

**TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN DAVUTOĐLU ERA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT**

By

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Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts


Sabancı University

January 2019

**TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN DAVUTOĞLU ERA:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT**

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DATE OF APPROVAL: January 7, 2019

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ABSTRACT

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MA Thesis, January 2019

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Emin Fuat Keyman

Keywords: Mediation, Turkish foreign policy, conflict resolution, tools of mediation

This thesis aims to investigate the concept of mediation and how it is implemented on Turkish foreign policy. What mainly considered in this thesis are the motives behind Turkey's mediation attempts, the progress of mediation processes and finally the consequences that had been experienced in the ends of selected mediation cases. In order to figure out these processes correctly and to make objective interpretations, first, international conflict resolution methods have been defined. Secondly, by taking its theoretical and historical backgrounds, the similarities and differences of 'mediation' among the other methods have been clarified. Thirdly, the implementation of 'mediation' to foreign policy approaches is taken into consideration and the components of mediation which are published by the United Nations are demonstrated. Fourthly, while taking the motives of Turkey's mediation into consideration, it is debated that to what extent Turkey could adopt these components to the mediation cases in which Turkey have participated particularly in between Israel – Syria and the US – Iran. In the end, in addition to these components, impacts of the other internal and external variables on the selected mediation processes are taken into account in order to provide more reasonable explanations for both the reasons and consequences of these mediation attempts.

ÖZET

DAVUTOĞLU DÖNEMİNDE TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI: KRİTİK BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

MUSTAFA ÖGET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ocak 2019

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Emin Fuat Keyman

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arabuluculuk, Türk dış politikası, uyuşmazlık çözümü, arabuluculuk araçları

Bu tez arabuluculuk konseptini ve bu konseptin Türk dış politikasında nasıl uygulandığını araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezde temel olarak ele alınan, Türkiye'nin arabuluculuk girişimlerinin ardındaki nedenler, arabuluculuk süreçlerinin ilerleyişi ve nihayetinde seçilmiş arabuluculuk davalarının sonlarında tecrübe edilen sonuçlardır. Bu süreçleri doğru bir şekilde ortaya koymak ve nesnel yorumlar yapmak için öncelikle uluslararası uyuşmazlık çözüm yöntemleri tanımlanmıştır. İkinci olarak, teorik ve tarihsel geçmişlerini alarak, diğer yöntemler ile “arabuluculuk” arasındaki benzerlikler ve farklılıklar netleştirilmiştir. Üçüncü olarak, “arabuluculuk” uygulamasının dış politika yaklaşımlarına uygulanması dikkate alınmış ve Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından yayınlanan arabuluculuk bileşenleri gösterilmiştir. Dördüncü olarak, Türkiye'nin arabuluculuğunun nedenleri göz önünde bulundurulurken, Türkiye'nin bu bileşenleri, özellikle İsrail-Suriye ve ABD-İran arasındaki arabuluculuk davalarında ne kadar benimseyebildiği tartışılmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu bileşenlere ek olarak, seçilen arabuluculuk süreçleri üzerindeki diğer iç ve dış değişkenlerin etkileri, bu arabuluculuk girişimlerinin gerekçeleri ve sonuçları için daha makul açıklamalar sağlamak amacıyla dikkate alınmıştır.

To my parents and my sisters...

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. E. Fuat Keyman for encouraging me in all steps of my thesis. He also made valuable recommendations to me for finding the most appropriate topic by considering both of my academic background and my sphere of interests. Briefly, I felt that his support was always with me during my career as much as the thesis process.

I also would like to thank my friend Ali Murat for motivating me during this process. He gave me enthusiasm to focus on my thesis and as we stayed together and took the same courses, we have always supported each other for not only dealing with academic issues but also job finding process as well. I will never forget the exams we proctored together.

Last but not least, I would like to express my sincere appreciations to my parents and sisters for always supporting me in any decisions I take. They never stopped believing in me regarding I was doing the right. Feeling their support behind me has strengthened and motivated me more.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABA:	American Bar Association
AKP:	Justice and Development Party
AR-GE:	Research and Development
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
CSIS:	Center for Strategic and International Studies
IAEA:	International Atomic Energy Agency
MSU:	Mediation Support Unit
ULC:	Uniform Law Commission
UMA:	Uniform Mediation Act
UN:	United Nations

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Since the establishment period of Turkey, there have always been differentiations in the roots of Turkish foreign policy. These differentiations have not only stemmed from the domestic politics, but also there have been many other external factors that influence Turkish foreign policy. In other words, there are global paradigm shifts in foreign policy approaches and as the other actors and countries; Turkey has also followed the global trends. Recently, as Apakan mentions, “we have seen a growing interest in and support for mediation as a means of preventing conflicts and resolving disputes, not only at the United Nations (UN) headquarters, but also at regional and national levels”.¹ Therefore, if the increased threats regarding international peace and security are taken into account, mediation, which is a way of conflict resolution, could be assessed as the new international phenomenon while shaping foreign policy approaches.

In this thesis, Turkey’s approach towards the mediation will be investigated. By doing this, the main parameters of Davutoğlu’s *Strategic Depth*² book will be analyzed and used in order to figure out the guiding points of Turkey’s recent foreign policy approach. To put it another way, because this book provided guidance for Turkey’s foreign policy during Davutoğlu’s foreign ministry and prime ministry eras, it would help us to understand that why Turkey preferred to be in dispute resolution processes. Moreover, this book also gives clues in terms of the reasons behind Turkey’s mediation roles.

As Apakan mentions, the tendencies of countries towards the dispute resolution have rapidly increased especially in the last decades and there are various reasons behind it. If this issue is considered by an idealistic perspective, disputes damage international cooperation and peace, so they have to be resolved. On the other hand, to be realistic, the disputes between the countries may be used for increasing the international position and reputation by another actor or country. If we elaborate on the situation, resolving the

¹ Apakan, E. (2013). Mediation: The Best Way Forward in Conflict Prevention and Resolution. *All Azimuth*, 2(1), 39, p. 39

² Davutoğlu, A. (2001). *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları

disputes between countries would influence the reputation of a country in a positive way because of its contributions to the international peace and security. Furthermore, an effective resolution process would also affect the domestic politics as well as the international one. If an international dispute can be successfully resolved by a particular country, it would directly increase the level of constituents of the ruling government.

Briefly, these are the main and fundamental motives for the countries to prefer mediation as a tool of foreign policy. However, as all the others have, Turkey also has its own reasons and motives behind its mediator role. As they will be deeply discussed in the following chapters, according to Davutoğlu's perspective, regional dynamics and the history have been the biggest motives behind Turkey's mediation attempts. Therefore, in order to understand the motives behind Turkey's mediation the main parameters of Davutoğlu's book, *Strategic Depth*, is needed to be considered.

In the literature, there are many resources that investigate the role of conflict and dispute resolution in foreign policy approaches, because, as abovementioned, dispute resolution attempts have become a worldwide trend during the foreign policymaking processes of countries. Further, as Akpınar argues, mediation has begun to be used as a foreign policy tool by many countries.³ Therefore, there are various numbers of researches in terms of the role of conflict resolution methods during foreign policymaking processes. Moreover, as similar to this thesis, some of these resources have taken Turkey's mediation role into consideration by considering the various mediation cases that Turkey has attempted to reach a resolution. However, although most of these are the valuable works in order to understand Turkey's mediator role and foreign policy perspective in Davutoğlu era, because the reasons behind these mediation attempts can be seen more clear in the course of time and because there are still unresolved and sustaining disputes that Turkey has attempted to resolve, there is a gap in the literature that ensures a recent assessment. In other words, because it would be easier to observe the motives behind mediation attempts by considering the developments in the aftermaths of the mediation processes and because different cases might demonstrate differentiations depending on the internal and external variables, the points of views towards Turkey's mediation cases may also change in

³ Akpınar, P. (2015). Mediation as a foreign policy tool in the Arab Spring: Turkey, Qatar and Iran. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 17(3), 252-268, p. 253

different time periods. Accordingly, unlike its counterparts, the overall aim of this research is to contribute to the literature by investigating particular mediation cases by not only observing the circumstances when the cases have emerged, but also taking the impacts of developments and trends occurred both in international arena and domestic politics of Turkey into account. Consequently, as far as I am concerned, this research provides a recent and broader perspective to the literature to figure out the motives and the results of Turkey's mediation role in different cases.

Depending on this, the main purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how the mediation processes might differentiate according to the internal and external variables. By saying the internal and external variables, it is referred to the developments in both international relations and domestic politics, because in order to observe and figure out the processes correctly, their impacts on the progress of mediation should not be underestimated. Accordingly, I argue that it would be a mistake to evaluate Turkey's mediation attempts simply as resolving the disputes between countries, but there are many other factors behind it, and in order to be successful, it is necessary to look broader than the mediation process itself. To put it another way, Turkey's mediation attempts did not only aim resolving the conflicts between countries, but also it was intended to develop Turkey's international reputation as well as increasing the level of constituents in domestic politics by implementing an effective and comprehensive foreign policy approach. In order to prove this claim, Turkey's particular mediation cases will be investigated by considering the regional dynamics, domestic political factors and the other international developments in the course of time.

As it will be deeply discussed in the next chapters, in *Strategic Depth*, Davutoğlu mainly pointed out the importance of regional countries on Turkish foreign policy.⁴ That is why he believes that Turkey must give priority to those countries in order to create a regional peace and solidarity. Consequently, mediation has been used as a tool of foreign policy especially in his era and onwards. The main reason for Turkey to prefer mediation within the other conflict resolution methods provided by the UN (will be discussed in next chapters) is because this may be evaluated as the moderate way of resolution which is

⁴ Davutoğlu, A. (2001). *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları

between negotiation and arbitration. In other words, if all these conflict resolution methods are sorted by their ability to impose sanctions, mediation would be in the middle of the list because, although a mediator is not able to impose punishments or regulations to the parties, a mediation process must be sustained under the authority of a mediator. Therefore, because this is neither the hardest nor the softest way of conflict resolution, mediation has been preferred by Turkey.

According to AKP's 2013 Ar-Ge (Research and Development) report, Turkey has had eleven mediation attempts between 2002 and 2013⁵. Because some of them are currently unresolved and still debated cases, this research is limited by taking two cases into account which are mainly Turkey's mediation attempts to the conflicts between Israel – Syria, and Iran – the US. By considering only these two cases, the purpose is both to investigate them in a deeper way and to provide various perspectives towards different cases. While investigating the cases, mostly qualitative research methods will be used and different approaches in the literature will be discussed. Further, it should be noted that this is not a research that makes an overall evaluation of Turkish foreign policy; rather this is an assessment of Turkey's particular mediation attempts.

If we take all these points into consideration, in the next chapter, international conflict resolution methods will be explained. By explaining these methods, the main purpose is to demonstrate different dispute resolution methods which can be used as the tools of foreign policy by the other countries. In this chapter, firstly, the meaning of conflict resolution and the shift from the use of hard power to soft power will be discussed. Depending on this, article 33 of the UN Charter, which offers all the conflict resolution methods of the United Nations, will be briefly explained. In order to figure out the similarities and discrepancies between them, all the methods that are considered in the article 33 will be discussed one by one, because this would be crucial especially to distinguish mediation from the other methods. To put it another way, because all of these methods demonstrate a great deal of similarities both in theory and practice, and because the mediation is one of the key concepts of this thesis, in order not to cause confusion, it is preferred to touch on all the methods briefly. In this part of the chapter, basically it is aimed

⁵ 2002 - 2013 Döneminde Dışişleri Bakanlığı Faaliyetleri (Vol. 20, pp. 1-16, Rep.). (2013). Ankara: Ar-Ge Vizyon - Ak Parti Ar-Ge Başkanlığı, p. 5

to clarify the concept of mediation by comparing and contrasting to the other methods provided in the UN Charter. Thanks to this, the reader will be more able to figure out the similarities and discrepancies between the conflict resolution methods, and will be aware of how a mediation process maintains in a particular case.

After explaining these, in the next chapter, firstly, the history and definition of mediation will be taken into consideration. The terminology of mediation is not only used in politics or international relations, but it is also observed in various fields. By taking this into account, it is purposed to show the use of mediation in different resources and literature. After briefly touching the use of mediation in different fields, it will be mostly concentrated on its political definitions and explanations. Accordingly, this part can be assessed as a historical and literature review regarding the concept of mediation.

Then, in order to understand the logic of mediation, the “mediation paradigm” which is provided by Wall et al. will be investigated.⁶ The main reason for taking this perspective into consideration is because this article not only focuses on the dispute and conflicting parties, but it also takes the mediator(s) into consideration as well as the other variables. As it will be deeply discussed in the next pages, the “mediation paradigm” also investigates the impacts of domestic politics of the parties including the mediator(s) in addition to a mediation process. Consequently, the article classifies the outcomes as “total net outcomes” and “alternative outcomes”, and by comparing and contrasting them, it proposes claims regarding the development of a mediation process.⁷ This approach is important while making evaluation about selected cases in this thesis, because a mediation case does not consist solely of disputing parties, but the impact of mediator(s) and the other internal and external variables should not be underestimated. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, this perspective must be taken into account to provide more objective assessments for selected cases.

After investigating its meaning and uses in different resources, it would be essential to concentrate on a mediation process. In order to reach an effective and permanent

⁶ Wall Jr, J. A. (1981). Review Section: Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), 157-180.

⁷ Ibid.

resolution, there are benchmarks and components that are needed to be considered during the process. The Guidance for Effective Mediation which is provided by the UN is a valuable resource for not only understanding the rules of mediation, but also for finding a permanent resolution. Therefore, the components that are provided in this Guidance are investigated one by one to figure out how the processes in selected cases have been progressed in the course of time.

Before the case evaluation part, as the final step of theoretical background, it is necessary to consider Turkey's recent Turkish foreign policy approach. To put it in another way, analyzing the theoretical basis of Turkish foreign policy is important to understand the reasons behind Turkey's mediation attempts. In order to provide a logical explanation, it will be beneficial to consider Davutoğlu's *Strategic Depth* book because of not only his duty on foreign ministry, but also he reflects the perspectives of current government on foreign policy. That is why, the main parameters of *Strategic Depth* will also be considered briefly. Depending on this, it will be easier to clarify the motives behind Turkey's mediation attempts. In addition to Davutoğlu's point of view, the other reasons behind Turkey's mediation will be analyzed by considering various evaluations and perspectives. As an example of this, Neo-Ottomanism which can be assessed as a buzzword in terms of Turkish foreign policy will be briefly discussed. This would be beneficial to demonstrate different opinions and perspectives related to the topic.

After discussing all of these, cases will be taken into consideration. As abovementioned, Turkey's mediation between the US and Iran; and Syria and Israel will be the main cases that are going to be discussed. Before this, however, very brief information in terms of different mediation cases that Turkey were in until today, will be provided in order to roughly inform the reader about the other cases. Finally, the selected cases are going to be discussed.

These cases, in fact, were not randomly selected. Although the mediation attempts of Turkey have been frequently observed between 2002 and 2013, the conflicts between Israel and Syria, and the US and Iran are still unresolved cases and did not lose their validities. In addition to this, there have been lots of fluctuations observed in these cases in the course of time. The issue of Golan Heights between Israel and Syria created the basis of the conflict

between these countries. Similarly, the nuclear proliferation program of Iran is the main problematic situation between Iran and the US. Briefly, because these cases are still today's heated debate topics, these two particular cases are selected in order to provide a recent perspective.

The investigation of selected cases will contain, first, the summary of disputes. After explaining them, the motives behind Turkey's reaction and the way that Turkey reacted will be pointed out. Then, the mediation processes will be evaluated by considering the UN's components and mediation paradigm approach.⁸ These evaluations would be helpful in order to figure out why there is a failure or success in these selected cases. Finally, there will be an overall evaluation of both Turkey's and disputing parties' attempts. Briefly, this chapter can be evaluated as case investigation chapter and both of the selected cases will be discussed in this format. The overall aim here is both to demonstrate different cases and perspectives, simultaneously, explaining them deeply by taking only two of Turkey's mediation cases.

Consequently, after discussing all of these, at the end of this thesis, the failures and successes will be discussed by considering all the variables. If we elaborate, Turkey's efficient or inefficient use of benchmarks that are provided by the UN, alternative and total net outcomes that have emerged at the ends of processes, the use of both domestic and international politics during the mediation processes and the other prospects and challenges will be taken into consideration in the last chapter. Mainly, the last chapter contains evaluations and assessments. Was there an over-exaggeration in Turkey's mediator role? To what extent it was appropriate to use the name of Ottoman Empire and Neo-Ottomanist approach during the mediation processes? Was the capacity of Turkey enough sufficient to maintain the mediation processes? Actually, one of the main aims of this thesis is finding answers for these questions especially about Turkey's mediation role. However, it must be pointed out that the assessments here do not make an overall evaluation of Turkish foreign policy, instead, they are completely related to the Turkey's mediation attempts on selected cases. Therefore, it would not make sense to make an overall comment on Turkish foreign policy by considering solely the mediation attempts. That is why, the success or failure of

⁸ Ibid.

Turkey's mediation could not be generalized as the success or failure of Turkey's foreign policy.

If we take all these points into consideration, basically the flow of this thesis will be in this way. As abovementioned, the main aim of the thesis is to provide a recent and broad perspective in order to understand the role of mediation on Turkish foreign policy. As far as I am concerned, this thesis would contribute to the political literature by answering the questions like "how a mediation process should be?", "how to be successful during a mediation process?" and "how the other internal and external dynamics can affect a mediation process?". This thesis only covers Turkey's mediation roles in particular cases, but the benchmarks which have been provided by the UN are not only for Turkey, but also for all the other countries and actors in international arena. Therefore, because these benchmarks will be discussed by considering the selected cases of Turkey, the evaluations and assessments at the end of this thesis would be a useful opportunity for the others in order to progress an effective mediation process. In other words, although the cases or conditions are different, these benchmarks play an essential role during all mediation processes in international arena. Because the prospects and challenges that Turkey has experienced in its mediation cases are taken into account, the experiences here might lead both Turkey and the others to avoid making the same mistakes again and again.

