

THE US, EU AND TURKEY TRIANGLE: AMERICAN SUPPORT IN TURKEY'S  
ACCESSION TALKS WITH THE EU

by

YASIN BOSTANCI

Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Sabancı University

Spring 2014

THE US, EU AND TURKEY TRIANGLE: AMERICAN SUPPORT IN TURKEY'S  
ACCESSION TALKS WITH THE EU

APPROVED BY:

Meltem Müftüler Baç .....  
(Thesis Supervisor)

Brooke Luetgert .....

Emre Hatipoğlu .....

DATE OF APPROVAL: August 4th, 2014

To those who taught me, without whom none of this would have been possible...

Sevgili *annem* ve *babama*...

© Yasin Bostanci, 2014

All Rights Reserved.

THE US, EU AND TURKEY TRIANGLE: AMERICAN SUPPORT IN TURKEY'S  
ACCESSION TALKS WITH THE EU

Yasin Bostanci

European Studies, Master's Thesis, 2014.

Thesis Advisor: Meltem Müftüler Baç

Keywords: European Enlargement, American Support, American Perception, EU-Turkey Relations, US-Turkey Relations, Tri-lateral Relations

This research answers the question of what shaped the US support for Turkish membership in the EU and the reasons behind this support between the 1990s and early the 2000s in order to be able to elaborate on the future of Turkey as a candidate country. Studies do exist in the literature, which strive to reveal the importance of US influence in world politics or its support in bilateral relations between the European Union and Turkey. However, this thesis furthers previous studies by (1) providing a credible path within the multi-dimensional framework of neorealism and (2) benefitting from the APP data to elaborate on shifting American support in EU-Turkey bilateral relations across time.

With the above-mentioned aim, this thesis first introduces neorealism as the overarching theory of this study. Then it reviews Turkey-EU and Turkey-US bilateral relations to emphasize the emerging shift between European and American perspectives on Turkey after the Cold War while underscoring the essence of this study; American support in Turkey's accession to the EU. In detail, this work discusses how the shifted international system and changing relations of the US, heralded as the hegemon of the international system, affected American attempts to support Turkey in European circles and examines the reasons behind the American support during the 1990s and the early 2000s. With the adoption of neorealism as the theoretical framework, this thesis aims to focus on the significance of Turkey's relations with the EU for the US security interests. Additionally, this thesis constitutes the first quantitative study, which intends to evaluate the primary form of US support to Turkey in official and non-official European circles during the 1990s and the early 2000s.

# ABD, AB, VE TÜRKİYE ÜÇGENİ: TÜRKİYE’NİN AB’NE KABUL GÖRÜŞMELERİNDE AMERİKAN DESTEĞİ

Yasin Bostanci

Avrupa Çalışmaları, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014.

Tez Danışmanı: Meltem Müftüler Baç

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği Genişlemesi, Amerikan Desteği, Amerikan Algısı,  
AB-Türkiye İlişkileri, ABD-Türkiye İlişkileri, Üçlü İlişkiler

Bu araştırma, 1990’lar ve 2000’lerin başlarında Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği için ABD’nin verdiği desteğin nasıl oluştuğu ve bu desteğin arkasında yatan sebepler nelerdir sorularına, Türkiye’nin aday bir ülke olarak geleceğini yorumlayabilmek amacıyla cevap vermektedir. Literatürde ABD’nin dünya politikasında etkisini göstermeyi amaçlayan veya ABD’nin Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ikili ilişkilerine olan desteğini göstermeyi hedefleyen çalışmalar bulunmaktadır. Lakin, bu çalışma daha önce gerçekleştirilmiş çalışmaları (1) neorealizm’in çok yönlü temeli ile güvenilir bir yordam sağlayarak ve (2) APP verilerinden faydalanarak zaman içerisinde değişiklik gösteren ABD’nin Türkiye-AB ikili ilişkilerinde desteğini yorumlayarak iletmektedir.

Yukarıda bahsedilen amaçlarla, bu tez öncelikle neorealizmi bu çalışmanın kapsayıcı teorisi olarak sunmaktadır. Daha sonra, Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonrasında Türkiye ile ilgili Amerikan ve Avrupa algılarında oluşan değişimi açıklamak amacıyla Türkiye-AB ve Türkiye-ABD ikili ilişkilerini gözden geçirmekte ve bu çalışmanın özü vurgulanmaktadır: Türkiye’nin AB’ye kabulünde Amerikan desteği. Son olarak, bu çalışma, değişen uluslararası sistemin ve uluslararası sistemin egemeni olan ABD’nin ilişkilerinin, 1990’lar ve 2000’lerin başlarında Türkiye’nin Avrupa’da desteklenmesine yönelik Amerikan çabalarını nasıl etkilediğini detaylı şekilde tartışmaktadır. Neorealizm’in bu tezin teorik temeli olarak benimsenmesi ile birlikte, bu tez ABD’nin güvenliğe yönelik çıkarları için Türkiye’nin AB ile olan ilişkilerinin önemine odaklanmaktadır. Bu araştırmanın aynı zamanda ABD’nin Türkiye’yi resmi ve gayri-resmi Avrupa ilişkilerinde desteklemek için 1990’lar ve 2000 başlarında kullandığı öncelikli yaklaşımı değerlendirme niyeti olan ilk sayısal çalışma olduğu da belirtilmelidir.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to gratefully thank my thesis advisor, Meltem Müftüler Baç for her guidance and support throughout the duration of my Master's at Sabanci University. Prof. Müftüler Baç was not only my academic advisor at this institution but also my idol and coach. Without her support and wisdom, I would probably have given up before seeing the finish line. I always feel that I am so privileged and am proud to have her on my side.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Brooke Luetgert. Along with Prof. Müftüler Baç, what Prof. Luetgert represents as an academician has become my ultimate goal in my academic life to come. To be honest, I cannot fully express my admiration. Without her wisdom, encouragement, and advice, none of this would have been possible. I also would like to thank her for understanding me and listening to me with great patience at all times, and rooting for me during my Ph.D. applications. She is the only professor of mine who, without my request, offered an outstanding reference letter for my applications. I cannot even thank her enough, and I am looking forward to future research opportunities to work with her.

I would like to acknowledge and appreciate the incredible help and support of Nancy Karabeyoglu, the coordinator of the Writing Center at Sabanci University. Throughout this academic year, she was always there as a mother, a colleague, and a teacher of mine when I needed. Additionally, I would like to thank her once again for proofreading this thesis, the reference, and the scholarship that she provided on behalf of the Writing Center. She is one of four people at this institution, who gave me strength, which I always needed here, in order to complete this programme.

During the writing period of this thesis, Prof. Shapiro and Prof. Fortna were always at my disposal to answer my questions about the life at my next home and my career in political science. It is them who arranged an external research fellowship at Harvard University and additional financial aid at Columbia. Without their support, I would have

never had the motivation and willingness to complete this thesis. Subsequently, I would like to thank Prof. Gavaghan, my former academic advisor at the University of Oxford and Prof. Toprak, my former academic advisor at Anadolu University for their help and motivation.

I am also indebted to Emre Hatipoğlu and William Lowe for providing the impetus for my career and much of my graduate study applications in political science. I would like to thank Prof. Hatipoğlu, especially for the POLS529 course he offered in Fall 2014 and the advice he gave during the Master's. At any institution, any other course related to political methodology will never be the same as the POLS529. Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the help of Prof. Lowe at Mannheim University regarding the research design of this thesis. His advice and evaluation regarding the quantitative content analysis methods helped me so much while shaping this study.

Here the funniest part begins with my all impatience. Dear ES and POLS assistant room residents; thanks to you all. Your studies will be continuously interrupted and you will be disturbed by e-mail and telephone in the coming years.

At this point, my special thanks go to my academic soul mate, Aylin Ece Çicek, who I met at an unexpected moment and in a weird place (Room G-050), without whom none of this would be possible. Life obviously would not be the same when there is a 10-hour distance standing between us. But, keep in mind that I am always on your service to pick you up from the airport (as long as you bring your own driver's licence!). I will be missing your endless support for both academic and non-academic life. Thanks for listening to my problems at all times and helping me find out solutions. It should be noted here that I would not be able to find a friend, who I can sing Counting Stars out loud (And yes, it is also so hard to find!). Anyway, I cannot spare you any more space in this acknowledgements section more than my professors, until you become one. HAHA!

I also would like to thank my dearest friends, Leyla Magdalena Amur for proofreading this thesis, but for first calling me unexpectedly punctual Turkish guy; Faruk Aksoy and Emine Ari for lending me cigarettes (Yes, here I announce that Emine Arı is the



responsible for my smoking), biscuits, sun flower seeds, tea, and coffee; Bahadır Ően, Yasemin Őener, Zlal Sunaođlu, and Ayman Kseođlu for psychological support; Glnur Kocapınar, Osman Zeki Gke, Ece Demir, Said Dođan, Firuze Simay Keskin, Ezgi Őiir Kıbrıs, Kaan zgney, and AyŐe Nazlı Sylet for their help and advice regarding Sabancı University and its professors; Yael Bostancı and BŐra nder for rating the documents which I analyzed in this study.

Finally, I would like to thank my mom, dad, and my love for their endless financial and mental support. None of this would be possible without you. İyi ki varsınız!

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .....	12
LIST OF FIGURES.....	13
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS .....	14
INTRODUCTION.....	16
METHODOLOGY .....	25
2.1. Setting Theoretical Framework: Realism and Neorealism .....	25
2.1.1. The Concepts of Neorealism .....	26
2.1.2. Neorealism during the Post Cold War .....	29
2.1.3. An Introduction to the European Union: the Neorealist Perspective .....	37
2.1.4. American Support and Neorealist Approach .....	43
2.2. Consolidating the US Support: A Quantitative Aspect of Content Analysis.....	49
2.2.1. Document Collection for Content Analysis .....	49
2.2.2. Hand Coding .....	51
2.2.3. Wordscores.....	55
2.2.4. Problematic Aspects of Method .....	60
2.2.5. Analysis.....	61
THE TRIANGLE: TURKEY, THE US AND THE EU .....	64
3.1. An Overview of Turkish – American Relations after the Cold War .....	65
3.2. An Overview of Turkey and EU Relations after the Cold War .....	78
3.3. Conclusion .....	86
TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP: AMERICAN APPROACH.....	88
4.1. Introduction .....	88

4.2. The US Perception towards Turkish Accession to the European Union .....	89
4.3. The US Support in the 1990s: the Customs Union and the Helsinki Summit .....	96
4.3.1. The US Support in the Customs Union .....	96
4.3.2. The U.S. Support in the Helsinki Summit .....	101
4.4. Mapping American Support: the Clinton Administration .....	106
4.5. The Factors Effecting American Support during the Clinton Administration.....	107
4.6. The US Support in Accession Talks.....	109
4.7. Mapping American Support: the Bush Administration .....	120
4.8. A Comparison of Bush and Clinton Presidencies .....	120
4.9. Conclusion .....	122
CONCLUSION .....	125
APPENDIX A: Algorithm for the Categorization of Documents.....	130
APPENDIX B: Information and Consent Form .....	132
APPENDIX C: Automated Content Analysis Results .....	137
REFERENCES.....	225

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Documents in the Database .....	51
Table 2: Sample Hand Coding Classification Scheme .....	53
Table 3: Cohen's Kappa, Scott's Pi and Krippendorf's Alpha Results for Scale A.....	54
Table 4: Cohen's Kappa, Scott's Pi and Krippendorf's Alpha Results for Scale B .....	55
Table 5: Variable Properties .....	62
Table 6: Two Sample T-Test for the Clinton and Bush Administration (Scale A) .....	121
Table 7: Two Sample T-Test for the Clinton and Bush Administration (Scale B).....	122
Table 8: Document Categorization Rules .....	130
Table 9: William J. Clinton Document Analysis Results (SCALE A) .....	155
Table 10: William J. Clinton Document Analysis Results (SCALE B).....	173
Table 11: George Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE A) .....	178
Table 12: George Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE B) .....	183
Table 13: George W. Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE A).....	195
Table 14: George W. Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE B).....	207
Table 15: Richard B. Cheney Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE A) .....	209
Table 16: Richard B. Cheney Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE B) .....	211
Table 17: Summarized Clinton Values (All years) on SCALE A and B .....	212
Table 18: Summarized G. Bush Values (All years) on SCALE A and B .....	213
Table 19: Summarized G. W. Bush Values (All years) on SCALE A and B.....	214
Table 20: Summarized R. Cheney Values (All years) on SCALE A and B.....	215
Table 21: Summarized G.W. Bush and R. Cheney Values (All years) on SCALE A and B .....	216
Table 22: Scale A Values (by year) .....	223
Table 23: Scale B Values (by year).....	224

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Waltzian (1979) Components of the System Structure .....	26
Figure 2: A Neorealist Review .....	29
Figure 3: Defensive Realists' Contributions to Waltz's Theory .....	36
Figure 4: Morgenthau's Predictions regarding European Integration .....	42
Figure 5: Variables defined in accordance with the neorealist approach .....	48
Figure 6: Hand Coding Rules for Scale A .....	52
Figure 7: Hand Coding Rules for Scale B .....	53
Figure 8: Laver et al.'s Procedure for Wordscores .....	56
Figure 9: Wordscores Components .....	56
Figure 10: Wordscores in Practical Terms .....	59
Figure 11: Changing American support (Document values) for Turkey's EU membership by year .....	217
Figure 12: Changing level of American Support (Document Scores) for Turkey's EU membership by year .....	218
Figure 13: Distribution of Document Values on Scale A (by owner) .....	219
Figure 14: Distribution of Document Values on Scale B (by owner) .....	220
Figure 15: Distribution of Document Values on Scale A (by owner) .....	221
Figure 16: Distribution of Document Values on Scale B (by owner) .....	222

## LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	the Justice and Development Party
APP	the American Presidency Project
CEEC	Central Eastern European Countries
EC	the European Community
EP	the European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	the European Union
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JDP	the Justice and Development Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPAA	National Programme for the Adaption of the Acquis
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PASOK	the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement
SFOR	Stability Force
TBMM	the Turkish Grand National Assembly
TGNA	the Turkish Grand National Assembly

UNPROFOR

United Nations Protection Force

US

the United States of America

USSR

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This research answers the question of what shaped US support for Turkish membership in the EU and the reasons behind this support between the 1990s and the early 2000s in order to be able to elaborate on the future of Turkey as a candidate country. American support in the Turkey-EU relations following the end of the Cold War, offers a unique analysis to those researchers who are keen on multi-faceted inquiries since the process contains various levels. Since the end of World War II, Turkey saliently has constituted a major role in bilateral/transatlantic relations between the US and the EU. The US has always been very determined in supporting Turkish integration with the Western institutions since the initiation of the Cold War. The Turkish issue and the Turkish inclusion in the West portrayed a positive stance until the end of the 1980s. Accordingly, this seemed to be supported by both a domestic and international audience. On the contrary, this support became a challenge for Turkey, especially after the end of the Cold War. While the US continued to further support Turkey in its official and non-official relations with the West due to its increasing geo-strategic importance following the end of the Cold War, the Western alliance which was born out of the threat of Communism started to become problematic once the common concerns regarding security started to dissolve. As a consequence, Turkey's position in the European Union has since been readjusted with the degrading alliance in the



international system. Contrasting with the fact that the everlasting alliance between Western European countries and the US started to worsen after the end of the Cold War, American support to anchor Turkey to the West appeared as successful efforts during the 1990s, once the 1995 Customs Union Agreement and the 1999 Helsinki Summit decision which made Turkey a candidate country for EU membership considered. The US's support was also influential in Turkey's membership to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as the European Community (EC). While neither the international structure nor the capabilities of the US encountered a radical change, American attempts to support the European Union to assist Turkey as a candidate country dramatically became a burden for Turkey by the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 and the European Council decision regarding the start of accession negotiations in 2004. Considering that Turkey is now a member of Western based political and security mechanisms such as NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe, Turkey's full-membership to the EU still seems to lag behind.

During the Cold War, US motivation in supporting Turkish integration with the Western institutions was mainly based on strategic concerns. Turkey's unique geostrategic location made it possible for the US to contain Soviet expansionism in areas surrounding Turkey. As a consequence, this necessitated Turkey's inclusion in the Western group. According to the US, Turkey's membership to the non-military institutions such as the EC would accelerate the adoption of Western democracy, norms and values, and free market economy. Turkey's integration with the West, in turn, would help the US in creating a stronger Western 'buffer' against the communist threat. In other words, the US's support for Turkish inclusion in the West was a significant and complementary part of its global security policy. On the other hand, the US had no doubts about Turkey's foreign policy orientation or Turkey's potential search ability for an 'alternative.' The fact that Turkey was already following a Western-oriented foreign policy and was weak against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the issues regarding its East border were two of the driving factors for Turkey's membership to NATO and the Western group. Due to Turkey's strategic importance,

the EC also appreciated Turkey's application in 1963. In this regard, it can be argued that the strategic imperatives of the Cold War period combined American and European approaches towards Turkey. As a result, these approaches of the two sides fastened Turkey's inclusion in the Western institutions and this balance could survive until the end of the Cold War.

When the Cold War came to an end, divergence about Turkey and global security expectations emerged between the US and European states. The rogue states, the newly emerging European security and defence framework as well as missile defence system were only some of the matters that caused divergence between the US and European states. It should be noted here that nearly all of the studies in literature express the level of divergence emerged during the post-Cold War with their titles such as: 'transatlantic strains,' 'the divergence of transatlantic policies,' 'allies divided,' 'fraying ties,' and 'continental adrift.'

However, Turkey's geostrategic location kept its prominence as the driving force in US-Turkey bilateral relations. Even when a divergence about Turkey emerged in the EU due to a number of factors such as Kurdish issue, Cyprus issue, and democratic and human rights deficits, the US's policy to anchor Turkey to the West remained strong because of the continuation of Turkey's strategic importance for American interests. As reflected in the US's National Security Strategy in 1998,

...Turkey's relationship with Europe has serious consequences for regional stability and the evolution of the European political and security structures. A democratic, secular, stable and Western-oriented Turkey has supported the US efforts to enhance stability in Bosnia, NIS, and the Middle East as well as to contain Iran and Iraq. Its continued ties to the West and its support for our overall strategic objectives in one of the world's most critical regions are critical. We continue to support Turkey's active constructive role within NATO and the Europe (The White House, 1997, p. 16).

As can be understood from the US security strategy during the post-Cold War, Turkey emerged as a critical actor for the US's security policy to be implemented in the surrounding regions. In other words, Turkey now had a multiregional role for the US.

Accordingly, this study considers the abovementioned context in order to understand the American support in bilateral relations between Turkey and the EU. This thesis aims to reveal the motivations for the US in supporting Turkey's membership to the EU during the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, this study seeks to understand the American perspective on the EU variable in Turkey-US bilateral relations as well as the affecting US security policy.

This thesis first elaborates on the dimensional change in relations between the European Union and the US after the Cold War. Then, the work focuses on the American efforts to support Turkey's potential membership in the European Union. Finally, this thesis examines the reasons behind the American support during the 1990s and the early 2000s.

The primary concern of this thesis is to understand the American perspective in Turkey's accession to the EU and the reasons behind this support. This work will discuss how the shifted international system and changing relations of the US, heralded as the hegemon of the international system, affected American attempts to support Turkey in European circles. Exploring such an effect will create minor questions for this thesis. Some of the questions which will be posed in the next chapters are as follows: How did the European Union deal with the Turkish issue? How did the US deal with the Turkish issue? How could the US support relations between the European Union and Turkey? To what extent did the US support relations between the European Union and Turkey? What were the motivations of the US behind its aggressive support policy? What were the limits for American support? How were the relations between the US and the EU during the 1990s and the early 2000s?

To provide a theoretical framework for the main research question of this thesis, I will review the related conceptual literature in the forth chapter. The very detailed review of neorealism as the overarching theory of this study will help better explaining the underlying reasons of continued and furthered American support. However, this thesis will mainly focus on a series of secondary sources to elaborate on the shift by adding different variables into the equation such as the different stages of American support

and structural impetus. To further elaborate on American support, this study will also quantitatively evaluate the stance of US Presidents within the framework presented in Chapter 2.

This research covers the period from the end of the Cold War until the early 2000s, in other words, from the time when Turkey submitted its first formal application for membership in the European Union until the time the European Union declared that it would start the accession talks with Turkey. This time period provides the researcher the opportunity to evaluate in detail the gradually decreasing effectiveness of American support in bilateral relations between the European Union and Turkey. Additionally, this period witnessed the most problematic EU-Turkey relations in history. The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as well as the Iraq War in the 2000s are some of the key factors that this work evaluates at the global level.

Additionally, this period witnessed how the atmosphere of the international system both during the Cold War and the post-Cold War had an impact on foreign policy of the European Union. As a result, US efforts were much welcomed in official and non-official European circles. However, following the start of accession talks with Turkey in 2005, bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey underwent a significant transformation. It was during this time when it became apparent that the EU would not be under the influence of a third party in its decisions such as the start of the Customs Union negotiations with Turkey and Helsinki Summit decision for Turkey. On the contrary, EU-Turkey relations and the Turkey issue in a general sense would now be based on a number of domestic factors such as domestic reforms that would be adopted by Turkey. Following the Helsinki Summit in 1999 and the start of accession negotiations in 2005, the relations of the EU with Turkey was understood as being conditional according to the progress of Turkey's reform process. As a result, the US and Turkey realized that without adopting necessary reforms requested by the EU, American efforts to involve Turkey in the EU would be ineffective. In this regard, it can be concluded that the strategic interests of the US have no longer affected the outcome for Turkey and the EU started to have its own strategic interests at some level. On the

other hand, as this thesis evaluates, the US always continued to further support Turkey regardless of the EU's stance in a very determined manner.

The chapters in this thesis follow a sequential order. With an intention to go into the details of the divergence emerged towards Turkey, the first half of the second chapter adopts neorealism as this study's theoretical framework. The second chapter presents the analytic features of this approach as well as its suitability for other frameworks. First, it starts with the development of realism as a major stream international theory and then elaborates on the different schools of neorealism. Furthermore, it touches upon the details of neorealism's development as an international relations theory during the post-Cold War. This chapter presents a provisional road map to understand American support and the reasons behind it by examining neorealism in detail. With its comparatively flexible methodology, this theoretical framework helps the researcher adopt mainly structural motivators (variables) and paves the way for understanding foreign policy outcomes of the US within the time frame of this thesis.

With the adoption of neorealism as the theoretical framework for this study, this thesis gains the ability to explain policy outcomes with sensitivity through the act of balancing between external structural variables, as well as domestic accelerators and barriers. However, it should be noted that this thesis neither attempts to test the validity of neorealism nor to evaluate its sufficiency to explain the foreign policy outcomes. On the contrary, the framework that this thesis adopted only helps in answering the main question of this study in a systemic manner while strengthening the arguments presented throughout the chapters.

The second half of the second chapter additionally presents a quantitative content analysis technique named Wordscores. This thesis has benefitted from Woolley and Gerhard Peter's The American Presidency Project at the University of California Santa Barbara, which contains "most of the US President's public messages, statements, speeches, and news conference remarks" (Peters, 2014). This study evaluates 757 automatically extracted documents related to Turkey from the 1990s until 2006 to quantitatively analyze the efforts of American Presidents in supporting Turkey in

European circles, since public speeches to the European leaders were the primary form of US efforts to support Turkey in official and non-official European circles (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005). This section first introduces the details of the document collection process and hand coding rules. Then, it presents the details of Wordscores as well as its mathematical foundation and software components. Third, this chapter discusses problematic aspects of the method along with its advantages.

With this aspect, this study demonstrates the level of US support across time. As a consequence, this approach provides the opportunity for researcher to compare US support quantitatively along with structural variables which neorealism suggests, and increases the explanatory power of this research.

The third chapter provides a historical framework to comprehensively understand the bilateral relations between the US and Turkey and between Turkey and the EU after the Cold War. This chapter also provides insight regarding the divergences that arose towards Turkey after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Throughout this work, special emphasis has been placed on American approach, interests, and motivations towards Turkey; as opposed to focusing solely on Turkish policies.

To understand the American support on bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey, the fourth chapter elaborates on the attempts of the US to assist Turkey in European circles from the 1990s until the 2000s with a special emphasis on the US scope of Turkish membership after the end of the Cold War. Similar to the approach adopted in Chapter 3, this chapter stems from the assumption that Turkey constituted for a bulwark for the US's interests. This chapter evaluates American national interests as well as its motives in supporting the Turkish membership in the Union by treating the international climate as an independent variable. Additionally, the fourth chapter touches upon the international climate as a factor which shapes the US foreign policy at all levels. Then, to show American support and efforts to support Turkey in European circles, this chapter sequentially orders 'what happened' in the relations of the European Union with Turkey from the 1980s until the early 2000s, with their causal mechanisms. The efforts of American leaders as well as the approaches of the US administrations, specifically

their public speeches, which have been available in the APP dataset, have been treated as the primary form of American support in accordance with the literature and the renewed neorealist assumptions. However, this study mainly focuses on the aggressive American foreign policy and its interventions by the end of the Cold War, after the events on September 11, and the Iraq crisis that followed as a result of the changing structure of the international system. This chapter examines American interventions in the EU-Turkey relations in two sections: during the 1990s and during the early 2000s. As a consequence, the first section of this chapter focuses on two major events; the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and the Customs Union agreement in 1995. With an aim to understand the changing perspective of the EU regarding the US interventions, the second section of this chapter mostly touches upon the American efforts to support Turkey during the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 as well as the initiation of accession negotiations in 2004. By evaluating the shifting responses of the European Union during the Clinton and Bush administrations, this study presents empirical data to demonstrate the significant decrease of the legitimacy of the US in bilateral relations of the European Union and Turkey during Clinton and Bush presidencies.

All of the above-mentioned chapters help the researcher to explain the American perspective on Turkey's accession to the EU and the reasons behind this support as well as how complicated the rational and continued support of the US in Turkey's accession process to the EU gradually lost its legitimacy. In turn, this thesis demonstrates that American efforts in supporting Turkey in both non-official and official European circles were due to the US's security policy which aims to protect and increase American economic, political, and military interests at all levels. Furthermore, this study indicates the essential importance of changing geo-political hierarchies and the changing balance in the international system for understanding the policy outcomes of related actors.

**This page intentionally left blank.**



## **CHAPTER 2**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **2.1. Setting Theoretical Framework: Realism and Neorealism**

As one of the major stream international relations theories, the use of realism is "unavoidable" (Norris, 2002, p. 15). According to some scholars, whether it is incomplete or not, realism, as Frankel puts it:

...as an intellectual construct as dominated the study of international relations from the beginnings [for the reason that] Realism has consistently provided the most reliable guidance for statecraft, and it has consistently offered the most compelling explanations of state behaviour (Frankel, 1996, p. ix).


As a consequence, realism as one of the major international relations theories has been pervasive through both political science and international relations literature. Due to its prevalence, most paradigms and theories could only oppose realism partially. Furthermore, Baldwin indicates that "commercial liberalism" or interdependency; "republican liberalism" or democratic peace theory; "sociological liberalism" or constructivism; and neoliberal institutionalism are some of the approaches that have emerged as a critique of realism (Baldwin, 1993). On the other hand, as Keohane puts it:

Periodic attacks on Realism have taken place; yet the very focus of these critiques seems only to reconfirm the centralist of Realist thinking in the international political thought of the West (as cited in Smith, 1986, p. 20).

The controversial debate between the neorealists and neo-liberalists dominated the last two decades of political science and international relations literature (Powell, 1994). However, I approach these debates as the efforts which improve neorealism with alternative causal mechanisms.

### 2.1.1. The Concepts of Neorealism

According to the approach that Waltz adopts in his masterpiece, *Theory of International Politics*, the systemic structure is defined through: (1) order, (2) the variance in units' functions, and (3) capabilities of the units (as cited in Vasquez, 1996, p. 310).



**Figure 1: Waltzian (1979) Components of the System Structure**

In his work, Waltz preferred to evaluate the interactions of states, particularly the pathway of warfare. According to Waltz, the system in which states are members is an

anarchic one. Under the circumstances of the international system, the states cannot trust each other and rely on each other only for their own interests, even if interaction between two states continues for a long time. Without an authority in charge of the international system, i.e. a world government, there is no way to prevent hostility among states. As Waltz argues, each state of the international system is forced to develop an ability called "self help" since each and every member of the international system can only survive by relying on only itself. As a consequence, Waltz thinks that "wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (as cited in Viotti & Kauppi, 1999, p. 140).

In an anarchical international system, being dependent is much more beneficial for a state in the long-term. Under hierarchical conditions, specialization of state in a specific area might lead to a better cooperation in the economy; on the contrary, under anarchical circumstances a state's dependence on each other would bring nothing but vulnerability in the long run. As Waltz defines the international system as a mechanical structure by stating: "A mechanical society rests on the similarity of the units that compose it; an organic society is based on their differences" (Waltz, 1986, p. 324). Accordingly, Waltz expects the states to be functionally similar under the circumstances of the international system. While the states do their best to protect themselves and their interests, obviously what they arrange is determined by their capabilities. This automatically creates an advantage for those states with more capabilities under the circumstance of the anarchic international system, while fewer capabilities become vulnerability for some of the states. As Waltz asserts, the functions of the states become alike, but the efforts they can put into their plans differ due to their capabilities. From this point of view, Waltz builds his theory upon what Thucydides calls cruel reality, "...the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" (as cited in the translation of Warner, 1972, p. 402).

As a consequence, if the states with more capabilities are able to build their hegemony in the system, those with fewer capabilities may prefer to build a coalition to enhance their abilities and attempt to unseat the hegemon. Since the hegemon may start to

exploit the rest at anytime by benefitting from its position, the incentive of the rest to act together to reset their positions gains significance. As Weber puts it:

...peace is nothing more than a chance in the character of the conflict... As every big political community is a potential aspirant to prestige, it is also a potential threat to all its neighbours. Finally, by virtue of an unavoidable 'dynamic of power,' wherever claims to prestige flare up... They challenge and call forth the competition of all other possible bearers of prestige (as cited in Smith, 1986, p. 26).


Due to the anarchic environment of the international system, small powers are expected to coordinate and stand against the hegemon. Since the states are rational actors, a state is more likely to act against and challenge the hegemon, particularly right after its adversary gains hegemon status in the international system. Whether the same state or states obtain the hegemon status in the international system, it is always advantageous for the other states to initiate another challenge against the hegemon. Additionally, there is nothing to hinder them in the anarchic structure of the international system.

The "balance of power" concept of neorealism, according to Waltz, is the most important addition that neorealism has made to the political theory. As he puts it:

If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of power is it (as cited in Viotti & Kauppi, 1999, pp. 161-162).

Waltz adopts the international system as his primary causal variable. According to him, the insecurity of the system and its anarchic nature leads to the restructuring of its units. For the neorealists, this transformation or the balance of power process would repeat itself forever until another ordering is arranged. As Gilpin adds:

Disequilibrium replaces equilibrium, and the world moves toward a new round of hegemonic conflict. It has always been thus and always will be, until men either destroy themselves or learn to develop an effective mechanism of peaceful change (as cited in Viotti & Kauppi, 1999, p. 166).



**Figure 2: A Neorealist Review**

### **2.1.2. Neorealism during the Post Cold War**

If the process of balance of power is endless and timeless, as Morgenthau and Waltz claim: "...the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience" (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, pp. 38-39) then the US should have been the new and only hegemon after the collapse of the Soviet Union as neorealists expected. As Waltz asserts: "Never since the Roman Empire has power been so concentrated in one state" (Waltz, 2000). However, for the US to be the only hegemon in the system would falsify the balance of power assumption of neorealism. Due to the continuity found in the balance of power process, the US should have been challenged by a number of states who are simply not 'happy' with the status quo. In 1993, Waltz claimed that the balance about to be reached as the following:

Hegemony leads to balance... That is now happening, but haltingly so because the United States still has benefits to offer and many other countries have become accustomed to their easy lives with the United States bearing many of their burdens (Waltz, 1993, p. 77).

During the 2000s, when Waltz stated that "the balance is emerging slowly" (Waltz, 2000), most scholars who work with realist theories started to re-evaluate the Waltzian formulation of neorealism. As a consequence, neorealism divided into two branches: (1) offensive neorealism and (2) defensive neorealism.

On the contrary, defensive realists think that classifying states according to their capabilities is not sufficient. A hegemon in the international system may be the most powerful state; however, the rest may be powerful enough to initiate a challenge while the capabilities of each constitute a weakness. As a consequence, defensive realists refer to realism during World War II and focus on the intentions of states. Rather than solely focusing on a state's need for self-help, they claim that this situation in the international system creates distrust and leads to competition among states. As a further note, defensive realists also touch upon the costs of competition among states and incentives for cooperation.

According to defensive realists, a state does not follow a pre-determined path in the international system nor does it has any pre-determined behaviour. A state, as a rational actor calculates the risks and benefits of an action and acts accordingly. As Schweller puts it:

...if all states seek the minimum of power needed for security, threats sufficient to provoke balancing behaviour will not arise in the first place.  
...anarchy among units wishing to survive does not mean that war is always possible, and states that do not pursue security will not be punished by the system (Schweller, 1996, pp. 115-119).

Thus, Schweller takes the position that a state does not follow an automated path in a conflict, if its ultimate motivation is for its own security. Furthermore, if a state's ultimate goal is to reach security, then the possibility of a war in the international system should be less likely. However, if a state cannot prevent domestic crime, no matter how much it is determined to do so or not, it is impossible to prevent conflict in the international system if a member is highly committed. As a result, a member's aggressiveness may be the trigger of a conflict and not only the anarchic structure of the international system. As in the case of revisionist states, the ones who look for security

may also be classified according to their motivations. Contrasting with the assumptions of a more pessimistic balance of power approach, conflicts are seen as the only results within this framework. As rational actors, states are “to build and deploy forces and develop doctrines that emphasize their benign intentions and that create no incentives to strike first” (Schweller, 1996, p. 118).

With a similar approach, Glaser also argues that a state’s intentions are important to understand its intentions. Since the states are assumed to be rational actors, Glaser through this assumption suggests that a state who seeks security should look for cooperation first rather than increasing capabilities. As he puts it:

Structural realism properly understood predicts that, under a wide range of conditions, adversaries can best achieve their security goals through cooperative policies, not competitive ones, and should, therefore, cooperate when these conditions prevail (Glaser, 1996, p. 123).

According to Glaser, states as rational actors with ‘selfish’ goals are already motivated and encouraged to cooperate and they are able to present their intentions to each other through what Glaser defines ‘costly signals.’ For example, a security-seeking state may adopt military policies and strategies such as limiting military power only for defense, a policy that a non-security-seeking state would find too costly. In this context, a security-seeking state, as Glaser puts it: “can communicate information about which type of state it is, that is, about its motives” (Glaser, 1996, p. 141). Glaser’s contingent realism, a renewed version of Waltz’s structural realism, corrects for the Waltzian neorealism’s misjudgment of “the propensity of states to succumb to systemic pressures towards conflictual patterns of behaviour” (Norris, 2002, p. 27). As Glaser offers additional paths:

Considerations of power do influence the answers to these questions, but they only begin to tell the story... (Glaser, 1996, p. 134). In short, states motivated primarily by security should not as a general rule try to maximise their relative power (Glaser, 1996, p. 145).

Kydd also argues for the importance of a state’s motives by emphasizing:

...anarchy is not so bad in and of itself, it only leads to problems if there are states with aggressive motivations, a desire for more land or power, for instance (Kydd, 1997, p. 115).

As rational actors, security-seeking states are expected to attempt to understand the motives of another state. If both parties are looking for security, then this situation should lead to cooperation. If this is not the case, then states are expected to switch to the 'self-help' mode and take precaution for their securities. Then a question emerges: is it possible to know a state's intentions in an anarchic environment?

As Glaser previously suggested, an actor can send each other a 'costly signal.' According to Kydd, costly signals may become problematic for aggressive actors by simply increasing the cost while it may not for those who seek security. Additionally, by touching upon neoliberalism and furthering Glaser's arguments, Kydd thinks that due to the policy process of a democratic state, it's intentions are expected to be pretty clear. As Kydd adds:

If a democracy is really a security seeker, the openness of its policy processes will reveal this to the world (Kydd, 1997, p. 119).

With a different evaluation other than structural realists, Kydd rejects the idea of whether or not states share the same or 'good' intentions are forced into a conflict due to the anarchic structure of the international system. According to Kydd, structural realists,

...strongly overestimate the difficulty in assessing state motivations. Information on the motivations of security seeking states is so easy to come by that mistaken fears about motivations cannot plausibly explain any significant war, arms race or crisis this [20th] century (Kydd, 1997, p. 128).

Walt by agreeing with Kydd, argues that the type of state is also important in understanding the behaviour of the state and the traditional approach would be misleading. According to Walt, the capabilities of a state does not determine the balance status. A very powerful hegemon may or may not choose to harm. On the contrary, a less powerful, revisionist state may motivate itself through its revisionist goals and challenge the balance of power system. As a consequence, the revisionist state



or states emerge as the ones to create a counter-balance. So, Walt replaces the balance of power concept with the balance of threat dynamic as the following,

Balance of power theory predicts that states will ally against the strongest state in the system, but the balance of threat theory predicts they will tend to ally against the most threatening (Walt, 1997, p. 933).

While offensive realists backed up the fundamental basis of realism by claiming,

Of the gods we know and of men we believe, that it is a necessary law of their nature that they rule wherever they can (as cited in Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, p. 40).

Defensive realists attempted to form combined theories by changing their level of analysis and even adopting non-realist explanations. As Legro and Moravcsik started the debate, modern realist scholars appear to be adopting a number of explanations both from outside realism and contradictory to the assumptions of realism. Legro and Moravcsik criticize modern realist scholars for risking the fundamental paradigm(s) for the sake and credibility of alternatives. According to modern realists, especially defensive realists, harm neorealism:

Realism's central analytical leverage, parsimony, and distinctiveness derive from its ability to explain social life simply through variation in the distribution of objective material power capabilities, rather than preferences, perceptions, or norms (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999, p. 34).

At this point, Spirtas contributes to the debate with a very similar approach. He defines two different schools of realism. According to the first school, 'Evil School', as also discussed by Morgenthau and Niebuhr, the actor is intrinsically evil and conflict emerges due to the actions of a human or state. Since an actor cannot be 'fixed' for its evilness, whether mediatory tools such as diplomacy attached to conflict or not, a conflict cannot be completely solved. On the contrary, the second school, 'Tragedy School' does not see any relation between an actor's nature and evil developments. Rather, it prefers to indicate the importance of the environment. According to this approach, actors are likely to commit evil behaviour since the environment they live in, as Waltz puts, is simply insecure. Under these circumstances, they are likely to act as 'evil entities' whether their intentions are purely good or not.

According to Spirtas, 'Evil' and 'Tragedy' schools of realism was a significant part of realism until Waltz published his work in 1975, *Theory of International Relations*. Then, defensive realists attempted to revive a pre-Waltzian approach to cover deficiencies emerged especially after the end of the Cold War, which are indicated by both defensive realists and the other scholars. As Schweller furthers the realist theories after the end of the Cold War by rejecting Legro and Moravcsik's approach regarding defensive realists' 'betrayal,'

...has been faithful to the paradigm's core principles precisely because it has not advanced uncausal explanations of complex phenomena. In so doing, it has restored the theoretical richness of realism that was abandoned by structural realism (R. Schweller, 2000, p. 174).

Additionally, as Spirtas puts it,

Now the major challenge to Waltz comes from those who seek to include unit-level factors in a theory of state behaviour. Realists are increasingly turning to evil to explain international politics (Spirtas, 1996, p. 398).

However, adding unit-level variables into the frame is consistent with Waltz's previous explanations regarding the vague nature of neorealism and again and again need for non-systemic variables.

Waltz first pointed out "his theory of the significance of the system structure" (Norris, 2002, p. 32) or "third image" in 1954, which is itself insufficient,

The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images, there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy (Waltz, 1965, pp. 237-238).

In 1979, Waltz furthered his arguments by relating the first and second images with the third image and admitting that relying on a systematic level of analysis would provide a limited perspective only, as anarchy suggests,

Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone (Waltz, 1999, p. 309).

As Waltz clearly clearly further expresses,

Far from thinking of unit-level processes as ‘all product...and...not at all productive’ I, like Durkheim, think of unit-level processes as a source of both changes in systems and of possible changes of systems, hard though it is to imagine the latter. Neither structure nor units determine outcomes. Each affects the other... Changes in, and transformations of, systems originate not in the structure of system, but in its parts (Waltz, 1986, p. 328 and 343).

Following the end of Cold War, Waltz remained him in his stance on the “duality of causation” (Frankel, 1996, p. 79) approach:

Structural change begins in a system’s unit, and then unit-level and structural causes interact (Waltz, 1993, p. 49).

During the 2000s, Waltz reformed his theory and concluded that knowledge from the units of the system is required:

Structures shape and shove; they do not determine the actions of states... One example is enough to show this... [In Yugoslavia] American policy was generated not by external security interests, but by internal political pressure and national ambition (Waltz, 2000, p. 24 and 29).

With Waltz’s attempts to contain unit-level variables in his theory, defensive realists can be seen in the same track with neorealism. As previously mentioned, Waltz himself made it clear that containing unit-level variables is not only consistent but also important for neorealism’s applications in practice. Obviously, this expression contrasts with and corrupts Spirtas’s argument:

The advantages of Waltz’s neorealism is that it discourages the proliferation of variables by making the distribution of capabilities among states the only dependent variable (Spirtas, 1996, p. 391).



**Figure 3: Defensive Realists' Contributions to Waltz's Theory**

Defensive realists added the motivations of an actor along with its capabilities and its strategies for the transparency of an actor's motivations into the equation. As a consequence, balancing appears as a non-automated process which relies on a number of different variables. As Vasquez expresses the general posture of post-Cold War realism:

that the balancing of power was never the law Waltz thought it was. In effect, he offered an explanation of a behaviour regularity that never existed, except within the logic of the theory (Vasquez, 1997, p. 908).

As a furthering point, defensive realists think that anarchy solely itself does not affect the behaviour of the actors. According to them, an actor's behaviour is affected by "structural modifiers" (Taliaferro, 2000, pp. 136-138). So, what modern realists need to do is to reveal these modifiers. As Schweller puts it:

...is not whether states balance or bandwagon – history clearly shows that they do both – but rather under what conditions states choose one strategy or the other (R. Schweller, 1997, p. 927).

One of the top questions that scholars of international relations and political science ponder is that under what conditions an actor is more likely to follow a specific strategy. According to Norris, “Neorealism today is less content to formulate theoretical abstractions” (Norris, 2002, p. 35). The comparative stability arose right after the end of the Cold War made it clear for theorists that international relations is quite complex and beyond an automated balancing process. According to Powell, during the attempts of scholars to explain the effects of different variables, the gap between neorealism and its one of the alternatives, neoliberalism started to narrow. In both neorealism and neoliberalism scholars attempt to move from the effects of structure to its provisional – related– relationship with the system units. As Powell claims,

...both neorealism and neoliberalism see the effects of anarchy and the degree of concern about relative gains to be conditional. The task ahead is to specify these conditions more precisely (Powell, 1994, p. 344).

### **2.1.3. An Introduction to the European Union: the Neorealist Perspective**

Once the analyses of the European Union are evaluated, the very problematic structural approach to neorealism is more likely to be seen compared to the dual-causality theory. The previous works gather around two broad avenues. According to the first approach, European integration was a state-centric answer to bi-polarity. This state-centric answer was a US led attempt to create a balance against the Soviet Union and threat, and also an attempt for those former powers to significantly be a part of the international system once again. As a consequence, European integration was not aiming to form a common power, but it was aiming to strengthen the member states individually through common points. So, European integration was about the states, but not completely about Europe. This is why “modern realists have been sceptical of the EC” (Grieco, 1993, p. 329). According to Gilpin, the EC is an

interstate alliance whose primary purpose is to strengthen the position of individual states in an interdependent and highly competitive global economy (Gilpin, 1996, p. 19).

As this argument suggests, the members of European integration expected to leave the integrationist behaviour after the end of the Cold War, and follow an alternative pathway in accordance with their national interest against the superpower and constraints which affect them. Furthermore, Mearsheimer with the help of neorealism and political history, argued that following the end of the Cold War, Europe would return to multipolarity. According to him “the European state system has been plagued with war since its inception” and a balancing process would eventually come and Europe would be “back to the future,” because “the keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of the individual states” (Mearsheimer, 1990, pp. 11-12). As Griffiths puts it with a very similar approach:

States are condemned to reproduce the logic of anarchy and any cooperation that takes place between them is subordinated to the distribution of power (Griffiths, 1999, p. 49).

On the other hand, the second approach to European integration argues that another super European power would emerge as a result of European integration, while agreeing with most assumptions of the assumptions in the first approach. According to this view, European states will merge and form a new superpower to balance against the rest. As Rosecrance puts it: "Five great bases of power again control the organization of the world order: the United States, Russia, the European Community, Japan and China" (as cited in Norris, 2002, p. 37).

During the 1990s, the significance of Mearsheimer’s prediction, “Back to the Future” (Mearsheimer, 1990, pp. 11-12) started to decline and European integration was furthered with the support provided by the US. Obviously, it was meaningful that European states were now able to save themselves from the anarchic order. Surprisingly, it was this development that convinced neorealists to add unit-level variables to their analyses. Additionally, while European integration furthers, the Western states have been able to communicate with the hegemon internally and externally. As a result, structural theory started to be criticized for not being able to explain ongoing developments in Europe. As Lake stated, “whether or not realists got the Cold War right, they have most certainly got the warm peace wrong” (Lake, 1999,

pp. 44-45), while Schweller and Wohlforth's conclusion was that "the end of the Cold War undermines realism" (Schweller & Wohlforth, 2000, p. 60).

