

THE ROLE OF AUDIENCE COSTS IN TURKISH HARD AND SOFT POWER
FOREIGN POLICY

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THE ROLE OF AUDIENCE COSTS IN TURKISH HARD AND SOFT POWER
FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstract

What role do domestic audience costs play across different types of foreign policy threats issued? Research on domestic audience costs—the domestic penalty a leader would face for making foreign threats and then backing down--provides direct evidence for the existence of audience costs for leaders who back down from hard power foreign policy threats, such as the threat to use militarized force. This thesis tries to understand the role of domestic audience costs across different foreign policy tools. Following Tomz (2007), I designed questionnaires that depict four different scenarios of hard and soft power foreign policy crises in the Turkish context.

My findings indicate that Turkish citizens hold a leader more accountable for following up on threats regarding foreign policy tools of economic sanctions and border blockades. The public is less willing to punish reneging from both a more hard power tool--militarized force, and a softer foreign policy tool--the extension of foreign aid. These findings suggest that the level of audience costs differs across different foreign policy tools. In addition, I found that Turkish national security, international reputation, and its relationship with neighbors are important factors to Turkish respondents when making a decision about how the prime minister handled the situation. On the other hand, establishing Turkey's leadership in its region was found to be the least important factor. Finally, evidence suggests that the main source of audience costs for the Turkish public emanate from their concern regarding national security and the international reputation of the country.

TÜRKİYE SERT VE YUMUŞAK GÜÇ DİŐ SİYASETİNDE İZLEYİCİ MALİYETİNİN ROLÜ

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Özet

Yerli izleyici maliyetinin farklı dıř siyaset tehditleri üzerinde oynadıđı rol nedir? Yerli izleyici maliyetleri – bir liderin dıř tehdit yaratıp ardından vazgeçmesinin ÷lke içinde cezalandırılması – üzerine yapılan araştırma, silahlı kuvvet kullanma tehdidi gibi sert güce dayalı dıř siyaset tehditlerinden vazgeçen liderler için izleyici maliyetlerinin söz konusu olduđuna dair doğrudan kanıt sađlar. Bu tez farklı dıř siyaset araçları üzerindeki yerli izleyici maliyetlerinin rolünü anlamayı amaçlıyor. Tomz’u (2007) temel alarak Türkiye bağlamında sert ve yumuřak güç ile ilgili dıř siyaset krizleri hakkında dört farklı senaryo betimleyen anketler tasarladım.

Bulgularım Türk vatandaşlarının lideri daha çok ekonomik yaptırımlar ve sınır ablukaları ile ilgili dıř siyaset araçlarına ilişkin tehditleri takip etmekten sorumlu tuttuđunu gösteriyor. Halk hem sert güç aracı – silahlı kuvvet gibi – hem de yumuřak güç olarak dıř siyaset aracından – dıř yardım uzantısı gibi – vazgeçmeyi cezalandırma konusunda daha isteksiz. Bu bulgular izleyici maliyetlerinin seviyesinin farklı dıř siyaset araçları arasında farklılık gösterdiđini ortaya koyuyor. Ayrıca Türk katılımcılarının bařbakanın durumu nasıl idare ettiđi konusunda karar vermelerinde Türkiye’nin ulusal güvenliđi, uluslararası itibarı ve komřularıyla iliřkilerinin önemli etkenler olduđu sonucuna vardım. Diđer yandan Türkiye’nin bölgedeki liderliđinin pekiřtirilmesinin en önemsiz etken olduđu ortaya çıktı. Son olarak, bulgular Türkiye halkı için izleyici maliyetinin ana kaynađının, ulusal güvenlik ve ÷lkenin uluslararası itibarı hususundaki kaygılardan ortaya çıktıđını gösteriyor.

To my dear mother, Ana Elsa Moran

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1. INTRODUCTION

What role do domestic audience costs play across different types of foreign policy threats issued? Frequently, states are faced with foreign policy crises where their respective domestic political audiences observe and assess how their political leaders choose to handle such crises at hand. Understanding why and how international crises occur and unfold was the motivation behind James Fearon's (1994) work on audience costs theory. Fearon argued that political leaders who choose to back down from an international crisis are faced with domestic audience costs which increase if leaders further escalate the crisis. Twenty years have passed since the introduction of audience costs theory. And since then, audience costs theory has opened new avenues of research which have later proved to be very important. For example, scholars have applied it to other settings of international relations such as alliances (Gaubatz 1996), international cooperation (Leeds 1999), and trade (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002).

The immediate empirical tests, which followed the seminal work where Fearon coined the term, tried to establish the existence of audience costs through indirect tests, mainly focusing on whether international militarized threats escalated into the use of force or not (see, for example, Eyerman and Hart 1996; Partell and Palmer 1998; Schultz 2001). Recent research started pointing towards direct evidence that political leaders suffer domestic consequences after publicly issuing threats or promises and failing to follow through (see Tomz 2007, 2009). Analyses by Tomz (2007) were based on a series of experiments embedded in public opinion surveys. And these findings indeed show audience costs exist.

My research question mainly builds on Tomz's (2007, 2009) recent studies on audience costs. The scenarios Tomz presented to the respondents solely focused on the use of

militarized threats. And as a result, Tomz tested for audience costs in a scenario of hard power foreign policy, eventually overlooking the role of audience costs in a soft power situation. Interestingly almost all studies look at militarized threats, and as such, threats by leaders that resort to force if their demands are not met. However, international diplomacy and international crisis resolution happens in far more cases where military is not even on the table. Despite the salience of alternative foreign policy tools, no study has been done to test (1) whether audience costs exist for foreign policy scenarios involving soft-power scenarios. And to test (2) what is the relative salience of audience costs across these different foreign policy tools.

In this thesis, I take a closer look at the role of domestic audience costs between Turkish hard and soft power foreign policies by replicating Tomz's approach in the Turkish setting. For this study, a set of questionnaires were distributed to 100 Turkish citizens compiled through convenience sampling. Via their answers to hypothetical scenarios, I tried to measure whether the presence of audience costs significantly varies between hard and soft power foreign policy. Research on the role of audience costs between hard power and soft power foreign policy could benefit leaders who are vulnerable to audience costs in deciding whether to issue empty commitments or not in the case of a foreign policy crisis.

The analysis shows that audience costs are present across all four scenarios of foreign policy. In particular, audience costs resulted in higher frequencies for a hard power foreign policy scenario involving economic sanctions, and for a soft power foreign policy scenario involving the blockade of national borders. In this sense, I found that the role of audience costs varies across different tools of foreign policy. And lastly, I found that the majority of Turkish respondents were driven to punish renegeing leaders in all foreign policy scenarios because of concerns for the international reputation and national security of the Turkish Republic. Additionally, evidence also shows that, to some extent, respondents cared about Turkey's moral responsibility to help neighboring countries and about Turkey's foreign relationship with its neighbors. All in all, the reasoning for respondents choosing how to rate their leader was contingent upon the aforementioned rationales. Meanwhile, the rationale of Turkey's role as a regional leader received very little concern from the vast majority of respondents.

In the remainder of this article, I delve into the theoretical background of audience

costs. Then I further corroborate that constituents disapprove of leaders who make international threats and then renege. In addition, I look into some factors that might have some influence in the way respondents approve or disapprove of how the Turkish Prime Minister handled the situation at hand. I then further into the rationales used by constituents for judging their prime ministers' actions. Finally, as a step toward deepening our theoretical as well as empirical understanding of audience costs, I investigate what rationales drive citizens to react negatively to empty threats.

2. TURKEY AS A SETTING FOR AUDIENCE COSTS

In 1960, Schelling contended that political leaders can reinforce their bargaining position in a foreign crisis by making overt public statements to incite public opinion in order to avoid concession (Schelling 1960). Through this logic, scholars such as Fearon (1994) emphasized on the incentive leaders have in being held accountable by domestic political audiences. More specifically, that domestic political audiences would punish political leaders for backing down on a given foreign policy issue. However, as mentioned before, this penalty for leaders was at first empirically tested by referring to militarized cases in which democratic leaders were actually punished by domestic political audiences (Schultz 2001). Direct evidence of audience costs were also measured through militarized crisis scenarios (see, e.g., Tomz 2007, 2009). As a result, the existence of audience costs has solely been tested in cases of hard power foreign policy, rather than soft power or both.

In a realists world where states operate on an anarchic system, possess some offensive military capability, are uncertain of other states, and are rational actors seeking to maximize their likelihood of survival (see Mearsheimer 2007); coercive or coaxing foreign policy strategies would appear to be normal in state behavior. According to Joseph S. Nye's (1990) instrumental logic of foreign policy actions, such types of foreign policy strategies almost always require the use of force that are oriented towards adding up the benefits of a course of action and then comparing them with the associated costs. However, the use of force has become more costly for modern day state powers, while soft-power foreign policy strategies have become increasingly attractive (see Nye 1990:168). Soft-power foreign policy strategies are oriented towards ensuring cooperation and that others would automatically follow the lead of the power-holder due to the power of attraction (Oğuzlu 2007). In this

regard, some scholars have acknowledged soft power as an essential resource of statecraft that builds attraction and employs an intangible power of persuasion rather than economic and military power (Cooper 2004; Wilson III 2008).

According to Oğuzlu (2007), domestic and international developments in Turkey during the beginning of the 21st century gave rise to its soft power capabilities in the region. On the other hand, Altınay (2008) contends that Turkey's soft power potential is due to its capacity to attract and inspire regional neighboring states that share similar historical and cultural ties. In a similar matter, Kalın (2011:7) argues that Turkey's soft power capacity is a product of Turkey's "history, geography, cultural depth, economic strength, and democracy." Regardless where Turkey's soft power potential originates from, it has also been noted that it is limited due to endogenous and exogenous constraints (see, for example, Altunışık 2008). More recent literature has also argued that analyses of Turkey's soft power foreign policy have been fraught with conceptual issues that, in turn, reduce the capacity to explain foreign policy outcomes (see Demiryol 2014). Nonetheless, much of Turkish soft power has been underlined in world politics through its foreign policy tools and strategies as a third party actor and cultural hub. In particular, Turkey has played both humanitarian and third party roles in the management and resolution of global conflicts in distant regions such as Somalia, the Balkans, and Lebanon (see, *inter alia*, Altunışık 2008; Öner 2013; Zenalaj, Beriker, and Hatipoglu 2012; Timocin 2013). In addition to this, Turkey's role as a cultural hub has further underlined Turkish soft power in world politics. For instance, Turkey's rising image around the globe is, in part, due to soft power tools coming in the likes of cultural exports (Deniz 2010), tourism (Altınay 2008), and even its national airline company, Turkish airlines (Selçuk 2012).

The institutional setting in a polity to examine audience costs requires two properties: (1) the country should have the willingness and capability to conduct a variety of foreign policy tools, and (2) the country's leader should be culpable to domestic political actors, preferably most importantly through elections. Turkey is a suitable case for such examination. Turkey's foreign policy has recently been employing a wide range of tools, which spawn a wide geography around the globe (see, *inter alia*, Oğuzlu 2007; Altunışık 2008; Kalın 2011; "Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs" 2011). In Turkey, general elections are held on a regular basis; currently every four years. Furthermore,

elections are, for the most part, free and fair. Additionally, the national suffrage appeals to the international democratic norms. Above all, elections are known to be a very important part of the Turkish political culture because Turkish policy makers alike diplomats have always underline the importance of the Turkish public opinion (Erdoğan 2005). Also, with the presence of democratic elections in Turkey, an increase in the transparency of foreign policy issues along with an increase in media and press coverage, have given rise to public opinion on international relations of the nation state (see, Kalaycioğlu 2009). This advent of public opinion has been identified by Kalaycioğlu (2009) to heed, engage with, and even take into account foreign policy issues. As a result, the public opinion in Turkey can be seen as a source of impact on the way in which political party groups or factions vote in the National Assembly (Kalaycioğlu 2009). This falls in tandem with evidence that suggests a notable increase in foreign policy salience in Turkish politics (see Keyman 2009). All in all, recent research illustrates how Turkish foreign policy has occupied an important part in the electoral manifestos of major parties represented in the Turkish parliament (see Hatipoglu, Aslan, and Luetgert, 2014).

3. A REVIEW ON THE LOGIC OF AUDIENCE COSTS

3.1. Theoretical Background

Audience cost theory has generated a substantial body of theoretical and empirical research. The initial logic of the theory, defined by Fearon (1994), suggested that political leaders would be held accountable to domestic audience costs for openly issuing a threat during an interstate crisis, and then backing down. According to Fearon (1994), democratic leaders are, by implication, more likely to be subject to audience costs due to their vulnerability of suffering from unfavorable public elections. Moreover, Fearon (1994) asserted that democratic leaders were more likely to threaten when they intended to follow upon that threat if needed. More specifically, Fearon argued that domestically accountable leaders selectively threatened other countries because backing down would result in substantial domestic political costs. As a result, threatened states that are cognizant of this would more likely take threats from democracies more seriously (Fearon 1994; Smith 1998; Schultz 2001). However, more recent research illustrates empirical evidence towards the presence of audience costs for particular types of non-democratic leaders as well (see, *inter alia*, Weeks 2008; Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2012). For instance, Weeks (2008) found that audience costs for some autocratic leaders emanate from domestic elites who act as audiences that are similar to domestic political audiences in democracies. In conjunction with this, under particular conditions, certain types of autocracies, like democracies, also seem to be capable of credibly signaling resolve with the presence of audience costs (Kinne and Marinov 2012).

