

**CHANGING STATE PREFERENCES OF GREECE TOWARDS TURKEY'S
EU ACCESSION ON THE ROAD TO THE HELSINKI SUMMIT OF 1999**

by

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ABSTRACT

CHANGING STATE PREFERENCES OF GREECE TOWARDS TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION ON THE ROAD TO THE HELSINKI SUMMIT OF 1999

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Key Words: Rational Choice Institutionalism, Neo-institutionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, state preferences, preference formation, pressure groups

Greece and Turkey cannot be regarded as the bosom neighbors of all time as relations between two have been strained several times thought the course of history. However, 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU could be rendered as a major turning point in Greco-Turkish relations history as an attempt to break down the ages-old antagonism between two countries. Having a specific term as “Greco-Turkish Rapprochement” or “Détente” in literature, such reconciliation has been analyzed by various scholars from sociological or constructivist point of views such as the disaster diplomacy following the devastating earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999 and 2000, major efforts of diplomatic actors namely Ismail Cem and Yorgo Papandreu or contributions of notable public figures and intelligentsia. This thesis would like to bring a pure rationalist approach to Greco-Turkish Rapprochement and seeks to understand the changing state preferences of Greece and Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey's EU Accession on the road to the Helsinki Summit of 1999. In attempt to explain the underlying reasons behind Greece's shifted foreign policy approach to Turkey, this thesis examines the major political parties in Greek polity and how domestic actors, particularly, public opinion, have influenced them. As an external factor playing an important role in Greek foreign policy making, the significant impact of the European Union will also be discussed.

ÖZET

1999 HELSİNKİ ZİRVESİ'NE GİDEN YOLDA YUNANİSTAN'IN TÜRKİYE'NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NE ÜYELİĞİ KONUSUNDA DEĞİŞEN TERCİHLERİ

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Yunanistan ve Türkiye tarih boyunca ilişkileri birçok kez zedelenen iki ülke olarak dünyanın en iyi geçinen iki komşusu sayılamazlar. Bununla birlikte, 1999 Helsinki Zirvesi iki ülke arasındaki tarihi düşmanlığı yok etme yolunda atılan önemli teşebbüs olması açısından bir dönüm noktası olarak nitelendirilebilir. Literatürde “Türk-Yunan Uzlaşması” ve “Detant” olarak adlandırılan bu yumuşama, 1999 yılında Türkiye ve Yunanistan’da art arda meydana gelen depremlerin ardından “Afet Diplomasisi”, İsmail Cem ve Yorgo Papandreu gibi devlet adamlarının bireysel uğraşları ve her ülkedeki aydın kesimin etkisi üzerinden akademisyenlerce sosyolojik ve yapısalcı bakış açılarıyla değerlendirilmiştir. Bu tez Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde gerçekleşen bu uzlaşmaya rasyonel bir bakış açısı getirerek 1999 Helsinki Zirvesi’ne giden yolda Türkiye’nin AB’ye Üyeliği karşısında Yunanistan’ın değişen dış politika tercihlerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Yunanistan’ın Türkiye’ye karşı değişen dış politika tutumu arkasındaki nedenleri açıklamak amacıyla bu tez önde gelen Yunan siyasi partilerini ve bu partiler üzerinde geniş çaplı etkiye sahip olan, özellikle kamuoyu olmak üzere, iç faktörleri değerlendirmektedir. Öte yandan Yunan dış politika yapımında dış bir etmen olarak önemli rol oynayan Avrupa Birliğinin yadsınamaz etkisi incelenecektir.

To my family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|------------------------------------|
| EC | European Community |
| EU | European Union |
| ND | New Democracy |
| PASOK | Panhellenist Socialist Movement |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |

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INTRODUCTION

A SHORT PRELUDE

It is no surprise to say that Turkey and Greece have been in constant conflict with each other particularly after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and with the subsequent Greek uprisings. These antagonistic relations could only become a little bit milder and less arduous following the revolutionary changes both in Turkey and Greece thanks to their leaders Ataturk and Venizelos respectively. With the shifting direction of both countries to stick together with the Western World after the First World War and accordingly developed chain of reforms, the state preferences of these two countries changed drastically towards one another in a positive way. However, these relations took a sour turn during the 1970s onwards due to several disputes over the jurisdiction of the Aegean Sea and the division of Cyprus into two different states. As the international trends evolved into more liberal economic and political structures in 1980's, it was inevitable for Greece to alter its nationalist foreign policy to a more cooperative and friendlier attitude towards its neighbor, Turkey. However, there is no doubt that the biggest factor to spur this change is the potential membership of both countries to the European Community (hereinafter referred to as "EU") and be a member of the democratic block of the contemporary world. Adding to the rivalry over the Aegean Sea waters and airspace following the Cyprus Intervention by Turkish Republic in 1974, two neighbors competed over EC membership which ended with the victory of Greece in 1981.

Inspired by the Greece's successful EC application in 1981, Turkey made her official application to the EC in 1987, however, also partly due to lobbying by Greece, Turkey wasn't considered as fit to the Europe as Greece by the European Community. Since its membership to the EC, Greece had become the major opponent to Turkey's EU accession by acting as an influential (veto) player in many issues concerning Turkey ranging from membership to funding. However, this went under some changes with the 1999 Helsinki European Council the following of which turned Greece an enthusiastic supporter of Turkey's EU accession. The Helsinki European Council in 1999 is a turning point in Turkish-Greek relations as Greece, for the first time, showed its support for Turkey's EU bid. Although Greece followed a single-handed approach to find a solution to its issues with Turkey and enjoyed its upper hand as an EC member, it

wasn't until the Helsinki Summit that Greece acknowledged the need for Turkey's involvement in the resolution process.

In consideration of such change in Greek's one-sided approach to a more Turkey-involved one, this thesis seeks to understand the altering state preferences of the Greece towards Turkish Accession by arguing that Greek domestic interest groups act as veto players in the government's foreign policy choices towards Turkey and the EU frames and constrains the Greek foreign policy preferences towards Turkey.

States as the main actors of the anarchic system have their firm and rational preferences towards other actors. However, these preferences are shaped with the contribution and intervention by various actors within the domestic politics of a state. The main domestic actors influential upon state preference formation are economic interest groups; political groups namely political parties, non-governmental organizations and trade associations or unions. Out of this wide array of domestic actors, groups with economic and political interests are overwhelmingly more instrumental to make change on state preferences. This thesis proposes that Greek state preferences changed in 1990's specifically after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 when Greece showed its blatant support for Turkey's EU accession and further advocates that this shift was motivated by domestic groups and the EU as a regulatory actor.

This thesis comprises of four chapters. In the first chapter I will introduce the theoretical framework that I will adopt throughout this thesis to explain Greek state preference formation. As the EU is one of the main actors within this framework and Greek state preference formation is partially shaped by the EU, this study will apply European integration theories of liberal intergovernmentalism by Andrew Moravcsik and his re-explanation for liberal intergovernmentalism with a "rationalist framework"¹. The main assumption based on these theories is that states are rational actors and they act according to their rational interests which are mostly shaped by their domestic interests groups and such international actors as the EU capable of imposing binding rules on its members. Based on this two-tier theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, this thesis analyzes the influence of domestic interest groups and the EU impact on the Greece foreign policy shift to supporting Turkey's EU accession.

¹ (A. Moravcsik, 1998)

The second chapter will be dedicated to the historical background of these changes and how historical atrocities and age-old rivalry play an instrumental role on states' foreign policy formation. With a short overture of ancient relations of the Greeks and Turks, the chapter will mainly deal with the history of conflicts between Greece and Turkey in 20th century with a close scrutiny on such major issues as Cyprus conflict, Aegean Sea problem, coastal waters and airspace dispute.

The third chapter concerns the domestic interests groups such as the political parties, the utility based approach of the public and the impact of the EU conditionality. The main proposal of this thesis will be also discussed in the third chapter that the Greek public opinion played a tremendously important role in the Greek foreign policy making process on normalizing the bilateral Greco-Turkish relations and the solidarity between two nations following the 1999 earthquakes hitting Turkey and Greece respectively prepared the perfect ground for Greece to normalize its relations with Turkey through supporting its EU membership.

The fourth chapter entails the conclusions from the empirical based analysis of Greco-Turkish relations. It constitutes a profound basis for my findings and explanations as well as suggestions and recommendations for further researches.

In this thesis, I will use data sources, including public statements and interviews by members of government and politicians, press reports, and the existing Turkish and English - language international relations and political science literature on Greco-Turkish relations.

CHAPTER I

A Theoretical Framework of Changing State Preferences

European Integration Theories in Explaining State Preference Formation

Realism is one of the most prominent and prevalent theories of international relations in explaining the behaviors of the states and what is the main motivation lying behind such behaviors. However, realism in its classical sense is not really explanatory in interpretation of the interstate interactions and what constrains their behaviors despite their constant tendency to use power. It is the point where neorealism come for help and bring an explanation to the structure that actually puts constrains on state behaviors and shape their decisions to a certain extent. As introduced by Kenneth Waltz², system is the most influential element in inter-state relations due to its characteristics of anarchy meaning there is no central authority neither to stop nor control states. Unlike classical realism, states don't chase after sole power maximization but they seek for survival as there is no authority to stop a state from attacking the other one. This uncertainty leads states to make either alliances with a hegemon or become the hegemon itself as long as it holds the power or counterbalance another potential hegemon. Realism adopts the idea that the state is the only unitary actor in international politics and similarly argues that states are the only determinant agents in foreign policy making. This thesis aims at challenging this idea and argues that states are not independent actors in foreign policy making besides, they are bounded and constrained by their inner dynamics which can be the public opinion, interest groups and other domestic actors. Such foreign policy attitude of a state falls upon the liberal paradigm of International Relations Theory with a specific focus on neoliberalism. Neoliberals share the core ideas of anarchy and the influential role of anarchy in inter-state relations like the neorealists, even though they contradict with each other on the debate whether the economic or the military

² (Waltz, 2001)

capabilities matters the most and whether domestic dynamics and actors play a role in foreign policy objectives. Domestic politics and agents, as this thesis focuses on, are one of the main catalysts to demark how these two realms of international relations approach foreign policy making. Although neoliberals and neorealists agree on the state of anarchy within the international system, it is the neo-liberals that adopts domestic actors as instrumental agents on foreign policy making while the other keep the state as its one and only actor (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012).

Pioneer figures in neoliberal paradigm studying on the effect of domestic politics and factors are James Fearon (Fearon, 1994), Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (De Mesquita, 2005), Robert Putnam (Putnam, 1988) and Andrew Moravcsik (A. Moravcsik, 1998) . As this thesis would like to answer whether domestic factors have any effect to spur a change in Greek national state preferences towards Turkey's EU accession, It would be more appropriate to base my ideas on such an integration theory as Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism approach which foresees that states set their foreign policy choices as the end product of an internal bargaining process and they advocate these domestic driven preferences on intergovernmental settings.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

In his famous theory of liberal intergovernmentalism with an empirical focus on European integration and enlargement, Moravcsik adopts the two-level game as introduced by Putnam (Putnam, 1988) in order to explain the relative bargaining power of state on an intergovernmental setting and the domestic dynamics and demands a state faces at home. According to Moravcsik, national state preferences, before going to the international bargaining processes to be represented are very much shaped by "economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system and the international institutions" (A. Moravcsik, 1998) .

Liberal intergovernmentalism came as a backlash theory against neo-functionalist theories of Ernst B. Haas³ and Leon Lindberg. It mainly drives from the empirical evidence of French President (between 1959-1969) Charles de Gaulle's "Empty Chair Crisis" which made clear that European technocrats cannot be delegated with the sole power to decide upon Europe's future and European states must have their say in each

³ (Haas, 1958)

and every policy area that has a direct effect upon them. Unlike the Neofunctionalists' views on the European Commission as a powerhouse of integration which is furnished with complete authority on European Affairs so that integration could proceed and have a "spill-over"⁴ effect on further integration areas, liberal intergovernmentalism brings the decision power and the instrumental domestic dynamics of a state to the forefront. In his famous article "Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach" (Andrew Moravcsik, 1993), Moravcsik brought a new perspective to both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalist approaches by adopting the two-level game approach. According to Moravcsik, European integration consists of a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist account of strategic bargaining between states (Rosamond, 2000). On the one hand, national interests of member states arise out of their own domestic politics and the member states try to meet those interests as they are doomed to please their own society; on the other hand, member states bargain over those interests at an international and competitive level to protect their benefits. As the governments want to keep their position firm in domestic politics, they feel obliged to meet the expectations of some societal and interest groups.

In order to explain changing Greek national preferences towards Turkey's accession in the Post-Helsinki period, this thesis will incorporate these two levels or determinants: "economic interests of powerful domestic constituents" and "the international institutions" namely the EU. The first assumption that will be adopted throughout the thesis is that Greek domestic interest groups have diverted the Greek government's foreign policy choices pro-Turkey because of their material interests.

However the material interests of domestic groups aren't the only determinants to change state preferences. EU has democratic principles and peaceful resolution rules as an end product of its diplomatic tools and those rules and principles applies to each and every member and any state who wants to be a member to the EU. Therefore EU played an important role in relations between its member Greece and its candidate Turkey. Even though Greece enjoyed the comfort of having a privilege in eyes of the EU, it obviously had to recognize that Turkey was a strong NATO ally and, maybe not as dear

⁴ Ibid.

as to be considered as a member but still matters for European states. EU is one of the major determinants in Greek state preference formation. This thesis proposes as a second hypothesis that the EU frames and constrains the Greek foreign policy preferences towards Turkey.

