IRON FIST OF A SOFT POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE MEASURES (ECONOMIC SANCTIONS) BY THE EUROPEAN UNION

by

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Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Sabancı University

August 2014
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DATE OF APPROVAL: 04.08.2014
Beni uzak diyarlardan izlediğini bildiğim sevgili dedeme...
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I am deeply grateful to my thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Bağ whose support I always feel since the beginning of my graduate study. I have been able to complete this process with her guidance, patience, and confidence in me. I also would like to thank her for the opportunities she has provided for my future professional life.

I am also thankful to Dr. Brooke Luetgert and Dr. M. Emre Hatipoğlu for their contributions to my thesis and for acting as jury members for my thesis defense.

I would like to express my gratitude to my parents and my sister whose unconditional love and understanding always give me strength. I am grateful for everything they have done for me in my life.

Finally, I am truly indebted to Nazlı Türker who has always been with me in this process with her full support and invaluable suggestions.
ABSTRACT

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M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis, 2014

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç

Keywords: Common Foreign and Security Policy, Restrictive Measures, Soft Power, Smart Power

The European Union (EU) in world politics is traditionally characterized as a ‘soft power’ due to reliance on diplomatic measures rather than military force in its relations with the rest of the world. However, since the 1980s the EU has been increasingly using restrictive measures (economic sanctions) as a foreign policy tool under the domain of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Since economic sanctions are defined as ‘hard power’ tools, increasing use of them creates a contradiction with EU’s traditional characterization in world politics. Aim of this study is to provide an explanation to this contradiction by analyzing the EU economic sanctions practices. In this sense, empirical evidence shows that the ability of the EU to use economic sanctions in an increasing trend stems from further integration and institutionalization of the CFSP via the interaction of internal and external dynamics which have led to an attempt by the EU to become an actor that is defined as ‘smart power’.
ÖZET

YUMUŞAK GÜCÜN DEMİR YUMRUĞU: AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ TARAFINDAN UYGULANAN KISITLAYICI ÖNLEMLERİN (EKONOMİK YAPTIRIMLAR) BİR ANALİZİ

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Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2014

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, Kısitlayıcı Önlemler, Yumuşak Güç, Zeki Güç

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INTRODUCTION

“When all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. This old saying was often used to criticize the U.S. overreliance on military force in its security policy. A modified version was said to characterize the European Union’s foreign policy — when all you have are carrots, every problem looks like a rabbit. But the times of the EU as the “global payer” are over now. Instead, the EU has acquired its own hammer: sanctions” (Lehne, 2012).

The above quoted statement from Stefan Lehne, former General Secretariat of the Council of European Union, gives intuitions about the European Union’s redefined role at the global stage with the introduction of economic sanctions (i.e., restrictive measures in EU jargon) as a foreign policy tool. Use of economic sanctions has recently become one of the EU’s favorite foreign policy tools through which the EU aims to change the behavior of the targeted actor in world politics. As of May 2014, the EU has 47 sanctions imposed against countries from its near neighborhood to other regions of the world where 22 of them are still in force. This phenomenon has emerged somewhat surprisingly for scholars and policymakers due to traditional characterization of the EU as a soft power which lacks the sufficient capacity of military power to bring the desired change in the target’s policies.

Since the economic sanctions are defined as a ‘hard power’ tool, an important element can be drawn from Stefan Lehne’s statement: the EU has been drifting away its traditional foreign policy of overreliance on soft power tools – carrots – such as economic and development aid or diplomatic solution to the challenges in world politics. In this respect, aim of this study is to answer the following question: What are the underlying motivations that lead to increased reliance on economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool by the EU? Furthermore, as an important element to this question, this study also focuses on the characterization of the EU as an actor in world politics and tries to incorporate the how the change in instruments of foreign policy is likely to lead to a change in the typology of the EU’s role in world politics.

In order to provide a thorough understanding to the question of interest, this study explains the concepts that are used to characterize the EU’s role in world politics, development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and development and analysis of general characteristics of the EU sanctions policy, respectively. In the light of the arguments proposed throughout the study, it is hypothesized that further
integration and institutionalization of the EU’s foreign policy through the effects of internal and external dynamics changed the EU’s self-perception and initiated attempts for becoming an actor that is characterized as ‘smart power’ in world politics which eventually led to increased use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool.

A detailed analysis of EU integration process shows that this change in the characterization of the EU in the international system with the inclusion of sanctions as a foreign policy tool has its roots back in the development of the EU foreign policy. More specifically, it can be attributed to the further integration of the foreign policy with more concrete steps taken which can be divided into three phases that will be argued in detail in the second chapter. The first phase started with the establishment of European Political Cooperation in the 1970 which was completed with the 1981 London Report. The creation of EPC represented the first serious attempt by the member states to have a common foreign policy where the ultimate aim was to take a more coordinated stance towards the issues in world politics and to ‘speak with one voice’.

The second phase started with the entry into force of Treaty on European Union in 1993 which created Common Foreign and Security Policy, successor of EPC, as a separate pillar of the European Union. With the TEU, the CFSP became one of the building blocks of the Union which facilitated further cooperation and coordination of the foreign policies of the member states. Therefore, the EU became more able to ‘speak with one voice’ in world politics although the CFSP remained as an intergovernmental pillar where most of the decision making power was kept by the member states rather than the institutions of the Union.

Finally, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 the foreign policy of the Union has become more integrated mainly due to institutionalization of the EU foreign policy with the introduction of an administrative body European External Action Service and creation of a post for High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. With the help of these developments over the years, the EU has become a more powerful actor which can raise its voice regarding the problems it faces in world politics. In the light of emergence as a global actor, the EU has also incorporated sanctions in its foreign policy toolbox and has been increasingly employing them in order to induce a change in the behavior of a targeted actor.
Moreover, the change in the EU’s sanctions policy in line with the further integration and institutionalization of the foreign policy leads to a new conceptualization of what kind of power the EU represents in world politics. In this sense, this study argues that these developments culminate into a more active Europe in dealing with the third parties in the world which can be characterized as an attempt to become a ‘smart power’ which will be explained in the first chapter. Yet without sufficient military tools which have the ultimate capability of bringing the desired change in the third party, it is quite difficult for the EU to become a smart power as the term itself suggests. Therefore, since the sanctions are the ‘hardest’ measures that the EU could take, the EU is becoming a ‘smart power of its own kind’ which again reflects the EU’s sui generis nature.

In the light of this argument, this study presents an analysis of the EU sanctions policy practices. In order to have a more thorough understanding, first chapter focuses on the different theoretical conceptualizations of the EU’s power in world politics by addressing a wide range of literature. The second chapter proceeds with the development of the EU foreign policy in a chronological order by focusing on three separate phases as the most important steps taken towards further integration in foreign policy. The third chapter presents the development of EU sanctions policy including the decision making procedure and the type of sanctions adopted. Then the chapter proceeds with a summary of the EU sanctions policy practices by dividing them into three separate phases according to development of foreign policy. Since the number of sanctions cases is large, the discussion of sanctions cases is quite limited by only presenting the highlights of the events. Finally, the last chapter presents a general characterization of the EU sanctions policy practices with regard to basic descriptive statistics such as duration of sanctions, geographical distribution, issue coverage, and types of sanctions. The study concludes with the effect of use of sanctions on EU’s characterization in the world politics by building the bridge with the first chapter and implications for further research.
Methodology

As indicated above, the third chapter provides an analysis of the EU sanctions policy since the first use of sanctions in 1982 until present time. The European External Action Service uses ‘restrictive measures’ and ‘sanctions’ interchangeably and describes them as designed “to bring a change in activities or policies such as violations of international law or human rights, or policies that do not respect the rule of law or democratic principles” (EEAS, n.d.). For this reason, the concept of ‘sanctions’ is used in this study rather than ‘restrictive measures’ in order to follow conventional wisdom in the literature.

First, it is important to note that the EU adopts sanctions imposed by the United Nations as well as its autonomous sanctions but this study focuses on only the autonomous sanctions of the EU as a CFSP tool. Second, there are three types of sanctions according to their decision-making process. First type of sanctions is decided and implemented by the Community which includes sanction types as withdrawal of preferential trade agreements and suspension of development aid. The second type of sanctions are agreed under the domain of CFSP at the Council of Ministers and implemented by the Community institutions which include trade embargoes, financial sanctions, and flight bans. Finally, third type of sanctions are agreed under the domain of CFSP and implemented by the member states which include arms embargoes, restrictions on admission, diplomatic, cultural, and sports sanctions. In this sense, this study focuses on the former two types of sanctions which are agreed under the domain of CFSP. In short, the focus of this study includes only the EU autonomous sanctions which are imposed under the CFSP.

Sanctions are classified according to phases of the EU foreign policy development which will be explained in detail in the second chapter of this study. The following method is decided on the basis of major steps taken towards having a more concrete foreign policy at the EU level. These phases include years from 1981 to 1992 as the first phase, from 1993 to 2008 as the second phase, and from 2009 to present time as the final phase. In other words, the first phase starts with the London Report and continues until the Treaty on European Union; the second phase ranges from TEU to Treaty of Lisbon, and the final phase includes years from entry into force of Treaty of Lisbon.
The index of EU sanctions including all EU autonomous sanctions from 1981 to 2014 is created with the help of official documents of the EU such as Council Decisions, Common Positions, and Joint Actions as well as other scholarly publications (Eriksson 2005; Kreutz 2005; Portela 2010; Giumelli 2011, 2013). The tables and graphs presented towards the end of the chapter are created by coding of the index in statistical software program Stata and the dataset is available for further use. Finally, the index includes more than one sanction cases for certain countries which may seem as double-counting. Yet, this situation stems from the fact that the EU sometimes suspends or removes sanctions against a certain country and imposes again after a time period. Therefore, a sanctions case is defined as starting when the EU imposes sanctions and ends when they are suspended or removed. If sanctions are renewed, they are included as a new sanctions case.

In line with the argument introduced in this section of the study, the following chapters discuss the conceptualization of EU’s power, development of EU’s foreign policy, and finally an analysis of EU’s sanctions policy practices. In this regard, the next chapter deals with the question of how the EU is characterized as an actor at the global stage throughout the years since its establishment.
Since its establishment, the EU’s attempts for creating a common foreign policy without a single state raised many questions about the capabilities and limitations of the EU in world politics as an important actor. One strand of the literature on the EU foreign policy has focused on whether the EU has a foreign policy or not (Bull 1982; Kagan 2004), while other strand of the literature has focused more on the nature of the EU’s power in world politics such as civilian power (Duchene 1972; Holsti 1995; Hill 1983; Stravridis 2001; Whitman 2002; Larsen 2002), normative power (Manners 2002; Young 2004; Diez 2005); military/strategic power (Smith 2000; Sjursen 2006; Hyde-Price 2006); superpower (McCormick 2007; Moravcsik 2009), and finally smart power (Nossel 2004; Nye 2011). The choice of different strands of literature in understanding the EU’s role in world politics stems from the intertwined nature of the discussions and their cumulative understanding. Since the power is the core concept of this chapter, conceptualization of power is discussed briefly before going into detail with the literature on the EU’s power.

What is Power?

Similar to any other debate in the literature of international studies, the conceptualization of the EU’s foreign policy has also been affected by the nature of the international system. In this sense, it is important to define the concept of ‘power’ with regard to the concepts covered in this chapter. Power is usually defined as one’s ability to exert influence on the other to do something that otherwise he/she would not do (Dahl, 1957, p. 202). It has been one of the central concepts in the study of world politics which has dominated the major debates for a long time. Scholars of international relations theories have discussed the concept of power in world politics and have attempted to understand and explain the process in world politics by using the concept of power. The conceptualization of power, among many others, has been dependent on the conjuncture and developments in the international arena. First

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1 The concept of ‘unidentified political object’ for defining the EU is first used by former Commission President Jacques Delors during his speech in Luxembourg, 1985.
attempts of conceptualization of power took place in the Cold War years which was highly affected by the realist theory of international politics.

Hans Morgenthau (1954) was the proponent of the defining the theoretical core of international relations based on the concept of power. Morgenthau, based on the assumptions on human nature, argues that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power”. According to him, all states in the international system seek to maximize power in order to dominate the others and power is an ‘end’ itself. Kenneth Waltz was another realist scholar who took a different approach than Morgenthau and attempted to conceptualize power in international relations differently. Waltz (1979) argues that power is not an ‘end’; rather it is a ‘means’ for states in order to retain their existence in the international arena. According to Waltz, power is the capacity of one state to affect the behavior of other state (p. 191). Since the ultimate end for states is to seek for power (for Morgenthau) and for survival (for Waltz), the common characteristic of power in both scholars’ work is the coercive nature of power which is identified by military capacity.2

While the Cold War was approaching to détente years, the conceptions of power started to change in international politics. In the early years of 1970s, Klaus Knorr (1973) called attention for the difference between ‘coercive power’ and ‘non-coercive power’ (p. 3). Neo-liberal institutionalist scholars have argued that the outcomes in the international relations cannot be explained only by referring to crude power of states. Keohane and Nye (1977) argue that military capability is not the sole important indicator of the power of a state; rather there are transnational issues such as trade and monetary relations that have strong influence on the relations among states. According to Keohane and Nye, these new relations among states will lead to a world which is characterized by complex interdependence among different actors. In such a world, the military capabilities of states would not be important any more.

In short, the conceptualization of power in world politics is highly affected by two dominant schools of thought. Realists, throughout the years, have argued that power is the key determinant of the relations among states and it is crucial in understanding the

2 Since realism as a school of thought has variant theories in itself, scholars diverge in their conceptions of power and the role of power in international relations. For a more detailed discussion on the role of power among realist scholars please see Schmidt (2005).
dynamics of war and peace. On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalist scholars have focused on other concepts, such as economic and transnational relations, as the other important determinants of the relations among political entities. Therefore realist approaches emphasize the hard power capacities of states which enable them to influence other states and to protect themselves from interference while neoliberal institutional approaches emphasize the soft power capabilities such as cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions as the main resources at the global arena.

Contemporary Conceptualizations of Power and the EU’s Role in World Politics

As the definition of power emanated from its match with ‘force’, variations for the concept of power have emerged. In 1990, Joseph Nye developed the notion of ‘soft power’ in order to describe the ability to co-opt rather than coerce and the ability to shape the preferences of others in world politics. According to Nye (2004), power depends on the nature of the relationship between the two sides. Due to this nature, having power resources does not guarantee one side to reach the desired outcomes by coercing the other as the situation of the United States during the Vietnam War (p. 3).

Nye argues that measurement of power was easier in earlier periods because its meaning was generally attributed to the ‘strength for war’ during the two world wars (p. 3). However, with globalization and the era of technological development, power has become a concept that is difficult to measure. In this sense, Nye argues that the distribution of power resources in contemporary world resembles to a three dimensional chess game in which one can play both vertically and horizontally. Interstate military issues stands on the top of the chess board. At this point, the United States (US) has the place as the superpower with the overwhelming military capacity in the unipolar international system. Interstate economic issues follow interstate military issues and it is placed in the middle of the chess board. Unlike the interstate military issues, the distribution of power is multipolar in this dimension. Although the US is the only superpower in terms of military capability, in economic terms she cannot act unilaterally and she needs the cooperation of the other economically strong states and
entities such as China, Japan, and the EU. Transnational issues stands at the bottom of the chess board which consist of issues like terrorism, international crime, and climate change. Power is widely distributed at this dimension and cooperation among state and non-state actors is weak for these issues (p. 4).

According to Nye, in such a complex world of international relations, acting as if playing on a single dimension would lead to failure for leaders where using soft power assets become required. Therefore, it has become important to attract others in world politics rather than coerce or threaten to persuade them (p. 5). Soft power seems to work when an actor is persuaded by the means of attraction without any threat. However, soft power is not only related to persuasion, its value rests on the ability to attract which then leads to acquiescence because persuasion can also take place by threatening the others with force (pp. 6-7). Therefore, the sources of soft power differ from traditionally defined measures of power.

According to Nye, there are three sources of soft power. First, ‘culture’ refers to an area of attraction where a country’s culture consists of universal values and its policies create values to be shared among others. This universalistic culture of a country increases the probability of reaching the desired outcomes in the behaviors of other states. The US is one of the beneficiaries of universal culture whose values are shared by others, though not by all, in the international arena. For example, commerce is a means of spreading a culture (pp. 11-13). ‘Political values’ is the second source of soft power. ‘Political values’ refers to government policies at home such as democracy and rule of law. The values that a government pursues at home may have an effect of attraction to others. Finally, foreign policy of a state is a source of soft power as well. A state with its foreign policy can create an area of attractiveness for other states in the international system (pp. 13-14).

A soft power also pursues general goals more than it pursues specific goals in its foreign policy what Arnold Wolfers (1962) calls as ‘milieu goals’ and ‘possession goals’. In Wolfers’ own words:
“In directing its foreign policy toward the attainment of its possession goal, a nation is aiming at the enhancement or the preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches value. The aim may apply to such values as a stretch of territory, membership in the Security Council of the United Nations, or tariff preferences... Milieu goals are of a different character. Nations pursuing them are out not to defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their natural boundaries. If it were not for the existence of such goals, peace could never become an objective of national policy” (p. 73).

Nye’s analysis of soft power is mostly based on the US as the leading soft power in world politics. Yet, he argues that the US is not alone in the world as a soft power. According to Nye, although any single European country cannot compete with the US in size, the Union of European states as a whole is a good prospect of soft power. Europe, a continent without the possibility of war, offers a hopeful image for future for other states in the world (p. 77). European Union with its united structure over important policies such as trade, agriculture, human rights, and monetary policies is becoming a positive force for solving global problems. European countries with their widespread culture and widely spoken languages are attracting other states in the world. The values European governments pursue at home are creating an area of attraction for others. For example, policies pursued on capital punishment, control on the use of guns, and global warming are appealing young people from different countries (p. 79). Together with their culture and political values, foreign policies of the European states are also source for Europe’s soft power. He argues that Europeans provide more than half of the world’s overseas development aid and provide troops to peacekeeping operations, and most importantly European approach of multilateralism makes European policies attractive for other states (p. 81). With these sources, the EU stands as the biggest competitor of the US as a soft power in world politics.

Joseph Nye’s analysis of EU as a soft power is an important characterization of the EU as a player in world politics. The EU both in its internal politics and foreign policy reflect most of the features of a soft power. In its foreign policy, the EU is generally not regarded as keen on using ‘hard’ military power in order to achieve its objectives contrary to the US. Instead, it appears to focus on multilateralism and diplomatic means rather than relying on military power to execute its foreign policy. Although soft power is not always coined to describe the EU, various terms that reflect the characteristics of soft power such as ‘civilian power’, ‘normative power’, ‘quiet
superpower’ and ‘postmodern superpower’ have been used by scholars (Duchêne, 1972; Manners, 2002; Moravscik, 2002; McCormick, 2007). However, the introduction of sanctions as a foreign policy tool represents a drifting away from EU’s traditional means of using power in its relations with the rest of the world. With the introduction of sanctions which are characterized as ‘hard power tools’, the EU can also be characterized as smart power (Rehn 2009; Nye 2011) which is a term originally used to represent US a decade ago and found resonance in European affairs as well.

Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power was not the first characterization of the EU as an actor in world politics. The first attempt for conceptualizing the Europe’s role came in 1972 by François Duchêne who coined the term ‘civilian power’. According to Duchêne the EU is “a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed force”. He urges that “the European Community must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards or it will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself” (1973, pp. 19-20). The EU with its internal characteristics can exert influence in world affairs. However, Duchêne did not develop a clear-cut definition for civilian power and this gap was filled by Hans Maull (1990) who defined civilian power as:

“the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management” (pp. 92-93).

Other scholars have also contributed to the development of the concept of civilian power. Karen Smith (2005) puts forward four key elements to civilian power: means, ends, the use of persuasion, and civilian control over foreign policy making. Means are defined as resorting non-military instruments such as economic, diplomatic, and cultural means to achieve goals while ends refer to the preference of international cooperation over coercion. She argues that although scholars do not include all these
elements to their definition of civilian power all these features are important in order to draw the line between what is civilian power and what is not (pp. 2-3).

The ways used as means to achieve ends are also important to define a civilian power. Holsti (1995) argues for six ways in which an actor can influence other international actors: persuasion by giving a response without the possibility of punishment; offering rewards; granting rewards; threatening by punishment; resorting non-violent punishment; and finally using force (pp. 125-126). An actor which uses non-military and mostly economic measures are defined as a civilian power. Christopher Hill (2003) also puts forward four ways to categorize exercising power and influence. To compel another actor to do something, an actor can use force or deterrence or it can sway another actor’s decisions by using persuasion and deference (p. 137).

Hill (1983) is one of the proponents of the ‘civilian power Europe’ argument. He argues that the European Union is playing an important role in world affairs by placing diplomacy over coercive instruments, searching for mediation in international crises, and providing economic solutions to political problems (p. 200). Therefore, diplomacy and multilateral approach to problem solving reflects the civilian nature of the European Union. Hill (1990) also argues that the EU’s international behavior can be categorized into two models. First one is the civilian power model which refers to the EU’s reliance on persuasion and negotiation in communicating with the other states in the world and solving of the international problems. The second one is the power bloc model which refers to the EU’s appeal to its economic strength in order to reach the political objectives. He argues that the civilian power Europe argument should not be discredited because there are limitations to power politics as well and any attempt by the EU to become a ‘superpower’ would contradict with its civilian power characteristics.

A strong criticism to civilian power Europe concept was directed by Hedley Bull (1982) who argues that although the attention is shifted to economic, social, and cultural matters in world politics, the military issues are still important. Lacking the means for providing security for itself and relying on the US for defense presents vulnerability for European states. In Bull’s own words, “Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one” (p. 151). He argues that the civilian characteristics held by Europe depend on the safe environment provided by the US with its military capability. He suggests that Europe should develop a self-sufficient means
for defense because of the diverging interests with the US, the continuous threat coming from the Soviet Union, and for regeneration of Europe (p. 152). He proposes seven ways to acquire self-sufficient defense measures: the development of nuclear deterrent forces; the improvement the quality of conventional forces; a more important role played by Western Germany; more commitment and loyalty by France; a change of policy in Britain; careful attention to the Soviet Union; and careful co-existence with the United States (pp. 157-162).

After Bull’s criticism to the concept of civilian power Europe, Hill (1993) readdressed the same question and he agreed with Bull on the point that the European Union is not an effective actor for producing collective actions and impacts on the problems in world affairs. Yet, he approaches the question from a different perspective by underlining the difference between the EU’s ‘actorness’ and ‘presence’ in world politics. He argues that there is a gap between what the European Union is capable to fulfill the functions in the international system and what is expected from the European Union by the third parties (p. 306). The external demands directed to the European Union are not compatible with the EU’s ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments it has in order to meet these demands (p. 315). According to Hill, two measures should be taken in order to fill this capability-expectations gap. The EU should improve attempts in the long run to improve its capability in international relations and it should attempt to develop patterns of cooperation in foreign policy by recognizing the importance of complex interdependence (p. 326).

