

**GLOBAL GOVERNANCE CONSTELLATIONS, CHALLENGES,  
AND TRAJECTORIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN ISSUE BASED  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS**

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AND TRAJECTORIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN ISSUE BASED  
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## ABSTRACT

### GLOBAL GOVERNANCE CONSTELLATIONS, CHALLENGES, AND TRAJECTORIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN ISSUE BASED EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS

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One of the most salient debates regarding the international system in the 21st century is whether the post-war liberal international order is dissipating due to the increasing amount of stress caused by rapid transformations brought on by globalization. Shifts in global governance constellations and challenges of this new age require responses which adequately address complex global problems in a timely and organized manner. At this juncture, this study investigates the dynamics of state behavior in one of the most important global governance institutions, the United Nations General Assembly, and unveil the instances in which narrow national interests and relative power positions determine their stance against the general will of the international community. Given that global governance encompasses a wide collection of concerns, this study narrows down the inquiry by looking at the most contested issues on the international agenda; the Middle East, nuclear weapons and disarmament, human rights, and economic and social development in the context of the UN General Assembly voting records. Methodologically, the research utilizes an ordinary least squares regression in order to uncover the effects of and correlations between GDP, military power, economic power, and regime type over voting patterns of member states. Additionally, the ratios of voting in line with successful resolutions are also investigated within the framework of global political discourse. The study argues that global governance platforms such as the UN General Assembly are podiums in which power politics are conducted and states are ultimately concerned with their narrow national interests and relative power positions, especially within circumstances in which global crises threaten the balance of power within global governance.

## ÖZET

### 21. YÜZYILDA KÜRESEL YÖNETİŞİM, ZORLUKLAR VE YÖRÜNGELER: BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER GENEL KURULUNUN KONU BAZLI AMPİRİK ANALİZİ

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21. yüzyılda uluslararası sistemle ilgili en dikkat çekici tartışmalardan biri, savaş sonrası liberal uluslararası düzenin küreselleşmenin getirdiği hızlı dönüşümlerin sonucundaki dağılma eğilimidir. Küresel yönetim takımyıldızlarındaki değişimler ve bu yeni çağın zorlukları, karmaşık küresel sorunları zamanında, organize ve yeterli bir şekilde ele alan yanıtlar gerektirir. Bu çalışma en önemli küresel yönetim kurumlarından biri olan Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulunda devlet dinamiklerini araştırıyor ve bu kapsamdaki dar ulusal çıkarların ve göreceli iktidar konumlarının genel uluslararası iradeye karşı duruşlarını belirlediği durumları açıklayıcı faktörleri inceler. Küresel yönetimin geniş bir konu alanını kapsadığı düşünülürse tüm endişelerin toplanması konusundaki zorlukları uluslararası gündemdeki en tartışmalı konular üzerinden inceleyerek en kapsamlı hale getirmektedir. Bu konular BM Genel Kurulu oy kayıtları altında dört başlık olarak toplanmıştır; Orta Doğu, nükleer silahlar ve silahsızlanma, insan hakları ve ekonomik ve sosyal gelişme. Metodolojik olarak, bu araştırma korelasyonların etkilerini ortaya çıkarmak için sıradan en küçük kareler regresyonu (OLS) oy verme modelleri üzerinden GSYİH, askeri güç, ekonomik güç ve rejim türü arasında üye devletler üzerinde en büyük etkileri araştırmaktadır. Ayrıca başarılı kararlar doğrultusunda oy verme oranları da küresel siyasi söylem çerçevesinde incelenmektedir. Bu çalışma BM Genel Kurulu gibi küresel yönetim platformlarında, özellikle kriz dönemlerinde, güç siyasetinin yürütüldüğü ve devletlerin birincil olarak ilgilendiği unsurların dar ulusal çıkarlar ve göreceli güç konumlarıyla belirlendiğini sonucunu çıkarmaktadır.

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*To Lucca, Murphy, Sunday, Bamboo and Kenzo*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>BRICS</b>	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa .....
<b>CHR</b>	Commission on Human Rights.....
<b>CoE</b>	Council of Europe .....
<b>CSD</b>	Commission on Sustainable Development.....
<b>CTBT</b>	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty .....
<b>CU</b>	customs union.....
<b>CWC</b>	Chemical Weapons Convention.....
<b>DAC</b>	Development Cooperation Directorate .....
<b>DDA</b>	Doha Development Agenda.....
<b>DESA</b>	Department of Economic and Social Affairs.....
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations .....
<b>DSB</b>	Dispute Settlement Body .....
<b>EC</b>	European Community .....
<b>ECE</b>	Economic Commission for Europe .....
<b>ECHR</b>	European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.....
<b>ECJ</b>	European Court of Justice.....
<b>ECOSOC</b>	Economic and Social Council.....
<b>ECtHR</b>	European Court of Human Rights .....
<b>EEA</b>	European Economic Area .....

<b>EEC</b> European Economic Community .....	
<b>EFTA</b> European Free Trade Agreement .....	
<b>EMU</b> Economic and Monetary Union.....	
<b>EU</b> European Union .....	
<b>GA</b> General Assembly .....	
<b>GATT</b> General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade .....	
<b>GDP</b> Gross Domestic Product.....	
<b>GNP</b> Gross National Product .....	
<b>HAMAS</b> Movement of the Islamic Resistance .....	
<b>IAEA</b> International Atomic Energy Agency.....	
<b>ICC</b> International Criminal Court .....	
<b>ICJ</b> International Court of Justice.....	
<b>IGO</b> intergovernmental organization .....	
<b>IHL</b> international humanitarian law .....	
<b>ILO</b> International Labour Office or Organization.....	
<b>IMF</b> International Monetary Fund.....	
<b>ING</b> international non-governmental organization.....	
<b>IO</b> international organization .....	
<b>MNCs</b> Multinational Corporations .....	
<b>NAFTA</b> North American Free Trade Agreement.....	
<b>NATO</b> North Atlantic Treaty Organization.....	
<b>NIEO</b> New International Economic Order .....	
<b>NPT</b> Non-Proliferation Treaty.....	
<b>OCHA</b> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.....	
<b>OECD</b> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.....	
<b>OHCHR</b> Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights UN United .....	

<b>OPEC</b>	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries .....
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe .....
<b>PA</b>	Palestinian Authority .....
<b>PACE</b>	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe .....
<b>PLO</b>	Palestine Liberation Organisation .....
<b>PTBT</b>	Partial Test Ban Treaty .....
<b>SC</b>	Security Council .....
<b>TEU</b>	Treaty on European Union .....
<b>TFEU</b>	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union .....
<b>UDHR</b>	Universal Declaration of Human Rights .....
<b>UN</b>	United Nations .....
<b>UNAdT</b>	UN Administrative Tribunal .....
<b>UNAT</b>	UN Appeals Tribunal .....
<b>UNCAC</b>	UN Convention Against Corruption .....
<b>UNCED</b>	UN Conference on Environment and Development .....
<b>UNCITR</b>	UN Commission on International Trade Law .....
<b>UNCLOS</b>	UN Convention on the Law of the Sea .....
<b>UNCTAD</b>	UN Conference on Trade and Development .....
<b>UNCTC</b>	UN Commission on Transnational Corporations .....
<b>UNDG</b>	UN Development Group .....
<b>UNDP</b>	UN Development Programme .....
<b>UNDT</b>	UN Dispute Tribunal .....
<b>UNEP</b>	UN Environment Programme .....
<b>UNESCO</b>	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization .....
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund .....
<b>UNGA</b>	UN General Assembly .....



<b>UNHCR</b>	UN High Commissioner for Refugees .....
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund.....
<b>UNIDO</b>	UN Industrial Development Organization.....
<b>UNIFE</b>	United Nations Development Fund for Women .....
<b>UNSC</b>	UN Security Council.....
<b>US</b>	United States.....
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics .....
<b>WB</b>	World Bank .....
<b>WEO</b>	World Economic Outlook .....
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme.....
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization .....
<b>WMD</b>	weapons of mass destruction .....
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization .....

## INTRODUCTION

In 1993, the former Counselor to the American President Lyndon B. Johnson and National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski diagnosed the global political system as “out of control” as a response to global changes. He warned statesmen and policy makers about the costs of such dynamics that have arisen due to newly developed advanced human capabilities, stating “history today entails sharp discontinuities that collide with each other”. (Brzezinski 2010) Brzezinski’s astute observation rings especially true in the decades following the new millennium. Globalization has shaped the current global system into one of increased mobility and instant communications, eliminating a myriad of old world barriers (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020). Concomitantly, the international arena saw the emergence of various actors that now play an important role in shaping global outcomes; with the center of international power shifting away from the convention of nation-state towards the new, creating new decision making processes and procedures (O’Rourke 2019, Janssens, Maddux, and Nguyen 2019). This new world saw technological advances at unprecedented rates, leading to exceptional improvements to human life; an increase in life expectancy, a spread of literacy and basic educational standards, and perhaps, most importantly, a decrease in extreme poverty (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020).

Despite its many advantages, this novel system is characterized by rapid dynamics which created challenges that neither experienced statesmen nor global governance institutions could successfully overcome. With economic development at full force, the gap between the rich and poor widened, solidifying the polarization between classes (Meadows and Meadows 2007). The global economy is currently fueled by debt with the likelihood scenario of financial chaos approaching rapidly (Dahl 2019). Additionally, economic development, at the rates observed, threatens environmental balances; disrupting whole ecological systems and depleting a large area of the ozone layer (Dahl 2019). Essentially, this paramount environmental issue signals that the current global system cannot continue without a collapse in one way or

another (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020). Perhaps the ongoing crisis over the Coronavirus 19 situation which erupted in early months of 2020 is the first of many crises to come. Simultaneously, trust in global governance institutions is failing as they are not seen as neither fast nor effective in addressing critical global emergencies (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020). This darker side of globalization also encompasses existing widespread corruption and rise of populist nationalist movements across the world- signaling a weakening of ethical and moral responsibility (Pinker 2018). All of these factors contribute to growing insecurities regarding the future of the not just isolated economic, social and political systems but the world as a whole.

Correcting this downward trajectory are global governance institutions, addressing global problems that have universal effect on all potential levels. Considered as one of the most important players in this game is the United Nations, which works towards remedying international issues ranging from security to the environment by setting ambitious goals to make the world more peaceful and economic growth more sustainable. UN's aims are novel and necessary; however, it is evident that without a complete shift in outlook, its grand agendas detailing sustainable development goals seem to be further out of reach. Broadly speaking, there are four major challenges that both the system and its parts are required to address. These are issues regarding the environment, global security, sustainable economic development and social challenges. The abundance of problems presents another complexity regarding the hierarchy and urgency of challenges which need to be addressed. Additionally, many matters are correlated with one another, calling for a highly sophisticated and organized institutional response. Such an approach requires a restructuring of the international organization of the globe to one which integrates the notion of constant change into the equation, adapting its response and actions according to the circumstances of the time (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020, Stiglitz 2017).

The characteristic of adaptability and the importance of acting within the context has become increasingly vital and the inadequacies of the current global system are clearly observed in its responses to shocks. Two main cases emerge as instances in which the inadequacies of global governance are abundant; the ongoing environmental emergencies caused by economic development, and the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. The first instance concerns the unrestricted push of the capitalist markets to produce more, disregarding its consequences. The second being the global pandemic which has demonstrated the shortcomings of global governance, especially with regards to the discrepancies between national and international responses. Another problem which has stemmed from this is the varying acceptance and retort of the advice put forth by the epistemic communities.

The first aim of this study is to broadly map the constellations of global governance players to contribute to the myriad of debates regarding the future of the international order, which is in ostensible peril (Ikenberry 2019, Owen 2019, Ikenberry 2018, Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020, Rodrik 2019, Weiss and Wilkinson 2019, Beeson 2019, Kahler 2018, Weiss 2016, Murphy 2014, Kahler 2009, Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006). The 2020 coronavirus pandemic has fueled the current discussions regarding the state of the international system, indicating that both the system and its actors are undergoing significant changes in both function and structure (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann 2020). Leading liberal internationalist scholars such as Ikenberry focus on the systematic aspect of the global order, investigating the future of the system by investigating “new forms of protection and capabilities to manage interdependence”; while neorealism foresees a return to protectionism and isolationism (Allen et al. 2020). Looking at the world in light of recent events, Stephen Walt suggests that the crises that have unfolded in the past year has solidified the Western reputation and that the power struggles which shape the international arena will not change because of the “the fundamentally conflictive nature of world politics (Allen et al. 2020).” Similarly, Robert Niblett claims that it is unlikely for the world to go back to the shiny era of globalization of the early 2000s and that “overt geopolitical competition is a potential option which could mark global interactions in the future (Allen et al. 2020).

This diagnosis of the international system and global governance is centered around the concept of power, and merits further investigation to understand the machinations of *realpolitik* and its influences over state behavior and global agenda setting. Such a lofty task is too large of an undertaking for this dissertation; due to both data limitations and spatial concerns. Therefore, general questions regarding the role of power over state behavior in global governance need to be narrowed down to allow for theory building and hypothesis testing. This is primarily achieved through case and variable selection. By looking at one of the most prominent examples of global governance, the United Nations -more specifically the General Assembly- this study aims to unveil the pattern and constraints in which states behavior is shaped on the most contested issue areas (Middle East, nuclear weapons and disarmament, human rights, and economic and social development) on the global platform to understand the role of narrow national interests and relative power concerns, within the fundamentally conflictive nature of the international system.

The dissertation begins by a thorough overview of theoretical approaches to both power and international cooperation and their roles in global governance under the umbrella of international relations theory. This acts as an anchor to situate notions within an array of similar concepts. By establishing the theoretical foundations and

proposition on which the study is based, the following chapter will focus on methodology and hypotheses centered around specific claims established in the proposed theoretical framework. Here, case selection and data sources will be presented. The methods and variables utilized to conduct the analysis will be discussed in detail. The third chapter will provide a detailed historical background on the emergence and evolution of global governance. This account will bridge the gap between the theoretical assumptions and events. Such an account is especially necessary as a solid understanding of the intricacies of global governance are presented chronologically, contributing to the overall cohesion of the study. This section will conclude by summarizing the processes and procedures under which the UN General Assembly functions.

The fourth chapter introduces the selected issue areas by giving a historical account of their role in global governance. Tracing the issues back to their origination within global governance provides another manner in which theory and practice are combined.

The fifth chapter of this dissertation is of descriptive nature and is intended to summarize the state of affairs between 1999-2018 on the international platform under the umbrella of power by discussing the similarities and divergences of traditional and emerging powers on the areas of the Middle East, nuclear weapons and disarmament, human rights, and economic and social development. The patterns and trends uncovered here will contribute to current debates over the role of emerging powers by illustrating whether they threaten the post-war traditional powers.

The sixth chapter begins by diverting from descriptive analysis to a statistically oriented analysis. Here, the aim is to answer the question of likelihood of a state supporting UNGA Resolutions on the previously mentioned four issue areas. The data and analysis of each issue will be presented separately. Following this question, the logical trajectory leads to investigating the likelihood of states voting on the side of the winning resolution. Chapter seven revolves around discussions of the results of this calculation which allow for a more detailed understanding of the characteristics of states in line with the global agenda as well as specific instances in which this is the case.

In the last chapter of this study, the focus takes a micro turn to investigate power on a more pragmatic manner. The major question here is to look at the instances in which other member states vote with regards to the United States of America. This investigation brings the study to a full circle by looking how states behave with regards to one of the most powerful state, the USA. The results of this regression illustrate the instances and issues under which American support is prominent

and garners the backing of the international community regardless of the resolution passing or not.

The entirety of this investigation is to systematically show the role of power over state behavior in global governance by looking at UN General Assembly voting data since 1999. The data will illustrate the evolution of the international system as well as demonstrate the significant shift that global governance is currently undergoing. Put simply, the entirety of this study contributes to international relations literature by enhancing and uncovering the importance of narrow national interests in global agenda setting, touching upon the question of when states put their interests above mutual benefits.

## 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theoretical discussions regarding the nature of global governance are full of complexities and the diverging ideas on the subject. They also possess the ability to fuel conversations for the foreseeable future, and it is useful to ponder on these concepts as these intellectual discussions contribute in strengthening the foundations of the field of study in global governance. However, it is also critical to step out of the exercise of definition and investigate the functions and structures of the phenomenon. This section will provide the theoretical basis of this study by looking at approaches to global governance through different paradigmatic camps of the discipline.

Looking at international relations theory as a whole, it is important to initiate this section on the theoretical framework on a cautious note: no specific camp is able to capture the full extent of realities and nuances of global governance-or international politics (Hollis and Smith 1990). That is simply an impossible undertaking. However, there are specific propositions and concomitant hypotheses, which stem from diverging paradigmatic origins. These come closer to modeling the complex reality of the international order and its inhabitants. This constitutes the rationale behind choosing realism, and neo-liberal institutionalism as the major theoretical perspectives to analyze the outputs of global governance (Burchill et al. 2013). Another reason behind this choice is the prominence of these two paradigms in current IR literature (Maghroori 2019). The task of evaluating the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the diverging analyses put forth by realism, and neo-liberal institutionalism begins with addressing each paradigms approach to the international system, states, and role of non-state actors. Axioms and assumptions put forth by each camp significantly shifts the panorama of global governance and frames the manner in which the current global crisis is interpreted. All provide a strong set of diagnostic factors as well as prescriptions for the future.

The first mainstream theoretical approach, neo-realism, defines the international system as anarchic, which suggests the lack of an ordering principle-an overarching authority in the international system (Waltz 2010). Here, states are considered to be the most important agents in this international order; whose primary character-

istic are that they are self-interested, rational, unitary actors (Mearsheimer 2001). Within an anarchic system, states are self-reliant on their own survival and the major tool in achieving this is through power (Jervis 1999). The logic behind this is the understanding that the lack of an overarching authority structure in the international system raises the stakes of international interactions. This renders the international system as innately conflict prone with the possibilities of international cooperation low, and thus, the likelihood of an escalation of conflict into armed confrontation is high (Waltz 1993). Under these circumstances, coming out of a disagreement intact relies on having more power than the other party. This also implies that the most important consideration of a state is survival, which is established through power. The realist claim is relative power and distribution of capabilities are the sources of influence of the international distribution of power. In other words, strong players are more influential on the outcome. Concomitantly, international organization is one type of pattern that emerges from this strong player interaction (Gilpin 1984, Gilpin 1983).

Within this framework, cooperation is difficult to achieve and arduous to maintain due to relative gains considerations and, apprehensions about cheating (Mearsheimer 1994). A state's position in the balance of power is only determined relatively, therefore, power positions and relative gains matter as they can benefit or disadvantage the states' place. Similarly, the lack of trust also plays into the equation of protecting and maximizing their power positions, as a state is always concerned with its own interests above all else. Viewing international exchanges in this light emphasizes the difficulties of cooperation in a realist world. As Mearsheimer puts it, "Cooperation takes place in a competitive world in which states have incentives to take advantage of one another." Uncertainty about future intentions of the other party results in a state to focus on relative gains so their future capabilities are not in jeopardy.

International institutions in the realist context are merely tools for powerful states to manifest their own self-interests. Parameters of the rules, under which international institutions function, are based on the power distribution of the international arena. Concomitantly, powerful states are more likely to form and maintain these institutions with the end goal of keeping and maximizing their stance in international politics (Evans and Wilson 1992, Gilpin 1984). Institutions, according to the neo-realist view, are intervening variables in explaining war, and do not hold much importance in the balance of power dynamics in which the international system operates under (Mearsheimer 2001). The nuclei of realist theories revolve around formal international institutions and how players reflect their will through those platforms.



Put simply, the international organization of the global arena is determined through the distribution of power.<sup>1</sup> “If there appear to be patterns of authority, control, and legitimacy in contemporary world politics—global governance in common parlance—it is because of the relative power and ongoing interactions among powerful states.” (Sterling-Folker and Charrette 2013) Another important characteristic of the realist conception on cooperation is the suspicious nature of states. Realism postulates that under uncertainty caused by the anarchic system, a state can never understand other states’ intentions and capabilities (Mearsheimer 1994). Therefore, a cautious approach is always in place when cooperating along with relative gains concerns. This is precisely the reason to why international cooperation is hard to establish and harder to maintain—insecurities and unequal gains (Waltz 2010). We can observe these patterns in previous global governance schemes where the common threat brought together powerful actors to craft an international solution.

Within theoretic discussion of international organizations and global governance, the realist view is underrepresented due to a misconception that assumes realism has little to add to this conversation. Perhaps this is because the theory is considered to be too state-centric to meaningfully include International Organizations (IOs), or the way that IOs and global governance is defined (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). Regardless, the conception that the role of IOs and global governance is unimportant within the realist paradigm is a notion that does not hold ground as realist theories indeed recognize the existence and functions of other international entities— they just do not share the same level of significance put upon its shoulders.

The current breadth of global governance and the liberal international order forged in the 1960s appear to contradict the realist outlook on international cooperation. However, it should be understood that realism does not claim that cooperation does not exist all together rather that global governance cooperation is hard to achieve and even more difficult to maintain. In explaining the prevailing cooperative efforts of the modern state system, Mearsheimer proposes that there are certain temporary situations in which obstacles towards such cooperative actions can be subdued and, the pattern of order can be achieved (Mearsheimer 1994). Here, the theoretic explanation centers around the effect of the distributions of power. Concomitantly, the way power is distributed produces specific patterns of order and international organization, which in turn affect the probabilities of war and conflict (Mearsheimer 1994, Kennedy 1989).

The first type of an international system is a multipolar system which houses multiple great powers. With a system like this, international interactions are increased

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<sup>1</sup>Barnett and Duvall argue the exact opposite in their book *Power and Global Governance*.

and interdependence raises the cost of war (Copper 1975). Additionally, satisfaction from the cooperation of states is key, as the outcome depends on state challenges to the status quo. If challenged, the resulting system of cooperation is weak and shallow due to concerns of survival. If the status quo is not challenged then, the resulting system of management is stronger as concerns of survival are lessened (Schweller and Priess 1997).

The second distribution of power is referred to as bipolarity, where there are two major powers with more or less equal capabilities on the international arena. The resulting international system is one shaped by the interactions between these two great powers. Here, there is a delicate balance between choosing to compete and cooperate. The dynamics between the USSR and USA during the Cold War years is a great example of a bipolar system, with two spheres of influence dominating the globe. The final distribution of power is unipolarity where there is a single great power dominating the international arena and its attributes. The superpower shapes international organizations to its benefit, choosing what is most similar to its internal characteristics. If it is liberal, then the international order produced reflects this in the form of domination through consent. The superpower will strive to make the international system attractive for others (Schweller and Priess 1997). If the state is illiberal, this results in an international order of imperialism.

There are varying reasonings over the dynamics of power, and how long a hegemon or great power can depend on its advantageous distribution of capabilities. The anarchic system pushes actors into competition over unchecked power. Yielding more power both internally and externally, states will wish to balance against the hegemon's power. In instances of these power transitions, the hegemon is susceptible to interstate conflicts which in turn upsets the hegemon's relative capabilities. This leads to the system's distribution of power transforming from a unipolar hegemonic system to a multipolar or bipolar arrangement of global governance (Waltz 1993, Gilpin 1983). In theoretical discussions, unipolarity as a concept gained ground after the collapse of the USSR and was described as the "unipolar moment" and the general world system was a liberal capitalist democracy with 'the West' reigning over 'the rest' (Fukuyama 1989, Krauthammer 2002, 1990). The break of the bipolar distribution of power between the USA and USSR gave way for the United States to exert its influence and find its position of power as the hegemon. However, as stated above, the duration that this hegemonic power can continue depends on various factors.

In the early 2000s two key events shook this unipolar movement; the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and, Putin's rise to power in Russia. The unipolar movement

that came into place with the USA as the Western hegemon was unexpectedly threatened (Krauthammer 2002). The assumptions that there were no possible powers that could parallel American power were proven wrong. Putin's efforts to reinstate Russia as a great power on the global arena and his challenge to American domination was clearly stated in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. Hailed as 'iconic' by Sputnik News and, "disappointing and not helpful" by former NATO secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Putin demonstrated that the American hegemonic moment was being challenged (Watson 2007, Sputnik 2016). These intentions were put into action in 2008 with Russia's intervention in Northern Ossetia and Abkhazia regardless of blatant American support for Georgia. More recent examples include the Crimean annexation and Syrian intervention.

When this line of realist thought is taken in the context of 2020 global governance constellations, with the current international system being one between the declining American unipolarity forged post 1990, and multipolarity caused by the rise of emerging actors a major theoretic proposition is presented that establishes one of the central arguments of this dissertation: that relative power positions influence framing of global governance (Webb and Krasner 1989).

Proposition 1: If the system is indeed purely unipolar and the realist arguments holds, then international outcomes should reflect American national interests, and international rules and resolutions should have the hegemon's full support (Wohlforth 1999); conversely, a multipolar type of distribution would suggest a less stable system with an abundance of issue contention on the arena of global governance.

The realist approach that has been outlined holds the concept of the power as the structuring principle of the international system, whose most important inhabitants are states. However, there are other perspectives in viewing the dynamism of the international system and its frameworks that suggest looking at other international actors as explanatory factors. This is the case with neo-liberal institutionalism which focuses on the role of institutions in shaping state behavior as well as the layout of international arena. Here, it is important to remember that the neo-liberal ideology does not adopt the neo-realist structural explanation of the international system. Rather, the neo-liberal camp is concerned with the manner that state behavior is shaped through institutions. Accepting the anarchic nature of the international system, and the systemic boundaries that it presents, this view assumes the mitigating role of international institutions over anarchy through coordination. International institutions are "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area" (Krasner 1983), which imply the importance of mutual interests as its foundation. Here, it is critical

to highlight that this paradigm does not suppose that cooperation is easy (Hughes and Lai 2011). Robert Keohane states that “even when mutual interests exist, cooperation frequently fails (Keohane 2005).” This is the reason to why the topic of his inquiry is focused on distinguishing between the types of mutual interests and more specifically, which categories proved to be most supportive of cooperative behavior. To solve this conundrum, a fine-tuning to the characterization of cooperation is made: mutual adjustments are its main function (Keohane 2005). One of the main features of this school is that state expectations combined with power concerns are a vital factor in shaping state behavior on the international front. Concomitantly, mutual acceptance of international institutions amplifies its influence (Hughes and Lai 2011, Ruggie 1983).

A leading component of neo-liberal institutionalism is the prescriptions given in achieving a lesser probability of conflict. On this topic, Keohane and Nye present their notion of complex interdependence- the transnational ties, communications, and interdependencies which occur between the state and society (Keohane and Nye 1977). The rise of such relationships would inevitably lead to a new type of structuring principle of the international system; one which did not source its power from the military as realists highlight, but the economic activities of a state. Also, these ties would also be platform in which cooperation was encouraged through raising the economic costs of conflict (Keohane 1998, Keohane and Martin 1995, Keohane 1988, Axelrod and Keohane 1985).

From the perspective of institutionalism, the current constellations of global governance would reflect the key assumptions posited by the ideas of complex interdependence. This is the basis of the second proposition which this study aims to unravel:

Proposition 2: If neo-liberal theories of complex interdependence hold, then states dyads who possess the highest volumes of economic interactions are more likely to behave in a similar manner to issues on the platform of global governance.

The following section will first introduce the context in which the hypotheses have been formulated and then discuss the methodologies employed in the testing of the theories in light of the two major propositions.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

Current debates argue that the global system is under a significant change; various challenges, emerging actors and shifting power balances have played a role in this alteration. The neo-liberal argument that the liberal world order is under a new type of construction through emerging actors is widely accepted (Humphrey and Messner 2006, Kirton, Daniels, and Freytag 2019, Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2019, Weiss and Wilkinson 2019, Beeson 2019). Global crises of migration and terrorism have also affected the functioning of cooperative platforms to shift their foci from mostly economic issues to security concerns (Kirton, Daniels, and Freytag 2019, Koenig-Archibugi 2019). Concomitantly, global governance is also under a different frame due to the shifting political atmosphere. Within this environment of urgency, it is observed that states and particularly great powers are key actors that shape the course of events (Xuetong 2019, Brawley 2019). This dissertation argues that great powers still hold an important place in shaping the global agenda as opposed to the neo-liberal arguments that posit emerging powers threaten their hold over the global decision-making processes.

Answering the question of how great powers shape global governance is difficult and vague and it is outside of the scope of this dissertation. The specific research question here is to either confirming or disproving the role of power in global governance and ultimately decipher the instances when relative power concerns shape voting patterns. However, before diving into the specifics a most important discussion needs to be made; defining power and its characteristics. Global governance encompasses many of the fundamental elements of power itself, global governance without power is unthinkable (Barnett and Duvall 2004).

Since E.H. Carr's seminal work, *The Twenty Year Crisis*, the concept of power has been closely associated with the realist paradigm, reflecting the principles of *realpolitik* and security concerns at the forefront (Barnett and Duvall 2004, Carr, Cox, and Cox 1946). Due to this association, there have been tendencies to view power as the ability to make another entity to act in a way it would not otherwise engage (Mearsheimer 2001). The realist view concentrates on the operationalization

of power and emphasizes how one state might be persuaded to shift course of action through material resource usage by coercion or payments (Nye Jr 2003, 2009). Literature of this strain also stresses the importance of the will to power; converting resources into capabilities and outcomes (Baldwin 1989). Other paradigmatic outlooks such as neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism also discuss the role of power on the international arena and state behavior as well, however, those discussions fail to contribute to the aspects and characteristics of power; rather they focus on the effects of power on the explanatory level. Such an approach misses the explanatory strength and significant of power due to conceptual complexities (Baldwin 1989). Instead, neo-liberal institutional theories regard factors like regime type, national and mutual interests, values, interdependence and functions of international institutions to shape agent behavior on the international system. Constructivism similarly emphasizes the importance of ideas, identities, norms, and learning, when state behavior is concerned.