CHAPTER 2: MEANING OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION METHODS

2.1. Definition and Classification of Conflict Resolution Methods

Since the establishment of states, there have always been various types of conflicts between them. In this thesis, rather than their reasons, it will be concentrated on the resolution methods and processes of these conflicts. In the course of time, the ways and tools that are used during conflict resolution processes have changed to a large extent. In order to figure out how and why this change happened, firstly, it would be better to categorize the conflict resolution methods under two headings. In general, the use of hard power and soft power can be evaluated as two separated methods which have been used for conflict resolution in international relations. In order to figure out how these processes have been progressed, it is necessary to briefly define and explain these concepts.

Hard power can be briefly defined as forcing others by using coercive diplomatic strategies, military power and economic sanctions in order to protect and increase the interests and profits.⁹ To put it another way, according to Joseph Nye, hard power is “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will”.¹⁰ By saying the ‘carrots and sticks’ Nye emphasized the rewards and punishments that can be imposed by using coercive strategies in order to protect and improve national interests. On the other hand, Nye introduced the concept of soft power and defines it as an ability of a state to make others act in the same way that it wants without using coercion or military power.¹¹ In other words, according to Wilson, “soft power is a capacity to persuade others to do what one wants”¹² and especially after the Cold-war period, it is possible to observe a gradual transition from use of hard power to soft power. Briefly, globalization and developed interactions between states can be assessed as the biggest reason of this transition because; the increased interaction has made states to

⁹ Campbell, K. M., & O'Hanlon, M. E. (2006). *Hard power: The new politics of national security*. Basic Books (AZ).

¹⁰ Nye, J. S. (2003). Propaganda isn't the way: Soft power. *The International Herald Tribune*, 10.

¹¹ Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft power. *Foreign policy*, (80), 153-171.

¹² Wilson, E. (2008). *Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power*. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 110-124. Retrieved from <http://icproxy.sabanciuniv.edu:2195/stable/25097997>, p. 114

need each other more and instead of wars, they started to use others' needs in order to increase their own national interests.

Finally and more recently, a 'smart power' strategy is started to be emphasized in the literature of international relations. It is defined as "an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand one's influence and establish legitimacy of one's action".¹³ It can be referred from this definition that smart power is a mixture of hard and soft power because although the significance of alliances, partnerships or the state institutions are emphasized, the use of hard power is also taken into account when it is necessary. According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Commission Report, a smart power strategy mainly concentrates on five critical points. These are basically; "alliances, partnerships and institutions; global development; public diplomacy; economic integration; technology and innovation".¹⁴ According to this report, all of these points must be taken into consideration globally. That is why it is very crucial to create resolutions for international challenges and conflicts for the implementation of a smart power strategy throughout the world.

As a consequence of these shifts in power types, the conflicts that have been observed between states have also changed and depending on this, new conflict resolution methods have been developed. Since the smart power is currently and mostly used type of power in international relations, the UN developed conflict resolution methods by considering this shift. According to UN Charter Article 33,

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.¹⁵

This article mentions that if there is a threat that could harm the international peace and if the UN Security Council thinks that it is necessary to intervene, the very first step

¹³ Armitage, R. L., & Nye, J. S. (2007). CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America. CSIS.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. New York: United Nations, Office of Public Information. Article: 33

will be searching for solutions by given methods. These methods can be evaluated as peaceful means of conflict resolution and usually does not include hard power capacities. Instead of this, the very first attempt would be trying to solve the conflict by using negotiation, enquiry or mediation methods. Although there are many determinants and variables while determining the resolution method, it is commonly accepted by the UN that the first steps must include peaceful suggestions and attempts. After the peaceful attempts of the UN, if the consequence is still negative and the conflict is getting bigger and bigger, then the UN may decide to take action by taking the Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter into consideration. Although, these articles include the use of hard power capacities as the conflict resolution methods such as military intervention, economic sanctions or blockades, these are the last resorts and undesired techniques to be implemented.

According to Kelman, “international conflict resolution can be placed in the context of a larger, growing held of practice, applied at different levels and in different domains, and anchored in different disciplines, theoretical traditions, and fields of practice”.¹⁶ By referring this, it is not possible to claim that there is a stereotyped and commonly accepted conflict resolution method for all international and intrastate conflicts. For instance, Rothman and Olson argue that the “identity-based, ethno-political conflicts are often resistant to traditional resource- and interest-based resolution methods”.¹⁷ Although, the UN Charter approaches to all conflicts by using peaceful means and methods as the first step, if it does not work, even the UN Security Council does not hesitate to intervene by using hard power strategies. Therefore, while determining a dispute settlement for a particular conflict, taking all historical, cultural and political variables into consideration, understanding and researching all parts of the conflict deeply, listening the reasons of the conflict from all parties are the vital things to reach an effective and permanent resolution.

Finally, in this part of the thesis, it will be briefly taken all the conflict resolution methods into consideration amended in the UN Charter. In the Chapter VI, Article 33 of the UN Charter, the first suggestions for dispute resolution methods are demonstrated. As abovementioned, it is stated that if a threat against the international peace and security

¹⁶ Kelman, H. C., & Fisher, R. J. (2003). *Conflict analysis and resolution*, p. 315

¹⁷ Rothman, J., & Olson, M. L. (2001). From interests to identities: Towards a new emphasis in interactive conflict resolution. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(3), 289-305, p. 289

emerges, then the Security Council shall seek a solution. From now on, I will briefly explain these methods one by one by considering the UN's "Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States".¹⁸

2.2. International Conflict Resolution Methods

2.2.1. Negotiation

According to the UN, although the negotiation is taken as a method of dispute resolution in the UN Charter, the way of using it is generally assessed as a prerequisite for the other methods because, unlike the other methods mentioned in the Article 33, negotiation is a more flexible method which can be applied for almost all types of conflicts.¹⁹ Accordingly, in the words of the Permanent Court of International Justice, it is said that "before a dispute can be made the subject of an action at law, its subject matter should have been clearly defined by diplomatic negotiations".²⁰ That is why, rather than a method, negotiation is evaluated as a necessity before the implementation of a dispute resolution method. Briefly, negotiation is a classical and routine way of solving a conflict even in daily life. The difference is, in the international relations, the negotiation process is maintained by diplomatic channels. Although it does not give very effective results - because it has become routine- in various small cases, negotiation can be an effective and cheapest dispute method which can be sustained bilaterally, multilaterally or collectively. Therefore, in the Charter of the UN, negotiation is taken as a dispute resolution method.

2.2.2. Inquiry (Enquiry)

The function and purpose of inquiry is basically investigating the facts and issues of a dispute. If the negotiations do not work, according to the UN, an international inquiry commission can be established in order to figure out the reasons of the conflict. This commission is a third party commission which must be impartial for understanding the facts and issues truly. In other words, an impartial third party commission could be

¹⁸ Handbook on the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. (1992). New York: Office of Legal Affairs

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 9

²⁰ Permanent Court of International Justice. (1924). Series A, No:2, p. 15

beneficial for collecting information from different resources regarding the facts which are giving rise to the dispute.²¹ In this sense, this commission might be confused with mediation which is another resolution method provided by the UN. It is, however, stated by the UN that “inquiry, as an impartial third-party procedure for fact-finding and investigation”²² and the major difference between inquiry and mediation is related to the process. To elaborate, while mediation can be defined as a process that is maintained by an impartial third party and searches for a resolution, the function of inquiry is described as “investigation or elucidation of a disputed issue of fact”.²³ In international relations, as a result of misunderstandings or misvaluations, disputes may emerge between the states. Briefly, inquiry commissions aim to find and investigate the facts behind these kinds of disputes and if there is a misunderstanding between the parties, the main function of these commissions are demonstrating the realities and facts to disputing parties.

2.2.3. Mediation

Mediation is another method provided by the UN Charter for dispute resolution. Similar to inquiry, mediation is also another third party intervention for a conflict. It basically includes a mediator and contending parties, and the mediator proposes a resolution after considering all sides of the conflict. There is, however, no rule about the number of mediators and if there is a need to have more, then the number of mediators can be increased by an agreement. The main function of a mediator is indicated in article XII of the Pact of Bogota as “assisting the parties in the settlement of controversies in the simplest and most direct manner, avoiding formalities and seeking an acceptable solution”.²⁴ By referring this, the first priority of a mediation process is to prevent the conflict from expansion. Furthermore, if there is a bloody conflict which influences the civilians, reconciling the parties on a ceasefire must be the first agenda that has to be taken into consideration. If a calm environment could be created, then the process can be administrated and progressed easier.

²¹ Handbook on the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. (1992). New York: Office of Legal Affairs, p. 24

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ American Treaty on Pacific Settlement ("Pact of Bogotá"), (1948). Organization of American States (OAS), Chapter 2, Article 12.

Regarding the mediation process, firstly, the mediator(s) must be accepted by all disputing parties in order to progress effectively and reach a permanent and peaceful resolution. Secondly, the impartiality is an essential feature for a mediation process because if questions emerge in the minds of parties regarding impartiality, most probably they will leave and this might even increase the intensity of conflict. Thirdly, taking all variables and determinants into consideration is an indispensable part of sustaining an effective mediation process. Finally, in decision making process, preparing an impartial and permanent peace agreement which considers international laws and regulations contributes not to emerge again. Briefly, mediation can be assessed in between the inquiry and arbitration because although in a mediation process the facts and issues are investigated and resolutions are offered by a mediator, it could not be possible to impose a particular resolution to the parties. In other words, the role of a mediator cannot go beyond offering a resolution to the parties and if the parties do not accept the offered resolution, they cannot be punished or sanctioned by the mediator.

2.2.4. Conciliation

It is stated in the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes that “the task of the Conciliation Commission shall be to elucidate the questions in dispute, to collect with that object all necessary information by means of enquiry or otherwise, and to endeavor to bring the parties to an agreement”²⁵. In this sense, conciliation can be connected to mediation and inquiry, and can be evaluated as the combination of these two. In all of these methods, cases or conflicts are investigated by third parties. However, conciliation differs from mediation because in a conciliation process, the conciliator tries to repair the harmed relationships between parties. The process starts with a fact-finding investigation and then the conciliator provides solutions by negotiating with the parties. While the conciliation commissions can be an ad hoc commission which ends itself when the conflict is resolved, they also might be permanent commissions as well and the main purpose of a conciliator is lowering tensions between the parties and boosting them to look for alternative solutions.

²⁵ European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. (1957). Article 15, Paragraph 1.

In terms of the procedure of conciliation, Regulations on the Procedure of International Conciliation states that unless a disagreement emerges between disputing parties, they are free to set their own rules and procedures for a conciliation process and in the first meeting, by considering the written pleadings of the parties, rules and procedures are determined by the conciliator.²⁶ Briefly, a conciliation process proceeds in this way and can be assessed as the last resort before the judicial settlement.

2.2.5. Arbitration

Arbitration can be defined as a third party intervention by taking the consents of disputing parties. What makes it different from the other conflict resolution methods is the authorization of imposing judicial settlements or sanctions to the disputing parties. In this sense it can be evaluated as a kind of mediation with a judicial settlement. In other words, the arbitration process contains almost all the fundamental features of a mediation process and additionally, the arbitrators have a right to impose sanctions or duties in the framework of international laws and regulations. Arbitration is classified in the conflict resolution methods amended by the UN Charter and usually includes a group of arbitrators and disputing parties. According to 1907 Hague Convention, arbitration is defined as an interstate conflict resolution process in which the states determine their own judges in order to reach a resolution.²⁷ In terms of the rules and procedures of an arbitration process, it is stated in the Reports of International Arbitral Awards article 5 that the arbitrators are free to implement their own rules and procedures during the process.²⁸ Regarding the number of arbitrators, different from a mediation process, most of the treaties and cases contained three members while in some of them five are observed but there is not a strict limit in terms of the number of arbitrators and if the parties wish, the number can be either increased or decreased.²⁹ If three arbitrators are preferred, parties appoint two of them and the last arbitrator, who is generally considered as the chair, can be appointed by the joint decision of either disputing parties or the arbitrators that are appointed by the disputing

²⁶ Regulations on the Procedure of International Conciliation. (1961). Article 4.

²⁷ Hague Convention (1907), Article 37.

²⁸ Reports of International Arbitral Awards. (1928). Article 5.

²⁹ For detailed info see, International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2006), Chapter 3, Article 6-9.

parties.³⁰ Finally, the decisions that are taken by these arbitrators are the binding decisions and parties must obey them. If the parties underestimate those decisions, they can be legally punished or sanctioned. Briefly, the arbitration is a conflict resolution process which contains judicial settlements by the third parties.

2.2.6. Judicial Settlement

When the states face conflict with each other, they are able to submit their concern to the widely accepted international courts. The decisions that are taken by these courts are binding and the parties must obey them as it is observed in arbitration. However, judicial settlement diverges from arbitration in some cases. While the arbitration is a process and ends when the conflict is resolved, the judicial settlement includes the permanent and pre-constituted courts. In addition to this, there are predetermined rules of permanent international courts³¹ and according to the Statute of International Court of Justice, it is not possible for the parties to appeal to the other or higher courts.³²

According to the Handbook on the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, the first international court is the Permanent Court of International Justice. In the course of time, it succeeded to International Court of Justice whose jurisdictions include all subjects that are in the UN's Charter as well as the other treaties or conventions and has become an organ of the UN.³³ Today, the number of international courts is increased to a large extent and they are divided in different fields in order to shorten the court process and to give more appropriate and effective decisions. That is why the international courts are widely accepted and their jurisdictions are evaluated as the international rules which are not appealable.

³⁰ Handbook on the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. (1992). New York: Office of Legal Affairs, p. 60

³¹ Ibid, p. 66

³² Statute of International Court of Justice. (1946). Article 60.

³³ Handbook on the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. (1992). New York: Office of Legal Affairs, p. 66

2.2.7. Resort to Regional Agencies or Arrangements

In the article 52 of the UN Charter, it is mentioned that if the activities of regional agencies and regional arrangements are appropriate and respectful for the principles of the UN and the Charter, in a conflict resolution process, taking an active role of regional agencies is encouraged to create and maintain a peaceful environment.³⁴ That is why, resort to regional agencies or arrangements are evaluated as a method of conflict resolution by the UN Charter. Basically, the difference between regional agencies and regional arrangements is stated in article 52 of the UN Charter. While regional agencies are permanent international institutions for keeping peaceful environment in the region, by contrast, regional arrangements include agreements such as regional treaties without creating a permanent institution in a particular region.³⁵

The regional agencies usually have their own tools and mechanisms for conflict resolution process and they are able to use other conflict resolution methods amended in the article 33 of the UN Charter. For instance, a regional agency can use mediation or arbitration techniques in a conflict resolution process, but it should be noted that those agencies need to take the international laws and regulations into consideration. By doing this, it is aimed by the UN to resolve the regional conflicts by the regional actors who are more knowledgeable than the other international actors regarding both the dynamics of the region and variables of the conflict process as well. That is why, regional agencies and arrangements are evaluated as effective methods for dealing with regional conflicts. League of Arab States, Organization of American States or Organization of African Unity can be assessed as the examples of the regional agencies which are permanent regional agencies and have been used in order to resolve conflicts in the regions that they are.

2.2.8. Other Peaceful Means

There is a list of conflict resolution methods in the article 33 of the UN Charter. Until now, we have covered those methods briefly one by one and the final one is called “Other Peaceful Means”. By saying this, the UN refers to alternative peaceful methods for dispute

³⁴ United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. New York: United Nations, Office of Public Information. Article 52.

³⁵ Ibid.

resolution and although the alternative resolution methods are not listed therein, parties may resort to other peaceful means and methods by considering the UN Charter. To put it another way, if the parties believe that the listed resolution methods in the article 33 of the UN Charter are not appropriate for resolving their conflicts, they shall freely set their own dispute resolution methods, provided that they are bound by the Charter of the UN. While they are able to do it by combining two or more of listed conflict resolution methods in the UN Charter, they may also prefer not to use them and instead a new method can be prepared in the framework of international laws and rules amended by the UN.

If we take all these conflict resolution methods into consideration, it is possible to argue that the UN Charter approaches the conflict resolution methods quite flexible. Although there are listed resolution methods in the Charter, the UN leaves the door open by saying “other peaceful means” at the end of article 33.³⁶ This statement actually makes the states or actors free to establish their own dispute resolution methods. In addition, to resolve the regional conflicts effectively, the UN encourages having regional agencies which are much more aware of the facts and dynamics of the region.

However, if none of these resolution methods are able to resolve the conflict and the threat for international peace and security continues to increase, according to article 41 of the UN Charter, the UN may decide and call the members to enforce sanctions without using arm forces. Cutting diplomatic relations and enforcing economic embargos are some of the examples stated in the article 41.³⁷ If these sanctions are inadequate to stop the rise of dispute, according to article 42, the UN has the right of using military power in order to protect or restore the peace in the region.³⁸

To sum up, the UN’s international conflict resolution methods can be investigated mainly under three steps. First one includes the use of soft power mechanisms which contains diplomatic methods. As they have been covered above and stated in the article 33, the UN offers a lot of dispute resolution methods. Furthermore, the Charter opens a maneuvering space and gives parties chances to create their own resolution methods by

³⁶ Ibid, Article 33.

³⁷ Ibid, Article 41

³⁸ Ibid, Article 42

referring “other peaceful means”.³⁹ If the conflict could not be solved by these methods, in the second step, the UN activates hard power mechanisms by implementing economic and diplomatic sanctions.⁴⁰ Again, if these sanctions are inefficient to reach a resolution and stop the rise of dispute, as the third and final step, the UN has a right for military intervention in order to keep or restore the international peace and security of the region.⁴¹ Briefly, when a conflict emerges between the states or regional actors, and becomes a threat for international peace and security, the process of resolution proceeds by respectively considering these three steps.

After explaining all of these methods, because mediation will be one of the key concepts while investigating Turkey’s mediator role in various cases the theoretical and historical background of it must be taken into account. In order to evaluate whether these cases have been progressed successfully or not, it is necessary to figure out what mediation means and how it emerged and used in different cases and historical periods. Therefore, from now on, theoretical and historical background of mediation will be provided.

³⁹ Ibid, Article 33

⁴⁰ Ibid, Article 41

⁴¹ Ibid, Article 42

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL AND LOGICAL BACKGROUND OF MEDIATION

3.1. Brief Historical and Theoretical Background of “Mediation”

Throughout history, many conflicts have been experienced between different natural and legal persons. Before the establishment of states and societies, conflicts were usually between different individuals and there have been different kinds of mediation attempts observed to reach a resolution. After the establishment of states and social groups, the importance of mediation has tremendously increased. The reason behind this should be explained by considering different ideologies, interests and perspectives of various actors towards issues. That is why, mediation has been used as an effective tool to reach an agreement and resolve the issues between different communities, states, organizations and individuals for a long time.

