

TURKEY'S INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK CASE STUDY: SOMALIA

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This policy report provides an overview of Turkey's development and humanitarian approaches in the territories of Somalia. For the past three decades, Turkey has been an active participant in multilateral peace efforts in a diversity of conflict-affected states such as Bosnia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Traditionally Turkey has offered assistance to peacekeeping and military initiatives particularly through the United Nations and NATO. Since early 2000, however, Turkey's approach to conflict-affected countries has shifted away from being primarily military to an increasingly civilian capacity focus. In its role as an emerging power, Turkey has stepped onto the development platform long dominated by "Western" donors. This shift reflects the change in foreign policy under the guidance of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's visionary leadership. As a majority Muslim state that is emboldened with a pluralistic democratic constitution, Turkey has resisted aspects of the traditional Western framework. Instead, civilian development actors have been engaged in a hybrid model through which Turkey's own unique global perspective and positioning is reflected. There is growing international interest in Turkey's regional leadership and in particular, its influence upon the Horn of Africa. This report analyzes Turkey's development efforts in Somalia and investigates its alternative strategy for working within a stagnant conflict-affected state.

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Executive Summary

This report concludes that

- Turkey needs to continue clarifying and formalizing its development vision and goals for Somalia.
- Although efficient delivery of aid is highly valued by Turkish actors, they must ensure consistent coordination and communicate their intentions more effectively with other international actors and relevant institutions. Otherwise, they risk undermining their development efforts and contributing to the country's war economy. Turkish officials are aware of this need and are currently drafting a development strategy in consultation with several civil society actors and the UNDP. The final policy brief should set out clear steps to institutionalize coordination with international donors and Somali actors.
- Turkish officials should engage with traditional donors not only in coordinating aid and policies towards Somalia but also to gain a wider understanding of past mistakes made by the international community. Lessons learned and best practices will enhance and strengthen Turkey's projects.
- Somalia is a deeply divided state. Aid and development are never neutral resources in fragile contexts. Turkey needs to institutionalize conflict-sensitive practices into all aspects of its policies and projects in the country. Such institutionalization will not necessarily decrease the creative initiatives and implementation of agencies such as TIKA but instead enhance efficiency and good development practice.
- During the 2011 famine, harmonization between the Turkish state and the NGO community's policies was at its highest. Leaders recognize the benefits of coordination and are currently developing a flexible strategy that will institutionalize these relationships while at the same time respecting the necessary independence of NGO efforts. This is an endeavor that should be supported.
- In contrast to other international donors, Turkey has tried to engage with Al-Shaabab and NGO workers implementing humanitarian projects in Al-Shaabab areas. This is a policy area that needs careful reflection in implementation. A high majority of people needing humanitarian assistance are in Al-Shaabab controlled areas. Turkish and Somali officials must be careful that assistance carried out in these conflicted-affected regions is not misused by jihadists.
- Youth is the most significant demographic in Somalia. Turkish initiatives have featured a number of projects benefitting this group. These efforts should be extended and broadened across the country and include a particular focus on the rehabilitation of former combatants.
- While Turkish policies have had success in a number of areas, more focus must be placed on economic initiatives. Piracy, aid, and remittances are the most significant sources of finances for much of the country's population. Turkey, in conjunction with other actors, should begin to consider this aspect of development.
- The Somali diaspora is a significant resource that offers the potential to benefit or contribute to the country's ongoing conflict. Since its intervention in 2011, Turkey has enjoyed significant support by various cleavages of the diaspora. Turkey and other international donors should incorporate diaspora groups into policy initiatives as a means of engendering Somali empowerment and countering more malign forces exacerbating the conflict.

Introduction

The increasingly complex and contradictory changes that have occurred during the first decade of the 21st century have, by their very nature, challenged the way development aid is conceptualized and delivered. The inauguration of the Millennium Development Goals and the inspiring hope that this global initiative brought to the developing world was soon overshadowed by the heightened securitization of aid that followed 9/11¹ and security, which is now embedded in many countries' assistance frameworks, continues to dictate the financing and autonomy of development aid.² Against this backdrop assistance, discussions are increasingly dominated by the emergence of non-DAC countries - an ambiguous label which includes a wide range of countries such as China, Brazil, Turkey and South Korea.³ The extent and diversity of these states' activities is hard to quantify given that they do not adhere to the reporting practices of traditional DAC countries.⁴ However, what is undeniable, is the creation of an alternative aid dynamic that has shifted away from traditional donor protocol. By snubbing the reporting duties and conditionality of these donors, emerging countries have begun to provide a legitimate alternative to the tainted goals and policies of the West. The dispersion of power to regional actors is illustrated by the willingness of emerging countries to engage with states that have been isolated because of Western security concerns.

It is within the context of this complex mosaic of development actors and security challenges that attention turns to the role of pervasive conflict in the most persistently underdeveloped states, ostensibly categorized as “fragile states” and “least developed states.”

Although the label of “fragile states” originated

outside the development community in the wake of 9/11⁵, the 2011 World Bank report is lauded for highlighting development deficits in conflict-affected countries⁶.

The g7+ group of self-identified fragile states now occupies this specific aid category⁷. Fragile states are considered the most unstable and vulnerable states to conflict, all of whom have failed to achieve a single MDG. Conflict has inevitably been a significant influence on traditional development trajectories, but has only recently begun to gain traction among development aid practitioners.⁸ In the 1990s, the international community was confronted with a multitude of civil and ethnic wars that both international legal norms and the donor system were unable to address. Decades of ideological and state-centric aid in the post-colonial and cold war eras had been followed by the decentralized project-based aid of the good governance agenda⁹, none of which considered the internal dynamics and competition that foreign aid can elicit. Aid is rarely neutral; more often, the politicization of aid creates winners and losers. The predictability of this dynamic was particularly evident in the aftermath of Rwanda's genocide¹⁰. In the wake of this horrific event, a vast literature on different conflict-sensitive approaches began to address the potential effect of development assistance at the local and national levels.¹¹ This is exemplified in works such as Kenneth Bush's “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment” (PCIA), and Mary Anderson's “Do No Harm.”¹² Concern regarding the relationship between aid and conflict has since created an industry of conflict-analysis methods, trainers and programs. It also perpetuated the trend of bureaucratic heavy aid¹³. The recent inclusion of fragile states into development language is a reflection of the growing security awareness of donors but also of terminology that is fueling ambiguity regarding aid categorization.

