuz myths and traditions were exploited and manipulated by the Ottoman authors to legitimize their rule in the eyes of their Turkish subjects in Anatolia (Wittek 2012, 38-42). Halil İnalcık indicates that the Oghuz tradition in the chronicles is a response to the Timurid vassalage and helped to the Ottomans to claim supremacy over Turkish principalities (İnalcık 1964, 156). John E. Woods points out that not just the Ottomans but also other polities, such as the Aqquyunlu and Qaraquyunlu, who reigned between the Battle of Ankara in 1402 and the political emergence of the Safavids around 1500, exploited pan-Oghuzian lines to establish universal appeal to the Turkmens living in Anatolia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Woods 1999, 173). Barbara Flemming emphasizes that, with the significant events in the second half of the fifteenth century, such as Mehmed II's conquest of Constantinople, the demise of the Aqquyunlu, rise of the Safavids, and Ottoman subjugation of the Crimean Khanate, Oghuzian genealogies were replaced with more ambitious and universalistic pedigrees (Flemming 1988, 127). Indeed, one such universalistic claim was made by Shāh Qāsim who argues that the Ottoman house was descended from Esau.

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[1] For example, see Neşri (2008, 8); Aşıkpaşazade (2003, 321); Kemalpaşazade (1970*b*, 201-204).

[2] Barbara Flemming quotes from the Oxford Anonymous or Pseudo-Rūḥī and argues that the author rejects the lineage from Japheth and accepts Esau. See Flemming (1988, 135-136). Also, see Shāh Qāsim (3392, 25b); ʿAlī (2019, 11).

5.1 Who Was Esau?

Esau and Jacob were the sons of Prophet Isaac, son of Prophet Abraham. Esau was the eldest son, and because of the right of primogeniture, prophethood had to pass to him. However, Jacob tricked his blind father and usurped his elder brother's right to prophethood. Isaac pitied Esau and wished to him and his descendants to have worldly sovereignty to rule the world until the end of times. After Isaac's death, Esau had conflicted with his brother, but soon after he went to Turkistan to feed his populous nation. He became the king of this region, and the kingship rested with his offspring.[3]

Several Ottoman historians trace the lineage of the house of Osman to Esau, including Pseudo-Rūḥī, Idrīs-i Bidlīsī, and Shāh Qāsim. Still, they cite the Japhetic tradition. Yet, the Esavitic paradigm is central to their narratives, and they meticulously delineate on the life of Esau and how his father, Isaac, bestowed him with the worldly sovereignty. On the other hand, some other Ottoman historians point out to Japheth, son of Noah, as the forefather of the Ottoman house. Japheth had been regarded as the ancestor of the Turks by the Islamicate Turkish polities of the Late Medieval Islam, and it seems that they based their claim on Rashīd al-Dīn's (d. 1318) account, the *Jāmiʿ al-Tavārikh* (*Compendium of Histories*). Quoting from the Torah, he states that Noah divided the land into three parts: the first one was given to Ham, the ancestor of the Sūdān (black people); the second was acclaimed by Sam, the father of the Arabs and Persian; the third part was acquired by Japheth, the ancestor of the Turks. The Turks did not know that Japheth was the son of Noah and called him "Abuljā Khan" (Hamadānī 1994, 47). As an Ilkhanid bureaucrat, Rashīd al-Dīn emphasizes the life of Japheth and creates a Turco-Mongol and Islamic amalgamation to situate his Ilkhanid patrons into broader Islamic history. In Stefan Kamola's words:

> "...by nesting the latter (the Oghuz Khan descendance) into the tradition of the sons of Noah as the progenitors of the various peoples of the earth, Rashīd al-Dīn creates a stemma for understanding the entire Turko-Mongol world within the broader contours of Judeo-Islamic prophetic tradition. The Abrahamic injunction to record genealogy is an effective conceit to situate non-Mongol tribes within this genealogical tradition, even when no recorded history survives for them. Within this scheme, Genghis Khan and his descendants appear not as the creators of a new world empire, but as the re-unifiers of the descendants of Japheth. Three groups, namely the Arabs, Oghuz Turks, and Mongols, stand out

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[3]See **?**, 21b-24a; **?**, 371-375.

for preserving their tribal genealogies in compliance with the Abrahamic injunction to do so. From this assertion, Rashīd al-Dīn weaves a coherent system for explaining the fact of Mongol rule within the contours of Perso-Islamic and Turko-Mongol tradition." (Kamola 2015, 567).

Indeed, Rashīd al-Dīn's deployment of genealogy as a political tool to legitimize his patrons, who had recently converted to Islam, had been imitated by the subsequent historians.

One such historian was the Aqquyunlu chancellor, Abū Bakr Tihrānī-Iṣfahānī (*fl.* the 1470s). Just like Rashīd al-Dīn, Tihrānī exploited Aqquyunlu genealogy to claim supremacy over his patron's, Uzun Hasan's (r. 1453-1478) rivals, the Ottomans and the Qaraquyunlus. Tihrānī gives the complete Aqquyunlu genealogy and provides detailed information about each ancestor of Uzun Hasan up to Prophet Adam and establishes sixty-eight generations between Adam and Qara 'Usman (d. 1435), the founder of the Aqquyunlu Empire (Tihrānī 1993, 11-30). Unlike Rashīd al-Dīn, Tihrānī mentions to Japheth in several lines and does not delineate more on him. Instead, Tihrānī emphasizes the life of Oghuz Khan and exalts his patron for having a descendance from Oghuz Khan. During Tihrānī was writing his book, the main rivals of the Aqquyunlus were the Ottomans and the Qaraquyunlus, who were trying to establish a universal basis for the Turkmen tribes. Thus, Oghuz Khan and his legendary life became more important for these polities, since Turkmen tribes were attracted by Oghuz Khan.

Mughal chronicles present similar patterns to the Aqquyunlu ones. The Mughal emperors were the descendants of Chinggis Khan, and by extension, Japheth. Yet, Mughal historians never stress their patrons' lineage from Japheth and direct attention to Chinggis Khan and Alan Qoa, the ancestor of the various Mongol clans. For example, Akbar's (r. 1556-1605) grand vizier and court historian Abū al-Faẓl Mubārak (d. 1602) has a long section about the life of Alan Qoa and Chinggis Khan but does not elaborate on Japheth. It seems that, the Aqquyunlu and Mughal historians accept the ancestry of Japheth. Since the Japhetic lineage did not serve their purposes to attract their audiences, they do not emphasize Japheth in their book. Yet, their Ottoman counterparts discussed the Japhetic and Esavitic paradigms, and by the time Shāh Qāsim finished writing his book, the Esavitic paradigm came to be cited more by historians.