To comprehensively understand the theoretical basis of power in international relations, it is helpful to adopt the taxonomy of power constructed by Barnett and Duvall (2005). This approach integrates the views of the three outlooks in IR theory. The authors' conception of power is based on two major dimensions; relational specificity (direct or diffuse) and power realization (through state interaction or social relations of constitution) (Barnett and Duvall 2004). This categorization produces four major types of power; compulsory, structural, institutional and, productive. For the scope of this dissertation, the type of power used here will be compulsory power which is a combination of direct coercion through state interaction. The reason behind this specific choice lies in measurement concerns and data availability as it is quite difficult to identify adequate indicator which would be parameters for structural, institutional, and productive power. For the purposes of this study, a Weberian understanding of power is adopted. Simply put, power is the "probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability exists (Kunz 2010, Weber 1947)." This study looks at power from two perspectives, economic and military, to understand which aspects of hard power are more influential to shaping the behavior of states.

In order to operationalize concepts as well as explain the machinations of power politics in global governance, further clarifications and presentation of case selection is much needed. Firstly, since analyzing the entirety of global governance is not possible, the UN General Assembly has been chosen as the main platform. This is due to two reasons, firstly the UN General Assembly is as close to universal representation as possible. This allows for a high number of states and observations.

Secondly, the UN General Assembly is more comprehensive in issue areas as opposed to the Security Council- which produces binding legislations which are oriented towards issues of international security, having a narrow focus. Additionally, the resolutions of the General Assembly are not binding; this holds its strengths in the analysis as it indicates the natural leniency of member states without fears of punishment.

The procedures that the UN General Assembly take in formulating resolutions and processes which lead to voting as well as the voting results need to be explained in order to move on to the methodological organization of this study. The role of the GA, as outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, is to discuss and issue recommendations on issues pertaining to international peace, human rights, nuclear disarmament, international law, and human rights. The drafting of a resolution can be done in two ways; either a member state (sponsor) puts forth the resolution and submits it to the UN for further approval or the subsidiary bodies of the UN produce such drafts. The key point here is that the GA resolutions are reflective of the views of the member states as well as the collective view of the UN, which combines the interests of members. This combination gives the closest measure that can be dissected regarding the global agenda.

Since such resolutions are not legally binding, the voting behavior of states is more indicative of their specific foreign policy approaches than the Security Council decisions, and leniencies to the specific issue areas can be clearly observed. Voting in support of a resolution indicates that states' foreign objectives are in line with the general consensus which the UN has approved. Similarly, voting negatively demonstrated that a state does not regard the specific resolution to be advantageous to their relative power position on the international arena. Abstaining in voting of a resolution is more complicated to analyze as it can be due to many reasons ranging from the resolution being regarded as a hindrance or advantage to national interests but voting for it would jeopardize existent alliances or create new tensions. Such issues are worthy of further investigation, however, exceed the scope of this study.

The issue areas selected in analyzing the General Assembly votes are decided in the context of the most contested issues: Middle East and the Palestinian Conflict, nuclear weapons and disarmament, human rights, and economic and social concerns. All of these issues are wide enough to encompass the varying approaches of states and capture many of the nuances of concomitant international interests put forth in their respective foreign policy.

There are four major questions which the dissertation aims to answer to understand and support/argue against both the realist and liberal approaches. The first

is to look at the convergences and divergences of traditional and emerging powers in their support of the UN General Assembly resolutions. In this part of the analysis, the measurement of power differs from the latter two conceptions which are integrated in the other two major questions which will be explained shortly. To look at whether traditional powers' and emerging powers' interests on the international front a specific definition of these countries are adopted. Although traditional powers are synonymous with the notion of great powers, this dissertation will distinguish between the two. The first part of the analysis will compare traditional powers and emerging powers. Traditional powers after the Cold War are stated as being the US, UK, China, France, Germany, Japan, Italy and Russia (Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann 2004, Fazal and Poast 2019, Han and Paul 2020). Emerging powers are defined as nations who are displaying upward trajectories in areas of economy, resources, diplomacy and population (Mourato Pinto 2013). Such countries are Brazil, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa, Mexico, Nigeria and Turkey. These two groups labeled traditional and emerging powers are the units of analysis for the first part of the examination. This conception of the powerful is rather static and limiting, however, accepting the predefined and conservative sets of the powerful allows to contribute to the general question of whether emerging powers are threatening the status quo which the postwar powers have implemented. This analysis is descriptive and is conducted by comparing the means of yes votes.

By looking at the UN voting patterns it is possible to see the convergences and divergences of different countries on selected issue areas. Utilizing the UN data provided by Erik Voeten votes relating to (a) the Palestinian conflict, (b) nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, (c) human rights and (d) economic development will be analyzed to demonstrate divergences and convergence. Due to the data size, another assumption is made with regards to the connotations of yes and no votes of the General Assembly. Yes votes are assumed as supporting the context of the resolution as opposed to no votes which do not support actions proposed. A clear example of this can be seen General Assembly resolution (A/69/L.76) which proposed in 2015 to raise the flag of Palestine, a non-member observer at the UN. The resolution passed with a 119 yes, 8 no, and 45 absent votes.<sup>1</sup> The hypotheses for this comparison are as follows:

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<sup>1</sup>“State of Palestine Flag to Fly at United Nations Headquarters, Offices as General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Non-Member Observer States.” *United Nations*, September 10, 2015. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11676.doc.htm>



Figure 2.1 Hypotheses For Traditional Versus Emerging Powers' Voting Tendencies

	Issue Areas			
	<i>Middle East</i>	<i>Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament</i>	<i>Human Rights</i>	<i>Economic and Social Development</i>
	<u>Hypothesis 1(a)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 1(c)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 2(a)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 2(c)</u>
<b>Major Research Question: Traditional vs Emerging Powers Vote Convergence/Divergence</b>	Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining the Middle East	Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament.	Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights	Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development
	<u>Hypothesis 1(b)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 1(d)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 2(b)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 2(d)</u>
	Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining the Middle East	Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament	Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights	Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development

Assuming these predefined definitions of traditional and emerging powers present two shortcomings. The first is that Russia fits into both categories as it is also considered to be an emerging power as a part of the BRICS nations. Secondly, not all traditional powers display the characteristics of great powers (superpowers) and therefore, the assumption that traditional powers are great powers fall through. This is the foundation which the second part of the study and the latter three major questions is based upon. The second part of the analysis does not assume any preconditions on great powers and looks at GDP and military expenditure as the parameters on which great powers are defined. This allows a more objective approach to understanding who great powers are on a yearly basis and is more accurate. Although it is possible to aggregate great power on combining GDP and military measures, it is more descriptive to divide the two components to see whether military or economic power has more explanatory strength. Also, this will allow for the final analysis to illustrate which parameters of power are more effective in swaying voting patterns on specific issue areas.

The analysis for these hypotheses will be conducted through ordinary least square regression analysis while controlling for GDP, exports, imports, military expenditure, research and development expenditure.<sup>2</sup> The outcome of the UN session will be measured by taking a simple majority (% 50 +1). These issues are grouped into two main categories and four sub-categories as above and will be treated as such as the work of the United Nations deals with: economic and social development and, peace and security issues (Normand and Zaidi 2008). The findings of the following

<sup>2</sup>Data sources can be found in the Annex.

hypotheses demonstrate the determinance between the likelihood of voting in a certain manner. Put simply, this part goes into the main reasons behind the divergence established in part one of the analysis.

The dependent variable is set as the ratio of voting yes in a certain issue area (ME, NU, HR, EC) in a given year. This is calculated through dividing the number of yes votes in specific issue area in a year to the number of total votes in that issue area. The independent variables GDP, export, import, military expenditure, CINC data, Polity V, population, militarized interstate disputes and, research and development expenditure. GDP (constant US dollars in thousands) data, considered to be a demonstrator of economic power, is taken from World Bank dataset. The import export variables which are also another indicator for economic strength are taken from the International Monetary Fund dataset. Military expenditure (constant US dollars in thousands), is a demonstrator of military power and thus hard power, measures the military spending of countries in a given year as a share of GDP. This data is pulled from the SIPRI database. Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) is an alternative measure for hard power which integrates population, resources such as iron and steel, energy consumption, and military expenditure to personnel ratio. CINC data is utilized in a secondary manner due to data limitations (1990-2013). Polity V data is another composite index that measure the level of democracy in a country on a given year, this data allows to control for the regime type and differences in similar regimes- taken from the Polity V database. The score for democratization ranges from -10 to 10, from autocratic to democratic. Population and research and development (as a share of GDP, constant US dollars in thousands) data is taken from the World Bank. Militarized interstate disputes are crucial to include in the analysis as such activities are considered to be of shock value to the system and its components. This data is extracted from the Correlates of War Project database records the number of events between two countries which have escalated into conflict.

GDP, import, export, population, research and development, military expenditure data are transposed to the logarithmic form to ensure unit compatibility. Also, all the variables will be lagged for one year to control for endogeneity. Additionally, in order to control for fixed and random effects decade dummies will be introduced and the regression will be clustered around the countries. Below are the descriptive statistics of the variables:

Figure 2.2 Descriptive Statistics For All Variables

Variable	Observation	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
GDP pc	2203	15.9	1.42	12.12	18.3
Export	2136	10.27	1.76	4.54	14.71
Import	2136	10.1	1.98	4.31	14.3
Population	2203	16.55	1.42	12.96	21.02
Military Expenditure	2193	0.021	0.016	0	0.1621
Total MID	2203	0.47	1.16	0	19
Polity	2203	5.55	5.96	-10	10
CINC	1670	0.008	0.02	0.001504	0.16

The hypotheses for this analysis are as follows:

Figure 2.3 Hypotheses Regarding Support of UN General Assembly Resolutions

	Issue Areas			
	<i>Middle East</i>	<i>Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament</i>	<i>Human Rights</i>	<i>Economic and Social Development</i>
	<u>Hypothesis 3(a)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 3(c)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 4(a)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 4(c)</u>
<b>Major Research Question: Support of UN Resolutions</b>	Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining the Middle East	Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament	Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights	Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development
	<u>Hypothesis 3(b)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 3(d)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 4(b)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 4(d)</u>
	Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining Middle East	Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament	Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights	Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development

The above tests and results will illustrate the determinants of the yes voting tendencies. However, the success of these resolutions is not included and therefore, it is critical to also explain the results of the resolutions; whether it has passed or not. Introducing this success variable, changes the initial question of inquiry which evolves into investigating the factors behind the likelihood of agreeing with the passed resolution. Calculating the threshold of the passing resolution is done through a simple majority principle which is (50+1). Simple majority is calculated through looking at all of the votes casted in a resolution being divided into two and rounded to the upper limit. This value is considered to be the 50+1, simple majority threshold. Concomitantly, the results of this analysis provide the success or failure of the resolution which in turn demonstrates the parties which have their interests in line with the global agenda determined by the United Nations. Following this, countries have been grouped into whether they fall under the successful or failed

category under the umbrella of the way their votes were casted. The dependent variable in this analysis is measured through dividing the number of being in the success category by the total number of votes casted in a specific issue. The same set of control variables have been used in the ordinary least squares regression model as explained above. The hypotheses for this analysis are below:

Figure 2.4 Hypotheses Regarding Support of Passed UN General Assembly Resolutions

	Issue Areas			
	<i>Middle East</i>	<i>Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament</i>	<i>Human Rights</i>	<i>Economic and Social Development</i>
	<b>Major Research Question: Support of Passed/Successful UN Resolutions</b>	<u>Hypothesis 5(a)</u>  Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning the Middle East	<u>Hypothesis 5(c)</u>  Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning nuclear weapons and disarmament	<u>Hypothesis 6(a)</u>  Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning issues of human rights
<u>Hypothesis 5(b)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning the Middle East		<u>Hypothesis 5(d)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning nuclear weapons and disarmament	<u>Hypothesis 6(b)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning the human rights	<u>Hypothesis 6(d)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning economic and social development

To complement the story presented above with the data combined with the historical analyses of global governance, an important actor comes forth which requires special attention especially with regards to its place in international power play. This idea stems from Erik Voeten’s paper which estimates dynamic state preferences from UN voting data where the author looks at state positions with regards to each other (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). Here, the aim is to focus upon solely the voting behavior patterns between the United States and others. The dependent variable for this analysis is measured through calculating the ration of the number of in line votes with the USA to the total number of votes casted in each issue area. In order to conduct the ordinary least square regression two main parts of the data need to be changed. Trade import and export, and militarized interstate dispute data will be transposed into a dyadic format to complement the dyadic nature of the analysis. Additionally, here it would provide helpful to also introduce dyadic alliance scores which measures the number of existing alliances a country has with the United States in a given year. This data is provided by the Correlates of War

Project Formal Alliance 4.1 database. The hypotheses are below:

Figure 2.5 Hypotheses Regarding USA Allignment

	<b>Issue Areas</b>			
	<b><i>Middle East</i></b>	<b><i>Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament</i></b>	<b><i>Human Rights</i></b>	<b><i>Economic and Social Development</i></b>
	<b>Major Research Question: Alignment with the United States of America</b>	<u>Hypothesis 7(a)</u>  In the area of the Middle East, stronger military alliances would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America	<u>Hypothesis 7(c)</u>  In the area of nuclear weapons and disarmament stronger military alliances would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America	<u>Hypothesis 8(a)</u>  In the areas of human rights stronger military alliances would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America
<u>Hypothesis 7(b)</u>  In the area of the Middle East, stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America		<u>Hypothesis 7(d)</u>  In the area nuclear weapons and disarmament, stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America	<u>Hypothesis 8(b)</u>  In the areas of human rights stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America	<u>Hypothesis 8(d)</u>  In the areas of economic and social development, stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America

In order to investigate these questions and paint a coherent picture and provide analyses on the issues the dissertation will be first present an overview of the historical evolution of global governance in order to set up for the specifics of each issue area. Following the general historical framework, an in-depth historical analysis of each issue area will be presented. The political historical accounts will be the foundations upon which the hypotheses are tested and analyzed within the appropriate contextual framework in the following chapters.

### 3. AN OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

It is always possible to talk about various forms of global governance throughout history; the existence of more than one group of actors require some sort of government within and governance of relations externally (Weiss and Wilkinson 2013). Whether this is exemplified through the Greek city state system or the empires of Rome and Persia, the resulting various world organizational patterns can all be viewed as different systems of global governance, not as evident as the current constellation, but existent none the less.

From the time of the Peloponnesian War to the Industrial Revolution, the lifespan of man was relatively short; evolving from age 20 in the Neolithic era to age 25 in Classical Greece (Angel 1969).<sup>1</sup> Life for the average man in the ages up until the industrial revolution was characterized by poverty with little to no hope of economic or social advancement (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020). Crises during this time such as famines and pandemics lasted long and in the severe cases reduced populations in extreme numbers; the Black Death caused over a hundred million of casualties (Benedictow and Benedictow 2004). Scarcity led those in power to allocate the resources at hand to military and security-based needs rather than the general population which in turn steered the general populations' dissatisfaction. In order to control this dissatisfied public and ensure survival, rulers and those in power opted for authoritarian types of governance (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020). Thomas Hobbes' characterization of the life of man being "nasty, brutish and, short" rang especially true for the simple man with little to no prospects of a better life and material gains, with the much needed order and safety permeating from the established rules of the regimes (Hobbes and Curley 1994). Within this context, the importance of the Industrial Revolution lies not in the eradication of violence, poverty, disease and, famine, but the introduction of notions that man could strive for more than just physical survival, which paved the path for scientific

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<sup>1</sup>According to the WHO the 1900s world average was 31 years of age while in the 1950s this number increased to age 48 and by the year 2017, man was expected to live until for 72.2 years (Prentice 2006, Kaplan et al. 2000, Lancaster 2012).

and technological advancements.

These notions of order did not solely exist on the national front. As early as the 1300s concepts of international order- where international arrangements were discussed were discussed. Dante Alighieri's *De Monarchia*, translated as *On World Government*, went into detail on the need of a supranational world government to assist in dispute settlement (Alighieri 1904). According to Dante mankind would function best under peace and unity to achieve its perfection. For this universal well-being to come into existence, a universal order was deemed necessary under Dante's framework. Three centuries later in 1693, William Penn similarly discussed notions of a united and federal Europe to ensure peace (Penn 1896). Although Penn's ideas were more limited in application, values towards life were the same. To achieve these concepts a supranational authority and parliament were necessary, and the importance of a common legal framework was emphasized. Twenty years later Charles Castel de Saint-Pierre, a French clergyman, laid the foundations for Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Perpetual Peace* with his ideas on a confederate Europe (Spector 2013). The publication of Rousseau's *A Project of Perpetual Peace* (1761) highlighted the same struggles against violence and rebellions and, proposed a united Europe to face these threats together. This is considered to be one of the earliest mentions of a need for collective security- a collaboration between entities to ensure survival against common threats (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020).

Immanuel Kant, regarded as the most important philosopher of the Enlightenment period by American statesman Henry Kissinger, took the ideas and values put forth by Saint-Pierre and Rousseau wrote detailed essays on the nature of man and how it affected domestic and international order (Kissinger 2014). Kant posited that man was sociably unsociable and that the threat of disorder was imminent in all collective entities governed by man (Wood 1991). According to Kant there were two manners in which peace could be established; either on the "mass graveyard of the human race" or by rationality (Kissinger 2014). This concept of rational design called for a federation of states under an agreed framework of laws and rules and most importantly, codes of conduct. Such a collective would require a great deal of voluntary faith with states would be obliged to interact diplomatically in order to ensure peace (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020). Ultimately Kant argued that this arrangement would turn into a world order of peace and security (Kant 1983).

One of the earliest practices of these proposed ideas of collaboration came with the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the subsequent signing of the American Constitution in 1787, with 13 states ratifying the Declaration. The European Enlightenment philosophies of cooperation and the shortcomings of the

current cooperative schemes were very much reflected in the Federalist Papers. Both Alexander Hamilton and James Madison raised concerns over the loose cooperation between the States (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020). In the 51st Federalist Papers this concern was quoted as “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” Similarly, Hamilton’s ideas on law stemmed from this shortcoming of man as well; law was crucial in keeping the peace (Lynn Jr 2011). In order to keep the peace and ensure the wellbeing of the population, the interests of the States within America were debated in the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787, culminating in the understanding that a system of centrality was needed. However, this central government also needed check and balances to safeguard against corruption of power and concomitant authoritarianist tendencies (Collier and Collier 2007). The central government was granted rights to regulate trade and the financial system which led to the United States becoming a considerable economic power in the early 20th century. This economic development and its subsequent consequences also translated into the political arena by strengthening the American stance, internationally (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020).

Contemporary historical accounts of global governance begin around 1945, with the end of the Second World War taken as a point of origin. However, the roots of the contemporary global governance system can be traced back even further to the early 19th century with the end of the Napoleonic Wars and Congress of Vienna being the key triggers (Murphy 2015). Bringing together the great powers of the nineteenth century, the Congress of Vienna aimed to establish a certain equilibrium between European empires. It was the primary multilateral meeting that aimed to decrease conflict on the continent; the Hague international peace conferences of 1899 and 1907 continued this effort. Following this trend, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference established the League of Nations- a noble yet failed attempt at an all reaching global governance peace network. More importantly, this multilateral Congress system increased the occurrences of such meetings inevitably becoming the basis for the legislation of contemporary global governance (Murphy 2015). Conferences of this caliber gathering statesmen of many nations also attracted various associations and unions becoming non-official platforms in which concerns were raised. With increasing international attention, actors and issues, such conferences required an internal bureaucracy to organize logistics, develop agendas and frameworks, and conduct follow ups. Concomitantly, what is now called the Secretariat was formed under these circumstances.

Against the backdrop of the Great War, the philosophical importance of the League of Nations lies in the fact that it was perhaps the next logical step in following the ideology presented by the likes of Charles Castel de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques



Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. With the increasing power of the United States as both an economic leader and political influencer on the international front, President Woodrow Wilson's initiative to champion democracy and peace abroad was a stark turn from the American isolationism prevalent at the time. In a speech given to the US Senate on the 22nd of January 1917, Wilson stated with a potential end of the Great War in mind that: "The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, [...]not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. [...] There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized, common peace." During this time, an American civil society organization, the League to Enforce Peace, played a critical role in shaping the trajectory and realizations of the Wilsonian ideals and ultimately the League of Nations (Ambrosius 2002). Consisting of businessmen and academics, the League to Enforce Peace pushed forth four goals with the creation of a League of Nations being the first. The function of the League would be to prevent war and ensure peace through its mechanisms of negotiations and discussions. This is the foundations over which the League of Nations as we have come to know of it, is based upon.

The end of the Great War and the Paris Peace Conference marked the final stages of discussions on the Covenant of the League of Nations on the international front. The main outlining of the Covenant was done by 19 representatives, which included President Woodrow Wilson. While noble in ideal, certain key aspects within its constitution weakened the League's position. A prime example of this instance is the clause of Article 5 which permitted veto power to all of its member states over Council decisions. Other key clauses within the League of Nations framework included the issues of arms reduction (Article 8), collective security (Article 10) and diplomatic negotiation (Article 12, 13, 15). The League worked ardently to put in place mechanisms to prevent instances of devastation such as the Great War based on the belief that their platform would supply the necessary tools to safeguard peace.

The League's failure stemmed from its feeble enforcement mechanisms and instances of its weakness such as Hitler's occupation of Rhineland, Japan invading Manchuria and Mussolini's advancements in Ethiopia (Clark 2012). With these examples underway, the belief in the system also weakened and states chose to simply opt out such as Germany and Italy (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020). In the United States reproach to the League presented itself in the Senate with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Henry Lodge proposed a harsh set of recommendations which would either strengthen the United States position within the League or exempt it from League obligations which were not in line with US

interests. Lodge's opposition to the League was two pronged; first, the Senator was hesitant about the enforcement mechanisms of the Covenant. More specifically, he argued that with such weak enforcement that war would become more likely through failed negotiations and arbitrations. Secondly, Lodge claimed that the role of the United States within the League would eventually turn into one of enforcer and policeman, which would in turn damage the country's reputation of democratic champion (Clark 2012). In March 1920, the Covenant failed to pass Senate vote.

The congregation of these great powers formed the new imperial economy that governed the globe with their newly minted industries being the economic drivers of the Second Industrial Revolution. The global economic order was marked by "mass" of production and distribution. The evolution of machines and technology assisted this process, which was mostly concentrated in the core countries. With the increase of wage workers along with increased communications between empires, public international unions were formed to establish certain industry standards. International institutions were at the heart of this practice providing necessary platforms to foster and dissipate standardization. This rapid economic transformation had its consequences as well; certain groups within the core were harmed by the increasing levels of trade (an example would be farmers). To combat this negative outcome, the International Association of Labor Legislation was formed and functioned as an NGO. It was one of the instances in which the role of NGOs played an important part in the global governance of the era by using the political sphere and advocating internationalism through social measures. This positive trajectory came to a halt when the Great War erupted followed by the 1929 Great Depression and the Second World War. The global inter-imperial economic order that once was, had diminished.

The early part of the 1930s was marked with the hardships consequential to the Great Depression; economic struggles and loss of jobs along with an already tense international environment marked by a stressed League system led to increasing trends of economic nationalism and protectionist policies. The aggressions of Japan in Manchuria, Germany's claim to parts of Europe and Italy's actions in Ethiopia combined with the League's ineffectiveness led to a pessimistic outlook in international circles (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020, Clark 2012). During this time across the pond, another influential civil society organization, similar to the American League to Enforce Peace, stemmed. Formed in Britain in 1938, the Federal Union promoted three step approach to ensure peace. First, a federation of European states to guarantee peace in the region; second, an Atlantic union integrating the Americas to promote such ideals overseas. The last step would be a natural culmination of such a cooperative integration; a world federation (Baratta 2004). The ideas of a cooperative effort within Europe were slowly materializing when a

Supreme War Council was organized between France and the United Kingdom in 1939. The German invasion of Poland in 1939 strengthened the intellectual appeal of the Federal Union and is said to influence Winston Churchill's proposition to form a union with France in 1940 (Baratta 2004). Additionally, trade agreements between the two forces were signed under the supervision of Jean Monnet, who saw these collaborations as a foundation for a wider set of cooperative constellations in Europe for the future, in the same year to solidify the ties between the two countries.

The origins of this union lie on the 28th of March 1940, when French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud met with the British government to discuss such cooperative efforts which culminated in a joint declaration that stated that neither government would negotiate armistice with their German counterparts (Shlaim 1974). The following month was marked with the invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium which contributed to the fall of the Chamberlain government and subsequently, Winston Churchill was chosen as the successor for the duty of Prime Minister. On June 15 1940, the Churchill cabinet gave their approval to the creation of a union between France and the United Kingdom (Baratta 2004). The Declaration of Union stated that during war time there would be only one war cabinet which would in turn lead all of the forces of the two nations.<sup>2</sup> The decision and concomitant declaration was met with mixed responses in both host countries but perhaps the most extreme reaction belonged to Marechal Petain, who stated that the union was a "fusion with a corpse" (Taylor 2010). Failed in passing and gaining majority support in France, the proposed union failed (Reynaud 1951). In retrospect however, the historical significance of this Declaration is summarized by historian Avi Shlaim as laying the foundations of a wider European cooperation (Baratta 2004, Shlaim 1974, Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020). Jean Monnet similarly hypothesized about the counterfactual "[...] but think what it would have meant if the political offer of union had succeeded. There would have been no way of going back on it. The course of the war, the course of the world might have been different. We should have had the true beginnings of a Union of Europe (Klos 2017)."<sup>3</sup>

The failing League, along with a rejection of the potential Anglo-French Union and, the state of the global atmosphere tainted by war and violence marked the late 1930s and early 1940s. The attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 pushed the United States to enter a war that they had been reluctant to become a part of. A solution that prospered peace and security through cooperation was needed to

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<sup>2</sup>Tierney, Dominic. "When Britain and France Almost Merged Into One Country." *The Atlantic*, August 8, 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/dunkirk-brexite/536106/>

<sup>3</sup>There is further irony in the reactions of both France and Great Britain when the events of Brexit are taken into account; France remains a staunch supporter in European integration, whereas England's approach to a unified Europe is more skeptical. The tides have turned in this instance.

amend the ongoing global tensions- a solution that would prove to be structurally stronger than Wilson's conception of the League. The first steps in realizing this framework were made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt who recognized the need for a specialized group of statesmen and academics to work on post war planning. Thus, the Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy was formed under the leadership of the Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Undersecretary Sumner Welles. The goal of this group was to design a platform in which global peace and security issues would be discussed while at the same time avoiding the weaknesses that the League of Nations succumbed to. The platform chosen for the furthering of this goal was what is now known as to be the United Nations. On the first day of the new year, in 1942, the United States along with 25 other nations including the United Kingdom formed an alliance against the Axis powers to establish a solid framework for international security which had been declared with the Atlantic Charter of 1941. By 1942 the Axis powers had the upper hand and were aiming to maximize their territorial hold in both Europe and Eurasia.

Until 1943, discussions regarding the United Nations were mostly concerned with its structure both within and as an international body. The aim of these conversations was to amend the issues of enforcement that the League of Nations could not recover from. A substantial effort went into ideas of a legislative international entity with adequate power to push binding decisions over its member nations, all under the broad goal of a peaceful, more integrated, war-free world. An interesting development occurred in a meeting conducted to discuss the general path of the organization in Moscow in 1943. Instead of congregating on the international entity however, the Russian party pushed for support to open another front to sidetrack the German military away from their territory. Lopez-Claros analyzes this move through the lens of power politics, stating that "[...]one cannot avoid getting the sense that the Russians would not object to some form of collective security mechanism, provided it was based on great power (meaning the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China) unanimity through the exercise of the veto. As long as the United Nations was founded on the principle of the sovereign prerogatives of certain privileged members (e.g. including the USSR) and was, thus, rendered into a largely harmless organization [...]" (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020)."

In order to circumvent the problems observed through the League experience, the United Nations would solely grant the four main powers the right of veto as opposed to all members as in the League. There were two additional issues also addressed within the talks surrounding the formation and structuring of the United Nations; voting procedures and the distribution of power (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff

2020). The issue of voting was first suggested as a weighted mechanism tied to various factors such as trade and population, however, this was not established, and every member was granted one vote within the General Assembly. The second question regarding the distribution of power was much more complicated to address. The granting of veto power to only the five main powers in the Security Council presented the argument that the organization would be subject to the whims and yearnings of these countries resulting eventually in the control of the organization. Here, an additional concern was also raised; the Council would suffer in instances where the permanent members had clashing interests (Clark 1943).

Concrete steps in establishing the United Nations and its branches was done at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 when statesmen from the United States, United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union convened to discuss the post war international system (Meyer 1945). However, the outcome of the Dumbarton Oaks talks did not satisfy participating parties as the foci of the discussions shifted from a common goal of peace to petty national concerns (Clark 1943). This dissatisfaction led to the famous San Francisco Conference held between 25 April 1945 to 26 June 1945 which culminated in the creation and signing of the United Nations Charter as it is known today.

The formation of the Security Council and concomitant UN branches all contributed to this newly designed system of peace. Within this system of peace and prosperity, trade liberalization and economic development were the main axes of interest and prolonged effort. UNs unique platform of bringing together statesmen and other actors proved to be as important as the role of pre-war NGOs using the political sphere to accomplish their goals. The diffusion of human rights principles, rules, regulations and, laws are all examples of the diffusion function of the UN.

The 1970s marked both a high and low point for the United Nations. The high point being an increase in decolonization efforts strengthening state institutions of the periphery by providing technical assistance. Unfortunately, this normative high was shadowed by the creeping consequences of the global industrialized economy: environmental issues demanded the attention of the globe. An increase in pollution and species extinction was an important cause for worry, hence the Stockholm Conference of 1972 was held to address these topics.

At the same time, a certain dissatisfaction was brewing within the periphery countries (third world or developing used synonymously) with regards to their role in the global economic order. The request was to introduce measures to ensure that these countries could develop to the same level as the highly industrialized countries. During that time both US and GB were shifting their economic policies to a *laissez faire*

system which lowered production and labor costs together; the short-term benefits of this won over long term costs. The shift away from the existing welfare economic orientation led to an increase in poverty levels and concomitantly, the gap between rich and poor widened. The response from global governance was inadequate as both the IMF and World Bank imposed a Western oriented economic system which exacerbated the problem.