The increased activity of emerging donor states is therefore met with apprehension among many traditional actors but optimistically by conflict-affected states because these new assistance actors offer an alternative to the status quo.

Ethical questions pervade discussions of emerging donors such as China¹⁴ regarding transparency and the principles of non-interference, particularly with abusive regimes. Yet these actors offer a method of engagement that presents them on an equal par with Western donors and offers opportunities for new perspectives. Their efforts are supplemented through bilateral technical cooperation which is quite contrary to the conditionality that so often fosters resentment from recipient states¹⁵. For example, emerging states may buck the regulatory and reporting guidelines of traditional DAC donors but such isolation also allows these states, many of whom have recently graduated from ODA, to pursue south-south cooperation without the stigma of association with decades of failed development policies. Several of the precedents and trends established in the 2005 Paris Declaration, ACCRA 2008¹⁶ and the “New Deal” at Busan in 2011¹⁷ have been adhered to by emerging states although not publicly championed. These new development actors have been relatively cooperative and transparent, yet their voice and legitimacy in the South has been persistently scrutinized and questioned. As all international actors weigh their national strategies with that of development and peacebuilding agendas, problems over harmonization of aid programs will likely continue¹⁸. Despite continued issues of transparency and ethical concerns, the opportunities for cooperation and creation of complimentary projects through bilateral or triangular cooperation are considerable. With the deadline for the MDGs looming, this is an auspicious time to create a more equitable and inclusive approach for aid assistance to developing and conflict-affected countries.

Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Development Agenda

The post-9/11 international system is one that is characterized by anti-western terrorism, Islamaphobia, the weakening of NATO, and a diffuse UN consensus. The effects of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have generated significant reverberations within the region and throughout the global community. Turkey’s geostrategic position has traditionally marked the country as the bulwark between East and West, especially during the Cold War¹⁹. But of increasing importance today is Turkey’s cultural identity as a modern state with a parliamentary democracy, a secular constitution, and a majoritarian Muslim population. These unique characteristics have positioned Turkey as a multi-dimensional actor between the hinges of the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. The impact of geopolitics, modernity, and democracy has brought shape to the central values underlying Turkey’s foreign policy and the source of its soft power.²⁰ It is within this context that Turkey has emerged as a pivotal state in world affairs. Despite global downturns, Turkey has enjoyed unprecedented economic growth in the last decade, making it the 17th largest economy in the world.²¹ Political leaders have since stepped onto the international stage by becoming accepted regional mediators and the fourth largest donor of humanitarian assistance in the world – particularly in the Balkans and Middle East.²²

A strong tradition has emanated from the Ottoman era of state and private philanthropy for development projects and services such as schools, hospitals, and mosques.²³ This understanding of constructive development is one that is still prevalent among many Turkish agencies and civil society actors. Turkey’s NGO community has been growing in size and activism since the mid-1990s after the relaxation of many of the laws and social

restrictions that had impeded civil society activity. The Bosnian war and the expanding violence in the Balkans was a key influence on the emergence of humanitarian NGOs in Turkey²⁴ and the increasing mobilization of the Turkish state's humanitarian activities, which also sought to reestablish its cultural, economic, and political ties with the region.²⁵ Similarly the independence of the Turkic states of Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union ignited the desire for closer relations and mutual assistance that has only in recent years come to fruition.²⁶ These events provoked a more assertive shift in Turkey's foreign assistance. Turkey, as a recipient of Official Development Aid (ODA) since multiparty rule began in the 1950s, was significantly influenced by both its experience as an aid recipient and internal strife with its minorities. Beginning with the transition in the 1980s, Turkey first began to re-orientate and increase its international activity. Officials promoted forms of "assistance" which reflected dual emphasis on state security and economic development. It initially targeted neighboring countries where there was a long heritage of historical and cultural ties.²⁷ Reflecting this increasing commitment to development assistance, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) was established in 1992. Under the governance of the AKP, TİKA's portfolio has since been diversified and expanded to include the Caucasus, South Asia, and of increasing prominence, Africa. It now works in 100 countries and has 33 Programme Coordination Offices in 30 cooperation partner countries.²⁸ Turkey's commitment to proactive development assistance and systematic cooperation with international actors is evidenced by its participation in the UNDP South-South Cooperation (SSC)²⁹ and its initiatives with Least Developed Countries.³⁰

In the past three decades, Turkey has been active in participating with international initiatives in a diversity of conflict-affected states such as Bosnia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

Traditionally Turkey has offered assistance in peacekeeping and other military initiatives, starting with the Korean War, where it provided the 4th largest contingent.³¹ After the Cold War, Turkey assumed a number of roles such as a UN observer following the 1988-1991 Iran-Iraq war, and providing military leadership during the UNOSOM II operation in Somalia in 1993. Additionally, Turkey made significant contributions to the stabilization of Kosovo and Bosnia by deploying both military and civilian police. However, since early 2000, Turkey's approach to conflict-affected countries has shifted away from being primarily military to an increasingly civilian capacity focus. This shift reflects the change in foreign policy under the guidance of its chief architect Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has promoted a pragmatic multilateral foreign policy that strives for a balance between proactive or "visionary" foreign policy and crisis management.³² The importance of human rights, which previously had been rhetorically emphasized, has now become central to Turkey's foreign policy practices under the terminology of "humanitarian diplomacy." In its evolving role as a regional mediator, Turkey continues to wrestle with the difficult and fragile balance between respecting the sovereignty of states while also protecting the security and needs of citizens - a tension that is particularly relevant to its efforts in Syria and Somalia in 2011-2013.³³

Somalia Case Study

Over 30 years of conflict and insecurity have persistently destabilized Somalia. Waves of famines, internal displacement, terrorist activities, and an ineffectual central government has fragmented the country into the sub political and territorial entities of Puntland, Somaliland, Galmudug State, Jubaland, and the South Central region of the Federal Government of Somalia. In the two decades since the fall of the Barre regime, both Puntland and Somaliland have largely been able to escape the periodic humanitarian crises that has plagued the rest of the country, and remained peaceful and stable. Isolated from the global banking networks, agriculture serves as the basis for the country's informal cash economy.³⁴ With fertile land in the South and significant fisheries and natural resources such as gas and oil in the North, Somalia's potential for self-sufficiency is high. It has also cultivated a significant and powerful diaspora³⁵ that have the paradoxical potential to help lift the country out of its strife or to feed into the Islamist insurgency threatening the nation.