Moravcsik's return to his critics: "A rationalist framework"

Starting from this point of view, this thesis adopts a second additional and complementary theoretical element called "a rational framework" as Moravcsik establishes in his book "Choice for Europe."⁵ Moravcsik's theory analyzes European integration and he examines EU negotiations for important policy decisions or agreements such as Treaty of Rome, Common Agricultural Policy, Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty etc. In *Choice for Europe* Moravcsik actually brings a re-explanation to his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. Mark A. Pollack argues that Moravcsik had to make a clarification on his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism due to the backlash from the rational choice institutionalists claiming that Moravcsik's theory pays too much attention on domestic factors and dynamics but lacks a clear contemplation of institutional constraints and factors. (Pollack, 2000) Moravcsik explains the central argument of his book as such:

European integration can best be explained as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of the international institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments. (A. Moravcsik, 1998)

Moravcsik adopts a different terminology here instead of naming a general theory of integrations. He would rather name his re-explanation or refinement as a "rationalist framework." Mark A. Pollack summarizes Moravcsik formula as such:

"Specifically, Moravcsik nests three complementary middle-range theories within his larger rationalist framework: a liberal theory of national preference formation, and intergovernmental theory of bargaining, and a new theory of institutional choice stressing the importance of credible commitments." (Pollack, 2001) Although

⁵ (A. Moravcsik, 1998)

Moravcsik is known for the liberal approach based on bargaining of states serving to the benefits of domestic interest groups, he adds a rational angle including not only economic interests but also security and geopolitical factors to his theory and names it a “framework” instead of a “theory” or “model”. (Bhagwati, 1995; A. Moravcsik, 1998)

Unlike the two folded structure of liberal intergovernmentalism, rationalist framework comprises three levels of negotiations “national preference formation,” “interstate bargaining” and “institutional choice.”⁶ The third level falls upon the question of delegation of powers to the international institution. Should the states grant authority to the institutions that guarantee to protect their interstate bargaining agreements in accordance with the institutional principles? This thesis will seek to understand whether Greek bargaining power in the European Council constituted a real upper hand or an advantage for Greece or whether Turkey could have a victory over Greece if it were to be an EU member.

Moravcsik doesn’t regard state preferences as fixed opinions or policies of a state. Of course he accepts that there are some “ideational and national objectives” lying behind these preferences and actually keep them pursued by states regardless of any economic or security interests. However, he believes that examining the literature from a fixed policy behavior would limit scholars’ ability to develop theories thus lead to creation of unverifiable information. It would also leave many factors out of the playground such as the economic growth desire of a state and international institutions. He proposes a midway in the initial two stages to explain whether the national preferences are fixed or they can be shifted. At first the national preference formation is based on the general historical view of a state towards the other which is traditionally fixed. At the second stage, national state preferences are exposed to international pressures and criticism as they are presented to the international bargaining environment which might lead to a change in the national preferences.

Moravcsik also emphasizes that the national state preferences are not really “unitary.” They might be represented in a unitary form on the international bargaining table but they are affected by many external and internal factors until the second stage.

⁶ Ibid.

As it is illustrated by Moravcsik in the Table 1⁷, there are 3 stages for national state preference formation to be represented and states have two determinants for preference formation: economic and geopolitical interests. Economic interests are shaped by domestic groups while geopolitical interests represent the “fixed” and most of the “ideological” interests of a state. What matters in the international bargaining is the relative powers of each determinants. Whichever determinant, geopolitical or economic, overwhelms the other in the intra-state bargaining would be represented in the international one. This thesis will further discuss whether geopolitical interests of Greece overwhelmed the economic interests of domestic actors.

Table 1: International cooperation: A rationalist framework

| Stages of Negotiation | National Preference Formation | Interstate Bargaining | Institutional Choice |
|--|--|--|--|
| Alternative independent variables underlying each stage | What is the source of underlying national preferences? | Given national preferences, what explains the efficiency and distributional outcomes of interstate bargaining? | Given substantive agreement, what explain the transfer of sovereignty to international institutions? |
| | Economic interests or Geopolitical interests? | Asymmetrical interdependence or Supranational entrepreneurship? | Federalist ideology or Centralized technocratic management or More credible commitment? |
| Observed outcomes at each stage | Underlying national preferences | Agreements on substance | Choice to delegate or pool decision-making in international institutions |

Although Moravcsik assumes that national state preferences cannot easily change and shift, this thesis argues that it was not the case for Greece in the 1999 Helsinki Summit. Although constant rejection of Turkey’s candidacy or a total exclusion of Turkey from the democratic policy mechanism as the EU was a Greek preference against Turkey, with the Helsinki Summit Greece proved that it has changed its preferences pro-Turkey, however, we can never be sure if the underlying goals serve to Turkey’s favor.

⁷ Ibid.

The First Stage: National Preference Formation and its Main Determinants

Before moving to the second stage of the theory, the two determinants of national preference formation are to be discussed here. Even though Moravcsik makes differentiation between geopolitical and economic interests as the main determinants of a state's national preference formation, he cannot think of them as separate parameters and assess them as the two main instruments serving for the same goal which is the territorial, economic and political integrity of a country. As for European Integration he advocates that the main driving force for the states to create an economic union was actually protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity by means of economic cooperation. He further claims that "Economic integration is not an end in itself but a means to manipulate "high politics."⁸ He supports his idea with a reference to the dominant theory of neo-realism and the systemic assumption of anarchy. As Kenneth Waltz foresees in *Man, State and War*, "with no system of law enforceable among them"⁹ a state is vulnerable to any attack from another or others. The anarchic structure of the state forces them to prioritize their security concerns during the national preference formation. Therefore, Moravcsik predicts that "When economic integration is perceived to generate positive geopolitical externalities, governments tend to favor integration, whereas when integration perceived to generate negative geopolitical externalities, they are more likely to oppose it."

As for the Greco-Turkish rapprochement , Greece preferred to go into good terms with Turkey and integrate it within the European Union following the Helsinki summit due to the fact that Greece couldn't receive any positive or functional results out of its persistent veto policy against Turkey's EU accession. The question may pop up on why Greece initially pursued this veto policy at all. However, before Helsinki, Greece has the mind to solve the remaining conflictual issues between them in a single-handed manner by making use of its adherence to the EU who is the blueprint of democracy specifically at that time and whose diplomatic tools for the conflict resolution are already stipulated in its foreign policy objectives. Natalia Tocci reiterates EU's sound commitment for peace as a foreign policy objective as follows:

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ (Waltz, 2001)

*In view of its nature and self-perception as a peace project, from the outset of the EU's foreign policy objectives have prioritized conflict resolution. In the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, when the EU specified for the first time its foreign policy aims, conflict resolution stood out amongst them, alongside promoting international security, regional cooperation, democracy, the rule of law and human rights (Article J.1) Since then, the EU has remained firm on its objectives.*¹⁰

Taking EU membership for granted, Greece wanted to secure its geopolitical interests over Cyprus and Aegean Sea, but Turkey has never stepped back from advocating its own rights in these major tensions between two. The firm and decisive stances over their territorial integrity have brought Greece and Turkey on the brink of a war on various occasions such as the 1987 Aegean Crisis and 1996 Imia/Kardak Crisis which will be further discussed in the second chapter. For institutional support behind Greece didn't result in the settlement of the major disputes in its favor as well, Greece found the remedy in integrating Turkey into the democratic system of the EU and boost bilateral economic relations¹¹ instead of investing on security instruments. Still, as Moravcsik points out the main goal in economic integration or cooperation is always to secure the "territorial integrity"¹² and sovereignty against a "security threat"¹³, Greece didn't necessarily conceded or gave up its geopolitical needs or its claimed rights on Aegean waters or airspace, on the contrary, by agreeing on Turkey's accession, Greece wanted to solve such disputes by diplomatic means.

Besides geopolitical concerns of a state, there lay the economic and political priorities to be considered during state preference formation. These economic and political interests may lead to shifts and changes in state preferences. According to Moravcsik, there are 5 dimensions contingent upon the political and economic preferences: "variation in preferences across nations and issues, the timing of preference changes, consistency with broader foreign policy, salient domestic actors and cleavages, and major considerations mentioned in domestic deliberations."¹⁴

The shift in the Greek state preferences towards Turkey's EU accession aims at the resolution of existing conflicts and deadlocks on a possible bilateral dialogue rather than

¹⁰ (Tocci, 2007)

¹¹ <http://www.voanews.com/content/greece-boosts-cooperation-with-turkey-reuters/1615163.html>

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid. p 49.

integrating Turkey into the monetary union, economic union or increasing the trade relations. Indeed, major economic benefits prevail the Greek positivity towards Turkey, but Turkey was already a Customs Union member when Greece finally showed a blatant support for Turkey's EC membership. Therefore the first dimension addresses Turkey as *the nation* and the resolution of remaining disputes as *the issue*.

Timing of the shift in Greek preferences follows the subsequent crises and conflicts of 1987 Aegean Sea problem, 1996 Imia/Kardak Crisis and diplomatic crisis of Öcalan which means that an urgent settlement was needed to impede a possible break out of a war.

As the Greek governments were always considered as the veto players against Turkey's membership to the EU, with the transition to a more supportive kind of attitude following the Helsinki Summit of 1999, it has been made clear that Greek government has made a shift in its veto *policy consistency and negotiating demands* as the third dimension.

Moravcsik puts the fourth dimension, *domestic actors and cleavages*, at the heart of its main arguments about the considerable effect of domestic dynamics and groups. As for the Greek example, the shift occurred among the Greek society who believed that Greece should have ordinary bilateral relations with Turkey just like two neighbor countries should instead of constant fight which came as an influential factor upon the government and the political parties to pursue friendly relations with Turkey.

The fifth dimension, *negotiating demands and salient concerns in domestic policy discourse*, addresses to the changes in the main discourse of the policy-makers on geopolitical interests paving way for the economic interests to be realized between two countries. Ayten Gündoğdu¹⁵ puts this shift on the political rhetoric of the two major politicians:

Just before the earthquakes, in May-June 1999, Cem and Papandreou exchanged a series of letters that included proposals for improving bilateral relations by cooperating in various fields. These letters showed that a key element in the change was a revision in the Greek perception of Turkey. Papandreou wrote, "Both Greece and Turkey have rich cultural traditions. Building a multicultural Europe means that we need to enhance

¹⁵ (Gündoğdu, 2001)

our cultural identities and understand each other's specificity."¹⁶ This type of statement is in sharp contrast with the view of his predecessor, Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, in 1997: "We have nothing to do with Turkey. A man can't discuss things with murderers, rapists and thieves."¹⁷

National preference formation constitutes the most basic and the initial stage towards the comprehensive rationalist framework in analyzing the preference shifts of a country with persistently dissident policies to another one. The following stage will discuss the representation of the national policies at the international level and show how a country responds to intergovernmental reactions against its policy shifts or constant policies.

The Second Stage: Interstate Bargaining

Moravcsik nests his ideas upon integration and cooperation theories of institutional bargaining paradigm with a broader understanding of the EC and he develops a two-folded approach featuring "Supranational bargaining" vs. "Intergovernmental Bargaining". Obviously bargaining is a win or lose game for the states. However, in the EU context, there is supranational gain factor which means the supranational mechanism of the EU is another actor together with the members states and the supranational structure of the EU is less likely to concede compared to member states during the bargaining processes concerning the sustainability of integration. The main driving force behind the nonstop European integration, the Commission, has its own agenda on various issues concerning the future of the Union and individual gains of the members. According to Moravcsik, bargaining on the issues that fall upon the community pillar has generally ended up with the victory of the supranational actors or in his own language "supranational entrepreneurs"¹⁸. It is mainly because of the ability of such actors to access comprehensive information on the bargaining case at stake. Moravcsik argues that supranational actors can "initiate, mediate and mobilize" negotiations as they have the ability to generate "technical, political and legal

¹⁶ "Letter from Mr. George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, to Mr. Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey," June 25, 1999. .

¹⁷ Athens News Agency, Daily News Bulletin, September 27, 1997.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 52

information or ideas.”¹⁹ Neither member states nor their domestic social and economic groups can access the same amount of information on a matter of negotiation as The Commission can. Such hypothetical statement can be testified on the example of current TTIP negotiations, the content of which isn’t a matter of public record and only discussed behind closed doors. The Commission members blatantly secure information on TTIP negotiations and they are intolerable to any kind of public leakages as they know that keeping the information in the Commission case during the negotiations will provide them with a victory.²⁰

Although supranational bargaining is extremely important with regard to changing the ideas of member states²¹, what this thesis adopts is the enlargement attitudes of Greece and other EC members, thus, it will focus on the intergovernmental bargaining fold. The determining factors we will follow here are *efficiency* and *the distributional gains* as Moravcsik did for his negotiation analyses for the European Integration.

According to Moravcsik, such issues as enlargement or treaty amendments that requires unanimous voting and fall under the pillar of intergovernmentalism are the perfect ground to see the relative bargaining powers of the member states. This time it is not the Commission who has the broader influence upon states but it is the states themselves who change or wouldn’t be able to change the decisions of one another. For instance a member state can change another member state’s decision by promising a concession or trade-off. Also, unlike the community pillar matters in which the Commission has more power to manipulate the bargaining process due to its wealth of information and intelligence about the issue at stake, each state has the necessary information to form and shape its preferences.

Moravcsik²² explains the relative bargaining power as great factor in the outcomes of the bargaining process by deriving from the concept of “asymmetrical interdependence” as described by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in their famous work, *Power and Interdependence*.²³ It is a matter of common acceptance that the EU was founded on the

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 58

²⁰ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ttip-controversy-secret-trade-deal-can-only-be-read-secure-in-reading-room-in-brussels-10456206.html>

²¹ Ibid, p. 58

²² Moravcsik, Andrew, and Vachudova, Milada Anna. (2003) National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement. CES Working Paper, no. 97, 2003.

²³ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977).

very principle of economic and political interdependence. However, some countries with more powerful and stable economies within the EU are of course less dependent on the relatively small economy countries within the Union. Such demarcation becomes more visible in the bargaining processes and it becomes even more visible in the enlargement negotiations of an applicant country. So, let alone the applicant country, the member countries are already uneven within the EU bargaining table. Nonetheless, as they are the ones who will gain most out of potential EU membership they are to concede more. Adding to that, if country has a potential veto player and opponent among the EU members, it has much more dependent as we can see in the example of Greece and Turkey.

