

**HANDLING THE WAVE:  
AUTHORITARIAN SURVIVAL IN EGYPT AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS**

**By  
Begüm Zorlu**


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## AUTHORITARIAN SURVIVAL IN EGYPT AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS

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
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**To Sevda Sucu**

## **ABSTRACT**

### **HANDLING THE WAVE: AUTHORITARIAN SURVIVAL IN EGYPT AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS**

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Keywords: Arab Uprisings, Authoritarian Survival, Egypt

At the beginning of 2011, after two weeks of contentious protests setting off from Cairo and spreading to numerous cities in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, who was ruling the country with an iron fist for 25 years, left his seat. Albeit his departure and the characteristic of the social movement that presented a capacity for a change towards democratization, the direction of the progression turned into the reconstitution of the authoritarian regime which was strengthened with the military coup in 2013, creating a more repressive mode of governance before the uprising.

The research setting off from this repercussion, discloses the strategies deployed by the regime to reconstruct authoritarianism in Egypt at the aftermath of the popular uprising that took place in 2011, as a single case study.

To deduct the path that led to authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt, the first section encompassing the methodology provides a theoretical framework that covers the literature on authoritarian survival and social movements theory. The second part of the study presents the historical background of protest activity in Egypt with a focus on the process between 2011 to 2013 by parting it to three waves; the 18 days that led to Mubarak's fall, the reign of the military and the Morsi era. The third section gathers and decodes the process and reveals the strategies that were used to re-establish authoritarianism at the aftermath of the historical case of the popular uprising in Egypt.

## ÖZET

### ARAP AYAKLANMALARINDAN SONRA MISIR'DA OTORİTERLİĞİN YENİDEN İNŞASI

ZORLU, Begüm

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, Haziran 2016

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Bülent Aras

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap Ayaklanmaları, Mısır, Otoriter Ayakta Kalış

Mısır'da Arap Ayaklanmaları bağlamında 2011 yılının ilk ayında başlayıp iki haftaya yakın süren, Kahire'den yola çıkıp çeşitli şehirlere yayılan halk ayaklanmasından sonra 25 yıldır ülkeyi yöneten başkan Hüsnü Mübarek koltuğunu terk etti. Mübarek'in gidişi ve sosyal hareketin niteliğinin demokratikleşmeye neden olacağı tahmin edilirken, 2013 yılında gerçekleşen darbe Mısır'da otoriterliği yeniden inşa ederek önceki yönetimden daha baskıcı bir yönetim oluşturdu.

Bu tezin hareket noktası, 2011 yılında gerçekleşen halk ayaklanmasından sonra otoriterliğin yeniden inşasında kullanılan stratejileri tekli durum çalışması ile açığa çıkartmaktır.

Araştırma, Mısır'da otoriterliğin yeniden inşanın yolunu açığa çıkarmak için ilk bölümde teorik bir çerçeve ile otoriter ayakta kalış ve sosyal hareketler teorilerini inceliyor. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü Mısır'da sosyal hareket ve protestolara tarihsel bir giriş sunarak 2011 ayaklanmasından, 2013 darbesine kadar gerçekleşen süreci 3 alt başlıkla izliyor: Mübarek'in düşüşünü sağlayan 18 gün, ordunun yönetimi ve Mursi'nin devri. Üçüncü bölüm ise aktörleri ve süreci bir araya getirip, deşifre edip, Mısır'da gerçekleşen tarihi vakadaki otoriterliğin yeniden inşasında kullanılan yöntemleri açığa çıkarıyor.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

**ASU** Arab Socialist Union

**ETUF** Egyptian Trade Union Federation

**EFITU** Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions

**FJP** Freedom and Justice Party

**NDP** National Democratic Party

**NDF** National Democratic Front

**NSF** National Salvation Front

**SCAF** Supreme Council of Armed Forces

**RCC** Revolutionary Command Council

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This thesis could not have existed if it was not in the leadership of Bülent Aras who encouraged me to investigate the Arab Uprisings and authoritarian survival as a subject.

The research, lectures and interviews that were carried out at The Project on the Middle East and Arab Uprisings (POMEAS) and İstanbul Policy Center (IPC) has also been crucial to understanding the dynamics of the Arab World and see the Arab Uprisings as a vital historical case to be explored.

The in-depth interviews that were carried out with Hesham Shafick, Mahmoud Makade, Ahmed Emad Hamdy, Hussein Qazzaz and Matthew Cassel have been useful in the quest for grasping the dynamics of Egypt.

The '*new media*' had played a crucial role in shaping the uprising itself but also created worthy resources for the researchers. The websites of the bloggers, right activists; social media accounts, the database of the 'revolution' *Tahrir Documents* lead by the University of California, reports carried out by international organizations, opinion pieces mainly on *Carnegie Endowment for Peace*, *Jadaliyya*, *Mada Masr*, *Muftah.org*, international newspapers and English news from *Egypt Independent* and *Al Ahram English* has set the main data for the research.

The work of journalists, researchers, and academics focusing on the Arab Uprisings, Egypt, authoritarian survival and social movements have broadened the vision and the arguments that are presented in the thesis.

Without their effort, this thesis could not have existed.



## GLOSSARY

**6th of April Movement:** Famous for the mobilization of protestors to Tahrir Square with leftist leaning that was founded in 2008 in support of the workers in El-Mahalla El-Kubra, that were going to have a strike on April 6

**Al-Azhar:** A 1,000-year-old mosque and university often considered the highest seat of learning in the Sunni Islam world<sup>1</sup>

**Assabiya:** Assabiya is social solidarity in Arabic

**Feloul:** *Feloul* meaning remnants in Arabic signifies the ousted officials of the Mubarak era in post 25<sup>th</sup> of January Uprising

**Intifah:** The policy that was named after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's move for opening the door to private investment in Egypt

**Freedom and Justice Party: (FJP)** Freedom and Justice Party was a novel formation driving from the Muslim Brotherhood allied with various political forces under the *Democratic Alliance Coalition* in the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Uprising. The party was founded on April 30, 2011, and dissolved on August 9, 2014

**Kefaya Movement:** *Kefaya* meaning enough in English is a coalition of diverse political movements that was united and formed against the authoritarian rule of Hosni Mubarak for disabling the transition of power from to his son Gamal in the early 2000's. It is officialy named as the Egyptian Movement for Change

**Misr al-Kawiya Party:** The Strong Egypt Party is an opposition party that comes from an Islamic background, which was established following the January 25 Revolution in 2011. Led by Abdoul Futuh, it opposes the role of military in political affairs describes itself as centre-left and moderate Islamist (Arian, 2012)

**Maglis El-Shaab:** The People's Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt

**Maglis El-Shura:** The Consultative Council of the Arab Republic of Egypt

**Grand Mufti of the Republic:** The highest religious authority in Egypt that exists since 1895

**Silmiya:** *Silmiya* that means peaceful in Arabic was one of the main slogans used in the Egyptian Uprising of 2011

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<sup>1</sup> As Khalil explains 'part mosque, part university, part center of religious research and knowledge, al-Azhar is perhaps the central and certainly the most prestigious element in the state-religion complex in Egypt'. (Khalil, 2011)

**Tamarod:** *Tamarod* means rebel in Arabic. It was a petition campaign that set off in mid-2013 that called for Mohammed Morsi's resignation

**Thawra:** *Thawra* means revolution in Arabic

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## CHAPTER 1

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 1.1.Introduction

Over the last five years, many articles started with a reference to Mohammad Bouazizi, a 26-year-old street vendor from a small city called Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia. He set his body on fire on 17 December 2010 as a response to his frustration to the municipal police but overall the corrupt and unjust system that had dominated Tunisians for an excessively long time. This desperate act of a huckster against bad governance, corruption and oppression have been taken as the milestone for the development that became recognized as the Arab Spring.

While his name was heard in the coffee shops and social media platforms around the Middle East, he was becoming the symbol of the popular uprisings that transformed and still alter the dynamics of the region and the World today. As the uprising passed on to other Arab nations varying in vastness and influence, the connotation '*spring*' became common for addressing the wave of protests due to its non-violent nature, speed and the demands it set off.

Whereas '*spring*' was associated with the movement right after it set off, the failure of expected democratic transitions in most of the countries, furthermore, the increase in authoritarian measures pending to sight after 2012 started a process of re-naming the outcome of the uprisings as a '*winter*' and brought back the prior discussions that democratization in Arab societies is just impossible<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> For Arab societies and democratization see Diamond (2002), Diamond and Plattner (2014), Bellin, (2004, 2012), Oliver, (2012) Yom (2005), Lust-Okar (2005), and Sadiki (2004, 2012).

Apart from this broad generalized outlook to the region, the outcome of the revolts of 2011 has been crucially dissimilar in every single Arab country. The aftermath of the uprisings was molded by the dynamics and structures of each one. While the dictators in Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt left their seats, Bahrain, Yemen have been stage to military interventions from their neighbors and Syria was dragged into one of the worst conflicts of the century. Whereas, the aftermath of the international military intervention that rebounded Gaddafi's fall in Libya has failed to succeed a stable governance, the monarchies endured in the wave.

The uprisings in the Arab countries,<sup>3</sup> that mainly spread after the fall of Mubarak in Egypt bared similarities to the post-Soviet transition movements like the Orange or 'color revolutions'. This was coupled with the usage of the term '*spring*' as the outset encompassed mainly non-violent and rights based demonstrations.

There have been protests throughout the region differing on subjects -religious, socio-economic- and time periods but the feature of this wave was the emergence of common characteristics as it took place simultaneously among the nations and was regime challenging. It was named '*spring*' because apart from the timing there was a similarity that arose in the methods that the protestors pursued and their eagerness. The slogans were imitated from one country to another, and the protestors in all countries tried to occupy their city squares. While some were hesitant and some more courageous the protests started with one thing in common; discrediting violence. The slogan that passed from country to country was; '*ash-sha'b yurīd isqāṭ an-nizām*' 'the people want to bring down the regime'.

The people brought down rulers in some countries. In the Arab World, the mobilizations did the unpredictable; they reached the specific objective that toppled down the dictators of Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya and undoubtedly challenged the authority in all countries in the region. The spark that was lit from the Arab countries with the frustration of masses against their regimes has taken its place and references in various social movements around the World. Movements like the Rose Revolution,

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<sup>3</sup> The uprisings mainly took place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia.



Occupy, Chile Student's Riots without concentrate leaders, aimed at occupying squares, and proposed specific targets shared similarities with the Arab Spring.

By this means, to investigate the recent development in the region, studies of mobilization appropriated a central place. Mobilizations brought out the clashing practices within the 'rulers' and the 'ruled' that had dynamic connotations in particular conjunctures. The mobilizations under the broader term collective action<sup>4</sup> signifying an act carried about by a group of people to address a spesific goal in each case created an exceptional dynamic to be explored.

However, studying mobilization alone was not sufficient to explain the developments that occurred in the Arab World after the uprisings. Though the methods and the demands were similar in the set off throughout the region, the outcomes in every country were diverse. While some resulted in a change of governance, some confronted waves of violence, authoritarian reconstruction, some reforms and civil war.

Additionally, the characteristics of 2011 which made up the '*spring*' gradually started to vanish in the following period. What was becoming common was the necessary suppression to the engagements by the respective ruling coalitions. These responses by the governments were a result of a learning process that occurred with the dynamic that the protest caused. Collective action has pushed authoritairan structures to re-invent strategies to hold on to power. What began with the popular uprisings was that it transformed the traditional relationship, added a new dynamic between the authoritarian regimes and their societies and has created a lurch to the authoritarian structure of the countries. The process in the near aftermath of the popular mobilization showed that there has to be more focus on how it threatens authoritarian regimes as it became an existential challenge for it.

While the suddenness of the uprisings was one of the most current debates in 2011, Salamey and Pearson (2012) pointed out that the outbreaks are not unexpected eruptions, nevertheless the growth of experiences by particular groups. The authors

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<sup>4</sup> According to Britannica, collective action occurs when some people work together to achieve some common objective.

emphasized on the fact that apart from the historical grievances of specific groups based on their social, cultural, economic or tribal inequalities, one important factor was the political learning process that came with the protest, new modes of communication, globalization and the influence of non-violent rights-based movements. (Salamey and Pearson, 2012) This was a phenomenon to be investigated for the authoritarians as well. While the political experiences of the deprived unfolded in a learning process, so did the contrary experiences that the regimes attained in the aftermath of a mass mobilization.

In 2011, Egypt experienced a democratic revolution in the sense that it resulted in the experience of a real democratic platform. The collective consciousness shaped by the popular movements were visible at the city centers and from all of the squares of the Arab World that were on the agenda on 2011, *Midan Tahrir*, known as Tahrir Square where the popular protests led to Mubarak's resignation in 18 days. When Hamid Dabashi was saying 'we need metaphors to understand the Arab Spring' (Oktay and Ayndinkaya, 2011:55) the uprising have already started to create new methods for collective movements to organize and act. As Hardt and Negri (2011) said: 'Egyptian squares, streets had become parliaments, forums of negotiation and battlegrounds'.

When the protests set off, the confrontations with the security forces did remain in the borders of self-defense alike the protests that took place in Europe at 2008. Comparing it to the Syntagma Square in Athens as Sharp underlined: 'the square did remain relatively safe spaces and did not break down into the kind of Hobbesian chaos that the media invariably claimed' (Sharp, 2012:129). The emerging components had effect in uniting movements that were geographically apart. Tahrir was similar to the Occupy Movement in the US with the ties that emanated in the protesting platforms like the existence of libraries, tents, and kitchens in the square. It was no coincidence that a year later the chants of Tahrir Square were reflected in the Occupy movement in the US. While giving enthusiasm abroad, the experience of 2011 in the Middle East was reflected in the literature of non-violent social movements, the similarities were short-lived.

The Egyptian Uprising that was named as the 'Egyptian Revolution' or '25 January Uprising' marked a united demand that arose from below; the resignation of President

Hosni Mubarak. Demonstrations took place almost in every city in Egypt, and the squares were filled with people from various social and political classes. In the 18 days that the realization of the demand was reached. There were no prominent sectarian slogans and specific leadership. Slogans of bread, freedom and social justice, human dignity, and political freedom were dominating the discourse. The movement created new metaphors for how Egyptians defined themselves with solidarity, abnegation, a common goal and the ability to conduct a shared decision.

As the research prospects, the outcome of the 18 days demonstrated a remarkable social mobilization, a grassroots uprising that was met with an authoritarian counter move which is an obvious example of authoritarian survival/authoritarian learning. It is viewed as a reconstruction process that set off from the 18 days that led to the removal of Mubarak and was strengthened in the path that resulted in the military coup in mid-2013.

The successes of the 18 days firstly came with the fact that it has reached its demand to remove the dictator. The period that followed Mubarak's departure encompassed rights-based movements, the first free elections in Egyptian history, various referendums and a confrontation with one of the main pillars of the Egyptian state: the army. As the movement from below continued its quest for democratic governance, authoritarian reconstruction continued and on the other hand, finally resulted in the coup that took place in June 2013. Since then all opposition and protest movements have been criminalized in the country, placing Egypt to a worse subordinated condition on rights and freedoms.

Additionally, there were many debates about categorizing, naming the protests in the region and the uprising in Egypt that comprised of changing dynamics between January 2011 to June 2013. Studies of democratization were one of them, and the movements were seen as a late-comer to the third wave of democratization that Huntington (1992) described. The discontent had similarities with waves that occurred after the end of military regime in Latin America or the Color Revolutions which Huntington named the third wave of democracy that encompassed transition to democracy in non-democratic

regimes during a particular period, taking place due to the loss of the consensus for the authoritarian regime and the snowballing of the protests (Huntington, 1996).

However, the uprisings in the region showed quickly that the experience was not the extension of a third or neither the fourth wave of democratization, but there was a more crucial subject to be explored that hindered the process of democratization; the survival of the authoritarian regimes.

Valbjørn and Bank (2010) had highlighted that research on the Middle East should focus on how authoritarianism reproduces itself rather than democratization. There is a long history of protest, discontent in the Arab countries but not many examples of regime change or the overthrow of leaders due to a mass uprising. After the fall of colonial rule in the Arab World, there have been few significant cases of popular mobilization and not any of them was 'regime threatening'. The distinctiveness of the Arab Uprisings was that the mobilizations influenced the dynamics of the mass popular movements and transformed the question on what are the factors that keep authoritarian regimes stand on their feet. Therefore, in order to understand the wave that occurred and how the authoritarianism reproduced itself in 2011, it became crucial to investigate the strategies that were put forward.

Accordingly, the research, departing from the exceptionality of the cases to contribute to the literature of authoritarian survival and reveal the Egyptian experience, investigate authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt after the Arab Uprisings by exploring how the collective action that constituted the demand to challenge the authoritarian regime ruling in Egypt failed to overcome the persistence of authoritarianism in the country. It focuses on the question how the authoritarian regime in Egypt rebuild itself after the mass demonstrations that shifted the power structure within the ruling elite.

Consequently, the study aims to reveal the forces of the reconstruction of the regime in Egypt by reading the subtexts of the uprising, the testimonies, the literature on authoritarianism, social movements theory and history from below with the quest for contributing to the literature on authoritarian regimes and authoritarian learning.

In the pursuit of finding answers, it will provide the theoretical framework of authoritarian survival and social movements theory in the first chapter. In the second chapter, by giving the substructure of the historical background of protest activity in Egypt, it will focus on the process between January 2011 to July 2013 by parting it into three waves that highlight changing dynamics. These waves will be composed of the 18 days that led to Mubarak's fall, the reign and the fall of the interim military rule and the election of Morsi to his downfall. The last chapter will gather and answer the questions on authoritarian survival in this context and reveal the strategies that were used to re-establish authoritarianism at the aftermath of the historical case of the popular uprising in Egypt.

## **1.2.Methodology**

‘Handling the Wave: Authoritarian Survival in Egypt’ explores the methods of reconstruction of the authoritarian regime in Egypt after a regime threatening collective movement/mobilization, at a specific period from January 2011 to June 2013. The study proposes that the mass/popular movement that set off at Egypt in January 2011 has created a new learning process for the authoritarian regime in the country and produced a relationship between the social movement and the governance.

Heading off from the complexity and genuineness of the uprisings the research aims to investigate the case of authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt. In the selection of the case as Aras had pointed out Egypt has always possessed a decisive role in the wider Arab world; (Aras, 2014) and the uprisings in the region were mainly inspired by the aftermath of the fall of Mubarak in Egypt.

The focus of this research is not categorizing a specific model of Egyptian authoritarianism but rather reveal the relationship between the dependent variable; authoritarian reconstruction with the independent variable; mass protest. As Heydemann (2015) put, the recent developments that the Arab World, experienced in this specific time period differs from other studies on authoritarianism or process of democratization due to the changes and demands that came with new telecommunications technology, pressures for democratic and economic reform. The transformation resulted in a new reality to be explored.

In this descriptive case study, the independent variable of the research is what the protests have succeeded or altered with the mass movement. In order to explain this relation, the research exposes the authoritarian tactics that were used to counter the dynamics of the mass protest after the Arab Uprisings in Egypt. Examining the process reveals how successful the regime was in containing and sustaining its authoritarian rule which is called authoritarian survival.

### **1.2.1. Authoritarian Survival in Egypt as a Single Case Study**

The primary reason to conduct a single case study lies in the uniqueness of a particular social movement. Yin (1984) had pointed out that explanatory research concludes on credible explanations which are consistent with the facts and provide a comprehensive explanation of the outcome of popular movement as it presents data bearing cause-effect relationships.

Eva Bellin makes a crucial point by saying that: ‘there is no single roadmap for democratization in the globe and what was a success in another country, even for neighboring nations will not be the determinant of how the other will democratize.’ (Bellin, 2012).

In his quest for attaining a specialized agenda for on the repercussions of social movements Giguini (1999) points out compatible models fail in relation to general causes as there are no stable motives in life itself. For him, ‘different conditions and historical circumstances are conducive to varying movement outcomes.’ (Giugini, 1999: 27).

As authoritarian reconstruction is determined with the distinct tensions of individual regimes (Heydemann, 2007), a single case study is the suited mission to investigate the causes of authoritarian resilience in Egypt. Heydemann (2007) points out that by ‘expanding to areas of controlled political contestation authoritarian survival remains different in every regime’. Even though the concluding patterns that are revealed at the end of the analysis can contribute to the general theories on authoritarianism and authoritarian survival as authoritarians tend to learn from each other, the experiences of every case must be investigated.

In this regard, to expose the relationship between authoritarian survival and mass protest in Egypt, this chapter continues with the theoretical discussions on authoritarian survival and mass protest. The literature on protest and social movements contribute to defining the experience of the uprising that auspicated in 2011.

The second chapter provides the historical background to the independent variable; mass protest and focuses on the process within and after the January 25 Uprising for conceding the interaction between the dynamics that emerged after the grassroots movement and the responses of the authoritarian regime to the emerging dynamics. Finally, the last chapter examines the specific time period, reveals the challenges that the regime met and the strategies that were deployed against the momentum that mass protests brought. This calculation of the process reveals what had determined the reconstruction of authoritarianism in Egypt.

While the scope of the research ends with the military coup that took place in mid-2013, naming it as the restoration of the authoritarian rule in Egypt, the research does not propose that the process of contentious politics in Egypt is over. This particular period is taken into consideration as a single case in a single time frame (*see: 1.2.2. for the selection of time period*) for revealing the measures of authoritarian survival against a social movement that produced a hazard to the ruling regime in Egypt. The restored authoritarian rule today is the result of the mass movement that set off in 2011.

Also, the study does not conclude with an evaluation that names the mass movement as a success or failure of but rather explores the gains versus the setbacks of the social movement consequently asking what were the setbacks of the movement that led to authoritarian reconstruction. In order to express these earnings and the setbacks the research uses qualitative research methods, primarily content analysis, systematic search of data to identify specific observable actions or characteristics. These observable actions are the key variables in the study.

### **1.2.2. Selection of the Time Period**

The period taken into consideration in this research is aimed to reveal the impact of mass protest to authoritarian survival. The two-year cycle that led to the coup d'état needed examination because it was a process of unique societal mobilizations with large-scale reaction to political choices of the ruling elites. On the other hand, this time period was marked with non-stop contentious politics that urged the authoritarians to invent strategies to hold on to power. Each cycle determined the authoritarian learning of the next phase. The quest is to reveal the patterns in the period of contentious politics



starting with the first wave with the 18 days that led to Mubarak's resignation; the interim period constituted the second wave of protests against the military rule which some called it the second revolution and the third wave that was marked with the first free elections in the history of modern Egypt and ultimately the military coup in mid-2013.

