title   
  

Assignment maximization

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Bo, Inacio and Turhan, Bertan (2018) Assignment maximization. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

[img]
Preview
PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
320Kb

Abstract

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated – in terms of number of assignments – in equilibrium. The second are fair for unassigned students and assign weakly more students than stable mechanisms in equilibrium. We provide comparisons with well-known mechanisms through computer simulations. Those show that the difference in number of matched agents between the proposed mechanisms and others in the literature is large and significant.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:35346
Deposited By:Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Deposited On:31 Jul 2018 16:06
Last Modified:31 Jul 2018 16:06

Repository Staff Only: item control page