

POPULISM, FAILURES, AND A SENSE OF CRISIS

by
MERT ŞENCAN


Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Sabancı University
July 2019


POPULISM, FAILURES, AND A SENSE OF CRISIS

Approved by:


Assoc. Prof. Özge Kemahlioğlu
(Thesis Supervisor)



Asst. Prof. Berk Esen



Asst. Prof. Nedim Nami Nomer



Approval Date: July 19, 2019

MERT ŐENCAN 2019 ©

All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

POPULISM, FAILURES, AND A SENSE OF CRISIS

MERT ŞENCAN

POLITICAL SCIENCE M.A. THESIS, JULY 2019

Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Özge Kemahlioğlu

Keywords: populism, failures, crisis, sense of crisis

Scholars of populism literature mostly view crisis as one of the key causal independent factors for the emergence of populism. Instead of viewing crisis as an available initiator element, this study takes into account its perceptual dimension, views crisis indeed as failures, and accepts that they can only become crisis when they are perceived as crisis. This study aims to focus on Benjamin Moffitt's claim that the ability of populism to remain power depends on its perpetuation failures as crisis. As taking Ernesto Laclau's conception of populism as a base, to check whether this claim may seem to be true for Turkish case, a mixed method exploratory research has been run by combining case studies of recent economic failure periods with content analysis of president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's discourses. While focusing on periods of failures, Erdoğan's discourses have been categorized according to their potential ability to rise crisis perception of the people of Turkey. Whether Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric is greater than his crisis denying populist rhetoric has been checked per each case, while changes in sense of crisis of the people and support of the electorate to AKP have been presented. In that way, not an explanatory but an exploratory study has been run to find out whether Erdoğan may fit the "populist" profile that Moffitt uses for Hugo Chávez. However, under conditions like small number of cases and constraints of discursive data, findings point out Erdoğan may not fit such "populist" profile.

ÖZET

POPÜLİZM, BOZULMALAR VE KRİZ ALGISI

MERT ŞENCAN

SİYASET BİLİMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Özge Kemahlıoğlu

Anahtar Kelimeler: popülizm, bozulmalar, kriz, kriz algısı

Popülizm literatürü uzmanları, krizi çoğunlukla popülizmin ortaya çıkışındaki nedensel bağımsız kilit unsurlardan biri olarak görürler. Bu çalışma, krizi hali hazırda bulunan tetikleyici bir öge olarak görmek yerine, onun algısal boyutunu dikkate almakta, krizi aslında bozulmalar olarak görmekte ve bozulmaların yalnızca kriz olarak algılandıklarında kriz olabileceklerini kabul etmektedir. Bu çalışma Benjamin Moffitt'in popülizmin iktidarda kalma becerisinin bozulmaları kriz olarak ebedileştirme becerisine dayandığı iddiasına odaklanmaktadır. Ernesto Laclau'nun popülizm anlayışını baz alarak, Türkiye vakası için bu iddianın doğru olup olamayabileceğini kontrol etmek için, yakın dönem ekonomik bozulma dönemleri örnek olay incelemeleri ile Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın söylemlerinin içerik analizini birleştirilerek karma yöntem ile keşifsel bir araştırma yürütülmüştür. Bozulma dönemlerine odaklanılırken, Erdoğan'ın söylemleri Türkiye halkının kriz algısını arttırabilme potansiyel becerilerine göre kategorize edilmiştir. Halktaki kriz algısındaki ve AKP'ye olan seçmen desteğindeki değişimler sunulurken, Erdoğan'ın kriz derinleştirici popülist retorığının kriz reddedici popülist retorığından daha yüksek olup olmadığı her örnek olay için kontrol edilmiştir. Bu yolla, Erdoğan'ın, Moffitt'in Hugo Chávez için kullandığı "popülist" profile uyup uymayabileceğini bulmak için nedensel değil fakat keşifsel bir çalışma yürütülmüştür. Fakat, bozulma dönemleri sayısının azlığı ve söylemsel veri kısıtları gibi şartlar altında, bulgular Erdoğan'ın bu "popülist" profile uymayabileceğine işaret ediyor.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I'd like to thank, first and foremost, my thesis supervisor Özge Kemahlioğlu for accepting me to work with her; for her guidance to enable me to run this research, for giving her precious limited time to read my frequently changed writings and giving me valuable feedbacks; for her patience and goodwill towards me despite my continuous e-mails and my pushing limits in terms of submission deadlines.

Second, I'd like to thank Nedim Nami Nomer for his understanding and goodwill towards me since the very beginning of my studentship at Sabancı University, especially due to his faith in me when I first applied to the program.

Third, I'd like to thank Berk Esen for not rejecting to be a part of the jury, coming from Ankara in the middle of the summer season in order to be ready in my thesis defense. I've appreciated his feedbacks for a better and transparent research design.

Last but not least, I'd like to thank faculty staff Sumru Küçüka for her patience in providing me a guidance about the format of this thesis.

Dedicated to my mother, for her support during the time I've run this research and standing by me, from the beginning to the end.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	x
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	xiv
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Why Does Populism Matter?	4
1.2. A Brief History of Populism	7
1.3. On Structural Theories	8
1.3.1. Critique of Structural Theories	10
1.4. Implications.....	13
2. THEORETICAL PART	17
2.1. Ideational Approach.....	17
2.1.1. Critique of Ideational Approach	19
2.2. Strategic Approach.....	22
2.2.1. Critique of Strategic Approach	25
2.3. Discursive Approach.....	29
2.3.1. On Laclauian Perspective	31
2.3.2. Critique of Discursive Approach	33
2.4. Implications.....	37
2.5. Theoretical Framework	40
3. RESEARCH DESIGN.....	46
3.1. How is Populism Measured in the Literature?	46
3.2. On Research Design and Methodology.....	51
3.2.1. Variables	58
3.2.2. Case Selection.....	61
3.2.3. On Discourses	65
3.2.3.1. On sources of discourses	70

3.2.3.2.	On selections of textualized discourses	71
3.2.3.3.	On exceptional selections of textualized discourses	82
3.2.3.4.	On transcriptions and selections of transcribed discourses	86
3.2.4.	On Excerpts and How I've Measured Populism in This Research.....	100
3.2.4.1.	Excerpt Examples	103
3.2.5.	Categorical Variables.....	107
3.2.5.1.	Crisis Emphasizing Rhetoric	111
3.2.5.2.	Crisis Denying Rhetoric	118
3.2.5.3.	Failure Ignoring Rhetoric	121
3.2.6.	On Failures and Package of Failures	127
4.	EMPIRICAL PART	132
4.1.	Cases	132
4.1.1.	Case 1: 10.2012 – 01.2013	132
4.1.2.	Case 2: 10.2013 – 01.2014	139
4.1.3.	Case 3: 01.2015 – 04.2015	151
4.1.4.	Case 4: 09.2016 – 01.2017	159
4.1.5.	Case 5: 09.2017 – 11.2017	167
4.1.6.	Case 6: 01.2018 – 05.2018	175
4.1.7.	Case 7: 06.2018 – 09.2018	183
4.2.	Analysis.....	190
4.3.	Concluding Remarks.....	199

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Case example in which all variables get deteriorated.....	62
Table 3.2 An example of a division of a continuous deterioration.....	64
Table 3.3 An example of a division of a continuous deterioration.....	64
Table 3.4 Textualized discourses that are selected with priority.....	72
Table 3.5 The list of remaining randomly selected textualized discourses.....	77
Table 3.6 Frequencies of excerpts of randomly selected discourses of economic events....	79
Table 3.7 Textualized discourses of April 2015 that are qualified for random selection.....	81
Table 3.8 The list of videos of transcribed discourses and discarded remaining options.....	89
Table 3.9 Complete Selection Process in one table.....	94
Table 3.10 Three Main Categories.....	124
Table 3.11 Three Main Categories and Categorical Criteria.....	125
Table 3.12 Populist vs non-populist distinction of three main categories.....	127
Table 4.1 Changes in economic indicators within case 1.....	133
Table 4.2 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 1.....	133
Table 4.3 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 1.....	133
Table 4.4 Changes in economic indicators within case 2.....	140
Table 4.5 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 2.....	140
Table 4.6 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 2.....	141
Table 4.7 Changes in economic indicators within case 3.....	151
Table 4.8 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 3.....	152
Table 4.9 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 3.....	152
Table 4.10 Changes in economic indicators within case 4.....	159
Table 4.11 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 4.....	160
Table 4.12 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 4.....	160

Table 4.13 Changes in economic indicators within case 5	168
Table 4.14 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 5	168
Table 4.15 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 5	169
Table 4.16 Changes in economic indicators within case 6	176
Table 4.17 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 6	176
Table 4.18 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 6	176
Table 4.19 Economic deterioration within case 7	184
Table 4.20 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 7	184
Table 4.21 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 7	185
Table 4.22 Cross case proportions of each rhetoric	191
Table 4.23 Overall frequencies and proportions of all types of rhetoric	192
Table 4.24 Within case proportions of each rhetoric	193

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 1.....	136
Figure 4.2 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 1	137
Figure 4.3 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 1	139
Figure 4.4 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 1	139
Figure 4.5 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 2	142
Figure 4.6 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 2.....	143
Figure 4.7 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 2.....	150
Figure 4.8 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 2	151
Figure 4.9 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 3	153
Figure 4.10 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 3.....	155
Figure 4.11 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 3	156
Figure 4.12 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 3.....	158
Figure 4.13 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 4.....	161
Figure 4.14 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 4.....	162
Figure 4.15 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 4	163
Figure 4.16 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 4.....	167
Figure 4.17 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 5.....	170
Figure 4.18 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 5.....	171
Figure 4.19 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 5	173
Figure 4.20 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 5.....	175
Figure 4.21 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 6.....	178
Figure 4.22 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 6.....	179
Figure 4.23 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 6.....	180
Figure 4.24 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 6	183

Figure 4.25 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 7	186
Figure 4.26 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 7.....	188
Figure 4.27 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 7	189
Figure 4.28 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist case 7	190
Figure 4.29 All variables, cases, within case proportions of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric and crisis denying populist rhetoric of each case	196

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party).....	51
ANAP: Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)	124
Brexit : The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union	19
CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party).....	115
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency	182
DSP: Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party).....	124
E.U. : European Union.....	44
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation	182
FETÖ: Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü (Fethullahist Terrorist Organization).....	161
IMF: International Monetary Fund	145
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (a.k.a. ISIL or DAESH)	161
MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party).....	124
MÜSİAD: Müstakil Sanayici İşadamları Derneği (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association).....	82
NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization	181
PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers' Party)	161
PVV: Partij Voor De Vrijheid (Party For Freedom).....	27
PYD: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party)	161
TÜGİK: Türkiye Genç İş Adamları Konfederasyonu (Young Businessmen Confederation's of Turkey).....	105
TÜİK: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Statistical Institute).....	54
TÜSİAD: Türk Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği (Turkish Industry and Business Association).....	122
U.K. : United Kingdom.....	32

U.N.: United Nations	82
U.S. : United States.....	6
WWII: World War II	12
YPG: Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People's Protection Units).....	161

1. INTRODUCTION

Populism is often viewed as a contested (Mudde 2017, 27; Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 1; Panizza 2005, 1), vague (Mudde 2017, 34), elusive (Taggart 2002, 66), and recurrent (Laclau 1977, 143) concept. It is said to be ambiguous (Urbinati 2018, 6), pernicious (Müller 2016, 11), toxic (Ferguson 2016, 20), chameleonic (Taggart 2002, 70), contagious (Pappas 2016, 35), pragmatic (Mény & Surel 2002; 17, 19), contextual (Canovan 1999, 4), confrontational (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 3), reactionary (Freeden 2017, 9), direct (Betz 2002, 199), performative (Moffitt & Tormey 2014; 388, 394), moralistic (Müller 2016, 20), normative (Hawkins, Read, & Pauwels 2017; 279), inclusionary (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012; 167), exclusionary (Moffitt 2015, 202), left-wing (Rodrik 2018, 13), right-wing (Mudde 2004, 549), and etc. phenomenon.

Populist politics was often seen as equivalent with a vulpine electoral tactic in semi-democratic regimes of the Global South, specifically in Latin American politics. However, following the end of the Cold War, a global decline in ideological politics showed itself as a populist uprising in various disparate geographies. As traditional ideological content is being replaced by stylized performances and contemporary politics have become more and more stylized, as politicians have becoming like celebrities while protests and various sorts of mobilizations gain a stylized character (Moffitt & Tormey 2014; 388, 394). While populist politics has been increasingly taking over mainstream politics, it is widely been viewed as perilous due to its potential of leading the moralization of politics complemented by a strong polarization tendency which leaves a very little space for a peaceful political struggle of populism with its competitors. Such struggle is considered as a zero-sum game in which one collective identity gradually eliminates the other (Kaltwasser 2012, 199). With regards to its hazardous association with representative democracy, scholars frequently use the term

populism with metaphors such as shadow (Canovan 1999; 3,10,16; Müller 2016, 11), specter (Arditi 2007; 50, 51, 53; Kazin 2017; xi), pathology (Taggart 2002, 62), parasite (Fieschi 2004, 236), or an “awkward drunken guest” (Arditi 2007, 78).

This work is not a study focusing on the debate like “populism versus democracy.” Populism has become a trending topic among social scientists due to a recent synchronized emergence of populist actors, movements, and parties all around the globe. Such simultaneous emergence of populist figures has turned into populist wave while “reversing the previous acquisitions” of infant democracies, expanded specifically after the end of the Cold War. An extensive scrutiny of democratic and non-democratic foundations of populism is beyond the scope of this study. I’ll briefly mention such concerns pointing out a decline in democratic politics by different scholars under the heading of “why does populism matter.”

Although there is no consensus on the definition of populism in political science literature, scholars widely agree on who populists are (Moffitt 2015, 198). Precisely, many scholars agree that leaders such as Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, Viktor Orbán, Silvio Berlusconi, Alexis Tsipras, Tayyip Erdoğan, Rodrigo Duterte, Juan Perón, Hugo Chávez, Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem, Fernando Collor de Mello, and etc. have been leaders that have owed their political success to populism. However, scholars of political science have not achieved to agree on what populism indeed refers to so far. Past and present instances of populism vary from one geographical region or a period of time to another and this contextuality of the phenomenon in turn makes generalizations of it extremely difficult (Urbinati 2018, 4). This is a huge problem, especially when one wants to conduct a scientific research in populism. In order to handle this problem, I want to focus on three main approaches to populism in the literature, elaborating their pros and cons analytically, and attempt to build a minimal definition of which domain is a political one. Such a justified minimal definition enables measurement of populism and assist one to conduct an empirical study while minimizing the risk of having conceptual stretching problems.

What makes this study different is that I intend to focus on the relationship between populism and a sense of crisis. It is claimed that populism can sustain itself while depending on the perpetuation of the latter. Scholars of populism literature often view crisis, whether it has a

social, political or economic base, as a key initiatory element for the emergence of populism. Almost all works take crisis as a preceding causal element, functioning as an independent initiator to provide propitious ground for the rise of populism. In particular, these studies attempt to explain the emergence of populism by presupposing it as an oppositional political actor or movement, challenging the existing establishment which has been undergoing a crisis. However, just few of them mention the perceptual dimension of crisis (Taggart 2002, 2004; Moffitt 2015; Moffitt & Tormey 2014). And one of them emphasizes that the durability of populism depends on its ability to perpetuate crisis (Moffitt 2015) without distinguishing populism in power and populism in the opposition.

This study focuses on populism in power, in Turkey and aims to check Moffitt's (2015) claim supposing that populism, as an outcome of failures, results in a sense of crisis over citizens, contributing to its ability to remain power. My intention is to apply this claim to Turkey and see whether Erdoğan may be using a similar strategy or not. However, this study is not a comprehensive explanatory work. Rather, I intend to explore and check whether Erdoğan, during his speeches, attempt to emphasize or deny framing failures in order make a sense of crisis among the people or not. If there seems to be an association as Moffitt (2015) argues in his claims for Chávez, I intend to check whether such association works for Erdoğan's case or not.

The first chapter includes an introduction part, a combination of various views of scholars on why populism matters, a brief history of populism and structural explanations aiming to understand its underlying reasons. In Chapter 2, I'll present an extensive literature review, and I'll attempt to build a minimal definition in order to make this phenomenon measurable. Literature review will provide a detailed descriptive information on three main traditions in populism studies, each will follow their own critique sections, in which I intend to create an inferential leverage for the conceptualization part and enable a better comprehension of populism. After the introduction of theoretical framework mostly based on Laclau's theory of populism, I will create a minimal definition for empirical research. In Chapter 3, once I've briefly mentioned on how different scholars measure populism in the literature, then I'll explain my research design briefly. This will follow the introduction of my variables and cases. In the remaining part of Chapter 3, discourse selections and the criteria I've used for

it will be explained in detail. Then I will discuss the excerpts and how I've made my measurements. This will be followed by the introduction of categorical variables and package of failures part which I've thought to be useful to help me during my research. In Chapter 4, I will introduce my cases, and an analysis part will follow. This chapter will come to an end with concluding remarks.

1.1. Why Does Populism Matter?

Either corrective for representative democracy or a threat to it, populism is a crucial phenomenon (Van Kessel 2014, 115). Many scholars no longer see populism as a marginal reaction, indeed, it is said to have turned into mainstream politics (Mudde 2004; 542, 562; Stanley 2008, 96; Mudde 2013, 2; Moffitt 2015, 210; Kaltwasser et al. 2017, 16) and what we are witnessing might possibly be a "populist Zeitgeist" (Mudde 2004, 551).

In concordance with its observable impact on mainstream politics, academic work on populism has been expanding (Kaltwasser et al. 2017, 16). Some scholars argue that populism will be a regular theme in future politics although today's instances may be temporary due to the episodic nature of the phenomenon (Mudde 2004, 563), while some others assert that the fate of the democracy depends on it (Kazin 2017, xii). By taking populism as a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism, some scholars argue even the election of a populist may potentially end up with an institutional crisis and thereby distortions within democratic framework (Levitsky & Loxton 2013, 112). As Mudde (2013) claims, the real threat to democracy is that the extreme right-wing ideology has been gaining respect in the guise of democratic legitimacy (2). A populist contamination – that all political parties apply populist themes in their political discourse has turned out to be evident (9). In short, populism is contagious and other parties may ineluctably end up with shaping their political agenda according to the rising popularity of populists (Taggart 2002, 76), and thereby it poses a threat against liberal institutional framework and strengthen illiberal politics (Pappas 2016, 35). Populist influence on mainstream parties may result in their plummeting legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013,

27). Thus, the real power of populist politics comes from its potential ability to change the rules of the game in representative politics. While mobilizing within representative politics, populism may pose a serious threat to it (Taggart 2002, 78). Populism is frequently emphasized as a destabilizing element of democratic politics (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, 382) and thought to be equivalent with non-democratic attitudes.

Populism undermines political institutions, lowers the quality of knowledge of the electorate about the political system and it motivates reactions based on fear and resentment rather than informing electorates for policy debates and building a possible social consensus (Bonikowski 2016, 22). It may jeopardize democracy's functioning via a distrust towards institutional procedures and conflicts with institutional framework, as attempts to undermine separation of powers and the rule of law (Arditi 2007, 52). As Moffitt & Tormey (2014) point out populist leaders apply discursive references to the elite or political establishment as sources of crisis, corruption, political malfunctioning of the system and introduce the people as their cheated and oppressed victims. Hence, populists may apply a denying discourse of experts' expertise, adopt an attitude against technocracy and bureaucracy (391). By undercutting the confidence in institutions, leading polarization, and political stalemates, it raises tension and rivalries within the society which further enhances inequalities (Bonikowski 2016, 23). Furthermore, huge mass support may be more determinative than institutional constraints and therefore can evolve into an ability to change not only institutional but also democratic regime structure. Concisely, institutional constraints may be insignificant when a populist movement with a massive support comes to power and pursue a change in constitutional framework (Hawkins, Read, & Pauwels 2017, 275). That's why many scholars consider populism as a toxic phenomenon for democratic politics and a malicious threat against party systems (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013; 17, 18). As Taggart (2004) remarks, if underestimated and disdained, the impact of populism on political settings may be overwhelming, as in the case of Italy in the early 1990s. The distrust in political system may lead a complete transformation of the party system in the country and a complete change in constitutional settings (283).

To Bonikowski & Gidron (2013), if still ignored, populist politics, especially within an unconsolidated democracy, may even be responsible for reversions from democracy (22).

Levitsky and Loxton's (2013) contend that if populists become successful in benefiting from the discontent with the status-quo and weak party systems, in their attacks on institutions of horizontal accountability, then fragile democracies are likely to slide into competitive authoritarianism (107, 108, 112). Even if we merely focus on European context, deconsolidation as a consequence and a complementary phenomenon of populist surge, may not only pose a threat to unconsolidated and infant democracies of Eastern and Central European post-communist states such as Poland or Hungary. That means, populism may even thrive in established democracies (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 24). As Foa and Mounk (2017) remarks, there is a growing disaffection toward democracy in Western liberal democracies and now it's the time to question the assumption that asserts once a democracy is consolidated, then it will last forever (8, 9). Although democracies do not disappear overnight and deconsolidation does not necessarily end up with a breakdown, it is one of the most important signs of a democratic failure (Foa & Mounk 2016; 16, 17).

Due to this perilous potential against representative democracy, populism is mostly viewed and studied as a serious negative phenomenon. Nevertheless, contrary to such negative perception and an extensive usage with pejorative epithets, some scholars claim that populism may have some positive repercussions. Beside its aforementioned detrimental potentials, populism can serve as a warning to the power elite that the system has begun to malfunction (Mény & Surel 2002, 15), and gives a chance to experts to pinpoint the weaknesses of the system (Taggart 2002, 78). With manifestations of the discontent of masses (Mény & Surel 2002, 21), it may provide a legitimate voice for excluded groups (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 19), therefore can be corrective for democracy when politics become too distant and unresponsive to people's demands (Müller 2016; 8, 61). In short, populism can be read as a reactive force against deterioration of representation (Mény & Surel 2002, 13), and the rise of populist movements can give us clues about shortcomings and inherent deficiencies of representative politics (Taggart 2004, 286). After all, the gains of populism in the world history cannot be ignored when one looks into 19th century U.S. populists' contributions to the development of social democracy concept, via advocacy of democratic reforms and demands of a regulatory state structure (Müller 2016, 90).

1.2. A Brief History of Populism

Although the concept of populism was developed by social sciences in the post-war era (Di Tella 1997, 188), populism is indeed a historical phenomenon that has reoccurred since 1890s (Canovan 1999, 12), that even American politics has witnessed a party labeled itself as “populist” in late 19th century (Müller 2016, 85). As Urbinati (2018) points out, first instances of populism appeared in the late 19th century. In Tsarist Russia, Narodnichestvo had an intellectual ideal suggesting an agrarian type of communitarian society which consists of "uncontaminated peasants" whereas the People's Party in the U.S. was an ethical political movement aiming to protect individual producers against industrialization and corporate capitalism and challenge power elites by referring the constitution (4, 5). In time, populism sprang into Latin America and turned into a movement which has different mainstays such as nationalism, charismatic leadership, and mass support of "the people," thereby evolved into authoritarian regimes run by Perón in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil during 1940s and 1950s (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, 322). By applying state power in order to downgrade liberalism, stunt political opposition, protect conventional ethical norms, and empower middle class masses both politically and economically, Latin American populism thrived in the age of socioeconomic modernization (Urbinati 2018, 5). On the other hand, on European continent, populism emerged as a right-wing reactionary politics (Taggart 2002, 70). During Post-War period, populism thrived in a guise of far-right politics during 1970s, as a reaction to traditional politics, emphasizing its neglectful dimension, and proposes new laws and policies on immigration, taxation and crime, while depending on nationalism (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, 322). During 1980s and 1990s, the term "populism" was used to mark politicians who conducted irresponsible statist economic policies (Aslanidis 2016, 95; Di Tella 1997, 188). Also called as economic populism, fiscal irresponsibility which appeared as rulers' extravagant distribution of economic benefits to the people for the sake of raising their mass support, focused on short-term gains of popularity results with deep crisis in the long run that masses would be worse off inevitably (Weyland 2017, 51). However, as Latin American 'neoliberal' populists (Carlos Menem, Alberto Fujimori, Fernando Collor de Mello) took over the political scene, extravagant statist economic policy decisions no longer

viewed as a criterion to pinpoint populism (Aslanidis 2016, 95; Weyland 2001, 8; Weyland 2017, 51). In short, populist experiences have adopted rural form (in 19th century U.S.), revolutionary form (in Tsarist Russia), urban mass movement form (as Peronism in Argentina) and extreme right-wing forms (in contemporary Europe) (Taggart 2002, 70). Furthermore, populism was identified with economic policy choices for a short period of time in 1980s and 1990s, and polemically associated with the rise of fascism and national socialism in Europe during 1930s.

As scholars do not agree upon what populism is, they therefore demonstrate disagreements on its history as well. To Müller (2016) fascism experience of Germany and Italy in 1930s had populist characteristics - they were not just fascist, racist, violent movements but also populist movements gathered around a radical leader profile (93). On the contrary, to Ferguson (2016), the tone of interwar fascism involved a serious level of militarism, eventually fascists prepared for the war, wore uniforms, and went to war (13). However, he contends that populists tend to trigger trade wars, not real ones (21). While Barr (2009) contends that the U.S. agrarian movement seen at the end of 19th century was not populist because it had a bottom-up characteristic, with participatory linkages (38, 39). In contrast, Vittori (2017) argues that leaderless movements are a priori viewed as non-populists, which indeed may not be the case (51). Disagreements among scholars on “populist” instances are indeed numerous. Before presenting their assessment criteria, I’d like to mention on structural causalities, subjected to some grand theories, enabled many scholars to develop functionalist explanations according to critical junctures of political history. Development, complemented by traumatic transformative changes that human beings have gone through, have always been inspirational for scholars to create their own theories which seek to interpret episodic populist surges.

1.3. On Structural Theories

Political scientists mostly don't examine populism within a historical unity (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 3). Aforementioned episodic emergences of populism through the history have

pushed scholars to develop structural explanations for populist surge since alleged particular causes are too distinct and numerous to provide a unified explanation for its escalation. For instance, populism is associated with harsh economic conditions (Canovan 1999, 12), a severe financial crisis (Ferguson 2016, 16), globalization shocks (Rodrik 2018, 2), a feeling of deprivation of power (Mény & Surel 2002, 11), the ability "to appeal to, and mobilize popular resentments" (Betz 2002, 211), the decline of ideological politics (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, 387; Mudde 2004, 555), distrust to elites and institutions (Taggart 2002, 69), technocracy (Müller, 2016, 96), immigration and multiculturalism (Betz 2002, 211), a resentment against crime (Mudde 2013, 11), the rise of artificial intelligence (Inglehart & Norris 2017; 18, 19, 22, 23), etc. Instead of focusing on particularity of these all alleged causes, structural explanations seek to find underlying causes of populism by looking at the big picture and attempt to develop theories of material and non-material causalities. My intention is to mention some of these theories as briefly as possible, since I suppose these are valuable assertions which may help one to comprehend populism better, and thereby helpful to develop a conceptualization

Among some mostly asserted structural theories, Di Tella's relative deprivation thesis emphasizes the asynchronism of disparate development levels of developing world versus developed world, and rising expectations of the people in developing world due to this mismatch (Laclau 1977, 151). To Di Tella (1997), once a certain social and economic level is achieved, satisfying demands of entrepreneurs and working-class people is essential and populism ineluctably rises due to this requirement (199). The core argument of this thesis as people living in developing countries, which are on the periphery of developed countries, witness the level of wealth in the developed world and want to have a high level of wealth as their counterparts living in the developed world enjoy (Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels 2017, 272). In another theory, Betz (1994) emphasizes two big transformative changes: First, the end of the Cold War and a shift towards a unified world capitalist economy, and second the rise in globalization and fluid forms of capital, labor, information technology, services, etc. Betz argues, that these changes have brought tremendous impact on work force (27, 28), which in turn led a sense of powerlessness, resentment, and anxiety among the people, and prepared a suitable political environment for radical right-wing populists to exploit such emotions (38). Likewise, Inglehart & Norris (2016) resort to economic insecurity thesis in

order to explain populist escalation in Western democracies. This thesis is based on the overwhelming impact of substantial changes over the workforce and the society in the post-industrial economies (1). It claims that due to catastrophic impacts of modernization, globalization, and neo-liberalism, such as atomized workforce, the erosion of unionized labor, sharp decline in manufacturing industry, neo-liberal austerity policies, rising income inequality, etc., the rise in economic anxiety and social deprivation have enhanced the sensitivity of low income and less secured parts of the society to xenophobic, nativist, anti-establishment populist rhetoric (2, 10, 11, 12). With regards to non-material dimensions of transformative changes, Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels (2017) focus on Durkheimian mass society thesis which associates the rise of popular grievances with changes in social relations due to the atomization of the workforce after industrialization. According to this thesis, increasing mediatory salience of the state in social relations evoked the shift of power from individuals and their social formations to impersonal bureaucratic institutions (269). Norms and values that function like an integrative cement of the society, such as social consciousness, collective action, solidarity slowly drifted away from members of the society (269). A crisis of identity, appeared as a void which would be filled by populists, and instrumentalized as a motor power to trigger mass mobilization (269). In a similar vein, Inglehart & Norris (2016) also mention counter-silent revolution which emerged as a hostility to the spread of progressive and post materialist values originated from leftist student demonstrations of 1960s and 1970s and pervaded all over the globe (13). Such progressive values accompanied by an erosion in traditional and conventional values, a sense of loss especially among members of older generations and less educated individuals, thereby following their resentment due to a sense of losing privileges, consequently contributed the rise of populism (14).

1.3.1. Critique of Structural Theories

All of these theories are extremely valuable with regards to their ability to bring a macro vision to the reader, and thereby facilitate critical commentaries not only for populism but also for many other social phenomena. However, they have some serious shortcomings.

First of all, structural efforts often do not even tend to define populism. Rather, they are more likely to speculate on it axiomatically (Laclau 1977, 154). They are unable to build a unified logic of populism, that can be applied to any part of the world (Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels 2017, 274). More clearly, these theories may be unable to provide an overarching explanation for populism due to their inherent spatial limitations. For instance, Di Tella's relative deprivation thesis can be applied to explain populism in Latin American while it cannot be used to commentate on populism in Western developed democracies. This theory implies that once a society gets more developed, then it must gain an immunity against populism (Laclau 1977; 153, 154). But when we look at populism in today's Western developed world, we see that's not the case. As Kaltwasser (2012) populist parties and movements also appear in Norway and Switzerland (188). Moreover, as Laclau (1977) contends, viewing populism as an outcome of asynchronism of different development levels of nations is problematic per se. The reason is fascism in Italy during 1920s was associated with Italy's agrarian underdevelopment status and therefore surmised that no industrialized country would experience it. The ones who developed such theses obviously couldn't anticipate the zenith of fascism would take place in highly industrialized Germany (153).

Secondly, these theories may lack explanatory power with regards to not only a spatial dimension but also a temporal one. For instance, as Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels (2017) argue, Betz's thesis might explain structural transformation that globalization has created in the medium term, especially for western consolidated democracies (271). However, scholars emphasize its weak explanatory power for the long-term existence of populism in Latin America (271). Any explanation based on historical shifts (for example, from export-oriented economies to import substitution industrialization, or from nationalism to neoliberalism) is reductionist and doomed to fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for populism (de la Torre 2000, 139). If populism were equivalent with import substitution industrialization in Latin America, then no one would talk about populism today for Latin American context, since this type of development had largely been abandoned (Knight 1998, 238). Moreover, as Laclau (1977) argues, any relation with populism and import substitution industrialization has to be proved, especially for the period between 1930 and 1960 in Latin America (177). In concordance with such a doubtful remark, de la Torre (2000) asserts that claimed correlation between import substitution industrialization and populism may not be as high as

expected. In Brazil, import substitution began to be implemented before 1930s and populism emerged during 1940s and in Peru and Ecuador, populism emerged before import substitution industrialization took place (5).

Thirdly, despite their valuable effort, these functionalist approaches may also be misleading in terms of viewing world political and economic history as a subject of social experiment. What I mean is, taking modernization or globalization as mere independent variables in a *ceteris paribus* logic is not possible. Huge transformative changes have had too many repercussions, which ultimately have been in interaction with one another. For instance, as Inglehart & Norris (2016) admit, drawing a clear-cut distinction between economic inequality and cultural backlash theories is extremely difficult. There may be a series of interaction processes between economic and cultural settings and those two may interact and mutually feed each other. As globalization enhances the level of economic insecurity, then it may trigger a cultural backlash among conservatives who are more inclined to protect traditional norms and values (3). In short, changes might erupt after critical junctures like the end of WWII or Cold War, but history and so does the social life have a continuity. Therefore, phenomena such as industrialization, modernization, urbanization, and globalization cannot be considered as totally distinct.

Fourthly, and most importantly, as Weyland (2001) argues, structural explanations of modernization or dependency theories overlooked the impact of politics by an overstating focus on social and economic transformations (5). They discredit the autonomy of politics while shifting the domain of the phenomenon from political to economical (8). Equating populism with economic preferences and defining it over economic decisions will inevitably end up with misconceptions. These misconceptions contribute stretching the scope of this notorious concept further. Populists may have got involved with flamboyant redistribution policies ending up with fiscal irresponsibility however, such policies don't seem to be under the monopoly of populists since many other governments also apply such tactics, particularly when elections are about to take place (Knight 1998; 242, 243). Moreover, as Weyland (2001) points out, fiscal irresponsibility, a.k.a. economic populism, cannot be attributed only to populist leaders, it is indeed an outcome of consequential decisions of parliaments or governments and underlying reasons may vary from case to case (11). Instead of focusing on

commonly agreed upon policy preferences, as Betz (2002) asserts, contextual specificity is important in populism and populist movements should be checked case by case, rather than resorting overarching explanations (213). Because populism has a contextual sensitivity, it suffers from conceptual ambiguity (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, 1272).

1.4. Implications

Before concluding this chapter, I contend that the relationship between populism and big social transformative changes, which constitute building blocks for structural theories mentioned above, points out a simple, but at the same time a complicated relationship. On the one hand, the relationship is simple because all these structural factors indicate a core causal factor - a crisis as a common denominator, whether it's social, political, or economic. In particular, populist escalation has mostly been associated with systematic economic crises, globalization shocks or recessions (Ferguson 2016, 16; Kazin 2017, xiii; Laclau 1977; 175, 176; Rodrik 2018, 2; Weyland 1999, 397), social traumas (Hawkins, Read, and Pauwels 2017, 269; Inglehart & Norris 2016; 13, 14) or a crisis of representation (Müller 2016; 78, 79; Taggart 2002; 69, 72; Stavrakakis 2017, 549; Urbinati 2018, 3; Van Kessel 2014; 99, 100). On the other hand, it is complicated or maybe viewed as loose because these social transformative changes subjected to structural theories, have neither attempted to impede expressions of popular demands nor developed mechanisms hindering populist escalation. As Taggart (2002) remarks, modernization may have created conditions for populism, but at the same time, it resulted with an institutional area that populists can utter their grievances and direct their frustration to (73). But what does that mean and why is this remark noteworthy?

It is noteworthy because if these big transformative changes have constituted underlying reasons that in turn triggered populism as claimed, and if they haven't built mechanism to hamper it, then different populists must continuously and almost mechanically rise to and fall from the political scene around the globe. There would be a complete populist saturation over what is political, only populists and their populist substitutes, not any other forms. As

I've mentioned above, the social history has a continuity which inherently embodies *the change* that no one can stand against. No political entity can fight against globalization, the spread of information, artificial intelligence, flows of capital and people, as none could have resisted industrialization, capitalization, modernization, and urbanization due to the pervasiveness of such phenomena and power competition between nations. Whenever countries attempt to resist *the change*, they end up with a limited ruling capability, they lose international and domestic power, and ultimately fail. However, *the change* is continuous and often comes with a group of new losers, that means the people have faced and will face with constant crisis. If we are in a constant crisis era, and if crisis automatically leads populism, then how can we explain long time uninterrupted presence of populists at their office (Chávez, Duterte, Erdoğan, Orbán, etc.) without any challenges from their potential substitutes, oppositional populist counterparts? Is it all about weak oppositional challenges or skewing the even playing field of democratic politics? The answer of this question is beyond the scope of this study since it requires an extensive empirical research. But populists in general, are expected to rise and fall due to a commonly agreed upon idea that the longer a populist politician remains in power, the less likely he/she will apply to populist discourse (Bonikowski 2016, 15). As Knight (1998) remarks, populism as an outcome of crisis and confrontation, has a "limited shelf-life". In the long run, it inherently loses its momentum and fail, or loses its populist character and gain a completely different one - gets institutionalized and thereby mutated as in the case of Peronism (231). In a similar vein, Weyland (2001) argues that neoliberal populists (Menem and Fujimori), although less institutionalized than Peronism, ultimately failed since neoliberal prescriptions were painful for the people, and that's why they attempted to boost fiscal expenditure before electoral campaigns in order to benefit it from politically (17). Thus, if conditions continue to be harsh for the people and if *the change* comes with crisis despite its episodic severity, brings a group of new and snowballing losers, how can one answer the question mentioned above by applying an inferential logic?

An inferential answer is in accord with points mentioned above with regards to populism's limited shelf-life, and implicitly given by Taggart's (2002, 2004). He contends that "self-limiting quality" is one of populism's core feature and it refers to the assumption which presupposes that populist mobilization only occurs against *a sense of crisis*, and naturally,

populists cannot sustain such sort of mobilization in the long run since once they have achieved power, they inevitably tend to adopt new forms of politics and get institutionalized (69, 78; 276). To Knight (1998), contrary to frequent remarks on the association between populism and crisis, such association would be problematic since crisis itself a vague term, under-theorized (227). In a similar vein, Moffitt (2015) argues that what political science literature views as a crisis indeed is a failure, which can manifest itself over objective indicators (197). On the contrary, crisis is not a neutral objective phenomenon, it has no clear but boundaries. Instead, what determines its scope is what we think, feel, and express about it (190, 194, 195, 197). Hence, a crisis is indebted to its occurrence to the degree that it is perceived as crisis (Moffitt 2015, 197; Moffitt & Tormey 2014, 391) and such perception is achieved by “spectacularization” of a failure by performative populist style (Moffitt 2015, 197). Examples can be given as Hugo Chávez’s emphasis on imperialist conspiracies and Geert Wilders’ Islamophobic remarks arguing that the Dutch society is under a perpetual attack due to rising Islamization (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, 392). To Moffitt (2015), such populist performances do not eliminate the fact that crises are temporal phenomena – running a constant performance of crisis is not easy (207). If populism is a reactionary phenomenon to a sense of severe crisis as Taggart (2002, 69) argues, then its existence and sustainability depends on maintaining a propaganda that deepens and perpetuate crisis (Moffitt 2015, 209). To Moffitt (2015), Chávez was able to run his “performance of crisis” in a linear and gradual manner and that’s why he remained in power and had been able to rule his country (207). In other words, populists who skillfully perpetuate a performance of crisis and achieve to extend it to a longer period of time have longer political lifetime than the ones who are unable to do so (208).

But one can wonder how a populist can perpetuate a sense crisis despite his/her position as the head of the government. In a possible populist escalation scenario, we expect that a populist challenges established elites during a crisis, when the power bloc of those elites is highly fragile. Once the populist has achieved power and begun to rule, then he/she inevitably will face with new losers of *the change* (not only refers to *the change* as I’ve used through this part which refers to an inevitable inconvenience that a structural transformation brings over the people, but also, as I’ll explain later, refers to an inevitable exclusion at least for some part of the society, due to the inherent exclusionary nature of populism), thereby face

with a dissatisfaction which he/she is expected to instrumentalize as a mean of mobilization against the previous power bloc. Moreover, as populism continues to rule, it may deviate into a more institutionalized and routinized path in order to obtain a durability, thereby ultimately loses its mobilizational power, as mentioned above (Knight 1998; 231, 232; Taggart 2002; 69, 78; Taggart 2004, 276). Once populism has reached that level, then it becomes responsible for the failures that masses mostly would pay the price. But as Moffitt's (2015) remark for the case of Chávez mentioned above, the trick seems to be convincing citizens that they are the target of an existential threat. What the people can do is to get mobilized against this threat and support their leader.

I will continue to explain this mobilization and its relationship in terms of instrumentalizing of *a sense of crisis* in the conceptualization part since it requires further theoretical clarification. Before that, I want to go into the next chapter, and continue to mention on three main traditions in populism.

2. THEORETICAL PART

2.1. Ideational Approach

Ideational tradition has grown as the most popular approach in populism studies with regards to quantity of contributors and publications. Prominent scholars of this tradition are Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2013), Catherine Fieschi (2004), and Ben Stanley (2008). This view of populism has roots in Michael Freeden's thin centred ideology concept. In his influential work, Freeden (1998) defines a thin-centred ideology as an ideology that "arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts" (750). Freeden argues that a thin-centred ideology is unable to offer complex range of explanations due to nonexistence of chained ideas between the abstract conceptual core and concrete and practical conceptual periphery. It is this limited ideational structure that makes it thin-centred (750). In short, while a full ideology is capable to provide wide range of answers to political issues of societies create, a thin-centred ideology is not.

Cas Mudde (2004), who is the pioneer of ideational approach, defines populism as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (543). This definition asserts that populism have two polar opposites: elitism and pluralism (543). In another work, Mudde & Kaltwasser (2013) point out that elitism refers to the belief that people are banal and not trustworthy but elites, on the other hand, are superior in terms of culture, intellect, and morality. Pluralism refers to a reference to the heterogenous structure of the society with various power centers, and society is not pure confrontation of

homogenous “the people” versus “the elite.” Due to pluralistic form the society, no one can talk about a phenomenon like “the general will.” Pluralism, in this respect, means tolerating and encouraging ethnic, cultural, religious minorities to pursue their own way of living (152).

Mudde views populism as a thin-centred ideology, which means, it has limited scope and ambition than thick ideologies, such as socialism or liberalism. This thin-centered characteristic of populism disables an ability to offer or formulate broad menu of solutions to major issues (Mudde 2017, 30). However, according to this conceptualization of populism, it can integrate itself with other thin or thick sorts of ideologies such as; communism, socialism, nationalism or ecologism (Mudde 2004, 544). Likewise, Fieschi (2004) contends that populism has a parasitic, symbiotic and fulfilling relationship with mainstream ideologies (236), and it can only function and perform when it finds a host ideology, it cannot stand on itself (238). In concordance with such views, Stanley (2008) views populism as a complementary ideology and a receptive partner for full scaled ideologies. To Stanley, populism is compelled to remain as conceptually thin due to a great range of its own versions (107). One other crucial point of Stanley’s work is his emphasis on interpretations. Stanley contends that ideas are individual interpretations of the world, and ideologies are interpretive frameworks constituted by a set of ideas as concepts (Stanley 2008, 98).

Scholars of ideational approach also accentuate the emotional dimension of populism. In order to undergird their remarks, they apply Taggart’s concept of heartland which refers to a splendid image of the historical times of a nation when there was not such inconveniences and defects of today’s politics such as globalization, immigration, heavy tax burdens and etc. (Taggart 2002, 68). To Taggart, heartland as a romanticized grandeur and unifying concept, brings the people together and constitute the population of it (Taggart 2002; 67, 68). Mudde applies to Taggart’s heartland concept as an equivalence of initiator of a populist surge. He claims that heartland becomes active under unusual circumstances such as a mixture of political resentment, a serious threat against usual way of living, or presence of an attractive populist leader (Mudde 2004, 547). Similarly, Fieschi uses the term “empty heart” as an equivalence of Taggart’s heartland and argues that this concept indeed refers to the thin-centredness of populism (Fieschi 2004, 238). To Fieschi, a sine qua non feature of populism is its appeal to the people. Populism relies on positive valorization of the people vis a vis the

elite (Fieschi 2004, 237). In short, populism significantly relies on sentiments, it refers to the realm of the sentiment instead of rationality (Fieschi 2004, 238).

For the last two decades, ideational approach has mustered up wide support from various scholars. Numerous works on populism has viewed it as a thin or loose ideology and conducted their analyses according to ideational definitions. Frequently asserted advantages of ideational approach are its ability to provide measurability to empirical studies of populism, both of which can be qualitative or quantitative (Mudde 2017, 35), and can study populism both on the elite and on mass level (Mudde 2017, 39).

2.1.1. Critique of Ideational Approach

Although ideational approach is widely adopted in populism studies, it has begun to lose its initial popularity. As ideational debate has permeated to the literature, it has had serious backlash from scholars of other approaches. Besides, even Freedman (2017) is involved to this debate, by an article on Brexit and populism, questioned whether populism may be accepted as a thin-centred ideology or not. Before Freedman's response on his thin-centred concept and its alleged relation with populism, I'd like to mention on some important reactions of various scholars to ideational tradition.

First of all, Van Kessel (2014) emphasizes that viewing populism as a thin-ideology requires a fixed classification of parties or movements which are populist and non-populist, according to a defining ideological characteristic (102), and as Aslanidis (2016) remarks, an ideology has to have coherence (89). But as Taggart (2004) underscores, the fact that populism lack core values would ineluctably result in a great "chameleonic" and therefore, a context dependent nature. By the term "chameleonic," Taggart implies that populism is like a liquid that can take the shape of a whatever it is into (275). Likewise, while Canovan (1999) admits populists might have some principles, she remarks that due to context dependency and absence of core values, they do not show adherence to any particular ideology (4). According to Mény & Surel (2002) populism is highly pragmatic and not stable, such chameleonic

nature may inevitably result in switching their strategies according to changing events and rules of the game (17, 19). In short, due to the lack of a core program, one can hardly talk about a possible populist ideology (Van Kessel 2014, 102).

Secondly, Mudde (2017) argues that ideological elements in populism cannot be overlooked. Even in organizational definitions of populism, especially for the ones used for Latin American cases, such elements are apparent (28). Contrary to this logic, Di Tella (1997) contends that having ideological elements or bonds cannot be considered as a determinant in populism. For instance, as in the case of Wałęsa in Poland, rightist or Catholic bonds of a political actor does not automatically make him a non-populist or does not reduce his populist quality (192). Besides, to Hawkins (2009), unlike any ideology, populism cannot provide clear policy preferences. It is unstable, innately does not have crystal-clear arguments, and has a subjective quality which is expressed by the rhetoric of the orator (1045). Furthermore, as Panizza (2005) remarks, populist narratives may employ various ideological themes and arguments, myths and symbols in order to enable the identification of the leader with the people (20). That's why it may be very hard to find a common ideological ground that is shared by all populist movements and organizations (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 5). To Bonikowski (2016), populism can be seen in both right and left sphere of the political spectrum. While it appears with the patterns of islamophobia (17), ethno-nationalism and distrust in the political system in richer European countries as the right-wing populism. In poorer Southern Europe, it usually emerges as a reaction against neoliberal policies (20, 21). Moreover, even the very same political actor may apply populism in one campaign and may not use it in another one (Bonikowski's examples are Eisenhower's campaigns in 1952 and 1956; Clinton's in 1992 and 1996) (13). Hence, populism cannot be viewed as a coherent world view or ideology (23).

Thirdly, as Moffitt & Tormey (2014) point out, Freedman contends that thin ideologies, despite their limited conceptual cores, continuously strive to expand their conceptual articulations and target to turn into more developed ideologies via enhancing their ideational intensities and visionary capabilities (383). However, scholars argue that populism seems to lack such efforts. What is more, to Moffitt & Tormey (2014), political formations rarely present themselves as populist. There is not a unified body of global populism like Populist

International. There has been neither a philosopher nor a theoretical text shedding light on a full-developed and broad populism theory and endeavoring to broaden its ideational horizons. Although it embodies some ideational elements, the history of populism lacks a common originator of populist formations beside late 19th century of People's Party in USA and Narodnichestvo in Tsarist Russia (383, 384). In short, populism lacks vision and universality (Aslanidis 2016, 89; Betz 1994, 107).

