

THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE COOPERATION IN
EUROPEAN UNION: PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION (PESCO)

by

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Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Sabancı University

July 2018


**THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE COOPERATION IN EUROPEAN
UNION: PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION (PESCO)**

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DATE OF APPROVAL: 19.07.2018

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Sevgili Annem Meliha, Sevgili Babam Kurtuluş, Sevgili Ablam Dila'ya...

ABSTRACT

THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE COOPERATION IN EUROPEAN UNION: PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION (PESCO)

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M.A. Thesis, July 2018

Supervisor: Prof. Meltem Müftüler-Baç

Keywords: The European Union, Security, Defense, PESCO

The European Union (EU) as a sui generis entity covers many different policies from economic to political issues. Today, the EU plays a significant role in world politics, and it expertly shapes essential developments in the international area. The thesis focuses on one of the most controversial policies of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Maastricht Treaty established the three-pillar structure which contains the CFSP in its second pillar-1992, this policy has had a significant place on the EU's agenda. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a recent development that occurs under the CFSP. It is a defense organization which has been agreed among 25 EU member states, and it has binding commitments for the members. Due to its binding nature, PESCO is a historical development within the EU in terms of security policy. The thesis argues that increasing material security interests of the Union, encourages the formation of PESCO as a new defense organization. In this context, the argument helps us to understand the role of material security interests in the evolution of CFSP and its final stop, PESCO. First and foremost, it is important to indicate a theoretical framework with Liberal Intergovernmentalism which is one of the leading theories that explains the European integration process. Understanding this unique development of the CFSP and the primary analysis will be based on this framework. In this context, it examines the evolution of European security arrangements chronologically. Due to the dominance of the realist paradigm in the international system, the interests of states have had a central position, especially on foreign and security issues. Taking collective action in these policy areas among EU member states is much harder than on low political matters such as the economy. That is why it is hard to examine an entirely successful performance within the EU regarding CFSP practices. In this regard, this thesis will also discuss that "Will PESCO be effective?" and "What motivates it?" Before the conclusion, the thesis also examines the role of Turkey on the EU's security arrangements and Turkey's position towards PESCO by regarding its project-based characteristics and try to cover the impact of PESCO on Turkey's accession to the EU.

ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ İÇİNDE BİR SAVUNMA İŞBİRLİĞİNİN OLUŞUMU VE GELİŞİMİ: KALICI YAPILANDIRILMIŞ İŞBİRLİĞİ (PESCO)

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Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2018

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Güvenlik, Savunma, PESCO

Avrupa Birliği (AB) ekonomiden siyasete kadar birçok politikayı içerisinde barındıran kendisine özgü bir oluşumdur. Günümüzde, AB dünya siyasetinde büyük rol oynamakta ve uluslararası alanda çok mühim gelişmeleri etkili bir şekilde şekillendirmektedir. Tez, AB'nin en çok tartışılan politikalarından biri olan ortak dış ve güvenlik politikasına odaklanacaktır. 1992 Maastricht anlaşması ile birlikte ikinci blok olarak ortak dış ve güvenlik politikasını içinde barındıran üç bloklu yapı kurulduğundan beri, bu konu AB'nin ajandasında çok önemli bir yere sahiptir. 25 AB üye ülkesi tarafından kabul edilmiş ve bağlayıcı olan bir savunma organizasyonu PESCO gibi, ortak güvenlik ve dış politikaları ile ilgili son gelişmeleri değerlendirdiğimizde, bu gelişmenin AB için tarihi bir ilerleme olduğu çıkarımı yapılabilir. Bu tez, birliğin materyal güvenlik çıkarlarının, PESCO gibi bir savunma birliğinin kurulmasını desteklediğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu bağlamda tez, materyal güvenlik çıkarlarının ortak dış ve güvenlik politikasının ve son durağı olan PESCO'nun gelişimindeki rolünü anlamamıza yardımcı olacaktır. İlk ve en önemli olarak, ortak dış ve güvenlik politikasındaki yeni gelişmeleri anlayabilmek için, avrupa entegrasyonunun en önemli teorisi olan Liberal uluslararasılık ile bir teorik çerçeve oluşturulacak olup analiz bölümü bu teorik çerçeveye oturtulacaktır. Bu bağlamda tez, kronolojik olarak Avrupa güvenlik düzenlemelerini inceleyecektir. Özellikle dış ve güvenlik politikalarında, uluslararası sistemde realist düşüncenin baskın olmasından dolayı, devletlerin çıkarları her zaman merkez konumundadır. Ortak bir dış ve güvenlik politikası için AB üye ülkeleri arasında müşterek karar almak, ekonomi gibi yumuşak siyaset konularından çok daha zordur. AB içinde ortak bir dış ve güvenlik politikası için tam entegrasyon sağlanamamasının en önemli nedeni ülkelerin kendi milli çıkarlarını gözetmesidir. Bu bağlamda çalışma PESCO'nun gelecekte başarılı olup olmayacağını ve bu işbiliğine yol açan sebepleri de inceleyecektir. Ayrıca, sonuç kısmından önce Türkiye'nin AB güvenlik politikalarındaki rolünü ve PESCO'nun Türkiye'nin AB'ye katılım sürecine etkisini PESCO'nun proje bazlı olma özelliğine dayanarak tartışacaktır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Initially, I would like to express my appreciations to my respectable supervisor Prof. Meltem Müftüler-Baç for guiding me through this Master thesis faithfully and patiently. I am very glad to have her support through this thesis. Her detailed comments and revisions were priceless to me. This thesis could not get its final form without the help of her.

Also, my dear pacemaker M. Selin Türkeş Kılıç, you believe me from the beginning of my academic adventure, I am so lucky to run across with you in this life.

I would also thank my parents Meliha Keskin, and Kurtuluş Keskin for their encouragement, love, and faith in me and my lovely sister Dila Önen and her husband Kerem Önen gave me a lot of support, and they believe in me unsubtly. During my studies and the thesis writing process, I was able to achieve my goals through their support.

My dear friend Inci your support was inestimable for me. So glad to have you!

Finally, Berfu; my warm-hearted friend, I am fortunate to have you in my life. Your support, encouragement, and faith to me are golden. Love you!

Miray.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CARD: Coordinated Annual Review on Defense

CEEC: Central Eastern European Countries

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP: Common Security and Defense Policy

ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community

EDA: European Defense Agency

EDIDP: European Defence Industrial Development Programme

EDU: European Defense Union

EEAS: European External Action Service

EEC: European Economic Community

ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy

ESS: European Security Strategy

EU: European Union

EUFOR Althea: European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

EUGS: European Union Global Strategy

EULEX Kosovo: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

ENP: European Neighborhood Policy

GWoT: Global War on Terror

HR/VP: High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Commission Vice-President

MPCC: Military Planning and Conduct Capability

NAFTA: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OEEC: Organization for European Economic Cooperation

PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

PYD: Kurdish-led Democratic Union Party in Syria

RRF: Rapid Reaction Force

SEA: Single European Act

TEU: Treaty on European Union

UK: United Kingdom

US: The United States

USSR: United Soviet Socialist Republic

YPG: People's Protection Unit

INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War period, 1990, understanding of the foreign policy dimensions of the states and the notion of security was changed eventually. This situation is entirely valid for the European Union (EU) when we compared with other countries. Especially after the 1990's the EU has identified its lines more precisely in terms of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the help of the Maastricht treaty in 1992. With the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, CFSP gained a new point of view within the Union, turned into Common Foreign and Defense Policy (CSDP), and several different projects and policies were developed related with the security of the Union. The main reason for this change is linked to the changes of the world conjecture regarding security interpretation. To be able to identify the patterns and make some generalization, theories pave the way for a robust explanation and make sense of the fact which is observable and empirical.

Understanding the threat perceptions of the state necessitate a theoretical basis. There is the fact that the offense-defense differentiation and this separation entailed the security dilemma among states, (Glaser, 1997). The countries can aim to be offensive or defensive towards security threats. For example, if a state increases their armaments of defense, this decrease the security dilemma within that country. However, in contrast, a state expands its armaments of offensive, in this state, the level of security dilemma increases too. Charles Glaser stated that, according to structural realists who are also called as neo-realists, there is a stabile insecurity situation and there is war threat. These structural realists have got two different interpretations which are the offensive structural realism and defensive structural realism, (Glaser, 1997). According to Offensive Structural Realist such as John Mearsheimer and also Hans Morgenthau as a classical realist, they believed that the threat of war is stable and military ability must be maximized, (Mearsheimer, 1995). This situation basically, makes security dilemma as a primary source of conflict. Also, states must act in parallel with the worst-case assumption, because in an anarchical international system which can be defined as an absence of a central authority or the absence of a world

government states are offensive and wilder. Within this structure, states must take care of their security. Besides, for this reason, they cannot share their interests with other countries, interests cannot be universal, (Morgenthau, 1948) and the primary goal of the states is to maximize their security.

In contrast to Offensive Structural Realists, the Defensive Structural Realists believe that states are not wild, and a threat was always changeable. Today, when we look at the threat perceptions, we can find the rising of the terrorism, economic volatility, climate change, energy insecurity and so on. Today, getting involved in war could be too costly for the states due to the development of the war technology and interdependence among countries. Even though, the European integration inaugurated with an economic character, as a result of this situation, it achieved a political aspect too. CFSP is a substantial part of the European Integration process. This can be an answer to the “Why we need theories to explain the European Integration?”. To get the essential idea about how it functions, it is needed to have a sense for this entire process. Theory helps us to see the bigger picture of what European integration is. Because it is something more than institutions and politics. All of them bring together under the roof of theory. For this reason, the first chapter of this research will examine the CFSP and its final stage Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) under a theoretical framework which is Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Liberal Intergovernmentalism is one of the Grand theories of the European integration process that explains the overall developments that happened in this progress. In the International Relations (IR) discipline, different theoretical perspectives help us to understand current events that occurred in world politics. Theories are also necessary to make effective policy evaluation too, (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2013). For this reason, both the CFSP and PESCO have a strong theoretical basis. Liberal Intergovernmentalism as one of the grand theories of the integration process is a theory that helps to explain the emergence and evolution of PESCO. Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a theory that looks at member states preferences while they were shaping their policies. The EU is a formation that contains 27+1-member states. This situation represents that each of the states has their preferences. These preferences can be domestic or foreign. For this reason, liberal intergovernmentalism is a theory that offers us an examination that includes both domestic level analysis and international level of analysis which is foreign. In the analysis part, Federica Mogherini’s statements represent the EU, not the member states preferences. She frames the member states preferences and boundaries which member states formed. However, due to the time

limitation, it is not possible to cover the all of the EU member states reactions towards the emergence and evolution of the PESCO or their attitudes for further cooperation on foreign and security matters.

The CFSP has a direct impact on the evolution of the EU due to its tentative characteristics. After the several developments that shaped under the CFSP, PESCO was the final stage that came to our attention. It is too early to see the presentative implications of the PESCO; however, it is apparent that this is a major step to develop CFSP practices within the Union. In the light of this, the primary aim of this thesis is to apprehend How PESCO has occurred and What motivates it? And the research question will be “Is it spillover from other policies or is it an example of the convergence of material security interests?” Regarding this, the research will examine the relationship between material security interests of the EU and the emergence of PESCO.

The second chapter of this article will focus on the Evolution of European Security Arrangements as a historical analysis because it is essential to cover the historical background of the CFSP to understand the motivations of the PESCO. This part will also clarify the practical information about the PESCO, and its base which is the global strategy of the EU. The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) contains a set of shared goals and actions and promotion of the shared interests among member countries, especially on the external actions. In addition to practical information about PESCO and the Global Strategy, by regarding the research question, this part also will discuss the relationship between a material security interest and PESCO. Increasing material security interests affected the emergence of the PESCO within Union by encouraging the formation of PESCO as a new defense organization. The primary source will be the official statements which are made by Federica Mogherini in the official websites of the European Union External Action for this part of the article.¹

The final chapter will discuss Turkey’s position on the EU security arrangements. Both of the titles of this thesis or the research question did not contain PESCO-Turkey relationship. However, it is essential to clarify Turkey’s position on the EU security arrangements and the future of PESCO, because the security of the EU is also crucial for the neighboring countries too. The EU security is beyond the EU itself. Turkey plays a strategic role in the security of the region. Under the roof of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey is one of the most

¹ https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/search/site/PESCO_en

important security partners of the both the US and the EU. For this reason, discussing the future of Turkey and the EU under security matters can offer a different point of view about the future of the PESCO.

In the light of this, this chapter will examine “What is the relative position of Turkey on the European Security Arrangements? How Turkey contribute to the evolution process of PESCO? And What will be Turkey’s perspective towards PESCO?” Should we create PESCO, Global Strategy, Turkey triangle? Is this possible or not? All of these questions will be discussed regarding Turkey as a strategic partner of the Union. PESCO as defense cooperation is a new opening. When we look at the NATO, it is the US based defense organization; however, Europe wants to its security structure under Global Strategy, and PESCO is the obvious step to realize this desire. Turkey as an actor has a crucial position both in the NATO and for the EU when the subject matter is about the security. Due to this fact, Turkey’s position on the evolution of the PESCO can be discussed under third-party participation in project level.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A literature review can be helpful for interpreting the research problem. This thesis will investigate the new stage of Foreign and Security policy of the EU, PESCO. The CFSP has a direct impact on the evolution of the EU due to its tentative characteristics. After the several developments that shaped under the CFSP, PESCO was the final stage that came to our attention. It offers to enhance joint military capabilities among 25-member states by regarding the project-based approach, (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2018). It is too early to examine the presentative implications of the PESCO; however, this is a significant step in the CFSP practices by regarding its formation. In the light of this, the primary aim of this thesis is to apprehend How PESCO has occurred? And What motivates it? Is it spillover from other policies or is it an example of the convergence of material security interests? In the light of this, what is the relationship between material security interests of the EU and the emergence of PESCO?”.

There is a sufficient number of articles and academic works about the EU’s CFSP developments and practices. PESCO as a recent security-related evolvement will offer us more material to work on the future of European security. By regarding this, it is essential to understand the emergence and the motivations of the PESCO. Also, what will be the role of Turkey in this

development? The relations of the EU and Turkey become more complicated than ever regarding Turkey's accession. The common ground for both parties is security, especially right after the Arab Spring uprisings that started in 2010. Several insurrections in the Middle Eastern countries triggered the main security problems for Europe such as; migration problem, and the rising of terrorist groups especially Islamic State. Even though PESCO is a recent development, a literature review can be helpful to make an inference and helps us to understand the gaps.

The literature review will be shaped under three different headings for this thesis. First of all, the CFSP related articles are crucial to apprehend the evolution process of PESCO and the motivations of it. There are mainly historical papers that cover the improvement of the common foreign and security policies. Besides, several articles contain theoretical debates about the security and defense matters within the EU and foreign policies. To understand the PESCO and its evolution, it is essential to follow the progression of the CFSP.