The following decade and the political developments in the continent posed more issues that global governance needed to address. The fall of the Soviet bloc regimes spread the resources of UN peacekeeping operations thin as more and more attention was required to adequately deal with the power vacuum left by the crumbling of the balance provided by Cold War bipolarity. Yet the effects of the Cold War on global governance have not all been negative; the vacuum also provided an opening to further advocate a liberal economic system and its benefits. All of these developments contributed to an understanding of global governance; whether it be narrow or too vague. Global governance has fostered multiple systems of peace; furthered economic integration and development through its various actors and organizations; and most importantly, provided a platform in which problems of collective nature can be discussed and solved. The effectiveness of global governance can be and has been debated: Andrew Scott claims that global governance has created more problems than solutions (Scott 1967). Regardless of a positive or negative orientation towards the effects of global governance, the point remains that global governance was, is and, will be a force in international affairs.

### **3.1 An Example of Supranational Success: the European Union**

Presenting an account of global governance without discussing the history and formation of the European Union is incomprehensible as it is one of the most successful supranational experiments under the umbrella of global governance. According to Jean Monnet, the father of the European idea, the European continent within itself had always struggled with one another, viewing their own nation superior to the others, and, acting with this impetus eventually became weaker than before (Fontaine 1988). Therefore, the aftermath of the Second World War brought much needed ideological change in Europe's approach to each other, where economic cooperation was seen as a tool to enhance stability and security as well as prospering peace (Hungdah 2010). This was the foundation behind the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, ultimately bonding the six signees together for the foreseeable

future- a small step in a very long path resulting in the European Union.

During the debates revolving around the Treaty establishing the ECSC, France put forth an idea regarding a common defense force which would be controlled by a joint council. This however, failed as the differences between the commitment of the members of the ECSC to the notion of a union varied. This military concept was seen as rather ambitious for the time being and ministers of the ECSC proposed to establish other avenues of cooperation and coordination such as the European Atomic Energy Commission and the European Economic Community. The culminating arrangement, the Treaty of Rome, was signed in 1957 by six European nations. This legal framework, along with the treaty of the ECSC cogitated the constitution of the European Community. All put together, these steps positively affected European trade and communications between nations (Fontaine 1988).

With increasing mobilities caused by trade activities, regulatory mechanisms of the status quo was becoming insufficient in dealing with complex issues on the intra-state borders (Hungdah 2010). Additionally, certain social and national tendencies were hindering trade. Lopez-Claros summarizes two examples of this phenomenon “[...] while existing tariffs had been removed, they were sometimes replaced by hidden barriers: Germans would not allow imports of beer from other countries for “health reasons”; Italians would not allow imports of pasta because these were not done with the “right” kind of flour (Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020).” By the 1980s this inadequacy resulted in a stagnation throughout the continent, while the opposite trend was observed in the economies of the United States, China and, Japan which observed rising numbers of growth (Hungdah 2010). The lesson to be taken was clear: either Europe would have to rise above these problems and implement concrete solutions regarding integration, or the continent would fail to keep with the world.

By the 1990s, to amend the downward trajectory of the European economy and turn the tides, European statesmen strategized that the primary issue was to eliminate the obstacles that hindered integration on the economic front- 300 directives were decided on. By overcoming these obstructions, the European market would evolve into a more efficient and integrated system which would be capable of competing with foreign markets. The following step after deciding on which actions to take, was to establish a timetable by which these goals would be completed- by 1992. The third step was to implement a qualified majority voting procedure to the Treaty of Rome- the centrality of the Single European Act of 1987 (Moravcsik 1991, Swann 2017).

The background of the Single European Act of 1987 lies in a key concept in global

governance and more specifically when it comes to dealings with supranational institutions; mutual recognition. Until the Single European Act, the system of cooperation was based on shared norms and standards that required a unanimous vote within the Council to pass. The problems with this framework ranged from the rate of action- which was a slow and tedious process which could take for up to 15 years for nations to approve, to the objection of members when their national interests did not align with the interest of the whole group. However, this semi-functioning system came into question in 1979 when a case was brought to the European Court of Justice (120/78) which urged a significant change by shifting the interpretations of Articles 30-36 of the Treaty of Rome (Devereaux, Lawrence, and Watkins 2006). The case revolved around a West-German company which wanted to import French liqueur but could not do so due to regulations within German law that required a specific alcohol level (Fielder 2000). The ECJ eventually ruled that West Germany had been exercising discrimination on invalid grounds against its international competitors as the product did not endanger public health (Story and Walter 1997). This case solidified the new approach to integration within the Community and had vast implications in the continent as a whole by eliminating the covert mechanisms (like discriminatory domestic policies) that hindered economic change. The idea of a European continent without borders was the notion behind the Europe 1992 programme which was a culmination of the efforts leading up to the liqueur case (Türkeş-Kılıç 2016).<sup>4</sup> However, there were other problems which arose when the discussions on Europe without frontiers began. The primary concerns were centered around the customs system and their effects on the trade flows in the region. More specifically, this mechanism brought in much needed taxes to each nation and the no frontier Europe proposed that neighboring countries could potentially claim the value added taxes due to the host nation. In retrospect, the initial years of the European Union was marked with efforts to overcome the setbacks produced by each nation in the path to economic integration (Müftüler-Baç 2017). At the heart of this lies, of course, the dilemma between national interest and the interest of the group as a whole; the issue of sovereignty and the transference of some sovereignty and authority to a supranational entity (Müftüler-Baç 2017). Therefore, it is safe to say that the motors of the EU have been deeply affected by these two forces, driving the process in opposite directions (Palmer 2015, Lodge 1981).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>For more information about action justifications based on European norms and principles see Türkeş-Kılıç, Selin. "Political party closures in European democratic order: comparing the justifications in DTP and Batasuna decisions." *Journal of European Public Policy* 23, no. 4 (2016): 492-509.

<sup>5</sup>An example of the forces driving national interests can be summarized in the 1966 unanimity rule which granted veto power over the Community decisions in order to allow member states to look out for their own national interests. A detailed overlook of this process can be found in Juliet Lodge's works. More specifically, the author focuses on this process in her 1981 "The European Parliament: What Is It- What it Does – How it Works" pp. 148-149. According to the author, this rule led to segmentation within members.



In terms of success, there have been major keystones in the history of the European Union that assisted in creation and maintenance of the current system of cooperation. For example, the European Monetary System fostered economic stability which established the monetary union, leading to the founding of the European Central Bank and creation of the euro (Ungerer 1990).<sup>6</sup> However, the most critical development in the history of the Union is the Single European Act of 1987, summarized previously, that led to the Amendment of the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the 1993 Maastricht Treaty which in turn widened the legal reach<sup>7</sup> of the European community by integrating multiple new areas of concern (Cihangir-Tetik and Müftüler-Baç 2020). The introduction of qualified majority voting procedures produced a new-found strength of the Parliament as well as opening up novel positions such as the President of the European Council. Moreover, the addition of the Article 50 made it possible for members to leave the Union- as is the case of Brexit.

On the other hand, throughout its inception, the European Union has also experienced severe hardships as well. The Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty brought into question the effectiveness of the Union in successfully bringing together the interests of all of its member states equally on the table. Similarly, the opt-outs that were granted to the United Kingdom and Denmark proposed inquiries into the justice of the system and issues of positive discrimination (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Despite these valid points, it is critical to understand that establishing a working system of integration which unifies 28 members under a common umbrella is not the easiest of tasks and although understandable setbacks have been observed in EU history, the truth remains that this experiment in supranational integrations remains unparalleled (Fry 2012).

### 3.2 State of Affairs Since the 2000s

Globalization has become an undeniable part of reality in the past 20 years. It has enabled unparalleled speed of spread of information as well as increasing lines and avenues of communication effecting the processes of domestic governance to international negotiations. While it is impossible to deny the existence of the phenomena, there are many debates over the potential benefits and disadvantages brought on by the changes caused by globalization (Anderson 2001).

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<sup>6</sup>The European Central Bank and the euro has suffered greatly from the financial crisis of the mid 2000s resulting in measures put in place to increase its robustness under stress. Regardless, it is still gathering new members as of 2019.

<sup>7</sup>The European Union's bill of rights was made binding under legal stance.

The end of the Cold War brought forth a system of international order characterized by the United States' leadership and unipolar movement suggested by Charles Krauthammer (Krauthammer 1990). The decade leading up to the attacks on the Twin Towers, the USA was considered to be the superpower, chief of the global locomotive in what was an era where much was changing due to the forces of globalization.<sup>8</sup> Perhaps the most striking change was perceived with the attacks on 9/11 2001, which clearly demonstrated that terrorism, along with so many other notions, had become global to the extent that had never been observed previously.

The tragic fall of the World Trade Center's Twin Towers in New York city in September 11, 2001 all pointed towards one direction: that terrorism was a force to be reckoned with. Following the events, the American President George W. Bush stated that the USA was at war with terror on a global scale and, for the first time, terrorist networks were implied to be important non-state actors.<sup>9</sup> Terrorism became the trending topic discussed in various platforms on the international setting, along with the recognition of the vast effects of these non-state actors on both the domestic and international levels. Together with its standalone efforts in combatting terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the United States championed various other international efforts for this goal. This was perhaps one of the most visible dynamic in which it was recognized that global governance was fell short.

Going a few years back another example of the shortcomings of the global governance system comes to mind; the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 where the IMF response was inadequate, heightening its effects. A similar dynamic was observed with the 2007-2008 economic crisis resulting in a world-wide recession. Although a solid financial regime would have neither prevented nor cancelled out the negative effects of these socks, the consensus is that it would have certainly decreased the severity of the crisis at hand.

Another area in which the problem- as Kofi Annan puts it- "without a passport" are the global endemics that have been experienced. Although the World Health Organization is battling with HIV/AIDS, malaria, pulmonary tuberculosis, its efforts alone are not enough.<sup>10</sup> The Covid-19 crisis has abundantly proven that public health concerns need to be addressed on the global platform and that domestic ef-

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<sup>8</sup>Dewitt, David B. "9/11, 10 Years On: How the Attacks Changed Global Governance." *Centre for International Governance Innovation*, September 9, 2011. <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/911-10-years-how-attacks-changed-global-governance>

<sup>9</sup>"President Bush Addresses the Nation." *The Washington Post*, September 20, 2001. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress\\_092001.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html)

<sup>10</sup>World Health Organization data show that tuberculosis, a preventable disease, is still in the Global Top Ten List for causes of death in 2016. <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/the-top-10-causes-of-death> (Accessed April 2, 2019)

forts are not enough to combat such issues. A similar situation was observed when the capacity of global humanitarian efforts exercised was questioned in Rwanda and Somalia. The deteriorating condition of natural resources, deforestation, climate change and species extinction are also areas in which a strong global governance structure may better its current conditions.

However, there are certain new challenges to global governance that require a special emphasis: the role of the rising powers, the refugee crisis and, rising poverty gap are all products of the ever-changing dynamics of the globe. These issues affect states both domestically and internationally. They are problems that concern humanity in general and need to be addressed as such. More specifically, there are some problems that a state centric problem-solving mechanism cannot fix and, a collective effort is not just coveted but required. These issues are the real-world examples of problems that cannot be solved at any lower level. I will attempt to summarize these challenges to global governance and discuss how such arrangements are coping with, and/or adapting to, the incoming global difficulties of the past two decades.

### **3.3 Power and Rapid Transformations in the World since 2015: The Effects of Global Shocks and Recent Developments to Global Governance**

In the past decade, the world has experienced an unprecedented rise in global economic shocks, financial turmoil, political conflicts, migratory crises and, spreading terrorist networks. All these issues-and more- have been observed not only in the western world, but also in the east. In this section, I will aim to first summarize the current situation of global governance, second, summarize global events that have occurred since 2015 and, illustrate the challenges that they have brought on to global governance and, lastly discuss global responses to these matters.

The current global condition is one in which the dominant American hegemony and the international order -that has been its consequence since the mid-20th century- is dissipating (Ikenberry 2018). All regions of the world are in their own crisis; Europe is dealing with a rise in nationalistic politics, the Middle East is constantly being shaken by political turmoil and terrorist activities, Asia is struggling to adapt to its new role in the power vacuum. Within these parameters, states are turning inwards and shaping their respective international approaches, with new rising states having the opportunity to increase their influence and power on the international arena, reformulating the new borders of the international order. The Obama administration

recognized the shifting balances and even went as far as stating that the new world order should be one of multiple partners. According to John Ikenberry, a grand deal was in the works; rising states would be accepted into the liberal world order with the condition that they would accept the norms, rules and, principles of the existing one. Regardless or not of this deal working or not the reality is clear, the “other” is on the rise, and the American led international liberal order is failing to adapt to this new system.

The reasons behind this collapse-so to speak- can be explained through a classic understanding of the power transition theory advocated by realist theorists from E.H. Carr to Charles Doran and, Robert Gilpin. It is the idea that the international system is derived from great powers’ or empires’ will through their concentration of power. Therefore, the decline of the international order produced is in direct relation to the level of power, thus, when a hegemon’s power decreases, so does its hold over the international system it created. Concomitantly, the system similarly collapses and makes way for new states to rise to the occasion (Doran 2015, Ikenberry 2018). This is especially the case with China, India and, Russia- three major players challenging the status quo of the world order. From a power transition point of view, the implications of declining hegemony translate into a global restructuring, however, there are two factors that are vastly overlooked in this line of thought. Firstly, this theory emphasizes the importance of hard and economic power to the extent that other nuances are lost. Although power is a high-level factor affecting the functioning of the system, so are the ties and relationships between other players. In other words, the international global order consists of complex networks between a myriad of actors and overlooking the importance of these relationships disregards the hold and influence they have over the concentration of power. When the “order” is reviewed from this perspective, rejecting the assumption that the current order is a byproduct of American hegemonic power, all left with the idea that the governance schemes of the world is that it is much more complex and multi-layered (Ikenberry 2018, Ikenberry 2019, Owen 2019).

The entrance of rising powers into the global governance constellations brings more questions into mind: what roles they want, how much authority is coveted, which positions within specific arrangements seem more beneficial. . . etc. All of these are inquiries that determine the trajectory of the global order and realism-based approaches fall short in explaining what falls outside of structure and more importantly fail to explain the continuation of global governance after hegemonic decline. In practical terms, power transitions would foresee the end of the liberal world order after the US decline of power, with China and other rising states formulating a new world order. However, this is not an accurate reflection of reality. Currently, the

global international order is transitioning by being reshaped, but the basic principles and notions linger on. The same principles that have made it possible for states such as China to become international players (Ikenberry 2018). In Zakaria’s terms, the “rise of the rest” began.

To better understand the trajectory of global governance and the actions of its components, it is important to look at the events that have occurred in the past years. In 2015, Donald Trump entered the US political arena in his bid for the presidency, shocking both domestic and international audiences. During that time, there was a stock market collapse in China costing trillions of dollars of value followed by a sharp decline in exports and currency devaluation, effecting the stock markets around the world. Another key player, India, under Hindu nationalist Modi’s rule, took steps to increase its global influence and challenge China’s bid as the rising power. This was halted by the tensions between India and Pakistan as dialogue was suspended. Pakistan’s assessment of the new Indian approach was understood as patronizing, best described in the words of the Pakistani security advisor to the Prime Minister claiming that India was “[...] acting as a regional superpower, where [we also] are a nuclear armed country.”

The economic and financial hardships that were felt in Asia were also being experienced in Europe, as mentioned in the previous section regarding the monetary arrangements put forth after the Single European Act of 1987. The Eurozone system that was put into place to promote economic and fiscal unity had begun to crack. Economist Milton Friedman summarized the Eurozone as a factor that would “exacerbate political tensions into diverse political issues.” He argued that a common currency strategy would not work when the diversity of culture, language, society were so varied, as is the case in Europe. This was the dynamic that was observed in the Greek crisis, which negatively shook the European financial system. Brining the need of a more robust economic system into light.

While these occurrences went on, turmoil in the Middle East was escalating at alarming rates. On the 18th of December 2010 in Sidi Bouzid Tunisia, Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor, set himself on fire in front of the Governor’s office in protest of his treatment by the local authorities in the marketplace.<sup>11</sup> Bouazizi’s actions sparked protests among the nation as a response to the more widespread oppression and corruption of the government.<sup>12</sup> These protests against oppression dispersed rapidly into the region with mass gatherings happening in Libya, Egypt,

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<sup>11</sup>Fahim, Kareem. “Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia.” *The New York Times*, January 21, 2011. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html>

<sup>12</sup>Editorial Board. “The Arab uprisings: Democracy’s hard spring.” *Economist*, March 10, 2011. <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2011/03/10/democracys-hard-spring>

Yemen, Syria and Bahrain.<sup>13</sup> Following the lead of these countries, protests also occurred in Morocco, Iraq, Algeria and Iran. The protests were later on called the Arab Spring and resulted in a major change in many of the countries involved (Agdemir 2016). Zine El Abidine, the President of Tunisia, fled<sup>14</sup>; Hosni Mubarak of Egypt resigned<sup>15</sup> and Ghaddafi of Libya was overthrown.<sup>16</sup>

The aftershocks of the Arab Spring combined with rising rates of terrorist activities brought middle eastern nations to the brink of armed conflict both inter and intra-state. Leadership challenges or changes in countries affected the stability of nations; Egypt from Mubarak to Morsi and lastly to el-Sisi; the execution of Gaddafi in Tunisia, government overthrown multiple times in Yemen and, al-Assad in Syria. Also regarded as the Arab Winter, the consequences of the Arab spring were vast, not only for affected countries, but globally as well.

The power vacuum resulted from state failure proved to be an opportunity for the Islamic State (IS) to establish control over various regions. This skewed effort in state building displaced millions of people and resulted in a death toll of over 400,000 civilians between 2011-2016 according to UN sources. The important role that non-state actors had was proven once again. Proxy wars occurred within the region between multiple dyads causing an increase in polarity between Islamist sects. In 2015 Iraq lost land to the Islamic State, while prominent Syrian archeologist Khaled al-Asaad, head of antiquities at the ancient city of Palmyra, was beheaded by the Islamic State while attempting to stop IS's systemic destruction of artefacts. Hundreds of thousands of civilians ran from their countries in search for safe haven in Europe and Turkey. Many died while crossing the Mediterranean, while the survivors were placed in refugee camps for prolonged periods of time during which leaders of affected nations discussed what to do with them. Heated debates were held and leaders of Europe were divided between humanitarian responsibilities and, economic and security concerns that the refugee crisis presented.

Russia deserved a distinct mention here. Involved in the Middle East as well as Eastern Europe, the ex-communist country contributed to the change in the global

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<sup>13</sup>Raghavan, Sudarsan. "Inspired by Tunisia and Egypt, Yemenis join in anti-government protests." *The Washington Post*, January 27, 2011. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/27/AR2011012702081.html>

<sup>14</sup>Editorial Board. "Tunisia's Ben Ali flees amid unrest." *Al Jazeera*, January 15, 2011. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/20111153616298850.html>

<sup>15</sup>Peterson, Scott. "Egypt's revolution redefines what's possible in the Arab world." *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 11, 2011. <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0211/Egypt-s-revolution-redefines-what-s-possible-in-the-Arab-world>

<sup>16</sup>Spencer, Richard. "Libya: civil war breaks out as Gaddafi mounts rearguard fight." *Telegraph*, February 23, 2011. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8344034/Libya-civil-war-breaks-out-as-Gaddafi-mounts-rearguard-fight.html>

governance order. In an aim to recapture the influence once held in the region, Russia aimed to become an influential actor by supporting Bashar al-Assad in Syria (Malashenko 2013). This trend continued with the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, President Vladimir Putin, challenged many western ideals, making the international community question his place in the western global order. Putin's yearning for the past, similar to French President Charles De Gaulle in the decades before when he insisted to Roosevelt and Churchill that France should hold a place in the post war order, and his nationalistic tendencies put Russia's foreign policy goals in the expansionist realm.<sup>17</sup> This aggressive stance was in direct conflict with Obama's negotiation first, action latter type of leadership.

In the years following these developments Vladimir Putin's stance was not subject to change, however, American leadership transformed drastically with the election of Donald J. Trump- an American real estate mogul/businessperson/ media personality. Trump's election came as a shock to the international community who was anticipating a democratic win in the United States. President Trump's leadership style and foreign policy choices as well as his approaches to international problems posed a great challenge for the liberal international world order and global governance arrangements. Mirroring Putin's aggressive stance and shrewd rhetorical choices, Trump's America brought the two countries to a similar footing. Simultaneously, the Russia-China relationship continued to flourish- much to the dismay of the USA, who regards China as rival. The grand question with regards to global governance here is to ask whether a global order can be made with excluding Russia or China. Looking at the evolution of the world system the most plausible answer would be no. In a world with multifaceted global problems, excluding big players would go against its whole rationale.

Lastly, another vital challenge to global governance has been the rise of the extremist movements. The past decade has provided ample examples of instances in which extremist politics and ideals have resulted in civil conflicts, international tensions and even worse, the loss of lives. Before diving into extremism under the umbrella of terrorism, the rise of nationalism and populism around the globe needs to be assessed. Some examples of this include India's election of Modi, America's choice in Trump, Japan's Shinzo Abe, the Turkish example of Recep Tayyip Erdogan are all points in a global pattern; populist tendencies seem to gather votes. The reasons behind this are vast- and too tangential for this study- however, the reality is clear; people are selecting leaders that promote polarizing opinions (Bieber 2018). These domestic choices translate into international outcomes through choices of foreign

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<sup>17</sup>Hussey, Andrew. "How Charles de Gaulle made France great again." *NewStatesman*, June 27, 2018. <https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/books/2018/06/how-charles-de-gaulle-made-france-great-again>

policy and how it is conducted. Similar to the idea that democratic norms and values flow from domestic choices to international choices, nationalistic principles also effect the choices of an actor on the international front. If true, this phenomenon is an obstacle to the ideals of global governance collective problem solving, as it is difficult to function on a joint setting where the operating principle is to “other” all else.

These are just a few of the problems challenging the notion of global governance. These problems create obstacles for joint problem-solving efforts through different functions and they all require specialized solutions. The response of the current global governance order is inadequate, but it is still many steps ahead of the governance of the 20th century. It is too far reaching to hope for complete harmony in the anarchical international system, however, alleviating global problems is possible and global governance provides a platform in which this can be made possible.



## **4. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF ISSUES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: MIDDLE EAST, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT**

### **4.1 The Middle East**

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding have been two of the founding values and functions of the United Nations. As a result, both as a conversation of global governance, and as a measure of the UNs effectiveness, a deeper look into the issue on the Middle East, in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict is provided in this chapter. The threats that Hitler and Mussolini made to the global order pushed towards a recognition that mechanisms for collective resistance were lacking; such an absence threatened the wellbeing of all. Since its inception, the United Nations has had the role of being a platform to settle disputes peacefully. Another main purpose of the UN has been to collectively deal with acts of aggression or threats to global peace with the assumption that the Security Council would be successful in identifying the threat and more importantly, that UN members would be willing to provide necessary forces to combat such threats (Urquhart 1995).

While the UN had a mixed record in keeping peace, the Middle East turned out to be one of the key regions where it had significant challenges. A turbulent region for decades, the Middle East -especially following the emergence of sovereign states which broke free from their colonial masters in the aftermath of World War II-has proved to be a learning experience for the United Nations efforts for peacebuilding. Of particular note in that regard is the Palestinian conflict, especially because it has been more of a source of contention than any other issue in the global arena, as well as gathering the most scholarly attention of the region (Goldschmidt Jr and Boum 2015). Additionally, the Palestinian Question has also affected the dynamics of the region, outlining the manner in which the Middle East has been functioning.

Moreover, the attention that international entities and major global players have paid to this issue highlight its large role in world politics today. Specifically, UN actions regarding the Palestinian Conflict is considered the framework for peace-building, conflict relief and, humanitarian relief. Although public confidence in the UN has declined over time, especially when the situations in Kashmir, Sarajevo and ex-Yugoslavia is considered, the organization still remains a one of a kind collective security system (Bennis 1997). Regardless, the UN has been involved in a variety of peacebuilding operations around the world (Benner and Rotmann 2008).

The UN aim to mitigating the effects of the Palestinian Conflict and making the region safer has been ongoing since 1945, when Palestine became a League of Nations mandate which in turn became a part of the UN Trusteeship. This was to be a temporary status as a stable system was to be put in place in the region with British and UN efforts. However, Palestine proved to a colossal challenge to both the UN and the world. Although it is claimed by historians that roots of the religious war been Judaism and Islam date back to the times of Abraham and his two sons Isaac and Ishmael, the modern source of the conflict rest on the aftermath of the Great War and the concomitant rise of nationalism. Jewish nationalism, or Zionism, rests on the principle that the Jewish people are a nation, deserving the same rights and freedoms of other nations (Goldschmidt Jr and Boum 2015). For political Zionists, the most important freedom was to return to their homeland of Israel and form a sovereign state. Gaining political traction in European politics, the Zionist movement proved to be a force which both opposing parties in the First World War sought to gain the support of the Zionist Lobby, which in turn fueled the British efforts to sway the political movement towards their own camp. Despite the low number of Jews in the country, the ideology captured the attention of Chaim Weizmann-a leading scientists with political ties. Weizmann's efforts to introduce the cause into the political arena was successful as he amassed the support of two key figures: Prime Minister David Lloyd George and, Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour.

In the early stages of the issue, the main problem was that the needs and requests of the Palestinian population was not regarded (People 1979). In contrast to the international communities approaches to the People of Palestine, their attitude towards the Jewish population diverged significantly as the British party committed to the establishment of a home for the population in Palestine years earlier. The commitment to this goal materialized in the 1917 Balfour Declaration where British Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur James Balfour, declared sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations. This was later on adopted in the Mandate and was received with negative fervor among the Arab states. In the United Nations Report "The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1988" the Declaration is stated as the

root cause of the problem in Palestine.

The Balfour Declaration ensured the European commitment to an Israeli state in Palestine once control had been established and the end of the Great War saw British occupation in modern day Palestine. The regime that was put in place was pulled into the rift between the Jewish settlers and the regions Arab inhabitants, resulting in the revolts of the Arabs in 1920. The British response was inconsistent: in the international arena, they continued to support the Zionist cause due to powerful domestic pressures caused by the Jewish Lobby in London (Goldschmidt Jr and Boum 2015). Within Palestine, however, the British were aligned with the Arabs to ensure cooperation of the Muslim neighboring countries. The Palestine mandate created by the League in 1922 supported the British international rhetoric and tasked the British to put in place the principles of the Balfour Declaration. This tasked proved challenging because the mandate was to assist in the creation of an Israeli state in a region where its inhabitants were Arabs.<sup>1</sup> The following decades saw the tension between the Israeli population and the local Arab population increase to the dismay of the British, who were not able to mitigate these rifts (Goldschmidt Jr and Boum 2015). In the early days of the rise of Hitler, many Jews were displaced and in need for a new place of residence. Europe was in economic peril and many European states were not able to provide the relief that the Jewish people were in need of.

Exhausted by the Second World War, Britain- the mandated power in Palestine, brought the issue to the UN General Assembly as the region proved to be too much to handle both politically and economically (Urquhart 1998). The UN responded by putting together the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) under which the partition plan was presented to the General Assembly and passed in 1947. The author of the partition plan, Ralph Bunche stated that “no real [...] solution [...] is possible, the best [...] is a compromise [...]” (Bunche 1995).” A few years later an armistice was achieved, however, this was far from the end of this conflict. In the 1940s nations did not want to be a part of this hefty and costly process; internally the United States was not able to reach a consensus regarding the Israeli state and, the Soviet Union fully supported the potential State of Israel as a means to combat prevalent colonialism, then. The Soviets later changed their stance to supporting Arab forces. France and wider Europe did not wish to lose time and resources over this conflict although they had certain embedded interests in the region. In 1948 the British mandate was no more, and the State of Israel was founded in the immediate aftermath. Israel, now a separate state, was invaded by five Arab

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<sup>1</sup>The mandates of Syria and Iraq were different in nature, the task was to establish a state where inhabitants were locals. The situation in Palestine pushed a foreign nation into the lands where local peoples were present.

states the next day and all of the UN's efforts to find a stable solution were made useless. Already struggling with the situation, the UN appointed Folke Bernadotte to mediate between the parties. Bernadotte was assassinated and his successor Ralph Bunche negotiated another armistice which lasted until the Suez Crisis.

Following the decade long efforts of the French and Egyptian governments to create the Suez Canal, it was opened in 1869 immediately becoming a landmark of geopolitical significance (Ross 2004). The importance of the Suez Canal lies in its central location which bridges the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans as the fastest route as opposed to circling the African continent (Turner 2012). This was especially to the benefit of European powers, who had both economic and colonial interests tied to the route (Verbeek 2017). Shortly after its establishment, under economic duress caused by financial crises in the nations, the Egyptian government sold its shares (44%) to a British company with the majority still in French hands. The 1882 events that led to the invasion of Egypt by British forces gave the United Kingdom an upper hand as they established the Suez Canal as a protected neutral zone.<sup>2</sup> The Suez canal proved to be a useful asset to the Allied powers during the Great War when any non-allied ship was denied access which significantly increased their transportation time (Derek 2003). Similarly, during the Second World War the Canal was controlled to the advantage of the Allied powers- this time affecting the transportation of much needed oil. This became one of the largest sources of tension between the British and Egyptian governments and coupled with the British support for the establishment of the Israeli state, anti-British reaction echoed throughout Egypt (Darwin 1988). These reactions led for the Egyptian party to single sided revoke the agreement under which the UK was granted a lease on Suez (Pearson 2002). Anti-British sentiment led to riots and the Egyptian nationalist Free Officers Movement overthrew the rulers when the Egyptian monarchy did not act in line with the populations wishes with Nasser becoming the president of the country (Butler 2002).

According to retired lieutenant colonel and historian James Corum, the Middle East was ridden with four major power struggles from the 1950s onward (Corum 2008). The first involved Cold War dynamics with the USA and USSR's battle for influence. The second were the strains growing between the Palestinian and Israeli parties. The third mêlée was concentrated around rising nationalistic tendencies in the region and, lastly, the race for power between Arab nations. In the backdrop of continuous conflict and pressures, on July 26 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal and immediate cessation of the Canal to Israeli ships to the dismay of

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<sup>2</sup>"Suez Canal." *Egypt State Information Service*, 20 February, 2007, Web Archive. <https://web.archive.org/web/20070220163200/http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Land26people/50th/03170000000000002.htm>

European forces (Kissinger 1994). On the 29th of October 1956, Israeli forces pushed into Egyptian Sinai, invading the region. Days later, on the 5th of November 1956, British and French forces also joined the efforts sending in the paratroopers to assist the Israeli party.

