

A DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF COMPLETION OF  
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE CASE OF TURKEY

by  
DÜZGÜN KILIÇ

Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts

Sabancı University  
January 2018

A DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF COMPLETION OF  
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE CASE OF TURKEY

Approved by:

Doç. Dr. Özge Kemahhoğlu  
(Thesis Supervisor)



Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hasret Dikici Bilgin



Yrd. Doç. Dr. Oya Yeğen



Date of Approval: January 9, 2018

© Düzgün Kılıç 2018

All Rights Reserved

## ABSTRACT

### A DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF COMPLETION OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE CASE OF TURKEY

DÜZGÜN KILIÇ

M.A. Thesis, January 2018

Thesis supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Özge Kemahlioğlu

Keywords: Democratic completion, Backsliding, Turkey, Erosion

This thesis aims to study the problems of democratic completion in the case of Turkey. Discussions on backsliding into authoritarianism and erosion of democracies began to take more space in the democracy literature. The increasing number of criticism on populist-authoritarian tendencies of AKP government necessitates this study to detect the erosion of Turkish democracy and problems in democratic completion. This thesis attempts to problematize the concepts of democratic consolidation and backsliding and omissions of the literature. Results of Turkish case proposes that, despite the curbing of the tutelary power of Turkish military; the deterioration in the rule of law, absence of strong autonomous civil society organizations, political culture far-fetched from possessing democratic civic culture characteristics and increasing level of populist discourse and practices create fertile sociological ground for the backsliding of Turkish democracy by populist-authoritarian executive with strong electoral mandate. This study posits that the assumption of transition paradigm on the elimination of tutelary powers after transition would bring democratic completion, neglected the possibility of democratic backsliding in the absence of strong checks and balance system and democratic political cultural traits in the Turkish case.

## ÖZET

# TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİNDE DEMOKRASİNİN TAMAMLANMASI SORUNLARININ TARTIŞMASI

DÜZGÜN KILIÇ

Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ocak 2018

Tez danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Özge Kemahlıoğlu

Anahtar Sözcükler: Demokrasinin tamamlanması, Bozulma, Türkiye, Yozlaşma

Bu tez, Türkiye örneğinde demokratik tamamlanma sorunlarını incelemeyi amaçlıyor. Otoriterliğe ve demokrasilerin erozyona maruz kalması ile ilgili tartışmalar son yıllarda demokrasi literatüründe daha fazla yer kaplamaya başladı. AKP hükümetinin popülist otoriter eğilimlerine yönelik eleştirilerin sayısının artması, bu çalışmanın Türk demokrasisinin erozyonunu ve demokratik tamamlamadaki sorunlarını tespit etmeyi gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu tez, demokrasinin pekişmesi ve demokrasinin bozulması kavramlarını ve literatürdeki eksiklikleri sorgulamaya çalışmaktadır. Türkiye örneğinin sonuçları, Türk ordusunun vesayet gücünün azaltılmasına karşın; hukukun üstünlüğünün bozulması, güçlü özerk sivil toplum örgütlerinin olmaması, demokratik sivil kültür özelliklerine sahip olmaktan uzak siyasi kültür ve giderek artan düzeyde popülist söylem ve uygulamaların, Türk demokrasisinin siyasal ve siyasal temellerini popülist-demokrasinin aşılması, güçlü seçim desteğine sahip olan popülist-otoriter iktidar partisi tarafından Türk demokrasisinin geriletilmesine yönelik uygun bir sosyolojik ve yapısal zemin oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışma, demokratik geçiş paradigmasının vesayet güçlerinin demokratik geçiş sonrasında tasfiyesinin demokrasinin tamamlanmasını beraberinde getireceği varsayımının, güçlü denge ve denetleme mekanizmalarının ve demokratik siyasal kültür özelliklerinin bulunmaması durumunda demokrasinin bozulmaya uğrayabileceğini Türkiye örneği üzerinden ortaya koymuştur.

To my lovely Family

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express his gratitude to his thesis supervisor, Associate Professor Özge Kemahlıođlu for her guidance, patience and graciousness in all phases of the thesis and for her constant encouragement. Throughout the thesis, she also helped the author to broaden his spectrum on various subjects of political science.

Special thanks are due to Prof. Ersin Kalaycıođlu, Asst. Prof. Oya Yeđen and Asst. Prof. Hasret Dikici Bilgin for their guidance, contributions and criticism for the thesis.

The author would also like to thank Prof. Feride Gönel, Gülnur Kocapınar and Emine Arı for their special support and encouragement.

The moral support provided by the family of the author is gratefully acknowledged.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>CHAPTER I .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<i>INTRODUCTION .....</i>	<i>1</i>
<b>CHAPTER II.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<i>DEFINING DEMOCRACY.....</i>	<i>13</i>
2.1 Definitions of Democracy.....	14
2.2 Institutions That Make Democracy Possible .....	21
2.3 How Democracies Differ .....	216
Conclusion .....	35
<b>CHAPTER III .....</b>	<b>37</b>
<i>DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, CONSOLIDATION, BACKSLIDING .....</i>	<i>37</i>
3.1 Democratic Transition .....	38
3.2 What is Becoming Resilient Democracy .....	46
3.3 Backsliding of Democracies .....	533
3.4 Traits that Make Democracies Resilient .....	58
3.4.1 Civil Society .....	60
3.4.2 Political Society .....	62
3.4.3 Rule of Law .....	63
3.4.4 Economic Society .....	64
3.4.5 Elimination of Tutelary Powers and Reserved Domains.....	67
3.4.6 Political Culture .....	67
3.4.7 Commitment of Political Elites.....	70
Conclusion .....	71
<b>CHAPTER IV .....</b>	<b>74</b>
<i>EROSION OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY.....</i>	<i>74</i>
4.1 Turkey under AKP Rule .....	75
4.2 Turkey: General Overview .....	85
4.2.1 Civil Society: Persistently Weak Phenomena.....	85
4.2.1.1 Business Associations.....	92
4.2.2 General Overview of Turkish Political Culture.....	97
4.2.3 Rule of Law and Tutelary Powers .....	104
4.2.4 Media and Freedom of Expression .....	115
4.2.5 Populism .....	120
4.3 Illusion of Democratic Consolidation.....	128
4.3.1 Discussion of Democratic Consolidation .....	128
4.3.2 Backsliding of Turkish Democracy .....	134
Conclusion .....	134
<b>CHAPTER V .....</b>	<b>146</b>



<i>Conclusion</i> .....	146
<b>REFERENCES</b> .....	<b>153</b>
<b>APPENDIX</b> .....	<b>170</b>

## **LIST OF TABLES OF FIGURES**

TABLE 1: Intolerance towards People .....	91
TABLE 2: Participation to General Elections, 1987-2015 .....	101
TABLE 3: Number of Cases in ECHR on Turkey .....	109
TABLE 4: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Turkey 2005-2015 .....	111
TABLE 5: World Bank Voice and Accountability Index: Turkey, 2005-2014.....	112
TABLE 6: The World Press Freedom Index, 2007-2017 .....	117
TABLE 7: Freedom of Press Reports, 2007-2017 .....	119
TABLE 8: Freedom in the World Reports, 2009-2017 .....	142

## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

A remarkable worldwide resurgence of democracy emerged in the early years of 1990s. The collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Cold War were the main reasons of this new phenomenon. In search of political legitimacy and to become a part of Western World through NATO or European Union, old Soviet satellite regimes started to declare their will to become part of democratic world. Snowballing effect of democratization led to a new era of democratic expansion through the world.

Samuel P. Huntington's classic article in 1991 defines the resurgence of democracy in modern world from 1974 to early 1990s with the newly introduced concept of "third wave" of democratization. After two waves of democratization and two reverse waves, third wave of democratization began in 1974 and reached peak point in 1990s. The deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes, the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, 1973 and 1979 Oil Crises which led to the collapse of the dominance of Keynesian model, led to energy deficit, increase in prices of oil which in turn increase the input costs results in a fiscal crises. Low economic performance causes the effectiveness, legitimacy problems and questioning of authoritarian governments (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994). Economic deterioration, a striking shift in the doctrine of Catholic Church to defend democracy, policy changes of actors like European Union and "snowballing" effect of democratization led to a wave of democracy that brings at least thirty countries into the world of democracy (Huntington, 1991, p.12-13). After short optimistic atmosphere for the successful democratic transition, scholars began to be more critical with respect to calling these new regimes as democracies. After periods of discussions about the nature and structure of these regimes some scholars claimed that some of these regimes are swinging

between democracy and authoritarian forms of government rather than becoming a fully democratic regime. For that reason, labels offered by scholars in order to define these regimes that are standing in the grey zone between authoritarian regimes and democracies (Carothers, 2002, p. 9). Labels such as “semi-democracy”, “pseudo democracy”, “illiberal democracy”, “semi-authoritarianism”, “electoral democracies” or “partly free democracies” are used to define these regimes that are swinging between two poles or carrying elements from both types of regimes. Increasing number of studies began to analyze these hybrid regimes, their forms and how they differ from each other. Yet, many of these definitions have democratizing bias; handle this type of democracies as they are moving to democracy (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 51).

After twenty-five years of the collapse of Soviet Union, some of countries among third wave of democracies have chance to consolidate their democracies while others lagged behind in the foundation of democratic institutions, procedures and functioning of the way of democracies. More and more scholars used the words like backsliding, recession, pushback, retreat, erosion in their articles in order to describe in which areas these regimes’ were to become unsuccessful to establish a full democracy.

A near consensus emerged between scholars about the existence of “democratic recession”. Some even ask whether democracy is in decline both in number and as an ideational commitment that it is an ideal type of government to be reached. This debate has two sides/aspects. As Marc F. Plattner (2015) asserts, one of it deals with what is actually taking place on the ground; how many countries are democratic or is their number rising or shrinking or what is the situation with respect to such liberal democratic features as rule of law. The second concerned about how democracies in the world are viewed in terms of legitimacy and attractiveness (Plattner, 2015, p. 6). In the first dimension, Levitsky and Way (2015) empirically show that democracy score remained the same or increased according to the scores of four prominent global democracy indices (Levitsky and Way, 2015, p. 46). According to their measures, there is no need to be worry about democratic downturn because it lacks empirical foundations. The reason behind this illusion was observers’ optimism to count any country where authoritarian regime fell down. Researchers began to conflate

authoritarian breakdown with democratization and labeled “new democracies” wherever dictatorship fell and opposition ascended to power (Levitsky & Way, 2015, p. 49). Many of these regimes have now seen a consolidation of authoritarianism, but because their regimes were wrongly classified as democratic in the first place, this should not be seen as evidence of democratic decline (Plattner, 2015, p. 7). At the same line, Larry Diamond (2015) found that the past decade has been “a period of at least incipient decline in democracy” (Diamond, 2015, p. 142). There has been no expansion in the number of electoral democracies in the world, oscillated between 114 and 119. This number began to decline after 2006. Larry Diamond counts 25 breakdowns of democracy in the world, not only through military or executive coups, but also degradations from minimum standards of democracy. But more importantly, as Diamond (2015) observes, there has also been a trend of declining freedom in a number of countries and regions since 2005 (Diamond, 2015, p. 147). Many and many democracies have been under the thread of this pervasive and increasing level of abuse of power, bad governance, shrinking political space for public debates, freedom of speech and media, political rights and civil liberties. A menu of manipulation emerged in countries where transparency, rule of law, checks and balances are weak and democratic institutions and procedures are fragile. In countries where populist leaders are in power these areas are their first targets to be manipulated. Transparent and strong media, independent high judicial institutions, rule of law etc. are seen as an obstacle for these leaders to consolidate their political positions in order to maintain power. Populist leaders set up their political discourse as if these institutions and concepts are hostile against people’s interests. For that reason, leaders do not hesitate to publicly blame and demonize institutions, criticize their bureaucrats and protectors. Leaders’ another strategy was to present these institutions as the last fortress of political, military and business elites who ruled country according to their self-interests of an elitist class and keep country from becoming “real democracy”. In some democracies existing democratic procedures and institutions were eroded in the hands of populist leaderships, elected directly with the help of democratic processes. I argue here that, the Turkish democracy seems presenting this kind of an example. A menu of manipulation in electoral, judicial and legislative area, together with the oppression of opposition

parties, freedom of speech and media made Turkey a perfect example for the league of countries relegated from democracy.

Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been controlling the majority of seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA, TBMM) since 2002. The economic crises of 2002 and the failure of coalition governments throughout 1990s paved way for new political actors in Turkey. In their first election, AKP had achieved to control the two thirds of the seats in legislative assembly hence formed a single party government. Party successfully alleviated the effects of 2001 economic crises. Increasing level of budget used for social policies, inflation and interest rates are lowered, big infrastructure projects are started and improvements in education and health industry helped party in expanding the electoral support base of party. The support of liberal intellectuals and ongoing accession talks with EU, declarations of party leaders favoring Turkey's NATO ties supported the public legitimacy of AKP in its struggle against Turkish military. EU constitutionality regime welcomed by the Party, lead to legal and constitutional reforms, which the party was encouraged to curb the political role of Turkish military gradually. Party criticized high ranks of bureaucrats in judiciary and state agencies as being the protectors of elites' interests and guardians of Kemalist establishment; criticized media and secular business groups for inviting the military to intervene in civilian politics. Republican coalition<sup>1</sup> consisting from military, judiciary, academia and media was presented as an obstacle for AKP to carry out its political agenda. AKP and personally Erdoğan placed himself as the "voice of the people" against their struggle with Republican coalition. These populist images and discourses intensified during AKP's reign, has changed over time. I argue here and will provide support in the upcoming chapters that the party did not hesitate to use this populist discourse especially after Gezi Parkı protests in 2013 with more Islamic and Neo-Ottoman framework.

---

<sup>1</sup> In this study, I will refer to the term "Republican Coalition" for describing the institutions forming secular characteristic of Turkish state, namely Turkish military, HSYK, high ranks of judiciary, Republican People's party, universities and some part of Turkish business associations and media in Turkish politics.

In 2007, in their second general election, AKP came to power with strong electoral support. Party was strong enough to push back declaration of Turkish army<sup>2</sup>, delegitimize its major opponents, secular characteristics of Turkish military and state institutions of Kemalist regime in politics. Same year, a constitutional amendment made in 2007 altered the tenure and election procedures of presidency into five plus five year tenure with direct election by the people itself. The presidential office would be chosen by popular vote first time in Turkish politics, in line with the 2007 constitutional amendment. From 2008 to 2013, Turkey was shaken up with Ergenekon conspiracy and Sledgehammer trials against the coup plotters in military and so-called “deep state”, who were accused of plotting against civilian government. Most of these people were in active duty in military, which led to turnover in military cadres and shuffled the upcoming promotion in the high ranks of the Turkish military. These cases coincided with the transformation in the Turkish media. Ownership of some of mainstream Turkish media outlets have passed to AKP affiliated business groups. These media group’s presentation of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials for helped the delegitimization of Turkish military.<sup>3</sup> With this contribution coming from media, AKP successfully weakened its historically hostile military from politics, through reforms forced by EU conditionality regime.

2010 Referendum was another source for expanding the power of AKP government and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Controlling the HSYK was vital for AKP to eliminate one of the members of aforementioned secular coalition. AKP supported by Gülen movement<sup>4</sup> aimed to transform the structure and composition of board. With 78% turnout rate, 58% of voters said “Yes” to constitutional referendum.

---

<sup>2</sup> In April 12, 2007 Turkish military issued a declaration blaming AKP as the center of being anti-Republican forces against regime. Military’s main aim was to block Abdullah Gül’s –one of the founder of AKP and minister of Foreign Affairs - candidacy for Presidency. Gül was seen as incompetent and incompatible with the secular characteristic of Turkish state. Military failed to block with strong electoral success of the AKP in 2007 general elections. Abdullah Gül became 11<sup>th</sup> President of Turkish regime.

<sup>3</sup> Many of active duty personnel of Turkish military was accused of plotting military coups against AKP government. Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Cases were seen problematic in terms of severe violations on rule of law and on evidences against defendants.

<sup>4</sup> Gülen movement was a religious movement founded by Fethullah Gülen. He choosed to self-exile in United States after his trials in late 1990s. He was accused of plotting and organizing religious movement against secular and Republican characteristic of Turkey. His congregation was mainly organized around education institutions and bureaucracy. Movement was a loyal supporter of AKP government policies in elections and Constitutional amendment in 2010 Referendum.

Result of the Constitutional referendum helped AKP government control the appointment and electoral processes of HSYK through increasing number of seat appointed by TGNA and President Abdullah Gül. With this Constitutional modifications, increased number of judges and prosecutors appointed by the President Abdullah Gül, whom has Islamic backgrounds.

A wave of protests in 2013 Gezi Parkı in İstanbul was a severe shock against AKP government. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered in streets to protect one of the last green spaces in İstanbul, which led to heavy clashes between protesters and police forces, led to political stalemate in Turkey. Same year, another blow came from the Gülen movement. Waves of police investigations arose in 17th of December and 25th of December, 2013 with the accusation of bribery, corruption, fraud and money laundering against three ministers of AKP government, their sons and several bureaucrats (Arango, 25.11.2013). Fethullah Gülen movement, which once upon a time was an ally and main supporter of AKP government in academia, media and judiciary began to criticize the Party as an authoritarian government even called Erdoğan as dictator (Dokuz8Haber, 18.07.2016). Despite these two events, AKP and Prime Minister Erdogan succeeded in June 2014 local elections and then 2014 presidential elections. Prime Minister Erdoğan became the first president of Turkey elected by the popular elections.

Under these circumstances, in 2014, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had won country's first direct presidential election with 52% support and extending his rule for another five years who is currently in power more than ten years. After his victory in popular elections, Erdoğan had done what he promised; create de facto practices of politics, declare his claim to exceed the traditional boundaries of Presidency. For example, he did not promise to be an impartial and neutral president which was against article 101 of the constitution in effect (Hürriyet Daily News, 08.07.2014). Erdoğan aimed to extend the Constitutional limits of presidency. Presidents are able to call national security councils, appoint judges and several high rank positions for state agencies, veto legislation also call for an early election if a government cannot be formed. In some of his speeches, Erdoğan claimed that the presidential system is the



most suitable one for Turkey (Hürriyet, 01.06.2015). His main strategy was transforming the Turkish political system from parliamentary system to a presidential one. During this time, before referendum that introduced the Presidential system, Erdogan declared that he was in need of malleable figure for prime ministership. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu handpicked by Erdoğan to the party leadership, has installed in the role in 2014. According to Erdoğan, this was a move to an era of strong President and strong Prime Minister. Neither Erdoğan stayed within the limits of presidency, neither Davutoğlu a caretaker role in politics. After 2014 presidential elections, Erdoğan was seeking to transfer executive power from prime minister to president and legally consolidate his de-facto presidency. Five months after losing majority government in June 2015 general elections, Davutoğlu's AKP has comeback with victory in November 2015 snap elections. The high-stakes vote, took place in a climate of mounting tension and violence following an inconclusive June poll in which the conservative, Islamic-leaning AKP failed to secure an outright majority for the first time since coming to power in 2002 (Henley & Shaheen, 2015). Yet, despite the electoral victory of Davutoğlu, tension between these two politicians intensified as Davutoglu did not give his full backing for Erdoğan's plans for Presidentialism. In May 2016, resignation of Davutoğlu is forced by the demand of Erdoğan himself.

Another unexpected political event has happened in the mid of 2016. On the night of 15 July 2016 Turkey experienced another coup attempt in its history. A small group mostly consisted from midlevel ranks of Turkish military organized mostly in İstanbul and Ankara aims to seize strategic locations such as airports, bridges, General Headquarters of Chief of Staff and Special Forces, satellites and TV channels. The mass mobilization of party grass roots, effective use of religious discourse, organization and mosques –such as salaa's from mosques-, and municipality services, the counter aggressive of loyal police forces against military and the role of media that stand behind the government had played significant role in failure of the attempted coup (Esen & Gümüştü, 2017). An hour after attempt, Erdoğan and PM Yıldırım had spoken against the coup in live TV. Their call for citizens to rally against the “invasion of country by followers of small groups of Gülen movement in military” created a mass mobilization

of citizens to protect regimes from a military coup. This mass mobilization might have hindered some of non-pro-Gülen officers to support the coup and may cause low level of participation of Turkish military. It was apparent that the denial of the coup attempt by Chief General and General of First Brigade based on İstanbul and public statements of opposition parties against the coup were another source of major blow for putschists. After the failed coup, parliament passed martial law. Erdoğan was the president formally has been operationalized under the martial law that helped him pass laws that he would not dreamed of in pre-coup period such as purge of thousands of civil servants from different departments of bureaucracy and academia, abolishment of military schools, seizure of billions of dollars firms affiliated with Gülen movements, closure of numbers of civil society organizations, radio, TV channels and newspapers. Erdoğan was right on his evaluation on coup attempt, having described it as a “gift from God,” (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017: p. 69).

After the attempted coup, Erdoğan urged AKP to introduce 21-article constitutional amendment that enhanced the power of the head of state and officially replace parliamentary system with the existing presidential one. In 2017 Erdoğan’s main project of Presidentialism ultimately passed in constitutional referendum and expanded the powers of the President (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017: p. 11). With this result, Erdoğan achieved to obtain enough vote for constitutional amendment that modify Turkish politics into presidential one and also, create a presidential seat who can control of his party since amendment allowed president to be member of party.

Before Presidential Referendum, Solution to Kurdish Question Process has been finalized. Intensified clashes with PKK after July 2015 elections in southeast part of Turkey brought an end to ongoing Kurdish Solution Process. Co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, whom clearly showed their strong opposition against Presidentialism project of Erdoğan, have been jailed for their alleged links with terrorism in November 2016 after their parliamentary immunity were abolished.

As historical narrative from the beginning of 2002 elections to today’s many of the positive expectations about the future of Turkish politics has been failed. Many

scholars and pundits support AKP's policies for removing Turkish omnipotent military's veto power in politics, increasing the chances of accession to European Union, enlarging civil liberties and freedoms regarding the Kurdish issue and governing with respectable economy policies. As I argued in following chapters, for these people modifications in these political areas have made Turkey more democratic than in previous periods at the beginning of 2000s.

AKP has gradually entrenched its own political hegemony through extending control over the judiciary, TGNA, state institutions, bureaucracy and media. Media has always been at the center of interest for AKP government. Many of newspapers have been purchased by economic groups that are connected with AKP's inner circle as Buğra & Savaşkan (2012) gave briefly the examples of Akın İpek and Ethem Sancak. More media workers fired or forced to resign because of the pressure on the media groups (Freedom of the Press, 2017). As many observers and indexes such as Freedom House, World Press Freedom Index manifest as I showed in following chapters, freedom of media diminished and nearly disappeared in modern Turkey. Purges and deposition of state bureaucrats and officers from judiciary and security departments are turning to daily issues.

From 2010 to 2017, under AKP rule, the freedom of speech and opposition, civil liberties, political freedoms and rights are gradually eroding according to the Freedom House Freedom of the World Index especially after 2013. In 2013, civil liberties changed from 3 to 4, freedom rating from 3 to 3.5 where 7 defines the worst condition for freedoms. In 2017, Freedom House is reporting that the civil liberties of Turkey 5/7, political rights 4/7 and overall rating as 4.5/7, which is the worst of this decade (Freedom House, Freedom in the World Reports 2010-2017). Turkey can no longer be evaluated as a democratic type of regime. Especially after the 2010 Referendum and 2013 Gezi Parkı protests, Turkish democracy eroded gradually. Tendencies toward majoritarian style of rule, demonization of dissents and criminalization of opposition parties, stifling political atmosphere created by AKP controlled media led to increase of number of critics towards the Turkish regime. Backsliding from the democracy intensified with the 15 July failed coup.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the successful leader of AKP, has been centralizing his personal power gradually since 2002, with the help of success in consecutive elections (Kingsley, 16.04.2017). Being charismatic and experienced politician, having Islamic background, using religious discourse, Erdoğan benefited his talents in a predominantly conservative and nationalist country. His charismatic leadership, his success in elections, religious discourse and his conservative characteristics helps him in building populist policies in reaching out to conservative and religious electorate. Until 2010, AKP policies was somewhat restricted with secularist institutions –namely military, judiciary, and universities- such as in the case of 2007 Turkish military’s declaration in pre-Presidential election. Therefore, AKP was emphasizing more the importance of EU reforms, which the party could be benefited for restricting the role of military in politics, macroeconomic stability, accession to EU, social policies and abolishing some of rigid secularist laws. However, after 2010 as AKP and its leader consolidated their power, the discourse has become more Islamic, more Sunni-Muslim especially after Gezi Parkı protests in 2013 (Aslan, 20.02.2015). Party began to see the politics as “us versus them”. Business groups that are close to party corridors are awarded with big state procurements. The firms having connections and affiliations with the AKP receive more than the unaffiliated/non-partisan foreign firms, firms that are connected to opposition parties and non-partisan business associations (Gurakar, 2016: p. 5). Media, freedom of speech and opposition media’s accession to the news can be limited by the pressure from AKP such as through blocking websites or denying media accreditation (DailyOnline, 10.11.2015). These efforts made Erdoğan able to skew the playing field of Turkish politics. Erdoğan has now become the founder of dominant party regime and also the popularly elected president since August 2014 elections.

There is an ongoing tendency to divide 15 years old single party government of AKP into two periods. In the first period, because of the advancement in the accession talks with EU, agenda required for EU conditionality regime and intention of party to demilitarization of civilian politics, curbing of the political power of military and recognition of the Kurdish identity led many, both from domestic or foreign world to support AKP. The party’s denial to accept the conditions proposed by military

declaration in 2007 and its struggle to eliminate the political space available for military caused optimistic evaluations about the future of Turkish democracy. However, contrary to these optimistic predictions, withdrawal of Turkish military from politics and elimination of tutelary powers did not bring democracy to Turkey. Rather, lack of strong and independent check and balance system and strong public institutions could not resist a majoritarian political force, which in turn leads to foundation of dominant party system. AKP exploited the existence of tutelary powers and heritage of illiberal practices of Kemalist regime for consolidating its support base through populism. AKP was applying the populist discourse even from the beginning, but it become more evident and Islamic later on. The conservative democrat and pro-Western and pro-NATO policies and discourses of the party later were abandoned to Islamic and Neo-Ottomanist ones. Therefore, many failed to be conscious of that the party has the populist characteristics from the beginning.

This study will focus on the problems of democratic completion in the case of Turkey. I will explain and summarize what are the factors that block/prevent a country's complete transition to democracy through the arguments proposed in the literature. Discussions on backsliding into authoritarianism and erosion of democracies began to take more space in the democracy literature recently. The numbers of countries in all around world that are experiencing backslidings are rising as in the examples of Venezuela, Poland and Hungary (Fischer & Taub, 2017) (Salmi, 2017). In this study, I will discuss the backsliding into authoritarianism in the case of Turkey. Beside this, as I pointed in above, contrary to conventional wisdom or say the arguments of public intellectuals of Turkey, withdrawal of tutelary institutions did not bring democratization/consolidation to Turkey. Therefore, it would be wise to discuss how some scholars of the Turkish democratic consolidation literature failed to interpret the policies of AKP as advancement towards democratic consolidation and did not foresee its populist and authoritarian shift? While doing this, I will apply and compare to the typologies offered by Andreas Schedler and Nancy Bermeo.

In doing so, first, study will focus on the definition of democracy and institutions that make democracy possible in order to understand how democracies

differ from each other. In the second chapter, study will aim to outline conditions that cause democratization and areas that complete democracies to become institutionalize and backsliding by giving literature review from democratic transition and resilience and backsliding. In the third part, study's case, Turkey will be in the center, I will discuss the conditions that failed to make democracies resilient in Turkish case one by one. Our case will be Turkish democracy from 1983 democratic transition to 2017 Presidential Referendum.

Turkish democracy lacks conditions such as rule of law autonomous from executive interventions, independent media and freedom of expressions, autonomous and strong civil society, and favorable political culture properties, which are critical conditions for avoiding the democratic erosion. General properties of Turkish political culture are also far-fetched from the civic political culture. System lacks interpersonal trust, social capital, tolerance that a democracy necessitates. These institutions are pillars of checks and balances system, that could hinder the populist-authoritarian regressions, can prevent political system from slow death of democracy. Therefore, the assumption of transition paradigm of elimination of tutelary powers after transition would bring democratic completion failed in Turkish case. Under the conditions of weak checks and balance system and democratic institutions and unfavorable political cultural traits, after curbing the political space available for tutelary powers, Turkish democracy experienced backsliding into authoritarianism by democratically elected government.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **DEFINING DEMOCRACY**

Second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century had been marked by an unprecedented expansion of democracy. Increasing number of countries adopted democracy as their form of government. Millions of people started to be ruled by democratic type of government or at least started to elect their rulers. From ancient periods to modern world, “democracy” or “democratic” had become one of the insistent used words to define specific type of government. Throughout history, the meaning of the words has been reshaped-transformed and started to define a more complex political regime or a system of governance. As time goes by, the meaning of democracy began to be used in a specific area, system and regime type. A remarkable consensus has emerged concerning the minimal conditions that polities must meet in order to merit the prestigious appellation of “democratic” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991: p. 75). In time, political scientists were started to compromise over the meaning of democracy, its preconditions, institutions, and procedures.

Considering the study’s research question, we need to clarify the meaning of democracy and how prominent definitions of democracies differ from each other on what aspects. Throughout this chapter, I will briefly explain the definition of democracy, its procedures, institutions and principles. In this chapter, study will examine procedures that make political system to a democracy. Study will answer the question of what are the components of democracy that change democracies from other regime types and diminish subtypes of democracy.

## 2.1 Definitions of Democracy

Elsewhere, Samuel P. Huntington indicates, democracy is one public virtue, not the only one, and the relation of democracy to other public virtues and vices can only be understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from other characteristics of political systems (Huntington, 1991: p. 10). What Huntington tried to implicate is we need to distinguish democracies from other regime types. And virtues of democracy can only be understood through comprehending its differences. In order to discuss democracy, first we need to clarify what we mean by defining “democracy”. To discuss a concept, democracy, which many scholars attributed different meanings, dimensions, conditions to it, I found it necessary to start with this clarification. Following the historical trajectory of development on the definitions of democracy from procedural meanings to a more complex one might help our conceptualization of democracy through analyzing definitions of prominent political scientists.

Joseph Schumpeter introduced a seminal definition of democracy in his book called *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1942). The author defined the democratic method as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 1942: p. 250). Schumpeter, through this procedural meaning presents a non-normative definition of democracy. People itself, through free, fair and periodic elections will decide on what is good or bad for their country which Schumpeter argues that there is no such common good. Periodically repeated free and fair elections constitute the central institution in which citizens reflect their views and propound their common good. In this definition, democracy is acknowledged as the most powerful collective decision-making system in which citizens choose their rulers among competing candidates. Thus, Schumpeter emphasizes that there must be political elites competing for a specific public office, more than one candidate. The word “common good” connotes definite answer to all sets of questions that people all agree what is good or bad for them or their society. In his definition, Schumpeter argues that will of every normal people can be manufactured. However, it would be compelling for sole



individual to decide upon each issue with all the other citizens. There is no such a thing that everybody will agree on through rational argument. And for getting rational decision people should get informed impartially and get involved in political affairs. Different groups and individuals attributed different meanings to same concepts or problems. If there is no consensus in the society over specific issues, irreducible attitudes and conflictual situations begin to emerge which may in turn cause clashes. In order to solve this question, significant problems can be decided by a body of delegates or a committee whose members will be elected by popular vote.

Dahl introduced the term *polyarchy*, procedural definition of democracy and this term enables him to distinguish political democracy from ideal –normative- system of democracy. After Second World War, democracy had gained two different meaning; Western democracies and public democracies. Each state began to claim that their political regime is democracy, or some other revealed their desire to become full democracy. The concept ‘democracy’ began to lose its scientific meaning, when states started to announce their political system as democracy, even if they are not matching with the criteria of democracy. For that reason, Dahl proposed another concept, ‘polyarchy’, which would be more legitimate for academics to be used instead of corrupt usage of democracy. Dahl assumes that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals (Dahl, 1971, p. 1). The only characteristic that Dahl considers regarding to define a system ‘democratic’ is political system’s quality of responsiveness to its citizens. Competition and participation (inclusiveness) are essential in move towards polyarchies. In order to have this political system in a nation state, all citizens must formulate their preferences, must signify their preferences to their fellow citizens. The government by individual and collective action and must have ‘as people’ their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference (Dahl, 1971, p. 2). Mutual security of government and opposition increases the chances of opposition (Dahl, 1971, p. 16). Hegemonic, dominant party system could pose serious risks for regimes in becoming polyarchy. Once governments are formed, they

should be tolerant for opposition while their authority respected by citizens. For that reason, in order to form democracy a type of government, system has to meet the criteria of responsiveness to its citizens. Beside this, eight requirements are proposed by Dahl in order to meet the necessary conditions of democracy. Freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, institutions for making government policies depend on votes are institutional guarantees required for carrying out democracy among a large number of people. Eight different guarantees constituting two dimensions of democratization; these are public contestation and inclusiveness. Democratic regimes vary in terms of their extents in these two dimensions. When a regime grants right to vote in free and fair elections, to some of its citizens, it moves toward greater public contestation, but the larger the proportion of citizens who enjoy the right, the more inclusive the regime (Dahl, 1971, p. 4). At this point, we should differentiate preconditions that cause democracy from dimensions that distinguish subtypes of democracy like responsiveness, participation and access. Each of these might be essential component of democracy but as Schmitter and Karl asserted (2013) “they should instead be seen either as indicators of this or that type of democracy, or else as useful standard for evaluating the performance of particular regimes” (Karl & Schmitter, 2013, p. 38) but not the preconditions or part of the definition that make democracy possible.

Martin Seymour Lipset (1959) defined democracy as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permitted the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office (Lipset, 1959, p. 71). Lipset’s definition emphasizes several points and implies number of specific conditions. Democracy, according to Lipset, a “political formula”, a system of beliefs, legitimizing the democratic system and specifying the institutions, parties, a free press which are legitimized by one set of political leaders at the office and another one or more set of leaders out of office, who act as a legitimate

opposition attempting to gain office (Lipset, 1959, p. 71). Lipset's definition is stressing contestation over public and popular offices, and competition between different ideologies whose supporters are out of offices, attitudes and political parties through which population will reflect its collective decisions by means of elections.

Huntington, in his *Third Wave of Democracy* (1991) contributed to the definition of democracy which is highly influenced by Dahl's perspective. Huntington's study defined a political system as democratic if its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote (Huntington, 1991, p. 7). So, as like Robert Dahl, Huntington emphasized contestation and participation dimensions of democracy. These two definitions are crucial in distinguishing, comparing and defining political system as democratic according to Huntington. Elections which are free and fair are the essence of democracy, the inescapable *sine qua non* (Huntington, 1991, p. 9). Free and fair elections are the core element of democracy; however it is not the only precondition that makes a system a democracy. Today, populist leaders aiming to guarantee their strong electoral mandate, mostly focus on their electoral success and fall in the trap of electoralism. In the eyes of these populist leaders, elections are the only source of legitimacy.

According to Adam Przeworski et al (2000), in terms of definitions of democracy, Schumpeter and Dahl give emphasis to competition and contestation respectively (Przeworski et.al., 2000, p. 14). Przeworski et al, just like Dahl attach importance to contestation dimension of democracy. Regimes that allow some, even if limited, regularized competition among conflicting visions and interests, and regimes in which some values or interests enjoy a monopoly buttressed by the threat or the actual use of force are two dimensions that Przeworski incorporated into the definition of democracy. According to Przeworski et.al. democracy is a regime in which those who govern are selected through contested "elections, the outcome of which is uncertain for the government and non-government parties and candidates (Przeworski et.al., 2000, p. 15). This narrow definition emphasizes –rulers- seeking to get an office and contestation for these offices. Simply, democracy is a system in which parties lose

elections (Przeworski et.al., 1999, p. 10). Therefore, offices have to be filled by elections through contestation for the office. This contestation emerges when there exists an opposition, struggles for winning office. Alternation in office constitutes prima facie evidence of contestation (Przeworski et al, 2000, p. 16). Therefore, existence of more than one party is one of our requirements for contestation. Przeworski et.al. assert two other criteria in order to define political system as democratic. Two offices; chief executive office and seats at the legislative organ of the government must be filled after the electoral processes. For a regime to be qualified as democratic, the executive must be directly or indirectly elected through popular elections and must be responsible only directly to voters or to legislature elected by them (Przeworski et al, 2000, p. 19). At this point, I should also remind of the temporal nature of the political outcome. Office seeker once gained the control of the office, cannot use office's power in order to undermine contestation or make it impossible for opposition to win the next time. This regime could be anything but not a democratic regime.

In order to emphasize different dimensions of democratic regimes, many scholars reproduce new definitions of democracy. One of these definitions is proposed by Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens in *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (1992). Their definition of democracy focuses more on responsibility dimension and emphasizes importance of suffrage in political systems. In the study, representative democracy defined by regular, free, fair elections of representatives with universal and equal suffrage, responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected parliament and the freedom of expression and association as well as the protection of individual rights against arbitrary state action (Rueschemeyer et.al., 1992:42). In the first part of this broad definition, authors accentuate general suffrage as principle of the democracy. All citizens without any restriction should be able to take part in politics with equal opportunity. All citizens must be granted their right to vote. Exclusion from free and fair elections on the basis of ethnic and religious identities, literacy, wealth, or profession is not part of democratic type of government. State apparatus must be responsible directly to citizens or committee or legislative organ which has representative power of the nation. Lastly, political parties, civil society organizations

and citizens should be feeling free to express their attitudes, share ideas and opinion, and persuade others with their political preferences in the public realm. Besides these, individual rights must also be protected from arbitrary state action.