Contrasting with the progressive balancing that neorealism expects, the members of the EU appear to find a way to institutionalize their interests to act together, while not being affected as much by the structure of the international system and attempts for self-help. The EU is a sui-generis entity that emerged not only against an adversary but between adversaries. This fact is an answer to why "the chances of enduring peace among Union members" increase (Weitsman, 1997, p. 191). Furthermore, Jervis also goes beyond a distinction between Gould's "time's cycle" and "time's arrow" to reject the idea that the members of the international system would go back to the previous patterns they followed before the Cold War, following the end of the Cold War. According to this view, a higher level of cooperation on the international stage is possible (Jervis, 1991-1992, pp. 39-73). If the assumptions of neorealism are problematic because of the structural approach, then the 'time's cycle' argument would be inappropriate as a conclusion. Keohane argues that the structural theory is "particularly weak in accounting for changes" (Keohane, 1999, p. 154). However, it is not completely static. While offensive realists adopt the 'time cycle' approach in their analyses and expect a tragic ending in the European integration while states go back to their previous national strategies; defensive realists adopt the 'time arrow' approach, which appears to be advantageous since this approach considers the changes as well as persistence of unit factors.

Since European integration furthered and deepened following the end of the Cold War, sustaining neorealism in this context could be a hard task. On the contrary, once Waltz's dual causality theory is considered, such expressions would become irrelevant. Because, according to Waltz, his theory, additional unit variables, and further neo-structural theories are able to work fine both in 'time's arrow' and 'time's cycle' approaches. On the other hand, an analysis of units was not a part of Mearsheimer's analysis. From this point of view, Mearsheimer's explanations overlook Waltz's consideration of changes at the unit level. According to Waltz, members of the European Union were not

destined to switch back to multipolarity as well as pre-Cold War conflicts, which would confirm the previous formats of the balance of power theory. The furthering European integration does not necessarily mean that neorealism “has got it wrong,” because the other pathway is still possible.

The ‘time’s arrow’ approach, an approach in which defensive realists adopted, considers Waltz’s theory powerful and plausible. This is due to the fact that while the structure has an effect, changes at the unit level and cross-relation between these changes and structure still affect international politics. Following the end of the Cold War, it can be argued that European politics started to shift according to changes at the unit level, while it continued to operate under the anarchic conditions of the international system. Inside the integration, European states might have decreased the effects of anarchy, but outside the integration, the anarchic systemic structure constituted a constraint for all. With the deepening and furthering European integration, offensive realism has appeared to be more flawed than ever. On the other hand, defensive realism arguments and Waltz’s theory still remain plausible, valid, and strong. If the balancing process does not apply to the states who are involved in the European integration project, then they together may act as a balancer against the rest of system actors. As the ‘time’s arrow’ approach expects, the states who involve in the European integration project may constitute a one and only single unit, but they will still be restrained to what the uni-polar world offers and limits.

As a consequence, the balance of power concept of neorealism for Europe relies on the provisional fact that European states will form a superpower soon enough to challenge the state in the international system, who holds the status of hegemon. Additionally, once the list of countries involved in the EU and the EU itself considered, it appears less likely that any of them will become a challenger in the international system. At this point, one of the first divisions of neorealism, ‘time’s cycle’ and its assumptions, which foresee a shift back to a European multi-polarity, does not seem likely. On the contrary, ‘time’s arrow’ emerges as a strong and valid alternative that foresees that the



rebalancing of the international system would be through the EU, which would eventually become a global actor.


The variables issue and the fact that European states may be replaced with a new European actor have been on the agenda of neorealists for a long time. Gilpin by furthering one of the fundamental assumptions of all-types-of realism, which is that the only actor in world politics is the nation state claimed that the only actor in the world politics is the “conflict group” (Gilpin, 1996, p. 7). Furthermore, according to Gilpin, the EU, a supranational sui-generis entity could be covered by realism. As he puts it:

...just as the modern nation-state is a product of particular historical forces, changes in those forces could bring about the demise of the nation-state (Gilpin, 1984, pp. 267-296).

Moreover, Waltz points out that

International structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era, be they city-states, empire, or nations (Waltz, 1996, p. 309).

As Gilpin and Waltz, Morgenthau in his masterpiece, *Politics Among Nations* in 1948, also touched upon the transformability of the actor. For European integration, Morgenthau listed three different aspects, two of which relate to the variance in neorealism, such as offensive and defensive realism, and one, that is between the former two. The “political creativity” prediction expects a very intense political, economic, and military integration among European states, while “political impotence” refers to European neutrality and the EU’s pulling itself back from foreign relations and “political desperation” refers to a distancing from integration and cooperation and a switch back to national interests.



**Figure 4: Morgenthau's Predictions regarding European Integration**

'Political desperation' has been adopted by offensive realism supporters especially after the end of the Cold War since the pressure that was born out of the international system forced European states to be able to self-help once again. However, the EU (or then the EC) gave a different response by facilitating a number of agreements starting from the early 1990s that eventually led to better integration and cooperation among the member states. As a consequence, the EU's efforts to become an 'ever closer union' supported Morgenthau's predictions for European integration.

It should be noted here that Morgenthau's contributions to explain European integration does not solve the question of whether the European Union is an actor in the international system or not. While Morgenthau's approach contrasts with the traditional realist view that a supranational organization may only reflect the interests of its major members, it forms a trajectory for European integration and concludes in an approach that the European Union is a comparatively small conflict group. However, Mearsheimer's analysis already started to lose its attractiveness. While in agreement with the transformation of a supranational actor into a global actor over time, Waltz argues,

Supranational agents able to act effectively, however, either themselves acquire some of the attributes and capabilities of states... or they soon reveal their inability to act in important ways... (Waltz, 1996, p. 307).

During the early 1990s, the EU was fairly in the shape of a state. Until now, as a single unit which resulted in a new balancing process in the international system, the European Union could be evaluated through the lens of defensive realism as one of the major candidates or the only candidate that would become an actor in the international system. In the last decade, the European Union intensely attempted to expand its area of influence, territory and economic ability. Especially, the formation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 has been a noticeable effort of the Union. From this perspective, a Gilpinian view would be that the European Union is an actor, a state which attempts to change the international system (Gilpin, 1999, p. 149). As Nye Jr. narrates from one of the observers of European integration:

A political bloc is emerging in the form of the European Union that likes to see itself as a challenge to America (Pryce-Jones & Nye, 2000, pp. 51-52).

As a consequence, scholars of international relations and political science have started to approach the EU as an actor capable of balancing world politics. Waltz, in 1993, added the EU to his list of balancers. Additionally, Wohlfort stated that “if the EU were a state, the world would be bipolar” (Wohlfort, 1999, p. 31). In summary, the EU’s ability to challenge the US emerges as an essential and valid fact in the context of neorealism, and the once considered that offensive realism and ‘time’s cycle’ approach have lost credibility.

#### **2.1.4. American Support and Neorealist Approach**

The ‘time’s arrow’ approach, an approach in which defensive realists adopted, considers Waltz’s theory powerful and plausible. This is due to the fact that while the structure has an effect, changes at the unit level and cross-relation between these changes and structure still affect international politics. Following the end of the Cold War, it can be

argued that European politics started to shift according to changes at the unit level, while it continued to operate under the anarchic conditions of the international system. Inside the integration, European states might have decreased the effects of anarchy, but outside the integration, the anarchic systemic structure constituted a constraint for all. With the deepening and furthering European integration, offensive realism has appeared to be more flawed than ever. On the other hand, defensive realism arguments and Waltz's theory still remain plausible, valid, and strong. If the balancing process does not apply to the states who are involved in the European integration project, then they together may act as a balancer against the rest of system actors. As the 'time's arrow' approach expects, the states who involve in the European integration project may constitute a one and only single unit, but they will still be restrained to what the uni-polar world offers and limits.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this thesis will examine US-Turkey relations, the US approach towards Turkey, the efforts and support of the US in bilateral relations between Turkey and the EU, and the underlying motivations. As a consequence, in accordance with neorealist assumptions, this study will rely mostly on structural variables.

In this thesis, I treat the alliance and co-operation among European states, including Turkey as a realist consensus to balance the Soviet Union during the Cold War. My point here is that, following the end of the Cold War, European integration continued to further under the circumstances of an anarchic systemic order. While the European Union accelerated its progress to become a political union with its supranational body, the anarchic structure of the international system constituted a barrier for the Union's foreign policy and relations with the transatlantic actors.

In the approach I adopt in this study, as mentioned above, the EU will be treated as a single actor in the international context. The EU emerges as a global actor, which frees itself from US hegemony following the end of the Cold War. Contrasting with the expectations of classical realists, the EU did not disappear from the international arena

following the end of the Cold War (Norris, 2002). As Nye Jr. narrates from one of the observers of European integration:

A political bloc is emerging in the form of the European Union that likes to see itself as a challenge to America (Pryce-Jones & Nye, 2000, pp. 51-52).

The EC was formed under US hegemony during the Cold War period. However, the EU preferred a transformation to increase its political power in world politics following the end of the Cold War. With institutional changes and further integration steps regarding the political and economic aspects of the Union, the EU obtained the ability to play as a single actor in the international system (Norris, 2002). Above all, the political integration of the Union does not comply with the structural assumptions of realists. However, conflict groups determined by the realists, who can dominate the international system could be:

politically united actors who are bound by a common interest, though realists are interested mostly in the ‘primary’ groups, which since the seventeenth century has meant nation-states (Norris, 2002, p. 41).

As a consequence, realists adopt two different approaches while examining the case of the EU. While the first one strictly relies on structural variables and benefits from the so-called potential unit-level variables to examine the EU at the global level, the second one evaluates the European integration by mainly relying on unit-level variables. In the end, the both explanations perceive the EU as a state, an actor capable of balancing in the international system. At this point, since this study focuses on the American perception on Turkey’s accession to the EU and the motives behind this support, but does not place a special emphasis on the European perception towards Turkey, this study benefits from the realist explanation, the one, which suggests that the EU and the US will act to protect their interests, in other words, interests which constitute their sources of power (e.g. political, economic or military power) at the global level, obviously according to what the international system suggests.

Strengthening this study’s approach preference, as briefly mentioned in the previous paragraph, the EU’s enlargement as well as its internal politics between member and candidate countries started to become affected by a number of unit-level variables when

the security risks that were born out of the structure of the international system started to dissolve. On the contrary, the US continued to further support Turkey in the framework of its security policy. Furthering this view as the main frame of this thesis, I argue that the US's foreign policy behaviour between the post-Cold War period and the post-September 11 attacks can be best explained by considering systemic variables such as the US's attempts to secure its interests in accordance with the events at the global level (i.e. the US's security oriented policy).

As a furthering note, it should be noted that the EU is an undivided entity such as the US since it is being shaped by the interests of member states. In a parallel manner, I assume that the individual interests of member states of the EU have an impact on the formation of the Union's foreign policy, as well as the Union's perception regarding US efforts and support for Turkey. As Ratti puts it:

the realist perspective... share the view that supra-national institutions are above all a tool of national governments and that states use them in ways that suit their national interests (Ratti, 2006, p. 98).

As a consequence, concurrently I expect the EU to act according to its member states' interests, which are assumed to have a significant effect on the Union and its decisions regarding Turkey for a better understanding of the effectiveness of the US support in bilateral relations between the European Union and Turkey, particularly when the views of the EU and the US started to change.


Throughout this thesis, the analysis will apply the neorealist approach and adopt a standing closer to defensive realists, which effectively evaluate the shift in the international system as a critical independent variable that is responsible for the shift in the effectiveness of US efforts and support in bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey. Subsequently, this study will treat the standing of American leaders regarding the strategic importance of Turkey and security as the primary form of American support, since public speeches to the leaders of European states were the primary form of US efforts to support Turkey in official and non-official European circles (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005). Furthering this point, the leader of state must have adopted moral values

and behaviour, which are in favour of the interests of the state (Machiavelli as cited in Ari, 2012) in foreign policy making.

As can be understood from the perspective above, this thesis presents a multi-level analysis, which benefits from a number of factors (Figure 5), for a better understanding of US attempts to support Turkey in both official and non-official European circles.

**Independent Variables (The Structure of the International System):**

All shift in the international structure during the 1990s and the early 2000s such as the **increased stability (political changes)** in Southeast Europe, **incidents** (i.e. Iraq War, the Gulf War) occurred in the Middle East, **Turkey-Israel Relations** as well as the developments in **Bosnia** and **Kosovo**.



**Dependent Variable (Foreign Policy Outcome):**

The US attempts to support Turkey (The stance of American leaders).

**Figure 5: Variables defined in accordance with the neorealist approach**



## 2.2. Consolidating the US Support: A Quantitative Aspect of Content Analysis

As mentioned in the first half of the second chapter, US-Turkey relations during the post-Cold War era were expected to improve on the basis of security convergences, in accordance with realist assumptions. By adopting the speeches of US leaders as the primary form of American perception and support, this part of the thesis introduces the quantitative aspect of this study to demonstrate the changing US support to Turkey in European circles across time. First, this section introduces the details of the document collection process and hand coding rules. Then, it presents the details of Wordscores method as well as its mathematical foundation and software components. Third, this chapter discusses problematic aspects of the method along with its advantages. The results of the analysis have been presented and discussed throughout Chapter 4, in accordance with the historical framework given in Chapter 3 and theoretical framework given in Chapter 2.

### 2.2.1. Document Collection for Content Analysis

Firstly, all presidential documents have been extracted from Woolley and Gerhard Peter's The American Presidency Project at the University of California Santa Barbara (Peters, 2014). The types of documents as well as their time frame contained in the database are as follows:

<b>Document Period</b>	<b>Document Type</b>
Washington 1789 through Taft 1913	Messages and Papers of the Presidents
Hoover 1929-1933; Truman through G.W. Bush 1945-2007; & Obama 2009-2010	Public Papers of the Presidents
F. Roosevelt 1933-1945	Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin

	D. Roosevelt
Carter 1977 through G.W. Bush 2009	Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
Obama 2009-2014	Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents
Washington 1790 – Obama 2014	Annual Messages to Congress on the State of the Union
Washington 1789 – Obama 2013	Inaugural Addresses
Reagan 1982 – Obama 2014	Saturday Addresses (Radio from Reagan through G.W. Bush)
F. Roosevelt	Fireside Chats
Hoover 1929 – Obama 2014	News Conferences
J.Q. Adams 1826 – Obama 2014	Executive Orders
Washington 1789 – Obama 2014	Proclamations
Hoover 1929 – Obama 2014	Presidential Signing Statements
Truman 1947 – Obama 2014	The Economic Report of the President
(Clinton 1997 – Obama 2014) – (105 <sup>th</sup> – 113rd Congress)	Statements of Administration Policy
1928-2012	Presidential Nomination Acceptance Addresses
1960-2012	Presidential Candidates Debates
1960, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2012 Elections	Documents Related to Presidential Elections
The 2000s	Documents Related to the 2000 Election Dispute
2009 Presidential Transition (G.W. Bush – Obama) 2001 Presidential Transition (Clinton – G.W. Bush)	Documents Related to Presidential Transitions
Between 1840-2012, of parties receiving	National Political Party Platforms

electoral votes	
-----------------	--

**Table 1: Documents in the Database**


Since the American Presidency Project database benefits from a SQL coded storing system, an additional .php script has been used to download the entire dataset consisting of 105.245 documents as .txt files. Following the extraction of the above-mentioned documents, the algorithm given in [Appendix A](#) has been used to classify .txt documents, which are somehow related to Turkey between the years, 1990-2006 (n=753). Each document has then been re-classified according to its owner (i.e. President Name) and date under the different folders. Upon the completion of this task, re-classified files have been renamed in accordance with the file creation date. For instance, a document from President George W. Bush's folder with the date 20.01.2007 has been renamed as '1.txt', while a document with the date 24.04.2008 has been renamed '2.txt.'

### **2.2.2. Hand Coding**

Hand coding is one of the most widespread approaches used in content analysis (Klüver, 2013). Content analysis with hand coding involves four steps. First, a researcher develops a categorization scheme. Then, the texts are divided into sub units such as paragraphs or sentences depending on the adopted research design. Third, units of analysis are assigned categories based on human judgement. Finally, this analysis ends up in a dataset consisting of the units of analysis and their assigned categories. In this study, we adopt paragraphs, full-sentences, and quasi-sentences as our units of analysis, defined as “an argument or phrase which is the verbal expression of one idea or meaning” (Klingemann, Volkens, Budge, Bara, & McDonald, 2006, p. xxiii).

Following the creation of sub-datasets, a random document selection process has been applied. For every sub-sample of each US president, which consists of nearly 25%

(184/757) of all documents have been randomly duplicated for the hand coding process. To prevent a potential rater bias regarding the identity of the US president, each sentence and word in the sub-folder which might reveal the identity of the document owner has been automatically deleted. In accordance with the algorithm rules, full-sentences and quasi sentences related to our keywords, ‘Turkey’ or ‘Turkish’ have been marked with red. Furthermore, two different coding scales have been prepared and then two different raters were asked to read the information and consent form given in Appendix B. According to Scale A, each rater was asked to assign a point ranging from -10 to +10 to each document or report it as ‘Not suitable for research.’



**Figure 6: Hand Coding Rules for Scale A**

Then, each rater was asked again to re-rate the document, which they already assigned a point of 10 in accordance with the rules given below; in other words, according to Scale

B. Additionally, the coding rules as well as the information and consent form are given in Appendix B.

Assign 1	Assign 2	Assign 3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•If the document appears to be <b>SLIGHTLY IN FAVOUR OF</b> Turkey's membership in the European Union.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•If the document appears to be <b>SOMEHOW IN FAVOUR OF</b> Turkey's membership in the European Union.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•If the document appears to be <b>VERY STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF</b> Turkey's membership in the European Union.</li> </ul>

**Figure 7: Hand Coding Rules for Scale B**

Overall category	Scale A			Scale B			
	Do not assign	-10	0	10	1	2	3
...this Turkey recipe...	X	-	-	-	-	-	-
...maybe Turkey should consider becoming a privileged partner in the EU.	-	X	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey is an important contributor to the peace projects in the Caucasus.	-	-	X	-	-	-	-
Turkey is a neighbour of the EU.	-	-	-	X	X	-	-
The European Union should start accession negotiations with Turkey as soon as possible.	-	-	-	X	-	X	-
Turkey as a democratic, liberal, and European country provides security for the EU and must be anchored to EU institutions.				X			X

**Table 2: Sample Hand Coding Classification Scheme**

By itself, hand coding for content analysis has the comparative advantage of, central validity when compared with computerized content analysis methods. However, the hand coding process in this study is taking a requirement from Wordscores into consideration known as ‘a priori’ position, which will be discussed in detail in the next section.

The reliability of hand coding may be very problematic when collecting results from at least two document raters. Cohen’s Kappa and Krippendorff’s Alpha; in other words, inter-rater agreement tests have been conducted to make sure that the researcher’s coding scheme could be used to obtain ‘a priori’ positions in the automated content analysis ahead. These tests have been conducted at least twice for both Scale A and Scale B. According to Landis and Koch (1977), an agreement rate above 0.41 constitutes a plausible agreement beyond chance. Since the agreement rates for both tests were higher than 41%, the researcher’s own coding results were adopted as ‘a priori’ scores required for Wordscores (Landis & Koch, 1977).

<b>Percent Agreement</b>	<b>Scott’s Pi</b>	<b>Cohen’s Kappa</b>	<b>Krippendorff’s Alpha</b>
56.70%	0.421	0.466	0.423

**Table 3: Cohen's Kappa, Scott’s Pi and Krippendorff’s Alpha Results for Scale A**


<b>Percent Agreement</b>	<b>Scott’s Pi</b>	<b>Cohen’s Kappa</b>	<b>Krippendorff’s Alpha</b>
58.3%	0.442	0.482	0.447

**Table 4: Cohen's Kappa, Scott's Pi and Krippendorff's Alpha Results for Scale B**

### 2.2.3. Wordscores


Due to the lack of reliability in the content analysis through hand coding, a number of automated, computerized content analysis techniques have been developed. In their paper, Laver et al. and Benoit and Laver presented a new method for automated content analysis, which assigns scores or positions to the documents by assigning scores or positions to the words used in virgin texts (Laver & Benoit, 2002; Laver, Benoit, & Garry, 2003, p. 311).

For the content analysis, the Wordscores method has four steps. Obtaining reference data with the a priori scores or positions to set reference values (*setref*) is the first requirement. Once these data are imported, Wordscores assigns scores or positions to the reference data (*wordscores*). Thirdly, it assigns scores or positions to virgin texts or data (*textscore*) and optionally it "transforms virgin text scores to original metric" (Laver et al., 2003, p. 314).



**Figure 8: Laver et al.'s Procedure for Wordscores**

To comprehensively understand the functioning of Wordscores, let  $\Phi$  denote the text population, where  $\epsilon$  denotes the text sample available,  $\gamma$  denotes virgin data,  $\delta$  denotes the unavailable data, and  $\zeta$  denotes the reference data, which a score or position has already been assigned.



**Figure 9: Wordscores Components**



Then, the relative frequency or the proportion of each word  $\theta$  in the reference data can be formulized as the following, where  $\omega$  denotes the number of words in each text file:

$$\theta = \omega/\zeta = \omega/(\Phi - (\delta + \gamma))$$

Let us assume that we have twenty-five (25) same words in the reference text  $R_1$  and fifty (50) words in the reference text  $R_2$ , both of which consists of one thousand (1000) words. Then the probability of reading a specific word in one of the text files is as the following:

$$P(\omega_1) = \frac{25}{1000} = 0.025$$

$$P(\omega_2) = \frac{50}{1000} = 0.050$$

If it is known that a reader reads one of these text files from a set of textual data, the probability of reading the text file one and text file two is as the following:

$$P(\kappa_1) = \frac{25}{25 + 50} = 0.33$$

$$P(\kappa_2) = \frac{50}{25 + 50} = 0.66$$

If a document has a priori position  $\nu$  and given that a reader reads a specific set of textual data, which contains  $\omega$ , then the total score a specific document  $\psi$  equals:

$$\psi = \sum_{\omega} (\theta \cdot \nu) = \sum_{\omega} \left( \left( \frac{\omega}{\Phi - (\delta + \gamma)} \right) \cdot \nu \right)$$

In other words,  $\psi$  is an average of  $\nu$ , which is weighted by  $\theta$ . If a word occurs in a single text file, then the probability of reading that specific text file, which contains that specific word,  $\theta$  is equal to 1. Then,  $\psi$  equals

$$\psi = (1 \cdot \nu) = \psi = \nu$$

Visiting back the above-mentioned text file one and text file two examples, let us assume that

For text file one:  $\nu = +10$  and  $\theta = 0.33$

For text file two:  $\nu = -10$  and  $\theta = 0.66$

Then  $\psi$  value for each, same word

$$\psi = (+10.(0.33) + (-10.(0.66)) = -3.3$$

Obviously, this value will change upon the addition of several words as part of the reference data. But, calculating scores for virgin data is relatively simple once this step is completed. Now let  $\theta_v$  denote the word frequencies of virgin data and  $\psi_v$  denote the document scores of virgin data. Then document score for a virgin text  $\tau$  would be equal to


$$\tau = \sum_{\omega} (\theta_v \cdot \psi_v)$$

As a consequence,  $\tau$  represents the virgin data score based on a priori score of the reference data. This inference is based on the fact that the word frequencies of word usage in reference data should be linked to the word frequencies of word usage in virgin data. As Laver et al. argue, the scores of virgin data will be calculated with the help of same word universe. Because of this, the scores of virgin texts will be quite clustered and hard to compare with reference texts. To overcome this issue, we need to transform the scores of virgin texts for them to have the same dispersion metric as the scores of reference texts. This is done as the following, where  $\tau$  denotes the average of virgin text scores,  $SD$  denotes the standard deviation of reference texts  $\psi$  and virgin texts  $\tau$ .

$$\tau = (\tau_1 - \tau_2) \cdot \frac{SD_{\psi}}{SD_{\tau}} + \tau_2$$

Additionally, Wordscores calculates the confidence intervals through the variance of the individual word scores around the document's mean score. The method for further investigation and work can be found in Laver et al.'s article, as well as the Wordscores website<sup>1</sup>.

The Wordscores method relies on a number of different assumptions. First, it assumes that positions or scores are reflected in the relative frequency of words used within and across the text documents. Second, it assumes that a word's meaning remains stable over time. Third, Wordscores treats the same words as they have the same weight in the estimation process. However, Laver et al. eliminate this problem by standardizing the raw scores by expanding the variance of virgin text scores to equal the variance of reference document positions or scores (Laver et al., 2003). Finally, Wordscores requires all related words to the research question be contained in a text document. In practical terms, to use Wordscores, one should follow the steps stated in Figure 10.



**Figure 10: Wordscores in Practical Terms**

---

<sup>1</sup> Wordscores Project Website, [http://www.tcd.ie/Political\\_Science/wordscores/](http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/wordscores/) (Accessed on 20.07.2014).

Here, for automated content analysis, I assigned a priori scores to my reference documents according to the hand coding results. Furthermore, I combined at least two different documents, that received a point of 10 on Scale A, and a point of 3 on Scale B, since the reference data should contain as many words as possible for a better estimation of virgin data scores.

#### **2.2.4. Problematic Aspects of Method**

Hand coding in general is very time consuming and labour intensive, which makes the content analysis for the large number of texts very difficult. Additionally, the lack of reliability is a serious issue in manual hand coding once compared to the computerized content analysis methods (Bakker, Edwards, & De Vries, 2006; Mikhaylov, Laver, & Benoit, 2012). Last, but not least, coding political issues sometimes can be very technical, and as a consequence, this situation may constitute a difficulty for both coders and researchers to develop an understanding of content. Forming a classification scheme and allocating units of analysis into sub-groups also emerge as additional obstacles. However, this study, by preferring the hand coding only to obtain a priori scores requested by the nature of Wordscores greatly benefitted from the central validity claim of manual hand coding. On the other hand, the results of the inter-rater agreement tests demonstrate that the researcher's coding scheme overcomes the problem of reliability at a significant level.

The automated, computerized content analysis method adopted in this study, Wordscores, is 100% replicable. As a result, reliability is not an issue for this method. Furthermore, analyzing the large amount of data with Wordscores is much easier and not time consuming. On the contrary, the requirement of a priori scores or positions is one of the disadvantages of Wordscores. However, this problem only occurs when there is no available empirical data. From the mathematical point of view, a researcher is able

to assign independent scores to virgin texts. In this study, the probability of this problem was eliminated through hand coding. It should be noted here that additional automated content analysis methods might also have been applied for cross-validation.

### 2.2.5. Analysis

The researcher's coding scale has been recorded with the *setref* function of Wordscores in accordance with files located under US Presidents' folders (e.g. Richard Cheney, Al Gore). Following the randomization of files for scaling, documents belonging to John F. Kerry have been removed from the sample since these files (n=2) have been reported by both raters as 'not suitable for research.' Furthermore, transformed scores could not be determined for Richard Cheney's documents (n=24) on Scale B since Wordscores requires mathematically at least two different values (a priori scores or positions) to be assigned to documents in the sample. According to rating reports, it was not possible to assign an additional score to the randomized Richard Cheney documents, since the randomization process did not result in a document belonging to Cheney that could be rated on both Scale A and B. However, this does not constitute a problem for this analysis, as transformed scores do not necessarily need to be assigned (Laver & Benoit, 2002). After obtaining Wordscores for the documents on Scale A (dimension1) and B (dimension2), the following variables have been created:

Variable Name	Storage Type	Display Format	Variable Label
clintona	Float	%8.0g	Clinton Values (Scale A)
clintonb	Float	%8.0g	Clinton Values (Scale B)
gbusha	Float	%8.0g	G. Bush Values (Scale A)
gbushb	Float	%8.0g	G. Bush Values (Scale B)
gwbusha	Float	%8.0g	G.W. Bush Values (Scale A)
gwbushb	Float	%8.0g	G.W. Bush Values (Scale B)

rcheneya	Float	%8.0g	R. Cheney Values (Scale A)
Rcheneyb	Float	%8.0g	R. Cheney Values (Scale B)
gwbushrcheneya	Float	%8.0g	G.W. Bush and R. Cheney Values (Scale A)
gwbushrcheneyb	Float	%8.0g	G. W. Bush and R. Cheney (Scale B)
Year	Float	%8.0g	Years of documents
Allyeara	Float	%8.0g	Values on Scale A (All years)
Allyearb	Float	%8.0g	Values on Scale B (All years)

**Table 5: Variable Properties**

Accordingly, descriptive statistics have been obtained for these variables to increase the explanatory power of this study<sup>2</sup>. With this straightforward analysis, this study gained the ability to evaluate American support across time. Accordingly, it becomes now possible to differentiate between and elaborate on different US presidencies (e.g. Clinton and G.W. Bush) in their support to Turkey in European circles. It should be further noted here that the results for both Clinton and G.W. Bush presidencies have been within my expectations and the details of which have been explained in the next chapters.

---

<sup>2</sup> Please refer to [Appendix C](#) for detailed results.

**This page intentionally left blank.**

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE TRIANGLE: TURKEY, THE US AND THE EU**

From the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the US and Western European states have become role models for the modernization and advancement of the nation. At the same time, Turkey has also gained significance for both the US and Western European countries since the end of World War II. Increased security concerns of the US and Western European countries during the Cold War led to the consideration of Turkey as an integral part of the Western alliance against the Soviet Union. Especially during the Cold War period, Turkey was regarded as an important ally against the Soviet expansionism. As can be expected, not only the dynamic relations of the US and Western European countries with Turkey but also US foreign policy have undergone a remarkable transformation following the end of the Cold War. During this period, the US saw Turkey as increasingly important as the focus of US foreign policy was placed upon a very critical geography ranging from Central Asia to the Balkans after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Four decades later, George W. Bush's declaration of the US's war on terrorism immediately after the September 11 attacks particularly boosted the regional importance of Turkey. With this further development, bilateral relations between the US and Turkey have deepened on the basis of geopolitical-security concerns. On the contrary, however, the significance of Turkey for Western European countries has declined following the dissolution of the Soviet Union; the common goals born out of security concerns more or less dissolved. Furthermore, Western European countries chose to further economic integration through the



transformation of the European Economic Community (Leech, 2002). Although Turkey has appeared as an ally with an important geo-location for the US, new, but a negative perception of Turkey has also emerged in continental Europe, which we will briefly discuss in detail in the following chapters. At this point, this division arises as an answer to the question of why Turkey-EU and US-Turkey relations are not on the same track.

This chapter will provide a historical background to properly address the research goals of this thesis. First, it will focus on Turkey-EU and US-Turkey bilateral relations after the Cold War from different perspectives, most of which occurred after the West division during the 1980s. While presenting the historical background of US-Turkey relations, a specific approach to those events such as the Iraq War, the Gulf War, Israel-Turkey relations, energy policies of the US, and Kosovo and Bosnia crises, will be demonstrated, since these events mainly shaped the American support as well as emerged as the underlying motivations of the US. Concurrently, Turkey-EU relations will be briefly evaluated to further elaborate on the historical divergence that emerged between the US and the EU.

### **3.1. An Overview of Turkish – American Relations after the Cold War**

According to Lesser, the US has seen Turkey as part of Europe from the very beginning of its bilateral relations with Turkey (Lesser, 2008). Following the Soviet Union's expansionist policy towards the Caucasus, the Middle East and especially countries rich in oil in the region, Turkey emerged as an important player along with its geostrategic location as a country that, be used in the US's fight against the Soviet Union.

In 1947, US President Harry Truman prepared a plan, later to be known as the Truman Doctrine, to further the US's fight against the Soviet threat. This plan granted Turkey and Greece economic and military aid and was aiming to protect these countries from the threat of communism (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006, p. 232). From 1948-1952, the

similarly titled Marshall Plan also aimed to economically help a number of countries including Turkey to protect them from the Soviet expansionism.

These plans were the primary economic form of American support to a number of countries including Turkey, during the Cold War. Along with foreign aid, prospects of membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) paved the way for the 1946 multi-party elections and accelerated Turkey's democratic transition. With Turkey's contribution to the Korean War in 1950, on the other hand, Turkey attempted to ensure its security through the West (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006, p. 212).

Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War also challenged the US's global role in the international system; one major question emerged due to the unexpected collapse of communism: what will be the US's actions in the future? After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet threat, the US in its foreign policy specifically started to focus on the Caucasus and the Middle East, which constitutes of huge oil sources. As a result, Turkey's unique geo-strategic location kept its prominence for the US in providing stability in the region for the implementation of its policies. In addition, right after the end of the Cold War, Turkey's location appeared as the most important bridge between the regions from the Balkans to Central Asia. Three major reasons that paved the way for Turkey to emerge as a major partner in the region for the US were Turkey's ongoing relations with Israel, its borders with oil-rich countries such as Iraq and Syria, and the significant effect of air bases located in Turkey. Additionally, the US was able to present Turkey as a secular role model to the countries in the Middle East as a promotion of Western values and democracy. According to the Clinton administration, Turkey also constituted a good role model for those countries emerging right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, who might accelerate their democratic and economic transition (Tocci, 2011). Confirming this approach, the Clinton administration declared that the US's alliance with Turkey was a strategic partnership; and this newly-defined alliance relied both on multi-faceted and multi-dimensional relations (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006, p. 216). In summary, the post-Cold War Turkish-American relations

were essentially based on a geopolitical and strategic understanding, and this understanding resulted in much critical cooperation in the decades to follow.

During this period, with an intention to meet the challenges in the Middle East, as part of its dual containment policy, the US started to further its military presence in the Gulf (Çankaya, 2003, p. 62). The US's vital interests in the Middle East were,

the survival of Israel and the completion of the Middle East peace process, access to oil, forestalling the emergence of a hostile regional hegemon, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, promoting peace and reform and through it, the internal stability and holding terrorism in check (Rubin, 1999).

The new partnership of Turkey with the US in the Middle East began with their participation in the Gulf War. Obviously, the US's economic support acted as the most important catalyst for Turkey's involvement in the conflict (Oğuzlu, 2008). Due to Turkey's significance in the Gulf War, in 1991, the US increased and accelerated the security assistance available to Turkey while additionally doubling the prices of textile products being paid, and granting Turkey \$282 million for further economic and military assistance (Sayarı, 1992, p. 19). On the other hand, according to Oğuzlu, following the increase in PKK's<sup>3</sup> mobility and regional threats, Turkey did not see available options other than supporting the US (Oğuzlu, 2008). On January 17<sup>th</sup>, 1991, the US published an offensive act and the Turkish Grand National Assembly immediately issued a bill making it possible for the Turkish Army to join a coalition with the American forces against Iraq. Furthering this bill, Turkey did let the US army use its grounds with Operation Northern Watch, despite domestic criticisms (Barkey, 2007, p. 450). As Çankaya states,

---

<sup>3</sup> "The Kurdistan Workers' Party, commonly referred to by its Kurdish acronym, PKK, is a Kurdish political and military organization which from 1984 to 2013 fought an armed struggle against the Turkish state for cultural and political rights and self-determination for the Kurds in Turkey, who comprise between 10% and 25% of the population and have been subjected to official repression for decades" (Wikipedia, 2014d).

...During the War, Turkey opened İncirlik air base for the use of the US, closed Yumurtalık pipeline, deployed soldiers and implemented embargo on Iraq in accordance with the UN resolutions (Çankaya, 2003, p. 63).

Along with these developments, the Operation Northern Watch further brought the Kurdish issue to the international arena (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997) and the developments regarding a Kurdish state in northern Iraq started to become problematic in US-Turkey relations. In 1992, the foundation of an autonomous Kurdish state created anxiety for Turkey. As Turkey expected, in 1994, this development resulted in the increase of terrorist attacks near the Turkish border and paved the way for cross-border operations. From the very beginning, Turkey, even while supporting the territorial integrity of Iraq, was afraid of the emergence of a federal Kurdish state in the region. On the other hand, this Turkish concern did not pose a serious problem for the US (Çankaya, 2003). Upon this Turkish political concern, the US encouraged Egypt to initiate trade to compensate the loss of the Turkish economy due to the closure of Yumurtalık pipeline (Sayarı, 1992), as a 'sedative,' so-to-speak.

After the end of the Gulf War, an international commercial embargo was imposed on the Iraqi government according to the UN decisions. However, a divergence on the Iraqi embargo emerged between the US and Turkey. While Turkey suggested lifting the embargo since 1992, the US advocated the implementation of it until the collapse of the Saddam regime, the elimination of mass destruction weapons, and the end of domestic violence in Iraq (Sever, 2000). One of the reasons behind the Turkish request was Turkey's deteriorated economic relations with Iraq. As a border country, Iraq was one of the most important trade partners of Turkey. Despite the American foreign aid and efforts, Turkey's economic loss was incomparable. Yumurtalık pipeline, which has been carrying oil from northern Iraq to Mediterranean, earned Turkey \$1.2 billion per annum. Furthermore, Iraq was the second largest importer of Turkish products (Marr, 1996).

However, despite the economic losses that the Gulf War caused, Turkey cooperated with the US as a security provider and stabilizer in the region. Additionally, the war emerged as an opportunity for Turkey to prove to the West that Turkey is still vital in providing security and stability in the region while protecting the interests of European

countries. As expected, this cooperation further exemplified Turkey's continuing importance to the West.

Meanwhile, Turkey was attempting to improve its relations with Israel while claiming its place in the West. During the post-Cold War era, Turkey was isolated in the Middle East region mostly due to its history. As Müftüler-Baç indicates, "the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey's perceived break with Islam, the secular form of government in Turkey since 1924" have been some of the reasons behind the Arab Middle East's perception (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 2). As a consequence, Turkey was aware that it was not welcome in the Arab Middle East, while it was not also fully accepted to the Western group at the end of the Cold War. Thus, Israel, as a Middle Eastern country has emerged as an important ally for Turkey for several reasons. As Müftüler-Baç asserts,

In the post-Cold War era, Turkey finds itself in a turbulent security environment marked by volatility and instability. Such regional destabilizers as Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Iran have alerted Turkey to the dangers of isolation and marginality within the global and regional security order leading it to find new allies, with Israel the most likely candidate (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 2).

On the other hand, the above-mentioned Gulf War also emerged as one of the motivators of Turkey in its relations with Israel. This war demonstrated that the Middle East was still able to constitute a security threat at both global and regional levels. Furthermore, the Gulf War resulted in a Turkish-Israeli perception that these two countries were pretty similar. Both of these countries were not Arab and still existed in the Middle East, and they were vulnerable to similar threats. Former Iraq leader, Saddam Hussein's understanding of the Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974 as well as his approach to the Palestinian problem between Israel and the Palestinian authority underscored the same enemy in Iraq for the two countries. However, Israel and Turkey did not only share concerns related to their regional security. Both being economically integrated to European system, having free-market economies, and being the only secular democracies in the surrounding region also helped bilateral relations between these two countries to positively correlate (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 5). As realist approach foresees, these two countries started to cooperate for the sake of their interests

(Nachmani, 1999; Yılmaz, 2001). As former president of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel summarizes Israeli-Turkish relations: "Turkey and Israel have decided on regional cooperation for increasing the economic welfare of the region and curbing terrorism" (as cited in Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 1).

One of the steps that furthered Turkey-Israel alliance was the Oslo process. In 1992, the Oslo process, "a peace process that is aimed at achieving a peace-treaty based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, and to fulfill the "right of the Palestinian people to self-determination"" (Erdemir, 2007, p. 120; Wikipedia, 2014e) was launched between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Following this diplomatic development, Turkey immediately increased the level of its official representation in Israel, as the Palestinian Authority had. After the initiation of more diplomatic contact, Turkey and Israel signed a number of bilateral agreements on trade, military collaboration, and tourism. Obviously, Turkey's efforts as well as Israel's efforts were welcomed, supported and promoted by the American administration. As previously mentioned, the Middle East has been perceived vital for American interests with its economic and strategic importance. Additionally, as Müftüler-Baç furthers,

...the demise of the Soviet Union has increased the strategic importance of the Middle East by shifting American attention to the well-armed rogue states that represent the new threats to Western security. These rogue states defy internationally accepted rules of conduct, support terrorism, possess substantial military capabilities, are engaged in massive arms build-ups, and carry the potential to destabilize regional and global security. The American administration has labelled Iran, Iraq, and Libya as rogue regimes and Syria as having the potential to be one. Thus, a Turkish-Israeli alliance might act to counterbalance these rogue states as part of the American "dual containment policy" towards Iran and Iraq (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 3).

Following the end of the Cold War, the US also aimed to revise and improve the American role in the New World Order. Accordingly, it appeared more rational for the US to transfer authority and the attached responsibilities to regional actors. As a consequence, the US would need regional allies, who might respond in events such as peace-keeping and crisis management. In the end, such a strategy would decrease immediate US participation and serve American interests in a more pragmatic fashion.

So, an Israeli-Turkish alliance would be the best one in serving American interests by keeping the US presence unharmed in the Middle East, while decreasing the chances of a direct American participation that would not be rational (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 3).

As mentioned in the paragraph above, the US supported Turkey-Israel alliance in a very determined manner. When Turkey was anxious about the potential negative Arab perception of an Israeli-Turkish alliance, President Clinton's special envoy to Cyprus, Richard Hoolbroke (Independent, 1997) expressed the importance of Israel to Turkey, in other words, the alliance by saying: "If you would like us to help you regarding the Cyprus issue, then you need to cooperate with Israel" (translated from Varol, 2014). The military investments of the rogue states along with the US's desire for "uninterrupted flow of oil" help understanding the US manner towards the Israeli-Turkish alliance, which might create a long-awaited protection for the US interests in the region with its stabilizing and balancing abilities (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 9). In the end, the Israeli-Turkish alliance was mostly against security threats in the region, but was not aiming at a particular actor, as former president Süleyman Demirel expressed in 1997: "Turkey and Israel should stand together to fight terrorism" and former advisor to the Israeli Defence Minister, David Ivri furthered: "the security pact signed is not aimed at any state, but it seeks to build confidence in the Middle East and to contribute peace and stability in the region" (as cited in Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 8).

Meanwhile, the emergence of the ethnic and national conflicts following the dissolution of Yugoslavia changed the American security strategy from central Europe to east Europe. It should be noted here that the problems in the Balkans did not constitute a direct threat to American security. However, former US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson stated that problems occurring in the Balkans were important because of the 'rotten apple theory' or the 'domino theory.' In other words, these conflicts had the potential to spread to the mainland Europe with a spill-over effect. As a consequence, this was the main motive behind the US policy and interventions in the region (Albright, 1998). The Balkans constituted the second major area that the US mostly intervened after the Gulf War in the post-Cold War period (Schulzinger, 2007). It can be argued

that the US's motivations in intervening in the Balkans were: (1) the geography of the region, as the Balkans was a strategic link to the regions of greater importance (i.e. the Gulf, the Mediterranean), (2) the Balkans had the potential to host conflicts which might threaten the newly constructing European security structure, since it had the 'centers of conflict' such as Kosovo and Serbia, (3) potential US interventions would prevent powers such as Germany and Russia to actively intervene in the region, (4) the Balkans constituted a test for the US presidency as well as the containment capacity and effectiveness of the NATO in the new world order (Schulzinger, 2007). As Çankaya further expresses the US attempt to create a balance in the region: "The US tried to balance the influence of England, Russia, and France which supported Serbs and Germany backing Slovenia and Croatia" (Çankaya, 2003, p. 61).

Here the difference in approaches of the Bush administration and Clinton administration should be emphasized. According to President Bush, Yugoslavia was not strategically important for the US (Glitman, 1996-1997). On the contrary, President Clinton advocated for a more active and deep intervention in his election campaign in 1992 (Neville-Jones, 1996-1997). Accordingly, Turkey and the US played an important role in resolving the conflict in Bosnia and in providing security and stability in the region. As Çankaya asserts,

Among the new areas of cooperation between the US and Turkey, the Balkans could be regarded as a region where the Turkish and the US foreign policies nearly totally converge and a significant degree of continuity in Turkish-American cooperation could be observed... ..it was observed that both countries had similar objectives, implemented similar policies, and acted together in 1990s. The US made use of cooperating with Turkey in the region since it comparatively had little knowledge about the region and Turkey exploited the opportunity to cooperate with a superpower (Çankaya, 2003, p. 59).

The US existence in Kosovo through the mobilization of NATO forces against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia along with the economic support provided by the US constituted two important aspects of the efforts in the region to secure peace and stability (Tocci, 2011). In the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy was fairly similar to American foreign policy in the Balkans. Turkey, with the encouragement of the US,



attempted to use its Muslim identity to relate to Muslims living in Bosnia and Croatia, and reconciled attempts to reach a constitutional agreement in Bosnia (Tocci, 2011). In wanting to prove its worth to the West, Turkey became part of the "UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) in 1993-1995, Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996-present), Combined Police Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (1995-present), International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1997-present), Operation 'Alba' in Albania (1997), Kosovo Verification Force (1998-1999), and Kosovo Force (2001-present)" (Tarik Oğuzlu & Güngör, 2006). The US involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo under NATO and its success in ending the conflicts created a perception that the US security strategy enlarged. As President Clinton expressed,

Europe's security, when it was threatened, as it was in Bosnia and Kosovo, we too, will respond. When it is being built we too always take a part (Lesser, 1998).

Contributing to this approach, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, President Clinton launched the South European Cooperation Initiative along with his Action Plan for the Southeast Europe in order to assist the countries in the region, solve their economic and regional problems, which might prevent the stability and security required for US interests (Rubin, 1999). Following the military intervention in Kosovo, the US also signed a Stability Pact by urging the EU and the south-eastern European countries in the region to promote stability and security. Since this pact did not contain OSCE or NATO involvement, it brought a new aspect to the transatlantic relations.