While the regime today uses various strategies to hold on to power, they defer from the ones considered in this research. After all the military coup of mid 2013 and after the presidential elections of 2014 that led to the presidency of the former defense minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the state of socio-political life in Egypt has been under worse condition than the Mubarak era as rights, liberties as every kind of contentious politics is heavily crushed by the government.

After all, going back to 2011 this research proposes that the mass movement that brought down Hosni Mubarak in 18 days was a unique societal mobilization that was an intimidating threat to the authoritarian rule of the country. The course of authoritarianism had to be transformed after this unique societal event. While the 18 days were crucial to determine the course of the waves to come, each wave was met with strategies used by the regime that were shaped by the dynamics of the previous one.

### **1.2.3. Research Question**

Setting off with the intention to expose what the authoritarian rule did to contain such threats in this specific the study, with an integrated approach, the strategies of authoritarian survival in Egypt is revealed. Eventually, with its particular period and location, the driving question of this research is to explain how the popular uprising in Egypt forced the reconsideration of the familiarized explanations of authoritarian resilience. In order to disclose the reconstruction, the research asks:

- How did the collective action that constitutes a series challenge to the authoritarian regime ruling in Egypt, fail to overcome the persistence of authoritarianism in the country?
- How did the authoritarian regime in Egypt rebuild itself after the mass demonstrations that shifted the power structure within the ruling elite?

- What does the mobilization practice mean for authoritarian survival in Egypt?
- What lessons can be learned about authoritarian reconstruction in the aftermath of the Egyptian Uprising?

#### **1.2.4 Content Analysis**

As this study is a historical analysis of an uprising and its aftermath, quantitative part of the study will deliver statistics about the scope protest activity in Egypt (number of strikes, casualties, arrests, percentage of representation in the parliament, etc.) within the studied period. In this research, already existing data are used. Thus, rather than a data collection process, the existing data are brought together and analyzed. Interviews are conducted with experts and actors to gain in-depth information about the waves of contentious politics.

The analysis reveals how were the cycle formed, what was the characteristics of it and what did the protestors or the ruling elite learn in each cycle. To determine the boundaries and measures of authoritarian survival, the study benefits from the literature on authoritarian survival and contentious politics.

Content Analysis is the primary tool to obtain data in the research. The strategy to identify actors with real influence and power through reputational method through interviews and the observations of interlocutors or experts. In the process of content analysis mainstream, Egyptian Newspapers (Egypt Daily News, Al Masry-Al Youm, Al Akhbar, Egypt Independent, Al Ahram English) mainstream local newspapers and international broadcast media, (Al Jazeera, Guardian, The New York Times) are scanned.

As a new arena to be investigated the texts written in social media spheres like Facebook and Twitter profiles of activists were crucial documents that were given a place in this research. Social media tools (*social media sites like Twitter, Facebook, blogs,*) speeches (*Mubarak, SCAF officials, the opposition and Morsi*) websites of political parties (*Ikwanweb, Revolutionary Socialists*) have become the leading content that formed the research.

On the other hand, official documents, reports from human rights organizations (*Amnesty International, Cairo Institute for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch*) and especially the work of *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, the research projects *Tahrir Diaries, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)* and *Project on Middle East After the Arab Spring (POMEAS)* were crucial resources to enhance this study.

### **1.3.Literature Review**

#### **1.3.1. Social Movements Literature and Contentious Politics**

Studies of revolution/spring/social movement/uprising are more prone to historical explanations. These studies look at general social factors contributing to regime change which is generally by means of violence (Foran 1997; Skocpol 1994; Tilly 1993). Group formations within these mobilizations (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos, 2013), policing responses of power (Grinberg, 2013), ‘collective identity creation’ in the squares (Talshir, 2012; Castells, 2012;) ‘direct democracy practices’ (Dhaliwal, 2012), ‘democracy from below’ (De Porta, 2014) interconnectedness of global struggles (Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos, 2013) and economic prosperity and regime support (Magaloni and Wallace, 2008, Lynch 2012) have been some of the most discussed issues.

Mobilizations after 2011 have been taken up under the topics of revolutions, riots, and resistance but has been a part of the broader literature on social movements. The social movements literature has various under titles and discussions but in the last decades the title ‘new social movements’ were mainly affiliated with non-violent movements gained importance with the uprisings in Eastern European countries in 2000s, Chile in 1989, South Africa in 1994, and the ‘colorful revolutions’ in Georgia 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan in 2005, the anti-austerity riots in Europe and the Arab Uprisings. Tarrow defined social movements as:

sequences of contentious politics based on underlying social networks, on resonant collective action frames, and on the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents (Tarrow, 2011:7).

They are not developed on their own, are ‘formed through complex encounters’ (Porta, 1999: 257) with the inter communication of the challengers and authorities. (Tarrow,

2011). In order to define the dynamic that arose in 2011, within the studies of ‘new’ or non-violent social movements, uprisings, Sidney Tarrow’s concept of ‘contentious politics’ is the broadest concept which covers all of the repertoires of collective action. Tilly defined the ‘repertoire of contention’ as ‘the ways that people act together in pursuit of shared interests.’ (Tilly, 1998: 41).

Tarrow noted that contentious politics is ‘an interaction that is episodic, public, collective between the rulers and the ruled when; ‘at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims and the realization of the claims effects the interests of at least one of the claimants.’ (Tarrow, 2001:5).

Setting off from the social movements literature to examine the uprisings of the Middle East and Egypt contentious politics derives support to define the popular movement that took place and to expresses the affiliation with authoritarian survival.

According to Tilly, the ‘revolution<sup>5</sup>’ takes place when the interaction the government coercion does not work anymore. Simply this connotes to the lifting of the barrier of fear that was one of the mottoes in the Egyptian Uprising. After Tahrir, square occupations and forums in the squares or parks created a new repertoire of collective action and the squares became theaters when the barrier of fear was lifted. Contentious politics was formed with non-violent methods like student strike, boycott of social affairs, social disobedience, strikes, but the actual work of the organizers consisted of patching together provisional coalitions, suppressing risky tactics, negotiation with multiple agendas and finding public voice to collective action (Giugni, et.al, 1999).

While the name revolution was used by the participants of the uprising, certain scholars, activists, etc. (Fadl, 2015, Alexander, 2013, De Smet, 2015) in the Egyptian example on the other hand, one crucial debate was whether the uprising in Egypt was a military takeover as Brown defined the fall of Mubarak as a military coup that came with public pressure (Brown, 2012).

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<sup>5</sup> In the research the word uprising is used to refer to the Egyptian case as a dictatorship collapse by mobilized political action. However, the word ‘revolution’ is accepted in various contexts to describe an authors or protestors perspective.

From the outlook of the research, the case in Egypt can be defined as a dictatorship collapse by mobilized political action. It was a revolutionary process but whether it suits the determinants of revolution or a coup is another area of research. By focusing on contentious, the research politics escapes the debate whether what happened was a revolution or not, but expresses that it is the dynamics/characteristics of the movement that had created an interaction between the challengers and the authorities. In whichever name used the revolt/uprising/spring/revolution, not spring nor winter, not an event for a season but a dynamic process is a dynamic process with the interaction of various actors. As Tarrow pointed out:

contentious politics occurs when ordinary people – often in alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in public mood – join forces in a confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents. It is triggered when changing political opportunities, and constraints create incentives to take action for actors who lack resources on their own. People contend through known repertoires of contention and expand them by creating innovations at their margins. When backed by well-structured social networks and galvanized by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with opponents – to social movements (Tarrow, 2011:6).

Driving from the literature of social movements the affinity among governments and primary actors is called regimes. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2007) Moreover, each regime has its own characteristics and as Tarrow proposes the departure in one case does not possess a generalized rule, an intangible law that works in all formulas of contention (Tarrow, 2011).

From Tilly's terms the power holders, participants and the subject populations accompanied by other parties are the constitutes of the social movement (Tilly, 1999). While coup d'etat and civil wars don't count, a contentious movement is: 'joint actions from activists, building alliances, struggling with competitors, mobilizing supporters, building collective identities, searching for resources and lobbying' (Tilly, 1999: 257).

The demands that come with the cycle of contention 'by highlighting the vulnerability of authorities to contention challenge the interests of other contenders, either by claiming part of their resources or by attacking the interests of an established group directly'. (Tarrow, 2011). Therefore, the interaction determines the path of the cycle.

Collective actions usually innovate new repertoires, frames when power challenges them (Tarrow, 2011). The authoritarian counter attack becomes visible when the policing reactions of power become successful in dealing with these measures (this challenge of authority regarded as policing in the literature; repression, new legislation, bans, criminalization of the participants, etc.) the challengers are forced to invent new repertoires of action. As Grinberg discusses, policing can develop as a response to power against resistance, riots, and social movements. Both opponents socially learn how to act against each other. Thus, it creates a repertoire for both sides (Grinberg, 2013).

### **1.3.2. Authoritarian Survival**

Authoritarianism in its simplest definition is: ‘a political system which individual freedom is held as completely subordinate to the power or authority of the state, centered either in one person or a small group that is not constitutionally accountable to the people.

Carrying off from the persistence of this political system where individuals are under subordination of the unaccountable, the authoritarian survival literature examines the sources and reasons of regime stability relatively to the likelihood of regime change.

When slogans of the 2011 uprisings are investigated under light, it is revealed that all refer to the inner dynamics of enduring authoritarianism and to its shortcomings, which are at the center of social mobilization in the Arab World in 2011. For more than a decade studies on authoritarianism and authoritarian survival Heydemann, (2007), Heydemann and Leenders, (2012), Bellin (2004, 2012), Josua and Edel (2014), Anderson (2011), Lust, (2005), Gandhi and Przeworski, (2007), Droz-Vincent (2011), Valbjørn and Bank (2010), Ottoway (2010) searched how authoritarian systems continue their existence and suppress the actualities that threaten them.

Authoritarian survival literature has been keen on explaining the reasons for the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. While Valbjørn and Bank propose that democratization studies account for the region in a ‘linear path from authoritarianism’ (Valbjørn and Bank, 127:2010) that leans towards democratization,

studies of authoritarian survival argue that examining the mechanisms that permit its determination gives us a better account of the realities of the region. (Valbjørn and Bank, 2010). Aarts, Kolman, Statema, Dahhan, point out:

if we wish to understand the variation in autocracies and why some are better than others in sustaining survival strategies, we should analyze how authoritarian rulers perceive the threats they face and which institutional, social, political, and ideological conditions influence such threats (Aarts, et.al., 2012:13).

In their recent work Aras and Falk (2015) examine the reaction of authoritarian regimes in the MENA region by revealing the shifting alliances in regional policies while Bellin (2004, 2012) focusing on the uniqueness of each democratization process underlines the military's capacity and decision 'to shoot or not to shoot at the protestors' remains one of the crucial aspects for collective action to form its path and authoritarians to survive.

Hinnebusch (2006, 2015) on the other hand, investigates state formations, and the structures which he proposes are responsible for the authoritarian survival in the Middle East. In his recent work (2015) in order to find observable trajectories, he looks at the role of mass mobilization -if it possesses cross-class coalitions or not-, opportunity structures, regime capacity, the role of bureaucracy, political economy, external intervention and the role of a transitional coalition for reconstruction of authority in different cases. Stancer (2012) on the other hand, by focusing on the capacity of flexibility of the regimes examines political structures, alliances of elites, institutions, and 'governance in Egypt and Syria because 'even in successful revolutions they are seldom renounced'.

The literature on the breakdown of authoritarianism and transition processes prioritizes authoritarian learning rather democratic contagion. In the quest for grasping the dynamics what Heydemann and Leenders (2012) answer is that how the regimes come around to the massive threats that mass mobilization poses for regime survival. Apart from the dominance of coercion, their study encompasses dynamics of military defection; the logic of social mobilization; and the complementary roles of structure, intention, and protest which can be examined under political uprisings.

In order to pass the wave of protests, discontent, and regain legitimacy, regimes attain strategies to stay in power. These strategies as Heydemann and Leenders name counter-revolutionary as well (2012) are not simply defensive or reactive.

As they point out:

they are complex, multilevel games involving regimes, publics, and external actors, in which regimes develop strategies that aim to affect the strategic calculus of citizens, allies, and adversaries, even while constantly updating their own probabilities, both of successfully suppressing their opponents and, should this become unlikely, negotiating the terms of their departure from office (Heydemann and Leenders, 2012:83).

However, in the quest for grasping the dynamics, it is crucial to investigate how the regimes adapt to the challenges that mass uprisings pose. (See: *Table 1* for the variety of the tactics of Heydemann & Leenders, 2012).

<b>Table 1: Authoritarian Survival Tactics of Heydemann and Leenders</b>
1. Intervention from regional or international actors
2. Sectarianism discourse
3. Strategic use of violence
4. Acceptable exit strategies

**Source:** Heydemann & Leenders, 2012

Nonetheless, the strategies are not led in a day, and structural reasons account for the capacity for authoritarian survival. Bellin’s classification of authoritarianism supports Heydemann and Leenders’s (2012) which are; ‘the financial power of autocratic structures with receiving support from international networks’, which becomes an existential necessity to hold on combined with ‘low levels of institutionalization and weak capacity for societal mobilization’ (Bellin, 2012). These shared characteristics of authoritarian regimes determine its survival too. Another crucial tactic for the survival of authoritarianism according to Lynch is:

regimes adapt strategies to prevent the emergence of internal splits within the ruling coalitions and their key support bases. They can be the defection of militaries, like increasing the salaries of armed forces, hand-outs to the regime constituencies. (Lynch, 2012:83)

On the other hand, Sharp’s research contributes to the authoritarian survival literature as it examines the weakness’ that dictatorships face. While he points out that unity which



is attained with non-violence<sup>6</sup> remain crucial for a social movement to succeed, he points out that internal institutional conflicts within the regime followed with the possibility of distinctive agenda by the military may end up in its collapse. (Sharp, 2009: 89) Apart from the weaknesses of dictatorships if we return to Tilly (2006) again, the threatening mass mobilization which he bases as strengths of mass mobilization driving from his description of contentious politics contains; worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (Tilly, 2006:53).

### **1.3.3. Protest and Authoritarian Survival**

Protests<sup>7</sup> are not desired for authoritarian regimes, but sometimes inevitable. They are crucial in the literature of authoritarian survival because they can determine the survival of regimes as Magaloni and Wallace (2008: 27) refer by ‘affecting the probabilities of coups, elite splits and factional politics at the top of the regime.’ Regime threatening mobilization, in its short connotation protest as Lipsky (1965) defines is ‘a political resource used by those who do not have direct access to policy making to mobilize influential public opinion.’ As the main act of the non-violent resistance, protests as their part in a social movement are ‘a collective challenge to elite authorities by significant number of people with common purpose and solidarity’ (Durac, 2013: 45).

As protests cause authoritarian instability, it triggers the authoritarian learning process. They emerge as an important variable as it threatens the regime and gains the capacity of collective mobilization (Haynes, 1997).

Tullock’s formulation of the potential sources of danger for dictatorships encompassed a genuine popular uprising. (Tullock, 2005) Magaloni and Wallace’s research investigate the relationship between mass politics and political survival by setting off from the question ‘how much political survival is threatened by protest and demonstrations’ followed by ‘what can determine their capacity to resist or collapse’? Their research concludes that in order for a regime to survive it has to be supported with what they call citizen loyalty backed up with its ruling coalition, and armed forces

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<sup>6</sup> The Arab Uprisings were categorized as non-violent social movements. For a detailed account on tactics that are used in non-violent social movements see: Sharp (2012) at Appendix 1.

<sup>7</sup> Protest activity can be signing petitions, boycott, strikes, occupation of buildings,

(Magaloni & Wallace, 2008) so in order for a movement to succeed the ruling coalition has to be convinced and the subversive coalitions dropped (Magaloni & Wallace, 2008).

On Magaloni and Wallace's account citizens are obedient to an authoritarian rule is because as individuals they don't have the capacity to transform or terminate it. (Magaloni and Wallace, 2008) Though when protests integrate with the public into a social movement and creates new areas, memories, and the most courage.

Protest occur when citizens are dissatisfied. So when a group is dissatisfied or deprived as Gurr points out (1970), a riot will be aimed at changing their well-being by transforming the political and economic structures, and forcing government action. If the ruling class can balance the deprivation, they survive the wave.

Grinberg (2013) enters into the debate with his concept of 'movement of resistance'. Resistance is understood as a reaction to authoritarian politics that if only participants share some understandings and identities, the authorities can be threatened; they can form an identity with resistance. Shared interests during the time of political events bring them together. However, strength and popularity of contention lead to changes within these group formations. A movement of resistance emerge against power when two conditions coexist; as a marginalized, discriminated group have no space to express themselves, and dominant group's political mechanisms to prevent marginalized group's representation is weakened or removed. When these conditions exist, marginalized group, seek to gain recognition and representation to its claims. They protest against the dominant power including opposition groups as well by accusing them to be failed on their representation too. However, a movement of resistance is not a cycle because when the moment ends political power reacts to prevent a new cycle. Grinberg calls this moment a counter-movement. He argues that movement of resistance has unintended consequences instead of desired ones in most of the cases (Grinberg, 2013).

Protest can create divisions between the ruling elites and reveal true preferences of the participants of the social movement. As Giugini writes, they can:

produce political change with ‘altering the power relations between challengers and authorities; by forcing policy change; and by provoking broader and usually more durable systemic changes, both on the structural and cultural levels (Giugini, 1999, xii).

So protests can create a culture of resistance that can end or harm the legitimacy of the regime. Porta underlines a crucial point that there has been a change in the shared conception of legitimate ways to protest as well as a legitimate way for the state to control the protest. (Porta, 1999:66) As protest turn to squares for the quest for rights, the protestors gain legitimacy by imposing political pressure on the regime. It is an effective, challenging strategy because as Chenoweth and Stephan point out:

by raising the costs to the regime of maintaining the status quo higher levels of participation contribute to a number of mechanisms necessary for success including enhanced resilience higher probabilities of tactical innovation expanded civic disruption (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:10).

One of the outputs of the protests is the new, creative slogans, songs, slogans, artwork creating what Durac (2013) calls ‘emotive national symbols’ and most importantly as Fournier (2014) underlines protests create belonging to the social movement, a goal, motivation and identity. The regime has the use of force, but the protestors only possess the advantage of numbers, creating masses, capturing a location. This location creates an ethical superiority which has been the cases of the ‘Friday Demonstrations’ that set off from mosques.

#### **1.3.4. Repression and Authoritarian Survival**

When a regime is met with a challenge, the responses range from accommodation to suppression. However, the most widely reported aspect of authoritarian rule is coercion; understood as the regime’s ability to use or the capacity to attain force.

So what happens when regimes use repression and why do they use it? Repression is a tool for stability and survival but repression alone is not sufficient to understand the dynamics of a given protest. So authoritarian survival explores why there is a use of repression and when.

Josua and Edel define repression as ‘the sum of all strategies employed by the elites to contain the challenges.’ (Josua & Edel, 2014) As elites give a wider repertoire of strategies besides repression at their disposal survival strategies aim to contain challenges. Therefore, the nature of the challenges determines the choice of strategies and available options. (Josua & Edel, 2014:6) Why do some regimes choose to repress, some do not and which repressive measures are utilized, when and why depends on each case.

When the mass movement makes repression harder Bellin says that regime survival turns on the military and ‘its willingness and capacity to bring in the tanks, the heavy weapons, and the men in numbers significant enough to contain a mass uprising’ (Bellin, 2012). However, it becomes selective to shoot or not to shoot therefore it is important to investigate authoritarian survival strategies as Albrecht names ‘beyond coercion’ (Albrecht, 2005).

Bourdieu (2005) distinguishes between ‘excessive state violence’ that occurs after weak social challenges and surprising state tolerance towards formidable challenges. As he notes ‘contentious challenges may undercut modes of state power, legitimize or inspire other difficulties to which authorities cannot respond’ (Bourdieu, 2005:35). So in order to grasp the strategies to re-build hegemony one has to bear in mind the usage of selective violence and that in the protests there can be a contentious change of the use of repression with a check and balance, a learning process. The elites/authorities who have control of the state apparatus can decide that using oppression is less healthful movement.

### **1.5 Square Occupations**

Described as ‘resistance in daily life through squares’ by Bayat (2013) square occupations and encampments for days or weeks are the novel character of the movements since 2011. Previously ‘reclaim the streets’ movement beginning from 1991 occupied streets and highways, WTO protests held the streets in Seattle in 1999, Global Justice Movement and stop war coalitions occupied streets and squares even in Egypt in 2003. However, none of them stayed there for days and established collective management of occupied space and forums.

One of the main characteristics of the occupations is that it takes place in the centers of urban centers. Wallace argued that urbanness challenged authoritarian rule because:

protests in the capital are more likely to be observed by regime insiders, the masses, foreigners and is harder to disperse than multiple smaller protests in many different places that add up to the same population of protestors. (Wallace, 2013:638)

As Chenoweth and Stephan argued, the solidarity and the humor that the protestors construct helps to break the fear that authoritarian system is built up upon. '*Courage breeds courage*' as square politics provide massiveness as higher numbers of turnout promote the success of a contentious movement resulting in loyalty shifts, (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) mainly within the opponents or members of the security forces.

On the other hand, Castells (2013) names the occupiers as communities. For Castells social movements occur at a symbolic location with the formation of independent communities against the political institutions. Communities depend on unity. The invaded locations (some places of symbolic force comprise of financial institutions, parliament buildings, party headquarters and squares<sup>8</sup>) are a direct symbolic force against the rulers.

While Bowen was referring to the Midan as 'the Paris Commune was reborn 140 years later in the narrow streets around Tahrir Square' (Bowen, 2013:8) the free people's republic of Tahrir was used in various chants. He tells that the existence of demonstrators in the square made the protestors feel like they were owning the city. (Bowen, 2013) Chabot and Sharifi point out that the occupation of the Tahrir Square led to the creation of communities that worked daily on cleaning, media coverage and preparing nonviolent direct action campaigns. Primarily the Tahrir Square and other public spaces were the reflection of an alternative way of life and confronting authorities (Chabot & Sharifi, 2012).

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<sup>8</sup> Historically important invasions mark the 1871 Paris Commune, 1915 Glasgow strikes, etc.

## 1.6 Authoritarian Learning

Authoritarian survival enters a cycle which is conducted with a counter reaction to the challenge named as ‘authoritarian learning’ for authoritarian regimes to re-shape their policies. (Heydemann, 2007) According to challenges the authoritarians adapt themselves to the new conditions. Named as authoritarian learning, the adaptations become a result of ‘domestic and external resources that define any given regime’s ‘opportunity set’ (Heydemann, 2013: 65).