Secondly, this literature review must contain the related articles about the PESCO. However, it must be emphasized that the PESCO is a very recent development. For this reason, there is a trace of academic work on it. We can usually find several policy briefs, reports and official statements from EU institutions about the PESCO. In a Literature Review, it is crucial to cover the most current articles about the research. One of the positive effects that the topic has, all of the articles, policy briefs and reports are recently published. However, the negative impact is also coming from the same reason. PESCO is a very recent development, and there is a limited number of academic works.

Finally, this literature review accommodates the related articles about the theoretical basis of the emergence and the evolution of PESCO which is the Liberal Intergovernmentalism.

CFSP was evolved as a result of the specific security concerns within the EU. Even though, it's transformation dates back to the founding reason of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which was established after the end of the World War 2. Foreign and security policies of the states are intertwined. Unremarkably, security policies are designated in line with foreign policies. There are three essential objectives of foreign policies which are the interests of the states, threats, and opportunities that they can have. Interests of the countries are generally national and constant, for this reason, it is hard to take collective action on foreign and security matters. Threats and opportunities can be changeable due to perceptions and capabilities. The primary source of the

threat is geographical proximity. Due to this fact, during the cold war period, Europe was an insecure position by regarding its geographic proximity towards the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). Threats are the main reasons for the security concerns. According to Penksa and Mason, there are three levels of security concerns within Europe: The global-strategic confrontation, Western European Region itself, Domestic security and internal conflicts, (Penksa & Mason, 2003). European security is intertwined with these three dimensions. Concretely, realism is apprehensive with these security concerns and realism itself is a significant paradigm that helps us to understand the foreign policy indicators of a state.

The articles that have theoretical perspectives on CFSP typically refers to the realist paradigm. In a general sense, realism focuses on conflict, conflict resolution, war, arms races so on. In other words, it mainly concerns with the hard power issues.

However, the Cold War was a significant turning point in the evolution of IR theory from the beginning. In the 1970's the Cold War gained acceleration, some of the scholarly debate began to criticize the realist paradigm. The primary challenge was towards the notion of power, and military capabilities understandings of the realist paradigm came from the Keohane and Nye. In 1977, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye published a book called Power and Interdependence. In this book, they argued that the world is much more than as realism explains. The national survival, military capabilities of a state, security concerns are the fraction of the international system. Military and political matters are not to be ignored, however the role of the economy as important as they are. Military capabilities and economic capabilities have got the equal significance, (Nye & Keohane, 1977). Realist paradigm also matters the financial facilities too, because if a state has reached a higher GDP level, this means that it can put more on military expenditure. There is a significant relationship between them. This shows us that the realism is not always incorporated into the theory of economics. There is a strong linkage between economy and military in this sense in realism. However, Keohane and Nye stated that the military capabilities do not only give us the portion of power and there are other aspects of power that realism is not considering with. The linkage of the security capabilities and economic power has a close relationship. Especially in the context of the re-settlement of the new world order, the global events affect the foreign and security policies of the states. By regarding this, the EU security and defense policy are motivated by the shared security concerns to a certain extent.

Barry Posen explains ESDP with structural realism, in other words, the balance of power theory. The main argument is a possible threat from the USA does not justify the European states. European states are balancing the US' power. The security policy of the EU is one of the primary practices for redressing the balance, (Posen, 2006). In a very similar way, Haroche stated that the European Defense cooperation is a response to the US hegemony. He explained this argument from a theoretical point of view under neo-realism. Besides, he argued that there is a linkage between international crisis and the development of European defense cooperation, (Haroche, 2017). This article also highlighted the main problem between European collaboration and National policies of the member states. This situation is the main reason why it is hard to take collective action on foreign and security policies among member states. Congruently, Simon Sweeney examines security cooperation within the EU by regarding neo-realism, and mainly focuses on Europe's Relative gain dilemma, (Sweeney, 2015).

Also, according to the Eurobarometer survey, the support of the EU public towards the CFSP was generally affirmative, it met more than 60% support, (Peters, 2014). Although there were several failures regarding CFSP practices, this support also promotes the evolution of the collective defense cooperation within the EU. Many of the CFSP related articles in the literature offers us a theoretical analysis and epistemological information. The literature about PESCO is very recent, for this reason, most of the academic work about the PESCO is descriptive, and there is a trace of academic work because it is a recent development about European security. However, there are a considerable amount of policy briefs, news and official statements that address PESCO.

The existing literature about the PESCO is mostly focused on its objectives, legal basis, and structure. Francesco Guerzoni focuses on the reasons for the emergence of PESCO. The main argument is the changes in the European security environment was profoundly affected by the development and evolution of the PESCO in this paper, (Guerzoni, 2017). Especially, with the Brexit, the security policy of the Union required a revision. Clarie Mills had a different point of view in her article when it compared with Guzerzoni. She focused on the historical background of the PESCO and the global strategy, (Mills, 2017). In most of the academic work, the historical frame of the PESCO starting with the Maastricht treaty and covers the Lisbon treaty revisions on CFSP. However, PESCO is a very recent initiative, and it does not take its final form. There is still an ongoing process regarding its evolution. For this reason, the most recent and main data about the PESCO is the official statements that were made by the European institutions, (Mogherini,

2017), (Council of the European Union, 2017) (Parliament, 2017), (Council of the European Union, 2018). Each of the official statements focuses on the recent developments about the PESCO, its features, and objectives. In other words, these statements offer us epistemological information.

Besides these descriptive academic works about the PESCO, it is essential to consider the PESCO, NATO, and the EU triangle. Moustakis and Violakis were arguing that the NATO is the major collective defense organization in the world and it mainly represents the European countries by regarding its formation. In the beginning, NATO had a negative perspective towards the emergence of a disembodied EU force. However, today we can come across with a more penetrating attitude towards a separate EU force.

The 11th Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated in his' speech in 2004 that the EU as a security actor will always endure flourishing. By regarding this idea, NATO was supported by the emergence of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) which was one of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) idea. RRF took support from NATO because this force can serve towards a common security concern which is the fight against terrorism, (Moustakis & Violakis, 2008). Accordingly, a separate EU defense cooperation can be favorable for the NATO.

Today, when we consider the USA, it has got major economic powers in the world. For this reason, it has great military capabilities, and this situation is the main reason why NATO is under the control of the USA, (Whitney, 1997). According to the Ikenberry, there is an economic logic and the security logic. The economic logic occurred after the Bretton Wood System, 1945. Also, with the Cold War, the security logic was established. For example, the USA as a hegemon, combined both of these logics, (Ikenberry, 2005). Due to the fact that, if there will be a convergence of security interests between the EU and the USA, this situation will profoundly affect NATO-EU relations. For this reason, creating separate defense cooperation is beneficial for the EU.

Explaining the facts necessitate a theoretical framework to make sense of the matter. Theories help us to identify patterns and make some generalization. With the help of the theories, we can make a prediction and make sense of an international system, (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2013). For this reason, it is crucial to imbedded PESCO to a theoretical framework. Liberal Intergovernmentalism is one of the Grand theories of the European integration process that

explains the overall developments that happened in this progress. Andrew Moravcsik identified this theory in the 1990's. He borrowed the idea of Robert Putnam which is Two level game, (Putnam, 1988). The structure of the game both contains the international level and the national level which is also called domestic level by Moravcsik. As a theory, liberal intergovernmentalism, initially identified in 1993 in *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach* by Andrew Moravcsik, (Moravcsik, 1993).

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1.Theoretical Framework

Explaining the facts necessitate a theoretical framework to make sense of the matter. Theories help us to identify patterns and make some generalization. With the help of the theories, we can make a prediction and make sense of an international system, (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2013). There are observable and empirical facts, but there is a need for a theory to bring out these facts and make sense of them. The same thing is valid for the European Integration process. Some theories were identified to explain this process. To get the basic idea about how the community functions, there is a need to have a sense for this entire process. Theory helps us to see the bigger picture of what European integration is. It is something more than an institution and more than politics. All of them bring together under the roof of theory. To explain the European integration process, there are two types of theories. First of all, the Grand Theories of the European integration focus on defining the overall integration process. It mainly illustrates each detail of the integration process. Also, grand theories point out that “How Nation-States integrate?” Neo-Functionalism, Intergovernmentalism, and Liberal Intergovernmentalism are the grand theories of the European integration process. Secondly, there are Mid-range Theories or Mid-level Theories which focusing on specific aspects of the issue in micro level. For example, what happens to the degrees of governments? They are more limited and specific regarding their questions when we compare it with Grand Theories. Social constructivism, Rational Choice Institutionalism, and Historical Institutionalism are the mid-range theories of the European Integration process.

PESCO as a recent common foreign and defense policy practices is a part of the European Integration process. To understand the formation of the PESCO, the grand theories of the integration process can be helpful. Is PESCO a spillover from other policies or is it an example of the convergence of material security interests? In the light of this, what is the relationship between material security interests of the European Union and the emergence of PESCO? Increasing material security interests of the Union encourages the formation of PESCO as a new defense organization. The theoretical framework can be developed for answering these questions will be possible with Liberal Intergovernmentalism.

1.2.Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal Intergovernmentalism is one of the Grand theories of the European integration process that explains the overall developments that happened in this progress. It looks at internal dynamics within a state and takes intergovernmentalism and refines it on the light of Single European Act (SEA)-1986 which breaks down the period of no integration.

Intergovernmentalism put states as a central actor. The determinant is the rational state behavior. They can objectively evaluate their costs and benefits by making the cost-benefit analysis. This characteristic of the states makes them rational actors. The cost-benefit analysis intends to provide a reliable process for considering the decisions by regarding the consequences. The central question is “What is the difference between Intergovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism?” Liberal Intergovernmentalism looks at the national preferences formation. In other words, how their bargaining position is defined at the domestic level. This means that ‘how national preferences are made’ in the first place at the national level. They give priority to domestic politics to determine or to interpret the international action of the nation-state.

Andrew Moravcsik identified this theory in the 1990’s. He borrowed the idea of Robert Putnam which is Two level game – 1988, (Putnam, 1988). Two level game explained: The national policymakers always play this game simultaneously. They still play two games more or less at the same time. One is performed at the national level where officials try to coalitions of support among

domestic constituencies that will vote for them and keep them in power or detract from the power. In a domestic game, a politician tries to be reelected. At the domestic level, the ultimate goal of the politicians is to be reelected. This is the first level. The second level is at the international level. In this level, he discussed that “What national actors do international level?” The national actors use the international level as the bargaining side in which they make specific deals that will help them keep their domestic constituencies happy at home in the first level. In other words, they use this level as a bargain place in which they make certain deals. They enter into specific policies that will help them keep their domestic constituencies. What states officials that they try to do, in international level to take some benefits. The second level covers the Intergovernmental analysis of inter-state bargaining at the international level. Moravcsik applied two-level game in international politics, and he identified the levels as domestic level and international level.

According to the Liberal Intergovernmentalism societies have various kinds of political, social, and economic groups within a society. These groups can contain the several military groups, interest groups, non-governmental organizations and trade unions. All of these associations can influence the foreign policy dimensions as an internal unity. Liberal Intergovernmentalism firstly identifies these different social and political groups within a state. Following this identification, it considers the relative power of these groups. Relative power is an essential component to predict the impact of the social and political group on shaping foreign policy dimensions. By regarding the policy area, their preferences might be distinguished. For example, a military group can be affected by an upcoming operation and so on. The preferences of these social, political or economic groups and their relative power had an impact on the indication of policymaking. Liberal intergovernmentalism identifies the most influential group within that country and looks at how their preferences affect the governmental policies in the international area. National self-interests are given, and it is shaped due to the power calculations and should not change from one government to the other or one leader to the other, they are constant. By regarding this aspect, Liberal Intergovernmentalism has differed from the realist paradigm. Andrew Moravcsik challenges the realism with the assumption of domestic preferences can shape the foreign policies of a state. To give an example from the European Integration, contrary to black box metaphor the country has not fixed interest, and the national preferences shape the international relations and in the context of European integration. Moravcsik also looks economic interests too. If the national preference formation refers to the international analysis of the first level, the intergovernmental

analysis is the second level represents the European Level. They analyze the domestic preferences, constituencies and the how those domestic matters lead the specific policies that advocated by the governments of national states at the European level when they are bargaining with the other counterparts of another member states. Their bargaining position ultimately determined by the first level. Regarding the case that Moravcsik looks at and focuses on the SEA. SEA is an initiative that had broader agreement among members of the European Economic Community and this first significant treaty revision of Rome Treaty-1957 created Single Market among members. The question was “How did this happen?” His primary argument is that the world economy was changing, neoliberalism shapes the world economy, and European business was not efficient. They wanted to stand more united stronger against external competition. For their interest to be served, they were lobbying with national governments.

National elites saw the SEA as the one way to cover these demands. There were domestic preference formations shaped of the economic interest, and they wish to see a common European market that out of push these elites to further with the project. So, when he opens the black box and look through the national level, he sees the business interest that push the national state to agree on the SEA, (Moravcsik, 1993). Besides the formation of the National preferences, there are two more levels of the Liberal Intergovernmentalism which are Intergovernmental bargaining process and Delegation of power to the European Institutions. In the level of intergovernmental bargaining, the bargaining power of the states does not derive from their economic or political power but comes from the intensity of their economic interests, (Coşkun, 2015). Also, in the third level which is the delegation of power to the European Institutions refers to the principle-agent relationship. Due to the idea of Moravcsik, there is not a tension between supranational institutions and Intergovernmentalism. These institutions can increase the intergovernmental bargaining, (Coşkun, 2015).

The following part will discuss the PESCO’s formation under Liberal Intergovernmentalism after this brief epistemological part.

1.3.PESCO vs. Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Moravcsik indicates that the EU has reached a stable constitutional equilibrium since the mid-1990's, especially on defense policy, (Andersson, 2015). The EU plays a subordinate role by taking decisions with unanimity on defense matters. For this reason, there were no successful CFSP practices within the Union. PESCO as a newly established defense organization aims to create a common and binding security framework for the EU citizens and the EU territory. However, as an internal formation, will PESCO shape the foreign and security policies of the Union?

To start with the main characteristics of the liberal intergovernmentalism, the most important one is its domestic and foreign intertwinement. According to the realist paradigm, there is the separation of the domestic and foreign spheres. Because anarchy is a significant shaping force for states preferences and actions. States are the essential units in the international politics, and they affect each other within the anarchic structure, they aim to be secure, and they use power as a central variable to explain their behavior, (Parent & Baron, 2011). In the anarchical international system which can be defined as an absence of a central authority or the absence of a world, states are offensive and wilder. For this reason, anarchy is a significant shaping force for state preferences and actions. Again, for the very same purpose, states are designated their foreign policies in the light of their constant interests such as; survival, and territorial integrity and domestic preferences are not the shaping force for the foreign policy. By regarding the realist paradigm, while their foreign policies determine states, they are not concerned with domestic policies. They shaped their actions, preferences, and policies by the line of the developments in foreign spheres. Security Dilemma can be a good example to explain the state's preferences by taking as references to separation of the foreign and domestic area. Security dilemma is the outcome of the state's preferences which was derived from their foreign policies. It is not the outcome that comes from the domestic field. Security Dilemma in the IR theory refers a situation that when a state increases its security, such as; by increasing its military strength, this situation can be a reason for the other states' ability to improve their military capabilities, (Schmah, 2012). So, this is an outcome that occurs from state- state relationship.

