FROM OTTOMAN IMPERIAL WORLDVIEW
TO TURKISH NATIONAL OUTLOOK: THE LATE
OTTOMAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

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To B.T. and for a lovely and most precious friendship
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ABSTRACT

FROM OTTOMAN IMPERIAL WORLDVIEW TO TURKISH NATIONAL OUTLOOK: THE LATE OTTOMAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Doğan Gürpınar

Ph.d. in History

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak

19th Century Ottoman Empire, Diplomatic History, Bureaucracy, Nationalism, Elite Formation

This study investigates the cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations of the Ottoman diplomatic service in the late Ottoman Empire with an emphasis on the Hamidian era. The study attempts to describe the basic contours and premises of the culture of the late Ottoman bureaucracy as well as the social origins of the late Ottoman state elite by examining the diplomatic service as a microcosm of the late Ottoman bureaucratic elite. Examining the dispatches sent from the Ottoman legations abroad as well as the memoirs and books written by diplomats, the study attempts to overview the concerns and dispositions of the diplomats. The study also aims to highlight the prominent role the late Ottoman bureaucratic establishment played in the development of the modern Turkish national identity and Turkish nationalism, as well as the ideological premises of the republic.
ÖZET

OSMANLI EMPERYAL DÜNYAGÖRÜŞİNDEN TÜRK ÇEHRESİNE :
GEÇ DÖNEM OSMANLI HARİCİYESİ

Doğan Gürpinar

Tarih doktorası

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak

19. yy. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Diplomatik Tarih, Bürokrasi, Milliyetçilik, Elit Oluşumları

Bu çalışma Abdülhamid dönemine yoğunlaşarak, geç dönem Osmanlı hariciyesinin kültürel, entelektüel ve ideolojik donanımlarını incelemektedir. Çalışma, Osmanlı hariciyesini Osmanlı bürokratik elitinin küçük bir örneklemi olarak ele alarak, geç Osmanlı bürokratik kültürünün niteliklerini ve bu elitinin sosyal kökenlerini tanımlamaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışma yurtdışı Osmanlı temsilciliklerinden yapılan yazışmalara ve diplomatlarca yazılmış hatırat ve kitaplara dayanarak diplomatların temel kaygı ve duyarlılıklarını ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışma, aynı zamanda Osmanlı bürokratik elitin Türk ulusal kimliğinin, milliyetçiliğinin ve cumhuriyetin ideolojik dayanaklarının oluşumundaki kayda değer rolünü ortaya sermeyi amaçlamaktadır.
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Onur Öymen, November 2009
INTRODUCTION

This study is a modest attempt to examine the mental structures of the late Ottoman bureaucracy. It examines the intellectual/cultural/ideological formations of the Hamidian diplomatic service. The diplomatic service is selected as representative of the late Ottoman bureaucracy since it reflected the distinctive habitus and culture of the late Ottoman bureaucracy at its best with its elitist and exclusivist character. Although one of the motivations of the dissertation is to show the significance and extent of the ideological and cultural formations of the diplomatic service (and the entire Ottoman political establishment beginning with Abdülhamid himself) in the formulation of foreign policy orientations, the primary aim of this study is to investigate the emergence of a bureaucratic nationalism wielded around the Empire and to expose the imperial origins of Turkish Republican nationalism. Arguing that the Hamidian (as well as the Tanzimat) bureaucratic establishment was constitutive in the making of Turkish nationalism, I attempt to demonstrate that the Turkish nation was imagined and formulated by a certain state elite which defined the Turkish nation in its relation to the state, which claimed to represent the nation in itself. This Turkish nation was defined in a subservient relation to the eternal and transcendent state and the idea of the Empire. However, the same state was simultaneously intimitized by the state elite, given that the state was imagined and constructed with reference to a certain habitus, identity, and culture espoused by this elite. The study especially emphasizes that the state was not perceived as transcendent, but on the contrary familiarized by the Turkish state elite. The particular concerns of this state elite were projected to the imagined “Turkish nation”. I also elaborate on the continuities of the perceptions of the institutional culture of the Ottoman Foreign Office and its legacy in the Republican Foreign Office. Evidently, most of its peculiarities and its distinct social culturalization were retained and reproduced in the transition to the republic and persisted throughout the republic. Therefore, a cultural and ideological continuity may be observed from the late Ottoman bureaucratic establishment to the Republican bureaucracy.

This study will not develop a discursive analysis. It will be an inquiry into a certain mindset which was constitutive of Turkish modernity, the modern and secular Turkish state, and the Turkish national imagination. This study will not discuss the intellectual
formations of the late Ottoman elite in a vacuum but contextualize and situate its mental structure within a particular milieu in which the Empire was in retreat, and the challenge created by modernity, the imperialist powers, and non-Muslim groups could not be met. In a sense, this study will try to trace the progress of some of the prominent “unit ideas” and “unit concepts” as historians of Begriffsgeschichte applied to the fundamental concepts of European modernity. Although, this study lacks the meticulousness and depth of Begriffsgeschichte, it aims to be a modest preliminary to a full study of the development of concepts constitutive of the modern Turkish political and national discourse. It attempts to show the intertwined character of the notions of the nation, modernity, and the state, especially in the imaginary of the Ottoman/Turkish elite. Furthermore, it will point out how the concept of the Turkish nation was constructed in the imagination of a particular elite deriving from an imperial vantage point. It tries to demonstrate that the particular concerns of the political (and therefore national) elite stimulated the constitution of a national imagination so that particular self-attributes (or “cultural intimacy” to use the term of Michael Herzfeld) of this particular elite were “nationalized” and consecrated as “national characteristics”. In this dissertation, it will be argued that, many of the Turkish “lieux de mémoire” were already formulated and espoused by the imperial ancien régime before


2 “Cultural intimacy” is defined by Michael Herzfeld as “the recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality, the familiarity with the bases of power that may at one moment assure the disenfranchised a degree of creative irreverence and at the next moment reinforce the effectiveness of intimidation.” Herzfeld, Michael, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State, London; New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 3.
their perfection in the early Republic, albeit some in a modified version. It will also emphasize the institutional and cultural continuities of the bureaucratic and political elites without underestimating the breaks, modifications, adaptations, and ruptures. This continuity from the pre-Tanzimat elite to the republican elite can be seen both in terms of its perceptions and genealogy. In short, this study attempts to expose some facets of an intellectual collective biography of the late Ottoman diplomatic service with a particular emphasis on the Hamidian diplomatic service embedded in a distinctive culture and habitus.

In many aspects, this study leans on the revisionist historiography of the late Ottoman Empire that challenged conventional assumptions and modernist paradigms. A long summary of the revisionist historiography of the late Ottoman Empire will not be presented here. The modernist paradigm that reigned in the late Ottoman scholarship was challenged and discredited by a new generation of Ottomanists who were in close contact with the paradigms and methodologies of the European historiography by the 1980s and approaching the late Ottoman Empire in a comparative perspective. The new generation of historians who challenged the paradigms and visions of the pioneers of the late Ottoman scholarship came from a different intellectual formation. They learned to be more critical of the alleged achievements of modernity and were skeptical of the extent of the transformative impact of 19th century modernity. Following the European historians who demonstrated the impact of the early modern age on the 19th century transformation and exposed the “early modern origins of modernity”, Ottoman scholars demonstrated the pre-Tanzimat origins of the Tanzimat. One of the latest interests in Ottoman historiography is the “roads to modernity” of the post-classical Ottoman Empire. This period is no more regarded as decline and degeneration. Instead, the 17th and the 18th centuries are studied

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as the foundational periods of the modern bureaucratized Ottoman/Turkish state.\(^5\) The new paradigm that reinterprets modernity not as a complete rupture exported from abroad, but as a continuous process fuelled by indigenous dynamics further questions the agency of the state (and especially the Tanzimat state) in the reception and production of modernity. Beginning from the *avant garde* study of Abou-Al-Haj, Ottomanists such as Linda Darling, Ariel Salzmann, Butrus Abu Manneh, and Beshara Doumani demonstrated the long history and multiple sources of an indigenous modernity in the Ottoman lands and the Middle East. These historians were also uninterested in grand theories and Gordian-knot concepts. The Arab historian Beshara Doumani wrote:

“(w)hen it comes to the modern period, this discourse has been dominated by a single overarching narrative: the piecemeal incorporation or integration of the Ottoman Empire into the European economical and political orbits. This narrative is a central one because it deals directly with the problems of capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism...in discussions of these key issues the Ottoman Empire was, until fairly recently, usually portrayed as a stagnant, peripheral, and passive spectator in the process of integration. The decline thesis, as it has come to be called, has been persuasively challenged since the early 1970s, but the very thrust of the integration narrative, regardless of the theoretical approach used, tends to relegate the interior regions of the Ottoman Empire...to the status of a periphery’s periphery.”

The new generation of scholars was also critical of the self-righteousness of modernity and the modern state. Influenced by the post-World War II critical scholarship on modernity, they did not cherish the emergence of modernity in the Middle East. On the contrary, they were prone to expose the mechanisms of violence and surveillance new modern states imposed under the cover of progress and development.

Other historians rejected dualities, such as secularism versus Islam, Republic versus Empire, and reaction versus progress, and portrayed the late Ottoman Empire in its complexity and multidimensionality. Studies such as Selim Deringil’s “The Well-Protected Domains” and Ussame Makdisi’s work on Ottoman Orientalism exposed the rich mental

\(^5\) For the earliest effort to interpret these two centuries as the emergence of the modern state, see Abou-Al-Haj, Rifat, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century*, New York: SUNY Press, 1991. Also see Salzmann, Ariel, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State*, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2004


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worlds of the late Ottoman identity, representations, and possibilities. Şükrü Hanioğlu’s evaluation of the Young Turks in exile exposed the ambivalent and syncretic nature of their mental formations and portrayed them in their complexity and in their contradictions. Many other works scrutinized the ideological and intellectual formations of the late Ottoman men of prominence. Dispositions such as Turkism, Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, modernism, and traditionalism were no longer taken as mutually exclusive categories and diametrical opposites. The new generation of late Ottoman scholarship demonstrated how different dispositions coexisted and complemented each other and overlapped. In that regard, they also established the institutional, structural, ideological, and cultural continuities from the Empire to the Republic, partially influenced by the genre of “persistence of the old regime” in the scholarship of modern European history. It was also established that Turkish nationalism did not emerge after the 1908 Revolution as a break from the ancien régime, but that its seeds, various manifestations in various disguises, were already observable much earlier.

Apparently, these new approaches were inspired and even exported from the changing paradigms of Western historiography and the social sciences. New intellectual history, Foucauldianism, cultural turn, poststructuralism, and postmodernism were all sources of inspiration.

In every decade, academia subscribes to some magical formulas and terms as revelations. The “magical term” of the 1950s and 1960s in the heyday of optimism and self-confidence in the modern West, was “modernization”. Besides books such as Berkes’ The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Weiker’s study of Turkish modernization and the book on the beginnings of modernization in the Middle East edited by Polk and

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Chambers\textsuperscript{10}, which all examined the modernization process in its totality, other classical studies scrutinized particular aspects of modernization within the modernization paradigm, such as the studies of Kazamias\textsuperscript{11}, Robertson\textsuperscript{12}, Frey\textsuperscript{13}, Magnaraella\textsuperscript{14}, Szyliowicz\textsuperscript{15}, and Ross\textsuperscript{16}. With the failure of developmentalism and the developmental state, this paradigm had been abandoned. Governmentality replaced modernization.\textsuperscript{17} The postmodern


\textsuperscript{11} Kazamias, Andreas, \textit{Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey}, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966


\textsuperscript{13} Frey, Frederick W, \textit{The Turkish Political Elite}, Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1965


\textsuperscript{17} For the Foucauldian notion of governmentality, see, Graham Burchell & Colin Gordon & Peter Miller (ed.), \textit{The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality}, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. The Foucauldian narrative of the emergence of the modern art of government in his lecture on governmentality that follows is quoted in Rabinow, Paul (ed.), \textit{Michel Foucault}, New York: The New Press, 1997, vol. III: “(I)n the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, the art of government finds its first form of crystallization, organized around the theme of reason of state, understood not in the negative and pejorative sense....but in a full and positive sense: the state is governed according to rational principles that are intrinsic to it and cannot be derived solely from natural or divine laws or the principles of wisdom and prudence....The state, like nature, has its own proper form of rationality, albeit of a different sort. Conversely, the art of government, instead of seeking to found itself in transcendental rules, a cosmological model, or a philosophical-moral ideal, must find the principles of rationality in that which constitutes the specific reality of the state.” (p.212-13) He discusses the redefinition of the meaning and reason of the state with the modern age and the emergence of governmentality as follows: “(P)opulation comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health and so on; and the means the government will act either directly, through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly...the population now represents
condition had contrived the word “discourse” to replace the mystical powers of the now abandoned term “modernization”. Now, “the long 19th century” Ottoman history was constructed along a “discourse”. The policies and reforms of the 19th century Ottoman state were no longer seen as efforts of modernization and Westernization, but as strategies of governmentality. The population censuses, the temettuat registers, the introduction of quarantine, the regulating of public health, the organization of modern education, and cartography were manifestations of the concern of the Ottoman state to measure and regiment its subjects and the land.\(^\text{18}\)

Accordingly, this process was the emanation and fulfillment of an overarching discourse. The term “discourse”, as refashioned and formulated by Foucault, had tacit, evil connotations. For Foucault, discourse was there to dominate, control, and subdue the masses. Thus, the 19th century was no longer the “good century” of the modernization school. Instead, it was now the mother of all evils, namely nationalism, excessive rationalism, modernism, intolerance, \textit{et cetera}. The benevolent state of the 1960s turned out to be intrinsically malicious. Ehud Toledano concluded his book on the demise of slavery in the late 19th century as follows: “In recent years the trend has been to portray states and empires in the long nineteenth century as the ever-centralizing, oppressing tool of the elites. Contrary to that, the case of Ottoman enslavement provides here sufficient evidence to argue that the state’s growing interference in the slaver-enslaved relationship in fact benefited and protected the weaker partner in the relationship. The Tanzimat-state, I have tried to show, increasingly abandons its traditional support of the slavers’ ownership rights and gradually began to favor manumission claims put forth by the enslaved.”\(^\text{19}\) Of course, a fervent Foucauldian would argue that the state’s benevolence towards the subaltern was a new strategy to include the previously non-included larger populace within the political and social community to be able to control, govern, and discipline them. This

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is what Patrick Joyce called the “rule of liberalism.” For Joyce and many others, the abolishment of slavery and all other unnatural statuses are contrary to the logic of market and liberalism, the very ideological tool of the 19th century surveillance menace, and therefore have to be eradicated for market and liberalism to rule. Thus, according to them, the leniency on behalf of the state is yet another manifestation of Foucauldian pastoral power.

Also influenced by the rise of the new statism developed by historians such as Skocpol and Tilly, many new studies had taken the “Foucauldian turn”. These new works and dissertations tried to discover and “unveil” the draconian encroachment of the state over society, over the public and the private. Various articulations and manifestations of the making of the centralized Ottoman/Turkish state were examined, such as the establishment of the modern police, army, social institutions, and the social state. In Foucauldian jargon, modernity was identified with the insatiable assault and the subsequent victory of


22 For Foucault, “pastoral power” which the early modern state derived from the Catholic Church is “concerned with the salvation of everyone in ‘the flock’ on an individual level, requiring, ideally, a thorough knowledge of the subject’s ‘soul’ and officials who could monitor and account for each and every individual. It (is) an individualizing power in that is sought, through supervision, to structure the life of the individual, both through confessional technologies and techniques of self mastery.” Introduction: Moss, Jeremy, “The Later Foucault”, in Moss, Jeremy (ed.), *The Late Foucault Reader*, London; Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998, pp.2-3.


the beast called “the state”, which was not a free agent but itself a prisoner and executioner of the pervasive discourse of encroaching modernity.\textsuperscript{25}

This study is in agreement with the general premises of the Foucauldian movement. It holds that the Foucauldian movement catches the fundamental psyche of modernity very accurately. However, I believe that the Foucauldian movement is too simplistic and derives from a reactive moralism and resentment against the “winners of modernity”.

It is a question how reasonable and accurate it is to explain the complexity of the rise of the 19th century modern state with only one single overarching concept. Similarly, the papers gathered in “Osmanlı’da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza” (Order, Crime and Punishment in the Ottoman Empire) also advances a critical approach to the “Foucauldian effect” on Ottoman studies.\textsuperscript{26} These papers pointed out the simplistic and reductionist tendencies of adapting Foucault to the 19th century Ottoman trajectory. The modernization and centralization processes were not intended conspiracies perpetrated by the elites but were complex processes not to be explicable within one single overarching narrative. Likewise, as the papers in this collection demonstrate, it is inadequate to interpret the making of the Ottoman police and reform of the prisons as simply a cunning fabrication of the modern state.\textsuperscript{27} Many different dynamics and concerns played an equal role in the reorganization and reconceptualization of the state, society, and the self in the 19th century.

This study sees the thrust of the 19th century transformation in the shifting structures of mentalities of the Ottoman elite. Nationalism and modernism derived from the concerns,

\textsuperscript{25} For the rise and domination of this new discourse, see Foucault, Michel, \textit{The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences}, New York: Vintage Books, 1973.


\textsuperscript{27} Along the same lines, Bruce F. Adams in his study on Russian prison reform criticizes the Marxist and other schools of historical interpretation (and especially the historiography of 19th century Russia) that explain the course of history based on interest seeking and based on materialist assumptions. He underlines the reformist zeal in the Russian governing and elite circles regarding prisons. He concludes “(a)truism and the desire of people to make the world conform to their ideals have been powerful forces in history.” Probably, Toledano would agree with this statement. Adams, Bruce F. \textit{The Politics of Punishment: Prison Reform in Russia 1863-1917}, De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996, p. 197.
perceptions, and politics of the elite. This does not mean that these concerns and perceptions were merely fantasies and belonged to the realm of ideas. On the contrary, these concerns and dispositions were embedded within a certain material conjuncture and products of a certain social and political context as Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock, Koselleck, and others have demonstrated for the transformations of the European mental structures and perceptions.

The elite as a concept had not been examined as a specific and prominent formative component of Turkish modernity beyond the pioneering studies of Frey\(^\text{28}\) and works of scholars such as Roderick Davison, Şerif Mardin, and Metin Heper. The concept of the elite and its structural qualities were not analyzed within a structural framework. The reductionist paradigm of the duality of center and periphery was preserved; this paradigm treats this duality as specific to the Ottoman/Turkish pattern and sees it as an “aberration”. This duality fails to answer several questions regarding the emergence and development of Turkish modernity. For example, why did the republican secular elite whom we may call “Kemalists” assume the national leadership position and how did they retain this position long after the transition to multi-party democracy? From where did it derive its legitimacy? What were the structural reasons that enabled a “superwesternized” elite to assume the position of “national leadership” in most of the late modernizing, “non-western” nations in formation and to be able to speak “in the name of the nation”? Kemalists in Turkey, the Congress Party in India, Muslim League in the future Pakistan, and Ba’athists in the Arab world are manifestations of the same structural pattern\(^\text{29}\). Why is it that the national leadership was always taken over by a modernizing/westernized and supersecular elite? What are the structural bases of this recurring pattern? These questions need answers that go beyond the paradigm of the dichotomy of center-periphery which treats this dichotomy as a “mistake” rather than a particular sociological and political pattern.

The question of why the 19th century non-western elites replicated the western model seems to be very obvious and straightforward at first glance, but in fact it is a very complex

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question. If we acknowledge that “westernization” and “modernization” are the *sine qua non* of the non-western 19th century elites, it means that westernization is not an autonomous process but a dependent variable of the politics and economies of elites and states. Then, westernization/modernization constitutes no historical/social category by itself. We have to assume that westernization is not a cultural category but a social/political one. Westernization and modernization are functions of the relationships of class and social structures. They are explicable within a socio-economical structure.

The nuances and modifications of the manifestations of westernization are to be varied in different geographies, but not westernization itself. Westernization emerges and develops as an imperative rather than a choice or an option. It is important to emphasize this dimension because Turkish sociology and political science literature takes it for granted that there is a dichotomy between the westernized elite and the traditional folk whether it be called center and periphery or otherwise and treats it as a conspicuous phenomenon. We may even speak of the “westernization of west” with reference to the path breaking works of Norbert Elias, Eugen Weber, and Marc Rauff where it has been demonstrated that the traditional “folkways” were classified as barbarism and uncivilized and were effectively obliterated or transformed beginning in early modern Europe. This discourse is endorsed with equal vigor at the same time by both the Kemalist left and the Turkish right as the alleged dichotomy serves to enhance the self-images and righteousness of both parties, the first representing the courageous enlightened few against the ignorant

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30 Mardin, Şerif, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics ?”, *Daedalus*, 102-1 (1973) pp. 169-190. İdris Küçükömer’s classic book, which preceded Mardin’s article by two years, should also be considered as a complement to this article with its sweeping impact on Turkish intellectual thought and academia although it sometimes has the negative effect of simplifying the course of Turkish history and Turkish social dynamics. Küçükömer, İdris, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1969. Whereas Mardin’s periphery is the populace untouched by the reformism of the center, Mardin’s center is state, and therefore the center-periphery clash is not between two compatible foes. Mardin’s tension is between the state and its unruly subjects, and therefore it is wrong to develop this scheme along a cultural rift. Also see, Heper, Metin, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, Beverley, North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1985.

masses, the later representing the *vox populi* against the illegitimate usurpers. If we assume westernization as a non-category, then we have to redefine the course of late Ottoman/Turkish history within a social/economical framework after redefining the “cultural” dynamics as historical and structural categories embedded within their social context.³²

States are not only class-based entities, but they are also inventors of values as well as bearers of values. The modern state, by its nature of being “modern” is a generator and promoter of certain values compatible with its vision of governance.³³ For example, one of the most indispensable and prominent values the modern state generates is its secularity. A modern state should be secular not only for reasons of state but also to fulfill its obligations towards its subjects, which it professes to uphold. Therefore, the state renounces any alternative source of power that may hinder its ability to espouse its legitimacy over its subjects. In that regard, secularism derives from such a structural concern and is an imperative. It is less a cultural category than a structural necessity. Secularism is not an option but a corollary of the modern state and nation-state. The legal understandings of religion and modern nation-states are wide apart. Whereas the religions prioritized the regulation of relations between the community as a whole and the individuals within this community, the modern nation-states acknowledge only relations established between the state and the individuals and deny the legitimacy of any intermediaries. Only individuals exist and not communities. We may argue that, modernity is the renunciation of communalism in favor of a nation-state universalism in which the state is able to monopolize the regulation of relations between individual citizens and the relations between the individual citizens and itself. Apparently, the modern states generated and disseminated values *ex nihilo*, values which were evidently not derived from social sources and do not need to be. What is called westernization is in fact the practice of the emerging modern/rational states. The supposedly-westernized elites became the executor of this

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practice not only in the 19th century Ottoman Empire but also in other states including Eastern European ones. This elite’s foremost quality is to acquire the necessary skills to manage and lead this process thanks to the process which is rightfully dubbed as “westernization” (and modernization).

This interpretation makes the paradox of nationalism more elucidative. After all, a nation is created in the image of the elites (and the rising new intellectuals). By nation, a nationalist does not understand “the ethnic community which he feels to belong to” but something more subtle. Nation is an idol which he adores and adheres to. It is not a coincidence that many of the nationalist intelligentsias developed anti-populist discourses, especially in the Third World, and despised the commoners unlike nationalist intelligentsias such as the Russian Panslavists who were “going to the people” in late 19th century czarist Russia and glorifying the people.34 Indeed, it is the sacred mission of the nationalist intelligentsia to educate, civilize, and rear the people so that the “nation” will be saved from obscurantism, ignorance, and the threat of national demise. Thus, the scorning of the people may be seen as an indispensable trait of the nationalist intelligentsia. It is an intrinsic attribute of its missionary zeal. This attitude is visible throughout the history of Turkish nationalism from the first generation of nationalists (and most explicitly in Ömer Seyfeddin35) to the early 21st century neo-nationalists. It may be argued that this is because in the minds of the nationalist intelligentsia the nation they sympathize with is not the present-day nation but the “future-nation” designed and appropriated by the modernist visions of the intelligentsia. It is the prospective “ideal nation” that will be created after the overcoming of backwardness they feel attached to. Because such an ideal “really existing nation” does not exist, it is only the image (or mirage) of the nation they adore and praise. In fact, in the image of the nation, the nationalist intelligentsia sees its own values and reference system. The fiction of the nation is thus appropriated from the prism of the self-attributes of the elite and serves to disseminate the traits of the culture and habitus of a certain cultural community in the disguise of “national traits”.

35 For example, the short stories of Ömer Seyfeddin, such as “Tuhaf Bir Zulüm”, Humiliate Turks for their backwardness, ignorance, and stupidity. See Ömer Seyfeddin, Yüksel Ökçeler, Ankara: Bilgi Yaynevi, 1973.
The nation is an idea before it becomes a reality. Even when it becomes a reality as a result of communication, education, and the practices of everyday, it still remains an idea. However, this “idea” continues to shape and reshape the material world.

Moreover, the emergence and development of a “national idea” cannot be dissociated from the encroachment of modernity. We may observe that nation-making and modernism go hand in hand. Furthermore, they are not only complementary processes but may be seen as consequences/manifestations of the same phenomenon. Actually, they are not hand in hand, but are actually different sides of the same coin. One obliges the other.

Here, the question of which one of these manifestations precedes the other may be raised. Here, I would argue for the precedence of modernism over nationalism. According to this suggestion, nationalism becomes a corollary of modernism. This does not mean that, a la Marx, nationalism and other developments should be regarded as epiphenomena and consequences of modernity. On the contrary, the establishment of nations and their espousal is an indispensable and preeminent element of the formation of modern states and modernity. Following the transformation of the state and subsequently the populace from which the state derives its legitimacy, a certain imagination is to be generated compatible with the transforming perceptions of the world, society, and the self. Subsequently, this new imagination acquired its own reality. Disentangling the “concept of nationalism” from a label referring to ethnicity and reconceptualizing it as an expression of a collective self-identity constituted within a process of social and economic transformation and as a response to the challenges posed by these developments will let us frame it within the process of the formation of modernity (and early modernity). 36

The new intellectual historians criticized conventional intellectual history for being interested only in what the authors wrote and not paying attention to the social/political

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milieus in which ideas developed and concepts emerged, matured, and died out.37 Moreover, they questioned the reliability of taking only some eminent authors (some became famous only after their death) to portray the structure of the mentalities of the time. Likewise, the new cultural historians rejected the conventional understanding of “culture”. They arrived at a “thick description” of culture in which culture was perceived as being constituted within a particular social, economic, and political background and milieu, and also as a reflection of the social, material, and political background in which they flourish.

This study was inspired by the impressive studies of new intellectual historians, new cultural historians,38 and historical anthropologists who probed into early modern and modern European history, as well as political anthropologists such as Michael Herzfeld.39 It attempts to emphasize the prominence of ideas and concepts which acquire an objective existence for themselves once they are constructed in the mind. Rejecting a duality of


“objective existence” and “subjective existence”, this study treats the intellectual/cultural/ideological formations as shaped by the social and political background they inherit and the social, economic, and political structures in which they were born. It also argues that structures of mentalities have the power and capacity to shape the supposedly “objective” political, social, and economic dynamics. This relation is evidently double-track. They complement and mutually constitute each other simultaneously. Thus, the emergence of a “nationhood” and a secularized outlook were at the center of the making of the “Turkish modern” and were consequences of reflexes given in the context of a retreating and threatened empire. In short, this study is more of an essay of historical anthropology rather than a work of history proper focusing on the making of a certain structure of mentality that establishes the “Turkish nationhood” and “Turkish modern”.

The first chapter of the study is an overview of the 19th century transformations of the Ottoman structures of mentalities and the configuration of the state elite. This chapter also aims to construct a theoretical framework for the emergence and development of a “nationalized” imperial elite. The second chapter is an overview of the mental and ideological formations of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucracy. The third chapter attempts to discuss how modernity and “modern knowledge” triggered a new configuration within the state elite and how the bureaucracy, enjoying the monopoly over access and employment of the “modern knowledge”, took over the state and controlled it before its power was restrained in the Hamidian era. This chapter also attempts to show how the dynamics of international politics and foreign policy had an impact on political developments.

After the first three chapters which deal with the Tanzimat and Hamidian bureaucracy as a whole, given that different governmental offices are hardly distinguishable from each other, the next chapters particularly focus on the late Ottoman diplomatic service with a specific emphasis on the Hamidian diplomatic service. The fourth chapter attempts to draw the main social characteristics of the Ottoman diplomatic service. As can be observed, the social backgrounds of the diplomats are conspicuously similar. They were predominantly born in Istanbul as the sons of (some low-ranking and some others high-ranking) officials and thus share a certain habitus welded around the state. Although, the 19th century
Ottoman bureaucracy shares a common culture, the Ottoman diplomatic service is the one with the most elitist background (not unlike the European diplomatic services). This is not to say that all the diplomats came from illustrious families with aristocratic backgrounds. On the contrary, the chapter shows that the diplomatic service recruited from various layers of the Ottoman bureaucratic cast and thus constitutes a microcosm of the late Ottoman bureaucracy, albeit considerably more aristocratic one.

The fifth chapter focuses on the routine of the diplomatic service. This chapter examines how a certain structure of mentality may be molded from the routine of the Ottoman diplomatic service. The concerns of the diplomatic correspondence draw the outlines of a structure of mentality. The sixth chapter investigates the “great transformation” of the ideological/mental/cultural formations of the Ottoman diplomatic service. This chapter argues that the third generation of the Tanzimat exhibits certain traits significantly different from the first and second generations of the Tanzimat. With the third generation, a conservative modernization was abandoned in favor of a radical modernization. The third generation was radical in many regards. This generation was radical with regard to its perception of modernity, its identity, and its perception of the “others”. However, this transformation is not just a matter of a “clash of fathers and sons”. It is argued that, on the contrary, this transformation is pervasive and not limited to the new generation. Thus, many Hamidian grandees adapted to the transformation and endorsed the “new outlook” enthusiastically although many others were disillusioned with this process. The seventh chapter is a general survey of the cultures of the European diplomatic services. The chapter attempts to show that the Ottoman Foreign Ministry replicated the 19th century pattern and shares its common culture. World War I brought not only the collapse of the Ottoman Empire along with the Romanovs, Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs, but also a European-wide aristocratic style of governance and culture.

At its end, the study will also try to highlight the continuities from the Empire and its structures of mentalities to the Republic. The epilogue is a preliminary attempt to demonstrate the continuities (as well as modifications and breaks) from the Empire to the Republic as can be observed in the social and cultural formations of the Republican diplomatic service and the patterns of Republican diplomacy.
CHAPTER I

NATIONALISM, MODERNITY AND ELITE POLITICS

1.1. Nationalisms

This chapter aims to situate ambivalent concepts such as modernity, elites, nationalism and proto-nationalism with regard to their contributions in the making of modern Turkey before focusing on the ideological/intellectual/cultural formations of late Ottoman bureaucracy and diplomatic establishment.

The very early theories of nationalism had approached nationalism in terms of an “idea”. After all, this was the time when social sciences were conceived as an outer reach of humanitas, an activity related to the reflection on the world and the self. The most well-known classical study of nationalism within this paradigm was penned by Elie Kedourie. For Kedourie, nationalism was an innovation of early 19th century German romantics. Given that Kedourie was in the tradition of the pre-World War English conservativism, he was distressed with the endorsement, popularization and spread of this continental fiction, a consequence which for Kedourie was an avoidable misfortune.

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41 “The attempts to refashion so much of the world on national lines has [sic]not led to greater peace and stability. On the contrary, it has created new conflicts, exacerbated tensions, and brought catastrophe to numberless people innocent of all politics. The history of Europe since 1919, in particular, has shown the disastrous possibilities inherent in nationalism. In the mixed area of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans, empires disappeared, their ruling groups were humbled and made to pay, for a time, the penalty of previous arrogance....What can be said with certainty is that the nation-states who inherited the position of the empires were not an improvement. They did not minister to
However, his particularistic explanation remained a minority view. “The twin founding fathers” of the academic study of nationalism, Carleton B. Hayes and Hans Kohn,42 who wrote after World War I during the age of the emergence of numerous new nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe43, argued that nationalism is by definition a modern concept. Within the modernist paradigm of the time, they tacitly assumed that this process (like any development in history) was inevitable. For them, nationalism was inherent in the making of the modern world and modern imagination. Hayes was a scholar who was one of the first to observe the bleak nature of the 19th century underneath the disguise of the glamour of progress44 but nevertheless he viewed this undercurrent as a deviation from the inevitable triumphal march of modernity. In other words, his critical/relatively pessimistic approach to modernity did not lead him to question the triumphalism and the myth of modernity.

Later scholars of nationalism distanced themselves from Kedourie, denied any room for contingency in history and advanced the path of Hayes and Kohn. The modernization...
school, which was an upshoot of structural functionalism.\textsuperscript{45} treated the course of modern history and emergence of a modern society/social organization as an institutionalization of a mechanistic body in which there is no place for agency and “meaning”. Thus, they renounced anything peculiar and uncanny in nationalism. For them, nationalism was an inevitable and indispensable outcome of modernity. Nationalism was viewed as intrinsic in modernity and an indispensable element of modern social organization. It is functional in the establishment of a capitalistic and modern society. In the words of Benedict Anderson: “(within) the formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept- in the modern world everyone can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality, as he or she “has” a gender-vs the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations”\textsuperscript{46} in the modern age. However, these early historians of nationalism disagreed on why nationalism became unavoidable and inevitable.

A classical explanation was proposed by Ernest Gellner. For Gellner, “nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, generally transforming them in the process, but it cannot possibly use them all.”\textsuperscript{47} Gellner explains nationalism as a necessary instrument in the transition of humanity from agraria to industria within his

\textsuperscript{45} Talcott Parsons, the founder of structural functionalism, perceived nationalism as an instrument of social needs. His interpretation of nationalism is as follows: “At one extreme, the principal content of the normative order may be considered more or less universal to all men....At the other extreme, both government and the normative order may apply only to a particular small community. Within the broad range of variation between these extremes, modern societal communities have generally taken a form based upon nationalism. The development of this form has involved both a process of differentiation between societal community and government and a reform in the nature of societal community, especially with respect to membership.” Parsons, Talcott, Politics and Social Structure, New York: The Free Press, 1969, pp. 49-50. In his “The Social System”, he relates nationalism with industrialism. “The connection between the development of industrialism and of nationalism is well attested. Soviet Russia in this as in so many respects, seems to be no exception, in spite of its ‘internationalist’ ideology.” Parsons, Talcott, The Social System, Glencoe III: Free Press, 1951, pp. 187-88.

\textsuperscript{46} Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, London; New York: Verso, 2003, p.5

periodization of human history. Gellner’s impressive interpretation of nationalism renders nationalism not an independent ideology per se but a mechanism to create a nation and society. National formation is a process which is a requirement for the emergence and consolidation of modern industry-based states and social organizations of industria. In short, for Gellner, nationalism is the 

\textit{sin qua non} of capitalism, modernity and industrialization. Nationalism is thus not an irrational outburst, but a masterfully planned plot to serve for goals totally irrelevant to the “official” goals of nationalism.

Gellner’s modeling of nationalism appears to be impressive and instructive. However, what is unpersuasive in Gellner’s account is its all-encompassing explanatory nature. The model is so perfect, so convincing and comprehensive, that it generates the suspicion that somewhere something is missing; it does not leave much room for contingency and variation. Although Gellner’s general modeling is impressive, his presentation of nationalism as a rational and coldly calculated ideology that was hijacked for ends other than its declared claims remains too deterministic, concealing nuances and distinctions.


\textsuperscript{49} Gregory Jusdanis rejects the Gellnerian market-state-centered logic explanation of the emergence of nationalism in favor of a “culturalist” alternative explanation. “I argue that nationalism developed in the latter eighteenth century for two reasons. First, the far reaching transformations accompanying modernity brought about a profound interaction among populations. Although cultural and economic exchanges had always been part of human history, in the modern age this intercourse began to threaten the ethnic identities of regional groups more than had been the case with the polyethnic empires of the Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Capitalism, colonialism, and new means of communication and transportation pulled distant places closer together and mixed their populations, endangering thereby their cultural existence. The intensity and scope of contact among the world’s peoples engendered a deep interest in the collective self and the separation of this self from others. The more people confronted groups beyond their frontiers and borrowed from them, the more the differences between those inside and outside were emphasized.” Jusdanis, Gregory, \textit{The Necessary Nation}, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 5-6. For the birth of Turkish nationalism, a reconciliation of these two approaches may be established. First of all, material considerations, to save the state which represented and affirmed the pride and exaltation of its kinship, played a prominent role. This urge did arise both from “culturalistic” reasons (self-respect, pride, identity-formation, expression of the “self”- a la Charles Taylor-) and “materialistic” reasons (employ it as a strategy to maintain and uphold the group’s privileged status). The emergence of Turkish nationalism is a problematique for a Gellnerian approach because the Ottoman context lacks a market-
More recent historians in particular and social scientists in general had contemplated on the meaning of belonging to a nation and the experience of discovering a nation. With the “cultural turn” new generation of scholars of nationalism and comparative nationalism rehabilitated basic premises of Kedourie and refashioned them within the perspectives of “new intellectual history” and “new cultural history”. Since Gadamer’s “Truth and Method”, “meaning” gained a prominence as the ultimate explanatory concept to comprehend the complexity of modern society and the making of modernity. In a sense, this shift can be seen as a return to Kedourie. However, the recent anthropological approach, rejecting the conventional “histoire of ideas” perspective situating “nationalism” belonging to the realm of ideas, focuses more on the context in which people are enforced and constrained to contemplate on their identity, their self and their relation to the outer world. In recent studies, the principal subject of inquiry focused on individuals and their appropriation of the outer world rather than anonymous masses. As historical anthropology developed, the cosmologies of individuals such as the miller Menocchio became objects of inquiry and interest.

Recent social scientists and historians sought to answer how a socio-political vision (named nationalism) may be engendered as an end to this “existential” quest. Accordingly, the idea of nation may be viewed as inseparable from individuals’ and group’s encounter with modernity. The birth and development of nationalism cannot be dissociated from the unprecedented transformations individuals faced. It may be argued that, nationalism was received by these individuals and groups as a revelation to explain the perplexing and petrifying developments observed which individuals and groups failed to comprehend.

based economy. In the Ottoman/Turkish case, a, state-centred approach would be more plausible and convincing


Thus, we can further argue that, in an age of uncertainty, nationalism provided relief, certitude and confidence. It may be seen as a comprehensive answer given to all unknowns, thus resolving all ambiguities and obscurities, an action at once comparable to the cutting of the Gordian knot by Alexander the Great.

Recent studies also approached nationalism as a constitutive element of modernity rather than an outcome of modernity. Accordingly, nationalism was neither a bastard of modernity nor its side effect. It was not the collateral damage of modernity. According to this view, something rather quintessential was present in the nature of nationalism.

With “modernity,” a mechanistic transformation is not implied. Rather, by modernity, we understand a redefinition of the perception of the relation of man to nature, the relation of man to other men, and of man to society. Among other outcomes, modernity is the emergence of a new meaning of personal and social existence. Thus, it is an anthropological experience as much as a social and political development. The ideas of nation and of belonging to a nation are also upshots of the drastic alteration of social meaning and existence. This is not to claim that nationalism is a natural and automatic process that comes with the new configuration of meaning of man. On the contrary, the new structures of meaning were created, maintained or at least buttressed by the emerging modern states. According to this approach, a new interpretation of nationalism is necessary without reducing nationalism to a dependent function of the modern nation-state, industrial capitalism, or mass education. The simple question we have to answer is that why do people tend to feel to belong to a nationhood or why they tend to accept/affirm the ideological infiltration of the state-sponsored or intelligentsia-sponsored idea of nationhood and nationalism?

For our purposes, we also have to ask the question as to why the 19th century European intellectuals were disposed to imagine and discover a nation for themselves. After questioning the reality of nationhood, then we have to address the question why the construct of nationhood was so foundational in the development of 19th century social, cultural and political developments.

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Very simply put, we may speak of two different types of nations in the 19th century Europe: those nations with their state in power and those nations without their states. With regard to the first type, a scholar may study how the idea of nationhood was forged around an already existing state. Many studies investigated the emergence of a national idea in countries such as England and France where preexisting states became associated with a national essence and identity. In other countries, national ideas and sense of nationhood developed before the organization and consolidation of modern states. A sense of nation was pursued and developed in countries such as Greece and Russia relatively late and parallel to the organization and consolidation of a modern state where state consciously enforced an ideological project.

A study investigating the emergence of nationalism in countries such as England and France would involve a survey of the state and the bureaucracy because in these examples the fiction of nationhood was forged with the active involvement and vanguard role of the state while the background of this endeavor was already prepared within an ideological


setting. With regard to the second category where the emergence of a “sense of nation” preceded the emergence of a state, nationalism was more or less an intellectual activity and a “curiosity” turned into “political”. It was a “fantasy” that was subsequently politically came into being. The Greek, Bulgarian, Romanian, Czech discourses of nations can be given as examples to this category. In the first category, the states forged an idea; whereas in the second, ideas appear to have forged states. For example it was the sense of being a Czech (and Slovak) that to an important extent enabled the foundation of Czechoslovakia.

In comparison to the abovementioned models, the Turkish/Ottoman trajectory follows rather an idiosyncratic path. In the Ottoman case, an idea took over an already existing state. Moreover, the conspicuous situation in the Ottoman Empire is that the state bureaucracy and the intellectual elite are mostly indistinguishable. Therefore, in the Ottoman/Turkish case, the “nation” may be both an intellectual fantasy and a political imposition at the same time.

Why does “an intellectual” need to belong to a nation and furthermore dedicate his life for a fictitious nation? Certainly “nation” is an idea which has emerged within a certain social context, and since ideas can be meaningful only within the framework of social contexts, intellectual quests may be contextualized in their social/historical settings.

Here, primordialist theories of nationalism provide some assistance to us. As is well-known, Anthony Smith and others claimed that nations existed prior to the modern age. John Armstrong, in his survey book discussing the ethnics within the gigantic scene of history throughout centuries, claimed that nations do exist before nationalism.57 Anthony Smith wrote:

“…ethnie and nations are not fixed and immutable entities “out there” (not even the nationalist thought so); but nor are they completely malleable and fluid processes and attitudes, at the mercy of every outside force. To interpret them as masks and channels of “real” social forces or the cultural surface of anatomical structures beneath, is to miss the independent role and originating power of ethnic identities and ethnic cleavages.....(h)ence the need to take the ethnic roots of modern nationalism seriously, and give due weight to those myths, memories and symbols that can ignite

populations and mobilize them for assault on the precarious balance of forces that hold the regional systems of state together.”

In other words, for Smith, the ethnic symbols, myths and the very ethnicities themselves constituted a reservoir of material to be utilized for other goals. However, this does not mean that ethnie is a blank sheet to be filled freely. The ethnie has its own genuinity and autonomy. The genuinity of the ethnie as a value limits the extents of manipulation as well. Ethnies are not simply words of Humpty-Dumpty meaning whatever the nationalist meant to be.

In the light of the Smithian perspective, what did “nationhood” mean for the ruling (and intellectual) elite in the context of the Ottoman Empire? The Ottoman case exemplifies neither the first (nations with states) nor the later version (nations without states) of the two “types of emerging nationhoods”. The Ottoman ruling elite had its state but this state was to be reclaimed and reshaped. It had to be charged with new attributes and meanings. As Smith pointed out, there is no one objective and single notion of ethnicity and nation, thus lacking one definite meaning. It may signify different meanings in each historical context, continuously shaped and reshaped in interaction with various dynamics that are also in constant change. The dynamics that shape the makings of nationhoods are not necessarily domestic. International factors may be as influential as are domestic factors as apparent in the development of Turkish nationalism. In the end, some of the competing meanings of “nation”s arise amongst others, due to suitable intellectual and realpolitik conditions.

1.2. Imperial Nationalism vs. Ethnic Nationalism

The “creation of the Turkish identity/nationhood” will tell us not about a certain (social and political) reality but about a mental set derived from a certain preexisting structure of mentality. All nationhoods began their careers as an idea before they became a reality.

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Abigail Green begins her book *Fatherlands* with a quote from Heinrich von Kleist’s *German Catechism* (1809). “In his ‘German Cateschism’, Kleist envisages a confrontation between a Saxon father and his German son. ‘I am a German’, the son declares. ‘A German’ his father cries. ‘You must be joking. You were born in Meissen, and Meissen is in Saxony!’ ‘I was born in Meissen’ the son replies ‘and Meissen is indeed in Saxony; but my fatherland, the country to which Saxony belongs, is Germany-and your son, my father, is a German.’ But the father remains unconvinced. ‘Where is this Germany?’ he asks. He cannot find it on the map.” This anecdote is probably one of the earliest examples of the clash of generations; the radical son revolting against his conservative father; a popular theme of the 19th century European literature and imagination. The anecdote also resembles the late Ottoman overlapping of identities. One can easily replace the “Saxon” with the “Ottoman” and “German” with the “Turk” to adapt it to the Ottoman context (later to meet the Teuton and Turanian dyad as well). However, Green criticizes the conventional historiography of 19th century Germany and those who assume the anecdote of Kleist as sheer reality. She asserts that, rather than a break, German nationalism displays continuity. “The book (Green’s book-DG) attempts to establish how national Germany was before unification and how federal it remained thereafter.”

Same criticism may be leveled against the conventional historiography of 19th century Ottoman historiography and Turkish nationalism. The conventional historiography dates the emergence of Turkish nationalism to the era of the Young Turks. According to this narrative, the idea of Turkishness emerged in the minds of Young Turks in the first decade of 20th century when they were in opposition in the Hamidian era. The idea came to power

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with the 1908 Revolution. One dissenting interpretation, however, had been proposed as early as 1977 by David Kushner. In his book, he demonstrated the prevalence of Turkism as early as the era of Abdülhamid II. Interestingly, the Turkists of Kushner were not revolutionaries or upstarts unlike the Turkist Young Turks. On the contrary, Kushner’s Turkists were established figures writing in the harmless dailies of Istanbul and publishing articles approved by the censor of Abdülhamid II’s censor. In short, in their intellectual orientations, they were men of different stock than were the Young Turks and in their class background. Although Kushner’s study did not capture attention in his day, later studies of Turkish nationalism did begin to date the emergence of Turkish nationalism at an earlier date. This observation also requires questioning the alleged sharp dichotomy between the Hamidian generation/establishment and the Young Turk generation in their intellectual orientations. Dating the emergence of a “certain idea of Turkishness” to an earlier date is not only a matter of chronological precision. It also requires us to question the main premises and features of Turkish nationalism. The redefinition of Turkish nationalism acknowledges the intertwining of various coexisting and sometimes contradicting dispositions, ideologies and leanings in its very emergence.

The presumed characteristics of the two variants of nationalism/national awareness (Hamidian versus Young Turk) differ in many ways. The Young Turks were busy “inventing” a nation ex nihilo in their image. Conversely, the earlier imperial generation was mending the society (Muslim society in process of being imagined as a Nation) into the already existing imperial identity and into an imagination of social order. The nation was to serve a certain purpose. That is to say; the nationalism of the earlier generation was a “matter of state” although it is not claimed that that was intentionally and consciously done. In the perception of the Hamidian dignitaries, the Nation is submissive, hierarchically organized community. Nevertheless, within this framework; “the Ottoman Empire hedged

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towards a ‘nationally imagined community’ as Ottoman identity assumed an increasingly Turkish character, even if this identity was packaged in universalist Islamic terms.”

However, whatever the differences between the two strands of nationalism may have been, there was no simple process of replacement of the one with the other. On the contrary, the social imagination and premises of the Hamidian generation was prominent in the formation of the nationalism of the Young Turks. In this study, it has been argued that, the Young Turks took over many propositions of the earlier generation as indispensable tenets of their imagination of the Turkish nation and Turkish nationalism which they were professing to invent. Turkish nationalism was constituted as a state project although not necessarily planned so intentionally. It is also interesting to observe that dating the emergence of a full-fledged nationalist discourse to the Young Turks was first developed by the Young Turks themselves (presenting themselves as the generators of a national awareness in contrast to the corrupt Hamidian ancient regime) and the assumptions of historiography derived from this ideological maneuver (which was further consolidated by the Kemalist/republican historiography).

The very early historiography on the emergence of Turkish nationalism developed after the World War II within the modernization paradigm insisted on establishing a dichotomy between Turkish ethnic nationalism and imperial Ottomanism. In fact, these accounts were heavily influenced by Young Turks’ discrediting Ottomanism and presenting it as a naïve and almost effeminate paradigm. Here, “imperial Ottomanism” is not taken as the official Ottomanism propagating the equality of subjects of the Empire regardless of religion. Apparently, the Ottoman center was not a neutral site but biased disproportionately towards an Islamic and Turkish identity. By “imperial Ottomanism”,

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we refer to the ideological/political orientation prioritizing the imperial interests and
having imperial reflexes in contrast to the Turkist reflexes of the later generation which
would prioritize the explicit interests of the Turkish nation. This dichotomy assumes as the
imperial Ottomanism had became defunct and succumbed without leaving any trace. This
simplification derives from the very categorization Young Turks themselves formulated.
The caricature of Ottomanism by Young Turks (and the non-Muslim and non-Turkish
intellectuals) obliterated the significance and possibilities of Ottomanism. The gradual
secularization, radicalization and ethnicization of the Turkish nationalism between early
years of 1900s and early 1910s obscured the transitions, linkages and interwining between
imperial nationalism and ethnic Turkish nationalism. In a sense, Yusuf Akçura’s
breakthrough article “Three Modes of Politics” [Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset] published in the Young
Turk journal “Türk” in Egypt in 1904 determined the course of Ottoman studies,
persuading the practitioners of it to assume that (secular and radical) Turkism was the only
feasible ideology, the only one capable to adapt to the modern times in a somewhat
Darwinian logic.

Interestingly, Akçura in his “Three Modes of Politics” himself does not speak of three
mutually exclusive “modes” of politics (i.e. ideologies) but seems to blend them.
Furthermore he is ambivalent in opting for one among the three options. He is a
pragmatic Turkish patriot urging for strategies to save the Empire rather than urging for
ideologies. Ideologies are a secondary concern for Akçura.

67 Hanioğlu, Şükrü, Preparing for a Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001, pp. 64-73.

68 Akçura ends his treatise as follows: “hulasə, öteden beri zihnimi işgal edip de, kendi
kendimi ikna edecek cevabım bulamadığım sual yine önüne dikilmiş cevap bekliyor:
Müşlûmanlık, Türkîk siyasetlerinden hangisi Osmanlı Devleti için daha yararlı ve kabil-i
tatbiktir.” Also note the pragmatism in the text. Yusuf Akçura, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset, Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1976, p. 36.

69 Yusuf Akçura was not unique in his pragmatism. In a response to the article of Yusuf
Akçura, Ahmet Ferit, one of the future public figures of Turkists, concluded: “Türk siyaseti
bugün mevcut değildir; fakat Osmanlı siyaseti milli mevcutüyetimizi muhafaça ederse,
belki gelecekte İslam birliği siyasetinin gözden kaybolduğu zaman bize bir yardımcı olur.
For Akçura, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism were all “ideal types” because he had written his text in a relatively early date when Turkism was not yet seen as a predatory ideology destined to monopolize the ideological scene by eliminating its rivals as an iron law of history. 1904 was too early to realize that ethnic nationalism would turn into the inevitable ideology of the future whereas the others were destined to collapse. But it turned out to be so. Turkish nationalism (in its particular form) succeeded to present itself as the only viable and popularly feasible ideology. In this study, the extent of this success, the contradictions between Turkish nationalism’s self-presentation, and its actuality will be investigated. It will be claimed in this study, following several other studies of the past two decades, that Turkish nationalism has its peculiarities and distinctivenesses deriving from what it had inherited from its Ottoman/imperial heritage. Turkish nationalism neither resembles state-centred “Western nationalisms” nor is idea-centred “Eastern nationalisms”. Rather, Turkish nationalism is an imperial nationalism with its distinct features and background. Apparently, such “peculiarities” are not unique to Turkish nationalism. The riddle of nationalism is that nationalism is a general label/code word used to define various distinct evolutions of certain imaginations that do not necessarily resemble each other. As Anne McClintock aptly states, “nationalisms are invented, performed and consumed in ways that do not follow a blueprint.” Likewise, as expressed by Partha Chatterjee, they don’t “follow ‘script already written’ but they are projects of individual national imaginations.” Therefore, with regard to Turkish nationalism, our work is to expose what social/cultural/class-related attributes Turkish nationalism evokes under the rubric of nationalism and the national imagination.

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1.3. Development of an “Official Nationalism” at the Ottoman Center

Nationalism was an “import” into Ottoman lands. The use of the word “import” may sound rather odd as if it were a commodity. However, nationalism was in fact an “import” in the sense that the arrival of the word “nationalism” preceded the arrival of nationalism as a social-political reality. The concept of “nationalism” had been learned as a textbook concept before it had been encountered in its mature form manifested resembling its European versions disregarding the proto-nationalist popular movements preceding the European-style nationalisms observable within the Ottoman geography beginning from the early 19th century. The South Eastern European intellectuals marveled with the ideas and worlds of the Enlightenment which had developed their national identities and transformed Balkan peasant rebellions into national revolts and awakenings.73

The approach of the Ottoman ruling elite towards the Balkan nationalities was very “technical” not unlike their approach to the concept of “nationalism” itself. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1823-1895), the conservative reformist statesman and one of the emblematic figures of the culture of the 19th century Ottoman imperial elite, wrote that these Balkan nationalities had taken the motive of nationhood from the West as if it was an imported commodity. He also noted that “nationalism is an outcome of French Revolution” as he copied down the French historians’ accounts covering the French Revolution without contemplating on the dynamics and origins of this novel phenomenon called nationalism. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha held a rather negative opinion of nationalism. He wrote that there is no equivalent of the word “nation” in the Ottoman vocabulary. According to him “vatan” (patrie) implies just the village square and has no capability to motivate the soldiers, whereas “Islam” provides a far better motivation for waging war.74 However, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s usage of “Islam” was also “national”. For him, Islam was a political cause

to be pursued not limited, to the “other world,” but also related to this world. Islam was what is just, good, and simply the pillar of the ideal political order for Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. This mental background was the reason for his disparagement for Balkan nationalisms. For Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Balkan insurgencies were no more than brutal and barbaric banditry, failing to surrender to the perfect and just political order of the abode of Islam as practiced by the Ottoman polity.  

In the perception of the Ottoman elite, Bulgarians, Greeks or Serbians were not equal to the imperial Ottomans. The emerging nationalisms of these Balkan nations were only expressions of rapaciousness and arrogant and uncivilized sentiments of these nations. Contrary to the obnoxious nature of the Balkan nations, Ottoman Empire symbolized the ultimate goodness and righteousness. Thus, its use of force was legitimate and served for a higher ideal. These were the premises of the imperial discourse elaborated against the unruly Balkan nationalisms. Given that, Balkan nationalisms to a certain degree emanated from rural banditry and were reactions of the Christian villagers to their subordinate status vis-à-vis their Muslim landlords before it had been given nationalist twists in Bulgaria, in Serbia, in Bosnia, the perception of the imperial discourse was not too wrong.

The Ottoman imperial vision took for granted that the Ottoman polity was inherently superior to the “unhistorical nations” of the Balkans. The Ottoman imperial vision did not acknowledge any agency to the Balkan nations. As Ebru Boyar rightfully pointed out in her book, the perception of Ottomans “represented the Balkans very much within the centre-periphery paradigm, assigning no concept of ‘sentient being’ to the areas of the periphery whose very existence depended not on their own aspirations and actions but on a centre, be it Istanbul or elsewhere....although nationalism came to be used more and more in the interpretations of the later Ottoman historians and, especially, of those of the early Republic, essentially the late nineteenth-century understanding....of the uprisings remained

framed within the centre-periphery paradigm.” The traditional Turkish/Kemalist historiography attributed this perception to the mental backwardness of the nineteenth-century Ottomans, their inability to comprehend contemporary ideological developments. However, more recent studies pointed out to other motivations for Ottomans’ denouncement of Balkan nationalisms. It did not derive out of being not in touch with the latest developments but out of its imperial discourse and worldview.

In fact, a striking discursive continuity exists from the narrative of Ahmed Cevdet regarding the depiction of the Balkan nationalist uprisings in the official Kemalist discourse in terms of denying them any agency in their exploits. The Kemalist historiography reiterates the imperial assumptions and assumes that these Balkan rebels might be only manipulated by the Russians (or other foreign powers). The Ottoman ruling elite did not recognize any legitimacy for the banditry in the Balkans to claim political authority for themselves. This perception is in contradistinction to the self-victimizing perception of the Unionist and Kemalist nationalisms which portrayed Turks as

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78 For the persistence of the Ottoman/imperial discourse in the Kemalist era, see Boyar, Ebru, ibid, p. 59.
79 For example, see *Tarih III (Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlar)*, Ankara: Devlet Matbaası, 1933, pp 257-258.
80 After the publication of Edward Said’s *Orientalism* and his exposure of the “invention of the East”, this theme was “applied” to many other non-western regions. For Balkans, see Wolff, Larry, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, Stanford: Stanford University Press; Todorova, Maria, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. For the Ottoman images of Balkans in the Ottoman caricatures which strikingly resembles the Western imaginaries depicting the Balkan nations as bandits wearing traditional clothes (in contrast to civilized-looking and appropriately dressed Turks) see Heinzelman, Tobias, *Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu*, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004. This book shows that the imagery of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and his contemporaries persisted in the heyday of Unionist Turkish nationalism within a more ethnically loaded jargon. Balkans was continued to be represented as the culturally and socially underdeveloped periphery of the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars as Heinzelmann’s study demonstrates. For another Ottoman author who depicted Bulgarians as “killing their prime ministers in the streets” and Montenegrins as “lacking any sign of civilization and progress” in 1905, see Samipaşazade Sezai, “Balkanlar’da İttifak-ı Müselles”, Şura-yi Ümmet, 4 June 1905, excerpted in Kerman, Zeynep (ed.), *Sami Paşazade Sezai: Bütün Eserleri*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2001, v. III, p. 200.
oppressed and in retreat and Balkan nationalists as arrogant and aggressive. However, the republican perception may be interpreted as a consequence of the change of the conjunctures and not as a modification in ideological outlook. Yet, if we agree to establish a link from Ahmed Cevdet Pasha to the Turkish nationalism of the coming decades, we also need to acknowledge a continuity from the post-classical Ottoman historians to Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa in his Tarih, in his Tezakir and in his other works reiterates the premises and contours of the age-old Ottoman discourse, which relies on the Islamic law and Islamic notion of polities\textsuperscript{81}, claiming the absolute legitimacy to rule over the territories already seized and ruling over its subjects without necessarily paying attention to their considerations. The mercilessness of premodernity and the naturalization of violence (as long as it is just) is also prevalent in Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, reminiscent of his predecessors. Once the subject races revolted, the Islamic âmân (“mercy”) was to be abandoned and being in a “situation of war” the life of any rebellious subject was no more to be maintained.\textsuperscript{82} Therefore, a dehumanizing discourse was maintained based on classical Islamic and pre-modern premises prevailed in the modernizing 19\textsuperscript{th} century.

\textsuperscript{81} For the Islamic perception of state and order with special reference to the Ottomans, see Lewis, Bernard, \textit{The Political Language of Islam}, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, Also see Lambton, Ann K.S, \textit{State and Government in Medieval Islam}. London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 1991, pp. 15-16. “Belief in the divine origin of community and the lack of any separation between ‘church’ and the state had important consequences so far as civil war and internal disturbances were concerned. These were called fitna (pl. fitan) and were considered to be, fundamentally, rebellion against the divine law.” (p.15) I do not establish that there is a certain Islamic law and perception concerning the state, community and order unchanging throughout centuries. However, certain premises derived from Islamic legal perceptions have the power to partially shape and influence the later perceptions including the founding axioms, reference system and mental cosmology of Turkish nationalism and Ottoman imperial official nationalism. Apparently, Turkish nationalism has Islamic origins in many regards and visible in its various attributes and manifestations.

\textsuperscript{82} For such a language of dehumanization see Mehmed Es’ad Efendi, \textit{Vak’â-Nâvis Esad Efendi Tarihi}, İstanbul: OSAV, 2000; Erdem, Hakan Y, “‘Do not Think of Them as Agricultural Laboureres’: Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence”: Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence”, in Dragonas, Thalia & Birtek, Faruk (ed), \textit{Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey}, London; New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 67-85. For the premodern dehumanizing perceptions, see Kiernan, Ben, \textit{Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur}, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. In the Ottoman perspective derived from Islamic law
The transformation of the Ottoman perception with regard to its taking care of its subject and the endorsement of the discourse of the modern benevolent state was visible as early as the reign of II Mahmud. Although to claim to serve its subjects and maintain their prosperity and security was present in the premodern political rhetoric and was a pivotal part of the Islamic (and therefore Ottoman) conception of law and governance, the modern understanding that acknowledges its subjects as individual citizens and perceives the duties of the state not as graceful benevolence but a social responsibility was novel. Moreover, the enhancement of state capacities ensured the interference of the state to lives of individuals directly and indirectly. The changing perception of the Ottoman polity was manifested in various occasions such as in the tour of the Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Pasha in Bulgaria (who also planned to visit Macedonia but cancelled the trip due to the emergency situation in Lebanon) in 1861 to listen the complaints of its Christian subjects although “visits” to distant areas as far as Varna began with Mahmud II and Mehmet Emin Pasha’s visit was only the most comprehensive and most publicized.

and Islamic political culture, the non-Muslim subjects were not regarded as fully human beings deserving a dignity but captives whose right to life were recognized conditionally. In many ways, this language may be seen as dehumanizing the non-Muslims. However, such a judgment would not be correct because dehumanization refers to a normality in which humans are not seen as individuals with complete control over their bodies. Apparently, in premodernity there was no such perception. The persistence of this dehumanizing discourse in Tanzimat can not be regarded as the “persistence of old regime” but should be perceived as an integral part of the Ottoman modernization experience. This was the main argument of James Reid in his study. See Reid, James, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878, Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2000. For a dehumanizing discourse regarding the Balkan rebellions of 1875 and the Turkish-Russian War, also see Mustafa Celalaeddin Pasha, Mirat-i Hakikat, Istanbul: Berekat Yayınları, 1983.


For an evaluation of the tour of Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Pasha, see Köksal, Yonca & Erkan, Davut, Sadrazam Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Pasha’nın Rumeli Tefişi, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayımları, 2007.
Nevertheless, this new sensibility and “rhetoric of inclusion” did not terminate the prevailing “rhetoric of exclusion”. Instead, we observe the coexistence of these two contradictory discourses. The Islamic dehumanization of non-Muslims did not die out. Rather, it adapted itself and went along with an inclusive rhetoric towards the non-Muslims as long as they kept their loyalty. This conditional “rhetoric of inclusion” would be pursued as long as the aspirations of non-Muslims would not challenge the notions and premises of Islamic hierarchy, morality, justice and order.

Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s perception of the French Revolution may be read along the same imperial rhetoric. His negative attitude towards the French Revolution did not arise from the fact that he was, as an "old Turk", imperceptive to the latest European currents and developments but due to his class/status origins. Apparently, he was alarmed with the revolution not only for the Ottoman polity but for the European order in general. He was an aristocrat in the sense that he was a member of the semi-closed and privileged community


87 For his attitude towards the French Revolution and his interpretation of the revolution, see Neumann, Christoph, Araç Tarih, Amaç Tanzimat, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000, pp. 138-140. For Ahmed Cevdet, revolutionaries were immoral and barbaric threatening justice and order.

88 It would be insightful to assess Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s attitudes in comparison with the attitudes developed by the established elites with regard to the French Revolution, empire and subalterns. John Mackenize, one of the prominent and most severe critics of Edward Said writes; “they (orientalists) were culturally conservative and technically innovative. Far from offering an artistic programme for imperialism, they were finding in the East ancient verities lost in their own civilization.” MacKenzie, John, Orientalism, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995, p. 67. For MacKenzie, orientalism was not the fifth column of imperialism but a conservative enterprise in the aftermath of French Revolution. MacKenzie’s criticism of Said is rather instructive for us to remember to look for ideologies and mental sets within a social framework. Along the same lines, David Cannadine also portrayed British empire –pace Said- as an extension/replication of the British perception of society, order, hierarchy and privilege. For Cannadine, empire was an aristocratic encounter and the premises of the empire are understandable only with understanding the British mind and the aristocratic perceptions of society and nature. See Cannadine, David, Ornamentalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Both of the authors are “socializing” imperialism in contrast to the essentialization of the empire by Edward Said. MacKenzie’s and Cannadine’s hints may be useful for us to understand some tenets of the making of the worldview of the Turkish nationalism as well.
of the Muslim state elite. He happened to be also an ethnic Turk. These two identities of his were intertwined: being an ethnic Turk was associated with membership in the state nobility. Many ethnic Turks might be denied this privilege and despised as vulgar masses but still being an ethnic Turks (and being a Muslim from different origins to a lesser extent) was relatively advantageous for incorporation to the state elite. It could be claimed that a peculiar Turkish national identity was born from this overlapping. This identity implied a certain notion of superiority (millet-i hakime), not only vis-a-vis the non-Turks but vis-a-vis the ethnic Turkish masses as well. The separation was established between those who were almost divinely ordained to rule and those who were supposed to be submissive (Muslim masses and non-Muslims) to those who were morally superior (the Muslim/Turkified imperial elite). The imperial identity was forged not based on ethnic lines but with implications for its ethnicity. Similarly, imperial identity was not strictly exclusive but open to those comfortable with the imperial premises including the non-Muslims.

89 For the prominent role of his high class background on his writings and analyses, see Neumann, Christoph, “Bad Times and Better Self: Definitions of Identity and Strategies for Development in Late Ottoman Historiography 1850-1900”, in Ottomans and Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, Farouqi, Suraiya, Adanır, Fikret (ed.), Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2002, p. 64.

90 Many ethnies were established and forged within social and class contexts. For example, although there were variations, as a general observation, in the Central and Eastern European lands, it was the German-speakers who were nobles and who also constituted urban populace whereas the folk and peasantry spoke various accents of Slavic languages. This was not because classes and social formations were constituted along ethnic lines but because certain languages were associated with respectability and ethnic differences were alleviated with social connotations as the dissemination of modernity began to privilege some ethnies. Similarly, social unrests turned into national rebellions as it happened in Balkans against the Turks who constituted the “dominating class” vis-a-vis the reayah Christians. In an interesting case, Belorussianess was a provincial identity defined by the tongue of the peasantry in contrast to the urban population speaking Polish and Ukrainian. With the invention of a Belorussian nationality, the peasant tongue established its own nation and Belorussian identity joined the superleague of nations. For the emergence and consolidation of the Belorussian national culture and identity, see Snyder, Timothy, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 41. Also see Martin, Terry, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Empire, 1923-1939, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.
The concept of *millet-i hakime* appeared in the first half of the 19th century as a reaction to the rise of non-Muslim nationalities, probably inspired by the Habsburg *Herrenvolk* idea and the Germans’ self-perception in the Habsburg Empire. This concept denotes the development of what Benedict Anderson calls “official nationalism,” imbued with a nationalized imperial identity. The racist doctrines of late 19th century Europe were far away from the mindset of the Ottoman imperial elite although such a linkage might be tangible to the Young Turk thought. Whereas the racist doctrine is egalitarian, equalizing any member of the racial community/ethnicity, the Ottoman imperial identity and the idea of nationhood was flamboyantly elitist and inegalitarian.