In this part of the chapter, it will be considered that how mediation has been defined, indicated and applied in different fields and literature. Since mediation is a broader and comprehensive concept, there are a lot of definitions observed in the literature. However, in this thesis, it will be mostly concentrated on that how this concept has been defined and evaluated in politics and international relations. In other words, the use of mediation between states, and governmental or non-governmental organizations will be indicated to a large extent.

First of all, the term of mediation, according to Wall et al., emerged from a Latin word “mediare” which actually means “to halve” and in different languages, it was interpreted in different meanings.⁴² For instance, while in Chinese, mediation was seen as a step for solving problems between different actors, in Arabic it was evaluated as manipulation, or in the West, mediation was assessed as a tool for conflict resolution.⁴³ According to Mosten, mediation used first as a method of jurisdiction and it was done by reshaping and reforming courts and legislations. In the course of time, it expanded in

⁴² Wall, J., & Lynn, A. (1993). Mediation: A Current Review. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(1), 160-194. Retrieved from <http://www.istor.org/stable/174500>. p. 160

⁴³ Ibid.

different fields, such as private sector or daily life.⁴⁴ With the experiments of practitioners and other types of organizations, mediation was adopted to different institutions.⁴⁵ By considering this, it might be observed that mediation used in different meanings in different regions and historical periods.

However, since this thesis focuses on more diplomatic and political perspectives of mediation, the resources that are used here must consider this meaning. For instance, in Bercovitch's article, the term of mediation is used in international relations context "to describe a wide range of third party activity, provided such activity is acceptable to the adversaries, and purports to abate, settle or resolve an international dispute without resorting to force or invoking authoritative rules".⁴⁶ Touval used it as an instrument of foreign policy and as a logic which aims to behave strategically.⁴⁷ Similarly, while, Schelling defines mediation as a "behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages"⁴⁸, Riskin states that a mediator is "a person in a neutral position, without authority to impose a solution, helps others reach their own agreement concerning a dispute or transaction".⁴⁹ As far as I am concerned, the simplest and most understandable definition of mediation is assisting between two or more parties and attempting to find a resolution for the conflict or issue that they have.

By considering all of these definitions and evaluations, it is possible to argue that mediation does not have only one particular form and there might be variations in different law systems. To put it another way, although mediation is universally accepted as a method of conflict resolution, the ways of using it may not be the same in different parts of the world. However, due to the similarities, there has been an ongoing contradiction between the meanings of arbitration and mediation in literature. Therefore, although these are classified as different conflict resolution methods by the UN and they had been explained

⁴⁴ Mosten, F. S. (1999). Mediation and the process of family law reform. *Family Court Review*, 37(4), 429-447.

⁴⁵ Mosten, F. S. (2004). Institutionalization of mediation. *Family Court Review*, 42(2), 292-303.

⁴⁶ Bercovitch, J. (1991). International Mediation. *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1), 3-6. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/424189>. p. 3

⁴⁷ Touval, S. (2003). Mediation and Foreign Policy. *International Studies Review*, 5(4), 91-95. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186396>. p. 91

⁴⁸ Schelling, T. C. (1963). *The Strategy of Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press

⁴⁹ Riskin, L. (1984). Mediation in the Law Schools. *Journal of Legal Education*, 34(2), 259-267. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42892684>. p. 259

in the second chapter of this thesis, it would be beneficial to briefly demonstrate and compare the similarities and differences between these two concepts. Firstly, in terms of similarities, both mediator and arbitrator are the third parties. Secondly, both of them should be objective and they have to put the same distances towards each sides of conflict. Regarding the differences, first and the most important difference is that a mediator is not able to impose a final decision but an arbitrator has a right to impose a regulation and decision to the sides. Secondly, while mediation process can be sustained by a single mediator, arbitration usually proceeds with a group of arbitrators, and they can impose regulations or decisions to the sides either by consensus or plurality of votes.⁵⁰ Therefore, it should not be forgotten that even though mediation and arbitration demonstrate similarities, they are actually different conflict resolution methods.

The institutionalization of mediation is crucial to figure out that how and when it became universally valid and applied as a professional activity. In this institutionalization process, the impact of Uniform Law Commission (ULC) is very huge. The ULC is a cooperative association founded in the US in 1892 and the main aim is “to promote uniformity in the law among the several States on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and practicable”.⁵¹ Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) which is amended in 2003 by the ULC with the collaboration of the American Bar Association (ABA), aimed to create uniformity regarding mediation. This was a big step for institutionalization of mediation because the ABA is one of the largest professional organizations in the world and its amendments usually draw big attention throughout the world.⁵²

In the second section of the UMA, it is aimed to provide the common definitions of mediation concepts. Since there are a lot of concepts defined in this section, I will choose to demonstrate the most frequently used ones. First of all, mediation is defined as “a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute”.⁵³ Secondly, while the

⁵⁰ Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation: What's the Difference? (n.d.). Retrieved January 10, 2018, from <http://adr.findlaw.com/mediation/mediation-vs-arbitration-vs-litigation-whats-the-difference.html>

⁵¹ Constitution of Uniform Law Commissions. (n.d.). Retrieved January 10, 2018, from <http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Constitution>. Article 2

⁵² For detailed information, see https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba.html

⁵³ Uniform Mediation Act. (2003). Section 2

mediator is defined as “an individual who conducts a mediation”, the mediation party means that “a person that participates in a mediation and whose agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute”.⁵⁴ Finally, by saying mediation communication, it is referred that “a statement, whether oral or in a record or verbal or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a mediator”.⁵⁵ Briefly, all these concepts defined by the UMA contributed to create a national institutionalization of mediation and in the course of time, these definitions have become universal.

Lastly, since the United Nations’ (UN) Guidance for Effective Mediation is used while discussing and investigating the cases in the next chapters of this thesis, it would be beneficial to consider the role of the UN during institutionalization of mediation. Mediation Support Unit (MSU) was founded in 2006 by the UN and it is “a system-wide asset that assists the mediation initiatives of the United Nations, Member States, regional/sub regional organizations and relevant partners.”⁵⁶ Therefore, it is clear that since the establishment of MSU, the concept of mediation started to be in the UN literature. Finally, in 2010, the “mediation for peace” attempt of Turkey and Finland held in New York created a new sense in terms of conflict resolution in the UN. As a consequence of this attempt, on 24 September 2010, “Group of Friends of Mediation” was founded “to promote and advance the use of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution, as well as to generate support for the development of mediation” and now the Group of Friends of Mediation has 47 member states and 7 regional and other international organizations.⁵⁷ Consequently, in 2012, the Guidance for Effective Mediation was published and mediation started to be used as a tool for conflict resolution by the UN.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Mediation Support Unit| Fact Sheet. (2016). United Nations, Political Affairs.

⁵⁷ Group of Friends of Mediation | UN Peacemaker. (n.d.). Retrieved January 10, 2018, from <https://peacemaker.un.org/friendsofmediation>

3.2. Mediation Paradigm and the Logic of Mediation

According to idealist approach, universal peace is an indispensable part of international relations and the states or actors that do not trust each other and are skeptical, can find a common point while discussing or mediating in the platforms that have been founded by various international organizations.⁵⁸ To be realistic, however, all of the actors in international arena consider their own profits and interests before everything else. This would exactly be in the same way for mediation as well. During a mediation process, even the mediator(s) thinks about his interests as the disputing parties. To put it another way, if a mediator does not get direct or indirect benefits from the mediation process, actually it would not make sense for a mediator to put himself in the center of a conflict. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the actors in international arena would be willing to solve a conflict only if he is able to get a benefit from there and the cases that will be discussed in the next chapter can also be evaluated as the examples of this issue.

In an environment where every party thinks about his own profits and interests, a mediation process would not proceed in an idealist way. That is why, it is necessary to talk about a realistic paradigm in the conflict resolution processes. According to Wall et al., a mediation paradigm includes a mediator, opposing parties, constituents of both the mediator and opposing parties, and third parties which are directly or indirectly affect or affected from the process.⁵⁹ The relationship between the parties consists of the expectations that include rewards and costs spring from the negotiations. The level of rewards and costs are related to the stance of the conflicting parties. In other words, if the disputing parties can be flexible during the mediation process, the possibility of reaching an agreement would be higher. However, if the conflicting parties choose to be unbending during the negotiations, the process actually takes longer time and it would be very hard to create a resolution for the mediator. Briefly, the logic of mediation and an ordinary mediation process can be summarized in this way.

⁵⁸ Keyman, F., Lorasdağı Koyuncu, B., & Vardar, D. (2013). Uluslararası İlişkilere Giriş(Vol. 2). Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi, p. 12

⁵⁹ Wall Jr, J. A. (1981). Review Section: Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), 157-180, p. 158




Figure 1: The Mediation Paradigm⁶⁰

There are many determinants and variables which have tremendous influences on outcomes and results. If the figure of 'mediation paradigm' is examined, according to Wall et al., in a mediated negotiation system, we see a mediator and opposing negotiators (disputing parties). However, in the outside of mediated negotiation system, it is possible to see constituents both the mediator and parties, and third parties. Actually, the impacts of constituents and third parties are higher than it is thought because disputing parties must take the considerations of majority in order to receive their votes in domestic politics. In other words, to stay in power in their countries, politicians have to act by considering the common tendencies of their citizens in a mediation process. Therefore, this might cause the extension of negotiation process. In addition to this, usually "the third party attempts to

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 159

help the actors in the conflict to find a satisfactory solution to the problem by themselves”⁶¹ and during the negotiation process, sometimes the mediator may need the support of third parties to make his claim more applicable for the disputing parties.⁶² However, there might be negative impacts of third parties on a negotiation process as well. For instance, if we assume that there are two conflicting parties and one mediator in a mediation process and a suggestion that considers both of the conflicting parties’ interests is offered by the mediator. Although this suggestion offers benefits for both of the conflicting parties, a third party may intervene the negotiation process and can offer better outcomes to one of the conflicting parties. Probably, the most optimistic result would be the interruption of the process, but there is also a huge possibility of destroying everything that is done as well. Therefore, it is possible to argue that third parties and constituents of all parties have impacts on both the negotiation process and the outcomes.

According to this perspective, in a particular mediation process, parties set targets and goals to themselves and act for achieving them. The acts of parties cause different outcomes both during the mediation process and at the end of it. Wall et al. briefly calls these outcomes as “**total net outcomes**” and formulizes them in this way,⁶³

A) The net outcomes (rewards – costs) resulting from the interactions with each party * Probability of occurrence of possible outcomes in continuing process

B) The net outcomes resulting from an agreement between the negotiators * Probability of occurrence of each respective net outcomes in continuing process

Total net outcomes to each person = A+B

According to this classification, there is also another type of outcome which is called “**alternative outcomes**”. Alternative outcomes basically contain “the total net outcomes accruing to a person from **not** interacting with the other persons and **not** agreeing with or

⁶¹ Armengol, V. F. (2013). The principles of mediation and the role of third parties in peace processes. Norwegian peacebuilding resource center. Report, p. 4

⁶² Wall Jr, J. A. (1981). Review Section: Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25(1), 157-180, p. 165

⁶³ Ibid, p. 158

being a party to an agreement with them”.⁶⁴ By considering these two types of outcomes, it is argued that if the total net outcomes of a party are equal or more than the alternative outcomes, that party will sustain the negotiations. In contrast, if the alternative ones overweigh, first attempt of the party will be acting to increase his total net outcomes and if this does not work, most probably he would prefer to leave the process and look for alternative outcomes.⁶⁵

If we take all these points into consideration, the logic and paradigm of mediation can be briefly summarized in this way. In this part, it should be figured out that a mediation process does not only consists of a mediator and disputing parties, but also the impacts of third parties and the constituents of both mediator’s and disputing parties cannot be underestimated. In addition to this, the possible outcomes have been investigated by demonstrating different types of them which are total net outcomes and alternative outcomes. In brief, a mediation process can be progressed only if the total net outcomes exceed the alternative ones.

3.3. Components of the United Nations for Effective Mediation

As it has been discussed in the previous chapter, the UN offers different conflict resolution methods. All of these methods have been used for many times in order to reach a resolution for both international and intrastate conflicts. However, it would not be possible to use all of these methods without considering the types of conflicts. As Aras argues, there are significant determinants and variables which are necessary to be used while determining the resolution method. The capability of the state, strategic environment and use of power can be assessed as some of the important determinants for this process.⁶⁶ Since, in this thesis, Turkey’s mediator role is taken into consideration, it will be concentrated on that the UN’s components in order to figure out the mediation processes deeply. The UN has collected these components under the title of “Guidance for Effective Mediation”.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 159

⁶⁵ Ibid, pp. 159, 160

⁶⁶ Aras, B. (2017). The Role of the Turkish State in Conflict Resolution. Istanbul Policy Center, p.3

⁶⁷ UN Guidance for Effective Mediation | UN Peacemaker. (n.d.). Retrieved January 05, 2018, from <https://peacemaker.un.org/guidance-effective-mediation>

According to the UN, the purpose of the Guidance is providing information in terms of effective planning and managing the mediation processes. Although the guide is considered as a source for mediators, states and other actors who support the mediation efforts, it would also be beneficial for the conflict parties, civil society and other stakeholders simultaneously.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the guide defines the real mechanism of mediation as a tool for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Most importantly, the UN emphasizes that it is essential to be aware of the limitations as well as the potentials for being an effective and proportionate mediator.⁶⁹ This means that mediators must never see themselves as superior to the parties and all parties should be equally taken into consideration during mediation process.

In this part of chapter, these components will be analyzed by considering the definitions and explanations of the UN. According to the Guidance, there are mainly eight components that have to be taken into account for sustaining an effective mediation process. These are respectively named as, “preparedness; consent; impartiality; inclusivity; national ownership; international law and normative frameworks; coherence, coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort; and quality peace agreements”.⁷⁰ From now on, I will briefly define and explain these components by taken the Guidance into consideration.

3.3.1. Preparedness

As it can be understood from the title, for sustaining an effective and reasonable mediation process, mediator must not only be knowledgeable about the conflict, but it is also crucial to investigate all its variables and determinants deeply. According to the Guidance, “preparedness combines the individual knowledge and skills of a mediator with a cohesive team of specialists as well as the necessary political, financial and administrative support from the mediating entity”.⁷¹ A good preparation does not only contain information regarding the conflict, but the mediator has to be prepared for all the scenarios which might

⁶⁸ Ibid, p.3

⁶⁹ Ibid. p.3

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid, p.6

arise during the mediation process and there has to be alternative resolutions and recommendations for keeping the parties in a straight line. Finally, it is claimed by the Guidance that “a well-prepared and supported mediator is able to manage expectations, maintain a sense of urgency while avoiding quick-fix solutions, and effectively respond to opportunities and challenges in the overall process”.⁷² By considering all of these, it is possible to argue that *preparedness* composes the backbone of an effective mediation process and contributes the mediator to respond correctly.

3.3.2. Consent

Getting the consents of all conflict parties plays a crucial role to have an effective mediation process, because if one of these parties which do not want to attend the process is forced to be in the process without considering its consent, it would be unreasonable to expect an appropriate resolution at the end. If this kind of situation is encountered, even the progress of the process becomes very difficult for all parties. That is why, consent is an indispensable part of progressing an effective mediation. Additionally, according to the UN, to get the consent of the parties, there must be no doubts in the minds of parties in terms of confidentiality and security. Therefore, the mediator needs to make the parties feel safe during the mediation process.

On the other hand, there might be a possibility of withdrawing the consent for the conflict parties during the process. In this kind of a situation, if there are more than two parties, some of them may search for the ways of collapsing or damaging the process. As a result of their bad intentions, it may be the case that the violence might increase as the conflict cannot be resolved. Briefly, to get rid of these kinds of problems, it is important to get the consent and promise of all parties for adhering to the process.

3.3.3. Impartiality

According to the Guidance, impartiality is an indispensable part of mediation process. If the mediator approaches to the conflict by considering one of party’s profits and interests, it would not make sense to claim that the process can be sustained and progressed

⁷² Ibid.

for the long run because, failure to comply with the principle of impartiality is incompatible with the logic of mediation. According to Carnevale, it is a possibility that the challenging parties might attempt to attract the mediator's attention to their sides for producing more favorable outcomes.⁷³ By doing this, disputing parties want to create biases and prejudices in the mind of mediator and depending on this the outcome can be in favor of only one party, not for the all. If the mediator falls into this trap, then the principle of impartiality can be underestimated easily. Consequently, if there is not an equal approach towards the disputing parties, one or more may leave the process or even the level of conflict can increase. Therefore, if the mediator feels unable to maintain the process and started to question his loyalty regarding impartiality, according to the Guidance, it would be the best choice to handover the conflict to another mediator for maintaining the process more effective and impartial.⁷⁴ In brief, creating a balance while negotiating with the parties is indispensable for a mediator and according to the logic of mediation, having equal distances with all of disputing parties contributes to the progress of the mediation process.

3.3.4. Inclusivity

The component of inclusivity can be evaluated as having a broad perspective towards the reasons of conflicts. Rather than the known reasons and causes, it is also significant to consider the background, because there might be invisible and unknown determinants which trigger the conflict. In addition to this, inclusivity does not only take the reasons of conflict, but also all the actors and disputing parties are taken into account. Excluding one or more parties from the negotiations makes it difficult to progress. As the Guidance says "An inclusive process does not imply that all stakeholders participate directly in the formal negotiations, but facilitates interaction between the conflict parties and other stakeholders and creates mechanisms to include all perspectives in the process".⁷⁵ Therefore, the mediator has to be inclusive in terms of observing both the causes and actors during negotiation process.

⁷³ Carnevale, P. J., & Arad, S. (1996). Bias and impartiality in international mediation. *Resolving international conflicts: The theory and practice of mediation*, 39-53, p.39

⁷⁴ UN Guidance for Effective Mediation | UN Peacemaker. (n.d.). Retrieved January 05, 2018, from <https://peacemaker.un.org/guidance-effective-mediation>. p. 10

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 11

On the other hand, inclusivity sometimes might be evaluated as taking all groups into the process without considering their legitimacy. Under the title of inclusivity, mediating with armed groups can create a wrong sense and other conflicting groups may tend to armament as well. In other words, it might be understood that armament has a positive impact to be in the negotiation process. That is why, it is expected from the mediator to be both inclusive and selective simultaneously, and it should not be allowed to the conflict parties to perceive that armed groups are rewarded.

