THE LIBERAL ORDER IN PERIL: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ORDER WITH THE WEST AGAINST THE RISING REST

AHMET EVİN¹ WITH MEGAN GISCLON²

March 2015

¹ Senior Scholar at Istanbul Policy Center and Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Sabancı University.
² Editorial Assistant at Istanbul Policy Center.
About Istanbul Policy Center

Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) is an independent policy research institute with global outreach. Its mission is to foster academic research in social sciences and its application to policy making. IPC team is firmly committed to providing decision-makers, opinion leaders, academics, and general public with innovative and objective analyses in key domestic and foreign policy issues. IPC has expertise in a wide range of areas, including - but not exhaustive to - Turkey-EU-U.S. relations, education, climate change, current trends of political and social transformation in Turkey, as well as the impact of civil society and local governance on this metamorphosis.
As part of its Observatory Program, Istanbul Policy Center (IPC), in cooperation with the Transatlantic Academy and Columbia Global Centers, organized a second conference on the “Future of the Liberal Order.” The one-day roundtable conference took place on May 27, 2014, at Columbia University’s Reid Hall facilities in Paris. The purpose of this roundtable, like that of the preceding one, was to develop new ideas and fresh insight from a small group of international participants with a view to contributing to the ongoing debates on the shaping of a post-Western world.

Both of these conferences drew upon the work done by the Transatlantic Academy over the past two years, but they were not confined solely to the issues taken up by the Transatlantic Academy fellows. The first conference held in Istanbul on May 22-23, 2013, took as its point of departure the Transatlantic Academy’s 2013 report, Transatlantic Disconnect: Citizenship and Accountability in the Transatlantic Community. The questions that arose in that meeting have been incorporated in the conference report Considering the Future of the Liberal Order: Hope, Despair and Anticipation.

This second meeting took as its point of departure the Transatlantic Academy’s 2014 report, Liberal Order in a Post-Western World. This report acknowledged at the outset that the West’s “material and ideological hegemony” was coming to an end. However, it concluded that the West would be able to play a significant role in promoting liberal values and practices and contribute to the shaping of a rules-based world in future provided that it has the ability to recover “its political and economic strength.”

The Observatory’s Chatham House roundtable format lent itself to the tentative nature of intellectual considerations in respect to the perceived changes in the global order. One can anticipate a future world on the basis of the clues gleaned from current trends; but, how the future world might differ from ours remains a matter of intellectual speculation.

---

1 See Appendix


5 Ibid., 166.
If the West’s political and economic domination is waning, at least in comparison to that of the rising non-Western powers, what kind of a future world order can one anticipate? As the possibility of an alternative order arises, to what extent will the liberal order, promoted especially by the United States and Great Britain, remain a viable and valid source for maintaining global order? Or, in the transition from Western hegemony to emerging powers, will there be a different rules-based system developed for global governance?

The debate began with a sobering note as one scholar asserted that attempts at establishing dialogue with emerging powers had failed to take root because of the divergent interests and priorities among the emerging powers. The emerging powers on the whole rejected the “old order” and were often determined to play by their own rules. Hence, the traditional tools that have been in use in multilateral diplomacy and international relations no longer served effectively as a means for communication or mediation. New tools were needed to address the problems brought on by both current global events as well as ever-changing geopolitics. These new tools must also ensure a common understanding (not necessarily agreement) of issues between the West and the Rest.

In light of recent global developments, the future of the liberal order in both emerging countries and the West looks bleak. Events across Europe and the Middle East are of increasing concern as they demonstrate how far the world has veered away from the rules-based ideology of the liberal order. The recent European Parliamentary elections that reflect the rise of Euroskepticism and nationalism, the crisis in Ukraine, Russia’s increasing belligerence, the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, and above all, the spread of jihadist terrorism across the Levant—they have all run counterintuitive to the rationale behind the international liberal order and contributed to the increasing anxiety about the world’s uncertain future. These events, moreover, call into question whether or not it will be possible to maintain an international order that will serve as an agreed norm of reference in the same way the liberal order has served in the course of modern history. Economic and political uncertainty in the West has given rise to doubts about time-honored assumptions concerning the integrity of the nation state, its moral function, and its interactions with other nation states, international organizations and supranational institutions, civil society, and the “world community” at large.