It had been suggested that the future racist nationalism of Germany had emanated from the European-wide colonial thought which divides society into two, i.e. those who are destined to be subjugated and those destined to rule. It has been argued by scholars such as Deringil and Makdisi that European colonialist discourse influenced the 19th century Ottoman political governance and ideology. Apparently, we observe several manifestations of the impact of the European political visions and terminology on Ottoman political culture such as the term and notion of *millet-i hakime* (which was refashioned with a new content by the Young Turks as boldly articulated by Hüseyin Cahid in his

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91 I thank Hakan Erdem for drawing my attention to the novelty of *millet-i hakime* and its probable transplantation from Habsburgian political language.


notorious article “Millet-i Hakime” in Tanin in 1908 and transmitted to the Young Turk generation and the secular and ethnicized Turkish nationalism and subsequently to the practices and premises of the republic vis-à-vis the non-Muslim minorities\(^9^5\).

Given that the new generation of historians established that the early modern European state formation was pivotal in the making of the modern state and paradigms of governance\(^9^6\), the reception of these structures of governance and the ideological settings by the Ottoman Empire had to be relocated to an earlier date. Thus, we can argue that the Turkish nationalist discourse was simultaneously influenced from the hierarchical premises of both modern and premodern imaginations and visions of political order. On the one hand, the 19th century colonialist visions that presupposed the superiority of the “enlightened ones” impacted nascent Turkish nationalism. On the other hand, hierarchy and order were two of the principal ethical premises of classical Ottoman polity appropriated by the later generations also receptive to early modern and modern influences -both deriving from domestic origins and imported from the European patterns-. Thus, the hierarchy in its established form based not necessarily on acquired but inherited merits was one of the founding stones of the 19th century Ottoman ideology; furthermore, this specific ideological formation was derived from different and sometimes contradicting sources.

1.4. Discovery of a Nation for a State and for an Intelligentsia


Within this hierarchical order paradigm, it is argued that, the Ottoman ruling elite “discovered” Turks and “Muslims” as a community with which it can identify itself in response to two different challenges. The first was the challenge of a series of non-Muslim unrests shattering the Ottoman imperial authority severely. The second was the encroachment of the European great powers on the Empire. The unchallengeable military and diplomatic supremacy of Europe exerted a severe pressure on the Ottomans forcing them to encounter the European powers. It may be argued that, a self-identity was developed in response to these emerging perceived threats. These perceived threats enforced the imperial center not only to develop new mechanisms of legitimacy but also to engender new self-identities. The discovery of a religio-ethnic community in its road to the discovery of Turkishness could be located within the historical context of these grim realities and pressures.

We speculated that, in the beginning, the idea of a certain proto-nationhood was an imperial project “discovered” by the ruling elite, not necessarily overlapping with an ethnical understanding of nationhood. This argument is not surprising at all given that the process was more or less similar in some other cases, especially in the Eastern European examples (in the hands of “intellectuals” in the lack of a “ruling class”). However, we have to bear in mind that the Ottoman Empire retained its religious/imperial identity while discovering and developing a certain proto-nationhood for itself. Moreover, it is important to reiterate that at least before the 1860s, there is no possibility about speaking of an intellectual elite independent from the state. The Turkish/Muslim intelligentsia was hardly distinguishable from the state elite. No Habermasian intellectual “public sphere” independent from the political realm and political authority emerged in the

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Ottoman/Turkish centre (especially until 1908). Furthermore, the emergence of a public sphere outside the state did not bring an “emancipation” of the intellectual elite from the political authority as occurred in Russia with the emergence of a totally new class known as “raznochintsy”. The latter one distinguished itself and its interests from the state and the classes whose interests were strictly dependent on the state. The raznochintsy, a class composed of graduates of colleges who were devoid of the prospect of quick advancement in the civil service and therefore alienated from the state-centered prospects of life and worldview, did develop its own knowledge, its own values and value system independent of the state. Therefore the raznochintsy nurtured its own public sphere and spaces of free public discussion such as literary journals and publishing networks. Contrary to the process of the emergence and development of the intelligentsia in Russia, Ottoman intelligentsia did not break away from imperial paternalism. On the contrary, it associated its interests and prospects with the interests and prospects of the state. The Ottoman intelligentsia, in terms of its members’ occupations, wealth and lineages (blood lines as well as genealogies not based on blood lines) continued to be wedded around the state. The question of the destiny of the Ottoman state continued to be the central preoccupation of the elite as their assets relied on the well-being of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it was their concern regarding the fate of the political authority in which they had faith that motivated them to endeavor for a community/nation. Thus, the Ottoman/Turkish

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intellectual sphere was more or less a function of the state and the knowledge they produced could not be disassociated from the state including the knowledge they produced with regard to nation and ethnicity. Therefore, although the impact of Balkan nationalism was considerable, the Turkish intellectuals’ discovery of the proto-nationhood and ethnie was a rather different experience from their East European counterparts. Their discovery was molded to a major extent within an imperial discourse.

At the same time, it is possible to talk about the actuality and historicity of a “Turkish ethnie” a la Anthony Smith. By Turkish ethnie, we mean those Sunni Muslim populations who either spoke Turkish or who identified in their minds Sunni Islam with Turkishness. Furthermore, it could be claimed that there existed an implicit self-consciousness (based on linguistic and cultural distinctions) among the Turkish-speaking population who felt to a certain degree that they belonged to a certain community which distinguished them from the Albanians in Macedonia and from the Kurds, Arabs and others in Eastern Anatolia and in the Levante. It could be anticipated that with the improvement of communications, transportation and enhancement of the awareness of the existence of a world beyond their localities, a feeling of belonging that surpassed people’s localities would emerge. However, this was not a natural and an inevitable process but rather a constructed one which was foremost political (rather than social or cultural).

Furthermore, it is more accurate to speak of various Turkish ethnies (or proto-nations) that shared a similar language and accumulated a shared memory transmitted in the courses of generations throughout centuries. However, the existence of common traits does not rule out the potentiality of separate nations-in making. It was the marginalization and trivialization of differences and nuances which together with the exposure and emphasizing of commonalities and resemblances that engendered the imagination of a single Turkish nation. Among these potential Turkish nations-in-making, the Roumelian community was arguably raised to betray the main attributes of the emerging Turkish nation in the eyes of

Also for an assessment which traces the origins of nationalism into the early modern centuries and designates the nobility as the founders and developers of nationalism, see Greenfeld, Liah, *Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992. Greenfeld notes that the intellectuals and professionals of nineteenth century were the promulgators and disseminators of nationalism rather than inventors of nationalism. (p.22) Such an analysis of the roles of the social clusters in the making of Turkish nationalism may render the birth and development of Turkish nationalism more explicable.
its spiritual founders; what we have called the Young Turk generation. The rise of Roumelians was arguably fundamental due to two factors; Balkans’ relative openness to the impact of the West and its position as a war zone in a combat in which Turks were on defensive. Thus, we may suggest that, the modern imagination and construction of the Turkish nationhood (Turkish nationhood “as we know it today”) was very much shaped by the individual/communal experiences of 19th century Roumelian Turks.

Therefore, it may be argued that, a significant factor in the forging of the imagination of a “certain” Turkish nationhood was the Roumelian origin of the Young Turk generation. These Young Turks rose up from the opportunity of a good education and were able to subsequently join the Ottoman bureaucracy based on their distinguishing merits (besides all others belonging to the same generational cluster and coming from all the parts of Ottoman Empire benefiting the educational opportunities provided by the imperial schooling system).

This is not to say that they “invented” the Turkish nation in their image. On the contrary, the origins of Turkish nationalism went further back before Roumelian recruits modified it. Here, I would prefer to use the word “nationalism” rather than “Turkish nationalism” because the sentiment of nationalism is not simply a matter of discriminating and privileging ethnies. Beyond referring to ethnies, nationalism is fundamentally a feeling of belonging expressed within the discourse of ethnicities establishing the inner and outer groups upon ethnic differences. However, nationalism can not be reduced simply to a matter of ethnicities. Indeed, nationalisms address loyalties beyond ethnicities. It is not easy to distinguish between coexisting loyalties and isolate one of them. The very fundamental reference of nationalism is the concept of “we”. In this framework of conceptualization, the antagonist is “they”.

In the Ottoman/Turkish context, it may be explicable to use the word “they” rather than “other”. Before the 19th century, the “Turks” (and “Muslims”) did know the “others” without necessarily “otherizing” them as “they”. This was because they did not previously


perceive a “threat” from them. “Other” was safely distant and unthreatening to “us” never posing the danger of mingling with “us”. In the old order, everybody knew their place, as did non-Muslims. The passing of the old order severely shattered the non-Muslim communities as well. Once the old hierarchical order was shattered, the non-Muslim entities became legitimate rivals with equal or higher chances to outdo Muslims in a free (and Darwinian) competition\(^{103}\). The process of realizing the competitive advantages of the outsiders of yesterday became the cement of the emergence of an awareness of belonging to a community for Muslims (of Turkish and non-Turkish origin). It may be argued that, as the Muslim populace lost its natural/naturalized and inherited superiority, the psychology of entrenchment put the seeds of a sense of nationalism in search of an identity.

This development was visible in the localities. However, such conceptualizations/categorizations were to remain local phenomena unless an external force was to be exerted. It was a “central project” to “ politicize” these local senses of belongings and unite unrelated developments and incorporate them into one single grand narrative.\(^{104}\) Apparently, “nation” is a political concept by definition. However, it is built on non-political themes. It may be “artificial” in its political construction, though this political construction builds on genuine non-political concerns and social-economical realities. If we define modernity as the politicization of what had been non-political, publicization of what had been private; then nationalism was arguably the main protagonist of this transformation.


\(^{104}\) For the discussion of how diverse Greek regional communities with different languages, cultures and memories like Pontus Greeks, Capadocian Greeks, Cypriot Greeks were assembled together and incorporated into a single Greekness by the policies of 19th century Greek government and intellectuals and managed by Greek schooling and other mechanisms, Kitromilides, Paschalis, “Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus”, Middle Eastern Studies, (26:1), 1990, pp. 3-17.
The existence of local rivalries does not necessarily bring out the politicization of the concepts of nation and belonging\textsuperscript{105} as well as the form of its politicization\textsuperscript{106} although it is a fact that with the advent of the modern age, “knowledge of human behaviour.... became nationalized and universalized. Events that occur in isolated villages and hamlets or on the city streets have become subject to placement in categories and contexts previously unknown to or incidental to the lives of those who experience them.”\textsuperscript{107} We may observe that, the ethnic tensions and atrocities in the Balkans before reaching its climax during the Balkan Wars established the founding memories of Turkish nationalism. The sufferings and the subsequent exiling of the Turkish/Muslim civilians in the Balkan Wars was arguably the apex of this process.\textsuperscript{108}

Here, a very critical dimension had to be reintroduced. As claimed above, it is not possible to speak of the existence of a certain single “Turkishness” within the Ottoman geography. “A certain idea of Turkishness” can be constructed along with a certain conception of territoriality and the existence of an undisputable center. A well-know response of Fuad Pasha to the British ambassador to Constantinople, Stratford Canning as quoted in Cevdet Pasha’s “\textit{Tezakir}” illustrates this perception: “The integrity of the Ottoman Empire is founded on four premises. As long as these four premises are retained, it progresses. In the absence of any of these premises, it can not be held. These premises are as follows: the nation of Islam, the Turkish state, the dynasty of the Ottomans and

\textsuperscript{105} For the evolution of local rivalries and aggressions into the ethnic hatreds during and after the Balkan Wars see the report of the Carnegie Report. \textit{The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect}, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993. For the violent crashes and feuds between Bulgarians and Greeks within villages and communities before the outbreak of Balkan Wars and throughout the Hamidian era, see Dakin, Douglas, \textit{The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913}, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{106} For example left-wing political identities derived in many cases from local enmities as it happened in the post-WW II Greece, Italy and France. Accordingly, the endorsement of right and left political stances were derivations of non-political and pre-political cleavages. See Kalyvas, Stathis, “Red Terror: Leftist Violence during the Occupation”, in \textit{After the War was Over}, Mazower, Mark (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 176.


\textsuperscript{108} For the impact of the Balkan Wars on the production of Turkish memory, see the short stories of Ömer Seyfeddin such as \textit{Beyaz Lale, Primo Türk Çocuğu} and \textit{Bomba}.
Istanbul as its capital.” (Devlet-i Aliyye dört esas üzere müesses olup bunlar ile her nasıl istenilir ise idaresi ve ilerlemesi kabil olur ve bunlardan kangısı nakş olur ise idare kabil olmaz. Dört esas budur. Millet-i islamîyye devlet-i türkiyye salatin-i osmanîyye payitaht-i Istanbul.\textsuperscript{109})

To be able to incorporate rivers Vardar and Arax within the same imagination, a \textit{deux ex machina} is necessary. It may be argued that, it was the “myth of Istanbul” around which the idea of Ottoman/Turkish imagery/ideal was constructed. It was a pivotal element that enabled the flourishment and consolidation of an encompassing Turkishness within a wide geographical setting. Apparently, Istanbul symbolized the grandeur of the Ottoman \textit{imperium}. Here, the symbolism of Istanbul can be taken as the “primacy of politics” (i.e. external interference of the center) which facilitated the unification of the various strands and embodiments of Turkishness. This was yet another instance of the critical role of the imperium in the making of the political Turkish ethnie.

Thus, the making of the Turkish nation and a single Turkish ethnie eliminating local differences was an amalgamation of different processes in progress. It is impossible to dissociate any of these constitutive elements of Turkish nation and nationalism. The center needed the peripheral forces; however, the peripheral forces were to remain politically negligible unless stimulated and manipulated by the center. Regarding the making and development of Turkish national awareness and Turkish nationalism, there was no one single storyline in progress but different plots developing independently within the storyline to be intersected at a later point in time in the storyline. The imperial center was the reference point both for the peripheral developers of Turkish nationalism and the intellectuals situated in Istanbul and served as the unifier of these different storylines.

1.5. \textbf{Ruling Elite of the Tanzimat}

At this point, it is necessary to undertake an analysis of the Tanzimat ruling elite. In order to make such an analysis, a meticulous and extensive work is to be undertaken; here two different clusters referring to two different generations, socializations and upbringings,

will be proposed. The two clusters proposed are that of the Tanzimat generation and the Young Turk generation\textsuperscript{110}. These clusters will constitute models similar to the Weberian ideal types. In reality, they resemble and overlap with each other as much as they diverge. The transformation of the former to the later and transitional figures defying such a reductionism and duality are also observable, especially in the outlook of the bureaucrats of the late Hamidian era\textsuperscript{111}. The complete detachment of these two clusters (generations) would only conceal the Tanzimat origins of the Young Turk era. Furthermore, this study aims to emphasize the evolution of a structure of mind rather than to assess the generational change in terms of “the revolt of sons against their fathers”. This study focuses on what we will call the “Tanzimat generation” and discusses the “Young Turk” generation when necessary. In the next chapters, it will be attempted to be demonstrated that, the diplomats of the Hamidian Foreign Ministry were very much representative of their Tanzimat generation in their upbringing, socialization and mental structures.

We may also divide the Tanzimat generation into two distinctive sub-groups. In our scheme, “the early Tanzimat elite” was comprised of the higher echelons of the imperium from 1840s onwards who received limited and informal education, lacking professionalism and pursuing precarious careers. The Hamidian generation (the other sub-group of the Tanzimat generation) displayed the gradual maturation of the Tanzimat elite comprised of bureaucrats with more or less formalized educational backgrounds benefiting from the educational opportunities provided by the late Tanzimat reforms and holding clearly defined public offices and smooth careers. With the Hamidian era, it may be said that, the reforms of Tanzimat had widened to encompass the entirely of the state structure. Therefore, a modern bureaucracy, structured to a certain degree in terms of merit and formal education, became visible (albeit with limitations) as a gradual development of the Tanzimat. However, the nature of the Hamidian bureaucracy has to be qualified. The 19th

\textsuperscript{110} By “Young Turk generation”, we do not refer strictly to the Young Turks and Unionists. By “Young Turk generation”, we refer to the generation that grew up in the late 19th century, educated in the Hamidian imperial schools, socialized in a particular cultural and intellectual milieu and became much more equipped with Western and modern knowledge and vision. Thus this category subsumes the bulk of the young bureaucrats of the Hamidian era.

\textsuperscript{111} For example, see Çetinsaya, Gökhan, *Ottoman Administration in Iraq, 1890-1908*, London; New York: 2006, p. 71.
century bureaucratic culture hardly resembled the 20th century formal and impersonal bureaucratic culture. Instead, it relied predominantly on personal connections, thrusts and skills acquired less based on formal education but more on cultural socializations. It may be observed that the preexisting agrarian-coercive ruling elite reinvented itself as the bureaucratic elite and assumed bureaucratic offices.\textsuperscript{112}

Here, we are using the term, “ruling elite”, a rather ambiguous term. This term has to be precisely defined. By the term ruling elite, I mean a group of people who had reached the higher echelons of the Ottoman polity by merit, blood or mere chance and felt secure to transfer their wealth and prestige to their descendents. Şerif Mardin, in his classic book convincingly argued that by the time of Tanzimat or by the late reign of Mahmud II, there was an emerging self-consciousness and recognition of the idea of being a closed ruling elite with proper education and skills that was motivated and felt responsible for the maintenance and upholding of the Ottoman polity, taking the ultimate responsibility for the destiny of the Ottoman polity from the sultan.\textsuperscript{113}

This elite was not a hermetically closed community. It allowed and even encouraged new recruits. However, that does not mean that it was a completely “open” system welcoming any new member emphatically. A very important condition for admission into the ruling elite was the capacity and willingness to endorse the necessary mores, code of conduct, values and motivations of the governing elite and the state. In short, the new recruit had to attain the same ethos. Generally, this requirement did not generate such a drastic obstacle because the required education and training did infuse the relevant mores, and the new graduates learned not to pose serious challenges to the ideological pillars of the state structure. They willingly and enthusiastically assimilated themselves.

It is important to observe that many subjects of the sultan were unfavorable candidates to be admitted into the state elite due to their inappropriate ethnic, confessional or social backgrounds. Though, many from the unfavorable ethnic and communal groups were incorporated into the ruling elite, the extent of incorporation among these “unfavorable


groups” remained limited. It is possible to imagine that this discrimination tacitly and implicitly contributed to the realization of a belonging to a certain (national) identity which generates a sympathy with the population with whom they supposedly share the same ethos and same (notorious) fate in the context of the collapse of the empire which, incidentally, also threatened their material and non-material interests and dignity. The proposition could be made that an imagination of a cross-class community sharing commonalities was forged in this process.

The new recruits faced few practical problems in their conversion and assimilation to the state and the state elite. Of course, they were to encounter severe grievances and injustices as they were the new recruits to be sidelined and abused by the more privileged in the highly corrupted statecraft of the late Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman establishment was a conservative/patriarchal polity in which newcomers were not welcomed enthusiastically. That is, they were to be admitted to the governing elite although they were not acknowledged as equal as others. However, such mistreatments and discriminations derived partially from personal rivalries as a consequence of the gerontocratic and patriarchal understanding of statecraft which esteemed age and seniority and therefore would be outdone with the gradual promotion within the state bureaucracy.

On the other hand, the governing elite in the late Ottoman Empire was always “in the making” and continued to be “in making” throughout the early republic as the number of bureaucrats and the students studying in the imperial colleges of the Empire continued to rise exponentially in every generation. Every new generation of officials redefined the nature and build up of the Ottoman bureaucracy and polity although never radically altering its characteristics. Thus, continuity within changes is visible. The problem of failing to inject the ethos to the new recruits arose in the late Hamidian era when the education began to fail to mold the recruits with an appropriate upbringing. The new generation became disenchanted with the acclaimed ethos of the empire. The new generation demanded the modification of Ottoman ideological build up and rejected the ethos introduced to them in their training. Though, the main premises of the new generation were not destructive to the thrust of the imperial discourse.
1.6. The Elite-Formation and Identity-Formation Processes of the Tanzimat

It is important to emphasize that it is possible to speak of such a self-conscious state elite for the first time in the two decades just preceding the Rescript of Tanzimat (Reform) which ensued the proclamation of the Rescript. With the Tanzimat, dignitaries were assured that they would not be arbitrarily beheaded and their wealth and property not be confiscated as a consequence of their dismissal from office. The recognition of the maintenance of personal wealth after dismissal from office with the Rescript of Tanzimat also brought a new self-understanding of this elite. Previously, wealth, property and honor were seen as an imperial grant and therefore bound to the imperial grace. The state made the man and thus the beneficence endowed by the state may be revoked once the grace is withdrawn. With the termination of confiscations, the grandees’ pomposity began to belong solely to the individuals themselves. Such a guarantee and acknowledgement of the right to retain their property and wealth turned this “grouping” for the first time into a class-for-itself (in a non-Marxian sense). This does not mean that with the state’s (or sultan’s) recognition of the irrevocability of the wealth, this elite became relatively detached from the state. On the contrary, we may argue that, with the assurance of their possessions, they became associated/identified with the state even more closely since the legal recognition of their possessions meant that their wealth, prestige and reputation became bound to the survival and well-being of the Ottoman state. Thus, now, they had a major stake in the future of the Ottoman state for the first time.

114 For a conscious advocacy of the importance of the assurance of the civil officialdom see Sadık Rıfat Pasha’s Müntehabat-ı Asar, quoted extensively in Mardin, Şerif, ibid, pp.179-190.

115 For a parallel and comparative “emergence of an aristocratic caste” in the absence of official recognition of aristocracy, the Turkish aristocracy in Egypt is a very instructive example. The Turkish caste which derived its power not from holding land and property but from holding technical and bureaucratic knowledge and its domination of military and civil bureaucracy, establishment itself in the reign of Muhammed Ali and consolidated its power throughout the nineteenth century. Its supremacy was derived from functional and cultural origins. For a discussion of this peculiar aristocratic caste, see Grant, Samuel Becker, Modern Egypt and the Turco-Egyptian Elite, unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968, pp. 47-48, 88-90.
In the late Ottoman Empire, as a residue of the pre-modern political-economical order and pattern, wealth continued to be distributed and redistributed not according to the ownership of capital and holding of means of production but according to the control of the political power. The distribution of the capital was not determined as a function of relations of capital but as a function of relations of political power.

Marx is criticized for disregarding the importance of the mechanisms of distribution and redistribution and the prominent role the owners of the means of distribution and redistribution assumed in the economic sphere although it was Marx himself who vividly demonstrated the unprecedented transformative power of forces of capital with the onset of capitalism (i.e. modernity). Contrary to Marx, we may argue that, before the advent of modern age, regardless of who made the actual production, the power laid with the political authority. It was the coercive mechanisms of the political authorities that could be able to extract the surplus from the producers and the owners of the tools of production based on their legitimate rights drawn on the divine grace and customs. So, we may argue that, whoever generated a certain surplus within the Ottoman lands, the ultimate profiteer and ultimate accumulator of surplus was the political authority. The social group who benefited from the accumulation of wealth in the treasury was the state elite, the persons who held the key positions in the state’s extraction of wealth.

Moreover, before the Industrial Revolution, productivity and efficiency was minimal and production created only very little surplus. That means, the best option to accumulate wealth was not intensive production (unless there was a gigantic market demand like in the Roman Empire) but plunder and tribute. Therefore, military activity was the quintessential occupation to accumulate wealth. Simply put, warfare was not only an economic activity in pre-modernity but it was also the most profitable business. Apparently, the military entrepreneurs and contractors like Wallenstein were amassing

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116 Randall Collins names this mode of social order as “agrarian-coercive”. Collins, Randall, *Macrohistory*, Stanford: Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. For Collins, the chief beneficiaries of this order were those who held the tools of (material and spiritual) coercion like states, land and monasteries. In this order, it was not the market but the coercive mechanisms that determined the production and distribution of wealth.

enormous amount of wealth and were the successful businessmen of their time.\textsuperscript{118} This analysis establishes that the possessors of the right to use violence and coercion and not the producers of material goods were more likely to be “elites” even in economical terms. The state itself was also an economic activity and a mechanism to extract and transfer wealth. Moreover, the state was a privilege of those who claimed it for themselves and therefore benefited from its material advantages.

While discussing the transitional period of the Ottoman statecraft from a medieval self-interested and self-oriented organization to a “patron state” claiming to represent and uphold the benefit of all its subjects (and land), Ehud Toledano defines the classical and transitional Ottoman state as follows:

“If ‘state’ is taken to reflect a well-integrated modern entity....then this is not what the Ottoman Empire was during the period reviewed in this book (19th century-DG). Rather, it was a “compound” polity, made up of a coalition of interest groups that formed its imperial elite. That elite was mostly male and Muslim, multiethnic, kul/harem and freeborn, military-administrative-legal-learned, urban and rural, officeholding and propertyed, Ottoman-imperial and Ottoman-local....It is in that sense of a composite polity that we use here the term Ottoman ‘state’ which also jibes with the notion of a ‘classical tributary empire’....(It) consisted of “segmented, loosely integrated, and partly overlapping forms of power and authority.”\textsuperscript{119}

The description of Ehud Toledano fits well with our Marxian framework which presupposes not a well-knit and perfectly organized exploitative elite but a conglomerate of various clusters with different inclinations and orientations sharing a common interest and assembled as a compromise in this joint venture. Toledano makes the point that in contrast to the rhetoric of Tanzimat, this organization did not change considerably throughout the 19th century although it was on its way to transform itself into a “patron state”, especially by the Hamidian era. It is also important to note that, this transition was arguably managed without disturbing the interests of the “ruling elite(s)”.  

\textsuperscript{118} For Wallenstein, see Mann, Golo, \textit{Wallenstein: His Life Narrated}, Rinehart & Winston, 1976.

Of course, here it will not be intended to make a comprehensive and all-encompassing Marxian analysis of the Ottoman state elite.\textsuperscript{120} However, it is important to construct an operational framework to comprehend the dynamics of the (trans)formation of the 19th century Ottoman state elite. Here it is argued that, given that the structure and patterns of Ottoman political organization were favoring Muslims (and even more so Turks\textsuperscript{121}) in admitting them into the elite and including them, this Marxian scheme can be seen as illustrating the foundations of the making of the Turkish nation forged around the pivot of Ottoman polity. Here, it is argued that, the effort and urge to safeguard the economical system maintained throughout the several Ottoman centuries contributed to the generation of a Turkish/Ottoman national awareness and subsequently nationalism to flourish throughout 19\textsuperscript{th} century and onwards.\textsuperscript{122} In other words, the very Turkish nationalism was

\textsuperscript{120} For the conceptualization of the pre-modern Middle Eastern elites by themselves and by the people, see Ayalon, Ami, Language and Change in the Arabic Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 52-68.

\textsuperscript{121} Turks were began to be perceived as early as early nineteenth century. While the Ottoman Empire was establishing the new conscript army after the abolishment of Janissaries, non-Turks were seen as unreliable and therefore Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye was formed of predominantly Turkish populace. See Erdem, Y. Hakan, “Recruitment for the ‘Victorious Soliders of Muhammad’ in the Arab Provinces, 1826-1828”, Gershoni, Israel & Erdem, Y. Hakan, Woköck, Ursula (ed.), Histories of the Middle East, Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 189-206.

\textsuperscript{122} Although obviously nations did not exist as fixed entities throughout history, this does not mean that nations were created in the beginning of the modern age ex nihilo. In this sense, nations are genuine not because they did exist before the modern age but because they were constituted not as a manipulations of sinister puppet masters but constituted spontaneously due to the impelling of the dramatically changing circumstances. Nation-making process was the amalgamation of responses to the very recent developments and therefore “nations” have their genuineness. Based on an economical explanation, nation-formation resembles the class-formation. Michael Mann explains fascisms as a formulation of class war, for example in countries such as Poland, Austria (and Germany to a less extent) Jew constituted a very high percentage of the practitioners of liberal professions and economical enterprises. In this context, anti-semitism emerged as an expression of class hatreds and class prejudices. It was also an expression of the have-nots against the haves. (see Mann, Micheal, Fascists, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2004). Mann interprets the genocides again as the ultimate expression of class envies. “Ethnic hostility rises where ethnicity trumps class as the main form of social stratification, in the process capturing and channeling classlike sentiments towards ethnonationalism” (Mann, Michael, The Dark Side of Democracy, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.5) Mann criticizes theorists of nationalism such as Brubaker, Hutchinson
partially an effort of the beneficiaries of the political/economical structure to hold on to their medieval state privileges at a time when revolutionary transformations of economic and political environments took place.

The expropriation of the domestic produce was no more possible in the age of imperialism, foreign intrusion and the internationalization of Ottoman economy. Although with the introduction of machinery, the surplus obtained in production had boomed exponentially, the Ottoman state lost its privileged share in the distribution of the surplus obtained. Market forces and foreign merchants began to get increasing shares from the aggregate surplus and thus weakened the significance and pivotal status of the Ottoman polity and its shareholders. The role of the state in economical relations declined and destroyed the economic privileges of the beneficiaries of the Ottoman polity. This process was expected in the age of the emergence and predatory expansion of the market. Although countries such as Britain had increased their power with benefiting from the expansion of the market, Ottoman polity perceived market as its binary opposite. With the marketization process, economic relations could no more be determined along ethno/religious identities and communities in the age of market in which everything solid melted into the air. Market in Europe demolished all socially constructed structures and communities such as guilds and aristocracy. The Ottoman center elite, holding onto the classical perceptions, tried its best to perpetuate the economical relations as they used to be and Smith for completely neglecting the class relations in the making of nationalisms. He also criticizes those who see class as something materialistic and nations something emotional such as Connor and Horowitz. (p.5) Although here Mann points outs the dynamics of class in the making of nationalisms, the class dimension is significant in the very making of the nations as well. In the Balkan nationalisms and the Turkish one, this interrelation was even more significant.


124 It may be interesting to recall Karl Polanyi’s portrayal of the dissolution of all medieval social constructs and the crisis of the Ottoman state’s imagination of the new age of market.
and depended on politically, socially and culturally constructed categories and distinctions. The fact that Muslims (and primarily Turks) were the beneficiaries of the pre-modern economic organization and it was the non-Muslims who benefited from the marketization of economy ensued the ethnicization of the economic transformation and thus the economic cleavages (such as in the case of Balkan peasant rebellions in which Christian peasants rebelled against the Muslim landowners throughout 19th century) caused the formations of ethnic symbolisms and identities.

In the Ottoman Empire, the askeri class/reaya distinction had already collapsed in the 17th century if it had ever existed in its perfect form. The devşirme system also had collapsed by the late 17 century. By 19th century, all the constructed and imagined social structures and distinctions were in retreat and on the verge of collapse. In the pre-Tanzimat period, “there was nothing like one Ottoman elite, there were a number of them, and some of the elite groups would have had no place in the sixteenth-century concept of askeri; it is sufficient to mention as examples the tax-farming provincial notable, the non-Muslim kocabaşı (local or regional community leader) the Phanariot hospodar or the Armenian money-lender of substance who belonged to the group of people called amira.” In this period, we also observe the emergence of an ulema aristocracy. “Aristocracy” here is meant a closed community enjoying the advantages of entitlements and stubbornly keeping the community intact. This privilege was maintained due to the ulema’s divine/exceptional status. The ulema had managed to avoid outside interferences and meddling, be it sultanic or otherwise. The ulema aristocratic families managed to hold onto a common interest, a certain sense of class-for-itself. In short, we can speak of a fragmented and subcontracted

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ruling elite, not consistent with a legal framework, that survived throughout the 19th century, basically dependent on the Ottoman state.

However, whatever the reconfiguration and reality of the Ottoman governing elite may be, the social imagination that society was split between those who are ruled (subjects) and those who rule (masters) persisted well until the early 19th century and state continued to be imagined as a “privilege”. This division may be formulated in quasi-Marxian terms as between owners of the means of distribution and redistribution and those who do not own means of distribution and redistribution. In theory, this division was determined by people’s status/relational vis-a-vis the state. The askeri group was defined by its members’ submission to a certain authority. It may be that all the members were seeking their own self-interest but pursuit of self-interests of all the individual members does not automatically entail the existence of a group interest. The existence of strong and shabby factions attested by Abou-El-Hajj and others does not indicate the existence of the presence of a bureaucratic aristocracy primarily because they did not set the rules themselves. However, these factions and rivalries had planted the seeds of the prospective emergence of a bureaucratic aristocracy and a state elite. With the transformation of the Ottoman state, this group evolved into an elite for itself although the use of physical violence in intra-elite rivalries avoided the emergence of a unified and solid elite. The violent struggles between factions severely cost the governing elite as a whole and its development as a class.


130 The genealogical continuity was not a novel feature of eighteenth century. Itzkowitz writes “Another reality which is revealed by a study of careers and career opportunities in the empire is the tendency for sons to follow in the careers of their fathers. This tendency for sons of Janissaries to become Janissaries, sons of Ulema to become Ulema, and sons of bureaucrats to become bureaucrats was already well-established by the early seventeenth century and in the course of the eighteenth century it appears that it was getting to be awfully difficult for sons to break with the career patterns of their fathers. To put it another way, the Ottoman Empire may have been suffering from hardening of the career arteries”. (Itzkowitz, Norman, “Eighteenth Century Realities”, Studia Islamica, No. 16 (1962), p. 91.
The bloody end of the Pertev Pasha-Akif Pasha conflict terminated the use of violence and physical elimination of political rivals as an effective method to advance in the hierarchy.\textsuperscript{131} The Tanzimat brought out the mutual recognition of the inviolability of the basic rights of life and property of the members of the governing elite as well as the recognition of these essential rights of the individuals belonging to the governing elite by the sultan. Hence, the Tanzimat paved the way for the emergence of a solid governing elite with a number of families, each member occupying various chief posts of the state.

Dror Ze’evi speaks of “the cunning hand of history...(that) plays tricks on the protagonists.” Ze’evi points out to the self-destruction of the traditional kul (slave/servant – of the sultan- DG) class by voluntarily dissolving the pre-national and pre-modern (agro-literate) collective identity through the official nationalism of the Ottoman Empire. “In the course of their attempts to create a new political and social structure, the kul unwittingly destroyed the foundations of the old one-their own.”\textsuperscript{132} However, regardless of the shift to a new institutional model, I would suggest a genealogical continuity of the Tanzimat elite with that of the pre-Tanzimat elite. Itzkowitz after studying the eighteenth century Ottoman civil officialdom concludes: “It is significant that the bureaucrats were in the forefront of those who supported the reforms of Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The wearers of the fez and the long, black frock coat, the uniform of the bureaucracy under Mahmud II, were the sons of the scribes of the eighteenth century, many of them in turn, descendants of the scribes of the seventeenth century.”\textsuperscript{133}

Here, it is claimed that with the diffusion of power from the political high-ranking posts to the bureaucracy at large, civil servants prominence increased. Hence, dissemination of power created a new grouping and identity.

\textsuperscript{131} For the bloody struggle between Akif Pasha and Pertev Pasha and its drastic repercussions, see Findley, Carter, \textit{Ottoman Civil Officialdom}, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 70-80. This case is a very interesting showcase for the Foucauldian argument of the replacement of bodily violence with non-physical mechanisms of violence.


\textsuperscript{133} Itzkowitz, Norman, \textit{Mehmed Raghib Pasha: The Making of an Ottoman Grand Vizier}, unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1959, p. 21 Itzkowitz also notes that
The dignitaries of the early decades of the Tanzimat formed the first generation of these families who were predominantly scions and descendants of minor (or major) clerks and military officers of the preceding generation. Others were scions of provincial/peripheral elites moving to Istanbul. In the next decades, we observe the second and third generation of these governing elite families retaining the prominent roles of their families. A genealogical revolution will take place only with the coming of the graduates of the imperial schools in the late nineteenth century although even after the “democratization” of the education, a remarkable continuity is visible.

A prosopographic study would show us the genealogies, lineages and connections of the late Ottoman elite. In this study, in the forthcoming chapters, this pattern will

Roderick Davison failed to recognize this continuity of the nineteenth century Ottoman bureaucracy implying that Davison treats as if the Tanzimat bureaucracy had came from outer space. Also see Itzkowitz’s remarks in Itzkowitz, Norman & Shinder, Joel, “The Office of Şeyh-ül Islam and the Tanzimat-A Prosopographic Enquiry”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan., 1972), p. 100. “There is evidence to indicate that bureaucrats who progressed rapidly after 1839 to attain high; but not the highest, offices were the sons of Ottomans of low bureaucratic rank. In other words, tanzimat did not open up Ottoman status in any wholesale way to those who had not been Ottomans prior to 1839.” Avigdor Levy also underlines the persistence of the old elite. “From a social point of view, the new military leadership was fully integrated with the older ruling class. It was this integration that had assured the acceptance of Mahmud’s reforms in the first place, for they had not been accompanied by any social upheavals. This was an achievement of mixed significance. The absorption of the old ruling elite into the new system was a source of weakness in Mahmud’s own time, for the transformation of a traditional leadership into a modern one is a slower process than the creation of a new elite. In the long run, however, the preservation of the old elite became a source of strength.” Levy, Avigdor, “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II’s New Ottoman Army, 1826-39”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan., 1971), p. 39.

Apart from various names articulated throughout this study, some examples coming from local dynasties and prominent families are Yusuf Kamil Pasha (İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnan, Son Sadrazamlar, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982 , p. 196) Hüseyin Avni Pasha (İbnülemin..., p. 483), Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha (Rifat Uçarol, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa, İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1989, p. 7). (Istanbul or local) Ulema was another source for the recruitment of Tanzimat statesmen. Some figures were fathered by an alim such as Münif Pasha (Budak, Ali, Münif Paşa, Kitabevi, 2004, p. 4) and others came from prominent local ulema families such as Fuad Pasha (İbnülemin..., ibid,, p. 149) and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (Fatma Aliye Hanum, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve Zamanı, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1332, p. 7; Chambers, Richard, “The Education of a Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Alim, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Oct., 1973), p. 440). Apparently, a significant portion of the
attempted to be revealed in the case of the Ottoman diplomats and a genealogical continuity from the first generation of Tanzimat to the early republic will be attempted to be established. What is more interesting than the genealogies extending from early Tanzimat (and pre-Tanzimat) to the republic are the marriage connections. The marriages functioned as the glue of a somewhat closed community which delineated its borders and strengthened its cohesiveness. The significant role of the marriages will be revealed again in the case of the diplomats in the next chapters of this study. The lineages and connections observable among the Ottoman diplomats will also expose how this closed elite was integrated and how well the closed elite perceives itself as a community with clearly drawn borders and habits. Furthermore, marriages enabled this community’s perpetuation and adjustment in terms of welcoming newcomers from the newly ascending segments of the society, which was in the process of capitalizing the economic structure and the centralization of the state.

The emergence of a kind of cohesive bureaucratic aristocracy and a state elite created a certain sense of belonging. For the first time, the governing elite constituted a certain community (imagined or real). The development of the notion of belonging to a certain

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Tanzimat elite were fathered by prominent servants of state like Mustafa Reşid Pasha (Sicill-i Osmani, p. 1384), Mehmed Emin Pasha (İbnülemin…ibid, p. 83), Mahmud Nedim Pasha (Pakalın, Mehmet Zeki, Mahmud Nedim Paşa, İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1940, p. 1).

135 The old paradigm equaled the advent of modern age with the decline of aristocracy. According to this paradigm, in the new modern world, aristocracy had no chance to live. Its age-old privileges were abolished and therefore it was forced to be ousted from the political scene. The monetarization and capitalization of the economy destroyed the economic base of the aristocracy. However, this paradigm had been questioned as the mechanisms the aristocracy developed to adapt itself to the modern economy have been studied. The new studies acknowledge a significant role to the aristocracy in the 19th century not only in Britain but also in France (and apparently Germany). See Higgs, David, Nobles in Nineteenth Century France, John Hopkins University Press, 1987. Hence, although in the Ottoman Empire we can’t speak of an official aristocracy in the European sense based on bloodlines, we may speak of an aristocracy based on belonging to a respectable family with venerable service to the state. In this regard, we may reanalysis the “birth of modern Turkey” not centered around the Young Turks but around the previous generation. The Hamidian “imperial classrooms” in which the prospective Young Turks studied and learned to revere the Ottoman polity were established out of the imaginary of the Tanzimat generation.
community was the first step for the creation of the idea of a national identity. It could be envisioned that nations are imageries of families written large. If this allegory is correct, nations then symbolize what a family (or a small community consisted of people who know each other well like a neighborhood) symbolizes; intimacy, feeling of security and affection. In the case of the Ottoman governing elite, the image of Turkishness (which is itself to a certain extent a derivation of the Muslimness) may be interpreted as a projection of its own sense of belonging and identity in the face of a variety of threats close and distant.

The Tanzimat and post-Tanzimat generations of bureaucrats developed different political outlooks due to the experience of different social environments in their formative periods. The Young Turk generation, experiencing daily ethnic discriminations and cleavages, was more prone to conceptualize the social and economic matters in ethnic terms given that they felt themselves threatened and regarded themselves inferior to the non-Muslims in terms of economic and local political dynamics. For the Tanzimat generation, it was rather the opposite. “They” were superior metaphysically and practically to the ones whom they regarded as their rebellious subjects or their ra’yah. They were superior to the non-Muslims both in reality and in perception. This perception, as pointed out above, originated from an actuality but persisted although the reality changed dramatically throughout the 19th century when Muslims could not compete with the advancement of the non-Muslims. The idea that non-Muslims had to be submissive as the Islamic law and divine grace required endured even in the republican perception of the non-Muslims as a remnant of the imperial consciousness. In short, these two outlooks, sometimes contrasting and sometimes coinciding self-perceptions, were transplanted onto the modern self-image of Turkishness. Here, some simplistic categorizations do not apply.

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137 This perception is prevalent in various 19th century accounts of Ottoman statesmen. For example see Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, Mira’at-i Hakikat, İstanbul: Berekat Yaynevi, 1983; Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, Sergüzeş-ti Hayätım, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996, v. I.
On the contrary, these continuities within breaks show the complex nature of the nature of Turkish nationalism.

This observation is congruent with the argument made above. If we agree that nationalism is not a phenomenon out-there to be grasped with the onset of modernity but instead created (in the minds), then every social-political-economical context will produce its own actuality which we call for the sake of simplification “nationalism” as if all the nationalisms are equivalent or similar.\(^\text{138}\) If we define nationalism not as a consequence of other dynamics but a “style” or a “rhetoric” and contextualize nationalism in relation with the socio-economical and political context in which it developed, then we may answer larger existential, distressing and profound questions to which nationalism emanated as a modest response. In this regard, nationalism may be seen as a strategy of interest-seeking. Nationalism supplies a considerable legitimacy for propagandizing for other means, generally particularistic interests of a class, a status group or a generation.

Signs of these continuities could be traced to a symbolic level. The language and vocabulary of the classical Ottoman polity was a reservoir from which the basic tenets of Turkish nationalism were reproduced. Alleged symbols of the grandeur of classical Ottoman imperium such as “Mehter Marşı” were invented by the Young Turks as “tradition” as were the various “inventions” of Abdülhamid II regarding the origins of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman Empire in its classical age as shown by Selim Deringil.\(^\text{139}\) After 1908, the anniversary of the birth of the Empire began to be celebrated as a national holiday.\(^\text{140}\) This practice is what Anthony Smith calls the utilization of myths


\(^{139}\) Deringil, Selim, ibid.

and symbols. Smith argues that the ethno-symbolism was prevalent throughout centuries and nationalists had built on these ethno-symbols and myths.\textsuperscript{141} Here, developing on Smith’s argument, we may recall how constitutive the Ottoman symbols and myths were in the making of Turkish nationalism. However, these continuities include not only myths and symbols but the basic discourses and perceptions as well. This does not mean that Turkish nationalism was a continuation, revival or modification of Ottoman imperialism (as the Balkan nationalist historiographies like to interpret). It demonstrated how certain perceptions and modes of conduct were predetermined by the inheritance which was voluntarily or involuntarily, consciously or unconsciously adopted. In short, although Turkish nationalism may be a novelty and a recent phenomenon, it rose over a legacy it had adopted and appropriated. First and foremost, it took a particular perception which had been produced within a certain socio-politico-economical context and background but once constructed, it created its own reality and independent existence for its own.

Regarding the emergence of a Turkish national identity, it had been pointed out that two alternative suggestions may be stipulated. First is to maintain that national identity was brought forth by the group of people whom we called “Young Turk generation”, mostly originating from Roumelia coming from provincial lower middle classes\textsuperscript{142} (and some from Anatolia and Istanbul as well). The alternative interpretation is to argue that a certain national identity was already conceptualized in the center (in the abode of imperium). Of course these two alternative suggestions are “ideal types” and discussed here for presenting a palpable yet simplistic modeling. Here, it is suggested that the conceptualization of the Turkish nationhood was not a smooth and straightforward process. On the contrary, it was the outcome of an interactive and complex process made, remade and negotiated every day.


\textsuperscript{142} For the Roumelian origin of the Young Turks, see Erik J. Zürcher’s statistics; see Zürcher, Erik J, “The Young Turks- Children of the Borderlands ?”, \textit{International Journal of Turkish Studies}, 9/1-2 (2003), pp. 275-286.
To summarize, here it is argued that Turkish nationalism’s perceptions, premises and assumptions can’t be disassociated from the Ottoman central elite’s perceptions, premises, concerns, reflexes and responses to changing circumstances. The perceptions of “retreat” and “advances of the others” were all retained, maintained and reinvented. Though, many novel concerns particular to the ramifications of modernity and the encounter with modernity appeared such as the proposed strategies for “regeneration”, a step function trajectory from the 17th-18th century to the discourse and nature of Ottoman/Turkish modernity can be traceable.

1.7. The Pre-Tanzimat Istanbul Elite

Ariel Salzmann, based on her research on the tax-farmers of 18th century, showed how the Istanbul ‘aristocracy of service’, took advantage of a distinctly old-regime type of insider trading or what the economist Joseph Stiglitz calls in a modern context, “asymmetric information.” Rifa’at Abou-El-Haj showed how a bureaucratic and military aristocracy, without carrying hereditary titles and designations, reproduced itself in the late 17th century. Itzkowitz pointed out that sons maintained the career patterns of their fathers. Whereas Dina Rizk Khoury demonstrated that the emergence of a local elite was not necessarily adverse to a centralized Ottoman polity within an Ottoman framework, Salzmann and Abou-El-Hajj established that the emerging self-interested households of the “center” did not pose a threat to the effectiveness and authoritativeness of the state as well.

143 Salzmann, Ariel, ibid, p. 19.
The aforementioned Ottomanists reveal that, these household maneuvers and politics, on the contrary, contributed to the development of an effective central power.\textsuperscript{146}

We can not consider all these crucial developments independent from the emergence of the modern state. This is especially what Abou-El-Hajj fundamentally demonstrated in his studies. In his dissertation, he denoted the Treaty of Karlowitz as a milestone in the gradual transformation of the character of the Ottoman statecraft from a military-based structure to a modern-bureaucratic structure. Abou-El-Hajj wrote that before the Karlowitz, the Ottoman state lacked any formal understanding for the role of diplomacy. The “militant Islamic ideology” prioritized victory in the battleground. Diplomacy was not a habitual and institutional part of the statecraft but only a method used as a last resort applicable only when arms do not produce the anticipated results. After several defeats in the Ottoman-Austrian war, the Ottoman sultan did not “turn to compromise until every chance of regaining the lost Ottoman territories, by military arms, had been exhausted. Finally, with the defeat at Senta in 1697, it became quite clear to the Court at Istanbul that the only alternative to compromise and a negotiated peace would most definitely have been an even more punitive dictation of terms.” Realizing the utmost threat, the Ottomans agreed for a settlement. Abou-El-Hajj proposes that “for Ottoman history, the sultan’s consent to negotiate peace has farreaching consequences.” For the “patently militarist ideology, it is perhaps a truisim to assert that to this State war rather than compromise had been the chosen and preferred instrument of international intercourses with Europe. However, this attitude could be sustained only as long as an Ottoman military superiority was upheld.....In the process of dictating its peace terms, during moments of victory, the Ottoman State had developed neither the formal apparatus for diplomatic communication nor the corps of trained personnel necessary for the negotiation of peace. In the past, when knowledge of the immediate military situation was considered sufficient qualification for leading an Ottoman diplomatic delegation, the personnel of Ottoman mission was drawn almost exclusively from the military establishment. In some instances, the grand vizier himself, as commander-in-chief, would lead a delegation composed primarily of his military entourage.....With the appointment of the Reisülküttab Rami Mehmed Efendi as chief of the Ottoman

\textsuperscript{146} For the rise of households in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century in provinces, also see Hathaway, Jane, \textit{The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt}, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1997.
delegation to the Congress of Karlowitz, the transfer of responsibility for leadership of Ottoman diplomatic missions from the military establishment is completed.”

Although, the argument of Abou-El-Hajj remains reductionist, not giving its due to the developments in the scribal service in the preceding crucial decades, especially in the light of recent scholarship exposing the earliest stages of modern state-formation and bureaucracy-formation and he reiterates the Eurocentric assumption that the classical Ottoman (and Islamic) worldview was static, militarist and determined by religious affiliations and zeal, the basic premise of his argument that there is a gradual change of the self-perception of the nature of state within the Ottoman polity, is valid.

In the 18th century, the civil bureaucracy gradually enhanced its position vis-a-vis the military and the religious establishments. Agreeing with Abou-El-Hajj, Virginia Aksan wrote that “(t)he eighteenth century, then, can be seen as a battleground not just of the Ottomans and the Russians but also of the opposing visions of Ottoman elites, who gradually began to realize the inadequacy of the old ideology.” She further commented that “(t)he military was probably the most disenfranchised and alienated professional group

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150 For an overview of the rise of the 18th century Ottoman civil officialdom see Aksan, Virginia, *An Ottoman Statesman in War & Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi*, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 1995

151 Aksan, Virginia, ibid, p. xii.
Aksan sees her protagonist, Ahmed Resmi Efendi, as a transitional figure but notes that “those ideals (of the classical Ottoman discourse) disappear for the most part in the political advise literature of the later eighteenth century, although appeals for the preservation of religion and state (din-ü-devlet) remain constant.” Likewise, although peace with infidels was accepted, “jurists were interpreting the concept of holy war to permit a legal state of peace, basing it on the rationale of the good of the Muslim community –maslaha- a term much evoked in later treaties.” The justification was legitimized by a story of the prophet Muhammad, which became a cliché in the Ottoman writings on war and peace. In the Treaty of Hudaybiya in 628 AD between Muhammad and the Meccans, the prophet was forced to concede a truce of ten years, in order to enable the new Muslim community to perform the pilgrimage in the city of Mecca. In the event, Muhammad and his community made a triumphal entry into Mecca the following year. In other words, such concessions were only a temporary stop on the way to the ultimate Muslim victory.”

In short, we, like Aksan, observe the process of a dramatic upheaval going along with the persistence of the discourse of the classical age. What we observe is not a total repudiation of the former ideology but its adjustment, refabrication or even restoration, rendering it compatible in the changing environments and communicable/relevant in the novel political vocabulary of the modern age.

The civil bureaucracy had more vested interest in the survival, well-being, and advancement of the state as they were more likely to acquire wealth and property to inherit to their scions. Therefore, a civil bureaucratic elite is more prone to stability and thus more conservative in its orientation in comparison to the military caste. With the increase of the number of clerks within the nascent bureaucracy and their advancing role within the administrative body, a new elite with a strong sense of commitment to their stakes was

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152 ibid, p. xiv.
consolidated. Here, it is suggested that, to understand the Tanzimat and the Ottoman modernity, we have to reconstruct the nature of this newly emerging elite preceding the upcoming radical transformation of the Ottoman polity and contextualize Ottoman “transformation” within this socio-political background. Although the early modern age of the Ottoman polity became an area of interest for study, the integration of the field of early modern Ottoman Empire into the field of European early modernity is yet to be achieved, especially due to the lack of interest of the historians of early modern Europe towards the Ottoman Empire. Framing early Ottoman modernity within the European early modernity is yet to be undertaken.  

The few decades prior to the Rescript of Tanzimat are conspicuous in the sense that in them, themes of premodern history and themes of modern history are intertwined and blended. Therefore a study of this time span requires a knowledgeable background and needs a sophisticated and subtle interpretation. Recent Ottomanists meticulously tried to portray this crucial transitional phase in its complexity. They questioned the alleged revolutionary features of the Tanzimat and conceded a long period of “preparation”. However, we are yet to comprehend the peculiarities of the reforms of Mahmud II, Selim III and their backgrounds in their complexity. Furthermore, although the term “Westernization” is getting less and less explanatory and abandoned for its value-loaded


content while conceptualizations such as “centralization” are proposed\textsuperscript{158}, we still lack a systematic treatment and an alternative assessment of the sweeping transformation undertaken by the pre-Tanzimat Ottoman state.

A subtle assessment of the era may be established with entering into the mental world of the ruling elite. Such an endeavor may allow us to figure out some aspects of the “social” origins of the so-called Westernization. As suggested above, Westernization may be seen as a dependent function of elite politics and state affairs. When we are speaking of the state and formation of the modern state, we cannot comprehend this process without contextualizing it within a social framework. Into what kind of socio-political background, was all the upcoming tremendous upheaval to be born?

Joel Shinder discusses the career and worlds of Mustafa Efendi, a civil servant, a nobody for history, and one of those losers “staffing the bureaus …[who] turned out enormous mountains of paperwork”. He tries to reconstruct the world of Mustafa Efendi according to his inventory on his death registered item no. 2448 in Kamil Kepeci classification. After documenting his library, full of Islamic books, poetry, political tracts and chronicles reflecting the intellectual world of premodernity before the advent of rationality and natural sciences, Shinder ended his article writing: “During the succeeding generation a radical change in style and pace of Ottoman life would commence. This change was Westernization…. (t)he defeats of 1768-1774 and the changes they called for were part of another world. However many watches and chime clocks and European locks he might have owned, Mustafa Efendi would not have understood, not at all.”\textsuperscript{159} Although it is true that any generation faces grave problems in adapting to a changing world, these encounters can not be reduced to a simplistic Westernized vs. Eastern dichotomy. The recent studies on the 18\textsuperscript{th} century Ottoman Empire, while demolishing reductionist myths such as “Age of Tulips”\textsuperscript{160}, demonstrated the interactions which can not be reduced


to two mutually exclusive categories. It is important to notice that although the phrase “taking from the West” was employed, this process was not a wholesale Westernization, and an import. As it had been demonstrated, what had been dubbed as “Westernization” had indigenous inspirations and dynamics.

Westernization was not a goal in itself but a method to survive/revive in the changing times. It was an effort of adaptation and cooptation. Mustafa Efendi, a member of the ruling elite and in the view of Shinder was “probably a scribe in the imperial council when, to France’s delight and Austria’s dismay, the Ottomans managed to win as much at the conference table in 1789”; illustrates the mental repercussions experienced at the dawn of an unprecedented transformation and disproves the supposed dichotomy between the old-type clerk and the Westernized bureaucrat. As it had been suggested by Itzkowitz, Aksan and many others, there is not only a traceable ideological/mental continuity and affinity between the 19th century and the 18th century but a genealogical continuity as well. This does not mean that there existed a closed elite. Apparently, inclusion in the Ottoman state elite was considerably easier vis-à-vis its European counterparts. It may be even argued that incorporations into the state elite was perceived as reinforcing the state and thus encouraged. However, the extent of inclusion and the assimilative/selective nature and form of this incorporation situated the motor of change within the established elite of the Empire. Therefore, assuming a sharp break between Tanzimat and its preceding era would be misleading and conceals affinities and continuities. The drastic Ottoman undertaking of reorganizing and modernizing the state had been born in such a social milieu.


1.8. Modernity as Reorganization of the State, Reorganization of the Society

At this point, a few words have to be said about Ottoman modernity in order to link and relate it to its immediate prehistory. As it should already have been noticed, we have not yet presented an operative and authoritative definition of the “modern”. Understanding “what is modern” and what it takes to be “modern” are crucial in our framework for the study of the making of the modern Ottoman/Turkish state.¹⁶³

First and foremost, it should be observed that formation of modernity was not a “democratic” process in the sense that it was not equally and simultaneously disseminated to all the strata of society simultaneously and in equal proportions. Moreover, the intensity of its diffusion is not equal among various social classes, segments and spheres. This pattern is not unique to the Ottoman or non-Western contexts. As shown best in the landmark study of Eugene Weber, it was only by the late 19th century or the early 20th century that modern state and modernity had infiltrated into the French countryside. It was the state that had developed and instigated “modernity” by intentionally radiating (or imposing) it via the means of education, conscriptions, railways et cetera. The states found it necessary to “socially disciplinize”¹⁶⁴ and “modernize their subjects” by means of educating and civilizing them. Thus, the states had stake in the “modern”. It was in their best interests to reconstruct the individuals and the community which they ruled over (dubbed and redefined as nations) as “modern” and “saving” them from being unruly savages. By reformatting them, the states rendered their subjects more efficient, productive and, thus, controllable.¹⁶⁵ Their governmentality policies necessitated a modernization

¹⁶⁵ For some prominent historical studies on social discipline, see Raeff, Marc, The Well-Ordered Police State, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983; Melton, James Van Horn, Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Education, Cambridge,
Regardless of the reasons and motivations of these actions; the official initiatives had shaped the emergence of the modern society. In short, to an important extent, modernity was imposed from above by political decree. We have to consider the artificial nature of the genesis of modernity to understand the dynamics of the emergence of the Ottoman modernity.

As argued above, first, it was the state that was “modern”. It was the early modern states that reorganized themselves according to objective, rational, sound and effective norms. The states did not self-consciously “opt” for “modernizing themselves” but the opportunities, such as the development of transportation, communications and accumulation of knowledge, as well as constraints such as expansion of the military, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1988; Oestreich, Gerhard, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1982.

See Foucault, Micheal. “Governmentality”, in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Burchell, Graham & Gordon, Colin, & Miller, Peter (ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Foucault defines art of government in his lectures on governmentality as follows as quoted in Michel Foucault (Rabinow, Paul (ed.), New York: The New Press, 1997, vol. III): “(I)n the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, the art of government finds its first form of crystallization, organized around the theme of reason of state, understood not in the negative and pejorative sense....but in a full and positive sense: the state is governed according to rational principles that are intrinsic to it and cannot be derived solely from natural or divine laws or the principles of wisdom and prudence....The state, like nature, has its own proper form of rationality, albeit of different sort. Conversely, the art of government, instead of seeking to found itself in transcendental rules, a cosmological model, or philosophico-moral ideal, must find the principles of rationality in that which constitutes the specific reality of the state. “ (pp.212-13) He discusses the redefinition of the meaning and reason of the state with the modern age and emergence of governmentality is as follows: “(P)opulation comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health and so on; and the means the government will act either directly, through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly...the population now represents more the end of government than the power of the sovereign; the population is the subject of the needs, of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of government....ignorant of what is being done to it.” (pp. 216-17)

growth of the bureaucracy, financing the rising expenses, had compelled them to undergo a radical reorganization. This reorganization was accompanied by a restructuring and adaptation of the mental sets to maintain, uphold and co-opt with the newly emerging necessities of the governmentalities. Simply, “modernity” emerged as an “official” project. The states decided to “civilize” and “modernize” their subjects when it became clear that only transforming and reorganizing the state was insufficient. Their population had to be rendered “efficient” for the state to counter the sweeping challenges\textsuperscript{168} -hence the Turkish nationalism of the late Ottoman Empire and \textit{la mission civilisatrice} of the Republic-. The state and the power of the state were no more understood as an administrative-military structures superimposed on the subjects and its territories. The power and wealth of the states were now measured and defined with the level of the well-being of the subjects\textsuperscript{169} (from now on “citizens”) and the quality and prosperity of the land it reigned over.\textsuperscript{170} Such a transformation of perception was clear in the eyes of the men of the Tanzimat as observable in the text of the Rescript of Tanzimat which refers to the quality and fertility of the Ottoman lands and the hardworking nature of its subjects.\textsuperscript{171} For this reason, the state was supposed to involve itself with the society and the land. We observe that from early 19\textsuperscript{th} century onwards, society became a pivotal concern in state affairs in the Ottoman context. Issues such as public hygiene, education and poverty became concerns of the

\textsuperscript{168} For an interesting case study of the “rational” and “modern” state faces when it decided to modernize agriculture by opening several agricultural high schools, supplying seeds and investing in the modernization of agriculture Quataert, Donald, \textit{Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia 1876-1908}, unpublished dissertation, UCLA, 1973.

\textsuperscript{169} This concern was defined by Foucault as “pastoral power”. For Foucault, “pastoral power” which the early modern state derived from the Catholic Church is “concerned with the salvation of everyone in “the flock” on an individual level, requiring, ideally, a through knowledge of the subject’s “soul” and officials who could monitor and account for each and every individual. It (is) an individualizing power in that is sought, through supervision, to structure the life of the individual, both through confessional technologies and techniques of self mastery.” Introduction: Moss, Jeremy, “The Later Foucault”, in Moss, Jeremy (ed.), \textit{The Late Foucault Reader}, London; Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998, pp.2-3.

\textsuperscript{170} For the early modern state’s appetite to measure and know about its land and its subjects, see Headrick, Daniel R, \textit{When Information Came of Age}, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

\textsuperscript{171} For the text of Rescript of Tanzimat, see Alkan, Mehmet Ö. (ed.), \textit{Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi}, İstanbul: İletişim, 2001, pp. 449-451.
state. For the first time, the state began to attempt to regulate and design society beyond aiming to rehabilitate the sphere of government and administration.

This Foucauldian governmentality project was legitimized by nationalism, especially in latecomer countries. It may be argued that, the radical nature of Third-World nationalisms in general and the Turkish nationalism in particular developed due to the immediacy of this governmental project as these states were pushed into the corner during the age of imperialism and thus destitute to undertake such a radical governmentality project. In this regard, nationalism emerged as a function of the encounter with modernity and modernization. The secularism of the Turkish Republic was also arguably derived from this Foucauldian concern which was perceived as an indispensible component of Turkish nationalism as if national identity could not be imagined without impeccable secular credentials.

A full-fledged “modern/rational methodology” was the founding stone of Ottoman modernity. The emergence and development of modern ethics and premises of a “modern society” are a different matter. Although a “modern stance” is an ambiguous term and there is no “authoritative” definition of the “modern”, I would argue that Kantian moral individualism and individualized ethics constitute the basis of this modern stance. Kantian moral individualism is a corollary of the demystification of the concept of society, metaphysics and divinity. Kantianism is the moral foundation of modernity with its demanding categorical imperatives enforcing the individual who have become

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173 After the collapse of the social and communal mechanism of control, for Durkheim “personal autonomy of modern man....(is the) central feature of contemporary morality” although he perceived development of individual personally as socially constructed. Regardless of his “scientific observations”, he believed in Kantian moral individualism as the base of a society. Lukes, Steven, Emile Durkheim, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975, p. 23. For Kant’s influence on Durkheim, see pp. 54-58. For Durkheim’s suggestions of “moral education” of citizens of the Third Republic in a strictly secular and rationalist fashion in primary schools which he sees as the modern counterpart of churches, pp. 110-119.
“emancipated” from divine imperatives. Yet, modernity is not merely a philosophical assumption but also a transformation of the social imagination of man acquired not only voluntarily but also superimposed upon him involuntarily by political and economical dynamics beyond his control. Kantian ethics is to some extent an outcome of modernity and a proposed resolution in response to the perils and ambivalences of the post-metaphysical world. However, Ottoman modernity was a political endorsement of the modern as a methodology of reform. The philosophical corollaries and premises of modernity, however, did not accompany its structural and political framework. It would wait until Kemalism for a partial internalization of modernity along Kantian lines although the significance of imported Kantianism remained limited during the Republican decades. In short, modernity lacks to a certain extent its epistemological as well as ethical bases in the Ottoman/Turkish context. Modernity in its actuality/experience and modernity as a discourse are two different phenomena. Although the later is a consequence of the former, it does not necessarily accompany it. In the Ottoman/Turkish context, not dissimilar to other “belated and borrowed modernities”, the later followed the former belatedly and only partially, establishing the basic premises of the Turkish “modern” as legitimate as any other path to modernity.

The problem of speaking about the “modern” in history is to conceptualize the “modern” without historicizing it. The “modern” in philosophy may refer to a different notion, but “modern” in historiography is a social concept referring to a certain mode of attitude and perception independent from the intentions of the actors. In other words, “modern” does not describe a certain act but a state of being that is generalizable within a spatial and temporal context. That is to say, we are not interested in men and women themselves but in the socially and historically constructed mental climate and environment in which they are embedded. These remarks are important to reassess the origins and dynamics of “Ottoman modernity”.

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Ottomans didn’t fail to endorse the modern “military science” rationality since the late 18th century.\(^{175}\) This did not imply a genuine Ottoman transformation and reorganization but a reception of the 18th century European military practices and drills.\(^{176}\) The problem with the general conception of a “genuine transformation” (versus imitating a model) obscures the nature of the process. The general Hegelian idea that history is a progression of ideas discards the extent of the role and significance of technical necessities that had obliged drastic and ideational transformations. Given the intertwined nature of the “technical” and “philosophical”, it is impossible to disassociate them from each other.

In the eyes of the reformers, the manual for the conduction of reforms was evident. It appears to be that at this early stage, there was no reasonable alternative to be suggested other than the complete reception of the Western model. There is yet no perception of the possibility of a partial reception of the West.\(^{177}\) There is also no conceptualization of the two realms of the Western prototype, one technical, the other spiritual, as the reformists did not yet face the challenge of modernity and that the problem was not simply a matter of technical failure did not become apparent. Of course, the reception was not a choice but considered a necessity. The very motivation for “modernization” derived from the fear that

\(^{175}\) Even it is possible and legitimate to speak of the adoption of the modern military organization to an earlier date. Gabor Agoston relates the Ottoman military reformism with the early modern military revolution and thus eliminates any boundary between the modern and premodern military reformism. See Agoston, Gabor, Guns for the Sultan, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Also see Ibrahim Müteferrika’s Usul ul-Hikam fi Nizam ul-Ulum which is a tract written in 1720s and very much reminiscent of the tracts written to Selim III in the late 18th century. Müteferrika’s work is very much influenced by the military studies of Montecuccoli and Marsigli, the Austrian military men turned into military scientists. See Berkes, Niyazi, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, London: Hurst & Company, 1964, pp. 36-46.