Proving the existence of domestic audience costs has initially been through indirect measurements, mostly looking at whether threats emanating from democratic countries are perceived more credible by the targeted state. Fearon's conjecture of audience costs being higher in democracies than in autocracies led; Eyerman and Hart (1996), Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001), and Partell and Palmer (1999) to check for correlations between democracies and foreign policy. More specifically, the aforementioned scholars developed statistical models of interstate crisis behavior to see whether threats issued by democratic states are perceived to be more credible by the target. The findings from all three studies indeed showed that democracies have an advantage in generating audience costs and hence signaling resolve. However, while being good initial attempts towards providing empirical support for Fearon's assertion on the relationship between democracy and the level of audience costs in a polity, these same empirical tests do not directly prove that audience costs exist in practice. In other words, these studies do not examine whether audience costs actually cause a democratic leader to suffer from a domestic penalty.¹ The shortcomings of these earlier studies have recently been discussed in more detail by Gartzke and Lupu (2012).

Realizing some of the shortcomings of previous studies, scholars started studying the direct impacts of audience costs. Such direct impacts range from looking at the fate of leaders who issued such threats without following through, the intentions of leaders, the extent that leaders can communicate with each other, to how they perceive such information. Such empirical evidence can be retrieved from historical case studies where the situations being examined closely resemble the function that audience costs theory predicts. However, the concern that most scholars commonly take issue with is partial observability and strategic selection bias (Schultz 2001; Baum 2004; Tomz 2007). More specifically, these concerns that scholars take issue with come along with examining historical case studies in which domestic audience costs are found to have taken place.

Nonetheless, such studies that employed historical case study analyses for examining audience costs theory should not be disregarded. If anything, they are fine

¹All of this very much resonates with evidence found to support the existence of gravity. It is obvious that gravity is not visible; however, it can be measured and hence confirmed to exist through its implications. In this respect, the same could be said for early research of audience costs theory.

contributions to the theory upon that some have augmented the scope of the theory itself. For example, Schultz (1998) delves on Fearon's (1994) assertion that leaders are left with a penalty to pay when failing to follow through with publicly announced foreign policies. To test the validity of this claim, Schultz (1998) uses historical events and large-N analysis to shed light on the role of political opposition mobilization with respect to inciting the domestic penalty that Fearon (1994) had conjectured in his theory. This contribution later proved to be useful to scholars like Prins (2003:68), who in addition to suggesting that political opposition was a key component of audience cost signaling, also suggested that "an uncertainty regarding the stability of a regime's political competition naturally had an impact on foreign policy decision-making."

More recent research has paid close attention to the methodological difficulties (i.e., strategic selection bias and partial observability) that surfaced in testing Fearon's argument about domestic political audience costs and signaling in international crises (see, e.g., Schultz 2001; Baum 2004; Croco 2011). For example, Schultz (2001) used a formal model, brief case studies, and Monte Carlo simulations to show that earlier studies biased direct tests against supporting either of the audience cost propositions. In doing so, Schultz (2001:36) adds to the audience costs conjecture by demonstrating that "estimates using observed audience costs underestimate both the level of audience costs in the population and the difference in means across regime types."

Baum (2004) avoids strategic selection bias by focusing on the case of the United States. Here, Baum (2004) finds empirical evidence indicating that U.S. presidents tend to avoid generating audience costs when no national security interests are at stake. Lastly, Croco (2011) also bypassed strategic selection bias by creating and using her own data set to test the role of domestic audience costs for culpable and non-culpable leaders. Ultimately, she finds that only culpable leaders who lose are vulnerable to domestic audience costs, while those who lose and are non-culpable leaders are exempt from such domestic audience costs.

Overall, Fearon's predictions were initially widely tested through indirect implications. Such existing studies only employed the nature of domestic institutions (i.e., the regime type, the political status, etc) as a substitute for indicating to what extent a leader could domestically be accountable in its foreign policy threats and actions. In the

end, almost all audience costs models in the extant literature gave leeway to two important conjectures of audience costs theory: 1) that a state leader incurs audience costs to a certain extent, and this cost can jeopardize the leader's political career when they openly issue a public threat or promise and fail to follow through, and 2) that their institutional setup put democracies at an advantage towards generating audience costs, which could then be used to credibly signal their intentions to other states.

The methodological challenges mentioned earlier in empirically and directly testing the existence of audience costs rendered an empirical conundrum for scholars of international relations. Tomz (2007) was the first scholar to come up with two separate research designs that directly tested for the existence of audience costs. Audience costs theory was directly tested through a survey design that was able to avoid both indirect findings and strategic selection bias. More specifically, Tomz's experiments--which were embedded in public opinion surveys--illustrated that audience costs actually existed. In doing so, Tomz (2007) confirmed that citizens actually punish their leaders who say one thing but do another.

The literature has been focused towards advancing this theoretical frontier. And it is important to understand how this notion of audience costs underwent various transitions. To do this, I continue with a general overview of the theory by presenting major early works that quickly went on to assume a dichotomy between democracies and autocracies in respect to the ability to generate audience costs. Then, I survey some major themes that emerged over time with audience costs literature. Following a survey of major themes, I then delve into the dichotomy of democratic and autocratic regimes that developed in the early stages of the theory. Next, I continue to focus on the dichotomy of political regimes, in bringing into account how later studies of the theory caused problems for the idea in place, eventually shattering a common assumption of a dichotomy between democratic and autocratic regimes. Further on, I give heed to empirical advancements that led to a furthered understanding of whether audience costs actually existed or not, and if so, how they worked. All while taking into account how there have also been theoretical backlashes against this theoretical argument. And finally I discuss how a number of scholars have taken issue with the empirical support for the audience cost theory. All in all, this chapter provides an analytical descriptive literature review of audience costs theory.

3.2. Earlier Works on Audience Costs Theory

Schelling's statement; "the right to be sued is the power to accept commitment or make a promise" (Schelling 1956:299); paved the way for James D. Fearon's 1994 study; *Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes*. In a nutshell, Fearon argued that a leader, who openly issued a threat and then renege, could then be susceptible to being held accountable by domestic punishment that would put his political career in danger. Furthermore, due to the presence of such a domestic penalty, a state leader would have the power to credibly commit to a threat or make a promise since she would only engage in such behavior when she would be intent in following such threats and promises. He further argued that electoral concerns which leaders in democratic regimes faced made these leaders more wary of audience costs. This logic opened new channels for research in international relations. And although his work was based on the context of war, it greatly contributed to further research in sub-disciplines of political science other than international relations (e.g. Huth and Allee 2002; Tarar and Leventoglu 2012) as well as in other academic disciplines of the social sciences, such as economics (e.g. Jensen 2003) and psychology (e.g. Hoffman, Agnew, Lehmiller, and Duncan 2009).

From a bargaining perspective, the ability for a state to incur domestic audience costs successfully gives that state the chance to credibly signal its resolve (Fearon, 1994:577). This implication has constituted a major departure point for initial studies venturing to test the validity of the audience cost argument. Put in Slantchev's (2012:377) summary:

“If (1) backing down in a crisis makes an actor suffer costs in addition to those arising from conceding the stakes, (2) these costs increase as the crisis escalates, (3) these costs can become so large that war becomes preferable to a concession, (4) no other mechanism for coercing the opponent exists, and (5) attempting to coerce the opponent does not increase his costs of conceding, then escalation can commit an actor to fighting, and the resulting risk of war discourages bluffing, which makes escalation informative and gives it a coercive role.”

In sum, Fearon (1994) assumes that in a conflict where a state backs down, its leaders suffer audience costs that increase as the conflict increases in severity. In this way, Fearon notes that democracies should be, on average, better able to generate audience costs than non-democracies. This general assumption that democracies had a larger capacity than non-democracies to generate audience costs became a common assumption in subsequent audience costs literature. And as mentioned earlier, major early works that followed Fearon’s theoretical model were attempts to empirically test several hypotheses that emanated from Fearon’s model (see, *inter alia*, Eyerman and Hart 1996; Smith 1998; Schultz 1998; Partel and Palmer 1999; Schultz 2001; Dorussen and Mo 2001; Prins 2003). Although these studies were briefly introduced early in this chapter, it is essential to delve into the specifics of these studies in order to better grasp a closer understanding of audience costs in the extant literature.

Beginning with one of the first published studies, Eyerman and Hart (1996) focused on examining Fearon’s argument: “that democracies should be able to effectively communicate their resolve and therefore escalate in fewer stages and back down less often” (Eyerman and Hart 1996:602). The authors evaluate this argument by observing the behavior of democracies and non-democracies within crises listed on SHERFACS, a phase-disaggregated conflict management data set. More precisely, the authors compare the crisis activity of both democratic and non-democratic states. In doing so, the authors expected non-democratic states, on average, to have higher crisis activity than democratic states. The authors anticipated this trend because Fearon conjectures democracies to have stronger

domestic audiences. Because of the higher audience costs they are subject to, democratic states are hypothesized to seek crisis activity only when they have high resolve, in other words, democracies threaten less frequently, and when they do, their threats are more credible. In comparison, non-democracies are expected to rely on greater crisis activity to signal their resolve. Ultimately, the authors found that domestic characteristics of democracies allow democracies to communicate intentions more effectively than non-democracies. As a result, their findings also supported existing explanations of the democratic peace.

In another early study, Smith (1998) provides micro-foundations for why constituents are motivated to punish leaders who fail to follow through with their commitments. In doing so, Smith was interested in explaining why audience costs work, and he did this by predicting how domestic conditions and political institutions affect the extent to which audience costs bind leaders and, hence, the extent to which threats influence crisis behavior. In sync with this, Smith designed a model of state crisis behavior and domestic politics, which ultimately lead to two sets of results. Smith's model first shows how domestic conditions within a state affect foreign policy decisions by all states involved in a crisis. Moreover, Smith finds that this association between domestic politics and foreign policy enables leaders to issue credible threats that deter adversaries. In this way, Smith explains why voters want to remove leaders who renege on their threats. With this he generates a theory for the creation of audience costs, and concludes that audience costs make foreign policy statements meaningful.

As for Partell and Palmer (1999), formal models of political events and large-N empirical tests were essential in empirically testing a number of interesting hypotheses from Fearon's model. More specifically, the following four hypotheses from Fearon's model were empirically tested by the authors: 1) "that states that are better able to generate audience costs are less likely to back down in disputes than states less able to generate audience costs;" 2) "that high-audience-cost states will be significantly less likely to initiate limited probes in foreign policy;" 3) "that in disputes in which both sides decide to escalate, the observable balance of capabilities should be unrelated to which side backs down; (4 and "that leaders who face high audience costs will pursue more escalatory strategies of crisis management when they face low-audience-cost states than when they face other high-

audience-cost states” (Partell and Palmer 1999:391-392). The empirical measurements of these hypotheses were done using a data set of the Correlates of War Project’s Militarized Interstate Dispute, 1816-1992 (MID).

Eyerman and Hart (1996) provided the first test of Fearon’s model; however, several problems are revealed when juxtaposed with this similar analysis from Partell and Palmer (1999). For example, even though Fearon asserts that nondemocratic leaders can also face strong domestic audience costs, Eyerman and Hart’s (1996) test only focused on characteristics of democracy as their indicators of audience costs. Second, Partell and Palmer (1999) state that because Fearon’s audience-costs hypothesis is monadic, it should apply to all high-audience-cost states, regardless of their opponents’ domestic political structure. However, Eyerman and Hart test the hypothesis at a dyadic level by only looking at the crisis behavior of states inside democratic crises. And finally, Partell and Palmer point out that Eyerman and Hart only test one hypothesis from Fearon’s model, whereas Partell and Palmer (1999:390) take credit for using “multiple measures of audience costs to test four of the central hypotheses that flow from Fearon’s model at the monadic rather than dyadic level of analysis.” As a result, Partell and Palmer’s (1999) study can be considered to be thorough empirical tests when compared to that of Eyerman and Hart’s (1996).

Ultimately, Eyerman and Hart’s (1996) along with Partell and Palmer’s (1999) investigations of audience costs supported Fearon’s (1994) conjectures. However, their empirical results were from measures of models in which audience costs were dependent on democracies. In this way, such tests overlooked “whether the effects of democracy stem from audience costs or from other differences between political regimes” (Tomz 2007:822). Schultz (2001), on the other hand, delves into the challenges of directly testing Fearon’s model. Towards that end, he employed a formal model, brief case studies, and Monte Carlo simulations to illustrate that severe difficulty can surface in conducting and interpreting direct tests of the audience costs theory. For example, one could test leaders directly; however, a leader that anticipates domestic audience costs would simply just avoid any action that would expose him or her to such penalties. In the end, Schultz (2001:52) arrived at the conclusion that “in general, finding evidence for the existence of audience costs is easier than determining whether they are higher or lower for some kinds of states.”

In all these early contributions, a dichotomy was assumed between democracies and

autocracies in respect to the ability to generate audience costs as these scholars assumed that due to electoral concerns, democratic leaders would be more susceptible to audience costs. As a result, this initially confined the scope and application of audience costs theory to democratic institutional features. However, later studies of audience costs theory looked at variance within authoritarian regimes in terms of incurring audience costs (Weeks 2008; Kinne and Marinov 2012).

