REGIME TYPE AND THE PROPENSITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH INSURGENTS DURING CIVIL CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

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Conventional wisdom in the literature of terrorism suggests that groups using terrorism selectively attack governments based on their expectations about government compliance. Domestic institutions, in this respect, emerge as one of the important factors that encourage and/or discourage terrorism. However, researchers have not empirically addressed how differing domestic institutions condition governmental responses to terror attacks. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature by examining the interactive effect of regime type and terror attacks on a government's tendency to negotiate with insurgent groups during civil wars that took place between 1989 and 2009 in Africa. Using the regime type categorization by Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014), I find that terror attacks have a positive effect on the probability of government negotiations with insurgent groups in democracies, single party regimes, and in military regimes, but a negative effect in personalist regimes. Prior work on the relationship between regime types and political outcomes suggest that democracies, single party regimes, and military regimes tend to accommodate groups using terrorism, due to (i) high costs of repressive counterterrorism measures, (ii) low tolerance towards civilian casualties, and (iii) constraints on exercise of coercive power. In contrast, terrorism does not translate into government compliance in personalist regimes, because personalist leaders are (i) immune to political costs of repressive counterterrorism measures, (ii) unsensitive to civilian casualties, and (iii) unconstrained in their exercise of coercive power.

ÖZET

REJİM TÜRLERİ VE SİVİL UYUŞMAZLIK SÜREÇLERİNDE İSYANCILAR İLE ANLAŞMA YAPMA İHTİMALLERİ

TUBA SENDİNÇ

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Literatürdeki hakim görüş terör saldırıları yapan grupların saldırı yapacakları hedefleri hükümetlerden almayı bekledikleri tepkilere göre seçtiklerini öne sürmektedir. Bu bağlamda, ülkelerin siyasi kurumsal yapısı terör saldırılarını teşvik eden veya caydıran önemli faktörlerden biri olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Fakat, araştırmacılar farklı siyasi kurumların hükümetlerin terör saldırılarına tepkilerini nasıl etkilediğini inceleyen ampirik bir çalışma henüz gerçekleştirmemişlerdir. Bu tez, rejim türleri ve terör saldırılarının interaktif ilişkisini 1989 ve 2009 yılları arasında Afrika'da gerçekleşen sivil savaşlar süresince hükümetlerin terör saldırıları yapan gruplarla anlaşma yapma ihtimalini nasıl etkilediğini inceleyerek literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlıyor. Geddes, Frantz, ve Wright (2014) rejim kategorilerininin kullanıldığı bu çalışma, terör saldırılarının demokrasiler, tek parti rejimleri, ve askeri rejimlerde hükümetlerin isyancı gruplarla anlaşma yapma ihtimalini arttırdığını, fakat tek adam rejimlerinde azalttığını ortaya koymaktadır. Rejim türleri ve siyasi sonuçlar literatürüne göre, demokrasiler, tek parti rejimleri, ve askeri rejimler terör saldırıları yapan gruplar ile uzlaşmayı tercih etmekte, çünkü bu rejimlerde (i) baskıcı terör karşıtı politikaların siyasilere maliyeti yüksek, (ii) sivil kayıplarına karşı siyasi tolerans az, ve (iii) baskıcı devlet gücü siyasi kurumlarca kısıtlamalar altında. Bunun aksine, terörizm tek adam rejimlerinde hükümetleri anlaşma yapmaya teşvik edememekte, çünkü tek adam rejimlerinde (i) baskıcı terör karşıtı politikaların liderlere olan siyasi maliyeti düşük, (ii) sivil kayıplarına karşı siyasi hassasiyet yeterli değil, ve (iii) devletin baskı gücü herhangi bir kurumsal kısıtlamaya tabi değil.

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To my mother and my little brother, Kadriye and Mehmet Sendinç.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is often considered as a rational policy tool for politically discontented groups to garner government concessions (see, for example, Kydd and Walter 2002), which indicates that terrorism brings about the expected outcomes for groups that employ it. However strategic groups are, the literature on terrorism provides inconsistent results regarding the effectiveness of this tactic in advancing neither domestic political goals (see, for example, Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014), nor transnational goals (see, for example, Abrahms 2006, 2012; Atkinson, Sandler, and Tschirhart 1987; Bloom 2005; Dershowitz 2002; Mueller 2006; Park and Bali 2017). Scholars of terrorism have long argued that groups target governments that are expected to be responsive to terrorism. For instance, empirical findings suggest that democracies are significantly more likely than others, i.e., autocracies, to be targeted by terror attacks (see, for example, Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Lai 2007; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid 1992; Stanton 2013; Young and Dugan 2011). Such findings point to a possible mechanism where regime type condition governments' responses to terrorism.

Some of the canonical explanations connecting level of democracy to the incidence of terrorism suggests that democracies make attractive targets for terrorism due to democracies' sensitivity towards civilian losses and executive constraints that preclude democratic leaders to pursue a retaliatory counterterrorism strategy (see, for example, Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Kalyvas 2004; Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003; Stanton 2013). A recent study done by Saygılı (2019) finds that democracies with low levels of regime stability are likely to concede to hostage-taking terrorism. Such a dichotomous approach to regime types have attracted criticism from many scholars in the field of comparative politics (e.g. Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Geddes 1999, 2003) and international relations (e.g. Lai and Slater 2006; Slater 2003; Weeks 2008, 2012), since it fails to capture the qualitative differences among autocratic regimes. As such, this study moves beyond the question of whether democracies are more responsive to terrorism than autocracies and contributes to the debate of how differences within autocratic regimes shape governmental responses

to terrorism. By employing data on autocratic regime types collected by Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014a), this thesis compares both differences between democracies and autocracies and between democracies and different types of autocracies in responding to terrorism

This thesis examines which regime types are more responsive to terrorism in the context of civil wars. Recently, scholars have become interested in analyzing the dynamics of terrorism and civil war in relation to each other (Findley and Young 2012; Fortna 2015; Stanton 2013; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014). During civil wars, some groups exclusively employ guerrilla attacks, while others combine their military strategies with terrorism (Fortna 2015; Ganor 2002; Merari 1993; Thomas 2014). For instance, while UNITA in Angola relied on a mixture of guerrilla tactics and terrorism,[1] Chad National Liberation Front (Frolinat) did not employ terrorism and only relied on guerrilla tactics. A limited number of studies (Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014) have presented somehow contradictory results on whether terrorism "works" or does not "work" during civil wars. This calls for a greater attention from scholars of terrorism and conflict to elucidate the unexplored causal mechanisms that translate terrorism into success in garnering political concessions at times of civil wars. Using a sample of cases from civil wars, this project aims to contribute to this line of literature by investigating which regime types are likely to respond to the demands of insurgents using terrorism. More specifically, I will focus on the incidence of negotiations as a measure of success for insurgents, as negotiations are necessary for insurgents to be granted legitimacy by their governments and eventually garner political concessions (Thomas 2014).

This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide a discussion on motivations behind terrorism, especially in the context of civil wars, along with a discussion on costs governments incur as a result of terror activity. Here, I also outline existing literature on the effectiveness of terrorism in civil wars and identify several potential reasons why the empirical findings yield contradictory results on the effectiveness of terrorism in civil wars.

In Chapter 3, I first provide a glimpse of the literature on the link between regime type and terrorism where domestic institutions are considered to be important factors that encourage and/or discourage terrorism. Prior work has presented two causal mechanisms linking regime type to the incidence of terrorism. The first causal mechanism suggests that some regime types, i.e., democracies, provide strategic incentives (e.g. free media, the tendency to concede) to use terrorism for politically

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[1] Foreign Policy in Focus, February 1, 2002. "Jonas Savimbi: Washington's Freedom Fighter," Africa's "Terrorist."" https://fpif.org/jonas_savimbi_washingtons_freedom_fighter_africas_terrorist/ Consulted on July 4, 2019.

aggrieved groups (e.g. Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Li 2005; Pape 2003). Building on this line of thinking, researchers find a positive association between democracy and the incidence of terrorism. The second causal mechanism, however, suggests that political access facilitated by democratic institutions reduces the likelihood of terror attacks as citizens find venues to voice their political grievances and seek solutions. Scholars in the second camp find a negative association when political participation and executive constraints are considered in explaining the occurrence of terrorism (e.g. Eyerman 1998; Li 2005; Young and Dugan 2011).

In Chapter 4, I provide a theoretical account on the effects of terrorism on forcing governmental compliance as conditional on regime type, along with a series of hypotheses. After providing a theoretical account on democratic responses to terrorism, I go beyond the democracy-autocracy dichotomy and discuss the institutional variation within autocracies and how it shapes the way autocratic governments respond to terrorism. I specifically focus on three main factors in developing my theoretical expectations regarding different regimes' responsiveness to terrorism which are; costs of repressive counterterrorism measures, sensitivity to civilian losses, and executive constraints. Accordingly, I hypothesize that terrorism should have a positive effect on government negotiations with insurgents in democracies, single party regimes, and in military regimes, but a negative effect in personalist regimes.

In order to conduct empirical analyses to test hypotheses, I combine data on terror attacks and governmental negotiations provided by Thomas (2014) and on regime types provided by Geddes, Frantz, Wright (2014a). In Chapter 5, I present an overview of this combined dataset and provide a discussion on the descriptive statistics. In the following section, I introduce the variables specified in the full model equation used to test the hypotheses. Then, I report and interpret the empirical findings in both statistical and substantive terms. I find that terrorism has a positive effect on the probability of government negotiations with insurgents in democracies, single party regimes, and military regimes. Still, the results show that terror attacks have differing effect magnitudes on the probability of negotiations in each regime type. More specifically, while each terror attack substantially increases the probability of government negotiations with insurgent groups in democracies, this effect is marginal in single party and military regimes in substantive terms.

Chapter 6 concludes this thesis and provides a discussion on the key findings from the empirical analyses. The empirical findings of this research project are in line with the previous research which argues that groups act strategically in targeting governments. As the findings suggest, compared to different types of autocracies, democracies, regimes that are targeted by terror attacks most frequently, have the

highest likelihood to negotiate with groups using terrorism. Conversely, personalist regimes, regimes that are seldom targeted, have the least likelihood to grant negotiations to such groups. The findings also echo the existing literature on varying government preferences across autocratic regimes, as different types of autocracies exhibit variation in their responses to terrorism. I finish this chapter by touching upon the potential limitations of this study.

2.   TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT

Hannah Arendt (1970, p. 51) asserted: "violence is by nature instrumental," countering the view that groups using violence are a collection of "crazy," "evil," and/or "angry" individuals.[1] Instead, Arendt suggested that violence is thoughtfully employed as an instrument to achieve ends by individuals and groups. Violence via terrorism is no different; terrorism is a strategic choice and does not occur "out of the blue."[2] In this regard, use of terrorism by insurgents is a product of a careful calculation, especially given the availability of other military tactics, i.e., guerrilla attacks, at times of civil wars[3] to achieve government and/or population compliance.

A clear definition of terrorism is necessary for analytically rigorous research on why groups and organizations use the instrument of terrorism. Interestingly, however, little agreement exists on what constitutes a terror act. Indeed, no international legal definition of terrorism is adopted to date.[4] Schmid (1992) identifies 22 different "definitional elements" of terrorism in his study where he examines definitions of terrorism used in articles published in leading journals of their fields.

Still, notable agreements on the definition of terrorism have so far allowed strands of literature to build on each other. First, many scholars have agreed that terrorism is political (see, for example, Crenshaw 1981; Ruby 2002b). "...robbery, homicide, and kidnapping, which are committed in the furtherance of personal or criminal goals..." are not considered as acts of terrorism (Ruby 2002b, p. 809).

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[1]For a study on the association between mental illness and terrorism, see Ruby (2002a).

[2]Laitin and Shapiro (2008) provide a review on studies with rationalist approaches to terrorism.

[3]Instead of providing an abstract definition of civil wars, scholars preferred to determine a set of criteria in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of conflict. According to most of the criteria, civil wars (a) involve a fight between agents of a state and nonstate groups who seek to oust their governments or to change government policies, (b) result in 1,000 battle-related deaths annually, (c) where at least 100 were killed on both sides (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

[4]UN Security Council member states have passed the Resolution 1566 (2004) that lists violent acts that qualify as terrorism. However, member states still did not agree on a definition. According to the resolution, terror activities include "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act..." (UN Security Council 2004, p. 2)

Second, an overwhelming majority of scholars have reached a consensus that the most important defining characteristic of terrorism is target choice, i.e., civilians and nonmilitary targets (see, for example, Ganor 2002). Third, groups employing terror attacks aim to convey a political message to a large audience rather than to inflict pain on immediate targets (see, for example, Crenshaw 1981; Hoffman 2006; Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004). In Hoffman's words (2006, p. 40-41), terrorism "is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider 'target audience'..." For the purposes of this study, I will employ the following definition provided by Lake (2002, p. 17): "terrorism is the irregular use of violence by nonstate groups against nonmilitary targets and personnel for political ends."[5]

2.1 Terrorism in Civil Wars

Insurgent groups largely rely on guerrilla attacks during civil wars and use terrorism as a "complementary" military strategy (Fortna 2015; Ganor 2002; Merari 1993; Thomas 2014). Even though guerrilla and terror attacks converge in terms of their motivation, i.e., achieving political ends, they *differ* in terms of their targeting choice. The main target of guerrilla attacks is military targets, whereas, terror attacks are directed at civilians and noncombatants (Abrahms 2006; Ganor 2002; Jongman 2017; Moghadam 2006; Nolan 2002). Following this logic, guerrilla warfare is defined as "a violent struggle using (or threatening to use) violence against military targets, security forces, and the political leadership, in order to attain political aims" (Ganor 2002, p. 296).