Stancer (2012) names the learning process as ‘adaptation’ and defines it as a political change in a state that comes along with the changes in its environment by containing power at the expense of the unity of the elites. The nature of the protests and the strength of the protesters effect response (Josua & Edel, 2014:6) but depend on the respective regime.

However, in the quest for grasping authoritarian learning in the Middle East, Heydemann categorizes some common authoritarian learning characteristics (Heydemann, 2013: 66) that are observable in the cases of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.

<b>Table 2: Heydemann’s Common Authoritarian Learning Characteristics in MENA</b>
1. Appropriating and containing civil societies
2. Managing political contestation
3. Capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms
4. Controlling new communications technologies
5. Diversifying international linkages

Source: Heydemann, 2007

Naming them as ‘hybrids’ Heydemann (2007) concludes that the Arab regimes combine repression, regulation, and co-optation, adopt NGO functions of the state to control civil society so it cannot challenge the regime.

## **1.7 The Role of Authoritarian Institutions in Regime Survival**

Prezowski and Gandhi (2007) underline the role of institutions in the context of authoritarian regimes and highlight that autocrats institutionalize through consultative councils, juntas, and political bureaus to stay in power longer (Prezowski and Gandhi, 2007).

Political institutions are considered the most durable ingredient of opportunity structures. They operate in a way that various groups within a society cannot challenge the ruling coalition. As Kriesi and Wisler indicate the mode of institutional oppression tends to narrow preferences in so the thought of any political alternative of rule is just impossible (Kriesi & Wisler, 1999: 42).

The relation of mass movement with authoritarian institutions is best defined by Josua and Edel as: 'regime characteristics influence the government from above and interact with the factors from below, namely the characteristics of the challenge that threatens stability' (Josua and Edel, 2014:3).

Stancer, (2009) points out that any consideration of the causes and the consequences of protest and political opposition require an assessment on the monopoly of the most powerful institution; state. (Stancer, 2009) This is because: 'the nature and the effectiveness of opposition are not determined primarily not by the actor's inherent characteristics, but by the state to which it is reacting' (2009:6).

Springborg alike points out that consideration of the causes of protest and political opposition require an assessment on the monopoly of power of the state. (Springborg, 2009). This is because the nature and the effectiveness of opposition are determined primarily not by the actor's inherent characteristics, but by the state to which it is reacting. As Waldner (1999) emphasizes the origins of institutions determine which elites are included and how elite consensus is reached.

On the other hand, according to Ambrosio (2014) the structural characteristics of the state, its effective rule are the key determinants of regime survival. He suggests that authoritarian survival is sustained with the capacity of the government to embed itself to

the changing dynamics. He argues that:

having inclusive institutions in place to respond to the needs and interests of societal forces creates a more stable foundation for any regime's continued rule – something just as true in autocracies as it is in a democracy (Ambrosio, 2014:484).

Apart from their capacity in learning, the usage of repression when and in which scale is directly linked to the role of authoritarian institutions as regimes depend on them to serve their security needs. (like the ones Bellin (2012) sets as the military branches, intelligence agencies, police, and a praetorian guards).

For example, the adaptations of the Assad regime in Syria were different from Egypt with its capacity and willingness to use repression or the tactics what Heydemann emphasizes as using a sectarian hard-liner rhetoric and using institutionalized repressive exclusionary habits (Heydemann, 2013: 67) because the formation of institutional actors is different. For instance, while Mubarak's departure did not mean a disengagement for the state's capacity to rule in Libya Gaddafi's departure itself meant the dissolution of the state.

Pepinsky (2008) conversely points out that political conditions rather than institutions are at the heart of authoritarian survival and that institutions are tools of durable regimes, not determinants of them (Pepinsky, 2008: 17). However, he doesn't deny their role in understanding their function in regime survival but doesn't find it necessarily sufficient.

### **1.8 Success or Failure of Social Movements**

When scores of people in the main sectors of society stop obeying and engage in prolonged acts of social, political and economic disruption they may fundamentally alter the relationship between the ruler and ruled (Chenoweth &Stephan, 2011).

However, naming this transformation as a success or failure can be deceiving due to its complex outcomes, different contexts and the demands of particular movements. Setting off from this complexity studies of social movements, revolutions, uprisings question the measuring of success as labeling victory is highly compelling. With another terminology Josua and Edel (2014) use change and continuity to explain the transformations that come with a particular social movement.



According to Jack Goldstone, there are four crucial elements that have to coincide for a revolution to succeed. They are:

...a government that seems so irreversibly unjust that it is commonly believed to be a threat to the country's future; elites, especially in the military, must feel alienated from the regime and no longer prefer to defend it; a majority of the population, including different ethnic and religious groups and socioeconomic classes, must mobilize; international powers must either constrain a government from using all possible means to defend itself or refuse to interfere and defend the government in power. (2011: 9)

However, a transfer from one elite to another may not be the determinant of success. It might lead to the dismissal of one particular group but can end up in the tyranny of the other. One backlash can be the Iranian Revolution; that was a success for some but a failure for the other.

As Giugini defines social movements compose of mixed up organizations, and aims their final destination can possess different strategies and desires (Giugini, 1999). So success or failure becomes extremely relevant. Somaia says that (2010) to calculate the latitude of a social movement whether it has been a success or a failure depends on its ability to impose its own agenda on the political regime. Therefore, what is determining to understand success or a failure of a campaign must be traced from the fact that whether there is a shift in power between the ones resisting and the opposer (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 58).

Goldstone's second point that the alienation of the elites underscores the armed forces alienation from regime for a movement to succeed can be articulated Bellin's (2004) proposal that the vastness and impact of the coercive apparatus hinder social mobilizations in the Middle East and (2004: 27) the responses of the military is a determinant fact for success. Nonetheless, as a large scaled participated movement with tactical and strategic aims can overcome the opposing forces (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:61), but the end may not be democratization.

## CHAPTER 2

### PROTEST ACTIVITY IN EGYPT

#### 2.1 Contentious Politics in Egypt

Recent history of the Middle East is littered with examples of strikes, opposition movements, bread riots setting off in the 1970s in Egypt and Jordan, military operations like the Hama Massacre in Syria in 1982, the radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1990s, the uprisings at the North of Iraq against the Baath Party in 1991 followed by more recent ones like the Syrian reform movement in 2005, Lebanon in 2009, the Green Movement in Iran in 2009. Therefore, it has always been in the center or near the land that has been unsettled for various internal and external reasons.

In such chaotic turmoil region, Egypt has never been away from street protests. Therefore, the uprising on 25th of January, too, was neither the first nor the last revolt in Egyptian history. From the start of 2000s, Tahrir Square in Cairo, considered the heart of Egypt, has been home to solidarity protests with Palestinian Intifada in 2000, anger over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the gathering of the judges in 2006 (Alexander & Bassiouny, 2014:98) and various labor movements.

What distinguishes the recent mobilization of 2011 was that it was challenging the regime for the first time with the masses united around one single aim. According to Saif, (2011) the movements portrayed collective action that came from 'bottom up' differing from various other social movements under the oppression of authoritarianism' (Saif, 2011).

In the last decade during and aftermath of the flawed elections held in 2005 and 2010, the demands of labor were crucial for mobilization and formation of new social groups

and movements. According to Hamzawy (2005), the protestors were perceived as a threat, though not significant enough as they were unable to mobilize the cogent segments of the society. As he underlines the protests in 2005 were sit-ins not marches as the police would not let the protestors pass and the crowd of protestors was not big enough to be able to break the security forces. Yet, in 2011, it was, which ushered a new era for Egypt.

### **2.1.1. From Nasser to Sadat: The Origins of 'Revolutionary Egypt.'**

Cook (2012) on the modern Egyptian regime states that:

There were moments when the regime and its defenders enjoyed tremendous popular support, but it always managed to maintain through a combination of bribery and, importantly, coercion (2012:226).

The Mubarak presidency, which was toppled down on January 25<sup>th</sup> 2011, had its origins in the coup d'état that had toppled King Farouk of Egypt and brought the Free Officers to power in 1952. Named as the Revolution of 1952, the Free Officers moved to power after the historic clash with the British forces that cost the lives of 40 soldiers leading to an unrest among Egyptians costing more lives and causing more anger. After the coup, the military announced that there would be a passage to a parliamentary system, following which is a well-known figure Mohammad Naguib was chosen as the head of state, becoming the first President of the Republic.

The parliamentary system was a target never to be reached. In 1953 while the monarchy was abolished, Naguib too resigned giving the leadership to the popular name Gamal Abdel Nasser. Despite the fact that the military intervention was conducted with the popular support of the people, the new regime was neither ready nor confident for contestation. The new administration banned political parties, even executed labor activists Mostafa Khamis and Mohammad Hasan el-Bakary responsible for factory riots against the officers (Montado, 2013). In this era when the administration was trying to build itself on durable grounds and gain trusted allies, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd were the only groups to survive the crackdown as Cook mentions (Cook, 2012).

The regime of popular support was born through the Egyptian national struggle powered by the rhetoric of independence advocating freedom from first from British

rule, then the legacies of the military take-over of 1952, Suez Crisis of 1956 and the conflict with Israel. The Nasser era, named ‘Arab Socialism’, marked a closer relation with Soviets, in some contexts focused on spending large sums of money on welfare and profiting people working on the land. (Owen and Pamuk, 1998)

Outside, the military enjoyed aids from the Soviet Union in the era, but stayed as a representative of the Non-Aligned Movement that posed a midway in the Cold War. Inside, the military regime with a statist Soviet-style planned economic programme pursued land reform policies that benefited the peasants, gave workers job security making it harder for the bosses to fire employees. (Cook, 2012: 73) It was not fond of strikes. As Kandil puts forward, the consensus of the regime was built as: ‘the regime offered free education, employment in an expanding public sector, affordable healthcare, cheap housing and other forms of social protection, in return for obedience.’ (Kandil, 2011)

The masses were in fact obedient with some ‘flaws’ that could be taken down. The regime was enjoying mass popularity but was by all means authoritarian. While political opposition was non-existent, the Emergency Law that drove from the colonial legacy was attained by the military rule primarily in 1958. The law gave the government extraordinary powers under a state of emergency, which continued to exist in the Mubarak Era).

The age of Nasser was when Egypt was perceived as the big brother of the Arab World. As contentious movements against the colonial powers were on the agenda, he became the face of the Arab cause (Cook, 2012:72). Even though the 1967 war with Israel was lost in solely six days, Nasser was still loved and respected, preserving his reputation in the Arab world.

With Nasser’s death in 1970, Sadat opened a new page in Egyptian politics. After the defeat in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the peace agreement with Israel was on the horizon. He went to a change of figures and removed the pro-Soviet sentiments in the administration and turned his face to the US and the liberalization of markets. One of the greatest changes that came with Sadat was his famous/infamous *infitah* policy.

*Intifah*, meaning opening in Arabic, had two layers: first enhanced relation with the US and the second the ‘opening’ of the economy. The policy challenging their previous privileges and social protection primarily upset the peasants that had a stake in the established system.

Lippman explains the results of Sadat’s policies as the following:

...while Sadat gained international prestige as a result of his peace treaty with Israel, he remained disliked at home. The peace treaty brought no immediate benefits to the Egyptian people, and Sadat’s liberal economic reforms caused massive discontent. His decision to make peace with Israel isolated Egypt from the other Arab countries, worsening his approval ratings throughout the region. By the time of his assassination, Sadat was viewed as a visionary abroad but reviled and alienated in Egypt (Lipman , 2016).

While with the Camp David Peace deal Egypt enjoyed recognition and support from the US, recognizing Israel meant a transformation of the role of Egypt as a regional leader creating repercussions in the Arab world like suspending Egypt from the Arab League and moving the headquarters to Tunisia. Inside, there was a castigation, too.

The structural amendments that primarily proposed the end of state subsidies on nutrition triggered the 1977 events, named as the ‘bread riots’. The anger ended leaving seventy-nine dead more than five hundred injured. The army re-established the food subsidies to contain the protests. Two years later, Sadat was assassinated by Khalid Islambouli, a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, affiliated with al-Qaeda. His death led to the creation of a new tool for the regime to oppress; the fear of Islamism (Cook, 2012).

### **2.1.2. From Mubarak Era to Present Day**

The death of Sadat paved the way for Hosni Mubarak to become the fourth president of Modern Egypt. What Mubarak did primarily was to pursue the *intifah* policy with oppression at home and conduct negotiations for loans abroad. In response to Camp David deal, the military enjoyed large amounts of aid from the US.

While Islamists were the primary group to be oppressed, all opposition parties got their share. After Sadat’s era, there was a sweeping oppression and no tolerance to Islamist and other movements with an increased securitization of the state. All publications of

the opposition groups were outlawed and religious centers were taken under the state supervision (Cook, 153:2012). The emergency law prevailed while the role of the president was strengthened.

According to Blaydes, Egypt under Mubarak was ‘a paradoxical combination of an autocratic regime and competitive elections in ‘semi-authoritarianism’. As Cook points out, Egypt as a country ‘remained largely poor, authoritarian, and dependent on a global power’ (Cook, 2012:133).

According to Holgar (2005), Mubarak’s survival was dependent on keeping the military’s privileged position as the regime could ‘never totally ignore any group or stratum of society that might come to pose a serious challenge’ (2005:384). However, the hegemonic place of the army was changing in practice as security measures were transformed giving more power to Central Security Forces and from time to time the *baltagiya* which are the infamous gangs to deal with the discontent. The military was not on the political scene but remained as a chief partner to the ruling class and an ally to the regime.

Nasser’s ‘Arab Socialism’ in some contexts had focused on spending large sums of money on welfare (Owen and Pamuk, 1999). *Intifah* was a crucial step to open Egyptian markets to the international arena and alter the foundations that modern Egypt is based on. With the implementation of the IMF plan, as Stacher (2012) points out, the transition to neoliberalism occurred through adapting authoritarian structure that the newly emerging elites would benefit from. The Mubarak regime abandoned the previous policy of providing guaranteed employment in the state sector for those with university or intermediate degrees (Owen and Şevket, 1999) which upset the middle classes and the educated youth.

In his era the elite extended to successful businessman, influential family clean heads as senior bureaucrats. While the rich got richer, the pact hit the ones that worked in the land. The subsequent clashes over land disputes left 100 farmers dead in 1997 (Blaydes, 2010). There were also occasional unrests in various cities but they were not big enough to challenge the regime. However, the consensus that was driven by the redistributive mechanisms was coming to an end.

The late 2000s was marked by the increase in food prices with the lack of any food subsidy causing more deprivation. The Egyptian economy had grown from about 4 percent in 2004 to 7 percent in 2008, but 40 percent of Egyptians live on less than \$2 a day today. Furthermore, the reduced rate in oil-producing countries of the Gulf caused the return of migrants to Egypt with no jobs and lack of satisfaction in the social status. Additionally, in 2010 food prices rose by 21 percent (Bowen, 2013) accompanied by the lack of jobs provided for the 700,000 young people that were joining Egypt's workforce every year. As Bowen noted only around 30,000 new jobs were available per year (Bowen, 6:2013). With such figures, a public unrest was inevitable.

With economic hardship, the emergency rule prevailed and allowed Mubarak to hang down rights and liberties, censorship on the media, and imprisonment of the opposition when necessary (Kraetzschmar & Cavatorta, 2010).

### **2.1.3. 2005 Elections: A Turning Point?**

In 2005, with the pressure from Western countries that the regime was cooperating with, Mubarak passed a new presidential election law that paved the way to the first multi-contested elections in Egyptian history. Named as the 2005 reforms, it was the first time that the opposition could organize and compete publicly and legally.

The 2005 Reforms occurred in a period when civil society grew not because the state retreated, but because authoritarian incumbents deployed a new tactic of control. Thus, they could reassert power and slake dissension by granting concessions too mild to produce systemic change. By calling it a calculated survival strategy Yom points out that:

Arab autocrats promoted reforms that encourage political competition and liberal opposition; but when civil discord becomes a viable threat, the state de-liberalizes, retracting its indulgence and intensifying repression until anti-regime sentiment has abided (2005:23).

However, despite promising free elections, Mubarak took steps to prevent any potential rise of opposition when it became clear that the opposition could change the balances. NDP cloistered entrance to polling sites where the opposition was strong, opened fire on voters, stuffed ballot boxes and later on arrested the candidates. Therefore, to 'correct'

the election results were one of the strategies that Mubarak used to stay in power.

Naming it as **electoral violence** Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta state that:

While including force selectively, on the other hand, the regime would further undermine the regime's legitimacy at home and built on the fear of Islamism and stability internationally. In the end, the regime opted for what it must have perceived as the lesser of two dangers to authoritarian survival, cracking down harshly on the Muslim Brotherhood, its candidates and sympathizers (Kraetzschmar & Cavatorta, 2010:330).

Apart from the fraud elections with the start of the 2000s, Egyptians began to mobilize in town squares. Yet, the 'new era' in Egyptian politics can be traced back to 2004 when the first series of demonstrations under the Kefaya (*Enough*) Movement set off. This was united with the crucial strikes of 2004 rising in 2005 in to 202, 222 in 2006 and 614 in 2007 (Naguib, 2011).

Though there were slogans for their Arab fellows, Mubarak, and the regime was not under direct target. In the 2000s social movements blossomed in Egypt. Kefaya was crucial as it gathered different opposition groups together ranging from leftist, pro-Nasser groups, Islamists, and liberals. It used the method of civil disobedience and went to the squares without taking permission from the officials. As Shehata underline the crowd protested, chanted slogans denouncing 'the president, his family, and the security establishment' (Shehata, 2010) but did not call for the end of the regime. The Intifada, Iraq War were the major events that united Egyptians to demonstrate and express themselves on public spheres focusing at their deprivations as well.

In an in-depth interview Mahmoud Makade, from Tomorrows Youth Liberal Organization stated that:

'First, there was a ritual for protesting at important dates. In the 2000s, at 9<sup>th</sup> of April 2003 when American invaded Iraq, it was the first time when Egyptian people protested against the regime. This was the first time after 1952 they started to chant against the head of government<sup>9</sup>'.

On April 6, 2008, a loose coalition of Mahalla and Kafr Al-Dawwar textile workers coordinated general strike and a national day of protest to demand a minimum wage and end to the corruption of police brutality (Ghobashy, 2012:25). When the movement

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with Mahmoud Makade. 9 March, 2015.



proved that it was durable and resistant, it was first met with repression; yet, the emerging negotiations resulted in a resolution, not as much as the workers wanted but they received a forty-five-day bonus and profit sharing (Cook, 2012:179). The concession were made because the movement was joined by thousands of people. While the workers ended up getting enhanced conditions, the crucial outcome was the birth of 6th of April movement, a solidarity campaign that encompassed different social bases and worked grassroots.

Apart from regional uneasiness the main cause of the mass discontent in Egypt was the economy. The Egyptian economy was growing from about 4 percent in 2004 to 7 percent in 2008 but more than 40 percent of Egyptians were living on less than \$2 a day. As Jack Shenker states the rich got richer in Egypt while the life in the shanty towns was dreadful with the deprivation of one of the most basic needs; water (Shenker, 2009).

In the 2000s, the businessman emerged as politicians, and figures like Mubarak's son Gamal exemplified the inequality within the country. The newly appointed rich businessman deputies like Ahmed Ezz, owner of the biggest steel company of the country was causing frustration in the public. In contrast to old Egypt born in Nasserist grounds that glorified being an Egyptian and provided jobs and lands for its people, the injustices were becoming apparent. The emergence of these new elite did not please the military, either, as the privatization process could hamper their economic privileges.

Another significant change of the Mubarak era was the growth of the internal security and intelligence. Egypt was transforming from a military state to a police one. Almost every protesting sector had experienced police brutality (Sowers & Toensing, 2012) but as Ghobashy (2012) points out none of them were able to shift the balance of resources in their benefit. This was due to the discrepancy of the opposition.

When 2005 parliamentary elections took place ending with fraud due to Mubarak's fear that he could lose the majority, there was no gathering big enough to challenge the injustice. The opposition, as fragmented as it was, was not strong enough to throw a blow to the Mubarak regime.

However, Kefaya, 6<sup>th</sup> of April and the contention at the beginning of the decade were among the first clues that showed the stronger challenge to the regime would come from the matrix of established political organizations. There were contention and organization after another rigged elections of Mubarak in 2010 parliamentary elections. In order to repudiate the legitimacy of his rule, National Association for Change formed a shadow parliament peoples' assembly with 120 representatives that included the Muslim Brotherhood (Fahmi, 2012).

Copts were under more pressure just before the uprising on November as the start of the month in Southern Egypt some Muslim groups burned down houses of Copts because 'a Muslim woman had an affair with a Christian man' while the security failed to stop the destruction from occurring. ('Egyptian Coptic Christians revolt over halted church-building', 2010). Weeks later the police with the order by the municipality stopped the construction of a church in Cairo by violent means that resulted in a death of a citizen. This was followed by the New Year Bombing at Alexandria at the Saint Mark and Pope Peter church that took the life of 34 citizens.

When the dates were ticking to 2010, the discontent had reached its final point. The killing of a young boy called Khaled Said from Alexandria in June 2010 under police custody sparked anger. In an in-depth interview Ahmed Emad Hamdy, a resident of Alexandria was saying that:

Khaled Said was someone that everyone had a sympathy too. He was one of us. He was killed when trying to reach home, and the government lied about him. They said he took drugs but later we learned that he was tortured to death. His death was one of the reasons I joined the protests.<sup>10</sup>

Khaled Said was the Bouazizi of Egypt, but his immediate death had not caused mass protests. However, the Facebook page on his memory motivated thousands of Egyptians that transformed it to one of the mobilizing forces of the 25<sup>th</sup> of January Uprising.

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<sup>10</sup> Interview with Ahmed Emad Hamdy April 30, 2015.

## **2.2. The 18 Days of Tahrir**

*Tahrir was more than a demonstration; it was the creation of a dynamic and resourceful community of citizens brought together by the shared goal of bringing true democracy to Egypt.’ (Roccu, 2013).*

The 18 days that became to be known as the Egyptian Revolution or the ‘Tahrir Commune’ were the initial social movement that led to the collapse of the Mubarak rule. The 18 days were a very live process that every second meant a defining moment for protestors that maintained their daily demonstrators and the occupation of Tahrir square for day and night, camping there for the 18 days and not giving up on the unifying demand: on Mubarak’s resignation.

Beinin points out that the January 25<sup>th</sup> uprising was a revolution. For him, it was similar to the previous examples in Egyptian historical memory like the ‘1919 Revolution’, the ‘July 23 Revolution’ or coup d’état of Nasser. He calls these events ‘revolutions’ because of their popularity driven by the political mobilization within the country (Beinin, 2013).