The May 2014 European Parliamentary elections saw the rise of conservative, right wing, and Euroskeptic political parties. The particularistic, ideological rhetoric emanating from these parties is also in sharp contrast to the internationalist, rules-based outlook that characterizes the liberal order. The financial crisis that has been felt by countries around the world is still taking its toll in most European countries, including Spain and Greece. Meanwhile, tensions in Ukraine have been rising since the annexation of Crimea, and a proxy war is being fought in Eastern Ukraine between the Ukrainian army and the self-declared secessionists. Russia’s assertion of military and economic force to subdue and control its “near abroad” has been implemented with no restraints to the extent of arming irregulars with sophisticated missiles, which resulted in the loss of a civilian aircraft with its international passengers. Although Russia’s excesses in intimidating Ukraine have drawn sharp rebuke, including sanctions by the United States and the EU, the West’s response to Russian aggression has nevertheless been criticized as weak and ineffective. Russia’s ability to carry out its policies militarily and without restraint in its neighborhood points clearly to the weakness, if not the absence, of an international order at the present time.

Disorder has also spread across the Middle East, where debilitating armed conflicts mirror intense polarization along ethnic, confessional, and communitarian lines. Iraq is a vivid example of how violently centralized forces operate in a divided land. The civil war in Syria continues to rage with no likely end in sight, especially after recent elections yet again have ensured Al-Assad another term as president. The rise of international terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria and their ability to spread out and control large areas in both the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa have been unanticipated, serious developments. IS gained power from Sunni radicals, such as al-Nusra, at first inadvertently supported by the West along with other opponents of the Assad regime, and from members of Saddam’s army that was demobilized and thus driven underground by the Bush administration.
On the one hand, the West has been blamed for standing by despite human rights violations and evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria. As such, Obama’s “red line” had been crossed, and the West had failed to act in a determined fashion, charged some observers, in the face of the biggest humanitarian crisis of the twenty-first century. Yet, the West woke up to a greater humanitarian crisis as well as a bloodier upheaval caused by the IS.

On the other hand, as some observers have continued to insist, it was the authoritarian regimes that were the main cause of the region’s instability. These regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and other Gulf states, have continued to hold sway in other parts of the Middle East and have escaped virulent criticism. Meanwhile, Egypt’s military coup, with support from the West as some observers claimed, attracted much attention and condemnation of those who had pinned their hopes on the “Arab Spring” as a popular movement that would har borger democratic awakening in the MENA region. It is true that the general behind the coup, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, was elected president in May 2014 despite an extremely low voter turnout and a last-minute 24-hour extension of the elections. However, it must be asked if the Morsi government had been dedicated to democratic principles and if the Morsi regime would have steered Egypt any closer to the Western concept of pluralist order.

This past year has proved to be challenging not only for Europe and the Middle East but also for those in Turkey who were forced to reflect on the relationship between economic growth and democracy. The Gezi Protests, which brought thousands of protestors to the streets in many cities in the summer of 2013, could be interpreted as a reaction against the uneven economic growth of the country that resulted from pursuing rents from land development. Clientalistic policies of the government resulted in a real estate boom driven by companies supporting the AKP. Construction in many sites continues despite court orders to the contrary, which remains to be a source of frustration across the country.

The Gezi Protests forced Turkish society to reflect on the discrepancy between economic growth, on the one hand, and democracy and equality on the other. Turkish politics took another blow on December 17, 2013, when several cabinet ministers, officials, and the Prime Minister’s son were accused of graft allegations, and the Prime Minister himself was implicated in the scheme. A series of tape recordings was released of several ministers caught in the act, which validated long-held suspicions of corruption in the top tier of the Turkish government. In an attempt to clear his name from graft allegations, Erdoğan has managed to bypass the judicial system by reassigning prosecutors, reshuffling the judiciary, and restacking his cabinet. Throughout the crisis and since then, he has increasingly resorted to authoritarian tactics and polemical rhetoric, resulting in greater polarization in Turkey. He has used executive power over the judiciary to incriminate the Gülenists, the AKP’s erstwhile supporters, and oust them from the judiciary and bureaucracy. His uncontrolled rhetorical excesses went so far as to offend Turkey’s allies, notably the United States. Nevertheless, the AKP has been given credit both by its supporters as well as its critics for transforming the Turkish economy and achieving high growth rates, which, ironically, also resulted in the uneven distribution of resources in society. Yet, economic growth and expectations from that growth have led to the AKP’s victory in the March 2014 municipal elections, winning 43 percent of the vote. Erdoğan campaigned personally emphasizing national issues and thus turned these local elections into a referendum of personal approval.