Researchers have looked at the potential reasons why insurgent groups might supplement their conventional civil war military tactics with terrorism. Zartman (2008, p. 7) argues that civil wars are characterized by power asymmetry between a government (strong party) and at least one insurgent group (weak party).[6] Because of this power asymmetry, attacking only on military targets is inadequate for insurgent groups to coerce governments effectively, which necessitates seeking additional

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[5]For a discussion on state terrorism and state sponsoring terrorism, see Ganor (2002).

[6]Zartman (2008) argues that insurgent groups are always disadvantaged compared to their respective governments since even in the cases of power parity, insurgent groups suffer from legitimacy problems.

tactics like terror attacks to increase the costs of fighting for their respective governments (see, for example, Findley and Young 2012; Hultman 2009; Polo and Gleditsch 2016; Stanton 2013; Wood 2010). To put it in clichéd terms, terrorism is considered to be the "weapon of the weak."[7] In support of this argument, researchers have found that the likelihood of terrorism increases if insurgent groups lose a sufficient number of battles during civil wars (Eck and Hultman 2007; Wood 2010).

Even though civil wars are forms of asymmetric conflict, government victory against insurgents is not automatic, since "a weak actor's strategy can make a strong actor's power irrelevant" (2001, p. 93-94). Arreguin-Toft (2001, p. 105) suggests that strategies that help weak actors to win against strong adversaries are indirect military strategies that aim to decrease adversaries' willingness to fight by attacking non-combatants and private property, as opposed to direct military strategies that aim to destruct the military capabilities of adversaries. As such, terrorism appears to be an indirect military strategy employed to undermine governments' power and capabilities by asymmetrically imposing costs on governments during civil wars (Hultman 2009; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014). Echoing Slantchev (2003), terrorism gives insurgents an asymmetric "power to hurt" governments, which might lead to governmental compliance (Hultman 2009; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014). By exponentiating the costs of conflict for governments via terrorism, groups seek to signal governments that ending the conflict is a better option than continuing to fight.

What are the costs governments incur when faced with a terror attack? First, governments suffer from legitimacy loss in the eyes of citizens at times of terror attacks because (i) terror attacks are considered as a sign of poor protection offered by governments (Hultman 2009; Kydd and Walter 2006), (ii) citizens become discontented towards their governments at times of repressive counterterrorism measures (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Kalyvas 2004; Kydd and Walter 2006), and (iii) terror attacks might spoil peace processes between governments and discontented domestic groups (Findley and Young 2012; Kalyvas 2006; Kydd and Walter 2006). Second, governments also suffer from direct material costs as a result of terrorism, as terror attacks might (i) displace populations and (ii) decrease economic activity (Wood and Kathman 2014).

Several scholars suggest that terror attacks might help insurgents to decrease the legitimacy of a government by showing that the government is not able to protect its citizens (Hultman 2009; Kydd and Walter 2006). In this regard, Hultman (2009,

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[7]For competing arguments, see Walsh and Piazza (2010), Young and Dugan (2011), Fortna (2015) and Findley and Young (2015).

p. 823) argues "by destroying the government's ability to maintain control, and by providing that the state is unable to provide security, an insurgent group can force the government to back down and offer them concessions." Similarly, researchers argue that groups might employ terrorism with the aim of provoking governments to implement repressive, violent, and indiscriminate policies which in turn mitigates public support for governments (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Kalyvas 2004; Kydd and Walter 2006). When selective targeting is too costly, governments are more likely to opt for indiscriminate counterterrorism measures during civil wars (Kalyvas 2004), which directly and indirectly increase insurgents' power to hurt governments. Bennett (2008) suggests that excessive coercive measures against insurgent groups might help insurgents to gain "the hearts and minds" of their population by mounting anger towards governments which leads to increased levels of support to such groups in the form of material benefits. Governments also suffer from various other costs as a result of terrorism during civil wars such as internal displacement of civilians, decrease in economic activity, and alike (Wood and Kathman 2014, p. 691). Terror attacks might also help groups to spoil peace processes and recruit more members that levy costs on governments (Findley and Young 2012; Kalyvas 2006; Kydd and Walter 2006).

While existing research suggests that governments incur a myriad of costs as a result of terror attacks, the research on the "success" of this strategy during civil wars in bringing the desired outcomes for insurgents remains limited. Do governments show compliance to insurgent groups when faced with a terror attack? Are groups using terrorism during civil wars more advantageous than groups that do not? In this respect, the following pages will provide a discussion on the current state of the literature examining the success and/or effectiveness of terrorism during civil wars.

2.2 Effectiveness of Terrorism in Civil Wars

What is "success" for groups using terrorism during civil wars? Kalyvas (2004, p. 99) argues that terrorism is carried out during civil wars to "achieve compliance."[8] Governmental compliance is a process where a "government adjusts its behavior to accord with the coercing party's given preferences" (Abrahms 2012, p. 371). Existing

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[8]Terror attacks are mainly aimed at achieving governmental compliance. However, several researchers also point out that population compliance might be another goal that groups seek to achieve through terrorism (see, for example, Kalyvas 2004; Kydd and Walter 2006).

studies suggest that government compliance might be observed in various degrees, forms, and at various stages of a civil war, as researchers conceptualize terrorism's success in civil wars as *sitting at the negotiation table*, *obtaining concessions*, and achieving *favorable civil war outcomes* for insurgents.[9]

Thomas (2014, p. 806) suggests that negotiations can be a useful tool to examine the effectiveness of terrorism during civil wars, as governmental concessions and an eventual peaceful settlement are achieved through a series of formal talks. In this respect, she shows that sixty-four percent of governmental concessions were gained in the months insurgents and governments negotiated in civil wars in Africa between 1989 and 2009 (Thomas 2014, p. 806). Furthermore, sitting at the negotiation table with governments per se is a success for insurgent groups, given many governments' policy of "no negotiations with terrorists" to deny legitimacy to groups using terrorism (Bapat 2005; Crenshaw 1981; Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014) as well as to discourage the further usage of the tactic (Betts 2002; Bremer III 1992; Carr 1996).

At times when hostage-taking terrorism was very common, American President Ronald Reagan asserted "America will never make concessions to terrorists."[10] In this sense, governmental concessions are largely considered as a success for organizations employing terror attacks. However, using concessions as a measure of success is not straightforward in the literature, since governmental concessions exhibit a considerable variation in terms of their volume and importance. Researchers have stressed the importance of capturing the volume and the importance of concessions granted to groups using terrorism and operationalized concessions as categorical (see, for example, Abrahms 2012) or count variables (see, for example, Thomas 2014) to capture the importance and volume of concessions. Governments might also respond to terror activities by addressing demands fully, partially, or not at all (Abrahms 2012, p. 371). Similarly, concessions might address substantial political demands, military demands, as well as some other non-political demands such as delivery of food, medicine, and supplies (Thomas 2014, p. 371).

Researchers have also looked at civil war outcomes as a measure of success for insurgents using terrorism, in addition to negotiations and concessions, forms of governmental compliance that take place during civil wars (Fortna 2015; Wood and

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[9]Abrahms (2007) argues that the effectiveness of terrorism might be examined under two domains which are "combat effectiveness" and "strategic effectiveness." The former refers to the ability of groups to inflict material and human costs on governments via terrorism, and the latter refers to their ability to achieve their political aims (Abrahms 2007). In this study, I examine the "strategic effectiveness" of terrorism.

[10]The New York Times, June 19, 1985. "President Bars 'Concessions'; Orders Antihijacking Steps; 3 More TWA Hostages Freed." https://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/19/world/president-bars-concessions-orders-antihijacking-steps-3-more-twa-hostages-freed.html Consulted on July 1, 2019.

Kathman 2014). As such, Wood and Kathman (2014) examine the probability of civil wars ending in negotiated settlements as a result of civilian killing by insurgents. Similarly, Fortna (2015) uses a categorical measure of civil war outcomes and argues that the most favorable outcome during civil wars for insurgents is insurgent victory and the worst outcome is government victory. Contrary to Wood and Kathman (2014), she argues that negotiated settlements are the second-best outcome for insurgents during civil wars, because negotiations necessitate concessions from both sides (Fortna 2015, p. 523).

Studies examining the effectiveness of transnational terrorism are abundant, however, only a handful of studies looked at the success of domestic terrorism, and in particular, terrorism during civil wars (Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014). In addition to the theoretical importance and the policy relevance of the subject matter, studying terrorism in the context of civil wars also helps us to make a comparison between the groups that employ terrorism and the groups that do not in terms of the effectiveness of their tactical choice (Fortna 2015, p. 521). Such a comparison allows researchers to make a stronger causal argument, unlike existing studies (e.g. Pape 2003) that only examine the success of groups that exclusively employ terror attacks (Fortna 2015, p. 521). Hence, studying the effectiveness of terrorism with a sample of cases from civil wars allows researchers to introduce the necessary variation to examine whether terrorism "works" or "does not work" -or rather, when it "works."

Using a sample consisting of the civil wars in Africa between 1989 and 2009, Thomas (2014) finds that insurgent groups using terrorism, on average, are more likely to negotiate with their respective governments and to be granted concessions than groups that do not. Wood and Kathman (2014) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between civilian killing and the likelihood of negotiated settlements where moderate levels of civilian killing are positively associated with negotiated settlements, and very high and very low levels of civilian killing impede termination of civil wars in diplomatic and peaceful means. In contrast to these studies, Fortna (2015) finds that groups using terrorism are no more likely to achieve their maximalist goals; they only achieve some tactical goals that help them to survive longer than others that do not use terrorism.

The state of existing literature on the effectiveness of terrorism during civil wars call for a greater attention from scholars, as the empirical findings are somehow inconsistent. Some empirical issues should be addressed to understand the contradictions among empirical findings. First, the inconsistencies in empirical findings might be attributable to the use of different conceptualizations and operationalizations of

success for groups using terrorism. While Thomas (2014) considers the incidence of negotiations and concessions as a success for armed groups, Wood and Kathman (2014) and Fortna (2015) examine whether civil wars ended with a favorable outcome for armed groups using terrorism. In this sense, while a group of studies focuses on what insurgents gain during conflict (Thomas 2014), another group focuses on whether the conflict is terminated in a way insurgents desire (Fortna 2015; Wood and Kathman 2014).

Similarly, these studies employ different measures of terrorism which might be another explanation for these contradictory empirical findings. Young (2019, p. 10) shows that using different measures of terrorism (e.g. number of terror attacks versus number of fatalities) might change empirical results.[11] While Thomas (2014) uses the total number of successful terror attacks in a given month, Wood and Kathman (2014) use the total number of intentional civilian deaths caused by an insurgent group in a given month. Fortna (2015), in contrast, uses a dichotomous measure of terrorism that denotes 1 for insurgents that employ indiscriminate high casualty terrorism.

Whether in the form of concessions or negotiations, terrorism is considered successful when governments change their behavior. As long as governments do not change their behavior in response to terror attacks, terrorism would remain an ineffective tactic during civil wars. Knowing this, groups launch terror attacks against the governments that, they think, would be responsive to terror attacks in ways that are favorable to them (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler 2017; Piazza 2007; Stanton 2013; Young and Dugan 2011). The next chapter will provide a discussion on the research examining the variation in the occurrence of terrorism across different regime types.

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[11] Young (2019) replicates Chenoweth (2010) and finds that empirical results lose their statistical significance when number of fatalities caused by terror attacks is used instead of using number of attacks as Chenoweth (2010) did. As a result, Young (2019, p. 10) suggests that scholars of terrorism should use different measurements for terror attacks in order to check the robustness of their empirical results and build more nuanced theoretical expectations.

3.   TERRORISM AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

In a 2012 speech to Chatham House, David S. Cohen, the U.S. Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, revealed: "...we know that hostage takers looking for ransoms distinguish between those governments that pay ransoms and those that do not and make a point of not taking hostages from those countries that do not pay."[1] Extant research is in line with Cohen's expectations; groups using terrorism tend to attack governments selectively. A large body of research on this topic highlighted the effects of regime type, and in particular the level of democracy, in encouraging and/or discouraging terror attacks (Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Eyerman 1998; Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler 2017; Schmid 1992; Stanton 2013; Young and Dugan 2011).[2]

Scholars have traditionally relied on two distant but related mechanisms to explain the link between democracy and terrorism. The first mechanism concentrates upon the strategic benefits of targeting democracies with terror attacks where mostly a positive relationship is found between democracy and terrorism (Berry 1987; Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Kydd and Walter 2006; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid 1992). The second mechanism, in contrast, implies a negative relationship between the level of democracy and terrorism by highlighting the political access offered in democracies that enable aggrieved groups to channel their dissent (Eyerman 1998; Li 2005; Young and Dugan 2011).

These studies employed a variety of measures of democracy. While some studies employed the unidimensional Polity 2 score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2018) to capture the effects of democracy (e.g. Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler 2017), some others used a dichotomous variable that distinguishes democracies and autocracies (e.g. Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Eyerman 1998). Furthermore, several scholars also employed various other measures that capture the nuances in differing demo-

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[1] U.S. Department of the Treasury, May 10, 2012. "Remarks of Under Secretary David Cohen at Chatham House on "Kidnapping for Ransom: The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge"" https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1726.aspx Consulted on July 5, 2019.