In the 18 days, dynamics changed daily, even by the hour so the president and the ruling coalition were forced to deliver quick responses. The clearing of the square from the police on the 30<sup>th</sup> of January and the transfer of security from the police to the army was one of the decisive moments. Every day was marked with changing dynamics and its own unique character. 25<sup>th</sup> of January was the day of rage, 28<sup>th</sup> Friday of Anger, 1<sup>st</sup> of February the million March, 4<sup>th</sup> Departure Friday, 6<sup>th</sup> Sunday of the Martyrs, 8<sup>th</sup> the Love of Egypt, 11 Departure Friday.

### **2.2.1. 25<sup>th</sup> Day of Rage**

On January 14, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia left his seat after ruling with an iron fist for 23 years. On January 18, a young Egyptian Asmaa Mahfouz from April Six Movement uploaded a video to YouTube and called out to fellow Egyptians:

‘Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire so that maybe we can have a revolution like Tunisia; maybe we can have freedom justice honor and human dignity. I, am a girl, and I am going down to Tahrir Square, and I will stand alone. We want to go down to Tahrir Square on January 25th. If you still want to live in honor, we have to go down and demand our rights, our fundamental human rights. (‘Asmaa Mahfouz & the YouTube Video that Helped Spark the Egyptian Uprising’, 2011)

She asked for fellow Egyptians to unite under the grand banner of honor to join the protests on the 25<sup>th</sup>. The meeting places were announced on the on social media pages of the April 6 and We Are All Khalid Said Movements. The police were prepared, and the goal was to disable the protesters from reaching Tahrir Square. When the day arrived, the crowd that met from one demonstration to another in Cairo thought that there was going to be the usual crew in the square, exposed to police violence as usual, yet, the protesters turned out to be mistaken as thousands and thousands marched from the Interior Ministry to Tahrir Square.<sup>11</sup>

On the other hand, in Northern Egypt, former Nasserist deputy Hamdeen Sabahi was leading another protest. In other cities in Egypt, at Tanta, Kafr al-Dawwar, Ismailia, Suez, Mahalla el Kubra, Alexandria thousands gathered for protests with popular chants among the cities: ‘Corruption caused this country’s destruction!, We are saying million times Mubarak we want you out and "Mubarak, your plane is waiting.’ (For a list of slogans day by day see: Appendix 2).

While the police fired tear gas, shot with rubber bullets, and even used live ammunition in Cairo, the protesters passed the police forces and entered the square. They were tweeting and asking for their fellow Egyptians to come to the square<sup>12</sup>. As a response to the brutal police attack, the citizens living near the square opened their homes to their fellow citizens. However, the masses occupied the square and built a small commune with tents and central coordination organs resulting in the birth of common symbols. One of the first accomplishments was to set up a local radio station. Committee of Wise Men was created with the will of the protestors in the square to push for demands.

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<sup>11</sup> Interview with Hesham Shafiq, March 20, 2015.

<sup>12</sup> Main hash tags were ‘# tahrir # jan25, # amneldawla, # elbardie (Iskander, 2011)

When nightfall came at the end of the day of rage, Twitter and the internet servers were dashed. Five people lost their lives.<sup>13</sup> The next day the Tahrir metro line was shut down. (Ghobashy, 2012) Deaths started to appear as the protestors and police confronted. Some protestors tried to burn down NDP office, but the crowd sought to maintain the square. Social media was crucial to escalate participation and share vital and updated information. People shared codes on how to pass the Internet restrictions (Iskander, 2012). Mohamed ElBaradei from National Association for Change was saying that: ‘the people have broken the barrier of fear. There is no going back.’ The contention was everywhere, while Friday was chosen for the day of anger against the regime on January 27, hundreds of relatives of the detainees’ demonstrated in front of police station chanting the slogans ‘Enough! We want our kids!’ (Ghobashy, 2012)

### **2.2.2. 28<sup>th</sup> Friday of Anger**

Friday was leading to anger and unity. On a Facebook page with more than 70,000 signatories, the demonstrators were writing to gather at more than 30 mosques and churches in Cairo and sending messages of unity like: ‘Egypt's Muslims and Christians will go out to fight against corruption, unemployment and oppression and absence of freedom’ (‘Egypt tense ahead of protests’, 2011).

Contention continued and spread to other cities gathering more people due to Friday being the holiday. Muslim Brotherhood had announced that it was joining the protests for the first time since the 25<sup>th</sup> followed by other opposition parties. The internet was shot down in the country. While trying to contain the protests, the main opposition leader El-Baradei was taken into house arrest. So was Wael Ghonim, the ‘We are all Khalid Said’ Facebook page coordinator and the head of Google in the Middle East. (later to write the book called ‘Revolution 2.0’). The wave of arrests included chief members of the Muslim Brotherhood like Abdel-Moniem Abdel-Maksoud, Essam El-Erian and Mohammed Morsi.

On that day tanks were deployed in Cairo in the main squares. With the army on the scene, Mubarak announced that he had dismissed the government. While the police

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<sup>13</sup> See: Appendix 3 for the Martyrs of the Revolution

faded away robbery and security problems spread over the city. To provide surveillance, popular committees were created, and they put checkpoints in certain neighborhoods to exercise security. The tourists and foreigners rushed to the airport ('Egypt protests: Army rules out the use of force', 2011). All around the country 664 people lost their lives in the day of anger. Egypt was on the brink.

### **2.2.3. 1<sup>st</sup> of February the million March**

On 30<sup>th</sup> of January, the state judges and even General Tantawi, head of the armed forces, joined the protests. El-Baradei was released and came to the square requesting a new constitution and a transitional government. The existence of prominent figures created the impression that Mubarak was on the edge. Shafik was ordered to form the government.

Another crucial event that happened became the symbols of the uprising was the solidarity between Muslims and Christians who formed a human shelter to protect Muslims during the prayer time to protect them from the interference (Christians protecting Muslims during their prayers in Tahrir Square, Egypt, 2011). On February 1<sup>st</sup> Mubarak appeared on national television trying to reconquer the unity that was sustained in the square and started his speech as follows:

In light of this refusal to the call for dialogue and this is a call which remains standing, I direct my speech today directly to the people, its Muslims and Christians, old and young, peasants and workers, and all Egyptian men and women in the countryside and city over the whole country ('Hosni Mubarak's speech: full text', 2011).

He promised the democratization of the regime and promotion of employment adding that he was ready for a 'national dialogue'. More importantly he stated that he would not seek another term with a peaceful transition to September elections. One of the major concessions was that there would be a reform in the presidential system that would limit his rights. While the protestors were not satisfied, the next day turned out to be a catastrophe that will be remembered as the day of the Battle of Camel. The attack of pro-Mubarak thugs, known as the *baltagiya* on horses and camels in the square left 11 dead. Some of the thugs said that they were paid by the regime to attack the protestors ('Egyptian opposition defiant over VP's warning', 2011).

Though the Egyptian military declared that they would not interfere to the protests and were on the side of the protestors, the thugs entered the square with camels causing one of the deadliest moments to occur (‘Egypt protests: Army rules out the use of force’, 2011). The military did not fire, but did not stop the gangs from killing protestors, either.

#### **2.2.4. 4th Departure Friday**

The violence with the Battle of Camel on the 4<sup>th</sup> of February did not stop thousands of people turning out to the square with children and whole families in a spirit resembling a family day out. This was followed by the support of the army with the defense minister Tantawi’s visit to Tahrir Square. Chants of ‘the army and people are united’ were shouted. Mass prayers took place in Tahrir while the internet services were being restored. Protesters erected a vast banner on a building in Tahrir Square listing their demands. (See: Table 3)

<b>Table 3: Demands of Departure Friday</b>
1. Mubarak should step down.
2. The rigged parliament should be dissolved.
3. A freely elected parliament should introduce the constitutional amendments necessary for presidential elections.
4. The immediate prosecution and referral to trial of the “murderers” of pro-democracy protestors, and of those implicated in corruption.

**Source:** ‘Egypt revolution live updates: minute by minute account of Departure Friday’, 2011

These demands became the consensus in the square. Crucial changes came with the 4th of February as four interior ministry civil servants were arrested. Shafik was negotiating with the protestors which provided them with recognition. Muslim Brotherhood’s formative tone contributed to the unity of the protests. While giving an interview to the press, Essam El-Erian from the organization was trying to ensure that they did not possess a hidden agenda as a response to the regime’s attempts to label protestors as Islamists. The scenes of Coptic Christians building a human shield for Muslims in prayers to protect them from the police attack became become a symbol of the nature of the uprising. The gains of the protestors were increasing while Mubarak was becoming

trapped. The bank accounts of Mohamed Rashid, former Minister of Industry, was frozen, and he was banned from going abroad (‘Minister of Trade Rashid Mohamed Rashid banned from leaving Egypt’, 2011).

On the same day Shafik also stated that the government was holding talks with different organizations that participated in the movement and they were close to reaching an agreement. The Committee of Wise Men<sup>14</sup>, made up of critical names from the square like respected scholars, moderate Islamists and liberals, emerged as a medium to negotiate with the government (See: Table 4). Members included George Ishaq, a liberal opposition member, previously leader of Kefaya Movement, Abdel Monem al Fotuh, head of the doctors’ syndicate and a member of the Brotherhood (after the protests he was to split away from the Brotherhood and form the Strong Egypt Party), Fahmi Howeidy, an ex-columnist for Al Ahram and Islamist thinker<sup>15</sup>, Ahmad Zuweil, a prominent Egyptian chemists, Farouk el Baz, a space scientist, Amr Moussa secretary general and former foreign minister and a representative from head of the Arab Socialist Union’s Youth Bureau, and Nabil Fahmy former Egyptian ambassador to the United States.

<b>Table 4: Demands of the Committee of Wise Man</b>
1. The protection of the life of protestors
2. The government to put an end to the attacks by thugs and hooligans;.
3. Stopping the arrest and detention of pro-democracy activists and the release of the arrested.
4. The military should assist peaceful transition of power in Egypt

**Source:** ‘Egypt revolution live updates: minute by minute account of Departure Friday’, 2011

Despite the events that was storming the country, Mubarak was trying to hold on. On the 5<sup>th</sup>, Chief of the Coptic Church Pope Shenouda III, appeared on state television in support of Mubarak, (‘Pope Shenouda III supports Mubarak’, 2011) while the grand Mufti asked the protesters end their protests by declaring the uprising as *‘haram’*<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> Cook names them as potential interlocutors between the regime and the opposition. (Cook, 2012)

<sup>15</sup> See. Ince (2011)

<sup>16</sup> Haram is an Arabic term that means forbidden.



With their untimely support for the regime, both religious leaders failed to attract the public and lost their reputation in the eye of the public.

#### **2.2.5. 11<sup>th</sup> of February Departure Friday**

More issues became public when the halt on internet was lifted causing the documentation of the events through the internet reaching thousands of people. Towards the inevitable end, the slogan ‘the army and the people one hand’ became as famous as ‘the people want to topple the regime’ or ‘*erhal*’ meaning leave. However, during the 18 days the army committed atrocities against the protestors and repeatedly asked them to go home (‘Egypt protests, Wednesday 9 February’, 2011). It took Mubarak some days to leave.

The two-day massive strikes around the country (see Appendix 4: Strikes of 8 and 9 February) pushed Mubarak to leave power as the strikes in crucial workplaces like transport halted the country. On the other hand, the week that was relatively free from police repression was like a festival centered in the middle of Cairo. Songs were sung, discussions were led, the squares were filled by people, both children and elderly, posing in front of burnt cars telling stories.

On the 9<sup>th</sup> when Mubarak insisted on staying in power, the protestors camped in front of different institutions like the Shura Council, the Parliament, the Presidential Palace pushing for their demands to be implemented. Then NDP was starting to dissolve. There was the tremendous turnout that resulted in the highest legitimacy. While Suleiman was talking about commissions to investigate crimes and prisoner amnesty, the protestors were convinced; Mubarak had to go.

The first clear moment that the army was taking over the rule was the meeting of SCAF on the 10<sup>th</sup> without the president (as the supreme commander which is the president leads the meeting), which Kandil names as the soft coup (Kandil, 2012:490). On the 11<sup>th</sup> Suleiman declared that Mubarak was gone and the generals taken over the power. Two days later SCAF dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution.

### **2.3. The Second Wave**

The second wave started with SCAF officially ruling the country. As the Crisis Group's report on the reign of the military pointed out brilliantly; the military rule was 'arrogant, reluctant to share power and was seeing itself as the only actor that possessed the experience, maturity and wisdom necessary to protect the country from domestic and external threats'. (Crisis Group, 2012) However, there were many contentious actions boiling up in the country and the military rule was left with the burden to take care of it, forcing the military to seek a civilian partner that it could trust.

#### **2.3.1. The handful stays in the square**

One of the first things that SCAF wanted to do was to clear the squares. It tried to ease it during the infamous 18 days, yet, now under their rule it was becoming unacceptable. Many left. The ones that stayed urged on a civilian-led government and the abolishing the repressive state of emergency. The ones who remained and insisted on staying in the square were keen on their rights as citizens to seek for accountability and were demanding a true democratization process in Egypt. Their language was kind and explanatory and the only method they used was staying in the squares. In a proclamation they were saying 'please publish this and photocopy to increase its usefulness' (Tahrir Documents, 2011a) about their statement banner that they were distributing in the square. However, as they were smaller in numbers they were forced to leave. (for the Demands of the Group from a sit in see: Appendix 5)

On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of March Ahmad Shafik who had been appointed by the Mubarak regime resigned. Figures like Ayman Nour head of El-Ghad (the liberal party) was declaring that the transition to be on the right track while on the other hand El Baradei (National Association for Change) was saying that 'today the old regime has finally fallen.' ('Egypt's prime minister resigns', 2011).

While the contention remained in the square on March 9, the military interfered brutally and evacuated Tahrir Square arresting 180 people. The notorious virginity tests were conducted in this period ('Egypt's army passes draft constitutional amendments', 2011). Some other public sector workers and bank employees were also protesting in Alexandria and other cities (Mc Greal, 2011). What was in quest from the military's

perspective was the immediate return to a stable order with people going to their work and no strikes or protests popping out from here to there.

### **2.3.2. First Constitutional Amendments**

Just weeks later, the military pushed the constitutional amendments to the 1971 constitution and proposed that the transition to a civilian rule would be over after the elections in 6 months. The amendments were written by a committee of eight that the military attained.

As Brotherhood was promoting the yes vote to reach parliamentary elections as soon as possible, the opposition was accusing the party for making a deal with the military ('Egypt approves constitutional changes,' 2011). The rumors of the deal were strengthened while political prisoners like Aboud al-Zomor , who was arrested in 1984 for planning to assassinate Sadat, were released. While, 6<sup>th</sup> of April Movement, Nasserist and liberal groups were proposing that it was too soon for the elections, the March referendum passed with a participation of %44 with %77 yes vote. (Tarek, 2011

<b>Table 5: Constitutional Amendments of March 2011</b>	
<b>On Presidency</b>	Four-year term in office, with a maximum of two terms for any one individual.
<b>On Presidency</b>	In order to be president ones parents cannot be dual citizens of another state; and second, the president may not be married to a non-Egyptian.
<b>On Presidency</b>	Independents would have to fulfill one of two requirements: either receiving endorsements from 30 members of parliament, or signatures from 30,000 eligible voters living in 15 governorates.
<b>Electoral Process</b>	Full judicial oversight for the entire electoral process, from voter registration to the announcement of results.
<b>Eligibility for Office</b>	The supreme constitutional court, rather than the parliament, would decide who is eligible to take office.
<b>Vice presidency</b>	The president would be required to appoint a Vice President within 60 days of taking office. If the Vice President's job becomes vacant, the president must "immediately" appoint a replacement.
<b>Constitutional Change</b>	Constitutional amendments may be proposed either by the president or the lower house of parliament, and will then be referred for a parliamentary vote and a public referendum <sup>17</sup> .
<b>State of Emergency</b>	The president can still declare a state of emergency, but the constitutional committee proposed two changes. A parliamentary majority would have to approve the declaration within seven days; and, if the president seeks to extend it beyond six months, it would be subject to a public referendum.
<b>Terrorism Law</b>	Terrorism law that proposed that "the president may refer any terror crime to any judiciary body," which allowed Mubarak to bypass civilian courts and try "terrorism suspects" in front of military or emergency courts to be abolished.

Source: Carlstorm, 2011

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<sup>17</sup> To note that changes requested by the president must have cabinet approval; changes requested by the parliament must be endorsed by at least half of the members in both houses. The revised article 189 would also require the new parliament to appoint a constitutional assembly within six months of taking office. That assembly would draft a new constitution, which would then be submitted to a public referendum. (Carlstorm 2011)

### **2.3.3. The Infamous *Feloul***

Although the protests ended, it was clear that the streets gained a legitimate status to express demands. The first action was the storming of the state security headquarters where the *feloul* had destroyed documents. ('Egypt: Protesters raid on Cairo state security HQ', 2011) On the other hand, around 2,000 police officers held protests for better wages and tried to clear the bad reputation they had. Some other public sector workers and bank employees were also protesting in Alexandria and other cities.

As demonstrators were insisting on their demands (for the demands of the April 6 Movements in April see: Appendix 6) the change was seen on the horizon. In April 1 it was decided Mubarak's name was going to be removed from public places while his sons were to be jailed for corruption and the abuse of authority. One of the demands of the uprising, a new minimum wage and 15% rise in salaries and pensions, was met in April, proving success of the mass protests.

The *feloul* was starting to be punished as Rachid Mohamed Rachid, the country's former trade and industry minister, was given 15 years, and Amr Assal, a former industrial chief, received 10 years. Ahmed Ezz was sentenced to prison with a debt of 10 million to its fellow citizens (Kirkpatrick & Afify, 2011). However, the military was holding the grip in its hand, proved by the fact that eight military officers who joined Mubarak trials demonstrations were interrogated in military courts.

### **2.3.4. A Second Revolution?**

Although the army promised a transition process, it was in fact carrying out similar policies against the opposing groups in the country. The July Riots, named as *the second uprising* against the military, mainly took place in Cairo, Suez and Alexandria with demonstrations that resembled the first wave but this time with a lower number of participants. The protests were conducted due to growing discontent with the lack of change despite the period of 6 months after the revolution. The masses who met in the square were heavily interfered by the military. Concentrated on parliamentary work and avoiding confrontation with the military, Muslim Brotherhood was criticized by the opposition groups for its non-existence and silence (Amrani, 2011).

Furthermore, the newly formed labor unions after the uprising ETIUF (*the official ETUF boycotted it*) joined the protests, too. The main demand was the persistence of a civilian government but economic demands were on the agenda as well. On July 1<sup>st</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> the reoccupation of main squares in Alexandria and Suez as well as Tahrir in Cairo took place under the leadership of the April 6 Movement with the slogan: ‘the families of the martyrs and the poor first<sup>18</sup>’ (Beinin, 2011). However by staying in the squares, the July 17 gains were firing of Egypt's antiquities, finance, industry ministers. The military which was trying to disable the passage to civilian politics was now saying that: the prime minister Sharaf was not entitled to appoint or dismiss ministers under the interim constitution. (Shackner, 2011)

In the heated atmosphere of August 2011, the Al-Ahram newspaper writer Wael Eskandar (August, 2011) made a list of unfulfilled promises which summed up the process. Among the unkept promises, the followings were eye-catching: the leaving power in six months, holding parliamentary elections in September, protecting the protestors, investigating torture<sup>19</sup>, stopping the mismanagement of military tribunals, preparing for the presidential elections would take place in 2011 and providing freedom of media.

Setting off from June, the protests grew in November as military was delaying the promises and judging civilians in military courts. On November 11, the National Association for Change issued a statement titled ‘an Army That Protects Us, Not Governs Us’ in order to push the army to hand the power to a temporary government that would possess presidential powers and focus on solely security issues until a new government is elected. Only then this new government would be responsible for cleaning the *feloul* elements off the Interior Ministry. The expectation from this interim government was to abolish rules like the ban on strikes and protest and work on the small scale solutions for the economy and unemployment. (Gaweesh, 2011)

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<sup>18</sup> For the main demands of the April 6 Movement in the *Second Wave* see: Appendix 6.

<sup>19</sup> According to Aida Seif El-Dawla, the director of El Nadeem Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture, methods include beating the feet, whipping, suspension in painful positions, solitarily confinement, sexual abuse, death threats and attacks on relatives.

### 2.3.5. Time to Leave

However, the military was not going to lead the changes that the opposition requested. The October events remained as a smutch of the military in the interim period. It became more apparent when the Copts raided the headquarters of state television to protest the sectarian sentiments of a programme. The confrontation with the military killed 28 and injured many. In the incident which was called the Masrepo Events Egyptian soldiers drove over protesters with armored vehicles and fired live ammunition into a crowd of unarmed Coptic group. From the autopsy reports it was clear that the crowd was crushed to death by vehicles.

After Masrepo, Essam Sharaf, the interim prime minister, offered his resignation to the ruling council, but it was not accepted. Hazem el-Beblawi, then the finance minister, made a statement on a private television channel saying that ‘the government failed in its main responsibility, which is to provide security, and it should at least acknowledge its failure to give this issue the effort it needed and apologize.’ (Kirkpatrick & Afify, 2011) The anger was intensifying against the army.

Between 14<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> November, the demonstrators filled the square again denouncing the army. 45 were killed protesting against military rule in street battles around Mohamad Mahmoud Street. The violence escalated on 16<sup>th</sup> December in 2011 when the demonstrations outside the cabinet office led to 17 deaths. This was followed with more arrests leaving 12,000 civilians on trials in military courts (Bush, 2012).

In November the numbers grew in the square and the Brotherhood aiming for the elections to take place was putting pressure on the military. The opposition reunited in the square and signed a document called ‘*finishing the revolution*’ declaring the army as the hindrance to progress. The 18 groups that signed the document included the revolutionary committees that were formed in the Tahrir Square and various Egyptian cities (see: Appendix 7: Let us Return to the Squares to Complete our Revolution). In the square there were puppets of Tantawi with the slogans ‘we are not leaving, but he is’ (meaning Tantawi) and ‘the people want to bring down the field marshal.’ (for slogans see: Appendix 2). SCAF was losing credibility as one protestor in the square was underlining:

We have one enemy, the military regime and its political dictatorship ... It is imperative that we bring down the ... military regime, and that there be a complete separation between the military and political activity. ('Maikel Nabil slams Egyptian military regime as the enemy', 2012)

The Bloody Football Massacre in February that caused the death of 74 people was the breaking point against the military rule. At the stadium of Port Said, during a league football match between the rival teams El Masry and El Ahly<sup>20</sup> fans (primarily started with El Masry attack) fought each other while the doors of the stadium were locked and the security forces disappeared in an odd way. Testimonies pointed out to a planned massacre due to the lack of police search and presence and used the words 'revenge' for Ahly's support and the previous conflict with the security forces. In the next four days, the streets leading to the Ministry of Interior in Cairo were blocked off by El Ahly fans who harshly confronted security forces and demanded the removal of people they accused of being Mubarak loyalists within the ministry, but little was done to heed their calls (Piazzese, 2015).