The beginning of 2000s has witnessed an important debate about the effect of militarizing of the EU on its civilian characteristics. Karen Smith (2000) has argued that civilian power Europe argument carries a great irrelevance due to the attempts by the EU for acquiring military power. She argues that although the end of the Cold War has reinforced the expectations about the importance of a civilian power and its effects on world politics, the EU has been moving away from being civilian power (p. 11). Until the signing of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the EU has been identified as a civilian power by relying on economic and diplomatic means and by lacking military instruments (p. 13). According to Smith, there are three developments which triggered the demands for the adoption of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). First, with German unification there emerged the need for deepening of European integration in order to include united Germany to European multilateralism.
Second, the US has started to withdraw its forces from Europe with the end of the Cold War which led to Europe to carry this responsibility. Third, acquiring military power did not seem irrelevant anymore to Europeans (pp. 14-15). By going under this process, the EU has started to abandon its civilian power characteristics.

On the contrary to Smith, some scholars argue that acquiring military power does not mean that the EU is moving away from being civilian power. Stelios Stravridis (2001) claims that “thanks to the militarising of the Union, the EU might at long last be able to act as a real civilian power in the world, that is to say as a force for the external promotion of democratic principles” (pp. 43-44). According to him, the definition of civilian power provided by Duchène consists of two main characteristics; first one is “a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces” and the second characteristic is “a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards” He argues that scholars have only focused on the first characteristic while the second one is mostly overlooked (p. 44). The debate about the civilian power Europe has ignored the more important issue of how to promote civilian and democratic standards without having military power. Therefore, he claims that using only first part of Duchène’s definition is not enough to conceptualize the EU’s role in world affairs. According to him, civilian power lacks the capability to bring the desired change in the EU’s relations with the rest of the world if it only depends on non-military capabilities. What makes an entity a civilian power is how these capabilities are employed. Therefore, the EU would be still a civilian power by promoting democracy and human rights although it acquires military power (p. 48).

Richard Whitman (2002) also argues that the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy with the Treaty on European Union does not mean the end of the EU’s civilian power. Rather, he contends, it is possible to account for the development of CFSP is compatible with the nature of civilian power Europe which would contribute to the EU’s international identity (p. 20). Similarly, Henrik Larsen (2002) argues that the militarizing aspect of the EU foreign policy does not reflect that the EU is moving away from being a civilian power. He admits that this is an important change in the foreign policy of the EU which has usually been identified with non-military means. However, military capability is adopted as a last resort for conflict resolution which means that “they are one kind of means among many” (p. 292).
The debate about the EU as a civilian power is important in the sense that it brought a new aspect to European foreign policy as a research area. The EU as a civilian power moved the debate on another stage that is interested in the ‘type’ of the EU’s ‘actorness’ rather than whether the EU has a foreign policy or not (Sjursen, 2006, p. 235). However, the concept of civilian power was developed during the Cold War years and with the changing nature of the international relations after the Cold War, a new concept developed by Ian Manners has overcome the concept of civilian power Europe (Whitman, 2006, p. 2).

Manners (2002) has brought a new aspect to the role of the EU in international relations by coining the term ‘normative power’. On the contrary to Smith, he argues that the development of CFSP does not represent a departure from civilian elements in the EU’s international role (p. 237). He criticizes Duchêne’s civilian power Europe and Bull’s notion of military power on the basis that their understandings of international relations were limited to the frozen nature of the Cold War years by relying on the assumptions of fixed nature of the nation-state, the importance of crude force, and the emphasis on national interests. However, the end of the Cold War witnessed the revolutions in most of the Eastern European countries which means that the ideas have become as important as physical force. Therefore, he argues, by focusing on the power of ideas rather than the physical power the role of the EU in world affairs can be understood better (p. 238).

Manner’s conceptualization of the EU is an attempt to shift the analysis of the EU’s international role from civilian/military power argument to ideational impact of the EU as a normative power. Therefore, the concept of normative power Europe is focused on “the power over opinion, idée force, or ideological power” (p. 239). According to him, the EU’s normative difference depends on its historical context, hybrid polity, and political-legal constitution. Historical context refers to the conditions upon which the EU is structured after experiencing brutalities of numerous wars. Learning the lessons of the past, Europe, now, aims at preserving and strengthening peace and prosperity of the continent. The hybrid polity means that the EU transcends classical Westphalian norms of nation-state with its supranational and international means of governance. Finally, political-legal constitution refers to the values the EU is based on such as democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights. According to Manners, these three features contributed to the commitment to the universal norms and
principles by the EU member states which in turn reflect the normative nature of the EU (pp. 240-241).

In order to analyze the normative basis of the EU, Manners identifies five core and four minor norms that are located within *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politque*. The five core norms are the centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. He identifies four minor norms as social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and principle of good governance. This basis of normative power has been developed by the EU’s treaties, policies, conditions, and declarations (pp. 242-243). These norms are diffused by contagion and transference (pp. 244-245).

By suggesting that the EU is not only found on a normative basis but also acting in a normative way in international relations, he says that “the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system” (p. 252). According to him, the ability to determine what is ‘normal’ in international affairs is the greatest power an entity can carry in world politics (p. 253).

Thomas Diez (2005) argues that the discourse of the normative power Europe has become a significant practice of European identity construction with the attempts of the changing others by spreading the norms the EU based on (p. 614). According to him, the discourse of the EU as a normative power works on the basis of creating ‘other’ and representing itself as a force for good in changing the other’s policies (p. 633). On the contrary to Manners, he argues that normative power is embedded in the concept of civilian power rather than being a completely different notion\(^3\) (p. 635).

Normative power Europe argument has contributed to the debate regarding the EU’s international role and it has been subject to criticism by numerous scholars. Richard Youngs (2004) argues that although the ideational dimensions of the EU’s international role have become more important, the norms and values promoted demonstrate the EU’s security concerns as well. According to Youngs, some aspects of

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\(^3\) For Manner’s response to Diez, please see Manners (2006).
the human rights policies of the EU reflect the security-based concerns of the EU. This becomes obvious by instrumentalist bias to some human rights policies and the role played by strategic actors in decision-making process (p. 431).

Adrian Hyde-Price is another strong critique of normative power Europe concept. Hyde-Price (2006) argues that the literature on the conceptualization of EU foreign policy has been shaped around liberal-idealist theory but structural realism offers a more concrete understanding of the EU as an international actor. According to him, structural realism analyses the structural determinants of the EU foreign policy in contrast to liberal-idealist theory’s explicit and normative approach (p. 218). The foundation of the EU is strongly related to the bipolar nature of the Cold War and after the Cold War the EU itself has evolved into a multipolar entity. In this sense, Hyde-Price argues, since the end of the Cold War “the EU was used by its most influential member states as an instrument for collectively exercising hegemonic power, shaping its ‘near abroad’ in ways amenable to the long-term strategic and economic interests of its member states” (pp. 226-227).

In dealing with its near abroad which consists of post-communist states, the EU has employed instruments based both on soft power and hard power. By using these instruments such as coercive economic statecraft in the form of ‘conditionality’, the influential states of the EU have attempted to impose their perspective of political and economic order to those states in transformation process. This shows that the EU “serves as an instrument of collective hegemony, shaping its external milieu through using power in a variety of forms: political partnership or ostracism; economic carrots and sticks; the promise of membership or the threat of exclusion”, rather than acting as a normative power in world politics (p. 227).

Helene Sjursen (2006) approaches normative power Europe argument from an ontological perspective by discussing the distinguishing characteristics of a ‘normative power’. According to Sjursen, the conceptualization of the EU as a normative or civilian power in the literature lacks sufficient definitions and criteria for a strong assessment in order to test whether the EU is a ‘force for good’ or not (p. 236). She argues that without such criteria for assessment, the results of any analysis about whether the EU is a normative power is destined to be the personal opinions of researchers (p. 248).
Upon this argument, Sjursen suggests that a powerful indicator of normative power Europe would depend on the legal principles its foreign policy is based on. Therefore, a cosmopolitan dimension to international law would work as an indicator for normative or civilian power Europe. In this sense, “a normative power would be one that seeks to overcome power politics through a strengthening of not only international but cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of individuals and not only the rights of states to sovereign equality. It would be a power that is willing to bind itself, and not only others, to common rules” (p. 249). Taking this definition as a criterion, Sjursen argues that there is a contradiction between the EU’s approach to multilateralism with regard to foreign policy with emphasis on external sovereignty and human rights and its external policies. This contradiction makes it harder to define the EU as a normative power in world politics (p. 249).

Additionally, Michelle Pace (2007) argues that the literature on normative power Europe has ignored the ‘construction’ of normative power Europe and in what ways this construction makes the EU unable to have an influence in world affairs (p. 1043). She tests her argument with the case study of Arab-Israeli conflict that the EU is willingly involved. She argues that the EU’s response to the elections in Palestine in 2006 which concluded with the victory of Hamas disappointed Palestinian people who took a step towards democratization. The EU’s reaction to elections has discredited the values it relies on such as free, fair, and transparent elections. In her own words, “the success of Islamist parties does not seem to feature on the EU’s normative radar” (p. 1060). In this sense, the Arab-Israeli conflict reveals that the construction of the normative power Europe ‘disempowers’ the EU’s role as a global player in world politics.

Another strong criticism to normative power Europe argument comes from Steve Wood (2009) who takes EU’s attempts to democratize Russia as a case study. He argues that although the EU perceives its values to be universal which are same for all societies and states, it is not able to spread these norms to other states when those states have strong bargaining tools. The EU’s attempts to democratize Russia seem unsuccessful within the context of the relationship in which the EU depends on the energy supplied by Russia. The EU’s dependence on energy from Russia reveals the failure of the EU’s capacity and commitment as a normative power in world politics. In Wood’s own words “the EU’s mission civilisatrice is susceptible to a relatively straightforward if unpleasant realpolitik that can expose a rhetoric-behavior gap…When
faced with resistance to a (potentially) vigorous promotion of democracy and human rights, or when imperatives that compel it to modify or rescind such activity enter the equation, the EU appears a rather powerless normative power” (pp. 127-128).

The EU is also defined as a superpower by some scholars. John McCormick (2007) challenges the conventional wisdom that believes great powers can only be states with large military capabilities that seek for their own national interests. His argument is based on the relative decline of old-style power politics and on the increase in the role of globalization and interdependence in world politics. According to him, “the ownership of the means of production is more important than ownership of the means of destruction, and cooperation is more effective than coercion” (p. 2). These developments in world affairs paved the way for the emergence of a post-modern environment in which the EU rises as a superpower.

There are three overlapping arenas where the change in the international system can be observed. First, the developments took place in the EU itself increased the EU’s strength and sharpened its identity. With the single market structure, the EU has become the world’s biggest economy. Furthermore, adoption of a single currency has challenged the dominance of US dollar in the global market. Second, the developments internal to the US have also revealed the changes in world politics. The long-term domestic economic problems; and social and political divisions have weakened the US and allowed the EU to compete with the US. Finally, the developments in the international environment itself with the change in the understanding of what constitutes power and security has brought a new aspect to world politics and increased the importance of globalization and interdependence (pp. 5-6). In this new system, the EU has emerged as a superpower that:

“relies upon soft power to express itself and to achieve its objectives, and that finds itself at a moral advantage in an international environment where violence as a means of achieving influence is increasingly detested and rejected, and at a strategic advantage because its methods and priorities fit more closely with the needs and consequences of globalization. The EU has become influential by promoting values, policies and goals that appeal to other states in a way that aggression and coercion cannot. In so doing, it has redefined our understanding of the meaning of power” (pp. 6-7).
Similarly, Andrew Moravcsik (2009) argues that the European Union is a ‘quiet superpower’. In contrast to conventional wisdom which argues that the role of EU is in decline, he claims that Europe remains as a superpower along with the US in a bipolar world (p. 405). The European states are the only states besides the US that are able to exert influence upon other states by acting on a wide spectrum from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ measures (p. 407). By acquiring military power and possessing a civilian power, Europe has become a more hospitable place for the spread of European forms of power. According to Moravcsik, this means that “there is every reason to believe that Europe’s rise in power will continue (p. 418).

A new phenomenon in conceptualizing power in world politics has emerged in the last decade – the concept of smart power. The concept was first coined in discussing the US foreign policy after the increasing antagonism towards the US and its role in world politics following the Iraq intervention of 2003. In fact, the effectiveness of using hard power – coercion rather than persuasion – in foreign affairs became under scrutiny both by scholars and politicians. However, scholars also argue that soft power is not enough to achieve foreign policy goals which sometimes remain inefficient.

First attempt to theorize the concept of ‘smart power’ was introduced by Suzanne Nossel in her Foreign Affairs article in 2004 where she urges for the need to renew neoliberal institutionalism. By trying to revitalize the value of multilateralism in US foreign policy, she argues that “smart power means knowing that the United States’ own hand is not always its best tool” (p. 138). She goes on to say that “unlike conservatives, who rely on military power as the main tool of statecraft, liberal institutionalists see trade, diplomacy, foreign aid, and the spread of American values as equally important”. Therefore, to build efficient ways to prevent the challenge proposed by terrorism would require reactivating a well-established policy framework which also includes soft power instruments at the same importance level as the military might. In this respect, smart power leads to reframe the security issues the US faces after 9/11 into a progressive liberal structure (p. 132).

Upon the contributions by Nossel, the term was theorized by Joseph Nye (2004, 2011) who also coined the term ‘soft power’ in 1990s. According to Nye “smart power

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4 Originally, the ‘quiet superpower’ concept was coined in 2002 by Moravcsik but he developed the concept in detail in 2009.
Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power”. Smart power, as Nye elaborates, was an attempt to fix the misperceptions regarding the soft power’s ability to achieve preferable outcomes in foreign policy. In his own words:

“Power is one’s ability to affect the behavior of others to get what one wants. There are three basic ways to do this: coercion, payment, and attraction. Hard power is the use of coercion and payment. Soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction. If a state can set the agenda for others or shape their preferences, it can save a lot in carrots and sticks. But rarely can it totally replace either. Thus there is need for smart strategies that combine the tools of both hard and soft power” (Nye, 2009, p. 160).

The discussion on smart power is largely stems from Nye’s concept of soft power where he resembles the power politics in the world as a three dimensional chess where actors both play vertically and horizontally. The twenty-first century presents challenges to decision-makers not only at the international level but also at transnational and global level. In order to confront these challenges what is needed is neither mere use of hard power nor soft power only (Nye & Armitage, 2007, pp. 10-11). Therefore, the question of which power resources are available to actors carries a great importance. Hard power, by definition, refers to ability for a political entity to get what it wants through military coercion and economic payments while soft power is traditionally defined as to achieve the goals through attraction. Since the smart power is a skilful combination of the two, it can be summed up as the combined use of military and economic powers by including public and general diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign aid, civic action, and economic development.

Nye (2011) argues that since a strategy relates means to ends it requires a clarification of goals (preferred outcomes), resources, and tactics for their use. In this respect, a smart power strategy should provide answer to five questions. First, “what goals or outcomes are preferred?” This question stems from the limitations of the ability to get what one wants and the nature of structural trade-off among objectives. Second question is “what resources are available and in which contexts?” This question refers to
the importance of understanding the usefulness of available resources in reaching objectives rather than focusing only on the complete inventory of resources. Then, the following question is “what are the positions and preferences of the targets of influence attempts?” which aims to understand and explain the potential capabilities of opponents. More specifically, it aims to identify the motivations and intentions of the targets of the foreign policy. This objective leads to the fourth question which is “which forms of behavior are most likely to succeed?” This question is intended to understand, given the conditions, which behaviors among broad range of tools such as coercion, co-optation, persuasion, or the combination of them will be more likely to achieve the desired outcomes. Finally, the fifth question that a smart power strategy should answer is “what is the probability of success?” which refers the necessity for careful calculation of the costs and benefits of the tools that are used. If a smart power strategy fails to answer the final question, as Nye argues, there is a need to start over from the first question (pp. 208-209).

As the concept of ‘smart power’ became a point of interest in the US and the President Barack Obama’s foreign policy, it has gained a considerable resonance in the European politics as well. Although the works of McCormick (2007) and Moravcsik (2009) explained above focused on the EU’s potential capability of using both soft power and hard power tools, they did so only implicitly. However, in the recent years, the focus on the EU as a potential smart power has increased by policy makers and bureaucrats of the Union though without considerable scholarly work. The hybrid nature of the EU’s foreign policy can serve as an important test for the concept of smart power. Nye’s concept of power highly resembles the EU’s concept of security as being global, all-inclusive, and not being based on only the number of people under the armies. In fact, a smart power strategy can give the EU a genuine role in world politics by maintaining its security through comprehensive tools available – ranging from development aid (soft power tools) to economic sanctions (hard power tools).

One of the early supporters of the ‘smart power Europe’ is Ferrero-Waldner, the Commissioner for Foreign Relations, who argues that the EU has become a smart power in important areas in her speech in 2007. According to Ferrero-Waldner, the Iraq War of 2003 brought the end of hard power and soft power often lacks the ability to face the challenges of the modern world. She argues that with a population of more than half a billion people the EU constitutes the world’s largest trading entity and the largest donor
of economic and development aid with almost sixty percent of global resources. Recently, these soft power instruments are also combined with hard power tools such as Mission Atlanta as the EU’s first naval mission, and those in Darfur, the Balkans, the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan and the EUBAM mission in Rafah. She goes on to say that “these examples show that the EU has broken free of the classic distinction between hard and soft power” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007, pp. 4-5).

Another strong supporter of the smart power EU approach is former Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn who views smart power as a policy tool which helps to redefine the EU’s role in world politics. He defines smart power as “combining soft and hard power better in the EU’s external relations by using the whole spectrum of the Union’s policy instruments and economic resources” (Rehn, 2009, p. 3). His argument follows the EU’s role as a global actor which became more engaged in global affairs over the years initially in economic areas such as aid and trade and recently in diplomacy and security missions outside of its borders. He proposes three ways to improve the Union’s smart power strategy. First proposition requires making the EU’s external policies more coherent and effective. He urges for the need to upgrade external policy instruments and make them work better together. Second, the institutional architecture of the Union needs to be improved by implementing the reforms to external policy making. In this sense, he states, the combination of the tasks of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy with the post of Commission Vice President for External Relations is a step towards better governance of the external policies. Finally, he argues that the need to spread the values and interests more effectively to extend the European zone of peace and prosperity in order to reinforce the EU’s smart power. However, he does not offer a ‘one size fits all’ approach in external relations, rather a more flexible approach in enlargement, neighborhood, and third countries (pp. 3-4). In short, Olli Rehn’s view of smart power EU is based on three principles: improvement of political agenda, institutional reforms, and defining clear foreign policy objectives.

The principles to build the structure for the EU based on smart power tools proposed by Olli Rehn points out the roadmap for the EU to pursue. In fact, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the EU has taken a substantial step towards being a smart power in world politics. Although innovations brought by the Treaty of Lisbon will be discussed in detail in the second chapter of this study, it is
worth mentioning some of the aspects in this section in order to have a strong grasp of the argument with regard to EU as a smart power. Since its establishment, the EU has attempted to build a more integrated common foreign policy which gained substance with the Treaty on European Union in 1992. With regard to defining clear foreign policy objectives, introduction of Common Foreign and Security Policy as an independent pillar of newly established European Union played an important role. The creation of CFSP brought a new understanding to the ways the member states to follow a more coordinated foreign policy and further institutionalized foreign policy of the Union following the establishment European Political Cooperation in the 1970s. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon has brought three major innovations that lead to improvement of political agenda and the necessary institutional reforms for a better coordination regarding the foreign policies of member states.

First major innovation that was introduced with Treaty of Lisbon is the introduction of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Through the newly introduced position, the foreign policy making of the Union has gained a foreign policy chief who would facilitate coordination and cooperation in this field. Furthermore, the High Representative was given the role to chair the Foreign Affairs Council. Before the introduction of High Representative, the foreign affairs minister of the country that holds the presidency of the term on the basis of rotating presidency used to be the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council. Therefore, the foreign policy of the Union has gained continuity in contrast to the previous procedure and thereby has facilitated the improvement of political agenda. Similarly, with the introduction of the new post of President of European Council as the second major innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon the political cooperation and integration has gained strength through the similar mechanism of providing continuity to the policy making in the Union.

Finally, with regard to institutional mechanism the Treaty of Lisbon has introduced the European External Action Service which shows the EU’s commitment to increase the level of integration in foreign policy making. In fact, the establishment of EEAS reveals member states’ commitment to bind their foreign policies to the EU institutions more closely. Since the member states possess the ability to use hard power tools and the EU to use soft power tools, the introduction of EEAS would facilitating the coordination between soft power and hard power instruments. Furthermore, since
the EU is fundamentally a diplomatic actor, creation of an ‘institution’ through which member states can articulate their interests along with the Union’s interest represents a significant step taken towards more effective improvement of policies and defining clearer foreign policy objectives. Therefore, with the Treaty of Lisbon the EU has taken an important step towards its aim to become a smart power. The introduction of post of High Representative and President of the European Council, and the creation of EEAS represent the necessary institutional reform in this field through which the EU would be more able to effectively improve policies and define clearer foreign policy objectives.

Joseph Nye (2011) also argues that Europe has the capability to become a smart power in the global arena. With its total economy and population larger than the US, human capital, and technology Europe is the biggest competitor of the US. In military terms, as a tool of hard power, the EU spends less than the US but it outnumbersthe US by its men under arms as well as two countries with nuclear powers. In terms of soft power tools, Europe has always been culturally attractive to the rest of the world than the US which is often associated with using hard power in foreign affairs. The European states also have been an important part of the international institutions. However, the EU still faces challenges including the limited competences of the institutions, economic crisis of 2008, and declining population of the Union. According to Nye, if the EU manages to tackle with these challenges, it has enough means to develop a smart power strategy (pp. 158-163).