Moving from the position of a non-member state in the enlargement process to the relative positions of member states, Moravcsik argues that there are three prominent features of intergovernmental bargaining theory. First of all, it brings no obligation upon any state to create a common set of interests as each member is free to decide whether to accept and agreement, to opt-out or to veto it. Due to the independent nature of unanimous voting, a state can easily terminate an agreement by simply rejecting to approve it. Or if it is powerful enough to mobilize other states, it can influence or persuade other stakeholders to accept its own set of gains.

Secondly, the governments don't refrain from revealing their interests and preferences which makes access of information pretty cost-effective for member states unlike the supranational bargaining processes where the Commission has the most exclusive privilege of holding information and it is hard to access for member states. This enables a more transparent bargaining process where each member state is aware of what the other state is claiming for.

Finally, in the bargaining process, all states pursue a set of gains and advantages, but some states have a more intense pursuit of their interests. Moravcsik believes that the states with a greater desire to make benefit out of an agreement tend to concede more compared to any state with optimum desire to approve it. Therefore, the other states obtain gains from such a bargaining process as the compromises of such state means dividing its main interests and sharing some of them with the coalitional states to get at

the ultimate result of an agreement. He calls this a “pareto efficient”²⁴ situation where everyone has a set of gains and losses in disproportionate amounts. As for the enlargement agreements, the disproportionate distribution of costs to the member states plays a significant role in supporting the accession of a country or not. However, the unanimous voting system creates grounds for countries who want to conceal their opposition to the accession a country in order not to harm its bilateral relations with it. In other words, if one country says “no” the other have to say no more and they can simply free ride upon the dissident country.

²⁴ Pareto efficiency is obtained when a distribution strategy exists where one party's situation cannot be improved without making another party's situation worse. Pareto efficiency does not imply equality or fairness.

Read more: [Pareto Efficiency Definition | Investopedia](http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pareto-efficiency.asp#ixzz3y5vnCFDt) <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pareto-efficiency.asp#ixzz3y5vnCFDt>

CHAPTER II

A Historical Overview to Greco-Turkish Relations and Introduction to Major Conflicts

The first major encounter between the Greeks (Roman nation) and the Turks occurred in 1071, Manzikert Battle which opened up the way for the Turks to settle down in Asia Minor and coexist with other ethnic groups such as Greeks. Since then, most of the Greek speaking communities in Asia Minor were first ruled by the Seljuks and then their successors, notably the Ottomans. Although there are opposite examples for the cohabitation between different religious and ethnic groups, , the non-Muslim Greeks and Muslim Turks could somehow coexist for centuries by influencing each other in terms of culture and values.²⁵ One of the most notable anecdotes for the tolerance policy of the early Ottomans rulers toward the non-muslim Ottoman citizens is the Lucas Notaras' famous statement²⁶ which has become one of the most popular example to use among the Turkish people to describe that the Ottomans were much more preferable for the Byzantines than even their fellow Christians. In the hay days of the Empire, once they convert to Islam, the Greek originated government officials could enjoy and pursue a career path from a highly appreciated position as a Dragoman (translator) even to the Grand Vizier.²⁷ Even though Greeks and Ottomans coexisted and shared a “millennium year” of history, this past isn't recognized with complete harmony but with a “deep feeling of adversity” (Evin, 2004). However, the French Revolution (1789) has brought tremendous changes to any multicultural and multiethnic state at that including the Ottoman Empire no matter how hard The Ottomas tried to

²⁵ Heraclides, A. (Heraclides). *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*: Palgrave Macmillan UK, p. 18

²⁶ “The Turkish turban is more preferable in the midst of the city (Constantinople) than tiara of the Latin Cardinal” Ibid. p.20 (as cited in (Arnakis, 1952))

²⁷ Ibid. p. 22

avoid the separatist and secessionist ideas coming along with it.²⁸ From then on, inspired by the nationalist ideals, various ethnic minorities spearheaded by Serbs and the Greeks began to rebel against the Ottoman Empire which ultimately accelerated the decline of the Empire together with the external threats specifically from Russia.

All in all, it is no surprise to say that Turkey and Greece have been in constant conflict with each other particularly following the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent Greek uprisings. Nevertheless, it was only after the First World War that these antagonistic relations turned out to be more of an icy relationship through the revolutionary changes both in Turkey and Greece thanks to their leaders Ataturk and Venizelos respectively. With the shifting direction of both countries to stick together with the Western World after the First World War and accordingly developed chain of reforms, the state preferences of these two countries changed drastically towards one another. Right after the Second World War, these two countries were tied one another this time with the glue of NATO membership and the American Foreign policy of excluding Russia from spreading its sphere of influence to the Orthodox Greeks and relatively new Turkish Republic. The following years staged a downward trend in the relationship graph between Greece and Turkey especially after Greece was granted the membership position whereas Turkey entered into a never ending journey with the EU. Considered as a more suitable member for the fittest by the European Community, this appreciation enabled Greece to be an influential (veto) player in Turkey's accession process. However, this role has undergone some changes through the course of time and the most prominent repercussion of it is the aftermath of 1999 Helsinki European Council. The Helsinki European Council in 1999 is a turning point in Turkish-Greek relations as Greece obviously showed its support for Turkey's accession to the EU. In order to analyze this specific case study, I believe one should design a more retrospective research rather than only coming up with such general explanations as post-Cold War Era conjuncture as a driving force for détente or the neo-liberal tendencies coming along with globalization. In order to understand what brought Greece and Turkey together after all those years of atrocities, it would be plausible to take a look by starting with the Late Ottoman and Early modern history of Greco-Turkish relations. Furthermore, I will touch upon the subject matters of escalating bilateral tension between these two and I will conclude with the pre- and post- Helsinki

²⁸ Ibid. p.31

conjuncture which is the hallmark of the changing state preferences of Greece towards Turkey.

2.1 From the Ottoman Legacy to Greek Independence

During the Ottoman Dynasty, Greek minority (Millet-i Rum) and Orthodox Christians constituted a significant place in the social pattern of Ottoman Empire. The Greeks had the right to reside on Ottoman land as long as they paid their tributes to the Sultan. However, it has been obvious that the Greeks never acknowledged and internalized the Ottoman Rule on their land and tried to reverse this situation the moment they had the power to do so. With the decline of the empire, Greek minority could find the strength in themselves to rise up against the Ottomans and lid the flame of further rebellious movements in the Balkans.

The coexistence of Greeks and Turks dates back to the 11th century. The real Ottoman rule over the Greeks started with the Conquest of Istanbul in 1453 and ends with 1830 Greek independence which is called bay the Greeks as “400 years of Turkish yoke.”²⁹ The major Greek revolts against the Ottomans only came in the last century of four hundred years of coexistence but most of them could be suppressed by the Ottomans. However, the Greek War of Independence (1821-1832) was a real challenge for the declining empire as it was soon assisted by Russia and many European forces. After many years of fierce and harsh battles, Greece declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. However, Greek dreams were not limited to gaining independence but instead they wanted to realize “the Megali Idea” (Great Idea) of reviving the Hellenic Empire by conquering Istanbul or in other words creating a new Empire under the Greek dominance. (Evin, 2005) Inspired by the Greek Independence, Balkan Wars (1912-1913) broke out with no surprise and caused great material and territorial losses to the Ottoman Empire. Greco-Turkish animosity and close combats retained until after the First World War and the establishment of Turkish Republic. In 1919 Greek forces first occupied Izmir-Smyrna and then moved to inner parts of Anatolian Land and committed such atrocities that could pave way for no legitimacy for them to stay in neither Izmir nor Anatolia.³⁰ In 1922, the Greeks left Izmir in a

²⁹ Ibid. p.5

³⁰ Ibid. p.57

vanquished situation and the city was set on fire by arsonists whose side has been still a matter of controversy for both countries blaming each other for the arson.³¹ Due to such alleged atrocities, two nations became more hostile to each other than they had ever been.

Even though I tend to endorse a rather rationalist point of view to the healing relations between Greece and Turkey, I believe that for this period of time, bilateral relations between two needs a little bit more constructivist explanations and identity-based discussions in order to understand this long lasting animosity between Greeks and the Turks. One of the most famous explanations for the Greco-Turkish animosity has been extensively and comprehensively written by Alexis Heraclides. Heraclides defines the everlasting hostility between these two as a “perennial enmity” which can be dated back to the 1071, Battle of Manzikert and continued in growing fashion with the Conquest of Istanbul in 1453. He further claims that the Turks and the Greeks consider each other as “imagined enemies” by defining one another as “the other.” Whereas the Greek describe the Turkish people as barbarians, invaders and unfit to European land, the Turks define the Greeks as betrayer and traitor to their “benefactor” despite the utmost tolerance bestowed upon them. (Heraclides, 2010) Reckoning with the aforementioned explanations, one can come to the conclusion that the already existing hostility between Greece and Turkey was only reinforced and hardened with the last mutual killings and fierce battles instead of recovering the already bruised and crushed views of both nations to one another.

However, after the Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923), with the attempts of Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Greek President Eleftherios Venizelos to normalize the relations between Turkey and Greece, Greece gave up its historical claims on Turkish territory and finally two countries could negotiate on a diplomatic level. Such friendly reconciliation was actually a byproduct of the technical problems concerning the population exchanges in the aftermath of the application of Lausanne Treaty. With the 1930 Ankara Convention which is known as the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement of 1930 in literature and with the visit of then Prime Minister of Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos to The President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the bilateral relations were strengthened and the remaining disputes from the Lausanne Treaty were more or less resolved between two leaders. (Bölükbaşı, 2012) However, all these

³¹ Ibid. p.61

positive attempts were broken with the mutually contentious and overwhelming chains of events after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. First of all, Turkish government imposed *Varlık Vergisi* (Wealth Tax) upon rich people including wealthy Greeks in order to strengthen Turkish economy and basically eliminate minorities' effect and upper hand on Turkish economy in 1942 (J. Ker-Lindsay, 2007). Secondly, the attacks to the Greek minority by Turkish nationalists as a result of fabricated news alleging that the Greeks destroyed Atatürk's house brought the already vulnerable Greco-Turkish relations to such level that it took many years for both countries to normalize their bilateral relations again. In addition to those tragic events took place during the early period of Turkish Republican Era, Greco-Turkish relations evolved in a more hostile and problematic atmosphere with the eruption of Cyprus issue and discrepancy over coastal lines on the Aegean coast.

2.2 Cyprus Issue

The major atrocities such as the Cyprus intervention by Turkey, problems over the sea and air spaces in the Aegean regarding the territorial borders and rivalry on the disputed islands play a very important role in Greece's attitude towards Turkey's EU Accession. Following the great division between Greece and Turkey as marked by the secession of Greece from the Ottoman Empire in 1821, the Military coup by Greece and the alleged military intervention by Turkish forces in Cyprus came as a shock and Cyprus issue stood as one of the most prominent obstacles against reconciliation between Greece and Turkey which makes it automatically a big challenge for Turkey on the way to the EU. On many occasions of serious attempts by Turkey for getting one step ahead on accession talks, Greece interfered as a blocking instrument with the excuse of Cyprus. One might ask what is so special about Cyprus besides being the one and only substantial tool for Greece to obstruct a potential Turkish membership and secure its own interests. Cyprus is historically a contentious and a strategically important island for both Turks and Greeks and the British. Actually, it is not only Greece who wants to keep control over the island but also Turks trying to keep their influence over the island in order to secure their interests. When we scrutinize upon the historical background of the main issues of Cyprus, we can clearly see that, apart from this rational attitude of interest maximization through the resources of the island and

security concerns, there is a kinship factor on both sides to secure their people namely Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Cyprus has always been a strategically important island for both Greece and Turkey due to their cultural, religious and national affiliations with the Cypriot people.. Before the Ottomans took control over it in 1571, there were already Greek Cypriots and Ottomans placed Turkish people in the island. “By the end of the seventeenth century, approximately 30,000 Turks settled on Cyprus, and a sizable Turkish community was formed, eventually composing about 18 percent of the total population.” (Yılmaz, 2010) However, with the eruption of Turkish-Russian War in 1877, Britain provided the Ottomans with military support in return for administrative control of Cyprus which led to the start of British rule over the island in 1878. Under the provisions of Cyprus Convention, United Kingdom acquired the right to rule the island whereas the Ottomans reserved the right of sovereignty over Cyprus. However, the British rule started to act as the only and legitimate power controlling the island and treated Cyprus as another colony of the British Empire. “By the end of the century, some Greek Cypriot elite began to ask that the island be united with the Kingdom of Greece, which gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. However, viewing no reason to relinquish the territory and arguing that Cyprus was formally still a part of the Ottoman Empire, Britain refused the request.” (Yılmaz) This very attitude of Britain lit the flame of a rebellious movement aiming at liberalization of Cyprus from external forces and eventually annexation of Cyprus to Greece which is known as *enosis*. Rallied under the illegal organization called EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), rebellious Greek Cypriots ignited a civil war in 1950s with people supporting the idea that Cyprus must unite with Greece. While the Greek Cypriots was craving for a potential union with Greece, Turkish Cypriots was demanding to separate from the Greek Cypriots as two different nations on one island which is known as the idea of *taksim*. Activities of Greek Cypriots continued following the establishment of the independent state of Cyprus in 1960 with the London-Zurich Agreements and these rebellious movements began to act in an organized way. The London-Zurich Agreements as signed by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Harold MacMillan the Prime Minister of Turkish Republic, Adnan Menderes and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Greece Konstantinos Karamanlis came as an attempt to conclude and settle the dispute between the two

Cypriot communities not to be open again. Pursuant to these agreements, independence of Cyprus has been achieved and a constitution for the new state was adopted. However, the Constitution didn't bestow the same rights to the Turkish Cypriots as it did for the Greek Cypriots. For instance, the state was decided to be run by a President and a vice-president, however, the President was supposed to be a Greek Cypriot whereas the vice-president could be elected from Turkish Cypriot candidates or the Turkish Cypriots could only have three ministers while the Greek Cypriots could have seven representatives in the Council of Ministers.³² Although Greek and Turkish governments agreed on protection of Cyprus as an independent state with no affiliation or an organic bond with either Turkey or Greece as the guarantor parties to the Treaty of Guarantee signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960³³, in the eyes of the Greek Government, "the Greek Cypriot people are entitled to self-determination and the right to statehood and that the Turkish Cypriots are just a subject community" (Olgun, 1998) Furthermore, the Greek Government was under the impression that the Turkish Cypriots were granted to enjoy ample amounts of liberties and concessions compared to that of Greek Cypriots. (Meltem Müftüler-Bac, 1999) Encouraged by the general acknowledged idea of excluding the Turkish Cypriots from the control of the island, rebellious groups started gain roots and committed violent attacks towards British and Turkish community in the mid 1960s which led Turkey to protect Turkish Cypriots on her own. As the violence and instability escalated to an unbearable extent with the coup d'état by Greek Junta in 1974, Turkish State intervened Cyprus and took control over the northern part. Even though Turkey's intervention to the island was met with outrage by the international community and The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is still not recognized by the United Nations, the very rationale behind the Turkish intervention in Cyprus was the 1960 Accords which granted Turkey as one of the guarantors of the stability and nonviolence on the island. (Meltem Müftüler-Bac, 1999)

Even if there have been many attempts to normalize the situation in the island particularly the Annan Plan concerning a referendum for the Cypriots to determine their future and unify the island, the majority of Greek Cypriots said "no" and this attempt also ended up as a failure. As a result of the aforementioned events and circumstances,

³²The London and Zürich Agreements for the Constitution of Cyprus, February 1959, APPENDIX I, Chapter II, Provision number 2 and 5, available at: http://www.embargoed.org/downloads/1959_London_and_Zurich_%20Agreements.pdf

³³ For further information: http://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_guarantee.pdf

Cyprus became a serious problem between Turkey and Greece, however the main rationale behind Cyprus becoming a problem is the mutual suspicion and accusations between Greece and Turkey for being highly influencing upon whatever happens in Cyprus. Therefore, a potential Cyprus membership to the EU, considering Greece is already a member, would raise the question whether Turkey can ever be a member with two influential veto players against her. A subsequent response to this question would probably answer why Greece vetoed signing a Customs Union Agreement with Turkey but gave it away only in return for starting accession negotiations with Cyprus in 1998.