After the massacre, an opposition was uniting again under the banner *Kazeboon* meaning 'they are lying.' Around 37 groups issued a statement against the army saying that it was reproducing the old regime and dragging the country into chaos and turning the revolution into a military coup. In never ending street movement the elections came.

### **2.3.6. Parliamentary Elections**

The first free parliamentary elections of modern Egypt took place after a long delay following the first proposal to hold. A year after the uprisings the parties took place in the elections through forming blocks. The biggest of all was the Democratic Alliance for Egypt in which the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) emerged. The alliance was formed in July with the number of parties joining the alliance reaching 34. However, many parties left the alliance because of FJP's domination on candidates. (Anani, 2011)

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<sup>20</sup> Kandil (2012) defines the sports fans group of El Ahly of the Ultras as the semi-anarchist fans that has protected demonstrators against police brutality in the Egyptian Uprising.



**Table 6: Alliances at November 2011 Elections**

Name	Parties
<b>Revolution Continues Alliance</b>	The Socialist Popular Alliance Party, the Egyptian Socialist Party, the Egyptian Current Party, the Egypt Freedom Party, Equality and Development Party, the Revolution's Youth Coalition, the Egyptian Alliance Party.
<b>Islamist Bloc (Alliance for Egypt)</b>	Al-Nour Party, Al-Asala Party, Building and Development Party.
<b>Egyptian Bloc</b>	Free Egyptians Party, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and Al-Tagammu Party.
<b>Democratic Alliance for Egypt</b>	Freedom and Justice Party, Al-Karama Party, Ghad Al-Thawra Party, Labor Party, Al-Islah wal-Nahda Party, Al-Hadara Party, Al-Islah Party, Al-Geel Party, Misr Al-Arabi Al-Ishtiraki Party, Al-Ahrar Party, Al-Horiyya wal-Tanmiya Party.


**Source:** The list is gathered from Al Ahram English's series on the presidential elections.

The Islamist Alliance was made up of the Salafi al-Nour Party, the Salafi al-Asala Party and the Building and Development Party, traditional actors coming from Mubarak era. Dominated by inter-party conflicts, the Egyptian Bloc (The Egyptian Bloc, 2011) formed in August was the main central-left alliance consisting of the Free Egyptians Party<sup>21</sup>, the Social Democratic Party and al-Tagammu. Established to confront the Democratic Alliance the bloc stated that 'Islamists are welcome to join the party if they share the values specified by the bloc' ('Liberal, leftist and Sufi forces create electoral bloc in Egypt', 2011) but was divided over the naming of candidates.

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<sup>21</sup> The Free Egyptians Party was founded in April with 100,000 registered members.

2012 Parliamentary Elections- Ratio of Deputies  
 Source: Interactive: Full Egypt election results, Al Jazeera, February 1, 2012



**Figure 1:** Ratio of Deputies in 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Blocs

With an overall %54 participation, Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) took 235 seats and emerged as the winner of the elections. Freedom and Justice Party won 47% of seats in parliament while the Salafi Nour party got 25%. The Revolution Continues Alliance, the emerging secular electoral alliance in Egypt dominated by youth groups at the forefront of the protests that toppled Mubarak, attracted less than a million votes and took just seven seats<sup>22</sup> (Coleman, 2012).

### 2.3.7. Presidential Elections

Right after parliamentary elections, the process of presidential elections started and the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) entered the political scene. As the elections were not conducted under the law of political isolation, the court claimed the process unconstitutional. It argued that the rules governing candidate selection had been misapplied, giving the candidates of political parties an unfair advantage over those standing as independents (Alexander, 2014:206). So just as Morsi was elected at June 2012 the Supreme Constitutional Court had dissolved the newly elected lower chamber of the parliament.

<sup>22</sup> On a statement the group was saying ‘We are your sons and your daughters and your brothers and your relatives and neighbors we went out on January 25, to liberate Egypt from the darkness confirms his refusal to cooperate with any political forces or support candidates affiliated with the former regime, and is aimed primarily to defend the revolution.’

The presidential elections took place at two rounds first 23/24 May and the second 16 /17 June. In June 24 the victory was Mohammed Morsi's. In the elections, among the nominees an ex-Brotherhood member Fotouh was representing 'a milder Islamism' with a socialist face while Amr Moussa, the old general secretary for the Arab League, portrayed a more liberal tone. The leading figures were Mohamed Morsi of the Brotherhood, Ahmed Shafik, a senior commander, minister of Civil Aviation for 10 years under Mubarak and a short term prime minister from 29 January to March 3, 2011, who represented the old regime and Hamdeen Sabbahi the social democrat/Nasserist leader. As Şahin notes (2014) the ones in quest for an alternative rather than the Brotherhood and *'feloul'* supported Hamdeen Sabbahi.

While Sabbahi boycott the run-offs Morsi and Shafik were on the second run. Another president nominee from the Socialist Popular Alliance Party Abu-al Ezz al-Hariri had described the Islamists as a greater danger than Shafik. However, in June 2012 a coalition of opposition parties and figures agreed to support Morsi in a meeting named as the Fairmont Hotel Meeting. Figures like Wael Ghoneim, Ahmed Maher, head of April 6 Youth Movement, writer Alaa Al-Aswany and revolutionary formations like The National Front for the Protection of the Revolution joined the meeting' (Shukrallah, 2012).

<b>Table 7: Results of Presidential Elections of 2012</b>		
<b>Candidates</b>	<b>Results in the First Round (%)</b>	<b>Results in the Second Round (%)</b>
<b>Mohamed Morsi</b>	%25	%51.7
<b>Ahmed Shafik</b>	%24	%48.3
<b>Hamdeen Sabahi</b>	%21	-
<b>Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh</b>	%17	-
<b>Amr Moussa</b>	%11	-

**Source:** Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi wins Egypt's presidential race, 2012.

At the end of the meeting Maher, the leader of April 6 Movement stated that: 'the failure of the revolutionary movement to decide on one candidate left them the choice

of either backing the Brotherhood candidate or the perceived candidate of the military. We made the choice given the circumstances.’ (Shukrallah, 2012)

#### **2.4. The Morsi Era- the Third Wave**

When it was announced that the victory was Morsi’s he declared that ‘he would rule for all Egyptians’.<sup>23</sup> Not being able to have a parliament, his term started with the primary confrontation of one of the state institutions; the constitutional court. Strikes set off from the beginning of the era. Two weeks after he was sworn in, the biggest firm in textile industry known notorious for the government with contentious strikes in mid 2000s launch a strike that covered about 20.000 workers asking for rises and government help. When being rocked by a terror attack in August in the Israeli border, Egypt responded with aerial strikes on militants. The term was going to be hard.

On July 8, as a first move Morsi issued a decree calling back into session the dissolved parliament and the new parliamentary elections to take place within 60 days after the make-up of the constitution. SCC rejected Morsi’s wish to open the parliament and proposed that the president did not possess the power to re-open it. Ignoring the appeal on 10<sup>th</sup> of July, the parliament convened. The SCC responded with anger while the parliament asked Egypt's Court of Cassation to overrule the decision, which again failed (Shahine, 2012). On the 11<sup>th</sup> July in the deadlock Morsi gave up on opening the parliament as a primary step and tried to seek for partners to continue governance. Morsi made a move for the ‘revolutionaries’ by releasing 572 people detained by the Egyptian military in the 2011 protests, and reduced the sentence of 16 others from life sentence to seven years in jail. (Egypt's President Mursi pardons 'revolutionaries', 2012) The next step was swapping Tantawi with Sisi.

##### **2.4.1. Structural Changes?**

On 22 September when Egypt's Supreme Administrative Court upheld an earlier Supreme Constitutional Court ruling, which had ordered the dissolution of the lower house of Egypt's parliament, Morsi saw no other way than extreme powers to reverse the institutions that led to the constitutional declaration. He appointed a pro Brotherhood judge Mahmoud Mekki, as his vice President (Ezzat, 2012). Under the

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<sup>23</sup> For the whole speech See: Appendix 8.

name 'completing the revolution' Morsi also announced the constitutional amendments that was passed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) giving him, his office the power to conduct legislative and executive changes to finish the constitution.

After the appeal contention was on the streets. While he focused on constitutional amendments, activist groups and political parties were protesting in October, after a court acquitted all 24 people charged with involvement in the Battle of Camel. But though the protests were a once uniting element, the new ones were scattered in a pro and against Morsi camp, solidifying an opposition that was becoming more agitated. The pro-Morsi camp was thinking discontent was delaying the path to constitutional clashes. On 12 October two competing rallies occurred in Tahrir one pro and one against Morsi. As the constitutional referendum approached the process worsened. ('Egyptian 'Battle of the Camels' officials acquitted', 2012)

#### **2.4.2. November Clashes Over the Constitution**

November was marked with the contest for constitutional changes. While Article Six in the 2011 amendment was saying that no judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council or the Constituent Assembly, the new constitution gave the presidency the controversial power saying that it can take the 'necessary actions and measures to protect the country and the goals of the revolution.' (Amnesty, 2012a) Morsi was insisting on changing the constitution. He thought that the institutional problems would be solved if the constitution passed with the support of people power through referendum. The referendum passed but peace did not come. Arrests, contention and repression continued. (For events and arrests in third wave see: table 8)

As popular demonstrations turning more and more violent creating more insecurity, the military was granted the power to arrest until the constitutional process ended.

However, when the quarrel occurred between the protestors and the Muslim Brotherhood, according to the Şahin (2015) SCAF remained silent as the emerging constitution benefited the military, giving a veto over any national security or sensitive foreign policy issue. (Şahin, 2015) Blood spilled. At the total wave, 470 lost their lives.

<b>Table 8: Events and Arrests in the Third Wave</b>		
<b>Event</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Arrests</b>
<b>1. The First Syria Embassy Events</b>	July 18, 2012	25
<b>2..The Second Syria Embassy Events</b>	September 4, 2012	14
<b>3. American Embassy Events</b>	12 to 15 September, 2012	459
<b>4. Anti-Morsi Protests</b>	November 19 to 30, 2012	541
<b>5. The Constitutional Declaration Protests</b>	December 5, 2012	166
<b>6.The events of the anniversary of the revolution</b>	January 24 to February 15, 2013	479
<b>7.Contention in the Street</b>	February 26 and March 3 and March 27, 2013	179
<b>8.Corniche Events</b>	3 to 12 March 2013	303
<b>9.Moqattam clashes</b>	23 March, 2013	71
<b>10.Clashes in Cairo</b>	March-July, 2012	414

Source: Wikithawra. Accessed at March 9, 2015.

New power to arrest was not the only privilege given to the military in the new constitutional declaration. In the Morsi Era the alleged custom that a military officer had to be a minister of defense was untouched. The establishment of a 15-member National Defense Council with Article 182 that stated: ‘the SCAF shall undertake the examination of the matter pertaining to the methods of ensuring the safety and security of the country’ and the articles 193 and 197 stating the council was responsible of safeguarding the military budget and military law were the gains of military. This article was one of the major objections of activists of ‘no to military trials’ to act against the Morsi governance (Kingsley, 2013).

### **2.4.3. Failure to Form a National Dialogue**

The discontent united the 'discontenters'. Egypt's main opposition met under National Salvation Front, an alliance of political parties against Morsi to turn over the process of constitutional declaration. Once united, the uneasy deal, the promise of Morsi to fulfil the demands of the revolution had failed. If there was an ever Tahrir Coalition, it was the end.

Constitution Party, Egyptian Popular Current Nasserist Party, Free Egypt Party, National Association for Change, Egyptian Communist Party, Free Egyptians Party, New Wafd Party, Egyptian Social Democratic Party and some others joined the coalition with the Mubarak-era minister Amr Moussa. While Morsi was determined not to give in, the violent clashes occurred between the protestors and the military did not do much to contain the confrontations. The Mubarak figures were replaced with Morsi graffiti's. (Hussein & Black, 2012)

Right after the constitutional change, the confrontations continued between pro-Morsi and the revolutionaries. On the 21<sup>st</sup> of April Egypt's justice minister Ahmed Mekkyhas resigned. In Tanta, Egypt's Brotherhood governor was attacked with a shoe while Muslim Brotherhood quarters were set on fire.

### **2.4.4. Tamrood and the Downfall**

The anger led to the formation of the *Tamrood* movement (Rebel) on April 2013. As a grass roots movement which aimed to assemble 15 million signatures, the campaign started as an initiative from below. However, as Şahin mentions the cross-class alliances and endorsement of the old regime figures of the movement, the protests turned into a coalition of liberal, right-wing and pro-Mubarak groups (Şahin, 2015) later to be taken over the military. The popularity of the contention turned the military against the Brotherhood and enabled them to possess power completely again.

In Tamrood again the chances for Morsi to establish another national dialogue had been missed. Since November it had alienated every opposition party against its rule. The Brotherhood could not find an ally to fight against the coup that was about to come. It fell.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **ANALYSIS**

#### **3.1. Introduction to Analysis**

The analysis is formed in three sections. The first is to answer the question ‘who participated in the uprisings’ will be taken into consideration looking into traditional actors and new actors. The traditional actors will be the organized in groups that date back in modern Egyptian history, and the emerging ones will be taken into consideration as the ones that have led a pivotal role since 2005. As Cavatorta and Pace (2012) points out these new actors, including tribes, clans, and youth movements, have clearly been crucial in the uprisings, but traditional ones, such as the army and trade unions have also played and still play a major role. (Cavatorta & Pace, 2012)

The study fragmented the Egyptian social movement into three waves, which interacted in a way that led to authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt. While there were certain characteristics of the certain wave that was sustained through authoritarian learning at overall, there were the general structural constraints that led to the resistance of authoritarianism in Egypt. By this fact, the second section will reveal the tactics that were used in the three cycles for authoritarian survival.

Lastly, a final analysis will be given for the casual relationship between protest activity with on each cycle and for the process that encompasses the three cycles.

#### **3.2. Who Participated? The Actors of the Uprising**

What made the Egyptian Uprising a revolution was the massiveness that the protests portrayed. As the ones that participated explored hereinafter are a vast populace that is formed of organized political/social groups and ordinary citizens.



These protestors in each case, established a powerful unity in high numbers and strong commitment marching together wearing banners singing songs of solidarity and shouting slogans. (Tilly, 1999:256) Grouping is hard because as Tilly also points out ‘at various times, same people represent themselves as workers, residents, ethnics, women, citizens, gays, partisans and members of other categories that distinguish them from other parts of the population. In each case, they establish worthiness unity numbers and commitment marching together wearing banners singing songs of solidarity and shouting slogans. (Tilly, 1999:256)

According to a witness Ramy Fakhr in the Egyptian experience: ‘there were people from all walks of life: older men with their families, middle aged men and women, groups of women, muslims, Christians, rich, poor and the majority were youth’ while another witness Amr Alim was saying that ‘the Muslim Brotherhood is highly represented, but so are all political parties’ (Noshokaty, 2011). Brown (2012) added that also state employees were dominantly joining the protests.

Hellyer, (2011) on the other hand, points out that with everyone from trade unionists to ultraconservative Salafists participating in, the protest did not have a single path but the Revolutionary Youth and the Wise Man became the actors that led the conversation with the regime. As it can be seen from their statements, the traditional parties were not sure to join the protests as Tagammu Party issued a statement the day before the protests stated that it would not participate Police Day, an inappropriate date for a mass demonstration. Similarly, Wafd party was hesitant to join, like Muslim Brotherhood. In an in-depth interview Shafiq<sup>24</sup> stated that though the Muslim Brotherhood was not joining the protests it’s youth was very active from day one and seeking for alternative organizations like April 6 or the Revolutionary Youth to join the protests. The new actors lit the courage in the Egyptian Uprising.

To name the determined groups that participated as organized groups apart from the general public were: the 6 April Movement, syndicates, the Campaign in Support of Baradei, the Muslim Brotherhood Youth, the Youth Movement of the Democratic Front

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<sup>24</sup> Interview with Hesham Shafiq, March 20, 2015.

Party, the centrist Islamist group called the (Center) Party, Nasserists, Kefaya, the April 6 Youth Movement, the Popular Democratic Movement for Change, Mayehkomsh, bloggers, journalists, non-governmental organizations, Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution, Justice and Freedom group, National Association for Change Youth, Democratic Front Youth, independent trade unions, Mohammed ElBaradei's National Association for Change, the established opposition parties, the Constitutional Committee (Kandil, 2010).

Mahalla workers, Sinai Bedouins, civil servants employed by the cabinet, fans of the two biggest national soccer teams and Khalid Said's mother joined the second week (Hill, 2013). The movement also included the 'liberals' outside Mubarak's close circle and the Middle class who were deprived of their property rights and entrepreneurship due to inadequate legal system and difficulty to start their own business as it required dealing with fifty-six government agencies as explored in the work of de Soto. (Bowen, 49:2012)

In the Egyptian Uprising of 2011 the success came from the actors that were consisted of organized groups but massively the people, not a single opposition group against the regime. Named under new social movements, these movements delegitimized violence. (Durac, 2013) The diverse groups could co-exist and unite with the legitimacy that the non-violent protest sustained. This was evident from a participant Hassan Haddad's quotes that the success of 'the protests came from abolishing of all sorts of sectarian violence and harassment' (Noshokaty & Fakr, 2011). In a non-sectarian and non-violent entity, the participants could connote and form identities through and affiliations with the movement.

### **3.2.1. Traditional Actors**

Political opposition has been existing right after Sadat's death and is formed through political parties and rights based movements.

Albrecht notes:

the logic behind the toleration of opposition in Egypt is that opposition does not only figure as an opponent of the regime but – maybe at times even to a higher degree – as a potential political ally... The more heterogeneous the landscape of political opposition, the more opportunities for the regime to use one opposition camp, at least as a part-time ally, to check another. (Albrecht, 2005:390)

### **3.2.1.1. The Egyptian Military**

The Egyptian military is the world's 10th largest army with near to 468,000 soldiers. (Sayigh, 2011) The institution acquires its political power from the coup of 1952 led by the Free Officers. By overthrowing the corrupt Western-controlled monarchy, Nasser's rule of Egypt from 1956 to 1970 was marked by the entrenchment of the military's economic and political position of privilege in Egyptian society.

The Egyptian military is driven from every part of the society and is ethnically quite heterogeneous compared to the Syrian army (Heydemann, 2011 & Kandil, 2012) coming from every sector. It is an honorable job to be a part of the military and it is quite wide in Egyptian society. In an in depth interview Makade says that 'everyone has a military relative in their family, proving the role of military in society<sup>25</sup>'.

After Nasser's death, Egypt was a defeated nation, crushed by the disastrous result of the 1967 war and poor economic planning. The peace treaty with Israel helped the military consolidate power. Since then it has achieved most of its privileges through the annually aid that US provides. For the power of the military Cambanis (2010) says that:

The military has built a highway from Cairo to the Red Sea; manufactures stoves and refrigerators for export; it even produces olive oil and bottled spring water. When riots broke out during bread shortages in March 2008, the army stepped in and distributed bread from its own bakeries, burnishing its reputation as Egypt's least corrupt and most efficient state institution. (Cambanis, 2010 September 11)

As the founding elite, the military plays an outstanding role in the organization of the center of power in Egypt. From the start of the uprising again driving from this legitimacy it portrayed itself as the guarantor of the regime. This was accepted by the

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<sup>25</sup> Interview with Mahmoud Makade. 9 March, 2015.

public, as it was visible in the chants of the first wave ‘army and people hand to hand’ and the Committee of Wise Men’s quest to lead the negotiations with military rather than Mubarak or his government.

Bellin (2012) sees the army as a separate apparatus and points out that it takes its position through the persistent negotiations that it conducts with the higher authoritarian structure. The point where Heydemann (2012) and Bellin meet is that the sectarian or the minority connection lowers the autonomy of the army. Consequently, this places the army into an organic part of the authoritarian structure. In the case of the Egyptian officers, it turns into a privilege as they are quite heterogeneous compared to the Syrian army, for recruitment patterns were informed primarily by meritocratic factors in which recruits were targeted from across the entire country.

On the other hand, the Egyptian army posed an economic empire which sees as a means to generate a patronage network to buy the loyalty of the officer corps. During the transition period, one of the red lines that the army made clear was that their economic empire is not under discussion in any political system and the constitutional changes protected the confidentiality of the financial accounts of the army establishment. As Sullivan proposes it possess an ownership that is worth 20-30 billion dollars. (Sullivan, 2011) However exact numbers are not known as it has always ignored calls in parliament for budget transparency. While Demmelhuber (2011) added that military was involved in the real estate sector, the production of household appliances or subsidized bread, according to his estimates, military's business activities made up 20 per cent of the country's annual economic output (Demmelhuber, 2011).

#### **3.2.1.2. Copts**

Deriving from the Greek word ‘Aigyos’ meaning Egyptians, Copts are one of the oldest groups in Egypt making up the 10% of the population as the biggest minority (Buchanan, 2015) though numbers are not official. As Pennington informed:

... before the reign of Viceroy Muhammad Ali<sup>26</sup> Egyptian Copts were subjected under Islamic citizenship law, which treated them as “Peoples of the Book” that entitled them to state protection but prohibited them from participating in politics, civil service, and the military. They were also obliged to pay special tax imposed on religious minorities (*jizya*) and were subjected to periodic discrimination and persecution from state authorities. (Pennington 1982: 158).

The status of the Copts improved under Muhammad Ali’s regime, which incorporated Copts and other European Christians to his agency. (Vatikiotis 1991: 63-64) Their status as a protected minority was further strengthened by the Hatti Humayun Decree of 1856, which declared that the Egyptian state would move to ‘legislate equality among people, revoking any sort of discrimination based upon ethnicity, race, or religion.’ (Makari 2007: 49)

The decree guaranteed freedom of religion for Copts, abolished the *jizya* tax that they were required to pay as a religious minority, and cancelled many of the restrictions against non-Muslims under the Islamic rules, such as prohibitions from government service and the military. (Scott 2010: 37) As Pennington notes by the end of the 19th century, approximately 45 percent of all Egyptian civil servants were Copts. (Pennington 1982: 160) They were widely represented both within the civil service and the parliament, as wealthy Coptic families used their financial and political connections to ensure that Copts were represented in Egypt’s National Assembly. (Pennington 1982: 164)

Albrecht proposes that (2005) while ‘the millet partnership’ helped to protect the Copts, their privileges were weakened significantly after the 1952 coup during the Nasser’s reign, as they were no longer having representation both within the National Assembly and civil service, making them more dependent on the regime instead of being self-reliant.

