

THE CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE KEMALIST
PARANOID STYLE IN TURKISH POLITICS

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
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ABSTRACT

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Many years ago, R. Hofstadter pointed out that American political rhetoric was suffering from a paranoid style and claimed that such a style was not exclusive to his country; for him, it was an international phenomenon. Following Hofstadter, the study claims that a style that can be named as paranoid can also be observed in Turkish political rhetoric, in the one that has been adopted by Kemalism against political Islam. By utilizing the tools provided mainly by psychoanalysis and critical theory, the study attempts i) to analyze the style that the founding ideology of the republic has adopted, ii) to come up with possible explanations as to why a paranoid discourse has been developed and sustained to this day and iii) to see what such a style means for the nature and tendencies of the ideology itself. To be able to see how deep such a style goes, the study surveys not only the foundational texts of the ideology, but also the recent literary and cultural works pertaining to Kemalism. By doing so, the study attempts to find out what kind of latent and explicit characteristics such a style might have and what kind of reaction Kemalism has given against the resurgence of political Islam in Turkey.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE SİYASETİNDE KEMALİST PARANOYAK ÜSLUBUN ÇAĞDAŞ KÜLTÜREL DİŞAVURUMLARI

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Uzun yıllar önce, R. Hofstadter Amerikan siyasal söyleminin paranoyak bir üsluptan muzdarip olduğuna işaret etti ve böyle bir tarzın ülkesine has olmadığını iddia etti; ona göre paranoyak söylem uluslararası bir olguydu. Hofstadter'i takiben bu çalışma, Türk siyasal söyleminde de paranoyak olarak adlandırılabilir bir üslubun var olduğunu iddia etmektedir; siyasal İslam'a karşı Kemalizm tarafından benimsenen üslupta. Temel olarak psikanaliz ve eleştirel kuramın sağladığı araçları kullanarak bu çalışma i) cumhuriyetin kurucu ideolojisinin benimsediği üslubu analiz etmeyi, ii) paranoyak bir söylemin neden geliştirildiğine ve bu güne dek sürdürüleceğine dair mümkün açıklamalar sunmayı ve iii) böyle bir üslubun ideolojinin doğası ve eğilimleri için ne anlama geldiğini öğrenmeyi amaçlar. Böyle bir üslubun ne kadar derinleştiğini görebilmek için, çalışma sadece ideolojinin temel metinlerini değil, aynı zamanda Kemalizme ait edebi ve kültürel eserleri de inceliyor. Böylece, bu tarz bir üslubun ne tür gizli ve açık özelliklere sahip olduğunu ve Kemalizmin siyasal İslam'ın Türkiye'de yeniden yükselişine karşı nasıl bir tepki verdiğini bulmaya çalışır.

>To *logos*<

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. General Introduction

“Mother, I love you a lot, but I love my country a lot, as well! I am sorry that I cannot be by your side on Mother’s Day, but I am protecting our Republic.” read one of the placards brought to Republic Demonstrations in İzmir. “We do not want a media [coverage] concealing the peril!” wrote another one from the same demonstration. Other slogans went as the following ones: “Is the new generation going to be shaped by Imams?”, “[AKP] is reactionary.”¹ The aforementioned demonstration took place in 2007 and the purpose of it was uttered by a politician of the time, Zeki Sezer (then the president of Democratic Left Party, DSP), as being “to get rid of AKP, these dark men.”² If we were to lay together some of the aforementioned words, we could as well perceive ourselves to be reading a dark atmospheric gothic novel or a popular detective story in which a deep secret plot is carried out against the hero. “I am protecting our Republic against these dark reactionary Imams [even though] media [is] concealing the peril”. Among all other literary genres of different styles, why did these people and this politician feel the need to adopt these particular words creating an overcast atmosphere? Why did their particular style was similar to the right wingers’ of the U.S. in that, just like the Daniel Bell of the U.S., they felt that once, they were “in possession of their

¹“İzmir'in Alanları Yetmedi.” *Cumhuriyet Almanya*, 18 May. 2007, p. 4. My translation.

²“Son Cumhuriyet Mitingi İzmir'de.” *Haber7*, 13 May 2007, www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/240710-son-cumhuriyet-mitingi-izmirde. My translation.

country” but sensed their country was on the verge of being “largely taken over from them and from their kind” (Hofstadter 4).

In his article, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics”, Richard Hofstadter attempted to understand American “political psychology” through the discourse analysis of “[American] political rhetoric” (Hofstadter 77). Upon reading the text myself I could not help but notice the analogous identity between the American and Turkish styles of political rhetoric thanks to the language used in the aforementioned demonstrations and countless other encounters where I have observed an existing lexicon which could be submitted as “paranoid”. Thus, I decided that the paranoid style in Turkish politics would be engaging to study so as to see how come a paranoid style could become so predominant in a discourse and psyche of a particular group and possibly a whole society. However, as Hofstadter himself stated over fifty years ago, “[the paranoid style] is an international phenomenon” (Hofstadter 86). Therefore, showing the paranoid language in Turkish political rhetoric (or in any other political setting for that matter) would only be stating the obvious. Unlike Hofstadter, who mostly wrote in a descriptive manner in his study, I wanted to go further and investigate the underlying reasons behind such a “paranoid” discursive style if it existed. Therefore, I decided to focus on a field where a “paranoid style” could take on subtler and perhaps more thought-provoking forms: literature and culture in general, particularly ones that revolve around Kemalist ideology.

Memduh Şevket Esendal, who won the CHP literary prize for best novel with his *Ayaşlı ile Kiracıları* and who is also a prominent figure in the Kemalist literary canon, once wrote “this is how politics is; utilizing every chance there is. This nation will do whatever it takes to become a sound, vigorous and lively nation. It is necessary to call out and shout it into their ears, eyes and their brains [...] with every poem, every song and every writing.” (Esendal 244) Following such proclamations, I arrived at the opinion that focusing on “paranoid” language in the literary/cultural texts of Kemalist writers, for whom it is obvious, as in Esendal’s case, that literature/culture is yet another field for implementing a political agenda, would be more productive than the analysis of political rhetoric because doing so could give us a hint about the depths of such style within the Kemalist body or the Turkish society in general.

One might rightfully ask why the study of Kemalist writers is prioritized when Turkish politics and most of its agents seem to suffer from a certain level of paranoia regardless of their positions in the political spectrum. After all, the actors of the current political party in power -which will often be mentioned throughout thesis- has also got a substantially paranoid style in political discourse and that style is not less worthy of a graduate thesis than this one. Even the whole literature around the single word “upper mind (üst akıl)³”, which the former prime minister and current president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to be very fond of using ambiguously to evade the matters of national and international issues alike, can be subjected to a lengthy analysis someplace else. However, I believe that if a paranoid language and psyche in Turkish politics can be observed, it would be best to return to the founding ideology, -which has been either in power or in the major opposition since the foundation of the republic, and its supporters, like those people carrying placards mentioned at the very beginning of this thesis- to seek possible governing dynamics of such a style.

But why did Kemalists develop a paranoid language and thinking towards political Islam in particular⁴, the instances of which we have seen at the beginning of the introduction and we are going to see throughout thesis? I believe the traumas Mustafa Kemal and the society and/or republic experienced growing up might have affected the stance Kemalist ideology adopted towards political Islam. At this point, I see no problem likening the development of the ideology to that of a child’s. After all, building a metaphor around the political issues has been done before me by a lot of other scholars⁵. If we follow the scheme Klein offers, we can come up with an idea why Kemalists have developed a paranoid thinking towards Political Islam. Klein contends that at a very early age, everyone splits the world into “good” and “bad” as a defense mechanism against “envy” and “aggression”, which is present in every person and later merges and works through “good” and “bad” in order to develop a strong personality⁶. I

³ An unknown mastermind or a group which, according to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his supporters, seems to plot and control almost every attack towards the Turkish Republic, AKP and/or even himself.

⁴ Of course, political Islam is not the only agent against which Kemalism adopted a paranoid style, such as the West or the Kurds but for the sake of the length of this study, the analysis of the discourse has been confined to one adopted against political Islam.

⁵ See Freud, *Group Psychology*; Somay Çok Bilmiş Özne, Kernberg, “Paranoid Social Developments as a Consequence of Ideological and Bureaucratic Regression” in *Even Paranoids Have Enemies*.

⁶ Klein, Melanie. *Haset ve Şükran*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. Print. p.35.

believe, because of the language and style developed in early Republican Era, Kemalist ideology might have drawn its boundaries against political Islam, marking it as “bad”. However, it seems they have refused to merge “good” and “bad”, developing not a strong political character but a narcissistic thus a paranoid one. Such a theory can contribute much to ongoing “hatred/envy/paranoia” of Kemalists towards political Islam and persistent paranoid rhetoric on it. Ergo, it would not be surprising to observe intensification of such rhetoric at the times of resurgence of political Islam in Turkish context, which will be one of the main urges of this thesis to demonstrate.

At this point it would be best to clarify what is meant by “resurgence” in order to avoid any misunderstandings. One could easily and rightfully observe that political Islam has always been operative in Turkish politics. However, after 1990s especially the second half of the decade and 2000s, as Ahmet Çiğdem has also observed, political Islam has been able to generate actors capable of intervening in and/or claiming political power/taking over bureaucracy, as we see in AKP’s case (Çiğdem 122). Therefore, it is the reaction against such an Islamist movements claiming power -meaning resurging to claim power- in the state that this study is interested in analyzing.

1.2. Methodology and Aim

Conducting such study, I will analyze the type of discourse that Kemalist writers use in their “artistic” endeavors against political Islam and try to show the resemblance of that discourse with paranoia and its symptoms as it is framed by psychoanalysis. Of course, as Somay points out in his book which had a similar psychoanalytical stance to approaching social and political issues, one feels obliged to defend and explain the workings of such a method in social sciences. Just like Somay does, I, too,

[...] use a psychoanalytical paradigm and a psycho-cultural analytic methodology in the overall theoretical structure of my analysis, which needs to be justified from the outset. When I say ‘psychoanalysis’, I mean a methodological/epistemological tool of looking at/observing phenomena, a theory (theoria, Anschauung), rather than a ‘science’, a discipline of individual psychology or a method of healing. [...] What I will be trying to establish is that psychoanalytical concepts and terminology areas deeply rooted in culture, mythology, history, literature, anthropology and even archaeology (insofar as these may be treated as narratives) as they are in

individual psychology. Employing psychoanalytical concepts in these disciplines is not simply a metaphoric endeavour, using psychoanalytical ‘established facts’ to explain historical and cultural phenomena; it is rather the other way around. (Somay *Psychopolitics* 3-4)

So, what I intend to do, as Somay explains clearly, is not coming up with scientific explanations to paranoid Kemalist style. What I do is rather building up a metaphorical scenario and showing the similarities between the individual paranoia explained by psychoanalysis and the paranoia that is explicit in political, cultural, sociological context regarding Kemalism and Kemalists as a group. That is to say, looking back in history and treating books, paintings, video clips, speeches and so on as texts and “narratives”, just like Freud did, I, too, built a “reciprocally metaphoric model, in which individual mental traits, disorders and structures would serve as metaphors for historical/mythological cultural structures, and vice versa” (Somay *Psychopolitics* 5) In that sense, this thesis may be best situated in a field called psychosocial studies, or psychopolitical and even psychocultural one might suggest, which “assert[s] the inseparability of the individual psyche from the sociocultural context, trans-referencing psychoanalysis and social/cultural/historical analysis as reciprocal preconditions.” (Somay *Psychopolitics* 5-6). To sum up, this study intends to show some structural similarities between the paranoid style/ psyche of individuals with those of Kemalists as a group and that of Kemalism as an ideology.

Talking of the concept of “paranoia”, it is necessary to note that I will try to use the word in sociological and psychoanalytical senses of the word in my venture to find grounds for the employment of the paranoid style in Kemalist literature. I will be referring to at least two important concepts, namely “narcissism” in Freudian and Kernbergian terms and “projective identification/projection” in Kleinian understanding and try to apply them to discourses adopted by Kemalists, whom I believe inherited not only a republic but also a kind of lexicon, narcissistic features, traumas and somewhat laden “envy” from their political father (Atatürk: the father of the Turks) together with a kind of Oedipus complex persistent in Kemalists –if not in all of Turkish society- all of which may have contributed to the shaping of a paranoid discourse/language/lexicon, which is in general “a language for the construction and negotiation of legitimacy in Turkey” (Glyptis 10) and Turkish politics . I will try to show how Mustafa Kemal and his early experiences in the stage of history affected his way of thinking and acting and how he transferred them to the next generations through his own discourse and mythos

surrounding him. For such venture, I will have *Nutuk*, written by Mustafa Kemal as my basis of analysis. I will try to argue that with such a language it chooses, *Nutuk*, which is an important source “for creating a father” figure (Somay *Psychopolitics* 140), by prioritizing and emphasizing on words like “defending”, “enemies”, “traitors” without clear signified makes an undeniable contribution to a paranoid thinking among Kemalists if not among the Turkish society in general. Also, I will try to demonstrate that as narcissistic patients that divide the world into two groups (Kernberg *Smnr* 205), *Nutuk* and similar foundational texts and discourses adopt a dichotomous rhetoric, leading to deepening of paranoid psyche and rhetoric if not creating it all along.

In order to show what kind of discourse Kemalism adopts after political Islam (re)claims its powerful position in Turkish politics, I am going to analyze the language used in recent texts produced after around 1990 and make comparisons where possible with the foundational texts of early stages of Kemalism to see the probable similarities if there are any. Therefore, primarily, I will go into the domain of popular culture and try and have a look at the possible reactions in popular culture, the analysis of which can tell us a lot about the liabilities of Kemalists and Turkish society in general. In this section, I will have a look at some of the texts of personalities like Levent Kırca and Nihat Genç. Then, I will steer my attention to the works of people who are considered to have produced more decent works of art in terms of their aesthetic values and try to do my best to demonstrate how paranoia has affected their works. I will have a look at the works of Ataol Behramoğlu, who can be claimed to have his own canon in Turkish/Kemalist literature and a painting of Bedri Baykam, who is a renowned Turkish painter.

When I will concentrate on its implications in politics, I intend to use the concept of paranoia in a negative sense, just like Hofstadter himself does in his article. If paranoia is persistent in the Kemalist psyche, as I claim, it might be one of the most important reasons behind the confirming idea of “bureaucracy” and authoritarian tendencies among Kemalists and in Kemalist ideology. Also, if paranoia is still persistent in their ideology so many years after it was put forward, I argue that it is against one of the most -if not the most- important one among the six founding principles of Kemalist ideology: revolutionism. Let alone being a revolutionist, I will argue that as an ideology which maintains its paranoid discourse and which is “fixated” in its primitive stages,

Kemalism shows serious reactionary tendencies in Turkish political context when it comes to its reaction towards political Islam.

1.3. Outline

This thesis is comprised of five chapters in total. After the introductory first chapter, I am going to give a historical background of Kemalism and its discourse against political Islam. While doing so, I will try to find theoretical grounds for the adoption of such discursive style from the fields of politics, sociology and psychoanalysis. Having done so, I will reserve a chapter for the books produced for the general liking of the general society, which in this respect, can be categorized as popular. In this chapter, I will try and argue if Kemalist ideology and discourse -the paranoid one in particular- has had any impact on the cultural domain as well as the political one. In Chapter 4, I am going to have a look at the writings of two Kemalists⁷, Ataol Behramođlu, who is named as the “grand poet” by Özdil, -one of the top ideologues of Kemalist ideology today⁸- and a painting by Bedri Baykam, and try to show how their style might reflect the paranoid style against political Islam that is prevalent in Kemalist ideology. Of course, in the final chapter, I am going to summarize my findings and try to reflect on their implications for aesthetics, politics and socio-psychology in terms of Turkish context and Kemalism in particular.

⁷ By Kemalist writers, I mean the writers who either call themselves “Kemalists” or who show Kemalist tendencies in their discourses.

⁸ Özdil, Yılmaz. *Adam*. İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınları, 2016. p. 82

CHAPTER 2

KEMALISM, POLITICAL ISLAM AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS TO PREVALENT PARANOID STYLE

2.1. Kemalism

What is Kemalism that has been the main subject of discussion of innumerable if not all of the political discussions made in Turkish politics and sociology? “It is a political ideology” (Parla *Kemalist* 19) which “Atatürk has contributed to forming with his ideas at first hand” (Parla *Kemalist* 300) that “has continued to prevail for 70 years official[ly]/half official[ly]” (Parla *Kemalist* 300). As far as this thesis concerned, we can briefly define Kemalism as the ideology, the outline of which has been drawn in CHP (Republican People’s Party) party programmes starting from the one prepared in 1931. According to that programme and the one prepared in 1935, CHP is a “republican, nationalist, statist, populist, laicistic, and revolutionist” party “principles of which is called Kemalism”⁹ (C.H.P Programı 2, 6).

Just like other political ideologies, Kemalism may have shown minor ramifications in terms of its definitions, interpretations and practices in time due to changing ideologues, party leaders and practitioners. However, the core principles holding the ideology together identified in the 1930s or even before have remained almost untouched. It will not be the aim of this thesis to show if Kemalism has been able to become the ideology

⁹ It is important to note that the name Kemalism is introduced in the programme that was prepared in 1935 even though the principles were already established in 1931’s party programme.

it claimed to be or provide a brand new interpretation or reading of the ideology itself. Instead, I will accept an interpretation, which I think is a fair one and try to show why that interpretation has validity while shedding light on and deconstructing the paranoid style Kemalists possess. According to Taha Parla, who has been studying Kemalism for decades:

Kemalism-Ataturkism-the Six Arrows of CHP is an ideological whole. Neither historically nor logically or semantically can they be separated from each other. [...] [Kemalism] claims to be the sole truth, to be similar only to itself, to find others vile and harmful and to be valid forever and so on. [...] This strict political ideology is pro-leader, paternalist, elitist and tutelary. It is not pluralist, tolerant or agreeable. [...] It is authoritarian, and totalitarian at times. It is para-militarist, and occasionally direct militarist. In short: it is anti-democratic. (Parla *Kemalist* 302-303)

In Taha Parla's formulation of Kemalism, the most crucial word within the context of this thesis is "paternalist" since it will be argued that the fatherly figure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's and speeches together with the actions of his might have greatly influenced the type of discursive style Kemalists adopted within the last several decades, just like a father forming/influencing his children's identity.