In this regard, the use of sanctions emerges as an important tool of a smart power. The aim of economic sanctions is to induce an ‘economic coercion’ on the target state which makes it likely to be located closer to ‘coercion’ pole of the continuum. However, sanctions are still ‘softer’ means than coercion my military measures, which becomes useful when combined with instruments for ‘attraction’ as in the case of the EU. Although the scholarly works that links the EU and smart power concept still remain limited in number, it offers an important research area when the increased use of sanctions is taken into account. In this sense, the final section of the third chapter will go back to this question and aim to answer whether the introduction of sanctions as a foreign policy tool in EU’s relations with the rest of the world has changed the typology of the EU as an actor at the global stage.
This chapter has presented a general overview of the literature on the characterization of the EU’s power in world politics by following a more chronological order of the literature since each argument has built upon the previous one which requires a cumulative understanding. The reason for selecting a wide range of theories in explaining the EU’s role in world politics stems from the difficulty of how to characterize the EU due to its hybrid nature. Furthermore, it helps to provide a more thorough understanding of the issue in question. Building on the theoretical arguments presented in this chapter, the next chapter explains the development of EU foreign policy in order to obtain the knowledge required for the analysis of EU sanctions policy practices and how the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool has changed EU’s characterization in world politics.
CHAPTER II: THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: ON THE WAY TO “SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE”

The development of European foreign policy has been one of the most challenging areas of European integration process. Despite all the difficulties encountered in more than half a century, Europe has been able to develop a foreign policy by moving from an economic entity to a Union with a political and foreign policy dimension. Since the 1970s European foreign policy has transformed from being a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ to operating “as a political entity in dealing with terrorism, the Balkans, the proliferation of weapons, the Middle East peace process, African development and many other issues” (Cameron, 2007, p. 204). This transformation of European foreign policy can be considered as an action-reaction process where the EU develops foreign policy as a ‘reaction’ to the ‘actions’ take place both in world politics and in the Union itself.

An overview to the development of European foreign policy reveals this path of evolution where two most important developments regarding foreign policy followed major changes in internal and external contexts. First major step taken in foreign policy coordination was the establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC) with the London Report in 1981. Internally, it can be attributed to the accomplishment of integration in other areas. Externally, it was a product of changing global structure where there were Arab-Israel War and following Oil Crisis of 1973 and the deteriorating relations with the US. These dynamics led the EC to reconsider the necessity to raise its voice in world politics as a single entity. Second major step taken in foreign policy was the transition from EPC to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the way to the Treaty of Lisbon. Internally, the developments in the 1990s until the Treaty of Lisbon can be considered as a product of the enlargement process of the Union. Externally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a huge impact on the further integration of the EU. The eastern enlargement of the EU following the demise of the Soviet Union led member states to take substantive initiatives towards a more coordinated foreign policy. Finally, since the entry into force of the TEU, the EU has completed its foreign policy development to a certain extent with the introduction of an administrative body for foreign policy, EEAS, and the creation of a post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Therefore, the development of foreign policy at the EU level can be considered in three phases where
beginning of the phases was marked with major breakthroughs in the history of the EU. The empirical part of this study, the development of EU sanctions policy and analysis of sanctions imposed up to date, shows consistency with the development of EU foreign policy where each phase in the foreign policy integration witnesses use of sanctions more frequently.

Since such a hybrid evolution shapes the characterization of the EU’s role in world politics, analyzing the development of European foreign policy becomes inevitable for understanding the EU’s role in international relations. Towards this aim, this chapter presents the evolution of European foreign policy in a chronological order by explaining developments internal and external to the EU either obstructing or facilitating the process. Before proceeding explaining the evolution of European foreign policy, it is worth mentioning that although this chapter focuses on the development of EU foreign policy in general, other areas of integration are sometimes referred due to intertwined nature of the EU integration process.

**Background: Early Steps in European Integration Process**

In 1950, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, presented the French proposal to Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) for the creation of a common High Authority for French and German coal and steel. According to Schuman Plan, which is prepared by French diplomat Jean Monnet, authorities of France and FRG on these respective industries would be under the control of a supranational entity. Although this first step towards European integration seemed to have mainly an economic aspect, it was also political for the founding fathers of the EU. According to Schuman, “the pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of a common foundation for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe” (Schuman cited in Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2003, p. 38).

One year after the Schuman Plan, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded with the signing of the Paris Treaty by France, FRG, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. It was a revolutionary event in the sense that
European states decided to solve their problems by cooperation rather than long-lasting conflicts on the continent and they agreed on the rules based on international order and multilateralism. Referring back to Cooper’s argument, with the establishment of ECSC the European states have transformed their relations to be built on Kantian principles rather than living in the Hobbesian world where ‘war of all against all’ is the prominent rule. According to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2003), emphasis on the rules based on international order and multilateralism would become the main standing stone of European foreign policy (p. 38).

Although Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, as supporters of a federal Europe, emphasized the political dimension of integration process, hardly any progress was accomplished in the name of creating a common foreign policy for Europe. In the following years, there were two developments which were not very effective because of different reasons. Germany was left disarmed after the Second World War against any possible future aggression. While the negotiations for the Schuman Plan were taking place, German rearmament was a great question in the minds of political decision makers. The solution proposed by France, which is known as Pleven Plan, suggested the creation of a European army with a European Minister for Defense under the control of a Council of foreign ministers of member states. In 1952, the Six signed the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty which was subject to ratification of national parliaments. Although France was the proposer of the Plan, the Treaty was rejected by the French parliament and EDC became a stillborn initiation towards creating a foreign and defense policy (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 41).

Upon the failure of the EDC, the question about German rearmament remained unresolved. Another alternative solution was proposed by English foreign secretary Anthony Eden with the support of the US. In 1954, several agreements were signed such as FRG’s membership to NATO, Italian and German membership in the Brussels Pact, and the creation of Western European Union (WEU). However, creation of a defense dimension for Europe remained a problematic issue for the following years (Bindi, 2010, p. 14).

Although the steps taken towards the creation of a common foreign policy were unfruitful, the following years witnessed the well-functioning of the ECSC on its agreed terms. However, member states realized that integration only in coal and steel sectors
would not be effective in the future. As a result, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the member states held a conference at Messina, Italy in 1955 where they agreed on “the establishment of a united Europe by the development of common institutions, the progressive fusion of national economies, the creation of a common market, and the progressive harmonization of their social policies” (Messina Resolution, cited in Weigall and Stirk, 1992, p. 94). Upon the agreement at Messina Conference, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was founded with the signing of the two Treaties of Rome in 1957. Treaties did not mention any foreign policy initiative which meant that while deeper integration was taking place considering the economies of the member states, development of a European foreign policy remained as a big question mark.

**The 1960s: Charles de Gaulle’s Stamp on European Affairs**

Throughout the 1960s, there were several attempts that can be characterized as unsuccessful as European states to coordinate their foreign policies. In this decade, General Charles de Gaulle, who returned to power in France in 1958, put his stamp on European affairs. De Gaulle supported coordination among foreign policies of member states but his views on Europe had a contradictory nature. While he was in favor of a “European Europe” which was to be powerful enough to counterbalance the US and Soviet Union, he supported the idea that states should keep their full sovereignty. According to Federiga Bindi (2010), “this contradiction came to characterize the French approach to the process of European integration and constitutes one of the major contradictions of a European foreign policy today” (p. 16).

In 1959, Charles de Gaulle initiated a European policy aimed at the creation of a political authority under which political and foreign policy cooperation would be institutionalized. Not surprisingly, the institutional mechanism was to be based on intergovernmental structure which would run independent of the Brussels-based institutions of the Community and it would be established in Paris. The mechanism was to operate by regular meetings of the foreign ministers of the Six to discuss the foreign policy agendas. With this foreign policy cooperation, France aimed at development of
policies by Europe, not by the US, both in domestic and international affairs (H. Smith, 2002, pp. 48-49).

The first meeting of foreign ministers took place in January 1960 and it became the backbone of European foreign policy which is known as CAGRE (the Conseil Affaires Générales et Relations Extérieures). In the meantime, de Gaulle did not give up his idea about the regular meetings at the level of heads of states and governments. The result was the Paris summit, held on February 1961, which was the antecedent of European Council. However, this did not mean that the member states fully agreed with de Gaulle’s proposals. The Dutch foreign minister, Joseph Luns, rejected the idea of regular meetings at the level of heads of states and governments (Bindi, p. 16).

As a result of Dutch foreign minister’s rejection, the EEC leaders decided to establish a committee under French ambassador to Denmark, Christian Fouchet, whose responsibility was to write proposals for political cooperation. The report prepared by Fouchet Committee, known as Fouchet Plan, proposed the creation of a union of states which to follow a common foreign and defense policy independent of NATO. The plan suggested the development of an autonomous European institutional infrastructure and establishment of a council at the level of heads of states and governments to meet four times in a year. In order to implement the Council decisions, creation of a political committee consists of foreign ministry representatives of the Six was proposed (Malici, 2008, p. 8). According to Kernic (2006), the Fouchet Plan, though not being explicit, based on the idea of placing Europe in a triangle along with the US and the Soviet Union (p. 11). However, in the Cold War atmosphere, this led to reluctance among European governments who, at the end, preferred placing themselves under the NATO umbrella. Further, the idea of an independent foreign policy and establishing concrete institutions increased their reluctance on this issue (Malici, p. 9).

In the period between 1959 and 1963, besides the internal problems, the foreign ministers had an agenda for discussion about different international problems such as the Congo crisis and Cuban missile crisis. However, these meetings remained only as discussions without any solution or contribution because of more fundamental and deeper internal problems of the EEC on the possible ways and the extent of cooperation (H. Smith, p. 49). In the following years, the EEC focused on its internal problems which were mainly the crisis stemmed from French insistence on creating Common

The Luxembourg Compromise: Solution to Internal Deadlock

De Gaulle’s contradictory view on the European integration led to an internal deadlock in the Communities in mid-1960s. He was in favor of cooperation in foreign policy but he strongly rejected the idea of increasing competence of the institutions. In this regard, he rejected participation of France in any of the Community decision-making structures for six months in 1965-1966 which led to a deadlock in decision-making process. The solution to be found for this problem was called Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 which made member states’ authorities equal in decision-making capacities with the European Commission on all issues. When the Six managed to merge the institutions under a single roof and became to be known as European Communities (EC) with the Merger Treaty in 1967, the new European Commission was left unable to initiate any proposal for a European foreign policy (H. Smith, p. 50).

1967 witnessed another attempt by de Gaulle with the aim of revival of the intergovernmental political and foreign policy cooperation at the Rome Summit. The proposal of French government remained the same with the previous one, by suggesting regular meetings of foreign ministers to discuss foreign policy issues such as the Middle East crisis and the division of Germany. The antagonist member state of the Summit against the proposal was the Netherlands again, by arguing the importance of Britain’s involvement in these political cooperation negotiations. The result of the Summit was a failure for taking a step towards cooperation in foreign policy, the member states only agreed that political and foreign policy cooperation could take place when circumstances were appropriate for such an action (H. Smith, p. 51).
The Hague Summit, 1969: An Important Step towards Further Integration

At the end of 1960s, the EC encountered a new environment of changing domestic and international context. Internationally, the Cold War was approaching its detente years and the question of the US’ commitment to Europe remained intact. Internally, West German Chancellor was replaced by Willy Brandt whose foreign policy agenda was rapprochement with Eastern Europe and the end of de Gaulle era paved the way for initiation of new European policies (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, p. 44).

With the effect of changing internal and external environment, French President Georges Pompidou, successor of General de Gaulle, initiated The Hague Summit in 1969. He stated in the conference that:

“...at a time, as we all know, the superpowers – the Soviet Union, but also the United States – view European problems as they affect their own interests, and cannot but view them thus, we owe it to our peoples to revive their hopes of seeing Europe in control of its destiny. It was because of this and with this idea in mind that I suggested calling this conference whose outcome will condition not only the Community’s future, but also the future policy of each of the nations assembled here” (Pompidou, 1969).

Therefore, The Hague Summit started with three important issues on the agenda which were enlargement, economic and monetary union, and political union later became to be known as Pompidou’s Triptique (Bindi, p. 18). A new possibility emerged after de Gaulle was the prospect of membership to new states. In this respect, accession negotiations with the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway started (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, p. 44) and foreign ministers were assigned “to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification” (The Hague Summit Declaration). For economic and monetary union, The Hague Summit Declaration identified the establishment of the Common Market as “the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world (The Hague Summit Declaration).
Besides the introduction of the enlargement process and preparation of strategies for economic and monetary union, the political unification leg of the Triptique emphasized the introduction of strategies for a ‘united Europe’ which would strengthen its stance and mission in world politics (Malici, p. 9). Despite being ambiguous, the concept of political union suggested introduction of a method where Community institutions can be put in a more coordinated structure for an effective decision-making process (H. Smith, p. 66). The institutional mechanism for political unification called a series of biannual meetings among foreign ministers and officials. The results of these meetings were declarations and suggestive procedures for coordination in political and foreign affairs but they were not binding for member states. Further, the idea of cooperation included only foreign policy issues by leaving out common defense policy. Despite these limitations, The Hague Summit was an important initiative and served as a precursor of further integration in foreign policy among member states (Malici, p. 9).

The 1970s: First Breakthrough – Establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC)

First Enlargement: Europe of ‘the Nine’

After The Hague summit, the process of European unification has started. First, accession negotiations with the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway started in 1970. The accession treaty with the UK, Ireland, and Denmark was signed in 1972 and they became members of the Community in 1973. The negotiations were completed successfully with Norway, but Norwegian membership to EC was vetoed by its respective public in a referendum. From then on, the EC became to be known as the “Europe of the Nine” (Bindi, p. 19). As a second part of Triptique, member states started negotiations on how to set up a monetary union in 1970 and a committee to be responsible for creating the structure was formed under the authority of Pierre Werner. Member states perceived the monetary union as the ideal tool for further integration (Mockli, p. 38).

There were developments regarding the political union as well. At the beginning of the 1970s, the member states of the EC started to feel the international pressure
increasingly about foreign policy cooperation (Kernic, p. 12). In this period, the escalating crisis between the Arabs and Israel in the Middle East and resulting oil crisis, and the Vietnam War put the responsibility on the EC’s shoulders for further engagement in integration process (Bindi, pp. 20-21). With these developments, the EC decided to engage in foreign policy cooperation because member states wanted to show their political weight in world affairs, rather than being only an ‘economic giant’. From then on, the EC engaged in series of attempts to establish a coordination system for creating a foreign policy (Cameron, 2007, p. 24). In this respect, the Belgian Political Director Vicomte Davignon was appointed by the foreign ministers of member states at the beginning of 1970 to draft a report which would include the ways how a new system could be achieved in foreign policy cooperation (Nicoll & Salmon, p. 347).

The Luxembourg Report and European Political Cooperation

The report prepared by Davignon was approved by the member states at the Luxembourg Conference of Foreign Ministers on 27 October 1970, and it became known officially as the ‘Luxembourg Report’. The Luxembourg Report marked the beginning of a significant process which is called European Political Cooperation (EPC) based on an intergovernmental structure. In the Report, there was a strong emphasis on the need to “intensify political cooperation” and to “concentrate specifically on the coordination of foreign policies in order to show the whole world that Europe has a political mission”. According to the Report, the role of this political mission was to “promote the relaxation of international tension and the rapprochement among all peoples, and first and foremost among those of the entire European continent” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, p. 44). Although there was the emphasis of “the entire European continent”, the membership to EC was open only to the states which were democratic with freely elected parliaments. According to H. Smith (2002), this emphasis refers to a specific philosophical and normative commitment by the member states which suggests the consolidation and expansion of liberal democratic values in Europe (p. 68).

The objectives of the foreign policy cooperation were defined as follows: “to ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual
understanding on the great international problems; to strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmonization of their views, the coordination of their positions and, where it appears possible and desirable; common actions” (Hill & Smith, 2003, p. 77).

In order to reach these objectives, EPC established certain mechanisms such as biannual meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to discuss foreign policy. The meetings were to be chaired by the foreign minister of the country providing the President of the Council of European Communities. These meetings were to be prepared by the Political Committee consisted of senior officials from the foreign offices of member states. A group of European correspondents who were a junior group of officials were assigned to assist the Political Committee. A telegraphic system was established to exchange diplomatic messages among officials which known as COREU, for ‘Correspondant Européen’ (Cameron, pp. 24-25).

EPC marked a significant step reflecting the will to create a common European foreign policy. According to Ifestos (1987), The Hague Summit and the creation of EPC was a “conjectural turnover period, dominated by an optimistic and creative atmosphere about the future prospects of European integration.” The common actions would be one of the most important tools in relations with the rest of the world in the following years (p. 151). However, the EC was still far away from reaching its objectives on the way to unification of foreign policies. For example, the objectives of EPC were very cautious because the member states only referred to sharing information and consultation on “the major issues of international politics” (H. Smith, p. 68). Furthermore, France, with the legacy of the failure of Fouchet Plan, rejected involvement of the Community institutions which disabled the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice to play any role in EPC. Therefore, the EPC’s aim was reduced to provide consultation, coordination, and cooperation among member states’ foreign policies rather than creating a common foreign policy. In this respect, the issues discussed in the context of EPC remained limited. For instance, foreign policy towards the former colonies was not included in EPC (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, p. 46). Relations with the former colonies remained as agreed with the Yaoundé Convention which was signed in 1963 (Bindi, p. 16). Furthermore, external developments which pushed Europeans together for foreign policy coordination created centrifugal pressures on the states to find a solution by themselves alone (Nicoll & Salmon, p. 348). As a result of the nature
of EPC and its relative ineffectiveness, member states of the EC continued their attempts for creating a common foreign policy in the following years.

Despite its ineffectiveness, the EPC did not die and became the precursor of Common and Foreign Policy (CFSP) which to be established in 1992. The governments of member states were eager to discuss the next steps to be taken for the development of EPC in accordance with the provisions of the Luxembourg Report. As a result, they held a summit in Paris in 1972 to discuss the progress reached in foreign policy cooperation (Hill & Smith, p. 80). The decisions reached at the Paris Summit was important in the sense that it showed the cooperation would be likely to intensify in the future although there was no significant progress until the Summit. Member states recognized the Commission as a necessary partner for further cooperation. As a result, an important prospect was opened for involvement of the Community institutions in the process of creating a common foreign policy at the Paris Summit (H. Smith, p. 72).

**The Copenhagen Report and Declaration on European Identity, 1973**

In July 1973, under the guidance of Davignon, foreign ministers of member states completed the Copenhagen Report stating the ways to enhance the cooperation in foreign policy. According to the Copenhagen Report, the main objectives of EPC were to:

“...ensure by means of regular consultations and exchanges of information, improved mutual understanding as regards the main problems of international relations; to strengthen solidarity between governments by promoting the harmonization of their views and the alignment of their positions and, wherever it appears possible and desirable, joint action.”

*The Copenhagen Report, 1973*

The overall aim was, again, to alter the attitudes of member states towards foreign policy coordination despite the lack of a supranational authority (Hill & Smith, p. 83). Therefore, the Copenhagen Report further institutionalized the changes in the role of Community institutions in EPC’s decision-making process. The aspect where the Copenhagen Report was different from the Luxembourg Report was the lack of a comprehensive philosophical framework (H. Smith, pp. 73-74).
The major reason for this absence was the strained relations with the US. The relations between the EC and the US started to deteriorate in the late 1960s. In the 1970s, the US experienced a deficit in the balance of payments and held the EC responsible. Later, the US started to see the EC as an important economic competitor. From then on, the US supported the idea of the EC should contribute more to NATO expenses while the US would remain as the leader of the organization. The disagreements between the EC and the US were also evident on Vietnam War and on the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the resulting Oil Crisis. In 1973, the EC agreed on a common view about the legitimate rights of the Palestinians which was opposed by the US (Bindi, p. 21).

In April 1973, Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, argued that, beyond economic cooperation, there was a need for development of political and defense relationship between the EC and the US (H. Smith, p. 76). This American call is best represented by Kissinger’s statement that “we want to speak to them but they do not have a phone number.” This statement pointed out the lack of cohesion among European states about the important developments in world politics (Nicol & Salmon, p. 348). According to H. Smith (2002), this aim would have been acceptable to EC if the US did not place the Europeans as a “junior partner” which would be responsible for merely regional issues. This situation dragged the EC into a dilemma which the Nine perceived the necessity to balance the US demands with their will to have an independent existence in world affairs (p. 77).

As a result of this dilemma, the Nine adopted the Copenhagen Declaration of European Identity which was the EC’s first attempt after the EPC to identify European interests and relations with the rest of the world. The Declaration aimed to specify the general principles which would guide the EC’s international relations and its development in the future. The emphasis was put on broader concepts and values such as interdependence, representative democracy, and rule of law, social justice, and human rights (M. Smith, p. 136). The Declaration on European Identity touched upon two important issues. First, by focusing on these values, the EC agreed to construct its relations with third countries on a harmonious and constructive basis (Lodge, 1989, p. 229). Therefore, the prerequisite for membership to the EC were defined as to share the same ‘ideals and objectives’ for other European states who want to become a member in the future (H. Smith, p. 77).
Second, the Declaration on European Identity stated that the relations between EPC and the US should not have any effect on the EC’s attempts to found a distinct and original identity while they recognized the significance of the US for European security (Peterson & Sjursen, 1998, p. 182). It was clearly indicated by the Declaration as:

“European Unification is not directed against anyone, nor is it inspired by a desire for power. On the contrary, the Nine are convinced that their union will benefit the whole international community... The Nine intend to play an active role in world affairs and thus to contribute, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, to ensuring that international relations have a more just basis; that prosperity is more equitably shared; and that the security of each country is more effectively guaranteed. In pursuit of these objectives the Nine should progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy.” (Declaration on European Identity, 1973)

The Gymnich Agreement, 1974: Reconciliation with the US

Although the Declaration on the European Identity was an important step in defining the common values must be adopted by the future member states and the EEC’s willingness to ‘speak with one voice’, it did not bring a permanent solution to the relations with the US. When the EC’s engagement in the Euro-Arab dialogue in 1974 faced a harsh reaction from the US, the Nine urged for a solution to the relations with the US. This process was challenging for the EC due to the disagreements among the member states. The new government in the UK under James Callaghan adopted a radical view on this issue and defended the American point of view which demanded a right to have a say on the EPC decisions. Callaghan stated that the UK would not take any action with the member states without bilaterally consulting to the US (Mockli, p. 316).

Federal Republic of Germany, the president of EPC of the time, tried to reach a balance between the US and the UK demands while retaining the autonomy of EPC. FRG proposed the idea of an informal meeting of the foreign ministers of member states at a castle near Bonn called Gymnich. Pressure from both sides revealed the fact that reaching a concrete general agreement would be difficult
Therefore, they focused on the idea of an informal agreement instead of an official written agreement. German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher identified the agreement as a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ (Nuttall, 1992, p. 91). The agreement was stated by Genscher as:

“...concerning the question of consultations of the Nine with allied or friendly states by means of the presidency, ministers have agreed to proceed in a pragmatic and case-by-case fashion. Where one of the partners raises the question of informing and consulting an allied or friendly state, the Nine will discuss the matter and will, after consensus has been reached, request the Presidency to proceed accordingly” (Genscher cited in Mockli, p. 319).