[2] In terms of transnational terror attacks, Savun and Phillips (2009) suggest that foreign policy choices are better predictors of terror attacks than regime types.

cratic environments, by using a veto players approach (Young and Dugan 2011), and by examining the effects of executive constraints and democratic participation (Li 2005).

The strategic mechanism argues that targeting democracies via terror attacks is strategically beneficial as media and press freedom in democracies allow groups to garner sufficient publicity to advertise their attacks, and thus influence a large portion of the populace (see, for example, Eubank and Weinberg 1994). Furthermore, terrorism is believed to be more accessible and less costly in democracies compared to autocracies as democratic environments provide groups with the opportunity to mobilize and organize dissent (Schmid 1992). Another line of thinking that builds upon the strategic benefits of targeting democracies via terror attacks suggests that democracies are more prone to make concessions to terrorism as such regimes are sensitive to civilian losses (Berry 1987; Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003; Stanton 2013).

The political access mechanism presents a negative relationship between the level of democracy and the incidence of terrorism. Several scholars have argued that democracies provide formal institutions through which aggrieved groups can channel their dissent which eliminates the need to pursue violent strategies to achieve their aims (Eyerman 1998). However, researchers have shown that democracies might not always provide a conducive atmosphere for political change due to the institutions inherent to democracies. In this respect, Li (2005) finds empirical evidence lending support to both mechanisms linking democracy to terror attacks where while executive constraints increase prospects of being targeted by a terror attack, democratic participation decreases terrorism. In a similar study, Young and Dugan (2011) argue that democracies with multiple veto players are likely to experience terror attacks than others since such political environments are prone to deadlocks that make it hard to change policies. Consequently, groups resort to terrorism to change the preferences of the veto players and force political change (Young and Dugan 2011).

By using a unified model which captures both mechanisms, Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler (2017) find a nonlinear relationship between the occurrence of terrorism and regime type. They maintain that full-fledged autocracies and democracies are less likely than anocracies to experience terrorism (Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler 2017). This is because, they argue, discontented groups do not have any room to launch their terror attacks in strict autocracies as such regimes use excessive repression against anti-government activity, whereas, such groups do not have incentives to engage in terrorism in well-established democracies as democracies provide political access and have the capacity to combat terrorism. However, anocracies are

the most unstable regimes and are very susceptible to terror attacks. (Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler 2017, p. 519).

Many of these studies have employed the Polity scale as a typical regime type indicator to contrast democracies with autocracies and neglected the variation within autocracies in experiencing terrorism. During the last two decades, many scholars in different fields of political science and international relations have started problematizing such a dichotomous approach in assessing the effect regime type has on political outcomes (see, for example, Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012; Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Davenport 2007a; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Geddes 1999, 2003; Kinne and Marinov 2010; Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Pickering and Kisangani 2010; Slater 2003; Weeks 2008, 2012; Wilson and Piazza 2013). Scholars have found that different autocracies demonstrate different abilities to credibly signal their resolve during international crises (Weeks 2008), practiced different levels of repression (Davenport 2007a), had different rates of survival (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), had different levels of belligerency during international crises (Lai and Slater 2006; Slater 2003; Weeks 2012) and experienced different levels of terror attacks (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012; Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Wilson and Piazza 2013).

Autocratic regimes might host institutions through which aggrieved groups can mobilize and launch terror attacks. In support to strategic accounts that link regime type to terrorism, Aksoy, Carter, and Wright (2012) find that autocratic regimes with opposition parties that have no access to legislation are the regimes most prone to experience terrorism. Political parties in autocracies allow opponents to overcome obstacles to mobilization, and if opponents are not given any access to legislation, they resort to terrorism in pursuit of their political ends (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012, p. 823).

Wilson and Piazza (2013) present a theoretical account that combines strategic and political access mechanisms in explaining the occurrence of terrorism across autocratic regimes. They use autocratic regime categorization as a proxy for state capacity and argue that the variation in terror attacks across autocratic regimes is attributable to differences in the state capacity in coercing and co-opting dissent (Wilson and Piazza 2013). Building on the literature on variants of autocratic regimes, the authors argue that single party regimes have the bureaucratic and institutional capacity to use a mixture of coercion and co-optation against dissidents which reduces the likelihood of experiencing terror attacks as groups neither have enough political grievances to resort to terrorism, nor the opportunity to execute it (Wilson and Piazza 2013). In contrast, the absence of an institutional environment

in military and personalist regimes to voice political grievances explains why such regimes are more likely to experience terrorism (Wilson and Piazza 2013).

Scholars also showed that targeting some autocratic regimes might be strategically beneficial as they are more prone to make political concessions at times of terror attacks. Building on the audience costs argument developed by Fearon (1994) and extended by Weeks (2008), Conrad, Conrad, and Young (2014) argue that autocracies with audience costs, i.e., single party regimes, military regimes, and dynastic regimes, have the same likelihood of experiencing terrorism with democracies, the traditional targets of terror attacks, and personalist regimes rarely experience terrorism. They explain that discontented groups expect autocracies with leaders that are somehow accountable to domestic audiences to be sensitive to civilian losses like democracies and such groups aim to exploit this sensitivity by launching terror attacks (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014, p. 5). Moreover, single party and military regimes are responsive to large winning coalitions in which some elements might be sympathetic to the cause of groups using terror attacks, which makes such regimes good targets of terrorism through which groups can garner concessions (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014).

3.1 Regime Type and Governmental Responses to Terrorism

The studies examining the relationship between regime type and the incidence of terrorism largely benefit from a theoretical account based on how varying institutional settings encourage and/or discourage terrorism (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012; Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Eyerman 1998; Kydd and Walter 2006; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid 1992; Stanton 2013; Wilson and Piazza 2013; Young and Dugan 2011). However, researchers have not empirically addressed the extent to which regime type shapes government responses to terrorism. Even though groups target governments that they expect would capitulate when faced with terrorism (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003; Stanton 2013), we observe, in reality, considerable variation in the way governments respond to terror attacks. While some governments grant negotiations and concessions to groups using terrorism, others do not. This unexplained variance forces us to bring a systematic explanation to the kinds of calculations governments carry out regarding their response to groups using terrorism. More specifically, what role regime type plays in determining such counterterrorism strategies pursued by

governments?

Only recently, researchers became interested in empirically answering the questions raised above. Saygılı (2019) stands out as one of the initial attempts in the literature to explain how domestic institutions predict the variation in government concessions induced by terror attacks. Using data on government reactions to hostage-taking terrorism between 1978 and 2005, Saygılı (2019) examines whether democracies are more prone to pursue an accommodating strategy in managing hostage-taking incidents and finds that democracies with high levels of regime stability are more likely than others to concede to hostage-taking terrorism. She explains this finding by arguing that leaders in democracies with high regime stability can afford the reputational costs of conceding to hostage-taking terrorism (Saygılı 2019, p. 470). Conversely, democratic leaders in countries with low levels of regime stability tend to pursue harsh responses to terrorism as the potential political and security risks of concessions to groups using terrorism in politically fragile contexts seem to be more costly than human costs of not conceding.

Many questions regarding the link between regime type and government responses to terrorism still remain to be answered. First, the issue of bargaining between governments and groups using terrorism highly influence governmental calculations. Saygılı (2019) focuses only on how domestic institutions shape government responses to hostage-taking terrorism, a form of terrorism that implies a unique bargaining platform where groups demand material benefits in the form of ransoms. However, groups that employ terrorism often demand other types of concessions from govern-ments, such as territory, autonomy, and political and social rights. Dealing with such issues necessitates governments to carry out varying cost-benefit calculations. In this respect, researchers should examine whether varying demands of groups affect the way in which domestic institutions condition the effect of terrorism.

While a wealth of studies has looked at differences among autocracies in many aspects of security (Colgan and Weeks 2015; Croco and Weeks 2016; Debs and Goemans 2010; Lai and Slater 2006; Radtke 2019; Slater 2003; Weeks 2008, 2012), no work has so far looked at how different types of autocracies differ with respect to responding to terrorism as well as how each of these regimes compare vis-à-vis democracies. In an attempt to address such questions raised above, we need to establish a valid theoretical framework with a causally coherent set of arguments. In this study, I will focus on how terror attacks shape government responses to insurgents during civil conflicts. Focusing on the effects of terrorism in civil wars will allow me to exploit the variation among groups that use terrorism and groups that do not and examine whether, and if so, under what conditions, terrorism proves to be

an effective strategy for insurgent groups (Fortna 2015). Furthermore, investigating how governments respond to terrorism in civil wars will allow me to articulate the implications of the institutional variation within autocracies as autocratic countries are more prone to experience civil war and political instability than democracies (see, for example, Gates et al. 2006; Hegre et al. 2001).[3]

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[3]Prior work suggests that this might not be always the case. Buhaug (2006) finds that high levels of democracy are associated with a high risk to experience a territorial conflict.

4.   TO REPRESS OR TO ACCOMMODATE?

State leaders mostly have responded to terror attacks by either (i) increasing repression and/or (ii) accommodation of demands of groups using terror attacks at varying levels.[1] According to Goldstein (1978, p. 27), repression is the "actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions." Davenport (2007a, p. 1) argues that state repression might appear in the form of "harassment, surveillance/spying, bans, arrests, torture, and mass killing." Repression in response to terror activity diverges from many forms of repression as it aims to discourage a "faceless form of political violence that requires disproportionate intelligence and some level of community sympathy or support" (Wilson and Piazza 2013, p. 943). Consequently, repressive counterterrorism measures mostly include but are not limited to, intelligence-gathering activities, large scale government surveillance, the imposition of martial law, and alike (Miller 2007).

Before providing the theoretical account on when governments repress and/or accommodate groups using terrorism, what constitutes accommodation should also be clearly explained. As noted earlier, scholars conceptualized negotiations, concessions, and incidence of peaceful resolution of conflicts as a success for insurgents using terrorism during civil wars (Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014). I conceptualize accommodation as the incidence of negotiations in this study. As mentioned earlier, the incidence of negotiations between governments and insurgent groups is a good way of examining the effectiveness of terrorism for several

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[1] Miller (2007) argues that state leaders have five options to choose in combatting to terrorism: *doing nothing*, *conciliation*, *legal reform*, *restriction*, and *violence* (Miller 2007, p. 334). *Legal reform* is changing laws to make combating terrorism easy (e.g. expanding police powers), *restriction* implies steps taken to restrict groups' abilities (e.g. gathering intelligence), and *violence* refers to governmental use of force to discourage groups from using terror attacks (Miller 2007, p. 335). In this sense, *legal reform*, *restriction*, and *violence* are forms of governmental repression against terrorism, given Goldstein's definition of repression. In contrast, conciliation refers to granting negotiations and concessions to groups using terrorism to discourage future terror activity (Miller 2007, p. 335). Doing nothing against terror activity is not a common practice for most of the states (Miller 2007, p. 335). This is because doing nothing against terrorism can jeopardize leaders' political survival; as Berry (1987, p. 296) puts it "A target that is incapable of responding to terrorism will lose public support."

reasons (Thomas 2014). First, negotiations per se are hard to achieve between governments and insurgent groups (Kaplow 2015). Governments mostly resist sitting at the negotiation table with insurgent groups, especially the ones that employ terrorism, as they do not want to confer legitimacy to violent groups (Bapat 2005; Crenshaw 1981; Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014). Second, governments tend to think that if they concede or legitimize a group using terrorism, other discontented groups might also embark on a terror activity as a means to extract concessions from a government that tends to exhibit accommodating behavior (Betts 2002; Bremer III 1992; Carr 1996). Third, negotiations are significant predictors of government concessions to insurgents, since such formal frameworks facilitate a discussion where insurgents can clearly communicate their demands (Thomas 2014). Thus, convincing a government to sit on the negotiation table can plausibly be conceptualized as a success for groups, and needs to be examined further.

To date, many scholars have suggested that the extent to which these options are chosen is a function of domestic political institutions, i.e., regime type (Crenshaw 1981; Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Kydd and Walter 2006; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid 1992; Stanton 2013; Wilkinson 1977). Which governments are likely to repress, and which governments are likely to accommodate when faced with a terror attack? The following sections provide a theoretical account along with a set of hypotheses on how regime type influences governments' calculi regarding responses to terrorism.

4.1 Democratic Responses to Terrorism

Depending on their institutional configuration, governments show variation in their ability to employ repression. As such, when faced with a terror attack, democratic countries are expected to be less likely to repress than autocracies (Crenshaw 1981; Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Kydd and Walter 2006; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid 1992; Stanton 2013; Wilkinson 1977)[2] for several reasons. First, democratic governments need to develop counterterrorism measures within the limits of "liberal norms" in order to not intimidate constituents, the main base of political support

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[2]Several researchers argue that the relationship between the levels of democracy and repression is not linear. Instead, regimes combining elements of democracy and autocracy are found to be the most coercive regimes (Fein 1995; Regan and Henderson 2002). Other researchers argue that until a certain level of democracy is reached, increasing levels of democracy does not exert a negative effect on repression (see, for example, Davenport and Armstrong 2004).

for democratic politicians. In this vein, a British counter-insurgency expert, Paul Wilkinson, argues:

> The primary objective of a counter-terrorism strategy must be the protection and maintenance of liberal democracy and the rule of law. It cannot be sufficiently stressed that this aim overrides in importance even the objective of eliminating terrorism and political violence as such. Any bloody tyrant can 'solve' the problem of political violence if he is prepared to sacrifice all considerations of humanity, and to trample down all constitutional and judicial rights (1977).