Fourthly, to Aslanidis (2016), when one offers a direct opposite of a concept, or an antithesis of a thesis, the two has to be equivalent with regards to conceptual hierarchy (91). To Mudde (2004), populism has two polar opposites: elitism and pluralism (543). Based on this definitional argument, Aslanidis (2016) contends that these two must also be thin-centered ideologies as well (91). He asserts that Pappas' (2016) analysis at this point makes more sense since he defines populism as "democratic illiberalism." To Aslanidis (2016), taking populism as ideology requires such sort of conceptualization. But the distinction between what is thin and what is thick is obviously highly interpretative (91). In sum, viewing populism as a thin-centered ideology ineluctably leads conceptual stretching and thereby enhancing the confusion about populism (91, 92).

Lastly, many years after his influential work that has been an inspiration for scholars of ideational approach, Freedon (2017) has written an article on populism and Brexit. In this work, Freedon himself contends that populism may not be considered as a thin-centred ideology. To Freedon, populism is different than other thin-centred ideologies such as nationalism, ecologism or feminism, due to its essence and morphology. In terms of its essence, populism is reflective, it lacks transformative capacity to drive a future change. And due to its morphology, it has a limited nature to embody elements of other ideologies and lack of capacity to turn itself into a full ideology. Freedon also remarks that thin-centred ideologies have a potential to become full ideologies when they embody features of other ideologies. However, populism does neither show such a potential nor a desire to do so. The populist core doesn't let any broader ideational inclusion (3). Besides, although precision is not a prerequisite for ideologies (2), the core of populism varies according to societies and circumstances, which makes an analysis of the core difficult (4). What is more, except its core ideas, populism highly lacks coherence within itself, while ideologies are expected to

have at least some level of coherence. Due to this inconsistent nature of populism, it cannot even be compared with other ideologies (6, 7). Moreover, Freedman also points out that what happens in the peripheral section of populism (an economic crisis, a judicial intervention, a severe increase in immigration, etc.) almost has an instant access to the core of populism. In full developed ideologies, except serious emergencies like war or terrorism, that speed is far lower due to filters around the core, and the path that goes to the heart of a comprehensive ideology is wavy. That absence of ideological filters around the populist core engenders vulnerability of speedy transmissions of ideational and political emergencies and fabricated crisis, ensuing impulsive abrupt reactions from populists (6).

In sum, I have enough reasons to claim that ideational approach to populism is not a proper way to run a populism research due to its flaws and misconceptions remarked by many different scholars mentioned above. Although ideational elements in today's populists cannot be ignored, they seem just like a tip of the iceberg. Therefore, if one wants to fully comprehend populism phenomenon, he/she has to go deeper below. After all, as I have pointed out, ideational approach to populism couldn't find a support even from Michael Freedman, the creator of thin-centred ideology concept. In short, I agree with Aslanidis' (2018) point asserting that ideational approach to populism offers nothing more than a Manichaean outlook, which is also emphasized by discursive tradition (1244).

2.2. Strategic Approach

Frontrunners of this tradition are Kurt Weyland (1999, 2001, 2017), Robert Barr (2009), Kenneth M. Roberts (2006), and Nadia Urbinati (2018). This approach is inclined to view populism as a strategic movement of which ultimate goal is to achieve power (Urbinati 2018), and take policy preferences, party structures, and types of mobilization as units in their studies (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 10). In general, this approach is different than two other main approaches with regards to its emphasis on actions rather than rhetoric, party organization, a strong emphasis on the leader, and the direct relationship between the leader and followers.

As an identified name with this tradition, Weyland (2017) views populism as a political strategy in which a personalistic leader seeks ways to raise the influence of his/her supporters and exercises their power (55). Populists appear on political scene in order to win and maintain political power via mass mobilization, with emphasis on achieving will of the people. Personalistic leaders appeal to masses which are heterogeneous and loosely institutionalized, and heavily rely on unmediated contact (59). To Barr (2009), populism may be viewed as an attempt to re-institutionalize of politics, in terms of replacing horizontal accountability of institutional framework with vertical accountability of a single political actor via building vertical ties between the leader and his/her followers (45). However, in order to talk about populism, we need three necessary conditions: anti-establishment rhetoric, outsiders and vertical linkages between the ruler and the ruled. When separated and become uncombined, none of these features refers to populism on their own (44). In concordance with such conditions, Barr (2009) defines populism as "a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages" (38). In this definition, plebiscitarian linkages refers to either momentary or episodic input of the people in public decision-making process. So, they authorize a political actor to decide on behalf of themselves (35, 36). Outsiders are not newcomers to political system. Instead, what determines an actor's condition of being an insider or outsider is his/her position vis a vis the party system (33). And mavericks are insiders but simply challenging the status-quo (44). Lastly, what Barr (2009) means by anti-establishment appeals is all sorts of challenges to power elite, whether they are political or economic elites (31). According to Urbinati (2018), populism is mainly a strategic movement that relies on leadership, party structure, the manipulation of institutions and procedures in order to achieve power by gaining the consent of the majority (7). Roberts (2006) claims that the underlying reason of the hardship in defining populism stems from its organizational variation and disparate forms of mobilization, that's why he views populism as a political mobilization of masses by personalistic leaders challenging established elites (127).

To strategic approach, leadership is a core input in populism. Scholars of this tradition also often mention on charismatic leadership as a significant catalyst in populism. Charisma, which is often regarded as the leader's superhuman abilities to represent, lead, and protect the people (Weyland 2001, 13). Although not a core characteristic, it may indeed consolidate

quasi-direct relationship between the leader and masses (Weyland 2017, 50), reinforces the confidence to the leader's capability to perform, triggers mass mobilization like a crisis does (Barr 2009, 41). But political history has also witnessed non-charismatic populists, like Alberto Fujimori in Peru (Barr 2009, 41). Hence, Weyland (2017) claims that rather than charismatic leadership, populism requires personalistic leadership. With such a leader, populism seeks to challenge and dominate established political actors of the elite and organized parties (55), while ending up with an engagement in the chameleonic dimension of the phenomenon (67). Opportunism, flexibility to seek votes, and a lack of ideological commitment are defining features of personalistic leadership (63).

Like political scientists of ideational approach, scholars of strategic tradition often underline advantageous aspects of their approach, especially by comparing it with other two main approaches. For instance, Weyland (2017) sheds light on the basic argument of strategic approach that distinguishes it from other two traditions: Strategic conceptualization of populism focuses on what populists do, not on what they say (50). The logic of populism as a strategy relies on the discrepancy of populist discourse and action (53). Leaders show their true intention when they make decisions, not by giving a speech or applying any other sorts of discourse (61). Thus, populists' promises, and their policy performance usually do not overlap (64). Moreover, if we take populism as a loose ideology or a discourse, then we mistakenly consider all leftist politics should be populist. In fact, parties with tightly organized structures and ideologically committed to left wing ideology (for instance communist parties) cannot be counted as populist (62). Besides, these misconceptions are not limited to leftists. Fascist leaders, such as Hitler or Mussolini, cannot be considered as populists due to their commitment to dogmatic rigid ideological positions while populists are instead pragmatic, opportunistic, and put their vote maximization targets ahead of their related ideological backgrounds (50). Organizational factors and programmatic/ideological commitment distinguish real populists from the assumed ones – the ones that are mistakenly considered as populists by other traditions (62). What is more, by not adding a personalistic leader to populism analysis, one can also mistakenly cover bottom-up mass movements, which are indeed not populists. Merely depending on Manichaean discourse does not make a movement or leader populist (59), rather populism requires top-down leadership, pioneered by a personalistic leader (54).

2.2.1. Critique of Strategic Approach

First, as I've mentioned above, Weyland's (2017) focuses on the discrepancy of rhetoric and action, ideological commitments and tactical vote calculations, as means of a true identification of populism (53). According to this point of view, populism is a pernicious phenomenon, which inherently acts against the masses. It's a trick, a con which may only end up with losses of masses. However, populism is also considered as not a purely demonic phenomenon, but it might also correspond an inclusionary form of politics, which in turn may also bring benefits for the people (De la Torre 2000, 141). It may enhance inclusiveness by raising political participation at the expense of political competition (Kaltwasser 2012; 197, 200). Inclusionary distributive policies of Chávez and Morales are some examples (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013, 159). In short, it can also refer a corrective phenomenon in democratic regimes because it provides a voice to the ones fraught with a sense of not being represented by existing elites (Kaltwasser 2012, 185). Moreover, this logic merely focuses on short run cost-benefit dimension of the issue. It does not say much about the possible long-run consequences and is doomed to fail to explain the political presence of populists who have been running their countries for a long time period. Specifically, it is unable to provide a reasonable explanation for the long-term rule of leaders such as Erdoğan, Duterte, or Orbán, who are viewed as identified with their populist way of doing politics by various scholars and intellectuals. Furthermore, when Weyland (2001) associates the loyalty of followers with the leader's ability to fulfill his/her promises, he also remarks that a decline in popularity of a populist may ineluctably lead a collapse in populist politics (13) Such emphasis on the discrepancy of what is said and what is done overlooks the impact of how such discourse is framed by mass media and how is it perceived by followers. More or less, popularity and loyalty depend on a degree of subjectivity. Weyland's such claims obviously disregard populism's sentimental dimension, which I've mentioned before while presenting ideational approach. Populism is highly interpretative, thus how the leader's performance is perceived and evaluated by masses is extremely important. That's why the political career of a populist may not merely depend on success and failures of the fulfillment of his promises. As Barr

(2009) points out, personalism requires a faith in personalities, not in any sorts of ideologies or impersonal dimension of procedures such as laws, rules, etc. (40). A strategic approach depends on personalistic leadership therefore also depends on the faith in such leadership. So, what matters is much more about not losing the faith, which is not shaped merely by facts but also by perceptions, interpretations, norms, values, and beliefs. This is indeed in accord with Barr's (2009) criticism on personalistic dimension of populism. He contends that the people may have various reasons to support a political actor. Hence, one cannot precisely claim that support to populism is an outcome of materialistic loyalties depending on benefits based on ties of clientelism and patronage, or non-material loyalties which are more due to leaders' messages or charisma (Barr 2009, 41).

Second, as Mudde (2017) points out, assuming populism as a strategy may be highly problematic due to the fact that it relies on the idea that populists have strategy while other politicians do not (30). In addition, as Aslanidis (2016) remarks, identifying populism as an opportunistic political strategy which is merely based on taking electoral benefits or not is very hard indeed. To know what truly exists at a politician's mind is not possible. What is more, politics is a bundle of tactics and strategies, strategy is embedded in it. Political actors are rational individuals, each of whom seeks to maximize his/her political benefit (96). Hence, when we view populism as a strategy, we take it as an equivalence of politics. Because politics as a whole includes all ideological movements as well, which inevitably confutes Weyland's (2017) claims on the distinction of opportunist vs ideological politics I've mentioned above. Besides, as Urbinati (2018) herself mentions, electoral success is a part of democratic contest, and this fact obscures the distinction between populism and any other movement of representative politics (7).

Third, prominent scholars of strategic approach views populism as some sort of a governance which operates under a semi-democratic setting. Urbinati (2018) evidently remarks that populism is a new sort of government, in which one part of the populace has overwhelming power over the rest of the society. It contests constitutional democracy with "direct representation" which refers to the direct relationship between the leader and the people (14). Similarly, Weyland (2017) argues that both Mussolini and Hitler resorted Manichean discourse, the essence of which was based on the distinction between pure people and their

enemies. However, while fascism or national socialism may quickly turn into a despotic authoritarian governance, populism remains in the gray zone, between democracy and competitive authoritarianism (Weyland 2017, 53). Urbinati (2018) asserts an affirmative argument: Populism is different than fascism in terms of not discarding free and competitive elections and accepting their legitimate role. (5). Therefore, unlike fascism, populism needs elections in order to prove its legitimacy (9, 10). I have several reasons to oppose these ideas. First of all, populism may end up with authoritarian forms of governments such as competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Loxton 2013) or especially when relies on charismatic leadership, it may end up with a rise in authoritarian tendencies (Inglehart & Norris 2016, 7). But assuming populism as a form of regime or government may end up with conceptual stretching and lead us distorted results in our studies since it not only changes the unit of analysis but also our conception of populism. Besides, focusing too much on fascists might lead us to overlook the historical context. Political circumstances in 1930s were very different than the ones we have today. One cannot know for sure, but we need to think on this counterfactual: If fascists of 1930s lived today, would they transform their regimes into fascist ones? My answer is no, probably they would remain in the “gray zone” because, as Müller (2016) remarks in today's global politics, the cost of open authoritarianism is too high and an official abolishment of a "democratic regime" may end up with a huge loss in international prestige, as well as a possible loss in material benefits (49, 50).

Fourth, Weyland (1999, 2001, 2017) often emphasizes loose organizational formations of populist movements in his works (384-389, 12-15, 58) and briefly argues that populists seek for support among unorganized masses (Weyland 1999, 386). In addition, Weyland (1999) contends that party weakness is a necessary condition of populism and claims that strong parties hinder the rise of populism. As an example, he mentions that Hungarian strong parties impeded a populist surge (385). He also emphasizes that parliamentary systems do not provide auspicious environment for populists to rise power (390). To these arguments, I can say that this point of view is highly dependent on Latin American context and almost totally relies on a conceptualization of populist instances from Latin American politics. In general, European parties are in strong and not loosely organized. But we know that populist escalations have recently gained a serious support from the electorate in several European countries. As Moffit & Tormey (2014) point out, Le Pen's National Front or Wilder's PVV

do not have loose organizational structures although they are widely viewed as populists by many scholars (386). More interestingly, contrary to the claims of loose organizational structures of Latin American populists, Kaltwasser (2012) remarks that completed works depending on empirical evidence showing that Peronism in Argentina was indeed very organized (193). Moreover, even other scholars of this approach do not agree on taking organizational formation as a defining characteristic for populism. To Barr (2009), an analysis of organization structures is not defining characteristic of populism since organization formation may vary from one populist movement to another but cannot be operationalized in order to distinguish populists from non-populists (42). Likewise, Roberts (2006) argues that due to the organizational variation of populism, organized vs unorganized dichotomy cannot be a defining characteristic (127, 128). For emphases on party systems and strong parties, I agree that a collapse of party systems may provide propitious conditions for populist surge (i.e. Italy in early 1990s). But the entire political history has shown us that populists may thrive in almost any governmental setting. Focusing on strong parties cannot provide a true explanation for Viktor Orbán's achieving power in Hungary and his long-term presence in the office. Besides, too much focus on parliamentary vs presidential distinction may cause trouble in populism analysis since it overlooks populist emergences in parliamentary settings. For instance, one cannot explain how Orbán and Erdoğan achieved power in their initial electoral campaigns, in two different parliamentary settings.

To sum up, strategic approach has a crucial logic within itself. It presents leader as a determinant. Despite the weaknesses and inconsistencies in general, Barr's (2009) approach to populism seems more consistent. However, even this definition would have a low operationalizability in a possible comparative research on populism. Measurement would be problematic since there is not a clear single unit of analysis, thereby only allows qualitative works for the supply side analysis of populism. Therefore, I'll move into the discursive approach to discover whether it is able to provide an operationalizable conceptualization that one can apply in quantitative empirical studies. But what is more important than operationalizability is that strategic approach fails to offer a sufficiently rigid and a single unified conception of populism, due to its inferential inconsistencies detailedly mentioned above and conceptual disagreements among its own prominent contributors.

2.3. Discursive Approach

The pioneer of discursive tradition is Ernesto Laclau (1977, 2005a, 2005b), while numerous other scholars have contributed (Aslanidis 2016; Bonikowski 2016; de la Torre 2000; Hawkins 2009, 2010; Kazin 2017; Panizza 2005). Definitions of discursive approach may seem disparate for instance; a logic (Laclau 2005a), an appeal (Canovan 1999)¹, a mode of persuasion (Kazin 2017), a Manichaeic rhetoric (de la Torre 2000), a political communication style (Jagers & Walgrave 2007), a discursive framing strategy (Bonikowski 2016), a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2016), and etc. Nonetheless, they all have an important common denominator: Discourse as the unit of analysis; comprising words, expressions, speeches, and statements of various political actors.²

This tradition basically views populism as an anti-status quo discourse that symbolically divides the political society into “the people” and its “other” (Panizza 2005, 3). For example, Aslanidis (2016) asserts that populism is better identified with discourse emphasizing the sovereignty of the people against the corrupt elite (96). Likewise, to de la Torre (2000), populism is a style of political mobilization based on a Manichaeic rhetoric that constructs politics as a moral and ethical struggle between the people and the oligarchy (4). Similar definitions of which units are again discourses are built by many other scholars, even their traditional origins have been different. For instance, also known with his structural approach to populism, Di Tella (1997) defines populism as political expressions that initiate a mass of loosely organized people into action against the privileged, better of segments of the society (188).

¹. Although Canovan’s (1999) work puts too much emphasis on appeals to the people, she doesn’t view discourse as the only unit in populism. To her, ideological elements embedded in democracy such as sovereignty of the people, are also crucial (Canovan 2002, 33).

². I deliberately have not included scholars who view populism as a style for this paragraph since they often consider other units beside discourse. For instance, Knight (1998) is different than other scholars mentioned under this rubric with regards to his emphasizes on that populism cannot be limited to a simple rhetoric. Similarly, to Moffitt & Tormey (2014), populism as a style is different than a mere discourse, it refers to a bigger set of dramaturgical elements such as performance, audiences, actors, stages, screens, etc. (389, 390).

According to scholars of discursive approach, populism is not a coherent world view or ideology. Rather, it is a dynamic discursive framing strategy (Bonikowski 2016, 23). Framing is the practice of presenting an issue from a certain point of view in order to maximize its impact on people. Frames are not characteristics of individuals, movements, or political parties, but they are features of political discourse such as statements, speeches, press releases, briefings, or public debates (Bonikowski 2016, 14). Because ordinary citizens have incomplete information and understanding about who is responsible for worsening economic conditions, or who is really involved with scandals, populist politicians appear as narrators. Populists stimulate populist attitudes via rhetorical framing (Hawkins, Read, & Pauwels 2017, 277) and populist discourse works as it touches to the “ressentiment” of masses and exploit it (Betz 2002, 198). Populist strategy indeed depends on discursive references to the sovereignty of the people - Populists pretend to care about concerns of the people, present themselves as they were not alienated from the folk, therefore strive to pose for as if they are better candidates to defend interests of the folk (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, 323).

An analysis of populism based on discourse is almost a requirement if one cares about empirical consistency. Because the only common denominator of all populist movements is "a rhetorical style which relies heavily upon appeals to the people" (Quoted from Canovan, Vittori 2017, 51). Apart from this fact, I want to mention on some pros of viewing populism as a discourse, expressed by various scholars. As I've mentioned above, populism lacks adherence to any sorts of ideologies. It is indeed a flexible reaction in order to persuade the people (Kazin 2017, 3). To Hawkins (2009), unlike any ideology, populism cannot provide clear policy preferences. It lacks crystal-clear arguments and has a subjective quality which is expressed by the rhetoric of the orator (1045). In short, populism is contextual (Canovan 1999, 4), unstable (Bonikowski 2016, 13), and chameleonic (Taggart 2004, 275). Thus, rather than ideological conceptualizations, one should focus on discourse as an expression of populism. Identifying populism as a discursive, speech-level phenomenon enables us to recognize its contextual dimension with regards to its not only temporal but also spatial differentiation (Bonikowski 2016; 14, 15). Discourse can be measured via attentive scrutiny of discursive elements exercised by political actors (Aslanidis 2016, 97). Populist discourse is not only measurable but also valid and reliable (Hawkins 2009, 1046). To Aslanidis (2016), taking populism as a discursive frame brings us two advantages: First, it enables a better

comprehension for its cognitive dimension. Second, it provides a methodological framework for empirical work (98). Moreover, most of the empirical work in populism indeed views populism as a discursive phenomenon (100). Discursive elements are implicit in populism's ideational approach that Cas Mudde has developed. In fact, scholars of ideational approach criticize discursive tradition, but they mostly rely on discourse as a unit of analysis in their studies (98)³.

Before mentioning critique of discursive approach, I want to present a simplified overview of Laclau's theory of populism. This simplified version of the theory will not only provide sufficiently satisfying answers for any possible opposing inquiries, but also provide a base for my minimal definition.

2.3.1. On Laclauian Perspective

In his highly theoretical work, Laclau (2005a) builds an abstract maximal theory of populism. He simply defines populism as a political logic, rather than a movement identified with a particular social base or an ideology (117). His approach to populism requires a shift of units of analysis from movements and ideologies to political discourse (Laclau 2005b, 33). According to this theory, in a political society, there are distinct particular demands of individuals constituting that society. When unfulfilled, these particular demands get accumulated. The more accumulation they undergo, the less the institutional system becomes able to absorb them as different demands. This follows with the establishment of an equivalential relation between such demands due to a solidarity between individuals whose particular demands are not responded (73). If demands remain isolated from each other, then they remain as democratic demands. But when demands get articulated in an equivalential way and constitute a plural social subjectivity (refers to the body of an equivalential chain in Laclau's theory), they turn into popular demands (74). The prerequisite of equivalence is the particularity of demands. If such particularities disappear, then there would be no common ground to build an equivalence. So, for the construction of "the people," both difference and

³. Scholars who have ideational background or adopt an ideational definition of populism but view discourse as the unit of analysis in their works will be mentioned under the section called "Critique of Discursive Approach"

equivalence of demands are essential (79). In other words, what equivalential chain eliminates is that the distinction of demands, not the demands themselves. Popular identity rises over persistent and disparate unfulfilled demands (Laclau 2005b, 46).

To Laclau (2005a; 2005b), three conditions are necessary for a populist surge: First, an antagonism - based on a dichotomy of the social space that is distinguished each other with an internal frontier (for instance the people vs the power elite or bloc); second, the construction of “the people” via the construction of equivalential chain, which has inherent anti-pluralistic and anti-institutional characteristics, by articulation of unfulfilled demands; and third a stable system of signification once a certain level of mobilization has been achieved, the vague solidarity between equivalent demands turned into a unification of such demands (74; 38). Hence, the success of a populist surge depends on the strength of equivalential links between particular demands (Laclau 2005b, 37), the generation of a popular subjectivity which necessitates the construction of an internal frontier (Laclau 2005b, 38) and the ability of one difference to achieve a totality via discursive identification, when exposed to exclusion (Laclau 2005a; 78, 82). For instance, on the hand, we have a well-functioning welfare state, in which particular demands are responded without any modification to their particularity and therefore equivalential links and the internal frontier of antagonism never emerge. So due to its non-exclusionary functioning, such society does not provide the propitious environment for the construction of a totality, and thereby “the people” (78, 79). On the other hand, in a different political setting (Laclau’s example is Thatcher’s initiation of neoliberal policies in the U.K.) facing with a severe exclusion, an equivalence among differences may rise by self-identification of all links in a popular chain with a common denominator. In this process democratic particular demands turn into popular demands while the former may remain and expand in a hegemonic formation (82). What Laclau means by *hegemony* is the claim of one particular demand to represent the whole equivalential chain without losing its particularity and start to function as a signifier of the totality of the chain (Laclau 2005b, 39). At this point, “the hegemonic identity becomes something of the order of an *empty signifier*” (Laclau 2005a; 70, 71). What we must understand from the “emptiness” is the common denominator that is signified via a popular symbol. Any popular identity necessitates a condensation around some signifiers, such as words, speeches, images, etc., of which function is to signify the equivalential chain as a

totality (Laclau 2005a, 96). And what Laclau (2005b) calls as the *empty signifier* is the element that deliberately provides coherence to an equivalential chain by signifying it as a totality (44).

I want to underscore three key dimensions of Laclau's theory of populism. First, the emphasis on *representation* as explained by a popular subject's claim to represent totality of equivalential chain. Second, the importance of *discourse* – such claim of representation indeed relies on discursive construction of “us and them”. And third, *the leader* – who initiates the functioning of signification process. In order to accentuate the role of representation and discourse, Laclau (2005b) clearly argues that in a political society, "the people" can only be constructed through relations of representation (48) and since "the people" is a constructed conception, populist discourse does not simply express a sort of popular identity, rather it builds popular identity over relations of representation (48, 49). Furthermore, Laclau (2005b) remarks that the common genus of a movement or an ideology is a discourse (47) and one cannot talk about populism when the discursive construction of the enemy is missing (39). In other words, the construction of hegemony in populism is achieved via discourse (Laclau 1977, 196).

2.3.2. Critique of Discursive Approach

Criticism to discursive approach indeed focus on few but important aspects. First and foremost, despite her emphasis on appeals, Canovan (1999) asserts that populism cannot be merely taken as a discourse (1999, 5). Due to the fact that every political speech claim to speak on behalf of the people, or for the people, distinguishing populist speeches from non-populist ones is considered as impossible (Panizza 2005, 5). In a similar vein, Knight (1998) contends that appeals to "the people" cannot be merely attributed to populism and any regime can employ much or less populist elements (229). Supportively, Mudde (2017) claims that emotional discourse cannot be considered as populism since all political campaigners resort such rhetoric (35). In accord with that, Weyland (2017) argues that “us and them” demagoguery may have been used by various leaders, including both populists and non-populists. Such rhetorical explanations convey analysis to a vaguely broader scope (53). My answer to such

remarks would be that as explained in Laclau's theory (2005a, 2005b), populist discourse does not refer to a usual, ordinary or simple sort of discourse. Not all appeals that refer to "the people" can be assessed within the extent of populism (Laclau 1977, 165). It is indeed a very particular type of rhetoric, aiming to achieve a totality of the whole equivalential chain via attempting to build an artificial homogeneity for it, while presenting it as a hegemonic alternative vis-à-vis the power elite (the other). Such attempt is undertaken by one particular difference pretending to act like an empty signifier (an individual with an unfulfilled democratic demand, or to put simply, the leader/initiator of the populist movement). Therefore, appeals to the people, only under such circumstances can be assessed as populist. According to Laclau's (2005a, 2005b) point of view, any politician attempting to gain such hegemonic power against a power bloc by merging his unfulfilled particular demand with other unfulfilled particular demands of individuals who are also excluded, gets engaged with populism. To discursive tradition, there is no binary distinction like populist vs non-populist (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 9). To Laclau (2005b), rather, one should inquire that to what extent a movement is populist (45). In other words, every movement is somehow more or less populist due to their appeals to the people against an enemy via a constructed social frontier (47). Populism may have degrees, just like democracy may (Aslanidis 2016, 93). As Kaltwasser (2012) says by referring to Robert Dahl's *polyarchy*, democracy is an ideal that can never be achieved fully (196). Aslanidis (2016) reasonably asks why democracy indices such as Polity IV and Freedom House is widely used and thereby viewed as legitimate data while indices of populism are largely viewed as illegitimate (93). More interestingly, as Aslanidis (2016) remarks scholars who adopted ideational approach and often strive to downplay discursive tradition are often complainant about "degreeism" issue, but they ultimately rely on discursive data (92, 93). For instance, as measuring populist discourse for his quantitative text analysis of populism, Pauwels (2011) agrees that populism is a thin centred ideology but what makes this ideology measurable is its discursive expression (100). Likewise, Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) employ Mudde's (2004) definition of populism as a thin-centred ideology and measure it by ultimately relying on election manifestos (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; 1273, 1274). Similarly, Vasilopoulou et al. (2013) argue that populism as an ideology is likely to manifest itself via narratives of political actors (389). For degreeism debate, Aslanidis (2018) reemphasizes in one of his other work – that populist discourse

inherently shows its intensity according to degrees (1242). In concordance with this assertion, not only Pauwels' (2011) claims point out but also his findings verify that populism is not a Sartorian "either-or" concept, rather it inherently has a "matter of degree" (97, 98, 114). This means some parties, naturally, might be more or less populist (114). In a similar vein, results of Rooduijn and Pauwels' (2011) study point out that some parties are more and some other are less populist, thereby acknowledging that populism indeed has degrees (1277).

Second, another frequently pronounced objection is an overlook of the action, but a mere concentration on the rhetoric. To Van Kessel (2014), populism can show itself as a loosely applied discourse (114). Weyland (2017) asserts that focusing on the discrepancy between discourse and action is absent in Hawkins' (2009) measurement procedure. Therefore, populism is falsely defined in such discursive works Weyland (2017, 53). More precisely, Weyland (2017) argues that if one applies Hawkins' (2009) holistic grading procedure to Hitler and Mussolini, then one may conclude that these leaders were populists, which was not the case to Weyland (Weyland 2017, 53). Hawkins' response is more accurate for the discrepancy between discourse and the action: "Actions are ultimately "populist" because of the meaning that is ascribed to them by their participants, not because of any objective quality that inheres in them" (Hawkins 2009, 1047). This response reflects how much interpretations are important in populism and how actions are shaped by interpretative discourses, speeches, words, or statements. One can easily object to Weyland (2017) ideological assessment criterion in terms of distinguishing populists from fascists. More or less, every populist politics has ideational dimensions. Indeed, there are scholars who view fascism as having a populist nature. To Müller (2016), both Mussolini and Hitler were also populists (93). According to Laclau (1977), Nazism indeed emerged as a populist mass movement, which in time avoided revolutionary potential of popular interpellations, and deviated into a path that brings it to its true objectives (174). What makes a movement populist is its ability to express popular-democratic elements antagonistically against a power bloc (173). That is why movements that have distinct ideological background such as Maoism, Peronism, or fascism, may all refer to populist escalations (de la Torre 2000, 13).

Third, scholars from strategic approach criticize discursive tradition due to its negligence institutional framework. Although Laclau (2005a, 2005b) mentions on equivalential chains

are get linked together in an anti-institutional way, as I've mentioned above, in general discursive approach takes discourse as unit of analysis, not the organization of the movement itself. Organizational features are not viewed as core characteristic of populism, even by some scholars of strategic approach, as I've mentioned before. However, Barr (2009) emphasizes the position of the leader with regard to the political establishment and argues that rhetoric is not enough to pinpoint this position. Outsiders can only be identified by looking their experience within the party system (33). Moreover, Barr (2009) contends that populism is highly dependent on plebiscitarian linkages, but stylist approaches do not take this into consideration (43). As once can expect, Barr (2009) views populism according to his own definition. However, in the critique of strategic approach, I've already mentioned that being an outsider is not seen a necessary condition by even other scholars of strategic tradition. When it comes plebiscitarian linkages, Barr (2009) describes them as extreme, purer and vertical forms of electoral linkages, authorizing political actors, instead of political parties, for the representation of the people (35, 36). They have top-down dimension, highly dependent on the leader, and they provide direct relation between the leader and the led, by transcending institutional settings (37). What I understand from Barr's plebiscitarian linkages is that they exist due to first leader's personalism tending to bypass institutional settings, and second electoral processes of democracies, so more or less, they are dependent on democratic framework. Moreover, Barr (2009) seems to create this new type of linkage due to high frequency of Latin American leaders tending to involve those kinds of relationship between the people. But the domain of populism is not limited to democracy, rather it depends on political representation. In a political society where representative politics is prevalent, populism has always a chance to thrive, regardless of democratic or non-democratic institutional structure.

To sum up, among three main traditions, I've found discursive approach as the most propitious one which I can use to build my own minimal definition. Besides, with regards to operationalizability and measurement, this tradition seems to have fewer inner disagreements on populism and provides higher consistency. After all, the unit of analysis is clear, determined, and theoretically justified. Scholars who take discourse as a unit can conduct any sorts of studies: Qualitative, quantitative, or mix-method. Now I wish to mention what I've inferred from populism as a discourse so far, by presenting an implications section. Next, I

will introduce my own conceptualization, that is based on Laclauian perspective of populism. With a few modifications, I'll attempt to build a minimal definition whose core features are clear and theoretically justified.

2.4. Implications

In accord with remarks of various scholars in populism literature, I contend that populist discourse has four crucial dimensions - moralistic, constructivist, formative, and exclusionary. These four do not have to be totally distinct from each other, instead often may appear complementary.

With regards to moralistic dimension, populists, in their rhetoric, claim the validity of their majorities depends not only on numerics but mainly on ethics and morality (Urbinati 2018, 9). According to populist logic, popular will is a symbolic representation of "real people" (Müller 2016, 27). That means only some of the people are "real" in a political society (Müller 2016, 21). Populist rhetoric is based on aggrandizing good and virtuous of simple, ordinary people while vilifying incompetent, unaccountable and corrupt elites (Mény & Surel 2002, 12). It brings a severe political polarization and it relies on profound political loyalties (Knight 1998, 237). Such dualisms of "the people" vs "the elite" or "us" vs "them" are based on a conception of morality since they indeed attempt to build moral boundaries with clear cut lines by a quasi-religious approach (Bonikowski & Gidron 2013, 2; de la Torre 2000, 15; Mudde 2017, 29; Müller 2016, 25; Taggart 2002, 78). Neither 'pure people' nor 'corrupt elite' refers to formal categorizations, rather they are "moral constructs" (Mudde 2002, 216). Populists apply moral references in their discourses, and such moral dimension of populism disables political adversaries by not letting any "legitimate dissent" (Panizza 2005; 22, 23). That explains Müller's (2016) emphasis on the power of populism – it indeed comes from populists' empirically non-falsifiable hypothesis. While democratic politicians can try something and fail, populists make moral and symbolic claims which are not empirically falsifiable due to their nature. Because populists are invulnerable to empirical denial, they are discursively persistent in today's politics (39, 102).

What I mean by constructivist dimension is that politicians who apply populist frequently, skillfully construct an identity for “the people,” an incarnation of such identity with themselves. Manichaeic discourse is based on identification of the good as the unified will of the people and of the evil as a conspiring elite (Hawkins 2009, 1042). This “us and them” antagonism helps populism to build a group identity (Moffitt 2015, 201) by appealing value commitments of the people (Müller 2016, 92). To Hawkins (2009), by identifying the enemy, populism negatively constitutes the people. For instance, Chávez defines evil as imperialism and blames the opposition of being puppets of United States and other international perilous forces against Venezuelan people. The good is constructed as an overarching notion that symbolizes the ones who reject any compromises with the evil (1043, 1044). Populists dexterously resort constant “existential threats” during their appearances of addressing the nation via mass communication channels such as regular radio programs as in the case of Viktor Orbán, “Aló Presidente” channels as in the case of Hugo Chávez, or TV programs as in the case of Evo Morales (Müller 2016, 43). Expressions of bad manners may complement the performative political style of populists (Moffitt & Tormey 2014, 392). Populists’ proximity to the people leads an identification, an imaginary incarnation of “authentic people” with the leader (Urbinati 2018, 12). Such identification facilitates the people’s delegation of power to a political actor who allege to be incarnation of their redemption (de la Torre 2000, 19). Identification does not have to be one sided - accompanied with a sense of belongingness, it may emerge interactively between the people and the populist actor (de la Torre 2000, 19) and it may also result in a redefinition of the people, as in the case of George W. Bush's attempts to construct the identity of “us” and to redefine what is to be American (Panizza 2005; 6, 7).

The formative dimension refers to the ability of populism to shape perception of the people. Cas Mudde (2004) seeks for an answer for why political stage is so much saturated with various populist movements. Mudde simply asks two questions: Is the distance between the people and the elite is wider than it was in the past? And is corruption a more serious problem in today's politics than before 1990s? His findings do not match what is expected, and do not provide an explanation for why we experience a populist *Zeitgeist*. Thus, he contends that what has changed is indeed perceptions, not facts (552, 553). Events, actions, facts are indeed facilitating instruments for populists. Such instruments enable intensive and easy means to

build group identity so long as they are instrumentalized by populist discursive framing. According to Panizza (2005), what triggers the construction of that identity is indeed discursive framework, not by material concreteness of events. Bush achieved to create a collective identity of “us vs terrorists:” "Either you are with us, or with the terrorists" (6). Bush’s claim that 9/11 was indeed against freedom provided a simple explanation for confused and traumatized American people (8). In short, perception plays a huge role in populist politics and what shapes perceptions of individuals is cognitive mobilization conducted by political statements, speeches, discourses of populist politicians.

If one talks about populist strategy, then one needs to focus on the exclusion of the existing power bloc, or the status-quo, or the opposing equivalential chain at the other side of the internal frontier in Laclau’s (2005a, 2005b) theory. Then one may see that populist strategy inherently leaves no space for reconciliation or compromise while discursively initiating cognitive and when necessary, physical mobilization of masses. Inherent exclusionary logic of populism should not be confused with inclusionary forms of populism as Kaltwasser (2012; 197, 200) Mudde & Kaltwasser (2013, 159) point out. These scholars focus on policy outcomes of populist rule or mobilizations when they refer to inclusionary forms of populism. Inclusionary policies of Chávez and Morales are politically inclusionary actions, once these leaders have achieved power to increase their popularities, to fulfill prerequisites of their left-wing ideologies, or pay back to “the people” for their electoral support. What I mean is, during the appearance of opposing equivalential chains, the antagonistic construction of “the people” and thereby the enemy, while identifying the former with the leader, requires an exclusionary attitude against the enemy. That means populism has an inherent exclusionary dimension. This exclusionary dimension of populism is explanatory about why Robert Barr (2009) views the condition of being an outsider or a maverick as a required condition for populism. As I’ve pointed out, populism is highly constructive, moralistic, and formative. Therefore, it relies on identities, senses, emotions, perceptions, beliefs, and loyalties. That means populism rises as a non-material phenomenon that highly depends on faith (Barr 2009; 40, 41; Canovan 1999, 9). Faith is the key to understand the solidarity between individuals because other individuals with unfulfilled particular demands have to have a faith in the leader and *perceive* him/her as an “equal” with regards to their excluded status. That explains why not only political outsiders but also insiders challenging the status-quo (mavericks)

occasionally appear on political stage as fervent demagogues. As Barr (2009) contends, like outsiders, mavericks practice populist rhetoric and present themselves as the change against the status-quo (44) (This change is different than the change that huge social transformations ultimately bring. In accord with Laclauian conceptualization, it refers to the exclusion of the status-quo while it may be inclusive for followers of the leader). As Panizza (2005) remarks, excluded people want to be represented by someone like them but also have outstanding achievements that may inspire them: An ordinary individual but with a strong personality, with a similar disadvantaged background but ultimately able to achieve power due to his/her perseverance and hard work, despite all unfavorable circumstances he/she has gone through (21, 22). I contend that being an outsider, or a maverick, or charismatic leadership are not necessary requirements. These features do not necessarily evolve into populist escalation per se. The effort of Barr (2009) can be explained as an attempt to achieve an overarching inclusion of all populist instances via an either-or logic, especially focusing on the ones appeared in Latin American politics. Conditions of being an outsider or maverick are closely associated with all dimensions I've emphasized, in terms of serving as strong facilitators for a populist escalation via stimulating an identification of the people with the leader. Therefore, I argue that these conditions are catalysts, not prerequisites of populism. Instead, the precondition is that the leader has to be identified as an equivalence of all differences, by all differences positioned as the leader's equivalences in the whole equivalential chain, and thereby has to be able to claim a hegemonic totality of the whole chain he belongs.

2.5. Theoretical Framework

In this part, by using Laclau's (2005a, 2005b) theory as a base, I'll strive to build a minimal definition in order to conduct an empirical study that leaves no space for confusion or conceptual stretching issues. But before that, I have to agree Weyland's (2001) emphasis that the domain of populism is political. Historical instances of populist surge have proven that it cannot be limited to the scope of economic policy choices. And once one has agreed that populism is indeed political, then one may inevitably accept that populism is practiced in

order to achieve or perpetuate power, like any other forms of politics. As I've agreed upon the domain of populism and what it actually refers to, now I want to go back to the very beginning of populist escalation.

Once the spark of populism prematurely appears due to failures or crises, a common resentment of the people that encourages a positioning against a power bloc is essential, not for all traditions agree upon its existence as a requirement, but for the necessity of that unfulfilled particular demands to form equivalential relations, if one takes Laclauian logic (2005a, 2005b) as a base. The resentment of differences – individuals with distinct particular demands – serves as a builder for an ambiguous internal division between frustrated differences and the power bloc. Such ambiguity can be overcome by a solidarity among all differences, resulting with a more explicit internal frontier of equivalences positioned against the power bloc. At this point, Ben Stanley (2008) reasonably asks this question during his attacks on Laclauian perspective: What enables the solidarity between dissatisfied, frustrated individuals? Is this an automatic process? (97, 98). Indeed, Laclau (2005a; 2005b) has provided this answer by contending that the construction of a popular subjectivity requires a discursively generated, universal representation of the whole chain, which in turn necessitates homogenizing the heterogeneous totality, and that is achieved by the leader (74; 39, 40). As Laclau (2005a) clearly points out, one difference shows up and attempts to transcend oneself in order to achieve a hegemonic totality and gets in touch with others, whose demands are different but at the same time, with regards to the unfulfillment status of their demands are “equal” individuals (78, 82). Only in this way, the logic of equivalence overwhelms the logic of difference. At the end of this process, populism rises due to the expansion of the logic of equivalence at the expense of the logic of difference (Laclau 2005a; 77, 78). In short, I contend that the presence of a leader is an essential core characteristic of populism.

So far, I've mentioned populism as a discursive phenomenon, and that is inherently able to bend objective realities and manipulate it. At the end of the first chapter, I also mentioned on Moffitt's (2015), Moffitt's & Tormey's (2014) and Taggart's (2002, 2004) emphasis on what really stimulates populist escalation – *a sense of crisis* (Moffitt 2015; 195, 199; Moffitt & Tormey 2014; 391, 392; Taggart 2002, 69; Taggart 2004, 275). This may be true for both

populism in the opposition challenging an established power bloc and populism in the office, aiming to maintain the leaders' perpetuation of power. To Moffitt (2015), a systematic crisis is enhanced to a level of perceived crisis and after then, it can only be experienced via mediation and performance of populists. "Populist actors actively perform and perpetuate a sense of crisis, rather than simply reacting to external crisis" (195). In short, a sense of crisis underpinned and perpetuated by the leader. This view is more reasonable than assertions claiming that populism emerges due to crisis – which are, to Moffitt (2015), indeed objective phenomena and therefore should be named as failures. However, before adding perpetuation of a sense of crisis as a core feature of populism one key issue rises – the impossibility of reading minds of populists and the probability of that the mind of the electorate may be shaped by various elements, not merely by discursive performance of populists. So, I view Moffitt's (2015) claim as a testable hypothesis in an empirical research. In addition, when one attempts to build an overarching minimal theory that encompasses all possible populists instances, one should not forget that shaping perception of the electorate (which I've named as formative dimension) cannot be limited the leader's performative discourse, it may be run by the media by polishing the leader, or by the opposition via weak performance and constant denigration of the populist leader. Panizza (2005) points out that identification may also thrive over a negativity- a failure or a weakness of "the other" in turn reinforces the people's identification with the populist leader. The more their adversaries demonize populist leaders, the more it consolidates the people's identification with them (26). What is required in populism is that, after a leader appears due to solidarity, he/she might not simply conduct a populist performance merely based on taking advantage of a failure and perpetuating it as a crisis, but he/she *must attempt to achieve a hegemonic totality of the equivalential chain*. For instance, before Erdoğan came to power, he did not have a media power. But he was presented as an outsider, banned from politics before since he read a religious excerpt of Ziya Gökalp, and thereby was imprisoned. Before elections, he joined a TV program, faced with the opposition candidate Deniz Baykal, while remaining as a calm and a righteous, legitimate alternative for the power, and that was all his performance. The weakness of the opposition indeed strengthened the construction of shared identity among Erdoğan's actual and potential followers. Thus, today's high frequency of performative stylistic populists does not necessarily require that populism must be defined with such an inclination. A sense of crisis

in the mind of the electorate provides a fertile soil for a growing solidarity between equivalential links but does not necessarily come from the populist performance of the leader. Such perception may be found as given or already existed before the solidarity. Once the leader has appeared on political stage, he/she may only attempt to utilize an already existed sense of crisis for a claim of hegemonic totality of the whole equivalential chain. Hence, I consider perpetuation of a sense of crisis via populist performance as an important facilitator, a true catalyst, but not a core necessary feature. Instead, perpetuation of a sense of crisis via populist discursive performance can be tested, especially to better comprehend instances of populism in power.

Once the leader appears, the initial ambiguity of the internal frontline disappears, antagonism of resentment evolves into antagonistic group identity, and polarization of two identities takes place: on the one hand *the people* and on the other hand its “other” - *the power bloc*. Once the society reaches this stage, both parties rise as moral alternatives to each other. Discourses, political speeches and statements would inevitably have a moral, an ethical dimension, in order to maximize new possible articulations for both equivalential chains, positioned against each other with a moral antagonism, while both demonizing “the other.” This moral positioning of both parties ineluctably turns into a Manichaean outlook for populism. The power bloc is a constructed entity, built by populist rhetoric. At this point, once more I have to remark that a claim for hegemonic totality is a requirement for populist politics. As Stavrakakis (2017) points out, discourse and hegemony are closely related (549). Moreover, depending on Laclauian perspective, Howarth (2014), while referring to Laclau, explains hegemony as a corresponding process that one difference claims to represent “an incommensurable totality”, without ceasing to remain as a particular difference (8). In a hegemonic formation, discursive practices link and modify heterogeneous elements (10).⁴ Hegemonic discourse appears as a claim to achieve an impossible totality while Manichaean outlook requires actual or constructed, abstract or concrete enemies. So, the enemy as a construct, may correspond an actual entity or gain fictional character. That is explanatory for both populism in the opposition and populism in power. When in the opposition, the process

⁴. Hegemony in such references and in Laclauian perspective in general refers to a concept different than its frequent usage in political science literature. Hegemony in political science often viewed as a term that is synonym with dominance or authority of one group against the other. On the webpage of American Heritage dictionary, it is defined as “The predominance of one state or social group over others.” (Accessed online on April the 24th, 2019).

of articulations of equivalential links accompanied by the leader's claim of hegemonic totality of the whole chain, takes place in the periphery. But when in power, populists are at the center of power. Populism at the center cannot be understood without an intensive consideration of populism's Manichaeic outlook and a tendency to present itself as a peripheral alternative challenging the actual or perceived global power center. Dependency theories and Di Tella's (1997) remarks point out a division of global center and periphery relations – while the Global North refers to the center, countries of the Global South refer peripheral countries. I argue that in the Global South, populism in power uses this factual position to challenge established power centers of the political globe, due to its attempts to achieve a hegemonic totality. However, these peripheral populist challenges may not only be conducted against actual power centers but also perceived ones – the ones that are claimed by populists, indeed imaginary and ambiguously constructed enemies. Tayyip Erdoğan often resorts populist discourse that emphasizes a “master mind” playing vicious schemes and conspiracies against Turkish citizens, which is unknown, undetermined by a concrete formulation. Such discourse is also adopted by leaders of global power centers of the Global North. For instance, Donald Trump frequently applies to populist rhetoric when he attempts to demonize an abstract phenomenon – globalization and its inherent outcomes that bring various inconveniences to American working-class people. When Trump attempts to do so, he positions the frustrated Americans at the periphery of the bigger global and political picture in which the ones who benefit from globalization as an opposing power bloc. But whenever, populist point out a phenomenon, they also point out actors around, taking advantage of or consciously benefiting from it. A phenomenon itself, as long as not a natural disaster like an earthquake is not likely to cause trouble for people.

In short, populism emerges as a hegemonic discourse against abstract or concrete power centers. Such power centers may not only refer to actual powers such as U.S. or E.U. due to their overwhelming political and economic power and influence but also refer to agents of *the change* such as globalization, information, artificial intelligence, etc. which can be downgraded via certain policies, inevitably bring a group of winners and losers, but cannot be eliminated or cannot be resisted against. This is true for all populists, regardless of their ruling in the Global North or South. In short, the group identification shaped by Manichaeic outlook may require manipulative populist discursive tactics based on the creation of actual

or imaginary enemies in order to consolidate group identity, to maintain its hegemonic ability. The strategy of populism refers to the whole populist process, beginning from the appearance of the leader triggering solidarity among all frustrated individuals, to the attempts of achievement or perpetuation of power.

To sum up, populism as a discursive strategy, has four core requirements: a leader stimulating a solidarity among “the people,” the leader’s claim of a hegemonic totality of his equivalences to challenge a power bloc, an inevitable Manichaeian antagonism of “the people” identified with the leader against the power bloc; and an objective to achieve or perpetuate power like every other political movement.

In concordance with these features, I define populism as:

A hegemonic discursive strategy, based on a Manichaeian antagonism of “the people” versus a power bloc, employed by a leader on behalf of “the people,” and practiced in order to achieve or perpetuate power.

Now, because I have a minimal definition of populism which makes its measurement possible, I may continue to the next chapter in which I thoroughly explain my research design.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1. How is Populism Measured in the Literature?