With Enverī's (*fl.* 1465) *Düstūrnāme*, a "Semitic paradigm" had entered into the Ottoman historiography. Enverī mentions a certain Ayaż b. ʿOs̲mān, a Qureyshi soldier in the army of Saʿd b. Abi Waqqas in Iraq, who married with the Oghuz tribesman Tümen Khan's daughter (Enverī 2003, 5-8). Evrim Binbaş claims that

the name Ayaż is most probably a corrupted form for ʿIyās, that is, Esau, son of Isaac (Binbaş 2010, 9). This couple had a son and named him Süleymān, who was also called Oghuz. Oghuz first married to the daughter of Selçuğ, then divorced her because of her infidelity and married to the daughter of Bermek (Enverī 2003, 10-11). This marriage produced six sons, the eldest of them being Cemşid, also known as Ḳayı. Although the structure and themes of Enverī's narrative of Oghuz are similar to that of Rashīd al-Dīn's, Enverī's timeframe and hero names are quite different, and in a way identical to historical figures. First of all, Rashīd al-Dīn and other *Oghuznāme*s agree that Oghuz had lived before the Prophet Muhammad, but Enverī claims he lived after the Prophet. Second, he married to Selçuğ's and Bermek's daughters, who reminds the eponym of the Seljukids and influential vizier family of the Abbasids, the Barmakids, respectively. Thirdly, Ḳayı Khan had a son whose name is Tuğrul, which was the name of Seljukid ruler, too. Fourthly, Ṭuğrul's son, Çalış, married to Ḳutalmış's daughter (Enverī 2003, 13). Kutalmış was the father of the founder of Anatolian Seljuk state, Süleyman. Last, Enverī mentions a certain *ghaza*n Khan (r. 1295-1304) as one of the ancestors of Osman (Enverī 2003, 14). *ghaza*n Khan was an Ilkhanid ruler who embraced Islam in the last decade of the thirteenth century. These are resemblances between Enverī's Ottoman genealogy and actual historical personalities, which may reflect historical truths or Enverī's efforts to position the Ottoman history as a continuation of the broader Islamic history.

But why did Enverī embraced such an unprecedented paradigm to link the Ottomans to the Arabs? Flemming argues that apocalyptic expectations after the conquest of Istanbul by Mehmed II is the main thrust behind the creation of the Semitic paradigm that, Esau was seen as the ancestor of the Greeks, who would appear at the end of times. She makes references to several hadiths which caused the fall of Istanbul a preamble to eschatology and suggested before the end days, sons of Isaac would conquer the city (Flemming 1988, 134-135). In addition to this reason, Enverī's *Düstūrnāme* reflects another political aspect. Ottoman-Mamluk relations were heated after the repair of Hijaz water springs and Ottoman interference to the Mamluk protegee Dhu'l-Qadrids' dynastic internal affairs in 1465 (Uzunçarşılı 2011*b*, 147-149). These incidents coincided with the composition of Enverī's *Düstūrnāme*, and he signalled a possible Ottoman intervention into mostly Arabic speaking territories of the Mamluks, by linking the Ottomans to a Muslim-Arab soldier.

ʿĀşıḳpāşāzāde disregards Enverī's ambitious "Semitic" paradigm and accepts the Japhetic lineage in the first years of Bayezid II's rule. ʿĀşıḳpāşāzāde in his *Tevārīḫ-i Āl-i ʿOs̱mān* recounts forty generations between Noah and Osman and argues that the Ottomans were descended from Japheth. Then, he states that from the time of

Abbasids until the reign Süleymān Şāh, alleged grandfather of Osman, the Arabs were superior to the descendants of Japheth, i.e. the Persian and the Greeks. Persian kings were frustrated by this and procured nomads (*göçer evlü*) from the Japhetic lineage as warrants (*sened*) to themselves and because of that, they were triumphant against the Arabs (Aşıkpaşazade 2003, 321). Here, it seems that he refers to the Eastern Romans and several Islamic Persian dynasties who benefitted from Turkic military power to defeat the Arabs. However, upon defeating the Arabs, the government of infidel (*vilayet-i kāfir*) became disobedient, and the Persians abstained from these nomads. Thus, the Persians gave fifty-thousand Turkmens and Tatars under the control of Süleymān Şāh, who was one of the leaders of these nomads and ordered him to march to Anatolia (*Rūm*). After successful raids, Süleymān Şāh decided to return *Turkistān*, and on the way, he fell to the Euphrates and died (Aşıkpaşazade 2003, 321-322). Here, ʿĀşıḳpāşāzāde presents the Persians, Greeks, and Turks as the descendants of Japheth and shows the Arabs as enemies of these nations. In an age when the Ottomans conquered the remnants of the Byzantine Empire and rivalling against the Mamluks, ʿĀşıḳpāşāzāde's designation of the Greeks and Persians as relatives to the Ottomans appears plausible.

In the meantime, Pseudo-Rūḥī narrates another paradigm different than Enverī's and ʿĀşıḳpāşāzāde's. For Pseudo-Rūḥī, the ancestry of the Ottomans goes back to Esau. His version of the story is quite distinctive than Enverī's that Esau was the son of a prophet and lived in Biblical times. Pseudo-Rūḥī's inclusion of the "Esavitic" paradigm is a demonstration that progeny of Esau was destined to rule the world. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the existence of another genealogical claim and cites the Japhetic tradition (**?**, 375).

Another historian of Bayezid II's time, Neşrī counts fifty-three generations between Osman and Noah and considers Japheth as the ancestor of the Ottomans. He criticizes the Esavitic paradigm and argues that Esau is the ancestor of the lesser Rome (i.e. the second Rome) and descendant to Arfahşād b. Sām. The Turks, on the other hand, are the descendants of Japheth, just like the Mongols and the first Rome (Neşri 2008, 56). Most probably, Neşrī refers to the Greeks by saying the second Rome, since Esau was the ancestor of the Rūm in the Arabic tradition (Flemming 1988, 134). Thus, the first Rome becomes the people of the Roman Empire, i.e. the Italians. Yet, Neşrī does not elaborate more on this issue, and it needs further research.

Following the footsteps of Pseudo-Rūḥī, Idrīs-i Bidlīsī centralizes the "Esavitic" paradigm in his Hasht Bihisht. After narrating the biography of Esau, he states that Esau was known as Qaytī in Turkistan and he established his rule there. Again,

he does not omit claims of the Japhetic lineage (**?**, 18a). Similarly, Kemālpāşāzāde accepts the Esavitic paradigm. He indicates that some historians argue Ḳayı Khan is Esau and his ancestry goes back to Sam, son of Noah. Then, he presents the second view which traces Ḳayı Khan's lineage to Japheth, son of Noah (Kemalpaşazade 1970*b*, 39).