3.3. Major Themes in Audience Costs Theory

Over the last two decades, various themes have emerged in audience costs literature. For example, audience costs as a theoretical mechanism has been applied to and associated in such instances as; war (e.g., Fearon 1994), economic sanctions (e.g., Dorussen and Mo, 2001), institutional instability (e.g., Prins 2003), partisanship and backing down (e.g., Levendusky and Horowitz 2012), terrorism (e.g., Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2012), public opinion (e.g., Baum 2004), media (e.g., Slantchev 2006), autocratic audience in the context of war (e.g., Weeks 2008; Kinne and Marinov 2012), and peacemaking and rapprochement (e.g., Akcinaroglu, DiCicco, and Radziszewski 2011). Other themes worth noting include; international cooperation (e.g., Leeds 1999), alliances (e.g., Gaubatz 1996), trade (e.g., Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002), foreign direct investments (e.g., Jensen 2003), debt repayment (e.g., Schultz and Weingast 2003), and monetary commitments (e.g., Broz 2002).

An interesting example worth noting in detail is from Dorussen and Mo (2001). In their seminal work, they point out that little attention had been heeded to the longevity and end of economic sanctions. In shedding light on this topic, they found that taking audience costs theory into consideration elicited a helpful explanation for the longevity and end of economic sanctions. In basic terms, their argument was that the leader of the sender (government who imposed the economic sanctions) generated audience costs as a commitment strategy to convince the target (government who suffers the economic

sanctions) that future costs are inevitable as long as the sanctioned state is unwilling to give in (Dorussen and Mo 2001). In this application, the authors looked at the mechanism of audience costs as a factor affecting the nature of economic sanctions. More specifically, audience costs were confirmed to play a role in prolonging the longevity of economic sanctions when the cost of retracting exceeded the cost of continuing economic sanctions. Therefore, the authors concluded that only audience costs as a strategic commitment help the sender bring forth target concessions.

The aforementioned studies illustrate considerable attention for the functions of audience costs theory. As a result, audience costs theory continued to gain interest from many scholars--especially those interested in international relations. Eventually, further examinations of the theory looked for its existence rather than for its implications which were conjectured on studies based on the, previously mentioned, democratic-autocratic dichotomy.

3.4. The Democracy-Autocracy Dichotomy

For the most part, democratic leaders were assumed to be held accountable for their actions more often than non-democratic leaders. Correspondingly, the ability to generate or incur domestic audience costs was initially widely recognized to only correlate with democracies. In 1994, Fearon first conjectured that democracies should be, on average, better at generating domestic audience costs than non-democracies, and hence gain the ability to commit and signal resolve. As a result, non-democracies did not receive much attention in respect to the level of variance observed in audience costs within authoritarian regimes until the work of Weeks (2008).

The democracy-autocracy dichotomy was a hypothesis of the theory that received plenty of attention from early contributions in the literature. Despite the empirical support for the audience costs' indirect implications, a research design employing a direct test towards the existence of audience costs had not been employed yet. This dichotomy

received early support from Partell and Palmer (1999:402), where they illustrated empirics in favor of democratic states in generating high audience costs because they were thought to have a politically constrained executive. In addition, Prins (2003:68) focused on the association between the democratic peace theory and domestic audience costs. In doing so, he argued that “the believability of audience costs and resolve depends in part on the stability of domestic political structures.” In turn, this gave further reason to believe that the political stability of a state enacted the presence of audience costs.

On the other hand, Slantchev (2006) conducted a thorough investigation of how audience costs arise and how they come into existence. He considered how previous analyses assume that audience costs existed and that they are related to regime type, more particularly, higher in democracies and lower in non-democracies (2006:470). Slantchev focused on linking domestic audience costs to the citizens’ ability to hold leadership accountable for pursuing unfavorable policies they would not want if they had the same information about the quality of such policies.

By taking into account two information transmission mechanisms; politicians and the media, Slantchev (2006) arrived at interesting results that did not fall in line with the democratic-autocratic dichotomy conjecture in audience costs theory. The results suggested “that perfect audience costs can arise endogenously only in mixed regimes where the costs of repressing dissent are neither too high nor too low” (Slantchev, 2006:470). This result not only deviated from the democratic-autocratic dichotomy hypothesis, but it also paved the way for Weeks (2008) and a line of other scholars after her. In her seminal work, Weeks (2008) found that domestic elites present in certain non-democratic regimes act as a domestic audience for non-democratic political leaders, which in turn enables the presence of audience costs in autocratic or mixed regimes. Her pioneering work eventually led future research in audience costs theory to sway away from the conventional democracy-autocracy dichotomy.

3.5. Problems with the Democracy-Autocracy Dichotomy

With time, new studies rendered the notion of regime type and audience costs theory problematic. New perspectives on the nature of regimes revealed variations within these regimes with respect to their capacity to generate audience costs (see, Weeks 2008; Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2012; Kinne and Marinov 2012). Interestingly, before these new perspectives emerged in the field, few scholars had already touched upon the possibility that the common assumption of regime type and audience costs can be, after all, misleading. As previously mentioned, Slantchev (2006:446) realized that if “one relied solely on strategic sources of information (government, opposition parties), citizens of either democracies or autocracies are unlikely to learn enough to credibly threaten to sanction their leader for bad behavior.” In other words, how were citizens supposed to understand when to punish their leader for issuing empty threats? In another case, Partell and Palmer (1999:404), discovered that their results of Fearon’s model suggested that audience costs exerted influence over which side to a dispute will back down, but the connection between audience costs and regime type remained unclear.

New perspectives on regime types came about when Jessica L. Weeks (2008) shattered the common assumption adopted by many audience costs theorists. In her article, Weeks argues and provides empirical evidence that domestic elites in certain non-democracies have incentives to punish leaders for reneging on foreign policy threats. Weeks (2008:36) does this by proposing “three necessary conditions for generating audience costs; 1) the incentive and ability for domestic political groups to coordinate to punish the leader, 2) domestic negative views for backing down, 3) and whether outsiders can observe the possibility of domestic dissatisfaction.” She then argues that certain variations of autocratic regimes meet these requirements, and then statistically supports her hypothesis with empirical data. In doing so, she manages to show that threats made by democracies are not more credible than threats made by autocratic regimes.

Some autocratic regimes, she argues, meet the necessary conditions for generating politically significant audience costs, thus their actions are held accountable by high ranking officials whom they share power with or receive support from. However, she also notes that some autocratic leaders use surveillance and punishment strategies to prevent elite coordination, while others occlude their foreign policy decisions from domestic observation. As a result, such autocratic regimes cannot generate audience costs (Weeks 2008). For example, leaders in some autocracies may not be held accountable by the people or domestic elites, if any.

On another related note, Kinne and Marinov (2012) use data on the reciprocation rates in militarized crises to show that even electoral authoritarian regimes are able to credibly signal resolve. In their study, the authors argue that some non-democratic electoral processes are mechanisms of credible signaling. And they further find that nondemocratic regimes also have the capacity to be held domestically accountable, and by the same coin, credibly signal resolve. In brief, the authors argued that if electoral bias decreases and the vulnerability of the incumbent increases, then the electoral process could be held accountable, hence enhancing the ability to credibly signal resolve.

In sum, these studies of the theory rendered the idea of a dichotomy of political regimes problematic. Further studies on the theory continued to build upon these findings and provided new empirical advancements that led to a furthered understanding of whether audience costs actually existed or not. Such studies not only challenged the theoretical argument, but also brought forth theoretical backlashes to the logic of the theory.

3.6. Empirical Advancements on Audience Costs

Empirical advancements that clarified the existence of audience costs emanated from novel conceptual functions of the theory. These advancements went on to explain disparate perspectives of audience costs theory. For example, several important contributions further research in audience costs to explain intriguing topics such as; why leaders or regimes with extreme capabilities to signal resolve choose instead to go private (see Baum 2004); peace and rapprochement (see Akcinaroglu, DiCicco, and Radziszewski 2011); and even why terrorism occurs (see Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2012). These novel approaches to audience costs theory are non-symmetrical with previous studies in the literature that had suggested, for the most part, that the ability to generate domestic audience costs was seen as a strategy of benefit for leaders to successfully signal resolve. While these empirical advancements led to more coherent explanations for the existence of audience costs, it is also worth taking into account the theoretical backlashes they introduced against the theoretical argument. In 2004, Baum (2004) focused on the role of audience costs in the United States. As a democratic nation, U.S leaders are theorized to have the capacity to generate audience costs when publicly issuing a threat or promise. However, Baum (2004) delves on how it has long been held true that American leaders do not disclose any highly classified information to the American public--especially when conditions prove unfavorable. In fact, most political matters that are believed to incite any sort of discontent from the public are commonly known to be covert. And despite all the potential credibility that domestic audience costs are theorized to provide for the U.S, there is still an inclination to avoid domestic audience costs. With this in mind, Baum (2004) explored the role of domestic public opinion in influencing the decision of American leaders. What he found through an analysis of U.S. behavior in all international crises between 1946 and 1994, was that an excess in audience costs actually causes undesirable costs for the president as a democratic leader if failure is met. In addition, Baum (2004:627) found that when the

“United States has no significant national security interests at stake, presidents will be hesitant to seek the public spotlight unless they are fairly confident of success.” In reflection to Baum’s empirical evidence it could be inferred that a good amount of American political matters are most likely done through undisclosed deep politics that remain unbeknown to domestic audiences. As a result, high audience costs are avoided with “quiet diplomacy” (Baum 2004:628). The empirical evidence from this work further corroborates the existence of audience costs; however, it also presents a theoretical backlash to the theory as it purports the presence of audience costs to backfire against the leader.

Another interesting case that audience cost theory was associated with was a study of peace and rapprochement. In this particular case, scholars were able to piece together the effects of audience costs on the aftermath of a natural disaster-shared by rivals entangled in a protracted conflict, as impetus towards peace and rapprochement (Akcinaroglu, DiCicco, and Radziszewski 2011). Through newspaper content analysis and time-series analysis, they were able to detect the impact of audience costs in the aftermath of two major earthquakes that shocked Turkey-Greece, and India-Pakistan. Ultimately, based on their research they arrived at two interesting conclusions. 1) If there is a presence of routine violence, even if a natural disaster occurs there is no room for rapprochement because most citizens impose audience costs on leaders who seek warm relations. 2) On the other hand, when enduring rivalries are ‘locked in’ constituents impose audience costs towards rapprochement. (Akcinaroglu, DiCicco, and Radziszewski 2011:271). In the end, this empirical advancement introduced a very different perspective on audience costs theory.

Conrad, Conrad, and Young (2012) brought forth an intriguing perspective on audience costs theory. They employ audience costs as a contextual variable to measure the likelihood of terrorism in autocratic regimes. In general, Conrad et al. argue that the differences in the audience costs generated by non-democratic leaders explain why some non-democracies experience more terrorism than others. More specifically, this study is based on Weeks’ (2008) classification of regime types, and argues that dictatorships with the capacity and resources to generate more audience costs would consequently experience more terrorism than autocratic regimes that incur relatively low audience costs. The logic is that terrorists would choose to execute a terrorist attack, if and only, they could achieve an audience to witness their activity, and hence create costs for the leader or regime in power.

Their contribution to the theory gave rise to an interesting implication that did not agree with the theoretical consensus that had long established the ability to generate audience costs as a favorable and beneficial ability for war deterrence. Their interpretation of the theory *vis-a-vis* terrorism salience rendered the presence of audience costs as a catalyst for welcoming terrorist attacks. The empirical evidence found for this logic advanced support for the existence of audience costs theory, but it also draws near to a theoretical backlash against the initial consensus that favored the ability of generating audience costs. As a result, these studies not only furthered an understanding of whether audience costs actually existed or not, but they also introduced disparate outlooks on the way the theory can be conceptualized.

3.7. Issues with the Empirics for Audience Costs Theory

From the beginning, some scholars have taken issue with the empirical support for audience costs theory. The discontent with the extant empirical evidence is for the most part due to the methodological quandaries present in most research. As mentioned earlier, studies of the theory have been indirect on account of strategic selection bias and partial observability. Tomz (2007) and a number of scholars who took issue with not the theoretical validity, but rather quality of the empirics, acknowledged that many early studies examined the theory through indirect implications. Direct evidence of audience costs theory was first found by Tomz in 2007. The empirical evidence was obtained from public surveys conducted among American citizens. Through these experiments, Tomz designed fictitious scenarios and asked American voters whether they approved or disapproved of different leaders who openly made a foreign policy threat and then chose to back down. The results not only pointed towards the presence of audience costs, but they also indicated that audience costs increase as leaders further escalate their foreign threats.

Nonetheless, before these studies took place, earlier studies had already taken issue with the empirical evidence of audience costs. More specifically, some theorists pointed

towards notions of incongruity when examining and applying a theory that could otherwise not be literally observed. For example, as Smith (1998:623) sought to better understand the theory itself, he pondered on the thought of how the concept of audience cost was largely problematic because it was simply assumed to exist. For Smith, audience costs theory was not tenable and even misleading (Smith 1998:623). As a result, he found himself focusing on the micro-foundations from the public perspective of the logic in order to better attach meaning to the theory.