Cyprus applied for the EU membership in 1990 as a single state without recognizing the existence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the sovereignty of its Turkish Cypriot community. European Union accepted the Cyprus's EU bid and integrated Cyprus along with eight Central and Eastern European countries as well as Malta in single enlargement wave in 2004. Even though European Union didn't recognize Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and was convinced that Cyprus could live up to the EU's expectations concerning democracy, respect for human rights and a full functioning economy, EU was concerned about the impact of Cyprus on further distorting its bilateral relations with Turkey (Nugent, 1999). On the other hand, Turkey was quite disturbed by the membership of Cyprus as a single state regardless of the consent or opinion of Turkish Cypriots besides its being another potential veto player against Turkey's share from EU funds. Although Greece could use its veto power by threatening the EU of preventing the accession of Central and Eastern European countries on the condition that Cyprus isn't included in the enlargement agenda (Nugent, 1999), resolving the Cyprus issue didn't turn out to be the same case. EU avoided a total distortion in its relationship with Turkey by turning against Greek demands of settling Cyprus problem at the expense of Turkish Cypriots. Due to Turkey's failure to meet Copenhagen Criteria or Europe's elusive attitude giving no clue of accession even if the *acquis* was ever completely adjusted by Turkey, the relations between Turkey and the EU has never been seamless and easy. No matter how volatile and ambivalent their relations are, Turkey is an important economic partner for Europe as well as a political ally due to its affinity with NATO. Greece and Cyprus with their attempt to enable Cyprus to be an EU member and bring a singlehanded solution to the Cyprus problem by deliberately not recognizing Turkish Cypriots' claims over the island had learnt that they cannot solve this issue without Turkey's or Turkish Cypriots'

involvement. Despite the fact that Cyprus is recognized as a *de jure* single state by the rest of the world whereas TRNC remains as a *de facto* one merely recognized by Turkey, their upper hand as an EU member didn't result in quite a victory mainly because EU is an intergovernmental system as much as it is a functional institution which means the member countries and EU as a whole cannot act upon Greece's foreign policy objections but they would prefer a rational choice of a strategic cooperation with a country such as Turkey with a major geo-strategic location and a potential market. In short, it is this multilateralism and perennial refusal to make concessions that drag the issue into a quagmire.

2.3 Controversy over the Aegean Sea

Canonized as The Aegean Sea Dispute in international relations literature, the controversy over the Aegean Sea concerning Turkey and Greece basically revolves around a bunch of discrepancies over such maritime concepts as continental shelf, territorial waters and air space as well as demilitarization of the islands and little scattered islets in the Mediterranean. According to Turkish Authorities, discrepancies over the Aegean Sea arise out of breaches of Lausanne Treaty by Greece in the form of militarizing the Greek islands, Greek extension of territorial waters, usage of continental shelf and airspace violations. As it was stipulated in Lausanne Treaty in 1923³⁴ (Article 12,13,14,15,16), Greece took control over most of the islands in Aegean Sea as Greek population was larger in number and they were the inhabitants since the ancient times. Moreover, under the provisions of United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Greece claimed a greater length of territorial waters and a broader area for controlling its continental shelf. The length of continental shelf and territorial waters has been already a matter of controversy for many centuries now. Since 19th century, some of the coastal countries adopted the rule of 3 nautical miles long territorial sea waters while others argued over 6 or even 12 nautical miles to be accepted as the breadth of territorial waters. However, most of the attempts to compromise over a fixed number of nautical miles ended up as a failure. (Kassimeris, 2009) For centuries, many countries adopted the rule of extending their territorial waters to 3 nautical miles and it was accepted as a practice without any official compromise. As countries became more

³⁴ For further information on Lausanne Treaty: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-political-clauses.en.mfa

dependent on trade and natural resources extracted from underground, they tend to value their sea beds and the materials underneath which ultimately means a greater importance attached to the territorial waters and continental shelf. As an attempt to legalize and commercialize their waters, states became much eager to legitimize their sphere of influence through international agreements which materializes in the example of UNCLOS.

Due to the anarchic structure of the system, international rules or agreements only bind the states that went under such contracts and there are even no clear cut obligations for states to conform to these contracts. UNCLOS as compiled by the United Nations in 1982 in a written form as a result of three successive conferences that set and describe the rights of a country's control area over its coastal waters and seabed. Greece signed UNCLOS in 1972 whereas Turkey preferred not to be party to this agreement. Therefore, whenever Greece attempts to exercise its so called rights arising out of this agreement, this creates a dispute or even conflict serious enough to bring two countries on the brink of a war as in the example of 1987 (Continental Shelf dispute) and 1996 (Imia/Kardak Crisis). (Lucas, 2005)

Although, according to the international practice on limiting the territorial waters, the territorial sea line was only 3 nautical miles for both countries and Greek islands were already too close to Turkish coast, Greece didn't hesitate to implement the new developments in Law of the Sea in order to extend its territorial waters at first 6 miles and then to 12 miles. However, "If the territorial waters of the two countries were brought to 12 n miles, 71.5 per cent of the Aegean Sea would be under Greek sovereignty and 8.7 per cent Turkish. The area of high sea would be reduced from 49 per cent to 19.7 per cent. If the two countries established EEZs, the remaining space (19.7 per cent) would fall entirely under the jurisdiction of Athens." (Ortolland, 2009) As Greece has many islands and islets close to Turkey and the geography of the area lets Greece to have a broader influence, it would ultimately mean almost complete Greek control over the Aegean Sea which is the most alarming consequence for Turkey. Therefore, Turkish government made it quite clear that any attempt by Greece to extend its territorial waters will constitute a *casus belli* and Turkey will not shy away from taking any military action once needed. (Aydın & Ifantis, 2004) The strained relationship and the diverging attitudes of both neighbors on the issue of territorial

waters extension remain to be unsolved and constitutes a potential spark of a military confrontation between two neighbors.

Closely interrelated with the territorial waters dispute, continental shelf constitutes another major problem in terms of research induced navigation claims by both countries. Continental shelf is an important belonging for a coastal country as it enables the country to explore and extract natural resources and precious materials hidden under the sea bed. In the UNCLOS, the continental shelf is described as such: “The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”³⁵ Normally, coastal states can do excursions to find out natural resources within the limit of 200 nautical miles and it doesn't constitute a problem for the neighbor coastal state unless they are too close to each other and there is some space left for high seas. However, on the condition that the continental shelf of neighbor states overlaps, the share of the sea between them is separated by a median line and this might create a problem of disproportional delimitation of the sea as we can see in the Greco-Turkish case. Due to the geographical features of the Aegean Sea the islands are scattered so haphazardly and some of the islands obtained by the Greeks during the Lausanne Treaty are located too close to the coast of Turkish Mainland. As these islands are governed under the Greek jurisdiction their continental shelf rights arising out of the Law of the Sea contradict with the rights of Turkey. Turkey consider these islands as a natural extension of its mainland and claim that it has any rights for conducting research and exploration as much as Greece does whereas Greece consider any explorative action as the breach of its rights on continental shelf of its islands. Turkey turned a blind eye to the Greek claims over the impenetrability of the continental shelf of its islands by Turkey and sent its vessels to join the bandwagon of searching for oil in the Aegean Sea. In 1976, Turkey sent the vessel, Sismik 1 (Hora) to the Aegean in order to search for natural resources but Greece claimed that Turkish vessel navigates in the area that Greece considers within the limits of its continental shelf and sent its naval forces to

³⁵ The Convention on the Continental Shelf of 29 April 1958, the Law of the Sea concluded at Montego Bay in December 1982. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

intimidate Turkey. This very event brought both countries at the brink of a war on the Aegean which was only soothed by bilateral talks.³⁶ Intimidated by Turkish persistence of claiming its rights on the continental shelf and having been brought at the brink of a war with Turkey, in 1976 and 1987, Greece brought the case to the International Court of Justice stating that Turkey violates Greek space of continental shelf. However, the judgment of ICJ concerning the jurisdiction of the Continental Shelf in the Aegean Sea came as much of a disappointment to Greece as it was stated in the decree that “the Court, by 12 votes to 2, found that it is without jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Government of Greece.”³⁷ Although both countries signed a confidential agreement in Bern in 1979 and agreed that they will be both respecting each other with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf, both still conduct researches and cannot compromise on a mutual consent decision. Turkey explicitly demonstrates that it would constitute a major antecedent or pretext of a war should Greece extend its territorial waters and-as a result- Turkey is deprived of its right on the high seas of the Aegean. Delimitation of jurisdiction areas in the Aegean Sea constitutes the basis of Aegean Sea dispute between Greece and Turkey. However, the disagreement isn't limited to maritime areas but also the aerial zone between two neighbors. Greece and Turkey cannot agree on the delimitation of their airspace. Both continental shelf and territorial waters create a basis for disputes over air space because of the fact that “under international law, it is customary for airspace to correspond to the delimitation of territorial waters.” (M. Müftüler-Bac, 1997) Long before the issuance of UNCLOS inscribing the legal status of the airspace in the Article 2³⁸ that the airspace sovereignty of a state extends over its territorial sea and continental shelf, Greece extended its airspace from 3 nautical miles to 10 nautical miles with a presidential decree³⁹ in 1931. It didn't cause a huge problem for Turkey until Greece claimed several times that Turkey actually violates Greek airspace whenever a Turkish military aircraft float over Aegean. As Turkey only has 6 miles of airspace whereas Greece has 10 nautical miles, Turkish jets or aircrafts exceeding the Turkish airspace is automatically considered as a

³⁶ Washington Post, March 29, 1987

³⁷ The Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey) Judgment, I.C.J. Summary Report 1978.


<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=327&p1=3&p2=3&case=62&p3=5>

³⁸ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, United Nations Treat Series, available from http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

³⁹ Presidential Decree (PD) 6/18 September 1931. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/GRC_1931_Decree.pdf

violation of Greece airspace and Turkish aircrafts are intercepted. According to the Greek military data, the number of airspace violations by Turkish jets only in 2014 accounts for 2,244 times⁴⁰. The airspace dispute has turned into an ongoing fight over the Aegean Sea between Greek and Turkish jet fighters, whenever Turkey flies over the Aegean Sea.

Figure 1: Alleged Violations of Greek Airspace by Turkish aircrafts



2.4 Imia-Kardak Crisis

Ratifying the UNCLOS agreement in 1995 to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, Greece demonstrated its determination to draw territorial lines on the Aegean. Following the Greece's proactive approach to legalize its claims over the Aegean, the first confrontation with Turkey didn't delay. The incident that brought both countries at the brink of a war once again in 1995 took place on a few islets or hills in the Aegean which cannot even be considered as islands at all. The crisis started with a Turkish carrier ship running aground the islets of Imia or Kardak as called in Turkish. The captain of the carrier ship waited for Turkish forces to be rescued while a Greek rescue ship approached to salvage of the carrier. The captain of Turkish vessel, *Figen Akat* refused help at first as he didn't want to pay the rescue expenses to the Greek

⁴⁰ Forbes, November 26, 2015, retrieved from: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/11/26/turkish-jets-violated-greek-airspace-over-2000-times-last-year-infographic/#4f715f5a75c3>

authorities, however, unable to wait more, the captain had to accept Greek offer to rescue the carrier. The persistence of the captain not to pay the salvage fee to the Greek rescue team claiming that it is already Turkish land led both countries to question to whom the islets actually belong. Turkey, having not ratified and recognized the UNCLOS, investigated the owner of the islets and applied to the Greek Embassy in 1996. The answer was clear that Turkey actually gave away the islets to Italy along with the other Dodecanese islands under the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. (Arapoglou, 2002) Although the issue could be solved peacefully as it was already defined in clear terms that the islets are not Turkish territory due to previously agreed legal procedures, especially Greek media manipulated the islets as an attempt to create a public awareness as if Turkey was reclaiming its territories from Greece in an exaggerated fashion. Some sentimental Greek citizens affected by the news of Greek media framing the issue as new tension between Turkey and Greece, erected the Greek flag on the islets where goats usually graze. Finding such move offensive enough, a group of journalists from Hürriyet Daily News reached the area via helicopter and planted the Turkish flag instead. The issue became more serious when both countries' naval forces appeared and demonstrated to attack each other if and when the tension escalates to an insurmountable level. Having no previous example before, The EU and The USA used any means to mediate between two NATO members not to fight but compromise instead. Both sides agreed on a joint communiqué on 8th July, 1997 in Madrid which stipulates that both sides agree not to use attack to one another and abide by the rules of existing agreements.⁴¹

2.5 Application to the European Community

Greek accession to the EC in 1981 brought a new phase to Turkish-Greek relations and induced a blatant disappointment on the Turkish front, as Greece, from then on, would be able to use its membership as a leverage against Turkey and try to solve major common problems at the expense of Turkish interests. "Through its consistent veto policy, Greece was effectively depriving Turkey of any closer relations to the European

⁴¹ Bohlen, C. (1997, July 21). At Long Last, Greece and Turkey Tiptoe Toward Reconciliation. The New York Times, Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/21/world/at-long-last-greece-and-turkey-tiptoe-toward-reconciliation.html>

Union; this objective was, however, being achieved at increasing political cost.” (Grigoriadis, 21st June 2003)

However, Turkish response to it was quite straightforward in the sense that Turkey never hesitated or shy away from demonstrating its military capabilities and kept on arming her military. From a realist perspective, Turkey considered her military power the only way to retaliate the Greek attacks in the form of acting as a veto player and obstacle against Turkey which arises out of the unanimity voting principle on the level of intergovernmental decision making.