\(^{177}\) Malkam Han, one of the pioneers and fervent advocates of Persian reform suggested that “European systems of government...had to be accepted on faith.” He advocated a full-fledged and prompt adaptation of European way of governing. For Malkam, “(i)n the same way that the telegraph can be brought from Europe and without any difficulty established in Tehran...so too it is possible to adapt their principles of organization and without delay establish them in Iran.” Bakhash, Shaul, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy & Reform under the Qajars 1858-1896, London: Ithaca Press, 1978, pp. 13-14.
unless all the required adaptations were successfully fully implemented as perfect replicas; a collapse was inevitable and unavoidable.\textsuperscript{178} A rereading of the not-much-known reign of Selim III complicates the picture that we have taken for granted.\textsuperscript{179}

Contrary to Shaw’s depiction of two warring parties, the layihas (reports) presented to Selim III drawing the proposed outlines of “reform” displays very complex sets of minds.\textsuperscript{180} In the layihas, the sole intention was the survival of the state and the recipes were purely technical, not considering any repercussions of these technical reforms. “(T)he key processes of late Ottoman history can be explained above all, not by the logic of ideas, but by the structural constraints imposed on the leadership of the Empire by geography, demography, institutions, and the examples set by European countries. This does not mean that one should approach late Ottoman history in a simple-mindedly historicist manner, seeing that the path of Ottoman history as predetermined. Rather, it means that one must begin with the recognition that the set of realistic choices that lay before the Ottoman leaders was not unlimited. One need not be a passionate Social Darwinist to recognize that the modification of the old order became inescapable in the late eighteenth century, if the Empire was to survive; or that the most logical source of inspiration for any new order was Europe.”\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{178} The “trends” in academia had gravitated from taking modernity as a breaking point (Weber, Weberianism, Braudel, Wallerstein, Tilly) to a revisionist perspective investigating early modernity and denying the transformative role of the modern. Jack Goody goes as far as questioning the uniqueness of the modern capitalist West’s claims associated with the rise of West/modernity/capitalism. See Goody, Jack, \textit{The Theft of History}, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2006. Goody suspects if the word capitalism and modernity has any explanatory capacity at all. Goody claims that these terms conceal more than they reveal. Goody follows the lead of historians such as Pomeranz showing that the mastery of West dates only from early nineteenth century but surpasses them in the revisionist aspects of his assertions.

\textsuperscript{179} For a reinterpretation of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedit} politics, see Yıldız, Aysel Danacı, \textit{Vaka-ı Selimiyye or The Selimiye Incident: A Study of May 1807 Rebellion}, unpublished dissertation, Sabancı University, 2008.


\textsuperscript{181} Hanioğlu, Şükrü, \textit{A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire}, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, pp. 210-11.
Beginning with the military reorganization, Ottoman statecraft restructured its organization under dire pressures. This restructuring was seen as an obligation to adapt to the changing circumstances and environment. This does not necessarily mean a sharp renunciation of the “old” as assumed in the conventional historiography. It is, in this perception, a “modification”. The instruments employed do not necessarily reveal the attributes and motivations of the individuals and groups who employed the instrument. Of course, the instruments have the power to transform the hand that used the instrument but limits of this transformative power should not be exaggerated. We do not observe a transformation of the structures of mentalities. On the contrary, with the new equipment in hand, the habitual mindset may invigorate and consolidate itself. Modernity is a method although a method with unintended and infinite consequences and implications.  

Modernity develops a certain state of mind, but this particular state of mind derives not from intellectual encounters but from methods implemented and habitualized. That means, although it is completely novel, radical and disquieting, modernity is not necessarily a total revocation of the mental sets of premodernity. Beyond the vast opportunities and equipments provided by modern technologies (in the Foucauldian sense), the ruthlessness and cold rationality of the modernity may exacerbate the ordinary and banal violence of the premodernity and therefore does not necessarily generates a transformation of the structures of mentalities.

Evidently, we do not distinguish between different manifestations of modernity. The seemingly different paradigms of the Tanzimat and the Republic derive from the same considerations and embedded within the same historical structure. The Republic legitimized itself by discrediting the modernizing experience of the Tanzimat era and criticizing it as a half-hearted modernization which failed to comprehend the mentality behind the European modernity, as it was most lucidly expressed by Ziya Gökalar, the chief ideologue of the Young Turk regime.  

As mentioned above, “mentalities” do not develop within a vacuum. It is not an ideological category but a historical one determined by its

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182 Such an interpretation is presented by Reid, James, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000.

temporal and spatial context and structure.¹⁸⁴ Such a criticism had been leveled by the Republican ideology (beginning earlier with Gökalp), claiming that the Republic did internalize the mentality of modernism in contrast to the non-committedness of the Tanzimat.¹⁸⁵ Apparently, for the Tanzimat elite, modernizing was a technical matter to be resolved in practical terms. What was different in the radical modernization of the Republic was that “society” and “social culture” began to be taken as technicalities that had to be transformed. What really changed was not the paradigm but the scope of the technical transformation. Looking at a modernist Ottoman governor of the early 19th century, Lisa Pollard describes the perception and vision of modernity of Mohammad Ali Pasha as follows: “(He) ranked the world’s “nations” scientifically and placed Egypt vis-a-vis other nations in a hierarchy of development, at the apex of which sat ‘modernity’. Knowledge that was useful to the state created a cartography of modernity in which the intimate details of domestic activities stood out as prominent features and were used as units of measurement.”¹⁸⁶ Modernity and adaptation of the Western methods (which was what was understood from “modernity) was a matter of implementation. “The Egyptians who left Alexandria for Europe were sent out in search of practical knowledge....Egyptians in Europe set sail in search of Egypt’s future-a future that they themselves would later construct.”¹⁸⁷

As illustrated throughout this work, practical knowledge was not limited to mechanics. A grasp of international relations, economics, the underlining philosophical and mental foundations of the “modern West” were all seen as practical knowledges to be acquired as well. Modernity may be seen as the endorsement of the imperatives of the changing times. The very crucial and urgent problem for the Ottomans and other “trailing states” was to manage a more effective military and a more efficient state organization. For a management of this colossal machine, they were enforced to collect more taxes for

¹⁸⁵ Ziya Gökalp is the chief propagator of this argument. See his Türkçülüğün Esasları, İstanbul: İnkılap Yayınevi, 2001
¹⁸⁶ Pollard, Lisa, Nurturing the Nation, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005, p. 15
¹⁸⁷ ibid, pp. 16-17.
provisioning the army and to construct an effective bureaucracy to maintain the technicalities of the military.

The supposed distinction between possible different kinds of modernity such as the supposed conservative modernism of the Empire and radical modernism of the Republic is simplistic/reductionist and needs reassessment. From a structuralist view, all the modernist transformations including the Ottoman/Turkish one can be analyzed in terms of a technical adaptations and adjustments. What was new, striking and daring in the Republican reformism was its endeavor to reshape the society, if necessary by force. This was a radical break from the earlier mode of modernization which was basically concerned with the reorganization of the state. The motivation of the Republic to undertake such a sweeping social and cultural modernization project derived from the recognition of the failure to transform and uphold the state by limiting its efforts to reorganize it. The changing conceptualization of the state which began to be conceived in relation with the society and the nation supposed to represent and serve fostered the motivation to reorganize the society and the individuals besides the organization of the state. The individuals, the minds of the individuals and the society as a whole had to be transformed for the state to encounter the challenges of the modernity, the progress of the non-Muslims and the encroachment of the Western powers. The nation replaced the state as the pivotal and critical object to be saved, protected and maintained. The radicalism of the project derived from its endeavor to prioritize the nation/society instead of the state in its transformative project. Therefore, the difference between the mode of modernizations of the Republic and the Empire can be interpreted as limited to its means rather than its objectives.

1.9. Reconstituting Religion Beyond Faith in the Modern Age

One of the fundamental subjects of inquiry of the modern social sciences, religion was long seen as the arch enemy and diametrical opposite of the European Enlightenment, science, reason, modernity and all the things assumed to be “modern”. The assumption was that the year 1789 was the decisive year (year zero) in which religion began to retreat against the forces of modernity although the retreat was already observable throughout the
eighteenth century, the century of the Enlightenment. Religion did its best to fight back the forces of modernity but it was too late for a recovery and there was no chance to avoid what was inevitable. Religion was to remain on the defense and its inevitable doom was only a matter of time.

This paradigm was more a self-propaganda of the nineteenth century “enlightened” thought rather than a disinterested observation. Moreover, it reflected the triumphalism of the 19th century positivism. This argumentation is now known as “secularization thesis” and has been severely criticized after the World War II.188

Contrary to the positivists who celebrated the end of the stage of metaphysics to be followed by the stage of positivism, it is now recognized that, on the contrary, 19th century was the apex of religion in many aspects. It was the century in which Europeans cultivated a particular piety and showed their respect to God in masses. The Victorian value system developed urban middle-class and upper-class forms of piety that were unprecedented in many ways.189 The rural areas were also reconquered from the darkness of superstition. The old superstitions were wiped out by the Church, thanks to the village priests it had sent to the remote villages and working-class neighborhoods. The superstitions were replaced by the organized and regularized “correct teachings” of the Church. It was the first half of 20th century or even the two decades succeeding the World War II that religion retreated dramatically.190


The early criticism of the “secularization thesis” derived from the German hermeneutic tradition. While contemplating on the much neglected area of “sociology of knowledge”, they claimed that religion derived from the human quest to give a meaning to the outer world around the self. Therefore, religion cannot be reduced to mere ignorance and superstition. It is not simply deception but an outcome of the quest to know what is unknowable. Hence, religion is not to be dissolved as easily as it had been presumed. Hermeneutics also enabled the social scientists to approach religion not as an enemy but as a social and intellectual phenomenon needing to be explained.

Of course religion is not one single “entity”. In line with 19th century Positivism, we observe the disappearance of rural religion and the waning of its culture of superstition in which local saints were helping the peasants who visited to “sacred” sites nearby the villages to seek for healing of their sufferings.\(^{191}\) The peasants arriving at the cities did leave their countryside habits and beliefs. But in this process of urbanization, we also observe the development of an organized religion at an unprecedented scale sponsored by the states to manipulate it for their agenda. Taking the hermeneutic analysis of religion to the “realm of state”; we observe the evolution of a new, more politicized and an encompassing version of Christianity in the world of nation-states and modern Empires crafted by the states to serve for the self-legitimization of these polities and infuse them with self-righteousness and glamour. Institutionalized religion provided the meaning these politics needed to legitimize themselves.

Religion is a historical category which has many manifestations differing in different ages and geographies. The religion of the nineteenth century had risen parallel to the rise of the modern states and therefore understandable within this socio-political context. First of all, the church institution may be seen as the first modern organization to be replicated by

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states as argued by Max Weber a century ago.\textsuperscript{192} The church had transformed itself from being a holy see regulating the spiritual affairs of Christians to the first bureaucratic, political and colossal machine beginning from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{193} The Counter-Reformation was the climax of this transformation. The Counter-Reformation was not an invention of the early modern ages constituted as a reaction to the rise of Protestantism but denoted the culmination of the earlier dispositions of the Church.\textsuperscript{194} It is also a very important point to clarify that the Inquisition is itself a product of late Middle Ages, institutionalized so as to respond to the proliferating heresies and therefore an outcome of the Early Modern age as a manifestation of the expansion of the Church institution.\textsuperscript{195} The vigorous resurgence of the Church also transformed the social meaning of the religion. Religion became an institutionalized culture. Catholicism was always defined with reference to the existence of a hierarchical institution with a divine grace to which the faithful had to submit; however, with the onset of the early modern era, the scale


\textsuperscript{193} The church also transformed itself from being the preacher of the souls to being the commander of the souls. See De Boer, Wietse, \textit{The Conquest of the Soul}, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2001.


\textsuperscript{195} The “myth of the Inquisition” was created by the Protestant pamphleteers of the time to blacken the name of Catholicism and Spain (hence dubbed as Black Legend-La Leyenda Negra- by Julian Juderias in 1914) in the name of Protestant propaganda. For the development of this myth and its historiography, see Peters, Edward, \textit{Inquisition}, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989; Kamen, Henry, \textit{The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision}, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997.
and the scope of the institutionalized religion had become more imposing.\textsuperscript{196} Souls were not only to be guided but also to be commanded.

Of course the transformation of Christianity (in its Catholic and Protestant manifestations) was a multifaceted phenomenon. It was also related with the massive diffusion of literacy.\textsuperscript{197} With the acquiring of the skill of reading, the flock demanded a new and more interactive style of adherence to the Christian community. They were no more to be treated as the passive sheep waiting for the commands and teachings of their shepherd. This requirement demanded the sophistication and activation of the Church institution. The Church also had to persuade its previously obedient flock in which the lack of continuous doctrinization might be won over by heresy. The Church should be proactive, aggressive and diligent.\textsuperscript{198} Whereas earlier, the Church discouraged her flock from being literate and lay Bible reading in its struggle with the Protestant conventicals, in the eighteenth century, the Church began to promote literacy and perceived literacy as the best way to wipe out heresies and advance true faith.\textsuperscript{199} There was one drive originating from the Church to refashion religion. Another drive derived from the secular authorities. As ascendant secular authorities enhanced their political authorities in centuries and monopolized sovereignty, they also felt the necessity to tame and domesticate religion. Given that Church and religion constituted the greatest sphere independent from the secular political authorities, the rise of the secular authorities throughout early modernity

\textsuperscript{196} For a case study of the ambitious rechristianization effort of the Church in early modern France targeting the French countryside see Chevalier, Louis, \textit{The Religion of the Poor}, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1997


\textsuperscript{199} For this sharp reversal of the Church policy in the eighteenth century, see Melton, James Van Horn, \textit{Absolutism and the Eighteenth Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria}, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 60-90.
gave them the opportunity to contract the autonomous sphere of religion. For this, concordatas with the religious authorities was essential. With concordatas and “mutual understanding”s, the social religion of early modernity and more so the religion of 19th century was domesticated.

Another reason why Christianity had been transformed was related with the continent-wide political developments pertaining to the issue of legitimacy. As the absolutist states had felt the necessity to include the subjects in their body politic, they had to speak a language which is at the same time universal and sectarian. This was what a religion was. As absolutist states began to be more complex than ever, this process brought the religious institution which they had associated themselves with to be more complex and more institutionalized. As states had risen from being mere polities interfering only with matters of politics to administrative monsters regulating the everyday matters of their subjects, the religion followed it. Religious devotion also became a full-time occupation or this was what the clergy began to preach.

In short, there was a deal between the Church and the rising absolutist states. Certainly, the political authority needed the religious authority to be on his side to assist in realizing its ambitions. Religious legitimacy is the best method to reach and capture the subjects and the minds of the subjects. As it had been expressed above, for reasons mentioned and for many other reasons not mentioned, the consent and support of the subjects began to matter with the eighteenth century onwards. Not only the subjects themselves but the souls and the minds of the subjects began to matter in the eyes of the political authorities, they also had to be controlled and regulated. Of course, in the nineteenth century, in the age of nation-states, subjects and the considerations of the subjects will be important more than ever. After all, it is the subjects’ will upon which the nation-states claimed to build themselves.

Therefore, religion became politicized beginning in early modernity and further politicized in the 19th century. This is not to say that religion was not political before.

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201 A very classical and one of the earliest case of the presentation of the states and kings as bearers of a some lofty ideal is Louis XIV. See Burke, Peter, Fabrication of Louis XIV, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
Given that religion is a social phenomena (different from individual faith), it is by its very
definition a political concept. What is new, however, was that with the rise of the absolutist
states, religion had became a pillar of the absolutist states. For example, by the sixteenth
century, the subjects had to be a believer of the denomination in which the political
authority professed to.\(^\text{202}\) If a subject was allowed to profess to another denomination, he
will not be accepted as a member of the community. The act of non-adherence to the
denomination of the political authority meant the rejection of the earthly power of the
political authority as well. Associating confession with political loyalty was a novel
phenomenon that became possible in the age of mass communications and literacy. This
process became even more apparent in the age of nation. Religion, not being the antidote of
nationalism, served as the cement of nationalism and national identity, especially in the
states where nationalisms developed with the sponsorship of states.\(^\text{203}\) British identity was
forged as early as in the 17\(^{\text{th}}\) century as being the “New Jerusalem” fighting against the
continental Catholics in the service of Satanical forces.\(^\text{204}\) Similarly, the Dutch identity was
forged with the Dutch struggle against the yoke of Catholicism.\(^\text{205}\) Lutheranism of Prussia
served the same function\(^\text{206}\). Catholicism was an indispensable element of the French


\(^{203}\) Van Der Veer, Peter & Lehmann, Harmut (ed.), *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on

University Press, 1997, pp. 36-65; McLeod, Hugh, “Protestantism and British National
Identity, 1815-1945”, in Van Der Veer, Peter & Lehmann, Harmut (ed.), ibid, pp. 44-70.

\(^{205}\) Groot, Frans, “Papists and Beggars: National Festivals and Nation Building in the
Netherlands During the Nineteenth Century”, in Van Der Veer, Peter & Lehmann, Harmut
(ed.), ibid, pp. 161-177; Van Rooden, Peter, “History, the Nation, and Religion: The
Transformations of the Dutch Religious Past”, in Van Der Veer, Peter & Lehmann, Harmut
(ed.), ibid, pp. 96-111; Israel, Jonathan I, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall

\(^{206}\) Smith, Helmut Walser, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology,
Politics, 1870-1914*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995; Altgeld, Wolfgang,
"Religion, Denomination and Nationalism in Nineteenth Century Germany", in Smith,
Helmut Walser (ed.), *Protestants, Catholics and Jews in Germany, 1800-1914*, Oxford:
national identity even in its Republican forms. Religion became the distinctive mark of the nations as well as their proof to be (morally) superior to other contenting nations. In other words, religions baptized and consecrated the nations.

1.10. Politicization of Religion in the Ottoman Empire

As argued above, religion can not be limited to faith. Religion is not only the relationship between God and the believer but a relationship between the members of a particular community as well as the relationship between the members of the community and the community as a whole. The politicization of religion may not be taken as a sign of the rise of conservative modernization over liberal modernization but a corollary of the early modern developments before religion and modernization were dissociated. This does not mean politicization of religion is simply a consequence of modernity. Given that religion is a social phenomenon, it is inevitably political. The transformation of the meaning of religion and its politicization is rather the outcome of the interaction of many processes taking place simultaneously and independently from each other in Early Modern and Modern Europe.

In the earlier historiography of the late Ottoman Empire, Ottoman reforms used to be interpreted simply as a process of secularization as if these two concepts were synonymous. The Turkish translation of the title of Niyazi Berkes’ classical Kemalist study on Ottoman modernization in the fiftieth anniversary of the Republic, where “secularization” was translated as çağdaşlaşma, i.e. “modernization”, is an overt illustration of this assumption and ambiguity. Furthermore, Berkes’ book’s original name, seeing secularization as the pivotal aspect of the 19th century Ottoman transformation, also establishes such equivalence. In this perception, it was a matter of


simple arithmetic. More modernization should have led automatically to less religiousness of the state and the individual.

However, recent studies critical of the Kemalist assumption highlighted the more complex nature of the 19th century Ottoman transformation. It had been demonstrated that the reforms of Mahmud II were legitimized upon a religious discourse presenting these reforms as “religious efforts.”

The abolition of the Janissary corps was presented and legitimized as a religious duty and as a jihad against the infields (Janissaries) who had infiltrated among the Ottoman military. The janissaries were presented as enemies of state and religion in the service of Christian states. The event itself was conspicuously hailed as “Auspicious Incident” (Vaka-i Hayriye). According to this official propaganda, Mahmud II was the religious reformer (müceddid) of the era as heralded in the Islamic and Quaranic sources. He successfully eradicated all the heretics and all the remnants of the heresy. Mahmud II literally butchered all the Bektaşi graves and reestablished orthodox Islam and Bektaşicism was eradicated throughout the Empire and declared as a heretical sect. The Bektaşi influence over the Janissary corps was countered with the endorsement of an orthodox Islam and the required study of the works of orthodox Islam by the newly organized military corps such as Birgivi Risalesi for the purpose of “rectifying the practice


210 Yıldız, Gültekin, ibid, p. 89, 115. For the self-legitimization of the abolishment of the janissaries and presentation of the act as a religious act, see the firman abolishing the janissaries as quoted in Heinzelmann, Tobias, ibid, p. 39-42.For the contemporary texts reflecting the official position on the abolishment and eradication of the janissary corps, see Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi, Gülzar-i Fütühat, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2001; Es’ad Efendi, Üss-i Zafer, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2005. For some valuable comments on Selim III’s and Mahmud II’s emulation of the manners of the prophet, see Hagen, Gottfried, “The Prophet Muhammed as an Exemplar in War: Ottoman Views on the Eve of World War I”, in New Perspectives on Turkey, Spring 2000, no: 22, pp. 151-152

211 Heinzelmann, Tobias, ibid, p. 50; Es’ad Efendi, Üss-i Zafer, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2005, pp. 166-184; Es’ad Efendi, Vak’a-Nüvis Es’ad Efendi Tarihi, İstanbul: OSAV, 2000, pp. 648-650; Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Tarih-i Cevdet, Darü'l-Tibaat'ül Amire, 1309, v. XII, pp. 180-184; Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi, Gülzar-i Fütuhat, pp. 19-22.

212 Yıldız, Gültekin, ibid, pp. 115-130.
of religion and faith” (\textit{usul-t diniyye ve aka’idlerini tashih zimmında}).\footnote{213} Furthermore, the unprecedented jihadist tone in the declaration of war against Russia in 1826 just after the destruction of the janissary corps, whether it be a public relations effort or not, was a novelty in the Ottoman official discourse. This radicalizing and orthodoxization of the official rhetoric was not a repetition of the traditional Ottoman discourse. It was an innovation and an expression of an emerging discourse embedded in the Ottoman modernization and in the emerging rhetoric of the Ottoman/Turkish proto-nationalism and nationalism.\footnote{214} This process also involved the etatization of Islam. Islam was rendered subordinate to the state and state interests. Although the case was not very different in the classical centuries of the Ottoman Empire, the extent of this subordination was unprecedented. These were early symptoms of the nationalization process interwoven in the modernization, not unlike the development of an evangelical language in \textit{17th} century England in its road to nationalization in the early modernity.\footnote{215}

The emergence of discourses of identity, demonization and “othering” were preeminent manifestations and components of the formation of a modern state. Different from pre-modern polities, modern states developed their public faces and discourses to legitimize their existences. Along with cannons and rifles, the Ottomans reproduced such strategies of governmentality. These modern states differ from the medieval ones in their claim to serve for a particular mission. The medieval states knew what they were. Any Western barbaric kingdom from Merovengians to the Norman England was founded by a certain military/militarized elite longing for more glory and booty. In the words of Charles


Tilly, state making was an “organized crime”. The case was not different in the Muslim Middle East. Although they claimed to serve for a higher goal, (religion and God) the mechanisms of these polities were not organized on their claims to serve for higher ideals. These polities were organized basically to maximize plunder and booty.

The modern states did not have such a luxury. They, on the other hand, (re)organized themselves to substantiate their claims to serve for respectable ideals. Accordingly, although Ottomans always claimed to uphold the banner of Islam; it was with the late eighteenth century they endorsed this claim more energetically and self-consciously.

To display the sacramentalization of the Ottoman Empire, Aksin Somel aptly named his book on the modernization of 19th century Ottoman education as “The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline”. Somel’s book’s name also implies an analogy to the 19th century Russian autocracy’s zeal in its claim of protection and promotion of order and religion. The

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217 A well-studied example of the Ottoman reorganization to claim to serve for a sublime ideal is Ottomans claim for the caliphate. See Buzpinar, Tufan, “The Question of Caliphate Under the Last Ottoman Sultans”, in Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration, Itzchak Weismann & Fruma Zachs (ed.), I.B. Tauris, pp. 17-36.


resemblance of the Ottoman imperium and the Russian autocracy\textsuperscript{220} (and the Meiji Japan\textsuperscript{221}) is also one of the points Selim Deringil had pointed out in his classic work on the self-representations of the reign of Abdülhamid II.\textsuperscript{222} All these polities had throughout 19th century endeavored to establish a cult based on the splendor of their autocracy, the religiosity/divine grace of their regimes and their benevolence towards their subjects.\textsuperscript{223} Thus, the politicization of Islam was an inevitable and pivotal component of the 19th century Ottoman Empire replicating the pattern of a modernizing autocracy reminiscent of Russia, Japan and Prussia.

\textbf{1.11. Military Revolution and Westernization}

The Turkish modernization/Westernization had been interpreted primarily as an identity problem rather than a strictly political and structural one by the earlier historiography. The political necessity or even political immediacy had been recognized as a push factor that forced Ottomans to pursue an aggressive and uncompromising enterprise of Westernization. For scholars like Berkes and Lewis, the Ottoman transformation/modernization/Westernization process was primarily a structural and political one implemented in dire conditions as an utter necessity but they also assumed that identity problem had to be encountered and resolved for Ottomans to embark on a determined Westernization venture. In these scholars, the Ottoman transformation was

\begin{itemize}
  \item For the representations and manifestations of the Japanese imperial cult, see Fujitani, Takashi, \textit{Splendid Monarchy}, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
  \item For the Habsburgs, also see Unowsky, Daniel L., \textit{The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Imperial Austria, 1848-1916}, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2005.
\end{itemize}
perceived as a matter of identity more than a matter of adaptation to modernity. This paradigm is arguably a relic of the Orientalist origins of Ottoman historiography.

With the incorporation of Ottoman studies into the mainstream historiography, from the 1970s onwards the late Ottoman history began to be investigated through the application of universal concepts of social sciences and paradigms of history and historical sociology. Here, in line with these studies, it will be suggested that it is misleading to attribute a primary role to the politics of identity and presume that politics of identity was prevalent since the beginnings of Ottoman Westernization. However, it is necessary to contextualize and historicize identity politics rather than treat it as a natural phenomenon as if West and East exist in pure forms. Here, it will be argued that, the problem of identity arose in the later phases of the so-called Westernization process which itself was a product of “Westernization”. This point will be explored in the coming chapters in the case of Ottoman diplomats. In fact, identity politics is a consequence of encountering with modernity as argued by Sorin Mitu.

“In fact, identity and self-perception crises are merely an effect of modernization, all the sharper as the latter quickens its pace. As a consequence, there is no escape from

225 The notion of identity had been introduced to social sciences by Eric Ericson, a Swedish émigre to United States, he felt his identity as a constitutive part of his self (Handler, Richard, “Is ‘Identity’ a Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?” in Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, John R. Gillis (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 34). In his classical opus, Ericson studied Martin Luther as a man in psychological crisis. He introduced and developed psychological history. His personal and individualistic notion of identity had been redefined in social sciences as “social identity”, identity as a social notion. From Ericson, identity had been a popular interest area of social sciences in general. It even demolished the socio-economical approach which had been the principal perspective in social sciences until 1980s. With the linguistic turn, identity had been seen an autonomous subject by itself. The recent theorists presume that “identity” does not only accompany social-economical developments but it has its own reality. Furthermore, identity may have priority over the socio-economical developments in historical determinacy. The identity may determine the socio-economical context and not vice versa. However, a reaction to the hegemonic discourse of identity had been leveled in the recent years. Charles Taylor’s “Sources of the Self” exposes that a certain understanding/perception of the self is a modern-Western concept, although Taylor’s book does accept many of the presumptions of the identity discourse. See Erikson, Erik, Young Man Luther, Norton, 1962; Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1992.
an inter-conditioning between critical reflection on modernity and an identity-centered problematic, as a fundamental and inextricable datum of one’s existence. Modernity, as mental space and general human condition, shelters the seed of a somewhat paradoxical attitude: the post-modern tendency to deny and ceaselessly reformulate not only tradition and the ‘oldness’ against which it defines itself, but also its own bases and motivations-reasons, individualism and ‘progress’, individual and collective identity, which is a tendency that runs the risk of being (completely erroneously) taken for traditionalism and anti-modernity.”

The structural reasons for the precipitation of the Ottoman modernization and transformation is attested by the new generation of Ottomanists. Şükrü Hanioğlu writes; “by and large, when Ottoman policy makers and intellectuals turned toward Europe, they did so not out of a clear, articulate ideological preference, as is often suggested by later Ottoman scholars. Rather, they looked to Europe for answers because a return to the old order was thoroughly unattractive for answers because there was nowhere else to turn. Extreme reactionaries existed in late Ottoman society as elsewhere. But the sharp debate between them and the radical Westernizers distorts the historical reality of a consensus on the need for a European-inspired change that was shared by a solid majority of the Ottoman elite from the nineteenth century onward.” A first and foremost, the labeling of the process had to be questioned. The label “Westernization” is a label that had been established in reading history backwards and misrepresents the actual process in many ways. The label “modernization” also creates similar shortcomings. The problem with these two idioms is that they evoke an organized, pre-planned and full-fledged project of social, political and institutional transformation. These labels assume implicitly that there was a certain decision made at a certain time which initiated the inevitable and irreversible process of “Westernization” and “modernization”. In reality, the objects of the process were much more modest and spontaneous. It was in the beginning fundamentally a project

226 Mitu, Sorin, National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania, Budapest: CEU Press, 2001, p. 97. Also for the development of identity politics in Poland throughout 19th century in encounter with the “West” and quest for authenticity and inclusion simultaneously, see Jedlicki, Jerzy, A Suburb of Europe, Budapest: CEU Press, 1988. The Romanian, Polish and Turkish self-perceptions and identity constructions are strikingly similar. These identities and attributes all derived from encountering with modernity and “more advanced Western nations”.

of reforming the current state apparatus and rendering the state organization more resilient and more efficient. It was a state project targeting state institutions. It involved no social and transformative dimensions.

It was a Westernizing project in the sense that the Ottomans wanted to replicate the impressive and effective state institutions of the Western powers which had been the supporting base for strong armies. The Ottomans did not show any timidity in their aspirations. They wanted to learn how Western powers had organized themselves that made them so vigorous and fierce. This was not a matter related to the “realm of religion” but relevant to the “realm of state affairs” and “military science”228 (fenn-i harb)229.

“State affairs” in the late 18th and the early 19th century meant predominantly military affairs. The budget was principally spent on military expenditures until the early 19th century.230 Furthermore, it was the military defeats rather than certain other economical


229 Fenn-i harb was defined in a manual written in the 1830s as follows: “Her bir nefere başka başka ‘acemi ve üstad nefer ta’limini öğrettikten sonra birkaç neferi bir sıra üzerine dizip’ aynı hareketleri onlara beraberce icra ettirmek ve ba’dehu ol ner feratı bir bölüşe rabt ile bölüş ta’lim ve sekiz bölüğü bir tabura rabt ile ta’bur talimine ve dört taburu bir alaya rabt ile alay ta’limi ve iki alayı bir livaya rabt ile liva ta’limini ve iki livayı bir firakaya rabt ile ferik ta’limini icra ettirerek usulü velhasıl al’l-ıtlak fenn-i harb tabir olunmakla fenn-i harb fenn-i harb fenn-i harb tabir olunur.” In the same manual, fenn-i muharebe was defined as follows: “ol mu’allem ve muntazam’ askeri bir yere cem edip musammem olan maksamdın istihsalı zimmında cümlesini mahal ve mevki’inde güzelce ve müdebbirane istimal etmek fenn-i harb tabir olunur.” Yıldız, Gültekin, Neferin Adı Yok: Zorunlu Askerliğe Geçiş Sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti’nde Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum (1826-1839), İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2009, p. 362.

230 Cezar, Yavuz, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi, İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986, p. 301. This book demonstrates the military origins of fiscal reforms and fiscal modernization in the 18th and early 19th century Ottoman Empire. For a calculation of the percentages of the spending of the imperial treasuries on military affairs in the postclassical era, see Murphey, Rhoads, Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700, London: University College London Press, 1999, pp. 49-63. Also see for the complex organization of warfare and campaign, see Finkel, Caroline, The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606, Wien: VWGÖ, 1988. This book is pretty illustrative in its demonstration of the parallel development of the “military revolution” in the Ottoman context and therefore a valuable reading to evaluate the Ottoman early modernity.
losses and failures that enforced a drastic reform. In the perception of the dignitaries of the time, the state meant to a larger extent the military machine. This assumption was not wrong. The well-being of the state was directly related to military success and efficiency. State’s might, glory and pompousness were measured according to its military efficiency. All other state affairs were auxiliary to the military advancement of the imperium. In a sense, the pre-modern state was, in Charles Tilly’s terms, an organized crime founded for the very interests of the members of the gang. The recognition of the fact that military might became much more dependent to the non-military factors necessitated the reformation of the state apparatus. The demilitarization of the state also triggered the effort of the ruling elite to differentiate themselves from those whom they decreed as criminal and illegitimate.

In this regard, there was nothing surprising that so-called Westernization had been “initiated” firstly in military affairs. Of course a valid and legitimate question to be posed here is that how can we interpret this process as a Westernization move? The phenomenon of bringing foreign experts for the military was not a novelty in the eighteenth century. Ottomans had always invited foreign experts for assistance. This was not a unique Ottoman method either. In early modern Europe, European countries had always sought and brought experts regardless of the nationality and ethnicity of the experts. This was one of the causes and the outcomes of the European military revolution. The transfer of


technological developments within the European scene was prevalent which ensued the dissemination of new military methods. The transfer of military technology had exploded due to the rapidly developing military technology. After a point, it became a dire necessity to adapt these novelties and no European power could dare to disregard it. Basically, the eighteenth century European experts had introduced the novelties of the military revolution to Ottomans. This was to counter Russians and Austrians who were holding the upper hand against the Ottomans thanks to their superior military technology and tactics. The principal ally of Ottomans against these powers was France, so it was France to whom the Ottomans turned to take military know-how. The military advisers who throughout the eighteenth century happened to be French (with the exception of De Tott who had a Hungarian origin but had been Frenchified) were individual entrepreneurs trying to make their living and career in the Ottoman military although it was with the French backing they had acquired their contracts in the Ottoman army.

In short, the presence of military advisers in the Ottoman army involved international dimensions as well. France was allied with Ottomans and content with the well-being of Ottomans as long as it could keep the privileges it obtained in 1740 and retain its hegemony in the Levantine trade and economy. Thus, “the French connection” was a crucial factor in Ottoman politics and it continued to be so throughout Tanzimat.

The reign of Selim III had begun with continuous defeats in wars with Russia and Austria. The warfare ended with the disappointing treaty of Sistova. From then onwards, Selim III decided to reform the military. The military reform was followed by a

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234 For example see the description of Russian military might in Koca Sekbanbaşı’s tract, Hulasat-ül Kelam fi Redd-i Avam, Tercüman Yayınları, edited by Abdullah Uğman.


236 For the “meşveret meclisi” gathered after the defeat and a detailed narrative of the discussions within the meşveret meclisi based on the chronicles of the time see Shaw, Stanford, Between New and Old, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971. For more information on the meşveret meclisi see Cihan, Ahmet, Reform Çağında Osmanlı
comprehensive reform of the statecraft as it became evident that military power depends on a modern organization of the state. For Ottoman reformers, once the machines were activated, the inevitable positive feedback mechanism was also to begin to operate.

1.12. The Ancien régime Problem in Europe

“(The concept) ancien régime was created by the French revolution. It was what the revolutionaries thought they were destroying in and after 1789.” Thus, the concept ancien régime emerged as an ideological artifact for the purpose of discrediting and denigrating an invented diametrically opposite adversary by the revolutionaries. Thus, ancien régime was denied any agency and any constitutive role for its posterity. However, later scholarly works acknowledged the existence of a certain form of politics, society and culture which may be justly named as “ancien régime” not definable in relation with what it preceded (“the new regime”) but as an encompassing vision of political and social order with its distinctive attributes.

The culture of aristocracy was at the very center of the ancien régime. “Nobility” and “aristocracy” are concepts, which may have different meanings in terms of time and social context. Marc Raeff, a historian of Russian aristocracy writes in his introduction to his book that “we must turn to the always tricky problem of terminology, for Russian reality and concepts have no obvious equivalents in the West. Our study concerns the dvorianstvo of eighteenth century.” He defines dvorianstvo as “all titled persons, serf owners, officers, officials, professional people, whether they owned land or not” , and technically “the

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service nobles of the Grand Duke and Tsar.” The aristocracy of Russia was from the beginning constituted very much in relation to the state and shaped by the initiatives of the state beginning from Ivan the Terrible’s suppression of the boyars. Every polity had developed different notions of privilege, distinction and political ordering. An aristocracy does not necessarily fit in the Western European classical model in which nobility preceded the formation and expansion of the states. The making of nobilities and state nobilities had different modalities in different national contexts.

Moreover, no aristocratic cluster remains the same in the course of time. The characteristics and social roles of aristocracies do change, transform and evolve. One interesting case is the trajectory of the Prussian aristocracy throughout Prussia’s evolution from a lesser princely polity to an authoritarian monarchy. The Prussian aristocracy achieved to sustain its power vis-a-vis the non-aristocratic interests in a world in which land and landed interest were no more the dominant means of production and means of power. The state and the aristocracy established a partnership in which aristocracy redefined itself with regard to its relation to the state.

One of the main debates among English historians is the problem of the break/continuity of the “ancien régime” in Britain. The question is whether the political establishment of British 19th century can be seen as the continuation of the 18th century political regime and establishment or not. The (old) Whig families constituted the political elite of the 18th century Britain. It was a century of oligarchy and a period of consensus within the commanding heights of the British ruling class. With the extension of political

241 For the development of nobilities and orders in post-Petrine Russia, see Becker, Seymour, Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia, De Kalb, III: Northern Illinois University Press, 1985.
rights in 1832, a reshuffling took place, terminating the Whig ascendancy. Whigs had to share political power with the Tories as the commonality of interest among the politically ruling elite had ebbed. Furthermore, Tories reigned for the most of the 19th century and new alignments within the politically ruling elite and outside the politically ruling elite took place. Thus, liberals and radicals made their way into the parliament within the Whig establishment and the old whigs had to lose their dominance within the Liberal Party.

The traditional Whig historiography associated the ascendancy of Britain with the rise of a new entrepreneur class capitalizing on the benefits of Industrial Revolution. However, the revisionist historians of 1980s claimed that “the strength of Britain....lay less in its novel entrepreneurial activities than in the elements of stability and continuity, which derived from its status as a rural ancien régime society, the monarchy, the church and the aristocracy.”244 The eighteenth century Britain (not unlike with the new interest to the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire) was rehabilitated from being a neglected field of study to a field of increasing attention. John Brewer, Paul Langford, Linda Colley245 and others produced remarkable studies that investigated and reassessed the eighteenth century Britain and the British aristocracy in power not as a world doomed to collapse and vanish but as the harbinger of the dynamic nineteenth century Britain. The revisionist historians asserted that aristocracy played a constitutive role in the making of the British nineteenth century.

David Cannadine showed that the collapse of the British aristocracy can be dated only to the late 19th century and 20th century.246 In another book, he also reinterpreted English imperialism, in a polemic with Edward Said, as a venture motivated mainly by aristocratic aspirations247 which also challenged the assumptions of historians of imperialism. The new imperial historians also shed light on the significant contributions of the British aristocracy

to the development of British imperialism. For the impressive historians of British colonization, Hopkins and Cain, British imperialism was advanced by the southern aristocracy of Britain who failed to compete against the northern industrialists and northern capitalism.\footnote{Cain, P.J, & Hopkins A.G, \textit{British Imperialism: 1688-2000}, New York: Longman, 2002.} In an influential book, Martin Wiener claimed that the disappointing economical performance of 20th century Britain was the result of the dominance of the southern land-based aristocrats in the political and cultural spheres impeding the rise of the ethos of bourgeoisie of the northern industrialists. For Wiener, land-based aristocrats disdained the culture of the innovative and industrious business elite and promoted an anti-industrialist ethos. For Wiener, the industrialists, who were mocked in Charles Dickens' \textit{Hard Times}, never seized the political and ideological control\footnote{Wiener, Martin, \textit{The Decline and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850-1980}, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981.} and the “old regime” with its value system had prevailed.

Revolution differed in their views and in their interpretation of the revolution. Nevertheless, the collapse of the argument that 1789 was a bourgeois revolution brought back the aristocracy to the stage. The aristocracy was no longer seen as a class that had ceased to exist after 1789. Revisionist historians documented how the ancien régime aristocratic families managed to adapt themselves to the new circumstances of the nineteenth century and reproduced their wealth. The French case was different from the British one in the sense that the French aristocrats as a class lost their political power. Nevertheless, in economics, politics and bureaucracy, the aristocracy retained its strong presence throughout the nineteenth century. The aristocratic families found ways to retain their wealth and prestige before they began to vanish by the end of the nineteenth century.

Furthermore, there was no self-standing and arrogant bourgeoisie committed to eradicate the aristocracy and the passé aristocratic values as Marx had postulated with enthusiasm in the 19th century. Sarah Maza shows that the myth of bourgeoisie was invented to refer to a fictive enemy rather than to represent social reality. Contrary to the vision of Marx, the bourgeoisie of the 19th century France was timid and never intended to challenge or oppose aristocracy. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie imitated the aristocracy and as it found its impressive literary account in Marcel Proust. We may speak of the final triumph of the bourgeoisie, if there ever was a bourgeoisie and if it was ever victorious, only in the 1890s with the consolidation of the institutions established by the Third Republic. However, the bourgeoisie of the 1890s was not the bourgeoisie of the previous

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255 For the struggle of the Republicans to establish a “bourgeois Republic” during the Second Empire, see Nord, Philip, The Republican Moment, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995. For the intense struggle in the first decade of the Third Republic between the Republicans and the monarchists and the dynamics of the consolidation of the
decades. It was the bourgeoisie that made its peace with the order and abandoned its “progressive” and oppositionist rhetoric after witnessing the horrors of the Commune. In other words, the triumph of the bourgeois and the Third Republic was in many ways more the victory of the ancien régime.

The czarist Russian historiography also reassessed Russian ancien régime. The conventional historiography of the czarist Russia’s interpretation of czardom had been revised by the revisionist historians beginning from 1970s. The revisionist historiography developed a comparably “favorable” view of the czardom refuting to label czardom as mere despotism.256

“In recent years, Nicholas’ bureaucracy has been the subject of considerable study in the West. For H. J. Torke the major characteristics of the Russian civil service were its lack of professional autonomy, expertise or ethos. Unlike its Prussian counterpart it had neither the corporate rights guaranteed by the Allgemeine Landrecht, nor yet a clear sense of service to the communal welfare enshrined in an abstract ideal of the state. Without challenging Torke’s view that the Russian civil service as a whole was corrupt, inefficient, arbitrary and concerned with its own welfare rather than the communal interest, some American scholars recently casted a somewhat redeeming light on certain aspects of Nicholas’ bureaucracy. What emerges clearly from the work of these scholars is that by the 1850s Russia possessed an elite officialdom fully committed to the service of a state whose only legitimate function in their eyes was the welfare of the community. These men were expert career officials, firmly rooted in the ministerial apparatus, and possessed an ethos distinct in most cases from that of the landed aristocracy and the gentry. They expected the state to play the leading role in bringing reform and modernization to Russian society and, if permitted by the monarch and his entourage, were willing and able to take the burden of leadership on their own shoulders.”257

The Great Reform era initiated after the catastrophic Crimean War, which had been perceived as a dismal failure, was reexamined and rehabilitated: “More recently, Western

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256 Also for Lieven’s reassessment of the autocracy of Nicholas II and his criticism of the historiography on Nicholas II, see Lieven, Dominic, Nicholas II: Emperor of all the Russians, London: Pimlico, 1994.

scholars have looked much more depth at the question of how the Great Reforms were implemented, tested and developed and considered their broader social, political, and cultural implications in an impressive series of studies.\(^\text{258}\) Apparently, recent studies do not celebrate the autocratic reformism of Alexander II but present a balanced evaluation of the Great Reform era.\(^\text{259}\) Hence, the myth of “monarchic absolutism” for Russian czardom had been demolished. In short, for the revisionist historians, the czarist Russia was not a medieval obscurantism but a dynamic polity that would had viability in the world of the twentieth century if the Revolution had not taken place as an unexpected consequence of the World War I.

The post-WW II assumption that Germany followed a distinct trajectory in contrast to the British and French trajectories is also criticized heavily by the recent historians. “The peculiarity of Germany” argument was very problematic first and foremost because it implied that France and Britain followed a “normal/straight path”. Furthermore, the revisionist historians have questioned the validity of the conventional narrative seeing Britain and France necessarily destined to evolve into liberal democracies and Germany doomed to its path to the Nazi totalitarian state. Apparently, this was a presentist reading of history.\(^\text{260}\)

The Sonderweg (special path) debates constitute the very essence of the German historiography.\(^\text{261}\) The Sonderweg argument simply states that Germany did not follow the “normal path” to evolve to a liberal democracy but followed a distinctive path. Different explanations and variants of the Sonderweg paradigm blamed various reasons such as late

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modernization, the failure of the 1848 Revolution or the authoritarian Prussian tradition. The late modernization thesis establishes that the urge to catch up the early modernizers compelled the state to engineer the growth of economy. The state assumed an immense power in the economy and did not allow the emergence of a self-regulating market. On the contrary, the state had promoted certain industries and entrepreneurs to enable them to expand to gigantic proportions. The lack of a competitive market meant that the capitalist entrepreneurs were rendered dependent on the state and therefore subordinate to the ancien régime elite. In short, according to the Sonderweg approach, “Germany industrialized without destroying the social and political hegemony of aristocracy, of modernizing economically while remaining entrapped in a pre-industrial nexus of authoritarian social structures, values and political attitudes.”

This study is not the place to enter into the historiography of the Sonderweg. The word was originally coined in the imperial period by the German conservative historians and publicists to eulogize Germany for escaping both from the corrupt autocracy of Russia and the decadent democracies of Britain and England. Later, especially with the impact of the World War II, the word was employed by English historians such as Sir Vansittard, Namier, French historian Poliakov and most popularly by the American journalist William

262 The failed 1848 Revolution was hailed as Germany’s missed opportunity. Although it is evidently true that, the failure of the liberal parliament in Frankfurt paved way to the consolidation of power by the authoritarian and illiberal Prussian monarchy; the significance of the 1848 had been exaggerated. For a brief historiography of the 1848 Revolution, see Han, Hans Joachim, The 1848 Revolutions in German-Speaking Europe, New York: Longman, 2001.

263 Engels was a contemporary observer of the failure of the 1848 Revolution. For his pessimism for the advancement of liberalism in Germany as well as his severe critique of the “bourgeoisie” for their timidity to challenge the authoritarian regime, see Engels, Friedrich, Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution, New York: International Publishers, 1969.


Shirer to establish that Hitler was an inevitable outcome of the course of German history. This assumption was taken and transformed into an academic argument by the postwar German historians such as Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler who were critical to the nationalist historiography prevalent in Germany before the 1960s. Hans-Ulrich Wehler and his “Bielefeld School” associates depicted imperial Germany as a paternalistic and hierarchical society carefully engineered by the *ancien régime* aristocrats.267

“Criticizing an older German historiography which denied the long-term roots of Nazism in German history....(Wehler) insisted..(that) in 1848....the German bourgeoisie failed in its attempt to wrest power from aristocracy in the way its counterparts in other countries had done, in England in 1640 for example, or France in 1789. As a result, the Prussian aristocracy was able to preserve its sociopolitical hegemony. It cemented it through the conservative ‘revolution from above’ which united Germany under Prussian domination from 1866-1871. Continuing industrialization and social change increasingly threatened its position, but it was the army, the civil service and the Reich leadership. To bolster this, it engaged in a successful ‘feudalization of the bourgeoisie’ into aristocratic modes of behavior and value-orientations (such as dueling, deference to inherited status, the hunt for decorations and titles, the scramble for the position of reserve officer, the adoption of an authoritarian and paternalistic attitude towards employees in industry, and, crucially, the rejection of democracy and parliamentarism), a process made easier.....as a result of the “great depression” of 1873-96, which left the big industrialists heavily dependent on the interventionism of the undemocratic state.”268

Wehler’s imperial Germany was static and closed to any change unless destroyed by external shocks and extraordinary developments such as had happened in 1918.269

The nature of the German bourgeoisie was at the center of the debate of the German Sonderweg. The German bourgeoisie was accused for being accomodationist and submissive. It had been suggested that, because the German bourgeoisie did not opt to openly challenge the established order, especially in the critical year of 1848, it had been


forced to accept a marginal and subordinate role within the elite. However, this assumption tacitly assumes that the bourgeoisie fought aggressively elsewhere and, furthermore, bourgeoisie as a class has an intrinsic motivation to confront (and destroy) established orders.

Arno Mayer’s “The Persistence of the Old Regime” is the classical account of the new reassessment of the nineteenth century. Arno Mayer showed that, contrary to the established opinion, in the nineteenth century, it was the nobility of different sorts that had controlled political power. For Mayer, the Marxian assumption that the economical and political powers are indistinguishable and who controls the economy controls the political power is wrong. For him, throughout the 19th century, the political power continued to be exerted by traditional elites which did not overlap and intersect with the economical elites and centers of economic production.

Two leading historians of Germany, David Blackbourn, and Geoff Eley analyze the problem of the German bourgeoisie in their path breaking book, “The Peculiarities of German History.” They question the relevancy of the historiography of German history and conclude that, it is misleading to assume that German history is particularly “peculiar”. They criticized the approach comparing the German model to the supposedly “normal” model. For Blackbourn and Eley, the course of German history might display certain peculiarities but “all national histories are peculiar.”

Blackbourn and Eley opposes the “bourgeois-centered” historiography. The conventional historiography assumed that it was the dynamic bourgeoisie that had shaped and transformed the modern world. According to this approach, the problem with Germany

271 The “persistence” of traditional landed, bureaucratic and military elites was not noticed for the first time by Arno Mayer. “Vilfredo Pareto, Herbert Spencer and Max Weber wrote with dismay about the ‘persistence’ of traditional elites at the second half of the nineteenth century as after the 1870s, as new authoritarianism is rising European wide.” See Halperin, Susan, War and Social Change in Modern Europe, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 11.
272 For an interpretation of 19th century European political power structures, see Halperin, ibid.
(and Russia and many others) was that the state played the constitutive role in the “making of modern Germany”. However, with the hindsight of many historical case studies and theoretical works, we now know that the state played an immense role in the making of the modern world in general.\textsuperscript{274} First of all, capitalism was generated, fostered and maintained thanks to the institutionalization of the states. It was the states that were the gears of capitalism, not the markets.\textsuperscript{275}

To conclude and go back to our inquiry, it had been suggested that the immense and decisive role the state played in the emergence and development of modernity was not peculiar to the Ottoman/Turkish case. The states defined the mode of the modernity of their respective “nations”. Moreover, it was the states that had formulated Turkishness as well as Englishness, Germanness, Frenchness, even Britishness and Ottomanness. However, unlike the 18\textsuperscript{th} century Britain where in the journals “John Bull”s were drawn, defined and redefined\textsuperscript{276}, in the absence of public expression, the degree of the role the state played in the Ottoman/Turkish case was incomparably immense.

In many ways, Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s representation of Willhelmine Germany resembled Hamidian Ottoman Empire although some seminal aspects which Wehler attributed to the Willhelmine Germany are missing in the Hamidian Empire such as the “manipulation of political anti-semitism”\textsuperscript{277} and “industrial capitalism”. Definitely, the “industrialists” are missing in the power configuration in the Hamidian context.


\textsuperscript{277} Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, ibid, p. 246.
Nevertheless, the Hamidian Empire may be interpreted as an authoritarian polity with “superimposition of class differences on those between the traditional late-feudal estates” and “myth of the bureaucracy” as Wehler had defined Wilhelmine Germany. Interestingly, such an interpretation of Hamidian Empire would coincide with the traditional perceptions of Hamidian polity which see the Hamidian regime as closed to any modernization and a bastion of obscurantism in reaction to the reformism of the Tanzimat. Recent studies, however, acknowledged the enormous contributions of the Hamidian era to the establishment and development of “modern” institutions and reforms in Turkey. Therefore, while the frameworks of historians such as Wehler and Mommsen were criticized by names such as Blackbourn, Eley, Evans and Berghahn for taking the Willhelmine era as static and “reactionary” within a structural Marxian paradigm, historians such as Deringil and Akarlı criticized the depiction of Hamidian regime as a monolithic power structure with a reactionary ideological foundation by the earlier generation of scholars. Apparently both the Willhelmine Empire and the Hamidian Empire were not monolithic power blocs and new generation of late Ottomanists and scholars of Willhelmine Germany are exposing the more complicated nature and various aspects of these two polities.

It was no coincidence that the foundation and the consolidation of the Hamidian autocracy coincided with the consolidation of fellow authoritarianisms of Willhelm II in Germany, Alexander III (who inverted the policies of the assassinated liberal czar Alexander II) in Russia and the Meiji in Japan. In this regard, Hamidian autocracy, like the Tanzimat preceding it, can be seen as influenced and shaped by the political/social/economic developments and trends of late 19th century. It was a manifestation of the European turn to conservative modernization and authoritarianism. In Europe, the late 19th century was an age of restoration of political stability and restoration of ancien régimes within the structures of modern states. This process was a reaction to the rise of republicanism, liberalism, and other destabilizing forces and political movements throughout the 19th century. Political stability was maintained with the iron fists of the

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278 For a survey of the historiography of the Hamidian era, see, Özbek, Nadir, "Modernite, Tarih ve İdeoloji: İkinci Abdülhamid Dönemi Tarihçiliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme." Literatür, no. 3 (2004), pp. 71-90
states in the age of dreadnoughts and machine guns. For sure, the Ottoman Empire did also achieve a temporary stability in the Hamidian era. The principal motivations for the emergence of Hamidian autocracy were dissatisfaction with the Tanzimat reformism and liberalism and the rise of ethnic politics and separatisms. Apparently, in the Hamidian context, the forces of instability were ethnic unrests rather than social and political agitations of Europe.

The assumption Wehler and his contemporary associates developed was that because Germany did not eliminate the aristocratic/royal elite as the French did, imperial Germany was doomed to be reactionary. Although it is a truism that the aristocratic ruling elite did construct a different political system than France or Britain developed, this political system was equally “modern”. Indeed, in many ways, it was arguably “more modern” than its West European counterparts in terms of its economic dynamism, the structure of its economy and its military organization, technology and mobilization.

Willhelmine Germany created its own “national cult”, a state-nationalism unique to itself as like any other manifestation of nationalism. Contrary to the pre-1848 anarchic/Republican nationalisms, the Willhelmine national cult presupposed a staunch loyalty to the monarchy and the emperor. It was the emperor and his aura that represented the nation in his persona. In the figure of the emperor, the nation found its embodiment. The German nation was embedded within the emperor and the state. This national cult was to be challenged not only by socialists but race-centered nationalists from 1890s onwards, again not unlike the Young Turk challenge to the Hamidian official proto-national imperial representations and the official cult. Apparently, German/Prussian construction of official national cult was not unique to Germany. For example Russian autocracy developed its own cult along same lines. Along the same lines, the Russian autocracy established its “national cult” around an imperial idea. In the genesis and

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development of Russian “official nationalism” and in the Russian perception of the “nation”, nation was defined strictly not in terms of ethnicity but in terms of obedience to the imperium and identification with the imperium.\(^{282}\) In the words of Richard Wortman, “After 1825, nationality was identified with absolutism, ‘autocracy’ in the official lexicon. Russian nationality was presented as a nationality of consensual subordination, in contrast to egalitarian Western concepts. The monarchical narrative of the nation described the Russian people as voluntarily surrendering power to their Westernized rulers.”\(^{283}\)

As mentioned above, in the post-1870 Europe, the nation-states had consolidated themselves and repressed liberal and Republican opposition. The liberal and Republican contours of nationalism were eliminated and subordinated. The nation had been redefined in terms of states. The states began to be embodiments of the nations and replaced ethnicities. The Hamidian structures of loyalty to the Empire and the sultan himself can be interpreted in line with these developments. The Hamidian Turkish national cult defined nationhood not in terms of Turkish ethnicity but Turkishness embodied within the imperium, Islamic identity and the sultan himself. It is here suggested that, such a construction of nationhood around the imperial center was a founding moment in the forging of the Turkish nationalism.

To sum up our remarks on the problem of ancien régime, we portrayed a certain vista of ancien régime, not an ancien régime about to be thrown into the dustbin of history but an ancien régime that had reestablished/reinvented itself, an ancien régime which is not static and doomed to collapse soon or later, but an ancien régime vivid and innovative in its own ways. In other words, this is an ancien régime constitutive of the modern world as much as the modern nation-state. Establishing the preeminent roles of the ancien régimes, we may argue that the Ottoman ancien régime was constitutive of the Turkish modern nation-state, Turkish nationalism and “Turkish modernity” in general. It had reinvented and adapted itself not as a relic of the past but as an entirely novel phenomenon.


The Turkish *ancien régime* was very pivotal in the constitution of Turkish modernity not only with the legacy it had left but also by crafting the very founding contours and axioms of Turkish modern experience and discourse. It is also argued that Turkish *ancien régime* should be understood fundamentally as a state-elite phenomenon. No economical and social forces played a significant role in this process. The principal stimulator was the state and the state-elite. As the 1789 and Industrial Revolution were no “year zero”s for France and Britain, respectively, and as elites of the *ancien régimes* persisted in new clothes, the Tanzimat and Hamidian elites derived from earlier generations of elites. In this genealogical continuum, an ideological continuum may also be observable connecting the traditional Ottoman imperial discourse to Turkish nationalism. It is argued that, clinging under the banner of the Ottoman imperial identity, the agents and actors of the *ancien régime* had designed a modern Turkish national identity defined in its subordinate relation to the political authority. The next chapter will deal with the Hamidian bureaucracy and its visions of nation and Empire. It will be argued that these premises will be reproduced by the later generations. Then the study will particularly focus on the Ottoman diplomatic service. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry, one of the best showcases of the Turkish *ancien régime*, is a good place to probe the worlds and times of the Turkish *ancien régime.*
CHAPTER II

THE STRUCTURES OF MENTALITIES OF THE LATE OTTOMAN BUREAUCRACY

2.1. A Note on Bureaucracy

The bureaucratic theory in its Weberian “ideal type” assumes impersonality as the very definition of bureaucracy. This theory takes bureaucracy as impersonal. The officials do not exist as themselves, but as anonymities.\(^{284}\) This anonymity renders bureaucracy a very efficient mechanism.\(^{285}\) Thus, within this perspective, bureaucracy is invented for its very functionalism by an external superior prerogative. Apparently, bureaucracy lacked any “agency” itself but was in the service of a superior authority.

Weber and Michels\(^ {286}\) can be seen as the two founders of the classical theory of bureaucracy although criticisms of bureaucracy, e.g., idioms like “bureaumania”, were prevalent themes throughout the 19th century and although Martin Albrow spoke of the “English theory”\(^ {287}\) of bureaucracy before Weber and Michels “theorized” bureaucracy. Although the Weberian conceptualization of bureaucracy continued to be taken as the classical account of the social sciences regarding bureaucracy before the 1970s, the social functionalists, who brought Weber to North America, had already exposed the limitations

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\(^ {284}\) For a criticism of the “anonymity of bureaucracy” theory claiming that the opposite is the case for the 19th century British bureaucracy, see Parris, Henry, *Constitutional Bureaucracy*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969, pp. 93-94.


and inadequacies of the Weberian theorization. Selznick and Merton pointed out the unexpected consequences of the bureaucratic undertakings and demonstrated the inefficiencies of the bureaucracy while Anglo-Saxoning the Weberian theory. However, these criticisms of Weber did not question the founding assumptions of the Weberian ideal type. Indeed, they focused on frictions of the theory and qualified, improved, and deepened the theory. Their critiques of Weber were limited to pointing out the “externalities” of the bureaucratic theory such as the unpredicted complications of organizations rather than questioning the theory itself. It was the later students of bureaucracy who demonstrated that bureaucracy is not free of personalized relations, biases, or cultures. For these critics, bureaucracy cannot be reduced to the objective and mechanistic implementation of the task given.

For Weber, “(b)ureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. This is the feature which makes it specifically rational.” Furthermore, in Weber’s view it was axiomatic that in order to generate control, 


290 Orlovsky in his article on the literature on the Russian bureaucracy notes that there are two different conceptualizations of the term “bureaucracy. “The first is descriptive and denotes the government of a territory through a system of offices staffed by appointees loyal to either dynasty or state. The second is normative and is usually associated with the writings of Hegel and Max Weber. This bureaucracy expresses the rationalization of collective activity and is associated with the appearance of capitalism.” For Orlovsky, the confusing of these two different conceptualizations of bureaucracy is common in the studies of Russian bureaucratic history. Orlovsky, Daniel T, “Recent Studies on the Russian Bureaucracy”, *Russian Review*, vol. 35, no. 4 (October 1976), p. 452. After the decline of the “modernization paradigm”, we learned to treat bureaucracy not necessarily as a Weberian-Hegelian entity but simply as an organization that is more or less intended to be hierarchical, rational, and regulated although at a level that varies in different examples of bureaucratic structures.
knowledge itself had to be controlled. Quoting Weber, David Vincent leveled the question of “whose rationality” is served in keeping the information secret. Vincent pointed out that the secrecy of the bureaucracy is self-serving rather than in the public interest. Vincent’s book along with many other “post-Weberian” books emphasized the self-interestedness of bureaucracy. Of course, one of the most subtle analyses of the bureaucracy had been made by Michal Herzfeld, who interpreted bureaucracy not as a master builder but as a mechanism of minimalization of damage or as a mechanism of damage control. Furthermore, quoting Gerald Britan, Herzfeld notes that ineffectiveness of bureaucracy is not a failure but an intrinsic aspect of bureaucracy given that the very basic goal of the bureaucrat is not rational efficiency but his and his group’s survival unless he is motivated by some other pragmatic goals. The bureaucracy is evidently not an altruistic but a self-interested group contrary to what Hegel had presumed.

The birth of modern Turkey and the modern Turkish nation can be seen as an elaboration of the bureaucratic or semi-bureaucratized privileged imperial class in interaction with other dynamics. The culture and habitus the Turkish bureaucracy had developed and maintained was a prominent component of the Turkish modern and Turkish national imagination. The fact that the survival and well-being of the Turkish nation was central to the self-interest of the Ottoman bureaucracy does not mean that Ottoman bureaucracy was a self-interested actor, but it means that the self-interests of the bureaucracy defined to a certain extent the character of the “original” Turkish nation constructed in the image of the bureaucracy.

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294 Herzfeld, Michael, ibid, p. 5.
2.2. Prussian Ruling Elite and Bureaucracy and the Tanzimat Bureaucracy in Comparative Perspective

The illiberal character of the Prussian path to modernity is a well-established notion in academia since the World War II. This illiberalism derived from the existence of an all-powerful bureaucratic organization regarded as totally autonomous from external forces and political/royal prerogatives. It is no coincidence that the “myth of the bureaucracy” emerged in Prussia. The Prussian Hegel observed that the bureaucratic class “is at the apex of the social pyramid not only because of its universal intentionality, but also because it is the only class of society whose objective is knowledge itself, not nature, artifacts or abstraction, as it is the case with all other classes.” The universal class has for its task the universal interests of the community.” Furthermore, it is not a coincidence that another German, Max Weber, conceptualized bureaucracy as "the dominance of spirit of formalistic impersonality: ‘Sine ira et studio,’ without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm.” It is ironic that Weber’s perception of the Prussian bureaucracy was taken as the representation of the universal bureaucratic model until his interpretation was questioned several decades later.

The British and French bureaucracies expanded enormously in the nineteenth century (and the British bureaucracy’s expansion preceded the others) and subsequently these bureaucracies acquired immense power but no such “myth of the bureaucracy” emerged in

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298 Avineri, Shlomo, ibid, p. 158.

299 Weber, Max, Economy and Society, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968, p. 225. Weber admits that, “this is the spirit in which the ideal official conducts his office.” However, for Weber bureaucrats’ failure to handle their tasks “without affection and enthusiasm” is an exception and distraction from the general rule.
these countries.\textsuperscript{300} This was arguably because these bureaucracies remained subservient to the political authorities above them and therefore could not “own” the state and were not charged with national and universal missions in these countries.\textsuperscript{301}

If the Prussian model and its independence from any external authority (in its Hegelian-Weberian interpretation) is one extreme manifestation of bureaucracy, the Russian case can be taken as the embodiment of the other extreme. The Russian bureaucracy may be characterized as less autonomous from the prerogative of the czar vis-à-vis its Prussian, French and British counterparts. Although, the conventional historiography depicted 19\textsuperscript{th} century Russian bureaucracy as completely dependent to the prerogative of the czar, this reductionist view of the Russian bureaucracy has been challenged by a new generation of historians who established that the Russian bureaucracy also developed considerable autonomy as well as sophistication and effectiveness in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century czarist Russia.\textsuperscript{302}

The Ottoman bureaucracy not only gained an autonomy but also exerted an immense power with the Tanzimat. Indeed, it had been shown in this study that, the era of Tanzimat may be characterized as the Ottoman bureaucracy’s assumption of power beginning from 1839 before the loss of this power beginning from 1871 first with the death of Âli Paşa and appointment of Mahmud Nedim Paşa to the grand vizirate and then with the reign of


\textsuperscript{302} For a critique of this perception, see Lincoln, Bruce, “The Ministers of Nicholas I: A Brief Inquiry into Their Backgrounds and Service Careers”, \textit{Russian Review}, Vol. 34, No. 3, (Jul., 1975) pp. 308-323.
Abdülhamid II. In the Hamidian era, the Ottoman bureaucracy lost its autonomy considerably and lacked effective mechanisms to protect itself from the royal and political prerogative, but it could develop as an effective and imposing structure. Nevertheless, what Abdülhamid II did was the reestablishment of the political prerogative. In a way, the history of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century can be partially read as the clash of the administrative elite versus the royal/political authorities.

Hans Rosenberg, the pioneering historian of early Prussia, presents a survey analysis of the transition of the Prussian polity from “dynastic absolutism” to “bureaucratic absolutism”.

Rosenberg’s contribution was his assessment that the bureaucracy was an autonomous territory independent from the interests of the crown and the aristocracy. Although the bureaucracy was a creation of the crown and although its members were recruited from the aristocracy (Junkers), through time it acquired a separate identity. Rosenberg did not see the bureaucracy as a technical instrument of professional public administration. For Rosenberg, the Prussian bureaucracy was a political and social interest group. For Rosenberg, by the early nineteenth century, the bureaucracy achieved a “revolution from above” and assumed control of the Prussian polity.

A few other historians studied the Prussian bureaucracy in its different phases, and all were influenced by the framework and main thesis of Rosenberg. Reinhard Koselleck took over where Hans Rosenberg left off by studying the decline of bureaucratic absolutism after the reign of Friedrich the Great and before the Revolution of 1848. Runge picked up the story in 1918, focusing on the role of the civil service in the German Revolution and the status of the civil service under the Weimar Republic. Eckart Kerr, the precocious Marxist of Weimar, also penned a fragmentary but insightful assessment of the 19th century Prussian bureaucracy.