In other words, the agreement was reached by acceptance of the US as a special case in EC’s relations among third parties. The US was to be consulted in the context of EPC but it would have no right to have a seat at the EPC table. In order to prevent the US to have bilateral meetings with the member states, the Presidency was assigned for consulting on behalf of other member states (Hill & Smith, p. 97). Although the agreement was unwritten, it formed the basis of EC and the US political consultations in the following years (H. Smith, p. 79).

According to Mockli (2009), the importance of the Gymnich Agreement reflects itself in two different dimensions. First, by the Gymnich Agreement the EC solved the EPC’s most challenging pressure from international environment. As a result, the Nine guaranteed the existence of EPC in the upcoming years. However, they had to pay a cost which referred to the removal of any issue from the EPC agenda in the situations where the consultations with the US failed. From this dimension, the Gymnich Agreement revealed the “subordination of European interests to US leadership” which would lead the absence of independent common policies of the EC. Although, in practice, the Gymnich Agreement had a limited role due to some member states’ non-compliance, it revealed the shift from ‘European dreams’ to the US demands in Europe’s relations with the rest of the world (pp. 319-321).
The Paris Summit, 1974: Establishment of European Council

Although the EPC was severely affected by the problematic relations with the US in 1973, the ad-hoc summits of the EC continued to push the process forward. With the recognized necessity to put EPC an international weight, the heads of states and governments held a summit in Paris upon the invitation of French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (Hill & Smith, p. 99). The discussions of the leaders mainly focused on the establishment of an intergovernmental institution which would regularize the meetings of the heads of states and governments as to be taken place three times a year. France was in favor of a limited participation as including only the heads of states and governments. However, this proposal was rejected by the other member states and it was decided to include foreign ministers and the President of the Commission in order to assist the heads of states and governments (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987, p. 33).

In order to achieve ‘European unity’, the European Council was to “ensure progress and overall consistency in the activities of the Communities and in the work on political cooperation.” In order to achieve these goals, the European Council would try to “adopt common positions and coordinate their diplomatic action in all areas of international affairs which affect the interests of the European Community.” The President in Office would be the spokesman of the member states (The Paris Communiqué, 1974). Despite being intergovernmental in nature, the European Parliament was given a role to ask questions to the foreign ministers which remained as a small effort in order to increase the involvement of the Community institutions (H. Smith, p. 79).

The Paris Summit was important in several aspects. First, the establishment of the European Council, which would deal with both Community and EPC issues, put an end to the practice of foreign ministers meeting in different places even on the same day (Nicoll & Salmon, p. 348). Another significant aspect reflected by the Paris Summit was the blurred lines between the Community and foreign policy competencies. According to H. Smith (2002), the inclusion of the Commission President in the European Council only four years after the decision on the exclusion of Commission from non-treaty issues at the Luxembourg Report represented a
contradiction. Furthermore, the involvement of the European Parliament revealed the nested nature of the treaty and non-treaty issues (p. 80). Although the European Council did not become an institution of the Community until 2000s, it was institutionalized within its own context in the following years (M. Smith, p. 98).

The Tindemans Report, 1976: Too Ambitious for the Time

Already at the Paris Summit in 1972, the member states requested preparation of regular reports on the ‘European Union’ by the Community institutions including the Commission, the Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the Economic and Social Committee. At the Paris Summit in 1974, they invited Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to present a comprehensive report on the basis of those prepared by the Community institutions before the end of 1975 (Ifestos, pp. 192-193). There were several reports prepared but the Nine demanded to bring them all together and Tindemans, who was in favor of a deeper integration, was willing to take a leap forward towards this aim (Hill & Smith, p. 99). Leo Tindemans defined the objective given to him as “to define what was meant by the term ‘European Union’” (Tindemans cited in Gilbert, 2003, p. 103).

Tindemans was cautious about not being too ambitious and he tried to use the arts of politics as possible (Hill & Smith, p. 99). Therefore, the Report did not aim to achieve a federal Europe yet it turned out that the wills for the future of Europe presented by the Report was ahead of its time (Nicoll & Salmon, p. 348). For Tindemans, “European Union implies that we represent a united front to the outside world. We must tend to act in common in all the main fields of external relations whether in foreign policy, security, economic relations or development aid” (the Tindemans Report, 1976). One of the revolutionary proposals of Tindemans was the abolishment of the dual structure which implied different ministerial meetings for EC and EPC. According to him, “in order to decide on a policy the Ministers must be able to consider all aspects of the problems within the Council” (the Tindemans Report, 1976).
In the same context, the Tindemans Report also proposed the establishment of legal obligations for member states in order to ensure foreign policy cooperation. These legal obligations would include common policies as competencies in treaty-based Community areas (H. Smith, p. 81). By doing so, the coordination of national positions would become under the guarantee of law which in turn would enhance the EPC decision-making process (M. Smith, p. 122). To this end, “the minority must rally to the views of majority at the conclusion of a debate” (the Tindemans Report, 1976). This proposal implied that “the European Court of Justice be given jurisdiction over all aspects of Union decision-making – including foreign policy” (H. Smith, p. 81).

Tindemans also urged for the necessity that Europe should play a significant role in the ‘new world economic order’. The Report suggested that the way to advance monetary integration was to allow the countries that were strong enough to push for economic and monetary union. Furthermore, according to the Report, the European Council was to coordinate the internal monetary policies and budget policies of member states. In the context of ‘social and human dimension’, Tindemans suggested the introduction of European passport, free movement of people, exchange of students, and improvement of educational policies across member countries (Gilbert, p. 104).

However, the Tindemans Report was rejected by the member states because of its ‘too demanding’ proposals (M. Smith, p. 122). In 1976 European Council, the member states decided “to exercise their sovereignty in a progressively convergent manner as regards political cooperation” (Ifestos, p. 197). They only agreed on the continuation of annual reports from the foreign ministers and the Commission about the progress towards the European Union (H. Smith, p. 81). According to Hill and Smith (2000), the Tindemans Report “had caught the down slope, not the crest, of the wave of enthusiasm which had characterized the EC in the early 1970s” (p. 100).

The failure of Tindemans Report revealed the immature atmosphere for the development of political integration due to internal divisions and disagreements in the 1970s which would continue to dominate European politics in the decade to follow. Another result derived from this refusal was that the EPC would continue to be a ‘pragmatic’ and ‘realistic’ forum for foreign policy discussions among the
member states. At the time, the prospect of common foreign policy seemed as a possibility for the future although the practices had been proved inefficient so far (Ifestos, p. 198).

**Other Developments in the 1970s: the Community of Twelve**

While the EC was trying to balance the relations with the US and engaging in attempts for developing foreign policy coordination, dictatorship regimes ended in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. In 1974, the regime of colonels came to an end in Greece and the same year also witnessed the Carnation Revolution in Portugal which overthrew Antonio Salazar from power. Spain also started its transformation towards a democratic regime with the death of Franco in 1975. These three countries in transformation lost no time for applying the EC membership. There was no choice for the EC, which defined the prerequisites for membership with the Declaration on European Identity, to reject these new democracies which needed guidance for political and economic development. France considered the application of Greece, Portugal, and Spain as a chance to re-balance the EC towards the center (Bindi, pp. 22-23).

Greece had already applied for membership in the late 1950s but it was rejected on the basis of its underdeveloped economy. It was still characterized by poor economic performance such as low wages, high inflation rates, and underdeveloped industrial sectors. However, with French insistence, the Nine decided that membership would facilitate Greek attempts to democratize. As a result, the accession talks started in 1976 and Greece became a member of the EC in 1981. Spanish and Portuguese economic records were similar to Greece and this situation created reluctance among the member states. Feeling the same responsibility, the EC started negotiations with Portugal and Spain in 1978 and 1979 respectively. However, the process for Portugal and Spain took longer time and they became full members of the EC in 1986 (McCormick & Olsen, 2014, pp. 66-67).
The 1980s: Focusing on Internal Dynamics

With the second enlargement the member states of the EC were doubled since its inception which had several economic and political consequences. The geography and structure of the EC changed; it became the largest economic bloc in the world, the decision-making process became more complicated, and the internal economic structure was changed by the inclusion of poorer Mediterranean countries. In order to re-arrange the internal structure, the EC focused more on deepening by initiating reforms on the internal market (McCormick & Olsen, p. 67).

The London Report, 1981: Completion of European Political Cooperation

The London Report was the third report which established and codified the EPC along with the Luxembourg Report and the Copenhagen Report (Hill & Smith, p. 114). The proposal to prepare a report on EPC came from the UK who had been cautious about further integration of the EC. The main reason for British interest was the EPC’s inability to react Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Iranian hostage crisis. Lord Carrington, British Foreign Secretary, criticized the slow and uncoordinated structure of EPC and called for a consultation mechanism which would serve in times of crises. This proposal was of a pragmatic character introducing practical improvements which did not foresee any changes in the intergovernmental structure of the EPC (Nutall, 1992, p. 175).

The proposal of Lord Carrington composed of four different dimensions: political commitment, institutional structure, crisis consultation, and security. First, the Report urged member states to find ways for closer cooperation and commitment of their national policies to the objectives of EPC. As stated in the London Report “…the need for a coherent and united approach to international affairs by the members of the European Community is greater than ever…the Ten should seek increasingly to shape events and not merely to react to them” (The London Report, 1981). Second, creation of an institutional mechanism which would strengthen the
EPC was proposed. This institutional mechanism was to be composed of experienced foreign policy staff which would assist the President-in-office (Ifestos, p. 296).

Third, meetings for consultation were to take place in times of crises within forty-eight hours upon the request of three member states. The Report stated that member states “emphasize their commitment to consult partners before adopting final positions or launching national initiatives on all important questions of foreign policy which are of concern to the Ten as a whole” (The London Report, 1981). Last but not the least, security was mentioned for the first time as a concern of the EPC. As stated in the report “…the Foreign Ministers agree to maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which has made it possible to discuss in Political Cooperation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security” (The London Report, 1981).

Although the London Report focused on four different dimensions, the major change in the structure of the EPC was the introduction of ‘Troika’ which included the previous and successor foreign ministers to support the President-in-office. With regard to political commitment, although the discourse was stronger than the previous two reports it was still political commitment without a legal basis. Therefore, the member states did not feel obliged to commit themselves to the agreed objectives. Furthermore, the agreement on the security dimension proved to be ineffective because of the wording of the Report which kept it at the minimum level (Ifestos, pp. 294-295). According to H. Smith (2002) “there was no radical change in ideas developed at Luxembourg and Copenhagen and merely some fine-tuning of the diplomatic apparatus” (p. 82).


The London Report, with its pragmatic and minimalist approach, was able to bring only modest changes. However, its procedural approach did not appeal to German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who made a speech in 1981 calling for further progress towards European Union. In his speech, he stated that if
Europe wanted to have an effective foreign policy, it should show its willingness and capacity towards this end. Genscher’s initiative was launched as Foreign Minister and party leader which did not include the Federal Government as a whole. Therefore, Genscher sought support from abroad which was provided by Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo. Colombo made a speech in 1981 where he took a similar approach with Genscher. He also called for going further on the path to European Union by developing a European cultural policy and by strengthening political cooperation on the basis of day-to-day management (Nutall, pp. 183-185).

The public announcement of Genscher-Colombo Initiative occurred in January 1981 where Genscher pointed out the shortcomings of Monnet’s evolutionary approach to Europe by arguing that it is ‘illusory’ to hope reaching a political union through further economic integration. According to him, the problems of Community could not be solved without “a definite political dimension” (Burgess, 2000, pp. 134-135). In line with Genscher’s talk, the concerns of the Initiative were mainly policy development, institutional improvement, and adjusting the relationship between the EC and EPC (McAllister, 1997, p. 150). The core of the Initiative was the idea for an amalgamated common foreign policy including a security dimension (H. Smith, p. 85). The aim was to direct the attention of the member states to defense area from issues such as money and institutions. Cultural cooperation and cultural identity was also seen as other important areas of policy. In addition, adopting a common action regarding law and order was another highly-stressed area which later was to build the third pillar of 1992 Treaty on European Union (Hill & Smith, p. 120). The Initiative also included proposals for a more well-defined role for the European Council. Increased powers for the European Parliament were emphasized but in practice this proposal sought for a modest change (McAllister, p. 157).

The Genscher-Colombo Initiative was an important step for Europe’s future because it raised some questions directed at the heart of the process of European integration. However, the Genscher-Colombo Initiative failed to achieve its objectives because of successive rebuttals of European Council and relative inactiveness of the European Commission (Burgess, p. 136). Burgess (2000) argues that the Genscher-Colombo Initiative with foreign and security policy at its core was one version of de Gaulle’s “Political Union”. However, as its predecessors the Genscher-Colombo Initiative was a reflection of intergovernmental Europe because it lacked the necessary
support from the heads of states and governments who had different priorities at the
time. Due to these obstacles, the Initiative was reduced to the status of “Solemn
Declaration” in June 1983 (p. 138).

The Solemn Declaration on European Union was a weakened soft version of
Genscher-Colombo Initiative specifically in issues regarding the proposals where any
member state had a “vital interest”. Therefore, the Declaration did not include any
major change either in substance or in procedure of the process towards reaching
foreign policy cooperation. Ireland, Greece, and Denmark specifically objected to
introduction of any Community competence to the area of security policy. One major
difference from the London Report was that foreign ministers were to discuss
political and economic aspects of security rather than discussing only political
aspects (H. Smith, p. 86).


Upon being directly elected for the first time in 1979, the European
Parliament felt itself responsible to move the cause of European integration forward.
The initiator of this movement was Altiero Spinelli who was a strong federalist in
favor of strengthening European Parliament by transcending national and party
divisions. According to Spinelli, the past thirty years of European integration hardly
achieved a progress because of the strong hand of heads of states and governments.
In this respect, his aim was to establish a system where the decisions can be taken on
the level of public and national parliaments rather than the heads of states and
governments (Nuttall, p. 239).

In order to reach these objectives, Spinelli worked with governments who
were also disappointed about the integration process, particularly FDR and Italy (Hill
& Smith, p. 133). The proposals included in the Draft Treaty suggested a
constitutional change that would bring the treaty-based institutions and procedures
together with EPC and European Council. The Draft Treaty also offered a legal
personality to European Union and an increase in the supranational method vis-à-vis
intergovernmental cooperation (H. Smith, p. 87). Spinelli proposed a three-layered
structure for decision making for the Union. The first one was supranational where the decisions were to be reached at the Union level. The second was introduced for policy areas where both Union and Member States would be responsible together. The last layer for the decision making procedure would be exercised under the authority of member states. Foreign policy was included in this intergovernmental layer and no transfer of sovereignty was proposed by the Draft Treaty. Therefore, the intergovernmental nature of EPC was preserved but the prospect for future change was open in case of member states demanded to change (Nuttall, p. 240).

The Draft Treaty was accepted by the Parliament in 1984 with 237 votes against 32. The Treaty offered an evolutionary way to European Union without touching the key areas in which member states were reluctant since the inception of the Community. As a result, the nature of the Draft Treaty implied the continuation of intergovernmental character of foreign policy cooperation. Yet, the main ideas of the Draft Treaty constituted an important part of the Single European Act to be signed two years after the Draft Treaty or the later Treaty on European Union (H. Smith, p. 88).

The Dooge Report, 1985

The new French President, François Mitterand, was one of the most enthusiastic figures of the proposals laid down by the European Parliament’s Draft Treaty on European Union. He suggested that the 1983 Solemn Declaration should be used as the basis of the new treaty. Mitterand was strongly in favor of setting up of a permanent secretariat for political cooperation. Germany, Italy, and Benelux states also supported the idea in order to revive the federalist project (Hill & Smith, p. 138). However, Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister, was reluctant to agree with other member states because of the budgetary issues where she was insistent on to “win Britain’s money back” from other member states (Nicoll & Salmon, p. 29).

The ongoing budgetary problem was solved at 1984 Fontainebleau European Council and Britain agreed to appointment of an ad-hoc committee on institutional affairs chaired by the Irish Representative James Dooge (Hill & Smith, p. 138).
final version of the paper was presented in 1985 discussing the problems with regard to creation of an external identity for Europe. The Dooge Report was as a modest report in nature mainly due to Danish and Greek reservations. The Report suggested a closer cooperation between the structures of Community decision making and EPC without any emphasis on merging these two structures (Ifestos, p. 337).

The Single European Act, 1987: A Key Event in the Quest for European Union

As the integration process began to emancipate from euro-sclerosis in the mid-1980s, a trend within the Community emerged with the aim of transforming the relations between the Community and member states into a single unit – the European Union. An important number of these proposals suggested acceleration of foreign policy cooperation and institutional changes to the decision-making procedure of Community and EPC. These proposals were at the heart of June 1985 Milan European Council and 1985 Intergovernmental Conference which formed the basis of Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. Though, the process on the way of SEA was far from being smooth, rather marked with ups and downs (Swann, 1992, p. 10).

In 1985, Jacques Delors who was in favor of deeper integration became the new Commission President. He urged for the necessity to set up a date for removal of all barriers and tariffs as well as free movement of labor and capital among member states. As a result, Commission initiated the Single Market Plan by proposing 1992 as the deadline for achievement. Besides economic aims, the Plan also intended to strengthen the integration process by changing the voting system of the Council of Ministers to qualified majority voting (QMV) and, hence, recovering from the veto system. In line with these aims, Lord Cockfield was assigned to present a White Paper setting up the schedule for the completion of the single market (George & Bache, 2001, pp. 114-116).

Two months after the launching of the White Paper, heads of states and governments met at the Milan European Council. The European Council agreed on the proposals introduced by the White Paper on the establishment of a single market by 1992. Yet, a major disagreement emerged about the institutional change with regard to Community. The institutional debate was shaped around the question whether the veto
rights to member states should be kept in decision making process. Margaret Thatcher supported informal agreements rather than revision of decision-making system. By taking a coordinated stance, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterand argued for an urgent institutional reform. As a result of the disagreements, Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi called for an IGC to resolve these problems by revising the Treaty of Rome. Britain and Denmark strongly opposed the proposal of Italian Prime Minister by arguing that such action was not necessary and Greece supported them. The remaining seven member states voted in favor and decision to hold the IGC was agreed by majority vote (Dinan, 1999, pp. 115-116).

The IGC started in September 1985 with the participation of foreign ministers of member states and the two candidate countries, Spain and Portugal, and the Commission. An agreement was reached regarding the further liberalization of the common market and transition to majority voting on issues related to internal market. Though, foreign policy cooperation still remained as a problematic issue (H. Smith, p. 91). There were two competing groups in the Conference: one group represented by the UK and Denmark, the other represented by France and Italy. While the former put emphasis on internal market liberalization, the latter was in search of a stronger political commitment by pushing for an institutional reform (Owen & Dynes, 1993, p.55).

Jacques Delors was supporting the second group. In his speech during the Conference, Delors stated that “with regard, more specifically, to the political and institutional foundations for dynamic renewal of the Community, the gradualism which has worked well enough and proved its worth since the Treaty came into being is not in question” (Bulletin of the European Communities, 1985). Supporting a unified Europe, he argued for adoption of a single treaty which would strengthen the concept of European Union and would reveal the member states’ will for speaking with one voice. As a result of the negotiations, a draft treaty was submitted by the Political Committee regarding political cooperation. France also proposed a draft treaty on European Union which would combine the competencies of Community and EPC in one treaty (Ifestos, pp. 344-345). However, French proposal was opposed by the other camp represented by the UK and Denmark. The divergent views among the member states included the objectives followed by EPC, managing body of the EPC, and the scope of EPC’s relations with Community. Finally, a compromise was reached on the basis that
provisions relating to EPC were to be included in a different section – Title III – in the SEA (H. Smith, p. 91).

At the Luxembourg European Council in 1985 the SEA was effectively agreed and it was signed in 1986 as the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome. The preamble of the SEA indicated that the intention of the member states was “to transform relations as a whole among their States into a European Union” (The Single European Act, 1986). It represented a major step in the history of European integration. It introduced a plan for the completion of the internal market and majority voting to decision-making procedure. Regarding political cooperation, SEA codified EPC with reference to Luxembourg, Copenhagen, and London Reports and to the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration. In addition, it brought the EPC and Community under the same legal umbrella (Hill & Smith, p. 138). As Regelsberger (1988) stated “for the first time in its history, political cooperation received a legal basis” (p. 9).

Inclusion of provisions regarding the EPC into a separate title revealed that the SEA formalized a two “pillar” structure although there was no explicit attempt for it (Allen, 1998, p. 50). The major innovation that SEA brought was the codification of EPC and European Council. Although the nature and methods of operation remained constant, the SEA formalized the intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy. Title III, named “Treaty Provisions on European Cooperation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy”, brought real changes even though they were modest (Hill & Smith, p. 139). It stated that the member states “undertake to inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementation of joint action” (SEA, Article 30.2.a).

Codifying all the agreements achieved over the years through different texts and treaties, the SEA defined the role of the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament within the EPC. The SEA gave a leading role to European Council. The Council Presidency was assigned to identify and advance “European interests” by representing the Member States vis-à-vis third countries. The European Commission was given a role for assisting the Council in all matters. According to SEA, the Commission’s major role as initiator and negotiator that represents the European interests under the mandate of the Council would continue (Allen, p. 51).
Finally, the SEA strengthened the role of the European Parliament by giving it the power to assent future enlargements of the European Community and with the agreements with third countries or international organizations. In addition, the role of the Presidency and of the troika in the EPC was codified by SEA (Bindi, p. 25).

The SEA also effectively introduced the idea that foreign policy activity should take place in Brussels. With the SEA, EPC working groups were agreed to convene in Brussels which previously were functioning in the capital of the presidency. The Political Committee and Ministerial meetings might still take place in the capital of presidency but possibility to discuss EPC matters in the General Affairs Council was opened up. Finally, an important step towards bureaucratic structure was taken and the EPC Secretariat based in Brussels was established (Allen, p. 51).

According to M. Smith (2003), there are three important aspects of SEA with regard to foreign policy of the Community. First, it strengthened the intergovernmental character of the EPC through codification of its composition and the role of the European Council. Second, it also reinforced the trans-governmental network by the agreement on to permanently move Political Committee to Brussels. Third, the external EC and EPC policies were tied which were independent of each other before and they became legally binding on EU member states. However, full “communitarization” was not accomplished formally by the SEA; rather it was an attempt to regularize the practices what had been reached throughout the years (pp. 151-153).

**The 1990s: Second Breakthrough – Treaty on European Union (TEU)**

Although the initiation of SEA represented an important leap towards further integrated Community, major change – not only to Europe but also to world politics – has come with the historical events of 1989-1991 beginning with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and ending with the demise of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. These events triggered the need for major reforms in existing international institutions including the EC, NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE. Further, it also led to creation of new ones such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Keohane, Nye, & Hoffman, 1993).
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the prospect of a unified Germany had major implications for the future of Europe that is known of present time. The idea of a unified strong Germany presented a challenge for member states specifically for France and the UK. The challenge had two aspects – one being procedural and the other being political. The former was related to question how to absorb the relatively underdeveloped East Germany and create a stable cohesion between both parts. The latter question was how to maintain the commitment of Germany to EC and prevent it from dominating European affairs. On the other hand, Germany faced the challenge of reassuring its partners to its attachment to European integration (Dinan, 2005, p. 115).

