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**Citizen – State Interface in Turkey:
A Study from the Comparative Perspective**

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Introduction: State and the Citizen

Turkish political system is renowned with a strong “state tradition,” which it seems to have, in part, inherited from the Ottoman Empire in the form of a patrimonial state system (Mardin, 1973). The formative years of the War of Liberation and its immediate aftermath seemed to have created a state structure, which Metin Heper calls as “transient transcendentalism” (Heper, 1985: 67-97). Heper went on to argue that such a transcendental substance or core persisted. Yet over time, it became more bureaucratic. However, with the industrialization of the country, it gave way to a partial form of transcendentalism, which by the 1980s started to give early signals of even becoming partially transcendental and even turning into a form of instrumentalism (Heper, 1985: 124-55). The gist of that argument is that there is a marked statist orientation (*étatisme*) in Turkey, which stresses community over its members, uniformity or conformity rather than diversity or dissent, an understanding of the law that stresses collective reason instead of the will of membership (Heper, 1985: 8, 50-66). Such a statist orientation tended to view politics as leadership and education of ‘uncivilized’ masses through the intervention of state or bureaucratic elites (Heper, 1985: 50-97).

Those tendencies went along with the establishment of a compact and culturally homogenous Center, which tends to dominate and control every aspect of social life. The Center views the rest of the society (Periphery) as a cauldron of mischievous and even rebellious gatherings ready to launch social revolutions whenever the Center relaxes its grip on the society (Mardin, 1975: 10, 22-23). The Center is suspicious of social groupings, associations, and organizations of all kinds that are not under its close surveillance. Hence, the reservoir of goodwill for freedom of association has been shallow. An interventionist and distrustful Center often leaves little room for any vigorous social activity and associability to

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flourish. A meddling Center imposes its will on the Periphery whenever it enjoys a chance.

The Center – Periphery divide was imported or inherited from the Ottoman political system. The preponderance and hegemony of the state over a population that comprised of peasants, farmers, petit bourgeois, and local merchants; unorganized and lacking the practice of and the social capital of political organization, continued unabated (Keyder, and Öncü, 1994). The reformist “higher bureaucrats” have been preserving their stranglehold of the realm of political power since the Tanzimat (Beneficent/Reorganization) Reforms of 1839 – 1876 (Mardin, 2003: 276 - 278, and Inalcık, H., 1964: 55- 56). The collapse of the Ottoman system and the emergence of the Republican one instead provided greater latitude for them to control the state for their interests and privileges. So both Keyder (1987) and Zürcher (1999: 190ff) argued that the state could provide the groups of the Center the power and opportunity to completely transform the whole system. Indeed, the reformist bureaucratic factions had attempted to capture the state apparatus for their reform agenda since the modernizing reforms were initiated in the mid - 19th century. Thus, the practice by the high bureaucrats using the state implementing reform from the above, without any contact, consent or inclusion of the society at large or any portion of civil society, in particular, has a relatively long history. The aim had been to render the state more viable or save it from threat and attacks, and thus protect the realm of the state, and society.

The most notable example and experiment with such reform came into being with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Secularizing, nation-building and national economy reforms were initiated in the 1920s with the same style of what had been practiced since the time of the French Revolution, if not before. They were carried out to build a new nation-state, the Turkish Republic, and the reforms were carried out to render it viable. It was in this context that a national (Turkish speaking Sunni) class of entrepreneurs was to be created, so that they would identify with the state and thus their interests would not threaten those of the higher bureaucrats of the state. The presumption was that this national class of entrepreneurs would have neither represented interests that were narrowly defined to serve them alone, nor cooperated with non-Muslim entrepreneurs and stand against the state (Keyder, 1987: 81). The new system has been established, but its political regime and its *modus operandi* continued to be the good old patrimonial state structure and governance style, which would continue without any significant alterations in Turkish political life. The Turkish state has always given priority of its interests to the interests of any community or individual citizens and regarded the state interests more than the collection of individual interests. Thus, politics was not defined to be a matter influenced and determined by an interaction, competition or struggle of individual interests, but as a realm in which higher bureaucrats chart out the correct course of action for the community and its members (Heper, 1985: 48 – 49).

It has also been argued that the state, which evolved out of such a political and historical context has been one of a paramount mechanism of control (Papa State, *Baba Devlet*) (Heper: 1985: 102-3). The awe of the state is such that no group dares to challenge its hegemony over the society. Furthermore, it is argued that most economic interests rather than challenge it tends to pursue a policy of co-existence or congruence with the "Papa State" (Heper, 1985: 103). The creation of a national bourgeoisie with the intervention of the state was nothing more than the arrangement of social structure by political intervention and empowerment of hand-picked social groups, which falls into the long held tradition and history of Center – Periphery relations (Keyder and Öncü, 1994). Thus, the state arranged for the necessary conditions for the accelerated accumulation of essential capital to boost industrial growth and economic development in an environment where financial capital was pretty scarce (Sunar, 1974: 70 – 72). However, all of this needed to be done in a way that did not threaten the patrimonial Center – Periphery relations and the status of the state or the higher bureaucrats controlling the levers of power. A national bourgeoisie created by the state and subservient to it provided for the establishment of capitalism that would not threaten the status and power of the state (Insel, 1990: 46).

The image of the state as depicted is one of an omnipotent hegemon, which controls every social process and suffocates any freedom of social, economic, or cultural action. The condescending attitude of the bureaucratic intelligentsia married with the awe of the state breeds ominous results: "Having always been pushed around the Turkish periphery could not develop public interest and emerge as 'civil-society-as-public'" (Heper, 1985: 103). It is small wonder then that the state tradition in Turkey does not nurture a fertile environment for civil society. The role of the individual citizen in this context is very limited and mostly passive. However, we have evidence that personalized demands from the political system, which had been absent in the Ottoman Empire until the mid-1800's started to mushroom after the Tanzimat Reforms by 1847 (Kalaycioglu, and Saribay, 2014). It was about that time that local politics began to host representative institutions but no popular elections until after 1908.

Since the late Ottoman reform era, two staged elections with limited suffrage that resulted in representative assemblies have had a non-negligible role in the newly emerging governance system of the declining empire. Looking into the limited historical evidence we have, the elites, as well as the multi-ethnic and multi-religious masses of the Ottoman Empire, appear comfortable with the idea of holding elections for a representative body (Davison, 1990). Kayalı (1995: 282) notes that "...Regardless of electoral flaws and the number of actual voters, the elections served both to legitimate the constitutional representative system and to promote political citizenship in the empire... Electoral politics exercised a mobilizational effect that was not restricted to the polls. It also contributed to the expansion of the public sphere in the Middle East, as the proliferation of journalistic activity, petitions, rallies, and festivals accompanied the campaigns. Thus, elections expedited the processes of social and political mobilization, particularly after 1908. Electoral

competition for the allegiance of different social groups enhanced collective consciousness and cleavages, which the imperial government tried to contain by promoting an integrationist ideology and by co-opting the elites of these groups.”²

Turkish politics has had periods of popular elections after that date but only intermittently and not as free and fair elections until the 1950 national legislative elections. Survey research conducted between 1974 and 2015 indicated that there was a great propensity to participate in elections at all levels of government. However, contacting the politicians, taking part in campaign activity and deliberative debate to produce solutions to a community, neighborhood, town or city problems were at much less demand (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu, 2007; and Kalaycioglu, 2016). Protest and repressive participation levels in Turkey were also kept at a relatively low magnitude and scope until the 2010s, while both, but the especially repressive behavior seems to have shown some recent increase yet from a very low level (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu, 2007; and Kalaycioglu, 2016). So, a survey of the political participation research in Turkey concluded: “...that there is a distinct proclivity among the Turkish voters to participate in the most legitimate and politically sanctioned acts of conventional political participation, such as voting...” (Kalaycioglu, 2016: 218).

Under those circumstances, one does not necessarily expect to find much of evidence of a robust and lively civic activism and well-connected civil society. However, the ideal typical representations of civic activism and state-citizen interface often do not match with the complexity of the socio-political reality of everyday politics in the country. What we mean by this is that although traditions matter, socio-economic, political structures and behavior tend to change over time, often more rapidly than research can catch up with their pace.

Indeed, more recent research by Ayşe Buğra (1994) and Ziya Öniş (2002, 2001a, 2001b, 1998a, 1998b, 1991), and Çağlar Keyder (1987) have indicated that the bureaucratic dominance of the state that split from the elected political elites in the post-1950s seemed to have created a divide or even a gulf between the state elites (bureaucrats and technocrats) versus the elected representatives of legislators, ministers, and the prime minister (political elite). This split had become more visible and institutional by the establishment of a constitution (1982) which established the office of the Presidency with tutelary powers over the high bureaucracy and separated the autonomous agencies of the state such as the security and defense establishment, foreign policy bureaucracy, and the academic personnel of the public universities from the elected offices and office holders of the government (Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, and the legislature). The administrative tutelary powers of the Presidency often extended onto the turfs of the legislature and the judiciary, providing whoever were able to control and influence it, with significant administrative power over the whole of

² See also Khalid (1984), Koçu (1950), and Tuncer (2002) on elections in the Ottoman Empire.

government and through it the society. However, the Prime Minister (PM) and the Council of Ministers seemed to have been exclusively powerful and effective in managing the macro economy of the country. It was the government of several PMs in Turkey that was instrumental for the last four decades in establishing free market institutions and managing a capitalist economy that functioned more like crony capitalism than liberal market capitalism.

If we examine the entire odyssey of the democratization process from the beginning of the 1950s onwards, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) seemed to have emerged in the 1940s as the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie and especially of the *nouveau riche* of the World War II years, purport to promote their mercantile and industrial interests. The DP had hoped that such an alliance would be enough for the operation of a democratic regime (Karpaz, 1964: 60). Keyder had a different interpretation of the state – business relations at this juncture; he argued that in the post-war years the bourgeois class defied the state (higher bureaucrats) but mostly to promote free market rule, and paid scant attention if any to democracy. This orientation of the burgeoning mercantile-industrialist class failed to develop a more robust civil society, on the one hand and did not object to the state-dominated economy so long as its wealth was not in jeopardy, on the other (Keyder, 1987, 122-127, 133).