Viewing populism as a discursive phenomenon requires taking discourse as the unit of analysis. Empirical works of populism measure this phenomenon through classical content analysis as in works of Jagers & Walgrave (2007), Hawkins (2009; 2010), and Vasilopoulou et al. (2013); or through computational content analysis based on certain predetermined keywords as conducted by Reungoat (2010), Pauwels (2011); or through both as offered by Aslanidis (2018) and run by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011).

Among all works, Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) analysis can be considered as a breakthrough in populism studies with regards to its methodological innovations and insights, while being among very first instances of empirical populism studies (Aslanidis 2018, 1248; Pauwels 2011, 102; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, 1273). In this study, by defining populism as a political communication style, Jagers and Walgrave (2007) pinpoint three core characteristics of populism phenomenon by mentioning historical examples: a reference to "the people" and a justifications of actions depending on "appealing to and identifying with the people;" anti-elite sentiments; "the people" as a homogeneous monolithic body, with the exception of exclusion of marginal groups. Scholars build an operational definition that is merely based on the first characteristic and call it "thin concept of populism." To them, this refers to the minimal – necessary and sufficient – condition of populism. Scholar also develop a "thick concept of populism," which combines all three features (322, 323). Scholars apply content analysis political party broadcasts of Belgian parties on a TV channel. A compilation of randomly selected 20 broadcasts per party, each of which are 10 minutes long, between 1999

and 2001, constituted measurable populism data for scholars (325). Despite its earthshaking impact on populism studies, this work unfortunately has some serious issues such as including false positives since all references to the people are coded as populists (Aslanidis 2018, 1248). In addition to issues of validity, this work also seems to suffer from issues of reliability (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, 1273) since it only focuses on one country and scholars do not even mention whether their technique works for other sources of data, rather than TV broadcasts.

Inspired by Jagers and Walgrave (2007), in their work focusing on populism embedded in Greek politics, Vasilopoulou et al (2013) define populism as a blame-shifting mechanism grounded on an exclusionary discourse of us against them (392). By employing measurement technique of Jagers and Walgrave (2007), scholars use parliamentary speeches of the leaders of five political parties in Greek parliament (Vasilopoulou et al. 2013; 392, 393). Scholars build their own indexes, call them blame shifting index and exclusivity index, then focus on sentences rather than words, omitting phrases that do not include verbs such as exclamations or question marks (Vasilopoulou et al. 2013; 393, 394).

Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) work has also been inspirational for Reungoat (2010) who operationalizes scholars' indexes with a few diversifying changes, while checking European election manifestos for populist tones. Reungoat (2010) measures populism by taking percentage of populist words over total number of words of particular segments of manifestos which are related with her own indexes (311). To Aslanidis (2018), this work over codes instances of people centrism and takes all claims of democracy as populists (1249).

Hawkins (2009, 2010) uses a technique called holistic grading that requires determining core characteristics of populist textualized discourse and employing trained native scholars in different geographies. Taking the entire text as the unit of analysis, Hawkins' (2009, 2010) trained coders measure populism according to a three-point scale (0,1, and 2 referring non-populist, mixed, and populist respectively) and build a populism score according this measurement process. However, this technique is claimed to fail to provide enough reliability (Pauwels 2011, 102; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, 1273), and be problematic due to inclusion of false positives (Pauwels 2011, 102).

Alternatively, Pauwels (2011) runs computational text analysis rather than a labor-intensive manual coding (97). While rejecting minimal definitions due their possible drawbacks such as low operationalizability, Pauwels (2011) uses words that are expressed by “Vlaams Belang” to determine expressions of populism (103), thereby his dictionary-based method requires predetermined certain words which are used as unit of measurement. For instance, the more parties use words such as promise, arrogant, betray, disgrace, truth, then the higher their populism scores would be since populism relies on that the people are deceived by self-interested corrupt elites (105). Same logic requires counting words such as direct and referendum as signs of being populist (105). Pauwels’ (2011) core argument justifying his measurement method is that a computerized quantitative text analysis does not treat texts as discourses that require interpretation (102). It not only enables numerically counting textual content but also analyzing it (98). But computer-based analysis is also criticized due to its vulnerability to inconveniences of human interpretative bias since choosing certain keywords ultimately depends on human led decision making (Aslanidis 2018, 1245; Moffitt & Tormey 2014, 385). After all, there is no universal rule in building a dictionary of populist expressions and any attempt to build such a dictionary would be problematic due to its inherent overlook of context specificity of the phenomenon (Aslanidis 2018, 1247). On the other hand, one of Pauwels’ (2011) criticisms against classical content analysis method of Jagers and Walgrave (2007) is its mere focus on single case. However, Pauwels’ (2011) work reduces the domain of populist into a single party, Vlaams Belang, due to the fact that it is seen as notoriously populist by various scholars (103), despite the fact that few scholars have doubts about its populist character (106). Throughout his research, Pauwels (2011) count references to the people, and this logic requires that parties who more frequently use such references will be more populist than others (104) while his ideational approach to populism requires the assumption that the people and its opposite the elite are two homogenous entities. However, he admits that measuring populism depending on a word counting measurement does not eliminate the possibility of whether the people and its opposite – the elite – are given as homogenous bodies during the content (105). As he points out that impossibility, he remarks that his work inevitably lacks validity but argues that this is due to the tradeoff between a rise in reliability in quantitative content analysis with a decline in validity (105).

In accord with such remarks of Pauwels (2011), Aslanidis (2018) mentions that while computer-based analysis provides high reliability, which is inherently low in human coding techniques, they face with issues of validity due to their dictionary quality (1245). Therefore, he offers a hybrid method for future projects in order to overcome issues of validity and reliability (1250, 1251).

Likewise, Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) chooses a hybrid method. They employ Mudde's (2004) definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology, and measure populism according to its two core dimensions – people centrism, and anti-elitism – while relying on election manifestos as unit of analysis (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; 1273, 1274), and apply their analysis by trained coders who are provided a large body of words and phrases which may refer to appeals corresponding these two dimensions (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; 1274, 1275). Because classical content analysis requires an expensive time-consuming process, Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) also apply computerized content analysis of which measurement depends on a dictionary of possible populist indicators (1275). While in classical content analysis their unit of measurement is paragraphs, in computerized analysis scholars focus on words rather than paragraphs (1275). Employing a hybrid measurement method and applying both classical and computational measurement methods, Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) admit that classical content analysis of populism provides more valid and probably more reliable results than a computational one (1279).

While taking discourse as commonly agreed upon unit of analysis, scholars running quantitative research on populism mostly suffers from validity, many of them do not even have a robust justified definition and conceptualization. I argue that maximizing reliability when not having a valid solid ground does not refer any scientific merit in these studies. For example, Pauwels (2011) chooses high reliability and operationalizability at the expense of validity. His dictionary-based approach involves certain keywords such as “people, elite, ruling, undemocratic, politic, direct, betray, deceit, treason, arrogant, mafia, corrupt, caste, shame, shameless,” etc. as signs of populism. The one who applies using such words more frequently than others are calculated as more populist than them. Likewise, Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007) work is also problematic with regards to distinguishing populism as thin and thick concepts, while underscoring the former as a prerequisite. Scholars count all

appeals to the people as populists since they claim such references to the people constitute the thin concept.

To Pauwels (2011) classical content analysis in general has four main issues: lack of reliability, labor intensive work which makes possible comparisons over time and space extremely difficult, probable subjectivity of the coder, and the absence of consensus on unit of analysis (102). Among scholars, validity is often understood and explained as a correspondence of validity between two things. For instance, Weber (1990) remarks, many content analyses are based on face validity, which refers to the extent that a category seems to measure what it aims to measure (18, 19). Similarly, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) remarks that validity is measuring what we suppose that we are measuring (25). To Adcock and Collier (2001), a measure is valid when obtained scores of a measurement can be meaningfully interpreted with regards to a systematized concept (531). Error in measurement can be either systematic or random while the former refers to issues of validity whereas the latter refers to problems of reliability – which means repeated applications of a measurement process yield different outcomes (531), especially when conducted by different scholars (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; 26). By shedding light on this distinction, Adcock and Collier (2001) argue that unreliable scores may be still valid on average, but scholars emphasize that abstaining a systematized error is their main concern (532).

I admit that concerns of Pauwels (2011, 102) mentioned above on classical content analysis, would be inevitably present in this work too. However, I've already provided enough justification for my unit of analysis as discourse and I contend that my minimal definition will measure what it intends to measure, thereby fulfill validity requirement of a social research better than any computational or classical word/phrase-based populism analysis. To my view, populism requires a qualitative check on discourses and quantitative word count is not enough to pinpoint it via words that may potentially correspond to a type of Manichaeism and a hegemonic claim of totality. Any attempt to ignore the qualitative dimension of populism research would inevitably underrate existing populist rhetoric and leads biased results. This is because any word/phrase count may not necessarily fulfill these two core requirements of populist rhetoric words/phrases that are used by the leader during exercising a Manichaeism and a hegemonic totality claim do not have to refer

same particular statements. These two can be given separately in a group of sentences, or between paragraphs, especially when the speaker uses implicit mentions. They can even be understood when the complete speech is viewed holistically whenever required to do so. Thus, I argue that my understanding of populism with respect to the minimal definition I've generated in the previous chapter, would end up with a higher validity. Besides, I've provided parts of discourses (excerpts) that I've coded during my analysis. Some of these excerpts are given as coding instances. By presenting excerpt examples under each case, I intend to overcome concerns of validity and coder subjectivity.

3.2. On Research Design and Methodology

Throughout this research, pinpointing populist discourse and measurement of it will depend on the definition that I've generated at the end of chapter two. According to that definition, four core characteristics – a leader, a discursive claim of hegemonic totality, a discursively exercised Manichaeian exclusionary antagonism, and an objective to achieve or perpetuate power are required in order to talk about populism. Because I scrutinize Erdoğan's discourses, I don't need to focus on the first and the last one since Erdoğan has been the leader of the ruling party in Turkey since 2002, and he has been a politician, thereby has already been in the domain of politics. Besides, a rational politician running for the office does not only try to achieve power but also strives for perpetuation of his rule once he has got the office. When we look at Turkish case, by almost the half of the population who has been voting for the opposition, Erdoğan is also considered as a leader seeking ways to perpetuate his power and not losing the office especially after the failures that Turkey has witnessed since 2013. It is known that this portion of Turkish electorate view Erdoğan's rhetorical antagonism as attempts further deepening the existing partisan polarization within the society. This is also related with the fact that political actors of opposition parties mostly have pointed out Erdoğan as the core responsible of such failures, whenever they appeal towards their actual or potential supporters. On the one hand, supporters of opposition parties have continuously been critical about AKP's years of alliance with Gülenist Movement that

came to an end with the initial conflict that took place on December the 17-25th and peaked on July the 15th, the failed coup attempt. On the other hand, compromises given to Kurds during Kurdish peace process had also been criticized by the majority of the opposition and their supporters, especially during peace negotiations with Kurdish Movement.

In short, during my analysis, while taking unit of analysis as discourse, I have checked the remaining two conditions: a claim of hegemonic totality, and a Manichaeian exclusionary antagonism exercised by Erdoğan via discourse either implicitly or explicitly⁵. I consider discourses that fulfill these two necessary conditions as populist discourses. Whenever an excerpt of discourses I've checked falls short to provide both conditions, I consider it as non-populist excerpt⁶. But because I've also taken implicit totality claims and antagonistic references into account, the division of populist vs non-populist excerpts depends merely on antagonistic rhetoric. This is because the issue here is that excerpts that I've assessed throughout this study includes either implicit or explicit hegemonic totality claim. This is about my review of appeals that might actually or potentially have an impact over the equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people of Turkey in economic sense on the national level. The logic depends on what Erdoğan explicitly says in some of his appeals that "We are on the same ship." Erdoğan's appeals about Turkish economy or economic conditions of the people either implicitly or explicitly strengthen or weaken the equivalential relation between him and the people. Therefore, throughout this work, populist vs non-populist division is determined according to antagonistic rhetoric.

In order to explain the focus of my research, I have to mention on Moffitt's (2015) work on populism and crisis that has been an inspiration for me to conduct this study. In his article, Moffitt (2015) argues that "populists" who skillfully perpetuate a performance of crisis and achieved to extend it to a longer period of time have longer political lifetime than the ones who couldn't achieved to do so (208). Moffitt's (2015) core argument here is that politicians

⁵. For implicit mentions I've sought for a certain word, phrase, a group of words that may refer to a sign for an antagonism or a hegemonic totality claim. For instance, if Erdoğan uses "these, they" as pronouns for antagonistically aforementioned political actors or groups in his related speech, then I've perceived such appeals as containing implicit antagonism. But whenever he uses a reference to the economy, or the people in an economic sense, I've viewed it as an equivalence of an implicit hegemonic totality claim since economy interests all of us. This detail is important since this work does not focus on pure political appeals which do not necessarily include such implicit totality claims.

⁶. In the following pages of this chapter, I'll mention detailly on what excerpts refer to.

who are infamously applies populism more frequently than others perpetuate failures⁷ and turn them into crisis, achieve a sustainable populist performative politics to remain in power. He points out Hugo Chávez's success of achieving such perpetuation, and thereby had been able to rule for a long period of time (207). Based on this claim I've intended to run an exploratory mix-method research throughout this work. My objective is to take Moffitt's (2015) claim and check whether president Erdoğan uses the same strategy to perpetuate his power in Turkey, as Chávez has been claimed to sustain successfully in Venezuela. But different than Moffitt's (2015) approach to populism, which relies on that it is a performative style, I view populism as a discursive phenomenon. Besides, what I mean by crisis is economic crisis, not mere political ones⁸.

This research is not an explanatory one looking for causal relationships since sense of crisis of the people living in Turkey may have too many underlying independent variables. Instead, I've decided to focus on Moffitt's (2015) valuable claim and intended to run an explorative case study research which aims to pinpoint whether there is an associational pattern between Erdoğan's perpetuation of failures as crisis via populist appeals and crisis perception of the people living in Turkey. If such a pattern exists, I've further checked whether it helps Erdoğan to remain in power, with regards to the electoral support to his party. In accord with this objective, monthly data of crisis perception of the people living in Turkey and electoral support to AKP are acquired from research company called Konda. In the former, people are asked whether they expect an economic crisis in the following months. The percentage of affirmative answer is taken into account as sense of crisis percentage of the people. In the latter, people are asked which party they would vote if there were an election today. The percentage of the ones who answered that they would for AKP is viewed as electoral support to Erdoğan and taken into account accordingly. More information of these two variables can be found under "Variables" title.

⁷. I've used the term "failure" in a similar sense with Moffitt's (2015) understanding which posits that failures are structural preconditions for crisis (Quoted from Hay, Moffitt 2015, 197) while crisis exist only when they are perceived as crisis by the people (197). Throughout the research, whenever I say a failure, I mean a phenomenon on the structural and national level which may actually or potentially have an impact over the society in a negative way.

⁸. Due to the data I've been working on, I've focused on economic crisis perception of the people living in Turkey. However, I have also paid regard to how Erdoğan frames crises - not only outcomes of mere economic failures but also, and mostly indeed, a combination of both economic and political ones.

Because populism is a contextual phenomenon, I've thought that for populism research, case study may be the best method for this aim since it is known as studying a phenomenon extensively within its context. In concordance with my research interest, I've run a case study research based on 7 different periods of recent economic failures in Turkey that took place from May 2012 - one year before Gezi Events - to the end of 2018. The reason I've focused on such periods of economic failures is that I've considered when the economic decline is tangible and severe, Erdoğan may be more likely to attempt to perpetuate failures as crisis via a rhetoric that aims to deepen existing crisis perception further and this may give me insights about whether the associational pattern I've been seeking for seems possible or not. Economic downturn has begun to become visible and palpable since Gezi Events took place. Besides, data I've been able to get from Konda - crisis perception and electoral support to AKP – covers the period between 2012 and 2018 despite some missing monthly values.

Cases, as periods of economic failures, are determined according to economic deteriorations of three key economic indicators: Exchange rate, inflation rate, and unemployment rate extracted from the official webpage of Central Bank of Turkey, relying on official TÜİK data. In accord with case selection criteria I'll detailly mention, 7 cases in total are detected between October 2012 and September 2018. The reason I've focused on these economic indicators is that they all have immediate and non-negligible impact on Turkish electorate. Cases are built whenever at least two of these indicators simultaneously deteriorate within a period, varying from 3-month to 5-month periods. Detailed information about how these periods are determined can be found under "Case Selection" title.

Once I've determined my cases, then I've intended to acquire discursive data of Erdoğan that fall into each case. My priority has been to obtain textualized discourses of him. Official presidential webpage of Turkish Republic (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019) has been a great source for me in terms of enabling me to run this study. However, this source has not been adequate since textualized discourses of Erdoğan exists on this page once he has been elected as the president in August 2014. Unfortunately, textualized discourses of Erdoğan's prime ministry period (before August 2014) are completely missing since the official webpage of prime ministry has been directed to presidential webpage once Turkey has adopted a presidential system and abandoned the parliamentary one. Therefore, after an

extensive search on web, on a personal webpage of an AKP deputy (Karaca n.d.), I've been able to find some textualized discourses of Erdoğan's that fall into my cases that refer to the term before August 2014. These discourses are checked whether they match with original discourses or not via video materials of Erdoğan related speeches that can also be found on web by a Google, Yandex, or Youtube search. However, even such texts couldn't be enough due to missing data of some months. So, in order to textualize missing discourses, I've had to transcribe them by listening the content of video materials that are available on web. Details of how discourses are selected, which discourses are taken into consideration, and which criteria are followed in terms of discourse selection are extensively given under upcoming "On Discourses" title. But in short, textualized discourses - either comes from official presidential webpage or from Karaca's personal webpage - which fit selection criteria are assessed with priority. Whenever such data becomes completely missing, I've transcribed the essential parts of remaining discourses by listening to the content that is available on web.

By applying case study as my research strategy, Erdoğan's appeals are qualitatively checked and quantified via coding. Once the required discursive data has completely been extracted, discourses are divided into what I call excerpts – the paragraphs that I've created due to the fact that paragraphs are arbitrarily given in some textualized data or they do not even exist because of the transcribed content I've had to type. Excerpts have been built according to their semantic unity within themselves, and detailly explained in following part of this chapter. Excerpts are taken into account according to their potential to refer an equivalential relation based on economic elements, between Erdoğan and the people of Turkey on the national level. They are coded and quantified according to the type of categories they fall into. Excerpt examples of each case are qualitatively given is once cases have been introduced in the last chapter. Moreover, graphical descriptive data based on quantities and proportions of coded excerpts of each case that fall into different categories is also provided under cases and analysis titles. In short, beside qualitative case studies, excerpts of each case are quantified via a content analysis logic. In this way, as a result of such mix-method approach, frequencies and proportions of excerpts are used for the empirical assessment of each case and for the analysis of all cases.

In order to conduct an explorative analysis, categories have been created with regards to their potential ability to increase/decrease or remain indifferent towards crisis perception of the people. With examples of coded excerpts, categories are extensively explained under “Categorical Variables” title, but I want to mention briefly on three main categories that I’ve used to categorize Erdoğan’s appeals in this work. In accord with this approach, first I’ve checked whether Erdoğan ignores or recognizes economic failures, or a package of failures⁹ as he claims to be the source of economic ones.

On the one hand, Erdoğan may ignore failures and he may pretend as if there are no failures at all. Erdoğan’s indifference vis-à-vis failures can be inferred via his positive remarks about Turkish economy by expressions on AKP’s contributions to Turkish economy so far or by his mentions about investments and huge projects of his government which aim to make Turkey among top 10 economies of the world in the future. For a failure ignoring rhetoric, a positive reference to the economy is required¹⁰. On the other hand, Erdoğan may recognize failures, simply by mentioning them during his speech. Once he has recognized failures, has two framing options: To emphasize and thereby perpetuate them as crisis or as a second option, deny framing them as crisis. While the former is expected to raise crisis perception of the people, the latter can be considered as an expression to lower or mitigate sense of crisis. The choice of framing failures as crisis or not depends on Erdoğan’s political strategy.

Erdoğan denies framing failures as crisis by simply denying their actual or potential impact over the economy, or over the people of Turkey in an economic sense. He may do so, for instance, by pointing out the intention or determination for governmental action in order to overcome inconveniences that failures have created or about to create. Or he may remark that

⁹. Economic failures do not have to be merely expressed; Erdoğan may also relate them with political failures as well. This is done when both political and economic failures are combined and presented as a package – by pointing out the ultimate source of all failures. For instance, Erdoğan may associate economic downturn with political turbulence that has continued since Gezi Events. In such appeals, political and economic failures are framed as different projections of the same threat – a “mastermind.” Whenever Erdoğan associates economic failures with such political ones, discourses are holistically examined in order to code the related excerpts accurately and consistently. However, in order to take into consideration such excerpts for coding, a concrete association has to exist via certain words such as attack, assault, plot, trick, malicious games, etc. within the excerpt that is focused on during assessment. Detailed information with examples is given under “On Package of Failures” title.

¹⁰. Positive remarks on AKP’s contribution to Turkish economy are viewed as referring implicit claims of hegemonic totality. On the condition that Erdoğan does not mention any failure of AKP governments, mere positive references to AKP without any antagonism against other political actors or groups is assessed within the scope of failure ignoring non-populist rhetoric. Whenever an antagonism is involved, then such appeals are viewed as examples of failure ignoring populist rhetoric. Detailed explanation with examples is provided under “Failure Ignoring Rhetoric” title.

the economic overview has changed or has begun to change recently, and failures or sources of failures have been eliminated or at least has been completely neutralized. Or he may simply deny the potential of failures or threats and claim that they can't even have or couldn't have had an impact over the economy or in an economic sense over the people of Turkey. I call such appeals as instances of crisis denying rhetoric and I've viewed them as appeals to lower or mitigate existing crisis perception of the people.

Contrarily, Erdoğan can emphasize failures and frame them as crisis via crisis emphasizing rhetoric¹¹. He may do so by simply putting the people into an alarming position while not denying framing them as crisis. Secondly, instead of pointing out governmental action, he may apply using pure political or religious appeals and frame them as ultimate solutions vis-à-vis failures. Thirdly, due to the inability of the government to overcome troubles that failures have resulted with, he may ask help from the people to contribute solutions that he proposes. Fourthly, he may emphasize uncertainty for the future - either by remarks on a turning point for Turkey or via conditional statements that point out the probability of overcoming failures¹². Fifthly, Erdoğan may try to perpetuate failures as crisis by using an offensive tongue that point out a threat on the global level, a “mastermind” – the ultimate source of all failures, against Turkish economy. In short, Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing rhetoric via such appeals is expected to raise crisis perception of the people.

I have to repeat that extensive information about these three major categories with examples of populist and non-populist excerpts that fall into each of them is given under “Categorical Variables” title. Detailed explanation on why I've viewed such types of appeals as attempts of crisis perpetuation or denial is also given in that part. Here, I just want to briefly mention on what I've intended to do, with regards to the path I've followed during this study.

¹¹. Both crisis emphasizing and crisis denying appeals have overwhelmingly populist characteristic since Erdoğan mostly frames economic failures as threats, plots, or attacks against Turkey and Turkish economy. Because an economic attack refers to an antagonism by implicitly pointing out an actor attempting against Turkey, and since Turkish economy interests all people living in Turkey and thereby includes an implicit totality claim, such appeals are viewed as instances of populist rhetoric for both categories.

¹². Inherently, uncertainty embodies a negativity and is expected to enhance existing anxiety and concerns of the people. Thus, I haven't taken into account positive emphases for the future here. For instance, if Erdoğan says Turkey is about to become a great power again, as she had been in her glorious past experiences, this is not viewed as a remark about an uncertain future. Instead, what I mean is something like “We are on the edge of a catastrophe” or “The fate of our nation is completely dependent on our fight with these traitors.” These examples are given hypothetically.

During analysis, I've checked whether there is an association between Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing attempts and a rise in crisis perception of the people during periods of failures. In accord with Moffitt's (2015) core argument, my expectation is of Erdoğan's populist appeals is that he must exercise less crisis denying populist rhetoric than crisis emphasizing one. In other words, if he uses crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric more frequently than crisis denying one and if an increase in sense of crisis is observed, then I can conclude that there seems to be an associational pattern between Erdoğan's rhetorical framing of failures and rising crisis perception of the people. However, any such finding is not enough for what I've intended to check for. In addition, for the cases such associational pattern exists, I've also checked whether the electoral support to Erdoğan increases or not. If it does, then I can infer that Erdoğan may fit Moffitt's (2015) "populist" profile – the one who perpetuates failures and turns them into crisis in order to perpetuate his term in the office.

In short, the association I've been seeking for requires three conditions. First, Erdoğan must exercise crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric. Second, he must do so more frequently than crisis denying populist rhetoric. And third, an increase in sense of crisis must be observed. I've viewed these three conditions as necessary conditions to claim that there seems to be an association between Erdoğan's crisis perpetuation attempts and rising crisis perception. But in order to comment on whether Erdoğan may use this strategy in order to remain in power or not, I also need to check how electoral support to AKP changes. If Erdoğan's electoral support rises whenever there is an association, only then it can be possible to affirmatively comment on that Erdoğan may fit the "populist" profile that Moffitt (2015) talks about.

3.2.1. Variables

In order to have a measure for crisis perception among the people, I've got in touch with Konda. This is a famous research company in Turkey which is viewed as neutral in terms of distinguishing its own political stance and conducting unbiased surveys. I have been able to acquire a sense of crisis data from this research company. This indicator is built by monthly conducted surveys of Konda's researchers with many respondents, also graphically demonstrated on Konda interactive webpage (Konda interaktif 2019). I obtained the measure

of a sense of economic crisis which relies on the total percentage of Konda respondents that expect an economic crisis for the upcoming months in Turkey. However, there is one issue with such surveys – they are not conducted every month, so there are some missing observations.

In addition to sense of crisis data, I've also consulted to this research company for the data that shows electoral support to Erdoğan. Fortunately, again despite some missing observations, results of monthly surveys that are conducted to find out which party the people would vote for have been acquired. In such surveys, people are exactly asked to which party they would vote for if there were an election in Turkey today. Percentage values of electoral support to AKP are added to my analysis since they also manifest the electoral support to Erdoğan. Thus, potential electorate support to AKP is considered as an equivalence of potential support to Erdoğan.

Remaining variables are the monthly values of three key economic indicators of Turkish economy. In order to pinpoint economic failure periods, I've checked such indicators since I believe that they all refer to concerns the people of Turkey, and have an immediate, non-negligible impact over the people of Turkey, therefore have a direct impact on crisis perception. These indicators are exchange rate, unemployment rate, and inflation rate. I've obtained the data of these three indicators from electronic data delivery system of the official webpage of Turkish Central Bank (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası, n.d.). The ultimate source of these three measures is TUIK since it is the official institution that shares such statistical data in Turkey. Although Erdoğan mostly complains with the interest rate and occasionally attacks authorities working in the Central Bank of Turkey¹³, interest rate changes rarely and not frequently. Whenever it changes it, the possible impact of the change may not immediate, and mostly pertain to investments to Turkish economy. Due to the fact that the possible effect of investment can only be understood only in the long run, one cannot

¹³. When it comes to explicit references to any economic indicators, Erdoğan mostly emphasizes interest rate and frames it as the source of inflation and any other economic troubles. However, since interest rate does not change frequently, I've thought a case selection based on it is neither practical nor can serve to the purpose of this work. Besides, my intention has been to check the most significant, core indicators whose impact is immediate and non-negligible when it comes to the people of Turkey. Erdoğan's appeals that frequently point out interest rate may be viewed more as responses of the government for economic downturn instead of what is actually deteriorating within the economy. Whenever Erdoğan mentions on interest rate, such appeals are taken into consideration. However, I haven't used interest rate as an indicator that determine cases.

make any speculations or run an analysis in the short run depending on the interest rate. Therefore, I've decided that case analysis depending on the interest rate is neither practical nor can serve to the purpose of this work.

For the exchange rate, I've taken the value of U.S. Dollar vis a vis Turkish Lira since it is most powerful option among indicators to be selected, due to the overall dependency on U.S. Dollar among every today's global economies. But because Turkey is a developing country and does not have key strategic resources (such as, oil) to sustain an independent path on its own, thereby dependent on foreign inflows of capital, the value of U.S. Dollar matters much more for us. Inflows of U.S. Dollars contribute Turkish economy via investment projects and underpin sustainable economic growth of Turkey. However, circumstances causing an outflow of dollars do not only refer to a decline in investment and thereby in growth in the long run, but also immediately reduces the value of Turkish Lira vis-à-vis American Dollar, and thus leads an immediate overall rise in prices of many consumer goods especially when they are imports. In turn, that may contribute a rise in perceived economic crisis among the people living in Turkey. Moreover, Erdoğan's appeals which are subjected to this work might be expected to be more sensitive to exchange rate hikes and might be more frequently expressed during periods of severe deteriorations of the exchange rate. Because the value of American Dollar is a very important indicator for Turkish economy, not only due to its substantial impact on the economy as a whole, but also its ability of shaping the people's perceptions, because of some particular past devaluation experiences in 1994 and 2001. Besides, as I've mentioned before, claims of economic war intensified during exchange rate crisis of Summer 2018.

Second, despite its worldwide imperfect calculation by official authorities in general, unemployment rate is a crucial variable that demonstrates the ability of an economy to provide sufficient job opportunities for its actively job seeking citizens. When an economy is unable to fulfill job demands of its citizens, then it may be considered as in a failing trend. Under high unemployment levels, people may get the idea that the economy is not working properly, and that may reinforce people's perception of an economic crisis.

Third, inflation rate, as the percentage change in consumer price index, simply demonstrates how much 1 Turkish Lira in pockets of the people loses its purchasing power over time due

to a rise in price level. Under circumstances of high inflation, people cannot afford their same standard level of living, and may consider that such conditions refer to an economic crisis. Besides, like exchange rate, historically, the impact that the inflation brought over Turkish economy and purchasing power of the people was severe before AKP governments. Especially during coalition government periods of 1990s, it is known to have brought a traumatic impact over the people of Turkey. Therefore, one may consider that it is among the first and foremost economic variables whose potential impact over the crisis perception among the people might be highly influential. Thus, I've taken it as my third key economic indicator.

3.2.2. Case Selection

In order to determine my cases, I've decided to focus on the time period between December 2018 and May 2012, one year exactly before Gezi demonstrations. The reason is that after Gezi uprising occurred, it has triggered a serious rise in oppositional politics and corresponded the time that an apparent rising trend in exchange rate began to be observed again in Turkey. Within this time period, potential cases are pinpointed according to failure of three key economic indicators. The reason is that I think that Erdoğan may be more likely to perpetuate failures as crisis when the economy is in a downturn.

When I determine cases, I've taken into consideration following conditions:

- All cases have to include at least two economic failures. Only one deterioration of any economic indicator is not enough to label a case as a case of economic failures¹⁴.
- Corresponding months of all cases only belong to one particular case. There are no common months for any cases. This is because every month has its own political and economic dynamics. Mixing cases with common months may end up with misleading implications.

¹⁴. Because fluctuations in interest rate is high in my data and since short run tradeoff between inflation rate and unemployment rate is an acknowledged phenomenon that has already gained a ground in the economy literature, I've thought that labeling a period as a term of failures requires more than one deterioration since only one may not be enough to mark a serious economic downturn.

- Cases consist of consecutive months and a continuous deterioration for exchange rate and unemployment rate have to be observed before labeling a period as a case. A deterioration has to exist between 1st and 2nd month, 2nd and 3rd month, and so on. Within a case, there has to be no interruption in continuous deterioration of the values of these two economic indicators. To label a time period of consecutive months as a case, with regards to deteriorations in exchange rate and unemployment rate, there must be at least 10 percent continuous deterioration for values of these indicators. An example is given below:

Table 3.1 Case example in which all variables get deteriorated

Date	Exchange Rate	Unemployment Rate	Inflation Rate
10.2013	1.99	9.10	1.799
11.2013	2.02	9.30	0.008
12.2013	2.06	9.60	0.460
01.2014	2.22	10.30	1.978

- When it comes to inflation rate, in order to label a period as a case due to this indicator, there has to be at least 1 percent monthly increase on average in inflation rate for the related case. Because I've focused on the average value of inflation rate deterioration for any possible case, deterioration for the values of inflation rate does not require a continuity. That is because, unlike trends of continuity in deterioration of the values of exchange rate and unemployment rate, fluctuation is severe in inflation rate data. In short, the average value of the positive inflation of related consecutive months must be at least 1 percent. Cases cannot include negative inflation rates.
- The temporal scope of any case is limited to minimum 3 months and maximum 5 months. All cases have to refer at least 3-month time period in order to be sure that deterioration is not an accidental fluctuation. Besides, cases can refer max maximum 5-month time periods since as the temporal volume of cases gets extended, then the impact of deteriorations on crisis perception may vary due to varying future deteriorations. People may more likely to perceive failures as crisis when the overall number of deteriorations gets increased. I've put 5 months maximum criterion due to the fact that in continuous

deterioration trend that goes beyond 5 months, the number of overall deteriorations may change, as I've observed during my scrutiny of economic failures that took place in 2018. Moreover, as the number of months within a case increases, within case political and economic dynamics of any potential subsequent case may shape crisis perception in a different way. So, I've considered it would be better to keep temporal dimension of any cases from 3 months to 5 months. In short, when a continuous deterioration trend that goes beyond 5 months is observed, then cases are divided according to the overall number of economic deteriorations that possibly fall into each potential case, as long as the case criteria for the first potential case is satisfied.

When we look at the values of three indicators for corresponding months in the table given below, we cannot take last two months in any case since November 2018 has a negative inflation rate, and from September 2018 to October 2018 deterioration in exchange rate reverses and continuous deterioration comes to an end. I've divided these 9 months into two cases: January to May, and June to September. This is done since 10 % deterioration in exchange rate is satisfied only in May 2018 while not for unemployment rate. Because cases must include at least two deteriorations, from January 2018 to May 2018, deteriorations in exchange rate and inflation rate satisfy case criteria. From June 2018 to September 2018, all indicators get deteriorated and this deterioration is continuous until October 2018. Therefore, I've taken the period from June 2018 to September 2018 as my second case for 2018.

Table 3.2 An example of a division of a continuous deterioration

Date	Exchange Rate	Unemployment Rate	Inflation Rate
01.2018	3.77	10.80	1.02
02.2018	3.78	10.64	0.73
03.2018	3.88	10.12	0.99
04.2018	4.05	9.60	1.87
05.2018	4.41	9.70	1.62
06.2018	4.63	10.16	2.61
07.2018	4.75	10.76	0.55
08.2018	5.73	11.12	2.29
09.2018	6.37	11.40	6.30
10.2018	5.86	11.60	2.66
11.2018	5.37	12.30	-1.44

According to such criteria given above and the data of my economic indicators I've checked for the time period between May 2012 and December 2018, I've detected 7 cases in total, one consists of 3-month time, four consists of 4-month time, and two consists of 5-month time.

Table 3.3 An example of a division of a continuous deterioration

Cases	Corresponding Time Period	Types of Economic Failures
Case 1	10.2012 – 01.2013	Unemployment rate and inflation rate
Case 2	10.2013 – 01.2014	Exchange rate, unemployment rate, and inflation rate
Case 3	01.2015 – 04.2015	Exchange rate and inflation rate
Case 4	09.2016 - 01.2017	Exchange rate, unemployment rate, and inflation rate
Case 5	09.2017 – 11.2017	Exchange rate and inflation rate
Case 6	01.2018 - 05.2018	Exchange rate and inflation rate
Case 7	06.2018 – 09.2018	Exchange rate, unemployment rate, and inflation rate

3.2.3. On Discourses

As I've mentioned earlier, the temporal scope of this research refers to the time period between May 2012 and December 2018 and due to my case selection criteria, my cases refer to a time period between October 2012 and September 2018. Erdoğan's discourses that fall into this period exist on web, but not all of them can be found in textualized format. Because I view populism as a discursive phenomenon and working on discourses which are not textualized requires serious time and energy, I've firstly focused on Erdoğan's available textualized discourses within this period¹⁵. Where I've checked for such textualized discourses (sources of textualized discourses) are given in detail once I'll have explained which discourses I've focused on and according to what criteria I've made a selection. Before going into details of this section, I'd like to remind the reader that the list of all selected discourses with corresponding web links is given in the appendix. Moreover, all textualized discourses which are eliminated from selection process are available on whether official webpage of presidency (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019) or Harun Karaca's personal webpage (Karaca n.d.).

In terms of data collection, as I've just said, my priority has been to collect official textualized discourses as much as possible and make a selection among available ones according to a predetermined selection criterion. Hence, textualized discourses are selected with priority and the ones that I've been able to collect for selection, I've selected two of them per month on the condition that;

- Erdoğan's message is in Turkish¹⁶, and potentially must pertain to domestic political or economic issues of Turkey on the national level with regards to the audience Erdoğan speaks to¹⁷. In terms of the audience, discourses which pertain to issues of Turkey on the national level are taken into consideration with priority.

¹⁵. De jure or de facto, Erdoğan has always been the leader of AKP and the ruler of Turkey, therefore only his discourses are taken into account during the whole study. Discourses of Ahmet Davutoğlu, as the prime minister and de jure elected leader of AKP, once Erdoğan has been elected as the president thereby he had officially remained away from his own party between August 2014 and May 2017, are only secondary to the scope of this study.

¹⁶. Erdoğan's messages which are given in English on presidential website are overwhelmingly about global/international matters which are irrelevant to the scope of this research.

¹⁷. The first condition I've taken into account is the availability of domestic audience which Erdoğan speaks to and the fact that appeals are primarily towards Turkish people. Whenever Erdoğan talks towards with a mere global/international audience, it automatically violates this criterion.

- Selected textualized discourses consist of at least 1000 words¹⁸,
- There should be at least one-week temporal distance between two discourses,¹⁹
- Discourses should not be in a question and answer format, like Erdoğan's interviews or TV programs that he speaks as a guest²⁰.

What I mean by discourses which are viewed by priority with regards to the audience, Erdoğan's potential appeals that pertain to Turkey as a whole are primarily viewed. And according to this objective, priority is given to:

- First, party meetings that take place on the nation level: AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, in both of which Erdoğan speaks on issues that pertain to Turkey on the national level.
- Second, Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars that is organized in the presidential palace in, Ankara, in which Erdoğan also uses references to domestic issues of Turkey as a whole.

Hence, among textualized discourses, discourses of party meetings which are held on the national level are selected with priority. By party meetings on the national level, I mean AKP group meetings or extended provincial chairmen meetings²¹ of AKP in both of which Erdoğan appeals to the members of his party and dominantly talks about Turkey's political and economic issues. AKP group meetings are held in the parliament and extended provincial

¹⁸. This is about my focus on textualized discourses with priority and the fact that textualized data on presidential webpage is limited for some months. I've determined minimum 1000 words criterion for textualized discourses since Erdoğan will probably use greetings and pure political appeals during any speech he exercises. But because I've looked at proportions for analysis, I've considered discourses that are above a certain word count limit can also be viewed for the assessment. Besides, 51 discourses out of 58 are above 2000 words. 6 of the remaining discourses belong to case 7. For this case, textualized discourses exist on presidential webpage but the number of ones that fit my selection criteria is low, especially when I take into consideration temporal distance between potential selections. Except 6 discourses of case 7, last remaining one whose word count is between 1000 and 2000 words is the one that Erdoğan exercises in September 2017, during his visit to Turken Foundation, which I've also had to select due to limited availability of existing textualized discourses. Lengths of all selections in terms of word count will be given via tables during this chapter.

¹⁹. I've endeavored to pay attention to the temporal distance between two discourses, not only for discourses which are exercised within the same month, but also with regards to discourses of consecutive months. However, as I'll mention in detail, there are some exceptions due to limited availability of textualized data. Whenever available textualized discourses for a particular month do not satisfy one week temporal distance between two potential selections, I've strived for the maximization of the temporal distance between them while simultaneously, paying attention all selection criteria. Hence, while primarily keeping an eye on whether textualized discourses satisfy selection criteria or not, I've also paid regard to the maximization of the temporal distance among available options.

²⁰. I've decided to pay attention to this condition since such programs may mitigate Erdoğan's choices and understate potential populist appeals. Erdoğan may only talk about what is being asked by the interviewer or the moderator of those programs, thus his answers may be directed by the questions of the questioner. I've preferred to focus on Erdoğan's speeches in which he speaks totally independently, and in that no one asks any questions and expects an answer.

²¹. In extended provincial chairmen meetings, Erdoğan appeals to provincial chairmen of 81 provinces of Turkey.

chairmen meetings take place in AKP headquarters, in both of which Erdoğan speaks as the leader of his party. Discourses of these two meetings are viewed as alternatives to each other. Although they have priority when compared with other available textualized discourses, among themselves, if there are more than two available textualized discourses of these party meetings, they are randomly selected by taking into account the temporal distance between each other.

If there is no textualized discourse of such party meetings, then again due to concerns of appeals expressed on the national level and pertain to domestic political and economic issues of Turkey, I've given priority to Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars in which Erdoğan welcomes them in presidential palace. Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars began to be organized in January 2015, after he has elected as the president in August 2014. Due to his position, he left his own party²² and Ahmet Davutoğlu as the prime minister began to speak in AKP group meetings and extended provincial chairmen meetings. Meanwhile, Erdoğan did neither appear in AKP group meetings nor in extended provincial chairmen meetings of AKP since he officially left his party. However, while he was away, I've noticed that Erdoğan attempted to speak on national matters not only as a president but also as the founder and de facto leader of AKP, especially during his meetings with muhtars of Turkey, coming from different cities of the country. Therefore, as long as there is no textualized discourse of AKP group meetings or extended provincial chairmen meetings that Erdoğan appears as the orator, then in terms of the selection, I've given priority to Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars.

By focusing on AKP group meetings, AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, or Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars, I've tried to maximize my chances to merely focus on domestic political and economic issues of Turkey on national level. Among the remaining textualized discourses, a random selection has been made as long as they satisfy selection criteria, detailly given below. In terms of making a random selection with regards to the

²². That's why, there are no such party meetings in which Erdoğan speaks as the leader, up until May 2017. The first one when Erdoğan rejoins AKP and whose text is given on official presidential webpage does not fall into my cases. The remaining ones which are shared on presidential webpage fall into one of my cases (for case 6, during the first five months of 2018) are selected with priority among other available textualized discourses and randomly among themselves by checking their temporal distance with one another. Except group meetings, there are no such textualized speech of any extended provincial chairmen meetings on this official presidential page unfortunately, even after Erdoğan rejoined AKP in 2017.

audience that Erdoğan speaks to, in order to refrain an irrelevant selection to the scope of this work, I've taken into account the following criteria given below.

Discourses are selected on the condition that;

- Regardless of the location of the meeting in which Erdoğan speaks, he does not talk primarily towards foreign authorities or to a global/international audience²³,
- He does not speak in a conference, meeting, or an event in general that would inevitably involve mostly Islamic references²⁴,
- He does not attend a meeting, organization, a ceremony, or an event in general of which scope seems to be merely about art or culture²⁵,
- He does not speak on an organization or an activity about sports²⁶,
- He does not talk on an event which potentially embodies mostly social references such as like women rights, the importance of family as the core institution of the society or appeals primarily about children.²⁷
- He does not speak on an academic event that the scope of event merely seems to be about education²⁸.

²³. Discourses of global/international meetings are irrelevant to the scope of this study. For example, whenever Erdoğan speaks on United Nations General Assembly in the U.S. or NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels. In addition, whenever Erdoğan meets with Angela Merkel for a press conference about Turkey's relations with Germany or E.U., regardless of the location of the meeting, discourses exercised during such meetings are also irrelevant to the scope of this work. Another example is Erdoğan's speech in International Ombudsman Conference which took place in Istanbul, on September the 25th, 2017. Such discourses are kept out of assessment in order to abstain potential intense or pure global/international appeals, which are irrelevant to the focus of this study.

²⁴. With regards to the audience that Erdoğan speaks to, if there is any Islamic reference that gives a clue that the discourse will consist of Islamic appeals, I've not taken it into consideration since my observation is for such events, Erdoğan mostly exercises pure political and religious appeals during them. Therefore, they are not in the scope of this study.

²⁵. For instance, if Erdoğan attends a ceremony or a commemoration for Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, this is again irrelevant to the scope of this work. As another example, if he speaks on the opening ceremony or a historical building which has a cultural value and has undergone a restoration process, the speech he exercises at that event is also irrelevant to the focus of this study.

²⁶. Because Erdoğan may not even talk about politics in such meetings, such discourses are kept out of selection.

²⁷. Such events which potentially would be full of social appeals rather than political and economic ones, thereby ignored during selection of discourses. Although not limited to, examples can be given as Erdoğan's speeches on March 8 international women's day or his statements during his meetings with children on April 23 national sovereignty and children's day.

²⁸. Not only Erdoğan's discourses that are exercised during inauguration ceremonies of upcoming academic year, but also his speeches in special invitations from educational institutions are ignored. For instance, there are numerous attendances of Erdoğan to receive honorary doctorate titles which are awarded by various universities, not only from Turkish universities but also from the ones all around the world. Because potential appeals during these events are irrelevant to the scope of this study, such discourses are not taken into consideration.

In terms of selecting remaining possible textualized discourses according to criteria listed just above, I haven't further generated priorities in order to avoid any possible subjectivity. So, apart from textualized discourses of AKP group meetings, AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, and Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars, for the remaining textualized speeches, in terms of my concerns of avoiding from a more complicated discourse selection process, I've decided to make a random selection by not taking into account any further criteria, on the condition that discourses satisfy selection criteria detailly given above²⁹.

However, for some months of my cases, due to limited availability of textualized discourses, I've had to add an additional criterion before making a selection since especially for one month, no discourse satisfies any of my selection criteria given above. Thus, in order to make a selection among limited textualized discourses for some exceptional months, I've paid regard to the following additional criterion beside initial selection criteria:

- For exceptional months due to limited available textualized discourses that satisfy initial selection criteria, I've checked whether Erdoğan speaks primarily towards a domestic audience or not. If so, then the ones that he appeals to the crowd within geographical confines of Turkey are selected with priority when compared with the ones he speaks abroad³⁰.

After clarifying this extra criterion for exceptional months, now I can conclude that remaining discourses which do not violate any selection criteria are viewed as alternatives to each other and a complete random selection is made among them. For instance, when there are no party meetings on the national level for a particular month, discourses which violate selection criteria are eliminated from selection process and kept out of assessment. A random selection is made among remaining ones, regardless of where Erdoğan speaks within

²⁹. During my focus on Erdoğan's various discourses, apart from discourses that are kept out of assessment due to the selection criteria given above (In terms of the title of the discourse and the audience Erdoğan appeals to, the ones that are exercised primarily towards a global/international audience/authorities; discourses that is expected to embody strong Islamic references; discourses which are expected to include appeals on art and culture; or discourses that will probably be about pure social issue; or discourses exercised on an academic event), I've realized that he can more or less can talk on any issue according to his political agenda, regardless of where speaks within geographical confines of Turkey and the particular audience he speaks to. By primarily focusing on Erdoğan's discourses in AKP group meetings, in AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, or in his meetings with muhtars and selecting discourses of these meetings with priority, I've tried to maximize my chances to merely focus Erdoğan's remarks on domestic political and economic issues of Turkey on the national level and abstain a possible biased selection.

³⁰. This is the case for both September 2017 and 2018, when Erdoğan mostly speaks abroad, especially during the former. I've had to give priority to discourses which are exercised within territory of Turkey as long as they are exercised primarily towards domestic audience.

boundaries of Turkey, or which audience he speaks to. Details of this random selection will be given with examples shortly after. But before that, I must clarify from where I've extracted textualized discourses from.