Turkey-US relations continued to improve during the 1990s with US attempts to implement a new energy policy in the Caspian region. US president, Bill Clinton's visit to Turkey after the earthquake in Gölcük in 1999 also strengthened relations between the two countries (Flanagan & Brannen, 2008). Additionally, the US played a significant role between Turkey and Greece in the 1999 crisis and supported crisis resolution to prevent a war between these two countries. Apart from that, the US's support in delivering the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 was another aspect that demonstrates Turkey's importance in security-oriented policies of the US (Kirişçi,

2001). In summary, the cooperation between the US and Turkey in the Gulf War and the Balkan crisis, the collective action to deliver Azeri gas to the Mediterranean region through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (Barkey, 2008, p. 32), and the US's support for Turkish accession to the EU also represented convalescent relations between Turkey and the US during the 1990s.

Following al-Qaeda, "a global militant Islamist and takfiri organization" (Wikipedia, 2014a) attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001, transatlantic relations gained a new dimension. The US declared war against anti-Western Islamism and accordingly its foreign policy underwent a transformation, which later required the US to follow a much more interventionist and aggressive foreign policy. Upon these unfortunate events, Turkey declared its alliance with the US against terrorism since many of its citizens have been lost due to PKK terrorism. Confirming this declaration, Turkey's role in the US intervention in Afghanistan further demonstrated Turkey's willingness and closeness to the US in the war against terrorism. As part of this support, Turkey sent its special forces to Afghanistan and let the US benefit from military bases located in Turkey in the war against the Taliban. After the collapse of the Taliban regime, Turkey also participated in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and took command between June 2002-February 2003, and February 2005-July 2005 (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006, p. 216).

As previously mentioned, a controversial debate about the support to be given to the US regarding the Iraq War arose during the meetings in the Turkish Parliament, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM). One of the reasons behind this debate was Turkey's economic concerns regarding the war. First, it was not satisfied with the financial support that it received from the US after the Gulf War and secondly, an economic struggle that might have arisen in the case of participation in the war next to the US (Güney, 2005). Apart from these economic concerns, Turkey was worried about the potential emergence of a Kurdish state in the Northern Iraq, and its potential effects on the Kurdish population living in Turkey considering the PKK's terrorist activities, particularly in the southern region of Turkey. In other words, the Turkish state was

afraid of a Kurdish uprising on its borders due to the emergence of a new Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. At this point, the probability of fleeing refugees from the militarily affected zones was also another driving force for the Turkish state (Güney, 2005; Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010). The US started to put pressure on the newly-elected the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in 2002, and since the party had Muslim grassroots and Islam as its religious orientation, it was not easy for the Turkish government to decide (Güney, 2005). The US, on the contrary, never expected hesitation from its strategic partner; furthermore, Turkey's participation appeared as essential to the US and to the Western European states. According to Barkey, without the full support of the Turkish government, the US would have had "a terrible time keeping Saddam Hussein in a box" (Barkey, 2008, p. 32).

Also considering the fact that the global economic crisis in 2002 also hit Turkey, the US promised the nation a number of economic aid packages so as to accelerate the Turkish government's decision making process, which would lead to the deployment of its forces on Turkish soil. On the other hand, it is possible to talk about the Turkish government's suspicion in supporting the war, since Turkey did not get the compensation promised since the Gulf War (Güney, 2005). In other words, the First Gulf Crisis, in which Turkey preferred cooperation with the US, was still negatively impacting the Turkish economy that was performing poorly and this was perceived intensely by the Turkish elite and mass public (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010). During that period, Turkey attempted to gain the trust of the countries located in the Middle East and declared its willingness to promote peace in the region. Following this approach and US pressure, the Turkish government, with the command of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, met with foreign ministers of countries located in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Syria to promote peace, keep stability, and destroy the possibility of war (Güney, 2005).

Meanwhile, the US was impatient to learn of Turkey's final decision. As an economic promotion, Turkey was offered 20 billion dollars in loans through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 14 billion dollars in grant by the US if it participates in the

Iraq intervention (Güney, 2005, p. 349). As a deterrent, the US also declared that the rejection by the Turkish government would result in the cut-off of military aid. While the Erdoğan government did not want to lose US support, in March 2003, the TBMM rejected the US use of Turkish soil to intervene in Iraq with 264 'no's' and 251 'yes's', and 19 abstentions. After all of the US's promises of support to Turkey and the deterrent factor, the disapproval of the TBMM to the US request of use Turkish soil for the transfer of American troops to Iraq came as a shock to the US (Congress of the United States, 2003). According to American evaluations, "the potential threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction has gone largely unnoticed in Turkey" (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010, p. 26). Obviously, the TBMM's rejection, which came as "the most significant foreign policy decision in its history" (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010, p. 19) after long-lasting negotiations with the US severely damaged the Turkish-American alliance. The Turkish public was also strongly objecting a potential war in Iraq as well as any kind of Turkish involvement (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010). As Filkins and Miller claims,

The showdown between the Bush administration and Turkey reflects the deep-seated antipathy felt by an overwhelming majority of the Turkish people for the American military plans. Turkey's leaders say that despite their country's 50-year-old military alliance with the United States, they are finding it difficult to disregard the public's anti-war feelings (as cited in Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010, p. 26).

However, in accordance with realist expectations, the Turkish government, as a preventive action, which would be in line with its interests, offered a new bill to the TBMM to strengthen the alliance, a bill, which makes it possible for the US to use the Turkish airspace and lands to provide logistic and humanitarian support to Americans located in Iraq due to the intervention. The Turkish government's intention was to prevent a potential US standing against Turkey due to the TBMM's disapproval of the first bill. As a member of NATO and a traditional ally of the US, the failure to assist the US in its efforts would jeopardize Turkey's national interests in the region and especially would harm its political and economic system (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010). Finally, the Assembly approved the latter bill and it was quite beneficial for the US, while, it offered less than the US expected in the first place. Turkey appeared as not

willing to be a part of the Iraq war; however, the approval of the second bill in the TBMM demonstrated that Turkey was in favour of the Iraq invasion. In October 2003, the TBMM approved a further bill that paves the way for the deployment of 10,000 Turkish military personnel in the northern region of Iraq. Upon this approval, in early February, former Prime Minister, Abdullah Gül, stated that "his government had abandoned efforts for a diplomatic solution and decided to join the United States in military action" (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010, p. 30). Turkish response to the criticisms arisen in the US and Western European countries was that the increasing level of the Kurdish threat in the region justified such a move (Oguzlu, 2004).

Following the US's adoption of a more aggressive and interventionist foreign policy, it can be argued that Turkish foreign policy underwent a transformation and has become more 'activist' and independent (Barkey, 2008, p. 43). As previously mentioned, Turkey did not hesitate to show its interest in cooperating with the US; however, Turkey also demonstrated that it could act independently according to its expected gains and losses. Turkey's political presence in the Middle East and Balkans has thus been affected by the US, but is not solely a result of it (Tocci, 2011). It can be argued that Turkey has started to follow a more activist and independent foreign policy with President Özal, a stance which has been later furthered by the policies of the AKP government such as 'zero problems with regional neighbours' (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006). According to Kirişçi, Turkey's foreign policy towards Russia, Iran, Syria, and Iraq now can be examined through Turkey's interests, domestic institutions, and state structures as well as civil society organizations (Kirişçi, 2009).

Right before the Iraq War in 2003, Turkey tried to communicate with its neighbours. During the 2000s, the Turkish government started cooperation with Iran to eliminate the PKK threat on their shared borders. Additionally, following the Syrian President's visit to Turkey in January 2004, Turkey played the mediator in Israeli-Syrian relations (Tocci, 2011, p. 136). Furthering these attempts, once the US started to lose its prestige during the Iraq War, Turkey played the role of pacifier and attempted to provide stability in the Middle East. Upon Turkey's 'arm's length' policy towards the US policy

in the Middle East after disapproval of the first bill put forth by the TBMM, Turkey's relations with Iran, Syria, and Iraq, Turkey's attempts to play the mediator in some Middle East conflicts, and its more 'active' and independent foreign policy – all resulted in anxiety in Washington. Was "the US... losing Turkey?" (Lesser, 2008, p. 221). During the Iraq crisis, when US-Turkey relations were strained, Turkey also paid attention to its Europeanization process by manifesting a fear of alienation from the West. Although Europe has been the most prioritized goal of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey understood the importance of its relations with the US and the US's support, especially after the Helsinki Summit.

### **3.2. An Overview of Turkey and EU Relations after the Cold War**

The relations between Turkey and the EU have always been complex and multi-dimensional. From the first day of its founding, Turkey has seen itself as a part of the West, and the West as an important dimension of its modernization process. Similarly, the West has always wanted to develop its relations with Turkey through a realistic approach that it has adopted. Contrasting with this fact, both sides have perceived these relations within different contexts. While Turkey has attempted to closely relate itself to Europe and wanted to become a member state of the EU, Turkey's membership has been perceived differently in member countries and ignited a controversial debate on Turkey's accession to the EU. Following the change of Turkish association agreement in 1987, relations between the EU and Turkey have been transformed in such way that reflects two different periods: the Cold War and the post-Cold War.

From the 1950s until the 1990s, Europe like the US perceived Turkey as an important ally against the Soviet threat due to its geo-strategic position (Kramer, 2001, p. 223). Similar to the US's perception, according to the West, Turkey was in such a location that could actually serve the security interests of European states. As Gordon et al. put it:

As a NATO member country that shared borders with the Soviet Union and tied down some twenty-four Russian divisions, Turkey's credentials as a valuable military asset to the West were undisputed. Thorny questions about democratic standards, military interventions, human rights, and Muslim identity were set aside (Gordon, Taşpınar, & Özel, 2009).

Soviet threats that were intensely felt by the West prevented European states from adopting and reflecting an ideology against Turkey in their foreign policies. In this context, Turkey has successfully become a founding member of the Council of Europe in 1949. It has also become the founding member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1961 and 1973 respectively.

During the 1960s, Turkey started to have its first official relations with the European Community (EC). In 1959, Turkey submitted its official request to become a member. Following the Ankara agreement, it obtained associate membership in 1963 after two years of Greece's membership (Onis, 2000, p. 467). The Ankara agreement was also the basis of Turkey's membership to the Customs Union. Turkey's membership to the Customs Union was anticipated in three phases. A preparatory phase of five years and a transition phase of twelve (Franck, 2002, p. 109). According to the agreement Article 28:

...When the operation of the agreement makes it possible to envisage acceptance by Turkey of the full obligations deriving from the Treaty establishing the Community, the contracting parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to membership of the Community (as cited in Franck, 2002, p. 109).

The Additional protocol of the Ankara agreement, which was signed in 1970 and subsequently came into effect in 1973, indicated the direction of transition phase for full membership of Turkey to the Customs Union. Here, we should note that Turkey could complete the transition phase foreseen by the Additional protocol in January 1996 (Franck, 2002, p. 109).

Especially during the Cold War, bilateral relations between Turkey and the EC had further progressed. At the same period, there was no significant difference between

Turkey and Greece in the EC, and Turkey, Greece, Portugal or Spain was not considered different (Onis, 2000, p. 467). For example, Turkey's association agreement was signed in the context of the EC Mediterranean policy dated 1972 as analogous to Malta's agreement in 1970 and Cyprus's agreement in 1972 (Franck, 2002, p. 109). Since Turkey did not share a different pathway other than what the other non-member states followed, it can be argued that the EU had the same perception regarding Turkey as well as the US.

Confirming this situation, before Turkish association, a Christian Democrat from Germany, Herr Hallstein made the following declaration:

Turkey is part of Europe: today that means that she has established an institutional relationship with the European Community. As for the Community itself, the relationship is imbued with the concept of evaluation (as cited in Franck, 2002, p. 109).

Furthering Hallstein's sayings, the President of the Council of Ministers, Schaus in 1963 made the following declaration and solidified the Community's security oriented policy towards Turkey:

Turkey has been one of the first European countries to express its trust in the Community and its role in the organization of the free world underlines the importance of its participation in our common endeavour (as cited in Tocci, 2011, p. 93).

During the Cold War, Turkey was one of the states which was not affected by the Soviet threat and Turkey "played a key role in the defence of 'Western civilizations' in its struggle against the Soviet Union" (Tocci, 2011, p. 90). Additionally, during the same period, half of Turkey's trade was with the EC and economic relations between Turkey and the EC also indicated Turkey's importance as an economic player (Franck, 2002, p. 108).

Contrasting with what the US did, the Western states started to lose their interest in Turkey once the security concerns posed by the Soviet threat disappeared. Furthermore, due to the decrease in security concerns, the EU had the chance to primarily focus on its internal dynamics and reshape them, considering that its political and economic



structure experienced nothing but drama (Onis, 2000, p. 464) since the Single European Act in 1987. Following these developments, a hidden ideology regarding Turkey started to emerge in the European political and economic system and this ideology started to be affected by two main events: (1) the systemic nature arisen during the post-Cold War period and (2) religious and political opinions that emerged after the September 11 attacks (Alessandri, 2010, p. 94).

However, even after these problematic events, good relations with Turkey have been accepted as an important asset by a number of European states, since Turkey has still been a prominent actor in providing security in the Middle East and Eurasia (F.S. Larrabee & Lesser, 2001). From the very beginning, the European states adopted a realist perspective regarding Turkey by always considering its location which emerges as a connecting bridge between Europe, Russia, and Central Asian countries, and Turkey's economic importance that it presents in the European markets (Onis, 2000, p. 466). Rather than considering Turkey's location in the same way that the US does, Europe interpreted its location in a broader sense (Kramer, 2000, p. 223). As Kramer puts it:

For the Europeans, relations with Turkey kept their strategic value but were defined in more general and imprecise terms, such as the country's function as a bridge to the Islamic world or to Central Asia, or as a barrier against the advance of threatening Islamic fundamentalism. This is a consequence of the equally vague way the Europeans tend to define their new security interests more generally: stability, prosperity, and peace in Europe and its neighbourhood (Kramer, 2000, p. 223).

When these changes occurred, Turkey was forced to determine its place and stance in the international system. With the intention of determining its position, Turkey started to launch policies to further its political system and economy, since it was now crucial to be a part of "progressive and increasingly democratic institutions that Europe represented (Gordon et al., 2009, p. 39). Right after the 1980 Turkish coup d'état, when the military administration left Turkey gained democracy back in 1983, the Turkish government still made a formal application to the European Community to become a member (Onis, 2000, p. 468). In 1987, the Turgut Özal government formally applied to

the EC in order to speed up Turkey's economic and political development. This formal membership application to was considered important since it brought the Turkish issue back to the EC debates (H. Yılmaz, 2009).

Confirming the changing approach of European states towards Turkey, the EC rejected the Turkish application indicating its political and economic deficits. The formal application altered the nature of Turkey-EU bilateral relations by transforming the Turkish issue into a more delicate one. Despite the above-mentioned association agreement between Turkey and the EC, the Turkish application to become a full member was considered serious, and it ignited a wave of fear in European countries. As a consequence, the EC/EU approached the Turkish application with concerns related to the Turkish political and economic system, cultural, and religious differences (Onis, 2000, p. 466), as well as the future of European political and economic integration after Turkey's full membership.

Three major reasons that acted to slow EU-Turkey relations were the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the worsening of the Turkish political and economic system, and the resulting 1980 Turkish coup d'état (Onis, 2000, p. 468). Economic problems and the political struggles that Turkey faced under the attacks of the PKK, the removal of the Turkish Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (Gordon et al., 2009, p. 40), and the aforementioned concerns were the major reasons behind this rejection. Additionally, during the same period, the inclusion of the countries located in Eastern Europe, which emerged right after the collapse of the Soviet Union became the major concern for Europe (Gordon et al., 2009, p. 40).

On the other hand, this did not mark the end of Turkish hopes for full membership, and Turkey did not change its perception regarding its integration with the West after getting the European Commission's approval of Turkish 'eligibility' for membership in 1987 (Tocci, 2011, p. 2). After the rejection of the application of Özal government, the Customs Union was interpreted as the second chance for Turkey to prove its place in the West. With an intention of not missing this chance, Turkey applied an intense lobbying in European institutions while it was adopting a number of reforms within its political

and economic system. As a consequence, in December 1995, the European Parliament ratified the Customs Union agreement signed with Turkey. The Customs Union agreement was obviously important for the Turkish economy since it was offering the chance to integrate the Turkish economic system with the West. Following the initiation of the Customs Union agreement, "50 percent of Turkey's yearly trade was with the EU" (Nachmani, 2003, p. 64) during the late 1990s. While Turkey viewed the Customs Union agreement as the first step of its membership to the European Union, most Western states viewed this development in the bilateral relations as the 'maximum' for Turkey (Yılmaz, 2009, p. 56), so there was no need to further Turkish inclusion and giving the Turkish state member status.

In the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, Turkey was not declared as a candidate country in the long list of candidate states which mainly consisted of Central and Eastern European countries, since it did not meet membership criteria. Before the Summit, the European Christian Democratic Union declared that "the EU is in the process of building a civilization in which Turkey has no place" (as cited in Gordon et al., 2009, p. 41). This result of the Summit further demonstrated that EU-Turkey bilateral relations would not progress as much the bilateral relations between Turkey and the US. Furthermore, the Luxembourg Summit by not listing Turkey as a candidate country, demonstrated that Turkish integration will not be solely based on the geo-strategic importance of Turkey as was done with the US (Onis, 2000, p. 465), and put Turkey in the "framework of a new European strategy" (Gordon et al., 2009, p. 41).

Of course, as expected, the Luxembourg Summit harmed the atmosphere created by the Customs Union. The Turkish nation did not reach positively after the rejection of its full membership application, and the disappointment spread with the end of the Summit. According to Turkey, the decision of the European Union was not fair since (1) the other listed candidate countries such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic were not ahead of Turkey in terms of economic and political status and (2) Turkey had applied for membership much earlier (Onis, 2000, p. 463). Then Turkey-EU relations came to a stopping point and the Turkish government finally froze its relations

with the EU institutions with the threat of withdrawing its membership application by the end of 1998 (Barchard, 1998, p. 2).

Contrasting with the Luxembourg Summit decision, which did not list Turkey as a candidate country, even ‘paradoxically’ –so-to-speak– the EU in the Helsinki Council of 1999 reversed its decision (Onis, 2000, p. 464) by listing Turkey as a candidate country to heal the worsening relations since the Luxembourg Summit. In the Helsinki Council of 1999, the European Union declared that it would start negotiations with Turkey, once Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria, which are the provisions of the European Union to determine the membership eligibility of any country that wishes to apply for membership. During this period, the European Union also offered economic aid to Turkey to accelerate its economic and political reformation process for further integration to the membership criteria. As a consequence, the EU and the European Commission started to monitor the Turkish reform process as well as political and economic developments in the country and recommended suggestions with the first Accession Partnership for Turkey (Tocci, 2011, p. 4).

Obviously, after the Helsinki Summit, the political and economic reforms demanded by the European Union became one of Turkey’s top targets. During the early 2000s, Turkey underwent a very comprehensive reformation process. Becoming a member of the European Union became the driving force to overcome the deficits indicated by the European Union; this transformation process also played an important role to solve the problematic aspects of relations with neighbouring countries (Alessandri, 2010, p. 88). During this reformation process, Turkey adopted various changes such as increasing minority rights, especially for the Kurds, increasing civil control over the National Security Council, improvements for human rights and the freedom of speech, liberalizing the Turkish economy, and removing the State Security Courts established during the 1980 Turkish coup d’état (Gordon et al., 2009, p. 44). All of these reforms appeared to be done by the request of the European Union. Upon these developments, in October 2005, the European Union gave consent to further accession talks, so start the

negotiations since Turkey had 'sufficiently' met the pre-conditions for membership (Tocci, 2011, p. 4).

In December 2005, negotiations that were already started and reforms created a belief in Turkey that its performance would determine and guarantee its membership in the European Union. As expected, once the negotiations started, the European Union started to trace Turkey's progress and continued to further the negotiations. The EU also provided help to Turkey in its membership and reform process with accession partnerships and progress reports published by the Commission (Tocci, 2011, p. 4). Although, the European Union started to help Turkey regarding its application, as the French President Jacques Chirac said: "Let's be clear if conditions allow the negotiations to start at the beginning of next year, we have to know these negotiations will be long, very long" (Guardian, 2004). Confirming Chirac's declaration at some level, the transformation process was including "economic, political, cultural, ethnic, social, religious, secular and excessive national issues, the democratic process and military interventions in that process, human rights, minority rights, immigration and other aspects" (Nachmani, 2003, p. 55). At this point, as mentioned above, one can argue that the relations between Turkey and the EU are different than the relations between Turkey and the US. As Kuhnhardt explains:

The United States perceives Turkey primarily as a strategic asset, whereas the European states tend to concentrate more on conditions in Turkey, in particular human rights and problems of democratic consolidation but also the divide between Christianity and Islam (Kühnhardt, 1999, p. 234).

In this regard, it would be problematic not to conclude that Turkey-EU relations will be based on a more complex and multi-dimensional context rather than depending solely on a geostrategic partnership.

### **3.3. Conclusion**

This chapter introduced a historical review of Turkey-EU and US-Turkey bilateral relations after the Cold War, most of which occurred after the West division during the 1980s into two separate sections. The first half of this chapter presented the fundamental dynamics of US-Turkey relations as well as the formation of these dynamics by emphasizing major turning points in bilateral relations of the two countries. In the second half of this chapter, significant historical events in Turkey-EU bilateral relations have been introduced to further elaborate on American support in the forth chapter.

Along with the assumptions of neorealism, the details of which have been given in Chapter 2, the fourth chapter stems from (1) the historical framework of the US-EU and Turkey-US relations, which has been put forth in Chapter 3 and (2) the quantitative content analysis results, details of which have been given in the second half of the second chapter, to evaluate the American perception regarding the Turkish membership in the EU after the Cold War, US attempts to support Turkish membership, and, of course, the consequences of these perceptions and attempts on US-Turkey bilateral relations.

**This page intentionally left blank.**

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP: AMERICAN APPROACH**

#### **4.1. Introduction**

To understand the US support in the process of Turkey's membership to the European Union from the 1990s until the early 2000s, this chapter will focus on the American perception regarding Turkish membership to the EU after the Cold War, US attempts to support Turkish membership, and, of course, the consequences of these perceptions and attempts regarding bilateral relations between the US and Turkey. The first aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive background to understand the US's strategic expectations from Turkey especially after the Cold War and the September 11 attacks, which, in general, emerged as a support for Turkish accession to the European Union. Then, this chapter will explain how and when US support arose in the relations between Turkey and the EU within the timeframe from the 1990s until 2005. With an intention to elaborate on this aspect, this chapter will also underline the responses of European leaders and politicians to US interventions.

In this chapter, the analysis is concentrated around the effects of the international system, which is an independent variable as set in the previous chapter, on the American approach towards EU-Turkey bilateral relations. In general, this chapter evaluates the changing structure of the international system from the end of the Cold



War to post-September 11, as well as the effects of these developments on the US. Additionally, this chapter treats the approaches of the American presidents as an indicator of American support during the post-Cold War to comprehensively elaborate on the form of American interventions in world politics. In sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, the political structure of the Clinton administration was examined to understand American efforts and support in EU-Turkey bilateral relations. In section 4.6 and 4.7, efforts and support of the Bush administration were evaluated by considering the changing international climate with the September 11 incidents and events occurring in the Middle East such as the Iraq Crisis. Finally, in section 4.8, the quantitative content analysis results have been presented in a comparative fashion. In summary, this chapter indicates a correlation between increasing American intervention in bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey and changing external circumstances.

#### **4.2. The US Perception towards Turkish Accession to the European Union**

Due to increasing Soviet threat, the Western alliance in general and transnational cooperation between the European states and the U.S. were based on a realist consensus of reaching a power balance against the common enemy. Especially following the end of World War II, the US was one of major supporters of European integration, thus creating a powerful block against the Soviet expansionism. As mentioned previously, the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine were only two of the many tools used by the US to support this integration. After the end of the Cold War, the US willingly continued to support European integration and cooperation by following a support policy for Western expansionism into Central and Eastern Europe, due to its "geo-strategic interests" (Morningstar, 2010, paragraph 2). For the US, Turkey was considered within this context, and it appeared important for the US to have Turkey and the major European states as stable and strong allies. As Carlucci and Larrabee put it:

Turkey's entry into the European Union is in the long-term interest of the United States. It will make Europe a stronger strategic partner and

strengthen efforts to promote democratic reform in Turkey (Carlucci & Larrabee, 2005, p. A18).

Following the years of alliance, the sharp end of the Cold War, of course, affected the trilateral relations between the US, Western European states, and Turkey. The US continued to fully support Turkish participation in the European Union, since Turkey's ties with the Western block were important in removing the residue of Soviet influence. For the US, Turkey remained as an important and strategic asset with its unique location, which makes it available for the US to reach the Balkans, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. Since Turkish support was required for the US to implement its policies in those regions, Turkey remained critical for the US national interests.

As one of former US ambassadors to Turkey, Mr. Parris, asserts:

From a security perspective, the military dimension of the relationship proved as important as during the Cold War. Turkish participation in peacekeeping actions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia demonstrated to the Pentagon and White House planners Ankara's capabilities and readiness to shoulder responsibility as a 'security producing' nation (Parris, 2003, p. 9).

During the post-Cold War period, Turkey and the US operated together for a number of reasons in the Balkans and the Middle East. As previously mentioned in the first chapters, the US financially supported Turkey and helped the Turkish government to capture Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. With all this support, US support to Turkey in its relations with the EU, was actually to maintain Turkish-American relations for US regional interests (Sayarı, 2006). Additionally, supporting Turkey in its relations with the EU would be consolation to Turkey for (1) keeping its relations stable with the US and (2) providing help during the Gulf War in 1990-1991 (Tocci, 2011). As Öniş asserts, the best assistance that the US could offer was to encourage the EU to actively deal with the Turkish issue and Turkish membership (Öniş, 2001, p. 165). Furthering this approach, according to Sayarı, US intervention in the EU-Turkey relations:

...has rested on the recognition of the fact that membership is an internal matter for the EU and that Turkey's progress towards full integration depends on Ankara's ability to undertake the reform measures needed to comply with the Copenhagen criteria (Sayarı, 2011, p. 255).

According to the Clinton administration, for Turkey to be considered in the Western world as a democracy, it should somehow be attached to the EU (Tocci, 2011). At this point, Kayhan and Lindley assert:

In an era in which American strategic interests have focused on dealing with the instability and chaos in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, it is crucial for the US that Turkey stays strongly anchored to the West as a stable, modern, secular, and democratic ally (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006, p. 3).

The development of the Turkish political system was essential, especially for the Clinton administration. With Turkey, which practically adopts global norms and democratizes itself, would the US have a democratic ally connected to the West, so the US could then advocate Turkish membership in the European Union. At the very beginning, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community/European Union emerged as opportunities to tie Turkey to the West (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005). One of former US ambassadors to Turkey, Eric Edelman declared that the US had been willing to see to Turkey adopting the reforms required for the EU membership. Furthermore, Edelman declared that US interests and strategic expectations could only be actualized with a strong Turkey and these could only happen through the Turkish membership in the European Union (Yetkin, 2005).

As a general approach, the US supported Turkey's connection to Western institutions by thinking that Turkey would follow a westernized policy in its foreign policy and security-related policies (Makovsky, 2001, p. 362). The only way the US could further Turkish westernization by keeping the secularism and democracy without any rupture in the political and economic system was to support its membership process in the EU (Özel, Yılmaz, & Akyüz, 2009). With this support, the US would have a democratic and stable ally as Turkey, which would help the US in implementing its security policies in a very wide region. Additionally, the US would not be held fully responsible in the

Turkish transformation process if European institutions would be involved. As Teitelbaum and Martin report:

It is in the strategic interest of the U.S. that Turkey continues to democratize, westernize and modernize. A stable and prosperous Turkey will be an anchor for the entire region from the Balkans to the Middle East to the Caucasus and Central Asia (Teitelbaum & Martin, 2003, p. 3).

As one can conclude, the US efforts would be as effective as the EU requirements for membership. Considering the recent changes in the Turkish political system, the EU emerges as a more prominent and effective actor rather than US encouragement and suggestions. As Özel et al. put it:

Should that process falter either because the EU proves utterly unimaginative or beholden to its members that want only an ambiguous 'privileged partnership' or because Turkey loses interest completely, the result could well be a deterioration of democratic standards and practices in Turkey. Such an outcome would certainly be detrimental for the nation. It should also be against the interests of Turkey's EU and NATO partners, particularly the United States (Özel et al., 2009, p. 29).

If Turkey could be a member of the EU, then close relations leading to this result and its membership "would enhance Turkey's political stability and promote economic growth, as well as help ensure a strong, democratic Turkey on the doorstep of a sometimes turbulent Middle East and Central Asia" (Atlantic Council, 2004). Additionally, Turkish membership in the EU would obviously accelerate its democratization (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 37) and its modernization, which would eventually result in a more stable Turkey that would be more beneficial for the US.

Especially after the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration understood the increasing importance of Turkey and furthered support available to Turkey in EU-Turkey relations. Particularly for the invasion of Iraq and in obtaining Turkey's support in using to use its soil and air space for the American troop deployment in 2002, the Bush administration promoted its diplomatic advocacy. In this context, public speeches made to the leaders of European states, the 2002 Annan Plan to resolve the conflict in Cyprus, and many more initiatives before the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 all constituted primary efforts of the US to once again start negotiations between the EU

and Turkey (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005). Although these efforts were interpreted by a number of European states as the efforts of the Bush administration to obtain Turkey's support in paving the way for the US to use Turkish soil and airspace for troop deployment in Iraq and open a new northern front through Turkey (Sayarı, 2006).

In addition, a Turkey who is anchored to the West with its Muslim population would be able to act as a secular democratic role model for those countries located in the Middle East and would thus help the US fight against radical Islamic groups (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006; Kuniholm, 2001; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005). So, one of the reasons behind the American support in EU-Turkey relations was for Turkey to be a role model in providing stability required of American foreign policy. Contrasting with the opinions of major European states such as Germany and France, the US was thinking that Turkey must be attached to the Western society to act as a bridge between the Islamic world and the rest.

On the other hand, Turkey might also help the US fight against the anti-Americanism that arose in Muslim countries as well as controversial debates regarding American foreign policy. By admitting Turkey to the Union, European society would also have the chance to declare to the world that it did not oppose the world's the Muslim population (Debnar & Smith, 2006, p. 20). In line with this approach, the EU would seem as an anti-Muslim entity in delaying Turkish accession to the Union. Turkey's membership to the Union represented great importance to silence the 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996) oriented debates within Europe and decrease the risk of Islamic terrorism. As Robert asserts:

...welcoming Turkey into the European club would send a powerful message to the rest of the Muslim world. It would say that the largely white, Christian West is not biased against those who hold the Islamic faith. It would say that it wishes to reconcile, let bygones be bygones, and start the relationship afresh with a new partnership of equality and mutuality (Robert, 2005, p. 7).

The westernization and modernization of the Turkish political and economic system through Turkish membership in the EU were especially important for the US, because

the US was afraid of a Turkey which might seek to regionally cooperate with other Muslim countries by giving up on its relations with the West (Sayari, 2006, p. 7). As previously mentioned, Turkey's membership and cooperation were considered important and critical to build a bridge between the Islamic world and the West.

With a Turkey, and as a member of the EU, the US would also have the chance to cooperate with the EU directly regarding security issues in the regions surrounding Turkey. This membership would obviously decrease the burden on American shoulders by involving the EU in a region where US security interests lie. According to the Atlantic Council: "If admitted to the EU, Turkey would expand the Union's borders, bringing it into direct contact with some problematic neighbours" (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. 9). By containing Turkey as a member, the borders of the EU would reach countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and this would eventually result in the European Defence and Security Policy to involve this area. So, the EU would be required to launch consistent and stable policies regarding the region and would have to cooperate with the US.

Furthermore, Turkey would have arguably the most significant role in decision making processes of the Union in the case of admission due to its very high population. As Turkey was an important and faithful ally of the US for a very long time, a number of European states interpreted the Turkish membership into the EU as the increasing influence of the US in the EU, which had gradually decreased since the end of the Cold War to the early 2000s. According to some European states, US support for Turkish membership in the Union was actually a strategy of the Bush administration to decrease the role of France and Germany in the EU since these two countries were against the interventionist and aggressive policies of the US in early 2000s.

Whether these debates are legitimate or not, it is clear that the US started to worry right after the Nice Summit in 2000. The 'separate operational movement capability' of the European Security and Defense Policy and future relations of the Union with NATO were behind this concern (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 37). Starting or furthering relations between European Security and Defense Policy and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, and eliminating the risk of the NATO's decreasing role in Europe would be possible through Turkish accession to the Union, as Turkey's existence in the European Security and Defense Policy would relieve US concerns, since Turkey has been a faithful member of NATO for a long time and would increase the power of the European Security and Defense Policy, and lead to a cooperation between NATO and European Security and Defense Policy (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. 25). In this context, the EU would emerge as a strategic partner to the US in case of Turkish admission to the Union (Carlucci & Larrabee, 2005).

I should also note the rumour that Turkey would turn to Brussels rather than turning to Washington D.C., so that it in the case of admittance into the Union, it would become more 'European', did not interrupt US support in EU-Turkey relations (Carlucci & Larrabee, 2005). On the contrary, Turkey was expected to be the country that has an Atlanticist approach in the Union. With this expectation, the US would be more actively heard in the Union regarding the transatlantic issues (Tocci, 2011, p. 79). Additionally, Turkish membership in the Union would have economic consequences both for Turkey, the US, and the European Union. With membership, Turkey would be able to open its labour market to the EU, which would transform the European market into a more appealing one for American investors. As a result, this recovery in the economic relations would result in closer ties between the US and the European Union (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. 24).

As previously mentioned, a divergence between the policies adopted by the US and the EU emerged right after the end of the Cold War. This dilemma has been transformed into a problematic series of relations following the September 11 attacks and the Iraq War. The US continued to follow the same policy regarding its bilateral relations with Turkey. As Makovsky puts it: "probably in no other internal EU issue has the U.S. been so actively involved and asserted a right" (Makovsky, 1998, p. 60). In fact, supporting Turkey in its relations with the EU and the membership process did not result in a significant cost for the US, except for the reaction of some leaders in European states (Abramowitz, 2004; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005; Sayarı, 2006, 2011). Here I should also note

that Turkish accession to the EU might not affect relations between the US and the EU as the US expected. Admitting Turkey as a member does not necessarily mean that the EU would follow a policy similar that of the US in the Middle East and surrounding regions. Additionally, Turkey might in fact, become, a more Eurocentric country and the ties between Turkey and the US might weaken (Bremmer, 2004). After joining the EU and European Security and Defense Policy, Turkey might choose the side of the EU and distance itself from NATO, which might result in the EU to follow unique and active policies, especially in the Middle East rather than duplicating US policies. However, Turkish accession negotiations and its membership to the EU still have become a significant part of the US agenda starting by the end of 1980s (Sayarı, 2006). As the international structure underwent a transformation following the end of the Cold War, it would not be problematic to conclude that the US expectations also have been transformed.

### **4.3. The US Support in the 1990s: the Customs Union and the Helsinki Summit**

#### **4.3.1. The US Support in the Customs Union**

The American administration during the 1990s was aware that liberal norms and increase in the strength of the political and economic system in continental Europe would aid in removing the communist threat that stemmed from the Soviet Union and reconstruction of the continent. As a consequence, the US supported EU enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. From the very beginning, it was important for the US to have an economically and politically strong and stable Europe, which shares the same interests with the US and could fight against Soviet influence and thus, Soviet threat. As President Clinton declares:

We must build a new security for Europe; the old security was based on the defense of our bloc against another bloc. The new security must be found in



Europe's integration... an integration of security forces, of market economies, of national democracies (as cited in Daalder, 2002, p. 75).

Obviously, the European Union as a *sui generis* entity with the opportunities that "its unique market" offers (Peterson & Cowles, 1998, p. 251) have had the power to become a new economic player and it would be beneficial for the US if Turkey could become part of this growing economy.

According to President Clinton, Turkey's relations with the EU would also develop bilateral relations between Turkey and the US, most of which are based on geo-politics and economy. As he puts it: "When Turkey enters the EU, Turkish-US relations will not weaken but grow stronger" (as cited in Kohen, 2002). In this context, the Turkish accession to the Customs Union had great importance, since it would pave the way for trilateral relations to grow stronger and help Turkey to integrate with the West as much as possible. Following the Turkish Association Agreement with the European Community in 1963, it had already become important to prepare the Turkish economy for further integration. With this scope, the Clinton administration started to push the European states to further cooperate with Turkey in the Customs Union negotiations.

Indicating the importance of Turkey in the European Union after the rejection of the Commission in 1989, the US officially lobbied the European leaders and EU institutions (Sayarı, 2006). Before membership in the Customs Union, the European Parliament made it clear that "approval would depend on human rights reform" (Makovsky, 1995, paragraph 9). Similarly, the Clinton administration also pointed out the reforms that Turkey must comply with as soon as possible such as the Copenhagen criteria. Within this framework, the American intervention of EU-Turkey relations continued in two dimensions. First, the Clinton administration promoted Turkish membership in European capitals, and second, it encouraged Turkey to adopt the reforms as soon as possible (Tocci, 2012). Since Turkey has not ever lost its significance for the US, nor did the US ever force or harshly criticize the Turkish political or economic system cruelly, but on the contrary, has the US always supported the Turkish membership in the EU by encouraging Turkey with the human rights report and public speeches related to the Turkish democracy and human rights (Tocci, 2011). However, the European

Parliament was not quite sure about the Turkish existence in a formal Customs Union agreement and a close vote was expected to be on the agenda (Sayarı, 2006). To prevent this, Stuart Eisenstat, former chief US trade negotiator, personally lobbied the EU (Sayarı, 2006). Additionally, during this period, before the Customs Union agreement, former US ambassador Mark Grossman and former Assistant Secretary of the Department of State attempted to convince Turkey to release jailed journalists, ameliorate the conditions in jails, and expand freedom of speech (Tocci, 2011). Following this pressure of the US, Turkey adopted minor changes in its constitution and initiated the 1995 Anti-Terror Law before furthering to the Customs Union (Tocci, 2011, p. 80).

Contrasting with all of these efforts, the Cyprus issue was still a barrier in front of the Turkish accession to the EU, and in this case, the Customs Union. The officials of the Turkish government at that time and the Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic leader Rauf Denktaş were aware that Turkey's official application to the EU has only been for Turkey and not for the Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic (Park, 2000, p. 35). In addition, the resolution of the Cyprus conflict has also been one of the demands of the West. At the Dublin Summit in 1990, the EC announced that "future relations with Turkey would depend on Ankara adopting a more cooperative stance on the Cyprus issue" (as cited in Park, 2000, p. 35). As a mediator, the Clinton administration also attempted to resolve the conflict on the island to accelerate the ratification of the Customs Union agreement in the European Parliament. Furthermore, Clinton indicated the importance of resolving the Cyprus conflict with Turkey as NATO partners in his talks with former Prime Minister of Turkey, Tansu Çiller. While Çiller claimed that the Cyprus conflict was now on her agenda, Clinton did not hesitate to use the Cyprus issue as a slogan before the US presidential elections in 1996 by exclaiming: "I will solve the Cyprus issue." Confirming this approach, in the very beginning of the year 1996, Clinton also attempted to arrange a meeting with the Cypriot leaders Klerides and Denktaş in New York. However, these attempts to resolve the Cyprus issue were not successful (Duğan, 1995). On the other hand, the positive atmosphere created by Clinton and Çiller was perceived as important in the EU.

According to the March 1995 European Union Council report, the Customs Union agreement with Turkey would be effective from 1996 and the accession negotiations would start following the "conclusion of 1996 Intergovernmental Conference" (Franck, 2002, p. 105). The purpose of the agreement was that Greece would not be able to veto the Turkish accession to the Customs Union due to the ongoing Cyprus conflict (Franck, 2002).

Contradictory to the relations between Israel and Turkey in 2014, at that time Israel effectively lobbied the EU with the support of the US for the Turkish accession to the Customs Union (Franck, 2002, p. 105). Improving relations between Israel and Turkey was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. In speeches of Israeli officials and former Israeli Prime Minister Peres, the bias in favour of the Turkish accession could be demonstrated (Makovsky, 1995 paragraph 3). As one of the socialist members of the European Parliament at that time, Pauline Green asserts: "...these countries had addressed 'wise words' to the Assembly and the EP's assent was finally given in December 1995 by 343 votes to 149 and 36 abstentions" (Franck, 2002, p. 105).

After a short period of time since the ratification of the Customs Union agreement, an additional conflict emerged between Greece and Turkey. In 1995, a Turkish boat named *Figen Akat* ran aground near an islet called Imia, which is located nearly 4 miles from the Turkish coast. Greece declared that the accident occurred within its sea borders; Turkey declared the reverse. This debate escalated very quickly and ended up with the waving of the Greek flag in the islet. Upon this development, Tansu Çiller, former Prime Minister of Turkey, demonstrated Turkish readiness for a fight against Greece by declaring, "This flag will go down and this soldiers will go out of the island" (Wikipedia, 2014c). In 1996, Clinton intervened in this conflict as well as the EU. The EU announced that Turkey was violating the EU's Aegean border (Cooley, 1996). When each side was declaring that they were ready for a fight against each other, the Clinton administration attempted to resolve the conflict by inviting both sides to the negotiation table and calling them to remove their flags from the islands. At that time, this effort was positively perceived by the leaders of both conflicting countries. While

the efforts of the Clinton administration were positively perceived in Turkey, it ignited a controversial debate in Greece (Cooley, 1996).

The US's attempts to support Turkish accession and its encouragement to Turkey for the adoption of suggested reforms turned out to be very influential. The positive approach of the European leaders to the US attempts before and after the Customs Union agreement simply justified the US's efforts to anchor Turkey to the West. This fact also furthered US support and created a great deal of expectation in Turkey regarding American support.

From the US point of view, one of the reasons behind the Clinton administration's success was the form of US interventions. Most interventions during the Clinton presidency emphasized the importance of the liberal norms, values, EU enlargement, and the reforms adopted in Turkey (Tocci, 2011). While lobbying for Turkish membership in the EU, the US also attempted to accelerate reforms to be adopted in Turkey. As an example, the US decreased the level of economic aid to Turkey and declared that 10% of the total amount will be given only if Turkey could progress in the Kurdish issue (Tocci, 2011). Furthermore, the US rearranged the export licences for Cobra helicopters as part of this manipulation (Kirişci, 2001, p. 138). Additionally, the Clinton administration's efforts never contained harsh or direct criticisms toward either Turkey or the EU (Tocci, 2011). The US and the EU communication was pretty much based on telephone lines, and as a result, the Clinton administration's support for Turkey was through "diplomats privately engaged with European counterparts" (Tocci, 2011, p. 84).

From another point of view, the Customs Union agreement obviously came with advantages for the European states. First, the agreement created an economic opportunity for EU members. Besides, Turkey's role in the Balkan crisis, its geo-strategic importance, security concerns during the 1990s, the EU's structural problems were also significantly and positively affected the climate of perceptions about Turkey. Different from all of these aspects, the Clinton administration's direct influence in

domestic reforms in Turkey emerged as influential and important in the European Parliament's ratification of the Custom Union agreement.

#### **4.3.2. The U.S. Support in the Helsinki Summit**

For the 5<sup>th</sup> enlargement of the EU, the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 declared that the EU would start accession negotiations with Slovenia, Poland, Southern Cyprus, Greek Cypriot Administration, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia in December 1999, starting from the Helsinki Summit. As previously mentioned, Turkey was not included in the list of candidate countries; furthermore, this fact created a huge disappointment both in Turkey and the US administration.

However, the result of the Luxembourg European Council did not stop the Clinton administration's efforts to include Turkey as a European country. Furthermore, the Clinton administration interpreted the decision as a 'mistake' (as cited in Franck, 2002, p. 105). As former Under Secretary Richard Holbrooke puts it:

We think that the invitation to Cyprus was correct and the treatment to Turkey was a mistake, and we hope that the EU and Turkey will work together actively to improve the situation for Turkey (as cited in Franck, 2002, pp. 105-106).

Additionally, as a reaction to the Luxembourg European Council's decision, anti-EU movements started to emerge in Turkey, especially within the coalition government consisting of the Democratic Left Party and the Nationalist Action Party members (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005, p. 6). Then Turkey-EU relations came to a stopping point and the Turkish government finally froze its relations with the EU institutions with the threat of withdrawing its membership application by the end of 1998 (Barchard, 1998, p. 2). As Kinzer explains:

That set off a storm of protest in Turkey, highlighted by emotional denunciations of Europe and suggestions that Turkey should look for friends elsewhere. American leaders, including President Clinton, criticized the

European decision and urged that Turkey be made to feel unwelcome in the West (Kinzer, 1998).

The US attempted to restore relations between Turkey and the EU (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005). According to a former US official: "American diplomats would not miss an opportunity to lecture European counterparts on the imperative of reversing the Luxembourg decision" (as cited in Barkey, 2003, p. 215). As a result, President Clinton followed both an informal and formal policy regarding the Luxembourg decision. His aim was to "press EU leaders to revise the Luxembourg decision" (Franck, 2002, p. 106). As part of his policy towards Turkey and the EU, President Clinton had several telephone meetings with European officials in order to change their decision regarding Turkey (Gordon et al., 2009; Sayarı, 2006). President Clinton particularly wanted to show to the West that Turkey and its transformation were still significant for the EU.