The same overall proclivity contributed to the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) of the post 1960s as the alliance between the higher bureaucracy, industrialists and unionized labor worked to diminish inter-class as well as intra-class conflicts, and create conditions for stable economic growth (Boratav, 2003; Keyder, 1987: 180 - 191). The industrialists continued to operate under the dominance of the higher bureaucrats of the state and continued to be complacent with their role away from the political scene so long as the distributive conflicts did not endanger their wealth (Keyder and Öncü, 1994: 11). By the 1970s the industrialists were able to organize into prominent business associations (such as TÜSİAD) and began to register their preferences toward achieving rapid growth while not risking income equality (Buğra, 1994). They did not refrain from warning the government of the time that social crises would be imminent in case of income inequality which in turn would be detrimental to their (industrialists') well-being as well as that of the well-being of the country (ibid.)

When the Turkish government decided to adopt neo-liberalism of one kind or another on January 24, 1980, onwards, it was again justified on the grounds of saving the state and the economy it rested upon. Indeed, the military establishment as those higher bureaucrats who were able to possess full autonomy from the government, made a coup in September 1980 to end the impasse of the ideologically divided political parties and their emphasis on clientelistic ties to particular interests rather than what they considered to be the collective will of the nation, and save the country and the state once

more, the big business did not fail to welcome it and provide its full support (Heper, 1985).

In the years after the 1980 coup, it was the new PM Özal who diagnosed that ISI and the predominance of the higher bureaucracy as the main culprits to be responsible for the economic crisis of the 1970s. However, this criticism of the meddling and powerful state had not brought about the end of the autonomous state in the hands of higher bureaucrats. The practice of the regulations of the Turkish state's economic bureaucracy changed while leaving the status of the state – business relations intact (Öniş, 1998b). Economic decision-making shifted more robustly into the domain of the PM Özal and his close circle of bureaucrats, most of whom he had worked with him when he had been functioning as a high bureaucrat from 1960s until the 1980s (Öncü, and Gökçe, 1991). Öniş argued that this core around the PM become insulated against the influence of both the other higher bureaucrats, on the one hand, and the interest groups (mainly TÜSİAD), on the other (Öniş, 1991). It was eventually the mismanagement of this core of the government in the calibration of the regulations, rather than the state that resulted in the failure of the neo-liberal policies by the late 1980s and the 1990s (ibid, and Buğra, 1994). However, it was contended that eventually, the experiment of creating industrialists by state regulation and intervention produced a mature bourgeoisie by the late 1990s, as TÜSİAD began to promote not only economic interests and not exclusively in their selves, but in the name of the welfare of the whole country, on the one hand, it also began to demand more democratization, on the other (Öniş, 2002). The luring prospects of membership in the European Union (EU) was a critical mobilizer behind this activism at the top eschelons of Turkish business community.

With the economic crisis of 2001 behind and the financial sector in a much healthier state and public finances under control the new economic policy era under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) offered opportunities for privatization that was unparalleled especially given the favorable international economic context where large sums of investment funds were available. Since 2003 a large chunk of State Economic Enterprises (SEE) has been on the market for sale, and there has been an oscillating but persistent effort by the governments to privatize state owned companies since even the 1980s. The Customs Union Treaty with the EU was negotiated in the 1990s and has been in operation since January 1, 1996, which opened up the Turkish markets to EU and through it other global competition. More importantly, the Cold War had come to an end by then, and now cultural fault lines of the country, ethnic, religious, both confessional and sectarian divides had become much more relevant than the earlier secular socio-economic divisions and distributional issues about the latter only. Kurdish separatism, Sunni religious organizations and their commercial counterparts were now becoming active, and the Turkish civil society was changing. This was a challenge that TÜSİAD was unprepared to meet. One of their Young Turks, Cem Boyner, who emerged to form a political movement and a party and ran for public office failed to receive any

significant support from the big bosses of the industrialists and businessmen' association. Soon an alternative Islamist – Conservative organization of MÜSİAD emerged to occupy the limelight of politics until the AKP, the party much closer to their hearts if not their pockets came to power in 2002. The demands of democratization of TÜSİAD began to fall on deaf ears, as MÜSİAD emerged to be much better situated to promote its understanding of economics and politics of democratization from the new economic centers of power that be. TÜSİAD began to shift back to the older status of protecting its share of the pie from the economic distribution of the state, as more and more conservative people in business began to take their share of the increasing economic welfare of the country. All of these changes in the economy and the role of the state in it in Turkey should have some impact on the state and civil society relations.

The Periphery in Charge

The institution of the state and its culture has also been changing. The importance of the cultural cleavage between a compact and culturally homogeneous Center and a culturally heterogeneous Periphery is sparingly used to account for the happenings of Turkish politics since the 1990s. Mardin (2003), Heper (2000), Özbudun (2000), and others argued that the Center has been fragmented and lost its compactness, and cultural homogeneity. From 1950 to 2015 eighteen national elections took place for the seats of the *Meclis* (the lower chamber of the Turkish Grand National Assembly) and the political parties are palpably representing the values of the Periphery won fourteen of them. They also won sizable representation in the other four elections, where no political party won the majority of the seats in any of those four elections. The power to hire and fire bureaucrats were probably no longer in the hands of the forces of the pre-1950 Periphery or their off springs, and their followers for the last sixty-five years. Such a preponderance of the forces of the Periphery in Turkish politics, for such a long time, should have produced some impact. Indeed, the state is no longer the bastion of the aloof, unaccountable, unimpressionable, and secularly educated higher bureaucrats and their culture in Turkey. Indeed, the autonomy of the state institutions might only be purported to exist for the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and perhaps the Ministry of Finance only briefly by the beginning of the twenty-first century. The High Appeals Courts, the Higher Educational Council (YÖK) may also be argued to have had some autonomy until the 2010s, even then, how much of that was exercised by them in practice had been hotly debated in the Turkish media.

However, as research has undoubtedly unearthed since Sept 12, 2010, referendum three significant steps were taken to completely oust the vestiges of the higher bureaucrats in the Center and place the former Center under full control of the champions and representatives of the Periphery (Özbudun, 2015). On September 12, 2010, the referendum amended 24 articles of the 1982 Constitution and changed the

powers and the selection procedures of the members (judges) of the Constitutional Court and of the High Council Judges and Public Prosecutors (*Hâkimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu*, HSYK). “The thrust of the HSYK reform was to give it a more pluralistic and representative structure and to increase its autonomy vis-à-vis the government” (Özbudun, 2015: 45). It was welcomed by not only the AKP supporters but the liberals, former socialists at home also by the European Union, Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, and the Consultative Council of European Judges abroad (Özbudun, 2015: 45). The Constitution (art. 159) was amended in line with the referendum, which received the blessings of the Venice Commission, and a new HSYK was established by new appointments and elections in which all first degree judges and prosecutors participated for the first time in Republican history (Özbudun, 2015: 46). It looked as if Turkey was finally moving toward enhancing the independence of the judiciary. However, a second stage was reached soon by December 2013 whereby a spate of corruption charges levied against four AKP ministers and the Prime Minister caused a major upending of the 2010 amendments. This time unable to amend the constitution the AKP majority in the TBMM moved to change the law about the HSYK and motioned a legislative “bill to limit the powers of the Plenary of the HSYK and to strengthen the role of the Minister of Justice as its president” (Özbudun, 2015: 46). The constitutionality of the bill was in doubt and even President Gül, who had been the first PM of the AKP in 2002, objected to it and further but minor amendments were made to it. Finally, on February 27, 2014, the new bill (Act no. 6524) came into effect that established the stranglehold of the Minister of Justice (executive branch of the government) over the HSYK and through it over the judiciary (Özbudun, 2015: 47). By promulgating Act no. 6545 special criminal judges were established, and by Act no. 6572 Courts of Cassation and Council of State were completely overhauled, and new judges were installed to pack the High Courts of the country to function in line with the AKP government (Özbudun, 2015: 50 - 53). Thirdly and finally, the Constitutional Court, which had been left as the final bastion of the independent judiciary in Turkey had some of its judges removed for their alleged relationship with terror organizations and in their place, new ones were appointed by the President of the country after the coup attempt of July 15, 2016.

Eventually, re-establishing new procedures of appointment, hiring, and firing of the judges, the autonomy, and power of the judiciary rapidly waned between 2010 and 2016. The autonomous agencies of the state that were established under the previous coalition government to manage the financial meltdown of the banking system since 2001 had worked well. Indeed, between 2001 and 2008 most of the 19 banks that went bankrupt were nationalized, their debts were serviced, some were closed down permanently, and some of them were sold to private corporations. These agencies were also re-shaped in 2011 as the political system became more centralized by placing all of those agencies as bureaus of the Prime Minister’s office. Previously, the AKP had motioned a legislative bill to further devolve the powers of the central (national)

government to the local administrations (mainly, municipalities), but when it was vetoed by the President A. Necdet Sezer, the AKP decided to shelve the proposed bill. Thus, let alone devolution, even little de-concentration of central power was no longer to be tolerated. Finally, in 2017 mayors of some major metropolitan cities who had been popularly elected on the AKP ticket were summarily removed from their offices without a proper recall mechanism, or any criminal or immoral charges being made against them, but just by the instigation of the central (national) AKP government. The rationale seemed to be that they had lost their zeal to manage the affairs of their cities, although no hard evidence was also put forth to prove that argument either. Only one mayor objected to that decision publicly (Milliyet daily, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/baskanligi-ve-partiyi-aglayarak-siyaset-2546601/>). The residents of those cities did not seem to show any reaction for the removal of the mayors whom they had earlier elected either. All government in Turkey began to be national government by the 2010s.

Another major autonomous agency of the state was the YÖK, which had been declared as a bastion of the former Center by the AKP in its first years of power. It was gradually co-opted into the executive branch of the government, more or less as a Ministry of Higher Education. The YÖK practice had started as strict control of the tertiary education of the country under the military government of 1981, the previously established academic, financial, and administrative autonomies of the universities by the 1946 University Act and the 1961 Constitution had been curtailed by the 1981 Act no. 2547 and the 1982 Constitution. The universities had struggled hard and long to push back the stranglehold of the YÖK in the 1980s. The academics of the public universities had succeeded to get back some of their autonomy accepted by the governments of the 1990s as their chance of participating in the election of their administrators, especially rectors (presidents) increased after 1992. In the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt and operating under the emergency measures, the *avant-garde* public universities (Boğaziçi and Middle Eastern Technical Universities) in the struggle for autonomy were the first ones to lose their right to have a say in electing their rectors in the 2016 – 2017 academic year. The rationale for the amendment of the procedure for the selection of the rectors of the universities was also very telling: “...*Elections of university presidents lead to unfair practices, chagrin and personal strife in the universities, and create a chaotic atmosphere in institutions of tertiary education. The replacement of the election system with an appointment system would eliminate these problems at universities.*” (The Science Academy Report on Academic Freedoms, 2015 -2016: 8). Consequently, a new governmental decree with the force of law (Decree no. 676) removed the inclusion of the academic personnel in the election of a rector in public universities and fully authorized the President of the country to appoint them with or without the input of the YÖK. It seemed as if that the country has gone a full circle back to 1981 regarding its centralized control of the public universities, but this time it was not the military but the popularly elected political party and its government which was the chief instigator of those

changes. The champions of the Periphery once more sidelined what they considered to be one of the key allies of the former Center, the university professors.