In their article, Schmitter & Karl (2013) define modern political democracy as a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 34). Their definition seems like an aggregation of other definitions through emphasizing several different dimensions of democracy such as institutions, the role of culture and political actors. At this point, I believe that scrutinizing each aspect of their definition would contribute our study significantly.

*A regime or a system of governance* is an ensemble of patterns that determines the methods of access to the principal public offices, the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access, and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 34). This system of governance must be shared, practiced and approved by all actors in order to function properly.

Democracy depends on the *rulers* who occupy specific authority and power over others. Democracies are regimes that elect their officials and representatives through elections and also bind them through accountability to their electorate for the next elections. Elected rulers emerged as a result of a competition process which differs democracies from dictatorships. What distinguishes democratic rulers from nondemocratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come to power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 34). The *public realm* encompasses the making of collective norms and choices that are binding on the society and backed by state sanctions (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 34). *Citizens* are also crucial in democracies. Any restriction that excluded one part of the society could not be considered as democracy. Equal and universal suffrage is vital for democracies. One of the most important successes of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the political

history was the abolition of restriction over the criteria for political inclusion. According to Rueschemeyer et.al. democracy was achieved by those who were excluded from rule and who acquired the social power –namely working classes in 20<sup>th</sup> century- to reach for a power to reach for a share in the political process (Rueschemeyer et.al., 1992, p. 46). The ideal of democracy is advanced by those who fight for the principles of democratic rules and procedures in order to gain political power. This situation not only broadens regimes' legitimacy within the country but also make it sustainable to reversals by increasing inclusiveness dimension of the democratic rule.

Democratic regimes should permit visions, ideas, and ideologies to compete. *Competition* is related to free, fair and regular elections. Competition allows citizens to make choice among competing alternatives and rank/choose according to their merits, weakness or characteristics. One of the significant fallacies about democracy is its equation with regular elections, defined *electoralism* by Terry Lynn Karl. Some equated elections with democracy, seen it a sufficient condition of democracy. Democracy should be beyond that free and fair conducted election. Fairly, free and regular elections are definitely the core element of democracy and they should be fairly conducted and counted. Through regularly conducted, free and fair elections, governments and rulers will be responsible for their actions in the office. This would increase vertical accountability of the rulers to their electorate and will increase the quality and effectiveness of democracy.

Another commonly accepted image of democracy is identification of it with *majority rule*, by combining the votes of more than half of those eligible and present is said to be -democratic, whether that majority emerges within an electorate, a parliament, a committee, a city council, or a party caucus (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 35). Successful democracies are those which apply majority rules under strict supervision through legislative and constitutional review, but also those not pass any legislation that would harm minority rights. Using majoritarian or plesbicitarian decision-making mechanisms can be dangerous without any legal and institutional review. Ethnic, religious, political minority rights must be protected in democracies. These protections

can take different forms like constitutional provisions such as Constitutional Court's overview over the constitutional modifications or court decisions.

*Cooperation* is the last dimension of Karl & Schmitter's definition of democracy. Voters, groups, individuals collective action capacities are important for democracies, parties and assemblies. They must be capable of acting collectively through parties, associations, and movements in order to select candidates, articulate preferences, petition authorities, and influence policies (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p.36).

## **2.2 Institutions That Make Democracy Possible**

Democratic institutions, rules and procedures are significant in order to compare political systems, analyze whether they are improving within their own democratic system or not. For example, the main struggle for the pro-democratic forces in the 19th century was for general suffrage. However today, since most of the democratic countries adopted standard suffrage principles, democratic forces are now seeking to more advance in deepening the democracy such as for more inclusive participation to political processes. Number of these conditions expanded and became much more complex throughout the last two centuries. Adoption of these institutions did not take simultaneously, rather gradually introduced to systems. For the minimum requirements of democracy I will follow Dahl's conception of democracy. The political institutions of modern representative democracy requires elected officials, free, fair and frequent elections, freedom of expression, access to alternative sources of information, associational autonomy, inclusive citizenship. They are the defining elements of democracies, not wholly developed in a short period, though are all are consequence of a long process of struggle for democracy. Once they are all introduced to a political system, they must function properly. As Schmitter and Karl indicate specific procedural norms, must be followed and respected. Throughout this section, I will follow procedures defined by Schmitter and Karl. They are not sufficient conditions in order to define a polity as democratic, but necessary ones. However, these procedures are not significant if there is no functioning rule of law. Any polity that fails to follow the "rule

of law” with regards to its own procedures should not be considered democratic (Schmitter& Karl, 2013, p. 36).

*Elected Representatives.* Modern large scale democracies require elected representatives. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens (Dahl, 2013, p. 74). As number of people that participate in the political decision making process increase the role and the power that elected representative hold increase as well. As far as the magnitude of the political system increases, politics and procedures become more complex, number of political institutions will rise and pursuing lawmaking process turn out to be harder. In order to incorporate citizens into these processes, democracy necessitates elected representatives that speak and stand for according to the wishes of their voters, control the agenda of legislative process or represent party policies in legislation.

Democracy requires professional politicians as representatives as well. Politicians today need ample party and personal resources to win elections, require specialized knowledge in order to hold technocrats accountable, and must surround themselves with experts in polling and the like in order to stay in office (Schmitter, 2013, p. 46). This may lead to disenchantment of voters from their representatives or reduce their chances to access politicians since it become more professional. However, politicians that have social capital, procedural knowledge and experience would contribute to the institutionalization of the political processes such as rules of that of the rules of procedures in the parliament.

*Free, Fair and Frequent Elections.* Each citizen of a nation should be free to vote in elections. Any restriction that would inhibit any citizen from his or her right to vote is violation of democratic procedures. Elections must be fairly conducted and fairly counted. Each of the citizens must have equal opportunity to vote and all votes must be counted as equal. To be free means that citizens can go to the polls without fear of reprisal; and if they are to be fair, then all votes must be counted as equal (Dahl, 2013, p. 78). Finally, elections must also be frequent and must be conducted between scheduled time periods. However, there are also limits on being free to vote in elections.



For example, in most of countries prisoners are not allowed to vote in elections. There are also limits on the voting age, which is mostly 18 and those below this age limit are deprived of voting in elections.

*Free Expression.* Citizens have a right to express themselves without danger of severe punishment on political matters (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 36). They should declare their political preferences and persuade other citizens to vote for their party or participate their social movement, civil society organization. To acquire civic competence, citizens need opportunities to express their own views; learn from one another; engage in discussion and deliberation; read, hear and question experts, political candidates, and persons whose judgments they trust; and learn in other ways that depend on freedom of expression (Dahl, 2013, p. 78). Free expression is important especially for the opposition parties. They must be able to defend their views, ideologies and reflections in ongoing political processes which are central in democracies. Considering the erosion of the democratic rule, it is not surprising to see that early steps of any authoritarian political power mostly focus on to restrict freedom of expression.

*Alternative Sources of Information.* The availability of alternative sources of information is one of the basic criteria for democracy. Citizens must have a chance to reach alternative and independent sources of information in order to make right choice. Regimes that manipulate, control or produce a media that loyal to it or a media controlled by a monopoly is not considered as democratic regimes. Citizens must have access, then, to alternative sources of information that are not under the control of the government or dominated by any other group or point of view (Dahl, 2013, p. 78). Governments that apply censorship, manipulation of media or using state power in order to weaken pluralism of media not only undermine freedom of media but also hinder citizens' participation to politics. Alternative sources of information should exist and also protected by law. For example, in order to solve the problem of corruption, office holders' abuses of power, transparency, accountability would be the remedies. These remedies, as well, require free press and the media that can expose corruption

scandal and inform voters for their future decisions. Accountability will function better if democracy has alternative sources of information.

*Independent Associations.* Democracy requires independent political organizations. Political parties, civil society organizations, trade unions, interests groups, lobbying groups are all part of democratic politics. These associations are where politics unfolds, where elected representatives recruited or gained political skills. Associations provide opportunities for people to discuss, deliberate, increase their associability, social networks and help promote interpersonal trust, sharing attitudes, and information or produce resources for social movements. For example, political parties provide access to government, create shortcuts to tell voters who are who, help reduce the information costs of voting and put candidates in for public office (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 2-3). Citizens have the right to form several of alternative and independent associations or organizations.

*Inclusive Citizenship.* Inclusive citizenship means that no one who is subject to the laws of the land can be denied the right that other citizens possess (Dahl, 1998, p. 86). Inclusive citizenship implies full access to the rights of citizenship, citizens' participation into political processes.

All these institutions enable to capture the essence of the procedural meaning of democracy, polyarchy. These are the minimum requirements for democratic countries. Beside these institutions Schmitter & Karl offer two other procedures that might be seen as prior conditions of those proposed by Dahl. According to Schmitter & Karl (2013), popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 37). What Schmitter & Karl imply with this proposition is power and capacity of the elected officials must not be confined, restrained by civil service, military officers or business groups. Existence of a tutelary and veto power or specific "guaranteed and protected" political areas that are absent from the control of civilian rule would be detrimental for democracy. Huntington also warns about the same point. Political leaders must share power with other groups in society. If those

democratically elected decision makers become, however, simply a façade for the exercise of much greater power by a non-democratically chosen group, then clearly that political system is not democratic (Huntington, 1991, p. 10). And a political system that contains any of such powers could not be considered as democratic. Democracies are where elected representatives' decisions hindered through several ways such as constitutional provisions and through restraints from guarding military officers or civil servants might be dragged into “electoralism” easily.

Another proposition of the Schmitter & Karl (2013) is that the polity must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 37). With the development of blocs, alliances, spheres of influence, and a variety of “neocolonial” arrangements, the question of autonomy has been a salient one (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 37). Taking binding decisions in international areas because of the force used by external powers are problematic. In democratic countries, decisions are produced/approved by legislative/executive organs which must be accountable to the people and political institutions.

Guillermo O'Donnell also made a contribution to Dalh's list. According to him, elected and appointed officials should not be arbitrarily terminated before the end of their constitutionally mandated terms as like actions of Alberto Fujimori of Peru and Boris Yeltsin of Russia when they fired members of the Supreme Court or closed their countries congresses (O'Donnell, 1996, p. 35). O'Donnell's second additional criterion is that there should be an uncontested national territory (O'Donnell, 1996, p. 35), which is actually originally introduced by Dankwart Rustow in early 1970s.

Through examining democratic procedures, institutions and requirements what democracy is summarized above. However, in order to reach the ideal of democracy all these procedures and institutions must function properly. They are necessary but not sufficient condition for consolidated, properly functioned advanced democracies and any single set of preconditions are inadequate to define democracies. Extent of these prerequisites is also central in regard to distinguishing subtypes of democracy.

### 2.3 How Democracies Differ

Democracy does not consist of a single, unique set of institutions. There are many types of democracies, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of effects (Schmitter & Karl, 2013). Post-Cold War era has been marked by an unexpected expansion of democratic type of government because of the collapse of Soviet Bloc countries. Many saw these countries as hybrid regimes that oscillate between democratic and authoritarian type of government. This situation attracts scholars to focus on “democracy with adjectives” (Collier & Levitsky 1997) in order to define partial democracies. Even if they meet the requirements of democracy most of them fall into the danger of what Andreas Schedler (2013) called “multiparty elections without democracy (Schedler, 2013, p. 188)”.

There is not such a black and white duality in regime studies. Even authoritarian or democratic regimes are varied among themselves. Every polity somehow may have mixed combinations. Whether democracy or not, political regimes in several areas can have institutions that combines democratic features or vice versa. Illiberal practices can live in institutionalized free and fair elections systems. Therefore, we should not ignore the critics of “whole system” thinking, who eschew efforts at regime classification altogether and seek to identify the ways in which each political system combines democratic and undemocratic features (Diamond, 2002, p. 33). Combinations of these democratic and undemocratic elements lead to discussions of political systems that are deficient from the requirements of democracies in several areas. The definitions of hybrid regimes emerged between these discussions where the political regimes oscillated between democracy and authoritarianism.

In these regimes, institutions of democracy may live together with authoritarian practices. The free and fair elections may coexist with the highly restricted civil rights and liberties as in illiberal democracies (Zakaria 1997), multiparty elections with certain degree of competition which is restricted through several mechanisms in competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way 2002), or free and fair elections with the recognition of some degree of civil rights and liberties and opposition where the parliament and

judiciary seen as impediment for the representation of the national will in the body of leader (O'Donnell 1994), formal democratic institutions with strict supervision of military exercising the political power above elected governments (Przeworski & Wallerstein 1988), liberalized authoritarian regime called *dictablanda* or illiberal democracy *democradura* (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986), semidemocracies that are close to meeting the requirements of polyarchies (Linz, Lipset & Diamond 1988). These labels are created for defining certain types of regimes, implied either deficiency from requirements of democratic institutions or the evaluation of existence of authoritarian practices. These labels would contribute our study during discussions about the democratic transition of Turkey in 1983 and to determine AKP's drift to authoritarianism.

Complex and changing context of these components produces different types of democracies. On the basis of the works of Schmitter & Karl (2013), this study will briefly discuss the components that distinguish one subtype of democracy from others. Schmitter & Karl (2013) maintain that type of democracies change by potential combinations which are *consensus, participation, access, responsiveness, majority rule, parliamentary sovereignty, party government, pluralism, federalism, presidentialism, checks and balances* (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). Through discussing these combinations, my study will examine subtypes of democracies in following paragraphs. Given this process, study will examine how these combinations, their absence or existence, causes differentiation of subtypes. These indicators are not included in the generic definition of democracy but indicators that differentiate the type or this type of democracies.

*Consensus.* Democracy is, by its nature, a system of institutionalized competition for power (Diamond, 1990, p. 49). Competition and conflict are embedded into the functioning of democracies. Democracy requires conflict –but not too much; competition there must be, but only within carefully defined and universally accepted boundaries (Diamond, 1990, p. 49). The boundaries of the game should be decisive and certain for all the players in the game. As conflicts are embedded in democracies, resolution of these conflicts requires consensus among competing/clashing ideas and

ideologies. Systems that are creating only conflicting ideas but not consensus would end up with stalemates. Political conflict runs the risk of becoming too intense, producing a society so conflict-ridden that civil peace and political stability are jeopardized (Diamond, 1990, p. 49). And it should be reiterated that, politics by nature is the art of resolving conflicting ideas. This creates one of the paradoxes in democracies. Democracy aims to resolve problems and while facing with conflicts. Therefore, there must be consensus over the playing field of democracy, its boundaries and limits. Playing field must be definite and certain and accepted by major political actors. Thus, democracy requires consensus on at least some rules of the game. Such as, all citizens may not agree on the substantive goals of political action or on the role of the state (although if they did, it would certainly make governing democracies much easier) but when they did, this would broaden chances of consolidation (Schmitter and Karl, 2013, p. 38). Among other cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy, agreement on national identity and borders make the formation and consolidation of democracy possible (Rustow, 1971). Again, if consensus is part of political culture of a specific country, democracy is more likely to emerge in that country. Political culture that has tendencies of moderation, accommodation, cohesion, consensus and compromise and habitually shared these concepts would foster the idea of democracy within political system.

Disagreements among democrats over issues such as a unitary versus a federal state, a monarchical or republican form of government, or the type of electoral system may create questions about the legitimacy of the emerging democratic government, the decision making processes, and indeed the future of the political system (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 4). Decisions that are receiving during the democratic transition periods would be crucial for the future of democratic regimes and their chances of eliminating democratic breakdowns. When decision makers enable to form a consensus over the structure of the political system, electoral laws, separation of power, political institutions, democracy will be more durable and resilient against backslidings.

Majoritarian democracy may cause exclusion of minorities from government, may alienate the excluded ones from politics, may cultivate separatist ideas and unrests,

may polarize voters, and may abolish freedom of expression and the culture of discussion. Consensus based decisions can also avert the resurgence of the confrontations and historical cleavages that belongs to past political developments. Consensus over political structure of the country between political actors would definitely contribute resilience of political regimes. For example, chances of possible conflicts in the political system will be more if political actors did not reaching consensus during the formation of constitution. This kind of historically conflict-producing areas –such as exclusion of specific political groups from in politics may cause persistently unconsolidated democracy. These areas may skew the playing field in terms of favoring incumbent government or specific group that was powerful during the democratic transition. In the periods of political modifications or crisis, politically strong actors may affect the construction of future regime and if this process managed by enclosed political elite more conflict is potential. Under these circumstances, an increase in the chances of production of a kind of hybrid or flawed regime rather than full democracy will be highly possible.

*Participation.* All citizens may not take an active and equal part in politics, although it must be legally possible for them to do so (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). Participation in the political processes under the legal protection seems like absorbed by most of democracies today, even in weak ones. Participation must be equal and free for all in the society. Control of specific elite groups, class, military or committee or a societal group over the political system is definitely inimical to democracy. For that reason, extent and level of participation of regimes is crucial for the evaluation of regime types.

Exclusion of certain groups from participation is a dangerous game. Considering the danger of separatist and secessionist movements, if this exclusion is based on ethnic, ideological and religious cleavages, exclusion may even become more dangerous and harmful to democracy. Exclusion of specific ethnic groups may cause unlawful protest, violent acts and terrorist organizations by excluding groups in order to attract attention. This may encourage state apparatus in order to provide political order through strict measures at the expense of fundamental rights and liberties of people. As we know,

citizens are generally more prone to accept these political measures during times of political violence and crises. And these times are fertile grounds for political actors to carry out their authoritarian tendencies and restrict democratic ways of participation. Progression to the democratic type of government or at least protection of it may be thwarted through these measures.

Participation emphasizes that there must be no any restriction for any part of citizens to participate political processes. It is not only about general suffrage but forming political parties, civil society organizations, interest groups and social events. Exclusion of any specific group from politics on the basis of differentiated dimensions would harm the idea of democracy. Democracy will broaden with deepening of political participation, participation of not just voting from one election to another but by participation in decision making processes from local scale to national one.

*Access.* Citizenship implies that individuals and groups should have an equal opportunity to express their preferences if they choose to do so (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). Political system must provide enough spaces for all opinions and expression of all these political visions must be free for all. Restriction over the expression of political ideas, or prohibition of condition that allow parties to do propaganda or control the news sources in order to restrict access of citizens would move away countries from full democracy. Media and other news sources, for that reason, are subjects of authoritarian governments' pressures. New kind of authoritarian politics not only target media or journalist directly but somehow skew the media for their side. Incumbent governments through state advertisements, tax agents, or through blocking distribution of newspaper and intervention to newsprint supply or introduction of new media laws not only restrict opposition party's chances of expressing their political opinions but also control media groups to promote their incumbency.

*Responsiveness.* The government will be responsive if the regime is democratic. Rulers may not always follow the course of action preferred by the citizenry, but when they deviate from such a policy, they must ultimately be held accountable for their actions through regular and fair processes (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). The main



desire of the politicians is to reelect in next elections. For that reason, they may choose to follow policies that are not preferred by the citizens but for themselves. So, political elites must be accountable in terms of their actions to the electorate even if they follow their own agenda. And the punishment of the politicians by the voters must be in the limits of democratic methods.

*Majority rule.* Positions may not be allocated or rules may not be decided solely on the basis of assembling the most votes, although deviations from this principle usually must be explicitly defended and previously approved (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). Any candidate or a party that combines more than half of the votes must be eligible to perform its incumbency if the office does not require more than half, in such circumstances as the changing constitution. However, democracy is not only a system of majority rule. Minorities and their rights must be protected by the democratic system itself through legal rules and institutions. Political structure must limit the decisions that can harm the rights of minorities. On the other hand, as I indicate above, existence of specific veto powers over the civilian rule may also be detrimental to majority rule. There can be limits imposed on the policy preferences of the majority party by the military or specific capitalist class or partisan courts. When policies of these two contradict, tutelary powers may limit or object to the policy acts of civilian rule.

*Parliamentary sovereignty.* The legislature may not be the only body that can make rules or even the one with final authority in deciding which laws are binding, although where executive, judicial, or other public bodies make that ultimate choice, they too must be accountable for their actions (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). As like the other branch of the government, legislature is not free from being accountable for its acts and laws. At the same time, any concessions given to the legislative branch of the government would also violate separation of power principle and undermine the quality of democracy. Checks and balance system of the political system can guarantee the separation of power. Through that any acts that would harm the separation of power such as increasing power of legislative branch of the government can be controlled by the other two.

*Party government.* Rulers may not be nominated, promoted, and disciplined in their activities by well-organized and programmatically coherent political parties, although where they are not, it may prove more difficult to form an effective government (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). Democracy requires talented political elites. Competent rulers can deepen and advanced the functioning of democracies since they experience the practices, rules and norms beforehand. Unorganized, undisciplined and inexperienced governing bodies may cause low level of political performance and may pose trouble for effective government. Parties can train and recruit experienced political elites needed by political system.

*Pluralism.* Pluralism affirms the belief that diversity and dissent are values that enrich individuals as well as their polities and societies (Sartori, 1997, p. 58). Where there are monopolies of representation, hierarchies of association, and obligatory membership, it is likely that the interests involved will be more closely linked to the state and the separation between the public and private spheres of action will be much less distinct (Schmitter and Karl, 2013, p. 38). Democratic contestation requires pluralism. Free challenge of ideas, freedom of expression, and culture of debate would be strong in plural societies, which in turn promote democracy. Pluralism would be weak where state plays important role and control each aspects of life. Separation of public and private spheres is a prerequisite for a plural society. Monopoly of representation and hierarchical order and membership, combination of state and civil society in one strong organization are detrimental to the conditions that provide fertile grounds for pluralism. Broad civil society originates in political system where state is distinct from public spheres. For example, if government or state controls the economy than capitalism and market economies have difficulty to develop in this country. This would be destructive for pluralism and therefore civil society to encounter and balance the power of state apparatus. Controlled economy is likely to produce ill conditions for development of democracy by restraining other groups' chances of reaching state resources.

*Federalism.* The territorial division of authority may not involve multiple levels and local autonomies, although some dispersal of power across territorial and/or

functional units is characteristic of all democracies (Schmitter & Karl, 2013, p. 38). Federalism provide basis for functional and territorial division of power. Ethnic conflict has always been at the top of detrimental issues that would harm the quality of democracy. Federalism can become problem solving institutional arrangement for ethnically and religiously divided societies. Regionally based ethnic and religious conflicts and demands for more participatory democratic processes can be solved by federal institutions. Federal systems are particularly effective in managing ethnic tension because they utilize a variety of mechanisms for reducing conflict by dispersing conflict by transferring much of it to state and local governments (Diamond, 1990, p. 58). Federal institutions can help resolve ethnic, religious, tribal problems within that territory without becoming topic in national level. Federalism through giving more resources and control power for local officers can help local actors to solve their own issues. Federalism can promote inclusivity level of political system by providing resources and have a say for ethnic groups in political processes. For that reason, federalism as an institutional arrangement helps promote democracy for ethnically divided societies. On the other hand, federalism can be also exacerbate historical cleavages in deeply divided societies, may fuel regional conflicts, since ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded (Horowitz, 1993, p. 18). Because in divided societies, being in and out of politics also determines the access to the material benefits. In some countries, federalism may not be the cure for problems of minorities. When we say federalism as a solution, we imply that it will mitigate the conflict and will reduce the level of ethnic, regionally dominant political requests. However, minority identities may be so strong to be pushback, alleviated by the political structure of federalism. In these examples, federalism may not be the cure for resolving questions of divided societies.

*Presidentialism.* Presidential systems are make up one of the most important form of government dimensions in democracies. In presidential systems an executive with considerable constitutional powers –generally including full control of composition of the cabinet and administration- is directly elected by the people for a fixed term and is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence (Linz, 1990, p. 52).

President's dependency on legislature in order to pass law produced specific attention for scholars to work. Scholars that are not in favor of presidential systems mostly speak of two perils of presidentialism. First, dual legitimacy implies the danger of double-headed ruling power. Problem of "dual legitimacy crises" emerges if president and majority party in legislature elected from different parties. Presidential systems that have concentrated, cohesive, organized political parties more prone to future conflict since the deputies are not willing to cooperate with president rather than their party's official agenda. If president is not backed by his or her coalition or majority party or lose it, then he/she must find solution to pass bills in assembly. If pork and barrel politics and patronage are not sufficient, or if parties are ideologically strict and loyal to their party, presidency would be more prone to stalemates and conflicts. Since both of presidency and legislative organ are popularly elected, their claim to speak on behalf of "the people" would produce such threats to democracy. Under these circumstances, system could easily fall into the danger of stalemates and deadlocks if the regime ruled by a president and legislative majority that oppose each others' political agenda. Experiences -especially those are in Latin America- showed that such situations create favorable conditions for military forces to intervene politics as a mediating power.

Another important problem emerges because of the essence of the system; fixed term at the office. Presidents' tenure at the office for a fixed term shape and adjust behavior, future and plans of all political actors. Preventing system from the danger of power concentration is the main concern behind the idea of term limit. One of the main critiques against presidential systems is its nature of facilitating the personalization of power. Prominent political scientist Juan Linz in his legendary *Perils of Presidentialism* (1990) also points this paradox. Linz said;

"On the one hand, such systems set out to create strong, stable executive with enough plebiscitarian legitimation to stand fast against the array of particular interests represented in the legislature. On the other hand, presidential constitutions also reflect profound suspicion of the personalization of power: memories and fears of kings and caudillos do not dissipate easily (Linz, 1990, p. 54)".

So, presidential systems on one hand are fulfilling the needs of effective and strong executive and on the other hand, exacerbating the suspicion of personalization of presidential power.

*Checks and Balances.* Governments should be monitored by legislative and judicial branch of the government. Democracy obligates each branch of the government to stay accountable to other branch of the governments which called horizontal accountability. Along horizontal accountability, vertical accountability -elections, free media, independent civil society- too, hold political actors accountable to citizens. Civil society and media can also serve as watchdog of the political system and form societal accountability to check the democratic procedures. Governments or executives that are far from efficiency or could not meet the demands of their constituents will be punished by civil society and free press and will lose its chances of reelect for next term. Democracy rests on checks and balances which, taken together, serve to protect the polity from abuses of power and the dangers of political extremism (Toledo, 2013, p. 155). Its existence can produce hegemony of moderate attitudes and in turn, facilitate compromise and tolerance for become part of the political culture.

*Consensus, participation, access, responsiveness, majority rule, parliamentary sovereignty, party government, pluralism, federalism, presidentialism and checks and balances* are central concepts in order to distinguish diminished subtypes of democracies. These subtypes differ from each other with their existence or deficiency from the political system. Mix of these components produces different types of regime, which will help us in forthcoming sections to understand on what areas study's case differ from each other, on which components they have weakness or absence that makes them subtypes of democracy or deter them from further deepening of democracy.

## **Conclusion**

Democracy literature provides substantive sources for defining what democracy is and what it is not. Seeking to construct a general definition for democracy as a concept led to proliferation of democracy definitions. This is not only stemming for reaching out a

general definition but also because of the very nature of research and its question. Therefore, conceptual stretching applied by scholars determines number of dimensions –contestation, responsiveness, participation- incorporated into study’s definition of democracy.

Democracy requires the realization of some of preconditions as I argued above. Completion of some of these conditions determines the qualification political system. Establishing of these democratic institutions, that put forward by several academics, can led to completion of democracy. In order to have a complete democracy, regimes must meet with these conditions. However, not all regimes can complete these preconditions, therefore differs from complete democracies. The gradual development of democratic institutions or deficiencies from these institutions creates new types of democracies, which called democracy with adjectives. Absent or differentiation from some of these institutions cause a literature on the varieties of democracy differed from each other by means of distinguished procedures and components. Increasing number of label for defining specific types of regimes began to circulate in the literature. Their deficiencies such as restriction on civil rights and liberties while having free and fair elections of democratic institutions led to emerge of new types of definition of regimes. The coexistence of illiberal or authoritarian practices together with democratic institutions led to definition of the regimes as subtypes of democracy.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, CONSOLIDATION, BACKSLIDING**

Emergence of democracy after the so-called third wave of democracies raised concerns about their chances of survival of these new democracies. The main concern was whether these new regimes can be considered as democracies and chances of their sustainability towards potential anti-democratic pressures. Transition of these new regimes was a source of attention for many scholars studying the endurance of new regimes and their chances of confronting potential authoritarian regressions. Most of these countries were far away from forming stable democratic institutions. Many lacked a functioning and effective state authority and bureaucracy. For that reason, not only democratic transitions but also consolidation of these regimes started to be studied by academics. Scholarly interest for democratic transition contributed to the arguments about crafting political institutions that might help promote endurance and consolidation of these regimes. Newly emerged examples help broaden the literature about the consolidation of democratic regimes.

This chapter will specifically focus on the issue democratic transition, failure in democratizations and conditions that makes a democracy resilient against backsliding. What are the factors that cause democratization and failing to have durable democracy? In which areas, democracy should be strong to push back authoritarian pressures. What kind of aspects of these areas might increase the level of resilience of democracies? To give an example, what kinds of elements of civil society help promote democracy or weaken it? Literature reviews might help us reply these questions and also help us to understand other examples and reasons that cultivate new ideas. Study will also try to understand the dynamics of consolidation of democratic regimes, to become advanced and endured. Democratic practices should develop and promoted in specific areas. In

order to define “consolidation of democracies”, we need to know where the democratic transition is completed. We need to know reasons for democratic transitions, failures of democracies; their backsliding. First, this study will focus on democratic transition literature. For that reason, it would be wise to know in which areas democracies should be open gates for transition and resilient against undemocratic pressures. Because, as I will show in following sections, democratic consolidation somehow related with the conditions and strategic behaviors of actors during and after transition. We will apply to democratic transition literature, definitions of democratic consolidation and how scholars perceive areas that make a democracy durable. In following sections, study will focus on definitions of democratic resilience. We will apply the literature of democratic consolidation and its definitions.

In this section, study will analyze the democratic transition literature in order to evaluate democratic transition of Turkey in 1983. Then, areas making democracy resilient against authoritarian push backs and backsliding literature will be our topic. Specific properties of these areas would promote and increase in the level of endurance of democratic regimes. Most of these properties are the common traits of consolidated democracies. However, this does not mean that democracies would have never been breakdown; rather assume their political structure would be better performing against authoritarian pressures. Even today, there is a possibility of breakdown of consolidated democracies. Through examining these traits, this study will examine facilitating factors that make democracies more resilient. Based on these factors, the study will examine the facilitating conditions of democratic resilience with the Turkish case in the next chapter.

### **3.1 Democratic Transition**

A subfield of political science has emerged with the so called third wave of democracies. Authoritarian regimes, military and personal dictatorships have broken down, moved to different type of regimes in all around the world. This new phenomena opened gate for new questions. What are the preconditions for democratic transition and



consolidation of it, who are the agents of these changes, are these transitions supported by external forces (Landmann, 2000)?

According to Lipset (1959) modernization causes democracy. Economic development causes the likelihood of being democratic regime. Lipset (1959) was the first in shed light on the correlation between the economic development and democracy. Controversy begins with this question, whether the relationship is correlated or causal between these two variables. With modernization, Lipset implied sets of variables that determine the level of modernization, such as wealth, education, urbanization, expansion of middle class. Barro argues that correlation between primary education and democracy is recognized in this relationship (Barro, 1996). However, there were also deviant cases for this correlation such as India. Despite its being defined as democratic regime, in terms of the level of economic development, GDP per capita, economic inequality and living standards, India were one of the least in the world in terms likelihood to form democratic regime. Therefore, the role of economy in the studies of democracy was getting more significance. Economic success of these newly established regimes became one of the core issues for countries in their sustainability of regimes. Once established, these new democratic regimes should sustain economic development and resolve problems of efficiency and political legitimacy. Severe economic crises could be potential cause of the breakdown of the new age of democracies that took place after 1970s. Suffering economic deterioration can be reason for questioning legitimacy of governments which might lead to the legitimacy crisis. Legitimacy crisis was the reason of breakdown of some of political regime such as Germany after 1920s. Overlapping of deteriorating of legitimacy with economic crisis would make a regime more vulnerable for breakdown which might finalize with democratic transition. According to the empirical study of Przeworski et.al. (1996) democracies are performing better when they confront with economic crisis from 1987 onwards (Przeworski et. al., 1996). However, economic development arguments of democratic transition are neglected and insufficient and challenged by Guillermo O'Donnell. Author showed examples from Latin American regimes from 60s and 70s, where some of the most developed Latin American countries democracy faced with

democratic breakdown such as Argentina in 1966 and 1976, Brazil in 1964 and Uruguay in 1973.

Modernization theory postulated a positive correlation between capitalist development and democratization and thus failed to anticipate the “new authoritarianism” that swept through the relatively industrialized Latin American countries (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1995, p. 4). In bureaucratic authoritarian model, late industrialized countries faced the breakdown of democracy together with increasing inequality. As the industrialism advanced, benefits that the system is provided for different sectors of society have changed. When the domestic market for consumer goods was satisfied, demands of working classes were increased and resulted in high inflation, balance of payments and foreign debt deficit. According to the work of Collier (1979) high level technocrats were linked with foreign capital, and for them, in order to attract multinational capital country need less distribution, less subsidiaries, more capital accumulation and less rights for working classes. The dominant political coalition is formed after the collapse of democracy by technocrat class in close association with foreign capital in order to promote advanced industrialization. For elimination of mobilization of working class, number of strikes and reduction for wages, dominant classes –generally military, technocrats, bureaucrats, business associations- were coalesce for introduction of new authoritarian regimes. The result of this process is the exclusion of popular sectors of society from politics. Structural problems of the economy have an effect on the problems of democratic transition. When the transformation of economy and transition to democracy are accompanied by the same time, both systems could pose great dangers for newly emerged democracy. His study shows that the dual transformation could create more challenges for regimes. Another implication of Collier’ study can be the difference of interests between the popular sectors of society and the ruling coalition. This clash of interests can be ended up with the breakdown of regime and this difference can create a specific class or groups that are excluded from the system that are open for future populist policies.

Przeworski & co-authors (2000) claimed that the economic development does not cause democratization; it reduces the likelihood of democratic breakdown, thus

increasing the number of rich democratic countries even though it has no causal effect on transition to democracy (Przeworski et.al. 2000). Their argument is inconsistent with arguments of O'Donnell about the breakdown of more economically developed Latin American democracies. Maybe, their study neglected the strategic behaviors of classes and sectors with the transformation that economic development brings such as making the society a much complex one. According to their study, economic development increases the likelihood of democratic stability but not causes democratization. The relationship is stemming not from being economically wealthier but resulting from the political stability that rich countries have, therefore leads to high number of rich countries with democratic regime. This argument challenged by Boix & Stokes (2000), by expanding the time period of dataset, that economic development contributes to democracy, it is an extremely important predictor of transition prior to 1950, though has only a small effect in the post-1950 periods (Geddes, 2007, p. 321).

For Linz & Stepan (1996), preceding regime type and initiator –military, dictator, oligarchy, technocrats- of the transition are two most important variables for successful democratic transition (Linz & Stepan, 1996). They also claimed that in order to solve the confusion about the dependent variable in transition studies, they defined thresholds –liberalization, transition, consolidation- for determining the phases of democratization of a regime. For example in Latin America, because of the overgrown bureaucracy, high degree of monopoly and protectionism, weak tax collecting system cause inflation, unemployment, resource misallocation as well as to generate volatile changes in relative incomes, in the short run of the reforms (Przeworski, 1991). Yet, the durability and performance of newly introduced reforms and policies depends on their capacity to resolve existing problems. Success of these new reforms, policies and institutions might help build legitimacy and public support for new regimes.

Studies of Acemoglu & Robinson (2001, 2005) and Boix (2003) focus more on the income equality determinant of democratization and concluded that democratization is more likely if income distribution is more equal. According to Acemoglu & Robinson (2001), elites are willing to cede some power rather than risk the costs of revolution when they believe democracy not to cause extremely redistributive taxation policies

(Geddes, 2007, p. 321). In the low levels of inequality, an increase in the inequality can promote democracy through increasing the threat of revolution. However, at higher levels of inequality, elites will repress them rather than offering concessions because of their fear of the redistributive consequences of democratization (Geddes, 2007, p. 321). If elites threatened by the upcoming potential revolution, they would increase the level of redistribution for sustaining existing political system. Another option would be transition to democracy while making the redistribution conceivable. Boix (2003) argues that income equality and capital mobility reduce elite fears of democracy, first because it reduces expected redistribution by popular governments and the second because it provides capital holders with an exit option if taxes become confiscatory (Geddes, 2007, p. 336). His effort was huge in explaining the correlation between economic developments with democracy on the basis of the micro relationship as such in redistribution.