The initial analysis of the situation saw the defeat of the Egyptian party, however, this was not the case long term as the situation benefited the Egyptian nation as the US, USSR and United Nations pressured the three invading parties to withdraw which led to a loss of reputation (Krieger and Crahan 2001, Abernethy 2000). More specifically, in addition to the involved parties, the issue also concerned France and Britain- two major players in the UN system. As a response to Suez, the United Nations formed an emergency force (UNEF). The ongoing global situation- the Cold War, resulted in the Soviet interest in the Middle East and made the stakes in the region even higher. Sir Brian Urquhart summarizes the situation:

*“The UNEF provided not only a buffer between the British and French invading forces and the Egyptian army, but also the pretext for the British and French withdrawal. Later, and after complex negotiations, the UNEF was the catalyst for the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, and provided the buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces on the Gaza ADL and in Sinai, as well as the presence at Sharm al-Shaykh which allowed Egypt’s President Jamal ’Abd al-Nasir not to reoccupy the gun positions dominating the Strait of Tiran and the access to the Israeli port of Eilat. This regime lasted until 1967. ”*

– Brian Urquhart, The United Nations in the Middle East: A 50-year Retrospective

With the Soviet threat expanding, the United States’ previous disinterest in the region reversed. Tensions arose again in 1967 when Egypt necessitated that the UNEF forces leave their territory. Israeli concerns lied with the closure of the Straits of Tiran which Egypt threatened unless UNEF withdrawal. Despite all UN efforts to diffuse the situation, Egyptian president Abdel Nasser did not back down and the famous Six Day War took place ending with Israeli victory. On the 5th of June 1967 Israeli forces stroke Egyptian airfields initiating the Six Day War. During this time, Soviet interest in the Arab world increased and their amplified power enabled them to support various Arab countries; by doing so Moscow challenged the west. The western response was to consolidate their relationships with non-Arab states in the region. The 1970s marked a difficult time for the Soviets as their relationship with Egypt diminished. However, other alliances were still holding such as USSR-Syria,

Iraq and, South Yemen. Although the United States seemed to have the upper hand in the region, the Cyprus issue and Islamic Revolution in Iran shook their stand.

The Six Day War presented the UN with another issue that required more attention- the number of refugees increased; the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was the main organ that assisted in such issues. All of these developments and the Israeli upper hand made their Arab counterparts even less lenient. The failure of the UN lied in its dormant stance during this time, and especially its lack of action to prevent the 1967 and 1972 wars. Resolution 242 was passed and seemingly ideas of a settlement were back on the table. However, efforts were futile as in 1973 Egypt crossed the canal. This resulted in the international response that led to the Geneva Peace Conference where all involved states and parties came together to discuss a potential settlement. The platformed attested US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's mastery of diplomacy leading to relations between Israel and Egypt and, Israel and Syria bettering through disengagement. However, during this period, Palestine was not represented and therefore a more comprehensive agreement was not possible. The establishment of UNEF II during the Suez crisis proved to be a worthy project, as it was an important tool for the UN to utilize in the region eventually leading to the Camp David agreements and subsequent UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) concerning Golan Heights. Although American President Carter's aim for a conclusive peace agreement during the Camp David talks remained, the reality was far from achieving such a goal.

The UN faced a loss of credibility and impartiality in the 1970s as the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions were Soviet manipulated- especially the 1975 Zionism resolution, which internationalized the Arab-Israeli conflict weakened the UN stance. Both the United States and Soviet Union decreased their support to the organization. American ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan stated that the passing of this resolution was essentially allowing anti-Semitism legal (Weiner 2013). Although the UN faced serious reputational consequences during the 1970s, it still proved to be a useful tool in mitigating disagreements- the hijacking of an Israeli bus in 1978 is an example of this function by providing a platform for all involved parties to talk. By the 1980s UNEF II was dispersed due to Soviet-USA tensions regarding the Camp David Accords; this by no means signaled a full departure of the UN in the region. The organization continued its presence in the Middle East through its various organs such as the UNDOF and UNIFIL. During this time the Palestine Liberation Organization was recognized the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The late 1980s and the ending of the Cold War put the region into a power vacuum;

Gorbachev's new approach to the international situation of the time lessened the existent rivalry that has defined the world. The dissolution of the Soviet Union had adverse effects for the PLO and Syria. This was even more hastened after the Kuwaiti invasion by Palestinian leader Arafat's support of Saddam Hussein.<sup>3</sup> More specifically, on the 2nd of August 1990 the Iraqi military invaded their neighboring country Kuwait within a two-day period. This occupation lasted for seven months. The United Nations declared to Iraq a deadline until which they were to cease operations in foreign soil. However, Iraqi forces did not adhere and the United Nations sent in coalition forces led by the Americans.<sup>4</sup> Thus, it came quite a shock when the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles was announced. Participation included Arafat and Rabin together, which was unimaginable before. However, the Oslo agreement did not mean that a peaceful order would be fully implemented in the region regarding Palestinian and Israeli claims. Mutual suspicions by both parties shadowed the negotiations.

The decade following the end of the Cold War was shaped by global events which had their repercussions on the Middle East. The first of these events is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the 2003 American invasion of Iraq which resulted in the Third Gulf War. Iraqi forces were pushed back however by the American led coalition, the invasion brought forth the Iraqi problem and negatively affected the relationships between Arab states (Hale and Kienle 1997). Halliday summarizes the situation as "the period from the late 1980s to the 2000s was, above all, not one of a greater interdependence or liberalization, but one in which patterns of regional conflict and alliance came to prevail over the international rivalry of great powers (Halliday 2005)." The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought two major changes to the world: the first was a political shift in ideology, where anti-capitalist sentiments evaporated and, the second was strategic in the sense that the east-west nuclear race dissipated (Hale and Kienle 1997). The new ex-Soviet countries were fragmented, and uncertainty arose. Regional power dynamics shifted as Russia, for the first time, did not have a border with the Middle East. To counter Turkey and Turkish actions- a major player in the geopolitical arena- Moscow pursued partnerships with Iran and the Saudis. However, Russian influence in the region was limited to its role in the Security Council as a permanent member. After December of 1991, American interest in the Middle East also increased as economic ties with ex-Soviet countries as well as Turkey and other Arab states proved beneficial.

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<sup>3</sup>Anderson, Jack and Dale Van Atta. "Why Arafat Backed Saddam." *The Washington Post*, 26 August, 1990. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1990/08/26/why-arafat-backed-saddam/904a9366-c1e0-4294-ab64-1391b0e3b452/>

<sup>4</sup>"United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (Condemning the Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq), S.C. res. 660, 45 U.N. SCOR at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990)." *Peace Resource Center*, August 2, 1990. <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/peace/docs/scres660.html>

The turmoil and reshaping of the international system were also translated within the domestic politics of Israel and Palestine. The two Oslo Accords, especially Oslo II, exasperated Palestine because of its uneven handout of land granting Israel more territory. Domestically, Rabin's decisions on the diplomatic front was not well received by his political rivals and ultimately led to his assassination in 1995. Rabin's successor Netanyahu was a proponent of a harsher stance against Oslo II decisions. By 1999 when Netanyahu was replaced by Ehud Barak, hopes were higher; however, domestically Barak was required to include anti-settlement parties in his coalition which again led to a halt in negotiations. Ariel Sharon's approach to Oslo II was not positive as well leading to the al-Aqsa intifada (Second Intifada) of 2000. The violence of the Second Intifada began after politician and later on to become the 11th Prime Minister of the State of Israel, Ariel Sharon, visited the Temple Mount in the September of 2000. This action was seen as hostile by the Palestinian population and resulted in violence and mass protests against Israel (Pressman 2003). The tensions lasted until the Sharm al-Sheikh summit in 2005 when the Palestinian President Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Sharon declared a ceasefire.<sup>5</sup>

By this time, another effort led by the United States to stabilize the region was afoot. The Camp David 2000 talks failed, intensifying the ongoing conflict and, leading to Sharon's reclaiming of the lands granted to the Palestinians in Oslo II Peace Accords signed in 1995 where the Palestinian party was granted limited authority. Israel's military advances destroyed the PLO's headquarters and effectively undermined Arafat's influence and reputation. The Israeli party constructed a wall in the West Bank in an effort to cease terrorism; displacing many by going through small towns. In 2004 Sharon's <sup>6</sup> efforts to block any peace talks was substantiated with US approval of a withdraw, effectively creating what Bush stated as the "new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers. [...] any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities."<sup>7</sup> In 2005 Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip; however, kept control over the mobility of goods and people via another wall. This limitation contributed to the 2006 victory of Hamas and concurrent placement of its prime minister functioning under the Palestinian Authority based president. This development was against Israeli and American interests within the region and talks to form a Fatah battalion led to the Palestinian Authority to utilize preemptive measure to prevent such actions- the 2008 attack on Gaza.

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<sup>5</sup>"Full text of Abbas declaration." *BBC*, February 8, 2005. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4247327.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4247327.stm)

<sup>6</sup> "Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Address to the Knesset Prior to the Vote on the Disengagement Plan." *The Knesset*, October 25, 2004. <https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/sharonspeech04.htm>

<sup>7</sup>"Letter From President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon." *The White House*, April 14, 2004. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html>



Changes in American leadership in 2009 following the 2008 presidential election pushed forward an Israeli-Palestinian partnership based on the 1967 borders to no avail; both parties were not compromising. Obama's peacebuilding approaches were not received well domestically (Cooper and Thee-Brenan 2011). Congress seemingly supported Netanyahu's stance backing him ostensibly. This support also constructed the decision to block the 2011 UN Security Council vote on recognizing Palestine as an independent state. In 2015, invited by a conservative member of Congress without the knowledge of the American President Barak Obama, Netanyahu opposed the US stance on Iranian nuclear development (Fawcett 2016). This signaled a rift between the President and Congress. This undermining action had implications both domestically and internationally and, Obama was pushed into backing Israel.

By 2014 the stalemate was suspended when Hamas and the Palestinian Authority arranged to form government. Israel, unhappy with this development, cut ties with the PA unless they back down from the agreement with Hamas. These developments led to civil unrest and the killings of Israeli and Palestinian civilians, which in turn resulted in the Gaza War of 2014. The few years following the destructive Gaza War were not marked by settlements or agreements. In 2015 tensions rose again as Palestinian activists and Israeli citizens clashed. Initiating the Intifada of Individuals, aggressive actions were taken by the Israeli State, Palestinian Authority as well as other groups. Unfortunately, the current state of affairs in the region does not signal a bettering of the situation.

## 4.2 Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament

There are few concepts in International Relations literature that hold universally negative connotations; concepts are not analyzed from a moral perspective with positive or negative connotations. However, few are exempt from this unsaid rule; weapons of mass destruction are simply bad and non-proliferation has become the norm (Gavin 2010).<sup>8</sup> This is mainly due to their global effects- mutually assured destruction or MAD in short. Biological, chemical and nuclear weapons- when used for purposes of destruction- are almost guaranteed to cause mass extinction. This section deals with one such weapon of mass destruction -nuclear weapons- and how nuclear policy has evolved within the realm of global governance and United Nations. More specifically, development of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is

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<sup>8</sup>There are very few critiques to this view; see Waltz 1981 and 2012. This holds true politically, as well, with only Saddam Hussein, Muammar Ghaddafi and Kim Jong-Un as outliers.

first outlined here, and then the current situation of nuclear non-proliferation is analyzed, especially with regards to how powerful states shape this issue within the global agenda towards their own benefits.

The 1930s signified an interest in uncovering the works of the atom. Concomitantly, the United States -with the support of the United Kingdom and Canada- initiated a research and development endeavor known Manhattan Project in 1939. Headed by the physicist Robert Oppenheimer, the project was aimed to further the research of German scientists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, who discovered the possibility of nuclear fission. Theoreticised by Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch, producing a nuclear weapon was now within the realm of possibility. This led the United States to stockpile raw materials such as uranium-ore. Such a weapon- if made- would bring about destruction that had not been imagined before. In 1945 the United States demonstrated this catastrophic power in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki- killing over 190.000 people (Temples 1980). The usage of nuclear technology in military applications and security concerns changed the toolbox of power munitions where this newly found weapon became an indispensable part of prestige and status and thus, international power (Udum 2017).

The aftermath of the bombings did not result in the proliferation nor prohibition of nuclear weapons as would be expected. The global situation of the decade was one of uncertainty and nuclear power became a critical part of state strategy- with the Soviet Union immediately forming its own nuclear programme. Domestically, the United States formed the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 to deal with everything related to nuclear weapons. The passing of the McMahon Act also called the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 pushed the United Kingdom to pursue its own nuclear agenda as the United States' decision to unilaterally go ahead with its own research threatened the Kingdom's place in world politics. During this time, France also developed its own nuclear research regime, however internal turmoil resulted in a temporary halt. With DeGaulle back in power in 1958, France was able to continue its efforts and currently holds its own nuclear weapons.

The other major actor- the Soviet Union- went into a partnership with China, exchanging raw materials and know-how. Although bilateral relations halted later on, the Soviet Chinese partnership assisted China's nuclear research and supported the production of Chinese nuclear weapons. During this time, the world went into what is now known as the Cold War.

The Cold War was marked by the clash of ideologies between the United States and the Soviet Union; capitalism versus communism. The struggle of dominance over Eastern Europe escalated into a worldwide conflict marked by the nuclear arms race

and policy of mutually assured destruction. In 1952 the United States experimented with thermo-nuclear weapons and the Soviets quickly followed suit in 1955. The mid to late 1950s also saw the development of man's venture into space with the Soviet Union launching Sputnik into orbit starting the space race. The culmination of both the arms and space race began. Increasing attention to nuclear issues led to the founding of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957.

The 1960s was marked by the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which the world came close to a full-blown nuclear disaster when the United States reconnaissance flights discovered Soviet missiles in Cuba. After increased tensions caused by communication difficulties that resulted in the Kennedy-Khrushchev negotiations, the Washington Moscow hotline was established to moderate a potential accidental warfare. However, even the threat of nuclear destruction did not halt US or USSR nuclear material and weapons acquisitions. In 1968 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is signed by USA, USSR, China, UK and France. NPT recognized the five nuclear weapons states as well as the others' right to nuclear technologies. However, it prohibited other states to acquire new nuclear weapons or potential capabilities that would assist in the production of nuclear weapons. The Treaty went into effect two years later in 1970. Flaws in the design of the Treaty caused by ambitious goals debated by the policymakers did not take into account the realities of the situation (Weiss 1996). Problems emerged almost immediately with Germany (party to the NPT) and France (pledged party to the NPT) wanted to export nuclear materials to countries which were not part of the NPT such as Brazil and Pakistan. Although both exporting countries agreed to act under the parameters set by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the reality remained that such actions were not acceptable. Although the initial understandings of the NPT agreed that this arrangement would be limited to a 25-year period, the consensus through the Review Conference in 1995 was that the Treaty would be prolonged indefinitely.<sup>9</sup>

Certain states stand out when the NPT system is being discussed. Four of them have never been a part of the Treaty; India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan. Indian Minister Mukherjee stated during his visit to Japan's Institute of International Affairs in 2007 that the reason behind India's non-participation in the NPT lie not in their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation but in the structural flaws in the Treaty.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Ahmad Chaudhry stated the discriminatory nature of the NPT additionally bringing into account the ongoing

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<sup>9</sup>Graham, Thomas Jr.. "Avoiding the Tipping Point, Book Review." *Arms Control Association*, accessed July 28, 2020. [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004\\_11/BookReview](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/BookReview)

<sup>10</sup>"India seeks Japan's support, calls NPT 'flawed.'" *WhereInCity*, January 12, 2012, Web Archive. <https://web.archive.org/web/20120112151514/http://www.whereincity.com/news/3/15197>

tensions between India and Pakistan as an important factor behind their decision. Chaudhry stated in 2015 that “Pakistan has the right to defend itself, so Pakistan will not sign [...] Why should we?”.<sup>11</sup> The state of Israel, on the other hand, has adopted the approach of ambiguity with regards to any mentions of nuclear weapons, technologies or capabilities (Steinberg 2006, Avner 2010). In 2009, the United Nations called Israel requesting transparency regarding nuclear issues, however the Israeli response was that there would be no cooperation.<sup>12</sup>

North Korea ratified the NPT in 1985, however after tensions with the United States over allegations of a nuclear weapons program it withdrew from the Treaty in 2003 becoming the first nation to do so.<sup>13</sup> In 2006, North Korean officials declared that they had successfully completed tests for a nuclear fission device.<sup>14</sup> Another outlier concerning the NPT is Iran, whom although a party to the regimes, was found to be non-compliant to the Treaty with regards to safety clauses (General 2011). After investigations, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported this non-compliance in 2006 to the United Nations Security Council which immediately passed decision demanding a cessation of these activities. However, Iran did not take such measures into account, resuming its nuclear operations.<sup>15</sup> Similar reports have been submitted to the UN Security Council by the IAEA in 2009. During the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks between the USA and Russia in 2010, President Obama stated that "We will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective security."<sup>16</sup> A major turn of events happened in 2015 when a nuclear deal was negotiated between the USA, France, China, Russia, the UK, Germany and Iran resulting in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. However in 2018, the United States removed itself from the Plan of Action, imposing sanctions.

In the decade following the initial signing of the NPT attention was brought to arms limitations and cooperation towards this end; the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) were signed. However,

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<sup>11</sup>Iqbal, Anwar. “Pakistan will not sign NPT, says foreign secretary.” *Dawn*, June 3, 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1185843>

<sup>12</sup>“Israel pressured on nuclear sites.” *Al Jazeera*, September 19, 2009. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/09/2009918173136830771.html>

<sup>13</sup>“Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards.” *International Atomic Energy Agency*, accessed July 28, 2020. <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards>

<sup>14</sup>“N.Korea 'to conduct nuclear test'” *BBC*, October 3, 2006. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5402018.stm>

<sup>15</sup>“Iran 'resumes' nuclear enrichment.” *BBC*, February 13, 2006. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4709490.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4709490.stm)

<sup>16</sup>“New START Treaty and Protocol.” *U.S. Department of State*, October 19, 2012, Web Archive. [https://web.archive.org/web/20121019010913/http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/new\\_start\\_treaty\\_and\\_protocol](https://web.archive.org/web/20121019010913/http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/new_start_treaty_and_protocol)

two global events undermined this period of détente: the Yom-Kippur War (1973) and USSR-China confrontation on the Amur River (1969). In 1979, another effort to mitigate nuclear conflict was made through SALT II by limiting production of nuclear weapons. However, USSR's involvement in Afghanistan and the concomitant nine-year war against the mujahedeen (backed by USA and Saudi Arabia funding) jeopardized the already fragile linkage and SALT II was withdrawn (Grau 2004).<sup>17</sup>

In 1981, the American President Ronald Reagan proposed a zero-option- suggesting that all nuclear missiles be withdrawn from Europe. The following year in 1982 the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) aimed to reduce the number of nuclear warheads was presented by the Reagan administration. In Europe, the USA and NATO staged Pershing II missiles. Pursuing an aggressive route of action, the Reagan administration make the famous “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative against the Soviet threat. The USSR struggled to keep up with the USA nuclear efforts technologically, and with Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, the USSR took a different approach to nuclear weapons non-proliferation- marked by the 1986 Reykjavik Summit. The failed summit was put together with the aims to deliberate on human rights and the USSR invasion of Afghanistan. In 1987 the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed by both Reagan and Gorbachev marking a first in a nuclear treaty in which a reduction of numbers is made rather than a limit to the number of nuclear weapons.

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 hasten disarmament efforts and in 1991 START I is signed, again with the approach of limiting numbers of nuclear warheads. The dissipation of the Soviet Union required the attention of the USA to provide assistance to ex-Soviet countries to deal with nuclear materials in a safe manner (this is called the Cooperative Threat Reduction-CPT). In 1993, START II was signed by Russia and the USA. However, it is not implemented. In 1995, the NPT Treaty is prolonged with new rules added. Similarly, in 1997 the ABM Treaty of 1972 is discussed to be amended; however, George Bush withdraws the from the ABM in June 2002- making the arrangement futile.


In the aftermath of 9/11 the USA nuclear policies have been deemed as being one sided, regardless US and Russia sign the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty- which comes into effect one year later- aimed to reduce numbers of nuclear warheads. Presidents of both countries state that the aim is to make issues of missile defense between two countries more transparent. In 2007 another important actor comes into play: Iran. The US proposes to put a shield to defend against Iranian

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<sup>17</sup>Between the Soviet Union and Afghani insurgent groups, the Soviet Afghan War resulted in stalemate. The impetus driving Soviet forces was to increase influence in the region.

missiles in Europe, that does not sit well with Russia as they allegedly support the rapidly developing Iranian nuclear programme. The changing leadership in the United States also affects the so-called nuclear relationship between USA and Russia. Obama’s approach to cooperation resulted in a joint framework which was intended to reduce rather than limit nuclear warheads and capabilities. Stating that “Together, we’ve stopped that drift, and proven the benefits of cooperation. Today is an important milestone for nuclear security and non-proliferation, and for U.S.-Russia relations. It fulfills our common objective to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty” President Obama signals the importance of cooperation, especially in the area of nuclear security.<sup>18</sup> In 2010 both nations sign the START I successor treaty; it is approved by the Senate in 2010 while Russia approves in 2011. This upward trajectory is also demonstrated by the data which shows US supports of successful resolutions which have peaked in 2011 following the signing of the Treaty.

Figure 4.1 American Support of Successful Resolutions in the UN General Assembly (Nuclear Weapons)



All of this collaboration comes to a halt in 2019 when the Trump administration pulls the USA from all commitments regarding the Cold War agreements. Six months

<sup>18</sup>“Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia at New START Treaty Signing Ceremony and Press Conference.” *The White House*, April 8, 2010. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-medvedev-russia-new-start-treaty-signing-cere>

later the United States rejects all of its obligations granted by the INF Treaty citing that Russia has prohibited nuclear warheads. This latest development of the nuclear regime signals a reversion to a more aggressive international order- an order based on and characterized by power. The following section will analyze history from the perspective of power and demonstrate that power indeed is the main currency shaping the nuclear regime.

Nuclear non-proliferation regimes, as presented in the section above, are primarily concerned with limiting nuclear weapons; they aim to prevent and prohibit (Ruzicka 2018). The foundation of the nuclear regime, the 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is a clear reflection of this; however, while limiting the number of nuclear weapons and capabilities has been observed, the prohibition of nuclear weapons has not been possible within this system. Put simply, the NPT does not ban the ownership of nuclear weapons and therefore, it can be said that it echoes the dominant power dynamics of the era it was signed. It has no effect over who had nuclear weapons and material capabilities and, who did not. Nuclear weapons states were provided a legitimacy over their arsenals; those who did not were simply, unlucky. This inequality has been a source of tensions ever since the beginnings of the nuclear regime mainly because it solidifies the underlying power dynamic of the Cold War era. In a positive critique of the NPT in hindsight, Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institute has stated that the arrangement was successful if its limits are taken into account and that the NPT has tightened the mechanisms of inspection.<sup>19</sup>

Looking at power and how it operates within a specific regime is a daunting task as there are many different operationalizations of power other than simply considering the material capabilities of states (Strange 1982, Ruzicka 2018). Looking even more broadly there are many theoretical approaches to take when analyzing the nuclear regime. A brief overview will be presented below, however, it is not the point of this study to prove or disprove any specific nuclear regime theory; this section is simply aimed to see whether great powers and outcomes align on the international front, therefore supporting the very general realist claim that great powers influence the global agenda in the direction that they see fit, for nuclear issues.

There are many distinct theoretical approaches to nuclear regimes, as already presented, however two stand out; realism and idealism (Hymans 2006). The realist view subscribes to the understanding that nuclear weapons are a necessary deter-

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<sup>19</sup>O’Hanlon, Michael E., Robert Einhorn, Steven Pifer, and Frank A. Rose. “Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect.” *Brookings*, March 3, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/03/experts-assess-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-50-years-after-it-went-into-effect/>

rent in the system of anarchy- perhaps the best deterrent due to its sheer power.<sup>20</sup> The existence of nuclear weapons provide security in the system of uncertainty that is the international arena (Davis 1993). The classical realism of Morgenthau argues that nuclear power affects the perceptions of power on many different levels; national and international (Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton 1985, Rosenthal 2002). They are important contributors to a country's prestige. With the accumulation of nuclear weapons however, a dilemma gives rise: security-power. As countries do forward with acquiring nuclear weapons and capabilities for their own security, others seeing this increase in nuclear power are also pushed to do the same; thus, leading to the classical arms race observed during the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union. The key here is that states are constantly adapting to their relative place in the power system of the international arena therefore, creating a subsystem of balance of power under the wider umbrella of the anarchic system (Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton 1985, Walt 1990). This is the origin of alliance formation as states aim to increase their survival capabilities (Wright 1954). This point is a critical one, as many misinterpret realism as being opposed to cooperation, or seeing cooperative efforts as futile. That is not the case as realism does not view power as an end. Power is a tool to manage anarchy and increase security.

There is a conundrum with this line of thought and reality; all of the world's nations do not have nor have aimed to acquire nuclear power and capabilities. This is because "the predictable reactions of other countries may make nuclear status self-defeating (Davis 1993)." Certain states' cost-benefit analysis makes it rational for them to detain from nuclear weapons and capabilities and join the status quo in signing the nuclear non-proliferation agreement (NPT). As with all international agreements, the usefulness or effectiveness of the NPT can and has been debated and realism argues that such efforts are not likely to succeed- and perhaps this is what is being observed with the current developments of the USA pulling out of the INF Treaty. Certain realist scholars have a simple take on this; Ben Frankel argue that international nuclear stability is a byproduct of superpowers rather than nuclear regimes or treaties (Cohen and Frankel 1990). Others like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that nuclear proliferation increases international stability (Waltz 1995, Mearsheimer 1993).

Regardless of the strain of realism, their approach of suspicion has pushed readers to assume that realist though rejects cooperation fully. This is not the case as the realist paradigm accepts international rules, norms, efforts and, institutions are useful platforms to further a broader cooperation. The key point that realism

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<sup>20</sup> According to Davis (1993) not all forms of power is desirable to classical realists and this is explained through the security-power dilemma.



is making and critiquing their counterparts is the extent of this cooperation and unrealistic state expectation from collective security (Gavin 2010). Realist though posits that institutions such as the United Nations are platform in which powerful states can push their agenda and shape international frameworks on certain issues.

This is precisely the complex phenomenon that is occurring in the nuclear issue discussed within the United Nations General Assembly (1990-2018). The major difference between all other issues being analyzed and the nuclear issue is that there already exists a solid nuclear regime as demonstrated above. However, this nuclear regime and the nuclear non-proliferation norm seems to only effect those that it simply can. More specifically, great power countries- countries that hold advanced nuclear power and capabilities act as if they are exempt from international norms and regimes in this area. This is perfectly demonstrated in American President Donald Trump's decision to pull back from all agreements made during the Cold War era, including the NPT and its successor INF.<sup>21</sup> Votes within the UN General Assembly can be considered to be even more demonstrative of power; great power states, when compared to emerging powers are relatively silent on matters of nuclear non-proliferation. Where emerging powers vote increasingly to support non-proliferation efforts, great powers either choose to abstain or vote negatively, proving that the suggestions of the nuclear regime do not apply to them and their interests.

### 4.3 Human Rights

In an anarchic system of order in the international arena, states are still primarily concerned with security and more importantly, guard their right to sovereignty above all. It is within this environment that the United Nations has formed to secure these rights of states by assisting the mitigation process of anarchy. Under these circumstances bound by hard issues, it is a triumph that human rights as an issue has had an important place in the United Nations (Normand and Zaidi 2008).

The emergence of human rights as an important creditor to international peace and stability is an idea that is rooted in the aftermath of the Great War. The idea that democratic states or states with a healthy and content citizenship translate those values into their international actions is the logic that has birthed the democratic peace theory its various subsets (Rosato 2003, Gat 2005, Normand and Zaidi 2008).

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<sup>21</sup>Gordon, Michael R. and Vivian Salama. "Trump Moves Closer to Ending Another Post-Cold War Treaty." *The Wall Street Journal*, October 27, 2019. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-moves-closer-to-ending-another-post-cold-war-treaty-11572177600>

This factor, in addition to a moral recognition that the wellbeing of humanity was above all contributed to the spread of human rights norms- with the tragic events of the Holocaust amplifying this effect. Eventually, these ideas and principles were integrated within the UN and many other international formations as well as becoming an important part of the international legal system (Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss 2001, Weiss and Daws 2018).

Beginnings of the modern human rights framework is attributed to the Hague Peace Conference (1899), where nations convened to discuss potential restraints to acts of war, recognizing that citizen rights were not always state rights in the international system which resulted in the Hague Regulations on Land and Naval Warfare. Although the Hague Peace was unable to achieve this goal, it is still considered to be the platform in which our current understanding of modern human rights originated. Tension rose in Europe as the contest for power and territory continued. The Second Hague Conference in 1907 convened to discuss the ongoing increase of tensions but the end result changed little to none; the existing power balance remained (Hull 1908). A combined effect of militarization and industrialization along with political struggles resulted in an unprecedented bloodshed that we now know as the First World War- the Great war (Gilbert 2014). Of the 65 million men assembled, the war saw 8 million perish (Mayer and Taylor 1978). The territorial aftermath was also dramatic with the dissolution of four major empires. Europe's territorial borderlines drastically changed.

The vacuum of power that the world system had fallen into necessitated a restructuring of the international (dis)order to alleviate uncertainty to the extent that it could. Thus, it is no surprise that the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 attracted many major players- some established, some newly forged. The United States under President Woodrow Wilson, although not part of the war, took a central role in forging the new order. Wilson's new ideals, embodied within the Fourteen Points, marked the importance of human rights and presented the United States as a champion of these rights for all the world- not just itself (Nicolson 1947). Parallel to this liberal ideological development, another philosophy arose in Russia. Not looking at individual rights like its western equivalent, Lenin was more concerned with the rights of workers and defended communism to achieve real equality as opposed to a more liberal system (Mayer 1965). The communist promises of equality and participation appealed to many in Eastern Europe, rapidly gaining a solid follower base.