Somalia is at a precarious moment. It stands at a threshold of either building on positive developments such as renewed international engagement in the country and re-opened talks with Puntland and Somaliland³⁶ or sinking back into the historical and chaotic patterns of clan rivalry and Jihadist warfare that have thrived in an environment of structural insecurity and poverty.

Short History of War Torn Somalia

The complexity of Somali society and its geostrategic position has been a source of Somalia's enduring independence and its disunity. Continuous fragility has been exacerbated by decades of internal conflicts as well as international

aid intervention strategies. Somali clan affiliation, the dominant form of social organization and protection, is a critical factor in the country's persistent discord. Clanism is a product of the territory's vast geography, the nomadic nature of the country's agriculture-based economy, colonialism, and a deep distrust of a centralized state. During the scramble for Africa, the Horn succeeded in retaining significant autonomy under the colonial administration of Italy who governed the area of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and what is now considered Somalia. Like many forms of colonialism, however, the presence of a possessive foreign power and its invasive societal impact heightened ethnic identity and clan associations. These affiliations became a significant support for survival; the strength of these ties persists today.

The nature of clan lineage is also embedded in specific Islamic practices that have developed in the country for over 1,000 years. The most popular expression of Islam has been the traditionally apolitical Shafi branch of Sunni Islam which includes the veneration of Saints – as well as the ancestors of Somali clans.³⁷ One of Italy's colonial administrative strategies was to manipulate cultural and religious identities between the Muslim Somalis and the Christian Ethiopians.³⁸ This dynamic is particularly illustrated through Italy's annexation of the semi-desert area of Ogaden – from Ethiopia to Somalia – the same area that would later fuel Pan-Somalism, aggravate an undeclared war, and intensify tensions between the two countries. Although clan affiliation briefly diminished in favor of a unified Pan Somali vision to thwart Italy's colonial governance, it re-emerged again as the primary form of association alongside a more fundamentalist form of Islam in the 1980s. During this same time period, Somalia's neighboring countries, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti began providing various forms of assistance to different warring clan factions.³⁹ The three factors of strong clan affiliation, Islamic fundamentalism, and foreign aid created a potent

backdrop for President Barre's evolving repressive regime.

General Barre had stepped onto Somalia's political stage in the middle of the Cold War. The general, a member of the Marehan Darod sub-clan near Ogaden, organized a coup and overthrew the democratically elected government of the Somali Youth League in 1969. During the proxy wars of the Cold War, global security and ideology were taking precedence over human rights concerns. Public will was often traded for increasingly ineffective and unpopular governments. Such was the case in Somalia. As the Cold War era progressed, Somalia's geostrategic importance became significant. Barre's administration began to reap the benefits from foreign aid funneling into Mogadishu, first from the Soviets, and then by the United States as well as Saudi Arabia. Flush with petro-dollars, Saudi Arabia's bi-lateral aid was meant to challenge the influence of the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ Monies were provided to build and fund Madrasas and to provide educational scholarships for Somali youth. The toxicity of these paradoxically motivated flows of aid into Somali society would first become apparent with the disastrous invasion of Ethiopia's Ogaden region in 1977. No other event so singularly illustrates how the forces of global security agendas can precariously politicize humanitarian aid.

The Ogaden War (1977-1978) created 400,000-800,000 refugees (comprised mainly of Somali Ethiopians from all clans inside Somalia⁴¹), and drew an influx of Western aid and workers to service these camps for the next eleven years. The presence of international NGOs soon became a source of lucrative funds for the government in Mogadishu with officials acting as intermediaries between the NGOs and refugees.⁴² They diverted much of the aid, while simultaneously inflating the number of displaced people to increase supplies and then expelling any foreign dignitaries or expatriates who challenged the state's position. Clan leaders were equally shrewd. They began to capitalize off

the foreign financial aid pouring into the country and eventually used it to fight against President Barre's despotic government and to ultimately overthrow his regime. With the ousting of Barre's forces from Ogaden by the Soviets in 1978, Somalia slowly descended into civil war as disgruntled clans begin to oppose an increasingly violent central government stacked with Barre's Marehan Darod clan.⁴³ Utilizing a state war economy, the Barre regime had turned refugee sites into de-facto training camps and humanitarian aid into logistical support, recruiting many of the refugees to fight up north in the occupation of northwestern Somalia in what is today called Somaliland. Despite the international aid community's awareness of these violations, no actions were taken to suspend aid to the refugee camps as Somalia was still an important and strategic Cold War ally.

Pilfering of foreign aid continued as the country descended further into civil turmoil, culminating in the 1991 famine and the dissolution of the Somali Democratic Republic. When Barre's regime finally fell, international humanitarian organizations were confronted with a war economy that was no longer orchestrated by the government in Mogadishu, but by local clans and militia. While NGO personnel were not harmed, rebels began to target their vehicles, housing, and the food supplies meant for the camps. After decades of internal conflicts and disaster, humanitarian aid was one of the only sources of reliable revenue for them. They felt entitled to the aid of agencies that operated in their areas. Aid workers were frequently forced to purchase protection from local militia to pursue their work, in what became known as "technical assistance."⁴⁴ The initiation of the first UNITAF mission in 1992 (Operation Restore Hope), briefly brought greater security to aid personnel but ultimately this international intervention changed the nature of the security dynamic and agenda in Somalia. Within five months, UNITAF had transitioned into UNOSOM whose mandate

had moved from one of humanitarian support to securitization of the escalating civil war. Their directive was to re-establish a central state and arrest local warlords. The effect of this action resulted in such an escalation of violence that the United States ultimately exited the mission in the aftermath of the Black Hawk Down incident. The neutrality and security of humanitarian aid workers was compromised by these events, forcing NGOs to eventually relocate their headquarters and international staff to the safety of Nairobi; a situation that has largely persisted to this day.

A retreat of the international community and aid organizations from Somalia has strengthened clan affiliation as people sought security through alternative networks. In fact, the constitutions of Somaliland and Puntland were negotiated in conjunction with clan leaders to ensure a consensus.⁴⁵ However, while clans have brought stability to some local areas through traditional conflict resolution methods such as blood-money, they have been unable to curb the activity or influence of terrorist groups. Additionally, because the international community has been so fixated on establishing a centralized government in Mogadishu, it has been unable to effectively counter both the recruitment and activities of terrorist groups in Somalia, particularly those with a clan affiliation.⁴⁶ The internationally supported Transitional Federal Government was deeply unpopular and ineffective in the country in this regard. Although the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was rejected by the international community because of its fundamentalist links, it had enjoyed widespread support among the clans and brought a level of stability and rule in 2006 to South Central Somalia that had not been achieved for years.