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According to Rosenberg and other historians of the Prussian bureaucracy, the Prussian bureaucracy reached its zenith in terms of the power it held and the prestige it acquired between 1815 and the 1840s.\(^{307}\) This was the period when Fichte called for a national reinvigoration after the embarrassing defeat by Napoleon. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, a national plan to reinvigorate Prussia was enacted by Karl von Stein.\(^{308}\) From Stein onwards, the bureaucratic reform was hailed and cherished as “liberal” and “progressive”.\(^{309}\) In the eyes of the “progressives” of the time, bureaucracy was seen as the prime mover of emancipation from the obscurantist medievalism of the Junkers. The establishment of law, order, and administration was seen almost by definition as “progressive”. It was the social and economic unrest (in the years of the “hungry forties”\(^{310}\)) in the 1840s that harmed the prestige of the bureaucracy. By the 1840s, the bureaucratic establishment had lost its magnificent isolation from the social world surrounding it. The end of its isolation also meant the end of its grace, aura of privilege, respectability, and infallibility. The bureaucracy as a corps came down to earth from its divine loftiness and lost the mysticism attributed to it. The mission and the meaning attributed to the bureaucracy had vanished. It turned into a mere practical institution. Furthermore, Prussian intellectuals began to criticize the bureaucracy for no more serving the public interest, but only seeking to protect its own interests as a corps as elaborated in Theodor Von Schön’s influential pamphlet *Woher und Wohin?*\(^{311}\) The critics argued that bureaucracy became an end in itself. In the following decades, many progressives

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\(^{307}\) The Code of 1794 was the founding codex of the 19th century Prussian bureaucracy which bestowed a huge mandate and also provides universal respect and social prestige. Willis, John, *The Prussian Bureaucracy in Crisis 1840-1866*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971, p. 16.

\(^{308}\) For Stein and the controversy around him and his political orientations, see Epstein, Klaus, “Stein in German Historiography”, *History and Theory* vol: 5, no:3, 1966, pp. 241-274.


denounced the Prussian regime to advocate liberal and socialist agendas adverse to the Prussian state and its *raison d’etat*. Ottoman officialdom did not encounter similar ideological and categorical criticism from liberal and socialist standpoints. Socialist/radical critique was almost non-existent and was limited to small circles. The timid Ottoman liberalism never questioned the legitimacy of state governance but criticized it only from a technical point of view: namely the cumbersomeness, ineffectiveness, and incompetence of the state which was not necessarily a liberal critique.312

With the 1840s, the flow of landed aristocrats into the higher civil service was accompanied by the influx of the entrepreneurial middle class into the lower echelons of the civil service.313 The prestige of Prussian bureaucracy was so much that, “the Frenchmen wants the Order of the Legion of Honor; the Englishmen wants MP beside his name; the German wants to become a Kommerzienrat or Geheimrat.”314 Throughout the 19th century, the state became the ultimate address of the expression and manifestation of the spiritual cosmos of the privileged. It was no longer the imagined community of the nobility but the state that exposed the sheer strength and magnificence of the world of the powerful and privileged. The state assumed the central position in the symbolism of the imagined community of the nobility. This transition implied a partial surrender of the aristocrats’ lofty distinction and excellence but also implied the emergence of a new configuration of relations of power.

Another question to be resolved was the extent of the overlapping of the interests of the bureaucracy and the Junkers. The Prussian bureaucracy was definitely an institution of the establishment. It was a part of the conglomeration of the *ancien régime*. It may even be said that it was the guardian of the establishment although not in a Marxian sense. What made the bureaucracy a peculiar status group was that its interests were partially dependent on external circumstances and the social forces exterior to it. Willis establishes the

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313 Willis, John, ibid, p. 38

314 Willis, John, ibid, p.38.
connection between the old house of Junkerdom and the modern Prussian bureaucracy: “In speaking of the modernization of the bureaucracy, one must be careful to note that the process did not necessarily involve the cessation of all traditional habits and attitudes. On the contrary, one of the most striking characteristics of modernization in Prussia was the way in which apparently contradictory elements were combined, and many reformed institutions were dependent on traditional symbols and personnel for their authority. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the bureaucracy, a group that broke with the past in a rapid and dislocating manner, yet preserved many of the habits and attitudes associated with the earlier period.”

Nevertheless, the bureaucracy gained prominence after the Napoleonic wars and became a powerhouse by itself. This is why Hegel rightfully called bureaucracy the “universal class”. For Hegel, bureaucracy could not have particularistic interests. Its interests overlap with the interests of the “whole”. Bureaucracy’s interest is in the universal advancement of the nation and the subjects of the state. Thus, the “part” becomes the “whole”. This was the original version of Marx’s attribution of the status of “universal class” to the proletariat. Marx attributed to the proletariat what Hegel had previously attributed to the bureaucracy. For Marx, the proletariat could not have its own interests. The proletariat would fulfill itself only by advancing the interests of the whole. Because of its being the universal class, Hegel assumed that bureaucracy was a priori progressive. This assumption was not particular to Hegel but shared by the intellectual world of his time.

As pointed out above, this perception changed after the revelation in the eyes of the intellectuals (who also perceived themselves as representing the interests of the “whole” in themselves) that bureaucracy was the guardian of the status quo from the second quarter of the nineteenth century onwards.

Hamerow contrasts the Viennese and Prussian bureaucracies and argues that whereas for the Viennese civil service bureaucracy was a matter of pragmatic professionalism, the Prussian bureaucracy differed in that, “behind the outward appearance of a devoted subject lurked the bold frondeur. His faith in the monarchy arose out of a sense of pride, and his

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315 Willis, John, ibid, p. xiv
opposition to liberalism was more than a preference for royal over bourgeois rule.”

Hamerow does not distinguish between the aristocracy and the bureaucracy and associates Prussian bureaucracy with aristocratic power. For him, the Prussian bureaucracy’s sole purpose was to defend the interests of the conservative establishment. Along the same lines, he does not concede any significant and effective role to the Prussian bureaucracy in the course of German unification in his classic book, *The Social Origins of German Unification 1858-1871*. Apparently for Hamerow, social and economic developments shaped the German polity, and he conceded no active role to the state and the bureaucracy in this process. Although he saw the Prussian bureaucracy as an adamant adversary of reform, he perceived this opposition as a current against the stream with no transformative role in the flow of history.

After Hamerow, the overwhelming role of the Prussian state in the course of German history has been acknowledged by historians as social scientists, who began to “bring the state back in”. Willis claimed that the autonomy of the bureaucracy ended from 1840s onwards. Partisanship, conflict, and disintegration “replaced the rational and olympian Beamtenstand of the early decades(.”

“What ultimately came forth from the upheavals of the transitional period was a relationship suited to an industrialized and urbanized Prussia, in which the old corporative distinctions were no longer tenable. By the time of national unification much that had once divided the aristocracy and bureaucracy had disappeared; both were now part of one relatively homogeneous upper class which also comprises the officer corps and the upper bourgeoisie. Whereas earlier in the century the status symbols of birth, rank, wealth and education had been the property of the separate *Stande*, now they were characteristic of the upper class as a whole. The social distance between the landed aristocracy, the industrial-commercial bourgeoisie, and the higher bureaucracy had narrowed to the point that there existed what Otto Hintze was to call a ‘noble-bourgeois aristocracy of office’.”

Willis presents us with a re-articulation of the Wehler-Mommsen “ruling elite” narrative of the critical, left-liberal German historians of the post-World War II Bielefeld School. This

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319 Willis, John, Aristocracy…, p. 108.
“academically popular” vision of the “conglomerate of the ruling elite” is both illuminating and irrelevant for the nineteenth century Ottoman context. The Wilhelmine and Hamidian regimes differ in many aspects. First of all, we can speak of neither a “bourgeoisie” nor “aristocracy” for the Ottoman context. However, we can definitely speak of a certain ruling elite for the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. A very important characteristic of the Prussian polity (as well as the other European polities) was the existence of corporate bodies. The nobility and the civil service were two corporations. They had their precisely defined rights and privileges. What we see through the Tanzimat is the emergence of an informal corporation of the “ruling elite” holding official posts and gaining “respectability”. In this study, it is argued that the culmination of the fashioning of the “ruling elite” was reached in the Hamidian era.

The Hamidian elite was not the intimidating and monstrous Willhelmine elite of Wehler-Mommsen. It was much more modest in terms of its organization and structure. No Hegel had attributed a historical mission to it. No Fichte had consecrated it. However, a national mission had been assumed by the late Ottoman bureaucracy. It was the state elite that had to counter the assault of the Western powers and more importantly the seditious and separatist non-Turkish and non-Muslim communities. It was the bureaucracy which had to import the necessary knowledge and skills and apply it for the goodwill of the nation. It became the teacher/instructor and role model of the nation. It was the importer, producer, and reproducer of the modern and national knowledge. This was not yet the divine task the Unionists assumed when they tried to reestablish the state as a tool in their radical and uncompromising policies of all sorts. However, the Tanzimat bureaucracy perceived itself as the only source for the revival of the Ottoman state and the idea it represented. In this regard, the Tanzimat bureaucracy played a much more effective role than its Prussian counterpart. It was more “Hegelian” than the Prussian bureaucracy at least as far as “national cause” was concerned. Therefore, the particular structures of mentalities of the Ottoman bureaucracy were decisive in the formation of Turkish nation and modernity.

320 For the role of corporations in medieval Europe and their significance within the imagination of social order in European political thought, see Black, Antony, * Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present*, London; New York: Routledge, 1984.
Following the introductory discussions on bureaucracies in general, this chapter will discuss the collective intellectual formations of Ottoman officialdom. One of the problems in studying 19th century Ottoman intellectual history as well as studying the ideological make-up of the 19th century Ottoman state elite has been to perceive it as a passing or transitory phenomenon. It is as if the Kemalist mind and the Republican reformers ran over the intellectual legacy of the Tanzimat, resulting in its death with this merciless stroke. For example back in 1962, Richard L. Chambers divided, “Turkey’s evolution into a modern nation state in two stages, the first of which may be said to begin in 1789, and the second in 1919.” For Chambers, “the early phases of change were in a manner of speaking defensive since they were effected to preserve the authority of the traditional ruling elite; the changes after 1919 were effected in a genuinely progressive spirit.” Chambers saw Tanzimat as the “age of bureaucrats” before they “lost the position of leadership they had intermittently held for some half a century, first to Abdülhamid and his conservative allies, then to the Young Turk army officers and intellectuals, and finally to Atatürk and the politicians.” Here, the snapshot summary of Chambers’ analysis will not be criticized because these lines are not quoted to criticize the perspective of Chambers but to illustrate the emblematic approach of the time. Chambers himself was a scholar of the Tanzimat bureaucracy and the author of a dissertation on Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, and moreover his quoted article was probing not the Republican bureaucracy but the Tanzimat bureaucracy. Nevertheless, he saw the Tanzimat as a bygone age that failed to respond to the assaults leveled firstly by the patrimonialism of Abdülhamid and later by the military officers. In short, the Tanzimat had been eradicated without any trace. While the Kemalist ideology had been delighted with this alleged eradication, many others had resented the collapse of the Tanzimat. Many public intellectuals who are critical of Kemalism perceived

322 ibid, p. 302.
323 ibid, p. 325.
the gradualism of the Tanzimat as the failed alternative to the radicalism of the Republic. However, here we should probe the Tanzimat intellectual environment not as an archaeologist excavating to find some relics of the past but as a contemporary historian, if not a political scientist, to reconstruct a formative moment of Turkish modernity. In short, here the mindset of the Ottoman bureaucracy will not be investigated as a passé phenomenon, but as the foundation of Turkish modernity as well as the foundation of the Republic.

2.3. The Problem of Secularism

In the modern Ottoman/Turkish historiography, one of the understudied areas and concepts is “secularism”.325 The fact that Mustafa Kemal had decreed secular practices by law and that defined laicism was introduced as a legal concept made us to fail to comprehend and locate what secularity is. Furthermore, the emergence and development of a “secular mind” in the turbulent decades of the late nineteenth century in the Ottoman world could not be mapped satisfactorily. The acuteness and authoritarian nature of the Kemalist practice of Kemalist secularism rendered us unable to grasp the complexity, multi-facetedness, and ambivalent nature of secularism. The preference for the French concept of laicism instead of Anglo-Saxon secularism also determined our (mis)perception of secularity.326 Laicism was a legalistic and an ahistorical concept as opposed to the dynamic, and socially and historically constituted nature of secularity. Not being a legal


notion, there is no Archimedian point at which “secularism” begins.\textsuperscript{327} There is not even an agreed definition of “secularity”. Furthermore, it is legitimate to question if secularism in its fullness is ever possible. Secularism as an epistemological and ontological notion is almost impossible to comprehend,\textsuperscript{328} especially as revealed after the debates of the postsecular society and multiple modernities.\textsuperscript{329}

The ambiguous aspects and nature of secularism is evident for a student of the development of secularism in 19th century Europe. Arguably, a similar pattern was observable in the Ottoman Empire throughout the course of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. What was probably different in the context of the Ottoman Empire was its politicization and the repercussions in its manifestation within the political realm, arguably especially after the Incident of the 31st of March in 1909. The word secularism may imply that there is a clear-cut dichotomy between “secular” polities, and between secular societies and the non-secular ones. It is as if it should be one way or the other.\textsuperscript{330} However, in the previous chapter, the place and role of religion in European monarchies had been discussed, and it had been pointed out that religion was brought forth and used for other (i.e., worldly)

\textsuperscript{327} Due to this assumption, Daver discusses the secularism of Tanzimat and reaches a middle-ground answer claiming that Tanzimat was a step in the secularization of Turkey although it was itself hardly secular. In a way, for Daver, Tanzimat was half-secular. This is because Daver (not unlike Berkes) does not disassociate secularism from modernization of public law. See Daver, Abidin, ibid, pp. 41-22.


\textsuperscript{330} For the ambiguity of the word “secularization” and the impossible effort to designate the point where “secular” begins, see Chadwick, Owen, \textit{The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century}, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 15-18. For a literary survey of the sociological critiques of the explanatory capacity of the concept “secularization”, also see Glasner, Peter E, \textit{The Sociology of Secularisation}, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 5-14
means. The presence and function of Islam in the 19th century Ottoman Empire also had to be analyzed within this framework and these premises. What was aberrant in the course of Ottoman/Turkish history was the sharp denial of any role to Islam by the republic. In fact, this was also a manifestation of a European-wide pattern (the sudden and drastic decline of recognition of any social or political role for religion in the aftermath of World War I with the collapse of the monarchies across the continent) and thus cannot be analyzed in isolation from global dynamics. In certain ways, this development can be seen as an attempt to accommodate the changing times. This also shows that even the radical nature of Kemalism was not a hundred percent local phenomenon but a variation of the postwar republican transformation across the continent.

What the republic did was to shift the “address of allegiance” from a complex and multidimensional one to a blatantly singular one. The republic had declared “ethnic belonging” and the “state” as the immediate “manifestations/embodiments of the nation” thereby eliminating all other sources of identities and legitimacy structures, first and foremost Islam. In this chapter, we will try to delve into the complex and multidimensional mental world of the late Ottoman imperial identity in which different allegiances coexisted and complemented each other.

2.4. The Structures of Mentalities of the Tanzimat Bureaucrat

What do we know about the mindset of the “typical” Tanzimat bureaucrat, not as a literary character in Tanzimat novels, but as a historical person? A meticulous and critical reading of the memoirs will not reveal to us coherent structures of mentalities. On the

331 After the unexpected and dramatic collapse of the “ancien régime” with its value system, religion had been replaced with new forms of political theology as the ultimate source of legitimacy. Nationalism, fascism, and communism are expressions of such an endeavor to establish and perfect a new political religion as first noticed by contemporaries such as Hans Kohn, Hayes, Voegelin, and Raymond Aron. Fascists were explicit in their aim of establishing a new political theology. See Gentile, Emilio, “Fascism as Political Religion”, Journal of Contemporary History, vol.25, no.2-3, May-June 1990, pp. 229-251. Kemalist secular theology cannot be analyzed in isolation from this continent wide zeal beginning not with the 1930s, but from 1918 onwards, following immediately the collapse of the value system of the ancien régime and only becoming overt and dangerous in 1930s.

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contrary, the memoirs will reveal structures of mentalities full of contradictions and incoherence (though maybe only in the eyes of the historian). These texts are useful in opening up a world for us which we do not know, which we cannot reconstruct, and with which we cannot be familiar or empathize. Still, we can try our best to reconstruct a world which is rather distant and unintelligible to our modern minds. We have a few memoirs of Ottoman diplomats, each of them reflecting different worldviews and mindsets. It is the careful researcher’s task to integrate them and interpret them as a whole. The memoirs of state officials in general (mostly governors and officers) can also enable us to enter the world of the late Ottoman bureaucratic world in all its complexity.

Although it is a regrettable fact that we lack an abundance of memoirs written in the 19th century (and earlier) in the Ottoman Empire in comparison to the number produced in Western Europe, the ones available provide us with perspectives from which to enter the cultural formations, and social and political cosmologies of the late Ottoman bureaucratic mind. It may be argued that the available memoirs and their contents have yet to be meticulously worked out and interpreted satisfactorily. Moreover, new memoirs are continuing to appear as descendants of the memoirists are publicizing their ancestors’ notebooks, which were long kept in attics and only taken into daylight in a decade in which antiquity became fashionable. From early 1990s, a growing interest (peaking in the late 2000s) was shown in the memoirs, and since the early 1990s the memoirs of military

332 See the most comprehensive memoirs, see Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, Hariciye Hizmetinde 30 Yıl, 4 volumes, 1949-1955, For weak but curious memoirs, see Paker, Esat Cemal, Kirk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıralarım, Hilmi Kitabevi, 1952.

officers and the members of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Special –Secret- Organization), accounts of Ottoman travelers to foreign countries, and other conspicuous accounts were published. Many contemporaneous memoirs printed in part in newspapers (tefrika) were turned into separate books after some more than sixty years since their original printing (some transcribed into the Latin alphabet), as well as some memoirs printed in part in the popular historical journals of the 1950s and 1960s. Although several deficiencies like the “Turkicizing” of the memoirs without providing the original texts are reducing their substantiality and utility for historical research, these memoirs enable us to learn more

334 “İş Bankası Yayınları” published numerous memoirs of military officers (and private soldiers) although in “simplified forms” and did not provide the original texts. These publications include Bir Onbaşının Doğu Cephesi Günlüğü (Ali Rıza Eti), Kumandandım Galicya Ne Yana Düşer (M. Şevki Yazman), İstibdattan Meşrutiyete, Çoculuktan Gençliğe (İsmail Hakki Sunata), İstanbul’da İşgal Yılları (İsmail Hakki Sunata), Gelibolu’dan Kafkaslara (İsmail Hakki Sunata), Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Bir Yedek Subayın Anıları (Faik Tonguç), Sarıkağıt (Köprüli Şerif İlden), Afganistan’da bir Jöntürk (Mehmet Fazlı). Remzi Kitabevi, another popular publishing house addressing mainstream readers, also published various memoirs of military officers for the first time without providing their original texts. See Harbiye’den Dersim’e (Ziya Yergök), Sarıkağı’tan Esarete (Ziya Yergök), Sadettin Paşa’nın Anıları (Sadettin Pasha). Many small publishing houses also published many memoirs. Of course, İş Bankası Yayınları, Remzi Kitabevi, and other small publishing houses reprinted the memoirs previously published. İş Bankası recently republished the memoirs of Cemal Pasha, İzzeddin Çalışlar, Talat Pasha, Ali Fuad Erden, Kılıç Ali, and Enver Pasha. Apparently, there is a rising public interest and curiosity in the recent decades in memoirs as a part of the rising general interest in late Ottoman history and late Ottoman artifacts.


regarding the worldviews of the Tanzimat and Hamidian cadres. The old assumption that the “Orient” lacks memoirs and personal narratives before the arrival of modernity has been already refuted. New memoirs and diaries have been discovered both from the classical age of the Ottoman Empire written in Turkish and Arabic, and from the 19th century, further proving that this orientalist cliché is baseless.

The memoirs pose several problems to be tackled. First of all, not all of these memoirs can be taken as sincere accounts. Different from diaries written immediately and objectively, all memoirs have a particular motivation and purpose in being written down. Some might have more innocent purposes, like looking for a commercial success or hoping to be remembered after long years of oblivion. Some are to serve a political agenda. Cemal Pasha wrote his memoirs to expose his innocence regarding the Armenian massacres. Riza Nur wrote his flamboyant and eccentric thick volumes to be published after his death to challenge and discredit the Kemalists from his tomb. Several memoirs published in the Istanbul dailies in the 1930s were the long-forgotten voices of men of prominence of yesteryear such as the Lord Chamberlain of Abdülhamid II, Tahsin Pasha or forgotten Young Turks like Ahmed Riza, Muhittin Birgen and Ali Haydar Midhat. Apparently, all these accounts inevitably distorted the past to serve political or personal

337 Recent works by Ottomans (as well as Arabists) criticized the simplistic and untested claim that the Ottomans (and Muslims in general) do not have a tradition of memoirs unlike the West and demonstrated that Ottomans also produced a remarkable number of first-person accounts. For some reassessments and criticisms, see Kafadar, Cemal, “Self and Others: The Diary of a Dervish in Seventeenth Century Istanbul and First-Person Narratives in Ottoman Literature”, *Studia Islamica*, no: 69 (1989), pp. 121-150; Terzioğlu, Derin, “Man in the Image of God in the Image of the Times: Sufi Self-Narratives and the Diary of Niyazi Mısri (1618-1694)”, *Studia Islamica*, no: 94 (2002), pp. 139-165.


interests. Some distortions may be intentional and others unintentional. However, distortions may also be suggestive for deciphering the worldviews of these authors. Memoirs may communicate wonderful observations and interpretations that can be perceived only by an intimate observer. Interesting single anecdotes told by the observer may enable us to conceive the broader picture. Single incidents may be more explanatory and revealing than a whole account. Of course, again we should be careful not to over-interpret the anecdotes and bear in mind that the anecdotes narrated are selected by the author to make his points more persuasive. Literary creativity is a necessary quality of the historian, but the historian is first of all a hard scientist. Though we have the ability to know what the observer preferred to tell us, we however do not have the chance to know completely what the observer preferred not to tell us. However, the possibility of distortion renders the memoirs even more valuable in the eyes of the intellectual historian. The distortions are also a part of the mind of the memoirist.344

One way to categorize the memoirs would be in terms of “typical” and “non-typical” ones. The non-typical memoirs may not be the best sources to depend on as they would not be representative. On the other hand, non-typical memoirs may display the complexity and multi-facetedness of the group for which they are classified as “non-typical”. They diverge from the mainstream in a way that reveals the norms and normalities of the “mainstream”. For example, we may classify Ebubekir Hazim’s (Tepeyran) memoirs (written only in the 1940s) as non-typical with regard to his non-nationalist and liberal approach as a provincial administrator and a governor.

Besides the memoirs of governors, military officers, high profile politicians, denizens of the palace, and men of letters, figures from various governmental offices also penned down their memoirs. Some memoirs depicting the interesting careers of the authors were

written by medical doctors serving in the imperial hospitals who became the founders of modern Turkish medicine, a military engineer who became a pioneering industrialist and aviator, a member of the imperial orchestra, a military officer active in the establishment of a military veterinary school, one of the earliest female painters, and travelers visiting all parts of the world.

Another categorization of memoirs might be established based on the memoirs’ profoundness and lucidity. Some accounts do not disclose more than a depiction of the daily routine of an author serving in various posts. Many of the memoirs lack a structured framework. Others may reveal the cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations of the author in its all complexity. For example, Ebubekir Hazim’s (Tepeyran), Mehmet Tevfik’s (Birgen) and Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha’s memoirs are examples of lucid and knowledgeable memoirs written by men of prominence who held high offices. More importantly, they were competent and knowledgeable officials, and thus their memoirs convey to us a lot about the worldview of the late Ottoman bureaucrats. From such memoirs, we can construct a comprehensive worldview of the late Ottoman bureaucrat.

Some labels with which we may categorize/label the authors of the memoirs are “nationalist”, “conservative”, “modernist”, et cetera. As articulated in the previous chapter, all these simplistic, definitive labels fail to represent the minds of the Ottoman bureaucrats as the memoirs leave us with perplexing questions rather than providing the keys for penetrating into the mind of the memoirist.

First of all, it is very hard to find an uncompromising “conservative/traditionalreactionary”. The wicked and bigoted reactionary is a character which we encounter both in the Western observers’ accounts and in the supposedly liberal/westernist Ottoman accounts. For example, the theme of the clash between

345 Cemil Kopuzlu, Hıtraları, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945; Operatör Hazım Paşa, Hıtraları, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945; Celal Muhtar Özden, Hıtraları, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945.
346 İlmen, Süreyya, Hıtralarım, İstanbul: İbrahim Horoz Basımevi, 1947.
347 Kaçar, Halil, Hıtraları, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945
348 Albatı, Eşref, Hıtraları, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi,1945.
progressive Mustafa Reşid Pasha and his reactionary archenemies is prevalent in Ahmed Cevdet Pasha’s *Tezakir*. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha wrote that, when Mustafa Reşid Pasha was temporarily dismissed from office, his archenemy the reactionary Said Pasha took control of the state and accused Mustafa Reşid of blasphemy. Furthermore, he exiled all the champions of progressive ideas from Istanbul and tried to transform the state into what it had been one hundred years earlier (*İstanbul’u efkar-ı cedide eshabından tahliye etmek velhasıl devleti yüz sene geriye döndürmek gibi hülyalara saptı*).³⁵⁰ The western accounts also like to depict the irreconcilable clash between the progressive wing and the reactionaries within Ottoman officialdom. However, all these accounts fail to substantiate the gist of the matter. The “uncompromising arch-reactionary character” seems to be a literary character (as well as an ideological asset) given that the Tanzimat bureaucracy as a whole was imbued with a certain reformist/transformative agenda although kindred souls of this fictitious character could be found among various conservative figures of the Tanzimat bureaucratic world. As has already been argued, this shared ethos derived less from cultural preferences than from structural imperatives and concerns. A few names such as Namık Pasha, who renounced his earlier Westernized culturalization, became a devoted Naqshibendi, and publicly displayed his piousness, remained exceptional.³⁵¹

The affair that was portrayed as a “reactionary takeover” was Mahmud Nedim Pasha’s rise to power in 1871. After coming to power, Mahmud Nedim Pasha purged many of the men of prominence (and members of the “progressive” cabal of Âli Pasha) and practically exiled them by appointing them to provincial posts. The appointment of Mahmud Nedim Pasha to the Grand Vizirate was depicted in almost all the contemporary Ottoman accounts as a kind of counter-revolution⁵² (*irtica* is the translation of one of the foundational

³⁵² For the birth and development of “counter-revolution” as a reaction to the “revolution” and its demonization and prominent role in the revolutionary rhetoric in France, see Godechot, Jacques, *The Counter-Revolution: Doctrine and Action, 1789-1804*, Princeton:
concepts of French Revolution, reaction) with a tone resembling the Young Turk accounts narrating the Incident of 31 March as the insurrection of reaction when the politically heavily loaded term/label irtica made its debut.  For example, Ebuzziya Tevfik writes that the Young Ottomans who previously were outspoken foes of Áli Pasha appreciated him after his death. This was because although they were disturbed by the despotic nature of Áli Pasha’s governance, they shared the ethos of the Tanzimat whereas Mahmud Nedim Pasha was depicted as a man of radically different aspirations and worldview. Mahmud Nedim Pasha was described in all these accounts as someone who was not only reactionary and politically incapable, but also a man with negative personal qualities such as “maliciousness” and “treachery.” For Namik Kemal, Mahmud Nedim’s rule was a despotism aimed at eradicating all the reforms and achievements of the Tanzimat (in contrast to the government of Ali Paşa which was guilty of not undertaking any substantial reforms and betraying the legacy of Mustafa Reşid Paşa) and collapsed in the face of resistance by the whole nation (umum millet). Butrus Abu Manneh claimed that Mahmud Nedim’s takeover had signified a conscious, drastic transfer of power and the capture of power by a certain ideologically motivated mentality which failed after strong and effective resistance by the bureaucracy. Mahmud Nedim’s goal was to destroy the


existing bureaucratic caste and to pack the bureaucracy with an alternative group of officials. Henry Eliot also notes that after the appointment of Mahmud Nedim as the Grand Vizier, “(t)he sultan....appoint(ed) to high posts several of the worst of the old school of Pashas.” Although in Elliot’s narrative, the sultan’s act remained a personal prerogative and an arbitrary act rather than a manifestation of an ideological dynamic, he established the political underpinnings of this personal prerogative. Although this prevalent narrative reflects a genuine concern and a political feud, it also constitutes a founding discourse of the Turkish progressive narrative by creating an enemy and demonizing it (preceding the 31 March Incident of 1909). This is not to suggest that Mahmud Nedim lacked such motivations. However, the “official demonization” of Mahmud Nedim reflects a certain bias. Furthermore this narrative was semi-officialized after Mahmud Nedim’s retreat against the organized resistance of the leading cadres of the Tanzimat.

The basic motivation that influences Mahmud Nedim’s rise and practices developed, as shown by Abu Mannah, out of a broad disappointment with the West and the fear of the prospective and inevitable rise of the non-Muslims within the bureaucracy and in the Ottoman world in general after the liberal reforms of 1860s. This fear was shared by the adamant opponents of Mahmud Nedim as well. Therefore, Mahmud Nedim’s reaction may be regarded as a symptom rather than a cause. The liberal-reformist optimism of the Tanzimat had collapsed from the inside, and Mahmud Nedim was only a symptom of the evolution of the Tanzimat ideology. Mahmud Nedim was only the most visible and setback of “gradual secularization, of the pursuit of Osmanlıcılık, of general modernization” and the coming of “nascent Islamic sentiment and a rising anti-Europeanism” with the death of Ali Pasha and the appointment of Mahmud Nedim as his successor. Roderick Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 269.

358 For a short discussion of the “cabal” of Mahmud Nedim Pasha, see Butrus Abu Manneh, ibid, pp. 171-76. For the exile policy of Mahmud Nedim Pasha, see Roderick Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 281.


360 For the political uses of the Notion of “irtica” in the Unionist and Kemalist eras by the political elites to discredit, demonize and delegitimize opposition (as also noted by Velid Ebüziyya, the son of Tevfik, in 1923), see Azak, Umut, ibid, pp. 38-41.
outspoken expression of the change in perceptions. In short, Mahmud Nedim’s conservative backlash emanated from the dynamics of the Tanzimat. Nevertheless, his critical attitude to the basic premises to the Tanzimat were denounced and doomed him to failure.

2.5. Sivilizasyon

According to Tuncer Baykara, the word “medeniyet” as the translation of the French word *civilisation* possibly appeared for the first time in the Turkish language in 1834 when it was used by Mustafa Reşid Pasha, himself being praised later by Şinasi as a “messenger of civilization” (*medeniyet resulü*). For Mustafa Reşid Pasha, civilization meant the “upbringing of the population and the execution of orders” (*terbiye-i nas ve icra-i nizamat*). Sadık Rifat Pasha also mentioned “the present civilization of Europe, i.e., the principles of familiarity and culture” (*Avrupa’nın şimdiki sivilizasyonu yanı usul-i me’nisiyet ve medeniyeti*), also equating Europe and “medeniyet”. It is also very illuminating to check the translation of the French word *civilisation* into Ottoman Turkish in the dictionaries of the time. Artin Hindoglu in his *Dictionnaire Français-Turc* in 1831 translated *civilisation* as “*edeb, erkan öğrenme*” (cultivation, learning of manners) and *civilité* as “*edeb, erkan, çelebilik*” (cultivation, refinement). The *Vocabulaire Français-Turc* of Bianchi published in Paris in 1831 translated *civilisation* as “*insaniyet*” (humanity).

In short, the word *civilisation* in Turkish implied good manners and elegance on the eve of the Tanzimat. By the 1870s, the word had attained a more political and ideological connotation besides its more personalized aspects. Redhouse, in his *Lexicon* in 1877, translated civilization as “a-) medeniyet; terbiye; terbiye-i medeniye: tehzib-i ahlak ve tervic-i ulum ve fûnun; içtma’-î kemalat-i edebiye ve ilmiye b-) vahshilik halinden çıkarub terbiye ve medeniyet yoluna dahil etmeklik” (a-) civilization, politeness, development and perfection in learning, politeness and morality b-) giving up barbarism and becoming

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civilized and developing good manners). In his 1880 dictionary, Redhouse translated civilization as “terbiye” (good manners). In short, medeniyet meant at the same time being refined and polite determined according to the contemporary code of conduct standards of Europe, which did overlap and complement each other.\(^{362}\)

One of the important points to underline is that according to the perception of the time, there was one single *civilisation*. It was understood in some ways as the European civilization, and in some ways it was perceived as a laudable notion without any geographical and cultural references. The second point to be underlined is that this notion had an unambiguously positive connotation. Thirdly, civilization was an ideal to be emulated and attained. Furthermore, it was perceived as open to all who were eager to endorse it and who had the ability to internalize it.

Although we have tried to list the non-political conceptualization of “civilization”, this does not mean that “civilization” was a non-ideological concept. On the contrary, civilization was an ideological concept reflecting and imposing the value system of a class, the class that distinguished itself from ordinary folk.

In the mindset of Tanzimat officialdom, the ideal of civilization was a very pivotal theme. In the culture of the classical Ottoman Empire, influenced by the pre-Islamic Persian and Islamic ideals, the state was associated with refinement and cultivation. Thus, a member of the privileged member of the askeri class (being part of the state), the Ottoman scribe was to be a figure of emulation. He perceived himself as a figure of emulation and was supposed to be distinctive from the common men due to his upbringing and refinement\(^{363}\). This traditional Ottoman/Islamic perception and ideal overlapped with the 19th century ideal of civilization. In fact, before the impact of the 19th century Western civilization ideal, a certain ideal of cultivation was a very prevalent and pivotal aspect of the classical Ottoman officialdom and worldview. In this regard, the endorsement of the


\(^{363}\) For the ideal of Ottoman refinement in classical age of the Ottoman Empire, see Fleischer, Cornell, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
19th century civilization ideal was not an entirely new phenomenon but an alteration/modification of classical Ottoman vision and ideology.

Civilization epitomized the imperial ideal as well. Civility was one of the hallmarks of being an empire and state. An empire was to be distinguished and revered by its claim to refinement, which set it apart from the sheer military might of usurpers and tyrants. These are some reasons why the endorsement of Westernization was so smooth before it began to be problematized in the late 19th century. In this regard, the import and endorsement of the “ideal of civilization” has to be explained in structural terms rather than cultural terms.

Ebubekir Hazim, then a lower level official working in the Governorship of Konya and a dilettante poet and man of letters, was advised by the governor of Konya, Müşir Mehmed Said Pasha, as follows:

“I am reading your poems in newspapers. I do not get any taste from our poems which are mere imitations of the Persian poems....we have to acknowledge that in this country genuine talent in fine arts is restricted to only a few. I never heard of any poet, artist, or musician who became prosperous. Especially, all the poets live without any exception in conditions of misery and curse what they call fortune (felek)....I do not want to see you join this miserable community....You can specialize in a certain science. Even if you decide to continue your career in the bureaucracy, you have to have proficiency in fiscal, judicial, or administrative matters ... To acquire such an expertise in any of these fields, you are obliged to learn one of the European languages. This is because there are not enough books in any of the fields (in Turkish). To read the available books again and again is to be like a horse with his eyes closed and to run and run in a small circle. You cannot move one step forward in progress and maturity.”

Taking the advice of the governor seriously, Ebubekir Hazim decided to learn French although he was desperate to find a printed alphabet in Konya. He mastered the French language in the miserable conditions of the provinces in ten years. The French language symbolized the opening of a new world. In the person of Ebubekir Hazim, the learning of the French language also allowed him to become familiar with modern French poetry instead of only encountering “monotonous” Ottoman poetry. The French language was a

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365 ibid, pp. 40-45.
passport allowing the bearer entrance into the modern world and civilization, and permitting travel from one world to another.366

Civilization was perceived as an elite ideal rather than a political and ideological concept. The endorsement of Westernization by the pre-political inter-elite world of the Tanzimat was based on this perception and assumption. Münif Pasha equated civilization with Islam. For him, Islam advocates Bildung and civility in opposition to ignorance (cehalet) and barbarism (bedeviyet).367 Civilization was yet to be an subject of contestation. In fact, during the abolition of the janissaries and the establishment of a modern military corps, drastic reforms were presented as the clash between the righteous defenders of Islam and the ignorance and (religious) corruption prevalent among janissaries and other defenders of the “old regime”.368 Apparently, there was a class background to these representations since whereas the state and state elite were associated with (genuine as opposed to rhetorical) piousness, righteousness, and morality, the mob was associated with incivility, barbarism, and heresy. During the Tanzimat-period, rather than being an impediment to westernization, Islam was perceived as a supportive force in the course of Westernization. In the classical Ottoman Empire as well as throughout Islamic history, Islam epitomized civility, refinement, and the distinction of the elite. The contrast was drawn between the ignorant barbarism of the nomads and the ordinary folk, and the cultivated elite which were distinguished by their careful and strict observance of Islam. The ordinary folk were ignorant of Islam and its refinements. Tanzimat advanced on this


367 For the long paragraph where Münif Pasha elaborates on his argument, see Budak, Ali, Münif Paşa, Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004, p. 551. Also see the contrast established between “bedeviyet” and the (civilized) state, see Es’ad Efendi, ibid, p. 623.

368 Es’ad Efendi, Vak’a-Nüvis Es’ad Efendi Tarihi, pp. 644-650; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet, pp. 154-170.

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premise. Therefore, Islam was an integral part of the Tanzimat civility. It did not pose an obstacle. On the contrary, the Islamic ideal was complementary to and harmonized with the Tanzimat ideal. We do not observe a contradiction between Islam and the zealous “imitation” of the Western ideal. Of course, such a harmony was possible within the traditionalist and elitist interpretation of Islam espoused by the Ottoman elite. An alternative and oppositionist Islam was also in the process of development, especially those ideas associated with the Khalidiyya-Naqshibandi order.  

We observe the emergence of a process of parting of the ways during the Hamidian era as religion/religiosity began to be perceived, particularly among the younger generations of educated intellectuals, to be incompatible with science and the emerging materialistic thought. This 19th century Ottoman blend of Islam, progress, and science was not unlike the Victorian ideal which was in contrast to the strictly secular and emancipationist republican ideal of republican France. Much as the Victorian consensus was retreating in the very late post-Darwinian decades of 19th century, simultaneously the Young Turks were revolting against the Islamic ideal (and Islamic-and Western-civility as well). Nevertheless, many other Young Turks continued to retain both their commitments. Contention over the ideal of civilization will emerge also as an impact on the West after the radicalization of German right with its emphasis on the deadly antagonism of the Western Zivilisation and the German Kultur among writers such as Oswald Spengler and Ernest Jünger. Nevertheless, it also has to be pointed out that the first signs of this anti-civilizationist discourse developed during the Hamidian era. It is ironic that the post-


Tanzimat anti-westernist discourse of the multiplicity of civilizations and of Western civilization as the (toothless) evil incarnate was also an outcome of Westernization.

It was the impact of the late 19th and early 20th century discourse of multiple civilizations and the rhetoric of anti-civilizationism especially prevalent in Germany that had diluted Tanzimat’s civilizationism and generated the discourse of Ottoman/Turkish/Muslim authenticity and distinctiveness claiming to descend from a different and superior civilization. Although the great Islamic past was a theme to be articulated, its juxtaposition in opposition to western civilization and its transformation into a strategic asset exposing the deficiencies and hypocrisies of western civilization emerged from the late 19th century onwards and gained prominence with the radicalism of Young Turks.372 In fact, anti-civilizationism and the rhetoric of multiple civilizations were partially influenced by and imported from the German anti-civilizationism developed during the Wilhelmine era and peaked in the thoughts of post-war right-wing intellectuals such as Oswald Spengler373 and Ernest Jünger374. As these intellectuals juxtaposed German Kultur against cosmopolitan Western Civilization, the Young Turk generation proclaimed the irreconcilability of the Western Christian imperialist “Civilization” with Turks and Muslims being the political leaders and representatives of Islam. In this view, imperialism, Europe, and Christianity became indistinguishable and virtually meant the same thing. It was equally true for the Turks, Islam, and the innate anti-imperialism of this cultural/political entity who began to be depicted as the diametrical opposite of the “toothless” Western civilization.

2.6. Reformism, Civilization, Progress, Science and Islam: The Consensus of the Tanzimat Bureaucratic World

373 Spengler, Oswald, The Decline of the West, New York: A.A.Knopf, 1926.
It is another question whether the Tanzimat scribal class had a comprehensive political worldview. It may be argued that they had divided political orientations and dispositions. The notion that people are to have encompassing political worldviews and orientations appears to be hardly applicable to the 19th century Ottoman context. Some fundamental assumptions of the Tanzimat scribes were clearly non-political or supra-political. Furthermore, these assumptions were not contested assumptions but the expression of a common understanding regardless of the minor differences among the political/social views of the Tanzimat officials. We have to await the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 or perhaps the Hamidian era for the differentiation and the flourishing of alternative and rivaling political/ideological stances.

One feature of the mindset of Tanzimat Ottoman officialdom was commitment to and belief in a standardized and fixed scheme of programs of reform. In the numerous “reports” of the time, the issues suggested to be undertaken and accomplished were almost identical and straightforward: regulation of fiscal matters, improvement of education, alleviation of the agricultural infrastructure, improvement of the efficiency of the bureaucracy, et cetera. The very basic idea was that once all these reforms were accomplished, the serious, age-old problems would be overcome. This faith in progress via implementation of the necessary technical reforms was limited to the replication of what had been already done in the “West”. No structural impediments were to be expected once the necessary will and skills were put into effect. The agenda for the advancement of the Ottoman state was rather straightforward.

One of the most overt examples of this optimism was arguably Mustafa Sami Efendi’s “Avrupa Risalesi” (Pamphlet on Europe) first published in 1840. Mustafa Sami’s travel


376 A very similar state of mind in 19th century Persian reformists is caught by Shaul Bakhsh. He dubs this the “open sesame” approach which assumes that Persia can enjoy the benefits of Western civilization without any friction once they are introduced. For Bakhsh, the “open sesame” approach also assumes that when the positive effects of westernization become evident, any resistance or opposition to reform will evaporate. Bakhsh, Shaul, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy & Reform under the Qajars 1858-1896, London: Ithaca Press, 1978, p. 30.
account is a striking example of an utmost confidence in the achievements of Europe. At the end of his book, Mustafa Sami concludes that the advanced state of Europe was neither due to the climate of Europe nor to the fertility of its soil. For Sami, the reason for the advanced state of Europe was due to science and to science only. Mustafa Sami suggested that once Ottomans emulated this model, the abode of Islam would be even more advanced than Europe given that its land is fertile, its climate is fine, and its people are intelligent by birth.\(^{377}\) It is striking to notice that almost the same “developmentalist”, optimistic interpretation was articulated in the Rescript of Tanzimat in which it was claimed that due to the fertility of the soil and intelligence of its people, the Ottoman Empire will be an advanced nation “in five to ten years” once the necessary measures were taken.\(^{378}\) In fact, what Mustafa Sami did was to reiterate and propagate the ideas of the Rescript of Tanzimat. Given that Mustafa Sami was appointed as a secretary in the Ottoman embassy to Paris (after serving in the Ottoman embassy to Vienna) and that this travelogue was written based on his observations while on his way to Paris to begin to serve in his new post and furthermore given that he was a confident of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the political agenda of this text is evident. A similar and earlier analysis and prescription was presented by Sadık Rifat Pasha in 1837, who at the time of writing his report was the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna.\(^{379}\) It may be claimed that in his report, Sadık Rifat foreshadowed Tanzimat. In his *risale*, Sadık Rifat noted that the basis of advancement no more lay in military improvement but in peaceful means.

In fact, both Sadık Rifat Pasha and Mustafa Sami Bey’s accounts could be understood as variations of the Rescript of Tanzimat. In fact, the same reasoning and policy proposals will be reiterated in many political pamphlets. Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha forty years later suggested similar policy proposals to Abdülhamid. Although he was critical of some aspects of Tanzimat, his reasoning and arguments were strikingly reminiscent of Mustafa Sami and Sadık Rifat. Like his predecessors, for him the Ottoman Empire regressed due to


its internal corruption and its diversion from the path of the golden age of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire will ascend by employing the Staatswissenschaft of Europe, reorganizing the state as a modern state, and avoiding corruption and lethargy.\textsuperscript{380}

Münif Pasha was another representative of early Tanzimat. His years in Berlin as a secretary in the Ottoman embassy in his youth were constitutive of his later intellectual formation. Facing Western intellectual superiority, young Münif developed a radically Westernist orientation and contributed significantly to the transmission of Western knowledge in an encyclopedia format in the 1860s.\textsuperscript{381} The same observation is equally valid for İbrahim Edhem, who along with Münif Pasha served as a secretary in the Berlin embassy in the same years. As suggested above, Münif’s and İbrahim Edhem’s were educated at a time when the astronomical gap between the Muslim Ottomans and Europe did not produce enmity but admiration of the West. Münif Pasha began his career in the Translation Office before his appointment to Berlin. “In 1859, he returned to the Porte and reentered the Translation Bureau. In this year, he provided the Muslim Ottomans with the first translation into Turkish of what may be termed the ideas of the Enlightenment.”\textsuperscript{382} After a brief tenure in the Bureau, he rose to other governmental departments including a five-year tenure at the embassy to Teheran.”\textsuperscript{383} Münif Pasha belonged to the very early Tanzimat generation and preceded Namık Kemal and his colleagues, who were frustrated by the shortcomings of Tanzimat and the attitudes of the Western powers and were seeking an authentic identity for Ottomans, Turks, and Muslims.\textsuperscript{384}

Nonetheless, the optimistic vision of the undertaking of the necessary technical reforms and improvements was not as naive as it may seem. This faith also contained a resilient trust in the state as it was the only possible actor to direct and administer this sweeping

\textsuperscript{380} See Çetin, Atilla, Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988, pp. 254-75. For the texts of his three policy proposals presented to Abdülhamid, see ibid, pp. 312-56.

\textsuperscript{381} Budak, Ali, Münif Paşa, İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004, p. 22.


\textsuperscript{383} Budak, Ali, ibid, pp. 21-24, 31-35.

\textsuperscript{384} See for a comparison between Münif Pasha and Namık Kemal, Mardin, Şerif, ibid, pp. 233-246.
transformation. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha’s impressive account is a perfect example of the perception that the establishment of the order by the state was the primary condition for the establishment of a modern and well-ordered infrastructure.\textsuperscript{385} Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, an officer motivated by professional ethos and confidence in the progressive capacity of modern organization and technology, carried out his assignments by suppressing revolts in the various peripheries of the Ottoman Empire, moving from Yemen\textsuperscript{386} to Montenegro, from Lebanon to Serbia. In his account, he was anxious to suppress these revolts by violence if necessary, not because he was a merciless soldier filled with loyalist zeal, but because he regarded these rebels as unruly savages needing to be educated and tamed. For him, the modern organization of the state and society had to be handled with the iron and authoritative hand of the state, which was by definition the only legitimate authority capable of undertaking this demanding mission. Apparently, the reform project was welded around a benevolent state.

For the reformers, the state represented the ultimate good, not unlike the classical Ottoman and classical Islamic political imagination. The local resistance to the state simultaneously symbolized obscurantism, uncivilized manners, and treachery. That axiom definitely led to the assumption that all the opponents and critics of the state, at least those who were not favorable to the territorial integrity of the empire, were motivated by evil goals. The discourse of orientalism and colonialism of the Ottoman center towards the periphery had been scrutinized by Usama Makdisi. “By casting the Ottoman Empire as the progenitor of the Enlightenment ideal (and therefore its natural inheritor), capable of its

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, \textit{Serzüğêş-i Hayatım}, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996 (2 volumes)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
own renaissance, Ottoman reformers also articulated the notion of the ‘Ottoman man's burden’ toward its subject populations, who would have to be disciplined and reformed before the Ottoman Empire could firmly establish itself as a civilized power.\(^{387}\) Apparently, these “reforms”, “disciplining” and civilizationist practices also included violence. The destruction of the Kurdish principalities\(^ {388}\), the forced settlement of Turcoman tribes\(^ {389}\), and the introduction of modern governance in Yemen\(^ {390}\) were all achieved by violence legitimized on progressive and civilizationist grounds. These premises were the sanctity and rightfulness of the Ottoman state, and the intellectual and ethical superiority of the Ottoman ruling elite. A new expansionism molded with a civilizationist discourse emerged in the Tanzimat, especially in the Arab lands.\(^ {391}\)

Here, the undertakers of the “progenitoring of the Enlightenment ideal” were “members of the state elite”, “Muslims” and gradually “Turks” (especially vis-à-vis “Kurds” and “Arabs”).

Not only the Tanzimat statesmen, but also Ottoman intellectuals displayed the amalgamation of these complex and overlapping identities and self-perceptions. Namık Kemal epitomizes the intertwined nature of these identities and ideals. In his article, “Terakki” (Progress), published in the daily İbret in 1862, we observe his commitment to “civilizationism” and adoration and admiration of the West. Namık Kemal defined London as “the photograph of the display of the progress of civilization”.\(^ {392}\) After this introduction,

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Namık Kemal makes an imaginary visit to London with his readers. Namık Kemal describes certain buildings and what is done there. He visits Westminster, a building in which the hard-working parliamentarians are contributing to the progress of their homeland; the Palace of Justice, in which justice is distributed with utmost civility and politeness; schools in which children are given manners and erudition; libraries in which people are reading books about science, et cetera. After long paragraphs of fascination, Namık Kemal concludes by asking why the Ottomans were left behind. He also asks the reader if “we” lost all our learning and why “we” are in such a desperate situation.\(^{393}\) Namık Kemal suggests that London with all its glamour, civility, and elegance is the model to imitate. It is the ultimate goal in the quest for progress. In his other articles, Namık Kemal entertains colonial visions towards the Arab lands (with the motive of rehabilitating Arabs to their distinguished past as the original nation of Islam)\(^{394}\), dreams of a pan-Islamic enlightenment and revival\(^{395}\), claims authenticity and cultural distinctiveness from the Europeans\(^{396}\), and envisions an Ottoman Empire which has fully appropriated “civilization” and “modern technologies”.\(^{397}\) A recurring concern in his articles was to show and prove that Islam was not the cause of the deterioration of the Islamic lands. In other words, in Namık Kemal we observe the perplexed mind of the 19\(^{th}\) century Ottoman intellectual/bureaucrat, where all of these concerns exist intertwined and are meaningful only in interrelation with each other. Likewise, the “we” of Namık Kemal remains vague. For example, although he has a clear idea of a community of Islam, Islam is inevitably politicized, and as soon as Islam was imagined as a politicized identity, the prospects of Islam were to be defined in terms of the prospects of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, for Namık Kemal, the Ottoman Empire was clearly an empire led by the Turks though they were supposed to serve an altruistic goal.

Namık Kemal’s perception of Arabs is intriguing because although he respects the Arabs as the original nation of Islam, noting that Arabs had converted Turks to Islam and

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\(^{393}\) Namık Kemal, ibid, p. 220.

\(^{394}\) Namık Kemal, “Yemen’e Dair Mütalaa”, ibid, p. 57.

\(^{395}\) Namık Kemal, “İttihad-ı İslam”, ibid, p. 84-87.

\(^{396}\) Namık Kemal, “Medeniyet”, ibid pp. 358-361.

“educated them” (terbiye etmek), at the same time he points out that the Arabs were in a miserable condition at the time (Arap bizim fesad-ı rüzgar ile a’sabına halel gelmiş üstadmızdır). Turks were to save the Arabs from their backwardness and restore them to their historical greatness.\(^{398}\) Apparently, he sees Turks as the nation destined to educate, civilize, and lead the nations of Islam as Turks were the ruling nation (millet-i hakime) of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, his “we” is a complex one, amalgamating discrete identities although it is rather clear within his worldview and within his historical context that he arranges Ottoman imperialism, the Turkish nation, and Islam within a hierarchy. Given that there is no space here to enter into the convoluted structures of the mindset of Namık Kemal, it will be only noted that Namık Kemal illustrates the multilayered and anomalous nature of the late mind of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite at its best.

Within this encyclopedic intellectual milieu, “knowledge” was perceived as a semi-sacred and “objective” notion, not unlike the Islamic notion of “ilim” with its divine/religious connotations. In fact, it may be argued that the Islamic “ilim”\(^{399}\) (which served as further proof of the existence and magnificence of God) was replaced by the modern/Western notion of science (ulum-plural of ilim) and thus, that the positivism of late Ottoman thought was derived from Islamic premises and outlook. “Knowledge” was hailed as emancipating people (from ignorance and unjust oppression) and functioned as the beacon of humanity and progress. Thus, the attitude towards “knowledge” derived not only from the 19\(^{th}\) century European positivist perception, but also from the authentic Islamic culturalization that consecrated authority and authoritative knowledge. Thus, 19\(^{th}\) century “Western knowledge” was perceived as authoritative and worthy of being imported. However, this did not mean that they should merely imitate Western techniques and become “modernists”. On the contrary, their adaptation of technical knowledge was not to be in conflict with or in contradistinction to their authentic culturalization and

\(^{398}\) Namık Kemal, “Yemen’e Dair Mütala”, ibid, p. 57.

\(^{399}\) The value attributed to Western/technical knowledge and Ottoman positivism was in a sense the persistence of the traditional Islamic perception of knowledge. “The concept of knowledge enjoyed an importance unparalleled in other civilizations.” Rosenthal, Franz, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, Leiden: Brill, 1970, p. 334.
distinctiveness. The western technical “objective” knowledge was to be employed to strengthen the Ottoman state.

In the early Tanzimat, science and knowledge lacked any cultural connotations. There was yet no contestation over knowledge and science or an effort to Islamicize and indigenize them. Nevertheless, the discourse of the “Islamic golden age” accompanied the reception of Western knowledge and science. The Western science and knowledge was adapted and digested with the discovery and articulation of “Turkish-Islamic” scientists, such as Avicenna and al-Farabi, the glorification of the “Islamic golden age”, and an emphasis on the crucial Turkish-Islamic contribution to the development of (modern) science. A discourse of authenticity and distinctiveness in the late 19th century developed. In fact, this discourse of authenticity was partially based on the conjectures of 19th century French republican historiography -which constituted the chief and almost only source of information regarding the European medieval period for the Ottoman intelligentsia- and positivist thought, which depicted the feudal, European medieval age as obscurantist, uncivilized, and “dark” and which juxtaposed the alternative civilization of the “enlightened Muslim East” against obscurantist Christendom. Nevertheless, there was not yet the “indigenization of knowledge” and development of a discourse of an alternative and rival “Islamic/local/traditional knowledge and civilization” which became visible later, especially after the Revolution of 1908.

Faith in science, a shared attitude among the late Ottoman bureaucrats, reached an extreme level within the context of the Darwinian ideas circulating in the Ottoman Empire

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401 For a parallel development of the “indigenization of knowledge” and the emergence of nativism in culture, the social sciences, thought, and even in technology in Iran, see Boroujerdi, Mehrzad, Iranian Intellectuals and the West, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996; Fazeli, Nematollah, Fazeli, Politics of Culture in Iran, London; New York: Routledge, 2006. The 19th century Iranians also developed the idea that pre-Islamic Iran was “the source of knowledge for the Greeks, the Egyptians, and (it) had been the fountain of civilization and education (chismish-i tamaddun va tarbiyat)””. Thus, what had to be done was simply to rediscover the authentic and historic magnificance and erudition of Iran. Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 68.
in the 1890s. A new generation emerged, endorsing a materialistic worldview in reaction to conservative ideas, most famously in the thoughts of Doktor Abdullah Cevdet\textsuperscript{402} and Beşir Fuad, but not limited to a small circle of people.\textsuperscript{403} However before the 1890s, the perception that science and religion are inevitably contradictory did not exist either in the Ottoman Empire or in Europe in general. Until then, science had been welcomed as the beacon of humanity. Such an infinite faith in science was also compatible with the assumption that the superiority of the European nations was principally due to science. Once the Ottomans appropriated science as the Europeans already had, they would reach the level of progress of Europe. Therefore, the superiority of Europe was not a matter of “culture”, as would be claimed from the 1890s onwards, but only a matter of delay. The ones who were suspicious of the achievements and limitless opportunities of science were mocked for failing to comprehend the modern world and were regarded as examples of an obsolete and archaic mentality as can be observed in numerous accounts of the time.\textsuperscript{404}

A break in this optimistic faith in science and the idea that science and religion were not compatible but mutually exclusive emerged only in 1890s, a decade which was also critical for the transformation of the “European mind” as well.\textsuperscript{405} In this regard, the generational drift observable in the Ottoman context was actually a continent-wide phenomenon and has to be assessed as part of a European intellectual phenomenon. The fall of the conservative Tanzimat men with their optimistic, conservative, and evolutionist

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\textsuperscript{402} For an impressive account of the prevalence of materialist thought among the students in Tıbbıye while Abdullah Cevdet was a student, see Hanioğlu, Şükrü, \textit{Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi}, İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981, pp. 8-20.

\textsuperscript{403} For the prevalence of Darwinian thought in the late Ottoman Empire, see Doğan, Atila, \textit{Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm}, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006. The book reveals the prevalence of Darwinian and social Darwinian thought in the late Ottoman Empire before the Young Turks. The book’s study of the Darwinian and social Darwinian thought of the “conservative” Ahmed Midhad Efendi is particularly striking. See pp. 147-165.

\textsuperscript{404} See Biren, Mehmet Tevfik, \textit{II. Abdülhamid, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları}, İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1998, vol I, pp. 34-35. He mentions and illustrates “sofia zihniyeti”, which he depicts as not believing in science and progress.

\textsuperscript{405} The last three decades of the 19th century were transformative. The conservative and static nature of the social order of Europe was challenged by a new generation influenced by the materialistic and radical thought of the age. See Stuart Hughes, \textit{Consciousness and Society}, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958.
visions was yet another manifestation of the European-wide transformation as has been previously pointed out.\textsuperscript{406}

2.7. The Image and Representation of the Tanzimat-Period in Official Hamidian Discourse

The discourse of the Hamidian regime did not level an open assault against the Tanzimat. On the contrary, the establishment and consolidation of the Hamidian regime was presented and legitimized by its contribution to the Tanzimat. The official Hamidian discourse acclaimed and extolled Tanzimat, which it celebrated as the rebirth and regeneration of the Ottoman state.\textsuperscript{407} The year 1839 continued to be year zero and the \textit{annus mirabilis} of the “new Ottoman Empire”. For example, Mehmed Memduh Pasha, who served as the Minister of Interior between 1895 and 1908, eulogized Mustafa Reşid Pasha as follows: “When we look at history, we see that the greatest achievements are performed not by administrators, but by geniuses who possess extraordinary skills from birth and who act in ways which no one else thinks of. Mustafa Reşid Pasha is such an unequalled person.”\textsuperscript{408} The same commentary was also enunciated verbatim by Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, who was one of the grandees of the Hamidian regime\textsuperscript{409}. Mehmed Memduh shared the antipathy towards Mahmud Nedim Pasha, whom he described as an unskilled and malicious, and towards his loyalists whom he defined as hypocritical and...
careerist. The tone of Üss-i İnkilap (Foundation of the Revolution), which may be taken as the authorized account of the Hamidian regime, written by Ahmed Midhat Pasha to eulogize the “revolutionary” takeover of Abdülhamid went along the same lines. Ahmed Midhat presented Abdülhamid as the revolutionary leader whose mission was to fulfill the undertaking of the Tanzimat. The book was not entitled Üss-i İnkilap for nothing. The name of the book established a connection and continuity from the elimination of the Janissaries to the Hamidian takeover. The book’s criticisms were directed not towards the founders of the Tanzimat and not towards its founding motivations/orientation, but against those who diverged from the glorious path of the Tanzimat. The Hamidian discourse presented itself as the corrector of the misdeeds of the corrupters of the Tanzimat.

2.8. De-whigging Late Ottoman History

How should we interpret the Hamidian takeover in light of the developments of 1870s? As mentioned previously, the old paradigm was to present the Hamidian takeover as the return of reaction. However, scholars such as Stanford Shaw and Engin Deniz Akarlı challenged and demolished this cliché. Instead of symbolizing a break, the Hamidian establishment legitimized itself using the Tanzimat. We may suggest that with the realization that reformism is not sufficient to maintain the empire intact and with the rise of authoritarian/conservative states such as Prussia and Russia (after the discrediting of liberal France), a mental turn was observed. The Hamidian regime was a process of redefinition of

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410 Mehmed Memduh Paşa, ibid pp. 62-64.
412 The book’s name was inspired by Esad Efendi’s Üss-i Zafer, in which Esad Efendi narrates and eulogizes the act of Mahmud II.
413 For the textbooks, see Demiryürek, Mehmet, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Bir Osmanlı Aydınlı: Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi, İstanbul: Phoenix, 2003, pp. 153-173.
the Tanzimat after disillusionment with the liberal reformism of Tanzimat as it became apparent with the “incident of Mahmud Nedim”.  

The “whig interpretation of history” was first criticized by Herbert Butterfield and Lewis Namier. Butterfield defined the “whig interpretation of history” as follows: “To praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past ...(and)...imagine it as working not to accentuate antagonisms or to ratify old party-cries but to find the unities that underlie the differences and to see all lives as a part of the one web of life.” For Namier, 18th century British political history was limited to factional strife among groups consisting of self-interested individuals. Namier denied any role to ideology and ideas. For him, politics was an arena for the clash of personal ambitions rather than the historic struggles of ideologies and social interest groups.

In the Ottoman context, it was Rifat Abou-El-Hajj who applied the Butterfield-Namier paradigm for the first time. Based on a case study on the origins and meaning of the 1703 Edirne Incident, he questioned the teleological assumptions attributed to developments in the early modern Ottoman Empire. By establishing factional lineages and coalitions between factions, he showed that the main tension was not between alleged progressives and defensive reactionaries, but between rivaling factions.

414 Davison, Reform…, p. 269.
416 ibid, p. 3.
In order to de-whig the 19th century Ottoman Empire, we have to reassess power struggles along these lines. That does not mean that we have to ignore/exclude ideology and politics, but we have to reassess ideology and politics in interaction with factionalism and to a certain extent, as a corollary of factional divisions. We may define the Hamidian status quo as a “transition to a controlled and restrained modernization in reaction to the advancing threats supported and administered by the newly established Muslim elites aiming to avoid the rise of rival elites be it Muslim or non-Muslim”. This endeavor necessitates the establishment of its value system organized hierarchically and symbolized in the persona of Abdülhamid.” Elites are not ideologically motivated. They seek to maximize their interests. The claim here is not that this elite had created Abdülhamid. What may be modestly suggested is that the consolidation of an established state elite after the precarious decades of the early Tanzimat provided the appropriate conditions for an autocracy to rise which nurtured and monitored an established status quo representing and upholding the values and priorities of this elite in the persona of the sultan and in the symbolism of the imperium. The state was reified for these self-interested reasons. The “officials both contribute to the creation of standardized views of the state and experience the constraints on action that result from this constant process of reification.” Engin Deniz Akarli also notes that, “This new elaboration of bureaucratic structure penetrated deep into society and enhanced the visibility, control, and to a certain extent also the respectability of the government. Equally important, it served as a mechanism to create a growing cadre of officials committed to the Ottoman cause.” As it happens, self-interest and social/political visions are often negotiated and intertwined.

2.9. Hamidian Autocracy as Class Politics and Class Formation


Fatma Müge Göçek analyzes the making of Turkish modernity as a class formation. Discussing and criticizing the Marxist and Weberian interpretations of class formation, she establishes that, “(i)n the context of Ottoman Empire, the Marxian and Weberian analyses help identify three significant elements of Ottoman social change: households as the unit of analysis, the sultan and the state as the significant social actor, and war and commerce with the West as the external catalyst.”

She constructs a dichotomy between what she calls the “commercial bourgeoisie” and the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”. Without discussing the reliability of her label “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (a term which is an oxymoron), she explains the demise of the empire by pointing to the failure of the two social clusters to co-opt. For Göçek, these two social clusters felt apart because the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was predominantly Muslim/Turkish and the commercial bourgeoisie was predominantly non-Muslim. For Göçek, the bifurcation and polarization of the two segments became apparent in the late Hamidian regime and the polarization ended with the tragic collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the nation-states founded with blood and iron. In Göçek’s account, the culpability for the emergence of this polarization belongs to the Young Turks. It is important to highlight that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie of Göçek had already seeded the mentality of the Young Turks. In a way, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie of the Hamidian era was already concerned with the question of how to deal with the non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie. The motivations of the Hamidian “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” were in accord with the coming generation sharing the same concerns with their successors. In fact, they were not only non-bourgeois, but also disturbed by the emerging commercial bourgeoisie which was predominantly non-Muslim. For this particular reason, the Ottoman state aimed to establish and promote a Muslim entrepreneurial class as well as Muslim professionals whom the state perceived as reliable and loyal, and

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422 Göçek uses the memoirs of Mehmed Reşid to illustrate the changing and radicalizing tone of the Turkish/Muslim community (pp. 134-37). It is important to remember that Mehmed Reşid was the governor of Diyarbekir during the massacres of 1915 and was one of the most wanted perpetrators of the Armenian massacres. His extremely xenophobic and brutal tone cannot be taken as indicative of his generation.
established several agricultural, industrial, and commercial schools as well as schools of veterinary medicine and pharmacology. The state elite of the Hamidian era’s vision of politics was centered on the well-being and security of the state. The macro-understanding of state politics which relates the interests of the state to the interests of the society and social forces was lacking in the Hamidian elite. Its reflexes derived from its class formation welded around a state. For that reason, it envisioned a class of entrepreneurs and professionals loyal to the state and not posing a threat to the state as opposed to entrepreneurs and professionals alienated from and adverse to the state. The Hamidian state elite conceptualized the interests of the state in contradistinction to the interests of the non-state actors, especially when the non-state actors were at the same time non-Muslim and therefore unreliable and even treacherous.

One of the crucial dynamics which set the ground for the Hamidian autocracy to emerge and to consolidate itself was the fear of the Tanzimat state elite of the rise of the non-Muslim bureaucrats. With the Reform Edict of 1856, public service was opened to non-Muslims. By the 1860s, the non-Muslims were beginning gradually to be promoted. Musurus Pasha was the first non-Muslim to hold the title of pasha. Non-Muslims were admitted to the Supreme Council (Meclis-i Vala) and later to the Council of State (Şuray-i Devlet), established in 1868 and organized as the legislative organ of the Empire. The rise of the non-Muslims in the bureaucracy and the inevitability of the increasing presence and prominence of the non-Muslims within Ottoman statecraft with the supposedly hidden destructive agenda of the non-Muslims created questions in the minds of the state elite. The personal autocracy of Abdülhamid enabled the circumvention of the non-Muslims and avoided the interference of the rising non-Muslim threat within the government. The

423 For the observations of Eşref Albatı, one of the earliest military veterinary graduates, see Albatı, Eşref, Hatıraları, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1945, pp. 16-17.
424 For the lists of the members of the Meclis-i Vala and the gradually increasing percentage of non-Muslims appointed in the 1860s after the appointments of Logofet Bey and Mihran Bey in 1864-1865 (H. 1282), see Seyitdanıoğlu, Mehmet, Tanzimat Devrinde Meclis-i Vala (1838-1868), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1994, pp. 202-218.
426 For example, see Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Ma’ruzat, İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980, p. 2.
number of non-Muslims and their promotions were restrained during the Hamidian rule although the number of non-Muslim officials continued to increase exponentially.\textsuperscript{427} The imperial prerogative served as the assurance of the preponderance of the Muslim character of the polity and the bureaucracy. It was the presence of the sultan and his title as “caliph” which were the hallmarks of the Muslim (and tacitly Turkish) character of the polity. In short, Abdülhamid’s personal autocracy resembled a coup in a situation in which elite interests could not be protected unless a deus ex machina was asked to intervene. Although Abdülhamid’s autocracy partially eliminated a certain cabal, it was not simply a takeover of power from the Tanzimat bureaucracy given that the Tanzimat bureaucracy’s institutional capacity and institutionalization had deepened and been strengthened. The Hamidian takeover may be regarded as a half-conscious strategy of the Tanzimat officials to counter the new realities. “Fine tuning was concerned in the first degree with the power elite, the men who formulated and applied policy. Even as autocratic a sultan as Abdülhamid II, who was in effect the last real sultan of the empire, had to rely on a staff who fed him information, advised him, and indeed influenced him. So, the so-called ‘Red Sultan’....who rarely left his palace, and never left his capital, depended on these men(.).”\textsuperscript{428}

With the 1870s, as discussed above, a reaction to the Reform Edict and to the new conditions triggered by that document was in the air.\textsuperscript{429} Since the Reform Edict, trust in the Tanzimat reformism had eroded drastically. The autocracy of Abdülhamid was the only viable and optimum solution to the discomfort felt by the state elite in restructuring the Ottoman state to evade mounting European pressure and the troublesome non-Muslim clamor. Hamidian modernization was an example of “controlled modernization” as an


\textsuperscript{429} For the severe opposition of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the architect of the Rescript of Tanzimat, to the Rescript of Islahat based on his anxieties concerning the increasingly privileged role of the non-Muslims and its possible repercussions, see Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991, vol 1, pp. 75-82.
alternative to the uncontrolled modernization of the liberal Tanzimat.\footnote{For an impressive assessment of the Hamidian modernization, see Akarlı, Engin Deniz, \textit{The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)}, unpublished dissertation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.} In short, the Hamidian era was a fine tuning which adjusted the Ottoman state machine against the newly rising and encroaching threats, whether merely perceived or real.