In opposite to realist paradigm, liberal IR theory offers us a different picture when it compared with realist understanding. When we examine the liberal institutionalism, anarchy is not the only shaping force for states preferences and actions. There are some other forces to shape the state's actions such as; technology, welfare orientation of domestic interests, (Grieco, 1988). Liberals suggested that countries are not concerned with power and security anymore, because due to the development of the nuclear weapons and mobilized national populations are made a possible war too costly. Also, as a result of the development of economic relations, there is now a dependency among states. All of these developments can abolish the separation between foreign and domestic spheres. Moreover; domestically, industrialization can be effective on state preferences, (Grieco, 1988). The significant difference between the liberal paradigm and realist paradigm is, liberals rejected that realism's pessimism about the international institutions, Nye and Keohane suggested that, the role of the international institutions in politics are significantly increased day by day, (Nye & Keohane, 1977). As it can be understood from this statement, there can be different indicators of states preferences and actions besides foreign policies. Domestic developments and policies can be an indicator, and both foreign and domestic spheres do not have to be separate. The impact of the domestic politics on states behavior is continued to be a controversial issue. Liberal paradigm offers that interests can be based on domestic politics. For example, when democracy is considered as a type of political regime, it can prevent a future war as an internal factor rather than external. Type of the political regime – Is it democracy or not- can be an example of the domestic effects on states interests. In other words, internal level factors can shape the foreign policy of a state. To have a more peaceful world, local attributes can be the critical point. To prevent future war, internal changes can be collimating. For this reason, domestic and foreign relations are not separate, and both of these notions are intertwined as a logic. This means that domestic level factors can shape foreign policy. Moreover, domestic politics is accepted as the center of the debate on democratic peace. Also, the importance of globalization and international institutions as it mentioned continue to shape foreign external relations, (Nick, 2009). PESCO is one of the EU policies that can be examined within these two level both domestic and international.

Secondly, the agenda of the states are not limited to high political issues which are the military and national security issues. There are also low political issues which contain social and human security too. PESCO is a formation that covers both of these issues.

When we look at the CFSP as an intergovernmental development, there is an interpretation that Foreign, security, and defense matters are under the control of the national governments. European Commission has a limited role in these areas, and the member states did not share their national sovereignty. However, the EU member states collectively decided to work together under intergovernmental cooperation, (Sweeney, 2015).

Thirdly, while Moravcsik was explaining the features of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, he inspired from Putnam's two-level game as it was aforementioned. If the national preference formation refers to the international analysis of the first level, the intergovernmental analysis is the second level represents the European Level. When we look at the composition of the PESCO, it has got a two-layered structure which contains Council Level and the Project Level. In the Council level, 25 PESCO member states are responsible for the decision making and long-term policy directions. In the Project level, if a project is adopted, the PESCO member states will involve the management process of that project and also the implementation of the project. The Council level feature of the PESCO represents the domestic level decision making because only the PESCO member states have the right to say about the process. However, when we look at the Project level characteristics, some of the non-EU members can be involved in project-based cooperation with the PESCO on security matters. At this stage, it is possible to come across with the international level.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism as a challenge to the Intergovernmentalism explaining the situations both in domestic level and international level. This idea comes from the two-level game. The EU perform its policies both in domestic and national level in different areas. In the international level 27+1-member states league together. Member states of the EU bargain and convince each other of their interest. In the domestic level, member states act in accordance with reactions and movements in their country. PESCO as one of the EU policies can be examined within these two level both domestic and international. Security matters are different than economic issues. Security is vital. Within an insecure world, the economy would not be able to develop. PESCO as defense cooperation can offer projects to be more secure. Due to its formations

and features, it seems like it is more than a CFSP or a CSDP practices. This policy also is an example of domestic development. It can pave the way to the foreign relations.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism and PESCO fit with each other by the help of these three characteristics which are domestic and foreign intertwinement, high politics and low politics combination, and two-layered structure of PESCO which was derived from Putnam's two-level game. Federica Mogherini's statements frame the member states preferences; however, her statements did not represent the member states preferences purely. The statements mainly represent the EU. At this point, one of the classic dilemmas of the EU policy formation come to our attention which is Intergovernmentalism vs. Supranationalism. Even though, PESCO is one of the supranational developments in the EU by its binding characteristics for the member states, the evolution of it must be examined in an intergovernmental way too. Because the common foreign and the security policy of the Union has always been intergovernmental characteristics due to national self-interests. Besides the Mogherini's statements, member states official statements about the PESCO can give adequate information about the development process of the PESCO.

The following part will focus on the historical background of the EU Security Arrangements and try to understand the motivations of the PESCO.

CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION

2.1. Evolution of European Security Arrangements

The EU as a sui generis entity covers many different policies from economic to political issues. Today, it plays a significant role in world politics, and it effectively shapes momentous developments in the international area. The thesis focuses on one of the most controversial policies of the EU, the CFSP, and CSDP as a central part of the CFSP. Since the Maastricht Treaty established the three-pillar structure which contains the CFSP in 1992, this policy has had a significant place on the EU's agenda. When we consider the recent developments about the CFSP which is PESCO, it is a defense organization which has been agreed among 25 EU member states and also it is one which will be binding for them. The thesis argues that increasing material security interests of the Union, encourages the formation of PESCO as a new defense organization. In this context, the thesis helps us to understand the role of material security interests on the evolution of CFSP and its final stop, PESCO. First and foremost, it is important to indicate a theoretical framework Liberal Intergovernmentalism which is one of the leading theories of the European integration process to understand this new development of the CFSP. In this context, it examines the evolution of European security arrangements chronologically. Due to the dominance of the realist school of thought in the international system, the interests of states have had a central position, especially on foreign and security issues. Taking collective action on these policy areas among EU member states is much harder than on low political matters such as the economy. This is why it is hard to examine an entirely successful performance within the EU regarding CFSP practices. Before the conclusion, this thesis also discusses the role of Turkey in the EU's security arrangements and Turkey's position towards PESCO.

Foreign and security policies are generally identified at the national level. While states are designating their foreign policies, they give an eye to their interests which can never be universal, (Morgenthau, 1948) or shared with another country. Today, examining the EU's security arrangements necessitate understanding its historical background. The evolution of European security regulations can be divided into two different periods: The post-World War II period and the post-Maastricht period.

The developments after World War II brought us today's EU as a sui generis organization, which means neither a state nor an international organization. It was established as an economic union called the ECSC with the 1952 Treaty of Rome. However, currently, when we look at the EU, it is also a political union too. Being a political union, which means that, the states are now share some common political and economic interests. How did this evolution happen, and what led to this? Finding the answers to these questions are possible with the investigation of the background.

Europe has faced destructive wars throughout the history. The 20th century witnessed World War I, World War II and the Cold War. Beyond any doubt, World War II plays a significant role in today's construction of Europe as a continent and the EU as an organization. The journey of the EU began with an economic cooperation idea. After the devastating World War 2, Europe was aware that 'cooperation' was necessary to rebuild after wars economic losses. This financial difficulty created an internal pressure for the idea of European integration. However, this idea not only contained the economic cooperation but also offered the countries located in Europe a chance to prevent a possible future war too. In Europe, the location of the states is very near one to another. They share the same borders. This geographical proximity is one of the most important reasons that contribute to possible war, (Diehl, 1991). Also, the states located near to each other have a greater tendency to have territorial disputes, (Robst, Polachek, & Chang, 2006) due to sharing borders. For these reasons, it was an appropriate time to take action for the restoration of Europe, and especially healing the European economy was significant.

After the World War II, the US took over the hegemon position in world politics. This means that the US is a hegemonic actor who has control over resources and market and also who has the capacity to set the rules in the international system both economically and politically, (Yazid, 2015). This situation brought the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan, and NATO to our

attention. All of these developments affected European countries intimately, and the US was the key player in these developments as a hegemon. It is important to clarify that due to the unfortunate defeat of Germany after World War II, it did not count as a European country.

Being a European means that to be founding members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). This organization was created in line with the Marshall plan (1948), and it aimed to promote cooperation among the founding member states and reconstruction of Europe.²

Economic downfall of Europe was not the only reason that the continent faced with. Also, there was a rising communist threat which was come from the Soviet Union towards Europe. The main aim of the Soviet Union was to improve their influence on Europe and Sovietize the region. Beyond any doubt, Europe was profoundly affected by this threat when it compared with the rest of the world. With the help of the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan (1948), some of the European countries including Greece and Turkey took economic and military assistance from the US. In other words, the US, by creating new policies that include several aids and assistance to Europe, both prevent Soviet Union's expansion and ensure economic help to Europe and also Marshall Plan provided an opportunity to spread American views of mobility to Western Europe, (Schipper, 2008).

After this brief introduction, the first important point about the collective defense in Europe was the Brussels Treaty. This treaty was signed between Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and the main aim was to create a collective defense alliance, (Brussels Treaty, 1948). This was the very first step that shows us states can cooperate on defense-related issues. Furthermore, this treaty paved the way for the establishment of NATO. It was established as a military alliance towards Soviet threat in Central and Eastern Europe in 1949. The founding members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom (the UK), and the US. The main difference between the Brussels Treaty and NATO is their target point. The Brussels Treaty was signed due to the German threat. After World War II, no country saw Germany as an ally. Germany was perceived as the most substantial threat to Europe. However, NATO was established to prevent the Soviet threat. Moreover, NATO includes two countries that are located outside of Europe, the

² <http://www.oecd.org/general/organisationforeuropeaneconomicco-operation.htm>

US and Canada.³ Both of these military alliances show us the situation was compelling, and to protect themselves from external threats, states met under a common roof.

In Table 1, there is a timeline for the years between 1945 and 1990, which can be called the Cold War years. Three important points are related to this time period regarding Europe. First of all, during the Cold War, there was a constant threat for Europe due to the geographical proximity of Europe to the Soviet Union, and correspondingly, the expansionist policy of the Soviets was a threat in itself towards European countries. Second, the establishment of NATO was the significant step from the point of collective security. The idea of collective security emerged with the Brussels Treaty, and it became a strong idea with the establishment of NATO, under the leadership of the US.

Regarding Europe, the emergence of the European Defense Community idea was based on the Pleven Plan. Former French Prime Minister Rene Pleven offered this plan. He desired to set up a supranational defense community in 1950, the establishment of NATO as a collective security defense. However, this defense community was different from NATO and Brussels' pack because decisions are made on the European level, not at the state level, making it a supranational organization. However, this plan was not ratified by the French government in 1954 because the French government was experiencing a rise in nationalist movements the proposed. For this reason, it was not surprising to see this rejection. Until the Maastricht Treaty, defense community could become realized.

³ Appendix B

MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AFTER WORLD WAR 2

1945	End of the World War 2
1948	Brussels Treaty
1949	Establishment of NATO
1950	Pleven Plan
1950	Schuman Plan
1950	Korean War
1951	Paris Treaty, European Coal and Steel Community
1952	European Defense Community
1954	Modification of the Brussels Treaty, Western European Union (WEU) was established.
1957	Rome Treaty, European Economic Community
1961	Fouchet Plan
1962	Fouchet Plan failed.
1969	Hague Summit Declaration
1970	Davignon Report (European Political Community 1)
1971-1979	Vietnam War and Soviet Intervention to Afghanistan
1973	Copenhagen Report (European Political Community 2)
1973	UK, Denmark, Ireland Enlargement
1975	Trevi
1980	London Report (European Political Community 3)
1981	Greece Enlargement
1986	Single European Act
1986	Spain, Portugal Enlargement
1990	Iraq invasion to Kuwait
1989	Fall of Warsaw Pact
1990	Fall of Berlin Wall
1991	Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Table 1: Main Developments After World War 2

EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1991/92	Maastricht Treaty, Establishment of CFSP as an Intergovernmental Pillar
1999	European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
2002	Berlin Plus Agreement
2003	European Security Strategy adopted.
2004	European Defense Agency
2009	Lisbon Treaty and Common Foreign and Defense Policy (CSDP)
2013	Priority Actions for Defense set out

Table 2: European Security Arrangements⁴

Table 2 clarifies the significant step regarding shared security and foreign policy starting from the Maastricht Treaty revision. The Maastricht Treaty was the first legal step for common defense policy. It was a founding treaty of the EU which is also called the Treaty on European Union (TEU). With the revision of the Treaty of Rome, the European Community gained a political identity. This meant that the European Political Cooperation become a legal part of the Union under the name of CFSP. The primary objectives of the CFSP were enucleated by the TEU, under the Title V. Article J. 1. 2.;

- *“to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;*
- *to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;*
- *to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;*
- *to promote international cooperation;*
- *to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”*, (Council of the European Union & European Commission, 1992).

⁴ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/defence-security-timeline/>

The Council can make decisions unanimously for issues related to the CFSP, except for procedural questions, (Council of the European Union & European Commission, 1992). This shows us that the second pillar of the Treaty on European Union was the intergovernmental body of the Union as like the third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs when it compared with the first pillar of the economic and supranational body. Basically, in supranationalism decisions are taken by the higher authority, not the member states. Also, the supranational institutions of the EU represent the interest of the organization. In contrast, intergovernmentalism⁵ refers that member states make the decisions as a result of negotiation by regarding the national interests of the countries.

The changed the world order in 1990's turning over a new leaf for the EU. Providing security is the primary interest for a state, and it provides the survival of the country, territorial integrity, and survival of the population. Interest as a main foreign policy objective for a state is always constant. To create a common foreign policy within the Union can be troublesome in practice. The legal establishment of the first step of the CFSP took almost forty years from the Paris Treaty in 1951 to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Notwithstanding, this treaty revision faced with Danish rejection with a referendum. In a second referendum, Denmark decided to approve this treaty revision by choosing to opt out from the second pillar which contains CFSP. The main reason for this rejection was the Danish people did not want to share the decision making on foreign and security policies even if the decisions were taken unanimously. As a result of this Danish defense opt out, Denmark did not be a part of the execution of the actions of the Union for defense implications.⁶ This opt-out shows us the EU is not able to practice full integration.

The world conjecture regarding security threats changed eventually starting from the 1990's. For the Western block, the threat was the Soviet Union, for the Eastern Bloc, the threat was the West itself during the Cold War years. However, today the meaning of threat is more than this understanding. Rising terrorism and its effects on EU member states, economic volatility, climate change, and energy insecurity⁷ can represent different threats too. All of this makes it essential to cooperate on security and foreign policy related issues.

⁵ <http://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/module-4-extract-2-Sovereignty-intergovernmentalism-and-supranationalism.pdf>

⁶ <http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/TheDanishDefenceOpt-Out.aspx>

⁷ <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/priorities-eu-global-strategy>

For this reason, even though Denmark rejected the Maastricht revision of the Rome treaty, they created an additional legal base to pass it which is called an opt- out.