Although Wilson's Fourteen Points were generally applauded at the time, his ideals were received on the normative basis and many statesmen saw these statements

unachievable- not reflecting the realities of the world in front of them (Throntveit 2011). This dynamic was observed during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference where realpolitik was conducted under the façade of universal rights. However, the idea of universal rights still was appealing- at least to the extent that a joint effort was made to form the League of Nations. The catch was that power politics still found its way under the League as well. Even during the formation of the League's charter this power principle was observed; a rising power, Japan proposed a racial equality clause and even agreed to a more conformist version of its initial proposal in its attempt. The clause passed with a majority however, American President Wilson utilizing his position within the organization overruled the clause. Citing that the racial equality clause<sup>22</sup> had too many opposers (namely just the Americans and British)- even if there was a majority clause (Lauren 2011, 1978). Another example of principles only applying to the powerful when they deem fit is the Japanese claim to Chinese land in Shandong- a claim with little basis and simply was imperialistic politics at play.<sup>23</sup> Wilson sided with the Japanese despite the claim being against League principles because the Japanese were considered more important of allies than the Chinese (Nicolson 1947). Regardless of all of these flaws, however, it is important to recognize the feat of establishment such a grouping introduced to the world in the form of international organizations as a result of the Treaty of Versailles.

The League of Nations was weakened by three factors: first, the United States was not a full part as there was opposition from Congress which Wilson could not overcome. After this, America adopted an isolationist capitalist system which caused the Great Depression. Secondly, for member European nations, the League implied restrictions to their sovereignty which had both domestic and international repercussions. Lastly, the existing balance of power did not seriously consider the League and its norms seriously (Pedersen 2015, Simpson 2001).

Unfortunately, the picture did not get better between the periods of the First and Second World Wars. Not yet recovered from the Great War, Europe was already in dire economic and social need to restructure. Although for a brief period of time, after the Treaty of Versailles was signed, Europe experienced an increase in liberal regimes, these newly founded states were lacking in upholding economic and social expectations; hunger was widespread. The incompetence of the League of Nations combined with the powerful states' promises not being fulfilled, paved the way for

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<sup>22</sup>It is critical to analyze this in the context of the era where racism was openly applied by the Americans, British, and French. Measures of equality applied mostly to the white man.

<sup>23</sup>The League of Nations framework is full of examples like Shandong where the powerful make decisions to overrule principles for their own benefit and bend the rules- even shaping the rules according to their own concerns. Lauren (2011) divides the League of Nations into three country groups: the powerful that frame and shape everything, the middle consisting of states which have European ideals but are pushed into minorities treaties, and the mandates consisting of colonized states.

increasing nationalistic and fascist parties to emerge and gather a substantial number of followers (Mazower 2009). The 1920s and 1930s was a period of stalemate for human rights progressions.<sup>24</sup>

All of these factors combined to create the perfect environment for the ideological clash between Anglo-American capital liberalism and Soviet communism. The battle over Europe continued over these fault lines. In the early days, populist and fascist parties were especially effective when compared to Anglo-American or communist ideologies in Italian, Spanish and German domestic politics utilizing a European superiority based rhetoric (Mazower 2009).<sup>25</sup> The liberal response to these rising threats was to utilize a similar rhetoric, however, these attempts failed. In Germany, for example, the executive branch was given astonishing constitutional command to pass legislation, instead of the conservative parliamentary route. Austria followed a similar route. This made an authoritarian -but not authoritarian at first sight- type of rule widespread even before Hitler and Mussolini came to power. However, it should be noted that without democratic rule both leaders would not have enjoyed their powers as they came into power by using democratic means and later on using democratic functions to alter the regime into the fascist or totalitarian ones we know of today.<sup>26</sup>

Gaining power was the fascist ideologies; challenging the liberal capitalism that was the prevalent system of thought. The main argument was that liberal ideas of self-determination and legal sovereignty of nations weakened their overall stance internationally and domestically they contributed to a rise in inequality (Lauren 1978, Normand and Zaidi 2008). They used the example of the League's miserable failure to demonstrate and support their points. Liberals responded by acknowledging these failures, however, opposing the solution of lesser freedom. The Nazi regime interpreted the international framework in a different light; suggesting that a Darwinian principle trumped interstate relations and that nations were in a race to win the prize (Mazower 2009). By blaming the Jewish population for the rise of liberalism and the defeat of the Great War, the Nazi's had a perfect culprit to gather masses under the ruse of community, sacrifice and, service. Another important reason behind the success of fascism in Europe was purely financial; authoritarian regimes

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<sup>24</sup>The advancements regarding human rights were very limited. One example is the Hague Air Laws, proposing the restriction of aerial bombings in civilian areas, which was never signed.

<sup>25</sup>Liberal thinkers of the time also had the opinion that Europe was superior to others, calling Russian counterpart barbaric. For a detailed account of the development of fascism see A. W. Brian Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 227.

<sup>26</sup>Mussolini called the era a "fascist century". For more information on the rise of fascism in Europe during the interwar period, see . Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London: Routledge, 1991) and to directly read in Mussolini's own words see, Mussolini, Benito. "Le Fascisme-Doctrine." *Institutions* 3 (1934).

were better off economically and were able to provide more for their citizens as opposed to failed liberal governments; the Soviet Union, Germany and even Japan were the concrete evidence of this.

Although the issue of human rights took a backseat to these ideological dilemmas of the era, there were significant developments that planted the seeds of the international legal human rights system that we are familiar with today starting with the idea of a codified legal human rights law that was enforceable (Normand and Zaidi 2008). A group of thinkers challenged the ideas presented in Paris and the Hague which viewed human rights as mainly concerning groups and minorities. These scholars posited what would be the foundations of human rights regime of the United Nations which defended the view that all humans are equal and possessors of basic rights regardless of their nationality (Burgers 1992). Three key figures have been integral to this process; Alejandro Alvarez, Andre Mandelstam and, Herbert George Wells. Alvarez, a Chilean diplomat and pioneer of human rights legislations, wrote extensively on individual and civil rights and, co-founded the American Institution of International Law, eventually being nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The life and works of Andre Mandelstam demands particular attention as he is stated as being the “most prolific and active proponent of human rights during [...] era (Normand and Zaidi 2008, Burgers 1992),” and is considered to be the pioneer intellectual in human rights law. Mandelstam, an attorney specializing international law, fled to Paris after the Bolshevik Revolution and attracted the attention of many scholars sharing similar views and ideals. The founding of the International Diplomatic Academy provided a platform in which Mandelstam and his colleagues could continue to write resolutions on human rights laws that were binding; he penned his most prolific work, the Declaration of the International Rights of Man, which was adopted by the French organization la Défense des Droits de l’Homme. This declaration is considered to be a major influence behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Burgers 1992).

Lastly, Herbert George Wells put forth an extraordinary amount of effort to promote the diminishing cause of human rights by drafting a bill of rights with the input of many prominent intellectuals of the era. Wells, determined to convey the human rights message, sent his draft to the presidents and notable political individuals of the time (Smith and Stone 1989). Although his numerous attempts at convincing the people about the importance of integrating human rights into the legal system did not prevent nor limit human rights abuses in the Second World War, Wells continued to propagate his ideas in the hopes that it would affect legislation once the War was over.

The tragedies of the Second World War proved two things: first, human rights were not just a philosophical and moral problem, it was a very real issue with real life consequences; second, something needed to be done to prevent any kind of recurrence of the atrocities of World War II. Even those who opposed this issue on the grounds of human rights and equality being too idealistic, mainly the United States, supported the discussions of human rights due to its ideological power in the face of fascism.

World War II brought an unprecedented degree of destruction to the continent and the world. Advances in military technology resulted in the lines between civilians and the military to blur and, although there was agreement on respecting civilian populated zones, conflicting parties began to bomb these areas with the purpose of weakening the opposers moral (Normand and af Jochnick 1994, Normand and Zaidi 2008, Lightbody 2004). The total destruction of the Second World War is aptly summarized:

*“Vast armies marched across Europe, Asia, and Africa; ancient cities were bombed and blitzed; countries were occupied, their governments toppled and replaced. Hundreds of millions of workers and soldiers were mobilized. Though impossible to calculate with any certainty, it is commonly estimated that up to 50 million people—a majority of them civilians, up to half of them from the Soviet Union alone—were killed in the slaughterhouse of global war.”*

– Normand and Zaidi, Human Rights and the UN: A Political History

Germany was getting more powerful every passing day. The United States was exercising its politics of isolationism voted by Congress after the failure of Wilson’s idealism, and concomitant Monroe Doctrine. Put simply, Europe’s liberal future looked bleak. European powers against Germany as well as the United States realized that the ideological power of human rights was a weapon that they could use to weaken the enemy’s stance.

America, during this time, remained an observer; focusing on the economic restructuring of Europe with the expectation that Germany and Britain would make peace with Hitler who would retain the majority of control over the continent. The aim to completely defeat Germany wasn’t until the United States entered the war (Hobbsawm 2020). During this time President Roosevelt secretly planned the aftermath of the war, including plans regarding the future of Europe, human rights and, what would now become known as the United Nations (Simpson 1994, Klabbers 2004).<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>It is an overseen fact that the United States monopolized post war planning; Britain, the rest of the

The American President tasked the Under-Secretary of State, Benjamin Sumner Welles<sup>28</sup> to lead post-war intellectual planning and advising (Gellman 2019). Welles' progressive internationalist outlook was a far cry from the isolationist policies the US Congress supported. Publicly speaking on many occasions on the importance of human rights and liberties, Welles always emphasized the importance of the United States in championing these American values (Gellman 2019, Normand and Zaidi 2008).

With the influence of Welles over the President increasing, Secretary of State Cordell Hull appointed Leo Pasvolsky in an attempt to counter influence within the post-war planning department. Pasvolsky did not share Welles' convictions to spread human rights values- values that he saw as soft and secondary (Schlesinger 2003), however, Welles' intellectual tenure trumped that of Pasvolsky in terms of influence; Welles continued to work on drafts discussing human rights and his works during this time shaped the UN human rights framework. Unfortunately, Welles' time in political affairs was cut short when he was blackmailed with intimate details of his personal life by Hull and was forced out (O'Sullivan 2009). With Welles out of the way, the postwar planning division was under Pasvolsky's full command.

Still under a veil of secrecy, the postwar planning division continued to function under the Roosevelt regime up until 1941 when the president recognized the need to engage with the public regarding the restructuring the international system through what we now know as FDR's Four Freedoms (Roosevelt and Rosenman 1938). In the Annual Address to Congress Roosevelt introduced four principle freedoms which he claimed was the cornerstones of security: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear (Roosevelt and Rosenman 1938). This established the validity of the New Deal, supported American involvement in international affairs by declaring the horrors of fascism by promoting human rights and, signaled the extent of US influence and leadership over the postwar international system (Daynes, Riccards, and Pederson 1998).

The United States struggling to overcome the Great Depression enacted a series of reforms aptly titled the New Deal to relieve, restructure and, recover its internal conditions. Roosevelt's victory over this struggle installed confidence in his actions from the domestic populations and initiated the idea that internationalizing the New Deal would strengthen the US position globally (Normand and Zaidi 2008). The four freedoms which was presented before was also the main talking points for

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Continent and, the Soviet Union were otherwise occupied.

<sup>28</sup>Sumner Welles was a close friend of President Roosevelt. Their close relationship and Welles' involvement in advising the President in a multitude of issues disturbed the administration's Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

the United States in its attempt to counter the fascist rhetoric that was gaining precedence. This implied that the spread of these values would eventually call into being two goals: the adoption of democratic principles domestically for European states and, secondly, the creation of a universal framework of collective security based on human rights.

FDR continued to emphasize the importance of human rights and in an attempt to demonstrate the US commitment stated that “Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or keep them (Roosevelt 1941).” This was a strategic statement that justified American involvement in the upcoming war. This resonated well with liberal European nations such as the UK, with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden overtly declaring that the four points were in line with the British purpose (Simpson 1994). This mutual understanding paved the way for the signing of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 when Churchill and Roosevelt gathered to discuss postwar order and show unity against Axis powers. Between the two powers, the main source of contention was regarding the future of colonized states in which the US pushed for self-determination whereas Churchill argued that this was a ruse for the underlying motivation of creating a system in which these states would be dependent on the US economically (O’Sullivan 2009). Both countries, the Associated Powers, signed the document, however, it was received negatively for retaining too vague of language to have a lasting effect.

The United States entered the Second World War after the Japanese forces bombed Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in December of 1941. By the first day of the new year Roosevelt pushed for another global declaration similar to that of the Atlantic Charter but appealing to a wider audience. Changing the Associated Powers designation, FDR called this new potential association the United Nations (Green 1956). Called the United Nations Declaration, the document which included the first mention of human rights semantically, was signed by twenty-six nations. Power dynamics of the the time was manifested during the signing of this document as Roosevelt asserted that the most powerful states sign in order of importance (Simpson 2004).<sup>29</sup>

The realist principle of the powerful determining the international agenda continued to shape interactions within the organization (Thompson 1942). Championing human rights and four freedoms in their discourse, both the United States and United Kingdom did not better their own policies (Russel and Muther 1958). Winston Churchill blatantly stated that British colonies were exempt from issues of self-determination, while their American counterpart still had racist policies and would

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<sup>29</sup> According to FDR this hierarchy held the United States first, followed by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and lastly China.



continue systematic racism with their treatment of Japanese-American citizens (Serano and Minami 2003). Put blatantly, the United States wanted to establish the postwar order aligned with their own benefits.

Human rights were in the international rhetoric but in practice nothing had changed. This made intellectuals and prominent thinkers to continue to draft human rights legislations in partnership with NGOs and the State Department; citizen attention was also focused on human rights; the cause resonated within public opinion. In a manner, the two powers were becoming constraints by values that they had propagated in the first place. This was a concrete example that the powerful had command over public opinion as well as international political discourse (Normand and Zaidi 2008). The public interest led to many NGOs, unions, groups and, associations to work on human rights dealing with the normative aspects as well as policy related concerns.

Across the pond, Europe was concerned with a combination of economic hardship, social unrest and political turmoil. European intellectuals, lawmakers and statesmen were battling with the rise of fascism and spread of communism. Discussions centered around democracy and its characteristics under hopes that it would be the order that shaped the European reality. Critiques to this approach posited that these discussions were pointless as human rights laws were a prerequisite of democracy (Maritain and Anson 1944). The major contribution to human rights legislation came from esteemed international lawyer Hersch Lauterpacht<sup>30</sup> who proposed that instead of aiming for an ideal universal agreement of human rights, states should integrate certain human rights principles into their own constitution (Koskenniemi 1997).

Lauterpacht's approach impressed both public and private spheres and Europe began to discuss state planning under economic and social policies. This approach was a foreign one and echoed parts of the Soviet understanding of state intervention (Mazower 2009). Britain, a prime example of this unlikely union between "communism under democratic rule (Chernomas 1989)" was rather successful in implementing such policies. This turn to a Keynesian economic outlook helped relieve Britain's internal hardships with the government rationing system. Experiencing the positives of state control, the British government supported many economic research programmes with the hopes of developing a system that could be applicable to post-war Europe. The new British perspective pushed the government to participate in the Bretton Woods Conference and the founding of International Monetary Fund and the World Bank demonstrated the legal applicability of joint agreements.

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<sup>30</sup>Hersch Lauterpacht was a British intellectual and professor of international law at Cambridge University.

At the end of 1943 the Big Three sat down to negotiate post war arrangements focusing on the restructuring of the economic and political state Europe was in- human rights was omitted from the agenda once again but more importantly, Europe- with the exception of Britain, was not a part of these talks in which the future of the continent was being decided. The culmination of numerous meetings, drafts and discussions the Big Three, with the addition of China, forged together the basic structure of the United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks. This framework reflected mostly US interests as a great amount of power was granted to the Security Council which comprised of four members holding permanent membership and veto power (Russel and Muther 1958). France was the fifth and last member to the prestigious group. A separate group called The General Assembly was also formed to discuss economic and social issues covering a wider subset of global problems. The Dumbarton Oaks Charter failed to mention human rights to the dissatisfaction of Roosevelt, still holding the belief that human rights contributed to US power (Simpson 2004).

Franklin D. Roosevelt passed away in 1945 right before the San Francisco conference to which he had extensively prepared (McCormick 1945). Reassuring Mrs. Roosevelt that he would continue to work for the American flag that FDR had so valiantly carried, Harry S. Truman became the 33rd president of the United States. Truman retained all of the groundwork and staff that FDR had gathered in preparation for the conference (Nicholas 1984). The San Francisco Conference<sup>31</sup> commenced with the participation of forty-six states in an attempt to debate the Dumbarton Oaks Charter. Although Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union had already made the big decisions, within the San Francisco Conference there were many discussions on the formation of a possible international organization- the United Nations (Gildersleeve 1954).

The outcome of the San Francisco Conference was a step in the right direction for human rights, as the resulting charter fixed certain shortcomings at Dumbarton Oaks. Public attention to the conference in addition to being highly publicized in the international circle pushed the Big Three to include and enforce human rights principles to the framework of the new world order.

Up to now, a detailed account of the development of human rights as a notion in international politics has been presented. Even today, we see echoes of the decisions and discussions of the past in the human rights debate. Ideas of binding human

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<sup>31</sup>The San Francisco Conference was a collection of extravagance; from the meetings to the parties, participant records indicate the opulent atmosphere, staged by the United States in an effort to display its superiority in every way. For more information on the conference see James B. Reston, "The Critic Turns Actor," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1945): 50-61. Another interesting undertaking during the conference concerned military intelligence. US intelligence agents infiltrated all communications and the US had the upper hand during the negotiations.

rights to the micro level- the individual level, was perhaps the most important factor in universalizing the human rights regime.<sup>32</sup> However, the idea of universality is not the currently accepted notion of inclusivity. The context of the time allowed for a skewed idea of universality and, its philosophically Anglo-Saxon roots warranted the exclusion of a great number of men. Smaller states were expected to attend certain meetings and participate in discussions however their input was rather limited-essentially non-existent (Schlesinger 2003).

Of the powerful, the United States was *primus inter pares*. Though the extent of US influence over the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not quantifiable, it would not be erroneous to assume that CHR decisions were mainly shaped by the American diplomats (Epps 2005). Thus the Universal Declaration was an international beckon strengthening perceptions of US ideological power.

All of these efforts came to an abrupt stop with the beginning of the Cold War; nations focusing on the postwar order of the world now turned their attention to escalating political tensions. Human rights, again, was a secondary concern; the UN and Commission on Human Rights activities almost came to a halt. Housing the rival states under its roof the CHR was used as a platform for the powers to challenge one another (Evans 1998). In the 1950s the United Nation was working in a diplomatic capacity. With China changing leadership, the United States pushed for the Chinese seat in the Security Council and General Assembly to stay with Kuomintang rather than passing it on the Mao Zedong. USSR strongly disagreed and boycotted the UN for a short period of time as the inclusion of Zedong would serve the Soviet interest (Meisler 1995).

The Cold War affected every sphere of existence as the nuclear threat promised complete demise. The conflict between the two ideologies spilled over into all parts of the world (Kolko 1997). Europe had not yet recovered from the Great War and the restructuring of the continent was under debate when the conflict erupted. The USSR's sphere of influence spilled over to the territorial stage when they invaded Czechoslovakia and Hungary leaving the rest of Europe under imminent threat. Meanwhile, the United States was internally dealing with the repercussions of the ideological threat. US politics swayed to the conservative side and the communist witch hunts began. Public approval of the UN declined, and the Congress attempted to pass the Bricker Amendment (Davies 1993).<sup>33</sup> The US, now under the Eisenhower administration, signaled their seclusion by giving up their leading status in the CHR (Cassin 1972).

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<sup>32</sup>Within the historical context, universality applied to the UN member states of the time- which was one third less than its members today. Also, human rights applied to a minority few, namely, the white man.

<sup>33</sup>The Bricker Amendment aimed to stop the internalization of international laws into the Constitution.

The following decade did not bring peaceful times. The UN was in an impasse within both the Security Council and General Assembly as the influence of the Western ideals was shifting towards the Soviets. US involvement in Vietnam reinforced this negative perception. Recently liberated or young states were persuaded to join the Soviet cause. Concomitantly, the US's international influence over global affairs dissipated. During this time the UN debated on seemingly theoretic issues regarding human rights, but no significant headway was made.<sup>34</sup> The major debate of the time was reconciling the discourses of the two ideologies on human rights issues (Green 1956); while throughout the world the very real problem of development had progressed uncontrollable levels. The alliance of various third world urged the UN to deal with economic injustice. The acceptance that the current economic system had become outdated, the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order was forged into existence in 1974 (Frank 1980).<sup>35</sup> Rising inequality in other areas led to the Assembly to adopt the New International Economic Order programme, which dealt with social and political issues as well. Most importantly the declaration dealt with the exploitation of the colonies which did not appeal to the Western powers. The US, not able to block NIEO due to wide support from UN nations, eventually agreed for a voluntary support that excluded the right to aid (Alston 1991). Put simply, the post-colonial states had enough power to push the international arena to recognize the moral problem and consequently draft a resolution, what they did not have was enough leverage for the Big Three to commit to economic aid and reparations. The solution that the US, the most vocal opposer to economically support the Third World, proposed was a model based on voluntary trade. This new development model was what marked the 1960s for the human rights legislation, the 1960s looked at the issue from an economic development perspective (Toye and Toye 2004). The United States, acting strategically, launched the First Development Decade. The main aim was to promote economic growth and increased GDP through free trade (increasing imports and exports as well as supporting FDI) with the assumption that these goals would increase the wellbeing of society through strengthening all sectors (Hurni 2020). This effort failed miserably as the world was primarily concerned with the nuclear arms race between the two ideologies in addition to these policies having no effect on increasing the economic wellbeing (Hurni 2020, Toye and Toye 2004).

Understanding the shortcomings of the previous attempt, the Second Development Decade (1970-1979) focused on social welfare and discussed poverty and income

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<sup>34</sup>The sole effort proposing to look at practical human rights issue came from the Israeli delegate Mr. Najjar who presented a two-sided approach to discussions by dividing issues into normative and practical categories.

<sup>35</sup>The status quo system was shaped when most of these third world countries did not even exist.

inequality, which was much more applicable to the Third World as they were dealing with crippling international debt and were suffering domestically as a result (UN 1970). The problem remained the same as is with recommendations: there was no enforceability other than the sense of responsibility (Lipson 1981). Again, the Development Decade failed.

The third attempt had a more detailed and basic approach to developmental issues (Jolly et al. 2004). Focusing on critical problems like poverty, unemployment, sanitation and health care, the Third Development Decade had the lofty goal of universalizing certain and basic needs for all humans (McHale and McHale 1979). This was major progress for the human rights cause as linking human rights to development ensured its place in discussions (Streeten 1980). Unfortunately, the Third Development was not successful; global economic shocks, the oil and debt crises and, democratic backsliding and political turmoil in Latin America all contributed to the foci of statesmen to overlook the human rights agenda. For the human rights agenda rest of the decade was marked by the tensions between the Third World and the Anglo-Saxon powers- a game of push and pull.

The 1980s saw the continuation of political, ideological and, military tensions between the US and USSR. The American President called the Soviet Union the ultimate evil and the Soviets accused the US trying to enslave their own people (da Nobrega 2014). The race of influence rose to new heights with Ronald Reagan's space program Star Wars; the arms race escalated. In 1985 the CHR received a draft of the Declaration to the Right to Development by the working group; the document was written with vague language aimed to satisfy all parties and saw human rights as an endogenous factor and not as much a prerequisite of the right to development (Barsh 1991). International rights advocates saw this declaration as ineffective in establishing a stance like the Universal Declaration mainly due to its compromising tone (Alston 1988). The Group wanted to produce principles like the ones in the UD which over time would gain legal status. Presented to the General Assembly, the Declaration to the Right to Development, passed with only one country opposing- the United States. Although successful in passing, it still was not the unanimous vote the working group was aiming for and in an attempt to get the US on board, the Group made concessions. The US strategy of "bait and switch" was fairly successful due to its stance as the superpower and was utilized many times in the future to shape and frame issues that they were not completely on board with (Mertus 2008). As Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi put it, the major contribution of the Declaration "was that it overcame the divide between the political and economic dimensions of human rights and opened new spaces within and beyond the UN for placing human beings at the center of the development paradigm (Normand

and Zaidi 2008).” The right to development was generally accepted on the principle part, however, implementation was a different issue. In 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights convened in Vienna and the right to development was accepted as being a fundamental human right (Robinson 1993).<sup>36</sup> Regardless of its shortcomings, the incorporation and recognition of the right to development as a human right was a critical step in the advancement of the human rights regime- both normatively and legally (Sen 2014). However, a solemn picture emerges in retrospect which solidifies the realist approach of *realpolitik*: powerful states are willing to accept the right to development in theory (after much persuasion), but they are unwilling to economically and legally commit to the cause (Normand and Zaidi 2008).

Events of the Cold War reinforced the critical importance of human rights in all areas of policy, and the rise of the globalization phenomenon made it possible for different human rights frameworks to emerge and to be realized. The fall of the Soviet Union and the concomitant victory of democratic rule allowed for increasing dialogues regarding universal rights. With the threat of the USSR gone and the importance of cooperation established, smaller states had the opportunity to shift their attention to advancing peace and security on all fronts. Many NGOs and IOs were formed in the goal to make cooperation possible and better the human condition. Within the United Nations many subdivisions were formed to assist in the global effort for human rights. This, however, is not the full reality as not all obstacles were overcome with the fresh realization that human rights legislation is central to international stability; human rights was still a voluntary principle shaped by the superpowers under the buffer of sovereignty and self-determination. Beliefs that state-centrism as a determining force of the international system remained.

In the 1990s two new threats to human rights emerged: the phenomena of globalization and, terrorism (Normand and Zaidi 2008). Neo-liberal globalization changed the unit of analysis from state to international organization. By looking at non-state actors to contribute to making human rights legislation, whose importance was just beginning to be realized, the issue of enforcement became even bigger problem- hitherto the situation was already voluntary and ineffective (Normand and Jochnick 1994). The HR framework in the UN was already subject to great power politics as passing human rights legislations in the General Assembly and Security Council required the support of the Big Three.<sup>37</sup> The ending of the Cold War gave HR supporters a false sense of relief as the assumption that as the lack of ideological war vanished a global consensus regarding human rights at the UN would finally

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<sup>36</sup>Months earlier in Bangkok, Asian states concluded in their preparatory meeting that the right to development would undermine civil and individual rights. This stance did not please western states and was accused of being one sided (Bauer 1996).

<sup>37</sup>The United States to be exact. The treatments of Rwanda and Iraq clearly demonstrate this point.

become reality (Normand and Zaidi 2008). What happened in reality was of stark contrast to this conviction. The primary action of the Security Council after the End of the Cold War- the ending of the ideological warfare- was to give authorization to military involvement in Iraq. In retrospect, the passing of this motion was the result of the intense push of the United States, particularly Secretary of State James Baker (Baker and DeFrank 1995). The United States exploited certain half-truths in order to gain the approval of others to accept this act (Peterson 2002). Following this endorsement of the UN, the United States strategically blocked all diplomatic relations with Iraq and put sanctions in place until 2003, when Saddam Hussein was killed. Ostensibly, the UN green lighted another resolution to invade Iraq, under false pretenses.

While the US was defending its own interests in Iraq, a true atrocity was occurring in Rwanda. Although the Security Council had received credible information both before and after the genocide occurred, the UN failed to act accordingly- the United States even refrained from using the expression as it would warrant legal standing and responsibility (Gourevitch 2015). UN peacekeeping forces were denied entry by Security Council approval, although top UN officials supported the right to intervene stating the dire need for humanitarian assistance. To the dismay of human rights activists and top UN officials, the situation in Rwanda remained grim until the government was ousted by civil war (Dallaire 2009). Over 1 million people were killed in Rwanda, and all of this happened under the watch of the UN and the international community (Lemarchand 2013). Rwanda could have been prevented.

Another challenge that globalization amplified is the north-south problem. A group of Asian countries presented the following idea; development should take precedence to political freedom (Leifer 2013). Of course, this idea made sense for the Asian tigers, who were mostly autocratic regimes, as their priorities revolved around economic success rather than human rights and civil freedoms. Even today with democratic regimes being the norm, countries like China and Singapore have better economic growth than their counterparts (Leifer 2013, Bauer and Bell 1999, Bauer 1996). This western oriented framework of political and economic standards also had a reaction from Asian human rights organizations and NGOs. The problem for the Asian party was the double standards and biases that western, Euro-centric human rights legislation was subject to (Mutua 2013). Unfortunately, while this critique of the human rights discourse was well founded, it did not generate adequate response from the West.

When the issue of bias and double standards is investigated in a broader sense it is evident that the Universal Declaration did not have the expected effect in

bettering the human rights approach. The promises of the western liberal economic model were not realized, and its effect was indifference at best (Weiss et al. 2005). Normand (2008) presents two main implications of globalization in this area: the first is the continuation of the Washington Consensus and the Bretton Woods institutions unequal treatment towards indebted states. Second is WTOs compromises of human rights principles on behalf of the benefits of liberal free trade system (Greider 1998). Here, the link between globalization and human rights is filtered through the lens of economics. As Normand and Zaidi posit, these challenges are the product of globalization since the process of incorporating state economies into the world system “with relatively unimpeded capital and trade flows spurred by new communications technologies and a framework of international law that promotes free and open access to the market” is still in the hands of powerful states which shape it according to their will and needs (Mander 2014, Normand and Zaidi 2008).


The second threat of the 1990s was a bigger danger to states as it was directly tied to the very real concern of security. Terrorism undermined the shift towards democracy and consequent attention to human rights and, after the dissolution of the USSR all devotion—both economic and political—focused on national security. Concomitantly, financing human rights was exchanged for increasing military expenditure. This trend continued until the September 11, 2001 events after which the geopolitical environment became even more security conscious. Since the Great War conflicts have had an increasing influence over state behavior on the international arena. The tragedy on 9/11 amplified this effect and essentially reshaped the way international politics was conducted; the new framework introduced new actors into the arena (Fuller 2002). Terrorist organizations could not be ignored much longer; US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the long war and what is now infamous in international relations terminology, the global war on terror (White and Tyson 2006).