2.10. Governance versus Politics: On the Social and Political Cosmology of the Tanzimat Bureaucratic World

Another issue that has to be highlighted is the lack of political space in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century Ottoman Empire. Politics may be defined as “judgments and proposals for the conducting of matters of governance and society”, whereas “governance” may be defined as the “application of the expert and decided policies.” Politics \textit{a priori} assumes that there are equally legitimate alternative ways of addressing and resolving problems. Governance by contrast presupposes that the means to deal with the problems is a matter of technicality. It may be argued that the Tanzimat denied any legitimate role to politics.\footnote{See Findley, Carter Vaughn, “The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East (Part I)”, \textit{Studia Islamica}, No. 55 (1982), pp. 143-169; Findley, Carter Vaughn, “The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East (Part II)”, \textit{Studia Islamica}, No. 56 (1982), pp. 147-180.} Not distinct from the classical Islamic notion that was apprehensive of \textit{fitna} (sedition), politics was perceived as divisive and corrupting. While the Young Turks, like the Young Ottomans preceding them, challenged the rule of Abdülhamid, they did not oppose him on political grounds.\footnote{For a discussion of the prevalence of Islamic notions in the thought of Young Turks such as Abdullah Cevdet and Ahmed Riza, see Mardin, Şerif, \textit{Continuity and Change in the Ideas of the Young Turks}, İstanbul: Robert College, 1969, pp.23-27.} They accused Abdülhamid of mismanagement of the state and of treachery. For them, Abdülhamid was betraying the supreme interests of the Ottoman polity, which was assumed to be monolithic, fixed, and identifiable. Abdülhamid departed from serving the metaphysical Ottoman polity and cared only about his own interests and throne. Thus,
Abdülmid’s reign was not legitimate for these reasons. The Young Turks claimed to defend the genuine interests of the Ottoman polity, which was facing the grave danger of partition and dissolution. Although they did not aim to introduce “politics” and replace it with “governance”, it was the Young Turks who had unintentionally crashed the notion of the legitimacy of governance and introduced politics after the 1908 Revolution. It was the strikingly new conditions of 1908 that had imposed the introduction of “politics”. The Revolution of 1908 opened new channels for the democratization of the political sphere not in terms of procedures, but in terms of the emergence of a new legitimacy based on the masses (and political programs and manifestos) instead of on elite bargaining and compromises, especially observable in Armenian and other non-Muslim communities.

The ideological assumption that politics was fitna and therefore evil and illegitimate does not mean that there was no politics. On the contrary, although not recognized as a legitimate activity, the deeds of the leading Tanzimat figures and the prerogatives of Abdülaziz and Abdülhamid were all acts of politics. The impetus behind these acts was clearly political concerns. Some concerns were related to the domestic inter-elite struggles and some others were strategies developed as responses to international developments. In many cases, international and domestic concerns were indistinguishable and cannot be taken into consideration in isolation. However, a conceptualization based on the understanding of differentiation of ideas and the equal legitimacy of varying opinions was non-existent due to the lack of a legacy similar to the European religious wars, which gave birth to an at first reluctant and gradually internalized respect for or at least recognition of

433 Carter Findley discusses the same development with regard to the advent of ideology. Findley claims that it was the Young Ottomans that had introduced the notion of ideology but only partially due to their strong allegiance to traditional Islamic thought. For Findley, whatever the limits of the Young Ottomans’ vision of ideology, their impact was remarkable. Findley, Carter Vaughn, “The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East (Part II)”, Studia Islamica, No. 56 (1982), pp. 147-180. For a discussion of the role of ideology, also see Türköne, Mümtaz’er, İslâmcılığın Doğuşu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.

alternative beliefs and opinions. Politics were yet to become legitimate in the late Ottoman Empire.

The Hamidian regime may be defined as an amalgamation of the institutionalization of a modern bureaucratic state under the supervision of a semi-aristocratic and patriarchal polity. The Hamidian bureaucracy was a loyalist bureaucracy, not necessarily loyal to the persona of the sultan, but loyal to the Ottoman polity, its image, its representations, and its ideal. Loyalty to the sultan was one of the indispensable and fundamental components of the Ottoman polity as the sultan’s personality embodied and symbolized the integrity and immortality of the empire. In such a complex organization, the role of the sultan was pivotal. The office of the sultan was indispensable not because there was consensus over the legitimacy and efficiency of the system, but because there was no viable and promising alternative to it, not unlike the Habsburg monarchy in the perception of the German-speaking bureaucracy or in the perception of the Russian bureaucracy. The presence of the sultanic authority also excluded politics from the legitimate sphere of governance. Moreover, there would be no transcendentalization of the governing elite and the social internalization of the inherent superiority of the governing elite in the absence of the sultan and his metaphysical aura. Allegiance to the sultan meant allegiance to the class itself. Of course, the Turkish and Muslim (and caliphal) identity of the sultan established the ethnic and confessional nature of the imperium as well. Therefore, this was a class identity embedded in confessional and (to a certain extent) ethnic identities. In Marxian terms, this was class consciousness rather than a false consciousness.

It is also noteworthy to note that Engin Deniz Akarlı, one of the leading authorities on the Hamidian bureaucracy, suggests that the highest echelons of the Hamidian bureaucracy were an exception to the impressive professionalization and structuring of the lower and middle echelons. Akarlı writes that, “other contradictions that embittered these young bureaucrats were related to the politicized nature of the upper reaches of the Ottoman officialdom. Each pasha was at once an administrative expert and a political figure, susceptible to the influence of different interest groups. Petitioning, persuasion, shared profits, and bribery were among the means available to influence a pasha's decision; the

nature of the business at hand as well as the personality and current power of the pasha in question determined the means chosen.”\textsuperscript{436} For Akarlı, the critical function of Abdülhamid was to be the supreme arbiter between the pashas. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid’s job was not easy. “For one thing, he was openly afraid of the pashas’ proven ability to seat and unseat sultans; for another, he believed that it was ‘the royal fountain of favor’ that produced "the best harvest on the field of sovereignty."\textsuperscript{437} Of course, the arrogance and pettiness of the pashas does not mean that the Ottoman polity was mere the preserve of pashas for their corruption and plunder. On the contrary, it was a metaphysical entity in which pashas felt at ease and embodied the social and political cosmology of a certain mindset.

It was Şerif Mardin who first demonstrated that the thought of Young Ottomans in particular and the Tanzimat in general could not be understood without taking the Islamic worldview and Islamic visions of political and social order into account. Young Ottoman thought was very much molded within this mental/ideological formation. The Young Ottomans showed an intense “concern for the welfare of the Islamic community."\textsuperscript{438} On the other hand, Selim Deringil showed that the Hamidian state policy displayed a more secular and utilitarian stance employing Islamic concerns for other political ends. In the words of Reinkowski, the Tanzimat aimed at “the institution of a secular foundation for state ideology, but through the use of Islamic vocabulary and ideological tools. After having sifted a great amount of documents it seems rather that the Ottoman routine bureaucratic correspondence during the Tanzimat period shows, if anything, a kind of secularized ‘Islamic’ vocabulary.”\textsuperscript{439} He further argued that;


\textsuperscript{437} Akarlı, Engin Deniz, …, p. 363

\textsuperscript{438} For a perfect demonstration of the role and meaning of Islam in the classical age, see Crone, Patricia, \textit{Medieval Islamic Political Thought}, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005.


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“At the heart of the Tanzimat political idiom it is a state ideology of order cum prosperity. Central to it is the term asayiş (public order, public tranquility; repose, rest). Similar to it, but more narrowly referring to the technical production of security is emniyet (safety, freedom from fear, security; confidence, belief; the police, the law). Security is granted by the state to its subjects, but the state is entitled in recompense to the subjects' complete obedience. The immediate outcome and positive product of asayiş is prosperity, expressed by the terms rahat (ease, rest, comfort, tranquility) or ıstirahat and refah (easy circumstances, comfort, luxury, affluence). The term refah is based on the general notion of mülkün ma’murluğu (flourishing condition, prosperity) which seems nothing else than the Roman salus publica (public wealth) in an Ottoman disguise. Prosperity, hand in hand with security, will be of maximum benefit to the state's and society's order." \[440\]...The official announcements of the Tanzimat stressed the quest for enlightened state policy and sought a new basis on which to legitimize the rule of the central power over the polity. However, the standard terminology of the bureaucracy stuck closer to the traditional concepts of order. All the images and terms that have been discussed to this point were in use not only in the early Tanzimat period but also in the later phases which started with the second reform rescript of 1856 and were to be enforced even in the empire's most remote provinces. New concepts central to the Tanzimat ideology did not supersede old concepts but only supplemented them, e.g., the confessionally neutral kb’a which could be applied to all subjects of the Ottoman state coexisted with the representation of the Christian people as members of the "flock" (re’a ya). Tanzimat rhetoric and political terminology remained deeply embedded in the traditional Ottoman imagination of a perfect order and society.”\[441\]

This does not mean that Tanzimat remained within the premodern and traditional cosmology. On the contrary, gradually the Tanzimat figures learnt and adapted the modern political and social discourses and visions. These two cosmologies do not exclude each other. Based on the aforementioned premises, the Hamidian bureaucracy blended the traditional Islamic Ottoman political and social cosmology with the modern cosmology and institutionalized it. In this regard, Hamidian institutionalization of the bureaucracy sealed the perimeters of Turkish modernity. The Hamidian bureaucracy, considerably institutionalized and enlarged by the 1890s as an interest group which could influence (although not shape) the forging of the modern Ottoman polity was also compatible with their interests as individuals and as an interest group. This was an internalized and intimate state meaningful within a certain social and political cosmology. In this perception, the

\[440\] Reinkowski, Maurus, ..., p. 200.

\[441\] Reinkowski, Maurus, ..., p. 204.
nation was defined in reference to the state which was perceived within a cultural prism. The nation was to be submissive to the imperial state which represented the nation in it. This state also internalized the habitus of this state elite. Therefore, the “nation” was imagined in line with the habitus, cultural formations, and premises of this state elite. The state was reified as long as it served as the embodiment of this habitus and become its disseminator. Thus, the Turkish nation was imagined “secular” and “modern” as opposed to “backward” and “pious”.

2.11. The Enigma and Spirit of Tanzimat in the Eyes of Western Beholders

The Western perceptions of the Tanzimat and the Tanzimat men may be insightful for us to identify the patterns in which the “new men” of Tanzimat were depicted and enable us to imagine the nature of the state elite of the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods. The Westerners’ accounts perceived and interpreted the course of the 19th century Ottoman Empire entirely with regard to the developments in the Ottoman state apparatus. This narrative was “statist” in the sense that the state was assumed to be the sole determinative actor in the flow of history and historical development. The Western interest was focused upon this supposedly omnipotent actor. They were interested in the reformation of the cruel Muslim institution called the Ottoman state. The Tanzimat, which was identified simply as “reform” in the western accounts, constituted the central theme of the historical narrative. The disagreements among various accounts revolved around two questions: the

442 For an impressive analysis of the familiar and intimate relation established by the people and by the bureaucracy, see Herzfeld, Michael, Cultural Intimacy, London; New York: Routledge, 1997.

443 For a balanced evaluation of the Tanzimat with pro-Turkish leanings, see Engelhardt, Turquie et le Tanzimat ou Historie des Reforms Dans L’Empire Ottoman, Paris, 1882. Engelhardt portrayed the 19th century Ottoman transformation as reformism and reorganization enacted by the state for reasons of state. Engelhardt focused specifically on the administrative and organizational reforms. However, he emphasized that this was not a technical process, but an ideological/mental decision and breakthrough.
degree of successfulness of the reforms and the sincerity of the reformers. With “reform”, they implied the Ottoman state’s reorganization but also more importantly its evolving/emerging new mentality. Thus, the term “reform” was associated more with a mental change of the Muslim ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire than a technical/organizational change.

So, here in these accounts we encounter not a Weberian legal/bureaucratic state, but a state governed by ideological concerns and ambitions. Here, the ideology determines the nature of the state, not vice versa. That is, these accounts assume an idealist theory of state and history. These accounts supposed that by understanding the dominant mentality of the ruling Muslim elite, they could grasp the nature of the Ottoman state. The Ottoman state was merely an embodiment of the ideological and mental disposition of the Muslim ruling elite.

It may be also claimed that these accounts did not specifically explore the ideological dispositions of the Ottoman elite (Islamism, liberalism, et cetera) but attempted to trace the intentions and good will of the Ottoman state as an abstraction. The critical question they had endeavored to decipher was if the Ottoman state had (inherently) “good” or “evil” intentions.

The western accounts had a very idealistic conceptualization of state of affairs. They discussed the political situation and developments in terms of “good” or “bad”, or within the Christian value system, in terms of “good” and “evil”. This is obviously not unexpected given that most of the accounts were written by the evangelical Protestant missionaries. However, the accounts of non-missionaries (diplomats, journalists, et cetera) were not very different. This is because the English observers especially revealed an intense Protestant devotion and commitment which guided the formation of their worldviews. There were two levels of “idealizations” within this discourse. The first level was with regard to the

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444 For example, David Urquart, the foremost Turcophile, in his effort to convince skeptics regarding the sincerity of Turkish reformism wrote that, “all Turks nowadays exhibited ‘the strongest desire of instruction and respect for our customs and institutions.’ ” Cunningham, Alan, Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century, London, Portland: Cass, 1993, vol II, p. 73.

445 The most important name whose worldview and political commitments were shaped by Protestant evangelism was definitely Stanford Canning. To understand his worldview, see the collection of his essays, Eastern Question, John Murray, 1881.
“essential nature” of the reforming Ottoman state, whether it was essentially blameless and innocent, determined to get rid of its unspeakable sins of yesteryear, or was it the old sinister and deceitful Ottomans posing as if reforming in order to deceive “civilized nations”. The second level concerned the extent of success of reforms if it was assumed that Ottomans were sincere in their endeavors. The accounts rated the level of “purity” of the Ottoman state in terms of its success in its reformism. The more it was found “reformist”, the more “benevolent” it was. It is worth noting that even the word “reform” itself was a religious/Protestant concept and refers to a spiritual rebirth purifying the soul from degeneration and sinister corruptions, sins, and vices. Here, “reform” did not imply the connotation the word gained in later times (gradual and modest transformation as opposed to a radical transformation), but on the contrary implied a strong commitment to complete transformation. This approach apparently reflected a Christian/Protestant worldview.

It is also important to bear in mind that the 19th century accounts were speaking of “national traits” and “national characters”. As one ethnicity/nation/race might have round cheeks, narrow foreheads, and tough faces, they might be also sly, treacherous, hospitable, or quiet. These “national characteristics” in fact reflected the moral judgments objectified by attributed national characteristics. These alleged characteristics might not necessarily be entirely good or entirely evil but in the amalgam of these attributes, authors revealed their sympathies and antipathies towards different “races”446. In various traveler accounts of Ottoman lands, some sympathized with Greeks and despised Armenians, whereas other travelers boosted Bulgarians and scorned Serbians.447 It is as if all the authors had their

446 For some obvious examples of attributing certain traits to certain ethnicities, among many other, see Mrs. Fanny Janet Blunt and Stanley Lane Poole, The People of Turkey: Twenty Years’ Residence Among Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, Turks and Armenians, John Murray, 1878, 2 volumes; Reid, John, Turkey and the Turks Being the Present State of the Ottoman Empire, Robert Tyas & Paternoster Raw, 1840; Pardoe, Julia, The City of Sultan and the Domestic Manners of the Turks, 1862. For a study on the Russian observer’s perceptions of the “Persian”, see Andreeva, Elena, Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism, London; New York: Routledge, 2007.

447 Because Armenians inhabit poor and inaccessible mountainous regions, display an authentic and uncorrupted pure version of Christianity, and possess a noble savage image, Armenians were the most sympathetic group. Armenians were the group most open to Protestant missionary propaganda, whereas Greeks were subjects of the strong and
“favorite races” among others which they observed as humble, trustworthy, hard-working, et cetera in contrast to other “races” sinister, untrustworthy, and pernicious. Similarly, all these writers developed their opinions of Turks and their national traits, some high, some low, some very low.448 Apparently, different from the “subject races”, Turks were the “master race”, and therefore appraisal of the Turks could not be done without making statements about Ottoman rule. Some differentiated between the Turkish populace at large and Ottoman officialdom, and some commented that the differences were only on the surface.449 These prejudices (although derived from some factual observation) also influenced their assessment of the capacity of Turks to “reform”. They also judged the genuine sincerity of the Turks to reform. If the Turk was to be essentially sinister and treacherous, there would be no reason to believe in the word of the Turk.450 Of course, it


448 For very useful documentation, Reinhold Schiffer documents parts of several early 19th century English travel accounts based on the subjects. For the analyses of the “natural Turk” in five accounts (Thornton, Frankland, Madden, Kinneir, Carne, Emerson), see Schiffer, Reinhold, Turkey Romanticized: Images of the Turks in Early 19th Century English Travel Literature, Studienverlag Dr. N. Bockmeyer, 1982. Also see his Oriental Panorama: British Travellers in 19th Century Turkey, Rodopi, 1999.

449 Edwin Pears distinguishes between the “private Turk” and the public Turk. He writes; “(T)here was no one among us who hated the Turk as a private man. We all recognised that he had traits of kindliness, simplicity, and generosity which made him lovable. It was only when he was acting as one in authority, and when the damnable spirit of fanaticism took possession of him, that he became a savage beast.” Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople, Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1916, p. 60. Likewise, American journalist and historian William McCracken distinguishes between “rural Turk” and the “official Turk”. Whereas the “rural Turk” is hospitable, temperate, considerate, and kind to animals, “there is, of course, nothing to say in favor of the official Turk.” Quoted in Moore, John Hammond, America Looks at Turkey, unpublished dissertation, University of Virginia, 1961, pp. 165-66.

450 In the introduction of his book, Sir Charles Eliot relates a story in this fashion. The vali of “Karakeu” after all politeness reveals that he sees all the Christians as swine. The vali says that his father kept saying that all Christians were swine and that as a youth he disagreed with his father. He goes on: “I thought my father was a fool. But now that my own beard is getting grey - by God, I think the old gentleman was right.” Eliot believes that
should be emphasized that these clichés predominantly derived from religious beliefs and premises.

Another predominant paradigm of these western accounts was “liberalism”. “Liberalism” embedded in these accounts was not an ideology with its 20th century implications and overt political connotations. Although French influence had its impact on the making of liberalism, the 19th century Anglo-Saxon Weltanschauung was the primary foundation of 19th century liberalism. This liberalism was not a normative ideology but an expression of a time and space specific perception of social order. The liberalism of the 19th century (beginning with 18th century British political commentators, as well as Adam Smith, who succeeded them) was primarily the belief that with the progression of modern world, more liberties and freedom will make the world a better place.\footnote{\text{451}} This optimism was less a coherent ideology than a certain mindset and a set of attitudes and beliefs. Although this mindset was necessarily secular and distanced itself from conservatism, it had a strongly embedded religious motivation behind it. Liberalism was also an ethical perspective interpreting political developments in terms of value judgments, such as “good” and “bad”. In this regard, liberalism in the eyes of “liberals” was defending the “good”, the “just”, and the “right” against the “evil” and “unjust”. In this perception, the forces of conservatism and “old mentalities” represented the evil. The shining brave new world was against the dark forces of the medieval mind. Therefore, in its assessments and perceptions, 19th century Anglo-Saxon liberalism was the reformed and secularized form of Christianity/Protestantism in the 19th century.\footnote{\text{452}} It was the new expression of the Christian/Protestant faith and ideals.\footnote{\text{453}} In other words, liberalism was not a worldly


\footnote{\text{452}} The word “whig” would be more appropriate for the peculiar version of 19th century British liberalism.

\footnote{\text{453}} Democracy was also seen as the perfection of the Christian/Protestant ideal. Graham Maddox contrasts the 19th and 20th century views of the emergence of Western democracy as follows. “Whereas the religious influences upon emerging communities were once taken for granted, the very process of secularization required the preservation of religious liberties has in turn produced a climate in which the secular foundations are assumed to be

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ideology with a political/economic program, but the political expression of Dissenting Protestantism. With regard to the Ottoman Empire, liberals tended to support or condemn the Ottoman state depending on their theological images and their interpretation of the divine essence of the Ottoman Empire.\(^{454}\)

The pivotal and complicated problem in all these discussions was the Muslim character of the Ottoman polity. Could a Muslim polity ever be “good”? If the answer to this question was affirmative, then the entire Tanzimat was to be perceived as a test of this bold statement\(^{455}\). Although an analysis of the numerous accounts would show that most of the accounts tended to answer this question negatively, quiet a number of accounts were optimistic, some for political reasons (seeing Turkey as a political ally against the Russian menace\(^{456}\)) or for religious reasons (the Christian idea that people are inherently good and act accordingly when the opportunity is given). The Palmerstonian foreign policy of safeguarding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was launched against the expansionist ambitions of Russia. This Turcophile stance was criticized by many liberals for supporting the only ones important to modern democracy.” Maddox continues; “(t)his book attempts to reaffirm the essential nature of the religious background to democratic theory.” Maddox, Graham, Religion and the Rise of Democracy, London; New York: Routledge, 1996, p. vii. Also for the “modernity” of the evangelical/Protestant inspiration and theology, see Bebbington, D.W, Evangelicalism in Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s, London; New York: Routledge, 1989; Brian Stanley (ed.), Christian Missions and the Enlightenment, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2001.

\(^{454}\) For a classic account of the perception of the zealous Dissenting Protestantism towards the infidel and barbarous Turks, see Shannon, Richard, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, Archon Books, 1975. The book’s introduction perfectly illustrates the religious nature and origins of British liberalism.

\(^{455}\) “Can the Koran stretch to this point?” asks “(o)ne Englishman, looking at the need for regenerating the Ottoman Empire in 1812(.)” Cunningham, Allan, ibid, p.99. Stratford Canning was very negative regarding the nature of Islam. He observes that “(t)he master mischief in this country is dominant religion”. For him, the prosperity and progress of the Ottoman Empire is “to be measured by the degree of emancipation from the source of injustice and weakness” which is Islam. Ibid, p. 126.

\(^{456}\) The foremost advocate of Turkey as a staunch ally against Russia is David Urquart. See his Turkey and its Resources, London, 1833. His extreme Turcophilism (or his Turcomania according to some of his contemporary critics) was scorned and seen as the eccentricity of a crazy man. See Timur, Taner, Osmanlı Çalışmaları, V Yaymlari, 1989, pp. 178-181. For an account of the thought and deeds of David Urquart, see Nash, Geoffrey, From Empire to Orient: Travellers to the Middle East 1830-1926, I.B. Tauris, 2005, pp. 43-73.
and buttressing Muslim oppression of the Christian *rea’ya*. For these opponents of the policy, the Christian *rea’ya* would prefer their co-religionist Russians vis-a-vis the Ottomans.\(^{457}\) The counter-argument argued that Turks were less oppressive than the Russians and furthermore that Turks were reforming with a tremendous zeal. Therefore, Turkey was by now a much better polity, and the old Turkish brutality was about to end for good soon\(^ {458}\). In fact, throughout the 19\(^{th}\) century, the British political scene was characterized with the struggle between the Turcophil conservatives versus skeptical liberals (who represent different confessional and theological constituencies).

It is also noteworthy that the same word in English (reform) had two possible translations into Turkish with diverging connotations. Both “*Tanzimat*” and “*İslahat*” were referring to the same concept in the English political/theological vocabulary: Reform. In Ottoman political terminology, *İslahat* (reform) referred to reforms addressing the rights of the Ottoman Christians whereas *tanzimat* (reorganization) implied the reorganization of the Ottoman state within the age-old, intra-Muslim world. Whereas “*tanzimat*” was espoused unanimously by the bureaucracy, “*İslahat*” encountered fierce opposition, including Mustafa Reşid Pasha.\(^ {459}\) For the Tanzimat bureaucracy, “*tanzimat*” was “necessary” and “good”, and therefore it had to be undertaken immediately and seriously whereas *İslahat* was secondary, irrelevant, and even treacherous. Such differentiation was irrelevant for the Christian/Western observers of Ottoman reform for whom the gist of the matter was the amelioration of the sufferings of the Ottoman Christians. Within this perspective, the reorganization of the Ottoman state was a means to improve the conditions of the Christians. Amelioration of the life conditions of the Christians was perceived as the

\(^{457}\) Richard Cobden, the arch-liberal, pacifist, and strongest opponent of the pro-Ottoman policy in the parliament, said “If I were a rajah I should prefer a Russian government rather than a Mohamedan one.” To this statement, Palmerston responded with saying that Cobden was “greatly misinformed as to the state of Turkey for the last thirty years.” praising the advancements achieved by the Tanzimat. Cunningham, Allan, ibid, p. 214.


principal criterion measuring the level of the success of the “Ottoman reform”. These diverging perspectives caused misunderstanding between the two parties.

The assumption in these accounts was that the Ottoman state was the only agent of Ottoman political development. The will of the omnipotent Ottoman state was to determine the prospects of the Ottoman lands and the miserable Ottoman Christians. The litmus test of Ottoman goodwill was its commitment to “reform”. Reform was associated with all the good deeds. All the other issues were derivatives of reform with a capital R. The “reform” requires the “will” of the Ottoman leadership and also the technical/administrative capability of the Ottoman leadership. Both sympathetic and unsympathetic observers of the 19th century Ottomans make the observation that whatever the efforts of the leadership may be, the execution of the reform encounters severe problems. There were different and varying arguments brought up by the observers who acknowledged the limitations of the reform. Some spoke about the lack of modern, technical knowledge. Some pointed out the financial inadequacy of the empire. Some others who preferred more ideological reasoning for the partial failure of the reform indicated the discrepancy between the visions and mentalities of the ruling central elite and the conservative provincial administrators and officials. For these observers, although there was an enlightened and determined leadership in Constantinople which was anxious to endorse liberal/western governance, the local officials were subscribing to the old, despotic oriental mind. This assumption was one of the most overt clichés of the paradigm of westernization which contrasts the enlightened few of the leadership with the ignorant and barbaric unenlightened oriental flock. In this assumption, with the emanation of the new enlightened ideas from the privileged few to the lower cadres of government and to the bulk of the Muslim populace, the transformation of


461 A very sympathetic and optimistic account is by Ubicini, H.A, Etat Present de L’Empire Ottoman, Paris, 1876. For a work very unsympathetic to the reforms of early Tanzimat, see Macfarlane, Charles, Turkey and its Destiny, Lea and Blanchard, 1850. Also for a severe criticism of Mahmud II’s reform, see Slade, Adolphus, Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, etc. and of a Cruise in the Black Sea with Capitan Pasha in the Years 1829, 1830, and 1831, London: Saunders and Otley, 2005, 2 volumes.
the Ottoman Empire will be completed. Given the small possibility of a mental transformation on such a scale, the western observers feel obliged to admit that the enlightened views of the leadership are not enough as long as the bulk of the officials retain oriental despotic worldviews.

As stated above, without developing a Weberian state theory of post-Holocaust 20th century, the western observers perceived the Ottoman state (as any other “state”) as the embodiment of a certain mentality and will of the ruling elite. In other words, the state was for them a matter of “mentality”. It was a mere reflection of the minds of the people holding the commanding positions. The western accounts observed that the emanation of this “idea” could not be achieved by decree. This was a problem given that the Muslim masses and provincial petty officials continued to be “fanatics” regardless of the intentions of the Tanzimat bureaucrats. The “idea” had to be disseminated to be effective. Therefore, the “old Turks” of all levels have to be eliminated, marginalized, sidelined, or transformed.

As stated above, this line cannot be explained by reducing it to a modernist paradigm. This approach is also “ethical”. It perceives a struggle between “good” and “bad”. We should bear in mind that in the 19th century, western supremacy was associated with Christian ideals, especially when encountering the non-Christian world.

Another major point that has to be emphasized is the dynamics of international relations and politics shaping the development of these clichés, prejudices and assumptions. Apparently, the sympathetic discourses developed by British and Franch authors towards the Ottomans derived from the fact that the Ottoman Empire was an ally of the British-French axis against the Russians.462 With the dying out of this alliance and the failure of

462 On the birth of Turcophilism in the establishment circles of Britain and its association with the championing of reformism in the Ottoman Empire, Alan Cunningham notes that “(Turcophiles) during the rest of the 1830s...banished the traditional and picturesque impressions of the barbaric pageantries of old Turkey, and gave the Sultan’s empire a new image and a new importance....(T)hey were Turcophiles who set out to show that common problems confronted states, and that while the Ottoman Empire rather lagged behind other countries in dealing with these, there was no inherent reason why her rulers should not solve them successfully, given the time and the guidance. A rejuvenated Ottoman Empire would be a logical friend for Britain, she would stay the Russian penetration of central Asia, and consequently check the tsarist threat to the security of British India (.) Cunningham, Alan, ibid, p. 67. As seen clearly, the thrust of the Turcophile argument is that the Turk is not the unchanging barbarous and imprudent man. On the contrary, he is as
the Ottoman treasury to pay its debts to its English and French creditors in 1875, the English and French accounts will also change. The accounts written after the waning of Tanzimat were more critical and mistrustful of the Ottoman reformation. Around that time, the image of the unreconstructed barbaric character of the Ottomans made a sudden comeback. This is very understandable because as the Ottoman Empire lost its stance in the 19th century ethical battle to be placed on the side of the “good” against the “evil”. By departing from the British-French axis, the Ottomans began to represent barbarism, bigotry, and the enemies of civilization. Its inadequacies and negative attributes became visible and disturbing in the eyes of the Western observers. The optimism of the early Tanzimat waned after the failure of the enactment of the reforms, and thus the shortcomings of the entire Tanzimat became more apparent in the eyes of the western accounts.

2.12. “Old Turks”

“Old Turks” versus “Young Turks” was one of the favorite themes of the western observers of the Ottoman Empire, who felt no need to explain what these labels meant and assumed that they were self-evident. Mordtmann in his 1877 book *Stambul und Das normal as the others and therefore open to improvement and civilization. The British support for peripheral countries very much depends on the reformist zeal of the countries in question. Backing the British was one of the fundamental motivations for the political authorities to reform and empower the reformist party. For the case of Iran, see Bakhsh, Shaul, *Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy & Reform under the Qajars 1858-1896*, London: Ithaca Press, 1978. For the Moroccan case, see Burke, Edmund, *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. In the Persian case, similar to the role they played in the Ottoman Empire, Russia was the chief sponsor of the anti-reformist party, whereas in Morocco, this role was assumed by France and Spain. Although the British “open door” policy was the principal reason for the British championship of reform, the peculiar 19th century evangelical/Protestant liberal ideology of Britain was also a supportive motivation not to be ignored.


elaborated on the meaning of these categories and criticized the erroneous usage of these categories. Mordtmann noted that westerners used the term “Young Turks” in relation to Young Germany and Young Italy (which were movements with overtly liberal overtones) and understood Junkers when referring to the “Old Turks”. Mordtmann wrote that the genuine Old Turks were gone forever after the breakdown of the janissary corps. For Mordtmann, if there were a few of them surviving, they could never form a faction. Mordtmann established that there was no Old Turk party defending their interests fervently as the Junker party was doing in Germany. The “Old Turks” were a new formation rather than being the unreconstructed remnants of the old guard and representing an old class. For Mordtmann, the Old Turks were conservative in the sense that they defended the autocracy in its existing form. The principal motivation of “Old Turks” was to avoid foreign interference as much as possible. Here, Mordtmann made an interesting point, arguing that for this reason the Old Turks were keen to satisfy the non-Muslims and maintain good relations with the Western powers. Mordtmann opposed the commonly held view among European observers that Young Turks were preferable to Old Turks. Mordtmann went further and wrote that, “Old Turks are with a few exceptions honorable men.” For Mordtmann, it was the Young Turks who were radical although he


466 “Old Turk” in the romantic 19th century western accounts referred to the oriental man with his turban on his head, sitting on his divan symbolizing the immortal Orient with all its idleness and lack of a concept of time. Mordtmann warns the readers that no such person exists, at least not in Istanbul. Charles MacFarlane, writing in 1850, illustrated the transformation/alteration of the “Turk” vividly. “The Turks over in Constantinople certainly looked much less like Turks, and were far more civil than in 1828. They were incomparably less picturesque and imposing in their outward appearance….in many cases, it cost me thought and trouble in distinguish between Mussulmen and Rayahs. Twenty years ago, there was no possibility of confounding them; for, even without the then marked distinctions of dress, of head-gear, of boots and paposhes, the Osmanles were to be known by their swaggering gait, their overbearing looks, and their contemptuous insolent manners.” MacFarlane, Charles, *Turkey and Its Destiny*, Lea and Blanchard, 1850, p. 41.

regarded all the Turks as chauvinists whatever party they belonged to.\textsuperscript{468} To sum up, what distinguished Old and Young Turks for Mordtmann was the methods they employed rather than their mentality. Moreover, because the “Young Turks” were on better terms with modern equipment, they were more capable of realizing their ambitions and hence were more dangerous.

Mordtmann’s assessment was prophetic. He was exceptional in seeing the complexities and contradictions of modernization in general and Turkish modernization in particular. The fundamental misrepresentation the western accounts held to was to construct the clash between the supposed “Old Turk party” and the “Young Turk party” as constituted with regard to their approaches to Westernization and modernization. This alleged distinction between the Old Turks and Young Turks was illusory and superficial in many ways. While it has a grain of truth in it, this distinction did not reflect a sharply defined ideological antagonism or even a factional division.\textsuperscript{469} The post-World War II Anglo-Saxon historiography was in agreement in calling the men of Tanzimat reformers\textsuperscript{470}, but although the term “reform” was in common usage at the time, what was meant by the word “reform” was not always clear. The reformers did not face any apparent antagonistic party of considerable strength before the 1870s. In this regard, “reform” did not imply any political or ideological standpoint, but implied only the concern to undertake administrative and legal changes to render the Ottoman state more efficient, stronger, and better able to respond to the challenges of the modern world (hence, Tanzimat). For “reformers”, reform was a technical matter rather than an ideological imperative in the absence of an outspoken opposition organized within the political/bureaucratic sphere. We observe the politicization and factionalization of “reformism” with the 1870s as alternative

\textsuperscript{468} ibid, p. 168.

\textsuperscript{469} Family ties and connections were more determining than ideological positions. A striking example of the priority of lineages over ideological stances was exemplified by the active support of Mehmed Bey for his uncle Mahmud Nedim Pasha. Mehmed Bey, a Young Ottoman who fled to Paris in 1865, epitomized the radical wing of the Young Ottomans, published Inkişap seeking a revolution, and personally fought with the Paris Commune publicly advocated the prime ministry of his conservative uncle. See Davison, p.218

\textsuperscript{470} See Bernard Lewis, \textit{The Emergence}.... p. 127; Roderick Davison, \textit{Reform}..... p. 81, Niyazi Berkes, \textit{The Development}... p. 155.
voices within the bureaucracy and political sphere were heard and liberalism had to accompany the reform process.

Western observers were divided in their assessment of the capability of “old” Turks to reform. Throughout the 19th century, British authors had a tendency toward “showing a very English respect for the Ottoman governing class” and “constructed indigenous peoples (of the Balkans-DG) through the familiar motifs of chaos, savagery, backwardness, and obfuscation.” Burnaby, a Turcophile and propagator of support for the Ottoman Empire against the Russian aggression just before the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War, saw Turks as a race capable of governing, even governing Christians after the “cadi’s law” was abrogated given that this law, as Burnaby emphasized, does not accept the testimony of a Christian. Burnaby’s sympathy for and confidence in the “Turk” increased, especially after he encountered the unruly and savage Kurds in East Anatolia. Although others were dubious of the ability of the “Turk” to govern, they still respected the remarkable characteristics of the “Turk”. Mark Sykes, who travelled throughout Anatolia and Arab lands, observed the “rule of the Turk” and wrote, “A Turk will understand an Englishman’s character much sooner than he will an Arab’s; the latter is so subtle in his reasoning, so quick-witted, so argumentative, and so great a master of language that he leaves the stolid Osmanli amazed and dazed, comprehending nothing. The Turk is not, truth to tell, very brilliant as a rule, though very apt in assuming Western cultivation.” In Edhem Bey, he found a reformist Turk who resolved the Armenian disorders. “(H)ere the chapter of Zeitun closes, for within three weeks Edhem Pasha, a noble example of what a cultivated Turk can be, arrived on the scene, and with the assistance of the European Consuls concluded an honorable peace with the town(.)” In another passage, he expressed his doubts that Turkey could ever be reformed in the grip of financial shortcomings, given the lack of a developed infrastructure and educational opportunities, though these structural limitations

474 Sykes, Mark, ibid, p. 76.
did not lessen his respect for the “Turk”. Likewise, the war correspondent of the Daily Telegraph in the Balkan Wars wrote, “We were received on every hand with the greatest courtesy and politeness, the Turk being by instinct the first gentleman in Europe.” These western (and indeed very much Anglo-Saxon) stereotypes are presented to exemplify the complex reception of the “transformed Turk” in the eyes of the western beholders. The personification of the nations was a prevalent theme in 19th century political writings. The national stereotypes were not limited to distinguishing ethnicities, but also to distinguish between the imagined “old Turk” and the “young Turk”. In fact, these supposedly ethnic stereotypes were in effect class-based observations. It was a habit of the 19th century observers to associate ethnicities with certain class formations. Interestingly, “the old Turk” was generally preferred by the Europeans, and especially by the British, who found their oriental counterpart in the gentlemanliness of the Tanzimat-Hamidian pasha. “Ghazi Moukhtar...is a splendid specimen of the old type of Turk.”

Obviously, there was no scientifically defined categorization of the “old Turk”. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, who was an impressive military officer with a Western education, a distinguished professional record, and considerable erudition, turned out to be an “old Turk” in 1913 (the year this account was published) in the reign of the young Turks. Here,

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475 “This may sound extraordinary but is nevertheless true so far as my experience carries me. Every Turk I have met who has dwelt for a considerable period in any European country, although never losing his patriotism and deep love for his land, has become in manners, thoughts and habits an Englishman, a German or Frenchman. This leads one almost to suppose that Turks might be Europeanized by an educational process without any prejudicial result, for at present they have every quality of a ruling race except initiative, which is an essentially European quality. Their ardent patriotism is their only incentive; and their intelligence is scarcely sufficient to show them that serving their country as soldiers is not the only duty of citizens. There are few Turks who would not lay down their lives for their country, there are fewer who would save it from internal decay; notwithstanding this, however there are many able and great men in Turkish official circles, but they are paralysed in action by the limited field open to them, and by want of funds and lack of communication. A Kaimakam may improve his Sanjak, a Vali his Vilayet; more than this it is impossible for one individual to do. A Colonel may bring his regiment to a pitch of efficiency, but he cannot organize the War Office, and so it is in Turkey.” Sykes, Mark, ibid, pp. 64-65.


477 ibid, p.13.
the label “old Turk” attains an ideological connotation. The Young Turks, with their Prussian and social Darwinian attributes, were disdained by this British correspondent who favored men with whom he can trustingly bargain and compromise. The assumption was that they could collaborate with a Turkey which was governed by a class resembling the British cultural formation (in its social and cultural connotations) and the British governing elite. That is to say, “old Turk” was not simply a cliché to refer to the “modernization index”, but a cultural/political/ideological concept determined by concerns and interests of the states coinciding with the imperatives of international politics. In this study, we are trying to portray this vanished elite dubbed by many Westerners as “old Turks”, but without the cultural implications the Westerner accounts maintain, and situate it within a historical framework and historical structure.

2.13. The Problem of Generations: A Key to the History of the Late Ottoman Empire

It can be maintained that the world of the Tanzimat could also be understood by taking ideal-type generations into consideration. “Generation” is a concept that seemingly refers to our individual daily lives rather than those lofty social concepts such as “class”, “bureaucracy”, “status”, and “stratification”. However, early experiences and particular modes of socializations in particular periods are crucial for the formation and development of individuals and constitutive of pervasive and shared mindsets. Arguably, a person who is a member of a certain generation has more affinity with his coevals than his parents regardless of differences of class, status, et cetera. However, it is also important to point out that a generation does not automatically include any person that is born within a certain time range. Generations are also class-bound. Generation is an ideational and cultural concept. Therefore, generations are exclusive rather than inclusive. For example, Robert

Wohl defines the generation of 1914 as follows: “In early twentieth century Europe generationalists (generation of 1914-DG) were almost always literary intellectuals living in large cities. They were members of a small elite who were keenly aware of their uniqueness and proud of their intellectual superiority. What concerned these writers or would-be-writers was their decline of culture and the waning of vital energies; what drove them together was the desire to create new values and to replace those that were fading; what incited them to action was the conviction that they represented the future in the present.”479 Paradoxically the generation of 1914 subsumed all Europe surpassing national borders, but excluded many of the layers and cultural formations of Europe at the same time. Likewise, the Tanzimat generations were also exclusive and inclusive at the same time. In short, generations do matter480, and they are not only simplifications and vulgarizations. Generation is a historical category constructed within social and political circumstances rather than a cultural conceptualization. In this regard, some generations are “more generations” than others in the sense that they reveal very particular characteristics differentiating them from others. This is particularly so when history accelerates. Certain time periods witness drastic changes and transformations brought forth by certain generations. It is needless to point out that generation is a modern concept, meaningful only

in the context of the modern age in which time accelerates and the sharp discrepancies between fathers and sons are very easily noticeable. The first Tanzimat generation was arguably the first generation in the course of the Turkish/Ottoman history per se that experienced an intentional and dramatic break from their fathers’ experiences and intellectual formations. As Wohl points out, “Historical generations are not born; they are made.” The second Tanzimat generation and Hamidian generations were more “modest generations” in terms of their self-consciousness of their own generation and of their displaying the characteristics of a generation. The Young Turk (subsuming the young officials of the late Hamidian era) generation exemplifies a tremendous rejection of the values, codes, and mentalities of their fathers. As pointed out above, generational politics cannot be isolated from social changes and transformations. The reshaping of the class structures and the export of new thoughts gave rise to the emergence of new politics and new cosmologies. For example, Peter Wien illustrates a similar contrast in Iraq in the interwar period. Wien demarcates between the old school “Sherifian generation” of officers in conflict with the coming radical nationalist “Young Efendiyyah” generation sympathetic to Germany and inclined to fascism. Wien defines the Sherifian generation/class as “regarding themselves as an elite of Arab nationalism. Many of them had received an elevated military education at the Ottoman Staff College in Istanbul and had learned Western languages....The Sherifian officers had managed to enter the old urban landholding elite through shady moves in legislation, and thus the old and new urban landlords had the upper hand.” For Wien, the Sherifian officers who turned out to be a

481 Here, I do not refer to the “fathers and sons” genre. Here, by generation, I understand a rigidly socio-economical formation determined by the conditions of the socio-economic and political realities. Although it is an undeniable fact that the 19th century may be read along the narrative of the revolt of the sons against their fathers, too much emphasis on this aspect of the 19th century would lead us to fail to consider that every generation has established their (strict) code of morality. The image of the hedonistic and dandy son which is prevalent in the Tanzimat literature would lead us to fail to see how slightly refashioned codes of moralities had been reproduced throughout 19th century Ottoman Empire. For a glance at the generational struggle in the Tanzimat, see Parla, Jale, Babalar ve Oğullar, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990.
482 Wohl, Robert, ibid, p. 5.
ruling conservative elite had compromised with the landholding Sunni elite. In contrast, the Young Efendiyya were “educated in the newly established nationalist schooling system...they challenged the ruling elite of the 1920s(.) They were disappointed by the collaboration of the Sherifians with the Mandate Power and by their abuse of power...Instead of the conciliatory and pro-British inclination of the Sherifian elite, the Young Efendiyya absorbed ‘Western Ideas’ and ideologies as they were transported as translations in the press and on the book market.”

In short, generations are sets that intersect class, status, social backgrounds and age-groups, and are therefore a crucial social formation themselves. As argued above, the Hamidian generation represented the apex of the imperial elite at a time when the limits of liberal politics became apparent and the empire was failing to respond to the demands of its constituents. It is no coincidence that in these conditions, the last imperial generation had been crashed by the first generation of the nation. Nevertheless, this last imperial elite cluster was also constitutive of the first and later generations of the nation.

To conclude this chapter, because generations are not solely determined by time, but also by class and socializations, it has to be noted that all these clusters of generations are actually restricted to small elites. In fact, the Tanzimat period constitutes a process of elite-formation and elite-expansion. What we will investigate in the following chapters is an “intermediate” generation that paved the way for the emergence of a new generation that I will call the “Unionist generation”. Nevertheless, as argued in the beginning of this chapter, the Tanzimat generation did not die out without leaving a trace. On the contrary,

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484 Wien, Peter, ibid, p. 16. The case was no different in the Japanese modernization. “This generation was ‘new’ relative to the ‘old men of Meiji’ who had engineered the revolutionary reforms of the Restoration; specifically, they were ‘the first generation of Japanese to attend the new Western-oriented schools of higher learning.’ Reaching maturity in the decade before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, this generation struggled with the fundamental problem of national identity and of the proper use to be made of the Japanese heritage in the process of modernization.” Smith II, Henry Dewitt, Japan’s First Student Radicals, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, ix. Also see Pyle, Kenneth B, The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885-1995, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969.

485 For the forging and dissolution of class/status groups in the course of time, see Batatu, Hanna, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
its worldviews, premises, and cultural and intellectual formations made a decisive impact upon the subsequent generations.
CHAPTER III

PRIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, DIPLOMACY, APPROPRIATION OF THE “NEW KNOWLEDGE” AND THE OTTOMAN TRANSFORMATION

This chapter aims to show how diplomacy emerged as a primary concern of Ottoman statecraft and how this development triggered the appropriation of “new knowledge” which consequently resulted in a new organizational and ideological restructuring of the Ottoman polity. In other words, it suggests the “primacy of foreign affairs” in certain historical conjectures.

3.1. Discovery of Diplomacy and the Rise of “New Knowledge”

Since the formation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1836 as a modern bureaucratic structure replacing the previous scribal service attached to the Office of the Grand Vizierate, the Ministry became a preeminent part of Ottoman statecraft.\textsuperscript{486} Although conducting foreign relations had never been an insignificant business, the increasing impact of international developments on the Empire, growing vulnerability vis-à-vis neighboring major powers such as Russia and Austria, as well as the requisites of the rise of the modern state turned the conduction of foreign relations into a prominent preoccupation of statecraft. Therefore, the Ministry gained an importance of unprecedented levels within the Ottoman establishment. It rose from a secondary position (especially vis-à-vis the military and the ilmiye) within the state to the forefront of Ottoman statecraft. The

\textsuperscript{486} The foundation of the Tercüme Odası in 1821 was also an important milestone in the modernization of the Ottoman Empire which preceded the reorganization of Ottoman foreign policy office.
Ottomans had to play according to the rules of the international game to respond to the immediacy of the international pressure on the Empire.

It may be argued that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the bureaucratic institution that played the most significant role in Ottoman transformation, a role different and more intense than that played by the military, especially after it became evident in the eyes of the state elite that something more fundamental than military prowess was necessary to survive the emerging international challenges. This became apparent after the acknowledgement of the enormity of Russian military might which became evident throughout the disastrous Ottoman-Russian wars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.\(^\text{487}\) The Russian army had the capacity to mobilize millions of peasants as Ottoman contemporaries observed, and therefore it was literally unbeatable given Ottoman military capabilities.\(^\text{488}\) The Ottomans suffered severe defeats by the terrifying Russian army in 1774, 1812, and 1829, when Ottoman defenses in Bulgaria collapsed and the Russian army crossed the Balkan mountains and reached as far as Burgas, Aydos, Varna, and even targeted Edirne.\(^\text{489}\)

Under such circumstances, no domestic policy could be developed and implemented independent of its international consequences and imperatives. The Ottomans were well aware that they were dependent on and subject to international developments. This was also an opportunity for the Ottomans since exploiting diplomacy and the dynamics of the international balance of power provided them room for maneuver against the otherwise militarily invincible Russians. Especially from 1774 onwards, the Ottomans were cognizant of their retreat and reluctance to act in such an environment. They were obsessed


with the efforts to reverse their seemingly inevitable collapse. From 1774 onwards, the prospect of an eventual collapse of the Empire guided a substantial portion of diplomatic as well as domestic policies. The Ottomans knew that they were no more an independent actor in the international arena. The international alignments, rivalries, and aggressions were of primary importance for the prospects of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman establishment acknowledged that its well-being was dependent on a number of overlapping factors. Therefore, they had to accommodate themselves to the world around them.

To accommodate to the new circumstances, they had to import and appropriate the “new knowledge”. The “knowledge” to govern, maintain and defend the state was no longer held by the ilmiye class, the prestigious class that held a monopoly and the halo of respectability for possessing the privileged knowledge throughout all the classical age. Although kalemiye rose to prominence within the Ottoman state as early as the eighteenth century (if not earlier), the ilmiye class was at the forefront of the ideological backbone of the state. Certainly, the very critical moment that had brought the sudden decline and marginalization of the ilmiye was the abolition of the janissaries given that the janissary-ilmiye alliance was the fulcrum of the institutional power of ilmiye. With the organization of the new army, the ilmiye retreated from its preeminent position within the power bloc. Nevertheless, we cannot explain this retreat merely as a consequence of the changing alliance structures. If that were the case, it would be even harder to explain the paradoxical involvement and support of ulema in the destruction of the janissaries. It is possible to conjecture that the ilmiye’s prestige collapsed suddenly and drastically with the realization that they no longer possessed the superior and relevant knowledge. Islamic knowledge and science were increasingly discredited in the process of the Ottoman encounter with the modern and “Western” sciences (in the process of military revolution) as their “knowledge” remained irrelevant and impractical. The ulema became sidelined and


491 Timothy Michell explored the meaning of modernity and the employment of modernity in the non-Western world. In his landmark study, *Colonising Egypt*, Mitchell argued that the inevitable entrance of the “new knowledge” and “modern mind” brought the collapse of the “old ways of making things” and forced Egypt to submit to the modern discourse and therefore to the penetration of Western imperialism, which holds the monopoly on
marginalized within the new circumstances, and the social-cultural environment in which their knowledge remained was restricted to the private and non-political spheres.\(^{492}\)

The holders of the “technical knowledge”, who had been recruited for conduction of daily affairs, were elevated from being secondary class auxiliaries to being captains of statecraft. The quality of having the definite skills to lead the ship of state had been taken over by a new group of officials from the kalemiye equipped with positive and pragmatic knowledge distinct from the “philosophical knowledge” the ilmiye maintained. The ilmiye class gave way to a new class which was more compatible and in touch with the new developments (after a period in the late 18\(^{\text{th}}\) and early 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century in which the prominence of the ulema was at its zenith).\(^{493}\) The 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century rise of the kalemiye class, as shown by modern knowledge. Local “experts” also established their dictatorship based on their monopoly of the “new knowledge”. They were the only ones who were familiar with “making things rationally”. In “Rule of Experts” Mitchell shows how the modern Egyptian bureaucracy had developed a novel mentality which recreates Egypt in their image and causes the eradication of the old knowledge. Thus, in the argumentation of Mitchell, the local elite of “experts” and the Western imperialists collaborated, and the local experts functioned as the “compradors of western knowledge” adapting the Marxist notion of “compradorial bourgeoisie”. Mitchell, Timothy, Colonising Egypt, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991; Mitchell, Timothy, Rule of Experts : Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Also for the eradication of the effective “local knowledge” by the states and the detrimental effects of states’ intrusion into the traditional society, see Scott, James, Seeing Like a State, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. For another inspiring essay on the meaning of modern/Western bureaucracy, see Herzfeld, Michael, The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.


\(^{493}\) The whole Tarih-i Cevdet can be read as a polemic against the crumbling ilmiye class. Coming himself from the ranks of ilmiye, Cevdet in his Tarih is a staunch modernist
Aksan, reached its apex in the early 19th century. Although the rise of kalemiye can be witnessed as early as the 17th century, it was only in the early 19th century that kalemiye became a self-conscious group assuming immense political prominence and power. The new knowledge was now the monopoly of this new class, who had acquired the necessary skills to thrive in the new circumstances that were pushing the Empire into a corner. It was this group that assumed power with the Edict of Reform in 1839. Paradoxically, the authoritarian policies of Mahmud II that eradicated the opponents of the reform (i.e., policies of Mahmud II) enabled the newly rising class, who enjoyed the elimination of their rivals from offices of prominence, to grab power from the palace and the sultan with the coming to the throne of the young and inexperienced Abdülmecid in 1839.494

The analysis of Christoph Neumann on the foreign policy decisions of the Ottoman Empire in the reign of Selim III in his aptly named article, “Decision Making without Decision Makers”, demonstrates that the policy making was a fragmented vocation and that there was no authorized corporate structure to decide foreign policy. Neumann also underlines the prominent role of the ilmiye class in the making of foreign policy. In addition, Neumann shows that foreign policy decisions were dependent on personal relations and household rivalries. Before its institutionalization, foreign policy was hostage to rivalries of “political factions aimed at achieving personal career enhancement, not political programs.”495 Although members of ilmiye class had a prominent role in foreign policy, many other actors were also extensively involved in this process, such as the Admiral Gazi Hasan Pasha who had veto power over matters relevant to the North African Barbary Coast. From such a chaotic, uninstitutionalized configuration in which personal

propagating the new way of conducting the state. He does not spare his words when it comes to scorning the ilmiye and making fun of their lack of understanding of the new world. For Cevdet, the alternative to accepting the new modes of statecraft is the death of the Ottoman polity. See a broad analysis of the discourse of Tarih-i Cevdet, Neumann, Christoph, Araç Tarih Amacı Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet’in Siyasi Anlamı, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000.

494 For the power struggles after the death of Mahmud II and the subsequent victory of the reform party and Mustafa Reşid Pasha, see Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, Vak’anüvüş Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Efendi Tarihi, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999, pp. 1006-1025.

and interpersonal relations shaped foreign policy, the creation of an institutionalized and impersonal organization isolated from daily and personalized petty politics was no less than a revolution.

This institutional revolution was a victory of “modern knowledge” replacing the reign of traditional knowledge⁴⁹⁶. This epistemological revolution compelled an institutional reorganization. The institutional reorganization was a corollary of the epistemological revolution. Apparently, “modern knowledge” necessitated the erection of an autonomous bureaucracy to reproduce itself. Furthermore, it generated the development of notions of expertise and specialization. The modern epistemology maintains that what is valuable is not “knowledge as a whole and in a totality” but knowledge as specified and particularized. Modern officialdom and its bureaucracy were to an important extent founded on these premises.⁴⁹⁷

In fact, the modern epistemology enforced a radical reorganization in the military.⁴⁹⁸ The Ottoman transformation began with the military sector.⁴⁹⁹ The reasons were obvious. The very visible symptoms of the Ottoman failure were observed in the devastating military defeats. Although the immediate aim of all the efforts was to reorganize and strengthen the military, in the “new world”, military prowess and military victory was less

⁴⁹⁶ In Iran, the reformist Malkom Khan makes a differentiation between “natural intellect” and “acquired education”. He criticizes Iranians for preferring to see the former as more valuable and important, whereas for Malkom, this is not tenable in the modern world. Menashri, David, Education and the Making of Modern Iran, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 33.

⁴⁹⁷ For the rising prominence of the ilmiye in conducting foreign affairs in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the subsequent, drastic decline of their role in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and a detailed survey of the ilmiye members in the conduct of foreign affairs, see Cihan, Ahmet, Reform Çağında Osmanlı İlişki Sınıfı, Birey, 2004, pp. 91-101.

⁴⁹⁸ For an application of the rationalized military reorganization and its proud announcement, see Mahmud Raif’s Tableau des Nouveaux Reglemens de L’Empire Ottoman printed in 1798 to advertise the recent Ottoman military reforms which made the Ottoman military a fully-fledged modern military. For the text, see Terzioğlu, Arslan; Hatemi, Hüseyin (ed.), Osmanlı Imparatorluğu’nda Yeni Nizamların Cedveli, İstanbul: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 1988.

decisive than before. After long efforts to overcome the military deficit, it was recognized that changes had to be made elsewhere. A new kind of knowledge other than military prowess had to be acquired. These motivations prepared the ground for the emergence and rise of the future-diplomats as a group. The discovery of diplomacy was the new great white hope for the Ottomans.

To establish a chronological order, we may contextualize the rising prominence of conducting foreign affairs beginning from the late eighteenth century. The continuous Russian wars, especially from the disastrous 1774 onwards, exposed the reluctance to know and exploit international political dynamics. The helplessness of the Empire against the Russian menace compelled the Ottomans to seek long-lasting and comprehensive alliances rather than temporary alliances. The Western European states were now potential new comrades for the Ottomans against the Russians. These future comrades were sharing a common fear, the rise of the Russian bear.

The second crucial period in the emergence of modern Ottoman diplomacy was the Napoleonic Wars. The term “Napoleonic Wars” encompasses a more than twenty-year period not of continuous warfare, but a period in which coalitions and alliances were formed, dissolved, and reestablished. It was a period in which modern diplomacy became

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500 The same can also be said for the rise of the modern bureaucracy. The bureaucratic model copied from the West was first introduced by Mahmud II, but it took the bureaucracy several decades to mature and exemplify a modern Western-type bureaucracy.

501 The “Russian dimension” had been neglected in the Ottoman historiography. The permanent Russian wars and menace had been treated as a side issue rather than the very fundamental problem of the Ottomans throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The “Russian dimension” is significant not only in terms of military defeats, but also because the Russian army as a modernized army with western skills and training since Peter the Great was the first western model the Ottomans encountered face to face. This led the Ottomans to want to imitate it. The Russian army that overwhelmed the Ottoman army was the modern army Selim III, and subsequently Mahmud II, wanted to establish. Virginia Aksan writes: “Napoleon’s bold thrust into the Eastern Mediterranean in 1798, prelude to his imperial reign is very often held to be the beginning of the “modern” age in the Middle East. My sense is rather that the modern age for the Ottoman Empire began on the fields of Kartal (referring to the Russian victory at the Battle of Kartal in 1770-DG) and at the walls of Ochakov.” Aksan, Virginia, Ottoman Wars, New York: Pearson Longman, 2007, p. 170.

formed and reached unprecedented levels of sophistication. The Congress of Vienna of 1815 can be seen as the founding moment of modern (aristocratic) diplomacy with its established codes of conduct.\textsuperscript{503} It was a very constitutive moment in the rise of the role and significance of foreign affairs in government policies, which was particularly true for the Ottomans. The Napoleonic Wars were an unprecedented episode in which war and peace were indistinguishable from each other and in which no power in Europe had the luxury of isolating itself diplomatically. The Ottomans were entangled in this complex web of relations oscillating within the complex web of alliances. With the aim of preventing a possible European-wide deal at the expense of the Empire, the Sublime Porte struggled to make the best of it within the European-wide politics of alignment, and thus the Ottomans became incorporated into the European order, albeit in a passive posture.

The European-wide Napoleonic “Cold War” was also an opportunity for the Ottoman Empire. Russia and Austria had to give up their campaigns against the Ottomans by 1792 as a response to the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{504} After the break of the French Revolution and once the European powers including Russia and Austria were forced to track the post-revolutionary developments instead of fighting, the Ottomans not only found breathing space but found a chance to be allies with the Russians and others. Playing a diplomatic game between France on one side and Britain on the other, the Ottomans endeavored to maximize their interests.\textsuperscript{505}

Recent studies have revised the Orientalist/reductionist image that Ottomans were completely ignorant of their time, demonstrating that on the contrary Ottomans were

\textsuperscript{503} For an appraisal of the congress, see Schroeder, Paul W, \textit{The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848}, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 575-582.


perfectly aware of the conditions they were in and cognizant of the transforming world. However, such awareness does not automatically break the impasse. Diplomacy requires a massive technical knowledge to be acquired as has been best exemplified by Venetian diplomacy. Diplomacy also needs accumulated experience and practical skills developed over a long time span. Diplomacy as a craft and an art developed in Europe in the early modern period, first becoming visible in the Italian city states in the fifteenth century and gradually becoming established in the sixteenth century throughout Western Europe. The Ottomans were not complete foreigners to the world of diplomacy. They pursued a rather sophisticated diplomacy in the post-classical centuries. However, Ottoman diplomacy failed to adopt many of the specifics of the intra-Christian codes and cultures of diplomacy. Moreover, they failed to modernize the craft and techniques of diplomacy such as information-gathering and utilization of gathered information. The Ottomans had to acquaint themselves with the new language, new skills, and new code of conduct. They lacked the accumulation of knowledge and experience which Europeans amassed in the few centuries of early modernity. Furthermore, the terrain of diplomacy was a foreign

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509 For example, see Kolodziejczyk, Dariusz, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th-18th Centuries), Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2000.

510 In 1838, while he was the foreign minister, Mustafa Reşid Efendi was appointed as the ambassador to France, retaining his ministerial post. This was “to examine the European codes of conducts and the developments in Europe in situ.” Akyıldız, Ali, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform, İstanbul: Eren, 1993, p. 79.
land for Ottomans, and they were trying their best not to act not as guests, but as one of the hosts. In other words, they were on the fringes, but not quite “in”.

In short, the Ottomans were not unaware of the world around them as they used to be portrayed by the earlier Eurocentric historiography, but they were certainly far from grasping the very exact circumstances in which they could thrive. They had a clear vision of what to do to survive in this new jungle, but they lacked the necessary equipment to implement complex and sophisticated policymaking. The Ottomans were not naïve observers failing to understand the world around them and the new developments therein. However, the lack of background knowledge and background training rendered them incompetent to react effectively although they were not entirely unaware of their incompetence and superficiality.\textsuperscript{511} Knowing the existing circumstances around and having the skills to master those circumstances are two different phenomena.

After the defeat of Napoleonic France and the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna, the new “European concert” and the diplomatic world became even tougher for the Ottomans. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha in his \textit{Tarih-i Cevdet} is highly critical of the non-participation of the Ottomans in the Congress of Vienna, which in his opinion Pasha cost the Ottomans greatly in the diplomatic arena.\textsuperscript{512} He went further in exposing the diplomatic blunders of the Ottomans which were to a large extent responsible for the Greek independence movement, which was unthinkable and undesirable in the eyes of the Western powers at the beginning of the rebellion.\textsuperscript{513} The blunders of the Ottomans guaranteed the changing attitude of the European powers towards the Greek rebels. This fiasco was the last warning for the Ottomans that full participation and involvement within the Concert of Europe was necessary to avoid further setbacks. Ottoman reformism was born in such an environment. The so-called Ottoman Westernization was not only motivated, but also led, by anxiety about surviving in such a predatory environment. The

\textsuperscript{511} For 18th century Ottoman diplomats, see Aksan, Virginia, \textit{An Ottoman statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783}, Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 1995.
\textsuperscript{512} Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, \textit{Tarih-i Cevdet}, İstanbul: Darü‘t-Tibaat’ül Amire, 1309, v. XII, pp. 194-196.
\textsuperscript{513} Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, ibid, v. XII, pp. 215-219.
Ottoman reformism cannot be dissociated from these diplomatic entanglements.\textsuperscript{514} It was a function of international developments and alignments. The so-called Ottoman Westernization was not a process that started at a certain time in history with a clear intention and direction. It was only a set of responses to Western (mainly Russian) aggression. There existed no conscious “break/rupture” from the “old”. The operation was limited to the acquisition of new knowledge first in military matters (\textit{Nizam-i Cedid} soldiers onwards) and then in diplomacy. Instead of being a dependent variable of socio-economical and political developments, diplomacy became a transformative force itself, and it shaped and influenced socio-economical and political developments.

The new knowledge was to be rational, measurable, and free of any metaphysical assumption, hence “modern”. Therefore, “modern” was first and foremost a methodology and organization designed by people mindful of the aforementioned principles.\textsuperscript{515} The implementation of this methodology was dubbed “Westernism” or “reformism” retrospectively with the hindsight of the drastic transformation it triggered. In short, although it prompted an inevitable massive scale transformation, it was not an intentional project. As argued above, diplomacy and diplomatic considerations were major dynamics in this process.

3.2. Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry

\textsuperscript{514} For the emergence and development of the concept of “Westernization” in Turkish historiography, see Murphey, Rhoads, “Westernization in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire: How Far, How Fast?”, \textit{Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies} vol. 23, 1999, pp. 116-139.

\textsuperscript{515} This is no place to discuss or evaluate the “nature of modernity”. However, it may be necessary to define what we understand from modernity. It will be denied that modernity is an unprecedented transformation of our mode of thinking and, therefore, of our relations with the world. Modernity is a passionate challenge to transform/control the natural world around us. However, this kind of passionate modernity reflects the mental worlds of Enlightenment philosophes, adventurers, overseas tradesmen, and bankers but not necessarily the world of everybody facing modernity. The understanding of modernity by the Ottoman statesmen will be evaluated throughout the essay.
The Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Umur-u Hariciye Nezareti) was established in 1836 by an edict of Mahmud II.\textsuperscript{516} Akif Efendi, the incumbent Chief Secretary of the Sublime Porte (Reis-ül-Küttab) since 1832, was named as the first Foreign Minister.\textsuperscript{517} Hulusi Pasha replaced Akif Efendi after the latter was dismissed in four months’ time. However, it was with the appointment of Mustafa Reşit Pasha in 1837 that the new ministry began to become a modern office. Before the establishment of the Foreign Ministry, the institution of Reis-ül-Küttablık was a department within sa’drazamlık. The official titles of the Reis-ül-Küttabs were lower in comparison to the other holders of prominent offices. Whereas the Chief Financial Official (defterdars) and the Drawer of the Sultanic Seal (nişancı) were among the top functionaries of the Sublime Porte (erkan-ı Babiali), the reis-ül-küttabs belonged to the rank of “higher officials” (rical-ı Babiali). Recognizing the rising importance and increasing role of foreign relations, Mahmud II allowed the upgrading of the title of the Reis-ül-Küttablık. Mahmud II in the very beginning of his edict established that the the title of the Foreign Ministry had to be upgraded because they represent the Ottoman Empire vis-avis the European powers and they are in a position to serve the Empire in very important issues. (“çünkü rütbe-i evveliyede bulunanlar Devlet-ı Aliyye’mizin en büyük hizmet ve maslahatlarına me’mur olduklarından ve zat-ı me’muriyetleri i’tiyareyle lazım gelen nüfuz ve haysiyetleriçün fi ma ba’da müşirlik ve vezaret rütbe-i celileleri sıralarında add ve i’tiabar olunmalari hususu geçmişe tıbk-ı irade-ı şahanem üzre icra olunmuş idi.”\textsuperscript{518})

By 1836, the new Foreign Ministry became an independent body with the ministers enjoying the title of vezir.\textsuperscript{519} A regulation for the new organization had already been prepared by 1835. The regulation clearly established that only the ministry had the authority to conduct foreign relations. Parallel to Mahmud’s centralizing policies and institutionalizing and restructuring of the state bureaucracy, the new Foreign Ministry was

\textsuperscript{516} See Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciyye, (1301/1885), pp. 162-163.