Repeated workplace accidents in both the mining and the construction sectors reveal how little attention was paid to the safety of blue-collar workers. In May 2014, the Soma mining disaster resulted in the death of 301 miners due to neglect and failure to implement necessary security measures. The same, it was pointed out, was also true in the construction sector, where frequent workplace accidents have caused hundreds of deaths in recent years. Both cases, it was argued, reflect how much political support was given to investors, regardless of their lack of concern with safety, as a result of the AKP’s “neoliberal” policies. These cases also call into question the degree to which the AKP’s so-called neoliberal policies are consistent with the international world order. In the event, the Soma disaster did not detract from Erdoğan’s popularity; again, he won the presidential election in August with a little over 50 percent of the vote.
RECONSIDERING OUR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The West, mainly the United States and the UK, has been perceived as the main anchor of the international liberal world order for the past two hundred years. This liberal order, the one that is currently in question, consists of both democratic and economic governance built around clearly articulated rules-based norms and principles. While Great Britain was the champion of the liberal order prior to World War II, the United States took the lead after the war in an effort to spread “liberal democracy, industrial capitalism, secular nationalism, and open trade. In order to defend and expand democracy, the rule of law, and free markets, the United States and its Western allies institutionalized this liberal, multilateral order, and then worked hard to extend the reach of Western institutions once the Cold War ended.”

In light of the recent global events and their impact, the general assumptions underlying the basic framework of the liberal world order have become vague. The relation of the liberal order to democracy has been called into question as emerging countries tend to exhibit authoritarian tendencies, yet they are able to benefit economically from the rules-based liberal world order. This apparent paradox reflects how the political and economic aspects of the liberal order, once thought to be inseparable from one another, can indeed be taken and adopted separately by those countries that did not experience the development of the modern state in the same way as Western Europe did. If these two dimensions of the liberal order can be taken à la carte and adopted selectively, as for example by the so-called “illiberal” democracies, then it becomes essential to redefine and develop a new concept of the liberal order.

However, in redefining the liberal order, according to the current realities of the international system, care should be taken to avoid entrapment by received notions. Is the liberal order in danger? This central question was discussed by one participant who claimed that the so-called liberal order had never been widely and uniformly adopted, nor was it “orderly” or “liberal.” Another participant chimed in to remind the group that the Western international order itself had been hardly liberal during most of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the Transatlantic Academy’s 2014 report clearly stated that it was not correct to “envisage this emerging debate as entailing a clash between the West and the

“Rising Rest.” Glossing over the differences between nation states and defining them within two categories as “the West” and “the Rest” does not correctly reflect the dynamics of international relations today.

Classifying the West and the Rest, it was pointed out, as distinct camps was erroneous as was taking the West to be a monolithic entity. Likewise, it was an error to state that the West or Europe, for example, was in financial decline. Many countries in Europe were doing well economically, especially those beyond the Eurozone. Moreover, the striking differences between American and European normative values was another factor that belied the notion of a coherent West. European norms generally included a social market economy that restrained neoliberal excesses and higher social benefits to the citizens; but, did they also overly expand the role of the state, as some claimed, and hinder economic growth? Whether Europe, the largest trading bloc in the world, needed radical reform in order to be able to promulgate the liberal order was a question worth pursuing. Furthermore, normative differences that have arisen as a resource of new emerging powers, which have a colonial history and unique narratives of their own, have further complicated the question of whether the liberal order will survive in “the next world,” to borrow Charles Kupchan’s apt phrase.