Shāh Qāsim does not deviate from this narrative. He counts fifty-one generations between Osman and Prophet Abraham which follows; (1) Ibrāhīm (Prophet Abraham), (2) Isḥāq (Prophet Isaac), (3) ʿAyṣ (Esau, also known as Qāytī Khan), (4) Qarā Khan I, (5) Ughūz Khan (Oghuz Khan), (6) Gūk Ūlp, (7) Tūrmish, (8) Bāytamūr, (9) Būrlaghā, (10) Ṭarkhulū, (11) Sulaymān Shāh I, (12) Qara Ughlān, (13) Qumāsh, (14) Bāljū, (15) Qūrukhād, (16) Qūrulmish, (17) Jārbūghā, (18) Sawinj, (19) Ṭughurā I, (20) Bāysū, (21) Ḥūrmaz, (22) Yāshūghā, (23) Yamāq, (24) Qizilbūghā, (25) Ṭūrukh, (26) Jaktamūr, (27) Qamārī, (28) Ārtūq, (29) Gūch Beg, (30) Duwāghmish, (31) Ṭughurā II, (32) Bāy Beg, (33) Yalwāj, (34) Nāsū, (35) Qarā Khan II, (36) Dūrluq, (37) Qutluq, (38) Ḥamīd, (39) Yāsāq, (40) Tūqtamūr, (41) Sūnqūr, (42) Bulughāy, (43) Qarāyunū, (44) Ṭughurā III, (45) Qutlugh (Qutluq II), (46) Bāytamūr II, (47) Qizilbūghā II, (48) Qayā Ūlp, (49) Sulaymān Shāh II, (50) Arṭughrul, (51) ʿUs̱mān (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 25b).

He copies this genealogy from Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's *Hasht Bihisht*, but Shāh Qāsim only mentions that Esau had to abandon the lands of Arab because it became troublesome and unproductive for Esau and his people. They headed to Turkistan where they could find appropriate livelihood and abundance of sources. A ruler of that region gave Esau a piece of land and he became the ancestor of the Turks (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 25b-26a).

Why did Pseudo-Rūḥī, Idrīs-i Bidlīsī, Kemālpāşāzāde, and Shāh Qāsim adopt the Esavitic lineage, instead of well-known Japhetic tradition? Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's and Kemālpāşāzāde's works coincided with the rise of the Safavids in the East, who claimed a *sayyid* descent. The Ottomans realized their traditional Japhetic genealogy appeal to neither nomad Turkmens nor Persian city-dwellers. Therefore, these historians promoted a new genealogical discourse in which they stress how Esau and his descendants were given worldly sovereignty. Moreover, by linking the Ottomans to Esau, they rivalled the Safavid's *sayyid* descent in a way that they presented the Ottomans as the descendants of Abraham, who was also the ancestor of the Prophet Muhammad. In other words, they aimed to show that the Ottomans were distant relatives to Muhammad.

By the time Shāh Qāsim was writing his book, The Ottomans had crushed the Safavids in 1514 and conquered the whole Mamluk territories by the end of 1518.

Shāh Qāsim was commissioned to write a history of Süleyman during the campaign of the Two Iraqs, which resulted in the conquest of Arab Iraq. As it was shown earlier, Shāh Qāsim's intended audience was the Persian speaking élites of Safavid realms and Baghdad. In that context, Shāh Qāsim adopted an Abrahamic genealogy for the origins of his patrons, to appeal newly-conquered Arab and Persian audience and legitimize the Ottoman rule by claiming once Esau was living in those lands but had to leave due to scarcity; but now his descendants were back.

5.2 The Ḳayı Thesis Revisited

The modern scholarship has been discussing whether the Ottomans descended from Ḳayı or Gök Alp. It seems that the Ḳayı thesis has carried the day that in popular culture and historiography, the Ottomans have been regarded as the progenies of Ḳayı. However, except for Yazıcızāde 'Alī and Pseudo-Rūḥī none of the Ottoman chroniclers before 1550 mention Ḳayı as the Oghuz's grandson and the ancestor of the Ottomans. Instead, they present Gök Alp as the forefather of the Ottomans. But why has the current historiography presented the Ottomans in a way that the Ottomans had not presented themselves in that way? The answer to this question lies in the Oghuzian succession system.

Maḥmūd al-Kashgārī (d. 1102), in his book, *Diwān Lughāt al-Turk*, mentions to the hierarchy between the twenty-four Turkic tribes. He argues that kingship shall pass to eldest sons, for example, Oghuz Khan's eldest son, Gün Khan was the fittest to rule among Oghuz's son; in the same fashion, Kınık was the most appropriate among Oghuz's grandsons, who was followed by Ḳayı (al Kāshgharī 1333 (1915, 56). Considering the patron of al-Kashgārī, the Seljuks, who belonged to the Kınık tribe, presenting Kınık as the elder brother of Ḳayı is plausible since al-Kashgārī aimed to prove that his patrons had to rule over other Turkic tribes. Thus, Gün Khan and his offspring have a higher rank in succession hierarchy, more than Gök Khan and his sons. Yet, al-Kashgārī's order within the Oghuzian tribes is different than Rashīd al-Dīn's. For Rashīd al-Dīn, Oghuz Khan had six sons: Gün (Sun) Khan, Ay (Moon) Khan, Yıldız (Star) Khan, Gök (Heavens) Khan, Dağ (Mountain) Khan, and Deniz (Sea) Khan.[4]. Among these six sons, Gun Khan was the eldest, and his eldest son was the Ḳayı. Kınık, on the other hand, was the younger brother of Ḳayı

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[4]For a diagram of the family of Oghuz, see Woods (1999, 175)

(Hamadānī 1994, 58). It seems that historians agree on the Gün Khan's seniority, but they had not established who the eldest son of him was.

A similar case applied to the Aqquyunlus. Although Tihrānī's genealogy is the same as Rashīd al-Dīn until Oghuz Khan, he modified the next generations and argued Uzun Hasan was a descendant of Bayundur Khan, son of Gün Khan (Hamadānī 1994, 24). On the other hand, according to Rashīd al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ al-Tavārīkh*, Bayundur was the son of Gök Khan (Hamadānī 1994, 60). Tihrānī modified Bayundur as the eldest son of Gün Khan because he wanted to assure the Aqquyunlu dynasty had a genealogical right to claim supremacy over other Turkic polities, such as the Ottomans.

Ottoman historians were not baffled by these genealogical discussions. For them, the Ottomans were descended from Gök Khan. Indeed, the first known history of the Ottomans, Aḥmedī's *İskendernāme* (written in the first decade of the fifteenth century), mentions the *ghaza* of ʿAlā al-Dīn to Bithynia with Gündüz Alp and Ertuğrul. Their companions belonged to Gök Alp and Oghuz.[5] Here, Ertuğrul is the father of Osman, and Gündüz Alp is his grandfather. Hakan Erdem argues that, although this is a fabricated story, the context might reveal that Gök Alp refers not to a particular person, but tribes who descended from Gök Alp, son of Oghuz (Erdem 2020 (accessed May 19, 2020). On the other hand, Fuad Köprülü shows this passage as the first written example of the Ottomans' Oghuzian lineage (Köprülü 1999*a*, 76). Yet, Aḥmedī's reference to both Oghuz and Gök Alp is too superficial, interesting though, and shall not be used as a proof to Gök Alp descendance.