The securitization of aid that followed in the aftermath of the UNOSOM missions and the post-9/11 global context has compromised the independence and efficiency of aid, leading to further deterioration on the ground.⁴⁷ The Horn of

Africa has received much scrutiny and international coordination in relation to the security concerns instigated by the growing activities of pirates, and continued terrorism activities. Out of this concern for security, Ethiopia engaged a military intervention in Somali against the “Jihadists” and UIC in 2006.⁴⁸ This disastrous action deteriorated security even further, leading to increased refugee flows into Kenya, thus precipitating conditions that ultimately led to the 2011 famine. Additionally, a number of attacks on Western aid agencies and citizens in Somalia have created a heightened culture of security-risk aversion among traditional donors over the years. As a result, security has become the defining criteria for aid distribution, placing the safety of NGO personnel above humanitarian and development efforts. This imposition of security conditions on aid sends a clear message that the safety of international aid agencies is prioritized over the needs of the populace.⁴⁹ Based in Nairobi, international aid agencies have been forced to rely on local contractors in Somalia to deliver aid, many of whom benefit from the continuance of the very conditions that attract humanitarian assistance.

At an inter-state level, anti-terror laws are exacerbating the internal dynamics in Somalia and the efficiency of humanitarian aid projects.⁵⁰ In the pursuit of global security, traditional donors such as the United States, Australia, and Britain, all adhere to national anti-terrorism legislation that criminalizes any transfer of resources to a suspected terrorist organization or associates⁵¹.

Such legislation also limits the autonomy of associated NGOs by inserting clauses into funding agreements and procedures or through legislation governing NGO conduct. A number of British NGOs working in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia organizations in the Gaza Strip, have had their funding cut due to such agreements. In 2009, the US government withheld new food assistance deliveries to aid agencies pending a review of the legality of their operations in Somalia in response to Al-Shaabab's

designation as a terrorist organization the year before. Since that time, three American NGOs have terminated activities in the country and overall aid fell to 88 percent.⁵² 60 percent of the 3.5 million Somalis that required humanitarian aid in 2009 were in areas controlled by Al-Shaabab.⁵³

The complex mosaic of clans and identities in Somalia has been essential to Somali survival, but it is also a system that has been exacerbated by aid securitization over the years. The territory of Somalia has been ravaged by decades of conflict, leaving the economy and infrastructure of the country emaciated. The economy of Puntland, an autonomous region since 1998, is almost completely dependent on the revenue generated from the piracy conducted off its coast.⁵⁴ The economies of Somaliland and Somalia consist of agriculture, a black market economy driven largely by humanitarian aid and piracy, and the remittances of the large international Somali diaspora.⁵⁵ Anti-terrorism laws and the securitization of aid limit the flexibility and security of humanitarian and development efforts. In a country as complex and fragile as Somalia, the association between civilians and members of undesirable organizations such as Al-Shaabab or Hizb-al-Islam is often due to the necessity of survival and the kinship of clans. In such a situation, efforts to penalize a few have affected entire regions. Aid has become politicized by those who are allowed or not allowed to receive it, and the providers of assistance have become tainted by their bias and a history of failed international interventions in Somalia.

Turkey's Development Initiatives in Somalia

As a majority Muslim state that is emboldened with Western institutions and a pluralistic democratic constitution, Turkey has created a hybrid model of development that reflects its own unique global positioning. Although the "West" is at the very genesis of Turkey's modern political identity, the

relational and historical threads of the Ottoman era reach far to its east, north, and south, too. The built-in ambiguity or flexibility in this distinctiveness offers Turkey a unique locus. It can tilt comfortably in a variety of directions depending upon the specific concerns and needs of any global challenge. Within this nimble positioning there is generous latitude for the country to adapt to the growing edge of most regional and/or international demands.

Turkey believes the combination of its geostrategic location, a booming economy, the ability to understand different social and cultural dynamics within the region, and its foreign policy values bring a unique perspective and shape to development assistance. These distinctions also set it apart from the frameworks of traditional Western donors.

Foundational foreign policy principles such as multi-dimensional diplomacy, zero problems with neighbors, cooperation, win-win strategies, defending democratic values, and demanding a just international order infuse the ethics of Turkey's humanitarian and development practices. Its leaders have consistently refused coercive methods for international conflict resolution engagement and, instead, promote proactive diplomacy and dialogue between all parties. In addition, Turkey tends to prioritize bilateral and direct engagement over multilateral development efforts. Another hallmark of Turkey's development framework that may be unique from the "West" is the emphasis it places on strengthening the economic integration within its region in order to enhance interdependence. While economic initiatives may illustrate Turkey's liberal approach to international cooperation and institutionalization, this priority also demonstrates a raised consciousness about the relationship between violence, poverty, and political instability. Highlighting efforts in Somalia, for example, underlines Turkey's focus upon a participatory and comprehensive approach to economic and social development. Providing the means and support for infrastructure development is both complimentary and necessary to stabilize Somalia's transition. Turkey forecasts that strengthening the public and private sectors will ultimately contribute to

national cohesion.

Turkey's perspective on this strategy is pragmatic and essential for building sustained peace.⁵⁶

Turkey considers soft power and confidence building strategies as a holistic approach to conflict intervention, peacebuilding, and development.