Experienced US diplomats started to intensely lobby the EU officials and European leaders for the adoption of a much more moderate approach towards Turkey (Kinzer, 1998). To change European leaders and the EU's attitude towards Turkey, US officials attempted to adopt mainstream measures in favour of Turkey until the Cardiff Summit in 1998. Former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, arranged a meeting with the Foreign Minister of France, Hubert Vedrine, the Foreign Minister of Germany, Klaus Kinkel, and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Robin Cook, so as to form a policy of appeasement towards Turkey. According to the report, Madeleine Albright experienced progress during the meeting but also had the opportunity to observe the anti-Turkish attitude in Greece and the forthcoming elections in Germany as the main obstacles to more positive EU-Turkey relations (Kinzer, 1998). As one of former US officials acknowledges: "This Turkey question is probably the most serious disagreement we have with Germany" (as cited in Kinzer, 1998).

Additionally, as one of former US diplomats working on the Turkish issue claims:

We are now engaged in a full-court press to get the EU to ease up on Turkey, to make the Turks feel more welcome in Europe... There are intense negotiations going on aimed at getting the EU to improve the terms of its offer. The European countries have accused us of not understanding

their problems. We do recognize that it will be a long time before Turkey is ready to join (as cited in Kinzer, 1998).

With a very similar approach, as former Under Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, expresses the following US sentiment:

As a very interested non-member and non-applicant, the US has urged the EU to find ways to bring Turkey more fully into the process of enlargement. We have done so and we will persist in doing so-for reasons that have as much to do with our hopes for Europe as with our hopes for Turkey. We do not believe that European unity and integration will be fully successful if a key European country is set uniquely alone and apart (as cited in Franck, 2002, p. 106).

As previously mentioned, an ideology about Turkey has surfaced in Europe, particularly after the disappearance of Soviet security concerns. Confirming this anti-Turkish ideology, Helmut Kohl, former German Chancellor, in his statement in 1997 confirmed this anti-Turkish ideology with the phrase "the gap in culture and civilization between Europe and Turkey," a statement which appeared to be confirming the one of criticisms about the EU being a "Christian club" (Kohen, 1997). Contrasting with the ideology rising in Europe, the Clinton administration promoted Turkish membership as an opportunity which could unite the East with the West. Publicly, US officials argued that Turkey could play the role of the bridge between the West and the Islam world (Kohen, 1997). The Clinton administration also promoted European values as one of the ways to provide peace in the continent; in other words, the US wanted to indicate the importance of the expansion of these values while advocating Turkish membership. President Clinton when talking to his European counterparts frequently pointed out the importance of Turkish membership in the EU for providing peace, economic and political stability in the continent As President Clinton declares regarding the Turkish participation in European enlargement:

The foresight to see that our vision of a Europe that is undivided, democratic and at peace for the first time in all of history will never be complete unless and until it embraces Turkey. The United States is not a member of the European Union, but I have consistently urged European integration to move further and faster, and that includes Turkey. There are still those who see that body of water or, worse, where people stopped to

worship God in a different way. But there is a growing and encouraging consensus that knows Europe is an idea as much as a place, the idea that people can find strength in diversity of opinions, cultures and faiths, as long as they are commonly committed to democracy and human rights; the idea that people can be united without being uniform, and that the community we loosely refer to as the West is an idea, it has no fixed frontiers, it stretches as far as the frontiers of freedom can go (Clinton, 1998, p. 2096).

Especially and interestingly after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the European enlargement was pretty much centred on liberal values and democratic norms such as human rights. In this context, Clinton's speech became a very effective one in the EU (Tocci, 2011).

As previously mentioned, the Clinton administration continued to support Turkey by encouraging Turkey to adopt necessary reforms. So that, the Clinton administration would be able to get a result in favour of Turkey, a result different than the results of the Luxembourg Summit. Former Prime Minister of Turkey, Mesut Yılmaz and US officials arranged several meetings in 1997 to discuss reforms to be adopted such as the liberation of journalists and parliamentary members, reducing torture, enhancing human rights, political participation rights, non-governmental organizations, the southern issue, and the issue of internally displaced persons (Barkey, 2003). Additionally, the US encouraged Turkey to resolve the Cyprus conflict. Former Under Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, visited Cyprus as a mediator on behalf of the US in this context; however, he could not arrive at any significant conclusion after his meetings with Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders. Following his visit to Cyprus, Holbrooke declared that Turkish Cypriots would not accept serious compromises as long as the EU did not treat Turkey as Turkish Cypriots would have expected (Kinzer, 1998). Apart from this support, Clinton also visited Turkey a month before the Helsinki Summit, a visit which was very important in the history of US-Turkey bilateral relations, since this was the third visit of an American president to Turkey (Abramowitz, 2001b). Clinton visited both Turkey, Greece, as well as former German Chancellor Schröder (Marsden, 1999). Clinton's visit to Turkey might be interpreted as successful as it further encouraged the adoption of reforms that strengthened Turkey's position against the EU, and increased US influence (Abramowitz, 2001b, p. 3).



During his visit, Clinton made a statement in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on November 1999 regarding the US support for the Turkish accession and the importance of Turkish membership:

The coming century will be shaped in good measure by the way in which Turkey itself defines its future and its role today and tomorrow, for Turkey is a country at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia... the future can be shaped for the better if Turkey becomes a fully a part of Europe as a stable democratic-secular nation... Turkey is where Europe and the Muslim world can meet in peace and harmony (Clinton, 1999).

Along with this, in November 1999 Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Istanbul, Clinton offers the following:

What Turkey does, and what we do together in the coming years, will help determine whether stability takes root in the Balkans and the Aegean, whether true and lasting peace comes to the people of the Middle East, and whether democratic transformation in the states of the former Soviet empire, from the Caucasus to Central Asia, actually succeeds (as cited in Niblett, 2005, paragraph 2).

The Helsinki Summit created a turning point in the EU-Turkey relations. The Summit decision in December 1999 paved the way for Turkish membership in the EU, and the US played a very important role before and during the Helsinki Summit. In one of the interviews of former US ambassador to Turkey, Eric Edelman, he announced that the Helsinki Summit decisions actually were the result of the efforts of the US. Eric Edelman himself was the US ambassador to Finland at the time of the Summit and he declared that he and Marc Grossman from the US Department of State, Mark Parris as the US ambassador to Turkey, Jim Jeffrey as a US official, and Nicholas Burns in Greece strongly attempted to change the Luxembourg decisions in such a way that Turkey would be listed as a candidate country. Edelman was the US ambassador to Turkey when the EU gave a date to Turkey for the start of accession negotiations. According to Edelman, this was the most satisfying day in his whole career (Yetkin, 2005).

Considering the fact that Cyprus's negotiation talks with the EU started without the resolve of the Cyprus conflict, former Prime Minister of Turkey, Bülent Ecevit objected

to the candidate status given by the EU. Upon this development, President Clinton attempted to convince Ecevit not to reject the agreement. Later, Ecevit in one of the press releases declared that it was the President Clinton who convinced him regarding the advantages of being a candidate country to the EU (Tocci, 2011, p. 82).

Finally, the efforts of the Clinton administration resulted in an advantageous situation for Turkey in the Helsinki Summit in 1999. After the EU declared Turkey as a candidate country, President Clinton made the following statement with "pleasure":

The US had long supported Turkey's bid to join the EU in belief that this would have lasting benefits not only for Turkey, but also for EU members and the United States (as cited in Sayarı, 2006, p. 169).

Aside from this statement, President Clinton especially thanked the Greek Prime Minister, members of the EU, and the nation of Finland for their acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country. Clinton also thanked the Turkish government for their progress in the democratization of the country and adoption of reforms (Hürriyet Daily News, 1999). EU enlargement towards the East that came with the Helsinki Summit had basically met the expectations of the US (Lippert, 2002, p. 45), since Central and Eastern Europe were playing a significant role for the stability of the continent (Lippert, 2002).

#### **4.4. Mapping American Support: the Clinton Administration**

Overall, during the Clinton administration, the President, vice presidents, and responsible White House officials, in total, made 369 different public speeches related to Turkey. According to Scale A mentioned in [Chapter 4](#), and details of which are given in throughout the second half of the second chapter and [Appendix B](#), the mean value for Clinton documents is 3.19, where median value is 4.36 and standard deviation is 5.82. Furthermore, Clinton documents received a mean value of 2.43, a median value of 2.43, and a standard deviation of 0.40 on Scale B. During his presidency, Clinton

demonstrated great effort (any score greater than 3.0) to support Turkey in European circles in 1996 (49 documents with a mean value of 3.01 and a standard deviation of 5.10), 1997 (45 documents with a mean value of 4.15 and a standard deviation of 4.15), 1998 (49 documents with a mean value of 3.18 and a standard deviation of 7.19), 1999 (111 documents with a mean value of 4.05 and a standard deviation of 6.10) respectively. Accordingly, the level of support for Turkish membership in the EU, the mean values of documents scores according to Scale B by year tend to increase in years, in which critical events occur in EU-Turkey bilateral relations such as Customs Union negotiations and the Helsinki Summit. These findings related to the Clinton presidency have been within my expectations. A comparison of these findings with the Bush administration values will be made and discussed in section 4.8 of this chapter.

#### **4.5. The Factors Effecting American Support during the Clinton Administration**

Obviously, the US lobbying was not the only reason behind the Helsinki Summit decisions. The decisions of the Council had been considerably affected by the Kosovo War factor. The Kosovo War in 1998-1999 demonstrated that the EU was dependent on NATO and the US (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 42). Additionally, the EU's evaluations of Turkey from the geo-strategic and military point of view did lead to these decisions. The Turkish assistance with the US during the Balkan Crisis also helped the EU consider Turkey as a valuable asset for the future security and defence of the Union. During the Balkan Crisis, the EU was not able to cope with the issue by itself, since it did not have a strong and sufficient Common Security and Defence Policy. Help from both NATO and the US was considered necessary which could bring the problems the continent was facing to an end. As a result, the US policy in the Balkans and the American-Turkish alliance were recognized as strategic and significant actions in the EU. This approach strengthened an argument related to Turkey's military capabilities. At that time, Turkey's role as the second largest military force in NATO and its capabilities were discussed in identifying Turkey as an asset for the future of the

Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. As a result, Turkey's accession would make the EU intervention in Eastern Europe and Middle East easier (Tocci, 2011). While Turkey was not a candidate country due to the decisions of the Luxembourg Summit, embodiments in the Balkans and Turkey's contributions in the Balkans helped the European Commission reconsider its previous decision. As a result, Turkey was announced as a candidate country along with the Eastern European states after the Helsinki Summit in 1999 (Tocci, 2011). Before the Helsinki Summit, the EU was also not comfortable with the status with Turkey that emerged after the Luxembourg Summit. At economic, military and geo-strategic levels, Turkey constituted a valuable asset for the EU.

Political changes in the EU also played an important role. Increasing number of Social Democratic party members in the EU, who generally embrace different cultures in a society, affected the outcome (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005, p. 6). Especially in Germany, the removal of the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl (Abramowitz, 2001a, p. 262) and the election of the Social Democrat, Schröder were also other factors that affected the Helsinki Summit. Furthermore, Greece-Turkey relations started to improve following the 1999 earthquakes. Greece's democratic transformation had a considerable effect regarding its changing attitude towards Turkey. Following the cooperation of two countries in the 1999 Gölcük earthquake in Turkey, one of the Socialist parties of Greece, PASOK supported Turkey's position in the EU (Tocci, 2011). Former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair's lobbying activities in the EU and domestic relations (Daniel, 2002; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005), US support for the Turkish membership in the EU, and Turkish lobbies such as Turkish Industry and Business Association (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005) also were the joint factor that resulted in the change of the Luxembourg Summit decisions. Additionally, the form of American interventions during the Clinton administration did not encounter harsh or direct criticisms from the EU and European leaders (Tocci, 2011). In other words, the US needed to be very cautious, since, as Makovsky claims: "US diplomacy was crucial to the process of Turkey achieving candidate status" (Makovsky, 1999, paragraph 1).

Considering the end of the security threat and anti-Turkish ideology arose in the West after the end of Cold War, the US's direct support played a very important role for Turkey's relations with the EU from the Customs Union to the Helsinki Summit (Sali, 2010, p. 30). As Sali furthers:

The US was successful both in egging the EU to press forward its relations with Turkey and in contributing to a more favourable climate in the Eastern Mediterranean which in turn eased an EU-Turkey rapprochement, especially on Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations (Sali, 2010, p. 30).

To sum up, one can argue that without American support, Turkey would have furthered its relations with the EU under worse conditions. As a result of this assumption, processing times might have been longer, as Turkey would have had to wait more and probably receive delayed responses from the EU.

#### **4.6. The US Support in Accession Talks**

Especially after the September 11 attacks, Turkey's role in President Bush's security oriented policy became more important. As previously mentioned, anchoring Turkey to the West would provide a significant opportunity in the US's fight against radical Islamist groups. To obtain Turkey's support in the Iraq War against Saddam Hussein in the early 2000s, the Bush administration intensely intervened in the relations between the EU and Turkey. As Bush expected, these interventions would result in Turkish support in the Iraq War.

In the Bush administration's Turkey promotions, the US mostly indicated the role of Turkey as a Muslim country (Tocci, 2011). According to Bush, Turkey was a role model for those Muslim countries in the region and a bridge between Europe and the Muslim countries (Taylor, 2002). With the accession of Turkey to the EU, the EU would be able to expand the norms and values it adopted to the Muslim countries and would reach a balance between Muslim and Christian identities. As former President Bush stated:

America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion, and it would expose the 'clash of civilizations' as a passing myth of history (Bush, 2004).

With the Turkish membership in the EU, the Islamist terrorism risk in Europe would most likely decrease, since the EU would be accepting a secular and a Muslim country as a member. Within this manner, the Bush administration applied pressure to the EU and European leaders for the Turkish inclusion. As former US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz expresses:

Turkey offers a valuable model for Muslim-majority countries striving to realize the goals of freedom, secularism and democracy... Those who would criticize Turkey for its problems confuse what is challenging with what is fundamental. They focus too much on the problems Turkey is struggling today and ignore where it is heading (as cited in Gordon, 2002).

Right before the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, the Bush administration who expected the consent of Turkey for the deployment of the American troops to Iraq from the Turkish soil, intensely put pressure on the EU for a specific date to be given to Turkey as the start of accession negotiations. Former President Bush also made the following statement when incumbent Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a visit to Washington D.C. in 2002 before the Copenhagen Summit: "the US stood side-by-side with Turkey in its desire to become a member of the European Union" (Radikal, 2002; Watson, 2002). Following this statement, Watson stated in one of his speeches in BBC News that: "In diplomacy, though, there is often a catch. The US also hopes that backing Turkey's efforts to join the EU will, in turn, lead to Ankara supporting possible military action against Iraq" (Watson, 2002).

Furthermore, the US cooperated with the British government to support Turkish accession to the EU (Daniel, 2002; Radikal, 2002). Furthering its support, former President Bush called the French President Jacques Chirac and the Prime Minister of Denmark and the revolving president of the EU, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, two times before the Copenhagen Summit (Radikal, 2002; Vinocur, 2002). As Rasmussen later

announced, the decision about the Turkish admission to the European Union was a "European one." Additionally, Rasmussen underlined: "We don't allow ourselves to be pressured from any quarter" (Vinocur, 2002). Unlike the Clinton administration's efforts to support Turkey, the Bush administration's efforts were directly and harshly criticized. As Sayarı states: "It has angered many Europeans who have increasingly viewed the US policy as unwarranted American interference in the internal affairs of the EU" (Sayarı, 2011, p. 251).

Similar to Rasmussen's approach, the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi of Italy, made the following declaration regarding the borders of the EU in the future:

We should be allowed to decide our own future without any interference from the United States or anyone else... The debate on where Europe's borders lie is a debate about our identity. It will be conducted in the European Parliament, in the national parliaments and involve all European citizens (as cited in Banks & Chapman, 2002).

The statements of both Rasmussen and Prodi gained support in the European circles. Enrique Barón Crespo, former leader of European Socialists group encouraged the approach:

We support Prodi 100% on this. It's a matter for the EU to decide who joins the Union. The Americans should leave the EU to handle its own affairs (as cited in Banks & Chapman, 2002).

Supporting Crespo's expression, former chairman of European People's Party, Hans-Gert Pöttering said:

We do not advise the Americans on their relations with neighbours such as Mexico. They should not be telling us what to do with our neighbours such as Turkey... Don't push it (as cited in Banks & Chapman, 2002).

The leader of liberal group, Graham Watson, also made a very similar statement regarding their disapproval of the US pressure in the EU-Turkey relations. Direct and harsh criticisms regarding the US pressure also emerged in the small groups of the EU. While Daniel Cohn-Bendit expressed that "I agree with Prodi. I wonder how President Bush would react if the EU insisted on Mexico or Canada being integrated into the US?"

as the leader of Greens/European Free Alliance group, Francis Wurtz furthered Cohn-Bendit's speech by saying, "Of course Prodi's right. The US totally overstepped the mark in interfering in the enlargement negotiations" as the leader of the European Left group (as cited in Banks & Chapman, 2002).

According to former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, those who help Turkey in its adventure of accession to the EU were actually "the adversaries of the European Union" (BBC News, 2002). Similarly, according to former French Minister of Industry and former president of the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine: "It's certainly not up to the president of the United States to interfere in something so important and which mainly concerns Europeans" (as cited in Vinocur, 2002). Additionally, former Trade Commissioner of the EU, Pascal Lamy of France gave a response to the US advocacy for Turkey:

It's a classic of US diplomacy to want to put Turkey in Europe. The further the boundaries of Europe extend, the better US interests are served... Can you imagine the reaction if we told them they had to enlarge into Mexico? (as cited in Vinocur, 2002).

Contrasting with the approaches given above, former Danish Foreign Minister, Per Stig Moeller's reaction to the US 'pressure' varied greatly. After a very intense diplomatic activity between US officials and the EU, in a phone call between former US Secretary of State, Colin Powell and Per Stig Moeller, Moeller said: "quite appropriate that our American friends speak their mind. It's not a question of pressure, not at all" (as cited in Filkins, 2002).

As previously mentioned, before the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, the US pressured the EU for a specific date to be given to Turkey as the start for accession negotiations. This was an effort carried out by Paul Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz in London promoted Turkey's membership while most American diplomats were thinking that overcoming the EU's attitude towards Turkey was "something of a long shot" (Gordon, 2002). As Wolfowitz puts it:

The decision on EU members is, of course, Europe's to make, but history suggests that a European Union that welcomes Turkey will be even



stronger, safer and more richly diverse than it is today. The alternative, exclusionary choice is surely unthinkable (as cited in Gordon, 2002).

According to Wolfowitz, the Turkish accession to the EU was also important to overcome the risk of 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996) in the Muslim world. Here should be noted that this speech was made just a day before Wolfowitz's visit to Turkey regarding the potential Turkish support in Iraq intervention (Gordon, 2002).

The US also attempted to resolve the Cyprus conflict which stands as one of the major obstacles in Turkey's application to the EU for full membership. In this regard, the 2002 Annan Plan was the first initiative to resolve the conflict through the channel of the United Nations. Former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan prepared and introduced the first comprehensive plan regarding the resolve of Cyprus conflict (Morelli & Migdalovitz, 2009). The Annan Plan, which is supported by the US, was aiming to form a single state in Cyprus which consists of two nations: the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. The US promoted the Annan Plan for the resolve of the Cyprus conflict and so that, one of the obstacles facing Turkish membership would be removed. During the referendum in April 2004, while 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' for the Annan Plan, 75% of Greek Cypriots voted 'no.' With the influence of Greece as an EU member, Cyprus was admitted to the EU in 2004, while the dispute continues. However, Turkey's stance against the efforts for the resolve of Cyprus conflict was welcomed in European circles.

Finally, during the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, the EU decided to start the accession negotiations with Turkey "without delay" upon a report from the European Commission in the European Council two years later, which confirms that Turkey met the Copenhagen political criteria (Commission of the European Union, 2002). Contrasting with the expectations of Turkey and the US, the EU preferred not to specify a date for the start of the accession negotiations. This statement of the EU demonstrated that "although American support is important, what ultimately matters is the ability of Turkey to undertake domestic economic and political reforms and to implement the Copenhagen criteria fully" (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005, p. 11). As can be understood, the decision of the EU was conditional and the US failed to manipulate the EU for a

specific date to be given to Turkey for the start of the accession negotiations. From this perspective, the US could not get what had set out for unlike the Customs Union and Helsinki Summit.

Events that happened both before and after of the Copenhagen Summit demonstrated the decreasing effectiveness of the US support in relations between Turkey and the EU. As some authors think: "They (Europeans) perceived the American involvement as an illegitimate interference in internal EU affairs" (Islam, 2008, p. 22). According to Öniş and Yılmaz, the Copenhagen Summit "clearly displayed the limits of American power in so far as decision-making regarding EU membership was concerned" (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005, p. 10). The result of the Copenhagen Summit demonstrated both to Turkey and the US that decisions regarding the EU will belong to the EU and European leaders who rule it. Now the decisions of the EU would not be determined in accordance with American interests, but will be based on the domestic structures of the EU.

Complementary to this result, US support for the Turkish accession to the EU became a liability rather than an advantage. The Copenhagen Summit decisions did not meet Turkey's initial expectations. On the other hand, however, one of the reasons behind the Copenhagen Summit decisions was "the involvement of the US as an advocate on Turkey's behalf, just at a time when transatlantic differences were becoming alarmingly prominent in the context of the developing Iraq crisis" (Robins, 2003, p. 555). Thus, efforts of the Bush administration to support Turkey started to be criticized with suspicion and created a controversial debate on the true intentions of the Turkish-American alliance. In this regard, the efforts of the Bush administration were considered as the moves to obtain Turkey's support in a potential Iraq War. Additionally, US efforts were even thought to be motives that aim to weaken the integration of the EU, considering the dichotomy between the major European powers such as Germany and France and the US regarding the Iraq War.

Once compared with the Clinton administration, the Bush administration's promotion of Turkey included more public speeches and significant pressure onto the EU and

European leaders (Tocci, 2011). The US was applying an intense pressure during the 2000s that European leaders and the officials of the EU even started to complain. Former President of Finland and former Head of the European Council, Martti Ahtisaari made a speech during the 1999 Helsinki Summit wherein he stated; "don't publicly interfere, but quietly support the process" (as cited in Tocci, 2011, p. 85). This might be given as an indicator to show an important implication of the American pressure. With a very similar approach to Ahtisaari's, experienced commissioners of the EU suggested that the US follow "quiet diplomacy" (as cited in Tocci, 2011, p. 85). As one of the commissioners, Günter Verheugen, expressed his complaint about the US efforts: "the veiled pressure and threats that came from within Turkey but also from the outside... caused a kind of overkill... it was just a fraction too much, a fraction that triggered a negative reaction in Europe" (as cited in Robins, 2003, p. 556). On the other hand, US officials thought that these statements were 'excuses' of the EU to cover up its hesitancy towards the Turkish accession (Sayarı, 2006, p. 169).

The Bush administration was following a foreign policy based on interventions with EU member states such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark. During the 2000s, the relations between the US and many European countries were already problematic due to the policies followed by the US. As the Atlantic Council reports:

The United States should focus on the new EU members and a few others, where the US advocacy could make a positive difference, but not a campaign openly in those countries such as Germany or France, where public efforts are likely to be counterproductive. In those countries, quiet encouragement of favourably inclined leaders is likely to be a more effective strategy (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. vii).

After the comparatively disappointing Copenhagen Summit, the US continued and furthered its support towards Turkish accession to the EU, especially to reach an ultimate result regarding the starting date of accession negotiations in December 2004. While these were being planned, the Turkish Grand National Assembly rejected a bill to prevent the deployment of US troops from Turkish soil to Iraq and to prevent US from benefitting Turkish airspace as well as ground bases. As a consequence, US-Turkey

bilateral relations started to deteriorate. However, the US continued to support Turkey in its adventure with the EU. After the disappointment created by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, former US Secretary of the Department of State, Robert Powell stated:

Turkey is a good friend, a good ally... We have a good partnership with Turkey and I'm sure it will continue to grow in the years ahead (as cited in Grossman, 2004, p. 67).

Obviously, while following a policy related to its national interests, as previously mentioned, the US also supported Turkey in its application for full membership in the EU. While doing so, the US insistently attended lobbying activities in major European capitals. On the other hand, while the EU was in favour of reforms that Turkey should adopt first, but not in favour of starting negotiations; according to Turkey, Turkey was adopting a number of reforms since the 1990s (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. 2). For the Bush administration, Turkey's identity as a Muslim country was important to overcome the risk of the 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996) and it was also important with its unique geo-strategic location to expand European norms and values in a wide geography. President Bush, in the NATO Summit in Istanbul made the following statement regarding the American-Turkish alliance, bilateral relations between Turkey and the US throughout history, and the US's support for the Turkish accession to the EU before the decision on the accession negotiations with Turkey:

For decades, my country has supported greater unity in Europe – to secure liberty, to build prosperity, and to remove sources of conflict on this continent. Now the European Union is considering the admission of Turkey, and you are moving rapidly to meet the criteria for membership. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had a vision of Turkey as a strong nation among other European nations. That dream can be realized by this generation of Turks. America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion; it would expose "the clash of civilizations" as a passing myth of history. Fifteen years ago, an artificial line that divided Europe – drawn at Yalta – was erased. And now this continent has the opportunity to erase another artificial division – by including Turkey in the future of Europe (Guardian, 2004).

Following Bush's meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan on June 2004, Bush furthered his statement: "As Turkey meets the EU standards for membership, the EU should begin talks that will lead to full membership for the Republic of Turkey" (as cited in Beatty, 2004). As previously mentioned Bush's statements regarding the EU decisions were directly and harshly criticized. For instance, former French President Jacques Chirac made a speech upon this statement and said: "Mr. Bush not only went too far but went on territory which is not his own... it's as if I was advising the US on how they should manage their relationship with Mexico" (as cited in Black, White, & Trimlet, 2004).

Finally, in December 2004, the EU decided to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. However, the US had to intervene in EU-Turkey relations once again to resolve the conflict between the two parties that emerged due to Turkey's Accession Negotiations Framework. According to the provisional framework, Turkey should not have prevented an EU member country's membership in an international organization. Obviously, this provision was against the Turkish interests regarding Cyprus. The issue has never been solved, but the attempts of former US Secretary of the Department of State, Condolezza Rice reduced the tension (Radikal, 2005). After a number of phone conversations with the Cypriot leaders, the United Kingdom, the EU and Turkey, Rice arranged a meeting of the US ambassadors to the EU to support Turkey. With her efforts, the British presidency of the EU published a note regarding Turkey and after all these efforts, the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül thanked Rice (Radikal, 2005).

The EU's decision to initiate negotiations with Turkey in 2005, was somewhat due to the Turkish adoption of constitutional reforms and legal integration packages after the Helsinki Summit. Especially after the Helsinki Summit, Turkey underwent a democratic transformation and reform process to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey's being given an official status regarding its application to become a member in the EU obviously accelerated the reform movements in the Republic. In this context, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted a major package which changes a number of articles of the 1982 Turkish Constitution. With this package, improvement on the article

related to freedom of expression and death penalty were amended. This package constituted the first step of Turkey's National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p. 21).

After being elected and came to power with a huge victory, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) signalled more willingly that it would continue adopting the reforms asked by the EU (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005). The victory of the AKP, that introduces itself as "a central-right and social conservative party" (Wikipedia, 2014b) was pretty welcomed in European countries such as Germany and Greece (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005, pp. 6-7). As the majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the AKP adopted a number of reforms in 2002, which significantly affected EU-Turkey relations such as removal of the death penalty and betterment of minority rights. The Turkish government was also able to adopt economic reforms and plans foreseen by the International Monetary Fund (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. 4). At this stage, a potential negative attitude from the EU regarding the reforms that Turkey was adopting would have ignited a serious issue in the Muslim community living within the EU borders (Atlantic Council, 2004).

Additionally, Turkey found the chance to work on the reforms and integration process in general that the EU requested, since Turkey was not participating in the Iraq War (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006). According to Kayhan and Lindley:

If Turkey had entered the Iraq War with the US in 2003, Ankara administration and the military would solely concentrate on the war rather than reform and democratisation process for the EU and the attempts for meeting the criteria (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006, p. 7).

As a result, Turkey would not have been able to start accession negotiations in October 2005, since it would have solely concentrated on the Iraq War. However, Turkey could instead benefit from its decision and adopted a number of reforms as a part of its membership process. When the American-Turkish relations were problematic due to the Iraq Crisis, Turkey attempted to anchor itself to the West as a part of its Europeanization process it followed since the establishment of the Republic (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006).

According to Kayhan and Lindley, if Turkey had not turned on its ally during the Iraq Crisis, the military would have still had significant power over the Turkish government (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006). However, Turkey had to decrease the level of power that the Turkish military had to comply with the EU criteria. With the seventh harmonization package, in 2003 and 2004, the military lost power through decreasing power of the National Security Council of Turkey (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006). Along with these changes was also the removal of the requirement for the head of National Security Council's to serve as a soldier. The number of civil officers in the Council has thus increased. The Council has been transformed into an advisory structure and the requirement of the Council meetings to convene every month was removed. Since Turkey witnessed three different military coup d'états before, the aim of these reforms was to prevent the military to take over the civilian government (F. S. Larrabee, 2010, p. 161).

As previously mentioned, US attempts were not successful in determining the agreement for the start of accession negotiations with Turkey. American support was not successful during the 2000s as it was during the 1990s. Due to this fact, American support dramatically decreased and the officials of the EU as well as the European leaders did not welcome the US effect, especially the Bush administration in the EU-Turkey relations, contrasting with what happened during the 1990s. As a response to the US, the officials of the EU and the European leaders blamed the US for the high level of lobbying and intense pressure for the accession of Turkey to the EU. As Tocci puts it:

Their reactions have been either polite silences, long-winded explanations of the complications inherent in the accession process, or impassioned demands of non-interference in a quintessentially European affair (Tocci, 2011, p. 83).

The EU insistently disapproved US attempts and did not want the US to intervene in the domestic issues of the EU. On the other hand, the US's insistence created another problematic aspect in European circles, since it ignited disapprovals and negative reactions as well as it created suspicion regarding the US and Turkey's intentions.

#### **4.7. Mapping American Support: the Bush Administration**

Overall, during the Bush administration, the President, vice presidents, and responsible White House officials, in total, made 297 public speeches. According to Scale A mentioned in [Chapter 4](#), and details of which are given in throughout the second half of the second chapter and [Appendix B](#), the verbal support reached its maximum in 2002 (53 documents with a mean value of 4.57 and a standard deviation of 6.75), 2003 (90 documents with a mean value of 3.36 and a standard deviation of 2.90), and 2005 (23 documents with a mean value of 4.78 and a standard deviation of 6.93) respectively. In accordance with our expectations and the assumptions of literature, the Bush administration, like the Clinton administration demonstrated significant support for Turkey in European circles, by receiving a mean value of 2.15 and a standard deviation of 0.80 according to Scale B, details of which are given in [Appendix B](#). A comparison of these findings with the Clinton administration values will be made and discussed in forth section of this chapter.

#### **4.8. A Comparison of Bush and Clinton Presidencies**

On Scale A, the Clinton administration received a mean value of 3.19, a median value of 4.36, and a standard deviation of 5.82. In line with these findings, the Bush administration, on Scale A, received a mean value of 3.46, a median value of 3.76, and a standard deviation of 5.12. On the other hand, the total number of documents analyzed for the Bush administration is 279, while the total number of documents analyzed for the Clinton administration is 279. As previously mentioned, Tocci claims that the Bush administration's promotion of Turkey included more public speeches and a greater pressure to the European Union and European leaders once compared with the Clinton administration (Tocci, 2011). Once Tocci's arguments are taken for granted, the fact that the Bush administration has less number of documents compared to the Clinton



administration in this study emerges as a problematic aspect of the APP data. However, Tocci's analysis may also be relying on a number of different data sources, which this study does not need to consider.

With an intention to compare the differences between clintona and gw bushrcheneya distributions (overall support for Turkey's accession to the EU), unpaired, two-sample t-test has been conducted. The results as well as their interpretation are as follows:

Two-sample t test						
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
clintona	369	3.19091	0.303182	5.823929	2.594724	3.787096
gw bushrcheneya	279	3.469092	0.306778	5.124207	2.865188	4.072995
Combined	648	3.310683	0.217282	5.531106	2.884019	3.737347
Diff		-0.27818	0.439021		-1.14026	0.585899

diff = mean (clintona) - mean (gw bushrcheneya) t= -0.6336  
 Ho: diff = 0 df= 646

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
Pr (T < t) = 0.2633	Pr ( T  >  t ) = 0.5265	Pr (T > t) = 0.7367

**Table 6: Two Sample T-Test for the Clinton and Bush Administration (Scale A)**

The value of 0 falls within the 95% confidence interval, and the value for two-tailed alternative, which we look at in this study, is 0.5265 and greater than the alpha level. As a consequence, we do not reject the null (Ho: diff=0) and conclude that the Bush and Clinton presidencies do not significantly differ when it comes to the supporting (overall) Turkey in European circles according to Scale A.

The above-mentioned process has been followed for clintonb and gw rcheneyb distributions (overall norms and values oriented support). The results as well as their interpretation are as follows:

Two-sample t test						
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
clintona	369	2.30658	0.02125	0.40825	2.26479	2.34837
gwbushrcheneya	279	2.15599	0.04818	0.80473	2.06115	2.25083
Combined	648	2.24174	0.02417	0.61532	2.19428	2.28921
Diff		0.15059	0.48495		0.05536	0.24581

diff = mean (clintonb) - mean (gwbushrcheneyb)

t= 3.1053

Ho: diff = 0

df= 646

Ha: diff <0

Ha: diff !=0

Ha: diff > 0

Pr (T < t) = 0.9990

Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.0020

Pr (T>t) = 0.0010

**Table 7: Two Sample T-Test for the Clinton and Bush Administration (Scale B)**

The value for two tailed alternative is 0.0020, which is smaller than the alpha value (0.05); in which the value of 0 also does not fall within 95% confidence interval, these two groups differ. Additionally, the one-tailed probability of getting a difference this large is 0.0010, as a consequence, we reject the null (H0: diff=0). These results show that, in presidential speeches, press releases and other related documents analyzed in this study, the Clinton administration statistically significantly used ‘clearer and modest’ sentences and paragraphs, which touch upon liberal norms and values to support Turkey in European circles (2.30±0.02).

#### 4.9. Conclusion

This chapter, US Perception towards the Turkish Accession to the EU, presented the relatively declining effectiveness of the US support in the bilateral relations between Turkey and the EU during the 2000s compared to the 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, during the 1990s, Turkey was a significant player and an ally for the US with its unique geo-strategic location which could help the US implement its security-oriented

foreign policy in a wide region. In accordance with the neorealist expectations, the US interests were shaped by external, changing systemic influences such as the unexpected end of the Cold War and incidents in the Middle East and the Balkans. While the efforts of the Clinton administration resulted in fruitful decisions both during the Customs Union and Helsinki Summit negotiations; President Bush and the efforts of its administration during the Copenhagen Summit received harsh and direct criticisms both from the officials of the EU and European leaders. It is also important to note here that during the 1990s, the effects of the political structure of the Clinton administration were much clearer on the type of US interventions, especially when the international system was comparatively stable due to the lack of security-related concerns. In other words, the comparative stability in the international system due to the lack of security related concerns, directed the Clinton administration to support Turkey in a 'peaceful' manner in European circles. Additionally, the Clinton administration pointed out the importance of liberal values of the European Union and reforms that Turkey should adopt. This study successfully demonstrated this aspect of the Clinton administration.

However, following September 11 incident, external systemic variables started to dominate foreign behaviours of the states. As a consequence, the type of American support started to shift during the Bush administration. During the early 2000s, President Bush first increased US attempts to involve in EU-Turkey bilateral relations and drastically presented his effort in the context of his war against terrorism and Iraq War. In accordance with realist expectations, external security scarcity was the most important variable which determined the actions of actors. Accordingly, the US attempted to support Turkey consistently and urged the EU for Turkey's inclusion. In summary, the structural influences were the main motives behind US foreign policy regarding Turkey-EU relations during the 1990s and the early 2000s, as well as these variables were responsible for the increase in American interventions, especially during the early 2000s.

**This page intentionally left blank.**

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

This study has mainly been about the support of the US in bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey. It answered the question of what shaped the US support for Turkish membership in the EU and the reasons behind this support between the 1990s and the early 2000s. From the US perspective, this study demonstrated that Turkey has become an ‘enabling partner’ for the US in carrying out vital US security interests during the post-Cold War period<sup>4</sup>. Turkey with its unique location has had the ability to increase American capacity to secure the US’s security oriented interests in the wide region surrounding Turkey. At this point, Turkey’s comparatively stable characteristics as well as its Western-oriented, classic foreign policy improved Turkey’s foreign policy potential and the possibility of an active cooperation between the US and Turkey.

Additionally, the US also perceived the EU, similar to Turkey, as an ‘enabling partner’ for American economic, military, and political interests. Following the end of World War II, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the US was one of major supporters of European integration, thus creating a powerful block against the Soviet expansionism. After improving its capacity in world politics and economy, the EU also

---

<sup>4</sup> The term, enabling partner, has been put forth by the former US Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat, in his speech on the EU at Nixon Center on October 1998.

made commitments in common security and defence mechanisms. While the US was having a problem in balancing between NATO and a potential ESDP mechanism, the US also supported the EU's attempts, since a stronger Europe with a security-providing capability, who admitted Turkey as a member, could prevent the security-related threats in the regions surrounding Turkey. On the other hand, the EU, as an efficient security provider both within Europe and beyond the borders of the Union, would be the 'right-arm' of the US in stabilizing Turkish foreign policy as well as preventing problems in the region.

The above-mentioned argument unfolds in nearly all chapters of this thesis. The fourth chapter of this thesis, *Turkey's EU Membership: American approach*, presented the bilateral relations between the EU and the US during the post-Cold War period as well as the US approach towards Turkey by introducing the historical development of these relations. Both the EU and the US wanted to have a close relationship with Turkey due to its highly important geographic location. The US's and Western European states' foreign policies that were born out of the security concerns due to the Soviet threat helped Turkey to be a part of the Western bloc until the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, Turkey became one of the founding members of the Council of Europe, became a member of NATO, and obtained the associate member status in the European Union in 1963. Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey's strategic importance due to its unique geographic location continued for the US, furthering US-Turkey bilateral relations. On the contrary, the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of Western concerns related to security changed the atmosphere in relations between the European Union and Turkey. While Turkey continued its efforts to become a part of the Western world and a member of the EU, the idea of Turkey's membership in the Union created a variation in the views of Europeans. This issue further ignited a number of controversial debates and conflict within the EU. Furthermore, the EU's new vision regarding the Turkish application came to the surface when the Union rejected Turkey's official membership application in 1989. As Müftüler-Baç summarizes very-well,

Since 1989, European security has been reformulated around the notions of common European values, norms, and a European identity. Turkey's

problem is that its European identity has always been questioned. Thus, in this new European order, the extent to which Turkey has integrated into the European identity becomes a crucial factor in determining Turkey's position as a security partner as well (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 10).

After the end of the Cold War, the US efforts and support for Turkey significantly decreased; however, during the 1990s, American support still succeeded to play catalyzer in some of the historical events in the relations between the EU and the US. As discussed in Chapter 2 and 4, the US supported further European enlargement covering Central and Eastern European countries and attempted to influence the EU to include Turkey in this process. The continued and furthered American support for Turkey during the 1990s and the early 2000s was prominently determined by the changing systemic structural factors. During the post-Cold War period, the primary form of American support was through public speeches in both non-official and official European circles.

The US, with its geo-strategic concerns attempted to influence the EU to include Turkey in the European enlargement towards Central and Eastern European countries to have a NATO ally, which is anchored to the West with Western liberal values. The Clinton administration and President Clinton supported Turkey in the process through public speeches and lobbying in the EU and by indicating the importance of liberal values and attempting to convince Turkey to adopt the required reforms. From the point of view of the US, one of the reasons behind the Clinton administration's success was the form of US interventions. Most interventions during the Clinton presidency emphasized the importance of the liberal norms, values, the EU enlargement, and the reforms adopted in Turkey (Tocci, 2011). The quantitative aspect of this study, details of which have been given in the second half of the second chapter, also have been in line with the previous observations as well as my expectations. While these efforts failed during the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, US support and efforts played the most essential role during the 1999 Helsinki Summit, and the Customs Union agreement negotiations. Furthermore, Chapter 4 presents how the Bush administration continued to support Turkey after the September 11 attacks to involve Turkey as an ally in President Bush's 'War on Terrorism.' President Bush and the officials of the Bush administration intensely

attended lobbying activities in European circles, made public speeches and meetings through the phone for the EU to determine a date for the start of accession talks with Turkey. Despite these efforts, American support for Turkey during the early 2000s, created the greatest controversial debate in the Union ever and received direct and harsh criticisms from European leaders and the officials of the European Union.

As a result, this study, by evaluating American perspective on Turkey's accession to the EU in accordance with neorealism, demonstrated that American efforts in supporting Turkey in both non-official and official European circles within the period from the 1990s until the early 2000s were due to the US's security policy which aims to protect and increase American economic, political, and military interests at all levels. Furthermore, this study indicates the essential importance of changing geo-political hierarchies and the changing balance in the international system for understanding the policy outcomes of related actors.



**This page intentionally left blank.**

## APPENDIX

### APPENDIX A: Algorithm for the Categorization of Documents

Problem: Having a dataset of speeches, which belong to former US presidents or US officials  $S_{US} = \{s_1, s_2, s_3, \dots, s_n\}$ , classify each document as ‘Turkey related’ or ‘Irrelevant.’

The algorithm I adopt here is based on the keywords contained in each document or phrase. The list of keywords as well their provisional points are given below:

Keyword	Point to be Assigned
Turkey	5
Turkish	5
Neither Turkey nor Turkish	0

**Table 8: Document Categorization Rules**

After looking up the keywords given above, assign a score to each document as stated; then categorize them based on the algorithm below:

```
if(Turkey score > 0)
```

```
return Turkey ;
```

```
add to the secondary database ;
```

```
if(Turkish score > 0)
```

return Turkey;

add to the secondary database ;

if (Document score = 0) or (none of the cases above)

return irrelevant ;

**APPENDIX B: Information and Consent Form**

**INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM  
FOR YASIN BOSTANCI'S MASTER'S THESIS IN EUROPEAN STUDIES**

**Thursday, July 3, 2014**

**Study Title:** The US, EU and Turkey Triangle: American Support in Turkey's Accession Talks with the EU.

**Researcher:** Yasin Bostanci, MA Candidate in European Studies at Sabanci University.

**Thesis Advisor:** Meltem Müftüler Baç, Professor, Jean Monnet Chair in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabanci University.

**Purpose of the Research:** This research answers the question of what shaped US support for Turkish membership in the EU and the reasons behind this support between the 1990s and the early 2000s in order to be able to elaborate on the future of Turkey as a candidate country.

**What You Will Be Asked to Do in the Research:** You will be given a random, electronic set of speech records, which belong to former US Presidents. You will read the files electronically and one by one, and assign them scores as the following:

<b>The Score to be Assigned:</b>	<b>When to Assign?</b>	<b>How to Assign?</b>
<b>Do not assign and report the file as NOT SUITABLE FOR RESEARCH.</b>	If the document you are reading is NOT related to Turkey's membership in the European Union or	Report the file as NOT SUITABLE FOR RESEARCH.

	Turkey AT ALL.	
<b>-10</b>	If the document you are reading, according to your best evaluation, appears to be AGAINST Turkey's membership in the European Union.	Please write down your score as well as the document name on a paper OR enter your score as well as the document name to a computerized sheet.
<b>0</b>	If the document you are reading, according to your best evaluation, appears to be about Turkey, but neither AGAINST nor IN FAVOUR OF Turkey's membership in the European Union.	Please write down your score as well as the document name on a paper OR enter your score as well as the document name to a computerized sheet.
<b>10</b>	If the document you are reading, according to your best evaluation, appears to be IN FAVOUR OF Turkey's membership in the European Union.	Please write down your score as well as the document name on a paper OR enter your score as well as the document name to a computerized sheet.

**If you assigned a document a score of 10, then ASSIGN AN ADDITIONAL SCORE according to the rules stated below:**

<b>The Score to be Assigned:</b>	<b>When to Assign?</b>	<b>How to Assign?</b>
<b>1</b>	If the document you are reading, according to your	Please write down your score as well as the

	best evaluation, appears to be SLIGHTLY IN FAVOUR OF Turkey's membership in the European Union.	document name on a paper OR enter your score as well as the document name to a computerized sheet.
2	If the document you are reading, according to your best evaluation, appears to be SOMEHOW IN FAVOUR OF Turkey's membership in the European Union.	Please write down your score as well as the document name on a paper OR enter your score as well as the document name to a computerized sheet.
3	If the document you are reading, according to your best evaluation, appears to be VERY STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF Turkey's membership in the European Union.	Please write down your score as well as the document name on a paper OR enter your score as well as the document name to a computerized sheet.

**Risks and Discomforts:** I do not foresee any risks or discomfort from your participation in research.

**Voluntary Participation:** Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may choose to stop participating at any time. Your decision not to volunteer will not influence the nature of the ongoing relationship you may have with the researcher or your relationship with Sabanci University either now, or in the future.

**Withdrawal from the Study:** You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so decide. Your decision to stop participating will not affect your

relationship with the researcher or Sabanci University. Should you decide to withdraw from the study, all data generated as a consequence of your participation will be destroyed.

**Confidentiality:** All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence and, unless you specifically indicate your consent, your name will not appear in any page of the thesis. Your data will be safely stored in a locked facility and a server, and only the researcher will have access to this information. Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law.