Yazıcızāde ʿAlī is the first historian to present the lineage of Osman consciously. He wrote his *Tevārīḫ-i Āl-i Selçūḳ* under the patronage of Murad II (r. 1421-1444; 1446-1451), and it seems that he was an official in the Ottoman court. Yazıcızāde narrates the legacy of Oghuz Khan in which he exhibited an analogy to show the vitality of brotherhood and solidarity. Then, he designated Gün Khan as his successor, after whom Ḳayı Khan shall be the leader of Turkic tribes. With these arrangements, Oghuz establishes the primogeniture rule that if there exists a Ḳayı descendance among ruler candidates, then he should be the ruler. Thus, he excludes Bayat and Bayundur from their right to govern Turkic tribes, but solely their own branches (ʿAlī 2009, 23-24). Here, it should be noted that Yazıcızāde's primary source for his passages about Oghuz and his descendants was Rashīd al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ al-Tavārīkh*, which presents Gün Khan and Ḳayı as their fathers' eldest sons. Eventually, he argues that Osman was the great-grandson of Ḳayı, and his patron, Murad II, is

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[5]See Aḥmedī (1949, 8) "Leşkerini cem'edüp girdi yola, Gündüz Alp, Erduğrıl anunla bile.
Dahı Gök Alp u Oğuzdan çok kişi, Olmış idi- ol yolda anun yoldaşı."

worthy of khanate who shall be revered by the rest of Oghuzian and Chinggisid tribes ('Alī 2009, 24).

Doubtlessly, Yazıcızāde's designation of Osman as the descendant of Ḳayı, therefore Gün Khan, is a political statement to emphasize his patron's superiority over other Turkmen tribal leaders, similar to what Kashgārī had done for his Seljukid patrons. Consideration of the political atmosphere of the book's composition date reveals the author's emphasis on Chinggisid and Bayundur tribes. The Ottomans were badly defeated to Timur in 1402 and during the reign of Murad II, they recovered their losses. Concurrently, Timur's death in 1404 resulted in the division of his colossal empire among his sons and grandsons, who fought many civil wars to inherit Timur's legacy as a whole. Thus, the Ottomans freed themselves from the tutelage of Timurid, i.e. Chinggisid, Khans, and returned to the antebellum conditions. While the Timurid authority was being shaken in the greater Iranian Plateau, Qarā ʿUs̱mān:

> "...had evolved the Aqquyunlu from a relatively insignificant, seminomadic tribal confederation in the service of petty princes on the periphery of the central Islamic lands, into an extensive semisedentary autonomous principality with a rudimentary Irano-Islamic bureaucratic state apparatus whose presence was now strongly felt in Cairo, Harat, and Bursa." (Woods 1999, 54).

Therefore, Yazıcızāde stresses on Chinggizid tribes to denote Timurid domination over the Ottomans had ended; Bayundurid tribes to indicate the Ottomans were superior to the Aqquyunlus. However, I could not find any relation to Bayat tribes with the Ottomans. Most probably, Yazıcızāde included them because Bayat was the little brother of Ḳayı, according to Rashīd al-Dīn's account.

The Ḳayı descendance thesis was quickly reversed in the following years. The first Persian verse account of the history of the Ottomans, Shukr Allāh's *Bahjat al-Tavārīkh*, was written under the reign of Mehmed II and patronage of the grand vizier, Maḥmūd Pasha (d. 1476). Having served as a delegate of Murad II, Shukr Allāh went to the Karamanid and Qaraqoyunlu courts. In the latter, most probably he saw an *Oghuznāme* in which he learned about the ancestors of Osman (Şükrullah 2011, 182). He indicates that the Qaraqoyunlu ruler, Jahanshah (r. 1438-1467) showed to him an *Oghuznāme* written in Uyghur script, and from there Shukr Allāh extracted that Ertuğrul was the descendant of Gök Alp in the forty-fifth generation.[6]

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[6]The full genealogy of Shukr Allāh as follows (1) Nūḥ, (2) Yafes̱ (3) Ḳayı Ḫān, (4) Ḳarā Ḫān, (5) Oġuz

Then, he quotes Jahanshah who states that he and Murad II were brothers because Jahanshah belonged to Deniz Alp branch and Murad to Gök Alp branch of the Oghuz tribes which elevates Murad's lineage to a higher place than that of Jahanshah (Şükrullah 2011, 204). We are not sure whether this conversation happened or not, yet Shukr Allāh's inclusion of this reveals political affiliations of the Ottomans during the Mehmed II's time. Shukr Allāh presents the Qaraqoyunlus as a vassal state to the Ottomans because of their right, originating from the rule of primogeniture, because Gök Alp was the elder brother of Deniz Khan, according to Rashīd al-Dīn. Indeed, the Qaraqoyunlus were the allies of the Ottomans, from the Timur's Anatolian campaign to their demise in the hands of the Aqquyunlus in 1469 and considered the Ottomans as their "elder brother". However, unlike Yazıcızāde's Ḳayı Khan thesis, Shukr Allāh defends the Gök Khan thesis, even though Gök Khan was the little brother of Ḳayı and thus had a lower rank in the Oghuzian hierarchy. Moreover, this Gök Khan is most probably the same Gök Khan as Aḥmedī mentioned in his work.

But why did Shukr Allāh adopt Gök Khan over more prestigious Ḳayı Khan as the ancestor of Osman, unlike Yazıcızāde? The narrative of Shukr Allāh signifies that Shukr Allāh did not care about the rivalry between the Ottomans and other polities, but solely amicable relations between the Ottomans and the Qaraqoyunlus. Moreover, it is more likely that Yazıcızāde modified the Ottoman genealogy in favor of Ḳayı Khan. Indeed, the ancestor of Osman was Gök Han, and Shukr Allāh presented this fact in a context in which the Ottomans were superior to their Qaraqoyunlu counterparts, who were the descendants of Deniz Khan.

Historians of Bayezid II continues the tradition of designating Gök Alp as the ancestor of the Ottoman house, just like Aḥmedī and Shukr Allāh (Şükrullah 2011, 321). ʿĀşıḳpāşāzāde and Neşrī do not mention to Ḳayı. Idrīs-i Bidlīsī and Kemālpāşāzāde refer to a certain Ḳaytī Khan and argue this is what inhabitants of Turkic lands had called to Esau. On the other hand, Pseudo-Rūḥī presents a mixed and conflicted discourse. Although he does not mention to Ḳayı Khan as the offspring of Oghuz Khan and ancestor of the Ottomans in his version of genealogy and shows Gök Khan as the forefather, the Ḳayı descendance has a central theme in his narrative. He justifies the supremacy of the House of Osman by referring to Oghuzian succession hierarchy. For him, Ḳayı was the eldest grandson of Oghuz, and thus by being the progeny of Ḳayı, the Ottomans had to right to govern other Turkmen tribes. Yet, Pseudo-Rūḥī fails to present a consistent genealogical narrative in his book. He presents a similar genealogical tree to Neşrī's version and a similar genealogical nar-

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Ḫān, (6) Gök Alp ... (50) Erṭuġrul, (51) ʿOs̱mān. See (Şükrullah 2011, 203)

rative and justification to Yazıcızāde ʿAlī's work. It seems that Pseudo-Rūḥī adopts the Ḳayı thesis to defend Ottoman supremacy over other Anatolian principalities. Indeed, other genealogies of the time consistently present the Ottomans' Gök Alp lineage. Years later, Shāh Qāsim did not alter this opinion. Yet, Gök Alp descendance is not a central theme to his narrative. His emphasis lies on the Esavitic lineage since the Ottomans needed a universal and Messianic genealogy for their growing empire.