It was suggested that the Western order rested on two pillars. The first pillar contained the “undignified” needs or the economic aspect of the Western model that embodied competition, open markets, and free trade. The second pillar referred to democracy and its values, including the rule of law and human rights. The framework suggested that there was indeed some use in distinguishing between the West and the “rise of the Rest.” While “the Rest” seemed to question the legitimacy of the democratic second pillar, the West seemed to be reassessing the relevance of the first pillar. The emerging powers had adopted and enormously benefited from open markets and free trade. Economic freedom did not seem to be in danger among emerging powers; however, the recent economic crisis, which erupted with huge political reverberations in the West, had cast doubt on the liberal order’s economic model.

---

7 Transatlantic, Liberal Order in the Post-Western World, 7.
While the West, particularly Europe, has become less convinced of the economic model it promoted in the first place, the emerging powers, as noted, have largely ignored democracy in embracing the economic pillar of its liberal order. For the West, the two pillars cannot be separated. The liberal order, the West claims, cannot survive for long without investing in both pillars. That is why liberal democracies criticize the Rest for their illiberal regimes and democratic deficit. Interdependence between the two pillars was emphasized in a succinct definition proposed: “The first pillar is output legitimacy whereas the second one is input legitimacy.”

Hence, in order to keep a society stable, there must be a balance between the two pillars. However, it was posited that the West had failed to achieve such a balance because of poor leadership. The situation in the United States was even bleaker given the gridlock in the political system, as evidenced by the October 2013 government shutdown, and the absence of bipartisan cooperation on major national issues. Ideological cooperation between Democrats (liberals) and Republicans (conservatives) often threatened to cause immobilization in the U.S. governmental system. With respect to the United States, moreover, it was posited that American culture reinforced individualism to such a great extent that it became impossible to expect voluntary restraints on the part of individuals to conform to any restrictions, even security restrictions. The NSA leaks (and the heightened security measures that resulted from those leaks) constituted but one example where unqualified support for individuals became in the final analysis a self-defeating proposition. Emphasis on security to curb individualistic excess, it was stated, had ironically resulted in American illiberalism, bringing the United States closer to the authoritarianism of the rising powers.

---

THE DECLINE OF THE WESTERN MODEL

It is often asserted that the West has been in decline, but ultimately, such assertions are vague. What needs to be clarified is what it is that is in decline. Is it the Western model itself, or is it the Western powers that are in decline? How can this envisaged decline be measured? Another question asked in this regard was what were the consequences of the steady decline of the West’s share of the global GDP. In addition, it was asked, could the ratio of military expenditure to GDP be taken as an accurate indicator of strength or decline? It was pointed out that while the United States was still spending considerable amounts on its military so also were countries such as Saudi Arabia, China, and Turkey. However, the decline of a particular power, no matter how important, ought not to be compared with the decline of the bloc or the model itself. For example, with the ratio of its military expenditures to its GDP well below that of the United States and many of the emerging countries (such as the latter three), can it be said that Germany was in decline even while it is Europe’s most powerful economy and its exports have exceeded those of China in the previous two years? Whether military spending is an accurate indicator of the decline of the liberal order in the West remains a moot point, but by all accounts, the West still remains financially stronger than the Rest. Data such as GDP and military spending are not accurate measurements of power nor can they be used for assessing the effectiveness or decline of the model itself.

In differentiating between the decline of the model and the decline of the powers, it was observed that the Western liberal model could not possibly be in decline; in fact, the United States demonstrated signs of entering a cycle of rejuvenation. Moreover, one participant further went on to argue that the liberal order, which was promulgated by the United States after World War II, was too strong to fail. However, the increasing gap between the economics of Northern and Southern Europe may point to difficulties in respect to the effectiveness of the liberal order. If the economic discrepancy between the two regions were to grow even wider, the economic principles of the liberal order would be called into question. Yet, if there was an alternative economic model to replace free market capitalism, it would have been identified during the global economic crisis. One participant stated that it was ultimately not a question of whether or not the liberal order’s economic model would ever collapse—instead it was whether or not it would be corrupted and when.