These include strategies such as economic interdependence, high-level political dialogue, development/humanitarian assistance, cultural sensitivity based upon a shared history, and effective public diplomacy. It is the intentional combination of these strategies (along with a commitment to non-coercive intervention) that sets Turkey apart from the more dominant Western approach. Additionally, Turkey seems to be unique in its explicit use of language – particularly around the meaning of “ethics” and its emphasis on working from an ethical paradigm. In the past year, there has been a sharp increase in rhetoric about “Turkey’s Ethical Framework” throughout diplomatic speeches and high level meetings. In his most current writings about involvement in conflict affected countries, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has started to describe the “ethics” underpinning Turkey’s foreign policy framework as being sincere, honest, transparent, trustworthy, neutral, hopeful, inclusive, and sharing a common vision.⁵⁷ President Gül has also stated that Turkey’s framework emphasizes human dignity and justice, serving as a unique and “virtuous power.”⁵⁸

Turkey’s entrance into the Somali conflict may have been a surprise to many, but it exemplifies the dynamic emphasis within its foreign policy. Its intervention into Somalia was based on a strong moral and ethical belief in the need to end the effects of the famine and the cycles of conflict that were perpetuating Somali suffering.⁵⁹ Not only was a strong sense of ethical obligation a driving force behind Turkey’s involvement, but so was its sense of duty that the international community shares a responsibility and obligation to assist in solving conflicts. Humanitarian crises and war are a result of much broader regional and global dynamics, and regional neighbors are neither immune nor

impervious to the impact of instability and violence. Turkey’s perspective on the causes of human suffering has emerged from the recognition of the challenging and global nature of conflicts facing many states today – and particularly within its own neighborhood. It is because of such an environment that Turkey’s foreign policy and development efforts embrace a proactive and multidimensional approach to meet those challenges. The country relies on its soft power strength, particularly in the areas of mediation, religious-based cultural affiliation, and bilateral development relations. All three mechanisms are leveraged to generate sustainable partnerships throughout the region.⁶⁰ They are also the same principles and mechanisms that form the basis for Turkey’s engagement in Somalia.

As an emerging donor in the global arena, Turkey’s development vision found full expression in Somalia as its efforts there reflect a commitment to mediation, social justice, and peacebuilding.

Free of aid conditionality, Turkey emphasizes a mutually beneficial and sustainable partnership between donor and recipients through civil capacity building measures which focus on cultural association and the equal and direct engagement with locals. Due to security concerns, traditional development aid to fragile states has often stagnated with such donors increasingly faced with questions about their agendas and motives. It is within this context that Turkey’s role has been evolving. Turkey entered into the Somali context without the encumbrances that currently plague international donors. Yet Turkey’s leaders have remained particularly critical of the international community’s ineffectiveness during the devastating 2011 famine and its failure to achieve justice and stability in Somalia.⁶¹ They have called upon the global community to return to the courageous development aid practices of the past and to offer more ethically and morally responsible assistance in the future.

When Turkish NGOs and officials began working in Somalia, efforts were initially framed as emergency

humanitarian assistance in specific response to the famine in 2011. Aid assistance and humanitarian workers were devoted to the alleviation of human suffering through short term material relief and services, emergency food aid, and relief coordination. Public and private harmonization and coordination was at its highest in the summer of 2011. A widespread campaign in Turkey, led by NGOs such as Kimse Yok Mu (KYM) and Human Relief Foundation (IHH), made a considerable contribution in finding substantial resources and support for relief efforts.⁶² However, these activities quickly transformed into broader programs to address the fundamental structural deficit in the country that is sustaining conflict.⁶³ Reflecting the country's commitment and approach to Somalia, Turkey appointed Kani Torun, a humanitarian activist and former general coordinator for Doctors World Wide (YDD), to oversee its efforts.

*Turkey's Somali aid program can be separated into five pillars: humanitarian aid, economic development, infrastructure, political assistance, and security sector reform.*⁶⁴

The goal of this comprehensive strategy is the protection of all Somalis within a functioning state; Mogadishu in particular needs capacity building in order to achieve this end. Currently, there is no state system or coordinating infrastructure through which Turkey's civilian assistance can be accepted, organized, or disseminated. At the same time, public trust remains low. There is a critical need to bolster sentiment for Somalia's national unity and to encourage a collective vision for a functioning state. Turkey's development reforms include finding ways to address public opinion through various civil society building measures. Described in Turkey's foreign policy goals as "global development diplomacy efforts," or "development cooperation efforts," civilian capacity building programs – such as strengthening infrastructure and encouraging civil society engagement – have become the basis of Turkish development efforts in Somalia.⁶⁵

The emphasis on civilian capacity building reflects

Turkey's increasing use of its soft power resources over traditional military based mechanisms.⁶⁶ Key technical assistance programs include infrastructure reform such as building roads, schools, health clinics, and civilian capacity building measures through training of municipality works⁶⁷, training of Imams⁶⁸, and increasing the civilian capacity of the Central Bank of Somalia.⁶⁹ Turkey's multi-faceted approach includes the parallel use of both humanitarian association and development aid, and encompasses collaboration with a number of private NGOs initiatives such as agricultural training and water sanitation. Turkish NGO YDD (Doctors Without Borders) is a significant partner to the country's development framework and reflects this fusion of aid efforts. YDD began its initial assistance to Somalia by providing humanitarian relief in 2010. They now have longer-term projects that combine technical assistance and civilian capacity building. For example, they helped build Sifa Hospital in Mogadishu to revitalize a healthcare system that had been destroyed by the civil war and foreign interventions. Currently, they are strengthening the capacity of Somali medical workers by training them at Turkey's Bezmialem Trust University Hospital. These workers continue receiving support through regular rotations by visiting YDD doctors at Sifa. YDD is now in the process of transitioning the hospital to the care of Somalia's Ministry of Health.⁷⁰ YDD also established medical nutrition centers in several regions through Somalia. Working in cooperation with UNICEF, nutritional experts supply curative food and medical formula for mothers and their infants.

Mediation is a flagship of Turkish foreign diplomacy and another example of its soft power.

Efforts at facilitating dialogue are indivisible from Turkey's framework of development which incorporates the support of peacebuilding and statebuilding. A central aspect Turkey's conflict-sensitive method is engagement and dialogue with all parties to a conflict. Through its various development initiatives, Turkey has sought to become a trusted partner and mediator in Somalia. At the intra-state level, Turkey supports national

reconciliation and the preservation of territorial integrity of all Somalia. Leaders have encouraged the facilitation of talks between Somaliland and South Central.⁷¹ Because of the fractured system and loyalties in Somalia, mediation and dialogue are the primary means through which Turkish NGOs and ministries conduct their aid programs. Although State efforts are generally suspected of political agendas, Turkey has intentionally worked to maintain humanitarianism's creed of neutrality as a core operating principle.⁷² This necessitates the perception of impartial engagement with all actors. Fostering interpersonal dialogue and engagement with local actors through the delivery of direct aid is one aspect of this balancing act. Turkey has been working through TIKA to open up development offices in Puntland and Baydhabo. Depending upon the security situation, Turkey has additionally received permission from Somaliland to open a General Consul in the region. These efforts reflect Turkey's genuine commitment to partnering throughout the wider territories of Somalia. Turkish state officials are very aware of appearing prejudiced towards Mogadishu, and have actively pursued engagement with other regions in the country from Somaliland to Kismayo in South Central Somalia.⁷³