Here, it should be discussed how the non-Ottoman chronicles met Ottoman genealogical references. As one of the few histories survived from the Anatolian principalities, Şikārī's *Ḳaramānnāme* provides unusual and unheard stories regarding the Ottoman rule in Anatolia. The book was written in the last quarter of the fourteenth century and took its final form in the beginnings of the sixteenth century. Most probably, Şikārī translated an earlier Persian history book about the Karamanids into Turkish and added remaining parts to his *Ḳaramānnāme*. Şikārī frequently insults Osman and his descendant by emphasizing their sheepherding.[7] Şikārī's opinions about the Ottomans prove that Ottoman genealogical claims did not appeal to Turkmens of Anatolia. On the other hand, Şikārī gives the Ottomans credit for their persistence in *ghaza* and mentions Bayezid I abandoned his campaign against "infidels" to fight with the Karamanids.[8] Therefore, it is fair to assume that Ottoman *ghaza* activities appealed more to the Turkmens than genealogical references.

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[7]"Aslı cinsi yok bir yörük oğlu iken Bey oldu." See Şikārī (2005, 196)

[8]For example, see Şikārī (2005, 196)

6.   CONCLUSIONS

The exceptional nature of the sixteenth century in world history transformed political traditions. The imminence of the Hijri millennium and the enormous territorial expansions of the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, and the Safavids forced monarchs to rival each other to achieve universal sovereignty. For that, they need to keep their entities intact through legitimizing their rules in the eyes of their subjects. Especially, history-writing became one of the primary mediators for kings to reach out to élites and educated segments of societies. Through historiography, monarchs not only promoted their victories and accomplishments but defined ideal kingship and just administration. In particular, Süleyman was portrayed as the *ṣāḥib qirān*, *mujaddid*, *khalīfa*, and *ẓill Allāh*, who would bring the whole world under his sovereignty and govern it with justice. This kind of vocabulary and depiction of a sultan had entered into the Ottoman realm with the Persian *émigré*s. The Safavid takeover and the subsequent demise of the Aqquyunlus on the Iranian Plateau in the first years of the sixteenth century accelerated the migration of intellectuals to the burgeoning Ottoman court. Idrīs-i Bidlīsī had altered the conception of kingship entirely and initiated new ways of history-writing under the Ottomans. His legacy and methodology were adopted by subsequent Ottoman historians, most notably by Shāh Qāsim. He was the native of Tabriz and just like Idrīs-i Bidlīsī; he was familiar with the Timurid historiographical tradition. Following the victory in Chaldiran by Selim in 1514, Shāh Qāsim transferred to Istanbul, where he was revered because of his scholarly abilities. With the succession of Süleyman, Shāh Qāsim started to write the life of his patron. By the time the Ottomans conquered Arab Iraq from the Safavids, Shāh Qāsim's mission had evolved into a grandiose project to introduce and promote Süleyman to the Baghdadi élites as the ideal ruler. Thus, Shāh Qāsim's the *Kanz al-javāhir* is not solely a history book which narrates the first decade of Süleyman's rule, but also a consciously formulated legitimation tool.

The *Kanz al-javāhir* was written in Persian. The first and foremost concern of Shāh Qāsim was to produce a work that successfully presents the uniqueness of Süleyman as the most capable ruler. While doing these, Shāh Qāsim provides basic information, which most probably Ottoman intellectuals of that time were familiar

with. His intended audience was someone who could understand Persian and was deficient in the deeds of Süleyman and his well-functioning empire. Moreover, his narrative consists of technical details that are chiefly understandable to the élites living in the Iranian Plateau.

It should be noted that the *Kanz al-javāhir* and writing in Persian at the Ottoman court also meant a legitimacy project directed at the Ottoman élite, members of which adored and imitated, and as such were themselves part and parcel of the Persianate tradition. As a native of Tabriz, Shāh Qāsim produced a chronicle for the Ottomans in Persian, which fed scholarly interests of the Ottoman élite of the sixteenth century. Moreover, the Sultan made a statement by commissioning this book that he presented himself as a highly sophisticated patron of the well-established Persianate tradition and the Persian language.

Shāh Qāsim was a follower of the Timurid historiographical tradition, and indeed, he was likely one of the most prominent representatives of this tradition in the first decades of Süleyman's empire. He portrays Süleyman as the ideal ruler who is the *mujaddid*, *ṣāḥib qirān*, *khalīfa*, and *ẓill Allāh*. While these titles are not new vis-à-vis the previous historiographical tradition, it is significant that in the sixteenth century when Shāh Qāsim wrote his *Kanz al-javāhir*, messianic expectations climaxed, and the Habsburg-Ottoman competition for world dominance peaked, which certainly lends Shāh Qāsim's encomium of Süleyman new meaning. Moreover, the Sultan's commissioning of Shāh Qāsim to compose a Persian chronicle is significant in and of itself, in this context, because the *Kanz al-javāhir* is the sole history book written in Persian for the first thirty years of Süleyman's rule.

Although the *Kanz al-javāhir* has three extant copies, and ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī, Mecdī Meḥmed, and Ṭaşköprizāde each have an entry about the life of Shāh Qāsim, the work never attracted much attention from Ottoman intellectuals and historians, unlike Celālzāde's *Tabakat* or Kemālpāşāzāde's *Tevārīḫ-i Āl-i ʿOsmān*. The *Kanz al-javāhir* is a well-articulated account of Süleyman's first campaigns and possesses an abundance of information that other chronicles omit. Yet, except for some preliminary studies, it was largely forgotten by scholarship. The reason behind this was the language preference of Shāh Qāsim. Persian had a vital role in Islamicate polities of the early modern period. Yet, as their empire had gained a distinctive and peculiar identity, the Ottomans promoted Ottoman Turkish as their literary and diplomatic language. Thus, the effect of Persian at the Ottoman court diminished. In the seventeenth century, the Persian language was not patronized as it had been in the formative ages of the Ottomans. Similarly, modern historians have disregarded Persian works about the Ottomans because of their relatively smaller impact. Most

probably, libraries of Istanbul possess a considerable amount of Persian manuscripts that have never been scrutinized by historians.