The church in the Nasser era was set with a political role in the 50s and 60s. As Soliman (2013) emphasizes while Islamization eroded secular spaces, the increasing number of Copts would only feel secure and welcome in their own religious space.

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<sup>26</sup> The Ottoman Wali (ruled between 1805-1848) that later declared himself the ruler of Egypt and Sudan, carrying military and economic reforms. (Lewis, 1997)

Marginalizing Copts had been a strategy of the previous regime as they faced institutional discrimination like losing religious courts, delaying church constructions and confiscating land and church properties. Even though the army has been seen as the guarantor of religious freedom in Egypt, the Free Officers did not have any Christian members in rank.

In the Tahrir uprising, the head of the Coptic church Pope Shenouda III told the Christian Egyptians not to join the protest against Hosni Mubarak. But as Makade says:

The pope was really popular and they really liked him, but the Christian youth kept sharing videos on Internet that meant ‘we respect the pope we got his orders but we are Egyptian and we have the right of revolution and be against Hosni Mubarak.’<sup>27</sup>

However, the process that followed the uprising shifted the argument. Tadros (2014) was saying that ‘Egypt is not Tahrir Square’ and just in the 100 days there were: ‘an army raids on a monastery, the arson of churches in Rafah, Sol, Atfih, Dayr Mawas, and Imbaba, the looting and burning of property belonging to Copts in the villages of Badraman and Abu Qurqas, the assault on Christians in al-Qamadir’.

The Amnesty Report in 2013 (Amnesty International ,2013) stated that there was pattern of discrimination against internal security forces for failing to protect Christian churches, schools, and charity buildings from an angry mob in the wake of the dispersal of two pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo. While the report underlined that there were minimum 15 attacks against Copts in the Mubarak era, the post transition period experienced worse. While Masrepo left 17 dead, Egyptian press reports showed that the number of sectarian attacks rose from 45 in 2010 to 70 in 2011, the year of the revolution that toppled Hosni Mubarak, to 112 in 2012. In 2013, Coptic Christian activists reported at least four attacks on Churches or affiliated buildings in addition to Wasta, taking place in the Governorates of Aswan, Beni Suef, Cairo, and Fayoum (Amnesty, 2013).

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<sup>27</sup> Interview with Mahmoud Makade. 9 March, 2015.

### 3.2.1.3. Workers Movement

*If the youth in Cairo and Alexandria are connecting with Mahalla, then the government knows it is in trouble<sup>28</sup> (Shackner, 2011).*

Since 2000s and in the uprising, going on strike has been an important tool for disabling the flow of capital, disturbing the daily routine, effecting agenda making.<sup>29</sup> Bein in was pointing out to the fact though there was no nationally recognized leadership of the workers movement, they were mobilized quickly and played a crucial role in the fall of Mubarak. The strikes of February 8<sup>th</sup> (for the strikes of 8-9 February see: Appendix 4), to February 9<sup>th</sup> contributed to his fall (Maher, 2011, Alexander, 2011, Alexander & Bassiouny, 2014, Bein in, 2012, El-Hamalawy 2011).

Prior to the protests the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) which was formed in 1957 was the only trade union federation in Egypt until 30 January 2011. According to Alexander, ETUF ran in a Soviet-style manner, obedient to the Nasserist state (Alexander & Bassiouny, 2014:153) and as a traditional actor of the Egyptian state it claimed monopoly over the workers by blaming them for receiving illegal foreign funding.

As Alexander pointed out, the isolated explosions of anger turned into a collective one in 2011. The workers movement was succesful at disorganizing, confusing the regime by paralyzing one of its key organs of popular political control, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation. (Alexander & Bassiouny, 2014:99) Workers organized and published common statements (Revolutionary Socialists, 2011) that led to the formation of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), at Tahrir Square on January 30<sup>th</sup>, 2011. After EFITU, 2011 experienced the emergence of hundreds of new, independent enterprise-level unions becoming a crucial gain after the uprising. Bein in argues that independent trade unions remain the strongest nationally organized force confronting the autocratic tendencies of the old order (Bein in, 2013).

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<sup>28</sup> Mahalla signifies the working class city which was famous for the 2008 strike that led to the formation of the April 6 Movement

<sup>29</sup> Alexander proposes that the overall size of the Egyptian working class cannot be estimated with the data collected by the ILO or the Egyptian state statistics authority CAMPAS (Alexander& Bassiouny, 2014: 61-62).

Workers gained experience of temporary direct democratic control over the workplace itself, and in a much wider layer of workplaces (Alexander, 2012:200). The total number of collective labor actions in 2011 was 1,400 reaching to 1,969 in 2012 and 2.400 in the first quarter of 2013 alone (Beinin, 2013). The social and economic protests were the main factors that led to the fall of Morsi.

#### **3.2.1.4. Muslim Brotherhood**

Gerges (2015) defines the Muslim Brotherhood as ‘a reactionary, ultra-conservative social movement that joined the uprisings belatedly and tried to utilize them in order to consolidate its power in Egypt and other places. (Kirkpatrick, 2015) The Muslim Brotherhood was the most mobilized group that participated in the January Uprising. Officially banned in 1954, despite the waves of repression, it grew among many layers of the population, underwent ideological transformation as Egypt returned to multi-party elections under the eras of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. As Shafik explained: ‘Sadat’s relationship with Muslim Brotherhood was marked with diversion.

While staying underground and taking place in parliamentary processes in the 2000s, the group took place in the uprising three days (though individuals and especially youth groups inside the movement participated) after it set off and was the leading actor to take place in the parliamentary and presidential elections. Similar to the Justice and Development Party in Turkey (JDP), the MB founded the FJP after the uprising. The party included Rafiq Habib, a Copt who was a consultant for former Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef as well as nearly 1,000 female co-founders (Al-Anani,2011).

The FJP, turned Muslim Brotherhood into the best organized and most influential organization in the country as National Democratic Party was out of the race. While like the JDP in Turkey, the Morsi presidency tried to lead mega projects to boost economic growth, strikes, restraints and pressure halted them in his short governance.

#### **3.2.2. The Emergence of New Actors**

The ‘new era’ in Egyptian politics can be traced back to 2004 when the first series of demonstrations under the Kefeya Movement set off. Egypt then and in the uprisings has



been a highly mobilized country. As pointed in chapter two, the square gatherings of 2000s contributed to the establishment of these new actors. Especially the youth movements that Lynch calls ‘self-aware and self-identified’ actors have become a novel category for political analysis. (Lynch 2012:24)

Social media was one of the places that the protestors mobilized. The internet emerged as a tool that contributed to mobilization. Social media websites like Twitter and Facebook were used as alternative communication tools. While street protests were dangerous for individuals under authoritarian rule, social media created ‘safer zone’ and forums for discussion. The new media led to the creation of more autonomous actors. The three important movements that changed the direction of the course of events in the last decade were the 6<sup>th</sup> of April Movement, ‘We are all Khalid Said’ and Kefaya.

Formed by Wael Ghonim, and Rahman Mansour ‘We are all Khalid Said’ was a justice campaign launched on the social media platform Facebook<sup>30</sup> for Khaled Said, a 28 year old young boy from Alexandria that was tortured to death by the police in 2010. The campaign was one of the most active organizations in the 2011 uprising and the page was a forum for mobilization and discussion.

The 6<sup>th</sup> of April was a solidarity movement that encompassed different social bases and worked grassroots was born on the 6<sup>th</sup> of April after a general strike at Mahalla and Kafr Al-Dawwar textile. As Shafiq<sup>31</sup> said; though the movement was born in 2008, it extended from the unnamed movement against the occupation in Iraq as well as the Palestinian intifada prior to that. The movement was effective as an intermediate between the workers and the activists.

Kefaya, known also as Egyptian Movement for Change, was a crucial actor in Egyptian politics that has pushed for reforms since 2004. The Movement was founded in November with 300 intellectuals from different ideological backgrounds (Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2010) in order to pursue a steady strategy in the 2005 elections.

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<sup>30</sup> The Facebook Page of ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ has been a crucial mobilizing tool in the 25<sup>th</sup> of January. The page can be accessed <https://www.facebook.com/elshaheed.co.uk/>

<sup>31</sup> Interview with Hesham Shafiq, March 20, 2015.

After the fraud elections the movement focused on specific goals like rejecting the possible succession of Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal Mubarak and fighting against corruption and emergency law. It was a well-coordinated movement as it can be seen in its capacity of holding anti-regime demonstrations at the same time in fourteen cities at Egypt in 2005. (Hamzawy, 2005)

The group had the formal representative base as well as an ability to incorporate the youth by organizing sit-ins in the square. While they were taken into custody from time to time they were consistent on rights and freedoms and one demand: democratization and the enlargement of rights.

The 6<sup>th</sup> of April like Kefaya and We are all Khalid Said used online networking tools to gain support while on the other other hand, organizers of the the 6<sup>th</sup> of April urged followers to demonstrate their support for the workers by wearing black, staying at home, and boycotting products on the day of the strike. Their methods and previous activism was transferred to Tahir Square in 2011, though this time with unprecedented numbers.

### **3.3. Analysis of the First Wave**

In the first wave protesters effectively outnumbered the central security forces by physically defeating them in street battles over four days. Apart from outnumbering they ended the equilibrium that favored authoritarian rule by gaining popular legitimacy. What made the Egyptian Uprising not an ordinary protest but a '*revolution*' was the massiveness that the protests portrayed.

Then the military came to the scene on January 28<sup>th</sup> and chose not to shoot. However, it was always supervising the square and asking the protestors to terminate the uprising. Calculating the weight of the protests, the institution inserted itself into the central position and altered the ruling coalition (Stacher, 2012:84). When Sharp's list (2012) for the threats to dictatorship interpreted at the Egyptian case concluded that the fulfillment of the four points (See: Table 9) resulted in the removal of the dictator.

<b>Table 9: Sharp's Checklist</b>	
<b>Reasons for Dictatorial Fall</b>	<b>Egyptian Examples</b>
1. Cooperation of different groups	The uprising became a 'people's movement' that gathered the participation of different social bases.
2. The requirements of past policies clashing with conflicting policies	Privatization policies, lack of infrastructural, restraints of freedom of speech, fraud elections ended the social contract united the opposition.
3. Internal institutional conflicts	NDP members and ministers resigned. The military decided to sacrifice Mubarak.
4. The explosion of regional, class, cultural or national differences	Christians protected Muslims on Friday prayers. Popular chants included 'Muslim, Christian hand to hand.' A superior Egyptian identity created with the legitimacy of Tahrir.

Source: Sharp, 2012

### 3.3.1. Protestor's Gains

Sharp's list of non-violent protest characteristics were enforced with group representations (the Revolutionary Youth), prayer and worship giving protests legitimacy (Friday prayers in the square), songs (voices of the revolution), honouring the dead (martyrs of the revolution<sup>32</sup>), public assemblies, civil disobedience (disobeying curfews), civil resistance, online activism (efficient use of social media networks), riots, strike and the occupation of urban places in the 18 days that led to Mubarak's fall.

Unity was the determinant reason for the success of the 2011 protests. Many layers of the Egyptian society were at the square from women to workers, civil servants to the unemployed. Neither the groups that propelled the revolution, nor the civil society players, nor the Islamic movement can credibly claim sole ownership or leadership of the uprising.

This was reflected through a participants' observation. Amr Alim, who joined the

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<sup>32</sup> See Appendix 2 for Martyrs of the Revolution.

protests said that the Muslim Brotherhood was highly present with other political parties' (Noshokaty, 2011) but pointing that the slogans (See Appendix 2: Chants of the Egyptian Uprising) under justice, equality and freedom were more dominant in the square rather than the ideologies of particular groups. As Alim underlined, under each slogan there was a list of popular demands (England, 2011).

The success of the protests came with the insistence of protestors not to leave the square and to occupy urban places. The longer they refused to leave the *meidan*, the more they grew in numbers and stopped being intimidated (Stancer, 2012:296). The main strategies of the regime such as hiring thugs, chaos scenarios, shutting down the means of communication was blocked through physical unity in a certain location that enhanced the component of unity. In the squares protestors used non-violent strategies like public speeches (forums in Tahrir square), declarations by organizations and institutions (doctors, textile workers, judges), and signed public statements.

'Bringing down the Hobbesian thesis' which created the means to provide security was one of the reasons why the movement succeeded. Life was not nasty, brutal or short in the squares. The country was not dragged into chaos. The disappearance of the police after mass participation and street clashes with the security forces was the primary gain of the popular movement. The protestors founded their own security forces called 'popular committees', to assure safety of their surroundings. Even though there was an absence of the security forces as Tadros (2012) noted there were no attack on religious sites and on the Copts in the eighteen days. This dynamic was not sustained during the other waves.

Using communication efficiently, especially with social media, was a crucial dynamic of the uprising. As Lynch points out the documentation of violence created a forced knowledge of the atrocities into the public sphere, making it impossible to deny their reality (Lynch, 2012:173). However, the communication did not take place solely with the social media. From the first day of the uprising popular communities again used a variety of tools ranging from slogans, caricatures and symbols, banners, posters and radio stations to journals that created popularity for the movement. The documentation of facts ended with an apology from an institution, the state newspaper Al-Ahram.

The ability of the movement to attract popular figures both raised legitimacy and sent messages to the regime. The participation of Essam Sharaf -signifying the government as he was the the Minister of Transport in Nazif government 2004-, Tantawi the head of army, famous public figures, Al-Baradei and celebrities like the Egyptian film star Omar Sharif as internationally known figures gave more legitimacy to the square.

The legitimacy was further enhanced by one determinant factor; strikes. The Egyptian uprising had the effect of a general strike. While the country was almost shut down in the 18 days, starting from the tourism which makes up 5% of the Egyptian economy, there were many hindrances to cash flow. The protestors put such an economic burden so that a resolution had to be reached. As it had reached 300.000 workers in less than two days (Alexander, 2012) the strikes of 8-9 February were crucial for Mubarak's fall. The strike by the public transport authority workers was particularly important to halt the daily routine of the public.<sup>33</sup>

Staying peaceful<sup>34</sup>, was a uniting element. Roberts (2016) was underlining that the non-violent aspect of the uprisings brought participation as well as international support and helped to the loss of legitimacy in authoritarian contexts. The calls to listen to the protestors from the US, Turkey and Europe came from this outlook. The turnout to the protest multiplied day by day. The repression from the regime did not discourage the protesters, on the contrary, strengthened their resolve. Protestors went to the locations that represented the regime with different tactics, not always with marching but conquering the location by outnumbering security forces.

Lastly, the military's choice: 'not to shoot' that Bellin (2012) describes as the crucial point for a social movement led to Mubarak's fall in 2011.

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<sup>33</sup> The strike by the public transport Authority workers was particularly important in this respect because Public Transport activists went to Tahrir and distributed a statement announcing their decision to strike on 9 February.

<sup>34</sup> By naming at '*Staying Peaceful*' the research approaches the 18 days as a non-violent popular movement. For the characteristics of a non-violent movement see the strategies of Sharp (2012) at Appendix 1: List of Non-Violent Tactics by Sharp.

<b>Table 10: Factors that led to Mubarak's Fall</b>
1- <b>Unity</b>
2- <b>Non-Violent Protest</b>
3- <b>Occupation of Urban Places</b>
4- <b>The ability to provide security</b>
5- <b>The efficient use of communication tools</b>
6- <b>The participation of popular figures</b>
7- <b>Strikes</b>
8- The military's choice: 'not to shoot'

### **3.3.2. Regime Tactics**

Repression was one of the main tools that the regime used (Bassiouni, 2016) which included arrest, torture, use of tear gas, deporting foreign journalists, sexual harassment and at the end killing. The resounding success of the first wave of protests was met with extreme brutality by the Ministry of the Interior using their strong arm the Central Security Force (CSF) with the thugs that were apparent on the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of February, but the tactic backfired as the protestors insisted on staying in central locations, in front of government buildings and suppress the attackers, catching and revealing their relationship with the regime.

Killing the protestors was a tactic to criminalize the movement. In the 18 days, 1075 died at 25 provinces, of whom 1022 were civilians, 49 were policeman, 4 soldiers, 1 journalist, 5 volunteers. Of the people that lost their lives 23 were woman, 108 were under 18, 92 were highschool and university students. (For a detailed account of deaths: Appendix 3: Martyrs of the Revolution) This strategy backfired, too, as the dead became the martyrs of the revolution and one of the pillars in the quest to confront the regime atrocities.

In order for people to end protest activity, curfews were declared at Port Said, Suez, Alexandria, Dametta, Luxor, Suez, Mahalla, Mensyra. This was a dud tactic as the massiveness of the movement de facto lifted the order.

However, disabling the means of communication was where the regime was ridiculed. On the third day of the uprisings in order to disable protestors from gathering, the regime shut down internet services in the country along with Twitter and Facebook. This repression was taken down with vendors and text messaging systems that replaced the internet and more people joining the protests.

Concessions with official public speeches happened gradually over the course of 18 days. Mubarak gave three speeches one on 28<sup>th</sup> of January, the others on February 1<sup>st</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>.

In his first speech Mubarak promised reforms saying that he respected the legitimate concerns of the people but would not tolerate chaos in the streets, adding that "to the point of exhaustion" he was devoted to his country and would "defend freedom and stability." He pledged more democracy, stability and jobs, saying that he was willing to engage in a "national dialogue." Then he fired his cabinet. ('Mubarak fires cabinet', 2011) However, as the regime had lost its legitimacy the opposition did not see it as a partner to negotiate with. They chose the army instead. While Mubarak addressed the nation again two times with more concessions and delivering rights, he promised not to run again and that elections would take place by the end of the year. On the 10<sup>th</sup> while he was insisting that he would stay, the next day he was toppled down.

Provoking the fear of instability and the fear of Islamists taking over was an authoritarian survival tactic from the beginning. On 9<sup>th</sup> February Egypt's Vice President Omar Suleiman made a statement that the government will not tolerate civil disobedience saying that the only option is 'dialogue or coup', while on the other hand the editor-in-chief of a pro-government paper; Osama Saraya, who attended Suleiman's meeting said that he did not mean only a military coup but also a possible takeover by state institutions or Islamist groups ('Egyptian opposition defiant over VP's warning', 2011). Al-Ahram, the biggest state newspaper used headlines like 'the Final Opportunity: Stability or Chaos' 'Danger of Division.' (Trager, 2011)

Opening the doors of prison as an international strategy for regimes to hold on to power occurred during these 18 days when Abood El-Zomor who was the organizer of Anwar Sadat's assassination was released with other convicts from Gamaa El-Islamiya (Ghoraba, 2013). By this means the government tried to negotiate with the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood did not give in. At the same time, the military during the 18 days continued to tell the protestors 'to go home' as a motto of being a 'True Egyptian' acting for the state as continuous protests harmed the country. If the protestors had fallen for this trap maybe Mubarak would not have been toppled.

While Mubarak was announcing that he dismissed the government the *baltagiya* attacked the square. Reversing his words with behavior, this tactic did not work on the protestors. Then the first concession followed was the cabinet shuffle by firing the 'neo-liberal' team. The 5<sup>th</sup> of February marked massive resignations from the NDP including Gemal Mubarak. The internal cohesion of the regime was broken and the next step had to come: 'Sacrificing Mubarak'.

As the contentious protests did not stop, the military made the February 10<sup>th</sup> intervention as the final step of the tactic: sacrificing Mubarak for the sustaining the regime (Kandil, Ottoway, Neguip, 2011 and Lynch, 2013). This tactic was the one that worked as the cohesion between the military elites and Mubarak had come to an end. In a restrained relation, the army saw this opportunity to grasp power. For Hashim it was 'the military's reluctance to save the regime from a people's revolution was the prime factor in the regime's relatively quick downfall' (Hashim, 2011).



**Table 11: Authoritarian Survival Strategies in the First Wave**

<b>1. Repression</b>
<b>2. Curfews</b>
<b>3. Disabling Means of Communication</b>
<b>4. Opening the doors of prison</b>
<b>5. Concessions with Official Public Speeches</b>
<b>6. Changing the Cabinet</b>
<b>7. Sacrificing Mubarak</b>

### **3.4. Analysis of the Second Wave**

In the second wave, the army implemented repression measures to terminate the occupation movements based on certain demands that were vivid continuously. However, one characteristic of the wave was the first free elections of Egyptian history but as Kandil puts it: ‘Egyptians voted decisively for the revolution—yet, alas, their votes were scattered among the five revolutionary nominees, thus failing to carry any of them to the second round.’ (Kandil, 2012:520)

<b>Table 12: Events and Results in the Second Wave</b>		
<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Result</b>
<b>25 February 2011</b>	The Protests for the Resignation of Shafik	The army uses force for the first time against the protestors. (though issues apology the day after)
<b>9 March 2011</b>	The Protests for the Resignation of Shafik	Brutal intervention by the military. Arrests, virginity tests conducted to woman.
<b>15 May 2011</b>	Sit-in for Civillian Rule and Justice	Military officers join the sit in are brutally taken into custody. Clashes lead to the death of Ali Maher (17).
<b>28 June 2011</b>	Sit-ins of the Family of the Martyrs Demanding Justice	Brutal intervention by the military. Hundreds injured and arrested.
<b>23 July 2011</b>	The March to Passage to Civilian Rule and Justice	Police controlled thugs interfere, causes the death of Mohamed Mohsen. (23)
<b>1 August 2011</b>	First Day of Ramadan Intervention	The ones that insisted to stay in the square until their demands were made are arrested and sent to military trials.
<b>9 October 2011</b>	Masrepo Events	Peaceful Coptic Protest at the state television building attacked by the army leading to 28 deaths.
<b>19 November 2011</b>	Sit-in for Completing the Revolution	5 day confrontation of protestors and the military ends in the death of 90. Many cases of loss of eyesight.
<b>16 December 2011</b>	Sit-in in front of Government Headquarters for protesting the newly elected Ganzoury	Confrontation of the military ends in the death of 15.
<b>29 December 2011</b>	NGO Crackdown	Trials against NGO's for receiving foreign funds
<b>1 February 2011</b>	Port Said Massacre	74 football fans die due to stadium riot. Military ruled blamed by opposition groups.

Source: Freedom House Country Report (2012).

Guaranteeing structural superiority to the military, the constitutional amendments in March 2011 gave legitimacy for the army to conduct the transition. SCAF's declaration limited the power and the number of presidential terms in Egypt and called for general

referendum. This closed the way for a true transformation and as they rushed to a parliamentary election based on a faulty electoral law, the elections had to be canceled.