9/11 remodeled the conventional definition for and, traditional conduct of war. For the first time, war was not an interstate affair: a new enemy emerged in the form of ideologies and terrorist organizations. This new war was not logistically constrained by boundaries and was not limited by principles of state sovereignty. Accordingly, all of these changes transformed how human rights ideas have been operationalized and manifested. Primarily, human rights as an ideology was propagated in war efforts; this put enormous emotional and moral connotation to the notions of democracy, liberty, freedom and, self-determination (Normand and Zaidi 2008). Confusing realities emerged: one man’s freedom fighter was the other’s terrorist ringleader. Clashing ideologies led to the thwarted human rights regime and, the UN system was inadequate in responding to the changing experience. In the war against terror,



human rights abuse escalated as great and middle powers alike had the ultimate justification: that they were in combat with the definitive evil (Cole 2005). States abused this even more when it came to dealing with domestic oppositions, using their newfound rationalization of the use of force and military fortification (HRW 2006). Domestically, states used this as a validation to alter domestic legislation in constitutionalizing disproportionate responses (Swift 2007).<sup>38</sup> The UN and the human rights framework fell short in responding to this exploitation of principles and ultimately the organizations reputation was damaged; in a speech given in 2003, President George W. Bush called the United Nations an “[...] irrelevant debating society”. The destructive and unconstrained power of fear the terrorist cells unleashed pushed even the staunchest human rights advocates to debate the hierarchy of human rights in the grand scheme of reality (Hoffman 2004). This rift between the US and the UN can also be seen in the data, where US support of successful resolutions decreases dramatically in the time period after 9/11. Regardless, the general consensus within the United Nations was to view these attacks as a crime against humanity under international law.

Figure 4.2 American Support of Successful Resolutions in the UN General Assembly (Human Rights)



<sup>38</sup>The US’s Patriot Act is an example of this; the unfair treatment of minorities, limitations of political oppositions, as well as restricting civil liberties and increased models of surveillance are all abuses of the newfound legislative power. Many other countries have also adopted measures similar to the Americans. See Hoffman, “Human Rights and Terrorism”; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004). Other human rights violations occur under military counter terrorism operations which are not accountable due to the veil of secrecy and lack of transparency.

This war against terror the United States announced paralleled the Cold War in the sense that it was also an ideological conflict, but, instead of capitalism versus communism, it was those who wanted peace and security versus oppression (Hajjar 2003). Although Al-Qaeda did not possess the traditional tools of warfare via advanced military technology, it did possess the ultimate weapon of fear which it quite skillfully mastered through the threat of suicide bombings (Sullivan 2007). Analysts in policy circles criticized the disproportional US response to the threat of terrorism as hyping Al-Qaeda's effect (Woodward 2002); by using emotionally charged concepts in defining this conflict like "good vs. evil" to support the American cause, President Bush essentially consolidated Al-Qaeda's apocalyptic rhetoric (Roy 2015).

The tragic events of 9/11 and America's concomitant ideological response called for a change in the international human rights legislation and agenda (Bennis et al. 2000). Hitherto, the United States' rapport in acting in line with human rights principles had always been lacking in adhering to the full extent of law; this was not only on the issues of human rights, but also on arms control and disarmament and, environment and climate change (Spiro 2000). The full extent of the American rejection of international consensus is summarized in the Amnesty International Report aptly titled "Human Dignity Denied: Torture and Accountability in the War on Terror" where it is stated that the US view refuses definitions of torture, the Geneva Conventions and the laws of war as being obsolete (International 2004). This was made even more visible during 2004 where General Rumsfeld commented that the US needed to reevaluate their approach to international human rights laws in light of the war on terror which has reshaped the nature of war (Schlesinger et al. 2004). This statement gathered much negative attention from humanitarian advocates as they claimed that the United States evidently justified civilian executions under the clauses of reciprocity (Lauren 2007). America's undermining of the foundational principles of human rights and UN legislations in the name of the war against terrorism and, blatant disregard of international consensus encouraged other semi autocratic regimes a certain level of comfort in their violations.

The culmination of the inadequacies of the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights in the face of 9/11 and its aftermath led to the 2006 decision of the General Assembly to dissolve the CHR and replace it with a fresh and proficient Human Rights Council (Ghanea 2006).<sup>39</sup> Although the new Human Rights Council was founded with noble intentions after a series of debates and discussions, the resulting framework did not result in the ambitious goals first set. The restructuring of the

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<sup>39</sup>This development came after the 2004 decision of Kofi Annan to recommend a panel to deal with the loss of reputation of the CHR. The USA went as far as claiming that only real democracies should be a part of the panel.

Human Rights Council was a result of many compromises to benefit the powerful such as the United States (Normand and Zaidi 2008). The new HRC consisted of forty-seven member states who were required to get an absolute majority<sup>40</sup> to be chosen, with their tenure limited to two consecutive terms. Additionally, this new body was situated under the General Assembly. This new place in hierarchy also granted the HRC an increased amount of political power (Heinbecker and Goff 2005). Passed by an overwhelming majority, the new HRC also won the support of international NGOs. Only four countries did not vote in favor for this new human rights body: United States, Israel, the Marshall Islands, and Palau. The major criticism received was that the new changes were mainly technical and did not tackle important problems like accountability issues and manipulations by the powerful (Habibi 2007, Dobras 2008).

The 2006 decision to abolish the CHR and the concurrent forming of the HRC essentially polarized the traditional powers and the emerging powers. The western traditional powers aimed to frame the system to serve their own benefit by excluding those with human rights violations in the areas of civil and political rights because those areas were where the western powers were most guilty. They aimed to shape the human rights agenda by limiting what human rights violations were; essentially putting pressure on non-democratic states. The other party consisted of emerging and developing powers<sup>41</sup> who accused the powerful of exploiting these norms to enhance their own geopolitical interests by continuing policies of imperialism. This dichotomy is seen in the data as well.

Despite all of these shortcomings and problems of enforcement, human rights principles and norms have come a long way in fifty years, essentially becoming the backbone of international legitimacy (Normand and Zaidi 2008). The soft power of human rights and norms have molded the accepted rules of behavior in both international domestic affairs (Nye Jr 2003). These principles separate those who are the perpetrators and those who are the accusers in the eyes of the international community determining who is right and who is wrong. Another way in which human rights has changed and challenged the status quo is how it has created a platform for developing and emerging countries disputed the US and western dominance on the front of international law (Deen 2005). The most prominent example of this is China's election to the HRC in 2006, where the US choose not to participate. The increasing tensions between the superpower and its competitors-rapidly gaining both economic and reputational (ideological) power demonstrated the two-pronged influence that

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<sup>40</sup>According to the new framework members of the HRC could be suspended by 2/3 majority in the General Assembly if they committed human rights violations.

<sup>41</sup>Namely, the Non-Aligned Movement

the human rights regime had gained.

Philosophically, the human rights mission by definition is supposed to be a universal and unbiased project not subject to the whims of the international power struggle. Unfortunately, as human beings are not created equally and with equal opportunities, such is the case for states as well. Furthermore, the machinations of realpolitik have contributed in the creation of a system in which human rights have been used as a vehicle to aggravate divisions by reflecting the inclinations of the dominant powers (Mutua 2013). Within these parameters many different types of dynamics arose both within the stronger country groups and the emerging country block. Superpower interactions were subject to intense bureaucratic tensions over the problem of shared and given sovereignty under the international organization umbrella. Emerging powers, on the other hand, pushed for more strict rules that would limit the actions of the powerful.

#### 4.4 Economic and Social Development

The initial scope of this section was solely focused on economic development under the umbrella of the United Nations. However, two changes needed to be made; first, the study of all of the UN branches' approach to economic development would be too wide an issue area to study. Therefore, this section of the dissertation will focus on the United Nations Development Programme to capture the intricacies of development. The second change was influenced by Craig Murphy's comprehensive study on the UNDP, in which he states that the programme is not just a tool to achieve economic development, but also a mechanism to foster relations between peoples and nations (Murphy 2006). Thus, this section will widen its reach by looking at both the economic and social concepts under development, because of their intertwined nature.

The United Nations Development Programme defines itself as an organization dedicated to the eradication of poverty and global development and through knowledge, experience and resources assists in people building a "better life".<sup>42</sup> The initiation of the UNDP dates back to 1966 when two United Nations organizations- the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the UN Special Fund, merged to create the Development Programme.<sup>43</sup> The EPTA was formed with the aim of providing tech-

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<sup>42</sup>This description appears on the homepage of the UNDP.

<sup>43</sup>Consolidation of the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in a United Nations Development Programme GA Res 2029, XX (1965)

nical assistance to countries in need and the UNSP conducted research on economic development projects and procedures producing invaluable insight into the machinations of development (Stokke 2009). For example, in the 1950s the UNSP assisted in bettering the universities from staff selection to curriculum formation in India, which is regarded in retrospect as a major contribution to Indian technological advancements today (Mukherjee 2007). A similar experiment was conducted in Brazil by the UNDP, where officials contributed to furthering research and development in hydroelectrical engineering. The work of the UNDP exceeds one solely providing technical help to nations- the organization has the most extensive network within the UN arrangement holding more than 150 offices throughout the globe (Murphy 2006).

Before diving into the dynamics of the UNDP system, it is critical to understand the concept of development and all that it entails for the UNDP. Currently, the sub-organization operates in 170 nations focusing on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals through the reduction of poverty, public health, democracy, energy, gender equality and lastly, crisis prevention.<sup>44</sup> It is implied that these problems can be solved through development, however, what development is remains a mystery to the unassuming reader of UNDP documents. On a basic level, understanding the work of the UNDP lies in a theoretical understanding of development.


Craig Murphy suggests a three-pronged approach to understanding development ultimately claiming that any theory and practices of development falls under the general universe in which these three approaches exist within (Murphy 2006). The first approach is the most conventional suggesting that development occurs with economic growth and eliminating inequality lies in fostering growth. The second, links development and freedom striving for liberty assists in achieving one's goals. Lastly, development and efficiency are tied together which "requires understanding the sources and flows in complex, real-world systems, and creating interventions, fabricated systems (such as incentives for import substitution), designed to move goods to where they are most needed (Murphy 2006)."<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>See <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/about-us.html>

<sup>45</sup>The figure is taken from Murhpy, Craign N. 2006 "*The United Nations Development Programme - A Better Way?*." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.43

Figure 4.3 Murphy's Three Approaches to Development



The strength of the UNDP lies in its combination of the three approaches; the economic aspect is taken care of by focusing on the economic growth of the receiving country (Kaufmann 1971, Witt 1951). Occurring through assistance in setting up markets, the UNDP helps to foster functional economic markets. Freedom values are under democracy promotion where the UNDP introduces more egalitarian systems of rule. Lastly, knowledge transfers are key factors in stimulating efficiency. This happens through introducing functional and proven systems into the developing nation. Combining these ideals, the UNDP has been an active influence for decades;<sup>46</sup> joining forces with the UN Food and Agriculture Group in the late 1960s, the organization campaigned to eliminate locusts which destroyed crops in 42 countries. Later on, in the 1970s, UNDP forces partnered with Singapore providing funds and expertise in multiple areas ranging from education to urban planning. Another keystone for the UNDP happened in the 1970s when the first global project was launched which focused on research and development in the study of corn. In 1977, TOKTEN project was realized with the aim to send experts back to their home countries to aid in technological development. During this decade, the plight of the Palestinian people led to the creation of the Programme of Assistance.<sup>47</sup> The UNDP was called upon to assist the Palestinian people in their efforts to better the economic conditions and social environment by creating projects to alleviate the

<sup>46</sup>The timeline of events has been taken from the UNDP's 50th year celebratory webpage. <http://50.undp.org/en/>

<sup>47</sup>The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 33/147 was adopted on the 20th of December in 1978. This was a milestone for issues regarding the Middle East region as the international community recognized the problems that were occurring in the disputed lands (West Bank and Gaza Strip) as opposed to a more one-sided approach that had been shaped by the Balfour Declaration on 1917 hitherto.

situations created by the lack of economic and social infrastructure.<sup>48</sup>

The 1980s began with issues of public health concerns at the forefront. The UNDP recognized the need for assistance and aid in African nations which were under the threat of river blindness as well as guinea worm. At the time, Mozambique was dealing with the rising danger of drought which the UNDP helped reduce by sending experts on groundwater sources to identify appropriate locations to place wells. Across the ocean, the UNDP assisted Argentina's democratic transition sending specialists on anti-corruption and good governance procedures. In 1986, the organization supported gender equality by launching the Women in Development, shortly after a programme for entrepreneurship was initiated.

In the 1990s the UNDP took a systematic approach to archiving development by creating the Human Development Report which also initiated the Human Development Index, cataloguing life expectancies and purchasing power. The beginning of the last decade of the century was monumental in environmental policy as the World Bank joined forces with the UNDP to launch the Global Environmental fund endowing 2 billion dollars to preserve nature.<sup>49</sup> Despite the UN's blatant failure of inaction during the Rwandan Genocide, the UNDP sprinted into action in the aftermath setting up refugee camps to alleviate the suffering masses (Straus and Waldorf 2011). During this time Africa was also dealing with the HIV virus to which the UNDP responded with forming a Joint UN Programme stating that the battle against HIV was indeed a development issue.

In the new millennium, the United Nations set the Millennium Development Goals-eight comprehensive aims centering around poverty and hunger to strive for until 2015, which was established following the 2000 Millennium Summit. The UNDP was set to act as its chief locomotive pushing the MDG. The foundations for this project was initially set with the UN Secretary General's report focusing on the responsibilities of the United Nation in the 21st century which highlighted the importance of combatting issues of poverty, human rights, gender equality and environmental challenges.<sup>50</sup> The outcome of the Millennium Summit and the consequent Millennium Development Goals stated that each nation was to be sensitive about their own problems and adapt the way in which such goals would be established in their own territories- highlighting the divergence of structural challenges that each actor would face.<sup>51</sup> Although lofty and noble in its nature, this initiative and the goals set forth

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<sup>48</sup>See <https://www.ps.undp.org/content/papp/en/home/about-us.html>

<sup>49</sup>"Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs)." *The World Bank*, accessed July 20, 2020. <https://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/dfi/fiftrustee/fund-detail/gef>

<sup>50</sup><https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml>

<sup>51</sup><https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml>

by the UN was heavily criticized for being too vague and not prescribing practical methods in achieving to better human life in lesser developed regions (Kabeer 2010). Another key critique to the MDG was that agriculture was not recognized to be a driving force behind development although the sector housed a significant number of jobs given to the poor (Deneulin and Shahani 2009). The progress of the MDGs across the globe has varied considerably with Brazil attaining a good portion of the goals while countries in central Africa failing to attain similar success.<sup>52</sup> The uneven progress pushed the UN to convene in 2012 and discuss the post-2015 agenda which focused on a collective effort as opposed to country specific aid allocation which was a part of the MDGs.<sup>53</sup> This new approach was a key point in the global governance of development as it was more inclusive and sensitive to needs on a micro level.<sup>54</sup> With the end of the MDG, the UNDP produced a new set of development goals aptly named Sustainable Development Goals (UN Resolution 70/1). The 17 goals of the SDG were stated as being a “universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030.”<sup>55</sup> The SDGs were also criticized similar to the MDGs; the major oppositions laid with the setting of goals and the means to achieve them, which were said by the media to be too lofty and vast (Sachs et al. 2019). Additionally, it was claimed that the goals contradicted one another and ultimately betrayed the poor of the world.<sup>56</sup> Regardless, the SDG and the widespread acceptance of the goals by UN member states has created a global framework in which a collective effort is made to realize sustainable development (TWI 2018).

The United Nations system is one of collective effort which aims to ensure peace and prosperity in world comprised of many entities, both state and non-state. Thus, the situation under which such goals are to be realized depends on the employment of a myriad of tools and methods. In other words, the MDG and SDG are merely a way in which the UN systems organizes itself to combat global problems ranging from poverty to environmental protection. The UNDP, on the other hand, is one of the many tools that the UN utilizes to narrow efforts to increase the collective quality of life. Here, there is an innate assumption that is made, which encompasses and paves the path, when looking at the UNDP and its ideas of development and that

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<sup>52</sup> According to data provided by the UN, Benin failed to realize all of the benchmarks put forth by the MDG in 2011. For more detailed information regarding country specific numbers see the MDG Monitor provided by the UN: [http://www.mdgmonitor.org/country\\_progress.cfm?c=BEN&cd=](http://www.mdgmonitor.org/country_progress.cfm?c=BEN&cd=)

<sup>53</sup> See [https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam\\_undf/report2.shtml](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/report2.shtml)

<sup>54</sup> Begashaw, Belay. “Global governance for SDGs.” *Development and Cooperation*, April 16, 2017. <https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/peer-pressure-can-contribute-achieving-sdgs-more-needed>

<sup>55</sup> See <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html>

<sup>56</sup> “The 169 Commandments.” *The Economist*, March 26, 2015. <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/03/26/the-169-commandments>



is the ideal of democracy.

While discussing the UN system as a whole or solely looking at the UNDP, it is unconceivable to disregard the notion of democracy and human development, and how it has shaped both the conception of goals and their implementation processes. This section will deal with how the current SDG agenda has been framed by the ideal of democracy promotion and subsequently, how the processes of state building efforts have been influenced under the paradigm of human development.

In a press release on the 14th of September 2016, the Inter Parliamentary Union, an intergovernmental organization aimed to strengthen international cooperation and an observer in the UN General Assembly, stated that the goals set forth in the 2030 Agenda- the Sustainable Development Goals- would only be realized “if there was more democracy in the world.”<sup>57</sup> Similarly, the German Development Institute echoed along these lines in their Discussion Paper stating that economic inequalities were closely tied to the democratic levels of a regime (Leininger, Lührmann, and Sigman 2019). Understanding the importance of the democratic processes and procedure and their accepted positive influence over the SDGs and general efforts to combat global inequality, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance produced a new report in how their Global State of Democracy Index could assist in evaluating the UN 2030 Agenda. This was partly done to ensure a more effective methodology in implementing such goals as well as evaluating the state of affairs on a yearly basis (Holden, Linnerud, and Banister 2017). These remarks aligned with the consensus among international entities: democracy promotion would indeed be of tremendous help in both achieving the SDGs but more importantly, make the world a better place (Lührmann et al. 2019).<sup>58</sup> Within the realm of the social sciences, in both theory and practice, the study of democracy and the plethora it entails has been a subject of systematic inquiry.<sup>59</sup> Without complicating the matter, it would not be faulty to claim that democracy has been accepted as a universal value (Sen 1999). This wide reach of the democratic norm has both shaped and influenced the way in which the UN system has functioned as well. The institutional bureaucracy of the organization as well as its goals and actions reflect

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<sup>57</sup>“More democracy key to achieving sustainable development by 2030.” *Inter-parliamentary Union*, September 14, 2016. <https://www.ipu.org/news/press-releases/2016-09/more-democracy-key-achieving-sustainable-development-2030>

<sup>58</sup>“The Sustainable Development Goals And The Global State Of Democracy Indices.” *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance*, February 21, 2019. <https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/sustainable-development-goals-and-global-state-democracy-indices>

<sup>59</sup>Although the philosophic foundations of democracy are dated far back to Ancient Greece, contemporary studies looking at democracy have paved the path for the modern understandings of this field. Books such as Robert Dahl’s 1971 *Polyarch: Participation and Opposition*; David Held’s 1996 *Models of Democracy*; Samuel Huntington’s 1991, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*; Arend Lijphart’s 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries*; Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds). 1986 study titled *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*.

the principles of democracy; internally, member states are legally equal, externally, the UN has innately supported that democracy promotion is an undeniable goal.<sup>60</sup>

Under these circumstances, it is most interesting that the word “democracy” is not present in the UN Charter. Nor is being democratic a preamble to UN membership. In the official documents, the requisite for becoming a part of the UN- Article 4(1)-is for a state to be “peace-loving” and willing to fulfil the obligations of the Charter. This dichotomy, between the written and implied, make the UN efforts involving democracy even more noteworthy- especially when the amount of financial involvement is taken into account. In order to understand the weight given to democracy promotion and the state-building efforts of the UN, it is key to illuminate the logic behind democracy and peace.

The primary philosophical foundation which pushes the UN to spend time and resources in this area, lies in the democratic peace theory which posits that two democracies are less likely to go to war. The idea is based on the Kantian theorem of “Perpetual Peace” and observations have shown that since the early 1800s wars occurring have not indeed been between two democracies (Doyle 1983).<sup>61</sup> This pattern was dissected further to unveil that consolidated and transitional democracies have different behaviors and therefore, assisting in democratic consolidation would foster peace (Schedler 2001, Carothers 2020, Volpe 2020). When this line of thought is combined, the rationale behind the UN sympathy for democracy becomes clear. However, these are not the sole reasons behind the push for democracy; economic and human rights concerns also are contributing factors (Poole 2019). The logic is similar as democracies are more sensitive to human rights and are more economically developed (Donnelly 1999, Franck 1992, Bhagwati 1995). Concomitantly, the effort to promote peace, human rights, and development seem bound to the notion of democracy, providing a theoretical justification (Newman and Rich 2004).

Among international entities, the United Nations holds a unique position in the realm of democracy promotion, being regarded as the primary actor of democratization (Joyner 1997). However, its efforts in democracy were veiled until the end of the Cold War where space was opened up to address the concerns of human rights, economic and social injustice as well as fostering international peace (Rich

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<sup>60</sup>Edward, Newman and Roland Rich. “The UN role in promoting democracy: Between ideals and reality.” *United Nations University Press*, accessed July 20, 2020. <https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:2450/pdf9280811045.pdf>

<sup>61</sup>In current literature, the theory that two democracies are less likely to go to war has been extensively studied. The most recent findings center around the notion of consolidation and transition periods of democracy as the main explanatory factor behind this idea. For more information on the normative aspect of the DPT see Bruce Russett (1993) book *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Also, Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller’s 1996 work *Debating the Democratic Peace* provides a detailed insight into the dynamics behind this theory.

2001). Political dialogue on the global front shifted from one concerned mainly of national security and nuclear concerns to those revolving around human security and this new approach allowed for the United Nations to debate on issues regarding democracy. More specifically, the UN Secretary General was requested to study the mechanisms of democratic consolidation in the early 1990s (Rich 2001, Boutros-Ghali 1999, 1996).

The main branch of the UN which is involved with the majority of democracy promotion and state-building efforts is the UNDP which functions through its offices located in the less developed countries which require the most attention when it comes to such matters. However, the presence of officials does not necessarily guarantee a successful outcomes as the domestic situation (local conditions, political culture...etc) all have an influence over whether the pushed form of governance is applicable (Whitehead 2001). An instance of this can be observed when analyzing the September 1992 elections and UN monitoring efforts (backed by the United States and Russia) in the African state of Angola when civil war erupted in the aftermath. Reasons behind this were summarized as the inadequacy of the United Nations to successfully organize its staff in a timely manner as well as appointing qualified officers to oversee the elections.

The Angola example proves two major points; first, the UN needed to adopt a more sensitive approach which employs case specific tools and trajectories in order to achieve their goals. Second, democratization efforts are far wider spread than previously assumed and thus, require UNDP presence not only in the introduction and implementation processes (transitions) of better governance but also after the shift has been made. The process of consolidation and straightening the democratic infrastructures takes time and requires around the clock attention (Santiso 2002, Yeğen 2018).<sup>62</sup>

Regardless of the criticisms voiced, the actions and nature of the UNDP is noble; it strives for a better world and increasing the quality of life for the less fortunate nations and peoples; it promotes the protection of the environment, educational literacy, gender equality and democracy. With all of these put together, it seems highly unlikely for any country to oppose such goals and actions. However, as is the case of national interests, not all propositions put forth by the UNDP and its goals are supported unanimously throughout the General Assembly and Security Council. The following section aims to paint the very real picture of realpolitik at play in UN

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<sup>62</sup>For more information on the judicial strengthening processes through constitutional change see Yeğen, Oya. "Judicial "empowerment" through constitutional change: the case of Chilean and Turkish Constitutional Courts." *Research and Policy on Turkey* 3, no. 1 (2018): 40-67. For a case study example of the importance of the constitution making process see, Yeğen, Oya. "Debating Unamendability: Deadlock in Turkey's Constitution-Making Process." In *An Unamendable Constitution?*, pp. 281-311. Springer, Cham, 2018.

General Assembly voting, focusing on issues central to the UNDP such as economic and social development.

## 5. TRADITIONAL VS. EMERGING POWERS

The first general examination of this dissertation is of descriptive nature. Looking at the voting behavior and inclinations of traditional and emerging powers' actions on the international front. As stated in Chapter II, traditional powers are defined as the powers which have shaped the post war international system. They are US, UK, China, France, Germany, Japan, Italy and Russia (Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann 2004, Fazal and Poast 2019, Han and Paul 2020). Emerging powers are defined as nations who are displaying upward trajectories in areas of economy, resources, diplomacy and population (Mourato Pinto 2013). Such countries are Brazil, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa, Mexico, Nigeria and Turkey. Below, the patterns of voting in each issue area is dissected from the data to uncover any patterns, convergences or divergences between the two groups. This is done by comparing the two groups numbers yes votes in the resolutions under each issue.

Figure 5.1 Hypotheses For Traditional Versus Emerging Powers' Voting Tendencies

<b>Major Research Question: Traditional vs Emerging Powers Vote Convergence/Divergence</b>	<b>Issue Areas</b>			
	<i><b>Middle East</b></i>	<i><b>Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament</b></i>	<i><b>Human Rights</b></i>	<i><b>Economic and Social Development</b></i>
	<u>Hypothesis 1(a)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 1(c)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 2(a)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 2(c)</u>
	Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining the Middle East	Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament.	Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights	Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development
	<u>Hypothesis 1(b)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 1(d)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 2(b)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 2(d)</u>
	Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining the Middle East	Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament	Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights	Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development

## 5.1 Trajectories of Traditional vs Emerging Powers' UN Voting Means on the Issue of the Middle East

When looked at the voting patterns within the UN General Assembly, reflections of global tensions can be observed. Pushing for more cooperation under Bush and Clinton, the USA has voted positively up to 2005. With the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the interests of the United States were at stake and this is clearly seen with the drop of yes votes concerning the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Since 2005, the United States has decisively voted against any resolution concerning the ME issue. Canada countries with ME votes. Emerging countries support UN resolutions regarding the Israeli Palestinian conflict more than traditional powers when the means of their votes are counted and analyzed through independent t-tests on SPSS (see Table).<sup>1</sup>

Figure 5.2 ANOVA Results Comparing Means Between Traditional and Emerging Powers (Middle East)

Descriptives						
		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence ...
						Lower Bound
vote_1_Sum_ME	1 EMG_PWR	232	17.88	4.838	.318	17.26
	2 TRAD_PWR	203	11.62	5.745	.403	10.83
	3 OTHER	2668	14.98	6.033	.117	14.75
	Total	3103	14.97	6.046	.109	14.76
vote_8_Sum_ME	1 EMG_PWR	232	.52	3.348	.220	.09
	2 TRAD_PWR	203	.04	.195	.014	.01
	3 OTHER	2668	1.13	3.567	.069	1.00
	Total	3103	1.01	3.445	.062	.89

The results of this analysis confirm our first two hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b): it is verified that traditional powers are less likely to say yes in ME issues on the platform of the General Assembly. Second, it proves that emerging powers are more likely to say yes on the same issues. Therefore, it is also established empirically that there is a clear divergence in traditional and emerging power preferences when it comes to yes votes. When the whole process is repeated for no votes, the same outcome occurs.

<sup>1</sup>The following figure is the descriptive display of the means done by ANOVA which compares three groups; traditional, emerging and the rest. However, for the purposes of this section, the analysis will only compare traditional vs emerging powers, which is why it is stated as being an independent t-test although it is labeled ANOVA. Regardless, if the complete comparison is conducted through ANOVA between traditional, emerging and the rest, the results remained unchanged as there is no homogeneity between their yes and no votes on the issue of the Middle East.

## 5.2 Trajectories of Traditional vs Emerging Powers' UN Voting Means on the Issue of the Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament

From here on, it is key to dive into more detail, and dissect the nuances of great and traditional power politics in the arena of nuclear non-proliferation and global governance in the years between 1990-2018. It is the aim of the section below to explain the logic behind the tested hypotheses from the lens of the political history nuclear regimes to determine the behavioral voting patterns of states in the UN General Assembly.

Concerns regarding the destructive effects, the moral conundrums and ethics framing nuclear power lie far before the tragedies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scholars involved in the Manhattan Project, the research and development programme undertaken during the Second World War, expressed their deep-rooted apprehensions centering around the wide spread destruction that such a potential weapon would pose in the Franck Report put together in 1945.<sup>2</sup> In the report, contributors also touched upon the manner in which the nuclear programme and weapons should be controlled suggesting that international agreements would suit the purpose best. After dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American President Truman also echoed these ideas stating that international agreements were key to the control and potential elimination of nuclear weapons.

The 1990s were an era of confusion for nations. Argentina and Brazil committed to an agreement which ceased all research and development activities regarding nuclear weapons; consenting to IAEA audits (Goldemberg 2006). At the same time, Libya, a signatory to the NPT, continued to fund state apparatus to continue its nuclear development agenda (Siracusa and Warren 2018). The trend was similar in ex-communist states in Eastern Europe as Belarus and Ukraine began government supported research activities. Iraq followed a similar trajectory and subsequently, the Invasion of Kuwait and the 1991 Gulf war pushed the international community, namely the UN Special Commission to push for the demolition of the country's nuclear weapons development efforts (Association 2014).<sup>3</sup>

Up to the 1990s ideas of nuclear regimes and theories revolving around nuclear-non proliferation had material based explanations (Myrdal 1977). More specifically, there was a realist and rational non-deterrence orientation to analyze the dynamics of strategy during the Cold War era (Ruble and Cohen 2018). Such theories ar-

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<sup>2</sup>The Franck Report of Nuclear Physics was published in June 11 1945, and discussed the ramifications of nuclear power for the United States' political and economic standing (see <https://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/franck-report>)

<sup>3</sup>See <https://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/unscom.htm>

gued that states aimed to preserve the balance of power (defensive realism) through nuclear power or they aimed to maximize their relative power position on the international arena through the means of nuclear weapons (offensive realism) (Mearsheimer 2001). The appeal of these theoretical frameworks lied in their strong explanatory power (Cimbala 2017). However, the end of the Cold War and subsequent power vacuum created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union permitted other kinds of explanations which aimed to explain different aspects of nuclear proliferation in the realm of international relations theory (Cimbala 2017). These theories departed from the convention of material explanations. One of the earliest examples of this trend is Scott Sagan's suggestion that norms have an effect on nuclear decision making (Sagan 1997). The notion that normative concerns are an important factor in framing a states' path in dealing with nuclear policy both domestically and internationally opened a new frontier in security studies bridging the realist outlook on national security and liberal conceptions on international norms (Siracusa and Warren 2018). Such differences bring richness and diversity to international relations theory by explaining the complex reality in multiple manners.