2.1.2. Kemalism, Political Islam and Laïcité

When Kemalism was being formed in the early 1920s¹⁰, Islam and Islam-related words already occupied a big place in the Kemalist lexicon. After all, it was being formed in Ottoman Empire and Ottoman Empire, with its Sultan also being the head of all the Muslims in the world (Caliph), had a tremendous Islamic mark in its political tradition even if we exclude the major role of Islam in social context and culture. Therefore, a political ideology, albeit old or new, had to consider Islam and had to have a say about it. During the Independence War period, Mustafa Kemal did not target political Islam in his discourse. He even: "[...] articulated his faith in the oneness of Allah and the fact that Muhammed was God's prophet as the occasions arose. He tried to bring dervish

¹⁰ Of course, as many intellectuals accept, Kemalism did not exist as a political ideology suddenly and at once. It was greatly influenced many other ideas of the preceding time -Tanzimat Era in particular- the ones adopted by Young Ottomans and Young Turks, which were also influenced by the ideas spread after the French Revolution.

lodges and religious foundations into the fold against imperialism as much as possible.” (Perinçek in Atatürk 17) so that he could “gain the support of pious soldiers.” (Glyptis 17) However, as Perinçek argues, Mustafa Kemal had “started an enlightenment struggle to undercut the Islamic ideology during the Independence War already.” (Perinçek in Atatürk 17). Even if one might disagree and claim that Mustafa Kemal did not wage a struggle against the religion of Islam altogether back in those days or never at all, we can clearly see that the feud between Kemalism and (political) Islam heightened -in countenance of Kemalism- after the republic was founded and Kemalism became the ideology in power with Mustafa Kemal in charge. The ultimate reason for this was the fact that Kemalism knew what kind of trajectory it was going to follow in terms of religion and Islam: as it was written officially in the party programme above, it was going to follow laicite. That is to say, laicite¹¹ became “ the central tenet of Kemalism, the official ideology of the modernizing political elite in the Republican period.” (Azak 9) Therefore, a lot of steps had to be taken to abolish political Islam from the political sphere and as the French Jacobin tradition, religion was needed to be sent to the private sphere as a “matter of individual conscience.”(Azak 8). For such an outcome, some changes were made.

A major institutional step in [the] secularization process was taken by the enactment of Law No. 431 (*Hilafetin İlgasına ve Hanedanı Osmaninin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Memaliki Haricine Çıkarılmasına Dair Kanun*), which abolished the Caliphate on 3 March 1924. The same law also abolished the function of Sheikh ul-Islam and the Ministries of Religious Affairs (*Şeriye*) and Pious Foundations (*Evkaf*). Instead, a Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Reisliği*) was charged with the administration of the mosques. (Azak 9) Italics, not mine.

One message was surely being given with these steps/laws: Islam could not be political¹². One can assume that once these revolutionary laws were enacted, the struggle against political Islam would stop or at least de-escalate because, besides one or two riots which are going to be discussed in a moment, we do not see serious attempts to bring Islam into the political domain in a reactionary manner. After all, not all of those riots were really for the sake of political Islam even though the term “reactionary” was uttered and used for the ongoing steps. According to professor Karpas,

¹¹ Azak mentions that she prefers using “secularism” instead of “laicism/laicite” for Turkish context but that nominal discussion will not be made in this thesis and both terms will be used interchangeably.

¹² Unless it was utilized by Kemalism itself.

for instance, İsmet İnönü government used Şeyh Said Riot as an excuse with the claim that it was working up for “reactionism”¹³. Most importantly, “any kind of a backward move to Islamic order was hardly one of the possibilities” (Akşin quoted in Azak 15) even in 1909 when the Ottoman Empire was weak to keep order. It was even more impossible to move back to any kind of Islamic order in an organized republic like Turkey. Obviously, one can claim that political Islam did not pose a serious threat to state and the new order so the struggle against Islam/Islamic images/political Islam¹⁴ could be decreased. However, Islam/political Islam continued to occupy as much space in Kemalist agenda both in practice, and in language. In 1925, shrines and dervish lodges were officially closed¹⁵. “After a while (1926) Islamic laws that were used until that day were abandoned with the enactment of Swedish Code Civil.” (Karpas 151). On 9th April 1928, [...] some laws of the constitution were changed and the statement of ‘the religion of Turkish State is Islam’ was abated.” (Karpas 153). In addition to these developments, the adhan/azan (call to prayer) was recited in Turkish instead of Arabic.¹⁶ These and many others were the developments that took place or precautions that were made against Islam and/or Islamic style/imagery during 1920s and early 1930s. Just as in practice, Islam and political Islam -and related lexicon- continued to take up much -if not increasing- space in Kemalist discourse towards the late 1920s and early 1930s so much so that Mustafa Kemal himself as a president seems to have showed an inclination towards the issue of Islam/political Islam personally in his own writings and speeches directed to public or made within his own circle. After all, of all of his statements about Islam and political Islam, the majority or at least the half were made after 1924 judging from the volume of his statements in the compilation prepared by Perinçek, which includes Mustafa Kemal’s expressions about Islam/political Islam, titled *On Religion and Laicite (Din ve Laiklik Üzerine)*.

But why? Why, after all that was said and done, did not the struggle and fear against Islam/political Islam de-escalate although there was not a real threat to the republic and although political Islam seems to have been taken under control by the state and the

¹³ Karpas, Kemal. *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi 1800-2012*. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. 2012. p. 150.

¹⁴ Later in the thesis, I will explain why what is Islamic and what is Islamist was brought to the same level both here and in Kemalist mentality and psyche.

¹⁵ Karpas, Kemal. *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi 1800-2012*. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. 2012. p. 151.

¹⁶ Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. *Din ve Laiklik Üzerine*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2016. p. 260.

government thanks to the abovementioned laws and policies? Why did “[t]he specter of *irtica* [Islamic reactionism] continued to haunt the Kemalist regime, which after 1925, claimed dictatorial powers and silenced the opposition?” (Azak 16, italics not mine).

2.2. Kemalism and its Discontents

To be able to find some grounds and probable explanations of Kemalism’s paranoid gaze at Islam/political Islam, we need to go back and analyze its encounters with political Islam or/and Islam in general. It is clear that ideologies cannot be considered without certain people who formulate them. That is to say, personal experiences of the ideologues who bring certain convictions into existence cannot be separated from the quiddities of the ideologies in question. Ergo, it would be far from absurd to claim that psychologically, parallel to the development of their ideologues, ideologies can also show a developments that is similar to the human beings’. Following such a reasoning, at least two deductions can be made. First, an analysis of the psyche of the ideologues may tell us a lot about the psyche and essence of the ideologies. Second, the analysis of developments of the ideologies can be made with the same theoretical tools and methodologies used for human beings with simple analogies. As an ideology itself with a strong and salient founding ideologue, Kemalism can also be subjected to a similar methodology, as well. Can the paranoid style be traced back to the early experiences, which are important for any kind of psychological analysis, of the ideology and those of Mustafa Kemal’s? If so, what might be the governing dynamics for such a psyche and such a style?

2.2.1 Paranoia

Before everything else, it would be apt to clarify what is meant by the word paranoia which is one of the keywords of this thesis. “The word comes from the Greek *parãnoia* (=paranoia), which can be roughly translated with the term madness or craziness, from “para”=outside and “nous”=mind.” (Pretti and Cella xv). According to the Oxford

Dictionary, the disorder is explained as “[a] tendency to suspect or distrust other or to believe oneself unfairly used.” (quoted in Preti and Cella xv) In clinical psychology, the term has more nuances and depth and classification¹⁷ is much more complicated than my general formulation in terms of its classification but for the moment, what is important for this thesis is not how the illness is classified but how that state of mind is described which can help us better understand the paranoid style in question.

According to Freeman and Garety’s formulation (2004) paranoid delusion can be defined with two characteristics: 1. The individual thinks that harm is occurring, or is going to occur, to him or her. 2. The individual thinks that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm. (Preti and Cella xvi)

With the light of the explanations and definitions above, we can confidently put forward that -whether it is as extreme as paranoid schizophrenia or as intense as paranoid personality disorder (PPD)- the disorder is characterized by its fear of being harmed by others. Therefore, if we are going to talk about a paranoid style, the word harm and its derivatives together with fear and its own derivatives will be essential as we shall see later in thesis.

Now that we have established a general outline of paranoia, it would be rational to look at the explanations and theories regarding the underlying reasons of the disorder and its symptoms. For such venture, it would be best to go into the domain of psychoanalysis which sits on the crossroads of both psychology and literature/culture in their ways of interpreting latent content and discourse.

A first useful explanation and/or theory regarding the cause and the workings of the disorder come from Sigmund Freud. According to Freud, paranoia is formed by a wish for homosexuality (Freud *Complete* 62). Even though one may not see a direct relationship between homosexual drives and paranoia and that of between paranoia and personal/political behavior, at least three key concepts are extremely crucial to introduce for later analysis, namely “fixation”, “narcissism” and last not least “projection”. For him, narcissism is

[...] a stage development in the libido which it passes through on the way to auto eroticism to object love. [...] What happens is this. There comes a

¹⁷ “The current diagnostic classification recognizes three types of mental disorders characterized by paranoia: paranoid schizophrenia, delusional disorder (persecutory type), and paranoid personality disorder (PPD).” (Preti and Cella xvi)

time in the development of the individual at which he unifies his sexual instincts (which have hitherto been engaged in auto erotic activities) in order to obtain a love-object; and he begins by taking himself, his own body, as his love object, and only subsequently proceeds from this to the choice of some person other than himself as his object. (Freud *Complete* 60)

As Freud himself explains clearly in the quotation that early in the development of every individual, there is a transitory stage where people direct their love to themselves. However, since it is a “half-way stage” (Freud *Complete* 61), narcissistic stage leaves its place to other stages in development¹⁸. If, according to Freud, people are stuck or “fixated” in this early phase of the development, they seem to be more liable to the disorder of paranoia.

People who have not freed themselves completely from the stage of narcissism-who, that is to say- have at that point a fixation which may operate as a disposition to a later illness- are exposed to the danger that some unusually intense wave of libido, finding no other outlet, may lead to a sexualisation of their social instincts and so undo the sublimations which they had achieved in the course of their developments. [...] Since our analyses show that paranoics endeavour to protect themselves against any such sexualisation of their social instinctual cathexes, we are driven to suppose that the weak spot in their development is to be looked for somewhere between between the stages of auto erotism, narcissism and homosexuality. (Freud *Complete* 62)

As we understand, Freud makes it clear that paranoia or paranoid liabilities are the results of narcissism which is a defense mechanism to homosexual fears. How narcissism leads to paranoia will be exclusively important when we try to apply these theories to understand the Kemalist paranoid style. For now, it would be better if we first defined what narcissism is and second we looked at the reasoning behind narcissistic thinking leading up to paranoia since there seems to be a leap from narcissism to paranoia in the abovementioned quotation.

Firstly, what do we mean when we talk about narcissism? This question will be of utmost importance when we seek narcissistic features in Kemalist discourse. For the features that can be defined as narcissistic, I am going to follow the outlines drawn by a Otto Kernberg who is claimed to be “the greatest¹⁹” analyst there is by many other

¹⁸ It is significant to note that Freud mentions the fact that many characteristics of the narcissistic stage “are carried out by [many people] into the later stages of the development.” (Freud, 61)

¹⁹ Kernberg, Otto. *Sınır Durumlar ve Patolojik Narsisizm*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2016. p. 7.

therapists and analysts. For him “[t]he primary characteristics of narcissistic personalities are grandiosity, excessive selfishness, and [...] the expectation of being shown admiration and appreciation.” (Kernberg *Şinir* 201). In addition to these traits, narcissistic people “talk about themselves aberrantly often” and “they envy others, idealize the ones from whom they expect narcissistic support and look down on the ones from whom they expect nothing.” (Kernberg *Şinir* 199).

Secondly, how does narcissism cause paranoid thinking specifically? Freud comes up with some explanatory mechanisms -or a patterns in reasoning, if you want- to answer the question. For him, “the proposition ‘I (a man) love him (a man) is contradicted by (a) ‘I do not love him -I hate him.’” (Freud *Complete* 63). Therefore, as Freud explains “[t]he proposition ‘I hate him’ becomes transformed by the projection onto another one: ‘He hates me (persecutes me), which will justify me in hating him.’” (Freud *Complete* 63). What Freud is trying to say here is clear: the hate which one paranoidly thinks others have is the result of the hate (love in the first place) one has within himself/herself. Such formulation (theory of projection) has been among the foremost and the most accepted ones in explaining the paranoid disorder especially in psychoanalysis so much so that it has been formulated in the analyses of literary works when, for instance, Davis defined the gothic logic and its technique as “taking an object of desire and projecting it into the external world as an object of fear just as Freud’s textbook contention about paranoia [...]” (Davis 2) Theory of projection was also applied even by Hofstadter himself who was not a psychoanalyst but felt that a projection (of fear/aggression et cetera) was in hand and at work in American politics, as well. As he puts forwards “[i]t is hard to resist the conclusion that this enemy is on many counts the projection of the self; both the ideal and the unacceptable aspects of the self are attributed to him.” (Hofstadter 85). All of these studies on paranoia and paranoid thinking indicate one thing: an analysis about paranoia cannot be done without considering projection and narcissism; so, that is what I am going to do in this thesis later in this chapter and in upcoming chapters when I do my analyses on Kemalist paranoid style. However, before doing so, there are other theories on paranoia that needs introduction, which will be useful later in the essay. One of these theories will be one proposed by Melanie Klein, who “bases her studies on child psychoanalysis” (Klein 7). If it is one of the tasks of this thesis to go into the first stages of the development of the ideology (its babyhood and childhood), it would be helpful to consult Klein, who

while focusing on the development of paranoia also uses projection theory but introduces at least one more key concept: envy -a feeling that narcissistic people possess against other people, according to Kernberg's classification. According to Klein, "envy is a oral-sadist and anal sadist expression of destructive impulses; it is effective from the beginning of life and has an idiosyncratic basis." (Klein 18) Right from the beginning of her theory, Klein makes it clear that people are born with the feelings of aggressiveness and expresses it with the feeling of envy. Then,

[i]n order to cope with the death instinct and the destructiveness that is present in its inner world, the baby projects part of its aggressiveness to the mother outside. Therefore, it splits the world (and the mother) as good and bad objects. [...] In other words, the fact that the baby splits the world with strong lines and perceives it as "good" and "bad" arises from its impulsive organisation. (Klein, 11)

Let us make it clearer with more detail and try to explain the role of "split" in paranoid thinking. Everyone is born with some degree of aggressiveness with "envy" early in his/her development. The mechanics of such expression takes place as follows. When someone is born, she/he bonds with a primary object and it is seen as the source of life. That primary object is the mother's breasts. (Klein 20) However, because of the competition between the death and life instincts²⁰, the anxiety it produces and envy/aggressiveness are also directed to this primary object.

The first object that is envied is the feeding breast because the baby assumes that this breast possesses everything [the baby] needs and it can give [the baby] endless milk and love but it keeps all of this for its own gratification. This feeling increases the baby's resentment and hatred and thus the relationship with mother is also distorted. The excessiveness of hatred for me shows that the paranoid and schizoid traits are also exceedingly strong and such a baby needs to be considered as ill. (Klein 25)

But how does the hatred turn into the paranoid and schizoid traits? Klein provides us with another mechanism -the mechanism of "splitting" that I talked about- which we will utilize later in thesis. For Klein, the more one is laden with envy, the more she/she suffers from guilt and she/he experiences the guilt as a paranoid idea of being persecuted. "Another result of excessive envy is early feeling of guilt. If 'I' feels the guilt when it does not have power to carry it, then the feeling is experienced as persecution." (Klein 39). Therefore, in order to get rid of this feeling of guilt, "I" splits

²⁰ Klein, Melanie, et al. *Haset ve Şükran*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. p. 21.

the world into “good” and “bad” and projects its bad traits to outside objects. This is also “one of the primitive defense mechanisms that “I” uses [...] to take control and gain domination on the object” (Klein 12). This process is called “projective identification” in Kleinian terminology. Whom the baby projects its bad traits to get rid of this feeling of guilt is has also been discussed by Klein through Oedipus complex, the explanation of which, again, will bear much importance for this thesis. As Klein explains, if the bond with the primary object is strong, then “the fear of losing the mother will not be great; thus the ability to share the mother will be developed.” (Klein 42). Therefore, if the bond with the primary object is weak, the paranoid liabilities will be greater thus it will affect how the Oedipus phase will be experienced. In Klein’s explanation Oedipus jealousy takes place “when the most of hatred is shifted from mother to father who is thought to possess the mother.” (Klein 43). Therefore, the father and other “rivals”²¹ become the objects that are “bad” since they are the ones that are thought to possess the mother. In a non-paranoid human development, the Oedipus phase is worked through and leaves its place to other phases in development, leaving the feeling of jealousy behind. “However, if paranoid and schizoid mechanisms are too strong, jealousy -and envy in the last instance- stays as it is.”, which might result in a “permanent impairment in the baby’s relationship with both the mother and the father.” (Klein 43). This impairment will be discussed later in thesis when we look at its role in Kemalist ideology.

2.2.2. Laius’s Oedipus Conflicts

All of the abovementioned statements are some of the foundational theories concerning paranoia and paranoid thinking. My suggestion is that if a paranoid style is persistent in the psyche of politicians and political discourse, then, we should be able to apply theories both to the agents as a group- and the ideology itself at a metaphorical level.

Trying to explain societal and political conflicts and phenomena through psychoanalysis and Oedipal complex is not new. Many scholars have done so before, some of whom I am going to refer to in this thesis. For instance, the psychoanalyst

²¹ Ibid. p. 42.