3.3.5. National Ownership

According to the definition of the Guidance “national ownership implies that conflict parties and the broader society commit to the mediation process, agreements and their implementation”.⁷⁶ It is necessary that all groups and societies represented by a certain party has to act together and there should not be separation during decision making process within a particular party because, an intra-party division triggers an intra-party conflict and even the mediation process can get harms from this division as well. Therefore, the promise of a certain party to act as a whole community is indispensable as well as having a notion of national ownership which considers international laws and norms.

However, it is hard for the mediator to decide that whose ownership should be taken into consideration. There might be a confusing situation and mediator may slog on while deciding whose ownership is needed for sustaining a responsible and reasonable mediation process. In this kind of confusing situation, rather than the own approach of the mediator to the actors, international laws and norms should be taken as the root in decision making process.⁷⁷

3.3.6. International Law and Normative Frameworks

In different fields, mediators perform their works by considering the rules of authority which gives them permission for authorizing the process. It is, therefore, an obligation for the UN’s mediators to take the rules and laws that are regulated by the Charter of the United Nations and relevant Security Council. Furthermore, the approved

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 14

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 16

resolutions of the UN's General Assembly must be considered during this process as well as the other regulations and laws.⁷⁸

According to the UN, there is a classification of crimes for mediation. For instance, While, “amnesties for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights, including sexual and gender-based violence” are the crimes that cannot be forgiven or underestimated by a peace agreement, on the other hand, the crimes like political crimes, rebellion and treason are in the category of forgivable crimes.⁷⁹ Therefore, when a contradiction is experienced between various laws and regulations used by different actors, the categorization of the UN should be taken into consideration during a mediation process.

3.3.7. Coherence, Coordination and Complementarity of the Mediation Effort

In a mediation process, it is not hard for the mediator to deal with only two actors, because their demands are pre-determined and they can be easily reshaped during the process. It is, however, can be challenging for the mediator when the number and variety of disputing parties increases. In this kind of a situation, it is highly possible to face with contradictions of ideas and approaches, and to prevent the complexity, mediator should manage the process in a coherent and coordinated way. According to the Guidance, “coherence encompasses agreed and/or coordinated approaches, while complementarity refers to the need for a clear division of labor based on comparative advantage among mediation actors operating at the different levels”.⁸⁰

Moreover, if there is a possibility of complexity and a mediator is not able to deal with this, it is argued by the UN that using more than one mediator and choosing one of them as their leaders would be beneficial to maintain the process without complexity. In this kind of a situation, mediators need to act together and there should be a transparent and coordinated flow of information between them. Additionally, there should be a common

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 16

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 18

strategy between the mediators to prevent the emergence of another conflict inside the conflict. Therefore, if the mediators get along well, the process would proceed easier.

3.3.8. Quality Peace Agreements

Creation of quality peace agreements is the final step of a mediation process. This part actually determines and demonstrates how the process is ended up and the outcome can be evaluated as the summary of the process. In other words, if the conflict parties could be agreed on a common ground, it might be claimed that the mediator(s) is successful. To make the agreement constant, however, it is essential to create a quality peace agreement between the parties. This is the final and most important part of the process, because even if negotiations between the disputing parties proceeded well, without a quality peace agreement which considers international laws and human rights, the possibility of recurrence of the conflict is very high. To avoid from this kind of a situation, it is suggested and emphasized by the Guidance that “the agreements should incorporate clear modalities for implementation, monitoring and dispute resolution to address disagreements that may arise during implementation”.⁸¹

Briefly, all of these are the components that are provided by the UN in order to maintain an effective mediation process. However, these components are not fair enough to maintain an effective mediation process and as abovementioned there are lots of internal and external variables that affect the process. From now on, Turkey’s foreign policy approaches and the motives behind Turkey’s mediation roles will be taken into account in order to harmonize the theory and practice.

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 21

CHAPTER 4: RECENT TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES AND ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S MEDIATION CASES

4.1. '*Strategic Depth*' as a Guidance of Recent Turkish Foreign Policy Approach

To figure out Davutoğlu period in the sense of his common theories and practices, it is essential to concentrate on his '*Strategic Depth*' book. According to Davutoğlu's perspective, Turkey has a lack of theory in the field of international relations and this book aims to dissolve this gap.⁸² With this book, Davutoğlu provides different theories and frameworks towards developing Turkey's position in international area. For doing this effectively, he investigates cases by considering "description (*tasvir*), explanation (*açıklama*), comprehension (*anlama*), interpretation (*anlamlandırma*) and orientation (*yönlendirme*)" steps.⁸³ This kind of classification makes it possible to evaluate cases correctly, because in international relations, instant reactions might be resulted in undesirable way and this may also cause a reduction of the reputation of a country. Respectively, *description* can be assessed as a first look towards a case and the first look usually does not give correct information regarding content of an issue. Therefore, Davutoğlu brought four other steps to the literature to assess all the determinants and variables truly in decision making process. In *explanation* process, cause and effect relationships are investigated. *Comprehension* part can be defined as being able to penetrate the case with mental imaginary and all sides of the case must be considered for giving true reaction towards it. Then, during *interpretation* process, by considering ideological and theoretical perspective, the side and stance must be determined. As the final step, according to Davutoğlu, *orientation* might be assessed as a bridge between theory and practice. In other words, the theoretical background, which is created during first four steps, is evolved into real life at *orientation* step.⁸⁴

Generally speaking, in *Strategic Depth*, Davutoğlu has attributed his theoretical basis on abovementioned steps. It is believed by him that the lack of theoretical background is the biggest problem for taking right decisions. Understanding all parts and sides of a case,

⁸² Davutoğlu, A. (2001). *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, p. 11.

⁸³ Ibid, p. 1

⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 1-3

analyzing its pros and cons, grounding a proper theoretical framework makes it possible to apply better foreign policy approaches. Therefore, these five steps has consisted Davutoğlu's main motto while creating and implementing foreign policies.

Regarding the concept of *Strategic Depth*, theoretically it might be defined as “determining strategies by taking all internal and external determinants and variables into consideration in a deeper way”. Davutoğlu's this discourse may demonstrate differentiations in different regions and ideologies. On the other hand, Davutoğlu claims that after the Cold-War period, power parameters of countries are not completely distinct from each other, but they have huge impacts on each other's positions.⁸⁵ In other words, there are mutual parameters which affect countries' international positions and relations. In his book, Davutoğlu categorized these power parameters as *constant variables*, *potential variables*, *strategic mentality and cultural identity*, and *strategic planning and political administration*. *Constant variables* are mainly classified as ‘geography, history, population and culture’ and all of those *constant variables* are the ones that are not possible to be changed in a short-term period.⁸⁶ Beyond those, *potential variables* as ‘economic, technologic and military capacities’ might show differentiations in a short or medium term and using these variables in a coordinated way increases the international power positions of countries to a large extent.⁸⁷ In terms of *strategic mentality and cultural identity*, Davutoğlu argues that there is a cause and effect relationship between strategic thinking and historical, cultural, psychological and religious values.⁸⁸ Because of these ties, all societies have different stances and world views towards cases. Finally, *strategic planning and political administration* determines the consequences. If a well-designed theoretical background -which considered both constant and potential variables-, cultural identity, and strategy is combined by an efficient political administration, the country wins in the long run.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 17

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 17

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 24

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 29

⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 31

Briefly, all these are the theoretical parameters that are used by Davutođlu for explaining his perspective towards international relations and positions of countries. If these parameters are implemented in Turkish case, first of all, it has to be accepted that Turkey should not be only considered as a ‘nation state’ which became a trend especially after the Cold-War period. To put it in another way, Turkey’s position in international relations is more than just being a nation state, but the cultural and historical legacy of Ottoman Empire must be taken into consideration because Davutođlu evaluates Turkey as the continuation of Ottoman Empire. That is why, this book is assessed as a product of both realist and romanticist theories.⁹⁰ On the one hand, Oran’s argument in terms of missing Ottoman Legacy and evaluating Turkey as the protector of this legacy can be shown as an example of romanticism. On the other hand, Davutođlu’s abovementioned theories and strategic thinking style with a contemplator perception can be assessed as an evidence for his realist perspective.⁹¹

Since the establishment of Turkish Republic, we have generally experienced as a status-quo based foreign policy understanding. However, since 2002, which is beginning of AKP rule, this perspective has changed and more active foreign policies have begun to be observed. Although Davutođlu was not the minister of foreign affairs during this period (2002-2009) actually, *Strategic Depth* has created the basis and triggered this shift in the perspective of foreign policy. The main reason behind this can be explained by the willing of being a regional power which had been experienced in Ottoman period. *Strategic Depth* stresses that Turkey has cultural and historical ties with the other nations such as Balkans and the other Middle Eastern countries and these ties are essential for being a regional power.⁹² However, Davutođlu pointed out that Europeanization of foreign policy is resulted with alienation of Turkey’s own geo-cultural inner circle, such as alienation from Balkans or Caucasus. Therefore, according to Davutođlu’s point of view, if *constant variables* (population, culture, history and geography) are taken into consideration, a contradiction

⁹⁰ Oran, B. (2013). *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt III (2001-2012)*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 136

⁹¹ Ibid, p. 134

⁹² Rabasa, A. and Larrabee, F. S. (2008). *The AKP’s Foreign Policy. The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*, RAND Corporation, p. 76

emerges between political elites and society. That is why, it is crucial to meet society's expectations to solve this problematic issue.

However, this does not mean that Europeanization damages Turkey during policy making process. Rather, it has to be argued that being able to use both Ottoman's legacy and the West would create the best results in terms of Turkish foreign policy. Bearing *constant variables* in mind makes Turkey powerful both inside and outside of her boundaries because Turkey has ongoing alliances with the West since the establishment of Turkish Republic. In addition, again if Davutoğlu's *potential variables* (as economic, technologic and militaristic variables) are taken into consideration, underestimating or ignoring Western powers does not give Turkey a priority to be a superpower, instead, the alliances that Turkey established with the West so far would suffer from it.⁹³ As a matter of fact, if the Western powers and the Ottoman legacy that Davutoğlu considered are compared with each other, in terms of *potential variables*, a contradiction emerges between his *constant* and *potential variables*, because while the heritage of Ottoman Empire is emphasizing the importance of the Middle East and Balkans, if today is taken into account, the West is an indispensable part of being a regional power regarding technologic, economic and military capacities.

Mainly, in *Strategic Depth*, Davutoğlu emphasized the importance of theoretical background during policy making process. According to his view, Turkey is not only composed of a nation state, but also the owner of the legacy of Ottoman Empire. By using abovementioned parameters during the preparation of foreign policies, Turkey can improve her international position. Furthermore, it is crucial for Davutoğlu to have good relations with all countries especially with border neighbors. While doing it “*near-land basins* (as Balkans, the Middle East and Caucasus), *near-maritime basins* (such as the Black Sea, the Red Sea, the Gulf or the Caspian Sea) and *near continents* (as the Europe, North Africa, South Asia and the Middle and East Asia)”⁹⁴ should be taken into account because it is argued that after the Cold-War period all these regions have begun to look for new alliances

⁹³ Durgun, D. (2016). Home is Where You Make it? Gender and Ahmet Davutoğlu's Strategic Vision in the Middle East. *Geopolitics*, 21:3, 628-660, p.654

⁹⁴ Davutoğlu, A. (2001). *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, p. 118

and interactions.⁹⁵ For being a regional power, Turkey should be attractive and give those regions confidence in order to take them her side. That is to say, according to Davutoğlu, strategic thinking begins with the near circle and the best way to develop international power and reputation of Turkey can be provided by using *soft power* methods.

4.2. The Motives behind Turkey’s Mediator Role

In order to figure out why Turkey preferred to be mediator, the notion of Turkish foreign policy should be discussed. In Davutoğlu era, basically, a proactive understanding of foreign policy has been observed. One of the main reasons behind this shift, according to Aras, is being an inclusive state in the region, but not to be the hegemon.⁹⁶ The mentality of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy also supports this claim because in his book, *Strategic Depth*, he frequently emphasizes the importance of Middle East and Balkans in order to be effective and inclusive state which owns the heritage of Ottoman Empire.⁹⁷ In his words, “the unique combination of our history and geography brings with it a sense of responsibility”.⁹⁸ Therefore, “Zero Problems with Neighbors” policy is developed and Turkey concentrated on solving the disputes especially emerged in the region.

By referring this, it would be argued that Turkey used mediation as an instrument of foreign policy. Akpınar claims that “when the mediator is a state, mediation often becomes a tool of foreign policy, if not the foreign policy itself”.⁹⁹ In other words, while the attempts of the states for being a mediator demonstrate their desires to use mediation as an active foreign policy tool or mechanism, if a state is a disputing party in a particular mediation, the actions and behaviors during the mediation process show directly its foreign policy approach. In this manner, Turkey’s preference to be the mediator in such cases can be explained by its desire to use the mediation as an instrument of foreign policy and both the

⁹⁵ Herzog, M., & Robins, P. (Eds.). (2014). *The Role, Position and Agency of Cusp States in International Relations* (Vol. 117). Routledge. p. 34

⁹⁶ Aras, B. (2009). The Davutoglu era in Turkish foreign policy. *Insight Turkey*, 11(3), 127, p. 7

⁹⁷ Davutoğlu, A. (2001). *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları

⁹⁸ Davutoğlu, A. (2009). Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 8(3), 11-17, p. 12

⁹⁹ Akpınar, P. (2015). Mediation as a foreign policy tool in the Arab Spring: Turkey, Qatar and Iran. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 17(3), 252-268, p. 253

proactive understanding of foreign policy and “Zero Problems with Neighbors” policy could be assessed as the evidences for this claim.

Furthermore, there would be some other domestic variables and determinants for Turkey to prefer the use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. As Wall argues, a state “might want the negotiation to proceed slowly or rapidly, to conform to societal norms, to enhance his reputation, or to please his constituency”.¹⁰⁰ By referring “pleasing constituency” he talks about domestic party politics and the possible outcomes of the acts and behaviors spring from a mediation process, because the ideological stance of the mediator might be changed in order to meet the expectations of the constituents. In Turkey’s case, while the purpose of increasing reputation of the state in international arena is observed, the reactions of the constituents and population are also considered to get their votes. Therefore, while, as Kamrava argues the motives behind preference of mediation might “be strengthening a state’s regional role, enhancing its legitimacy, image or prestige in the international arena”¹⁰¹, the importance of abovementioned internal variables could not be underestimated.

According to Keyman, the mentality of Davutoğlu era between 2002 and 2010 can be summarized as “proactive foreign policy articulated soft power coupled with civilizational multilateralism”.¹⁰² By referring this, it would be argued that Turkey’s desire of using mediation is because it is an effective mechanism for maintaining both a proactive and a soft power based foreign policy approach. Additionally, regional dynamics had huge influences. According to Davutoğlu, there are countries which play central roles in their regions because of their historical ties and legacies.¹⁰³ Turkey is one of these countries and evaluated as the owner of Ottoman heritage because of its multiethnic and multi-religious structure. That is why, it is claimed by Davutoğlu that Turkey is responsible for solving the conflicts and creating a peaceful environment in the region.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ Wall Jr, J. A. (1981). Review Section: Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), 157-180, p. 160

¹⁰¹ Kamrava, M. (2014). Mediation and Saudi foreign policy. *Orbis*, 57(1), 152-170, p. 153

¹⁰² Keyman, F. (2017). A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive" Moral Realism". *Insight Turkey*, 19(1), p. 56

¹⁰³ Davutoğlu, A. (2008). Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007. *Insight Turkey*, 10(1), p. 79

¹⁰⁴ Davutoğlu, A. (2009). Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 8(3), 11-17, p.12

By considering the geographical and political positions of Turkey, Davutoğlu mentions five main principles that must be taken into account for Turkish foreign policy. These are mainly, creating a balance between security and democracy by not harming the human rights and liberties; being confidential in relations with the neighbors; developing relations not only with the neighbors, but also neighboring regions; creating a multi-dimensional foreign policy approach; and having effective diplomacy in order to increase reputation of Turkey in international arena.¹⁰⁵ Basically, for a particular state, mediation is an effective way of doing all of these. By being a mediator, conflicts of the region can be resolved and consequently, regional security and peace might be provided. Furthermore, being an impartial mediator provides confidentiality in relations with the others and relations can be developed as well. A mediation process, also, contributes having multi-dimensional relations with the neighbors because the mediator interacts not only with the disputing parties, but also with the other third parties in order to reach different sources of information and opinions. Finally, if the process ends with a successful and permanent resolution, it both increases international reputation and diplomatic position of the state. Moreover, as Wall mentions, administrating a successful mediation process also has huge impacts on domestic politics in terms of getting the votes constituents as well.¹⁰⁶

In the literature, there are various evaluations of proactive shift in Turkish foreign policy. Hursoy calls the Davutoğlu's Turkish foreign policy approach "strategic responsibility"¹⁰⁷ and it is claimed by him that

The evolving 'strategic responsibility' perception of Turkish foreign policy-makers, which is amplified by its Ottoman legacy that brings together people in Turkey's surrounding areas and enables them to relate to a shared experience in time and space, is unlikely to be conceived of as a new imperial adventure.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 82

¹⁰⁶ Wall Jr, J. A. (1981). Review Section: Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), 157-180, p. 160

¹⁰⁷ Hursoy, S. (2011). Changing Dimensions of Turkey's Foreign Policy. *International Studies*, 48(2), 139-164, p. 139

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

By referring this, it would be said that Ottoman's inclusiveness is taken as an example by new policymakers and it is not a new phenomenon for Turkey. However, as Davutoğlu mentions in his book, since the establishment of Turkish Republic, the West has been taken as the role model and the only interlocutor. Although the main parameters of *Strategic Depth* is deeply discussed in the previous chapter, briefly, according to his perspective, Turkey forgot its own historical ties and traditions- *ben idraki*- and the Middle East and Balkans must be considered during foreign policy making process as well as the West.¹⁰⁹ In other words, Davutoğlu claims that there are cultural and traditional similarities between the regional populations and he criticizes the foreign policies continuing from the establishment period until the end of 1980s, for underestimating these similarities. It is also claimed that Kemalist foreign policy approach evaluates the Ottoman as “another country”¹¹⁰ which means that denying the Ottoman history. According to Davutoğlu's perspective, there are regional dynamics and concentrating only on the West and ignoring the others would affect Turkey's reputation in a negative way. Therefore, when the Balkans and the other Middle East countries started to play a role in Turkish foreign policy, it would not make sense for Turkey's this foreign policy approach to ignore the conflicts between them.