The interim changes were used to postpone structural changes and the work on a new constitution. One of the main strategies that the military used was to judge civilians at military courts, even arresting bloggers who were perceived as a challenge to the regime. The military sent 12,000 people to military trials in the transition process (Alexander, 2012:36).

Taking the Brotherhood as an ally, the first government formed after the uprising included figures associated with the opposition. While the military needed a civilian partner to conduct the interim process and safeguard its dominant role in the institutional power triangle, the emerging revolutionary seemed destabilizing and 'too curious'. As Kandil put: a traditional actor that can assure their privileged position the Brotherhood, who was the most organized opposition group in the country, seemed like a good ally (Dazey, 2013).

After taking Brotherhood to their side and disabling them from joining the street movement, **selective repression** was used to the protestors. This started with clearing off the squares and the confrontations with the protestors that tried to push the military for change in April, July, and November. One of the dividing points was the Maspero demonstration in October 2011 when Copts protested the demolition of a church near Aswan, which left 28 killed and 212 injured.

Between 19-14 November 2011, 45 were killed protesting against military rule in street battles around Mohamed Mahmoud, and on 16 December 2011, demonstrations outside the cabinet office led to 17 deaths. The Port Said massacre that was directed to the Ultras was one of the biggest examples of selective repression in the interim period. When existing laws stood in its way, the SCAF decided to change the rules to its advantage by outlawing protests with law against sit-ins. This power came from another institutional partner; the constitutional court. The repression was strengthened with the re-establishment of Emergency Law after the storming of the Israeli, and Saudi embassies, which was used as a means to re-start the emergency law.

Sexual assault against female protestors, on the other hand, was one of the crucial strategies to marginalize woman protesters and stop them from engaging in political activity. While even Hillary Clinton was addressing the military rulers to end this maltreatment, the military was stripping females in front of their male counterparts (Alexander, 2014:139) a tactic used by many authoritarian settings like the 1980 coup in Turkey. Military officials made statements to further polarize the society regarding these girls such as that they were *'not like your daughter or mine'* to justify virginity tests (Amin, 2011).

However, after being exposed to such treatments the struggles created figures like Samira Ibrahim, who went public and empowered other protestors. In an interview Shahira (2011) underlined while it was pointed out that the military was working in their favor so that they would not be raped, the institution was responsible of 'beating, giving electric shocks, strip-searching, and threats of prostitution charges' (Watson & Fahmy, 2011).

Storming NGO's was another tactic to silence and scare off opposition groups and create division by labeling the NGO's as foreigners and possessing a hidden agenda for interfering in internal affairs of Egypt. On December 29<sup>th</sup> the military raided into 17 foreign NGO's offices, arrested members including foreigners accusing of them causing unrest and protest in the country with espionage. In addition to the NGOs, SCAF accused the the July sit-of being funded by foreign powers trained to cause havoc within the country (Alexander, 2014:36).

While SCAF used these strategies to hold on to power, it could not escape the wave of protests that derived from the persistence of authoritarian rule in the aftermath of the uprising. The images in April reminded the good old days of Tahrir, fresh with thousands demanding Mubarak's (then Tantawi's) punishment and a transition to civil forces while the November Riots were uniting the opposition once again. By this means in order to contain street protests the parliamentary elections were pushed as an exit strategy followed by the presidential ones.

**Table 13: Authoritarian Survival Strategies in the Second Wave**

<b>1. Selective Repression</b>
<b>2. Judging Civilians at Military Courts</b>
<b>3. Taking Brotherhood as an Ally</b>
<b>4. Re-emergence of the Emergency Law</b>
<b>5. Storming NGOs</b>
<b>6. Law Against Sit-ins</b>
<b>7. Pushing Parliamentary Elections as an Exit</b>

### **3.5. Analysis of the Third Wave**

Apart from the demands of the uprisings, the divides dominated the third cycle that led the coup. Not only the structures from the institutions but also pressure from below led to Morsi's fall (Kingsley, 2011).

Primarily, Morsi failed to be a president of the 'Egyptian Revolution'. Though he declared some amnesties for the January 25 youth, he enhanced the position of SCAF. He safeguarded its privileges even when Tantawi was taken from rule, by bestowing him with honor. This was strengthened in the November 2012 constitutional declarations that caused a huge divide over the power of the president. In reality what the constitutional declaration did was to push the military while giving it legal protection and immunity (Khawaga, 2012) that disabled the quest for justice after the uprising. On the other hand, Morsi refused to take on the Ministry of Interior. Instead, he appointed Ahmad Gamal Eddin, the former minister of interior as chief of the Assiut Security Directorate (Hamilton, 2013).

The Brotherhood fell into the trap that the military dug. Rather than implementing policies of progressive taxation, or confront the military's economic empire, the Brotherhood looked to negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for a way out. The escalating fiscal crisis was a blow to Morsi's popularity.

Since coming to power in mid-2012, the Brotherhood was the strongest force in the parliament and with Morsi's victory of the presidency. However, it never possessed the real capacity to rule. Just as Morsi came to power, the parliament was declared unconstitutional. As Brown (2013) underlines the rule of SCC pronouncing that the elections were against the constitution was a tactic as a way for the old institution to hold legitimacy and to sustain its political role after the attainment of the president.

What can be interpreted from Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010) is that a similar case of the 2005 elections was portrayed in 2012 to 2013 against the Muslim Brotherhood. Back then the regime was securing the parliament with NDP majority to control the plenary debates, ensuring that the opposition lacked the numerical strength to obstruct the passage of critical government legislation. This time, the actors changed. The party

in fact never ruled.

The Opposition was fragmented immensely on the third wave. While the process started with the 2011 Constitutional Amendments as the Brotherhood conquered power, the opposition was marginalized and afraid that the Brotherhood was going to rule out the revolutionary process. This was strengthened with the constitutional amendments and the fragmented opposition united under the National Salvation front to topple Morsi this time.

At the end of the third wave, political opposition was expertly divided and contained. Just like the Mubarak era, the unity against Morsi was sustained but this time except Muslim Brotherhood on the team. However, the team was joined by members of the *feloul*. Originating from Brown this led to ‘using popular discontent for the military coup’<sup>35</sup> (Brown, 2013).

One of the tactics that the military inherited from the first wave was to use chaos and instability by ‘*leaving the squares run loose*.’ The army did not hesitate to shoot the protestors in the second wave, but was tentative in the first and the second. In the first wave during events like the Battle of Camel in Tahrir Square, the military stayed ‘neutral’ and chose not to interfere and protect the protestors.

In the third wave, especially after the constitutional declarations, the security forces refused to serve the president. While a massive police strike paralyzed the security system, the military chose not to interfere to the clashes between the two conflicting camps; one pro, one against Morsi. On the other hand, in cities where curfews were declared the military disregarded Morsi’s orders (even organized a football tournament during the order).

While sit-ins turned violent after the events of the anniversary of the revolution, the army did not fire a single bullet and did not protect the presidential palace between February 26<sup>th</sup> and March 3<sup>rd</sup> protests and throughout March to July in Cairo. Morsi

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<sup>35</sup> Brown defines the July intervention as ‘a military coup’ in response to public pressure which pushed the political leadership of the country aside (Brown, 2013).

called on his own supporters to safeguard the palace which led to the creation of pro Morsi thugs similar to the *baltagiya*'s of Mubarak. The chaos and instability contributed to the legitimation of the coup.

Also on March 2013, the police in more than a third of Egyptian provinces went on strike, including in parts of Cairo and in Port Said, which caused a security and legitimacy problem for the Brotherhood.

<b>Table 14: Authoritarian Survival Strategies in the Third Wave</b>
1. <b>Declaring the Parliament Unconstitutional</b>
2. <b>Using Popular discontent for the military coup</b>
3. <b>Fragmenting the Opposition</b>
4. Using Chaos and Instability



### **3.6.How Did It Survive?**

In the Egyptian case, there was the victory of continuous authoritarian governance and the deterioration of democracy rather than an affirmative transition after the uprisings. Until the end of 2012 Egyptians went to the polls four times for military's constitutional changes, followed by parliamentary, presidential elections and the constitutional referendum of November 2012. However, each election was marked with less participation signifying the despondency to one of the trivial characteristics of democracy.

The dismissal of Mubarak took place because there was a sudden change in the balance of resources between the rulers and the ruled. As Bowen (2013) points out what made the removal of Mubarak possible in January 2011 was the formation of a 'critical mass that was too big to be intimidated'. In this sense, the non-violent movement achieved its primary goal, but could not be durable.

According to Tilly's definition of contentious politics which included four key features; worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (2006) the Egyptian Uprising of 2011 ticked all the items on the list. The worthiness drove from the legitimacy of Tahrir Square. The unity came with the common demands, slogans and the formation of a new popular identity. Numbers with the million marches and commitment; risking life for the goal to succeed.

Authoritarian survival is a dialectic process that shapes regime responses with the threat conceived. The opposition contributed to regime survival as their division and organizational problems started directly after the first wave. While non-violent social movements can achieve certain goals, what determines their durability is a crucial point of investigation. In the Egyptian case, it was seen that the opposition did not unify at the demands at the post-Mubarak period.

In the context of this research the overall strategies that led to authoritarian reconstruction can be gathered under two headlines that cover the survival strategies in Egypt after the historical case of 2011 uprisings. These are; authoritarian adaptation that came with overthrowing one institution to be replaced with another which is named as

*'sacrificing Mubarak,'* the institution of presidency. The second one was that can be named as *'stealing the revolution'* -a popular discourse that was used by the activists in the square both for the military rule and Morsi era- through dividing the opposition and altering the standing of the togetherness of 2011. While the first tactic was done to provide the inner coherency of the ruling elites, the second one was conducted to the outer scope of the regime.

### **3.6.1. Tactic 1: Authoritarian Adaptation by Sacrificing Mubarak**

In the Egyptian case the popular mass mobilization received a response with the intervention of the armed forces where one institution presidency was disposed and another pillar of the state taking control. As Stacher names the take over as **conquering the ruling coalition**, (Stancer, 2012) Lynch explains the take over as:

*'the rebellions were met with disciplined responses and prompt decisions to sacrifice the regime or at least its incumbents in favor of the stability equilibrium and repeatedly misjudged the timing and extent of repression'* (Lynch, 2012:13).

The military made its choice, calculation. It decided that the interference would be healthier. By not participating but containing the protests in the first wave, it achieved two things. First avoiding the consequences of the street movement with no clear outcomes and second hindering any counteraction from officers at low ranks. In this historic political revolution, that Brown names a political coup, the ruling coalition was changed on the side of SCAF while *'the state'* remained untouched. SCAF had both forced Mubarak's departure and got into the emptied centralized authority (Brown, 2013, Stacher, 2012).

Under the broad strategy of authoritarian adaptation, the military slide into the void that was created with Mubarak's departure. However, this was not sufficient to guarantee authoritarian survival. By these means, the army adapted to the dynamics of the movement by first not shooting to the protestors and embracing the revolution as the new reality of the Egypt after the uprising (visible through public statements). These were the authoritarian survival strategies deployed at the second wave. However, the extensive repression in the second wave unsecured the position that the military had gained.

When contention rose, the waves fed each other, and the military transferred the titles of institutions to a selected partner that was promising the stable, robust role of the military. While the parliamentary and presidential elections were conducted, the military was behind the scenes in a solid position. In the third wave, it was tranquil as the confrontations took place. When the mass movement was transformed into a collective action that resembled 25/11, the military decided to turn the movement to itself, which also became the last step; using popular discontent for the military coup.

While taking the place that was abandoned, in an in-depth interview Morsi's ex-economic adviser Hussein Qazzaz was proposing that a transition never took place in Egypt by saying that:

'I don't think that the technical term is not transition, because transition would require some kind of a plan that will take you from point A to point B, in the paradigm this was not the case of Egypt, it was not the case yet, the Egyptian bureaucracy still operates the same way more or less. It operates the same way under Mubarak, under military rule, Morsi and the new regime. There is not yet a sense of change.<sup>36</sup>

The strong Egyptian state that was founded with the 1952 coup still had legitimacy. In the second run it could survive with the previous strategies that enabled Mubarak to stay in power. Morsi tried to capture the institution the presidency and strengthened his seat but it was too fragile and inadequate to stay in power. While the popular movement had brought new dynamics the Morsi administration failed to see them.

Stacher's study on 'adaptable autocrats' (2012) answered the first layer of authoritarian survival after mass mobilization in the Egyptian case. The old regime did not solely consist of Mubarak. In the interim and new parliament, there were figures from the old regimes cooperating with a new head, the military. In the parliamentary elections, Shafik's presidency and popularity showed that the old regime was still in power. They were not outlawed, or many members of the old regime were not brought in front of justice.

Stacher's answer to the situation is that the structure of executive power was centralized

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<sup>36</sup> Interview with Husein Qazaz. June, 15, 2014.

in Egypt before the uprising. When the uprising set off, the more homogeneous character of the Egyptian society (unlike Syria) helped the protesters to get over their previous collective action problems.

However, while this was a uniting element, he explains how the regime survived the wave:

Their (protestors) unified mobilizing pressure, combined with a rapid change in the balance of power between the coercive forces and the demonstrators, enabled a dynamic whereby members of the centralized ruling coalition could be and had to be dropped to save the regime. (Stacher, 2012:18)

As discussed in the literature, (Kandil, 2011, Ottoway, 2011, Lynch, 2012) Mubarak was sacrificed to save the regime.

### **3.6.2. Tactic 2: ‘Stealing the Revolution’ and Dividing the Opposition**

Kandil had summarized the differences between the 1952 revolution and the 2011 uprising as:

... what happened in 1952 in fact had been revolutionary legitimacy, because the Free Officers carried out the revolution and seized power. Now we have a different situation, where those who revolted on January 25, 2011 were not the ones who seized power (Kandil, 2012:498).

Porta's (2014) recent work contributed to Tilly's exclusions of military coups as a social movement provided a definition for the *Tamrood* campaign that led to the military takeover in July 2013. In her categorization to the mobilization to democracy she uses two options; elite or mass driven. While the mass-driven is called eventful democratization, the elite-driven is understood as a disruptive coup d'état that is a manipulation of mass protest to win over conservative groups. The army benefited from the popular outrage against Morsi and manipulated the social movement on its behalf and restored its position in the authoritarian structure in the country.

By these means the most successful tactic of the regime was the deliberate manipulation and division of opposition forces. The Egyptian Uprising was neither an Islamist nor a solely class motivated one. It was not the moment of the Muslim Brotherhood, either. It was a peoples' mobilization that could not be treated like the movements before. This was the reason why the regime tried to frame it as a Muslim Brothers mobility but later on failed to find evidence.

The major setback was the inability to create a united front that is called **‘cooperative differentiation’** in the social movements literature which is described as ‘maintaining a public face of solidarity towards the movements targets’ (Bandy, Smith 2005 Abdel, 2009) that allows diverse political groups with different ideological leanings, class interests and long term project to work together. The opposition did not possess organizational and institutional leadership to take power and replace the regime of the president (El-Bishry, 2011) or as Ghobashy underlines, no population group had become close to shifting the balance of resources in favor (Ghobashy, 2012). It was controversial to the view that the uprising was ‘leaderless’. In fact, the Egyptian revolution had many leaders, soon to be fragmented.

Josua and Edel (2012) underline that elites have wider strategies but repression remains a crucial part of its target groups, specific forms. One fact was that the army did not confront all opposition groups at the same time. As repression rises when legitimacy falls in the protests there was a contentious change of the use of restraint and at the end, the Egyptian elite/authorities who have control of the state apparatus decided that containing and fragmenting the movement was a healthier way. When fragmented the concentrated repression was not delegitimized.

### **3.6.2.1. Mistakes of the Brotherhood and the Opposition**

However, apart from elite strategies, the responses of the opposing groups in Egypt contributed to the outcome in 2013. The selective repression that was used by the regime was the primary tool for it to hold on to power as a divided opposition was proved easier to be ruled.

The military especially after the creation of National Salvation Front saw opposition as a potential political ally to check another. Brown (2013) says that after the Islamist majority that came with the parliament and the presidency, a new block occurred consisting of opposition to old regime elements and judges. Naming the block counter-revolutionary, it contributed to the persistence of military domination rather than passage to civilian rule.

This was a clear point that again Hamilton was making:

In November 2011 and in January 2012 the streets echoed with chants demanding the end of military rule. But now it had become the self-appointed role of the politicians to translate street action into political gain. Now, the army had people to talk to. Had all the forces that were supposedly against the military—the revolutionaries, the liberals, the Brotherhood and the Salafist ever truly united where might we be today? (Hamilton, 2013).

On the other hand, Shain noted that the Muslim Brotherhood was ‘not a revolutionary organization but came in a revolutionary time that required revolutionary measures’ (Akpınar, 2014) and the former institutions paved the way by marginalizing the Muslim Brotherhood. The main mistake of the Brotherhood was to opt for gradually reforming the state and protecting the privileges of the military instead of siding with the revolutionary youth and the people of the revolution. Brotherhood thought that a strong parliament would provide a robust platform for challenging the central pillars of the state which were mainly the security forces, the military, bureaucracy, media, and the judiciary.

According to Şahin (2014) one of the ‘mistakes’ of the Brotherhood was that the military’s longstanding political and economic privileges remained untouched (Şahin, 2014). What is more is that they were even institutionalized with the new constitution of 2012. Morsi was backed by the military because it was clear that he was going to win the elections and behind the scenes, they planned to preserve their own interests.

The Muslim Brotherhood saw the elections as a way to overcome and conquer some parts of the state apparatus mainly the presidency. However, the power of the presidency had shifted after Mubarak. It was not the powerful position of the three leaders that came with the main pillar of power, mainly the military legitimacy anymore. One of the mistakes that the Brotherhood did was to insist on electoral legitimacy by belittling the street movement which was unstoppable under the military and Morsi rule (Stacher, 2012b).

On the other hand, there was almost no security official held responsible for killing the demonstrators during the revolt itself. On June 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2012, a judge sentenced Mubarak and his last interior minister to life in prison for failing to protect the demonstrators—a political rather than a criminal charge—but was forced to release the leaders of the

security establishment for lack of evidence. (Kandil, 2012: 511)

### **3.6.2.2. Sectarianism**

One of the key moments of Tahrir was when Copts surrounded Muslims as human shields to stop the police intervention while they were praying. This unity, too, was broken up as in total of the third waves as little more than 100 people lost their lives due to sectarian events (See: Appendix 3: Martyrs of The Revolution). Sectarian attacks rose from 45 in 2010 to 70 in 2011, the year of the revolution that toppled Hosni Mubarak, to 112 in 2012.

The use of sectarian discourse as Heydemann and Leenders propose, too, (2011) was evident with the examples starting off from the Masrepa Events of October 2011 to the clashes between the Muslims and Christians during the third wave. But as Albrecht points out religious minorities like Copts in Egypt can make alliances with the regime as they presuppose that the regime can protect them from the ones ‘of the dominant religion’ (Albrecht, 2010) and that the likelihood of the collapse of the regime can be perceived as a threat.

**Table 15: Authoritarian Survival in Egypt after the Arab Uprisings**

- |   |
|---|
| <b>1. Authoritarian Adaptation by Sacrificing Mubarak</b>       |
| <b>2. ‘Stealing the Revolution’ and Dividing the Opposition</b> |

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **CONCLUSION**

The public protests that brought the 30-year-old Mubarak regime to its end in Egypt in 2011 failed to transform the system which was embedded in the state deeply. While successfully forcing Mubarak and his circle to resign, the movement left the core institutions of Mubarak's state untouched, paving way to the army's regain of control and postponing a true transformation of the regime to an uncertain time in the future. At the end of the three waves the strongest pillar of the Egyptian state, the army conquered the centralized executive of the Egyptian regime.

It was mostly due to the inability of the Brotherhood and Morsi's to understand the shifting power balances and the strength of the army and the old state's institutions. The influence of the mobilization level altered the relationship between repression and legitimation. While the legitimacy that was gained from Tahrir remained, the use of selective repression was never outlawed. From the uprising to the military coup, repression was used against different groups in different time frames, breaking one of the strongest element of the uprising: unity. With its failure to organize the aftermath of the revolution, the power of the protestors remained limited with the ability to mobilize the masses.

Another significant reason for the failure in the aftermath was the particular characteristics of the Egyptian Regime, which, unlike Syria, did not compose of solely of the president (Stacher, 2012). The internal cohesion and compliance within the state apparatus determined the fate of authoritarian survival in Egypt. For endurance the presidency was sacrificed.



Along with the strong roots of the old regime still surviving, the lack of organizational and institutional leadership played a substantial role in the failure of the civil resistance that toppled Mubarak down. Roberts also highlights that the revival of authoritarianism is not due to the weakness of civil resistance movement but rather the complexity of the aftermath that requires a new constitutional system (2012). Toppling down the dictator proved to be the first step necessary for democratic transformation. However, the experience revealed that popular movement that overthrew Mubarak did not have the effective organization skills or the leadership to take power and replace the regime (Bishry, 2015).

With its long history of privileges in Egyptian state and economy, the military cleverly manipulated the civil unrest and turned it into its own advantage. To ensure its privileged position, the military demanded protection of their interest during the transition process. Failing to grasp the calculated process, the Brotherhood contributed to it. While in the *second wave* there were still contentious protests against the privileges and the mismanagement of the army, it managed to put itself off the scene until the crucial moment allowing it to come back to governance once again at the end of the *third wave*. If the Brotherhood forces had participated in the just demands of the ‘*second revolution*’ –the popular movement against the army from June to November, 2011- rather than prioritizing the elections, another outcome could have been reached. The intense polarization of ‘revolutionary’ (*seeking shift in pillars of the state*) and ‘conservative’ (*seeking continuity in the mode of governance*) forces was counter revolutionary. When the Muslim Brotherhood held its grip at the parliament, they proposed that the legitimacy was represented by the parliament not the square. They were mistaken.

When investigated today it is clear that what made Tunisia relatively a success rather than a case of authoritarian survival has been its national consensus that was supplied with an inclusive constitutional process. In contrast, one of the main outcomes of authoritarian survival in Egypt was the drop in electoral participation in Egypt, closing the way for a desired democratization process in the future.

In the *third wave* it was clear that conquering the parliament was not an end. In Egypt

Mubarak's forced resignation altered the characteristics of the regime and the challenge, but not the state. Unlike Syria, the regime did not compose of solely Mubarak. This is especially important when a government faces a serious, sudden threat and reacts by using high intensity coercion, like shooting into large crowds. Therefore, the internal cohesion and compliance within the state apparatus determined the fate.