In another instance, Slantchev (2006:446) expresses how audience costs are for the most part assumed to be there, hence leading to his question; “how do they arise?” Lastly, Haynes (2012) takes a closer look at empirical evidence of domestic audience costs in causing electoral accountability for democratic leaders. Haynes (2012) reconsiders the suggestion that democratic leaders’ electoral accountability lends him or her significant advantage in crisis-bargaining situations by examining whether “lame-duck” presidents--leaders who are not eligible for reelection--benefit less from this significant advantage. Ultimately, his examination of the empirics did not illustrate any significant difference for democratic “lame-duck” leadership status.

The aforementioned studies, albeit skeptical of empirical support for the audience costs theory, are relatively insignificant when compared to how Tomz (2007) took issue with the empirical evidence at hand. The seminal work of Tomz (2007) solved the empirical conundrum of finding direct empirical evidence for audience costs. The main impetus that drove his experiment was to clarify if audience costs actually existed. A fundamental question that Tomz (2007) asked was if constituents would punish leaders for reneging? And in designing the series of experiments, Tomz made sure that his intentions to find direct evidence for audience costs were consistent. Tomz looked at the increase of audience costs in tandem with the level of escalation. In other words, he looked into both the realistic costs for backing down and the micro-foundations to clarify the intentions of the public opinion. In doing so, his analysis not only showed that audience costs existed across a range of conditions, but that audience costs also increased with the level of escalation. In addition, Tomz found that, among the population, politically active citizens acted more negatively towards empty threats. And lastly, the empirical evidence also indicated that audience costs emanated from citizens being concerned about the

international reputation of the country. Overall, Tomz (2007) found direct empirical evidence of audience cost by not testing the theory through its implications.

In 2009, Tomz (2009) examined domestic audience costs through a series of experiments embedded in interviews. He wanted to know what made international military threats credible. In light of this, he took on the presence of audience costs as an important factor for the credibility of international military threats. In doing so, Tomz developed a model of a military crisis with domestic audience costs. With this model, Tomz (2009) focused on three themes of domestic audience costs. In particular, he looked at the attitudes of citizens when leaders back down after openly making a threat, the expectations leaders hold from the domestic public after reneging, and how audience costs are perceived in different institutional settings. He brought into account his previous work from 2007 in order to assess the attitudes that citizens express about leaders who renege on a foreign threat. As for assessing whether leaders expect audience costs or no reaction from the public, Tomz in collaboration with three assistants from the University of Stanford conducted in-person interviews with British parliamentarians. And finally, in order to examine how domestic political institutions affect the expectations of leaders, Tomz and company asked British parliamentarians: “which type of leader—the leader of a democracy or the leader of a dictatorship—would be more likely to lose power at home if they backed down in a military confrontation, instead of following through on the threats they made?” (Tomz 2009:8-9). In the end, Tomz (2009) reaches three conclusions. He concludes that citizens punish leaders for escalating crises and then backing down. And that those leaders actually expect this kind of reaction from domestic audiences. Lastly, he concludes that “the simple distinction between democratic and autocratic institutions is not as salient as scholars have previously assumed” (Tomz 2009:10). Ultimately, these findings further contributed to direct evidence of audience costs theory.

And finally, other scholars who have actually taken issue with not the quality of empirics, but rather the theoretical validity of audience costs theory, brought forth critical theoretical critiques to the theory. One particular example of this is a critique of the theory by Trachtenberg (2011). Trachtenberg does a thorough historical analysis of events that had been presumed as instances of audience costs by Schultz (2001). Trachtenberg (2011) ultimately provoked many theorists and an array of response essays from the journal of

security studies (see, *inter alia*, Gartzke and Lupu 2012; Mercer 2012; Levy 2012; Shultz 2012; Slantchev 2012), most of which sided with Trachtenberg's (2012) arguments.

The contributions made by Tomz (2007, 2009) have indeed extended the empirical frontier of audience costs theory. The studies took place in the U.S. and British setting. And both studies were focused on the role of audience costs in hard power foreign policy—militarized crises. Nonetheless, as mentioned before, soft power foreign policy tools also play an increasing role in international politics. As shown before on the previous chapter, the discourse on soft power and hard power foreign policy tools is a growing topic in international relations literature. More particularly, a talk on Turkish soft power has emanated from Turkey's role as third party actor and regional cultural hub. In this respect, I use the Turkish setting to examine the role of domestic audience costs across different foreign policy tools.

4. METHODS

To directly study the role of audience costs in soft and hard power foreign policy decisions while avoiding the problem of selection bias, I designed and carried out a series of questionnaires. The questionnaires were translated to Turkish and administered to a convenience sample of 100 Turkish adults from Istanbul in 2014. The sample was mostly drawn from Sabanci University students, students and professionals studying at an “English-as-a-second-language” (about 40 each from the two groups). Although I employed a convenience sample, the demographic distributions are not skewed. Table 1 illustrates some of the demographic characteristics of my sample. Not surprisingly, the majority of the sample is comprised of students with ages under 25. That said, the sample also consists of a decent size of professionals. The sex ratio is close to 50%.

All participants who took the questionnaires received an introductory script: *“Hello, thank you for accepting to be a part of this study. In this study, I present to you a set of scenarios about the decisions that leaders make when they are faced with foreign politics. You will read 4 different foreign political situations that leaders are often faced with. The leaders might react differently to these situations. The scenarios will be described to you one by one, and you will be asked to agree or disagree with the leader’s decision. Please answer the questions according to the order given. The leaders from the scenarios are not related with the current leader, they are imaginary.”* stated in the introductory script, participants then read four different artificial scenarios about Turkish foreign policy crises in which the situation at stake was dependent on the type of foreign policy; in this case two soft power foreign policy scenarios and two hard power foreign policy scenarios. I designed all the foreign policy crisis scenarios based on Joseph S. Nye’s (1990) instrumental logic of foreign policy action, meaning that if the goal of the foreign

policy was to force others to make a cost-benefit analysis through coercing or coaxing strategies, then one could talk about hard power. However, if the goal of the foreign policy was to ensure cooperation and that others would automatically follow the lead of the power-holder due to the power of attraction, then one could talk about soft power (Oğuzlu 2007). In this way, the two scenarios I designed for hard power foreign policy are the following: a *Military Intervention* scenario where the Turkish Prime Minister reneges on a threat to militarily intervene in a neighboring country in order to prevent country A from invading country B; and an *Economic Sanctions* scenario where the Turkish Prime Minister reneges on a threat of imposing economic sanctions on country X for invading country Y, both neighboring countries. As for soft power foreign policy, I designed the following scenarios: a *Border Blockade* scenario where the Turkish Prime Minister reneges on a publicly issued statement to close Turkish borders and halt trade, including Turkish Airline commercial flights, with country P in response to country P's shortcomings in gas exports to Turkey; and a *Foreign Aid Scenario* where the Turkish Prime Minister reneges on his/her promise to maintain a constant flow of foreign aid support to country Z—an economically failing state.

For simplification purposes; from this point on, I will refer to each scenario in the following manner: *Military Intervention* scenario; *Economic Sanctions* scenario; *Border Blockade* scenario; and *Foreign Aid* scenario. The *Military Intervention and Economic Sanctions* scenarios are instances of hard power foreign policy crises while the *Border Blockade and Foreign Aid* scenarios are instances of soft power foreign policy crises. These foreign policy tools have been shown to be meaningful in past and present instances of Turkish foreign policy (see, *inter alia*, Oğuzlu 2007; Altunışık 2008; Kalın 2011; “Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs” 2011).

All scenarios were given to the respondents as vignettes in which the prime minister issued an empty commitment. The vignettes for each foreign crisis scenario are illustrated below in Table 2. In order to prevent preconceived attitudes of the participants from affecting their perception of the crisis at hand, I chose to not name the countries involved in the scenarios. Instead I labeled the countries with random and ambiguous alphabetical letters. In addition, the questionnaires in which the scenarios were presented varied in four different sequences in order to avoid order effects. These four versions of the questionnaire were randomly assigned to the respondents.

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of the Sample of the Study

Characteristic	Percentage (N=100)
<i>Sex</i>	
Female	46
Male	54
<i>Education</i>	
Primary + Some High School	6
High School	45
Some College	3
College	36
Masters	9
PhD	1
<i>Age</i>	
18-24	59
25-34	27
35-44	4
45-54	5
55-64	5
<i>Occupation</i>	
Student	62
Part-time	12
Full-time	17
Unemployed	4
Retired/Other	5
<i>Yearly Income (TL)</i>	
<10,000	16
10,000-24,999	27
25,000-49,999	26
50,000-74,999	14
>75,000	17

For each scenario, the background information set the stage and described a situation in which the Turkish Prime Minister was faced with a foreign policy crisis that required immediate attention. Having read the background information, participants learned how the Turkish Prime Minister handled the situation. In all scenarios, the respondents received a situation in which the prime minister made a commitment but did not carry it out. The language in all scenarios was intentionally neutral and free of any subjective phrases in order to avoid any idiosyncratic attitudes.

After respondents interpreted a given scenario, I asked whether the respondent “approved,” “disapproved,” or “neither approved nor disapproved” of the way the Turkish Prime Minister handled the situation. An immediate follow-up open-ended question asked the respondent to state why she/he approved or disapproved of the prime minister’s decision. After writing in their responses, the respondents were asked to proceed to a third question. Using a 1 through 6 scale (1 being the most important and 6 being the least important), the respondents were asked to rank items among a list of common rationales people have for approving or disapproving of their leader’s decision. They were asked to rank the following: maintaining the **international reputation** of Turkey; upholding the **moral responsibility** of the Turkish Republic; strengthening Turkey’s role as a **regional leader**; **maintaining healthy relations** with neighboring countries; protecting the **national security** of the Turkish Republic; and **other**. The entire questionnaire used for this thesis can be found in the appendix.

TABLE 2. Vignettes of Foreign Crisis Scenarios

<i>Hard Power Foreign Policy</i>		<i>Soft Power Foreign Policy</i>	
<i>Military Intervention Scenario</i>	<i>Economic Sanctions Scenario</i>	<i>Border Blockade Scenario</i>	<i>Foreign Aid Scenario</i>
<p>“Country A sent its military to take over Country B - a neighboring country of Turkey. The Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic publicly stated that if the attack continued, the Turkish military would prevent Country A from invading Country B. He then sent troops to Country B and prepared them for war. However, Country A continued to invade Country B. The Turkish Prime minister then decided to withdraw Turkish troops from Country B without sending them into battle.”</p>	<p>“Country X sent its military to take over Country Y - a neighboring country of Turkey. The Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic publicly stated that if the attack continued, Turkey would impose economic sanctions on Country X. He criticized Country X and attempted to get other neighboring countries to join him in imposing economic sanctions on Country X. However, Country X continued to invade Country Y. The Turkish Prime minister then decided to withdraw his claim without attempting to impose any economic sanctions to Country X.”</p>	<p>“Country P, being an important supplier of gas for Turkey, has drastically reduced its supply of gas to Turkey - without any explanation. The Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic publicly stated that if the flow of supply did not resume to its original flow, Turkey would prohibit Turkish Airlines from operating within Country P, and in addition it would close its borders with Country P. He began talks with Turkish Airlines and sent additional border patrols to enforce the border with Country P. However, Country P continued to reduce its flow of gas supply to Turkey. The Turkish Prime minister then decided to withdraw his claim of prohibiting Turkish Airlines to operate within Country P and never closed its borders.”</p>	<p>“The citizens of Country Z have been receiving foreign aid from Turkey for more than a year. Recently the citizens of Country Z have been experiencing escalating security threats from internal dissidents (rebels). The Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic publicly stated that even if the security threats continued, Turkey would continue its flow of aid and all other support in order to maintain the peace. He then made sure there was steady flow of financial support necessary to maintain the peace. However, the dissidents continued to molest and violently attack the citizens of Country Z. The Turkish Prime minister then decided to withdraw all Turkish professionals along with all other aid from Country Z without attempting to maintain the peace.”</p>

As mentioned earlier, my research design builds upon the work done by Tomz (2007). This approach, however, differs in that it not only offers the opportunity to directly measure domestic audience costs, but it also measures the role audience costs play across different types of foreign policy threats issued. I recognize that experimental approaches are vulnerable to problems with external validity. For example, respondents may behave different when answering a questionnaire and when actually experiencing a foreign policy crisis. Similarly my convenience sample is not representative of the Turkish population. Nonetheless, the data collected from the questionnaires provide a novel understanding of audience costs theory.

5. FINDINGS

5.1. Audience Costs for Hard and Soft Power Foreign Policy

The questionnaires employed in this study offer a new perspective on the role audience costs play in the type of foreign policy at stake. Past research shows direct evidence of audience costs for leaders who make a threat and then renege during an interstate crisis (see, Tomz 2007, 2009). In this regard, if a disparity exists on how audience costs differ between hard and soft power foreign policy, respondents, on average, should disapprove more of one type of foreign policy over the other. If, on the other hand, respondents equally disparage leaders for renegeing on their commitment in both types of foreign policy, then the frequency of disapproval should be approximately the same across all four scenarios.