\textsuperscript{517} For the foundation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Akyıldız, Ali, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform, İstanbul: Eren, 1993, pp. 70-91.

\textsuperscript{518} For the text, see ibid., p. 152.

\textsuperscript{519} Akyıldız, Ali, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform, İstanbul: Eren, 1993, p. 78.
established and organized as the sole authority to conduct foreign policy in contradistinction to the fragmented and collective nature of the earlier policy-making organization and process.

However, the ministry did not become a modern/Weberian institution overnight. On the contrary, it took a few decades for the institution to professionalize and create its own esprit de corps. Before its professionalization and specification of knowledge in the Hamidian era, it was one of the major offices of the Sublime Porte where there was a flow of recruits in and out. In the absence of trained bureaucrats, many preeminent statesmen served in diplomatic posts for a while. The Foreign Ministry became an office where bureaucrats and men of future political prominence were trained and acquired experience.

The Tanzimat Foreign Ministry had a very minor influence in the making of foreign policy as an institution.\(^{520}\) Foreign policy had been determined in the upper echelons by the “political initiative”. In this regard, it would be wrong to speak of a self-serving and autonomous bureaucratic polity reminiscent of the Prussian model.\(^{521}\) It seems that, the 19\(^{th}\) century Ottoman pattern resembled the Russian example more than the Prussian one.\(^{522}\)

The Foreign Ministry’s mission was confined to carrying out the tasks it was given. This can also be seen in the very low number of Foreign Ministers who came from the ranks of the ministry itself, especially in the Hamidian era. The post of Foreign Minister was a political post and not a bureaucratic post, being merely the supreme functionary of the ministry on top of the undersecretary. Nevertheless, given the small size and intertwined nature of the political-bureaucratic elite, it was not a place of minor significance.

Reviewing the literature on 19\(^{th}\) century Ottoman foreign affairs, one sees too much written on foreign relations and almost nothing on the actual daily conduct of foreign

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\(^{520}\) Akyıldız, Ali, ibid, p. 90.

\(^{521}\) The myth of Prussianism had been questioned by John Röhl. See his The Kaiser and His Court. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Röhl shows the role of the Kaiser and his personal circles in the making of foreign policy. In Röhl’s assessment, German foreign policies did not develop from professional analysis and work, but from personal and irrelevant motivations.

\(^{522}\) For a sharp contrast between the Prussian and Russian bureaucratic structures in the 19th century, see the articles in Heper, Metin (ed.), The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. However, such a dichotomy has been discredited by the latest studies on Russian bureaucracy.
affairs, particularly in view of the relatively recent declassification of the files of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That is to say, we know a lot about Ottoman foreign policy yet almost nothing about the technicalities and procedures of making the foreign policy. In the absence of documents kept in the archives of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the archival evidence used in all the relevant studies on Ottoman foreign relations consists of sources other than the archives of the Ministry. The bulk of the material used in these studies are irades and correspondence between the Palace (in the reign of Abdülhamid II) and the Babıali, and the correspondence between the Foreign Minister and his international counterparts. Given all these, we still know very little about the Foreign Ministry. This observation contradicts the superficial impression that diplomatic history is one of the most developed areas of 19th century Ottoman historiography.\textsuperscript{523} In other words, diplomacy has been interpreted and analyzed as a response to international developments rather than a comprehensive profession. Moreover, we lack the insights of the new critical diplomatic history. We have not gained sufficient information and insights about the Foreign Ministry from all these diplomatic histories. The men in charge implemented their policies based on certain information, but how this information had been obtained has yet to be researched.\textsuperscript{524}

\textsuperscript{523} The doyen of Ottoman diplomatic history is arguably Roderick Davison. Yet in the absence of the diplomatic archival sources of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we learn very little (almost nothing) from his collected essays about the Foreign Ministry. See his \textit{Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms}. Istanbul: Isis Press, 1999. Also see his \textit{Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History: 1774-1923}, Austin: University of Texas, 1990. Also it should be noted that in his “Reform in the Ottoman Empire”, he did not show a particular interest in the bureaucracy. He focuses on the “political level” to prove the development of Ottoman reforms. Here, it is not claimed that he is wrong. The point made here is that we lack sufficient knowledge of the Ottoman bureaucracy and cannot determine the role of the bureaucracy throughout the 19th century.

\textsuperscript{524} The same criticism was leveled against the diplomatic historians by a student of the diplomatic establishment. “The attention of those studying modern history and international relations in the past has focused largely upon three areas: the political substance of major foreign policies, the personalities of leading decision makers, and the events of dramatic crisis situations. As a result, our knowledge of diplomacy frequently has been confined to “high policy” regarding such issues as war or peace, to a restricted number of leaders whose names and actions made headlines, or sporadic episodes of tension and conflict. Obviously the problems and intricacies of international politics are infinitely more complex than indicated by these few highlights. Integral –but largely
What we know is that the Foreign Ministry was a very fundamental source of knowledge required for the age. Findley speaks of the renunciation of “military politics” in favor of diplomatic politics.\(^{525}\) A competent Foreign Ministry became more decisive than a strong army in the survival of the state. Civilians (efendi-turned-pashas in Itzkowitz’s formulation) began to rise in the state administration as early as the 18\(^{th}\) century.\(^{526}\) However, it was the Tanzimat in which the civilian supremacy was made routine, institutionalized, and consolidated after the reorganization of the military as subordinate to the political authority following the destruction of the janissaries and the pre-modern military organization. The reign of Abdülaziz was the high point of the Foreign Ministry with many recruits of the Ministry occupying the highest posts. “(I)t became common for the foreign minister to go on to serve as grand vizier. Dominating this combination of posts, Mustafa Reşid (1800-58), Keçecizade Fuad (1815-1869) and Mehmed Emin Âli Pashas (1815-71) shaped the period.”\(^{527}\) But with the coming of Abdülhamid, the Foreign Ministry lost its glory days. The reason for that relative decline in prominence within the state machine may lie in the fact that the Foreign Ministry cadres lost their monopoly on speaking French and being acquainted with the European realities. Their technical information and relatively superior level of knowledge regarding European realities might have continued to be useful, but possessing the technical knowledge no longer automatically provided political prominence. By then, Ottoman statecraft was much more sophisticated than it had been half a century earlier. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to be one of the most prestigious offices.

neglected- features of diplomacy, particularly in the twentieth century, must include the management of those policies encompassing more subtle commercial or “cultural” questions, the responsibilities of lesser bureaucratic officials in periods of both turmoil and stability, and the actual administrative machinery or organized context of policy formulation and execution.”Lauren, Paul Gordon, *Diplomats and Bureaucrats*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p. xvii.


3.3. Ottoman Foreign Ministry as Precursor of “Westernism” and Pseudo-Nationalism: Making of the Ottoman Modern Transformation

As has been suggested several times above, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was a preeminent institution in the process of the Ottoman transformation in the 19th century. This was because after the final collapse of the conventional prescription advocating stronger military stockpiling for the healing of all ills, it was the Ministry that had represented the novel and ambitious promise of “salvation” through “other” means. It was the Foreign Ministry that held the means to deal with and weather the dire situation. In the early Tanzimat period, the ministry was the institution which had the foremost and best direct contact with the “West”. The ministerial personnel were in everyday touch with the “Christian” powers, and therefore they had the advantage of following the latest developments closely in comparison to the other governmental offices. Hence, they were the ones who felt the urgency, acuteness, and graveness of the situation not only regarding diplomatic realities, but also regarding the technical retardation of the Ottomans. Furthermore, they “possessed” the best available prescription for the healing of the “Sick Man”. Only they had the skills to apply the proposed remedy. They were the ones who were perfectly aware that a new and complete reorganization of the state and state affairs was not a matter of intellectual debate and preference, but an imperative. For these reasons, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry not only recruited and trained the bulk of the Tanzimat (Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha) leadership, but also represented a role model for the desired new Ottoman civility. It assumed the role of the carrier of the Ottoman transformation before this model had been endorsed by the larger bureaucracy within a few decades. It is not a coincidence that Western observers of the Ottoman Empire found diplomats those with whom they most sympathized while considering them to be the most “Westernized and civilized”.

One example of how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was perceived to be the transmitter of the Western way of conduct and Western knowledge is the fact that

528 For example, see Mordtmann, Andreas David, İstanbul ve Yeni Osmanlilar, İstanbul: Pera, 1999, pp. 279-304.
institutions such as the “Council of Agriculture and Manufacture” and the “Council of Quarantine” were established in 1838 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Council of Agriculture and Manufacture was transferred to the Ministry of Trade in 1839. Likewise, the “Council of Public Education” was established in 1846 under the supervision of the ministry. Apparently, these committees were established under the ministry due to its proximity and access to the “centers of modern/Western knowledge”. The Foreign Minister was also the head of the Board of Health (Meclis-i Umur-i Sıhhiye) and therefore de facto “Minister of Health”. Thus, the offices to monitor and improve public health were to be included in the Hamidian Foreign Ministry yearbooks. The Board of Public Education, founded in 1846, was also to be monitored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The diplomats functioned as intermediaries for the “import of Western and technical knowledge” into the Ottoman Empire in addition to their diplomatic responsibilities. For example, it was the embassy to Paris that found, negotiated, and contracted two French forest engineers to come to Istanbul, supervise the forests, and establish a modern forestry office. The embassies were coordinating the recruitment of experts of all kinds of engineering, mining, medicine for the introduction of industrial production and establishment of modern public institutions in the Ottoman Empire and actively involved in this process. The first president of the board established to modernize Istanbul and create a modern municipal organization (İntizam-ı Şehir Komisyonu) was

532 Keskin, Özkan. *Orman Ma’adin Nezareti’nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri*, unpublished dissertation, Istanbul University, 2005, p. 18. These two forest engineers were invited for the following reasons: “Esbab-i siyasiye ilcastyla Avrupa Hey’et-i Düveliyyesine mümaṣat etmek ve hoş görünmek, peyda-yi vukuflı olanamayan fünun ve ‘ulum-i mütenevvia tahavvulat ve tebeddülattan istifade etmek, bizde henüz tatbik edilmeyen fenn vesair mevadi tatbik ve ta’nim etdirmek”.

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Emin Muhlis Efendi, a diplomat and a chief official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{533} Apparently, his experience and knowledge he obtained in his years in Europe should be the reason of his appointment to this post. Likewise, “Kamil Bey, the chief of protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the first director of the Sixth (municipal-DG) District” comprising of Pera, the European part of Istanbul. The board of Sixth District was created comprising of Europeans, non-Muslims and a few Muslims resident in the Sixth District to administer and develop Pera following the West European urban planning and urban developments.\textsuperscript{534}

Apparently the pioneering role of the Foreign Ministry was not unique to the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, the same pattern was visible in all the other non-Western modernizing states. Like the Ottoman case, the first generation of the Iranian modernization movement was comprised of employees of the Foreign Ministry who were assigned to posts in the Persian embassies in Europe. The Persian diplomats, who all came from the traditional bureaucracy not unlike the first Ottoman generation of reformers, were frustrated with their homeland’s incapacity to adapt to the modern world.\textsuperscript{535}

“Persia’s diplomats also assigned to the ministry of foreign affairs and themselves as members of it a pivotal role in bringing the new civilization to Persia. Malkam believed that the foreign ministry had the duty of acting as a channel through which the achievements and knowledge of Europe could be directed towards Persia. Others, as we have noted, believed that Persia’s ambassadors abroad had a special mission to enlighten their government and people and lead both along the right path to progress.”\textsuperscript{536}

“Those who were advocating reform in the 1860’s were never a large group, and they were not a tightly knit one. But their contacts with one another and the fact that they shared many attitudes in common seems to have given them a certain group feeling...The diplomats urging reform in the 1860’s also believed that their foreign experience and training better qualified and equipped them to guide the country than those who had not been abroad. In vaunting the superiority of the new arts and sciences of Europe, they were also suggesting that as Persians with a knowledge of


\textsuperscript{534} Gül, Murat, ibid, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{535} See Bakhash….p. 28.

\textsuperscript{536} Bakhash, Saul. … p. 52.
these sciences, they had a special claim to higher offices of the state... This elitist attitude, which owed something both to the Persian bureaucracy and to Islamic traditions, was closely bound up with the attitude to government that they looked on as the central guiding force in determining and directing the affairs of the people. They favored schools and newspapers because these offered a means for creating a better informed and better educated public. But this was at the same time a desire for newspapers, for instance, that would educate the public in ideas they believed suitable for Persia rather than as a means for permitting many schools of thought to compete for the people’s allegiance.

In Persia, the role and active involvement of diplomats was arguably significantly stronger than in the Ottoman Empire due to the less institutionalized nature of the early modern Persian state. In China, the transformative, modernizing, and civilizationist functions of the foreign ministry far exceeded the missions of its Ottoman and Persian counterparts.

“The activities of the Tsungli Yamen (the de facto Chinese Foreign Ministry) involved not only foreign affairs but also the promotion of modernization and defense projects. The office was concerned with the introduction of Western science and industry, modern schools, customs and the purchase of ships and guns... Functionally, the Yamen handled many duties far beyond the normal limits of a foreign office. In addition to diplomatic affairs, it coordinated almost the entire range of ‘Western affairs’ (yang-wu) such as foreign trade, customs, education, overseas affairs, postal service, national defense, and cultural affairs. It oversaw the work of the Trade Inspectorate General of customs and indirectly supervised the port commissioners in consultation with the two trade superintendents. It was involved in mining, machine factories, telegraph construction, Chinese laborers abroad, missionary incidents, and the manufacture and purchase of guns and ships. Further, the Yamen supervised the two T’ung Wen Kuan for the training of language students and future diplomatic and consular personnel. After 1867, when astronomy, chemistry, mathematics, and physics were added to the curriculum of the school, the Yamen defended this development against conservative opposition. All in all, the Yamen’s activities were too diverse to be functionally efficient.”

The same was true for the Japanese Foreign Ministry. “In this quarter-century (the end of the late 19th century), the Foreign Ministers enjoyed high status since they had generally

537 Bakhash, Saul...pp. 51-52.
538 Bakhash, Saul...pp. 52-53.
played some role in the civil war or the imperial restoration that followed it. In a way, many of them were statesmen and enjoyed a prestige second only to the Prime Ministers of today. In some cases, they possessed an exceptional knowledge of foreign countries by virtue of having travelled abroad. Of the early Foreign Ministers the following had visited overseas before taking up office: Inoue Kaoru; Saionji Kimmochi; Mutsu Munemitsu; Enomoto Takeaki; and Aoki Shuzo.541 For the same reason, many Japanese foreign ministers subsequently became prime ministers, a pattern reminiscent of the Ottoman pattern in the Tanzimat era.542 In all of these four countries, bureaucratic modernizers were to introduce “modern knowledge” to their people as well as minor officials. In all four countries, these bureaucrats were members of a small elite originating from the traditional elites of the preceding decades and centuries.543

In fact, the Ottoman statesmen and diplomats-to-be were exporters of their mission. The Persian modernization project was influenced by and modeled on the Ottoman modernization. Malkam Khan, the Persian ambassador to London and other capitals, and a pioneer and leading figure of the Persian modernization, was heavily influenced by Ottoman reformers during his post in the Persian embassy to Istanbul.544 While, he was a low-ranking official in the Persian embassy in Istanbul, he cultivated friendships with people such as Āli Pasha, Fuad Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, and Münif Pasha.545 His closeness to these names benefited him financially as well. When the Persian government stopped paying his salary (for reasons which remain obscure), he was granted a salary by the Ottoman Empire.546

542 Nish, Ian. ..... p. 328.
543 For the social origins of Persian diplomats, see Bakhsh, Saul, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars: 1858-1896, London: Ithaca Press, 1978, p. 28.
545 Algar, Hamid… pp. 65-74. Also for Abdülhak Hamid’s meeting with Malkom Khan several times in the residence of Ahmed Vefik Pasha (and also in London), see Abdülhak Hamid… p. 178.
546 Bakhsh, Saul… p. 27.
The transformation was not limited to the reorganization of the state. The officials’ own conduct of affairs and their self-imagination changed as well. As pioneers and promoters of the modernization/Westernization process, 19th century bureaucrats endorsed and replicated a new way of “officialdom” and “refinement”. The servant of the state turned into a civil servant. However, that does not necessarily imply the transformation of the pre-modern servant of the state into a rational, modern bureaucrat. The adaptations are not necessarily “transformations”. This “process of adaptation” may be divided into several stages. Shifting of the structures of mentalities throughout the decades of the Tanzimat were examined in the previous chapters. However, such a periodization should not be understood as a linear evolution from one world to another. Continuities as well as disruptions can also be observed. It may be a more insightful perspective to perceive the transformation not simply as the renunciation of the “old” and adoption of the “new”, but instead as a complex historical process in which a new reference and value system was created coexisting with the previous reference and value system. Following this perspective, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry exemplifies a distinct internalization of modernity in a certain social-political milieu and weltanschauung. This selective reception of modernity by the Ottomans was not a phenomenon peculiar to the Ottomans. Rather, it was a pattern observable in other exemplary experiments of non-Western modernization.

3.4. The Foreign Ministry in the Hamidian Era

Abdülmehid II preferred to appoint men originating from other civilian organizations to prominent posts in the Sublime Porte. Of the sixteen Grand Viziers of Abdülhamid, only one of them (Arifi Pasha) was a diplomat. Two others (Ibrahim Edhem Pasha and Safvet Pasha) served as ambassadors, but it would not be appropriate to regard them as diplomats. Of the ten foreign ministers of Abdülhamid, only three (Turhan Hüsnü Pasha, Arifi Pasha, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha) had extensive diplomatic backgrounds. Possibly, Abdülhamid was suspicious of the power of the Ministry and feared that he might be forced to share power with the ministry in foreign policy decisions once he allowed others some power in the
decision-making process.\textsuperscript{547} The memory of the dictatorial Áli Pasha and his close associate Fuad Pasha (who were known for their sympathies to Britain and France) should have been a warning for Abdülhamid not to favor diplomats in statesmanship. He might also have thought that appointing ex-ambassadors to posts in the foreign ministry or prime ministry might enable the countries where these ex-ambassadors had served to interfere and develop influence over the policy making of the Ottoman Empire. The suspicion of Abdülhamid was equally true for any individual of the Porte who might rise to challenge the supreme authority of the sultan as Said Pasha had. Instead, he preferred the Palace to be the sole authority in making foreign policy. He used to correspond with the ambassadors and consulates personally from the Palace and bypassed the Ministry and Grand Vizirate\textsuperscript{548} as he did with governors and local officials.

Abdülhamid founded an alternative and coexisting bureaucracy in the Yıldız Palace. It was a very efficient and well-structured manifestation of a modern bureaucracy. The immense and orderly correspondence, their registration, and the documentation of the Yıldız offices clearly demonstrates that it was a modern-bureaucratic structure in terms of organization and methodology, albeit patrimonial in other aspects and rivaling and interfering with the regular offices and bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{549}

On the other hand, it was the Hamidian period in which the ministry was professionalized and bureaucratized like the other bureaucratic offices. It was this period in which the modern Turkish Foreign Ministry as a professional Weberian bureaucracy emerged. Mahmud Esad Bey (later Pasha) was the first career diplomat to be appointed as ambassador after passing through necessary levels and promotions. He was recruited following his graduation and promoted consistently beginning from his first appointment

\textsuperscript{547} For how Abdülhamid II had established direct contacts with officials bypassing the Grand Vizirate and the Sublime Porte in general, see Akarlı, Engin Deniz, \textit{The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)}, unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1976.

\textsuperscript{548} See Yıldız Esas Evrakı-Elçiler, Şehbenderlik ve Ateşemiliterlik under the Yıldız archives in BOA.

\textsuperscript{549} For depictions of the Yıldız bureaucracy, see Mayakon, İsmail Müştak, \textit{Yıldızda Neler Gördüm ?} İstanbul: Semih Lütfi Kitabevi, 1940; Tahsin Pasha, \textit{Abdülhamid Yıldız Hatıraları}, İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1931. Also Georgeon, Francois, \textit{Sultan Abdülhamid}, İstanbul: Homer, 2006, pp. 170-74.
as the third secretary in the embassy to St. Petersburg and then serving as the second secretary and the first secretary in the embassy to Paris, besides his services in the ministry in Istanbul (a total of twenty years before reaching the rank of ambassador). Mahmud Esad Bey was first appointed as ambassador to Vienna in 1877 and then subsequently as ambassador to Paris in 1880. He also served as the ministerial undersecretary for one year in 1879. By the 1880s, the Ottoman ambassadors were predominantly career diplomats who had begun their service as third secretaries in the 1850s. Furthermore, it was the Hamidian era in which appointments and promotions created career paths, which became regularized and standardized. New recruits were to be appointed as third secretaries and promoted in time. After they were promoted to the rank of first secretary, many served in the embassies to Balkan capitals as ambassadors or undersecretaries before they were appointed as ambassadors to the capitals of Western Europe. In short, in the Hamidian era, Ottoman representatives of the higher and lower echelons were predominantly professional diplomats who had risen within the ministry (with the exception of some military appointments to various ambassadorial posts).

The presence/representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was remarkably high in the senates of both the first and the second constitutional periods, demonstrating the prestige and distinguished place of the ministry. It is not possible to make a table and a comparative analysis of the senators due to the lack of stable career patterns for the Ottoman bureaucrats, especially with regard to the Senate of 1877. The names of those who rose up from the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be appointed to the Senate in 1877 were Musurus Pasha, Ahmed Arifi Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, Ali Rıza Bey, Kostaki Antopoulos Pasha, and Server Pasha, not counting a few others who served in diplomatic posts briefly. A typical career pattern for a member of the Senate of 1877 required an earlier appointment in the Şuray-ı Devlet (Council of State). For their lack of domestic experience, the diplomats were rarely appointed to the Şuray-ı Devlet and therefore lacked a very crucial stepping stone for promotion to either a seat in the senate or

a position in the cabinet. In that regard, a diplomatic career was not as promising as a career in the military or in the civil administration.

In the early Tanzimat period, the lack of sufficient education and necessary knowledge permitted the diplomatic service to assume a privileged position by holding a monopoly on “Western knowledge”. By the Hamidian era, the development of better communication facilities and access to Western printed materials rendered the privileged knowledge of the earlier decades more accessible.

The Senate convened in 1908 displayed the increasing prominence of the diplomatic service. The career diplomats who began their civil service careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, served only in the ministry, and developed distinct professional socializations and intellectual formations emerged as a group only in the second half of the reign of Abdülhamid II and constituted a sizeable number in the senate of 1908, which was in fact a council of the dignitaries of the Empire. The senators of 1908 with Foreign Ministry backgrounds included Gabriel Noradonkyan, Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Keçeçizade İzzet Fuad, Yusuf Azaryan Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid, Ali Galip Bey and Damad Ferit Pasha, disregarding those who served briefly in diplomatic posts. Several others began their careers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but then moved to other administrative offices at various points such as Dimitri Mavrokordato Bey, Ibrahim Faik Bey, Bohor Efendi and Nail Bey. All these figures were elected not only due to their impressive diplomatic careers but possibly also for their aristocratic genealogies. Almost all of the non-Muslim senators were from well-known (and therefore reliable) families. This was especially true with regard to the Greek senators. Thus, we can argue that the diplomats were acknowledged as constituting one of the most prestigious segments of the state elite (although lacking the political power and prominence normally accompanying this social prestige).

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3.5. Changing International Environment and Changing, Transforming Identities

The Foreign Ministry tried its best to enable the Ottoman state to survive against all odds through its involvement in European diplomacy and its tackling of the delicate and robust matters the Empire had to face and resolve. The Ministry had not developed, but had pursued the idea that the Ottomans had to emulate the Westerners in order to survive. From correspondence, we may observe that, bearing the anxiety regarding the (non)future of the Empire in mind, the Ministry had contributed to the crafting of its imperial nationalism not necessarily by referring to a certain ethnicity (Turkishness), but by allegiance to a certain imperial center. In other words, their preoccupation and responsibilities were to create an identity formation. This identity formation was not an ideological preference, but the imposition of a *raison d’etat*. Their structures of loyalty were also formed by their appreciation of the imminent and longer term threats to the Empire, and therefore to themselves, as an examination of the ambassadorial dispatches will reveal in the coming chapters.

A new Ottoman identity had been forged in the 19th century, influenced by modern and medieval European traditions. The Ottoman imperial ideology inherited from the classical ages of the Empire had been redefined and refashioned in interaction with the modern European imperial pageantries and discourses. The synthesis and integration of different traditions created an entirely new Ottoman imagination. Of course, it is senseless to assume that the 19th century Ottoman imagination directly evolved from the earlier Ottoman imperial tradition. On the other hand, it is also important to recognize the critical role of the former Ottoman representations in the forging of the novel 19th century Ottoman imperial symbolism. However, again we need to emphasize that it is the brand new modern framework that utilized the traditional Ottoman representation to propagate the new modern Ottoman imperium. The Ottomans were ready for the modern challenge at least in their politics of imagination.

The content and essence of the new imperial ideology (officialization of Ottomanism by the 1860s) is another subject for debate revolving around the questions of whether there was room for Ottoman universalism; whether the imperial ideology was merely window-dressing for the control of the “sovereign nation”; whether this “sovereign nation” was
comprised of Turks or Muslims. An Ottoman imperial nationalism referring to various and not necessarily contradicting identities had developed in defense against European aggression.

The structures of loyalty of the diplomatic service will be investigated in the coming chapters. Some questions that may be posed are as follows: What were the motivations of the Ministry personnel in fulfilling their duties? Was their supreme loyalty towards the idea of the supra-national Ottoman Empire as believers in a Kaisernatioanalismus or did they nurture a superior loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty without a certain political agenda? What did the imperial family and the sultan mean to the ranks of the Ministry? Was the dynasty a central figure in their conception of the political body they were serving? How did they relate the survival of the Empire with Islam? For them, did the Ottoman Empire represent the realm of Islam and did serving the Ottoman Empire also imply serving religion and God? How secular were their political commitments? Were they “political” in any sense beyond dealing with technicalities and bureaucratic niceties? Did they have a perception of representing Turks, “the sovereign nation” among other Muslim “nations”, the “Muslim nation” being the nation more sovereign than others?552 Although no conclusive or even satisfactory answers will be given to these questions in the coming chapters, some preliminary observations will be made based on the limited evidence available.

The interrelations of Muslim identity (as a political modern construct rather than a personal faith) and imperial-dynastic discourse (based on various legitimizations) will be explored. As has been shown in many places, identity construction is a modern phenomenon and a consequence of modernity. In the Ottoman context, the identity-formation was also directly related to European aggression against the Empire. Modes of identity-formations are strategies to react to the complexities of international, social, and political developments.

The Foreign Ministry’s crucial efforts were directed towards incorporating the Ottomans into Europe proper. This was presumably a foundational motive in the construction of loyalties and ideological commitments in the diplomatic service. Instead of

being relegated to the collapsed nations/states, the Ottoman Empire had to be elevated to the league of European powers. The international situation was such that there was no third option. It was a zero sum game in which the Ottomans will lose everything or will be victorious in the end, victorious in the sense that the Empire will be stabilized and saved from collapse.

The founding diplomatic strategy of Tanzimat was persistently to seek an alignment with the “West” (England and France against the Russians) and a strict adherence to the “order party”. This “French-British” connection was the basis of what had been labeled as “reformism”. Being in alliance with the French-British bloc, the Ottomans were influenced by the “French way”. “To gain internal strength and external legitimacy (in the eyes of France, the symbol of progress), the Empire must modernize itself.” However, the Ottomans knew that these alignments were not between two equal parties but between states at two different levels. It was not up to the Ottomans, but up to the British to decide the future of the alliance. As is well known, the British decided to loosen the ties between the two states after observing the devastation of the Ottomans against the marching Russian army in 1877-1878. By then, the British realized that it seemed unsustainable to bet on the protection of the Ottoman Empire against the Russians. Britain gravitated to new alternative diplomatic policies and took Egypt as its new defensive border in the south against Russian aggression. Britain assumed the control of Cyprus (and subsequently Egypt) to sustain its new policy. By the 1880s, Abdülhamid was obliged to turn to Germany for a new partnership, a new move in his game of survival. The new partnership was not between two equal parties, either. The Ottomans were placing yet another bet on their survival. These diplomatic and strategic shifts and moves were influential in the redefinition of ideological fronts as well. The three modes of international alignments of the Ottomans (in the Tanzimat, in the Hamidian era, in the Unionist rule) were accompanied by three modes of modernizations and ideological dispositions.

In such an environment, the self-representation of Ottomans became ambivalent. It was up to the Ottoman Empire itself to survive. These circumstances enforced Abdülhamid to fabricate an imperial grandeur. Although on the one hand, the very fear of being annihilated was pervasive, on the other hand, a certain pride in belonging to the pompous Ottoman imperial body was entertained to counter and avoid the fear. These two motivations were not necessarily contradictory. On the contrary, they complemented each other. The fiction of “grandeur” magnified the obsession with being annihilated, and the fear of collapse motivated the construction of a fictitious grandeur in response.555

Abdülhamid strove to create an aura around himself. He personalized the Empire in himself. The traditional Ottoman self-representation was married to the 19th century modern European imagination and reached its zenith in the Hamidian era. In short, the Ottomans did not fail to present themselves as another prestigious and well-respected Empire.556 The limits of persuasion were yet another matter. The Hamidian Empire was in a sense the era of the “invention of Empire”.557

“Empire” is one of the latest “fads” of historiography and social sciences. While “Empire” used to be a specialty of a small circle of historians until recently not highly regarded by others, the retreat of nation-states in the 1990s has made “Empire” an


attractive theme to study. Yet, Bernard Porter, one of the oldest scholars of “Empire” and one of the foremost “imperial historians” of the British Empire, criticizes the new, booming interest in “studying Empire” arguing that the “imperial rhetoric” was restricted to the ruling aristocratic class, and hence it would be inappropriate to discover the “imperial” elsewhere. Bernard Porter was particularly critical of the studies advanced by Mackenzie which purported to establish that “Empire” was at the center of 19th century British society, politics, and culture. For Porter, “Empire” was a class-related phenomenon and ideology. Therefore, one must not be thrilled with the attraction of “Empire”. Nevertheless, the discovery of the Empire opened new horizons challenging the conventions of “modern historical scholarship” which was mesmerized by the modern-nation-states and tacitly took the premises of the modern nation-states for granted.

Impressed by these new horizons, Fujitani, a prominent historian of 19th century Japan, writes; “In this respect, I consider myself to be among a number of scholars of the so-called emperor system who have begun in various ways to critique the view long espoused by Japanese Marxists of the koza school, as well as modernists such as Maruyama Masao, that treated the prominence of the monarchy in modern history as a reflection of and reason for the incompleteness of Japan’s modernity. By resituating the emperor at the center of a modern panoptic regime, as I propose, we see not only that the cults of nation and emperor


were created in relatively modern times, but also that what has been called the emperor system, far from being characterized by its ‘feudal’ characteristics, was central to the production of Japan’s modernity. **561**

Apparently, what Fujitani did with respect to Meiji Japan (and Richard Wortman to imperial Russia**562**) was done by Deringil to the Hamidian Ottoman Empire.**563** The premodern political structures all used mechanisms of legitimizations, but traditional strategies of legitimizations came following the construction and consolidation of political powers rather than vice versa. However, modern political structures should have a “mission” and “meaning” from their very beginning. The political power struggle should never mean a merciless struggle for domination. The modern polities struggle for an ideal. This was the case for Great Britain, France, Russia, and also the 19th century Ottoman Empire. What did the Ottoman Empire mean in the eyes of its reorganizers? Or to formulate the question better, what did the reorganizers want the Ottoman Empire to mean? Furthermore, how much of this pursued ideal had been internalized?

Of course, instead of speaking of the “Empire”, we need to historicize and contextualize the “Empire”. The Tanzimat was the introduction of a totally new and unfamiliar language. With Tanzimat, the self-imagination and self-representation of the Ottoman Empire were recast from the medieval to the “modern”. Whereas the Rescript of Tanzimat in 1839 may be seen within the traditional Ottoman political vocabulary**564**, the Rescript of Reform (İslahat Fermanı) in 1856 marked a drastic shift in taking and endorsing the “modern” and “universalist” (with regard to its subjects) discourse. The

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563 Deringil does not develop his arguments from Fujitani’s book which appeared just two years before the publication of Deringil’s book. Deringil depends on Carol Gluck for his comparison with Japan and was inspired by her analysis of the representation of the Japanese monarchy. See Gluck, Carol, Japan’s Modern Myths, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
spontaneous and necessary alignment of the Ottoman Empire with the European “party of order” was strongly grounded in the Crimean War. The vocabulary and language employed in the Edict of Reform demonstrated the transformative role of the diplomatic alignment of the Ottoman Empire in the previous two decades with regard to political discourse and visions. The Rescript of Reform also symbolized the entrance of the Ottomans to the “European family”, following the wartime alliances with France and Britain and the signing of the Paris Treaty which admitted the Ottomans into the “Concert of Europe”.

The reign of Abdülhamid can be interpreted as the perfection and sophistication of the Tanzimat discourse dressed in authoritarian garb (not unlike the authoritarian discourses of Russian czardom, Prussia, and the European-wide conservative-reactionary monarchism in reaction to the “democratic” currents of the time). It was the zenith of Ottoman imperialism. The Hamidian era may be regarded as the maturation of Tanzimat after its infancy in the 1840s and its adolescence in the 1860s. It was the legal and institutional undertakings in the late 1860s, such as the new codes of Public Education (1869), Provincial Administration (1867), and Citizenship (1869), that set the ground for the Hamidian autocratic institutionalization. At the same time, the Hamidian regime was the foundational stage in the emergence of the Republic, not only in the microcosm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in the entirety of Ottoman statecraft. This was not only true in an institutional context. The men who had been educated and recruited to the state service in this reign would establish the Republic and constitute its bureaucratic and political elites.

For an impressive study on how the Ottomans used symbolism to deepen the temporary military alliance with the countries of Order in the Crimean War, see Eldem, Edhem, İftihar ve İmîtyaz: Osmanlı Nişan ve Madalyaları Tarihi, İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2004. The book shows the very strong urge of the Ottomans to present themselves as a respectable European Empire equal to the others. For the earliest observation of such symbolism back in the reign of Selim III, see Berktay, Halîl & Artan, Tülay, “Selimian Times: A Reforming Grand Admiral, anxieties of re-possession, Changing Rites of Power”, in The Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain, Elizabeth Zachariadou (ed.), Crete University Press, 2002, pp. 7-45.

As has been tried to be established, international developments were at the center of changing and transforming Ottoman identities, cultural and intellectual formations, and the structures of mentality of the Ottoman bureaucratic establishment. Therefore, the Ottoman diplomatic service was at the hub of these shifts, formations, and transformations. In this foundational stage, the identity formation of diplomats was constituted by three complementary dynamics, one primarily “political”, the second “structural”, and the last primarily “socio-cultural”. The first one was the encounter with external actors ranging from Düvel-i Muazzama (Great Powers) to Armenian, Albanian, Arab dissidents, and from the social and cultural habituses of Europe to various political networks of Turcophile and Turcophile tendencies. The second dynamic was international politics, entanglements, and rivalries. The last was their social culturalizations and social backgrounds which influenced and determined their reactions and perceptions in encountering political developments. In fact, it was the intersection of these three dynamics that led to the formation of a certain identity and cultural/ideological/mental formation. Moreover, the Hamidian regime’s official views and stances (with the legacy of the Tanzimat in the background) had shaped their political, social, and cultural dispositions. Therefore, the international entanglements and encounters were constitutive in the intellectual formation of the Ottoman state elite in general and Ottoman diplomats in particular.

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For a recent collection of articles in tribute to Norman Itzkowitz with a particular emphasis on “identity formation” in the Ottoman Empire, see Barbir, Karl & Tezcan, Baki (ed.), *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007.
CHAPTER IV

A SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

4.1. The Service Aristocracy: Who Were The Diplomats?

The 19th-century Ottoman bureaucracy was a habitus with regard to its mores, internal codes of conduct, socialization and attitudes, and it also lacked Weberian structure. The visits of Ahmed Îhsan in his travels have already been mentioned. When two sons of Hayrullah Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid and Nasuhi arrived in Paris in their teens to study at the Ottoman School and Saint-Cyr, respectively, they immediately went to the embassy. The ambassador, Cemil Pasha, welcomed them at the embassy. Abdülhak Hamid, who claimed to be the first Ottoman child ever in Paris, visited the embassy daily throughout his stay in Paris and was entertained by the ambassador. The child Abdülhak Hamid also became friends with the scribes Artin, who was to become Artin Dadyan Pasha, and Esad, who became Esad Pasha, the first career diplomat to be appointed as ambassador (first in Vienna, then in Paris). He also met Edhempașazade Hamdi, the future Osman Hamdi Bey, who also happened to regularly visit the embassy while studying law in Paris. When their father, Hayrullah Efendi, arrived in Paris, he also immediately visited the embassy. During his stay in Paris, he frequented the embassy regularly. We may observe that, the ambassadorial staff performed their daily routines in line with the habitus in which they

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569 Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, pp. 33-34.
571 Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, pp. 44-45.
operated and from which they had been recruited in the first instance.\textsuperscript{572} Apparently, Ottoman embassies, besides attending to their professional obligations and preoccupations, served as the hub of an Ottoman network and an “Ottoman club” where Ottomans belonging to the same social class met, socialized, and asked for help when necessary.\textsuperscript{573}

Ahmet İhsan, in his travels to Europe, visits the Ottoman embassy as soon as he arrives at a certain capital city. In his travel account, which was one of the earliest of the genre of Ottoman/Turkish touristic guides, he found worth mentioning to describe the physical aspects and qualities of the Ottoman embassies in the cities he visited as one of the most important information regarding the cities. His socialization and the intimate relations he nurtured with the staff in the embassies are instructive. For example, desperate to check if the new issue of his journal Servet-i Fünun was printed and in circulation, he obtained a copy of the latest issue of his journal from Rifat Bey, the military attaché in the Berlin embassy.\textsuperscript{574} In Rome, Mahmut Nedim Bey awakened from his sleep to welcome Ahmet İhsan and hired the carriage of the embassy for Ahmet İhsan to wander in the city\textsuperscript{575}. Ahmet İhsan found and befriended Katibyan Efendi in London, a new graduate of the school of engineering and a secretary in the embassy, who was a nephew of Hayik, a friend of Ahmet İhsan’s from his high school, and they wandered around in the city together.\textsuperscript{576} Ahmet İhsan met and befriended many Ottoman university students working as secretaries in the Ottoman embassies.\textsuperscript{577} Reading Servet-i Fünun and other journals, and socializing

\textsuperscript{572} The term “habitus,” as first used by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, is defined as, “…the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus.” Bourdieu, Pierre, \textit{Outline of a Theory of Practice}, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{573} For example, see Abdülhak Hamid, ibid., pp. 356-57; Ahmet İhsan, ibid., pp. 432-33.

\textsuperscript{574} Ahmet İhsan, \textit{Avrupa’da Ne Gördüm ?} İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2007, p. 315.

\textsuperscript{575} Ahmet İhsan, ibid, pp. 432-33.

\textsuperscript{576} Ahmet İhsan, ibid, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{577} Alain Servantie, Preface to \textit{Avrupa’da Ne Gördüm}, p. xlviii.
within the same milieu inhabited by the privileged few, we may observe that, Ahmet İhsan and the staff in the embassies shared the same closed world.

One rejected applicant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the future Mehmed Tevfik Bey, later governor, Minister of Finance and President of Şüreay-t Devlet (Council of State). He applied for a position in the Foreign Correspondence Office in the ministry after his graduation from Mülkiye in 1885. Yusuf Ziya Bey (the future Ziya Pasha, the ambassador to Paris and Vienna) was a close friend of young Mehmed Tevfik’s family. Therefore, young Mehmed Tevfik asked the acquaintances of his family to get him a post in the ministry. According to Mehmed Tevfik’s account, Ziya Bey had shown interest in the request of the young Mehmed Tevfik. He asked his brother, Mustafa Reşid Bey (Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs), to arrange Mehmed Tevfik’s employment through Naum Efendi (the future undersecretary of the ministry), then an official in the Foreign Correspondences Office. To his regret, no suitable post was arranged for the young Mehmed Tevfik. Instead, he was assigned to a less prestigious position in the Translation Office. Mehmed Tevfik resigned after three months to move to the Mabeyn (the chancellery of the Ottoman palace). Mehmed Tevfik Bey’s application for employment and his short tenure is yet another demonstration of the intra-elite character of the Ottoman bureaucracy. He was admitted to the ministry not due to his merit but because he was the son of Şirvanlı Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, an educator and a high-ranking bureaucrat who served in various posts related to education (though he was a graduate of Mülkiye and his credentials were superior to any ordinary son of a bureaucrat). Young Mehmed Tevfik was not the only recruit appointed due to family connections. Galip Kemali’s (Söylemezoğlu) employment in the Foreign Ministry was thanks to his father’s post. At the start of Galip’s bureaucratic career, his father was no less than the Head of the Committee of Recruitment (of Civil Servants). Apparently, he secured the appointment of his son to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the office of Tahrirat-t Hariciye. Abdülhak Hamid’s appointment as a scribe to the embassy in Paris was arranged by Ibrahim Bey,


579 Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, Hariciye Hizmerinde Otuz Sene, İstanbul: Şaka Matbaası, 1949, p. 53.
who was a relative of Abdülhak Hamid and son-in-law of Raşid Pasha, the foreign minister at the time.\textsuperscript{580} Given that Abdülhak Hamid came from a prominent family and had many family connections, all his appointments were made due to personal requests and some of his undesired appointments were annulled thanks to his connections.\textsuperscript{581} Young Mehmet Murad (yet to be Mizancı Murad) was appointed to an office (kalem) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thanks to the patronage of Midhat Pasha.\textsuperscript{582} After arranging the appointment of his younger brother Receb as an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Tevfik Bey (Pasha) thanked the sultan in a rather submissive tone rearticulating his obedience and allegiance to the sultan.\textsuperscript{583}

In the pre-modern perception, this was the most reasonable and anticipated recruitment pattern. It was yet to be dubbed as nepotism in a culture in which oral communication was as reliable as, if not more so than, the written word. This was far from a bureaucratic culture of individualism and meritocracy. This was seen as the most reliable method for recruitment in a culture of orality before the culture of the text. It was the usual way of conduct in a system of references in which genealogies and family reputations were taken as more substantial credentials and references than personal achievements and competences. This was viable not only because there was no regularized official procedure of recruitment, but also because the recruitment pool was small and those who were within the circle knew each other, if not personally, at least by name. The recruitment pool would grow after the number of graduates of imperial colleges increased exponentially and class/social origins of the officials changed and became diversified. Recruitment patterns would become considerably regularized and formalized after the 1908 Revolution and after the purge (tensikat) of officials on a grand scale. In fact, as argued previously, the “myth of

\textsuperscript{580} Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, pp. 99-101.

\textsuperscript{581} Abdülhak Hamid… pp. 213-14, p. 321.

\textsuperscript{582} Emil, Birol, \textit{Mizancı Murad Bey}, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1979, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{583} BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 19/6, 1311 C 19.
the bureaucracy” in its rigid Weberian definition was hardly applicable to the 19th century European bureaucracies as well where patronage reigned.\footnote{For example for the patronage in the British navy in its transition to a bureaucratic institution, see Dandeker, Christopher, “Patronage and Bureaucratic Control--The Case of the Naval Officer in English Society 1780-1850”, \textit{The British Journal of Sociology}, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 1978), pp. 300-320}

Nevertheless, efforts to transform the bureaucracy were attempted in the Western European polities at an earlier stage. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853’s Ottoman counterpart\footnote{For the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and reforms based on this report in Britain, see Dreyfus, Françoise, \textit{Bürokrasinin İcadı}, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007. In Britain, France and the United States, a dispassionate Weberian bureaucracy appeared only in the second half of the nineteenth century, when it began to be institutionalized, albeit partially and slowly. It was only in the 20th century when a modern bureaucracy based on strict procedures and formality, and on merit instead of recommendations was institutionalized.} was to be undertaken in the Ottoman Empire only after the 1908 Revolution. The reaction to the bureaucratic machine of the Hamidian era and concerns with reform and modernization of the bureaucracy became one of the most pressing issues of the early Second Constitution Era.\footnote{For the political debates and reforms, see Tural, Erkan, \textit{Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi: II Meşrutiyet Dönemi’nde Bürokratlar, İtihatçılar ve Parlamentler}, Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 2009.} Hüseyin Cahid Bey was an outspoken critic of the Hamidian bureaucracy.\footnote{ibid., pp. 76-78, 96.} For him, the inefficient bureaucracy was a product of the degenerate \textit{ancien régime} (\textit{devr-i sabık}) and was completely corrupt and self-interested. What he (and all the other reformers) proposed was recruitment based only on merit measured by objective and standardized examinations and promotions again based on merit measured by strict criteria. “Examination” became a magical word/concept in the writings of Hüseyin Cahid Bey and other political opinion leaders, as well as in the eyes of the parliamentarians.

The Hamidian bureaucracy can be characterized as a closed world in which personal relations were of primary importance. This was more evident in the highest echelons of the bureaucracy, where social exclusion and elitism survived after its dissolution in lower echelons of the bureaucracy. This culture was most manifest in the diplomatic service given that it was one of the most elite governmental offices. The end of the Hamidian
regime widened the pool of recruitment and weakened the intimate nature of the bureaucracy. However, the dispassionate Weberian bureaucracy never replaced the Hamidian bureaucracy. No such duality existed. This culture of bureaucracy was considerably modified but continued to reproduce itself.

Michael Herzfeld argues in his study on bureaucracy that “the family provides an easily understood model for the loyalty and collective responsibility that citizens must feel towards the state.”588 He also argues that; “(t)here is no such thing as an autonomous state except in the hands of those who create and execute its ostensibly self-supporting teleology…To recover accountability, we should not simply revert to the Weberian ideal type of the legal-rational bureaucratic state. We should instead ask who makes each decision on the basis of ‘the law.’ Restoring time and individuality to our analyses –the recognition of human agency- is the only viable defense against the reification of bureaucratic authority.589” For the late Ottoman bureaucracy, and especially for the diplomatic service, where the staff was recruited from a small and intimate social milieu, Herzfeld’s suggestions are particularly applicable. The perceptions of the state by the bureaucrats and their self-perceptions were to be understood within the metaphor of the “family.” This perception maintained a loyalty to the “intimate state” and developed a “group identity” imagined and forged around the familiarized state. Thus, the state was not an entity above the clouds to be subordinated. It was the perceptions and self-perceptions of the members of this group that had constituted and developed the idea of the state, which was transcendentalized only to serve more personal goals and aspirations. The rhetoric of submissiveness and rhetorical obedience to the sultan, which was one of the hallmarks of this imperial culture, was also a manifestation of this familiarization process. For example, the thank you letters of Yusuf Ziya Bey for his appointment as ambassador to Vienna and the thank you letter of Mahmud Nedim Bey for his appointment as ambassador to Rome display the extent of level of submissiveness to the sultan.590 However, this

589 Herzfeld, Michael, ibid., pp. 156-57.
590 Mahmud Nedim Bey writes the sultan: “velinimet-i bi- minnetimiz padişahımız şevketmeab efendimiz hazretlerinin sadik bir abd-i memluk ve ahkârları olmaktan başka
alliance of obedience was less referring to submissiveness to authority than reiteration of adherence to a certain community (family) which was legitimized and upheld by a culture of hierarchy. The sultan was perceived as the pivot that enabled the maintenance of this habitus. The relationship established with the sultan and the symbolism employed in addressing the sultan was reminiscent of intra-family relations.

Despite the somehow aristocratic character of late Ottoman diplomatic service, the Hamidian diplomats were not financially secure. On the contrary, in their missions abroad, many suffered from financial problems arising from the financial difficulties the Empire was facing. Complaints to the sultan for the non-payment of the salaries of the ambassadorial staff abounded.\(^\text{591}\) The embassies were not financially supported adequately enough to be able to pay their routine daily and professional expenditures.\(^\text{592}\) The second military attaché of the embassy to St. Petersburg complained that he had been paid one salary for the preceding seven and a half months.\(^\text{593}\) It was not only the average officials who complained about unpaid salaries. Şerif Pasha, the ambassador to Stockholm and son of Kürd Said Pasha requested his back salary to be paid\(^\text{594}\). Tevfik Pasha, while he was ambassador to Berlin in 1899 asked for his back salary from previous years to be paid\(^\text{595}\). After eight years (in 1907), he reiterated his request asking the palace either to pay his unpaid salary or to remove him from his post.\(^\text{596}\) Izzet Pasha, the ambassador to Madrid and son of Fuad Pasha requested a loan from the treasury to be repaid by cuts in his future payment.


\(^\text{592}\) BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 40/83, 1320 Ra. 30; 44/31, 1321 Ş. 2.

\(^\text{593}\) BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 35/101, 1318 Ra. 15.

\(^\text{594}\) BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 42/63, 1321 M. 8.

\(^\text{595}\) BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 28/46, 1315 C. 29.

\(^\text{596}\) BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 47/75, 1323 Ra. 26.
salar. Mustafa Reşid Pasha, while serving as ambassador to Rome complained of the financial burden caused by his unpaid salary and expenditures. Apparently, only those who were able to bear such financial burdens could be diplomats, not unlike the European diplomatic services. Although many diplomats suffered financial burdens abroad, they enjoyed a privileged life in Istanbul and, more importantly, shared a culture of their own. More importantly, the social capital and prestige they entertained was more valuable and preferable than material wealth in a world where many benefits were enjoyed not based on cash but based on reputation and social respectability.

The annal of the Foreign Ministry published in 1889 (1306) provides us an opportunity to view the social portrait of the Ministry (as of 1889). A list of the officials of the Ministry is presented with information on the occupation of their fathers, their birthplaces, and the offices they held. Although three other annals of the Ministry were published during the Hamidian era, the best and most comprehensive information is provided in this annal. Only the data in this annal is suitable to prepare a statistical observation although the rich data on the social background of the officials in the other three annals are also employed throughout this chapter. This survey of the middle and lower cadres of the ministry illustrates clearly that Hamidian diplomats were predominantly scions of state officials and members of this semi-closed world. The ranks of the fathers of the diplomats vary significantly. The sons of grand viziers, governors, and ministers worked together with the sons of minor officials. These minor officials whose sons became diplomats predominantly worked in offices in the capital rather than in the provinces. For example, of the 35 Muslims who were employed in the ministry working in Istanbul as of 1889 and who are listed in the annals of the ministry, only eight were not born in Istanbul. Of these eight, only three of them were sons of provincial officials. That is, of the 27 officials who were

597 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 48/42, 1323 L. 15.
598 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 28/23, 1315 C. 1.
599 Carter Findley develops a much more sophisticated social portrait of the Ministry from the early Tanzimat to the demise of the Empire based on the Sicil-i Ahval (Personal Registers). With regard to the social origins of the Muslims and non-Muslims, many of the conclusions suggested below had been already made by Carter Findley based on his findings and counts. Findley, Carter, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
sons of officials, only three of them were born outside Istanbul. The others not from
Istanbul were fathered by **ulema** (2), local notables (2) and merchants (1). In short, a
typical official in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was raised in Istanbul in the
family of a state official. Some also had grandfathers who were state officials that had been
recruited in the very early phase of Tanzimat. Of all the officials of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs counted (a total of 152) and listed in the annals of the ministry for the year 1889⁶⁰⁰
including the consulates, only 28 were born outside Istanbul. However, some were born
outside Istanbul while their fathers were serving in the provinces – for example, the
magisterial Sadullah Pasha, who was born in Erzurum while his father was serving as the
governor of Kurdistan. Therefore, not all of those born out of Istanbul can be regarded as
recruits from the provinces. Of these 28, some others were sons of minor provincial
officials and three were sons of provincial **ulema**. Two of the Muslim officials were born
out of the domains of the Ottoman Empire: one in Anapa in Crimea, the other in Circassia.
The map of the births of the Muslim and non-Muslim officials does not display any
meaningful variation. The Arab lands, Macedonia, and Anatolia seem to be equally
represented. The only meaningful variation observed in the geographical distribution of
their births is the prevalence of Istanbul as a birthplace.

In the yearbook of the ministry printed in 1889, brief personal information for the 152
officials was provided.⁶⁰¹ Of these, 98 were Muslims. The remaining 54 were non-
Muslims. Of these 54 non-Muslim officials, 25 were Armenians. The number of Greeks
working in the ministry was 15. The remaining 14 non-Muslims were Catholic/Orthodox
Arab, Jewish, Bulgarian, or European⁶⁰². Of the Muslims, 73 were scions of state officials
of varying ranks. Of the non-Muslims, 29 were scions of non-state official fathers. Only 14


⁶⁰² One Bulgarian (Aleko Vogoridi Pasha) served as Ottoman ambassador (to Vienna)
between 1876 to 1877. Although no Jew served as an Ottoman ambassador, the son of a
Jewish convert to Islam became an Ottoman ambassador. Several Europeans and Arab
Christians also served as Ottoman ambassadors. However, predominantly, it was
Armenians and Greeks that rose to prominent posts in the diplomatic service. See
of the non-Muslims were the children of state officials. The remaining six had fathers with a nationality other than Ottoman.

We observe an upward mobility within the generations. For example, Irfan, the senior secretary of the London embassy was the son of an official in Directorate of Forestry in the province of Selanik. Although the prestigious posts of “full ambassadorships”[ambassadors to Berlin, London, St. Petersburg, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Teheran were “full ambassadors” (büyük elçi) whereas ambassadors to capitals such as Athens, Belgrade, Washington, Den Haag were “orta elçi”s (middle ambassadors)] were predominantly restricted to the scions of dignitaries and families of high-ranking bureaucrats, there were also exceptions. For example, Mahmud Esad Pasha, the ambassador to Paris, was the son of a minor ulema in Izmir. Mahmud Esad Pasha owed his impressive rise in the civil service to his enrollment in the Ottoman School in Paris. He joined the Bab-ı Ali Translation Office after his graduation from the Ottoman School. He was posted to the embassy in St. Petersburg after his years in the Translation Office from where he was promoted regularly every five years before he was appointed as the ambassador to France in 1885.

Others did not enjoy such upward mobility. Several scions of sadr-ı azams, ministers, and generals were assigned modest positions and most held on to mediocre offices before their retirements. Even though they lived prosperous lives thanks to their backgrounds, they could not transfer their financial and familiar assets into ranks and offices. In that sense, Ottoman statecraft differed from the 19th-century British statecraft, the aristocratic nation par excellence, or Prussian statecraft, where the integration of the aristocracy and the bureaucratic estate (Beamtenstand) privileged the aristocrats. It has to be noted that the scions of Ottoman dignitaries comprised a considerable portion of the diplomatic corps. This was most visible in the posts of full ambassadorships. Full ambassadors of the Hamidian era, such as Sadullah Pasha, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, Yanko Fotiyadi Pasha, Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Salih Münir Pasha, Ahmed Arifi Pasha, and Musurus Pasha, were all men of

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Aristocratic and illustrious backgrounds. Apparently, the ministry was a prestigious office where the sons of Ottoman dignitaries hastened to draft their sons.

Abdülhâmit Kırmızı’s survey of the social origins of the governors is to some extent compatible with the findings presented above on the social origins of the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the ministry’s four annals. Kırmızı also finds that the sons of officials made up a high percentage of governors. Sons of local notables and dynasties, *ulema*, and merchants comprised the remaining office-holders. However, it is remarkable that the percentage of governors descended from state officials is significantly smaller in comparison to diplomats. The most likely reason for this difference might be attributed to the necessity of having sufficient fluency in French to serve in the ministry, which consequently privileged the sons of state officials who had greater access to French learning. The officials’ sons were more likely to be enrolled in the prestigious schools where they could master the French language. Furthermore, they grew up and were socialized in environments where one was more prone to French learning. Moreover, their being raised in an environment where one could develop a more cosmopolitan cultural formation and be more prone to acquire knowledge relevant to the diplomatic service should have favored the sons of officials. However, as suggested above, Kırmızı’s survey and the findings provided here indicate the predominance of the sons of officials in the state bureaucracy, which produced a distinct cultural intimacy closed to outsiders. The outsiders had to endorse the specific codes of conduct to be fully admitted and assimilated into this cultural and social world.

Some recruiting might have served to prove the loyalty of the *âyân* dynasties to the state. It can be observed that numerous scions of local dynasties were recruited to the Ottoman diplomatic service. This phenomenon probably indicates a strategy by the local elites to integrate their descendants and family into the state. The early Tanzimat-era witnessed the destruction of the power bases of many local dynasties in the course of the policy of centralization. The devastation of the local dynasties was followed by their

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605 For the biographies and social origins of the Hamidian ambassadors as of 1889, see *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (1306/1889), pp. 530-560.

displacement and resettlement in Istanbul, or exile to distant localities. This process was to some extent semi-voluntary in the sense that the local dynasties, once they accepted their new status, were granted attractive opportunities in the capital and welcomed. Given the pros and cons, many members of these dynasties “collaborated.” The Bedirxans, Karaosmanoğlu,607 Menemencioglu608 and Çapanzades609 raised the new generations of their families in the modern schools of Istanbul and in a few in Europe, and gave their best sons to the service of the state.

The transition and interconnectedness between the local notables and the state was a phenomenon that existed before the advent of the Tanzimat, especially in the post-classical centuries as the provincial elites consolidated their power in their localities. The delicate balance and mutual recognition between the Istanbul and local power holders was the backbone of the Ottoman control of Anatolian and Roumelian lands in the post-classical Ottoman Empire. The center and the provincial elites were in a relationship consisting of bargain and compromise rather than a clash and zero-sum game.610 Nevertheless, the âyan did not bother getting their sons recruited into the central administration, but rather trained them to rule over their own land and possessions. The center was not yet attractive enough. The pull and push factors were not sufficiently strong. As the center increased its relative

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607 Yuzo Nagata notes that “after the negative impact of the centralization policies of Mahmud II, the Karaosmanoğlu family… tried to retain its influence over the region by taking offices in the government.” Nagata, Yuzo, Tarihte Ayanlık: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerinde Bir İnceleme, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, p.191. One cannot neglect to recall that one descendant of the Karaosmanoğlu family was a “reluctant diplomat.” After the failure to retain their influence over their homelands and after moving to Izmir and Istanbul, the descendants of the Karaosmanoğlu family had made impressive governmental (and later civil) careers.

608 For the destruction of the Menemencioglu family’s powerhouse, narrated by a contemporary member of the family, see Menemencioglu Ahmed Bey, Menemencioglu Tarihi, Ankara: Ağaçğ, 1997 (ed. Yılmaz Kurt)

609 Ahmed Şakir Pasha, the ambassador to St. Petersburg between 1878 and 1889, was a descendant of the Çapanzade family. Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), p. 533.

(as well as absolute) power vis-à-vis the provincial elites, this relationship evolved into one of submission and obedience. This did not, however, mean that this obedience was necessarily disadvantageous to the submissive provincial elites as long as they benefited from the new opportunities offered to them. As Nagata noted, the âyan were not annihilated in the reign of Mahmud II. On the contrary, they survived, rehabilitated themselves, and assumed power within the Tanzimat local administrations. ⁶¹¹ Those whose local powerhouses were uprooted sought other lucrative and desirable options. They found means to adapt to the changing circumstances, albeit not under favorable conditions. “By 1820, the center had asserted its control over all of Anatolia and Eastern Rumelia although occasional clashes with lesser notables persisted for a time. Those notables who adjusted to the new reality of a strong and assertive center continued to wield economic power well into the twentieth century.” ⁶¹²

4.2. Assimilating and Integrating the Local Aristocracies: Periphery Marries the Center

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we encounter several descendants of Babans and other Kurdish tribal leaders, Turcoman chieftains, local Albanian dynasties, and Crimean aristocrats from the family of the Crimean khans ⁶¹³. The recruitment of the Circassian tribal chiefs should be regarded as a distinct sub-category. Although many descendants of the Circassian tribal leaders (for obvious reasons) were recruited into the Ottoman military

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⁶¹³ Apart from the reputable Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, the prime minister, the foreign minister, and the ambassador to Berlin and London, Hüseyin Saadet, an official in the Ministry of Foreign Ministry who died at a young age in 1901, and Ali Seyyid Bey were also members of the family of the Crimean khate (Girays). Çankaya, Ali, ibid, vol. III, p. 305. Ahmed Tevfik Paşa was described by Esat Cemal in his memoirs as “Türk oğlu Türk” probably due to his impeccable (ethnic) credentials as a member of the Crimean khate (who were, in fact, descended from Genghis Khan). Paker, Esat Cemal, *Siyasi Tarihимızde Kirk Yıllık Hariciye Hataları*, Hilmi Yayınevi, 1952, p. 47.
after fine educations, we encounter only one descendant of a Circassian tribal leader, Mehmed Şemseddin Bey, within the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

One of the most established figures in the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a local dynastic background was Numan Menemencioğlu. His father, Rifat, was a high-ranking bureaucrat who served as the governor of Baghdad, Minister of Finance, and President of the Senate, and he married the daughter of Namık Kemal, thus integrating himself into the culturally exclusive world of the Istanbuliot bureaucracy. His son, Numan entered the Ottoman diplomatic service in 1914 as the third secretary at the embassy in Vienna. He graduated from Saint-Joseph Lycée before studying law at the University of Lausanne. In other words, he followed the smooth path of a son from a well-to-do family and enjoyed the comfortable life of an aristocrat. Looking at him more closely, Numan Menemencioğlu defies categorizations. From a family of local Turcoman notables in Cilicia by birth, his kin were well assimilated into the Ottoman aristocracy; he, himself, served as a loyal servant of the Republic in Ankara. His father’s marriage to the daughter of Namık Kemal, who belonged to a family of the state aristocracy, and therefore acquiring from these family backgrounds different social and political values, further complicates the social background of Numan Menemencioğlu. Beginning his career in the Empire and being the most important person in the conduct of foreign affairs in the late 1930s and early 1940s of the Republic, he embodied the multifacetedness of the late Ottoman

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bureaucracy. Numan’s brother, Edhem Menemencioğlu, born in 1878, had a career in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1906 to 1927 and briefly served as ministerial undersecretariat in 1916. Edhem Menemencioğlu, who taught courses on international law, private international law, and diplomacy at the School for Civil Service (Mülkiye) after his departure from the ministry, had an impressive career. Turgut Menemencioğlu, the nephew of Numan, was also a high-ranking bureaucrat of the Republic, and held the posts of ambassador to the United Nations and to Washington. In short, the Menemencioglu family illustrates the path of a 19th-century provincial family joining the imperial bureaucracy from the periphery and surviving in the 20th-century Republican bureaucracy.

Another provincial dynasty, the Baban family, was also represented in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kürd Said Pasha served as the ambassador to Berlin between 1883 and 1885, in addition to his eleven-year tenure as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. His son, the famous Şerif Pasha, who claimed to represent the Kurds after the Armistice of Mondros in 1918, entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after serving as a military officer. Another member of the family who advanced in his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Halil Halid Bey, who also served as the ambassador to Belgrade and Teheran. The father and son Babanzades (and Halil Halid) may be seen as exemplifying an apparent case of the assimilation of the periphery into the center. The father, Kürd Said Pasha, was born in his hometown of Suleymaniye (present day Iraqi Kurdistan) in 1849. His birth was just two

617 Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, who worked with Edhem, the brother of Numan, for one year in the embassy in Bucharest, sees these brothers as some of the last representatives of the old-style diplomat - aristocratic, cultivated, exceptionally well-educated, and well-mannered. For Söylemezoğlu, the diplomatic service’s quality deteriorated drastically after World War I (what he actually meant was after the proclamation of the Republic) because of the employment of youths lacking respectable origins, manners, and sophistication. See Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, Hariciye Hizmetinde Kırk Sene, Şaka Matbaası, 1949, pp. 285-86.


years after the destruction of the independence/autonomy of the Baban emirate.\footnote{For the Tanzimat’s destruction of the Kurdish emirates, see Öozoğlu, Hakan, \textit{Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State}, New York: State University of New York Press, 2004, pp. 59-68.} He was raised in Istanbul, where his family had to resettle. After graduating from \textit{Mekteb-i Sultani}, he entered state service in the Translation Office. He was employed in a variety of posts in different governmental offices before he got his appointment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (and subsequently as the ambassador to Berlin). His son received a better education. Following his graduation from the \textit{Mekteb-i Sultani}, he enrolled in the prestigious Saint-Cyr Military Academy in Paris. He was appointed as the military attaché in Brussels and subsequently in Paris. He was appointed as the second secretary in the embassy to Paris before his appointment as the ambassador to Stockholm. He was married to Emine Hanım, the granddaughter of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha. His liberal politics in opposition to the Unionists and his conversion to Kurdish nationalism after his decades-long aristocratic/imperial leanings reflects the permeable nature of identities and dispositions.

The Babans were a good illustration of the refashioning of an aristocratic family, uprooted from its own soil, but having accommodated to the new opportunities and benefits of the centralized Empire. Many members of the Babanzades became prominent Ottoman bureaucrats, and with the emergence of an autonomous public space, leading Ottoman/Turkish intellectuals, ideologues, etc. They were also leading early Kurdish nationalists.\footnote{For a list and general view of the members of the Babanzade family in the late Ottoman and Turkish world, see Alakom, Ruha, \textit{Şerif Paşa: Bir Kürt Diplomatinin Fırtınalı Yılları}, İstanbul: Avesta, 1998, pp. 16-20.} The process by which Şerif Pasha, the loyal Ottoman diplomat, became a Kurdish nationalist seeking an independent Kurdistan is representative of the complexities and permeabilities of the “ideologies” of the time. The contribution of Babans both to the emergence of a Kurdish nationalism and to the Ottoman imperial grandeur simultaneously was not a contradiction. These were strategies of the members of the grand families of yesterday, who were trying to determine the best way to survive and to preserve and foster
their power in transforming circumstances. The varieties of the strategies employed by different individuals, and even the strategies employed by these certain individuals in the different phases of their lives, may differ but the concerns behind these strategies are the same. One intelligent strategy was to be incorporated into the imperium and be a part of the imperium, if not a major stakeholder in it. Moreover, such a course was welcomed and even encouraged by the state. Thus, we observe the emergence of a new state elite with aristocratic backgrounds assimilated into the service of the state. This process was not unlike the “stick and carrot tactics” of the French absolutist monarchs in gathering the French aristocrats at Versailles.