In the meantime, in 2011 the AKP won its third consecutive and the most decisive victory in the national legislative elections, which precipitated a debate over the character of the Turkish party system. Several studies wondered whether Turkey was moving toward a pre-dominant party system, with one party winning in every free and fair election due to socio-cultural cleavages and the performance of the macro economy of the country (Çarkoğlu, 2011; Gümüştü, 2012; Özbudun, 2013; Sayarı, 2016). With such a stellar success and increasing its popular support from 34% of the valid votes in 2002 to a record high of the recent times to 49% in 2011 (Kalaycioglu, 2017: 4), the AKP government could push the power of the “transcendental state” back with utmost effectiveness to the detriment of especially the military, security and foreign policy establishments, and of the judiciary by 2016. Any semblance of transcendentalism or institutionalization of autonomy that may be alluded to those agencies of the state that are related to defense, security, foreign relations, and public finance also seemed to have dwindled after the 2011 national legislative elections and most specifically by July 15, 2016 (Keyman, and Gürçan, 2017). In their comprehensive report Fuat Keyman and Metin Gürçan of the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC), argued that the state was too weak to avoid any penetration by an organized force that would be able to establish itself as a parallel organization within the state (ibid.: 5). The authors maintain that it was the weakness of the state and public bureaucracy that resulted in the fortuitous circumstances not only of penetration of a religious interest group into its ranks but also carry out a coup attempt against toppling the duly elected government (ibid.: 5). Keyman and Gürçan conclude that after the coup attempt of July 15, 2016 the Turkish state and public bureaucracy need to be overhauled and reformed to its former power and effectiveness under the tutelary powers of the new Peripheral elites. Finally, with the security and defense establishments entirely controlled and now going through a thorough overhaul of their organization under the vigilance of the elected political elites of the Periphery, the Center – Periphery divide in Turkey is no more. It is ironic that the aforementioned critical weakness of the state, the emergence of a parallel organization within the state that effectively aimed to dissolve the remnants of any merit based bureaucracy took place under a hegemonic party rule that had no serious opposition within or outside of the legislature (TBMM), and eventually acted against the elected government in July 2016.

Under those circumstances, it is warranted to ask what happened to the image of the Turkish state as a Papa State, the omnipotent, unaccountable, powerful transcendental entity in the eyes of its citizens? This is going to be one question we hope to find a response in the following pages of this paper.

The culture specific evolution of the Turkish state and the attitudes of the Turkish citizens toward that political entity does not constitute the entire glossary of the citizens’

attitudes and orientations to the state. Just like state everywhere the Turkish state is a source of security and socio-economic welfare in Turkey as well. Although there has not been any significant attempt at examining the attitudes and expectations of the citizens toward those universal functions of the state in Turkey so far, we have tried to tap those mass attitudes, perceptions, and expectations of the citizens concerning security and terror in the current ISSP Role of Government Survey - 2016. Currently, Turkey is going through another major military, security and public campaign to battle ethnic, religious (both confessional and sectarian) terror. This is, however, not the first time the country is in the grips of insecurity and terror, for in the 1970s, from 1982 through 1999, and 2007 and 2014, and 2015 up until today four significant waves of terror and security operations grappling with those waves have taken place. The same ethno-religious terror has not been confined territorially to Turkey proper and have engulfed northern Iraq, Syria, Greece, Bulgaria, Germany, where large groups of Turkish citizens live. In the fight against terror, the Turkish military has been quite successful in beating the terror organizations to relatively marginal groupings with the tremendous erosion of their capacity and resources several times within the Turkish territory (Başbuğ, 2011, Pelin and Yavuz, 2014). We have established that concerns over security and the emerging new wave of terror played a significant role in the November 1, 2015, national legislative elections (Aytaç et. al. 2017; Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım, 2017; Kalaycıoğlu, 2017). Therefore, it is warranted to ponder how the Turkish citizens perceive of the state as a security provider and evaluate its performance in coping with terror.

The Turkish Constitutions (both 1961 and the current 1982, article 2) have clearly stipulated that state has social welfare functions, and the size of the social security, health, housing and education expenditures have increased steadily since the first five-year economic development plan of 1963 – 1967 up until the 2010s (TUIK, 2012: 50 -59, and 64 -76, 404 – 416, 715). Correspondingly the tax burden, and specifically the indirect taxes, such as the consumption and value added taxes have also increased rapidly (TUIK, 2012: 642). The attitudes, perceptions, and expectations of the citizens concerning the socio-economic welfare expenditures and public revenues that fund them are therefore becoming increasingly important as the social functions of the state grow. The stakes increase and the number of resources to be allocated by the political authorities also increase in volume and worth. The demands of people for housing, education, and health care have produced greater efforts by the political parties, especially those in government to adjust their policies. From the 1980s onwards governments have tried to cater to the demands of newly urbanized masses by establishing a public agency for housing development. It was the Motherland Party government of PM Turgut Özal who initiated the legal provisions to establish the Housing Development Administration (TOKİ) by Act no. 2985 in the 1980s (<http://www.toki.gov.tr/en/background.html>). All governments including the current AKP government have been using this agency to build and supply new houses to large swaths of the population, which have also been used for clientelist

connections as they propagate their catering to the needs of the communities from which they ask support at the polls.

The demands for the rapidly growing population from the 1960s to the 2000s was also focused on education. Turkish educational institutions demonstrate a significant variability of quality, and the best and the brightest are often enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools. The cost of educating one's offsprings have spiraled over the years, and families have started to invest an increasing amount of their income and wealth to educate their children. Therefore, the demand for affordable and good quality schools have also been quite visible in the Turkish society. Political parties and especially those in government have also targeted investments in educational institutions as a way to promote their image as the government for the people. The current AKP government has been providing the books for the academic year to the elementary and secondary school students free of charge at the beginning of each academic year, which is an excellent contribution to the family budget of the parents and have been accepted as a popular policy of the government. However, government parties also tend to promote their ideological orientations onto the curriculum, and the current government has been promoting creation of a conservative generation. In practice this meant a change of curriculum and teachers to stress religion (Sunni Islam) over science, banning such topics as evolution in biology instruction. Such a move has been contributing to further deepening of the secular – Sunni pious and Alevi – Sunni religious sectarian cleavages among the population at large, and thus emerges as a controversial and divisive policy of education. With a massive youth population education constitutes one of the most critical socio-cultural and political domains in Turkey that sharply divides the population and precipitates a *kulturkampf* between those who believe in an Image of Good Society at the core of which is secularism, rationalism, and science versus another Image of Good Society the core values of which consist of traditions, Sunni piety, religious conservatism and the like.

Health also constituted a significant issue corresponding to the demands of the population concerning their well-being in the early 2000s. However, probably due to the relatively small size of the elderly population it has not attracted as much concern as a major problem area and political issue as education (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu, 2012: 35). ISSP Health Survey in Turkey (2012) unearthed that about three fourths of the population considered themselves as healthy, about two thirds as happy, and about 70 percent reported that they had no chronic illness (ibid.: 35). Under the circumstances, the demand for healthcare does not seem to be a significant political issue in Turkey any longer³. Nevertheless, the government parties have also been keen on promoting

³ Indeed, when asked as an open – ended question, what constitutes the most important problem facing the country in Turkey today, health does not seem to be mentioned by more than 2 percent of the respondents as the first problem that comes to their mind, and neither does it get to be mentioned more as a second most important problem (see Table 1).

affordable and universal healthcare coverage for the population, and not surprisingly it has been one of the active selling points for the current AKP government that they have made healthcare readily available to all in Turkey.⁴

We have been unearthing that the most critical issue and the salient problem of the country have been unemployment and economic growth. From 2002 Turkish election study to the ISSP Role of Government 2016 Turkey Survey, which was conducted between September and November 2017 we have systematically been asking the respondents of nationally representative survey samples what constitutes the most important problem that faces the country (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu, 2007, and Kalaycioglu, 2017, see also Table 1). Occasionally we also ask what is the most critical problem they face. In all cases and versions of that question anywhere between two thirds to three fourths of the respondents mention the economy as the most important that face the country or them personally. Therefore, aside from state as security and social welfare provider, we expect to find some expectations and attitudes of the citizens about the state to be a significant provider of jobs and economic growth as well.

⁴ It is reported in the Turkish media that 100 million people, the Turkish population is about 80 million, applied to the emergency wards of the Turkish hospitals in 2017 (<https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/turkiyede-acil-servislere-yilda-100-milyon-basvuru-yapiliyor>). It is legally imperative for the hospitals to provide care to anyone who reports to their emergency clinic without requesting any insurance or ensure their ability to pay for the healthcare expenses. Therefore, many report to the emergencies when their ailments may not even be urgent and they get instant treatment.

Table 1: What is the Most Important Problem Facing Turkey? (Open Ended Question)

| tems | Percent |
|---|-------------|
| Inflation / High cost of living | 18.0 |
| Unemployment | 26.9 |
| Economic Instability, Crisis | 8.0 |
| Corruption | 1.6 |
| Health and Social Security | 1.1 |
| Education | 8.3 |
| Political Instability | 3.1 |
| South Eastern / Kurdish Problem | 1.7 |
| Terror / National Security | 19.7 |
| Crime | .7 |
| Drug Addiction | .4 |
| Transportation / Traffic | .5 |
| Syrian Refugees | 1.5 |
| Government Party / Policies | .3 |
| Discrimination / Violence against Women | .2 |
| Low Income | 1.2 |
| Democracy and Justice | 2.4 |
| Agriculture / Farm Policies, Problems | .6 |
| Polarization / Social Conflict | .4 |
| FETÖ | .4 |
| Other | 1.2 |
| Don't Know/ No Response | 1.6 |
| Total | 100.0 |

Role of Government in the Eyes of its Citizens: Hypotheses

We would like to clarify further at this point that we do expect to find those belonging to different Images of Good Society, the secular versus devoutly religious (the pious Sunni), men and women, urban and rural community dwellers, young and old, social classes, different levels of formal education, political ideologies, and partisan identity differ in terms of their expectations, attitudes and evaluations of the state / government and their performance in Turkey.