Causes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes and transition to democracy are varied; from change of socio-economic factors to the old regime type of a country. Huntington's *Third Wave of Democracies* (1990) proposes explanatory factors for these questions. Deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian systems, global economic growth of the 1960s, changing doctrine of the Catholic Church, changes in the policies of external actors, snowballing effects of democratization are the reasons behind democratizing regime change in the 1970s and 1980s (Huntington, 1972). According to him, deepening political legitimacy problem of authoritarian regimes because of the poor economic performance of authoritarian regimes accelerate breakdown of authoritarian regimes. Broad base economic development, industrialization, increasing in the level of education and living standards can contribute to democratization and rapid economic growth can undermine authoritarian regime if combined with short term economic crisis (Huntington, 1968). For Huntington, transformation of political alignment of Roman Catholic Church in favor of democracy against authoritarian regimes is another reason behind the democratization. The pressure and effect of major external powers such as EU, USA and non-governmental organizations in promoting democratization, human rights and liberties together with the snowballing effect of the

democratization for geographically close countries are influential in transition to democracy. Huntington's preconditions for democratic transition are probably significant for specific geographies and countries rather than being general model for all democratic transition, an all-embracing model for transition. His preconditions also neglected the role of classes, elite alignment and attitude and role during the transition. Power relations in the society, between classes, state, civil society and military draw attention by other prominent scholars.

Some of researchers propose that ex-colonial heritage is also factor in being democracy such as Weiner (1987), Payne (1993). According to the study of Lipset (1993) once being an ex-British colony is the variable, highly correlated with democracy.

Following O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986) one needs to differentiate democratization of the state from democratization of the regime while latter requires the modifications in relations between state institutions and civil society. Civil society, however, as Larry Diamond (1994) claimed is essential component of democratic consolidation but not for the transition. Civil society can work only within institutionalized political structures. For Putnam (1993), practical performance of institutions is shaped by the social context, within which they operate. Civic involvement; active participation in public affairs, development of ideas of equality, trust and tolerance are environmental factors that varied and shape institutions and how they functions (Putnam, 1993, p. 86-91).

Nancy Bermeo's study (1997) discusses the effect of popular mobilization and violence in transition to democracy from an authoritarian rule. Bermeo defines a theory, what she calls "moderation theory", which proposes mobilization is beneficial for democratic transition but it should be moderate. Elites of previous regime can abandon from their decision of transition to democracy. Moderation is not one of the prerequisites for democracy yet they can decrease the level of polarization.

According to Lipset (1959), middle class was the main agent of democracies, while Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens (1992) claims that the organized working

class is the most crucial in promoting the democracy, while landowning class of the society is the prominent social group, barrier to democratization. Any policy strengthening the working class and reduce the capacity of landowning class would make significant contribution for democratization according to their seminal work. Conversely, Samuel Huntington (1968) claimed that if the political mobilization capacity of a country outstrips the level of political institutionalization, then the political order would be damaged as the institutional capacity of a country could not handle with the mass mobilization.

Considering the arguments that I briefly outlined above, literature seems shaping by structural, socio-economy based, and actor based arguments. Some of scholars propose the requirements of specific factors for the democratic transition while others focuses on the strategic behaviors of the actors during the times of transition as in the studies of Acemoglu & Robinson (2001; 2005). Scholars such as Lipset (1959) and Rueschemeyer et.al. (1992) argue that specific social groups –middle class, working class- are more inclined to transition to democratic regime. In light of these arguments, 1983 Turkish transition from military government did not fit the propositions of class based arguments; rather structural approach can be more illuminating in the Turkish case.

In 1983, Turkey reinstated the multiparty politics after 3 years of interruption since 12 September 1980 military coup. The political turmoil because of weak coalition governments, intensified clashes between the extreme right and left political movements, deteriorated macroeconomic outlook shaped Turkish politics until military coup. Fragmentation of the multiparty political system, campaign strategies of political parties for promising more material benefits and inclination of centre left Republican People's Party to the left of political spectrum (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 18) led to a conflicting political atmosphere for military coup which they could exploited as the reason of the intervention to the politics. According to putschists, coalition governments were evil, far away from bringing political stability and economic development; therefore system requires strong executive and strong government. Electoral system and 10% national threshold system that can provide effectiveness and strong executive is

placed in the Constitution. Kalaycıoğlu defines this system as an executive supremacy over legislature (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 18). On the other side, some of conditions that Collier (1979) argues seems to have similarities in 1970s. Turkish business circles were in favor of less distribution, fewer subsidies, more capital accumulation and less right for working classes in pre 1980 period as in the case of technocrat preferences of bureaucratic authoritarian models. The pressures on the balance of payments and the general level of prices; growing number working class organizations and strikes; radicalized syndical organization (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2015, p. 69-70) deteriorated the capital accumulation of private business.

Turkish case of transition to democracy is an example of Third Wave Democracies, where the military rule ended with a new Constitution followed by general elections. In some of the examples from transition literature that focuses on the class based analysis, the strategic behaviors of social actors or the mass mobilization of working class lead to transition to democracy. However in Turkey since they were repressed during and the post-coup period, working class did not effective to force military for possible transition. Rather, Turkey was a case where pact-building, ‘consensual rule-making’ and ‘explicit and formal compromises’ among rival actors have been comparatively weak (Somer, 2016, p. 485). Transition to democracy in 1983 was determined directly by the Turkish military, the only hegemonic actor during the period of the transition, since political parties were abolished; civil society and business groups were excluded from the Constitution making processes. The exclusivist nature of the Constitution formation continued in the Referendum when the coup leader General Kenan Evren “recommended” citizens to vote “Yes” in the ballot box. Therefore, 1982 Constitution, which is criticized as being authoritarian and dominantly favoring the executive; had been writ down under the strict supervision of Turkish military by the members chosen by higher ranks. Military guaranteed the ideology of Constitution and its veto power in the system. The Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren elected as President in the Referendum, several member seats were created in the independent state institutions such as in RTÜK and Higher Education Board (YÖK). National

Security Council was founded and immunity for the putschists guaranteed in the Constitution as veto powers.

Foundation of veto powers and guaranteed areas for military, problem in meeting with the procedural minima of democracy made the democratic transition of Turkey in 1983 open to question. In order to talk about the transition, new regime must meet with the minimum requirements of the democracy, namely the conditions that are proposed by Dahl. Democratic transition of 1983 was much more of a “formal” transition to civilian rule rather than democracy. Elections were under strict intervention by the military in 1983. Military even had their candidate in elections, Kenan Evren signaled Bülend Ulusu as the suitable candidate for premier. Therefore, Rodriguez et.al. (2014) claimed that Turkey had an incomplete democratic transition during the 1980s (Sommer, 2016, p. 485). The free and fair elections were adopted in 1987 elections. Democracy was under the guardianship of military and its Republican coalition ally, judiciary. Therefore, certain level of democratization and reforms due to EU conditionality regimes and the weakening of the tutelary power of secular coalition created an illusion of democratization or even a democratic consolidation at the beginning of AKP rule and Ergenekon and Sledgehammer operations.

In the light of these discussions, study will discuss the democratic consolidation and conditions that make democracies resilient. In following chapters, this discussion will route us to deficiencies between the existing conditions of Turkish democracy and the ones make it consolidated.

### **3.2 What is Becoming Resilient Democracy**

Many scholars perceive consolidation as the last station in the prolonged road of democratic process. For some of them, consolidation is the point where democratic regime achieved to obtain characteristics of survival that has never going to be breakdown. Others refer to “consolidation” with its aspects of persistence, maintenance, endurance, resilience, irreversibility and stability. For them, something that becomes consolidated seems as if it becomes resilient to interventions, immune to political and



economic shocks; institutionalized in its political structure. Scholars tend to describe regimes as consolidated in which they are resilient to authoritarian regressions, economic and societal deterioration, or performing serious progress to an advanced level of democracy. However, this does not mean that scholars reach an agreement over the definition of the term consolidation. Definition of the term seemed a bit vague and nebulous for some part of researchers. Complexity of the meaning of consolidation is creating confusion for academics specialized in democratic consolidation, which poses a serious risk for our study that has to be overcome.

Consolidation as a concept seems to have two dimensions. Separation between these two meanings is stemming from disparate meanings and features attributed by two groups in the definition of democratic consolidation. Scholars ascribe different meanings for the consolidation which also depends on what they understand from democratic consolidation. First dimension is the one that associates consolidation with stability, endurance, persistence, and maintenance. For the supporters of this dimension, consolidation refers to a condition in which regime can resist against the threat of authoritarian regressions, that regime's capacity of confronting potential and existing destabilizing factors is consolidated.

For the other side of this dimension, consolidation seems to require more than immunity against authoritarian regressions. Advocates of this dimension attributed compelling tasks for democratic consolidation in order to confront destabilizing factors. According to them, structural changes in political, societal or even cultural areas have to be materialized for a fortified democracy. This definition of consolidation implies institutionalization through structural changes; relating democratic consolidation with regimes' progression to higher degree of democratic quality through changes in political and sociological structure.

Andreas Schedler revealed a reasonable explanation for this contrast. Through using subtypes of regimes between authoritarianism and democracy, Schedler (1998) used liberalization, democratization or erosion concepts in order to define consolidation. From Schedler's perspective, consolidation can involve varied connotations if one

observing erosion from electoral or liberal democracy to authoritarianism or vice versa. In this transition, Schedler equates democratic consolidation as avoiding an authoritarian regression; from electoral or liberal democracy to a “better” regime that he called “advanced democracy”. Democratic consolidation means a democratic deepening; from liberal democracy to an electoral democracy; democratic consolidation means avoiding a “slow death” of democracy which means erosion from electoral democracy to liberal democracy; democratic consolidation means completing democracy (Schedler, 1998, p. 94). His study makes it clear that the meaning of consolidation depends on the type of regime that we are studying. The term “democratic consolidation” was meant to describe the challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against eventual “reverse waves” and rendering the democracy “the only game in town” (Schedler, 1998, p. 91).

For many, consolidation lacks of a unique and a core meaning that meet with the criterions of all these components. Those who concerned with the protection of diminished subtypes or democratic regime from destabilizing factors and possible authoritarian regression are emphasizing the need of endurance and immunity of democratic government, while other analysts associated consolidation with advancement to a high quality/degree of democratic regime. For the former, eliminating, neutralizing or converting disloyal players –military backed *autogolpes*, antidemocratic business elite, even disenchanted populations- represents the primary task of democratic breakdown (Schedler, 1998, p. 96). For them, erosion of democratic regime in principles like rule of law, separation of power, free and independent media and fairness of electoral processes or commonly known “slow death of democracy” must be thwarted by the democratic mechanisms. For the latter, changing in social and political structure on even in political culture is necessary.

Many scholars also support this dimension and perceive democratic consolidation as a process of what O’Donnell called “second transition”, which begins with the inauguration of democratic government and ends –if all goes well- with the establishment of a consolidated democratic regime (Mainwaring et. al., 1992, p. 2).

Interlude of this process requires deepening and advancement of democracy in several areas of democratic type of regime. “Process of moving away from some ‘diminished subtypes’ of democracy toward a ‘non-diminished subtypes’, deepening liberal democracy or institutionalizing democracy’s basic ground rules” called by Schedler as completing, deepening and organizing democracy (Schedler, 1998, p. 97-101). However, this view exacerbates conceptual ambiguity of democratic consolidation as well. Anticipation of reaching to a more advanced or a kind of normative democratic quality of democratic regime is making “democratic consolidation” a kind of a boundless concept based on the premise that it would never breakdown.

In their study, Linz & Stepan (1996) are referring to consolidation in order to define a political situation in which democracy has become “the only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5). Democracy can be considered as “the only game in town” in cases where it behaviorally, attitudinally and constitutionally consolidated, democratic norms, values and institutions deeply internalized and routinized by the public and actors in political, social and psychological life. Behaviorally, democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state, attitudinally, when even in the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas and constitutionally, when all the actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according to the established norms and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5). Citizens and political actors of consolidated democracies must stay within the scope of democratic methods even in the face of economic and political crisis, shocks or deteriorations. Any measure and policy preferences outside of the constraints of democratic rules, norms and procedures or ousting democratic regime and institutions could be anything but the characteristics of consolidated democracies. Public must perceive that democratic processes and methods are the only legitimate way for solving problems within the boundaries of democracy. Same definitional condition proposed by Adam Przeworski as well. Przeworski (1991) argues that democratic

consolidation occurs when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions (Przeworski, 1991, p. 26). According to this definition, public and actors must deeply internalize the rules of the game, accept and routinely practice them. Since people are aware of any violation of the formal and informal rules will be costly for them; strategic behaviors, future costs will discourage them from violations of the rules. Therefore, in regimes with law-based rule, the chances of violation of constitution or norms would be less likely to occur considering the actors are informed about the costs that will face. In these situations, the actual behavior of actors will be close to formal rules, since they do not mind to violate rules, because it will be costly for them. For that reason, consolidated regimes are more likely to be formed in those countries where “the gap between the formal rules and actual behaviors are close to each other” (O’Donnell, 1996, p. 41).

Gunther, et. al. (1995) seems to define consolidation along the same line with Linz and Stepan. According to them, when all significant groups provide attitudinal support and behavioral compatibility with the new democratic institutions and the rules of the game, democracy is sufficiently consolidated (Gunther et. al., 1995, p. 7). Democratic regimes are *sufficiently consolidated* so as to survive and remain stable in the face of such serious challenges as major economic or international crises, or even serious outbreaks of terrorist violence (Gunther et. al., 1995, p. 8). Their definition at first stipulated a condition for the political groups’ attitudinal and behavioral commitment to the democracy, then emphasize the regimes’ need of survival for democratic consolidation. Definition of Gunther et al. seem more on the line of Linz & Stepan’s (1996) conceptualization of democratic consolidation.

Their second definition is on the line of negative notions of democratic consolidation which emphasize the confrontation with authoritarian regression. Accepting the rules of the game by all significant political actors might partially provide legitimacy for the political regime, but this situation does not necessarily incorporate institutionalization or stability and endurance of the regime.

Attitudinal and behavioral commitment to democratic values and institutions can be necessary condition for democracy but not the sufficient condition for consolidation. On the other hand, regime durability and endurance do not necessarily imply consolidation of democracy as well. As Haggard & Kaufmann (1994) asserted that, many new democracies survived severe economic shocks, but their durability did not necessarily imply increasing legitimacy and acceptance of “the rules of the game” (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994, p. 6). Larry Diamond focuses on this “legitimacy” aspect of consolidation as well. According to him (1994), consolidation is the process by which democracy become so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that is very unlikely to break down. It involves behavioral and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty (Diamond, 1994, p. 15). Linz & Stepan (1992), Diamond (1994), Haggard & Kaufmann (1994) are commonly on the line of “the only game in town” definition, which expects attitudinal, behavioral, constitutional and even psychological institutionalization of rules and behaviors from actors.

J. Samuel Valenzuela’s definition is much more in the line of “confronting authoritarian regression”. In his definition, the scholar associates consolidation with its stability, its immunity, durability and persistence against disintegration and secession. However, stability cannot be equated with progress towards creating a fully democratic regime; what enhances stability may detract from the democratic quality of a regime (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 59). Elimination of destabilizing factors might be achieved by the means of rule of law. Undemocratic tools and ways could not be the solution for resolving the problems of potential reverse waves. Animosity produced political actions might in turn produce another counter waves at the end of this process. Consolidated democracies are those in which regime reversal and potentially destabilizing factors that are far-fetched from reality (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 58). A regime that consolidates its democracy is the one that does not have any perverse elements that might undermine quality of democracy. Valenzuela asserted that the danger producing perversion areas that can undermine democratic methods. The existence of non-democratic tutelary powers, subsistence of reserved domains in policy making decisions and discrimination

in the electoral process such as excluding minority party from elections are perverse elements that will make the democracy non-consolidated (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 69). Chances of democratic consolidation will fail unless these elements are eliminated from playing field. Many of these elements might be the residuals of the facilitating conditions of first transition; namely transition from authoritarian rule to democratic one.

For some, democratic consolidation is a complex and uncertain process from becoming a democratic government to democratic regime. According to O'Donnell, democratic consolidation can be perceived as the second transition –first one is transition to democracy- which eliminates the chances of confronting with authoritarian regression in near future. According to Guillermo O'Donnell (1992),

“Consolidated democracy or a democratic regime as one where there is political democracy in which democratic actors no longer have as one of their central concerns the avoidance of a authoritarian regression, and consequently do not subordinate their decisions (and omissions) to such a concern; where social and political actors who control significant power resources habitually subject their interrelations to the institutions specific to political democracy by means of practices compatible with the reproduction of these institutions – institutions which, whether they liked it or not, these actors calculate will last indefinitely; where the habitual nature of these practices and the strengthening of these institutions sustain the “procedural consensus” which Schmitter and I discussed in our cited work, and promote the uncertain nature of outcomes of fair and competitive elections; where this set of political relationship is increasingly consistent with the extension of similarly democratic (or at least non despotic and non-archaic) relations into other spheres of social life; where rulers and officialdom subject themselves to the distinction between the public and the private and there exist reasonably effective mechanisms to sanction anti-republican actions on their part” (O'Donnell, 1992, p. 48-49).

O'Donnell's perspective is standing between two camps of definitional differentiation. For O'Donnell, democracy becomes consolidated when political actors no longer observe the threat of authoritarian regression. If this happens, avoiding authoritarian regression will no longer be the political actors' main concern. Perversions and threat of authoritarian reversals will be definitely eliminated and have no longer concerned by the actors. Their policy preferences will not impinged on the decisions ordered by any tutelary power. Institutions and rules of the games will be definite for

the actors who are habitually subjected to them. Formal and informal rules should be habitually accepted and internalized by the actors. This will not only decrease the level of uncertainty in the game but would also reduce the gap between observed behaviors and expectations. Existence of these conditions in political arena is the evidence of democratic consolidation. His definition of democratic consolidation requires more than institutionalization of democratic procedures. If elections and their surrounding freedoms are institutionalized, it might be said that polyarchy or political democracy is “consolidated”, likely to endure (O’Donnell, 1996, p. 37). However, the process of transforming democratic government to democratic regime requires more than the institutionalization of these democratic procedures but also affirmative behavioral, attitudinal and psychological transformations that are coherent with democracy.

There is no proof that democracies are inevitable, irrevocable, or a historical necessity (Schmitter, 1994, p. 57). They maybe not the most efficient, responsive, accountable regime type either. But, at the same time, this type of government is less evil than other type of regime. For that reason, making the democracy immune, persistent, strong and able to withstand against authoritarian regressions is a historical necessity. And for this aim, one has to examine the conditions that make democratic consolidation possible.

### **3.3 Backsliding of Democracies**

Nowadays, the optimism about third wave of democracies is lost. Troubles such as the rise of populist leaders even in the consolidated democracies like Trump’s victory in United States of America, refugee crisis in Europe, Brexit, Euro crisis and global economic recession leads to pessimistic anxiety about global political turmoil and the future of democracies. Last few years marked the increasing number of questions just as; whether the democracy is in decline, is there a retreat from democracy, is democracy backsliding or are we observing the slow death of democracy? All of these questions focusing to detect the issues of hybrid regimes and whether the retreat of democracy is in question? These questions are implying that there are ongoing problems in

democracies around the world that demand that the scholars need to find elements to explain this phenomenon.

As I emphasize above, there is a possibility for breakdown of consolidated democracies. Consolidated democracies are not irrevocable concepts that they can never weaken or even breakdown. They can breakdown if they lack some core elements of what makes a democracy resilient or by *autogolpes*, or military coup etc. In today, breakdown of democracies or backsliding into authoritarianism by the incumbent become more prevalent from of subversion. Milan Svolik (2017) observed that the checks –public disapproval- on incumbent are often fails if the society is deeply polarized. In these societies, partisan voting and identification of voters with party or a leader is more obvious. Voters in polarized societies are indeed willing to trade off democratic principles for partisan interests and that their willingness to do so increases in the intensity of their partisanship (Svolik, 2017, p. 1). Elections became a central in these country's leaders in order to provide support of partisans since it is costly for them to change their votes. Therefore, in these regimes, polarization creates favorable conditions for backsliding into authoritarianism by the incumbent, through manipulating democratic processes.

Democracy necessitates protection of its core values and procedures. Today, studies observing numbers of threats against democracies, which can corrupt these requirements of democracy even in consolidated ones. These democracies prove their resilience against authoritarian regressions during times of economic and political turmoil. However, consolidated democracies can be resilient until they are not resilient against pushback. Retreat of factors that make a democracy consolidated can make a democracy backslide.

Is democracies are backsliding? According to Mechkova et. al. (2017), the answer is yes. According to data from 1976 to 2016, the average degree of democracy in the world is decreasing within regime types compared to pre-2000 period, democracies becoming less liberal and autocracies less competitive and less repressive, where in few countries even backsliding from democracy to autocracy like Thailand



(Mechkova et. al., 2017, p. 162). In liberal democracies, declines stem from non-electoral arenas such as rule of law, restrictions on media, journalism, freedom of expressions, and so, while in electoral democracies electoral processes are highly controlled by the incumbent at the expense of opposition. Backsliding is the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy (Bermeo, 2016, p. 5). Serious weakening of democratic institutions leads to backsliding of democracy. Extensive weakening of democratic institutions both in terms of scope and depth may end up with the breakdown of democracy.

According to Foa & Mounk (2016) citizens of number of consolidated countries in North America and Western Europe have become more cynical, less hopeful for democracy and willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives. Therefore, the claim is that worsening democratic legitimacy led to backsliding (Foa & Mounk, 2016, p. 7). Citizens have less faith that they can affect politics. Especially, devotion of millennials –born after 1980s- to democracy is lesser than older generations of their countries. What Foa & Mounk claimed seems parallel to what Linz & Stepan proposed in 1978. According to Linz & Stefan (1978) democratic consolidation requires behaviorally, attitudinally and constitutionally consolidated democratic norms, values and institutions that are deeply internalized and routinized by the public and political actors. Low level of commitment of political elites to the democratic system and to low support for democratic norms and institutions by the public omits one of the significant ingredients of the democracy for resilience. Decline in these areas through cynicism, political apathy, unwillingness to follow and get involved in political processes may lead to inclination toward populist alternatives. Democracy is not just free, fair and frequent elections but requires support, participation and activism of people for protections of civil rights and liberties and minimum requirements of democracy.

Freedom House provides no evidence that the quality of institutions protecting political rights and civil liberties deteriorated across Western democracies from 1972 to end-2016 (Norris, 2017, p. 3). Therefore, there must be others reasons for the presupposition of existing or potential decline in democratic institutions in all around the world. Behaviorally, the most important destabilizing threats for democratic regimes

are terrorism and the rise of populist authoritarianism. Incapacity of security forces from preventing terrorist attacks in Western metropolis in the last three years and the rise of populist authoritarian leaders that do not follow the conventional practices of observed liberal democracies, mistrust of the establishment, demonizing media and judiciary while challenging the core values of pluralism, social tolerance, rule of law, human rights, and freedoms in Western societies (Norris, 2017, p. 3). Terrorism in the center of Western democracies probably created a sense of insecurity among public, which led to support for more security based political measures. Therefore, it may produce inclination towards populist-authoritarian policies and support for right parties which traditionally support security based policies, less tolerant parties against refugees, freedoms of media and expressions as in the examples of Geert Wilders of Holland and Mariene Le Pen of France.

Where backsliding involves rapid and radical change across a broad range of institutions, it leads to outright democratic breakdown or authoritarian rule and where backsliding takes the form of gradual changes across a more circumscribed set of institutions, it is more likely to produce political systems that are ambiguously democratic or hybrid (Bermeo, 2016, p. 6). There we can claim that the pace –instant or gradual-, actors, scope and number of institutions that are exposed to populist-authoritarian pressures determines the endpoints of backsliding process. Elimination of political institution can be initiated by many actors such as popularly supported, democratically elected presidents as well. Bermeo (2016) offers six different types of backsliding for conceptualization of the term. According to her, there is a dramatic decline in frequency of *classic* (military intervention), *executive* (self-coups, *autogolpes*) *coups* and *election day vote frauds* between 1950-2014 (Bermeo, 2016, p. 6-8). Therefore, number of democracies being target of military coups or electoral fraud is declined between 1950-2014. First two can be seen as military, economic or political elites' intervention to democracy, which could be the reason of dramatic breakdowns rather than gradual erosion of democracy. The reason in the decline of *election day vote frauds* can be the civil society organizations' ability to conduct election monitoring. *Promissionary coups* frame the ouster of an elected government as the defense of

democratic legality and make a public promise to hold elections and restore democracy as soon as possible (Bermeo, 2016, p. 6-8). In *executive aggrandizement* type of backsliding refers to slow erosion of democracy without executive replacement. This form of backsliding occurs when executives weaken checks on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive preferences (Bermeo, 2016, p. 6-10). The last type, manipulation of elections strategically, through harassing opponents, modifications for election rules for favoring the incumbent etc. Election fraud generally needs strong organizational capabilities or exploitations of state institutions like judiciary, election councils or security forces. Therefore, it can be applied by incumbent governments that seek to maintain their office. Executive aggrandizement refers to inclination to authoritarianism with the eliminations of democratic institutions one by one.

Scholarly attention was mostly focused on the clear cases of breakdowns, transitions and consolidations of democracies and factors that correlate with these phenomena. However, backsliding is somewhat an elusive concept. Even if its definition is clear; the type of backsliding, elements and mechanisms that lead to backsliding depend on the type of regimes that we are talking about. In liberal democracies, as Bermeo (2016) and Norris (2017) show, there is no decline in constitutional framework of democratic institutions. Rather, backsliding happened through deteriorations in the civil rights and liberties. One explanation of this situation can be that, constitutional amendments/modifications about the structure of democratic institutions such as electoral system or the structure of judiciary necessitates more procedural and legal effort than targeting media, academics, pundits etc. Therefore, populist leaders may focus on attacking freedom of expression and media and civil society first. These institutions are crucial in holding the incumbent accountable, increasing the transparency of the system; they are more “easy” targets for populist leaders than attacking the judiciary or electoral system of regimes. Populist leaders’ attacks against social tolerance, moderation, solidarity, cooperation, disengaged civic activism that holds people together for protecting democratic institutions. Further erosion in the democratic institutions will eliminate the last "democratic" characteristic

of these flawed regimes, and then led to shift these hybrid regimes into authoritarian regimes.

### **3.4 Traits that Make Democracies Resilient**

Whatever its faults, this mode of political rule –democracy- was clearly preferable to any of several forms of autocracy (Schmitter, 1994, p. 57). There is a widely shared belief that democracy is less evil than other types of government systems. Proliferation of democratic countries has always been supported by international organizations and democratic countries. Spread of democratic values, legitimating the democratic procedures in the eyes of the public, recognition of formal and informal rules and effective governments of states are the facilitating factors for democratic countries in order to disseminate democratic regimes around the world.

Democracy has to be perceived as legitimate, accountable, effective and responsive for its citizens. It has to be seen in a higher and a precious position that citizens do not want to lose at all costs. In order to achieve this, democracy must function effectively and answer the needs of the people responsively. These perceptions should be deepened in areas such as institutions, values, political culture or economy.

The aim of this part of chapter is to analyze the supportive conditions that help consolidate a democracy. Obviously, there is not a single type of democratic consolidation process or a mechanism. Each consolidated democracies has their own historical trajectories, stages and narratives, domestic conditions.

One does not preclude the possibility that at some future time it could break down and there is not only one type of consolidated democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 16). The threat of populism, emergence of new set of problems that democracy did not confront previously, great economic and political shocks or highly popular anti-democratic leadership can transform democratic waves into authoritarian regressions. In order to prevent such situations, institutions must be crafted by means of taking into consideration of countries social, economic and political properties and historical

backgrounds. If successful democratic consolidation is the goal, crafters of democracy must take into careful consideration the particular mix of nations, cultures, and rising political identities present in the territory (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 28).

There must be a state for consolidation of democracies. No state, no democracy (Stepan & Linz, 1996, p. 15). Congruence between the *polis* and the *demos* facilitates the creation of a democratic nation-state; it also virtually eliminates all problems of “stateness” and should thus be considered a supportive condition for democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 24). For completion, democratic transition must be completed and political system, at least, must meet the criteria of polyarchy. Consolidation of democracy depends upon the foundation of the regime that at least meet with the minimum requirements of polyarchy. Because, only democracies can be democratically consolidated. The first condition for the consolidation of democracy is the completion of democratic transition that provides establishment of polyarchy. It is misleading to discuss the issue of democratic consolidation if the transition from any kind of authoritarian regimes or a subtype of regimes is not completed. Foundation of minimum prerequisites of democracy is essential for gradual institutionalization of democracy.

The problem of Turkey starts in this point. Turkish democracy after formal transition to democracy in 1983 took a form of defective democracy due to the existence of tutelary powers. Therefore, Turkey can be regarded as a tutelary democracy, a diminished subtype of democracy. Restrictions on freedom of expression and media, alternative information and associational autonomy, existence of tutelary and veto powers, hindered the country’s democratic completion. Turkey was on the continuing process of democratization although the existence of several unfavorable for full democracy. For that reason, it is not possible to talk about the democratic consolidation. Yet, this would not withhold us from the further discussions. What are the conditions of Turkey to help in build an institutionalized democracy? What are the shortcomings of Turkey for becoming a consolidated democracy in the future?

### **3.4.1 Civil Society**

Lively civil society must exist for stable democracies. Their interest and values will play major role in the stability of democratic regimes. For Linz & Stepan (1996), civil society is an arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 7). For Larry Diamond (1994), civil society is the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, and autonomous from the state, and bound by a large order or set of shared rules (Diamond, 1994, p. 5). Several points seem common in these two definitions. Civil society is self-organizing and generating, voluntarily participated associations and interest group organizations. These characteristics might provide basis for sharing and promoting values that are needed by democracy. Civil society can play role in promoting the functioning of democracy such as civic competence, solidarity among citizens, moderation, interpersonal trust, compromise, toleration for other people's ideologies. Through creating these democratic attributes and integrating them successfully into political culture of a country, civil society can contribute to democratic consolidation via moderation of extreme views, respect for other ideas, collaborating for specific task and most importantly help promote civic competence.

Civil society can bound the exercise of arbitrary state power. Civil society is an intermediary organization, situated between the state and private sphere. The most striking property of civil society is its ability of limiting state power. It involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable (Diamond, 1994, p. 5). Civil society can force politicians and public officers to be accountable to its citizens. Women and trade groups, associations, ethnic and religious groups can constrain arbitrary rule of state; can control abuses of state resources; can form societal accountability with the help of media in order to defend civil rights and liberties, can help flow of ideas and ideologies and can buttress pluralism and diversity within the system and can be part of checks and balances system

of democracy. This realm of spontaneously created social organizations separate from the state structure that underlie democratic political institutions and they are less manipulable by public policy, and indeed often bear an inverse relationship to state power, growing stronger as the state recedes and vice versa (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 8). As civil society increases its role in public realm or deepens its social roots with society, states' intervention to civil society institutions would be less likely. This pressure against state authority or effort for making the state more accountable might conclude with forcing state for policy changes or concessions with public. However, this huge effort requires rule of law to protect its own organization. For that reason, civil society and rule of law are two interconnecting areas that support each other in order to consolidate democratic system.

Another function of a democratic civil society is recruiting and training new political leaders (Diamond, 1994, p. 9). Civil society can be a step for significant success in civil society arena for politically competent citizens; volunteers can gain experience in politics and connect with political parties. Study of Robert Putnam's (1993) shows the social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1993, p. 67). Education will play crucial role in this point. Education will bring civic engagement, informed citizens, will support political participation and will increase the level of social capital. In order to come together for specific reasons traditions of civic engagement must exist and the trust for each other will facilitate this possibility. According to Putnam (2000), there is a causal mechanism between trust and participation; "virtuous circle" both affecting each other. For him, voluntary membership to social organizations like bowling clubs, sport clubs, religious organizations, etc. will increase the level of trust. Networks of civic engagement will promote social trust and social capital and formation of civil society organization is most likely depends on these elements which in turn will increase the level of interpersonal trust and tolerance for minorities. According to Uslaner (2002), there is only one causal arrow and that is from moral trust to civic engagement. Uslaner claims that social organizations as Putnam said only make people socialize with their own class

or those with similar background. Therefore, it does not increase general trust but individual one. This situation might even be harmful for general trust since it can create in group, particularistic trust rather than a trust to others.

Another important role that civil society can play is its social mobilizing effects. Civil society can increase political efficacy not only through recruiting politicians but also with supporting political participation and civic duties such as electoral watchdog, non-partisan election-monitoring, and hold politicians accountable for the public and check violations of public authorities. Civil society's effort of election-monitoring can change the results, can certify the fairness of elections and can avert election fraud. Armed with certain amount of civic competence, citizens may hold elected officials accountable. A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state institution and expenditures, can help transitions get start, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and deepen democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 9). Civil society is one of the crucial areas of democratic consolidation and as Larry Diamond (1994) pointed out "a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidation and maintaining democracy than for initiating it (Diamond, 1994, p. 7).

Civil society is an essential component of democratic consolidation but not the transition. Civil society can contribute to the functioning of democracy through the mechanisms that I indicate above within institutionalized political order. Because in pre democratic transition period, old regime forces could not allowed vibrant civil society and may manipulate them. Another strategy could be being selective about civil society institutions. Regime can only allow associations that are loyal to regime forces. For that reason, civil society can function properly only after introduction of democratic regime.

### **3.4.2 Political Society**

Civil society must be non-partisan and autonomous from political society. Distinctiveness of these two areas is important, but also their complementarily is crucial. Political society can be a mediating power between civil society and state or a



channel that represent policy changing demand of civil society. By political society, Linz & Stepan (1996) mean that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 8).

The building of a consolidated democracy involves in part an affirmation and strengthening of certain institutions, such as the electoral system, revitalized or newly created parties, judicial independence and respect for human rights, which have been created or recreated during the course of the first transition (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 58). Normative positive appreciation of those core institutions of a democratic political society –political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances, and legislatures- by which society constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic government (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 8). Institutionalization of political party system and parties itself, their internal organization and leadership, electoral system and election rules can contribute to consolidation of democratic political society. And these prerequisites must be appreciated by the wide range of society.

### **3.4.3 Rule of Law**

Government must be subjected to law and oversight of the courts. No democratically elected government is above law (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 63). Not only government but also all kind of regional power, ethnic, political or economic groups and political leaders; in short, all significant political actors without any privilege must be subjected to independent and autonomous law and oversight of the courts. Existence of any tutelary power above law will be the first destabilizing factor in political system in order to establish consolidated democracy.

The elected government and the state administration are subjected to a network of laws, courts, semiautonomous review and control agencies, and civil-society norms that not only check the state's illegal tendencies but also embedded it in an interconnecting web of mechanisms requiring transparency and accountability (Linz &

Stepan, 1996, p. 19). Rule of law, through protecting civil society, any other review and control agencies can contribute to transparency and accountability of the system. Beside this, civil rights and liberties backed by network of law and courts would help increase the quality of democracy. Another point that I want to emphasize is judicial oversight. Emerging after World War II, constitutional courts became the significant fortress of protecting the civil and minority rights, liberties and confronting violations of rules and procedures and other type of constitutional policies. Constitutional monitoring backed by the power of law can be supportive element of democratic consolidation. If the rule of law supported by the constitution had written in a consensual process, integrated all significant political groups and take political leader's support, than respect for the laws and courts might have been more likely to happen. The extent of judicial independence; rule of law, judicial oversight and the role that constitutional courts in politics are significant factors on advancement of democracy in a country.

#### **3.4.4 Economic Society**

As both theoretically and empirically shown, economic conditions and indicators play significant role in both transition and consolidation of democracy. Suitable conditions are supportive of formation and then, endurance of democratic governance. Modern consolidated democracies require “a set of socio-politically crafted and socio-politically accepted norms, institutions, and regulations”, which Linz and Stepan call economic society that mediates between state and market (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 11).

Economic markets are necessary but not sufficient conditions for democracy (Maravall, 1995). Consolidation of democracy in pure market economy or in pure command economy is less likely to emerge. As studies of several scholars indicated an effective, legitimate and stable democracy needs re-distributional policies in pure market economy as like society needs intermediary organizations and pluralism in pure command economy. Since, civil society is acknowledged as one of the significant pro-democratic force and necessary condition for consolidation and its association with market necessitates this kind of economic order in country. On the other hand, in order to prevent political apathy, alienation from political system and cynicism; state must

provide material benefits, social services, keep inflation moderate and sometimes market intervention for the lower strata of the society. For that reason, economic organization must be found on the balance between those two in order to derive support and sustain for democratic system.

In their distinctive study, Przeworski et. al. (2000) found two general finding. Once a country has a democratic regime, its level of economic development has a very strong effect on the probability that democracy will survive (Przeworski et. al., 2000, p. 40). Economic growth has contributive effect on the survival of the democratic regimes. The faster the growth of economy, the more facilitating conditions emerges for the survival of democracies. Scholars have revealed that democracies survive if they generate economic growth and if they control distributional pressures by allowing some inflation and reducing income inequality (Przeworski et.al., 1996, p. 50). More moderate inflation and income equality have facilitating effect on democratic consolidation and increase probability of more stable democracy. Drawing from the study of Boix (2003), Boix & Stokes (2003) argue that “democracy is caused not by income per se but by other changes that accompany development, in particular, income equality” (Boix & Stokes 2003, p. 540). They claimed that the economic development is an extremely important predictor of transition prior to 1950, but has only a small (though statistically significant) effect in the post-1950 period.