Before conducting statistical analyses, I checked for missing data by making sure all parts in the questionnaires were answered. Some demographic and political background questions were deliberately left blank by a number of participants because they simply did not want to disclose such information. More specifically, the demographic variable of *income* was left blank in five questionnaires, while the variable for *ideology* was left blank in one questionnaire. I filled in a total of six missing values with its covariate corresponding median as such imputation does not introduce bias to the analyses conducted later.

I examined how the participants responded to the prime minister's decision in each scenario. Evidence of audience costs are illustrated below for each scenario in Table 3. For each decision the prime minister made, the table gives the percentage of respondents who disapproved, approved, or expressed a moderate viewpoint. Table 3 illustrates that the respondents were most sensitive to the prime minister's renegeing on an economic sanction threat

(62 %) followed by reneging on a threat of border blockade (56%). Forty three percent of the respondents partially or fully disagreed with the prime minister's choice to not to fulfill Turkey's promise to extend foreign aid. Finally, my findings show that the Turkish respondents least objected (34%) to the prime minister's choice to back down from his threat to employ the Turkish military.

These initial results render interesting insights regarding audience costs and the type of foreign policy tools (hypothetically) utilized in the Turkish context. While the data demonstrate respondents indeed distinguish between different types of foreign policy tools, sample means do not demonstrate a clear relationship between the 'hardness' of a foreign policy tool and the amount of audience costs it creates. Rather, we observe that the respondents are most punishing (and most understanding) for one hard and one soft power foreign policy tool each. Interestingly, the respondents were most 'understanding' when the leader reneged on a promise to use the 'hardest' of the foreign policy tools, that is military intervention. And they were also most 'understanding' when the leader reneged on a promise to maintain the flow of foreign aid to failing state, the 'softest' of the foreign policy tools. This altogether suggests that the public may full be aware of the costs of military intervention and of the costs of extending aid to a failing state, ex-ante and ex-post, and thus not be as hasty to punish a leader for reneging on a bluff. All this resonates with recent research regarding how domestic political conditions can shape the way in which audience costs are imposed on a reneging leader (e.g., Levedusky and Horowitz 2012).

TABLE 3. The domestic political cost for making empty commitments

	<i>Public reaction to reneging on a threat of Military Intervention (%)</i>	<i>Public reaction to reneging on a threat of imposing Economic Sanctions (%)</i>	<i>Public reaction to reneging on a threat of Border Blockade (%)</i>	<i>Public reaction to reneging on the promise of continuing Foreign Aid (%)</i>
<i>Definitely Agree</i>	20	6	7	13
<i>Partially Agree</i>	29	13	24	25
<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	17	19	13	19
<i>Partially Disagree</i>	19	28	25	18
<i>Definitely Disagree</i>	15	34	31	25
<i>TOTAL</i>	100	100	100	100
<i>% partially or fully disagree</i>	34	62	56	43

5.2. What Factors Influence The Role of Audience Costs?

Given the discrepancy of how respondents approved or disapproved of the prime ministers' decisions across all foreign policy crisis scenarios, it is fundamental to understand how they varied. Towards this end, I conducted ordered logistic regression for each scenario in order to look more closely at the role of audience costs in Turkish hard and soft power foreign policy. More specifically, I look at factors that influence the voters' approval or disapproval of a leader's decision to back down from a foreign policy commitment.

In this study, Turkish citizens were asked if they definitely agree, partially agree, neither agree nor disagree, partially disagree, or definitely disagree of their leader's decision to back down from a commitment in four different foreign crises.² In all four models, I employ the same five independent variables, namely (i) self-placement of the respondent on an ideological scale, (ii) the respondent's sex, (iii) the level of political activism the individual declares, (iv) the respondent's approximate income, and (v) the average age of the participant was also collected. I have reason to expect different factors to have varying impacts between the levels of approval and disapproval across scenarios of a same foreign policy. For example, some factors that may influence voters in the *Military Intervention* scenario might not have the same impact for voters in the *Economic Sanctions* scenario. It is possible that a respondent may not care about what Turkey does in an economic sanctions episode, but may gauge a leader's competence by looking at how that leader acts in a militarized crisis. Alternatively, a respondent may think that an economic sanctions scenario can be a good opportunity to manifest Turkey's resolve while risking a military adventure for such an endeavor may be too costly. More broadly, I expect a variance in the way participants approve or disapprove of the leaders' decision across all four scenarios. Since my dependent variable is an ordinal one, I will employ ordered logit regression models to see whether the five aforementioned independent variables significantly affect the way

² An underlying assumption here is that a voter who does not agree with a leader's policy will electorally punish that leader. The link between policy approval and voting behavior can be an interesting topic for further study.

an individual agrees or disagrees with the political leader's decision to renege on a foreign policy threat or promise.³

All four dependent variables are different with respect to the type of foreign policy and tested against the same set of covariates. Hard power foreign policy tools are depicted in two scenarios; *Military Intervention* scenario and *Economic Sanctions* scenario, while the *Border Blockade* scenario and *Foreign Aid* scenario constitute soft-power policy tools. For this section, I will refer to the aforementioned ordered logistic regression models in the following matter: Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4.

The estimate of an ordered logistic regression model for *Military Intervention*, *sex*, *political activism*, *income*, *age*, and *ideology*; is illustrated in Table 4. The p-value of 0.03 illustrates that the model as a whole, has statistically significant explanatory power, as compared to the null model with no predictors.

The estimates for Model 1 illustrate that while *income* and *political activism* are statistically significant, *ideology*, *sex*, and *age* are not. Given this information, for *income*, it can be said that for a one category unit increase in *income*, there will be a 0.37 increase in the log odds of being in a higher level of disapproval with the prime minister's decision, given all of the other variables in the model are held constant.⁴ Two different causal mechanisms can account for this finding. First, research on American politics has long suggested that more affluent individuals tend to follow and even influence politics, and foreign policy for that matter (see *inter alia*, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013). As such, these individuals may be more sensitive to 'performance measures' in foreign policy. Alternatively, it may be that the more affluent (and hence possibly more educated) parts of society tend to be more critical of government policy makers.

A one unit increase in *political activism*, on the other hand, suggests a 0.57 increase in the log odds of being in a higher level of disapproval for the Turkish Prime Minister's decision, *ceteris paribus*. In other words, the less politically active respondents are more likely to approve the prime minister's decision. At its face value, this is an interesting finding that falls in tandem with the previous finding on *income*. More politically active individuals may be more critical of

³ For designing the ordered logistic regression models I referred to Algresti (1996, 2002). And for interpretation, I referred to Liao (1994) and Long and Freese (2006)

⁴ Note that a higher level of the dependent variable denotes disagreement not agreement.

the tough choices a leader may be faced with in foreign policy matters. Another possible explanation for this inverse relationship may also relate to the political culture in Turkey where the reverence for authority is a common norm among Turkish voters. This could explain why Turkish voters, although politically inactive, would remain comfortable with, and thus approve of any decisions taken by the current government in office.

As for the *Economic Sanctions* scenario, Model 2 has a p-value of 0.073 for the chi-squared test. While failing the conventional statistical threshold of 0.05, 0.073 is still notable for a possibly under-specified model. In this scenario, *ideology* is the only statistically significant covariate. Furthermore, it could only be said that for a one unit increase in *ideology*, there will be a 0.23 decrease in the log odds of being in a level of approval for the Turkish Prime Minister's decision, given that all the other variables in the model are held constant. This suggests that respondents who placed themselves further on the right of the ideological spectrum were more likely to approve of their prime ministers decision to renege on imposing economic sanctions. This finding suggests that partisanship may precede the evaluation of foreign policy, and not vice versa. Although the p-values of *political activism* and *income* slightly exceed the 0.05 threshold (with p-values of 0.063 and 0.079, respectively), the findings still indicate some influence towards the disapproval for the Turkish Prime Minister's decision to back down. More specifically, for a one unit increase in *political activism*, there will be a 0.49 increase in the log odds of being in a higher of disapproval for the Turkish Prime Minister's decision. And as for a one unit increase in *income*, there will be a 0.25 increase in the log odds of being in a higher level of disapproval for the Turkish Prime Minister's decision.

Interestingly, both hard power scenarios were cases in which *income* and *political activism* had some influence in the role of audience costs. In particular, respondents with higher incomes and higher political activity appeared to be more prone towards disapproving with the prime ministers' decision to renege on hard power foreign policy tools. It could be that more affluent and politically active respondents might find failure in hard-power foreign policy more threatening towards the national reputation in the international arena. Hence, for the sake of "face saving" (i.e., maintaining a good image and avoiding the embarrassment of looking bad) respondents with fiscal and political influence could find it righteous to sanction a leader who fails to continue with an openly issued coercive threat.

TABLE 4. Hard Power Ordered Logistic Regression Tables

Variables	<i>Military Intervention</i> Scenario (<i>n</i> = 100)			<i>Economic Sanctions</i> Scenario (<i>n</i> = 100)		
	<i>B</i>	(SE)	P-value	<i>B</i>	(SE)	P-value
<i>Ideology</i>	-0.06	(0.09)	0.50	-0.22	(0.09)	0.018**
<i>Sex</i>	0.34	(0.40)	0.40	-0.38	(0.38)	0.30
<i>Political Activism</i>	0.57	(0.27)	0.04**	0.49	(0.26)	0.06*
<i>Income</i>	0.37	(0.15)	0.01**	0.26	(0.15)	0.079*
<i>Age</i>	-0.18	(0.17)	0.30	-0.03	(0.19)	0.84
<i>Cut 1</i>	1.06	(0.98)	-	-2.51	(1.01)	-
<i>Cut 2</i>	2.53	(1.01)	-	-1.15	(0.98)	-
<i>Cut 3</i>	3.27	(1.02)	-	-0.09	(0.96)	-
<i>Cut 4</i>	4.40	(1.05)	-	1.14	(0.96)	-
<i>Prob>chi2</i>	0.03			0.07		
<i>Pseudo R2</i>	0.04			0.03		

Notes: **p* < 0.10; ***p* < 0.05; ****p* < 0.001

TABLE 5. Soft Power Ordered Logistic Regression Tables

Variables	<i>Border Blockade</i> Scenario (<i>n</i> = 100)			<i>Foreign Aid</i> Scenario (<i>n</i> = 100)		
	<i>B</i>	(SE)	P-value	<i>B</i>	(SE)	P-value
<i>Ideology</i>	-0.15	(0.09)	0.10	-0.08	(0.09)	0.35
<i>Sex</i>	-0.38	(0.38)	0.31	0.005	(0.38)	0.98
<i>Political Activism</i>	0.22	(0.26)	0.41	0.29	(0.27)	0.28
<i>Income</i>	0.025	(0.14)	0.86	0.15	(0.13)	0.25
<i>Age</i>	-0.31	(0.17)	0.06*	0.05	(0.18)	0.74
<i>Cut 1</i>	-3.89	(1.05)	-	-0.97	(0.95)	-
<i>Cut 2</i>	-2.03	(0.98)	-	0.45	(0.94)	-
<i>Cut 3</i>	-1.43	(0.97)	-	1.24	(0.95)	-
<i>Cut 4</i>	-0.30	(0.96)	-	2.07	(0.96)	-
<i>Prob>chi2</i>	0.10			0.74		
<i>Pseudo R2</i>	0.03			0.008		

Notes: **p* < 0.10; ***p* < 0.05; ****p* < 0.001

5.3. Juxtaposing the Results

In placing together, side by side, the estimates of the ordered logistic regression models, it is apparent that towards hard power foreign policy, the estimates from both scenarios show that some factors have some influence in the way respondents approve or disapprove. The *Military Intervention* scenario being statistically significant shows that *income* and *political activism* significantly affect the way the respondents' make their choice. While on the one hand, it can be concluded that respondents with higher incomes are more inclined to disapprove of the prime minister's decision to back down. On the other hand, respondents who are less politically active are more inclined to approve of the prime minister's decision to back down. Therefore, it can be suggested that more affluent and politically active respondents are more likely to penalize the prime minister for renegeing on militarized threats. In contrast, these effects are not the same for the *Economic Sanctions* scenario, which is also a hard power foreign policy tool. In fact, the model for the *Economic Sanctions* scenario only showed *ideology* to have some influence on how respondents approved of the prime minister's decision. More specifically, it is observed that respondents who lean more towards the right in political ideology are more inclined to approve of the prime minister's decision.

As for the soft power foreign policy scenarios, the same cannot be said about how these covariates influence the way respondents approve or disapprove of their leader's decision to back down from a foreign policy commitment. On the contrary, both estimates for Model 3 *Border Blockade* and Model 4 *Foreign Aid* are as whole models statistically insignificant. Consequently, none of the variables are statistically significant enough to corroborate any change in the way voters feel about the empty commitments made by their prime minister. Overall, across all four scenarios the only significant variance in how covariate variables influence the way respondents feel about a prime minister's empty commitment, is largely present for the hard power foreign policy scenarios, particularly *Military Intervention*.