As Wilkinson points out, repressive measures in response to terrorism are laden with negative externalities, such as encroachments to privacy of citizens due to increased government surveillance, limiting citizens' mobility due to martial law in a specific region, and alike.[3] After 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government enacted the Patriot Act which its pundits argued to "[defend] the civil liberties of Americans by reducing their civil liberties" as the act revised the surveillance laws in the US and allowed the government to access a considerable amount of private data (Epifanio 2016, p. 713). According to a Gallup poll conducted in 2003, 67% of Americans did not support counterterrorism measures that contained significant civil liberty restrictions.[4] Similarly, Davis and Silver (2004) find that Americans are not supportive of restrictive counterterrorism measures, if their threat perception is sufficiently low and liberals are found to be the least likely group to lend support for such policies.

Second, separation of powers in democracies make repressive measures hard to enact (Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Li 2005).[5] Executive branches of governments hold the coercive power of state apparatus and their actions are largely limited by other branches of government, i.e., legislation and judiciary, which "inevitably hurts the government's ability to repress" (Bapat 2005, p. 709). The legislative branch of a government may limit executives' ability to use coercive measures as security policies should mostly be passed through a legislation process before they are in effect (Perliger 2012, p. 497). Legislative branches of governments may also raise the

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[3]Compared to indiscriminate repression, selective repression is possible, yet a costly option as it requires high levels of information and state capacity (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Kalyvas 2004).

[4]Gallup, September 9, 2003. "Public Little Concerned About Patriot Act." https://news.gallup.com/poll/9205/public-little-concerned-about-patriot-act.aspx Consulted on July1, 2019.

[5]Institutions might also constrain governments in changing repressive policies. Conrad and Moore (2010) show that as the number of veto powers increases in a government, the likelihood of terminating torture decreases.

costs of repression for state leaders by articulating and enforcing international norms for protecting human rights, as the ratification of international treaties on human rights is made by legislations. Lupu (2015) shows that international laws protecting human rights are more effective in reducing state repression when a legislative body hosts strong opposition parties whose interests diverge with the executive. Similar to the legislative branch of governments, judiciaries also act as restraining agents in terms of state repression. Also, Davenport (1996) shows that countries with independent judiciaries are less likely to repress their populations.

Third, democratic sensitivity to civilian casualties incentivize democratic governments to accommodate groups using terrorism. Researchers have long investigated the implications of casualties on democratic governments' preferences regarding issues of war and peace. Indeed, human costs of war have long been used as a measure of costs inflicted on states during international conflicts (Gartner, Segura, and Barratt 2004; Senese 1999; Sweeney 2003). Some researchers showed that casualties affect the duration of militarized interstate disputes (Goemans 2000). Others showed that as the casualties in a war increase, public approval and support decreases (Gartner 2008; Karol and Miguel 2007). The repercussions of human costs of war at times of international conflict apply to civilian casualties generated by terror attacks. Democratic governments cannot afford civilian casualties inflicted by clandestine organizations originated within or outside of their jurisdiction (Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003).

Prior work on democracy and terrorism presents several implications for the study of government responses to terrorism during civil wars. First, the political costs of repression outweigh its benefits for democracies (Crenshaw 1981; Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Kydd and Walter 2006; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid 1992; Wilkinson 1977), as repressive measures do not only negatively affect groups using terrorism but also the lives of ordinary citizens that might lead to a loss of political support for leaders in democracies. Second, institutional constraints placed on the executive power in democracies should lower the ability of democratic executives to carry out repressive measures against terrorism. Furthermore, at times of terror attacks, democratic governments cannot stay inactive either; democracies are highly sensitive to civilian losses (Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003) and democratic governments might lose public support if they prove ineffective of responding to terror attacks (Berry 1987, p. 296). In contrast to democratic environments, repressive counterterrorism measures seem to be easier to implement in autocratic environments, since autocracies do not face the constraints inherent to democratic rule, which provides a permissive atmosphere to repress for autocratic leaders (see, for example, Davenport 2007*a*; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Hathaway 2001; Poe and Tate 1994).

Existing literature provides us with many insights regarding democratic responses to terrorism. Given the costs associated with repression as well as the limitations placed on coercive measures, when faced with a terror attack, I expect democratic governments to negotiate with groups using terrorism. Conversely, terrorism should not force autocracies to sit on the negotiation table with insurgents given the permissive environment for coercion. If these theoretical expectations hold true, then, I should find empirical evidence in support of the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Terror attacks increase the likelihood of government negotiations with insurgents in democracies, however, decrease in autocracies.*

Democracies' accountability to the public might work in the opposite direction as well. Existing research suggests that democratic leaders' concerns related to political survival might highly affect their decision whether to accommodate groups using terrorism or not. Echoing Fearon (1994), backing down during international crises can cost democratic leaders elections as public opinion does not favor leaders with poor performance. Repercussions of backing down in response to terror activity might be somehow similar; an accommodating attitude, i.e., granting negotiations and/or concessions, towards groups using terrorism might often be perceived as backing down and/or a signal of poor performance, and thus risks state leaders' political survival (Berry 1987; Ritter 2014).

A considerable number of studies surveyed the electoral consequences of accommodating policies towards terrorism in democracies (Berry 1987; Chowanietz 2010; Crenshaw 2000; Friedland and Merari 1985; Gadarian 2010; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Kıbrıs 2011; Ritter 2014). Many have found that constituents tend to vote for right-wing political parties under the threat of terrorism, as they are thought to be "hardliners" against groups employing terror attacks (Bali 2007; Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008; Chowanietz 2010; Friedland and Merari 1985; Gould and Klor 2010; Kıbrıs 2011). Kıbrıs (2011), using novel data on the hometowns of Turkish soldiers who died during the fight against the PKK, finds that constituents in localities where Turkish soldiers were buried tended to vote more for right-wing political parties during the 1990s which had "no-concessions policy" towards the PKK. Similarly, Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) show that Israelis living in the range of rockets launched from Gaza Strip are more likely to vote for right-wing political parties with a hard stance against organizations that engage in terrorism.

Considering the potential electoral consequences, leaders might tend to pursue coercive strategies to discourage future terror attacks (Berry 1987; Chowanietz 2010; Crenshaw 2000; Friedland and Merari 1985; Gadarian 2010; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Kıbrıs 2011; Ritter 2014). In this respect, terrorism should have a decreasing

effect on the probability of government negotiations in democracies, since democratic leaders should demonstrate a hard stance towards terror activity to ensure their political survival. Conventional wisdom suggests that autocratic leaders do not necessarily have incentives to accommodate domestic opposition as they can rely exclusively on repression to deal with domestic opposition (see, for example, Carey 2006). However, Ghandi and Przeworski (2007, p. 1281) argue "nondemocratic rulers must do more than just avert rebellion" to ensure their political survival. Thus, considering the adverse effects of accommodating counterterrorism strategies in democracies and potential incentives of autocracies to accommodate, my hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 1a: *Terror attacks decrease the probability of government negotiations with insurgents in democracies, however, increase in autocracies.*

4.1.1 A Bargaining Theory Cut 1

The effect terror attacks have on the propensity of negotiations between governments and insurgents can also be analyzed through a bargaining framework. Kavaklı, Chatagnier, and Hatipoğlu (forthcoming) suggest that understanding the creation of a bargaining space between actors in dispute goes through understanding "the power to hurt" (Schelling 1966) and "the power to bear costs" (Slantchev 2003). The authors argue that while actors' ability to hurt their adversaries increases their bargaining power, this ability to hurt is a function of targets' power to bear costs (Kavaklı, Chatagnier, and Hatipoğlu forthcoming). Targeted actors will not yield even inflicted high costs as long as they have adequate power to bear the costs.

As noted in Chapter 2, insurgents acquire an asymmetric power to hurt their respective governments via terrorism (Hultman 2009; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014). However, this thesis argues that the extent of terrorism's power to hurt governments is a function of regime type as different regime types imply different power to bear costs for governments. How do terrorism's power to hurt and governments' power to bear the costs of terrorism change with respect to regime type during civil wars?

The theoretical account outlined in the previous section implies that terrorism is expected to create a bargaining space between governments and insurgents in democracies and to preclude the creation of such a bargaining space in autocracies. From a bargaining perspective, democracies have weaker power to bear the costs of ter-

rorism than do autocracies. The reason for this difference in the ability to bear the costs of terrorism in democracies and in autocracies is that the former has a higher sensitivity to civilian casualties than the latter (Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003). This sensitivity, in turn, gives democratic governments stronger incentives than autocratic governments to prevent future acts of terrorism. Even though civilian casualties will harm all governments, the costs associated with civilian deaths will be sufficiently hurtful in democracies compared to autocracies.

The way to preclude future terror activity goes through either repression, or accommodation, or, rather through a mixture of both (Miller 2007). However, counterterrorism measures come with their costs that affect governments in varying ways depending on the domestic political setting where governments operate. Democracies, in this sense, seem to have fewer options to combat terrorism than autocracies. Prior work suggests that repressive counterterrorism measures might create discontent among the public, and thus mitigate political support for leaders (e.g. Davis and Silver 2004). Furthermore, several scholars have argued that democratic governments are constrained in their ability to enact and implement repressive counterterrorism measures (e.g. Li 2005). Thus, repressive counterterrorism measures are both costly and hard to enact and implement in democracies. Absent such costs and constraints, autocratic governments may easily employ repressive counterterrorism measures to halt future terror activity. As a result, while terror attacks open up a bargaining space between governments and insurgents in democracies, they do not open up a similar bargaining space in autocracies.

However constrained democratic leaders are in applying repressive counterterrorism strategies, democratic responsiveness towards public opinion might drive leaders to demonstrate a hardline stance against groups using terrorism. The theoretical account behind this argument rests on the logic of audience costs. How does the logic of audience costs and government negotiations with insurgents using terrorism meet in a bargaining framework? Hypothesis 1a in the previous section suggests that democratic governments should be less likely than autocratic ones to negotiate with insurgents involved in the acts of terror. In this line of reasoning, the creation of a bargaining space is precluded in the presence of terrorism in democracies, as democratic leaders know that accommodating policies towards terrorism will be punished by domestic audiences (Chowanietz 2010; Kıbrıs 2011; Ritter 2014). Thus, democratic leaders' desire to stay in power might introduce an additional power to bear the costs of terrorism in democracies. Conversely, terrorism might give rise to the creation of a bargaining space between autocratic governments and insurgents, as autocratic governments are neither accountable nor responsive to public opinion and have incentives to preclude antigovernment activity (see, for example, Gandhi

and Przeworski 2007).

4.2 Autocratic Responses to Terrorism

Authoritarian regimes seem to exhibit varying levels of ability and incentive to repress society when faced with anti-government activity (see, for example, Davenport 2007b; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986). In this vein, terrorism might translate into differing governmental responses across autocracies. O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986) argue that autocratic governments consist of hardliners and soft liners where the former is likely to opt for repressive policies and latter is likely to be in favor of concessions when faced with domestic opposition. Due to the schisms between these two factions, authoritarian regimes employ a mixture of repression and accommodation as a response to the dissident activity rather than excessively relying on repression (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986).

In a seminal article, Davenport (2007b) empirically demonstrates that autocracies vary with respect to their tendency to repress. In his comparison among autocratic regimes with respect to civil liberty restrictions and personal integrity violations, Davenport (2007b, p. 490) finds that single party regimes are the least likely group to violate civil liberties and personal integrity rights, given that single party regimes have the political and bureaucratic capacity to provide avenues to voice dissent. Military regimes, Davenport (2007b) shows, exhibit sufficiently low levels of civil liberty restrictions, yet high levels of violations against personal integrity rights. He explains this finding with the argument that military regimes are familiar with types of repression that involve torture, killing, and disappearances, rather than imposing restrictions like curfews, arrests, and banning (Davenport 2007b, p. 487). Svolik (2012) provides a similar discussion by arguing that militaries do not automatically resort to military measures to combat domestic opposition since military raison d'etre is concentrated upon issues of national security, not necessarily the ones about internal security. Among all autocracies, personalist regimes appear to be the most repressive in terms of both civil liberties and personal integrity rights, since a policy change induced by domestic opposition is not legitimate in the eyes of personalist leaders (Davenport 2007b, p. 486).

Just like democratic leaders, some autocratic leaders might be in a politically risky situation when casualties rise as a result of terrorism. Şirin and Koch (2015) show

that single party and military regimes incur fewer casualties during international conflicts than do personalist regimes. The reason why single party and military regimes embark on less costly conflicts in terms of casualties than personalist regimes is that their winning coalition is larger than that of personalist regimes which make them sensitive to casualties (Şirin and Koch 2015, p. 810). Following a similar logic, Conrad, Conrad, and Young (2014, p. 543) suggest that single party regimes and military regimes should be more likely than personalist regimes to address the demands of groups using terrorism as their winning coalition represent diverse interests and the demands communicated via terrorism might be appealing to some portion of the winning coalition. Civilian losses do not constitute a threat for the tenure of personalist leaders, as they do not depend on larger audiences to ensure their political survival (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Şirin and Koch 2015). Also, personalist regimes do not host diverse interests to be represented. Consequently, personalist regimes do not have incentives to embark on a policy change in an attempt to discourage terrorism (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014).