4.3. Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkey's this foreign policy approach is called by some scholars as Neo-Ottomanism in the literature, because the heritage of Ottoman Empire has been evaluated as the main resource of Turkish foreign policy.¹¹¹ The Neo-Ottomanist approach has been observed in the post-Cold War era for the first time. The main reason behind this shift can be explained by considering the disintegration of the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the disintegration, a lot of new nation states established in the region, such as Azerbaijan and the other Turkic Republics. In addition to these, in the Balkans, the Muslim population also triggered Turkey to take them into account during foreign policy making processes,

¹⁰⁹ Davutoğlu, A. (2001). *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları

¹¹⁰ Onar, N. F. (2009). *Neo-Ottomanism, historical legacies and Turkish foreign policy*. Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies, Discussion Paper Series, p. 1

¹¹¹ Murinson, A. (2006). *The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy*. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42(6), 945-964, p. 945

because it is considered by the policymakers that there are historical and traditional ties with them deriving from the Ottoman period. That is basically why Turkey has followed this kind of new approach in its policymaking process.

Furthermore, to be realistic, it might be assumed by the policymakers that if Turkey helps these new states during their establishment and strengthening periods, Turkey may be an umbrella state which is supported by the new established regional states in the course of time. Therefore, the discourse of “owning the Ottoman heritage” would be the best way to make these helps reasonable for the Turkish foreign policymakers. In other words, in the international arena, the shift in Turkish foreign policy approach can be best explained by “owning the Ottoman heritage” and it was aimed that thanks to good relations and diplomacy with the new established states, Turkey can be a regional power and more effective actor in the Middle East. However, as Ataman argues, what triggers Turkey for this shift in foreign policy approach is the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the new states.¹¹²

Theoretically, Turgut Özal, who was the president of Turkey in that period, created the grounds of this new approach after the Cold War period. In the of Justice and Development Party era, this approach started to be implemented more in foreign policy making processes and it is possible to observe more comprehensive version as it has been experienced in Özal period.¹¹³ As abovementioned, although it was firstly used in Özal period, Davutoğlu has created the theoretical background of this new approach in his *Strategic Depth* book. That is why Murinson argues that, when Justice and Development party came to power, a ‘new paradigm’ emerged in Turkish foreign policy and according to his perspective;

Using the Islamist discourse, this influential policy advisor advances a new vision of Turkey as playing a decisive role as a participant in an emerging multi-dimensional world order, being still in a positive relationship with the

¹¹² Ataman, M. (2002). Leadership change: Özal leadership and restructuring in Turkish foreign policy. *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 1(1), p. 12

¹¹³ Ibid, pp. 945-946

United States and Israel, but also an active player in Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia.¹¹⁴

By considering this, it would be argued that Turkey has aimed to broaden its horizons in order to be more active in international arena. Rather than the West, to be more active in the Balkans or the Middle East, Turkey followed the neo-Ottomanist approach. There are various definitions and approaches towards the neo-Ottomanism. In 1998, Yavuz says that “the main theme of this neo-Ottoman discourse is a pluralizing and populist Islamic ideology that seeks to cope with the complexities and challenges of a state achieving a level of economic and political development not matched by most nominally Muslim countries”.¹¹⁵ Before 2000s, when the Neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy first emerged, the approach was similar to Yavuz’s words. However, in the course of time, some scholars argue that this new foreign policy approach of Turkey should not be called Neo-Ottomanism because it does not reflect the characteristics of political and ideological perspectives of Ottoman Modernist Reformers.¹¹⁶ Additionally, while Oğuzlu calls this shift as “Middle Easternizing”¹¹⁷ of Turkish foreign policy, Raptopoulos argues that Turkey is “rediscovering its neighbors”¹¹⁸. All these different opinions in the literature demonstrate that although there is a consensus on the shift in Turkish foreign policy, it is really hard to define this shift with a single word or phrase. To put it another way, it would not make sense to call the shift in Turkish foreign policy such as “Neo-Ottomanism” because, as abovementioned there are claims that this change does not directly reflect the Ottoman understanding of foreign policy. However, although this shift is named as Neo-Ottomanism or something else, it is possible to argue that there has been a paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy from the West to the East.

¹¹⁴ Murinson, A. (2006). The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42(6), 945-964, p. 960

¹¹⁵ Yavuz, M. H. (1998). Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo- Ottomanism. *Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East*, 7(12), 19-41, p. 21

¹¹⁶ Somun, H. (2011). Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans and " Neo-Ottomanism": A Personal Account. *Insight Turkey*, 13(3), 33, pp. 35-36

¹¹⁷ Oğuzlu, T. (2008). Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?. *Turkish Studies*, 9(1), 3-20, p. 3

¹¹⁸ Raptopoulos, N. (2004). Rediscovering its Arab neighbours? The AKP imprint on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East. *Les Cahiers du RMES*, 1(1).

If we take all these points into consideration, it can be argued that according to Davutoğlu's perspective, considering the regional states can also be evaluated as a cultural enrichment of both Turkish society and foreign policy.¹¹⁹ On the other hand there are regional dynamics and historical events behind the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy. The process mainly starts with the disintegration of Soviet Union. As the consequence of this, new nation states started to be observed in the region. Then President Turgut Özal laid the grounds of new foreign policy approach and the first attempts have been observed regarding taking the regional states into consideration in foreign policymaking processes. Therefore, Özal period can be assessed as a milestone in Turkish foreign policy, because rather than the West, he also took the regional states into account in order to have more comprehensive foreign policy vision.

4.4. “Zero Problems with Neighbors” Policy

After this period, in Davutoğlu's prime ministry era, Davutoğlu took the Özal's foreign policy approach and theorized it in his book *Strategic Depth*. Similar to Özal, according to his view, Turkey must consider the regional dynamics and Ottoman heritage in order to be more effective actor in international relations. That is why he criticized Kemalist foreign policy approach as having unilateral relations only with the West. According to Davutoğlu, having multilateral relations especially with our neighbors creates a peaceful region and develops Turkey's international reputation. Therefore, he preferred to follow this approach and named his policy as “Zero Problems with Neighbors”.

The main motto of “zero problems with neighbors” policy is “to minimize problems and maximize cooperation in the neighboring regions”.¹²⁰ In order to do that the very first attempt of Turkey must be solving the regional conflicts. If Turkey succeeds on this, it both contributes Turkey's international reputation as being a confidential actor in conflict resolution and also international and regional peace. The main motive behind Turkey's mediation role actually stems from this. If the mediation cases are taken into account, it is possible to see that most of the conflicts that Turkey attempted to reach a resolution are

¹¹⁹ Lami, B. (2017). Influence of Turkish Foreign Policy in Albania. *European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies*, 4(1), 98-106, p. 104

¹²⁰ Aras, B., & Akarçeşme, S. (2012). Turkey and the Arab spring. *International Journal*, 67(1), 39-51, p. 49

regional conflicts. For instance, Turkey's role on Israel – Syria (2008), Croatia – Serbia (2010), Bosnia – Serbia (2009) and many other cases can be assessed as the evidences for implementation of Turkey's new foreign policy approach. Therefore, according to this perspective, the very first and fundamental way to be a successful and effective international actor depends on the success of solving the regional conflicts. Basically, Turkey's desire to be an inclusive and effective actor in the region forces it to take mediation into consideration.

4.5. General Investigation of Turkey's Mediator Role in Different Cases

As it has been abovementioned briefly, according to Ar-Ge Vizyon report which is created by Justice and Development Party's Research and Development Center, between 2002 and 2013, there had been eleven mediation attempts of Turkey towards different cases.¹²¹ Although there is a long period of time between 2002 and 2013, Apakan argues that the Security Council Summit in 2010 during the presidency of Abdullah Gül, was the milestone of adaptation of "peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building and preventive diplomacy".¹²² This shift has lead Turkey to mediation between disputing countries. Therefore, after this period, the mediation attempts have been more frequent.

In order to figure out the mentality and logic behind the selected cases deeply, it would be beneficial to briefly consider all of the cases between 2002 and 2013. The very first case is between Iraq and Sunni, Shiite Groups in 2005 and 2010. After the US – Iraq War, Iraq had suffered from the contradictions between different religious and ethnic groups. Turkey's communication with the leaders of these groups prevented the region from bloody conflicts and reduced the tension to a large extent.

Secondly, in 2007, Turkey has aimed to resolve the discrepancy between Pakistan and Afghanistan and develop the economic relations. The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan is simply because these states accused each other for supporting terrorism. In 2007, Turkish President Gül organized Trilateral Summit Meetings and it is emphasized

¹²¹ 2002 - 2013 Döneminde Dışişleri Bakanlığı Faaliyetleri (Vol. 20, pp. 1-16, Rep.). (2013). Ankara: Ar-Ge Vizyon - Ak Parti Ar-Ge Başkanlığı, p.5

¹²² Apakan, E. (2013). Mediation: The Best Way Forward in Conflict Prevention and Resolution. *All Azimuth*, 2(1), 39, pp. 39-40.

that the terror is a common problem of the region and for developing socio-economic relations mutual trust is needed. Consequently, at the end of eighth summit, a joint statement was adopted which includes developments regarding regional trade and peace.¹²³

Thirdly, Turkey has attempted to resolve the postwar conflicts between Syria and Israel. The conflicts between Syria and Israel have begun in 1967, as a consequence of Israeli occupation of Golan Heights. Because Golan Heights have strategic importance for Syria, there has been an ongoing conflict between Israel and Syria. In 2008, Turkey's attempt for being a mediator between Israel and Syria for yielding a permanent solution and creating peace in the region, was demolished because of Gaza Strip War and by considering the other variables. This case will be deeply examined in the next part of this chapter.

Fourthly, because of the close number of seats of two opposite groups (March 8 and March 14 Alliances) in the Lebanon Parliament, president could not be elected for twenty-one month period and it created political polarization both in social and governmental levels. To solve this, Turkey organized meetings with both sides. However, because this is a deep-rooted and internalized conflict in Lebanon, the attempt of Turkey could not achieve its purpose.¹²⁴

Fifthly, Turkey attempted to resolve forty-year conflict in order to create a peaceful environment between Mindanao Muslims and Philippines. The problem is, briefly, Mindanao Muslims demanded self-government and Philippines did not accept it for a long period. To solve this conflict, in 2009, Davutoğlu attempted to bring two sides together at a certain point. It was aimed by him that Mindanao Muslims get certain constitutional rights for self-governance and this would create peace between two sides. However, this attempt could not reach its purpose and the conflict still continues.

The sixth case was between Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia. During the war between Bosnia and Serbia, because of the killings of approximately 350 Bosnians in Srebrenica, Bosnians blame Serbians as carrying out genocide. Since 1992, there have been

¹²³ Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014) Joint Statement Adopted at the Conclusion of the Eighth Trilateral Summit of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the President of the Republic of Turkey and the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Retrieved March 03, 2018.

¹²⁴ Ayhan, V. (2011). "Başbakan" Hariri Türkiye'de: Lübnan Krizi ve Türkiye'nin Oynayabileceği Rol. Retrieved November 28, 2017, from <http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/12433?dil=tr>

deteriorative relations and diplomacy between these two countries. Because these are Balkan countries which are evaluated as the legacy of Ottoman Empire in Turkey, starting from 2009, Turkish government organized trilateral summits for reconciling Bosnia and Serbia. In these summits, the importance of regional economic and cultural cooperation has been emphasized. Although the conflict could not be completely resolved yet, Turkey's mediatory attempt resulted positively for all sides.¹²⁵

Seventhly, Turkey's mediation attempt between Serbia and Croatia can be assessed as similar with the Bosnia and Serbia. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Croatia demanded to declare its independence. Consequently, during the Croatian War of Independence, it is claimed by Croatians that there was a mass destruction of Serbians against them. Although the war has ended in favor of Croats, the problems are still continuing. As it is experienced in Bosnia case, Turkey has another mediator role between Serbia and Croatia for creating stable and peaceful Balkans.

Eighthly, Turkey has attempted to resolve the conflict between Iran and the US stemmed from nuclear program of Iran. Nuclear program of Iran has been evaluated as a threat for peace in the region by the US and Vienna group (consisted of Russia, France and IAEA) and the members of this group have imposed various sanctions to Iran. Because these sanctions and nuclear program of Iran increased tension in the region, with the support of Brazil, Turkey took a mediator role between Iran and the US. As a result of this attempt, although many suggestions were brought from different actors, there is not a compromise between them yet. Again, this case will be deeply discussed in the next pages.

Ninthly, the conflict between Uzbek and Kirgiz people started approximately 27 years ago and was stopped with the intervention of Russia. This conflict, in which 1200 people lost their lives, flourished again in 2010. Particularly, the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions suffered from this to a large extent and almost 90 people died during this civil war. Then minister of foreign affairs Davutoğlu have played a mediator role in order to stop the civil war. Consequently, the conflict ended when the President Bakiyev was overthrown.

¹²⁵ Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013). Ankara Summit Declaration Adopted at the Conclusion of Turkey – Bosnia Herzegovina – Serbia Trilateral Summit, 15 May 2013, Ankara. Retrieved November 28, 2017, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ankara-summit-declaration-adopted-at-the-conclusion-of-turkey-_bosnia-herzegovina-_serbia-trilateral-summit_-15-may-2013_-ankara.en.mfa

Tenth attempt of Turkey was in Palestine and aimed to resolve the conflict between Hamas and Al-Fatah groups. Due to political and ideological disagreements, there has been a long-standing conflict between Hamas and Al-Fatah. To solve this conflict, Turkey and Egypt have played a mutual mediator role between these political groups. Although Turkey leaved the process in this case, now these two groups were agreed by Egypt and, Hamas and Al-Fatah leaved the region to the Palestine government.¹²⁶

According to Ar-Ge Vizyon Report, the final mediation attempt of Turkey has aimed to resolve political conflicts between countries located in Greater Horn of Africa. Since the 1990s, Somalia has been facing with a civil war. As a consequence of ideological differences an inner turmoil emerged in Somalia, in the course of time, a state called Somaliland was constituted in that region. Because Somalia has a strategic importance in the Greater Horn of Africa, there has been an ongoing conflict between many African states (Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan / Eritrea, Ethiopia). In order to reach a resolution, in 2013, Somalia Summit in Ankara was held in Presidential level and regional cooperation of Somali and Somaliland had been emphasized.¹²⁷

Basically, all these are the mediation attempts of Turkey between 2002 and 2013. Because there have been different outcomes both during and after the process, it would be hard to claim that there is a complete success or failure. However, there have been a great deal of fluctuations in the course of time and some of these cases are still in progress. That is why, Syria – Israel and Iran – the US cases are selected for this research in order to demonstrate the fluctuations since the beginning of processes. By doing it, it is aimed to show the possible determinants and variables which might affect the progress of mediation. By saying possible determinants or variables, it is referred to domestic politics of the parties including the mediator(s), international developments, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations, and economic or diplomatic sanctions. From now on, the mentioned cases will be discussed deeply.

¹²⁶ Filistin'de Hamas ile El Fetih anlaştı | DÜNYA | DW | 12.10.2017. (2017). Retrieved November 28, 2017, from <http://www.dw.com/tr/filistininde-hamas-ile-el-fetih-anla%C5%9Ft%C4%B1/a-40919135>

¹²⁷ Historic Somalia Summit in Ankara. Presidents of Somalia and Somaliland met in Ankara. (2013). Retrieved November 28, 2017, from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/historic-somalia-summit-in-ankara-presidents-of-somalia-and-somaliland-met-in-ankara.en.mfa>

4.6. Turkey's Mediation on Syria – Israel Case

During AKP era, according to Bengio, Turkey has aimed to be a “pivotal” state in order to revive the Ottoman heritage in the Middle East.¹²⁸ Turkey has adopted this as the grand strategy for having multilateral relations by strengthening the ties between both the Arab states and Israel. By doing this, it has been aimed to minimize the conflicts in the region which are the biggest problems of the Middle East. In addition to creating a balance in the region, Turkey also wanted to create a harmony between different cultures, religions and traditions by mediating between the Middle Eastern countries. As Bengio mentions, Turkey has been enthusiastic about introducing a new phenomenon, which is the “democratic Muslim state” model in the Middle East.¹²⁹ The most important purpose behind Turkey's mediation in this case, however, is minimizing or resolving (if it is possible) the ongoing conflicts in the region and being a reputable actor in the Middle East.

In this case, in order to figure out the stages of mediation process, it would be beneficial to touch on the historical background of Israeli and Syrian conflict. Actually, this conflict did not emerge in near history, instead, the very first touchstones were started to be seen in the establishment process of Israel. During this process, there was a big contention between the Arab states and Israel, and Syrian political, economic and militaristic stance has always been against Israel. Furthermore, rather than these, Syria have also demonstrated its hard power and involved all the regional wars against Israel. The war between Israel and Arab states in 1948 and the Six Day War in 1967 are the biggest examples of Syrian use of hard power capacities.

Although there have always been frictions between the Arab states and Israel, until the Six Day War, there was not a particular conflict between Syria and Israel. The bilateral conflict actually starts with the Israeli capture of Golan Heights, which is one of the biggest water resources of the region, at the end of Six Day War. This particular event strained the relationships and increased the tension, because these heights are strategically essential for both parties. That is why in 1973, Syria had a counter attack to Israel to get back the Golan

¹²⁸ Bengio, O. (2009). *Altering interests and orientations between Israel and Turkey: a view from Israel*. Insight Turkey, 43-55, p.44.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, p.44

Heights. However, this attack has been sprayed with the strong defense of Israel and did not meet the expectations of Syria. In 1974, both Israeli and Syrian military forces were withdrawn from the Golan Heights and the zone was started to be controlled by the UN peacekeeping arm forces.¹³⁰ Then, in 1981, although the feedbacks from the international community were not supportive, Israel declared its invasion of Golan Heights again. Subsequently, in 1991, there had been a peace negotiation process held in Madrid until the Palestinian suicide bomb attacks in Israel.¹³¹ Consequently, the negotiation process has ended in 1996.