When Greece started its negotiations with the EC in 1960s, Turkey was kind of offended and disappointed because of the fact that she was not as European as Greece even if she tries so hard. Turkey knew that she wasn't eligible in terms of a consolidated democracy and a flourishing market economy but either was Greece. Furthermore, it was not only due the Turkey's failure to fulfill EU obligations but also due to the bilateral problems between Greece and Turkey such as the “minority problems” and “Cyprus issue” that obstructed Turkish accession talks (Önis, 2001). Therefore, Turkish officials made the Community members of their resentment and it turned out to be for the benefit of Turkey as EC signed Ankara Agreement in 1963 with Turkey immediately after Greece talks began. However, EC had significant impacts on Greece economy, whereas it only helped Turkish economy to a certain extent. It became obvious to Turks that EC was more inclined to accept Greece as a member and boost its economy rather than Turkey with Greek membership in 1981. Turkey could only apply for a full membership position in 1987 as a result of its domestic political conflicts. With the eruption of 1974 Cyprus crisis, Turkey understood better that Greece will definitely use its power in the EC as a tool towards Turkey in terms of getting at its interests in Cyprus and coastal lines issue as well as its influence over the treatment of Greek Minority in Turkey. Even if, they were both immature democracies and economies, Turkey knew that Greece's upper hand was a given for them as they were descendants of Greek philosophy and political thought that gave its soul to today's Europe. Differentiated as non-European and non-worthy of political and economic privileges, Turkey never gave up and supplemented the Ankara agreement with an additional protocol in 1970 which also turned out to be a non-functional and on the paper agreement as EC didn't keep his promises about a preferential agreement and

application of CAP, yet, instead EC enjoyed commercial privileges of tariff reductions to enter Turkish markets.

With the Greek membership, Turkish non-accession was also doomed to concessions and losses on foreign policy. Turkey asked the EC to create a solution for Greece's hindering any Turkish Foreign policy objective by its very existing in the unanimous voting system. Despite the reaction by some members for Turkey's request, Commission came with a solution as such "the country holding the European Council presidency, together with its successor and predecessor, would jointly inform Turkey of any issues which concerned it. This would avoid the situation in which Greece would be the sole country representing the Community to Turkey, which would give it the potential to take advantage of the situation." (M. Müftüler-Bac, 1997) However, this even couldn't prevent Greece from using its EC position as a tool to realize its own foreign policy objectives as the expense of Turkish membership. Although Turkey went under a liberalization process in its economy in 1980s with Turgut Özal and showed a relatively rapid development to increase its eligibility to the Customs union, "...the customs union negotiations between Turkey and EC were blocked by Greece throughout 1994. Even after the Customs Union Agreement was signed, Greece had threatened block the financial aid to be granted to Turkey under the terms of the Customs Union Agreement." (M. Müftüler-Bac, 1997)

Although Turkey failed to meet main European needs such as a fully functioning democracy, poor human rights records notably following the 1980 military coup and a lack of liberal market, EU authorities weren't happy about constant Veto policy of Greece. EU would definitely preferred a Turkey with normalized relations with its members like Greece. Greek national preferences were mostly security driven especially before EU membership. With the accession to the EU and adopting its democratic culture, from a liberal perspective, Greece had to take domestic interests and needs into consideration as well as its own conventional state preferences. Moreover, as the international trends changed in 1980s to a more liberal economy and democratic political structures, it was inevitable for Greece to alter its nationalist foreign policy to a more cooperative and friendly relations with its neighbor Turkey.

CHAPTER III

Post-Helsinki Period: Changing State Preferences of Greece towards Turkey

3.1 Changing national preferences

Ioannis D. Stefanidis explains Greek political culture as the dominant determinant of Greek Foreign Policy making. Greek nationalism and the Christian Orthodoxy dominated Greek foreign policy making and its antagonistic attitude of Greek attitudes towards Turkey. Also he adds that Greek nationalism as most notably seen in education system brings a romantic understanding of national ideas acknowledged by the public. (Stefanidis, 2001) Such nationalist attitude prevailed upon Greek Foreign policy making for so long that it even didn't change so quickly with the accession to the cradle of liberal and democratic norms, namely the EU. It is a generally known fact within the circle of political scientists that Greek foreign policy has much been shaped by a populist and nationalist ideology of Greek political parties that dominated the Greek political culture. However, it doesn't necessarily mean that people were completely isolated and had no influence upon the decision makers. Although Greek Foreign policy objectives, specifically on the Greco-Turkish relations, were immensely based on its nationalist and geopolitical interests embedded in the minds of Greek people with constant ideological impositions by the incumbent politicians and with a highly anti-Turkish historical narrative, it isn't reasonable to propose that Greek people have always been against thawed relations between Greece and Turkey.

3.2 Greek Interstate Bargaining: Domestic Groups

Bearing in mind that the domestic groups are influential upon the foreign policy decisions of states, this chapter will study the domestic dynamics effective upon the Greek government to lift its veto policy towards Turkey's EU accession in the 1999 Helsinki Summit. For liberal democracies it is a generally acknowledged truth that such domestic actors as trade unions, business groups or civil society organizations can have an enormous effect upon people thus lobby the government and frame foreign policy in accordance with their interests. By all means, domestic pressure groups were effective in Greek political life but it is hard to claim that they have been as powerful as the civil society or business groups in other mature and consolidated European democracies. As mentioned above, Greece doesn't have a full-functioning democratic culture unlike its ancient political traditions. Instead Greek near history of politics has witnessed bumps and impediments on the democratic transition path such as the military coup (1967-1974) which also played an important role in the Cyprus problem thus affecting Greek foreign policy making. The Cold War atmosphere brought Greece closer to its Western Allies with sequential membership first to NATO and then to the EU. Joining on the bandwagon of 'stick-together' policy seemed more practical for Greece at that time, however, geopolitical and territorial interests of Greece have always prevailed over Greek foreign policy making. Cyprus issue and the re-deteriorated relationship between Greece and Turkey is the perfect illustration for Greece's historically rooted commitment to its territorial integrity and geopolitical interests. Following the end of the military regime in Greece, the relations with Turkey continued on a security driven approach by both countries (Dokos & Kollias, 2013). However, in democracies, political parties seek to remain at the office by constantly seeking the consent of people. (Milner, 1997; Thomas, 2001, p. 9 cited in Stefaninidis, 2001) The foreign policy priorities of people shape and constraint the foreign policy objectives and decision making processes of the political parties especially on economic and security oriented decisions. My starting point was to examine the interest or pressure groups in Greece that paved way for the ground braking change on Greece's persistence of being a veto player against Turkey's accession to the EU. As I read deeper it has been revealed to me that there isn't enough data to prove the effectiveness and the influence of the socio-economic or civil society groups on Greek Foreign Policy making. Although interest

groups do not encapsulate the political parties in a democratic society, this chapter will involve the most influential and relevant bodies in Greek political life which are the major political parties that ruled Greece between 1974 and 1999.

There are many reasons behind the rising of political parties as the main voices of people or socio-economic groups in Greece instead of the civil society or interest groups which are expected to be the leading figures in a modernized society. The most prominent and visible reason can be the traditional clientelism trend in Greek political culture. In Greece, it is hard to make a clear cut distinction between social groups as the voter behavior is measured by the particular party's capability to provide patronage and a clientalistic relationship. (Çarkoğlu. A & Kirişçi. K, 2004; Vasilopoulou. S & Halikiopoulou. D, 2013) Even though Greece has gone under a modernization and democratic transformation period especially after the fall of military coup (1974) and the following membership to the EU in 1981, the nationalist and clientelist inclinations deeply rooted in Greek polity has remerged and retained during the switching periods of reign between two primary parties, PASOK and New Democracy. In order to retain in the office both parties struggled to deliver the best policy options appealing to people's taste.

Considering the rapprochement in 1990's between Greece and Turkey, one, by all means, needs to reckon with the EU's persistent demands for a better relationship between two strategic allies as well as the promise to bestow Cyprus with membership status despite lack of an understanding between Turkish and Greek Cypriots over how the island will be governed. Yet, the public opinion in Greece has also played an important role due to the abovementioned rationale behind a political party's struggle to retain the office. As for the Greco-Turkish rapprochement, such consent by people became obvious after the two successive earthquakes striking both nations subsequently. Turkey was stroke by a huge earthquake on August 17, 1999 resulted in thousands of deaths and many more casualties. Soon after the disaster in Turkey, Greece was hit by an earthquake on 7th September, 1999. Both countries didn't hesitate to be the first responders and aid donors to the disasters taking place in its neighbor. Such friendly and humanitarian approach by both nations helped the new term "seismic diplomacy" to be canonized in political literature as then Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou eloquently expresses: "It often takes public opinion on a wide scale to ensure that world leaders act. The devastating earthquakes that shook Turkey and

Greece last summer are a case in point. Through their moving expressions of solidarity, the citizens of Greece and Turkey effectively coined a new political term: “seismic diplomacy”.⁴² Dimitris Lucas argues that the earthquake diplomacy was actually what was needed by the Greek government to start up new friendly relationship with Turkey adding to the ongoing warm bilateral relationship between Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou.

“...Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Papandreou knew well that in order to have a policy reversal at the Helsinki Summit in December, they needed a big event to occur in order to reverse the opinion of the general public in Greece. The earthquakes of August and September did exactly what the Greek government was looking for. The public was now a full supporter of further rapprochement with Turkey and approved of the Greek government’s attempts to improve bilateral relations with Turkey...The path was clear for Greece to further its efforts in continuing the dialogue with Turkey, cooperating to clear the path for Turkey’s EU candidacy approval, and to continue its efforts to meet the EMU criteria.”

Besides Greek foreign policy objectives of settling the Cyprus dispute and granting Cyprus with EU membership, Greece wanted to be a member of the eurozone.⁴³ These motivations drove the change in the antagonistic foreign policy approach of Greece that prevailed its foreign policy for many years. Such approach actually arose from a historically rooted ideology of nationalism and irredentism which materialize in the Greek foreign policy as security-driven and defensive policies. Greece has always felt a threat from the east and showed a clear tendency to secure its eastern borders. However such approach didn’t prevent Greece from having trouble with neighboring Turkey. Their relations has become such a romantic kind of relationship with ups and downs that they both moved away from rational policies that would enable them act under win-win conditions or provide them with mutual cooperation. The tensions between them had a bad effect on bilateral trade relations and both nations, specifically the businessmen, weren’t content with the lack of necessary economic cooperation with their closest neighbor. It was a high time that both countries pioneered for a potential rapprochement. As pointed out in Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism theory with

⁴² George Papandreou, " The Impact Of Greek-Turkish Rapprochement On The Mediterranean" <http://www.hri.org/MFA/whatnew/lastampa_gap.htm>

⁴³ BBC News, March 9, 2000, retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/672150.stm>

a rationalist framework, the inner-state bargaining process for Greece literally started when the Greek and Turkish nations ostensibly demonstrated a mutual humanitarian assistance towards one another following the devastating earthquakes in 1999. Both nations were not actually happy with the deteriorated relations lasting for so many years and bringing no efficient results but rather the lack of lively economic relations. There were of course some other attempts to normalize the relations before and after 1999 events between to neighbors such as the close diplomatic liaisons between George Papandreou and Ismail Cem especially after the tragic even of capturing Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdish rebel groups. Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Nairobi and it has been found out that he was taking shelter under the residential premises of the Greek Embassy. Even though the Greek authorities denied that he ever set foot on Greece, Turkish side remained suspicious about the Greek role over the long run of Öcalan.⁴⁴ Due to the fiasco revealed with the capture of Öcalan, Greek government found itself under by far one of the most difficult situations faced in Greco-Turkish diplomatic history. The government was urgently in need of a maneuver to whitewash its distorted image on the international arena and ameliorate its relations with Turkey at least to a certain extent. Yet, at the same time, Greek government was obliged to receive the consent of Greek people to compromise with Turkey in order to remain in the office in the next term. The answer came right after the earthquake unfolded in Turkey's Marmara region with the immediate support and aid transferred from Greek people to the Turkish people. I do not argue that this sign coming from the Greek people was the only determinant over the sudden and unprecedented shift on Greek policy towards Turkey. There were of course other factors and influence elements, however, what I am proposing is the influence of Greek people on Greek foreign policy making regarding Turkish question was marked by the very event of earthquake diplomacy. Therefore, in this chapter the main goal is to examine the most dominant political parties in Greek politics and their stances on the 1999 Helsinki Summit outcome of opening up a new phase in the Greco-Turkish.