IHH, one of the largest Turkish NGOs, provides another example of conflict-sensitive approaches to development among Turkish private actors. Since 1997, they have actively engaged with several local clans through collaborative efforts with Somali NGO Zamzam.⁷⁴ IHH seeks to develop partnerships that are undergirded by strong communication with the local leadership and communities. They stress neutrality towards civil disputes and emphasize their support for all of Somalia. Their long-standing relationship with Zamzam is why IHH Deputy President Hüseyin Oruç believes they are perceived as unbiased actors in the country; free from holding a security agenda.⁷⁵ Facilitating dialogue between communities is an underlying goal in IHH's framework and is exhibited through programs such as educational and agricultural training workshops in which people are drawn

from all over the country.

The key aspect of Turkey's ambitious development framework is the direct delivery of aid between the government and Turkish NGOs to local Somali communities. TIKA estimates that there are less than 200 Turkish nationals in Somalia as of 2013.⁷⁶ Despite the low numbers of Turkish aid workers, quick and effective aid delivery has continued unabated. Regional Somali Ministries have praised the method of direct aid delivery because it has empowered and engendered confidence in the local populace by signaling that they can be trusted as equal partners.⁷⁷ The result of this direct aid has also been visible through significant infrastructure changes such as paved roads, disposal services, and clean water services.⁷⁸ The efficient delivery of aid is something that is highly valued among Turkish personnel⁷⁹ and is a differentiating characteristic of Turkish development approach compared to other actors. While Turkey's level of ODA may be more limited than that of larger donors, its method of aid provision results in lower operating costs that produce higher aid yields.⁸⁰ Other international donors base themselves in Nairobi or in the heavily guarded Anisom base in Mogadishu⁸¹ and rely on local but impersonal channels to send aid. But the cost of delivering humanitarian aid is therefore higher due to corruption, security expenditures, and other running costs. The direct delivery of aid by officials not only provides more assistance, it also promotes mutual trust, a personalized manner of aid delivery⁸², and increases Turkey's sphere of influence.

In contrast to many traditional donors, Turkey does not attach conditionality to its assistance because such aid often fosters resentment and stifles the kind of sustainable statebuilding that donors hope to support.⁸³

An increasing number of States have begun to prefer engagement with Non-DAC members because of this issue which has created a unique opening for emerging countries. While Turkey does not engage in ideological aid or conditionality, its pursuit and support for good governance initiatives

in Somalia, as part of its wider development agenda, represent a more equitable and empowering approach towards democratization than the coercive measure of political conditionality of aid. The controversial inclusion of 300 civil society groups in the second UN Istanbul conference on Somalia in June 2012 illustrates the Turkish state's commitment to fostering national unity through engagement and dialogue. Challenging the reluctance of their Somali counterparts and the international community, Turkish officials stressed that "we want the international community to hear the voice of the grassroots organizations of Somalia."⁸⁴ Also, Turkey's training programs for Somali civil servants and diplomats' influences the creation of a culture of good governance.⁸⁵ Similarly the state's scholarship program for Somali youth represents an investment not only in the future leaders and entrepreneurs of the country, but also the bilateral relations between Somalia and Turkey. In 2011, almost 1,100 scholarships were provided for Somali students by Diyanet, KYM, and Helping Hands⁸⁶, with a further 440 students studying in Turkey in 2013.⁸⁷

In the absence of aid conditionality, Turkey frames its relationship with Somalia in terms of a shared religious-cultural heritage. This has made some traditional donors nervous, especially as they witness an overall shift taking place in Muslim countries' donor activities.⁸⁸ But this is yet another example of Turkey extending a traditional tool of soft power. Turkey supports cultural projects and the study of Turkish language through both its scholarship programs and the opening of a Turkish Culture Center in Mogadishu.⁸⁹ The acceptance of Turkish State agencies and NGOs by locals has been aided by highlighting their religious affinities. The framing of their relationship and presence in Somalia in terms of shared religious heritage helps to facilitate the ability of public and private Turkish organizations to successfully interact with local clans as legitimate and non-threatening partners. This is a critical dimension of what separates Turkey's efforts from traditional donor actors in Somalia.⁹⁰ NGO workers have stated that

"for the Turkish organizations it was much easier because we don't have a political agenda. We were not the occupier of Somalia. In addition we have another bridge between Somalia and Turkey; both are Islamic countries and people from the Islamic world have been accepted much more than Westerns."⁹¹ A shared religious-cultural heritage has created a level of trust among most actors, with the exception of Al-Shaabab which considers Turkey too Western.⁹²

Turkey has developed considerable experience working in conflict countries such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Burma⁹³, while also engaging in bilateral mediation between states such as Israel and Syria (2003,2007), and facilitating dialogue between Iran and the West over the former's nuclear program.⁹⁴ The values inherent in mediation such as a non-coercive and inclusive process guide Turkish NGO activities in Somalia. Embracing a multilateral approach, Turkish NGO actors support the process of national reconciliation at a local level through civilian capacity building programs. At the same time, Turkey's governmental officials pursue intra-state Track One diplomacy through efforts which encourage the territorial integrity of Somalia.

The provision of full Turkish scholarships for hundreds of Somali students is not only a significant investment in the future relations between the two countries but it is also a conflict-sensitive strategy by discouraging Somali youth from joining militant groups. The provision of scholarships to Somali youth targets the country's largest demographic for militant recruitment and offers them a chance for an alternative future. This focus on Somali youth is also reflected in the numerous schools currently being built by TIKA, KYM, IHH, and the Gülen movement. Contrary to the Chinese who have been widely criticized for importing labor⁹⁵, Turkey invests heavily in local capacity through training programs and it creates local jobs with many Somali's acting as translators, laborers and representatives for Turkish organizations farther afield.⁹⁶ This has the dual effect of decreasing the cost of Turkish aid while simultaneously

empowering locals. However the continuing problem of a large population of unemployed youth is an issue that will require a multilateral approach by both the Somali government and the international community if national reconciliation is to be sustained.

While the success of Turkey's political strategy is ongoing, the "Turkish model"⁹⁷ of providing direct aid to people on the ground and its extensive infrastructure projects has been praised for providing visible and tangible progress to local peoples.