As a consequence of these strained diplomacy and relationships between Israel and Syria, there had been various mediation attempts in order to solve the dispute. As abovementioned, very first attempt was by the US and USSR in 1991 in Madrid. Following it, the negotiations started in 1994, Washington in ambassadorial level again. After two meetings held in December 1994 and June 1995, a long way was taken in the negotiations. However, the following explanation of Israeli authorities ended up the US mediation process;

In order to conduct serious and genuine peace negotiations, Syria must cease its support of terror, cease its sponsoring of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations, refrain from providing weapons to Hizbullah and bringing about the destabilizing of Lebanon, cease its support of terror in Iraq, and relinquish the strategic ties it is building with the extremist regime in Iran.¹³²

In this statement, Israeli authorities blamed Syria for supporting terrorist organizations and it was claimed that the organizations that Syria supports harm not only Israel, but also the other regional states and actors. In other words, the actions of Syria cause regional destabilization and it would not be possible to maintain the peace negotiations in these conditions. After this statement, Turkey has involved the process and it was also announced by the same authorities that “Syria and Israel have started indirect

¹³⁰ Özcan, C. (2010). Lessons learned from Turkey's international mediation efforts in Syrian-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts since 2002: impact of impartiality of the mediator on the mediation outcomes (Doctoral dissertation), p.28.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Israel-Syria Negotiations. (2008, May 21). Retrieved from [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Israel-Syria Negotiations.aspx](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Israel-Syria%20Negotiations.aspx)

peace talks, under the auspices of Turkey”.¹³³ With this statement, Turkey’s mediation had officially started between Israeli and Syrian authorities.

However, it has to be investigated that why Turkey was willing to attend and arrange a mediation process between Israel and Syria. According to Mitchell, a mediator can benefit from a mediation process in four different ways. First, the mediator must be able to affect the conflict in order to get benefit from the process. Second, the mediator has to consider the regional dynamics and environment. In other words, if the mediator is aware of the regional facts and dynamics, his stance towards the process will be more clear and advisable. Third, the mediator should affect the third parties which have impacts on the mediation process. Finally, the mediator can gain benefit from the mediation process if he is able to affect parties’ constituencies.¹³⁴ All these can be assessed as the possible rewards of a successful mediator and theoretically Turkey acted in order to receive these benefits.

Although it is possible to demonstrate a great deal of reasons behind Turkey’s mediation, in this case, the motives behind Turkey’s mediation mainly stemmed from economic and geostrategic variables. In other words, by considering Mitchell’s classification, Turkey wanted to receive benefits mostly from the regional dynamics and environment. As early mentioned, Turkey’s foreign policy in Davutoğlu era focused on becoming a regional actor. Particularly after the Cold War period there has been a destabilization in the region because of newly established states. It is also stated by Altunışık and Çuhadar that “Turkey’s new geopolitics also meant that it was surrounded by unstable states and regions, endemic with armed conflicts that risk spilling over across its borders”.¹³⁵ It is the fact that the regional conflicts are not only the problems of disputing actors or countries, but also the problems of the other countries in the Middle East as well. In addition to this, the regional states were looking for new alliances in order to survive in this conflict zone. As Kanat mentions “...and thus increasing security and stability, for countries like Turkey it brought more uncertainty than security and opened political

¹³³ Syria and Israel start peace talks. (2008, May 21). Retrieved from [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/Syria and Israel start peace talks 21-May-2008.aspx](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/Syria%20and%20Israel%20start%20peace%20talks%2021-May-2008.aspx)

¹³⁴ Mitchell, C. R. (1988). The motives for mediation. *New approaches to international mediation*, 34-46, p. 36

¹³⁵ Altunışık, M., & Çuhadar, E. (2010). Turkey's Search for a Third Party Role in Arab–Israeli Conflicts: A Neutral Facilitator or a Principal Power Mediator?. *Mediterranean Politics*, 15(3), 371-392, p.373.

opportunity”.¹³⁶ Therefore, for meeting all of these expectations, Turkey primarily focused on decreasing the tension in and lessening the use of hard power capacities in the region. It should also be noted that Turkey would get benefit from this process by not only minimizing the potential risk of war, but also having more alliances would help Turkey for being a regional actor.

Furthermore, a regional conflict would not only cause security problems, but also might lead huge losses on economic relations. If the amount of trade between Turkey and Israel is taken into consideration, Turkey’s mediation attempts between Israel and Syria would be more understandable. According to the United Nations’ Commercial Trade Database the trade amount between Israel and Turkey has been increased regularly. The following table demonstrates that Turkey’s involvement of this conflict would not only decrease the potential risk of war, but also for developing the economic ties between Israel as well.

Year	Trade Flow	Trade Between		Trade Value (US \$)
2004	Import	Israel	Turkey	1,166,715,000.00
2004	Export	Israel	Turkey	813,524,000.00
2005	Import	Israel	Turkey	1,221,107,000.00
2005	Export	Israel	Turkey	903,310,000.00
2006	Import	Israel	Turkey	1,272,663,000.00
2006	Export	Israel	Turkey	821,053,000.00
2007	Import	Israel	Turkey	1,607,017,000.00
2007	Export	Israel	Turkey	1,195,833,000.00
2008	Import	Israel	Turkey	1,825,339,000.00
2008	Export	Israel	Turkey	1,609,994,000.00

Figure 2: Israel-Turkey Trade Flow between 2004 and 2008¹³⁷

While it is possible to argue that the biggest motive behind Turkey’s mediation stemmed from economic relations with Israel, if the Syria side is taken into consideration, it would not be advisable to claim the same one. That is to say that, although Turkey aimed to develop economic ties with Israel in this mediation process, the purpose in Syria side is

¹³⁶ Kanat, K. (2012). CONTINUITY OF CHANGE IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE JDP GOVERNMENT: THE CASES OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND SYRIA. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 34(4), 230-249. Retrieved from <http://icpro.v.sabanciuniv.edu:2136/stable/41858710> p. 232

¹³⁷ UN Comtrade: International Trade Statistics. (n.d.). Retrieved September 16, 2018, from <https://comtrade.un.org/data/>

different. Turkey mostly considered geostrategic welfare because a possible war would harm Turkey more than it is expected. The biggest example of it could be observed in today between Syria and Turkey, which stemmed from the civil war. Rather than the political and diplomatic consequences, if only the economic values are taken into account, according to the resources of Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's expenditure on Syrian refugees have exceeded 30 billion dollars until today and more than 3.2 million Syrian refugees live in Turkey.¹³⁸ This data basically demonstrates the impacts of possible conflict in a bordering country. Therefore, Turkey's biggest motive in this mediation process regarding Syria side is to get rid of these kinds of possible outcomes and minimizing the risk of war in the region.

All these can be assessed the motives behind Turkey's mediation in Israel and Syria case from foreign policy approach. It is, however, also crucial to consider the domestic politics as much as the international one. As Wall mentions, there are *total net* and *alternative outcomes* that would be gained from a mediation process. As these types of outcomes deeply explained in previous chapter, they should be calculated in order to understand Turkey's domestic earnings from the mediation case between Israel and Syria. That is to say, rather than the demands of disputing countries and international variables, Turkish politicians have also considered the demands of their own constituents as well. As Keyman classifies, Turkish constituents' "Moral Realism"¹³⁹ and developed humanitarianism approaches have had tremendous impacts on triggering politicians. By considering these, it can be argued that the mediation process between Syria and Israel did not only affect from the international politics, but also both of disputing countries' and the mediator's constituents had played role during decision making process. As it could be figured out here, even in the preparation of the mediation process, there had been many dependent and independent variables. Therefore, Wall's mediation paradigm¹⁴⁰ has been considered in order to evaluate the case in a deeper and objective way.

¹³⁸ Turkey spends \$30 billion on Syrian refugees: FM. (2017, November 06). Retrieved September 16, 2018, from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-continue-responding-to-humanitarian-crises-121982>

¹³⁹ Keyman, F. (2017). A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive "Moral Realism". *Insight Turkey*, 19(1)

¹⁴⁰ Wall Jr, J. A. (1981). Review Section: Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), 157-180, p. 158

Until now, the preconditions of mediation process and historical background of the dispute have been clarified. From now on, the mediation process itself will be investigated and it will be discussed that whether this mediation case is appropriate to the UN's Guidance for Effective Mediation.

First of all, because this thesis takes the mediation cases which had been done in Davutoğlu era, his perspective towards this must be taken into consideration. He claims that there are four dimensions of a mediation process. These are mainly, psychological, intellectual, ethical and methodological dimensions¹⁴¹, but according to Davutoğlu's perspective, firstly "the mediator himself should believe that the problem can and will be solved. If we do not believe that, we cannot convince the conflicting parties that there is the possibility of a solution".¹⁴² By considering this it can be argued that the ability of having a good command on the dispute contributes Turkey's *preparedness* in Israel-Syria mediation case. That is why Davutoğlu says that

When we launched indirect talks between Israel and Syria, they were announced in May 2008. The actual process, however, had started three years before that, when Prime Minister Erdoğan spoke with Bashar al-Assad and Ehud Olmert, at the same time. During the two-to three-year interim period, we tried to lay the groundwork and prepare both sides psychologically for a solution... A mediator should be patient, making sure, before the final stage, that all sides are ready to discuss and negotiate.¹⁴³

In terms of getting the *consents* of disputing countries, the following explanation of Israeli sources could be evaluated as the evidence of being disposed of maintaining a mediation process under the auspices of Turkey. It is said by the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs that

The two sides stated their intention to conduct these talks in good faith and with an open mind. They decided to pursue the dialogue between them in a serious and continuous way, in order to achieve the goal of comprehensive peace in accordance with the Madrid Conference terms of reference for peace.

¹⁴¹ Davutoğlu, A. (2013). Turkey's mediation: critical reflections from the field, p. 84.

¹⁴² Ibid, p. 85

¹⁴³ Ibid.

Both sides thanked the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Turkey, for their role in this process and their generous hospitality.¹⁴⁴

In addition to the Israeli side, Syrian president Bashar Assad also states that there would not be secret talks or meetings between Israel; instead, Syria prefers to maintain the negotiations in Turkey's mediation process.¹⁴⁵ Basically, these explanations demonstrate that both of the disputing countries have given their *consent* to progress a mediation process under the sponsorship of Turkey.

After these explanations, the mediation process had started and there would not be a trouble during this period. However, the negotiations did not last too long and in 2009, Israeli attacks against Gaza strip had led to the end of negotiations between Syria and Israel. By considering this, Turkey's *impartiality* can be questioned in order to figure out why there is a failure in this mediation process. As far as I am concerned, the *impartiality* issue must be investigated deeper because this contributes us to understand why Turkey had reacted in this way.

First of all, as Altunışık and Çuhadar claims "the pro-Palestinian feelings of the Turkish public have been an influential factor for the domestic constituencies of both the governing and opposition parties".¹⁴⁶ As it has been pointed out by Wall et al., the mediator(s) also considers their own constituents as well as the disputing parties. In other words, if the *total net outcomes* coming from the mediation process become lesser than the *alternative outcomes* for the parties (including the mediator), most probably, the mediation process would be ended.¹⁴⁷ By considering this, if the Altunışık's and Çuhadar's point is taken into account, it can be argued that the *alternative outcomes* had exceeded the *total net outcomes* coming from the mediation process for Turkish government. The reason behind this could be explained by evaluating the profiles of Turkish citizens, especially AKP's

¹⁴⁴ Syria and Israel start peace talks. (2008, May 21). Retrieved from [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/Syria and Israel start peace talks 21-May-2008.aspx](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/Syria%20and%20Israel%20start%20peace%20talks%2021-May-2008.aspx)

¹⁴⁵ Stratton, A. (2008, April 24). Assad confirms Turkish mediation with Israel. Retrieved September 22, 2018, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/24/syria.israelandthepalestinians>

¹⁴⁶ Altunisik, M., & Çuhadar, E. (2010). Turkey's Search for a Third Party Role in Arab–Israeli Conflicts: A Neutral Facilitator or a Principal Power Mediator?. *Mediterranean Politics*, 15(3), 371-392, p.375.

¹⁴⁷ Wall Jr, J. A. (1981). Review Section: Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), 157-180

constituency. Since the establishment of Israel, there has been a distance between Turkish population and Israel because of many reasons. Most significantly religious and cultural differences have made Turkish population to stand distant to Israel. However, in contrast, as it has been shared in previous pages, there has been a huge trade flow between the countries for many years. In this case, while the development in trade flow could be assessed as one of the example of *total net outcomes*, according to Turkish government, the critical stance of Turkish constituents towards the Israeli attacks against the Gaza strip was the biggest example of *alternative outcomes* within the mediation process because of the domestic politics. That is to say, Turkish government evaluated the possible outcomes and made a choice between them. Basically, on the one hand, there was a conflict in the region and a mediation process could be performed. It is thought by the Turkish government that performing that kind of mediation would be beneficial in terms of being a regional actor in the region and developing economic and diplomatic ties with the regional states. On the other hand, there were both political and military attacks of Israel against the Palestinians who have shared the similar religious and cultural values with Turkish population (especially the conservative AKP constituents) and Turkey made a choice between these two.

As it has been observed in Turkish side, there has been an active role of constituents in Israel as well. Altunışık and Çuhadar pointed out that there have been different stances towards Turkey's mediation in Israel. It is claimed by them that Israeli right-wing parties were not in favor of Turkey's mediation and they have totally become opposite when they faced with AKP government.¹⁴⁸ That is why, it is possible to argue that Turkey did not cut off the ties unilaterally. As much as the conservative Turkish constituents, Israeli constituents also were not in favor of Turkey's mediation. In addition to Turkey's reactions against Israel because of the Gaza attacks, the visit of Hamas leader to Ankara had also played a significant role on Israeli authorities for leaving the negotiations. Turkey's rapprochement to the enemies of Israel had been evaluated as being partial and it is argued that "Turkey could not successfully separate its own (including its domestic constituency's

¹⁴⁸ Altunışık, M., & Çuhadar, E. (2010). Turkey's Search for a Third Party Role in Arab-Israeli Conflicts: A Neutral Facilitator or a Principal Power Mediator?. *Mediterranean Politics*, 15(3), 371-392, p.383.

interests from the disputing parties' interests, unlike what is expected from a neutral facilitator".¹⁴⁹

According to Altunışık and Çuhadar, Turkey's mediation in Israel and Syria case had inhibited because of various reasons. First of all, the complications regarding the *impartiality* had played the biggest role during this process. While the components of the UN's Guidance of Effective Mediation were investigating in the previous pages, the essentiality of *impartiality* for a mediator has been emphasized. In this case, although there would not be a trouble was observed in the *preparedness* and *consent* components, when we the issue of *impartiality* is taken into account, Turkey's meetings with Hamas and Davos crisis had been evaluated as being partial by Israeli authorities. In the end, this created unexpected consequences regarding trust against Turkey's *impartiality* during the mediation process.¹⁵⁰

The second problem in this case is related with Turkey's behavior towards the disputing parties during the process. As Altunışık and Çuhadar mentions, there is a thin line between a "neutral facilitator and principal-power mediator".¹⁵¹ During the mediation process, Turkey's behaviors have been perceived as if giving orders towards the disputing parties rather than offering recommendations. The discourses of then Prime Minister Erdoğan against the Israeli President especially during the Davos Summit in 2009 could be evaluated as the evidences for this claim.¹⁵² Therefore, all of these discourses and behaviors of Turkey were assessed by the Israeli side as acting partial.

However, as far as I am concerned, the final and biggest reason for Turkey to break up the mediation process is related with the reactions of conservative constituents. As it is well-known AKP is a conservative center-right party and represents the biggest size of Turkish population in the parliament. In addition to this, Turkey's perspective towards the Palestinian issue has always been the same for many years and Turkey has always blamed Israel for acting inhumane against Palestinians. Therefore, the attitudes of AKP government

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p.384

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Bennhold, K. (2009, January 29). In Davos, Turkey's Erdogan and Israel's Peres Clash Over Gaza. Retrieved September 23, 2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html>

during this process did not only reflect the conservative constituents, but also reflects the perspectives of the biggest size of population.

Again, as Wall mentions in his mediation paradigm, in a mediation process, when the alternative outcomes exceed the total net outcomes, most probably the process lasts no longer. The biggest example of this might be observed in this case. In the beginning of the process, we have observed developing economic relations and trade flows with Israel. In addition to this, there are a lot of military collaborations have been experienced between Turkey and Israel during the history especially in 1990s.¹⁵³ However, it can be argued that the governments of Turkey and Israel calculated the outcomes and decided to break up the process by considering the demands of their constituents.

The strained diplomacy between Israel and Turkey created the biggest reasons to conclude the mediation process. Between 2008 and 2010 there would not be a trouble between Turkish and Syrian governments. That is why it cannot be argued that Syria had a huge impact on concluding this process. However, the diplomacy between Syria and Turkey has also strained because of the civil war started in 2011 which still continues. Even it is kind of a hypothesis, if there were no problems between Turkey and Israel, the civil war in Syria may most probably conclude the mediation process.

If we take all these points into consideration, in this chapter Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria case has been investigated. Briefly, the conflict stemmed from Israeli invasion of Golan Heights. Because these heights have the biggest spring water resources in the region and strategically important for both of the countries a conflict occurred and frictions between Israel and Syria has continued for a long time.

So, why Turkey wanted to be a mediator for this conflict? Is there a possible harm or benefit for Turkey for being a part of this conflict? Although these questions have been investigated deeply in the previous pages, basically it can be claimed that Turkey's mediation derived from its new foreign policy approach. That is to say, Davutoğlu's demand to be a regional actor and reviving the Ottoman heritage in the region might be assessed as the long term theoretical reasons for Turkey to be in the process. Rather than

¹⁵³ Bakır, B. (2016, July 06). Dünden bugüne Türkiye-İsrail ilişkileri. Retrieved September 23, 2018, from <https://www.haberturk.com/yazi-dizisi/haber/1262938-dunden-bugune-turkiye-israil-iliskileri>

this, there are also economic and security variables that affected Turkey's mind in this process. As it is pointed out, there was a developing trade flow between Turkey and Israel. Furthermore, because Turkey and Israel have the biggest military capabilities in the Middle East, it is thought that good relations would contribute Turkey in terms of regional security. However, "although in the early 2000s Turkey continued to strengthen its defense and military ties with Israel, Israel's attitude toward the Palestinians strained bilateral relations"¹⁵⁴ and that is basically why the process did not meet the expectations.