Increasing growth would likely to support distributional policies, wealth and reducing unemployment rate will change social strata. Under the condition of moderate inflation and economic inequality; widening middle class would be reason behind the political moderation, reducing support for extremist parties, stronger civil society and dispersion of middle class values such as tolerance, trust among society (Lipset, 1959, p. 84). Increase in the income level of a nation will affect political values and promote democratic norms. For that reason, sustaining economic growth is crucial for democracy’s survival and stability. Political leaders of newly emerged democratic countries must focus on this area and craft their institutions with reference to economic growth. Even where democratic regimes are held in place, weak economic performance can undermine attitudes and behaviors that are important for democratic consolidation

(Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994, p. 6). Economic deterioration and rising inflation have been closely linked with social tension. Lower classes of the society are not vulnerable to economic crisis and are also more likely to produce social events. Political system must provide material benefits to this part of society not through clientelism, favoritism or patronage, but as it is citizen right. For that reason, policy performance by new democratic governments should be positive for the sake of legitimating democracy, but the context of severe economic crises makes such an outcome doubtful (Mainwaring et. al., 1992, p. 9). The relationship between legitimacy and macro-economic outlook must be kept in the mind of political leaders.

Modernization increases the receptiveness to the type of norms and values that mitigate conflict, penalize extremist groups, and reward moderate democratic parties (Lipset, 1959, p. 83-84). In countries that are experiencing protracted economic deterioration chances of confronting political cynicism and apathy, strikes, public demonstrations, decline in political participation more likely to emerge. Increasing inclination towards extreme, revolutionary or antiestablishment political groups and their actions, at first, would produce destabilizing factors, and might pose risk to the erosion of democracy. If a democratic regime lost citizens' faith towards democratic political system, then authoritarian cures for economic prescriptions may become more favorable for alienated part of society.

Przeworski et. al. (2000) empirically verified that growth matters for regimes survival –especially per capita income indicators-, changes in the overall distribution have no clear effect on the stability of regimes but democracies are somewhat less stable when the share of the bottom 40% declines (Przeworski, 2000, p. 109-121) and lastly, democracies are much more likely to survive in affluent countries. According Diamond & Plattner (1995) democracy cannot be consolidated unless it eventually generates the basis for sustainable growth.

### **3.4.5 Elimination of Tutelary Powers and Reserved Domains**

Building an effective democracy very often requires abandoning or altering arrangements, and institutions that may have facilitated the first transition (by providing guarantees to authoritarian rulers and the forces backing them) but that are inimical to the second (Valenzuela, 1992, p. 58). Existence of a tutelary or veto power or specific “guaranteed, protected” political areas absent from provision of civilian rule is detrimental to democratic regime. However, these concessions are significant in reaching consensus especially with those who hold power in authoritarian era for exit strategies during democratic transitions.

Guarantees provided for authoritarian elite, military and police forces, judiciaries or dominant business groups in exchange for the introduction of democratic methods are facilitating conditions in the times of democratic transition. Constitution written in the supervision of tutelary powers, specific laws for the protection of old authoritarian powers, reserved domains such as higher ranks of judiciary or specific ministries out of civilian control are generally known methods of exit guarantees. These areas can be considered as sources of destabilizing factors and regime reversals. In the long term these easing transitional conditions turned to drawbacks for the democratic type of government. Advancement in the democratic way of government requires abolishment of these areas and concessions and subordinating military to the democratic government.

Democracy cannot be consolidated if the military continues to challenge the democratization. They should not be interfering to democratic political system, restraints to their specialized area.

### **3.4.6 Political Culture**

In 1959 Lipset asked his inspiring question of why rich countries are more likely to be democracies than poor ones. There must be many replies to this question and from 1960s onward. One of these replies focuses on the aspects of political culture that a

country has. Political culture was seen as one of the supportive factor of a democratic political system. The term “political culture” refers to specifically political orientations –attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of self in the system (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 12). Almond & Verba (1963) define the democratic political culture as civic culture which seen as an allegiant political culture in which political participation is mixed with passivity, trust, and deference to authority. This deepest level includes phenomena such as family structure, religion, moral values, ethnic consciousness, “civic-ness,” and particularistic historical traditions (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 8).

The term “civic culture” refers to a culture of consensus, a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion; a culture permitted change but moderated it, culture of diversity and consensualism, rationalism and traditionalism (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 6). This type of culture does not only protect pluralism, diversity, tolerance and trust among citizens, it can also help promote civil society and political society and provide a foundation for consensus based political atmosphere. The greater the degree of consensus among political forces over “national goals”, political institutions such as the constitution and rules of the games is, the greater the chances of solving historical cleavages and political, ethnic, religious conflicts. Consensus based politics can reduce political tension and promote political moderation through decreasing the level of political polarization and make political collaborations possible between parties. Prevention of zero-sum forms of politics would definitely support democratic consolidation.

It appears that the acquisition through repeated practice of asset of democratic attitudes –in politics as well as in other spheres- tends to spill over from its point of origin in the direction of other patterns of authority (O’Donnell, 1992, p. 20). Abolishment of authoritarian tendencies and practices at all level of society from family to macro-politics would support democratic methods in all areas of life. The acquisition of democratic beliefs and attitudes seems to be contagious: if we practice them in certain types of activities, it is likely that we will extend them and/or support those who attempt to do so (O’Donnell, 1992, p. 20). In order to consolidate democracy, attitudes,

behaviors or even psychological appreciation of democracy must be accepted and internalized. This can be possible with the practice of democracy which in turn tends to spill over and help fight against the despotic patterns of authority at all level of society. If citizens are practicing and routinely applying a more moderate, participatory and inclusive behavior in life, then these personal behaviors can transmit to political culture and generate and promote of these attributes. Education level of the masses can also become crucial. It would not be wrong to say democracy will probably be more endured if citizens are more educated and demanding, when they actively participate in political topics, and are aware of their citizens' duty. When the ideal citizen profile meets with the favorable economic conditions, civic culture will more likely emerge and begin to promote democracy in that country.

However, the question of whether democracy brings democratic political culture and values or political culture itself brings democracy is still a question on the table. For many years the role of political culture is downplayed by many researchers on the transition to democracy literature. Specifically, political belief attitudes towards the political systems emerged as an intervening factor for the relationship between economic development and democracy. Through democratic practices, democratic beliefs and practices will diffuse around the political institutions. Inglehart (1997) claimed that economic development, cultural change, and political change go together in coherent and even predictable patterns. Developments of these social institutions will increase education then will create a facilitating political culture that promotes democracy. Once industrialism has embarked, socioeconomic changes and related syndromes are likely to appear; from mass mobilization to the changes in gender roles which then will bring new societal changes to democratic political institutions. According to Inglehart's empirical research from same article, individuals' attitudes to the functioning of democratic institutions was limited in quality and depth. According to Lijphart (1980), the reverse causal relationship is possible in which democratic stability promote the civic culture. For Limongi & Przeworski (1997) transition to democracy is mostly determined at the elite level regardless of the underlying economic

and cultural conditions. However, this does not mean that civic aspects of political culture will bring democratization by itself.

One criticism is whether the civic political culture is a product or a producer of democratic systems. For the study of Schmitter & Karl (1991), civic culture is much more a product of democracy. Because, formation of civic culture taken time for it to become a habitual practice. In pre-democratic transition period, aspects of civic culture are less probably ingrained in the society. For that reason, proliferation of factors that will bring civic culture very likely depend on the habituation of democratic practices. Traits such as tolerance to minorities, interpersonal trust, moderation, and respect to each other should be established in society. For that reason, ingrained of these aspects of political culture requires the process of regime consolidation.

#### **3.4.7 Commitment of Political Elites**

Democracy requires competent politicians who know political procedures, experienced in political processes and commit to the democratic practices. Commitment of political elites and parties to democracy is a necessary condition for stable democracy. Political elites must create institutions that represent interests in society and exercise moderating power over those interests (Mainwaring, 1992, p. 310). Democracy is a game that requires politicians' commitment to it to become stable in order to make it more stable and effective.

Democracies are more likely to survive when political actors have a strong normative preference for democracy and when they avoid radical policy positions (Mainwaring & Linan, 2013, p. 124). By commitment to democracy, we mean politicians value, internalize, practice and embrace the democratic methods in politics, holding normative preferences for democracy and these preferences can support democratic regimes' survival and endurance. If formerly authoritarian political elites commit to democracy after democratic transition, chances of democratic consolidation become possible.



Regime breakdown will be more likely to emerge with the management of authoritarian leaders who disrespect and violate democratic procedures. If radical actors win state powers, can control the institutions, they can impose high costs on the other actors, making it tempting for the losers to resort to coups as a way of preventing major and extremely difficult-to-reverse costs (Mainwaring & Linan, 2013, p. 130). This can open gates for authoritarian leaders to skew the playing field. In order to advance toward the consolidation of democracy, we see that democratic actors must at least. (a) neutralize those actors who are unconditionally authoritarian, either by isolating them politically or by turning them into fragmented sects who cannot threaten the survival of the regime, and (b) in regard to neutral actors, promote preferences or at least practices which are compatible with the functioning of democracy (O'Donnell, 1992, p. 22). Political elites that are deeply committed to democracy would prevent country from such situation or even push it for further advancement.

### **Conclusion**

Consolidation of democracy depends on the foundation of a regime that at least meet with the minimum requirements of polyarchy. Because, only democracies can be democratically consolidated. Democratic consolidation is not the consolidation of regime. Democratic consolidation requires institutionalization of democratic norms, procedures and institutions that make a system democracy. Consolidation of regime rather implies the consolidation of institutions or mechanisms in any type of regime. The first condition for the consolidation of democracy is the completion of democratic transition that provides establishment of polyarchy. It is misleading to discuss the issue of democratic consolidation if the transition from any kind of authoritarian regimes or a subtype of regimes is not completed. We can claim that the completion of democratic transition is different from the consolidation which is referring to a situation of institutionalization or stabilization of the democracy. Foundation of minimum prerequisites of democracy is essential for gradual institutionalization of democracy. Tutelary power above civilian politics with reserved domains or pressures on media and freedom of expressions are deficiencies and their existence presents barriers for

becoming a full democracy. While transition to democracy is still ongoing elimination of tutelary powers and any kind of illiberal or authoritarian practices can be eliminated. However, consolidation does not refer to advancement through stages per stages; rather a gradual process disseminates democratic ways, norms and institutions in political life. For that reason, consolidation of democracy must be differentiated from consolidation of subtypes.

One of the problematic traits of the concept “consolidation” is that it does not mean that these democracies would never breakdown. The premise that consolidation is irrevocable or inevitable is bound to be fail. Democratic consolidation connotes wide variety of meanings. As I scrutinize above, for some of the scholars democratic consolidation refers to a level of sustainability against authoritarian regressions and backslidings, endurance of regime and stability of democratic institutions what I have called “endurance” line of definition. For the other line, democratic consolidation refers to institutionalization of democratic practices in political, cultural and social structure that makes “the democracy the only game in town”. The latter requires attitudinal affirmatives for the democratic regimes.

In a democracy, specific properties of the system can contribute to immunity of democracy in confronting reverse pressures. Pluralism both in economy and political life, commitment of people to democratic methods, vibrant civil society that is not manipulated by the state, democratic political society and elimination of all authoritarian practices can strengthen the resilience of democratic system. Each of democratic consolidation areas has their own facilitating condition for democratic consolidation. But, the general framework of these conditions refers to sharing democratic values and practicing the democratic methods through inclusive participations to political processes. The golden rule of democratic consolidation is practicing democratic methods. Democracy disseminates through practicing and adopting of democratic practices in all way of life.

It should be noted that the institutional crafting of democracies can play significant role in both democratic transition and consolidation. Transition period,

concessions to old regime, creation of new institutional arrangements for the system, constitution forming periods and how these processes are managed vital for futures of democracy. Exclusivist political methods, institutions that produce authoritarian practices or cultural traits that accentuate obedience can be eliminated by the well-established political institutions. Even if each country has their own historical-traditional trajectories, precisely selected institutions can be cure for old problems, while providing concrete solutions for future ones. Therefore, democratic consolidation of countries may depend on their idiosyncratic political and economic history. Therefore, historical case studies can be optimal methodology for observing the consolidation of specific democracies.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **EROSION OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY**

In this chapter, I will focus on the Turkish democracy as a case after 1983 to 2017 presidential referendum. This was the year that country took democratic transition from military government to multiparty politics. In 1946, Turkey formally made the transition to democracy after World War II in order to become an ally of the Western World. There were several reasons behind this decision. Turkey was in need of military and political allies in order to protect itself from the menace of Socialist Bloc and Stalin's territorial claims over Turkey (Yılmaz, 1997). Severe pressures on uni-party system (Kalaycıoğlu 2008), displeasure of Turkish public after the WWII and the economic recession throughout WWII period (Pamuk, 2010) were other reasons behind this political decision. However, the relationship between Turkey and democracy was a bit intense, disputed in its early years. Multiparty politics has been interrupted by military interventions in several times. In 1960 and 1980, the Turkish military intervened in Turkish democracy directly with a military coup. It abolished multiparty politics, closed TGNA and declared martial law. Following 1983, multiparty politics started under the shadow of mighty Turkish military with the new 1982 Constitution. New constitution created a new political atmosphere with a new dialect, new political forces, politicians and generation, which led to criminalization of leftist political movements, their chances of regeneration for future (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005). When the putschist focused pressures on the leftists political movements, the regime founded by the 1980 putschists confronted with dominant Islamist and populist political party in the beginning of millennium.

In the first part, I will outline the factors that have been suggested in the literature and discuss each for the case of Turkey. Following the Turkish political

developments under the AKP rule after 2002 general elections; this study will focus on a general overview of Turkish politics with a historical and structural background on political events, including elections and the strategies that make AKP powerful will be the center of attention. In the second part, I will focus general structure of rule of law, civil society, political culture, populism and media and freedom of expressions.

#### **4.1 Turkey under AKP Rule**

In the 1990s, the Turkish democracy has faced two new challenges: the rise of political Islam as represented mainly by renowned Islamists such as Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (WP), and the rise of Kurdish nationalism. This need to be considered in the light of the emergence of globalism, the rise of micro nationalism around the globe, and religious fundamentalists movements in search for recognition to religious and nationalist identities and the rise of identity politics in the world, which in turn led to debates on the idea of unitary national state (Kalaycıoğlu & Çarkoğlu, 2007). The collapse of Soviet Union, weakening of social democratic welfare state policies in Western Europe, and revival of Islamic movements against leftist movements in Islamic countries, the effect of Iranian Revolution, the failure of Turkish leftist political movements for regeneration and neoliberal economic policies of the centre-right Motherland Party and the end of protectionist state policies after 1980 military coups led to decline of welfare state and create a sense of uncertainty in political order. These problems initiated the discussions regarding the unitary, social and secular characteristic of Turkish state. Collapse of USSR, Gulf War, Bosnian War, questioning of ethnicities created a state of uncertainty, in the minds of voters which also dragged them to vote for Islamic and nationalist parties (Kalaycıoğlu & Çarkoğlu, 2007). Weakening of leftist movements coincided with the rise of political Islam. Many social groups have been unable to protect themselves against this socio-political transformation. Islamic revivalist easily and successfully filled the void created as results of these developments. Shantytowns, newly emerged urban areas, newly migrated masses are mostly got under the network of Islamic movements, *cemaats* and *tarikats* (Ayata, 1996, p. 112). Rising powers; Kurdish nationalism and Islamic revivalism challenged

the national ideology, Atatürkism. Islamists, after the mid-1990s started to steal the fame and stage of Turkish politics, gained several electoral victories after 1995, which was the result of biggest electoral shift in Turkish political history from center right of political spectrum to far right. Hence, the political engineering project of 1982 Constitution had severe blow from 1991 and 1995 elections where coalition governments emerged and centripetal tendencies of the voters dissolved and shifted to rightist parties even if the coalition governments were centripetal. Fractionalization and volatility of votes have also increased (Turan, 2003, p. 156).

1994 local elections can be considered as a critical historical challenge to secular ideology of Turkish state. WP successfully gained the major metropolitan cities. Following local elections, WP became the top party in 1995 general elections, formed a coalition government with Tansu Çiller's centre-right DYP and Erbakan became the prime minister. WP successfully brought the problem of wearing headscarf –*türban*- to the national political level and successfully took advantage of the question in order to mobilize conservative masses especially women. Socio economically, least developed provinces of Turkey -mostly *gecekondu* areas and shantytowns-conservative masses and newly migrated Kurds living in metropolitan areas voted for the Welfare Party (Ayata, 1996, p. 112). The effect of this new transformation also had an impact on civil society. New charity organizations like IHH, Deniz Feneri become more prominent and MÜSİAD has been founded in early 1990s. Conservatives and those who are sensitive about the so-called headscarf question even some of leftist liberal groups came together in civil society organizations. Rising usage of Islamic references and speeches of Welfare party politicians and public presence of Islam in public increased the tension between WP and Turkish military and ended with the declaration of Turkish military which lead to breakdown of WP, centre-right True Path Party coalition government.

In 28<sup>th</sup> February 1997, declaration by the Turkish military against Erbakan's coalition government led to resignation of government. Civil society organizations played an important role during the so-called 28 February process. The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is), Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions Small Traders and Turkish Confederation of Small Traders (TESK) chairs supported the

declaration of National Security Council which attacked Islamist Erbakan Government to the heart of counter-revolutionary activities against secular republic founded by Atatürk. With the infamous postmodern coup of 28 February 1997, when the National Security Council<sup>5</sup> gave a declaration to the government asking it to take strict measures against the threat of rising Islamism in the country, the coalition government was dismantled (Yeğenoğlu, 2012, p. 229). After political bans to the leaders of WP, Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) established in 1998 as a caretaker party of WP. However, the difference about the role of Islam in politics created a split among the high rank cadre of the party between the traditionalist and reformist sides. Traditionalists have won the party congress, and reformists founded the Justice and Development Party –AKP- (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). 1990’s are important to understand conditions that bring AKP to power. In the following sections, I will show how AKP benefitted from the 90s politics for further support and for populist policies.

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP controlled the majority of seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) since 2002. In its first election, AKP had achieved to control two thirds of the seats in legislative assembly. In the early years of AKP’s majority government, party achieved decline in inflation, focused more on infrastructure development, consumption has boomed thanks to low-interest loans and social expenditures increased (Deliveli, 2015). These ratios were improved in comparison with the 2001 economic crises. Together with victory in 2002 elections, effective governance of economy contributed to the expansion of party’s electoral base. Even if AKP was founded by leaders with Islamic roots, they were able to gain votes from different positions of political spectrum such as nationalists, Kurdish and centre-right political groups. AKP was indeed a coalition of centre-right, combining Islamic politics and nationalist views. However, it was also supported by small and effective political groups such as liberals (Waldman & Çalışkan, 2017). At first, liberal intellectuals and supporters of EU integration process were suspicious about the party

---

<sup>5</sup> National Security Council (NSC, MGK in Turkish) founded by 1980 Constitution. Council develops national security policies together with Turkish military and civilian rulers. Council was many times criticized for being an “protected area”, created by 1980 Coup makers. NSC played an important role in the process after 1983. From the point of military NSC was a kind of an advisory council, in which military delivers its concerns on national security, foreign policy and current political issues. NSC was a channel for military to deliver their concerns, ideas and comments to civilian governments, rather than a mutual transfer of ideas about policies.

because of their Islamic sentiments, and then became defenders of AKP government as the party declared its allegiance to NATO and the accession process of the EU. Legal and constitutional reforms came out of by AKP, supported by the EU, opened the way for accession talks with Turkey in 2005. AKP was encouraged to curb the political role of Turkish military gradually. Party presented itself as a challenger against the political establishment and elite politics.

During their first term in power (2002 to 2007), AKP successfully lowered the inflation and interest rates, managed to stabilize macroeconomic variables, opened way for the recognition of linguistic and cultural rights of Kurdish identity and allowed religious women enter in universities while covered with *turban*; enhanced the visibility of Islamic symbols in public and gave voice to conservative parts of society (The Silent Revolution Report, 2013). EU conditionality regime's economic and political reform agenda and democratization process of AKP helped promote their political power and widened their electoral base. But, most importantly, these processes have helped AKP eliminate and delegitimize its major opponents, secular characteristics of the Turkish military and state institutions of Kemalist regime in politics.

In 2007 general elections, AKP came to power with strong electoral support. Party was strong enough to push back declaration of Turkish army that accused AKP government of being hotbed of anti-secular activities against Turkish Republic. Military's main aim was to block Abdullah Gül's –one of the founder of AKP and minister of Foreign Affairs - candidacy for Presidency, which according to higher ranks of judiciary and military, was unfit to the presidency because of his Islamic tendencies. However, deadlock was successfully eliminated by AKP through early elections in the same year. The AKP won majority of seats in TGNA with the 46,6% shares of vote, which forced military to accept the presidency of Abdullah Gül. Electoral success of AKP in 2007 helped AKP to control not only the legislative branch of government, but also presidency, which according to writers of 1982 Turkish constitutions is a symbolic position elected by the TGNA, absent from partisan politics and protector of national interest of secular Turkish state. However, a constitutional amendment made in 2007 altered the tenure and election procedures of presidency into 5+5 year tenure with direct



election by the people itself. Through direct elections, AKP could easily obtain presidency, head of executive in a country dominantly voting for centre-right/conservative parties. Since the opposition parties were weak and conservative, centre-right voting blocs consists more than 50% of Turkish people, AKP would easily get more than 50% vote of electorate. This strategy would help to eliminate one of the tutelary powers in politics. However, in March 2008, chief public prosecutor petitioned Constitutional Court for the closure of AKP on the account of its anti-secular activities. The international support for the party by EU and USA and dominant support of Turkish media and business may have helped the Constitutional Court's decision not to close.

In 2010 another debate emerged around Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). AKP aimed to reduce the dominance of Republicans in the body. Victory of 2010 Constitutional referendum<sup>6</sup> has helped AKP to control the appointment and electoral procedures of HSYK<sup>7</sup> and made it subordinate to the executive branch of the government through appointments for the body. With the help of President Abdullah Gül, judges and prosecutors with Islamic background and those who could be loyal to AKP government were appointed to HSYK and higher ranks of judiciary (Özbudun, 2014). After 2010, AKP was able to control legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government. Voters endorsed modifications to Turkey's current constitution, making the military more accountable to civilian courts and giving parliament - the 550-seat TGNA- more power to appoint judges (BBC, 12.09.2010).

Inclination towards majoritarian style of rule, demonization of dissents and opposition parties, restriction on freedom of expression, media and internet led to emergence of stifling political atmosphere, which in turn led to rising protests from

---

<sup>6</sup> Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) is key in controlling the high rank judiciary appointments. The most important constitutional modifications were the increasing power of TGNA in appointing the high judges. Controlling of HSYK was vital for AKP to decrease the power of Republicans within the Board. According to party, Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) was one of the last strongholds of conservative secularists together with the Turkish military and universities. HSYK did not hesitate to coalesce in joint declaration against the policies of Islamic parties together with universities.

<sup>7</sup> Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors is the institutional body of legal system of Turkish judiciary, plays significant role in appointments of judges and prosecutors. Body was established by 1982 Constitution, and its structure was amended in 2010 Constitutional Referendum.

opposition forces. A wave of protests in 2013 Gezi Parkı was a severe shock against AKP government and the way it represented itself as a democratic Islamic party. Same year, another blow came from the Fethullah Gülen movement. A wave of police investigations arose through 17th of December and 25th of December, 2013 on the charges of bribery, corruption, fraud and money laundering against three ministers of AKP government, their sons and several bureaucrats (Arango, 25.12.2013). Members of police department and prosecutors were linked with Fethullah Gülen Cemaati, which once upon a time were allies and supporters of AKP government. Parliamentary question for the investigation of accusations were rejected with the votes of AKP deputies. Politicians accused of bribery dropped from ministry positions however did not nominated for TGNA in the following elections. Despite these two events, AKP and Prime Minister Erdogan succeeded in June 2014 local elections and then 2014 presidential elections. Erdoğan became the first president of Turkey elected by the popular vote.

Under these circumstances, in 2014, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had won country's first direct presidential election about 52% share of vote in the first round against Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, joint candidate of opposition parties of Republican People's Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Presidential election of 2014 extended Erdoğan's rule for another five years who is currently in power more than ten years. After declaring victory, Erdoğan addressed his supporters at party headquarters and said, "with the president being elected by popular vote, obstacles between Çankaya [the presidential palace] and the public have been lifted." (Uras, 11.09.2014). Erdoğan, once again recalled the gap between the old regime forces, elites and the public. Erdoğan blamed his rival, İhsanoğlu, as being the advocate of status quo and a symbol of old regime. During presidential campaign, Erdoğan reiterated repeatedly that through popular election presidential office belongs to the public, and the system will bring a new legitimacy to the Office. According to Erdoğan, previous system was in need of presidents that are guardians of the regime in old Turkey (HürriyetDailyNews, 08.07.2016). According to the designers of 1982 Constitution, presidential office has to be a symbolic, non-political and neutral position and

presidents should be advocates of constitution and characterize secular, social character of the state. Erdoğan's candidacy was a direct assault to the characteristic of the Office. His main strategy was to stretch parliamentary system through de-facto presidency, emphasize more on executive power of the Office. He repeatedly said he will be an unconventional and active president during his campaign (Uras, 11.09.2014). In his speeches during the campaign, Erdogan promised to work towards a new constitution, to resolve the Kurdish issue, achieve higher democratic standards, make progress in Turkey's European Union membership bid, and protect the public against the "circles in the state" (Aljazeera, 12.07.2014). After his victory in popular elections, Erdoğan had done what he promised; create de facto practices of politics. For example, he did not promise to be an impartial and neutral president (HürriyetDailyNews, 08.07.2014). Erdoğan maximized the powers of presidency even if it was limited by Constitution. According to Constitution, even if the Presidential Office defined as a ceremonial position, presidents are able to call national security councils, appoint judges and several high rank positions for state agencies, veto legislation also call for early elections if a government cannot be formed. Erdogan maximize these powers with the help of majority group of AKP in the TGNA. In one of his speeches, he asserts that "whether you will like it or not, the system has changed in Turkey, and this de facto situation has to be finalized constitutionally" (HürriyetDailyNews, 15.08.2014). In some of his speeches, Erdoğan claimed that the presidential system is the most suitable one for Turkey (Hürriyet, 01.06.2015). With policies of President Erdoğan, Turkish political system has moved away from parliamentary system in favor of a presidential one. To lead from the presidency he would, in practice, he desired to control the head of AKP, despite being required by law to step down of its official head (Yeginsu & Arsu, 2014). Ahmet Davutoglu, veteran Islamist politician, was the architect of "zero problems with neighbors" policy and the intensified the use of Ottoman legacy and political discourse in politics. Davutoğlu handpicked by Erdoğan to the party leadership and installed in the role in 2014. According to Erdoğan, this was a move to an era of strong President and strong Prime Minister.

Mr. Davutoglu was expected to play a backseat role as Mr. Erdogan pushed to make the largely ceremonial presidency into an all-powerful position (Sims, 05.05.2016). In contrast to the expectations, neither Erdoğan stayed within Constitutional limits, nor Davutoğlu accept malleable role in Prime Minister. Davutoglu did not intend to be caretaker, rather often attempted to act autonomously without informing President such as on the issue of refugee crisis deal with the EU. Five months after losing majority government in June 2015 general elections, Davutoglu's AKP has comeback with victory in November 2015 snap elections. After victories of consecutive elections in 2002, 2007, 2011, June 2015 elections were the first AKP's failure to control majority of seats in TGNA. The high-stakes vote, took place in a climate of mounting tension and violence following an inconclusive June poll in which the conservative, Islamic-leaning AKP failed to secure an outright majority for the first time since coming to power in 2002 (Henley & Shaheen, 02.11.2015). In five months between two elections Turkey has shocked with hundreds of deaths in modern and Western part of the country. Bombings of PKK terror groups and Islamic terror groups, namely ISIS, intensified clashes with PKK in southeast part of Turkey and end of Kurdish Solution Process shook Turkish politics fundamentally and left more than thousand people dead. Under these circumstances, AKP regained the majority in TGNA, swept back to single party government again. Despite the electoral victory of AKP under the management of Davutoğlu, tension between these two politicians intensified as Davutoglu did not gave his full backing for Erdoğan's plan to replace parliamentary system of government with a presidential one. In May 2016, Davutoğlu was forced departure from power with the demand of Erdoğan himself. Davutoğlu hinted in his speech "the fact that my term lasted far shorter than four years is not a decision of mine but a necessity," (Malsin, 05.05.2016).

After replacement of Davutoğlu with Binali Yıldırım, the clashes between Gülen movement and the government has intensified. The party had teamed with the Islamist network founded by Fethullah Gülen in hopes of outmaneuvering the Kemalists once and for all (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017, p. 60). In a summer night of 15 July 2016, a small group of mid-level ranks of Turkish military attempted a coup against the civilian

government. Tanks and soldiers were on the roads to control strategic places and seizing the General Staff Headquarters, Special Forces Headquarters, Boğaziçi Bridge, Atatürk and Sabiha Gökçen airports, state owned TRT TV channel, police headquarters, municipalities and some of public places. Erdoğan, via using Facetime application, aired on live TV, called for people on the streets to take back and resist against coup makers. Erdoğan, implied that a minority group in Turkish military loyal to Fethullah Gülen movement is behind the coup. Later of the same night, it was understood that the Chief of Staff did not support the coup, rather midlevel ranks of staff were dominantly behind the coup attempt. These two were missing in this attempt. Then, the news of General Hulusi Akar is being held in captive by coup makers is televised. The declaration of Peace at the Home, the name of junta among the military, is televised in TRT. Declaration was criticized AKP for undermining the Republican ideals, democracy, rule of law and constitution. However, the most important element that failed the coup was the mobilization of citizens for resisting the coup. People began to pour into the streets, resist against tanks and soldiers. Citizens were killed by soldiers, tanks ran over to civilians and led to 248 deaths and more than 2400 wounded (Sabah, 07.10.2015). Putschists' aim to assassinate Erdoğan has failed. By early morning of July 16, it was apparent that the bulk of the Turkish armed forces were not behind the coup, and that popular resistance was too intense and widespread to overcome (Esen & Gümüüşçü, 2017, p. 62). The denial of Hulusi Akar to join the attempt and sign to the declaration played crucial role for personnel mobilization of non-Gülen military personnel. After the failed coup, it was clear that the most of midlevel putschists were promoted in 2013, 2014 and 2015 mostly from Turkish Air Force and Gendarmerie in the aftermath of Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Operations.

According to military analyst and ex-military major, Metin Gürcan, the putschist forces were mostly Gülenists, with joining of several secular and pragmatic anti-Erdogan officers incorporated (Gürcan, 17.07.2016). In 21 July 2016, TGNA passed the emergency law which has been extended 5 times since that day. Even the Presidential referendum passed under the condition of martial law. The coup failed because the putschists first lost the media battle and then decisively lost the momentum, once people

took to the streets en masse (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017, p.63). The weak internal organization of the putschist was another factor for the failure. They predicted that the bulk of military personnel would join them, but, only 1.5% of military personnel, mostly in Ankara & İstanbul, were behind the organization (NTV, 27.07.2016) Media, Directorate of Religious Affairs, the party's access to public and private resources helped AKP and the mobilization of party grass roots contributed to the failure of coup attempt (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017).

After curbing the political power of military, Erdoğan articulated his ambition to rebuild the system in favor of Presidency, urge AKP to introduce 21-article constitutional amendment that enhanced the power of the head of state and officially replace the existing parliamentary system with the presidential one. Erdoğan aimed to legalize what he called “de-facto situation” in Turkish politics through constitutional change. In fact, after 15 July coup attempt, Turkey was governing through decrees and executive orders in the state of emergency that bypasses the parliamentary processes. In the Turkish parliamentary political system, President was the head of state. With the new system, the president will have strong executive power rather than a ceremonial one. According to the adopted presidential system, the role of prime ministers would be eliminated and the president will be the single head of the executive, presidents will introduce law, be member of a political party, can stay at most two terms tenure in office, appoint ministers and public officials, two-thirds of senior judges, can declare state of emergency.

After the 2014 presidential elections, Erdoğan was seeking to transfer executive power from prime minister to president and legally consolidate his de-facto presidency. For that reason, introduction of 21-article constitutional amendment was the final step for transformation of ceremonial presidency to powerful and de jure presidentialism. According to Erdoğan, the new system would make Turkey's government stronger and more decisive and better able to defend the country against external threats like terrorism and internal threats like the Kurdish insurgency and coup plots (Sanchez, 31.03.2017). AKP has passed the draft bill from commission and sent 18 new articles amendment for parliamentary vote.

After tense debates in TGNA, Turkish people went to ballot box on 15th April. AKP and conservative groups together with nationalists party MHP championed “Yes” while secular RPP and Kurdish nationalist HDP backing “No” in the referendum. The “Yes” campaign had won 51.3% share of vote against 48.6% vote for “No”. However, the decision of Supreme Election Council of accepting unstamped ballot papers as valid unless proven otherwise (BBC, 16.04.2017), together with the irregularities over invalid votes raised concern about the accuracy of results. With this result, Erdoğan regained the control of his party since the amendment allowed president to be member of party. These constitutional modifications except partisanship will come into effect in 2019. Until then, Erdoğan will serve as a popularly elected president.

## **4.2 Turkey: General Overview**

### **4.2.1 Civil Society: Persistently Weak Phenomena**

Turkish political system has a strong “state tradition” inherited from Ottoman Empire.<sup>8</sup> (Mardin, 1975, p. 178). Many of Turkish Republican institutions, political and cultural traditions inherited from Ottoman Empire continued to function in Turkish Republic. Country has a long-lived legacy of strong state tradition. Founders of Turkish Republic were the members of Ottoman military and administrative class. In many areas, traditions, institutions and practices continued to be implemented by newly founded Turkish Republic. Some of these historical practices and institutions would affect the future political and sociological practices.

The association between economic and political power in Turkish society and the structure of the political organization was the reverse of the sociological and

---

<sup>8</sup> There were not any intermediary institutions in Ottoman state tradition to link the state and the public. Sultan and military class were at the center of Ottoman Empire, eliminated all rival centers of power which in turn resulted with a situation called absence of civil society (Özbudun, 1988, 38). Power and the state were all belonged to the Sultan. People were the subjects of Sultans, properties and the belongings of the Ottoman Sultans. Any kind of power concentration outside of the palace was eliminated directly by the state itself. State has been at the center of Turkish politics, a strong, heavy-handed, and arbitrary one, suspicious of its subject and any challenging and opponent concentration of power. Legacy of Sultanistic regime of Ottomans and positivist, Republican single party period heritage of Kemalists led scholars to focus more on state power as the cause of weak civil society.

historical structure of Western Europe. Instead of economic power (ownership of the means of production) leading to political power, political power (a high position in the state bureaucracy) provided access to material wealth (Özbudun, 2000, p. 126). Neither religious classes nor city guilds had played an intermediary role between political authority and society. For that reason, it is plausible to claim that there was no legacy of autonomous and independent intermediary body between the state and the public in Turkish political structure until the foundation of Turkish Republic.

Proliferation of civil society depends on many factors. A civic political culture, absence or existence of centralized state tradition<sup>9</sup>, the level of stateness<sup>10</sup>, pluralism, the scope of the concentration of decision-making processes, socialization process of citizens, associability level, or socio-economic modernization of a country are determinants of a strong and autonomous civil society.

The 1980s in Turkey have hardly been conducive to the flourishing of pluralistic or corporatist interest group politics (Heper, 1991, p. 12). 1970s conflictual political atmosphere, unreconciled ideological views, increasing death tolls created by the left and right political violence created situation which Turkish military was displeased of. According to Turkish military, political parties must protect the national unity, national interest and the unitary character of the Turkish state. This fear forced them to ban all interest groups that are linked with political parties or organizations that are pursuing political aims after 1980 military coup d'etat. Articles that ban direct linkage between parties and civil society institutions were abolished in mid-1990s (1982 Constitution,

---

<sup>9</sup> The Ottoman society was fragmented into two poles between the rulers, askeri and the ruled reaya. Which, created a big political and cultural gap between the center and the periphery; the ruler and the ruled; the state and the community. Center-periphery debate was the most historical cleavage that shaped the Turkish politics until the transition to multiparty politics of 1950s from Tanzimat period. It is argued to be still critical in the Turkish party system. It is obvious that this kind political structure is not a conducive environment for pluralism which civil society needs to proliferate.

<sup>10</sup> There is a marked statist orientation (etatism) in Turkey, which stresses community over its members, uniformity rather than diversity, and an understanding of law that emphasizes collective reason instead of the will of membership (Heper, 1985, p. 8). State was the only power to determine who will rise or fall within state bureaucracy or in business circles. The fate of people belonged to two lips of the mighty Sultan which created an immense uncertainty in the political system through his arbitrary rule. States' power over the determination of the economic and political power can be destructive. Having close relationship with the state bureaucracy can be risky yet benevolent to any subjects in Ottoman country at the same time. Cases of confiscations can be seen in many times if state considered a bureaucrats or a merchant as dangerous political subject.