In such a dynamic environment, the foundational base for EPC was inefficient to cope with those changes. At 1989 G7 meeting, the US President G. Bush urged for the necessity to develop a coordinating assistance to Central and Eastern European states by the European Commission under the guidance of Jacques Delors. This proposal was to have an important effect on European politics by paving the way for a new policy area. As Cameron (2007) argues the number of Commission officials responsible for the relations with communist countries was fewer than ten in 1990 while it increased more than thousand in less than ten years with the opening of Commission delegations in almost all countries of the region (p. 28).

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union enhanced and specified the efforts for institutional reforms in European foreign policy, it was also a product of an endogenous process within the Community. Therefore, this process was of a cumulative nature acquired throughout the years by the EPC which formed the basis of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). According to M. Smith (2003), “we can describe this evolution as moves toward a system of governance, broadly defined for the moment as the authority to make, implement, and enforce rules in a specified policy domain” (p. 176). On the other hand, Cameron (2007) argues that the dramatic changes that were brought by the end of the Cold War signaled that Europe now was expected to increase its voice to gain more political influence and maintain stability in its borders. The limitations of EPC was evident which made it inevitable to build a stronger structure for foreign and security policy (p. 28). Therefore, Treaty on European Union was the result of the ‘1992 Plan’ regarding the completion of monetary union and triggering effect of the end of communism in Europe regarding the political union.
The Treaty on European Union, 1992: Transition from European Political Cooperation to Common Foreign and Security Policy

The dual structure of the issues – economic and political – shaped the negotiations of Treaty on European Union (TEU), also known as Maastricht Treaty, in 1992 which took place in two separate intergovernmental conferences. The German question led many European leaders to search for strengthening and deepening of the EC institutions that would further bind Germany to European integration and hence preventing its dominance in Europe. This idea was commonly shared among the member states and Commission President Jacques Delors who argued that “the only satisfactory and acceptable response to the German question” would be the creation of a federal Europe. The strongest supporter of this view was French government due to the prospect of facing a unified strong Germany which historically had been its major rival in the continent. In this regard, France sought for strengthening and deepening of EC structures (Baun, 1995, p. 609). Germany was also in favor of strengthening the institutions in order to prove its commitment to European integration. The proposals to create further cohesion in foreign policy were made by France and Germany in April 1990. François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl proposed to build the monetary union combined with a political union which would enhance coherence among member states including a common foreign and security policy (Bindi, p. 26).

In contrast to French and German view, the British government under Prime Minister Thatcher was in favor of widening the EC by incorporating post-communist countries in Eastern Europe as well as members of European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The UK’s main aim was to create stability in Eastern Europe by keeping the national sovereignties. Another motivation behind this strategy was the German question because for Thatcher a more unified Europe would become under German predominance rather than would a group of independent sovereign states. Although Portugal supported the British stance, these countries remained as minority among those in the Community who were in favor of deeper integration (Baun, p. 610).

As a result of the political confrontation between the two camps, the decision to convene two intergovernmental conferences was taken – one on monetary union and
one on political union. During these negotiations, Germany reunified without any formal modifications of the treaties (Bindi, p. 26). The IGC on political union took place in December 1990. In the meantime, the international events such as Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the outbreak of Yugoslav crisis revealed that the decision of IGC would also become one of the focal points in world politics (H. Smith, p. 94). Therefore, the expectations about the Community to ‘have a say’ in world politics were further increased. Although, there was an initial consensus about bringing EPC and external relations together and increased role of the Commission, the conference witnessed serious debates (Hill & Smith, p. 151).

The negotiations were shaped by two traditionally competing camps. One camp, represented by the UK and Denmark, wished to keep the decision-making authority in the hands of member states while the other camp supported further integration in foreign policy issues. Another major disagreement was whether the EU should develop an independent defense policy or it should be left to NATO (Cameron, p. 29). The US and the more pro-NATO member states argued that the establishment of an independent defense policy would damage NATO which would eventually weaken western security as a whole. How to incorporate EPC into the Community structure represented another point of disagreement. Some member states supported a separate structure for EPC with an informal close association with the Community while others were in favor of abolishing the distinction. This situation also created dilemmas for small states because they supported convergence while at the same time they were worried about such convergence would bring them under the direction of powerful states (Hill, p. 152).

Following the end of the conference, Maastricht Treaty which created the European Union was signed. The agreed treaty was a product of a compromise among the majority of member states which were reluctant to adopt a more supranational policy. The EPC was replaced by intergovernmental CFSP which became the second pillar of newly established European Union along with Community Pillar and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Pillar. The Treaty stated that:
“the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy were to safeguard the common values, the fundamental interests, and the independence of the Union; to strengthen its security and its member states in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (TEU, 1992, Art. J.1.2).

These objectives were to be pursued through cooperated action of member states in a “spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” (Art. J.1.4). The Treaty also addressed the issue of common defense by referring the “possibility of gradually moving towards a defense system” (Art. J.4.1). Regarding institutional structure, the Presidency was given the responsibility to internationally represent the EU in CFSP issues. Outside the borders of the EU, there would be cooperation among member state diplomatic missions and European Commission delegations as well as consultation of the European Parliament (Art. J.5 & Art. J.7.). The Treaty stated that the general guidelines of foreign policy were to be defined by the European Council and responsibility to implement them was given to the Council on the basis of QMV. Further, the right to initiate foreign policy proposals was given to the Commission (Art. J.8. & Art. J.9). Last but not the least; the Treaty put forward the conditions and steps to be taken to establish economic and monetary union by 1997.

The Maastricht Treaty, officially establishing the European Union, marked the beginning of a new stage in European affairs by further taking a leap towards ‘an ever closer union’. An important part of the Treaty was built on the past EC treaties, the body of law, and policy made by the institutions over four decades. Newly introduced provisions of the Treaty aimed to respond external challenges of the time that the Community faced as well as enlargement (Duff, 1994, p. 20). Regarding economic policies, the TEU established the EMU which aimed:

“to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States” (TEU, Art. 2).
Regarding the newly established CFSP, the Treaty sought to respect the *acquis communautaire* but it remained as a structure qualitatively different from its supranational structure by following the experience of the EPC procedures. Although the Council was given the responsibility of taking ministerial decisions, CFSP remained as an intergovernmental pillar and excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. The CFSP was to pursue its objectives through ‘common positions’ and ‘joint actions’. Common positions represented the common procedure of EPC while joint actions were based on a more complicated practice. For an issue to become subject to joint action the Council has to decide by unanimity based on the guidelines from the European Council (Duff, p. 24).

In fact, before the ratification of the TEU, European foreign ministers agreed on that the Treaty procedure would be unable to generate a common policy. After the agreement on the Treaty, they decided to launch a report that was to define Europe’s common interests and the areas of priority for the CFSP. With this aim, the Lisbon Report which identified the areas where joint actions to be taken was launched at the Lisbon European Council of June 1992. The Report had a theoretical nature where the EU was to act in international politics. In this sense, the emphasis was given on promotion of democracy, human rights, and conflict prevention in the EU’s regions of interest such as Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East (Hill & Smith, p. 162). During the period between 1993 and 1995 eight joint actions were implemented such as monitoring the elections in Russia and South Africa, supporting measures to create stability in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the Middle East. Furthermore, fourteen common positions were adopted in the same period (Bindi, p. 28).

To summarize, the move from EPC to CFSP signaled the major recognition of the developing economic power of the EU needed to support by a political dimension (Cameron, p. 38). However, newly established CFSP was not able to represent an all-encompassing foreign policy for the member states due to its intergovernmental nature. The major philosophical innovation it brought was the idea that it was an evolutionary process where both foreign policy and Community policies continued to be integrated under one single institutional structure (H. Smith, p. 96). As M. Smith (2003) argues “the process of institutional change did not end at Maastricht; this Treaty merely raised
new expectations and created new pressures for reform, thus setting the stage for the 1996-1997 IGC of the EU” (p. 177).

Other Developments in the 1990s: International Crises and the Fourth Enlargement

In the mid-1990s there were other developments both with regard to the EU and in world politics which proved the need for reforms that would take place in 1996-1997. The dissolution and war in Yugoslavia proved the inability of the EU in tackling with international crisis. Apart from the Yugoslavian case, the inability of the Union to adopt a common position in the Middle East, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Central Africa further strengthened the beliefs for a reform regarding the structure of the European foreign policy (Bindi, p. 34). In 1995, the Union also underwent the fourth enlargement process with new members from the north. Austria, Sweden, and Finland became members of the EU while the Norwegian referendum with the refusal of the public prevented Norwegian membership. The membership of advanced democracies did not require a significant change to foreign policy priorities of the Union. Furthermore, their long-established liberal economies facilitated the smooth transition to the EU membership (H. Smith, p. 101).

The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997: Revising the Union

The inability of TEU to tackle with the international crises of the time led to another IGC that would contain the untouched areas of policy. As already foreseen by the TEU, Title V Article N stated that “a conference of representatives of governments of Member States shall be convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of the treaty for which revision is provided.” One of the provisions that the Treaty stated was about the WEU which came to deadline for review. Other issues at stake were the expanded use of majority voting, the balance between big and small countries, financing the CFSP, and the ever present question of how to ‘speak with one voice’. With these issues in question, the new IGC began in Turin on March 1996 after a Reflection Group had
The Report prepared by the Reflection Group put emphasis on the shortcomings of the EU’s pillar structure. The intergovernmental nature of the decision-making system in the second and third Pillars was the major obstacles on the EU to ‘speak with one voice’. According to the Report, the weakness of pillar structure reflected itself as the EU’s inability to respond to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Regarding the voting system, it was seen essential to replace unanimity with the QMV if the EU was to survive in the upcoming years in the face of enlargement. Therefore, the Reflection Group suggested three major aims for the 1996 IGC: bringing the EU closer to its citizens, improvement of functioning in order to prepare for enlargement, and providing a greater capacity for foreign policy (Phinnemore, 2010, p. 38).

The negotiations in the 1996 IGC revealed that the reform process was not to be easily achieved. The British government retained its traditional reluctance and policy of non-cooperation as well as the reluctance of other member states and the public. The agenda of almost all member states was occupied by EMU and the issue of enlargement (Hill & Smith, p. 169). The British general elections during the IGC also revealed that the final agreement would have to wait for a longer period. After the elections, the Labour Party’s victory relatively facilitated the negotiations of IGC (Dedman, 2009, p. 167). Regarding the shortcomings of CFSP, the prevailing view during the IGC was to keep intergovernmental structure of CFSP rather than pushing for a more unified structure with whole EU body. Yet, in order to strengthen CFSP several reforms were proposed such as involvement of European Council more to increase consistency, creating the post of High Representative, development of long-term strategies, and defining the concept of security (Phinnemore, 2010, p. 39). Upon the completion of IGC, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on October 1997 yet it was subject to severe criticisms due to its failure to accomplish the objectives (Dedman, p. 167).

In spite of the organized preparations by the Reflection Group and lengthy negotiations before the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the achievements of the Treaty was not considered as a major success by the politicians and bureaucrats. According to Jacques Delors, “Amsterdam Treaty was a ‘catastrophic result’ for Europe”. In contrast to what was foreseen at the Maastricht Treaty regarding the
internal policy-developing exercise was dominated by the issues about EMU and enlargement (Cameron, 1998, pp. 70-71). While the Treaty did not introduce any philosophical changes to the structure of CFSP, it brought some institutionalized procedural innovations and amendments to decision-making procedures. These innovations include the creation of a Policy and Planning Unit for the CFSP and a secretary-general within the Council Secretariat to deal with CFSP. The Secretary-General of the Council was to be responsible for the CFSP and was appointed as the ‘High Representative’. The constitution of troika was transformed to the Presidency, the High Representative, the Commission, and the successor Presidency (H. Smith, p. 101).

The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced a new instrument named ‘common strategies’ along with clarifying the distinction between previously defined joint actions and common positions. Yet, common strategies were vaguely defined as the strategies to be adopted in areas where member states have common interests. In the Treaty, joint actions were defined as “they shall address specific situations where operational action is needed” (Art. J.4.), and common positions were defined as “they shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature” (Art. J. 5.). Regarding the decision-making system, the Treaty did not bring any significant change to the TEU. The major principles of the foreign policy making, consensus and unanimity were retained the same. However, the principle of unanimity was made flexible to facilitate decision-making with the introduction of ‘constructive abstention’ meaning that states abstaining from voting were not to be committed by the decision but also to refrain from any action likely to conflict with that decision (Cameron, pp. 72-73).

The ratification of the Treaty also took a long time for the signatories. Finally, it fully entered into force on May 1999. The following Cologne Council of June returned to subject of CFSP with new proposals but they were mainly focused on the security dimension. Therefore, the Cologne Council was another attempt to re-launch the CFSP by equipping it with necessary capabilities to face its responsibilities. During the Council, the former Spanish foreign minister was appointed as the ‘High Representative’. Therefore, the changes that the Treaty of Amsterdam brought represented a more substantial change rather than what was predicted at the TEU and report of the Reflection Group. The EU still needed a considerable progress to move towards further integration at the beginning of the new century. As Hill & Smith (2000)
state “whatever ups and downs lie ahead for the institutional development of the CFSP, the story of Europe’s attempt to construct a common foreign policy is far from being concluded. There are more documents, more treaties – and more arguments – to come” (p. 170).

The 2000s: Third Breakthrough – On the Way to Treaty of Lisbon

The beginning of the new century was stamped by two significant events for European politics and evolution of the EU. First, the Kosovo War of 1998 explicitly revealed the inability of the EU to respond to international crises and it urged the need for institutional reform for the Union if it was to have a say in world politics. Faced with the lack of capabilities to respond to a crisis on the European continent itself, the demands for building a defense system increased. Second issue on the European agenda was the Eastern enlargement. For the first time in its history, the EU was to undergo a considerable expansion with ten countries from which eight were post-communist states. The future effect of the enlargement on political, geographic, demographic, and economic balance of the Union was obvious with the prospect of increasing the population by almost one-third while increasing the GNP only by 10 percent (Bindi, pp. 35-36). Therefore, how to accommodate the new members became an important question with the fact that without any regulation the decision-making in the Union would come to a deadlock. As stated above, the Treaty of Amsterdam proved to be inefficient to deliver the desired changes regarding the institutional reform (Dedman, p. 166).

At the meeting in Cologne on June 1999, the European Council agreed on to convene an IGC at the beginning of 2000 to address the issues regarding the enlargement. Furthermore, the European Council of Helsinki on December 1999 expanded the aims of the planned IGC to deal with the issues unresolved by the Amsterdam Treaty – so called ‘Amsterdam leftovers’ – such as the organization of the European Commission, the reweighing of the votes in the European Council, and the extension of the QMV (Bindi, p. 36). The preferences of member states reflected more of a limited agenda while the Commission and the EP were in favor of broader issue coverage. The Commission supported the reorganization of the treaties and the
integration of the WEU to the EU to have a common defense policy. The Report prepared by the Commission urged for the necessity to reform the EU in a flexible way that would allow for progress towards the goal of further integration. The French government was also in favor of building a European constitution. However, these aims proved to be too ambitious for the time and it was evident in the discourse of other member states blaming French government to abuse their position as chair to impose their own agenda rather than mediating the negotiations. At the end of lengthy negotiations, the Treaty of Nice was signed on February 2001 (Phinnemore, pp. 41-42).

The Treaty of Nice, 2003: Dealing with ‘Amsterdam Leftovers’

The Treaty of Nice entered into force on February 2003. The reforms regarding the CFSP were quite limited since the agenda was dominated by the enlargement and defense policy. Regarding enlargement the votes were reweighted and the number of the Commissioners was reduced while WEU was incorporated in the EU with regard to defense policy. The incremental changes in CFSP largely focused on the cleaning up the wording in few areas. QMV in decision-making for CFSP was extended to two minor areas beyond what was outlined by the Amsterdam Treaty which were the appointing of the High Representative as the Secretary General of Council and nominating of special envoys (M. Smith, p. 234).

Besides these minor reforms, the Treaty introduced the principle of ‘flexibility’ into the set of rules on ‘enhanced cooperation’ which refers the situations where some member states in the enlarged Union – group of the ‘willing’ – could take an action for a specific policy serving the common interests and objectives of the CFSP. Therefore, any action that would be taken for this end should safeguard the values and serve the interests of the EU with the emphasis on the coherent identity. However, the Treaty excluded the extension of enhanced cooperation to the areas of military and defense whereas could only be applied to common positions and joint actions (Regelsberger 2001, p. 159). This limitation reduced the scope of the cooperation with regard to CFSP and made it clear that the member states would cooperate based on consensus and pragmatic decision-making by using economic means rather than military capability (M.
To summarize, the Treaty of Nice prepared the EU for the new enlargement while leaving the CFSP issues as modestly altered.

**Other Developments in the 2000s: European Security Strategy, 2003 and Fifth Enlargement**

In the mid-2000s, another development was the launch of European Security Strategy (ESS) approved by the European Council in Brussels on December 2003. The Strategy was drafted by the High Representative Javier Solana with the focus on ensuring the security for Europe in a globalized world. In order to secure Europe’s place in the world, the ESS urged for a multilateral cooperation within Europe and abroad because of the fact that “no single nation is able to tackle today’s complex challenges” (ESS, 2003, p. 1). The ESS outlined the key challenges that the EU faced in the new century such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states, and organized crime. Therefore, it was agreed for the EU to promote regional governance in Europe and to become more capable to tackle with the problems of the new century (Bindi, p. 37).

Another development in the mid-2000s was the fifth enlargement that increased the number of member states from fifteen to twenty-five, and twenty-seven eventually. In 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia joined the EU and then followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. The major implication of the new enlargement covering a broad geography was the extension of its external borders which would require for further regulations for foreign policy (Bindi, pp. 37-38). These developments in the mid-2000s required further steps to be taken which was also foreseen by the Treaty of Nice.


The Treaty of Nice did not signal the end of the CFSP reforms. Rather, the effect of enlargement and the changes in the global politics such as terrorist attacks of 9/11
and the war against Iraq in 2003 triggered the Union to redefine their place with an active role in world politics. The Draft Constitutional Treaty, one of the biggest steps in European politics, was designed in the light of these events. As stated by the Treaty of Nice and Laeken Declaration of 2001, a new IGC was to hold in order to revise the existing TEU legal framework (Regelsberger & Vessels, 2004, p. 102). The priority was defined as the clarification of the procedures and tasks of EU institutions strengthen the EP, national Parliaments and the transparency of proceedings. The overall aim was to bring closer the EU and the public. The proposed Draft Treaty included all earlier Treaties and incorporated the ‘pillars’ of the Union into a unified body as well as a legal personality for the EU. This was an attempt for centralization of the Union by extending Brussels’ authority to intergovernmental issues (Dedman, p. 174).

Regarding the evolution of the CFSP, the Draft Treaty added some new innovations to the traditional procedures that culminated throughout the years. It strengthened the role of the European Council which was to be responsible for identifying strategic interests and objectives of the Union. It also introduced the extended Presidency of the European Council and responsibilities for the chair to represent EU externally. One of the major innovations was the establishment of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs which would be the sole signal of authorizing the Union on foreign policy issues. Despite these major steps, the progress in decision-making structure was rather modest. With the attempts of traditional supporters of unanimity principle like the UK, the Draft Treaty confirmed the existing rules and did not go beyond the defined principles (Regelsberger & Vessels, p. 103).

Following the end of the IGC, the Draft Constitutional Treaty was signed in Rome in October 2004. Yet, eleven member states were to hold referendums to ratify the Treaty. First positive outcome of referendum came from Spain. However, in 2005 it was rejected by the public in France and the Netherlands (Church & Phinnemore, p. 49). The rejection by the French and Dutch public created an atmosphere of pessimism. Luxembourg Prime Minister, Jean Claude Juncker, stated that “Europe is not in a crisis; it is in a deep crisis”. According to Dedman (2009) if France and the Netherlands did not reject the Treaty, the UK and Poland would have done in their referendums (p. 174). In spite of this pessimistic atmosphere, other states continued to ratify the Treaty during the so-called ‘period of reflection’. As a result, German Council Presidency offered another deal by proposing a new IGC that would keep the innovations brought by the
The Treaty of Lisbon, whereas eliminating the propositions what made the Treaty ‘constitutional’ (Church & Phinnemore, p. 49). The outcome of the new IGC was to be the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Treaty of Lisbon, 2009: End of the Way on ‘Speaking with One Voice’?

After the failure of Constitutional Treaty, new reform process started with the initiations of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. With the electoral victory of Nicholas Sarkozy as the French President, French support for German initiation increased and it culminated into a new IGC to discuss the reform and re-implementation of Constitutional Treaty. An informal European Council in Lisbon in 2007 brought the negotiations to a close and the Treaty of Lisbon, the replacement of the Constitutional Treaty, was signed (Church & Phinnemore, p. 55). The Treaty of Lisbon led to a simplification of the Union’s structure by eliminating the pillar structure, granted the EU to a legal personality, and brought institutional amendments to the European foreign policy making (Koehler, 2010, p. 58).

The Treaty of Lisbon brought substantial changes to the European foreign policy in terms of institutional structure. The explicit statement of the EU’s legal personality has two consequences for the CFSP. First, it clarified the question about who is in charge as a European party in international relations specifically as the signatory in international agreements. Second, it corresponds to the external means of the EU to implement the CFSP (Koehler, p. 63). With regard to institutional structure, the Treaty of Lisbon brought three major innovations by introducing the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the position of President of the European Council, and the European External Action Service.

The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was a replacement of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs as introduced by the Constitutional Treaty. The two differently named positions had the same mandates but the Treaty of Lisbon avoided using ‘Minister’ for this position due to fear of member states’ perception of losing national sovereignties. The newly created position combined two responsibilities of the existing CFSP High Representative and the EU Commissioner for
external affairs (Verola, 2010, p. 44). Granting High Representative ‘two hats’ job with the aim of eliminating the dual structure of Community and CFSP policies represented a breaking point for the institutional structure. With the ‘Council hat’, the High Representative was to be the chair of Foreign Affairs Council and was to run the foreign and security policy of the Union. On the other hand, the High Representative was to be a member of the college and one of its vice presidents with the ‘Commission hat’ (Paul, 2008, p. 16).