The conclusion of mediation process did not only derive from particular one party's actions in this case. Although all parties blame each other, there are many variables that had impact on this process. Critical point of views of Israeli constituents' towards the Turkish government and cultural and religious differences are some of the important obstacles for this mediation process for Israeli side. For Turkish side, the problems are summarized by Altunışık and Çuhadar as follows;

Turkey's facilitative mediation is hampered due to several factors: difficulties in maintaining impartiality and the consequent erosion of trust, lack of clear delineation between facilitation and principal-power mediation, ineffective use of incentive mechanisms (especially reward mechanisms) in the process, structural challenges, and a mismatch between the preferences of the domestic constituency and the preferences of the parties.¹⁵⁵

By considering this quotation, it can be argued that the biggest motives behind the end of mediation process stemmed from impartiality issue and demands of constituencies for both of Turkey and Israel. Therefore, this case can be evaluated as an unsuccessful mediation attempt for Turkish authorities.

4.7. Turkey's Mediation on Iran – the US Case

In order to survive, humans used various types of weapons since the beginning of history. In the course of time, mainly, swords replaced stones, rifles replaced swords and it

¹⁵⁴ Kanat, K. (2012). CONTINUITY OF CHANGE IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE JDP GOVERNMENT: THE CASES OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND SYRIA. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 34(4), 230-249. Retrieved from <http://www.istor.org/stable/41858710>. p. 245

¹⁵⁵ Altunışık, M., & Çuhadar, E. (2010). Turkey's Search for a Third Party Role in Arab–Israeli Conflicts: A Neutral Facilitator or a Principal Power Mediator?. *Mediterranean Politics*, 15(3), 371-392. p. 384

respectively goes on. What is seen as a common in these transition processes is the decrease of manpower day by day. In today's world, if the new technological developments are taken into consideration, the importance of manpower has almost been lost and countries are determining their policies by considering these developments both in their domestic and foreign affairs.

Depending on this, it has to be investigated that how these technological improvements affected the world politics. In the past, the most important component of a military capacity was the number of soldiers and the weapons that they were using. That is to say, the crowded and well-equipped ones can beat the others easily. Accordingly, a country which has abovementioned capacities can occupy and expand its borders. It is, however, differs in today's world and technology almost completely replaced the weapons. In other words, with the emergence of nuclear weapons, a city can be wiped off the map just by pressing a button. Therefore, nuclear proliferation has been one of the buzzwords of today and the crises between many countries stem from this issue.

Nowadays, nuclear proliferation is evaluated as the biggest threat for the welfare of the world. As it has been experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki case, the impacts of nuclear weapons did not only occur when they used, but they also have huge radioactive impacts on the future generations. The damages of the US's atomic bombings in 1945 on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still not past and millions of people have been suffered from them. Therefore, the fact that nuclear weapons are in the hands of wrong states or persons is perceived as a major threat on the world.

There is a strict relationship between Turkey's mediation case between Iran and the US with these abovementioned issues. The US has blamed Iran for supporting terrorism, inhibiting peace process in the Middle East and violation of human rights.¹⁵⁶ However, nuclear proliferation program of Iran has constituted the biggest part of the dispute between these countries. It is argued that Iran's state identity and the fact that the Shiite sect wants to spread religious values has made this subject more sensitive.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, Iran's

¹⁵⁶ TASAM | İnan Dış Politikasının Nükleer Program Çıkması. (2011, June 21). Retrieved September 30, 2018, from http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/2215/iran_dis_politikasinin_nukleer_program_cikmazi

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

problematic relationship with Israel and the United States, Iran's close relationship with the so-called terrorist groups gives Iran's nuclear efforts a different meaning and meaning to the other countries.¹⁵⁸ In addition, even if they are not directly affected the welfare of the US, there had been some attacks of Iran to the interest of the US as well. Supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon can be given as one of the examples for this situation.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, in these conditions, it would be a mistake to expect a good diplomacy between these Iran and the US.

Strained relationship between these countries has also created a problematic environment in the Middle East. Particularly, Turkey was in between the devil and deep sea because on the one side there is an allied superpower and on the other side there is a neighbor who shares the same religion and similar cultural and traditional values. Therefore, a possible conflict directly affects Turkey's interests and reputation in the world politics and in the region. That is why, Turkey felt responsible for taking a step in order to prevent both the region and herself from a possible deadlock.

Firstly, in order to figure out the mediation process deeply, the historical background between the US and Iran must be investigated. Although there has been a fluctuated relationship between Washington and Tehran, because the mediation case that is taken into account in this chapter is much more related with the nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the near history should be considered more. In 2001, a report by CIA argued that Iran has one of the most effective nuclear weapons program in the world and accordingly, in September 2002, Iran started to build up its first nuclear reactor by taking the supports of Russia.¹⁶⁰ Although, it is approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran's nuclear program is related with improving its energy sources and the purpose was not developing a nuclear weapon, it is also indicated in the report that

... although the materials would require further processing before being suitable for weapons purposes, the number of failures by Iran to report in a

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Davis, L., Martini, J., Nader, A., Kaye, D., Quinlivan, J., & Steinberg, P. (2011). Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran. In *Iran's Nuclear Future: Critical U.S. Policy Choices* (pp. 31-50). RAND Corporation. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1087af.12>, p.32

¹⁶⁰ Aljazeera. (2009, June 25). Timeline: Iran-US relations. Retrieved October 6, 2018, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/iranaftertherevolution/2009/02/2009249123962551.html>

timely manner the material, facilities and activities in question as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement has given rise to serious concerns.¹⁶¹

As it can be referred from this, Iran's nuclear activities did not clearly stated by Iranian authorities. As a result of this, a complexity emerged regarding what was the purpose of Iran by developing its nuclear reactors. That is why, the report could not argue that Iran's nuclear activities are only for improving its energy capacities and accordingly, Iran is blamed by the US for maintaining a secret nuclear weapon program.¹⁶²

Actually, the tension between Iran and the US emerged because of Iran's unacceptable policies and, Europe and the US assessed Iran as a potential risk in the Middle East. The main problem did not stem from the religion, but Iran's stance against the US's policies for the Middle East, especially for Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Israel, had increased the level of conflict. Particularly, after Ahmadinejad came to power, his discourses and speeches against Israeli authorities (such as "Israel should be wiped off the map") have created an irritable environment in the Jewish lobby in the US.¹⁶³ As a consequence of this, Iran's nuclear facilities came back to the agenda and after the US's invasion of Iraq, a debate emerged regarding shooting the nuclear facilities of Iran.

However, in 2009, when Obama came to power, hard power policies of the US were postponed and he tried to find a solution by establishing dialogue atmosphere. In this period, there were meetings between different levels of American and Iranian authorities. However, Iranian's thoughts regarding the abuse of Iran's presidential election in 2009 by the US, and improved effectiveness of the Jewish lobby in the US's parliaments have concluded the dialogue process between Iran and the US.¹⁶⁴

As a consequence of this, the relationships between Iran and the West strained again. In addition to the US, European countries had also affected from Iran's nuclear

¹⁶¹ Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. (2003, November 26). Retrieved October 06, 2018, from <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-75.pdf>

¹⁶² Aljazeera. (2009, June 25). Timeline: Iran-US relations. Retrieved October 6, 2018, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/iranaftertherevolution/2009/02/2009249123962551.html>

¹⁶³ Oran, B. (2013). Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt III (2001-2012), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 294

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

proliferation program. The reason behind this can be explained by considering the distance between Iran and Europe. Because there is not a long distance between Iran and the European countries, it would not be hard for Iran to target Europe with nuclear missiles.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, as well as the US, there have been concerns of Europe regarding the nuclear proliferation of Iran.

If all these points are taken into consideration, the conflict between Iran and the US mainly stemmed from Iran's nuclear proliferation program. Although there were some attempts and signed treaties (such as Paris agreement) between these countries, the impacts of the dispute have not only affected disputing parties, but also the other regional countries might suffer from it. Because of geographical location, Turkey is one of the most affected countries from this dispute. As a consequence of disagreements between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the level of dispute increased more and stretched diplomatic relations between the West and Iran have begun to hurt the regional countries especially Turkey. The main reason behind this is related with Turkey's stance because both sides of dispute have demanded Turkey's support against each other. As a consequence of this, Turkey wanted to take a step in order to find a resolution for the dispute and the tools of mediation had also been used in this case.

During the mediation process between Iran and the US, Turkey actually was not alone and Brazil was also involved. However, it would be hard to figure out that why Brazil wanted to be a part of this because there is not a particular diplomatic or economic relationship between Iran and Brazil. Furthermore, the distance between them is not also close to each other and Iran did not pose risk to Brazil in particular. In order to understand Brazil's this attempt, the foreign policy approach should be investigated. Similar to Turkey, Brazil also wanted to develop its diplomatic and economic relationships with all around the world because Brazilian authorities were aware of the fact that the world is globalizing and does not only consist of Latin America. As a result of Brazil's desire to be in part of the world politics more, a Brazilian support had been observed in the side of Turkey.

¹⁶⁵ TASAM | İnan Dış Politikasının Nükleer Program Çıkması. (2011, June 21). Retrieved September 30, 2018, from http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/2215/iran_dis_politikasinin_nukleer_program_cikmazi

However, the mediation process was more complex as it has been experienced in Israeli and Syrian case. Because of the number of countries that involved in the process, their expectations were not clear and it would not be easy for Turkey to find a common way for all. For instance, although then Prime Minister Erdoğan indicated his contrary opinion regarding Iran's nuclear proliferation, on the one hand, he was blamed by the West for being partial because of his strict criticisms against nuclear activities of Israel as well. On the other hand, Turkey's stance against nuclear proliferation of Iran had also criticized by Iranian authorities and it is said by the Deputy Head of Iran's Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri that

Turkey should rethink its long-term strategic interests and draw lessons from “bitter historical experiences” of other countries... Ankara should rely more on the strength of its Muslim nation as well as the potency of Muslims elsewhere and assume a role geared towards improving security in the region.¹⁶⁶

These explanations of both Iranian and the Western authorities demonstrated that Turkey could be more than a mediator in this process, because all of disputing parties demanded Turkey's support in their backs. Therefore, the case that Turkey faced with was more complex than it was expected and Turkey was caught between a rock and a hard place. In other words, in this case, it would be hard for Turkey to maintain an effective mediation process which implements the components of the UN's Guidance of Effective Mediation. Particularly, because Iran's nuclear proliferation does not only problem of the US or the West, but also a great concern of Turkey, it would not be hard to abuse the component of *impartiality*. Larrabe and Nader argues that “Despite Turkey's official stance on the Iranian nuclear program, the Turkish political and military elite are concerned about a potentially nuclear armed Iran”.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, there is a suspect in Turkish authorities regarding the resolution of mediation process because it directly affects Turkey's interests as much as the others. That is why, parties did not give their consents clearly and Turkey

¹⁶⁶ Iran warns Turkey on NATO missile plan. (2011, October 10). Retrieved October 07, 2018, from <http://www.payvand.com/news/11/oct/1104.html>

¹⁶⁷ Larrabee, F., & Nader, A. (2013). The Nuclear Issue. In *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East* (pp. 23-30). RAND Corporation. Retrieved from <http://icproxy.sabanciuniv.edu:2207/stable/10.7249/j.ctt4cgdbg.11>. p.26

has failed to maintain the process successfully and was exposed to harsh criticisms of disputing parties especially for acting partially.

As far as I am concerned, Turkey's mediation between the US and Iran is quite different than the other mediation cases. As abovementioned, Turkey aimed to maintain a proactive and inclusive foreign policy approach. The concepts such as "zero problems with neighbors" or "reviving the Ottoman heritage in the Middle East" are the biggest evidences of Turkey's demand for being a regional actor. Accordingly, Turkey had resorted to find various ways for increasing her reputation in the region. During Davutoğlu era, the mediation attempts were the biggest supporters of this claim and even the disputes were not directly affected Turkey's interests, Turkey tried to take a step further in order to find a resolution by mediating between disputing parties. However, the case that is investigating in this chapter demonstrates differences from the others, because mediating between Iran and the US was not a specific demand of Turkey. In other words, Turkey did not voluntarily want to be a part between Iran and the US, but because this friction harms Turkey's interests directly, Turkey tried to find a resolution thru mediation.

If the components of the UN's Guidance of Effective Mediation are taken into consideration, it can be claimed that Turkey's *preparedness* is problematic because there has been a pressure from all sides for taking Turkey's support in their backs. However, although an effective mediator must be independent and *impartial*, Turkey could not meet these conditions during mediating between Iran and the US. It is also claimed that "Turkey has credibility in Tehran due to traditionally good bilateral relations, especially as from Prime Minister Erdoğan's AKP victory and ensuing foreign policy re-orientations".¹⁶⁸ By considering this, it would not make sense to expect an impartial mediation process. Furthermore, because disputing parties are not in favor of using soft power methods, they did not give their *consents* to Turkey for maintaining a mediation process. Consequently, even if they were not too much, the agreements between disputing parties were not permanent and it would not be possible to observe *quality peace agreements*.

¹⁶⁸ Pieper, M. (2013). Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Iranian Nuclear Programme: In Search of a New Middle East Order after the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War. *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 12(3), p.82

On the other hand, although Turkish government acted more compassionate towards Iran than the European countries and the US, it is an undeniable fact that a neighbor who has nuclear weapons with its possible unfavorable impacts for the regional security cannot be reconciled with Turkey's interest.¹⁶⁹ However, Iran was not the only country which develops a nuclear proliferation program in the Middle East. In addition to Iran, it is well-known that Israel has also developed its own nuclear proliferation program. That is why Turkey was disturbed because of taking only Iran's (to be more specific; "a Muslim country's) nuclear proliferation program into account. Accordingly, the criticisms of Turkey regarding Israeli nuclear proliferation had been evaluated as being partial by the Western countries and the US. Therefore, these kinds of issues created deadlocks during the mediation process.

Even it can be claimed that this mediation process did not achieve its purpose and did not offer a permanent resolution for the dispute, it could not be told that Turkey was completely ineffective during the mediation process. In May 2010, with the supports of Brazil, Iran signed an agreement which is called Tehran Declaration. By signing this declaration, Iran had approved transference of 1200 kg of low-enriched uranium from Iran to Turkey.¹⁷⁰ However, although Iran accepts to sign this amount of low-enriched uranium to Turkey, in case of a potential risk, it has been indicated in the declaration that Iran was free to reclaim it. In other words, if Iran thinks that the uranium that was sent to Turkey is under threat, Iran had the right to take it back without any excuses. In addition to this, European countries and the US claimed that after sending 1200 kg of low-enriched uranium to Turkey, Iran still has enough amount of uranium to maintain its nuclear proliferation program, even for developing a nuclear weapon. In these conditions, actually, it would not make sense for the US and the West to sign an agreement because they thought that nothing will change. Therefore, although there is an agreement signed between disputing countries, the permanence and impact of this is open to question.

As far as I am concerned, the main intention behind countries' demands for developing their own nuclear proliferation program have stemmed from its deterrence

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Cengiz, S. (2018, May 11). Implications for Turkey of the US withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal. Retrieved September 14, 2018, from <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1301026>

effect throughout many years. In other words, in today's world politics, a country which is able to develop its own nuclear proliferation program is more effective than the others. In the history, the use of nuclear weapons has not been experienced too much, but as it had been observed in the Japan case, the impacts of nuclear weapons may cause many troubles not only for the time period and the zone that is used, but also it influences the future generations with its radioactive impact. Because of the possible threats to the world peace and as well as the human beings, a country which has nuclear weapons must be governed well and there should not be too much fluctuations both in the international and domestic politics. Butler gives Saddam Hussein as an example in order to demonstrate that how only one person could manage domestic and international politics only by taking his own personal interests into account. By referring Saddam Hussein, he states that "a man determined at all costs to attain, stockpile, and if possible make use of weapons of mass destruction in pursuit of his personal and political goals is a profound one, constituting a crisis in the management of global security".¹⁷¹ Although Iraq and Saddam Hussein had limited capacity, the decisions of him had been evaluated as a potential threat to the global peace especially by the US. Therefore, after these kinds of incidents and especially after 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US has become more sensitive for possible threats coming from different parts of the world.

As a consequence of these incidents, a differentiation in the roots of foreign policy approach had been observed in the US. As much as the government, the citizens have also become more skeptical regarding the foreigners. Particularly, after 9/11 incident in 2001, terrorism has been one of the biggest concerns of the US's citizens. According to the survey of PEW Research Center in 2002, 83% of the US's citizens had stated that terrorism must be the most important determinant during the preparation of foreign policies.¹⁷² Moreover, the graph given below also demonstrates the latest data regarding the US's citizens' priorities during preparation of government policies. Even in 2018, it is indicated

¹⁷¹ Butler, R., & Whitfield, R. (2000). *The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security* (pp. 113-16). New York: PublicAffairs, p. xix

¹⁷² Gramlich, J. (2018, September 11). Since 9/11, Americans have seen anti-terrorism policy as a top priority. Retrieved October 21, 2018, from <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/11/defending-against-terrorism-has-remained-a-top-policy-priority-for-americans-since-9-11/>

in the graph that 73% of the US citizens pointed out that terrorism must be the top prior determinant during preparation and implementation of government policies in the US.




Figure 3: Public's Policy Priorities of the US in 2018 (Percentage)¹⁷³

By referring this data, it is possible to argue that there has been an increase in xenophobia in the US, especially against the Muslims after 9/11 incident. Consequently, according to the Wall's perspective, the fear of foreigners on the constituents of the US has triggered the US's government to implement hard power policies against the possible threats as it is experienced in the Iranian nuclear proliferation program. That is basically why the US has not been in favor of Turkey's mediation during this dispute. Instead of this, the US had preferred to find a resolution by imposing sanctions against Iran. By referring the demands of the US's constituents, it might be argued that the US's government did not want to be a part of a negotiation process. In other words, the demands of the US's constituents can be another motive for the US government for not being in favor of finding a resolution thru mediation. Therefore, this situation can be assessed as another reason for

¹⁷³ Ibid.

explaining why the mediation attempts of Turkey and Brazil could not properly achieve its purpose.