Article 33, 52, 69, 135, and 171). All interest groups were forced to live under the monist decision making processes governed by military or civilian executive, under the highly centralized and bureaucratized political system of Turkey.<sup>11</sup>

In Turkish, "interest groups", have a pejorative meaning. "Interest" means as if they are only seeking to maximize their profit. Interest groups are seen as defenders of their particularistic and individualistic demands. As Robert Bianchi wisely argues; "Throughout the multiparty era, much of the political elite has continued to share a lingering fear that unless partitive interests are repressed, closely regulated, or prudently harmonized, divisions along such lines as class, religion, and region will threaten both the unity of the nation and authority of the state. (Özbudun, 2000, p. 129). Civil society requires plural society, which Turkish politics was lacking during 1980s. According to high ranks of Turkish armed forces, problems of pre-1980 period can only be solved through the elimination of particularistic, interest seeker behaviors and corrupt, rent seeking politicians and organizations (Turan, 1984). Armed Forces' stress for a strong state and strong executive, deep suspicion about party politics and interest seeking behaviors made the atmosphere compelling and even dangerous for Turkish civil society institutions which traditionally considered as "weak".

In 1980, military's decisions on new economic strategy of industrialization such as export orientation economy policies were welcomed by Turkish capital groups. A new economic alliance was set forth between the state and capital groups. Increase in workers' wages were repressed, activities of unions prohibited, prices liberated, state economic enterprises aimed to privatized, subsidies were abolished throughout 1980s until 1988 (Yeldan, 2009, p. 121-125). With the help of these factors, capital accumulation levels rose through 1980s which helps Turkish industrialists to invest more and paid less for workers. This new alliance between military and capital groups had been consolidated after the victory of Turgut Özal's neoliberal Motherland Party in their first elections. State, after 1980 military coup came to help Turkish capitalists and industrial groups to compensate what they lost during the 1970s because of the low

---

<sup>11</sup> One of the leading Turkish scholars Heper describes this dominant mode of interest representation as "lingering monism" (Heper, 1991, p.163-176).

level of growth that are stemmed from political unrest and violence, strikes and the rising number of demand from working class (Yeldan, 2009, p. 121-125).

The accession process of Turkey with European Union also has an impact on the state-civil society relations. EU has impacted civil society development in Turkey through its membership conditionality regime, funding policies and mechanisms, the networks fostered between Turkish and European civil society actors and by legitimizing civil society activity (Rumelili & Bosnak, 2015, p. 1). EU has coerced significant modifications on the legal framework of civil society through several mechanisms. Another contribution of EU to Turkish civil society organization is its funding programme. Wide range of facilities has been offered by EU, increased the capacity, operations and autonomy of civil society organizations that have limited ones. EU conditionality regime also contributes to building between Turkish civil society organizations with its EU counterparts; increase the chances of organizing common campaigns and create new channels and networks. The EU has not only shaped the legal environment and the activities of NGOs but also empowered the civil society vis-à-vis the state, nevertheless, the EU's transformative impact on civil society has largely been limited to issue-based NGOs (Rumelili & Bosnak, 2015, p. 18).

Single party government of AKP has been in power since 14 years. In these 14 years, one can observe the fluctuations between the relationship of NGO's and the government. Number of civil society organizations affiliated with AKP such as KADEM and TÜRGEV began to rise. These civil society organizations acted like grass-root organizations, a tool for mobilizing supporters especially women. However, the effect of these organizations to policy formation is weak as the overall decision-making processes of AKP stayed centralized through the same period. The ties between Turkish political parties and associations have always been weak as Özbudun (2000) pointed out. Low political efficacy of interest groups is the result of the absence of strong ties between them and political parties, the link often remain weak and tenuous (Özbudun, 2000, p. 137). AKP tried to change this balance to a somehow a bit complex one. Party benefited from the close relationship of loyal and submissive civil society organizations. While on the other side, organizations enjoyed the aids and resources that

offered by the party in return to political support total loyalty for the government policies. Their activism and mobilization power can increase their chances for gaining political positions. AKP used several strategies to control civil society organizations that are specialized in different areas. These strategies can help us to understand the new structure of relationship between the state and civil society.

Party's support for civil society organizations depends more on the organizations' support to the policies of AKP especially at the grass root level (Mehveş & Doğan, 14.10.2016). In one of his speeches, Erdoğan said that state institutions and civic organizations now worked hand in hand for the good of the people; "coalescence of the state and the nation." (HurriyetDailyNews, 22.06.2016). Same old rhetoric of "national unity" and "reason of state" once again came to stage for curbing and limiting the power of civil society in Turkey. All interest groups must work within the framework of strong state tradition and extensively centralize decision-making mechanisms (Özbudun, 2000, p. 137), which in turn caused low political efficacy of interest groups in Turkey.

Turkish state is selective on its relationship with associations. Those who challenge the regime and the unity of state on the basis of the ethnic and religious motivations are mostly closed down by legal sanctions. For example, in 2016, with a government decree, 375 civil society organizations, most of whom had ties to Kurdish political movements were closed (Birgün, 22.11.2016). Those operating on the Kurdish issue, refugees problem, civil rights and liberties tightly controlled by the state after a short liberal period before 2010.

2016 Civic Freedom Report of Turkey by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law also referred the same points;

"Civil society has also been affected by a number of destabilizing pressures, including renewed tensions over the Kurdish conflict, instability spilling over from neighboring Syria, a series of terrorist attacks by ISIL, the increasing flow of refugees, political deadlocks, an economic decline and a failed coup attempt. All of this has happened in the context of political instability that has paved way for a state of constant readiness to curb basic freedoms, including the freedoms of association, assembly and expression, for the sake of the preserving "national

security” or “public order” (Freedom House, Freedom of the World: Turkey, 2016).

Other unfavorable conditions of Turkish civil society can be inferred from the numbers of associations and their structure. According to up to date numbers pointed by Ersen (2016);

“Turkey’s population is approaching 80 million. That means one association for every 750 people, or 13 percent. In Scandinavian countries, there is 10 associations for each person. We are not really on an advanced scale; in fact we are far behind the developed world. We also see that the administrative members of associations and foundations are mostly male, upper middle-aged and relatively educated. The number of women members is very low – just 4 percent. The membership numbers among youth are equally very low. But numbers don’t show everything. Of the 110,000 associations, 25 percent are associations to construct and sustain a mosque” (Yinanç & Ersen, 21.03.2016).

As Ersin Kalaycıoğlu pointed out, most of the Turkish civil society institutions consist of charitable organizations that focus on building mosques, sport and education facilities, both in numbers and its composition. These are far from its European equivalents. Most associations remain deeply influenced by primordial bonds which are established around religious affinities, blood ties, local and regional solidarity, as well as economic interests (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002, p. 259-260). The composition and number of civil society institutions did not help us to be optimistic about the future of Turkish civil society.

Turkey seems to suffer from lack of social capital and society shows no signs of establishing or sustaining social and political partnership between each other. As Table 1 shows, interpersonal trust and tolerance level is one of the lowest in world. Lack of social capital undermines the development of civil society, civil activism and initiative, primordial ties and associations based on blood, territory and religious solidarity disables cross-cultural organizations from being established and maintained in the democratic regime of Turkey (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009, p. 118).

**TABLE 1: Intolerance towards People**

<b>Criminals</b>	80.9	<b>Christians</b>	54.7	<b>Homosexual</b>	91.7
<b>Another Race</b>	34.0	<b>Alcoholic</b>	87.1	<b>Jewish</b>	59.4
<b>Extreme Leftist</b>	70.3	<b>Large Family</b>	40.7	<b>AIDS</b>	88.5
<b>Extreme Right</b>	71.1	<b>Foreigner</b>	28.3		

**Source:** Çarkoğlu, Ali and Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, *The rising tide of conservatism in Turkey*, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009.

Turkish civil society is a weak and fragile one. As I made it obvious above, there are several alternative explanations for this phenomenon. First one is, refers to a strong state tradition of Turkish society. However, according to the results of Ersin Kalaycıoğlu's study in (2002), which measures the state strengths with the help of factor analysis, the overall state strength for Turkey turns out to be relatively weak, where he concluded that it is highly dubious that the level of strengths of the state could be considered as a major factor inhibiting civil society in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002, p. 70). Turkish state's tendency to use force, heavy-handed interventions against any challenging and opponent concentration of power might be the reason that hinders the proliferation of the civil society. These interventions can be military coups or legal acts that prohibit specific political groups or associations from politics, martial law, purge or high number of turnover rate of civil servants from state institutions. Rigorous interventions to political, economic and societal life led to interruptions which in turn impedes the consolidation and institutionalization of procedures, process and operation of these areas. For example, government's approach to the Gezi Parkı protests in 2013 or Turkish military's intervention to long-lasting conflict of Kurdish problem can be example of this kind of heavy handed use of state power.

Parallel to the findings of Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu (2009), on the societal level, low level of interpersonal trust and self-esteem, intolerance against other people from different ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds; the culture of distrust among people; lack of social capital; cynicism and political apathy; dogmatic and traditional system of values seems still prevailing in the Turkish society. Transformation of Turkish society through migration from rural areas to urban cities constituted another

deep wave that turned the Turkish society to a more complex structure. Urban values do not seem established among newly migrated part of Turkish society. Normlessness is becoming common norm for Turkish society, where the rules, procedures, values are eroding (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). However, it seems that the conventional political structure especially political participation began to be changed as Gezi Parkı protests presents. Even if the emergence of new type of participation and civic activism potentials are weak in Turkey Gezi Parkı protests emerges as an exception. The overall number of associations is increasing but most of them founded for charity rather than supporting civic activism. These civil society institutions mainly established on the basis of primordial ties (lineage, regional bonds, kinship etc.) rather than partnership and cooperation. People who share same ethnic or religious roots or same political views tend to be gather together for civil society organizations.

#### **4.2.1.1 Business Associations**

The relationship between state and economic civil society organizations needs to be detailed. Relationship between capital groups and the state was mutually beneficent for both sides. It is cooperative yet sometimes repressive. State is a risk factor for businessmen that should be considered. Once they know, Turkish businessmen can able to internalize how to gain public procurements, utilize privatizations, exports licenses that they needed to grow. In Kalaycıoğlu (1995), two representatives and the Turkish business community defined the same effect:

“Since the days of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish private sector has always been nurtured by the state and obtains its power and nectar from the state. Even today a businessman is under the command of the bureaucrats in Ankara....Most Turkish businessmen make more money from the decisions of Ankara than they do by production of some items... Most Turkish businessmen make more money from the decisions of Ankara then they do by production of some items...Regardless of the circumstances, the business community must be on very good terms with the government because they always need the support and protection of the state” (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995, p. 81-82).

Personal trust between businessmen and bureaucracy matters in reaching out the economic advantages that state can propose for Turkish businessmen. Infrastructure

investments for innovation, production of new goods were expensive method than capital accumulation through having close relationship with the state. Political connections with the government have always been at the center of the game. Boards of chambers played an important role in establishing these connections for businessmen. State, in turn used these chambers as tools for constituting a more complex and harmonized economic policies. During the post-1980 period, the chambers functioned as before, that is quasi bureaucratic arms of government (Heper, 1991, p. 15). This mutually beneficent relationship between the government and the chambers and economic interest groups lead to government interventions to internal affairs of chambers, their elections, decisions and ideas on economic policies. Through this way, Turkish governments had a chance to harmonize the general economic strategy, made chambers inactive to challenge economic policies of government. On the other side, chambers and business groups had chances of gaining export licenses, credits with low interest rates or even travelling with the prime ministers and cabinet members to neighboring countries for forming new trade agreements or personal networks for state procurements. With the help of this, clashes between the government and economic interest groups on the overall economy policies alleviated and controlled by the government. Interest groups were not involved in policy formations on the issues of economy, rather was in totally submissive positions vis a vis the government.

Turkish state was the sources of wealth for these businesspeople. For Republican elite, economic independence was crucial and must be fulfilled following the political independence. The relationship between business people and Republic was not different at all; continued within limits. Two major problems were seen in the republican policy, one was the heavy state intervention in the economy which prevented economic efficiency and a healthy development process and the other was secularist modernization as a process lead by authoritarian intervention in socio-cultural relations (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014, p. 29). State can create new business areas yet can impose new regularities and uncertainty for entrepreneur. Close relationship between these two groups can be both beneficial and too dangerous. Ayşe Buğra, a prominent Turkish scholar, offers some generalizable observations about this kind of relationship between

the economic and political leaders of Turkish society. The codependence of Turkish businessmen with the Turkish state, the lack of self-confidence and prestige that the economic activity has, lack of professional management bodies of big corporate rather than managing by family members, economic alliances between similar economic groups rather than representation of business interest though economic interest group bodies were all general properties of Turkey observed by Buğra (1994, p. 1-33). Turkish businessmen try to maximize the opportunities and avoid risks that stem from the policy process, relying more on relationships of personal trust than on their professional organizations to overcome their difficulties (Buğra, 1994, p. 196). Lack of entrepreneurship, omnipotent state power on regulations, and in deciding who will rise and fall in the system and dependence on state incentives to create new business areas create a sense of precarious and uncertain conditions to act in for businessmen. According to Buğra, Turkish businesspeople tried of not to work without the limit and interventions of Turkish state. Especially after 1990s, export oriented growth plan and EU anchors to Turkish politics together with transformation of TUSİAD's priorities toward democratization as Bayer & Öniş (2010) posits, started to change the view.

After 1990, Turkish big business companies and business elites have become pro democratic rather than pro authoritarian. The support of EU for democratization process of Turkey coincided with regional, domestic and transnational parameters and the effects globalism led to changing the perspective of Turkish big businesses toward democracy. EU was and still is the biggest trade partner of Turkey and members of TUSİAD are the core exporter of this organization. Many of TUSİAD members are commercial partners of European corporations in their operations in Turkey. As the TUSİAD incorporated more in transnational trade, organization got more pro-democratic stance in politics started from 1990s to today. As a result of cost-benefit analysis of big corporations and business elites, they decided to opt for democratization of Turkey and started to act and work accordingly (Özel, 2013, p. 1104-1105). As the prospect of EU membership materializes, the Turkish elite businesses' perception towards the cost of authoritarianism has changed. According to the same study, at the beginning of 2000s, big business perceived that democratization was believed to tie up



the state's hands, hence, thwarting arbitrary interventionism and EU can limit the arbitrary power of state, can eradicate the political role of Turkish military, can undertake legal and political reforms (Özel, 2013, p. 1104-1105). Considering the big business groups, challenged by these new domestic rivalries -namely MÜSİAD, TUSKON- and intensifying international and domestic competition, big businesses gradually came to an understanding that a deficient democracy would aggravate uncertainties at the national level, endanger its international competitiveness, diminish the credibility of the country, obstruct capital in-flows and thwart potential opportunities for collaboration with foreign capital (Özel, 2013, p. 1106). As a result of strategic thinking, TUSİAD evolved to become one of the significant pro-democratic civil society organizations in Turkey.

Turkish capitalist business class is not homogeneous. Differentiation of Turkish business associations like TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD, ASKON, TİM etc. is significant in understanding the role of business association in economy. The rise of business associations very much depends on incumbent governments and the association they are close to. These associations have different cultural identities, political inclinations and positions, representing different types of capital accumulations. TÜSİAD was the result of aiming to create Turkish bourgeoisie project. They were seen as Republican secularist and developmentalist policies of Kemalist state in private sectors. This heritage made TÜSİAD as the advocate of EU accession after 1990s, and significant economic partner of Western corporations in Turkey. Their main economic proliferation coincided with the adoption of import substitution model of industrialization after agriculture led growth policies of 1950s, which helped capital accumulation for production of export goods.

TUSİAD is generally known for its strong economic ties with European countries and the supporter of EU integration process, rule of law and democratic liberal values (TÜSİAD, 1999). Organization represents the big corporations, large conglomerates and holding companies of Turkey, approximately 600 individual members that controlling more than 2500 corporations, is the significant organization in Turkey. Its political importance, on the other hand, originates from its significant role in

shaping up the public opinion, as well as its influence on policy-making (Özel, 2013, p. 1082). Since the late 1980s, TUSIAD has been publishing reports on political and economic issues for publicizing its views. From the late 1990s onwards, big business has emerged as one of the main supporters of Turkish democratization (Bayer & Öniş, 2010, p. 181). This was partly because of TUSIAD's liberal and pro-democratic political views. Before 2010 Referendum, Erdoğan criticized the TUSIAD on its "silent stance" on Referendum. Erdoğan said 'Those who choose to remain impartial today, will find themselves excluded later' (Milliyet, 18.08.2010). Recently, the relationship between the TUSIAD and AKP was tense. As AKP started to show plebiscitarian and authoritarian tendencies through restricting the civil rights and freedoms and erosion of institutions, the number of critics from TUSIAD have risen. However, AKP governments' comments and declarations have targeted the board of members, which even led to resignation of Muharrem Yılmaz, former president of TUSIAD (Akyarlı Güven, 2014). On the other side, TOBB (The Unions of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) remained silent through 2010s, agreed to take a more submissive position against government policies. TOBB is generally known with its support for local city industrialists, tradesman and guilds. Elections of this body is not absent from party politics, where the each political party aimed to replace its candidate for the presidency of local chambers.

In 1990, MÜSİAD was founded, consisted mainly by conservative, small and medium sized enterprises (SME) mostly voted for parties of renowned Islamists Necmettin Erbakan. AKP government seemed to have close relationship with government supported interest groups and tried to keep them under control.<sup>12</sup> Their first strategy was to control the board of chambers that are traditionally consisted from prominent affiliates of industrialist and traders of cities. Candidates that have strong connections with the party organization are openly supported by the local party

---

<sup>12</sup> In 1990s, class based understanding of politics died where cultural characteristic such as ethnicity and religiosity emerged to dominate in Turkish politics (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 10). Parties claimed to represent interest of ethnic, religious and conservative part of society started to attract more share of votes in elections such as Virtue Party, Justice and Development Party and Democratic Society Party. Islamism especially with the success of AKP even become the prominent political force in Turkish politics with its 16 years of single party government. Foundation of MÜSİAD can be seen as one of the signals of Islamic revivalism in Turkish politics in 1990s. MÜSİAD was affiliated with Welfare Party and conservative business groups.

organizations. For example, in December 2016, relatives of President Erdoğan's wife and the son of Ankara mayor Melih Gökçek competed for the elections of Ankara Board of Chambers (Demir, 2016). AKP was active in these elections. Party members encouraged to be members of boards of chambers. These management positions of Chambers are so significant that two of main candidates were both from relatives of AKP. This was also an advantage for the candidate since the party mobilizes businessmen to vote for that specific candidate. Resources and facilities that are serving by the AKP government to party affiliated candidates was another motivation for people to support. By that way, AKP not only had loyal allies in each districts of Turkey, but also increases the chances of reaching capital groups and business classes.

Chambers are a source of political recruitments. Being a member of chambers was a school for businessmen before entering to the politics. Being a candidate for general elections and elected for TGNA many times requires wealth and money, which means power. Reaching more people by media, flyers, banners etc., increase the chances of gaining votes and electing. The close relationship with party and chambers might support networking and founding of political connections. Licenses, public procurement and credits can be getting by a harmonized support for AKP policies. However, the role of economic interest groups and chambers on the policy formation over issues relating to economy was very weak. The situation was much more of like what Ersin Kalaycığlu defined in 2002, as the role of commercial interest groups in the economy policy making process of the government is an either minimal or non-existent. Major decisions concerning the Turkish economy are mainly resolved by the government, overly centralized especially during the reign of AKP. The role of the chambers and civil society organizations were redefined and limited by the party as the control of government on civil society organizations have increased.

#### **4.2.2 General Overview of Turkish Political Culture**

The set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings people hold about politics in a society constitutes the political culture of that society (Almond and Powell, 1978, p. 25). These attitudes, beliefs and sentiments can be shaped in history, wars, politicians or

sociological structure. Frederick Frey (1966) argued that Turkish politics was shaped by elite politics. The political drama was limited to elite actors, elite institutions and elite urban settings and mass elements of society was excluded by the nature of culture, distribution of resources and design of the rulers (Frey, 1975, p. 42).

Political culture of Turkey deeply rooted from the political and historical structure of Ottoman Empire. Elite culture found its basis in the great palace culture of Ottomans. Among many things inherited from Ottoman political atmosphere to Republican era was center-periphery debate<sup>13</sup>. Struggle against low, mass culture of the periphery shaped the framework of elite culture. Being educated, working for state, “knowing the Ottoman way” was always considered as being an elite. Papa state tradition, religion based identity and intolerance to opposition, killing for political reasons -*siyaseten katl*-, social engineering were all inherited from Ottoman political culture to the Republican era (Heper, 1985).

The most striking characteristic of Turkish elite political culture is in-group vs. out-group orientations, an inclination to see the things as “us against them” (Frey, 1975). In this framework, any kind of criticism considered as *fitne-fücur* by the political elites. Those who criticize any issue in politics can easily become an enemy, *düşman*, *fitneci* in Turkish context. This problem can only be solved through total loyalty, subordination and solidarity, which are highly valued among Turkish society. For that reason, Turkish political elites are prone to elevate group’s interests over the individuals

---

<sup>13</sup> Mardin (1975) associates contention between center and periphery with the centralization and modernization process of Ottoman state (Mardin, 1975). There wasn’t any dimension as such state and church, labor-bourgeoisie, nation builders and localists, but the major confrontational was uni-dimensional, always clash between the center and the periphery (Mardin, 1975, p. 170). During and after the War of Independence center and periphery duality once again emerged within the GNA, between secularist and statist Kemalists and the faction called “second groups” (Demirel, 2015) consisted from local notables and pious ex-Ottoman officials. Modern educational institutions had further exacerbated pre modern, cultural cleavage between the center and the periphery rather than reduce it and complicated two irreconcilable image of good society (Mardin, 1975, p. 178; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 50). Adoption of Western ideas laws produced another cycle to contention between those who favor Westernization and those who oppose it, mainly religious and old military officials (Özbudun, 1988, p. 7). In 1946, with transition to multiparty politics, the intensity of the debate reduced In the post-1945 period through multiparty politics, rapid social mobilization, industrialization and urbanization. After conservative AKP’s success in 2002, center-periphery debate started to alleviate gradually with the help of multiparty politics and transformed into a different structure called *kulturkamph* by Kalaycıoğlu (2010). A debate modified into *kulturkamph* framework which two sides of debate has different “image of good society” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010, p. 2). Secular image of good society comprise of secular ideas with embracing science and rationality, whereas conservative image of good society involve traditional and religious sentiments. Secular- Sunni Muslim, Alevi-Sunni, Turkish-Kurdish ethnic nationalism are cross-cutting deep running dimensions shaping modern Turkish politics. These fault lines separated Turkish population into several blocs whose lifestyles, values, attitudes and political behaviors differ sharply along these fault lines (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 7).

(Frey, 1975). This leads to overemphasizing of hierarchy, loyalty, and sense of duty among group members. Learning to see world as friend versus foe, in-group versus out-group, us against them easily turned to “no holds barred war” in which aggravate compromises over political issues between political elites (Frey, 2975). Beside this, cost of being out of power really is high for political leaders which easily turned politics into a war between political elites for certain office positions.

Courage culture and national pride are the two attributes that Turkish people are sensitive about. Exaggerated uses of power against others, in turn create a sense of revanchism and hostility against others. This situation dragged politics into an area of conflict where demand for revenge becomes actors’ main motivation (Frey, 1975). Since, cost of being out of power is high Turkish politics; actors are aiming to stay in power as long as they can. Therefore, those who are failed to play political game, politics became an area for revanchism.

Turks, culturally showing their commitment to democratic practices such as voting in elections but not shares its core values like tolerance, compromise and respect for individuality as we can see above (Özbudun, 1988, p. 1). Compromising on political issues is an exceptional situation in Turkish politics not only in political party leaders’ level but also among public.<sup>14</sup> Tolerance for different lifestyle, ethnic and religious identities or ideologies and thoughts is problematic among Turkish public as well. Low level of interpersonal trust and associability level is far from reaching the level of European consolidated democracies (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 275). In Turkey, the majority of people over 18 year old, nearly 90% of Turkish society says that they cannot trust people they do not know, they must be approached with caution to other people, because people will try to take advantage of others when they have the opportunity, and

---

<sup>14</sup> Secular- Sunni Muslim, Alevi-Sunni, Turkish-Kurdish ethnic nationalism are cross-cutting deep running dimensions shaping modern Turkish politics. These fault lines separated Turkish population into several blocs whose lifestyles, values, attitudes and political behaviors differ sharply along these fault lines (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 7). As Kalaycıoğlu (2012), Birtek & Toprak (1993) show two camp can tolerate each other only if one accept its subordinate position which where religious-conservative camp encroach domain of the modernist secularist camp, invading political discourse of politics with Islamic terminology (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 174). AKP was really successful in using these fault lines for deriving votes from conservatives by creating the sense of “us vs. them” dichotomy. The large scale infrastructure investments are compared with Ottoman times, historical projects of Ottoman ruler, named as “crazy projects” accomplished by AKP (Srivastava & Harvey, 6.12.2014). The Ottoman language, which uses the Arabic scripts, lessons becomes as a selective course in high schools.

they often say that people are not helping each other. According to the data of World Values Survey, the interpersonal trust level of Turkey was 9.8% in 1990, 6.5% in 1996, 7.3% in 2006 and 11.8% in 2007. In 2007, Turkey could only pass Brazil among the countries in the survey data, in which Norway has the highest interpersonal trust score with 60.3% (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 254).

Although several negative cultural characteristics that can be seen, there are also several traits in Turkish political culture that can make one hopeful about the future of Turkish democracy. It is plausible to suggest that Turkish political culture has ingredients that both undermine and advance the consolidation of democracy (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 179). Among many, the most striking feature of Turkish political culture is a deep democratic impulse (Frey, 1975, p. 71). This impulse is generally reflected in participation to elections.

Participation in elections is generally higher in Turkey than its European counterparts. There is a widespread belief among the Turkish electorate that their participation in elections matters in political life. Turkey seems fitting the general framework of Latin American countries in terms of political efficacy (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008). Result of the study indicates that, there is not enough evidence to think that there is a relatively common political indifference and political alienation in Turkish society (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 262). Considering the result, existence of a majority who think that they can succeed in influencing political authorities and institutions is a positive factor for Turkish democracy.

Trust for the democratic institutions is also worth noting. According to the survey data, Turkish military 84.4%, religious institutions 65.4%, police forces 64.2%, courts 63.2% are the most trusted institutions for Turkish society whereas newspapers 60.1%, TVs 58.7% and European Union 51.8% are the least trusted ones (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 270). Turkish government and deputies do not seem having widespread trust by Turkish society, which can be serious signal for the democratic institutions of Turkey.

Voting turnout has always been consistently high in Turkey considering its Southern European counterparts. As the Table 2 shows, from 1987 to 2015 November

general elections, participation rate has never fallen under the level of 80% except 2002. After 2000, voter turnout rates oscillated between 75,2% and 83,7% in Italy, between 68,9% and 75,7% in Spain and in Greece between 62,5% and 76,7%.

**TABLE 2: Participation to General Elections from 1987 to 2015**

<b>Election Years</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2015 H</b>	<b>2015 K</b>
<b>Turnout Rate (%)</b>	93.2	83.9	85.2	87.0	79.0	84.1	87.1	86.4	87.4

**Source:** Supreme Election Council Dataset, 1987-2015.

Participation in elections and public debates for the intention to find solutions of public problems are relatively important for Turkish voters (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 270). Unconventional political participation (petitioning, protest) lack effectiveness, in comparison to personalized contacts through networks built on primordial bonds (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 58). Especially conservative and more religious part of Turkish society more inclined to show their preferences and discontent through conventional way of political participation, rather than protesting or petitioning. In the turbulent times of socioeconomic transformation in Turkey, voters love to flex their muscles at the polls, whether national or local elections, or even referenda (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 177). Participation to political processes through voting in the elections is the most common type of political participation in Turkey, which is also the least risky one. Conversely, unconventional political participation is uncommon, unreliable and dangerous one in the eyes of Turkish people. Turkish voters believe that unconventional political participation (petitioning, protest) lack effectiveness, in comparison to personalized contacts through networks built on primordial bonds (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 58). Gezi Parkı protests in 2013 seem to signal the changes in general perception of Turkish people against the unconventional political participation especially for Turkish youth. AKP government's shopping mall projects to at the heart of Istanbul with a small number of trees turned to clashes after intervention by the police. According to Amnesty International (2013) more than 2.5 million people in 79 of 81 provinces

participated the Gezi Parkı protests. Anti-authoritarian and pro-democratic political motivations of protesters gathered them in the streets, these protesters were mainly have white and blue collar proletarian background, rather than high professionals who had greater representative power during protests (Yörük & Yüksel, 2014, 121-122). The Gezi Park protests were a manifestation of the conflicts between the ruling AKP political elite and a newly emerging pro-democracy movement (Tuğal, 2013), and was a result of deep political polarization between different sections of Turkish society. The AKP elite and media accused the Gezi protesters of serving the intelligence services of foreign countries and held that their demands for good governance were part of a global conspiracy against Turkey (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 8). Common use of social media platforms, independent and individual participation to the protests, and evident visibility of environmentalist, LGBT, student and minority activism, solidarity of Kurdish protest movements with mainstream Turkish political movements, party-less participation has shaped Gezi Parkı protests. In terms of changes in the youth perception of unconventional political participation, Erdoğan & Semerci (2017) indicates that there is a difference between conventional and unconventional participation levels between young and older citizens (69). However, gender, economic status and living in urban or rural areas play more important roles where different politicized collective identities do make a change to the way people participate, and self-claimed 'we'ness does play a more important role in the way people participate (Erdoğan & Semerci, 2017, p. 69). Evolving youth perception for political participation can be more significant in future political developments. Democracies are evolving institutions and should reproduce itself. Political participation of youth and those who are excluded from society and politics would be reason to make optimistic predictions about the future of Turkish democracy.

There can be many reasons behind this generational difference in terms of political participation. First reason can be using elections for eliminating the domination of elites in political arena. Voters can only punish them through elections during the times of bad governance, economic crises, times of political deadlocks etc. Second reason can be a more individualistic one. Gaining material benefits through voting is the



rule of the game in Turkish multiparty politics as in the world. The popular image of democracy in Turkey has been tilted toward an understanding that democracy allows people greater access to the resources of the “State” through the help of political parties (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 62). In the absence of protectionist economy and public goods; politics began to be meant as sources of favoritism, clientelism and nepotism according to voters (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p. 171-182). The convergence of primordial factors as regional solidarity, blood relation, material benefits seem to have created support for democratic regime in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 66). This crucial motivation to participate electoral processes will be continued as long as the party provides benefits for ordinary voters through the network of religion, kinship or any other types of primordial factors. Majority of these voters believe in the importance of voting and found political parties useful especially as channels of communication with government (Özbudun, 1988, p. 35). Getting material benefits in return to voting, namely, patronage creates a poisonous atmosphere in politics as well. As patronage started to emerge in all part of politics, Turkish urban middle classes started to alienate from democracy since they do not have any chance of connecting to those primordial relationships for gaining benefits (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 64; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 68). This led to the weakening of rule of law in Turkey as favoritism, nepotism, patronage and normlessness became the rules of the political game.

The relationship between patron and client provides grass-root support for political parties especially in newly emerged shanty-towns of metropolitans, which in turn increases the chances of re-election of deputy or party. For that reason, demands such as job application, promotion, transfers or caseworks or demand for preserving certain commercial and financial interests of interest groups in the legislative took most time of deputies (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 212-213; Kalaycıoğlu, 1995, p. 48). This composition has changed over time; MPs began to follow strategic behaviors in engaging with their constituents rather than purely focus on pork and barrel politics. If MP's believe that party leadership has the most influence in candidate selection, they are more likely to ask PQs than spending time for solving problems of their constituency. On the other hand, constituency-minded representatives frequently engage

in activities increasing their public visibility among the constituents (Çiftçi & Yıldırım, 2017, p. 2). This type of strategic behaviors is mostly applied by opposition MPs. Even if this kind of political engagement is beneficial for constituency, it is also detrimental for politics. Patronage networks provide support for Turkish democracy yet undermine the rule of law and legislative processes. Turkish voters seem to enjoy participation to conventional politics but do not like unconventional ones.

#### **4.2.3 Rule of Law and Tutelary Powers**

Rule of law is defined by the UN Secretary Office as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards (UN Secretary General, 2016). As defined by UN Secretary General, the definition of rule of law emphasizes the importance of equality under the law and accountability before the law, together with the protection and advancement of human dignity. Human rights, norms and standards constitute a normative basis for rule of law to be operated in. For that reason, we oblige to analyze the existing situation of Turkish courts and conditions of human rights and liberties such as freedom of media, expressions and conscience.

In 1983, after 3 years of military rule, executive power has been transmitted from military government to new civilian government. Military intervention to politics in 1980 was much more a consequence of political deadlocks, violence, terror and economic deteriorations. TGNA could not be able to elect a president together with increasing level of sectarian and political unrest and terror. Therefore, coup makers aimed to create a stable, foreseeable and well-ordered political structure with strong executive.

1982 Constitution was a reflection of the 1980 military coup, a statist, restrictive and tutelary constitution with a strong suspicion towards civilian politicians. As a result of this 1982 Constitution aimed to limit as much as possible political areas in order to

control politicians. Exclusivist characteristics of constitution shaped the Turkish politics after 1980. 1982 Constitution was even less trustful than its predecessor of the national will elected assemblies, parties and leaders (Özbudun, 2000, p. 58). Hence, 1982 Constitution create several institutions and reserved domains for controlling and supervising the political parties and politicians to maintain military's influence in politics.

Among several tutelary powers, 1982 Constitution established an omnipotent, unaccountable and legally and politically irresponsible President of Republic. According to coup makers, presidential office should be the representative of the national interest, guardian of secularist, nationalist and Republican Turkish State, away from partisan politics, a moderator between civilian governments and military through National Security Council. President was given power to appoint the chairman and some members of the Board on Higher Education (YÖK) and the university rectors, some of the members of Constitutional Court, Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, Courts of Accounts (Sayıştay) and the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation (Yargıtay) (Özbudun, 2012, p. 42). This power of appointment gave president to sustain the protection of Republican elite, especially in the judicial branch of the government. Beside these, president also seen as guarantor of the republic and a strong ally of military in the National Security Council, which can be considered as an exit guarantee. In the judicial area, Constitutional Court, Sayıştay, Yargıtay, High Military Courts, HSYK (Higher Council of Judges and Prosecutors) together with Bar Associations seen as the first line of defense against any legal acts that can be harmful against republican state and values.

In order to have a strong government, coup makers help create a political structure that gave excessive power to executive branch of the government. Military government concerned about pre-coup conditions of sectarian, ethnic and religious divide. Their main aim was to create a stable and strong state that meet with the public demand for law and order. For that reason, National Security Council, composition of military and government established and endowed with an enormous political power. Under these conditions, TGNA has turned to be what Weinbaum (1975) called as

“subordinate” type of legislature (Weinbaum, 1975, p. 211), in which legislative organ of state tightly controlled and intervened by the executive branch of the governments.<sup>15</sup> TGNA dragged into a weak position vis-à-vis the executive branch of the government. Yet, the subordination depends on internal party politics of country, since the parliament has the power to bring down government. Therefore, the emergence of strong majority government in TGNA, may subordinate the body to the executive branch. Power of executive branch of government and the presidential office was also given new powers (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 17). Rules of procedures of TGNA have changed many times because of partisan claims, which undermined institutionalization of the standard functioning of TGNA. Coup makers introduced proportional representation with 10% national threshold and banned pre coup political parties and their leaders, planned to protect political system from coalitions and extreme ideological parties. Ministry of Justice was given a membership in the body of The Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). This act inhibited the formation of independent judiciary rather than judiciary controlled by executive.

1982 Constitution introduced another problematic political innovation; proportional representation with 10% national threshold. The main aim was to protect political party system and TGNA from coalitions and extremely ideological parties. Nearly all mainstream political parties -25 political parties- and politicians were banned from politics after military coup. Trade unions, voluntary associations, foundations, public professional organizations, and cooperative societies were not allowed to support or received support from political parties or to engage in joint action among themselves (Özbudun, 2012, p. 41). Electoral threshold mainly targeted Islamic, Kurdish and extreme leftist parties, excluding them from the seats of TGNA. This new electoral law was in favor of the rural and agricultural interest of the country by assigning at least one seat per province, irrespective of the size of its population (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 133). For that reason, conservative and nationalist parties that traditionally have voter base from rural areas and small towns of Anatolia overrepresented in TGNA. New electoral

---

<sup>15</sup> TGNA has always been at the center of politics even in the War of Liberation. Assembly was the body, representing the Turkish nation. Therefore, its historical legacy was immense, yet its power curtailed in 1982 Constitution. 1983 even if TGNA was given authorities, political order favors and defined immense power to executive branch which can be summarized as de jure legislative supremacy-de facto executive supremacy.

system also favors front runner. This situation leads to domination of conservative deputies in the assembly and also representation of traditional and conservative values and political agenda.