As an alternative to the variations among autocracies with respect to audience costs, Wilson and Piazza (2013) exploit the heterogeneity autocratic regimes exhibit in their state capacities, and argue that different autocratic settings imply different state capacities to use coercion and/or co-optation against terrorism. In this respect, they argue that military autocracies are less likely to use co-optive strategies against terrorism since such regimes lack the necessary institutions (e.g. political parties) that provide avenues for accommodation (Wilson and Piazza 2013, p. 945). Single party regimes, in contrast, can employ a mixture of coercion and accommodation owing to their authoritarian and bureaucratic capacity (Wilson and Piazza 2013, p. 945).

Extant research suggests that autocracies will exhibit variation when responding to terror attacks. Single party and military regimes may be more inclined to use accommodating strategies against terrorism rather than repressive strategies, for three reasons. First, coercive counterterrorism strategies should be less common among single party and military regimes, as they are less likely to repress civil liberties when faced with domestic opposition as shown by Davenport (2007*b*). Second, single party and military regimes are more susceptible to civilian losses than other autocracies given their political audiences (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Şirin and Koch 2015), which will give incentives to such regimes to accommodate the demands of groups using terrorism to prevent civilian deaths. Third, prior work suggests that terror attacks might induce single party and military regimes to pursue an accommodatşng strategy towards groups using terrorism since their large winning coalitions might consist of elements sympathetic to the demands of

such groups (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014). Furthermore, single party regimes should be more accommodating than military regimes as they have the bureaucratic capacity to address domestic dissent which is weak in military regimes and absent in personalist regimes (Wilson and Piazza 2013).

Compared to single party and military regimes, accommodation should be less common in personalist regimes as encroachments to civil liberties are not politically costly for such regimes (Davenport 2007*b*). Furthermore, personalist regimes do not necessarily have incentives to accommodate terror groups, since their susceptibility to civilian deaths is considerably lower than single party and military regimes (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Şirin and Koch 2015). Furthermore, organized around one personalist leader, personalist regimes represent only the interests of the leader (e.g. Geddes 2003) which reduces the propensity of such regimes to initiate a political process with discontented groups, especially the ones that resort to terrorism. Drawing from these studies, my second hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 2: *Terror attacks increase the likelihood of government negotiations with insurgents in single party and military regimes, however, decrease in personalist regimes.*

Just like in democracies, the existence of audiences, i.e., single party and military regimes, might put some mechanisms into effect that encourage governments to use coercive measures against terrorism. Weeks (2008) argues that single party and military regimes are susceptible to the punishment of domestic audiences, thus they choose their policies accordingly. In this respect, showing a positive attitude towards groups engaging in terrorism might signal the weakness of governments in single party and military regimes -just like in democracies,- thus single party and military regimes should not be willing to demonstrate a weak stance towards terrorism. In contrast, as discussed previously, personalist leaders are not subject to the punishment of domestic audiences, thus performance evaluation is not a matter of concern for such leaders. However, still, personalist regimes are considered to be the most belligerent regimes among autocracies (Weeks 2012), thus, absence of punishment by audiences should not necessarily encourage personalist regimes to be more accommodating when faced with a terror attack. Considering this theoretical account, my last hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 2a: *Terror attacks decrease the likelihood of government negotiations with insurgents in single party, military, and personalist regimes.*

4.2.1 A Bargaining Theory Cut 2

The variance in autocratic responses to terrorism during civil wars can also be analyzed in a bargaining framework. As the literature suggests, autocracies exhibit variation in their ability to tolerate civilian casualties, and thus terrorism. While leaders in single party and military regimes face threats to their tenure in the presence of civilian casualties, personalist regimes can ensure their political survival even when civilians are killed (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Şirin and Koch 2015). Consequently, terrorism hurts single party and military regimes as much as it hurts democracies, as single party and military regimes have similar power to bear the costs of terrorism with democracies.

When hurt by terrorism, what can autocratic governments do in response? Coercive counterterrorism measures have differing costs for single party and military regimes and personalist regimes. The former group cannot solely depend on coercive measures to stay in power. In this respect, Davenport (2007*b*) shows that single party and military regimes are less likely to restrict civil liberties than personalist regimes. Furthermore, elements of the political regime in single party and military autocracies might be sympathetic to the demands of insurgents using terrorism (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014), thus, the ability of leaders in such regimes to implement repressive counterterrorism measures are constrained. Personalist regimes, in contrast, do not host any differing political views (Weeks 2008), thus personalist leaders are not constrained in their ability to repress terror activity. All in all, terrorism is expected to create a conducive atmosphere in single party and military regimes where a bargaining space with insurgents might open up. In contrast, terror activity against personalist regimes falls short in creating such a bargaining space between leaders and insurgents.

Just like in democracies, autocratic audiences might drive leaders to pursue a repressive counterterrorism strategy and change the dynamics of the bargaining platform outlined above. Domestic audiences in autocracies might not be in favor of accommodating counterterrorism measures and the leaders might be driven to follow a coercive counterterrorism strategy in order to maintain the support of domestic audiences. Which autocracies are responsive to domestic audiences? As discussed before, single party and military regimes are considered to rely on the support of a coalition of diverse interests and personalist regimes are considered to have no domestic audiences (Weeks 2008). Accordingly, single party and military regimes might have more power to bear the costs of terrorism than expected owing to their reliance of support from diverse elements in their political establishment. Hypothesis

2a aims to capture this theoretical account with respect to governmental responses to terrorism and suggests that terrorism might fail to create a bargaining space in single party and military regimes, as such regimes might be driven to apply repression in response to terrorism as a result of the preferences of their domestic audiences. Following this logic, a bargaining platform should still be hard to materialize in personalist regimes, as personalist regimes have high levels of power to bear the costs of terrorism and have no incentives to initiate a bargain with insurgents using terrorism due to the absence of domestic audiences.

5.   DATA, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

In this chapter, I first present an overview of the data used for the empirical analysis in this study. Then, I provide a discussion about the research design and the model specification. In the last section, I report and interpret the empirical findings.

5.1 Overview of Data

As noted earlier, the number of studies investigating the effect of terrorism in civil wars is quite limited (see, Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014). However, still, researchers have collected adequate data on government responses to terrorism in civil wars which allow me to empirically test the mechanisms proposed by the theoretical expectations outlined in above.[1] To this end, I use replication data of Thomas (2014) along with the data on autocratic regime types, i.e., single party, military, and personalist, collected by Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014*a*).

I build on the data collected by Thomas (2014) because her dataset provides pieces of information on a very novel measure of success for terrorism in the literature, i.e., incidence of negotiations, unlike Wood and Kathman (2014) and Fortna (2015) who examine civil war outcomes, an intensively studied phenomenon in the literature. Sitting at the negotiation table is not easy for insurgent groups, especially for the ones that employ terror attacks, as most of the governments tout the policy of "no negotiations with terrorists," in order to not legitimize groups using terrorism (Bapat 2005; Crenshaw 1981; Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014). Furthermore, Thomas (2014) reports that 64 % of governmental concessions occurred in months following terror

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[1]Replication materials for Wood and Kathman (2014) can be downloaded from http://jacobkathman.weebly.com/research.html. To access data to replicate analyses in Thomas (2014) https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/24506&studyListingIndex=1_aaf02d17e8b389ae30530d8b13de. Replication materials for Fortna (2015) can be downloaded from http://iojournal.org/do-terrorists-win-rebels-use-of-terrorism-and-civil-war-outcomes/.

attacks (Thomas 2014, p. 806). As a result, negotiations are important facilitators of government compliance and needs further attention from scholars examining the effectiveness of terrorism.

Collected in a dyad-month format, the data cover all cases of civil wars that took place in Africa between 1989 and 2009 and provide information regarding government responses to terrorism, i.e., the incidence of negotiations and the number of concessions, the number of terror attacks, government characteristics (e.g. GDP and Polity 2 score), insurgent group characteristics (e.g. insurgent group strength relative to government and the number of groups in fighting), and civil war dynamics (e.g. the intensity of conflict and the occurrence of ethnic/territorial war) (Thomas 2014).

The dataset includes 403 cases of negotiations participated by 65 insurgent groups out of 106, which Thomas (2014, p. 810) defines as "instances of formal bargaining between the main belligerents in conflict."[2] In coding the incidence of negotiations between insurgents and governments, Thomas (2014, p. 810) uses news sources from Lexis Nexis Academic, and other sources like Keesing's Contemporary Archives and Jane's Security and Terrorism Monitor, in addition to each conflict's historical accounts.

Data on the number of terror attacks perpetrated by each insurgent group come from from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which covers domestic and international terror incidents in all over the world (START 2018). The GTD defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (START 2018). Our sample only includes cases of domestic terror attacks which are coded as successful in the GTD.[3]

I merge Thomas (2014) dataset with Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014a) dataset on regime types to test the conditional effect of regime type on terrorism.[4] Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014a, p. 4) define a regime as "a set of formal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies." In their dataset, a regime is democratic if the executive is elected through (i) "a direct, reasonably fair competitive election in which at least ten percent of the total population (equivalent to about 40 percent of the adult male population) was eligible to vote," or (ii) "indirect election by a

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[2]This measure excludes backchannel negotiations and negotiations where third parties involve in bargaining without no formal communication between the conflicting parties.

[3]According to the GTD, a terror attack is successful when it causes damage (START 2018).

[4]Table B.1 in Appendix B presents a cross-tabulation of Geddes, Frantz, Wright (2014a) regime type categorization and Polity 2 score.

body at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct, reasonably fair competitive elections," or (iii) "constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive." (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014*a*, p. 6).

Table 5.1 Negotiations and Terror Attacks (t-1) across Regime Types

| | | Negotiation | | |
	Terror Attack (t-1)	*Yes*	*No*	Total
Democracy	*Yes*	2 (25%)	6 (75%)	8 (100%)
	No	37 (18%)	170 (82%)	207 (100%)
	Total	39 (18%)	176 (82%)	215 (100%)
Party	*Yes*	26 (37%)	45 (63%)	71 (100%)
	No	43 (6%)	732 (94%)	775 (100%)
	Total	69 (8%)	777 (92%)	846 (100%)
Military	*Yes*	5 (4%)	126 (96%)	131 (100%)
	No	82 (15%)	463 (85%)	545 (100%)
	Total	87 (13%)	589 (87%)	676 (100%)
Personal	*Yes*	1 (2%)	43 (98%)	44 (100%)
	No	171 (13%)	1130 (87%)	1301 (100%)
	Total	172 (13%)	1173 (87%)	1345 (100%)
	Total	367 (12%)	2715 (88%)	3082 (100%)

Note: Percentages show relative frequencies within each row in each cell.

Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014*b*, p. 318) classify autocratic regimes with respect to (i) control over policy, (ii) leadership selection, and (iii) control of security apparatus. Through this classification, they identify four main types of autocracies, namely single party regimes, military regimes, personalist regimes, and monarchies (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014*a*, p. 12). According to their coding criteria, in single party regimes, a ruling party controls policy and security apparatus of the state and determines who can be selected as a leader and military institutions are primarily responsible for controlling policy and choosing leaders, in addition to controlling security apparatus in military regimes (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014*a*). A small group organized around one leader gives rise to personalist regimes, as the

leader and a small clique decide policies and leadership and manage security apparatus (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a). Lastly, monarchical regimes are controlled by a royal family that decides policies, leaders, as well as maintains a huge grip on security apparatus (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a).

Table 5.1 reports the cross-tabulation of negotiations and the number of terror attacks lagged by one month across all regime types. The table shows that the data contain 215 democratic months, 846 single party months, 676 military months, and 1345 personalist months. This suggests that almost half of the sample contains personalist regimes. Table 5.1 shows that democracies and personalist regimes experienced terror attacks almost in a similar fashion; terror attacks occurred only in 4% of democratic months and 3% of personalist months. In contrast, single party regimes experienced terror attacks 8% of the time and military regimes experienced terror attacks 19% of the time.

Democracies appear to have negotiated with insurgents more than other regimes. Table 5.1 shows that governments and insurgents sat on the negotiation table 18% of the time in democracies. Single party regimes experienced the lowest number of negotiations compared to rest of the regimes; only 8% of the time negotiations occured in single party regimes. Military and personalist regimes seem to have negotiated with insurgents as frequently as democracies; military and personalist regimes negotiated with insurgents 13% and 12% of the time, respectively.

A simple look at the relative frequencies among observations where there was at least one terror attack and where there was no terror attack in the previous month reveals many patterns on how governmental responses to terrorism change across regime types. Table 5.1 shows that most of the negotiations in democracies and single party regimes took place when there was at least one terror attack in the previous month. Conversely, for military and personalist regimes, negotiations were more prevalent when there was no terror attack in the previous month.

We should keep in mind that cross tabulations neither imply causality nor show the partial effect of the main independent variables in question. Due to this, I will employ a series of regression analyses that allow me to make causal inferences as well as to see the partial effect of regime type and terror attacks on the propensity of negotiations with insurgents.

In the following section, I state the full model equation used to test the hypotheses. Then, after introducing the control variables I use in the regression analyses, I provide a brief discussion on the descriptive statistics of the variables in the effective sample.