Another area of research would be a comparative outlook to the roles that armies played in the uprising as the Tunisian army has never experienced combat and does not dominate the domestic economy like the Egyptian one (Anderson, 2011).

Though the thesis focused on the inner dynamics of the Egyptian case, the international outlook of the uprising is a necessary arena to be investigated. Salamey and Pearson points out that 'the prioritization of Middle Eastern stability over democratic transformation' in the international sphere strengthened the ability for authoritarianism to exist (Salamey & Pearson, 2012). While being the warden for authoritarian regimes for many decades, the influence of Western countries on the mobilization of opposition movements and their capacity to transform inner dynamics is an interesting research topic. Especially, the role of exterior countries -mainly Saudi Arabia and United States- in maintaining the regime's privileged position is also a compelling issue to be discovered. This is in correlation with the military capacity of Egypt and the question what are the sources that the Egyptian military acquires its strengths from democracy.

Conditions contributed to the survival of authoritarianism by providing opportunities to marginalize and divide the opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood's short-lived governance combined with the military in the quest for conquering the central executive failed to achieve the desired democratization in Egypt. When the Brotherhood failed to pursue an inclusive route, the regime was successful in pushing the movement to a fragmented, polarized and sectarian side.

Apart from the impact of the exterior to the interior or conditions, more research has to be done on universal usage of non-violence in comparative cases.

What can be concluded is that in order to achieve success a campaign must go beyond persistence and achieve a shift in power between the opposition and the adversary. If

Goldstone's four pillars for change (2011) is remembered, it has to be backed up with the international conditions favoring change. The uprising of 2011 ended up with continuity rather than change with a shift in the ruling elite. However, contentious politics in Egypt is not over.

While authoritarian reconstruction has been accomplished in Egypt after the *three waves*, ending in authoritarian reconstruction, survival is a dialectic process. The learning process occurs for the challengers and the regime. The fourth wave due to this cycle can end up in another uprising or challenge that can come as a surprise at any time, with any spark like 2011 did. Despite its failure to achieve transition to democracy, the Egyptian uprising ended with some gains like free elections inside worker unions, universities and the courage and hope for collective action. In addition to its success or failure in the near future, the results of the unique uprising will be re-examined.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1

#### List of Non-Violent Tactics by Sharp<sup>37</sup>

1. Public speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
4. Signed public statements
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions
  
7. Communications with a wider audience
8. Slogans, caricatures and symbols
9. Banners, posters, and displayed communication
10. Leaflets, pamphlets and books
11. Newspapers and journals
12. Records, radio and television
13. Skywriting and earth writing
  
14. Group representations
15. Deputations
16. Mock awards
17. Group lobbying
18. Picketing
19. Mock elections
  
20. Symbolic Public Acts
21. Display of flags and symbolic colors
22. Wearing of symbols
23. Prayer and worship

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<sup>37</sup>The list of Methods of *Non Violent Action* from Sharp (2012: 124-135).



24. Delivering symbolic objects
25. Protest disturbing
26. Destruction of own property
27. Symbolic lights
28. Displays of portraits
29. Paint as protest
30. New signs and names
31. Symbolic sounds
32. Symbolic reclamations
33. Rude gestures
  
34. Pressures on individuals
35. 'Haunting' officials
36. Taunting officials
37. Fraternalization
38. Vigils
  
39. Drama and Music
40. Humorous skills and pranks
41. Performance of plays and music
42. Singing
  
43. Processions
44. Marches
45. Parades
46. Religious processions
47. Pilgrimages
48. Motorcades
  
49. Honouring the dead
50. Political mourning
51. Mock funerals
52. Demonstrative funerals
53. Homage at burial places
  
54. Public Assemblies
55. Assemblies of protest or support
56. Protest meetings
57. Camouflaged meetings of protest
58. Teach-ins

59. Withdrawal and renunciation
60. Walk-outs
61. Silence
62. Renouncing honors
63. Turning one's back

## **Appendix 2**

### **The Slogans of the Egyptian Uprising<sup>38</sup>**

#### **1. January**

##### **1.1.25th of January**

- We studied, graduated but employment is a destiny.
- We don't want her to be destroyed<sup>39</sup>, our target is to be free.
- Soldier you are shooting why? Am I Egyptian or not?
- We are saying million times Mubarak we want you out.
- We want free government, the life is becoming disguising.
- Revolution, revolution Mubarak out!
- People want the downfall of the regime.

##### **1.2.27th of January**

- The people want the downfall of the regime.

##### **1.2. 28 January**

- 'Ya Masr<sup>40</sup>, it has been long time we have missed you.' (Soueif, 2012:6)

##### **1.3. 30th of January**

- Revolution revolution until victory, fall down Hosni Mubarak!
- We will not leave, we will not leave, leave, leave Hosni Mubarak!
- Jamal tell your father Egyptian people hate him.
- Bread, freedom, human dignity...
- No Mubarak / No Suleiman / No more Umala Amerikan! (Soueif, 2012:40)

##### **1.4.31 January**

- Mubarak, Egyptian blood is not cheap.

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<sup>38</sup> The data was derived from the Tumblr page 'Egypt Chants' that archives the slogans of popular demonstrations in Egypt. Translated by Assiad Aldebiat for this study. Retrieved June 20, 2015, from <http://egy chants.tumblr.com/>

<sup>39</sup> 'Her' signifying Egypt.

<sup>40</sup> *Masr* means Egypt in Arabic

- No Mubarak, we will not kneel down, we hated our low voice.

## **2. February**

### **2.1.2 February**

- The people want the execution of President.
- Come on people its popular revolution, its peaceful demonstration, come on our people join us.

### **2.2.5 February**

- Make your voice up hero; you are liberating your country.
- Mubarak good morning this is the last day.

### **2.3. 6 February**

- High high make your voice high who is chanting wont die.
- Egyptian soldier defend me protect me.
- Void void Mubarak, Jamal, Adly and the parliament.

### **2.4.From 6 February to 11 February**

- We didn't get tired; we didn't get tired freedom is not free.
- Leave leave Suleiman we don't want you also.
- The people want to judge the president.
- Egypt for Egyptians not for corrupts and clientalists.
- Oh Mubarak, be patient be patient tomorrow the people will dig your grave.
- Oh freedom where are you? Hosni Mubarak is between us.
- Bread, water Mubarak no!
- Fall down, fall down Hosni Mubarak!
- Tomorrow Hosni Mubarak will go like Ben Ali
- Out out, go out. we don't want you inside and outside
- The people want to judge the president
- Be all together one national movement shoulder to shoulder against the police who is killing us

### 3. March

- Hit us in the street, our voice will still reach out the world.
- Unite your row, put your shoulder next to mine.... A united national movement
- Martyr have some good sleep and rest; your blood is a motivation towards revolution.
- Sit-it sit-in until the system is falls.
- Revolution revolution till victory, until we clean all Egypt.
- We have removed the head, and still there is the tail. Come on people be strong.
- Revolution revolution for freedom. Revolution revolution for purification.
- Do you hear the martyr's mother calling out: the security men kill my sons?
- Martyr's blood calling out to you: free free all of your country.
- We are not tired yet, we are not tired yet, the freedom is not for free.
- We removed Mubarak and the brought to us Shafik, we become tired from patching.

### 4. April

- Silent silent why, you took your rights or what?
- Your hand in my hand to take our freedom. We are not thieves or axman.
- Revolution is happiness, life with military judgments is not.
- Strike its legal, legal against the poverty and hunger, legal against the remnants of *feloul*.

### 5. May

- Revolution to kick out the clientalists.
- Our families, our people the freedom for you and us.
- They said revolution, they took Mubarak and put "marshal".
- We are not tired; we need to complete the revolution.
- Out out interior ministry out, Egypt my country will stay free.
- Dictator dictator the marshal's time will come.
- The strong is strong ... the coward is coward, and we will get back to the field, strong.
- Dictator dictator, and the marshal will get his share.

- Ministry of interior, out out, and my home Egypt will remain free.
- We are not tired yet, we are not tired yet, either a full revolution or no revolution.
- They said this is a revolution, they there will be a change, but they remove Mubarak and put a marshal.
- Our people, our people the revolution is for you and us.
- Full revolution, full revolution that can remove every wicked and traitor.

## **6. June**

- We said bread, freedom no judgment to military.
- No subjugation, no torture.
- Immortal immortal my homeland, your blood will not go waste.

## **7. September**

- Solider go away the people are not happy.

## **8. October**

- Soldiers building fences, soldiers killing rebels. Fall down fall down military government.
- We are the people. we are the red line fall down military government.

## Appendix 3

### ‘Martyrs’ of the Revolution

The information of the ‘martyrs’ are sustained from the web page ‘*Wiki Thawra*’ an independent online group that refers to itself as the “statistical database of the Egyptian revolution. The data mainly depends on reports by independent civil society organizations including the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR), the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre (HMLC), and the Front to Defend Egypt’s Protesters (FDEP).

#### 1. Day to Day Casualties in the 18 Days<sup>41</sup>

In the 18 days there were protests in 22 provinces. In the sum of all days 1075 people died. The dispersion of the casualties is:

- 1022 civilians
- 49 policemen
- 4 soldiers
- 1 journalist
- 5 volunteers

866 of the deaths were due to political events and the rest occurred due to the lack of security measures in the time being.

On the other hand, out of the people that were killed 23 of them were women 108 of them were under 18 and 92 of them were high school or university students.

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<sup>41</sup>The information is taken from the web page *Wikithawra* that carries out statistical investigation of the uprising. Translated by Ali Alsaleh for this study. Retrieved September, 10, 2015 from <https://wikithawra.wordpress.com/2013/10/23/25jan18dayscasualties/>

<b>Table 16: Casualties in the First Wave</b>	
<b>Day</b>	<b>Casualties</b>
<b>January 25</b>	5
<b>January 26</b>	2
<b>January 27</b>	10
<b>January 28</b>	664
<b>January 29</b>	118
<b>January 30</b>	42
<b>January 31</b>	31
<b>February 1</b>	11
<b>February 2</b>	31
<b>February 3</b>	15
<b>February 4</b>	5
<b>February 5</b>	5
<b>February 6</b>	1
<b>February 7</b>	4
<b>February 8</b>	7
<b>February 9</b>	1
<b>February 10</b>	1
<b>February 11</b>	12
<b>February 12</b>	110

Source: Wikithawra



## 2. Facts About Casualties in the Three Waves

- In the 2<sup>nd</sup> wave 405 of the casualties were civilians, 24 were police officers and 8 were army personnel.
- In the 2<sup>nd</sup> wave 64 were killed in sectarian incidents.
- In the 2<sup>nd</sup> wave casualties were concentrated in Cairo (174) following Port Said (74) and North Sinai (30).
- In the 3<sup>rd</sup> wave out of 470, 399 civilians have been killed and 52 were police officers and 19 people were army personnel.
- In the 3<sup>rd</sup> wave 39 were killed in sectarian incidents.
- In the 3<sup>rd</sup> wave casualties were concentrated in Cairo (67) following Giza (67) Assiut (64) North Sinai (59) Port Said (56).

<b>Table 17: Casualties in the Three Waves</b>	
<b>Wave</b>	<b>Number of Casualties</b>
<b>1<sup>st</sup> wave 25 January – 12 February</b>	1075
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> wave 12 February 2011- July 1 2012</b>	438
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> wave 2 July 2012 - July 3 2013</b>	470

Source: Wikithawra

## **Appendix 4**

### **Strikes of 8 and 9 February**

#### **1. Tuesday, 8<sup>th</sup> of February<sup>42</sup>**

About 5,000 employees went on strike in three main centrals (Smart Village Central, Central Ramses, Central Alataba).

1,500 workers staged a sit Abu Sabaa Company for Spinning and Weaving in Mahalla, they cut off the highway in front of the company to demand overdue wages regardless and bonuses.

2,000 workers went on strike from work in “Sigma Pharmaceuticals company” for higher wages and the right to obtain promotions, and the dismissal of a number of corrupt officials.

3,000 workers protested , demanding an increase incentives and make all daily employment in established posts, in “transport Railroad Authority company” , and they sit on the railway rods and disrupted the movement of trains until their demands are met.

Nearly 6,000 workers of the Suez Canal Authority in Ismailia, Suez and Port Said staged a sit to demand higher wages, pointing out that the Suez Canal is one of the biggest sources of income in Egypt.

About 100 workers protested in “Kafr Dawar Silk Company”, and 500 others in “ Kafar Dawar Textile Company” before and after work shifts, demanding overdue bonuses and increase the meal allowance.

About 4,000 Alkok Company (basic chemical industry) workers in Helwan entered a

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<sup>42</sup> The information is gathered from Revolutionary Socialists, in corporation with the ETIUF (Egyptian Independent Trade Unions Federation) and translated by Ali Alsaleh. Retrieved June, 10, 2015 from <http://revsoc.me/workers-farmers/myt-lalf-mn-lml-ywslwn-lhtjtt/>

strike for higher wages and demanded stable jobs for the workers with temporary employment. They also demanded payment of incentives and profits and expressed their solidarity with the sit-revolutionaries in Tahrir Square, Workers also demanded an investigation into financial and administrative irregularities in the company that was investigated by the Central Auditing Organization. They also demanded not sending the profits to the “holding company” without regard to improving the conditions of workers in the company that makes a profit despite Although they work in a bad atmosphere.

## **2. Wednesday 9<sup>th</sup> of February**

More than 4,000 workers from the cleaning company "*Viola*" staged a protest inside the company headquarters in Alexandria to demand the lifting of the wage which was only 500 EGP for ten years.

More than 1,000 workers of Telecom Egypt company protested in front of Central Manshiya, to demand higher pay and equality with engineers , they demanded also better and fair working hours.

More than 800 dalliy laborers at Petroleum in Marine company protested in front of the company headquarters to demand their appointment.

Nearly 800 workers and technicians from the company "*Ermez*" for railway services had sit within the company headquarters of the Mount of Olives in Alexandria, to demand the lifting of the salary, install temporary employment and for obtaining higher conditions.

More than 500 nurses and doctors organized a sit-in within Mabarra Pflmnj Hospital in Alexandria, to demand higher wages.

More than 500 Temporary Workers employees at the University of Cairo protested to demand the fixation.

Thousands of oil workers protested in front of the Ministry of Petroleum in Nasr City.

500 temporary workers at Al Hilal Hospital, strike and staged a sit-in at the headquarters of the hospital demanding the dismissal of all the corrupt leaders.

## Appendix 5

### Demands from ‘a group of those in the sit-in’

By naming themselves as ‘a group of those in the sit-in’ this flyer has been distributed by the remaining masses in the square at March 2011. Titled as ‘*Why a Sit-In at Tahrir Square?*’ the flyer answered the following questions under the title ‘*Questions: Which Have Been Directed at Us and the Response to Them*’:

- Why are you sitting here?

Well we are staging a sit-in in order to effect our demands. Sit-ins are a guaranteed legal right in every constitution in the world and an inalienable human right as part of freedom of expression

- How long?

Until the status of this country is improved and our demands are met

- What is your response to some of the negative scenes of the sit-in such as?

We are attempting to deal with each of these happenings as much as possible and keeping away anybody who harms the ethics of the sit-in but [we do it] passively and without violence.

- But you are destroying the country and the economy is failing...

The country is improving as well as traffic passage and we see the Interior Ministry and the police protecting (misspelled in original) the safety of the country, and public servants are going to their jobs as usual, and classes have resumed, and we are undertaking every social activity as usual.

- Where do you come from? Certainly someone is paying you?

Come to the square and look at our situation. It’s hard for you, but we are patient for the sake of a better country and we are paid out of our own simple pockets, and at the very least the protests are necessary. You surely see that no one is paying us and there’s no KFC<sup>43</sup> or any other of the media’s lies. (Tahrir Documents, 2011a)

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<sup>43</sup> In the 1<sup>st</sup> wave, some media outlets accused the protestors of receiving foreign powers and that they have ordered ‘Kentucky Fried Chicken’ to Tahrir Square.

## Appendix 6

### Document of the Demands of the 6<sup>th</sup> of April Movement

The 6<sup>th</sup> of April published these demands on April 3, 2011 for the transfer to civilian rule and holding the *feloul* accountable:

1. To hold Mubarak and his family accountable.
2. The return of our stolen money and using it to support the economy.
3. The purification of the followers of the former regime from all state institutions, at their forefront the media institutions, and to hold accountable all those whose corruption is proven.
4. To hold accountable all who corrupted political life in Egypt, The dissolution of the NDP and the freezing of the political activities of its symbols for a period of 5 years.
5. To hold a public national conference between the Military Council and the whole spectrum of opposition. The intent of this is to open all the private files regarding the administration of the country's affairs during the Mubarak period in order to learn the truth of the country's current state and to put in place features for the upcoming. (Tahrir Documents, 2011b)

Figure 2: Extract of the list of Demands of the 6<sup>th</sup> of April Movement



Source: Tahrir Documents (2011b)

## Appendix 7

### **Petition: Let us Return to the Squares to Complete our Revolution**

The petition was signed on September 15 by:

- Popular Socialist Alliance Party
- . The National Front for Justice and Democracy
- The Popular Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
- The Revolutionary Socialists
- The Democratic Workers Party
- The Egyptian Social Democratic Party
- The Campaign to Support al-Baradei
- The Youths of the Revolution Coalition
- The Lotus Revoution Coalition
- Youth of the Front Party
- Progressive Revolutionary Youth Union
- National Independent Current
- Suez Youth Bloc
- Youth Movement for Justice and Freedom
- Democratic Revolution Coalition (Qana)
- January 25th Revolution Coalition (Upper Egypt)
- January 25th Revolution Coalition (Luxor)
- Democratic Revolution Coalition (Aswan)

The text:

The revolution has returned to all of Egypt's squares and streets yet again to complete its course. The masses are once again pouring into the squares to announce that the only legitimacy is that of the revolution and the people in the heart of the squares. They affirm the masses' distrust and refusal of the Military Council and its government. They refuse a Military Council that intentionally hindered the transitional period and impeded the revolution's course to change and cleansing. They refuse a government that lacks power and is nothing but a secretary to the Military Council. They refuse a government that does not possess the will or ability to complete the revolution's course.

We, as revolutionary youth forces, insist that the current crisis cannot be solved by merely accepting the resignations of Sharaf and his government, nor can it be solved by the Military Council appointing a new government which will also lack power. These deceptive solutions have been far surpassed by the masses. Now that they have raised their main slogans against the

Military Council and called for its ouster, these solutions are no longer acceptable to them. This cannot be achieved without continuing the popular pressure in all Egypt's squares, because the people are the one guarantee for the continuation of the revolution. They are the first and last decision-makers. Thus, we call for all Egyptians to march and participate in the million-man mobilization on Wednesday, 22 November, in all Tahrir Squares across the length and breadth of Egypt, in order to achieve the following:

- A total relinquishing of political power on the part of the Military Council
  
- The transfer of power to a National Revolutionary Salvation Government with absolute power to direct the transitional phase—This Government will be committed to achieving Egyptians' aspirations in the areas of security and the economy, and setting a clear time table for the transfer of power to an elected parliament and president.
  
- Trying all involved in assaulting civilians, from the Ministry of the Interior or the Army beginning on the 25th of June, continuing with the events at Maspero and to the massacre of November 19th and 20th.

Where the masses are concerned, the revolution still continues. Our people are in every street and square to build—upon the blood of our martyrs and their sacrifices—a new country that will achieve freedom and social justice for every citizen. (Tahrir Documents, 2011c).



## **Appendix 8**

### **Full Text of Morsi's Presidential Speech<sup>44</sup>**

Despite yesterday's tumultuous events, millions of Egyptians will nevertheless head to the polls this weekend to pick their first post-revolution president. Egypt's constitutional court has invalidated the recent parliamentary election but has allowed Hosni Mubarak's former PM, Ahmed Shafiq, to continue to stand for president. As the only other remaining candidate, I alone represent an unequivocal departure from the old regime that was toppled by the revolution of 2011.

I was nominated and elected by constituents – parties, groups, and individuals – who marched the streets of Egypt calling for change. I was jailed by the old regime. I belong to the middle classes that were sold out by the old establishment. I hold political and social views that are shared by many in our society but were suppressed or criminalised by the old regime. I understand the ambitions, values and standards held by many mainstream Egyptians.

For the sake of the Egyptian people and for the world, we must find the shortest and safest route to a stable, safe and sustainable transition in Egypt. To this end we need a detailed programme for change and renaissance, outlining clear priorities and specific plans. This I can offer.

On the political front, Egyptians revolted against an oppressive regime with the clear aim of regaining their freedom and affirming their liberties. Nothing short of a complete overhaul of the political system will be acceptable. It is not enough to remove a ruler or restructure a police force. We must spread and reinforce freedom, forming new political parties and a free mass media.

At the grassroots, people must be free of government interference, and allowed to choose public officials through fair elections. No party or group or class must ever be allowed to monopolise the political power in the country. As part of this agenda, I will

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<sup>44</sup> The article is derived from Morsi, June 2013.

transform the position of the president to an institution, with clear and delineated roles given to a number of vice-presidents (representing political and social forces other than the Freedom and Justice party that nominated me, and including a woman for the first time in modern Egyptian history), as well as a number of presidential aides and a team of advisers, all working in a transparent political environment and subject to oversight by parliament and civil society.

Inclusion is also at the core of my economic vision. For decades, economic opportunities, along with social status and political powers, were reserved for the very few (in their book, *Why Nations Fail*, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson state that most of the privatization programme in Egypt benefited only 30 families). With 40% of the Egyptian population spending less than \$2 a day, how could the economy ever grow sufficiently to fulfil the legitimate ambitions of Egyptians? Balanced economic growth and social justice will be the ultimate objective of my programme, as it was for our great revolution as a whole.

Supporting this economic vision is a comprehensive social and human development programme aimed at investing in Egypt's most valuable asset: its people, and the large, disciplined workforce that Egyptians have proven to be, in spite of monumental challenges.

In a highly integrated knowledge-based on global economy, we must encourage both the public and private sectors in Egypt to learn from, work and trade with the rest of the world. Members of my campaign have already been sending and receiving delegations to many countries to explore opportunities for such cooperation. I firmly believe that the reform and development objectives of the revolution can be achieved if we work closely and very effectively with friendly regional and global forces.

Egypt must emerge again, liberated from dictatorship and the rule of the exploitative minority, to occupy its rightful place on the world stage. The absence of Egypt in the past few decades has left a dangerous vacuum in the Arab world, and has damaged the stability of the region and the prosperity of its peoples. Egypt's destiny is to lead. If I am elected on Sunday, I will make sure that Egypt fulfils its destiny.