**Questions about the Research:** If you have questions about the research in general or about your role in the study, please feel free to contact Yasin Bostanci, MA candidate in European Studies, at Sabanci University, 34956, Tuzla, Istanbul. Turkey, telephone (554) 992-0809, or by e-mail (bostanci@sabanciuniv.edu).

**Legal Rights and Signatures:**

I (*fill in your name here*), consent to participate in ‘*The US, EU and Turkey Triangle: American Support in Turkey’s Accession Talks with the EU*’ conducted by Yasin Bostanci. I have understood the nature of this project and wish to participate. I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature below indicates my consent.

**Signature** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date**

Participant

**Address:**

**E-Mail:**

**Telephone:**

**Signature**

**Date**

---

Yasin Bostanci

03/07/2014

Sabanci University, 34956, Tuzla. Istanbul, Turkey.

[bostanci@sabanciuniv.edu](mailto:bostanci@sabanciuniv.edu) – 0554-992-0809



## APPENDIX C: Automated Content Analysis Results

### Word Frequency Tables

Text File	Raw Score	Raw SE	Unique Scored Words	Transformed Score	Transformed SE	Transformed [95% Confidence Interval]		Total Words Scored	% Tot Sc'd
t1	3.6117	0.1367	103	8.5145	1.7291	5.0563	11.9728	183	97
t2	3.5113	0.0479	527	7.2446	0.6057	6.0332	8.4561	2,028	96
t3	3.0754	0.02	1,961	1.7297	0.2525	1.2247	2.2346	16,759	93
t4	2.9935	0.0374	828	0.6934	0.4733	-0.2532	1.6399	4,163	95
t5	3.1719	0.0633	374	2.9507	0.801	1.3487	4.5526	1,092	93
t6	3.2429	0.0638	390	3.8484	0.8072	2.234	5.4628	1,214	96
t7	3.1551	0.1791	78	2.7383	2.2657	-1.793	7.2696	162	90
t8	3.2506	0.022	1,217	3.946	0.2777	3.3906	4.5014	9,194	94
t9	3.1737	0.0445	460	2.9729	0.5631	1.8467	4.099	1,820	89
t10	3.1199	0.0529	551	2.2927	0.6692	0.9542	3.6312	1,747	93

t11	3.1299	0.0597	393	2.4196	0.7555	0.9086	3.9306	1,204	95
t12	3.2191	0.0317	708	3.5471	0.4005	2.7461	4.3482	3,811	94
t13	3.192	0.073	344	3.2041	0.9241	1.356	5.0523	939	95
t14	2.9045	0.0428	815	-0.4326	0.5411	-1.5149	0.6497	3,793	95
t15	3.0837	0.1615	135	1.8351	2.043	-2.2509	5.9212	230	91
t16	3.2226	0.018	1,648	3.5915	0.2277	3.1361	4.0469	15,843	95
t17	3.1555	0.0589	380	2.7431	0.7453	1.2524	4.2337	1,134	93
t18	3.421	0.0331	800	6.1021	0.4185	5.2651	6.939	3,747	94
t19	2.309	0.0486	670	-7.9661	0.6147	-9.1956	-6.7367	1,903	94
t20	3.3607	0.0338	652	5.3395	0.4276	4.4843	6.1947	3,461	95
t21	3.1676	0.1535	164	2.8962	1.9422	-0.9883	6.7807	286	92
t22	2.6515	0.1031	245	-3.6333	1.3037	-6.2407	-1.0259	564	79
t23	3.2451	0.1842	129	3.8759	2.3306	-0.7853	8.5372	205	90
t24	3.1323	0.0241	1,129	2.4492	0.3044	1.8404	3.0581	7,825	96
t25	3.5034	0.0325	1,066	7.1442	0.4106	6.3231	7.9654	5,181	94
t26	2.1329	0.0388	803	-10.1938	0.4912	-11.176	-9.2113	2,077	100
t27	3.4132	0.0319	872	6.0032	0.404	5.1952	6.8111	4,239	94
t28	2.29	0.0453	713	-8.2068	0.573	-9.3527	-7.0608	1,946	96
t29	3.4538	0.0251	1,083	6.5163	0.3172	5.8819	7.1506	6,492	94
t30	3.5726	0.1512	156	8.0194	1.9134	4.1925	11.8463	283	93
t31	2.3834	0.0454	748	-7.0251	0.574	-8.1731	-5.877	2,257	94

t32	3.1755	0.1096	204	2.9957	1.386	0.2237	5.7677	694	87
t33	3.2078	0.0472	521	3.4051	0.5968	2.2116	4.5987	1,755	96
t34	3.3867	0.0301	912	5.6674	0.381	4.9054	6.4295	4,936	94
t35	3.3502	0.0285	899	5.2058	0.3602	4.4853	5.9263	5,369	91
t36	3.4541	0.0275	1,190	6.521	0.3483	5.8245	7.2175	6,785	91
t37	2.5026	0.2078	49	-5.5175	2.6287	-10.775	-0.26	78	82
t38	3.4742	0.0302	1,000	6.7743	0.3815	6.0114	7.5373	5,338	94
t39	3.5631	0.049	751	7.899	0.6195	6.66	9.138	2,685	94
t40	3.2871	0.0289	981	4.4082	0.3654	3.6773	5.139	5,183	93
t41	2.968	0.0356	586	0.3709	0.4507	-0.5306	1.2723	1,851	100
t42	3.667	0.0237	1,223	9.2146	0.2998	8.615	9.8141	8,166	95
t43	3.1436	0.1721	134	2.5924	2.1769	-1.7613	6.9461	225	89
t44	2.2663	0.047	686	-8.506	0.5942	-9.6944	-7.3176	1,964	94
t45	2.3843	0.0432	605	-7.0138	0.5469	-8.1075	-5.92	1,665	100
t46	3.1909	0.0244	932	3.1909	0.3085	2.5739	3.8078	6,142	90
t47	3.5294	0.0267	1,197	7.4733	0.3373	6.7987	8.1478	6,773	94
t48	2.4483	0.0439	662	-6.2034	0.555	-7.3134	-5.0934	1,896	99
t49	2.2624	0.0957	142	-8.5558	1.2109	-10.978	-6.1339	525	89
t50	2.2887	0.0874	212	-8.2225	1.1058	-10.434	-6.0108	1,058	79
t51	3.3532	0.0466	810	5.2444	0.5895	4.0653	6.4235	2,668	93
t52	2.3632	0.0469	681	-7.2808	0.5937	-8.4681	-6.0935	1,961	93

t53	3.3886	0.0299	975	5.6915	0.3783	4.9349	6.448	5,557	95
t54	3.479	0.0341	757	6.8362	0.4317	5.9728	7.6996	3,405	94
t55	3.3581	0.0319	889	5.3057	0.4038	4.4981	6.1133	4,372	93
t56	3.0212	0.1663	126	1.0435	2.1039	-3.1643	5.2512	223	86
t57	3.3626	0.0292	1,121	5.3632	0.3694	4.6244	6.1019	5,644	93
t58	2.2359	0.0962	181	-8.8911	1.2165	-11.324	-6.4582	547	86
t59	2.9742	0.1486	128	0.4488	1.8803	-3.3119	4.2095	336	89
t60	2.6002	0.1079	229	-4.282	1.3645	-7.0109	-1.5531	546	80
t61	3.2186	0.0304	945	3.5409	0.3842	2.7725	4.3093	5,021	95
t62	3.1633	0.0423	638	2.8416	0.5352	1.7713	3.9119	2,487	95
t63	3.4046	0.028	1,014	5.8948	0.3542	5.1863	6.6032	5,717	94
t64	3.443	0.0281	971	6.38	0.3551	5.6698	7.0902	5,490	93
t65	2.833	0.1206	155	-1.3374	1.5253	-4.3881	1.7133	334	89
t66	2.4578	0.0408	844	-6.0832	0.5156	-7.1143	-5.052	3,024	90
t67	3.3323	0.0352	786	4.9803	0.445	4.0903	5.8702	3,372	94
t68	2.8324	0.0472	498	-1.3449	0.5976	-2.5402	-0.1496	2,347	88
t69	3.3913	0.0253	1,163	5.7266	0.32	5.0865	6.3666	6,989	94
t70	3.5641	0.0396	655	7.9122	0.5013	6.9095	8.9148	2,960	93
t71	3.3825	0.0175	1,752	5.6144	0.2213	5.1718	6.057	14,287	95
t72	3.3682	0.0376	786	5.4344	0.4754	4.4837	6.3852	3,281	93
t73	2.2467	0.1048	168	-8.7541	1.3258	-11.406	-6.1025	434	86

t74	3.4197	0.0315	815	6.0858	0.3985	5.2888	6.8829	4,236	94
t75	2.8758	0.2892	59	-0.7958	3.6584	-8.1125	6.5209	86	82
t76	2.9993	0.0467	645	0.767	0.5909	-0.4147	1.9487	2,647	91
t77	2.9784	0.153	139	0.5029	1.9359	-3.3689	4.3748	285	84
t78	3.4636	0.0263	994	6.6413	0.3324	5.9766	7.306	5,864	94
t79	3.2334	0.0288	805	3.7289	0.364	3.0008	4.457	4,723	92
t80	2.4257	0.0458	785	-6.4904	0.5796	-7.6496	-5.3312	2,511	90
t81	3.357	0.0244	1,173	5.2922	0.309	4.6741	5.9102	6,861	95
t82	3.3044	0.0266	1,082	4.6268	0.336	3.9547	5.2988	5,938	95
t83	3.0485	0.0417	714	1.3892	0.5275	0.3341	2.4442	2,706	93
t84	3.4098	0.03	861	5.9607	0.3794	5.2018	6.7196	4,719	94
t85	2.9312	0.1871	115	-0.0945	2.3666	-4.8276	4.6386	184	85
t86	3.4721	0.0244	1,209	6.7487	0.3086	6.1315	7.3658	7,461	95
t87	3.4635	0.0519	412	6.6393	0.6567	5.326	7.9526	1,332	96
t88	3.4507	0.0266	1,105	6.478	0.3369	5.8041	7.1519	5,973	95
t89	3.3842	0.0329	961	5.6362	0.416	4.8042	6.4681	4,334	93
t90	2.6924	0.1754	51	-3.1161	2.2191	-7.5544	1.3221	86	98
t91	3.5479	0.0237	1,274	7.7072	0.3002	7.1068	8.3076	8,092	94
t92	3.5528	0.0413	703	7.7696	0.5221	6.7253	8.8138	2,917	95
t93	3.6137	0.0553	713	8.5392	0.7002	7.1388	9.9395	2,305	93
t94	3.4451	0.0262	1,050	6.4063	0.3309	5.7444	7.0681	6,050	94

t95	3.607	0.0256	1,208	8.4548	0.3242	7.8064	9.1031	7,000	95
t96	3.3644	0.0228	1,265	5.386	0.2879	4.8102	5.9618	8,419	94
t97	2.5597	0.2156	87	-4.7948	2.7271	-10.249	0.6594	137	82
t98	2.7163	0.1514	137	-2.8132	1.9158	-6.6447	1.0183	240	85
t99	2.2533	0.1254	135	-8.6702	1.5868	-11.844	-5.4967	332	82
t100	3.2049	0.0331	962	3.3683	0.4193	2.5298	4.2069	4,852	93
t101	3.4697	0.0331	900	6.7174	0.4186	5.8802	7.5546	4,070	94
t102	3.4578	0.0273	1,068	6.567	0.3449	5.8773	7.2567	5,951	94
t103	4.2083	0.0281	1,345	16.0624	0.3556	15.3513	16.7735	6,840	100
t104	3.3885	0.0293	1,063	5.6905	0.3707	4.9491	6.4319	5,461	93
t105	3.0685	0.0354	989	1.6424	0.4474	0.7477	2.5372	4,826	94
t106	3.3882	0.0272	1,114	5.6869	0.3441	4.9986	6.3751	5,881	94
t107	3.0995	0.0599	492	2.034	0.7582	0.5175	3.5504	1,346	90
t108	3.1732	0.2034	98	2.9673	2.5734	-2.1794	8.1141	158	87
t109	3.3668	0.0292	916	5.4167	0.3692	4.6784	6.1551	5,315	94
t110	3.1486	0.0484	731	2.6553	0.6124	1.4304	3.8802	2,392	92
t111	2.4862	0.1863	97	-5.7247	2.3572	-10.439	-1.0104	154	82
t112	3.152	0.0254	834	2.6986	0.3216	2.0554	3.3417	5,492	90
t113	3.1042	0.0749	342	2.0935	0.9474	0.1988	3.9882	1,064	87
t114	3.5714	0.0304	939	8.0044	0.385	7.2345	8.7744	5,391	95
t115	3.557	0.0289	944	7.8221	0.3657	7.0907	8.5534	5,311	95

t116	2.497	0.037	934	-5.5875	0.4682	-6.5239	-4.6512	3,621	89
t117	3.4813	0.0307	891	6.865	0.3878	6.0894	7.6405	5,160	95
t118	2.8167	0.0435	787	-1.5436	0.5501	-2.6437	-0.4435	3,281	85
t119	3.4703	0.03	879	6.726	0.3795	5.967	7.485	5,065	96
t120	2.7086	0.2286	72	-2.9102	2.8925	-8.6952	2.8747	117	80
t121	3.0252	0.0576	565	1.0941	0.7285	-0.363	2.5511	1,620	92
t122	2.8808	0.0986	212	-0.7323	1.2479	-3.228	1.7635	471	88
t123	2.1549	0.0579	336	-9.9161	0.733	-11.382	-8.45	704	100
t124	3.3662	0.0277	972	5.4082	0.3499	4.7084	6.108	5,467	93
t125	2.6298	0.0828	289	-3.9078	1.048	-6.0037	-1.8118	761	83
t126	3.4463	0.0286	979	6.4214	0.3612	5.699	7.1439	6,478	94
t127	3.5491	0.0382	768	7.7222	0.4838	6.7545	8.6899	3,431	93
t128	3.1404	0.0477	534	2.5515	0.6033	1.345	3.758	1,907	93
t129	3.4795	0.0264	1,051	6.8416	0.3343	6.173	7.5103	6,529	94
t130	3.3535	0.0338	882	5.2478	0.4271	4.3935	6.102	4,001	94
t131	2.35	0.124	159	-7.4477	1.5681	-10.584	-4.3115	363	84
t132	3.5581	0.0858	300	7.8368	1.0851	5.6666	10.007	702	93
t133	3.5765	0.0315	910	8.0686	0.3979	7.2727	8.8644	4,851	95
t134	3.3184	0.0374	770	4.804	0.4732	3.8576	5.7504	3,257	94
t135	3.1144	0.0599	458	2.2232	0.7577	0.7078	3.7386	1,552	94
t136	3.5889	0.031	892	8.2254	0.3923	7.4408	9.01	5,108	95

t137	3.2319	0.0304	908	3.7096	0.3848	2.9399	4.4792	4,414	94
t138	3.4877	0.029	1,256	6.9458	0.3665	6.2127	7.6788	6,368	94
t139	3.4001	0.0276	892	5.838	0.3496	5.1388	6.5372	5,775	95
t140	2.4953	0.0338	1,105	-5.6095	0.4279	-6.4654	-4.7537	4,867	88
t141	3.5212	0.0349	733	7.3689	0.4416	6.4857	8.2521	3,596	94
t142	3.4546	0.0222	1,421	6.5268	0.2811	5.9646	7.089	9,219	95
t143	3.6827	0.098	211	9.4121	1.2403	6.9315	11.8928	433	95
t144	3.4457	0.025	1,123	6.414	0.316	5.7821	7.046	6,915	96
t145	3.5972	0.0298	901	8.3312	0.3773	7.5766	9.0858	5,219	95
t146	3.1171	0.0395	574	2.2567	0.4995	1.2576	3.2558	2,682	92
t147	3.4604	0.0606	566	6.6005	0.7664	5.0676	8.1333	1,787	94
t148	3.0467	0.0968	281	1.367	1.2245	-1.0821	3.816	675	92
t149	3.1965	0.0911	270	3.2617	1.153	0.9557	5.5676	561	93
t150	3.3937	0.0648	486	5.7565	0.8203	4.116	7.397	1,295	92
t151	3.2814	0.0412	752	4.3363	0.5217	3.2929	5.3797	2,892	95
t152	3.1847	0.049	606	3.1127	0.6201	1.8726	4.3529	1,951	95
t153	3.2094	0.0455	687	3.4249	0.5753	2.2742	4.5756	2,407	94
t154	3.4639	0.0257	1,372	6.6443	0.3254	5.9934	7.2952	7,685	94
t155	3.6484	0.0734	534	8.9782	0.929	7.1201	10.8363	1,531	91
t156	3.901	0.0853	348	12.1738	1.0794	10.015	14.3325	850	94
t157	3.2481	0.1025	262	3.9142	1.2969	1.3204	6.508	628	90



t158	3.353	0.0354	927	5.2421	0.448	4.346	6.1381	5,325	89
t159	3.4763	0.0458	613	6.8011	0.5796	5.6418	7.9603	2,439	94
t160	3.5804	0.0381	655	8.1186	0.4818	7.155	9.0821	2,920	95
t161	2.9272	0.039	744	-0.145	0.493	-1.1309	0.841	2,173	100
t162	2.4895	0.0439	822	-5.6827	0.5552	-6.7931	-4.5722	2,876	89
t163	3.2807	0.1218	185	4.3268	1.5414	1.244	7.4096	388	93
t164	3.4752	0.041	884	6.7873	0.5185	5.7502	7.8243	3,430	93
t165	2.8709	0.2328	89	-0.8574	2.9451	-6.7476	5.0328	139	85
t166	3.5831	0.0377	647	8.1523	0.4767	7.1989	9.1057	2,794	93
t167	3.5812	0.0566	447	8.1284	0.716	6.6965	9.5603	1,449	95
t168	1.9429	0.1138	204	-12.5979	1.44	-15.478	-9.718	420	78
t169	2.8638	0.0649	418	-0.948	0.8211	-2.5903	0.6943	1,178	89
t170	3.6534	0.0342	755	9.0419	0.4332	8.1754	9.9083	3,722	95
t171	2.698	0.0393	801	-3.0451	0.4975	-4.0401	-2.0501	3,366	91
t172	2.2746	0.0912	171	-8.401	1.1538	-10.709	-6.0933	575	87
t173	2.7677	0.1343	136	-2.1633	1.6988	-5.561	1.2344	385	90
t174	2.8954	0.0555	576	-0.5471	0.7016	-1.9503	0.8562	1,916	93
t175	3.3432	0.0281	1,096	5.1174	0.3551	4.4072	5.8277	6,136	94
t176	3.2527	0.0308	986	3.9723	0.3897	3.1929	4.7518	5,441	94
t177	3.0086	0.2164	87	0.8842	2.7375	-4.5907	6.3592	129	88
t178	2.1432	0.1394	107	-10.0643	1.7632	-13.591	-6.5379	170	93

t179	3.0084	0.0195	1,458	0.8817	0.2461	0.3895	1.3739	8,034	100
t180	3.3005	0.0385	723	4.5774	0.487	3.6034	5.5514	3,212	92
t181	3.3361	0.2794	48	5.0283	3.5352	-2.0422	12.0988	117	94
t182	1.8357	0.1011	141	-13.9543	1.2785	-16.511	-11.397	202	100
t183	2.6145	0.1946	86	-4.1009	2.4624	-9.0256	0.8239	193	89
t184	3.4711	0.0339	783	6.7354	0.4288	5.8778	7.593	3,975	94
t185	3.2122	0.2623	60	3.4599	3.3184	-3.177	10.0968	87	93
t186	2.9922	0.1958	96	0.6775	2.4771	-4.2767	5.6317	147	87
t187	3.4488	0.0351	878	6.4541	0.4435	5.5671	7.341	4,309	93
t188	4.9271	0.0937	281	25.1551	1.1854	22.7842	27.5259	618	100
t189	3.6686	0.0369	788	9.2347	0.4672	8.3002	10.1691	3,677	95
t190	3.2142	0.0578	352	3.4858	0.7311	2.0237	4.9479	1,122	93
t191	2.2381	0.1168	139	-8.8636	1.4772	-11.818	-5.9092	403	85
t192	3.1711	0.2079	90	2.9402	2.6296	-2.3189	8.1993	208	89
t193	3.0265	0.0672	475	1.1105	0.8498	-0.5891	2.81	1,480	94
t194	3.0879	0.0504	592	1.8879	0.6378	0.6123	3.1634	1,878	90
t195	3.4963	0.0282	1,080	7.0544	0.3564	6.3417	7.7672	6,686	95
t196	3.5543	0.0326	850	7.7886	0.4118	6.9649	8.6122	4,719	95
t197	3.6182	0.0318	866	8.5971	0.4026	7.7919	9.4023	4,550	95
t198	2.3193	0.1175	143	-7.8363	1.4871	-10.81	-4.8621	401	89
t199	3.2453	0.2083	100	3.8786	2.6349	-1.3913	9.1485	206	91

t200	3.4229	0.0453	540	6.1252	0.5731	4.979	7.2715	2,050	94
t201	3.2068	0.2276	68	3.3926	2.8797	-2.3669	9.152	110	99
t202	4.4311	0.0377	1,251	18.8812	0.477	17.9273	19.8351	4,638	100
t203	3.7241	0.03	924	9.9366	0.3791	9.1784	10.6948	5,649	96
t204	3.4301	0.0766	394	6.2163	0.9688	4.2788	8.1539	994	96
t205	3.3936	0.0314	973	5.7557	0.3972	4.9613	6.55	4,693	94
t206	3.4622	0.0682	398	6.6229	0.8628	4.8973	8.3485	999	95
t207	2.8906	0.0385	936	-0.6077	0.4865	-1.5807	0.3653	4,297	85
t208	2.7446	0.0749	352	-2.4554	0.9471	-4.3496	-0.5611	1,153	85
t209	3.2885	0.1923	114	4.4258	2.4324	-0.4389	9.2906	180	87
t210	3.494	0.0327	831	7.0252	0.4134	6.1984	7.852	4,344	95
t211	3.6173	0.0353	777	8.5856	0.4463	7.693	9.4783	3,705	95
t212	3.2142	0.0518	429	3.4851	0.6557	2.1737	4.7965	1,378	95
t213	3.7948	0.0305	1,041	10.8307	0.3856	10.0596	11.6018	5,503	95
t214	3.4444	0.1472	142	6.3973	1.862	2.6733	10.1214	261	92
t215	3.5631	0.073	395	7.8994	0.9233	6.0528	9.746	1,019	94
t216	3.4246	0.0799	262	6.1472	1.0109	4.1254	8.1689	682	97
t217	3.6881	0.0499	516	9.4811	0.6316	8.2179	10.7443	1,899	96
t218	3.6513	0.0449	834	9.0148	0.5678	7.8792	10.1504	2,861	94
t219	3.4383	0.1271	176	6.3212	1.6079	3.1054	9.5369	336	94
t220	3.2868	0.0817	312	4.404	1.0334	2.3372	6.4708	717	94

t221	3.733	0.0413	696	10.0491	0.5224	9.0044	11.0938	2,932	96
t222	3.4475	0.0425	503	6.4375	0.5371	5.3633	7.5117	2,064	95
t223	3.1529	0.0403	488	2.7098	0.5102	1.6893	3.7303	2,071	90
t224	3.036	0.0695	415	1.2306	0.879	-0.5274	2.9886	1,284	89
t225	3.136	0.0882	180	2.4968	1.1156	0.2655	4.728	480	97
t226	3.4818	0.059	498	6.8704	0.7463	5.3777	8.363	1,441	95
t227	3.574	0.0474	523	8.0368	0.6002	6.8364	9.2372	1,923	95
t228	3.5786	0.0685	477	8.0961	0.8672	6.3618	9.8304	1,321	95
t229	3.3821	0.0498	597	5.6091	0.6305	4.3481	6.8701	2,118	92
t230	3.7124	0.051	478	9.7881	0.6457	8.4966	11.0795	1,915	96
t231	3.6529	0.0398	720	9.0358	0.504	8.0278	10.0439	3,182	94
t232	3.4901	0.0948	275	6.9764	1.1995	4.5775	9.3753	591	93
t233	3.6261	0.0607	425	8.696	0.7683	7.1594	10.2326	1,288	96
t234	3.8317	0.1285	140	11.2973	1.626	8.0453	14.5494	289	96
t235	3.4941	0.0308	984	7.0263	0.3898	6.2468	7.8058	4,874	95
t236	3.173	0.0846	380	2.9641	1.0703	0.8235	5.1047	858	95
t237	3.7344	0.0406	738	10.0666	0.5131	9.0403	11.0929	3,034	95
t238	3.5794	0.0399	939	8.1063	0.5047	7.0969	9.1157	3,673	93
t239	4.4121	0.0319	1,238	18.6402	0.4037	17.8328	19.4477	5,869	100
t240	2.9619	0.0541	436	0.2936	0.6841	-1.0746	1.6618	1,444	90
t241	3.2612	0.0448	568	4.0796	0.5668	2.946	5.2133	2,211	94

t242	3.1202	0.052	681	2.2967	0.6583	0.98	3.6133	2,138	90
t243	4.5405	0.0653	488	20.2651	0.8261	18.6129	21.9174	1,244	100
t244	3.5534	0.0342	794	7.7766	0.4328	6.911	8.6423	4,107	96
t245	4.0515	0.1612	134	14.0784	2.0391	10.0002	18.1567	242	93
t246	2.7193	0.0794	277	-2.7753	1.0044	-4.7841	-0.7664	811	92
t247	3.4057	0.0304	954	5.9084	0.3842	5.14	6.6769	4,957	93
t248	3.7072	0.0467	586	9.7231	0.5914	8.5404	10.9059	2,397	95
t249	3.4847	0.2347	91	6.9072	2.9696	0.9679	12.8465	132	90
t250	3.3613	0.049	603	5.3467	0.6202	4.1063	6.5871	2,010	92
t251	2.5845	0.0659	457	-4.4809	0.8332	-6.1474	-2.8145	1,557	73
t252	3.46	0.043	652	6.5958	0.5442	5.5074	7.6842	2,697	95
t253	3.1784	0.0278	1,486	3.0327	0.3523	2.3281	3.7372	8,454	94
t254	3.4387	0.0243	1,288	6.3258	0.3074	5.711	6.9406	8,014	94
t255	3.5579	0.0257	1,061	7.8342	0.3252	7.1838	8.4845	6,488	95
t256	2.8009	0.1062	216	-1.743	1.343	-4.4289	0.943	481	85
t257	3.2704	0.037	742	4.1969	0.4687	3.2596	5.1343	3,218	92
t258	3.2953	0.0376	672	4.512	0.4754	3.5611	5.4629	3,031	94
t259	3.3245	0.0335	831	4.8809	0.4239	4.0331	5.7287	3,932	93
t260	4.021	0.2274	88	13.6928	2.8775	7.9379	19.4477	132	96
t261	3.0622	0.208	88	1.5621	2.6319	-3.7018	6.826	128	85
t262	3.1887	0.1791	102	3.1636	2.2656	-1.3677	7.6948	167	88

t263	2.7626	0.0336	981	-2.2281	0.4251	-3.0784	-1.3779	6,822	91
t264	3.2423	0.038	1,053	3.841	0.4804	2.8801	4.8018	4,106	91
t265	4.9194	0.0477	1,097	25.0578	0.6036	23.8506	26.265	3,360	100
t266	3.2288	0.0549	604	3.6699	0.6939	2.2821	5.0577	2,118	90
t267	4.2567	0.0176	2,810	16.6744	0.2223	16.2299	17.1189	19,816	100
t268	3.2939	0.0264	821	4.4945	0.3342	3.8261	5.1628	4,875	91
t269	2.9867	0.1924	61	0.6075	2.4342	-4.2609	5.4758	126	86
t270	3.0907	0.0145	2,815	1.923	0.1835	1.5561	2.2899	30,391	89
t271	2.6176	0.2239	86	-4.0615	2.8325	-9.7265	1.6035	133	81
t272	3.0765	0.0168	2,342	1.7433	0.213	1.3174	2.1692	21,878	91
t273	2.788	0.214	87	-1.9062	2.7075	-7.3213	3.5089	130	86
t274	3.4916	0.0346	792	6.9954	0.4382	6.119	7.8718	3,668	94
t275	3.6627	0.0407	545	9.159	0.5145	8.1299	10.188	2,483	95
t276	3.5941	0.0526	460	8.2914	0.6651	6.9613	9.6216	1,458	96
t277	3.3173	0.0507	605	4.7904	0.6415	3.5074	6.0733	1,808	94
t278	2.5307	0.0293	1,210	-5.1615	0.3705	-5.9024	-4.4205	7,191	87
t279	3.7259	0.0335	777	9.9594	0.4233	9.1129	10.806	3,797	95
t280	2.5934	0.1388	168	-4.3688	1.7559	-7.8806	-0.857	346	83
t281	1.9832	0.0991	149	-12.0883	1.2541	-14.597	-9.58	220	100
t282	3.4411	0.0281	1,020	6.3557	0.355	5.6457	7.0656	5,342	96
t283	2.6346	0.0657	402	-3.8465	0.8306	-5.5078	-2.1852	1,563	81

t284	2.9427	0.2029	95	0.0507	2.5667	-5.0828	5.1842	155	83
t285	2.8326	0.0344	1,052	-1.3426	0.4355	-2.2135	-0.4717	5,182	85
t286	3.3049	0.0336	802	4.6331	0.4256	3.7819	5.4844	3,939	93
t287	2.9992	0.0941	259	0.765	1.1911	-1.6171	3.1472	602	89
t288	3.378	0.0404	721	5.558	0.5107	4.5367	6.5793	2,947	94
t289	3.4584	0.0258	1,216	6.5749	0.3263	5.9224	7.2275	6,839	94
t290	3.7141	0.0486	476	9.8096	0.6143	8.581	11.0383	1,722	96
t291	3.5467	0.045	590	7.6921	0.5698	6.5526	8.8316	2,416	94
t292	2.8627	0.2273	79	-0.9609	2.875	-6.7109	4.7891	125	85
t293	3.3341	0.0849	207	5.0026	1.074	2.8545	7.1507	517	94
t294	3.4174	0.0517	427	6.056	0.6547	4.7467	7.3653	1,388	95
t295	2.9413	0.0199	1,258	0.0337	0.2511	-0.4686	0.536	7,650	100
t296	3.2646	0.0228	1,194	4.1236	0.2881	3.5473	4.6998	8,038	95
t297	3.2105	0.026	955	3.4393	0.3291	2.7811	4.0976	5,450	94
t298	3.3102	0.0254	1,374	4.7	0.3219	4.0562	5.3438	7,272	94
t299	2.6463	0.2389	76	-3.6986	3.0228	-9.7441	2.3469	111	84
t300	2.785	0.1989	87	-1.944	2.5168	-6.9776	3.0896	181	84
t301	3.2468	0.0558	426	3.8985	0.7062	2.4861	5.3108	1,317	95
t302	3.2187	0.0898	328	3.5428	1.1358	1.2712	5.8145	888	92
t303	2.66	0.0539	625	-3.5259	0.6823	-4.8905	-2.1614	1,909	89
t304	3.3497	0.0262	880	5.1998	0.3314	4.5371	5.8626	5,482	93

t305	2.4322	0.1168	173	-6.4078	1.4773	-9.3625	-3.4532	451	83
t306	2.4107	0.0888	164	-6.6801	1.1236	-8.9273	-4.4328	896	82
t307	2.6156	0.0516	680	-4.0876	0.6524	-5.3924	-2.7828	2,197	89
t308	2.9076	0.0808	224	-0.3928	1.0218	-2.4364	1.6509	549	93
t309	2.6225	0.0455	746	-3.9996	0.5754	-5.1503	-2.8489	2,665	90
t310	2.9359	0.0573	465	-0.0352	0.7244	-1.4839	1.4136	2,002	89
t311	3.3327	0.0316	959	4.9847	0.3999	4.185	5.7845	4,547	94
t312	2.9425	0.1938	118	0.0483	2.4514	-4.8545	4.9511	212	89
t313	3.3856	0.0236	1,181	5.6536	0.2979	5.0578	6.2495	7,249	95
t314	3.1959	0.0234	957	3.2535	0.2957	2.6621	3.8448	6,409	94
t315	3.0929	0.037	671	1.9514	0.4679	1.0156	2.8872	2,865	94
t316	2.8844	0.0301	850	-0.6866	0.3811	-1.4487	0.0756	3,210	100
t317	3.47	0.0429	578	6.722	0.5432	5.6355	7.8085	2,409	95
t318	3.4038	0.0482	508	5.8848	0.6102	4.6643	7.1053	1,780	95
t319	3.4873	0.0455	589	6.9405	0.5757	5.789	8.092	2,342	94
t320	2.8975	0.2037	80	-0.5213	2.5772	-5.6758	4.6331	169	89
t321	3.0632	0.1099	208	1.5755	1.3908	-1.206	4.357	487	92
t322	3.6753	0.1786	136	9.3194	2.2591	4.8012	13.8376	238	92
t323	3.442	0.0467	524	6.3677	0.5913	5.1851	7.5503	2,032	93
t324	3.3844	0.2213	84	5.6392	2.7999	0.0394	11.2391	139	85
t325	1.2809	0.0712	851	-20.9723	0.9008	-22.774	-19.171	3,397	100



t326	3.1985	0.0619	417	3.2865	0.7827	1.7212	4.8519	1,233	92
t327	3.4436	0.0303	840	6.3874	0.3829	5.6215	7.1533	4,501	95
t328	3.3386	0.0268	1,081	5.0593	0.3392	4.3809	5.7378	6,103	94
t329	3.4238	0.0238	1,059	6.1373	0.3014	5.5345	6.7401	6,505	95
t330	2.3352	0.1542	127	-7.6347	1.9509	-11.537	-3.7328	283	84
t331	3.3407	0.0241	1,077	5.0856	0.3053	4.4749	5.6963	6,952	95
t332	3.3558	0.0357	853	5.2765	0.4523	4.3719	6.181	3,700	95
t333	3.353	0.0403	852	5.2415	0.5092	4.2231	6.2599	3,166	93
t334	3.5264	0.0331	778	7.4347	0.4193	6.5961	8.2733	3,747	94
t335	2.8177	0.1444	99	-1.5305	1.8273	-5.1851	2.124	283	91
t336	3.0841	0.0316	895	1.8395	0.4001	1.0393	2.6396	4,834	92
t337	3.2626	0.0328	739	4.0974	0.4151	3.2671	4.9276	3,912	92
t338	3.5575	0.0651	330	7.8282	0.8232	6.1817	9.4746	878	94
t339	2.9232	0.0673	331	-0.1954	0.8509	-1.8972	1.5065	901	93
t340	3.2346	0.0751	388	3.7435	0.9495	1.8445	5.6426	994	92
t341	3.284	0.0307	831	4.3691	0.3889	3.5914	5.1468	4,367	96
t342	1.8035	0.0656	263	-14.3608	0.8296	-16.02	-12.702	584	100
t343	3.4104	0.0249	1,001	5.9675	0.315	5.3375	6.5976	6,206	95
t344	1.8035	0.0656	263	-14.3608	0.8296	-16.02	-12.702	584	100
t345	3.334	0.029	907	5.0007	0.3667	4.2673	5.7342	4,602	95
t346	3.3637	0.029	970	5.3763	0.3666	4.643	6.1096	5,189	94

t347	2.5972	0.0795	355	-4.3202	1.0053	-6.3308	-2.3097	915	78
t348	3.2056	0.1725	69	3.3766	2.1817	-0.9868	7.74	133	89
t349	3.3581	0.1944	126	5.3062	2.459	0.3881	10.2242	210	91
t350	2.2035	0.0906	198	-9.301	1.1459	-11.593	-7.0093	545	86
t351	2.6762	0.1623	87	-3.3201	2.0536	-7.4272	0.787	218	89
t352	3.3839	0.0292	865	5.6319	0.37	4.8919	6.3719	4,515	94
t353	3.466	0.0285	959	6.6708	0.3604	5.95	7.3915	5,417	95
t354	1.9887	0.1492	97	-12.0184	1.8876	-15.794	-8.2432	226	87
t355	3.4501	0.033	764	6.4703	0.4172	5.636	7.3047	3,588	95
t356	3.1694	0.0441	422	2.9189	0.5573	1.8042	4.0336	1,977	87
t357	3.4634	0.0611	333	6.6388	0.7725	5.0937	8.1838	1,193	97
t358	3.3437	0.0277	1,006	5.1235	0.3499	4.4237	5.8233	5,315	94
t359	3.2398	0.1025	232	3.8091	1.2971	1.2149	6.4033	543	88
t360	3.4708	0.0399	601	6.7317	0.5043	5.723	7.7403	2,664	95
t361	3.1765	0.2115	107	3.0081	2.6755	-2.3429	8.3592	163	91
t362	3.481	0.0612	331	6.8604	0.7744	5.3116	8.4093	1,076	97
t363	3.438	0.0345	768	6.3165	0.4362	5.4441	7.189	3,535	94
t364	3.4702	0.036	810	6.7241	0.455	5.8141	7.6341	3,523	94
t365	3.5596	0.0545	414	7.8557	0.6899	6.476	9.2355	1,412	96
t366	2.9616	0.0619	423	0.2903	0.7828	-1.2754	1.856	1,331	89
t367	3.023	0.0294	1,196	1.0665	0.3725	0.3215	1.8115	6,456	94

t368	2.9897	0.0163	2,553	0.6453	0.2057	0.2338	1.0568	24,013	88
t369	3.2118	0.0278	807	3.4554	0.352	2.7514	4.1594	4,645	91

**Table 9: William J. Clinton Document Analysis Results (SCALE A)**

<b>Text File</b>	<b>Raw Score</b>	<b>Raw SE</b>	<b>Unique Scored Words</b>	<b>Transformed Score</b>	<b>Transformed SE</b>	<b>Transformed [95% Confidence Interval]</b>		<b>Total Words Scored</b>	<b>% Tot Sc'd</b>
t1	2.5195	0.0247	91	2.6976	0.0454	2.607	2.789	169	90
t2	2.4788	0.0081	434	2.6228	0.0149	2.593	2.653	1,878	89
t3	2.3118	0.0041	1,215	2.3162	0.0075	2.301	2.331	14,786	82
t4	2.3814	0.0069	590	2.444	0.0127	2.419	2.469	3,722	85
t5	2.3351	0.0141	295	2.3589	0.0258	2.307	2.411	989	85
t6	2.4192	0.0116	309	2.5133	0.0213	2.471	2.556	1,111	88
t7	2.1729	0.0511	60	2.061	0.0938	1.874	2.249	138	77
t8	2.3269	0.005	836	2.344	0.0093	2.325	2.363	8,213	84
t9	2.2619	0.0122	363	2.2245	0.0225	2.18	2.269	1,666	82
t10	2.3481	0.0114	432	2.3828	0.021	2.341	2.425	1,577	84
t11	2.2827	0.0151	313	2.2627	0.0278	2.207	2.318	1,046	82

t12	2.2575	0.0087	501	2.2164	0.0161	2.184	2.249	3,297	81
t13	2.4461	0.0131	284	2.5629	0.024	2.515	2.611	870	88
t14	2.4194	0.0067	602	2.5138	0.0123	2.489	2.538	3,457	86
t15	2.1479	0.0424	107	2.0152	0.0779	1.859	2.171	196	78
t16	2.4058	0.0034	1,097	2.4887	0.0062	2.476	2.501	14,432	86
t17	2.4389	0.0119	313	2.5496	0.0219	2.506	2.593	1,051	86
t18	2.3574	0.0075	614	2.4	0.0138	2.372	2.428	3,382	85
t19	1.9922	0.0183	389	1.7291	0.0337	1.662	1.797	1,455	72
t20	2.3587	0.0078	509	2.4023	0.0144	2.374	2.431	3,089	85
t21	2.3787	0.028	141	2.439	0.0515	2.336	2.542	259	84
t22	1.8632	0.0364	175	1.4922	0.0668	1.359	1.626	472	66
t23	2.0358	0.0517	98	1.8092	0.095	1.619	1.999	168	73
t24	2.4438	0.0044	812	2.5587	0.008	2.543	2.575	7,165	88
t25	2.4455	0.0055	816	2.5616	0.0101	2.541	2.582	4,799	87
t26	2.0034	0.0179	404	1.7497	0.0328	1.684	1.815	1,499	72
t27	2.3742	0.0068	644	2.4307	0.0125	2.406	2.456	3,839	85
t28	2.0199	0.0178	404	1.78	0.0327	1.715	1.845	1,471	73
t29	2.3795	0.0054	782	2.4406	0.01	2.421	2.461	5,900	86
t30	2.306	0.0312	128	2.3054	0.0572	2.191	2.42	251	82
t31	2.0147	0.0165	448	1.7705	0.0302	1.71	1.831	1,737	73
t32	2.0465	0.0278	141	1.8289	0.0511	1.727	1.931	585	73

t33	2.5436	0.0077	428	2.7419	0.0141	2.714	2.77	1,650	90
t34	2.3526	0.0066	654	2.3912	0.0121	2.367	2.415	4,418	84
t35	2.323	0.0066	641	2.3367	0.0121	2.313	2.361	4,900	83
t36	2.3582	0.0055	869	2.4014	0.0101	2.381	2.422	6,277	84
t37	2.0148	0.0868	38	1.7707	0.1593	1.452	2.089	67	71
t38	2.4025	0.0057	761	2.4828	0.0105	2.462	2.504	4,913	86
t39	2.49	0.0072	612	2.6434	0.0132	2.617	2.67	2,517	88
t40	2.2998	0.007	694	2.2941	0.0128	2.268	2.32	4,623	83
t41	2.5452	0.0074	437	2.7449	0.0137	2.718	2.772	1,673	90
t42	2.3993	0.0047	889	2.4769	0.0086	2.46	2.494	7,423	86
t43	2.0948	0.0459	104	1.9176	0.0842	1.749	2.086	191	75
t44	1.9547	0.0187	399	1.6602	0.0344	1.591	1.729	1,477	71
t45	2.1003	0.0175	343	1.9277	0.0321	1.864	1.992	1,268	76
t46	2.2943	0.0063	667	2.284	0.0116	2.261	2.307	5,649	83
t47	2.3979	0.0052	885	2.4743	0.0095	2.455	2.493	6,190	86
t48	2.0784	0.0168	381	1.8875	0.0308	1.826	1.949	1,448	75
t49	1.8708	0.0392	91	1.5062	0.072	1.362	1.65	395	67
t50	1.6577	0.0319	118	1.1148	0.0586	0.998	1.232	792	59
t51	2.4267	0.0083	645	2.5273	0.0152	2.497	2.558	2,469	86
t52	1.9979	0.0178	412	1.7397	0.0327	1.674	1.805	1,525	72
t53	2.3512	0.0061	679	2.3885	0.0113	2.366	2.411	4,978	85

t54	2.4285	0.0068	581	2.5305	0.0125	2.506	2.555	3,145	87
t55	2.3193	0.0074	642	2.3299	0.0136	2.303	2.357	3,897	83
t56	2.0221	0.0484	100	1.7841	0.0889	1.606	1.962	191	74
t57	2.4133	0.0057	841	2.5026	0.0104	2.482	2.524	5,183	86
t58	1.8844	0.0383	110	1.5312	0.0703	1.391	1.672	425	67
t59	1.8166	0.0532	75	1.4066	0.0976	1.211	1.602	243	65
t60	1.8661	0.0368	173	1.4975	0.0676	1.362	1.633	454	67
t61	2.3287	0.0068	678	2.3472	0.0126	2.322	2.372	4,432	84
t62	2.4752	0.0073	522	2.6163	0.0135	2.589	2.643	2,314	88
t63	2.3533	0.0061	727	2.3925	0.0112	2.37	2.415	5,130	85
t64	2.3577	0.006	724	2.4006	0.011	2.379	2.423	5,042	85
t65	2.2437	0.0315	129	2.1911	0.0578	2.076	2.307	298	79
t66	1.9846	0.0144	526	1.7152	0.0264	1.662	1.768	2,392	71
t67	2.3483	0.008	590	2.3833	0.0148	2.354	2.413	3,008	84
t68	2.1239	0.0136	362	1.9711	0.025	1.921	2.021	2,042	76
t69	2.3503	0.0056	835	2.3868	0.0102	2.366	2.407	6,260	84
t70	2.3951	0.0077	513	2.4692	0.0142	2.441	2.498	2,730	86
t71	2.4503	0.0032	1,185	2.5706	0.0059	2.559	2.582	13,237	88
t72	2.4212	0.0071	623	2.5171	0.0131	2.491	2.543	3,059	87
t73	1.83	0.0446	103	1.4312	0.0818	1.268	1.595	330	65
t74	2.4215	0.0063	631	2.5177	0.0116	2.495	2.541	3,913	87