5.2 Research Design

The hypotheses stated in the previous chapter are tested using the following model equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Pr(\text{Negotiations=1}) = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Number of Terror Attacks}_{(t-1)} \\
& + \beta_2 \text{Party} + \beta_3 \text{Military} + \beta_4 \text{Personalist} \\
& + \beta_5 \text{Number of Terror Attacks}_{(t-1)} \times \text{Party} \\
& + \beta_6 \text{Number of Terror Attacks}_{(t-1)} \times \text{Military} \\
& + \beta_7 \text{Number of Terror Attacks}_{(t-1)} \times \text{Personalist} \\
& + \beta_8 \text{Relative Insurgent Strength} + \beta_9 \text{Main Group} \\
& + \beta_{10} \text{Intensity} + \beta_{11} \text{External Support for Insurgents} \\
& + \beta_{12} \ln(\text{Battle Related Deaths}) + \beta_{13} \text{Number of Conflict Episodes} \\
& + \beta_{14} \text{Conflict Duration} + \beta_{15} \text{Territorial War} + \beta_{16} \text{Ethnic War} \\
& + \beta_{17} \text{Third Party Mediation} + \beta_{18} \text{Number of Groups} + \beta_{19} \ln(\text{GDP}) \\
& + \beta_{20} \text{Number of Months Since Last Negotiation} \\
& + \beta_{21} \text{Number of Months Since Last Negotiation}^2 \\
& + \beta_{22} \text{Number of Months Since Last Negotiation}^3 \\
& + \epsilon
\end{aligned}
$$

The dependent variable in this study is the *incidence of negotiations*, binary variable that takes the value of one if a formal negotiation occurs in a dyad in a given month. *Number of successful terror attacks* is a count measure of terror attacks perpetrated by an insurgent group in a given month. In the sample, this variable ranges from zero to 49 and has a mean of 0.36, which reveals that terrorism was not observed in most of the months. I lag this variable by one month in order to account for endogeneity bias.

Regime type is a categorical variable where zero denotes *democratic regimes*, one denotes *single party regimes*, two denotes *military regimes*, and three denotes *personalist regimes*. Since I expect the effect of terrorism to be conditional on regime type, I introduce the multiplicative interaction of the number of successful terror attacks and single party regimes, number of successful terror attacks and military regimes, and number of successful terror attacks and personalist regimes to the regression in order to test the interactive effect of terror attacks and regime types on the propensity of negotiations with insurgents. For my main model specifications,

the baseline regime type category is democracy.

I control for a group of theoretically relevant variables that can potentially explain government negotiations with insurgents. First, I control for *relative insurgent strength*, because governments would be more likely to negotiate when insurgents are stronger than them. Relatedly, "the mutually hurting stalemate," a ripe moment in a conflict that brings parties to the negotiation table, might occur when governments and insurgents have similar capabilities (Zartman 2008, p. 232). I also account for *external insurgent support*, as prior work suggests that involvement of external actors might prolong civil wars and preclude peace talks as outside actors introduce additional reservation points to the bargaining set (Cunningham 2010). Additionally, I include a dummy variable that takes the value of one when an insurgent group is a *main group* in a civil war. Likewise, I account for *number of insurgent groups* in a country to control for the effects of a multi-insurgent group setting on the likelihood of negotiations. Walter (2006) argues that governments are less likely to pursue an accommodating strategy when multiple groups appear to be claimants during civil wars. I control for the natural logarithm of *number of battle-related deaths* as a proxy for the costs of fighting for governments (Mason and Fett 1996). To control for state capacity, I use the natural logarithm of *GDP*. I also control for *conflict duration* in months, *number of conflict episodes*, whether a civil war in the sample is a *territorial war* or *ethnic war*, and whether a *third-party mediation* is present.

Additionally, I add a variable that counts *the months since the last negotiation* and its second- and third-degree time polynomials to control for temporal dependence as advised by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). When analyzing time-series cross-sectional data with a binary response variable, BTSCS, one should account for temporal dependence because the observations in BTSCS are likely to violate the independence assumption in logit and probit regressions (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). If there is temporal dependence, the results will be misleading without introducing time polynomials or cubic splines to the model (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). Our data are time-series cross-sectional, and my dependent variable is a binary response variable which implies that the logistic regression I carry out might violate the assumption of independence of observations. In order to account for temporal dependence, I generate the month counter variable and introduce it to my model specification. Instead of cubic splines, I introduce the second- and third-degree polynomials of this month counter variable, since Carter and Signorino (2010) argue that time polynomials present an easier and effective solution to control for temporal dependence.

I employ logistic regressions to test the hypotheses as my dependent variable is a binary variable. I use robust standard errors clustered by conflict in order to account for conflict specific factors, absent in the regression equation, that may introduce heteroskedasticity into our estimations.

Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics for Effective Sample

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Negotiations	.128	.335	0	1
Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$	.282	1.90	0	49
Terror Attack (Dichotomous)$_{(t-1)}$	.086	.280	0	1
Party	.267	.443	0	1
Military	.236	.425	0	1
Personalist	.437	.496	0	1
Main Group	.742	.438	0	1
External Support to Rebels	.474	.499	0	1
Territorial War	.189	.392	0	1
Ethnic War	.755	.430	0	1
Third Party Mediation	.599	.490	0	1
Intensity	1.22	.414	1	2
Number of Groups	1.77	.724	1	4
Relative Rebel Strength	1.82	.660	1	5
Number of Conflict Episode	1.35	.819	1	6
Conflict Duration (Months)	36.9	36.6	1	192
ln(GDP)	22.3	1.31	19.8	25.3
ln(Battle Deaths)	5.51	1.56	3.21	9.39
Months Since Last Negotiation	18.2	25.8	0	144

Note: The number of observations in the effective sample is 2407.

Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables for the effective sample. Negotiations and terror attacks are infrequent events given their significantly low means as shown in the table. Territorial wars are another uncommon phenomena observed in the effective sample. Similarly, the number of single party and military regimes is lower than that of personalist regimes. Most of the observations in the effective sample are cases of civil wars motivated along ethnic lines given the high mean of ethnic war variable. The variable measuring relative insurgent strength (that takes on values from one to five where one and two signify weaker insurgent groups, three signifies equally powerful insurgent groups, and four and five signify more powerful insurgent groups) has a mean of two, which tells us that most of the insurgent groups in the effective sample are groups weaker than their respective governments. Another related variable, number of groups in fighting has almost a mean of two, which means that most of the civil cases took place in a multi-group environment. Cases of third-party interventions are also very common. Furthermore, the cases of civil wars in the sample lasted, on average, almost three years.

5.3 Empirical Findings

The logistic regression estimates from 4 different models are reported in Table 5.3. For Models 1 through 4, the base regime type category is democracy.[5] In Model 1, I report the results of an additive model where I introduce regime type dummies and the number of terror attacks, but not their multiplicative interactions. Model 2 is slightly different than Model 1; I only add temporal controls to this model. Model 3 is an interactive model where I introduce multiplicative interactions of regime type dummies and number of terror attacks. My full model specification is reported in Model 4, which includes both the multiplicative interactions and temporal controls.[6]

The estimates in Models 1 and 2 suggest that executing terror attacks increase the propensity that targeted governments will come to the negotiation table with insurgents as the coefficient on the number of terror attacks is positive and statistically significant at 99% confidence level in both models. The coefficients on the single party and military regimes in Models 1 and 2 are not statistically significant, which suggests that these regimes do not necessarily differ in their responses to insurgent groups than the baseline regime type, i.e., democracies. In contrast, the coefficients on the personalist regimes in both models are negative and statistically significant at 95% confidence level; personalist regimes are less likely to negotiate with insurgents than democracies in the presence of terrorism.

The coefficients associated with control variables in Models 1 and 2 suggest that relative insurgent strength, number of months in conflict, the existence of third-party mediation, number of groups in fighting, GDP, and whether the conflict is emanated from ethnic tensions increase the propensity of negotiations between insurgents and governments during civil wars. Including temporal controls, however, slightly changes the estimates. Model 2 shows that correcting for temporal depen-

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[5]Table A.2 in Appendix A shows the same model estimates where personalist regimes are taken as the baseline regime type category. According to the estimates, the direction of the effect of terrorism on the propensity of negotiations with respect to regime types does not exhibit a change from the main models. Table A.3 in Appendix A reports regression estimates where democratic cases are excluded and single party and personalist regimes are taken as the baseline regime type category. I plot the average marginal effect of terror attacks among autocracies where baseline regime type is single party in Figure A.5. According to the figure, terror attacks have a statistically significant effect on the propensity of negotiations in all regime types and terror attacks have a positive impact on the probability of negotiations in single party and in military regimes, and a negative impact in personalist regimes.

[6]Table A.1 in Appendix A reports regression estimates where a dichotomous terrorism variable is used instead of a count variable to compare the probabilities of negotiations in the presence and in the absence of terrorism. Figure A.3 illustrates the marginal effect of terrorism on the propensity of negotiations across regime types. Figure A.3 shows that terror attacks only have a positive effect on the probability of negotiations in single party regimes, and a negative effect in personalist regimes. Figure A.4 shows the predicted probabilities of negotiations with respect to terror attacks across all regime types. According to the t-statistics, the difference in the probability of negotiations in the absence and presence of terrorism is not statistically distinguishable from zero in any regime type category.

pendence decreases the coefficients on the control variables as well as their standard errors. Additionally, we see in Model 2 that external insurgent support becomes statistically significant with temporal dependence controls, however, only at 90% confidence level.

In Model 2, temporal dependence controls are statistically significant at 99% confidence level. The coefficient associated with the month counter variable, i.e., months since last negotiation, suggests that the propensity of negotiations decreases as the number of months since last negotiation increases.

Inclusion of temporal controls in Model 2 improves the model fit. The log-likelihood of Model 2 is higher than that of Model 1, and lower values for Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) in Model 2 suggest that Model 2 provides a better fit to the data than Model 1. Moreover, according to the likelihood ratio test I conduct, the inclusion of temporal controls increases the model fit in a statistically significant way.

Models 3 and 4 are interactive models where I introduce the multiplicative interactions of regime type dummies and the number of terror attacks in order to test the hypotheses in this study. The only difference between Models 3 and 4 is again the temporal controls; Model 3 is the restricted model and Model 4 is the unrestricted model. The log-likelihood in Model 4 is higher than that of Model 3, and, AIC and BIC values are lower in Model 4 which suggests that Model 4 fits the data better than Model 3. Moreover, the result of the likelihood ratio test between these model specifications also indicates that including temporal controls, as in Model 4, increases the model fit in statistical terms.

Does including multiplicative interactions of regime type dummies and terror attacks improve the model fit? To determine this, we have to compare Models 1 and 3 and Models 2 and 4. Table 5.3 shows that Model 3 has a slightly higher log-likelihood than that of Model 1. Similarly, a slightly lower value for AIC in Model 3 suggests that inclusion of multiplicative interaction terms is not redundant. However, BIC value in Model 3 points to the opposite; higher BIC value in Model 3 implies that Model 1 provides a better fit to our data. The likelihood ratio test I perform also shows that the addition of multiplicative interaction terms does not necessarily improve the model fit. A similar situation occurs when we compare the model fit of Models 2 and 4. Even though Model 4 has a higher log-likelihood than Model 2, both AIC and BIC values show that Model 2 provides a better fit to our data than Model 4. Indeed, the likelihood ratio test between Models 2 and 4 also shows that the interactive model does not perform better than the additive model in improving our model fit.

Table 5.3 The Effect of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$ and Regime Type on the Propensity of Negotiations with Insurgents in Africa During Civil Wars, 1989-2009

	Model 1 Negotiations	Model 2 Negotiations	Model 3 Negotiations	Model 4 Negotiations
Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$	0.102***	0.121***	0.348	0.667***
	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.221)	(0.166)
Party	-0.385	-0.292	-0.471	-0.334
	(0.624)	(0.304)	(0.643)	(0.305)
Military	-0.547	-0.332	-0.522	-0.298
	(0.561)	(0.267)	(0.564)	(0.274)
Personalist	-1.109**	-0.817***	-1.066**	-0.770***
	(0.523)	(0.256)	(0.522)	(0.257)
Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$×Party			-0.165	-0.475***
			(0.231)	(0.164)
Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$×Military			-0.306	-0.591***
			(0.218)	(0.174)
Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$×Personal			-1.501***	-1.461***
			(0.284)	(0.194)
Relative Insurgent Strength	0.641***	0.407**	0.637***	0.408**
	(0.224)	(0.162)	(0.224)	(0.162)
Main Group	0.477	0.212	0.496	0.218
	(0.350)	(0.248)	(0.348)	(0.249)
Intensity	-0.402	-0.276	-0.442	-0.311
	(0.342)	(0.307)	(0.339)	(0.301)
External Support to Insurgents	0.565	0.395*	0.533	0.370*
	(0.366)	(0.220)	(0.362)	(0.218)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.002	0.016	0.011	0.025
	(0.161)	(0.115)	(0.162)	(0.117)
Number of Conflict Episode	-0.463	-0.032	-0.406	-0.018
	(0.617)	(0.218)	(0.597)	(0.206)
Conflict Duration (Months)	0.006***	0.007***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Territorial War	-0.688	-0.340	-0.701	-0.342
	(0.546)	(0.405)	(0.542)	(0.401)
Ethnic War	1.056***	0.653***	1.040***	0.660***
	(0.228)	(0.203)	(0.234)	(0.201)
Third Party Mediation	2.316***	1.659***	2.281***	1.646***
	(0.430)	(0.368)	(0.431)	(0.373)
Number of Groups	0.354**	0.208*	0.352*	0.210*
	(0.179)	(0.116)	(0.180)	(0.116)
ln(GDP)	0.459***	0.302***	0.468***	0.311***
	(0.143)	(0.102)	(0.139)	(0.100)
Months Since Last Negotiation		-0.286***		-0.288***
		(0.046)		(0.047)
Months Since Last Negotiation^2		0.010***		0.010***
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Months Since Last Negotiation^3		-0.000**		-0.000**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	-15.821***	-10.366***	-16.034***	-10.606***
	(3.339)	(2.404)	(3.268)	(2.358)
N	2407	2407	2407	2407
Pseudo-R^2	0.217	0.295	0.221	0.298
Log-likelihood	-722.751	-650.289	-718.990	-648.087
AIC	1479.503	1340.577	1477.981	1342.174
BIC	1577.867	1456.300	1593.703	1475.256

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by conflict in parentheses. Baseline category for regime type is democracy.
Two-tailed tests: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Model 3, the coefficient associated with the number of terror attacks is not statistically significant, however, it becomes significant at 99% confidence level when I add the temporal dependence controls as shown in Model 4. The coefficient associated with the number of terror attacks in Model 4 suggests that terror attacks increase the probability of negotiations in democracies, i.e., when regime type takes the value of zero. Similar to the other models, the coefficients on the single party and military regimes are not statistically significant. The coefficient on the personalist regime is statistically significant and negative, which suggests that the propensity of negotiations is lower in personalist regimes than in democracies in the absence of terror attacks.