Another significant step regarding CFSP was taken in 1999 with the launch of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) at the Cologne Summit after the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force. In this summit, the member states of the Union aimed to consolidate the CFSP with ESDP. In this context, the European Council decided to create further development on CFSP in the light of several discussions, also in the Helsinki Summit, Council discussed further common European security and defense policy.⁸

The Kosovo War led to a new crisis in Europe, displacing refugees and people. In the Cologne Summit, The European Council agreed on a common strategy for the EU on Kosovo crisis, Ukraine, Russia, Mediterranean Region and so on. They defined a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. To exemplify, the first common strategy towards Russia was offered to strengthen the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU. This common strategy was fundamental to maintain peace and security in Europe.⁹

When it comes to the 2000's, starting from the 9/11 incident in New York, EU began to take more material action regarding the development of the CFSP. The 9/11 attack became a catalyst for a series of global events which will be discussed in the following paragraph. The balance of power in world politics has inconvertibly degenerated towards new world order, (Moustakis & Violakis, 2008). Due to this new settlement, the EU came up against a number of challenges. These challenges were shaped by transformation of the Union in the international arena in the light of ESDP, (Moustakis & Violakis, 2008).

After 9/11, the US intervention to Afghanistan in 2001 and the US-Iraqi War in 2003 shaped the states foreign and security policies. The EU declared their support to the US and gave signals of cooperation and solidarity. The EU supported the US war in Afghanistan by taking consent from the Global War on Terror (GWOt). However, the problem occurred within EU under the CFSP due to the dissenter states which were EU's supranational powers Germany and France.

⁸ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.htm

⁹ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol1_en.htm#V

Both of them did not support the US- Iraqi War in 2003, which other member states choose to support the US foreign policy. This situation created a divergence between the US and the EU foreign policy and also formed a discrepancy among the EU states too. Generally, the founding members of the Union were against the US intervention to Iraq, whereas the new members of Europe who become a member after 2004 enlargement supported US foreign policy. Because the Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC) which become members of the EU with 2004 enlargement were post-communist countries which took support from the US as it aforementioned the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. This fact shows that there is no common foreign policy among EU member states.

In the Hague Summit in 1969, the European Council decided to adopt three principles which were deepening, widening and completing. These principles paved the wave to the development of the enlargement policy with widening principle and supported to make cooperation on more policy areas besides, an economic collaboration by deepening principle, and with the help of the completing principle, the Union decided to complete what they started. Two of these principles which were deepening and completing gave support to the development of the CFSP too. For this reason, due to the Foreign policy divergence among the EU member states during the US- Iraqi War, they developed the European Security Strategy (ESS) which was adopted by the European Council in Brussels Summit in 2003. Javier Solana who was the former High Representative (HR) for foreign affairs was tasked by members of the Union to develop the Security Strategy for Europe. It provided a cognitive structure for the CFSP.¹⁰ From this development, the main inference was although there was divergence among the EU member states, they continue to develop strategies on security.

Before the adoption of the ESS, Berlin Plus agreement was signed between NATO and the EU in 2002. It was an opportunity for the community to access the NATO holdings and capabilities under certain conditions. In this way, the EU had permission to use NATO's military assets in the operations that were made by the EU. However, it is essential to keep in mind that, the EU and the US, show an alteration in their attitude to security-related issues. The main reason for this is the US has got dominant military power and capabilities and also, they have trained and well-equipped

¹⁰ <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world>

forces that are not available for Europeans, (Penksa & Mason, 2003). As it can be understood from the Berlin Plus agreement, in terms of material military requirements can be derived from NATO and the head of this defense organization in the US. In the light of this, the establishment of the European Defense Agency (EDA) which aimed to improve the European defense capabilities in 2004 and the European Commission's 2007 draft directive on defense procurement indicated that there was a growing institutionalization in EU level in terms of the CFSP (Mawdsley, 2008).

Beyond any doubt, one of the significant revisions of the Maastricht Treaty on the CFSP was the Lisbon Treaty revision. The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2007, and it came into force in 2009. As a result of this treaty revision, the ESDP renamed with the CSDP. The Lisbon provided the formation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and most importantly the CFSP was no longer the second pillar due to the abolishment of the three-pillar structure with the Lisbon Treaty.

The CSDP as a main part of the CFSP mainly permits the EU to take a pathbreaking role in peacekeeping operations. It also enables the Union to develop conflict prevention and consolidation of the international security.¹¹ The EU had practiced many overseas operations under the CSDP in the Europe, Africa, Asia.^{12 13} Undoubtedly, this policy area still predominantly remains intergovernmental. However, the evolution of the CFSP shows us that there is a positive tendency towards a shared security and defense policies in terms of the member states of the EU especially in the 2000's due to the complex development of security issues in world politics. Also, there are several benefits of the CFSP to the EU, although the interests of nation states are the primary concern, the CFSP also matters for them too.

First of all, by making peacekeeping operations¹⁴ in different continents under the CSDP which the main part of the CFSP is, the EU can put a practice of their main founding aim which is a promotion of democracy and transmission of the peace towards neighboring countries. In this way, the EU member states can protect their borders from an external threat by trying to keep stabilize their neighboring regions.

¹¹ https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en

¹² Appendix C

¹³ https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en

¹⁴ Appendix C

Secondly, the EU can gain international prestige and respectability from the non-EU countries. However, it must be kept in mind that the CFSP remains a differentiated integration exemplification. Especially, due to the changing political structure in the world brought more complex discussions for states in terms of security issues. In parallel with this, Europe also faces with disconcerted and undetermined security environment. Even though states interests cannot be shared with another country, the EU member states started to share same interests such as the economy and shared security threats such as terrorism and some values after years of formation. For this reason, there is still an increasing demand for the EU to become more capable, compatible, and more convenient as a global actor.¹⁵

In addition to all of these reasons for the development of the CSDP, according to the neo-realist understanding, the CSDP was evolved as a response to the US hegemony in the international system.

In respect to the neo-realist idea, starting with the dissolution of the Soviet Union distribution of power in world politics became unipolarity by the US, (Hyde-Price, 2006). This situation paves the way for the EU member states make cooperation among themselves, (Haroche, 2017).

¹⁵ https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5393/csdp-capabilities_en

EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

2016	Presentation of the European Union global strategy
2016	Signature of the EU-NATO joint declaration
2016	Implementation plan on security and defence
2016	European Defence Action Plan presented by the European Commission
2016	Common set of proposals to implement the EU-NATO joint declaration
2016	European Council stressed the need to strengthen Europe's security and defence
2017	Council reviews progress and agrees to improve support for military missions
2017	Council discussed EU-NATO cooperation with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
2017	EU Global Strategy: Council conclusions on security and defence
2017	Council establishes a Military Planning and Conduct Capability
2017	Council welcomes progress made on EU-NATO cooperation
2017	European Council calls for the launch of a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
2017	European Council resumes discussions on PESCO
2017	First step towards the establishment of PESCO
2017	EU-NATO cooperation: new set of proposals
2017	Council establishes PESCO with 25-member states participating
2017	Establishing the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP)
2017	EU leaders welcome reinforced defence cooperation
2018	PESCO: Council adopts an implementation roadmap

Table 3: European Security Arrangements

After the identification of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016, the CFSP gained a new aspect. The years between 2016 and 2017 were considerably intensive in terms of the developments related to the security policies and military issues as it is listed in Table 3. Especially, in the final stage of the CFSP, PESCO was introduced.

The following part of this research will cover the EU global strategy and developments that happened between the year of 2016 and 2017 in terms of the CFSP, and it will mainly focus on the questions of What is PESCO, what motivates its evolution? Also, the next part will investigate the material security interest and PESCO relationship. Increasing material security interests affected the emergence of the PESCO within Union. When we look at NATO, it is the US-based defense organization. However, the EU wants its security structure. Even though there were several EU-NATO cooperation in the period between 2016 and 2017 as it listed in Table 3, why the EU still need PESCO on defense? What is the relationship between NATO and PESCO? And What is the relationship between the EUGS and PESCO?

Treaty of Lisbon establishes the CSDP as a part of the CFSP in 2009. The decision making in the CSDP is intergovernmental to a large extent because there is a desire to keep member states' national sovereignty in the field of security and defense. The decisions are taken with unanimity by regarding the security-related issues. Unanimity gives member states right to veto the resolution. This type of decision making on CSDP banned the evolution of the policy. Taking a decision could be harder when it comes to unanimity. This situation also created inefficiency for the policy. Under this circumstance, CSDP by taking reference from the Lisbon treaty paved the way for the establishment of the PESCO as a collective defense organization.

2.2. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): What is PESCO?

European security has evolved with significant hurdles. The most important step for building a framework for a collective European security and defense mechanism came in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty when the second pillar of intergovernmental decision making was set up for deliberations on common foreign and security matters which was the CFSP. However, this was not an easy feat. Although the ultimate control of the armed forces still belongs to the nation-states in national level in the Lisbon Treaty, same treaty prepared a base for the development of PESCO as a collective security initiative.

In the middle of November 2017, as a new initiative, PESCO was formulated as the final stage of the CSDP. PESCO is defense cooperation arrangement bringing together 25 out of 27+1 EU member states, (Council of the European Union, 2017). It proposed to decrease the fragmentation and disorganization of the national defense expenditures and to increase the shared defense spending within the EU. However, when we look at the adaptation process of PESCO, the CFSP related issues can take a long time to be applicable. Although the Lisbon Treaty established the foundation of PESCO in 2009, the official publicity of PESCO was in late 2017. Besides this, PESCO is one of the differentiated integration implications which means that all the EU member states do not adopt it. The most significant differences of PESCO from other CFSP practices is, this time commitment and membership of the PESCO will be binding for the members, (Aydın-Düzgit, 2018). These binding commitments make PESCO significant policy development on European Defense, (Marrone, 2017). This is the very first time that the EU members are getting into binding agreements by addressing the security issue. However, the most crucial question is Will PESCO be effective? Even the emergence of this defense cooperation shows that a critical step was taken in the direction of make common foreign and security policy of the Union more efficient, useful and beneficial.

In addition to practical information about PESCO, by regarding the research question, the relationship between the material security interest and PESCO must be examined. As it aforementioned, security-related policies can be developed under a deprivation. Increasing material security interests due to the changing nature of security affected the emergence of the

PESCO within the Union. When we look at the NATO, it is the US-based defense organization. However, Europe wants to its security structure under EUGS. As project-based cooperation of the EU, PESCO paves the way for the increase in the efficiency of the European security.

In the light of these, to understand the PESCO as a formation, it is necessary to cover the legal basis and the main features of PESCO as defense cooperation. Thereafter, it will explain the common European security, how it has evolved and What was the determinants that help to the embodiment of the common security within the Union? Also, the evolution of PESCO and correlation between PESCO and EUGS will be highlighted in this part of the thesis.

2.3. Legal Basis and Features of PESCO

The threats that the EU citizens perceived are not only had military characteristics. There are also non-military threats that must be considered and make a precaution possible. These non-military threats can be related to environmental issues, cybersecurity, cooperation on migration and so on. This variation of threats necessitates material action and these non-military issues besides military ones must entitle with plentiful attention because this type of problems adequately shapes the security policies, (Parliament, 2017). The PESCO is the recent example of this situation. Article 42(6) and Article 46 of the TEU also the protocol 10 contributed the opportunity for a group of Member States which have harmonious policy ideas on European defense, (Comission, 2017), (Mogherini, 2017b). Article 42(6) of the TEU stated that:

“Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.”(European Union, 2012).

Also, the Article 46 of the TEU is supporting the Article 42(6):

“Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.”(European Union, 2012).

These two articles of TEU created a legal base of the PESCO and conceived the Protocol 10 on PESCO established by Article 42 of the TEU. It contains three articles and clarifies the general framework of PESCO.

The threats that the EU citizens perceived are not only driven by military concerns, (Guerzoni, 2017). Member States can reach PESCO only if they want to integrate it because it is willingness cooperation of defense in the framework of the CSDP.

Non-PESCO countries can be a part of the collaboration if they provide the requirements which are necessary to be. They have to fulfill the criteria which are operational criteria, financial criteria, and industrial criteria. There is an expectation from PESCO that it will optimize European military capability generation by regarding sharing common defense. One of the main aims of the PESCO is to decrease the fragmentation of national security and inefficiencies of the CFSP practices, (“A new chapter for EU defence coordination – PESCO finally on the way,” 2017). It has got three priorities: Answering to external conflicts and crisis that affected the EU, Capacity Building of Partners, and Protecting the border of the Union and its citizens. PESCO as a treaty-based framework on security desire to expand defense cooperation among member states by increasing their operational convenience.

There are two levels of decision making on PESCO: The Council level and Project level. Both of these levels are connected to the PESCO secretariat which gave overall support to the members. In the Council level, 25 PESCO member states are responsible for the decision making and long-term policy directions. In the Project level, if a project is adopted, the PESCO member states will involve the management process of that project and also the implementation of the project. Currently, 17 projects were approved in three areas: Common training, Operational Domains, and Joint capabilities. The adaptation process for the PESCO projects started in March

2018.¹⁶ Each of the member states has got different responsibilities on different projects as it can be seen in *Table 1* and *Table 2*. There was a distribution of roles among member states which agreed on PESCO commitments. PESCO as project-based defense cooperation focuses on mostly military training and developing military capabilities in its projects. This also shows that there is still no mutual military cooperation among member states, and this development did not make PESCO as supranational action on security matters. This characteristics of the PESCO projects support the intergovernmental attributes of foreign and security issues. Due to its binding nature, the decision making of the PESCO can represent the supranational action, however, when we look at the subject matters of the projects, there are considerable steps, but there is no collective decision making on same interests that are shared by member states.

Most of the PESCO projects contain several matters from Military Mobility to Cyber Threats and Maritime Surveillance. Each of these projects will develop under the PESCO and they are mostly about training and developing capabilities.

¹⁶ Appendix A: Project Process of PESCO

Project	Project members
1. European Medical Command	Germany, Czech Republic, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden
2. European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR)	France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Finland
3. Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and support to Operations	Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia
4. Military Mobility	Netherlands, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden
5. European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC)	Germany, Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Sweden
6. European Training Certification Centre for European Armies	Italy, Greece
7. Energy Operational Function (EOF)	France, Belgium, Spain, Italy

Table 4: PESCO Projects and Project Members, (Council of the European Union, 2018b)

Project	Project members
8. Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package	Italy, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Austria
9. Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM)	Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania
10. Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO)	Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal
11. Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance	Greece, Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus
12. Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform	Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Austria, Portugal
13. Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security	Lithuania, Spain, France, Croatia, Netherlands, Romania, Finland
14. Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations	Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal
15. Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle	Italy, Greece, Slovakia
16. Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery)	Slovakia, Italy
17. EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC)	Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus

Table 5: PESCO Projects and Project Members, (Council of the European Union, 2018b)

2.4. Common European Security

Formulating common European security, foreign and defense policies has always been highly controversial. It was only in 1993 with the Edinburgh Agreement; Danish people approved the Maastricht Treaty when Denmark was granted the opt-out the second and the third pillar: CFSP and JHA. Even though this rejection, the Maastricht treaty brought considerable step on the path of collective security.