⁴⁴ Milliyet, 16 February 2016, retrieved from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1999/02/16/siyaset/siy0.html>

3.2.1 New Democracy (ND)

It is universally acknowledged that Greece is the motherland of democracy and where the democracy has spread from. However, it is not easy to say that Greece could always maintain its democratic principles. The most renowned illustration for that is the junta regime that ruled over Greece between 1967 and 1974. It was only when the Turkish troops landed on the Northern Cyprus that, first, the Greek supported military regime in Cyprus and then the Greek junta fell. Following the disposal of the Greek junta, the exiled leader Constantine Karamanlis came back to power and established the center-right political party of New Democracy (ND). As self-explanatory it is, ND's main election campaign promise was to restore democracy in Greece and set up the constitution. In accordance with its pledge for more democracy, ND followed the path of Greece's Western Allies and committed itself to be integrated into the European Union. Although ND's EU bid only resulted in 1981 when its major rival party PASOK has secured the office, New Democracy Party has put its utmost effort to be a part of European democracy.

To have an independent foreign policy is one of the main pillars of a liberal and democratic country as well as an indispensable element for the integrity and security of a state. Following the democratic consolidation of Greece, New Democracy pledged to follow an independent foreign policy exempt from external manipulation and influences in an attempt to demonstrate that there is a brand new Greece stand in international political system.(Coufoudakis, 1988) the perfect illustration of this shift towards an independence in foreign policy can be seen in Greece's attitude towards Turkey, a NATO member. Turkey must have been seen as an ally due to their joint NATO membership, however, Greece has tended to render Turkey's claims on the Aegean Sea as offensive and belligerent actions of a wider policy of complete jurisdiction over the Aegean and, thus, considered the biggest security threat could only come from the east. Although Greece wanted to be externally independent in foreign policy making, it was less possible to redeem foreign policy from domestic influence. The deeply embedded nationalist and irredentist ideology ostensibly supported by the public level has always shown itself as a primary source of influence. In the reign of ND (1974-1981), first the Prime Minister and then the President Konstantine Karamanlis experienced the twists and turns in changing the perceptions of people towards foreign policy. Two of the

major conflictual issues, Cyprus and the Aegean Sea problem, flared up the period of ND rule in Greece.

Even though Karamanlis vowed to lift the influence of the junta and military effect, he couldn't suspend the rooted military dominance as he thought Turkey constitutes a threat to Greece's security at the borders.(Moustakis, 2003) It has always been a Greek Foreign Policy tendency to address Turkey as the ever-present enemy because of the fact that, otherwise, it would demonstrate a weakness to the society and might have led to a major fall in the votes to the incumbent. Karamanlis has always stated that the irresolvability of the issues between Turkey and Greece emanates from Turkey's offensive claims over the Aegean and Cyprus and blamed Turkey of trying to change the legal status of the Aegean islands, especially the status of Cyprus.⁴⁵ Several times, he criticized the US and NATO's attitude towards Turkish involvement in the Cyprus issue and complained that "Washington treated Greece unfairly in order not to vex Turkey."⁴⁶ Withdrawing from the military wing of NATO was discussed many times in Greek Parliament but a complete action to leave NATO has never been taken.⁴⁷ Turkey was a strategically important ally for NATO especially during the Cold War years and US would never prefer Turkey to shift its Foreign Policy pivot towards the Soviet Union. Therefore, Turkey was enjoying the privilege of sending its research vessels to the controversial sea areas despite the strong Greek resistance and persistence to keep a major part of the Aegean under Greek jurisdiction. Even though Greece was so disturbed by the Turkish presence in the Aegean and considered it as a security threat, NATO didn't show a particularly determined position to assist Greece in the event of a potential threat from Turkey. (Coufoudakis, 1991) Disappointed by the US involvement in favor of Turkey instead of Greece in the Cyprus and the Aegean debacle, Greece has shifted its focus towards the Soviet Union. Karamanlis paid a visit to the Soviet Union in 1979.⁴⁸ However, such foreign policy shift didn't bring any resolution on Greco-Turkish conflicts, thus Greek policy makers were assured that US is an indispensable actor in this triangle with a possible effect on Turkey. However, they knew that US would never allow any turmoil or tension in its back yard in which US invested so much

⁴⁵ Milliyet, 15 December 1977, Page.3 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁴⁶ Milliyet, 28 October 1977, Page.8 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁴⁷ Milliyet, 12 January 1980, Page.3 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁴⁸ Milliyet, 04 October 1979, Page.3 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

in order to keep it stable. Persuaded to avoid any kind of military demonstration or a hot battle with Turkey, Greece, particularly under the leadership of Konstantine Karamanlis, pursued an alternative policy based on peaceful negotiations and talks. Nevertheless, it didn't necessarily mean that Greece was ready to compromise over the major and indisputable questions like Cyprus or the continental shelf. As a matter of fact, Greece was expecting Turkey to compromise and relinquish its claims over the Aegean and Cyprus by bringing these issues under the jurisdiction of international law thus depriving Turkey of a legal basis. Leaving Turkey out of the game through legal ways was the main reason why Greece brought the Continental Shelf problem to the ICJ in 1978. Though it resulted in nobody's favor, it represents the way Greece would follow from then on.

Even though Karamanlis was faced with a strong public opinion against negotiations with Turkey, he has never given up on emphasizing the importance of the diplomatic negotiations and dialogue to evade from a potential battle between Turkey and Greece on the Aegean. (Couloufouidakis, 1991) He insisted on his reformist policies and prioritized democratic and peaceful tools in conflict resolution with Turkey⁴⁹. Even though such personal approach of Karamanlis provided him with Greek membership to the EU in 1981, it created a big disappointment among his constituencies who supported a more nationalist and ideological approach when it comes to Greco-Turkish relations. The same year when Greece became an EU member, Greek parliamentary elections witnessed the birth of a new actor in Greek political history, Panhellenist Socialist Movement (PASOK). The two term tenure of Karamanlis ended with an unprecedented loss to the main opposition PASOK. Although Karamanlis remained in power as the president and the symbolic leader of Greek reformism and democracy, the political party that he founded could only seize power in 1990-1993 periods. Following the groundbreaking change in the office in 1981, PASOK has become the dominating party in Greek politics and the most vocal and enthusiastic defender of protecting Greek interests over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus.

⁴⁹ Milliyet, 18 March 1978, Page.9 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

3.2.2 Panhellenist Socialist Movement (PASOK)

PASOK, seizing power in 1981 with complete failure of New Democracy party, was always the most prominent critic of ND on its soft and easy foreign policy behavior towards Turkey. However, during its long term reign PASOK has also demonstrated some shift from its hardliner position and had to give up on its nationalist and socialist ideology to a certain extent. Despite the fact that PASOK has never changed its red lines on the foreign policy objectives regarding the bilateral relations with Turkey which included the indisputability of the Greek territorial waters and the withdrawal of Turkish army from Cyprus island, PASOK feared the public backlash considering the negotiations as a sign of weakness. Yet, even such dilemma couldn't prevent PASOK from acting as a rational actor and applying diplomatic tools instead of increasing the military expenses and wage war against Turkey.

"...despite domestic pressures and ideological bravado, resort to force has been avoided even though in 1974, 1976 and 1987 Greece and Turkey came dangerously close to war. Under both conservative and socialist governments, pragmatism has prevailed." (Coufoudakis, 1991)

During its short period of acting as the opposition, PASOK severely criticized the ruling ND for being moderate in its foreign policy and treating Turkey with reconciliatory approach rather than demonstrating Greek determinism to use any kind of force if Greek territorial integrity is under threat. Despite PASOK "nationalistic" and "socialist" rhetoric in its political campaigns, PASOK's ideology of a self-help, socialist and independent state in its foreign policy, economy or politics didn't really apply to the reality as PASOK also couldn't evade from adopting moderate foreign policy preferences when it comes to Greco-Turkish relations. Although the nationalist and harsh rhetoric on the indisputability of the indivisible Greek soil/territory prevailed, "the anti-imperialist" promises of PASOK have turned out to be "softened". (Spourdalakis, 1986)

During PASOK's rule some major historical turning points became a determinant on the Greek public opinion which was already characterized as anti-Turkish and ultra-nationalist on foreign policy. The self-declaration of independence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 was tremendously condemned by the Greek public and administration. Therefore, PASOK leader Papandreu couldn't find a legitimate ground

to continue bilateral talks with Turkey. Even if he avoided a sharp and certain refusal to have bilateral talks with Turkey⁵⁰, he rather preferred live up to the expectations of Greek public opinion and didn't make a move to start the negotiation process. The then Turkish Ambassador to Greece, Nazmi Akıman expresses in his memoir regarding a meeting with Greek Prime Minister Papandreu that Papandreu constantly put forward the Cyprus problem as a stumbling block against building good relations between Greece and Turkey whenever Mr. Akıman brings up starting the dialogue process. (Akıman, 2002)

Already fragile relations were hit by another strike in 1987 which brought two neighbors on the verge of a battle. The tension began with the announcement of the North Aegean Petroleum Co., a consortium, to start up a drilling process to find our petroleum reaching out of the Greek territorial waters and Greece didn't make a concrete movement to stop such attempt as it was also on Greece's favor to prove that Aegean Sea is actually mostly under Greek control and Greece will eventually declare its jurisdiction on 12 nautical miles beyond its territories.⁵¹ Uncomfortable because of the suspension of bilateral talks and the pending Bern Agreement of 1976, Turkey retaliated by sending its research vessel Sismik 1 with a naval escort to protect it for a potential confrontation on the Aegean Sea. Both nations kept their ships within their territorial limits and avoided a possible close combat. Sismik I (formerly known as Hora) went on its oil research within the Turkish territorial waters⁵² after the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal announced that "Turkey will retaliate if and when Greek vessels move beyond their territorial waters."⁵³ He also added that Turkish ships will not leave Turkish territorial waters and Turkey will wait for the first move from the Greek side.⁵⁴ Such statements from Turkish sides helped the tension to be soothed otherwise a real confrontation in the Aegean by naval forces of two countries was inevitable. Nazmi Akıman explains the preceding events to the softened tone of the voice in the announcements of PM Özal as such:

⁵⁰ Milliyet, 23 January 1983, Page.12 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁵¹ Washington Post, March 29, 1987, retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/03/29/greeks-turks-back-down-over-aegean/6d96e867-33a1-4619-bfdc-1cc687f6c9f4/>

⁵² Milliyet, 30 March 1987, Page.8 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁵³ Milliyet, 28 March 1987, Page.5 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁵⁴ New York Times, March 28, 1987, retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/28/world/greece-and-turkey-alert-forces-as-tension-builds-on-oil-search.html?pagewanted=all>

“Upon receiving instructions from Ankara, I saw Kapsis and warned him of Greece’s obligations to abide by the rules of the Berne Declaration of 1976 that was agreed to by Turkey and Greece. But Kapsis retorted that the Greek government considered the Berne Declaration “inoperative,” therefore it would decide to drill when and wherever it liked in the Aegean. ...Just when the Aegean standoff entered a dangerous stage, Papandreou sent Yiannis Boutos, a parliamentarian friend of his, to see me. Unlike Kapsis, who was given to bluster, Boutos was a man of measured demeanor. When I explained my conversation with Kapsis, and the gravity of the situation, Boutos hastily conveyed my remarks directly to Papandreou. He also stated that Papandreou had not been adequately briefed by Kapsis regarding our exchange... I advised Ankara accordingly. It took some time for the danger of a confrontation in the Aegean to dissipate, but in the end we managed to defuse the standoff. Ultimately, Athens indicated that it had no plans to drill beyond its territorial waters, while insisting that it reserved its rights in the Aegean.”

It was only after the disclosure of the misunderstanding between two leaders and their cautious approach to avoid a potential war that Papandreou and Özal decided to meet in the Davos Summit to discuss the Aegean related disputes in 1988. Initiated with mutual understanding and enthusiasm, the Davos spirit didn’t last long enough to establish a common ground for maintaining the negotiations for further problem solving.⁵⁵ The 1989 Greek parliamentarian elections was also conducive on the failure of the sustainability of Davos process, as Papandreou didn’t want to fall into the same trap as its predecessor New Democracy did and sacrifice his office for the betterment of Greco-Turkish relations. However, Papandreou’s move to slow down the negotiation process and draw the image in the eyes of the Greek people that he fights for Greek interests at any costs without conceding to Turkey didn’t result in success and he was defeated by the New Democracy leader Constantine Mitsotakis in 1989 elections.

After a four year period of ND rule, the office was passed over the PASOK government in 1993. Continuing his role as the charismatic leader of the most dominant political part in Greece history, Papandreou brought his part to a more moderate position compared to its early hardliner rhetoric. Like in many administrative areas of Greek state, including foreign policy, PASOK remained an ardent supporter of Greek interests and paid close attention to Greek public opinion. No matter how much he was liked by

⁵⁵ Milliyet, 31 October 1988, Page.7 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

his constituencies, Andreas Papandreu had to step back and retire from politics due to his health problems in 1996.

As a natural part of Greek-Turkish relations, his successor Kostas Simitis couldn't evade from tackling with major bilateral conflicts during his tenure. Inheriting highly vexed and turbulent relations with Turkey, Simitis had many breaking points to have an idea about the Greek public opinion towards Turkey and he had to seek for a reason to normalize the bilateral relations like his counterpart Papandreu. First warning from the Greek society came right after the Imia/Kardak Crisis in 1996 that even a few rocky hills of Greek soil is not open to negotiation. Under the mediation of US both states managed to consolidate and the escalation to a bigger crisis was prevented. However, Simitis encountered a big opposition at home and he was even booed and blamed by opposition members of the parliament for being a traitor.⁵⁶ Right after the crisis ended, Simitis didn't delay seeking for EU's support in combat with Turkey for Greek rights in the Aegean. Simitis put forward his belief in the democratic principles of the EU and its working system.⁵⁷ However, EU's signing the Ankara Agreement with Turkey in 1996 and functionally integrating Turkey to the Customs Union in 1996 was the perfect illustration for Greece to understand that EU wasn't really in favor of excluding Turkey from European Union. Simitis was very well aware that there weren't left many alternatives to discuss and solve the never-ending conflict with Turkey apart from normalizing relations and negotiate under real democratic terms which are set by an overarching institution, namely the EU. However, it was also clear to Simitis that he needed to be backed up by his constituencies.