An interpersonal approach to local empowerment reflects their overall emphasis on peacebuilding. Turkey's efforts during the 2011 famine illustrate that an emerging country can potentially make a more significant development impact than the better resourced BRICS and traditional donor states. They did so by identifying neglected development gaps that require assistance and by mobilizing both public and private organizations to work in tandem with governmental initiatives.⁹⁸ However, there still remain significant problems of overall coordination between TIKA, the Somali governments, and the numerous Turkish NGOs active on the ground.⁹⁹ The flexibility and efficiency of aid delivery, which is a defining characteristic of Turkey's approach, has meant that Turkish officials have sometimes bypassed the relevant state channels in their enthusiasm, undermining the very statebuilding they are hoping to support. This is a problem that TIKA has experienced in other developing countries.¹⁰⁰ The problem of consistent coordination in Somalia is further problematized by the fragmented condition of Somali ministries, and reluctance on the part of Turkish officials to feed into the corruption that is endemic in the country. Given the amount of aid that is pouring into all parts of Somalia, Turkish officials recognize the serious need for better coordination. Currently, an inter-Ministerial Committee is drafting Turkey's development strategy in consultation with several civil society actors and the UNDP. Turkey's development coordination offices in any country are essential for its effectiveness. As the

implementing agency of various Ministry programs, TIKA is the most important supporting mechanism for NGOs working in the field. Yet officials have acknowledged that there must be more enhanced regulations and strategies to direct the multiple Turkish institutions that work through TIKA and their relationship with civil society in general.¹⁰¹ The need for regulation and coordination within all conflict-affected states is also of key concern but Turkish officials are trying to balance their desire for stronger institutional mechanisms with the NGO communities' insistence to retain independence.

The process of clarifying and institutionalizing Turkey's development model is ongoing. Their approach to every development effort differs and they design unique programs for each particular country.¹⁰² Turkey is now cautiously attempting to institutionalize long-term approaches to conflict and fragile states. However Turkey is wary of the bureaucracy and binding regulations of traditional donors which it feels stifles the creativity of programs and may hinder flexibility and efficiency in responding to problems. Although not a member of the DAC, Turkey is an observer and is reporting its ODA figures to the Secretariat.¹⁰³ Since 2005, the DAC has dropped the perquisite that members stop receiving ODA to join. This policy change has opened the opportunity for emerging states to more fully embrace international development efforts without damaging their domestic agendas. Yet Turkey is attempting to formalize a unique development framework without external influences¹⁰⁴ thereby avoiding the pitfalls and enforcement mechanisms of more established donors. This decision may account for why TIKA has been accused of distancing itself from other international organizations and forums in the past few years such as Busan 2011.¹⁰⁵ Coordination and isolation are also two complaints regularly leveled at Turkey by other international actors, in particular in relation to Somalia.¹⁰⁶ Coordination among the international community is essential to establishing sustainable statebuilding in Somalia and in fighting a culture of patronage.¹⁰⁷ In response to such criticisms, Turkish officials have consistently

emphasized their willingness to communicate directly with international actors who are on the ground in Mogadishu. Reflecting a concern of falling into the traditional donor pattern of the securitization of development, Turkish officials insist that any development agenda for Somalia is discussed within the country and among its various leaders.

To Somalis, the continued visibility and presence of Turkish citizens in Mogadishu since the ousting of Al-Shaabab in July 2011 has been one of the most striking and endearing aspects of the country's approach. It has changed the stigma of the country as a "no-go zone and raised questions over the country's isolation for two decades."¹⁰⁸ Turks have enjoyed unprecedented security in a country noted for its hostility to foreigners and even from the punitive activities of Al-Shaabab which views them as Westernized Muslims.¹⁰⁹ This has been attributed primarily to Turkey's willingness to live and work alongside the local population and the level of respect that they exhibit towards Somalis. Despite the presence of many Turkish citizens in Mogadishu for nearly two years, there were no attacks on them until April and July 2013. The Al-Shaabab attacks killed three Turkish workers for Kizilay,¹¹⁰ a member of the Turkish embassy¹¹¹ the head of YYD operations in Somalia and a native Somali.¹¹² In its cooperation with conflict-affected states, Turkey wrestles with finding the fragile balance between respect for state sovereignty and international community's response and responsibility towards state-sponsored or rebel violence against citizens. This challenge will likely be an ongoing juggle with bilateral efforts in Somalia. In the aftermath of these recent attacks, Turkish officials have reiterated their commitment to the Somali people and their presence on the ground. There will be increased security around personnel and citizens in Mogadishu but it has been emphasized that this will not stop the activities of Turkish workers.¹¹³ Projects will continue and expand to other parts of the country, such as the General Consul in Somaliland as Turkey pursues its development vision with Somalis.

Turkey's development approach to Somalia reflects its soft power-attributes and status as an emerging donor. Its multilateral development initiatives span the humanitarian and development arena while simultaneous political efforts are being pursued to forge a united Somali system that has support from regional governments and civil society actors.

The importance of mediation and conflict-sensitivity is apparent in Turkish ministries' and NGO initiatives that pursue multilateral and capacity-based development projects that are primarily aimed at alleviating humanitarian suffering and empowering locals. While traditional donors employ the discourse of democratization, the use of historical and religious rhetoric by Turkish actors has served to legitimize Turkey's presence in the country as a non-threatening actor that can serve as an alternative role model to the developing nation. The presence of Turkish citizens on the ground in Mogadishu has only served to reinforce this perception. However Turkey's preoccupation in distinguishing itself from the tainted practices of other donors has prevented it from fully engaging and communicating with other international donors in Somalia. This limits the success and extent of its multilateral projects in a country driven by complex clan and kinship alliances that have extensive experience in playing donors against one another. Despite Turkey's awareness of these conflict-dynamics it still risks being perceived as biased by its almost exclusive presence in Mogadishu due to the continuing security problems in the surrounding region. Turkey's development vision in Somalia, which emphasizes a moral imperative in humanitarian activities, offers a refreshing approach to a stagnate conflict but one that cannot be fully achieved without addressing internal institutional issues and engaging with all international actors.