Collective European Defense was highly inefficient since the beginning because of its intergovernmental characteristics. In other words, the main reason for this inefficiency is the importance of national interests on security and defense matters; it is hard to take collective action and create common policies. Besides this inefficiency, regarding its formation, the EU security matters mainly dependent on foreign powers, mainly the US under the roof of the NATO. Most of the states are the members of both PESCO and NATO as it can be seen in the *Image 1*. Except for the UK, Malta, Denmark, and Portugal, Ireland (These two states later approved to be a part of the cooperation) PESCO launched. There is a great effort to answer the growing demand of the EU citizens who were claiming more on European level of cooperation on security matters with the help of the PESCO. This claim of the EU citizens mainly comes from the rising of terrorism in the European states. This advancement led to the idea that there is a need for collective defense, (Marrone, 2017).



Image 1: NATO, PESCO, EUROPEAN UNION

It can be collocated several reasons why EU needs to develop a capable defense policy like PESCO, (Guerzoni, 2017). Most importantly, three main reasons must be highlighted in “Why and how PESCO was formulated?” and “What motivates PESCO?”. These reasons are mainly external welded and paved the way for the emergence of PESCO. First, the changing of European Security Environment in a negative way due to the alterations in the neighboring regions. For example; firstly, Russia-Ukraine dispute, uncertainty in the Middle East region and Northern Africa, and rising of terrorism presented new security challenges to the EU. The terrorist threat has the direct impact on the current environment on the EU security. The EU has a great responsibility to protect their citizens, (Marin, 2015). Secondly, Brexit affected the developments on security and defense-related issues as much as other policy areas. The departure of the UK from the EU brings an intense change in the European Security environment, and also the EU have noticed that there is a weakness on security issues within the Union, (Guerzoni, 2017). Finally, changing the US foreign policy profoundly affected due to the EU’s defense arrangements due to the structural dependency on the US-led NATO.

It is crucial to start with the first reason of why and how PESCO was formulated which is the pessimistic changes of European Security Environment. According to the 2015 report of the European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies towards a new ESS there are some

changes in the European security environment. First and foremost, the most extensive changes on European security environment was the 2003 adaptation of ESS. The reason for the adoption of a new security strategy was the 9/11 attack in the US. This systemic adjustment changed the balances in the system because it brought 2001 the US intervention in Afghanistan and 2003 the US and Iraqi War. These two tensions that the US involved created a divergence of foreign policy among the EU member states. This was the main reason for the ESS initiative. The adaptation of the ESS was the first significant experiment by the EU to create a common framework for a global strategic document for the security matters. Another significance of ESS was, it was the only document that drafted by a regional institution containing a specific framework about the security and a collective vision regarding its international role except for NATO. In terms of its formation, ESS was very similar with the PESCO. It can be said that PESCO was a revision of ESS. The adaptation of the ESS also showed that there were new threats and new challenges in the security environment. The leading indicator of these new threats and new challenges was the emergence of GWoT which came to our attention with the 9/11 attack.

Another important point about the changes of European Security Environment was the changing nature of the current conflicts. Today, we can come across with many different types of disputes, and tensions especially with the development of technology; there are cyber threats, drones and so on. As it can be understood from the definition of the CSDP that was created by Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the main purpose of this new revision of collective foreign and security policy is to investigate the Union's external ability in the military missions and operations in terms of civilian and military capabilities in conflict presentation and crisis management. For this reason, the further action needed on security matters within the Union. Secondly, Brexit has profoundly affected the recent developments on security and defense matters. The unfortunate departure of the UK from the EU brings an intense change especially in terms of defense expenditures (Guerzoni, 2017).

When the UK decided to out from the EU, non-EU members stated that the EU is started to split, but PESCO shows that they can still create new cooperation on defense. As Mogherini noted that in her speech on the official statement of PESCO, "This is a historical binding agreement on defense."¹⁷ However, the contribution of the UK on defense matters covered the budget to a

¹⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qjZbtRjAmy8>

large extent. *Table 3* gives us official statistics on total defense expenditure of the EU. *Table 4* shows the UK’s contribution to total defense expenditure.¹⁸ The year between 2009 and 2015, the entire defense expenditure among the EU member states were € 1.362.897 Mln, the UK’s contribution on the defense spending was € 322.406 Mln. These results presented that the UK provided 23.65% of the expenditure. Brexit is costly for the EU regarding defense matters. PESCO as a new collective defense policy will help to set a new order among the EU member states.




Table 6: Total Defence Expenditure of the EU^{19 20}

¹⁸ Time period contains after Lisbon Treaty, 2009

¹⁹ European Defense Agency Collective and National Defence Data 2005-2014

²⁰ <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal>




Table 7: Total Defence Expenditure of the UK ^{21 22}

PESCO also identifies an institutional anchor by representing an additional value of contributing a structured framework of cooperation existed in the treaties, (De France, Major, & Sartori, 2017). It contains twenty binding commitments for member states which is a part of it. It must be noted that the public opinion towards security matters within the EU is also improved positively. The statistics show that 75% of the EU citizens are supporting the CSDP, (Council of the European Union, 2017). This statistic shows us the citizens of the EU are concern about their security. Under the PESCO, 17 projects have already approved. These projects desire to cover the EU defense capability gaps and aim to increase the EU's responsiveness to the crisis, (Council of the European Union, 2017).

Finally, changes in the US foreign policy has profoundly affected the emergence of the PESCO. The EU's security policies depend on US-led NATO to a large extent. As it can be seen in the Image 1, most of the countries that approved to be a part of the PESCO, also the member of the NATO. PESCO as a binding agreement on security and defense covers the EU territory, and

²¹ European Defense Agency Collective and National Defence Data 2005-2014

²² <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal>

the EU citizens will try to improve defense capabilities by compounding the member states' defense facilities. It is separate security formation from NATO, however the EU member states which also the member of the NATO will continue to benefit NATO, (The Council & Mogherini, 2017). PESCO can be considered as strengthening the European pillar within the EU- NATO alliance. This affiliation consists of peace and security, military mobility, counter-terrorism and so on, (Council of the European Union, 2018). However, the US foreign policy has been changed significantly after the Donald Trump administration, especially in the Middle East region. This reason supported the development of final security initiative of the EU which is PESCO. This changes also affect the NATO. The relationship with NATO and PESCO can be interpreted with two different aspects. First of all, with the evolution of PESCO, the EU can develop collective military capabilities within the EU borders. It can be considered as a guarantee for the EU security and minimize security dependency to NATO. Secondly, when we consider PESCO from the NATO point of view, NATO can also take support from PESCO as additional defense cooperation in the future. For this reason, the formation of the PESCO is a win-win situation. There is a considerable harmony among them.

2.5. Evolution of PESCO and The European Union Global Strategy

After the Lisbon treaty came into force and the CSDP created under this treaty, the signals generated on the need for further development on security and defense, (Mills, 2017). The Lisbon Treaty extended the responsibilities of the CFSP by creating the CSDP and European External Action Service. Following these revisions, there were some developments by regarding the extended duties on CFSP.

The first step to move security and defense was the EUGS for foreign and security policy which was published by Federica Mogherini who is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President in June 2016, (Mills, 2017). It aims a stronger Europe on security and defense matters, (Parliament, 2017).

EUGS offers series of initiatives on EU defense: The Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) for CSDP military operations, (Fiott, Missiroli, & Tardy, 2017). Within the EUGS, five priorities defined:

1. The Security of the Union
2. State and Societal Resilience
3. An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crisis
4. Cooperative Regional Order
5. Global Governance for 21st Century, (Mogherini, 2016).

To take as a reference on the priority of the EUGS which is the security of the union supported the emergence and the development of the PESCO as a political framework that aims to help EU countries to enhance their military capabilities collectively and increase their ability to expand them, (Besch, 2017). PESCO is the operationalization of the EUGS for Foreign and Security Policy. Federica Mogherini who is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and also the Vice-President of the European Commission indicates the importance of the EUGS in following words;

“The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. Yet, our citizens and the world need a strong European Union like never before. Our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure... This is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a Strategy. We need a shared vision, and common action... None of our countries has the strength nor the resources to address these threats and seize the opportunities of our time alone... This is exactly the aim of the Global Strategy for European Foreign and Security Policy...”(Mogherini, 2016).

As a second step, November 2016 proposal on an implementation plan for CSDP discussed in the Council of the EU and it adopted by EU member states. The leaders of these member states had approved this implementation plan in European Council Summit in 2016.

The evolution of PESCO developed in parallel with the NATO. European Defense Action (EDA) is a plan that aimed to increase cooperation between NATO and the EU on security and defense matters, (Mills, 2017). EDA is an intergovernmental agency of the Council of the European Union. Besides Denmark, all of the EU Member States participated in EDA.²³ Council of the EU practiced the EUGS in the area of security and defense in the November 2016. Member States of the Union invited Federica Mogherini as HR/VP and as a head of the EDA to present proposals on CARD.²⁴ The main aim of the CARD is “to develop, on a voluntary basis, a more structured way to deliver identified capabilities based on greater transparency, political visibility, and commitment from the Member States.”²⁵ Each of these developments is the key pillars of the PESCO.

The EU mostly represents soft power related issues from the beginning such as; promote and protect democracy, the rule of law, protection for human rights, however, this cannot last forever. An integrated defense capacity is necessary for some level. That is why there is NATO as a collective defense organization.

Jean Claude Juncker who is the president of the European Commission (Comission, 2017) stated that without some integrated defense capacities could not be successful in the long run even it has the most substantial soft powers. In the following words, he apparently defined that an integrated defense capacity must exist.

“We need to work on a stronger Europe when it comes to security and defense matters. Yes, Europe is chiefly a ‘soft power.’ But even the strongest soft powers cannot make do in the long run without at least some integrated defense capacities. The Treaty of Lisbon provides for the possibility that those Member States who wish to pool their defense capabilities in the form of permanent structured cooperation. More cooperation in defense procurement is the call of the day, and if only for fiscal reasons.”²⁶

²³ <https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/who-we-are/member-states>

²⁴ [https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-\(card\)](https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card))

²⁵ [https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-\(card\)](https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card))

²⁶ European Commission, President Jean-Claude Juncker, Political Guidelines, 15 July 2014

This shows us, the Commission as a supranational body of the EU supports the evolution of the PESCO as integrated defense cooperation. The following part will give a theoretical framework which will cover Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and it will discuss that the emergence of the PESCO as a spill-over effect or is it a convergence of material security interests?

As it can be understood from this point of view, EUGS contains a set of common goals and actions and promotion of the shared interests among member countries especially on the external actions. A shared vision and common action are the key points of the EUGS and to perform these two key features is possible by the implementation of the PESCO. Beside to be binding for the members, PESCO has also adopted a shared vision and collective action as a principle. This also makes PESCO a different CFSP practices. The main ambition of EUGS is to create more efficient defence capacities within the Union and to build an autonomous European Defense Union (EDU).

2.6. An Analysis of the Official Documents: Statements from the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and the European External Action Service

“Today, we can research together the technologies of tomorrow in the field of defence and develop together our defence capabilities. We can buy together, to ensure that we have all the capabilities we need and also spend efficiently. We can act together on operations to manage and prevent crises, to strengthen our partners, to make our citizens more secure. This is the European Union of security and defence that we have started to set up.”

*High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini,
December 2017²⁷*

Under the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, the EU’s main aim is to create more secure Europe both for its borders and citizens. This is also why, the main motivations for the Global Strategy and its operationalization with the adoption of the PESCO could be uncovered by looking at the official statements of the highest-ranking EU officials in this policy

²⁷ Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, 2018

area. To assess the EU's main motivations, I have examined the official statements of the EU High Representative and the European Commission Vice President Federica Mogherini. This analysis revealed three essential points regarding both the emergence and the evolution of the PESCO: PESCO is developed to increase the level of global presence of the EU on security matters, to create a convergence of material security interests and understand the member states preferences related with PESCO and common defense commitments.

In 2016, High Representative/ European Commission Vice-President Federica Mogherini declared an implementation plan for the security and defense policy. This plan offers a roadmap and indicates several strategic priorities which are put together as a Global Strategy for overall security and defense of the EU, replacing the 2003 European Strategy Document.

Taking a collective action is necessary under the three strategic priorities which contain responding to external conflicts, building a collective capacity among partners and protecting the EU and its citizens. When we consider the emergence and the evolution of the PESCO as defense cooperation, it is possible to see that the planned arrangements are designed to meet these three priorities. PESCO helps the Union for the development of their defense capabilities with binding commitments and aims to increase the efficiency of the security and defense policy.

The official statements of the High Representative Mogherini are productive, current and explicit to understand PESCO and related security and defense developments. Since the primary aim of this research is to find an answer to "What motivates PESCO? Is it spillover from other policies or is it an example of the convergence of material security interests? This analysis of the Official statements would enable me to answer these questions. In addition, while I was investigating the statements of the Mogherini, I have noticed that PESCO is more going beyond this framework. It is not only the example of the convergence of material security interests, but it is also the most crucial step towards the development of common foreign and security policy due to its binding characteristics. It demonstrated a willingness on behalf of the EU members that the participation of 25 of the 27+1-member states under this binding nature to commit to their common defense capabilities.

In Mogherini's official statements, several common points are visible about PESCO which discourse analysis reveals and empirically demonstrates. Qualitative method is an empirical method that is extensively used in social sciences and other relevant disciplines with discourse

analysis used as one of the primary data collection types in qualitative methods. In line with this method, data collection for this research contained three stages: Filtration of the statements, identification of the keywords, enumeration of the keywords.

Filtration of the Statements: Federica Mogherini as High Representative/ European Commission Vice-President has multiple statements on security, defense and foreign policy matters. For this reason, the first step was to filter the PESCO related statements among these numerous statements and documents. When this was completed, it turned out that there were almost 60 documents related with PESCO between the year of 2017 and March 2018. These records do not only contain the official reports of Mogherini, but also include PESCO factsheets and newsletters. These four months are critical for the development of the PESCO because it highlighted the fundamental structure of the cooperation and showed us its future. In this process, we can find several definitive statements that explain the key features, legal basis, aims, steps of the PESCO and projects and their implementations.

Identification of the Keywords: After filtering the statements related to PESCO, I specify seven different keywords. These words refer to the common points of the statements, and they support the three main arguments. By looking at their word count, the arguments will be supported.

While I was designating the keywords, I have read all the statements, and I determined 20 words which were mentioned several times as you can see in the *Table 8*. After, I choose seven of them due to their total usage count. Besides this reason, each of the keywords represents the emergence and evolution period of the PESCO. The word “security” is mentioned frequently. This is very natural to come across with this word in the statements of Mogherini. Her main focus point is the “Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU”. For this reason, she mentioned the name of the policy couple of times in a statement and the word count of the “security” is extortionate. Due to the fact that, the word “security” will not be used in the “*Total Usage*” table.

In addition, I prefer to choose “military capabilities” and “common work” words. Eventhough these two keywords did not mention as much as others, they have critical place in the analysis part. The main aim of the PESCO is to develop collective military defense capabilities and make it as common.²⁸

²⁸ Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, 2018, Federica Mogherini’s Statement

KEYWORDS	COUNT
COOPERATION	124
EUROPEAN DEFENSE	68
MILITARY CAPABILITIES	6
MISSIONS	54
OPERATIONS	64
PARTNER/PARTNERSHIP	86
COMMON WORK	15
GLOBAL STRATEGY	26
THREATS	31
SECURITY	261
RESPONSIBILITY	22
REST OF THE WORD	2
BINDING	10
TRAINING	34
INTERVENTION	5
DEFENSE INDUSTRY	1
AGREEMENT	13
COMMITMENTS	27
UNITY	14

Table 8: Keywords

KEYWORDS	COUNT
COOPERATION	124
EUROPEAN DEFENSE	68
MILITARY CAPABILITIES	6
MISSIONS	54
OPERATIONS	64
PARTNER/PARTNERSHIP	86
COMMON WORK	15

Table 9: Main Keywords for the Analysis

Each of the words offers us an implication about the future of the security and defense of the EU under the roof of PESCO.