The High Representative’s duties vary according to matters fall under the CFSP umbrella or external relations. In the former, the High Representative was to act as the representative of the European Council with the right of initiative. In the latter case, the High Representative was to act as an integral part of the European Commission (Verola, p. 44). The European Council was given the authority to appoint the High Representative by voting on the basis of qualified majority. Furthermore, the Commission President has to give assent to the nomination. To gain a democratic strength, the EP was given the responsibility to vote of approval for the High Representative as well as the right to ask for him or her to resign. For this position, Baroness Catherine Ashton, former Commissioner for Trade, was appointed by the Council in 2009 (Missiroli, 2010, p. 431).

Another major innovation brought by the Treaty of Lisbon was the introduction of the European Council as one of the EU’s constituent institutions and the position of European Council President. The introduction of European Council as a formal institution of the EU granted the right to Council to identify the strategic interests and the objectives of the Union although the Council had already been exercising these functions before the Treaty of Lisbon. The introduction of position of European Council President was also an important development that brought continuity to European foreign policy making. Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the head of state or government of the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers also had the responsibility to chair the meetings of the European Council. Therefore, the Presidency of the Council was also subject to change according to the rules of rotating presidency. With the Treaty of Lisbon reforms, the European Council President had a ‘permanent’ role with two and a half year in the office which also could be renewed once. The European Council was given the authority to elect the President of the European Council on the basis of QMV. In 2009, the European Council elected Herman van
Rompuy, the former Belgian Prime Minister, as the President of the European Council (Koehler, p. 68).

Another substantial innovation brought by the Treaty of Lisbon was the introduction of a new service that was to be responsible to ‘assist’ the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This new service was named as European External Action Service (EEAS) which was to bring efficiency for the High Representative to fulfill his or her actions. According to the Treaty, “in fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the member states” (Art. 27(3)). The duties of the EEAS were to ensure the consistency and coordination of the Union’s external action and to prepare policy proposal and implement them following the approval of the Council. The Service was also to assist the President of the European Council, the President and the Members of the Commission in their duties (Paul, pp. 23-24).

Although the Treaty of Lisbon brought substantial changes to the institutional structure of the CFSP, the reforms regarding the decision-making procedure rather signaled modest changes from the prior treaties. The Treaty preserved the innovations of the Constitutional Treaty in the extension of majority vote and enhanced cooperation. The Treaty also adopted the same general provisions as before which authorized the European Council to unanimously decide whether to adopt QMV in areas where unanimity is still foreseen. Therefore, the QMV was extended to only specific areas rather than to whole CFSP decision-making (Verola, pp. 45-46). Although the decision-making based on unanimity bound the foreign policy making to the willingness of member states, the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon represented a significant step towards increasing the coherence of the European foreign policy which would increase the effectiveness of the policies and strengthen the EU’s capability to ‘speak with one voice’ in world politics.

This chapter has presented the development of EU foreign policy since the establishment of the EU until present time. The argument of the foreign policy development of the EU provides useful insights in understanding the EU sanctions
policy practices today because the EU sanctions policy practices follows the same trend with the development of EU foreign policy. As argued throughout the chapter, there are three important events that led to further integration of the EU foreign policy. The first phase started with the completion of the EPC in 1981 as the predecessor of the EU foreign policy. The second phase started with the entry into force of the TEU which built the CFSP as a separate pillar of the Union. Finally, the beginning of the last phase was marked with the entry into force of Treaty of Lisbon which shaped the present foreign policy of the EU. In light of this argument, next chapter analyses the EU sanctions policy practices with regard to three separate phases and then presents a general characterization of the EU sanctions policy practices with basic descriptive statistics. Then it builds the bridge with the first chapter and argues that the EU is transforming itself to a smart power with the introduction of the sanctions as a foreign policy tool.
CHAPTER III: EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS POLICY PRACTICES

Development of European Union Sanctions Policy

The use of sanctions has become a common foreign policy tool for many international actors as well as the EU to induce a change in a target state’s policies. The utility of sanctions stems from inability of diplomatic measures to bring the desired change and costly nature of military actions in certain cases. Therefore, sanctions offer a middle ground between “words and wars” (Wallensteen & Staibano, 2005). The EU, like both national and international actors in world politics, has been employing sanctions increasingly over the years. The development of sanctions policy of the EU resembles the development process of European foreign policy – reflecting an evolutionary nature.

Although the EU sanctions policy roots back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the sanctions imposed represented more of ‘economic’ concerns with regard trade relations with the rest of the world (Kreutz, p. 7). A new era in sanctions policy started in 1980s with London Report establishing the last phase of EPC and first sanctions of ‘political’ nature imposed against Soviet Union in 1982 as a response to Soviet intervention in Poland (Bindi, p. 20). However, until the Treaty on European Union sanctions were imposed on the basis of national legislations (Rolenc et al, 2010, p. 109). In other words, until 1992 sanctions represented a policy domain where there member states ‘cooperate’ rather than having a ‘common’ policy.

Therefore, since the 1990s the nature of EU sanctions policy has changed in an important level which led the way to autonomous EU sanctions. With the inclusion of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool, the Union combined the range of purely economic instruments under the first pillar into political instruments under the second pillar (Giumelli, 2013a, p. 395). According to TEU, the objectives of EU sanctions policy are the same as CFSP objectives which were:
“to safeguard the common values, the fundamental interests, and the independence of the Union; to strengthen its security and its member states in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (TEU, 1992, Art. J.1.2).

Since the TEU’s entry into force, the number of sanctions imposed by the Union, not by the member states, increased tremendously and reached a peak in recent years after the entry into force of Treaty of Lisbon. Following the TEU and the increasing political will to resort to sanctions led the EU to adopt three key documents that are related almost all aspects of the EU sanctions policy (Giumelli, 2013a, p. 395).

The first document is the ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures’ (‘Basic Principles’, hereon) which was adopted in June 2004 upon the request by the Council to introduce a framework for the effective implementation of sanctions. With the approval of Basic Principles, the Union committed itself to use economic sanctions as a tool to maintain and restore international peace and security (Basic Principles, 2004). According to Basic Principles,

“If necessary, the Council will impose autonomous EU sanctions in support of efforts to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and as a restrictive measure to uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. [The Union] will do this in accordance with [the Union’s] common foreign and security policy, as set out in Article 11 TEU, and in full conformity with [the Union’s] obligations under international law” (Council of European Union, 2004, Art 3).

Basic Principles also clarified an important feature of EU sanctions regarding the question of ‘whom to punish’. As stated in the document, “sanctions should be targeted in a way that has maximum impact on those whose behavior [the Union] want to influence. Targeting should reduce to the maximum extent possible any adverse humanitarian effects or unintended consequences for persons not targeted or neighboring countries” (Basic Principles, 2004). This principle was already adopted by the UN in the 1990s in order to reduce the undesired hardship imposed on the respective public of targeted states.
The second document related to the EU sanctions policy is the ‘Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (‘Guidelines’, hereon). ‘Guidelines’ was approved in 2003 and was updated three times in 2005, 2009, and 2012. In contrast to relatively short and limited in scope Basic Principles, Guidelines offer a comprehensive understanding of how the EU sanctions work by outlining the objectives, legal basis, and the Union’s competences. It argues that the experience of the EU as a ‘sanctioner’ in world politics urges for the necessity “to standardize implementation and to strengthen methods of implementation. The guidelines address a number of general issues and present standard wording and common definitions that may be used in the legal instruments implementing restrictive measures” (Guidelines, 2012).

The first part of the Guidelines provides a framework of characterization of EU sanctions policy. Since decision to impose sanctions on a target needs political will of the member states, they may be applied only after a political decision was adopted. In other words, the initial decision to apply sanctions or not is not governed by the Guidelines. The second part of the document focuses on basic principles with regard to imposition of sanctions such as objectives of sanctions, targeting of sanctions, the creation of sanctions lists, exemptions, and the implementation of UN resolutions. The third part of the Guidelines outlines the common definitions in conformity with the CFSP when implementing sanctions. The final part of the document focuses on the monitoring and evaluation of sanctions by defining the mandate of the Sanctions Formation of Foreign Relations Counselor Working Party (RELEX/Sanctions).

Finally, the third document is the ‘EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures’ (‘Best Practices’, hereon). The document was adopted in 2006 and was updated in 2007 and 2008. Best Practices proposes the ways of “identification of designated persons and entities in order to improve the effectiveness of administrative measures and restrictions on admission and to avoid unnecessary problems caused by homonyms or near-identical names” (Best Practices, 2008). In short, the document offers a practical guidance with regard to identification of individuals who are responsible from undesired behavior in the target state. In this respect, Best Practices are aimed to supplement the Guidelines. The first part of the document focuses on targeted restrictive measures and de-listing. The following three parts explain freezing of funds and economic resources, humanitarian exemptions, the
prohibitions on the provisions of goods and services. The final part of the document introduces a vision on how to achieve ideal cooperation and coordination among member states, institutions of the EU, and the expertise groups on sanctions.

What Kind of Sanctions the EU Imposes?

‘Sanctions’ is a general term used in the literature that refers specific sub-categories. The EU adopts a broad range of sanctions which include diplomatic sanctions (expulsion of diplomats, severing of diplomatic ties, and suspension of official visits); suspension of cooperation with a third country; boycotts of sport or cultural events; trade sanctions (general or specific trade sanctions, and arms embargoes); financial sanctions (freezing of funds or economic resources, prohibition of financial transactions, and restrictions on export credits or investment); flight bans; and restriction on admission (European Commission, 2008).

In recent years, the EU has increasingly adopted sanctions in the form of arms embargoes, economic and financial restrictions, and restrictions on admission (European Commission, 2008). The reason for the focus on these types of sanctions stems from the view on reducing the costs of sanctions on the civilian population of the target state and punishing those responsible for the undesired policies. Until 1990s the typical form of sanctions used was ‘embargo’ which restricts export or import of certain goods. The transition from ‘comprehensive sanctions’ to ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions reflects the transition from state centric sanctions to non-state actors (i.e., individuals, groups, or companies) and they focus on only specific sectors or specific products (Cortright & Lopez, 2002). This trend was initiated by the UN after the unintended effects of sanctions on the civilian population of Iraq and Haiti and following criticism directed to the UN (Gibbons, 1999, p. 39). Therefore, in line with its primary norms to protect civilians, the EU followed the trend by the UN and recently imposes targeted sanctions.
Arms Embargoes

Arms embargoes are based on the decision to prohibit the sale of weapons to a certain country, region, group or individual, who might have incentive to use them against peace processes and civilians and to undermine the stability of regimes. The EU adopts arms embargoes to stop the flow of arms and military equipment to the regions of conflict and to the regimes that might use them against a foreign country or its civilian population to repress them. In this respect, the EU also bans the provision of financial and technical assistance, brokering services and other services related to military activities. The exceptions to arms embargoes apply if there is humanitarian or protective use, institution building programs, and crisis management operations such as representatives of media and personnel of development programs (European Commission, 2008).

Economic and Financial Sanctions

Given the combined economic power of 28 member states, the economic and financial sanctions of the EU may significantly harm the target state. This type of sanctions involves export and/or import bans of specific products such as timber, oil, and diamonds; bans on the provision of specific services such as financial and technical assistance; flight bans, prohibitions on investment; payment and capital movements; or withdrawal of tariff preferences (European Commission, 2008). Such sanctions, specifically the bans on export and/or import, are designed to distort the domestic distribution of power in the target state (Cortright & Lopez, p. 181). However, in order to prevent civilian suffering the EU applies economic and financial restrictive measures to all persons and entities operating businesses in the EU, including the nationals of non-EU states. In this respect, the EU has often imposed targeted financial sanctions to the specific persons as stated above. These targeted financial sanctions include freezing of all funds and economic resources of targeted persons and entities responsible for the objectionable policies. Exemptions apply in certain conditions such as payments for foodstuffs and medicines (European Commission, 2008).
Restrictions on Admission (Visa or Travel Ban)

Travel bans refer to the ban on the entrance of certain individuals to a given territory. The motivation of such sanctions is creating discomfort or preventing certain individuals from carrying out actions. Travel bans are adopted specifically in the face of threat from terrorist organizations to prevent them from travelling in EU countries (Giumelli, 2011, p. 14). In line with the decision, the member states are called upon to take all the necessary measures to prevent listed persons from the entry into or transit through their territories. Similar to other sanction types, exemptions apply on humanitarian or other grounds in conformity with the international law (European Commission, 2008).

Flight Ban

The EU also imposes sanctions in the form of flight ban but the legal difficulties encountered with regard to this type of sanction made flight ban an undesirable measure. There has been only one case where a country was subject to flight ban. In 1998, Yugoslavia was subject to this type of sanction along with other measures. However, the UK failed to enforce the sanctions because its existing air services agreement with Yugoslavia took precedence over EC law (Portela, p. 57).

Diplomatic, Cultural, and Sports Sanctions

Diplomatic, cultural, and sports sanctions refers to type of measures that induce a limitation of contacts, the invitation of political dissidents to national celebrations at embassies abroad, and the suspension of scientific cooperation. By their nature, this type of sanctions has a more symbolic effect on the target which led to rare use of them by the EU (Portela, p. 58).
Decision-Making Process of the EU Sanctions Policy

The decision making for imposition of sanctions in the EU can be considered in two different structures according to the type of sanction on the agenda – sanctions those falling under the Community and CFSP domain. Portela (2010) classifies three different decision-making procedures for EU sanctions policy since the entry into force of TEU until the Treaty of Lisbon 2009. First, the decision to implement sanctions is taken by the Community and the authority to impose sanctions is also given to the Community. These types of sanctions include the withdrawal of Generalized Systems of Preference (GSP) benefits, suspension of financial and technical assistance, suspension of development aid, interruption of trade and cooperation agreements, postponement of new projects, and interruption of decisions to implement cooperation (p. 27).

These ‘community sanctions’ are decided on the basis of QMV by the Council following the proposals of the European Commission with the exception of suspension of trade and cooperation agreements. Regarding these sanctions the Council acts unanimously (Eriksson, 2005, p. 109). For sanctions under the domain of Cotonou Convention, the Council decides on the basis of QMV regarding partial suspension and on the basis of unanimity for full suspension. On the other hand, some sanctions are decided by the European Commission only. For example, Commission suspended aid to Equatorial Guinea in 1992 without the involvement of the Council. The European Parliament also has the authority to delay the ratification of cooperation. For instance, the EP blocked the initiation of new 5-year aid to Syria in 1992 due to Syria’s poor human rights records (Hazelzet, 2001, p. 71).

Second, sanctions are agreed under the domain of CFSP and implemented by the Community. These sanctions involve trade embargoes, financial sanctions, and flight bans. The procedure starts with the agreement decided by the Council on the basis of a unanimity vote that result with a legal act either in the form of a Common Position or a Joint Action. Then, a Community Regulation is adopted to implement the decision. For Community Regulations regarding trade embargoes and financial sanctions, the Council decides by QMV (EC Treaty, Art. 301). Finally, sanctions are decided under the domain of CFSP and implemented by the member states on the basis of their national legislations where the EU does not have competence. Arms embargoes, visa bans,
diplomatic and cultural sanctions fall under this category. The decision to implement is taken on the basis of unanimity by the Council (Jones, 2007, pp. 115-116).

Until the Treaty of Lisbon, the principle of unanimity in certain cases prevented effective decision-making mechanism in EU sanctions policy. For example, arms embargo against Indonesia automatically expired in 2000 although the crisis in East Timor continued. The necessary decision for continuation of sanctions required another Council decision however with the veto vote of Portugal, the Union failed to take necessary measure before the expiry date of sanctions (Hazelzet, p. 100). With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union has eliminated unanimity vote in sanctions policy. Since 2009 the Council acts on the basis of QMV on a joint proposal from the European Commission and the High Representative and informs the European Parliament (TFEU, Art. 215). Therefore, the Treaty of Lisbon has strengthened the legal basis of EU sanctions policy.

**EU Sanctions Policy Practices**

The EU sanctions policy practices can be divided into three phases: First phase involves the time period starting from development and completion of EPC (1981-1992). Second phase covers the period from the entry into force of the TEU until the Treaty of Lisbon (1993-2008). Finally, last phase includes the time period since the entry into force of Treaty of Lisbon to present time (2009-present). The reason for such classification stems from the important breakthroughs in development of the EU foreign policy in line with the development of sanctions policy as argued in the second chapter of this study. This trend reveals that as the EU continues to develop a more concrete foreign policy its adoption of sanctions increases which in turn signals EU’s attempt for transformation to a smart power in the recent years.
The First Phase: From EPC to TEU

Although the use of sanctions as a tool was mentioned with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the EU did not appeal to autonomous sanctions until the 1980s. The only case was the EU member states’ following of UN sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965 which was implemented on the level of individual member states (Kreutz, p. 8). The first autonomous sanctions were imposed in 1982 against Soviet Union as a response to Soviet Union’s intervention to Poland. The sanctions were result of a process started in mid-1970s with the labor protests regarding the poor economic development in Poland. Following the protests, Polish government declared martial law and arrested the protesters. The EU, despite disagreements among member states who wanted to keep good relations with the east such as Germany, decided to withdraw ‘Most Favorable Nation’ treatment to Poland and imposed partial trade embargo to Soviet Union (Kreutz, pp. 21-22). The terms of the embargo were quite vague and unclear by only indicating that “the interests of the Community require that imports from the USSR be reduced” (Official Journal 1982 cited in Koutrakos, 2001, p. 60). Furthermore, the sanctions imposed against the Soviet Union suffered from a lack of implementation by the member states which signaled the deficiencies of the Community sanctions policy and the need for further steps to be taken.

Second autonomous sanctions in the history of the EU were imposed against Argentina as a response to invasion of Falkland Islands. The conflict between Argentina and the UK constituted an important and distinctive case for the EU because the Union was faced with an attack on a territory of a member state which put it into a situation where a reaction was necessary. Upon the call made by the UK, the EU declared its full support for a combined action against Argentina. However, Denmark opposed this proposal by arguing that the EU did not have any constitutional right to impose sanctions. As a consequence member states agreed on to adopt national measures identical to what had been decided at the EU level and imposed arms embargo against Argentina (d’Estmael, 1997, p. 7). Similar to sanctions against the Soviet Union, Argentina case also revealed the need for further reform in sanctions policy and foreign policy in general.
The third autonomous sanctions of the EU were imposed against China in 1989. Following the protests in Tiananmen Square and Chinese government’s use of brutal force to move the protesters from the Square led the EU to take measures as a response to human rights violations on the level of member states and later on sanctions by the EU. These sanctions include diplomatic and economic sanctions consisting of an unspecified arms embargo (Jakobson, 2004, p. 51). Fourth, the EU adopted sanctions against Burma/Myanmar in 1991 as a response to Burmese governments’ use of force and mass-arrests against the student protesters who were calling for democratic reforms in the country. Upon the elections held in Burma, the EU decided to impose arms embargo based on the refusal of respect to election results and ongoing human rights violations. The EU also took additional measures in the form of restrictions on admission to certain individuals responsible for the violations of human rights in the country (Giumelli, 2013b, p. 29). Finally, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were also targeted by sanctions as a result of the subsequent wars in 1991-1995 and 1992-1995 which led to disintegration of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The main reason of the EU to impose sanctions against Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina was the intrastate conflict going on in the region which constituted an important security threat against the EU member states territory. In this period, the EU lacked the military capabilities to efficiently tackle with the situation on the continent and responded to threat posed by imposing arms embargo against both entities.

**Characterization of the First Phase of EU Sanctions Policy Practices**

A general characterization of the first phase of EU sanctions policy practice reflects the EU’s deficiencies in this policy area and signaled for the necessity to take further steps in this regard. The sanctions in this period were either the result of the UN imposition of sanctions and EU’s following UN tradition or the initiation of member states where most of the time imposed on the basis of member states since the EU lacked the sufficient legal basis for adoption of sanctions. Additionally, since the EU lacked experience, it was unable to respond quickly to challenges proposed by other states. Geographically, sanctions are distributed as one case in Americas (Argentina), two cases in Asia (Soviet Union and Burma/Myanmar), and two cases in Europe (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) which reflects a homogenous distribution over the world. Issue-wise, the sanctions are imposed as a response to threat to territorial
integrity of a third country (Soviet Union), human rights violations and respect for
democracy (China and Burma/Myanmar), and finally intrastate conflict (Croatia and
Bosnia/Herzegovina). The measures adopted against these countries includes arms
embargo, partial trade embargo, and restrictions on admission while arms embargo
being the most common type of sanctions used in this period. This characterization
shows that the EU in its surrounding region as in the case of Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Soviet Union imposed sanctions with the concern of protecting its
security while in the rest of the world (Argentina and Burma/Myanmar) it is concerned
about issues that can be considered as ‘low politics’ such as respect for democracy and
human rights violations. This reflects the view that in the early years of EU sanctions
policy practices EU acted more as a regional power rather than a global power which
also reveals the fact that EU lacked the sufficient mechanism to be a global player in
world politics although one of the main objectives to ‘have a say in world politics’.

The Second Phase: From TEU to Treaty of Lisbon

As the EU moved towards having a more concrete foreign policy with the
signing of the Treaty on European Union and introduced a Common Foreign and
Security Policy as a pillar of the Union, the sanctions policy practice also gained pace
and increased to 23 cases until the Treaty of Lisbon as opposed to only 6 cases in the
previous phase. The second phase also witnessed more coordinated stance against the
challenges proposed by the other states in world politics with regard to both
geographical and issue coverage. Since the increased number of cases in this period
obstructs a detailed coverage of all sanctions cases, a general overview of EU sanctions
policy practice is provided.

As mentioned above, the second phase witnessed a broad coverage of issues and
geographical distribution. Following the entry into force of TEU, the EU imposed
sanctions on Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Nigeria and Sudan in 1993 and
1994 respectively. Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) was subject to sanctions by
the EU because of the President Mobutu’s violation of democratic principles although
his declaration of the legalization of the parties and promise to hold elections in the
future. When the election process was disturbed by violence among the ethnic and
political fractions in the society, the EU imposed arms embargo and restrictions on admission to Zairian nationals (King, 1999, p. 323). Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) was again targeted by sanctions for the same reasons in 2005 with measures taken as arms embargo, restrictions on provision of certain services, restrictions on admission, and assets freeze.

Similarly, the EU imposed sanctions against Nigeria as a response to violations of democratic principles. 1990 and 1992 elections in Nigeria were subject to criticisms of electoral fraud when it was proved that the number of votes exceeded the total number of registered voters. After free elections in 1993 under the supervision of local and international authorities, the military leader of Nigeria suspended the elections which were followed by violent protests and military coup in the country. As a response to violation of democratic principles and human rights, the EU imposed arms embargo against Nigeria. Nigeria was also targeted by sanctions in 1998 due to the same reasons. Similar to situation in Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, Sudan was subject to sanctions by the EU in 1994. The main reason of sanctions initiation was the Sudanese government use of force against the protesters and bombing of civilians following the military coup. As a response to violation of democratic principles and human rights, the EU imposed arms embargo against Sudan. Furthermore, upon the intrastate conflict of 2004 the EU adopted stricter measures by adopting restrictions on admission, assets freeze, and restrictions on provision of certain services along with arms embargo (Agbu 1998 cited in Giumelli, 2011, pp. 69-70).