Kernberg has tried to see the resemblances between the formation of paranoia and its relationship and results in bureaucratic formations within states. As for Turkey, we see similar if not a more radical approach to the relationship between Oedipus complex and the workings of the state and or civilization. In his attempt to understand the “crisis” within the “minds and inner humans” of ours, Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar, talks about a “duality caused by the transition from one civilization to another” (Tanpınar 34) and vaguely claims at some point in his article that as a civilization and individuals we “[...] have been living in Oedipus complex, that’s the complex of a man who killed his own father without knowing it, since Tanzimat.” (Tanpınar 38). As one of the most important intellectuals of Turkish history of ideas and novelists, Tanpınar chose to use Oedipus complex, a psychoanalytic term, to understand or rather illustrate the psyche of the society and that, in my opinion, is important to note in terms of the range that psychoanalysis encompasses in critical theory within various disciplines.

Tanpınar is not alone in sensing Oedipal complexities felt within the society and its psyche. In his attempt to conceive of an allegorical interpretation of Hamlet by Kemalists in 1970s, Bülent Somay also turns his face to psychoanalysis. For Bülent Somay, in *Hamlet ‘70*, directed by Algan at the time,

[...] we were Hamlet, the youth. The ghost of the father was Mustafa Kemal and the ghost was warning us about the fact that the State, the mother Republic [...] was being subjected and raped by right wing/pro-American politics and even by Demirel²² himself and it was calling us to protect the Republic despite the governors and them in accordance with the spirit of the “Address to Youth”. (Somay *Çokbilmiş* 92)

In his attempt to understand the importance of the allegory²³, Somay tries to understand some political events and the psyche of that generation with Oedipal drives. For instance, he sees the 1971 Turkish military memorandum as Kemalists’ “effort to create a positive father figure and to ingratiate themselves with that father.” (Somay *Çokbilmiş* 111). Later in his article, he goes on his analyses to conclude that “in our gaze towards the society and politics, we need not have to be the Oedipal children who cannot detach from their mother.” (Somay *Çokbilmiş* 113). From his optimistic deduction, we understand that Somay also believes, like Tanpınar, the society and its

²² Süleyman Demirel was then the prime minister of the Republic of Turkey.

²³ The allegorical play itself shows us the fact that approaching to the Republic/the land and so on as mother figure and Mustafa Kemal as a father figure is not new at all and done before this thesis several times as well.

approach to politics are suffering from Oedipus conflicts. Obviously, as in Somay's and Algan's cases, people focused on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's influence on the society and politics as I am going to do. However, what has not yet been emphasized enough, I claim, has been the causes of such a psychological state. Yes, the state of Oedipus as a son has been analyzed here and there with regards to the relationship between the society and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. I contend, however, that the psyche and the discourse of the father have not yet been construed enough. In general, everybody tends to talk about the conflicts of Oedipus; yet, they often forget the fact that Laius, the father of Oedipus, had his psychological conflicts, as well. He himself was a child of a father, after all. Therefore, in any attempt to talk about Oedipal conflicts, if possible, we should also talk about the relationship between Laius, whom Oedipus kills, and his father. In our case, the society, Kemalists in particular I claim, has their ongoing conflicts in their roles as Oedipus, with Mustafa Kemal who represents Laius. Therefore, to better understand the paranoid psyche prevalent in politics, we had better have a look at the relationship between Mustafa Kemal and his father figures in politics since while we are dealing with the problems/conflicts of ours with our own father, we either directly or indirectly also deal with the one that our fathers have with their fathers which has a lot to do in forming of our fathers' psyche. It is important to note that since what we are trying to grasp and explain here is the political psychology, what should be subject to analysis should be Mustafa Kemal and his relationship with his father figures in political domain with whom he conflicts and competes for the sake of a mother figure in political life (the motherland, the republic). In Kemalists' and Turkish society's case, I repeat, we may not have only inherited our father's (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, meaning the father of the Turks) legacy and republic, but we also received his traumas, psyche, state of mind and lexicon related to these. Who was the figure in question whom Mustafa Kemal had conflicts with? Upon reading Mustafa Kemal's speeches and writings²⁴, I have realized the existence of strong figures as such whose names are repeated countless times in the abovementioned materials: the Sultans of the time, especially Vahdettin (Mehmet VI), who was the head of the Empire when the War of Independence started. I put forward that his conflicting relationship with the sultans,

²⁴ And of course, the ideas that were put forward before him within the Committee of Union and Progress and other circles whose ideas helped Mustafa Kemal shape Kemalism.

especially Vahdettin, has contributed a lot to political character and its “split” shape and style.

Just after the struggle for independence started, we can see that Mustafa Kemal-as-soldier and as-politician-to-come has stated his loyalty and belief in the sultanate and caliph multiple times until he secures the country and his position as a politician by stating that “[he] would always be the guardian of the supreme sultanate and caliphate and royal Turkish nation [...]” (Atatürk *Din* 34) and that “the chair of sultanate, by also being the chair of the caliphate, our Sultan, is the head of Muslim people” (Atatürk *Din* 43) and by wishing that may God protect the sultanate and caliphate (Atatürk *Din* 35). At this phase, we do not realize much of a conflict between Mustafa Kemal and the sultan of the time, Vahdettin, who was also the caliph of Islam. However, as Doğu Perinçek observes and as the history has proven itself to be true, Mustafa Kemal’s purpose was actually not “to defend nor save the sultanate” but “on the contrary, to get rid of the sultan [...]” (Atatürk *Din* 16). That is to say, he was acting like a Machiavellist²⁵. After the War of Independence was fought, then won and the republic was founded, we get to see what Mustafa Kemal-as-a-politician really thinks of the sultanate and the chair of the caliphate. On 25th of September, 1920, Mustafa Kemal was recorded uttering:

[...] Unfortunately, the person who holds the positions of sultanate and caliphate is a treacherous man for this nation. [...] This person who has the epithets of sultan and caliph has got some organizations of factiousness that he is personally busy in deceiving and ruining this nation. [...] [t]his person is a traitor. He is the tool of our enemies against the land and nation. (Atatürk *Din* 51)

We see that, even in the state of war, Mustafa Kemal utters these words both to the chair of sultanate and caliphate, a position whose influence Mustafa Kemal tried to utilize at the war. During one of his visits of the time, Mustafa Kemal utters the following:

There is no place on this land for caliphs and sultans, who do not hesitate to adapt the continuation of their personal interests, sultanate and debauchery in Istanbul to the enemies’ goal of invading our motherland, to cooperate with them, to resign to the wants of the enemy states and who do not have consciences and who do not abstain from treacherous efforts

²⁵ Başkaya, Fikret. *Paradigmanın İflası Resmi İdeolojinin Eleştirisine Giriş Batılılaşma, Çağdaşlaşma, Kalkınma*. İstanbul: Doz Yayınları. 1991. p. 99. Print.

to break the determination of our nation to live freely and independently.
(Atatürk *Din* 112)

These lines were uttered during a visit of an Anatolian city in 1925, two years after the foundation of the republic and one year after the abolishment of the caliphate. Even after the foundation of the republic, Mustafa Kemal's position as the head of the state was secured²⁶, and the sultanate and the caliphate were abolished, Mustafa Kemal's conflicts with a sultan/caliphate and most importantly the emphasis of them being "treacherous" did not end, if not intensified. The most important ideological source of Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk (The Great Speech)*, recited in 1927, also starts with a similar emphasis on Vahdettin, who was the sultan and the caliph when Mustafa Kemal was mobilized to wage war on occupying states in 1919. He says: "Vahdettin, the degenerate occupant of the throne and the Caliphate, was seeking for some despicable way to save his person and his throne, the only object of his anxiety." (Atatürk *A Speech* 1). Of course, the discussion of Vahdettin does not end there, and his "treacherous" behavior is mentioned and commented continuously throughout the speech. For instance, when Mustafa Kemal talks about the abolishment of sultanate together with Vahdettin's displacement of the country and then his title as caliph, he spares a harsh commentary on him.

Indeed, it is sad to think that a creature like Vahdettin, who was low enough to consider that his life and liberty could have been in danger from whatever cause it might be, in the midst of his own people, had been able to stand even for a single moment at the head of the nation. It is fortunate that the nation has driven this wretch [...] and has put an end thereby to the long parade of his baseness. [...] An incapable and low creature without heart or intelligence might well place himself under the protection of any foreigner [...]. (Atatürk *A Speech* 579-580)

In her article, "National Myths and Self-Narrations", Hülya Adak talks about Mustafa Kemal's rhetorical style in *Nutuk*, and rightfully points out to the use of the pronoun "I", which sets the point of view of events narrated in *Nutuk*, and asserts that "[t]he transcendent, unchanging self of *Nutuk* points to one of the most foregrounded myths in *Nutuk*, the myth of the narrator of *Nutuk* as the unique/sole hero or secular prophet in

²⁶ Zürcher, Erik Jan. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. p. 177

Turkish history.²⁷” (Adak 515) We understand from Adak’s rationalization that *Nutuk* serves as a book to set an identity proper for Mustafa Kemal.

[...] *Nutuk* is a cyclical and repetitive account of a self with a prophetlike calling to rescue the nation. This self’s others, the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph and the political opponents of Mustafa Kemal, are likewise denied development or maturation and remain unchanged as the self’s others throughout *Nutuk*. (Adak, 515)

I agree with Adak on the assertion that with the type of language he chooses to use Mustafa Kemal, separates himself from his others. The fact that he opens *Nutuk*, with how “I” acted against how “Vahdettin” acted shows that he wants to draw a line between himself and others (Vahdettin in particular) who acted differently. Thus, the mechanism of splitting seems to be at work here. “I” the good is against Vahdettin, the bad. We have seen multiple times so far that Mustafa Kemal uses a certain pejorative language towards Vahdettin with nouns and adjectives like “hain (traitor, treacherous), alçak (low), yaratık (creature) and so on. By doing so, Mustafa Kemal shows he is the exact opposite of his other, as one may expect. Yet, such language also reveals the psyche he was in and how he felt towards Vahdettin as well. Therefore, the language Mustafa Kemal with its pejorative, splitting and dichotomous tone shows us the hints of conflict Mustafa Kemal-as-politician had with Vahdettin, the Sultan and the Caliph. And it seems that it was a never-ending conflict. Just as the *Nutuk* started with a reference to Vahdettin as a traitor, it ended with a more comprehensive one that definitely included Vahdettin within its range. The lines are from the famous speech referred as “Address to the Turkish Youth” which ends *Nutuk*:

Turkish Youth! your primary duty is ever to preserve and defend the national Independence, the Turkish Republic. [...] In the future, too, there will be ill-will, both in the country itself and abroad, which will try to tear this treasure from you [...] that they have, through craft and force, taken possession of all the fortresses and arsenals of the [Homeland]²⁸. Assuming. in order to look still darker possibilities in the face, that those who hold the power of Government within the country have fallen into

²⁷ Adak’s ideas are in line with Kernberg’s here. If Mustafa Kemal’s rhetoric caused paranoia in future generations as I claimed, it would be logical Mustafa Kemal to be a praise-seeker, grand in his image and at the center of everything.

²⁸ The book that I am using preferred to use “Fatherland” for the translation of “vatan”, homeland. However, here Mustafa Kemal did not genderize the word homeland in Turkish as he did in one of the abovementioned quotations, in which case he referred to motherland as “ana-vatan”, literally meaning “mother-land”, which is more convenient as Somay clarifies, in Turkish society, the land is seen as female in general (Somay *Psychopolitics* 99).

error, that they are fools or traitors, yes, even that these leading persons identify their personal interests with the enemy's political goals, it might happen that the nation came into complete privation, into the most extreme distress: that it found itself in a condition of ruin and complete exhaustion. Even under those circumstances, O Turkish child of future generations! it is your duty to save the independence, the Turkish Republic. (Atatürk *A Speech* 740-741)

If we consider his previous writings, speeches and the kind of language he previously used, it is not hard to conclude that by “traitors who equate their goals with those of the enemies”, Mustafa Kemal warns the future generations of people like Vahdettin. It is important to note that, at this point of *Nutuk*, Mustafa Kemal uses some signifiers such as “traitor”, “crafters”, “error” does without a clear signified such as Vahdettin. Again, we may understand that the group of “signified” people include Vahdettin but Mustafa Kemal does not limit his references by stating a clear name, thus leaves questions marks over the signified person/people. I contend that such a choice of a vague reference - either made consciously or unconsciously- in a text that is of great importance to Turkish society²⁹ adds a lot to the paranoid psyche and style of the society, Kemalists in particular, if it is not one of the primary causes in the first place. Here, the trait of being treacherous is no longer the fault of a single man, Vahdettin but it can be possessed by anyone -those holding the power³⁰ in particular. Therefore, Mustafa Kemal also bequeaths its followers another -this time unspoken- duty: the constant duty of identifying possible traitors who are there somewhere plotting against or disposing of the motherland/nation/the Republic for their own interests since as Mustafa Kemal

²⁹ “Address to the Turkish Youth” is one of the most recognized texts in Turkish context because, for decades, every student from every level has been made recite the text. In addition, the text has been hung on the walls of not only almost every school in the nation but also of almost every classroom. Also, it is a speech with which “Atatürk binds national consciousness with the republic’s protection” (Glyptis 15). Last not least, it has been made to put in the first few pages of every textbook together with a portrait of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. From all these encounters, one can grasp the scope of familiarity of the Turkish society with “Address to the Turkish Youth”, which contains elements of paranoid style with its references to indefinable traitors. For Glyptis, such familiarity especially in education “[...] creates a tight nexus of meaning, permitting Kemalist ‘vocabulary and syntax’ to pervade a child’s work and leisure time.”, which intensifies the effect and expands the scope further in the society.

³⁰ As we have seen in “Address to the Turkish Youth” and previous instances, Mustafa Kemal is particularly more conflicted with those who are involved in selfish/treacherous activities and who at the same time have much power to damage motherland/nation/ the Republic such as the Sultan/Caliph and people who hold government positions. Why this conflict is important in particular will be discussed in a few lines.

makes it clear: “[i]n the future, too, there will be ill-will, both in the country itself and abroad [...]”³¹ (Atatürk *A Speech* 740).

Questions of utmost importance still persist: Why did Mustafa Kemal’s conflicts as a politician did not end with Vahdettin and who were the possible traitors Mustafa Kemal talks about in his *Nutuk*? This is where, I put forward, the mechanics of Oedipus conflicts and the aforementioned metaphors seem to be at work. I claim that within the domain of politics, the primal³² object of desire that is seen as the source of life is will to power, which can be represented anything through which power is obtained: nation, motherland, bureaucracy and so on. To put it in another way, just like a baby or a human being considers milk as the source of life and desires mother (and her breasts) as the source of milk, subjects considers the power as the source of their existence and desires anything that channels that power, be it motherland, the nation to rule, the parliament and so on. If the metaphor is extended, those who want to obtain the power (milk) are to be found in a desire over the motherland, the nation and so on (mother) which in turn is expected to lead to conflicts/competition with that who already holds the power or means of power (a father figure possessing the mother)³³. In Mustafa Kemal’s case, it was Vahdettin (a sultan, father figure³⁴) who possessed the power to rule and to have the means of power while Mustafa Kemal and his friends were in desire thus conflict with Vahdettin to gain that power over the motherland³⁵. Let us remember once again the lines uttered by Mustafa Kemal: “There is no place on this land for caliphs and sultans, who do not hesitate to adapt the continuation of their

³¹ The rightness and the necessity of such style in the text and *Nutuk* in general will not be discussed within this thesis since it is not its claim to do so. Some may argue that traitors and similar plotters may exist in any political context, and I may agree with them. However, this thesis does not claim to pass normative judgements over historical events and actions at this level but rather does analyses over discourses that were already produced by the agents of the time.

³² Ultimate, too.

³³ This formulation also suggests the following in reel-politics: any type of opposition is expected to be found in an Oedipal conflict with the people who hold the power and means of power in their hands.

³⁴ Somay talks about the idea that the sultan was also produced and seen as a father in Ottoman Empire (Somay *Psychopolitics* 139)

³⁵ Of course, I do not deny the fact that Mustafa Kemal had also conflicts with the Western intruders but his conflict with them is not something we can explain with Oedipus complex. Mustafa Kemal and his friends’ conflicts with them can be likened to the one Hamlet has towards Claudius. Yet, such a conflict and its analysis cannot be included in a thesis like this which seeks to understand Kemalism and its gaze towards political Islam.

personal interests, sultanate and debauchery in Istanbul to the enemies' goal of invading our motherland." (Atatürk *Din* 112) Clearly, Mustafa Kemal is directing his anger towards a Sultan-Caliph (a father figure) who is letting intruders possess the motherland. Would it be far-fetched to claim that such a language and picture suggest that the mother was either getting or trying to be raped by foreigners and the father was helping them do it; in front of their children?

Even if we would go as far to accept that an Oedipal mechanism is at work, it would not alone explain Mustafa Kemal's and Kemalism's rage and hatred towards Vahdettin which in turn cause Mustafa Kemal to use words like "low, creature, treacherous, heartless" since all of these ideas and imputations to Vahdettin would show a tendency to fade away after Mustafa Kemal finally obtains the power and motherland. Yet, this did not turn out to be the case for him and his ideology. After all, the excerpts that I am analyzing and have quoted are from an era in which Mustafa Kemal already had and secured his power and position. So, the conflict somehow lingered. But why could not Mustafa Kemal and the ideology in general put an end to the conflict even after they gained the power they sought? And why is this important for Kemalism and its paranoid gaze towards political Islam?

In an ordinary human development, everyone goes through Oedipus conflicts regardless of their sex. However, as Klein puts it, the conflicts normally seem to be coped with and then overcome and this is actually how a strong personality is built. However, as we can see, Kemalist ideology did or could not at all end its conflict with its father figure (Vahdettin and sultanate) as, it can be claimed, they projected all of their bad and guilty traits to father because of the excessive hatred it possessed. Therefore, I contend that the fact that Kemalism and Mustafa Kemal-as-politician could not end its conflicts with its father figures stems from the fact that it was stuck in early and primitive stages of human development- and political maturity in that sense. Can this be the reason why as Adak rightfully observes that "[t]his self's others, the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph and the political opponents of Mustafa Kemal, are likewise denied development or maturation and remain unchanged as the self's others throughout *Nutuk*." (Adak 515). It seems to me that as a parallel to what has been claimed above, it is the type of self, ideology, discourse that actually lack "development and maturation" and it projects it onto their "others". As for the importance of the explanation for Kemalism and its paranoid gaze towards political Islam, Kemalism can still be claimed to be stuck in those early and

primitive stages in this day and age. Whether this claim that Kemalism as an ideology is stuck in an early stage has truth in itself is the question this thesis has embarked on to find an answer for.