PESCO itself is defense cooperation that presents both military and non-military collaboration among the EU member state. At the project level, it also creates collaboration with non-EU members too. For this reason, it is crucial to count the word “cooperation.”

Statement 1: ... is the outcome of good teamwork that was done, high ambition on the common commitments that will now need to translate into concrete projects of cooperation, but also of an inclusive process, because the high number of Member States that have joined in this step...

As it can be seen in *Statement 1*, Mogherini puts an emphasis on project-based cooperation characteristics of PESCO, and by using the word “teamwork”, she highlights the solidarity among member states who decided to join PESCO.

On the other hand, “European Defense” is another important word in this analysis. The main aim of the PESCO is related to the increase of collective European Defense and military mobility (*Statement 3*). This aim also paves the way for the greater military cooperation between the EU member state and also cooperation between NATO and the EU, (Council, 2018). Also, as it like in *Statement 2*, she highlights the public support on European Defence and Security policy.

This is an important indicator on the development of the PESCO and implementations of PESCO projects.

Statement 2: *...EU citizens favour a common European Defence and Security policy...*²⁹

Statement 3: *...this is a historic achievement for the European defence, but it is not only a day for celebration. It is the beginning of a journey on which we will embark together. This is the beginning of a new story, and not the closing of a page. This will open the way for the European defence, the European Union of defence and security...*³⁰

“Military capabilities” is the key for the PESCO, because one of the aims is to increase the collective military capabilities of the member states. The aim of “increasing military capabilities” can be explained with the word “cooperation,” however "cooperation" is not only referring military collaboration in the statements. For this reason, I also prefer to choose "military capabilities." Several numbers of statements highlight the military capabilities and PESCO relationship and clarify the development of joint military capabilities among member states like exist in Statement 4 and 5.

Statement 4: *...This is based on more binding commitments between Member States, to jointly develop and deploy military capabilities...*³¹

Statement 5: *...I will present a progress report on all the different fields that were decided last December by the European Council from working together on developing military capabilities, including some incentives - from the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to other means, the use of the Battlegroups...*³²

²⁹ Bruxelles
13/12/2017 - 23:08
HR/VP speeches

³⁰ Bruxelles
13/11/2017 - 21:35
Remarks

³¹ Bruxelles
18/05/2017 - 22:27
Remarks

³² Bruxelles
06/03/2017 - 10:16
Remarks

Moreover, the word count of the “operations” and “missions” can give fertile information for the analysis. These two terms are the security terms that contains practices of the theory of security. In other words, conducting operations and missions could be seen as the operationalization of the security policies and the EU ongoing operations such as in Africa region. The linkage between these operations and PESCO is explaining in the statements that is listed below;

Statement 6: *...One is the example of Mali and the Sahel. I was there 2 weeks ago, visiting our 2 missions and operations – a civilian and a military one –, and our delegation...*³³

Statement 7: *...we are not talking about creating a European Union army: all 25 Member States that are launching the permanent structured cooperation [PESCO] are going to continue to keep their national forces. And, they are going to continue to use their capabilities, either in European Union missions and Operations...*³⁴

Statement 8: *...These projects span from a common military training, to new technologies for protecting our critical infrastructures, to providing medical support to our operations...*³⁵

Finally, “Partnership” and “Common work” are the keywords that frequently mentioned in the official statements. These two words are significant in this analysis regarding taking a collective action of the states. As it stated in *Statement 9*, the word “partnership” also refers non-EU member states. In this point, a new discussion can be examined which is the role of non-EU members and PESCO relationship. By regarding this, as one of the long-standing candidate countries, the

³³ Bruxelles
21/06/2017 - 23:46
HR/VP speeches

³⁴ Bruxelles
12/12/2017 - 23:24
Remarks

³⁵ Strasbourg
12/12/2017 - 19:51
HR/VP speeches

position of Turkey will be discussed in the following chapter. Also, as it can be understood from the *Statement 10*, the PESCO as its formation is a common work practice among engaged states.

Statement 9: ...*We see some Member States investing a lot in this work, together with all the European Union institutions. We need more from all in order to sustain this work in partnership with our African friends, in partnership with the Libyan authorities and I am sure that this will bring even more results...*³⁶

Statement 10: ...*This is the beginning of a common work; 23 Member States engaging both on capabilities and on operational steps is something big...*³⁷

Enumeration of the Keywords: There were 60 documents among Federica Mogherini’s official statements when it filtered with the word “PESCO.” These documents contain the direct official statements of the Mogherini, factsheets, and European External Action Service’s news about the PESCO. There are 33 direct official statements between November 2017 and March 2018. Each of the keywords was counted in each document. The numeric data of the keyword count was merged, and Total Usage Table was created.

³⁶ Bruxelles

22/06/2017 - 15:27

Remarks

³⁷ Bruxelles

13/11/2017 - 13:42

Remarks

2.7. Findings

This part will summarize the findings related to the research question and support the arguments with the discourse analysis from the Federica Mogherini's statements. In Table 1, there are total usages of the keywords.




Table 10: Total Usage of the Related Keywords from Federica Mogherini's Statements³⁸

First, the total usage of the word “cooperation” is 124 over 33 documents. When we compare with the other keywords, this is the word that mentioned most frequently. Cooperation is the crucial point for the evolution of the PESCO. According to Neo-realism, the cooperation is not

³⁸ [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/search/site/en/?f\[0\]=bundle%3Aeeas_press&f\[1\]=im_field_eas_homepage%3A38&f\[2\]=sm_field_eas_press_category%3Ahrvp](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/search/site/en/?f[0]=bundle%3Aeeas_press&f[1]=im_field_eas_homepage%3A38&f[2]=sm_field_eas_press_category%3Ahrvp)

possible due to the relative gain which contains the states' actions by regarding the balance of power. In relative gain concept, there is no other concern besides power balances. This concept limits the cooperation, (Waltz, 1979). States preferences on security matters have unique structure.

However, the changing nature of the political environment in world politics leads to make more collaboration in different fields. For the EU, collective defense seems to be one of them. Since the establishment of the EU, it is hard to take collective action on CFSP matters. With the establishment of the PESCO, the EU could have moved a step further on defense cooperation. Moreover, the idea of cooperation is stressed at almost all levels with Mogherini emphasizing cooperation in all of her statements. This begs the question as to why this as an explicit aim coming so much to the forefront. First, as a result of the changing of European Security Environment with the Russian-Ukrainian dispute, uncertainty in the Middle East region and Northern Africa, and rising of terrorism, the EU faces new security challenges. Terrorism has a direct impact on the current environment on the EU security, (Republique Francaise, 2017). The EU has a great responsibility to protect their citizens, (Marin, 2015). For this reason, it is natural to see an increase in cooperation on security matters. Second, Brexit- the coming withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, affected the developments on security and defense policies of the Union. The departure of the UK from the EU brings an intense change in the European Security environment, and also the EU have noticed that there is a weakness on security issues within the Union (Guerzoni, 2017). Malcolm Chalmers who is the Deputy Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute clearly stated that the departure of the UK from the Union will have considerable impacts on security and defense issues.

“...Brexit could make it difficult to maintain current levels of cross-border cooperation in combating terrorism and organized crime...”(Chalmers, 2016).

“...Brexit will have an impact on efforts to maintain a strong European defence and security industry. If the UK leaves the Single Market and the Customs Union at the end of the transition period, it could have a significant effect on the cross-border supply chains of defence and security companies...”(Chalmers, 2016).

Since PESCO is a crucial step for the strengthening of the security and defense policies, losing one of the most important security players, the UK, will be a major challenge as it can be understood from the direct statements of the Chalmers.

Finally, changing the US foreign policy profoundly affected due to the EU's defense arrangements due to the structural dependency on the US-led NATO. With the Trump Administration, there were several changes on foreign policy of the US such as, withdraw the US from Trans-Pacific Partnership, putting a travel ban towards different Muslim countries, revitalization of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), leaving the Paris Agreement on Climate.³⁹ All of these new arrangements on the US foreign policy affected the EU both politically and economically. PESCO will be balanced the EU-NATO relations. Besides this, it will create project-based cooperation between the EU and the NATO. These three reasons show us that the formation of the PESCO is a convergence of material security interests. In other words, it is the changing external security environment, the new security risks and the subsequent uncertainty that led to the emphasis on cooperation as an underlying motivation for PESCO. This fits with the neo realist logic precisely due to the very nature of the international system and security risks, threats leading to a foreign policy change in individual players, in this case, the European Union.

KEYWORDS	COUNT
PARTNER/PARTNERSHIP	86
OPERATIONS	64
MISSIONS	54
EUROPEAN DEFENSE	68

Table 11: Related Keyword Numbers

³⁹ <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/trumps-foreign-policy-moments>

Secondly, general perception from outside countries towards the EU is negative due to the Brexit. There is several news, comments on the political blogs related to “Will the EU collapse after the Brexit?”.^{40 41 42 43 44 45} Many of the news stated that the departure of the UK from the EU is the beginning and the member states of the Union will leave the EU one by one. However, in the statements of the Mogherini, there is a message that the EU will be stronger by making more cooperation especially on defence matters.

In 33 PESCO related statements, the word count for the term ‘partner/partnership’ is 86. This word has the second rank after the word cooperation regarding the count. This shows that enhancing partner/partnership emphasis is important for the continuity of the Union. Both “cooperation” and “partner/partnership” referred similar meanings and showed us that the basis of the PESCO is about making cooperation possible among member states as a partner. It is possible to argue that the expectation is that PESCO will also overthrow the negative perception about the EU inability to defend itself by increasing collective European defense capabilities, joint military, and humanitarian missions or operations. In Table 11, one could easily see that the words “operation” and “mission” are mentioned in a considerable amount. Making peacekeeping operations in different continents under the CSDP helps the EU to put a practice of their main founding aim which is a promotion of democracy and transmission of the peace towards neighboring countries. In this way, the EU member states can protect their borders from an external threat by trying to keep stabilize their neighboring regions. For example, the EU military operation on Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 was the very first step for the development of the European Security and Defense Policy.

⁴⁰ <https://www.quora.com/Will-the-EU-collapse-as-a-result-of-Brexit>

⁴¹ <https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/940578/brexit-latest-european-union-collapse-soviet-union>

⁴² <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/942653/Brexit-news-latest-briefings-UK-EU-collapse-Commonwealth-trade-deal-update-video>

⁴³ <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/940170/brexit-news-european-union-collapse-soviet-union-academic>

⁴⁴ <http://www.businessinsider.com/george-soros-president-trump-eu-collapse-2018-5>

⁴⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/06/the-germans-are-making-contingency-plans-for-the-collapse-of-europe-lets-hope-we-are-too>

The operation on Congo was also called as Operation Artemis and it was the first rapid response practice of the Union. The main aim is to provide humanitarian assistance for the people in the region and also to create more security.⁴⁶

Restoring of the order and the peace in the region was the main reason for the operation and it was the material step for the development of the CFSP. This kind of operations can be counted as a device for the increasing the global presence of the EU in the world. Also, increasing collective defense capabilities and partnership notion among the EU member states will increase the global presence of the EU regarding security and defense matters. PESCO will be a tool for enhancing the global presence of the EU.

Third, the word “common work” mentioned 15 times by Mogherini in her official statements as seen in Table 1. However, this term is not emphasized as much as the word ‘cooperation’ or ‘partner/partnership’ as seen in the quantitative analysis. However, one could argue that all these terms have similar meanings. “Common Work” indicates that the application of the member states preferences would have been sufficient to explain PESCO’s adoption. The 25-member states preferred to be a part of a common work which has binding commitments.

As it can be understood from these three reasons which were highlighted from the Mogherini’s statements, the PESCO emerged as a result of the convergence of material security interests. The changing nature of the political environment in world politics leads to more cooperation in different fields, and security is one of them for the EU. Rising of terrorism, economic volatility and energy insecurity push the emergence of the PESCO. Brexit is another reason that creates a need for material security interest within the Union due to the reasons which are discussed above. Finally, common work emphasis of Mogherini supports the argument of increasing convergence of material security interest of the Union.

It must be recognized that the PESCO is a very recent development and its future is still undecided. It seems like it will move further with the project-based practices. There was a distribution of roles among member states who agreed on PESCO commitments, each of these member states will unilaterally operate on its own preferences. PESCO projects contain several military matters from Military Mobility to Cyber Threats and Maritime Surveillance. The primary

⁴⁶ <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rd-congo/>

desire of these projects is to trigger further collaboration among members and optimizing the effectiveness and the existing capabilities under the framework of common work. Also, a third country can also be a part of this common work in project level, and they can actively affiliate with the CSDP operations and missions. Cooperation with NATO is one of the examples of this principle. In this level, Turkey can play a role in the development of the PESCO projects under the common work. They can adopt the commitments of the related projects in the accession process. By regarding this, the following chapter will discuss Turkey's position on the EU security arrangements and discusses that Will Turkey have a role on PESCO?

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY'S POSITION ON EU SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

3.1. Turkey's Position on the EU Security Arrangements: The Role of Turkey on PESCO

Security notion is closely linked with self-defense under three components which are protecting the survival of the population, ensuring the territorial integrity, and create a safeguard towards existing identities of the state which contains political, economic, cultural, and social attributes.⁴⁷ In the globalized world, the threat perception was changed eventually. Currently, there are new threats due to the changing nature of the security with the improvement of technology. The impact of technology on the security field showed itself especially during and after the Cold War with the weapons of mass destructions which contains: Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons, and Biological Weapons. By using one of these weapons, a state can destroy the extensive amount of living space in a brief period. Besides this, there are large-scale violent conflicts in the international system, ongoing territorial disputes among neighborhood countries, cyber threats towards national intelligence and several multi-national companies which played an essential role on the state economy, rising of terrorism all over the world, uncertainties in the Middle East region and so on. As it can be understood from these different types of threats, collective action must be necessary to a certain extent. For this reason, the EU desires to build a common task which will contain more binding commitments to expand defense capabilities and interactive projects under a multinational formation. There was not a successful performance since the beginning of the standard foreign and security policies within the EU due to the priority of the member states interests. It is hard to take a supranational decision on the security matters within

⁴⁷ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i-turkey-s-security-perspective-historical-and-conceptual-background-turkey-s-contributions.en.mfa>

the Union. This is the main reason for the failure of CFSP initiatives. PESCO was the recent attempt on collective security in the EU. The most important point about the EU security is it is essential for its neighboring countries too. The EU security has got a close relationship with Turkey, too. Border control, protecting their citizens and promoting more security is important for both Turkey and the EU. By regarding this, the chapter focuses on Turkey's position on the EU security arrangements and discusses that "Will Turkey have a role on PESCO?"