Sanctions imposed by the EU in the mid-1990s represented different issue and geographic coverage. In 1996, the US, Afghanistan, and Former Republic of Yugoslavia were targeted by sanctions. The main motivation behind the EU sanctions against the US was to protect EU companies from US laws with regard to conducting business with Cuba, Iran, and Libya (Joint Action 1996/668/CFSP). The reason the EU put forward was the violation of international law while the measures adopted remained as vaguely defined as “each member state shall take the measures it deems necessary to protect the interests of natural and legal persons” (Joint Action 1996/668/CFSP). Afghanistan was also subject to sanctions in 1996 when the intrastate conflict broke out following the Soviet forces’ withdrawal from the country after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1989. In 1994, a new Islam-based government was established by Taliban which was recognized as a terrorist organization. In 1996 the intrastate conflict gained pace and led
to serious human rights violations and obstructed humanitarian aid to the country which caused a severe refugee crisis. As a response, the EU imposed an arms embargo against Afghanistan on the basis of intrastate conflict and support for terrorism. Furthermore, Afghanistan was targeted by sanctions in 2001 because of its support to terrorism with measures such as restrictions on admission and assets freeze along with arms embargo (Kreutz, p. 35). Similar to Afghanistan, Former Republic of Yugoslavia experienced an intrastate conflict in the mid-1990s which led to disintegration. During the Kosovo crisis the tension in the region increased and Serbian police forces used excessive force on the Kosovo Albanian demonstration where more than 80 civilians were killed. Following the events, EU imposed an arms embargo which was further strengthened by restrictions on admission to certain individuals, partial trade embargo, and assets freeze as well as some positive measures such as reconstruction aid and lifting of the oil embargo on the Serb municipalities who were opposed to Milosevic regime. Sanctions were further renewed in 1998 and 2001 (de Vries, 2002, p. 87).

The end of the decade witnessed sanctions imposed against Indonesia and Libya. The destabilization in Indonesia started in the mid-1990s in the form of large-scale political protests and ethnic conflict as well as financial crisis. The EU’s connection with the conflict was based on Portugal’s relationship with Indonesia as a former colony. The separation movement in East Timor led to serious conflict within the state and EU committed itself to contribute to find a solution. After the agreement on to hold a referendum with regard to independence to East Timor and the result of the elections, the paramilitary groups attacked the independence supporters. As a response, the EU imposed an arms embargo and suspended economic aid to Indonesia (King, p. 334). In 1998, Belarus was targeted with sanctions by the EU because of the ongoing instability in the country after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Poor economic conditions helped the rise of Lukashenko as a president whose agenda was to continue the traditions of the Soviet Union such as introduction of Russian as an official language and introduction of Soviet symbols. The referendum held regarding these issues lacked the free and fair conditions which followed by political violence where demonstrations were brutally suppressed by the police forces and conducted mass arrests. As a response, the EU imposed restrictions on admission on the members of the government. Although the sanctions were lifted in 1999 following an agreement between the EU and Belarus, the domestic political situation did not change in the upcoming years (Kreutz, pp. 37-38).
Therefore, sanctions were renewed in 2004 and 2007 on the basis of violation of democratic principles and human rights.

Libya was also subject to EU sanctions because of the 1986 bombing of a discotheque in Berlin which killed 4 civilians. This attack constituted a security threat on the EU territory which led the EU to take measures such as arms embargo, restrictions on admission, and diplomatic sanctions on the basis of support for terrorism. In fact, the sanctions episode started in 1986 with the UN Security Council decision which EU also followed but in 1999 UN decided to suspend the sanctions against Libya (SIPRI, 2012). However, the EU autonomously kept sanctions in force which is the reason of the inclusion of sanctions in the second phase of EU sanctions policy in this study.

In 2001, the EU imposed sanctions under unstable conditions within a different context. In the case of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia where a number of individuals were engaged in protecting and supporting the indictees of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The EU imposed sanctions against the indictees in the form of assets freeze by demanding them to go voluntarily into custody (Giumelli, p. 12). At the beginning of 2000s, Zimbabwe was also targeted by sanctions because of continuing land ownership issue and events followed since its independence in 1980. The referendum on land relocation in Zimbabwe led a serious political violence in country where President Mugabe used excessive force on the political opposition which led a minimum of 100000 households were forced to leave by the end of 2001. As a response to internal repression and violation of democratic principles and human rights the EU imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe in the form of arms embargo, restrictions on provision of certain goods, restrictions on admission, and assets freeze (Eriksson, pp. 200-201). As a result of the violent intrastate conflict in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, the EU imposed an arms embargo to the country (Paes, 2009, p. 71).

Uzbekistan became a target of EU sanctions in 2005 as a result of the use of force by the government against the civilians and killings of hundreds of people following the uprising in Andijan. Furthermore, the Uzbek government did not allow international independent investigation to take place in the region as suggested by the UN. As a response, the EU imposed measures including arms embargo, restrictions on
the export of military equipment used for internal repression, and restrictions on admission (Portela, p. 78). Iran was also subject to sanctions by the EU in 2007 due to its violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by concealing plans to enrich uranium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and international community put pressure on Iranian government to reveal its plans whether they are conducted for peaceful purposes. Upon the rejection by Iran, the EU imposed sanctions in the form of arms embargo, restrictions on admission, assets freeze, and restrictions on import of certain goods (Guimelli, pp. 26-27). In the second phase of the EU sanctions policy the sanctions imposed on Belarus and China were renewed because of the same reasons in the first phase as argued above.

Characterization of the Second Phase of EU Sanctions Policy Practices

A general characterization of the second phase of EU sanctions policy practice reflects the process that EU recorded in the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool while there are deficiencies. The number of sanctions significantly increased to 23 during this phase in comparison to 6 cases in the first phase. The EU has become more able to respond challenges faced in world politics more broadly both in terms of geographical and issue coverage. Geographically, sanctions policy practice of the EU was distributed as one case in Americas (the US); four cases in Asia (Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Burma, and China); seven cases in Europe (Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Belarus, and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia); four cases in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region (Afghanistan, Libya, and Iran); seven cases in sub-Saharan Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe), and finally one case that cannot be qualified as a region which is ICTY. The sanctions in this phase, thus, reflect a more homogenous distribution across the regions in the world and more engagement with the rest of the world compared to the first phase.

Issue-wise, the sanctions are imposed as a response to intrastate conflict (Afghanistan, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Sudan); support for terrorism (Afghanistan, and Libya); internal repression (Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe); respect for democracy (Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Zimbabwe); human rights
violations (Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, China, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe); violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Iran); violation of international law (the US); and finally respect for the Court (ICTY). The issue coverage of the sanctions policy reveals that the EU started to engage more in the problems of world politics ranging from internal repression to violation of international law in comparison to first phase where issue coverage was limited to intrastate conflict, human rights violations, and threat to territorial integrity of a third country. Therefore, there has been a transformation from dealing with only important security issues or direct threats to be interested in issues that can be considered as ‘low politics’ such as violation of international law or respect for the ICTY as well as still focusing on the security threats.

The measures imposed against these countries include arms embargo (Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe); restrictions on exports (Afghanistan); restrictions on export of equipment that can be used for internal repression (Burma/Myanmar, and Uzbekistan); restrictions on import (Iran); partial trade embargo (Former Republic of Yugoslavia); restrictions on provision of certain goods (Zimbabwe); restrictions on provision of certain services (Burma/Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan); restrictions on admission (Afghanistan, Belarus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe); assets freeze (Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, ICTY, Iran, and Zimbabwe); restrictions on provision of new banknotes and coins (Iran), and diplomatic sanctions (Libya). In comparison to the first phase, the range of measures adopted in this phase also expanded while there were only three types of sanctions imposed in the former in the form of arms embargo, partial trade embargo, and restrictions on admission.

This characterization of the second phase of EU sanctions policy practices shows that the EU has become more engaged with the rest of the world as well as its near neighborhood. While there are only 7 cases in Europe, the EU imposed 17 cases of sanctions in a wider geography. Regarding the issue coverage, the EU has also expanded the issues it focuses on diverting from solely being interested in direct
security threats. Therefore, in line with the developments and further integration in foreign policy, the EU started to become a more global power that engages in different geographical locations and with different challenges on the way to increase its power to ‘have a say in world politics’.

The Third Phase: From Treaty of Lisbon to Present

The third phase of EU sanctions policy practices represents the shortest time span while it is the period which EU imposes sanctions most frequently compared to the previous two phases. The increasing trend of use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool is in line with the development of the EU foreign policy and its move toward a more integrated approach with the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon and institutionalization of the foreign policy with the establishment of EEAS and introduction of post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. With the help of institutionalization, the EU has become more able to ‘speak with one voice’ and respond the events in the world politics quickly. This period has witnessed 18 cases of sanctions in only 6 years whereas there were 23 cases in the second phase which consists of 17 years and only 5 cases in the first phase which includes 12 years. Similar to the second phase, the increased number of cases obstructs a detailed coverage of all sanctions cases. Therefore, a general overview of sanctions cases will be provided in this section.

In 2009, Republic of Guinea was subject to sanctions by the EU as a response to violent crackdown of the protests by the government. Following the military coup after the death of President Lansana Conte, protests erupted against the military government. As a response to the government’s excessive use of force in handling with the protests which led to killing of 150 people, the EU imposed sanctions against the Republic of Guinea in the form of arms embargo, restrictions on admission, and assets freeze on the basis of internal repression, regional instability, and human rights violations (Giumelli, 2011, p. 61). During the same year the EU renewed sanctions against Zimbabwe on the basis of same reasons with the previous sanctions such as internal repression, and violation of democratic principles and human rights. The type of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe remained the same as the previous case as well.
The EU confirmed another episode of sanctions against Belarus in 2010 but the decision was also to suspend travel ban in order to influence the cost-benefit calculation of Belarus government on human rights violations. However no step was taken further at the Belorussian side and the government was also reluctant to release the political prisoners. Since there was no improvement with regards to democracy, human rights, and release of political prisoners, further sanctions were imposed on the regime in the form of arms embargo, assets freeze and restrictions on admission (EEAS, 2013, p. 1-3). In 2010, the sanctions imposed against Iran were also renewed due to no progress in Iran’s uranium enrichment program (Esfandiary, 2013, p. 3).

Côté d’Ivore (Ivory Coast) became subject to sanctions by the EU in 2010 as a result of the President Laurent Gbagbo’s rejection of election results. Côté d’Ivore experienced a significant armed rebellion in 2002 which split the country into two camps due to ethnic discord. Following the already delayed elections in 2010 the unrest in the country increased due to President’s rejection of the internationally recognized winner of elections Alassane Quattara (BBC, 2014a). Before the UN was able to take measures against the government, the EU responded with sanctions following Quattara’s call for cocoa sanctions and the EU banned all EU companies from doing business with institutions supported by Gbagbo which caused a huge impact on Côté d’Ivore economy (Vines, 2012, p. 874). The sanctions were imposed on the basis of threat to reconciliation in the country and human rights violations in the form of restrictions on admission and assets freeze. The sanctions against Côté d’Ivore were renewed in 2012 due to no progress in country with added measures such as arms embargo, restrictions on provision of certain services, and import restrictions on diamonds.

In 2010, the EU also imposed sanctions on Moldova with regard to conflict in Transnistria region which declared its independence from the Republic of Moldova after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Following the limited conflict between Transnistrian and Moldovan troops, Transnistria gained an autonomous status in the country which in fact only recognized by Russia. Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) proposed a resolution to situation but it remained ineffective. As a response to the Transnistrian leaders’ reluctance and obstruction to the peace process, the EU imposed sanctions in the form of restrictions on admission (Portela, p. 95).
2011 represented a breaking point in the EU sanctions policy practices history. The uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa – Arab Spring – which started with the demonstrations in Tunisia and sparked the anti-government protests in the rest of the region had a huge impact on the EU foreign policy as well as in world politics. Although the demonstrations were sudden and unexpected, the EU responded very quickly to the events which underlined the process has been taken in sanctions policy from the beginning and success of institutionalization of foreign policy. The number of sanctions imposed in this period also signals the aforementioned effect. In 2011, four MENA countries which experienced anti-government demonstrations became subject to sanctions by the EU whose aim is to support the democratic transition in these countries. The sanctions imposed against Tunisia were based on the reason of misappropriation of state funds and they were imposed in the form of assets freeze to certain individuals who were responsible for the undesired behavior (Grieger, 2013, p. 24). The demonstrations in Tunisia and fled of President Ben Ali’s from country following four weeks of protests created a domino effect and Egypt fell into anti-government protests after Tunisia. Similar to his Tunisian counterpart, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned following the events (Schumacher, 2011, p. 107). The reason of the EU sanctions was the same with Tunisia which was based on the misappropriation of state funds and the measures were taken in the form of assets freeze.

The situation in Libya and Syria were more complicated than the previous two cases. Libya was the third country that fell into anti-government protests where there were violent conflicts which ended with the killing of the ruler Muammar Gaddafi. While the situation in Tunisia and Egypt represented EU’s assistance to local authorities to consolidate the transition process the protests in Libya and Syria were much more violent which in fact is still going on in Syria. Therefore, the EU sanctions against Libya and Syria were more directed to undermine the capabilities of the regime from repressing the civilian population. The first episode of sanctions imposed on Libya aimed to weaken Gaddafi’s power and the second episode of sanctions which were implemented after Gaddafi’s death were designed to assist the democratic transition process. Therefore, the sanctions were imposed on the basis of internal repression and violation of democratic principles in Libya in the form of arms embargo, restrictions on admission, and assets freeze. Since the conflict between the opposition and Syrian
government is still going on and the country witnessed death of significant number of civilians the measures taken against Syria is much stricter than the previous three countries (Giumelli, 2013b, p. 35). The types of measures imposed include restrictions on provision of certain goods, restrictions on provision of certain services, restrictions on import of arms, import restrictions of crude oil and petroleum products, restrictions on provision of new Syrian banknotes and coins, restrictions on trade in gold, precious metals and diamonds with the Syrian government, restrictions on admission, and assets freeze.

In 2011, the sanctions against Burma/Myanmar were renewed on the basis of violation of democratic principles and human rights in the form of arms embargo, restrictions on exports of equipment that can be used for internal repression, and ban on provision of certain services (Council of the European Union, 2011). Second renewed sanctions in this period were against certain individuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina whose activities undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty and threaten the security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The measures taken include arms embargo, restrictions on admission, assets freeze, and partial trade embargo (Council Decision 2011/173/CFSP). Following the military coup in Guinea-Bissau in April 2012, the EU imposed sanctions in the form of restrictions on admission for the restoration of peace and security and respect for democracy. The targeted persons were all military personnel and military leadership who were responsible for the coup d’état (Council Decision 2012/285/CFSP). Central African Republic (CAR) also became subject to sanctions by the EU in 2013. CAR has been faced instability since its independence from France in 1960. Throughout its history, the country has experienced serious internal conflicts and military coups. Although there were some steps toward stability in recent years, the new Seleka rebel alliance captured the capital of the country and ousted the President Francois Bozize in 2012. Following the event, the country was fallen into ethno-religious conflict again where thousands of people were misplaced (BBC, 2014b) .As a response, the EU imposed sanctions in the form of arms embargo, restrictions on admission, restrictions on provision of certain services, and assets freeze (Council Decision 2013/798/CFSP).

2014 witnessed an important event occurred in Ukraine which caused the EU to directly enter into a conflict of interest with the Russian Federation. This was a significant event in the history of EU because the EU has become one side in an
international crisis while previously the Union played a role as mediator between conflicting parties. When Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and his cabinet abandoned the agreement regarding closer trade ties with the EU and decided to build closer relations with Russia in 2013, several protests occurred in the country’s capital, Kiev, where more than 100000 people gathered. As a response, the government took harsher measures against the protesters and violently repressed them. Contrary to expectations, the government’s approach led to increase in protests which were nearly 1 million people attended. Because of the scale of the protests, President Yanukovych signed a compromise with the opposition leaders at the beginning of 2014 and fled from the country and protesters took control of presidential administration buildings. In the following days, a conflict erupted in Crimea which was known as a pro-Russian region. At that point, Russia intervened in Crimea in order to protect Russian interests in the region. The Crimean Parliament decided to hold a referendum to join Russia and the results of the referendum showed that 97% of the public wants Crimea’s secession from Ukraine. The EU leaders, as a response, gathered in Brussels to condemn the Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Later on, sanctions were imposed both on Ukraine and Russia. The reasons for sanctions against Ukraine were misappropriation of state funds, human rights violations, and threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty and they were imposed in the form of assets freeze. On the other hand, Russia was subject to sanctions on the basis of violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of a third country and the sanctions imposed include restrictions on admission as well as assets freeze.

**Characterization of the Third Phase of EU Sanctions Policy Practices**

A general characterization of the third phase of EU sanctions policy practices show that there were significant developments in the sanctions policy in line with the development of the foreign policy in a more concrete sense where the EU experienced institutionalization of the foreign policy with the introduction of EEAS as the administrative body with regard to external relations of the Union and the introduction of post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The number of sanctions imposed in this period is 18 which represent the most frequent use of sanctions. The sanctions imposed as a response to the events in the Middle East known as ‘Arab Spring’ constitute 4 cases which can be considered as a selection bias. However, without including those cases, the last phase still remains where the sanctions
are used most frequently. Although the number of imposed sanctions in this period is relatively less than the second period, regarding the time periods of the phases, where the third phase consists of only 5 years compared to 17 years in the second phase, it can be said that the sanctions have become a more commonly used foreign policy tool for the Union in this period. The trend of addressing a broader issue-wise coverage was also dominant in this phase although the geographical focus remained narrow.

Geographically, sanctions policy practice of the EU in this period was distributed as two cases in Asia (Burma/Myanmar and Russia); four cases in Europe (Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and Ukraine); six cases in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region (Egypt, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia); and six cases in Africa (Central African Republic, Coté d’Ivore, Republic of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Zimbabwe). Therefore, the sanctions in this case, unlike the previous one, reflect a more regional focus where MENA and Africa were the most sanctioned regions followed by Europe.

Issue-wise, the sanctions are imposed as a response to intrastate conflict (Central African Republic and Moldova); internal repression (Republic of Guinea, Libya, Syria, and Zimbabwe); respect for democracy (Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Syria, and Zimbabwe); human rights violations (Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Coté d’Ivore, Republic of Guinea, Syria, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe); release of political prisoners (Belarus); restoration of rule of law (Belarus); threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine); threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty of a third country (Russia); threat to peace process and reconciliation (Coté d’Ivore); regional instability (Republic of Guinea); restoration of peace and security (Guinea-Bissau); misappropriation of state funds (Egypt, Tunisia, and Ukraine); and finally violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty (Iran). The issue coverage of the sanctions policy in the third phase represents that the EU started to engage broader problems of world politics similar to the second phase. Human rights violations and respect for democracy are the most frequent issues that led to sanctions by the EU followed by internal conflict. Therefore, security issues have a greater place on the EU agenda in this period compared to more homogenous distribution between high politics and low politics issues in the second phase. Furthermore, the scale of security issues increased in this period ranging from intrastate conflict to regional stability.
The measures imposed against these countries include arms embargo (Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Central African Republic, Coté d’Ivore, Republic of Guinea, Iran, Libya, and Zimbabwe); restrictions on export of equipment that can be used for internal repression (Burma/Myanmar); restrictions on imports (Coté d’Ivore, Iran, and Syria); restrictions on provision of certain goods (Syria and Zimbabwe); restrictions on provision of certain services (Burma/Myanmar, Central African Republic, Coté d’Ivore, and Syria); restrictions on admission (Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Coté d’Ivore, Republic of Guinea, Iran, Libya, Moldova, Russia, Syria, and Zimbabwe); assets freeze (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Coté d’Ivore, Egypt, Republic of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Libya, Russia, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe), and finally restrictions on provision of new banknotes and coins (Iran and Syria). The trend of using wide range of measures also continued in this phase similar to second period.

This characterization of the third phase of EU sanctions policy practices shows that the EU has become more active in using sanctions as a foreign policy tool by adopting 18 cases of sanctions in only 5 years as stated above. This increased frequency of sanctions can be attributed to the development of foreign policy specifically to the institutionalization of administrative body which enabled the EU to respond quickly to the problems of world politics. Geographical distribution of the sanctions shows that the EU has focused more on regions rather than a broad geographical coverage. Regarding the issue coverage, the EU has focused more on the security issues in this period which mainly stemmed from the subsequent anti-government protests in the MENA region. Therefore, in line with the developments and further integration in foreign policy after the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has become a more powerful actor which can take actions in serious problems it faces in its surrounding region and the rest of the world.

Having explained the general overview of EU sanctions policy practices in three phases, a general characterization of EU sanctions in terms of geographical distribution, issue coverage, and type of sanctions imposed with regard to each specific period is drawn. The following section provides a combined overview of the EU sanctions policy practices since 1980 until present time.
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<th>Target State</th>
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<th>Issue</th>
<th>Sanction Type</th>
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<td>1982</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>Present</td>
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<td>Arms embargo, partial trade embargo, restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
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<td>Start Year</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<td>Arms embargo, restrictions on exports of equipment that can be used for internal repression, restrictions on provision of certain services, restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
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<td>12.</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Coté d’Ivore (Ivory Coast)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Threat to peace process and reconciliation, human rights violations</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>Respect for democracy</td>
<td>Arms embargo, restrictions on provision of certain services, restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Misappropriation of state funds</td>
<td>Assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Former Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Intrastate conflict, human rights violations</td>
<td>Arms embargo, partial trade embargo, flight ban, restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Intrastate conflict</td>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>---</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Guinea (Republic of)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Internal repression, human rights violations, regional stability</td>
<td>Arms embargo, restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Respect for democracy, restoration of peace and security</td>
<td>Restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)(against Indictees)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Support for effective implementation of the mandate of ICTY</td>
<td>Assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Intrastate conflict</td>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
<td>Arms embargo, import restrictions on crude oil and petroleum products, import restrictions on petrochemical products, restrictions on admission, assets freeze, restrictions on provision of new Iranian banknotes and coins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
<td>Arms embargo, import restrictions on crude oil and petroleum products, import restrictions on petrochemical products, restrictions on admission, assets freeze,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year From</td>
<td>Year To</td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Arms embargo, restrictions on admission, diplomatic sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Internal repression, respect for democracy</td>
<td>Arms embargo, restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Internal repression</td>
<td>Arms embargo, restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Moldova(Transnistria)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Intrastate conflict(secessionist movement)</td>
<td>Restrictions on admission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty of a third country</td>
<td>Restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1982(unclear)</td>
<td>Threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty of a third country</td>
<td>Partial trade embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Human rights violations</td>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Intrastate conflict, human rights violations, threat to regional stability</td>
<td>Arms embargo, restrictions on provision of coins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Present Status</td>
<td>Sanctions/Measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Internal repression, respect for democracy, human rights violations, Restrictions on provision of certain goods, restrictions on provision of certain services, restrictions on import of arms, import restrictions of crude oil and petroleum products, restrictions on trade in gold, precious metals and diamonds with the Syrian government, restrictions on admission, assets freeze, restrictions on provision of new Syrian banknotes and coins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Misappropriation of state funds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Human rights violations, threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty, misappropriation of state funds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Violation of international law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Internal repression, Arms embargo, restrictions on</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EU Sanctions Policy Practices in General

The EU sanctions policy practices on a case by case basis with regard to different phases are argued in the previous section. This section, on the other hand, aims to present a general overview of the EU sanctions policy practices by referring the characteristics of the EU sanctions such as duration of sanctions, geographical distribution, issue coverage, and type of sanctions imposed with the help of visualizations of the data.