Now that we have discussed some Oedipal mechanisms and their possible effects at work, we can go back to the claim put forward at the end of 2.2.1, when we discussed the results of “splitting” and “narcissism” leading up to impairment in the relationship with father and mother. We have seen how Kemalism has had its impaired relationship with its father with traces of Oedipus conflicts³⁶. If we also add the mechanism of splitting together with its results and narcissism into the equation, Kemalism’s ongoing paranoid gaze and its issues with political Islam can start to make more sense. The harsh splitting done due to the hatred/envy towards the father and narcissistic traits led to a drawing of the framework of what “bad” could and would be. Whatever the “bad” is, it should have the same or similar characteristics of the father figure. In other words, what and who has the characteristics of the father figure should be “bad”. Together with his other characteristics Mustafa Kemal and Kemalism attributed to Vahdettin and his antecedents such as cowardice and lowness, Vahdettin and his antecedents were also the figures on whom the traits of “political” and “Islam”³⁷ came together due to a sultan being both the head of the state and the head of all Muslim people. That Mustafa Kemal and other Kemalists dealt a lot with the title of “Caliph” after the republic was founded can also strengthen the point that any Islamic/Islamist element in power was categorized/split aside as “bad” both then and later in Turkish political setting. Whether this claim that the ideology stigmatized such movements as “bad” has truth in itself is the question this thesis has embarked on to find answer for.

2.2.3. Historical Instances

Besides the psychoanalytic explanations made clear above, there might have been other causes of a paranoid style being developed by Kemalists towards political Islam that made the ideology and the ideologues setting themselves apart from political Islam,

³⁶ It means that Laius also had Oedipus’ conflicts within his psyche.

³⁷ I do not mean to call the ideology of Sultan/Caliph at the time as “political Islam” unlike Abdulhamid II, whose ideology was referred to as Islamism. However, it is important to note that a sultan/caliph with its constituent titles evokes the political ideology at hand.

whether we call them instances that caused splitting or traumas, or certain political positionings. After all, we know that some historical events might cause paranoia in societies³⁸. Among the first one of these historical instances was March 31 event, against which Mustafa Kemal himself was personally involved. The incident, “a mutiny by soldiers which has since been known as an Islamic revolt against the Young Turk government” (Azak, 15) occurred because of “provocations” of an extreme Islamist newspaper³⁹. The incident lasted for thirteen days and it was ended by the military unit/army that included Mustafa Kemal “Hareket Ordusu” (the Army of Action). For Kemalists, the incident is referred to as “reactionary” endeavor which “turned out to have an Islamic essence after the participation and the propaganda of Islamic fanatics.” (Aytepe 2017). The picture becomes clearer here with the agents involved in this incident: Islamist extremists who are targeting and even capturing the power on one side against the new regime and Mustafa Kemal on the other clashing with one another. Again, whether we call it splitting, trauma or political/military feud, Mustafa Kemal and political Islam crossed paths in this big event that had far-reaching effects following it. The way “the second man” of Kemalism, the prime-minister of Atatürk and the following president of the republic after Mustafa Kemal, İsmet İnönü, talks about the incident is of utmost importance as to see how the incident influenced and put a scar on the psches of Kemalists.

The event retained its traumatic effect on most of the leaders of the Republic such as İsmet İnönü (1884–1973), the second President of the Republic after Atatürk. İnönü was to write in his memoirs, published in the weekly magazine *Akis* as late as 1959, that he always recalled “the catastrophe of March 31” as “the collapse of a big building”, a reaction to the young constitutional regime which created “an ever-lasting atmosphere of insecurity.” (Azak 15)

It is important to note the word “insecurity” in İnönü’s statements. The word alone emphasizes how influentially detrimental the event was on Kemalists’ psyches even so many years after it occurred. If the “ever-lasting atmosphere of insecurity” is not a paranoid feeling, then what is?

³⁸ For instance, we know that -as Somay reports from Belge- Russian War created a paranoia directed foreign countries. It is credible to think that some inner events might have caused a paranoid gaze within the country.

³⁹ Karpat, Kemal. *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi 1800-2012*. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. 2012. p. 86.

31 March Incident was not the only event where Mustafa Kemal and the ideology-in-the-making crossed paths with political Islam or Islamic politics. There were also a few riots and certain resistance⁴⁰ by some Islamists against the new regime after the republic was founded. Among those were Menemen Incident and The Sheikh Said Rebellion both of which had an Islamic essence in their making especially the former which had more Islamist agenda in its desire to enunciate Sharia (Hür 2012), the Islamic Law than the latter one, which was a Kurdish nationalist rebellion against the regime⁴¹. Therefore, these events that had all-encompassing outcomes, too, in Turkish social and political context may have been effective in the process of marking “bad” label the Kemalists put on any plane where Islam and politics come closer to each other or/and directly political Islam itself.

What is also worth noting is that Mustafa Kemal personally knew what would happen if any Islamic element would be added for the sake of pragmatic outcomes in politics. He personally utilized the imagery and language of Islam during the War of Independence, during which he tried to use the title of Caliph to gather some help both within the country, an attempt which may be claimed to have worked and from the Islamic world, an attempt which eventually failed. Even though the call for help from other Islamic agents failed, Atatürk utilized the language and the imagery of Islam to get the power. Therefore, it can be claimed that he knew Islam provided some help to way to power and he could rightfully be afraid that others would do the same to access power. He knew Islam as a populist and a pragmatist tool could be used against Kemalist ideology in power since he saw that the Turkish sociology was liable to the effects of Islamic elements. This might have played a role in the making of the paranoid psyche of the ideology was suffering from against political Islam, as well.

Up until now, we have seen the possible explanations of the paranoid style used in Kemalist discourse from different fields of study such as psychoanalysis, discourse analysis, history, sociology and so on. My claim is that if there is a trace of truth in what I have demonstrated so far in terms of the paranoid style of Kemalist ideology, we would see an adaptation of a similar style/discourse after the influence of Islamic

⁴⁰ That of a famous Islamic cleric Said Nursi comes to mind who has been influential in Turkish Islamic circle.

⁴¹ Even though the Sheikh Said Rebellion was a Kurdish Rebellion (Zurcher 247), with a strong Sheikh figure being the leader, it had a strong Islamic visual and undertone, as well.

elements re-gained popularity and then re-claimed the power in Turkish politics after the late 1990s and early 2000s. In politics, this style is obvious as we have already seen at the beginning of the introduction. If Kemalist ideology is as influential as I foresee it is, we would see the existence of a paranoid style in literature and culture, as well, which have been other fields for Kemalist propaganda for decades as we have seen from the case of Esendal and countless other writers. The following chapters will try to prove the aforementioned foresight through the Kemalist canon produced after the 1990s and 2000s.

CHAPTER 3

PARANOID STYLE IN KEMALIST POPULAR CULTURE

If we are trying to see how much a paranoid style is ingrained within a group of people or a society is general, one of the first domains of reference must be the popular culture, since by nature, popular culture is formed through the insight of the masses.⁴²

One reason for attending to popular culture is the fact that there is an important relationship between the construction and maintenance of collective identities, and the manifestation and articulation of these identities within popular culture. Popular culture provides an outlet for imagining groups and disseminating the myths surrounding who belongs and who is an “Other.” (Nieguth and Wilton 4-9)

As such, the study of popular Kemalist literature and cultural domain would bear a great significance if we would like to uncover and analyze the “articulation” of Kemalist identity against (political) Islamic ones. Psychoanalytically speaking, the domain of popular culture would also tell us a lot about the mindsets and psyches that a certain group is in. After all, like Nieguth and Wilton claims, popular culture has the “ability to reflect (and invite reflection on) social cleavages.” (2015 4) The study of these cleavages, put intentionally or set unconsciously like slip-of-tongues as Freud would claim would help us understand the psyches and the liabilities of certain groups and that is what this chapter is intended to do in the case of Kemalists and their paranoid style and psyche.

⁴² Or the insight of the masses is set through popular culture, as Adorno and Horkheimer would argue. Even so, such a culture reflects the insight of the masses in return, whether it has been fabricated or not.

3.1. Judging the Book by Its Cover and Its Title

Secretly Elected: “You Did Not Elect Them; They Elected You” (Figure 1), (Gizli Seçilmişler: You Did Not Choose Them; They Chose You), Circulation: 230.000 by Soner Yalçın. This is how one of the bestselling books in Turkey is presented to readers by its cover on which there is a black shady upper hand on the top, dusting and dropping random black skulls. Whenever one visits the online bookseller OdaKitap, one can often -if not all the time- come across a book which is promoted in a similar fashion under “bestsellers” section. In the recent years, I have come to realize a distinguished presence of bestsellers which are advertised by the promotion of certain elements. Therefore, the study of these elements would be helpful in uncovering the claim whether or not Kemalist canon is aiming directly at a paranoid psyche and/or constructing such a psyche. Two distinct ones of these elements are the book titles abounding with the feelings such as “dispossessing, losing, being in the middle of conspiracies, being deceived and/or being able to be the one to uncover the hidden conspiracies”. Among those books, some are as follows: *Why Have Turkey Been Sacrificed (Türkiye Neden Feda Edildi?)* and *AKP as a Project of the USA (Figure 2) (Bir ABD Projesi Olarak AKP)* by Merdan Yanardağ; *Israel: Game of States from the Nile to the Euphrates (Israel: Nil’den Fırat’a Devlet Oyunları)* and *The Secret Cult in The Castle (Figure 3) (Saraydaki Gizli Tarikat)* by Erdal Sarızeybek; *The Struggle of Power Groups from The Ottoman Empire to the Republic (Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyete Güç Odaklarının Mücadelesi)* by İlker Başbuğ, *Who Are You Deceiving? (Siz Kimi Kandırıyorunuz?)*”by Soner Yalçın; *The Fish On The Hook: Turkey (Figure 4) (Oltadaki Balık Türkiye)* by M. Emin Değer. In a similar fashion, the covers of the same books also contain certain figures inducing paranoid thinking have such as “a white mask being held straight ahead by two hands it in front of a black background”, “certain cuts crossing out the words of the title including the word “Turkey”, “Uncle Sam’s hat on top of a bulb, which is the symbol of AKP”. Of course, as it was put forward at the beginning of the Introduction in line with Hofstadter, such a style could be expected from any political group and context since a paranoid style is not exclusive to American politics and is prevalent in Turkish political context -Kemalist circles in this case- as well. Therefore, it is not very surprising to come across books on everyday politics that have certain paranoid elements as such. What is more intriguing is the frequent

existence of such elements in literature -Kemalist literature in this case- and their shared aesthetics/style with the one utilized in politics. Among those are some of the most popular writers of this day such as Ahmet Ümit, Selim İleri⁴³, Atıf Behramoğlu, Zülfü Livaneli.⁴⁴ The similarities of the books of these writers with the abovementioned political books inducing paranoid books are self-evident. For instance, the book by Ahmet Ümit is titled as *Farewell, My Fair Homeland! (Figure 5) (Elveda Güzel Vatanım)* with a caption reading as “The depths of the state are darker than the depths of soil.”, on the cover of which there are two Turkish flags behind a shady male figure wearing a calpac resembling the one in the famous Mustafa Kemal Kocatepe photo. (Ümit, Cover Page). At first sight, regardless of the story inside the book, one can read the book as if the homeland was being taken away from someone, which is a feeling resembling the one Mustafa Kemal was talking about at the beginning of *Nutuk*, where the motherland was being invaded by other states. The phrase “regardless of the story being told inside the book” is important to emphasize because as a writer aiming at the readers of the popular culture who are liable to judge a book by its title and its cover, Ahmet Ümit is utilizing -again either knowingly since he might have sensed that books promoted in this fashion are sold out quickly or unknowingly under the effects of unconscious drives- paranoid elements immediately at the cover already, meaning what is told inside the book does not have to be so paranoid. What is important is that once such a book is produced, it is either the result of the paranoia prevalent in Turkish context -Kemalist circles in this case- or it itself is creating such a style/sense/style, both of which mean that we can talk about a certain existence of paranoia. For the most part, I associate such a feeling of paranoia with the Kemalists not because Ahmet Ümit is a Kemalist writer⁴⁵ because first, the imagery used in the cover is very similar to the imagery of Kemalists, with Turkish flags, shadowy people/images and so on and second, Kemalists are among the most populated and influential group being at the opposition that are dispossessed of the political power and/or motherland. A very

⁴³ Selim İleri may not be recognized immediately as a Kemalist; he may not even be one after all. However, it is important to note a literary figure who utilizes similar paranoid elements intentionally or without realizing just like some Kemalist writers do.

⁴⁴ Some of whom will be analyzed later in the thesis in detail.

⁴⁵ Again, even though he posts photos of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk from his twitter account, Ahmet Ümit may not be a self-proclaimed Kemalist; however, that is not really important if he is utilizing and contributing to that feeling of paranoia with Kemalist imagery.

similar title is seen to have been adopted by Selim İleri for a theatre play, which has become popular recently thanks to a number of different stagings: *Farewell Republic! (Allahısmarladık Cumhuriyet)*. Again, a sense of the republic is being taken away and/or the republic disappearing is highlighted for the sake of and thanks to popular attraction. Another literary book mentioned above that uses a similar style in its title and cover is *So Many Traitors! (Figure 6) (Ne Çok Hain)* by Ataul Behramoğlu, who will take up a lengthy space of his own with the type of discourse he uses against political Islam later in the thesis. On the cover of this book, we again have a white mask in front of a dark grey background with a few lines selected from the book which include “How suddenly you changed!/ [...] in the icy waters of selfishness”, lines implying that some people have gone “astray” due to their personal interests. It is important to note that like Mustafa Kemal blaming Vahdettin for following his personal interest albeit the nation’s, Ataul Behramoğlu is blaming “the other(s)” for being after their personal interests. In addition, the use of mask is also noteworthy since it implies a certain “pretending/acting” while in reality a face/a trait is being hidden. Again, someone is trying to deceive someone and/or pretending to be someone else for treacherous ends as in other numerous covered/uncovered cases. Another popular writer who has chosen to aim at certain paranoid feelings of the society - Kemalist in particular- is Zülfü Livaneli, who features the idea of losing something/the idea is something is being taken. The first book which exhibits these ideas is *Farewell to My Friend*, belonging to juvenile literature. Different from the other writers, Zülfü Livaneli’s book puts a huge Atatürk portrait on its cover, with words comprising of the title on his calpac in front a partly sunny and cloudy sky background. Here, one might say that the book chose its cover aptly since the book talks about the instances from Mustafa Kemal’s life and finally, his death. However, it is undeniable that the word “farewell” is an acknowledgement of Atatürk being taken away in some way, which may ultimately imply that it is Kemalism that is being taken away and the book bids Mustafa Kemal/Kemalism its farewell with its title. Livaneli’s other book *Shadows (Figure 7) (Gölgeler)* also puts an Atatürk portrait at the center of the cover with some literary figures such as Halide Edip Adivar and Yaşar Kemal. What strikes one at the first sight about the portrait used on the cover is the sorrow on Mustafa Kemal’s face. With one of the ultimate paranoid concepts of “shadow” in the title, the sorrow on Mustafa Kemal’s face arouses the feelings of Mustafa Kemal and his legacy being in the shadow, in the dark. The sentences written on the back cover of the books seem to reinforce such a feeling of being lost. “An

Istanbul evening which swallows up all the shadows. [...] Shadows are speaking in the dark.” (Livaneli Back Cover) To sum up, there is no need to highlight one again that paranoid mechanisms are at work in the articulation of these covers and titles and it seems to me that popular culture might be trying to utilize the already existing feeling of paranoid tendencies to attract more popular attention.

3.2. *How Did Islamist Erol Go Crazy?*

Often, more than more than one mechanism seems to be at work in paranoid thinking. As popular culture by definition is aiming at the taste of general thus average populi, it would be expected from the works of this culture to reflect the workings of these mechanisms explicitly since, with their desire to reach the majority, these works look for immediate attention and results. Therefore, analyses of such works of popular culture may give us hints as to which aspects of the psyche these and subtler works of literature are working on and which symptoms of the paranoid style they might display for further study. One such work of popular culture that has no intention of hiding its symptomatic aggression towards political Islam is *How Did Islamist Erol Go Crazy?* by Nihat Genç, who once wrote in the preface of a book *The Man (Adam)*, which lists the names⁴⁶ of men “[...] on whose shoulders Turkey stands, whose colons are being daggered by the pickaxes of the counterrevolution so that it would collapse [...]” (Özdil Back Cover) that

As long as we are are alive, we are on the watch on those mountains where the enemy was savaged. We still have an arsenal as big as Anatolia on those mountains where we savaged the enemy. That arsenal is law, republic, citizenship and laicite. We are still pushing the enemy back on those mountains. We are fighting by shielding our chests made of bronze, not by cooperating insidiously under the counter with the [Islamic] communities and their wild imams.[...] (Genç in Özdil 8)

At the very first sight, one can understand why Nihat Genç by establishing a splitting right away between “we” and “enemy”, by assigning himself as a rightful savior and

⁴⁶ It is noteworthy to mention that the names that are mentioned in the book make up an Atatürk portrait on the cover of the book, further implying that these men “on whose shoulders Turkey stands” are actually the ones that Kemalists approve of and that somehow sustain/constitute Kemalist ideology.

defender of the republic, by pointing out laicite as one of the backbones of his ideology is an almost perfect Kemalist in his stance. Therefore, with numerous prints of his many literary books, Genç seems like a suitable sample of analysis for this thesis.