Increasing material security interests of the Union encourages the formation of PESCO as a new defense organization. Beyond any doubt, while the EU is shaping its foreign and security policies, it considers the current situations with the Turkey which is the long-standing candidate of the EU since 1999 Helsinki Summit. Recently, there is a new perception about Turkey's full membership process to the EU. There is an ongoing debate about the "Will Turkey be a Strategic partner or full member to EU?". Also, it is crucial to point out the role of Turkey's accession to EU under the framework of foreign policy dimension. There is a long-termed accession negotiation between Turkey and the EU. That is why it is possible to create a connection between CFSP of the EU and Turkey and, this recent development within EU which is PESCO will probably affect the Turkey and EU relations in the future.

The idea of global governance which was the aim of Jean Monnet at the beginning of the EU adventure, following this, the purpose of economic welfare, protecting and promoting democracy and finally security concerns are the fundamental pillars of the EU since the beginning. And these are the most crucial points for the candidate countries to the EU full membership processes. However, the situation between Turkey and the EU gained a different aspect as it aforementioned: Turkey as a strategic partner for the Union or full member.

The recent debates about Turkey on "strategic partnership" is the sharp band on the Turkey and the EU relationship. The relations between them are strong and sustainable and based on a "win-win" strategy, (Republic Of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, 2014). As a longstanding candidate, Turkey's full accession to the EU is far away from near future due to the vetoed chapters of the Acquis Communautaire as it can be understood from the Table 12.

Since 1993, If a country desires to be a full member of the EU, it must fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria. These criteria cover political, economic and Legislative criteria, (Öniş, 2000). When we consider each of them one by one, there is all problematic regarding Turkey's

membership. In 1959, Turkey applied for the association agreement. In those days, the membership criteria were not much complicated. Turkey considered as one of the European countries since it is a founding member of the Council of Europe and member of the NATO and Turkey is democratic because it has a multi-party system. The existence of representative democracy no longer enough as a qualification for full membership to the EU, (Öniş, 2000). When we consider the membership criteria in the current context, it is beyond these considerations.

The Political criteria which contain democracy, the rule of law, respect and protection for minorities. The level of democratic development, compliance with the rule of law and willingness of the governments, are the most crucial internal scope conditions on the EU's enlargement strategy, (Müftüler-Baç, 2015). When we look at the economic criteria, there is a need for a functioning market economy. Turkey's economy is growing since the beginning of the 2000's. However, when we compare the Turkish economy with the EU, there are some problematic points. For example; currency, the Euro, and Lira do not fit with each other so on. Finally, the legislative alignment which was the Acquis Communautaire. Thirty-five chapters must be fulfilled. However, currently, more than ten chapters were vetoed by regarding Cyprus issue and Turkey's failure to implement the Ankara Protocol. EU plays a constructive role on Turkey with regard to its fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria. As it can be seen that, there are several problems with fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria for Turkey. However, the issues are not restricted with these. There are several obstacles that Turkey faced with on full-membership path: identity, culture, democracy, population, geographical position (Near the Middle East Region) is some of the obstacles. As a result of all of these, Turkey and the EU relations is evolved in the line of strategic partnership.

Considering the relationship between Turkey and the EU by regarding security is another complicated issue. The Chapter 31 which is the Foreign Security and Defense policy is one of the vetoed chapters due to the tension Cyprus. After accession negotiations started in December 2004, only one chapter was closed which was Science and Research. In 2006, the ongoing dispute regarding Cyprus issue led to freezing negotiations on eight chapters from the Acquis. Until a possible resolution is found no chapters among these eight of them would be closed. The road to full membership of Turkey can be considered as an immense highway. By regarding this situation, strategic partnership on specific matters can be more beneficial for both parties.

Cooperation on foreign and security policy delivered several assets for both the EU and Turkey and is crucial to help both handles the problems in their reciprocal neighborhood, (Grabbe & Ülgen, 2010). Due to the veto on the Chapter 31, there is no official development and negotiation between Turkey and the EU on security matters.

VETOED CHAPTERS OF THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE

Chapter 1	Free Movement of Goods
Chapter 2	Freedom of Movement for Workers
Chapter 3	Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services
Chapter 9	Financial Services
Chapter 11	Agriculture and Rural Development
Chapter 13	Fisheries
Chapter 14	Transport Policy
Chapter 15	Energy
Chapter 23	Judiciary and Fundamental Rights
Chapter 24	Justice, Freedom and Security
Chapter 26	Education and Culture
Chapter 29	Customs Union
Chapter 30	External Relations
Chapter 31	Foreign Security and Defense Policy

Table 12: Vetoed Chapters of the Acquis Communautaire

Although Turkey has got some obstacles and vetoed chapters, it has high geopolitical significance and geographic location. These are essential for the EU by regarding political and economic concerns, also for security matters. From the security point of view, PESCO is project-based cooperation. Turkey can be involved in some of the projects in the future. This partnership can be effective for both sides regarding increasing security of the region and citizens for both sides. If Turkey will be a part of the PESCO in project-based, this situation can strengthen

European Defense. According to the data of the Global Firepower (GFP) Index, Turkey's rank is out front from almost all of the EU member states in terms of annual GFP Index. The GFP offers us detailed numeric data about the country's military powers. There are eight related headings in the Index. These are Manpower, Airpower, Army Strength, Navy Strength, Natural Resources, Logistics, Finance, and Geography. In Table 13, there are several information about Turkey and the EU member states by regarding their military expenditure and their power index.

First, the annual GFP shows that Turkey's ranking is in the third line in pursuit of France and the UK. The annual GFP is indicated based on 136 countries. Among the EU member states; Luxembourg and Malta are not on this list as a result of the unmet conditions and minimums.⁴⁸ After the Brexit, Turkey becomes the second country after France concerning power index rate. The average of the member states is 52,48 regarding annual GFP rate. Turkey's rate is above the average by the landslide.

Secondly, the PwrIndx rate represents the country's military strengths very similar to the annual GFP. 0.0000 rate means that to be perfect. The USA locates at the top of the list with the rate of 0.0818.⁴⁹ Turkey has 0.2216, and again it placed in the third line after France and the UK.

Thirdly, when we compare the defense budget of the EU member states, The UK has the most extensive defense budget among the member states with \$50.000.000.000. At this point, we can again highlight the departure of the UK has an adverse effect on the total EU defense. Turkey has got \$10.200.000.000 defense budget which means that it is much more than Sweden, the Netherland, Denmark and so on.

As a result of these data, If Turkey will become a part of the PESCO, European Defense can be strengthened with the participation of Turkey. As a result of these data, If Turkey will become a part of the PESCO, European Defense can be strengthened with the participation of Turkey.

⁴⁸ <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-european-union.asp>

⁴⁹ https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=united-states-of-america

Country	Annual GFP out of 136 Countries	PwrIndx (0.0000 being perfect)	Defense Budget
<i>Turkey</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>0.2216</i>	<i>\$10.200.000.000</i>
France	5	0.1869	\$40.000.000.000
United Kingdom	6	0.1917	\$50.000.000.000
Germany	10	0.2461	\$45.200.000.000
Italy	11	0.2565	\$37.700.000.000
Spain	19	0.4079	\$11.600.000.000
Poland	22	0.4276	\$9.360.000.000
Greece	28	0.5255	\$6.540.000.000
Czech Republic	30	0.5969	\$2.596.470.000
Sweden	31	0.6071	\$6.215.000.000
The Netherlands	38	0.7113	\$9.840.000.000
Romania	40	0.7205	\$2.190.000.000
Denmark	54	0.9084	\$4.440.000.000
Hungary	57	0.9153	\$1.040.000.000
Finland	59	0.9687	\$3.660.000.000
Bulgaria	60	0.9839	\$700.000.000
Austria	61	0.9953	\$320.000.000
Slovakia	62	0.9998	\$1.025.000.000
Portugal	63	1.0035	\$3.800.000.000
Belgium	68	1.0885	\$5.085.000.000
Croatia	72	1.2108	\$958.000.000
Slovenia	92	1.8581	\$790.000.000
Lithuania	95	1.9165	\$430.000.000
Latvia	105	2.3063	\$280.000.000
Estonia	108	2.4078	\$335.000.000
Ireland	116	2.6049	\$1.165.093.600

Table 13: Global Firepower Index of Turkey and The EU Member States⁵⁰

⁵⁰ <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-european-union.asp>

Discussing the security matters necessitate that creation of a theoretical framework. There are diverse theoretical interpretations on security in international relations that helps us to understand the policies of the state on security. For example, Classical Realists argues that there are primary actors in international relations and these actors have competed for their protection within the structure which was anarchy, (Parent & Baron, 2011). Due to the anarchic structure of world politics, security dilemma must be considered as a consequence of anarchy.

Security Dilemma in the IR theory refers a situation that when a state increases its security, such as; by increasing its military strength, this situation can be a reason for the other states' ability to improve their military capabilities, (Schmah, 2012). Besides this classical definition of the security dilemma, it came to our attention when a state feels insecure. While a country is increasing its capabilities, which is defined as military power, an opponent state can think that you are planning to attack them. This situation makes the state which increases its capabilities towards opponent state a threat. To prevent the first strike attempt, a state can choose to attack towards its opponents. Although there was no apparent threat, a state can perceive this as a threat of attack. Deterrence can explain this situation. Due to the geographical proximity of Turkey and the EU, this type of situation can quickly occur.

Also, security dilemma can be explained by offense-defense differentiation, (Glaser, 1997). This means that security of a state can be aimed at offensive or defensive. For example, if a country increases their armaments of defense, this decrease the security dilemma within that country. However, in contrast, a state rises its armaments offensive, in this state, the level of security dilemma increases too. Charles Glaser stated that, according to structural realists who are also called as neo-realists, there is a stabile insecurity situation and there is war threat. These structural realists have got two different interpretations which are the offensive structural realism and defensive structural realism.

According to Offensive Structural Realist such as John Mearsheimer and also Hans Morgenthau as a classical realist, they believed that the threat of war is stable and military ability must be maximized, (Glaser, 1997). This situation basically, makes security dilemma as a primary source of conflict. Also, states must act in parallel with the worst-case assumption, because in an anarchical international system which can be defined as an absence of a central authority or the absence of a world government states are offensive and wilder. Within this structure, states must

take care of their security. Besides, for this reason, they cannot share their interests with other countries, benefits cannot be universal, (Morgenthau, 1948).

Primary goal of the states is to maximize their security. In contrast to Offensive Structural Realists, the Defensive Structural Realists believe that rules are not wild, and a threat was always changeable. Today, when we look at the threat perceptions, we can find rising of the terrorism, economic volatility, climate change, energy insecurity and so on. In other words, a threat is a perception, that is why it can show an alteration. Also, to understand the security dilemma and its position, it is essential to highlight the emergence of the security logic. John Ikenberry stated both economic logic and the security logic. Right after the end of the World War 2 in 1945, economic logic was established with the Bretton Woods System. This logic brought us multilateralism. In addition to economic logic, with the Cold War, the security logic was created. Due to the fact that, with the emergence of the security logic, the realism's self-help understanding is extended with the self-security. When we look at the US, it combined both of these logics, and it became a hegemon power which means the single-handedly dominate the arrangements in international politics and economy.⁵¹

The starting point of the security dilemma is the anarchic structure in world politics. As neo-realists stated that, in the international system, we could not change anarchy, the thing that we have changed is the type of the distribution of power such as the multi-polar to bipolar or to unipolar. For example, according to the idea of some scholars, the bipolar structure was the best way to perform the balance of power. As long as, an anarchic structure is not changed, the security dilemma will continue to exist. Because, in the anarchical system states are skeptic and system forces to countries to self-help, the military maximization is a result of this self-help situation. However, on the other hand, some scholars stated that the security dilemma is redundant because, the conflict occurs while states were trying to maximize their powers rather than security, but there is no escape from this dilemma. According to the Parent and Rosato, building capability cannot guarantee safety but can ensure insecurity, (Pareto&Rosato, 2015).

⁵¹ <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2010-11-01/rational-theory-international-relations-logic-competition-and>

The stable insecurity situation for states and maximization of the military capabilities to feel more secure are the simultaneous actions that states apply. The same position is valid for the EU and Turkey too. PESCO as a newly established defense cooperation arrangement within 25 EU member states can be sufficient for the non-EU member states such as Turkey.

Turkey's position from the perspective of the EU is very critical. Due to the changes in the notion of threat that perceived by states, the balance between globalization and security norm has degenerated. In other words, the realist paradigm assumptions which is facilitating cooperation on security matters is not possible due to the fear of cheating and relative gains (Grieco, 1988) is changed. If there is a threat which is common for a group of states, then collective security could be possible.

The NATO is the central tangible practices for this situation. The NATO was established towards Soviet threat during the Cold War period. In terms of the EU perspective, the EU member states can share common threats. In order to challenge the new common security threats, there was a need for the collective security within the Union. Within this context, it will be natural to see Turkey as an external part of the PESCO, because of Turkey's position on security matters within the region where between Europe, Asia and the Middle East can be an indicator. When we examine the Turkey's position on NATO, Turkey is a favorable partner for the US especially on military matters. Due to the fact that, the security policies of Turkey can be highly useful for the EU. Also, Turkey and the EU has got common security policy practices which are fighting against terrorism, especially towards the Islamic State. Moreover, NATO and PESCO had a closer relationship. Since the declaration of the PESCO, there is high coordination between two of them. We cannot think them as a separate security organization. Especially Central and Eastern European countries are not tending to be a part of a collective security pack besides NATO, because these countries were the ex-Soviet Countries.

When we look at Turkey's security policies, it shapes in line with both idealism and realism. This dilemma comes from Turkey's geographical location within its region. It is not possible to limit Turkey's foreign and security policies under a single view. Within a broader context of regional and global turmoil, Turkey has to develop security policies towards Russia, Iran or Syria and so on and it must keep balance while designating its foreign and security systems.

The moral actions of Turkey in Myanmar in 2017 can show us the idealist face of Turkey on security matters. This action of Turkey contained a considerable amount of food, clothes, and medicine under humanitarian aid to the Rohingya Muslims who live in Northwestern Myanmar. This improvement in Myanmar makes Turkey a good supporter in the international security field.

In contrast to the humanitarian aid to Myanmar, the foreign and security policies of Turkey also have a realistic characteristic. The Euphrates Shield Operation in August 2016 and Operation Olive Branch in January 2018 were the recent practices of Turkey's security policies under a realist framework. Operation Olive Branch is an offensive attack towards the Kurdish-led Democratic Union Party in Syria (PYD), and its military wing People's Protection Units (YPG).