6. RATIONALES USED FOR JUDGING THE PRIME MINISTER'S DECISION

6.1. The Rationales

In all four scenarios, participants were prompted with a list of six common reasons people have for approving or disapproving of their leader's decision. They were then asked to rank the reasons using a 1-6 scale, where 1 was considered to be the most important and 6 the least important. The results for all scenarios are distributed differently, illustrating a favorable skew towards particular reasons that are held very important or not important at all. The six rationales for approving or disapproving of the prime ministers' decisions are the following: 1) maintaining the international reputation of Turkey; 2) upholding the moral responsibility of the Turkish Republic; 3) strengthening Turkey's role as a regional leader; 4) maintaining healthy relations with neighboring countries; 5) protecting the national security of the Turkish Republic; and 6) other, where participants were asked to write-in their reason in mind. Ranking the rationales in each scenario differs with respect to the issues at stake in the particular foreign policy.

Given that the four foreign crisis scenarios are different from each other and express a type of foreign policy, either hard or soft power. The way in which the participants rank the rationales for approving or disapproving of the their leader's decision, is subject to variance depending on their feelings and opinions towards the specifics of the foreign policy scenario at hand. Despite obvious differences between all scenarios, in almost each case the rationale of protecting the national security of the Turkish republic was prevalent as being ranked the most important reason while Turkey's role as a regional leader was ranked as the least important or unimportant rationale, next to the option of other rationales. In focusing on the rationales that were ranked as the most important, a similar pattern is discernible in respect to the order of all

rationales for approving or disapproving of the leader's decision. More specifically, the ranking of the most important rationale differs to some noticeable extent in each scenario. Below the subtle differences can be distinguished in all four scenarios.

6.2. The “Most Important” Rationales in all Scenarios

Take for example, the *Border Blockade* scenario (see Table 6). In this scenario, the prime minister attempts to wield its economic influence, in other words its soft power, over a neighboring country. More specifically, the Turkish Prime Minister ultimately reneges on following through with the threat of closing Turkish borders and halting trade, including services by Turkish Airlines, with country P in response to country P's sudden shortcomings in gas exports to Turkey. Here among the most important ranked rationales, the concern for Turkey's national security, more specifically, national economic security is ranked as the most important at 37%. This rationale of concern is followed by another rationale of salient concern being Turkey's international reputation at 34%. The salience of rationales for approving or disapproving of the prime minister's decision in this scenario drops to 12% for keeping healthy relations with neighboring countries. This trend continues as the frequency for other rationales further plummets to 8% for Turkey's moral responsibility, 6% for other reasons specified or non-specified, and to 2% for Turkey's role as a regional leader. As such, in the border blockade scenario, hard politics –such as economic security and Turkey's international reputation seem to be the more salient than softer goals such as moral obligations and being a good neighbor.

In the *Military Intervention* scenario (see Table 6), where the Turkish Prime Minister flexes its hard power foreign policy capacity, the rationales highlighted by the respondents slightly differ from the results of the *Border Blockade* scenario. In this hard power foreign policy scenario, the Turkish Prime Minister ultimately reneges on following through with the threat of militarily preventing country A from invading country B. When participants were asked to decide on a rationale that they considered the most important when approving or disapproving of their leader's decision, the results yet again leaned towards national security at 40%. However,

this time the next most important rationale held by participants was Turkey maintaining a healthy relation with its neighboring countries at 22%. Turkey's international reputation, for this case, was the third most important at 14%, followed closely by Turkey's moral responsibility at 13%. And lastly, other reasons--not specified or specified, were held as the most important only 7% of the time while, again at the bottom, Turkey's role as a regional leader was held the most important just 6% of the time. The results here seem to indicate that the respondents find Turkey's national security and its relationship with neighboring countries to be very important rationales in considering whether to take a militarized risk or not. On the one hand, it could be that respondents see militarized entanglements as very costly political endeavors that could jeopardize their national security. On the other hand, it might be possible that respondents see the Turkish Prime Minister's failure to militarily defend and assist a neighboring country undergoing invasion as a failure of Turkey being a good neighbor.

In the *Economic Sanctions* scenario (see Table 6), the results are somewhat similar to that of the *Border Blockade* scenario. In this scenario of *Economic Sanctions*, the Turkish Prime Minister ultimately reneges on following through with the threat of imposing economic sanctions on country X for invading country Y. This flexing of hard power foreign policy is a direct coercive economic threat to a neighboring country. Nonetheless, the way in which the participants ranked the most important rationales for approving or disapproving with the prime minister's decision resulted in a somewhat similar fashion with those of the *Border Blockade scenario*. Only this time, Turkey's national security was joined by Turkey's international reputation as both were ranked the most important 29% of the time. Turkey's healthy relation with neighboring countries was ranked the most important only 17% of the time. Meanwhile, the moral responsibility of Turkey was considered the most important rationale just 8% of the time. And again, the two rationales that were least ranked as the most important were other reasons—specified or not specified at 7%, and Turkey's role as a regional leader at 6%. Although these two rationales do not fall far behind in this scenario, they continue to remain at the bottom. Ultimately, these results also point out to the respondents being concerned with rationales which embody harder politics. In this case, the respondents might feel that Turkey's international reputation could be at risk when the Turkish prime Minister reneges from the threat to impose economic sanctions on a country invading a neighboring country. Perhaps the respondents interpret this shortcoming of economically opposing the invader as an embarrassment to their

international reputation. Alternatively, like in the *Military Intervention* scenario, respondents might also be wary of the dangers that come along with intervening in a foreign conflict. As such, respondents closely consider the assurance of their national and economic security. The salient concerns for the national security of Turkey could be related to protecting Turkey's current status as an emerging economical power. Respondents, for that matter, might find the threat of imposing foreign economic sanctions to be a risky endeavor for Turkey's national security.

And lastly, as for the *Foreign Aid scenario* (see Table 6), the pattern of rationales ranked as the most important changes when juxtaposed with the results from all other scenarios. In this scenario, the Turkish Prime Minister ultimately reneges on following through with the promise of maintaining foreign aid and support, under any circumstance, to country Z. For this particular case of soft power foreign policy crisis, national security was yet again the most frequent ranked rationale as the most important at 34%. This was followed by the moral responsibility of Turkey, which was ranked as the most important at 25%. With lower percentages, Turkey's international reputation was considered the most important 18% of the time, while Turkey's healthy relation with its neighbors was ranked the most important only 12% of the time. And next to last, other—specified or not specified reasons—was ranked the most important rationale only 8% of the time. The last rationale that again barely received attention as the most important is Turkey's role as a regional leader. This rationale was ranked the most important just 4% of the time, making it the least popular rationale for the most important category across all scenarios (see Table 6). For this scenario it seems that respondents are more concerned about Turkey's moral responsibilities more than their country's international reputation and relations with neighbors. More specifically, the respondents might believe that extending foreign aid to a country embroiled in an intractable internal conflict is the moral responsibility for the Republic of Turkey. Consequently, the respondents might find it to be the Turkish Prime Minister's moral responsibility to take a risk and uphold his promise to continue helping the country in need. On another note, the high salience for the national security indicates that respondents could feel uneasy about the idea of extending foreign aid to a country with escalating internal problems. More precisely, respondents might feel that such actions could endanger their national security at home and abroad.

In general, the findings across all scenarios were, for the most part, the same. The national

security, international reputation, and relationship with neighbors of Turkey resulted to be the most salient in all scenarios, while the moral responsibility of Turkey resulted to be salient in only one scenario. Not surprisingly, these rationales coincide with the issues that voters pay attention to in Turkey’s foreign policy relations (see Kalacioğlu 2009). On the other hand, Turkey’s role as a regional leader resulted to be the least salient across all scenarios. Interestingly, we see across all scenarios a mismatch between what rationales the respondents in my sample prioritize and the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) discourse highlighting Turkey’s role as a regional leader (see Hatipoğlu, Aslan, and Luetgert 2014). More specifically, the results in all scenarios almost omit the idea of Turkey’s role as a regional leader. As such, these results differ from what the AKP manifests in their foreign policy discourse. All in all, these findings help better understand the motives that respondents use while deciding to agree or disagree with the way prime ministers handle foreign policy crises.

TABLE 6. Most Important rationales for agreeing or disagreeing: All Scenarios

<i>Most Important Rationales (frequencies)</i>	<i>Military Intervention Scenario</i>	<i>Economic Sanctions Scenario</i>	<i>Border Blockade Scenario</i>	<i>Foreign Aid Scenario</i>
<i>Turkey’s National Security or National Economic Security</i>	1. 40/100	1. 29/100	1. 37/100	1. 34/100
<i>Turkey’s International reputation</i>	3. 14/100	2. 29/100	2. 34/100	3. 18/100
<i>Turkey’s healthy relations with neighboring countries Turkey’s</i>	2. 22/100	3. 17/100	3. 12/100	4. 12/100
<i>Moral Responsibility</i>	4. 13/100	4. 8/100	4. 8/100	2. 25/100
<i>Other reason</i>	5. 7/100	5. 7/100	5. 6/100	5. 8/100
<i>Turkey’s role as a regional leader</i>	6. 6/100	6. 6/100	6. 2/100	6. 4/100

6.3. The “Unimportant” Rationales in all Scenarios

In order to gain a greater perspective on the frequency of the lowest ranked rationales, the three lowest ranking categories are collapsed into one category. More specifically; the categories somewhat important, least important, and not important; are all combined to express an unimportant category for agreeing or disagreeing with the Prime Minister’s foreign policy decision.

The order, in which the reasons were considered as unimportant by participants, subtly varies among all four scenarios (see Table 7). A similar pattern can be observed at first glance rendering little to be said in respect to the variation of rationales held as unimportant. Nonetheless, when looking closely at the juxtaposed results from all the scenarios, some observable slight variations are worth pointing out. In general, a trend that can be expected from the results is an inverse from the results of those rationales that were ranked as the most important. And sure enough, the results do encompass something along the anticipated trend. The results are explained in more detail for each scenario.

Results for the *Border Blockade* scenario illustrate significant frequencies for the option of other reason, which was an option that allowed participants to specify other rationales not listed (see Table 7). In total, the option for other reason—specified or not specified--was ranked unimportant 89% of the time for the *Border Blockade* scenario. Not surprisingly, this is the same case for all other scenarios. For example it was ranked unimportant 88% of the time for both the *Military Intervention* scenario and the *Economic Sanctions* scenario, and at 90% of the time for the *Foreign Aid* scenario. The option, other reason—specified or not, was added to the list of common reasons as an option for participants to express any other rationale that they might have held as more important than the given rationales. It could be plausible that the majority of participants ranked this option unimportant among all other options for obvious reasons. The respondents could have found it cumbersome to conceive other rationales that relate to political theory, or even encounter difficulties in finding any other relevant rationale that would explicate why they approved or disapproved of their leader’s decision. On the other hand, it is also true that several participants did in fact specify rationales for approving or disapproving of their

leader's final decision. To what extent most of these specified rationales differed or coincided with each other, remains unclear. Particular content analysis of all specified reasons would be required. However, for the purposes of this study, such analysis won't be necessary since at first glance the majority of specified rationales are either irrelevant or uninformed.

Following this, the rationale of Turkey's role as a regional leader was for the most part conceived as an unimportant rationale. Previously defined as one of the least ranked rationales for the most important category, this same option is now one of the most ranked reasons for the unimportant category. Overall, Turkey's role as a regional leader was ranked unimportant for the *Blockade scenario* at 75%, and at 72% for both the *Military Intervention scenario* and the *Economic Sanctions scenario*. Trailing not very far behind, it was considered unimportant 67% of the time for the *Foreign Aid scenario*. In sum, Turkey's role as regional leader can be considered as perhaps the most unpopular rationale for approving or disapproving with the prime minister's foreign policy decisions. As previously mentioned, my findings suggest a discrepancy between what the incumbent government highlights as a foreign policy achievement, and what my respondents find salient in this policy area.

Subsequently, Turkey's moral responsibility as a rationale for approving or disapproving of the leader's decision was also considerable held as an unimportant rationale. While not very popular as an important rationale among the respondents, this option was a popular option for the unimportant category. In three scenarios; the *Economic Sanctions scenario*, the *Blockade scenario*, and the *Military Intervention scenario*; Turkey's moral responsibility ranked as an overall 3rd unimportant rationale. More specifically, this rationale was ranked unimportant at 63% for the *Economic Sanctions scenario*, while it was ranked unimportant at 57% for the *Border Blockade scenario*, and at 48% for the *Military Intervention scenario*. Only in the *Foreign Aid scenario* did Turkey's moral responsibility result as the overall fourth unimportant rationale among all other unimportant rationale, at 42%. Another option that received close attention as an unimportant rationale is Turkey's relation with its neighboring countries. This rationale was ranked unimportant at 48% for the *Foreign Aid scenario*, making it the third overall unimportant rationale for this scenario. Moreover, Turkey's relation with its neighbors resulted as the fourth overall unimportant ranked rationale for the *Blockade scenario*, the *Military Intervention scenario*, and the *Economic Sanction scenario* at 45%, 38%, and 36%, respectively.

Not surprisingly, the last two rationales left to account for are national security and

Turkey's international reputation. Both of these rationales were very popular options for the most important category. And as expected, these rationales are also the least popular options for the unimportant category. Both, Turkey's national security and Turkey's international reputation differed in the order in which they were rank as unimportant rationales across all four scenarios. On the one hand, national security was ranked as an unimportant rationale for the *Foreign Aid* scenario at 38%, while it was ranked unimportant at 34% in the *Economic Sanctions* scenario, 32% for the *Military Intervention* scenario, and at 27% for the *Blockade scenario*. On the other hand, international reputation was ranked unimportant in the *Foreign Aid* scenario by 34%, which was closely followed by the *Military Intervention* scenario at 33%. Furthermore, this rationale was ranked unimportant with low percentages in both the *Economic Sanctions* scenario and the *Border Blockade* scenario, at 30% and 25%, respectively.