I doubt if we can find a Kemalist book in which splitting does not dominate the style/discourse in question. *How Did Islamist Erol Go Crazy?* is not an exception when it comes to establishing such a dichotomous psyche through the style it uses. The “bad” other that this book establishes is “Islamists” as the cover of the book immediately makes clear. In the case of this book we have Erol, the narrator, and Aysun, for me the real main character of the book, at one side of the dichotomy that have all the positive traits and on the other side, we have the generic Islamist characters.

Every Islamist has already transformed into cold-blooded psychopaths. [...] Every Islamist has transformed into suicide bombers. [...] Many young men who consider it to be their rights to tear heads and sell their religion and countries. Yesterday, he was sitting at my book store; we were drinking tea together. He could not keep his head straight due to his diffidence but now, I have seen his video, he does not seem diffident while beheading a fifteen-year-old. (Genç, 36)

Just like we have seen in Nutuk, we face a “bad other” or a group of others that have transformed into people who are capable of hideous acts against the country; who have lost their morals and become psychopaths. We can actually see how the mechanism of splitting is explicitly at work and sense the subtle narcissism that is attributed to the self. At one point in time, the self and the other were at the same level of maturity and morality (“drinking tea together”) however, while the self has remained as sane, country-loving and clean as before despite and vis-à-vis Islamists who have become “psychopaths” and are able to sell their “country”. Therefore, the worse the other is, the better the self gets and is considered, according to this equation. Throughout the book, we see a lot of instances where Genç tries to emphasize how “bad” the other is. As a matter of fact, the books can be seen as one long zeal of humiliation of the Islamists, thus, that of dignification of people sharing Kemalist values such as laicite, women not wearing headscarves, pushing religion into the private sphere. In the book, we hear the words of humiliation mostly from the character of Aysun, who “is a sparkling a pure thing flowing like water; so light that maybe [Erol] thinks Islamism would not instill in her...” (Genç 60) and who in a sense represents a Kemalist woman with her traits attributed to her by Islamists such as “not covered, impudent, hanging out with men”

(Genç 97). Concerning the Islamists she utters sentences such as “[i]t is unnecessary for them even to die.”, “The desperation of powerlessness and helplessness dragged them into immorality.”, “None of these are men, they are ferocious rats.”, “ the doors of their hearts and minds are opened only when they eat.” (Genç, 69-74). Within the range of five pages of the book, this is what Genç makes his character say about the Islamists with obvious words of humiliation. As mentioned above, the book has thousands more of these words so much so that the real challenge would be finding ones that do not humiliate the other. Of course, quoting every one of these words would be an impossible labor in the context of this thesis but even the random samples taken from the book reveal one characteristic of the book and its style; its aggressiveness. “The old friends; Islamists... whose brains and tongues are full of empty sectarian contestations, snot faces, shabby, pitiful, lazy wooden logs that would put out the fire they are thrown into, with their skins full of phlegm.” (Genç 122). We can confidently claim at this point where we have already talked about Klein, Freud and Kernberg that such aggressiveness or hatred leads to the humiliation/narcissism, splitting and other defense mechanisms that lead to/intensify paranoid thinking and style.

The aggressiveness in question is self-revealing in the book with its emphasis on the stillness, motionless of the other. For instance, at one point of the book, Erol, the main character of the book, asks Aysun why she considers Islamists as “ferocious rats” and the answer is a rather thorough one.

[W]hy are these people so nervous when there is no reason; a human being cannot sit for six hours without speaking. These people do! If they were to sit to lay eggs, they would stand up in three weeks; they will not even breathe in case it is considered as a sin; there is no looking right or left; there is no organizing the books and the astray lying awry before them; they constantly utter words in tension; they are neither cold nor warm; a human being may once speak in haste and may walk in the street in a hurry [but] there is none of these in the, why do these people speak like chickens that escaped knives cutting their head [...] They assume slow death to be life. (Genç 71-72)

Aysun’s thus Genç’ view on Islamists is clear. Their slowness, idleness is a trait to be angry at. The fast pace resulting from the lack of full stops and sentences flowing after one another together with the use of exclamation mark reinforce the case that the motionless state of Islamists -at least the way Kemalists see them- triggers the already existing aggressiveness and make them angry. We can even talk about the feeling of

“envy” in a sense that that state of calmness that Kemalists attribute to Islamists is feeling that Kemalists strive to be in. The constant questioning of the reason as to why Islamists are so motionless may hint us the fact that Kemalists are actually looking for ways to be as calm and free of aggressiveness as their others. Therefore, we can get a hint of an inner conflict within Kemalists in that sense. What is interesting in the aforementioned quotation is that the answer Aysun provides in that instance is not at all an answer to the question as to why she thinks Islamists are ferocious rats since the picture regarding Islamists she draws is not one of a ferocious thus a restless being but instead, one of a motionless one. This paradoxical answer may also give us clues about the conflicts Kemalists may be in. It is as if they are actually answering their own unspoken/unasked questions about their aggressiveness and how to get rid of it.

In addition, one can also claim, again in line with Klein and Kernberg, that Kemalists are projecting their own state of being “nervous” and “in tension” and project it onto the “bad” other so that they can provide a defense mechanism against the laden aggressiveness and envy extant in them. This may also explain the frequent application of the words of humiliation by Kemalists since again for Kernberg, “to humiliate in order to avoid envy” (Kernberg *Sınır* 208) is a defense mechanism used against narcissism, which as we know from Freud, may lead to paranoid feelings. *How Did Islamist Erol Go Crazy?* is a great example in that sense to supply us instances to demonstrate how such mechanisms of “humiliation” and “aggression” induced by desired calmness are at work. “An evil silence” (Genç 96) the writer of the story describes the motionlessness at another instance. This definition alone may support the idea that envy and aggression may lead to a paranoid thinking in the sense that silence of Islamists is now regarded as “evil”.

3.2.1. Losing Power and Bureaucracy

There is another point in the book where the author criticizes the lack of aggression in Islamists and humiliates them, which is also noteworthy.

Religious language has tied hands of these people. Bury yourself, your humanity with flamboyant words of your divinity; forget about them. On

these lands everyone's rage, personality, reflexes, objections have been captured and captivated by these substituted bright sacred words. [...] Do we become "religious" so that our sense and sensation organs are deracinated? (Genç 101)

It is important to note that this time, Genç refer to the lack of aggressiveness in Islamists and claims that Islamic side of their political view retains Islamists from their humane traits as "rage, personality, reflexes, objections". What is more important psychoanalytically and in the context of this thesis is the sentences Genç utters in his novel regarding the relationship between the aggressive language and homeland/motherland. "A country cannot be a homeland/motherland and cannot be free unless the screams of [...] 'fuck your guns and freedom' are heard." (Genç 102). What strikes me the most in these cases is the quick and the unexplained transition from cursing to becoming free and turning a country into a homeland. Somehow, Genç associates "cursing", an aggressive oral act with formation of a motherland/homeland. This unexpected and ostensibly irrelevant linking, just like a revealing slip of tongue, seems to foreshadow another connection between the aggression/paranoia and the state/country/homeland, which is the loss of power and bureaucracy to political Islam. Different from Mustafa Kemal's era, when Mustafa Kemal had the absolute power and had the bureaucratic control in his hand, Kemalists of the late 20th and especially early 21st century, after losing power and later bureaucratic positions in the state AKP⁴⁷, seems to have intensified the hatred/aggression thus paranoia/paranoid style and even manifested that intensification through the language and lexicon they used. Genç writes:

[Erol] is watching without showing his true colors the days of power of his friends, their adventures of ministry, undersecretariat and consultancy; which position have they captured again, how many people have they fired and which ministry they have appointed thousands of their men to, millions of dollars, captured newspapers and TVs, their dreams have come true. (Genç 138)

These are the lines that Erol himself utters, who is depicted as "a modest Muslim [...] not one of [those] ideological hormonal wild Muslims." (Genç 139). Clearly, just like Mustafa Kemal, Genç is okay if Islam is not brought to the political domain but only lived in the private sphere as in Erol's case. It is again a clear manifestation of the well-

⁴⁷ Of course it was not the first time an Islamist party was taking control of the political power in Turkey. After all, we have the example of Necmettin Erbakan as an important figure. However, while he or other Islamists were on power, bureaucratic institutions of the state were mostly still Kemalist or at least had Kemalist language.

known Kemalist trait which is defining and setting up restrictions on how religion can be lived within the society. That being said, we can see from the quotation above how much aware and disturbed Kemalists are by the “capturing” of the state by the Islamists. For them, it is as if Islamists “capture” something that do not belong to them; they are firing -clearly- those who are not their “men” -possibly Kemalists- and placing their own⁴⁸. For them, Islamists are “a flock of hyenas [who] enjoy a carcass as big as the land of Anatolia and as the state. (Genç 138). Such a pejorative, humiliating and aggressive language against Islamist “enjoying the state” and the lands thus even the mother -motherland- in an Oedipal sense is noteworthy since it shows how intensely Kemalists are reacting against the resurgence and in this case losing power and more importantly, the bureaucratic state, which is an often recurring image and a reference given in *How Did Islamist Erol Go Crazy?* and recent Kemalist literature in general. This recurrent image of the loss of bureaucracy bears an utmost importance for the intensification of the paranoid style because bureaucratic organizations are, by some psychoanalysts like Kernberg, seen as a way of defense mechanism in the sense that establishing bureaucratic organizations actually help disperse the “envy/hatred/aggression”. “I refer specifically to bureaucratization of the relationships within the large group. This avoids regression into either narcissistic or paranoid structures, with the corresponding development of narcissistic or paranoid ideologies.” (Kernberg *Even Paranoids* 92-93). What Kernberg puts forward here has pivotal importance in terms of Kemalism and other groups/ideologies that show paranoid tendencies and styles in use. In order not to go back to what Klein referred to as “paranoid-schizoid stage” where envy and hatred are not processed and leads to narcissistic and paranoid traits, the groups form bureaucratic organizations, which in turn lead to narcissistic and paranoid ideologies, like Kemalism, which is the main assertion of this thesis. If what Kernberg claims has truth in it, then in the time of an Islamist party ruling the country and the loss of such bureaucratic structure, we would perceive of a regression into narcissistic and paranoid feelings by Kemalists, which seems to be the case analyzing Kemalist literature. As we have seen above, often Genç expresses his distress of losing such power and bureaucratic structure explicitly, attacking with fury and humiliation, further reinforcing Kernberg's claim. At one point, Genç shows such aggressive language with a reference to Islamists gaining power:

⁴⁸ We will come to this “paranoid” image of Islamists populating/capturing places and positions later in this chapter.

“Minute-by-minute, [Erol] has witnessed Islamists becoming beasts after they had obtained the [political] power.” (Genç 36). At another point, Islamists gaining political power is not mentioned but is an accepted presupposition. “[...] They have turned the land reclaimed by a sacred independence war into filthy lands [...]” (Genç 20). At others, Genç directly talks about the positions of the state that have been gained by Islamists, like he did in the quotation above when he mentioned the “ministries, undersecretariat and consultancies”.

[Islamists] eradicated law with baseless evidences [...]. It is the era in which they took every risk in order to challenge the most entrenched institutions. They have everything: TRT⁴⁹, TOKİ⁵⁰, RTÜK⁵¹, law institutions, universities, TMSF⁵², the budget, and they see red so much as not to conduct a statutory audit for any of them. (Genç 77)

This quotation is crucial in showing how Kemalists perceive the gaining of political power/bureaucracy by Islamists. By taking of hold the institutions, they have “everything”, which is an indicator of the fact that bureaucracy is of utmost importance for Kemalists politically and psychologically- as a defense mechanism of their aggression/hatred/envy. Also, the fact that Islamists are “challenging the most entrenched institutions” indicated both a paranoid perception of Kemalists institutions/Kemalism being challenged and the fact that Kemalism and its institutions are the only ones that are rooted and should be kept. Again, a slight indication of narcissism is made present as a way of defending oneself when aggression/hatred/envy inducing subject is at hand.

There are many other cases where Genç talks about Islamists becoming the “ministers of the most cruel thieves and agents of history” (Genç 55) or them “being placed into jobs within the state.” (Genç 74). These frequent cases in which a pejorative language is used show how much Genç -and Kemalists in general- are going back to the early stages of envy/hatred against Islamism/political Islam and how much struggle they are having with losing one of their way of coping with that much hatred -bureaucracy. As we have seen in the second chapter, Genç and -as we shall see later in thesis- recent Kemalist tradition share a similar attitude in putting the blame on political Islam for

⁴⁹ Turkish Radio and Television Association

⁵⁰ Housing Development Administration of Turkey

⁵¹ The Supreme Board of Radio and Television

⁵² Saving Deposit Insurance Fund

following their personal interest before the motherland/the country/the republic and even exploiting those; splitting-induced dichotomous language, narcissistic fixation and so on. What is different in such a style from the early Kemalist era -which held the political power and formed a strong bureaucracy of its own throughout the year- is the intensity of the pejorative lexicon that is used and the frequency of the references made to the “other” in question-political Islam. Following Kernberg -in the quest to find grounds for such intensification-, we could easily claim that the loss of the bureaucratic organizations within the state must have played an important role in such a revision in language. Of course, language is an organic being that adapts to time and space and one can rightfully claim that such a revision in language is the result of the organic change in the use of language itself that tries to adapt to modern language which is in general an aggressive one, even the political and the literary language. However, relating the change in language to the era it is used in this case would not explain the increasing frequency and the quantity of the use of such a pejorative language. Ergo, the observation claiming that losing bureaucracy -a defense mechanism against envy- might have played a big role in such a revision in language and lexicon.

Besides the language, one can also object to the thesis of this study by claiming that such a paranoid style would not have to be necessarily and essentially a Kemalist reaction. Of course, we cannot expect from every Kemalist to see every happening through ideological lenses. Therefore, claiming such a reaction is a Kemalist one just because Nihat Genç is a Kemalist would not suffice. Luckily for researchers, Genç makes his claims in such an evident way that we know that his reaction against the resurgence of political Islam is a Kemalist one as well, thanks to his many readings on and through Kemalism. Genç makes Aysun speak most of the time:

[For them] Atatürk did not kill the enemy but the Muslims. While they are calling Atatürk anti-christ, they smirk as if they were playing Hacivat-Karagoz, they feel very free, ease off and get relaxed only when they are cursing Atatürk. Cursing Atatürk is a turning point for the unemployed, they become an important person when they curse Atatürk. (Genç 74-75)

In this and many other instances, Kemalists see themselves in Islamists’ shoes and speak for Islamists for them. Thanks to instances like this, we understand how Kemalists think Islamists see Kemalists and we can get an insight of the reason why Kemalists develop a paranoid thinking against the Islamists on a manifest level. “[For them, Atatürk did not save Turkey but occupied it. They are like a rabbit that saw a

headlight when they see an Atatürk portrait.” (Genç, 73) and “[for them] God created the world for the sake of those in our bookshop. However, laymen took this world from them by force and persecution.” (Genç 76).

In such instances, we do not even have to refer to psychoanalysis to decipher and uncover the latent content. We understand, for instance, from the quotation above, that Kemalists think that Islamists regard Atatürk as an “antichrist” figure and that Islamists claim that Atatürk killed the Muslims. When Kemalists put themselves in the shoes of the Kemalists in this way in which in they think Islamists do not like Atatürk, their paranoid thinking and the symptoms as well as the reference to defense mechanisms intensify. After all, at this point, we know that such hatred they think Islamists have against Atatürk may be mostly from the hatred/envy they project onto them. Therefore, we can claim that they must have had to feel the intensification of the envy/hatred so Kemalists felt the need to apply to the “projection” of the intensified hatred, which helps them reduce it. Besides, as we have seen that Islamists are seen as the other with whom they compete for the motherland/country/republic/power- (mother-milk), we can also refer to Freud and provide us a formula of the workings of such a projection, deepening paranoid thinking and style. The mechanism of symptom- building in paranoia requires that inner perception or feeling must be replaced by external perception. Then, “the proposition I hate him is projected in the form, He hates (persecutes) me, which justifies me in hating him.” (Freud *Complete* 63) We see instances in the book which makes clear the paranoid expectations from Islamists and regard them as vengeful. For example, in of those instances, Genç regards the Islamist generation as “[a] generation who do not accept any status of those who are outside and who nurture grudges with vengeful feelings.” (Genç 85). It is no-brainer that Kemalists develop a paranoid thinking and in return a style against Islamists when they see Islamists “who nurture grudges with vengeful feelings.” For Kemalists, Islamists went through a phase in which “the remark ‘The parenthesis of the republic is closed’ is linked to statement ‘The old Turkey is abolished and the New Turkey has been founded’[...].” (Genç 78)

3.3. Entomo-language, Claustrophobia and Darkness

Another distinctive aspect of the paranoid style we put to use in Kemalist literature is the language and images associating political Islam with an insect-related lexicon, a

feature which I relate to paranoia itself. One of the most encountered images in paranoia is the image of “shadows” and so far, without analyzing them, we have seen some examples such images in Kemalist literature. For instance, we have seen the image of “dark men” utilized at the beginning of this study and we have encountered sentences like “[s]hadows are speaking in the dark” on the back cover of Zülfü Livaneli’s book, *Shadows*. “Dark and shadowy” images in mind, the presence of another image and related language -for me- stood out among others; which was the insect-related and similar images and language. Up until now, we have seen the reminiscents of such images in both Mustafa Kemal’s and Nihat Genç’ discourse. Remember Mustafa Kemal called Vahdettin a “low creature” and Nihat Genç’s character Aysun insisted that Islamists were “ferocious rats”, an image encountered in “Delusional Infestation” which is a psychological disorder understood by “fixed belief of being infested with pathogens against all medical evidence.” (Freudenmann and Lepping 692). Of course, it would be far-fetched and daring to claim that Kemalists are suffering from such a specific disorder with almost no scientific data but the fact that insects-like delusions have been present in the history of paranoia-related cases may warn us to look out for such images. Therefore, it would be best to hunt for and analyze such images in paranoid style of Kemalists together with other dark and shadowy images.