A contrary argument was that the future of the liberal order was being threatened from within. Accordingly, the greatest threat to the liberal order did not come from outside the West but rather lay in the West’s inability to practice good governance at home. This self-criticism marked a change in the West’s typical narrative, which had habitually focused on external threats to the liberal order and vilified “the rise of the Rest.” In respect to the decline of the liberal order, reference was made to the Transatlantic Academy’s 2013 report, Democratic Deficit, which asserts that Western liberal democracy as a whole is in a state of decline. In the West, this strand of argument ran, was strained, and there was disconnect between governments and their citizens on every level. High levels of political mobilization were seen to have resulted from the current democratic disconnect. Political parties, too, took their share of blame for the erosion of Western values. Even if political parties alternated at the helm in democracies, there were no meaningful changes made in policies. In other words, while there were new faces, the rules of the game did not seem to change, and in this way, there was danger that money and politics became intertwined, resulting in discouraging or dissuading citizens from participating in politics. In order to motivate people to participate in politics and thereby address democratic disconnect, it was critical to rethink the relationship between society, state, and economy.

10 Transatlantic Academy, Democratic Disconnect.
Among a variety of opinions with respect to the future of the liberal order, one dominant view is that the liberal order in the future will be less American and less liberal. In his article “Internationalism after America,” John Ikenberry has stated, “Not only is the United States’ preeminence passing away, they say, but too, is the open and rules-based international order that the country has championed since the 1940s.”

Ikenberry holds firm to the position that the essential concerns of the liberal order will remain valid; however, the West, he claims, must quickly modify the way in which the liberal order functions instructionally in order to face today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.

Others, however, are not so sanguine about the continued relevance of the liberal world order and argue instead that other powers, notably China, would present a different model (the Beijing model) and lead the way internationally. Even if China challenged the liberal order, it was observed, it nevertheless did not pose a threat to the international liberal order; it was unlikely that China would attempt to take on the U.S. role as the hegemon behind the liberal order. There was no argument, however, with respect to the reasons why China would not become a hegemon. The 2014 Transatlantic Academy’s report called for greater understanding of emerging countries in the international arena, echoing John Ikenberry’s earlier statement, “Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging states have a different set of culture, political, and economic experiences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and anti-colonial pasts.”

While these countries are relatively new to the scene, they are not necessarily faced with the same kind of problems that challenged the Western countries.

It was claimed that 2014 would be the year in which Chinese leaders would mark the end of Western tutelage over China. Although China and Europe had a long history, evidence of new prejudices against China had made Chinese leadership uneasy and suspicious, yet they were still open to having a meaningful and constructive dialogue with the West. The West, in turn, needed to be careful not to create rhetorical, cultural misunderstandings in the course of its dialogue with China; it has to be particularly cautious with the language. For instance, while most of the Western narrative is centered around the “rise” of China, most Chinese do not view China’s emerging economic and political power as a “rise” but as a “restoration” to a time when China was a prominent power in the global economy. Because of misunderstandings such as this, China reacts to what it sees as a blatant misconception of Chinese history; the West, in turn, interprets the Chinese reaction as an indicator of China’s aim to become the leading hegemon. However, this is not the case. Contrary to popular belief, it was argued that China did not see itself as ethically or morally competent to be able to take on such responsibility. Moreover, China did not see its place in the future as being insecure; it has never attempted to rule the world before, and it would be unlikely that it would try to do so now. The West needs to accommodate Eastern cultural perspectives, such as the example given, in order to respond to China meaningfully in the context of a dialogue.

China’s outlook on the world has been significantly different from that of the West. China, like several other non-Western cultures, sees the world as being segmental; processes, procedures, laws, even concepts could be considered in terms of their constituent parts, allowing for selective borrowing of, for example, the liberal order. In the Middle East as well as East Asia, didn’t modernization mean, after all, selective borrowing from Europe?

In addition, other emerging countries, such as the BRICs and now the MINTs that were able to benefit from the free market system of the liberal world order, seem to be cherry picking from among the other aspects of the liberal world order. The question then becomes the following: to what extent do these other emerging markets buy into the two pillars of the international liberal order? Are they planning to devise their own system? In response to these questions, two opposing interpretations emerged with respect to the intentions of “the Rest.” The discourse surrounding Russia’s role in Ukraine was a case in point.