TABLE 7. Least salient rationales for agreeing or disagreeing; all scenarios

<i>Unimportant Rationales (frequencies)</i>	<i>Military Intervention Scenario</i>	<i>Economic Sanctions Scenario</i>	<i>Border Blockade Scenario</i>	<i>Foreign Aid Scenario</i>
<i>Other reason(s)</i>	1. 88/100	1. 88/100	1. 89/100	1. 90/100
<i>Turkey's role as a regional leader</i>	2. 72/100	2. 72/100	2. 75/100	2. 67/100
<i>Turkey's Moral Responsibility</i>	3. 48/100	3. 63/100	3. 57/100	4. 42/100
<i>Turkey's Healthy Relations with Neighboring Countries</i>	4. 38/100	4. 36/100	4. 45/100	3. 48/100
<i>Turkey's National Security or National Economic Security</i>	6. 32/100	5. 34/100	5. 27/100	5. 38/100
<i>Turkey's International reputation</i>	5. 33/100	6. 30/100	6. 25/100	6. 34/100

7. NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION AS DRIVERS OF DOMESTIC AUDIENCE COSTS

In the previous chapter the evidence thus confirms that for the majority of respondents, maintaining Turkish national security and the international reputation of Turkey, in each scenario, were more often considered as the most important rationales for approving or disapproving of the prime ministers' decision. Do these findings hold across all scenarios when respondents disapprove, in other words are these rationales drivers for audience costs? Table 8 displays national security as a driver for audience costs in each scenario. And Table 9 displays international reputation as a driver for audience costs in each scenario. The most interesting outcome from Table 8 and Table 9 is that, in every scenario the respondents determine national security and international reputation to be important reasons for either partially or absolutely disagreeing with the Turkish Prime Minister's decision to back down.

TABLE 8. National Security as a driver for Audience Costs

<i>Foreign Policy Scenarios</i>		<i>National Security</i>	
		<i>Important (%)</i>	<i>Not Important (%)</i>
<i>Hard Power</i>	<i>Military Intervention</i>	53	47
	<i>Economic Sanctions</i>	67	32
<i>Soft Power</i>	<i>Border Blockade</i>	79	21
	<i>Foreign Aid</i>	58	42

Turkish national security was estimated to be a driver for audience costs in all scenarios. Respondents who either partially or absolutely disagree with the way the Turkish Prime Minister handled a foreign policy crisis at hand, considered national security to be an important rationale at least 53% of the time in the *Military Intervention* scenario and as high as 79% of the time in the *Border Blockade* scenario. As for the international reputation of Turkey, it was also estimated to be a driver for audience costs across all scenarios. Respondents who either partially or absolutely disagreed with the way the Turkish Prime Minister handled the situation at hand, considered international reputation to be an important rationale at least 65% of the time in the *Foreign Aid* scenario and as high as 77% of the time in the *Border Blockade* scenario. Whether the foreign policy at stake is hard power or soft power, domestic audiences, it seems, disapprove of political leaders who renege, with national security and the international reputation in mind as salient rationales for disapproving. Although audience costs driven by both rationales were always evident in both tables, they varied with each scenario across Table 8 and Table 9. For example, in contrast to when respondents find national security as an important rationale for disagreeing, the motivation for audience costs was larger by approximately 15 percentage points

in the *War Intervention scenario* when respondents found that the international reputation of Turkey was an important rationale for disagreeing. Similarly, the motivation for audience costs was larger by approximately 7 percentage points in the *Foreign Aid scenario* when respondents found that the international reputation of Turkey was an important rationale for disagreeing.

These differences make sense. Audience costs depend not only on how the public views empty commitments, but also on what the international community thinks when the Turkish Prime Minister reneges. Also it is widely recognized that citizens are more prone to demand coercive action only when their security and livelihood are at risk. This could explain why the international reputation of Turkey is a more salient driver over national security for audience costs in both the *Military Intervention* and *Foreign Aid* scenarios. As a result, national security is slightly seen as a more salient driver for audience costs than international reputation in both the *Economic Sanctions* scenario and the *Border Blockade* scenario by approximately 1 and 2 percentage points respectively. Although these differences are much smaller than those from the other scenarios, it is discernible that national security was rendered an important rationale for leaders who backed down from a foreign policy concerning economic issues.

These findings, though preliminary, suggest that national security and international reputation are important drivers for audience costs in both soft power and hard power foreign policy crises. The price of committing and backing down, for example, may be driven more by a concern for the international reputation of Turkey than national security in some scenarios of soft and hard power. On the other hand, national security might be more salient for respondents as a driver for disapproving of prime ministers who commit and back down. Finally, although a thorough analysis of the effects of national security and international reputation would require experiments in many countries, this analysis from a small random sample of Turkish citizens may be important results for further research in Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy.

TABLE 9. International Reputation as a driver for Audience Costs

<i>Foreign Policy Scenarios</i>		<i>International Reputation</i>	
		<i>Important (%)</i>	<i>Not Important (%)</i>
<i>Hard Power</i>	<i>Military Intervention</i>	68	32
	<i>Economic Sanctions</i>	66	34
<i>Soft Power</i>	<i>Border Blockade</i>	77	23
	<i>Foreign Aid</i>	65	35

Given that national security and international reputation are salient drivers for audience costs, an alternative question remains: Could these two rationales also drive respondents to agree with the prime minister’s decision to back down? Table 10 and Table 11 both illustrate that, indeed across all scenarios, Turkey’s national security and international reputation are both important rationales for respondents who chose to approve of the way the Turkish prime Minister handled the foreign policy crisis at hand. Particularly, national security as a driver for approval was most prominent among the hard power scenarios. As seen on Table 10, the results could be due to the respondents’ perception of engaging in hard power foreign policy tools as an endangerment to their national security. The results for the international reputation of Turkey as a driver for approval, particularly, for the *Economic Sanctions* scenario and the *Foreign Aid* scenario, are contradictory when juxtaposed with the results for audience costs.

Interpreting these contrasting results could be fruitful in understanding why respondents see a reneging leader’s decision as a justifiable case. However, for the sake of my research question, the focus in this research will remain confined towards understanding how these rationales help explain the role of audience costs across different tools of foreign policy.

TABLE 10. National Security as a driver for Approval

<i>Foreign Policy Scenarios</i>		<i>National Security</i>	
		<i>Important (%)</i>	<i>Not Important (%)</i>
<i>Hard Power</i>	<i>Military Intervention</i>	78	22
	<i>Economic Sanctions</i>	74	26
<i>Soft Power</i>	<i>Border Blockade</i>	68	32
	<i>Foreign Aid</i>	68	32

TABLE 11. International Reputation as a driver for Approval

<i>Foreign Policy Scenarios</i>		<i>International Reputation</i>	
		<i>Important (%)</i>	<i>Not Important (%)</i>
<i>Hard Power</i>	<i>Military Intervention</i>	63	37
	<i>Economic Sanctions</i>	74	26
<i>Soft Power</i>	<i>Border Blockade</i>	68	32
	<i>Foreign Aid</i>	74	26

8. WHY DO CITIZENS DISAPPROVE?

Why do Turkish citizens disapprove more of leaders who issue empty commitments in some scenarios while not so much in others? And what else drives audience costs for leaders across scenarios? After respondents were asked whether they approved or disapproved of their leader's decision, they were asked to write in an explanation as to why they approved or disapproved. Respondents were specifically asked: *"In this section, I would like to know why you approve or disapprove of the Prime Minister's decision. Please explain your choice of answer in the space below, listing whatever factors affected or influenced your decision."* Respondents were able to write their answers directly into a text box, which made it easier for me to analyze each respondent's personal rationale for their decision. In doing so, I was able to trace the process that led to audience costs in foreign policy for my respondents.

In looking closely across all open-ended responses for all four scenarios, almost all written responses fell into similar categories—with the exception of a few which misunderstood the follow-up question or provided an unclassifiable answer.

The vast majority of responses were concerned with the inconsistency of the prime minister's actions. Many viewed inconsistency problematic and thought that the prime minister should have kept his or her promise no matter what circumstances were at stake. As one citizen explained, "being afraid is never a solution. Promises must be kept at all costs." Others felt that "the prime minister stepped back when he or she could not reach his or her goal, and because "promises came without action, no countries would take the prime minister seriously." A second group of respondents were more concerned about the international reputation of the Turkish Republic when the prime minister said one thing but did another. Some argued that such actions would mar Turkey's standing in the international arena ("in international relations, issuing empty

threats is the easiest way to lose international representation”). Others contended that the Turkish government should secure its national security for the sake of its international reputation and harmony with neighboring countries (“every country has good relationships with their neighbors but with securing its national security”). A few respondents disliked the Turkish government’s inconsistent actions for reasons that concerned the moral responsibility of Turkey with its neighbors. These few respondents viewed keeping foreign commitments with neighboring countries in need of help as a moral action; as one respondent simply put it: “helping neighboring countries is a moral action.”

These open-ended responses give preliminary support to the rationales that Turkish participants considered to be very important in their view of the way how the Turkish prime ministers handled the situations at stake. The evidence in this article is consistent with Fearon’s (1994) logic of domestic audience costs mediating how much political leaders value their state’s international reputation. In this case, the majority of respondents value their country’s international reputation and national security. As a result respondents tend to disapprove of executive actions that put these at risk. Considering that citizens can hold leaders accountable, the role of domestic audience costs in hard and soft power foreign policies could encourage political leaders to take the international reputation of the state more seriously, and hence avoid making empty commitments.

9. CONCLUSION

This thesis has offered a direct analysis of why audience costs exist. The research, based on a questionnaire, shows that domestic audience costs exist across different foreign policy crises and vary with respect to hard and soft power foreign policies. The negative ratings to executive empty commitments are evident across all scenarios presented in the questionnaires, especially for the hard power foreign policy *Economic Sanctions* scenario. In addition, preliminary evidence suggests that domestic audience costs arise from concerns about the national security and international reputation of the country and its leaders.

These findings illustrate how questionnaires conducted to a small random sample of the Turkish population can address the question regarding the role of audience costs in hard and soft power foreign policies. Moreover, these findings also have substantive implications that could be important for further research. In particular, they provide a new outlook into understanding the role of domestic audience costs in international relations. Previous research has found that domestic audiences enhance the credibility of international commitments by holding leaders accountable who renege on their publicly issued commitment. I further delve into this by examining how audience costs vary across hard and soft power foreign policy crises. Despite the salient differences between hard and soft power foreign policies, the respondents regarded bluffing as an illogical strategy across all scenarios.

In particular, audience costs resulted in higher frequencies for a hard power foreign policy scenario involving economic sanctions, and for a soft power foreign policy scenario

involving the blockade of national borders. Lastly, my results show that the majority of Turkish respondents were driven to punish reneging leaders in all foreign policy scenarios because of concerns for the international reputation and national security of the Turkish Republic. Additionally, the analysis also pointed towards respondents expressing some concern for Turkey's moral responsibility to help neighboring countries and towards Turkey's foreign relationship with its neighbors. Interestingly, the rationale of Turkey's role as a regional leader received very little attention from the vast majority of respondents.

Although this thesis contributes to an understanding of how Turkish voters might come to terms in dealing with leaders who say one thing but do another in foreign affairs, my sample of 100 Turkish voters is not representative of the Turkish population. Moreover, my research was limited to questionnaires, whereas studies by Tomz (2007; 2009) were experiments embedded in public opinion surveys and interviews. For my research to improve, some measures would have to take place. To begin with, a representative sample of the Turkish population would be essential in testing the role of audience costs in different foreign policy tools. Second, more elaborate statistical analyses would be fundamental for examining more accurately how the role of audience costs varies with respect to hard and soft power foreign policies. And lastly, my research might benefit more from insightful information about the preferences and beliefs of random Turkish voters from across the nation.

Finally, this thesis--while limited to a relatively small local sample size--may still provide some implications for policy-makers. In general, domestic audience costs may play an important role across different foreign policy crises. And in light of this, it should be noted that political leaders should not disregard domestic audiences when considering whether to wield hard power or even soft power foreign policy tools. Moreover, Turkish policymakers should pay close attention to the domestic concern for the national security and international reputation of Turkey. The respondents in my research demonstrated that they worry about leaders who break commitments. Largely, because most respondents noted that such actions by reneging leaders would undermine Turkey's international credibility, and put Turkey's national security at risk. All in all, respondents found it justifiable to disapprove when the Turkish Prime Minister adopted reputation-damaging strategies. As a result, Turkish citizens may seek to elect leaders who appear to be more competent at valuing and preserving the national security and international reputation of Turkish Republic. Further research would be fruitful in examining how political

leaders deal with strong domestic pressures during a foreign policy crisis. Another interesting question would be to address when, and under what circumstances, do leaders begin to safeguard their country's international reputation and national security. Domestic audience costs may, therefore, help explain how many leaders have adopted concerns for the integrity of national security and international reputation.

APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE

Sabancı Üniversitesi Araştırma Anketi



Merhaba, bu çalışmada yer almayı kabul ettiğiniz için teşekkür ederim.

Size bu çalışmada, ülke liderlerinin dış siyasette karşılaştıkları durumlarda yaptıkları tercihlere dair bir dizi senaryo sunmaktayım. Liderlerin geçmişte sıkça karşılaştığı 4 farklı dış siyaset durumunu okuyacaksınız. Bu durumlara farklı liderler farklı şekilde tepki verebilirler.

Size senaryolar teker teker açıklanacak ve her bir senaryonun sonunda ülke liderinin aldığı kararı ne ölçüde onayladığınız sorulacak. Lütfen soruları verilen sıraya göre cevaplayınız.

(Senaryolarda bahsi geçen liderlerin şu an görevde olan liderlerle bir ilişkisi yoktur, senaryolardaki liderler hayal ürünüdür).

İlk önce buradan başlayın.....

Senaryo #1

- Türkiye'nin en önemli doğalgaz sağlayıcılarından olan P Ülkesi Türkiye'ye yaptığı gaz dağıtımını hiçbir açıklama yapmadan büyük ölçüde azaltır.
- Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı doğal gaz dağıtımını eski seviyesinde devam etmezse, Türk Hava Yolları'nın P Ülkesi'ne uymasını yasaklayacağını ve ek olarak P Ülkesi'yle ticaret sınırlarını kapatacağını resmen açıklar.
- Başbakan Türk Hava Yolları'yla görüşmelere başlar ve P Ülkesi'yle olan ticareti gerektiğinde durdurmak için gerekli ticari ve finansal kararlamaları hazırlar.
- Buna rağmen P Ülkesi Türkiye'ye gaz dağıtımını azaltmaya devam eder.
- Bu gelişmeler üzerine Türkiye Başbakanı, Türk Hava Yolları'nın P Ülkesi'ne uymasını yasaklama iddiasından vazgeçer ve ülke sınırlarını ticarete açık tutar.

LÜTFEN AŞAĞIDAKİ SORULARI YANITLAYINIZ

A. Türkiye Başbakanı'nın Türkiye sınırlarını ticarete kapamaması ve Türk Hava Yolları'nın P ülkesine uçmaya devam etmesini ne ölçüde onaylıyorsunuz?

1. Kesinlikle onaylıyorum
2. Kısmen onaylıyorum
3. Ne onaylıyor ne onaylamıyorum
4. Kısmen onaylamıyorum
5. Kesinlikle onaylamıyorum

Senaryo #1

B. Bu bölümde, T.C. Başbakanı'nın kararını neden onaylayıp onaylamadığınızı öğrenmek istiyorum. Aşağıdaki boşlukta cevap şıkkınızı açıklayarak, kararınızda hangi faktörlerin etkili olduğunu yazınız.

Senaryo #1

C. Aşağıda, kişilerin liderlerinin kararlarını onaylama ya da onaylamamaları için bazı olası nedenlerin listesi verilmiştir. Aşağıdaki sebepleri 1-6 arasındaki sayıları kullanarak sıralamanızı rica ediyorum (1 en önemliyi, 6 en önemsizi ifade eder).

- _____ Türkiye'nin uluslararası itibarını sürdürmek
_____ Türkiye'nin ahlaki sorumluluğu
_____ Türkiye'nin rolünü bölgesel lider olarak tanıtmak
_____ Komşu ülkelerle sağlıklı ilişkiler geliştirmek
_____ Türkiye'nin ulusal ekonomisini korumak
_____ Diğer (Lütfen belirtiniz): _____

Şimdi bir sonraki senaryoya geçelim....

Senaryo #2

- A Ülkesi, Türkiye'nin komşusu olan B Ülkesi'nin yönetimini ele geçirmek üzere ordusunu gönderir.
- Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Başbakanı saldırı devam ettiği takdirde Türk Ordusunun, A Ülkesi'nin B Ülkesi'ni işgal etmesini önleyeceğini resmen açıklar.
- Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti daha sonra B Ülkesi'ne Türk askeri birliklerini gönderip onları savaşa hazırlar.
- Buna rağmen A Ülkesi B Ülkesi'ni işgal etmeyi sürdürür.
- Bunun üzerine Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı, B Ülkesi'ndeki Türk askeri birliklerini savaşa sokmayıp geri çekmeye karar verir.

LÜTFEN AŞAĞIDAKİ SORULARI YANITLAYINIZ

A. Türkiye Başbakanı'nın B ülkesinden Türk askerlerini çekmesi kararını ne ölçüde onaylıyorsunuz?

1. Kesinlikle

onaylıyorum

2. Kısmen

onaylıyorum

3. Ne onaylıyor ne

onaylamıyorum

4. Kısmen onaylamıyorum

5. Kesinlikle onaylamıyorum

Senaryo #2

B. Bu bölümde, T.C. Başbakanı'nın kararını neden onaylayıp onaylamadığınızı öğrenmek istiyorum. Aşağıdaki boşlukta cevap şikkınızı açıklayarak, kararınızda hangi faktörlerin etkili olduğunu yazınız.

Senaryo #2

C. Aşağıda, kişilerin liderlerinin kararlarını onaylama ya da onaylamamaları için bazı olası nedenlerin listesi verilmiştir. Aşağıdaki sebepleri 1-6 arasındaki sayıları kullanarak sıralamanızı rica ediyorum (1 en önemliyi, 6 en önemsizi ifade eder).

- _____ Türkiye'nin uluslararası itibarını sürdürmek
_____ Türkiye'nin ahlaki sorumluluğu
_____ Türkiye'nin rolünü bölgesel lider olarak tanıtmak
_____ Komşu ülkelerle sağlıklı ilişkiler geliştirmek
_____ Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenliğini korumak
_____ Diğer (Lütfen belirtiniz): _____

Şimdi bu senaryoya geçelim.....

Senaryo #3

- X Ülkesi, Türkiye'nin komşularından biri olan Y Ülkesi'nin yönetimini ele geçirmek için ordularını göndermiştir.
- Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı, saldırı devam ettiği takdirde Türkiye'nin X Ülkesi'ne ekonomik yaptırımlar uygulayacağını resmen açıklar.
- Başbakan X Ülkesi'ni eleştirerek diğer komşu ülkeleri X Ülkesi'ne ekonomik yaptırımlar uygulama konusunda kendi tarafına çekmeye çalışır.
- Buna rağmen X Ülkesi Y Ülkesi'ni işgal etmeye devam eder.
- Bu duruma rağmen Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı, X Ülkesi'ne herhangi bir ekonomik yaptırım tehdidi uygulamaz.

LÜTFEN AŞAĞIDAKİ SORULARI YANITLAYINIZ

A. Türkiye Başbakanı'nın X ülkesine yaptığı ekonomik yaptırım tehditini geri çekme kararını ne ölçüde onaylıyorsunuz?

1. Kesinlikle

onaylıyorum

2. Kısmen

onaylıyorum

3. Ne onaylıyor ne

onaylamıyorum

4. Kısmen onaylamıyorum

5. Kesinlikle onaylamıyorum

Senaryo #3

B. Bu bölümde, T.C. Başbakanı'nın kararını neden onaylayıp onaylamadığınızı öğrenmek istiyorum. Aşağıdaki boşlukta cevap şikkınızı açıklayarak, kararınızda hangi faktörlerin etkili olduğunu yazınız.

Senaryo #3

C. Aşağıda, kişilerin liderlerinin kararlarını onaylama ya da onaylamamaları için bazı olası nedenlerin listesi verilmiştir. Aşağıdaki sebepleri 1-6 arasındaki sayıları kullanarak sıralamanızı rica ediyorum (1 en önemliyi, 6 en önemsizi ifade eder).

- _____ Türkiye'nin uluslararası itibarını sürdürmek
_____ Türkiye'nin ahlaki sorumluluğu
_____ Türkiye'nin rolünü bölgesel lider olarak tanıtmak
_____ Komşu ülkelerle sağlıklı ilişkiler geliştirmek
_____ Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenliğini korumak
_____ Diğer (Lütfen belirtiniz): _____

Ve son olarak bu senaryoya bakalım.....

Senaryo #4

- Z Ülkesi'nin vatandaşları bir seneden uzun bir süredir Türkiye'den dış yardım almaktadır.
- Son zamanlarda Z Ülkesi'nin vatandaşları ülkedeki muhaliflerden (isyancılardan) gittikçe artan güvenlik tehditleriyle karşı karşıyadır.
- Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Başbakanı güvenlik tehditleri devam ederse, Türkiye'nin, barışı sürdürmek için Z Ülkesi'ne yardım akışını ve diğer bütün desteği devam ettireceğini resmen açıkladı.
- Başbakan, Z Ülkesi'ne Türkiye'den daha fazla uzman gönderip barışı sürdürmek için gerekli olan maddi destek akışının düzenli bir şekilde yapılmasını sağladı.
- Buna rağmen muhalifler Z Ülkesi'nin vatandaşlarını tacize ve şiddetli saldırılarına devam etti.
- Bu durumda Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı, barışı sürdürmekten vazgeçip Türkiye'den giden tüm profesyonelleri ve diğer bütün yardımları Z Ülkesi'nden çekmeye karar verdi.

LÜTFEN AŞAĞIDAKİ SORULARI YANITLAYINIZ

A. Türkiye Başbakanı'nın yukarıda anlatılan durumda vermiş olduğu yardıma geri çekme kararını ne ölçüde onaylıyorsunuz?

1. Kesinlikle

onaylıyorum

2. Kısmen

onaylıyorum

3. Ne onaylıyor ne

onaylamıyorum

4. Kısmen onaylamıyorum

5. Kesinlikle onaylamıyorum

Senaryo #4

B. Bu bölümde, T.C. Başbakanı'nın kararını neden onaylayıp onaylamadığınızı öğrenmek istiyorum. Aşağıdaki boşlukta cevap şikkınızı açıklayarak, kararınızda hangi faktörlerin etkili olduğunu yazınız.

Senaryo #4

C. Aşağıda, kişilerin liderlerinin kararlarını onaylama ya da onaylamamaları için bazı olası nedenlerin listesi verilmiştir. Aşağıdaki sebepleri 1-6 arasındaki sayıları kullanarak sıralamanızı rica ediyorum (1 en önemliyi, 6 en önemsizi ifade eder).

- _____ Türkiye'nin uluslararası itibarını sürdürmek
_____ Türkiye'nin ahlaki sorumluluğu
_____ Türkiye'nin rolünü bölgesel lider olarak tanıtmak
_____ Komşu ülkelerle sağlıklı ilişkiler geliştirmek
_____ Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenliğini korumak
_____ Diğer (Lütfen belirtiniz): _____

Ve lütfen son olarak hızlıca tüm senaryoları düşünün.....

Tüm senaryoları göz önünde bulundurarak sizin için en önemli olanı seçin. Seçtiğiniz bu senaryo sizin için neden önemli, ve diğer senaryolara kıyasla hangi açıdan önemli?

Çok teşekkür ederim. Lütfen son olarak aşağıdaki birkaç soruyu cevaplayınız.

Kişisel Karakteristik Özellikler

1. Yaşınız? (birini seçiniz):

- A. 18-24
- B. 25-34
- C. 35-44
- D. 45-54
- E. 55-64
- F. 65 veya üstü

2. Cinsiyetiniz? (birini seçiniz):

- A. Kadın
- B. Erkek

3. Tamamladığınız eğitim düzeyiniz nedir? (birini seçiniz):

- A. İlkokul mezunu
- B. Lise terk
- C. Lise diploması
- D. Üniversite terk
- E. Üniversite diploması
- F. Yüksek lisans derecesi
- G. Doktora derecesi

4. Medeni durumunuz? (birini seçiniz):

- A. Bekar, hiç evlenmemiş
- B. Evli veya hayat arkadaşlığı
- C. Dul
- D. Boşanmış
- E. Ayrı

5. Siyasi görüşünüz. Aşağıdaki şekil sol ve sağ siyasi görüşleri temsil etmektedir. 1 tam sol siyasi görüşte olmayı, 9 tam sağ siyasi görüşte olmayı, 5 ise ikisinin ortasında bir siyasi görüşte olmayı göstermektedir. Kendinizi bu şemada nerede konumlandırırsınız? (birini seçiniz):

[1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9]

6. Siyasi katılımda kendinizi ne derece aktif buluyorsunuz? (birini seçiniz)

- A. Çok aktif
- B. Biraz aktif
- C. Pek aktif değil
- D. Pasif

1

7. Şu anki iş statünüzü nasıl tanımlarsınız? (birini seçiniz):

- A. Tam zamanlı iş sahibi
- B. Yarı zamanlı iş sahibi
- C. İşsiz / iş arıyor
- D. Öğrenci
- E. Yuva kurucu (Ev Hanımı/Ev Beyi)
- F. Emekli

8. Yıllık aile geliriniz ne kadar? (birini seçiniz):

- A. 10,000 TL'den az
- B. 10,000–24,999 TL
- C. 25,000–49,999 TL
- D. 50,000–74,999 TL
- E. 75,000 TL veya üstü

9. Geçen seçimlerde hangi partiye oy verdiniz? _____

10. Yarın bir seçim olsa kime oy verirdiniz? _____

Anket bitmiştir. Zaman ayırdığınız için çok teşekkür ederim!

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