title   
  

When manipulations are harm[less]ful?

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Dur, Umut Mert (2015) When manipulations are harm[less]ful? [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

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Abstract

We say that a mechanism is harmless if no student can ever misreport his preferences so that he does not hurt but someone else. We consider a large class of rules which includes the Boston, the agent-proposing deferred acceptance, and the school-proposing deferred acceptance mechanisms (sDA). In this large class, the sDA happens to the unique harmless mechanism. We next provide two axiomatic characterizations of the sDA. First, the sDA is the unique stable, non-bossy, and independent of irrelevant student mechanism. The last axiom is a weak variant of consistency. As harmlessness implies non bossiness, the sDA is also the unique stable, harmless, and independent of irrelevant student mechanism.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:harmful manipulation, harmless, matching, mechanism, characterization
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
ID Code:27318
Deposited By:Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Deposited On:22 Nov 2015 21:56
Last Modified:22 Nov 2015 21:56

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