

THE REALIZATION OF MEHMED IV'S *GHAZİ* TITLE AT THE CAMPAIGN OF
KAMANİÇE

By

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KAMANİÇE

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ABSTRACT

THE REALIZATION OF MEHMED IV'S *GHAZİ* TITLE AT THE CAMPAIGN OF KAMANİÇE

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Kamanıçe.

In 1658 Sultan Mehmed IV was officially given the title of *Ghazi* with a *fatwa* of the Şeyhülislam; but it was not until in 1672 that this title materialized in concrete manner. This was unique, as for the first time in Ottoman history a sultan was officially - not rhetorically- receiving the *Ghazi* title prior to actually taking part in a campaign. In examining this unique case, the present study poses the following questions: under what circumstances was the *Ghazi* title first given to Mehmed IV in 1658 and why did he join the Kamanıçe campaign in 1672? To answer these questions, it advances two arguments.

First, it argues that Mehmed IV's *Ghazi* title was launched by the ruling elites as a legitimization tool against Abaza Hasan Paşa, the provincial governor who had revolted against the rigid rule of the Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Paşa in 1658. Second, it argues that the division of the Ottoman state bureaucracy into three parts (Grand Vizier, *İstanbul Kaymakamı*, and *Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı*) in the 1660s, which created complications during the siege of Candia, should have convinced some state officials that the Sultan should personally lead the campaigns in the 1670s. As a corollary, the study proposes to view the personal appearance of Mehmed IV in the campaign of Kamanıçe as an attempt to unify the state bureaucracy within a more limited ground, to smooth the way for centralizing the decision making process.

ÖZET

4. MEHMED'İN GAZİ ÜNVANININ KAMANİÇE SEFERİ'NDE GERÇEKLİK KAZANMASI

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Keywords: 4. Mehmed, *Gazi* Sultanlar, Abaza Hasan Paşa, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, Kamanîçe.

1658 yılında, 4. Mehmed'e Şeyhülislam fetvasıyla resmi olarak *Gazi* ünvanı verildi, fakat bu ünvan Sultan'ın 1672 yılında Kamanîçe seferine katılmasına kadar somut bir biçimde gerçeklik kazanmadı. Osmanlı tarihinde ilk defa bir padişah retorik bir şekilde değil, resmi olarak, *Gazi* ünvanını savaşa fiilen katılmadan önce almış oluyordu. Bu istisnai durumu incelerken mevcut çalışma şu soruları soruyor: 4. Mehmed'e 1658'de *Gazi* ünvanı hangi koşullar altında verildi ve kendisi neden 1672 yılında Kamanîçe seferine katıldı? Bu sorulara cevap vermek için elimizdeki çalışma iki sav ileri sürüyor.

Bu tez, ilk olarak 4. Mehmed'in *Gazi* ünvanının 1658 yılında, Sadrazam Köprülü Mehmed Paşa'nın katı yönetimine karşı ayaklanan Anadolu valilerinden Abaza Hasan Paşa'ya karşı yönetici elit tarafından bir meşruiyet aracı olarak hayata geçirildiğini tartışıyor. İkinci olarak, Kandiye kuşatması sırasında karışıklık yaratan, 1660'larda devlet bürokrasisinin üçe bölünme durumu (Sadrazam, *İstanbul Kaymakamı* ve *Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı*), bazı devlet görevlilerini sultanın da 1670'li yıllarda seferlere bizzat katılmasına ikna etmiş olmalı. Bunun sonucu olarak, bu çalışma 4. Mehmed'in Kamanîçe seferine bizzat katılmasını, karar verme sürecinin merkezileşmesini kolaylaştırmak adına, devlet bürokrasisini daha dar bir zeminde birleştirmeye yönelik bir girişim olduğunu öneriyor.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZET	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
Sources and Historical Writing in the Seventeenth Century.....	3
Primary Sources	3
Secondary Sources	8
Historical Writing in the Seventeenth Century	12
CHAPTER: 1	16
ONE FACE OF OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNTY: <i>GHAZI</i> SULTAN.....	16
I.1. <i>Ghazi</i> debate in the contemporary Ottoman historiography	17
I.2. The reign of Süleyman I: A Golden Age?	20
I.3. <i>Ghazi</i> sultans after the death of Süleyman I	23
CHAPTER: 2	33
DEPICTING MEHMED IV AS <i>GHAZI</i> IN 1658	33
II.1. Political situation around the mid-seventeenth century.....	34
II.2. The war with Venice	37
II.3. The revolt of George Rakoczy II.....	40
II.4. The mutiny of Abaza Hasan Paşa.....	41
CHAPTER: 3	49
THE DISUNITY IN THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT IN THE 1660s.....	49
III.1. Historical background	50
III.2. The role of <i>Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı</i> (Deputy of the Imperial Stirrup)	53
III.3. Correspondences between Mehmed IV and Fazıl Ahmed Paşa during the siege of Candia....	60
III.4. The campaign of Kamanıçe as a means of remembrance of the traditions	70
CONCLUDING REMARKS	74
BIBLIOGRAPHY:.....	77
Published Primary Sources:	77
Unpublished Primary Sources:	78
Travel Accounts:	79
Secondary Sources:.....	80

INTRODUCTION

In the present study, I attempt to examine the realization of Mehmed IV's *Ghazi* title at the campaign of Kamanıçe in 1672. By "realization", I refer to the fact that although the title of *Ghazi* was given to him with a Şeyhülislam fatwa in 1658, it was not until 1672 that this title materialized in concrete manner. In 1672, he directly attended the Kamanıçe campaign and appeared in the battlefield with the army. This peculiar characteristic of Mehmed IV's *Ghazi* title distinguished him from his predecessors throughout the post-Süleymanic age in the sense that for the first time in Ottoman history a sultan, not rhetorically, but officially took the *Ghazi* title prior to actually taking part in a campaign. In other words, despite the fact that the *Ghazi* title was rhetorically used in the Ottoman *zafernames* (conquest book) occasionally for the purpose of praising the military success of the sultans who did not even lead the army personally, an official usage of it was unprecedented in the Ottoman historical writing. This is due to the fact that Ottoman historians generally preferred to use the canonical titles which highlighted the legitimacy of a sultan's power, considering political exigencies of the time period they lived in. However, the most striking point in the case of Mehmed IV is that he was formally designated as '*Gazi Sultan Mehmed Han*' with a fatwa that relied upon a consensus of the ruling elites, including janissaries commanders, Ulema and high ranking state officials.

My main objective here is to explore why Mehmed IV decided to attend the Kamanıçe campaign although he had already gotten the *Ghazi* title nearly fourteen years before the military expedition. At first glance, we can see his decision as an attempt to bring state affairs under his own control after a long period of stay away, but if we further consider the developments occurred in the Ottoman court structure during

the second half of the seventeenth century, a different picture appears. Formerly, while Grand Vizier had been commanding the army in the battlefield, his deputy, *Kaymakam*, would have stayed in Istanbul and conducted the state affairs on his behalf. However, during the reign of Mehmed IV, when the sultan was in *sayd ü şikar* and *geşt ü güzar*, a third office known as *Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamlığı* (Deputy of the royal stirrup) increased in importance, which led to a tripartite court and bureaucracy. This resulting disunity in the Ottoman government in the second half of the seventeenth might have contributed to the participation of Mehmed IV to the campaigns after the 1670s, in order to smooth the way for the centralizing the decision making process. Especially, his indecisive behaviors towards the Venetian ambassador during the siege of the Candia between the years of 1667-1669, as his correspondences with Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha make evident, should have forced some state officials to lead the campaigns along with the sultan himself.

In the first chapter, I will try to touch upon some problematized issues in the recent Ottoman historiography concerning the early modern Ottoman court structure by tracing the usage of “*Ghazi*” in the post-Süleymanic age. The objective of this chapter revolves around two interrelated issues. On the one hand, I will trace the current historiographical discussion revolving around the usage of *Ghazi* title for the Ottoman sultans who ascended the throne after the death of Süleyman I, for a better understanding of its canonical dimension. On the other hand, through an elaboration of the *Şehname* literature, which dominated Ottoman historical writing throughout the second half of the sixteenth century and the first two decades of the following century, I will discuss the changing role of the sultans in the Ottoman political history reflecting on the fundamental changes in the Ottoman court structure.

In the second chapter, I will examine the reasons as to why the *Ghazi* title was given to Mehmed IV in 1658 with a Şeyhülislam fatwa. The chapter will demonstrate that the reason behind the sanctioning of Mehmed IV as “Ghazi” with a fatwa issued by the Şeyhülislam lies in the mutiny of Abaza Hasan Paşa who revolted against the rigid rule of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. I will also argue that the title was used as a legitimization tool by the ruling elites against Abaza Hasan Paşa who interrupted “the holy war” of Mehmed IV waged against the infidels in the European front. In other words, in the face of Abaza Hasan Paşa’s attempt to legitimate his own political claims,

the ruling elite at the time called upon the so-called ‘frozen legitimacy’¹ of the earlier Ottoman sultans, by emphasizing the Ghazi image of Mehmed IV. In this context, by focusing on the political atmosphere of the 1650s, I will try to explain the reason behind the ruling elite’s reworking of the title to enhance the legitimacy of the dynastic claim.

The third chapter constitutes the mainstay of the present thesis. By focusing on the last stage of the Cretean campaign, I inquire why Mehmed IV joined the Kamanıç campaign in 1672. At first glance, although his personal “willingness” to participate in the campaigns and the guidance of Vani Mehmed Efendi seem to have shaped the sultan’s ultimate decision, the main argument of this chapter, which seeks an alternative answer to the above-mentioned question, will concentrate on the disunity in the Ottoman bureaucracy during the second half of the seventeenth century. I will argue that the division of the Ottoman state bureaucracy into three parts (grand vizier, *İstanbul kaymakamı* and *Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı*) in the 1660s, which created complications during the siege of Candia, might have forced some Ottoman state officials to take action against this disunity by setting the sultan out to the campaign. As a corollary, we can view the appearance of Mehmed IV in the campaign of Kamanıç in person as an attempt to unify the state bureaucracy within a more limited ground. The campaign, on the other hand, was perceived by the ruling elites as an opportunity to convey broader messages to the public regarding the dynastic legitimacy of the House of Osman by restoring the sultan to his previous position as the military leader.

Sources and Historical Writing in the Seventeenth Century

Primary Sources

The scope of the current thesis allows using only a couple of narrative sources. Here, I prefer to provide an overview of all the relevant primary sources concerning the reign of Mehmed IV. The primary sources at our disposal for a study about the reign of

¹ Colin Imber, “Frozen legitimacy”, in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski, Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston: Brill, 2005), 99-107.

Mehmed IV largely fall into three categories: (1) general histories on the reign of Mehmed IV (both contemporary ones and various accounts composed afterwards). (2) *gazavatnames* on the conquest of Candia and the campaign of Kamanıçe. (3) And travel accounts written in both English and French.

Among the above mentioned sources, the historical accounts written during Mehmed IV's reign constitute the majority. Mehmed Halife's *Tarih-i Gilmani*² is one of the contemporary narrative works consulted in this study. Halife's account covers the years from 1623 to 1664, from the time when Murad IV ascended the throne till the treaty of Vasvar was signed. Since he remained in stay in the Inner Palace while he composing his history, it includes details which cannot be found in any other contemporary accounts. For example; that Mehmed IV was sanctioned as Ghazi is only mentioned in *Tarih-i Gilmani*. Another other account written by Vecihi Hasan Çelebi, who was the secretary of the imperial council between the years 1644-1660, comprises the events occurred between 1637 and 1660.³ Mehmed Halife and Vecihi are the only contemporary historians who narrate the period between 1657 and 1663. Other seventeenth-century historians, Karaçelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi,⁴ Katip Çelebi⁵ and Solakzade Mehmed Hemdemi Efendi⁶ had already completed their histories in 1657. The history of Mustafa Naima, known as *Ravzat ül-Hüseyn fi Hulâsat Ahbâr el-hâfikeyn*,⁷ can be accepted as a retrospective account due to its composition date (1704), but it is worth mentioning here because it comes up to the year 1660. Although Mustafa Naima, known as the first Ottoman official chronicler, was not an eye-witness of the events of the 1650s, his intellectual capacity for weaving various preceding

² Mehmed Halife, "Mehmed Halife Tarih-i Gilmani," ed. Ertuğrul Oral, PhD diss., (Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2001), XI-XV.

³ Vecihi Hasan Çelebi, "Vecihî, Devri ve Eseri," ed. Ziya Akkaya, PhD. Diss., (Ankara Üniversitesi DTCF,1957), 1-83.

⁴ Kara Çelebi-zade Abdül'aziz, *Ravzatü'l Ebrar Zeyl-i (Tahlil ve Metin)*, ed. Nevzat Kaya (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2003).

⁵ Katip Çelebi, "Kâtip Çelebi, Fezleke: Tahlil ve Metin, I-III," ed. Zeynep Aycibin, PhD diss., (Mimar Sinan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2007).

⁶ Solakzade Mehmed Hemdemi, *Solakzade Tarihi*, (Istanbul, 1297).

⁷ Mustafa Naima, *Tarih-i Naima (Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn fi hulâsati ahbâri'l-hâfikayn)*, ed. Mehmet İpşirli, 4 Vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), vol. 1, XIII-XXXI.

narrative accounts together renders the *Ravzat ül-Hüseyin* most comprehensive history of the 1650s.

In addition, I will be mostly benefitting from the *Vekayiname* of Abdi Paşa who was born in Anadolu Hisarı and educated in the *Enderun School*, a place in the third courtyard of the Topkapı Palace in which recruited Christian children were educated for the purpose of serving in various positions in the Empire. Shortly after Mehmed IV ascended to the throne, he was moved to *Büyük Oda* in Topkapı Palace where he had an opportunity to be close to the Sultan. Throughout his career, he was appointed to various ranks in the administrative system including imperial chancellorship (*nişancı*), the deputy of grand vizier in Istanbul (*kaymakam*) and the governorship of Basra. Although he is not recognized as the first official chronicler in Ottoman historiography, Abdi Pasha can be accepted as the court historian who was appointed by Mehmed IV himself to write the history of his reign. The creative process by which he composed the *Vekayiname* can be divided into two periods: Before he was appointed as the court historian in 1664, Abdi Paşa mostly constructed his account by relying on the previous historians' works. On the other hand, he was an eyewitness to the years from 1664 to 1678, so his account will be invaluable for the main themes of the current study.⁸ Another primary source about this period is *İsâ-zâde Tarihi* by İsâ Efendi. He held various offices during his incumbency, including the judgeship of Istanbul. The last parts his history was posthumous work composed after his death by his son, Mehmed Aziz, but its earlier parts give concise information about such issues as; military campaigns, change of positions in the political and religious realm, the comings and goings of foreign ambassadors.⁹ *Tarih-i Nihadi*, written by an unknown author, narrates the Ottoman history from its beginning to 1685. It is possible to infer from the content that he was an eyewitness to the reign of Mehmed IV.¹⁰

⁸ Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, *Vekâyi'-nâme: Osmanlı Tarihi 1648-1682 : Tahlil ve Metin Tenkidi*, ed. Fahri Çetin Derin. (İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2008), XIII-XIX, XXVI-XXVII.

⁹ İ sazade, *İ sazade Tarihi (Metin ve Tahlil)*, ed, Ziya Yılmaz, (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1996), XXIII-XXVI.

¹⁰ Nihadi, "*Tarih-i Nihâdî (152b-233a)*," ed. Hande Nalan Özkasap, MA Thesis, (Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2004), XII-XIV.

Other narrative accounts were completed after the reign of Mehmed IV. Under this category, there are four main works: *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, written by Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Pasha and completed between the years 1714-1716, briefly touches upon the siege of Candia and Kamanıçe campagin.¹¹ Secondly, Raşid Mehmed Efendi, to whom the official duty of “vak’a-nüvislik” was given in 1714, wrote *Tarih-i Raşid* as the continuation of *Tarih-i Naima* consisting the years 1660-1722.¹² In that work, he mostly benefited from two works of Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, namely *Zeyl-i Fezleke* or *Silahtar Tarihi* and *Nusretname*¹³. Thirdly, the history of Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, known as *Silahdar Tarihi*¹⁴ which was written as sequel to Katip Çelebi’s *Fezleke*, incorporates the years 1654-1695. The importance of this work lies in his author’s having held various offices in the palace, thus he got very invaluable information about the inner circle of the court. Lastly, *Silsiletü’l-Âsafıyye Fî Devleti’l-Hakaniyyetü’l-Osmâniyye (Târîh-i Sülâle-i Köprülü)*¹⁵ written by Behçeti Seyyid İbrahim Efendi in the eighteenth century uses the previous written biographies of the seven members of the Köprülü family.

The second group forming the basis of this study is the *gazavatnames* narrating the siege of Candia and the campaign of Kamanıçe. *The Jewels of History (Cevâhirü’t-Tevârih)*¹⁶ written by Hasan Agha, who was the seal keeper of Fazıl Ahmed Pasha

¹¹ Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Zübde-i Vekayiât. Tahlil ve Metin (1066-1116/1656-1704)*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), XXVII-XXXII.

¹² Raşid Mehmed Efendi, Çelebizâde İsmâil Âsım Efendi, *Târîh-i Râşid ve Zeyli (1071-1114 / 1660-1703)*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan, Yunus Uğur, Baki Çakır, A. Zeki İzgöer, 3 vols., (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları: 2013), XV-XXXIV.

¹³ Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, “Silâhdâr Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, Nusretnâme (1106-1133/1695-1721)”, *Tahlil ve Metin*”, ed. Mehmet Topal PhD. Diss., (Marmara Üniversitesi, Türkiyat Araştırmaları, 2001).

¹⁴ Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, “Zeyl-i Fezleke (1065-22 Ca.1106 / 1654-7 Şubat 1695),” ed. Nazire Karaçay Türkal, PhD diss., (Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2012), XIII-XXII.

¹⁵ Behçeti Seyyid İbrahim Efendi, “Behçeti Seyyid İbrahim Efendi ‘Tarih-i Sülale-i Köprülü’ (Transkripsiyon ve Tahlil),” ed. Mehmet Fatih Gökçek, MA Thesis, (Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2006), VII-XI.

¹⁶ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Mühürdar Hasan Ağa - Cevâhirü’t-Tevârih*, ed. Abubekir Sıddık Yücel, (Sivas: Asitan Kitap, forthcoming), 13-33. I thank Prof. Yücel for sharing his book with me before its publication.

between the years of 1660-69, recounts of the eleven years (1658-1669) of the grand vizier's tenure, from which firsthand knowledge about the two campaigns of the grand vizier as commander of the imperial army can be obtained including the siege of Candia between the years of 1667-1669. Most of the succeeding narrative accounts, such as *Silahdar Tarihi*, *Raşid Tarihi*, Behçeti Seyyid İbrahim Efendi's (*Târîh-i Sülâle-i Köprülü*) and Osman Dede's *Tarih-i Fazıl Ahmed Paşa*¹⁷ borrow the narrative of the siege of Candia largely from the account of Hasan Ağa. Thus, I mostly address this account in the third chapter.

With regard to the campaign of Kamanıçe, there are two narrative works which can be classified under the category of *gazavatname* genre. The first one is the account known as *The Conquest of Kamanıçe (Fethname-i Kamanıçe)*¹⁸, written by Yusuf Nabi, who obtained office in the palace by entering under the auspices of *Musahib Mustafa Pasha* in the 1660s. Many times in the following years several rewards bestowed upon him by the sultan with respect to his praiseworthy literary works. This *fethname* is accepted as the first literary work of his career. A second *The Conquest of Kamanıçe* was composed by Hacı Ali when he was under the service of Mustafa Pasha as *Tezkire* writer. It takes note of, day by day, all the *menzil* passed through during the Kamanıçe campaign.¹⁹

Most of the above mentioned primary sources are available in transcription so I will refer to these transcriptions in my study. Due to the scope of my research, I do not tap into traveller accounts. The diary of Antoine Galland, who was the assistant of the French Ambassador known as Marquis de Nointel, is worth mentioning as it includes one of the most detailed accounts concerning the campaign parade of Mehmed IV and other state officials for the military expedition against Poland in 1672. Unlike other contemporary travelers' writing about the Ottoman history, only Galland's account

¹⁷ Erzurumlu Osman Dede, "Köprülüzâde Ahmet Paşa Devrinde (1069-1080) Vukuatı Tarihi Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme," ed. Arslan Poyraz, (Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2003), VI-XIV.

¹⁸ Yusuf Nabi, "Gazavât-nâmeler ve Nâbî'nin Fetih-nâme-i Kamanıçe Adlı Eserinin Metni," ed. Hüseyin Yüksel, MA Thesis, (Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1997), 1-5, 39-52.

¹⁹ Hacı Ali Efendi, "Ali Efendi ve Tarih-i Kamanıçe Adlı Eseri (Tahlil-Metin)," ed. Musa Taçkın, MA Thesis. (Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2004), VI-XI, XXIV-XXXIV.

narrates the parade down to a gnat's eyebrow.²⁰ Apart from this important source, travel accounts of Claes Ralamb,²¹ Francois de Chassepol,²² Louis Laurent D' Arvieux,²³ Petits De Ia Croix,²⁴ Marquis de Nointel,²⁵ John Covel,²⁶ Paul Rycaut²⁷ are crucial in studying Ottomans' seventeenth century.

Secondary Sources

Maybe the most comprehensive study devoted to the mid-seventeenth century of the Ottoman Empire is still Metin Kunt's unpublished doctoral dissertation.²⁸ Although its title refers to the incumbency of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa between the years 1656 and 1661, the first part partially covers the first eight years of Mehmed IV's reign, concentrating on the political and economic aspects of the period in question. I considerably benefit from Kunt's study as regards with the international confrontations between the Ottoman state and European powers in the mid-seventeenth century.

Another study that I partly use in my research is Leslie Peirce's monograph on the Ottoman harem. Peirce studies the participation of the royal women in the exercise of

²⁰ Antoine Galland, *İstanbul'a ait günlük hâaturalar (1672-1673)*, tr. Nahid Sırrı Özik (Ankara: Türk Tarih kurumu, 1998).

²¹ Claes Ralamb, *İstanbul'a bir Yolculuk, 1657-58*, tr. Ayda Arel, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi; 2008).

²² Francois de Chassepol, *The History of the Grand Visiers, Mahomet and Achmet Coprogli, of the Three last grand signiors their sultanas, their sultanas and chief favorites with the most secret intrigues of the seraglio...* (London, 1677).

²³ Louis Laurent D' Arvieux, *Mémoires du chevalier d' Arvieux*. 6 vols. (Paris, 1735).

²⁴ Petits De Ia Croix, *Mémories du Sieur de la Croix*. 2 vols. (Paris, 1684).

²⁵ Albert. Mentz G. Vandal, *L'odyssée d'un ambassadeur. Les voyages du Marquis de Nointel (1670-1680)*. (Paris, 1900).

²⁶ J. Theodore Bent, *Early voyages and travels in the levant: I. The diary of master Thomas Dallam, 1599-1600 ; II. Extracts from the diaries of dr. John Covel, 1670-1679 ; with some account of the levant company of Turkey merchants*. (New York: Hakluyt Society, 1893).

²⁷ Sir Paul Rycaut, *The history of the Turkish Empire from the year 1623 to the year 1677 : containing the reigns of the three last emperours, viz. Sultan Morat or Amurat IV, Sultan Ibrahim, and Sultan Mahomet IV his son, the XIII. emperour now reigning*, (London : R. Clavell, 1687); Rycaut, Sir Paul. *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, (Westmead: Greek International Publishers, 1972).

²⁸ Metin Kunt, "The Köprülü Years (1656-1661)," PhD diss. (Princeton University, 1971).

Ottoman sovereignty concepts throughout the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.²⁹ Unfortunately, her analysis ends with the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa as grand vizier in 1656, since she interprets his appointment as “The End of the ‘Sultanate of the Women’”.³⁰ Despite the fact that the rest of Mehmed IV’s reign after the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa is left out of the scope of this study to a large extent, her study concerning the struggle between the two valide sultans of the time, namely Kösem and Turhan sultans, is still fruitful in analyzing the factional politics within the royal family around the mid-seventeenth century. On the other hand, it can be said that Lucienne Thys-Şenocak begins her study where Peirce’s stop. By mainly focusing on Hatice Turhan Sultan’s two building projects, namely the Seddülbahir and Kumkale fortresses in the Dardanelles and the Yeni Valide Mosque complex in Istanbul, Şenocak tries to draw a relationship between visibility and legitimacy of the architectural works that Hatice Turhan commissioned through examining these projects as an expression of her religious piety and political authority.

Two doctoral dissertations, whose main topics enable us to explore an alternative scheme about the political and religious understanding of the Ottoman society, are worth mentioning. Derin Terzioğlu by studying Mehmed el-Niyazi el-Mısri (1618-1694)’s life and works in detail, inquires the boundaries between orthodoxy and heterodoxy within the Ottoman religious and political discourse. The dissident views of Mısri to the prevailing Ottoman political discourse, especially his anti-Köprülü and anti-Vani line, and his criticism of the House of ‘Osman, shed light upon how an individual, who was coming from the oppositional stance, perceived the Ottoman ruling and religious establishment in the seventeenth century.³¹ Cengiz Şişman’s dissertation focuses on the Sabbatian movement in the Ottoman Empire, which came to surface around the 1660s and then evolved into different forms in the succeeding centuries. In his own words, the main purpose of his thesis “is to interpret the messianic Sabbatian experience within the Ottoman material and cultural world and to write a monograph on

²⁹ Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*. (Oxford University Press: 1993).

³⁰ Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, 255.

³¹ Derin Terzioğlu, “Sufi and Dissident in the Ottoman Empire: Niyazi-i Mısri (1618-1694),” PhD diss. (Harvard University, 1999). Especially, see chapter 4, 277-355.

this movement and its sects.”³² Şişman’s study is helpful in contextualizing this social and religious movement in its own historical circumstances with reference to the religious and political understanding in the seventeenth century.

Despite the fact that each book touches upon the different subject matter, three outstanding studies of Dariusz Kolodziejczyk³³ provide invaluable materials for the Ottoman-Polish diplomatic relations in the seventeenth century. If we also take into consideration that Ottomans interest towards the Podolia region made itself more apparent after the mid-seventeenth century, the importance of the documents given in these books can easily be understood.

Although it seems that the main purpose of Baki Tezcan’s *The Second Ottoman Empire*, is elaborate the political and social transformation of the Ottoman Empire in the early modern world, putting emphasis on the developments occurred at the end of the sixteenth and in the beginning of the seventeenth century, his study is important due to his overview of the rule of Köprülü family. Without putting much effort to scrutinize the socio-political forces and dynamics in the Ottoman realm at the time, namely Janissaries and the Ulema, he singles out this period to a considerable extent. For Köprülü period, Tezcan draws a picture of alliance between the Ottoman court and the Köprülü Grand Viziers. In this regard, Tezcan argues that “the political alliance between the court and the office of the grand vizier continued to the detriment of other political forces in the empire.”³⁴ His argument in particular and the approach attributing Köprülü’s great power and influence in general pose the danger of underestimating the agency of other political forces and actors. While the author marks the period until 1703 with constant conflict between the ‘absolutists’ and the ‘constitutionalists’, he sets apart the Köprülü period as a relatively peaceful and stable period. In other words, such

³² Cengiz Şişman, “A Jewish Messiah in the Ottoman Court: Sabbatai Sevi and the Emergence of a Judeo-Islamic Community, 1666–1720.” PhD diss., (Harvard University, 2004), 1.

³³ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish diplomatic relations (15th-18th century) : an annotated edition of ahnames and other documents* (Boston: Brill, 1999); Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Ottoman Survey Register of Podolia (ca. 1681) = Defter-i Mufassal-i Eyalet-i Kamaniçe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania: international diplomacy on the European periphery: 15th-18th century: a study of peace treaties followed by annotated documents* (Boston: Brill, 2011).

³⁴ Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

an understanding creates a dilemma: how did it become possible to suppress these sociopolitical forces with great influence on the Empire's fate. Although the alliances that the Köprülü family forged present an explanation to the question to a certain extent, it falls short to explain the intricate structure of the sociopolitical webs and networks dominating the period.

Marc David Baer in his *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe*³⁵ suggests that his book departs from the previous studies on mainly three grounds. First of all, he tries to bring a new perspective about Mehmed IV's persona by focusing on his achievements rather than his weak depiction seen both in the accounts of the subsequent writers who wrote after the reign of Mehmed IV and in the studies of the contemporary historians. Although his attempts to put Mehmed IV into the center of his narrative is noteworthy, the most fundamental problem regarding the way Baer depicts Mehmed IV is his ignorance of the broader political circumstances of the period, and of the key role of the Köprülü Family. Secondly, his uncritical reading of the contemporary narrative accounts leads him to overrate both the concepts of Ghaza and Jihad, which is his second contribution to the field. In this sense, the laudatory passages in the court histories misguide Baer to portray Mehmed IV as a "Ghazi sultan". Without questioning the underlying purposes and the authenticity of his primary sources, he only pursues the rhetorical description of Mehmed IV as Ghazi sultan. On the other hand, his third contribution to the field is about the phenomenon of conversion during the second half of the seventeenth century in the Ottoman Empire. Baer attributes a peculiar characteristic to the conversion experienced during the reign of Mehmed IV, without studying the issue synchronically across centuries of the Ottoman rule. More importantly, despite nearly half a chapter in the book is devoted to Shabbatai Tzevi's conversion,³⁶ he does not benefit from Cengiz Şişman's thesis on the Sabbatian movement. In the following sections of this thesis, some other problematic aspects of his approach will be mentioned.

³⁵ Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

³⁶ Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 122-132.

Historical Writing in the Seventeenth Century

What are there any continuing aspects in the works of seventeenth-century histories and those written in preceding centuries? Rhoads Murphey singularly analyzes structural aspects of the Ottoman historiography. The following excerpt from his article, *Ottoman Historical writing in the Seventeenth-century*,³⁷ touches upon the above mentioned question.

“Broadly speaking, Ottoman historians of the seventeenth century may be classified according to their membership in one of three principal groups: the *alim* historians representing the perspective of the shariah, the *katib* historians representing the perspective of members of the state bureaucracy, and an increasingly dominant group of historians who were members of the sultan's inner circle of palace advisers and household attendants, the *enderuni* historians.

One of the significant developments in seventeenth-century Ottoman historiography is the shift away from history written exclusively from the perspective of members of the outer state service, such as finance department and chancery secretaries, that is *katibs* of the financial (*maliye*) and chancellery (*asafıye*) branches of government service, to a new sort of history written by members of the sultan's personal household service, and intimates of the court. One subgroup within this broader category is made up by the *musahib* historians who as historians, personal companions, entertainers, and secret agents of the sultan, were answerable only to the sovereign himself.”³⁷

In this article, Murphey aims to show whether there were any common and consistent elements in the writings of Ottoman historians who wrote after the reign of Ahmed I (1603-1617), despite the fact that their careers and professional backgrounds varied from each other. He scrutinizes the way in which several historians narrate the dethronement of Ibrahim I (1640-1648). He states that despite the divergences in the general tone, all of the historians who depict the episode reflect the spirit of their times. According to Murphey, there is correlation between the historically constructed intellectual atmosphere and the ways in which the historian depicts a particular political episode. The typical seventeenth-century Ottoman historian was considered “as social

³⁷ Rhoads Murphey, “Ottoman Historical Writing in the Seventeenth-Century: A Survey of the General Development of the Genre After the Reign of Sultan Ahmed I (1603-1617),” *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 13 (1993-4): 281.

critic, satirist, and arbiter of and watch dog over standards of ethical behavior for holders of public office.”³⁸

In a similar way, this “history-writing was an exercise undertaken not only for the glorification of the dynasty, and the sustaining of its future reputation, but, chiefly, for the edification of contemporary rulers, administrators, and all those who are responsible for creating the conditions that would assure its continuance.”³⁹ In that sense, Murphey’s interpretation partially ignores the discussion revolving around the *Nasihatname* literature⁴⁰ in the Ottoman historiography, on the ground that Lütfi and Ali did not reflect the intellectual atmosphere of the era in which they lived in.⁴¹ According to Murphey, the Ottoman mirror for prince genre came to the forefront in real terms not before the first half of the seventeenth century. To what extent he did ignore this historiography is open to debate. However, his emphasis the extent to which the professional backgrounds of these writers might have influenced their opinion while narrating Mehmed IV and his reign is of utmost importance. Nevertheless, without elaborating the equally important intellectual and political atmosphere of the period in question, the factional positions and the patronage relations of the writers, any argument would lack a solid ground.

³⁸ Murphey, “*Ottoman Historical Writing*”, 295.

³⁹ Murphey, “*Ottoman Historical Writing*”, 295.

⁴⁰ For a brief survey of this literature in the contemporary works, see; Bernard Lewis, "Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline," *Islamic Studies* 1 (1962): 71-87; Rhoads Murphey, "The Veliyyüddin Telhis : Notes on the Sources and Interrelations between Koçi bey and Contemporary Writers of Advice to Kings," *Belleten* 43, (1979): 547-571; Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: the Historian Mustafa Ali (1541 -1600)*. (Princeton: 1986); Pal Fodor, "State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in 15th-17th Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 40 (1986): 217-40; Douglas Howard, "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Journal of Asian Studies*, (1988): 52-77; R. Abou-el-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State : The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, (Albany: 1991); R. A. Abou-el-Haj, "The Expression of Ottoman Political Culture in the Literature of Advice to Princes (Nasihatnameler) Sixteenth to Twentieth Centuries," in *Sociology in the Rubric of Social Science*. Professor Ramkrishna Mukherjee Felicitation. Ed. R.K. Bhattacharya and A. K. Ghosh (1995): 282-292; Douglas Howard, "Genre and myth in the Ottoman 'Advice for Kings' literature", in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*. Ed. V. H. Aksan and D. Goffman, (New York: 2007). For the most recent article, see; Derin Terzioğlu, "Sunna-Minded Sufi Preachers in Service of The Ottoman State: The Nasihatname of Hasan addressed to Murad IV." *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 27 (2010): 241-312.

⁴¹ Murphey, “*Ottoman Historical Writing*”, 282.

Unfortunately, since the second half of the seventeenth century has been largely neglected by Ottomanists, analytical and comprehensive studies concentrated on the thematic content of Ottoman historians' works still lack in the Ottoman historiography, as a consequence, it is very difficult to trace the structural analysis of this era properly. At this point, Marc David Baer's studies⁴² partially fill the gap. However, although he analyzed nearly all the relevant narrative sources written in Ottoman Turkish, he brought some important methodological problems to the front in his works ignoring some basic historical frameworks and overlooking the primary sources of the period in question. Since Baer, as Kunt rightly puts, is "interested in *representation* rather than politics"⁴³, he disregarded the political and intellectual atmosphere of the era.

Throughout his book, Baer aims to represent Mehmed IV as a Ghazi sultan who were conquering the lands and converting the infidels for the glory of Islam. While doing this, he bases his argument mostly upon the contemporary historians' works. The following lines from the book concisely summarize the main themes in the works of the Ottoman historians who wrote about the reign of Mehmed IV:

"Abdi Pasha and other writers connected to the court, specifically those who wrote conquest books, promote the view that Mehmed IV was a mobile, active military leader and warrior breaking out of the harem cage in the palace of Istanbul and spending most of his reign in Edirne and Rumelia, the heartland of the empire, motivated by religious zeal, bringing war to the Christian enemy and promoting the image of a worthy Islamic sovereign."⁴⁴

Baer seems to have felt a need to further investigate Ottoman historians of the second half of the seventeenth century in a more detailed manner in another article. According to him, especially after the death of Katip Çelebi (1609-1657), Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi and Mehmed Hemdani Solakzade (d.1657), the previous *Nasihatname* literature totally disappeared. Instead, writers who wrote after 1658 began

⁴² Marc David Baer, "Manliness, Male Virtue and History writing at the 17th-century Ottoman Court", *Gender & History*, Vol.20 No.1 (April 2008): 128–148; Marc David Baer, "*Honored by the Glory of Islam*".

⁴³ Metin Kunt (Book Review), *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* by Marc David Baer. *Journal of Islamic Studies* 19, 3 (2008): 411.

⁴⁴ Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 141.

to glorify the Sultan's achievements and give importance to ghaza and Islamic zeal.⁴⁵ In a similar vein, Baer claims that historians who wrote during this period, such as Mehmed Halife, Hasan Agha, Abdi Paşa, Hacı Ali, Yusuf Nabi, Vani Efendi⁴⁶ and Mehmed Necati⁴⁷ “imagined manliness in terms of bravery – manifested in hunting and waging war, labelled interchangeably ghaza or jihad – and Islamic zeal.”⁴⁸ The only one exception for him during this period, which underlined “piety” by praising the Valide Sultan, is the *Risale-i Kürd Hatib* by Kürd Hatib.⁴⁹

Unless we question the laudations raised in this corpus and explore the broader political situation in the second half of the seventeenth century which might have affected how the Ottoman historians were perceived history, as Kunt states, “the reader is left with the impression that not only did the sultan come to believe in his own court histories but so did the author.”⁵⁰ Considering the intellectual atmosphere of the time, we should pose the following set of questions: did nasihatname literature disappear during the Köprülü period as Baer argues, or did it evolve into (an) other form(s)? In this sense, can sufi literature be read as a genre taking up Nasihatnames' role of social criticism? For instance, to what extent the critiques of Niyazi Mısri and 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī⁵¹ were marginal?

⁴⁵ Marc David Baer, “*Manliness, Male Virtue*”, 128.

⁴⁶ Vani Mehmed Efendi, “Vani Mehmed Efendi'nin Münşe'atı – Transkripsiyon Tahlil ve Değerlendirme,” ed. Hamza Konuk MA Thesis (Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2001).

⁴⁷ Mehmed Necati, “Tarih-i Sultan Mehmed Han (bin) İbrahim Han,” ed. Cengiz Ünlütaş MA Thesis (Ege Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1998).

⁴⁸ Marc David Baer, “*Manliness, Male Virtue*”, 143.

⁴⁹ Kürd Hatib Mustafa, “*Risale-i Hatib*,” ed. Mehmed Çömçüoğlu, Thesis. (İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1969).

⁵⁰ Kunt (Book Review), “*Honored by the Glory of Islam*”, 411.

⁵¹ Samer Akkach, *Letters of a Sufi Scholar: The Correspondence of Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi 1641-1731*. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010).

CHAPTER: 1

ONE FACE OF OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNTY: *GHAZI SULTAN*

“The Ottomans created a political culture that drew on the multiplicity of options available in the early modern Islamic world. The unparalleled longevity of the Ottoman dynasty among Islamic dynasties was in part the result of its ability to accommodate and manipulate different political traditions, different concepts of sovereignty, and different bases of legitimation.”⁵²

As Peirce puts it, the Ottomans’ use of various instruments through the centuries enabled them to exonerate their genealogy or policy through which public images of the Ottoman sultans and Ottoman sovereignty could also be guaranteed. Since the sovereign came to power by hereditary rights in the dynastic states as in the case of Ottomans, the legitimacy of the state and of its monarch was generally imbricated.⁵³ Taking into account these nested patterns; it would not be very difficult to assert that the political realities of the era affect the legitimization tools of the state. It means that considering the most canonical and lawful apparatus of the legitimacy which were well-suited to the political agenda of the state, various instruments or tactics were into use simultaneously. Although exploring all the aspects of the Ottoman concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy across time is beyond our scope of, yet, one feature of Ottoman conception

⁵² Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, 153.

⁵³ Hakan Karateke, “Legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate: A Framework for Historical Analysis Legitimacy”, in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 14.

of sovereignty, the *Ghazi* origin, should be further discussed for our inquiry. It is a longest debated topic in the contemporary historiography on the early Ottoman polity.

In this chapter, after surveying the modern historiographical debates revolving around the ghazi identity of the early Ottomans, I will try to inquire into the changing role of the sultans within the Ottoman political system characterized by patron-client relationships between the centralized bureaucracy in the capital and his servants in the provinces, which were consolidated through the well-supported patronage system, coextended the whole empire after the mid-sixteenth century. Additionally, I will look at the sultans ascending the throne after the death of Süleyman I, to whom the ghazi title were given, in order to connect the journey of '*frozen legitimacy*' of the Ottoman sovereigns until when Mehmed IV got this title in 1658. In doing so, I will specifically focus on some debates in the recent Ottoman historiography concerning the early modern Ottoman court structure and changing dynamics of power within it over the years. Firstly, I will demonstrate some basic standpoints in the twentieth century historiography that brought the Ghazi identity of the Ottomans to the forefront for our inquiry.

I.1. *Ghazi* debate in the contemporary Ottoman historiography

The following excerpt concisely sums up the discussion in the first half of the twentieth century trying to present the most affective force that led to the Ottomans' success at the end of the thirteenth century in the Bithynia region.

“In one generation the explanation for the question of the identity of the early Ottomans had been transformed from one which styled them as an admixture of Islamicized Byzantines and Turks (Gibbons); to Turks who attracted a large number of Byzantine converts to their banner due primarily to the heterodox form of Islam they practiced (Langer/Blake); to an amalgam of Turkish tribes and groups whose administrative skills were inherited from earlier Turkish states in Anatolia, the Seljuks, and the Ilhanids (Köprülü); and finally, to a group of dedicated Muslim gazis who came together for the express purpose of fighting and converting the Christian infidels in the border marches of northwest Anatolia (Witteck).”⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Quoted from; Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*. (Albany: State University of New York, 2003), 7. For these works, see; Herbert A. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*. (Oxford, 1916); W. L. Langer and R. P. Blake, “The Rise of the Ottoman Turks and Its Historical Background.” *American Historical Review* 37 (1932): 468–505; Fuat

The last explanation given by Wittek around the 1930s occupied a very remarkable place in the contemporary Ottoman historiography for a long time. According to Wittek, Ottoman sultans preferred to use the Ghazi title for themselves from the very beginning to present themselves as warriors who pursue the religious duty incumbent upon them.⁵⁵ He suggested that early Ottomans were bound by strong religious sentiments, which enabled them to devote themselves to fight with the infidels along the frontiers. The early Ottomans' religious identity resulted in a strategic advantage among the other Turkic states, due to their status as a frontier society and to the Ghaza, an ideology of holy war, equipping them with the necessary religious justification. The ghaza ideology also provided them with moral values that as a long-term result, enabled them to establish a strong state in the region. Wittek's thesis about the early Ottomans remained unproblematized in the following forty years until the article of Halil İnalcık, in which he tries to reach a more inclusive explanation by incorporating both Wittek's and Köprülü's theses. That is to say, by bringing together both the tribal origins of the Ottomans and the role of holy war, he argued that 'Ghazi-Mercenary Bands' was the most decisive factor behind the Ottomans' success at the early stage of their coming out.⁵⁶ In addition to this work, there have been written many other works concentrating on the discussion about the foundation of the Ottoman Empire from varying aspects⁵⁷ but, the most comprehensive explanation with regard to

Köprülü, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*. Tr. and Ed. G. Leiser. (Albany, 1992); Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*. (London, 1938).

⁵⁵ Wittek depends his argument upon the 1337 on Bursa's Şehadet mosque in Bursa. According to him, Ottoman sultan gives himself the following titles: "*Sultan ibn sultan el-Ghuzât, ghâzi ibit el-ghâzi, şucâ ed-devle ve'ddin, merzbân el âfâk, pehlevân-i cihan, Orhan ibn Osman*." See; Paul Wittek, "*The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*", 14. Lowry, on the other hand opposes the argument of Wittek by saying that "...there is nothing unique about the titles they did employ, all of which were equally used by the leaders of other Turkish principalities in Anatolia in that period." See, Heath Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, 43-44.

⁵⁶ Halil İnalcık, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State." *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 2, no. 2 (1981-1982): 71-79.

⁵⁷ For these works, see; Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1983); Gyula Kaldy-Nagy, "The Holy War (jihdd) in the First Centuries of the Ottoman Empire," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3-4 (1979-80): 467-73; Ronald C. Jennings, "Some Thoughts on the Gazi-Thesis," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 76 (1986): 151-61; Pal Fodor, "Ahmedi's Dasitan as a Source of Early Ottoman History," *Acta Orientalia Hungarica* 38 (1984): 41-54; Colin Imber, "The Ottoman Dynastic Myth," *Turcica* 19 (1987): 7-27; Colin Heywood, "Boundless Dreams of the Levant: Paul Wittek, the George-Kreis, and the Writing of Ottoman History." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*. No. 1 (1989): 30-50.

the emergence of the Ottoman State and the *Ghazi* identity of the early Ottomans is provided by the study of Cemal Kafadar. For him, “all the principalities were heirs to the political culture of Sejuk Anatolia [...] but the Ottomans were much more experimental in reshaping it (state building) to need, much more creative in their bricolage of different traditions, be they Turkic, Islamic, or Byzantine.”⁵⁸ Here, the bricolage means that early Ottomans incorporated different beliefs, traditions and societal norms to create a new civilization in which the inclusivity of the two religions, Christianity and Islam played a fundamental role in shaping a liquid and fluid culture. In this sense, the *Ghazi* identity of the early Ottomans constitutes only one aspect of this formation. On the other hand, in an important article, Colin Imber objected to a single-sided usage of *Ghazi* term, saying that “in fourteenth-century Anatolia, [...] as in the rest of the Islamic world, ghazi had juristic, rhetorical, ethical and mystical nuances, which varied according to the context in which it appeared. In popular usage it was ultimately to acquire a different meaning altogether.”⁵⁹ If the term of *Ghazi* had different meaning in the first centuries of the Ottoman history, then when did it gain a specific meaning used for the title of Ottoman sultans as a means of canonical identity?

Imber states that in the notion of “*ghazi*” as was used in the first Ottoman chronicles, which appeared during the reign of Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512), like Aşıkpaşazade and Oruç, is embedded in the oral epic tradition attributing the ottoman sultan heroism and holy warriorship.⁶⁰ On the other hand, at about the same time, at the end of the fifteenth century, a different type of history writing which derived not from the popular religious understanding but from a learned outlook crystallized, when the religious dimension of the Ottoman state ideology began to dominate the political structure. This canonical dimension of Ghazi identity of the Ottoman sultans continued to prevail the history writing throughout the sixteenth century with the help of the ulema and medrese-trained state officials who dominated both the intellectual life and the

⁵⁸Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 121.

⁵⁹ Colin Imber, “What Does Ghazi Really Mean?” in *The Balance of Truth: Essays in Honour of Professor Geoffrey Lewis*, ed. Cigdem Balım-Harding and Colin Imber (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000), 174.

⁶⁰ Colin Imber, “Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History,” in *Suleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World*, ed. Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead, (London and New York: Longman, 1995), 142-143.

imperial bureaucracy.⁶¹ The following lines trace the evolution of the ghazi images of the Ottoman sultans through the fifteenth century:

“In the early fourteenth century, the Sultans adopted the title of *gazi*, an indication that, from the beginning, the dynasty regarded the pursuit of Holy War as its chief mission. Fifteenth-century chronicles preserve traditions which describe the early Sultans and their warriors in the same terms as the heroes of popular *gazi* epics. It is likely that these religious-heroic ideals were the main feature of dynastic ideology during the fourteenth century. They survived in popular tradition after 1400, but by 1500 they had largely given way to the orthodox Islamic concept of Holy War as the fulfillment of one of the obligations of the *shari’ah*. Earlier *gazi* tradition linked the Sultans to the figure of Ebu Muslim and other heroes of popular epics: by 1500 the annalists were promoting the dynasty as the greatest gazis since the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs.”⁶²

I.2. The reign of Süleyman I: A Golden Age?

While the Sultan’s ghazi identity provides valid reason for the Ottoman conquest in its early stage, the physical absence of the sultans from the battlefield after the death of Süleyman I has been seen in the traditional historiography as the reason for the subsequent military failures of the Ottoman state. Although there is no necessarily direct link between the physical absence of the Sultans from the battlefield and the Ottoman military defeats after the death of Süleyman I, as Karateke aptly demonstrates, there is today a collective memory among the people educated through the Turkish school system, whereby since the Ottoman Sultans kept themselves away from military activity and spent their time with pleasures, political and military “decline” of the Empire began to unravel.⁶³ Undoubtedly, the glorious achievements of both Selim I and Suleyman I on the battlefields would have contributed such an understanding to emerge. Especially the legacy of Suleyman I was so mythical that his long sultanate has been perceived as the “Golden Age” of the Ottoman history. Similarly, some fundamental changes, fallaciously perceived as symptoms of decline occurring in different segments of the

⁶¹ Colin Imber, “*Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History*”, 144.

⁶² Colin Imber, “*The Ottoman Dynastic Myth*”, 27.

⁶³ Hakan Karateke, “‘On the Tranquility and Repose of the Sultan’ – The Construction of a *topos*” In *The Ottoman World*, edited by Christine Woodhead, (London: Routledge, 2012), 116.

empire, have been attributed to the post-Süleymanic era in the conventional Ottoman historiography. As Cemal Kafadar rightly argues, “anachronistic characterizations of particular personages or periods have thus become part of regular usage in the field and at times impede one's efforts to appreciate Ottoman consciousness in its own terms.”⁶⁴ This remark, actually, warns us to avoid superficial generalizations and stereotypical assumptions in history writing. Otherwise, conceiving of the empire during the forty-six year reign of Süleyman I, as a homogenous, unchanging and stable entity, as if there were a clear-cut consistency in the various spheres of the empire actually did exist, would be an insufficient evaluation for the Ottoman sixteenth century. So, I think that before moving on to the main issue, some points should be clarified for the reign of Süleyman I in order to better comprehend the structural changes in early modern Ottoman court and the role of the sultans within it.

Throughout the late 1530s and 1540s in the Ottoman Empire, “we see an energetic compilation, codification, and modification of imperial ordinance, its regularization, universalization, and reconciliation with the dictates of the Holy Law, and also the rapid expansion and deepening of the machinery of government based on newly articulated principles of hierarchy, order, meritocracy, regularity, and replicability of basic structures based on function rather than on persons.”⁶⁵ Undoubtedly, the struggle with the Safavids in the east and with the Habsburgs in the west paved the way for the emergence of such a situation. Due to external challenges, Süleyman felt the need to reformulate Ottoman sovereignty and imperial image during the first decades of his reign.⁶⁶ When we come to the last years of Süleyman’s sultanate, on the other hand, we

⁶⁴ Cemal Kafadar, “The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymanic Era.” In *Süleyman the Second and His Time*, edited by Halil İncelik and Cemal Kafadar, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993), 40.

⁶⁵ Cornell Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign of Süleymân,” in *Soliman le Magnifique et son temps*, ed. Gilles Veinstein, (La Documentation Française, 1992), 167.

⁶⁶ Gülru Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry,” in *The Art Bulletin* 71/3, (1989): 401-427; Ebru Turan, “The Sultan's Favorite: Ibrahim Pasha and the Making of the Ottoman Universal Sovereignty in the Reign of Sultan Suleyman (1516--1526),” PhD Diss., (Chicago: 2007), 335-356; Markus Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy: Competing Claims for Authority and Legitimacy in the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict,” in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke

face with a different imperial concept, in which regularization and institutionalization of state ideology were completed. These notions replaced the glorious achievements of Süleyman I of the first two decades in this relatively peaceful period in the international level through the rest of his reign. This relatively peaceful period between the different political and religious oriented states provided each state the opportunity to concentrate on the internal developments and take part in “religious reform, social disciplining, and the state building”⁶⁷ process in the second half of the sixteenth century. However, internal issues created a problem for Süleyman I in the last decade of his reign this time. The execution of his son; Şehzade Mustafa in 1553, the struggle between his two sons for the throne and the fight between various constituencies affected Süleyman’s priorities to a considerable extent.

In this connection, if we consider that the penultimate campaign that he personally led, the campaign of Nahcivan took place more than ten years before his final one, then, we should ask the following question. Why did he feel the need to attend this campaign in person? Most probably, since Süleyman had achieved greatness during the first two decades of his reign, as Woodhead suggests, he would have remained under pressure through the rest of his reign in order to maintain this reputation in the eyes of the people.⁶⁸ Here, we have a chance to examine this inference from the account of Feridun Bey who took office under the incumbency of Sokullu Mehmed Paşa as a scribe during the campaign of Szigetvár whereby it is seen that for Suleyman, personal prestige, reputation and image had become a serious concern.⁶⁹

The role of Sokullu Mehmed Pasha during this war, on the other hand, evokes another important development within the Ottoman political order. Especially, acting as

and Maurus Reinkowski, (Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston: Brill, 2005), 151-173; Tijana Krstić, *Contested conversions to Islam: Narratives of religious change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011).

⁶⁷ Tijana Krstić, *Contested conversions to Islam*, 168.

⁶⁸ Christine Woodhead, “Perspectives on Süleyman.” in *Suleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World*. Edited by Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead. (London and New York: Longman, 1995), 180.

⁶⁹ Feridun Bey, *Nüzhet-i Esrârü'l-Ahyar Der-Ahbâr-i Sefer-i Sigetvar: Sultan Süleyman'ın son seferi/ Feridun Ahmed Bey*; edited by H. Ahmet Arslantürk, Günhan Börekçi; proof-reading, Abdülkadir Özcan. (İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2012), fol. 31a, (*Benüm namusumu ve gayretümi ve ırzumu ve hürmetümi sıyanet ve hırsaset eylemen gerekdür*).

a *regent* during this siege and his kingmaker process until Selim II ascended the throne safely made him, or rather his office, more crucial in the matters of the state.⁷⁰ As Imber correctly puts, “[Süleyman’s] role on the campaign was symbolic rather than practical, and in this sense marked the end of the old concept of the Sultan as active warrior.”⁷¹ This process, in fact, is the final evolution of Süleyman’s reign in which depersonalized bureaucratic functions of state affairs began to appear which carried certain limitations upon sultan’s personal rule and authority. So, it can be clearly asserted that the changing dynamics of power had already begun at the end of the reign of Süleyman I. In this regard, it is very probable to expect that the ideal image of the sultans is open to change. Leslie Peirce sums up this process as follows:

“The ideal sovereign of the post-Süleymanic Ottoman Empire was a sedentary monarch whose defense of the faith was manifested more in demonstrations of piety, support of the holy law, and endowment of religious institutions than in personal participation in battle, and whose charisma was derived more from seclusion broken by ritual ceremony than from martial glory.”⁷²

By taking into consideration of the above-quoted excerpt, the new image of the sultans after the death of Süleyman I will be discussed in the following section.

I.3. Ghazi sultans after the death of Süleyman I

After the death of Süleyman I in 1566, both Selim II (r. 1566-74) and Murad III (r. 1574-1595) did not participate in any campaign personally. At this point, if we look at the contemporary Ottoman historians, we can see a significant variation in their interpretation as to the two Sultans’ military activity. What is striking about this

⁷⁰ Metin Kunt, “Sultan, Dynasty & State in the Ottoman Empire: Political Institutions in the 16th century”, in *The Medieval History journal / Special Issue on Tributary Empires*, Vol.6, No.2, November (2003): 217-230; Metin Kunt, “A prince goes forth (perchance to return). In *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World : A volume of essays in Honor of Norman Itzkowitz*. Ed. Karl Barbir and Baki Tezcan. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 63-71.

⁷¹ Colin Imber, “*Frozen Legitimacy*”, 101.

⁷² Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, 185.

variation in their writings is that although Selim II did not command the army in the battlefield, there was no harsh criticism against his personal absence from the battlefield. For Karateke, there is a close correlation between the relatively successful campaigns during the reign of Selim II and in the writings of the Ottoman historians dating to that period. Since the Ottomans made a peaceful treaty with Habsburgs in 1568 and Cyprus was taken from the Venetians in 1571, there was not any rising objection against the Sultan's immobility.⁷³ However, during the reign of Murad III, it can be observed that discontents about the physical absence of the sultan from the battlefield had risen.

One of the most productive thinkers in the late sixteenth century in the Ottoman Empire, Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali in his *Nushatü's-selatin* (1581), propounds that if the Sultan had actively taken part in the campaign and managed the army in the eastern front, the Ottomans would have seized all the Iranian lands. In a similar way, in the *Şecaatname* (1586), Asafi took this idea a step further and claimed that all of the eastern lands including beyond Iran would have been taken by the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁴ However, if we consider that there were also some military achievements during the reign of Murad III, such as the capturing of Tabriz 1585 and the signing of a peace treaty with Iran in 1590,⁷⁵ it would be very difficult to link this change in the writings of the Ottoman historians merely to the actual military achievements in the battlefield. At this juncture, there must be a close connection between the political atmosphere of the period in question and the writings of the Ottoman historians.

Since Sokullu Mehmed Pasha continued to hold the grand vizierate during the short reign of Selim II, this period has been perceived as the continuation of the previous period in some ways in which patronage relations and household affiliations were still mostly under his control. Mustafa Ali and Asafi, whose careers developed in

⁷³ Hakan Karateke, "'On the Tranquility and Repose of the Sultan'", 117.

⁷⁴ Hakan Karateke, "'On the Tranquility and Repose of the Sultan'", 117.

⁷⁵ Christine Woodhead, "Murad III and the Historians: Representations of Ottoman Imperial Authority in Late 16th-Century Historiography", in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski, Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston: Brill, 2005), 89-90.

the same direction after the death of Sokullu Mehmed Pasha, tried to find new political connections under these circumstances. Their factional positions and competition between the different political cliques in the court must have influenced their writing.⁷⁶ In this point, to better inquire about the historical writing after the death of Süleyman I and analyze these political cliques, it is very crucial to look at the *Şehname* tradition in the Ottoman history writing because without paying attention to this genre, any argument would lack a concrete basis.

Beginning with the last decade of Süleyman's reign, a particular style of history writing came into being. Although the general histories composed during the reign of Beyazid II were aimed to enhance the public image of the Sultan,⁷⁷ the appointment of Arifi and his successors as Şehnameci marks a new phase for the Ottoman history writing in the mid-sixteenth century. The newly developing of history writing whose composers received a regular salary⁷⁸, as Fleischer argues, is "...the first attempt by the dynasty to assert direct control of the literary expression of historical ideology and imperial image."⁷⁹

Covering the years of 1520-1555, *Süleymanname* is the first example in Ottoman historical writing in which word and image were combined.⁸⁰ The works of Arif and Eflatun, the first two Şehnameci of Süleyman I, did not included a world history solely, but sacred history as well, in which Süleyman "is portrayed as the second person in history (both sacred and human) after the Islamic prophet Muḥammed, who combined

⁷⁶ For the eastern career of Mustafa Ali, see; Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600)*. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1986), 70-108.

⁷⁷ Halil Inalcık, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography", in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. by Bernard Lewis and Peter M. Holt, (London: 1962), 12.

⁷⁸ Christine Woodhead, "An Experiment in Official Historiography: The Post of Şehnameci in the Ottoman Empire, ca. 1555–1605," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 75, (1983): 157-182.

⁷⁹ Cornell Fleischer, "*The Lawgiver as Messiah*", 172.

⁸⁰ For miniatures, see; Esin Atıl, "*Süleymanname: The illustrated history of Süleyman the Magnificent*." (New York: National Gallery of Art, 1986).

perfectly in himself the qualities of a political and spiritual leader.”⁸¹ The *Şehname* tradition reached a peak with the partnership of Seyyid Lokman and Nakkaş Osman in their illustrated histories composed during the reign of Selim II and Murad III. However, there is a significant difference between the two generations they represented respectively in terms of both the style of writing and the political expectations of the authors. While the works of Arif and Eflatun were effective sources for propaganda that promoted the saintly image of Süleyman I, albeit produced for private use, Seyyid Lokman’s works were composed specifically for the aim of dissemination.⁸² Therefore, without paying attention to the patronage relations during the second half of the sixteenth century, it would be very difficult to situate these works into the Ottoman canonical writing.

Emine Fetvacı, who worked on the changing dynamics of patronage system in the illustrated books produced between the years of 1566 and 1617, asserts that the *gazanames* composed in the 1580s are connected with two historical developments. First of all, after the death of Sokullu Mehmed Pasha, the office of grand vizierate was interchangeably passed from one official to the other, namely, between Ferhad Pasha, Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha, Sinan Pasha and Siyavuş Pasha during the years 1579-95. Secondly, apart from Siyavuş Pasha, the other three officials were actively taking part in the Ottoman-Safavid war as commanders, so their activities conveyed the message of heroism to the court which glorified their own achievements.⁸³ According to Fetvacı, the power struggles among the various cliques within the court affected the contents of the illustrated books produced during the reign of Murad III by saying that:

“In the context of Murad III's court, between the sultan's interest in books and history and the transitional nature of the power balances, all of these manuscripts served as powerful agents of change: they were perceived

⁸¹ Fatma Sinem Eryilmaz Arenas Vives, “The Shehnamecis of Sultan Suleyman: `Arif and Eflatun and their Dynastic Project,” PhD Diss., (Chiago: 2010), 4.

⁸² Fatma Sinem Eryilmaz Arenas Vives, *The shehnamecis of Sultan Suleyman*, 5.

⁸³ Emine Fetvacı, “Viziers to Eunuchs: Transitions in Ottoman Manuscript Patronage, 1566-1617,” PhD Diss. (Harvard University: 2005), 142-143.

to not only record the events of their time but were also intended to have an effect on the careers of their authors, patrons, and protagonists.”⁸⁴

While the different political factions in the court affected historical significantly, Murad III had a keen interest in the process of book production. He especially raised objection towards earlier drafts of the *Şemâilname* in which “his contemporary Gazi Giray Khan II (1588–1607) could be viewed as more of an ideal ruler than himself—an active and successful military leader, a capable and involved administrator in his own territories.”⁸⁵ The sultan’s interference, and other broader political dynamics and processes, according to Baki Tezcan, “has to be interpreted within the context of Murad III’s absolutist politics that created strong reactions from the legalists who were concerned with placing certain limits on the political authority of the Ottoman sultan.”⁸⁶ Although examining that to what extent this interpretation suits the political realities of the Ottoman Empire at that time can be debatable, it is clear that the priorities of the Ottoman historiographers, while they were depicting the sultan, changed considerably. We can observe this development in the content of the some illustrated books. In this regard, Woodhead claims that the historical works written at the end of the sixteenth century gave special importance to a new image of the sultan rather than the two older ones the Ghazi warrior and the upholder of Sunni orthodoxy. The following excerpt simply refers to a third image:

“...the details illustrating each point in the original *Şemâ’ilname* show the various sultans engaged primarily in essential statecraft—combating heresy and instability, ensuring fair collection of taxes and customs duties, maintaining strong military and administrative organizations. The gazi image has no place in this presentation; military strength is almost taken for granted. Instead, the sultans exercise a supervision of affairs which could be done as easily by a palace-based sultan as by a physically active, ubiquitous leader.”⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Emine Fetvacı, *Viziers to Eunuchs*, 143.

⁸⁵ Christine Woodhead, “*Murad III and the Historians*”, 96.

⁸⁶ Baki Tezcan, “The Politics of Early Modern Ottoman Historiography”, in *The Early Modern Ottomans, Remapping the Empire*, ed. Virginia Aksan and Daniedl Goffman. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 169.

⁸⁷ Christine Woodhead, “*Murad III and the Historians*”, 94.

If we have also taken into consideration that this representation shows “...the uninterrupted succession of Ottoman dynastic lineage from one sultan’s reign to the next”⁸⁸, it would not be very difficult to imagine that the image of the *Ghazi* became more difficult to highlight due to fact that Ottoman Sultans did not join military campaign for thirty years after the death of Süleyman I. But, it does not mean that the Ghazi sultans totally disappeared in Ottoman history.

In addition to changes in the dynamics of power, the peculiarities military of the era’s military techniques affected the sultan’s absence from the battleground to a considerable extent. Both physical barriers and environmental constraints in the long war between the Ottomans and Habsburgs (1593-1606) showed the importance of a siege war in the frontiers.⁸⁹ The necessities of the warfare system brought about important changes in the governmental system of the Ottoman Empire. In this manner, the direct participation of the Sultan to these long-lasting siege wars would have been seen unreasonable because his physical absence in the capital for a long time would have triggered other political problems. Under these circumstances, since the Grand vizier commanded the army on the battlefield, there arose a need to appoint a deputy to perform state affairs in the name of Grand viziers.⁹⁰ “The tension between the grand vezir as army commander and his Deputy in Istanbul, or between the grand vezir in Istanbul and a vezir of lower rank as army commander”⁹¹ emerged during the reign of Mehmed III, especially before his only campaign, Eğri 1596. Karateke summarizes this tension as follows:

“If the grand vezir was sent as commander, his deputy (*kaimmakam*) in Istanbul would purposely withhold further soldiers and provisions from the army in order to cause the grand vezir to be unsuccessful, in the hope of damaging his reputation and ultimately replacing him. If another vezir was

⁸⁸Gülru Necipoğlu, "The Serial Portraits of Ottoman Sultans in Comparative Perspective", in *The Sultan's Portraits. Picturing the House of Osman*, (Istanbul: 2000), 34.

⁸⁹ Tibor Szalontay, “The Art of War during the Ottoman-Habsburg Long War (1593–1606) According to Narrative Sources,” PhD Diss., (University of Toronto: 2004), 77-91.

⁹⁰ Pal Fodor, “Sultan, Imperial Council, Grand Vizier: the Ottoman Ruling Elite and the Formation of the Grand Vizieral telkhis,” *Acta Orientalia* 47, (1994): 67–85.

⁹¹ Colin Imber, “Frozen Legitimacy”, 102.

appointed commander, the grand vezir himself would not want him to succeed and thereby become a possible contender for his own position. A higher authority such as the sultan himself would be a solution to all these problems, suggested Sinan Paşa.”⁹²

Whether Mehmed III’s decision to take actively part in this campaign originated from Sinan Paşa’s suggestion or the religious sanction from his tutor, Hoca Sa'deddin, believing that Mehmed III’s physical existence in the battlefield would end up with the success is another concern, but at the end, Mehmed III personally led the army to Hungary. Although he attempted to retreat the army from the campaign after the fall of Eğri castle, after receiving the news that the army of Habsburg was approaching, the Ottoman army gained a victory at the battle of Hacova in 1596.⁹³ After this campaign, Mehmed III attained the title of *Ghazi Sultan*⁹⁴ and his victorious entry into Istanbul was illustrated in the book of *Şahname-i Sultan Mehmed-i Salis* composed by Talikizade Mehmed.⁹⁵

After the death of Mehmed III, Ahmed I (r. 1603-1607) ascended the throne. During his sultanate, again, he did not command the army in the battlefield⁹⁶ as in the case of Mustafa’s two short sultanates (1617-18 and 1622-23). If we look at the some contemporary accounts written during the reign of Ahmed I, we can see that their authors did not adopt a critical view on the matter of removal of the sultan from the battlefield. For example, there were no harsh criticisms leveled against the immobility of Ahmed I in the *Habname* composed by Veysi and *Zübdetü’t Tevarih* of Mustafa Safi,

⁹² Hakan Karateke, “*On the Tranquility*”, 121.

⁹³ Hakan Karateke, “*On the Tranquility*”, 121.

⁹⁴ Günhan Börekçi, “Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-17) and his Immediate Predecessors,” PhD Diss., (Ohio State University: 2010), 45-46.

⁹⁵ Talikizade Mehmed Subhi, “*Eğri Fethi Tarihi*”, TSMK, MS H. 1609; 68b-69a. Taken from: <http://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/search~S9?/Ymehmed+III&searchscope=9&SORT=DZ/Ymehmed+III&searchscope=9&SORT=DZ&extended=0&SUBKEY=mehmed+III/1,23,23,B/1856~b1272495&FF=Ymehmed+III&searchscope=9&SORT=DZ&3,3,,1,0/indexsort=->

⁹⁶ Although he attempted to participate in the eastern campaign personally, he relinquished this idea after the suggestion of his tutor, Mustafa Efendi, see; Günhan Börekçi, *Factions and Favorites*, 218.

both of them were written around the 1610s.⁹⁷ According to Karateke, while the physical retreat of the sultans from commanding the army were serious of concern in some sources composed at the end of the sixteenth century, the same critical tendency is not found in most of the works written during the course of the seventeenth century. He argues that “...the debate and the sensitive public opinion about the sultan's going on campaign were context-specific. The debate should therefore be understood in its contemporary context, and not necessarily as a continuing issue.”⁹⁸

On the other hand, for some historians, Ottoman court structure gradually evolved along a different path, in which decision-making process came into the hands of a few people at the end of the sixteenth century, in contrast to the previous period.⁹⁹ Günhan Börekçi, for example, argues that “what differentiates Ahmed I’s reign from those of earlier sultans is that the power struggles within the Ottoman polity had shifted from a larger setting, which had included the provincial princely households, to the narrower domain of Topkapı Palace and Istanbul.”¹⁰⁰ This point brings us to the absolutism debate in the Ottoman Empire concerning the reign of Osman II.

The reign of Osman II (1618-1622) has been exploited enormously in the recent Ottoman historiography in many ways. Since he was the first Sultan murdered in Ottoman history, his short reign attracted considerable attention. If we take into account that he personally led the army to Hotin, despite the fact that the attempt itself was politically unnecessary,¹⁰¹ his motives for the campaign become important for our topic. Piterberg, who studied the regicide of Osman II, by focusing on the different interpretations of the Ottoman historians, claims that “Osman II tried to revive the image of the gazi- or warrior-sultan—the ruler of a frontier-oriented state who not only conducted raids across the Islamic border but more generally left the palace frequently

⁹⁷ Hakan Karateke, “*On the Tranquility*”, 122-23.

⁹⁸ Hakan Karateke, “*On the Tranquility*”, 124.

⁹⁹ See; Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

¹⁰⁰ Günhan Börekçi, *Factions and Favorites*, 13.

¹⁰¹ Colin Imber, “*Frozen Legitimacy*”, 104.

and exposed himself to personal contact with his subjects.”¹⁰² Similarly, Baki Tezcan argues that by actively taking part in Hotin campaign, Osman II attempted to restrain the power of the vizier’s households through his absolutist policies and measures.¹⁰³ The two modern historians’ works touch upon the similar concept that the ideal sultan as a warrior who fights for the glory of Islam did not totally disappear both in the writings of the Ottoman historians and in the actions of the Sultan himself. We have a chance to affirm the case from the last work of the Ottoman *Şahname* tradition composed by Ganizade Nadiri, namely, *Şehname-i Nadiri*. In that work, the depiction of Osman II either when he was commanding the army or he was on the battlefield well represented the image of the previous ghazi sultan.¹⁰⁴

From another viewpoint, military mobility of Murad IV supported the idea that he has been accepted as the last conqueror sultan in Ottoman history by a certain group of scholars in traditional Ottoman historiography. Although the first years of his sultanate passed with the regency of his mother, Kösem Sultan,¹⁰⁵ Murad IV attempted to actively participate in the Revan campaign (1635) and Bagdad campaign (1638) and took the *ghazi* title.¹⁰⁶ Once again, there is no attempt in the writings of the Ottoman historians in which Ibrahim I (r. 1640-1648) was depicted as a Ghazi sultan.

To sum up, although most of the Sultans did not actively participate in the military campaigns after the death of Süleyman I, Mehmed III, Osman II and Murad IV had at least once personally led the army in the battlefield. ‘Frozen legitimacy’, though it may be related to the Ghazi identity of the Ottoman sultans, did not completely disappear during the post-Süleymanic period. Whenever the sultan led the army

¹⁰² Gabriel Piterberg, “*An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play*.” (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 17.

¹⁰³ Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 128-132.

¹⁰⁴ Ganîzâde Mehmed, “*Şehname-i Nadiri*”, TSMK, H. 1124, 50b-51a and 64b-65a quoted from, Tülün Değirmenci, *İktidar Oyunları ve Resimli Kitaplar: II. Osman Devrinde Değişen Güç Simgeleri*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012), 212-15.

¹⁰⁵ Leslie Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, 248-55.

¹⁰⁶ For gazavatnames concerning the reign of Murad IV and especially for these campaigns, see: Agah Sırrı Levend, *Gazavat-nameler ve Mihaloğlu Ali Bey’in Gazavatnamesi*. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), 105-113.

personally, Ottoman historians also emphasized the ghazi title of the Sultan, emphasizing their duty as warriors of the faith, but the magnificence of the title lies in its symbolic meaning rather than signifying the previous ghazi image in real terms. Mehmed IV, on the other hand, took the ghazi title with the Şeyhülislam fatwa in 1658 prior to actually taking part in a campaign. It distinguished him from his predecessors through the post-Süleymanic age, because by ascribing a religious dimension, this title was used as a legitimate tool against the revolt of Abaza Hasan Paşa. In order to comprehensively inquire the political situations around the time when Mehmed IV took the ghazi title in 1658, firstly, a brief examination of his early reign should be pursued. After that, I will try to inquire the factors why the ruling elites decide to entitle Mehmed IV as “*Gazi Sultan Mehmed Han*” with a Şeyhülislam fatwa in 1658.

CHAPTER: 2

DEPICTING MEHMED IV AS *GHAZI* IN 1658

In this chapter, after elaborating the political situation around the mid-seventeenth century in the Ottoman Empire, I will try to inquire the factors that explained the ruling elites' decision to entitle Mehmed IV as “*Gazi Sultan Mehmed Han*” with the Şeyhülislam fatwa issued in 1658. I suggest that the reason behind the case lies in the rebellion of Abaza Hasan Paşa, who demanded the dismissal of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. Here, I argue that in the face of Hasan Paşa’s revolt, Mehmed IV’s Ghazi title was used as a legitimization tool by the ruling elites on the ground that he interrupted the “holy war” of the sultan waging in the European fronts. I propose that the importance of the Ghazi title given to Mehmed IV in such a way is twofold. Firstly, it signifies that for the first time in Ottoman history a sultan officially took the Ghazi title. That is to say, although there were some literal works in which the ghazi title was rhetorically used for some sultans with the intent of praising their personality, Mehmed IV’s Ghazi title is a unique case because he took it with a religious fatwa, which distinguished him from his predecessors in a fundamental way. Secondly, this event symbolizes the actual completion of the hegemony of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, because after getting the support of the Ottoman ruling elites against the revolt of Abaza Hasan Paşa, Köprülü neutralized the most serious challenge threatening his leadership. At this juncture, the consensus among the Ottoman ruling elites, which agreed upon with Mehmed IV’s Ghazi title, paved the way for the suppression of Abaza Hasan Paşa revolt. However, without understanding the political situation around the mid-seventeenth century, it would be hard to explain why the Ghazi title was given to Mehmed IV in 1658. Thus,

after giving background information about the first years of Mehmed IV's sultanate, I will dwell on two important international problems that the Ottoman Empire had faced in the mid-seventeenth century, namely the war with the Venice and the revolt of George Rakozcy II. Lastly and most importantly, I will put emphasis on Abaza Hasan Paşa's revolt whereupon the fatwa was issued to designate Mehmed IV as Ghazi.

II.1. Political situation around the mid-seventeenth century

When Mehmed IV ascended the throne at the age of seven in 1648, both the elder Queen Mother (Kösem Sultan) and Mehmed IV's mother (Turhan Sultan) were still alive. The first three years of Mehmed IV's sultanate, which was called the "Sultanate of the Ağas" by some historians,¹⁰⁷ passed with the domination of Kösem Sultan over the state affairs, competing always with her main rival in the harem, Hatice Turhan Sultan, in the matter of acting as regent to the sultan. The struggle between the two Valide Sultans, stimulated by the different circles of powers around them, especially by the Ağas who were divided into parties and formed various alliances with the different harem factions, dominated the political scene until the death of Kösem Sultan in 1651. In an attempt to enthrone her son, Süleyman, instead of Mehmed IV, the assassination of Kösem Sultan in 1651 was orchestrated by the factions of Hatice Turhan Sultan in the court. The death of Kösem Sultan accelerated an array of retaliations in Istanbul resulting in the execution of some janissary members who took sides with the elder valide sultan and the elimination of the harem faction led by Kösem sultan and her supporters.¹⁰⁸ The problem of regency, which culminated in the first years of Mehmed IV's reign, on the other hand, gives some clues about the political life of the Ottoman court in the mid-seventeenth century. As Peirce comments on this issue:

"It demonstrates that the palace was not a political monolith. It also suggests the complexity of links between inner palace politics and the outer world of administration. Furthermore, the competing claims to legitimate authority by the mother as well as the grandmother of the sultan are another indication of the degree to which the role of the *valide sultan* as guardian

¹⁰⁷ Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey*, 2 Vols. (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977), vol.1, 203-204.

¹⁰⁸ Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, 252.

and representative of the sultan had been institutionally secured by the mid-seventeenth century. Indeed, in this period when there were no adult male members to represent the dynasty, the intergenerational competition between the two *valide sultans* appears to be a kind of continuation of the tension surrounding the succession that had previously existed between fathers and sons.”¹⁰⁹

Although the political role of the *valide sultans* as regent seems to be accepted as a matter of fact in the mid-seventeenth century, it can be clearly argued that it was not, however, a long term phenomenon. The appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa in 1656 with extraordinary powers indicates this circumstance to a certain extent. As Peirce argues, “Turhan Sultan's relinquishing of direct control of government [...] was undoubtedly in part a recognition that the natural span of her regency was coming to an end.”¹¹⁰ The underlying reason behind circumstance lies on the difficulties that the Ottomans were facing at the time.

Most notably, the war with Venice began to deteriorate the state finances for several years, the result of which was a couple of serious military revolts in Istanbul, leading to the execution of many state officials and the displacement of several Grand Viziers. The most serious military revolt broke out around the mid-seventeenth century in Istanbul, namely the *Vaka-i Vakvakiye*, arising from nearly the same reason as in the previous ones; the payment given to the soldiers in debased coinage.¹¹¹ Hatice Turhan Sultan, who was continuing to be involved in the state affairs by acting as regent on behalf of Mehmed IV, seems to have a need to appoint a powerful man who would cease and overcome this chaotic atmosphere through resolute actions. For Turhan Sultan, this powerful man was Köprülü Mehmed Paşa who held various offices during his incumbency and lastly turned to Istanbul in 1656 with a group of people came together under the new Grand Vizier Boynu Yaralı Mehmed Paşa, who assured Köprülü that he was going to find a new post for him. While he was awaiting a new post, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa attended some meetings in which the difficulties that the

¹⁰⁹ Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, 252.

¹¹⁰ Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, 258. For the end of the “Sultanate of the Women”, see; Peirce, 255-258.

¹¹¹ For the financial difficulties of the Ottoman state, see; Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 21-33.

Ottoman state had been facing were discussed, including the Venetians' blockade of the Dardanelles. In time, the supporters of Köprülü began to put their plan into words about the appointment of him as Grand Vizier instead of Boynu Yaralı Mehmed Paşa. Their requests were welcomed by Hatice Turhan Sultan and Mehmed IV. In this sense, the indecisive attitude of the current Grand Vizier in the imperial council concerning the state affairs pushed them to appoint Köprülü as Grand Vizier.¹¹² Further to accepting this post and before commencing it, Köprülü offered a kind of contract to assure that nobody would interfere in the precautions that he aimed to apply. The following proposal suggested by him was accepted by the ruling elites and he was appointed as the Grand Vizier with absolute authority, a perk which had not been given to any of his predecessors for a long time. The following conditions were the preconditions of Köprülü for accepting the post of the Grand Vizierate.

“1) that all his requests be granted by the sultan, and that nothing contrary to such requests be sustained; 2) that no pressure be allowed on the grand vezir from any source in the granting of any office, so that the most deserving men might be employed; for, Köprülü insisted, such unreasonable requests are the cause of all disturbances; 3) that no vezir or other official (vekil) be allowed to emerge to a position that might rival or impinge upon the grand vezir's power and Independence of action; and 4) that no ill-willed backbiters be allowed to slander the grand vezir.”¹¹³

As soon as Köprülü became the Grand Vizier and guaranteed the power in his hands with the contract, he successfully eliminated the various circles of power in the capital by applying various measures. His first action was expel the very dominant figures of the Kadizadelis to Cyprus, including the spiritual leader of the movement at the time, Üstüvani Mehmed Efendi.¹¹⁴ Likewise, he executed the Orthodox Patriarch in

¹¹² For the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa as Grand Vizier, see; Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 50-60

¹¹³ Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 56-57.

¹¹⁴ Necati Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy among the Ottomans in the 17th century with special reference to the Qāḍī-zāde Movement,” PhD Diss., (University of Edinburg: 1981), 259-65; Semiramis Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadizadeli Movement,” PhD Diss., (Princeton University: 1990), 142-149.

Istanbul, claiming that he encouraged Christians to revolt against Ottoman authority in Wallachia.¹¹⁵ More important than these, he appointed his supporters to important offices in a short time after he came to power.¹¹⁶ Although the threats of opposition groups against the almost absolute power of Köprülü continued, he succeeded in maintaining and securing stability in Istanbul to a certain extent, but this time he had to engage with the Venetians because the war with Venice over the island of Crete had been continuing and they had already blocked the Dardanelles by taking Limni and Bozcaada Islands.

II.2. The war with Venice

“In the autumn of 1644, a ship set sail from Istanbul with a number of notables on board, among them the chief of the harem Sünbüllü Agha and Bursali Mehmet Efendi, who had just been appointed to the judgeship of Mecca. The ship stopped at Rhodes, where sailors warned them about a pirate boat lying in wait. Mehmet Efendi, however, insisted that they must reach Egypt in time for the haj, so the boat departed. Somewhere in the vicinity of Crete it was set upon by Maltese pirates. Sixty people were taken hostage (among them Mehmet Efendi) and the rest were killed, including Sünbüllü Agha, whose enormous treasure was shared out among the pirates. When he heard the news, Sultan Ibrahim accused the Venetians of having given safe harbor and aid to the Maltese in Crete.”¹¹⁷

The trigger effect of launching a military campaign against the Venetians on the Crete Island can be seen in the above-mentioned excerpt. If we consider both the political situation of Europe and the domestic politics of the Ottoman court, it would be hard to believe that it is the only explanation, since although there had already been pirate activity in the Mediterranean against the Ottoman fleet before the incident, the Ottomans had never taken the risk to launch a war against Venice, and most of the

¹¹⁵ Marc David Baer, “Honored by the Glory of Islam”, 59-60.

¹¹⁶ Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 61-62.

¹¹⁷ Cited in, Molly Greene, *A shared world : Christians and Muslims in the early modern Mediterranean* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2000), 14.

conflicts were tried to be resolved peacefully. So, declaring a war against the Venetians “can be interpreted as an indication of Ottoman self-confidence, restored after the successes of Murad IV against Iran.”¹¹⁸

For the Ottomans, as long as the war in the eastern frontier with the Safavids continued, it would be very difficult to open a new front in Europe. However, this obstacle disappeared after signing of a peace treaty in 1639 with the Safavids, which came after the two successful campaigns of Murad IV resulting in taking Revan (1635) and reconquest of Bagdad in 1638. On the Other hand, the peace treaty presented an opportunity for the Ottomans to direct their attention to the western fronts. On the other hand, actively involved with the Thirty Years’ War, Venice was now an assailable enemy for the Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean region. Another development within the court can also be added to the Ottomans’ willingness to attack Crete. After the death of Kemankeş Mustafa Paşa in 1643, who was known to be cautious about military expenditures, considering that these kinds of military actions would bring extra burden on the state treasury, the attitudes of Cinci Hoca and Kapudan Yusuf Pasha, who were disposed to declare war against Venice would have prevailed on Ibrahim I’s decision against the policy of the Grand Vizier Sultanzade Mehmed Pasha, who was the advocate of remaining in peace with Venice.¹¹⁹

Ottomans carried a quick success in the initial phase of the siege. In 1645, they easily captured the second biggest city in the Crete, Chania, and then took Rethymnon, in the following year. After capturing some other citadels along the coastline, the Ottoman-Venetian war began to spread to Eastern Europe, resulting in clashes in many fronts, Dalmatia, Bosnia and the Dardanelles. Venetians responded to the Ottomans’ attacks on the Dalmatian coast with the conquest of the Ottoman citadel in Bosnia known as Clissa.¹²⁰ Venetian’s counterattack must have forced the Ottomans to take measures against the naval power of Venice in the eastern Mediterranean region. Especially after the appointment of Sofu Mehmed Paşa as Grand Vizier and Voynuk Ahmed Paşa as Kapudan Pasha, the state officials began to seek a new way to ameliorate the condition of the navy, in order to break the Venetian blockade of

¹¹⁸ Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 15.

¹¹⁹ Molly Greene, *A Shared World*, 16-17.

¹²⁰ Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 16.

Dardanelles. For this purpose, the construction of galleons began to in 1648.¹²¹ However, these ships were not a successful experiment for the Ottoman navy, for even though they reinforced the fleet, they were still defeated by the Venetians.

After the three years that passed with several confrontations, the Ottoman-Venetian war over Crete entered a new phase in the following years. During these years some attempts to reach a peace agreement came into being, despite the fact that the naval battles between these two states were still raging on. The year 1655, on the other hand, witnessed the first victory of Ottoman galleons against the Venetians under the command of Surnazen Mustafa Paşa. However, most of these ships were captured by the Venetians in 1656, paving the way for the conquering the islands of both Limni and Bozcaada by the Venetians.¹²² These two islands in the entrance of the Dardanelles were not only important for their strategic locations, which enabled Ottomans to carry out the military aid to the siege of Crete, but also due to their role in isolating the Ottoman ships in the eastern Mediterranean region, blocking the food supply of Istanbul coming from Egypt. Actually, the occupation of these two Islands took place on the eve of the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa as Grand Vizier in 1656. Thus, the first thing for Köprülü to deal with was to break the Venetians' blockade of the Dardanelles. Therefore, after making a preparation throughout the winter, he initiated a naval campaign against the Venetians' fleet to break the blockade and to conquer the strategic Islands in the entrance of the strait. In the following year, the Ottoman navy successfully repulsed the Venetians' fleet and retook the Bozcaada and Limni Islands.¹²³ The successful naval battle pushed Köprülü to take further action against the Venetians in the eastern fronts. Kunt states Köprülü's intention towards the Venetians as follows:

“... Köprülü's ultimate objective in the war with Venice was to force the Republic to surrender Candia, which had been holding out for more than a decade despite the fact that most of Crete was held by Ottoman forces. To achieve this objective Köprülü planned a land campaign to strike at the Dalmatian and home territories of the Republic in the spring of 1658.” However, “...circumstances forced Köprülü's attention elsewhere, and

¹²¹ İdris Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 186-92.

¹²² İdris Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, 190.

¹²³ Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 70-82.

because the 1658 campaign was in the end directed against Transylvania it is often overlooked that the initial preparations were against Venice.”¹²⁴

This problem constitutes the second international confrontation of the Ottomans in the mid-seventeenth century, the revolt of George Rakoczy II, prince of Transylvania, who tried to take advantage from the political conditions in the Eastern Europe in his favor.

II.3. The revolt of George Rakoczy II

The revolt of Ukrainian Cossacks, led by Bohdan Xmel’nyč’kyj, against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1648 evolved into a war between Russia and Poland over the Ukraine. At first, the Ottomans tried to carry out a balance policy towards these two powers, but firstly the Crimean Tatars and then the Ottomans began to support Ukrainian Cossacks, expecting to gain a new dependent ruler in the Black Sea region.¹²⁵ However, Xmel’nyč’kyj’s alliance with Russia changed the policy of the Tatars and the Ottomans in support of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which later was invaded by the Swedish kingdom. The reason behind the change of policy towards the revolt lies in the fact that “a weak Commonwealth on their north-western frontier suited the Ottomans far better than a swathe of territory seized by an energetic vassal and held with Swedish support.”¹²⁶

The political situation in Eastern Europe at the time, from which the anti-polish alliance took a considerable advantage, paved the way for the revolt of George Rakoczy II, who had been the prince of Transylvania since the year 1648. Rakoczy tried to benefit from both the weakness of the Polish state, which had difficulties originated from the Cossacks revolt and Sweden's invasion, and from the fact that the Ottomans were at war with the Venetians. Trying to gain the support of the Ottoman vassals,

¹²⁴ Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 86.

¹²⁵ Cited in, Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish diplomatic relations*, 142.

¹²⁶ Caroline Finkel *Osman's Dream : The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923* (New York : Basic Books, 2007), 257.

namely Wallachia and Moldavia, Rakoczy intended to increase his role in the Eastern European politics by aiming to exercise sovereignty over Poland and Hungary. In response to Rakoczy's revolt, Ottomans took measures to suppress the revolt before the situation would become worse. "On one hand they pressured the Transylvanian Diet to depose Rakoczy and elect in his stead a nobleman by the name of Ferenc Rhedey; on the other hand the Crimean Han was instructed to attack Rakoczy and to drive his army out of Poland."¹²⁷ However, these maneuvers did not force Rakoczy to retreat from his policy, which provoked Köprülü to take military action against his revolt. In 1658, he personally joined the Ottoman forces, which were previously commanded by the governor of Özi province, Melek Ahmed Pasha, in order to launch an expedition against this revolt. In the same year, Köprülü marched to Yanova which had one of the strongest fortresses in south-western Transylvania region. The Ottoman army conquered the castle after a short siege. Then, with the help of the Crimean Tatars, the Ottomans occupied the capital of the principality, Alba Julia. Although Rakoczy managed to escape from this campaign, Köprülü suppressed the rebellion and appointed a new prince for the Transylvanian principality.¹²⁸ Köprülü Mehmed Paşa's successful attempts against the Venetians and the revolt of Rakoczy in the north-western frontier were not well welcomed in Anatolia, however. Abaza Hasan Paşa and a number of Anatolian governors raised their voice against the absolute rule of Köprülü.

II.4. The mutiny of Abaza Hasan Paşa

It can be easily argued that the revolt of Abaza Hasan Paşa was the most threatening attempt on Köprülü Mehmed Paşa's rising power over the state affairs. Neither the war with Venice nor the revolt of Rakoczy worried Köprülü that much because this revolt directly targeted his absolute power. In the same vein, this revolt is also important for the current thesis on the ground that Mehmed IV received the *Ghazi* title after the revolt had broken out. In the following lines, after briefly narrating this

¹²⁷ Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 89.

¹²⁸ Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 92-93.

revolt, I will try to examine the historical context in which the Ottoman ruling elites agreed to designate Mehmed IV as the *Ghazi* sultan. In doing so, I will also criticize the weak description of the event in the work of Marc David Baer.¹²⁹

Being appointed as governor of Aleppo, İbşir Mustafa Paşa raised some objections to the Ottoman court in an effort to put his own programme into practice that aimed to ameliorate the ill management in the government. At first, his demands were not welcomed. However, when the Porte received the news that İbşir Mustafa Paşa was on the road to march on Istanbul, he was appointed as the Grand Vizier in 1654. A few months later, he was executed in consequence of the rebellion led by the Janissaries and cavalry corps in the capital.¹³⁰ Yet, his two supporters; Seydi Ahmed Paşa and Abaza Hasan Paşa maintained discordant attitudes and when Köprülü Mehmed Paşa came to power, they began to raise their objections. In response to the two lieutenants of Hasan Paşa, on the other hand, Köprülü took some precautions against their possible discontent attitudes that might have threatened his authority. Firstly, Köprülü tried to minimize the threat that might have come from Seydi Ahmed Paşa by sending him to the Bosnian front to fight against the Venetians. However, the opposition of Hasan Paşa was more difficult to cope with because of his power coming from the other provincial governors in Anatolia as well.¹³¹

As I have mentioned before, while Köprülü was preparing to launch a military campaign against the Venetians along the Dalmatian coast so as to force them to relinquish Crete, the revolt of Rakoczy broke out. In return, the campaign was directed against the Transylvania region to suppress this revolt before the situation would become worse. As a result, Hasan Paşa was called together with the other governors in Anatolia to combine their soldiers with the central forces of the Ottoman army that was personally led by Köprülü Mehmed Paşa.¹³² However, procrastinating from taking part in the campaign, Hasan Paşa corresponded with other governors in Anatolia to form an opposition block against Köprülü's rule. With the participation of various governors,

¹²⁹ Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*.

¹³⁰ Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 246.

¹³¹ Metin Kunt, *The Köprülü Years*, 97-98.

¹³² As I have mentioned before, at first, this campaign targeted Venetian but at the end directed against the revolt of Rakoczy. See, footnote 8.

including the governors of Damascus and Anatolia, meaning Tayyartzade Ahmed Paşa and Can Mirza Paşa, nearly thirty thousand men gathered in Konya.¹³³ At first, they did not openly put forward their intention which can be seen in the letter of Hasan Paşa sent to the sultan, in which it is reported that Hasan Paşa was about to come to Istanbul with his soldiers.¹³⁴ Meanwhile, being deprived from the most of the Anatolian forces, Köprülü departed from Edirne to launch a campaign against the Transylvania before the arrival of the winter. While Köprülü was on the road with the central army, on the other hand, the Konya group held a meeting, whereupon they came to the conclusion that as long as the Grand Vizier, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, was executed, they were not going to attend any campaign.¹³⁵ Herein, they were very certain at their concern that if they attended this campaign, Köprülü would execute all of the members of this group, as he did before against his enemies.¹³⁶

As in the case of previous revolts, in which the rebelling parties had tried to depend their actions upon a legitimate ground, whether by obtaining a Şeyhülislam fatwa or garnering the support of a group of the ulema,¹³⁷ the members of Abaza Hasan Paşa revolt also attempted to build their action on a legitimate ground. They designated themselves as “*Cünud-ı Müslimin*, meaning Muslim soldiers, who were gathered in order to chasten the sultanate in line with the law.¹³⁸ Similarly, they also blamed Köprülü on the ground that he actually interrupted their holy war which had been

¹³³ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn*, 1785.

¹³⁴ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn*, 1785; “Sa’adetli sultanım, işte cem’ olan asker ile bu kulunuz dahi erişmek üzereyim.”

¹³⁵ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn*, 1787; “Veziria’zam katl olunmadıkça ne sefere ve ne fermanları olan canibe gitmek mümkündür.”

¹³⁶ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn*, 1786; “Sefer bahanesiyle matlubları olan bu kadar kimse Rumiline geçip bi-zahmet ellerine girdikte ayağıyla gelmiş şikar mesabesinde birer birer cümlemizi giriftar-ı kemend-i intikam ve seyf-i siyasetle katl ü l’dam edecekleri mahall-i şüphe değildir.”

¹³⁷ Cemal Kafadar, “Janissaries and Other Rifraff of Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels without a Cause?” in *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World : A volume of essays in honor of Norman Itzkowitz* , edited by Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir (Madison, Wis. : Center for Turkish Studies at the University of Wisconsin : University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 129.

¹³⁸ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn*, 1787; “‘Mukteza-i şer’le taraf-ı saltanatı guş-mal için tecemmu’ eden cunud-i Müsliminin ber-muceb-i defter zad ü zevadelerin varan mübaşir yediyle bi’t-tamam irsal eylesiz”.

directing against the Venetians over the Crete Island.¹³⁹ More important than these, their target turned towards the Ottoman state, meaning the sultan himself. This means that their intention went beyond demanding the execution of Grand Vizier and reached to the point of creating their own states, which can be seen in Abaza Hasan Paşa's own words: "From now on, consider us as implacable a foe as the Shah of Iran; they [the Sultan] shall have Rumeli and we Anatolia."¹⁴⁰

To what extent did their claims reflect the reality is open to debate, but in response to such sort of actions, ruling elites began to raise their own legitimacy devices. As the rebellions did before, this time, the Porte defined themselves as "Muslim soldiers", who were detained by these rebels when they were engaging in making a holy war against the infidels, by issuing a fatwa, which was then sent to Istanbul to influence the public opinion against the rebellion.¹⁴¹ Having understood that their intent came to a serious level, Mehmed IV summoned Köprülü Mehmed Paşa from Transylvania region immediately to take an action against this revolt in Anatolia.¹⁴² Köprülü received this order when the siege of Yanova castle came to an end. After receiving these news he moved to Edirne, where the imperial council was gathered with the participation of high ranked state officials, including viziers, the Şeyhülislam, janissary ağas, kazaskers and the 'ayans.¹⁴³ In the council, soldiers and the state officials came to an agreement to act together against Abaza Hasan Paşa. Among these officials, especially the soldiers raised questions concerning the religious legitimacy of fighting against other Muslims. By giving a reference to *Fetavay-ı Bezzaziye*, written by

¹³⁹ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyin*, 1785.

¹⁴⁰ This translation was taken from, Caroline Finkel, *Osman's dream*, 259. For original text, see, Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyin*, 1789; "Bundan sonra bizi dahi Şah-ı Acem gibi bir kavi düşman bilsinler. Fima-ba'd Rumili anların, Anadolu bizim bildiklerinden kalmasınlar."

¹⁴¹ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyin*, 1789; "...cünud-ı Müslimin küffar ile gazaya me'mur iken tahrik-i fesad ile fesh-i azimete ba'is olanlar kafirden eşedir deyü fetva-i şerife verilip İstanbul'da olan ulema-i a'lam ve fuzala-i zevi'l-ihtiram imza etmeleri için kaymakama irsal olundu. Ba'de'l-imza suretleri nakl ve tahrir olunup nefir-i 'amm emirleri ile etraf u cevanibe perakende kılındı."

¹⁴² Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyin*, 1791.

¹⁴³ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyin*, 1805.

Bezzazi, a hanefi scholar who lived in the fifteenth century,¹⁴⁴ this concern was resolved with the Şeyhülislam fatwa.¹⁴⁵

In fact, this point necessitates a brief look at the previous justification devices used by the early Ottomans in the matter of using holy war as a backbone of the territorial gains that were taken from Muslims. In this regard, since Ottomans attacked the Muslim territories, it would have been very difficult to label these campaigns for the sake of the glory of Islam. For that reason, the Ottomans fabricated various instruments to overcome this difficulty. Colin Imber concisely summarizes these devices as follows:

“Firstly, the Ottoman chronicles of the late fifteenth century tend to present Ottoman conquests in fourteenth and early fifteenth-century Anatolia as peaceful acquisitions without force of arms, and thus exonerate the Ottoman dynasty from the charge of waging war against Muslims. A second device which these chronicles adopted was to justify such wars as a religious obligation, on the grounds that the other Muslim rulers of Anatolia had cooperated with the infidels, and thus distracted the Ottomans from their sacred task of gaza. [...] Another technique was to portray the sultans’ Muslim enemies as ‘oppressing’ Muslims, thus making the ‘removal of oppression’ obligatory for the Ottomans.”¹⁴⁶

Similarly, although Abaza Hasan Paşa was not a ruler of any state at the time, but had an idea to create his own state in Anatolia, we can apparently see that the Ottoman rulers manifested similar devices, especially using the last two, to obtain a justification tool to be used to suppress his revolt. All of these precautions, mobilization and legitimization attempts obviously show that both Mehmed IV and Köprülü Mehmed Paşa took the revolt seriously.

However, the last but most important detail in the imperial council, which convened in Edirne two days after Köprülü’s arrival (15 October 1658),¹⁴⁷ is the scene that the Ghazi title was given to Mehmed IV. The only contemporary account, which recounts an anecdote about the designating of Mehmed IV as Ghazi sultan, is *Tarih-i*

¹⁴⁴ Ahmet Özel, “Bezzazi”, *DİA*, 1996, Vol. 6: 113-114.

¹⁴⁵ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyin*, 1806.

¹⁴⁶ Colin Imber, “*Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History*”, 145.

¹⁴⁷ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyin*, 1805.

Gilmani by Mehmed Halife. As he was holding an office in the inner palace, he probably was an eyewitness to the event. According to this contemporary account, when the news about the conquest of Yanova reached Istanbul, Mehmed IV moved to Edirne, where the Ghazi title was given to him by the Şeyhülislam fatwa and then his name was read as “*Gazi Sultan Mehmed Han*” in the sermon.¹⁴⁸

The date of issuing this fatwa is very crucial. As I have mentioned before, the real intent of Abaza Hasan Paşa made itself more apparent when the conquest of Yanova was already completed. So, various attempts by the rebels to base their actions on a legitimate ground coincided with the conquest. Here, it can be safely argued that Mehmed IV’s Ghazi title came up in a very specific political setting and was used as a kind of legitimization tool against the rebellion of Abaza Hasan Paşa, on the grounds that he interrupted the holy war of Mehmed IV against the infidels in the European front. Indeed, if we look at the continuation of this event in Mehmed Halife’s account, it can be seen that after the return of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa to Edirne, another imperial council was gathered with the participation of various state officials. There, Mehmed IV gave a speech towards the soldiers, saying that “My servants, are you with me in fighting against Celali Hasan Paşa, who interrupted my holy war and helped the infidels in this blessed year?”¹⁴⁹

However, the account of Naima is different from Mehmed Halife’s with regard to the speech. “Mehmed IV’s holy war” in *Tarih-i Gilmani* turned in to the “holy war”, which did not belong to Mehmed IV’s personality in the retrospective work of *Naima Tarihi*.¹⁵⁰ The difference in their narration brings to mind that the Ottomans’ attempt to make their claim on legitimate grounds by giving reference to Mehmed IV’s personality was not taken for granted. It is clear that by using the ghazi image of the sultan, the Ottoman ruling elites found a chance to substantiate and better manifest the legitimacy of the dynastic claim. In this sense, since *Gilmani*’s work was a

¹⁴⁸ Mehmed Halife, *Tarih-i Gilmani*, 82-83.

¹⁴⁹ Mehmed Halife, *Tarih-i Gilmani*, 64; “kullanm bu sene-i mübarekede vaki’ olan gazama mani’ olup küffara yardım iden Celali Hasan Paşa üzerine gitmeniz rica olunur, gider misiniz?”

¹⁵⁰ Mustafa Naima, *Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn*, 1805; “Kullarım! Abaza Hasan dedikleri mel’un emr-i hümayunuma inkiyad etmeyip bu sene-i mübarekede vaki’ olan gazaya mani’ olup küffaea yardım etmekle isyanımı izhar eyledi. Ve bir alay eşkiyayı başına cem’ edip Anadolu memalikini yağma ve garet ile fesada verdi. Uzerine seferim vardır gitmeniz me’mul-i hümayundur gider misiz?”

contemporary account, it can be argued that his narration better reflected the concerns of the ruling elites in a time when they tried to guarantee the dynastic claim through a strong sultanic appearance. Probably, the absence of a reference to Mehmed IV's Ghazi image in Naima's account can be explained with reference to his priorities at the time. That is to say, Naima might have not felt a need to add the Ghazi image of Mehmed IV into his work due to the fact that the ghazi image of Mehmed IV was not an important issue to be mentioned in his time.

Lastly, it is necessary to mention Baer's comment on the issue because although he always highlighted the Ghazi image of Mehmed IV in every section of his book, he did not pay attention to the broader circumstances under which the ghazi title was given to Mehmed IV. Throughout his book, one of the mainstays of Baer is to bring the Ghazi image of Mehmed IV into the forefront. For this purpose, he tried to reveal the rhetorical representations of Mehmed IV at the time, examining nearly all the relevant narrative accounts written during the second half of the seventeenth century. However, while he was always putting emphasis on Mehmed IV's depiction by referring to the various laudatory sentences in the works of court histories, he significantly eluded the historical context and ignored the political realities of the period in question. For example, by giving a reference to Mehmed Halife's work, *Tarihi-i Gilmani*, Baer interpreted the scene, which recounts how the Ghazi title was given to Mehmed IV, as follows:

“Mehmed IV and his handlers, Hatice Turhan and Abdi Pasha, were not unaware of the potential of ghaza for improving the sultan's image at home. Mehmed Halife notes that already in 1658, after the conquest of Yanova and following a week of celebrations in the capital, ‘as the felicitous sultan arrived in Edirne from Islambol with the intention of waging a military campaign, which caused the army to become confident [in his warlike intentions], a noble fatwa was issued declaring Mehmed IV a ghazi, and thereafter it was decreed that at the Friday sermon his name was to be read as ‘Ghazi Sultan Mehmed Khan.’”¹⁵¹

That's all about Baer's comment on the issue. However, as I have indicated before, the above-quoted passage does not tell Mehmed Halife's story in depth

¹⁵¹ Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 146.

concerning this event. After all, taking into account the political situation that the Ottomans had faced while Mehmed IV was depicted as Ghazi, it can be easily suggested that Baer's argument lack a solid ground, at least about the origin of Mehmed IV's Ghazi title. In this regard, at least, he would have asked following simple but crucial question: Under what political context did Mehmed IV get the Ghazi title despite the fact he had not personally lead the army in the battlefield?

CHAPTER: 3

THE DISUNITY IN THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT IN THE 1660s

By taking into consideration the political situation around 1660s in the Ottoman Empire, I will try find a plausible answer to the following question: why did Mehmed IV decide to join the Kamanıçe campaign to become a Ghazi sultan despite the fact that he had already received this title nearly fourteen years ago? At first glance, if one looks at the contemporary accounts, it can be seen that the ostensible impetus of Mehmed IV for leading the army in the battlefield was his eagerness and the guidance of Vani Mehmed Efendi.¹⁵² Keeping this point in mind yet, I plan to focus on two interrelated issues to elaborate this question from a different perspective. Firstly, I dwell on one of the most important developments within the Ottoman political system during the second half of the seventeenth century that is the division of the state bureaucracy into three parts (grand vizier, *İstanbul Kaymakamı* and *Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı*), due to the mobility of the court. While the grand vizier was on the siege of Candia and Mehmed IV was in the hunting expeditions, this situation became more apparent. Here, I argue that the personal attendance of Mehmed IV to the campaign of Kamanıçe can be

¹⁵² Hacı Ali Efendi, *Tarih-i Kamanıçe*, 69. “Hakikat-i hal mehabetlü ve şevketlü Padişah-ı İslam Ebu'l-feth ve'l-megazi Sultan Mehmed Han tavvelallahü ömrehu ve devletehu ila-intiha'i'd-devran hazretlerinin gaza vü cihada himmet-i hümayunları selatin-i maziyye muşabih olmayup, leyl ü nehar teveccüh-i hümayunları hadd-i tahrirden birun olduğundan gayri leyalı ve eyyamda Va'iz-i Sultan Vani Mehmed Efendi huzur-ı humayunlarında tefsir-i şerifden, gaza vü cihad faziletin takrir ü beyan ile tab'-ı hümayunları mücella olup, gaza vü cihaddan gayri cihanda murad-ı hümayunları olmadığı vüzeray-ı 'izam hazeratına ve asker-i İslam kullarına olan nazar u inayetlerinden zahir u hüveyda olmağın, saye-i devletleri 'amme-i'badi'llah üzerinden dur u zayil olmamak de'avatına sağır u kebir mudavemet ü iştigal üzrelerdir.”

seen as an attempt to unite the decision making process in a more limited ground. The second issue that I plan to further pursue in this chapter is Mehmed IV's indecisive attitude when the Venetian ambassador came to his seat for continuing the peace negotiation, which can be easily seen in the correspondences made between him and the grand vizier. The difficulties encountered especially during the peace negotiation between the Ottomans and the Venetians, arising from the multiple administrative centers, should have convinced the Ottoman state officials to take an action against this disunity within the Ottoman court by setting out the sultan to the campaign. But, before moving on these main topics, a brief historical background is needed.

III.1. Historical background

“...the Pashas were for a while all silent, not knowing what reply to make, or how to resolve to difficult and knotty a point, until Köprülü (who was then the most ancient and perhaps the wisest Pasha, as the actions of his following life have sufficiently testified) first replied that in his opinion, the only and most probable means for a tottering vizier to secure himself, is to divert the minds of the Grand Signior and other working, upon some Foreign War; for Peace is that which corrupts the disposition of men, and sets them on work to raise themselves with intestine and civil evils; when War buses their spirits, and employes them to gain renown and glory by Martial actions, by which means Plots and Theachery are droven from our homes; [...] And it is possible that Ahmet the Son of Köprülü, who began to last war with Germany, might go upon this Maxim of his Fathers; for in all matters of his Government, he is observed to walk by the fame rules and directions, which was bequeathed to him as well as his inheritance.”¹⁵³

These sentences from the book of Paul Rycaut, who was the private secretary of English ambassador during the 1660s and then became British consul at Smyrna, are

¹⁵³ Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, 49.

supposed to have shown Köprülü Mehmed Paşa's advice to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa regarding the policy that he should follow throughout his tenure as grand vizier. Accordingly, there seems to be apparent similarity between the policy of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa and his son, because Fazıl Ahmed Paşa always tried to keep the army out of Istanbul throughout his grand vizierate by launching various military campaigns, especially towards the European rivals. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa came to power in 1661, the war with Venice over Crete was still continuing, even if the previous constant confrontations came to an end. Besides, although the larger part of Crete had been taken by the Ottomans, some strategic cities and citadels were still in the hands of the Venetians.

As I have mentioned in the second chapter, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa had already attempted to launch a land campaign against the Venetians from the Dalmatian coast in order to oblige them to surrender Crete to the Ottomans. However, the revolt of Rakoczy in the Transylvania region led to the postponement of this campaign. One of the main outcomes of this campaign for the Ottomans was to gain a strategic location in Transylvania in order to secure the Ottoman rule at that region. In a way, the conquest of Yanova castles in 1658 by Köprülü Mehmed Paşa served to this purpose as well.¹⁵⁴ The suppression of this rebellion in favor of the Ottomans, on the other hand, brought certain political stability to this region for a while. This political stability gave Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Paşa an opportunity for putting an end to the problem with Venice, arising from the struggle for establishing full control over Crete. Considering the superiority of the Venetians over the naval battle, Ottomans decided to march to Venice through the Bosnia region in order to conquer some of the Venetians castles, such as Kotor, Şebnek and İspilet.¹⁵⁵ However, the direct intervention of the Habsburgs in Transylvania necessitated Ottomans to interfere to the region again.

In order to get involved in this problem, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa launched a military campaign against the Habsburg forces commanded by Raimondo Montecuccoli in 1663, which successfully ended with the conquest of some castles, including Uyvar. In the following year, on the other hand, although the Ottoman forces were defeated in the

¹⁵⁴ Metin Kunt, "17. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kuzey Politikası Üzerine bir yorum," in *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi, Beşeri Bilimler – Humanities*, Vols. 4-5 (1976-1977): 114.

¹⁵⁵ Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 99-100.

battle of Saint Gotthard by the Habsburgs, the treaty of Vasvar, whose conditions can be accepted as in favor of the Ottomans, was signed.¹⁵⁶ After assuring a peace treaty, which is signed for the duration of twenty years, Ottomans took the opportunity to deal with the Venetians over Crete. Here, it can easily be suggested that the origin of the Ottoman war with the Venetians over Candia between the years 1667-1669 bears upon the unfinished war process which had been continuing for nearly twenty two years. However, considering the fact that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa always tried to keep the negotiation channels open during this siege, which can be easily seen in the diplomatic correspondences made between Ottomans and Venetians, it becomes clear that Candia remained an important problem in front of the Ottomans which should be peacefully solved as far as possible, before the full mobilization of the military forces were directed against the western fronts. Indeed, if we look at his long tenure (1661-1676), except for the siege of Candia, all the military campaigns were conducted towards the Transylvania and Podolia regions.

So, the reason behind the Kamanıç campaign should be evaluated as a part of Ottoman interest towards the Eastern Europe region in the second half of the seventeenth century. As indicated in the previous chapter, the revolt of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj in 1648 revealed the fact that the Commonwealth was incapable of suppressing a possible Cossack revolt in the future. This situation provoked the Ottomans to change their policy towards this region at the expense of the Commonwealth, which had previously depended on maintaining a balanced policy between the Muscovy and the Commonwealth. In this sense, without any necessity of taking the support of the Commonwealth, the Ottomans were in need of regional base in the Podolia region to bring the Cossacks under the control of Ottomans. The fortress of Kamanıç provides an appropriate place for the Ottomans to conduct this new policy in the Eastern Europe against the Cossacks' potential attacks in the future.¹⁵⁷ While the historical developments during the second half of the seventeenth century necessitated changing policy of the Ottomans, waging a war still needs a reasonable pretext. Kolodziejczyk narrates the trigger reason of the campaign of Kamanıç as follows:

¹⁵⁶ Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 265-270.

¹⁵⁷ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Ottoman Survey Register of Podolia*, 3-5.

“On 6 September 1669 the Venetians signed articles of capitulation at Candia, marking the successful conclusion of the 25-year-long Ottoman campaign to conquer the island of Crete. Three months earlier, the Ukrainian hetman Petro Dorosenko was accepted as a vassal by the Ottoman Porte and granted a diploma, horsetail, tambour, and banner-symbols of imperial investiture. In 1670 the Commonwealth broke relations with Dorosenko, and in 1671 the grand hetman Jan Sobieski invaded Cossack Ukraine. In October 1671 the sultan warned the Polish king against attacking the Cossacks, and the governor of Ozii (Ukr. Ocakiv) Halil Pasha was sent to aid Dorosenko. Preparations for war began. In his last letter to the Crown deputy chancellor, Jędrzej Olszowski, Ahmed Koprülü reiterated the reasons for the war. "You claim Ukraine as your hereditary property. In fact, the real owner of all things is only [God] the Highest Lord of the two Worlds," wrote the grand vizier. Then the argumentation followed that the Cossacks, as a free people, had once accepted the king's patronage under the condition that he respect their rights. The king had broken the agreement and for the past twenty years he was no longer the legal ruler of Ukraine. Every nation may ask for the padishah's protection, as did the Cossacks, and the padishah does not reject such request.”¹⁵⁸

As demonstrated above, the political motive behind the Ottoman campaign conducted towards the Podolia region in 1672 originates from the fact that the balance of power began to change during the second half of the seventeenth century in favor of the Ukrainian Cossacks, which compelled the Ottomans to acquire a regional base in the Eastern Europe. However, this political situation does not provide a solid ground to detect why Mehmed IV personally attended this campaign. To better inquire Mehmed IV's attendance to the campaign of Kamaniçe in 1672, the structure of the Ottoman administrative system during the 1660s should be examined.

III.2. The role of *Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı* (Deputy of the Imperial Stirrup)

To better understand the political development in the Ottoman court system during the second half of the seventeenth century, a brief examination of the Kaymakam's involvement in state affairs is in order. Especially, the physical absence of the sultans from the military campaigns in the second half of the sixteenth century increased the importance of the office of the *kaymakamlık*, because these officials practiced nearly all the authority of the grand vizier in Istanbul, issuing imperial

¹⁵⁸ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Ottoman Survey Register of Podolia*, 5-6.

decrees and appointing the state officials, when the grand vizier was launching a military campaign in the front.¹⁵⁹ The tension between the grand vizier as an army commander in the battlefield and his deputy in Istanbul or vice versa, culminated at the turn of the sixteenth century. In that regard, it would be useful to remember Sinan Paşa's offer to Mehmed III regarding the importance of personal participation of the sultan to the campaign.¹⁶⁰ Karateke summarizes this suggestion as follows:

“If the grand vezir was sent as commander, his deputy (*kaimmakam*) in Istanbul would purposely withhold further soldiers and provisions from the army in order to cause the grand vezir to be unsuccessful, in the hope of damaging his reputation and ultimately replacing him. If another vezir was appointed commander, the grand vezir himself would not want him to succeed and thereby become a possible contender for his own position. A higher authority such as the sultan himself would be a solution to all these problems...”¹⁶¹

Taking into consideration Sinan Paşa's suggestion, it can be assumed that the competition between these two posts would have come to the surface in every military campaign, arising either from the factional politics in the court or a hostility between these two state officials. However, if one of the lieutenants of the grand vizier became *kaymakam* and stayed in the court to act on behalf of him, there would be no reason for the grand vizier to worry about that in the case of his unsuccessful military campaign, his deputy would have replaced him. In a similar vein, it can be said that during the

¹⁵⁹ Ercüment Kuran, “Kaim-makam”, *EI2*, 1997, Vol. 4: 461.

¹⁶⁰ Ahmet Hasanbeyzade, *Hasan Bey-zade Tarihi*, ed. Nezihi Aykut. 3Vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004), vol. III, 473-475; “... Sinan Paşa, bir gün, Padişah-ı kişver-güşaya [Kasr-ı hümayun'da,] tek ü تنها girüp, arz eder ki: [‘İlm-i hümayununuz hafi olmasun ki,] min-ba'd, kişver-i a'daya serdar irsali [ayn-ı] hatadur. Zira, ikiden hali değüldür ki, ta'yin buyurılan serdar, ya vezir-i a'zam ola, ya aşağı vüzeradan ola. Eger, vezir-i a'zam ise, yirine kalan kaim-makamı irsal-i asakir ü mehamm itmeyüp, maslahat görmedüğünü aksa-yı meram ider ki, azl itdirüp, yirine, kendüsi, vezir-i a'zam-ı Şah-ı enam ola. Eger, serdar, aşağı vezirlerden olursa, vezir-i a'zam bulunan, imdad idüp, yüz aklığı zuhura getürdüğünü murad itmez, şayed, hıdmeti meşkur olup, vezir-i a'zam-ı Şah-ı gayur ola diyü havf ider. Bunun ucındadır ki, nice yıldur, seferlerde, fütuhât vuku'a gelmeyüp, yok yire, bunca haza'in ü mühimmat, sarf olup, hebaya gider. Böyle olmakdan ise, ceddünüz Sultan Süleyman Han, - aleyhi mağfiretu'r-Rahman -, tarzı üzre, biricik, bi'z-zat, sefere azimet buyurun.”

¹⁶¹ Hakan Karateke, “*On the Tranquility*”, 121.

grand vizierate of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, he did not encounter such challenge from his deputy, because he appointed Kara Mustafa Paşa, brother-in-law, as *kaymakam* to conduct the state affairs during his first two campaigns, meaning the Ottoman-Habsburg war (1663-1664) and the siege of Candia (1667-1669).¹⁶²

On the other hand, if one looks at the Ottoman court system during the second half of the seventeenth century from a broader historical perspective, it can be observed that the Ottoman administrative system witnessed a crucial change; that is, the division of the state bureaucracy into three parts due to the mobility of the court. To put it more precisely, in addition to the *kaymakam* and the grand vizier, a third office, known as *rikab-ı hümayun kaymakamı* (Deputy of the Imperial Stirrup), which can be defined as the “second deputy to the grand vizier charged with accompanying the sultan on his excursions outside the capital for the purpose of hunting or during changes of imperial residence”,¹⁶³ made itself more apparent within the realm of Ottoman politics. Rhoads Murphey summarizes this development as follows:

“...the court and state bureaucracy was by necessity often divided into three parts, each assigned a particular function. This division of function applied with particular force during years when military campaigning led by the grand vizier was in prospect. One part accompanied the grand vizier leading the army in the field, a second part remained behind in Istanbul, where the grand vizier’s first deputy, known as the *Istanbul kaimmekamı*, took communications with the front. [...] But when the sultan undertook excursions for the hunt or for regular seasonal relocations, the royal household was further split, and it became necessary for a third official, called the *rikab-i hümayun kaim-mekamı* (deputy of the royal stirrup), to be appointed to liaise with both the grand vizier and his chief deputy, the principal *kaim-mekam*, who remained in Istanbul unless expressly summoned.”¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 275.

¹⁶³ Rhoads Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty : Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800*. (London ; New York : Continuum, 2008), 279.

¹⁶⁴ Rhoads Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty*, 212-13.

Although the above-quoted excerpt reveals this change to a certain extent, there is one crucial detail that should be revised. From the work of İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*, we can get brief information about the role and status of the kaymakam in the Ottoman administrative system. In the relevant chapter of this book, he asserts that the Ottomans used both the terms of *Kaymakam-ı Rikab-ı Hümayun* and *Kaymakam-ı Asitane-i Saadet* interchangeably. To put it differently, although there had been variations in the names of the grand vizier's deputy in Istanbul, these two titles refer to the same person.¹⁶⁵ He also states that when sultans travelled from Istanbul to Edirne, another official was left in Istanbul to conduct the state affairs on behalf of the *kaymakam*.¹⁶⁶ However, for him, this detail seems to be a temporal circumstance within the Ottoman administrative system due to the fact that throughout the centuries the Ottoman sultans preferred to stay in Istanbul apart from exceptional circumstances. This division, on the other hand, evolved into another pattern during the second half of the seventeenth century in which disunity began to appear within the Ottoman politics, especially when the grand vizier was leading the army in the battlefield. In this regard, it can be said that the mobility of the court arising from Mehmed IV's hunting parties, which were arranged at least fifty times around Edirne or in the Balkans between the years 1650-1681,¹⁶⁷ necessitated the further division in the state apparatus.

After the spectacular procession of Mehmed IV to Edirne in 1656,¹⁶⁸ he continued to visit Istanbul occasionally. Until the year that the Ottomans conducted a military campaign against the Habsburgs in 1663, he came to Istanbul at least three times and although he did not personally follow the army and went as far as Edirne, this departure became his fourth voyage to Edirne.¹⁶⁹ This time span is important because

¹⁶⁵ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı*, (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1948), 180-185.

¹⁶⁶ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı*, 184-185.

¹⁶⁷ Tülay Artan, Ahmed I's hunting parties, 99. Tülay Artan, "Ahmed I's hunting parties: feasting in adversity, enhancing the ordinary" in *Starting with Food: Culinary Approaches to Ottoman History*, ed. Amy Singer (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2010), 99.

¹⁶⁸ Karin Ådahl, *The Sultan's Procession : The Swedish Embassy to Sultan Mehmed IV in 1657-1658 and the Rålamb Paintings*, (Istanbul : Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 2006).

¹⁶⁹ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 156.

after that time onwards, his previous voyages to Istanbul seems to have decreased; instead he began to organize hunting expeditions around Edirne and beyond more excessively. Another significant event of this year is that Mehmed IV appointed Abdi Paşa as court historian to write the events surrounding the sultan. From this account, we have a chance to reach a firsthand knowledge about Mehmed IV's hunting parties, even though he did not describe these expeditions in detail. In this sense, if we follow a number of Mehmed IV's hunting parties during the 1660s, we can see how this division took place in the administrative apparatus.

However, firstly, attention should be paid to Murphey's interpretation about the role of the grand vizier's deputies. As he indicates, state bureaucracy was divided into three parts during the reign of Mehmed IV, as of grand vizier, *Istanbul kaymakamı* and *rikab-ı hümayun kaymakamı*. However, this process did not take shape as Murphey indicated in the paragraph above. Contrary to his claim, I suggest that the first deputy of the grand vizier, when he was in the military campaign, was not the *Istanbul kaymakamı*, but rather the deputy who accompanied the sultan either in Edirne or in the hunting expeditions.

During the 1660s, Kara Mustafa Paşa was the person who held the office of the grand vizierate's chief deputy within the Ottoman administrative system. Indeed, the incumbency of Vizier Mustafa Paşa as *kaymakam* during the first two campaigns of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa; Ottomans-Habsburgs war (1663-64)¹⁷⁰ and the siege of Candia (1667-69)¹⁷¹ shows that his position occupied a more significant place in the Ottoman court during the 1660s than the *Istanbul kaymakamı*. In this regard, if we look at the Abdi Paşa's account, it can be clearly seen that in most cases without using the specific

¹⁷⁰ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 157; "Mah-ı mezburun beşinci cum'a-irtesinde Serdar-ı Sadaret-şi'ar ordu-yı hümayunla Çukur-çayırlı nam mevzi'den hareket ve mahall-i me'mura azimet idüp rikab-ı hümayunda ka'im-makamlık için Kapudan Vezir Mustafa Paşa'ya semmur kürkklü hil'at-ı fahire ilbas olınmışıdı."

¹⁷¹ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 228-229; "Ba'de'd-du'a Serdar-ı Sadaret-şi'ar tekrar paye-i serir-i a'laya ruy-mal ve du'a-yı hayr-ı Padişah-ı ile tekmil-i izz ü ikbal idüp ve sancak-ı şerifi omzı üstüne alup gözleri yaşın revan iderek Babü's-sa'ade'den taşra çıkdı ve rikab-ı hümayunda ka'im-makamlık, yine ka'im-makam-ı sabık Vezir Mustafa Paşa'ya layık görülüp semmur kürkklü hil'at-ı fahire giydürülmüşıdı."

title, he preferred to use “*kaymakam paşa*” or “*kaymakam Mustafa Paşa*”¹⁷², from which it is understood that he actually referred to Mustafa Paşa. *Istanbul kaymakamı*, on the other hand, occupied a less remarkable place in that account. In this narrative source, we can only reach the name of the appointed *kaymakam* to Istanbul, without going into detail concerning the task that those officials had taken.¹⁷³ However, this situation only shows the condition of the Ottoman administrative apparatus when Mehmed IV was in Edirne. That is to say, when he was organizing hunting parties around Edirne, the duty of the officials changed to a degree.

For example; in 26 October 1664, Mehmed IV departed from Edirne for hunting expeditions which were arranged around Yanbolı region.¹⁷⁴ In accordance with his duty, *Kaymakam* normally was expected to stay in Edirne to conduct the state affairs on behalf of the grand vizier. In that case, however, Mehmed IV also summoned the *kaymakam* to join his hunting parties which lasted twenty five days.¹⁷⁵ In the meantime, Vizier Yusuf Paşa was left in Edirne as the deputy of *kaymakam* Mustafa Paşa in order not to delay the functioning the state affairs.¹⁷⁶ Likewise, in the following year, Mehmed IV decided to make another hunting expedition around Dimetoka and Ferecik, in which Mustafa Paşa was again called to join this trip and Yusuf Paşa was commissioned in Edirne as the official of the Ottoman government.¹⁷⁷ We can also see the same practice during the siege of Candia. In 1666, after the departure of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa from Edirne for the preparations of the campaign, Mehmed IV arranged another hunting expedition around Yanbolu region. *Kaymakam* Mustafa Paşa was

¹⁷² Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 161, 164, 165, 166, 168, 178, 188, 189; 162, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175.

¹⁷³ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 188; “Ve Astane-i sa’adet’de Ka’im-makam olan Vezir Uzun İbrahim Paşa kullarına eyalet-i Bağdad-ı inayet buyurup....ve İstanbul Ka’im-makamlığının Akkirman muhafazasında olan sadr-ı sabık Süleyman Paşa kullarına tevcih buyurup...”

¹⁷⁴ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 167.

¹⁷⁵ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 172.

¹⁷⁶ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 167.

¹⁷⁷ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 188.

invited to join this voyage and he left Vizier Mahmud Paşa behind in order to conduct the state affairs instead of him in Edirne.¹⁷⁸

More important than these, even *Kaymakam* Mustafa Paşa attended these hunting parties; sometimes he could not have a chance to reach Mehmed IV directly. To put it more clearly, although he accompanied Mehmed IV during these expeditions, he still continued to communicate with the sultan by using the *Telhis*.¹⁷⁹ This brings to mind that he departed from Edirne together with the sultan but moved on till the specific place, where he conducted the state affairs with the other officials. Abdi Paşa's account provides an opportunity to observe this detail. In 28 November 1667, *Kaymakam* Mustafa Paşa left Edirne with his retinues to join another hunting party of the sultan, during which Mehmed IV visited *Kaymakam* Paşa's *menzil* (billet).¹⁸⁰ It seems that Mehmed's constant mobility day by day during these expeditions required further division in the state bureaucracy, therein *kaymakam* and sultan communicated in writing in some cases. Despite the fact that nearly all of the important decisions, such as negotiations with the other states' ambassadors, appointments of the state officials or conducting of the state affairs, were performed by the *kaymakam* himself, the mobility of the court seems to have created both communication and administration problems, which became more apparent while the siege was continuing in Crete.

Consequently, it can be clearly inferred from these examples that when the sultan was in Edirne, the grand vizier's chief deputy was not *Istanbul Kaymakamı* as Murphey asserts. Fazıl Ahmed Paşa's close relative and future's grand vizier, Vizier Mustafa Paşa became the most important state official in the absence of the grand vizier during the 1660s. In that manner, it can also be argued that Mustafa Paşa's personality, meaning that the necessity of leaving a reliable official near the sultan, rather than his office became significant for the Ottoman ruling elites. Indeed, after the return of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa from the siege of Candia, he personally attended Mehmed IV's hunting party. As a deputy of the grand vizier, on the other hand, *Kaymakam* Mustafa Paşa was

¹⁷⁸ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 249.

¹⁷⁹ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 167-168.

¹⁸⁰ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 275-276.

left in Edirne on behalf of acting Fazıl Ahmed Paşa.¹⁸¹ Consequently, it seems that the Ottoman officials tried to find a pragmatic solution to the deputy problem when Mehmed IV was in the hunting parties around Edirne. In this sense, the division of the Ottoman state bureaucracy into many parts during the second half of the seventeenth century can be regarded as the consequence of the mobility of the court. Yet, a further research should be undertaken for understanding this disunity in a more comprehensive manner. Especially, the indecisive behaviors of Mehmed IV, when the Venetian ambassador came to his seat during the siege of Candia, explicitly reveal the disunity in the decision making process in the Ottoman administrative system, which can be observed in the correspondences made between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Mehmed IV.

III.3. Correspondences between Mehmed IV and Fazıl Ahmed Paşa during the siege of Candia

In relation with the siege of Candia, the most important work is the account of Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, who was the seal keeper of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa during this siege. Although his work, known as *The Jewels of History (Cevâhirü't-Tevarîh)*, can be categorized under the *gazavatname* genre, Hasan Ağa incorporated some other diplomatic documents, including imperial writs and correspondences made between various state officials, which distinguished it from other works to a considerable extent. The author of this narrative account has been debatable in the Ottoman historiography. While Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, Franz Babinger and Agah Sırrı Levend suggests that the author of this work was Erzurumlu Osman Dede, there is a consensus in the more recent studies that Hasan Ağa was the actual writer of this work.¹⁸² This confusion has been originated from the fact that there was another account written later on by Erzurumlu Osman Dede, known as *Tarih-i Fazıl Ahmed Paşa*. Probably, their similar contents apart from the small variations led these historians to assume that this work was written by him. In addition to Osman Dede's account, both Mehmed Raşid Efendi and Fındıklılı Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, who formed their works in the first quarter of the

¹⁸¹ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 345.

¹⁸² Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 13-17.

seventeenth century, benefited from Hasan Ağa's account to a considerable extent while narrating the last stage of the Cretan War. For that reason, in the following parts of this chapter, I mostly consult on the account of Hasan Ağa.

During the siege of Candia, Mehmed IV and Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had exchanged several *telhis* and imperial writs, all of which were recorded down to the last detail in the account of Hasan Ağa. Before going into detail of these correspondences, it would be better to mention Baer's comments on these letters. According to him, Mehmed IV was very interested in the condition of the army in the battlefield and closely followed the events occurred over the course of the siege of Candia. He also suggests that in these letters Mehmed IV "constantly humbled himself in prayer for God's assistance, confident that because his men followed the model of Muhammad they would be victorious in their efforts for Islam, the House of Osman, and God, and that the enemies of Islam and the Ottoman dynasty would be utterly frustrated."¹⁸³ In this regard, if one disregards the rhetorical features of the discourse used in these letters, which can be regarded as the typical communication process made between the sultan and the army commander aiming to give moral motivation to the combatants in the battlefield, one can erroneously assume that Mehmed IV was closely involved in the state affairs. Put differently, nearly all of the letters or imperial writs sent by Mehmed IV to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa do not signify the sultan's personal dedication to the state affairs as Baer argues. In this regard, his imperial writs during the siege of Candia do not go far beyond the rhetorical religious passages which aimed to exhort the army in the battlefield by way of praising the grand vizier. Beyond the rhetorical aspects, these letters should also be examined from the perspective of the political context because only this way Mehmed IV's personal interest towards the state affairs can be understood.

Beginning with the releasing of the Venetian ambassador who had been under arrest for nearly twelve years, all the diplomatic negotiations between the Ottomans and the Venetians had been conducted by the grand vizier himself.¹⁸⁴ Even upon the deaths of the Venetian ambassadors while the peace negotiations continued, new officials were

¹⁸³ Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 156.

¹⁸⁴ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 239.

directly sent to the grand vizier's office.¹⁸⁵ For that reason, it is difficult to see any hint in the correspondences made between the sultan and the grand vizier that Mehmed IV was engaged with the diplomatic issues. However, after Fazıl Ahmed Paşa's demand for the appointment of a new official for conducting the diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the Venetians from the Doge of Venice,¹⁸⁶ Fazıl Ahmed Paşa's authority over the diplomatic negotiations got out of his hand for a while, because this time, Venetians directly sent the envoy to the sultan. Although there is no direct reference in the account of Hasan Ağa for the question why did the Venetians decide to send their envoy to the sultan instead of the grand vizier's office as they did previously, it can be assumed that in the light of the previous futile attempts from the grand vizier's part, the Venetians might have decided to continue the negotiation process from another ground.

This point is important for our inquiry because Mehmed IV's indecisive attitude towards the siege of Candia during this negotiation puts the course of the siege at risk in the succeeding days. In order to better understand the level of concern that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa felt after he had received the imperial writ sent by Mehmed IV, the correspondences made between the grand vizier and the sultan during this period and the consecutive developments will be demonstrated in detail in the following lines.

In 7 of November 1668, Mehmed IV sent an imperial writ to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, in which he informed his grand vizier that the Venetian ambassador came close to his seat. It can be clearly inferred from this letter that Mehmed IV began to be worried about the prolongation of the siege of Candia. In that letter he anxiously asked Fazıl Ahmed Paşa how they should treat the Venetian ambassador when he would come to his seat. The following quotation from Mehmed IV's imperial writ reveals his anxiety:

“The Venetians ambassador reached to the vicinity of the Yenişehir but he did not come to my office yet. My tutor, what do you say, when the ambassador arrives, what response do we give him? If you come to believe

¹⁸⁵ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 285; “Ve işbu Şaferi'l-muzafferün ibtidâ (1 Şafer 1078/23 Ağustos 1667) günü ki, yevm-i cum'adur, ƙal'a limanından vira bayrağıyle bir ƙayıƙ bir semte yanaşub içinde olan kefere öyle haber virdi ki; hâlen Venedik'den elçimüz gelmişdür. Muƙaddemâ mürd olan elçimüz yerine şadr-ı a'zam hâzretlerine buluşmaƙ 'arz ider. Şadr-ı a'zam hâzretleri cevâb virdi ki (güzel), obürgün gelüb yalıda olan toplar yanında çıƙsun...”

¹⁸⁶ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 311-12.

that we will conquer the castle, I will want it from the ambassador. But if the siege will continue one year more, my empire will be incapable of sending soldiers, supplying munitions and other military requirements.”¹⁸⁷

We can understand from the account of Hasan Ağa that Mehmed IV’s uncertainty was taken very seriously by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. After receiving this letter, he gave a response that if the Venetian ambassador came to the court giving Candia to the Ottomans, negotiations could be made with him. But, if he came with the offers already suggested by the previous ambassadors to the grand vizier, he should be sent away. In that letter, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa also states that the reason behind the delay of the conquest of the city lies in the fact that the Ottoman soldiers were tired of fighting for a long time. However, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was very confident that they were going to conquer Candia in a short time. For that reason, the possible tribute offers presented by the ambassador should not be taken into account. More important than his official *Telhis*, he also wrote private letters to high ranked state officials, including Kaymakam Mustafa Paşa, Şeyhülislam Minkarizade Yahya Efendi, Silahdar Kız Hüseyin Ağa, Musahib vizier Mustafa Paşa and Vani Mehmed Efendi, expecting they could help influence the sultan’s opinion regarding the continuation of the siege.¹⁸⁸ The subsequent events,

¹⁸⁷ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 351; “Ve işbu mâh-ı mezbûruñ yine ibtidâsı güninde ‘azemetlü pâd-şâhımızdan hatt-ı şerîf gelüb, mazmûn-ı şerîfde bi-âmdi'llâhi Te'âlâ Yeñişehir'e dâhil olmışdur. Ve Venedik elçisi dahî Yeñişehir'e qarîb yere gelmişdür dahî rikâbuma yüz sürmedi. Benüm lalam nedersin, elçi geldükde ne cevâb virirüz. Fi'l-vâkı' eger ‘aqlıñuz çal'a fethini keserse çal'a'i elçiden isterüz ve eger bir sene dahî çal'a ile ceng olunur ise ‘asker ve cebe-hâne ve sâ'ir âlât-ı mühimmât yetiştirmege cümle memâlik-i mâhrûsem ‘âciz olmışdur. İmdi bu huşûsda bir iki kimse ile söyleşüb ve birgün evvel haberin irsâl idesin.”

¹⁸⁸ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 351-352. “Zıkr olunan hatt-ı şerîfüñ mefhûmın sadr-ı a'zam fehmi itdükde üç gün üç gice ağlayub ‘azim bî-huzûr oldu. Gelen hatt-ı şerîfüñ cevâbın üç günde müsvedde ve telhîse Qâyim-i maqâm Paşa'ya ve Müftü Efendi'ye ve Silâh-dâr Ağa'ya ve müsâhib-i şehri-yârî Vezîr Muştafâ Paşa'ya ve Şeyh Vâni Efendi'ye mektûblar yazılıb ve mefhûmlarında hâliyen Venedik elçisi gelüb rikâb-ı hümâyûna dahî henüz yüz sürmemişler. İmdi gelen elçide çal'aya müte'allık sözi var ise ne güzel, gelüb rikâb-ı hümâyûna yüz sürsün ve illâ yine yerinde otursun. Eger çal'a ahvâlin suvâl buyurılırsa Qal'a-yı Yeñi tarafından üçyüz zirâ' kadar yıkılmışdur. Ancaq mâ-beynimizde çal'aya girmek on kulaç yer çalılmışdur. Bu kadar yüz kulaç yerden bir miqlaklar ve toñuz damları ve lağımlar ve püskürmeleri geçdük ve şimdiki halde dahî on kulaç yer içerü gidilürse çal'a bizümdür. Benüm pâd-şâhum, biraz beldâr kıletli olmağile ve ‘askerde biraz yorğunluk olmağile yohsa on günlük işimiz çalılmışdur. Emmâ buña zamân demek olmaz. Lâkin küçük büyüğün sözi budur ki Hâkq Te'âlâ cümlemiziñ canını alsun tek bu çal'a keferde elinde yine çalmasın didüklerinde iştibâh yoqdur. Qal'a bir hâle varmışdur ki sâ'at besâ'at Hâkq Te'âlâdan fethin isterüz. İmdi aqçesine yâhud münâfıkların sözlerine i'timâd buyurmayub ber-ân yakın kuluñ gönderdük ki Qandiye Qal'ası ne halde çalılmışdur görsün. Elçiye hemân merd-âne cevâb buyurilsun. Ve işbu şehri-mezkûruñ beşinci günü telhîs ve mekâtib ile Qaplan Ağayollanmışdur.”

occurred after this correspondence between the sultan and the grand vizier, are more crucial for our inquiry, but before moving on this issue, it would be better to glance at the interpretation of Marc David Baer about this situation:

“The letters exchanged between the sultan and his grand vizier often referred, explicitly or implicitly, to connections among manliness, victory in battle, and propagation of the faith. This metaphor of sexual impotence is tied directly to the empire’s honor and by extension to that of the sultan. Comprehending the import of the writ, the grand vizier wept for three days and nights and became greatly distressed. It took him days to write a response. He wrote letters to all key men of state, including the sheikhulislam and Vani Mehmed Efendi, hoping they could help assuage the sultanic anger. Finally he informed the sultan that the army was fatigued but that the citadel would soon be theirs. He asked God to be on their side, to not let the citadel remain in infidel hands. Using the language of manliness, he wrote that it was necessary to give the ambassador a manly response.”¹⁸⁹

The problem in this interpretation is Baer’s incomprehensive approach that fails to handle the possible outcome of Mehmed IV’s standpoint in this letter over the state policy regarding the future of the siege of Candia. The distressed situation of the grand vizier after he took this imperial writ, on the other hand, did not originate from the fact that he was under the pressure of fulfilling the Islamic zeal on behalf of the sultan as Baer argues, but that his previous diplomatic negotiations, which had been carefully conducted for nearly two years, would have come to naught. More important than this maybe, the withdrawal from this siege after spending so much military efforts without gaining any success would have resulted a disastrous and costly attempt for the Ottomans.

After receiving the letter of grand vizier, Mehmed IV, replied to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa with an imperial writ. By informing the delegate’s offer that Venice accepted to pay an annual tribute, on condition that the Ottomans retreat from the siege of Candia, he asked the grand vizier whether he came to believe that the conquest of Candia was

¹⁸⁹ Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 157.

imminent.¹⁹⁰ In return, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa held a council with the participation of high-ranked military and administrative leaders in the island of Crete to discuss this offer. In the end, they agreed upon that it would be an inappropriate decision to relinquish from the siege because all the military efforts mobilized nearly for two years would have amounted to nothing, emphasizing that no one consented to give up Candia to Venice due to all they had suffered during this siege. The consensus among the high-ranked military and administrative leaders in the course of the siege was reported to the court in another letter written by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa.¹⁹¹

Mehmed IV, on the other hand, responded with an encouraging letter, in which he gave sanction to the continuation of the siege, stating that retreat from the siege after spending great effort would be a shameful attempt for the Islamic zeal. For that reason, he was ready to provide all the necessary equipments for the success of the Ottoman forces in the battlefield.¹⁹² Putting aside the rhetorical themes in that letter, it is safe to

¹⁹⁰ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 352. "...şadr-ı a'zam hâzretlerine tekrâr ol sa'at telhîs gönderüb mefhûmında Qandiye Qal'ası muhâşârasında olan vezîr-i a'zam ve ser-dâr-ı ekremüm Ahmed Paşa'sın. Selâm-ı selâmet-encâmumdan soñra ne hâldesin ve ne işdesiz. Hâkq Te'âlâ her işiñüzi âsân eyleye. Göreyüm seni niçe 'âkılâne hâreket (idersin) ve küffâr-ı bî-dîne gûş-mâl virmede taqayyüd-i tâm idüb anda senüñle muhâşârada olan qullarımıñ cümlesine selâm ve dü'âm biledür. Venedik elçisi gelüb bu kadar aqçe gösterüb Qandiye Qal'asından vazgeciñ deyi rikâbumda ve sâ'ir işde olan kimesnelere aqçe ve pîş-keş 'arz idüb, nedersin Qandiye Qal'ası'nuñ fetû u teshîrine 'aqluñ irüşir mi? Fi'l-vâkî' irüşürse ne güzel ve illâ bize aña göre i'lâm idesin."

¹⁹¹ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 352-53. "Şadr-ı a'zam dahî tekrâr telhîs ve âdem rikâb-ı hümayûna işbu şehr-i Recebüñ sekizinci (8 Receb 1079/12 Aralık 1668) günü gönderüb mefhûmında, 'âzametlü pâd-şâhum cümle umûr-bîn ve vüzerâ-i 'izâmuñ ve vükelâ-i kirâmuñ ve yeñiçeri ve sipâh ağaların ile ve gerek a'lâ ve gerek ednâ ile niçe kerre müşâvere ve mükâleme olinub Qandiye Qal'a(sı) küffâr-ı bî-dîn elinde qalmağa buña bir ferdüñ rızâsı olmayub bir buçuq senede olan zahmetler ve meşakqatler ve ceng ü hârb ve niçe biñ şühedâ ve niçe kere biñ kise aqçe masrafından mâ-'adâ nâmûs-ı dîn ü devlet ve huşûsâ cümleden elzem. İmdi bu kış dahî metersde cümle 'asker-i İslâm ile kışlamaq qarâr virilmişdür ve qal'anuñ iki tarafı dahî beşyüz zirâ' hâkile berâber olmuşdur ve hâlâ bir ayağımız qal'anuñ içerisinde. Hemân gelen elçi'i girü geldiği yola göndereler ve 'asker-i İslâm'a biraz 'asker imdâd ve bârut ve beldâr ve hazîneye bir gün (evvel) irsâl "ve himmet-i" hümayunları mebzûl olmak ümidindeiz. İnşâ'allâhu Te'âlâ ilk baharda lutf-ı Hâkq ile Qandiye Qal'ası'nuñ fetû u teshîri görünür."

¹⁹² Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 356-357. "Siz ki vezîr-i a'zamum ve ser-dâr-ı ekremüm Ahmed Paşa'sın. Sizi selâm-ı selâmet- bahşâ-yı pâd-şâhânem ile teşrîf ve tevķîr u ihtirâm ve mazhar-ı i'zâz ü ikrâm buyurduğumdan soñra hatt-ı hümayûnum-ı se'âdet-maqrûnum vusulinde ma'lûmuñuz olsun ki, hâlîyen vüzerâ-i 'izâm ve vükelâ-yı kirâmımuñ sen cümleden a'qal ve erşed ve a'del ve emcedi müdebbir-i kâr-dân ve dilîr-i şecâ'at-nişân olduğundan gayri me'mûr olduğun hizemat-ı dil-pezirüñle intizâm virüb, zabt u rabtlarında ve eger "merd-âne ve dilîr-âne" düşmen-i dîne göz açdırmayub muhâşâra olinan Qandiye Qal'ası'nuñ teshîrine niçe tedbir idüb gereği gibi muvâfiq "rızâ-yı" yümn-i iktizâ-yı mülûkânem ve lâ'ik-i 'ırz u nâmûs-ı saltanat-ı pâdşâhânem olmak üzre himmetler eyledüğün ecilden dü'â-i hayr-i icâzet-eşerüme nâ'il ve 'inâyet-i 'aliyye-i meymenet-perverüme mazhar olmuşsızdur. Yüzüñ aq ve nân u nemeküm saña hâlâl olsun ve

say that the exhortation letters of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa sent to the high ranked officials in the court must have influenced Mehmed IV's inclination towards the siege of Candia, because he was not only persuaded to continue the siege of Candia, but he also personally dismissed the Venetian ambassador from his seat to be imprisoned in Hanya and then to sent to Venice. However, his decision to send away the delegate of Venice was perceived by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa as an unexpected action, surprising and distressing him very much because his carefully conducted diplomatic negotiations nearly for two years would have been faced with the potential failure. This situation, in return, would have confronted Fazıl Ahmed Paşa with the only one option on the issue of Candia - to try to finalize this siege by way of military solution. The dismissal of the ambassador from the court gave Fazıl Ahmed Paşa trouble regarding the motivation of certain members of the soldiers in the front; but before moving on this issue, a further examination should be made for the division within the Ottoman court. In the following lines, by examining the correspondences made between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and the Venetian ambassador, emphasis will be put upon the disunity in the decision making process, which became more apparent after the Venetian ambassador was sent to Hanya upon the wrath of Mehmed IV.

On 18 January 1669, messenger Ahmed Çelebi reached to Crete with the news coming from the court that the ambassador was imprisoned in Hanya to be sent to

senüñle ma'an me'mûr olan vüzerâ-i 'izâm ve mîr-i mîrân ve ümerâ-i kirâm ve yeñiçeri ağası ve bölük ağaları ve zu'amâ ve erbâb-ı tîmar ve sipâh ve yeñiçeri ve sâ'ir 'umûm üzre 'asker-i İslâm kullarımuñ uğur-ı dún ü devletümde cân u başların ne vechile bezl ü fidâ idüb iki seneden berü muhâsara itdükleri Çandiye Çal'ası'nuñ teshîrine itdükleri içdâm ü ihtimâmları künhile ma'lûm-ı husrevânım olub cümlesi dü'â-i hayruma mazhar olmışlardır. Yüzleri aç ve iki cihânda ber-hurdâr olsunlar. Hizmetleri muqâbelesinde ben dahî inşâ'allâhu Te'âlâ ebvâb-ı in'âm u ihsânımı küşâde ve bî-dirîğ idüb mahallinde herbirinuñ isti'dâd u liyâkatlerine göre "ahsin kemâ ahsenallâhu ileyke" muqtezâsınca 'atiyye-i behiyye-i pâd-şâhânemle ber-murâd ve maqziyyü'l-merâm eylemem muqarrerdür. İmdi göreyüm seni, dâmen-i gayreti meyân-ı himmete bend idüb husn-i ittifâk ve kemâl-i ittihâd u fâsîk ile himmet eyleyüb teshîr-i3034 ikdâm u ihtimâm eyleyesin. Bunca sa'y-i emekden soñra terk eylemek lâ'ik-i gayret-i İslâm degildir. Lâzım olan mühimmât u âlât ve 'asâkir bu tarafdan peyder pey yetiştirilmek muqarrerdür. Hemân güzât u mücâhidîn kullarıma gayret virüb a'dâ-yı dîne mikdârın bildürmek gereksiz. Bu çal'a teshîri aqşâyı murâd-ı hümâyûnumdur. Bi-eyyi vechin kân fetî-i teshîrine bel bağlayub bu gazâ- yı nusret encâmâ ahsen-i vech ki fetî u zafer ile ahz-i intiğâmdur. İhtimâm virmege bezl ü kudret ve şarf-ı himmet eyleyesiz ve hâlâ mahz-ı 'atiyye-i celiyye-i husrevânem ve 'inâyet-i seniyye-i şâhânemdan bir şevb-i şerâ-ser çaplu semmûr-ı fâ'izu's-surûr ve bir şevb-i sâde serâ-ser ve bir çabza-i şemşîr-i 'advv-tedmîr ve bir çabza dahî muraşsa' hançer saña ihsân-ı hümâyûnum olub hâşsa muşâhiblerümden Yûsuf Ağa kulum ile göndermişümdür. Ve vüzerâ ve mîr-i mîrân ve ümerâ vesâ'ir kullarıma birer şevb hil'at gönderilmişdür. Envâ u i'zâz ve ikrâm u ta'zîm-i ihtirâm ile istikbâl idüb geyüb tahsîl-i mubâhât itdükden soñra ba'de'l-yevm ed'âf-ı muzâ'af ve diğkat ü himmet eyleyesiz göreyüm sizi ve'sselâm."

Venice.¹⁹³ While the Venetian ambassador was still a prisoner in Hanya, he sent a letter to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, asking whether he was going to be accepted by him to resume the diplomatic negotiations which had been already interrupted in the court.¹⁹⁴ After receiving the letter of ambassador, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa wanted him to clarify what was it that he did and resulted in him being dismissed from the seat of the sultan. Similarly, in order to learn the reason of the sultan's wrath, he sincerely asked him to report all the diplomatic attempts he conducted while he had been in the court. This letter also gives us an indication that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa seems to have been surprised by the imprisonment of the ambassador in Hanya because he honestly pointed out in this letter that it was a rare instance in the past years that an ambassador had been rejected. Although Fazıl Ahmed Paşa accepted his corresponding with Kaymakam Mustafa Paşa, he admitted that Kaymakam Paşa did not give details about the events in the court. Most probably, it was for this reason that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was obliged to ask the ambassador for the details of the negotiations that he had already made in the court, wondering what action had had the ambassador dismissed from the seat of the sultan.¹⁹⁵ In his response, the ambassador stated that he had done nothing to be exposed to the wrath of the sultan. He specified the fact that his accommodation for nearly one month and a half in Yenişehir where he received a kind treatment by the sultan, demonstrates his innocence.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 354-355.

¹⁹⁴ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 357.

¹⁹⁵ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 357-358. "Mektûbuñ gelüb mefhûmında herne ki yazılmış ise ma'lûmlarımız oldu. Ahvâlünü bildürmişsin ve Hânya'da qalurmıyuz yohsa ol tarafa mı varırız deyü suvâl etmişsin. 'Ażametlü pâd-şâhımız sizi redd idüb Venedik'e gönderilmek için ğadab ile fermân-ı hümâyûnları şâdır olub bu cânibe gönderilmişler idi. Rikâb-ı hümâyûnlarına recâ vü niyâz, ecdâd-ı 'ızamları zamânında elçiler redd olına gelmemişdür. 'Arz eyledüğümüzde Hânya'da hâbs olunmañuz bâbında fermân-ı 'âlileri şâdır olub 'izzetli Qâyim-i maqâm Paşa qarındâşımıza buluşduqda bilmeziz ne söz söyledüğünü ki böyle ğadab (ve) 'ıqaba mażhar olduk. 'Izzetlü Qâyimi maqâm Paşa qarındâşımız dahî anda ne yüzden cevâbıñüz olduğın bize tafşil üzere bildürmediler. Eger seni Venedik tarafından muqaddemâ İstefe'de söyleşilen uslûb üzere yine ol eski sözler ile göndermişler ise fikirsizlik etmişler. Şevketlü (ve) qudretlü pâd-şâhımız Allâh Te'âlâ'nun ihsâmı olan kuvvet ü qudret ile bu sefer-i hümâyûna hareket buyurub 'asker-i İslâm bu işün üzerinde bulunduqdan soñra muqaddem söyleşilen sözler el virmediği zâhirdür. Ve eger sen kendün mâbeyninde bir maşlahat göreyüm dirseñ bu vaqte muvâfaqat olmaz nâ-sezâ sözler ile iş biter, kıyâs eyledün ise yañılmışsın. Bu vaqtün iqtizâsı gayri yüzden bir söz ile itmâm-ı maşlahata mübâşeretdür. İmdi haqîkat üzere ahvâlünü ve me'zûn olduğun güftâr-ki tafşil üzere bu tarafa yazub bildiresün ki bu cezâyâ neden müsteħaq olduğun bizüm dahî ma'lûmımız olub, şevketlü ve 'azametlü pâdşâhımuñ rikâb-ı hümâyûnına ve eger Qâyim-i maqâm Paşa qarındâşımıza ahvâlün aña göre yazılıb 'arz u mükâtebe ola."

¹⁹⁶ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 360-361.

Here, it should be underlined that the limited historiography on the reign of Mehmed IV makes itself apparent once again in the interpretation of these correspondences. In this regard, leaving the interpretation of Marc David Baer out because of its rhetorical content, the only contemporary study which concentrated on the political aspect of these correspondences is the work of Ersin Gülsoy.¹⁹⁷ In the relevant chapter of his book, by giving references to the various narrative accounts, he meticulously recounts all the important themes of the negotiations made between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and the Venetian ambassador. Taking all these correspondences into consideration, Gülsoy reaches to the conclusion that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was well aware of the details of the negotiations made in the court. According to him, the underlying reason behind the supposed unawareness of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa regarding the ambassador's contact with the sultan lies in his attitude that does not let the ambassador know Mehmed IV's inclination to retreat from the siege of Candia. In the same vein, another intention of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa during the course of the negotiations with the ambassador, for Gülsoy, is to show that he and Mehmed IV shared the same standpoint regarding the direction of the siege, emphasizing the sultan's strong desire for the conquest of Candia.¹⁹⁸ As Gülsoy argues, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa received a number of letters, informing him about the offers presented by the ambassador. However, there is no direct reference in the first-hand Ottoman sources that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was properly informed by the court about the details of the negotiations. So, it can be clearly inferred that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa's inquiries about the details of the negotiations made in the court does not reflect his effort to give the impression that he and the court followed the same consistent policy towards Venice, but rather his unawareness about the details of the negotiations conducted in the court. It was for that reason that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa specifically asked the Venetian ambassador to report in detail why he had been dismissed from the court to be imprisoned in Hanya.

On the other hand, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa seems to have faced another important problem when the Venetian ambassador came to Crete on 18 January 1669. Although he was sent away for imprisonment upon the decree of sultan, Ottoman soldiers supposed

¹⁹⁷ Ersin Gülsoy, *Girit'in fethi ve Osmanlı idaresinin kurulması, 1645-1670*. (Istanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2004).

¹⁹⁸ Ersin Gülsoy, *Girit'in Fethi*, 176-177.

that Venice's official came to Hanya for surrendering Candia to the Ottomans.¹⁹⁹ It seems that this misunderstanding along with the uncertainty about the future of war and inconclusive diplomatic negotiations between these two states affected the motivation of a certain number of Ottoman soldiers in the battlefield. Indeed, while the negotiation between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and the Venetian ambassador were continuing in the island, the discontent among the cavalry forces came out.²⁰⁰ In 15 March 1669, two months after the Venetian ambassador came to Hanya, nearly five hundred cavalymen, who had voluntarily joined up the army for serving as the guardians after the conquest of this city, rebelled against the grand vizier on the ground that they had been not employed in fighting in the siege. Although it would be hard to say that this minor resentment in the army reflected the sentiment of the majority, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa took this uprising seriously and felt the need to inform the soldiers about the content of the negotiation in the following days, whose details were already indicated above. After the interruption of the negotiation made with the ambassador in *Katırçifiliği* on 28 March 1669, the grand vizier particularly wanted the soldiers to know that the Venetian official was sent back to Hanya due to the fact that he refused to give up Candia.²⁰¹ It can be clearly inferred from this situation that the ambiguity about the course of war arising from the disunity in the decision making process forced Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to take action against this uncertainty by informing the soldiers about the details of the negotiation.

After all, it can be concluded that the division of the Ottoman state bureaucracy into three parts (grand vizier, *İstanbul kaymakamı* and *Rikab-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı*) in the 1660s, which created complications during the siege of Candia, should have convinced some Ottoman state officials that the sultan should personally lead the campaigns in the 1660s to take action against the disunity in the state bureaucracy. Indeed, Mehmed IV's indecisive behaviors towards the Venetian ambassador during the siege of the Candia between the years of 1667-1669, as his correspondences with Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha make evident, puts the course of the siege of Candia at

¹⁹⁹ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 354-355. "...elçi-i Venedik Hânya'ya geldiği haberi geldükde, tahkik kal'a'ı virmek için "gelmişdür" žanniyle cümle 'âlem mesrûr olub şâbâha deg ordû-yı hümâyûnda olan 'asker-i İslâm bayram idüb meger elçi-i mezbûr hâbs için qarşu Hânya'ya göndermişlerdür."

²⁰⁰ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 366.

²⁰¹ Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, *Cevahirü't-Tevarih*, 367.

risk. In order not to confront such complications, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, as the army commander in the front, should have attempted to unify the state bureaucracy within a more limited ground by setting out the sultan to the campaigns in the 1670s. In this sense, it can be clearly inferred that the proximity of the sultan to the battlefield, or at least to the grand vizierate's office during the campaigns, conduced to smooth the way for centralizing the decision making process. Indeed, Mehmed IV attended all the military expeditions after the campaign of Kamanıç despite the fact that he only proceed to certain distances.

Since Mehmed IV received a *Ghazi* title prior to actually taking part in a campaign in the 1650s, his personal attendance to the campaign of Kamanıç in 1672 should be evaluated from a broader plane, not merely looking his ghazi identity. For this aim, in the following section, I will briefly touch upon to the question that how did the campaign of Kamanıç in 1672 pave the way for the remembrance of the traditions?

III.4. The campaign of Kamanıç as a means of remembrance of the traditions

The campaign of Kamanıç should be evaluated for the purpose of answering the question to what extent did the realization of Mehmed IV's Ghazi title with this campaign contribute to the legitimacy of the dynastic claim. Without putting an effort to contextualize this campaign from a broader plane, one cannot understand the way in which the Ottoman elites secured the legitimate power of the sultan. In this sense, it can be suggested that this imperial campaign, which Mehmed IV personally attended paved the way for the remembrance of the forgotten traditions. Beginning with the imperial procession held in Edirne when the Ottoman army set out a military campaign against the Podolia region in 1672, the Ottoman ruling elites began to constitute a number of devices, which can be regarded as the source of legitimacy.²⁰² Within this context, Mehmed IV's personal participation in the campaign aims to convey broader messages to the public, arranging a spectacular parade in May 1672.

²⁰² The rest of this part depends mostly on the article of Tülay Artan, see; Tülay Artan, "Royal weddings and the Grand Vezirate: Institutional and Symbolic Change in the Early Eighteenth Century" in *Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires: A Global Perspective*, ed. Duindam, Jeroen and Artan, Tülay and Kunt, Metin, (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 339-399.especially; 349-356.

The most detailed account concerning the imperial parade of Mehmed IV and other high ranking state officials for the Kamanıç campaign can be found in the diary of Antoine Galland, who was the assistant of Marquis De Nointel, the French ambassador in the Ottoman court between the years 1670-79. Interestingly enough, the details in this account are also unique among the Ottoman narrative sources through which one cannot encounter such a long account of this procession. Galland states that he had seen several processions in the Ottoman state, such as Friday ceremonies, religious festivals, and reception of ambassadors, but this parade was the most grandiose compared to previous ones.²⁰³ As a foreign observe, he narrates nearly all the interesting details from his perspective.

He gives a long description of the parade, arraying all the main parts of it. According to him, there were seven main parts, in which the lord chancellor, the minister of finance, Ibrahim Paşa, *Kaymakam* Mustafa Paşa, Musahip Mustafa Paşa, the grand vizier and the sultan respectively passed through, showing their spectacular attires to the people.²⁰⁴ The interesting thing here is that the last person who passed through this parade was the sultan himself. On the other hand, in one of the most important law codes written in the second half of the seventeenth century, that is the *Tevki'i Abdurrahman Paşa Kanun-namesi (1676)*²⁰⁵, the order is as follows: sultan, grand vizier, şeyhülislam, lord chancellor and minister of finance, chief justices, janissary commanders and other officials who were in the lower position.²⁰⁶ This change in the order of the persons who participated in the major processions is crucial for enlightening the forgotten state protocol through the decades. Indeed, it is written in the beginning of the *Tevki'i's* law code that the reason of the compilation of this work originates from the need for recording the state protocol before they are forgotten.²⁰⁷ Since the sultans had not personally participated in the military campaigns for a long time, the order of the procession in the campaign of Kamanıç seems to have been not

²⁰³ Antoine Galland, *İstanbul'a ait günlük hâtıralar*, 113.

²⁰⁴ Antoine Galland, *İstanbul'a ait günlük hâtıralar*, 113.

²⁰⁵ Tevkii Abdurrahman Paşa, *Osmanlı Devletinde Teşrifat ve Törenler – Tevki'i Abdurrahman Paşa Kanun-namesi*, ed. Sadık Müfit Bilge, (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2011).

²⁰⁶ Tevkii Abdurrahman Paşa, *Osmanlı Devletinde Teşrifat ve Törenler*, 32-37.

²⁰⁷ Tevkii Abdurrahman Paşa, *Osmanlı Devletinde Teşrifat ve Törenler*, 3.

organized according to the certain laws. That is to say, since the personal participation of the sultans to the campaigns did not ever materialize since the 1630s, it can be safely assumed that the state protocol during the imperial procession held in 1672 was not arranged according to *Kanun-ı Kadim*.

Another interesting point during this procession can be seen in the selection of the attires. Abdi Paşa in his account indicates the new turbans, which should be worn by the viziers. He recounts that the viziers shall be attired in a *Kallavi* turban instead of *Selimi*, stating that wearing a *Kallavi* turban had been the necessity of the ancient law (*Kanun-ı Kadim*), but it was forgotten a long time ago.²⁰⁸ The same protocol regulation was also registered in the book Tevki'i Abdurrahman Paşa.²⁰⁹ Such redefinition of the state protocol found more space in Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi's *Telhisü'l-Beyan fi Kavanin-i Al-i Osman* written in 1686.²¹⁰

In her article, in which one section devoted to the Ottoman state protocol after the mid-seventeenth century, Tülay Artan enlightens other elements which were used by the Ottomans as a means to convey legitimacy through various mechanisms.²¹¹ For example; the circumcision of Mehmed IV's two sons in the imperial festival organized in 1675,²¹² *Silsilename* commissioned in 1682 before the siege of Vienna²¹³ and the books of protocol already mentioned above "were basic sources or emblems of legitimacy..."²¹⁴ All of these practices implemented especially after the campaign of Kamanıçe reminds us that Ottomans felt the need to enhance the legitimacy of the dynastic claim by actualizing certain devices, which enabled them to enhance the

²⁰⁸ Abdi Paşa, *Vekayiname*, 360.

²⁰⁹ Tevkii Abdurrahman Paşa, *Osmanlı Devletinde Teşrifat ve Törenler*, 32-37.

²¹⁰ Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, *Telhisü'l-Beyân fi Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osman*, Sevim İlgürel, ed. (Ankara 1998).

²¹¹ Tülay Artan, "Royal weddings and the Grand Vizirate: institutional and symbolic change in the early eighteenth century" in *Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires: A Global Perspective*, ed. Duindam, Jeroen and Artan, Tülay and Kunt, Metin, (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 339-399.

²¹² Abdi, "The Surname of Abdi," ed. Aslı Göksel. MA Thesis, Bosphorus University (İstanbul, 1983).

²¹³ Musavvir Hüseyin. *Silsilenâme*. (Ankara: Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, 2000).

²¹⁴ Tülay Artan, "Royal weddings and the Grand Vizirate", 352.

sultanic authority and his image. Within this context, the Kammaniçe campaign was perceived by the ruling elites as an opportunity to convey the messages to the public regarding the dynastic legitimacy of the House of Osman by regarding restoring the sultan to his previous position as the military leader. Ottomans had no choice but to give the Ghazi title to Mehmed IV in the face of Abaza Hasan Paşa's political claims in 1658 because the Yanova castle had already been conquered by the grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Paşa when the mutiny of Abaza Hasan Paşa came out. Although Mehmed IV did not participate to this campaign in person, the successful military campaign led by Köprülü Mehmed Paşa enabled the ruling elite to call upon the Ghazi image of Mehmed IV, as the earlier Ottoman sultans did previously. However, since the Ghazi title of Mehmed IV materialized in concrete manner with the campaign of Kamanıçe, the ruling elites have had more alternative apparatus to implement various legitimating tools for the purpose of displaying a stronger sultanic public appearance by ordering ceremonies, rituals and regulations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In his article *Janissaries and other riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels without a cause*,²¹⁵ Cemal Kafadar provides a list of janissary uprisings in Istanbul from 1622 until its demolition in 1826. Remarkably enough, according to his list, although the preceding eight years saw four major revolts, there is no a major janissary revolt between the years 1656 and 1687, which coincides with successive incumbency of three members of the Köprülü family, namely, Mehmed Paşa, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa. How can we explain the absence of major janissary revolts in Istanbul? To what extent this phenomenon can be linked to the autocratic rule and general policy of the Köprülü family, or is there a direct link between the successive campaigns that Ottomans undertook and the absence of military revolt in Istanbul? In this connection, Ottoman historiography has a deep silence regarding what was taking place in the capital during the long sojourn of the Ottoman court. Related to this, for instance, Rıfat Ali Abou-El-Haj's account of 1703²¹⁶ rebellion narrates events since 1680s and does not go back to preceding decades. However, considering the fact that the court was in Edirne since mid 1650s, would it be a more fruitful approach to extend the analysis of 1703 rebellion in way to include pre-1680s as well in order to have a better assessment of the rebellion's origins?

Apart from the questions concerning administrative and military structure of the time, the role and function of the religious institution, especially the Şeyhülislam office, also needs attention. In this regard, the long tenures of Şeyhülislams Minkarizade Yahya Efendi (1662-1674) and Çatalcalı Ali Efendi (1674-86) seem to be one of the key points to understand the reign of Mehmed IV. Considering the relatively short tenures of the predecessors and successors of these to Şeyhülislams, the question arises as to why and how Minkarizade Yahya Efendi and Çatalcalı Ali Efendi served such long periods. The question becomes more crucial when one looks at the relatively frequent dismissals and appointments of Anadolu and Rumeli Kazaskers during the

²¹⁵ Cemal Kafadar, "*Janissaries and other riffraff*", 123.

²¹⁶ Rıfat Ali Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics*, (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1984).

period at hand. Of equal importance is the relationship between Kadızadelis and religious institution, a point which has not received enough academic attention among Ottomanists. An anecdote from *Naima Tarihi* reveals the intricate attitude of religious institution towards Kadızadelis: "...when asked why he let the Kadızadelis have so much influence, Minkarizade explained that in a time such as theirs it was good to have people like them who put fear in people's hearts and instilled obedience in them."²¹⁷ Linking Minkarizade's statements about Kadızadelis with his and his successor Çatalcalı Ali's long tenures, one wonders whether it was the turbulent atmosphere caused by the Kadızadeli movement that provided the Şeyhülislams in question with the opportunity of long term services in the office.

Another important that point needs to be mentioned regarding the second half of the seventeenth century is the relationship between center and periphery. That is to say, while examining the social, political, economic and religious dynamics of the certain groups in the Ottoman society such as, the Köprülü family, the Kadızadelis, the Ulema and Janissaries, nearly all of the current historical studies constitute their works by concentrating the power base which these groups possessed in Istanbul. Until now, there has been no comprehensive study that tried to inquire about what the ways through which these groups acquired power in the local level? To what extent, for example, can we widen the influence of the Kadızadelis movement out of Istanbul or to what extent did the Köprülü households extend through the Empire. Similarly, while the socio-political significance of the Ulema and the janissary throughout the Köprülüs period in Istanbul seems to be passive compared to preceding and subsequent years, what was the position of these groups in the provinces? It is true that some studies examines the status of these two groups in regional level, however we still need to fill the gap between the common characteristics of the groups who lived in Istanbul and the provinces and their interaction with each other through the prosopographical network analysis.

Last but not least, without elaborating the factionalism in the Palace during the second half of the seventeenth century, how can we reach an alternative reading of the Köprülü period and the reign of Mehmed IV? Since Peirce's comprehensive study

²¹⁷ Derin Terzioğlu, *Sufi and Dissident in the Ottoman Empire*, 231.

related to the Imperial Harem ends with the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa as the grand vizier in 1656 and Şenocak's study does not pay attention to the politics in the Harem after this time onwards, it is not possible to answer to the question that how the important figures in the Harem were engaged with the politics along with the other circles of power in the Empire during the rule of the Köprülü Family (1656-1683)? In this sense, to what extent did the abatement of the Black Eunuchs' role in the Harem explain the success of the Köprülü Family?²¹⁸

²¹⁸ Derviş Abdullah, "Derviş Abdullah, Risâle-i Teberdâriyye fî Ahvâl-i Darü's-sa'ade - (Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin)", ed. Pınar Saka, MA Thesis, (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2007), 77-78. In that book, Derviş Abdullah states that since Köprülü Mehmed Paşa and Fazıl Ahmed Paşa succeed in keeping the Black Eunuchs out from the state affairs, Ottoman state experienced prosperous period during their incumbency.

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