3.2.3.1. On sources of discourses

In terms of sources of discursive data, I've first checked discourses which are shared on the official web page of Presidency of the Turkish Republic (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019). Fortunately, for the term that Erdoğan has been serving as the president (since August 2014), textualized discourses are mostly available on this website. However, for to the period before August 2014, I haven't been able to acquire textualized discourses that easily. I've got in touch with AKP headquarters and asked whether I could acquire discourses that I need for my study. Unfortunately, I've got no positive response and directed to the official webpage of AKP (Ak Parti, n.d.) instead. After checking available data on official webpage of AKP, I couldn't find discourses I've been looking for. Moreover, for the period that Erdoğan has served as a prime minister, there are no textualized discourses available to public since the webpage of prime ministry is directed to the webpage of presidency, due to the fact that Turkey has adopted presidential system. So, there is no such an official webpage of prime ministry anymore since there is no prime ministry at all due to the presidential system that Turkey has adopted. That means, for the time period between October 2012 and August 2014, when Erdoğan serves as a prime minister, official textualized discourses are completely missing on existing official websites of Turkish Republic. Because full texts of Erdoğan's discourses are not regularly given by national or local newspapers, nor they are shared by AKP official website, I've attempted to look for remaining missing discourses of the period between October 2012 – July 2014 when Erdoğan serves as a prime minister, again by checking web. Fortunately, I've been able to find most of the discourses I've been seeking for on an AKP's deputy personal webpage, named Harun Karaca. Discourses which are acquired from this webpage are checked whether they are genuine or not, by comparing them with related video materials of each particular discourse, which are

also available on web³¹. Fortunately, all have turned out to be original, no significant error has been detected³². Besides, under some discourses that exist on Karaca's web page, an explicit reference to the official webpage of AKP is given (Karaca 2013). For my first two cases (case 1 and case 2), I've extracted the majority of textualized discourses of AKP party meetings from this personal webpage³³ since they are genuine, and they match with original speeches of Erdoğan whose video materials can be easily found on Youtube. For months which have more than two discourses, a random selection has been made since Karaca has mostly shared AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings on his page.

However, some discourses were still missing due to limited shared content of this webpage. Moreover, some of them even do not satisfy selection criteria and thereby are not in the scope of my research interest. That's why I've still had to search for remaining missing discourses, whose textualized formats exist nowhere on web. For the missing content, I've had to check video materials on web. And without any other possible option, I've had to transcribe these videos that do not exist in a textualized format on anywhere. Before going into details of transcribed discourses, I want to give a detailed information on how selections of textualized discourses are made and mention on exceptions due to limited availability of textualized data.

3.2.3.2. On selections of textualized discourses

³¹. I've done this by typing the title of each discourse on Google and Yandex. By the help of these two search engines, I've realized that all videos of such textualized discourses can be found on Youtube. I've checked these videos of each particular text by listening to the content.

³². By significant, I mean some textualized discourses may partially include Erdoğan's greetings at the beginning of his speeches. These parts, which refer to first one or two sentences of each discourse are not significant with regards to the focus of this work. They are not assessed even when they are readily found textualized. In short, because they have nothing to do with my research interest, partial greetings at the beginning are viewed as insignificant. This is also true for videos since many of them have a live stream break of related TV channels at the beginning.

³³. Among the discourses that I've acquired from this webpage, there is only one discourse of extended provincial chairmen meeting, which took place on 14th of November 2012. This is also the reason that the discourses of November 2012 have a 6 days temporal distance with one another, since there are no other existing textualized discourses for November 2012 on this page. Apart from this one, the rest of the discourses I've been able to acquire from this website completely consists of textualized discourses of AKP group meetings.

The list of textualized discourses that are selected with priority is given in the table below while the list of discarded textualized counterparts of them due to random selection can be found in the appendix.

Table 3.4 Textualized discourses that are selected with priority

Case / Discourse ID	Meeting / Audience	Date / Location	Length as Word Count / Number of Coded Excerpts	Number of Discarded Textualized Alternatives per month due to Random Selection
Case 1 / D03	AKP Extended Provincial Chairmen Meeting / AKP Members	14.11.12 / Ankara	3361 / 17	0
Case 1 / D04	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	20.11.12 / Ankara	5392 / 15	
Case 1 / D07	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	15.01.13 / Ankara	4100 / 18	0
Case 1 / D08	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	22.01.13 / Ankara	3473 / 7	
Case 2 / D10	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	22.10.13 / Ankara	3831 / 10	0
Case 2 / D11	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	05.11.13 / Ankara	4091 / 19	2
Case 2 / D12	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	19.11.13 / Ankara	5047 / 5	
Case 2 / D13	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	03.12.13 / Ankara	6250 / 11	0
Case 2 / D15	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	14.01.14 / Ankara	4363 / 18	0

Case 2 / D16	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	28.01.14 / Ankara	4421 / 9	
Case 3 / D18	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	27.01.15 / Ankara	3989 / 10	0
Case 3 / D19	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	17.02.15 / Ankara	3990 / 14	0
Case 3 / D20	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	24.02.15 / Ankara	3510 / 2	
Case 3 / D21	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	10.03.15 / Ankara	4099 / 8	0
Case 3 / D22	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	23.03.15 / Ankara	3683 / 5	
Case 3 / D23	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	08.04.15 / Ankara	3250 / 4	0
Case 4 / D26	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	29.09.16 / Ankara	4739 / 10	0
Case 4 / D27	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	19.10.16 / Ankara	3289 / 0	0
Case 4 / D28	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	26.10.16 / Ankara	3600 / 0	
Case 4 / D31	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	07.12.16 / Ankara	2829 / 20	1
Case 4 / D32	Erdoğan's Meeting with	14.12.16 / Ankara	2482 / 2	

	Muhtars / Muhtars			
Case 4 / D33	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	04.01.17 / Ankara	2696 / 7	1
Case 4 / D34	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	19.01.17 / Ankara	2873 / 7	
Case 5 / D38	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	18.10.17 / Ankara	2947 / 2	0
Case 5 / D40	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	09.11.17 / Ankara	3412 / 3	0
Case 6 / D41	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	09.01.18 / Ankara	2995 / 4	1
Case 6 / D42	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	16.01.18 / Ankara	2364 / 9	
Case 6 / D43	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	06.02.18 / Ankara	2677 / 7	0
Case 6 / D44	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	13.02.18 / Ankara	2840 / 0	
Case 6 / D45	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	06.03.18 / Ankara	3940 / 4	0
Case 6 / D46	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	20.03.18 / Ankara	2687 / 2	
Case 6 / D47	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	10.04.18 / Ankara	3343 / 5	1
Case 6 / D48	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	24.04.18 / Ankara	3853 / 14	
Case 6 / D49	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	08.05.18 / Ankara	3066 / 20	0

One should keep in mind that Erdoğan's discourses expressed during his meetings with muhtars may only refer to alternatives when there is at least one missing textualized discourse of AKP group meeting or AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting for the related month. Otherwise, textualized discourses of muhtar meetings are not viewed as alternatives to textualized discourses of AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings³⁴. When both discourses are the ones that are viewed for the selection with priority - AKP group meetings or AKP extended chairmen meetings - then their alternatives must also refer to remaining textualized discourses of discourses AKP group meetings or AKP extended chairmen meetings. By the same token, discourses of Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars are viewed as alternatives for other available discourses of muhtar meetings.

For months in which only one textualized discourse of AKP group meetings or of Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars is available on presidential webpage (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019), alternatives as remaining available textualized options, are given once they have been filtered both according to the selection criteria with regards to the audience and one week temporal distance between this one discourse that has been selected with priority³⁵. For instance, for some months such as, January 2015, April 2015, etc., once I've eliminated discourses that do not fit selection criteria with regards to the audience, I've also eliminated the ones that do violate one-week temporal distance and have not assessed as potential selections. As an example, a detailed explanation for random selection of April 2015 is given in the following pages.

³⁴ Indeed, there is no such month due to available discursive data on presidential webpage. Due to availability of textualized data, there is no textualized discourse of AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting at all, on presidential web page. But there are textualized discourses of AKP group meetings. Such discourses fall into case 6, from January 2018 to May 2018. From January 2018 to April 2018, because there are at least two discourses of AKP group meetings on presidential web page, in the previous table, only discourses of such meetings are given as possible alternative selections that can substitute each other, regardless of whether Erdoğan's discourse of a muhtar meeting exists. For May 2018, there is only one discourse of AKP group meeting, but there is no discourse of Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars. In short, for the previous table, I haven't been able to assess discourses of Erdoğan's muhtar meetings as discarded textualized alternatives due to random selection for his discourses which are exercised in AKP group meetings.

³⁵ What I mean is once a discourse that is viewed with priority has been selected, second selection is made according to the date of this initially selected discourse. So, only options whose dates are one week before and after the date of this initial selection are viewed as potential random selections. This is important especially when only one discourse which is selected with priority (discourses of AKP group meetings, AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, or Erdoğan's muhtars meetings) is available in textualized format for a month. In such cases, second discourse is selected among remaining available options that do not violate selection criteria and that have at least one week interval between the initial selection, which has already been selected with priority.

In the following table, details of remaining randomly selected textualized discourses according to the selection criteria are given. In the last column of the table, total number of discarded textualized alternatives due to random selection is given while numbers in parentheses refer to the total number of discourses that belong to a meeting or event in which Erdoğan is expected to express economic appeals more frequently with regards to the audience he speaks to. This detail is given because some selections also refer to discourses which are expressed in such events. As a response to the reader's concerns of a possible biased selection, I can say these selections have been made randomly. In terms of the audience Erdoğan appeals to, there is no violation of selection criteria. Besides, one week temporal distance between two selections of each month is protected, except some exceptional months due to limited available data. As one can clearly notice that all randomly selected textualized discourses that belong to an economic event or meeting given in the table below is in accord with the fact that the majority of available textualized discourses indeed belong to economic events or meetings for each related month³⁶. Hence, in terms of random selection, any concern of a possible biased selection to manipulate results of this study does not have a solid ground.

³⁶ As one can realize that this is true for April 2015, November 2016, and November 2017. During related months that these discourses are exercised Erdoğan overwhelmingly speaks in an economic event or meeting and therefore such selections overlap with the majority of all potential selections for related months. The only one exception is D30, which may not be viewed as a discourse of an economic event or meeting although 5 out of 6 discourses of November 2016 exercised during economic meetings or events. But I must underline D29 has already been selected randomly as the first discourse of November 2016. So, one can only talk about a balanced random selection for this month. And indeed, a balanced selection exists not only for November 2016, but also for January 2015, April 2015, November 2017. For these last three months, due to available discursive data, there are one already selected discourse of Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars for each month. Thus, for January 2015, April 2015, November 2017, because all available options beside such existing selections overwhelmingly consist of Erdoğan's discourses that are exercised in an economic event or meeting, any concern of a possible biased selection is void. If to talk on January 2015, Erdoğan's discourse towards TÜGİK (The Young Businessmen Confederation of Turkey) members is again randomly selected. Except this discourse, there are 2 available options whereas 1 of them is also Erdoğan's discourse in an economic event or meeting. So, random selection is made among 3 available alternatives, while 2 of them Erdoğan is expected to exercise economic appeals more frequently.

Table 3.5 The list of remaining randomly selected textualized discourses

Case / Discourse ID	Event or Meeting / Audience	Date / Location	Length as Word Count / Total Number of Coded Excerpts	Total Number of Discarded Textualized Alternatives per month due to Random Selection
Case 3 / D17	Erdoğan Welcomes Members and the president of TUGİK / TUGİK Members	19.01.15 / Ankara	4220 / 21	2 (1)
Case 3 / D24	23 rd MÜSİAD General Assembly / MÜSİAD members	25.04.15 / Istanbul	4324 / 26	4 (4)
Case 4 / D25	Erdoğan Welcomes Governors of 81 Provinces / Governors of Turkey	08.09.16 / Ankara	3095 / 0	1 (0)
Case 4 / D29	16 th MÜSİAD Expo Exhibition & 20 th International Business Forum Congress / MÜSİAD Members & Businesspeople	09.11.16 / Istanbul	2713 / 8	6 (5)
Case 4 / D30	The Conference of Turkey's New Security Concept / Police Academy Members	22.11.16 / Ankara	4165 / 4	
Case 5 / D35	Gala Dinner of TURKEN Foundation / Members of TURKEN Foundation	21.09.17 / New York	1677 / 0	0 (0)
Case 5 / D36	Inauguration Ceremony of 2016-2017 Academic Year / Academics & Students	26.09.17 / Ankara	3442 / 3	
Case 5 / D37	Meeting with Opinion Leaders and Representatives of Civil Society Organizations / Opinion Leaders and Representatives of Civil Society Organizations	05.10.17 / Ankara	2467 / 6	2 (0)

Case 5 / D39	The Publicity Meeting of Turkey's Automobile Joint Venture / Businesspeople of Turkey	02.11.17 / Ankara	2062 / 12	1 (1)
Case 6 / D50	Iftar Program with Families of Martyrs / Families of Martyrs	16.05.18 / Ankara	2053 / 3	0 (0)
Case 7 / D52	Erdoğan's Balcony Speech / The people of Ankara	24.06.18 / Ankara	1063 / 3	0 (0)
Case 7 / D53	Presidential Inauguration Ceremony / Authorities of Turkey and Participants of the Ceremony	09.07.18 / Ankara	1377 / 7	3 (0)
Case 7 / D54	Erdoğan's Speech on the July 15 Martyrs' Bridge / The people of Istanbul	15.07.18 / Istanbul	1753 / 0	
Case 7 / D55	The 10 th Ambassadors Conference / Ambassadors of Turkey	13.08.18 / Ankara	2409 / 11	4 (0)
Case 7 / D56	Graduation Ceremony of Ground Sergeants / Graduated Sergeants and their Families	31.08.18 / Ankara	1564 / 4	
Case 7 / D57	Veterans Day Ceremony / Participants of the Ceremony	19.09.18 / Ankara	1806 / 8	0 (0)
Case 7 / D58	TEKNOFEST Istanbul / Members of TEKNOFEST Foundation	22.09.18 / Istanbul	1921 / 4	

Before going into details of random selection, I want to emphasize that my aim in this work is to check my cases and, if possible, find Erdoğan's more frequently exercised crisis emphasizing populist appeals than crisis denying populist. My objective, as I've mentioned before, is to detect any possible associational pattern in accord with Moffitt's (2015) core claim, that leaders who are infamously apply populism more than other leaders do it by perpetuation of failures as crisis in order to remain in power. However, random selection of speeches that Erdoğan speaks in economic events or meeting mentioned above cannot overrate Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing populist appeals vis-à-vis crisis denying ones. In order to be transparent at this point, in the table given below, I've added frequencies of each type

of rhetoric that belong to my main three categories. I've also added frequencies of D30 although it does not take place in an economic event or meeting. One can notice that in none of these discourses, crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric is more frequently applied than crisis denying populist one. Hence, any concern of a biased selection in order to overrate Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing populist appeals in accord with the objective of this work is void.

Table 3.6 Frequencies of excerpts of randomly selected discourses of economic events

Type of Rhetoric / Discourse ID	D17	D24	D29	D39	D30
Crisis emphasizing populist	4	4	0	0	2
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	0	0	0	0	0
Crisis denying populist	4	5	2	3	2
Crisis denying non-populist	2	0	0	0	0
Failure ignoring populist	3	10	0	0	0
Failure ignoring non-populist	8	7	6	9	0

In order to be more transparent in my selections of randomly selected textualized discourses given above, I want to mention on selection examples of two months in detail and then I intend to shed light on some exceptional months and explain what makes them exceptional. But before that, I have to remind that all discourses mentioned above with their dates and particular audience are available on official presidential webpage (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019). Web links of all selected discourses and discarded potential selections can be found in the appendix part.

For example, D24³⁷ is a random selection of April 2015. Total number of all available textualized discourses on presidential webpage for this month is 23. Once textualized discourse of Erdoğan's meeting with muhtars that takes place on April the 8th, 2015 (as D23 given in the appendix) has been selected with priority, no other discourses of party meetings

³⁷. As one can realize, all discourses which are selected throughout this work are assigned with a particular discourse ID. For D24, Erdoğan talks in MÜSİAD General Assembly and appeals to MÜSİAD members on April the 25th, 2015.

on the national level or muhtar meetings have been found in a textualized format as the second discourse of this month. Therefore, in order to make selection among remaining textualized discourses, I've checked available textualized discourses that have a one week temporal distance between D23. On 1st of April, Erdoğan visits Romania and exercises two speeches here. One is exercised in Romania-Turkey business forum and the other belongs to the press conference with Romanian president Iohannis. These discourses are eliminated from selection process since they violate selection criteria due to their global/international scope. After April the 15th, the number of available textualized discourses on presidential webpage then falls to 14. So, I've randomly selected one discourse among these 14 available options once I've further eliminated the ones that violate selection criteria with regards to the audience Erdoğan speaks to. For instance, on 16th of April, Erdoğan visits Kazakhstan and two discourses of this day are similar to the ones exercised in Romania on the first day of the month. Precisely, Erdoğan talks in Kazakhstan-Turkey Business Forum and he speaks in a press conference with Kazak president Nazarbayev. Again, these discourses are eliminated from selection process since they violate selection criteria due to their global/international scope. One day after, on April the 17th, Erdoğan talks in Hoca Ahmet Yesevi International Turk-Kazak University while he was awarded as a title of honorary PhD. This one is also kept out of selection since it violates selection criteria. One day after, he talks in 51st Presidential Turkey Bicycle Tour publicity event. Because the title of this discourse points out a sports activity, this discourse is also eliminated from selection process. One day after, on April the 18th, Erdoğan talks in the award ceremony of Siyer-i Nebi contest, which is kept out of selection due to its religious and cultural scope. On 21st of April, Erdoğan speaks to children who attend to the International 23 April Child Festival and on 23rd of April, he talks during his welcome to children in presidential palace for April 23 National Sovereignty and Children's Day. Both are eliminated from selection process since they violate selection criteria. On 22nd of April, he speaks in the press conference with Iraqi president Fuad Masum. On 23rd of April, he also speaks toward a global audience in Istanbul for the Peace Summit that is arranged due to 100th anniversary of Çanakkale War. This one is also eliminated from selection process due to its global/international scope. Thus, for April 2015, once discourses that do not fit the selection criteria have been kept out of selection, a random selection among

the remaining 5 discourses is made. These 5 textualized discourses are given in the table below:

Table 3.7 Textualized discourses of April 2015 that are qualified for random selection

Case / Date	Meeting or Event / Audience	Links
Case 3 / 18.04.2015	Opening Ceremony in Kocaeli / The People of Kocaeli	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31829/kocaelinde-toplu-acilis-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / 19.04.2015	Opening Ceremony of Levent-Hisarüstü Subway Line / the People of Istanbul	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31831/event-rumeli-hisarustu-metro-hatti-acilis-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / 21.04.2015	175 th Anniversary of Establishment Ceremony of Turk Telekom / Members of Turk Telekom Company	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31970/urk-telekomun-175-kurulus-yil-donumu-dolayisiyla-duzenlenen-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / 25.04.2015	23 rd MÜSİAD General Assembly / MÜSİAD members	https://tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32122/musiad-23-genel-kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / 29.04.2015	Publicity of Turkey Agriculture and Rural Development Attempt Project Practices / Farmers and Producers	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32123/urkiye-tarim-ve-kirsal-kalkinma-hamlesi-proje-uygulamalari-tanitim-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma

As one can realize, all these 5 remaining textualized discourses belong to economic events or meetings in which Erdoğan is expected to exercise more economic appeals. The one that Erdoğan speaks in 23rd MÜSİAD General Assembly is selected totally randomly. Therefore, total number of discarded textualized alternatives due to random selection is 4 while all of them refer to discourses that Erdoğan exercises in economic events or meetings. Discarded 4 alternatives are also given in the appendix part, in a list of all discarded discourses of other cases due to random selection, among available textualized alternatives which do not violate

selection criteria and do not belong to events or meetings whose discourses are selected with priority³⁸

For September 2016, there are only six available textualized discourses on presidential webpage. Two of them are held in the U.S. and exercised during Erdoğan's meetings in the U.N. on September the 20th. First, he talks in the 71st meeting of United Nations General Assembly and then speaks in U.N. Summit for refugees and migrants. These two discourses are not eliminated from selection process since they apparently violate the selection criteria. There are 4 remaining discourses for this month: In the first one, On September the 1st, Erdoğan talks in the inauguration of 2016-2017 court year in presidential palace. In the second, on September the 8th, he again speaks in presidential palace while he accepts governors of 81 provinces of Turkey. In the third, he speaks during his meeting with members of Turkish civil society organizations in the U.S. on September the 22nd, and in the fourth one, he speaks when he accepts muhtars in presidential palace on September the 29th. Due to selection criteria, fourth one is picked with priority as the first selection of September 2016. For the third discourse of this month, although he appeals to a domestic audience during his meeting with members of Turkish civil society organizations in the U.S., he does so within territories of the U.S. Due to the availability of additional two discourses which took place within territories of Turkey, third one is eliminated from selection. So, for the second selection of this month there are only two remaining options which do not violate any selection criteria: The one exercised during the inauguration of 2016-2017 court year and the one that is exercised when Erdoğan accepts governors of 81 provinces. These two discourses both took place in presidential palace, Ankara. The latter is selected randomly. And the total number of discarded available textualized discourses for this month thereby equals to 1.

3.2.3.3. On exceptional selections of textualized discourses

When it comes to exceptional selections, I've realized that textualized discourses of some months do not have a one-week temporal distance with one another. Moreover, the ones that

³⁸. If to repeat, discourses which are selected with priority are Erdoğan's speeches which are exercised in AKP group meetings, AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, and if both are missing, in his meetings with muhtars.

have enough temporal distance with one another obviously violate the selection criteria. For exceptional months, I've primarily checked whether available discourses violate selection criteria or not. Then I've made my selections among the ones which do not refer to any violation and strived for maximizing the temporal distance between two possible selections. Any violation of this temporal distance is due to limited availability of textualized data. There are 3 days interval between discourses of September 2018, 5 days between the ones of September 2017, and 6 days of November 2012 and of July 2018. Except these four exceptional months all other remaining discourses I've selected have at least one-week interval between one another, even when they belong different months.

For November 2012, there are only two available textualized discourses and both are extracted from AKP deputy Harun Karaca's personal website³⁹. On November the 14th, 2012 Erdoğan speaks in an AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting and on November the 20th he appeals members of his party during an AKP group meeting. Once I've verified that such textualized discourses match with the original discourses by checking video materials on Youtube, I've selected both although they have 6 days temporal distance with one another. Like every other selection, links of this month's textualized discourses and their corresponding video links can be seen in the appendix.

Before going into details, I want to remind the reader that, except discourses of November 2012, all remaining discourses mentioned below are available on official presidential webpage (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı 2019).

For July 2018, there are only five available discourses on presidential webpage and none of them violates any selection criteria. Possible maximum temporal distance with any of these five discourses is 6 days. Two of them are exercised on July the 15th, 2018 and there is no other discourse given for the rest of this month. Hence, I've randomly selected the one that Erdoğan speaks on July 15 Martyrs' Bridge among those two and in order to maximize temporal distance with it, I've selected the earliest discourse of this month that is exercised on July the 9th, 2018 during Erdoğan's presidential inauguration as the second one.

³⁹. Given as D03 and D04 in the appendix.

For September 2017, I've paid special attention to maximize the temporal distance with one another while keeping an eye on selection criteria. However, both discourses of these month can be viewed as exceptions due to limited availability of textualized data. For September 2017, among textualized discourses of Erdoğan that exist on presidential webpage, Erdoğan first speaks on science and technology summit of Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Astana, Kazakhstan. Due to its global scope and purely Islamic focus, this discourse is not taken into account for the assessment. Then he visits the U.S. and meets with authorities of the U.S. and U.N. During this tour, he speaks on 72nd meeting of United Nations General Assembly on September the 19th 2017. This one is ignored due to its mere global-international scope. He talks on the opening ceremony of Turkish House in New York. This discourse contains only 769 words, thereby also not taken into consideration. Then on September the 21st 2017, he meets with members of Turkish-American and American Muslim Society and he speaks at the dinner meeting of Turken Foundation. Because the former is expected to have an overwhelming Islamic scope, it apparently violates the selection criteria. When it comes the latter, it may be expected to potentially involve references on education since Turken Foundation is known to have education purposes for Turkish youth in the U.S. despite the fact that is also seems to have a political scope. Once Erdoğan has returned from his U.S. tour, he speaks on International Ombudsman Conference on September the 25th 2017. Although he talks in Istanbul, the audience of this speech consists of international ombudsmen, among countries of Islamic Cooperation. Thereby, I haven't taken it into account. The last textualized discourse of this month is the one that he gives a speech on the inauguration ceremony of 2017-2018 academic year on September the 26th 2017. This is also in the scope of discourses on education. In short, all discourses more or less violate selection criteria for September 2017. Therefore, I've made my selection according to additional criteria I've determined. In concordance with that, I've checked whether he appeals to domestic audience, and if so, whether he does so within Turkey or not. Therefore, I've selected the last discourse as my first selection since it takes place in Ankara and the audience is domestic. For the second one, between Erdoğan's meeting with members of Turkish-American and American Muslim Society and the one at the dinner in Turken Foundation, I've selected the latter since Erdoğan primarily appeals to domestic audience in that speech whereas the audience of the former may be highly mixed due to its overwhelming

Islamic scope. In short, discourses of September 2017 more or less violate initial selection criteria. However, my selections for this month are most convenient ones among available textualized discourses and the selection is made according to the additional criterion I've determined for months which have limited availability of textualized discourses.

When it comes to Erdoğan's textualized discourses of September 2018, again they mostly consist of Erdoğan's global meetings and speeches that are expressed abroad. On September the 2nd, he is in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, attending a business forum and then he visits University of Manas for a title of honorary PhD which is prepared for Erdoğan. These two discourses are not eliminated from selection process since the former is primarily have a global/international scope in which Erdoğan primarily appeals to a foreign audience and the latter also violates the criterion I've put about education. In the following period within September 2018, Erdoğan gives a speech in Baku on September the 15th, due to 100th year anniversary of the independence of the city, which is totally irrelevant to my focus, thereby ignored. Then he speaks on the inauguration ceremony of 2018-2019 education season on September the 18th, again not selected due to its mere potential focus on issues of education. Among remaining discourses Erdoğan also talks on 73rd meeting of United Nations Assembly on September the 25th and during a meeting with members of the Turkish Muslim society in the U.S. The former is not selected due to its mere global scope while the latter is not taken into consideration with regards to its potential overwhelming Islamic references. The number of remaining discourses of this month equals to three: the one that Erdoğan makes a speech in Turken Foundation on September the 24th, 2018; the one that Erdoğan appeals war veterans on September the 19th 2018; and the one that Erdoğan speaks in TEKNOFEST Istanbul Aerospace and Technology Festival on September the 22nd 2018. Although they all have domestic audience, but Erdoğan's Turken foundation speech is made in New York. Moreover, as I've mentioned before, Turken Foundation is a foundation built for educational purposes. Due to limited availability of textualized discourses, despite the fact I have had to select one of Erdoğan's speeches that was exercised in Turken Foundation one year before, for September 2018 I've selected two that Erdoğan spoke within geographical confines of Turkey since they have priority due to additional criterion I've determined for discourse selection. That's the underlying reason of 3-day temporal distance between two discourses of September 2018.

3.2.3.4. On transcriptions and selections of transcribed discourses

For video materials of Erdoğan's discourses, my selection criteria for textualized discourses is almost the same for transcribed ones. The only difference is that for videos, there is not any word count condition, but durations of videos and dates of discourses are taken into account before making a selection. Among videos which are available to be transcribed, priority is again given to discourses of AKP party meetings that take place on the national level – AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings. Among such discourses, the ones whose video durations are the shortest are selected with priority in order to gain pace for the study. But while doing that, I've also paid attention not to make any selection that can violate one week temporal distance with the second potential selection for each month. If there are no available videos of such meetings, then in accord with selection criteria for all discourses, I've checked whether Erdoğan speaks in his meetings with muhtars or not. However, Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars began to be organized in January 2015. There is only one month after January 2015 in which a transcription is required due to one missing textualized discourse, and that is June 2018. But during June 2018, Erdoğan only speaks in meetings for the approaching June the 24th elections and no muhtar meeting is arranged during this month. So, if there are not any available video of AKP group meetings or extended provincial chairmen meetings, then a selection is made among the remaining videos of Erdoğan's discourses, as long as they do not violate selection criteria.

For any transcriptions, a selection is made according to the following conditions as long as no violation of the selection criteria with regards to the audience Erdoğan appeals to is observed:

- Transcriptions are made only when textualized discourses are unavailable. If there is only one available textualized discourse for a particular month, then for the second discourse of the related month, transcription is required. If there aren't any textualized data for one month, then both discourses are transcribed by checking available video materials on web.

- Videos of AKP group meetings or extended provincial chairmen meetings are selected with priority, as in the case of selection of textualized discourses.
- Durations of the videos of Erdoğan’s discourses, whose video materials are available on web and can be found via Google, Yandex or Youtube search, must be over 40 minutes, while only videos with shortest durations for related months are selected.
- While focusing on shortest available videos of discourses, one week temporal distance of potential transcriptions with one another is strictly protected since transcription is required in one way or another.⁴⁰ Because two discourses are selected for each month that is subjected to this study, once a video is selected due to its duration, then the second one is sought among the videos whose dates are one week earlier and later than the first one. If one discourse is already available in a textualized format for a particular month, then the second discourse is checked among options that comes one week before or after than the available textualized one.

In order to find video materials of discourses, I’ve typed on Google, Yandex, and Youtube the following key words while adding related month and year at the end, and then push enter. If results do not refer to the time period I’ve focused on, I’ve used search preferences to select corresponding month and year and repeated my searches⁴¹:

- “Erdoğan grup toplantısı konuşması (corresponding month year)”⁴²
- “Erdoğan genişletilmiş il başkanları konuşması (corresponding month year)”⁴³
- “Erdoğan konuşması (corresponding month year)”⁴⁴

I want to emphasize that videos might be partially given on web (for instance as part 1, part 2, etc. for the same speech). Such partial discourses are not eliminated, and their partial durations are added up in order to check if they were not given as partial, what their aggregate

⁴⁰. Different than the flexibility I’ve expressed in my selections when textualized discourses are highly limited, for transcriptions I’ve shown no such flexibility in terms of temporal interval between two selections. So, for transcribed discourses, there is no exception with regards to one week interval criterion – they all have at least one temporal distance with one another, or with the ones which are already available in a textualized format.

⁴¹. I have added month and year at the end of my searches and whenever required, I’ve written year before month. But I have neither used quotation marks nor parentheses during search process. Parentheses are given above only to point out that related month/year varies from discourse to discourse.

⁴². “Erdoğan group meeting speech (corresponding month year)”

⁴³. “Erdoğan extended provincial chairmen speech (corresponding month year)”

⁴⁴. “Erdoğan speech (corresponding month year)”

duration might refer to. However, if videos are given as one part but they are incomplete (Erdoğan does not conclude his speech), or interrupted during in the middle, such videos are not taken into account as options, and eliminated from the selection process⁴⁵.

Because transcribed discourses are simply in video format, additional work is required to convert them into textualized forms. However, transcribing entire speeches of videos are highly labor intensive processes and require serious amount of time. Moreover, it is pointless since not all appeals will be in the scope of my study. Even among textualized discourses, not all excerpts are coded and assessed since Erdoğan mostly apply pure political appeals. That's why once I've made the selection for any transcription, I've decided to transcribe videos of Erdoğan's speeches whenever I have to. I mean whenever a part of the discourse that needs to be coded is expressed by Erdoğan during his speech, I've transcribed it.

Among 58 discourses which are subjected to my analysis, 7 of them are transcribed by checking videos on web due to missing textualized data. For months whose textualized discourses are missing, first I've checked whether discourses which are viewed with priority due to selection criteria are available on web. If there are at least two videos of such discourses, the ones with shortest durations on the condition that they are above 40 minutes are selected while paying attention the temporal distance with one another. Once a video of Erdoğan's discourses of such meetings with the shortest duration has been selected, remaining options that comes one week before and after are eliminated from selection, and only videos of the remaining part of the related month are viewed as available options. So, two conditions given above require an initial selection of the video with the shortest duration of an AKP group meeting or AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting since for every month, I've selected two discourses throughout this work. Once the initial selection has been made, I've made the second selection while checking the temporal distance between the initially selected discourse and other potential selections that do not violate selection criteria. However, if there is only one available discourse of AKP group meeting or AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting, then it is selected regardless of the duration of its video. Moreover, if there is an available textualized option of such meetings for any month, second

⁴⁵. This is not the case for videos in which Erdoğan's greetings to the audience is interrupted at the beginning or at the end. The reason is for many videos, live streams of TV channels do not start at the very beginning of Erdoğan's speaking. Moreover, Greetings are not even transcribed since they are not relevant to the scope of this work.

discourse is selected among discourses of whose dates do not violate one week temporal distance with the existing textualized option. Details will be given once I've detailly explained transcribed discourses in the following pages.

In the table given below, all selected transcribed discourses and discarded remaining options are listed. I'd like to use the word "options" instead of "alternatives" here. That is because there are not any alternatives for selected ones since each selection has the possible shortest video duration and all of them are among videos of discourses which fit the selection criteria. So, while a random selection is possible for textualized discourses, it is not for transcribed ones. A detailed explanation for each month of transcribed selections is given once the table given below has been presented.

Table 3.8 The list of videos of transcribed discourses and discarded remaining options

Case / Discourse ID / Discarded Remaining Options	Meeting / Audience	Date / Location / Duration	Number of Coded Excerpts	Link
Case 1 / D01	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	02.10.12 / Ankara / 63:21	21	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwBs92-HiP0
Case 1 / D02	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	30.10.12 / Ankara / 58:52	9	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RhLQpW1WTrE
Discarded Remaining Option #1 of October 2012	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	09.10.12 / Ankara / 65:13	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NLTGq4LjLCc
Discarded Remaining Option #2 of October 2012	AKP Extended Provincial Chairmen Meeting / AKP Members	17.10.12 / Ankara / 68:26	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_ROUoCsXLM ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wnc-sRWn5-I ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jcr29sBc6k8

Case 1 / D05	AKP Extended Provincial Chairmen Meeting / AKP Members	05.12.12 / Ankara / 58:44	14	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ftBBStRT5DI
Case 1 / D06	Meeting Open to Public / The People of Şanlıurfa	29.12.12 / Şanlıurfa / 40:58	6	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-7fdOPssrU
Discarded Remaining Option #1 of December 2012	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	04.12.2012 / Ankara / 66:09	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qufcapZooNQ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAZrZDVMq5M
Discarded Remaining Option #2 of December 2012	Erdoğan's speech in provincial advisory council of Şanlıurfa / AKP local members	29.12.201 / Şanlıurfa / 58:47	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luuBglJakGo
Discarded Remaining Option #3 of December 2012	Erdoğan's speech in Blue Tunnel and Bağbaşı Dam / The people of Konya	16.12.2012 / Konya / 41:17	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FR01WPraCOk
Discarded Remaining Option #4 of December 2012	Erdoğan's Speech in Ankara Chamber of Industry / Businesspeople	27.12.2012 / Ankara / 51:55	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oWHmvP5ALR4; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9XjtYkKH8aE
Case 2 / D09	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	08.10.13 / Ankara / 74:57	10	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77GHGfFSb3M
Discarded Remaining Option of October 2013	AKP Extended Provincial Chairmen Meeting / AKP Members	25.10.13 / Ankara / 49:28	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdO-SWDO25s

Case 2 / D14	AKP Extended Provincial Chairmen Meeting / AKP Members	25.12.13 / Ankara / 55:21	25	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hD5Oaul9Vs
Case 7 / D51	Meeting Open to Public / The People of Adiyaman	01.06.18 / Adiyaman / 40:31	3	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2amPum2-cU
Discarded Remaining Option of June 2018 #1	Meeting Open to Public / The People of Sakarya	05.06.2018 / Sakarya / 42:00	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWhZ4YI2JHY
Discarded Remaining Option of June 2018 #2	Meeting Open to Public / The People of Trabzon	13.06.2018 / Trabzon / 42:01	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CN_XOXLY98Y
Discarded Remaining Option of June 2018 #3	Meeting Open to Public / The People of Kayseri	08.06.2018 / Kayseri / 43:10	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fku5zPauvcA
Discarded Remaining Option of June 2018 #4	Meeting Open to Public / The People of Hatay	07.06.2018 / Hatay / 43:22	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kRtjzL0ipGM
Discarded Remaining Option of June 2018 #5	Meeting Open to Public / The People of Denizli	10.06.2018 / Denizli / 43:45	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mV8hvOramMI
Discarded Remaining Option of June 2018 #6	Meeting Open to Public / The People of Zonguldak	05.06.2018 / Zonguldak / 44:39	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7TjGDVSZjg
Discarded Remaining Option of June 2018 #7	Meeting Open to Public / The People of Mersin	07.06.2018 / Mersin / 44:44	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b5KBT3CdOak

Discarded Remaining Option of June 2018 #8	Meeting Open to Public / The People of Konya	02.06.2018 / Konya / 44:57	N/A	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6foEBuOhSM
---	---	----------------------------------	-----	---

I aim to shed light on which videos of discourses are chosen for transcription while why other available options are discarded from selection. Therefore, in the table given above, only videos whose durations are above 40 minutes and that do not violate remaining selection criteria with regards to the audience are given as available options. If a selection is merely made among discourses of videos of AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, then for the related month, other videos are not even listed among discarded remaining options. Moreover, videos of AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings are given as discarded options even if they violate one week temporal interval between possible selections although they are not selected. Remaining videos are filtered due to one week criterion and only videos of discourses that do not violate this criterion are given as discarded remaining options in the table given above.

For October 2012, transcribed videos of Erdoğan's discourses are randomly selected among three available AKP group meetings of the same month (02.10.2012, 09.10.2012, and 30.10.2012 respectively) and one extended provincial chairmen meeting takes place on October the 17th, 2012. D01 and D02 are selected since videos of these two discourses have shortest durations and the temporal distance with one another is much more than one week.

For December 2012, I've encountered an AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting that takes place on December the 5th and whose duration is shorter than an AKP group meeting that is held one day before (58:44 vs 66:09). When the former is selected, I've checked videos whose dates go beyond December the 11th, 2012. Unfortunately, there are not AKP group meeting or extended provincial chairmen meeting for the rest of this month. Among four possible options as the second selection, I've chosen Erdoğan's meeting speech that is exercised in Şanlıurfa and in which Erdoğan appeals to the people of Şanlıurfa since the duration of the video of this discourse has the least duration (40:58). On the very same day, Erdoğan appeals towards local party members, by his speech exercised during provincial

advisory council of Şanlıurfa. Because this meeting is not held on the national level, it is assessed as an alternative for the second selection, unfortunately not selected due to its longer duration (58:47).

For October 2013, I haven't encountered any alternative group meeting for the one I've selected which took place on October the 8th. There is an option of extended provincial chairmen meeting that took place October the 25th 2013 and its duration is far lower. However, it violates the temporal distance with another group meeting that I've already been able to find in textualized format for this month and takes place on October the 22nd⁴⁶.

For December 2013, I've already found one group meeting of this month that is available in a textualized format⁴⁷. For the second discourse, I've had to select the extended provincial chairmen meeting speech which was held on December the 25th, 2013 since there are no other AKP group meetings or any alternative extended provincial chairmen meeting for this month. Thereby, because I select AKP party meetings that is held on the national level with priority, Erdoğan's speech in AKP extended provincial chairmen meeting that took place 25.12.2013 is selected as the second discourse of this month since it is the only available option.

In June 2018, due to June the 24th elections, Erdoğan runs a campaign in which he only speaks in meetings of different cities and towns in Turkey. Because of that, there is only one available discourse on presidential webpage for this month it is Erdoğan's balcony speech due to his electoral victory. Because my priority is getting textualized discourses, first I've picked this one available one as my first selection of June 2018. Beside this, I've had to pick one meeting speech of Erdoğan in Adıyaman, which took place on June the 1st, 2018. Because all other available meeting discourses exist in video format on web, I've checked videos whose duration are no shorter than 40:00 minutes. Among available discourses, the one that is exercised during Adıyaman meeting is selected by taking into account its slightly over 40:00 duration. For June 2018, videos whose durations are below 45 minutes are given as discarded remaining options while total number of discarded videos are much higher than 8 because of Erdoğan's electoral campaign.

⁴⁶. Given as D10 in the appendix.

⁴⁷. Given as D13 in the appendix.

In accord with discourse selection process and criteria detailedly explained, I've completed the selection of 58 discourses in total, two discourses per month, given in the appendix with their web links. The summary of the complete selection process is given below via a table.

Table 3.9 Complete Selection Process in one table

Followed Steps	Selection Process	Selection Criteria	Sources of Selection
Step 1	Check available Erdoğan's textualized discourses on web in order to select two discourses per month for the period between October 2012 and September 2018.	<p>1) Erdoğan's message must be in Turkish</p> <p>2) Selected textualized discourses consist of at least 1000 words</p> <p>3) There should be at least one-week temporal distance between two discourses</p> <p>4) Discourses should not be in a question and answer format, like Erdoğan's interviews or TV</p>	<p>Primary Source: official presidential webpage (tccb.gov.tr)</p> <p>Secondary Source⁴⁸: AKP deputy Harun Karaca's personal webpage (harunkaraca.com)</p>

⁴⁸. On this webpage, among Erdoğan's textualized speeches that fall into my cases, only Erdoğan's discourses that are exercised during AKP group meetings or AKP provincial chairmen meetings fits the selection criteria. And all available ones belong to the term when Erdoğan served as a prime minister. Hence, only these textualized discourses which are viewed with priority are extracted from this webpage. No muhtar meeting was organized when Erdoğan served as a prime minister. No other textualized discourses are available that fits selection criteria and fall into my cases.

		programs that he speaks as a guest	
Step 2	<p>Among available textualized discourses, focus on AKP group meetings and AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings with priority.</p> <p>Among available textualized findings of such meetings make a random selection of two discourses per month. If there is only one discourse of such meetings for a particular month, select it with priority as the first selection of that month.</p>	<p>Textualized Discourses of AKP group meetings and AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings are selected with priority</p>	<p>Primary Source: official presidential webpage (tccb.gov.tr)</p>
			<p>Secondary Source: AKP deputy Harun Karaca's personal webpage (harunkaraca.com)</p>
Step 3	<p>For remaining months in which there are no textualized data of AKP group meetings or AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings, then primarily focus on Erdoğan's textualized discourses that he exercises during his meetings with muhtars. Among available textualized findings of such meetings make a</p>	<p>Textualized Discourses of Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars are selected with priority</p>	<p>Source: official presidential webpage (tccb.gov.tr)</p>

	random selection of two discourses per month. If there is only one discourse of such meetings for a particular month, select it with priority as the first selection of that month.		
Step 4	Once selection have been made among discourses which are viewed with priority mentioned above, eliminate discourses which violate selection criteria from the selection process. Run an elimination process while also checking selection criteria with regards to the audience. Among remaining ones, make a random selection while paying attention to protect one week temporal distance between two possible selections not only of discourses exercised within the same month but also of discourses exercised between two consecutive months.	<p>Make a selection among remaining textualized discourses of Erdoğan on the condition that;</p> <p>1) He does not talk primarily to foreign authorities or a global/international audience regardless of the location of the meeting/event</p> <p>2) He does not speak in a conference, meeting, or an event in general that would inevitably involve mostly Islamic references</p> <p>3) He does not attend a meeting, organization, a</p>	Source: official presidential webpage (tccb.gov.tr)

		<p>ceremony, or an event in general of which scope seems to be merely about art or culture</p> <p>4) He does not speak on an organization or an activity about sports</p> <p>5) He does not talk on an event which potentially embodies mostly social references such as like women rights, the importance of family or children</p> <p>6) He does not speak on an academic event that the scope of event merely seems to be about education</p>	
Step 5	If available textualized discourses are unable to satisfy selection criteria for some months, then make a selection among available options according to additional criteria.	Erdoğan must appeal primarily to a domestic audience, and if possible, he should do so within geographical confines of Turkey	Source: official presidential webpage (tccb.gov.tr)

<p>Step 6</p>	<p>Once completed the selection of all discourses which are already available as written texts, then for the missing ones, run a transcription process by searching video materials of Erdoğan’s discourses on Google, Yandex, and Youtube. Run a search by typing:</p> <p>“Erdoğan’s group meeting speech (month year)”</p> <p>“Erdoğan’s extended provincial chairmen meeting speech (month year)”</p>	<p>1) Erdoğan’s speeches which are exercised during AKP group meetings and AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings are selected with priority.</p> <p>2) Durations of videos of discourses that need to be transcribed must be over 40:00 minutes while only videos with shortest durations are selected</p> <p>3) If no textualized discourse is already available for that month, then first select video with the shortest duration, and make the second selection while protecting one week temporal distance between two. If there is already a selected</p>	<p>Source: Youtube</p>
---------------	--	---	------------------------

		<p>textualized discourse but second one is missing, then make the second selection while protecting one week temporal distance between of its date and the date of available textualized one.</p>	
Step 7	<p>Once transcriptions of AKP group meetings and AKP extended provincial chairmen meetings are completed, for missing discourses, search video materials of Erdoğan’s discourses on Google, Yandex, and Youtube. Run a search by typing:</p> <p>“Erdoğan speech (month year)”</p> <p>And make a selection according to the selection criteria.</p>	<p>1) Durations of videos of discourses that need to be transcribed must be over 40:00 minutes while only videos with shortest durations are selected</p> <p>2) One week temporal distance between two selections must be protected. So, only take into consideration videos of Erdoğan’s speeches that take</p>	Source: Youtube

		place one week before or after the first selected discourse ⁴⁹ .	
--	--	---	--

3.2.4. On Excerpts and How I've Measured Populism in This Research

My understanding of populism does not allow merely focusing on keywords or checking discourses sentence by sentence since this may turn out ending up with biased results. Sentences may lack one core criterion of populism, and thereby cannot be assessed as populists on their own. A group of consecutive sentences may refer to a populist tone by constituting a cohesive semantic unity. So, I've initially considered to focus on paragraphs in order to measure populist rhetoric. However, my observation is that, sometimes even paragraphs may also lack such cohesion, and in some circumstances, they may only correspond a populist tone when they are combined. What is more troublesome is that I've also encountered with paragraphs which are given as arbitrarily in textualized discourses I've used during this work. They are given as arbitrarily divided, merged, or sometimes they are not even given as paragraphs, but a group of sentences as provided as paragraphs. Moreover, because I've had to transcribe some discourses since they cannot be found in a textualized format on anywhere on web, I've had to build my own paragraphs, by taking into consideration the semantic unity and cohesion of a group of consecutive sentences. Hence, because counting on paragraphs may cause troubles of consistency and since there are not textualized paragraphs in the videos I've transcribed in order to make discourses textualized, I've decided to form my own paragraphs, and call them "excerpts" during this whole study. In short, throughout this research, while my unit of analysis is discourse, my unit of measurement is excerpt⁵⁰. The reason I focus on excerpts is no different than my initial intention to focus on paragraphs - that sentences may lack one core criterion of populism,

⁴⁹. There are two months I've followed step 7 – December 2012 and June 2018, in both of which initial selections of first discourses have been made during previous steps.

⁵⁰. I mean populism is measured via coded excerpts, not via coded discourses as in Hawkins' (2009, 2010) holistic grading. However, due to Erdoğan's some expressions, a holistic examination of the text may be required in order to understand whether he points out an antagonism or not. This will be explained detailly in upcoming paragraphs.

and thereby cannot be assessed as populists on their own. However, because relying on paragraphs is problematic in some textualized discourses and because they do not even exist in a written format in videos which are transcribed, I've taken excerpts as my unit of measurement⁵¹.

While focusing on excerpts, my assessment of them may not be independent from Erdoğan whole speech since a semantically conducted holistic overview of the text may also be required. At this respect, I've had to view discourses according to a holistic examination of the text in order to find out whether subjects of his antagonistic rhetoric or certain words that are used as equivalences of failures are implicitly given or not. In terms of antagonistic attacks, Erdoğan may apply implies or pronouns (such as, "these") while he implicitly points out an actor or a group of actors in an antagonistic way. This is done since ignoring such appeals would lead an underrated assessment of populism and end up with biased results. Hence, in terms of pinpointing antagonism, I've paid attention to references that embody them either explicitly or implicitly and have also assessed them according to their possible semantic unity of the text. With regards to claims of hegemonic totality, whenever he mentions a certain failure, he may associate it with some certain labels or words such as operation, surgery, attack, conspiracy, plot, etc.⁵². Hence, indirectly and implicitly, a claim of hegemonic totality may not be given only via words such as Turkey, our economy, our country, us, etc. All these references are taken into consideration as instances of implicit hegemonic totality claim since they interest the whole nation. Moreover, besides appeals that interest the whole nation, references which explicitly or implicitly refer to members of Turkish society on the national level, whenever they correspond a mass, a plurality and thereby potentially refer to an alternative equivalential chain against an actual or potential power bloc are also taken into account as instances of claims of hegemonic totality. Appeals towards individuals who belong to an occupation category (for instance, whenever Erdoğan say my workers, my farmers, my doctors, etc.) are taken into account as long as the message is on the national level an pertain to economic elements. Similarly, for instance, appeals that

⁵¹. I've thought that a pure holistic assessment of discourses, like Hawkins (2009, 2010) does, in order to generate a populism score for each discourse may boost concerns of subjectivity for the reader. Thereby, I've preferred to focus on excerpts, while also qualitatively sharing examples of them as much as possible during my focus on each case.