The Center – Periphery divide has faded in Turkish politics, but its cultural residue is still lingering on and providing a major cultural cleavage in Turkish society that emerges as a *kulturkampf* of different Images of Good Society. Those who are secular, progressive

versus those who are traditional and religious conservative still differ sharply and clash over the role of government in the national economy and also in regulating the daily encounters of the citizens. We expect the respondents differ across secular – Sunni piety divide in their expectations of, orientations to and evaluations of the state and government.

Turkish society is also divided by a deep running cleavage across ethnic lines that pit the ethnic Kurdish nationalists and the ethnic Turkish nationalists in a struggle over the role of the state and government in education and cultural policies. We expect to find these divisions and conflict to be reflected on expectations, orientations, and evaluations of the state in the economy, security, culture and national education.

Among the demographic variables gender, age, level of education and the urban-rural divide will be controlled for and their statistically differentiating impact will be observed. Given the deep gender gaps in social and economic life, similar gender differences in attitudes and preferences concerning the role of the state and government policies in various areas are likely to be observed. We suspect that the young might be more likely to expect and demand job creation, employment opportunities and other economic policies that would help and ease their finances at an early stage in their lives. In contrast, older age respondents might be more sensitive towards healthcare and pension funds.

The importance of partisan identification has been on the rise in Turkey especially given the continuous tenure of the AKP in power since 2002. The partisan identification also is likely to be a determinant of how state and governmental performance is evaluated. We hypothesize that those who identify with the governing party AKP are more likely to be predisposed toward positive political evaluations and satisfaction with state and government performance than the others. Given close cooperation between the AKP and the Turkish nationalist MHP in the aftermath of the 2015 elections, one might also expect that the MHP identifiers to behave similar to the AKP identifiers, but this is an empirical issue that is best left to the data to provide evidence for.

Data on the Role of Government Study

The sample of this national survey was drawn randomly from the households proportionate to size of the city (metropolitan and large city), small town, and village (both “köy and “mezra” etc.) from the 26 NUTS – 2 regions of Turkey as defined by the Turkish Statistics Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Enstitüsü, TÜİK). The authors of this report calculated the urban, and rural population sizes and proportions per NUTS region and requested the TÜİK to draw the sample of household addresses according to the number of interviews we target per urban and rural settlement per NUTS region. It is the data of household addresses provided by TÜİK that we used to randomly selected 3400 addresses from 57 out of 81 provinces, to be able

to conduct more than 1400 interviews, which is an ISSP requirement. We have not used any substitution for addresses or the respondents we cannot reach, and 1535 face-to-face interviews were conducted between August 26 and November 15, 2017.

The survey interview schedule was prepared with the participation of the ISSP member countries, including the two authors of this report between 2014 and 2015. The role and functions of the government and the state that were to be included in the study were also determined by the participating member country representatives of the ISSP. A selected committee among the participants then prepared the first draft of the questions and the secretariat distributed them to all the members, who provided their proposals for amendments, re-wording, requested clarification and provided their feed-back to the committee. The second draft of the questionnaire was pre-tested in several member countries, and the questionnaire design committee shared the results of the pre-tests and the final draft with all of the ISSP member countries. A second review by the countries was then followed by a re-reading and voting per question of the interview schedule in the annual general meeting of the ISSP in 2015. The questions used in the interview schedule in Turkey are those that are accepted in the 2015 annual general meeting of the ISSP in English. The interview schedule was then translated by two different group of Turkish graduate students at Koç and Sabancı Universities in to Turkish and by others back to English and finally checked by the authors of this report, who are also the principal investigators of this study. The field survey was conducted by Infakto Inc., Istanbul, Turkey, whose interviewers were trained in the first week of August by the authors of this report, and a final pre-test was conducted in August of the Turkish interview schedule. The controls of the door to door and face-to-face interviews were conducted as the field survey was progressing. The coding and cleaning of the data began in November and ended in December 2017. We calculate that we have about +/- 2.6% sampling error in our raw sample. In the following data analyses, we use a sex and education weight to correspond to the aggregate distributions of those variables as reported by the last TÜİK national statistics report.

Findings: Strong State Tradition/Weak State and Its Citizens

Here we present the findings of our study not exclusively what we have the unearthed in Turkey so far, but we also use the comparative ISSP data from the 2006 survey in which Turkey had not taken part, as an outside criterion by which to judge where Turkish citizen – state relations, expectations, attitudes, and evaluations stand.

Perceptions and Expectations of the Government in the Economy

The respondents of the ISSP Role of Government Survey – Turkey seemed to be more inclined to suggest to decrease government spending; as more than half of them seem to be favoring cuts in government spending. In comparison to the ISSP Role of Government Survey 2006, Turkish responses seem to be more in line with the Western and Northern European countries than the Eastern European ones in this regard (see Figure 1). Since the liberal market reforms of January 24, 1980 in Turkey, a conservative idea of less involvement of the government in the market has been propagated with some effectiveness, and a broad swath of the population seemed to have bought into this overall idea. When asked as an abstract and general question less government spending seems to be favored by a majority of the respondents. However, as it is clear from the responses given to other questions of the Survey, even more, significant majorities of the respondents have also been eager to increase certain types of government spending pertinent to job creation (see Figure 2). However, even though 7 out of 10 Turkish respondents seem to be extending support for increased spending by the government to create new jobs, in comparative perspective Turkey seems to be among those countries which show much restraint on this account (see Figure 2). However, in there seems to be more support for more government spending for the declining industries (Figure 3) and cutting down the working hours to create jobs (Figure 4). As the respondents perceive unemployment as the most critical problem facing the country, they seemed to be more inclined to support the idea of giving more government subsidies (spending). Among the OECD member countries, Turkish employees seemed to be experiencing the most weekly working hours of 61 - 66 hours (<https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/2080270.pdf>: 168). Therefore, it is not surprising to discover that there is a very high amount of support for the reduced hours of work among the Turkish respondents, that ranks Turkey fifth in the list of the ISSP 2006 countries (see Figure 4).

Figure 1: Government Spending Cuts




Figure 2: Government Initiate Projects to Create Jobs




Figure 3: Government Support Declining Industry to Protect Jobs






Figure 4: Government Reduce Work Week to Create new Jobs



The Turkish respondents seem to be inclined to support fewer government regulations as well (see Figure 5). In comparison to the ISSP countries of the 2006 survey, Turkey seems to belong to a group of countries that are relatively more inclined to decrease government regulations than the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and also the Scandinavian countries (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Attitudes toward Government Regulations



It is also a matter of the fact that there is not that much support for increased government spending among the Turkish respondents for innovation, and research and development that would be instrumental in developing new products and technologies, in comparison to the ISSP countries of the 2006 survey (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Government Support for Innovative Industry




Table 2 below presents the results of an exploratory factor analysis using the six items presented above concerning attitudes about government’s role in the economy. These items were evaluated on a scale from 1 (Strongly in favor) to 5 (Strongly against). All six items load on a single factor that summarizes the weights attached to different evaluations concerning various aspects of conservative attitudes of government’s role in the economy.

| Table 2. Factor Analysis Results on Government's Role in the Economy | |
|--|---|
| Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favour of and which you are against. 1 (Strongly in favour of...) to 5 (Strongly against) | Component |
| | Favoring inactive government initiative |
| Support for declining industries to protect jobs | .82 |
| Support for industry to develop new products and technology | .80 |
| Government should be financing projects for new jobs | .78 |
| Reducing the working week to create more jobs | .64 |
| Less government regulation of business (Reverse coded) | .56 |
| Cuts in government spending (Reverse coded) | .55 |
| % of Variance | 48.73 |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. | |

The factor score distribution is also given below showing that most respondents actually have attitudes critical towards the overall conservative temperaments. Relatively speaking there are more respondents with below average level of conservative proclivities. Table 3 presents a simple regression analysis results relating basic demographic variables such as age, gender, education level, household income, urban-rural divide, ethnic and sectarian status, left-right self-placement (ideology), and religiosity measured in terms of frequency of worship together with partisan identity of the respondents to conservative attitudes towards government’s role in the economy. We observe that while women and more educated respondents appear to have a significantly lower level of conservative attitudes, higher income and respondents from households with larger number of residents appear relatively more conservative. What is surprising and against our expectations is that more right-wing and more religiously observant respondents appear to have relatively lower level of conservative economic policy stands. However, when after controlling for their left-right ideological position partisan differences appear insignificant. At this point we underline this unexpected finding and leave it for further study in the future.





Table 3. Explaining Conservative Economic Policy Preferences

| | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | Sig. |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|------------|
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | |
| (Constant) | .30 | .22 | | .17 |
| Age in years | .00 | .00 | .04 | .26 |
| DV for Female=1 | -.13 | .07 | -.06 | .05 |
| Education in years | -.02 | .01 | -.08 | .04 |
| Household income in 000 TL | .00 | .00 | -.08 | .01 |
| DV for Urban dwellers=1 | .11 | .08 | .04 | .17 |
| # of people living in the household | .07 | .02 | .12 | .00 |
| DV for Kurdish speakers | -.09 | .10 | -.03 | .38 |
| DV for Alevis | .03 | .07 | .01 | .68 |
| Left-Right self-placement | -.04 | .02 | -.10 | .01 |
| Religious practice (0 to 6) | -.06 | .02 | -.14 | .00 |
| AKP identifiers | -.12 | .08 | -.06 | .13 |
| CHP identifiers | .20 | .10 | .07 | .06 |
| HDP identifiers | .18 | .16 | .04 | .28 |
| MHP identifiers | .02 | .13 | .00 | .90 |
| Adjusted R Square | | | .08 | |
| Std. Error of the Estimate | | | .97 | |

When we turn to the priority domains of the state expenditure we observe that the Turkish respondents tend to prioritize unemployment benefits, education, retirement and pension funds, environment, culture and arts, and most overwhelmingly support for

the military and defense, which is supported almost four times the ISSP 2006 average (Figure 7). As the respondents consider unemployment, cost of living, security/defense/terror, and education as the most critical problems facing the country, their responses indicating the prioritization of these areas in the allocation of public funds are quite coherent with their overall concerns over the problems facing the country (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Priorities of State Expenditure



We observe in Table 4 a clear two dimensional differentiation across government spending priorities. On the one hand, we have spending areas that fall under distributive and social welfare objectives, and on the other, domestic and international security spending. Given the fact that higher factor scores reflect lower support for spending we see in Table 5 that while there is very little differentiation in the first dimension, there appears more differences between various groups in society, in the second. For instance, as expected older generations and people from larger households appear more supportive of government spending in the first dimension. We observe that the respondents with higher income levels, right-wingers, and AKP identifiers appear to be against more spending in this area.