On the other hand, from Iranian perspective, Iranian citizens have remained distant towards the US. According to the survey of World Public Opinion, it was experienced in the public that 77% of the population was unfavorable regarding the discourses of the US's government while only 17% of them were in favor.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, "large majorities think it is a goal of the United States "to weaken and divide the Islamic world" (81%) and "maintain control over the oil resources of the Middle East" (78%)".¹⁷⁵ By referring this data, it can be claimed that although there has been a skeptical stance towards nuclear proliferation, most of the Iranian citizens believe that nuclear proliferation has a deterrence effect against the enemies. By considering this, Farhi argues that pro-nuclear Iranian population believe that having a nuclear proliferation program and nuclear weapons would strengthen Iran's international reputation, bargaining position and the deterrence effect.¹⁷⁶ It is also stated that

If we give attention to the history of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War and the dominance of the bipolar system, we see that deploying nuclear weapons is not necessarily for attacking or finding enemies. Rather, given the credibility these weapons have had and continue to have at the global level, [their importance is] in the support they give to bargaining in international negotiations and advancement of the country's national interests.¹⁷⁷

Briefly, all these data demonstrate that although there have been heated debates about nuclear proliferation; the majority of Iranian constituents have reached a consensus against the US's discourses regarding Iranian nuclear proliferation. In other words, there is a common belief in Iranian public that the US aims to divide Muslim world and that is basically why they attempted to stop Iranian nuclear proliferation program. By considering Wall's mediation paradigm, it is possible to claim that Iranian government has shaped its

¹⁷⁴ Trilling, D. (2017, February 17). Polling Iran: What do Iranians think? Retrieved October 21, 2018, from <https://journalistsresource.org/studies/politics/ads-public-opinion/polling-iran-iranians-public-opinion-data>

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Farhi, F. (2001). To have or not to have? Iran's Domestic Debate on Nuclear Options. *Iran's Nuclear Weapons Options: Issues and Analysis*, 17-34.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

policies by taking the opinions of majority of the constituents. Accordingly, as the US, Iran was not in favor of stopping its nuclear activities and the dispute still continues.

Then, the question that comes to minds is “although both of the disputing parties were aware of the fact that they cannot reach a permanent resolution, why they accepted to try to find a resolution thru Turkey’s and Brazil’s mutual mediation? As far as I am concerned, the agreements signed by Iran during the mediation process such as Tehran Declaration can be evaluated as “saving the day”. By doing it, Iran might aim to save time in order to maintain studies on nuclear proliferation. Therefore, although it seems like Turkey and Brazil advanced finding a contemporary resolution; the mediation attempt between the US and Iran could not be evaluated as a success of Turkish foreign policy.

CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

Since the beginning of the thesis, respectively, the meaning of conflict resolution and international conflict resolution methods; theoretical and historical backgrounds of the concept of mediation, and Turkey's particular mediation attempts have been covered.

Firstly, by explaining conflict resolution methods, it is aimed to demonstrate different perspectives in international arena during a conflict resolution process, because there are huge differences between these methods regarding the ways and the conditions that they used. These methods are, however, look very similar to each other. In order to get rid of confusions and clarify the similarities and differences between these methods in readers' minds, it is preferred to briefly explain them one by one. Secondly, while pointing out the theoretical and historical backgrounds of mediation, the mindset of mediation has been stated and it is purposed to demonstrate how and where this concept has been used throughout the history. Furthermore, by taking the approach of "mediation paradigm" into consideration, the importance of constituents' of both disputing and mediating parties, and the impacts of third parties, such as regional organizations, on a mediation process have been emphasized. Consequently, as Wall et al. classifies, *total net* and *alternative outcomes* have been clarified in order to figure out the behaviors of the parties during a mediation process.¹⁷⁸ Then, the UN's Guidance of Effective mediation is investigated, and the components have been briefly explained one by one in order to show how a mediation process can be maintained properly.

Basically, these parts are not directly related with Turkey's mediation attempts. Rather, these are overall theoretical and historical information regarding the concept of mediation. Actually, the main reason behind providing this knowledge is giving clues to reader regarding the frameworks of mediation which is one of the keywords of the thesis. By doing it, it is aimed to give the reader the ability to make correct assumptions while evaluating Turkey's particular mediation cases. This would not only provide readers to look at the cases from a wider perspective, but also contribute to the reader the ability to

¹⁷⁸ Wall Jr, J. A. (1981). Review Section: Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), 157-180.

interpret Turkey's mediation cases objectively. Therefore, in order to understand the addressed mediation cases, it is very crucial to inform the reader in terms of the keywords and concepts that are going to be used during the flow of thesis.

After clarifying the concepts and giving theoretical and historical clues, in order to figure out Turkey's mediation attempts, the mentality behind then Turkish foreign policy must be internalized. As it is mentioned in the related chapters, according to Ar-Ge Vizyon report of the AKP, Turkey had eleven mediation attempts between 2002 and 2013¹⁷⁹, and because the cases that have been investigated here were in Davutoğlu's Ministry of foreign affairs era, his perspective towards Turkish foreign policy must be understood. To do it, related parts of his *Strategic Depth* book, which indicates his opinions regarding Turkish foreign policy, is briefly summarized before taking mediation cases into consideration.

Finally, after introducing all of these related concepts, theories and mental frameworks behind the topic, abovementioned eleven mediation attempts of Turkey have been briefly taken into account in order to show the differentiations between cases. However, this research is limited by evaluating two of these cases which are Turkey's mediation attempts between 'Israel and Syria', and 'the US and Iran'. Actually, these are not selected randomly from eleven mediation attempts. The reasons behind this selection are, first; demonstrating the differences between the roles that Turkey had played during various mediation processes, second; the importance of constituents and third parties in different mediation processes, and third; it was aimed to show that whether Turkey could use effective mediation tools in different cases or not.

In the beginning of this thesis, one of the purposes of this research was demonstrating the global tendency towards the use of soft power methods during conflict resolution processes. Before making a research about Turkey's mediation, it seemed likely that the countries try to find alternative ways for dispute resolution by using soft power mechanisms. Increased tendency towards using mediation and arbitration tools, the establishment of Group of Friends of Mediation and the publication of the UN's Guidance

¹⁷⁹ 2002 - 2013 Döneminde Dışişleri Bakanlığı Faaliyetleri (Vol. 20, pp. 1-16, Rep.). (2013). Ankara: Ar-Ge Vizyon - Ak Parti Ar-Ge Başkanlığı, p. 5

for Effective Mediation can be assessed as the evidences for the global demand to develop soft power mechanisms in international politics. After investigating both of the mediation cases, however, it is realized that the soft power mechanisms could not be used effectively not only by the mediator, but these mechanisms had also been abused by disputing parties as well. As far as I am concerned, the biggest motive behind this can be explained by referring the demands of constituents and domestic politics. Although mediation is a process which is maintained in governmental levels, because the governments are elected by the constituents, they have to reflect the voices of their constituents during the mediation processes.

If we elaborate on it, in both of the examined cases, it is possible to observe various examples of this claim. For instance, the populations of both of the states were the biggest obstacles for dispute resolution process between the US and Iran. On the one hand, Iranian discourses against Israeli nuclear proliferation were assessed as a threat by the Jewish lobby in the US parliament and it was even brought by the Jewish lobby to the agenda of the US' parliament that hitting Iran's nuclear facilities. On the other hand, as it is indicated in the previous chapter that the majority of Iranian constituents think that the US desired to divide Islamic world in order to capture the oil resources in the Middle East. Therefore, in both of the states, there have been skeptical considerations against each other. In these conditions, even if the negotiations progress well in governmental levels, according to the mediation paradigm table¹⁸⁰, it does not have a response at the level of constituents. That is to say, if the expectations of the constituents are taken into consideration and if the governments want to get majority of votes, it would not be logical for them to underestimate the voices and expectations of their constituents. As a consequence of this, interruptions in the mediation process have been observed in this case and this basically shows us the importance of constituents during this process.

In addition to the constituents of the parties, the importance of third parties cannot also be underestimated, because they are able to make huge impacts on a mediation process. In the case between the US and Iran, the reports of International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iran's nuclear proliferation program were also evaluated as important

¹⁸⁰ Wall Jr, J. A. (1981). Review Section: Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), 157-180.

determinants for the continuity of mediation process. During decision making process, all of the disputing and mediating parties have considered the recommendations and statements of the reports that are published by the IAEA. For instance, before 2009, IAEA reports were mostly skeptical regarding Iran's transparency regarding nuclear proliferation studies. It is stated in the 2007 report of the IAEA that

Bearing in mind the long history and complexity of the programme and the dual nature of enrichment technology, the Agency is not in a position, based on the information currently available to it, to draw conclusions about the original underlying nature of parts of the programme. Further light may be shed on this question when other aspects of the work plan have been addressed and when the Agency has been able to verify the completeness of Iran's declarations.¹⁸¹

These kinds of comments of IAEA reports have made the US and the other Western countries more skeptical and anxious about Iran's nuclear proliferation. Therefore, the diplomatic relations between them can be strained as a consequence of findings of these reports. This is actually a basic example for understanding that whether a third party affects the welfare of a mediation process. That is why, it would be claimed that a mediation process does not only consist of disputing and mediating parties, but also third parties can make great impacts on it.

Very similar attitudes have also been observed in Syria and Israel mediation case. For instance, considering the approaches between Turkish and Israeli population, historical clashes and divergence of opinions have been experienced especially regarding the religious and cultural values. Therefore, underestimating the ideological divergences and clashes in the societal level does not make sense for the governments even in a mediation process. If Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria is taken into account, similar attitudes could be observed. On the one hand, conservative Israeli constituents were not in favor of the mediation of current Turkish government. The reason behind this can be explained by AKP's center-right and conservative ideology. It is believed by conservative Israelis that Turkey's mediation would not be impartial and permanent if it is maintained by

¹⁸¹ Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. (2007, November 13). Retrieved September 29, 2018, from <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports> , p.2.

AKP government. From Turkish constituents' perspective, on the other hand, the regional actions of Israel such as attack to Palestine and Gaza Strip, were assessed as irritable. Therefore, in addition to the historical prejudices, current developments have also affected Turkish constituents negatively against Israel.

Actually, these kinds of approaches of disputing or mediating parties towards each other may usually be resulted with inefficient use of mediation tools. As it is declared in the UN's Guidance of Effective Mediation, there are common rules of mediation which cannot be ignored and must be implemented for all cases. However, there are the other factors affecting this situation. Regional dynamics, historical background, economic and diplomatic relationships are the important determinants that could affect the feasibility of the UN's Guidance of Effective Mediation. In both of the investigated cases, many instances of this issue have been experienced, especially regarding the component of *impartiality*. Although Turkey's *preparedness* were not too much problematic and usually resolution oriented in both of the given cases, because of the doubts of disputing parties regarding Turkey's *impartiality* - stemming from historical background in Israel – Syria case, and because of current political discourses of AKP government regarding Israeli nuclear proliferation in the side of Iranian nuclear proliferation in the US and Iran case - they mostly did not prefer to *give their consents* to Turkey for maintaining an effective mediation process. Accordingly, these conditions had triggered the emergence of prejudices against each other among both of the disputing and mediating parties. By referring this, it would be a mistake to expect Turkey's *inclusivity* towards disputing parties.

Because these components create the fundamentals of an effective mediation process, the failure to implement them also causes failure in the implementation of the remainders. That is to say, if there is a problem for the implementation of *preparedness, impartiality, consent, and inclusivity* components; it is not possible to implement the rest of them which are called *national ownership; international law and normative frameworks; coherence, coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort; and quality peace agreements*. If the abovementioned external factors (regional dynamics, historical backgrounds, etc.) that make impact on the mediation process were appropriate for all parties, there might be another chance to implement the other components in given cases. Therefore, it can be

briefly argued that a mediation process contains more than disputing parties and the conflict that they are facing with. As another consequence of this research, it is achieved that it is not fair enough to consider only the UN's Guidance of Effective Mediation handbook, but also it is necessary to be able to implement them by taking the other external and internal variables into account in order to maintain an effective mediation process.

As well as the impacts of constituents, third parties, and the other given internal and external variables, the motives of then Turkish foreign policy approach must be investigated. Davutoğlu usually and frequently emphasized the importance of “*near-land basins*”¹⁸², reviving the Ottoman heritage in order to be a regional actor by changing Turkish foreign policy approach from status-quo to a proactive one. However, it is a questionable issue that to what extent is it true to internalize proactive foreign policy approach by using the heritage of Ottoman Empire. In other words, in today's world with full of nation states especially in the Middle East, is it possible to use Neo-Ottomanist approach which aims to use the heritage and name of Ottoman Empire in order to find a resolution for disputing nation states. As far as I am concerned, there are contradictions between the reign of Ottoman Empire and today's world. For instance, when a conflict emerged between different ethnic or religious groups in Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman dynasty was the absolute power, and even if the opinions of parties were taken into consideration, the decision of the Ottoman dynasty had to be accepted, implemented and could not be questioned by the disputing parties. It must be thought, however, that to what extent it is possible to implement this kind of decision making process during a mediation process in today's world. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is not the owner of absolute power in the region. Therefore, even if the intention of Davutoğlu aims to find a resolution, using the name and heritage of Ottoman Empire during dispute resolution process can be evaluated as a day late and dollar short argument.

Furthermore, by emphasizing the Ottoman legacy and taking the empire as the role model, Turkish government has targeted to remind the power of Ottoman Empire. Even if this situation has aroused nationalist vessels within the country, it was, actually, unpleasant for the other countries. Oran calls this attitude as “playing to the crowd within the country”

¹⁸² Davutoğlu, A. (2001). *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, p. 118

and “creating a sensation outside of the country”.¹⁸³ Accordingly, he supports that a mediator should maintain the process only between the conflicting parties and necessary organizations or third parties, and doing it in a spectacular way might result in the termination of the mediation process. Therefore, he claims that even if it would bring votes in domestic politics, sharing all steps of the mediation attempts both in domestic and international arena would be unpleasant for the disputing countries. According to Oran, this can be assessed as one of the reasons behind failure of Turkey’s mediation attempts in both of the given cases, and he argues that Turkey’s intention to show her success has outweighed Turkey’s intention to find a resolution between disputing countries. As a consequence of disturbance of disputing parties, the processes could not be maintained properly and resulted with a failure.¹⁸⁴

Actually, in the beginning, the main intention of Turkish foreign policy was following a proactive approach towards international circumstances. Arranging mediation attempts, opening representative offices in abroad, attending international organizations or supporting international civil society organizations can be evaluated as some of the familiar ways of following a proactive foreign policy approach. The main motive behind following a proactive foreign policy approach is catching up the opportunities in order to be an international reputable actor in world politics. By considering this, Davutoğlu also emphasized the importance of proactivity in foreign affairs and during the preparation of foreign policies. In his era, establishing mediation processes were some of the worthwhile attempts in order to maintain a proactive foreign policy approach. It had to be, however, questioned that to what extent the region and the regional dynamics were appropriate to act in a proactive way. Oran mentions that implementing proactive foreign policy approach does not always fit to the Middle East because in this region mostly hard power has been preferred throughout the years. Hence, as well as creating opportunities, acting in a proactive way may also cause risky situations. In order to implement successful proactive foreign policies, therefore, soft power mechanisms must be internalized and used. If the conditions of the Middle East and the regional tendency to use of hard power capacities

¹⁸³ Oran, B. (2013). *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Cilt III (2001-2012), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p.215

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

have been taken into account, it would not be wrong to argue that the risks outweigh the opportunities, because the conditions were not constant and there are lots of short-term fluctuations depending on the instant circumstances. That is why, Oran criticized Turkey's proactive foreign policy approach for not considering the principle of *clausula rebus sic stantibus*, which is basically changing the rules depending on the conditions.¹⁸⁵

In the aftermaths of 2010, an increase has been experienced regarding the use of realist approach during foreign policy making processes. Mediation attempts and humanitarian aid campaigns to various countries are some of the apparatuses of Turkey's post-2010 foreign policy approach. It is an undeniable fact that this method has made Turkey more active in international politics. It is, however, should not be underestimated that there are militaristic, economic and geographical limits of Turkey. In other words, even if such initiatives are made with the intention of generating resolutions to disputes and increasing the country's reputation in international arena, Turkey's capacity was not actually fair enough to meet all of those attempts. This actually makes it possible to argue that there was an over-exaggeration of Turkey's role in international arena especially post-2010 period. Consequently, trying to resolve all the matters caused Turkey's failure in foreign affairs. Therefore, being aware of the limits is essential in order to maintain an effective foreign policy approach.

In the beginning, Davutoğlu's main motive was being a reputable regional actor. In the end of the mediation processes, however, Turkey has lost herself in the flow of incidents. In other words, Turkey went from being a quarterback and found itself as a part of a game being played in the Middle East. As Zalewski calls "Zero problems with neighbors" policy has evolved to "Zero Friends" and the diplomatic relations between neighbors have strained.¹⁸⁶ By considering all of these developments, it would not make sense to claim that Turkey's various mediation attempts have reached their purpose. As abovementioned deeply, although the intentions of Davutoğlu were appropriate, there have been mistakes observed during the processes. Moreover, regarding the determinants which are needed to be considered for establishing and maintaining an effective mediation

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Zalewski, P. (2013). How Turkey Went From 'Zero Problems' to Zero Friends. *Foreign Policy*, 22, 22.

process, it can be said that considering only the components of the UN's Guidance of Effective Mediation does not enough to find a permanent resolution. In addition to it, the given cases demonstrated that as much as the UN's Guidance, the regional dynamics, current political atmosphere, and the voices of constituents are the other important factors of a mediation process.

To sum up, this thesis aimed to demonstrate that whether Turkey had followed appropriate ways during mediating between various countries. The two examined cases show us that even if contemporary treatments observed between disputing countries during these periods, the experienced consequences are not as expected. There are still ongoing disputes and sanctions between Iran and the US because of the nuclear proliferation program. On the other hand, regarding the conflict between Israel and Syria, their situation is not too much different than the past. Briefly, this thesis has made an evaluation in terms of Turkey's mediation efforts in selected cases. However, it should be noted that this is not a general and overall evaluation of Davutoğlu's foreign policy approach. Rather, this only investigates mediation attempts done in his era. By referring it, the successes and failures in these mediation efforts cannot be generalized as the successes or failures of Turkey's foreign policy. However, it is clearly observed that Turkey did not meet the expectations from the mediation attempts.

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