Figure 5.1 Average Marginal Effect of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$ on the Propensity of Negotiations with Insurgents across Regime Types in Africa During Civil Wars, 1989-2009 (Model 4)

The information provided in Model 4 is somewhat limited as the results do not give any information on the impact of terrorism on the propensity of negotiations across all regime types in the sample; we only know that terrorism has a positive impact on the prospects of negotiations in democracies, i.e., when regime type variable takes the value of zero. In order to test the interactive effect of regime types and number of terror attacks on the propensity of negotiations with insurgents, I plot the average marginal effects of terror attacks on the probability of negotiations across regime

types in Figure 5.1 as suggested by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006).[7]

Figure 5.1 demonstrates the average marginal effect of terror attacks on the probability of negotiations across all regimes with an overlaid histogram of regime types shown in the effective sample. The x-axis represents regime types in four categories, i.e., democracy, single party, military, and personalist, and the y-axis represents the average marginal effect of terror attacks on negotiations conditional on regime type. An eyeball test shows that the average marginal effect of terror attacks is statistically significant across all regime types, given the upper and lower bounds of confidence intervals do not include zero. The p values associated with the marginal effects also suggest that the marginal effect of terror attacks on the propensity of negotiations is statistically significant across all regime types at 95% confidence level.

According to Figure 5.1, terror attacks, on average, have a positive effect on the probability of negotiations in democracies, single party regimes, and military regimes. In contrast, terror attacks have a negative effect on the probability of negotiations in personalist autocracies. These results provide partial support to hypothesis 1; in line with my expectations, terror attacks increase the probability of negotiations in democracies. However, in hypothesis 1, I also expect that terror attacks decrease the probability of negotiations in all autocracies, which is clearly not the case as terrorism has a negative effect on the propensity of negotiations only in personalist autocracies. Consequently, the findings lend partial support to hypothesis 1. However, I fail to reject the null for hypothesis 1a; terror attacks do not have a negative effect on the probability of negotiations in democracies and do not have a positive effect in personalist regimes. Furthermore, I fail to reject hypothesis 2, since terror attacks have a positive effect on the propensity of negotiations in single party and military regimes, but a negative effect in personalist regimes. Also, I reject hypothesis 2a, since the findings suggest that terror attacks have differing effects on the propensity of negotiations across different autocracies.

In Figure 5.2, I illustrate the predicted probability of negotiations across all regime types with an overlaid histogram of terror attacks in the effective sample where the number of terror attacks varies in its in-sample range and all the other covariates are set to their representative moments. As seen from the confidence intervals around the point estimates of negotiations for democracies, the difference between the effect of terrorism on the propensity of negotiations in democracies and in other regimes is statistically distinguishable from zero. However, confidence intervals around the

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[7]The marginal effect plot for Model 3 can be found in Figure A.1 in Appendix A. According to this figure, the direction of the effect of terror attacks remains to be positive for single party regimes and negative for personalist regimes; however, terror attacks lose their significance on the propensity of negotiations in democracies and in military regimes.

point estimates for single party and military regimes are overlapping which might suggest that the effect of terrorism on the propensity of negotiations in single party and military regimes is not statistically different. In line with this, the t-statistic for comparing these two categories suggests that the effect terror attacks have on the propensity of negotiations in single party and military regimes is not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Figure 5.2 The Effect of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$ on the Propensity of Negotiations with Insurgents across Regime Types in Africa During Civil Wars, 1989-2009 (Model 4)

As seen from the predicted probabilities, all regimes have somewhat similar tendencies to grant negotiations to insurgent groups in the absence of terror attacks. However, with each terror attack, all regime types exhibit a change in their tendency to negotiate with insurgent groups; democracies become the most likely group and personalist regimes become the least likely group of regimes to negotiate with insurgent groups in the presence of terror attacks.

The point predictions for democracies suggest that each terror attack results in a substantial increase in the propensity of negotiations with insurgents in democracies. As such, while the probability of negotiations in democracies in the absence of terrorism is almost .1, five terror attacks in a given month increases the probability of negotiations to almost .5. In the case where 10 or more terror attacks are executed in a given month, the probability of negotiations for democracies is almost one. The overlaid histogram of terror attacks shows us that most months were with 10

or fewer terror attacks. Hence, we do not necessarily rely on some hypothetical values of terror attacks when making inferences regarding democracies' propensity to negotiate with insurgents, as we have enough observations with 10 or fewer terror attacks in our effective sample.[8]

Single party regimes are the second most likely group to negotiate with insurgents in the presence of terrorism, however, the effect of terror attacks on the probability of negotiations in single party regimes is not as substantive as in democracies. In the absence of terrorism, single party regimes are almost as likely as democracies to negotiate with insurgent groups. The probability of negotiations, however, is .5 when only 15 or more terror attacks are executed in a given month -a probability reached in democracies with only five terror attacks. Even though a probability of .5 is high, the distribution of terror attacks in our effective sample indicates that the occurrence of 15 or more terror attacks in a given month is very uncommon. Consequently, even though we see that each terror attack increases the probability of negotiations in single party regimes, a meaningful increase takes place where our data do not have many observations as such.

Military regimes are the third most likely group to grant negotiations to insurgents. The point estimates of negotiations in military regimes show that the probability of negotiations with insurgents becomes .5 only after 35 or more terror attacks occur in a given month, a probability that is reached when 15 terror attacks and five terror attacks are executed in single party regimes and democracies, respectively. As the distribution of the terror attacks suggests, the occurrence of 35 or more terror attacks is a very infrequent phenomenon in our effective sample. As a result, although terror attacks increase in the probability of negotiations in military regimes, this increase is not substantial and inadequately supported by our data.

In stark contrast to other regimes, terror attacks do not induce personalist regimes to negotiate with insurgents. Indeed, the probability of negotiations starts to decrease with the first terror attack in personalist regimes, and each additional terror attack brings the probability of negotiations in personalist regimes closer to zero. Even though the probability of negotiations in personalist regimes in the absence of terror attacks is already quite low, terror attacks decrease the probability even further, however, not substantially.

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[8]Since the overlaid histogram of terror attacks in this figure shows the terror attacks for all the sample but not limited to one regime type, I plot the predicted probabilities of negotiations in four different graphs where the histograms show the distribution of terror attacks in each regime type in Figure A.2 in Appendix A. Figure A.2 suggests that democracies experienced less than three terror attacks in most of the months. Single party regimes experienced a higher number of terror attacks in a given month, however, still, experiencing more than three terror attacks in a given month in single party regimes is very uncommon. Similarly, insurgent groups in military regimes, on average, employed less than five terror attacks in a given month. The distribution of terror attacks in personalist regimes shows that such regimes did not necessarily experience high numbers of terror attacks in a given month.

Taken together, the findings provide limited support for the hypotheses stated in the previous section. Governments, in accordance with their regime type, behave in the expected direction when faced with terror attacks. However, the effect magnitude of terrorism is not identical across all regime categories; while terror attacks substantially increase the probability of negotiations in democracies, and somewhat in single party regimes, they do not exert a substantive effect on the propensity of negotiations in military and personalist regimes. Moreover, the effect terror attacks exert on the propensity of negotiations in single party and military regimes are not necessarily different, as the overlapping confidence intervals and the t-statistic for comparing for these two regimes suggests.

6. CONCLUSION

This thesis finds that terrorism might be effective in forcing government compliance, but only in some countries contingent upon their institutional setting. As such, the empirical findings suggest that the effect of terror attacks on government policies during civil wars is somewhat mediated by regime type. More specifically, I find that terror attacks exert a positive effect on the probability of government negotiations with insurgents during civil wars in democracies, single party regimes, and in military regimes, and a negative effect in personalist regimes. Further investigations to test the hypotheses show that the differences in the effect terrorism on the probability of negotiations in democracies and other regimes, i.e., single party, military, and personalist regimes, is statistically distinguishable from zero. However, the difference between the propensity of negotiations with respect to regime type in single party and military regimes is not statistically different. Predicted probabilities of negotiations across regime types as conditional on terror attacks also suggest that terror attacks substantially increase the propensity of negotiations in democracies, and somewhat in single party and military regimes. Conversely, terror attacks decrease the likelihood of negotiations in personalist regimes. All in all, insurgent groups can force governments to sit on the negotiation table via terrorism, only in democratic countries.

When faced with terrorism, leaders have two options; repression and/or accommodation. The extent to which a government can apply one or both is a function if its regime type. Repression might appear to be a better option than accommodation in combatting terrorism; however, repression is not priceless -for most of the political regimes. In this vein, costs of repressive counterterrorism policies are sufficiently high in democracies as repressive counterterrorism measures involve many negative externalities (Davis and Silver 2004; Epifanio 2016; Wilkinson 1977). In other words, repressing terror activity does not only affect groups using terrorism negatively but also, the lives of ordinary citizens. In this sense, I argue that the high tendency democracies exhibit in negotiating with insurgents in the presence of terrorism is attributable to the high costs of repressive counterterrorism measures.

Like democracies, repression is not a preferred option for single party and military regimes, however, personalist regimes frequently resort to terrorism in the face of domestic opposition (Davenport 2007*b*). Building on this logic, I argue that the causal mechanism that explains the link between terror attacks and high likelihood of negotiations with insurgents in single party and military regimes is the reluctance of such regimes to repress civil liberties. Conversely, personalist regimes do not have institutional and strategic incentives to respond to terrorism in an accommodating way, thus they are less likely to pursue conciliatory policies to respond to terrorism.

Second, sensitivity towards civilian losses appears to be an important factor explaining why some governments tend to "give in" to groups using terrorism. Extant literature is abundant with studies examining how human costs of war affect governments' policies at times of international conflict (Gartner, Segura, and Barratt 2004; Goemans 2000; Senese 1999; Şirin and Koch 2015; Sweeney 2003). Researchers argue that democracies have less cost tolerance than autocracies in terms of casualties, given that democratic leaders depend on public approval and votes to remain in office. Likewise, scholars of terrorism have argued that terror attacks place an enormous amount of cost on democratic governments as the number of civilian casualties rise (Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003; Saygılı 2019). Following these arguments, I argue that democracies are more likely to accommodate groups using terrorism due to their high sensitivity towards civilian casualties. Contrary to the common understanding, autocracies are not homogenous in terms of their cost-benefit calculations with respect to civilian casualties. Following scholars who argue that casualties imply varying costs to different types of autocracies (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Şirin and Koch 2015), I argue that the political costs of civilian losses are high enough to force single party and military regimes to sit on the negotiation table with insurgents using terrorism. In contrast, a decline in public support as a result of civilian casualties by terror attacks does not jeopardize the tenure of a personalist leader, as such leaders do not depend on popular support to maintain office.

Institutional constraints constitute another factor that precludes some regimes to pursue coercive counterterrorism measures, which, in turn, leaves governments with limited options in countering terrorism and thus force them to grant negotiations to insurgents during civil wars. Democracies, in this sense, are the most institutionally constrained regimes than all the others, as democratic executives are highly checked and balanced by other branches of government, i.e., judiciary and legislative (Bapat 2005; Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Li 2005; Lupu 2015; Perliger 2012). Similarly, single party regimes and military regimes have some degree of institutionalization and bureaucracy (Geddes 2003; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014*a*; Weeks 2008), which make them more likely to respond to terrorism with conciliatory measures.

Moreover, elements of the political establishment in single party and military regimes might be sympathetic to the demands of groups using terrorism, thus negotiations with such groups might occur as a result of pressure from inside the regime (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014). Personalist regimes, on the other hand, exhibit the lowest levels of institutionalization and bureaucratic capacity (see, for example, Geddes 2003; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014*a*; Weeks 2008, 2012), which in turn allows personalist leaders to make decisions without consulting to any other political actor and thus less likely to pursue accommodation with politically aggrieved groups.