The intra-state bargaining in Greece were profoundly shaped and restricted by the public opinion due to political and electoral concerns of the incumbent. On the other hand, there was a huge pressure on Greek government to thaw the bilateral trade relations with Turkey as a dramatic fall on the external trade rates can be clearly seen on the Table 2.

⁵⁶ Milliyet, 01 February 1996, Page 16 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁵⁷ Atenna News, 1 March 1996, retrieved from <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ant1en/1996/96-03-01.ant1en.html>


Table 2: Bilateral Greek-Turkish Trade Data, 1996-2005 (Current Dollars)⁵⁸

| Year | Exports (\$) | Imports (\$) | Balance (\$) | Volume (\$) |
|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| 1996 | 284,958,914 | 236,463,911 | 48,495,003 | 521,422,825 |
| 1997 | 430,780,094 | 298,236,607 | 132,543,487 | 729,016,701 |
| 1998 | 319,751,386 | 370,038,895 | -50,287,509 | 689,790,281 |
| 1999 | 287,555,576 | 406,794,147 | -119,238,571 | 694,349,723 |
| 2000 | 430,812,980 | 437,725,190 | 6,912,210 | 868,538,170 |
| 2001 | 266,253,783 | 476,095,465 | -209,841,682 | 742,349,248 |
| 2002 | 312,462,301 | 590,381,620 | -277,919,319 | 902,843,921 |
| 2003 | 427,743,333 | 920,400,913 | -492,657,580 | 1,348,144,246 |
| 2004 | 594,350,617 | 1,171,203,001 | -576,852,384 | 1,765,553,618 |
| 2005 | 720,679,499 | 1,122,108,994 | -401,429,495 | 1,842,788,493 |

Furthermore, PASOK government was anxious and uneasy about the amount of spending invested upon the armament since Papandreu's tenure. Greece was mainly concerned about the security threat from the East especially from Turkey due to deteriorating relations and discrepancies over the Aegean Sea. Due to security concerns, Greek military spending has increased and decreased according to the level of tensions between Greece and Turkey. It can be inferred from the chart (Figure 2) showing the military spending as of the percentage of GDP that there is a tremendous increase and several fluctuations especially between 1970's until the early 1990's when major clashes between two neighbors occurred whereas the line smoothly flows down after 1990 with quite minor increases pointing out to the Imia/Kardak Crisis (1996), Cyprus Missile Crisis (1997-1998) and Öcalan Crisis (1999).

⁵⁸ Source: Balkan Regional Center for Trade Promotion, www.balkantrade.org, cited from: Archontis L. Pantsios, "Trade and Conflict: The Dyad of Greece and Turkey", the 10th Annual Conference on Economics and Security, 22-23 June 2006.

Figure 2: Data on the percentage of GDP allocated to defense in Greece 1974-2010⁵⁹



According to Thanos Dokos and Christos Kollias, Turkey has been perceived as a military threat by wider public opinion and regarded as a country with “revisionist” aims to build its hegemony over the region which culminated in the dramatic increases of military spending. During one of his addresses Greek Prime Minister Papandreu remarked that “The reason why Greek economy cannot develop emanates from the excessive spending on defense against the Turkish threat” and the then spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Nazım Akıman responded the allegations with complete indifference saying: “Such allegations have always come out, but they have no substantial basis whatsoever.” Though Papandreu’s remarks were completely ignored by the Turkish side, both countries were actually in need of reconciliation in order to avoid security threats and military spending, however, they also needed public support to overcome mutual nationalist and antagonistic ideologies deeply embedded in their joint past. While two governments were looking for a rational understanding in order to turn the animosity into cooperation, the 1999 earthquakes striking both countries came as a rescuing signal or a herald for reconciliation of the reversed relationship. Much

⁵⁹ Source: (1974-1987) The Military Balance, (1988-2010) SIPRI retrieved from <https://europeangreens.eu/sites/europeangreens.eu/files/militaryexpences.pdf>


more importantly, it constituted a legitimizing basis for both governments to ask for the support of their public opinion. (James Ker-Lindsay, 2000) The PASOK government, particularly, was surely in need of a legitimate ground to resolve the disputes with Turkey without making any concession on the Greek land and the jurisdiction on the Aegean Sea. As this thesis proposes such legitimate ground could only be built with the 1999 earthquakes which clearly unleashed the fact that both nations were actually ready to make peace and reconciliation. There are of course other parameters or endogenous aspects to effect foreign policy priorities of the ruling party, however the successively emerged disasters and the mutual prompt responses were the most prominent and visible illustration of the willingness and inclination of Greek society for dialogue.

Another reason for the significance of “disaster diplomacy” in unleashing the Greek public opinion lies under the fact that “there has been practically no systematic study of the role of public opinion in Greek-Turkish relations and no comparative study of the composition and determinants of public opinion in both countries.” (Çarkoğlu. A & Kirişçi. K, 2004) It is hardly possible to find a substantial piece of research on the Greek public opinion on bilateral relations with Turkey apart from the prevalent rhetoric on the Greek media and the historically known fact of mutual animosity. Another exception can be considered the Eurobarometer report⁶⁰ in 1999 which provides an important parameter to understand the opinion of Greek society towards Turkey. The Eurobarometer 51 pictures the willingness and tendency of the EU citizens to endorse the potential accession of candidate or applicant countries.⁶¹

⁶⁰ European Commission. Eurobarometer 51. September 1999.

⁶¹ Turkey wasn't enlisted as a candidate country along with the CEECs in the Luxemburg Summit which caused a great disappointment on the Turkish government. It would take Turkey two more years to see the official EU candidacy with the Helsinki Summit.

Figure 3: Support Rate of 15 EU Members for Enlargement in 1999*



According to the results (Figure 3), Turkey has an obvious lack of support in the overall picture of the general support to the applicant countries. Being the least welcomed country to the Union, Turkey's level of support is only %29 and its least supporter is Greece with %13.⁶² Released in July, 1999, the Eurobarometer 51 was conducted in 1999 between March and April. This fact highlights that Greek public opinion didn't really change quite drastically enough for the government to start up a new process for the resolution of the main conflict in lieu with Turkey and the Greek society wasn't really in favor of Turkey's accession to the EU. Therefore, 1999 earthquakes created the perfect ground for the Greek government to continue bilateral good relations and support Turkey's EU accession so that Greece can more easily solve its bilateral problems on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea with an EU member Turkey with more democratic principles.

⁶² Although the Eurobarometer has a more homogenous approach and doesn't include the individual data for each EU member's public opinion, it is possible to see the Greek public opinion on Turkey's EU Accession as the report remarks the extreme data and Greece stands out as the least supporter of Turkey.

3.3 Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy

Due to its socio-cultural and historical ties with Europe Greece has always been in search of an alliance with the Western countries. Following the Second World War, Greece has made clear the line it chose to stand on and made its choice on the Western Alliance by being a member of NATO in 1952. Under the Cold War circumstances, there has been some twists and turns in Greco-Western world relations particularly when the Aegean Sea dispute and Cyprus problem is concerned. Dealing with its bilateral issues with Turkey, Greece has considered its NATO involvement as a taken for granted membership and expected NATO to support Greek interests at the expense of Turkey for any reason whatsoever. As the expected support wasn't delivered by NATO that preferred to act only as a mediator but not a guarantor of peace between two neighbors, Greece was forced to find alternative ways to defeat Turkish claims on the Aegean without making any concessions on Greek soil. Even if such attitude of the Western world has pushed Greece to make cooperation and strengthen its ties with Russia during Cold War, Greece never lost its persistence to continue being a part of modern western world and its institutions.

Following the demise of the Greek Junta regime in 1974, Greece has undergone a long process of democratic transformation and modernization in its political system. Initiated under the symbolic leadership of Konstantine Karamanlis and his New Democracy Party, the new democratization process has touched upon all the aspects of central administration including foreign policy making. Adopting the European modernism in many policy areas, Karamanlis office tried to liberate Greek policy making processes from the ethnocentric and nationalist Greek ideology. (Kalpadakis. G & Sotiropoulos. D) Even in the most turbulent times in terms of Greco-Turkish relations, Karamanlis continued his policy of negotiations with Turkey. Although it cost him the end of his office, such policy approach inspired its successor PASOK governments. Even though, PASOK governments, especially under the leadership of Andreas Papandreu, were known for their hardliner and harsh rhetoric on Greek's stances towards Turkey related problems, it is hard to say that PASOK was simply against the resolution of bilateral issues. On the contrary, even PASOK has changed its tone and party rhetoric to a modernizer and Europeanist party in time and started negotiations with Turkey whenever circumstances were mature enough for PASOK to maneuver in domestic politics. However, right after the historical defeat against the New Democracy in 1989

elections, PASOK returned to its nationalist and ethnocentric foreign policy approach with its 1993 victory. It was only after the 1996 elections that Greece began to pursue Europeanized foreign policies with the change of PASOK leader, Kostas Simitis. (Kalpadakis. G & Sotiropoulos. D)

From a Greco-Turkish relations point of view, a real Europeanization in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey could only be seen after 1996. Before that, no matter how modernized and pro-European the Greek governments' efforts were, there was no clearly defined wish for Turkey's EU accession. Adding to that, Greece persistently did whatever it takes to exclude Turkey from European integration and put every effort to make Turkey's EU candidacy impossible and slow down the economic growth by blocking the financial support from the EU. (Blavoukos. S & Bourantonis. D, 2009) Before 1990's, particularly after 1996, EU doesn't seem to have concrete effect on normalizing the relations between two neighbors. On the contrary, EU seemed indifferent to both countries' claims and tried to keep an equal distance to both as it wouldn't be wise to offend both strategically important NATO members. As history never fails to show that some people or countries in this case are more equal which can be clearly seen in Greece's EU membership. Even though Greece was far behind its European counterparts in terms of a functioning democracy and a full-fledged liberal economy, it didn't dissuade the EU to grant Greece with an EU membership (1981) while Turkey was not even considered as candidate until after the Helsinki Summit. Greece seek for EU membership "as a means to secure solidarity from other EU states in its difficult relations with Turkey's hegemonic demands (over the Aegean and in Cyprus)"(Trsardanidis. C & Stavridis. S, 2005) Therefore, EU's indifferent and negligent attitude disappointed Greece when the level of tension climbed up its peak between Greece and Turkey as in the case of Imia/Kardak Crisis which was only eased by NATO mediation. On the other hand, Turkey has always criticized the EU for increasing Greece's leverage over Turkey by granting the Greeks with members and leaving Turkey out of the game. The EU membership constituted a paradoxical situation for Greece as much as it does for Turkey. Greece inferred from the European treatment towards Greco-Turkish problems that Greece can only solve its problems with Turkey under EU mediation if Turkey has the equal status as Greek has in the EU. An EU member Turkey, who will give the utmost importance to conform to EU conditionality principles as any member should, would be much more agreeable for Greece to

consolidate over the disputed areas and prevent Turkey from realizing its expansionist desires in the Aegean. Under the mutually binding negotiation circumstances, Greece might have an advantage over Turkey to solve the eternal hostilities on Greek's favor.

With Simitis' seizure of power in 1996, the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey has become one of the cornerstones of Greek politics. The first illustration of such re-rapprochement came along with Greece's vote in favor of Turkey's membership to the Customs Union. This approach has also been persevered in the parliamentary discourse. A study⁶³ conducted to analyze the parliamentary statements in Greek parliament between the years of 1995-2003 has shown that there is an obvious dominance of the references made by the parliamentarians to the "external behavior and the international role of Turkey" between 1996 and 2003. (Kotsiaros, 2006)




Figure 4: Distribution of Statements of the Greek National Representatives between 1996-2003

⁶³ "The analysis is based on a Research Program conducted in the University of Athens, as a part of an international research project coordinated by the University of Konstanz. Using quantitative analysis methods, the research team of the University of Athens studied and coded 781 statements in the Greek National Parliament about Turkey from 1995 to 2003. The results of the research project were presented in the international Conference: "the European perspective of Turkey after the December 2004 decision" in Istanbul, Galatasaray University, on the 3rd and 4th of June 2005 by Prof. P. Kazakos and Dr. G. Kazakos." The study is cited from Kotsiaros, A. (2006). The change of the Greek foreign policy strategy towards Turkey: the Greek official political discourse. Working paper. Department of Political Science and Public Administration. University of Athens. Athens.