⁵². How I've assessed excerpts and holistically examined discourses whenever Erdoğan uses these words are detailedly explained under "On Package of Failures" title at the end of this chapter.

point out expenditure that is made for disabled individuals are taken into consideration due to the same logic. This logic refers to the assumption that such individuals are homogeneously dispersed to the territory of the country, and thereby appeals exercised towards them may have an impact over the economic equivalential chain between Erdoğan and such groups. So, on the condition that Erdoğan applies a totality claim for such individuals⁵³, if he also uses an antagonistic tone during such appeals, then his rhetoric is assessed within the scope of populist appeals. If not, then his rhetoric is viewed as having a non-populist quality.

One important issue at this point is that populist excerpts are not double coded whenever they embody more than one antagonism. In some cases, Erdoğan uses more than one antagonism during his attacks on a certain power bloc while instrumentalizing some other targets as complementary to the primary one, while he claims a hegemonic totality for a plurality. In such examples, I've focused on the primary target of such populist antagonism and code such paragraphs as one instance of populism, not more than once.

My primary concern throughout this work is to check whether Erdoğan perpetuates failures that pertain to the economy of Turkey, thereby touch the people of Turkey, and present those failures as crisis. I am looking for a pattern that might give clues about the variation of his framing failures as crisis. Therefore, a reference to a plurality, and Erdoğan's attempts of identifying that mass with himself accompanied by an inherent pretention of representation such plurality is required to decide on a claim of hegemonic totality. However, in his speeches, Erdoğan may claim totality of various groups and pluralities. For instance, during his visits to the Eastern Turkey, Erdoğan may frequently say "my Kurdish brothers and sisters" in his attempts to explicitly claim a totality for them while positioning them against terrorism and Kurdish Movement in general. Erdoğan also applies humanitarian messages and claim a totality of all Syrian refugees or Muslim population in the Middle East during his emphasis on the inconveniences these pluralities often face with, during his antagonistic attacks against the E.U. and superpowers of global politics. Due to the scope of this research, I neither focus on such regional/local messages nor appeals those are exercised for a particular ethnic group. Besides, global/international appeals also have nothing to do with

⁵³. As I've mentioned before, totality claim, either implicitly or explicitly exists in all appeals which are in the scope of this work.

my research interest. In short, totality claim with a mass must be on national level, not local, regional, or even global one, and should not be exercised for a certain ethnic group at the local/regional level. Only appeals that are on the national level are taken into account. Appeals that merely exercised towards the nation can be considered as an option to assess Erdoğan's populist rhetoric. However, as I've mentioned above, references towards a mass, a plurality that can be assumed as homogeneously dispersed within the national borders also should not be overlooked since, on the national level, they also potentially refer to an equivalential chain based on economic elements that Erdoğan claims to represent via claims of hegemonic totality discursively.

As I've mentioned above, when textualized discourses are missing, I've used video materials of speeches. And when I listen to videos of Erdoğan's speeches, I've divided speeches as excerpts to their semantic coherence, like paragraphs that are not built arbitrarily. In order to be consistent, paragraphs of textualized discourses are not viewed as excerpts for textualized discourses because they are arbitrarily given even by the official page. Besides, there are no textualized paragraphs given on available video material. Therefore, I've had to distinguish speeches into excerpts and check whether paragraphs are arbitrarily given in textualized discourses. For the latter, paragraphs are reorganized as excerpts accordingly by taking into consideration the semantic coherence of them within themselves.

3.2.4.1. Excerpt Examples

Here I just want to mention on how I've divided discourses into excerpts and which excerpts are kept out of assessment. More excerpt examples will be given once categories have detailly been explained in the following pages.

An example of division of discourses into excerpts is given below. This paragraph is taken from Erdoğan's speech in which he appeals to members of TÜGİK while accepting them in presidential palace on January the 19th, 2015.⁵⁴

⁵⁴. Discourse ID: D17. Link is available in the appendix.

“...Şimdi istihdamda bir sıkıntı görünüyor. Yani birçok batı ülkesiyle mukayese edilmeyecek derecede iyiyiz de, ama niye buralarda olsun, daha da aşağılarda olsun inelim yüzde beşe kadar, düşelim buralara. Tabii biz geldiğimizde hizmet sektörü felaketti. Şimdi hizmet sektöründe hamdolsun birçok alanlar açıldı. Yani en basitinden Turizm’de otellerimiz bizim biliyorsunuz sadece yaz mevsiminde çalışırdı. Onun dışında kapanırdı. Ama şimdi dört mevsim, otellerimiz çalışır hale geldi. Bu tabii bizim için çok çok önemli bir sıçrama, çok önemli bir atak.”⁵⁵

However, I’ve viewed it as two excerpts merged arbitrarily and composed one paragraph since Erdoğan indeed talks about two different issues: employment and service industry (particularly tourism). Therefore, according to semantic unity within themselves, the paragraph given on this webpage is divided into two excerpts and assessed accordingly:

“...Şimdi istihdamda bir sıkıntı görünüyor. Yani birçok batı ülkesiyle mukayese edilmeyecek derecede iyiyiz de, ama niye buralarda olsun, daha da aşağılarda olsun inelim yüzde beşe kadar, düşelim buralara.”⁵⁶

“...Tabii biz geldiğimizde hizmet sektörü felaketti. Şimdi hizmet sektöründe hamdolsun birçok alanlar açıldı. Yani en basitinden Turizm’de otellerimiz bizim biliyorsunuz sadece yaz mevsiminde çalışırdı. Onun dışında kapanırdı. Ama şimdi dört mevsim, otellerimiz çalışır hale geldi. Bu tabii bizim için çok çok önemli bir sıçrama, çok önemli bir atak.”⁵⁷

Both are non-populist excerpts since antagonism is missing for both of them. In the first one Erdoğan recognizes a failure in employment, but he does not frame it as a serious one while comparing its level with employment levels of Western countries. And he mentions his good intentions to pull unemployment down. I’ve assessed this first excerpt is a crisis denying non-populist excerpt. In the second, Erdoğan gives a positive message about what has achieved in tourism so far, under AKP rule. He makes a comparison of the term before AKP rule while not using an antagonistic tongue. He does not point out a failure that belong to AKP

⁵⁵. “...Now, there seems to be a trouble with employment. We are so good as not to be compared with many Western countries, but why is it here, at these levels, let’s fall into 5 percent, fall into these levels. Of course, when we arrived, service industry was a disaster. Thank God, many areas have been opened in service industry recently. I mean, as a simple example, in tourism you know our hotels had only worked during summer seasons. Except summers, they had remained closed. This is a very very important bounce for us, a very important attack.”

⁵⁶. “...Now, there seems to be a trouble with employment. We are so good as not to be compared with many Western countries, but why is it here, at these levels, let’s fall into 5 percent, fall into these levels.”

⁵⁷. “...Of course, when we arrived, service industry was a disaster. Thank God, many areas have been opened in service industry recently. I mean, as a simple example, in tourism you know our hotels had only worked during summer seasons. Except summers, they had remained closed. This is a very very important bounce for us, a very important attack.”

governments. Therefore, it is an instance of what I call failure ignoring non-populist excerpt. Detailed explanation of such categories will be provided under “Categorical Variables” title.

An example of a pure political populist excerpt which is out of assessment is given below⁵⁸:

“...Suriye’de ve Irak’ta oynanan bölme, parçalama, etnik ve mezhebi kışkırtma oyunlarının amacı, Türkiye’yi güneyden kuşatmaktır. Bu kuşatma faaliyeti sadece fiziki sınırlarımızdan ibaret de değildir. Burada ülkemizin içini de kapsayan büyük bir oyundan bahsediyorum. Allah’ın izni, milletimizin dirayetiyle, diğer saldırıları nasıl boşa çıkardıysak, bu oyunu da bozacağız, hiç şüphem yok.”⁵⁹

In this excerpt, while Erdoğan claims the totality of whole Turkish nation, he exercises an antagonism against the actors who are involved in such plots of division, fragmentation, and provocation of ethnic and religious conflict in Syria and Iraq. Pure political appeals are out of assessment since they do not refer to any economic equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people of Turkey.

Due to the scope of this work, I am also not interested in Erdoğan’s appeals against global/international power blocs such as Western powers, E.U., U.S., or U.N., on the condition that such appeals do not refer to an ability to build an opposing equivalential chains vis-à-vis such power blocs, with regards to economic concerns and anxieties of the people living in Turkey. Besides, I have to remind that failures of this work are failures of Turkey. Global appeals that mention failures of other countries or blocs are not in the scope of this study. Erdoğan’s appeals that are primarily on the global level are not taken into consideration, even they might refer to affect the equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people living outside of Turkey. Moreover, Erdoğan’s appeals that are about expenditures that have been made for Syrian refugees living in Turkey are used as a political weapon whenever he criticizes the indifference of the E.U. authorities towards refugees and immigrants. Although there are Syrian refugees still residing in Turkey, the issue is not even

⁵⁸. Discourse ID: D37. Link is available in the appendix.

⁵⁹. “...The aim of games of division, fragmentation, and provocation of ethnic and religious conflict in Syria and Iraq is to surround Turkey from its southern border. This surrounding action is not limited to physical borders. I am talking about a bigger game that involves the inner part of Turkey. With God’s will and wisdom of our nation, we will spoil this game just like we have nullified other attacks, I have no doubt about that.”

framed by Erdoğan as a failure of Turkey, rather it was framed as a failure of the E.U. and the West in general. During his speeches on Syrian refugees and immigrants, Erdoğan says that his government will continue to help these people despite the neglect of the E.U. Such appeals may refer building an equivalential chain between Erdoğan and refugees against power blocs that is claimed to cause Syrian War. But they are assessed as appeals on the global level, thereby do not fall into the scope of this work. In short, when it comes to failures, this work only focuses on failures of Turkey, and they are either recognized or ignored while Erdoğan speaks. Therefore, despite its populist tone, the following speech⁶⁰ is not in the scope of my attention during this study:

“... Onun için Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulunda defaatle ‘Dünya 5’ten büyüktür’ dedik. Ve 196 ülkenin yaşadığı bu dünyada dedik ki; 196 ülkenin kaderini bir ülkenin iki dudakları arasına mahkûm edemezsiniz. Gelin, artık İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın sonrasındaki şartlar bugün yok, bunu gözden geçirelim ve yeniden reforme etmek suretiyle tüm dünya ülkeleri Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyinde yer alsın. 20 ülke mi, 20 ülke dönerli olarak bunlar orada yer alsınlar ve karar sürecine katılsınlar.⁶¹”

In this excerpt, antagonism is primarily against one country (implicitly against the U.S.) and secondarily it is against five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council while hegemonic totality is explicitly claimed for all countries. It embodies populism in a global sense, but not in the scope of my assessment due to my focus through this research.

As I’ve emphasized before, populism is inherently in the scope of what is political. But economic messages cannot be regarded independent from politics. Due to empirical nature of this study, I only focus on Erdoğan’s appeals on economic issues which can potentially or actually turn into alternative equivalential chains via economic matters, concerns or anxieties of the people, who Erdoğan claims the totality for. But one key issue here is that not every excerpt that might have an impact over the equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people are coded. Excerpts are coded only when they embody references that may actually

⁶⁰. Discourse ID: D29. Link is available in the appendix.

⁶¹. “That’s why we have repeatedly said ‘The world is bigger than 5’ at United Nations General Assembly. We said, on a World that 196 countries exist, the fate of 196 countries cannot be doomed to between lips of one country. Let’s come, conditions of post-World War II no longer exist today, let’s revise this, and on the condition to reform it again, all countries of the World should appear on United Nations Security Council. Is it 20 countries? Then 20 countries by taking turns appear there and join decision making process.”

or potential have an impact on equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people living in Turkey, when involved economic elements are on the national or structural level. They may refer issues pertain to the national Turkish economy as a whole, or to the economic conditions and wellbeing of a plurality, a mass of individuals that can be taken as a sample only due to their potential homogeneous dispersion within the country. I also view the latter within the scope of what is national, as long as such plurality is not stuck into a local/regional scope⁶². In this way, a totality claim may rise over an equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people of Turkey, when the people refer to subjects on the national level or when they refer to a mass that is dispersed homogeneously among the county, therefore have an impact on the equivalential relation on the national level. Thus, as I've mentioned before, appeals embodying local/regional emphasis as given below⁶³, are irrelevant to this work even though whenever they refer to instances of populism while embodying economic appeals at local/regional level:

“...Şimdi benim Kürt kardeşim soruyor. Ya ne istiyorsun kardeşim, onu söyle? Bırak sen şu bölücü terör örgütünün ağzını, bırak sen onların siyasi temsilcilerinin ağzını. Sana yapılmayan ne var ya bunu söyle? Batı'da olup da sende olmayan ne var? İstihdam diyorsan onun vebali sende. Niye? Çünkü sen girişimcinin, yatırımcının Güneydoğuya, Doğuya gelmesine katkıda bulunacaksın değerli kardeşim. Niye? Bölücü terör örgütünün karşısına sen de dikileceksin, dimdik duracaksın. Bak oraya o zaman girişimci nasıl geliyor orada yatırım yapmaya nasıl başlıyor.⁶⁴”

3.2.5. Categorical Variables

⁶². This plurality may refer workers, farmers, doctors, the police, etc. Although these people have the same profession within themselves, they are assumed to disperse homogeneously within the country, and they refer to a non-ignorable body of plurality. Appeals exercised towards these pluralities may have an impact on the sense of crisis. Thus, excerpts that contain references towards these pluralities are taken into consideration and coded. Appeals that are exercised for a body of individuals that live in a particular region/city are not taken into account since they are not homogeneously dispersed. My observation is that Erdoğan mostly makes references towards a body of individuals whenever he exercises failure ignoring rhetoric, and while he talks about how his party has improved social and economic conditions of such people or whenever he mentions a body of individuals and asks their contribution to the economy, during his appeals pointing out “economic attacks against Turkey.”

⁶³. Discourse ID: D05. Link is available in the appendix.

⁶⁴. “Now my Kurdish brother ask. What do you want my brother, tell me? Give up using the language of this terrorist organization, give up the language of their political representatives. What has not provided for you, tell that? What exists in the West that you don't have? If you say employment, that is your fault. Why? Because my dear brother, you will contribute to entrepreneur's, investor's coming to Southeast, East. Why? You will stand against the separatist terrorist organization, and you stand against it. Then look how entrepreneur comes to there, how he starts to invest in there.”

As I've mentioned before, I've coded excerpts of Erdoğan's each discourse and categorized them according to their potential impact on crisis perception of the people as long as they contain references that can actually or potentially have an impact over the equivalential chain between Erdoğan and the people of Turkey, with regards to economic elements: economic concerns, anxieties, or even pleasures of the people of Turkey on the national level. Equivalential relation itself is indeed a political relationship, but what I've taken into consideration during this work excerpts which only embody or refer economic elements, thereby influential on crisis perception of the people. This relationship may be weakened or strengthened according to the variation of Erdoğan's rhetoric. But it may get stronger not only due to relieving, appeasing, or pleasing references but also due to appeals that exacerbate economic concerns and anxieties of the people. So, categorical variables are built whether they have a possible impact over crisis perception of the people and the strength of the equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people on structural or national level. For instance, if Erdoğan mentions how well Turkey has performed in economy lately, this would strengthen the equivalential relation of the existing equivalential chain which Erdoğan claims to represent the totality of and may also enable new articulations of remaining members of the society to it⁶⁵. Another example can be given as whenever Erdoğan recognizes failures during his appeals, again the strength of the equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people changes according to the type of rhetoric that Erdoğan uses, due to its varying impact over the people's perception. Indeed, my intention throughout this work, in accord with Moffitt's (2015) core argument, is to check whether Erdoğan's crisis deepening efforts that aim to exacerbate crisis perception of the people exist, and if so, whether such efforts work for his advantage with regards to strengthen this equivalential relationship or not.

While coded excerpts are only pertain to issues of the economy on the national level (the whole economy or ingredients of it such as; investments, huge projects, social expenditures, wages, etc.) my intention is to focus on Moffitt's (2015) core claim in explaining populism: Populism uses failures and perpetuate them into a sense of crisis via populist performances. This may shed light on how some politicians who are infamous with their excessive populist

⁶⁵. The interpretation of these new articulations in terms of politics is Erdoğan enhances electoral support to his party whenever he achieves to enable such articulations.

rhetoric are able to remain in power for a long period of time. But as I have explained extensively, different than Moffitt's conception of populism, mine requires handling it as a discursive phenomenon, not a vague performative style. In accord with my understanding, I want to focus on whether Erdoğan's populism emphasizes failures and perpetuates them into a sense of economic crisis among Turkish people via populist discourse. If Erdoğan uses this tactic to perpetuate his rule, my concern is to pinpoint under what circumstances such attempts of perpetuating failures and framing them as crisis exist. In concordance with Moffitt's (2015) claim, my primary focus is to find a simple answer for the following inquiry: Does Erdoğan emphasize failures of AKP rule in order to perpetuate them as crisis via populist rhetoric? If so, under what conditions does it happen? What might possibly explain for the variation of Erdoğan's tendency towards perpetuating failures as crisis?

During my focus on Erdoğan's discourse, I've tried several categorization scenarios. After endless efforts and an intensive focus, I've decided to ask a key question before coding excerpts: Does Erdoğan agree with that Turkey experiences failures that potentially or actually affect the economy? If yes, Does Erdoğan's framing potentially contribute to create a sense of crisis among the people? Does he endeavor to rise the crisis perception? Or does he strive to lower crisis perception and attempt to appease the people by denying perpetuation of failures? I've assessed the first category as *crisis emphasizing rhetoric* while I've viewed the second one as his *crisis denying rhetoric*. In both cases, Erdoğan *recognizes* those failures, but his framing of the issue varies according to his political strategy. As a third option, Erdoğan may also apply using a rhetoric which *ignores* failures, he may just pretend that economy is fine, and he can merely mention about AKP's contribution to the economy, by giving information that his governments have achieved so far. He may also point out that Turkey moves towards her 2023 targets and he may emphasize investments, huge projects that will enable Turkey's achieving those targets. For this third category, I've assessed such appeals under the category of *failure ignoring rhetoric*. The third option will also be mentioned in detail once I've explained the first two ones more clearly.

Excerpts which fall into these three broad categories are coded and assessed. They are labeled as populist or non-populist with regards to their inclusion of Manichaeism and

hegemonic totality claim, either implicitly or explicitly⁶⁶. As I've mentioned before, excerpts including implicit antagonism may require a semantically conducted holistic overview of the text. That is due to the fact that Erdoğan often uses words, a group of words, phrases, or pronouns (such as, "these") as implies during his antagonistic appeals or during his mentions on a certain failure as an outcome of some actors he points out during his speech. Whenever he does so, he implicitly exercises antagonism against them. The target of antagonistic rhetoric does not have to be explicitly given. Rather Erdoğan might frame them as if the ones who are mainly responsible for failures. In short, whenever there is an implicit antagonism in Erdoğan's appeals, I've had to assess such excerpts according to a holistic examination of the text in order to find out whether subjects of his antagonistic rhetoric or certain words that are used as equivalences of failures are at least implicitly given or not. This is done since keeping such appeals out of assessment would lead an underrated assessment of populism and end up with biased results.

One may ask for sure, according to what criteria appeals that refer to crisis emphasizing and crisis denying rhetoric are determined? At this point, I've applied one key inquiry: Do these appeals have a potential to increase or decrease the level of perceived crisis of the people? Does Erdoğan claim that deterioration in the economy or the source of it has stopped and indicators has started to move in an opposite direction? In other words, does he claim that the economic landscape has changed recently? Have failures been overcome or the source of failures (during Erdoğan's speeches, mostly framed as a threat) been eliminated or completely neutralized? Or is Turkey still under risk of failures? Does Erdoğan mean that he, his party, or even Turkey given in a totality extent, will continue to struggle? Does he emphasize his confrontational rhetorical style and say something like "we will not surrender" which definitely perpetuates the failure? During my analysis on Erdoğan's discourses, there have been times that I could find no clear-cut answers for these inquiries due to the existence of ambiguous and equivocal appeals. That's why, in accord with Moffitt's (2015) emphasis on his exemplifications of crisis perpetuation, I've further checked whether there are any answers for the following ones: Due to failures, does Erdoğan mention any critical turning point that Turkish people are at? Or does Erdoğan advice the people to take certain types of

⁶⁶. As I've mentioned before, due to the nature of this study, all appeals within the scope of this work have either implicit or explicit hegemonic totality claims.

actions in order to overcome potential future inconveniences of failures? In other words, is there a responsibility that is attributed to the people in order to mitigate actual/potential impact of failures? Or does Erdoğan exercises mere political or religious appeals that are presented as solutions other than concrete steps to be taken to solve the issue? If Erdoğan applies none of these, does he at least give appeasing messages about potential damage of failures and claim that precautions in order to hinder such negative consequences are taken by the government as the core responsible actor and the issue will be taken care of in following period, near future?

3.2.5.1. Crisis emphasizing rhetoric

As I've mentioned above, if Erdoğan recognizes failures during his discourses, there are only two options for them. One option is crisis emphasizing rhetoric, the other is crisis denying rhetoric. In both options, if Erdoğan recognizes failures by mentioning on them. If Erdoğan recognized failures, then one strategy for him can be perpetuation of those failures as crisis. I've named this category as crisis emphasizing rhetoric. This rhetoric can be exercised in five ways.

If Erdoğan recognizes failures and if he intends to perpetuate them as crisis, the first possibility is after the introduction of those failures, putting the people into an alarming position while not using any type of crisis denying rhetoric. In this first option of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, Erdoğan mostly presents failures as if they are caused by a threat, which attempts against Turkish economy or the people of Turkey in an economic sense. Thus, if Erdoğan does not use any instance of crisis denying rhetoric whenever he mentions about failures or sources of failures (threats), he exercises a kind of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. An example is given below⁶⁷:

“... Bakın, dikkatlerinizi çekiyorum, Hükümet değil, Hükümet politikaları değil, AK Parti değil, topyekûn Türkiye, topyekûn Türkiye ekonomisi hedef alınarak adeta 76 milyonun bir arada yolculuk ettiği geminin tabanına delik açılmak

⁶⁷. Discourse ID: D16. Link is available in the appendix.

istenmiştir. Son derece basit, ama aynı derecede ihanet boyutunda bir planı devreye sokmak istediler ve halen de istiyorlar. Ekonomi kötü giderse Hükümet yıpranacak, ama 76 milyona, çalışanlara, üretenlere, çiftçiye, esnafa, sanayiciye ne olacağını zerre kadar umursamadılar ve umursamıyorlar.⁶⁸”

Here, Erdoğan does emphasize that the threat is still active and attempts against Turkish economy and the people of Turkey in an economic sense. So, in the excerpt given above, Erdoğan accepts the impact of failures over the economy but he does not show any effort to deny framing the failure as crisis. Here, antagonism is built against Gülenist Movement although not explicitly given but can easily be understood when the speech is holistically examined. Totality is explicitly claimed for the whole nation.

This first option of emphasizing is not assessed with priority during coding. However, following four options are coded with priority. That means even though Erdoğan uses a crisis denying rhetoric in an excerpt, if he also uses the following four options of crisis emphasizing appeals, then that excerpt has been assessed as an instance of crisis emphasizing rhetoric and coded accordingly.

As a second option of his crisis emphasizing attempts, Erdoğan may apply pure political references instead of concrete steps to be followed (for instances, the situation can be handled once we have achieved our national political unity or if he says something like “the source of our power is not the amount of our money, but the strength of our unity, solidarity, and brotherhood”⁶⁹) or whenever he applies to religious references as ultimate solutions other than concrete actions that the government can take (for instance “Allah is enough for us”)⁷⁰ then these are viewed as strong signs of weakness against failures or threats, therefore they are assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. Another crucial example of mere political or religious responses to failures is that during exchange rate crisis in Summer 2018, Erdoğan claimed that evil external forces in collaboration of domestic traitors, attempted to implement an economic war in order to put Turkey in a position of bending the

⁶⁸. “Look, I am calling your attention, not the government, not government policies, not AK Party, but Turkey as a whole, by targeting Turkish economy as a whole, a hole was wanted to be opened on the base of the ship that 76 million people sail together. They wanted to activate a plan that is very simple but at the same time at the treachery level, and they still want to do so. If the economy deteriorates, the government will be chafed. But they do not care and have never cared about at all what will happen to 76 million, laborers, producers, farmers, craftsmen, industrialists.”

⁶⁹. For the related excerpt, discourse ID is D31. Link is available in the appendix.

⁷⁰ This example is a hypothetical one.

knee for them. These traitors and the “mastermind” they have been serving for strived to handicap the sovereignty of Turkish people by market tricks since they couldn’t achieve to do so by force during the failed coup attempt. Erdoğan applied a significant Manichaean antagonism against the U.S. authorities while combining it with a claim of hegemonic totality of Turkish citizens whose population overwhelmingly consists of Muslims, thereby exercised an apparent crisis emphasizing populist speech: “If they have their Dollar, we have our people, we have our Allah”(Gall 2018). This rhetoric obviously agrees with the claim that Turkey was in deep economic trouble. Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s strategy can be interpreted as an attempt to deepen existing economic anxieties of the people while positioning them against the common enemy via us and them antagonism by merely religious references. Any pure political or religious references that is framed as a solution rather than concrete governmental action is assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, no matter if Erdoğan uses any instance of crisis denying rhetoric with it.

One important issue at this point is that not all religious appeals are viewed in this scope. AKP claims to be conservative democrat and Erdoğan uses religious references too frequently, almost in his all discourses. Wishes that embody religious elements such as “with God’s permission” or “with prays of our nation” are out of such assessment. Religious references have to be framed as mere solutions vis-à-vis failures, in order to be taken as instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. Another important point is, wishes or prays of forces which are framed as threats (for instance domestic opposition in collaboration with external threats) against Turkey are also not enough to pose a threat to Turkish economy. If threat is active, then its activity must be framed as corresponding an action. For example, during his talks about CHP and Gülenist Movement, Erdoğan denies their potential impact over Turkey by claiming that “these can only organize imprecation sessions together.”⁷¹ Religious references here are not given as solutions for failures, rather they are used to disdain oppositional political actors and groups and demonstrate how much weak they are vis-à-vis Erdoğan and his government.

Thirdly, Erdoğan may ask help from the people to contribute the solution of the problem that failures have created. In such appeals, the solution becomes dependent on actions of the

⁷¹. For the related excerpt, discourse ID is 14. Link is given in the appendix.

people. By actions, here I mean actions of the people to downgrade economic downturn or if possible, eliminate it or the source of it that Erdoğan frames during his speech. Whenever Erdoğan explicitly ask help from the people in order to mitigate or overcome inconveniences that failures have created, such appeals are indeed signs of inability to overcome failures by merely governmental action, thereby assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. One crucial example is Erdoğan's calls for the people to convert U.S. Dollars into Turkish Lira, thereby to disable possible sharp exchange rate hikes. In these kinds of appeals, Erdoğan mostly uses a populist tone. However, Erdoğan may ask the people to take other kinds of actions to contribute to possible solutions against inconveniences that failures have created. He may also ask investors and businessmen to produce and employ more in order to contribute Turkish economy, as given in the following excerpt⁷²:

“...Değerli kardeşlerim, ben buradan tüm iş adamlarımıza, yatırımcılarımıza, esnafımıza, sanatkarımıza da seslenmek istiyorum: Yaşadığımız zorlukları, tereddütleri, sıkıntıları biliyorum. Ama gelin ülkenize güvenin, ülkenize sahip çıkın. Böyle bir dönemde üretime yüklenmeyeceksiniz, istihdamı artırmayacaksınız, ticaretin çarklarının dönmesini sağlamayacaksınız da bunu ne zaman yapacaksınız? Türkiye, üretimdeki düşüşü, istihdamdaki düşüşü, ticaretteki daralmayı hak eden bir ülke değildir. Potansiyelimiz de hedeflerimiz de tam tersine daha çok büyümeyi, daha çok istihdamı, daha çok ticareti işaret ediyor...”⁷³

The excerpt given above can be assessed an instance of crisis emphasizing non-populist rhetoric since economic failures are emphasized via “a period like this” (when the related speech is examined holistically, such emphasis can be understood easily) while antagonism is totally missing, and the subject of antagonism is not even implied. If Erdoğan asks people's help for their contribution to overcome failures, or their actual or potential impact over the economy, then it is assessed as crisis emphasizing rhetoric, no matter if Erdoğan uses any instance of crisis denying rhetoric with it.

⁷². Discourse ID: D31. Link is available in the appendix.

⁷³. “...My dear brothers, I want to appeal all our businessmen, investors, craftsmen, artisans from here: I know the difficulties, hesitations, distress that we experience. But come and trust your country, claim your country. If you did not produce, increase employment, and make the wheels of trade to turn in a period like this and then when would you do that? Turkey is not a country that deserves the fall in employment, recession in trade. On the contrary, both our potential and our targets points out greater growth, greater employment, greater trade...”

Fourthly, whenever Erdoğan emphasizes an uncertain future which may cause trouble for the people of Turkey in an economic sense, this is assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. Erdoğan may do so by associating solutions of failures via conditional statements, or by emphasizing a turning point, which may lead not only a happy ending but also embodies perils to the people of Turkey and Turkish economy. For example, if Erdoğan speaks with members of his party like “If you perform well and stand upright, then we will handle the situation”⁷⁴ then handling the situation depends on the condition that members of Erdoğan’s party perform well and stand upright. In this case, if members of Erdoğan’s party fail to perform enough, then the situation cannot be handled. I’ve viewed such appeals as crisis emphasizing rhetoric since they not only put the people into an alarming situation but also emphasize the undesirable outcome for them, even if Erdoğan pretends to be determined for the solution of the issue. In a similar vein, Erdoğan may also use a rhetoric that emphasizes a turning point, a juncture that Turkey faces once he recognizes failures and accepts the actual of potential impact of them. For instance, if he says something like Turkey is at crossroads once he has presented failures or claimed sources of them (threat), then such appeals are also assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric since they also point out an uncertain future for the people, which may not result in a happy ending. Hence, the potential undesirable outcome for the people is given due to a conditionality or an emphasis on a turning point that points an uncertain for the people, I’ve assessed it as an instance of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, regardless of how much Erdoğan is determined to overcome the issue or no matter if he uses any other instance of crisis denying rhetoric. An example is given below⁷⁵:

“...En küçük bir ihmale artık yer yok, en küçük bir rehavete boş vermişliğe, hele hele umutsuzluğa moralsizliğe yer yok. Açık söylüyorum, siz çalışırsanız Türkiye kazanacak. Eğer siz ihmal ederseniz, bütün Türkiye kaybedecek, milli irade kaybedecek, bütün Türkiye kaybedecek. Bu süreç, unutmayın, yeni Türkiye’nin istiklal mücadelesi sürecidir, bu kadar önemli. Bu süreç, Türkiye üzerine hesapları olanların hesaplarının bozulacağı süreçtir. Bu süreç faiz lobisinin Türkiye’den son darbeyi yiyeceği süreçtir. Yeise kapılmadan

⁷⁴. I’ve given the full excerpt below. When holistically examined, by “situation” Erdoğan means December the 17th incident. Because he frames this incident not only a political but also an economic attack against Turkey, this excerpt is assessed, and his such appeals are taken into consideration as instance of crisis emphasizing rhetoric.

⁷⁵. Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix.

karamsarlığa asla prim vermeden moralleri yüksek tutarak kararlı bir mücadele vereceğiz. Tekrar ediyorum, millet bizimle. Milletın hayır duası bizimle. Bırakın onlar manşetleriyle ihanet içinde olsunlar. Bırakın onlar milletın emeğini faiz lobilerine pazarlamanın gayreti içinde olsunlar. Bırakın sosyal medyada, iğrenç internet sitelerinde kasetlerinin içinde onlar boğulsunlar. Bırakın o kaset montajcıları, o itibar suikastçıları Müslümanlara beddua etsinler. Biz bedduaya lanet, duaya evet diyeceğiz...”⁷⁶

And fifthly, once Erdoğan has recognized failures, he may choose to frame their sources as global threats. On the condition that the alleged threat exists on the global level, and if Erdoğan uses an offensive⁷⁷ tongue against such threat, any attempt that extends the temporal scope of the political confrontation thereby framing the threat as a perpetual danger against the economy or the people of Turkey in an economic sense is assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, no matter if Erdoğan uses any instance of crisis denying rhetoric. At this point, the threat may also be domestic on the condition if it is associated with its global partners and discursively framed as positioned against Turkish economy or the people of Turkey in an economic sense. For example, whenever domestic oppositional actors, Gezi protestors, or Gülenist Movement are associated with global/external threats and framed as their domestic collaborators or internal extensions, on the condition such association must be given during discourse at an earlier time, these domestic threats are viewed as threats working for global threats. Thereby, offensive rhetoric against them and extending the scope of confrontation or struggle with such domestic threats are also assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric.

One might ask why I have two necessary conditions - a threat on global level and an offensive tongue - for this last crisis emphasizing option. The underlying reason is that Turkey is

⁷⁶. “...There is no room for any piece of neglect, any piece of slackness, nonchalance, and most particularly, there is no room for hopelessness, no room for downheartedness. I am putting this clearly, if you work, Turkey will win. If you neglect, the whole Turkey will lose, the national will will lose, the whole Turkey will lose. This process, do not forget, the struggle for the independence of New Turkey, it is that much important. This process is the process that calculations of the ones that have calculations on Turkey will be ruined. This process is the process that the interest rate lobby will take the death blow from Turkey. Without getting into desolation, not promoting pessimism, and keeping our morale high, we will decidedly struggle. I repeat, the nation is with us. Prayers of the nation is with us. Let them strive for marketing the labor of the people to interest lobbies. Let them choke on social media, and in their tapes on their disgusting websites. Let those tape editors, those assassins of reputation imprecate Muslims. We will say curse to imprecation, yes to prayer...”

⁷⁷. Appeals that Erdoğan in a defensive position like “...we do not surrender” are considered as defensive while the ones that Erdoğan in an offensive position like “we will struggle forever, until the last of us remains/until the last drop of our blood!” or “...Now they say we cut your Dollar. Do whatever you want, this nation will choke you!” are accepted as offensive.

developing country that is highly dependent on foreign capital. A rational logic points out that any offensive confrontation with Western global powers can only hurt Turkey and puts Turkey in a weaker economic position. Moreover, Turkey does not have any key strategic resources (such as, oil) to sustain an independent path on its own. That's why any offensive perpetual confrontation with "global threats" can have a huge potential to exacerbate existing crisis perception of the people. Appeals of this option thereby are assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric.

One crucial point about crisis emphasizing category is that the possible confusion and concerns of the reader about appeals whenever both crisis emphasizing references are given as combined with crisis denying ones, why I've given priorities to some options of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. Particularly, one may ask why I've taken the last four options of crisis emphasizing rhetoric as having an ultimate dominance vis-à-vis Erdoğan's crisis denying attempts. The reason is I've considered negative references that explicitly points out the inability of the government would inevitably raise sense of crisis among the people, regardless of the intensity of Erdoğan's crisis denying efforts. After all, categories are determined according to potential impact of Erdoğan's appeals over crisis perception of the people. In the first option of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, Erdoğan mentions a failure, this would inevitably put some people into an alarming position, so it is an inevitable outcome. I mean, recognition of failures and using them in appeals means that more or less, the people will be put into an alarming position due to discursive framing of those failures. If there are no denying remarks on the actual or potential impact of failures over the people of Turkey in an economic sense, then as expected, this would be assessed within the scope of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. But while frames failures or threats as source of failures, if he appeases the people in a way that they do not need to worry about them, then he accentuates that the government as a functional body exists, and the government does its job by eliminating any actual or potential inconvenience that failures or threats have generated or may lead. But whenever he gives pure political appeals as mere solutions, or whenever he asks the people's help to overcome failures, or whenever points out an uncertain future via conditional statements or emphasizes on turning points, or whenever he attempts to perpetuate failures as crisis by using an offensive rhetoric against a global threat, I've thought that such appeals may signal the people who listen Erdoğan's speeches in a way that the government has either

been unable to overcome failures or will be unable to do so. Hence, the outcome would an inevitable rise in the crisis perception. Besides, not limited to Erdoğan, but politicians all over the world more frequently use appeasing and positive appeals than their negative failure acknowledging ones. In this work, I've also figured out that Erdoğan also uses failure ignoring appeals more frequently than his failure recognizing ones. What I want to mean is that people are used to hear appeasing remarks of politicians and rulers whenever they face a negative situation. Among various references, I've assumed that people are expected to be more sensitive and selective for negative references or implies. If they infer from those messages that the government, highly probably, is or will be unable to handle the situation, then their crisis perception is expected to rise, no matter how frequently they hear appeasing appeals.

3.2.5.2. Crisis denying rhetoric

For this category, Erdoğan again must recognize threats but his strategy of framing threats completely differs from crisis emphasizing rhetoric. The necessary condition of this rhetoric is not to use any instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, except only appeals that put the people into an alarming position, as I've mentioned above, which is indeed inevitable due to recognition of failures and mentioning about them during speeches.

However, in the first option of crisis denying rhetoric, Erdoğan may deny the undesirable outcome for Turkish economy or for the people of Turkey in an economic sense by claiming that the government has begun to take required steps to overcome inconveniences of failures, or threats as sources of failures have created. In a sense, Erdoğan points out determination of the government for the solution via governmental action. However, he may also point out an intention to overcome the issue as well while not giving concrete action plans. In short, as long as Erdoğan does not use any crisis emphasizing rhetoric (given as 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th option under crisis emphasizing rhetoric title) while he points out an intention to handle inconveniences that failures and threats have caused either by a pure appeasing rhetoric or

by pointing out governmental action vis-à-vis failures or threats, then this is viewed within the scope of crisis denying rhetoric. An example⁷⁸ is given below:

“...Değerli kardeşlerim, on yıllardır ellerinde tuttukları imtiyazları tek tek yitirenler, Türkiye'nin felaketi için şu anda gayret ediyorlar. Allah'ın izniyle bu gayret, bu temenni hiçbir zaman gerçeğe dönüşmeyecek. Milletın hayır duası tüm bu beddua ve temennilere inşallah galebe çalacaktır. Biz de işimizi sağlam tutacağız, sıkı tutacağız, yere sağlam basacağız, ülkesinin felaketinden medet umanlara fırsat tanımayacak, zemin hazırlamayacağız. Biz belli bir çevrenin, belli bir zümrenin ikbali için değil, 76 milyonun tamamının ikbali, tamamının çıkarı, faydası için çalışacak, 76 milyonu bir ve beraber olarak kucaklayacağız...”⁷⁹

Despite its religious references of the excerpt given above, imprecations of the opposition are counteracted with prays of nation, framed with a populist emphasis. However, prays of the nation are only framed as against wishes of the opposition, not as the mere solutions that should be taken against the threat. So, Erdoğan does not attribute any responsibility to the people. The action of the active threat is emphasized by “striving for the calamity of Turkey,” which points out attempts of the threat to downgrade the economy, can be understood when the discourse is holistically examined. Here, Erdoğan shows a determination against the threat on the domestic level and accentuates that governmental actions will be taken against such attempts, although he does not explicitly pronounce any particular policy that is going to be implemented against the threat. Antagonism is against the ones who have lost their privileges, totality is claimed for the nation. Thus, it is an example of crisis denying populist rhetoric.

In his second option, Erdoğan may exercise crisis denying rhetoric via appeals that point out the economic overview has changed or has begun to change recently, and failures or sources of failures have been eliminated or at least has been completely neutralized. At this point, he may also share some statistical data that indicates the economic downturn has begun to

⁷⁸. Discourse ID: D11. Link is available in the appendix.

⁷⁹ “...My dear brothers, the ones who have lost their privileges that they have been holding for decades in the hands strive for the calamity of Turkey now. With God's permission, these efforts, wishes will not turn into a reality. The benediction of our nation will surmount such curse and wishes. We will also hold our duties tight, we will do so firmly, we will get our feet on the ground firmly, we will not give opportunities to the ones who hope the destruction of their country, we will not provide a proper ground for them. We will work not for the future of a particular group or class but for the future, benefit, and advantage of the totality of 76 million, and we will embrace 76 million as a whole and together...”

reverse. Such excerpts are coded as instances of crisis denying rhetoric because such appeals give a signal to the people that “no one needs to worry about it since the problem is over, and everything is under control,” thereby aims to lower the sense of crisis among the people.

The following excerpt (TRT Haber 2014) is an example of such an apparent denial Erdoğan claims that the threat against Turkish economy is completely neutralized⁸⁰. The condition of the threat is not an issue here, it may still be active but framed as harmless to the economy. Excerpt given below also has a populist tone since antagonism exists against Gülenist Movement and a hegemonic totality of the whole nation is claimed not only implicitly via attacks against economy and national institutions but also with “Turkey” as the main body of the people:

“...Şunu özellikle bilmenizi istiyorum değerli kardeşlerim: 17 Aralık darbe girişimi tam anlamıyla çökmüştür, tam anlamıyla geri tepmiştir. Ekonomiye, milli kurumlara, istikrara yönelik saldırı tamamen püskürtülmüştür. İşte şu anda şu kısa sürede bakın 4 milyar dolar yaklaşık tekrar Türkiye’ye döndü. Şimdi bu onları rahatsız ediyor tabi, bu onları rahatsız ediyor⁸¹”

In his third option, Erdoğan may deny the potential of failures or threats, and claim that they cannot even have an impact over the economy or in an economic sense over the people of Turkey in the following period. Similarly, as long as they took place during AKP rule, Erdoğan may also claim that failures could not have had any effect over the economy or in an economic sense over the people of Turkey. In the following excerpt⁸², Erdoğan claims totality of the nation while he positions 76 million vis-à-vis both the ones who try to scare and startle foreign capital and TÜSİAD and similar organizations of elites.

“...Birileri yabancı sermayeyi korkutmaya, ürkütmeye çalışırken Türkiye bu alanda büyük başarılar imza atmaya devam ediyor. İstikrar sayesinde, güven ortamı sayesinde, özellikle de yargıda yaptığımız reformlar sayesinde Türkiye uluslararası yatırımlar için cazip bir ülke haline geldi. Yabancı sermaye bundan

⁸⁰. This excerpt belongs to a discourse which does not fall into my cases. However, I want to give as an example in order to be transparent in terms of explaining how I’ve viewed crisis denying rhetoric throughout this research.

⁸¹. “...I want you to know this my dear brothers: Coup attempt of December the 17th has completely collapsed, completely backfired. Attacks against economy, national institutions, and stability have completely been repelled. Look, at this moment, in a very short time around 4 billion Dollars has returned to Turkey. Now this discomforts them of course, this discomforts them...”

⁸². Discourse ID: D16. Link is available in the appendix.

sonra da Türkiye'ye gelmeye devam edecek, ama öyle görünüyor ki TÜSİAD gibi kuruluşlar kendi ülkelerine yabancı kalmaya devam edecekler. Bugüne kadar kendi ülkelerine yabancı kaldılar, belli ki bundan sonra da yabancı kalacaklar. Eski Türkiye'nin aktörleri artık şunu bir defa kabul etsinler: Türkiye'de artık kazanan elitler, seçkinler, belli sermaye çevreleri değil, Türkiye'de bundan sonra kazanan her zaman 76 milyon olacak..."⁸³

3.2.5.3. Failure ignoring rhetoric

Beside crisis emphasizing and denying rhetoric, Erdoğan may also ignore economic failures as a third option. In that scenario, he may pretend as if there are no failures at all, and merely prefer to accentuate AKP's positive contribution to Turkish economy by sharing some statistical data about some economic indicators, or by mentioning investments and huge projects of his government that has undertaken so far to prepare Turkey for 2023, 2071, etc. Likewise, Erdoğan may also use appeals like "we will continue to make Turkey grow without a pause as we've done so far."⁸⁴ In short, for ignoring appeals, I've only taken into account Erdoğan's positive remarks about the economy since failure ignoring excerpts refer the ones that no failure is mentioned. As long as these have economic references on the national level, they are taken into account and coded.

During his ignoring populist discourse, Erdoğan may attack previous economic failures of past governments and accuse them that they treated Turkish people in an unjust manner by increasing economic burden over their shoulders. However, in order to assess such references as ignoring appeals, Erdoğan's appeals must contain positive references to the economy with regards to his party's contribution to it. Those can be services, projects, investments, or statistical data of Turkish economy, or he may just emphasize AKP's services to the people. Likewise, hypothetical election talk is also assessed within the scope of failure ignoring

⁸³. "...While some try to scare, startle foreign capital, Turkey continues to succeed in this area. With the help of stability, environment of trust, especially due to reforms that we have made in judiciary Turkey has become an attractive country for international investments. Henceforward, foreign capital will also come to Turkey, but it seems organizations like TÜSİAD will remain to be stranger to their own country. So far, they have been stranger to their country, they will apparently do so henceforth. Actors of the Old Turkey should accept this: Winners in Turkey will no longer be elites, notables, or certain capital circles, from now on the winner in Turkey will be 76 million..."

⁸⁴. These appeals are given hypothetically; however, one can realize that they are indeed so common in many speeches of Erdoğan.

category. The reason is whenever Erdoğan blames opposition parties just before elections while emphasizing their possible future actions that do not refer failures but framed as potential failures of the future, he talks hypothetically. On the condition that, Erdoğan's mentions on positive contributions of AKP to Turkish economy and the people of Turkey in such appeals at the same time, his accusation to the opposition party members for things that they haven't done yet, and his future oriented accusations are assessed in failure ignoring rhetoric. Because such appeals inevitably include an antagonism, they are instances of failure ignoring populist rhetoric, indeed.

One important point at this respect is that economic appeals within this category such as mentions on projects, investments, services should not be stuck in a local/regional scope. Investments and expenditures to a certain city is not taken into consideration since they have no repercussion on national level. Despite their locality, huge projects which are attributed to services on the national level (for instance, Kanal İstanbul, 3rd Airport, 3rd Bridge, Marmaray, etc.) are taken into consideration and assessed within this scope since they have a serious potential to bring a non-negligible impact over the national economy. Religious and pure cultural investments are not taken into consideration since they are assumed as not primarily conducted to build an economy or directly contribute to it. Another point here, mere meetings with regards to economic matters are not taken into consideration as long as they do not refer to actions or services other than meeting, on the condition that Erdoğan does not associate them with Turkey's growth, prosperity, rising welfare, etc.

Following excerpt⁸⁵ is an instance of failure ignoring populist rhetoric in which both antagonism and totality claim is given implicitly. Antagonism is built against DSP-MHP-ANAP while totality of the people is claimed over the amount of foreign exchange reserve stocked in Turkish central bank, whose national quality is also emphasized⁸⁶:

“...Bakınız, önceki gün Kızılcahamam'da da ifade ettim, Merkez Bankası rezervimiz yeniden rekor seviyeye ulaştı. 2002 sonunda görev geldiğimizde değerli arkadaşlar, iktidarda kim vardı? MHP-DSP-ANAP. Ve milli bankamız

⁸⁵. Discourse ID: D11. Link is available in the appendix.

⁸⁶. Even if Erdoğan had not put an emphasis on the national character of the central bank, I would have viewed it as an implicit totality claim anyway. Throughout this research, as I've mentioned before, both antagonism and totality relationship can be either built explicitly or implicitly. And as I've repeated before, totality claim inherently exists for all appeals that are in the scope of this work.