One view was that Russia had indeed cherry picked from the existing world order in implementing its policies in Ukraine, and therefore, it had not completely “bought into” the values of democracy that are inherent in the second pillar. Due to the new geopolitical challenges that Russia’s interventions in Ukraine and Crimea gave rise to, it was likely that the security and energy dimensions of Europe’s reaction to
Russia would be affected. It was then the responsibility of other countries to come up with new tools in order to deal with a more convoluted multilateral relationship among a range of international protagonists. This interpretation implied that Russia’s unilateral intervention resulted in nothing more than simply a glitch in the existing world order and that the West simply needed to readjust itself in order to be able to continue its spread of democratic values. The opposite view was that there already existed an alternative world order. Russia’s impunity towards its “near abroad,” especially developments in Ukraine, pointed to the existence of a rival order to the familiar liberal order, the effects of which were already being felt. However, we have not had a chance to adequately observe this rival order to be able to discern its characteristics.
It was agreed that the tools of multilateralism that have been commonly deployed in foreign policy and international relations needed to change in order to meet the challenges posed by the new geopolitics. This required action in the following three categories: (i) addressing the economic and material decline of the West; (ii) launching a meaningful dialogue between the West and the emerging powers; and (iii) changing our preconceived notions of leadership in an international world order.

In the face of what was called the obvious material decline of the West, it was proposed to focus on economic factors, such as accelerating trade liberalization in order to be able to revitalize the Western part of the global economy, to ensure a better defense for the United States and Europe together, and to make room for emerging powers to take their place in the global share of the economy. These actions needed to be taken not only in order to prevent the West’s economic decline but also to uphold the moral appeal to the system.

In attempting to establish a dialogue to tackle the issue of using old tools to deal with new problems, the West needed to be able to identify with a narrative of its own in the first place. The fact that Europe did not have a common narrative with which it could readily identify was a permanent problem. The European narrative of peace, growth, and universal values that had been relevant for the first and second generations after the European Community was established had lost its relevance. The transatlantic narrative, too, had evaporated in the wake of the special relationship between the United States and the UK.

The importance of establishing a fresh dialogue between the West and the Rest was reemphasized. In order to avoid misunderstanding and misconceptions, there was a need to develop a common rhetoric, taking into consideration the differing cultural, social, and historical backgrounds of emerging countries. What did “civil society” mean in different cultural contexts? How differently was it perceived across cultures? In which ways did individualism and collectivism differ among various cultural contexts? Also, changes in the social structure of urbanizing societies often resulted in a mix of collectivism and individualism within the same country. It was important to understand how those notions were manifested in everyday life and how two different cultural assumptions might clash. On the other hand, an exclusive emphasis on language ought not be permitted to obfuscate important issues. The purpose of the dialogue was to reach a common understanding with a view to providing practical solutions. Establishing such a dialogue with China would be the key initiative in this regard.

Finally, our assumption that there is a single hegemon leading the international order had to be called into question. Just because the United States has acted as the leading hegemon behind the liberal world order since World War II did not mean that it will have to be replaced by another single hegemon or that we should embark on a search for a new one. The consensus was that China would not replace the United States as the guarding hegemon of the international order. Nevertheless, let the West beware: if it wants to preserve its values, it must be cognizant of the fact that a single power can no longer dominate the system but instead can only be the prevalent party.


### Observatory Conferences
- Florence, June 2001
- Florence, April 2002
- Siena, October 2003
- Florence, May 2004
- Barcelona, June 2004
- Madrid, May 2005
- Istanbul, May 2006
- Barcelona, January 2007
- Athens, March 2007
- Istanbul, June 2007
- Lisbon, November 2007
- Berlin, December 2008
- Istanbul, April 2009 (with IE Med)
- Istanbul, June 2010 (with Transatlantic Academy)
- Istanbul, May 2012 (with IPC-Kronberg Talks)
- Istanbul, May 2013 (with Transatlantic Academy)
- Paris, May 2014 (with Transatlantic Academy and Columbia Global Center)

### Euro-Turkish Dialogue Conferences
- Hamburg, November 1995
- Venice, March 1996
- Lyon, June 1998
- Edinburgh, May 1999
- Brussels, October 1999
- Stockholm, June 2001
- Stockholm, November 2002