1982 Constitution created a new regime that gave immense power to executive branch of the government, established tutelary powers above civilian governments and offers exit guarantees for military including amnesty to check the acts of politicians. Kalaycıoğlu (2008) named this new regime as Neo-Hamidianism, an old style rule by executive fiat in democratic guise, an authoritarian style of rule with democratic façade which TGNA dragged into a weak position vis-à-vis the executive branch of the government (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 23). The motto of this new regime was de jure legislative supremacy but de facto executive supremacy. After the new constitution, TGNA has turned to what Weinbaum (1975) called as “subordinate” type of legislature (Weinbaum, 1975, p. 211). The power and might of TGNA got another blow during the reign of AKP as the party executive becoming more centralized and personalized.

One of the articles in constitutional amendments in 2008 was to abolish headscarf ban in the universities together with other serious modifications. Headscarf ban was a historical challenge of conservative masses to the Kemalist state. According to the Article 10 of 1982 Constitution, on equality adding the phrase “in the utilization of all kinds of public services,” and adding a new paragraph to Article 42 on the right to education that runs as follows: “No one shall be deprived of his/her right to higher education for any reason not explicitly specified by law (Özbudun, 2012, p. 45). The amendment was brought to Constitutional Court by Republican People’s Party of its constitutionality and its contradictions with the first three unamenable articles of 1982 Constitution. However, Constitutional Court rejects the case.

From 2007 to 2010, AKP strategically focused on Constitutional Court and HSYK. In March 2008, AKP faced up party closure case. The Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation accused AKP to become the center for anti-secular activities against Republic. Therefore, the Party focused on making the party closure cases more complicated.

After a case of party ban, AKP blamed and demonized Constitutional Court, HSYK and Bar Associations as being member of Republican elite. Changing the structure of HSYK and Constitutional Court became the first and foremost issue for the party. Even if there was a several articles that might foster democratization process of Turkish democracy such as right to apply Constitutional Court individually and introduction of public ombudsman, amendment package perceived as a step for the elimination of Republican dominance in the structure of judiciary. AKP introduced a reform package in 2010 Referendum for aiming to restructure the body of HSYK. Constitutional Amendment that aimed to change 24 articles, offered to vote for the citizens. The most controversial amendment among 24 was the one that aimed radically change the structure of HSYK. The Minister of Justice and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice preserved their positions in the HSYK, which was many times criticized by politicians and academics as it is an intervention to judicial independence. According to the amendments, the president can elect 4 members of HSYK. Constitutional change was intended to break the monopolistic domination of the two high courts over the Council, and to make it more representative of the judiciary as a whole by allowing the judges and public prosecutors of the ‘first-degree’ courts to be strongly represented in the Council (Özbudun, 2012, p. 48).

The number of Constitutional Court members also increased from 11 to 17 with the Referendum and 4 of them can be elected by the President. Beside this, President can also choose 3 members that nominated by YÖK among 3 candidates for each seats. The selective nomination role of the President consolidated as the President chooses 1 by the High Military Administrative Court, 2 members nominated by Council of State, 1 members nominated by the Military Court of Cassation and 3 members nominated by the Court of Cassation. The amendment got 58% of support from Turkish voters and approved. President Abdullah Gül’s nominations to HSYK and Constitutional Court have changed the composition of each body. Concerns about the judicial independence and rule of law triggered the discussions about the future of Turkish regimes as democracy.

Rule of law has always been problematic in Turkey. Turkey has always at the top of ECHR (European Court of Human Rights), one of the most sued country regarding the human rights cases. According to data as of 2014, Turkey was the champion of all member country both in terms of violations and applications even before Russia (Özalp, 31.01.2015). Turkey ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1954. From then on, the number of cases about Turkey has been increasing especially on the violations of human rights. During the AKP rule, the numbers of cases continued to increase. In 2013, the number of applications allocated to a judicial formation reached its peak exceeded the threshold of ten thousand. The most sued cases generally concentrate on the fair trials and security and freedoms topics. There are major and serious problems in Turkish judiciary that are worsening the quality of judicial processes.

**TABLE 3: Number of Cases in ECHR on Turkey**

<b>Year</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
<b>Total Case</b>	1097	2830	3706	4474	5821	8668	9098	10931	9488	8446

**Source:** European Court of Human Rights, Statistics, Applications allocated to a judicial formation.

According to Susan Corke, Freedom House Director of Euresia Programs;

“There are major and well-documented shortcomings in Turkish judicial proceedings and procedural code relating to the transparency of proceedings, the access of defense to the case file, the use of classified evidence without access for the defense, and the inexcusable abuse of so-called “provisional detention” to keep some individuals in jail for years before they are even tried. These shortcomings have been clearly evident in the cases of numerous journalists, as well as in the Ergenekon proceedings. The upcoming fourth judicial reform package has a lot of work to do to resolve these issues, and it is worth noting that previous judicial reforms, including just last year, have not taken adequate steps to fix the problems. And while we are talking about this issue in terms of journalism and freedom of expression, we have to note this is something that affects Turkey’s entire judicial system” (Corke et. al., 2013).

Rule of Law Index is a quantitative assessment aiming to measure countries' quality of rule of law in practice. Constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal justice are the determinants of measurement of the rule of law score that a country has. Amalgamation of these three characteristics constitutes a country score range from 0 to 1 (with 1 indicating strongest adherence to the rule of law). Scoring is based on answers drawn from a representative sample of 1,000 respondents in the three largest cities per country and a set of in-country legal practitioners and academics (The World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index, 2005-2016). Turkey ranked 99th among 113 countries with the score of 0.43, stepped down from 82nd out of 102 countries. Score of Turkey was 0.46 in 2015 and 0.5 in 2014.

Erosion of rule of law during the reign of AKP can be seen in Transparency International Corruption Perception Index as well. According to the measurement of the Index, corruption, transparency, freedom of expressions are highly correlated and tied to rule of law. According to index of 2015, the rank of Turkey deteriorated from previous years. Turkey ranked 66 among 168 countries -the rank of countries determines their positions relative to other countries- and the score of country indicates public perceptions on public sector corruption where 0 means highly corrupted to 100. According to 2015 report, Anne Koch, Director for Europe and Central Asia warns "Also very worrying is the marked deterioration in countries like Hungary, FYR of Macedonia, Spain and Turkey where we're seeing corruption grow, while civil society space and democracy shrink. Corruption won't be tackled until laws and regulations are put into action and civil society and the media are genuinely free." (Corruption Perception Index Report, 2015).

With some fluctuations over time, Turkey got the highest score in the year of 2013, where the 17th and 25<sup>th</sup> December Corruption scandals has blown up. 52 people detained and 3 Turkish ministers' sons arrested for the probe of corruption and bribery. Direct aggressions of Gülen movement related police officials to government quickly turned against them. Officials were dismissed and corruption case was dropped and former ally of AKP, Gülen Movement named as "parallel state". As the scores of index



makes it obvious, there is a marked tendency of increasing in the corruption perception among Turkish citizens.

**TABLE 4: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Turkey in 2005-2015.**

<b>Years</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
<b>Rank</b>	65	60	64	58	61	56	61	54	53	64	66
<b>Score</b>	35	38	41	46	44	44	42	49	50	45	42

**Source:** Corruption Perceptions Index, 2005-2015.

Bribe Payers Index of Transparency International can be another indicator to observe the rule of law in a country. The main purpose of the index is to measure the perceived tendency of companies to pay bribe in foreign countries. It scores and ranks countries on a scale of 0 to 10, where a maximum score of 10 corresponds with a view that companies from that country never engage in bribery when doing business abroad (Bribe Payers Index Report, 2011, p. 4). Business executives were asked for each of the 28 countries with which they have a business relationship with (for example as supplier, client, partner or competitor), ‘how often do firms headquarters in that country engages in bribery in this country?’ (Bribe Payers Index Report, 2011, p. 5). According to dataset the average of the 28 countries are 7.8 where Turkey ranked 19th in 2011 with the score of 7.5. In 2006, Turkey was in Cluster 4 with Russia, China and India and ranked 27th out of 30 countries. The reason of this improvement in the score was probably the signature of Turkey in enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which may transposed in national law and forced by the government, yet, Bribe Payers Reports of 2011 Turkey indicated that showed little or no enforcement for the Convention. But there was still an improvement in today in comparison with the period of 2008-2010.

Voice and Accountability Index captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as

freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media (Voice and Accountability Dataset, 2014). Index operationalizes from several indexes such as civil society, democracy index, political rights or freedom of press with combining survey data catching the perceptions of citizens of countries with those are able to participate in choosing their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Score of the index range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). According to the scores from 2005 to 2014, there is a marked evidence of deterioration among aforementioned areas in Turkey. Especially, as of the year 2010 where the composition of Constitutional Court and HSYK, changed by the referendum, the score of Turkey tended to decrease tremendously. Before that, Turkey was in lower than -0.1 threshold. In 2014, the score of Turkey was the lowest and two times doubled from the year of 2008.

**TABLE 5: World Bank Voice and Accountability Index: Turkey in 2005-2014.**

<b>Years</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
<b>Rank</b>	96	102	100	100	101	103	105	109	110	117
<b>Score</b>	-0.04	-0.11	-0,09	-0,08	-0,08	-0,12	-0,16	-0,23	-0.26	-0,32

**Source:** Voice and Accountability Index, World Bank, 2005-2014.

World Bank defines judicial independence with three characteristics. Judicial independence has three characteristic in which judicial decisions must be impartial, respected and when the judiciary is free from interference (World Bank, 2016). The rule of law and its components such as human rights, bribery, public perceptions of corruption, judicial independence are all linked to each other. As several indexes revealed that they are deteriorated in the post-2010 period.

Apparently, some of critical sufficient conditions of democracy such as rule of law, horizontal accountability and judicial independence are losing ground in Turkey. Transparency, freedom of expression, legal rights and freedoms are weakening while

electoralism is rising on the mouth of the populist politicians. Vertical accountability through elections is the only type of accountability for the AKP that can be taken seriously. Both the judicial and legislative branch of the government rendered to be dysfunctional as the executive power, authoritarian and plebiscitarian type of politics turned to be a growing power. Anomaly, amoral individualism, exploitation of state resources, nepotism, favoritism and patronage started to shape political system of Turkey. The more respect and effectiveness democratic governments develop through distributing favors, the more erosion occurs in the rule of law of the country (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 174). Patronage undermines law enforcement and erodes the rule of law and works at the expense of the rule of law in a country (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 63). Patronage is also detrimental to the legislative process and political institutions; poisoned its reputation in media and produce backdrop for political corruption.

The chance of transition from tutelary judiciary to independent courts had a low potential. In 2010, Constitutional Referendum passed with significant margin. Referendum was the causes of dramatic changes in the structure of HSYK. For opposition, AKP's main motivation was controlling the body of HSYK, eliminate secular/Kemalist judges and prosecutors and to capture the third branch of government. For the supporters of the modifications, HSYK will be more independent and democratic as a result of the bill. According to Tombus (2013) AKP's plan to restructure the HSYK has nothing to do with the establishment of independent judiciary since the bill instead of making the HSYK independent of the executive power; the bill has retained the Minister of Justice as a member of the HSYK (Tombus, 2013, p. 322). Supervision of Minister of Justice in the board of HSYK means continuation of the potential political interventions to judicial branch of the government. However, in 2014, political atmosphere has changed after graft investigation operations against AKP government by Gülenist police forces. Gülen movement was mainly concentrated in judiciary and police forces and HSYK was their main target to control. Judges and prosecutors related with Gülen movement infiltrated to the HSYK body either through elections or by appointments. Thus, elections for 10 regular and 6 substitute new members for the Board of HSYK turned to a battlefield for two sides. In the October

candidates that are supported by the government captured 8 out of 10 position of the Board. Politics was too much integrated into the standard elections for Board of HSYK. For the supporters of Referendum, idea of changing the structure of HSYK out of executive encroachments seemed to fail in October 2014 elections. Looking back at the intense debate surrounding the 2010 reforms, perhaps no one was right. The newly-composed HSYK did not become an agent of the AKP nor did it represent a more pluralist body enhancing judicial independence (Yeğen, 2014).

Past adverse scenarios of Turkey with the restructuring the judiciary may be intensified if the country involved in its long running request for a new Constitution. All parties in TGNA were coalescing for the necessity of forming a new Constitution. However, deep political polarization and the lack of tolerance and culture of reconciliation between parties would make constitution writing process a battleground for political war. Exclusion of significant political or societal groups, civil societies, or a political party would be reason for questioning the legitimacy of Constitution in future. Thus, negotiation period of Constitution writing must be inclusive. Comparing the Constitution drafting process of Chile and Turkey, Yeğen & Heiss (2014) put forward the differences between two countries where Turkey failed to attempt at constitutional modification. According to writers, Turkish constitutional drafting is without first setting the debate on the procedure of making a new constitution whether the TGNA or the commission had the original constituent power to write a new constitution (Yeğen & Heiss, 2014). At the beginning, some even questions the authority of constitution drafting commission because of its ad hoc characteristic. Considering the 10% national threshold that limits the representation of small political groups, number political groups representing their views could not be involved into the process. As Yeğen & Heiss reiterate, the commission planned to get the reviews, drafts and feedback of social organizations and individuals about the new Constitution via e-mails and through websites. Constitution drafting Commission dissolved while having consensus over 60 articles and the ruling party could not find any partner supporting for the amendments.

Turkish experience with Constitution drafting process has failed because of several reasons that some of are embedded in the political characteristic of Turkey. The

roadmap of making a new constitution must be clear and must receive the support of the political actors involved; must be shielded from daily politics that can jeopardize compromise; must have procedural legitimacy; thus curtailing the possibility that the process will be disorganized or delegitimized (Yeğen & Heiss, 2014). Considering the elements proposed by Yeğen, political parties, civil society organizations, business and political institutions should get into a process of discussion, coalescing and compromise which is hardly to find in Turkish political culture.

#### **4.2.4 Media and Freedom of Expression**

Independent and neutral media is one of the pillars of democracies. It is the area that is typically manipulated and controlled by authoritarian leaders. The scope, methods can vary from leaders to leaders, time to time and regime to regime but conventional and social media always at the center of populist leaders.

Turkish broadcasting framework has been organized by Radio and Television High Council (RTÜK). Members of RTÜK are elected by the parliament. Thus, composition of Council has been determined by the composition of seats in the TGNA. RTÜK has the authority to sanction on broadcastings and its contents. If broadcaster are not comply with the law or broadcasting principles of Council, they can be fined or limited by broadcasting. Another serious problem for the freedom of expression was TCK 301 amendment throughout 2000s. Almost 300 journalists and writers were prosecuted for “insulting Turkishness” under the provision, and they were also subject to threats from nationalist groups (Freedom of Press Reports, 2006). Nobel awarded writer Orhan Pamuk and Armenian journalist Hrant Dink faced with serious prosecutions because of this amendment, even before the AKP government, but prosecuted under AKP government.

Another important property of Turkish media is the role of state owned media. Turkish state is controlling 16 TV also one of the biggest with its number of TV broadcast, agencies and budget. AKP has been benefited from this composition as the government has chance to control state media group, TRT. For example, in presidential

elections of 2014, among candidates, TRT dominantly presented Erdoğan more than other candidates. In 2014, 4 July, Erdoğan broadcasted for 1 hour and 20 minutes while opposition candidate Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu got 1 minute and while Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş got no minutes (T24, 09.08.2014).

In Turkey, media are highly concentrated in the property of few large private holding companies. Media operations are small percentages of budget of these large conglomerates. For that reason, editors and journalists of mainstream newspapers and publishers are turning to a tool in the hands of private companies; representing the interests of their patrons. Because of this, journalist might restrain themselves from reporting the critical news, such as corruptions, commercial or illegal activities of politicians that will harm their business interests. Censorship is not explicit, but editors and journalists practice self-censorship out of fear of violating legal restrictions; Turkish press freedom advocates contend that self-censorship has become even more prevalent as a result of the onslaught of prosecutions under the new penal code in 2007 (Freedom of Press Reports, 2007). This could include avoiding criticism of the government or potential advertisers, both of which could have contracts with other arms of the companies (Freedom of Press Reports, 2005). The government continued to use the financial and other leverage it holds over media owners to influence coverage of politically sensitive issues (Freedom of the Press, 2015).

Public procurement decisions of governments are strong financial resources for these large private holding companies. Ministers that are responsible for defense procurements, housing and construction and infrastructure projects are controlling serious assets through distribution of procurement contracts. In one of the most flagrant examples of the use of economic leverage to shape media ownership, wiretap recordings leaked in December 2013 indicated that the government dictated which holding companies would purchase the Sabah-ATV media group in exchange for a multibillion-dollar contract to build Istanbul's third airport (Freedom of the Press, 2015). Another strategy of the party in supporting the party affiliated media groups was state's television advertisement. For example, in the first half of 2014, 60% of the television advertising budget of the public sector went to pro-government channels, whereas

critical outlets received virtually no funding (Taş, 2015: 786). Together with distribution of media outlets controlled by The Savings Deposit and Insurance Fund (TMSF) to a holding group close to AKP government, AKP created media groups predominantly loyal to the policies of AKP which control the majority of Turkish media outlets. Incumbent party successfully used “carrot and stick” policy against these large holding companies. “Old” structure of media has changed as time goes by under the AKP rule through state tenders and advertisements have been used as stick and carrot in favor of the government (Yanatma, 2016).

**TABLE 6: The World Press Freedom Index, 2007-2017**

20..	06	07	08	09	10	11-12	13	14	15	16	17
<b>Rank</b>	100	101	102	122	138	148	154	154	149	151	155
<b>Score</b>	25	31.2	22.7	38.2	49.2	70	46.5	45.8	44.1	50.7	52.9

**Source:** The World Press Freedom Index Reports, Reporters Without Borders, 2006-2017.

World Press Freedom Index ranks 180 countries of according to the level of freedom of reporters. Index calculates freedom of media via evaluating the overall performances of safety of working environment for journalists, legal framework of journalism and independence of media that a country has. Index is compiled by pooling the responses of experts of a country to a questionnaire, combined with quantitative data focuses on acts of violence against journalist. The criteria used in the questionnaire are pluralism, media independence, media environment and self-censorship, legislative framework, transparency, and the quality of the infrastructure that supports the production of news and information (The World Freedom Index, 2017). In 2017, Turkey ranks 155 out of 180 countries in the list, dropped from 151 in 2016. Report defines the existing situation in journalism as a witch-hunt waged by President Erdogan. According to the report, authorities have used their fight against “terrorism” as grounds for an unprecedented purge, eliminate dozens of media outlets, reducing pluralism to a handful of low-circulation publications, imprison journalists without trial and

censorship of online social networks has also reached unprecedented levels (The World Press Freedom Index: Turkey 2017).

In 2002, Turkey had the worst score for a country aiming to join EU where media covers are censored in the South East part of Turkey. Kurdish issues have always been at the center of censorship because of ethnic cleavage and terror organization and clashes between PKK and Turkish military. From 2002 to 2008 Turkey ranked between 98 and 115, even showed some improvement in Freedom of Press Index especially between 2005-2008 years. In 2007, Hrant Dink, the editor of Agos, one of the newspapers of country's Armenian minority, is murdered by a young nationalist Turk. In 2010, Turkey experienced historically low rankings with 138 which will be worsened in upcoming years. These declines can be explained, as far as Turkey is concerned, by the frenzied proliferation of lawsuits, incarcerations, and court sentencing targeting journalists and censorship of media that represent minorities and the control of government, armed forces and judiciary's control over coverage of matters of general interest (The World Press Freedom Index Report, 2009-2010). From that year on, country has never surpassed rankings lower than 150.

It is unfortunately clear that many of the world's leaders are developing a form of paranoia about legitimate journalism says RSF secretary-general Christophe Deloire (The World Freedom Index Report, 2016). Turkey is one of these countries under AKP government threaten journalist in public addresses, creating a sense of paranoia as if media is manipulating the public views against AKP government. Several journalists, pundits are also jailed in Ergenekon trials accused for involving in a coup plot against AKP government. Erdoğan started to target newspapers –Cumhuriyet, Sözcü-, Doğan Media Group- and journalists –Can Dündar, Ahmet Şık- with public blaming, suing for damages and on the basis of slander, defamation and organizing a plot against his government (Cumhuriyet, 31.05.2015). After 2013, another line of defense, a new strategy is invented by AKP by threatening journalist with imprisonment and blaming them as becoming the threat to national security of Turkey. In 2014, The World Freedom Index Reports defined Turkey as the one of the world's biggest prisons for



media personnel with more than 60 imprisoned journalists. In 2016, Turkey has one of the biggest declines after Poland with fall -5 ranks.

Reforms considering Turkish media have passed especially under the EU conditionality regime. In order to fulfill the EU criteria, in 2004, Turkey passed new press code, in 2005 country even has simple improvements in freedom of press. The new code, which was due to take effect in April 2005, reduced the minimum sentence for defamation and replace prison sentence with fines. The government removed the military member of the Supreme Council of Radio and Television (RTUK), the broadcast regulatory authority, state television and radio began limited broadcasting in minority languages, including Kurdish (Freedom of Press Report, 2005). This was one of the significant steps for freedom of expression in Turkey. In upcoming years, number of Kurdish broadcasting TVs have increased, even TRT, state-owned TV channel started to broadcast in Kurdish. However, not all developments were positive. In 2009, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, threatened the Doğan Media Group for covering a corruption scandal involving a Turkish charity that had allegedly channeled funds to certain individuals and companies (Freedom of Press Report, 2009).

**TABLE 7: Freedom of Press Reports, 2007-2017**

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Rank</b>	105	-	101	106	112	117	120	134	142	-	-
<b>Score</b>	49	51	50	51	54	56	62	65	65	71	76

**Source:** Freedom of Press Reports, Freedom House, 2007-2017.

According to Global Freedom of Press Report, from 2009 to 2017, freedom available for Turkish media has been declining steadily. Number of censorship and blocking of websites are growing. The power and authority of Telecommunication Authority (TİB) expanded for blocking websites mainly for national security, privacy, propaganda of terrorist activities without prior court approvals. The authorities continued to aggressively use the penal code, criminal defamation laws, and the

antiterrorism law to crack down on journalists and media outlets especially restricting reporting on corruption and national security issues (Freedom of the Press Report, 2015). In April 2015, the Law Amending the Law on State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organization has passed under severe dissidence by opposition parties, granted the MIT much greater powers, including the ability to access any personal data without a court order (Freedom of the Press Report, 2015).

In 2017, Turkey was one the countries that experienced largest decline in Freedom of the Press Report of 2017. Attempted Coup plot deepened the decline in the Freedom of the Press score of Turkey. Increasing authoritarian tendencies of AKP government and global decline in the freedom score of the press coincided in 2017 where global press freedom declined to its lowest point in 13 years in 2016. Even major consolidated democracies, critics, blaming, threatening of journalists have been generally applied by leaders.

The AKP could easily represent its opponents as collaborators of the Western states by using its gigantic media machine (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 13). Media is not only playing a crucial role in legitimatizing the policies of AKP, but also forming and shaping the policies of opposition parties. With the help of strong support of AKP controlled media, party has no difficulty in shaping the public opinion. It is important to understand the role of media in shaping the public opinion of Turkish voters.

#### **4.2.5 Populism**

Populism has variants. Literature of populism creates diminished subtypes of populism that differ from each other. In each study, scholars create number of types of populism in order to conceptualize phenomena such as left/right wing populism, authoritarian populism, economic populism, military populism, rentier populism, exclusionary populism etc. However, today we have enough literature to conceptualize the minimal definition of populism and its general properties.

Panizza (2013) argues that the populism consists of a discursive core which comprises speaking like the people, speaking for the people, the politics of antagonism and politics of redemption (Selçuk, 2016, p. 573). Personalistic leadership created an unmediated or weakly institutionalized relationship between the leader and public, discourse of “us versus them” and mistrust of democratic institutions which would limit the power of the leader (Carrión, 2009). Weyland (2001) focuses on the methods and instruments of winning and exercising power; emphasizes domination over redistribution and projection of power through elections, plebiscites, mass demonstrations and public opinion polls (Selçuk, 2016, p. 573). Barr defines populism as a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages (Barr 2009, p. 38). Conniff (2012) stresses the charismatic appeal to the common people and the significance attached to winning elections (Selçuk, 2016, p. 573). Wejnert & Woods (2014) conceptualize populism as is more locally grounded and context specific, refers to ‘the people’ for legitimacy; it is rooted in anti-elite feelings; it constructs an ‘us vs. them’ dichotomy with an exclusion strategy; and it forges mass mobilization (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 6).

Considering the commonalities of conceptualization of populists, few things are distinguished. First conceptualization defines a personalistic leadership and its discourse. The role of leader is core in populism. His discourse, appeals to the situations, replacing himself to the position of “mouth of the people, man of the people” as speaking for the people, with the people creates a sense of equation between the masses and the leader. His charismatic stance and appeal can be result of many things but help build the political aura around him which attracts common people around him. Populism is methodology, a style of communication for leaders for reaching out the people. Second conceptualization focuses on being us versus them. For sure, politics itself have a sense of being “in and out” of the “sides”, being advocate of an ideology, class, politics or a party. However in populism leaders place himself to the position of a “big redeemer” of the people from others. This “others” can be many things; elites, opposition party, military, class, minority or religious group. Elites versus poor masses,

national and versus foreigners (enemies), loyal people versus rebels; such binary moral dimensions are benefited by leaders for mobilization of masses at the expense of increasing the political polarization. Through that way, populist leader not only tighten their network/ranks and guarantee the unification of his people, but also create a sense of hatred, opposition and hostility against others. Populist leader can divert this antagonism against democratic institutions, opposition parties or specific hostile political concentration of power. As Carrión (2009) indicates above, leader can see any of these political power centers as a counter which would limit the power capacity of populist leader. Strategy of populists to limit the power of democratic institutions can also be founded over the antiestablishment discourse, either aim to change the existing political order, or seeking to gain or maintain power. The most important general property of populist leaders is their specific importance attached to winning elections and referendums. Plebiscitarian approach of populist leaders makes the politics only attach significance to the vertical accountability, only care about the elections. It is a methodology can be adapted to different political ends. World political history is full of populist leaders from right or left, fascist or socialist, secularist or Islamist political poles trying to reach people as being “one of them” or “the people”.

In Turkish politics, leaders have always been the core elements of politics. Starting from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İnönü, Menderes, Demirel, Turgut Özal and lastly Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have deeply influenced the country’s politics. Different patterns of populism are applied by these leaders from the very early Republican period to the modern Turkey. However, context, discourse and political conditions were different in each of these leaders and their period. In 2002, with the victory of AKP in general elections Turkey started to experience a new form of populism by Erdoğan. Party’s leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was a prominent figure for conservatives of Turkey, began his political life in the most populated city of Turkey in 1994 as mayor of Istanbul metropolitan municipality. 1994 local elections, Islamist Welfare Party had won 4 out of 5 metropolitan municipality of Turkey, which was signaling the major electoral shift in party politics and also the victory of party in 1995 general elections.

28<sup>th</sup> February 1997 was turned to a milestone in the victimization of conservative narratives of Islamists. The atmosphere created by military has also affected the life of Erdoğan. During his term as the mayor of Istanbul, he was charged for inciting religious hatred when reciting a poem in a mass rally (Selçuk, 2016, p. 575). Erdoğan served four months in prison in 1999 which he was sentenced to 10. After 3 years from his arrest, Erdoğan's AKP was able to get victory in 2002 general election with 34% share of votes. In the repercussion of the devastating 2001 economic crisis which had affected all sectors of society (Öniş, 2012, p. 138-139), the AKP emerged as the winner of the 2002 elections as the electorate retrospectively voted out all mainstream parties of the 1990s (Özbudun, 2013). Thanks to 10% national threshold, party managed to control the majority of seats in TGNA, thus formed single party government. Hence, the road to the dominant party regimes has been set up in 2002.

In its first period, AKP efficiently exploited the EU conditionality regime, introduced several reforms on behalf of the advancement in the chapters of EU accession process. Some of these chapters had involved the reforms in the structure of civil military relationship. For example, membership process had required the allegiance of Chief of General Staff to Ministry of Defense. Through these reforms AKP was trying to curb the political and tutelary power of military and had made them subordinated to civilians. The military was depicted as the guardian of elitism, bureaucratic autonomy, Istanbul business circles and media bodies that often criticized civilian governments in order to keep the military strong (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 10). Mainstream media, business elites –mainly TUSİAD-, opposition party CHP and Kemalist bureaucratic elites flocked in judiciary, HSYK and in some of ministerial seats was seen as a coalition invited military to the politics and help maintain its political power. In a populist way, through blaming these forces as the “winners”, self-seeking elements of existing political order, a privileged elite living in luxury, benefited from public procurements and derived economic power under the guardianship of military. AKP successfully exploited this structure and turned the politics in “us vs. them” dichotomy.

With strong electoral support of Turkish voters in 2002 and 2007 AKP maintained to stay in power with the single party government. Turning back to the conventional wisdom that I mentioned above, together with the positive effect of democratic reforms for EU accession process and populist policies, AKP was able to weaken the coalition of guardians of the regime. AKP pragmatically exploited the liberalization and democratic reforms conditioned to the accession of EU, while party leaders several times expressed their dedication to democracy, its values, reform agenda and democratization. However, the destruction of the Kemalist order has not been accompanied by the construction of a political system based on constitutional checks and balances, autonomous institutions, the rule of law, or a vibrant civil society and media. (Park, 2017, p. 3). Without having a strong checks and balance system by democratic institutions; playing field began to skew in favoring AKP.

AKP abandoned previously dedicated democratic reforms especially after 2010 Referendum. There were several reasons behind this political shift. Özbudun argues that the AKP has consolidated its power by eliminating the secular guardians of state and started to pursue a more markedly conservative and majoritarian (even plebiscitarian) style of rule (Özbudun, 2014, p. 155). Absence of strong autonomous civil society organizations, political culture far-fetched from possessing democratic civic culture characteristics and increasing level of populist discourse and practices created suitable conditions for AKP to consolidate its power and seeking to follow populist-authoritarian policies. The historical legacy of Turkey attributed specific role to military which gave it immense political role and reserved domains. The tutelary power of military led to concentration to the role of military in politics in the studies of democracy and democratization of Turkey. For some, the role of military in politics was the main barrier to completion of Turkish democracy. This presupposed that the elimination of political power of Turkish military will facilitate further democratization therefore finalize with the completion of Turkish democracy.

The backsliding of Turkey into authoritarianism by executive brings old questions to the ground. The view of AKP had masked its illiberal practices before its authoritarian tendencies were revealed (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 9) somehow implies

that the AKP has never been a fully democratic party; that internalize the democratic institutions, procedures, norms and values. Rather, party was aiming to consolidate its power through covering the real intentions of its ideology, the so called Islamist policies. Some of Republican academics, pundits and intellectuals have never believed the democratization of Turkey in the hands of AKP, rather masked their authoritarian tendencies through the Islamic concept *taqiyya*, which means denial of religious beliefs and practices under the condition of persecution. On the other side, Turkish liberals who were sensitive about the military's role in politics and opposed to the secular characteristic of military was source of support for AKP governments.<sup>16</sup> Even before the protests, despite openings in the Kurdish peace process which many liberals had advocated, they were increasingly targeted and isolated by Erdoğan, removing them from pro-AKP media outlets in order to prevent any criticism of his government from reaching his core base of support (Waldman & Çalışkan, 2017). In one of his speech, Aziz Babuşcu, AKP's branch head of Istanbul, clarified their relationship with the liberals several months before the Gezi Park. Babuşcu comments that liberals had worked with AKP for the past ten years they would not be with them in the future (Waldman & Çalışkan, 2017). Since the devout conservative masses continued to support the party weak support base of liberals can be neglected by the party.

The policies and style of rule of AKP after 2010 Referendum and to 2013 Gezi Parkı protests are signaled markedly the shift in the AKP's majoritarian policies. In the domestic realm, the AKP has centralized power by undermining democratic institutions and silencing alternative voices while it has adopted an Islamist discourse and policy toward the external world (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 2). At this point, I should underline that AKP's discourse carried populist elements from the very beginning. However, the degree and context of populism were Islamicized more after Gezi Park protests.

Withdrawal of the military from politics helped the party to turn back its Islamic discourse which became one of the pillars of the populist agenda of the party. In these new periods, Erdoğan signaled his plebiscitarian tendencies. In Gezi Parkı protests,

---

<sup>16</sup> Even if liberals were a small group of people, they have significant amount of visibility in academia, media and publishing which contributes to convince EU officials and centre-right people for the so called conservative democrat characteristic of the party. Gezi Parkı protests in 2013 create a shift in the relationship between liberals and the party.

Erdoğan call the protestors, invite them to organize a plebiscite for deciding the future of Gezi Parkı, whether to stay as green space or become as shopping mall as he projected (Birgün, 19.11.2014). Erdoğan subscribes to a plebiscitary view of democracy in which people can express their support to him not only through frequent elections and referenda but also in crowded mass rallies and public opinion polls. ‘The Respect to the National Will Rallies’ (Milli İrade’ye Saygı Mitingleri) organized in the aftermath of the 2013 Gezi Park protests are a good example of this tendency where Erdoğan demonstrated strength in a moment of crisis (Selçuk, 2016, p. 577). In the eyes of the Erdoğan, he personally only takes the elections serious. Due to its capability to mobilize the majority through populist policies, Erdoğan was believing of his capability and strong grass root organization of AKP. Erdoğan views ‘the “ballot box” as the only legitimate instrument of democratic accountability and describes anti-government demonstrations as an attempt by the minority to impose its will on the majority by unlawful means (Özbudun, 2014, p. 163). Democratic institutions that serves significantly important service named “horizontal accountability”, does not seem attached importance for the AKP and Erdoğan. Rather, as a strategy, AKP throughout its rule, aimed to weaken the power and authority of the TGNA and the independence of Supreme Court, High Council of Electorate and Constitutional Court.

The “cult” of Erdoğan had transformed during these period. Erdoğan began to be presented as a redeemer, and as a “man of the people”, the only protector of the interests of deprived ones, embodying the nation. His titles started to become more important and referring different aspects of him, approached in numerous situations. ‘The Chief ’ (Reis) referring to his paternalistic leadership, ‘the Tall Man’ (Uzun Adam) referring to his height; ‘the Conqueror of Davos’ (Davos Fatihi) referring to his bold stance against Israel during the 2009 World Economic Forum, and ‘the Master’ (Usta) referring his political skills (Türk, 2014).

Another major shift has been realized in foreign policy. Richard Rosecrance, in his Action and Reaction book, argued that, populists leaders are often seeking to solve their domestic problems with getting diplomatic or military victories abroad. AKP might have pragmatically exploited Islamism in foreign policy to enhance its power



inside Turkey (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 3). Considering the weakening power of Turkish military, in AKP's first period, through National Security Council Turkish military acted as a tutelary power that limit the AKP's intention of changing the foreign policy paradigm of Kemalist establishment. The NATO ties and ongoing EU accession processes were other institutional linkages that hold the paradigm shift at some degree.

Renowned Islamist and the architect of AKP foreign policy vision, Ahmet Davutoğlu was behind the shift of foreign policy paradigm of Turkey. Behlül Özkan, after reading nearly 300 publications of Davutoğlu, concludes that the foreign minister has a pan-Islamist vision, which rejects the Arab nationalism and secularism (Özkan, 2014, 119-120). His ambition and vision was aiming to make Turkey as being a regional power that has “zero problems with neighbors”. After withdrawal of military from politics, together with Arab Spring and repercussions of the discussion of Erdoğan and Israeli President Simon Peres, brought new opportunities for AKP for building Islamic discourse. Neo-Islamic discourse building around the unity of Islamic countries especially against Israel, more effective policies from Organization of Islamic Cooperation and lastly Neo-Ottomanism that helped building ambition of becoming the regional power in Middle East. Ottoman symbols, writings and even TV series became popular after AKP's intensified discourse of Ottomanism and Islamism. Anti-Israel discourse and pro-Palestinian politics helps AKP to reach out the streets of Arabian Peninsula. Turkey earned the acclamation of the Arab street not due to Islam per se but due to its rhetoric against with Israel and support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Öniş, 2013, p. 214).

Shift in foreign policy paradigm also reflects in domestic politics. Neo-Islamic and Neo-Ottoman rhetoric of AKP leaders are welcomed by conservative segments of Turkish society. However, widespread use of Ottoman and Islamic rhetoric did not please all sectors of society. Turkish society is divided along historical cleavages. Turk-Kurd, Alevi-Sunni, Secular-Conservative cleavages are embedded in Turkish politics. For that reason, increasing use of Ottoman and Islamic rhetoric displeased for the secular part of society together with Kurdish political movements and Alevis. In order to consolidate its conservative support base, with this strategy, AKP was not only

maintains its electoral support and also turned politics into “us vs. them” dichotomy again. According to Tuğal, this “us vs. them” dichotomy can be reflected in who would be included or excluded. Islam is not a tool for populist leaders but a structure that build the framework of populism. Tuğal suggest that Islam actively shapes this populism and imposes a certain form on it. Specifically, it decides the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, and determines who should be participating in this politics (Tuğal, 2002, p. 95).

### **4.3 Illusion of Democratic Consolidation**

#### **4.3.1 Discussion of Democratic Consolidation**

Democratic consolidation is a “nebulous concept” (Pridham, 1990, p. 8). The definition of the term seemed a bit vague and ambiguous for some part of researchers. Conceptual confusion about the definition and denotations of the term had an effect on the studies focus on the phenomenon as well. Conceptual framework about the term has been shaped by many studies. Yet, these studies refer varied number of meanings for the terms of consolidation. Even if there have been aggregations between the studies that attributed to the same meanings on democratic consolidation, "no clear consensus has emerged for the definition of democratic consolidation" (Gunther et. al., 1995, p. 5).

