Epsilon-ex post implementation

Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkıran, Aygün Nuh (2014) Epsilon-ex post implementation. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

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Official URL: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355


We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for epsilon--ex post implementation. Our analysis extends Bergemann and Morris (2008) to allow for epsilon-bounded rationality. Yet our necessity condition, epsilon-ex post monotonicity, and Bergemann and Morris (2008)'s necessity condition, ex post monotonicity, are not nested. Epsilon ex post implementation adds another dimension of robustness to ex post implementation in terms of bounded rationality.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:Maskin-monotonicity; Implementation; Epsilon-Nash equilibrium; Limited veto power
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:25736
Deposited By:Mehmet Barlo
Deposited On:06 Dec 2014 20:35
Last Modified:06 Dec 2014 20:35

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