Table 4. Dimensions of Priority Areas for Government Spending

| For the various areas of government spending, please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. | Component | |
|--|--|----------------------|
| | Distributive and Social Welfare Spending | Security and Defence |
| Culture and the arts | .75 | .00 |
| Unemployment benefits | .69 | .16 |
| Old age pensions | .68 | .20 |
| The environment | .68 | .06 |
| Education | .56 | .41 |
| Health | .55 | .43 |
| The police and law enforcement | .10 | .86 |
| The military and defence | .13 | .85 |
| % of Variance | 32.66 | 23.58 |

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Table 5 Determinants of Spending Priorities


| | Determinants of Demand for Distributive and Social Welfare Spending | | | | Determinants of Demand for Security and Defence Spending | | | |
|--|---|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|--|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|
| | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | Sig. | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | Sig. |
| | B | Std. Error | | | B | Std. Error | | |
| (Constant) | -0.14 | 0.22 | | 0.52 | -0.40 | 0.22 | | 0.07 |
| Age in years | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.08 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.03 | 0.44 |
| DV for Female=1 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.86 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.29 |
| Education in years | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.47 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.02 |
| Household income in 000 TL | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.07 |
| DV for Urban dwellers=1 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.97 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.40 |
| # of people living in the household | -0.03 | 0.02 | -0.06 | 0.07 | -0.05 | 0.02 | -0.09 | 0.01 |
| DV for Kurdish speakers | 0.03 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.78 | -0.04 | 0.10 | -0.02 | 0.68 |
| DV for Alevis | -0.03 | 0.07 | -0.01 | 0.69 | 0.15 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Left-Right self-placement | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.00 |
| Religious practice (0 to 6) | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.39 | -0.01 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.58 |
| AKP identifiers | 0.31 | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.00 | -0.10 | 0.08 | -0.05 | 0.21 |
| CHP identifiers | -0.05 | 0.10 | -0.02 | 0.61 | 0.24 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.02 |
| HDP identifiers | -0.20 | 0.16 | -0.05 | 0.22 | 0.75 | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.00 |
| MHP identifiers | 0.24 | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.04 | 0.29 |
| Adjusted R Square | .05 | | | | .00 | | | |
| Std. Error of the Estimate | .97 | | | | .00 | | | |

When it comes to domestic security and defense expenditures, the opposition CHP and the Kurdish HDP identifiers, as well as Alevis and non-AKP and MHP right wing voters appear to

be against more spending. The more educated, and those from smaller households also appear to be slightly inclined against more spending in this area (see Table 5).

Parallel with their priorities of the allocations of the state funds presented in Figure 7; the respondents seem to emphasize that job creation, social welfare of the unemployed, poor, elderly, and helping needy students with university tuitions are among the most important responsibilities of the state (Figure 8). However, in comparison to the ISSP 2006 Surveys the Turkish responses do not seem to produce any significant deviations from the ISSP 2006 averages, except for unemployment benefits and student financial help (see Figure 8)

Figure 8: Government Responsibilities



| Table 6. Views on the responsibilities of Governments (Factor Analysis results) | | |
|---|---|---------------------------------------|
| On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to ... | Component | |
| | Regulation of the economy and social welfare system | Care for the unemployed and the needy |
| impose strict laws to make industry do less damage to the environment | .73 | .22 |
| provide health care for the sick | .70 | .18 |
| provide industry with the help it needs to grow | .69 | .14 |
| promote equality between men and women | .64 | .20 |
| keep prices under control | .53 | .31 |
| give financial help to university students from low-income families | .51 | .44 |
| provide a job for everyone who wants one | .06 | .82 |
| provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed | .18 | .74 |
| provide decent housing for those who can't afford it | .34 | .66 |
| provide a decent standard of living for the old | .43 | .55 |
| reduce income differences between the rich and the poor | .36 | .53 |
| % of Variance | 26.60 | 24.21 |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. | | |


Factor analyzing the evaluations of government's responsibilities we again find two dimensions. One that brings together evaluations concerning the regulation of the economy and the social welfare system, and the other that underlines government's responsibility towards the unemployed and the needy. For the second dimension on unemployed and the needy we observe that only the Kurdish speakers are relatively more supportive of this area of government responsibility, whereas the ruling AKP and the MHP identifiers appear less supportive. On the first dimension we observe that the older and those who live in larger households appear more supportive of government's role, whereas again the ruling AKP and the MHP identifiers are less supportive of governments activism in this area. What is surprising perhaps is that AKP and MHP identifiers once again appear on the same side of this issue.

| Table 7. Determinants of the Views on the responsibilities of Governments | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|
| | Regulation of the economy and social welfare system | | | | Care for the unemployed and the needy | | | |
| | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | Sig. | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | Sig. |
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | | B | Std. Error | Beta | |
| (Constant) | 0.27 | 0.21 | | 0.20 | -0.80 | 0.22 | | 0.00 |
| Age in years | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.15 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.00 |
| DV for Female=1 | -0.03 | 0.06 | -0.01 | 0.66 | -0.09 | 0.07 | -0.05 | 0.17 |
| Education in years | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.05 | 0.18 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.07 |
| Household income in 000 TL | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.41 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.00 |
| DV for Urban dwellers=1 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.08 | -0.08 | 0.08 | -0.03 | 0.29 |
| # of people living in the household | -0.05 | 0.02 | -0.08 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.75 |
| DV for Kurdish speakers | -0.07 | 0.10 | -0.03 | 0.47 | -0.16 | 0.10 | -0.06 | 0.10 |
| DV for Alevis | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.95 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.43 |
| Left-Right self-placement | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.21 |
| Religious practice (0 to 6) | -0.04 | 0.02 | -0.09 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.65 |
| AKP identifiers | 0.37 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 0.00 | 0.19 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.02 |
| CHP identifiers | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.03 | 0.34 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.15 |
| HDP identifiers | 0.03 | 0.16 | 0.01 | 0.87 | -0.13 | 0.16 | -0.03 | 0.41 |
| MHP identifiers | 0.28 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.24 | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.07 |
| Adjusted R Square | .06 | | | | .06 | | | |
| Std. Error of the Estimate | .95 | | | | .97 | | | |

Perceptions on Taxation, Tax Administration and Fairness


When we turn next revenue raising activities of the state and notably the tax levy and collection, we observe that the Turkish respondents consider the tax burden on the middle and lower income groups as quite high (Figure 9). When compared with the findings of the ISSP 2006 Survey we observe that the Turkish responses are close to France, Czech Republic, Uruguay, and Norway, and way above Switzerland, South Korea, Germany and the United States (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: Tax Burden and Fairness



When asked to rate the performance of the tax authorities in the country, most seem to respond that the tax authorities make the respondents pay their taxes most of the time (Figure 9). However, a broad swath of the respondents seems to believe that the tax authorities do not always apply the law without taking into consideration the status or the network of the tax payers (see Figure 10). Unfortunately, these questions were asked for the first time with the ISSP 2016 Survey, the findings of which are not yet comparatively available. Therefore, we are not in a position to provide a comparison of how the Turkish respondents are rated *vis-à-vis* these questions.

Figure 10. The Tax Collection Practices: Fairness and Impartiality



In the eyes of the Turkish respondents, the corporate economic interests are not necessarily eager to pay their taxes by the law. One out of six respondents seem to believe that they almost always try to avoid paying taxes and one out of every four or five respondents seem to believe that the corporations often tend to avoid paying their taxes, and one third of the respondents seem to argue that they sometimes avoid paying their taxes; though almost the similar percentages also indicate that the corporations comply with the tax laws and regulations (see Figure 11). The respondents may also be registering an opinion that corporations create enough loopholes in the tax regulations to avoid paying their taxes.

Figure 11. Corporations and Tax Collection



The Turkish taxpayers have experienced 33 major tax pardons from 1924 till 2016 (Kumkale, R., 2016), which is one every 33.5 months or 1000 days or so. Some believe that such a practice produces a significant incentive to avoid paying taxes, for with every pardon the taxpayers end up paying less than the burden that they initially had (ibid.). Under the circumstances, it is only plausible to assume that the respondents register their opinions and attitudes toward the corporate tax paying practices to indicate that corporations tend to avoid paying their taxes some or most of the time (Figure 11). However, since we do not have the ISSP 2016 data to compare the Turkish respondents' responses with, we are not in a position to evaluate the comparative position of the country yet.

Government Managing Security, Privacy, and Freedom

The Turkish Grand National Assembly promulgated the right to information act (no. 4982) in September 2003. This move was hailed as a major move toward transparency. However, given the developments of the last two decades, when various terror waves and a coup attempt influenced the political agenda of the country it became less clear whether this right was to be preserved as an absolute right or be restricted under some conditions. The question was posed to the respondents, and about half of them

(45%) seemed to argue that public safety should be given priority to access to government information (see Figure 12). Only about one out of four respondents (26%) share the opinion that all government information should be publicly accessible and almost one out five (18%) respondents are somewhere in between these two positions (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: Right to Information versus Public Safety




Table 8 presents the determinants of preferences along the ten-point scale presented above. We see that the more libertarian end of the scale is preferred by women, ethnic and sectarian minorities (Kurds and Alevis), and the Kurdish HDP identifiers. Urban dwellers are significantly more on the libertarian end, but respondents of higher income appear to be more inclined to support public security over freedom of access to government information. All other major party identifiers appear insignificantly different from one another.