Any talk about democratic consolidation presupposes that a democratic regime exists from the beginning to the end of the process (Schedler, 1997, p. 6). This premises that democratic consolidation can only be realized in democracies where democratic transition successfully completed. Therefore; the term democratic consolidation is not applied to the regimes that are not completed their transition period. Because, completion of transition obliges to the foundation of procedural minimum of democracy. Consolidation of democracy realm is constrained by democracies that at least meet with the minimum standard of democratic institutions. Therefore, as Schedler pointed, this proposition implies that “mixed regimes” fall outside the realm of democratic consolidation unless we classify them as subtypes of democracy and not as

subtypes of authoritarianism (Schedler, 1997, p. 6). The structure of studies, whether a study applied “conceptual stretching” or not, maybe, exacerbated the ambiguity of the term democratic consolidation, since they applied the term that fall in the gray zone between democracy and autocracy.

The meaning we ascribe to the notion of democratic consolidation depends on where we stand our empirical viewpoints and where we look to (our normative horizons); it varies according to the contexts and the goals of our research (Schedler, 1997, p. 4). Those who look from liberal democracies and advanced democracies to authoritarianism equate democratic consolidation with preventing from authoritarian pushbacks; for those who look from electoral or liberal democracies to advanced democracies equate democratic consolidation with democratic deepening; those who look from liberal democracies to electoral democracies equate democratic consolidation with avoiding from a “slow death of democracy”; those who look from electoral democracies to liberal democracies equate democratic consolidation with completing democracy (Schedler, 1997, p. 10). Before we get into detail it would be better if we define the electoral and advanced democracy definitions according to the study of Schedler. Author defines electoral democracies that are somewhat different than conventional meaning, rather a diminished subtype of democracy. In literature electoral democracies are those somewhat have inclusive and competitive elections but fail to provide civil rights, freedoms and liberties to its citizens. “Advanced democracies” presumptively possess some positive traits over and above the minimal defining criteria of liberal democracy, and therefore rank higher in terms of democratic quality than many new democracies (Schedler, 1998, p. 93). Schedler equates polyarchies with liberal democracies.

In this section, on the basis of the Schedler’s typologies of democratic consolidation, study will examine the democratic consolidation literature and locate scholarly studies on these typologies.

#### *Avoiding Democratic Breakdown*

According to Schedler's typologies, political elites' main aim is to protect what they have maintaining the democratic institutions and securing from the possibility of breakdown. Preventing from potential authoritarian regressions and achieved to gain political stability to the endpoint of where there is no reason to be feared. Military coups or illegal attempts by other state elites, anti-system political or military actors, and disenchantment of citizens from democratic processes may pose danger for this branch of consolidation, and then led to the "quick death of democracy". In near future, democracy will be in secure, and prevented from the quick death of democracy. Therefore, this branch of consolidation will focus on the resilience, persistence, endurance and sustainability of their democracy.

#### *Avoiding Democratic Erosion*

Incremental power of undemocratic forces may lead to erosion of the democratic institutions. Corrupt or populist leaders that are seeking to maintain in power, hegemonic parties or populist leader aim to subvert democratic institutions through manipulating democratic institutions or can cause gradual weakening of democratic institutions. Therefore the liberal democratic system –*polarchy*- can degrade to a form of a hybrid regime. This branch of consolidation denotes avoiding from the decline of liberal democracy to an electoral one. According to Schedler, there is clear difference between the "avoiding democratic breakdown" and "avoiding democratic erosion". The former implies sudden and dramatic interventions like coup politics while the latter referring to gradual decay in the political system.

#### *Completing Democracy*

While "avoiding democratic breakdown" and "avoiding democratic erosion" refer to a consolidation that preventing from authoritarian regression, completing democracy implies advancement from electoral democracy to meet with the *polyarchy* criteria. Form diminished subtypes of democracy to a completed democracy. Thus, this type of consolidation tends to focus more on forward and advancement towards a more qualified democracy. This situation also implied that the threat of authoritarianism is a low potential. Valenzuela (1992)'s consolidation definition proposes the abolishing of

“tutelary powers,” “reserved domains,” and “major discriminations” in the electoral law appeared as necessary ingredients of democratic of this branch of consolidation (Schedler, 1998, p. 98).

O’Donnell (1992)’s “second transition” –from democratic government to democratic regime- definition begins with the formation of democratic government until the endpoint of the establishment of a consolidated democratic regime. Linz & Stepan’s (1996) “constitutionally consolidated” regimes conditioned to resolving of conflicts according to established norms, and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly (O’Donnell, 1992, p.15-16).

### *Deepening Democracy*

Deepening democracy refer to pushing of the liberal democracy further; to a more advanced level of democracy. A stage of democracy, which the long –term persistence of the regimes are guaranteed. The bulk of studies on democratic consolidation mostly think about this type of consolidation. Liberal democracies meets with the procedural minima and guarantee the civil liberties therefore further democratization will end up with consolidation of democracy.

Gunther et. al. (1995) and Linz & Stepan’s (1996)’s “behaviorally and attitudinally consolidated” democracy is the only game in town, where there will be no serious political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state and support the democratic methods (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 5). Parallel to Linz & Stepan (1996), Przeworski (1991) argues that democratic consolidation occurs when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p.26). These two definitions of consolidation refer to behavioral, psychological internalization of democratic norms and procedures while approving that the chances of authoritarian regressions seen as low potential. On the same line, Haggard & Kaufman (1995) and Diamond (1994) proposes that consolidation is the process by which democracy become so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that is very unlikely to break down (Diamond, 1994, p. 15)

## *Organizing Democracy*

Schedler offers “organizing democracy” as an uneasy intermediate position, a “neutral” usage of democratic consolidation, which comprehends democratic consolidation as the “organization” of democracy, where democratic consolidation demands establishing democracy’s specific rules and organizations (Schedler, 1998: p. 100). This branch of consolidation conceptualization requires re-organization and re-constructing of institutions for liberal democracy’s institutions such as electoral system judicial system.

Schedler’s typologies are bringing the empirical viewpoints, regime types to the discussion of consolidation. Thus, authors aim to decrease the conceptual confusion of the term which many ascribe number of meanings to the same word. The most important reason of the conceptual confusion was scholars aim to use most appropriate definition and regime type for their studies. Even if using the same word, the circumstances in which their studies were trying to explain were different. There has been a framework about the concept of consolidation, but as in the Schedler’s study, there was a separation between the "positive" and "negative" connotations of the concept. When negative and positive trends came into the analysis his study capture the “endurance, resilience, persistence” line of definitions. Also, positive trends towards advanced or liberal democracies from liberal or electoral democracy contributes his analysis for not to neglect the “advancement toward a more developed democracy” line of studies.

In terms of democratic backsliding, Schedler’s types of *avoiding democratic breakdown* and *avoiding democratic erosion* are suitable examples for backsliding discussions. These two typologies prevent from threats, destabilizing factors, regressions that have potentials to breakdown of democracy or erosion of its democratic institutions. Main motivations of political decision makers of these regimes are to build resilient democratic institutions which can confront in either slow or quick death of democracy. In *avoiding democratic breakdown* classic military coup d’états even if their numbers declined today comparing the 1960s, can be reason that lead to

breakdown of democracies. Promissory coups in which ouster of an elected government for protecting the Constitution followed by open-ended intervention therefore causes democratic breakdown. Self-coups, *autogolpes*, executives' aim to subvert constitution and suspending parliament in democratic erosion process are what public and elites aimed to object. This dramatic intervention to politics finalize with slow death of democracy. Same for executive aggrandizement; in which erosion of democracy is realized at a slow pace, without existence of executive replacement. Weakening of democratic institutions and checks and balance system by elected government as long as executive holds the majority of citizens' support causes slow death of democracy in these cases. The pace of erosion and the mechanism that led to backsliding determines the type of backsliding of democracy. Consolidation of regimes what Schedler (1998) defines as *avoiding democratic breakdown* and *avoiding democratic erosion* are those which was strong enough to prevent from retreat of democracy in their country.

Consolidation is not possible if the democratic transition fulfilled and completed. Therefore, rather than using the democratic concept of erosion of democracy, I would rather prefer to apply for Bermeo's executive aggrandizement model. Turkish democracy, under AKP rule, experienced what Nancy Bermeo (2016) called "executive aggrandizement model of backsliding"; failed to become resilient against authoritarian regressions at a slower pace without the replacement of executive government as Bermeo outlined in her study. In terms of consolidation, Turkish case failed to pushback slow death of democracy.

One can ask, at this point, what were the mechanisms used by AKP to erode Turkish democracy in favor of itself? In next section, I will focus on how Turkey failed to prevent from backsliding into authoritarianism and how Turkish public intellectuals' failed on their evaluations about AKP?

### **4.3.2 Backsliding of Turkish Democracy**

Intentions of dividing the AKP's 15 years of single party government into two periods implied that the party's ruling styles has changed over time. Pro-western, pro-NATO addresses of the party leaders, party's aim to advance in EU accession talks, their comparison of AKP with the Christian democrat parties of EU and leaders' main motivation of limiting the political power of tutelary institutions of Turkey praised and supported domestic foreign actors. Especially, withdrawal of the political power of military is supported by the EU as the conditionality regime requires civilian control over military (Repucci, 2007). Turkey described as a model country among Islamic countries, where democracy is functioning in a dominantly Islamic society.

There was a widely belief argument that the withdrawal of tutelary powers would bring consolidation of Turkish democracy. Many began to focus on the struggle between the party and military forces. The declaration of military before the expiration of term of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer at the office for undermining the candidacy of Abdullah Gül for presidency strongly defeated by the party in early elections with 46.6% share of vote. Following that, Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases against some of Turkish military personnel with accusations of organizing coup attempt against civilian government supported by a large coalition of political groups. AKP received 50% of the total votes in the national elections of 2011; the military's tutelage over politics vanished following the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017: 2). Expectations of public intellectuals from AKP to return back to its reform agenda, EU accession talks and policies that expand civil rights and liberties have been failed. The ongoing process of solution to Kurdish question in order to end the conflict was retained people from early critics of AKP. However, the strong answer of AKP to the Gezi Parkı protests with securitization of the protesters and organization of big rallies in Ankara and İstanbul and increasing Islamic discourse, and Erdoğan's insistence for introduction of Presidential system create a discussion about the regime type of Turkey and growing authoritarian tendencies of Erdoğan. In this section, study will focus on to understand what was problematic in the literature that predicted democratic consolidation when tutelary powers were eliminated.



There seems two general reason lead to optimistic evaluations for the future of Turkish democracy under AKP rule. For some of the liberal intellectuals AKP's aim to solve the Kurdish question was a huge step that would contribute to deepening of democracy through the recognition of Kurdish identity, giving more voice and rights to minorities and aiming to end up military conflict with Kurdish terrorist organizations. There are several mechanisms offered by intellectuals on how the solution would contribute to Turkish democracy. First, the Kurdish separatist movement was advocate of independence –later federalism- attacked the national unity of the Turkish state which the main political actors such as military, political parties and dominant part of Turkish society were against. And this situation was hindering the liberalization in many areas such as Kurdish identity, language, national security and civil rights and liberties. The idea of liberalization in these areas may weaken political and military struggle against terrorism was the main argument against those demanded liberalism. Political solution via negotiations with PKK or Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party may broaden the scope of civil right and liberties for the Kurds and the rest of society. Second, the militarization of the Kurdish question was source for creating political space for military. Kurdish question was a historical question, managed by the security forces and the effect of civilian politicians to the issue was limited. Securitization of the Kurdish question gave immense power to the military at the expense of civilian politicians of weak coalition governments throughout 1990s. In its second term in office, AKP was trying to solve the question through “political solutions” while still holding the strong electoral support after 2007 elections. Erdoğan says “he was against the regional terrorist activities but can contribute to advance cultural rights and pluralism” (Sabah, 17.12.2005).

Tutelary power of Turkish military was seen as the main hindrance in the Turkish democracy for further democratizations. Through several mechanisms, AKP reduced the political power of military. By implementing legal reforms that reduced the institutional power of the military in decision making; through the political delegitimization of the military's extra-legal interventions in politics; and by criminalizing such interventions AKP curbed the political space available for the military. The

military officers' seats in some of democratic institutions such as RTUK and Higher Education Council were abolished. The last blow for the military was the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Cases which shuffled the high command rank of that even led to sentencing of the ex-Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ.

Another source of optimism about the future of Turkish democracy was the ongoing process for becoming a member of EU. Turkey under AKP rule opened some of negotiations for chapters of the accession process. Conditionality regime of EU was forcing liberalization and approval of civil liberties in some areas such as the subordination of military to civilian government. AKP while showing his intentions for reforms and civil rights and liberties was careful enough not to startle the secular coalition of the country before consolidation of its power. For these scholars, the elimination of tutelary powers of Turkish democracy may have strengthened the commitment of conservative part of society to democracy since they thought that citizens will be reflected in TGNA and executive since there is no tutelary powers above politics. Bulk of EU reports on the progress made in the implementation of EU-Turkey statements were civil-military relationship, civil rights and liberties and judiciary until the EU conditionality regime was effective in promoting democratization of Turkey. In terms of civil-military relationship, significant reforms were centered on the framework and authority of National Security Council. With EU implementations, in between 1999-2010, the authority of National Security Council constrained, frequency of meetings lowered to one in two months, the scope of "advisory role" of the NSC was defined in the Constitution while number of civilian member of NSC increased, control of Parliament on military budget increased, the authority of Military Courts limited to 'military service and duties', "EMASYA Protocol" that gave a military personnel right of military operations without civilian permission was abolished as such. After 2010, number of reforms on civil-military relationship has been curtailed. Gürsoy (2015) and Sarigil (2015) claimed that violation of defendant rights of Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases' led to polarization among public and therefore has been adversely affected democratic consolidation of Turkey (Aydın Düzgüt, 2015, p. 69-70). There have also been serious improvements on torture under custody, detention

period, freedom of expression and right of assembly, freedom of associations via reforms. However, difficulties, including disputes with Cyprus and skepticism among some EU leaders and citizens about Turkish membership, slowed down the process, while the support of Turkish people to the membership was falling (Freedom in the World: Turkey, 2013).

For some, ongoing political process for the solution of Kurdish conflict may contribute to pluralism, social diversity and loyalty of Kurdish to the state and democracy. There have been number of improvements on Kurdish issue by the EU implementation process. Ban on opening courses in Kurdish language and broadcastings and naming children in Kurdish language was abolished before 2005. Efegil (2011) hoped that AKP's aim to resolve the historical Kurdish question will contribute to the democratization of Turkey. Efegil claimed that the existing government sees cultural pluralism in terms of richness and it describes social diversity as a connective ingredient. It assumes that giving more democratic, cultural rights to minorities will not damage the unified structure of Turkey (Efegil, 2011, p. 31). The disarmament process of PKK, bargaining with its leader Abdullah Öcalan, economic and social improvements in the southeast part of Turkey, liberalization of Kurdish language through newspapers and TV channels and a new constitution that capture the demands of all sectors of society was AKP's plan to solve the question. According to Minister Bülent Arınç, the unitary structure of Turkey will be empowered rather than damaged and secondly the loyalty and the trust of the citizens to the state will be strengthened (Radikal, 30.08.2009). Similarly, intellectuals such as Baskın Oran, Fuat Keyman and Can Paker very much predict that same claimed that the political solution to Kurdish question that would strengthened the loyalty of Kurdish citizens to the state. Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu suggest finding a solution through negotiations and political contacts and to finalize the democratization process (Efegil, 2011, p. 34). Possibility of the potential success of the Solution process fostered the belief of the disarmament of PKK and a new constitution that guaranteed the political and cultural rights of Kurdish citizens. According to the party, Kurds were one of the deprived groups of Turkey, parts of "others" excluded from the system. Party was trying to

integrate its claim of “Party of Turkey”, for Erdoğan “man of nation”, with the Kurds, intent to incorporate Kurds into party’s populist discourse. The Solution process was one of elements in AKP’s “normalization process“. For some these liberal intellectuals, AKP is the chance for the “normalization” of Turkish politics in civil military relationship and for the exit from authoritarian 1982 Regime. According to İnel, the formation of majority government after 2002 election served as an opportunity for a mild but radical exit from the regime created in September 12, 1980 by the movement like AKP, which Westernizing-statist elites regard with suspicion (İnel, 01.02.2004).

İhsan Dağı (2008) claimed that, despite its political background, by seeking integration into the EU, the AKP is pushing for a structural transformation of Turkey that means turning away from Islamization rather, the party is moving away from Islamization to the path of globalization and Europeanization, through broadening democratic participation, enhancing freedom of expression, and improving civilian control over the military with the help of EU’s approval by enacting reforms (Dağı, 2008, p. 28). During its very early period, Erdoğan has rejected the label of “Islamist party”, preferring instead to call their ideological position as a “conservative democrat”. The “denial of being an Islamic party” by Erdoğan himself at the beginning of 2000s was welcomed by many, led to positive comments that the party will not intent to polarize through secular-conservative cleavage. According to Ahmet Yıldız (2004) supporting of rigid ideological position and applying of identity politics played a significant role in the failure of consolidation of democracy and political stability of Turkey (p. 5). Therefore, as Dağı claimed that ideological position of AKP is far away from being described as Islamist. Therefore he claimed that there was a possibility having of pro-European and pro-democrat AKP.

The full membership to the EU would finalize this transformation, and eliminate the possibility of a foundation of Islamic regime in Turkey. Dağı’s claim about elimination of Islamization of the party and Turkey very much depends of condition to the EU membership. Dağı was too hasty for claiming that the party does not motivated by the Islamic sentiments. However, the bulk of the party leaders were started politics in Islamic and conservative Refah Party and the Özal’s Motherland Party. Dağı’s

arguments were very much of the result of voter composition of AKP in 2002 and 2007 elections. The 2006 TESEV report on religiosity showed that 95 of Turkish people was not in favor of state based *Sharia* and the party received votes from electors who had voted for different political parties in previous elections in 2007 (Dağı, 2008, p. 29). However, being a non-Islamic or non-pro-Sharia rule does not necessarily mean democratic.

A socialization process under the management of Hilmi Özkök the relationship between the AKP and the military was moving closer to liberal-democratic model, where the military grants that the civilian government has the last word on political matters (Heper, 2005, p. 227). Heper was optimistic about the civil-military relations on the basis of continuing internal transformation both in the military and in the conservative political movements, namely AKP. Therefore, Heper believes that the Turkish military may not become a barrier for the Turkey's EU membership. Heper claimed that transformation of civil-military relationship is inevitable for Turkey, considering the ongoing process for becoming the full membership of EU and military is very much aware of this possibility. Modernization along Western lines, military's awareness that the EU will help improvements in Turkish economy and military capability, and strategic analysis of high command regarding to the past and present can be the reason for the military in order not to stand on the road of EU membership. In terms of the government, Heper argues that government has not only been successful in the management of the economy and the conduct of foreign policy, it has also been quite skillful in its approach towards the military (Heper, 2005, p. 228).

Heper's analysis of AKP in power was mostly focus on the party's quite skillful approach towards the military, the ongoing liberal socialization of military under the Chief of Staff General Hilmi Özkök and the EU's regulatory modifications regarding the military-government which forced curb the role of military –especially NSC- to the civilian authorities. Heper do not forget to reiterate that his notes are based on the assumptions that AKP was not engaged with *taqiyya*, that I briefly explained above. Therefore, the dramatic changes in the policies of AKP from the early 2000s to post-2013 period falsified the arguments of Heper. Heper's analysis based on that Erdoğan

and those are in the higher echelons of the AKP do not have the “ulterior motives” such as taqiyya. As noted, the bulk of the Turkish intelligentsia was a highly optimistic about the political projects of the party. However, Heper did not seem propose strong evidences for this claim. Therefore, his expectations and analysis from the beginning of AKP rule seems falsified. The socialization process of military also failed in 15<sup>th</sup> July coup attempt. Therefore, non-democratic elites failed to be successful in socialization process.

Considering the studies of Efeğil (2011), Heper (2005), Dağı (2008), and their optimistic arguments on conservative democrat AKP was omitting several general properties of Turkish politics. First of all, they did not foresee the stagnation of accession process of EU-Turkey relationship. However, as Senem Aydın Düzgit (2015) posits from reports, implementation of EU reforms has been slowed down especially after 2010. There was too much focus on anchor of the conditionality regime of EU. The possibility of authoritarian regression or backsliding of democratic institutions was seen as impossible under the anchor of EU. Therefore, people did not focus on other areas such as problems of political culture, weak institutionalized check and balances on executive and the weakness of democratic institutions. In terms of Solution Process, as I indicated above with reference from Heiss & Yeğen (2015), dramatic political changes, crafting institutions such as Constitution making requires compromise. Contributions of opposition parties and civil society organizations were limited throughout the process. TGNA remained out of the process for a long time. Opposition parties were briefed only few times about the process. The management of process was not democratic that therefore its chances of resolving social conflict among citizens were a low potential. Inconsistence of the management process with nature of democratic resolving did not identified by many observers, therefore dramatic abandonment of the Solution Process ended up with a high pressure against HDP, end of conversation with Öcalan and detentions of HDP leaders.

So, why the party shift to Islamic discourse and authoritarian tendencies as I show below in Table 8, Freedom House Freedom of the World Turkey Reports. According to Etyen Mahçupyan, the advisor of ex-prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu,

criticized that the conventional opinion about the AKP's future was the prediction that the party will place itself to the center of political spectrum. However, according to Mahçupyan, AKP is the new hegemonic power of Turkish politics which is redefining the political "center" and has no historical connection with centre-right political parties (Mahçupyan, 17.03.2014). The conflict with Gülen movement was the first serious challenge after the elimination of military from politics. According to Mahçupyan the military coup in Egypt and civil war in Syria and left no room for AKP except to consolidate its power. According to Mahçupyan, these conditions create "ground" for increasing the "authoritarian" and "conservative" tendencies of the party (Mahçupyan, 17.03.2014). Consolidating power through the support of the people in elections is not an "authoritarian" act, but AKP's solution to aforementioned crisis intensified the critics against party as becoming more authoritarian.

AKP's reaction towards the Gezi Parkı protests through gathering of million people in *Milli İrade'ye Saygı Mitingi* in major cities was exacerbated the "increasing authoritarianism" critics against the party. The mutual aversion between the EU and AKP, EU's implicit support to the military coup in Egypt and Gezi Parkı protests were intensified the mutual distrust between two actors. Erdoğan was blaming EU as being agent and support of protestors hence undermining the political order of the country. Mahçupyan's analysis sees the AKP's increasing authoritarian tendencies as a deterioration in the "image" of the party. Domestic and international political developments forced them to take serious measures in order to deal with the intense political turmoil and instability. For maintaining its power in the office Erdoğan had to apply to the support of the people both in meetings and in elections. But, Mahçupyan's analysis omits the alternative democratic mechanism for dealing with political danger and opponents. Mahçupyan thought as if the policies that the party applied were their only choice, while claiming that these policies intensified the authoritarian image of the country.

AKP was showing centripetal tendencies until the withdrawal of Turkish military. The abandoning of political power of Turkish military and the absence of checks and balance mechanisms of democracy coincided with intense use of Islamic

discourse. We can argue that the secular coalition of business, judiciary and military was forcing the party to refrain from giving anti-establishment statements, Islamic political maneuvers.

**TABLE 8: Freedom in the World Reports 2009-2017**

		<b>Freedom Ratings</b>	<b>Civil Liberties</b>	<b>Political Rights</b>
<b>2009-2012</b>	Partly Free	3/7	3/7	3/7
<b>2013</b>	Partly Free	3.5/7	4/7	3/7
<b>2014</b>	Partly Free	3.5/7	4/7	3/7
<b>2015</b>	Partly Free	3.5/7	3/7	4/7
<b>2016</b>	Partly Free	3.5/7	3/7	4/7
<b>2017</b>	Partly Free	4.5/7	4/7	5/7

**Source:** Freedom in the World Reports, Freedom House, 2009-2012.

After initially passing some liberalizing reforms, the government has shown decreasing respect for political rights and civil liberties, especially in the past five years (Freedom in the World: Turkey, 2017). While calculating the overall condition and outlook of Turkish democracy, Report indicates the continued downturn trend from 2010 to 2015. In 2013, as the Table 8 shows Turkey's freedom rating decreased from 3/7 to 3.5/7. The decline in the civil liberties was due to detentions of Kurdish politicians, journalists (especially journalists Nedim Şener – Ahmet Şık Case), and military officers. While some observers hailed the case as a breakthrough for civilian oversight of the military, others expressed concern about the rule of law and warned that the government was using the coup trials and KCK arrests to silence legitimate critics (Freedom in the World: Turkey, 2013). Country had decline in freedom score with political polarization, anticorruption scandals and political interference to judicial



processes in 17-25 December 2014 corruption scandal. Country continued to have downward trend with the collapse of Kurdish Solution Process and bombings in the metropolitan cities, arrest of journalists and Kurdish oriented HDP mayors, the seizure of critical newspapers owned by Gülen movements were formed the background of the attempted coup.

The conventional wisdom of the intellectuals and scholars have failed in their expectations from the “conservative democrat” AKP. The highly competitive nature of Turkish party politics, and, until recent years, the successful conduct of free and fair elections in the context of a vibrant and partially free media, gave the impression that Turkey had already accomplished a transition to democracy and that its main challenges were those of democratic consolidation (Somer, 2016, p. 487). How, this happened. First, there were a huge optimism and expectations from the party. Party was claiming that they are no longer an Islamic Party, a conservative democrat as its counterparts in EU, Christian Democrat Parties. Leaders were repeatedly announced their allegiance to the EU accession process and loyalty to the NATO. They were against the military interventions to politics which welcomed by the liberal institutions both in Turkey and EU that are sensitive about the topic. The problems of Turkish political regime create fertile ground for the policy shifts and majoritarian tendencies of the Party.

The expansion of civil right and liberties due to meeting with the EU conditionality regime and the good economic performance of the party especially in decline of interest rate and inflation helped build its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. These optimistic expectations are somehow related with the pre AKP period but especially with the political structure of 1990s. Weak coalition governments were far away from finding solutions to economic and political turmoil of Turkey, 28 February postmodern military intervention to RP-DYP coalition, the economic crises in 1995 and 2001, intensified clashes with the PKK terrorist organization and the rising of Islamic parties that are challenging the secular foundation of the country gave immense reasons for new generations of Islamic politicians to exploit the failures of the past. As I indicate in the populism section of this paper, Erdoğan has been attacking to these failures through various mechanisms, placed himself and the party against illiberal

policies of the past. Somer defined the same situation as failure of AKP to overcome old-authoritarianism. A major reason for this failure might be that Turkish Islamists have for historical-institutional reasons developed a mental- ideological prioritization of ‘conquering rather than democratizing’ state institutions (Somer, 2016, p. 486).

Reforms and liberalization in some of these areas led many to expect the potential democratizations with the help of conservative democrat party refusing its Islamic heritage of Erbakan’s RP, since the party holds vast majority of support in the elections. Therefore, the elimination of tutelary powers in the politics while continuing the EU accession talks, Erdoğan famous Diyarbakır speech in 2005 that implied the potential recognition of Kurdish identity and his intention to start the Kurdish Solution Process and party’s support to Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases against alleged coup attempt in 2003 led many to be optimistic about the democratization of Turkish democracy as in the writings of Heper, Efeğil, Mağcupyan, İnsel, Bayramoğlu and Oran shows. This significant support for AKP outside of the party ranks was important, since these groups of intellectuals are linked with some of EU civil society institutions. The pragmatic relationship between the AKP for curbing the political power of military has been successful. Yet this process left no barrier in the political order that would limit the power of dominant political party. By the help of its popularity, the AKP has been able to undermine the domestic institutions and silence alternative voices and reinforced its autonomy on behalf of the majority. (Özpek & Yaşar, 2017, p. 14).

## **Conclusion**

1983 democratic transition was a formal one. 1983 elections were not a free and fair elections because of the strict supervision and pressure of military. The tutelary power of military functioned until the AKP curbed the military’s political power and started to limit the dominance of Republican coalition in politics. Thus, democratization process after 2002 with the anchor of EU, solution to Kurdish question, successful economic policies and curbing the political power of Turkish military from politics led to the presupposition of “democratic consolidation” in a near future. However, under heavy handed use of state power, weak civil society, skewed media freedom and

restrictions on journalism, lack of independent institutions, political culture far away from the characteristics of civic culture, lack of moderation, tolerance, compromise in politics undermine transparency and accountability of the regime. For that reason, the "second transition" -becoming democratic regime from democratic government- failed to prevail in Turkey. The AKP's strength in parliamentary is helped build expansion to the other branches of government. Judicial autonomy and independent state institutions could not prevent from executive interventions. Therefore, the presupposition that the withdrawal of tutelary institutions would bring democracy is failed without the existence of concrete check and balance system that holds the executive accountable. The authoritarian drift of AKP has become so clear. Turkey has no longer meets with the eight criteria proposed by Dahl's for *polyarchy*. Failure of Turkish democracy to become resilient against authoritarian regressions led to slow death of democracy.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

Due to the tutelary power of Turkish military and judiciary, problems in civil rights and liberties, freedom of expression and media, weak civil society and strong statist orientations, unfavorable properties of political culture Turkish regime was far away from meeting the minimum criteria of democracy. Problems of democratic transition such as reserved domains and tutelary power of omnipotent Turkish military shaped the post-transition period. The role of military in politics was seen as the most serious destabilizing factor in Turkish politics as in the assumption of democratic consolidation literature. Turkish Military was above the law, could be the source of potential authoritarian regression considering its legacy of military interventions to politics. The tutelary power of military led to concentration to the role of military in politics in the studies of democracy and democratization of Turkey. For some, the role of military in politics was the main barrier to completion of Turkish democracy. This presupposed that the elimination of political power of Turkish military would facilitate further democratization therefore finalizing the completion of Turkish democracy. This assumption was compatible with the arguments of democratic transition and consolidation, based on the role of military in politics. Tutelary powers, reserved domains and exist guarantees were seen as facilitating factors to convince political elites of previous regime in order to compromise for potential democratic transition. Once democratic governments established, the elimination of these concessions turned to be the main goal for the completion of these democracies. The aim was to make diminished subtypes of democracies to a completed democracy. For some of scholars in democratic consolidation literature, consolidation of democracy requires the elimination of authoritarian regressions and destabilizing factors that could produce acts outside of democratic practices. Thus, assumed that consolidated democracies are those where

there will be no possibility for authoritarian regressions. Therefore, it would be misleading to discuss the issue of democratic consolidation, if the transition from any kind of authoritarian regimes to a democracy is not completed.

Curbing the tutelary power of Turkish military and judiciary did not cause the completion of Turkish democracy. Scholars and pundits were so much concentrated on the political role of military and dominant secular characteristic of the political order that they could not foresee the weak checks and balance system, unfavorable properties of Turkish political culture and problems in civil society and media. Reforms for the accession to the EU led to restructuring of the military-civilian relationships, and liberalization in some of democratic institutions. Delegitimization of military in Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Case, (de)securitization of Kurdish question together with the modifications in civil-military relations are subordinated the Turkish military somehow to civilian control. Yet, the decline of political power of military coincided with the rise of populist-authoritarian practices of AKP especially after 2013 with Gezi Parkı protests. The assumption of transition paradigm that the elimination of tutelary powers after democratic transition would bring completion of democratization is failed in Turkish case. Under the conditions of weak checks and balance system and democratic institutions and unfavorable political cultural traits, after curbing the political space available for tutelary powers, Turkish democracy experienced backsliding into authoritarianism by democratically elected government. The assumptions of potential democratization or even the possibility of democratic consolidation in the first period of AKP government have failed. Without strong democratic institutions persisting against populist-authoritarian regressions, weak checks and balances system, political culture that can easily manipulate for inclination towards authoritarian tendencies, fragile civil society institutions and judiciary organ which is far-fetched from judicial independence, Turkish democracy became an example for democratic backsliding than democratic completion.

Turkish democracy, especially after 2013 failed to become resilient against authoritarian regressions. Turkish case failed to pushback the slow death of democracy in the hands of executive government. The triumphs of incumbent party in consecutive

elections contributed to government to skew the playing field; in areas such as in judiciary favoring the party, access to media and state institutions, unfair elections, violations of civil rights and liberties. Strong electoral mandate and weak institutions and unfavorable cultural, economic and social conditions are generated an immense power for AKP to create a political order that favors the party.

Public's orientation toward the political system is significant, it's inclination determines that it can help promote the resilience of the political system or can lead to authoritarian pushbacks. Democracy requires compromise, diversity, consensus, and tolerance for others, solidarity, moderation of different ideas within the system. These factors may supply facilitating conditions for the creation of intermediary groups that can act together to conserve democracy. Turkish political culture lacks many of these factors for a resilient democracy. Interpersonal trust and tolerance is low in Turkey, which may lead to suspicion towards others, blaming dissidents as agents of foreigners and may impede common acts and solidarity for certain goal. Perceiving the politics in the angle of Manichean worldview "us vs. them", in-group vs. out-group orientation is common in Turkish politics, creates a sense of revanchism for the dissidents. Considering the lack of compromise and tolerance, strong courage culture and national pride; Turkish political culture does not seem generating facilitating elements for the resolution of societal, religious, sectarian and ethnic fault lines which polarizes Turkish citizens into several groups that have different national goals.

Turkish political culture is unlikely to meet with the traits of "civic culture". For the Turkish people, the most trustful democratic institution is Turkish military, where the media is the least. However, Turkish people many times show their commitment to democracy in conventional political participation such as in elections. Their participation ratio is significantly higher than European counterparts. Electoral participation is the only political participation that is commonly shared by most of the public. Protests, petitioning or forming organizations for a specific goal is not shared by large sectors of society.

Turkish civil society organizations are weak and fragile. Monist and strong state tradition is a part of this condition, but not represent the full picture. The state's attitude towards civil society organizations is oscillated between cooperation and repression, thus create a sense of insecurity and reciprocal mistrust. One of the core properties of Turkish politics is its absence of strong civil society structure, due to historical legacy of weak intermediary institutions. Strong state orientation may impede proliferation of intermediary institutions between state and society. Skepticism against the activities of interest groups may cause of exclusion of interest groups from political decision making processes. Highly centralized decision making processes and bureaucratized political system led to absence of involvement of civil society organization into these processes.

State is the source of wealth. Even if its role in economy is shrinking via privatization process after 1980, it is still crucial in terms of capital accumulation via distribution of big amount of procurements and tenders. Therefore, codependence of business groups and state is limiting the ties between civil society organizations and strong business groups that are in need of state tenders. Legacy of undermining the formation of any kind of concentration of power except from state, has impeded institution of strong autonomous intermediary groups. The connection between civil society and political parties are also weak except for the new developments such as between AKP and TÜRGEV, SETA and KADEM. Due to EU anchor process in early 2000s coincided with the expansion of civil society organization both in number and in terms of issue based numbers. EU conditionality regime contributed to legitimization of civil society institutions, provided funds and human capital and introduced legal framework for the organization. However, the bulk of Turkish civil society organizations are consisted from *hemşehri*, mosque and village organizations. Such structure is far-fetched from generation of civic culture, rather promotes protection of primordial ties and traditionalism. Preponderance of community over individual, uniformity over diversity is not conducive for generation of pluralism in Turkish society. Low level of social capital and trust and socio-religious tolerance is inhibiting the proliferation of facilitating conditions for civic culture.

Turkish civil society organizations are far-fetched from meeting with the civil society structure of consolidated democracies. Autonomous organizations that limits and controls the abuses of state, promotes civic competence and duties and solidarity among people, moderation of extreme views and trust do not seem dominant in Turkey. Considering the crucial role of civil society in linking the ties between the rule of law and media, it would be wisely to claim that, one of the pillars of condition for the stability of democratic regimes is neglected in Turkish political system.

Civil society can function only within the legal framework and protections provided by judicial independence. Independent judicial institutions are crucial in protection of civil rights and liberties, freedom of expression and media, democratic norms, procedures and institutions. Constitutional monitoring is essential in conservation of Constitution and law enforcement in these regimes. Review and control agencies help promote transparency and horizontal accountability of the political system.

Turkish judiciary was not independent from the inauguration of government after formal transition to government. Turkish courts were seen as the agent of secular coalition, a tutelary power. Therefore, judiciary criticized as being a tutelary power, a subordinated organ of the state. Party prohibition cases are contributed to propagation of this perception. Party prohibition cases were generally concentrated towards Islamic and Kurdish parties, which were seen as dissidents against secular characteristics of the state. Yet, the probability of transition from tutelary judiciary to independent courts has failed in 2010 Referendum. Referendum failed to generate more plural body. Rather, post-Referendum structure of HSYK body turned to a conflict zone between the judges and prosecutors, supported either government or Fethullah Gülen movement. Instead of transforming the composition of HSYK to a more democratic and plural body, post-Referendum structure generated judiciary organ which is far-fetched from fostering judicial independence, more politicized and more weakened against the estrangements of incumbent party. Turkish courts especially after 2013 lost their grounds for judicial independence as I indicated from several measurements of rule of law indexes as well as deterioration in corruption and bribe. After the 15 July attempted coup, the situation



worsened with the emergency law and executive decrees. Constitutional Court declined to review executive decrees passed under the martial law. Incumbent benefited from this condition by targeting dissidents of the government.