The essential reason for this operation is Turkey's ongoing fight with PKK and Operation Olive Branch can be counted as another stage of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in the southeastern part of Turkey with the claim of keeping territorial integrity. Also, Turkey showed its military capability to the great powers besides being a member of NATO by regarding its offensive characteristics of this operation. This operation did not much take an endorsement in outside of Turkey including the EU. In parallel with this, there is no full expression about Turkey and the EU security cooperation. The accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU have always related with the political and economic lines. Under political criteria of the EU, Turkey must meet democracy, the rule of law and so on. However, nowadays, the emphasis on security concerns are one step ahead of the democratic interests of the states, and the policies are now generally shaped in this context. Currently, Turkey committed 8 different UN peacekeeping operations with 148 personnel, 85 of them are military personnel.⁵² In recent years, it is possible to see Turkey's participation to some of the peacekeeping operations of the NATO and the EU besides the UN peacekeeping operations that Turkey participated in. Table 14 contains related operations that the EU was held. Both EUFOR Althea and EULEX Kosovo are the operations that Turkey participated in certain extent. Turkey provided some additional troops for the operations and gave support.

⁵² <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-s-approach-and-contributions-to-the-united-nations-peacekeeping-operations.en.mfa>

Operation	Countries	Year
European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) ⁵²	EUFOR has 600 troops from 22 countries, mostly from the countries of the EU. Also, there are additional troops from other countries such as Chile and Turkey.	2004- Present
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) ⁵³	Apart from EU members, third parties Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, Canada and the United States also take part	2008- Present

Table 14: Some of the Operations that takes Turkey's Support^{53 54}

Turkey's EU full membership process is walking a fine line. Turkish and the EU relations were revitalized in 2015 because of the refugee crises. Nonetheless, it seems like a just cooperation on a serious crisis that regarding EU and Turkey relations. Turkey has got many obstacles in the EU road and more than a decade it tries to overcome these obstacles. These are the obstacles that Turkey faced with on full-membership path: identity, culture, democracy, population, geographical position is some of the obstacles that Turkey faced with. Besides all of these obstacles, Turkey's possible membership can also bring crucial benefits to EU especially in military capability, and geostrategic position, (Demir, 2012). The balance between this dilemma, can be solved in terms of military capabilities with Turkey's participation to PESCO.

European security was reshaped after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. These changes have always been Turkey's detriment. In the Cold War structure, Turkey was considered as European due to its membership to NATO and Council of Europe. After the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Turkey was no longer admitted as European, (Müftüleri-Baç, 2000). Besides this, Democracy understanding of the EU moves beyond to the multi-party system. These two reasons were the adverse developments in terms of Turkey's accession to the EU.

⁵³ https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en

⁵⁴ Appendix C

This is also the answer to the “Why it is not possible to create PESCO, the EU, and Turkey triangle?”. The EU and Turkey’s current relationship gives us all of the answers.

Today, although there is a pessimistic accord between the EU and Turkey, both of them are interdependent one to another. The main reasons for this interdependence first and foremost economic ties among them. Cutting all relations and stopping the negotiation process irrevocably will be too costly for both sides. Cutting all of the diplomatic relations and negotiations between Turkey and The EU and the visa versa cannot bring a solution. Within this situation is to make a strategic partnership on specific matters containing security-related problems. PESCO is a brand-new development among the EU member states. The future of this joint security cooperation is uncertain. The previous initiatives that provide security and defense-related issues show us that there may not be a successful performance.

It is also essential in the sense that the EU points at a specific institutional direction that EU is moving towards inside the institution. This direction referred to as differentiated integration. Differentiated integration means that in practice, some member-states are choosing to integrate into particular policy areas, whereas some decide to be left out. It is a model in which EU is not treated as a monolithic entity where all policy areas apply to member-states. Instead, it shows EU policy as referring to some member-states and not others. Schengen, fiscal union and the eurozone were examples of differentiated integration. Another reason for this expectation about the future of the PESCO is this universal cooperation on security was another differentiated integration practice within the EU. 25 over 27+1 EU member states were approved to be a part of the PESCO. In the signing ceremony, 23-member states were signed the joint notification on the PESCO. A month after Portugal and Ireland declare their participation on PESCO. Still, it is continued to be a differentiated integration practice.

Rising of terrorism, uncertainties in the Middle East region, the appearance of hybrid threats which contains cyberwarfare and using of mass communication for propaganda. Hybrid threats can also be seen during the time of peace. Also, if it is necessary, to sum up, today’s international system, there are sets of crises related to the globalization, economy, and security matters. For this reason, everyday actions on security issues can be helpful for the decreasing the costs of the negative impacts of security problems at least at the global level. Turkey’s last operation on Afrin could not take relative support from the EU. In the latest progress report of

European Commission on Turkey stated that Turkey must adjust more intimately with the EU's declarations and decisions on common foreign and security policy for the upcoming years. This statement from the recent progress report shows us that Turkey's security implications are not matching with the Union's. Turkey's operation in Afrin has national concerns. Despite the fact that the actions of Turkey affect the region, it is not much expected to take support from the EU for the Afrin operation by regarding this reason.

Under the CSDP partnerships, a non-EU country can be a part of the EU CSDP missions or operations. Beyond any doubt, the participation of the non-EU countries to both civilian or military activities of the EU increase the capability, performance, and impact of these operations and the missions. Within this aspect, Turkey and the EU cooperation under PESCO can be more effective. As it was mentioned in the beginning due to the national interests and the differentiated integration, the future of PESCO is blurred. In contrast, by regarding the changing nature of the security matters in world politics pushed states to make more cooperation on several policy areas containing the security. In the Turkish case for the EU, security locates very critical point, and under the umbrella of strategic partnership, favorable outcomes for both Turkey and the EU can be procured.

CONCLUSION

At present, the EU plays a collimating role in both world politics and world economy. With the emergence of the PESCO, the security policy was strengthened within the Union due to the binding nature of the commitments. Taking a mutual decision on foreign and security matters is not easy attainment. This thesis argues that increasing material security interests of the Union, encourages the formation of the PESCO as a defense organization. The changing nature of the political environment in world politics leads to more cooperation on security matters. Rising of terrorism, economic volatility and energy insecurity push the emergence of the PESCO. Brexit is another reason that creates a need for material security interest within the Union because the departure of the UK from the EU means that the Union lost its one of the most powerful countries regarding defense capabilities. Finally, common work emphasis of Mogherini supports the argument of increasing convergence of material security interest of the Union. As it can be understood from these reasons, the emergence of PESCO is a natural consequence due to the changes in the security notion in the international system. PESCO has emerged as a response to this change as material security interests; it is not a spill-over from other policies.

There are two different points of view explain the motivations and emergence of PESCO, and there are several findings from the Federica Mogherini's Statements. **The first** one is the Liberal Intergovernmentalism as one of the Grand theories of the European Integration can explain the formation of the PESCO. PESCO as a recent common foreign and defense policy practices is a part of the European Integration process. To understand the formation of the PESCO, Liberal Intergovernmentalism must be examined. This theory creates the theoretical base of the PESCO. The main characteristics of the Liberal Intergovernmentalism are domestic and foreign intertwinement. There is no separation between domestic and foreign spheres, and domestic policy can affect the foreign policy of the state. PESCO is also focused on both domestic and foreign security with its project-based structure, and it offers cooperation that has binding commitments. The domestic and foreign linkage is explained with Putnam's two-level game in the Liberal Intergovernmentalism. When we look at the formation of the PESCO, it has a two-layered structure: The Council Level and the Project Level.

In the Council Level, all of the member states that engage in PESCO and its commitments are in charge of the policy directions and the decision-making process. In the Project Level, policy directions and decision-making are belonging to the country which adopted the related project. In the future, some of the non-EU members may be involved PESCO as project-based as it discussed in Chapter 3 with the role of Tukey as a candidate country. With this aspect, the project level can be similar to the international level of the two-level game. In addition to this, the agenda of the states are no longer limited with only high political issues which are the military matters and national security. There are also low political issues which contain social and human security or climate change. PESCO is a formation that covers both of these issues. For these two reasons, there is a linkage between PESCO and Liberal Intergovernmentalism.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a theory that looks at member states preferences while they were shaping their policies. Under the roof of the EU, there are 27+1-member states, and each of them has their preferences. These preferences can be domestic or foreign. For this reason, liberal intergovernmentalism is a theory that offers us an examination that contains both domestic level analysis and international level of analysis which is foreign. However, there is a gap between Mogherini's statements and the member states preferences. In the analysis part, Federica Mogherini's statements represent the EU, not the member states preferences. She frames the member states preferences and boundaries which member states formed. However, due to the time limitation, it is not possible to cover the all of the EU member states reactions towards the emergence and evolution of the PESCO or their attitudes for further cooperation on foreign and security matters. Because member states did not mention more cooperation, Mogherini puts an emphasis on more cooperation, collaboration and common work on behalf of the EU. For Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the most crucial point is states' preferences. The next step can be further research about the evolution of PESCO, and this research can contain the member states official statements about the PESCO. In this way, more prediction will be coming to our attention about the future of this newly emerge defense cooperation.

Secondly, it is possible to understand the formation of the PESCO by looking at the historical background of the EU security arrangements. Some critical turning points in world politics shaped the security policies of the Union.

First and foremost, the changed of the world order in the 1990's with the dissolution of the USSR turning over a new leaf for the EU. The Maastricht Treaty was the evidence for the significant development of the EU security. This treaty created CFSP as a second pillar and made security a policy.

Secondly, besides this domestic development, the world conjecture was changed eventually regarding security threats in the 1990s. Rising terrorism, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity were shaped in the late 1990s and 2000s. All of these developments entailed more cooperation on security matters within the Union. For example, the EU can put a practice of their main founding aim which is a promotion of democracy and transmission of the peace towards neighboring countries by making peacekeeping operations in different continents under the CSDP. In this way, the EU member states can protect their borders from an external threat by trying to keep stabilize their neighboring regions. Besides, the EU can gain international prestige and respectability from the non-EU countries.

Thirdly, CFSP was evolved as a response to the US hegemony in the international system. Since the NATO is the US-led defense cooperation, the EU needs its security cooperation to a certain extent. However, there is also high cooperation between the NATO and PESCO. Today we can examine with the more penetrating attitude towards a separate EU force by NATO. The 11th Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated in his' speech in 2004 that the EU as a security actor will always endure flourishing. In parallel with this, RRF took support from NATO simply because this force can serve towards a common security concern which is fighting against terrorism.

In addition, the recent debates about Turkey on "strategic partnership" is the sharp band on the Turkey and the EU relationship. The relations between them are strong and sustainable and based on a "win-win" strategy. In the light of this, PESCO as a newly established defense cooperation arrangement within 25 EU member states can be sufficient for the non-EU member states such as Turkey. Turkey's position from the perspective of the EU is very critical. Geographical location and geopolitical significance of Turkey is essential for the EU in terms of political relations, economic concerns, and security matters. PESCO is project-based cooperation. Turkey can be involved in some of the projects in the future.

This partnership can be productive for both sides regarding increasing security of the region and citizens for both sides. If Turkey will be a part of the PESCO in project-based, this situation can strengthen European Defense. According to the data of the GFP Index, Turkey's rank is out front from almost all of the EU member states regarding annual GFP Index.

Finally, there are several findings from the Mogherini's Statement. The official statements of the High Representative/Vice President Mogherini are productive, current and explicit to understand PESCO and related security and defense developments. Since the primary aim of this research is to find an answer to "What motivates PESCO? Is it spillover from other policies or is it an example of the convergence of material security interests? This analysis of the Official statements would enable me to answer these questions. In addition, while I was investigating the statements of the Mogherini, I have noticed that PESCO is more going beyond to this framework. It is not only the example of the convergence of material security interests, but it is also the most crucial step towards the development of common foreign and security policy due to its binding characteristics. It demonstrated a willingness on behalf of the EU members that the participation of 25 of the 27+1-member states under this binding nature to commit to their common defense capabilities.

First, as a result of the changing of European Security Environment with the Russian-Ukrainian dispute, uncertainty in the Middle East region and Northern Africa, and rising of terrorism, the EU faces new security challenges. As a significant point, rising of terrorism has a direct impact on the current environment on the EU security. In two years, there were several attacks in Paris, Brussels, London, and Berlin. The EU has a direct responsibility to protect their citizens and borders. For this reason, it is natural to see an increase in cooperation on security matters.

Second, Brexit- the coming withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, affected the developments on security and defense policies of the Union. The departure of the UK from the EU brings an intense change in the European Security environment, and also the EU have noticed that there is a weakness on security issues within the Union. Table 6 and 7 shows us that the UK has the considerable contribution to the defense budget. For these reasons, a revision like PESCO was necessary for the EU defense and security.

Third, the primary desire of the PESCO projects is to trigger further collaboration among members and optimizing the effectiveness and the existing capabilities under the framework of common work.

Finally, increasing collective defense capabilities and partnership notion among the EU member states will increase the global presence of the EU regarding security and defense matters. PESCO will be a tool for enhancing the global presence of the EU.

The project-based nature will help to conduct successful implementations on security and defense matters. While considering the future of the EU, PESCO will play the crucial role in the overall developments.

First, it can increase the cooperation between NATO and the EU on defense matters in terms of information sharing among member countries. In this way, it will be easier to handle the common threats such as rising of terrorism, climate change, military industry, and research. Also, this situation paves the wave for more cooperation on different fields.

Second, it will increase the collaboration within the EU, because the defense is essential for the EU today, more than it was. The security environment all over Europe became more complicated, and there is the variation of threats. This time all of the member states has the great responsibility to protect their citizens and borders and create more secure Europe, and PESCO is a tool for this aim.

Third, PESCO will increase the effectiveness of the European Defense and enhance the implementation of the CSDP practices. The binding nature of the PESCO paves for this development. In the project level, specific countries will be involved in some particular projects, and, in this way, more growth is possible for the subject matter which is European defense.

It should be kept in mind that, it is still to make some explicit interpretations of the PESCO because it is a very recent development. Defense and security issues are always critical for the EU. However, PESCO will be the efficient development of the Union, and the EU will advance its defense capabilities, strengthening its defense cooperation, and we will see further integrating Europe.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: Project Process of PESCO

#EUDefence 

17 PROJECTS ADOPTED IN 3 AREAS

COMMON TRAINING AND EXERCISES

- European Training Mission Competence Centre
- European Training Certification Centre for European Armies

OPERATIONAL DOMAINS (LAND, AIR, MARITIME, CYBER)

- European Medical Command
- Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and support to Operations
- Military Mobility
- Strategic Command and Control System for CSDP Missions and Operations
- Energy for Operational Function
- European Secure Software for Radio Systems

JOINT AND ENABLING CAPABILITIES (BRIDGING OPERATIONAL GAPS)

- Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle
- Indirect Fire Support
- Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package
- European Crisis Response Operation Core (European Force)
- Maritime Surveillance
- Maritime Mine Counter Measures
- Harbour Protection
- European Cyber Information Sharing Platform
- European Cyber Rapid Response Teams

ROADMAP OF PESCO PROJECTS

Adoption of Council decision with first list of 17 projects and their participants

03/2018

PESCO secretariat to call for proposals for new and focused set of PESCO projects

05/2018

Council to adopt coherent set of governance rules for the PESCO projects

06/2018


Process to identify, select and assess the next set of PESCO projects

05-10/2018


Council to adopt Decision updating the list of projects with a new set of PESCO projects.

11/2018

Appendix B: One of the Original Texts from the Sixth Session of North Atlantic Council



Appendix C: Overview of the current EU mission and operations (2017)



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