History-writing during the reign of Süleyman holds a special place in Ottoman historiography. Unlike his grandfather Bayezid's support of compiling Ottoman dynastic histories, Süleyman's reign witnessed plenty of regnal histories which focus on a particular campaign or periods of Süleyman's rule, which are called *Süleymānnāme*s.[1] Indeed, historians aimed to secure revenue from their patrons at the Ottoman court. As a result, the general theme of the *Kanz al-javāhir* is to praise Süleyman and Süleyman's courtiers. However, this encomium is more than empty praise, as it also encouraged right action and discouraged bad behavior through writing history. This was initiated to and championed in the Ottoman realm by Idrīs-i Bidlīsī (Markiewicz 2019, 211). As contemporaries of Idrīs-i Bidlīsī and followers of the Timurid historiographical tradition, Kemālpāşāzāde and Shāh Qāsim were assigned "to perpetuate the echoes and instruct society about the glorious deeds of the Ottoman sultans." Kemālpāşāzāde argues that "it is clear to educated minds that without writing the histories of Sultans, their great deeds and fames would not survive the passing days to reach eternity." Süleyman, who was aware of this, commissioned Kemālpāşāzāde to record his father's prodigious deeds in order to acquire a second life and perpetual remembrance in this ephemeral world (Kemalpaşazade 1996, 8)." Likewise, Shāh Qāsim indicates that "the intention of writing this book, following the lofty order (by Süleyman), is to manifest excellent discourses about those sublime events (i.e. beautiful conquests and *ghaza*s of Süleyman) and comment on the heaven-reaching Sultanic state's traditions (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 10a)." Later on, he elaborates on his motivation for composing a chronicle which is to "perpetuate elegant commemorations on pages to instruct the predecessors and successors about the discourses on religious conquests with infallible confirmations, and wonders of visible and felicitous deeds, and extraordinariness of illustrious and unperishable lights with the help of the Grateful one (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 10b-11a)." Both historians were well aware of the didactic function of history, and according to which without recording the great deeds of rulers, subsequent generations would forget the tremendous achievements of their forefathers. Moreover, Kemālpāşāzāde and Shah Qāsim defined the "ideal king" by praising Süleyman through the deployment of the Timurid vocabulary of sovereignty.

*Emigré*s from the Timurid, Aqquyunlu, and Safavid courts accelerated the adoption of the Timurid vocabulary of sovereignty and Turco-Mongol notions of kingship. These *émigré*s introduced key features of the Timurid chancery style to the blos-

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[1] For an overview of historiography during the reign of Süleyman, see (Özcan 2006, 113-154).

soming Ottoman court, which became the high register of Ottoman Turkish for the sixteenth century. Having worked as a chancellor at the Aqquyunlu court and written epistles to other sultans, Idrīs-i Bidlīsī was acquainted with the chancery style and notions of kingship. His experience, talents, and mastery in bureaucratic affairs helped him to survive the chaotic age that followed the dissolution of Aqquyunlu rule in the late fifteenth century, and he transported his talents to new terrain, the Ottoman Empire (Markiewicz 2019, 239).

Consequently, he found refuge at the court of Bayezid II, where he was warmly welcomed and respected after the conquest of Tabriz by Shah Ismaʿil in 1501. Idrīs-i Bidlīsī was commissioned by Bayezid to write a dynastic history of the Ottomans, which he started in the summer of 1504 (Genç 2019, 187). Although he had to present it without an introduction (*dibācha*) and epilogue (*khatīma*), the *Hasht Bihisht* became an inspirational work for subsequent Ottoman histories. Whether scholars or secretaries, Ottoman historians overwhelmingly accepted the literary parameters and conventions of this chancery style and sought to compose works of history in Turkish that conformed to the canon of historical writing. Ottoman histories in Turkish increasingly "deployed the full range of rhetorical technique through frequent citation of the authoritative sacred, poetic, and historical references found in Persian histories (Markiewicz 2019, 239)." Kemālpāşāzāde's *Tevārīḫ-i Āl-i ʿOs̱mān* and Shāh Qāsim's *Kanz al-javāhir* are the first examples in the Ottoman realm for the chancery style and the Timurid historiographical tradition after Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's *Hasht Bihisht*.

Shāh Qāsim's narratives on the campaigns of Belgrade, Rhodes, and Vienna intimate that, for this historian, history-writing does not mean presenting mere facts about each campaign. In the subtext, Shāh Qāsim suggests that Süleyman's relentless efforts directed against the West were driven by his ambition to spread the name of God and conduct *ghaza*. Ottoman chronicles belonging to the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries excessively emphasize the ghazi identity of Ottoman Sultans. Indeed, one of Shāh Qāsim's most frequent epithets for his patron is ghazi. For instance, he considers Süleyman's persistence in the worship of *ghaza* and jihad as one of his distinguishing qualities as the *ṣāḥib qirān* (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 26b). Considering the intended audience for the *Kanz al-javāhir*, this kind of presentation aimed to justify the Iraq campaign in the eyes of the Persian speaking élite of Iraq and Persia. Shāh Qāsim subtly suggests that if the Sultan had not been in Baghdad because of legitimate reasons, he would be in the West, conducting *ghaza* and spreading the name of God.

The *Kanz al-javāhir* also functions as a detailed campaign narrative. Shāh Qāsim

meticulously delineates war preparations, waystations along the route the army was taking, fortifications, and the background of events. It seems that he intended to produce a work that could be used as a reference book for later generations. For example, in the narrative about the Belgrade campaign, he vividly describes how the Ottoman army breached the strong fortifications of the city. Moreover, he mentions the climate of Rhodes and what kinds of plants the inhabitants of the island grew. Still, the account of Shāh Qāsim never reveals tensions between factions at the Ottoman court. For him, the hero and the protagonist of all events is Süleyman. Through divine favor and strong characteristics, Süleyman successfully defeats the "infidels" and spreads the word of God and the realm of Islam towards the West.

Shāh Qāsim chooses ten qualifications of the tenth Sultan of the Ottomans, i.e. Süleyman. In describing these ten qualifications, Shāh Qāsim exhibits his esoteric, historical, and religious knowledge. He differentiates the Ottoman house from the other Islamic dynasties by emphasizing the regularity in the Ottoman succession system, the diligence of Sultans in *ghaza*, and just administration and prosperity in Ottoman realms. However, for Shāh Qāsim, the most significant qualification of Süleyman is his God-chosen and noble lineage. Although the *Kanz al-javāhir* belongs to the *Süleymānnāme* genre which focuses on the life of Süleyman and does not provide the lineage of the Ottoman house, Shāh Qāsim is an exception, in that he gives the family tree of Osman up to Prophet Abraham. For the author, Osman was the descendant of Esau, son of Isaac, son of Abraham. Just like the other Ottoman chroniclers, he appreciates Oghuz Khan as the forefather of the Ottomans. Yet, by emphasizing the "Esavitic" paradigm and placing it over the Japhetic paradigm, Shāh Qāsim reveals the political affiliations and tendencies of his time.

Modern scholarship has been discussing whether the Ottomans descended from Ḳayı or Gök Alp. It seems that the Ḳayı thesis has carried the day, and in popular culture and historiography, the Ottomans have been regarded as the progenies of Ḳayı. Yet, for historians in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the question of inquiry had been something different. Except for Yazıcızāde ʿAlī and Pseudo-Rūḥī, all historians admit that Gök Alp was the ancestor of the Ottomans, but they had investigated whether Japheth was the forefather of the Ottomans or Esau. It appears that they modified their narratives according to the political conditions of their times. Japheth appealed more to the nomadic Turkmen tribes and was embraced during the Ottoman expansion in Anatolia. On the other hand, Esau had strong Abrahamic connotations and may have been more appealing to sedentary and educated segments in Persian and Arab societies. Thus, as the Ottomans annexed Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and the Hijaz by the first half of the sixteenth century, the Esavitic lineage was adopted and promoted by historians. Pseudo-Rūḥī championed this claim, and

subsequently, Idrīs-i Bidlīsī cites this in his *Hasht Bihisht*. Years later, Shāh Qāsim revitalized it in his book, the *Kanz al-javāhir*. Yet, it should be noted that these historians never dismiss the Japhetic tradition and make references to other sources which accept Japheth as the ancestor of the Ottoman house.