Merkez Bankamızın döviz rezervi neydi? 27,5 milyar dolardı. Arkadaşlar, şu anda geldiğimiz nokta ne? Merkez Bankamızın döviz rezervi 134 milyar dolar seviyesine çıktı; 27,5 milyar dolardan 134 milyar dolara...”⁸⁷

Erdoğan may also attempt to use “failure ignoring non-populist rhetoric” as in the following excerpt of the same discourse⁸⁸. This excerpt lacks antagonism therefore it is non-populist:

“...Ve milli gelire oranla biliyorsunuz Türkiye’nin dış borcu yüzde 73, yüzde 74, buralardaydı, şimdi yüzde 36’ya düştü arkadaşlar; bunu bu şekilde izah edeceğiz, milli gelire oranla ne, buna bakacağız...”⁸⁹

However, when Erdoğan does not point out any positive remarks with regards to AKP’s contribution to the economy or its services provided for the people, then such appeals are out of assessment since they do not point out a failure during AKP governments. So, excerpts like the one given below (Gündem 2013), even though they have a populist characteristic, they are merely about past failures of previous governments, therefore cannot be taken into account during coding process and kept out of assessment⁹⁰:

“...Değerli kardeşlerim, biz milliyetçiyiz, biz şöyleyiz, biz milletimizi çok seviyoruz; Bahçeli, IMF’e borçlanan kim? Siz. Neyi ödediniz IMF’e, IMF’e neyi ödediniz? Siz o dönem içerisinde stand-by anlaşmalarıyla olsun, aldığınız talimatlarla olsun 3,5 yıl geçirdiniz. Ve yanlış yönetimlerin neticesinde bu ülkenin en önemli bankası Ziraat Bankası sürekli görev zararı yazıyordu sizden dolayı. Halk Bankası çöktü gidiyordu, Vakıfbank hakeza öyle. Ve bütün bunlarla beraber enflasyon yüzde 30, buralardaydı. Devletin borçlanma faizini yüzde 63’e, ey Bahçeli, siz çıkarttınız. Yüzde 63 faizle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti borçlanırken bunun bedelini kim ödüyordu? Benim milletim ödüyordu, bunu siz milletimize ödettiniz.”⁹¹

⁸⁷. “...Look, I’ve also said this the previous day in Kızılcahamam, our foreign exchange reserve in central bank again has broken a record. When we took the office in 2002, who was in charge? MHP-DSP-ANAP. And what was the amount of foreign exchange reserve in the central bank, in our national bank? 27.5 billion Dollars. Friends, where do we stand at present? Foreign exchange reserve has increased to 134 billion Dollars; from 27.5 billion Dollars to 134 billion Dollars....”


⁸⁸. Discourse ID: D11. Link is available in the appendix.

⁸⁹. “...And with regards to its proportion to national income, Turkey’s foreign debt was around 73, 74 percent, around here, now it has declined to 36 percent my friends; we will explain this in this way, what is the proportion to national income, we will check this ...”

⁹⁰. This excerpt belongs to a discourse which does not fall into my cases. However, I want to give as an example in order to be transparent in terms of explaining how I’ve viewed failure ignoring rhetoric throughout this research.

⁹¹. “...My dear brothers, we are nationalist, we are like this, we love our nation very much; Bahçeli, who became indebted to the IMF? You. What did you pay to the IMF, what did you pay to the IMF? You went through 3,5 years via stand-by agreements, via orders that you got. And as a result of your false governance, because of you the most important

Table 3.10 Three Main Categories



Before going into next section, I'd like to give three tables simplifying categorical distinctions. In the table given below, conditions with asterisks are viewed with priority when to determine the category of an excerpt and code it accordingly.

bank of this nation, Ziraatbank lost money. Halkbank was about to collapse, and so did Vakıfbank. And with all these, inflation was around 30 percent, around these values. Borrowing rate of the government was at 63 percent, hey Bahçeli, you increased this. While Turkish republic borrowed by 63 percent, who paid the price of this? My nation paid; you made our nation to pay this..."

Table 3.11 Three Main Categories and Categorical Criteria

Conditions	Type of Rhetoric		
	Crisis Emphasizing	Crisis Denying	Failure Ignoring
Condition #1	Emphasizing failures by putting the people into an alarming position while not using any type of crisis denying rhetoric.	Denying the actual or potential impact of failures by accentuating the determination of the government for the solution, or by mentioning concrete steps and governmental action, or at least an intention to overcome the issue.	Ignoring failures by simply not mentioning on them while accentuating AKP's positive contribution to Turkish economy and the people of Turkey in an economic sense instead.
Condition #2	Emphasizing failures by framing pure political or religious appeals as solutions*	Denying the actual or potential impact of failures via appeals that point out the economic overview has changed or has begun to change recently, and failures or threats, as sources of failures, have been eliminated or at least has been completely neutralized.	
Condition #3	Emphasizing failures by pointing out an uncertain future that may cause trouble for the people, via conditional statements or turning point emphasis*	Denying the potential impact of failures or threats, via claims that they cannot even have an impact over the economy or over the people of Turkey in an economic sense in the following period.	
Condition #4	Emphasizing failures by asking the people's help to downgrade economic downturn and emphasizing people's possible assistance to		

	take certain kinds of actions to overcome it.*		
Condition #5	Emphasizing failures by perpetuating the temporal scope of the political confrontation with a global threat via an offensive tongue*		

Populist appeals of each rhetoric requires, implicitly or explicitly, both a claim of hegemonic totality and an antagonism. As I've mentioned before, because I've viewed excerpts according to economic equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people, and since the economy interests all people, a totality claim implicitly exists for all appeals. However, not all appeals include antagonism. While most crisis emphasizing and denying appeals have a populist tone, failure ignoring rhetoric is mostly exercised in a non-populist way. For crisis emphasizing and denying rhetoric, since all appeals that are in the scope of this work include either implicit or explicit hegemonic totality claims since appeals are about the economy which interest all people, whenever such appeals lack antagonism, they are viewed as non-populist excerpts. That's why for these two categories, as one can see in the last chapter, frequencies of non-populist appeals are too low when compared with populist ones. The view is reverse when we look at appeals within the scope of failure ignoring rhetoric. In Erdoğan's positive remarks about the economy, the majority of his failure ignoring appeals lack antagonism.

Table 3.12 Populist vs non-populist distinction of three main categories

Type of Rhetoric	Populist	Non-populist
Crisis Emphasizing	Includes antagonism	Does not include antagonism
Crisis Denying	Includes antagonism	Does not include antagonism
Failure Ignoring	Includes antagonism	Does not include antagonism

3.2.6. On Failures and Package of Failures

As I've mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I've used the term "failure" in a similar sense with Moffitt's (2015) understanding and whenever I say a failure, I mean a phenomenon on the structural and national level which may actually or potentially have an impact over the society in a negative way. When it comes to individuals, despite their personal characteristic, incidents that some individuals are involved may have a potential to turn into failures, especially once such individuals are involved in politics or got engaged with other individuals who fall into the scope of politics. The potential of such incidents to turn into failures are based on their ability to be viewed on the national level by the members of the society. In this study, these failures are viewed in the scope of mere political failures and they are not taken into consideration during coding process unless they are associated with economic elements or their possible impact over the equivalential relationship between Erdoğan and the people via issues pertain to the economy. That's why incidents like deportation of Turkish minister in Holland or the trial of Reza Zarrab are viewed as political failures since they have brought an impact on the national level politics. Diplomatic relations were suspended, and the issue was framed as a national cause by Erdoğan. Whenever such incidents are discursively associated by Erdoğan with plots against Turkey that affects the economy, they are assessed as framed as package of failures and thereby coded. Moreover, by the same token, corruption claims against Erdoğan and some ministers of the government

of the related period during December 17th-25th incident also refer to political failures. However, since charges were against prominent politicians, corruption claim on the personal level turned into a national political failure not only because Erdoğan as the prime minister but also, he was among the accused politicians. However, the issue was framed by Erdoğan as a cover for economic attacks against Turkey and gained a national characteristic. I've viewed such excerpts in the pure political zone since corruption charges couldn't be proved and whether there was public loss or not is unknown. Even if there was a public loss, whether that impact was negligible or not is not known for sure. Besides, failures should be on national on national level not only with regards to political but also in terms of economic deterioration. Whenever corruption charges are framed as economic attacks against Turkey by Erdoğan, those are taken into consideration within a package of failures.

Throughout this study, I've focused on deterioration periods of three key indicators which I'll explain under research strategy and data title. And my claim was to check whether there is a pattern between such economic failures and Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing rhetoric. However, I've noticed that Erdoğan rarely mentions failures that merely pertain to these economic indicators explicitly during his discourses. My observation is that in most cases, Erdoğan strives to combine any existing or possible economic deterioration with various political failures and present them as a wider framework of a group of failures. This attitude is also emphasized by Moffitt (2015) while he gives examples from Hugo Chávez, during his remarks on perpetuation of failures as crisis. In a similar vein, Erdoğan associates oppositional actors with attempts to downgrade Turkey's economic performance. During serious economic troubles, he may mention that certain powers target Turkey's growth and development or Turkey faces with an economic war. Because of that, I've decided to check not only Erdoğan's mere references to economic indicators, but also appeals that he has economic references while mentioning an ultimate source of failures, which is mostly framed as an enemy, a threat to Turkish economic sovereignty. Such threat does not have to be explicitly mentioned but also might be implicitly framed as the source of failures and actual or potential economic deteriorations. These association attempts of Erdoğan should not surprise one since populism is inherently political and framing of economic downturns inevitably involves political messages. Therefore, leaders who intends to frame economic deteriorations in a populist manner may apply instrumentalizing political failures and use

them during their rhetorical attacks. For instance, Erdoğan may claim that Gezi demonstrations took place not due to environmental concerns but against Turkey's stability, growth, and great investments. In his claims, he may argue that once demonstrations have spread, external forces with the help of their domestic extensions, began to manipulate Turkish economy. He may also apply using a rhetoric that emphasize plots, conspiracies, evil games against Turkey; a coup attempt against Turkey, which also aims to tear down Turkish economy as in cases of conflict with Gülenist Movement. Such appeals that associate political failures with actual or possible economic failures have huge potential to change the level crisis perception of the people.

Due to the fact that Erdoğan often applies to benefit from package of failures in his populist attacks, related political failures cannot be ignored. Beside Gezi Events and conflict with Gülenist Movement (December the 17th-25th, and July the 15th coup attempt), there have been some other serious political incidents that Turkey has gone through since 2013 and Erdoğan uses as instruments during his populist rhetorical attacks. Terrorism and the rise of the armed conflict with Kurds after June the 7th elections are some of them. Confrontation with E.U. and U.S. also often mentioned by Erdoğan in his speeches. Turkey has experienced serious diplomatic crisis with the U.S. due to Reza Zarrab's arrestment in the U.S. in April 2016, and Hakan Atilla's involvement to the case as the general manager of Halkbank while being accused violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Moreover, confrontation with the U.S. gets intensified during debates over Pastor Andrew Brunson's imprisonment in Turkey, which resulted with a huge exchange rate hike, in Summer 2018.

Whenever Erdoğan uses references of a package of failures, these appeals are examined thoroughly. Erdoğan may claim something like enemies are working against Turkey's growth and development. In such mentions that embody a presentation of a package of failures which affect the economy, the key point here is that Erdoğan must make a remark about such failures and economic elements such as Turkish national economy or a reference to the people's economic conditions. Such association of package of failures with economy is required for the assessment. When there is not any association between such threats and the economy, I've viewed such appeals in the scope of pure political appeals, thereby haven't taken them into consideration during coding. Appeals that refer to a package of failures are

assessed via a holistic examination of each discourse⁹². The reason is that Erdoğan frequently uses some certain keywords during his whole speech for instance; operation, surgery, attack, conspiracy, plot, etc.⁹³ once he has presented failures as combined within a package of failures as he speaks. If Erdoğan uses such a label or word, then they are viewed as equivalences of a package of failures, on the condition that they have been associated with failures during the discourse at an earlier time and not explicitly associated with pure political elements in an excerpt in the remaining part of the speech. Due to such possible associations, all discourses are read and assessed very detailly, and holistically examined by taking into consideration whether Erdoğan makes such associations once he has presented failures or the source of them (threat) during his speech at an earlier time during his talk and does not apparently associate them with pure political elements⁹⁴. Unless otherwise specified (an explicit association with pure political elements) the target of the threat that Erdoğan frames as certain words such as; plots, conspiracies, games, assault, attack, etc. is assumed as Turkish economy.

“...Değerli kardeşlerim, yolsuzluk kılıfına gizlenmiş Türkiye’ye millete, Türkiye’nin geleceğine kasteden bir saldırıyla biliyorsunuz karşı karşıyayız. Şunu herkes görüyor: Bu bir yolsuzluk soruşturması değildir. Bu siyasete ve millete karşı açık bir komplodur, açık bir tezgâhtır. Allah’ın izniyle bu tezgâh, bu oyun milletimiz tarafından 30 Mart’ta sandıkta bozulacaktır. Yeni Türkiye yürüyüşümüzü hiç kimse durdurmayacak.”⁹⁵

In the excerpt given above⁹⁶, “assault” refers to December 17th – 25th incidents and this failure is associated with attacks against Turkey political and economic structure at an earlier time, during the same speech. As one can realize, he also uses words like “plot, stage, conspiracy”

⁹². Whenever Erdoğan associates a past failure of his government and frame it as a collaborator of a threat, which has an actual or potential impact over the economy, such association is taken into consideration during the assessment. For instance, Gezi demonstrations is associated with the initial conflict with Gülenist Movement during December the 17th and 25th incident and framed as reflections of an active threat for that period.

⁹³. These words are used as interchangeable throughout this work. Erdoğan may use different labels for the same threat. As long as he implies the same phenomenon, they are assessed as equal references.

⁹⁴. But one should keep in mind that holistic examination of discourses does not mean a holistic assessment of populism.

⁹⁵. “...My Dear brothers, as you know we are against an assault that is hides under the cover of corruption and attempts against Turkey, the nation, the future of Turkey. Everybody sees this: This is not a corruption investigation. This is a clear plot against politics and the nation, it is an apparent conspiracy. With God’s permission, this conspiracy, this stage will be spoiled by our nation on March 30th in the ballot box. No one will be able to stop our New Turkey march...”

⁹⁶ Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix.

as an equivalence for the same incident. Erdoğan not only agrees with the failure but also, he attributes a responsibility to the people to spoil such attempts in the ballot box of upcoming local elections. Moreover, the excerpt is an instance of populism since totality is claimed for the nation while antagonism is built against the ones who participated the assault. Therefore, it is an apparent example of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric.

Another important point is that whenever Erdoğan says that our economy is under attack or that there is an attempt to Turkish economy, such appeals are viewed as the threat is on the global level. The following excerpt points out not only domestic but also global threats. However, Erdoğan's tone is defensive while he emphasizes the continuity of the struggle. He mentions the determination of the government vis-à-vis threats. Thereby, the following excerpt pointing out a package of failures which includes terrorism, activities of societal and political engineering in Turkey. It is an example of crisis denying populist rhetoric since Erdoğan builds an antagonism against the groups that pose a threat to Turkey's economic growth, peace, and stability and totality is claimed for the whole nation implicitly⁹⁷:

“...Bunu şurada çok açık olarak ifade etmek durumundayım: Türkiye'nin büyümesini engellemek, Türkiye'nin kalıcı bir huzur ve istikrara kavuşmasını önlemek amacıyla, içeride olduğu kadar dışarıda da tuzaklar kurulmuş, dışarıda pişirilen o zehirli aşlar içeride servis edilmiştir. Biz 11 yıldır sadece içerideki karanlık odaklarla mücadele etmiyoruz, ama bunun dışında içeride olduğu gibi buna paralel dışarıda da yoğun bir mücadele halindeyiz. Türkiye'ye kasteden o terörü besleyen, kanlı terör örgütlerini koruyan, kollayan, çeşitli araçlarla Türkiye içinde tahriklere girişen, ülke içinde toplum ve siyaset mühendisliği yapmak isteyen odaklara karşı da hukuk içinde, diplomasi kuralları çerçevesinde çok yoğun bir mücadele veriyoruz...”⁹⁸

⁹⁷. Discourse ID: D10. Link is available in the appendix.

⁹⁸. “...I have to put this right here very clearly: To hamper Turkey's growth, to prevent Turkey's convergence with a permanent tranquility and stability, as much as traps that are settled inside of Turkey, traps are also settled outside of her, those poisonous meals that were cooked outside, were served inside. We've not only been struggling with domestic dark powers, apart from those, we've also been in a busy struggle with external ones. Within the scope of law and rules of diplomacy, we have been intensively wrestling with powers that feed the terror which attempts against Turkey, that protect, watch after bloody terrorist organizations, that undertake provocations within Turkey with several means, that want to run a societal and political engineering within the country...”

4. EMPIRICAL PART

4.1. Cases

During empirical analysis of each cases, I've intended to seek answers to the following inquiries as much as possible: Does Erdoğan more likely to recognize or ignore failures? Among the excerpts that Erdoğan recognize failures, does he more likely to emphasize or deny crisis? What about populist vs non-populist excerpts with regards to three main categories? Does he present failures as if they are a package of failures, or does he merely make references to a deteriorating economic indicator? When packages are involved and associated for failures, does he attempt to perpetuate temporal scope of past failures that emerged during AKP rule? Does Erdoğan mention an economic indicator explicitly during his perpetuation/denial? What options does he apply during his crisis emphasizing appeals? By focusing on seven cases, I've sought answers for these questions while giving additional excerpt examples that fall into each case.

4.1.1. Case 1: 10.2012 – 01.2013

Table 4.1 Changes in economic indicators within case 1

Date	Exchange Rate	Unemployment Rate	Inflation Rate
10.2012	1.79	8.30	1.960
11.2012	1.79	8.60	0.378
12.2012	1.78	9.30	0.381
01.2013	1.76	9.70	1.646

During this case period, only unemployment rate and inflation rate deteriorate. Deterioration level in in unemployment rate 16.9 %, and average value of inflation rate is 1.091 %. Monthly values of each indicator are given above.

Table 4.2 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 1

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing populist	0	0
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	0	0
Crisis denying populist	3	0.033
Crisis denying non-populist	2	0.022
Failure ignoring populist	37	0.407
Failure ignoring non-populist	49	0.538

My first case refers to a period when Turkey did not have serious political turbulence, especially when compared with other cases. Moreover, this is the only case in which Turkish Lira keeps its potency, thereby no exchange rate deterioration exists. Moreover, within this case, when Erdoğan's political agenda and his discourses are checked in detail, one can realize that Erdoğan's appeals are mostly towards building a perpetual peace with Kurds via a democratic peace process.

Table 4.3 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 1

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing overall	0	0
Crisis denying overall	5	0.055
Failure recognizing overall	5	0.055
Failure Ignoring overall	86	0.945
Overall populist	40	0.44
Overall non-populist	51	0.56
Overall coded excerpts	91	1.000

Within the case, Erdoğan’s appeals mostly have a failure ignoring characteristic. Only 5 excerpts are detected which point out a failure. All of them are crisis denying appeals while 3 of them are exercised with a populist tone. In 2 crisis denying non-populist excerpts, Erdoğan either mentions on government’s precautions and determination against potential troubles of ongoing global crisis, started in 2008 or he denies the actual impact of this phenomenon over Turkey. Because this excerpt lacks antagonism, it is assessed as an instance of crisis denying non-populist rhetoric. One of them is given below⁹⁹:

“...Aynı şekilde ihracatta Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisinin tespitlerine göre bize ait olan rekoru yine biz egale ettik. 2012 yılı ihracatımız dünyadaki tüm olumsuzluklara, küresel krizin dünya ticareti üzerindeki tüm olumsuz etkilerine rağmen 152 milyar dolar olarak gerçekleşti. Hatırlayın, göreve geldiğimizde bizim ihracatımız Türkiye olarak 36 milyar dolardı, 36 milyar dolardan 152 milyar dolara tırmandık...”¹⁰⁰

On October the 2nd, Erdoğan talks in AKP group meeting. While he attacks the opposition in an antagonistic way, he denies detrimental effects of global crisis over Turkey as he gives statistical data of exportation¹⁰¹:

⁹⁹. Discourse ID: D07. Link is available in the appendix.

¹⁰⁰. “...Likewise, according to findings of Turkish Exporters Assembly, we have equalized our own record. Our exportation in 2012 reached 152 billion Dollars, despite all negativities in the world, despite all negative effects of the global crisis over the world trade. Remember, when we took the office, our exportation as Turkey was 36 billion Dollars, we reached 152 billion Dollars from 36 billion Dollars...”


¹⁰¹. Discourse ID: D01. Link is available in the appendix.

“İşte bak az önce rakam verdim ihracatla ilgili. 36 milyar Dolar ihracat vardı. Şu anda 146 milyar Dolar ihracatı konuşuyoruz. Ve dünyadaki tüm ekonomik krize rağmen bunu konuşuyoruz. Ya nasıl oluyor da hangi yüzle çıkıp bunu söyleyebiliyorsunuz?”¹⁰²

2 out of 3 crisis denying appeals take place on October the 2nd, 2012 while the remaining 1 crisis denying populist rhetoric instance is exercised on January the 22nd, while Erdoğan uses an antagonistic tone against PKK, blaming it as a threat to the people’s welfare. This excerpt is taken into consideration since the people are not specifically framed as the people in the region but whether Erdoğan mentions the people in Turkey or in the region is not clear. That discourse mostly has regional emphasis and references pointing out certain individuals that are lost during the armed conflict with PKK. Except this one, on October the 2nd, in another crisis denying appeal, Erdoğan attacks the opposition by claiming that oppositional actors despite their weakness in the parliament strive for hindering Turkey’s development by applying interpellation while being aware that their attempts will remain inconclusive. To Erdoğan, that can be explained by just slowing down the functioning of the parliament, and thereby Turkey’s progress in her development path. Remaining crisis denying appeals refer to Erdoğan’s claims accentuating the success of the government despite many developed economies are still fighting against global crisis.


¹⁰². “...Look I’ve given numbers about exportation. There was 36 billion Dollar exportation. Now we talk about 146 Billion Dollar exportation. And we talk about this despite all economic crises over the World. How can you just show up and say something like that?”

Figure 4.1 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 1



This period does not have any instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric. Because there is only 3 failure recognizing populist excerpts, and they are all instances of crisis denying populist appeals, overwhelming majority of populist excerpts are failure ignoring ones (3 vs 37). Those appeals are mostly failure ignoring excerpts which are exercised against domestic oppositional actors, and mostly against the main opposition party.

Figure 4.2 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 1



On October the 30th, Erdoğan attacks main opposition and its supporters due to boos during the award ceremony in world women tennis championship organization, that took place in İstanbul Sinan Erdem Sports Complex. Erdoğan associates such defamation attempts with envy and the fact that previous elites of Turkey have lost their privileges once they had before AKP came to power. During his appeals he underlines AKP's efforts to host these organizations and endeavors to bring more sport activities. Erdoğan accentuates investments and government expenditure and tough work in this area to achieve such targets of the government. On November the 14th, he accuses previous CHP governments and the bureaucracy as the core source of poverty and inefficiency in Turkey while informing the audience about what AKP tries to do via new municipality law: Enhancing quality and quantity of all services for the people who even live in distant small villages. On November the 20th, he attacks CHP and MHP due to their jealousy of AKP's accomplishments while giving statistical information about such achievements. An example of a failure ignoring populist rhetoric that is taken from Erdoğan's speech of November the 20th is given below¹⁰³:

¹⁰³ Discourse ID: D04. Link is available in the appendix.

“...Değerli kardeşlerim, Cumhuriyeti muasır medeniyetler seviyesinin üzerine çıkarma hedefini gerçekleştirmek bugün AK PARTİ’ye nasip olmaktadır. Çünkü biz diğerleri gibi bunun lafını değil, gereğini yapıyoruz.”¹⁰⁴

On December the 5th, he rhetorically attacks the head of CHP due to his corruption claims against AKP. Erdoğan, in his responses shares statistics about how much his party has contributed to Turkish economy and how previous governments failed to do so. In such appeals, Erdoğan continuously attacks the main opposition party. Such appeals are coded as instances of failure ignoring populist rhetoric. Failure ignoring populist appeals are expressed more only in December due to such claims of the head of the main opposition party. The rest of the case, Erdoğan mostly uses a failure ignoring non-populist rhetoric. One short example is given below¹⁰⁵:

“...2012 yılında otomobil satışlarına bakıyorsunuz, 2011 yılının bir miktar gerisinde olsa da yıllık 556 bin adet olarak gerçekleşti. Bu miktar 2002 yılında sadece 91 bin adetti; 91 binden 552 bine...”¹⁰⁶

Failure ignoring excerpts are more likely to have a non-populist quality (49 out of 86 for the whole case period). For case 1, one may comment that Erdoğan is more likely to ignore failures and more likely to exercise non-populist rhetoric since he has not encountered any serious political opposition yet, unlike the remaining period within the scope of this research.

¹⁰⁴ “...My dear brothers, realizing the goal of enhancing the republic to the level of contemporary civilizations is achieved my Ak Party today. Because unlike others’ mere talk, we do what needs to be done for that.”

¹⁰⁵ Discourse ID: D07. Link is available in the appendix.

¹⁰⁶ “...When you look at sales of automobiles in 2012, even though it’s slightly behind the year 2011, happened as 556 thousand. This amount was only 91 thousand in 2002; from 91 thousand to 552 thousand...”

Figure 4.3 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 1





Figure 4.4 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 1



4.1.2. Case 2: 10.2013 – 01.2014

During this case period, all economic indicators have deteriorated. Deterioration level in exchange rate is 11.5 %, in unemployment rate 13 %, and average value of inflation rate is 1.06 %. Monthly values of each indicator are given below.

Table 4.4 Changes in economic indicators within case 2

Date	Exchange Rate	Unemployment Rate	Inflation Rate
10.2013	1.99	9.10	1.799
11.2013	2.02	9.30	0.008
12.2013	2.06	9.60	0.460
01.2014	2.22	10.30	1.978

With regards to political atmosphere, this case corresponds to a time that oppositional politics has recently become active in Turkey, and maybe reached its peak during AKP rule. This period refers to the post-Gezi period and it embodies the initial conflict with Gülenist Movement that took place in December 2013, which Erdoğan claimed as a coup attempt against AKP government and national will in his purely political appeals. Although post-Gezi period opposition is not powerful as it was during Summer 2013, Erdoğan makes some implies without explicitly pronouncing demonstrators until his speech on December the 25th. Especially just after the conflict, his speech on December the 25th, 2013, he associates not only members of Gülenist Movement but also Gezi demonstrators with international conspiracies and plots against Turkish economy. In short, political failures are presented as a package of failures during the case while the temporal scope of a political failure, Gezi Events, is extended and added into that package.

Table 4.5 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 2


Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing populist	27	0.252
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	1	0.009
Crisis denying populist	26	0.243
Crisis denying non-populist	1	0.009
Failure ignoring populist	22	0.206
Failure ignoring non-populist	30	0.28

Table 4.6 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 2

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing overall	28	0.262
Crisis denying overall	27	0.252
Failure recognizing overall	55	0.514
Failure Ignoring overall	52	0.486
Overall populist	75	0.701
Overall non-populist	32	0.299
Overall coded excerpts	107	1.000

Until his speech on December the 25th, Erdoğan’s failure ignoring tone overwhelms his failure acknowledging appeals. From October to November, the tendency to ignore failures is on a rise while recognizing failures is decreasing. Once the initial conflict with Gülenist Movement has occurred, Erdoğan does not apply any failure ignoring rhetoric in his speech that took place on December the 25th. All ignoring appeals of December 2013 are exercised on December the 3th. Hence, when comparing failure recognizing and failure ignoring appeals, one cannot think independently from the political atmosphere of the case. Within case 2, the overall number of failure recognizing excerpts is greater than failure ignoring ones (55 vs 52). This picture is totally different during the first two months (12 vs 31). Although rare, economic failures are mentioned explicitly within the case. In Erdoğan’s speech that took place on December the 25th, during his political attacks against internal and external enemies of Turkey, he mentions the value depreciation of Turkish Lira vis-à-vis foreign currencies and the rise in interest rate, while he channels the latter with activities of the interest rate lobby.


Figure 4.5 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 2



When it comes to failure ignoring populist and non-populist excerpts, non-populist ones are mostly about AKP's contribution to Turkish economy. Within the case, overall frequency of failure ignoring non-populist excerpts are greater than the ignoring ones (30 vs 22). The number of ignoring populist excerpts falls sharply after November 2013 since Erdoğan mostly applies either crisis emphasizing or crisis denying rhetoric in the following months, especially after December the 25th. Throughout this case period, due to the launch of Marmaray, Erdoğan mostly emphasizes the importance of such work and its potential contribution to the national economy during his ignoring non-populist appeals. Excerpts of failure ignoring populist rhetoric are mostly about AKP's contribution to Turkish economy while blaming the opposition. On November the 5th, ignoring populist appeals are exercised for the youth, students, and conservative female population with headscarves while antagonism is built against oppositional actors due to their past time economic failures. But Erdoğan mostly criticizes the opposition by standing against Turkey's huge projects and growth targets, particularly their jealousy against Marmaray project. Besides during his allusions on implementations of previous governments while blaming MHP for its pseudo nationalist claim, due to its failures during DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government. Similar accusations are made against MHP and CHP via failure ignoring populist rhetoric on November the 19th. On December the 3rd, Erdoğan talks about his party's assistance and services to disabled population of Turkey and how it has changed since AKP come to power

via populist and non-populist appeals. In January 2014, ignoring populist appeals are used as a response to corruption claims while Erdoğan accentuates AKP's contribution to Turkey with regards to education and health investments.

Figure 4.6 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 2



When it comes to crisis emphasizing appeals, Erdoğan's tone gets intensive once December 17th-25th incidents have emerged. Before that, excerpts that refer to instances of crisis emphasizing or denying rhetoric do not have that much confrontational and accusing tone. During his speech on October the 8th, his mentions involve some implicit warnings to his colleagues without clearly putting threats and insidious plans against Turkey. His wishes and cautions for the future to members of the AKP do not point out to any failure and his tone is mostly political. On October the 22nd, he briefly makes some allusions against environmental activists and members of the main opposition party. However, his tone is firm but not so offensive. On 5th of November, Erdoğan blames the opposition in a crisis emphasizing tone due to attempts to confuse people and efforts to damage the Turkey's stability. However, until December the 25th, Erdoğan's failure acknowledging appeals are few. From the beginning to the end of this case period, crisis emphasizing rhetoric, which is against the opposition in post-Gezi period and members of Gülenist Movement that led the initial

conflict between themselves and the government, are presented as a package of failures and appeals that are about these two groups are framed as plots against Turkey. These groups, despite their disparity between themselves with regards to their political stances, are mentioned as members of a big conspiracy. Frequency of crisis emphasizing rhetoric equals to 1 for both October and November 2013. In the former, antagonism of crisis emphasizing rhetoric is expressed as power circles and groups that do not want Turkey to grow and become more powerful in the region that Turkey belongs to whereas in the former domestic oppositional actors, although not pronounced explicitly, are framed as the ones who try to confuse people due to their envy to the government.

On December 25th, Erdoğan makes a very intense speech on the meeting of extended provincial chairmen of AKP and crisis emphasizing rhetoric reached its peak within this case. Erdoğan associates the move of Gülenist Movement on December the 17th with an international conspiracy against Turkey that has begun to be run by evil forces and interest lobbies since the end of May 2013, when Gezi demonstrations occurred. To Erdoğan, such circles target Turkey because Turkey achieved some serious economic accomplishments especially in May 2013. Besides, Erdoğan also mentions that Turkey has paid all her debt to IMF and has become debtless to this institution since May the 14th, 2013. He emphasizes the attack that took place on December the 17th cannot be considered independently from such achievements, which also led Gezi Events that started in May 2013. During his speech, because Erdoğan associates economic failures and attacks against the economy with a package of such political failures, and since he points out the same threat (without explicitly identification of it), emphasis on Gezi events are assessed since both December 17th incident and Gezi demonstrations are combined as if they are conducted by the same threat during the speech¹⁰⁷:

“...Bakın 2013 yılında biz çok farklı bir mayıs ayı yaşadık. Küresel finans krizinin etkileri tüm dünyada çok ağır şekilde devam ederken mayıs ayında biz Türkiye olarak, tarihte örneği görülmemeyen başarılarla, rekorlara imzamız attık. Nedir bunlar? Bunları çok iyi değerlendirmemiz lazım çünkü şu olay, yine altını çizerek söylüyorum, ulusal bir operasyon değildir. Bu olayın değerli arkadaşlarım uluslararası boyutu vardır ve uluslararası boyutta bunun en tepe

¹⁰⁷. Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix.

noktası vardır ve onun altında da bunun çeşitli yerlerdeki taşeronları vardır. Ve olay basit olarak ele alınmasın, bu Ak Parti iktidarının Türkiye'nin büyümesine olan öncülüğü sebebiyle yapılan bir operasyondur..."¹⁰⁸

This excerpt is an instance of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric since it puts the people into an alarming position while introducing the active threat while not expressing any denial with regards to its actual or potential impact over Turkey. Although Erdoğan mentions on May 2013 accomplishments of AKP, what Erdoğan points out as “this incident” is December the 17th incident¹⁰⁹. He emphasizes that Turkey as on the path to sustainable growth and development is tried to be pulled down. In this excerpt, antagonism is built against members of Gülenist Movement that triggered December 17th incident – although not explicitly given but implied via “this incident” while totality claim is again implicitly exists due to Erdoğan’s emphasis on AKP’s leadership in Turkey’s growth.¹¹⁰

Just after this excerpt, Erdoğan associates December the 17th operations with AKP’s huge projects. He points out the same the same threat attempting to undermine Turkish economy and investments that have been made in order to boost Turkey development and growth. Once Erdoğan has spoken as given in the excerpt mentioned above, in the following part, he mentions 9 points that economic troubles that Turkey has been facing since Gezi Events. 8 out of 9 are coded as crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric since the threat is presented by an implicit antagonism while its attempts are against Turkish economy, thereby implicitly targets the people of Turkey. So, most of these appeals are presented as a package of failures pointing out the same external threat working with in collaboration with domestic threats.

¹⁰⁸. “...Look we experienced a very different month in May 2013. While the impact of global crisis continued all over the world very heavily, we as Turkey, broke records of our history unprecedentedly. What are these? We must assess these very well since this incident, again I am saying by highlighting, is not a national operation. This incident, my friends, have an international dimension and there is top point in that international dimension, and under that there are proxies of that top in some certain places. And this incident should not be approached as if it is simple, this is an operation that is being run due to the leadership of Ak Party with regards to Turkey’s growth...”

¹⁰⁹. One can realize that’s the case if he/she checks the video material of this discourse. Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix.

¹¹⁰. Here “Turkey” may seem to be used in a mere institutional extent however, once I’ve read too many discourses of Erdoğan, I’ve realized that distinguishing what is institutional and what is not easy, thereby I’ve thought it shouldn’t be vulnerable against subjectivity of the coder. Therefore, throughout this work, I’ve assessed Erdoğan’s expressions like “Turkey, Turkish economy, our economy, etc.” as they embody an implicit totality claim since such expressions interest all the people of Turkey. I’ve viewed the excerpts including such expressions with implicit totality claims as populist on the condition that they embody at least an implicit antagonism. So, my point of view here is whenever Erdoğan says “attacks against Turkey,” he implicitly claims the totality of Turkish people. All excerpts are taken into consideration according to this logic due to concerns of consistency.

“...Peki nedir bunlar? Bir, İstanbul’da 46 milyar Dolarlık 3.havalimanı ihalesini gerçekleştirdik ve dünyanın en büyük havalimanını yapmak için kolları sıvadık. Bakın bu, çeşitli mahfilleri ciddi manada rahatsız etmiştir. Bunu bilmenizi istiyorum. Ve bu havalimanına yönelik her türlü olumsuzluğu her an yapabilirler, bunu da bilmenizi istiyorum. Çünkü bu dünyada ilk 3 içerisine girecek bir proje ve böyle bir şey yapılıyor.”¹¹¹

Here¹¹², Erdoğan puts the people into an alarming position since he emphasizes that the threat is active and has a potential to harm investments of Turkey and thereby, impede Turkey’s growth, downgrade it if possible. He presents the construction of the 3. Airport as a success story but he does not deny the potential impact the active threat. Therefore, it is another instance of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric.

Apart from excerpts that point out package of failures, Erdoğan also gives explicit references merely about the economy and deteriorations of economic indicators as well:

“...Halka açık şirketlerimizin değerli arkadaşlarım bu 9 gün içinde yaklaşık 20 milyar Dolar değer kaybetti. Faizlerde artış var. Türk Lirası’nın değerinde bir miktar düşüş var. Birilerine kaybettirdiler ama tabii birileri de bu arada bu işten çok karlı çıktı...”¹¹³

Here¹¹⁴, antagonism is built against the ones who have turned out to be better off due to the incident while totality is implicitly claimed for the nation. Crisis emphasis is strong since threat is framed as active and still affecting the economy. Again, no remark of denial exists at this point while the people are being put into an alarming position.

¹¹¹. “...So, what are these? One, In Istanbul, we have done the bidding of the 3. airport and we have rolled our sleeves up in order to make the world’s biggest airport. Look, this has substantially bothered some circles. I want you to know this. And they can do any negativity to this airport in any minute, I also want you to know this. Because this is a project that can be among top three in the world, and something like this is being made.”

¹¹² Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix.

¹¹³. “...Our publicly held companies in these 9 days, my dear friends, have lost roughly 20 billion Dollars. There is an increase in interest rates. There is a depreciation in the value of Turkish Lira. They have made some people to lose but some others have turned out to be better off...”

¹¹⁴ Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix.

During the same whole discourse, Erdoğan continuously warns the people of Turkey that Gülenist Movement will not stop in its malicious attempts, especially due to approaching local election of March 30th, 2014. In such way, he not only attempts to perpetuate economic crisis perception but also deepens a sense of political crisis for the people of Turkey. In the following excerpt, he speaks with members of his party as if that Turkey is in the middle of a turning point due to an active threat. Such emphasis is given with a conditionality. Antagonism is built against the interest rate lobby and the ones who the ones who are against Turkey while totality is claimed for the nation¹¹⁵:

“...En küçük bir ihmale artık yer yok, en küçük bir rehavete boş vermişliğe, hele hele umutsuzluğa moralsizliğe yer yok. Açık söylüyorum, siz çalışırsanız Türkiye kazanacak. Eğer siz ihmal ederseniz, bütün Türkiye kaybedecek, milli irade kaybedecek, bütün Türkiye kaybedecek. Bu süreç, unutmayın, yeni Türkiye'nin istiklal mücadelesi sürecidir, bu kadar önemli. Bu süreç, Türkiye üzerine hesapları olanların hesaplarının bozulacağı süreçtir. Bu süreç faiz lobisinin Türkiye'den son darbeyi yiyeceği süreçtir. Yeise kapılmadan karamsarlığa asla prim vermeden moralleri yüksek tutarak kararlı bir mücadele vereceğiz. Tekrar ediyorum, millet bizimle. Milletın hayır duası bizimle. Bırakın onlar manşetleriyle ihanet içinde olsunlar. Bırakın onlar milletın emeğini faiz lobilerine pazarlamanın gayreti içinde olsunlar. Bırakın sosyal medyada, iğrenç internet sitelerinde kasetlerinin içinde onlar boğulsunlar. Bırakın o kaset montajcıları, o itibar suikastçıları Müslümanlara beddua etsinler. Biz bedduaya lanet, duaya evet diyeceğiz...”¹¹⁶

In the same speech, Erdoğan also asks for help from the people in a crisis emphasizing populist tone. In the excerpt given above, Erdoğan attributes a responsibility to the people of Turkey by pointing out the ballot box of March 30th local elections. Antagonism is built against the ones who participated the assault – which is used as an equivalence of the failure – and totality of the nation is claimed¹¹⁷:

¹¹⁵ Discourse ID: D14. Link is given in the appendix.

¹¹⁶ “...There is no room for any piece of neglect, any piece of slackness, nonchalance, and most particularly, there is no room for hopelessness, no room for downheartedness. I am putting this clearly, if you work, Turkey will win. If you neglect, the whole Turkey will lose, the national will will lose, the whole Turkey will lose. This process, do not forget, the struggle for the independence of New Turkey, it is that much important. This process is the process that calculations of the ones that have calculations on Turkey will be ruined. This process is the process that the interest rate lobby will take the death blow from Turkey. Without getting into desolation, not promoting pessimism, and keeping our morale high, we will decidedly struggle. I repeat, the nation is with us. Prayers of the nation is with us. Let them strive for marketing the labor of the people to interest lobbies. Let them choke on social media, and in their tapes on their disgusting websites. Let those tape editors, those assassins of reputation imprecate Muslims. We will say curse to imprecation, yes to prayer...”

¹¹⁷ Discourse ID: D14. Link is available in the appendix.

“...Değerli kardeşlerim, yolsuzluk kılıfına gizlenmiş Türkiye’ye millete, Türkiye’nin geleceğine kasteden bir saldırıyla biliyorsunuz karşı karşıyayız. Şunu herkes görüyor: Bu bir yolsuzluk soruşturması değildir. Bu siyasete ve millete karşı açık bir komplodur, açık bir tezgahtır. Allah’ın izniyle bu tezgâh, bu oyun milletimiz tarafından 30 Mart’ta sandıkta bozulacaktır. Yeni Türkiye yürüyüşümüzü hiç kimse durdurmaz.”¹¹⁸

In January 2014, Erdoğan’s crisis denying rhetoric becomes to be greater than his crisis emphasizing one, he points out that December 17th-25th operations were failed, but the threat is still active. Therefore, some of his appeals are still in a crisis emphasizing manner. For instance, while attacking Gülenist Movement and mentions to decipher this organization which settled in all state institutions, Erdoğan warns his comrades and says: “If you show pity, then you become pitiful.”

Nonetheless, the frequency of crisis denying appeals are only lower than crisis emphasizing ones during December 2013 and once the tension of December 17th-25th incidents has declined, Erdoğan’s denial rhetoric again becomes dominant than his crisis perpetuation appeals. In the following excerpt¹¹⁹, Erdoğan claims totality of the nation while he positions 76 million vis-à-vis both the ones who try to scare and startle foreign capital and TÜSİAD and similar organizations of elites. This excerpt has a denial tone since Erdoğan here claims that despite the ones who try to scare and startle foreign capital, Turkey is successful in terms of investment appeal. It may look to have a turning point, however here it is not expressed against a threat that is framed as having a potential to bring an impact over Turkish economy and the people of Turkey in an economic sense:

“...Birileri yabancı sermayeyi korkutmaya, ürkütmeye çalışırken Türkiye bu alanda büyük başarılar imza atmaya devam ediyor. İstikrar sayesinde, güven ortamı sayesinde, özellikle de yargıda yaptığımız reformlar sayesinde Türkiye uluslararası yatırımlar için cazip bir ülke haline geldi. Yabancı sermaye bundan sonra da Türkiye’ye gelmeye devam edecek, ama öyle görünüyor ki TÜSİAD gibi kuruluşlar kendi ülkelerine yabancı kalmaya devam edecekler. Bugüne kadar

¹¹⁸. “...My Dear brothers, as you know we are against an assault that is hides under the cover of corruption and attempts against Turkey, the nation, the future of Turkey. Everybody sees this: This is not a corruption investigation. This is a clear plot against politics and the nation, it is an apparent conspiracy. With God’s permission, this conspiracy, this stage will be spoiled by our nation on March 30th in the ballot box. No one will be able to stop our New Turkey march...”

¹¹⁹. Discourse ID: D16. Link is available in the appendix.

kendi ülkelerine yabancı kaldılar, belli ki bundan sonra da yabancı kalacaklar. Eski Türkiye'nin aktörleri artık şunu bir defa kabul etsinler: Türkiye'de artık kazanan elitler, seçkinler, belli sermaye çevreleri değil, Türkiye'de bundan sonra kazanan her zaman 76 milyon olacak...”¹²⁰


During this case period, with regards to the variety of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, Erdoğan applies conditional statements while emphasizing turning point in his crisis emphasizing attempts. He also attributes duties to the people when he attempts to canalizes them to the ballot box for the upcoming local elections, thereby ask the people's help implicitly. Although he mostly frames failures as a package, he also makes explicit references to the depreciation of Turkish Lira and rising interest rate. While presenting failures as a package, he makes references to Gezi events, so he attempts to extend the temporal scope of this failure which happened before this case period under AKP rule. Erdoğan does not offer pure political or religious solutions against failures nor he attempts to extend the temporal scope of an offensive confrontation vis-à-vis global threats, although Gülenist movement is frequently associated by external enemies during Erdoğan's appeals. During his speech on December the 25th, with regards to crisis emphasizing rhetoric, Erdoğan mostly applies the first option of crisis emphasizing rhetoric, what I've called as putting the people into an alarming position while not using any crisis denying rhetoric.

When it comes to comparison of populist and non-populist rhetoric, Erdoğan's populism has always been greater than his non-populist appeals. And 96 % of non-populist appeals are in the scope of failure ignoring rhetoric. Within this case, the total number of such appeals is 30 whereas the number of crisis emphasizing and denying non-populist appeals is 2, 1 for each. So, if to compare failure acknowledging appeals within themselves, 2 out of 55 are only non-populist ones. Of course, this is due to my approach to appeals in general during this work. As I've mentioned above in a footnote, because any message that is related with Turkish economy pertain to all people living in Turkey, I've viewed such appeals as referring

¹²⁰ "...While some try to scare, startle foreign capital, Turkey continues to succeed in this area. With the help of stability, environment of trust, especially due to reforms that we have made in judiciary Turkey has become an attractive country for international investments. Henceforward, foreign capital will also come to Turkey, but it seems organizations like TÜSİAD will remain to be stranger to their own country. So far, they have been stranger to their country, they will apparently do so henceforth. Actors of the Old Turkey should accept this: Winners in Turkey will no longer be elites, notables, or certain capital circles, from now on the winner in Turkey will be 76 million..."


an implicit hegemonic totality claim. Besides, with regards to not only explicit and but also implicit mentions that embody antagonism and claims of hegemonic totality, the overwhelming superiority of populist appeals makes sense. However, one key point here should be because Turkish economy interests everyone, appeals pertain to it inevitably involve a totality claim. As long as such appeals also include antagonism, they inevitably refer to populist appeals due to my definition, given at the end of chapter II. Because Erdoğan's appeals of Turkish economy are mostly accompanied by antagonistic references, they mostly refer to populist appeals according to that definition.

Figure 4.7 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 2



During, 4 months, except December 2013, the frequency of crisis denying excerpts are greater than crisis emphasizing ones. However, crisis emphasizing rhetoric is so great in December, thereby total number of crisis emphasizing excerpts become greater than crisis denying ones (28 vs 27). The view is not different if we compare crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric vs crisis denying populist rhetoric (27 vs 26). Within this case Erdoğan's inclination to perpetuate of failures as crisis is mostly due to the conflict with Gülenist Movement on that took place December the 17th, 2013.

Figure 4.8 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 2



4.1.3. Case 3: 01.2015 – 04.2015

During this case period, deteriorated indicators are exchange rate and inflation rate while there is a fall in unemployment rate. Deterioration level in exchange rate is 13.7 % and the average value of inflation rate is 1.157. Monthly values of each indicator are given below:

Table 4.7 Changes in economic indicators within case 3

Date	Exchange Rate	Unemployment Rate	Inflation Rate
01.2015	2.33	11.30	1.102
02.2015	2.46	11.20	0.714
03.2015	2.58	10.60	1.185
04.2015	2.65	9.60	1.629

The political atmosphere of this case is stable, and the most crucial event is approaching general elections that took place in June the 7th, 2015. Despite the absence of a concrete political failure of this term, in his speeches, Erdoğan is likely to associate economic failures

with a package of political ones, especially by extending their temporal dimension. Mostly expressed particular incidents are Gezi Events and the initial conflict with Gülenist Movement on December the 17th-25th while the former is mostly associated with activities of an interest rate lobby working against economic interests of Turkey. Erdoğan also frames terrorism (PKK as the separatist organization) as an attempt to block Turkey's growth and development. Within this case, Erdoğan also explicitly mentions economic indicators such as, interest rate, inflation, and the fall in employment. But he mostly emphasizes the interest rate. He associates the rise in interest rate not only with interest rate lobbies but also indifference and impotency of Turkish Central Bank.