Table 8. Here is a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 is “all government information should be publicly available, even if this meant a risk to public security” and 10 is “public security should be given priority, even if this meant limiting access to government information.

| | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | Sig. |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | |
| (Constant) | 6.91 | 0.60 | | 0.00 |
| Age in years | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.98 |
| DV for Female=1 | -0.31 | 0.18 | -0.06 | 0.09 |
| Education in years | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.19 |
| Household income in 000 TL | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.09 | 0.01 |
| DV for Urban dwellers=1 | -0.77 | 0.22 | -0.12 | 0.00 |
| # of people living in the household | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.65 |
| DV for Kurdish speakers | -0.61 | 0.28 | -0.09 | 0.03 |
| DV for Alevi | -0.44 | 0.20 | -0.07 | 0.03 |
| Left-Right self-placement | -0.04 | 0.04 | -0.04 | 0.36 |
| Religious practice (0 to 6) | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.73 |
| AKP identifiers | 0.02 | 0.21 | 0.00 | 0.94 |
| CHP identifiers | -0.21 | 0.28 | -0.03 | 0.45 |
| HDP identifiers | -0.84 | 0.46 | -0.07 | 0.07 |
| MHP identifiers | -0.02 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 0.96 |
| Adjusted R Square | .03 | | | |
| Std. Error of the Estimate | 2.57 | | | |

On another potential threat to public safety, the respondents also seem to be inclined not to provide much leeway for protest against the government to take place (see Figures 13 and 14). Turkish respondents seem to be one of the least tolerant toward the organization of protest meetings or marches and demonstrations among all of the ISSP member countries of the 2006 Survey (Figures 13 and 14). They seem to be somewhat more tolerant toward revolutionaries holding meetings (see Figure 15), but again show little tolerance for their dissemination of their views by publishing books (Figure 16).

Figure 13. Protest against Government




Figure 14. Protest Marches and Demonstrations




Figure 15: Revolutionaries hold Meetings to express their Views





Figure 16: Revolutionaries should be able to Publish Books to Express Views



When we bring all these attitudes towards protest behavior together we observe that they form a single dimension (Table 9). Those respondents who score high on this dimension would tend to favor more prohibitive stances across the four items used. Table 10 shows that older, more affluent, right-wing, religiously observant, and AKP identifiers appear to support more prohibitive, stance whereas the Alevis, the CHP and HDP identifiers and urban dwellers appear more be more permissive toward protests and protesters.

| Table 9. Attitudes towards protest behavior (Factor Analysis results) | |
|---|---|
| | Permissive vs. Prohibitive Approach to protest behavior |
| Should people be allowed to hold public meetings to express their views? | .88 |
| Should people be allowed to publish books expressing their views? | .87 |
| Should organizing public meetings to protest against the government be allowed? | .86 |
| Should organizing protest marches and demonstrations be allowed? | .88 |
| % of Variance | 75.9 |
| Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. | |

| Table 10. Explainin Permissive vs. Prohibitive Approaches to protest behavior | | | | |
|--|-----------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|
| | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | Sig. |
| | B | Std. Error | Beta | |
| (Constant) | -1.11 | 0.19 | | 0.00 |
| Age in years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| DV for Female=1 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.28 |
| Education in years | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.07 |
| Household income in 000 TL | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.00 |
| DV for Urban dwellers=1 | -0.23 | 0.07 | -0.09 | 0.00 |
| # of people living in the household | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.42 |
| DV for Kurdish speakers | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.16 |
| DV for Alevis | -0.17 | 0.06 | -0.08 | 0.01 |
| Left-Right self-placement | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.28 | 0.00 |
| Religious practice (0 to 6) | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| AKP identifiers | 0.29 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.00 |
| CHP identifiers | -0.38 | 0.09 | -0.14 | 0.00 |
| HDP identifiers | -0.26 | 0.15 | -0.06 | 0.08 |
| MHP identifiers | -0.18 | 0.11 | -0.05 | 0.12 |
| Adjusted R Square | .27 | | | |
| Std. Error of the Estimate | .83 | | | |

The attitudes of the respondents in Turkey in 2017 toward detention of people without trial for long periods of time seem to be amongst the least favorable in all of the ISSP countries of the 2006 Survey (see Figure 17). It is also similar to telephone tapping, which seems to be somewhat less popular a measure than stopping and searching people randomly by the law enforcement authorities (see Figures 18 and 19). However, in comparison to the ISSP 2006 countries, Turkish respondents' position on such public safety measures seem to be supportive and not sensitive to concerns over civil liberties. The surveillance of the people by video cameras in public seems to be popular, though the respondents seem to be much less inclined to extend support for e-mail and other messaging being monitored by the authorities on the internet (see Figure 20). Finally, the vast majority of the respondents (about 65 -70%) seem to believe that the government should not have the right to collect information on people either in Turkey or abroad without their knowledge (Figure 21). There seem to be many shades of support for public safety over civil liberties, which is hard to generalize. For a country that is going through a very rough time dealing with terror and political instability, such a complex picture of attitudes does not seem to be unwarranted.

Figure 17: Authorities Should Detain People before putting them on Trial




Figure 18. Authorities should Tap Telephone Conversations





Figure 19. Authorities Should Stop / Search People Randomly



| Table 11. Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen. Do you think the authorities should have the right to | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|------------|-------------|------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Yes=1, No=0 | detain people for as long as they want without putting them on trial? | | | tap people's telephone conversations? | | | stop/search people randomly? | | |
| | B | Sig. | Exp(B) | B | Sig. | Exp(B) | B | Sig. | Exp(B) |
| Age in years | .00 | .87 | 1.00 | .00 | .44 | 1.00 | .00 | .42 | 1.00 |
| DV for Female=1 | -.05 | .73 | .95 | .12 | .41 | 1.13 | .23 | .12 | 1.26 |
| Education in years | .00 | .86 | 1.00 | .00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | .00 | .91 | 1.00 |
| Household income in 000 TL | .00 | .69 | 1.00 | .00 | .05 | 1.00 | .00 | .04 | 1.00 |
| DV for Urban dwellers=1 | -.29 | .11 | .75 | -.17 | .33 | .84 | -.17 | .33 | .84 |
| # of people living in the household | .00 | .97 | 1.00 | -.01 | .82 | .99 | -.02 | .68 | .98 |
| DV for Kurdish speakers | .73 | .00 | 2.07 | .38 | .08 | 1.46 | .28 | .20 | 1.33 |
| DV for Alevis | -.12 | .47 | .88 | -.09 | .60 | .92 | -.19 | .24 | .83 |
| Left-Right self-placement | .16 | .00 | 1.18 | .18 | .00 | 1.19 | .13 | .00 | 1.14 |
| Religious practice (0 to 6) | -.03 | .45 | .97 | .03 | .34 | 1.03 | .06 | .08 | 1.06 |
| AKP identifiers | .02 | .90 | 1.02 | .11 | .51 | 1.12 | .44 | .01 | 1.55 |
| CHP identifiers | -.81 | .00 | .45 | -.64 | .01 | .53 | -.76 | .00 | .47 |
| HDP identifiers | -.57 | .13 | .57 | -.70 | .07 | .50 | -.64 | .10 | .53 |
| MHP identifiers | -.71 | .03 | .49 | -.85 | .00 | .43 | .03 | .91 | 1.03 |
| Constant | -1.31 | .01 | .27 | -1.38 | .00 | .25 | -1.46 | .00 | .23 |
| -2 Log likelihood | 1242.6 | | | 1323.8 | | | 1323.9 | | |
| Cox & Snell R Square | 0.08 | | | 0.10 | | | 0.12 | | |
| Nagelkerke R Square | 0.11 | | | 0.13 | | | 0.16 | | |
| Hosmer and Lemeshow Test | | | | | | | | | |
| Chi-square Sig. | 0.12 | | | 0.55 | | | 0.50 | | |

Although the above figures show us where Turkish respondents stand in comparison to the larger list of ISSP countries, we do not know who actually supports these three restrictive policies in Turkey. In order to explain the popular bases of support for these policies we divided the answers to the three items into those who evaluate that authorities should have the right to detain people as long as they want without putting them on trial, tap people's telephone conversations or stop and search people in the street at random. We see from Table 11 that the CHP identifiers have significantly lower likelihood of approving all three of these policies compared to other party identifiers. Surprisingly, MHP identifiers are also less likely to support the detention and tapping of telephone conversations but appear to be insignificantly different from the AKP group on random stop and search policy. Right-wing voters appear more likely to support these restrictive policies. Surprisingly Kurdish speakers also are supportive of detention and phone tapping policies. Higher income respondents are also more supportive of the phone tapping and random stop and search policy but not of the detention policy.

Figure 20. Civil Liberties versus Public Security






Figure 21: Government and Surveillance



Perceptions of the Law, Fairness and Law Abiding Behavior

The moral imperative to abide by the law may not be so clear cut in many situations. Some laws may be unjust or unfair for some groups and communities of people, in other circumstances solidarity, compassion, pity, and other motives may inhibit one to follow the law blindly. When asked the respondents in Turkey seem to be almost evenly divided on this issue, just like those from Denmark, United States, Ireland and Czech Republic of the ISSP 2006 survey (see Figure 22).

Figure 22: Law Obedience: Ironclad Obedience versus Conscience




We analyzed this policy stance again in the form of a dichotomous variable that differentiates those who advocate that people should obey the law without exception as opposed to those who argue that people should follow their own conscience. We observe from Table 12 that MHP and HDP identifiers are less likely to support the tougher stance and refute people's use of their conscience. Kurdish speakers who are not HDP voters are more likely to be on the tougher side, whereas women are more likely to support appealing to conscience.

Table 12. In general would you say that people should obey the law without exception (1), or are there exceptional occasions on which people should follow their conscience even if it means breaking the law (0)?

| | B | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|
| Age in years | .01 | .09 | 1.01 |
| DV for Female=1 | -0.48 | 0.00 | 0.62 |
| Education in years | .01 | .59 | 1.01 |
| Household income in 000 TL | .00 | .22 | 1.00 |
| DV for Urban dwellers=1 | -.09 | .60 | .91 |
| # of people living in the household | -.02 | .63 | .98 |
| DV for Kurdish speakers | 0.79 | 0.00 | 2.19 |
| DV for Alevis | -.20 | .19 | .81 |
| Left-Right self-placement | .04 | .17 | 1.05 |
| Religious practice (0 to 6) | .00 | .92 | 1.00 |
| AKP identifiers | -.14 | .40 | .87 |
| CHP identifiers | -.28 | .20 | .75 |
| HDP identifiers | -0.86 | 0.01 | 0.42 |
| MHP identifiers | -0.59 | 0.04 | 0.55 |
| Constant | -.33 | .48 | .72 |
| -2 Log likelihood | 1389.91 | | |
| Cox & Snell R Square | .05 | | |
| Nagelkerke R Square | .06 | | |
| Hosmer and Lemeshow Test | | | |
| Chi-square Sig. | .05 | | |

The Turkish respondents seem to be less inclined to consider convicting an innocent person than letting a guilty one set free by the judicial error of a court (see Figure 23). However, almost all of the ISSP 2006 survey participants are similarly inclined. Therefore, when compared the responses of the Turkish 2017 survey seem to indicate that they were somewhat like the Venezuelan, Filipinos, British, and Hungarian respondents, whereby large minorities tend to consider letting the guilty person free is a worse choice (see Figure 23). Turkish responses of 2017 seem not to be anywhere close to the ISSP average so far as the image of justice seems to be concerned. In an environment where conspiracy theories of several sorts abound, and under severe political crisis produced by political instability and institutional decay, such a split opinion on the idea of justice does not look implausible.