Nuclear issues ranging from non-proliferation to research and development of nuclear programmes and their international implications have been a major part of international politics and power-play for the past 60 years.<sup>4</sup> Although there have been significant changes and shifts after the Cold War in this area of practice, the international order is still complex and conflict prone. Steven Cimbala aptly states that "international politics is a game of oligopoly, where the few rule the many" and this is especially relevant in the case of nuclear non-proliferation regimes. This idea is also the basis for Hypothesis 1(c) and Hypothesis 1(d); which claim that traditional powers are less likely to support nuclear non-proliferation on the international front because their national interests lie in increasing their relative power and; that emerging powers are more likely to support nuclear regimes and non-proliferation efforts to strengthen their positions by decreasing the amount of threat that such weapons create, respectively. Both hypotheses are confirmed when the voting patterns of the country groups are studied.

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<sup>4</sup>Rajagopalan, Rajeswari P. "The return of power politics and nuclear non-proliferation." *Observer Research Foundation*, November 5, 2019. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-return-of-power-politics-and-nuclear-non-proliferation-57287/>



Figure 5.3 ANOVA Results Comparing Means Between Traditional and Emerging Powers (Nuclear Weapons)

Group Statistics							
	TRAD	EMG	OTHERS	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
vote_1_Sum_NU	1	EMG_PWR		232	11.25	5.365	.352
	2	TRAD_PWR		203	6.50	3.696	.259
vote_3_Sum_NU	1	EMG_PWR		232	1.54	2.641	.173
	2	TRAD_PWR		203	5.72	3.906	.274

More specifically, through ANOVA analysis, it is proven that there is no homogeneity in the probability of traditional powers and emerging powers' yes voting tendency. In other words, there is a significant variance in the means of the two groups' yes vote numbers.

### 5.3 Trajectories of Traditional vs Emerging Powers' UN Voting Means on the Issue of the Human Rights

All of the claims presented in the political history in section 4.3 of the dissertation demonstrate real life instances in which power dynamics present a coherent picture of global governance inclinations in the area of human rights. However, it is important to support these ideas embedded in the historical records by data presentation and hypothesis tests.

Figure 5.4 ANOVA Results Comparing Means Between Traditional and Emerging Powers (Human Rights)

Group Statistics							
	TRAD	EMG	OTHERS	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
vote_1_Sum_HR	1	EMG_PWR		232	15.24	5.104	.335
	2	TRAD_PWR		203	8.96	3.503	.246
vote_3_Sum_HR	1	EMG_PWR		232	1.75	1.750	.115
	2	TRAD_PWR		203	6.54	4.604	.323

Hypothesis 2(a) and 2(b) suggest two findings: first, that there is a discrepancy between the voting patterns of traditional and emerging powers. Namely, that the two groups' votes do not display equal variance. The descriptive statistics are below.

## 5.4 Trajectories of Traditional vs Emerging Powers' UN Voting Means on the Issue of the Economic and Social Development

The advantage of the United Nations systems as opposed to other international organizations is claimed to be within its impartiality; the principle of one country one vote theoretically guarantees the Westphalian notion of legal equality (Fues, Dongyan, and Vatterodt 2007). However, despite the theoretically sound foundation of legal equality promised through votes, this is not necessarily the case when it comes to the realpolitik of the international arena. When looked at the voting patterns within the UN General Assembly, reflections of these global power dynamics can be observed. In the most general sense, emerging powers and traditional powers' voting behaviors do not follow a pattern of homogeneity. In simpler terms, the means between traditional and emerging powers' yes votes diverge. Which posit that the issues that are being supported do not overlap therefore, the Keohane argument of common interests are less evident than previously assumed by liberal theories such as neoliberal institutionalism. More specifically, traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development, conversely, emerging powers are more likely to do so. Therefore, hypothesis 2(c) and 2(d) are confirmed. The descriptive statistics for these measures are presented below.

Figure 5.5 ANOVA Results Comparing Means Between Traditional and Emerging Powers In Issues of Economic and Social Development

<b>Descriptives</b>						
		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence ...
						Lower Bound
vote_1_Sum_EC	1 EMG_PWR	232	7.15	3.804	.250	6.65
	2 TRAD_PWR	203	4.61	3.486	.245	4.13
	3 OTHER	2668	6.28	3.954	.077	6.13
	Total	3103	6.24	3.943	.071	6.10
vote_3_Sum_EC	1 EMG_PWR	232	.25	.596	.039	.18
	2 TRAD_PWR	203	2.13	2.442	.171	1.79
	3 OTHER	2668	.50	1.006	.019	.46
	Total	3103	.59	1.206	.022	.55

## 6. SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

### RESOLUTIONS

Assuming the predefined definitions of traditional and emerging powers present two shortcomings. The first is that Russia fits into both categories as it is also considered to be an emerging power as a part of the BRICS nations. Secondly, not all traditional powers display the characteristics of great powers (superpowers) and therefore, the assumption that traditional powers are great powers fall through. This part of the analysis does not assume any preconditions on power and looks at GDP and military expenditure as the parameters on which great powers are defined. This allows a more objective approach to understanding who great powers are on a yearly basis and is more accurate. Although it is possible to aggregate great power on combining GDP and military measures, it is more descriptive to divide the two components to see whether military or economic power has more explanatory strength. Also, this will allow for the final analysis to illustrate which parameters of power are more effective in swaying voting patterns on specific issue areas.

The analysis for these hypotheses will be conducted through ordinary least square regression analysis while controlling for GDP, exports, imports, military expenditure, research and development expenditure.<sup>1</sup> The hypotheses are below:

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<sup>1</sup>Data sources can be found in the Annex.

Figure 6.1 Hypotheses Regarding Support of UN General Assembly Resolutions

	Issue Areas			
	<i>Middle East</i>	<i>Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament</i>	<i>Human Rights</i>	<i>Economic and Social Development</i>
	<b>Major Research Question: Support of UN Resolutions</b>	<u>Hypothesis 3(a)</u>  Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining the Middle East	<u>Hypothesis 3(c)</u>  Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament	<u>Hypothesis 4(a)</u>  Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights
<u>Hypothesis 3(b)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining Middle East		<u>Hypothesis 3(d)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament	<u>Hypothesis 4(b)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights	<u>Hypothesis 4(d)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development

### 6.1 Predicted Ratios of Yes Votes for the Issue Area of the Middle East

The hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b) dive into the likelihood of saying yes in issues of the Middle East region in terms of power. The table below posits the baseline model (1) which integrates GDP per capita, military expenditures and, number of militarized interstate disputes. Model (2) includes the population and democracy index variables. Model (3) integrates import and export variables in addition to all. Model (4) integrates an alternate measure for the power variable which is the CINC score. All the four models show that the existence of a militarized interstate dispute decreases the probability to say yes on Middle East issues. Even though the existence of an interstate conflict decreases the probability to say yes on the Middle East resolution, the substantive effect is not high. The substantial impact, which is -0.03 as Model (3) indicates, is far less than one standard deviation of the dependent variable -0.233- which shows one interstate conflict will decrease the ratio to say yes on the Middle East resolutions 7 times less than one standard deviation change, which can be accounted as a substantively small impact of interstate disputes. Figure 1 also depicts this small substantive significance. Model (3) also supports that high levels of GDP per capita decreases the probability to say yes and substantively the impact of GDP is larger than the impact of the number of interstate disputes. As Figure 1 indicates, the predicted ratio to vote yes on Middle East in three different scenarios are different. These different scenarios represent the mean value and one

standard deviation higher and lower values than the mean value of GDP per capita to illustrate representative moments to understand the substantial effect. The change in the probability to say yes in one standard deviation below value of GDP per capita is 0,87 and this decreases to 0.69 when the GDP per capita value increases to the one standard deviation above the mean. This change indicates that the difference between slightly poor and rich countries the ratio to say yes decreases almost 10% which can be referred as a substantive significant impact of the economic power.

Table 6.1 OLS Models on Yes Vote Probability for Middle East

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP per capita	-0.00481 (0.0171)	-0.00485 (0.0170)	-0.0645** (0.0300)	
Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP per capita	-0.245 (1.710)	-0.262 (1.833)	0.142 (1.900)	
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	-0.0196** (0.00882)	-0.0333** (0.0159)	-0.0322* (0.0177)	-0.0178*** (0.00455)
Population		0.0191 (0.0120)	-0.0263 (0.0216)	
Polity V		-0.00504 (0.00459)	-0.00287 (0.00524)	
Export			0.00552 (0.0384)	
Import			0.0465 (0.0345)	
CINC				-0.944 (1.647)
Constant	0.931*** (0.285)	0.602 (0.397)	1.793*** (0.631)	0.846*** (0.0647)
N	2627	2484	2203	2357
R <sup>2</sup>	0.127	0.135	0.131	0.133

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## 6.2 Predicted Ratios of Yes Votes for the Issue Area of Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament

In order to truly support Cimbala's claim that the few rule the many on NU issues requires a more in depth analysis utilizing multiple controls and ordinary least square regression to see who truly shapes the global agenda and more specifically proves the

influential role of the United States in shaping the international nuclear trajectory that has been suggested in the political history of nuclear regimes two steps are required. First it is necessary to look at great powers and not traditional powers since one is pre-determined and the other is determined on the basis of various factors which are time sensitive. This inclusion brings forth hypotheses 3(c) and 3(d).

Below, the table, shows the three different models regarding the explanations behind the likelihood of a country to vote yes (support) UN actions being taken in the nuclear issues. The analysis posits the baseline model (1) which integrates GDP per capita, military expenditures and, number of militarized interstate disputes. Model (2) includes the population and democracy index variables. Model (3) integrates import and export variables in addition to all. Model (4) integrates an alternate measure for the power variable which is the CINC score.

Table 6.2 OLS Models on Yes Vote Probability for Nuclear Issues

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP per capita	-0.0157 (0.0163)	-0.0167 (0.0143)	-0.112*** (0.0244)	
Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP per capita	-0.0748 (1.382)	-0.450 (1.428)	0.00583 (1.481)	
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	-0.0257** (0.0102)	-0.0346*** (0.0114)	-0.0313*** (0.0115)	-0.0162*** (0.00373)
Population		-0.0180 (0.0113)	-0.0930*** (0.0196)	
Polity V		-0.00674* (0.00395)	-0.00445 (0.00432)	
Export			-0.00563 (0.0310)	
Import			0.0886*** (0.0293)	
CINC				-2.285* (1.251)
Constant	1.081*** (0.254)	1.411*** (0.328)	3.375*** (0.523)	0.833*** (0.0489)
N	2630	2484	2203	2360
R <sup>2</sup>	0.398	0.433	0.456	0.390


Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The number of militarized interstate disputes remains a prominent factor which decreases the likelihood for casting a yes vote in issues pertaining nuclear non-proliferation. As seen in Model (3) economic power also matters; as GDP per

capital increases the likelihood of casting a yes vote decreases. This suggests that economically powerful players are less likely to cast a yes vote in nuclear issues. At the same time, if a countries levels of imports are higher, it is more likely for such states to support nuclear issues in the General Assembly. Put simply, if a state is more dependent on foreign goods and services, their likelihood to support nuclear non-proliferation by voting yes is increased. Based on Model 3, the figure below, shows the predicted values of the ratio to say yes on nuclear issues in order to illustrate the substantive significance of these variables. As mentioned above economic power is substantially effective as opposed to the impact of number of interstate disputes. The predicted ratio to say yes on nuclear resolutions decrease from 83% to 57% when GDP per capita decreases two standard deviations. This predicted ratio increases from 56% to 83% when the import level increases by two standard deviations. These findings show that economic power, both statistically and substantially, is an important factor over the decisions on nuclear issues. The last model, Model (4), which includes the alternate power measure (CINC) suggests that high national capability decreases the likelihood of casting a yes vote by a 90% confidence interval.

Figure 6.2 Predicted Ratio to Say Yes on Nuclear Weapons



### 6.3 Predicted Ratios of Yes Votes for the Issue Area of Human Rights

Looking at the dynamics presented in the political history of the United Nations and human rights regimes in more detail and dissect the potential reasons behind behavioral patterns, it is important to investigate the explanatory strength of power (either military or economic) on the likelihood of voting to support UN General Assembly resolutions. Hypotheses 4(a) and 4(b) are tested with OLS regression:

Table 6.3 OLS Models on Yes Vote Probability for Human Rights

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP per capita	-0.0159 (0.0115)	-0.0153 (0.0120)	-0.0585*** (0.0191)	
Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP per capita	0.417 (0.893)	0.333 (0.912)	0.665 (0.951)	
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	-0.0221* (0.0114)	-0.0230** (0.0110)	-0.0227* (0.0126)	-0.0149*** (0.00424)
Population		0.00580 (0.00768)	-0.0250* (0.0135)	
Polity V		-0.00450* (0.00257)	-0.00312 (0.00283)	
Export			-0.000448 (0.0271)	
Import			0.0364 (0.0240)	
CINC				-0.763 (1.073)
Constant	0.953*** (0.182)	0.843*** (0.279)	1.691*** (0.412)	0.712*** (0.0428)
N	2625	2484	2203	2355
R <sup>2</sup>	0.349	0.366	0.382	0.294

Standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The table above shows the three different models regarding the explanations behind the likelihood of a country to vote yes (support) UN actions being taken in human rights. It is posited in the baseline model (1) which integrates GDP per capita, military expenditures and, number of militarized interstate disputes. Model (2) includes the population and democracy index variables. Model (3) integrates import and export variables in addition to all. Model (4) integrates an alternate measure for the power variable which is the CINC score. All the four models show that the existence of a militarized interstate dispute decreases the probability to say yes on issues of human rights. Model (3) also supports that high levels of GDP per capita



decreases the probability to say yes. Based on Model 3 in the table above, the analysis below illustrates predicted values of the ratio to vote yes on human rights. Among the three statistically significant variables- number of interstate disputes, GDP per capita and population- GDP per capita seems the most substantially effective factor in changing the probability to vote yes on human rights resolutions. When slightly poor (one standard deviation below the mean) and rich (one standard deviation above the mean) countries are compared the ratio to vote yes decreases from almost 72% to 55%.

Figure 6.3 Predicted Values of the Ratio to Vote Yes on Human Rights



#### 6.4 Predicted Ratios of Yes Votes for the Issue Area of Economic and Social Development

To dissect the potential reasons behind behavioral patterns, it is important to again separate traditional and great powers. Below are the tests of the hypotheses 4(c) and 4(d) which look at the explanatory potential of power (either military or economic) on the likelihood of voting to support UN General Assembly resolutions.

Table 6.4 OLS Models on Yes Vote Probability for Economic and Social Development

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP per capita	-0.0215 (0.0135)	-0.0213 (0.0141)	-0.0785*** (0.0257)	
Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP per capita	-0.253 (1.242)	-0.415 (1.393)	0.00256 (1.426)	
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	-0.0307* (0.0164)	-0.0335* (0.0169)	-0.0320 (0.0195)	-0.0162** (0.00689)
Population		0.0104 (0.00963)	-0.0353* (0.0202)	
Polity V		-0.00199 (0.00373)	-0.00000606 (0.00414)	
Export			0.000443 (0.0317)	
Import			0.0494* (0.0275)	
CINC				-1.088 (1.560)
Constant	1.058*** (0.219)	0.879*** (0.316)	2.056*** (0.548)	0.733*** (0.0486)
N	2626	2484	2203	2356
R <sup>2</sup>	0.282	0.290	0.299	0.262

Standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ 

The table above shows the three different models regarding the explanations behind the likelihood of a country to vote yes (support) UN actions being taken in economic and social developmental issues. It posits the baseline model (1) which integrates GDP per capita, military expenditures and, number of militarized interstate disputes. Model (2) includes the population and democracy index variables. Model (3) integrates import and export variables in addition to all.

As seen in Model (3) economic power holds explanatory power; as GDP per capital increases the likelihood of casting a yes vote decreases. This suggests that economically powerful players are less likely to cast a yes vote in economic and social developmental issues. At the same time, if a countries levels of imports are higher, it is more likely for such states to support these issues in the General Assembly by a 90% confidence interval. Put simply, if a state is more dependent on foreign goods and services, their likelihood to support development both social and economic by voting yes is increased. The figure below, based on Model 3, illustrates the substantive significant impact of the economic power on voting yes in economy related resolutions. The impact of both the GDP per capita and import variables are large. A double standard deviation increase in GDP per capita leads to a 0.23 decrease in

the predicted ratio of saying yes to resolutions related to economic issues while the same change in the import variable is the same with an increasing trend.

Figure 6.4 Impact of Economic Power on Voting Yes in Social and Economic Development



## 7. SUPPORT OF SUCCESSFUL UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS

Looking at the patterns uncovered in the analysis of the predicted ratios of yes votes, the logical step forward is to investigate whether these votes are on the side of the passed resolution or not. In simpler terms, what types of power are more likely to affect a states' probability to be in the winning camp. Introducing this success variable, changes the initial question of inquiry which evolves into investigating the factors behind the likelihood of agreeing with the passed resolution. Calculating the threshold of the passing resolution is done through a simple majority principle which is (50+1). Simple majority is calculated through looking at all of the votes casted in a resolution being divided into two and rounded to the upper limit. This value is considered to be the 50+1, simple majority threshold. Concomitantly, the results of this analysis provide the success or failure of the resolution which in turn demonstrates the parties which have their interests in line with the global agenda determined by the United Nations. Following this, countries have been grouped into whether they fall under the successful or failed category under the umbrella of the way their votes were casted. The dependent variable in this analysis is measured through dividing the number of being in the success category by the total number of votes casted in a specific issue. The same set of control variables have been used in the ordinary least squares regression model as explained above. Hypotheses tested are below:

Figure 7.1 Hypotheses Regarding Support of Passed UN General Assembly Resolutions

	<b>Issue Areas</b>			
	<b><i>Middle East</i></b>	<b><i>Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament</i></b>	<b><i>Human Rights</i></b>	<b><i>Economic and Social Development</i></b>
	<b>Major Research Question: Support of Passed/Successful UN Resolutions</b>	<u>Hypothesis 5(a)</u>  Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning the Middle East	<u>Hypothesis 5(c)</u>  Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning nuclear weapons and disarmament	<u>Hypothesis 6(a)</u>  Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning issues of human rights
<u>Hypothesis 5(b)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning the Middle East		<u>Hypothesis 5(d)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning nuclear weapons and disarmament	<u>Hypothesis 6(b)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning the human rights	<u>Hypothesis 6(d)</u>  Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning economic and social development

## 7.1 Convergence with Simple Majority Passed Resolutions for the Issue Area of the Middle East

Table 7.1 OLS Models for Convergence with Simple Majority Passed Resolutions (Middle East)

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	0.00843 (0.0140)	0.0151 (0.0136)
CINC	-1.188 (1.695)	-2.035 (1.943)
Population		0.0323*** (0.0116)
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes		-0.0294*** (0.00835)
Polity V		-0.00189 (0.00275)
Constant	0.625*** (0.196)	0.0436 (0.245)
N	4188	3539
R <sup>2</sup>	0.138	0.0920

Standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The table above looks at the probabilities of being in line with the global agenda which is measured by looking at the resolutions which have passed by simple majority. Model (1) is the baseline which includes GDP per capita as the economic power and, CINC and number of militarized interstate disputes as military power. The second model includes control variables such as population and democracy scores.

These results demonstrate that existence of interstate disputes decrease the probability to be in line with the global agenda. Put simply, a state which is in the process of conflict with another state is less likely to be voting in line with the successful resolution regarding the Middle East. However, the substantive effect of experiencing an interstate dispute is not high. The figure below, shows that when a country experiences an interstate conflict the ratio to be in line with the successful resolutions about Middle East decreases from 0.80 to approximately 0.76 which may not be considered as a substantial impact. Here, population is also of statistical significance which is to say that the higher the population of a state, the more it is

likely for the states' vote to be in line with the global agenda. Similar to the effect of interstate disputes, the substantive significance of population is not large.

Figure 7.2 Predicted Ratio to be in the Winning camp on Middle East



## 7.2 Convergence with Simple Majority Passed Resolutions for the Issue Area of Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament

The next step to uncovering if indeed the few rule the many requires to look at the voting patterns of states on issues of NU in the General Assembly and whether there is a tendency for great powers to vote together and more importantly, if these votes are in the “winning” camp (passed resolutions). Hypotheses 5(c) and 5(d) are tested.

The table looks at the probabilities of being in line with the global agenda which is measured by looking at the resolutions which have passed by simple majority. Model (1) is the baseline which includes GDP per capita as the economic power and, CINC and number of militarized interstate disputes as military power. The second model includes control variables such as population and democracy scores. These results demonstrate that existence of interstate disputes decrease the probability to be in line with the global agenda. Put simply, a state which is in the process of conflict with another state is less likely to be voting in line with the successful resolution regarding the nuclear issues. Here, the CINC scores demonstrate that as the national capabilities increase the likelihood of a state to be in line with the global agenda

Table 7.2 OLS Models for Convergence with Simple Majority Passed Resolutions (Nuclear Weapons)

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	-0.00921 (0.0119)	-0.00675 (0.0119)
CINC	-2.556** (1.211)	-2.572* (1.368)
Population		0.0126 (0.00978)
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes		-0.0277*** (0.00808)
Polity V		-0.00370 (0.00232)
Constant	0.948*** (0.166)	0.726*** (0.231)
N	4188	3539
R <sup>2</sup>	0.233	0.276


Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

decreases. Additionally, data posits that as the democracy score increases, it is less likely for state to be in the winning camp and support nuclear non-proliferation resolutions in the General Assembly. This dynamic is clearly observed when the USA's actions regarding the processes of nuclear regime is taken into account such as the Iran deal. Based on Model 2, the figure below illustrates the predicted ratio to be in the successful camp of the resolution which shows that the substantive significance of the findings are small since the changes in variables are not significantly large and the predicted values of the dependent variable does not change substantially.



Figure 7.3 Predicted Ratio to be in the Winning camp on Nuclear Weapons



### 7.3 Convergence with Simple Majority Passed Resolutions for the Issue Area of Human Rights

To further this line of logic and apply Cimbal's claims that the few rule the many in the area of human rights, hypotheses 6(a) and 6(b) are tested.

The table looks at the probabilities of being in line with the global agenda which is measured by looking at the resolutions which have passed by simple majority. Model (1) is the baseline which includes GDP per capita as the economic power and, CINC and number of militarized interstate disputes as military power. The second model includes control variables such as population and democracy scores. These results demonstrate that existence of interstate disputes decrease the probability to be in line with the global agenda. However, the substantive statistical significance of the impact can be considered low. Put simply, a state which is in the process of conflict with another state is less likely to be voting in line with the successful resolution regarding the human rights. This is demonstrated in the figure below:


Table 7.3 OLS Models for Convergence with Simple Majority Passed Resolutions (Human Rights)

	(1)	(2)
	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	-0.0129 (0.0102)	-0.0108 (0.0103)
CINC	-1.219 (1.248)	-1.404 (1.377)
Population		0.0138 (0.00922)
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes		-0.0216*** (0.00608)
Polity V		-0.00267 (0.00215)
Constant	0.895*** (0.140)	0.659*** (0.213)
N	4188	3539
R <sup>2</sup>	0.267	0.273

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Figure 7.4 Interstate Disputes and Probability to be In Line with the Global Agenda (Human Rights)



## 7.4 Convergence with Simple Majority Passed Resolutions for the Issue Area of Economic and Social Development

The next step to uncover detailed dynamics of the General Assembly voting is to look at the relationship between power and global agenda. Hypotheses 6(c) and 6(d) are being tested by OLS regression.

Table 7.4 OLS Models for Convergence with Simple Majority Passed Resolutions (Economic and Social Developments)

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	-0.0131 (0.0112)	-0.0107 (0.0114)
CINC	-1.428 (1.609)	-2.116 (1.828)
Population		0.0261** (0.0100)
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes		-0.0219*** (0.00831)
Polity V		-0.00157 (0.00228)
Constant	0.916*** (0.156)	0.486** (0.226)
N	4188	3539
R <sup>2</sup>	0.176	0.205


Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The table above looks at the probabilities of being in line with the global agenda which is measured by looking at the resolutions which have passed by simple majority. Model (1) is the baseline which includes GDP per capita as the economic power and, CINC and number of militarized interstate disputes as military power. The second model includes control variables such as population and democracy scores. These results demonstrate that existence of interstate disputes decrease the probability to be in line with the global agenda. Put simply, a state which is in the process of conflict with another state is less likely to be voting in line with the successful resolution regarding the economic and social issues. Moreover, as GDP increases, the likelihood to be in line with the winning camp decreases. Put simply, as a country is more economically and militarily powerful put together with high

levels of democracy scores, make it less likely for that state to be in line with the global governance agenda of economic and social development. While the findings show the statistical significance, the figure below, based on Model 2 in the table above, shows that the impact of these variables are not substantially significant.

Figure 7.5 Effect of GDP and Military Interstate Disputes on the Likelihood of being in Line with the Global Agenda



## 8. ALIGNMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

When the data is combined with the historical analyses of global governance, an important actor comes forth which requires special attention especially with regards to its place in international power play. This idea stems from Erik Voeten’s paper which estimates dynamic state preferences from UN voting data where the author looks at state positions with regards to each other (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). Here, the aim is to focus upon solely the voting behavior patterns between the United States and others. The dependent variable for this analysis is measured through calculating the ration of the number of in line votes with the USA to the total number of votes casted in each issue area. In order to conduct the ordinary least square regression two main parts of the data need to be changed. Trade import and export, and militarized interstate dispute data will be transposed into a dyadic format to complement the dyadic nature of the analysis. Additionally, here it would provide helpful to also introduce dyadic alliance scores which measures the number of existing alliances a country has with the United States in a given year. This data is provided by the Correlates of War Project Formal Alliance 4.1 database. The hypotheses tested are below:

Figure 8.1 Hypotheses Regarding USA Allignment

	Issue Areas			
	<i>Middle East</i>	<i>Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament</i>	<i>Human Rights</i>	<i>Economic and Social Development</i>
	<u>Hypothesis 7(a)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 7(c)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 8(a)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 8(c)</u>
<b>Major Research Question: Alignment with the United States of America</b>	In the area of the Middle East, stronger military alliances would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America	In the area of nuclear weapons and disarmament stronger military alliances would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America	In the areas of human rights stronger military alliances would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America	In the areas of economic and social development, stronger military alliances would affect the probability to vote in line with the United States of America
	<u>Hypothesis 7(b)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 7(d)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 8(b)</u>	<u>Hypothesis 8(d)</u>
	In the area of the Middle East, stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America	In the area nuclear weapons and disarmament, stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America	In the areas of human rights stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America	In the areas of economic and social development, stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America

## 8.1 Predicted Ratios of Vote Convergence with the United States of America in the Issue Area of the Middle East

The table below shows the four OLS models that are employed in the explaining the probabilities for US alignment. The first model (1) includes country specifics such as GDP per capita, population, CINC score, polity score of the state compared with the US. The second model includes dyadic variables which looks at numbers of interstate disputes with the USA (if any) as well as trade levels between the selected country and the United States and, lastly the number of alliances- both military, economic and social. Model (3) includes the amalgamation of the first two models. Model (4) diverges from these previous analyses by introducing US related variables along with dyadic controls (GDP, polity, population, CINC score differences). Hypotheses 7(a) and 7(b) are tested:

Table 8.1 OLS Models for US Alignment Probabilities for Middle East

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP per capita	0.0143* (0.00813)		0.0113* (0.00614)	
Population	0.00263 (0.00214)		0.000396 (0.00366)	
CINC	-0.222 (0.180)		-0.194 (0.207)	
Polity V	0.00132 (0.00116)		0.00100 (0.00143)	
Total Number of Military Interstate Disputes of the USA		-0.0154* (0.00914)	-0.00814 (0.00615)	-0.00875 (0.00633)
Internatinal Trade Volume		0.00162 (0.00352)	0.00112 (0.00336)	0.000160 (0.00325)
Total Number of Alliances of the USA		0.0207 (0.0138)	0.0149 (0.0245)	0.0142 (0.0246)
GDP Difference				-0.0131** (0.00623)
Population Difference				-0.00168 (0.00364)
Democracy Difference				-0.00104 (0.00144)
CINC Difference				0.203 (0.188)
Constant	-0.181 (0.111)	0.0438*** (0.0152)	-0.110 (0.0762)	0.0917*** (0.0305)
N	3515	4582	3468	3468
R <sup>2</sup>	0.110	0.0974	0.114	0.117


Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

According to Model (3), which integrates the first two models, as the GDP per capita increases the likelihood to vote in line with the United States increases as well. This means that it is more likely for a country that is richer in economic terms to have

aligned interests with the United States in issues pertaining the Middle East. In the figure below, however, it is illustrated that the impact of the GDP per capita is slightly substantially significant. When all controls are set to their mean values, the effect of GDP per capita is different in its different values. The ratio to say yes and aligned to the United States when GDP pc is one standard deviation above the mean is around 0.06 while one standard deviation below the mean is predicted as 0.03. While the probability to say yes doubles when the country is slightly rich but still the probability is low. Model (4), indicates that the wider the difference between the GDPs of the US and other state will decrease the probability to vote in line with the US.

Figure 8.2 Predicted Ratio to Vote Similar to the US on Middle East




## 8.2 Predicted Ratios of Vote Convergence with the United States of America in the Issue Area of Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament

When US support for successful resolutions and others' aligned voting behavior is extrapolated from the dataset another finding comes to light. Firstly, the United States' ratio of successful resolutions is rather low (the maximum is around 50 percent in the mid to late 1990s and only exceeds 10 percent in 2010 and 2011). This is also reflected in support for the US nuclear strategy on the UN General Assembly.