t75	1.8818	0.0864	48	1.5263	0.1587	1.209	1.844	73	70
t76	2.2787	0.0099	489	2.2553	0.0182	2.219	2.292	2,395	82
t77	1.9937	0.0445	107	1.732	0.0818	1.569	1.896	244	72
t78	2.3784	0.0057	734	2.4384	0.0106	2.417	2.46	5,307	85
t79	2.3851	0.0061	630	2.4509	0.0113	2.428	2.473	4,398	86
t80	1.9322	0.0167	467	1.619	0.0306	1.558	1.68	1,947	70
t81	2.4586	0.0046	884	2.5858	0.0084	2.569	2.603	6,365	88
t82	2.3609	0.0059	773	2.4064	0.0109	2.385	2.428	5,314	85
t83	2.3392	0.0094	554	2.3665	0.0172	2.332	2.401	2,438	83
t84	2.3598	0.0066	629	2.4044	0.0122	2.38	2.429	4,228	85
t85	1.9621	0.0582	86	1.6738	0.1068	1.46	1.888	153	71
t86	2.36	0.0053	850	2.4047	0.0097	2.385	2.424	6,685	85
t87	2.55	0.0085	353	2.7537	0.0155	2.723	2.785	1,256	90
t88	2.3785	0.0057	778	2.4386	0.0105	2.418	2.46	5,366	85
t89	2.4475	0.0059	765	2.5655	0.0109	2.544	2.587	4,060	87
t90	2.3289	0.0531	42	2.3476	0.0975	2.153	2.543	74	84
t91	2.4045	0.0046	919	2.4865	0.0085	2.47	2.504	7,415	86
t92	2.5357	0.0059	589	2.7274	0.0109	2.706	2.749	2,754	90
t93	2.482	0.008	592	2.6288	0.0147	2.599	2.658	2,167	87
t94	2.3477	0.006	759	2.3821	0.011	2.36	2.404	5,439	84
t95	2.5267	0.0039	925	2.7109	0.0072	2.697	2.725	6,606	90

t96	2.3084	0.0054	840	2.31	0.01	2.29	2.33	7,434	83
t97	2.0012	0.0641	73	1.7456	0.1178	1.51	1.981	120	71
t98	1.9769	0.0504	100	1.7011	0.0925	1.516	1.886	199	71
t99	1.8832	0.0466	96	1.5289	0.0856	1.358	1.7	274	67
t100	2.3385	0.0068	725	2.3652	0.0125	2.34	2.39	4,398	84
t101	2.4742	0.0058	708	2.6144	0.0107	2.593	2.636	3,804	88
t102	2.3425	0.0061	766	2.3726	0.0112	2.35	2.395	5,319	84
t103	2.3469	0.0058	759	2.3805	0.0107	2.359	2.402	5,752	84
t104	2.2723	0.0072	722	2.2437	0.0132	2.217	2.27	4,790	82
t105	2.4235	0.006	740	2.5214	0.011	2.5	2.543	4,420	86
t106	2.3396	0.0062	800	2.3673	0.0113	2.345	2.39	5,281	84
t107	2.2735	0.015	400	2.2459	0.0275	2.191	2.301	1,206	81
t108	2.0797	0.0565	76	1.8899	0.1038	1.682	2.098	134	74
t109	2.3686	0.0061	686	2.4204	0.0111	2.398	2.443	4,843	85
t110	2.3747	0.0094	561	2.4317	0.0173	2.397	2.466	2,188	84
t111	1.9381	0.0633	77	1.6298	0.1163	1.397	1.862	132	70
t112	2.2868	0.0069	606	2.2702	0.0126	2.245	2.295	4,988	82
t113	2.1424	0.0197	253	2.005	0.0361	1.933	2.077	938	77
t114	2.4281	0.0054	690	2.5298	0.01	2.51	2.55	4,956	87
t115	2.456	0.0051	715	2.581	0.0094	2.562	2.6	4,955	88
t116	1.9697	0.0132	576	1.6879	0.0243	1.639	1.737	2,890	71



t117	2.4034	0.0058	650	2.4843	0.0107	2.463	2.506	4,710	86
t118	1.972	0.0137	519	1.6921	0.0253	1.642	1.743	2,732	71
t119	2.4582	0.0052	671	2.585	0.0096	2.566	2.604	4,681	88
t120	1.9655	0.0727	58	1.6801	0.1336	1.413	1.947	102	70
t121	2.3278	0.0125	438	2.3455	0.023	2.3	2.392	1,454	83
t122	2.2632	0.0252	181	2.2268	0.0464	2.134	2.32	428	80
t123	2.182	0.0251	215	2.0778	0.0461	1.986	2.17	545	77
t124	2.3739	0.006	685	2.4303	0.011	2.408	2.452	5,005	85
t125	1.9724	0.0286	216	1.6928	0.0525	1.588	1.798	641	70
t126	2.4132	0.0051	704	2.5024	0.0094	2.484	2.521	5,945	87
t127	2.3857	0.0074	592	2.4518	0.0136	2.425	2.479	3,157	86
t128	2.3652	0.0106	417	2.4142	0.0194	2.375	2.453	1,723	84
t129	2.4379	0.0048	777	2.5478	0.0089	2.53	2.566	6,090	87
t130	2.4455	0.0063	683	2.5617	0.0115	2.539	2.585	3,687	87
t131	1.9104	0.045	111	1.579	0.0826	1.414	1.744	293	68
t132	2.479	0.014	270	2.6232	0.0257	2.572	2.675	667	88
t133	2.4253	0.0058	664	2.5246	0.0106	2.503	2.546	4,453	87
t134	2.4806	0.0065	612	2.6263	0.0119	2.603	2.65	3,036	88
t135	2.3937	0.0108	354	2.4665	0.0199	2.427	2.506	1,412	86
t136	2.4924	0.0049	689	2.648	0.0089	2.63	2.666	4,781	89
t137	2.4516	0.0058	675	2.573	0.0107	2.552	2.594	4,077	87

t138	2.4833	0.0047	976	2.6311	0.0086	2.614	2.648	5,946	88
t139	2.3829	0.0056	652	2.4467	0.0104	2.426	2.467	5,228	86
t140	1.9353	0.0119	679	1.6246	0.0218	1.581	1.668	3,846	70
t141	2.4314	0.0065	566	2.5357	0.012	2.512	2.56	3,337	88
t142	2.4621	0.0039	1,021	2.5922	0.0072	2.578	2.607	8,558	88
t143	2.5089	0.0163	188	2.6781	0.03	2.618	2.738	410	90
t144	2.522	0.0039	870	2.7022	0.0072	2.688	2.717	6,512	90
t145	2.4664	0.0051	676	2.6001	0.0093	2.581	2.619	4,839	89
t146	2.3652	0.0087	456	2.4143	0.016	2.382	2.446	2,494	85
t147	2.4737	0.0089	473	2.6135	0.0163	2.581	2.646	1,670	88
t148	2.3145	0.0191	237	2.3212	0.035	2.251	2.391	617	84
t149	2.473	0.016	241	2.6122	0.0294	2.553	2.671	531	88
t150	2.3885	0.0125	399	2.4571	0.0229	2.411	2.503	1,195	85
t151	2.4967	0.0066	612	2.6558	0.0122	2.632	2.68	2,709	89
t152	2.4032	0.0097	477	2.4841	0.0178	2.448	2.52	1,785	87
t153	2.4293	0.0083	537	2.5319	0.0152	2.502	2.562	2,215	87
t154	2.4533	0.0044	1,022	2.5761	0.008	2.56	2.592	7,178	88
t155	2.4078	0.0112	451	2.4924	0.0206	2.451	2.534	1,429	85
t156	2.5646	0.0106	309	2.7805	0.0196	2.741	2.82	811	90
t157	2.1304	0.0266	197	1.9831	0.0488	1.885	2.081	532	77
t158	2.2532	0.0077	676	2.2086	0.0141	2.18	2.237	4,796	80

t159	2.4268	0.0081	490	2.5274	0.0148	2.498	2.557	2,265	88
t160	2.4805	0.0065	534	2.6261	0.012	2.602	2.65	2,748	89
t161	2.4652	0.0085	508	2.5979	0.0157	2.567	2.629	1,900	87
t162	1.9668	0.0148	527	1.6825	0.0273	1.628	1.737	2,301	71
t163	2.4352	0.0202	166	2.5428	0.037	2.469	2.617	363	87
t164	2.416	0.0073	703	2.5075	0.0133	2.481	2.534	3,173	86
t165	2.0151	0.0659	69	1.7712	0.121	1.529	2.013	116	71
t166	2.4278	0.0073	533	2.5292	0.0135	2.502	2.556	2,634	88
t167	2.4804	0.0093	368	2.6259	0.0171	2.592	2.66	1,349	89
t168	1.6059	0.0528	120	1.0197	0.097	0.826	1.214	307	57
t169	2.2861	0.0153	339	2.2689	0.0281	2.213	2.325	1,082	81
t170	2.4861	0.0057	622	2.6362	0.0105	2.615	2.657	3,490	89
t171	2.0823	0.0121	531	1.8946	0.0222	1.85	1.939	2,780	75
t172	1.868	0.0375	107	1.501	0.0689	1.363	1.639	442	67
t173	2.0474	0.0389	88	1.8306	0.0715	1.688	1.974	311	73
t174	2.3787	0.0102	451	2.4391	0.0187	2.402	2.476	1,748	85
t175	2.3805	0.0055	808	2.4423	0.0102	2.422	2.463	5,604	86
t176	2.3799	0.0059	739	2.4413	0.0108	2.42	2.463	4,991	86
t177	2.0943	0.0601	68	1.9168	0.1104	1.696	2.138	111	76
t178	2.1367	0.0513	77	1.9946	0.0942	1.806	2.183	140	77
t179	2.4141	0.0048	810	2.5041	0.0088	2.487	2.522	6,942	86

t180	2.3468	0.0082	540	2.3804	0.015	2.35	2.41	2,938	84
t181	2.0207	0.0767	32	1.7815	0.1409	1.5	2.063	89	71
t182	2.127	0.0492	94	1.9768	0.0903	1.796	2.158	154	76
t183	1.8888	0.0639	52	1.5393	0.1174	1.305	1.774	147	68
t184	2.4342	0.0061	599	2.5411	0.0113	2.519	2.564	3,678	87
t185	2.4071	0.0464	53	2.4912	0.0853	2.321	2.662	81	86
t186	2.1431	0.0537	80	2.0063	0.0986	1.809	2.204	130	77
t187	2.3759	0.0067	639	2.4339	0.0124	2.409	2.459	3,935	85
t188	2.8759	0.0037	281	3.3522	0.0068	3.339	3.366	618	100
t189	2.4339	0.0065	611	2.5405	0.0119	2.517	2.564	3,372	87
t190	2.4732	0.0108	298	2.6126	0.0199	2.573	2.652	1,064	88
t191	1.863	0.0445	90	1.4918	0.0817	1.328	1.655	314	67
t192	1.9824	0.0549	64	1.7111	0.1008	1.51	1.913	168	72
t193	2.4015	0.0115	371	2.4808	0.0211	2.439	2.523	1,341	85
t194	2.23	0.0133	447	2.1659	0.0244	2.117	2.215	1,661	80
t195	2.4459	0.0047	786	2.5625	0.0086	2.545	2.58	6,173	88
t196	2.4415	0.0056	648	2.5543	0.0103	2.534	2.575	4,367	88
t197	2.4482	0.0056	653	2.5668	0.0103	2.546	2.588	4,208	88
t198	1.9326	0.0422	89	1.6197	0.0775	1.465	1.775	311	69
t199	1.8414	0.0658	64	1.4521	0.1208	1.211	1.694	150	66
t200	2.473	0.0081	443	2.6122	0.0149	2.583	2.642	1,916	88

t201	2.3352	0.0493	56	2.3591	0.0906	2.178	2.54	92	83
t202	2.8612	0.0018	1,251	3.3252	0.0032	3.319	3.332	4,638	100
t203	2.4821	0.0047	701	2.6289	0.0087	2.612	2.646	5,243	89
t204	2.4855	0.0114	326	2.6352	0.021	2.593	2.677	917	89
t205	2.4538	0.0056	738	2.577	0.0104	2.556	2.598	4,364	87
t206	2.4653	0.0122	336	2.5981	0.0224	2.553	2.643	925	88
t207	1.994	0.0117	622	1.7325	0.0215	1.69	1.776	3,603	72
t208	2.0036	0.0226	258	1.7501	0.0415	1.667	1.833	972	71
t209	2.2181	0.0439	99	2.144	0.0806	1.983	2.305	164	79
t210	2.4598	0.0056	617	2.5881	0.0103	2.567	2.609	4,054	88
t211	2.463	0.006	598	2.5939	0.0111	2.572	2.616	3,455	88
t212	2.4443	0.0106	351	2.5595	0.0194	2.521	2.598	1,266	87
t213	2.4835	0.0048	832	2.6315	0.0087	2.614	2.649	5,210	90
t214	2.4099	0.0268	125	2.4963	0.0492	2.398	2.595	244	86
t215	2.5048	0.0113	334	2.6706	0.0208	2.629	2.712	955	88
t216	2.617	0.0104	233	2.8767	0.0191	2.838	2.915	651	93
t217	2.5586	0.0071	438	2.7695	0.0131	2.743	2.796	1,793	91
t218	2.5103	0.0066	703	2.6808	0.0121	2.657	2.705	2,695	89
t219	2.4948	0.0194	158	2.6523	0.0357	2.581	2.724	315	88
t220	2.486	0.0141	266	2.636	0.026	2.584	2.688	667	87
t221	2.4795	0.0066	562	2.6241	0.0122	2.6	2.649	2,743	89

t222	2.5019	0.0075	418	2.6654	0.0138	2.638	2.693	1,953	90
t223	2.3164	0.0105	397	2.3246	0.0193	2.286	2.363	1,930	84
t224	2.1702	0.0175	310	2.056	0.0322	1.992	2.12	1,121	78
t225	2.586	0.0129	160	2.8198	0.0238	2.772	2.867	454	92
t226	2.5214	0.0092	426	2.7012	0.0169	2.667	2.735	1,353	89
t227	2.4712	0.0082	433	2.6089	0.0151	2.579	2.639	1,797	89
t228	2.4986	0.0098	414	2.6593	0.018	2.623	2.695	1,242	89
t229	2.3649	0.01	487	2.4136	0.0183	2.377	2.45	1,937	84
t230	2.5242	0.0073	404	2.7063	0.0134	2.68	2.733	1,812	91
t231	2.4839	0.0063	588	2.6323	0.0115	2.609	2.655	3,027	90
t232	2.4788	0.0158	243	2.6229	0.0291	2.565	2.681	554	87
t233	2.8667	0.0026	468	3.3353	0.0047	3.326	3.345	1,349	100
t234	2.5972	0.0168	128	2.8403	0.0309	2.779	2.902	277	92
t235	2.4738	0.0053	763	2.6136	0.0097	2.594	2.633	4,559	89
t236	2.3341	0.017	310	2.3571	0.0311	2.295	2.419	755	83
t237	2.5667	0.0055	622	2.7844	0.0101	2.764	2.805	2,904	91
t238	2.4504	0.0066	734	2.5707	0.0121	2.547	2.595	3,434	87
t239	2.6469	0.0039	1,238	2.9317	0.0072	2.917	2.946	5,869	100
t240	2.352	0.0122	357	2.39	0.0225	2.345	2.435	1,338	84
t241	2.4147	0.0088	456	2.5052	0.0162	2.473	2.538	2,020	86
t242	2.3071	0.0111	531	2.3075	0.0205	2.267	2.348	1,946	82

t243	2.8732	0.0028	488	3.3472	0.0051	3.337	3.357	1,244	100
t244	2.4949	0.0053	625	2.6524	0.0097	2.633	2.672	3,844	90
t245	2.6106	0.0182	129	2.8649	0.0335	2.798	2.932	236	91
t246	2.3834	0.0158	224	2.4476	0.029	2.39	2.506	741	84
t247	2.3912	0.0061	705	2.4619	0.0112	2.44	2.484	4,576	86
t248	2.4676	0.0076	479	2.6024	0.0139	2.575	2.63	2,237	89
t249	2.1863	0.0546	75	2.0856	0.1002	1.885	2.286	115	78
t250	2.4448	0.009	505	2.5605	0.0165	2.528	2.593	1,880	86
t251	1.6978	0.0243	316	1.1884	0.0446	1.099	1.278	1,299	61
t252	2.5031	0.0066	519	2.6675	0.0121	2.643	2.692	2,517	89
t253	2.3637	0.0052	1,032	2.4115	0.0095	2.392	2.431	7,581	84
t254	2.452	0.0044	923	2.5736	0.008	2.558	2.59	7,400	87
t255	2.4533	0.0047	786	2.5761	0.0086	2.559	2.593	6,016	88
t256	2.1652	0.0289	175	2.0469	0.0531	1.941	2.153	437	77
t257	2.3116	0.0085	553	2.3159	0.0157	2.285	2.347	2,926	83
t258	2.4706	0.0066	527	2.6078	0.0121	2.584	2.632	2,844	88
t259	2.3986	0.0068	615	2.4757	0.0125	2.451	2.501	3,605	86
t260	2.4856	0.0335	78	2.6353	0.0616	2.512	2.759	121	88
t261	2.2691	0.0473	81	2.2378	0.0869	2.064	2.412	121	81
t262	2.3207	0.0396	90	2.3325	0.0728	2.187	2.478	155	82
t263	2.2703	0.0063	674	2.24	0.0117	2.217	2.263	6,095	82

t264	2.3346	0.0077	773	2.358	0.0142	2.33	2.386	3,727	83
t265	2.8762	0.0019	1,097	3.3527	0.0035	3.346	3.36	3,360	100
t266	2.3155	0.0112	478	2.3229	0.0205	2.282	2.364	1,932	82
t267	2.404	0.0031	1,127	2.4856	0.0056	2.474	2.497	17,022	86
t268	2.3521	0.0065	628	2.3901	0.0119	2.366	2.414	4,526	85
t269	2.2176	0.0546	49	2.1431	0.1003	1.943	2.344	114	78
t270	2.1628	0.0037	1,631	2.0424	0.0068	2.029	2.056	26,389	77
t271	1.8849	0.0745	64	1.5321	0.1368	1.259	1.806	110	67
t272	2.2456	0.0039	1,433	2.1945	0.0072	2.18	2.209	19,097	80
t273	2.1206	0.058	74	1.9649	0.1066	1.752	2.178	115	76
t274	2.4302	0.0065	625	2.5336	0.0119	2.51	2.557	3,414	88
t275	2.5036	0.0067	450	2.6684	0.0124	2.644	2.693	2,350	90
t276	2.5552	0.008	384	2.7632	0.0147	2.734	2.793	1,368	90
t277	2.4345	0.01	496	2.5416	0.0183	2.505	2.578	1,650	86
t278	1.9302	0.0095	707	1.6153	0.0175	1.58	1.65	5,799	70
t279	2.5414	0.005	643	2.7378	0.0092	2.719	2.756	3,609	90
t280	2.0888	0.0375	137	1.9065	0.0689	1.769	2.044	308	74
t281	2.1621	0.0468	102	2.0412	0.086	1.869	2.213	168	76
t282	2.4891	0.0049	775	2.6417	0.0089	2.624	2.66	4,968	89
t283	1.9232	0.0208	295	1.6025	0.0383	1.526	1.679	1,311	68
t284	1.9819	0.0626	76	1.7102	0.115	1.48	1.94	132	71



t285	1.9599	0.011	699	1.6697	0.0202	1.629	1.71	4,309	70
t286	2.426	0.0063	627	2.5259	0.0115	2.503	2.549	3,687	87
t287	2.3254	0.0203	222	2.3412	0.0373	2.267	2.416	555	82
t288	2.3923	0.0078	562	2.4641	0.0144	2.435	2.493	2,700	86
t289	2.498	0.0043	949	2.6581	0.0078	2.642	2.674	6,459	89
t290	2.5927	0.0065	417	2.832	0.012	2.808	2.856	1,657	92
t291	2.4423	0.0078	497	2.5558	0.0143	2.527	2.584	2,263	88
t292	2.0423	0.0665	64	1.8211	0.1221	1.577	2.065	107	72
t293	2.5393	0.0144	184	2.7341	0.0264	2.681	2.787	490	89
t294	2.4947	0.0097	349	2.652	0.0178	2.616	2.688	1,292	89
t295	2.335	0.0056	731	2.3589	0.0102	2.338	2.379	6,426	84
t296	2.3707	0.005	840	2.4243	0.0091	2.406	2.443	7,247	85
t297	2.3734	0.006	701	2.4293	0.0111	2.407	2.451	4,941	85
t298	2.398	0.0051	999	2.4745	0.0093	2.456	2.493	6,654	86
t299	1.8976	0.0799	58	1.5554	0.1467	1.262	1.849	91	68
t300	1.9886	0.0573	65	1.7225	0.1053	1.512	1.933	154	71
t301	2.5243	0.0094	362	2.7064	0.0173	2.672	2.741	1,243	90
t302	2.4686	0.0129	287	2.6041	0.0238	2.557	2.652	840	87
t303	1.9754	0.0182	412	1.6983	0.0334	1.632	1.765	1,525	71
t304	2.3962	0.0057	656	2.4712	0.0104	2.45	2.492	5,090	86
t305	1.7464	0.0462	102	1.2777	0.0848	1.108	1.447	339	63

t306	1.6876	0.0343	87	1.1697	0.063	1.044	1.296	659	60
t307	1.9814	0.0168	440	1.7093	0.0308	1.648	1.771	1,757	72
t308	2.4368	0.0171	191	2.5457	0.0314	2.483	2.608	507	86
t309	2.0358	0.0144	491	1.8092	0.0264	1.757	1.862	2,166	74
t310	2.266	0.0118	360	2.232	0.0218	2.189	2.276	1,813	81
t311	2.333	0.0071	684	2.3552	0.013	2.329	2.381	4,053	84
t312	2.0951	0.0482	90	1.9181	0.0886	1.741	2.095	179	75
t313	2.3799	0.0052	851	2.4413	0.0095	2.422	2.46	6,551	85
t314	2.346	0.0058	681	2.3789	0.0106	2.358	2.4	5,775	84
t315	2.3828	0.0082	526	2.4465	0.0151	2.416	2.477	2,619	85
t316	2.32	0.009	524	2.3313	0.0165	2.298	2.364	2,672	83
t317	2.4424	0.0079	449	2.556	0.0146	2.527	2.585	2,213	88
t318	2.508	0.0081	427	2.6766	0.0149	2.647	2.706	1,671	89
t319	2.3607	0.0094	470	2.406	0.0173	2.371	2.441	2,116	85
t320	1.8621	0.0697	54	1.4902	0.128	1.234	1.746	128	67
t321	2.3595	0.021	183	2.4037	0.0385	2.327	2.481	445	84
t322	2.2433	0.0392	110	2.1903	0.072	2.046	2.334	205	79
t323	2.4292	0.0087	432	2.5319	0.016	2.5	2.564	1,927	88
t324	2.1411	0.0576	73	2.0027	0.1058	1.791	2.214	123	76
t325	2.3965	0.0076	524	2.4717	0.014	2.444	2.5	2,901	85
t326	2.4741	0.0109	360	2.6142	0.0199	2.574	2.654	1,177	88

t327	2.4114	0.0061	645	2.4992	0.0113	2.477	2.522	4,109	87
t328	2.3647	0.0058	777	2.4134	0.0106	2.392	2.435	5,501	85
t329	2.3977	0.0053	763	2.474	0.0098	2.455	2.494	5,862	86
t330	1.8474	0.0531	85	1.4632	0.0975	1.268	1.658	223	66
t331	2.365	0.0054	764	2.4138	0.0099	2.394	2.434	6,259	85
t332	2.3315	0.008	627	2.3523	0.0147	2.323	2.382	3,272	84
t333	2.406	0.0079	660	2.4892	0.0144	2.46	2.518	2,885	85
t334	2.4355	0.0063	606	2.5433	0.0116	2.52	2.567	3,496	88
t335	1.8587	0.058	58	1.484	0.1064	1.271	1.697	202	65
t336	2.2674	0.0076	648	2.2346	0.0139	2.207	2.262	4,312	82
t337	2.3762	0.0069	546	2.4345	0.0127	2.409	2.46	3,622	85
t338	2.3947	0.0145	275	2.4684	0.0266	2.415	2.522	806	86
t339	2.3927	0.0147	272	2.4648	0.027	2.411	2.519	821	85
t340	2.468	0.0122	347	2.6031	0.0223	2.558	2.648	945	87
t341	2.5101	0.0051	639	2.6803	0.0094	2.662	2.699	4,045	89
t342	1.8792	0.0396	117	1.5217	0.0728	1.376	1.667	390	67
t343	2.4161	0.0052	727	2.5077	0.0096	2.489	2.527	5,644	86
t344	1.8792	0.0396	117	1.5217	0.0728	1.376	1.667	390	67
t345	2.3806	0.0065	672	2.4425	0.0119	2.419	2.466	4,152	85
t346	2.3588	0.0063	721	2.4025	0.0116	2.379	2.426	4,702	85
t347	1.8194	0.0292	253	1.4118	0.0537	1.304	1.519	763	65

t348	2.4029	0.039	63	2.4835	0.0716	2.34	2.627	127	85
t349	2.1793	0.0428	102	2.0727	0.0786	1.916	2.23	181	79
t350	1.8926	0.0376	127	1.5461	0.069	1.408	1.684	427	67
t351	1.6952	0.074	50	1.1837	0.136	0.912	1.456	147	60
t352	2.3882	0.0064	660	2.4565	0.0118	2.433	2.48	4,105	86
t353	2.3892	0.0059	713	2.4583	0.0107	2.437	2.48	4,897	86
t354	1.796	0.0639	59	1.3688	0.1174	1.134	1.604	167	64
t355	2.4199	0.0068	603	2.5146	0.0125	2.49	2.54	3,287	87
t356	2.2722	0.0117	333	2.2435	0.0214	2.201	2.286	1,834	81
t357	2.5919	0.0083	296	2.8306	0.0152	2.8	2.861	1,139	92
t358	2.3524	0.0064	734	2.3908	0.0118	2.367	2.414	4,773	84
t359	2.242	0.025	198	2.1881	0.0459	2.096	2.28	489	80
t360	2.4677	0.0071	493	2.6025	0.013	2.577	2.628	2,499	90
t361	2.0409	0.0586	81	1.8186	0.1077	1.603	2.034	131	73
t362	2.6167	0.0077	294	2.8762	0.0142	2.848	2.905	1,034	93
t363	2.5216	0.0055	636	2.7014	0.0102	2.681	2.722	3,363	90
t364	2.4545	0.0064	648	2.5782	0.0118	2.555	2.602	3,298	88
t365	2.5566	0.008	362	2.7657	0.0148	2.736	2.795	1,344	91
t366	2.3185	0.0139	338	2.3285	0.0255	2.277	2.38	1,227	82
t367	2.4082	0.0053	850	2.4932	0.0097	2.474	2.513	5,884	86
t368	2.1472	0.0042	1,473	2.0139	0.0078	1.998	2.03	20,746	76

t369	2.3594	0.0065	604	2.4036	0.012	2.38	2.428	4,312	85
------	--------	--------	-----	--------	-------	------	-------	-------	----

**Table 10: William J. Clinton Document Analysis Results (SCALE B)**

<b>Text File</b>	<b>Raw Score</b>	<b>Raw SE</b>	<b>Unique Scored Words</b>	<b>Transformed Score</b>	<b>Transformed SE</b>	<b>Transformed [95% Confidence Interval]</b>		<b>Total Words Scored</b>	<b>% Tot Sc'd</b>
t1	0.3823	0.0241	132	-1.0302	0.2403	-1.5109	-0.5495	264	100
t2	0.698	0.1207	73	2.1242	1.2061	-0.288	4.5363	122	88
t3	0.4388	0.0149	474	-0.4656	0.1484	-0.7624	-0.1688	1,445	100
t4	0.4539	0.0215	349	-0.3144	0.2147	-0.7438	0.1149	1,155	94
t5	0.4333	0.0752	63	-0.521	0.7518	-2.0247	0.9827	139	63
t6	0.5112	0.0204	583	0.2574	0.2039	-0.1505	0.6652	1,417	100
t7	0.4113	0.04	176	-0.7403	0.4001	-1.5405	0.0598	349	86
t8	0.4942	0.0154	550	0.0883	0.1536	-0.2189	0.3955	2,626	94
t9	0.4712	0.0173	443	-0.1419	0.1726	-0.4871	0.2033	1,976	92
t10	0.3807	0.0389	98	-1.0463	0.3886	-1.8235	-0.269	280	76
t11	0.5126	0.0165	914	0.2716	0.1652	-0.0589	0.6021	2,654	100
t12	0.4894	0.016	607	0.0399	0.1595	-0.2792	0.359	2,392	89

t13	0.5	0.1173	56	0.1457	1.1725	-2.1993	2.4906	82	92
t14	0.4984	0.0254	340	0.1302	0.2541	-0.378	0.6384	875	91
t15	0.5572	0.0418	247	0.7169	0.4172	-0.1175	1.5512	722	87
t16	0.4459	0.011	764	-0.3946	0.1096	-0.6138	-0.1754	4,085	91
t17	0.581	0.0888	103	0.9551	0.887	-0.8189	2.7292	199	85
t18	0.5289	0.0922	57	0.4343	0.9214	-1.4085	2.2771	79	90
t19	0.4708	0.031	291	-0.1455	0.3101	-0.7658	0.4747	743	80
t20	0.5246	0.0168	753	0.3916	0.1678	0.056	0.7272	2,830	89
t21	0.3629	0.0312	194	-1.2241	0.3113	-1.8467	-0.6016	335	100
t22	0.6311	0.032	353	1.456	0.3197	0.8166	2.0954	933	91
t23	0.4637	0.0159	626	-0.2168	0.159	-0.5347	0.1012	2,214	87
t24	0.4207	0.0337	268	-0.6467	0.3367	-1.3201	0.0267	706	84
t25	0.4779	0.0213	473	-0.075	0.2127	-0.5004	0.3505	1,593	89
t26	0.4364	0.0534	174	-0.49	0.5335	-1.5569	0.577	380	77
t27	0.4722	0.0118	688	-0.1315	0.1181	-0.3677	0.1048	3,533	93
t28	0.4697	0.0235	438	-0.1564	0.2345	-0.6254	0.3125	922	100
t29	0.5707	0.0396	266	0.8518	0.3952	0.0613	1.6423	647	92
t30	0.4901	0.0475	214	0.0474	0.4748	-0.9023	0.997	508	83
t31	0.5904	0.0363	251	1.0489	0.3628	0.3232	1.7745	744	84
t32	0.6314	0.0579	114	1.4591	0.5787	0.3016	2.6166	250	87
t33	0.5902	0.116	60	1.0468	1.1592	-1.2716	3.3653	98	90

t34	0.3801	0.0357	85	-1.052	0.3566	-1.7652	-0.3388	128	100
t35	0.5259	0.0351	304	0.4044	0.3507	-0.297	1.1058	734	89
t36	0.495	0.0112	853	0.0956	0.112	-0.1284	0.3195	5,336	91
t37	0.3994	0.0258	181	-0.8595	0.2575	-1.3745	-0.3445	415	92
t38	0.496	0.0516	134	0.1059	0.5158	-0.9258	1.1375	249	87
t39	0.4948	0.0104	812	0.094	0.1038	-0.1136	0.3016	5,906	93
t40	0.5458	0.0157	579	0.6031	0.1573	0.2885	0.9177	2,971	92
t41	0.4864	0.0158	518	0.0101	0.1581	-0.3061	0.3263	2,328	94
t42	0.4613	0.0155	472	-0.2413	0.1551	-0.5515	0.0689	2,055	93
t43	0.5266	0.0476	148	0.4118	0.4753	-0.5388	1.3625	341	87
t44	0.6324	0.0206	626	1.4692	0.2062	1.0567	1.8816	2,778	91
t45	0.5156	0.0414	186	0.3019	0.4133	-0.5247	1.1285	471	85
t46	0.5521	0.0294	312	0.6668	0.2937	0.0795	1.2541	917	93
t47	0.5328	0.0173	588	0.4736	0.173	0.1275	0.8197	2,911	92
t48	0.6697	0.0372	276	1.8411	0.3717	1.0977	2.5845	802	88
t49	0.5064	0.0127	741	0.2096	0.1271	-0.0445	0.4637	4,543	91
t50	0.6549	0.0315	401	1.6936	0.3143	1.0651	2.3222	1,170	89
t51	0.523	0.0221	517	0.3754	0.2207	-0.0661	0.8168	1,732	86
t52	0.4356	0.0483	108	-0.4978	0.4829	-1.4637	0.4681	204	82
t53	0.4996	0.0107	1,084	0.1415	0.1069	-0.0724	0.3554	5,179	100
t54	0.491	0.0227	457	0.0563	0.2273	-0.3982	0.5109	1,428	85

t55	0.502	0.0158	611	0.1655	0.1576	-0.1497	0.4806	2,888	93
t56	0.5348	0.0837	106	0.4937	0.8364	-1.1791	2.1664	162	92
t57	0.4522	0.0184	395	-0.3313	0.1842	-0.6997	0.037	1,517	94
t58	0.5066	0.0124	785	0.2113	0.1239	-0.0365	0.4592	4,872	91
t59	0.7361	0.061	184	2.5045	0.61	1.2846	3.7244	375	91
t60	0.6501	0.027	520	1.6451	0.2698	1.1055	2.1847	1,746	88
t61	0.5831	0.018	580	0.9757	0.1796	0.6166	1.3348	2,616	92
t62	0.4709	0.0308	251	-0.1454	0.3077	-0.7608	0.47	719	94
t63	0.5639	0.0174	602	0.7847	0.1737	0.4372	1.1321	2,591	93
t64	0.6218	0.0349	323	1.363	0.3484	0.6661	2.0598	617	100
t65	0.5843	0.0343	242	0.9879	0.3427	0.3025	1.6732	558	90
t66	0.5548	0.0139	794	0.6933	0.1387	0.4159	0.9707	4,185	92
t67	0.5309	0.0353	266	0.4549	0.3523	-0.2496	1.1594	781	91
t68	0.4097	0.0195	270	-0.7565	0.1953	-1.1472	-0.3659	873	94
t69	0.3603	0.064	58	-1.2499	0.6396	-2.5291	0.0294	105	67
t70	0.6401	0.0239	628	1.5452	0.2386	1.068	2.0224	1,684	100
t71	0.7073	0.0492	283	2.2171	0.4914	1.2344	3.1998	669	90
t72	0.446	0.0302	234	-0.3938	0.302	-0.9977	0.2102	615	84
t73	0.4015	0.0404	95	-0.8388	0.4032	-1.6453	-0.0324	200	80
t74	0.5719	0.0276	402	0.8639	0.2753	0.3132	1.4145	1,180	90
t75	0.7547	0.1414	49	2.6909	1.4126	-0.1343	5.5161	73	86



t76	0.4582	0.0105	829	-0.2721	0.1054	-0.4829	-0.0613	5,130	91
t77	0.5063	0.0775	95	0.2088	0.7746	-1.3404	1.758	196	81
t78	0.6415	0.0433	222	1.5596	0.4323	0.6951	2.4242	598	90
t79	0.6072	0.0382	247	1.2166	0.3814	0.4538	1.9794	781	91
t80	0.4374	0.031	199	-0.4801	0.3097	-1.0995	0.1393	369	100
t81	0.5633	0.0286	458	0.7787	0.2859	0.207	1.3505	1,307	89
t82	0.6606	0.0388	264	1.7503	0.3874	0.9755	2.525	784	95
t83	0.3733	0.0236	255	-1.1205	0.2358	-1.5921	-0.6489	774	73
t84	0.5868	0.0265	306	1.0126	0.2648	0.4829	1.5423	1,077	95
t85	2.8675	0.1166	333	23.8004	1.1654	21.4696	26.1312	693	100
t86	0.4791	0.0551	91	-0.0631	0.5501	-1.1633	1.0372	150	100
t87	0.4791	0.0551	91	-0.0631	0.5501	-1.1633	1.0372	150	100
t88	0.5263	0.0266	253	0.4086	0.2654	-0.1221	0.9393	734	96
t89	0.5359	0.0121	1,024	0.5049	0.1205	0.2638	0.746	5,983	90
t90	0.471	0.015	909	-0.1438	0.1501	-0.444	0.1563	2,765	100
t91	0.4605	0.0146	782	-0.2487	0.1456	-0.54	0.0426	2,724	93
t92	1.052	0.2563	46	5.6611	2.5608	0.5395	10.7826	76	84
t93	0.4262	0.0114	987	-0.5913	0.1138	-0.819	-0.3637	3,157	100
t94	0.5632	0.0419	234	0.7778	0.4186	-0.0593	1.6149	626	91
t95	0.3216	0.0289	68	-1.6371	0.2892	-2.2155	-1.0586	185	67
t96	0.5077	0.0338	255	0.2232	0.3382	-0.4531	0.8996	774	91

t97	0.4361	0.0135	707	-0.4931	0.1346	-0.7623	-0.2239	2,962	87
t98	0.5235	0.0134	867	0.3808	0.1335	0.1137	0.6478	4,261	90
t99	0.4998	0.0301	260	0.1442	0.3004	-0.4566	0.745	680	100
t100	0.5825	0.1059	40	0.9698	1.0583	-1.1468	3.0864	61	81
t101	0.3684	0.0469	111	-1.1688	0.4688	-2.1064	-0.2312	233	80
t102	0.4633	0.0294	274	-0.2214	0.2939	-0.8092	0.3665	923	89
t103	0.4331	0.0746	76	-0.5221	0.7452	-2.0126	0.9684	147	74
t104	0.5249	0.0503	177	0.3942	0.5021	-0.6101	1.3984	327	90
t105	0.4815	0.0336	278	-0.0395	0.3357	-0.7108	0.6319	826	87

**Table 11: George Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE A)**

<b>Text File</b>	<b>Raw Score</b>	<b>Raw SE</b>	<b>Unique Scored Words</b>	<b>Transformed Score</b>	<b>Transformed SE</b>	<b>Transformed [95% Confidence Interval]</b>		<b>Total Words Scored</b>	<b>% Tot Sc'd</b>
t1	1.4613	0.065	59	2.3836	0.4958	1.392	3.3753	166	63
t2	1.352	0.0699	50	1.5486	0.5335	0.4817	2.6156	97	70
t3	1.3674	0.0298	143	1.6663	0.2273	1.2117	2.121	855	59
t4	1.3555	0.0323	120	1.5754	0.2465	1.0823	2.0684	720	59

t5	0.9647	0.0786	40	-1.4076	0.5998	-2.6072	-0.208	107	48
t6	1.3293	0.0308	172	1.3757	0.2348	0.906	1.8454	820	58
t7	1.1905	0.0596	76	0.3158	0.4548	-0.5937	1.2254	220	54
t8	1.3967	0.0211	179	1.8898	0.1612	1.5674	2.2123	1,679	60
t9	1.3568	0.0244	152	1.5858	0.1861	1.2137	1.9579	1,266	59
t10	1.0284	0.0541	43	-0.9211	0.413	-1.7471	0.0951	195	53
t11	1.3211	0.0229	210	1.3131	0.1748	0.9635	1.6626	1,518	57
t12	1.3186	0.0223	195	1.2941	0.1705	0.953	1.6352	1,541	58
t13	1.2526	0.1006	32	0.7898	0.7683	-0.7469	2.3264	57	64
t14	1.3292	0.0356	129	1.3747	0.272	0.8307	1.9186	566	59
t15	1.2477	0.0266	155	0.7524	0.2032	0.3461	1.1587	609	73
t16	1.3149	0.0174	210	1.2658	0.1326	1.0006	1.5311	2,568	57
t17	1.2374	0.0743	49	0.6743	0.5673	-0.4603	1.8089	131	56
t18	1.2711	0.1064	34	0.9313	0.8118	-0.6924	2.555	56	64
t19	1.1486	0.0401	118	-0.0037	0.3063	-0.6164	0.6089	483	52
t20	1.3103	0.021	224	1.2305	0.1606	0.9093	1.5518	1,794	56
t21	1.1081	0.0691	66	-0.3128	0.5273	-1.3675	0.7418	169	50
t22	1.5015	0.0315	168	2.6902	0.2403	2.2097	3.1708	673	66
t23	1.2574	0.0241	195	0.8272	0.1839	0.4595	1.1949	1,385	55
t24	1.0291	0.0445	101	-0.9156	0.34	-1.5957	0.2355	399	48

t25	1.3037	0.0279	162	1.1803	0.2129	0.7545	1.6061	1,013	56
t26	1.0793	0.0555	78	-0.533	0.4236	-1.3803	0.3143	248	50
t27	1.3608	0.0182	203	1.6158	0.1386	1.3386	1.8929	2,269	60
t28	1.2706	0.0398	118	0.9278	0.3038	0.3202	1.5355	503	55
t29	1.3913	0.043	108	1.8489	0.3281	1.1927	2.5051	413	59
t30	1.1789	0.0491	90	0.2273	0.3747	-0.522	0.9767	324	53
t31	1.3377	0.0341	110	1.4398	0.2599	0.9199	1.9597	552	63
t32	1.4354	0.0544	67	2.1854	0.4155	1.3544	3.0164	194	67
t33	1.1834	0.0913	31	0.2619	0.6969	-1.1319	1.6557	66	61
t34	1.2164	0.0964	36	0.514	0.7357	-0.9574	1.9854	72	56
t35	1.2974	0.0415	123	1.132	0.3166	0.4988	1.7652	464	57
t36	1.3911	0.0147	235	1.8473	0.1122	1.6228	2.0717	3,502	60
t37	1.293	0.057	70	1.0985	0.4352	0.2281	1.9689	247	55
t38	1.1921	0.0702	67	0.3281	0.5358	-0.7435	1.3997	156	55
t39	1.4048	0.0135	244	1.9523	0.1028	1.7467	2.1579	3,957	62
t40	1.3958	0.0191	191	1.8833	0.1455	1.5923	2.1743	1,977	61
t41	1.3949	0.0222	179	1.8761	0.1698	1.5366	2.2157	1,505	61
t42	1.366	0.0245	158	1.6559	0.1872	1.2815	2.0303	1,296	59
t43	1.3648	0.0512	77	1.6463	0.3906	0.8651	2.4276	252	64
t44	1.4332	0.0193	221	2.1689	0.1475	1.8739	2.4639	1,898	62
t45	1.2997	0.0453	81	1.1494	0.3457	0.458	1.8408	330	60

t46	1.5245	0.0332	132	2.8655	0.2536	2.3582	3.3728	635	64
t47	1.4429	0.0196	187	2.2426	0.1495	1.9437	2.5415	1,935	61
t48	1.5078	0.031	137	2.7383	0.2365	2.2652	3.2114	627	69
t49	1.3573	0.0162	213	1.5894	0.1239	1.3416	1.8371	2,908	59
t50	1.4261	0.0278	160	2.1149	0.2124	1.6901	2.5397	843	64
t51	1.2583	0.0268	173	0.8334	0.2049	0.4237	1.2431	1,102	55
t52	1.1574	0.0706	54	0.0637	0.5391	-1.0145	1.1419	140	56
t53	1.3988	0.0153	240	1.9062	0.1169	1.6724	2.1399	3,159	61
t54	1.275	0.0293	152	0.9613	0.2236	0.5141	1.4086	921	55
t55	1.3891	0.0193	210	1.8321	0.1472	1.5378	2.1264	1,924	62
t56	1.2703	0.0763	59	0.9254	0.5826	-0.2399	2.0907	111	63
t57	1.3274	0.0284	143	1.3612	0.2168	0.9275	1.7949	946	59
t58	1.3632	0.0157	242	1.6347	0.1195	1.3956	1.8738	3,152	59
t59	1.5005	0.0495	100	2.6826	0.3778	1.927	3.4382	272	66
t60	1.3987	0.0245	200	1.9054	0.1871	1.5312	2.2796	1,201	61
t61	1.4593	0.0194	212	2.3683	0.1478	2.0728	2.6638	1,815	64
t62	1.3929	0.0412	107	1.861	0.3147	1.2316	2.4903	459	60
t63	1.4821	0.0197	202	2.5424	0.1503	2.2419	2.843	1,788	64
t64	1.4919	0.0426	135	2.6171	0.3252	1.9667	3.2676	392	64
t65	1.4437	0.0431	107	2.249	0.3292	1.5905	2.9074	383	62
t66	1.4399	0.0155	256	2.2196	0.1181	1.9835	2.4557	2,902	64

t67	1.4203	0.0391	113	2.0707	0.2985	1.4737	2.6676	513	60
t68	1.3125	0.0378	106	1.2475	0.2886	0.6703	1.8247	538	58
t69	0.8823	0.1016	29	-2.0364	0.7754	-3.5872	0.4855	69	44
t70	1.4637	0.0245	201	2.4016	0.1869	2.0278	2.7753	1,088	65
t71	1.4763	0.0383	135	2.4976	0.2922	1.9131	3.0821	472	64
t72	1.2421	0.0446	95	0.7097	0.3402	0.0294	1.39	398	54
t73	1.0374	0.0753	47	-0.8524	0.5746	-2.0016	0.2969	126	50
t74	1.4169	0.0305	157	2.0442	0.2327	1.5788	2.5095	798	61
t75	1.508	0.0922	40	2.7401	0.7041	1.3319	4.1484	63	74
t76	1.3312	0.0157	241	1.3899	0.1198	1.1502	1.6296	3,213	57
t77	1.0598	0.0625	52	-0.6817	0.4772	-1.6361	0.2726	142	59
t78	1.3588	0.0301	159	1.6008	0.2296	1.1417	2.0599	509	76
t79	1.3276	0.0265	169	1.363	0.2027	0.9577	1.7683	646	76
t80	1.2943	0.0579	77	1.1085	0.4417	0.2251	1.9919	215	58
t81	1.2858	0.0324	153	1.0432	0.2475	0.5482	1.5382	795	54
t82	1.4903	0.0364	123	2.6047	0.2779	2.0489	3.1605	529	64
t83	1.0082	0.0347	116	-1.0753	0.2646	-1.6046	-0.546	550	52
t84	1.5722	0.0299	139	3.2299	0.2285	2.773	3.6868	757	67
t85	2.5773	0.0191	333	10.9029	0.1455	10.612	11.194	693	100
t86	1.3449	0.0802	44	1.4949	0.6126	0.2698	2.7201	95	63
t87	1.3449	0.0802	44	1.4949	0.6126	0.2698	2.7201	95	63

t88	1.4928	0.0367	124	2.6239	0.28	2.0639	3.1839	510	67
t89	1.3732	0.0138	265	1.7108	0.1052	1.5004	1.9211	3,970	59
t90	1.2748	0.0224	190	0.9597	0.1712	0.6173	1.302	1,548	56
t91	1.3017	0.0222	204	1.1648	0.1693	0.8263	1.5033	1,646	56
t92	1.4108	0.0955	31	1.9977	0.7287	0.5404	3.455	60	67
t93	1.2925	0.0216	188	1.0946	0.1649	0.7648	1.4243	1,755	56
t94	1.2404	0.0289	152	0.6969	0.221	0.2549	1.1389	511	74
t95	1.0195	0.0741	35	-0.989	0.5658	-2.1205	0.1425	134	49
t96	1.297	0.0237	183	1.1292	0.181	0.7671	1.4912	681	80
t97	1.2072	0.0213	201	0.4435	0.1623	0.119	0.7681	1,813	53
t98	1.3823	0.0163	250	1.7804	0.1246	1.5311	2.0297	2,827	60
t99	1.4227	0.0186	260	2.0883	0.1423	1.8037	2.3729	680	100
t100	1.3167	0.1055	28	1.2798	0.8054	-0.3309	2.8905	48	64
t101	1.019	0.0676	53	-0.9931	0.5158	-2.0247	0.0385	148	51
t102	1.2034	0.022	171	0.4148	0.1679	0.0789	0.7507	782	75
t103	1.0128	0.0807	37	-1.0403	0.6162	-2.2727	0.192	100	51
t104	1.278	0.0634	75	0.9841	0.4839	0.0163	1.9519	199	55
t105	1.1956	0.0255	169	0.3547	0.1947	-0.0346	0.744	675	71