Development Discussion

Development is a contested term. Many debates surround the meaning of development and arguments about “best practices” abound. Traditional donors and Western powers have tended to understand development as synonymous with economic growth and modernity. Unfortunately, vestiges of the colonial mindset have been woven into post-WWII framework and have continued to shape many contemporary practices. For example, the Eurocentric idea of “trusteeship” or that those already “developed” can and should act on behalf of others “less developed” brought much definition, if not permission, for States to pursue their “vital interests” under the cloak of humanitarianism. Post-development theorists have long argued against this particular expression of the contemporary development enterprise, emphasizing the destructive power within intervention strategies and attempts at transforming non-Western societies. Development, for some, has now become a ‘toxic’ word because it has torn apart the bonds of natural and human communities. Too often, according to Rist (1997)¹⁶, development has become a discourse that simply legitimates the global expansionism of capitalism and the ability of external state actors to pursue their goals.

Many communities in the world have benefited from traditional donor development engagement. Other communities have been stymied or debilitated by poor development efforts. In particular several states, most arguably the Least Developed Countries and fragile states – have been recalcitrant to many initiatives.

Analysis of what currently constitutes the assumed standard for “good” development is warranted. Yet research and practitioners’ experiences indicate that emergent conflict sensitive frameworks do offer more thoughtful analysis and considerations for the complexities of working within conflict-affected States.

While “conflict sensitive frameworks” may be the new development “buzz” word, there is clear merit in understanding the dynamic interplay of system-wide actors, historical strains, power differentials, religious ideologies, ethnic differentiations, and root causes of tensions, prior to instituting development practices in a conflict-affected community. Additionally, utilizing a Theories of Change approach can also be a critical resource for analyzing reactivity within systems – particularly the cause and effects of development initiatives. Even though many humanitarian and relief actors maintain their impartiality, what they “do” never remains neutral. Due to this inevitable bias, ethical considerations and frameworks must be in place to guide even the most sensitized and astute development practitioner.

As middle income states begin to emerge onto the development scene, it will be especially important for them to be cognizant of historical patterns and ways their own conceptualizations of development are influenced by the dominant international paradigm. Given their own histories of being donor recipients, emerging state actors may hold acute sensitivity to traditional hegemonic practices and seek alternative modalities such as bilateral projects and non-conditional aid. But if they are not careful, emerging donor actors may actually perpetuate historical modalities from the West. Our analysis indicates that Turkey’s evolving framework in Somalia is fluctuating between the poles of this broad continuum as its leaders continue to define what constitutes “best” development practices. As Turkey seeks to differentiate its practices in this post-development era, we encourage them to remain mindful of lessons from the past. They have much to learn from traditional donor successes as well as from the mistakes these actors made along the way. By adopting sensitivities from some of the best tried or failed practices of some traditional donors Turkey would not be threatening its unique foreign policy vision or be giving into “hegemonic” standards.

A strong “best” practice that has emerged off the battleground of over sixty decades of contemporary development is adopting a multi-dimensional understanding of the relationship between poverty and development, in that underdevelopment can be a cause of conflict.

Traditional donors have historically taken the position that when conflicts begin, their development initiatives go “on hold” and will only resume once the conflict has subsided. A limited perspective assumed that conflict generated mal-development. This assumption was bolstered by the powerful theme within Western liberal thinking that modernization and development brought stability. What some theorists and practitioners now acknowledge is that globalization and liberal policies can actually antagonize or alienate local divisions. An infusion of capital into the hands of a minority, for example, may sharpen social stratification and stimulate violent social transformation.

Economics are important, but it is simply not enough to spur financial growth. In fact, theorists such as Sen (1999)¹¹⁷, Seers (1979)¹¹⁸, and Goulet (1971)¹¹⁹ argue for a re-definition in our understanding of poverty and thereby economic and aid policies to states. While development must promote “life sustenance” such as food, clothing, health, and shelter – the quality of life is equally important. Dignity, freedom, access to education and literacy, national autonomy, and the ability to participate politically also contributes to improved and sustainable social conditions. People(s) do not just need a higher GNP. They need the ability to lead the kind of lives they value. Capacity-based theorists such as Sen (1999) maintain that the process of development matters as much as the outcome. As people’s capabilities – particularly their ability to access civil and political rights and governmental services – grow, their ability to help themselves and influence their lives will become enhanced. This type of framework ultimately promotes a development dialectic throughout the micro and macro levels. Turkey’s approach is capacity sensitive. Its aid practices are emboldened

by an understanding of the importance of human dignity in development projects. Leaders utilize an integrated effort, one that promotes education and local empowerment alongside the construction of vital infrastructures. We encourage them to continue developing a multi-dimensional understanding of human and state development while also increasing its capacity through coordination with international and local actors. Aid, no matter how well-intentioned, is not neutral. Turkey would do well to continue assessing its practices and communicate its activities with other donors to avoid flooding areas with uncontrolled aid flows. If they are not prudent their current efforts in Somalia could actually exacerbate local tensions instead of appeasing them.

It takes shrewdness and courage to confront the politics of war/conflict economies. Turkey’s determination and dedication to step back inside an internationally abandoned Somalia is commendable.

Violence remains deeply entrenched within and between communities which makes development itself a conflictual process. Strong development practice calls for careful reflection and awareness of the multiple social undercurrents in which it is embedded. Development actors are forced to make choices which are laden with attached social meanings such as class, literacy, ethnicity, gender, sect, clan, etc.¹²⁰ Partnerships with NGOs, who are hired for transportation or translation, and collaborations with political gate keepers – all affect how locals perceive who development actors are, and whose interests they represent. Historically, the potential redistribution of power due to donor driven resources threatened the monopoly of some clans and led donors to either stay (by paying for protection from clans) or leaving (and forfeiting their political presence or humanitarian efforts). Turkey has thus far been successful at sidestepping these dynamics. However as they continue to expand development efforts in Somaliland and South Center Somalia it is likely they will face similar dilemmas. Thoughtful preparation and a sensitive strategy are needed. By recognizing the

potential tensions between underdevelopment, liberal policies, and the infusion of capital, Turkey's development actors will become more mindful of power and positionality within Somali communities. Personnel will need to be culturally and politically astute as they analyze dynamics surrounding the economic transactions taking place. Somalis have played the development game a long time, and they know how to play it well. Turkey could increase its savvy by listening to the advice of international donors who learned this the hard way, and recognizing the near impossibility of rising above these dynamics. There are corrupt leaders in Somalia and without a demand for transparency and a high level of transparency, Turkey could easily fall prey to the same entanglements that beset the traditional development actors who have gone before them.

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
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