These numbers reflect the dynamics of the international arena and the central propo-

sition of this study in the sense that the game is indeed zero-sum.<sup>1</sup> The lack of the understanding of a common interest among the powerful in this issue area cause for increasing tensions with regards to the nuclear non-proliferation efforts, which is in turn a direct effect of the changing balance of power equations.

Figure 8.3 UN Member State Support to the United State on Issues Pertaining Nuclear Weapons



These numbers reflect the dynamics of the international arena and the central proposition of this study in the sense that the game is indeed zero-sum. The lack of the understanding of a common interest among the powerful in this issue area cause for increasing tensions with regards to the nuclear non-proliferation efforts, which is in turn a direct effect of the changing balance of power equations.

### 8.3 Predicted Ratios of Vote Convergence with the United States of America in the Issue Area of Human Rights

To dissect the power politics aspect of human rights, the next step is to look at the voting behavior of the United States in conjunction with other states. Hypotheses

<sup>1</sup>Rajagopalan, Rajeswari P. "The return of power politics and nuclear non-proliferation." *Observer Research Foundation*, November 5, 2019. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-return-of-power-politics-and-nuclear-non-proliferation-57287/>



8(a) and 8(b) are tested.

Table 8.2 OLS Models for US Alignment Probabilities for the Issues of Human Rights

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP per capita	0.0345*** (0.00855)		0.0313*** (0.00860)	
Population	0.000474 (0.00411)		-0.00195 (0.00525)	
CINC	-0.293 (0.379)		-0.0923 (0.373)	
Polity V	0.00824*** (0.00141)		0.00685*** (0.00156)	
Total Number of Military Interstate Disputes of the USA		-0.0642*** (0.0130)	-0.0322*** (0.0110)	-0.0313*** (0.0110)
Internatinal Trade Volume		0.00810** (0.00366)	-0.00390 (0.00439)	-0.00360 (0.00427)
Total Number of Alliances of the USA		0.0887*** (0.0198)	0.0816*** (0.0268)	0.0812*** (0.0269)
GDP Difference				-0.0311*** (0.00861)
Population Difference				0.00181 (0.00520)
Democracy Difference				-0.00685*** (0.00157)
CINC Difference				0.172 (0.347)
Constant	-0.361** (0.140)	0.0695*** (0.0167)	-0.261* (0.145)	0.289*** (0.0784)
N	3515	4582	3468	3468
R <sup>2</sup>	0.599	0.532	0.622	0.622

Standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The table above shows the four OLS models that are employed in the explaining the probabilities for US alignment in the issue area of nuclear non-proliferation. The first model (1) includes country specifics such as GDP per capita, population, CINC score, polity score of the state compared with the US. The second model includes dyadic variables which looks at numbers of interstate disputes with the USA (if any) as well as trade levels between the selected country and the United States and, lastly the number of alliances- both military, economic and social. Model (3) includes the amalgamation of the first two models. Model (4) diverges from these previous analyses by introducing US related variables along with dyadic controls (GDP, polity, population, CINC score differences).

According to Model (3), which integrates the first two models, increasing GDP per

capita and democracy scores increase the likelihood of voting similarly with the United States. Also, numbers of alliances increase the probability to vote similarly, while the existence of military interstate dispute decrease this chance. Model (4) similarly supports the findings. The figure below, based on Model 3 in the table above, shows the predicted values of the dependent variable in three different scenarios of different variables while other controls are set to their mean values. Figure 8 shows that the impact of the existence of alliances with the US has a substantial impact as oppose to the other statistically significant variables. The predicted ratio to votes aligned regarding Human Rights with the US while they do not have any alliance is around 0.18 while this ratio increases to approximately 0.35 when they have more than one alliances.

Figure 8.4 Predicted Values of the US Alignment (Human Rights)



#### 8.4 Predicted Ratios of Vote Convergence with the United States of America in the Issue Area of Economic and Social Development

All of these findings require a more in depth look into country specific dynamics, therefore the vote preferences and probabilities in line with the United States. Hypotheses 8(c) and 8(d) are tested.

Table 8.3 OLS Models for US Alignment Probabilities for Economic and Social Development

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP per capita	0.0219*** (0.00610)		0.0154*** (0.00538)	
Population	0.00515** (0.00253)		0.000381 (0.00357)	
CINC	-0.203 (0.226)		-0.134 (0.233)	
Polity V	0.00504*** (0.000958)		0.00439*** (0.00112)	
Total Number of Military Interstate Disputes of the USA		-0.0323*** (0.0105)	-0.0209*** (0.00714)	-0.0190*** (0.00681)
Internatinal Trade Volume		0.00901*** (0.00246)	0.00265 (0.00293)	0.00491* (0.00288)
Total Number of Alliances of the USA		0.0254** (0.0124)	0.0280 (0.0186)	0.0291 (0.0187)
GDP Difference				-0.0113** (0.00555)
Population Difference				0.00232 (0.00358)
Democracy Difference				-0.00432*** (0.00113)
CINC Difference				0.164 (0.212)
Constant	-0.315*** (0.0899)	0.0185* (0.0106)	-0.161* (0.0852)	0.0995** (0.0422)
N	3515	4582	3468	3468
R <sup>2</sup>	0.275	0.304	0.279	0.278

Standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The table above shows the four OLS models that are employed in the explaining the probabilities for US alignment in the issue area of nuclear non-proliferation. The first model (1) includes country specifics such as GDP per capita, population, CINC score, polity score of the state compared with the US. The second model includes dyadic variables which looks at numbers of interstate disputes with the USA (if any) as well as trade levels between the selected country and the United States and, lastly the number of alliances- both military, economic and social. Model (3) includes the amalgamation of the first two models. Model (4) diverges from these previous analyses by introducing US related variables along with dyadic controls (GDP, polity, population, CINC score differences).

According to Model (3), which integrates the first two models, increasing GDP per capita and democracy scores also increase the likelihood of voting in line with the USA in matters of economic and social development. Interestingly, while supporting

these findings, Model (4) shows that increased trade relations also increase the probability of voting in line with the USA. The figure below, based on Model 3 shows how predicted ratio voting aligned with the US changes in different scenarios. It also illustrates that the predicted ratio of voting aligned with the US changes by around 0.05 when the variables GDP per capita, polity score and number of interstate disputes change by two standard deviations. The effect of these variables thus cannot be accounted as variables which have large impacts.

Figure 8.5 Predicted Ratio to Vote Similar to the US on Economic and Social Issues



## 9. CONCLUSION

Since the 1900s the world has undergone many changes; the Westphalian system, established with the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück in 1648, is rapidly dissipating with questions of the reach state sovereignty at its core (Hickey 2020). The post-war world order and its parts, by which the current system and its inhabitants has been framed, is going through a crisis.<sup>1</sup> A myriad of actors has emerged from the shadows threatening the Western ideals of democracy and rule of law, a prime example being terrorist organizations. Emerging powers like China and India are threatening the systemic balance of power. Environmental issues such as climate change and resource depletion have declared emergency begging for the attention of policymakers and statesmen to change the status quo in being more sensitive to its needs. On the political front, populism is on the rise with nationalistic tendencies being observed in many regions of the globe. Economically, the system is constrained with the burden of international debt and issues of poverty and hunger are yet to be resolved. Most importantly, the novel coronavirus has the world under duress and a public health emergency is currently declared.

The crisis that threatens the post-war order and its parts is multifaceted and complex. Most importantly, there is the issue of power. The power balances of the system and shifting constellations of the powerful put tensions on the political, economic and, social aspects. These all require a system of global governance that can address issues of universal concern while presenting solutions that are acceptable to its units and contributing entities of the international order. This is the point of origin which has provided the primary motivation of this dissertation.

The global governance arrangements of 2020 reflect the duress that the international

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<sup>1</sup>Here, it is critical to distinguish between the global order and its parts- the post-war global order is characterized by the Westphalian principle of national sovereignty, a liberal economic market and diplomacy in the form of multilateral efforts (Ruggie 2020, Martin and Simmons 1998, Ikenberry 2018). Its inhabitants are the units which are capable of actions on the international front. These units are the actors which effect power dynamics and balances; such actors are mostly regarded to be states as they are the major forces which enter international agreements and treaties. However, it would be most problematic to claim that states are the only actors worth considering when looking at influential international entities as international organizations, multinational corporations, transnational advocacy networks, terrorist organizations, trade organizations, international regimes are also critical parts of this system- in the effects on both the framing and functioning.

system is under; it is marked by confusion and tensions. The coronavirus pandemic has amplified the situation by presenting a challenge that must be effectively addressed in both international and domestic platforms, and narrow national interests have hindered the communications between international actors pushing increasing amounts of tension into the equation. The United States and China are prime examples of such dynamics in 2020 under the issue area of public health. Here, the realpolitik is being played out in the platform of the World Health Organization. It is with these dynamics in mind that this study aims to understand how states act within global governance constellations with regards to their relative power positions and narrow national interests against the general will and global agenda setting on certain issue areas.

### **9.1 Overview of the Research Motivation, Questions, and Hypotheses**

The first part of this dissertation begins by presenting an in-depth of investigation of concepts within international relations literature that concerns global governance and thus, acts as an anchor to situate notion within an array of similar concepts. The first chapter of this study puts further meaning into the role of global governance on the international arena by developing and organizing concepts and notions through a theoretical framework. By establishing a theoretical foundation over which this study is based, the second chapter integrates theory and practice by presenting an overview of the historical evolution of global governance and provides a brief snapshot of the current situation.

The second part of this dissertation discusses the relationship between global governance and power. Here, the inquiry is shaped by the realist and neo-liberal institutionalist propositions which focus on the systematic distribution of power and complex interdependency as a determining factor of state behavior. More specifically, the questions at hand boil down to investigations on the role of power over global agenda setting and its concomitant influences on global governance as a whole. Due to the vast nature of this question, this study focuses on looking at power politics on the platform of the United Nations General Assembly. The main research agenda of this dissertation is to describe, define, uncover and illustrate the role -if any- of the relative power of countries on the platform of UN General Assembly voting results.

The main research question of this dissertation requires for a depiction of how traditional and emerging powers vote in the UN General Assembly in four issue areas

which have been categorized by Eric Voeten’s coded data of voting patterns (Middle East, Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation, Human Rights, and Economic and Social Development). Breaking down issues discussed in UN General Assembly allows the research to focus on specific areas of debate without the worry of issue spill over and cross-contamination. However, it should be noted that this approach is prone to overseeing certain intricacies of the issue areas and their inner connectedness. This descriptive data provides strong explanations for coalition forming and, alliance building on the international stage. Two options emerge from the comparing the two country groups. Both of which contribute to literature in the field of International Relations. The first option is that of homogeneity; traditional power and emerging powers voting together on specific issue areas; if verified, would strengthen theories regarding block voting and coalition building. The second option is that of divergence of voting behavior on specific issues, signaling that categorizing countries in this manner is indeed applicable and more importantly, clearly demonstrates the issues which are high ranking contributing to either realist, liberal or constructivist views regarding the importance given to the notion of national interest. The descriptive data gives a coherent picture of the patterns of power in the UN General Assembly- Hypotheses 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), and 1(d) and 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d). The results posit that Traditional and Emerging powers diverge in every issue area which confirm the realist understandings of the functioning of the international system. The results and their implications to international politics and global governance are discussed in the chapters. However, these results do not provide any novel ideas to the study of global governance but rather provide a roadmap of the trajectory since the 1990s.

	Middle East	Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation	Human Rights	Economic and Social Development
ANOVA Means Comparison: Traditional vs Emerging Powers	<b>Hypothesis 1(a):</b> Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining the Middle East, the Palestinian Conflict (Arab-Israeli Conflict).	<b>Hypothesis 1(c):</b> Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament.	<b>Hypothesis 2(a):</b> Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights.	<b>Hypothesis 2(c):</b> Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development.
	<b>Hypothesis 1(b):</b> Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining the Middle East, the Palestinian Conflict (Arab-Israeli Conflict).	<b>Hypothesis 1(d):</b> Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament.	<b>Hypothesis 2(b):</b> Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights	<b>Hypothesis 2(d):</b> Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development.

The major contribution of this dissertation starts with the recognition of the dichotomy presented in the traditional understanding of power. Namely, it is key to distinguish between Traditional powers (which are taken at face value in the first part) and Great powers (which are measured through military, population, economic strength and, resources). This distinction allows for a systematic demonstration of power and its effects over voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. More specifically, Hypotheses 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d) and, Hypotheses 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), 4(d) focus on the effects of military and economic strength on the likelihood of supporting UN General Assembly Resolutions.

	Middle East	Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation	Human Rights	Economic and Social Development
High vs Low Military Strength: Probabilities of Supporting UNGA Resolutions	<b>Hypothesis 3(a):</b> Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining the Middle East, the Palestinian Conflict (Arab-Israeli Conflict).	<b>Hypothesis 3(c):</b> Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament.	<b>Hypothesis 4(a):</b> Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights.	<b>Hypothesis 4(c):</b> Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development.
	<b>Hypothesis 3(b):</b> Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining Middle East, the Palestinian Conflict (Arab-Israeli Conflict).	<b>Hypothesis 3(d):</b> Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear weapons and disarmament.	<b>Hypothesis 4(b):</b> Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining human rights.	<b>Hypothesis 4(d):</b> Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining economic and social development.

For peace and security issues the results indicate the importance of military power and activity. On the issue of the Middle East, Hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b) dive into the likelihood of saying yes (supporting the UN) in issues of the Middle East region in terms of power. Results indicate in the baseline model that military strength does not affect the likelihood of saying yes. However, when other control variables are integrated in the advanced model it is confirmed that engaging in an interstate dispute decreases the likelihood of saying yes. There is a pitfall in this; context is critical, and the region of the interstate dispute is not controlled for, therefore, this finding should be taken with a grain of salt.

Regarding issues of nuclear weapons and disarmament results indicate that high military strength decreases the likelihood of supporting the UN. Similarly, high economic power decreases the likelihood of saying yes. However, as imports increase, the likelihood to say yes also increases, which implies countries that are economically



dependent support UN resolutions on nuclear weapons and disarmament.

For issues of human rights, the importance of military power are not as clear in the baseline model and no statistical significance is found. However, high economic strength is found to increase the likelihood of supporting the UN. For issues of economic and social development, economic power is the key. More specifically, economic strength holds explanatory power; as GDP per capital increases the likelihood of casting a yes vote decreases. This suggests that economically powerful players are less likely to cast a yes vote in economic and social developmental issues.

The success of these resolutions is not included and therefore, it is critical to also explain the results of the resolutions; whether it has passed or not. Thus, the study gravitates to uncovering the effects of military and economic power over global agenda setting procedures. Introducing this success variable, changes the initial question of inquiry which evolves into investigating the factors behind the likelihood of agreeing with the passed resolution. Calculating the threshold of the passing resolution is done through a simple majority principle which is (50+1). Simple majority is calculated through looking at all of the votes casted in a resolution being divided into two and rounded to the upper limit. This value is considered to be the 50+1, simple majority threshold. Concomitantly, the results of this analysis provide the success or failure of the resolution which in turn demonstrates the parties which have their interests in line with the global agenda determined by the United Nations. Following this, countries have been grouped into whether they fall under the successful or failed category under the umbrella of the way their votes were casted. The dependent variable in this analysis is measured through dividing the number of being in the success category by the total number of votes casted in a specific issue. Hypotheses 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 5(d) and, 6(a), 6(b), 6(c), 6(d) are presented below:

<b>Effects of Military vs Economic Strength on Global Agenda Setting</b>	<b>Middle East</b>	<b>Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation</b>	<b>Human Rights</b>	<b>Economic and Social Development</b>
	<b>Hypothesis 5(a):</b> Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning the Middle East, the Palestinian Conflict (Arab-Israeli Conflict).	<b>Hypothesis 5(c):</b> Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning nuclear weapons and disarmament.	<b>Hypothesis 6(a):</b> Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning human rights.	<b>Hypothesis 6(c):</b> Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning economic and social development.
	<b>Hypothesis 5(b):</b> Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning the Middle East, the Palestinian Conflict (Arab-Israeli Conflict).	<b>Hypothesis 5(d):</b> Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning nuclear weapons and disarmament.	<b>Hypothesis 6(b):</b> Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning human rights.	<b>Hypothesis 6(d):</b> Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning economic and social development.

For issues pertaining the Middle East, both Hypothesis 5(a) and 5(b) do not produce results of statistical significance in the baseline model. However, when other controls are integrated and the advanced model is analyzed these results demonstrate that existence of interstate disputes decrease the probability to be in line with the global agenda. Put simply, a state which is in the process of conflict with another state is less likely to be voting in line with the successful resolution regarding the Middle East.

On nuclear weapons and disarmament, the baseline model confirms that countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes and support the resolution. The advanced models also indicate that the existence of interstate disputes decrease the probability to be in line with the global agenda. Put simply, a state which is in the process of conflict with another state is less likely to be voting in line with the successful resolution regarding the nuclear issues. Here, economic strength does not produce statistical significance in the baseline model.

On the area of human rights, both military and economic strength do not exert an effect on the likelihood to vote in line with the global agenda, when the baseline model is analyzed. For issues of economic and social development, the baseline results are similar. However, more advanced models demonstrate that existence of

interstate disputes decrease the probability to be in line with the global agenda. A state which is in the process of conflict with another state is less likely to be voting in line with the successful resolution regarding the economic and social issues. Moreover, as GDP increases, the likelihood to be in line with the winning camp decreases. Put simply, as a country is more economically and militarily powerful with high levels of democracy scores, it is less likely for that state to be in line with the global governance agenda of economic and social development.

The combination of all of these tests confirm the initial observation which has motivated this study; relative power positions in the international system, combined with narrow national interests framed by economic and military concerns, shape state behavior in global governance. To complement this data-based analysis and bring the study to a full circle by combining theory and practice, the next step in the process is illustrate this realpolitik on the international arena. This requires a special look at the post-war hegemon, the United States of America, and its voting patterns compared to other UN member states. This idea stems from Erik Voeten’s paper which estimates dynamic state preferences from UN voting data where the author looks at state positions with regards to each other (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). The following hypotheses are tested.

	Middle East	Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation	Human Rights	Economic and Social Development
<b>US Alignment: Alliances vs Economic Ties</b>	<b>Hypothesis 7(a):</b> In the area of Middle East stronger military alliances would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America.	<b>Hypothesis 7(c):</b> In the area of Nuclear weapons and disarmament, stronger military alliances would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America.	<b>Hypothesis 8(a):</b> In the area of human rights stronger military alliances would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America.	<b>Hypothesis 8(c):</b> In the area of economic and social development, stronger military alliances would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America.
	<b>Hypothesis 7(b):</b> In the area of Middle, stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America.	<b>Hypothesis 7(d):</b> In the area nuclear weapons and disarmament, stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America.	<b>Hypothesis 8(b):</b> In the areas of human rights stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America.	<b>Hypothesis 8(d):</b> In the areas of economic and social development, stronger economic ties would increase the probability to vote in line with the United States of America.

Here the results show that for the issue area of the Middle East, military strength does not seem to be of explanatory value according to the baseline model. However,

the existence of strong economic ties increase the likelihood of voting in line with the United States. Here, it is also important to look at the advanced models which posit that the wider the difference between the GDPs of the US and other state, it is less likely to vote in line with the US.

In the area of nuclear weapons and disarmament, military alliances increase the probability to vote in line with the United States. Economic ties however, do not produce a statistically significant effect. Here, it is important to distinguish between economic ties and economic strength because the advanced model states that a higher GDP increases the probability to vote in line with their American counterparts.

For the issue of human rights, the baseline model proves significance for Hypothesis 8(a) confirming that stronger military alliances increase the likelihood of voting along with the US. Economic ties, however, do not offer a statistically significant result. However, when the advanced models are dissected, GDP per capita shows to be of effect thus, economic strength positively influences the likelihood of supporting American voting behavior. Similarly, in the area of social and economic development, military alliances do not show an effect within the baseline model. However, stronger economic ties positively influence the decision to vote with the United States.

## **9.2 Regarding the Future: Thinking in Context**

This study has aimed to map the constellations of global governance players to contribute to the myriad of debates regarding the future of the international order (Ikenberry 2019, Owen 2019, Ikenberry 2018, Lopez-Claros, Dahl, and Groff 2020, Rodrik 2019, Weiss and Wilkinson 2019, Beeson 2019, Kahler 2018, Weiss 2016, Murphy 2014, Kahler 2009, Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006). The 2020 coronavirus pandemic has fueled the current discussions regarding the state of the international system, indicating that both the system and its actors are undergoing significant changes in both function and structure (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann 2020). Leading liberal internationalist scholars such as Ikenberry focus on the systematic aspect of the global order, investigating the future of the system by investigating “new forms of protection and capabilities to manage interdependence”; while neorealism foresees a return to protectionism and isolationism (Allen et al. 2020). Looking at the world in light of recent events, Stephen Walt suggests that the crises that have unfolded in the past year has solidified the Western reputation and that

the power struggles which shape the international arena will not change because of the “the fundamentally conflictive nature of world politics (Allen et al. 2020).” Similarly, Robert Nibblett claims that it is unlikely for the world to go back to the shiny era of globalization of the early 2000s and that “overt geopolitical competition is a potential option which could mark global interactions in the future (Allen et al. 2020).

Although it can be argued that these outlooks seem explicitly aggressive and too pessimistic, the findings of this dissertation confirm the dire situation that the liberal international order is in, which is indeed one of peril. Therefore, this study contributes to the debates over international cooperation. Theoretically, the realist perspective emphasizes the conflictual nature of international politics-as blatantly stated by Stephen Walt. Additionally, the neo-realist understanding of the obstacles in the face of international cooperation seem to be equally applicable to the 20th century global system, as demonstrated by the systemic shock that the coronavirus pandemic has created. Despite the undeniable need for a more cooperative world in the midst of Covid-19, global governance has become a platform where power struggles of great powers play out. This is clearly seen in the tensions between the United States and China in the areas of public health, human rights, and economic concerns.

The realist theory also proves useful in the explanations over the political realm and foreign policy trajectories of the world players. Data provided in this study confirm that relative power positions and narrow national interests shape the behavior of states. The American return to a more solitary and unilateral international presence appears to strengthen realist understandings of the undeniable effects of structure shaping agent behavior- in the anarchic system all states are responsible for their own survival.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, this study provides a source of confidence for the realist school by investigating the manner in which national interests play out in the global governance platform. The analysis of the UN General Assembly voting data clearly demonstrate that great powers are committed to supporting the Global Agenda, set forth by the impartial UN Agencies, to the extent that is beneficial to their own goals; participating and pushing issues of their own choosing. Key realist scholar John Mearsheimer states that such institutions “are effectively rules that the great powers devise and agree to follow, because they believe that obeying those rules is in their interest (Mearsheimer 1994).” Concomitantly, it is the logical conclusion to state that realist theory holds the most explanatory power over the current dynamics of global governance, with the data confirming the multipolar

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<sup>2</sup>Walt, Stephen M.. “The Realist’s Guide to the Coronavirus Outbreak.” *Foreign Policy*, March 9, 2020. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/09/coronavirus-economy-globalization-virus-icu-realism/>

nature of the international system as suggested in the first proposition.

Despite the obvious advantages of adapting a realist understanding of current global politics, it is key to identify its shortcomings as well as highlighting the liberal perspective. A key critique of the realist camps' approach to global governance is that it is a diagnostic theory rather than resolving the problems and issuing prescriptions.<sup>3</sup> It is indeed true that states have gathered together to combat the common enemy, bridging national interests and international common will in various issue areas on the international platform; this is evident in the founding of the League of Nations, Bretton Woods Institutions, United Nations, NATO, and the G Groups. All of which are examples of creating balances between national and global interests.<sup>4</sup> Simply put, cooperation has been, and is, an undeniable reality of political history.

This study does not contest the liberal ideology on two points; international institutions are indeed key players, and economic power is a contributor to the relative power position of a country. However, the extent of the influence that institutions have over state behavior is limited and bounded to narrow national interests. This is also true for complex interdependences as the results of the analyses of Hypotheses 7(d) and 8(b) have not been statistically significant; for these queries, the models have indicated a correlation between economic power and global agenda setting, but have not indicated a result which confirms the effects of economic ties and thus, complex interdependency.

It is true that multinational platforms, such as the ones the United Nations provide, deliver unparalleled resources and podiums to address issues of universal concern and more importantly, states do regard such actors as significant forces in the international arena. The substantiality of global governance institutions is solidified by the presence of great powers in their rosters. However, there is one concern that trumps all else in international matters and that is one of relative power positions and the realization of national interests.

This dissertation has aimed to uncover the importance of national interests on the global platform by looking at the problem from the perspective of power. Data has supported the importance of military and economic power on various issue areas. However, this study provides crude analysis of global governance today by illuminating the instances in which unilateral motivations fuel behavior. It does not explain

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<sup>3</sup>Johnston Seth A. "The Pandemic and the Limits of Realism." *Foreign Policy*, June 24, 2020. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/24/coronavirus-pandemic-realism-limited-international-relations-theory/>

<sup>4</sup>In the effort to remedy the global situation of 2020, Joseph Nye states that the scope of national interests will define the future international system and its cooperative range (Allen et al. 2020). More specifically, the decisive factor is posited to be the balance between the national and international.

the circumstances under which states choose national interest above all. Therefore, further research is necessary to uncover the dynamics and parameters which both explain the why and the how.

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## APPENDIX A

Dataset Name	Source	Link	Citation
UN General Assembly Voting Dataset	Harvard Dataverse	<a href="https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/12379">https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/12379</a>	Erik Voeten "Data and Analyses of Voting in the UN General Assembly" Routledge Handbook of International Organization, edited by Bob Reinalda (published May 27, 2013). Available at SSRN: <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2111149">http://ssrn.com/abstract=2111149</a> When using the ideal point data, please cite: Bailey, Michael A., Anton Strelzhnev, and Erik Voeten. 2017. Estimating dynamic state preferences from united nations voting data. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (2): 430-56.
SIPRI Military Expenditure	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	<a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex">https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex</a>	You do NOT need permission to use or cite SIPRI data for the following purposes, so long as SIPRI is clearly identified as the source of the data: In a university/school/college paper, essay or dissertation.
CINC	Correlates of War- National Material Capabilities 5.0		Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.
Polity V	Center For Systemic Peace- Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research	<a href="https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm">https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm</a>	" Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
Militarized Interstate Dispute	Correlates of War- Militarized Interstate Disputes V.4.3	<a href="https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs">https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs</a>	"Ghosh, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:133-154.
GDP	World Bank	<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD</a>	World Bank. "GDP (Current US\$)." The World Bank Group. Accessed July 30, 2020.
Export & Import	International Monetary Fund	<a href="https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61013712">https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61013712</a>	Direction of Trade Statistics. "The International Monetary Fund. Accessed July 30, 2020.
Population	World Bank	<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL</a>	World Bank. "Population." The World Bank Group. Accessed July 30, 2020.
Research and Development	World Bank	<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS</a>	World Bank. "Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP)." The World Bank Group. Accessed July 30, 2020.

Table A.1 OLS Models on Yes Vote Probability for Middle East with Research and Development Variable

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	0.0101 (0.0350)	-0.0526 (0.0351)
Export	-0.0150 (0.0428)	-0.0343 (0.0460)
Import	0.0495 (0.0355)	0.0541 (0.0431)
Population	-0.00506 (0.0317)	-0.0128 (0.0281)
Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP per capita	-1.805 (2.220)	-2.336 (3.358)
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	-0.0165 (0.0141)	-0.0191 (0.0163)
Research and Development	-0.322*** (0.103)	
Polity V	-0.00265 (0.00519)	-0.00606 (0.00682)
Constant	0.787 (0.769)	1.867** (0.742)
N	1007	1007
R <sup>2</sup>	0.284	0.151

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A.2 OLS Models on Yes Vote Probability for Nuclear Development with Research and Development Variable

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	-0.0481 (0.0328)	-0.0575*** (0.0207)
Export	-0.0552 (0.0383)	-0.0464 (0.0319)
Import	0.132*** (0.0313)	0.0623** (0.0285)
Population	-0.0872*** (0.0287)	-0.0182 (0.0158)
Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP per capita	-2.107 (1.775)	-0.579 (1.629)
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	-0.0216** (0.00849)	-0.0173 (0.0119)
Research and Development	-0.270*** (0.0856)	
Polity V	-0.00318 (0.00464)	-0.00500 (0.00334)
Constant	2.685*** (0.679)	1.889*** (0.433)
N	1007	1007
R <sup>2</sup>	0.558	0.455

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A.3 OLS Models on Yes Vote Probability for Human Rights with Research and Development Variable

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	-0.0148 (0.0163)	-0.0575*** (0.0207)
Export	-0.0332 (0.0284)	-0.0464 (0.0319)
Import	0.0592** (0.0240)	0.0623** (0.0285)
Population	-0.0130 (0.0151)	-0.0182 (0.0158)
Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP per capita	-0.217 (0.896)	-0.579 (1.629)
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	-0.0155 (0.0106)	-0.0173 (0.0119)
Research and Development	-0.219*** (0.0463)	
Polity V	-0.00267 (0.00233)	-0.00500 (0.00334)
Constant	1.154*** (0.356)	1.889*** (0.433)
N	1007	1007
R <sup>2</sup>	0.533	0.455

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A.4 OLS Models on Yes Vote Probability for Economic and Social Development with Research and Development Variable

	(1)	(2)
	ratio_1_EC	ratio_1_EC
GDP per capita	-0.0173 (0.0314)	-0.0658** (0.0306)
Export	-0.0419 (0.0430)	-0.0568 (0.0440)
Import	0.0806*** (0.0288)	0.0842** (0.0342)
Population	-0.0222 (0.0309)	-0.0282 (0.0290)
Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP per capita	-1.362 (1.632)	-1.773 (2.524)
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	-0.0216 (0.0200)	-0.0237 (0.0214)
Research and Development	-0.249*** (0.0743)	
Polity V	0.00174 (0.00450)	-0.000904 (0.00551)
Constant	1.208* (0.682)	2.044*** (0.665)
N	1007	1007
R <sup>2</sup>	0.332	0.250

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$