This thesis echoes previous findings on regime type and the occurrence of terrorism (e.g. Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Stanton 2013; Young and Dugan 2011). Democracies are consistently found to be the "better" targets for terror activity, since democracies depend on popular vote and constrained enough to not pursue a fully retaliatory counterterrorism strategy (e.g. Stanton 2013). The findings of this thesis are also in line with the prior work on the heterogeneity among autocracies in experiencing terrorism where researchers argue that single party and military regimes experience more terrorism given that they have domestic political audiences that punish the leaders, and personalist regimes experience less terrorism, since the odds of political change are dire (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003; Stanton 2013).

The empirical findings of this project are also in line with the literature on the variation within autocratic regimes with respect to government preferences on various policy domains (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Geddes 1999; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014*a*; Lai and Slater 2006; Slater 2003; Weeks 2008, 2012). As such, the findings show that single party and military regimes and personalist regimes have varying cost-benefit calculations regarding how to respond to terrorism.

Several limitations remain for this study. First, I use only one measurement of terrorism, the number of terror attacks, which might bias the estimations since the number of terror attacks does not necessarily capture the damage inflicted on governments via terrorism. By using the number of terror attacks to capture the effects of terrorism, I assume that the effect of a terror attack resulting in one civilian death and the effect of another terror attack resulting in 100 civilian deaths are identical. In this respect, Young (2019) argues that using different terrorism measures (e.g. number of fatalities, number of attacks, number of suicide attacks, and discriminate/indiscriminate terrorism) might yield different results, thus, employing different measures of terrorism to check the robustness of the empirical findings in this study is necessary.

Another limitation of this study is about the external validity of the findings. The

dataset employed in the analyses covers observations only from Africa. Even though many conflict scholars have focused on Africa exclusively in their quantitative and qualitative research projects, however, the analyses should be replicated in different parts of the world to talk about the generalizability of these findings. Thomas (2014) argues that patterns of political violence and terrorism in Africa are compatible with those in different parts of the world. However, in this study, domestic institutions and regime type turn out to play a prominent role, and thus we need adequate variation in domestic institutional setting. Even though the sample in this study provides us with enough variation to conduct the regression analyses, however, there might still be some factors unique to African regimes that might bias the estimates. For instance, Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) provide an extensive discussion on how the neo-patrimonial aspect of African regimes render African governments and politics distinctive than the rest of the world.

In addition to its advantages noted in previous chapters, restricting the sample to the universe of cases in civil wars might also appear to be a limitation of this study. Existence of a civil war might introduce a systematic factor that affects some regimes in particular ways, which might bias the estimations. For instance, Hutchison (2014) shows that domestic conflicts increase the public's willingness to extend civil rights and liberties. Democracies, single party regimes, and military regimes might be accommodating to groups using terrorism, not necessarily because they use terrorism, but because the public opinion is already in favor of peaceful resolution of conflicts. Furthermore, the presence of a civil conflict weakens governments in many aspects, during and after civil conflicts. Collier (1999) argues that civil wars destroy resources and infrastructure which dampens economic growth and development. In this sense, this study does not necessarily talk about the responsiveness and/or unresponsiveness of regimes in the face of terror attacks at all times, but only at times of civil wars. Consequently, the analyses in this thesis should be replicated in politically stable contexts in order to have a deeper understanding on the interactive effect of regime type and terrorism on the propensity of negotiations between governments and insurgents during civil wars.

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Figure A.1 Average Marginal Effect of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$ on Negotiations with Insurgents across Regime Types (Model 3)

Figure A.2 The Effect of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$ on Negotiations with Insurgents across Regime Types (Histogram of Terror Attacks for Each Regime Type) (Model 4)

Table A.1 The Effect of Terrorism$_{(t-1)}$ (Dichotomous) and Regime Type on Negotiations with Insurgents

	Model 5 Negotiations	Model 6 Negotiations	Model 7 Negotiations	Model 8 Negotiations
Terror Attack$_{(t-1)}$	0.131	0.444*	0.546	0.889*
	(0.233)	(0.250)	(0.462)	(0.472)
Party	-0.276	-0.268	-0.472	-0.362
	(0.625)	(0.305)	(0.661)	(0.312)
Military	-0.521	-0.309	-0.475	-0.290
	(0.557)	(0.262)	(0.561)	(0.277)
Personalist	-1.114**	-0.817***	-1.070**	-0.779***
	(0.522)	(0.254)	(0.521)	(0.257)
Terror Attack$_{(t-1)}$×Party			0.195	-0.115
			(0.536)	(0.508)
Terror Attack$_{(t-1)}$×Military			-1.001*	-0.706
			(0.577)	(0.691)
Terror Attack$_{(t-1)}$×Personalist			-2.023***	-1.785***
			(0.504)	(0.463)
Relative Insurgent Strength	0.625***	0.392**	0.613***	0.393**
	(0.221)	(0.159)	(0.216)	(0.160)
Main Group	0.461	0.194	0.490	0.214
	(0.352)	(0.252)	(0.347)	(0.248)
Conflict Intensity	-0.368	-0.249	-0.429	-0.292
	(0.335)	(0.306)	(0.331)	(0.298)
External Support to Insurgents	0.586	0.409*	0.561	0.383*
	(0.359)	(0.217)	(0.357)	(0.217)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.004	0.019	0.013	0.026
	(0.158)	(0.116)	(0.160)	(0.118)
Number of Conflict Episode	-0.494	-0.044	-0.446	-0.036
	(0.644)	(0.231)	(0.637)	(0.220)
Conflict Duration (Months)	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Territorial War	-0.734	-0.323	-0.669	-0.304
	(0.568)	(0.417)	(0.541)	(0.404)
Ethnic War	1.045***	0.645***	0.995***	0.640***
	(0.226)	(0.201)	(0.233)	(0.201)
Third Party Mediation	2.332***	1.671***	2.270***	1.653***
	(0.417)	(0.359)	(0.418)	(0.365)
Number of Groups	0.346*	0.204*	0.341*	0.205*
	(0.177)	(0.114)	(0.180)	(0.116)
ln(GDP)	0.470***	0.307***	0.482***	0.314***
	(0.139)	(0.101)	(0.134)	(0.098)
Months Since Last Negotiation		-0.291***		-0.291***
		(0.047)		(0.047)
Months Since Last Negotiation^2		0.010***		0.010***
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Months Since Last Negotiation^3		-0.000**		-0.000**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	-16.032***	-10.468***	-16.220***	-10.620***
	(3.269)	(2.383)	(3.197)	(2.325)
N	2407	2407	2407	2407
Pseudo-R^2	0.212	0.292	0.216	0.294
Log-likelihood	-727.373	-653.216	-723.164	-651.483
AIC	1488.745	1346.431	1486.328	1348.966
BIC	1587.109	1462.154	1602.050	1482.048

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by conflict in parentheses. Baseline category for regime type is democracy.

Two-tailed tests: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure A.3 Marginal Effect of Terrorism$_{(t-1)}$ (Dichotomous) on Negotiations with Insurgents across Regime Types (Model 8)


Figure A.4 The Effect of Terrorism$_{(t-1)}$ (Dichotomous) on Negotiations with Insurgents across Regime Types (Model 8)

Table A.2 The Effect of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$ and Regime Type on Negotiations with Insurgents (Personalist Regimes as Baseline)

|	Model 9 Negotiations	Model 10 Negotiations
Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$	0.121***	-0.794***
	(0.032)	(0.110)
Democracy	0.817***	0.770***
	(0.256)	(0.257)
Party	0.525**	0.436*
	(0.224)	(0.227)
Military	0.485***	0.472***
	(0.152)	(0.147)
Democracy × Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$		1.461***
		(0.194)
Party × Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$		0.985***
		(0.114)
Military × Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$		0.869***
		(0.113)
Relative Insurgent Strength	0.407**	0.408**
	(0.162)	(0.162)
Main Group	0.212	0.218
	(0.248)	(0.249)
Conflict Intensity	-0.276	-0.311
	(0.307)	(0.301)
External Support to Insurgents	0.395*	0.370*
	(0.220)	(0.218)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.016	0.025
	(0.115)	(0.117)
Number of Conflict Episode	-0.032	-0.018
	(0.218)	(0.206)
Conflict Duration	0.007***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Territorial War	-0.340	-0.342
	(0.405)	(0.401)
Ethnic War	0.653***	0.660***
	(0.203)	(0.201)
Third Party Mediation	1.659***	1.646***
	(0.368)	(0.373)
Number of Groups	0.208*	0.210*
	(0.116)	(0.116)
ln(GDP)	0.302***	0.311***
	(0.102)	(0.100)
Months Since Last Negotiation	-0.286***	-0.288***
	(0.046)	(0.047)
Months Since Last Negotiation^2	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Months Since Last Negotiation^3	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-11.183***	-11.376***
	(2.467)	(2.427)
N	2407	2407
Pseudo-R^2	0.295	0.298
Log-likelihood	-650.289	-648.087
AIC	1340.577	1342.174
BIC	1456.300	1475.256

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline regime type category is personalist.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.3 Additive and Interactive Effects of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$ and Autocratic Regime Type on Negotiations with Insurgents

	Model 11 Negotiations	Model 12 Negotiations	Model 13 Negotiations	Model 14 Negotiations
Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$	0.113***	0.173***	0.113***	-0.769***
	(0.034)	(0.062)	(0.034)	(0.111)
Party			0.661***	0.580***
			(0.200)	(0.198)
Military	-0.180	-0.116	0.482***	0.464***
	(0.155)	(0.152)	(0.150)	(0.144)
Personalist	-0.661***	-0.580***		
	(0.200)	(0.198)		
Party × Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$				0.942***
				(0.107)
Military × Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$		-0.094		0.848***
		(0.069)		(0.115)
Personalist × Number of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$		-0.942***		
		(0.107)		
Relative Insurgent Strength	0.371**	0.374**	0.371**	0.374**
	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)
Main Group	0.393	0.411	0.393	0.411
	(0.293)	(0.292)	(0.293)	(0.292)
Intensity	-0.239	-0.276	-0.239	-0.276
	(0.327)	(0.320)	(0.327)	(0.320)
External Support to Insurgents	0.387*	0.367	0.387*	0.367
	(0.229)	(0.228)	(0.229)	(0.228)
ln(Battle Deaths)	-0.059	-0.052	-0.059	-0.052
	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.132)
Number of Conflict Episode	-0.266	-0.227	-0.266	-0.227
	(0.261)	(0.260)	(0.261)	(0.260)
Conflict Duration (Months)	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Territorial War	-0.781*	-0.792*	-0.781*	-0.792*
	(0.433)	(0.434)	(0.433)	(0.434)
Ethnic War	0.718***	0.714***	0.718***	0.714***
	(0.214)	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.213)
Third Party Mediation	1.799***	1.783***	1.799***	1.783***
	(0.429)	(0.432)	(0.429)	(0.432)
Number of Groups	0.222**	0.224**	0.222**	0.224**
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.113)
ln(GDP)	0.333***	0.339***	0.333***	0.339***
	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.101)
Months Since Last Negotiation	-0.272***	-0.272***	-0.272***	-0.272***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Months Since Last Negotiation^2	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Months Since Last Negotiation^3	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-10.812***	-11.038***	-11.474***	-11.619***
	(2.502)	(2.453)	(2.582)	(2.538)
N	2266	2266	2266	2266
Pseudo-R^2	0.312	0.313	0.312	0.313
Log-likelihood	-591.327	-589.779	-591.327	-589.779
AIC	1220.655	1221.557	1220.655	1221.557
BIC	1329.444	1341.798	1329.444	1341.798

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline for Model 12-13 is single party and for Model 14-15 is personalist. Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Figure A.5 Average Marginal Effect of Terror Attacks$_{(t-1)}$ on Negotiations with Insurgents among Autocracies (Model 12) (Single Party Regimes as Baseline)

Table B.1 Cross Tabulation of Polity 2 and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) Regime Type Categorization

Regime Type (Geddes et al. 2014)	Polity 2				
	Autocracy (-8/-6)	Closed Anocracy (-5/0)	Open Anocracy (1/5)	Democracy (6/8)	Total
Democracy	20	93	23	98	234
Party	157	439	255	8	859
Military	205	348	135	0	688
Personalist	525	811	61	0	1,397
Total	907	1,691	474	106	3,178

Note: Unit of analysis is dyad-month.

Table B.2 The Effect of Regime Type on Negotiations with Insurgents

	Model 15 Negotiations
Party	-0.107
	(0.316)
Military	-0.261
	(0.245)
Personalist	-0.757***
	(0.250)
Relative Insurgent Strength	0.404***
	(0.153)
Main Group	0.188
	(0.256)
Conflict Intensity	-0.218
	(0.305)
External Support to Insurgents	0.417**
	(0.213)
ln(Battle Deaths)	0.007
	(0.119)
Number of Conflict Episode	0.009
	(0.231)
Conflict Duration (Months)	0.006***
	(0.002)
Territorial War	-0.579
	(0.411)
Ethnic War	0.634***
	(0.208)
Third Party Mediation	1.715***
	(0.354)
Number of Groups	0.163
	(0.119)
ln(GDP)	0.313***
	(0.100)
Months Since Last Negotiation	-0.283***
	(0.046)
Months Since Last Negotiation^2	0.009***
	(0.003)
Months Since Last Negotiation^3	-0.000**
	(0.000)
Constant	-10.665***
	(2.489)
N	2471
Pseudo-R^2	0.286
Log-likelihood	-676.905
AIC	1391.809
BIC	1502.244

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by conflict in parantheses. Baseline regime category is democracy. Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure B.1 The Effect of Regime Type on Negotiations (Model 15)