The diagram hereinabove depicts that the ruling Greek government (PASOK under Simitis leadership) systematically tried to create a discourse within the parliament to make the people familiar with the new foreign policy of Greece which intends to integrate Turkey to the EU in order to diffuse the disputes on a joint legal basis. Greece was considering Turkey as a security threat and believed in the healing power of adopting democratic principles and EU's diplomatic and civic instruments that would play a role in solving the bilateral conflicts with Turkey on the condition that Turkey becomes a member. However, one can ask now that Greece adopted a supportive approach towards Turkey's EU accession and it is obvious in the political rhetoric why did Greece block Turkey's candidacy status in Luxemburg Council Summit? The Luxemburg Summit created a great disappointment and fury on Turkish side as the EU officially acknowledged the candidate status of Central and Eastern European countries as well as Cyprus while leaving Turkey out of the enlargement wave. Ruling out Turkey's eligibility to be an EU candidate, EU didn't fail to describe a strategy⁶⁴ for Turkey on how to be prepared for accession. (31st Paragraph) EU might seem to have backed Greece in excluding Turkey from the integration, however, Greece wasn't the only member to use its veto right against Turkish candidacy. For instance Germany took part on the blocking side during the Summit as it was concerned about Turkey's acquisition of equal number of seats due to its huge population almost similar to Germany in number. Luxemburg had similar concerns while Simitis stated that Greece wasn't totally against Turkey's EU accession but they believed that Turkey wasn't ready for such position yet. He also added that Turkey's impediment on Cyprus' accession and failure to bring the Imia/Kardak issue to the ICJ brought the situation to a complicated level.⁶⁵ While Germany and Greece sided together against Turkey's candidacy, England and France showed a clear support to Turkey which almost completely emanated from the US pressure on Europe not to exclude Turkey from

⁶⁴ Luxemburg European Council Presidency Conclusions, 12-13 December 1997, Paragraph 32: "This strategy should consist in:

- development of the possibilities afforded by the Ankara Agreement;
 - intensification of the Customs Union;
 - implementation of financial cooperation;
 - approximation of laws and adoption of the Union acquis.
 - participation, to be decided case by case, in certain programmes and in certain agencies provided for in paragraphs 19 and 21."
- Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm

⁶⁵ Milliyet, 13 December 1997, Page.21 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

regional stability area as Turkey was still a strategic partner for NATO. This policy driver would shape the rest of the EU relations with Turkey from then on which accordingly affected Greco-Turkish relations. What I argue here is the fact that Greece was in favor of an EU member Turkey under Simitis' transformed foreign policy objectives, however, Simitis wanted to test the EU support to Greeks' sensitive territorial problems as a last trial as solving the disputes with Turkey without conceding to Turkey would help Simitis not to lose his legitimacy on his constituency. Nevertheless, it didn't last long for Greece to understand that EU is a strategic partner for NATO, therefore, EU cannot easily exclude Turkey from the decision making processes on vital issues. Following the Luxemburg Summit, Greece and Turkey was in dispute again due to the S-300 missiles that Cyprus wanted to export from Russia in order to install against a potential Turkish threat. Turkey went against such wish as it would mean a serious security deficiency in the south. Constituting another hitch in the already thwarted relations, Cyprus Crisis didn't stop Simitis from following his healing relations with Turkey policy. He continuously argued that Greece isn't against Turkey's EU membership, yet he failed to show an open support in the Luxemburg Summit. The main underlying reason for such failure was the public backlash Simitis feared of because the Greek people were still cautious about normalizing relations with Turkey. Cyprus remained another stumbling block against Greece to support Turkey secure a place in the Union as Cyprus couldn't be a member yet. Rationally speaking, it wouldn't be wise and functional for Greece to open up ways for Turkey to be an EU member while Cyprus was crawling to possess the complete control and jurisdiction of the island at the expense of Turkish Cypriots by being an EU member which would only reinforce the political leverage of Greece over Turkey in the Union. On the other hand Greece stated many times that "Turkey must accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice if it wants closer ties with the EU."⁶⁶ Greece believed that Turkey would only respect and ratify the international conventions such as the UNCLOS if it adopts a democratic transformation process following the EU membership. Nevertheless, Greece would rather Cyprus to be an EU member before Turkey becomes.

In attempt to refrain further crisis, this time the Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem sent a package deal composed of 5 articles the main content of which addressed to

⁶⁶ Hürriyet Daily News, 12.03.1997, retrieved from: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/simitis-persists-with-veto-on-turkey.aspx?pageID=438&n=simitis-persists-with-veto-on-turkey-1997-12-03>

implementing the Madrid Declaration and starting a new phase of dialogue with Greek government. The Madrid Declaration was initiated by US efforts under the leadership of the Secretary General Madeleine Albright during the NATO Summit in Madrid in July, 1997. The Declaration was mainly a statement of bilateral agreement of non-aggression and refraining from a potential encounter between two neighbors. However, the Greek government was so against the dialogue without the involvement of a third party namely the ICJ, it didn't approach warmly to the idea of making Madrid declaration an agreement stating that "it is only a declaration and a declaration doesn't have the power to suspend the terms of the international agreements referring to UNCLOS." ⁶⁷ This phenomenon proved once again that neither EU nor NATO/ US could have the unifying impact on Greco-Turkish tension. Furthermore, Pangalos' personal statements played a negative role during this process. Unlike Simitis, Pangalos demonstrated an aggressive and offensive attitude during the critical period between Luxemburg and the Helsinki Summit. His infamously known remarks⁶⁸ on Turkish people pervaded specifically the Turkish media at that time.

To make matters worse, the Öcalan crisis occurred in 1999 and raising the tension to its peak between Greece and Turkey. When the runaway leader of the Kurdish rebel forces in Turkey, Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya in a resident owned by The Greek Embassy, it created a great rage and anger on the Turkish government against Greek government. It was also found out that Öcalan seek for asylum in Greece and Greece tried to find another country to grant him asylum not to get into further trouble with Turkey. Turkish authorities responded with anger and fury to Greece for not assessing the option to extradite him. Öcalan crisis created a big controversy in domestic political arena as well. Simitis was shunned and criticized by the opposition and nationalist members of the parliament for meddling with Turkey's own business.⁶⁹ In a response to the crisis, Simitis stated that "Due to some irresponsible, ultra nationalist and funny-opinioned people drew Greece into an adventure. Yet, Greece don't have to be

⁶⁷ Milliyet, 25 February 1998, Page.20 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁶⁸ Pangalos:"Under such circumstances, let alone dialogue, we cannot even start exchanging opinions... Yet, it is impossible to negotiate with robbers, murderers and rapists" cited from Milliyet, 26 September 1997, Page.18 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁶⁹ Milliyet, 18 February 1999, Page.21 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

accountable to anyone.”⁷⁰ Simitis didn’t lose his position due to unwelcomed chain of events but Pangalos had to resign following the domestic unrest over the Öcalan crisis.⁷¹

Öcalan crisis in addition to the missile and Imia/Kardak crisis has shown that Simitis cannot be sure to completely adopting a pro-approach towards Turkey’s EU accession and normalizing their relations as he could never be sure of the public opinion. Neither EU nor NATO could be concretely and feasibly influential upon Greece to embrace Turkey. It would be only the Greek interests and public opinion that would change the trajectory of the relations in the long run. 1999 earthquakes played the most important role to clearly demonstrate Greek government that Greek people are ready for a possible convergence between two nations.

It was the main motivation for Greece to take a positive stand towards Turkey’s EU accession in the Helsinki Summit and lifting its obvious veto policy. The latest crises left Greece with no choice but to pave way for Turkey to be an EU member, still Greece didn’t put aside its ”No Concessions to Turkey” policy and came up with some claims and conditions on the road to the Helsinki Summit. In the document containing the Greek conditions to be inscribed in the presidency conclusions of the coming summit for a possible veto lifting on granting Turkey with a candidacy status, Greece inscribed its claims as such:

- “1. *The unsolved problem of Cyprus should not prevent the accession of the Republic of Cyprus (at least the de facto accession of the unoccupied part – JR).*
2. *Any candidate for membership must be willing to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, within a certain time-frame (approximately until the end of 2000). Although this demand could be already found in the Agenda 2000, it, at the time, was not legally binding. Clearly, Greece demands greater clarity of terms defined by the European Council.*
3. *The Greek government also wants the Turkish candidacy to be seen as a real and not just a ‘virtual’ option. In other words, there should be a realistic road-map for Turkey, where the rights as well as the duties of the candidate are enacted.”*⁷²

⁷⁰ Milliyet, 06 March 1998, Page.14 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁷¹ Milliyet, 19 February 1999, Page.22 retrieved from <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/>

⁷² Cited from Jurgen Reuter, ‘Reshaping Greek-Turkish Relations: Developments Before and After the EU-Summit in Helsinki’, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), pp.8-10.

The abovementioned claims by Greece show that Greece persistently supports the accession of Cyprus to the EU, resolve all the remaining issues with Turkey in Hague and asks the EU to help Turkey prepare for this process of resolution by acting in a democratic way.

On the one hand Greece tried to set up the necessary and ideal conditions for accepting turkey's candidacy to the EU, on the other hand it went on pursuing a pro-EU rhetoric and political discourse at home. The research done by University of Athens and University of Konstanz shows that the statements about the relations between Turkey and EU have dramatically increased between 1999 and 2003 which actually proves that the government deliberately brought this issue on the agenda.




Figure 5: Distribution of Statements of the Greek National Representatives between 1999-2003

Pangalos' successor George Papandreu put his utmost effort for this rapprochement process not to be ruined or short-lived like the previous ones together with Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem. In a speech addressed by Papandreu in Istanbul

University⁷³, Papandreu emphasized on the substantial role of two nations for this latest reconciliation:

“In this process politicians can play an important role. Many have offered their help. We welcome it. But keep in mind that the real work will be done by you, the people: the Greek and the Turkish people. There is also little room for third parties: even when their intentions are good their methods might be limiting. Peace will come in our region “for the people” and “by the people”.” (George Papandreu, October, 1999) He also touched upon Turkey’s future in Europe and what benefits membership to the EU would bring to Turkey.

As the enhancing relations and visits may suggest, Greece finally was convinced to lift its veto policy and embrace Turkey to the EU. Met on 10th and 11th of December, 1999, The European Council adopted the Helsinki Council meeting conclusion which enclosed Turkey’s candidacy status with the help of Greece showing an open support to Turkey by lifting its veto. Although the EU had an undeniable effect on Greece to follow such a pro-path for Turkey, this time, it was Greece who drew the roadmap for Turkey. Greek propositions submitted to the Finnish Presidency were inscribed in the conclusions of Helsinki Summit. This phenomenon points out that Greece still had an undeniable bargaining power on the intergovernmental table of the EU. Just as Greece asked for EU to inscribe, the Helsinki Presidency conclusions included a roadmap for Turkey to prepare for and live up to the accession criteria.⁷⁴ (Article 12)

⁷³For further analysis of the speech see:

<file:///C:/Users/user/Desktop/UNIVERSITY%20OF%20ISTANBUL%203.Oct.1999.html>

⁷⁴ Article 12: The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the accession process. An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations must concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the *acquis*. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying the harmonisation of Turkey's legislation and practice with the *acquis*, the Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the *acquis*. The European Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for coordinating all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-accession. (Retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell_en.htm)

In the conclusions, Cyprus acquired the promise of being an EU member even if the disputed status of the island remains.⁷⁵ (Article 9-b)

Finally, European Council also made it clear that all the disputes between the 13 candidates must be resolved until 2004 as a main prerequisite to be a member.⁷⁶ (Article 4)

Helsinki Summit marked the historical reconciliation between Greece and Turkey that would shape the relations in 2000s. As a major triumph for both governments, PASOK finally managed to carry its willingness to an official ground. The council conclusion not only drew the road map for Turkey but also enhanced and reinforced the EU's conditionality principle upon further relations between Turkey and Greece. Founding a great opportunity for dialogue and peace, the Summit opened up new ways for Turkey and Greece to cooperate on a wide range of areas from commercial relations to civil society initiatives. Furthermore, the restoration in the relations between Greece and Turkey has shown its repercussions on trade, investment and tourism with a significant increase in economic relations (Öniş & Yilmaz, 2008).

The post-reconciliation process has witnessed further efforts particularly at the leadership level. Both countries' leaders paid mutual visits- most notably the visit of Greek Foreign Minister Papandreu to Turkey 38 years later from the last official visit- and didn't lose the opportunities to meet in international occasion. (Rumelili, 2005) Although the bilateral relations have been marked by rapprochement following the

⁷⁵ Article 9-b: The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors. (Retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm)

⁷⁶ Article 4: The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union. (Retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm)

Helsinki Summit, it wouldn't be credible to say that Greco-Turkish relations completely restored and continued on a mutually cordial basis, yet, Helsinki Summit still stands as a major turning point in the history of Greco-Turkish relations and an inspiration for the present bilateral relations between two neighbors.

CHAPTER IV

Conclusion

This study wanted to shed light upon the Greco-Turkish Rapprochement which has been comprehensively and extensively analyzed in literature. By making empirical analyses from Greco-Turkish history with a scrutiny upon the years of 1974-1999, I wanted to bring up the internal and external factors leading up to the Helsinki Summit which stands out as the hallmark of the steadiest and firm reconciliation process in Greco-Turkish history.

The literature is full of studies and works explicating the rapprochement and its motivations as well as the underlying reasons for Greece and Turkey to adopt a reconciliatory way. However, my main focus is on the Greek opinion over the rapprochement and the domestic influence groups playing an important role in the process as well as the EU as an institutional and external factor on Greek policy making.

Using the previously carried out research data and public opinion indicators such as events, reports and news, I have found out that the main reason against Greek politicians to normalize relations with Turkey beforehand was the Greek public who demonstrated an identity and ideological approach when it comes to resolving issues with Turkey and completely went against making any concessions thus making a possible agreement impossible for years.

Furthermore, I have found out that neither NATO nor EU as influential institutions could have the expected impact upon both neighbors. It was only after the obvious support by Greek people to Turkish people following the 1999 earthquake that Greek government could be persuaded and assured that Greek public opinion is ready to arrange a potential agreement with Turkey. If I am to apply Moravcsik's main

proposition here, I can state that Greek people for all those years preferred the Greek geopolitical interests better than their economic interests when their territorial claims are concerned.

Due to such firm and sharp geopolitical stance of Greek people, Greek governments could never be sincere about their approach towards Turkey and have never agreed to make any concession but always seek for the issues to be resulted at the expense of Turkey. It has been one of the biggest reasons for the failure of each attempt of rapprochement in Greco Turkish History and it still continues to be the major impediment against removing all the remaining disputes and setting up a steady and sustainable rapprochement period since Helsinki Summit.

As this thesis points out the EU has an important role in the restoration of bilateral relations, however, the latest developments in global agenda, most notably the refugee crisis and the mass migration through the Aegean Sea, have ignited a new possibility to go back to the geopolitically-driven foreign policy making. Greece is a major opening for migrants to reach Europe and one of the most affected countries from the migrations crossing through Mediterranean and the Aegean due to its strategic location. Due to the latest disputes over the prolonged period of visa-free travel for Turkey and the late solidarity messages from the EU following the coup attempt in Turkey on July, 15, relations between EU and Turkey have turned to be a little bit icy and troubled. Therefore, Greece is thoroughly concerned about a possible annulment of the Readmission Agreement signed between the EU and Turkey which would bring catastrophic and serious results to Greece as Greece is unable to handle such massive flow of migrants. It would not only cause a major disturbance in domestic Greek politics but it would also create another geopolitical tension between Greece and Turkey as the migrants reach the Greek shores by crossing Turkey. For further studies, this would lead up to another research question on the role of the EU in protecting border safety of its members.

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