Figure 23: Justice: Convict the Innocent versus Free a Guilty Person




Surprisingly perhaps, Table 13 shows that the CHP identifiers together with Kurdish speakers, and more affluent people appear more likely to find that letting a guilty person free is worse than convicting an innocent person.

| Table 13. All systems of justice make mistakes, but which do you think is worse to convict an innocent person (0) or to let a guilty person go free (1)? | | | |
|---|----------------|-------------|-------------|
| | B | Sig. | Exp(B) |
| Age in years | .01 | .30 | 1.01 |
| DV for Female=1 | .04 | .78 | 1.04 |
| Education in years | .04 | .07 | 1.04 |
| Household income in 000 TL | 0.00 | 0.05 | 1.00 |
| DV for Urban dwellers=1 | .14 | .44 | 1.15 |
| # of people living in the household | -.04 | .39 | .96 |
| DV for Kurdish speakers | 0.50 | 0.05 | 1.64 |
| DV for Alevis | .17 | .33 | 1.19 |
| Left-Right self-placement | .00 | .95 | 1.00 |
| Religious practice (0 to 6) | .07 | .08 | 1.07 |
| AKP identifiers | -.24 | .18 | .79 |
| CHP identifiers | 0.58 | 0.03 | 1.78 |
| HDP identifiers | .18 | .66 | 1.20 |
| MHP identifiers | .07 | .83 | 1.07 |
| Constant | .07 | .88 | 1.08 |
| -2 Log likelihood | 1180.20 | | |
| Cox & Snell R Square | .03 | | |
| Nagelkerke R Square | .04 | | |
| Hosmer and Lemeshow Test | | | |
| Chi-square Sig. | .35 | | |

Perceptions and Expectations of the Government for Providing Security

As Table 1 of this paper demonstrated Security / Defense is considered as a major problem facing the country in the eyes of the respondents who participated in the ISSP 2016 Survey in the Autumn of 2017. Therefore, when asked how successful the government was in dealing with the security challenges facing the country the responses given seem to indicate an almost even divide of 40% considering the government successful and 35% considering it unsuccessful (Figure 24). Ordinal correlations indicated that there was a systematic association between partisan identity and the responses given ($\eta = 0.42$ with AKP identity, and $\eta = -0.34$ with CHP identity), and also with the ideological position of the respondent (Somers's D = .36). The AKP government identifiers and those on the right of the left – right scale considered the government successful, and those on the left and main opposition CHP identifiers considered it unsuccessful.

Figure 24: Dealing with Security Challenges



Who Governs? Political Efficacy, National, and Global Interests

Compared with the responses given by the ISSP 2006 countries the Turkish respondents look as if they feel relatively inefficacious (see Figure 25). However, the same Turkish respondents seem to argue that they have a pretty good understanding of the most critical issues of the country, and they are almost around the average of the respondents who participated in the ISSP 2006 country surveys (see Figure 26). The Turkish respondents of the ISSP 2016 also seem to trust their MP's that they would try to carry out their campaign promises, which is about the average of the ISSP 2006 survey results (see Figure 27). However, the civil servants seem also to be lagging behind the MPs in the popular trust demonstrated toward them in the eyes of the Turkish respondents (Figure 28).

Figure 25: Have No Say in What the Government Does




Figure 26: Understand Politics




Figure 27: MP's Live up to Campaign Promises





Figure 28: Trust Civil Servants



In the eyes of the Turkish respondents, it seems as if the most important influence on the government comes from the media, followed remotely by business interests of banks and industry, and closely followed by the electorate/citizens and the party identifiers (see Figure 29). Organized labor and non-governmental organization of the civil society do not seem to carry much weight in the eyes of the respondents of the ISSP 2016 survey in Turkey (see Figure 29). One out of twelve respondents also believe that international organizations, such as the IMF or the UN play a major role, which seems to be a small minority (Figure 29). Unfortunately, we do not have the data from the ISSP on this question yet to compare how Turkey fares comparatively along these responses. A little more than half of the respondents (55% or so) believe that policies of the government are nationally formulated as opposed to about three out of ten (29%) who argue that international and global economic and political events determine the kind of policies governments make in Turkey (see Figure 30).

Figure 29: Government and Interests: Domestic and Global

Here is a list people and organisations that can influence government actions.
Please select the ones you think have the most and the second most influence on the actions of the
(Country) government?





Figure 30: National versus Global Powers in charge



Evaluating the Performance of the Government

Given the previous evaluations, we now turn to the overall performance of the state and government in Turkey and ask whether services could be provided fairly, according to law and equitably. The easiest way to determine such a performance is to inquire about the level of political corruption in the country. Half of the respondents (50%) argued that there was quite a lot of corruption in Turkey and an additional one out of six respondents (14%) argued that almost all of the politicians are corrupt (see Figure 31). However, these responses put Turkey in almost about the middle range of all of the ISSP countries that participated in the 2006 surveys, in the middle of the Philippines, Chile, United States and South Africa (see Figure 31). The respondents give a similar response for the level of corruption of the public officials in Turkey as well (Figure 32), which makes Turkey slightly worse off among the ISSP countries of the 2006 survey (see Figure 32). When asked whether the respondent was ever contacted for bribe giving, the performance of Turkey gets even worse (see Figure 33), where the country is now ranked right between the Philippines and South Africa and near the bottom of the pile (see Figure 33).

Ordinal correlations indicate that these responses are again associated with left-right ideological positioning, whereby left leaning respondents register existence of more corruption (Somer's $D = -.18$), and partisan affiliation also matter so that AKP identifiers register existence

of less corruption (Somer's D = -.33), and CHP identifiers register more perceived corruption (Somer's D = .25).

Apparently, corruption perception is widespread in Turkey. If the Transparency International Corruption Perception Indices are to be taken into perspective, the Turkish performance has gotten worse since the early 2010s, dropping from 54/176 in 2012 to 75/176 in 2016, after improving between 2000 and 2010 (http://www.transparency.org/country#TUR_DataResearch_SurveysIndices). However, we should warn the reader that although the respondents register an image of widespread corruption, they do not seem to consider corruption as a significant problem facing the country either (see Table 1 of this Report).

Figure 31: Are Politicians Corrupt?





Figure 32: Are Public Officials Corrupt?




We converted the two questions on whether the politicians and the public bureaucrats are corrupt, or not, into a binomial format differentiating those who believe that quite a lot to almost all politicians or public officials are involved in corruption (1) from those who think that these are few or almost no one is involved in corruption (0). We observe a clear partisan divide here. AKP identifiers are significantly less likely to claim that politicians or public officials are involved in corruption whereas the opposition CHP identifiers are more likely to assert the opposite. Older, more educated, and higher income respondents are similar to the CHP, whereas right wing respondents appear similar to the AKP identifiers (see Table 14).

Table 14. Corruption, politicians and public officials

| | Are politicians in Turkey involved in corruption? | | | Are public officials in Turkey involved in corruption? | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|------------|-------------|---|------------|-------------|
| | B | Sig. | Exp(B) | B | Sig. | Exp(B) |
| Age in years | .01 | .03 | 1.01 | .01 | .05 | 1.01 |
| DV for Female=1 | .03 | .88 | 1.03 | -.24 | .15 | .79 |
| Education in years | .04 | .10 | 1.04 | .07 | .00 | 1.08 |
| Household income in 000 TL | .00 | .02 | 1.00 | .00 | .06 | 1.00 |
| DV for Urban dwellers=1 | .34 | .09 | 1.41 | .27 | .16 | 1.32 |
| # of people living in the household | .05 | .36 | 1.05 | .12 | .02 | 1.12 |
| DV for Kurdish speakers | .38 | .14 | 1.47 | .19 | .44 | 1.21 |
| DV for Alevis | .29 | .13 | 1.34 | .23 | .21 | 1.25 |
| Left-Right self-placement | -.11 | .01 | .90 | -.07 | .08 | .94 |
| Religious practice (0 to 6) | -.06 | .17 | .94 | -.09 | .03 | .92 |
| AKP identifiers | -1.29 | .00 | .28 | -.90 | .00 | .41 |
| CHP identifiers | .59 | .06 | 1.80 | .58 | .03 | 1.79 |
| HDP identifiers | -.45 | .31 | .64 | .46 | .32 | 1.58 |
| MHP identifiers | -.21 | .49 | .81 | .13 | .66 | 1.14 |
| Constant | .76 | .18 | 2.13 | -.13 | .81 | .87 |
| -2 Log likelihood | 1019.6 | | | 1078.4 | | |
| Cox & Snell R Square | 0.18 | | | 0.15 | | |
| Nagelkerke R Square | 0.24 | | | 0.20 | | |
| Hosmer and Lemeshow Test | | | | | | |
| Chi-square Sig. | 0.02 | | | 0.46 | | |

Figure 33: Has the Respondent been Contacted for a Bribe?



A vast majority of the respondents still consider the state as the most reliable source for providing such social welfare services as healthcare for the sick, care for the elderly, and schools and education for children (see Figures 34). In both healthcare for the sick and the standard of living for the elderly the government is perceived to be highly successful (see Figures 35 and 36). In both cases, Turkey ranks as the third most successful country in providing healthcare for the sick and decent standard of living for the elderly in the eyes of the respondents of the ISSP 2016 survey in 2017 in Turkey, when compared with the ISSP 2006 surveys in the world (see Figures 35 and 36).

Figure 34: The Role of State in Social Welfare




Figure 35: Government Performance: Health care for the Sick?