The maneuvers of Şerif Pasha, the recruitment of the members of notable Kurdish families into the Ottoman state, and the generation of Kurdish nationalism by other family members posed no contradiction. At a time when identities were not forged and fixed, oscillations and shifting loyalties were to be expected. In the absence of identity politics, the primary concerns of these actors were adaptation to the new circumstances at an optimum level. They may prefer “exit,” “loyalty”, or “voice” at a given time and then switch to another option at a later time when their interests were best served by that option.

In fact, there was no strict separation between local dynasties and the Istanbul aristocracy. In a way, Tanzimat may be interpreted as the gradual move of local notables to Istanbul. The greater families’ accession to the center was more spectacular and came about later. Nevertheless, most of the first-generation Tanzimat statesmen were scions of


623 Abdülhamid Kırmızı’s list of governors displays the presence of the descendants of the local dynasties of Kurdish, Turcoman, Albanian and Anatolian/Roumelian Turkish origin as well as the scions of Daghestani aristocrats. Kırmızı, Abdülhamid… p. 69.


local notable families who had previously opted to move to the center. Aristocratic families of Istanbul such as the Samıpaşazades were all recent newcomers to Istanbul who had left their Roumelian homelands not long before. As pointed out earlier in the study, such grand names of Tanzimat as Fuad Pasha, Münif Pasha, Midhad Pasha, and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha can be seen in this light. They were all descendants of small notables and ulema in the provinces. One difference between them was the voluntary accession of the early recruits who had a smaller stake, less glory, and less prestige to lose by leaving their homelands; therefore, opportunities and posts in Istanbul were more attractive and adventurous for them. This contrasted with those who were forced to accommodate the new realities as their last change.

The background of Mustafa Reşid Pasha (not to be confused with the “Great” (Koca) Mustafa Reşid Pasha for whom he was named), the last of the Ottoman foreign ministers and ambassador to Bucharest, Rome, and Vienna, nicely reflects the move, adaptation, and promotion of a local notable family. The Müftüzades were an Evlad-i Fatihan (Descendants of the Conquerors) family and the holders of the office of the mufti of Ioannina (present-day northwestern Greece). The office belonged to the family, and sons replaced fathers. The family’s respectability did not originate from the ownership of land, but, not unsurprisingly, the family owned vast lands that enabled them to live prosperously when they moved to Istanbul. Due to the family’s religious titles and indirect affiliation with the state, the adaptation to the changing circumstances was not easy. After Mahmud II abolished the practice of hereditary succession to Roumelian mufti offices, the family moved to Istanbul to seek more attractive prospects. Şakir Mehmed Bey became a protégé

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626 Apart from various names mentioned throughout this study, some examples from local dynasties and prominent families are Yusuf Kamil Pasha (İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnan, Son Sadrazamlar, Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982, p. 196) Hüseyin Avni Pasha (İbnülemin..., p. 483), Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha (Rifat Uçarol, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa, Istanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1989, p. 7). (Istanbul or local) Ulema were another source for the recruitment of the Tanzimat statesmen. Some were the sons of alim, such as Münif Pasha (Budak, Ali, Münif Pasha, Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2004, p. 4) or were from prominent local ulema families, such as Fuad Pasha (İbnülemin..., Ibid., p. 149) and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (Fatma Aliye Hanım, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve Zamani, Istanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1332, p. 7). Apparently, a significant portion of the Tanzimat elite were fathered by prominent servants of the state like Mustafa Reşid Pasha (Sicil-i Osmanî, p. 1384), Mehmed Emin Pasha (İbnülemin...ibid., p. 83), Mahmud Nedim Pasha (Pakalın, Mehmet Zeki, Mahmud Nedim Paşa, Istanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1940, p. 1).
of Mustafa Reşid Pasha (hence the name given to his son) and advanced in his career, serving as the head of the State Financial Council (Meclis-i Maliye). Both of his sons graduated from the Mekteb-i Sultani. Being thus eligible for admission to the ministry, they began their careers in diplomacy, and both subsequently became ambassadors. Thus, the Müftüzades constitute an example of the identified pattern in three generations. Like the Müftüzades, many sons of other families with notable backgrounds that had settled in Istanbul entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Two more examples of this pattern are Mahmud Hamdi Bey, the Head of the Personnel Registers (Sicil-i Ahval) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose origins went back to a dynasty in Nevrekob (present-day Goce Delcev, in southwestern Bulgaria) and Mehmed Nuri Bey, who was an official in the same department in the ministry and whose origins went back to a local dynasty in Serres (present-day northeastern Greece). The other sons of these dynasties were apparently distributed to the other governmental offices (kalems) and constituted a significant portion of the late Ottoman bureaucracy. The old house of the Köprülühs was also represented in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Ahmed Ziya Bey, who was the grandfather of the historian Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, and who served as the ambassador to Bucharest between 1885 and 1888. The Keçecizades, after Keçecizade İzzet Molla and his son Fuad Pasha, secured posts for many of their sons in various governmental offices, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the late Tanzimat period. The Samıpaşažades, a family of religious scholars from the Peloponnesus, emerged as another distinguished family after Abdurrahman Sami Pasha had to settle in Istanbul after Greek independence and a sojourn


628 Also, for the career of Enis Bey (Akeygen), who had a similar socio-economic background, began his career in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1901, served as the undersecretary of the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1927 and 1929, and retired in 1945, see Tuğla, Enis, Atatürk, Venizelos ve Bir Diplomat: Enis Bey, İstanbul: Simurg, 2003. He belonged to a reputable family in Plovdiv that owned sizeable lands and possessions before the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. After the war, the family’s fortunes waned and it lost its possessions. A number of its members died, and the rest had to move to Istanbul, where they joined the ranks of the Ottoman central bureaucracy.

in Egypt in the service of Mehmed Ali.⁶³⁰ The mansion of Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha, the son of Abdurrahman Sami Pasha’s son, became a meeting place of the secluded Tanzimat elite where intellectual, literary, and cultural exchanges took place and networks of patronages developed.⁶³¹ Two of his brothers, Sezai and Necib (and one of his grandsons, Resmi⁶³²), became diplomats. One of the prominent families of the Tanzimat elite, its members displayed the unity and divergence of the ideological orientations of the sons of the Tanzimat. The family had one prominent Young Ottoman (Ayetullah Bey), one early novelist (Sezai), and one prominent Turkist, first as a Unionist and then as a Kemalist (Hamdullah Suphi). Abdurrahman Sami Pasha was the Minister of Public Education of Mustafa Reşid Pasha in the years between 1857 and 1861. His son Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha served as the Minister of Public Education for Abdülhamid (1876-1878). Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha’s son, Abdurrahman Sami Pasha’s grandson, Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) was the Minister of National Education of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (1920-1, 1925).⁶³³ He was later appointed as ambassador to Bucharest as a de facto exile after the abolition of Turkish Hearths and its incorporation into the RPP as People’s Houses, over which he presided.⁶³⁴ The Söylemezoğlus were another local family of notables from Kığı (present-day eastern Turkey) that obtained positions for many of its members in governmental offices. These included İbrahim Edhem Pervet and Galip Kemali, who got posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶³⁵

Another example of the shifting and changing loyalties and identities reminiscent of the political trajectory of Şerif Pasha was the flight of Abdürrezzak Bedirxan. Beginning his

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⁶³⁰ For the origins of the SamiPashazade family, see the account of a descendant of the family, Kocamemi, Fazıl Bülent, *Bir Türk Ailesinin 450 Yılık Öyküsü*, İstanbul: Ötüken, 2005. Also see İbnül Emin Mahmud Kemal, *Son Asır Türk Şairleri*, 1969, pp. 1649-50.


⁶³² Abdülhak Hamid… p. 277.


⁶³⁴ Üstel, Füsun… p. 61.

⁶³⁵ Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, ibid, p. 7.
career in the diplomatic service, he served as the third secretary in St. Petersburg and then in Tehran. While he was serving in Russia, he became acquainted with many Russians and developed connections. He then left the diplomatic service and took refuge in Russia to pursue pro-Kurdish activities. Later, he was pardoned by the Ottoman state but exiled and subsequently executed during the World War I. Loyalties were not mutually exclusive. Abidin Pasha, one of the Foreign Ministers of Abdülhamid was at the same time a sympathizer of the Albanian League and, according to a European observer, was alarmed by the territorial demands of Greeks during his tenure due to his Albanian background and instincts. Turhan Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to St. Petersburg (and ex-ambassador to Rome and Madrid) left the diplomatic service to be the prime minister of the newly founded independent Albania. Another Albanian diplomat who not only served as ambassador to Sofia and Bucharest but also served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1920 and 1921, Abdüllatif Safa Bey, was a member of the local Albanian dynasty of the Frasheri family and was the nephew of Şemsettin Sami and Naim Frasheri, one of the pioneers of Albanian nationalism. The Albanian identities and Ottoman/imperial identities and loyalties did not contradict each other. They may have complemented one

636 BOA, Y.PRK.UM, 30/97, 27 R 1312; BOA, HR.SYS 32/26, 7 July 1895; Celile Celil, Kürt Aydınlanması, Avesta, 2001, p. 102.
640 For the multiple identities of Şemseddin Sami Frasheri, the influential Albanian/Ottoman intellectual, see Bilmez, Bülent Can, “Şemsettin Sami mi Yazdı Bu ‘Sakıncalı’ Kitabı?,” Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar, Spring 2005, no: 1, p. 141. As Bilmez demonstrates, Şemsettin Sami Frasheri writes and acts as an Albanian and Turkish nationalist simultaneously, and this multiplicity does not pose any contradiction. For the complexities of the transition from Ottomanism to Arabism of Satı al-Husri, see Cleveland, William L, The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Satı-al Husri, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. For the Albanian
another in specific cases, given that the Albanian League was originally founded in 1878 by Albanians who wanted to defend their Albanian lands from Christian ambitions in reaction to moves by Christian Slavs and Greeks. Notable Druze families contributed to the Ottoman diplomatic establishment, too. Muhammad Arslan, a distant cousin of Shakib Arslan, served in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Osman Adil Bey, the son of Hamdi Bey, the Dönme mayor of Salonika and a member of one of the leading and influential Yakubi Dönme families served in the legal department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a time when Dönmes increasingly began to join the imperial governmental offices. In short, many non-Turkish Muslim recruits of the ministry manifested overlapping loyalties and identities. In that regard, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was more inclusive than the German Foreign Office, where Catholics were significantly underrepresented and the very few Jews were discriminated against, and more inclusive than even the British Foreign Office, where non-conformists, Jews, and Scotsmen were “conspicuously absent.” Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that notables from various ethnicities were united in one aspect. The fact that non-Turkish Muslims (not unlike their ethnic Turkish colleagues) came predominantly from high class origins also arguably demonstrates the limits of inclusion, not only with regard to non-


642 For a memoirs demonstrating the compatibility of Albanian and Ottoman identities, see Avlonyalı Süreyya Bey, Osmanlı Sonrası Arnava tuluk (1912-1920), İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2009.


645 Cecil, Lamar, ibid., p. 96.

646 Steiner, Zara, ibid., p. 19.
Turks but also with regard to Turks. Their social prominence, aristocratic backgrounds, and respectability (and education in the same imperial colleges for the forthcoming generations) were the common denominators. Thus, these newcomers to the state machine were welcomed with due respect for their heritages and social respectabilities. Ethnicity may have divided them, but their social backgrounds united them as long as this commonality remained compelling and rewarding.

Assimilation and integration of the peripheral elites is analogous to a marriage, where the center was the groom and the peripheral elites were the bride. Apparently, this was a strategy of the center, partially derived from conventional Ottoman practices and partially from the practicalities of the nascent modern state. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid developed a special concern to contact, co-opt and incorporate the peripheral elites, a practice that would deteriorate after the end of the Hamidian regime.\textsuperscript{647}

4.3. Non-Muslims

Different from the Muslim officials, non-Muslims working in the Ministry of Foreign Ministers were the scions of merchants and financiers, as well as officials. The considerable number of Armenians whose fathers were sarrafs is also telling. Of the 25 Armenians employed in the ministry as of 1889, six of them were the children of sarrafs. Their efforts to get their sons recruited into the civil service reflect the interrelation between the state and its financiers and the efforts of the financiers to integrate their family into the state. In this closed world, the state was the main benefactor, and people wanted to get close to it. The high level of recruitment highlights the possible connections and networks between the state and the sarrafs. The tendency for the sarrafs to have their sons and descendents recruited into the positions within the state makes one think that this intimate connection between the sarrafs and the state is one that cannot simply be reduced to material interests.

Two prominent (almost legendary) Armenians of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were both descendants of subcontractors to the palace and indirectly servants of the palace.

\textsuperscript{647} See also Akpınar, Alişan & Rogan, Eugene, \textit{Aşiret, Mektep, Devlet}, İstanbul: Aram Yayınları, 2001.
Gabriel Noradonkyan was the son of Krikor Noradonkyan, the chief supplier of bread to the military. Artin Dadyan was from a family of barutçubaşı, his grandfather Arakel Dadyan being the last appointed barutçubaşı in the reign of Mahmud II. The Manas family, many of whose sons were recruited into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, served as the palace painters from the 17th century to the early 19th century. The traditional Ottoman governmental subcontracting practices given to Armenian artisan families as hereditary family businesses enabled their descendants living in the age of the market to reestablish their affiliation with the Ottoman state in the changing environment at a time when personalized subcontracting practices were no longer tenable and when the Ottoman state was undergoing reorganization and eliminating its personalized attributes in favor of a depersonalized modern state. In such circumstances, the new form of incorporation into the state consisted of the recruitment of its members as (prominent) state officials. Ironically, family businesses and “special relations” between the Armenian amira class and the state continued in modified form. The premodern mode of relations was adapted into the modern practices of a bureaucratic state. The mode of relation had changed but the beneficiaries of the old practices survived. Whereas previously the privileged non-Muslim families were incorporated into the state through indirect and semi-official mechanisms, with Tanzimat they formally became part of the state. The continuity within change is striking in the case of the adaptation of the relation between “state Armenians” and the state. The relations between the Greek Phanariot families and the Sublime Porte also became more formalized several decades after the Greek rebellion. Although socio-economic dynamics and conditions formed the backbone of the special relationship between the Sublime Porte and the amira class and Phanariot families, it was formed at a very personal level. One example of the integration and persistence of personal ties with the state and its transformation into adherence to the state was the recruitment of the two


sons of Mavroyeni Bey, the personal doctor of Abdülhamid, into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although Yanko pursued a modest career, Aleksander’s impressive career included the post of ambassador to Vienna. In short, the world and fortunes of the privileged non-Muslim dignitaries continued to be constructed around the state.

A few non-Muslim dignitaries of the Foreign Ministry were appointed to the Senate in 1908. Excluding Bohor Efendi and Dimitri Mavro Kordota, who had left their diplomatic careers at some point, Manuk Azaryan and Gabriel Noradonkyan were two prominent figures of the ministry. Manuk Azaryan was an erstwhile undersecretary of the ministry in 1909, and Gabriel Noradonkyan was, as mentioned above, the long-time legal counselor of the ministry. In the Senate sessions, they emerged as among the most active members of the Senate. It has to be pointed out that Senate discussions were conducted very differently from parliamentary debates. Whereas there were heated debates in parliament, the Senate was a milieu for the dispassionate and calm exchange of views. Although several different opinions were held and expressed by the senators, all these differences of opinion were discussed calmly, as if these differences of opinion were merely technical matters that were bound to be resolved. In other words, all the members appeared to disregard “politics” and acted as bureaucrats rather than politicians, hence continuing the code of conduct of the Şura-ı Devlet. All the members spoke as responsible non-partisan servants of the imperium whose only concern was its advancement.

Whenever non-Muslim senators discussed matters pertaining to religion, they would routinely point to the tolerance shown by the imperium to Christianity and to Christian


religious sermons reiterating their loyalty and reverence. Azaryan presented the Christian faith as “pertaining to the individuality” “which is protected and secured by the Ottoman Empire” and reiterated that Christianity was one of the three legitimate faiths of the populace of the Empire and the Christian faith’s political significance was limited to the conduction of Christian millets’ communal affairs and Christians were part of the Ottoman political nation. Gabriel Noradonkyan also emerged as the dispassionate technical expert providing expertise in legal and administrative issues and instructing the senators. His speeches were always technical and informative. Azaryan also assessed the issues discussed from the point of view of the imperial interests in a calm and dispassionate tone. Apparently, both of these senators came from the Armenian amira, born in Istanbul to wealthy and respectable families. Therefore, they were natural candidates for appointment as senators. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that they were prominent figures in Armenian communal affairs and, therefore, had representative quality. Azaryan assumed the post of the secular head of the Armenians and was the head of the general assembly of the Armenian community. He was prominent in the Armenian communal affairs run by the Armenian elites of Istanbul and was an opponent of the rural and East Anatolian Armenian revolutionaries and militants.

There is a striking contrast between Greeks and Armenians in terms of their fathers’ occupations. Of the 25 Armenians counted in the 1889 annal of the Ministry, only four had a father serving in the Ottoman state. In contrast, of the 15 Greeks counted, six had a father employed in the civil service. Minor officials in the diplomatic service had Greek fathers who were merchants. These included, for example, Istavriki Kiryagidi, a certain Konstantin, and Azgoridi Nikolaki, whose fathers were Kiryako, Anesti, and Istavriki Ezgoridi from Erdek (on the southern shores of Marmara Sea), respectively. Although two

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653 For the speech of Beserya Efendi, see Meclisi Ayan Zabıt Ceridesi V. I, pp. 669-671. The chairman of the session, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, reiterated the “extensive level of tolerance” Muslims showed to the non-Muslims (p. 671).

654 Meclisi Ayan Zabıt Ceridesi, V. 1, p. 669.


656 For the tension between the conservative amira class, the newly developing “enlightened” middle classes, and the rural radicals, see Panossian, Razmik, The Armenians, London: Hurst & Company, 2006, pp. 148-153.
Greek officials of the ministry, Mihalaki Akselos and Aristidi Akyadis, had fathers who were officials of relatively more humble origins, in general the Greeks who joined the ministry had fathers who were officials of prominence and not minor officials. They belonged to the old Phanariot families\(^657\) or the protégés of the established old Phanariot families (such as Musuruses) who were incorporated into the Ottoman state machine via established Phanariot families. This observation is equally valid for the social origins of prominent Greek bureaucrats and senators as a whole. Logofets, Mavrokordatos, Musuruses, Aristarchis, Karacas (of originally Romanian origin) filled the ranks of holders of Ottoman posts, especially diplomatic posts where they could serve the Ottoman state and their family prospects and reputations simultaneously. Whereas the Greeks of more humble origins were minor officials, the scions of Phanariot families were ambassadors, ambassadorial counselors, or holders of other high-ranking offices. From the Phanariot families, as of 1889, two Mavroyani brothers (Aleksandr and Dimitri), two Karateodori brothers (Etienne and Aleksandr) and the father and son Fotiyadis were in the diplomatic service. One Karaca was the Ottoman ambassador to Stockholm and Den Haag. His father was the ex-ambassador to Den Haag, and the son assumed the office as if it was a right of patrimony after twenty one years. In that regard, these Phanariot families resembled the local dynasties of Turkish, Kurdish, or Albanian origin incorporated into the centralizing state. The role of marriage in this incorporation was as important among the Phanariot families as it was with the Muslim local notable families. The Phanariot families also intermarried and maintained themselves as a closed community and thus retained their privileged status\(^658\).

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\(^658\) Andrianopoulou, Konstantina, ibid, p. 53.
While the Ottoman state gave its due to its loyalist Greek families of repute and dignity, it opened the way to the aspiring young Armenians to be promoted in the Ottoman diplomatic service. Apart from the reputable families, Greeks seemed distant to the Ottoman state. The Greek communities of Anatolia and Macedonia were almost invisible in Istanbul. The background of the Armenian officials examined in the annals discloses a different picture. Armenians from different social and economic backgrounds, with or without any connections to the state, were recruited. The mixed and diverse backgrounds of the Armenian officials show that Armenians were comparably more “integrationist” whereas Greeks remained outside of the Ottoman political and administrative edifice. Of the 15 Greeks serving in the ministry, only one of the officials was born outside Istanbul (Meleka Yanapoulo, the consulate general to Trieste, born in Lesbos) disregarding Ianko Karaca, who was born in Berlin. In contrast, Armenian officials serving in the ministry were born in various peripheral cities such as Aleppo, Edirne, and Izmir. The Armenian modernizing educational infrastructure also spurred an upward mobility for many provincial Armenians to prosper and establish an Armenian intelligentsia residing in Istanbul who could join the Ottoman bureaucracy. Nevertheless, certain Armenian families who were prominent within the Armenian community and had acquired their wealth and prominence due to their connections with the palace and the state, known as the amira, supplied a considerable portion of the officials of the ministry, e.g., Dadyans and Manas as indicated above. Service to the state was also a hereditary family business. Many Armenian diplomats and officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sons of diplomats and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. Ohannes Kuyumcuyan, an

661 For a list of these sons and fathers, see below.
undersecretary of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the son of Bedros Kuyumcuyan, a member of the Şuray-ı Devlet and a protégé of Âli Pasha\(^{662}\).

One striking finding in the annal of 1889\(^{663}\) is that the non-Muslim officials were much more likely to be born in Istanbul than non-Muslim officials. Whereas 25% of the Muslim officials were born outside Istanbul, this was the case for only 12% of non-Muslim officials (excluding non-Muslim officials of foreign origin). The higher percentage of non-Muslims born in Istanbul is yet further evidence of the relationship of the non-Muslims with the state. Although the non-Muslims of the capital tended to join the ranks and worlds of Ottomanism, there were fewer propensities for non-Muslims from the provinces to join the Ottoman ranks and be integrated into the system. It may be argued that the politics of Ottomanism was not free from class relations. Here, we observe the development of a class formation based not only on economic opportunities and economic relations, but also on state and geographical affiliations. “The new-fangled official ideology (Ottomanism-DG) fared well in social strata already benefiting from the Pax Ottomana. Greek Phanariots, members of the Armenian amira class, and Bulgarian merchants who imported garments from Manchester and sold them in Aleppo were the typical enthusiasts of an ideology that promised to remove the social disabilities afflicting non-Muslims. Wider swaths of the Ottoman population, such as Bulgarian peasants who continued to chafe under their Gospodars, or Christian Bosnian and Herzegovinian peasants serving Muslim landowners, derived little benefit from the new ideology.”\(^{664}\) Although recent studies\(^{665}\) have

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\(^{663}\) *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306 /1889)*, pp. 485-630


established that Ottomanism was not marginal within the non-Muslim communities of the Ottoman Empire, it found support predominantly among the elites of these communities. The politics of Ottomanism also enabled these communal elites to dominate their coreligionists. Although these communities had had patriarchal and hierarchical social organizations previously, the new environments of the 19th century intensified the power of the communal elites thanks to the politics of Ottomanism and new ways of communicating with the Ottoman state. The Ottoman state subcontracted the allegiance of its non-Muslim communities to the communal elites. Thus, we observe an overlapping of interests between the Ottoman state and the communal elites. These imperial non-Muslim Ottomans were also the leaders and prominent figures of their respective communities. For example, as indicated above, Azaryan, the undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry and senator, assumed the position of chairman of the Armenian  

cismani meclis (Spiritual Assembly) in 1909 and became the chairman of the Armenian patriarchy’s “secular assembly.” Apparently, “democratization,” enhancing educational opportunities, and vertical mobilization for a larger segment of the communities would not only destroy this patriarchal structure, but also the promises of Ottomanism.667

The Greek Revolution of the 1820s was one of the major causes of the reorganization of the Translation Office. Once the Greeks became suspect and viewed as untrustworthy, new cadres of Muslim origin had to be trained and recruited668. “‘Greeks’ former preponderance as non-Muslims in official and semi-official positions had declined drastically following the Greek Revolution of the 1820s...Greeks had gone into eclipse as officials, so opening the way for the Armenians to become the chief beneficiaries of Tanzimat egalitarianism. Referred to then as the millet-i sadika (faithful people or nation),

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666 For a biography of Azaryan, see Pamukçıyan, Kevork, Biyografleriyle Ermeniler, İstanbul: Aras Yayınları, 2000.


the Armenians retained this prominence until the last quarter of the century, when nationalist conflict disrupted the Ottoman-Armenian relationship... Had the Empire lasted longer, it is interesting to speculate whether Ottoman Jews could have succeeded Armenians as the leading non-Muslim minority in official service, as the Armenians had supplanted the Greeks... It is interesting that the last Translator of the Imperial Divan (Divan-ı Hümayun Tercümanı), a position that Greeks monopolized for over a century until 1821, was a Jew, Davud Efendi."

Findley’s survey Jews constitute the youngest ethnic group in the Ministry of Ottoman Affairs seems to be evidence supportive of this speculation.

Differentiating between the lower echelons of the ministry, the middle ranks and the higher echelons provides further insight into the ethnic makeup of officials. As of 1889, of the 71 officials of the middle and lower ranks serving in Istanbul (those who were paid 5,000 guruses or less a year), 54 were Muslims and 17 were non-Muslims. Of the 54 Muslims, 44 were the sons of state officials of different ranks and positions. Of the 17 non-Muslims, five were the sons of state officials, whereas 12 were sons of merchants or financiers. They were born predominantly in Istanbul.

An examination of the highest ranking officials in the ministry in 1889 as listed in the annal of the Ministry provides similar findings. Of the seven Muslims in posts of major significance, six were sons of state officials. Of the four non-Muslims of equal rank, none were scions of state officials. According to these figures, there is no significant differentiation based on the rank of the posts. The primary distinction was apparently based on the religion of the officials. The social and economical backgrounds of minor and

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670 Findley, Carter, ibid, p. 97.
671 In his memoirs, Abdülhak Hamid points out the contrast between the prevalence of Armenians, especially in the highest echelons of the Foreign Ministry, with the almost total lack of Greeks in the diplomatic service and tacitly questions the loyalty of the Greeks. “For example, Midhat Pasha had one Odyan Efendi, Mahmud Nedim Pasha had one Artin Dadyan Efendi, Safvet Pasha had one Serkis Hamamciyan and Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha had one Noradonkayan Efendi. Why were all the undersecretaries of the prime ministers (foreign ministers-DG) Armenians with the exception of Davut Efendi? Why was there only one Greek beside them? Said Pasha’s undersecretary was Sultan Hamid. That was a different case.” Abdülhak Hamid… p. 357.
prominent officials are similar. This statistic is yet another demonstration of the different modes of social production of social (and economic) capital for Muslims and non-Muslims. Whereas the recruited Muslims came from a considerably small closed group welded around the state, the non-Muslims came from different backgrounds. This demonstrates the diversification of the development of the non-Muslims’ social (and economic) capital, which was more productive than that of the Muslims.

A cursory look at employment within the ministry would reveal that Armenians constituted the intellectual backbone of the ministry.\textsuperscript{672} The legal and technical offices were filled by them. “The special association of the Armenians with the Foreign Correspondences Office went back to its earlier years, when, at the end of the Crimean War, Sahak Abro, an able Armenian official well regarded by the Tanzimat leadership, became head of the Office and—a familiar motif—made of it something like a preserve for people he found congenial, namely, his coreligionists. By the end of the Hamidian period, however… the Office was losing its predominantly Armenian character.”\textsuperscript{673} A comparison of the officials working in the ministry as listed in the annals of 1889 and 1902 shows a slight but consistent decrease in the employment of Armenians.\textsuperscript{674} Muslim youngsters who in the 1890s were learning the skills of writing erudite memorandums in French and developing their capabilities had risen to the high-ranking professional positions of the Ministry. Among them, for example, was the undersecretary of the ministry during the time of the Unionists, Reşad Hikmet Bey.\textsuperscript{675} Another legendary name in the Ministry was

\textsuperscript{672} The stuffing of the Ministry by the Armenians was regretted by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. In the beginning of his Ma’ruzat he wrote, “Reşid Pasha retained the procedures and traditions of Mahmud II. After he was replaced by Ali Pasha, Armenians were promoted and the Foreign Ministry was filled with Armenians. These Armenians gradually eliminated not only the Muslim clerks, but also those Armenians who were loyal to the state, and replaced them with Armenians sharing their views. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was controlled by Armenians.” Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Ma’ruzat, İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980, p.1.

\textsuperscript{673} Findley, Carter, ibid., p. 264.

\textsuperscript{674} For example, compare the staff of the embassy as listed in the yearbook of the ministry in 1320 (1902), where the Armenian presence had considerably deteriorated (pp. 70-100)

\textsuperscript{675} See the account of Esat Cemal (Paker), who joined the Foreign Correspondence Office in 1896 after his graduation from Mekteb-i Sultani, Paker, Esat Cemal, \textit{Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları}, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1952, pp. 8-9. For valuable information, observations,
Ibrahim Hakkı Bey (later pasha), who was appointed as one of the legal counselors of the Ministry. “The appointment of one so young as the government’s counselor on international law aroused surprise. But the appointment had a larger significance, too. For the Empire had until then employed foreign experts in these positions. The simultaneous appointments of İbrahim Hakkı and Gabriel Noradounghian presented Ottomans with exciting proof that the Empire could produce its own experts for this function.” After Ibrahim Hakkı’s long tenure, no Muslim as impressive as Ibrahim Hakkı emerged. The Armenians continued to hold on to the key positions like the legal counsellorship, undersecretariat, and assistantships to these two positions even after the Revolution of 1908, when Turkification had manifested itself. Of the 286 officials of the enlarged ministry listed in the yearbook of the Ottoman Empire for 1906, only 40 were non-Muslim, which indicates a dramatic decline over the years.”

Ohannes Kuyumcuyan retained his position as the undersecretary until he was replaced by Said Bey in 1912 and Hrand Abro, the son of Sahak Abro, continued to serve as the legal counselor. One British report noted that the replacement of the undersecretariat by a Muslim after a long time may render the undersecretariat more influential. The report assesses Ohannes Kuyumcuyan as “possessed of a good knowledge and some knowledge of affairs” but “as under-secretary…timorous and unenterprising.” Said Bey; “as a Moslem he may, perhaps, have a greater share in the counsels of the ministry.”

Reşad Hikmet, the next “Moslem” undersecretary will be a man of respect and a person whose opinions and suggestions are considered by the prime minister and foreign minister. Although the new and younger recruits were significantly Muslim (with some Jewish), the higher offices continued to be held by non-Muslims (and predominantly by Armenians). According to the salname (annal) in 1910 (1326), of the 46 officials holding the highest posts, 35 were Muslims and 11 were non-Muslims. This and insights on the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Söylemezolu, Galip Kemali, Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, İstanbul: Şaka Matbaası, pp. 53-62.

676 Findley, Carter, ibid., pp. 196-7.
677 See Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye (1324) (excerpted in Salname-i Nezaret-i Umur-i Hariciyye (1320/1902), İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 2003, pp. 356-383). In this count, the consulates and consulate officials were not counted.
678 PRO FO, 371/1812, p. 348.

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was a sharp decrease in comparison to twenty years earlier. Two years later, the ratio remained more or less the same. Of the 46 high-ranking officials, 34 were Muslims and 12 were non-Muslims. A sharper decline in the representation of non-Muslims was observed with the advent of the World War. World War I was used by the Unionist leadership as an opportunity to Turkify capital, employment, and any other area. The Turkification in the Ottoman diplomatic service was achieved to a considerable degree. According to the 1918 (1334) annals, of the 52 officials in Turkey, only seven were non-Muslims. These seven non-Muslims were old timers such as Aleko Kasap, Hasun Efendi, and Hrand Abro Bey. No non-Muslim was promoted to a prominent position. Only some professionals were kept in their positions to practice their expertise. The degree of Turkification in the embassies was much more visible. Whereas in 1912, a significant portion of the staff was non-Muslim, in 1918 all the staff in the embassies was Muslim with very few exceptions. Not surprisingly, by 1926, no single non-Muslim remained within the ministry which moved to Ankara.

4.4. Apprenticeship for the Modern

The Ottoman Foreign Ministry also served as a school for men of various interests. The Foreign Ministry was a prestigious office attractive for many fathers. Many caring fathers with good connections directed their sons to the craft of diplomacy. With the profession of diplomacy, these sons attained satisfactory incomes, not to mention relatively light workloads, which enabled them to pursue their personal interests. Arguably the most famous diplomat of the ministry within this category was Abdülhak Hamid, who served in several consulates and embassies, including Paris, Den Haag, and London, and wrote

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681 Salname-i Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye (1334), pp. 185-190.
682 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Salnamesi (1926-1927), pp. 281-300.
literary pieces while serving in the embassies (and enjoying London and Paris). Although he was known to succeeding generations as a poet, a gentleman, and a man of letters, he was a full-time diplomat by occupation. Although, he was known for his disregard of his professional obligations and duties, in his memoirs, he depicted himself as a diligent and committed diplomat.

Others had begun their careers in the Foreign Ministry but left after briefly serving in the diplomatic service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was seen as a prestigious office in which many sons of the high-ranking public servants who turned out to be men of high significance served for a short time (one to three years on average). Predominantly, they served in the Office of Translation to master their French (or in the Office of Correspondence). Short-time officials of the ministry included Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem, Mizancı Murad, İsmail Kemal, Hüseyin Nazım Pasha, Ferit Kam, Babanzade Ahmed Naim, and Avlonyalı Ferit. Mizancı Murad was recruited in the Translation Office at a time when state officials with the proficiency to master diplomatic French were few. Thus, the French fluency he had acquired in the Russian gymnasium was incomparably exceptional. Others were recruited in the ministry at the beginning of their careers. Avlonyalı Ekrem worked in the Legal Department of the Ministry while studying in the Law Faculty. His was a de facto part-time job due to the fact that he was the nephew of Avlonyalı Ferid Pasha.

Another short-term official in the ministry was Halid Ziya (Uşaklıgil). Halid Ziya failed to be recruited to the ministry. This very much disappointed his father, who was highly desirous of such a career path for his son. Halid Ziya’s father had asked two acquaintances, Agop Pasha, the Overseer of the Imperial Treasury, and Mustafa Mansurzade, the Minister of Education, to arrange the recruitment of his son into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Young Halid Ziya went to Istanbul from Izmir with the dream

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683 When Abdülhak Hamid was appointed to a post in the embassy to Belgrade, he was infuriated and, using his connections, he had this appointment abrogated. He “did not want to live in a barn after Paris”, as he wrote in his memoirs. Abdülhak Hamid, ibid., p. 127.


685 For the account of Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey on his service in the ministry, see Avlonyalı Ekrem Bey, Osmanlı Arnavutluk’undan Anılar (1885-1912), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006, p. 99.
of being appointed to the embassy in Paris, the city with which he was fascinated. To his misfortune, just after young Halid Ziya visited Mustafa Mansurzade, Mansurzade was deposed. Agop Pasha, the other acquaintance of Halid Ziya’s father, advised young Halid Ziya not to enter the civil service, but instead to join his family’s business as entering into trade was more beneficial to the interests of the state than serving it as a official. Agop Pasha acknowledged that the state needed competent officials, but he believed that these officials should be recruited not from the families of prominent tradesmen, but from more humble sections of the society. It was more important for the state to have trained people in trade and industry. The Uşakizades were one of the few prominent Muslim merchant families in Izmir among the many Greek, Jewish, and Levantine merchant families. Needless to say, their position was rather precarious, and they experienced daily conflict in the economic, social, and political spheres. Halid Ziya’s short experience in the Directorate of Foreign Affairs combined his concerns as a member of an Izmir merchant family of Turkish origin and a state official. He and his colleagues in the directorate displayed the skepticism of the state officials towards the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire as well as towards the Europeans. Knowing that the local non-Muslim merchants that held the nationality of a foreign country (especially Greece) were privileged before the law, the officials felt as though they were vanguards in the fight to defend Turkishdom (in the economic war) against the bloodsucking non-Muslims. As a member of an Izmir merchant family, Halid Ziya must have had such concerns much more fervently as openly indicated in his memoirs.

Remembering the episode of his failure to be recruited into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Halid Ziya acknowledged that after more than forty years, he was still thrilled to imagine a career path in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving in the embassy in Paris. Nevertheless, he served for a while in Izmir as the assistant to the foreign affairs director. Halid Ziya, the failed diplomat, contrary to the mercantilist advice of Agop Pasha, did not enter into family business, but opted to settle in Istanbul as a man of letters.

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687 Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, ibid., pp. 84-88.
(and serving in various governmental offices to make his living). However, Edhem, the big brother of Halid Ziya, “although graduated from law school in Istanbul,” engaged in the family business in Izmir, disavowing bureaucratic prestige.689

The failed diplomat Halid Ziya brought up his two sons as diplomats. His son, Bülent Uşaklıgil, served in Paris as the Turkish ambassador and died as the ambassador of Turkey to Paris. Apparently, diplomatic service continued to be an occupation desired by the well-off families, especially due to the prestige it provided.

Halid Ziya’s circle included many young men serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The deposition of Mustafa Mansurazade and the illness of his mother may have hindered his prospective career in the diplomatic service, but other youngsters with literary interests were admitted to the ministry and were known for their literary works rather than their deskwork. Besides the “greatest poet,” some personalities who are known to posterity for activities they pursued out of their office were Samipaşazade Sezai, Saffeti Ziya, Reşit Saffet (Atabinen), and Ahmet Hikmet (Müftüoğlu). Serving at the embassy in Paris, the literary capital of the world, was an aspiration most of them shared with young Halid Ziya.690 A small circle of friends from similar backgrounds made up a significant portion of the staff of the ministry, as we can see from the literary recollections of the time. In fact, it was the same pool from which the early men of letters and diplomats were obtained, as established earlier in this study.

These were personalities whose principal life-time contributions, concerns, and preoccupations were irrelevant to their professional work. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs trained the new early 20th-century generation, a function it had had during the early Tanzimat period. This is not because the ministry taught and motivated its staff to be pioneers in various fields. Rather, it had to do with the fact that it was the imperial recruits who had the social and intellectual capital to be entrepreneurs and pioneers in introducing


the aspects of the modern West. They opted for a career in diplomacy principally because it provided them with free time, comfortable lives, income, prestige, and connections. Furthermore, brought up in a particular habitus, they knew no alternatives. Their positions and connections also facilitated the pursuit of alternative careers. It is unsurprising to observe that the diplomatic service contributed to pioneering more than other governmental offices did thanks to its close contacts with the West in general and its cosmopolitan nature. The opportunity they had to be in proximity to the means of communication and exchange of ideas with the West enabled them to import many previously unknown ideas and insights.

The diplomatic service also assisted the emergence and development of the Ottoman/Muslim satire. Cemil Cem, the founder of the satirical journal Cem, served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Being the son of Cemal Pasha, a military doctor, he graduated from law school. After his graduation, he joined the diplomatic service and served in the consulates of Nice and Toulouse before being appointed to more prestigious posts in the embassies to Rome and Paris. He regularly contributed to the satirical journal Kalem while serving in posts in Paris and Vienna between 1908 and 1909. He resigned from the ministry to publish his own satirical journal. He founded Cem in 1910. After his resignation from the government, he never assumed any bureaucratic post except for serving briefly as the Director of the School of Fine Arts. Throughout his life after his resignation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he made his living drawing cartoons and painting, which was unthinkable before 1908.691

Heinzelmann wrote that the first Muslim cartoonists (who emerged only in 1908 after the near monopoly of Armenian cartoonists in the Tanzimat and Hamidian eras) were predominantly ex-officials, civil or military692. Most of them resigned from their posts just

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691 For a short biography of Cemil Cem, see Heinzelmann, Tobias, *Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu 1908-1914*, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, p. 70.

692 For the development of satire and cartoons in the late 19th century Ottoman Empire, predominantly practiced by Armenians and other non-Muslims with some Muslims before the entry of Turkish/Muslim cartoonist in large numbers and launching of popular cartoon journals owned by Turks/Muslims after 1908, see Çeviker, Turgut, *Gelişim Sürecinde Türk Karikatürü*, İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1986; Çeviker, Turgut (ed.), *Terakki Edelim Beyler: Nişan G. Berberyan*, İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1986; Çeviker, Turgut (ed.),
after 1908, believing that it was an opportune time for free expression of their opinions. 1908 may be characterized as a milestone that ensued the development of a non-official sphere, as officials began working in non-state (private) positions or were self-employed. Nevertheless, ironically this was a break with the state only in terms of leaving the civil service. On the other hand, it meant an extension of the official sphere with regard to the emergence of new classes of free professionals maintaining the views and habitus they had acquired and internalized throughout their “education” in state service. Thus, they reproduced and extended a particular state-centric worldview, political cosmology, and cultural/intellectual formation. Therefore, we may suggest that, the Turkish middle class and the free professions emerged and developed in the image (and custodianship) of the state.

Although the Armenian and other non-Muslim printing activity and newspapers were commercially profitable, the Turkish language printing, publishing, and newspapers continued to be predominantly non-commercial or promised only modest profits or commercial value. This rendered the Turkish press a part-time voluntary pursuit of civil servants motivated by political concerns and goals, and not a strictly professional occupation. Thus, Turkish printing and publication retained its character as an extension of the official mind. Nevertheless, with slow but gradual commercialization and capitalization, Turkish printing and publishing became more commercial and more emancipated. It was the civil servants who had moved from governmental offices to private bureaus beginning with Agah Efendi, Şinasi, and Namık Kemal in the 1860s to establish the journalism of the Second Constitutional period. Hence, it was the original state-
funded capital accumulation that had financed the emergence and development of the materially non-profiting printing and publishing sector.

Another transfer to the arts from diplomacy was Burhanettin Tepsi, a pioneer of Turkish theater. Coming from a family of diplomats, he was recruited into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after his graduation from the *Mekteb-i Sultani*. In his daily routine in the ministry, he spent most of his time reading and studying the latest plays of Paris. Thanks to the interference of the *sadr-i azam* Avlonyalı Ferit Pasha, he was sent as envoy to Paris, where he had the opportunity to follow theater and buy the texts of the latest theatrical *oeuvres*. After a few years in the ministry, he resigned to pursue an artistic career abroad.695

Sports also benefited from the contributions of the diplomats. The first Turkish soccer team, the Black Stockings, was founded in 1901 by Mehmed Raşid Bey, a career diplomat, along with Fuad Hüsnü Bey, the son of Admiral Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha. He was elected as the president of the club and assigned as the coach of the first Turkish soccer club in its only match against the local Greek soccer club before the Black Stockings team was closed down by the public authorities and Mehmed Raşid exiled to Iran to serve in the embassy to Teheran.696 Another Ottoman diplomat, Reşid Saffet Atabinen, served as the head of the Turkish Olympic Committee between 1933 and 1936.697

The civil service’s fostering of the arts and humanities was not limited to its recruitment. Most of the first generation of artists, scientists, journalists, and pioneers in the free professions were scions of bureaucrats. The relatively comfortable material opportunities of these families facilitated the emergence of the first generation of the


696 Gökaçtı, Mehmet Ali, “*Bizim İçin Oyna*”: Türkiye’de Futbol ve Siyaset, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008, pp. 26-28. This book (and any other book on the beginnings of Turkish soccer and sports) demonstrates the immense role the sons of high-ranking bureaucrats played in the founding of sports organizations and the promotion of sports.

practitioners of the modern professions. The comparably high incomes of their fathers provided the capital needed for the development of non-productive or at least non-profit endeavors. Simply put, for a non-productive sphere which does not produce any surplus to flourish, an already accumulated capital had to be amassed and transferred. For the non-Muslims, this original capital was provided by finance, commerce, and industry given that most of the pioneers in the arts were the scions of merchants and financiers (resembling the West European pattern). The remuneration provided by the state in the form of “salaries” and other pecuniary rewards served the same function for Muslims.

The networks and patronages developed as important mechanisms for political, literary, and intellectual advancement. Apparently, blood relations and relations based on marriages were also very significant factors in the Tanzimat. A map that demonstrates these relations would be illuminating. Such a map would also display the intertwined character of the families. The Tanzimat elite was not only small and secluded, but also interwoven and integrated. Moreover, the political, intellectual, and literary realms were not distinguishable from each other. They were all intertwined. Thus, it would be interesting to look at the genealogies of the late Ottoman (and early Republican) men of letters. Being men of letters required free time, good educations, and financial support. Therefore, a typical man of letters in the late Ottoman Empire was (and had to be) a scion of a two-generation family of bureaucrats, whether descended from a high-ranking bureaucrat or a low-ranking civil servant.

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698 Young Celal Esad, resisting the pressure exerted on him by his family to seek a military/governmental career, notes that he wanted to live freely, and he knew well that his fortune allowed him to enjoy such a luxury. Arseven, Celal Esad, ibid., p. 44. Later in his memoirs, Arseven remarks that his friend and fellow artist, Nazmi Ziya, also had to face sharp opposition from his family. See, ibid., p. 73.

699 For the social origins of Armenian painters, see Kürkman, Garo, Armenian Painters in the Ottoman Empire, İstanbul: Matusalem Consulting and Publishing, 2004 (2 volumes). Also see the observations made by Celal Esad Arseven regarding non-Muslim artists studying in the Academy of Fine Arts, see Arseven, ibid., p. 50.

700 This is not the place to present a detailed documentation of the men of letters of Tanzimat, but rather to give a brief survey to corroborate the argument made above. See Recai-Zade Mahmud Ekrem’s genealogy see Parlatır, İsmail, Recai-zade Mahmud Ekrem, Ankara: Akçağ, 2004, pp. 13-14. The Recaizade family was originally from Kepsut in Balıkesir. Selim Ağa, Mahmud Ekrem’s grandfather from fifth generation, had moved to
More interestingly, an analysis of the late Ottoman literature will show that late-Ottoman literature was a closed sphere. It was written by the members of a certain community, read by the members of the same community, and narrated the worlds and lives of the members of that community. The characters, the plots, and the themes of these literary works strictly addressed the world of the governing elite. Thus, this literature was unintelligible and incommunicable to the non-members of the governing elite. Given that the readers’ market was predominantly restricted to the members of this habitus and to the aspiring youth emulating this habitus, the wider populace was neglected. The themes and inspirations of the literary works reflected the intellectual upbringing and social milieu of the authors.\footnote{701}

Istanbul and joined the janissaries. Selim Ağa’s son served as a judge. Mehmet Şakir Recai Efendi, Mahmud Ekrem’s father, continued the family’s gradual upward mobility by serving as Takvim-hane Naziri. Mahmud Ekrem was born in 1847 in Recai Efendi Yalısı in Vaniköy as a scion of an established family. As a further note, Mahmud Ekrem began his civil service career in 1862 in the Hariciye Mektubi Kalemi, where he met Namık Kemal and Ayetullah Bey. He continued his civil service career in various posts in the Ministry of Finance and then in the Council of State. A very similar pattern is seen for Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar (see Karaca, Nesrin Tağızade, \textit{Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar’ın Eserlerinde Geçmiş Zaman ve İstanbul}, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1998). His family’s origins went back to Ali Pasha of Tepelen. His great grandfather, Selim Sırrı Pasha, a grandson of Ali Pasha of Tepelen was the last guardian of Belgrade before Belgrade was evacuated. After the evacuation, he moved to Istanbul, where he rose in the central bureaucracy to the position of vizier. His son served as an official in \textit{Tophane-i Amire}. Abdülhak Şinasi was born in his grandfather’s \textit{yalı} (seaside mansion in Bosphorus) in Rumelihisarı as a descendant of an established Istanbul family. Although today he is remembered as a man of letters detached from the colorless actual world and a desperate nostalgic in search of the Ottoman lost time, he made a long career in European firms active in Istanbul. He became a civil servant in 1924 when Regié was taken over by the state, where he was an official. Interestingly, he left his beloved Istanbul and moved to Ankara to serve as the Secretary of the Balkan League. He was appointed as a legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1931. He worked in the preparation of the Montreaux Protocol. He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1945. He published well-known novels and books, such as \textit{Fahim Bey ve Biz} (1941), \textit{Boğazıçi Mehtapları} (1942) and \textit{Çamlica’daki Eniştemiz} (1944) while he was a civil servant in the Foreign Ministry. \textit{Fahim Bey ve Biz} is the story of a young recruit of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry and is a parody of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry.

\footnote{701} This observation is applicable to all the first generations of Ottoman novelists. When Nabızade Nazım penned a novel (or a long story) in which the setting was a remote village of Antalya, he did an extraordinary job of describing an environment in which his readers were uninterested and with which they were unfamiliar. Reşat Nuri Güntekin, who with his novels illustrates the unbroken continuity from the Empire to the Republic, perfectly recounts the life of clerks in their offices and in their daily lives. Güntekin depicts this
 Needless to say, the decisions of young men to seek artistic careers were not well received by their disappointed parents, who had anticipated seeing their sons as high ranking imperial bureaucrats or officers, and not despicable artists, as we can observe in the memoirs. In contrast to Europe (and non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire and Istanbul), where capital had been amassed from commerce and industry, in the Ottoman Empire the state became the main supplier of the capital for the emergence of an autonomous sphere for the fine arts and the humanities. This support was not limited to financial resources. The state also provided the intellectual capital through the training it provided in the imperial high schools and colleges. These scions of the civil service who opted for the fine arts and literature also received their training in schools established to train civil servants. It is no coincidence that the Military Academy produced the pioneers of the fine arts. Technical skills taught as a part of the military and engineering curriculum enabled many youth to encounter the fine arts for the first time. Şeker Ahmed Pasha, Halil Pasha, Hüseyin Zekai Pasha, Hoca Ali Rıza and Celal Esad (Arseven) are some examples (and pioneers of Turkish painting) of individuals who had been recruited into the fine arts while in the Military Academy.

Şeker Ahmed, who may be regarded as the first Ottoman painter in the Western sense, made his way to study art in Paris thanks to his education in the Military Academy, where he learned painting for the first time. He made his career in the military for more than thirty years and was paid as a civil servant, in contrast to the free-lance artists who depended on the sales of their work for an income.

In the fine arts, the first generation of artists was composed of, almost without exception, the scions of civil servants, and particularly high-ranking ones. One exception was the theatre, where the bulk of the early performers had been recruited from traditional

unique habitus of the officialdom brilliantly as an insider. What is also so striking in Güntekin’s novels is the lack of almost any difference from the Empire to the Republic as his clerks continued their routines. In his novels, their habitus remains uninterrupted.

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702 See Arseven, Celal Esad, ibid., p. 43.


704 Due to the necessity of being trained technically and the necessity of having the privilege to be able to observe the contemporary works to develop aesthetics, the pioneers of Turkish painting predominantly had aristocratic backgrounds. To give the best-known example, for the aristocratic origins of Abidin Dino, see Abidin Dino: Bir Dünya, İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi Sakıp Sabancı Müzesi, 2007.
street theater; in other words, it was it was performed by self-made people of lower class origins. A few of the early men of letters came from mediocre origins in contrast to the pioneers in the fine arts who came predominantly from families with civil service backgrounds. This was due to the fact that it did not require expensive and time-consuming training unlike the costly and extensive training required for the fine arts.

The late Ottoman pattern to an important extent resembles pre-revolutionary Russia. “(T)he Russian imperial bureaucratic elite was very much a part of the highly cultured world of pre-revolutionary-educated society. In no field was that more true than in that of music. A.S.Taneev was the first cousin of Serge Taneev and a close friend of P.I. Tchaikovsky. The latter was educated alongside future members of the State Council, at the School of Law, just as N.V. Rimsky-Korsakov and Mussorgsky, along with Serge Rachmaninov, himself a good friend of Nicholas II’s brother Mikhail, all came from families of the Russian landowning gentry.” Lieven remarks that the Russian traditional upper class’ “contribution in the fields of literature and music was far more impressive than those of any of their European peers.” This is hardly unexpected given the social, economic and political organization of Russian society and the state. The same observation is equally true for the Ottoman social, political, and economic organization. 

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705 For the emergence of modern Ottoman theater, its Armenian pioneers, and Muslim latecomers, see And, Metin, *Osmanlı Tiyatrosu*, Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1999.


707 ibid., p. 206.

708 Some examples of the scions of state officials of the Ottoman Empire played pioneering role in the development of Western music in Turkey are as follows: Cemal Reşit was the son of Ahmed Reşid; Sadeddin Arel was the scion of a family of high-ranking ulema including his grandfather, Mehmed Emin Efendi, who served as the kazaker. His father was a religious scholar and a member of the committee that prepared the 1876 Constitution. (Öztuna, Yılmaz, *Türk Musikisi Ansiklopedisi*, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1970, pp. 45-46.) Ulvi Cemal Erkin was the son of Mehmed Cemil, a high-ranking bureaucrat. (Say, Ahmet, *Türkiye’nin Müzik Atlası*, İstanbul: Borusan Kültür ve Sanat Yayınları, 1998, p. 61). Adnan Saygun came from a notable provincial family from Nevşehir known as Fişekçizadeler for their family business of producing fireworks. His father was incorporated to the state and modern professional life by becoming mathematics teacher and settling in İzmir. (Arabacı, Emre, *Ahmed Adnan Saygun*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007, p. 37). The aforementioned Samipaşazade family contributed to the
we do not observe a similar pattern in countries such as Britain, Germany and France, where bourgeoning middle classes were the driving force of “modernity” and the promoters of newly developing cultural habitus. It was predominantly the sons of middle classes who were the pioneers in the arts and sciences. In these countries, the aristocratic elites were pushed into the bureaucratic world and left the spheres that had developed independence from the state to the middle class, which was intellectually more adept and more comfortable with modernity. Therefore, the roles of the elites in these countries were to retain and reproduce spheres of power for themselves, but not to invest power in the future. Likewise, the spheres independent of the state were the dynamic forces shaping the future of these nations in contrast to the Russian and Ottoman/Turkish cases, where the state was the chief initiator and harbinger of modernity and the modern professions.

With regard to the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the fine arts, the example of Muhsin Ertuğrul, the pioneer of Turkish cinema, who was the son of Hüseyin Hüsni Bey, a cashier of the ministry can be given. Definitely, Nazım Hikmet, whose father Hikmet Bey worked in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as the Ottoman consul in Hamburg, can be regarded as the most “spectacular” scion of an Ottoman diplomat. Sedad Hakkı Eldem, one of the foremost 20th century Turkish architects, was the grandson of Grand Vizier Edhem İbrahim Paşa, a descendant of a late Ottoman aristocratic family, and the son of İsmail Hakkı Alişan, who as an official served in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry from 1891 to his retirement in 1925. The Ertegün brothers, the Turkish-American music executives, were the sons of Münir Ertegün, the emergence of contemporary music in Turkey. Erdem Buri, a pioneering jazz musician, was a member of the Samipasazade family (Kocamemi, Fazıl Bülent, ibid., pp. 172-74).


712 Çankaya, Ali, ibid, p. 410. Sedad Hakki Eldem’s brother, Sadi Eldem, also became a Republican ambassador and retired from his ambassadorial post in Teheran in 1975.
ambassador of Turkey to United States (between 1934 and 1944), who began his career in the Ottoman diplomatic service in 1908 just before the Revolution of 1908 and advanced in his career due to his impressive legal expertise.\textsuperscript{713}

Gendering the theme, not unsurprisingly, the same pattern is much more evident in the case of the recruitment of females into the modern professions. If providing a good education for sons requires a certain level of prosperity, it is much more so for the education of daughters. It is, obviously almost impossible for a woman of modest upbringing to enter the arts and the modern professions. Thus, early feminists and pioneering women in different fields were all the daughters of civil servants. Moreover, they were predominantly the daughters of high-ranking bureaucrats and men of prominence.\textsuperscript{714}

It is also very significant to note that, for a long time, Ottoman Muslim medical doctors were civil (or predominantly military) servants rather than free professionals. Although medical doctors of non-Muslims origins had been practicing their professions independently, in the case of medical doctors of Muslim origins, it was the official positions where the first medical doctors proved and improved themselves. A similar observation is valid for the law and lawyers. Muslims learned the intricacies of modern law in governmental offices. The many legal offices of the state established in the Hamidian era to apply modern Western laws and to regulate the commercial laws prepared Muslim graduates of law faculties to train themselves to be lawyers after gaining experience in these offices. The professors of the first universities and high schools of the Ottoman

\textsuperscript{713} For Münir Ertegün, see Harris, George S, “Cementing Turkish-American Relations: The Ambassadorship of (Mehmet) Münir Ertegün (1934-1944)”, in Harris, George S. & Criss, Nur Bilge, Studies in Atatürk’s Turkey: The American Dimension, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009, pp. 177-196. Harris writes; “thanks to his sons, the Turkish Embassy took the lead in desegregating the capital, hosting black musicians at a time when Marian Anderson was unable to perform at Constitution Hall in Washington because she was black.” Harris, ibid, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{714} A glance at the contributors to the Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete reveals this aspect. The contributors include the daughter (Fatma Aliye and Emine Semiye) and granddaughter (Zeyneb) of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Abdülhak Hamid’s daughter (Hamide), the granddaughter of Ahmed Vefik Pasha (Fatma Fahrünnisa), the daughter of Osman Pasha, and the head of the Military School (Sair Nigar bint-i Osman). Çakır, Serpil, Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1994, p. 32.
Empire were also predominantly comprised of ex-officials and scions of officials and thus academic studies and natural and social sciences were also initiated and advanced by this caste, arguably in line with the epistemological premises held by this caste. Thus, the free professions of law and medicine and academia developed as apprenticeships with the state.\textsuperscript{715}

Thus, we can argue that the state became the bedrock for free professionals such as medical doctors,\textsuperscript{716} lawyers, engineers, pharmacists, and academicians.\textsuperscript{717} It provided not only the primitive accumulation of capital for the development of the free professions among Muslims but also, due to the origins of the pioneers of these professions, it exported the particular cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations welded around it.\textsuperscript{718}

4.5. Merry Marriages

\textsuperscript{715} For the emergence of the legal profession in relation to the predominant role of the state, see Demirel, Fatmagül, \textit{Adliye Nezaretinin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (1876-1914)}, unpublished dissertation, Istanbul University, 2003, pp. 225-231.


Marriages serve a purpose in the establishment and consolidation of elites and elite cohesion. Before the advent of the “love marriage,” marriage was an institution of social exchange. Daughters and prospective wives were assets to be employed efficiently\textsuperscript{719}. Marriages were to provide financial means, connections, and entitlement for the father of the bride (the owner of the asset) and the groom (purchaser of the asset), and both parties would try to maximize their profit by making optimal choices\textsuperscript{720}. One of the functions of marriage was the integration of the holders of the financial means into holders of titles of social prestige and political power. This was due to the contradictory political/economical environment of early modern Europe in an age of capitalist accumulation when the economically powerful lacked the means to transfer their financial power into real power and the economically vulnerable held political means. Marriages also provided the means through which those who wanted to be incorporated into a certain caste could circumvent their lack of blue blood lineages.

A prevalent pattern of marriage (especially observable in early modern Europe), in which both parties were satisfied with the conclusion of the marriage, consisted of an arrangement between a son of a socially aspiring and ascending family and a daughter of a socially deteriorating family that was superior in social prestige, but inferior in actual terms. This pattern of marriage was exercised extensively in ancien régime France, where the aristocracy tried to slow its decline, and the bourgeoisie wanted to be ennobled\textsuperscript{721}. Nevertheless, in stable economic, social, and political environments, the “normal” practice of aristocratic marriage was endogamy, sons of nobles marrying daughters of nobles.

\textsuperscript{719} Before modernity, as the Lasletts argue, the household was the basic and principal economic unit. Thus, marriage regulated the economies of households. See Laslett, Barbara, \textit{Household and Family in Past Time}, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1972; Laslett, Peter, \textit{The World We Have Lost}, London: Methuen, 1965.


Ottoman upper-class marriage patterns had changed from a certain mode of marriage in which the marriage was perceived as simply a man’s taking a woman to maintain his lineage to a mode of marriage in which the bride was an asset providing benefits both for her father and for the groom. In the Classical Ottoman Age, a man of prominence was to marry a modest bride or a freed concubine. This pattern avoided the development of aristocratic lineages. This mode of marriage was also compatible with the household structuring of the Ottoman polity in which the patriarch of the household was the sole authority and the intactness of the households was to be maintained as long as allegiance was owed to a single authority. Not unexpectedly, intimate life was the sphere where the influence of Westernization and modernization had a very slow and gradual impact. Old marriage patterns, which had persisted for a generation after the Tanzimat, were replaced by a new marriage pattern in which marriages were arranged between the scions of two equal or compatible families. The marriage connections of Abdülhak Molla’s family and Ahmed Tevfik’s daughters’ marriages, which will be discussed below, are just two prominent examples of this trend. Curiously, although Abdülhak Molla had married a woman of respectable descent, his son, Hayrullah Efendi, married a concubine. Likewise, Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha was married to a woman of slave origin. Nevertheless, these were the last and (partially exceptional) examples in the new era of Tanzimat. Tanzimat grandees such as Ahmed Midhat Efendi, Abdülhak Hamid, and İbrahim Hakkı were among the last sons born to Circassian concubines. Concubinage was seen by the new generation as a barbaric anachronism to be eliminated and replaced by affectionate marriage. As the

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722 For the classical study investigating the family lives and perceptions of the modernizing Ottoman urban middle-class sons of the Tanzimat, see Parla, Jale, Babalar ve Oğullar, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993. For a depiction of the family life of Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha, see Melek Hanım, Haremden Mahrem Hatıralar, İstanbul: Öğlak Yayınları, 2003.

723 Of his three children, the first married a sultan from the palace, the second, a daughter of a diplomat colleague (and granddaughter of Sadullah Pasha), and the third, the son of Memduh Pasha, himself the son of Abdülhamid’s long-time minister of the interior. See Okday, Şefik, ibid.


725 One of the most reputable criticisms of the institution of slavery and concubinage was leveled by Samipaşazade Sezai in his novel “Şergüzeşt” published in 1888 while he was
structures of political legitimacy and the organization of the political order were transformed, marriage patterns changed along the same lines, and a new domestic ideal developed. The new mode of marriage was a derivation of the (European) aristocratic endogamous marriage practice in which marriages were arranged between two equal parties, or at least between two parties of same origin, unless they were forced to do otherwise. The 19th century European bourgeoisification of marriage partially influenced the transformation of 19th-century Ottoman marriage patterns as well. Third-generation Tanzimat members were influenced by the idea of bourgeois affectionate marriage (albeit limited to the sons of the bureaucratic elite) via French novels (and very early 20th century Ottoman novels such as Aşk-ı Memnu and Eylül) and acculturalization. In practice, however, marriage patterns continued to replicate those of the earlier generation. At the same time, the anachronistic imperial institution of the harem had become an


Diane Robinson-Dunn argues for the replacement of the ideal of patriarchal household “by a new ideal, that of the middle-class home, which contemporary Egyptians believed would provide a new foundation for the new nation” on the eve of the twentieth century with the elimination of slavery in Egypt. Robinson-Dunn, Diane, The Harem, Slavery and British Imperial Culture, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006, p. 57.

For the patterns and strategies of marriages in the Pomeranian Junker nobility from the eighteenth century to the twentieth century, see Baranowski, Shelley, The Sanctity of Rural Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 32-34.

embarrassment to the Ottoman aristocratic elite\textsuperscript{730} and in time led to the dissolution of the Hamidian harem by the Young Turks.\textsuperscript{731}

During the Tanzimat, we observe two general trends of marriage: intermarriages within the same social layer and marriages between the scions of two different, but converging social groups, e.g., provincial merchants and dynasties with aristocrats in Istanbul. An example of the prevalence of this inter-marriage is given from the Abdülhak Molla family. Abdülhak Molla, the chief doctor of the palace, was married to the daughter of Naci Efendi, the head of the Translation Office and, hence, the aunt of Ahmed Vefik Pasha. Nasuhi Bey, the grandson of Abdülhak Molla, the son of Hayrullah Efendi, and the brother of Abdülham Hamit, was married to the daughter of Rıza Pasha, the chief of staff. Mihrûnnisa Hamm, the sister of Nasuhi was married to the son of Fuad Pasha. Therefore, Abdülhak Hamid, a descendant of the family, had the chance to work with many of his relatives in the diplomatic service. While he was the ambassador to Den Haag, his second secretary was one of his relatives by marriage, Mehmed Ali Bey.\textsuperscript{732} These marriages reestablished and reproduced the coherence and convergence of the closed circle of the Tanzimat elite. In short and with slight nuances, Tanzimat marriages were exclusively inter-elite marriages.

Some diplomats, such as Ahmed Tevfik Pasha\textsuperscript{733} and Mustafa Reşid Pasha\textsuperscript{734}, arranged royal marriages for their sons. Necib Bey, while he was a scribe in the embassy in Paris, was married to Mediha Sultan, the daughter of Abdülmecid. Necib Bey became Necib Pasha through this marriage. This marriage was probably arranged due to the prestige of Abdurrahman Sami Pasha, the father of Necib (and Sezai), a highly respectable and strong

\textsuperscript{730} Erdem, Hakan, \textit{Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise}, Basinstoke: Macmillan, 1996, pp. 149-150.

\textsuperscript{731} Erdem, Hakan, ibid, pp. 147-49.

\textsuperscript{732} Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, p. 286.


personality during the Tanzimat period, who developed an extensive patronage network.\textsuperscript{735} After the sudden and unexpected death of Necib at an early age, Mediha Sultan married a colleague of Necip, Ferid, then a scribe in the embassy in London.\textsuperscript{736} Apparently, this marriage enabled young Ferid to be appointed to the Senate after 1908 and facilitated his career. Some diplomats married women from non-Ottoman royal families such as Şerif Pasha, who married a member of the Kavalalı dynasty.\textsuperscript{737} Houlsi Foad became part of the Kavalalı dynasty by marrying the granddaughter of Ismail Pasha.\textsuperscript{738} Intra-marriages between the members of the diplomatic service were also prevalent. A marriage was arranged between Sadullah Pasha’s granddaughter (Asaf Sadullah’s daughter) and Tevfik Pasha’s son.\textsuperscript{739} Abdülhak Hamid arranged the marriage of his daughter to Emin Bey, who served in the ministry as ambassador to Teheran (a post once filled by Hayrullah Efendi) and Director of Political Affairs\textsuperscript{740}. Naum Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris was married to the daughter of Franko Paşa, an undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the sister of Franko Paşa’s sons who were also serving in the Ottoman diplomatic service.\textsuperscript{741} Esat Cemal (Paker), whose memoires will be utilized extensively in this study, was married to Osman Hamdi Bey’s daughter and thus entered a family of diplomats.\textsuperscript{742}

This pattern enabled the unification of a single state aristocratic grouping that dominated the high-ranking bureaucratic positions and had the financial means to maintain a relatively prosperous lifestyle.