Table 4.8 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 3

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing populist	9	0.1
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	0	0
Crisis denying populist	18	0.2
Crisis denying non-populist	2	0.022
Failure ignoring populist	21	0.233
Failure ignoring non-populist	40	0.444

Table 4.9 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 3

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing overall	9	0.1
Crisis denying overall	20	0.222
Failure recognizing overall	29	0.322
Failure Ignoring overall	61	0.678
Overall populist	48	0.533
Overall non-populist	42	0.467
Overall coded excerpts	90	1.000

Figure 4.9 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 3



When we check the overall appeals of failure ignoring and failure recognizing in order to make a comparison, the former overwhelms the latter (61 vs 29) while 40 out of 61 failure ignoring excerpts are coded as non-populist appeals. Failure ignoring non populist appeals are more frequent in January and April, while the frequency of failure ignoring populist appeals reached its peak in April, especially during the speech that Erdoğan speaks on MÜSİAD General Assembly meeting on April the 25th, 2015¹²¹. In such appeals, Erdoğan rhetorically attacks the main opposition due to their election promises while mentioning AKP's contribution to the people of Turkey with regards to improvements that have been made to enhance their economic conditions. Although failure recognizing references are more frequent during January and April, even in these two months they are less than failure ignoring ones, and failure ignoring appeals dominate failure recognizing ones during the whole case.

Among failure recognizing appeals, crisis denying rhetoric is more frequently exercised than crisis emphasizing one during the whole period, in every month. Failure recognizing appeals continuously falls from January to March while Erdoğan mostly applies pure political appeals

¹²¹. Discourse ID: D24. Link is available in the appendix.

during February and March 2015. In his crisis denying appeals, he not only exercises populist appeals but also uses non-populist references, as given below¹²²:


“...Ben şunu biliyorum; kim ne derse desin bir defa yüksek faiz bu ülkede yatırımın önündeki en büyük engeldir. Eğer yüksek faiz devam edecek olursa bu ülkede yatırımlar bizim istediğimiz seviyede asla yürümeyecektir. Ve bu ülke girişimci doğuramayacaktır. Girişimcinin doğabilmesi için bir defa yüksek faiz değil, en azından şöyle uluslararası camiadaki faizlere yakın bir faiz politikasını bizim de uygulamamız lazım.”¹²³

Although Erdoğan recognizes high interest rate as an economic failure, he does not use any antagonistic language in the excerpt given above. Because the message manifests his intentions for a lower interest rate, it underlines why it is a requirement for Turkey. I've viewed it as an instance of crisis denying non-populist rhetoric. In case 3, among 20 excerpts of crisis denying rhetoric, he uses 2 non-populist ones.

¹²². Discourse ID: D17. Link is available in the appendix.

¹²³. “...I know this; whoever says whatever, high interest rate is the biggest obstacle to investment in this country. If high interest rate continues to exist, then investments in this country will never be on the levels that we want. And there will be no entrepreneur in this country. In order to pave the way for the entrepreneur, firstly not a high interest rate, but we need to implement an interest rate policy which is at least close to the ones of the international community.”

Figure 4.10 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 3



In his crisis denying rhetoric exercised during his meetings with muhtars¹²⁴ Erdoğan associates a package of political failures in which he exercises antagonism against Gülenist Movement and actors of Gezi Events. He blames actors who were involved in Gezi Events and December the 17th-25th incidents, as the ones who attempted to stage sabotages against Turkey due to Turkey's becoming grand, developed, and powerful:


“...Bakın değerli kardeşlerim; terör meselesi Türkiye'nin kalkınmasının, büyük, güçlü bir ülke olmasının, huzurlu, emniyetli, refah içinde bir ülke olmasının önünde en büyük engeldir. Şimdi biz bu büyük maniyi ortadan kaldırmaya çalıştıkça birileri de bizi engellemek için çalışıyor. 2013 yılında hatırlayın, Gezi olayları adı altında sahnelenen oyun Büyük Türkiye'yi sabote etme girişiminden başka hiçbir şey değildi. Arkasından altından kimlerin çıktığını gördünüz. Aynı şekilde 2013 sonunda 17 ve 25 Aralık tarihlerinde yolsuzluk maskesi altında sahneye konulan darbe girişimi, işte bu çözüm sürecini, bu kardeşlik sürecini, büyük Türkiye hedefini sabote etme girişiminden başka bir şey değildi. Biz bu

¹²⁴. Discourse ID: D18. Link is available in the appendix.

girişimler karşısında o zaman Hükümet olarak sağlam durduk, dik durduk. Aynı şekilde milletimiz oynanan oyunu gördü ve sapasağlam dimdik bir duruş sergiledi. Ve yerel seçimlerde görüldüğü gibi yine büyük bir arayla o zaman Genel Başkanı olduğum Partimiz geldi, seçimlerden başarılı bir şekilde çıktı. Çünkü milletin ferasetinin önünde durulmaz. Millet ferasetiyle bakar ve kararını ona göre verir. Orada da öyle verdi.”¹²⁵

The excerpt given above is an apparent instance that Erdoğan frames failures as a package. He denies the actual impact of such incidents and remarks that the people made their decision in local elections already. Hegemonic totality claim is explicit while actors who were behind such incidents were pointed out in an antagonistic way. So, it is a clear example of crisis denying populist rhetoric.

Figure 4.11 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 3



¹²⁵ "...Look my dear brothers; the issue of the terror is the greatest obstacle to Turkey's development, and to her becoming grand, powerful, peaceful, secure, prosperous. Now as we try to eliminate this great obstacle, some also try to prevent us. Remember, in 2013, the stage that was played under the name of Gezi Events was nothing more than an effort to sabotage Grand Turkey. You saw who showed up just behind that. Likewise, at the end of 2013, the coup attempt on December the 17th and 25th, under the guise of corruption claims, was nothing more than an effort to sabotage this process of the resolution, process of fraternity, the goal of grand Turkey. As the government, we stood upright and firmly against these attempts. Similarly, our nation saw this stage and manifested an iron and upright stance against it. And in local elections, by far and away, our party that I was the chairman of at that time came the first, became victorious in elections. Because no one can stand against the people. The people look with insight and make a decision according to that. At that time, they also did so."

When it comes to crisis emphasizing appeals, On January the 19th, he speaks in The Young Businessmen Confederation of Turkey¹²⁶. Among the parts of that speech, the following excerpt is an apparent example of crisis emphasizing rhetoric since it simply puts the people into an alarming position while not denying the actual or potential impact of the threat which is framed as involved economic attacks against Turkey. Here, Erdoğan associates economic attacks with December the 17th-25th incident. He claims the totality for the whole nation while attempts to build antagonism against Gülenist Movement:

“...Ülkemize yönelik saldırılara baktığımızda, bir yandan demokrasimizin onunla birlikte ekonomimizin hedef alındığını görüyoruz. Bu açık gerçeğe rağmen, içerideki bazı kesimlerin kendi siyasi veya ekonomik çıkarları uğruna ülkemiz ve milletimiz aleyhindeki kampanyalara destek verdiklerini üzüntüyle müşahade ediyoruz. Bilhassa değerli başkanın da az önce ifade ettiği 17-25 Aralık demokrasiye ve sivil siyasete darbe girişiminden beri paralel yapının ülke içinde ve dışında bu konuda başı çektiğini biliyoruz...”¹²⁷

In the following excerpt of April, the 24th¹²⁸, he simply puts the people into an alarming position while again combining Gezi Events and interest rate lobbies, while emphasizing interest rate lobbies exist in some certain Turkish institutions, and that is no good for the people of Turkey. Because there is no denial about the actual or potential impact of failures nor an intention or determination of the government to overcome them, it is an instance of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric. Totality claim exists for the country explicitly while interest lobbies and their domestic collaborators are the target of Erdoğan’s antagonism:

“...O Gezi olaylarında faiz lobilerine nasıl çalışıldığını hep anlattık. Faiz lobileri şu anda o malum kurumların içerisinde var mı? Var. Ve oradan çok ciddi bir gücü devşiriyorlar mı? Devşiriyorlar. Maalesef buna hizmet edenler kim olursa olsun ben onlara iyi nazarla bakmıyorum, onu da söyleyeyim, kim olursa olsun. Çünkü ben şuna inanıyorum: Faiz hiçbir zaman benim ülkem için yararına olmamıştır, olmayacaktır...”¹²⁹

¹²⁶. Discourse ID: D17. Link is available in the appendix.


¹²⁷. “...When we look at attacks against our country, we see on one hand our democracy and on the other hand, our economy is being targeted. Despite this apparent fact, sadly, we observe that some domestic groups support campaigns against our country and nation for their own political and economic benefits. Especially, since the coup attempt against democracy and civil politics of December the 17th – 25th as dear president has just stated, we know that the parallel structure (Gülenist Movement) leads the way in this regard, inside and outside of the country...”

¹²⁸. Discourse ID: D24. Link is available in the appendix.

¹²⁹ “...In those Gezi Events, we talked about how interest lobbies were being served. Are there interest lobbies in those certain institutions right now? Yes, there are. And do they pick up a serious power from there?”

As I've mentioned at the beginning, during case 3, Erdoğan mostly applies a package of political failures and associates them with Turkey's economic landscape in his crisis emphasizing appeals. While doing that, he extends the temporal scope of a past failure of AKP and present it as if it happened due to Turkey's enemies. Among options of crisis emphasizing, he uses the strategy of putting the people into an alarming position, asking the people's contribution for the solution. He neither applies expressing pure political or religious references as solutions, nor he attempts to extend the political confrontation with a global threat via an offensive tongue. He also does not use conditional statements or a turning point emphasis for an uncertain future that might cause trouble for the people of Turkey.

Figure 4.12 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 3



When it comes to populist vs non-populist appeals, populist ones are more frequently used. During the case, except March 2015, Erdoğan's populist rhetoric dominates the non-populist one. The high increase in the frequency of populist excerpts may be explained due to electoral concerns during April, when there is less than 2 months for June the 7th 2015 elections.

Yes, they do. Unfortunately, whoever serves this, I do not see them good, I should say that too, regardless of who they are. Because I believe in this: Interest rate has never been advantageous for my country, and never will be..."

4.1.4. Case 4: 09.2016 – 01.2017

During this case period, as one can notice by checking values, all economic indicators deteriorated. Deterioration level in exchange rate is 26 %, deterioration in unemployment rate is 15 % and average value of inflation rate is 1.25 %. Monthly values of each indicator are given below:

Table 4.10 Changes in economic indicators within case 4

Date	Exchange Rate	Unemployment Rate	Inflation Rate
09.2016	2.96	11.30	0.181
10.2016	3.07	11.80	1.438
11.2016	3.27	12.10	0.516
12.2016	3.49	12.70	1.643
01.2017	3.73	13.00	2.461

With regards to political atmosphere within this period, Turkey has declared the state of emergency period just after the failed coup attempt of Gülenist Movement on July the 15th, 2016. This period was marked with a shrinking political opposition since the pressure over all oppositional actors remained heavy, especially initial months following the coup attempt. In his pure political appeals of September and October, Erdoğan responds to the criticisms against the government which is made due to state of emergency declaration. Beside state of emergency and its impact over the Turkish society, during this case, relations with the U.S. remains problematic due to the involvement of Reza Zarrab and general manager of Halkbank to a sanction violation case, seen in the U.S. The issue was framed as a national cause and an attack to Turkey's sovereignty in pro-government media channels once Zarrab was arrested in Miami.

Table 4.11 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 4

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing populist	23	0.397
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	10	0.172
Crisis denying populist	19	0.328
Crisis denying non-populist	0	0
Failure ignoring populist	0	0
Failure ignoring non-populist	6	0.103


Table 4.12 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 4

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing overall	33	0.569
Crisis denying overall	19	0.328
Failure recognizing overall	52	0.897
Failure Ignoring overall	6	0.103
Overall populist	42	0.724
Overall non-populist	16	0.276
Overall coded excerpts	58	1.000

In the first two months, Erdoğan mostly focuses on the failed coup attempt of July the 15th. He frequently points out terrorism and its detrimental effects over the society in his rhetorical attacks against Gülenist Movement (FETÖ), PKK, YPG, PYD, ISIS, etc. He also does not hesitate to confront with the E.U over state of emergency issue and 5 permanent members of U.N. Security Council over ongoing Syrian conflict. Due to this turbulent political atmosphere, Erdoğan mostly exercises pure political appeals except the speech on September the 29th during the first two months. He only applies failure ignoring references during his


speeches that took place in November. However, Erdoğan's failure recognizing appeals overwhelms his failure ignoring rhetoric during the whole case period. Only in November the frequencies of these two are equal (6 vs 6).

Figure 4.13 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 4




Moreover, Erdoğan's failure ignoring rhetoric is completely non-populist. Whenever he applies using an antagonism in his appeals, they all refer have a failure recognizing tone, despite the fact that some of them refer to instances of crisis emphasizing appeals while he does not apply to use any crisis denying non-populist rhetoric during whole case.

Figure 4.14 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 4



During October Erdoğan does not use any economic references. His rhetoric is completely political. For the first three months of case 4, his crisis denying tone either equals to or greater than his crisis emphasizing rhetoric. However, for the last two months of this case, his crisis emphasizing populism becomes greater than the number of crisis denying populist references, and this remains the same in January 2017. He also applies non-populist crisis emphasizing appeals. In overall crisis emphasizing and denying appeals, the former overwhelms the latter in December 2016 (16 vs 6) and January 2017 (10 vs 4). In short, during the case, Erdoğan more frequently applies to failure recognizing rhetoric than failure ignoring one. His inclination to perpetuate failures as crisis only becomes greater than denying framing them as crisis in the last two months.

Figure 4.15 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 4



On September the 29th, Erdoğan attacks credit rating agencies via an aggressive crisis emphasizing tone. In the following excerpt, although his denials are more frequent, he offensively perpetuates the political confrontation with these agencies, which are framed as collaborators of global threats during the whole speech. Without a doubt, here “Lower how much you want to lower” makes the whole excerpt an example of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric¹³⁰. The reason is credit rating agencies have the power to promote capital inflows to Turkey. Moreover, Erdoğan also implies that these credit ranking agencies are not independent, but they are working for some other actors or circles. As I’ve explained under “crisis emphasizing rhetoric” title, extending the temporal scope of political confrontation with a global power via an offensive tone requires coding that excerpt as an example crisis emphasizing rhetoric. Whenever Erdoğan uses such a discourse, such appeals are viewed with priority. No matter how much Erdoğan denies economic landscape and claims “that’s not a reality of Turkey,” once an offensive confrontation with a powerful global actor has been involved, the people of Turkey is expected to be more concerned about their future. And when their concerns get intensified, sense of crisis among them is expected to rise.

¹³⁰. Discourse ID: D26. Link is available in the appendix.

“...Şimdi bizim notumuzu düşürdüler de ne oldu? Hazine biliyorsunuz hemen bir piyasa yaptı ve Hazine'nin kağıtlarına dışarıdan-içeriden bunların beklediğinin çok daha üstünde bir ilgi, bir alaka oldu. Niye? Türkiye'nin gerçeği bu değil ki. Batmış, bitmiş bir ülkeye, bir anda bakıyorsun 4 kat büyümede bir derece vermeye kalkıyorlar. Avrupa'dan 400 milyar avro destek gören bir ülkeye bu desteği veriyorlar, Türkiye gibi kendi ayakları üzerinde duran bir ülkeye de bakıyorsunuz 'durağan' diyor. Bu sefer durağan da demediler, ne yaptılar? Puanı, notu düşürdüler. İstedığınız kadar düşürün, Türkiye'nin gerçeği bu değil. Türkiye yatırımlarına devam ediyor, kalkınmaya devam ediyor, yükselmeye, güçlenmeye devam ediyor evvel Allah. Siz Türkiye'nin gerçeklerinden uzaksınız. Bunların cebine 3-5 kuruş ekstra para koy, istediğin notu al; bunlar böyle, böyle çalışıyorlar. Talimatları zaten nereden aldıklarını da biliyoruz. Biz gerçekleri her zaman konuşacağız...”¹³¹

During the whole case, instances of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric mostly point out an economic war that is being conducted against Turkey. Erdoğan claims that external threats with their domestic collaborators could not achieve to stop Turkey via coup attempts or terrorism, then they began to use economy as a gun against Turkey. The following excerpt is from the same speech¹³²:

“...Değerli kardeşlerim; Biraz önce de ifade ettim, ülkemize yönelik saldırılar çok farklı mecralar üzerinden yürütülüyor. Bunlardan biri de ekonomidir. Türkiye'nin önünü terörle, terör örgütleriyle, darbe girişimleriyle, uluslararası sergilenen alanda ayak oyunları ile kesemeyeceklerini görenler ekonomi kartını şimdi masaya sürdüler...”¹³³

This is an instance crisis emphasizing populist since the threat makes its new move over economy, and no denial of actual or potential impact of the threat is given. Totality claim

¹³¹. “...Now they have lowered our note (credit rating note), and what has happened? As you know, the treasury has made a market and a serious interest which is above what has been expected was shown towards treasury securities. Why? Turkey's reality is not that. You look and realize that they raise one note of a sunk country after a 4 times growth. They give support to a country which is supported 400 billion euro by the Europe. They say 'stationary' to Turkey which is a viable country. This time they even didn't say stationary, what did they do? They lowered our credit rating. Lower how much you want to lower; this is not a reality of Turkey. Turkey continues her investments, she continues to rise and get strong, with the help of Allah. You are far away from Turkey's realities. You put 3-5 Kuruş to the pockets of these, then take whatever note you want, they are like this, they work like this. We also know where they take the orders. We will always talk about realities...”

¹³². Discourse ID: D26. Link is available in the appendix.

¹³³. “...My dear brothers; I've just mentioned, attacks against our country are conducted over very different channels. One of them is economy. The ones who have seen that they cannot make Turkey to stop via terrorism, terrorist organizations, coup attempts, international intrigues now they pull out their economy card...”

exists with “Turkey”, antagonism is built against the ones who pull out their economy card. Erdoğan simply puts the people into an alarming position via such words.

He gives a very similar message on December the 7th, 2016¹³⁴. However, this time while he accepts the failure, he points out the determination of the government by taking governmental action to overcome inconveniences of the economic attack without simply putting the people into an alarming position. Therefore, Erdoğan denies framing the failure as crisis in a populist way. Besides, he makes an explicit reference to the deteriorating exchange rate, as given below:

“...Son hamle ekonomimizle yapıldı. İhracat ve turizm üzerinden yapılan saldırıya ilave olarak döviz spekülasyonu ile ekonomimiz çökertilmeye çalışılıyor. Ekonomimizin bazı sorunları, sıkıntıları yok mu? Elbette var. Hükümetimiz bunların çözümü için gayret sarf ediyor. Yeni tedbirlerle gereken önlemleri alıyor, almayı da sürdürecektir...”¹³⁵

Of course, Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing rhetoric is not limited to his populist tongue. He also applies crisis emphasizing non-populist rhetoric during the case especially when he asks from the people to revive the economy. During December, his crisis emphasizing non-populist appeals are almost equal to his crisis denying populist rhetoric (5 vs 6) whereas they are equal during his speeches made in January 2017 (4 excerpts for each). On December the 7th¹³⁶, the speech that Erdoğan most frequently applies to crisis emphasizing rhetoric, he also asks the people to contribute the economy to mitigate the inconveniences of economic downturn via a non-populist tone:

“...Değerli kardeşlerim, ben buradan tüm iş adamlarımıza, yatırımcılarımıza, esnafımıza, sanatkârlarımıza da seslenmek istiyorum: Yaşadığımız zorlukları, tereddütleri, sıkıntıları biliyorum. Ama gelin ülkenize güvenin, ülkenize sahip çıkın. Böyle bir dönemde üretime yüklenmeyeceksiniz, istihdamı artırmayacaksınız, ticaretin çarklarının dönmesini sağlamayacaksınız da bunu ne zaman yapacaksınız? Türkiye, üretimdeki düşüşü, istihdamdaki düşüşü, ticaretteki daralmayı hak eden bir ülke değildir. Potansiyelimiz de hedeflerimiz

¹³⁴. Discourse ID: D31. Link is available in the appendix.

¹³⁵. “...The last move was made against our economy. In addition to the attack on exportation and tourism, our country is tried to be subverted via exchange rate speculations. Aren’t there are some problems, some issues in our economy? Of course, there are. Our government tries hard for the solution of these. It takes required precautions via new measures, and it will also continue to take...”

¹³⁶. Discourse ID: D31. Link is available in the appendix.

de tam tersine daha çok büyümeyi, daha çok istihdamı, daha çok ticareti işaret ediyor...¹³⁷”

Because antagonism is missing, the excerpt given above¹³⁸, is an instance of crisis emphasizing non-populist rhetoric. Similarly, during the same speech, he also applies pure political solutions vis-à-vis failures, as given in the excerpt below:

“...Unutmayın kardeşlerim; gücümüzün asıl kaynağı paramızın çokluğu değil birliğimizin, beraberliğimizin, kardeşliğimizin kuvvetidir. Öyleyse tek millet diyeceğiz, tek bayrak diyeceğiz, tek vatan diyeceğiz, tek devlet diyeceğiz; bizim hedefimiz bu. Ve bir olacağız, iri olacağız, diri olacağız, kardeş olacağız, hep birlikte Türkiye olacağız; bizim hedefimiz bu olmalı. Onun için daha çok çalışacağız, daha çok ter dökacağız...”¹³⁹

The excerpt given above is also an instance of crisis emphasizing non-populist rhetoric since it lacks antagonism again, while totality claim exists for the nation. Erdoğan points out pure political references as solutions, rather than manifesting a determination for concrete steps to be taken in order to overcome inconveniences of failures have caused.

Erdoğan’s crisis emphasizing tone is high during this speech. He applies perpetuation of the temporal scope of past failures that emerged during AKP governments. For instance, Erdoğan again mentions Gezi events as the breaking point of economic attacks via interest rate lobbies. In the same excerpt, he makes an explicit reference to interest rate. He attempts to associate economic attacks with heroic defense of the nation that was manifested on July the 15th, 2016, during the failed coup attempt. Erdoğan also uses conditional statements during his crisis emphasizing appeals. Like in the first excerpt I’ve given above, he attempts to perpetuate the political confrontation with a global threat via an offensive tongue. He mostly applies packages including multiple sources of threats like terrorist organizations such Gülenist

¹³⁷. “...My dear brothers, I want to appeal all our businessmen, investors, craftsmen, artisans from here: I know the difficulties, hesitations, distress that we experience. But come and trust your country, claim your country. If you did not produce, increase employment, and make the wheels of trade to turn in a period like this and then when would you do that? Turkey is not a country that deserves the fall in employment, recession in trade. On the contrary, both our potential and our targets points out greater growth, greater employment, greater trade...”


¹³⁸. Discourse ID: D31. Link is available in the appendix.

¹³⁹. “...Do not forget my brothers; the source of our strength is not the abundance of our money, it is the strength of our unity, solidarity, and fraternity. If so, we will say one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state; this is our target. And we will be one, will be great, we will be strong, and all together we will be Turkey; that must be our target. Therefore, we will work harder, we will sweat more...”

Movement (FETÖ), PKK, ISIS, YPG; credit rating agencies that lower Turkey's credit not to depreciate overall investment; implicitly U.S. over Syrian politics, etc. Erdoğan's most explicit remarks of economic indicators is about the exchange rate. He frames economic attacks as exchange rate speculations. He also asks the people to continue to convert their U.S. Dollars into Turkish Liras.

Although Erdoğan does not apply ignoring populist rhetoric, the high frequency of populist crisis emphasizing and crisis denying rhetoric drives up the number of overall populist appeals and makes it higher than the overall non-populist ones. Because October is an outlier for the case since there are no economic references in Erdoğan's speeches, except November when the total number of populist and non-populist appeals are equal (6 excerpts for each), populist appeals overwhelm non-populist ones from September 2016 to January 2017.

Figure 4.16 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 4



4.1.5. Case 5: 09.2017 – 11.2017

During this case period, deteriorated indicators are exchange rate and inflation rate while there is a fall in unemployment rate. Deterioration level in exchange rate is 11.2 % and the average value of inflation rate is 1.406. Monthly values of each indicator are given below:

Table 4.13 Changes in economic indicators within case 5

Date	Exchange Rate	Unemployment Rate	Inflation Rate
09.2017	3.47	10.60	0.650
10.2017	3.66	10.30	2.077
11.2017	3.88	10.30	1.491

In case 5, state of emergency continued within geographical confines of Turkey while the political confrontation with E.U. over Holland and Germany that rose in March 2017 remains intense. Frequencies and proportions of each rhetoric and overall appeals of case 5 are given below.

Table 4.14 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 5

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing populist	2	0.077
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	0	0
Crisis denying populist	8	0.308
Crisis denying non-populist	1	0.038
Failure ignoring populist	1	0.038
Failure ignoring non-populist	14	0.538

Table 4.15 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 5

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing overall	2	0.077
Crisis denying overall	9	0.346
Failure recognizing overall	11	0.423
Failure Ignoring overall	15	0.577
Overall populist	11	0.423
Overall non-populist	15	0.577
Overall coded excerpts	26	1.000

For September 2017, as I've mentioned under "On Discourses" title, due to lack of textualized data, I've had to select Erdoğan speeches which are exercised at the gala dinner in TURKEN Foundation and inauguration ceremony of 2016-2017 academic year. In the former, Erdoğan does not mention any economic appeals. In this speech, all references are pure political, and mostly against Gülenist Movement due to their involvement in July the 15th coup attempt. While mentioning the importance of education, Erdoğan emphasizes the importance of patriotism and loyalty to national values. In the latter¹⁴⁰, while mentioning on education mostly, he exercises one example of crisis denying populist rhetoric, which is at the same time the mere failure recognizing example for this month:


"Değerli arkadaşlar; küresel ve bölgesel ölçekte eşine yüzyılda bir rastlanabilecek bir dönüşüm sürecinden geçiyoruz. Türkiye olarak çevremizde yaşanan tüm insani krizlere, çatışmalara, istikrarsızlıklara rağmen kendi hedeflerimiz doğrultusunda yolumuza devam ediyoruz. Bugüne kadar bize yöneltilen her saldırı, devlet ve millet olarak sergilediğimiz güçlü duruş sayesinde amacına ulaşmadan etkisiz hale geldi. Toplumsal kaos çıkarma planlarından bölücü eylemlere, ekonomik kriz senaryolarından siyasi istikrarsızlık gayretlerine kadar sayısız saldırıyı milletimizle birlikte göğüsledik."¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰. Discourse ID: D36. Link is available in the appendix.

¹⁴¹. "Dear friends, we have been through in an uncommon process of change on global and regional level. As Turkey, despite all humanitarian crises, conflicts, instabilities happening around us, we continue our path in accord with our objectives. Every attack that have turned against us until today got neutralized before achieving their goals. From societal chaos generation plans to separatist actions, from economic crisis scenarios to political instability endeavors, we have resisted to numerous attacks with our nation."


The nation is explicitly pronounced and thereby hegemonic totality claim remains strong. Failures are presented as a package. Although subjects of antagonism are not explicitly mentioned, “attacks” embody an implicit antagonism against the ones who have taken such actions against Turkey in order to turn her from her path. Therefore, it is viewed as an instance of crisis denying populism.

Figure 4.17 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 5



During the case, economic appeals are not so frequent especially when compared with other cases. In October 2017, failure recognizing appeals are greater than failure ignoring ones (6 vs 2), in November the view is reverse (4 vs 11). Overall, Erdoğan applies failure ignoring appeals more than failure recognizing ones (15 vs 11) and overwhelming majority of failure ignoring appeals consist of non-populist excerpts (14 vs 1).

Figure 4.18 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 5



Underlying reason of the huge increase in the number of failure ignoring non-populist excerpts in November 2017 is that Erdoğan talks on an entrepreneurship group's event which intend to build Turkey's automobile in the following years. In this meeting, Erdoğan's appeals are mostly positive remarks on the government's determination on producing the automobile of Turkey while he also exercises three examples of crisis denying rhetoric. In one of those appeals, while denying the actual impact of crisis, he satirizes global hegemonic powers by using economy as a weapon against Turkey, as in the following excerpt¹⁴²:

“...Çünkü bu ülkenin arkasında 100 milyonlarca insanın duası, 80 milyon vatandaşımızın ümidi, bize güvenen milletimizin gereken her durumda en güçlü şekilde ortaya koyduğu iradesi vardır. Ve ülkemize yönelik saldırıların cüreti giderek artmasına rağmen devlet ve millet olarak dimdik ayaktayız. Türkiye'yi darbelerle yıkamadılar, Türkiye'yi vesayet güçleri hep birlikte gayret ettiler durduramadılar. Türkiye'yi terör örgütlerini kullanarak hizaya sokamadılar. Türkiye'yi, ekonomiyi silah gibi kullanarak sendeletemediler. Bölgemizdeki krizlerin yıkıcı etkilerini bize ciro edemediler. Küresel düzenin çarpıkları konusundaki itirazlarımızın haklılığının üzerini örtemediler. Kendilerini küresel

¹⁴². Discourse ID: D39. Link is available in the appendix.

düzenin sahipleri olarak gören ülkelerin son dönemde ülkemizin üzerine bu kadar çok gelmelerinin sebebi işte bunlardır.”¹⁴³

This is an instance of crisis denying populist rhetoric since it embodies an antagonism against the countries who view themselves as the owners of the global order while totality is claimed for the nation. Erdoğan apparently denies the actual impact of such actors over Turkey and links the recent tension with unsuccessful attempts of mentioned global actors.

With regards to failure recognizing appeals, Erdoğan’s attitude is more likely to have a crisis denying oriented approach during the whole case. There are only 2 examples of crisis emphasizing rhetoric which both have populist characteristic and are expressed during the speech that Erdoğan has made on October the 5th 2017. While acknowledging failures, he strives for underrating the actual impact of them. In such failure recognizing appeals, Erdoğan applies a package of failure in which terrorism, Gezi Events, the initial conflict with Gülenist Movement on December 17th-25th 2013 and failed coup attempt that members of Gülenist Movement involved on July the 15th 2016 are framed as events which were organized by global powers in order to block Turkey’s growth and development. Most of these appeals are linked with regional reign of terror in recent years. Especially Erdoğan makes frequent references to what has been going on in the Middle Eastern geography, and particularly in Syria. One instance of crisis denying rhetoric is given below¹⁴⁴:

“...Değerli kardeşlerim... Türkiye, bölgesinde ve dünyada yaşanan tüm sıkıntılara, krizlere, çalkantılara rağmen, hedefleri doğrultusundaki kararlı yürüyüşünü sürdürmektedir. Bir yandan ülkemizin etrafındaki bu ateş çemberini kırmanın gayreti içindeyken, diğer yandan da ekonomide, yatırımlarda, güvenlikte, adalette, diplomaside çok önemli başarılarla imza atıyoruz. Büyüme rakamlarımızdan ihracata kadar ekonomide aldığımız sevindirici haberler, bize geleceğimiz için güven veriyor...”¹⁴⁵


¹⁴³. “...Because behind this country, there are prayers of hundreds of millions of people, the hope of 80 million citizens of ours, the will that is potently exercised whenever necessary by our nation that trusts us. And despite the increasing daring against our country, as the nation and the state, we stand upright. They couldn’t subvert Turkey by coups. Tutelary powers endeavored all together but couldn’t stop Turkey. They couldn’t align Turkey by using terrorist organizations. They couldn’t trip Turkey by using economy as a weapon. They couldn’t impute devastating effects of the crisis in our region to us. They couldn’t cover the rightfulness of our objections against the deviancy of the global order. That’s why the countries, which view themselves as the owners of the global order, offensively acted against our country recently...”

¹⁴⁴. Discourse ID: D37. Link is available in the appendix.

¹⁴⁵ “...My dear brothers... Despite all issues, crises, and unrest in the World and in her region, Turkey continues to walk her determined walk through her targets. On the one hand, we strive for breaking this ring of

This is an example of crisis denying non-populist rhetoric and it is the only failure recognizing non populist excerpt within this case. By the “ring of fire,” Erdoğan points out the actual armed conflict in Northern Syria. Although global powers are mentioned for their evil purposes over the Middle East, here in this excerpt Erdoğan is more about identifying the political landscape in the region. He does not mention any attack against Turkey, thereby antagonism does not exist, even implicitly.

Figure 4.19 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 5



In his crisis two emphasizing appeals, Erdoğan points out plots against Turkey due to her capabilities and strength, unlike other states in the region. He uses a populist rhetoric by presenting a package of failures that include Gezi Events, the initial conflict with Gülenist Movement on December the 17th-25th 2013, the recent trench war that took place in South Eastern Turkey against PKK, and July the 15th failed coup attempt that members of Gülenist Movement were involved. He frames all these different incidents as a complete bundle that is caused by various actors to prune Turkey’s power, not only with regards to political power but also in terms of her economic potency. The following excerpt is an instance of crisis emphasizing rhetoric since Erdoğan emphasizes that “we are being targeted” and does not

fire around our country, on the other hand, we have very significant achievements with regards to the economy, investments, security, justice, and diplomacy. From our growth rates to exportation, good news that we have for the economy gives us confidence for our future...”

even mention what needs to be done and what is considered against the threat. The outcome of incidents which are added into the package are clear however, the actual or potential outcome of Turkey's being targeted is not given within the excerpt. Here, antagonism is built against various political actors which are organized by the same master mind, while totality is claimed for the nation¹⁴⁶:

“Değerli kardeşlerim... Bölgemize yönelik bu kanlı senaryonun önündeki en büyük engel hiç şüphesiz Türkiye'dir. Bu oyunun başarılı olabilmesi, ancak Türkiye'nin zayıflamasına, tökezlemesine ve düşmesine bağlıdır. Çünkü güçlü Türkiye, bölgesel huzur ve istikrarın güvencesi demektir. Dış politikada etkin Türkiye, kurulan tezgâhı sahiplerinin başına geçiren ülke demektir. Ekonomik bakımından kendi ayakları üzerinde duran Türkiye, aynı zamanda tüm kardeş ve dostlarının da aydınlık geleceğinin müjdecisi demektir. Bunun için, ülkemiz içeriden ve dışarıdan kuşatılmaya çalışılıyor. Biz, ülkemize çizilen sınırlara eyvallah demediğimiz, gücümüzü sadece milletimizden aldığımız, bu güvenle üzerimize giydirilmeye çalışılan deli gömleğini yırtıp attığımız için hedef alınıyoruz. Gezi olayları, 17- 25 Aralık yargı-emniyet darbesi, bölücü örgütün çukur eylemleri ve son olarak 15 Temmuz hain kalkışması, Türkiye'nin önünü kesme planının farklı kesimler eliyle yürütülen safhalarından ibarettir.”¹⁴⁷

Erdoğan simply puts the people into an alarming position. In the same speech, he also applies a conditional statement for the uncertain future by accentuating the only way to overcome failures is keeping our unity strong. These are the only two options Erdoğan uses to perpetuate failures as crisis within this case. During this period, his crisis denying rhetoric overwhelms the crisis emphasizing one and the number of crisis denying excerpts increase from October to November while instances of crisis emphasizing are only seen in October.


When it comes to overall populist vs non-populist appeals, as I've mentioned before, there is only one failure recognizing non-populist excerpt and it has a crisis denying characteristic. Remaining non-populist excerpts are all failure ignoring ones. Due to the increase of such

¹⁴⁶. Discourse ID: D37. Link is available in the appendix.

¹⁴⁷. “...My dear brothers... Without a doubt, the greatest obstacle to this bloody scenario is Turkey. Its success depends on Turkey's weakening, stumbling, and fall. Because strong Turkey means an assurance of regional peace and stability. An active Turkey in foreign policy means spoiler of such plots. A viable Turkey in terms of economics means the harbinger of bright future of all her fellows and friends. That's why our country is trying to be surrounded from inside and outside. We are being targeted since we don't accept boundaries that are drawn for us, since our power comes from the nation, since we tear and throw the straitjacket that is tried to be put on us. Gezi Events, the coup of judiciary-security that took place on December the 17th-25th, trench war on separatist organization, and lastly the treacherous attempt of July the 15th are phases of the plan of blocking Turkey, conducted by different actors...”

appeals in November, frequency of non-populist appeals is greater than populist ones during this period (15 vs 11).

Figure 4.20 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 5



4.1.6. Case 6: 01.2018 – 05.2018

During this case period, exchange rate and inflation rate increases while unemployment falls continuously until April 2018. As one can see by checking the table given below, there is no deterioration in unemployment rate while two other variables deteriorate. Deterioration level in exchange rate is 17 % and average value of inflation rate is 1.56 %. Monthly values of each indicator are given below:

Table 4.16 Changes in economic indicators within case 6

Date	Exchange Rate	Unemployment Rate	Inflation Rate
01.2018	3.77	10.80	1.020
02.2018	3.78	10.64	0.731
03.2018	3.88	10.12	0.993
04.2018	4.05	9.60	1.872
05.2018	4.41	9.70	1.622

Table 4.17 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 6

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing populist	4	0.059
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	0	0
Crisis denying populist	8	0.118
Crisis denying non-populist	1	0.015
Failure ignoring populist	21	0.309
Failure ignoring non-populist	34	0.5

Table 4.18 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 6

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing overall	4	0.059
Crisis denying overall	9	0.132
Failure recognizing overall	13	0.191
Failure Ignoring overall	55	0.809
Overall populist	33	0.485
Overall non-populist	35	0.515
Overall coded excerpts	68	1.000


When we look at the political atmosphere of this period, Turkey is still in state of emergency period which is declared after the failed coup attempt of Gülenist Movement, and relations with the E.U. remains problematic due to the previous year's confrontation, especially with Germany and Holland. When we check Erdoğan's political appeals, Turkish national army organized an operation called "Operation Olive Branch" to north western Syria, to the city of Afrin in January 2018. Erdoğan earlier discourses of this case have many pure political references about this operation. From January 2018 to February 2018 both failure ignoring and failure recognizing appeals are in decline due to Erdoğan's frequent pure political appeals especially the ones about Syrian conflict and operation Olive Branch. Moreover, in January, his failure ignoring non-populist appeals includes investments in defense industry. Erdoğan focuses much more on pure political issues during the first two months of this case period although failure recognizing excerpts are far lower than ignoring ones (3 vs 17). Likewise, within the case, overall failure ignoring appeals overwhelms failure recognizing ones (55 vs 13). Except March 2018, failure ignoring rhetoric always overrides failure recognizing rhetoric.

In his failure ignoring appeals, On April the 10th, Erdoğan mentions rising level of economic relations with Russia with regards to some huge projects like the construction of Turkey's first Nuclear Plant in Akkuyu. He accentuates the potential impact of this project to Turkish economy and how it will contribute to Turkey in terms of supplying 10 percent of the overall electricity to the country, when activated. He also gives some explicit statistical information on Turkey's general economic overview in the same speech. In the second discourse of this month he also mentions on how AKP has contributed to Turkish economy so far. This month's failure ignoring excerpts are mostly have a non-populist tone (13 vs 2).

Through the end of this case period, Erdoğan's appeals turn into a more election-oriented quality. The reason is the gap between failure ignoring and failure recognizing appeals gets wider from March to April, and from April to May. This becomes visible when we check frequencies of failure ignoring appeals of these two months in the following graph. Moreover, from April to May, failure ignoring populist excerpts rises tremendously - from 2 to 17 while total number of such excerpts for the whole case is 21. During May 2018, Erdoğan's failure ignoring appeals are mostly towards approaching June 24th, 2018 presidential election.

Erdoğan’s failure ignoring rhetoric sharply gains a populist quality during his frequent attacks against main opposition party, especially on the speech he makes on May the 8th, 2018¹⁴⁸. Only this discourse has 16 failure ignoring populist excerpts. During this AKP group speech, Erdoğan mostly exercises failure ignoring populist excerpts in his rhetoric attacks against the opposition while emphasizing AKP’s economic contribution to turkey and the people of Turkey, due to approaching elections.

Figure 4.21 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 6



Likewise, I’ve assessed the following excerpt¹⁴⁹ and the ones that follow it as instances of failure ignoring non-populist rhetoric since they focus on AKP’s accomplishments with regards to concrete services to the people and to the economy while Erdoğan’s framing depends on purely rhetorical and hypothetical questions based on election talk. Due to antagonistic nature of such references, they are all coded as populist excerpts:

“...Muhalefetin projesi yok dedik, ama haksızlık ettik galiba, bir tane projeleri var, onu da şimdiden açıkladılar. Bu proje Türkiye’yi eski sisteme geri döndürmekmiş. Her şeyden önce bu tavır, milletin 16 Nisan’da ortaya koyduğu iradeye saygısızlıktır. Madem bunlar Ak Parti’nin her yaptığının tersini vadediyorlar, öyleyse buradan milletimize çağrı yapıyorum, size bu vaatle gelenlere şunları da sorun: AK Parti Türkiye’de 284 bin yeni derslik yaptı, siz

¹⁴⁸. Discourse ID: D49. Link is available in the appendix.


¹⁴⁹. Discourse ID: D49. Link is given in the appendix.

onları da mı yıkacaksınız? AK Parti Türkiye’de 585 bin yeni öğretmen göreve başlattı, siz onları da işten atacak mısınız? AK Parti Türkiye’de 111 yeni üniversite açtı, siz onları da kapatacak mısınız?”¹⁵⁰

Another example from the same speech is given below:

“...AK Parti 38 milyar lira sosyal yardım yaptı, siz bunları gidip garip-gurebadan geri mi isteyeceksiniz? AK Parti yaklaşık 4,5 milyon kişiye 15 milyar lira Tasarruf Teşvik Fonu ödemesi, 8 milyonun üzerinde kişiye 3,5 milyar lira Konut Edindirme Yardımı ödemesi yaptı, siz bunları geri mi alacaksınız?”¹⁵¹

Figure 4.22 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 6




Because Erdoğan mostly uses a populist tone during May, his failure ignoring populist tone also has affected the frequency of overall populist rhetoric. In May Erdoğan uses only 2

¹⁵⁰. “...We said that the opposition does not have any project, but I guess we were not fair, there is one, and they have announced it already. This project is turning Turkey into the old system. First of all, this attitude is an indignity to the will of the nation that took place on April the 16th. Seeing that these promise the opposite of anything that Ak Party has done, then I am making a call to our nation, you ask these to the ones who show up with this promise: Ak Party has built 284 thousand classrooms, are you going to destroy them also? Ak Party appointed 585 new teachers, are you going to sack them also? Ak Party has opened 111 new universities, are you going to close them also?”

¹⁵¹. “...Ak Party has made 38 billion Lira social aid; will you want this back from the poor? Ak party has made 15 billion Lira saving incentive fund payment to 4.5 million people, 3.5 billion Lira housing acquisition aid payment to over 8 million people, will you take this back?”

failure recognizing populist rhetoric, one for each. 17 out of 19 populist appeals have a failure ignoring characteristic. When we make an overall comparison of populist vs non-populist appeals within this case, until May 2018, the number of populist appeals in failure recognizing categories (crisis emphasizing and crisis denying) are close and fluctuating as like the frequency of failure ignoring populist excerpts (3, 0, 4, 4 vs 1, 1, 0, 2). Up until May, the number of crisis denying populist excerpts are slightly higher than both crisis emphasizing and failure ignoring ones (6, 3, 4 respectively) while in May the picture is totally different (1, 1, 17 respectively). If we merely focus to the first four months of the case, the number of populist appeals are greater than non-populist ones only in March 2018 (4 vs 2).

Figure 4.23 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist of case 6



From the beginning to the end of this case, there are only 4 instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric and they all have a populist tone. In March, Erdoğan mentions on Turkey’s purchase of Russian missile defense system S-400 from Russia while baldly criticizing the U.S. authorities due to their threats over sanctions against Turkey. In the excerpt given below¹⁵², Erdoğan also does not care to engage in a confrontation with the U.S. Although he has a defensive tone, Erdoğan simply puts the people into an alarming position while not denying

¹⁵². Discourse ID: D45. Link is available in the appendix.

the potential impact of any possible U.S. sanctions against Turkey¹⁵³. Hegemonic totality is claimed for the nation implicitly, and antagonism is built against the authorities of the U.S. who oppose Turkey's purchase of S400 missile defense system. So, it is an instance of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric:

“...Türkiye’yi, terör örgütleriyle mücadelesi, S400 hava savunma sistemlerini alması dolayısıyla eleştirenler, dönüp kendi yaptıklarına bir baksalar eminim haklılığımızı kabul edecekler. Sen kalkacaksın Yunanistan’ın S300’leri gündeme geldiğinde, şu anda S300’ler var, Yunanistan’a ses çıkarmayacaksın. Ee? Türkiye S400’leri alacağı zaman, sizlerden istediğinde vermeyeceksin, ama Rusya’dan S400’leri alma yoluna gidince, anlaşınca, ‘NATO ülkeleri için bu yanlıştır’ diyeceksin. NATO’nun Genel Sekreteri ne diyecek? ‘Hayır, Türkiye bu konuda özgürdür, istediği gibi hareket eder’ diyecek. Öbürü de ‘bak yaptırım uygulayabiliriz’ diyeceksin. Böyle ittifak, böyle bir dayanışma söz konusu olabilir mi? Bunların hepsi bugüne kadar yanlış alışkanlıklardır; ama bu yanlış alışkanlıklar kusura bakmasınlar bize geçmez. Biz yolumuza devam edeceğiz ve bu yönde sorgulamalara da gelemeyiz. Biz bu süreçte sağlam duracak, taviz vermeden kendi hedeflerimize doğru yürümeyi sürdüreceğiz...”¹⁵⁴

During the case, the frequency of Erdoğan’s crisis denying rhetoric is either equals to or slightly greater than the frequency of his crisis emphasizing rhetoric. On January the 9th, Erdoğan uses a reference to Reza Zarrab case that was being seen in the U.S. He exercises a crisis denying rhetoric while denying the potential impact of the failure. Zarrab’s case is framed as a pressure over the economy, as given in the following excerpt¹⁵⁵. This excerpt has a populist quality since antagonism is built against the U.S. authorities while totality claim implicitly exists for Turkish nation:

“...Değerli kardeşlerim; bakın burada bir konunun üzerinde hassasiyetle durmam gerekiyor; 15 Temmuz darbe girişimini ülkemizde başaramayanlar şimdi farklı darbe girişimlerinin arayışı içerisindedir. Değerli kardeşlerim, bunu da özellikle

¹⁵³ Sanctions are explicitly mentioned in the excerpt while Erdoğan does not retreat.

¹⁵⁴ “...I am pretty sure about that the ones who criticize Turkey due to her struggle against terrorist organizations, the purchase of s400 air defense system, will accept our rightfulness if they turn and look to what they, themselves have done. You will not make a sound against Greece when her S300s were brought to the agenda, they have S300s now, and then? When Turkey buys, when Turkey wants from you, you do not give them, but whenever she decides to buy from Russia and comes to an agreement, then you say, “This is wrong for NATO countries.” What will the general secretary of NATO say? He will say ‘No, Turkey is free in this respect, and she can act freely.’ And with the other, you will say “look we can implement sanctions.” Is such an alliance, a solidarity possible? So far, these all have been wrong habits; pardon us but these wrong habits do not work on us. We will continue our path and we cannot tolerate questionings in this path. We will stand strong in this process and we will move to our own targets without any concessions...”

¹⁵⁵. Discourse ID: D41. Link is available in the appendix.

buradan ifade etmem gerekir; şu anda Amerika'daki malum dava işte bir siyasi içerikli darbe girişiminin adresidir. Ve bu öyle sureta atılmış bir adım veya yapılmakta olan bir dava değildir. Türkiye'yi güya kendilerine göre ekonomik noktada sıkıştırmak, güya kendilerine göre FETÖ terör örgütüyle, CIA ile öbür tarafta FBI ile sıkıştırmak suretiyle Türkiye'ye kendilerine göre bir sıkıştırma operasyonudur. Fakat bu da tutmayacak, bunu da başaramayacaklar...¹⁵⁶

In his crisis emphasizing populist attempts, on April the 24th, Erdoğan explicitly mentions on plots on exchange rate, applies conditional statements. And in remaining two instances of this category, he simply puts the people into an alarming position by perpetuating failures as crisis. Reza Zarrab case is presented as a package, and the temporal dimension of this conflict, has been extended since a final decision has still not been made.