Shāh Qāsim's choice of the Esavitic paradigm indicates a change in Ottoman political affiliations. As was stated earlier, the *Kanz al-javāhir* was written for the élites of Iraq. Thus, portraying Süleyman as the descendant of Prophet Abraham and Esau, Shāh Qāsim deliberately shows the Ottomans as relatives to the Arabs. Moreover, Abraham was the ancestor of Prophet Muhammad, which Shāh Qāsim may have intended as a counterclaim against the Safavid assertion of *sayyid* descent.

Apart from its literary, artistic, and historical features, the *Kanz al-javāhir* is a significant source to understand ideological tendencies and political affiliations in the first two decades of Süleyman's rule. This thesis has attempted to contextualize the political conditions of this period with the writings of an *émigré* scholar from the Safavid Tabriz to Ottoman Istanbul. Moreover, it has situated the *Kanz al-javāhir* in the broader Perso-Ottoman historiographical tradition, in order to show how the Ottomans embraced and maintained the Islamicate way of history-writing. Hopefully, studies focusing on the imperial formation of the Ottomans would uncover oft-ignored texts and materials, so that we have a better understanding of the Ottoman Empire and its environs in the sixteenth century.

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APPENDIX A

Biographical Entries on Shāh Qāsim

Some Ottoman biography writers include the biography of Shah Qasim in their books. Since Shah Qasim has been largely neglected in historiography, it is appropriate to include English translations of biographical entries about Shah Qasim to present him to wider audiences.

ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī on Shāh Qāsim

He is from Tabriz. His father is Shaykh Makhdūmī. Upon the arrival of Sultan Selim at Tabriz, his tutor Ḥalīmī Çelebī, who previously arrived at Tabriz and there, under the service of Shaykh Makhdūmī, had exercised repentance and seclusion, when he had a friendly affection to deceased Shāh Qāsim. Because of this recommendation, he was promoted to the honorable attendance of the Sultan and the deceased Sultan Selim transferred Shāh Qāsim from Tabriz to the Ottoman realm. During the reign of Selim, Shāh Qāsim had lived his life with perfect dignity and prosperity, under the exalted shadow of Selim. Shaykh Makhdūmī was clever and delicate in knowledge and in devotion to the Sufism, among the learned men in the lands of Persia. But he spent his life with hadith, exegesis, and useful sciences and for the sake of instructing society, he preached and devoted his bodily structures to worship. Shāh Qāsim was like Keşşāf in the science of hadith and careful in juristic matters, like Ḳażī. His sea resembling life is a river and countless in numbers from capitals of mastery, in comparison to his appendix. He was eager to the writings of Imām Raġıb. and his drafts are like false dawn in comparison to Shāh Qāsim's pure books. It is

appropriate to say Imam Salebī, who is a wolf which has seen truths and subtilties in the tall mountains, stands at the lower hand then this lion. Imam Ebū Leyş, who is a lion of the battlefields, shall bleed when Shāh Qāsim's book is being recited. If commentators are various but it is known that half of them shall not be praised as he is. His book on exegesis is tantamount to that of Lebāb b. ʿĀdil; in hadith, it weighs the same as Ibn-i Hacer. He is like Bigavi, from the eminent scholars. Many possessors of strong tongues were fools and seduced, in comparison to him. In sum, he was a partner of his father in the sciences. I (i.e. ʿĀşıḳ Çelebī) heard from him that, "once I (Shāh Qāsim) was in the company of Selim in Edirne. I spoke to Halim Çelebī and pointed to me and said: "Shāh Qāsim's father had had a long hand in preaching and lofty rank in the eloquence, Selim wondered if I possess the same qualifications, in accordance with the saying "son is hidden in his father." Those who have ten tongues like a lily in the reverent sultanic assembly would become mute like a rosebud, those who are like exalted pens with the tips of the fingers in the meeting of divine kindnesses would chew their tongues out of the horror of the sword, just like me. But if their graces help and their desperate hearts, from the orientation of the royal heart, favor, verse:

A word is a pearl and belongs to the ear of the secret.

As I said to the Sultan, to whom God shall give him rewards, as he protects science, and then he ordered for the honoring of the meeting of lofty science and veneration of the exalted discourse. At that moment, they brought an Aḳ Yanbolı rug, which was folded four times. According to the Sultan's order, I commented on some Qur'anic verses from my memory. As he understood the secret meanings, his auspicious eyes were full of tears which means his narcissus of the noble flower garden filled with dew and looked to the sky, and with his happy face, he corresponded with the sublime God. In short, Shāh Qāsim was given 40-akçes, upon his arrival at Istanbul, then it became fifty. After Süleyman I (d. 1566) acceded to the felicitous throne, Shāh Qāsim wrote the beautiful life of Süleyman. When they saw some sections, they increased his daily stipend to seventy and raised his fame. He came to the campaign of Two Iraqs at its last days, entered into the noble retinue, and they increased his stipend to one hundred. Since they knew Shāh Qāsim deserved to be amongst the greatest servants, they used the writing of history as an excuse to increase his stipend. Because his stipend was increased to one hundred, he became happy as his amount of sheep was increased to a thousand and died in 946 (1539-1540). Before completing his history, eternal scribe finished his title, instead of his summary of the book of life. Shāh Qāsim was among the wonders and heaven reaching miracles, in terms of courtesy, decorum, kindness, situations, and business. He followed the works of previous pious men and imitated the tradition of the perfect ulama. In

chancery style, his delicate pen is the preacher of Abbasid cloak and delicate collector of pulpit seater. With three-feet chair mankind, it is not known to the candle of the ninth heaven that nobody has ever recited a sermon like him. Or, pen, which denotes "God has taught humans which he had not known", has not put a finger to a letter in his writings. The possessor of the Tārīḫ-i Muʿcem is barbarian and mute, in comparison to his eloquent discourse. Although his mirror is Vaṣṣāf, it is disturbed compared to transparent and pure Islamic tales of polished revelations. If Şeref becomes erudite of the time, with his value and pen, could not reach this goer of the true path and limps near to this high magnanimous horse. Ḫoca Molla Iṣfahānī's way of writing is crooked before the jewel-presenting style of the pen of Shāh Qāsim. At the beginning of the history of the Süleyman, Shāh Qāsim procured in this manner. "It is from Süleyman and starts with the name of God who is merciful." is a couplet from that book. Verse:

He himself is light; his book spreads light. Descending of that book (the Qur'an) to him (Muhammad) is light on light. Two plats are like two lams in lawlaq. His mouth is like a mim in mā ʿarafnāk. His shadow was invisible since the sun was under his shadow. Because of his creation's order, couplets of qasidas became eyes top to bottom.