**Table 12: George Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE B)**

<b>Text File</b>	<b>Raw Score</b>	<b>Raw SE</b>	<b>Unique Scored Words</b>	<b>Transformed Score</b>	<b>Transformed SE</b>	<b>Transformed [95% Confidence Interval]</b>		<b>Total Words Scored</b>	<b>% Tot Sc'd</b>
t1	2.938	0.1042	121	-2.5287	1.1327	-4.7942	-0.2632	348	84.1
t2	3.5142	0.0901	245	3.7378	0.9802	1.7773	5.6983	538	89.8
t3	2.8739	0.0177	723	-3.2253	0.1922	-3.6097	-2.8409	10,987	76.8
t4	3.4146	0.0243	1,004	2.6545	0.2642	2.1261	3.183	5,414	91.9
t5	3.3108	0.0601	469	1.5262	0.6533	0.2196	2.8328	1,519	85.9
t6	3.1322	0.0161	921	-0.4161	0.1755	-0.7671	-0.0651	8,155	86.3
t7	3.4523	0.0397	485	3.0647	0.4316	2.2014	3.928	1,816	90.7
t8	3.6267	0.0199	1,097	4.9615	0.2164	4.5287	5.3943	6,765	94.1
t9	3.0815	0.0556	344	-0.9675	0.6049	-2.1774	0.2424	1,352	81.1
t10	3.3032	0.0836	204	1.4436	0.9093	-0.375	3.2623	435	89.3
t11	3.4743	0.0238	919	3.3044	0.2584	2.7875	3.8213	4,848	93.6
t12	3.1793	0.0445	446	0.0964	0.4838	-0.8712	1.0639	1,544	90.8
t13	4.1331	0.3123	47	10.4686	3.3959	3.6767	17.2605	57	81.4
t14	3.4117	0.065	311	2.6226	0.7068	1.2089	4.0362	840	92.5
t15	3.6558	0.0734	175	5.2779	0.7985	3.6809	6.8749	472	94.6
t16	3.7091	0.0459	424	5.8573	0.4989	4.8594	6.8552	1,394	95.5
t17	3.3989	0.018	1,260	2.4843	0.1956	2.0931	2.8754	7,654	100
t18	3.5164	0.0178	1,201	3.7621	0.1933	3.3755	4.1487	8,052	94.8
t19	3.5809	0.0226	958	4.4636	0.2462	3.9712	4.956	5,480	94.2



t20	2.9694	0.1356	106	-2.187	1.4748	-5.1366	0.7626	225	84.3
t21	3.196	0.0462	532	0.2778	0.5026	-0.7274	1.283	1,697	90.8
t22	3.1246	0.04	639	-0.4992	0.4351	-1.3693	0.3709	2,271	90
t23	3.3019	0.0217	1,157	1.4291	0.2357	0.9576	1.9006	5,595	100
t24	3.4117	0.065	311	2.6226	0.7068	1.2089	4.0362	840	92.5
t25	3.4946	0.1163	173	3.5243	1.2645	0.9954	6.0532	335	87
t26	3.5596	0.0501	386	4.2316	0.5449	3.1419	5.3214	1,188	91.9
t27	2.7322	0.1258	110	-4.7658	1.3676	-7.501	-2.0306	269	77.7
t28	3.3923	0.0209	1,191	2.4126	0.2269	1.9589	2.8664	7,110	92.8
t29	3.6583	0.0346	740	5.3052	0.3757	4.5537	6.0567	2,944	93.3
t30	2.7993	0.0571	309	-4.037	0.621	-5.279	-2.7951	1,315	76.5
t31	3.634	0.0225	787	5.0409	0.2452	4.5505	5.5314	5,329	92.1
t32	3.5165	0.0725	338	3.7629	0.7888	2.1853	5.3405	912	88.7
t33	3.4662	0.2281	83	3.2155	2.4809	-1.7463	8.1772	123	82
t34	3.5926	0.0198	1,134	4.5901	0.2153	4.1595	5.0208	6,693	94.1
t35	3.1948	0.0674	179	0.2645	0.7327	-1.2009	1.73	478	93
t36	3.4274	0.2366	80	2.7941	2.5725	-2.3509	7.9391	123	82
t37	3.5889	0.0197	1,089	4.5505	0.2145	4.1214	4.9796	6,732	95.6
t38	3.5074	0.0388	490	3.6635	0.4224	2.8186	4.5084	1,625	94.1
t39	3.2486	0.0378	812	0.849	0.4108	0.0274	1.6706	2,730	89.7
t40	3.2447	0.0348	805	0.807	0.3786	0.0499	1.5642	2,983	90.3
t41	3.7001	0.0227	1,030	5.7596	0.2472	5.2652	6.2539	5,711	94.1
t42	3.5681	0.2372	81	4.3239	2.5793	-0.8348	9.4825	120	83.3

t43	3.6378	0.077	141	5.0818	0.837	3.4079	6.7557	340	93.4
t44	4.8754	0.0359	855	18.5407	0.3901	17.7606	19.3209	3,440	100
t45	3.6604	0.0275	799	5.3274	0.2988	4.7297	5.925	4,072	95.6
t46	3.8849	0.025	1,019	7.7688	0.2721	7.2246	8.313	6,048	95.3
t47	2.9645	0.0709	329	-2.2398	0.7715	-3.7827	-0.6968	955	81.7
t48	3.7923	0.0407	510	6.7619	0.4424	5.8772	7.6467	1,879	95.2
t49	3.2827	0.0849	202	1.2198	0.9237	-0.6276	3.0672	453	91.1
t50	3.6719	0.0206	1,099	5.4524	0.2244	5.0037	5.9011	7,008	96
t51	3.5271	0.0548	324	3.8777	0.5957	2.6863	5.0691	1,139	88.4
t52	3.4196	0.0424	516	2.7087	0.461	1.7867	3.6307	1,645	92.6
t53	3.6317	0.0219	964	5.0161	0.2377	4.5407	5.4915	5,590	94.6
t54	3.7152	0.1075	150	5.9234	1.1691	3.5853	8.2616	319	94.1
t55	4.5039	0.0231	1,359	14.5009	0.2514	13.9982	15.0037	7,056	100
t56	3.5322	0.0198	1,030	3.9335	0.2155	3.5026	4.3644	7,258	94.9
t57	3.7401	0.0195	1,123	6.1948	0.2119	5.771	6.6187	7,757	95.3
t58	7.2273	0.2392	74	44.1164	2.6016	38.9132	49.3196	107	100
t59	3.7268	0.02	1,055	6.0493	0.2178	5.6136	6.4849	6,439	96.1
t60	3.7419	0.0189	1,028	6.2135	0.205	5.8035	6.6235	7,753	95.9
t61	3.7243	0.0214	1,011	6.0228	0.2331	5.5566	6.4889	6,016	95.6
t62	3.0859	0.0171	724	-0.9195	0.1856	-1.2908	-0.5483	6,803	85.9
t63	3.6224	0.019	1,148	4.9147	0.2065	4.5017	5.3277	7,930	95.1
t64	3.7106	0.2194	89	5.8733	2.3858	1.1017	10.6449	130	85
t65	3.4481	0.0514	408	3.019	0.5595	1.9	4.138	1,142	91.2

t66	3.6246	0.0205	1,103	4.9389	0.2227	4.4936	5.3842	6,763	94.5
t67	3.5629	0.0205	1,145	4.2675	0.2235	3.8206	4.7145	6,936	95.2
t68	3.5553	0.0196	1,146	4.185	0.2134	3.7581	4.6119	7,077	94
t69	3.7023	0.0212	1,082	5.7831	0.2303	5.3226	6.2436	6,372	95.6
t70	3.5241	0.0491	389	3.8455	0.5341	2.7773	4.9138	1,159	92.7
t71	3.7399	0.0388	574	6.1921	0.4223	5.3474	7.0368	2,360	93.7
t72	3.6793	0.0185	1,241	5.5328	0.2013	5.1302	5.9354	8,390	95.1
t73	3.6228	0.02	1,170	4.9192	0.2172	4.4847	5.3537	7,693	94.5
t74	3.6215	0.025	881	4.9042	0.2719	4.3604	5.4479	4,643	93.5
t75	3.5596	0.0458	521	4.2316	0.498	3.2356	5.2276	1,602	93.2
t76	3.6117	0.021	1,079	4.7979	0.2286	4.3407	5.2552	6,247	94.2
t77	2.74	0.102	154	-4.6811	1.1094	-6.9	-2.4623	270	100
t78	3.0492	0.1661	106	-1.319	1.8066	-4.9322	2.2942	176	93.1
t79	3.6096	0.0213	1,033	4.7757	0.2311	4.3135	5.2379	6,020	94.5
t80	3.4916	0.0439	496	3.4919	0.4779	2.536	4.4477	1,668	92.1
t81	3.6663	0.0219	931	5.3922	0.2386	4.915	5.8693	5,549	95.2
t82	3.5939	0.0308	568	4.604	0.3349	3.9343	5.2738	2,479	93.5
t83	3.6495	0.0191	1,051	5.2094	0.2081	4.7932	5.6255	6,796	95.1
t84	2.9652	0.1815	43	-2.2329	1.9732	-6.1793	1.7136	119	80.4
t85	2.9652	0.1815	43	-2.2329	1.9732	-6.1793	1.7136	119	80.4
t86	3.5587	0.0211	1,022	4.2213	0.2295	3.7624	4.6803	5,909	93.7
t87	3.5789	0.0196	1,039	4.4417	0.2129	4.016	4.8675	6,730	94.3
t88	3.5601	0.0199	1,082	4.2373	0.2166	3.804	4.6705	6,842	94.9

t89	3.4697	0.0212	1,020	3.2539	0.2301	2.7938	3.714	6,452	93.4
t90	3.5818	0.0199	1,112	4.4726	0.2169	4.0389	4.9063	6,647	94.4
t91	3.5182	0.0177	1,153	3.7818	0.1927	3.3963	4.1673	8,424	94.2
t92	3.534	0.0193	1,063	3.9535	0.2094	3.5346	4.3724	6,706	95.2
t93	3.5796	0.0188	1,066	4.4488	0.2048	4.0392	4.8583	7,291	95.7
t94	3.6555	0.0179	1,143	5.2749	0.1942	4.8864	5.6633	7,971	95
t95	3.6343	0.0184	1,145	5.0436	0.1997	4.6441	5.4431	7,730	95.3
t96	3.6473	0.0187	1,145	5.1849	0.2038	4.7774	5.5924	7,506	95.1
t97	3.644	0.0184	1,186	5.1495	0.1997	4.7501	5.549	7,789	95.5
t98	3.288	0.0422	418	1.2778	0.4592	0.3594	2.1963	1,488	92.3
t99	3.6451	0.0188	1,126	5.1617	0.2045	4.7528	5.5707	7,777	95.3
t100	3.5288	0.0182	1,172	3.8967	0.1978	3.5012	4.2923	7,855	94.2
t101	3.4933	0.0276	764	3.5106	0.3006	2.9093	4.1119	3,722	94.2
t102	3.5969	0.0187	1,097	4.6367	0.2028	4.2311	5.0424	7,121	94.9
t103	3.59	0.0228	856	4.5625	0.2475	4.0675	5.0575	4,667	94.5
t104	3.6153	0.0179	1,098	4.8378	0.1951	4.4476	5.228	7,569	95.2
t105	3.2648	0.076	217	1.0256	0.8265	-0.6275	2.6786	646	88.4
t106	2.9238	0.0815	247	-2.683	0.8859	-4.4548	-0.9113	531	89.4
t107	3.5297	0.0242	789	3.9063	0.2631	3.3802	4.4325	4,116	94.5
t108	3.5477	0.0163	1,176	4.102	0.1767	3.7485	4.4555	8,809	95.4
t109	3.5403	0.0176	1,091	4.0221	0.1918	3.6385	4.4057	7,631	95.5
t110	3.4957	0.0233	981	3.5371	0.2532	3.0307	4.0435	5,129	94.2
t111	3.5837	0.0177	1,141	4.494	0.1922	4.1096	4.8784	7,759	95.9

t112	3.5842	0.0189	1,099	4.4994	0.2057	4.0881	4.9107	7,061	95.3
t113	3.279	0.1168	139	1.1796	1.2707	-1.3618	3.7209	278	85.5
t114	3.3753	0.0182	1,174	2.2274	0.1981	1.8312	2.6236	7,735	91.2
t115	3.0568	0.2174	53	-1.2364	2.3646	-5.9655	3.4928	72	93.5
t116	3.7773	0.2911	31	6.5987	3.1654	0.2679	12.9296	45	86.5
t117	3.6063	0.0611	349	4.7395	0.6645	3.4104	6.0685	960	94
t118	3.1846	0.0393	671	0.1539	0.4278	-0.7018	1.0095	2,197	91.4
t119	3.5514	0.0193	1,170	4.1427	0.2095	3.7236	4.5617	7,393	95
t120	3.5615	0.0191	1,170	4.2524	0.2077	3.837	4.6678	7,477	95
t121	3.5055	0.2129	89	3.6435	2.315	-0.9865	8.2735	138	85.2
t122	3.6667	0.0374	621	5.3964	0.4069	4.5826	6.2101	2,394	94.3
t123	3.3966	0.0672	388	2.4585	0.7311	0.9964	3.9206	1,201	85.2
t124	3.4595	0.0441	665	3.1424	0.4792	2.1841	4.1008	2,007	91.9
t125	3.7542	0.0219	919	6.3475	0.2382	5.8712	6.8238	6,715	96
t126	3.4496	0.1323	102	3.0354	1.4387	0.1581	5.9127	265	87.2
t127	2.9658	0.09	149	-2.2256	0.9784	-4.1824	-0.2688	521	81.9
t128	3.7477	0.0222	1,002	6.2769	0.2416	5.7938	6.76	6,632	96
t129	3.7969	0.0206	966	6.8125	0.2241	6.3643	7.2608	7,116	95.7
t130	3.7228	0.0184	951	6.0061	0.1997	5.6068	6.4054	8,570	94.8
t131	3.8397	0.0233	904	7.2774	0.2529	6.7715	7.7833	5,742	95.7
t132	3.8294	0.0235	951	7.1653	0.2555	6.6542	7.6764	5,920	94.9
t133	3.1342	0.0338	832	-0.395	0.368	-1.1311	0.3411	3,188	91
t134	3.1843	0.0702	375	0.1507	0.7637	-1.3767	1.6781	1,025	86.4

t135	3.1647	0.0904	246	-0.0631	0.9829	-2.0288	1.9026	545	92.7
t136	3.0894	0.2413	90	-0.8817	2.6239	-6.1295	4.3661	117	93.6
t137	3.1289	0.042	477	-0.4521	0.4571	-1.3664	0.4621	1,342	100
t138	3.4008	0.051	326	2.5043	0.5548	1.3947	3.6138	1,027	96.3
t139	3.8137	0.0272	813	6.9948	0.2961	6.4027	7.5869	4,412	96.1
t140	3.2807	0.0273	889	1.1981	0.2967	0.6047	1.7914	3,908	100
t141	3.4364	0.0257	866	2.8922	0.2793	2.3336	3.4508	4,358	94.6
t142	3.5599	0.0929	200	4.2349	1.0102	2.2145	6.2552	418	95.7
t143	3.4978	0.0428	414	3.5592	0.4652	2.6288	4.4897	1,514	94.9
t144	3.3363	0.0477	413	1.8034	0.5188	0.7659	2.841	1,424	92.7
t145	3.081	0.0754	237	-0.9733	0.82	-2.6134	0.6667	557	87.7
t146	3.1623	0.0409	559	-0.0895	0.4448	-0.9791	0.8002	1,919	91.4
t147	3.4424	0.0457	474	2.957	0.4972	1.9625	3.9515	1,569	94.5
t148	3.2393	0.0483	435	0.7478	0.5249	-0.302	1.7977	1,426	90.8
t149	3.43	0.0282	603	2.8218	0.3068	2.2083	3.4354	2,964	91.6
t150	2.6496	0.119	159	-5.6648	1.2942	-8.2532	-3.0764	323	79.4
t151	4.3665	0.3363	43	13.0068	3.6569	5.693	20.3205	52	91.2
t152	3.8993	0.0933	201	7.926	1.0141	5.8977	9.9543	400	94.6
t153	3.4777	0.0282	668	3.341	0.3064	2.7282	3.9539	3,305	94.2
t154	3.9534	0.0273	807	8.5145	0.2973	7.9199	9.1091	4,401	96.4
t155	3.8135	0.0257	855	6.9927	0.2795	6.4338	7.5516	5,184	94.8
t156	3.7501	0.0255	877	6.3036	0.2778	5.7479	6.8593	4,983	95
t157	3.1464	0.3025	34	-0.2622	3.2898	-6.8418	6.3174	44	78.6

t158	3.6776	0.0549	331	5.515	0.5969	4.3212	6.7087	948	94.1
t159	3.2259	0.0368	616	0.6026	0.4004	-0.1982	1.4033	2,214	91.6
t160	3.8611	0.0222	909	7.5101	0.2413	7.0275	7.9928	6,382	96.9
t161	2.8887	0.0377	824	-3.0639	0.4096	-3.883	-2.2447	2,333	100
t162	4.1038	0.1719	100	10.149	1.8694	6.4102	13.8878	186	88.6
t163	3.4188	0.0182	1,288	2.7001	0.1984	2.3033	3.0968	8,418	92.9
t164	3.6344	0.1361	135	5.0447	1.4795	2.0857	8.0038	253	88.2
t165	4.0294	0.2198	73	9.3401	2.3898	4.5605	14.1197	122	93.1
t166	3.5945	0.0438	431	4.6105	0.4765	3.6574	5.5636	1,536	94.7
t167	3.816	0.0238	891	7.0196	0.2588	6.5019	7.5373	5,671	94.3
t168	3.8954	0.0227	890	7.8834	0.2464	7.3906	8.3763	6,188	95.9
t169	3.4274	0.2132	87	2.7938	2.3186	-1.8435	7.4311	134	95
t170	3.7869	0.0371	608	6.7038	0.4038	5.8962	7.5115	2,359	95.2
t171	3.4857	0.0225	910	3.4278	0.2452	2.9373	3.9182	5,210	94.1
t172	3.195	0.0317	910	0.2662	0.3446	-0.4229	0.9553	3,524	90.6
t173	3.5372	0.201	62	3.9883	2.1857	-0.3831	8.3596	98	86.7
t174	3.4966	0.0323	683	3.5466	0.3513	2.8441	4.2491	2,968	92.6
t175	3.5262	0.0265	824	3.8681	0.2887	3.2907	4.4455	4,073	94.1
t176	3.3326	0.0756	272	1.7628	0.8224	0.1181	3.4076	621	91.1
t177	3.2968	0.0404	536	1.3737	0.4394	0.4948	2.2526	1,978	89.8
t178	3.4927	0.0235	911	3.5039	0.2552	2.9934	4.0144	5,110	95.4
t179	2.8602	0.0413	591	-3.374	0.4488	-4.2716	-2.4764	3,024	83.5
t180	2.7728	0.0507	509	-4.3246	0.5516	-5.4279	-3.2214	1,985	82.5

t181	3.0778	0.0982	187	-1.0076	1.0676	-3.1427	1.1276	448	88.2
t182	3.2406	0.0751	334	0.7621	0.8166	-0.8711	2.3953	914	84.9
t183	3.4216	0.0396	627	2.7313	0.4302	1.8709	3.5916	2,565	90.5
t184	3.6141	0.0381	537	4.8246	0.4146	3.9953	5.6539	2,183	95.5
t185	3.3864	0.0227	1,086	2.3478	0.2474	1.853	2.8425	5,714	93.3
t186	3.3349	0.0732	331	1.7884	0.7963	0.1959	3.381	906	87.2
t187	4.0253	0.2571	48	9.2958	2.7959	3.704	14.8876	71	89.9
t188	3.6725	0.0272	693	5.4588	0.2956	4.8675	6.05	3,979	95.9
t189	3.3901	0.0357	492	2.3882	0.3878	1.6127	3.1638	1,952	93.8
t190	3.4945	0.0323	620	3.5239	0.3512	2.8215	4.2264	2,640	94.9
t191	3.5801	0.0314	786	4.455	0.3409	3.7731	5.1368	3,430	92.7
t192	3.4721	0.0873	258	3.2803	0.9494	1.3814	5.1792	617	94.2
t193	3.6299	0.0346	558	4.9957	0.376	4.2437	5.7477	2,713	95.7
t194	3.097	0.1128	160	-0.7996	1.2271	-3.2538	1.6545	293	94.2
t195	3.2889	0.2004	91	1.2875	2.1792	-3.0709	5.6459	127	98.4
t196	3.3104	0.1423	121	1.5216	1.5469	-1.5723	4.6155	213	97.3
t197	3.797	0.0403	441	6.8127	0.4382	5.9362	7.6891	1,845	95.6
t198	3.3821	0.0243	894	2.3017	0.2642	1.7733	2.83	4,687	94.6
t199	3.4969	0.0225	828	3.55	0.2451	3.0598	4.0401	5,436	95.7
t200	3.1457	0.1382	93	-0.2696	1.5032	-3.276	2.7368	204	79.7
t201	3.377	0.031	479	2.2457	0.3375	1.5707	2.9207	2,385	92.8
t202	3.2405	0.0357	744	0.7618	0.3885	-0.0153	1.5388	2,843	92.8
t203	3.723	0.0205	1,020	6.0085	0.2231	5.5623	6.4547	6,992	95.6



t204	3.6772	0.0226	982	5.5098	0.2462	5.0174	6.0023	6,011	94.7
t205	3.2968	0.0162	1,835	1.3734	0.1767	1.0201	1.7267	15,737	88.2
t206	3.8258	0.023	911	7.1267	0.2501	6.6266	7.6269	6,273	96
t207	3.3099	0.022	1,403	1.5156	0.2393	1.0371	1.9942	6,331	100
t208	3.057	0.0831	244	-1.2342	0.904	-3.0421	0.5738	619	79.9
t209	2.8596	0.0718	276	-3.3807	0.7811	-4.943	-1.8184	628	87.1
t210	3.8876	0.0229	988	7.7987	0.2493	7.3001	8.2972	6,004	95
t211	4.7378	0.0297	1,047	17.0439	0.3233	16.3972	17.6906	4,776	100
t212	3.8219	0.0232	987	7.0839	0.2523	6.5794	7.5884	6,032	95.1
t213	3.3971	0.0361	894	2.4641	0.3927	1.6787	3.2495	3,273	92.7
t214	3.0644	0.0416	600	-1.1532	0.4526	-2.0584	-0.248	1,959	91.2
t215	3.1139	0.1881	70	-0.615	2.0455	-4.7059	3.476	101	90.2
t216	3.1659	0.1255	115	-0.0494	1.3646	-2.7786	2.6797	308	83
t217	3.0027	0.1382	117	-1.8245	1.5034	-4.8313	1.1823	267	90.8
t218	3.5603	0.1178	148	4.2388	1.2807	1.6774	6.8003	301	85.5
t219	3.0407	0.036	763	-1.411	0.3918	-2.1945	-0.6275	2,739	89
t220	2.9713	0.1393	91	-2.1656	1.5145	-5.1946	0.8634	261	84.2
t221	4.1569	0.087	192	10.7271	0.9459	8.8354	12.6188	461	97.5
t222	3.868	0.029	813	7.5853	0.3152	6.9549	8.2157	4,370	94.3
t223	3.868	0.029	813	7.5853	0.3152	6.9549	8.2157	4,370	94.3
t224	3.4239	0.0244	828	2.7553	0.2649	2.2254	3.2851	4,366	93.8
t225	3.2354	0.0309	812	0.7057	0.3366	0.0325	1.3788	3,354	93.6
t226	0.5723	0.6558	8	-28.255	7.1317	-42.518	-13.992	9	23.7

t227	3.0753	0.1328	111	-1.0352	1.4439	-3.9231	1.8526	284	83.8
t228	3.3881	0.0253	856	2.3665	0.2754	1.8157	2.9174	4,370	91.9
t229	3.1199	0.1918	61	-0.5506	2.0862	-4.723	3.6218	93	83
t230	3.4179	0.1246	149	2.6908	1.3548	-0.0189	5.4004	277	85.8
t231	3.1733	0.0323	917	0.031	0.3515	-0.6721	0.7341	3,660	89.9
t232	3.4591	0.0223	980	3.1387	0.242	2.6547	3.6226	5,551	93.6
t233	3.4415	0.0211	1,031	2.9473	0.2295	2.4882	3.4063	5,953	94.2
t234	2.8344	0.3023	31	-3.655	3.2872	-10.229	2.9193	51	79.7
t235	3.3899	0.0202	1,365	2.3862	0.2194	1.9475	2.8249	6,532	100
t236	3.5899	0.0212	915	4.5609	0.2307	4.0995	5.0222	5,970	96.2
t237	3.5299	0.0206	971	3.9084	0.2243	3.4599	4.3569	6,403	94.6
t238	3.4578	0.0296	1,014	3.1242	0.3216	2.481	3.7674	4,683	89.4
t239	3.5157	0.0561	501	3.7541	0.6099	2.5343	4.9739	1,447	88.7
t240	4.3315	0.0205	1,434	12.6261	0.2229	12.1802	13.072	8,526	100
t241	5.3358	0.2306	68	23.5472	2.5075	18.5322	28.5622	103	100
t242	3.6926	0.0252	778	5.6778	0.2745	5.1288	6.2268	4,439	94.3
t243	5.478	0.0943	206	25.0934	1.0251	23.0433	27.1436	494	100
t244	3.5272	0.0279	686	3.8788	0.3031	3.2726	4.4851	3,348	92.9
t245	3.5509	0.02	1,051	4.1372	0.2178	3.7016	4.5727	6,377	93.3
t246	2.9778	0.0548	361	-2.0951	0.5959	-3.2869	-0.9033	1,073	82.9
t247	3.522	0.0201	1,009	3.8221	0.2182	3.3857	4.2585	6,090	94.7
t248	3.5363	0.1689	113	3.9781	1.8362	0.3056	7.6505	224	89.6
t249	3.1962	0.2731	34	0.2802	2.9701	-5.66	6.2203	65	82.3

t250	3.0853	0.069	245	-0.9266	0.7507	-2.428	0.5749	611	85.5
t251	3.2117	0.0335	829	0.4486	0.3643	-0.28	1.1773	3,352	92
t252	3.6079	0.022	784	4.7565	0.2395	4.2775	5.2354	5,014	95.5
t253	3.6028	0.0185	1,088	4.7009	0.2015	4.2979	5.104	7,064	95
t254	3.5701	0.0368	571	4.3457	0.4007	3.5443	5.1472	2,145	95.9
t255	3.4071	0.0174	1,372	2.5733	0.1895	2.1943	2.9523	7,823	100

**Table 13: George W. Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE A)**

<b>Text File</b>	<b>Raw Score</b>	<b>Raw SE</b>	<b>Unique Scored Words</b>	<b>Transformed Score</b>	<b>Transformed SE</b>	<b>Transformed [95% Confidence Interval]</b>		<b>Total Words Scored</b>	<b>% Tot Sc'd</b>
t1	1.8721	0.0372	98	1.0506	0.1511	0.7483	1.3528	306	74
t2	2.0269	0.024	207	1.6802	0.0976	1.485	1.8754	492	82
t3	1.7486	0.0071	488	0.5489	0.029	0.491	0.6068	9,868	69
t4	2.1405	0.0063	772	2.142	0.0255	2.0909	2.1931	5,025	85
t5	1.8613	0.018	366	1.007	0.0731	0.8609	1.1532	1,324	75
t6	2.0589	0.0055	737	1.81	0.0224	1.7652	1.8547	7,772	82
t7	2.1643	0.0109	421	2.2384	0.0442	2.1501	2.3268	1,717	86

t8	2.2559	0.0049	900	2.6112	0.0199	2.5714	2.651	6,466	90
t9	1.8367	0.0192	268	0.907	0.0781	0.7509	1.0632	1,214	73
t10	2.1325	0.0229	182	2.1092	0.093	1.9231	2.2952	408	84
t11	2.2236	0.0061	754	2.4798	0.0246	2.4305	2.529	4,573	88
t12	2.1263	0.0127	367	2.0841	0.0516	1.9809	2.1872	1,428	84
t13	2.019	0.0755	47	1.6478	0.3071	1.0336	2.262	57	81
t14	2.1704	0.0169	272	2.2633	0.0687	2.1259	2.4008	785	87
t15	2.2548	0.0173	165	2.6067	0.0703	2.4661	2.7473	462	93
t16	2.2859	0.0098	383	2.7327	0.0397	2.6532	2.8122	1,342	92
t17	2.2757	0.0046	856	2.6914	0.0185	2.6543	2.7285	6,929	91
t18	2.2504	0.0044	951	2.5887	0.0179	2.553	2.6245	7,566	89
t19	2.2267	0.0057	776	2.4923	0.023	2.4462	2.5384	5,168	89
t20	1.834	0.0491	77	0.8961	0.1997	0.4967	1.2954	192	72
t21	2.0673	0.0134	406	1.8444	0.0543	1.7359	1.953	1,534	82
t22	2.0723	0.0118	495	1.8647	0.048	1.7687	1.9608	2,056	82
t23	2.2421	0.0059	781	2.5547	0.0239	2.507	2.6024	5,000	89
t24	2.1704	0.0169	272	2.2633	0.0687	2.1259	2.4008	785	87
t25	2.0133	0.0323	146	1.6247	0.1313	1.3621	1.8874	307	80
t26	2.1216	0.0132	332	2.0651	0.0537	1.9577	2.1724	1,110	86
t27	1.7013	0.0511	85	0.3563	0.2076	-0.059	0.7714	226	65
t28	2.1806	0.0054	915	2.305	0.0221	2.2609	2.3491	6,628	87

t29	2.1656	0.0081	599	2.2439	0.0331	2.1777	2.3101	2,757	87
t30	1.6776	0.0229	215	0.2602	0.0931	0.074	0.4464	1,130	66
t31	2.1958	0.006	682	2.3667	0.0244	2.318	2.4155	5,158	89
t32	1.9617	0.0205	266	1.4151	0.0833	1.2486	1.5817	818	80
t33	1.8456	0.0624	72	0.943	0.2536	0.4358	1.4502	111	74
t34	2.2299	0.0052	932	2.5052	0.021	2.4631	2.5472	6,337	89
t35	2.1754	0.0187	160	2.2837	0.076	2.1316	2.4357	447	87
t36	1.8305	0.0652	69	0.8818	0.2652	0.3514	1.4121	109	73
t37	2.2626	0.005	867	2.6382	0.0203	2.5977	2.6787	6,391	91
t38	2.2359	0.0105	430	2.5298	0.0427	2.4444	2.6152	1,548	90
t39	2.0603	0.0108	618	1.8159	0.0439	1.7282	1.9036	2,479	82
t40	2.0752	0.0102	621	1.8765	0.0414	1.7937	1.9593	2,723	82
t41	2.2432	0.0056	869	2.5591	0.0229	2.5134	2.6048	5,466	90
t42	1.879	0.0626	71	1.0789	0.2544	0.5701	1.5877	108	75
t43	2.263	0.0205	135	2.6397	0.0834	2.4729	2.8065	333	92
t44	2.1627	0.0086	855	2.2321	0.0351	2.1619	2.3023	3,440	100
t45	2.2354	0.0068	676	2.5277	0.0276	2.4726	2.5828	3,872	91
t46	2.1933	0.0056	844	2.3564	0.0227	2.311	2.4018	5,730	90
t47	1.7955	0.0242	261	0.7393	0.0984	0.5424	0.9362	838	72
t48	2.2601	0.0094	455	2.6281	0.0382	2.5516	2.7046	1,790	91
t49	2.12	0.023	177	2.0584	0.0935	1.8713	2.2454	418	84

t50	2.2537	0.0049	892	2.602	0.0199	2.5622	2.6418	6,603	90
t51	2.0656	0.015	278	1.8372	0.0609	1.7154	1.959	1,072	83
t52	2.1659	0.0111	428	2.2451	0.0451	2.1548	2.3354	1,540	87
t53	2.2752	0.0053	810	2.6895	0.0215	2.6466	2.7325	5,362	91
t54	2.2259	0.0221	137	2.4889	0.09	2.3089	2.669	304	90
t55	2.5847	0.0035	1,359	3.9476	0.0142	3.9192	3.9761	7,056	100
t56	2.2333	0.005	839	2.519	0.0202	2.4785	2.5595	6,816	89
t57	2.2917	0.0046	914	2.7567	0.0186	2.7195	2.7938	7,435	91
t58	2.773	0.0196	74	4.7131	0.0796	4.5539	4.8722	107	100
t59	2.3073	0.0047	869	2.8201	0.019	2.782	2.8581	6,178	92
t60	2.3038	0.0043	859	2.8057	0.0173	2.771	2.8403	7,452	92
t61	2.2982	0.005	848	2.7831	0.0203	2.7424	2.8238	5,759	92
t62	2.0529	0.006	585	1.7858	0.0244	1.737	1.8345	6,498	82
t63	2.2561	0.0048	942	2.6117	0.0195	2.5726	2.6508	7,546	91
t64	1.9738	0.0557	82	1.4643	0.2262	1.0118	1.9167	121	79
t65	2.156	0.0144	349	2.2049	0.0586	2.0877	2.322	1,072	86
t66	2.2604	0.0051	918	2.6293	0.0206	2.588	2.6706	6,457	90
t67	2.2584	0.0052	923	2.6212	0.021	2.5792	2.6631	6,559	90
t68	2.2279	0.0051	916	2.497	0.0208	2.4555	2.5385	6,713	89
t69	2.2651	0.0053	887	2.6484	0.0214	2.6056	2.6912	6,089	91
t70	2.2233	0.0122	350	2.4786	0.0496	2.3795	2.5777	1,107	89

t71	2.1948	0.009	487	2.3626	0.0368	2.289	2.4361	2,237	89
t72	2.2679	0.0044	1,010	2.6597	0.0177	2.6244	2.6951	8,024	91
t73	2.2319	0.0051	964	2.5134	0.0206	2.4723	2.5545	7,345	90
t74	2.2165	0.0065	750	2.4509	0.0262	2.3984	2.5034	4,424	89
t75	2.1975	0.0115	448	2.3737	0.0468	2.2802	2.4673	1,514	88
t76	2.2405	0.0054	882	2.5485	0.0219	2.5048	2.5923	5,969	90
t77	2.2266	0.0293	131	2.4918	0.1191	2.2535	2.7301	243	90
t78	1.9129	0.0526	80	1.2168	0.2137	0.7893	1.6443	145	77
t79	2.2279	0.0055	838	2.4971	0.0224	2.4524	2.5419	5,724	90
t80	2.1764	0.0116	424	2.2877	0.0471	2.1935	2.3819	1,571	87
t81	2.2543	0.0056	767	2.6044	0.0227	2.5589	2.6499	5,286	91
t82	2.2417	0.0081	501	2.5531	0.033	2.4871	2.6192	2,385	90
t83	2.2754	0.0049	870	2.6901	0.02	2.6502	2.73	6,516	91
t84	1.9014	0.0668	35	1.1698	0.2716	0.6265	1.7131	108	73
t85	1.9014	0.0668	35	1.1698	0.2716	0.6265	1.7131	108	73
t86	2.2381	0.0054	846	2.5387	0.0221	2.4945	2.5829	5,618	89
t87	2.2715	0.0048	863	2.6743	0.0196	2.6352	2.7134	6,435	90
t88	2.2663	0.0049	900	2.6532	0.0199	2.6133	2.6931	6,484	90
t89	2.2095	0.0055	814	2.4223	0.0223	2.3777	2.4669	6,118	89
t90	2.2543	0.005	908	2.6045	0.0202	2.564	2.645	6,335	90
t91	2.2299	0.0046	920	2.5054	0.0189	2.4677	2.5432	8,003	90

t92	2.2671	0.005	859	2.6563	0.0202	2.6159	2.6968	6,375	91
t93	2.2624	0.0049	878	2.6373	0.02	2.5972	2.6773	6,918	91
t94	2.2913	0.0044	954	2.755	0.0178	2.7194	2.7906	7,671	91
t95	2.282	0.0044	941	2.7171	0.0181	2.681	2.7532	7,380	91
t96	2.3036	0.0045	941	2.8047	0.0181	2.7684	2.841	7,209	91
t97	2.2904	0.0044	954	2.7514	0.0177	2.7159	2.7868	7,418	91
t98	2.2035	0.0115	366	2.3979	0.0469	2.3041	2.4916	1,411	88
t99	2.2819	0.0044	911	2.7166	0.0179	2.6808	2.7524	7,409	91
t100	2.2424	0.0047	941	2.5561	0.019	2.5182	2.5941	7,431	89
t101	2.2302	0.0069	624	2.5065	0.0279	2.4506	2.5624	3,517	89
t102	2.2867	0.0046	910	2.736	0.0186	2.6989	2.7732	6,815	91
t103	2.293	0.0055	723	2.7616	0.0225	2.7165	2.8066	4,496	91
t104	2.2916	0.0043	892	2.7563	0.0177	2.7209	2.7916	7,220	91
t105	1.9872	0.0231	180	1.5188	0.0938	1.3311	1.7064	586	80
t106	2.0226	0.0265	195	1.6627	0.1079	1.4469	1.8785	468	79
t107	2.2445	0.0065	673	2.5647	0.0263	2.5122	2.6172	3,922	90
t108	2.3038	0.004	950	2.8057	0.0162	2.7733	2.8381	8,430	91
t109	2.2977	0.0044	894	2.781	0.0178	2.7454	2.8167	7,293	91
t110	2.2378	0.0059	802	2.5374	0.0238	2.4898	2.585	4,839	89
t111	2.2898	0.0044	929	2.7489	0.0179	2.7132	2.7847	7,406	92
t112	2.2723	0.0047	916	2.6775	0.0193	2.639	2.7161	6,732	91



t113	1.9438	0.0356	117	1.3423	0.1449	1.0526	1.6321	255	79
t114	2.162	0.0052	894	2.2292	0.0211	2.1869	2.2715	7,297	86
t115	2.1346	0.062	48	2.1179	0.2521	1.6138	2.622	67	87
t116	2.102	0.0744	30	1.9854	0.3023	1.3807	2.59	44	85
t117	2.173	0.0156	307	2.2741	0.0635	2.1471	2.4012	906	89
t118	2.1002	0.0115	514	1.9779	0.0468	1.8844	2.0714	1,988	83
t119	2.2273	0.0051	947	2.4949	0.0206	2.4536	2.5362	6,956	89
t120	2.2358	0.0047	925	2.5293	0.0193	2.4907	2.5679	7,033	89
t121	1.8835	0.0589	78	1.097	0.2394	0.6181	1.5758	123	76
t122	2.2284	0.0085	531	2.4992	0.0347	2.4298	2.5686	2,273	90
t123	1.8929	0.0198	302	1.1353	0.0805	0.9742	1.2963	1,077	76
t124	2.1172	0.0116	522	2.0473	0.0472	1.9528	2.1417	1,839	84
t125	2.2588	0.0049	771	2.6229	0.02	2.5828	2.663	6,395	91
t126	1.9821	0.0366	88	1.4981	0.1487	1.2007	1.7955	241	79
t127	1.8221	0.0329	112	0.8477	0.1337	0.5803	1.1152	451	71
t128	2.2898	0.0048	857	2.7489	0.0196	2.7097	2.7882	6,382	92
t129	2.2615	0.0045	808	2.6337	0.0184	2.5969	2.6704	6,814	92
t130	2.2669	0.004	802	2.6557	0.0163	2.6231	2.6882	8,250	91
t131	2.2907	0.0049	773	2.7523	0.0201	2.7121	2.7925	5,542	92
t132	2.2514	0.0052	803	2.5926	0.0211	2.5503	2.6348	5,684	91
t133	2.0688	0.0101	613	1.8504	0.0412	1.768	1.9327	2,850	81

t134	1.9725	0.0206	304	1.4588	0.0837	1.2913	1.6263	921	78
t135	2.0543	0.0249	197	1.7912	0.1014	1.5884	1.9941	490	83
t136	1.759	0.0768	62	0.591	0.3121	-0.033	1.2151	87	70
t137	2.295	0.0106	373	2.7701	0.0429	2.6843	2.8559	1,220	91
t138	2.2636	0.0122	279	2.6423	0.0497	2.5429	2.7417	959	90
t139	2.2887	0.0057	703	2.7442	0.0232	2.6979	2.7905	4,238	92
t140	2.2424	0.0068	616	2.5562	0.0276	2.501	2.6115	3,490	89
t141	2.2179	0.0065	682	2.4566	0.0265	2.4036	2.5096	4,072	88
t142	2.1714	0.0227	169	2.2674	0.0925	2.0825	2.4523	382	87
t143	2.2453	0.0103	365	2.5678	0.0419	2.484	2.6517	1,430	90
t144	2.0832	0.0134	347	1.909	0.0545	1.8	2.0179	1,274	83
t145	2.0165	0.0233	199	1.638	0.0946	1.4488	1.8272	509	80
t146	2.1289	0.0118	444	2.0947	0.0479	1.9989	2.1905	1,764	84
t147	2.1715	0.0116	394	2.2679	0.0473	2.1732	2.3626	1,423	86
t148	2.0074	0.0149	378	1.6008	0.0607	1.4793	1.7223	1,267	81
t149	2.2077	0.0075	516	2.415	0.0307	2.3537	2.4764	2,830	88
t150	1.7817	0.0437	126	0.6834	0.1775	0.3285	1.0384	283	70
t151	2.2105	0.0596	42	2.4265	0.2423	1.9419	2.911	51	90
t152	2.2604	0.0184	187	2.6292	0.075	2.4792	2.7791	386	91
t153	2.2426	0.0069	566	2.5567	0.0281	2.5006	2.6129	3,134	89
t154	2.2987	0.0058	709	2.7851	0.0237	2.7377	2.8325	4,242	93

t155	2.2582	0.0055	721	2.6205	0.0225	2.5755	2.6655	4,958	91
t156	2.2734	0.0055	743	2.6821	0.0225	2.6372	2.7271	4,764	91
t157	1.7465	0.1068	30	0.5404	0.4341	-0.328	1.4086	40	71
t158	2.2515	0.0126	304	2.5929	0.0511	2.4908	2.6951	910	90
t159	2.1663	0.0103	505	2.2466	0.0418	2.1631	2.3301	2,061	85
t160	2.3046	0.0047	774	2.8091	0.0192	2.7706	2.8475	6,138	93
t161	2.0598	0.0119	475	1.8137	0.0486	1.7166	1.9109	1,911	82
t162	2.0851	0.0384	88	1.9165	0.1562	1.6041	2.2289	174	83
t163	2.2198	0.0047	993	2.4641	0.0193	2.4254	2.5027	7,964	88
t164	2.0438	0.0352	117	1.7489	0.1431	1.4628	2.0351	234	82
t165	2.1157	0.0514	63	2.0412	0.2089	1.6233	2.459	112	86
t166	2.2407	0.0101	377	2.5491	0.0409	2.4673	2.6309	1,453	90
t167	2.268	0.005	753	2.66	0.0204	2.6192	2.7008	5,439	91
t168	2.2622	0.0052	751	2.6367	0.0212	2.5942	2.6792	5,965	93
t169	1.9696	0.0551	66	1.4473	0.2242	0.999	1.8956	112	79
t170	2.2687	0.0083	537	2.6629	0.0336	2.5958	2.7301	2,268	92
t171	2.2157	0.006	738	2.4475	0.0246	2.3983	2.4966	4,933	89
t172	2.0807	0.0094	673	1.8989	0.0381	1.8226	1.9752	3,193	82
t173	2.0572	0.055	57	1.8032	0.2237	1.3558	2.2507	93	82
t174	2.1706	0.0084	571	2.264	0.0341	2.1959	2.3321	2,798	87
t175	2.2074	0.0066	665	2.4139	0.027	2.3599	2.4678	3,834	89