Dependence of capital owners of Turkish media to the state tenders and advertisements is the main reason for the problems of Turkish media. Revenues from media operations are the small part of main budget of these big companies. Power of media is stemming from its capacity to shaping the public opinions. Newspapers, websites, and TV channels represents the interests of patrons and corporations. Therefore, for preventing from criticism and punishment of governments, such as tax penalties, exclusion from state procurements; media had become subordinated to incumbent party, which successfully gained support in consecutive elections. “Carrot and stick” policy and the codependence of business corporations to state procurements is exploited by the AKP government to control media as like in the example of the aforementioned business association-government relationship. AKP government continued to use the financial leverages to control media outlets. The illiberal practices and structure of pre-AKP periods facilitates the conditions for AKP.

Press freedom indexes captured the deterioration especially after 2010. Freedom of expression and media had showed certain improvements due to the reforms necessitated for the EU accession process. EU anchor contributed to the developments in legal framework such as in the case of Article 301. The increasing number of cases and detentions against journalist, violations in civil rights and liberties in Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Operations, Nedim Şener-Ahmet Şık Case and self and explicit censorship together with the ownership structure of media, however led to decline in number of press freedom indexes especially after 2010 contrary to the improvements in first years of AKP government.

Turkish regime is absent conditions such as rule of law autonomous from executive interventions, independent media and freedom of expressions, autonomous and strong civil society, and favorable political culture properties, which are critical conditions for avoiding the democratic erosion. These institutions are pillars of checks

and balance system that could hinder the populist-authoritarian regressions. They can provide basis for accountability and transparency of political system; can hold politicians accountable for democratic institutions and for electorate, can protect civil liberties and rights, can provide law enforcement. The success of this system very much depends on factors such as civic political culture, which is far-fetched from the existing general properties of Turkish political culture. However, the general composition of these attributes are absent in Turkish political order. Therefore, while maintaining the strong support of electorate, AKP successfully achieved to create uneven playing field and started to follow populist-authoritarian agenda in order stay in power especially after Gezi Parkı Protests. Considering the strong electoral mandate of AKP and the foundation of political order favoring the party, ongoing emergency law and executive decrees absent from constitutional review, it is possible that the erosion of democracy would evolve to another degree.

## REFERENCES

- “ ‘Yürü ya kulum’ denen 6 şirket.” Sözcü, Sözcü, 24 Feb. 2016, at: [www.birgun.net/haber-detay/yuru-ya-kulum-denen-6-sirket-104583.html](http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/yuru-ya-kulum-denen-6-sirket-104583.html).
- “15 Temmuz darbe girişiminin acı bilançosu! Kaç kişi şehit oldu?” Sabah, Sabah, 7 Oct. 2015, at: [www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2017/07/10/15-temmuz-darbe-girisiminin-aci-bilancosu-kac-kisi-sehit-oldu](http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2017/07/10/15-temmuz-darbe-girisiminin-aci-bilancosu-kac-kisi-sehit-oldu)
- “Başbakan'ın 2005'te Diyarbakır'daki konuşması.” Sabah, Sabah, 17 Dec. 2009, at: [www.sabah.com.tr/siyaset/2009/12/17/basbakanin\\_2005te\\_diyarbakirdaki\\_konusmasi](http://www.sabah.com.tr/siyaset/2009/12/17/basbakanin_2005te_diyarbakirdaki_konusmasi)
- “Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Başkanlık sistemini ben daha çok gündeme getirdim.” Hürriyet, 1 July 2015, at: [www.hurriyet.com.tr/cumhurbaskani-recep-tayyip-erdogan-baskanlik-sistemini-ben-daha-cok-gundeme-getirdim-29162578](http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/cumhurbaskani-recep-tayyip-erdogan-baskanlik-sistemini-ben-daha-cok-gundeme-getirdim-29162578)
- “Erdoğan says ‘civil society groups working against Turkish state’ largely destroyed.” Hürriyet Daily News, Hürriyet, 22 June 2016, at: [www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-says-civil-society-groups-working-against-turkish-state-largely-destroyed-100789](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-says-civil-society-groups-working-against-turkish-state-largely-destroyed-100789)
- “Erdoğan: Bitaraf olan bertaraf olur.” Milliyet, Milliyet, 18 Oct. 2010, at: [www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-bitaraf-olan-bertaraf-olur-siyaset-1277904/](http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-bitaraf-olan-bertaraf-olur-siyaset-1277904/)
- “Erdoğan: I will not be an impartial president.” Hürriyet Daily News, 8 July 2014, at: [www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-i-will-not-be-an-impartial-president-68831](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-i-will-not-be-an-impartial-president-68831)
- “Erdoğan'dan canlı yayında Can Dündar'a tehdit.” Cumhuriyet, Cumhuriyet, 31 May 2015, at: [http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/288885/Erdogan\\_dan\\_canli\\_yayinda\\_Can\\_Dundar\\_a\\_tehdit.html](http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/288885/Erdogan_dan_canli_yayinda_Can_Dundar_a_tehdit.html)
- “Gülen: Erdoğan Hitler, Stalin ve Mao gibi diktatör.” Dokuz8Haber, 18 July 2016, at: [medium.com/@dokuz8HABER/g%C3%BClen-erdo%C4%9Fan%C4%B1n-hitler-stalin-ve-mao-gibi-diktat%C3%B6r-8e49df3181a3](https://medium.com/@dokuz8HABER/g%C3%BClen-erdo%C4%9Fan%C4%B1n-hitler-stalin-ve-mao-gibi-diktat%C3%B6r-8e49df3181a3)
- “Judicial Independence: What It Is, How It Can Be Measured, Why It Occurs.” World Bank, World Bank, at: [siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/JudicialIndependence.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/JudicialIndependence.pdf)

- “KHK ile 375 dernek kapatıldı: İşte kapatılan dernekler.” Birgün, Birgün, 22 Nov. 2016, [www.birgun.net/haber-detay/khk-ile-375-dernek-kapatildi-iste-kapatilan-dernekler-136563.html](http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/khk-ile-375-dernek-kapatildi-iste-kapatilan-dernekler-136563.html)
- “President should have links to party in new constitution: Erdoğan.” Hürriyet Daily News, Hürriyet, 16 Nov. 2016, at: [www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-should-have-links-to-party-in-new-constitution-erdogan-106189](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-should-have-links-to-party-in-new-constitution-erdogan-106189)
- “Q&A: Turkey's constitutional referendum.” BBCNews, BBC, 12 Sept. 2010, at: [www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11228955](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11228955)
- “Rights group: Turkey denies opposition media access to G-20.” MailOnline, 10 Nov. 2015, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3312232/Rights-group-Turkey-denies-opposition-media-access-G-20.html>
- “TRT'nin yayın akışı: 1 saat Erdoğan, 1 dakika İhsanoğlu, Demirtaş hiç yok.” T24, t24, 9 July 2014, at: [t24.com.tr/haber/trt-erdogan-disindaki-cumhurbaskani-adaylarina-ner-vermiyor,263779](http://t24.com.tr/haber/trt-erdogan-disindaki-cumhurbaskani-adaylarina-ner-vermiyor,263779).
- “TSK, darbe girişimine katılan personel sayısını açıkladı.” NTV, NTV, 27 July 2016, at: [www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/tsk-darbe-girisimine-katilan-personel-sayisini-acikladi,ns92udU75k2vw-1OIEK4gQ](http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/tsk-darbe-girisimine-katilan-personel-sayisini-acikladi,ns92udU75k2vw-1OIEK4gQ)
- “Turkey referendum grants President Erdogan sweeping new powers.” BBCNews, BBC, 16 Apr. 2017, at: [www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39617700](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39617700)
- “What is the Rule of Law?” United Nations, United Nations Secretary General, at: [www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/](http://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/)
- Abadan, Nermin. *Anayasa Hukuku ve Siyasi Bilimler Açısından 1965 Seçimlerinin Tahlili*, Ankara, Sevinç Matbaası, 1966.
- Acemoğlu, Daron and James Robinson. “Cross-Country Inequality Trends.” *Economic Journal*, vol. 113, no. 485, Feb. 2003, pp. 121-149.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. 1st ed., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Agüero, Felipe. “Debilitating Democracy: Political Elites and Military Rebels.” *Lessons of the Venezuelan Elites*, edited by Goodman, Louis W., Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995, pp. 136-162.

- Akyarlı Güven, Ayşegül. "AKP ve TÜSİAD'ın gergin ilişkisinin 12 yıllık tarihi." *WSJ, Wall Street Journal*, 17 Sept. 2014, [www.wsj.com/articles/akp-ve-tusiadn-gergin-iliskisinin-12-yllk-tarihi-1410951459](http://www.wsj.com/articles/akp-ve-tusiadn-gergin-iliskisinin-12-yllk-tarihi-1410951459).
- Almond, Gabriel A, and G. Bingham Powell. *Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978.
- Almond, Gabriel A, and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Arango, Tim. "Corruption Scandal Is Edging Near Turkish Premier." *The Newyork Times*, 13 Dec. 2013, [www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/world/europe/turkish-cabinet-members-resign.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/world/europe/turkish-cabinet-members-resign.html).
- Arango, Tim. "Corruption Scandal Is Edging Near Turkish Premier." *New York Times*, New York Times, 25 Dec. 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/26/world/europe/turkish-cabinet-members-resign.html>
- Aslan, Senem. "Different Faces of Turkish Islamic Nationalism." *The Washington Post*, 20 Feb. 2015, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/20/different-faces-of-turkish-islamic-nationalism/?utm\\_term=.40d978a2464a](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/20/different-faces-of-turkish-islamic-nationalism/?utm_term=.40d978a2464a)
- Avrupa Birliği'ne Tam Üyeliğe Doğru –Siyasal Kıstaslar ve Uyum Süreci- (Towards Full Membership in the EU –Political Criteria The Process of Integration), TÜSİAD, İstanbul.
- Ayata, Ayşe G.. "Solidarity in Urban Turkish Family." *Turkish Families and Transition*, edited by Rasuly-Paleczek, Gabriele. Peterlang, 1996.
- Aydın Düzgüt, Senem, et al. "Yeni Anayasa'ya Doğru: Kurumsal Reform ve Demokrasi Kültürünün Gelişimi." *Yeni Anayasa'ya Doğru: Kurumsal Reform ve Demokrasi Kültürünün Gelişimi*, [www.turkonfed.org/Files/ContentFile/turkonfed-yeni-anayasaya-dogru.pdf](http://www.turkonfed.org/Files/ContentFile/turkonfed-yeni-anayasaya-dogru.pdf).
- Barro, Robert J. "Democracy and Growth." *Journal of Economic Growth*, vol. 1, no. 1, Mar. 1996, pp. 1–27.
- Bayer, Reşat & Ziya Öniş. "Turkish Big Business in the Age of Democratic Consolidation: The Nature and Limits of its Influence." *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 15, no. 2, 2010, pp. 181-201.

- Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964.
- Bermeo, Nancy. "On Democratic Backsliding." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 27, no. 1, Jan. 2016, pp. 5–19.
- Bermeo, Nancy. "The Myths of Moderation: The Role of Radical Forces in the Transition to Democracy." *Comparative Politics*, vol. 29, no. 3, Apr. 1997, pp. 305–322.
- Birtek, Faruk and Binnaz Toprak. "The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The hazards of rewriting modernity." *Praxis International*, vol. 13, 1993, pp. 192–212.
- Boix, Carles, and Susan C. Stokes. "Endogenous Democratization." *World Politics*, vol. 55, no. 4, July 2013, pp. 517–549.
- Boix, Carles, et al. "What Causes Democratization?" *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 317–339.
- Boix, Carles. *Democracy and Redistribution*. 1st ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Bribe Payers Index Report. Transparency International, 2011, Corruption Perception Index. <https://www.transparency.org/bpi2011>
- Buğra, Ayşe, and Osman Savaşkan. *Türkiye'de Yeni Kapitalizm: Siyaset, Din İş Dünyası*. 3rd ed. İletişim Yayınları, 2015.
- Buğra, Ayşe. *State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study*. 1st ed. New York: State University of New York Press, 1994.
- Canovan, Margeret. "Populism for Political Theorists.", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol.9, no.3, October 2004, pp. 241-252.
- Çarkoğlu, Ali and Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, *The rising tide of conservatism in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009.
- Carothers, Thomas. "The End of the Transition Paradigm." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 1, Jan. 2002, pp. 5–21.

- Carrión, Julio F. “The persistent attraction of populism in the Andes.” Latin American democracy. Emerging reality or endangered species? edited by L. Millett, Richard et. al. New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 233–251.
- Çiftçi, Sabri & Tefvik Murat Yıldırım. “Hiding behind the party brand or currying favor with constituents: Why do representatives engage in different types of constituency-oriented behavior?” *Party Politics*, July 2017, pp. 1-13.
- Collier, David. *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Conniff, Michael L. “Introduction.” *Populism in Latin America* edited by Conniff, Michael L. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2012, pp. 1–22.
- Corke, Susan et. al. “Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey”, Freedom House Special Report, 2013. <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report%20-%20202-3-14.pdf>
- Corruption Perception Index. Transparency International, 2005-2016, Corruption Perception Index, <https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview>
- Dağı, İhsan, “Turkey’s AKP in Power”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 19, no.3, July 2008. Pp. 25-30.
- Dahl, Robert A. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. University of Chicago Press, 2013.
- Dahl, Robert A. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. 1st ed., Yale University Press, 1971.
- Deliveli, Emre. “Why has the AKP been so successful?” *Hürriyet Daily News*, *Hürriyet*, June 2015. <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:1KVmBUojlhMJ:www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/emre-deliveli/why-has-the-akp-been-so-successful-90598+&cd=1&hl=tr&ct=clnk&gl=tr>
- Demir, Oğuz. “ATO’da Gürsel Baran dönemi.” *Hürriyet*, *Hürriyet*, 3 Dec. 2016, [www.hurriyet.com.tr/atoda-gursel-baran-donemi-40296066](http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/atoda-gursel-baran-donemi-40296066).
- Demirel, Ahmet. *Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet: İkinci Grup*. 7th ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015.

- Diamond, Larry J. "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 2, Apr. 2002, pp. 21–35.
- Diamond, Larry J. "Three Paradoxes of Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1990, pp. 48–60.
- Diamond, Larry J. and Marc F. Plattner. "Democracy's Future." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 6, no. 1, Jan 1995, pp. 3-6.
- Diamond, Larry J.. "Toward Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 3, July 1994, pp. 4–17.
- Diamond, Larry. "Facing Up to the Democratic Recession." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 26, no. 1, Jan 2015, pp. 141–155.
- Efegil, Ertan. "Analysis of the AKP Government's Policy Toward the Kurdish Issue", *Turkish Studies*, vol.12, no. 1, 2011, pp. 27-40.
- Erdoğan, Emre & Pınar Uyan-Semerci. "Understanding young citizens' political participation in Turkey: does 'being young' matter?", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 17, no. 1, 2017, pp. 57-75.
- Esen, Berk, and Şebnem Gümüşçü. "Turkey: How the Coup Failed." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 28, no. 1, Jan. 2017, pp. 59–73.
- Evin, Mehveş, and Sevinç Doğan. "Sosyolog Sevinç Doğan: AKP iktidardan düşerse kaybedeceği şey çok." *Diken*, Diken, 14 Oct. 2016, [www.diken.com.tr/sosyolog-sevinc-dogan-akp-iktidardan-duserse-kaybedecegi-sey-cok/](http://www.diken.com.tr/sosyolog-sevinc-dogan-akp-iktidardan-duserse-kaybedecegi-sey-cok/).
- Foa, R. Stefan, and Yascha Mounk. "The Democratic Disconnect." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 27, no. 3, July 2016, pp. 5–17.
- Freedom in the World 2002-2017: Turkey. Freedom House, 2002-2017, Freedom in the World: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/turkey>
- Freedom of Press Reports 2002-2017: Turkey. Freedom House, 2002-2017, Freedom of the Press: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/turkey>
- Frey, Frederick W. "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey," *Political Elites in the Middle East*, edited by in Lenczowski, George. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975, pp. 41-82.



- Fukuyama, Francis. *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press, 1995.
- Gunther, Richard, et al. *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.
- Gürcan, Metin. "Bir darbe girişiminin anatomisi." T24, T24, 17 Oct. 2016, [t24.com.tr/yazarlar/metin-gurcan/bir-darbe-girisiminin-anatomisi,15059](http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/metin-gurcan/bir-darbe-girisiminin-anatomisi,15059).
- Gürsoy, Yaprak. "Turkish Public Opinion on the Coup Allegations: Implications for Democratization." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 130, no. 1, 2015, pp. 103-132.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R Kaufmann. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufmann. "The Challenges of Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 4, Oct. 1994, pp. 5–16.
- Henley, Jon, and Kareem Shaheen. "Turkey election: Erdoğan and AKP return to power with outright majority." *Guardian*, 2 Nov. 2015, [www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/01/turkish-election-akp-set-for-majority-with-90-of-vote-counted](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/01/turkish-election-akp-set-for-majority-with-90-of-vote-counted).
- Heper, Metin. "The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2, 2005, pp. 215-231.
- Heper, Metin. *State Tradition in Turkey*. Walkington, UK: The Eothen Press, 1985.
- Heper, Metin. *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post 1980 Turkish Experience*. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991.
- Horowitz, Donal L. "Democracy in Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 4, no. 4, ser. 1993, Oct. 1993, pp. 18–38.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. 1st ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

- Inglehart, Ronald. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- İnsel, Ahmet. "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey." *Birikim Dergisi*, *Birikim Dergisi*, 1 Feb. 2014, [www.birikimdergisi.com/articles/7399/the-akp-and-normalizing-democracy-in-turkey#.WkrHPFVI\\_IW](http://www.birikimdergisi.com/articles/7399/the-akp-and-normalizing-democracy-in-turkey#.WkrHPFVI_IW).
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "Civil society in Turkey: continuity or change?", *Turkish transformation: new century-new challenges* edited by Beeley, Brian. Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 2002, pp. 59-78.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "Kulturkampf in Turkey: the constitutional referendum of 12 September 2010", *South European Society and Politics*, vol.17, no.1, 2012, pp. 1-22.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "Political culture", *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey* edited by Heper, Metin and Sayarı, Sabri. New York, U.S.A: Routledge, 2012, pp. 171-182.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "The Turkish Grand National Assembly: A Brief Inquiry into the Politics of Representation in Turkey" *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s* edited by Balım, Çiğdem et. al. Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995, pp. 42-60.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "Türkiye'de demokrasi'nin pekişmesi: bir siyasal kültür sorunu (Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: A Problem of Political Culture)." *Ergun Özbudun'a Armağan (Essays in Honor of Ergun Özbudun)*, Ankara: Yetkin Yayınevi, 2008, pp. 247-277.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "Elections and Governance" *Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey* edited by Sayarı, Sabri ve Esmer, Yılmaz, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp. 55-71.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "From parliamentary uni-Partyism to fragmented multi-Partyism: The Odyssey of political regimes in the Turkish Republic." *Turkey in the Twentieth Century (Philologiae et Historiae Turcicae Fundamenta, Tomus Secundus)*, edited by Erick Jan Zürcher, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2008, pp. 89–116.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "Turkish Democracy: Patronage versus Governance." *Turkish Studies*. vol. 2, no. 1, 2001. pp. 54-70.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands*. New York, USA: Palgrave – Macmillan, 2005.

- Keyder, Çağlar. "The Agrarian Background and the Origins of the Turkish Bourgeoisie.", *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey* edited by Öncü, Ayşe et. al., Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994.
- Kibritlioğlu, Murat. "CHP'li Erdoğan: Kamu İhale Kanunu 12 yılda 162 kez değiştirildi." *Hürriyet*, *Hürriyet*, 17 Dec. 2014, [www.hurriyet.com.tr/chpli-erdogdu-kamu-ihale-kanunu-12-yilda-162-kez-degistirildi-27793436](http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/chpli-erdogdu-kamu-ihale-kanunu-12-yilda-162-kez-degistirildi-27793436).
- Kingsley, Patrick. "Erdogan Claims Vast Powers in Turkey After Narrow Victory in Referendum." *The New York Times*, 16 Apr. 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/world/europe/turkey-referendum-polls-erdogan.html>
- Landmann, Todd. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*. 1st ed. Routledge, 2000.
- Levitsky, Steven, and David Collier. "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research." *World Politics*, vol. 49, no. 3, 1997, pp. 430–451.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. "The Myth of Democratic Recession." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 26, no. 1, Jan. 2015, pp. 45–58.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 2, Apr. 2012, pp. 51–66.
- Lijphart Arend. "The Structure of Inference." *The Civic Culture Revisited* edited by Almond G. and Sidney Verba. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980.
- Linz, Juan J. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1990, pp. 51–69.
- Linz, Juan J. and Alfred C. Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Linz, Juan J. and Alfred C. Stepan. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. 1st ed., Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.
- Lipset, Seymour M. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, Mar. 1959, pp. 69–105.

- Lipset, Seymour M., et al. *Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, London: L. Rienner, 1988.
- Mahçupyan, Etyen. “Laik bir AKP 'masalı' ve yeni dindarlık.” *Al JazeeraTürk*, AlJazeera, 17 Mar. 2014, [www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/laik-bir-akp-masali-ve-yeni-dindarlik](http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/laik-bir-akp-masali-ve-yeni-dindarlik).
- Mainwaring, Scott and Anibal-Perez Linan. “Democratic Breakdown and Survival.” *Journal of Democracy*. vol. 24, no. 2, Apr 2013, pp. 123-137.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford University Press, 1995.
- Mainwaring, Scott, et al. *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*. 1st ed. New Haven: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992.
- Malsin, Jared. “Why Turkey's Prime Minister Had No Choice But to Resign.” *Time*, Time, 5 May 2016, [time.com/4320036/turkey-prime-minister-ahmet-davutoglu-resign/](http://time.com/4320036/turkey-prime-minister-ahmet-davutoglu-resign/).
- Maravall, Jose Maria. “The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage.” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 4, Oct. 1994, pp. 17–31.
- Mardin, Şerif, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 11, no. 3, 1969, pp. 258-281.
- Mardin, Şerif. “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems* edited by Akarlı, Engin D. and Ben-Dor, Gabriel. Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 1975, pp. 7-32.
- Mechkova, Valeriya et. al. “How Much Democratic Backsliding?” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 28, no. 4, Oct. 2017, pp. 162–169.
- Norris, Pippa. “Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks.” *Faculty Research Working Paper Series*, Mar. 2017, pp. 1–26.
- O’Donnell, Guillermo. “Transitions, Continuities, Paradoxes.” *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Scott Mainwaring et al., Haven: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992, pp. 1-56.

- O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 53, no. 1, Jan. 1994, pp. 55–69.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Illusions About Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1996, pp. 34–71.
- Öniş, Ziya. "The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era." *Turkish Studies*, vol.13, no.2, 2012, pp. 135-152.
- Öniş, Ziya. "Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East", *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 203-219.
- Özalp, Güven. "55 yılın ihlal şampiyonu Türkiye." *Hürriyet*, Hürriyet, 31 May 2015. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/55-yilin-ihlal-sampiyonu-turkiye-28088716>
- Ozankaya, Özer. "Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Siyasal Yönelimleri." vol. 209, no. 191, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1966.
- Özbudun, Ergun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey," *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey* edited by Özbudun, Ergun. Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association Publication, 1988. pp. 1-58.
- Özbudun, Ergun. "AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift," *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 19, no. 2, June 2014, pp. 1-13.
- Özbudun, Ergün. "Turkey's Search for New Constitution." *Insight Turkey*, vol. 14, no. 1, 2012, pp. 39–50.
- Özbudun, Ergun. *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, Boulder, London: Lynne Reinner, 2000, pp. 49-71.
- Özbudun, Ergun. *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, Boulder, London: Lynne Reinner, 2000.
- Ozel, Işık. "Is it none of their business? Business and democratization, the case of Turkey." *Democratization*, vol. 20, no: 6, 2013, pp. 1081-1116.

- Özkan, Behlül. "Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism." *Survival*, vol. 56, no. 4, 2014, pp. 119–140.
- Özpek, Burak B. and Nebahat T. Yaşar. "Populism and foreign policy in Turkey under the AKP rule." *Turkish Studies*, Nov. 2017, pp. 1–19.
- Pamuk, Şevket. "Economic Growth and Institutional Change in Turkey Before 1980." *Understanding the Process of Economic Change in Turkey* edited by Çetin, T. and Yılmaz, F. UK: Nova Science Pub Inc. 2010, pp. 15-30.
- Panizza, Francisco. "What do we mean when we talk about populism?" *Latin American populism in the twenty-first century*, edited by de la Torre, eds. Carlos and Arnson, Cynthia J.. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013. pp. 85–116.
- Park, Bill. "Populism and Islamism in Turkey.," *Turkish Studies*, vol. November 2017. pp. 1-7.
- Payne, Anthony. "Democracy in the Caribbean: Political, economic and social perspectives." *Westminster adapted: The political order of the Commonwealth Caribbean* edited by Dominguez, J. et al. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, pp. 57–73.
- Plattner, Marc F. "Is Democracy in Decline." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 26, no. 1, Jan. 2015, pp. 5–10.
- Pridham, Geoffrey. "Political parties, parliaments and democratic consolidation in southern Europe: empirical and theoretical perspectives", *Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe* edited by Liebert, Ulrike and Maurizio Cotta. London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990, pp. 225–48.
- Przeworski, Adam et. al. "What Makes Democracy Endure?" *Journal of Democracy*. vol. 7, no. 1, Oct. 1996, pp. 39-55.
- Przeworski, Adam, et al. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being World, 1950-1990*. 1st ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Przeworski, Adam, et al. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. 1st ed., Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Przeworski, Adam. and Limongi, Fernando. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics*, vol. 49, no. 2, Jan 2013. pp. 155-183.

- Przeworski, Adam. and Michael Wallerstein. "Structural Dependence of the State on Capital." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 1, Sept. 1988, pp. 11–29.
- Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and the Market*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Putnam, Robert D. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.
- Putnam, Robert D. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. 1st ed., Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Repucci, Sarah. "Civilian Control over Military Overdue in Turkey", Freedom House, 2 Oct. 2007, <https://freedomhouse.org/article/civilian-control-over-military-overdue-turkey>
- Rodriguez, Carmen, et al. "Democratization processes in defective democracies: The case of Turkey." *Turkey's democratization process* edited by Rodriguez, Carmen et al. Routledge, 2014, pp. 3-15.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, et al. *Capitalist Democracy and Development*. 1st ed., University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- Rumelili, Bahar and Büke Bosnak. "Taking Stock of Europeanization of Civil Society in Turkey: The Case of NGO's." *The Europeanization of Turkey: Polity and Politics* edited by Tekin, Ali and Güney, Aylin. Routledge, 2015, pp. 127-144.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. *The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto*. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- Salmi, Senni. "Democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland." Research Essay, John Hopkins University, April 2017.
- Sarıgil, Zeki. "Public Opinion and Attitude toward the Military and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey." *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 41, no. 2, 2015. pp. 282-306.
- Sartori, Giovanni. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: an Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*. 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997.
- Schedler, Andreas. "Concepts of Democratic Consolidation." Institute for Advanced Studies Department of Political Science, Apr. 1997, pp. 1–37., doi:Paper prepared

- for delivery at the 1997 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), Continental Plaza Hotel, Guadalajara, Mexico, 17–19 April 1997.
- Schedler, Andreas. “What is Democratic Consolidation?” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 9, no. 2, Apr. 1998, pp. 91–107.
- Schedler, Andreas. *The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. “Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy.” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 2, Apr. 1994, pp. 57–74.
- Schmitter, Phillippe, and Terry L. Karl. “What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not.” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 2, no. 3, 1991, pp. 75–88.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. 1st ed. Harper & Brothers, 1942.
- Selçuk, Orçun. “Strong presidents and weak institutions: populism in Turkey, Venezuela and Ecuador”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 16, no.4, October 2016, pp. 571-589.
- Sims, Alexandra. “Ahmet Davutoglu: President Erdogan's handpicked Prime Minister resigns.” *Independent*, *Independent*, 5 May 2016, [www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-prime-minister-ahmet-davutoglu-president-erdogan-resigns-a7015566.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-prime-minister-ahmet-davutoglu-president-erdogan-resigns-a7015566.html).
- Somer, Murat. “Understanding Turkey’s democratic breakdown: old vs. new and indigenous vs. global authoritarianism.” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 16, no. 4, Nov. 2016, pp. 481–503.
- Srivastava, Mehul and Benjamin Harvey. “Erdoğan Eye on 'Crazy Projects' Links Turkey Scandal to Builders.” *Bloomberg*, *Bloomberg*, 6 Jan. 2014, [www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-05/erdogan-eye-on-crazy-projects-links-turkey-scandal-to-builders](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-05/erdogan-eye-on-crazy-projects-links-turkey-scandal-to-builders).
- Svolik, Milan W.. “When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue: Partisan Conflict and the Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents”, Yale University Press, 2017.
- Taş, Hakkı. “Turkey – from tutelary to delegative democracy”, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 4, 2015, pp. 776-791.



- The Silent Revolution: Turkey's Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory (2002-2012). 3rd ed., Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security Publications, 2013, pp. 1–270, The Silent Revolution: Turkey's Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory (2002-2012), [www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/ingilizce.pdf](http://www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/ingilizce.pdf).
- The World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index. The World Justice Project, 2005-2016, World Justice Project: [worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016](http://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016).
- The World Press Freedom Index. Reporters Without Borders, 2002-2017, The World Press Freedom Index. <https://rsf.org/en/turkey>
- Tombus, H. Ertuğ. "Reluctant Democratization: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey", *Constellation*, vol. 20, no. 2, June 2013, pp. 312-327.
- Tugal, Cihan. "Islamism in Turkey: beyond instrument and meaning." *Economy and Society*, vol.31, no.1, January 2002, pp.85-111.
- Tugal, Cihan. "Resistance Everywhere: The Gezi Revolt in Global Perspective." *New Perspectives on Turkey*, vol. 49. 2013, pp. 157-172.
- Turan, İlter. "The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey." *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change*. Berlin: Leske Verlag and Budrich, 1984, pp. 84-112.
- Turan, İlter. "Volatility in Politics, Stability in Parliament: An Impossible Dream? The Turkish Grand National Assembly during the Last Two Decades." *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 151-176.
- Türk, H. Bahadır. *Türk Sağ Geleneği ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014.
- Uras, Umut. "Erdogan promises a 'new Turkey'." *Al Jazeera*, AlJazeera, 14 July 2016, [www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/erdogan-promises-new-turkey-20147127316609347.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/erdogan-promises-new-turkey-20147127316609347.html).
- Uras, Umut. "Erdogan wins Turkey's presidential election." *Al Jazeera*, AlJazeera, 11 Sept. 2014, [www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/erdogan-wins-turkey-presidential-election-2014810172347586150.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/erdogan-wins-turkey-presidential-election-2014810172347586150.html).
- Uslaner, Eric M. *Trust as a Moral Value*. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

- Valenzuela, Samuel J. "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings. Notion Process and Facilitating Conditions." *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* edited by Scott Mainwaring et al. Haven: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992, pp. 57–104.
- Voice and Accountability Index. WorldBank, 2005-2014, The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home>
- Waldman, Simon, and Emre Calışkan. *The New Turkey and Its Discontents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Weinbaum, Marvin. "Classification and Change in Legislative Systems: With Particular Application to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan," *Legislative Systems in Developing Countries* edited by Boynton, R. and Kim, Chong L., Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1975, pp. 3-68.
- Weiner, Myron. *Institution-Building in India*. Sage, 1987.
- Wejnert, Dwayne, and Barbara Woods. *The Many Faces of Populism: Current Perspectives*. Bingley: Emerald Books, 2014.
- Weyland, Kurt. "Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics." *Comparative Politics*. vol. 34, no. 1, 2001, pp. 1–22.
- Yanatma, Servet. "Media Capture and Advertising in Turkey: The Impact of the State on News", Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, July 2016.
- Yeğen, Oya and Claudia Heiss. "The Constitution-Making Process in Chile: A Cautionary Tale from Turkey", *Int'l J. Const. L. Blog*, June 19, 2015, at: <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/06/the-constitution-making-process-in-chile-a-cautionary-tale-from-turkey>
- Yeğen, Oya. "Turkey Rolling Back the 2010 Reforms?", *Int'l J. Const. L. Blog*, Oct. 24, 2014, available at: <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2014/10/turkey-rolling-back-the-2010-reforms>
- Yeğenoğlu, Meyda. *Islam, Migrancy, and Hospitality in Europe*. New York: Palgrave Mac Millan, 2012.
- Yeginsu, Ceylan, and Şebnem Arsu. "Turkey's Premier Is Proclaimed Winner of Presidential Election." *New York Times*, New York Times, 10 Aug. 2014,

[www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/world/europe/erdogan-turkeys-premier-wins-presidential-election.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/world/europe/erdogan-turkeys-premier-wins-presidential-election.html).

Yeldan, Erinç. Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye Ekonomisi Bölüşüm. Birikim ve Büyüme. 15th ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.

Yetkin, Murat. “Arınç: Baykal’ın elini bile öperiz.” *Radikal*, 30, 09, 2009. <http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/murat-yetkin/arinc-baykalin-elini-bile-operiz-952106/>

Yıldız, Ahmet. “AK Parti'nin "Yeni Muhafazakâr Demokratlığı": Türkiye Siyasetinde Adlandırma Problemi.” *Liberal Düşünce*, no. 34, Spring 2014, pp. 5-12.

Yılmaz, Hakan. “Democratization from Above in Response to the International Context.” *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 17, Fall 1997, pp. 1-38.

Yinanç, Barçın, and Tevfik Başak Ersen. “Ruling AKP creating its own NGOs, group says.” *Hürriyet Daily News*, *Hürriyet*, 21 Mar. 2016, [www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/ruling-akp-creating-its-own-ngos-group-says-96686](http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/ruling-akp-creating-its-own-ngos-group-says-96686).

Yörük, Erdem & Murat Yüksel. “Class and Politics in Turkey’s Gezi Protests.” *New Left Review*, vol. 89, Sep 2014, pp. 103-124.

Zakaria, Fareed. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 6, 1997, pp. 22–43.

APPENDIX

**TABLE 1: Intolerance towards People**

<b>Criminals</b>	80.9	<b>Christians</b>	54.7	<b>Homosexual</b>	91.7
<b>Another Race</b>	34.0	<b>Alcoholic</b>	87.1	<b>Jewish</b>	59.4
<b>Extreme Leftist</b>	70.3	<b>Large Family</b>	40.7	<b>AIDS</b>	88.5
<b>Extreme Right</b>	71.1	<b>Foreigner</b>	28.3		

**TABLE 2: Participation to General Elections, 1987-2015**

<b>Election Years</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2015</b>
								<b>H</b>	<b>K</b>
<b>Turnout Rate (%)</b>	93.2	83.9	85.2	87.0	79.0	84.1	87.1	86.4	87.4

**TABLE 3: Number of Cases in ECHR on Turkey**

<b>Year</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
<b>Total Case</b>	1097	2830	3706	4474	5821	8668	9098	10931	9488	8446

**TABLE 4: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Turkey 2005-2015**

<b>Years</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
<b>Rank</b>	65	60	64	58	61	56	61	54	53	64	66
<b>Score</b>	35	38	41	46	44	44	42	49	50	45	42

**TABLE 5: World Bank Voice and Accountability Index: Turkey in 2005-2014**

<b>Years</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
<b>Rank</b>	96	102	100	100	101	103	105	109	110	117
<b>Score</b>	-0.04	-0.11	-0,09	-0,08	-0,08	-0,12	-0,16	-0,23	-0.26	-0,32

**TABLE 6: The World Press Freedom Index, 2007-2017**

<b>20-..</b>	<b>06</b>	<b>07</b>	<b>08</b>	<b>09</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11-12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Rank</b>	100	101	102	122	138	148	154	154	149	151	155
<b>Score</b>	25	31.2	22.7	38.2	49.2	70	46.5	45.8	44.1	50.7	52.9

**TABLE 7: Freedom of Press Reports, 2007-2017**

	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>
<b>Rank</b>	105	-	101	106	112	117	120	134	142	-	-
<b>Score</b>	49	51	50	51	54	56	62	65	65	71	76

**TABLE 8: Freedom in the World Reports 2009-2017**

		<b>Freedom Ratings</b>	<b>Civil Liberties</b>	<b>Political Rights</b>
<b>2009-2012</b>	Partly Free	<i>3/7</i>	<i>3/7</i>	<i>3/7</i>
<b>2013</b>	Partly Free	<i>3.5/7</i>	<i>4/7</i>	<i>3/7</i>
<b>2014</b>	Partly Free	<i>3.5/7</i>	<i>4/7</i>	<i>3/7</i>
<b>2015</b>	Partly Free	<i>3.5/7</i>	<i>3/7</i>	<i>4/7</i>
<b>2016</b>	Partly Free	<i>3.5/7</i>	<i>3/7</i>	<i>4/7</i>
<b>2017</b>	Partly Free	<i>4.5/7</i>	<i>4/7</i>	<i>5/7</i>