“Why [...] did the insects start to move and attacked the world as if a volcano had erupted?” (Genç 78) asks Genç while explicitly referring to the Islamists as insects rising up and attacking the world. At this explicit level of the language, we do not see the explanation of the metaphor of “insect” in any way. Here, in this instance for example, “insect” is just used as a word of humiliation but it is crucial to note that this metaphor implies something both bigger and more latent in terms of the style and the psyche of Kemalism since reading the parts of this texts and some other texts included in this study with the image of “insect” in mind, it is possible to see that Genç is drawing a claustrophobic picture and using a claustrophobic and insect-related language that can be called entomo-language in which Kemalism or Kemalist images are surrounded and outnumbered-generally- by “dark” Islamists, as if Islamists were as Genç would say “insects”.

[Erol] would say “he is a boy who would eat a carcass of a dog with pleasure”. “He would not hesitate [to] eat if put a fried mouse before.”. It can be disgusting for humans but a parasite lives in a

carcass animately, many cestodes are living inside the growing crowds. (Genç 107)

This quotation forms the association between the “incest-like/parasite-like” Islamists together with they being forming and being parts of the “crowds”. This association is important to notice since not every writer may not be able to use the insect-like metaphors so explicitly as Genç does and/or may not choose to do so. Also, I believe what leads to a paranoid/delusional idea of insects populating Turkey may also be the product of a bigger feeling like being outnumbered/feeling claustrophobic. Therefore, looking for images to see if Kemalist language/style/discourse is claustrophobic is important if one wants to see how much Kemalist style is paranoid if it is paranoid after all. Besides providing us many examples of entomo-language directly or connotatively as in cases when he says “[t]hey are fond of eating a lot; that is why they are impossible ‘to annihilate’.” (Genç 76) as if they were a growing/evolving type of insects that are impossible to get rid of, Genç refers to the related image of Islamists populating, wandering around, “growing” in a paranoid discourse many instances in his book, like many other Kemalists we will analyze. At one point, he describes “desperate hopeless without a future [...] they are coming in and out of the shop in a vague manner like stretching and shortening mid-afternoon shadows that are like patterns drawn on a dusty floor. (Genç 56).” Once again, Genç leaves us with some uncertain shadowy images, drawing Islamists like aimless beings wandering around. Even though we do not see a certain image of surrounding crowds at this exact instance, reading this passage arouse a feeling of claustrophobia in the chapter it is used where Genç narrates how Islamists came to populate a district in Ankara, Hacıbayram a place which “was given to the plunder of Islamist institutions and foundations.” (Genç 57). A couple of sentences later after Genç describes the transformation of Hacıbayram that has “a greatly crowded stop (mahşeri kalabalık)”, he elucidates on the feeling of claustrophobia he feels. “We are at the beginning of the 1990s⁵³, the air has started to darken due to coal fumes, it is not possible to breathe, not a single step can be taken in the stampede [...]” (Genç 57). Obviously, the sense of not being able to breathe in the crowded dark streets filled with Islamists give the reader a sense of claustrophobia together with the general atmosphere of this chapter and the book in general. Later in the book, Genç also links a similar feeling to not political Islam but religion/Islam in general, hinting us at another style of

⁵³ The same date which this study marked as the start of the approximate resurgence of political Islam in the Turkish context.

the Kemalist style which the confusion they produce in meronymy related to political Islam, by which I mean the following. While they are attacking political Islam, they also tend to attack Islam/religion and Islamic imagery alone due to its relationship to political Islam and due to it being a part of the concept of political Islam. In other words, I claim that intentionally or unintentionally, Kemalists tend to attack the straw man, meaning that they attack Islam and Islamic imagery while they are fighting with political Islam, which causes the scope of paranoid thinking to be widened and deepened with new image possibilities. In other words, a transference is done again either knowingly or unknowingly, in which “bad” qualities/images of the political Islam are transferred to Islam alone.

Religion was everywhere on these creatures. Religion is in/on their collars religion is in the way they sit like slaves religion is in their speeches to children religion is in pontification religion is in Denmark religion is in/on their mustaches religion is in the sacrifices of their suicide bombers religion is in their mouths religion is on/in their feet religion is in the skins of their sacrificial animals religion is in deserts religion is in poems religion is in cinemas religion is in tear drops religion is in the civilization, there is a religion patrolling without its ropes. (Genç 105)

As the quotation makes it clear, we see the image of “religion” that is propagating and leaving no place without it similar to that of a virus/insects. We should note that even if Genç does not clearly draw the insect/virus metaphor here, the undertone and the language has a similar style and feeling with that of a “cestodes growing crowds”. In addition, this language resounds bits and pieces of the one mentioned above where Genç described the scene as “impossible to breathe.”. Last not least, the anxious non-stop tempo that ignores punctuations like simple commas makes the reader feel the uneasiness of the writer towards Islamists.

Of course, for one to be able to attribute such styles of the language to the style Kemalism adopts in general, one should see the instances in other Kemalist texts, as well and that is what this study recognized to be the case. Similar claustrophobic and paranoid feeling of being surrounded and outnumbered is encountered in other texts of (popular) culture. An ambitious, self-proclaimed Kemalist, who has been described as someone who “has both seen the fraternity and treachery [...]” and who “called the dictator a dictator [and] never bent down.” (Özdil 469), Levent Kirca is a theatre and TV actor, who produced a very famous TV show called *Olacak O Kadar (Will It Up)*. According to the official channel of the programme on YouTube, the show “is a satiric

TV programme that continued on various Turkish TV programmes for 22 years and that talks about the issues of the people.” (Olacak O Kadar 2014). Expectedly from a critical TV show as this one, Levent Kırca utilized the sketches he created in the program to convey his ideology from time to time and used a language, which I believe to be very similar to that of Genç’s and many other Kemalists, helping contribute to forming a shared language which shows paranoid characteristics that we have talked about above.

One of these TV sketches called “Documentary - Atatürk (Belgesel - Atatürk) is particularly intriguing to analyze in terms of its quality to manifest both Kırca’s and Kemalism’s way of looking at and drawing political Islam. The video clip starts with an overall description of “1900’s”, a period which is depicted in a rather miserable, hopeless sense with deserted landscapes. However, as a few frames later, a group of people with explicit and rather exaggerated Islamic imagery show up in the video, with men having a long beard and wearing Islamic “imamah”, a hat that Imams wear and with women, all of whom are wearing black niqabs (Figure 8). At this very scene, the group of people and the homeland are both transparent and visible as if the homeland and the people were intermingled with one another or these people were the “ghosts” living in the land. All of these people look extremely angry gazing at the camera, the audience. At this “ghostly” scene, again, we can refer to the theory of projection and claim that Islamists are projected onto a feeling, an image. It is the aggression/hatred Kemalists projects onto Islamists. At this point, one can rightfully ask if there is any Kemalist text in which Islamists are depicted as peaceful, harmless human beings. Almost all the time, they are depicted in Kemalist texts as angry, foxy, hating people. As we will see later in the study, they are drawn as arrogant or a certain arrogance is implied even when they are drawn smiling and happy.

Later in the sketch, we are introduced a woman who is dressed in a western garment, walking past the aforementioned group in Islamic imagery (Figure 9). At that moment, we hear the voice-over saying “these people do not show tolerance against people who do not dress and behave like them”. and the males of the group start looking and pointing at the woman, implying condemnation. A few seconds later, they start following the woman. Immediately after this scene, something strange happens and the linear narration is disturbed. The story is cut there and we see the group once again, together in front of an all black background and floor. This deviation from the linear storytelling this strange switch back to the group is worth noting since it is in this scene,

too, we encounter a claustrophobic feeling. In this scene, the group moves aimlessly, from left to right and right to left (Figure 10). Even when some of them leaves the scene, the crowded scene starts again. In Kırca's mind, what are these people doing since this is not a natural follow-up scene at all? Or in his mind who are these people really? Are they thinking about their next conspiracy? Does he see these people as aimless people who wander around like "insects" with their embedded black/dark imagery? The scene that follows this artificial one slowly moves onto the men whom we had seen that started the follow the Western woman. At that point, the voice-over talks about "fear" as if it was trying to prove that this group, these "aimless" beings are up to no good. Referring to the people who are against Islamists, it says "they are right to be afraid because these bearded and [dark clothed] people are extremely fearly/unrestrained". With these remarks, we see four men from the group walking towards the camera, the audience and the woman at the same time, evoking the image and the feeling of "closedness" further. This feeling of claustrophobia is almost taken to the extreme when the men start lynching the woman from every direction (Figure 11), leaving no space to escape or as Genç would say to "breathe". Of course, what is being lynched at that scene is Kemalism as well in the symbolic sense of the word since the woman with her Western imagery corresponds to the famous image "modern Kemalist/Western woman" of the republic. Obviously, Kırca makes an anachronistic mistake by relocating a modern concern, which is the Kemalist woman image against old-fashioned/Islamic imagery, because such antagonism belonged to post-republic era, heating up during the 1990s and on, not exactly to the pre-republic era of the 1900s. The comments voice-over makes further reinforces the idea that this sketch is a contemporary critique of Islamism with Kemalist spectacles with the references it makes to the loss of power/bureaucracy that we so far have talked about. "Behind them were those who ruled the country [backing them up]". Here we see a similar approach to Islamists in the sense that they are being backed up by those who are in charge. We remember a similar attitude by Genç who claimed that people were constantly given jobs in the state, referring to the modern bureaucratization in the state. Of course, Islamists being supported by the political power is a recent issue just like the image of women presented a few frames ago. From all these implications, we can read the sketch as a modern critique and response of Kemalists against the re-rise of political Islam. In fact, this claim makes sense when we consider and compare the two different languages used against political Islam by Mustafa Kemal and contemporary Kemalists. Whilst

Mustafa Kemal put a lot of weight on treachery, he did not suffer from a claustrophobic feeling or he did not refer to a certain nepotism in bureaucracy as Genç and other Kemalists have done recently. As we have seen above, this language belongs to a contemporary Kemalists. Considering this difference in language, we can claim, again, that the sketch at hand is a modern critique and response of Kemalists against the resurgence of political Islam and it talks about mostly the psyche and feelings (aggression/envy and so on) of modern Kemalists. With all these modern referential symbolism⁵⁴ at hand, we would not be wrong to claim that like Genç, Kırca, too, suffers from a certain feeling of aggression and envy together with claustrophobia caused by Islamists, leading to further deepening of the paranoid thinking and style. Such paranoia and paranoid style reveal itself once again at the end of the video with the following words, with a repetitive emphasis on the word “my father (atam)”.

They say the time erases everything; it is a lie my father!/ Today’s logging is worse than yesterday, my father./ My father, who so to say is living in my heart rather than the soil./ Today, the grand homeland/motherland is still crying, my father!/ You rest in peace; no one is strong enough to bring our country back to those old days, my father! (Olacak O Kadar)

The paranoia of another group taking over the “homeland/motherland” is and trying to bring the country back to pre-republic era is self-evident in these scenes, just like in Genç and even in the placards from the Introduction. Similarities in these instances are almost identical as one can easily notice the defensive lexicon here, the emphasis on the urge to “defend” the republic. It is as if Kırca and other Kemalists are answering to “Address to Youth”, to Mustafa Kemal who wanted people to defend the country when necessary, which is, of course, almost always in the paranoid thinking. Indeed, so many similarities in language, in feelings, in psyches among many Kemalists cannot be accepted only as coincidences; that is why talking about a Kemalist aesthetics a paranoid one is better to be spoken and put into consideration for further studies bigger than this one.

⁵⁴ I would like to state that I do not claim that such symbolism or the references to contemporary Turkey are produced on purpose. They could be read as the unintentional slips of the unconscious as works of art often uncover. Still, what matters is not the intention but the end product we are dealing with in this instance.

CHAPTER 4

THE EFFECTS OF PARANOID STYLE ON CULTURAL WORKS

4.1. Paranoia in a painting?

Now that we have talked about paranoia, the splitting in the psyche, narcissism, the claustrophobia and other certain images and feelings related to Kemalist style in popular culture, I would like now to go into a domain where works of culture are not directed to the taste of the majority of the population, by which I mean the culture consisting of works that mostly prioritize aesthetics and are not generally intended for the taste, understanding and access of general public. Having said so, my claim is going to be that due to the paranoid style Kemalists have adopted recently due to their position against the resurgence of political Islam, aesthetics of the works produced has been either overlooked or sacrificed completely.

The first work of art that I will try to analyze to illustrate my point is a painting by Bedri Baykam. This painting is crucial to be analyzed since it will show us how much Kemalist language with its paranoid tendencies is rooted in different types of artworks and how far the scope of the Kemalist canon stretches. The painting I am referring is one called *Thank You, Turkey (Teşekkürler Türkiye)* produced in 2007 by Bedri Baykam, who besides being an artist belongs to the popular culture with his many appearances on various TV programmes related to politics, football and so on. Bedri Baykam is another self-proclaimed Kemalist with his numerous books on the ideology called *Kemalism's Bridge to the New Century (Kemalizm'in Yeni Yüzyıla Köprüsü)*, *Secular Turkey Without Concession (Ödünsüz Laik Türkiye)*, *Mustafa Kemals, to the*

Duty! (Mustafa Kemaller Görev Başına), His Eyes⁵⁵ are Always on us (Gözleri Hep Üzerimizde). As one can clearly understand, we do not need further proofs to demonstrate the self-proclaimed Kemalist identity of Bedri Baykam and start the analysis of the style used in the painting. According to Bedri Baykam, this is a “3D work”, in which there is “Atatürk and around him [there are] Gül, Erdoğan, their wives and around them, women from every age that are turbaned and covered. [...] I wondered why thousands of people who came to my exhibition were infatuated with this painting.” (Baykam 2007). Indeed, Baykam reduces the imagery he used in the painting down to turbaned women and rightfully wonders why this painting struck a lot of people. I believe there is more in this painting telling us a lot about the Kemalist paranoid style, which might have had a lot to do with the appreciated reception it received from the visitors. The way I see it, this painting has almost every quality of a proper Kemalist paranoid style and in that way, akin to its purely textual companions that we have analyzed above which belong to popular culture. The famous paranoid idea which is losing or having already lost the republic/motherland/bureaucracy is visible at first sight in the painting. If this painting is to represent the overall state of Turkey, then, of course, at the very heart/core of the painting, we have a huge Atatürk portrait, which is contrasted with every other image surrounding it -except for another silhouette of Mustafa Kemal’s on the bottom right. Even though we have the portrait of Atatürk in the middle, he is surrounded by many Islamic/Islamist images of a lot of turbaned women with niqabs and so on. Clearly, Baykam still think that Atatürk/Kemalism has not not completely been erased from Turkish context however, the fact that Mustafa Kemal says “Thank you, Turkey”, which is written on his portrait and voiced orally, arouses the idea that Mustafa Kemal, the father, is not happy at all with the current state of the republic that is lost to political Islam. Here, Mustafa Kemal is resurrected with his own image and voice to censure his children. His warnings in *Address to Youth* and *Nutuk* have been ignored and his image/the republic has been or is about to be lost to those surrounding him. Of course, this harsh critique, which gets stronger due to its indirect and sarcastic nature, evokes the paranoid feeling that something has been lost or is about to be lost unless something -more- is done, which

⁵⁵ We understand that “his eyes” refer to Mustafa Kemal’s eyes since the cover of the book is designed with Mustafa Kemal’s eyes. The title is also interesting in that it either consciously or unconsciously proves the idea that Mustafa Kemal always watches us (Somay *Psychopolitics* 148), which is a state of mind that would intensify the paranoid psyche.

leads to adhering to Kemalist ideology more, deepening of the paranoid thinking and the mechanisms causing it, split/dichotomous view on people and so on. Such a style, such emotions evoked, I believe, may also explain the “infatuation” Baykam talks about or why those people who visited the exhibition were “struck” by the painting so much.

Others points that stood out among the others in terms of -paranoid- style are about the composition and details of the painting which in their essence has narcissistic features in a way and it is not only because the portrait of Atatürk is in the heart of the painting. The first detail to point at is the use of collage forming the composition. As one can see from the painting, all the details in the front are placed with the technique of collage, the style of cutting and sticking different images together. A quick research shows that the style bedri Baykam uses is not unique to this particular painting but the fact that he chose to use this particular technique in this particular painting is noteworthy in the sense that this style is completely in line with the splitting Kemalists refer to when they want to ease off the hatred/aggression, which leads to narcissism thus paranoid in the psyche as we have discussed above in the second chapter. In this case, the technique of collage is one of the best options to be adopted since it helps express the splitting Kemalists do between themselves (Mustafa Kemal) and political Islam (Erdoğan, Gül, women wearing turbans). Again, Kemalists draw limits, boundaries between themselves and Islamists, between good and bad, implying they are not anything like those “bad” others. “Good” is a quality of theirs. Let us once again bring forth the claim here. “We see the explicit coldness and antipathy towards [the others] an indication of narcissism.” (Freud *Kitle* 53)

In fact, this narcissistic point of view/psyche is carried so far in the painting is that Atatürk’s head is highlighted in a way that it immediately reminds one of the halo of divinity as one can see in Jesus portraits around Jesus’s head. While this halo-like contour separates Atatürk’s head from the corresponding images of turbaned women and niqabs and brings forward the image, it also dignifies and transcends it, introducing a prophet-like image. All in all, it would not wrong to claim that this “secular” prophet-savior-like image is narcissistic with its contrast to political Islam and claim that such a narcissistic image is desired as “ego ideal” by a group of people. This outer love to a leader by the individuals may seem like a limitation of the narcissistic feelings of the individuals but within the groups “individuals feel as if they were homogenous beings”

and the narcissistic feeling is substituted by the “libidinal bonding with other individuals” (Freud *Kitle* 54) of the same group. This bonding is expected to be seen as stronger and more “determinant”⁵⁶ when it is felt toward the leader of the group, who according to Freud “might pursue unconditional narcissism”⁵⁷ himself. Such a theory of “homogeneity” might explain both why we often see a shared lexicon/style and even a shared psyche among Kemalists and why the leader of the ideology, Mustafa Kemal, can be so much glorified by the members of the group thanks to the libidinal bonding with the members and the leader of the group. This claim gains strengths when we put forward, like Taha Parla does, the idea that some people actually seem to find an “ego ideal in Atatürk” (Parla *Kemalist* 308 and Parla *Kemalizm, Türk.* 316)

Besides this narcissistic imagery that we often encounter in Kemalist texts, we can talk about other similarities of this painting with the texts we have and are going to analyze in this study such as claustrophobia and projection of aggression, both of which are linked to paranoid style of Kemalists. If we again go back to the structure that makes up the composition of the painting, we can see that even though Atatürk image is in front, we feel a sense of claustrophobia due to the fact that Atatürk portrait is surrounded by the Islamic/Islamist images. Of course, this sense of claustrophobia is lighter and more optimistic than the one drawn by Genç, in which it was “impossible to breathe” because in this painting, we at least have a way out from the feeling of claustrophobia. We are not surrounded by political Islam completely. On the bottom right, we have the white Atatürk silhouette which may imply that the way out from this inclosure is again Kemalism/Mustafa Kemal. The ideology and/or Mustafa Kemal is the remedy of the psychological -paranoid- state Kemalists are in for Baykam and other Kemalists, which, as far as this study is concerned, seems to be a paradox since it is Kemalism itself that adds to if not leads to such a paranoid (claustrophobic, narcissistic, split) feeling/state of mind in the first place as we have seen in the second chapter. In other words, whenever Kemalists call out Kemalism as a remedy to their paranoid psyche, they call out an inescapable paradox together with it.