t176	2.1212	0.0212	232	2.0633	0.0861	1.8912	2.2355	574	84
t177	2.0524	0.0119	439	1.7836	0.0483	1.6869	1.8803	1,811	82
t178	2.228	0.006	730	2.4976	0.0242	2.4492	2.546	4,791	90
t179	1.7527	0.0149	425	0.5655	0.0606	0.4444	0.6867	2,507	69
t180	1.6594	0.019	360	0.1863	0.0773	0.0316	0.341	1,610	67
t181	1.9236	0.0326	142	1.26	0.1325	0.9949	1.525	387	76
t182	1.8518	0.0234	258	0.9682	0.0953	0.7776	1.1587	805	75
t183	2.0948	0.0103	516	1.9562	0.042	1.8722	2.0402	2,368	84
t184	2.2277	0.0089	457	2.4962	0.0362	2.4239	2.5686	2,057	90
t185	2.1903	0.006	851	2.3441	0.0243	2.2956	2.3927	5,351	87
t186	1.9034	0.0216	264	1.1779	0.0878	1.0022	1.3535	805	78
t187	2.0711	0.0561	44	1.8597	0.2279	1.4039	2.3154	67	85
t188	2.2604	0.006	596	2.6291	0.0244	2.5803	2.6779	3,771	91
t189	2.2379	0.0091	423	2.5378	0.0372	2.4635	2.6122	1,852	89
t190	2.2198	0.0083	527	2.4644	0.0338	2.3967	2.5321	2,490	90
t191	2.1719	0.0077	638	2.2693	0.0312	2.2069	2.3317	3,217	87
t192	2.1237	0.0207	203	2.0734	0.084	1.9053	2.2414	553	84
t193	2.2301	0.0079	492	2.506	0.0322	2.4416	2.5705	2,502	88
t194	2.0261	0.0331	127	1.6769	0.1346	1.4077	1.9461	253	81
t195	1.9718	0.0532	68	1.4563	0.2162	1.0239	1.8886	103	80
t196	2.1462	0.0341	95	2.1651	0.1388	1.8875	2.4427	186	85

t197	2.3002	0.0086	406	2.791	0.0351	2.7208	2.8612	1,800	93
t198	2.2536	0.0062	721	2.6016	0.0251	2.5515	2.6517	4,436	90
t199	2.2714	0.0053	698	2.6739	0.0217	2.6305	2.7172	5,153	91
t200	1.8286	0.046	82	0.8738	0.1871	0.4995	1.248	189	74
t201	2.2112	0.0086	411	2.4294	0.035	2.3594	2.4994	2,276	89
t202	2.1322	0.0096	564	2.1083	0.0391	2.0301	2.1864	2,573	84
t203	2.2842	0.0045	849	2.7261	0.0183	2.6894	2.7628	6,698	92
t204	2.2692	0.005	818	2.6649	0.0204	2.6241	2.7057	5,756	91
t205	1.9957	0.0048	1,248	1.5533	0.0197	1.514	1.5926	14,240	80
t206	2.3102	0.0048	762	2.8318	0.0196	2.7926	2.871	5,973	91
t207	2.2339	0.0056	878	2.5216	0.0229	2.4757	2.5674	5,616	89
t208	1.7959	0.0297	196	0.7412	0.1209	0.4994	0.983	553	71
t209	1.9268	0.0255	210	1.2731	0.1036	1.0659	1.4803	550	76
t210	2.2949	0.0048	852	2.7695	0.0195	2.7306	2.8085	5,801	92
t211	2.5644	0.0044	1,047	3.8651	0.0177	3.8297	3.9006	4,776	100
t212	2.2685	0.005	817	2.662	0.0202	2.6216	2.7024	5,755	91
t213	2.0968	0.0095	659	1.9643	0.0386	1.8871	2.0415	2,936	83
t214	2.0556	0.0126	444	1.7968	0.0512	1.6943	1.8993	1,739	81
t215	2.0239	0.0591	59	1.6678	0.2403	1.1872	2.1483	89	80
t216	1.8248	0.0418	93	0.8586	0.17	0.5185	1.1987	267	72
t217	1.8392	0.0461	82	0.9171	0.1875	0.5421	1.2921	212	72

t218	2.0074	0.0334	129	1.6008	0.1359	1.3289	1.8727	282	80
t219	2.0188	0.0114	563	1.6473	0.0464	1.5545	1.74	2,430	79
t220	1.7185	0.0494	69	0.4265	0.201	0.0246	0.8285	214	69
t221	2.3246	0.0156	182	2.8904	0.0636	2.7631	3.0176	449	95
t222	2.2449	0.006	709	2.5663	0.0245	2.5173	2.6154	4,179	90
t223	2.2449	0.006	709	2.5663	0.0245	2.5173	2.6154	4,179	90
t224	2.2252	0.0062	667	2.486	0.0252	2.4356	2.5364	4,142	89
t225	2.1899	0.0083	633	2.3427	0.0338	2.2751	2.4104	3,093	86
t226	0.2951	0.4084	4	-5.3597	1.6602	-8.68	-2.039	4	11
t227	1.8287	0.0447	87	0.8743	0.1818	0.5107	1.238	243	72
t228	2.1857	0.0068	685	2.3256	0.0276	2.2704	2.3808	4,132	87
t229	1.895	0.0679	53	1.1437	0.2762	0.5913	1.696	85	76
t230	1.9862	0.0355	128	1.5145	0.1444	1.2257	1.8033	256	79
t231	2.0316	0.0097	683	1.699	0.0393	1.6204	1.7775	3,270	80
t232	2.2186	0.0057	786	2.4594	0.0233	2.4129	2.5059	5,219	88
t233	2.2213	0.0057	833	2.4702	0.0232	2.4238	2.5167	5,605	89
t234	1.8497	0.1094	26	0.9597	0.4447	0.0703	1.8491	44	69
t235	2.2622	0.0051	878	2.6364	0.0209	2.5947	2.6782	5,862	90
t236	2.2982	0.0048	756	2.7827	0.0197	2.7434	2.822	5,676	91
t237	2.2324	0.0053	785	2.5156	0.0214	2.4728	2.5584	6,046	89
t238	2.0682	0.008	807	1.848	0.0326	1.7828	1.9131	4,322	83

t239	2.0087	0.0155	413	1.6061	0.063	1.48	1.7322	1,325	81
t240	2.5902	0.0031	1,434	3.9699	0.0126	3.9448	3.995	8,526	100
t241	2.4954	0.0346	68	3.5847	0.1407	3.3033	3.866	103	100
t242	2.2647	0.0057	671	2.6469	0.023	2.6009	2.6929	4,254	90
t243	2.3249	0.0106	206	2.8916	0.043	2.8056	2.9777	494	100
t244	2.2417	0.007	585	2.5532	0.0286	2.4961	2.6103	3,209	89
t245	2.2475	0.0051	869	2.5768	0.0207	2.5354	2.6182	6,080	89
t246	1.9324	0.0193	301	1.296	0.0784	1.1392	1.4527	986	76
t247	2.3054	0.0048	829	2.8122	0.0197	2.7728	2.8516	5,841	91
t248	1.8312	0.0474	92	0.8847	0.1925	0.4996	1.2698	195	78
t249	1.9114	0.0883	29	1.2104	0.3588	0.4927	1.9281	57	72
t250	2.0052	0.0229	213	1.592	0.093	1.4059	1.7781	568	79
t251	2.0884	0.0095	631	1.9299	0.0385	1.8529	2.007	3,025	83
t252	2.2938	0.005	671	2.7652	0.0205	2.7242	2.8063	4,799	91
t253	2.3097	0.0044	909	2.8298	0.0177	2.7944	2.8652	6,789	91
t254	2.3093	0.0082	491	2.828	0.0334	2.7611	2.8949	2,038	91
t255	2.312	0.0043	887	2.8389	0.0173	2.8042	2.8735	7,154	91

**Table 14: George W. Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE B)**

Text File	Raw Score	Raw SE	Unique Scored Words	Transformed Score	Transformed SE	Transformed [95% Confidence Interval]		Total Words Scored	% Tot Sc'd
t1	3.5868	0.0291	1,005	6.3208	0.2527	5.8154	6.8261	6,752	87
t2	3.5561	0.0346	697	6.0546	0.3003	5.4539	6.6552	4,591	85
t3	3.2515	0.0454	411	3.4134	0.3933	2.6269	4.2	2,067	84
t4	5.3472	0.0343	1,716	21.5843	0.2976	20.989	22.18	6,993	100
t5	3.4121	0.0679	366	4.8058	0.5887	3.6283	5.9832	1,036	88
t6	3.3913	0.0536	474	4.6256	0.4644	3.6968	5.5543	1,936	89
t7	3.4332	0.0544	440	4.9885	0.4718	4.0449	5.9321	1,768	88
t8	3.3127	0.0472	662	3.9442	0.4095	3.1252	4.7632	2,431	90
t9	2.7173	0.0332	920	-1.2182	0.2879	-1.794	0.6425	3,138	98
t10	2.5894	0.0301	1,072	-2.3275	0.2611	-2.85	1.8052	3,478	100
t11	3.1604	0.0141	1,661	2.6237	0.1224	2.379	2.8685	32,019	77
t12	3.2874	0.0303	775	3.7251	0.2625	3.2	4.2502	5,355	87
t13	3.4207	0.0283	909	4.8801	0.2451	4.3899	5.3704	6,650	88
t14	3.4094	0.0503	496	4.7821	0.4361	3.9099	5.6544	2,030	86
t15	3.2492	0.3087	49	3.3935	2.6768	-1.96	8.7471	82	77
t16	3.7281	0.0482	610	7.5458	0.4176	6.7106	8.3809	2,651	83
t17	3.4423	0.0407	730	5.0677	0.3531	4.3615	5.7739	3,585	81



t18	2.0682	0.094	108	-6.8466	0.8151	-8.477	5.2163	-	427	66
t19	3.3687	0.0375	801	4.4298	0.3253	3.7792	5.0805	-	4,182	81
t20	2.1507	0.1458	25	-6.131	1.2641	-8.659	3.6029	-	92	68
t21	3.4317	0.0365	865	4.9755	0.3166	4.3424	5.6086	-	4,591	82
t22	2.6589	0.0846	210	-1.7242	0.7332	-3.191	0.2578	-	551	80
t23	3.4926	0.0527	455	5.5042	0.4572	4.5899	6.4186	-	1,960	85
t24	2.0634	0.0399	660	-6.8879	0.3458	-7.58	6.1963	-	1,585	100

**Table 15: Richard B. Cheney Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE A)**

<b>Text File</b>	<b>Raw Score</b>	<b>Raw SE</b>	<b>Unique Scored Words</b>	<b>Transformed Score</b>	<b>Transformed SE</b>	<b>Transformed [95% Confidence Interval]</b>		<b>Total Words Scored</b>	<b>% Tot Sc'd</b>
t1	2.4577	0.0062	813	.	.	.	.	6,359	82
t2	2.4326	0.0077	591	.	.	.	.	4,403	81
t3	2.3973	0.0122	344	.	.	.	.	1,961	80

t4	3	0	1,716	.	.	.	.	6,993	100
t5	2.4814	0.0151	313	.	.	.	.	976	83
t6	2.4779	0.0112	380	.	.	.	.	1,794	83
t7	2.4436	0.0124	357	.	.	.	.	1,638	82
t8	2.4458	0.0107	515	.	.	.	.	2,198	82
t9	2.4082	0.0105	543	.	.	.	.	2,572	80
t10	2.3548	0.0109	559	.	.	.	.	2,730	79
t11	2.0959	0.0044	1,219	.	.	.	.	28,920	70
t12	2.4147	0.0075	602	.	.	.	.	4,942	81
t13	2.4429	0.0064	695	.	.	.	.	6,174	81
t14	2.4152	0.012	406	.	.	.	.	1,904	81
t15	2.0467	0.0922	45	.	.	.	.	73	68
t16	2.3738	0.0111	524	.	.	.	.	2,536	79
t17	2.3059	0.0104	612	.	.	.	.	3,395	77
t18	1.6997	0.0512	86	.	.	.	.	366	57
t19	2.2889	0.0099	664	.	.	.	.	3,940	76
t20	1.7868	0.104	20	.	.	.	.	81	60
t21	2.3035	0.0093	704	.	.	.	.	4,286	77
t22	2.1266	0.0333	172	.	.	.	.	487	71
t23	2.3995	0.0125	381	.	.	.	.	1,850	80
t24	2.2069	0.0199	326	.	.	.	.	1,166	74

**Table 16: Richard B. Cheney Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE B)**

**Descriptive Analysis of Automated Content Analysis Results**

<b>Clinton Values (All years) - SCALE A</b>				
	<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>Smallest</b>		
<b>1%</b>	-13.9543	-20.972		
<b>5%</b>	-8.2225	-14.361		
<b>10%</b>	-5.5175	-14.361	<b>Obs</b>	369
<b>25%</b>	0.6075	-13.954	<b>Sum of Wgt.</b>	369
<b>50%</b>	4.3691		<b>Mean</b>	3.19091
		<b>Largest</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	5.82393
<b>75%</b>	6.6393	18.8812		
<b>90%</b>	8.2914	20.2651	<b>Variance</b>	33.9182
<b>95%</b>	9.7231	25.0578	<b>Skewness</b>	-0.5119
<b>99%</b>	18.8812	25.1551	<b>Kurtosis</b>	5.03307
<b>Clinton Values (All years) - SCALE B</b>				
	<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>Smallest</b>		
<b>1%</b>	1.1837	1.0197		
<b>5%</b>	1.5062	1.1148		
<b>10%</b>	1.6697	1.1697	<b>Obs</b>	369
<b>25%</b>	2.0727	1.1837	<b>Sum of Wgt.</b>	369
<b>50%</b>	2.4339		<b>Mean</b>	2.30658
		<b>Largest</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	
<b>75%</b>	2.573	3.3353		
<b>90%</b>	2.6684	3.3472	<b>Variance</b>	0.16667
<b>95%</b>	2.7537	3.3522	<b>Skewness</b>	-0.7887
<b>99%</b>	3.3353	3.3527	<b>Kurtosis</b>	3.36017

**Table 17: Summarized Clinton Values (All years) on SCALE A and B**

<b>G. Bush (All years) - SCALE A</b>				
	<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>Smallest</b>		
<b>1%</b>	-1.2499	-1.6371		
<b>5%</b>	-1.052	-1.2499		
<b>10%</b>	-0.7565	-1.2241	<b>Obs</b>	105
<b>25%</b>	-0.2487	-1.1688	<b>Sum of Wgt.</b>	105
<b>50%</b>	0.1655		<b>Mean</b>	0.53939
		<b>Largest</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	2.5
<b>75%</b>	0.7847	2.5045		
<b>90%</b>	1.5596	2.6909	<b>Variance</b>	6.25001
<b>95%</b>	2.1242	5.6611	<b>Skewness</b>	7.84457
<b>99%</b>	5.6611	23.8004	<b>Kurtosis</b>	72.9711
<b>G. Bush Values (All years) - SCALE B</b>				
	<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>Smallest</b>		
<b>1%</b>	-1.4076	-2.0364		
<b>5%</b>	-0.989	-1.4076		
<b>10%</b>	-0.533	-1.0753	<b>Obs</b>	105
<b>25%</b>	0.7898	-1.0403	<b>Sum of Wgt.</b>	105
<b>50%</b>	1.3747		<b>Mean</b>	1.32232
		<b>Largest</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	1.41422
<b>75%</b>	1.9062	2.7401		
<b>90%</b>	2.5424	2.8655	<b>Variance</b>	2.00001
<b>95%</b>	2.6902	3.2299	<b>Skewness</b>	2.55193
<b>99%</b>	3.2299	10.9029	<b>Kurtosis</b>	21.6168

**Table 18: Summarized G. Bush Values (All years) on SCALE A and B**

<b>G. W. Bush (All years) - SCALE A</b>				
	<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>Smallest</b>		
<b>1%</b>	-4.7658	-28.255		
<b>5%</b>	-2.5287	-5.6648		
<b>10%</b>	-1.1532	-4.7658	<b>Obs</b>	255
<b>25%</b>	1.1981	-4.6811	<b>Sum of Wgt.</b>	255
<b>50%</b>	3.7378		<b>Mean</b>	3.49156
		<b>Largest</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	5.07092
<b>75%</b>	5.1495	18.5407		
<b>90%</b>	7.0196	23.5472	<b>Variance</b>	25.7143
<b>95%</b>	9.2958	25.0934	<b>Skewness</b>	1.70316
<b>99%</b>	23.5472	44.1164	<b>Kurtosis</b>	25.7254
<b>G. W. Bush Values (All years) - SCALE B</b>				
	<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>Smallest</b>		
<b>1%</b>	0.2602	-5.3597		
<b>5%</b>	0.8477	0.1863		
<b>10%</b>	1.0506	0.2602	<b>Obs</b>	255
<b>25%</b>	1.7858	0.3563	<b>Sum of Wgt.</b>	255
<b>50%</b>	2.4294		<b>Mean</b>	2.14006
		<b>Largest</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	0.83666
<b>75%</b>	2.6293	3.8651		
<b>90%</b>	2.7616	3.9476	<b>Variance</b>	0.7
<b>95%</b>	2.8122	3.9699	<b>Skewness</b>	-3.0866
<b>99%</b>	3.9476	4.7191	<b>Kurtosis</b>	27.2638

**Table 19: Summarized G. W. Bush Values (All years) on SCALE A and B**

<b>R. Cheney (All years) - SCALE A</b>				
	<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>Smallest</b>		
<b>1%</b>	-6.8879	-6.8879		
<b>5%</b>	-6.8466	-6.8466		
<b>10%</b>	-6.131	-6.131	<b>Obs</b>	24
<b>25%</b>	0.70275	-2.3275	<b>Sum of Wgt.</b>	24
<b>50%</b>	4.5277		<b>Mean</b>	3.23039
		<b>Largest</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	5.7735
<b>75%</b>	5.0281	6.0546		
<b>90%</b>	6.3208	6.3208	<b>Variance</b>	33.3333
<b>95%</b>	7.5458	7.5458	<b>Skewness</b>	0.71538
<b>99%</b>	21.5843	21.5843	<b>Kurtosis</b>	5.89957
<b>R. Cheney Values (All years) - SCALE B</b>				
	<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>Smallest</b>		
<b>1%</b>	1.6997	1.6997		
<b>5%</b>	1.7868	1.7868		
<b>10%</b>	2.0467	2.0467	<b>Obs</b>	24
<b>25%</b>	2.2479	2.0959	<b>Sum of Wgt.</b>	24
<b>50%</b>	2.3984		<b>Mean</b>	2.32526
		<b>Largest</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	0.25353
<b>75%</b>	2.44325	2.4577		
<b>90%</b>	2.4779	2.4779	<b>Variance</b>	0.06428
<b>95%</b>	2.4814	2.4814	<b>Skewness</b>	-0.3218
<b>99%</b>	3	3	<b>Kurtosis</b>	5.02296

**Table 20: Summarized R. Cheney Values (All years) on SCALE A and B**

<b>George W. Bush and R. Cheney (All years) - SCALE A</b>				
	<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>Smallest</b>		
<b>1%</b>	-6.8466	-28.255		
<b>5%</b>	-3.0639	-6.8879		
<b>10%</b>	-1.319	-6.8466	<b>Obs</b>	279
<b>25%</b>	1.1981	-6.131	<b>Sum of Wgt.</b>	279
<b>50%</b>	3.7621		<b>Mean</b>	3.46909
		<b>Largest</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	5.12421
<b>75%</b>	5.0818	21.5843		
<b>90%</b>	7.0196	23.5472	<b>Variance</b>	26.2575
<b>95%</b>	9.2958	25.0934	<b>Skewness</b>	1.58793
<b>99%</b>	23.5472	44.1164	<b>Kurtosis</b>	23.3034
<b>George W. Bush and R. Cheney Values (All years) - SCALE B</b>				
	<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>Smallest</b>		
<b>1%</b>	0.2602	-5.3597		
<b>5%</b>	0.8586	0.1863		
<b>10%</b>	1.097	0.2602	<b>Obs</b>	279
<b>25%</b>	1.81	0.3563	<b>Sum of Wgt.</b>	279
<b>50%</b>	2.415		<b>Mean</b>	2.15599
		<b>Largest</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	0.80473
<b>75%</b>	2.6212	3.8651		
<b>90%</b>	2.7567	3.9476	<b>Variance</b>	0.64759
<b>95%</b>	2.8122	3.9699	<b>Skewness</b>	-3.2223
<b>99%</b>	3.9476	4.7131	<b>Kurtosis</b>	29.3545

**Table 21: Summarized G.W. Bush and R. Cheney Values (All years) on SCALE A and B**








Figure 11: Changing American support (Document values) for Turkey's EU membership by year



**Figure 12: Changing level of American Support (Document Scores) for Turkey's EU membership by year**



**Figure 13: Distribution of Document Values on Scale A (by owner)**






Figure 14: Distribution of Document Values on Scale B (by owner)



**Figure 15: Distribution of Document Values on Scale A (by owner)**



**Figure 16: Distribution of Document Values on Scale B (by owner)**

<b>Scale A Values (by year)</b>					
<b>Year</b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
1990	38	0.06367	0.75794	-1.2241	2.1242
1991	55	1.00743	3.32441	-1.2499	23.8004
1992	24	1.73775	2.48146	-1.6371	8.51545
1993	15	1.53055	5.08437	-10.194	7.1442
1994	26	0.9484	6.48724	-8.558	9.2146
1995	19	2.38863	4.78332	-8.8911	7.9122
1996	49	3.01177	5.10461	-8.7541	16.0624
1997	45	4.1523	4.71274	-9.9161	12.1738
1998	49	3.18544	7.19061	-13.954	25.1551
1999	111	4.05701	6.10001	-20.972	25.0578
2000	38	2.29972	6.18396	-14.361	7.8282
2001	15	1.57093	2.87375	-3.2253	7.8557
2002	53	4.57997	6.75305	-4.7658	44.1164
2003	90	3.36401	2.90812	-5.6648	13.0068
2004	77	2.82542	5.23413	-28.255	17.0439
2005	23	4.78787	6.93781	-3.655	25.0934
2006	26	3.24801	5.54377	-6.8879	21.5843

**Table 22: Scale A Values (by year)**

<b>Scale B Values (by year)</b>					
<b>Year</b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
1990	38	0.93431	0.926035	-1.4076	2.6902
1991	55	1.75811	1.612013	-2.0364	10.9029
1992	24	1.4414	1.20419	-1.0403	2.6976
1993	15	2.24685	0.374726	1.4922	2.5629
1994	26	2.14759	0.417982	1.1148	2.7449
1995	19	2.1865	0.401116	1.4066	2.6163
1996	49	2.23434	0.378597	1.4312	2.7537
1997	45	2.41494	0.306884	1.579	2.7805
1998	49	2.27915	0.473661	1.0197	3.3522
1999	111	2.38399	0.416219	1.1697	3.3527
2000	38	2.24053	0.461366	1.1837	2.8762
2001	15	1.87396	0.689247	0.5489	2.7657
2002	53	2.19899	0.777282	0.2602	4.7131
2003	90	2.28422	0.54432	0.591	2.8057
2004	77	1.93893	1.102643	-5.3597	3.8651
2005	23	2.2835	0.795734	0.8847	3.9699
2006	26	2.36435	0.279659	1.6997	3

**Table 23: Scale B Values (by year)**



## REFERENCES

- Abramowitz, M. (2001a). Amerika'nın Türkiye Politikasının Belirlenmesi Sürecinde Karşılaşılan Güçlükler. In M. Abramowitz (Ed.), *Türkiye'nin Dönüşümü ve Amerikan Politikası* (pp. 221-268). Ankara: Liberte.
- Abramowitz, M. (2001b). Sunuş ve Genel Değerlendirme. In M. Abramowitz (Ed.), *Türkiye'nin Dönüşümü ve Amerikan Politikası* (pp. 1-32). Ankara: Liberte.
- Abramowitz, M. (2004). An American Perspective on Turkey and the EU: The Century Foundation.
- Albright, M. (1998). Statement of US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright to the North Atlantic Council [Press release]. Retrieved from <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/98/208.html>
- Alessandri, E. (2010). Turkey's New Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 45(3), 85-100.
- Arı, T. (2012). Realizm ve Neorealizm (Gerçekçilik ve Yeni Gerçekçilik). In E. T. Tayyar Arı (Ed.), *Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramları I* (Vol. 2645). Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi.
- Atlantic Council. (2004). Turkey on the Threshold: Europe's Decision and US Interests. Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council.
- Bakker, R., Edwards, E., & De Vries, C. (2006). Fickle parties or changing dimensions? testing the comparability of the party manifesto data across time and space. *Political Analysis*, forthcoming.
- Baldwin, D. A. (1993). *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*: Columbia University Press.
- Banks, M., & Chapman, P. (2002). Prodil tells Bush: 'Stay out of EU affairs'. *The European Voice*. Retrieved from <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/prodi-tells-bush-stay-out-of-eu-affairs/>

- Barchard, D. (1998). *Turkey and the European Union*. London: Centre for European Reform.
- Barkey, H. J. (2003). The Endless Pursuit: Improving U.S.-Turkey Relations. In M. Abramowitz (Ed.), *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need* (Vol. 207-49). Washington, D.C.: Century Publication.
- Barkey, H. J. (2007). The Push and Pull of Strategic Cooperation: The U.S. Relationship with Turkey in the Middle East. In D. W. Lesch & M. Haas (Eds.), *The Middle East and the United States* (Vol. 4, pp. 446-461). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Barkey, H. J. (2008). The Effect of US Policy in the Middle East on EU-Turkey Relations. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 43(4), 31-44.
- BBC News. (2002). Turkey entry "would destroy EU". *BBC News World Edition*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm>
- Beatty, A. (2004). Bush urges EU membership for Turkey. *The EU Observer*. Retrieved from <http://euobserver.com/enlargement/16743>
- Black, I., White, M., & Trimlet, G. (2004). Angry Chirac puts Bush in his place: French president publicly carpets the US leader for pressing Turkey's case for EU membership. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/29/eu.nato>
- Bremmer, I. (2004). Redefining Europe I: Would Turkey split the EU and the US? [http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/22/opinion/22iht-edbremmer\\_ed3\\_.html?pagewanted=all&r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/22/opinion/22iht-edbremmer_ed3_.html?pagewanted=all&r=0)
- Bush, G. W. (2004). President Bush Discusses Democracy, Freedom from Turkey. Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, White House.
- Çankaya, M. (2003). *The European Union Factor in The United States - Turkey Relations: 1995-1999*. (Master of Science in International Relations), The Middle East Technical University, Ankara. (140226)
- Carlucci, F., & Larrabee, F. S. (2005). Revitalizing U.S.-Turkey Relations. *The Washington Times*, p. A18.

- Clinton, W. J. (1998). *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*. Washington D.C.: The White House, National Archives and Records Administration, Office of the Federal Register.
- Clinton, W. J. (1999). Remarks by President Clinton to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Retrieved 29.06.2014, 2014, from <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56935>
- Commission of the European Union. (2002). Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession 2002: Commission of the European Union.
- Congress of the United States. (2003). *House 108th Congress, 1st Session, 149 Cong Rec H 2718, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act*. Washington D.C.: Congress of the United States.
- Cooley, J. K. (1996). U.S. Discovers the Hazardous Politics of the Aegean. Retrieved 26.06.2014, 2014, from <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/13/opinion/13iht-edcool.t.html>
- Daalder, I. H. (2002). The United States and Europe: From Primacy to Partnership? In R. Lieber (Ed.), *Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the 21st Century* (pp. 70-96). New York, NY: Longman.
- Daniel, C. (2002). Bush and Powell press EU to take Turkey as member. *Financial Times*.
- Debnar, V. A., & Smith, A. (2006). Why the US wants Turkey in the EU. *New Presence: The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs*, 7(4), 20-21.
- Duğan, Y. (1995). Ciller reportedly promised Clinton to solve the Cyprus problem. Retrieved 29.06.2014, 2014, from <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/1995/95-12-20.tcpr.html#02>
- Erdemir, H. (2007). *Türkiye-İsrail İlişkileri*. Manisa: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi Rektörlük Matbaası.
- Filkins, D. (2002). Turks Look West; Will It Look Away? *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/13/world/turks-look-west-will-it-look-away.html>
- Flanagan, S. J., & Brannen, S. (2008). *Turkey's Shifting Dynamics: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations*: CSIS Press.

- Franck, C. (2002). The US, the EU and the Turkey-Cyprus Link. In J. Leech (Ed.), *Whole and Free: NATO, EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations* (pp. 95-113). London: Federal Trust in conjunction with the Trans European Policy Studies Association.
- Frankel, B. (1996). *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*: Frank Cass.
- Gilpin, R. (1996). No-one Loves a Political Realist. *Security Studies*, 5(3), 19.
- Gilpin, R. (1999). In P. R. Viotti & M. V. Kauppi (Eds.), *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond* (pp. 166). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Gilpin, R. G. (1984). The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism. *International Organization*, 38(2), 287-304.
- Glaser, C. (1996). Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help. *Security Studies*, 5(3), 123.
- Glitman, M. (1996-1997). US Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach. *Survival*, 38(4).
- Gordon. (2002). Threats and Responses: The Allies; U.S. Presses Turkey's Case on Europe and Cyprus. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/03/world/threats-and-responses-the-allies-us-presses-turkey-s-case-on-europe-and-cyprus.html>
- Gordon, Taşpınar, & Özel. (2009). *Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can Revive a Fading Partnership*: Brookings Institution Press.
- Grieco, J. M. (1993). In D. A. Baldwin (Ed.), *Neo-realism and neoliberalism* (pp. 329). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Griffiths, M. (1999). *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*. New York, NY: New York Rutledge.
- Grossman, M. (2004). The U.S. - Turkish Partnership, Remarks to the Assembly of Turkish-American Associations. *The DISAM Journal*(Winter 2004-2005), 67-69.
- Guardian. (2004). Chirac rejects French EU vote. *Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/30/eu.france>

- Güney, A. (2005). An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US–Turkish Alliance: From “Cold War” to “War on Iraq”. *Turkish Studies*, 6(3), 341-359. doi: 10.1080/14683840500235449
- Huntington, S. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
- Hürriyet Daily News. (1999). Cyprus issue comes to the fore following Turkey's EU candidacy. *Hürriyet Daily News*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=cyprus-issue-comes-to-the-fore-following-turkeys-eu-candidacy-1999-12-13>
- Independent. (1997). Holbrooke offers hope to divided Cyprus. *Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/holbrooke-offers-hope-to-divided-cyprus-1254373.html>
- Islam, R. D. (2008). *The Accession of Turkey to the European Union: Security Implications for Transatlantic Relations*. Düsseldorf: Düsseldorf Institut für Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik (DIAS).
- Jervis, R. (1991-1992). The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past? *International Security*, 16(3), 39-73.
- Kayhan, O., & Lindley, D. (2006). The Iraq War and the Troubled US-Turkish Alliance: Some Conclusions for Europe. In J. Joseph (Ed.), *Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges* (pp. 211-232). London: Palgrave.
- Keohane, R. (1999). In P. R. Viotti & M. V. Kauppi (Eds.), (pp. 154).
- Kesgin, B., & Kaarbo, J. (2010). When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey's Iraq Decision. *International Studies Perspectives*, 11, 19-36.
- Kinzer, S. (1998). U.S. Pressing European Union to Be More Friendly to Turkey. Retrieved 26.06.2014, 2014, from <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/01/world/us-pressing-european-union-to-be-more-friendly-to-turkey.html>
- Kirişçi, K. (2001). U.S. - Turkish Relations: New Uncertainties in the Renewed Partnership. In B. M. Rubin & K. Kirişçi (Eds.), *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power* (pp. 129-150): Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Kirişci, K. (2009). The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40, 29-57.
- Kirişci, K., & Winrow, G. (1997). Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict - Kürt Sorunu: Kökeni ve Gelişimi. In K. Kirişci & G. Winrow (Eds.), *Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict - Kürt Sorunu: Kökeni ve Gelişimi*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Budge, I., Bara, J., & McDonald, M. (2006). *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Parties, Electorates and Governments in Eastern Europe and the OECD 1990-2003*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Klüver, H. (2013). *Lobbying in the European Union: Interest groups, lobbying coalitions and policy change*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Kohen, S. (1997). Turk push to join Europe now tests key US alliance. *Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved 29.06.2014, 2014, from <http://www.csmonitor.com/1997/1212/121297.intl.intl.2.html>
- Kohen, S. (2002). Why do Clinton and the U.S. want Turkey in the E.U.? Retrieved 17.06.2014, from <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/742643/posts>
- Kramer, H. (2000). *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Kramer, H. (2001). *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*: Brookings Institution Press.
- Kühnhardt, L. (1999). On Germany, Turkey and the United States. In H. Bağcı, J. Janes & L. Kühnhardt (Eds.), *Parameters of Partnership: The U.S.-Turkey-Europe* (pp. 217-235). Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Kuniholm, B. (2001). Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US Attitudes, and challenges for Turkey. *Turkish Studies*, 2(1), 25-53.
- Kydd, A. (1997). Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Securit Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other? *Security Studies*, 7(1), 115.
- Lake, D. A. (1999). Ulysses's triumph: American power and the new world order. *Security Studies*, 8(4), 44-78.

- Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. *Biometrics*, 33(1), 159-174.
- Larrabee, F. S. (2010). Turkey's New Geopolitics. *Survival*, 52(2), 157-180. doi: Pii 920295648
- Doi 10.1080/00396331003764686
- Larrabee, F. S., & Lesser, I. O. (2001). *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*. Santa Monica: RAND.
- Laver, & Benoit. (2002). Locating TDs in Policy Spaces: Wordscoring Dail Speeches. *Irish Political Studies*, 17(1), 59-73.
- Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Garry, J. (2003). Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data. *American Political Science Review*, 97(2), 311-331. doi: doi:10.1017.S0003055403000698
- Leech, J. (2002). Executive Summary: Eleven points for a new core partnership. In J. Leech (Ed.), *Whole and free: NATO, EU enlargement and transatlantic relations* (pp. 7-26). London: Federal Trust for Education and Research in conjunction with the Trans European Policy Studies Association.
- Legro, J. W., & Moravcsik, A. (1999). Is Anybody Still A Realist? *International Security*, 24(2), 5-55.
- Lesser, I. O. (1998). Sources of Conflict for the Greater Middle East. In Z. Khalilzad & I. O. Lesser (Eds.), *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century* (pp. 172). Washington D.C.: Rand Corporation.
- Lesser, I. O. (2008). From Advocate to Stakeholder: US Policy towards Turkey and Implications for EU-Turkey Relations. In N. Tocci (Ed.), *Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy* (pp. 215-229). Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali.
- Lippert, B. (2002). EU Enlargement: Comparing US and European Approaches, Interests and Roles. In J. Leech (Ed.), *Whole and free: NATO, EU enlargement and transatlantic relations* (pp. 27-47). London: Federal Trust for Education and Research in conjunction with the Trans European Policy Studies Association.
- Makovsky, A. (1995). Turkish Customs Union with Europe: What's at Stake? *Policy Watch*: The Washington Institute.

- Makovsky, A. (1998). Turkey's Faded European Dream *Conference Report: The Parameters of Partnership: Germany, the U.S. and Turkey* (pp. 60-61). Washington D.C.: American Institute of Contemporary German Studies.
- Makovsky, A. (1999). Turkey-Europe-Bound? Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Makovsky, A. (2001). Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Türkiye Politikası: Gelişme ve Sorunlar. In M. Abramowitz (Ed.), *Türkiye'nin Dönüşümü ve Amerikan Politikası* (pp. 323-396). Ankara: Liberte.
- Marr, P. (1996). Turkey and Iraq. In H. J. Barkey (Ed.), *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East* (pp. 45). Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press.
- Marsden, C. (1999). Helsinki summit marks aggressive turn by Europe. Retrieved 29.06.2014, 2014, from <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/1999/12/euro-d14.html>
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Back to the Future - Instability in Europe after the Cold-War. *International Security*, 15(1), 5-56. doi: Doi 10.2307/2538981
- Mikhaylov, S., Laver, M., & Benoit, K. R. (2012). Coder Reliability and Misclassification in the Human Coding of Party Manifestos. *Political Analysis*, 20(1), 78-91. doi: Doi 10.1093/Pan/Mpr047
- Morelli, V., & Migdalovitz, C. (2009). CRS Report for Congress: European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey's Accession Negotiations: The Congressional Research Service.
- Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1985). *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*: Knopf.
- Morningstar, R. L. (2010). European Union Enlargement in the US Interest. *US Mission to the EU*. Retrieved June, 2012, from [http://useu.usmission.gov/About\\_The\\_Ambassador/Morningstar/May1000\\_BA\\_AA.asp](http://useu.usmission.gov/About_The_Ambassador/Morningstar/May1000_BA_AA.asp)
- Müftüler-Baç, M. (1998). Turkey and Israel: An Evolving Partnership. *Ariel Center for Policy Research*(47).
- Müftüler-Baç, M. (2005). Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union. *South European Society and Politics*, 10(1), 16-30.



- Nachmani, A. (1999). A Triangular Relationship: Turkish Israeli Cooperation and Its Implications for Greece. *Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien*, 28(juin-décembre).
- Nachmani, A. (2003). *Turkey Facing a New Millennium: Coping with Intertwined Conflicts*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Neville-Jones, P. (1996-1997). Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia. *Survival*, 38(4).
- Niblett, R. (2005). US, EU and Turkey: Congressional Staff Forum.
- Norris, D. A. (2002). *Neorealism and the European Union Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era*. (Master's Degree in Political Science Master's Thesis), University of Ohio, Ohio.
- Oguzlu, H. T. (2004). Changing Dynamics of Turkey's U.S. and EU Relations. *Middle East Policy*, 11(1), 98-105. doi: 10.1111/j.1061-1924.2004.00144.x
- Oğuzlu, T. (2008). Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West? *Turkish Studies*, 9(1), 3-20. doi: 10.1080/14683840701813960
- Onis, Z. (2000). Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations. *Government and Opposition*, 35(4), 463-483. doi: 10.1111/1477-7053.00041
- Öniş, Z. (2001). Yeni Yüzyılın Başında Türkiye Ekonomisi Eleştirel ve Karşılaştırmalı Yaklaşımlar. In M. Abramowitz (Ed.), *Türkiye'nin Dönüşümü ve Amerikan Politikası* (pp. 137-168). Ankara: Liberte.
- Öniş, Z., & Yılmaz, Ş. (2005). Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity? *Middle East Journal*, 59(2), 265-284.
- Özel, S., Yılmaz, Ş., & Akyüz, A. (2009). Rebuilding a Partnership: Turkish-American Relations for a New Era, A Turkish Perspective: TÜSİAD.
- Park, B. (2000). Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to ...Ankara? *Mediterranean Politics*, 5(3), 33-51.
- Parris, M. R. (2003). Starting Over: U.S.-Turkish Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 2(1), 1-10.

- Peters, G. (2014). *The American Presidency Project*. Retrieved from: [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/inaugurals\\_words.php](http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/inaugurals_words.php)
- Peterson, J., & Cowles, M. G. (1998). Clinton, Europe, and Economic Diplomacy: What makes the EU different? *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, 11(3), 251-271.
- Powell, R. (1994). Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. *International Organization*, 48(2), 313-344. doi: 10.2307/2706934
- Pryce-Jones, D., & Nye, J. S. (2000). The U.S. and Europe: Continental Drift? *International Affairs*, 76(1), 51-52.
- Radikal. (2002). Bush: AB için omuz omuza. *Radikal*. Retrieved from [http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/bush\\_ab\\_icin\\_omuz\\_omuza-654073](http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/bush_ab_icin_omuz_omuza-654073)
- Radikal. (2005). Başkan Bush Verdiği Sözü Tuttu. *Radikal*. Retrieved from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=59444>
- Ratti, L. (2006). Post-Cold War NATO and International Relations Theory: The Case for Neo-Classical Realism. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 4(1), 81-110.
- Robert, S. (2005). The U.S. needs Turkey in the EU. *The World and I*, 20(6).
- Robins, P. (2003). Confusion at home, confusion abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq. *International Affairs*, 79(3), 547-566.
- Rubin, B. M. (1999). US Foreign Policy and Rogue States. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 3(3).
- Sali, S. (2010). Squaring the Triangle: Understanding American Influence on EU-Turkey Relations. *Spotkania Europejskie*, 3, 29-42.
- Sayarı, S. (1992). Turkey: Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis. *Middle East Journal*, 46(1), 19.
- Sayarı, S. (2006). The United States and Turkey's Membership in the European Union. *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 34, 167-176.

- Sayarı, S. (2011). Challenges of Triangular Relations: The US, the EU, and Turkish Accession. *South European Society and Politics*, 16(2), 251-263.
- Schulzinger, R. (2007). *US Diplomacy Since 1900*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Schweller, R. (1996). Neo-realism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma? *Security Studies*, 5(3), 115-119.
- Schweller, R. (1997). New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition. *American Political Science Review*, 91(4), 927.
- Schweller, R. (2000). Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare Me a Paradigm, or Was Anybody Evet a Realist? *International Security*, 25(1), 174.
- Schweller, R. L., & Wohlforth, W. C. (2000). Power test: Evaluating realism in response to the end of the cold war. *Security Studies*, 9(3), 60-107.
- Sever, A. (2000). ABD'nin İkili Çevreleme Politikası ve Türkiye. In G. Özcan & Ş. Kut (Eds.), *En Uzun On Yıl* (pp. 347): Büke Yayıncılık.
- Smith, M. J. (1986). *Realist thought from Weber to Kissinger*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Spirtas, M. (1996). A house divided: Tragedy and evil in realist theory. *Security Studies*, 5(3), 385-423. doi: 10.1080/09636419608429284
- Taliaferro, J. W. (2000). Security seeking under anarchy - Defensive realism revisited. *International Security*, 25(3), 128-161. doi: 10.2307/2626708
- Tarik Oğuzlu, H., & Güngör, U. (2006). Peace Operations and the Transformation of Turkey's Security Policy. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 27(3), 472-488. doi: 10.1080/13523260601060388
- Taylor, R. N. (2002). US hawk want Turkey in EU. *Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/03/turkey.eu>
- Teitelbaum, M. S., & Martin, P. L. (2003). Is Turkey Ready for Europe? <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58977/michael-s-teitelbaum-and-philip-l-martin/is-turkey-ready-for-europe>

- The White House. (1997). *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (pp. 16). Washington D.C.: The White House.
- Tocci, N. (2011). *Turkey's European Future: Behind the Scenes of America's Influence on EU-Turkey Relations*. New York: New York University Press.
- Tocci, N. (2012). Let's talk Turkey! US influence on EU-Turkey relations. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(3), 399-416. doi: Doi 10.1080/09557571.2011.646243
- Varol, A. (2014). Türkiye-İsrail Dostluğu Nereye? Retrieved 25.07.2014, 2014, from <http://www.vahdet.info.tr/filistin/dosya3/0760.html>
- Vasquez, J. A. (1996). *Classics of International Relations*: Prentice Hall.
- Vasquez, J. A. (1997). The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Program: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition. *American Journal of Political Science*, 91(4), 908.
- Vinocur, J. (2002). Support for Turkey spurs officials' anger: French accuse U.S. of meddling. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from [http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/13/news/13iht-ALLIES\\_ed3\\_.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/13/news/13iht-ALLIES_ed3_.html)
- Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (1999). *International relations theory: realism, pluralism, globalism, and beyond*: Allyn and Bacon.
- Walt, S. M. (1997). The progressive power of realism. *American Political Science Review*, 91(4), 931-935. doi: Doi 10.2307/2952177
- Waltz, K. N. (1965). *Man, the State and the War*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1986). Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics. In R. Keohane (Ed.), *Neo-realism and Its Critics*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1993). The Emerging Structure of International-Politics. *International Security*, 18(2), 44-79. doi: Doi 10.2307/2539097
- Waltz, K. N. (1996). In J. Vasquez (Ed.), *Classics of International Relations* (pp. 310). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

- Waltz, K. N. (1999). In J. Vasquez (Ed.), *American Journal of Political Science* (pp. 309).
- Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural realism after the Cold War. *International Security*, 25(1), 5-41. doi: Doi 10.1162/016228800560372
- Warner, R. (1972). *History of the Peloponnesian War*: Penguin Books Limited.
- Watson, R. (2002). Bush backs Turkey's EU efforts. *BBC News World Edition*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2564339.stm>
- Weitsman, P. A. (1997). Intimate enemies: The politics of peacetime alliances. *Security Studies*, 7(1), 156-193.
- Wikipedia. (2014a). Al-Qaeda. Retrieved June 11, 2014, from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaeda>
- Wikipedia. (2014b). Justice and Development Party. Retrieved 19.07.2014, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justice\\_and\\_Development\\_Party\\_\(Turkey\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justice_and_Development_Party_(Turkey))
- Wikipedia. (2014c). Kardak. Retrieved 23.06.2014, 2014, from <http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kardak>
- Wikipedia. (2014d). Kurdistan Workers' Party. Retrieved 24.07.2014, 2014, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan\\_Workers%27\\_Party](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers%27_Party)
- Wikipedia. (2014e). Oslo Accords. Retrieved 25.07.2014, 2014, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo\\_Accords](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords)
- Wohlfort, W. C. (1999). The Stability of a Unipolar World. *International Security*, 24(1), 31.
- Yetkin, M. (2005). Sizden beklentimiz AB yolunda başarılı sonuç. *Radikal*. Retrieved from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=153062>
- Yılmaz, H. (2009). Europeanization and Its Discontents: Turkey, 1959-2007. In C. Arvanitopoulos (Ed.), *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy* (pp. 53-64). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- Yılmaz, T. (2001). *Türkiye İsrail Yakınlaşması*. Ankara: İmaj Yayınları.