But he did not deign [to write in] Turkish, neither [narrative] nor lyric poetry. Since he was my tutor and his son was my associate or close friend, I was attending his meetings. Once, I was at his meetings, two men from the felicitous dynasty sent news which orders Shāh Qāsim to recite a couplet to carve on the bridal blanket and shirt's collar. For the collar, he said: verse:

Your collar is the rising of the beautiful sun that whoever stays away becomes your pure skirt.

For the blanket, he said: verse: Since your dream was a guest to my eyes last night, I made the blanket as cover and baby as a bed.

They told this poor one to recite, yet by saying it is an insolence, I demanded forgiveness, but surely, they did not let me and insisted. At last, a couplet about the collar came to presence. Initiatory verse of ʿĀşıḳ:

Its collar entered to its breast by whirling its arms to its neck. I would die because of envy, by God, my blood to its neck.

His son was a fortunate and clever valiant. While he was in the path of the judiciary and the judge of İvranya with a stipend of 50-akçes, he defamed a certain noble from the great servants, and a kick from the spirit of ulama and light of science reached

to him, and he died in 969 (1561-1562) (ʿĀşıḳ 2018, 593-595).

Taşköprizāde on Shāh Qāsim

May God Almighty have mercy on him, a native of the city of Tabriz, and when
Sultan Selim Khan entered this city, he took Shāh Qāsim with him to the land
of the Rum and bestowed him fifty dirhams of daily stipend. May God Almighty
have mercy on him; he was a complete scholar, a litterateur, sweet lecturer, gentle
interlocutor and had knowledge about all sciences. He had a fortune from the science
of Sufism as well, and he was a good script and had a perfect skill in the science of
prose. He started to write the history of the house of Osman, but he died in 948 or
949 (1541-1543), may God Almighty have mercy on him (Taşköprizāde 2098, 271).

APPENDIX B

The Ottoman Genealogies

Not all of the Ottoman chroniclers provide an Ottoman genealogy in their chronicles. They prefer to mention some historical figures crucial for their narratives. Still, some Ottoman historians present the lineage of Osman up to Prophet Noah or Prophet Abraham. Here, I show ʿĀşıḳpāşāzāde's, Neşrī's, and Shāh Qāsim's versions of Ottoman genealogies (Shāh Qāsim's and Idrīs-i Bidlīsī's genealogies are identical, except for some writing differences).

ʿĀşıḳpāşāzāde's Genealogy

(1) Nūḥ (Prophet Noah), (2) Yāfes (Japheth), (3) Māçin, (4) Çin, (5) Ṭurtmış, (6) Yantemūr, (7) Korluġā, (8) Ḳarāḥul, (9) Süleymān Şāh, (10) Ḳarālū Oġlān, (11) Amudī, (12) Ḳarāca, (13) Ḳurṭulmuş, (14) Çārbuġā, (15) Sevinç, (16) Ṭoġar, (17) Baybūs, (18) Ḳızıl Boġa, (19) Ḳamān, (20) Bāysūb, (21) Ḳarāḫān, (22) Ṭozaḳ, (23) Ayḳuṭluḳ, (24) Ḳarāḫān II, (25) Oġuz, (26) Gök Ālp, (27) Basūḳ, (28) Ṭoḳtemūr, (29) Suġar, (30) Baḳıyī, (31) Sunḳūr, (32) Ḳaynıtūr, (33) Ṭoġar II, (34) Ayḳoluġ, (35) Bayınṭur, (36) Ḳızıl Boġa II, (37) Ḳayā Ālp, (38) Süleymān Şāh Ġāzī II, (39) Ertuñrıl, (40) ʿOṣmān (Aşıkpaşazade 2003, 321).

Neşrī's Genealogy

(1) Nūḥ (Prophet Noah), (2) Yāfes (Japheth), (3) Būlcās, (4) Ẕīb Bāḵūy, (5) Ḳarāḫān (6) Oġuz, (7) Gök Alp, (8) Ṭūrtmış, (9) Bāytemūr, (10) Būzlūġān, (11) Ḳūrḫalū, (12) Süleymān Şāh, (13) Ḳarāoġlān, (14) Ḵūmas, (15) Bālçıḳ, (16) Ḳūrḫāv, (17) Ḵūrtūlmuş, (18) Çārbūġā, (19) Sevinç, (20) Ṭuġrā, (21) Bāysūy, (22) Cemūr Mīr, (23) Bāşbūġā, (24) Yamāḵ, (25) Ḳızılbūġā, (26) Ṭūruc, (27) Cemkīmūr, (28) Ḳarāṭāy, (29) Artūḵ, (30) Göç Bey, (31) Ṭoġmış, (32) Ṭuġrā II, (33) Bay Bey, (34) Yalvāç, (35) Yāsū, (36) Ḳazḫān, (37) Ṭūrāḵ, (38) Ay Ḳuṭluġ, (39) Çemendūr, (40) Yāsāḵ, (41) Toḵtemūr, (42) Sunḵūr, (43) Būlġāy, (44) Sāḵūr, (45) Ḳaraytū, (46) Ṭuġrā III , (47) Ay Ḳuṭluġ II, (48) Baytemūr, (49) Ḳızılbūġa, (50) Ḳayā Alp, (51) Süleymān Şāh II (52) Ertuġrul, (53) ʿOsmān (Neşri 2008, 54-56).

Shāh Qāsim's Genealogy

(1) Ibrāhīm (Prophet Abraham), (2) Isḥāq (Prophet Isaac), (3) ʿAyṣ (Esau, also known as Qāytī Khan), (4) Qarā Khan I, (5) Ughūz Khan (Oghuz Khan), (6) Gūk Ūlp, (7) Tūrmish, (8) Bāytamūr, (9) Būrlaghā, (10) Ṭarkhulū, (11) Sulaymān Shāh I, (12) Qara Ughlān, (13) Qumāsh, (14) Bāljū, (15) Qūrukhād, (16) Qūrulmish, (17) Jārbūghā, (18) Sawinj, (19) Ṭughurā I, (20) Bāysū, (21) Ḫūrmaz, (22) Yāshūghā, (23) Yamāq, (24) Qizilbūghā, (25) Ṭūrukh, (26) Jaktamūr, (27) Qamārī, (28) Ārtūq, (29) Gūch Beg, (30) Duwāghmish, (31) Ṭughurā II, (32) Bāy Beg, (33) Yalwāj, (34) Nāsū, (35) Qarā Khan II, (36) Dūrluq, (37) Qutluq, (38) Ḥamīd, (39) Yāsāq, (40) Tūqtamūr, (41) Sūnqūr, (42) Bulughāy, (43) Qarāyunū, (44) Ṭughurā III, (45) Qutlugh (Qutluq II), (46) Bāytamūr II, (47) Qizilbūghā II, (48) Qayā Ūlp, (49) Sulaymān Shāh II, (50) Arṭughrul, (51) ʿUs̲mān (Shāh Qāsim 3392, 25b).