As for the aggression and its projection onto the other, even though the general tone of the painting is indirect or passive-aggressive (since Mustafa Kemal sarcastically thanks

⁵⁶ Freud, Sigmund. *Kitle Psikolojisi*; İstanbul. Cem Yayınevi. 2017, p. 51.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 83

Turkey), Bedri Baykam does not leave out to provide us another aggressive Islamist in the painting (on the top left), just like Nihat Genç does. The fact that this aggressive turbaned woman is in the painting again shows us the mindset of Kemalists. It is actually them who are trying to deal with aggression/hatred; that is why, they do not miss the chance to depict them aggressive whenever possible within their works. Such projection of one's aggression onto the other has been among the recurrent features of the paranoid style of Kemalism so far as the works in this study are concerned. The main passive/indirect aggressive behavior of the painting may even be the result of this projection since due to such a projection, the intensity of the aggression may have been de-escalated, thus may have paved the way to be able to afford an indirect/passive aggressive behavior within the style instead of an anticipated direct/active aggressive one.

4.2. Political Art or Artistic Politics?

Indeed, that is not all about the style in question. There is another characteristic to be pointed out that stands out among others, which is the overall transformation of the style Kemalists use producing their works, the result of which is the products similar to the ones produced within popular/populist in which aesthetics is a vague concern. An observable switch from prioritizing aesthetics towards politics or -realpolitik or everyday politics to be precise- has haunted all of the Kemalist works that have been analyzed above and are going to be analyzed later on. Of course, we know that for Kemalists, art and culture in general have been a field of propaganda for Kemalism. However, in the recent years when political Islam have gained power, the so called "works of art" say novels, stories, paintings and so on have concentrated so much more on the message they are delivering as if they were not writing literary pieces or producing works of art but party manifestos -and it is logical to associate this switch to the loss of bureaucracy and intensification of paranoid thinking. This is not at all to say that politics has no place in literary pieces or art in general; however, when politics becomes the end goal with explicit remarks on everyday politics, putting style, aesthetics in the second place, what is produced does not become a "political art" but an "artistic politics". Of course, the change in the content also affects the style that is

being used since literary language can only be used to some extent because “artistic politics” would very much like to reach as many people as possible; that is why, the language and the overall style should be accessible to the crowds, downgrading aesthetics of culture to the level of that of popular/general culture. I come up with such an idea thanks to a metaphor proposed by Ortega y Gasset. He rightfully claims that when someone tries to look outside through a window and focuses on the garden s/he is looking at, s/he would not see the marks on the windows. However, he claims, when we switch our attention to see the window, the garden disappears and we see the marks on the window⁵⁸. “Similarly, a person who is expecting to get moved [...] by a word of art, adjusts his/her perception to it and as a result, cannot see the work of art.” (Ortega y Gasset 24). Following a similar logic of Ortega y Gasset’s, it is reasonable to say that when the writers prioritize the political message over the style and the aesthetics, they cannot see the artistic side of their work and in the end do not produce a work of art but again, a manifesto -with a few artistic nuances if we are lucky. We have so many instances where aesthetics is not a matter of concern while the main purpose is to provide political information and do propaganda. Such populist methods are expected to be adopted by the artists of popular culture as they wish to be read by as many people as possible. We have seen many examples of these even in the few examples we provided in the first chapter. “[Islamists] eradicated law with baseless evidences[...]. They have everything: TRT, TOKİ, RTÜK, law institutions, universities, TMSF, the budget, and they see red so much as not to conduct a statutory audit for any of them.” (Genç 77) says Genç at one point in his book as we have seen above. Or at another, he writes “[h]owever, now that the boss is America [the USA], they work so much that no one can contend against [these] Islamists.” (Genç 79). If these sentences were not to be found within a book that classifies itself as “novel” on the cover, one, would without doubt, think they were from extremely stereotypical newspaper columns, crowd-seeking political rallies, judging from the very straightforward, simple, didactic and thesis-like sentences. It is not even necessary to remind and emphasize on the very explicit, speech-like nature of the images and the narration of the sketch we analyzed from Kırca, who, in this TV programme, never seemed to have an aesthetic but a comedic and sarcastic concern, which was also sacrificed for the sake of political message in this

⁵⁸ Ortega Y Gasset, José. *Sanatın insansızlaştırılması ve roman üzerine düşünceler*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları. 2010. p. 24.

particular case. However, aesthetics is rarely the primary concern in the works of popular culture and it is not surprising for these works to sacrifice aesthetics for the sake of politics. What is perplexing is to observe a similar trend and style in the works that do not necessarily belong to popular culture. The first of these works in which politics leaves aesthetics in its shade is the painting we have analyzed above by Bedri Baykam. Baykam has always been considered to be among one of the most internationally renowned Turkish painter by many people for whom, for instance, Le Figaro wrote: "He can draw with both hands equally skillfully, can pass from the figurative to the non-figurative, can make use of a brush, a pencil or a charcoal, and finally can enliven Matisse and Miro before our very eyes." ("EXCERPTS From CRITICS"). One can find many appreciative criticisms from many professors and critics from all over the world on this website, all of which seem to suggest that Baykam's paintings have been well received and acclaimed. However, I claim, paranoia and prioritization of the paranoid politics have degraded the values of the works that have been produced within this framework. Let us once again turn to the painting whose paranoid features we have analyzed above, in which sense it shared a lot of similarities with the works of popular culture. In his painting called *Teşekkürler Türkiye*, we know that Bedri Baykam used a technique called collage. One can claim the adoption of this technique is aesthetically appropriate for a painting that wished to show (and deepen) the dichotomous nature of the political spectrum of the agents in the painting. However, a painting cannot be called aesthetic only because of its technique it chooses to utilize. After all, its choice of collage as a technique is not the first quality that the painting is praised for. The fact that Atatürk speaks in this painting and sarcastically thanks Turkey is made the primary purpose of the painting and the aesthetic components of the painting such as the choice of lively colors in the background, which does not suit the dark message and the paranoid nature of the painting anyway, the use of collage as a means representation do not come to the forefront, which already damages the aesthetics of the painting according to Ortega y Gasset. There are other problematics in the choice, I believe, that dis-serve the quality of the painting in aesthetic terms. Let us take the portrait of Atatürk used in the painting and the handwriting put in the middle of it that says "Teşekkürler Türkiye". Here, the problem damaging the aesthetics of the painting arises from the following reasons. The first one I believe is the very existence of that handwriting. This explicit way of conveying the message is in all aspects a very amateur way of execution since it does not fit the style Baykam is using in this painting.

It is not a component of any artistic choice Baykam made say the collage and the colors and so on. This writing is just floating there randomly with its conspicuity on the suit of Mustafa Kemal. Why does this message have to be given so explicitly? Why does this message have to be given at all? According to Baykam, the audience already hears the exact same words “Teşekkürler Türkiye” from Mustafa Kemal’s own voice⁵⁹ already. Why would he repeat the same message making changes on the painting at the expense of aesthetics? Clearly, this writing is just there so Baykam makes sure that the sarcastic message is conveyed. It is not there for an artistic end whatsoever. In fact, its randomness, its explicitness, and its aimlessness prevent this painting from being a work of aesthetics and the reason for that is an anxious paranoid concern for the political message. When we compare such an anxious and paranoid reaction with that of a great writer, Bertolt Brecht, we can see who actually prioritizes what in their works of art. As Berna Moran endorses in his book, Brecht refused to make his character, Mother Courage, to openly speak about a communist thesis at the end of the play in order to avoid any kind of misunderstanding about the message/effect Brecht was supposed to be after. Moran rightfully concludes that Brecht “must probably have thought that making a more explicit explanation, getting from implicitly would decrease the artistic value of the work.” (Moran 283-284). Therefore, just like Ortega Y Gasset, Brecht also thought that when aesthetics is not the main priority, it would have negative effects the aesthetics of a work of art, a result which we have seen in Baykam’s case.

The second problem with the aesthetics of the painting that in fact conflicts with the sarcastic message it is trying to convey is the choice of the Atatürk portrait used in the painting. In this particular painting, Mustafa Kemal has one of his strong politician postures that is in line with his cult of personality that was created. He looks away -as politicians often do in their photos, with his head held high. Normally, in order for the sarcasm to work properly in this case, Baykam might as well have used a thoughtful or a worried image of Mustafa Kemal⁶⁰, a state for which Atatürk would have a reason to thank Turkey sarcastically and the work would have the potential to have much deeper “effect”, which Baykam was after all along. Why would Atatürk thank Turkey “sarcastically” if he is still strong? In a state where Atatürk still has a powerful position,

⁵⁹ Baykam, Bedri. “Teşekkürler Türkiye”. *Cumhuriyet* [İstanbul]. 4 Dec. 2007. p. 16. Print.

⁶⁰ For instance, the one used on the cover of *Gölgeler* by Zülfü Livaneli looks rather tired and thoughtful, which, in my opinion, would have served much better to the workings of the sarcasm intended in the painting.

the sarcasm would not work, as there would be no reason to be disappointed or ungrateful -opposite of thankful, as the sarcasm suggests-. Here, I associate the choice such a strong portrait with the concern of somehow damaging strong Atatürk image, a concern which Kemalists have always been closely watchful of. Mustafa Kemal can almost never be shown as emotional, incorrect or defective for Kemalists. An extreme example of this is the law 5816, which is titled as “The Law On the Crimes Committed Against Atatürk”⁶¹. This particular law was enacted in 1951 to protect the legacy of Atatürk obviously and was from time to time exploited by being used not only against insults but also any negative remark uttered for Atatürk. Independently of this law, we have a recent example that illustrates the protective stance Kemalists take for the strong image of Mustafa Kemal. Many criticisms the docudrama on Mustafa Kemal called *Mustafa* are exemplary of how protective Kemalists can get on the issue. At the time the movie was released, it was criticised to show Mustafa Kemal too weak, too aggressive and too authoritative occasionally by Kemalists. A columnist and TV personality, Abbas Güçlü, wrote on the movie that “it did not give us the details we expected but different ones. One of the main reasons for the criticisms and the disappointments is this.” (Güçlü 2008). As one can clearly see, a different representation of Atatürk is even unimaginable and a reason for disappointment for Kemalists. For most of them, Atatürk needs to be re-told with the same -expected- details over again. They want to see what they have already seen and any diversion from that path is a reason to get alarmed/paranoid for Kemalists, as the criticisms and the painting of Baykam have shown above.

Baykam is not the only person who has sacrificed his/her aesthetics for the sake of Kemalism due to paranoid thinking. Reading his poems for a couple of years, I observed a similar if not a greater shift in the poetry of Ataul Behramoğlu, as well, of course in a negative sense of the word. For many people, Ataul Behramoğlu is considered as a significant figure in Turkish literature thanks to his poems and his translations as well as anthologies he prepared and so on. Like we have seen at the end of the Introduction, Kemalists see him as a “grand poet”. Likewise, many other international critics and poets have highlighted the quality of his poems. “What we hear from Ataul Behramoğlu’s poems are the statements that are unfeigned, stated

⁶¹ “ATATÜRK ALEYHİNE İŞLENEN SUÇLAR HAKKINDA KANUN.” *Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi*,
www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.5816.pdf.

generously and are passed on from person to person.” (Para in Behramoğlu *Yaşadıklarından* 200) says Jean Baptiste Para after stating that Ataul Behramoğlu is actually in line with Nâzım Hikmet’s poem tradition. Timour Muhidine says that “[t]he ones who read Ataul Behramoğlu’s poems [...] taste the whole pleasure of Turkish language.” (Mouhidine in Behramoğlu *Yaşadıklarından* 200). He has been awarded with many prizes and was even nominated to Nobel Prize for Literature in 2016 by Eminescu Academy. (Behramoğlu *Ne Çok* 5). Especially the comment from Mouhidine suggests that Behramoğlu’s poems have rhymes and rhythms together with poetic imagery and so on, features not enough alone to but necessary for poems to be regarded as “poems”. I put forwards that the recent poems produced by Behramoğlu have lost almost every aspects of his poems worth prising for, if he had ever had any before. Of course, the paranoid discourse/thinking thus putting everyday-political messages before poetics and aesthetics seemed to have played an enormous role in the process. Let us take a poem of Behramoğlu’s titled *Gezi*⁶² *Onurumuzdur* to start illustrating our point. The poem reads as the following in Turkish⁶³.

Gezi onurumuzdur/ Gezi zalime, zulme karşı koyuşumuzdur/ Gezi yurtseverliktir/ Gezi gözü pekliktir/ Gezi gençliğimizdir/ Gezi birlikteliğimizdir/ Gezi omuzdaşıktır/ Gezi aşktır/ Gezi bireyciliği aşmaktır/ Gezi ben değil biz olmamızdır/ Gezi öz saygımız, öz güvenimizdir/ Gezi özgürlük sevgimizdir/ Gezi tek değil çok olmaktadır/ Gezi ışık hızıyla çoğalmaktadır / [...] /Gezi sanatım bilimin üstünlüğüdür / [...] / Gezi şiirdir, resimdir, şarkıdır/ Gezi insan olma farkıdır/ Gezi ışıktır umudu aydınlatan/ Gezi bilinçtir karanlığı ışıtan⁶⁴/ [...] (Behramoğlu *Ne Çok* 49-51)

The poem goes one with similar and repetitive sentences. Here we have a very explicit end rhyme scheme with to distiches such as the ones done with suffixes -dur, -tir, -dir,

⁶² Behramoğlu is referring to nationwide Gezi Park protests that were initiated to protect a local park against the AKP and then prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s persistent imposition to replace the park with an Islamic-Ottoman social complex.

⁶³ I prefer to keep the original verses in the language it was written to give readers a chance to get the rhythm and rhyme that are almost non-existent.

⁶⁴ “Gezi is our honor/ Gezi is our resistance to tyrant, and persecution/ Gezi is patriotism/ Gezi is to be brave/ Gezi is our youth/ Gezi is our togetherness/ Gezi is to share our shoulders/ Gezi is love / Gezi is to overcome individuality/ Gezi is to become us not me/ Gezi is our self-esteem and self-confidence/ Gezi is our love to freedom/ Gezi is to become many not one/ Gezi is to reproduce at speed of light/ [...] / Gezi is the superiority of art and science/ [...] / Gezi is poem, painting and song/ Gezi is the privilege of being human/ Gezi is the light enlightening hope/ Gezi is the consciousness illuminating the dark/ [...]” My translation.

but there is no overall meter and almost no harmony both between distiches and among the individual sentences. The lines “Gezi ben değil biz olmamızdır/ Gezi öz saygımız, öz güvenimizdir”, for instance, do not even have assonance or alliteration to create an illusion of poetry within them. The whole poem relies on the repetitions created by “Gezi is [...]” but such a poetry, with no philosophy, original imagery and language cannot be considered as fine poetry just because it has got repetitions and end rhyme. What is so original in the sentence that reads “Gezi is love”. Is it introducing us a new image? Has it found a new way of expressing Gezi in its relationship to love? It is as if we are reading a parody poem that might be recreating banal love poems of the popular culture to expose their shallowness in expression. However, there is no parody in Behramoğlu’s poem. The problem here is that it probably is not trying to be poetic, after all. Just as it happens in Baykam’s artistry, Behramoğlu seems to have been lost in his endeavor to pass his political remarks. His intention seems to be repeating the word “Gezi” to make it echo in his readers’ minds. It is as if we were again watching a political rally, and the only concern of the politician’s was to win an “election of discourses” against AKP, by repeating the word “Gezi”, a word towards which AKP obviously feels antipathy -if not completely loathes it. I believe the metaphor of election works better if we notice the effort to reach out as many people as possible thanks to commonplace and sentimental sayings that people would remember from Gezi protests such as “Gezi is our honor” and that people would not have difficulty in reading and empathising with, like “Gezi is love.”. That is to say, Behramoğlu is trying to gather as many people as possible to his rally with his unoriginal and extremely reachable and explicit language with as little poetry as possible. Let us have a look at another poem from the same book, *Ne Çok Hain*, to see if we can find recurring problems in Behramoğlu’s poetry. This one is called *Adalet Yürüyüşçülerine*, dedicated to marchers of the “Justice March”, an event prepared by CHP. It reads, “Dağ başını duman almış/ İşimiz çok, vaktimiz dar/ Vatan ağır yaralanmış/ Yürüyelim arkadaşlar.⁶⁵” (Behramoğlu *Ne Çok* 85). Once again, Behramoğlu is reminding us popular lines from a poem, a march often known as *Gençlik Marşı* (*March of the Youth*) with which Turkish society is very familiar. Once again, we do not encounter an original language in this poem. What we have is lines echoing verses from a popular and often political march. Once again, poetry is not the main priority which is the political and the popular echo the

⁶⁵ Please note that in the book, all letters are written in capital letters.

verses create. In both of these poems, language and poetry in general is not a authentic language but is seeking for its readers who are familiar with these popular verses/statements. This kind of poetry has been criticized, and rightfully so, many poets including Cemal Süreya, who is among the most renowned poets of Turkish literature. In his book *Folklor Şiire Düşman*, Cemal Süreya argues against a poetic language that utilizes folkloric thus popular elements and sayings⁶⁶. I agree with Süreya in the sense that utilizing such elements would hinder original language and poetry, putting us in a spiral of unauthentic language thus poetry and images, which he calls a “barren path” (Süreya 23).

Having seen the poetry that Behramoğlu has created recently, we can have a look at the underlying reasons behind it. After spending a lot of time with the certain style and language Kemalists use, and the kind of psychology they are often in, I can confidently say that again, the feeling of paranoia against the resurgence of political Islam has a role in the shape the poetry of Behramoglu have taken. In these and the majority of the poems in the book *Ne Çok Hain*, we can notice a number of paranoid or paranoia-inducing elements and related language together with other symptomatic and defensive elements of paranoia in politics. In the first poem we analyzed, the second line openly gives away its paranoid way of thinking and style. “Gezi is our resistance to tyrant, and persecution.”. At this point, I see it necessary to remind the very close relationship of the idea of persecution and being persecuted with the paranoid psyche/hatred, as Freud made it clear with his formulation. After the projection of I hate him is complete, the mechanism “He hates me (persecutes me), which will justify me in hating him.” (Freud *Complete* 63) takes place, creating the idea of persecution in paranoid thinking. Similarly, one can claim that Ataol is, like other Kemalists we have analyzed, is projecting his own hatred onto the other and thinks that the other persecutes him. This formulation makes more sense if we start to read the whole poem as a defense mechanism to this hatred/paranoid thinking. Clearly, Ataol attaches a lot of importance to Gezi in his poem and says at one point that “Gezi ışıktır umudu aydınlatan/ Gezi bilinçtir karanlığı ışıtan”. The interpretation can be made twofold here. At the first level, Ataol seems to see Gezi as a “hope” against “darkness”, which is another paranoid element Kemalists see in Islamists- and for the sake of inserting and repeating the name of this hope against the “darkness” and “persecution”, he takes the aesthetics

⁶⁶ Süreya, Cemal. *Folklor Şiire Düşman*. İstanbul: Can Yayınları. 1992. Print. p 23.

for granted. The only aim of his is to put Gezi, which seems to ease his hatred/paranoid psyche as he sees it as a kind of “hope”, at the center of his poem, again at the expense of his poetry. This seems to be his method of dealing with the hatred/ paranoid thinking, induced by Islamic/Islamist elements. Of course, another point that is important is the Kemalist echoes the poem makes and leveling Gezi and Kemalist ideology/language. When Ataol tells that “Gezi is the light that enlightens the hope.”, which evokes the Enlightenment, in which the intellectual roots of Kemalism are found, or when he uses words that are often favored by Kemalist dictionary such as “the superiority of science and art”, or “patriotism”, we come to perceive that it is Kemalism that Behramoğlu is relying on his hatred to ease off, as other Kemalists have done. It is not necessary to talk about the paradoxical nature of such a way of thinking again, as we have already established that paranoid thinking is mostly initiated by the Kemalist ideology and style itself.

A similar approach of Behramoğlu where he serves Kemalist language for the sake of easing off his hatred and paranoid thinking at the expense of aesthetics can be seen in the other poem we quoted above, where paranoid elements are contrasted with Kemalist style/ideology. Even though it is a quadrant, we can realize similar elements counterbalanced with similar mechanisms. The lines that have the same end rhyme in Turkish “The smoke has taken over the top of the mountain” and “the homeland/motherland has been wounded heavily” are the lines that let us know about the paranoid psyche Behramoğlu in, once again. We have a dark image “the smoke” and the image of motherland/homeland that has been hurt -by the other, again in these lines. Of course, these paranoid elements, the projected feelings are counterbalanced with the shouting capitalized letters of the poem, which is an indication of the anxiety he is feeling. However, more importantly, the march that is often associated with the foundation of the republic and Kemalism has had to echo, making it complete with the reference made to CHP’s march, a Kemalist endeavor. What is lost, in this game of paranoia, hatred, anxiety and envy, is the poetry and the aesthetics that are left behind the ideology that needs to be put forward. One can claim that the poetry of Behramoğlu has always been “mediocre” and the reason for this mediocrity may not be the consequence of the paranoid style he has adopted recently. However, someone who checks some of Behramoğlu’s earlier poems especially his pre-1990s ones would easily notice that his poems do not have stereotypical Kemalist propositions against political

Islam and the elements from that particular paranoid style even on similar topics like the homeland/country being upset and in predicament. A few lines from a poem written in 1980 would suffice in showing us the difference in content and style between imaginative calm sadness Behramoğlu was depicting and the paranoid and anxious ones that have been analyzed above. “Türkiye, üzgün yurdum, güzel yurdum/ Dağ rüzgârı, portakal balı/ Alçakgönüllü, hünerli, sevdalı./ Türkiye, üzgün yurdum, güzel yurdum/ Yazgısı kara yazılmış gelin/ Kurumuş sütü memelerinin.⁶⁷” (Behramoğlu *Yaşadıklarım*dan 80). A similar Oedipal approach that Kemalists have always had exists here as well, but does not even the use of punctuation, imagery that it is evoking and the existence concern for rhyme and rhythm show us how much the poetry of Behramoğlu has transformed into one that is at the same level of political manifestos and works of popular culture and how much the resurgence of political Islam has affected his style?

If we go through the book of Behramoğlu’s with a fine-tooth comb, we can also see the instances where the fear of insects and the dark/melancholic atmosphere in the poems are observed once more and these words uttered are understood to be again against political Islam. In one of his poems, Behramoğlu writes “when the light of the truth blinds their eyes/ just like creatures that feed in the dark/ even though they try to run away flopping/they will perish in the light of the mind” (Behramoğlu 24). Once again we face statements uttered by a Kemalist in which s/he parallels “the other” to insects or creatures⁶⁸. Let us not state the obvious here again. The insect imagery and paranoia are related and often referenced in Kemalist texts. What is more subtle is to explain how one can understand that Behramoğlu is referring to political Islam with his words. This is where the light-darkness dichotomy enters the scene. Of course what is helping us here to make such a deduction is not only the fact that Behramoğlu and other Kemalists made the parallelism between darkness and political Islam before. It is actually the subtle reference Kemalism is often making. That is the Enlightenment principles of spending too much on reason and leaving no space on metaphysics in thinking, which

⁶⁷ “Turkey, my sad and beautiful land/ the mountain wind, the orange honey/ modest, talented and in love/ Turkey, my sad and beautiful land/ the bride of a dark fate/ milk dried up in your breast.” My translation. Please note that this part of the poem originally has -a-b-b/-a-c-c rhyme scheme which lacks in my translation.

⁶⁸ It is important to remember that “creature” was a word Mustafa Kemal used frequently -for Vahdettin in particular.

Kemalism relies on, as we claimed above. So the specific choice of words related to darkness is particular to political Islam, which of course has metaphysical elements due to its base in religion. In that sense, we can understand that whenever darkness is mentioned in a Kemalist text, we may understand that it refers to -political- Islam⁶⁹. The same logic applies when the imagery of darkness is adopted as a characteristic of paranoia in those texts. We can even go further and claim that the dark imagery has been referred this much in Kemalist paranoid style because of Enlightenment lexicon. Would it be too much to put forward that Enlightenment, with its rigid framework of ideas might have contributed to the forming of paranoid psyche/style in societies and politics in general -and the one Kemalists possess in particular- since it was Enlightenment that went against religious foundations in general in the first place?

In short, let us note at the end that even though one might not see the direct relationship with the insect fear/analogy and darkness, we have seen above that the image of insect can also be found in the paranoid cases and darkness is a common image used in both claustrophobia and paranoia in the shape of shades, shadows and so on.

To sum up, in the light of what have been discussed, we see that paranoia and paranoia inducing and counter mechanisms lead the Kemalist artists/writers in question to fall to the level of popular culture in terms of aesthetics, with the same mechanisms they adopt, the similar language and style they use and the feeling they suffer and deepen at the same time, against a group of people and the ideology they conflict with.

⁶⁹ After all, such an imagery would not be the one Kemalists would adopt against an “other” who in the eyes of Kemalists are considered as already developed and enlightened -say- the West.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Paranoid style in politics might be an “international phenomenon” as Hofstadter claimed years ago. However, its density and frequency of adoption by the political agents probably differ due to many reasons such as political traditions, culture, geopolitics, inner conflicts within the countries. Of course, to claim such density differs requires another lengthy and comparative study, which I did not attempt to do in this one. Still, I feel that the Turkish political context might have one of the most intense paranoid styles of all the rhetorics adopted in the international arena. As one can understand, I have not been interested in the fact that if Kemalists might have realistic grounds for adopting such a paranoid style against political Islam. What I have been trying to unearth and point to has been the certain type of style that has been adopted for years and its possible effects on the society, culture and politics. Clearly, the Kemalist discourse has manifested many symptoms of paranoia such as narcissism, splitting, envy together with non-overcome Oedipus conflicts indirectly most of the time, if not directly a paranoid one. Even though the frequency and the shape of this paranoid style have shown a little difference due to fact that Kemalist ideology has lost its powerful position and eventually political power together with bureaucracy, the characteristics, the way Kemalists manifested the existing paranoia has remained pretty much the same since the infancy of the ideology with much owing to the texts Mustafa Kemal has produced.

But what do all these suggest for the ideology, the agents and the society in general? The first outcome I relate to the paranoid style in politics and culture is about the issues

with democracy. If we agree that an ideology that has not reformed itself, that has been fixed in early stages of its developments cannot keep up with the necessary changes of the day and would have serious problems in being democratic. If we continue our metaphor of child-ideology/ and/or human psyche-political psyche, the amount of hatred and envy cannot allow Kemalists to think outside that psychological state and treat Islamists equally right not only as citizens but also on the intellectual level. That is to say, too much hatred towards a group like Islamists somehow ban them from even discussing political concepts, like laicite democratically. We cannot even assume that a Kemalist would discuss the nature and future of laicite if the proposition of discussion came from an Islamist⁷⁰. Bülent Somay, who has already contributed a lot to this study, elegantly put the outcome of oedipal conflicts in a society saying that “Oedipal children can be anything but independent” (Somay *Çokbilmiş* 112). They are, as Hofstadter would call “double sufferers of history”, who are “afflicted not only by the real world, with the rest of us, by his fantasies as well.” (Hofstadter, 86). Fantasies that were created and rooted mostly by the father of this society, it seems. “Sufferer”, I believe, is an apt word for those who really are torn between their real desires and their create desires as no other word would describe, for instance, the psyche of Nurullah Ataç⁷¹ who has always been torn between his love for Ottoman “Divan” poetry and his assurance to leave it completely behind. He often disclosed his conflict, his suffering with sentences like “[y]ou know that I love our old poetry, the Ottoman poetry a lot. Also, I am angry at it and at myself for loving it. We must shut off that poetry, leave it completely, forget and not teach it to our children” (Ataç, 97). Why does Ataç feel almost guilty and gets mad at himself for loving the old poetry and “suffers”? Since he feels, he is doing something that has been marked as out-of-question by the Kemalist “revolution” to which he was always dedicated. Somay rightfully explained such phenomena by putting forward that in Turkish society “psychotic segmentations” and “neurotic ambivalent manners” occur when “individuals come up against the state” (Somay *Çokbilmiş* 104).

⁷⁰ Admittedly, such a discussion would sound almost impossible even though it came from another group other than Islamists, as well. Still, such a proposition would stir the already stirred paranoid feelings of Kemalists.

⁷¹ Ataç has been considered as one of the literary critics and essayists in Turkish literature by many. He has also been among the most fervent Kemalist supporters as one can easily understand from his writings.

It is not only being fixed at an early stage that prevents Kemalism being a democratic ideology. The splitting actually serves a similar end, as well since a splitting in the psyche and in languages does nothing but polarizes the political and cultural domain, thus, the society and the country. A dialogue may not be realized in a scenario where one group calls the other one “insect”, for instance, as Genç would call.

Besides all these implications in politics, the analyses of the cultural works included in this study also close the discussion of the long-lasting endeavors of re-naming or even redefining Kemalism. The concept of neo-Kemalism has been among the ones that have been recirculated the most. The term neo-Kemalism has been referred to the “civil” side of the ideology that included “NGOs, a series of Kemalist magazines and opinion leader within media” that “appeared as a separate power besides political parties and the state” (Erdoğan 585). For Necmi Erdoğan’s observations and analyses, “neo-Kemalist discourse splits the political domain to two antagonistic parties as secular/non-secular, republican/ anti-republican, modern/ reactionary, Kemalist/ Second Republican, nationalitarian/ separatist” (Erdoğan 586). He continues and claims that “[o]ne of the obvious themes of neo-Kemalist discourse is the feeling of victimization that feeds on paranoid mindset.” (Erdoğan 587). What is apparent in Erdoğan’s words is the following: what he refers to neo-Kemalism is not actually anything new if we follow the scheme and analyses I have offered in this study. For me, the “civil” side of Kemalism has always manifested itself in the works of culture as a way of propaganda and as a result of paranoid thinking. I contend that re-naming Kemalism would not serve the purpose of showing the ideology as a progressive one. I once again claim that Kemalism has not changed but fixated at the early stages of its developments. It has weighed more one “nationalism” and “secularism” side of Kemalism instead of “referomism” tenet of the ideology. And paranoid style, I put forward, might have played a big role in not being able to mature and be more democratic as an ideology.

I believe that such psychosocial, psychopolitical and psychocultural studies as this one and Somay’s *The Psychopolitics of the Oriental Father Between Omnipotence and Emasculation* can enrich the contention of academics, politicians or anyone interested in such disciplines alike in the sense that even if they might think that such studies are not “scientific”, they can show the similarities between two unthinkable domains and open up new spaces of thinking and even spaces of action if one can draw reasonable conclusions from the studies. In this respect, I have come to think a lot of questions that

could not be answered or pursued in this study for practical reasons, which could again open up new opportunities for further studies that could bear important analyses for numerous domains. Some of these questions are as follows and are asked only for thought provocation. Can we think of and establish a correlation or relationship between nationalism/racism and paranoid rhetoric? To ask it another way, do nationalist or racist ideologies heighten the feeling of paranoia within the political, societal and individual psyche? Can there be a relationship between the name of the ideologies that are named after their founder/ideologues/ founding fathers and the feeling of bonding with it in terms of the society and individuals? What would Lacan's "name of the father" theory add to and imply for such an idea? Besides such grand theoretical questions, if we think about Turkey more specifically, and Kemalism in particular, we can come up with more concrete questions as well? For instance, why have Kemalist writers have started to produce more works pertaining to juvenile literature than before? Does such inclination have anything to do with the way Kemalism has developed or not developed itself since its foundation? Can this leaning be linked with child psychology in any way? These and many more questions like these can be formulated and their possible answers can avail many disciplines for further thinking and study.

Before ending thesis, I would like to address to some of the criticisms this study might receive upon its publishing. The first of these might be about the way I singled out Mustafa Kemal and his language and did not refer to paranoia and paranoid style that was existent before him, which of course affected him and his rhetoric one way or another. For instance, we know that one of Mustafa Kemal's favorite poets, Namık Kemal, utilized a language which was classified as paranoid, as Somay would report (Somay *Psychopolitics* 100). Even though this was the case, the inclusion of earlier eras and their rhetoric would make this thesis a much lengthier than it is now and at the end would be too difficult to follow. Like the answers of the questions I have asked above, this can be done in a different study as well. For now, this study has happened to be only interested in the agent(s) that shaped the Kemalist side of the paranoid style in the Turkish context.

Another criticism would be about the positionality of this thesis in the political spectrum. I understand that the study can be exploited by Islamists and other anti-Kemalist agents in Turkey, making Kemalism the scapegoat for many recent political

failures, which may or may not be the case, or using the statements of this thesis as a way of attacking the Kemalist ideology. However, one should be made clear that this thesis is purely academic and has had no intention of attacking any of the ideological figures of Turkish politics as I was not interested in analyzing particular individuals but the Kemalist language in general⁷². After all, I repeat that I have not been interested in showing if the Kemalist claims for reactionism have realistic grounds or not. I have just focused on the rhetoric produced around the concept and its possible implications for individuals, society, politics and so on. Also, claiming that Kemalism is suffering from a paranoid style does not mean that other parties against it are not. I once again state that starting with Islamism, many parties against Kemalism seem to suffer from a similar if not more intensified paranoid psyche even though they proudly position themselves somewhere opposite Kemalism. Instead of nitpicking statements to use against the political rivals, agents may as well try to benefit from the implications the study and such studies offer and look for ways to mature. Years ago, Murat Belge published an article in which he questioned why a certain poster had been continuously becoming popular in which a child with a teardrop is depicted. He concludes that “[o]ur society is, generally, is a society that is guilty⁷³ against its children. [...] [t]his child can evoke the feelings that have been dozing off in the deepest dungeons of our consciousness.” (Belge 183-184). I claim that most of us are still those children and we are equally guilty against ourselves as well as our children. The time for the of us to leave behind the early stages of development, to mature and to shatter the “imprisoned state⁷⁴” that narcissism -thus paranoia- brings into existence may have been long overdue. Still, the following saying provides the best advice: “Better late than never”.

⁷² Of course, I must admit the fact that I have not gone through the whole Kemalist canon and that there may be occasional exceptions which/who do not belong to the generality I have described in the thesis in terms of paranoid style.

⁷³ Nurdan Gürbilek also makes a reference to the same poster by claiming that “people put themselves in the child’s shoes rather than against it as a [...] guilty adult.” (Gürbilek 39). If that were the case, the society/child analogy would still be reasonable.

⁷⁴ Kernberg, Otto. *Sınır Durumlar ve Patolojik Narsisizm*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2016. Print. p 205.

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APPENDIX

FIGURES




FIGURE 1



FIGURE 2



FIGURE 3



FIGURE 4




FIGURE 5



FIGURE 6




FIGURE 7



FIGURE 8



FIGURE 9



FIGURE 10



FIGURE 11




FIGURE 12