During the case, all instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric refer to populist excerpts however the frequency of such excerpts are so few. From January to May, the number of crisis emphasizing excerpts reach its top level in March, and the number of crisis denying excerpts are either equal or great than crisis emphasizing ones. The number of crisis denying populist excerpts are greater than crisis denying non-populist ones during the case. The only one instance of crisis denying non populist rhetoric¹⁵⁷ of April 2018 is given below:

“...Bütçe disiplinimizden ve reform gündemimizden taviz ermeden, faiz ve enflasyon başta olmak üzere ekonomimizi tehdit eden tüm sorunların üstesinden yeni dönemde daha kolay geleceğimizi düşünüyorum. Erken seçim kararına piyasaların ve iş dünyasının verdiği olumlu tepki, bu sürecin ekonomide risklerin değil, fırsatların tetikleyicisi olacağına işaret etmektedir...”¹⁵⁸

I've assessed this excerpt as an example of crisis denying non-populist rhetoric the problems that threaten Turkish economy does not point out any antagonism since problems are mentioned as with economic variables. When we look at the overall distribution of populist


¹⁵⁶. “...My dear brothers, look here I need to dwell on a subject sensitively; the ones who couldn't be able to achieve the coup attempt of July the 15th are now in a search for another coup attempts. My dear brothers, I also need to state this particularly; the present case in the U.S., as you know, is the address of a thematic political coup attempt. And this is not a fake step that has been taken or a fake case that is being conducted. It is an operation of, supposedly, pressuring Turkey at the economical point, supposedly, by pressuring Turkey via the terrorist organization of FETÖ, CIA and FBI on the other side. But this also will not hit target, they will also not be able to achieve this ...”

¹⁵⁷. Discourse ID: D48. Link is available in the appendix.

¹⁵⁸. “...While not making concessions from our budgetary discipline and reform agenda, in the new period, I think we will overcome the problems that threaten our economy, particularly interest rate and inflation rate. The positive reaction of markets and business world to the decision of early election points out that this process will be a trigger of opportunities, not risks in the economy...”

vs non-populist excerpts within failure recognizing excerpts, excerpts only 1 out of 14 have non-populist characteristic, and it is in the scope of crisis denying category.

Figure 4.24 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 6



4.1.7. Case 7: 06.2018 – 09.2018

During this case period, all economic indicators have deteriorated. Deterioration level in exchange rate is 37.6 %, in unemployment rate 12.2 %, and average value of inflation rate is 2.94 %. Monthly values of each indicator are given below.

Table 4.19 Economic deterioration within case 7

Date	Exchange Rate	Unemployment Rate	Inflation Rate
06.2018	4.63	10.16	2.612
07.2018	4.75	10.76	0.551
08.2018	5.73	11.12	2.295
09.2018	6.37	11.40	6.304

Political atmosphere is highly dynamic during this case. Turkey has experienced a system change just at the beginning of this period. Presidential elections that took place on June the 24th resulted with the victory of Erdoğan. In July, Turkey was threatened by the U.S. authorities to release pastor Andrew Brunson immediately. The trial of pastor turned into a huge political crisis while its economic impact was felt immediately by the whole nation. When compared with other cases, this case has the greatest increase in exchange rate. Besides, not among the discourses I've analyzed but Erdoğan uses some offensive appeals against the U.S. over Brunson's continuing trial whenever he shows up in front of cameras, especially throughout August. Brunson remained imprisoned during this case period, he was released and went back to the U.S. in October 2018.

Table 4.20 Frequencies & proportions of each rhetoric within case 7

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing populist	7	0.175
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	0	0
Crisis denying populist	10	0.25
Crisis denying non-populist	1	0.025
Failure ignoring populist	2	0.05
Failure ignoring non-populist	20	0.5

Table 4.21 Frequencies & proportions of overall appeals within case 7

Type of Rhetoric	Within Case Frequencies	Within Case Proportion
Crisis emphasizing overall	7	0.175
Crisis denying overall	11	0.275
Failure recognizing overall	18	0.45
Failure Ignoring overall	22	0.55
Overall populist	19	0.475
Overall non-populist	21	0.525
Overall coded excerpts	40	1.000


The first two discourses I've analyzed are mostly about the presidential election. In the first one, Erdoğan talks in meeting in Adıyaman. In this meeting with the people of Adıyaman, he only uses failure ignoring appeals, by mentioning the contribution of his party to Turkish economy via enhanced level of investments, projects, and services due to approaching elections. During this meeting, Erdoğan uses only failure ignoring appeals while in his accusatory appeals, he rhetorically attacks the head of the main opposition and the candidate of the main opposition for upcoming presidential elections. However, Erdoğan's attacks against the opposition and alliance that the opposition forms are mostly in a pure political format. In the second one in which Erdoğan gives a balcony speech after his triumph in elections. During this speech, Erdoğan mostly uses a soft and inclusive rhetoric. In short, due to references are mostly shaped by the electoral campaign, Erdoğan only uses failure ignoring appeals in June 2018.

This is also true for July 2018. In July, Erdoğan also uses a soft rhetoric when he takes over the presidential office. The second discourse of July is exercised on July 15 Martyrs' Bridge where the people resisted in front of armed soldiers during the failed coup attempt. This speech has pure political appeals and mostly about cursing Gülenist Movement. In short, he doesn't even apply failure recognizing appeals until his discourses that take place in August.

One example of failure ignoring non-populist rhetoric which Erdoğan exercises during his inauguration ceremony as the president¹⁵⁹ is given below. Here, Erdoğan mentions on what his party has achieved so far for the people of Turkey via projects and investments. Such appeals are assessed within the scope of failure ignoring appeals. Because there is no antagonism, it has a non-populist quality:

“...Ülkemizi dünyanın en büyük 10 ekonomisinden biri haline getirmek için, makroekonomik dengelerden yatırımlara kadar her alanda çok büyük hamleler yapacağız. Bugüne kadar tamamladığımız projelerimiz en büyük referansımızdır. Halen devam eden yatırımlarımızı ve milletimize taahhüt ettiğimiz projeleri hayata geçirmekle kalmayacak, çok daha büyük işlere imza atacağız.”¹⁶⁰

Figure 4.25 Overall appeals: Failure recognizing vs failure ignoring of case 7



The confrontation with the U.S. got intensified towards late July when Turkey was explicitly threatened by vice president of the U.S. Mike Pence. After this incident and with the unstoppable value depreciation in Turkish Lira, Erdoğan’s discourses mostly focus on failures in August. That’s why, in August 2018, failure recognizing appeals substantially rise

¹⁵⁹. Discourse ID: D53. Link is available in the appendix.

¹⁶⁰. “...We will make huge moves in all areas, from macroeconomic balances to investments, in order to make our county as one of the top ten economies of the world. Our projects that we have completed up until today are our biggest references. We will not only actualize our investments which still continue and our projects that we have promised to our nation, we will make greater works.”

due to the intensified confrontation with the U.S. and exchange rate hike. On August 13th, Erdoğan talks in 10th Conference of Ambassadors, and he mostly mentions about economic attacks against Turkey, while applying instances of both crisis emphasizing and crisis denying rhetoric.

All instances of crisis emphasizing rhetoric are exercised in August, when the impact of the exchange rate over the society was tremendous. Overall, during such appeals, Erdoğan does not avoid extending the temporal dimension of the political confrontation with the global powers via offensive rhetoric and exacerbates the confrontation without hesitation. Among other crisis perpetuation options, he asks the contribution of the ambassadors he speaks to, in order to boost the economy. He also applies pure political appeals as solution for the failure. The following excerpt¹⁶¹ is an example of simply putting the people into an alarming position while not denying framing failures as crisis:

“...Kıymetli dostlar; görünen köy kılavuz istemez, böyle bir misalimiz var ya... Son birkaç haftadır yaşadığımız hadiseler hepimize şu gerçeği bir kez daha gösterdi: Türkiye diğer alanlarda olduğu gibi, ekonomide de bir kuşatmayla karşı karşıyadır. Gezi olaylarıyla başlayan, 17-25 Aralık girişimiyle devam eden, 15 Temmuz hain darbe teşebbüsüyle bir üst aşamaya taşınan saldırıların bir müddet daha devam edeceği açıktır. Türkiye'nin bağımsızlığı, ekonomik çıkarlarını, milli onurunu, haysiyet ve şahsiyetini hedef alan bu atakların farklı biçimlerine karşı da hazırlıklı olmalıyız...”¹⁶²


In excerpt given above, while economic blockade is framed as associated with a package of political failures, Erdoğan claims the totality of the nation while he exercises an antagonism against global powers over economic blockade. Moreover, participants of articulated past incidents are also in the target of his antagonism. It is an example of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric.

¹⁶¹. Discourse ID: D55. Link is available in the appendix.

¹⁶². “...Dear friends; it is clear that... Incidents that we experienced in some recent weeks showed us this fact: Turkey, like in other areas, vis-à-vis a blockade in economy too. It is apparent that attacks that began with Gezi Events, continued with attempt of December the 17th – 25th, leveled up with treacherous July the 15th coup attempt will continue. We also need to be prepared different forms of these attacks that target Turkey's independence, economic interests, national pride, dignity and personality...”

Erdoğan also applies mere political references as the solution vis-à-vis the economic blockade he mentions and accentuates the importance of national unity, solidarity, and support of the people to overcome failures. He explicitly mentions exchange rate during this discourse. In the second speech of this month, Erdoğan mentions on Andrew Brunson case without calling the pastor's name explicitly, while not denying framing the issue as crisis.

Figure 4.26 Categories: Populist vs non-populist of case 7




However, within this case, Erdoğan's overall tone denies framing failures as crisis (11 vs 7), while denying crisis populist rhetoric is more frequently used than his crisis emphasizing appeals (10 vs 7). The following excerpt is an instance of framing failures with a package while, this time, denying the actual impact of failures and accentuating the determination of the government¹⁶³. Totality claim is powerful while antagonism is primarily built against global powers and finance lobbies:

“...Son yıllarda terörden ekonomik manipölasyonlara, bir dizi operasyona maruz kalmamızın en önemli sebebi, milli menfaatlerimiz noktasında tavizsiz bir tutum

¹⁶³. Discourse ID: D55. Link is available in the appendix.

takınmış olmamızdır. Göreve geldiğimiz andan beri milletin emanetini namusumuz bilip üzerine gölge düşürmedik, siyasetin yeniden vesayet emrine girmesine izin vermedik. Toplumsal çatışma senaryolarını milletimizle sırt sırta vererek engelledik. Terör örgütleri üzerinden kurulan oyunları kısa sürede deşifre edip önüne geçtik. Suriye’de DEAŞ¹⁶⁴’la mücadele bahanesiyle etrafımızda oluşturulmaya çalışılan terör koridoruna rıza göstermedik. Ekonomide fakir-fukaranın rızkının finans lobilerine peşkeş çekilmesine göz yummadık...”¹⁶⁵

Figure 4.27 Overall appeals: Crisis emphasizing vs crisis denying of case 7




Within this case, populist and non-populist appeals of Erdoğan’s speeches fluctuate due to political atmosphere. Non-populist appeals are only lower than populist ones during August 2018. There is only one failure recognizing non-populist excerpt, and it is an instance of crisis denying non-populist rhetoric. It belongs to Erdoğan’s inauguration ceremony speech, while he accuses the old system due to its great burden over the people of Turkey, in terms of both political and economic. Remaining non-populist appeals are all failure ignoring ones. Their frequency rises greatly in September 2018. However, this rise is about Erdoğan’s remarks

¹⁶⁴. Erdoğan uses DEAŞ for DAESH a.k.a. ISIS or ISIL, given under the “List of Abbreviations” on page xvi.

¹⁶⁵. “...The most important reason that we have been exposed to a series of operation from terrorism to economic manipulations in recent years is that we have assumed an uncompromising attitude with regards to our national interests. Since we took the office, we have assumed the trust of the nation as our honor and haven’t compromised, we haven’t let the politics to be subjected to the yoke of tutelage again. We prevented societal conflict scenarios with our nation by standing back to back. We prevented plots that were set over terrorist organizations by deciphering them in a short time. We didn’t consent the terror corridor that was tried to build around us by excuses of struggle against ISIS in Syria. In the economy, we didn’t overlook the making the livelihood of the poor available to finance lobbies...”

about how much contribution AKP has done so far in order to enhance economic well-being of martyrs and veterans, in Erdoğan’s speech that is exercised on September the 19th, on the veterans’ day. Populist excerpts overwhelm non-populist ones in August (14 vs 1) when the political confrontation with the U.S. gets intensified over Pastor Andrew Brunson incident and exchange rate manipulation gets intensified accordingly. The story changes in September (3 vs 9), just before October 2018 when the Brunson crisis was overcome, and he was released.

Figure 4.28 Overall appeals: Populist vs non-populist case 7



4.2. Analysis

In accord with cases I’ve scrutinized and Moffitt’s (2015) core argument, in this analysis part, I have three major concerns. First, I want to check whether Erdoğan applies populist appeals more or less than non-populist ones. This is also important since Moffitt (2015) claims that “populists” who attempt to perpetuate failures as crisis remain longer in power than politicians who do not tend to do so. Because I do not define politicians in a binary sense like populist vs non-populist, and I argue that populism inherently has degrees, Erdoğan’s

more frequently usage of populist rhetoric might provide me a clue whether I have been running a reasonable research with regards to the associational pattern I've been seeking for throughout this work. To Moffitt (2015) that was the case for Hugo Chávez. Moreover, any possible finding on Erdoğan's inclination to apply populism more than non-populist appeals also confirms Hawkins' research on populism¹⁶⁶ including different leaders all around the world. In this study, in terms of the intensity of populist appeals, Erdoğan is ranked 4th among leaders of 40 different countries. Second, I aim to find out whether Erdoğan more frequently emphasizes or denies perpetuation of crisis via populist rhetoric. My intention is to focus on what a possible and plausible explanation for this variation might be. Third, I intend to check, for cases in which Erdoğan more frequently applies crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric than crisis denying populist one, how sense of crisis among the people changes and how electoral support to AKP fluctuates in those periods. This is indeed my primary concern throughout analysis part since it is the essence of Moffitt's (2015) argument which has become an inspiration for me to conduct this study.

Table 4.22 Cross case proportions of each rhetoric

Type of Rhetoric	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6	Case 7
Crisis emphasizing populist	0	0.056	0.019	0.05	0.004	0.008	0.015
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	0	0.002	0	0.021	0	0	0
Crisis emphasizing overall	0	0.058	0.019	0.071	0.004	0.008	0.015
Crisis denying populist	0.006	0.054	0.038	0.038	0.017	0.017	0.021
Crisis denying non-populist	0.004	0.002	0.004	0	0.002	0.002	0.002
Crisis denying overall	0.01	0.056	0.042	0.038	0.019	0.019	0.023
Failure recognizing populist	0.006	0.11	0.056	0.088	0.021	0.025	0.035
Failure recognizing non-populist	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.021	0.002	0.002	0.002
Failure recognizing overall	0.01	0.115	0.06	0.108	0.023	0.027	0.038
Failure ignoring populist	0.077	0.046	0.044	0	0.002	0.044	0.004
Failure ignoring non-populist	0.102	0.063	0.083	0.013	0.029	0.071	0.042
Failure Ignoring overall	0.179	0.108	0.127	0.013	0.031	0.115	0.046
Overall populist	0.083	0.156	0.1	0.088	0.023	0.069	0.04
Overall non-populist	0.106	0.067	0.088	0.033	0.031	0.073	0.044
Coded excerpts	0.19	0.223	0.188	0.121	0.054	0.142	0.083

¹⁶⁶. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2019/mar/06/revealed-the-rise-and-rise-of-populist-rhetoric>

In accord with these intentions, in the table given above, I've shared cross case proportions of each rhetoric that Erdoğan exercises during his speeches which I've focused throughout this work. According to proportions of populist coded excerpts with respect to overall frequency of all coded excerpts, Erdoğan's populism is greater in case 2, case 3, and case 4 while cross case proportions of populist and non-populist excerpts of case 6 and case 7 is also close. When overall frequencies and proportions are checked, the overall view seems to have a better accord with Hawkins's findings. Total frequencies of each type of rhetoric and their overall proportions are given below:

Table 4.23 Overall frequencies and proportions of all types of rhetoric

Type of Rhetoric	Overall Frequency	Proportion (of all excerpts)
Crisis emphasizing populist	72	0.15
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	11	0.023
Crisis emphasizing overall	83	0.173
Crisis denying populist	92	0.192
Crisis denying non-populist	8	0.017
Crisis denying overall	100	0.208
Failure recognizing populist	164	0.342
Failure recognizing non-populist	19	0.04
Failure recognizing overall	183	0.381
Failure ignoring populist	104	0.217
Failure ignoring non-populist	193	0.402
Failure Ignoring overall	297	0.619
Overall populist	268	0.558
Overall non-populist	212	0.442
Coded excerpts	480	1.000

To this table, Erdoğan exercises populist appeals more frequently than non-populist ones. However, the difference between overall frequencies & proportions, and cross case proportions relies on the variation of the intensity of applying populist rhetoric in different cases. Erdoğan's populist appeals overwhelms non-populist ones in case 2 (75 vs 32) and

case 4 (42 vs 16) while in remaining cases numbers are close to each other¹⁶⁷. case 1, when economic failures were not complemented with political ones, frequency of populist appeals vis-à-vis non-populist ones is 40 vs 51, while this is 48 vs 42 for case 3, 11 vs 15 for case 5, 33 vs 35 for case 6, and 19 vs 21 for case 7. These numbers are also shared under each case. Overall, due to overwhelming dominance of populist appeals in case 2 and case 4, Erdoğan more frequently applies populist rhetoric. But when we check the intensity of populist appeals vis-à-vis non-populist ones, in 3 failure periods that's the case, while in the last two cases numbers are very close. When one checks within case frequencies, then one can easily figure out that the overwhelming dominance of populist vs non-populist appeals in case 2 and case 4. This is indeed crucial since, whenever Erdoğan overwhelmingly applies populism within a case, he also does it by perpetuating failures as crisis more frequently than denying framing them as crisis. Within case proportions of each rhetoric is given below. Frequencies are divided total number of coded excerpts per each case.

Table 4.24 Within case proportions of each rhetoric

Type of Rhetoric	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6	Case 7
Crisis emphasizing populist	0	0.252	0.1	0.397	0.077	0.059	0.175
Crisis emphasizing non-populist	0	0.009	0	0.172	0	0	0
Crisis emphasizing overall	0	0.262	0.1	0.569	0.077	0.059	0.175
Crisis denying populist	0.033	0.243	0.2	0.328	0.308	0.118	0.25
Crisis denying non-populist	0.022	0.009	0.02	0	0.038	0.015	0.025
Crisis denying overall	0.055	0.252	0.22	0.328	0.346	0.132	0.275
Failure recognizing populist	0.033	0.495	0.3	0.724	0.385	0.176	0.425
Failure recognizing non-populist	0.022	0.019	0.02	0.172	0.038	0.015	0.025
Failure recognizing overall	0.055	0.514	0.32	0.897	0.423	0.191	0.45
Failure ignoring populist	0.407	0.206	0.23	0	0.038	0.309	0.5
Failure ignoring non-populist	0.538	0.28	0.44	0.103	0.538	0.5	0.5
Failure Ignoring overall	0.945	0.486	0.68	0.103	0.577	0.809	0.55
Overall populist	0.44	0.701	0.53	0.724	0.423	0.485	0.475
Overall non-populist	0.56	0.299	0.47	0.276	0.577	0.515	0.525
Coded excerpts	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000


¹⁶⁷ Because cross case proportion of total number of coded excerpts of case 2 is the greatest, it pulls up overall populist appeals to a higher level vis-a-vis non-populist ones.

In 5 out of 7 cases, Erdoğan uses crisis denying populist rhetoric more frequently than crisis emphasizing one. Moreover, when we compare his overall crisis emphasizing and denying appeals, the proportion of overall crisis denying populist appeals are also greater than crisis emphasizing ones except case 2 and case 4. One possible explanation about populist and non-populist appeals is the fact that I've viewed populism via claims of hegemonic totality and antagonism while the former inherently exists in all appeals that attempt to build an equivalential relation between Erdoğan and the people in an economic sense. So, non-populist appeals for failure recognizing categories (crisis emphasizing and crisis denying categories) are overwhelmed by populist ones. However, when we look at within case proportions of failure ignoring and failure recognizing appeals, except case 7, populist rhetoric is less frequently used in remaining all 6 cases. In case 7, proportions are equal. This can be explained due to Erdoğan's positive remarks about the economy and AKP's contribution to it mostly lack antagonism. Erdoğan only applies antagonism during his rhetorical attacks on the opposition. In such appeals, while accentuating AKP's contribution to Turkey and the people of Turkey in an economic sense, he either mentions failures of past governments or speaks hypothetically about potential future economic changes in Turkey due to a possible government change.

When we compare proportions of crisis emphasizing and crisis denying appeals, Erdoğan mostly applies crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric during case 4 and case 2. The proportion of crisis emphasizing populist excerpts is greatest during case 4. The view is more intense when we check overall crisis emphasizing appeals because over 11 crisis emphasizing non-populist appeals, 10 of them are exercised during case 4, during Erdoğan's speeches exercised in the last two months of this case. In both case 2 and case 4, Erdoğan's populist appeals with regards to perpetuating failures as crisis is greater than denying framing them as crisis. In both cases, all economic indicators that I've used while determining my cases have deteriorated. However, that's not the case for case 7. Moreover, although deteriorated economic indicators are explicitly pronounced by Erdoğan in his discourses of case 2 and case 4, crisis emphasizing appeals are more about Erdoğan's introduction of a bundle of political and economic failures together, what I've called as "package of failures" during this research. What I mean is Erdoğan overwhelmingly associates economic downturns with external threats and their domestic collaborators, both working against Turkey and welfare

and sovereignty of the people of Turkey. Such associations might be important since what makes case 2 and case 4 different than others is that AKP government underwent serious political conflicts on structural level with members of Gülenist Movement, and thus Turkey indeed experienced intense political failures in these two cases. In case 2, Turkey experienced December 17th-25th incidents and case 4 comes just after the failed coup attempt that members of Gülenist Movement are involved while implementations of state of emergency period continues. While December the 17th-25th incidents primarily target Erdoğan, some ministers and businesspeople which are close the government, the latter was conducted not only against Erdoğan but also against the people of Turkey. So, Erdoğan might attempt crisis emphasizing populist appeals more than crisis denying ones when he faces serious political failures that attempts to change political settings of the country.

Figure 4.29 All variables, cases, within case proportions of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric and crisis denying populist rhetoric of each case



In the graph given above, all variables and cases are provided while within case proportions of crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric (cepr) and crisis denying populist rhetoric (cdpr) are given for each case. For case 2 and case 4, Erdoğan more frequently applies crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric than crisis denying populist rhetoric (0.252 vs 0.243 in terms of within case proportions). For case 2, these seems to have an association with the rise in sense of crisis from 38.9 % to 49.7 % between October 2013 and January 2014. So, during case 2, sense of crisis rises while Erdoğan also uses a populist tone in perpetuation of failures as crisis than denying framing them as crisis. But does this work for Erdoğan's and AKP's favor? When we check electoral support to AKP, it falls from 40.2 % to 38.1 %. Of course, that might also be about corruption charges during December the 17th-25th incidents. However, although an association between crisis perpetuation via populist rhetoric and a rise in sense of crisis exists, it does not support the argument that that might help Erdoğan to remain in power. The story is not different for case 4. While Erdoğan more frequently applies crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric than crisis denying one (0.397 vs 0.328 in terms of within case proportions) crisis perception rises substantially, and almost continuously from 36.2 % to 63.9 % between September 2016 and January 2017, for the same period, the electoral support to AKP falls sharply from 49.8 % to 41 %. Furthermore, in both cases Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing populist appeals do not overwhelm crisis denying ones while they are just more frequently applied. Cases in which sense of crisis rises regardless of Erdoğan's rhetoric do not pertain to my research interest due to the scope of this study.

Lastly, if to make an overall summary of cases, for case 1 when political failures are not common and serious confrontations do not even exist, Erdoğan does not even apply any crisis perpetuation attempts while crisis denying ones exist, but they are so few. Instead he overwhelmingly applies failure ignoring appeals vis-à-vis failure recognizing ones (overall values are 0.945 vs 0.055). And like in all cases, his failure ignoring non-populist appeals are greater than populist ones. For case 2, Erdoğan recognizes failures more frequently than just ignoring them due to serious political confrontation with Gülenist Movement occurs during December the 17th-25th incidents. In accord with this political atmosphere, he uses crisis emphasizing populist appeals more frequently than crisis denying ones. Although this seems to be related with a rise in sense of crisis among the people of Turkey, it does not seem to

work for the advantage of AKP in terms of electoral support. For case 3, failure ignoring rhetoric begins to overwhelm failure recognizing one due to approaching June the 7th elections (0.68 vs 0.32 in terms of within case proportions) while Erdoğan less frequently applies crisis emphasizing populist appeals than crisis denying ones. For case 4, Erdoğan again recognizes failures more frequently than just ignoring them due to recent bloody confrontation with members of the Gülenist Movement during July the 15th coup attempt. Like in case 2, he again uses crisis emphasizing populist appeals more frequently than crisis denying ones while a tremendous rise in sense of crisis among the people of Turkey occurs. However, it again does not seem to work for the advantage of AKP in terms of electoral support. One important detail of this case is Erdoğan's overall failure recognizing appeals overwhelms his failure ignoring rhetoric (0.897 vs 0.103 in terms of within case proportions). For case 5, Erdoğan's crisis denying appeals are greater than crisis emphasizing ones while number of coded excerpts of any type of rhetoric is the lowest when compared with all remaining cases. Only 26 excerpts have been detected while Erdoğan's tendency is more about ignoring failures. For case 6, the gap between failure ignoring and recognizing appeals gets wider due to upcoming June the 24th elections and the former again overwhelms the latter as the election day approaches (0.809 vs 0.191 in terms of within case frequencies). Erdoğan again more frequently applies crisis denying populist appeals than crisis emphasizing ones. And lastly, for case 7 Turkey has underwent serious economic downturn due to exchange rate hike in Summer 2018 while political and diplomatic confrontation with the U.S. got severe. However, this confrontation was framed by domestic and international media to be more about Pastor Andrew Bronson's imprisonment in Turkey. So different than what was experienced in case 2 and case 4, political crisis of case 7 did not seem to be about changing political settings of Turkey. For case 7, crisis denying populist appeals turn out to be greater than Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing populist appeals. This might be related with due to the limited availability of data on official presidential webpage since some of Erdoğan's appeals which were framed by the media were indeed more in accord with the aim of this research. However, I haven't encountered such severe crisis perpetuation references of Erdoğan in discourses of this period on the official presidential webpage¹⁶⁸. I think that

¹⁶⁸. An example that I've used to explain my categories: "If they have Dollar, we have our people, we have our Allah." That was said by Erdoğan during exchange rate crisis of Summer 2018.

for the ones who aim to run future research, especially for this case, less limitations on availability of Erdoğan's discourses may be more helpful.

4.3. Concluding Remarks

In this work, I've intended to run an exploratory research based on Moffitt's argument that (2015) populism perpetuates failures and turns them into crisis, thereby achieve their sustainable populist politics, and remain in power. Moffitt (2015) argues that populists who skillfully perpetuate a performance of crisis and achieved to extend it to a longer period of time have longer political lifetime than the ones who couldn't achieved to do so (208). He points out Hugo Chávez's success of achieving such perpetuation, and thereby had been able to rule for a long period of time (207). Depending on this claim, I've attempted to run an explorative empirical case studies and a mixed method research in order to find out whether Recep Tayyip Erdoğan might have also been able to remain in power due to same strategy or not, for between October 2012 and September 2018. In the most of this period, Turkey has undergone serious economic and political failures. In accord with my objective, I've created and defined my categorical variables while selecting my cases according to failure periods of three key economic indicators: exchange rate, unemployment rate, and inflation rate. I was hoping to find out more crisis emphasizing or denying attempts of Erdoğan when Turkey experiences serious economic downturns. Once I have adopted both a qualitative and quantitative approach in terms of focusing on my cases and then running analysis, despite the narrow scope of this exploratory research due to limited data, I've found out that Erdoğan does not seem to fit the "populist" profile that Moffitt (2015) mentions during his remarks on Hugo Chávez. Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing populist rhetoric is more frequently exercised than his crisis denying populist rhetoric only in two of my cases, case 2 and case 4. Although there seems to be association with Erdoğan's crisis perpetuation attempts of failures as crisis via a populist tone and sense of crisis levels, contrary to my expectation, the electoral support to AKP does not rise and does not seem to work for the advantage of the government and Erdoğan for related cases. In both of these cases Turkey underwent serious political failures

and Turkey's political settings were under the risk of change. During case 2, Turkey experienced December 17th-25th incidents and case 4 refers to the period that the failed coup attempt that members of Gülenist Movement are involved on July the 15th, 2016. Hence, the variation of Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing attempts might only be explained by Turkey's facing with such huge political turmoil and framed by Erdoğan as political crisis in his pure political appeals. My point about this possible variation of Erdoğan's perpetuation of crisis via populist rhetoric may indeed be in accord with Chávez's position in Venezuela vis-à-vis the U.S. For many years, Venezuela under Chávez rule, had mostly been framed by international media as it has been under offensive political siege of the U.S. while this situation may have provided a fertile soil for Chávez crisis emphasizing attempts. Moffitt (2015) also gives examples of Chávez's perpetuation of political failures as crisis in his work. Hence, due to constraints of data and time, and because of limited findings of this study, one can also focus on a greater temporal scope while maximizing cases by including non-failure periods, and might seek to find out whether Erdoğan's crisis emphasizing attempts have an association with all serious political downturns that Turkey has recently faced with under AKP rule¹⁶⁹. Moreover, any future research does not have to be limited to Turkey and Erdoğan while many contemporary democracies of today are either being ruled or may be ruled in close future by "populist" leaders.

¹⁶⁹ Moreover, if available data can be found, one can instead merely focus on political failures and Erdoğan's perpetuation of such failures as crisis while checking political crisis perception of the people of Turkey. Due to data limitations in this work, I've been able to acquire only economic crisis perception of the people of Turkey.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adcock, Robert, and David Collier. "Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research." *American political science review* 95, no. 3 (2001): 529-546.
- Arditi, Benjamin. *Politics on the Edges of Liberalism: Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation: Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation*. Edinburgh University Press, 2007.
- Aslanidis, Paris. "Is populism an ideology? A refutation and a new perspective." *Political Studies* 64, no. 1_suppl (2016): 88-104.
- Aslanidis, Paris. "Measuring populist discourse with semantic text analysis: an application on grassroots populist mobilization." *Quality & Quantity* 52, no. 3 (2018): 1241-1263.
- Barr, Robert R. "Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment politics." *Party Politics* 15, no. 1 (2009): 29-48.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*. Springer, 1994.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. "Conditions favouring the success and failure of radical right-wing populist parties in contemporary democracies." In *Democracies and the populist challenge*, pp. 197-213. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2002.
- Bonikowski, Bart. "Three lessons of contemporary populism in Europe and the United States." *Brown J. World Aff.* 23 (2016): 9.
- Canovan, Margaret. "Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy." *Political studies* 47, no. 1 (1999): 2-16.

- Canovan, Margaret. "Taking politics to the people: Populism as the ideology of democracy." In *Democracies and the populist challenge*, pp. 25-44. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2002.
- Dahl, Robert A. "What political institutions does large-scale democracy require?." *Political Science Quarterly* 120, no. 2 (2005): 187-197.
- De la Torre, Carlos. *Populist seduction in Latin America: the Ecuadorian experience*. Vol. 32. Ohio University Press, 2000.
- Di Tella, Torcuato S. "Populism into the twenty-first century." *Government and Opposition* 32, no. 2 (1997): 187-200.
- Ferguson, Niall. "Populism as a backlash against globalization—Historical perspectives." *Horizons* 8 (2016): 12-21.
- Fieschi, Catherine. "Introduction to populism: Special issue." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9, no. 3 (2004): 235-40.
- Foa, Roberto Stefan, and Yascha Mounk. "The democratic disconnect." *Journal of democracy* 27, no. 3 (2016): 5-17.
- Foa, Roberto Stefan, and Yascha Mounk. "The signs of deconsolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 1 (2017): 5-15.
- Freeden, Michael. "Is nationalism a distinct ideology?." *Political studies* 46, no. 4 (1998): 748-765.
- Freeden, Michael. "After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology." (2017): 1-11.
- Gidron, Noam, and Bart Bonikowski. "Varieties of populism: Literature review and research agenda." (2013).
- Hawkins, Kirk A. "Is Chávez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 8 (2009): 1040-1067.

- Hawkins, Kirk A. *Venezuela's chavismo and populism in comparative perspective*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Hawkins, Kirk, Madeleine Read, and Teun Pauwels. "Populism and its causes." *The Oxford handbook of populism* (2017): 267-286.
- Howarth, David. "Introduction: discourse, hegemony and populism: Ernesto Laclau's political theory." In *Ernesto Laclau*, pp. 9-28. Routledge, 2014.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. "Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash." *Harvard JFK School of Government Faculty Working Papers Series* (2016): 1-52.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. "Trump and the populist authoritarian parties: the silent revolution in reverse." *Perspectives on Politics* 15, no. 2 (2017): 443-454.
- Jagers, Jan, and Stefaan Walgrave. "Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium." *European journal of political research* 46, no. 3 (2007): 319-345.
- Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds. *The Oxford handbook of populism*. Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira. "The ambivalence of populism: threat and corrective for democracy." *Democratization* 19, no. 2 (2012): 184-208.
- Kazin, Michael. *The populist persuasion: An American history*. Cornell University Press, 2017.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton university press, 1994.
- Knight, Alan. "Populism and neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 30, no. 2 (1998): 223-248.
- Laclau, Ernesto. *On populist reason*. Verso, 2005.

- Laclau, Ernesto. *Politics and ideology in Marxist theory: Capitalism, fascism, populism*. NLB, 1977.
- Laclau, Ernesto. "Populism: What's in a Name." *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* 48 (2005).
- Levitsky, Steven, and James Loxton. "Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes." *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 107-136.
- Mény, Yves, and Yves Surel. "The constitutive ambiguity of populism." In *Democracies and the populist challenge*, pp. 1-21. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2002.
- Moffitt, Benjamin. "How to perform crisis: A model for understanding the key role of crisis in contemporary populism." *Government and Opposition* 50, no. 2 (2015): 189-217.
- Moffitt, Benjamin, and Simon Tormey. "Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style." *Political studies* 62, no. 2 (2014): 381-397.
- Mudde, Cas. "The populist zeitgeist." *Government and opposition* 39, no. 4 (2004): 541-563.
- Mudde, Cas. "In the name of the peasantry, the proletariat, and the people: populisms in Eastern Europe." In *Democracies and the populist challenge*, pp. 214-232. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2002.
- Mudde, Cas. "Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?." *European Journal of Political Research* 52, no. 1 (2013): 1-19.
- Mudde, Cas. "An ideational approach." *The Oxford handbook of populism* (2017): 27-47.
- Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. "Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: Comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America." *Government and Opposition* 48, no. 2 (2013): 147-174.
- Müller, Jan-Werner. *What is populism?*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017.
- Panizza, Francisco. "Introduction: Populism and the mirror of democracy." (2005): 1-31.

- Pappas, Takis S. "Distinguishing liberal democracy's challengers." *Journal of democracy* 27, no. 4 (2016): 22-36.
- Pauwels, Teun. "Measuring populism: A quantitative text analysis of party literature in Belgium." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 21, no. 1 (2011): 97-119.
- Reungoat, Emmanuelle. "Anti-EU parties and the people: An analysis of populism in French Euromanifestos." *Perspectives on European Politics and society* 11, no. 3 (2010): 292-312.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. "Populism, political conflict, and grass-roots organization in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* (2006): 127-148.
- Rodrik, Dani. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization." *Journal of International Business Policy* (2018): 1-22.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs, and Teun Pauwels. "Measuring populism: Comparing two methods of content analysis." *West European Politics* 34, no. 6 (2011): 1272-1283.
- Stanley, Ben. "The thin ideology of populism." *Journal of political ideologies* 13, no. 1 (2008): 95-110.
- Stavrakakis, Yannis. "Populism and hegemony." In *The Oxford handbook of populism* (2017): 535-553
- Taggart, Paul. "Populism and the pathology of representative politics." In *Democracies and the populist challenge*, pp. 62-80. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2002.
- Taggart, Paul. "Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe." *Journal of political ideologies* 9, no. 3 (2004): 269-288.
- Urbinati, Nadia. "Political theory of populism." *Annual Review of Political Science* (2018).
- Van Kessel, Stijn. "The populist cat-dog: Applying the concept of populism to contemporary European party systems." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 19, no. 1 (2014): 99-118.

- Vasilopoulou, Sofia, Daphne Halikiopoulou, and Theofanis Exadaktylos. "Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 52, no. 2 (2014): 388-402.
- Vittori, Davide. "Re-conceptualizing populism: Bringing a multifaceted concept within stricter borders." *Revista española de ciencia política* 44 (2017): 43-65.
- Weber, Robert Philip. *Basic content analysis*. No. 49. Sage, 1990.
- Weyland, Kurt. "A Political-Strategic Approach." *The Oxford handbook of populism* (2017): 48-72.
- Weyland, Kurt. "Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics." *Comparative politics* (2001): 1-22.
- Weyland, Kurt. "Neoliberal populism in Latin America and eastern Europe." *Comparative politics* (1999): 379-401.

Secondary Resources

- Ak Parti. n.d. Accessed March 27, 2019. <https://www.akparti.org.tr/>.
- Gall, Carlotta. 2018. "Erdogan to Turkey: The West Is Waging 'Economic War'." *The New York Times*. August 17.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-economic-crisis-lira-trump.html>.
- Karaca, Harun. 2013. "Başbakan'ımız Sn. Recep Tayyip ERDOĞAN'ın 09 Nisan 2013 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni." Accessed March 27, 2019.
<http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/7344-basbakanimiz-sn-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-09-nisan-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasinin-tam-metni>.

Karaca, Harun. n.d. Accessed March 27, 2019. <http://harunkaraca.com/>.

Konda interaktif. 2019. Accessed April 1, 2019.

<https://interaktif.konda.com.tr/tr/barometre/>.

Mersin Gündem. 2013. “BAŞBAKAN RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN TBMM 11:30 AK PARTİ GRUP TOPLANTISI 14.05.2013 11:30.” YouTube. YouTube. May 14. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=29NMs4jplYQ>.

TRT Haber. 2014. “Başbakan Erdoğan. 18 Şubat 2014 / TBMM Grup Toplantısı Konuşması.” YouTube video. 51:55. From Erdoğan’s speech in AKP Group Meeting on February the 18th 2014. Posted by Atilla Subaşı on February the 18th 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W7T62ivfnG4>.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı. 2019 Accessed March 24, 2019.

<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/>.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası. n.d. “Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi.” Accessed April 15, 2019. <https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/>.

APPENDIX

Table: Web links of all selections

Cases / Discourse IDs	Links
Case 1 / D01	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwBs92-HiP0
Case 1 / D02	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RhLQpW1WTrE
Case 1 / D03	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/286-snbasbakanimizin-14-kasim-tarihli-genisletilmis-il-baskanlari-toplantisi-konusmasinin-tam-metni; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ccjb5k8UEg
Case 1 / D04	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/291-basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdogan-beyin-20-kasim-2012-tarihindeki-grup-konusmasinin-tam-metni; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dhudG1Bg_Gg
Case 1 / D05	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ftBBStRT5DI
Case 1 / D06	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-7fdOPssrU
Case 1 / D07	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/325-snbasbakanimizin-15-ocak-tarihli-tbmm-grup-toplantisi-konusmasinin-tam-metni; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajP42KLe1Hg
Case 1 / D08	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/329-snbasbakanimizin-22-ocak-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasi; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sp4eUzn81Q0
Case 1 / D09	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77GHGfFSb3M
Case 2 / D10	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/11407-basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-22-ekim-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MR-8nU7AYrw
Case 2 / D11	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/11416-basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-05-kasim-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PaaqcWP7qFs
Case 2 / D12	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/11426-basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-19-kasim-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9kZTDX64HnU
Case 2 / D13	http://www.harunkaraca.com/m/haber/genel-baskandan/11437-basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-03-aralik-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fTDPcdjxHDQ
Case 2 / D14	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hD5Oaul9Vs

Case 2 / D15	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/11470-basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-14-ocak-2014-tarihli-grup-konusmasinini-videosu-ve-tam-metni ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEgRtK2C_EU
Case 2 / D16	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/12475-basbakanimiz-sn-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-28-ocak-2014-tarihli-grup-konusmasinini-videosu-ve-tam-metni ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htWnJKAA9cg
Case 3 / D17	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2973/turkiye-genc-is-adamlari-konfederasyonu-tugik-genel-baskani-erkan-gural-ve-konfederasyon-uyelerini-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / D18	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2978/muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / D19	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2991/ikinci-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / D20	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2997/ucuncu-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / D21	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/29791/dorduncu-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / D22	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/29895/besinci-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / D23	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/30100/altinci-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / D24	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32122/musiad-23-genel-kurulunda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / D25	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/51281/81-ilin-valisini-kabulunde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / D26	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/52447/27-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / D27	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/55704/28-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / D28	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/55757/29-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / D29	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/58925/musiad-16-expo-fuari-ve-20-uluslararası-is-forumu-kongresinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / D30	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61114/turkiyenin-yeni-guvenlik-konsepti-konferansında-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / D31	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/65283/31-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / D32	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/66361/32-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / D33	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/69654/33-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / D34	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/71110/35-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma

Case 5 / D35	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87253/turken-vakfi-geleneksel-gala-yemeginde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 5 / D36	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87254/2017-2018-akademik-yili-acilis-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 5 / D37	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/84824/kanaat-onderleri-ve-stk-temsilcileri-ile-bulusma-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 5 / D38	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/85035/40-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 5 / D39	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87228/turkiyenin-otomobili-ortak-girisim-grubunun-tanitim-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 5 / D40	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87288/41-muhtarlar-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / D41	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/90386/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / D42	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/89348/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / D43	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/89335/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / D44	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/90412/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / D45	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/91644/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / D46	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92030/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / D47	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92346/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / D48	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92474/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / D49	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92824/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / D50	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94019/seyit-aieleriyle-iftar-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / D51	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2amPum2-cU
Case 7 / D52	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94716/ak-parti-genel-merkezinde-yaptiklari-balkon-konusmasi
Case 7 / D53	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94767/cumhurbaskanligi-goreve-baslama-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / D54	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96173/15-temmuz-sehitler-koprusu-bulusmasinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / D55	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96166/10-buyukelciler-konferansi-nda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / D56	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96331/kara-astsubay-meslek-yuksekokulu-mezuniyet-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / D57	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/98641/gaziler-gunu-torende-yaptiklari-konusma

Case 7 / D58	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/98791/teknofest-istanbul-da-yaptiklari-konusma
--------------	---

Table: The list of discarded textualized discourses of party meetings that is held on the national level and of Erdoğan's meetings with muhtars due to random selection

Case / Date	Meeting or Event / Audience	Links
Case 2 / 12.11.2013	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/11419-basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-12-kasim-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasinin-tam-metni
Case 2 / 26.11.2013	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	http://www.harunkaraca.com/haber/genel-baskandan/11432-basbakanimiz-sayin-recep-tayyip-erdoganin-26-kasim-2013-tarihli-grup-konusmasinin-videosu-ve-tam-metni
Case 4 / 01.12.2016	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/65235/30-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / 12.01.2017	Erdoğan's Meeting with Muhtars / Muhtars	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/70910/34-muhtarlar-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / 30.01.2018	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/89339/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 6 / 17.04.2018	AKP Group Meeting / AKP Members	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/92351/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma

Table: The list of remaining discarded textualized discourses due to random selection

Case / Date	Meeting or Event / Audience	Links
Case 3 / 06.01.2015	The 7 th Ambassadors Conference / Ambassadors of Turkey	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2970/yedinci-buyukelciler-konferansinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / 20.01.2015	Energy Markets Summit / Members of Energy Market Regulatory Authority and Participants of the Summit	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2974/enerji-piyasolari-zirvesinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / 18.04.2015	Opening Ceremony in Kocaeli / The People of Kocaeli	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31829/kocaelinde-toplu-acilis-torende-yaptiklari-konusma

Case 3 / 19.04.2015	Opening Ceremony of Levent-Hisarüstü Subway Line / the People of Istanbul	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31831/leven-t-rumeli-hisarustu-metro-hatti-acilis-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / 21.04.2015	175 th Anniversary of Establishment Ceremony of Turk Telekom / Members of Turk Telekom Company	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/31970/turk-telekomun-175-kurulus-yil-donumu-dolayisiyla-duzenlenen-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 3 / 29.04.2015	Publicity of Turkey Agriculture and Rural Development Attempt Project Practices / Farmers and Producers	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/32123/turkiye-tarim-ve-kirsal-kalkinma-hamlesi-proje-uygulamalari-tanitim-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / 01.09.2016	Inauguration of 2017 Court Year / Members of the Judiciary	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/51194/2016-2017-adli-yil-acilis-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / 04.11.2016	Capital Markets Congress / Businesspeople	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/58871/sermaye-piyasalari-kongresinde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / 07.11.2016	Opening Ceremony of Electric Power Plants / Actors of the Energy Market	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61154/elektrik-santralleri-toplu-acilis-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / 10.11.2016	November the 10 th the Commemoration of Atatürk / Participants of the Ceremony	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61155/10-kasim-gazi-mustafa-kemali-anma-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / 13.11.2016	Sendoff Ceremony of Energy Ships to Their Duty Station / Members of Karadeniz Holding and Sedef Shipyard	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61175/enerji-gemilerini-gorev-yerlerine-ugurlama-torende-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / 14.11.2016	National Agriculture Project Meeting / Farmers	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61156/millitarim-projesi-toplantisinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 4 / 23.11.2016	Gong Ceremony of Memorandum of Understanding for Strategic Cooperation Signed	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/61108/borsa-istanbul-ile-islam-kalkinma-bankasi-arasinda-imzalanan-stratejik-isbirligi-icin-mutabakat-zapti-gong-torende-yaptiklari-konusma

	Between Istanbul Stock Exchange and Islamic Development Bank	
Case 5 / 01.10.2017	Inauguration of Turkish Parliament for the 26 th Term 3 rd Legislative Year / Representatives of the Nation	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/84720/turkiye-buyuk-millet-meclisi-26-donem-3-yasama-yili-acis-konusmasi
Case 5 / 29.10.2017	October the 29 th Republic Day Reception / Representatives of the Nation	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87240/29-ekim-cumhuriyet-bayrami-resepsiyonunda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 5 / 01.11.2017	Tourism Council / Individuals of Tourism Industry	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/87230/3-turizm-srasinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / 13.07.2018	Opening Ceremony of the First Meeting of Presidency Cabinet / Ministers, Deputies, and Participants of the Ceremony	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/95917/cumhurbaskanligi-kabinesi-birinci-toplantisi-acilis-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / 13.07.2018	The Ceremony of Granting Medal of Honor to Turkish Parliamentary Speaker Binali Yıldırım / Participants of the Ceremony	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/94865/tbmm-baskani-binali-yildirim-a-devlet-seref-madalyasi-tevcih-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / 15.07.2018	Dinner with Kith and Kin of Martyrs and Veterans of July the 15 th / Kith and Kin of Martyrs and Veterans of July the 15 th	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96172/15-temmuz-sehit-yakinlari-ve-gazileri-ile-yemek-programinda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / 26.08.2018	Conquest of Anatolia Malazgirt 1071 Ceremony / Politicians and Participants of the Ceremony	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96277/anadolu-nun-fethi-malazgirt-1071-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma

Case 7 / 29.08.2018	2017 Media Oscar Awards Ceremony of RTGD / Media Individuals	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96329/radyo-televizyon-gazetecileri-dernege-2017-yili-medya-oscarlari-odul-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / 30.08.2018	The Ceremony of August 30 Victory Day / Participants of the Ceremony	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96324/30-agustos-zafer-bayrami-resepsiyonunda-yaptiklari-konusma
Case 7 / 30.08.2018	Graduation Ceremony of Students of Military Academy / Authorities of National Defense University and Military Academy, Graduated Students and Their Families	https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/96330/milli-savunma-universitesi-harp-okullari-mezuniyet-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma