title   
  

Strategic behavior in non-atomic games

Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme (2015) Strategic behavior in non-atomic games. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 60 . pp. 134-144. ISSN 0304-4068

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of This is a RoMEO green journal -- author can archive pre-print (ie pre-refereeing)] PDF (This is a RoMEO green journal -- author can archive pre-print (ie pre-refereeing))
Barlo-Carmona-062015.pdf
Download (325kB)

Abstract

In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal choice, this study proposes a refinement of Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium. Given a non-atomic game, its perturbed game is one in which every player believes that he alone has a small, but positive, impact on the societal choice; and a distribution is a strategic equilibrium if it is a limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibrium distributions of games in which each player's belief about his impact on the societal choice goes to zero. After proving the existence of strategic equilibria, we show that all of them must be Nash. Moreover, it is displayed that in many economic applications, the set of strategic equilibria coincides with that of Nash equilibria of large finite games.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Strategic equilibrium; Games with a continuum of players; Equilibrium distributions
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mehmet Barlo
Date Deposited: 25 Dec 2015 17:52
Last Modified: 23 Aug 2019 15:22
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/28599

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item