In the previous sections, it is argued that the EU has engaged in the use of sanctions in its relations with the rest of the world in an increasing trend. Although the EU employed sanctions 6 times in the following 12 years after the introduction of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Target State</th>
<th>Start Year of Sanctions</th>
<th>End Year of Sanctions</th>
<th>Issue under Dispute</th>
<th>Type of Sanctions Imposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Internal repression, respect for democracy, human rights violations</td>
<td>Arms embargo, restrictions on provision of certain goods, restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Internal repression, respect for democracy, human rights violations</td>
<td>Arms embargo, restrictions on provision of certain goods, restrictions on admission, assets freeze</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The List of EU Sanctions Cases (Target State, Start Year of Sanctions, End Year of Sanctions, Issue under Dispute, Type of Sanctions Imposed) (The term ‘Present’ refers to May 2014)
sanctions as a foreign policy tool, this number has increased to 18 in the last 5 years. The increasing trend in the use of sanctions can be seen in the graph below.

Furthermore, an interesting feature emerges with a closer and detailed look at the development of EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. As argued in detail in the second chapter of this study, the EU foreign policy has undergone substantial transformations in three different phases. The first phase started with the introduction of London Report in 1981 which constituted the last stage of European Political Cooperation. Two months after the launch of London Report, the EU imposed its first autonomous sanctions against the Soviet Union as a response to Soviet intervention in Poland. After the adoption of first autonomous sanctions, the EU has imposed 47 sanctions up to date by following an increasing trend. Second major development with regard to EU foreign policy integration came in 1992 when the Treaty on European Union has established the CFSP as a separate pillar of the Union. Therefore, the institutionalization of the foreign policy that started with the establishment of EPC has gained pace with the creation of CFSP. This development in foreign policy reflected itself in the EU sanctions policy practices as well. In line with further foreign policy integration, the EU has started to use sanctions more frequently as a response to problems in the world politics. In this phase, which is identified as the second phase in
this study, the EU adopted 23 sanctions episodes constituting almost the half of the sanctions in the history of EU sanctions policy.

The final substantial change in foreign policy development was the entry into force of Treaty of Lisbon which further institutionalized foreign policy making of the EU by creating an administrative body for the workings of Union’s external relations, EEAS, and the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The striking evidence in this regard is the great jump in the number of sanctions imposed against third countries or individuals. Within only 5 years period following the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has imposed 18 cases of sanctions against the challenges it faces in world politics. Therefore, the EU sanctions policy practices shows a progress which is in line with the development of foreign policy. In other words, as the integration in foreign policy has become deeper the EU has become a power in world politics that uses sanctions which are characterized as ‘hard power’ tools in the literature. Therefore, the EU has become able to respond more quickly to the challenges proposed by other states or entities in world politics. The table below presents the distribution of sanction cases according to different phases of foreign policy development. As it can be seen from the last column of the table, a basic calculation by dividing the number of sanctions over the years included in the phases reveals how active the EU has become in using the sanctions as a foreign policy tool in its external relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Number of Sanctions Cases</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Frequency of Sanctions According to Length of Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 (1981-1992)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.77%</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2 (1993-2008)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48.94%</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3 (2009-2014)</td>
<td>18(^5)</td>
<td>38.30%</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The Frequency of Sanctions Imposed in Three Phases of EU Sanctions Policy Practice (Total number of sanctions=47)

\(^5\) As mentioned above, the sanctions imposed against to the events in the Middle East (known as the Arab Spring) may be considered as over-representation of the sanctions cases in the last phase. In order to overcome such a selection problem, the number of cases with regard to Arab Spring (4 cases) is subtracted from the total number of cases in this phase. The results indicate the frequency of sanctions given the length of phase is 2.8 which are still consistent with the main argument of the study.
20 out of total 47 sanctions imposed by the EU are still in force as of May 2014. This numbers point out the fact that EU, currently, is very active in using sanctions against third countries or individuals who violate the principles of the EU as stated in TEU. The mean duration of sanctions is almost 5 years while 1 year being minimum and 19 is maximum duration of sanctions in force. The graph below presents a more general overview of the duration of EU sanctions.

Geographic Distribution of Sanctions Imposed by the EU

In the above presented sections, the geographic distribution of sanctions with regard to their imposed phase of EU sanctions policy practices is discussed in more detail. This section provides a more general overview of the geographical distribution by focusing the EU sanctions policy practices as a whole. Geographically, most sanctioned region by the EU is sub-Saharan Africa (13 cases), followed by European non-member states (12 cases), Middle East and North Africa (11 cases), Asia (8 cases), and Americas (2 cases). This general overview shows that the EU is more concerned the issues and problems occurring in its surrounding regions such as non-member states in
Europe, MENA region, and sub-Saharan Africa compared to the rest of the world. As argued above, the geographical focus captures a broader area only in the second phase while first and the last phase represents a more regional focus by the EU. The narrower geographical coverage shows that EU is still likely to be a regional power whose primary aim is to protect its own security. Therefore, a general characterization of the geographical distribution of sanctions reflects that the EU is not able to be engaged with the problems in world politics yet. The graph below presents geographical distribution of sanctions imposed by the EU under the domain of CFSP.

Graph 3: Geographical Distribution of Sanctions Imposed by the EU

**Issue Coverage of the EU Sanctions Policy Practices**

A general overview of EU sanctions policy practices shows that the most common issue that is subject to sanctions is human rights violations (23 cases) followed by respect for democracy (16 cases), intrastate conflict (10 cases), and internal repression (8 cases). At first glance, this characterization shows that the EU is more focused on issues traditionally considered as ‘low politics’ such as respect for democracy and human rights violations. However, there are also issues that are not as common as these stated issues yet consist of majority of issues (22 cases). This category is coded as ‘other’ and it includes both ‘high and low politics’ issues such as interstate
conflict (1 case), supporting terrorism (3 cases), violation of Non-Proliferation Treaty (2 cases), threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity (2 cases), violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of a third country (2 cases), threat to peace process and reconciliation (2 cases), threat to regional stability (2 cases), restoration of peace and security (1 case), release of political prisoners (1 case), rule of law (1 case), misappropriation of state funds (3 cases), support for effective implementation of the court (1 case), and finally violation of international law (1 case). This reveals that the EU has engaged in issues that address a broad range although the majority of sanctions are directed to human rights violations. In this sense, considering that the EU focuses on ‘low politics’ issues would be misleading in characterization of the EU sanctions policy practices with regard to EU’s role in world politics.

Furthermore, the issues that are the reasons of the sanctions imposed by the EU shows that the EU uses sanctions as a foreign policy tool in line with the objectives of the CFSP such as “to safeguard the common values, the fundamental interests, and the independence of the Union; to strengthen its security and its member states in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Therefore, although the dominant issues in EU sanctions policy practices are the rule of law and respect for human rights, the EU addresses other issues stated in CFSP objectives as well. The graph below shows the issue coverage of the EU sanctions policy practices.
Joakim Kreutz (2005) argues that although the EU has employed sanctions in its near geographical proximity and in the rest of the world, the motivations behind them are different. His analysis indicates that the EU has used sanctions as a response to more direct security based considerations in its surrounding region, while with regard to the rest of the world the EU sanctions policy practices seems to be more sensitive to the violation of international law and value-based policy. Since Kreutz’s analysis captures sanctions cases until 2004, his argument is tested with the expanded data until present time to see whether that trend still holds true in EU sanctions policy practices. Applying the same criteria with Kreutz, the EU near neighborhood is defined as including the countries such as non-member European states as well as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia (Commission, 2003). Unlike Kreutz’s findings, present EU sanctions policy reflects a similar approach to the near vicinity and the rest of the world. In both categorizations, most common issues that lead to sanctions are human rights violations and respect for democracy. More surprisingly, in the rest of the world intrastate conflict is the third most common issue that is considered as ‘high politics’ issue which shows an unexpected result with regard to Kreutz’s argument. The graph below shows the issue coverage with regard to classification of EU near neighborhood and the rest of the world.
As argued in the previous sections with regard to three different phases of EU sanctions policy practices, there has been a development in the types of sanctions imposed over the years. While in the first phase the use of sanctions was limited to arms embargo, partial trade embargo, and restrictions on admission, currently the EU has expanded its sanctions toolbox with different types of sanctions ranging from restrictions on provision of certain goods and services to restrictions on provision of new banknotes and coins. A general characterization of the type of sanctions imposed by the EU shows that the most commonly adopted measure is arms embargo (32 cases) followed by restrictions on admission (29 cases), and assets freeze (28 cases). However, such characterization leads to an overlook to the types of sanctions imposed by the EU because the other category which includes less common types of measures consist of 32 different cases including broad range of measures.
This situation stems from different sub-categories of sanctions such as import restrictions on petrochemical products which is in essence can be placed under the category of trade sanctions. In order to overcome this situation, a different classification is used by clustering different sub-categories of sanctions under more general categories in accordance with the types of sanctions defined in EU official documents as outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Yet, the EU official documents place financial and trade sanctions within one category which may be misleading because of their different characteristics. In this sense, following classification of Clara Portela (2010), six different categories are created namely arms embargo, financial sanctions, trade sanctions, restrictions on admission, flight ban, and diplomatic sanctions. According to this more general classification, the most commonly used type of sanctions follows the previous classification where arms embargo, restrictions on admission, and financial sanctions are the most commonly used types of sanctions. However, this new classification shows trade sanctions are the fourth most common type of sanctions which is overlooked by the first classification by including them in the ‘other’ category. Yet, this does not mean that the EU applies comprehensive sanctions which would induce the costs of sanctions on the civilian population. Rather, the EU opts for more targeted sanctions even if they were trade sanctions such as restrictions on exports of equipment that can be used for internal repression. By doing so, the EU aims to minimize civilian suffering and punish the individuals who are responsible for the undesired behavior. The graph below presents the distribution of types of sanctions imposed by the EU.
Drawing the Links between the EU Sanctions Policy Practices and the Characterization of the EU in World Politics

As argued in detail in the first chapter, the EU and its role in world politics in particular has been subject to different characterizations since the establishment of the Union. Up to date, the EU has been defined as civilian power, normative power, military/strategic power, superpower, and finally smart power. These characterizations usually differ from each other while they share certain assumptions. In other words, they are not mutually exclusive. All these different characterizations of the EU’s role in world politics and more specifically what kind of power it represents offer a testing ground for different implications which the EU sanctions policy practices are among many. In this regard, this section aims to draw the line between the EU’s sanctions policy practices with the theoretical arguments presented in the first chapter.

Since its establishment, the EU has been defined as a soft power which relies on soft power tools such as diplomatic means and economic aid to third countries in its relations with the rest of the world. In other words, it has been relied on persuasion
rather than coercion in its foreign policy. This feature has been attributed to EU’s lack of sufficient military capabilities by some scholars (Bull 1982; Kagan 2003), while others argue that it stems from founding values of the Union (Duchene 1972; Hill 1983). As the foreign policy of the EU developed over the years and started to have a more concrete shape scholars have argued that the EU has been moving from being a civilian power and becoming a hard power in its relations with the rest of the world (Smith 2000). On the other hand, other scholars have argued that developing a common foreign policy and hard power tools does not mean the end of the civilian power EU. Rather, with the adoption of hard power means the EU could become a civilian power since these means are one kind of among many (Stravridis 2001; Whitman 2002).

In line with the arguments regarding the characterization of the EU in world politics, adoption of sanctions as a foreign policy tool opens up a new debate. Since sanctions are defined as being hard power tools with a coercive nature, does incorporating them as a foreign policy tool lead to a change in EU’s characterization in world politics? In other words, which of the theories or arguments presented in the first chapter about the EU explains best the current EU sanctions policy practices? One general answer can be that the EU sanctions policy is compatible with all of the theories above since they are not mutually exclusive. Following Smith (2000), one can argue that EU is moving away from being a civilian power since in essence civilian power rests on the use of soft power tools while use of sanctions represents being a hard power. On the other hand, it can be argued that the EU aims to spread its values such as respect for democracy and human rights to the rest of the world via use of sanctions as Stravridis (2001) and Whitman (2002) argue.

This study argues that the introduction of sanctions as a foreign policy tool among many others shows the attempts of the EU for becoming an actor in world politics that can be characterized as a smart power. The introduction of sanction as a foreign policy tool in 1980s and increasing use of them to bring the desired change in the target states’ or persons’ policies follows the further integration in foreign policies of member states. As argued in the second chapter, there are three phases that can be considered as the breakthroughs in foreign policy development at the Union level. The first use of sanctions in the history of the EU coincides with the first phase of foreign policy development which started with the completion of EPC with the London Report in 1981. Since then, the EU has been using sanctions as a foreign policy tool in an
increasing trend as argued in this chapter. Finally, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the number of sanctions imposed on third parties has reached a peak point with the help of institutionalization of foreign policy. Therefore, empirical evidence support the main argument of this study that with further integration and institutionalization of foreign policy shows the attempts of the EU to become a smart power in the world and this attempts reflects itself in the increased use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool.

Joseph Nye, leading scholar who theorized the term, defines smart power as the skillful combination of both hard and soft power. Therefore, smart power relies on both coercion and payment on the one hand and attraction on the other. Since use of power exists along a continuum as argued in the first chapter, the EU aims to move towards the ‘coercion’ pole of such continuum which represents pure use of ‘hard power’ by the policy makers with the increasing trend of use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. However, given the already existing foreign policy tool that represents ‘soft power’, the EU still does not locate itself far away from the ‘attraction’ pole of the continuum. Furthermore, given the EU’s inability or lack of coercion through military force prevents the EU becoming closer to the ‘coercion’ pole. Therefore, if the EU is able to manage to become a smart power in the future, it is more likely to become a smart power of its own kind.

To sum up, the EU’s incorporation of sanctions in it foreign policy toolbox among other soft power measures reveals that the EU attempts to become a smart power in world politics. This situation is also in line with Olli Rehn’s argument where he defines the EU as “combining soft and hard power better in the EU’s external relations by using the whole spectrum of the Union’s policy instruments and economic resources” (2009, p. 3). Furthermore, Rehn argues that for more effective implementation of smart power strategies, the EU needs to improve external policy instruments, its institutional architecture, and is should define clearer foreign policy objectives. A more detailed look at the EU’s sanctions policy practices shows that the EU acts in the light of Rehn’s highlights in implementing sanctions against third countries or individuals in the world. As argued in more detailed throughout this chapter, the institutionalization of the foreign policy of the EU has improved the implementation of sanctions by the EU. Thanks to these developments which are a result of the cumulative development over the years the EU has become much more
able to respond the problems in world politics both in its near neighborhood and in the rest of the world.

Implications for Further Research

The present study provides a detailed explanation of EU sanctions policy practices with regard to separate three phases and in general. The main argument refers that as the EU’s foreign policy has developed over the years and more concrete steps taken towards this aim, the EU has become more able to take actions or respond to the problems it faces in external world. This in turn helped the beginning of transformation of EU’s characterization in the world politics with regard to type of power it represents from being a civilian power or soft power that relies on soft power tools such as diplomacy to being a smart power which can combine both tools. However, this study lacks the analysis regarding the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the EU. The EU imposes sanctions increasingly in the recent years, but whether they are successful in bringing the desired change in the target’ policies still remain in question. Given the combined economic power of 28 member states, the EU can impose significant costs on the target which have the possibility to induce a change. This would in turn help the development of the EU as a more effective smart power in world politics. Therefore, future research can focus on the effectiveness of the EU sanctions policy practices in order to have a more thorough understanding of the utility of sanctions imposed by the EU.
CONCLUSION

Since its inception, the EU has been subject to different characterizations as a power it represents in the world politics due to its sui generis nature. In this sense, it has been characterized as ‘soft power’, ‘civilian power’, ‘military/strategic power’, ‘normative power’, ‘superpower’, and finally as a 'smart power'. The scholars have approached this question from different perspectives and eventually came up with different typologies as the EU has continued to develop in its foreign policy as well as other policy areas. Since the concept of power and its typologies are defined according to the foreign policy tools that an actor usually relies on, such as diplomatic, economic, or military measures, identifying the measures that an actor implements carries a great importance. In this sense, the introduction of the sanctions as a foreign policy tool of the EU in the 1980s and additionally use of sanctions in an increasing trend in the following years presents a puzzle to understanding of the typology of EU’s power which has traditionally been characterized as a ‘soft power’. The reason for emergence of such a puzzle stems from the nature of sanctions which gains utility through imposing economic coercion to the target state. Coercion is a tool for hard power which also makes economic sanctions as hard power tools although they are still ‘softer’ than coercion through military force. Therefore, the EU’s increasing use of sanctions leads to a redefinition of its role in world politics. Stefan Lehne (2012), on this point, argues that the EU has redefined itself as an actor through acquiring sanctions as a ‘hammer’.

In order to provide an explanation to the puzzle introduced by increasing use of sanctions by the EU, this study focuses on the development of foreign policy at the EU level in order to understand the process which has led to the EU in such a direction in its foreign policy instruments. A detailed historical analysis of the EU foreign policy shows that there are three important breakthroughs in the history of the EU which led to a further integration and thus institutionalization of foreign policy. First major event for further integration occurred with the introduction of European Political Cooperation as the first major foreign policy integration attempt which was completed in 1981 with the London Report. Since it was completed in 1981, this study considers this date as the beginning of the first phase of foreign policy development. In this process, there was no major institutional reform with regard to foreign policy and the cooperation and coordination among the foreign policies of member states was on the consultation level.
When the sanctions cases that are imposed in this period are analyzed, the results also show that the EU sanctions policy practices are not developed and are not implemented effectively. The frequency of sanctions is low (6 cases between 1981 and 1992) which is geographically diverse but limited in scope of the issues covered. The trend in this period shows that the EU implemented sanctions with security purposes in its surrounding geography while in the rest of the world it followed policies regarding issues that can be considered as ‘low politics’ such as respect for democracy and human rights violations. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the EU has acted as a regional actor in this period rather than a global actor who ‘has a say in world politics’.

The second major breakthrough with regard to foreign policy development came with the entry into force of Treaty on European Union in 1993 and the introduction of Common Foreign and Security Policy as a separate pillar of the EU. Creation of CFSP was an important attempt through which for the first time in the history of the EU, the foreign policy has gained substance in a more realistic sense. Therefore, through making foreign policy as a separate policy area, the EU took a step forward in the integration and institutionalization process of the foreign policy. When the EU sanctions implemented in this period are analyzed, it is seen that there is a development with regard to EU sanctions policy practices. The number of sanctions has significantly increased to 23 between the years 1993 and 2008 compared to 6 cases in the first phase. Therefore, the frequency of sanctions per year has increased by three times. Furthermore, a more homogenous geographical distribution reveals that the EU has become more engaged with the rest of the world as well as its surrounding region. Regarding the issue coverage, there was also development towards a more general coverage from diverting its interests solely on the security threats. This trend shows that with further integration and institutionalization in the second phase the EU has become more able to use sanctions as a foreign policy tool with a broader geographical and issue coverage.

Finally, the third major breakthrough happened when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. Treaty of Lisbon has brought significant innovations to the EU foreign policy development with institutional reforms. The main institutional change regarding the EU foreign policy in this period was the introduction of the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the introduction of the post of the President of the Council, and establishment of European External Action Service.
The creation of a post to be responsible for the Union’s relations with the rest of the world and the post of President of the Council brought continuity to the implementation of foreign policy which eventually paved the way for more effective foreign policy making. Furthermore, the creation of EEAS whose responsibility is to support the High Representative and run as the executive body of the foreign policy has brought a substantial practicality to respond quickly to the events in the world as well as other foreign policy tools. Another important development was the change in the decision making procedure which also contributed to the increase of the number of sanctions imposed. With the help of these changes the EU has become able to implement sanctions more frequently.

When the EU sanctions policy practices in this final phase is analyzed, the results show that the number of sanctions implemented has reached its peak in the history of the EU with 18 cases only in 5 years. Therefore, this phase represents the most frequent use of sanctions of the EU sanctions policy practices. However, geographically this phase represents a more focused view on the near neighborhood of the EU which contradicts with the expectations. Regarding issue coverage, the EU has returned to its practices in the first phase by focusing more on the security threats which mainly stems from the outbreak of mass protests in the Middle East and North Africa and increase in the number of intrastate conflicts in the sub-Saharan Africa.

To recap, this study argues that the increasing use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool by the EU has become possible with the further integration and institutionalization of the EU foreign policy over the years through the interaction of the internal and external dynamics which are explained in detail in the second chapter. Through this further integration and institutionalization the EU has attempted become a power that is defined as ‘smart power’ which relies on hard power tools as well as soft power tools to effectively respond to the challenges in the global era by redefining its role in the world. However, being a ‘smart power’ also necessitates efficient use of the instruments in an actor's toolkit. Since this study does not focus on the effectiveness of sanctions implemented by the EU, it would be misleading to indicate that the EU has become a ‘smart power’. The effectiveness of sanctions implemented by the EU is another subject that needs attention and a careful analysis. Furthermore, without the existence of military capabilities which are considered as the real hard power tools, the EU is not likely to become a ‘smart power’ as it is defined traditionally. Therefore, this
study argues that with the attempts of redefining its role in the world, the EU has taken huge steps in foreign policy development with regard to further integration and institutionalization which brought continuity and practicality to the foreign policy making of the Union. Through these developments, the EU has become able to use sanctions as a foreign policy tool in an increasing trend which is likely to lead the EU, with the effective implementation of sanctions, to become ‘a smart power of its own kind’ in the future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