Figure 36: Government Performance: Standard of Living for the Elderly



| Table 15. How successful do you think the government in Turkey is nowadays in each of the following areas? | | | | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|------------|-------------|---|------------|-------------|---|------------|-------------|
| | Providing health care for the sick | | | Providing a decent standard of living for the old | | | Dealing with threats to Turkey's security | | |
| | B | Sig. | Exp(B) | B | Sig. | Exp(B) | B | Sig. | Exp(B) |
| Age in years | .00 | .91 | 1.00 | -.01 | .22 | .99 | .00 | .63 | 1.00 |
| DV for Female=1 | .05 | .73 | 1.06 | .00 | .98 | 1.00 | .12 | .46 | 1.12 |
| Education in years | -.01 | .51 | .99 | -.05 | .03 | .95 | -.03 | .15 | .97 |
| Household income in 000 TL | .00 | .08 | 1.00 | .00 | .00 | 1.00 | .00 | .02 | 1.00 |
| DV for Urban dwellers=1 | -.38 | .05 | .68 | -.65 | .00 | .52 | -.50 | .01 | .61 |
| # of people living in the household | -.02 | .74 | .98 | -.05 | .31 | .96 | -.01 | .89 | .99 |
| DV for Kurdish speakers | .20 | .41 | 1.22 | -.03 | .90 | .97 | -.14 | .55 | .87 |
| DV for Alevis | -.55 | .00 | .58 | -.56 | .00 | .57 | -.47 | .01 | .62 |
| Left-Right self-placement | .16 | .00 | 1.18 | .19 | .00 | 1.21 | .18 | .00 | 1.20 |
| Religious practice (0 to 6) | .11 | .00 | 1.11 | .06 | .11 | 1.06 | .08 | .03 | 1.08 |
| AKP identifiers | .70 | .00 | 2.02 | .68 | .00 | 1.97 | .68 | .00 | 1.98 |
| CHP identifiers | -1.36 | .00 | .26 | -1.46 | .00 | .23 | -1.99 | .00 | .14 |
| HDP identifiers | -.66 | .08 | .52 | .27 | .46 | 1.32 | -.82 | .09 | .44 |
| MHP identifiers | -.49 | .08 | .61 | -.79 | .01 | .45 | -.67 | .03 | .51 |
| Constant | -.68 | .19 | .51 | -.41 | .43 | .67 | -1.39 | .01 | .25 |
| -2 Log likelihood | 1169.0 | | | 1199.7 | | | 1148.9 | | |
| Cox & Snell R Square | 0.23 | | | 0.22 | | | 0.24 | | |
| Nagelkerke R Square | 0.31 | | | 0.29 | | | 0.32 | | |
| Hosmer and Lemeshow Test | | | | | | | | | |
| Chi-square Sig. | 0.76 | | | 0.78 | | | 0.14 | | |

We again dichotomized the three government performance evaluations concerning provision of healthcare for the sick, provision of a decent standard of living for the old and dealing with threats to Turkey's security. All three areas appear primarily shaped by the partisan divide. The right-wing and AKP supporters are more likely to find the government successful than the opposition parties. The MHP identifiers appear on the opposition side this time. Alevis and urban dwellers appear less likely to find the government successful, while higher income respondents are more likely to find the government successful.

Conclusion

The ISSP Role of Government – 2016 Survey conducted in Turkey between August and November 2017 unearthed that unemployment and cost of living are the most important problems facing the country in the eyes of the public. They are followed by national security and terror, and education as other pressing problems facing the country. As expected, most respondents identified the government/state as the source of their expected action in solving these problems, even though they expect smaller government and public spending cuts.

The priority of the respondents seemed to be related to job creation, improved life standards for the unemployed, children in school and students in college and the elderly, whose numbers have started to increase in proportion to the general population in the 21st century, as life expectancy increased from 71 years in 2000 to 77.3 years in 2017 (<http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist>.) Elderly care is slowly becoming a significant concern and a policy issue in Turkey. Nevertheless, the public perception of the government services for the elderly and healthcare seem to be considerably favorable. The government is perceived as doing a good job of providing social welfare services. However, we have to underline that these evaluations have been primarily shaped by partisan preferences. In other words, if an individual is a supporter of the ruling government than his/her evaluations are more favorable. The partisan divide may be hiding problem areas as long as alternative parties are too remote from coming to power and/or the overall satisfaction with the governing party is sufficiently high. However, as far as getting into the top two most important issues facing the country are concerned, healthcare does not appear to be among those issues of top salience in Turkey. This, however, does not mean that there is no room or expectation of improvement. It seems as if there is more demand for the improved spending of the state in the social welfare services, including healthcare. Our findings of earlier ISSP Surveys on Health (2011)⁵ and Family (2012)⁶ also unearthed that a more comprehensive set of measures are demanded especially by the women from the state in the fields of child and elderly care in Turkey.

Education had also been a perennial issue for Turkish politics as population growth rate had hovered around 2% per annum for long years in the 20th century. However, the population growth rate has gone down to around 1 percent by the 2010s (<http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist>) as children and the young are slowly losing their preponderance in the Turkish population. However, a new issue emerged about education as the government seems to be pushing forcibly to create a conservative generation. Religious education is getting a massive boost from the government, and the content of the curriculum is emerging as a new issue precipitating some form of *kulturkampf* in Turkish society and politics. It looks as if education will continue to be a central issue in Turkish politics for many years to come,

⁵ See <http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Saglik-Raporu.pdf>.

⁶ See <http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Aile-2012-ISSP-Family-Survey-final.pdf>.

although those who demand education will be dwindling as the population growth rate drops steadily.

Security, defense, and terror continue to occupy a significant issue space in the minds of the people in Turkey. This is perceived as a domain that needs to be managed by the state and the government with greater effectiveness. The people seem to be eager to spend much more on defense, security and terror management. Again one has to bear in mind that these preferences are also primarily a function of partisan identification and not necessarily performance, efficiency or effectiveness in handling the problem priorities. However, crime or non-terror related crime seems not to occupy any significant concern in the minds of the people. Indeed, crime does not emerge as a significant problem facing the country. Some of the measures the law enforcement authorities take, such as video camera surveillance of public spaces seems to be receiving support from the people at large. Given the high level of partisan support for anything that government does in the country and the prevalent level of conservatism and ideologically right-wing orientation, such callous attitude towards direct intervention into private life spheres may not be surprising. However, even under such unfavorable conditions for expressions of worry about government's involvement in the private sphere of individuals, we still observe that being an identifier of an opposition party or of left-wing ideology or being a member of the major sectarian or ethnic minorities in the country increase the likelihood of individuals to be critical and unsupportive of such policy interventions that threaten individual liberties.

There is also a downside of the overall performance of the elected politicians and the public officials. In the eye of the public corruption seems to be relatively widespread among them. The public perceptions of their political and bureaucratic masters seem to go through the prisms of ideological position and partisan identity of the respondents as well. However, about two thirds of the respondents have registered that political corruption exists to a certain extent. The level of corruption does not seem to make the Turkish case an outlier among the ISSP members of the 2006 Survey on the Role of Government, and neither is it perceived as a most or second most important problem that face the country. Political corruption then tends to fall through the cracks of partisanship and polarized ideological split in the society and could be effectively managed by media spin as more of a conspiracy than an issue of fairness, legitimacy, and capture of economic resources by crony capitalism of the country.

It is a matter of the fact that Turkish politics has been operating with a constitution that does not enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the vast majority of political forces since the 1980s, except perhaps the military, and even that for a while. Therefore, a profound crisis of political legitimacy looms at the background of the political regime and the game of politics that unfolds in the country. Under those circumstances, it is relatively difficult to define constitutionality, legality, and legitimacy of policy options and executions. Therefore, partisanship gains further relevance and justification for considering what constitutes legitimate policy execution. Such a divisive and polarized polity often fails to understand and share the same from emerging

political facts. Thus corruption becomes harder to define and be recognized by the public at large, which provides an immaculate opportunity for media spin to re-package facts as alternate facts for partisan consumption. Under the circumstances, the opposition can hardly gain much traction from accusations of political corruption, that turns into a non-issue, which we believe our findings in the ISSP Role of Government Survey – Turkey also unearthed.

We had pondered earlier in this paper that whether the image of the Turkish state as a Papa State, the omnipotent, unaccountable, powerful transcendental entity in the eyes of its citizens have changed or not? The ISSP Role of Government Survey 2016 - Turkey does not provide a direct answer to that question, however, state is considered as a major economic agent providing for industrial development, jobs, social welfare and cope with the security challenges that the country faces. Despite significant partisan divide, the military still seems to be perceived as that organ of the state that deserves the greatest boost of financial support. Although trust in public officials seem to be relatively low in Turkey with less than one in four respondents agreeing with the statement that most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country (see Figure 28), it does not rank Turkey much different from Britain, Germany or South Korea of the 2006 ISSP Survey. In spite of all the pushback of the power of the public bureaucracy by the elected politicians and their brazen propaganda, the overall trust in the public officials (*memur*) seemed not to have ebbed to the bottom of the ISSP ranks yet. In a capacity rich, affluent social setting with a functioning democratic governance and rule of law, such levels of low trust in public officials may not be alarming. Given the partisan divide in all evaluations government performance, lack of well-respected legal framework and constitutional safeguards with the rule of law, the shaky state of trust in civil servants in the country may not be comforting.

On all major policy areas, the state is still being given the priority to provide for the sick, education for the children and care for the elderly. In fact, health care emerges as a major service area in which the government seems to be perceived as having delivered most effectively in the eyes of the respondents.

Turkey is a fast changing and in many respects chaotic social setting. Any new piece of information, such as the ISSP Survey about the country could only hope to be partially contributing to cover the lack of information we are facing. Our new dataset places Turkey within a comparative framework only with about a lag of a decade. The comparative framework of the ISSP-Role of Government survey questionnaire is also limited in its ability to grasp *suis generis* nature of the Turkish society and its conceptions concerning its state and government. Given the recent developments in Turkish society and politics, our diagnoses, we believe provide some clues for a better understanding, but obviously further work is needed to cover many areas and dimensions left unaddressed.

We clearly see how the Turkish state and government remains under the control of the forces of the Periphery for the longest period in country's history. This control has also slowly but surely gotten tighter, and faced many domestic and international challenges. Our findings

clearly show a deep partisan divide that is reflective partially of the legacy of the cleavage of the Center-Periphery animosity from the recent Turkish history. Under such conditions it is quite difficult and perhaps impossible to separate reality from partisan interpretation. All results that seem encouraging or discouraging to the followers and scholars of Turkey appear to be somewhat blurred by the partisan biases of the respondents who provide us with their answers. We hence have to remember the larger picture of partisan divide and the *kulturkampf* that shapes the Turkish society when we interpret these findings; which we had hoped to do in the preceding analyses.

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