\textsuperscript{736} Erdem, Can, ibid., p. 2.
\textsuperscript{739} Okday, Şefik … p. 20.
\textsuperscript{740} Abdülhak Hamid… p. 340.
\textsuperscript{742} E-mail from Edhem Eldem (18 February 2010). I owe this information to Gül İnanç.
Another area in which the diplomatic service pioneered was marriage to European women. One apparent reason for the frequency of marriage to European women was because diplomats were not allowed to take their wives with them to the countries in which they were serving. The first ambassador to marry a European was İbrahim Haydar Bey, the ambassador to Vienna. In 1867, he married a Hungarian woman.\footnote{Kuneralp, Sinan, “Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri,” in Soysal, İsmail (ed.), Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Sürec, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997, p. 117.} Nevertheless, the Ottoman ambassadors and diplomats could not arrange marriages with the daughters of the European aristocrats. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, a member of the Crimean khanate family, married the daughter of a Swiss policeman\footnote{Okday, Şefik, ibid, p. 13.} whom he met in Athens while she was working as a governess. She was looked down upon within diplomatic circles because of her lower class origins. Likewise, Mustafa Reşid Pasha married an Italian woman of low origins, which cost him the ambassadorship to London because the British government did not want to include a European woman of low origins in the royal protocol. Mustafa Asım Bey, ambassador to Sofia and Teheran and foreign minister for a short time, was married a Viennese woman.\footnote{Lütfi Simavi, Sultan Mehmed Reşad Hanın ve Halifenin Sarayında Gördüklerim, Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1340, p. 96.} Asaf Sadullah, son of Sadullah Pasha and himself also a diplomat, was married to a German woman. Celal Münif’s first wife was American\footnote{BOA, HR.İM 227/68, 18 July 1928.} İbrahim Edhem, who remained a low-ranking official in the headquarters of the ministry in Istanbul and in the foreign legations of the Ottoman Empire, married a Frenchwoman\footnote{Çankaya, Ali, ibid, vol. III, p. 194.} Other diplomats married women of better origins. For example, Mehmed Rifat Pasha married the daughter of a Russian general who converted to Islam after the marriage.\footnote{Çankaya, Ali, ibid, v. III, p. 92; Kuneralp, Sinan, ibid, p. 117.} In contrast to his Muslim colleagues, Musurus Pasha was successful in marrying off his daughter to the general secretary of the Italian embassy in London. The son-in-law of Musurus Pasha would later be appointed to Istanbul.\footnote{Abdülhak Hamid… p. 177.} Malkom Khan, one-time Persian ambassador to...
Istanbul and London, an Armenian convert to Islam, and the pioneer of Persian reforms married a woman from the Dadyan family while he was serving in Istanbul and became the son-in-law of the Dadyan family.\textsuperscript{750}

The Ottoman Foreign Ministry resembled Austria in that it enjoyed the fruits of favorable marriages. Although it is beyond the capabilities of the author to list comprehensively the marriage patterns of the diplomats, the anecdotal evidence shows three things. Firstly, the diplomats entered into auspicious marriages and, thus, established good connections. Secondly, intra-marriage within the group (in-marriage) was common. Thirdly, diplomacy turned into a family profession in which succeeding generations were recruited into the diplomatic service. The genealogical continuity of the cadres of the ministry was partially explained by the marriage patterns.\textsuperscript{751}

\textbf{4.6. Fortunate Sons}

Osman Hamdi’s father, Ibrahim Edhem, served as ambassador to Berlin in 1879 and ambassador to Vienna between 1879 and 1882. Originally a Greek from Chios, he was captured, enslaved, and sold to Hüseyn Pasha, who sent him to Paris to study mining engineering. His skills led him to appointments to various posts from the military to diplomacy in addition to his later political appointments as the Grand Vizier, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of the interior. He raised sons who rose to prominence. Osman


\textsuperscript{751} Marriage was a very important institution for the 19\textsuperscript{th} -century European aristocratic culture, as well as the diplomatic establishment. “In the opinion of the (German) Foreign Office… (T)he women, like the men, were to have grace, tact and polish; they should be German-born and propertied. Aristocratic lineage was desirable but not essential provided…[the]wife had a ‘patrician or cosmopolitan background and natural good manners, in addition to a lot of money’ ” Cecil, Lamar, \textit{The German Diplomatic Service 1871-1914}, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 87. For the marriage connections within the Dutch diplomatic service, see Wels, C.B, “The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Netherlands 1579 to 1980,” in \textit{The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World}, Zara Steiner (ed.), Westport: Times Books, 1982, p. 372.
Hamdi’s “brothers served the state in various capacities...While his brother Mustafa became a customs agent and his brother Galip Ibrahim became the first Ottoman numismatist, his youngest brother, Halil (Edhem), followed in Osman Hamdi’s footsteps as assistant director of the museum after the latter’s death in 1910. He later played a significant role in the transition of Ottoman cultural institutions in the Turkish Republic and served as a member of parliament from 1923 until his death in 1935.”  

Osman Hamdi, who probably spoke French at home in his childhood, developed his interest in the arts thanks to the high-level administrative posts of his father. Cosmopolitanism, fluency in French, encounters with “Western culture”, and more importantly, connections and financial means were bestowed by the mechanisms of officialdom. Osman Hamdi’s refinement and elegance is a perfect example of the creation of a self-made and self-styled aristocracy in two generations.

Osman Hamdi’s entry into the world of the arts was possible within this environment and set of circumstances. He could renounce a fine career the bureaucracy offered him. He was sent to Paris to study law. “However, he soon decided to pursue his interest in painting instead, left the law program, and trained under the French Orientalist painters Jean-Léon Gérome and Gustave Boulanger.” He was called back to Istanbul by his father, who was concerned by his son’s turning into a vagabond in Paris.  

When Osman Hamdi returned to Istanbul from Paris, where he had a fanciful and uncommon life, he was posted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was appointed to several positions. He also served for one year in Baghdad in the retinue of Governor Midhad Pasha. It was not yet acceptable for a scion of a high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrat to live completely out of the world and shelter of the government. Furthermore, there was as yet no social sphere in which a Muslim could make such a living. Thus, Osman Hamdi pursued the career of a typical official. In 1881, he was appointed as the director of the imperial museum. He became the director of the Academy of Fine Arts and thus combined his interests and his

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752 Shaw, Wendy, Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology and the Visualization of History in the Late Ottoman Empire, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, p. 98.

Moreover, the first artists perceived their art and profession as being in line with their political loyalty to the state (and the nation embodied within the state). The process whereby artists began questioning their innate loyalty to the state and became (at least moderate and loyalist) dissenters began only after the 1908 Revolution. Even after that, the artists and men of letters never equaled the level of radicalism and dissent of their European and Russian counterparts.

This was particularly true because serving in state service was inherited from the family. It was not perceived as a career or a profession. It was rather the habitus in which fortunate sons felt comfortable and which they did not easily or voluntarily leave. Many sons followed in their father’s footsteps. Mehmed Cemil, the son of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, served as the ambassador to Paris three different times over a 3-year period and was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1872. Two sons of Mustafa Reşid, Mehmed Cemil and Ali Galip, served as Ministers of Foreign Affairs for very brief periods. Mustafa Reşid Pasha’s two grandsons, Mehmed Tevfik and another, Mustafa Reşid Beyefendi, also served in the Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul. Fuad Pasha’s son, İzzet Fuad Pasha, was the ambassador to Madrid between 1900 and 1908. Celal Münif, son of Münif Pasha, became a career diplomat serving in various posts in Ottoman embassies abroad before being appointed as the Director of Protocol of the Republican Foreign Ministry in 1924. Arifi Pasha’s son, Mustafa Şekip Bey, was the ambassador to Stockholm. Given that Arifi Pasha’s father, Şekip Pasha, was also an ambassador and later Minister of Foreign Affairs, three generations of the family worked in the ministry. Individuals in two different generations held the position of foreign minister. Four Franko brothers, Yusuf, Nasri, Fethi, and Feyzi, were sons of the former governor of Lebanon, Franko Pasha, and served in the Ministry simultaneously. Mustafa

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754 Shaw, Wendy, ibid, p. 99.
755 For this transformation, see Artun, Deniz, ibid.
Reşid and Yusuf Ziya, Agah Efendi and Şakir Pasha, and Ahmed Cevad and Şakir were brothers who both served as ambassadors.\textsuperscript{757}

As pointed out previously, genealogical continuity was particularly prevalent in the non-Muslim officials. Kostaki and Stefanaki were father and son ambassadors to London. The embassy to London operated practically as the private property of the Musurus family until 1874, when all the officials in the embassy were relatives of Kostaki Musurus Pasha. The staff included the ambassador Stefanaki Musurus Pasha, his brother, his two sons, and his son-in-law.\textsuperscript{758} The military attaché appointed in 1874 was the first non-Musurus recruitment. The state of affairs at the London embassy, the privileges held by Musurus Pasha, and the appointment of his son Maurus can be seen as artifacts of the pre-modern practice of giving posts as family possessions. Artin Dadyan, the long-time secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Ministry, recruited his son, Diran, into the ministry. Diran worked as an administrative official in the ministry in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{759} Artin Dadyan’s brother, Arakil, also briefly served as translator in the embassy in Paris.\textsuperscript{760} Hrant Noradonkyan, whose brother Gabriel Noradonkyan was the grey eminence of the ministry, also served in the ministry as assistant counselor in the Legal Council.\textsuperscript{761} Hrant, the son of Sahak Abro who was also the long-time Head of the Office of Foreign Correspondence, became a preeminent legal expert in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{762} Naum Paşa’s son also entered the Ottoman diplomatic service.\textsuperscript{763} The same was true for Said Bey, the son of Jewish Davud Efendi, the long time chief translator of the Ministry of Foreign


\textsuperscript{759} BOA., DH.SAID 10/207, 1270 Z. 29.

\textsuperscript{760} Kırmızı, Abdülhamid. Osmanlı … p.34.

\textsuperscript{761} BOA, DH.SAID 88/143, 1293, Z. 29; Kırmızı, Abdülhamid, Osmanlı …. p. 32.

\textsuperscript{762} BOA, DH.SAID 71/117, 1278 Z. 29.

Ahmet Rüstem, the Ottoman ambassador to Washington, was the son of the Polish aristocrat, émigré, and convert, (Nihad) Bilinski, who also served in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{765}

Asaf Sadullah, Sadullah Pasha’s son, worked as the secretary in the Berlin embassy while his father was the ambasassador to Berlin. Nusret Sadullah, another son of Sadullah Pasha, who became the ambassador to Den Haag in 1915, appears to be an exception to the absence of European-style “monarchism”. He resigned from the diplomatic service after the proclamation of the Republic due to his loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty and went into self-exile in Nice, where the members of the Ottoman dynasty had settled. Abdülhak Hüseyin, the son of Abdülhak Hamid, began his diplomatic career in Den Haag and London working with his father and died while he was the charge d’affaires in Washington during World War I after replacing Ambassador Ahmed Rüstem. Mehmed Su’ad, who served in the offices of the Legal Councilor and the Translation Office, was the son of Asım Pasha, a Minister of Foreign Affairs for Abdülhamid, and was not a career diplomat.\textsuperscript{767}

This pattern was not unique to the Ottoman case. On the contrary, the Ottomans reproduced the European pattern. In France, “(t)he profession could at one time have been considered a kind of caste…an aristocracy that was permitted to elect its own members…There have been in France, both before and since the Revolution, dynasties of diplomats…There have also been instances of brothers following parallel diplomatic

\textsuperscript{764} Özdemir, Bülent (ed.), \textit{İngiliz İstihbarat Raporlarında Fişlenen Türkiye}, İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2008, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{765} BOA, DH.SAİD 1/664, 1236 Z. 29.

\textsuperscript{766} Sons working with their fathers (or nephews working with their uncles) was not unique to the Ottoman diplomatic service. “Two ambassadors to France, Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenloe-Schillingfürst and Baron Willhelm von Schoen, were joined in Paris by their sons. In Madrid, Radowitz sent for his son, while young Count Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg served under his father at the Court of St. James…When Count Karl von Pückler, a junior army officer, desired to become a diplomat, he asked his uncle, Prince Heinrich VII Reuss, the ambassador to Austria-Hungary, to request that he be assigned to the embassy.” Lamar, Cecil, ibid., pp. 21-22.

\textsuperscript{767} BOA, DH.SAİD 22/197, 1278 Z. 29.
careers.” In Austria-Hungary, “employment in the foreign service was almost a family affair. Indeed, once a new family had gained a foothold in the Foreign Ministry it was almost a rule that the sons, even the grandsons, remained in this profession.” In the Netherlands, offices were “handed down from father to son, uncle to nephew.” In Russia, “(p)laces in the diplomatic corps were generally reserved for men born into the gentry. In fact, a diplomatic career was often passed down through the family.” In short, genealogical continuity was a European-wide phenomenon. “These (Foreign Office-DG) staffs were small and their members personally known to their chiefs. Gradually, positions came to be handed down from generation to generation. The same family names appeared—fathers and sons, brothers, uncles and nephews. There were many ‘closed shops.’ Successive generations of civil servants were often related to one another through descent or marriage.” The genealogical continuity was a corollary of the aristocratic quality of the diplomatic services. Though, many “diplomatic dynasties” lacked impressive aristocratic credentials, they became de facto magnate families or nobles of the robe in the 19th century style by associating themselves with the most prestigious offices of the states and became families of prominence. This was especially the case in France, where some dynastic families of the foreign office were of middle class origin. State service was an


elite-processing mechanism converting aristocracies of lineage to state aristocracies creating their own aristocratic lineages.

4.7. The Legacy of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry

Needless to say, genealogical continuity survived the Empire. Salih Münir Pasha’s nephew, Melih Esenbel, served as Turkey’s long-time ambassador to Washington, ambassador to Tokyo, the general secretary of the ministry, and Minister of Foreign Affairs for a very short while. Diplomacy was a family business on Melih Esenbel’s father’s side, as well. His maternal grandfather, Şemsettin Ziya, a descendant of the Ramazanoğulları, was another Hamidian diplomat. Melih Esenbel was the product of an intra-marriage within the diplomatic service given that there were diplomats on both sides of the family.

Selim Sarper, Turkey’s ambassador to Rome and Moscow, secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Foreign Minister between 1960 and 1962, was the nephew of Galip Kemali Söylemezőlu. Yüksel Söylemez, the son of a nephew of Galip Kemali was another diplomat raised in the family. Hürev Gerede, military officer-turned-diplomat during the Republic, who served in the key post of ambassador to Berlin during World War II, was the son-in-law of Söylemeozoğlu. However, the diplomatic genealogy of the family began not from Galip Kemali but from Kabuli Pasha, the father of Galip Kemali, who served as ambassador to Vienna. Seyfullah Esin, a descendant of both Sadullah Pasha and Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, served as ambassador to Bonn, Cairo, and the United States. Seyfullah Esin was married to Emel Esin, who was the daughter of Ahmed Ferit Tek, a Young Turk who became a career diplomat in the Republic, serving as ambassador to London, Warsaw, and Tokyo.

We meet the Uşaklıgil family again in the marriage of Cevat Açıkalın, the influential secretary-general of Minister of Foreign Affairs and son of Ali Cevad, the imperial secretary to Abdülhamid, to Mevhibe Uşaklıgil, the sister of Latife, the niece of Halid Ziya, and the aunt of Bülent Uşaklıgil. Cevad Ezine, the late Ottoman and early Republican

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773 For a biography of Cevat Açıkalın, see Güçlü, Yücel, The Life and Career of a Turkish Diplomat: Cevat Açıkalın, Ankara, no publishing house, 2002.
ambassador and a descendant of a prominent family from Ezine (a town in the Çanakkale province of modern Turkey) married the daughter of the illustrious Halil Edhem Bey and became the son-in-law of an aristocratic Istanbuliot Ottoman family. These two marriages were examples of the incorporation of two diverse elites. Hulusi Fuad Tugay, the son of Deli Fuad Pasha and himself served as an ambassador of Turkey, married the granddaughter of Khedive Ismail Pasha and son of Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the Ottoman military commander and the ambassador to Berlin between 1913 and 1915. This marriage was yet another marriage which connected diverse elites. The Republican cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to be the scions of late Ottoman civil servants. Prominent figures of the Republican diplomatic service such as Fatin Rüşdü Zorlu (and his brother Rıfkı Rüşdü Zorlu), Muharrem Nuri Birgi (and many other prominent ambassadors such as Nureddin Vergin, İsmail Erez, Pertev Subaşı and Nüzhet Kandemir) were descendants of Ottoman pashas. Hasan Esat Işık, the ambassador to Paris and Moscow, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense, was the son of Mehmed Esat (Işık), one of the pioneering medical (military) doctors and medical bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire. Among others, Süreyya Anderiman, the Republican ambassador to Tokyo, was the son of Mehmed Süreyya Bey, who began his diplomatic career in 1892 and served as Ottoman consul and ambassadorial secretary in various posts throughout the Hamidian era before becoming the Director of Protocol in the Republican ministry in 1931. Mustafa Reşid Paşa’s son, Basri Reşid Danişment, was also a Republican ambassador. Sons of Ottoman figures as diverse as Tunalı Hilmi (İnsan Tunalı), Ebubekir Hazım (Tepeyran) (Celal Hazım Tepeyran), Ali Kemal (Zeki Kuneralp), Bursalı Mehmed Tahir Bey (Bedri Tahir Şaman), Ali Fuat (Türkgeldi) (Ali Türkgeldi) and the grandsons of Kamil Pasha (Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Hilmi Kamil Bayur), Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa, Fuad Paşa (Şevket Fuad Keçeci being the grandson of both Fuad Paşa and Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa),


Halil Rıfat Pasha (Fuad Simavi)\textsuperscript{777} İbrahim Edhem Pasha (Sadi Eldem)\textsuperscript{778} and Ali Kemal (Selim Kuneralp, son of Zeki Kuneralp) served as Republican diplomats and ambassadors.\textsuperscript{779}

In short, the degree of continuity of the cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in terms of blood lineages from Empire to the Republic is enormous. It has been argued previously that the critical threshold of the founding of Turkish modernity and the modern state was surpassed by the Tanzimat and Hamidian elite and that there was continuity from the Hamidian aristocratic culture to the Republican culture with certain breaks and alterations. This continuity can be established not only in ideological terms, but also in genealogical sense.

The “imagined state elite” persisted in holding the major positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The idea of the state for the members of this elite was not an external reality. On the contrary, the state was part of their daily life. The state was a concrete and intimate reality. It was not sacred and transcendental.\textsuperscript{780} On the contrary, it was very real and familiar. It was their own. The state was internalized, familiarized, and personalized. The state was not something to which they should be servile, but the pivotal symbol of their sense of belonging and the safe harbor in which they felt secure. It was the polar star.

\textsuperscript{777} Fuad Simavi was also the nephew of Lütfi Simavi, an Ottoman diplomat and Lord High Chamberlain of Mehmmed Reşad and Vaheddin. Lütfi Simavi, \textit{Sultan Mehemd Reşad Hanım ve Halifenin Sarayında Görüldüklerim}, Dersaadet: Kanaat Kütübhanesi, 1340, p. 10; Birol, Nurettin, Halil Rıfat Paşa, \textit{C.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi}, v. 27 (December 2003), p. 278. He is also a cousin of Sedat Simavi.

\textsuperscript{778} These data had been gathered by examining the obituaries retrieved in the database of the daily Milliyet’s on-line archive and the yearbook of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ preeparred in 1964-65. (Aral, Hamid (ed.), \textit{Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yılıığı (1964-1965)}, Ankara, Dışişleri Bakanlığı.)

All the above-mentioned Republican diplomats were entitled ambassadors with the exception of the son of Tunalı Hilmi (İnsan Tunali), who resigned from the diplomatic service after serving as secretary in the embassies to Jerusalem and Tokyo and as consul, and the grandson of Halil Rıfat Pasha (Fuad Simavi), who was removed from the diplomatic service. Ateş, Sabri, \textit{Tunalı Hilmi}, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2009, p. 108; Dikerdem, Mahmut, \textit{Hariciye Çarkı}, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{780} For a classical interpretation of the Ottoman/Turkish modern state along these lines, see Metin Heper, \textit{The State Tradition in Turkey}, Beverley, North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1985, p. 66.
in their mental cosmology which made them confident in the eternity of the universe and provided ontological security.\footnote{For Giddens’ notion of “ontological security,” see Giddens, Anthony, \textit{The Consequences of Modernity}, Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1990, pp. 94-99. For a discussion of “ontological security” with regard to the perception of the people of the Republican state, see Alexander, Catherine, \textit{Personal States}, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.19.} From this “cultural intimacy”, they also invented a national imagination which linked the state, the nation, and themselves and attributed the nation “national characteristics” they themselves attained themselves in their habitus.

The state became more “sacred” and “transcendental” in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century as the bureaucracy became more formalized, depersonalized, and defamiliarized, and thus state lost its humane touch and its immediate proximity. The state also lost its embeddedness within the culture of a certain class formation. It lost its very personalized aspects and its emotional contact with its constituency. It ceased to be flesh and blood although the very 19\textsuperscript{th} century perception of the state persisted in the minds of the state elite who exported this perception of the state to masses.\footnote{See Alexander, Catherine, ibid.} Thus, a certain imagery was disseminated. It was no coincidence that the Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of the institutions that was able to partially avoid formalization and anonymization. It could keep its corps d’esprit, retain the “closed shop” nature of the 19\textsuperscript{th} - century (Ottoman) bureaucratic habitus, and be harbinger of a (state-centric) distinct nationalism and national imagination embedded within a certain culturalization.
CHAPTER V

THE ROUTINE OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AND ITS ENCOUNTERS ABROAD

5.1. Defending the Hamidian Autocracy Abroad

A habitual assumption regarding the cadres of Foreign Ministry is that they are primarily interested in “international” affairs, unlike the other bureaucratic offices. However, only a small percentage of the office work of the Foreign Ministry relates to the conduct of foreign relations. This is true for all foreign ministries, but it was much more so regarding the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The chief tasks of the Ottoman Ministry were the supervision of the activities of Ottoman nationals and especially the activities of the dissidents and non-Muslims abroad, the tracking of the local press’s commentaries regarding the Ottoman Empire and the sultan, in addition to many technical matters, such as the pursuit of the commercial and legal rights of Ottoman residents abroad. In short, in an age of internationalization, or in Hobsbawms’s Age of Empire, foreign policy was not a matter of technicality in isolation from domestic politics and political struggles. The Ottoman representatives were not mere technicians, but civil servants whose duties and policies were shaped by the domestic concerns of the Hamidian regime. A separation of foreign policy and internal policy was untenable. However, the diplomatic service was not a garrison of the Hamidian regime, either. In some ways, the Ottoman diplomats were at the very center of the Hamidian political structures, given their representation of the Hamidian establishment abroad. Yet, given their closeness to the international world, they constituted a privileged small group freed from the restraints of the Hamidian establishment.
Different embassies specialized in the pursuit of different national dissident groups. For example, the correspondence of the embassy to Washington abounds with documentation of the activities of the Armenians, whether they were dissidents or not. Not only did the bulk of the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and United States consist of the status of missionary schools and the problems deriving from the legal problems faced by Armenians in obtaining American citizenship, but we also observe that the Ottoman embassy to Washington’s specific task was the monitoring of Armenian activities (rallies, demonstrations, publications, organizational works) in the United States. Although the tracking of Armenians residing in the United States had been a regular activity of the embassy in Washington prior to 1890, with the rupture of the Armenian insurgencies, it became the principal preoccupation of the embassy. Prior to 1890, dispatches written by the embassy remained infrequent. These dispatches were written down not for urgent matters, but as regular dispatches every two weeks or so. With the explosion of the Armenian insurgency, the embassy to Washington’s workload increased drastically.

These dispatches included the regular supervision of the Armenian press in the United States783 with a specific focus on the New-York based Haik784, a close surveillance of the American press and their commentaries on the Armenian events, the writing of disclaimers to the relevant newspapers to be printed, and the lobbying of congressmen with pamphlets, et cetera. In 1896, the tekzips (disclaimers) had been gathered and published as a separate pamphlet to be distributed to congressmen.785 In 1890, the embassy submitted a comprehensive report, an overview of the Armenian press in the United States786. It was recommended in 1896 that some American newspapers, such as the New York Herald787

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783 BOA, HR. SYS 64/13, BOA, 26 June 1895; HR.SYS 60/40, 16 March 1891.
784 For a close scrutiny of the newspaper Haik, see BOA, HR.SYS 63-22, 4 August 1894; 60-46, 9 February 1895. The embassy repeatedly disclaimed the “unfounded allegations” in the Armenian journals. For the monitoring of the New-Jersey based Armenian newspaper “Arekag”, BOA, HR.SYS 59/37, 18 May 1888.
785 BOA, HR.SYS 65/52, 2 June 1896.
786 BOA, HR. SYS 59/37, 18 May 1888.
787 BOA, HR.SYS 65/58, 20 July 1896.
and the Washington Post\textsuperscript{788}, be denied entry to the Ottoman Empire due to the insulting pictures they published regarding the Armenian events. The embassy also regretted that the unfounded reports relayed by the Armenian press had been publicized by the American newspapers.\textsuperscript{789} As counter-propaganda, texts written by the \textit{Matbuat-i Ecnebiye Kalemi} (Office of Foreign Press) were published in the American media.\textsuperscript{790} In this regard, Ahmed Rüstem Bey, who was appointed as the ambassador in Washington in 1914 but who had been working in the Washington embassy in various posts previously, was the Turkish diplomat who did the most to combat the negative propaganda. He actively pursued a counter-propaganda policy by publishing articles in prominent American newspapers and making statements to the American newspapers. His Polish origins and European erudition should have facilitated his communication with Westerners and allowed his skills to impress and convince them.\textsuperscript{791} Reports also summarized the articles printed in prominent newspapers. For example, the embassy noted in 1895 that the newspaper “Sun” had argued that the Armenians were victorious vis-a-vis the Ottoman state with regard to their improved relations with the European powers.\textsuperscript{792} The embassy also dispatched the publications of Armenian newspapers to Istanbul. As an example of the dangerous deeds of the Armenian press based in New York and in other cities, the embassy noted that the Armenian press in the United States had requested Britain to be involved in Armenian affairs in order to protect the rights and interests of the Armenian people.\textsuperscript{793}

As the principal concern of the Ottoman Empire in its diplomatic relations with the United States of America was Armenian affairs, the predominant preoccupation in the diplomatic correspondence of the USA with the Ottoman Empire was the same as can be gathered from the yearbooks “Foreign Relations of the United States”. The number of documents regarding diplomatic relations with “Turkey” included in the yearbooks is very

\begin{footnotes}
\item[788] BOA, HR.SYS 65/58, 20 July 1896.
\item[789] BOA, HR.SYS 64/13, 26 June 1895.
\item[790] BOA, HR.SYS 64/12, 25 June 1895.
\item[792] BOA. HR.SYS 64/13, 26 June 1895.
\item[793] BOA, HR.SYS 61/6, 10 August 1891.
\end{footnotes}
small vis-a-vis the excessive amount of documents on other European and Latin American countries. Furthermore, no political report of “Turkey” was seen as necessary to be included in the yearbooks. The selected dispatches written from Washington to the embassy in Istanbul and from the embassy in Istanbul to Washington were covering the problems the missionaries and their schools (especially the Euphrates College in Harpoot) were facing. The selected documents were on the “maltreatment” and “murderous attacks” on the Armenians. Also, a lot of paperwork was devoted to the naturalization of Armenian residents of Ottoman nationality, and the problems the naturalized Armenians residing in America were facing regarding inheritances and legal rights. In short, the diplomatic relations with America meant predominantly “Armenian dissidence” for the Ottoman diplomatic service. It was no coincidence that Ahmed Rüstem Bey, after serving long in the embassy to Washington, wrote a book in Switzerland defending the Ottoman policies regarding the massacres of 1915.

Of course, although dominated by Armenian-related activities, the only occupation of the embassy was not police work. The embassy regularly reported the latest developments in the American political system. A regular report in 1898 informed Istanbul about the aggression between Nicaragua and Costa Rica which could have triggered a war between those two countries. The embassy also followed the crisis over the Panama Channel in 1903 and the involvement of the United States in these affairs that resulted in the independence of Panama from Colombia. The embassy also relayed information about South American politics since South American politics constituted the main interest of the United States government in international politics. Several reports informed Istanbul on the

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794 See Foreign Relations of the United States, years 1885, 1886, 1890, 1891, 1892.
796 BOA, HR.SYS, 77/15, 30 April 1888.
797 BOA, HR.SYS, 77/16, 17,18,19,20,21,22,23. (5 May 1886, 2 February 1893, 11 November 1903, 30 November 1903, 14 December 1903, 2 January 1904, 18 April 1904)
international and domestic politics of countries such as Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Mexico.

As the embassy in Washington was specialized in the pursuit of Armenian activities, the embassy in Rome was specialized in monitoring Albanian dissidents or “potential” dissidents. There was no timeframe in which the preoccupation of the pursuit of dissidents increased significantly. On the contrary, this was a constant concern. From the 1870s onward, there was a continuous concern about Albanian activities in Italy (as well as in Austria, Greece and to a lesser extent in Romania). The level of vigilance remained constant before the Albanian rebellion of 1911 when the Albanian problem turned out to be a primary and immediate concern for Istanbul.

In contrast to the Armenian activities in United States, the Albanian dissidence in Italy was disorganized and personal. However, that does not mean that the embassy in Rome was less concerned as the routine dispatches reporting the latest Albanian activities demonstrate. It was one of the main tasks of the embassy although in contrast to the embassy in Washington reporting Albanian dissidence comprised a relatively insignificant portion of the immense load of paperwork.

A report in 1886 relayed that the Albanian émigré community in Bari was trying to finance a newspaper and an institute in the Albanian language.\textsuperscript{798} The embassy was particularly alarmed when in 1880, two Albanian dissidents, Ali Hilmi and Süleyman Sami, moved from Athens to Rome. The embassies in both capitals sent dispatches relaying their information on these dissidents. The dissidents were chased in Rome.\textsuperscript{799} Suspicions were raised that they would move to Vienna. However, in the end the dissidents asked for permission to return to the Ottoman Empire after failing to advance their activities.

The task of the embassy was much simpler because the Albanians in Italy lived on their own and were not in regular contact with the indigenous people and the leaders of public opinion. In short, although the occupation of the embassy in Washington was a sophisticated and multi-faceted job, the job of the embassy in Rome remained a policing

\textsuperscript{798} BOA, HR. SYS 125/22, 18 March 1886; 127/25, 17 March 1886.

\textsuperscript{799} BOA, HR.SYS 126/2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 (dated from 10 June 1878 to 14 August 1878).
activity. As pointed out above, the embassy had much more political obligations and important duties such as following the Italian intentions with regard to the Ottoman Empire and with regard to the other European powers. The other embassies which were occupied with the Albanian dissidence were Athens, Bucharest, and Vienna.

One of the main preoccupations of the embassies was the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in the press. All the embassies were equally concerned with the advancement of the image of the Ottoman Empire. Of course, the general perception and portrayal of the Ottoman Empire was negative, and this was perceived as a principal threat to the interests of the Empire. Of course, embassies were not only relaying information on the mood of the local press. They were also active in changing and transforming the negative presentation of the Ottoman Empire. For example, a dispatch from the embassy informed Istanbul that a newly founding Vienna-based newspaper was planning to employ a correspondent in Istanbul, and the embassy requested/suggested that the Ministry be involved in the process so that the future correspondent would be sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire. Every embassy was so paranoid about the negative coverage of the Ottoman Empire in their local press that a dispatch from Vienna portrayed the press of Vienna as “the center of the anti-Ottoman coverage in Europe”. Every embassy was so paranoid about the negative coverage of the Ottoman Empire in their local press that a dispatch from Vienna portrayed the press of Vienna as “the center of the anti-Ottoman coverage in Europe”.

It has to be said that it was Abdülhamid who had aspired to influence, lead, and manipulate the Western press after the relatively passive stance of his predecessors. His personal policy of developing contacts with Western correspondents had brought up a general concern for struggling with and manipulating Western media. The interest in the foreign press was a top-to-bottom affair. Abdülhamid’s first act in this issue was trying to influence English public opinion by publishing the letters of Admiral Hobart in the prestigious newspaper, The Times, in 1877. Abdülhamid developed close relations with the correspondents in Istanbul. In 1878, he awarded Ottoman insignia to three of the seven French correspondents resident in Istanbul. Since then, he continued to follow the

800 BOA, HR.SYS 184/46, 25 January 1887.
801 BOA, HR.SYS, 198/9, 8 April 1903.
803 Koloğlu, Orhan, ibid, p. 67.
Western press coverage personally. Although Abdülhamid had established a bureau in the Yıldız Palace to follow foreign press coverage, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was always active in tracking the foreign coverage and taking action when necessary.

The issue of “public opinion” became an obsession throughout the reign of Abdülhamid. We know that “public opinion” became a novel factor to be considered and if possible controlled by the reign of Mahmud II. Throughout the Tanzimat, with the emergence of newspapers, it became apparent that public opinion had become a significant factor that had to be dealt with accordingly. For the first time, subjects and the minds of those subjects were a matter of concern. The idiom “efkar-ı umumiye” emerged and assumed a great importance. The state was obliged to measure, respond to, and lead public opinion. This concern became almost an obsession for Abdülhamid.

Newspapers were treated as acid tests of public opinion. In fact, excerpts from newspapers were not only sent to Istanbul as “annexes” to dispatches, but also comprised the bulk of the dispatches themselves. Sometimes, insignificant and minor press coverage caused scandals and uproars and caused a heavy load of dispatches to be sent from both Istanbul and the embassy in question. Nevertheless, in the diplomatic dispatches, it was

804 For the rich documentation of Abdülhamid’s personal follow-up of the Western press coverage and his acts to influence and lead it, see Orhan Koloğlu’s “Avrupa’nın Kıskasında Abdülhamid.” Needless to see, although this endeavor was a personal venture of the sultan, it was the hard-working diplomats, whether they may be Ottoman representatives abroad or the diplomats working in Istanbul who had informed Abdülhamid and did the job in the name of the sultan. However, Abdülhamid was not a person who was satisfied with the regular work of the bureaucracy. Abdülhamid recruited Louis Sabuncu, who was in charge of following the newspapers published in English, French, Italian, and Arabic and translating the articles on the Ottoman Empire. See the memoirs of Sabuncuzade Louis Alberi, Yıldız Sarayı’nda Bir Papaz, Istanbul: Selis, 2007.


806 For example, Ebüzziya Tevfik in his memoirs clearly indicates that he and his colleagues (the first generation of Turkish journalists) succeeded in developing and promoting a public opinion (efkar-ı umumiye) that had to be respected and heeded, which was beneficial for the well-being of Turkish nation. Ebüzziya Mehmed Tevfik. Genç Osmanlilar Tarihi, 3 volumes, Istanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1973.

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elections which were seen as the primary (and direct) manifestations of public opinion.\textsuperscript{807} The diplomatic service was underlining the role of public opinion expressed via political parties and via other means of the expression of public opinion. The anti-Ottoman mood of the public in Britain during the Russo-Turkish War had left a devastating impact on the Ottoman diplomatic service. For this reason, party politics in Britain was carefully followed. Reports on the party lines and positions were meticulously dispatched to Istanbul from Britain. A comparable concern regarding partisan divisions and disputes was also displayed in France, Italy, and other parliamentary regimes. Unsurprisingly, the correspondence from the embassies in Germany and Russia lacked tracking of a “public opinion”.

Ironically, Britain was the country where artificial manipulation of public opinion was least possible due to its developed civil society and open public political debates. It was also the country where public opinion exerted the most pressure on the foreign policy of the British cabinet. Knowing this, the Ottoman diplomatic corps showed a special concern for public opinion in Britain as became clear from the long reports assigned to it.\textsuperscript{808} Paradoxically, although it was least likely to influence public opinion in Britain via authorized publications, paying affiliated journalists, and other “artificial” means, it was in Britain where the most effort was exerted and the incomparably highest expenditures were made.

With the emergence of the Armenian events in the 1890s, this issue began to haunt all the embassies\textsuperscript{809}. Although the massacres caused diplomatic tensions, the most disturbing repercussion of the events was the uproar of the public opinion and the press rather than

\textsuperscript{807} For a political report commenting on the British elections as the manifestation of British public opinion, BOA, HR.SYS 582/20, 28 January 1892.

\textsuperscript{808} For the permanent pressure on the Ottoman diplomatic corps in London, see the memoirs of Abdülhak Hamid and Esat Cemal (Paker). Abdülhak Hamid, \textit{Abdülhak Hamid’in Hatıraları}, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1994; Paker, Esat Cemal. \textit{Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları}, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1952.

\textsuperscript{809} For the tension the Ottoman representations abroad experienced due to the Armenian events and its international repercussions, see Abdülhak Hamid… p. 217, 280. Abdülhak Hamid’s very negative views on the Armenian activities displays the immense effect of these events on the Ottoman diplomatic service. He endorsed a very defensive position on behalf of the Hamidian regime against the Armenian threat.
the relatively mild reactions of the European governments. All the embassies struggled with the growing bad reputation. The severest pressure was on the shoulders of the embassy in London as the British had the most organized and most outspoken civil society with Protestant/humanitarian reflexes. Moreover, the Bulgarian atrocities had displayed the enormous role of public opinion and public agitation in the making of foreign policy in Britain. The embassies felt a strong urge to defend the empire’s honor and their own although this experience also instigated an escalating reaction to the sultan’s corrupt reputation in the eyes of the diplomatic service. The Young Turks in exile also cultivated contradictory sentiments regarding the Armenian events. They oscillated between cooperating with the Armenian organizations in Europe and defending the actions of the Ottoman government as legitimate self-defense against a bloody insurrection.

From 1890 onwards, the embassies dispatched an abundant number of reports related to the Armenian problem. Four embassies were sending by far the highest number of reports on the issue: the embassies to St. Petersburg, Washington, London, and Paris. As mentioned above, these reports constituted the main paperwork of the embassy to Washington whereas the “Armenian work” was one of the main activities in the other three embassies. The importation of any publication into the Ottoman Empire that reported on the Armenian issue was to be prevented. Therefore, the embassies informed on the harmful

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810 For an Ottoman tract accentuating the significance of public opinion in Britain and criticizing how humanitarianism had been hijacked by the biased propaganda of Turcophobe opinion leaders; Halil Halid, A Study in English Turcophobia, London: Pan-Islamic Society, 1904.

811 Halil Halid, who was employed in the consular service in London and as a Turkish instructor in Cambridge University, addressed the British audience and pointed out that the reality of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was different from what the public assumed due to the success of Armenian propaganda in Britain. Halil Hamid, The Diary of a Turk, London: Adam and Charles Black, 1903. Halil Halid also published articles in the British newspaper to challenge the anti-Ottoman propaganda. See Wasti, Tanvir. “Halil Hamid: An Anti-Imperialist Muslim Intellectual”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 29, no:3, 1993, pp.559-579.

812 For some puzzling repercussions of the attempted assassination of Abdülhamid organized by the Armenian committees on the Young Turk opponents of the regime, see Hanoğlu, Şükrü. Preparation for a Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.59. Also, for the ambivalent attitude of Young Turks towards Armenian revolutionaries, see Hanoğlu, Şükrü. Young Turks in Opposition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
contents of publications and proposed the prohibition of publications or certain issues of publications in the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{813} It is not surprising to observe that the embassies in Vienna and Berlin did not find much to report to Istanbul. In the Hamidian era, Berlin and Vienna emerged as two reliable and unwavering allies of the Ottoman Empire in which any kind of unruly or seditious activity of dissent was not permitted or sympathized with. On the contrary, the German diplomatic service even requested friendly countries such as Switzerland to disallow any activity of the Ottoman dissidents within their territories\textsuperscript{814}.

Although the number of dispatches on the Armenian issue erupted in 1890, after the quietening of the Armenian events in the late 1890s, dispatches of the same ilk continued to be sent until 1908. Only a slight decrease is observable after the pacification of the Armenian problem in the late 1890s. In the eyes of the diplomats and the center, the affair had calmed down only temporarily, and therefore vigilance and readiness for a prospective eruption of the affair had to be maintained. This shows the extent of the impact the Armenian phenomenon had on the psyche of the Ottoman center. It may be also argued that the constant Armenian threat and subversiveness nurtured the development of a sense of “we” against “them” (Armenians), and subsequently this sense of “we” was transferred into an awareness of Turkishness, the only loyal element within the Ottoman Empire.

Ottoman officialdom kept its level of vigilance and alarm regarding the Armenian problem. Armenians abroad continued to be monitored and their activities reported. All the Armenians, whether they were students, peasants, people seeking their fortune, or political activists, were individually identified by files containing short biographies and information about their physical appearances. The movements of Armenians (especially when in groups) were followed and reported. In that regard, the Ottoman representatives abroad displayed the quick consolidation of a modern state seeking to know its own subjects in detail, given that in the Ottoman Empire citizenship had only been established in 1869. Nevertheless, the dimensions and effort of documenting and identifying were at a very

\textsuperscript{813} For example, see the request of Salih Münir Pasha, the ambassador in Paris regarding the prohibition of the entry of the newspapers “Echo de Paris” and “Aurore” into the Ottoman Empire, BOA, HR.SYS 2750-24, 4 April 1902.

modest scale in comparison to the provincial administrative offices from which reports and dispatches identifying and documenting were flowing abundantly.

5.2. Opposing Young Turks

Apparently, the activities of the Young Turks were another issue to be addressed by the Ottoman foreign representatives. Regular reports on the activities of the Young Turks and informative memoranda were continuously sent from the embassies to Istanbul. The rich reports on the activities of the Young Turks and analyses of their personalities took a considerable amount of ambassadorial and consular work. When Ali Haydar Midhat, the son of Midhat Pasha, left İzmir for Paris for subversive activity, he was contacted by the relevant Ottoman representatives personally both in Athens and Marseilles. One report just after the move of Kemal Bey, the grandson of Midhat Pasha, to France, suggested that Kemal Bey’s participation in the Young Turks should be avoided, by employment abroad if necessary. Ahmed Rıza Bey, İsmail Kemal, Ali Nuri (Gustaf Noring), and Edhem Nuri were the figures whose activities were most frequently reported. However, Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha who joined the Young Turks in Paris was the dissident who was most carefully and exhaustively followed and tracked at every opportunity. Loads of reports were amassed and dispatched to Istanbul. His desertion to the Young Turks shocked and panicked Abdülhamid and his establishment. The scare Mahmud Celaleddin’s desertion evoked reverberated in the continent wide communications concerning Mahmud Celaleddin. All the Ottoman diplomatic legations were on the alert for the possible moves of the renegade spy master. His short stay in Greece to get into contact with the Albanian

815. See the folders BOA, HR.SYS 1788/1814.
817. BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA 41/55, 1320 N. 21.
818. See folders BOA, HR.SYS 1788 to 1797.
819. For the reports on Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, see the folder BOA, HR.SYS 1791, 1792 (correspondence between 14 December 1899 to 3 February 1902, with half of it dated from the year 1902).
revolutionary committees organized by Ismail Kemal who voyaged to Corfu from Southern Albania created an immense uproar. His activities in Greece created a continent wide alert in the Ottoman legations. His journey was reported day-to-day by the relevant representatives. His short stay alarmed Istanbul. The Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried every means to persuade the Greek government to expel the renegade spy master. The rebuff of the Greek government was regretted by Rifaat Bey, the ambassador to Athens who admitted that Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha was a figure of sympathy for journalists, parliamentarians, and even ministers. He also related the negative response of the Greek authorities, who asserted that such an expulsion would be contrary to the spirit of their constitution. Thus, concluded Rifaat Bey, who was desperate to accomplish the tasks given to him, Greece provides “liberty of action to the anarchists”. Nevertheless, at the end, Mahmud Celaleddin was forced to leave Greece, not for his “anarchist activities” but “out of his own will” as imposed by the Greek government. His departure from Greece via Corfu was instantly communicated to Istanbul with relief by Rifaat Bey who got definite information from the consul general of the Ottoman Empire in Corfu. He landed in Brindisi, and this was reported by the Ottoman embassy in Rome. Simultaneously, Salih Münir Bey, the ambassador to France was informed that Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha might be on his way to France. The exchange of dispatches included brainstorming on how to react to Mahmud Celaleddin’s prospective arrival in France. The embassy in Rome kept Istanbul informed continuously until Mahmud Celaleddin left Italy for Switzerland. His activities in Switzerland, where he tried to organize the Young Turks in Geneva under his leadership, were followed very closely by the Ottoman consul general in Geneva, Baron Richthofen. Baron Richthofen sent regular and bulky reports to Istanbul on the moves of Mahmud Celaleddin.

The principal reason for the panic that emerged with the desertion of Mahmud Celaleddin was the sympathy expressed by European public opinion towards him. The European press portrayed Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha as a liberal and an able opponent of Abdülhamid who might challenge and seize his authority as he was acknowledged to be capable of such a takeover due to his impressive political background, intellectual credentials, and royal marriage.
Since his pro-British sympathies were well known, Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha contacted Britain support. These maneuvers alarmed Abdülhamid who feared Mahmud Celaleddin would “translat(e) it into a movement of the pro-British wing of the Ottoman bureaucracy and instructed Ottoman diplomats to scrutinize the affairs of his brother in-law. Later, the palace tempted Damad Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha to return with an offer of £ 50,000 and shares in the concession that he had been trying to acquire for a British company. Later in England, Anthopulos Pasha made him a new offer, and finally Turhan Pasha added some inducement in order to persuade him to return.” Although Abdülhamid failed to convince his brother in-law to return, his diplomatic efforts enabled the British to give a cold reception to his request for support. Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha’s efforts to seek assistance from Germany and France also failed. Mahmud Celaleddin’s desertion resulted in one of the most coordinated and extensive flurries of Ottoman diplomatic activity involving various diplomatic posts in Europe.

Although regular reporting of the subversive activities of the Young Turks was a permanent task of the diplomatic representatives, the number of reports on subversive activities exploded in 1898 and declined by 1905. The years 1900, 1901, and 1902 were years of heightened panic and tension as we can observe from the unprecedented amount of work devoted to the subversive activities in these three years. These years were also the years of Abdülhamid’s aggressive purge of the Young Turks. After Abdülhamid successfully countered the Young Turks, things calmed down from 1902 onwards. Nevertheless, the tracking of any Ottoman citizen within the area of responsibility of any diplomatic post continued to be a primary concern regardless of the potential threat the individual in question posed. Students, merchants, and others were to be tracked with equal diligence.

Salih Münir Pasha in Paris was the chief antagonist in the eyes of the Young Turks. He was the willing master spy of the sultan and pleased Abdülhamid with his impressive service. Salih Münir Pasha played the role of the intermediary between Abdülhamid and European diplomatic representatives by using his personal diplomacy and became a

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820 Hanioğlu, Şükrü. ibid, p. 143.
821 For a bleak portrait of Salih Münir Pasha, see Fesch, Paul, Abdülhamid’in Son Günlerinde İstanbul, İstanbul: Pera, 1999, pp. 81-89.
confident of the sultan.822 Being the son of Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, who was a high-ranking bureaucrat and Minister of Public Works in the Hamidian age, probably helped in gaining the trust of the sultan. He was rewarded for his loyalty with his long tenure as the Ottoman ambassador in Paris from 1895 until the fall of Abdülhamid. He chased the Young Turks carefully on every occasion and reported all their malice to his master. He was responsible also for Switzerland and Belgium. He tracked down the Young Turk committees in Geneva with equal determination as well.823 However, Salih Münir Pasha was no subservient loyalist. He was also a master of double-dealing. He asked for pay for informing the sultan of the subversive activities of the Young Turks. Unless he was pleased financially, he preferred to keep the information for himself. Moreover, he also invented conspiracies to squeeze money out of the sultan. The privileged ambassador visited Istanbul several times a year as he managed to keep his halo of immunity. His capacity to intrigue rendered the Yıldız Palace incapable of subordinating him. He succeeded in keeping the trust of the sultan.

Not surprisingly, he was dismissed immediately after the takeover of the Young Turks. He was degraded, and his title of “Pasha” was revoked. He was persecuted for his dealings, and his possessions were confiscated. He was forced to leave the Ottoman Empire. He was denied a pension until 1913.824 Only in 1925 he could return to Turkey.825 Salih Münir Pasha was one of the few victims of the Young Turks as he was one of the prominent symbols and arch-villains of the corrupt regime of Abdülhamid in the eyes of Young Turks. He was also the only major figure from the diplomatic service who encountered such a demonization. Apparently, he was purged and eliminated not for ideological reasons, but for personal maneuverings. The diplomatic service in general was relatively free of the disgrace of cronyism with the corrupt regime. The governors and military officers had much more chance to promote their own interests and benefit from the regime.

824 BOA, MV 174/62, 1331 Ra. 11.
In comparison, the Ottoman diplomatic service never enjoyed the prestige and privileges of the German diplomatic service within the autocracy that would have enabled them to be one of the pillars of the autocracy.\textsuperscript{826}

Although the toughest and most extensive work was performed by the Paris embassy, all the other embassies were carefully tracking any Young Turk activity and their contacts within their areas of responsibility. Necib Melhame, the brother of the ill-reputed Selim Melhame, was appointed as the undersecretary to the embassy to Paris with the specific mission of “buying” Young Turks. However, his corruption obliged the French government to declare Necib Melhame \textit{“persona non grata”}, and he was deported. Although Abdülhamid appointed his favorite as the Commissioner to Bulgaria, his corruption ended with the Bulgarian government’s deportation of Necib Melhame, declaring him again \textit{persona non grata}.\textsuperscript{827} Gadban Efendi and Necib Melhame, both Christian Arabs, were Abdülhamid’s special appointments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the specific purpose of tracking down Young Turks, and they acted as Abdülhamid’s personal informants and intelligence officers. Nevertheless, except for these figures, Abdülhamid did not interfere with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

An important point we have to address is the personal convictions and views of the members of the diplomatic service. The considerably high number of diplomats who joined the Young Turks makes us think that, apart from their obligation to perform their office work and their concern for future promotions, diplomats had not much enthusiasm and conviction in tracking down the Young Turks. Beginning from Kanıpaşaşazade Rifat Bey, a scribe in the Paris embassy who joined Namık Kemal and his entourage when they left the

\textsuperscript{826} For a comparison, see the immense influence of Prince Eulenburg, “the best friend of the kaiser”, on the kaiser, Röhl, John C.G. “Philipp Eulenburg, the Kaiser’s Best Friend”, in \textit{The Kaiser and his Court}, John C.G. Röhl, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 28-69. Apparently, there was no equivalent of Prince Eulenburg in the Ottoman diplomacy. Furthermore, such an influence and affinity is unimaginable given the different social status and social prestige of the ministries of foreign affairs in these two countries.

Ottoman Empire for Paris, many others opted to join the Young Turks.\textsuperscript{828} Samipaşazade Sezai, while working in the İstişare Odası (Counseling Office) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, decided to join the Young Turks and moved to Paris in 1901.\textsuperscript{829} Reşid Sadi Bey, the chief secretary of the London embassy, participated in the conspiratorial meeting organized by Prince Sabahaddin and İsmail Kemal in London in 1903.\textsuperscript{830} The observation that these officials seemed indifferent and lacking any conviction while performing their professional duties seems valid for the entire Hamidian bureaucracy as can be deduced from the memoirs of the officials as suggested previously. Of course, it is dangerous to make any such generalization. Many other officials, who were generally older and scions of the first Tanzimat generation, were loyal, not necessarily to the person of the sultan, but to the idea of the Ottoman polity. Lastly, careerism also had to be a decisive motivation in generating loyalty and conservative attitudes. It would be more accurate to reconstruct the conflict between the Young Turks and the palace not as an exclusively ideological clash, but a function of the unfulfilled expectancies of the newly rising educated generation, who felt that their merits and their superior Western-style education were not rewarded adequately, vis-a-vis those who owed their social status and offices to traditional and patrimonial loyalties, connections, and old-style education. Once the new generation were satisfied, they were prone to abandon their opposition and keep their personal opinions to themselves unlike the Russian opposition where the opponents of the regime were forced to give up their relationship with and loyalties to the regime completely.

After a compromise was reached between Abdülhamid and the Young Turks, “İşhak Sukuti and Abdullah Cevdet became medical doctors at the Ottoman embassies in Rome and Vienna; soon after, Tunalı Hilmi was appointed scribe to the Ottoman embassy in Madrid.”\textsuperscript{831} The age old, pre-modern Ottoman practice of appointing dissidents to state offices illustrates the complicated nature of politics. Abdülhamid could be confident that

\textsuperscript{828} Davison, Roderick, ibid, pp. 212-13.


\textsuperscript{830} Ali Haydar Midhat, Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Hatıralarım, İstanbul: Bengi Yayınları, 2008, p. 176.

these Young Turks would not confuse the minds of the staff in the embassies. His confidence derived not from his trust in the ideological and personal perfection of the staff in the embassies but from his recognition that the Young Turks would immediately cease to propagate their subversive ideas once they were subordinated to the palace. For example, one report suggested that if Kadri Bey, who had previously been a contributor to the subversive Saday-i Millet (Voice of the People) published in Bucharest and was subsequently appointed as consul to Kraguyevaç, was not paid his salary, he would go back to Bucharest and continue his subversive activities.832

Abdülhamid followed the same policy with regard to Halil Halid. Halil Halid departed from the Ottoman Empire for Britain to pursue his opposition politics and worked for the opposition newspaper of Selim Faris printed in London. He was persuaded by Abdülhamid in 1897 to quit the newspaper and to be employed as the second secretary in the Ottoman embassy to London.833

In the previous chapter, it had been pointed out that sharing the same social milieu, experiencing similar processes of socializations and therefore being part of the same state elite, Young Turks could be recruited in the embassies upon deference to the sultan. The world of Ahmet İhsan (as depicted in the previous chapter), the Young Turks, and the embassies was a familiar/habitual one in which conflicts and compromises were more personal than we may appreciate from outside and thus could be reconciliated in personal level.834 The tone and discourses employed in the “submission letters” of the Young Turks can be analyzed in this regard. In them, they were enforced to depict themselves as

832 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 30/62, 1316 Ș. 25.
834 One striking illustration of the primacy of personal and kinship over ideology is the closeness of Mehmed Bey and his uncle Mahmud Nedim Pasha, who was portrayed by the Young Ottomans as the arch-reactionary enemy of the Young Turks and any progress whatsoever. Mehmed Bey, the most radical and a partially anarchist member of the Young Ottomans, developed good relations with his uncle after his uncle became Grand Vizier. He supported his uncle and became his bridge to the Young Ottomans, who were frustrated by his appointment to the post of Grand Vizier. (See Mardin, Şerif, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 62-3.)
wrongly rebelled to the order in which they were taken care of and thus breached the code of conduct of this cultural intimate world. Although, apparently this discourse is imposed on them, given that Young Turks predominantly came from the same social milieu (or at least trained in schools where they experienced a similar socialization process and were assimilated to this culture) reconciliation with them and recruitment of the apologetic Young Turks in the embassies was possible. Thus, the Hamidian regime could develop its mechanisms of repression without ever using physical violence. The executions the Young Turks committed after the suppression of the Incident of March of 31 heralded the beginning of a new era in which political disagreements were no more seen as an intrafamily problem, but genuine, irreconcilable political enmities. Therefore, in this new world, there was no room for compromise as the legitimacy of politics was acknowledged and “age of politics” had emerged.

5.3. Connecting Two Worlds Apart

The position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unique in the sense that it functioned as the intermediary institution between the “foreigners” and “Ottomans”, between “Muslims” and “non-Muslims”, and between “provincial Ottoman officials” and “high-ranking bureaucrats in Istanbul” as it coordinated the implementation of the Ottoman “reform” (i.e., reform of the situation of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire) in an interactive bargaining between the parties. The local officials reported their implementation of the “reform” as well as the general situation regarding the relations between Muslims, Christians, and the state. Not surprisingly, most reports were optimistic regarding the implementation and the results of the “reforms”. On the other hand, many

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835 For example, for the “submission letter” of Mizancı Murad in 1897, see Emil, Birol, Mizancı Murad Bey, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2009, pp. 149-150.

836 For the genesis and development of the Armenian imbroglio in the Ottoman diplomacy throughout Hamidian era, see Küçük, Cevdet. Osmanlı Diplomasisinde Ermeni Meselesinin Ortaya Çıkışı 1878-1897, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1994. Also see Şaşmaz, Musa, British Policy and the Application of Reforms for Armenians in Eastern Anatolia 1877-1897, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000.
complaints were voiced by the missionaries, the representatives of the local churches, and the consuls of the European powers, and these needed to be communicated to the offices in charge or to be reviewed by the Ministry itself.\textsuperscript{837}

Of course, the ministry also collected reports from the local governmental offices (governorships, district administrations, military garrisons, police) reporting the subversive military, political, and non-political activities of Armenians, the communications and relations between the foreign consuls and the Armenians, et cetera. These reports were transmitted to the Prime Ministry. In short, the ministry was in the center of a web of communications between distant parties. At the same time, it conveyed communications to alleviate the situation and to execute the coordination of the progress of the counter-insurgency by managing its international dimensions. For example, with the 1900s, Roumelia became a very important concern of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It transmitted the international dynamics of the Roumelian problem and coordinated the pursuit of the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian brigands moving back and forth between the Ottoman Empire and their “homelands abroad”.\textsuperscript{838} In the correspondence of the Ministry, Roumelia emerged as a priority issue with the end of the 1890s. The Roumelian problem was a multilayered and multi-faceted one in which diplomatic, political, law and order, and ideological dimensions were intertwined. Therefore, it needed the instant follow-up of various dynamics simultaneously.

This task of the Ministry regarding the non-Muslims partly derived from the fact that the supervision and administration of the Ottoman non-Muslim millets had been managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1876. “Mezahip Odası” (later called Deva-i Hariciye Kitabeti) was established to administer the records of the non-Muslim millets and coordinate their relations with the state. Mezahip Odası was also charged with handling the legal disputes among non-Muslims and Muslims.\textsuperscript{839} “Mezahip Odası” was transferred to

\textsuperscript{837} For the constant follow-up on the turmoil the Christians (and predominantly Armenians) had experienced by the British military consuls throughout Anatolia, see DeVore, Ronald Marvin, \textit{British Military Consuls in Asia Minor 1878-1882}, unpublished dissertation, Indiana University, 1973. Also see Hans-Lukas Kieser, \textit{Iskalanmış Barış}, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005.

\textsuperscript{838} See BOA, HR.SYS 1132/1, 19 February 1903.

\textsuperscript{839} “Hariciye Nezareti”, \textit{DIA}. 294
the Ministry of Justice in 1877 with all the tasks of the office maintained due to the recognition that non-Muslims were subjects of the Ottoman Empire like the Muslims.\textsuperscript{840}

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs partially acted as the overseer of the “reforms” due to its intermediary role between the clashing parties.

Given the interconnectedness of the external and internal politics of the Ottoman Empire, it is hard to perceive the Ottoman Foreign Ministry as merely the coordinator of foreign relations. For example, the concerns of the Inspectorship of the Province of Roumelia were a major preoccupation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The Ministry corresponded with the relevant embassies to track necessary information to inform and assist the inspectorship.\textsuperscript{841} Apparently, the inspectorship of the Province of Roumelia is a good example of the interconnectedness of domestic and international politics. Nevertheless, the Inspectorship of Province of Roumelia was not the only Ottoman governmental office assisted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Any governmental office in need of information was provided with that information and logistics by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, this was one of the crucial responsibilities of the Ministry. Security concerns of the Dahiliye were an important task of the Prime Ministry. The “şekavet” (brigandage) activities of Balkan nationalists were tracked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the Dahiliye.\textsuperscript{842}

The Foreign Ministry conveyed the dispatches of the embassies to the relevant ministries (predominantly Dahiliye and Zabtiye) through the Prime Ministry.\textsuperscript{843} The ministries and the prime ministry were also in touch with the Foreign Ministry for attaining the necessary information and consultation. These included the reliability of individuals of foreign nationalities (as well as the Christians of Ottoman nationality regarding their

\textsuperscript{840} Demirel, Fatmagül, \textit{Adliye Nezaretinin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (1876-1914)}, unpublished dissertation, Istanbul University, 2003, p. 54.

\textsuperscript{841} For example, see folders BOA, HR.SYS 1622 to 1636.

\textsuperscript{842} For example see BOA, DH.MKT, 474/60 (1319 Z. 29) for the communiqué of the Dahiliye Nezareti requesting the governorships to dispatch the şekavet incidents to the MFA on daily basis.

\textsuperscript{843} For example, the dispatch from the Athens embassy submitted to the Prime Ministry by the MFA reports the plans of the Armenian revolutionaries in Athens to instigate a rebellion in Istanbul. BOA, A.MKT.MHM 630/20, 1314 Ca 2..
possible activities and connections abroad), possible foreign contacts of the local activists, et cetera.

It is important to bear in mind that the Ottoman Empire had a very centralized organization in which every communication was passed through the Prime Ministry. The Prime Ministry was informed of any communication between any two governmental agencies.844 The Prime Ministry was acting in the name of the sultan, and this status endowed the Prime Ministry with immense power. The organizational structure of the Sublime Porte was instituted taking the Prime Ministry as the center and the ministries as conductors of daily business rather than independent bodies. Thus, it was no coincidence that the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs were both working in the building complex of the Prime Ministry. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its routine cannot be dissociated from the other governmental offices. This is true also with regard to its ideological build up as reflected in the official documents and correspondence.

5.4. From Sedition to Anarchism: Enemies of the State

The Hamidian official language used when referring to Armenian affairs was strikingly “archaic”. As Grigor Suny has observed, we cannot assess the Turkish-Armenian conflicts as the outcome of “two competing nationalisms” but rather between the rising Armenian nationalism and “state imperialists” who were ambivalent and vexed facing a threat they could not comprehend in an age of nationalism.845 The official language is not only dehumanizing, but also self-confidently and arrogantly state-centric. First of all, in the

844 See BOA, A.MKT.MHM 617/41, 1324 C 13. Terşabuk, who had lived in Paris for several years and had just returned to Mersin where his relatives resided, was arrested with his relatives. An interrogation was conducted simultaneously by Zabtiye, Dahiliye (Governorship of Adana), and Hariciye, which requested an investigation of Terşabuk’s possible political activities in France. All the correspondences are coordinated by the Prime Ministry. Also see Akyıldız, Ali. Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004, p. 47.

eye of the Ottoman bureaucrat, Armenian disorders were “Ermeni fesadi denilen asar-ı șekavet” (signs of brigandage known as the Armenian conspiracy). Armenian activity was imagined and defined as merely brigandage in its pre-modern and pre-political sense. Thus, the response to the Armenian militancy was police action. The Ottoman embassies and consulates were to undertake police action such as informing Istanbul regarding the moves of the Armenians and demanding the persecution of the Armenians by the host countries. Thus, no agency was conceded to Armenians. As indicated previously, this perception was equally applicable to any of the rebellious ethnic groups such as Serbians, Greeks, and Bulgarians and derived from the state-centric vision of the Ottoman bureaucratic world. “Yüz bulmak” was a frequent official label depicting the attitude of the non-Muslim communities who were to be only stimulated and manipulated by external forces.846

The innocent Armenian folk who were yet to be “encouraged” by external forces was carefully dissociated from the Armenian “tertibat-ı fesadiyye” (conspiratorial organization) in an imperial benevolence.847 This was because, as the developing official discourse argued, the Armenian community lived peacefully and faced no difficulty in practicing its religion and religious ceremonies with the grace of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore the Armenian brigandage was irrelevant.848 Nevertheless, probably partially for reasons of practicality, Armenian militants in official correspondence were described simply as “Armenians”, which establishes an image that ethnicizes political activity, includes all the members of the ethnic group, and subsumes them within a single politicized community. Thus, although the official discourse uses an archaic state-centric language that curses those who were not grateful for the benevolence of Ottoman rule, it transforms through repetition into an ethically sensitive state-nationalist if not nationalist language.

It is interesting to compare and contrast the language used between the Ottoman governmental offices and between Ottoman officialdom and their foreign counterparts. The Armenian bands were termed as “erbab-ı fesad”, “eşkiya”, “Ermeni fesadesi”, “erbab-ı

846 For Armenians, see BOA,Y.EE 167/7; for Serbians, see BOA, İ.HUS 54/1320.
847 BOA, HR.SYS, 2829/47, 15 February 1894.
848 “Cümlenin ma’lumu olduğu vechile tebe’a-i şahaneden bulunan Ermeniler mine’l kadim Hükümet-i Seniyyenin saye-i adl ü re’fetinde asude-nişin (ve) emn ü eman olarak her hususuda dare-i emniyyetede ve mezhep ve ayin bahsinde de serbesti-i kamil içinde yaşamış”. (p.2)
“Ermeni müfsetatı”, “fesad komiteleri” (intriguers, brigands, Armenian conspiracy/sedition, conspiratorial committees) in the interdepartmental correspondence of the Ottoman state. The label of “erbab-ı fesad” and others were dropped in the dispatches of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed to its foreign counterparts. However, it looks that “erbab-ı fesad”, a specific concept meaningful only in its Ottoman/Islamic background was also excluded in the (French language) intraministerial correspondence of the Foreign Ministry and not translated into French. The same was true with regard to the language employed in reporting on the Young Turks. For example a dispatch sent to Abdülhamid in Turkish from the Ottoman consul general in Geneva defines Geneva as “her kısım erbab-ı müfsetat ve melanetin ilticagahi” (the haven of all kinds of seditionists). Apparently, these terms were very emotionally loaded and bound to lose their specific references when translated into French and more so when translated into diplomatic French. The same dispatch defined the journal “Osmanlı” as “Osmanlı nam melanetkarane”. We observe that the use of French as the language of communication tempered the tone of the discourse as any language was another medium in which the discourses were reconstructed according to the references of the language. The French language with its “civilizationist” and “objective/rational” sounding nature in the eyes of the Ottoman bureaucrats remained aloof from the discourse and vocabulary of the Ottomans. The fact that it was accessible to any foreigner should also have forced the producer of the texts to accommodate to a new mental milieu and develop strategies specific to the language of conduct. In the French-language reports, the erbab-ı fesad turned into Armenian anarchists, transforming the age old seditionist and unruly subjects of the Muslim polity into modern conspirators aiming to destroy the social order.

849 For example, see BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA 9/69, 1306 N. 19.
851 Quoted in Ateş, Sabri, ibid, p. 59.
852 The volumes published by the State Archives Directory provide us many examples of correspondence regarding the Armenian activists abroad written in French. See Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Fransız İlişkileri, 3 volumes, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002; Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-İngiliz İlişkileri, 3 volumes, Başbakanlık
The 1890s were also the peak of anarchist activism and assassinations throughout Europe (and the United States). It was a preeminent concern of the European governments. The 1890s were a decade in which several heads of the state had been assassinated. Sadi Carnot, Umberto I, and McKinley were murdered by anarchist assassins following the killing of Alexander II in 1881 by the Narodnaya Volya.\textsuperscript{853} The activities of the anarchists, as well as the persecution of the anarchists, were seen as important news to be dispatched to Istanbul. Anarchism was a common threat to the states, the established order, and the ruling elites of Europe. This aspect was underlined by the Ottoman diplomats as they were aware that all the established elites were floating on the same ship. Such an understanding was developed as early as the Congress of Vienna in which the representatives of the European powers agreed to intervene in the case of a popular unrest or rebellion. This policy was implemented many times between 1815 and 1830 before such interventionism became unproductive and even counterproductive.\textsuperscript{854} Given that Armenian Dashnaks, Hncaks, and the Bulgarian IMRO were all influenced by the socialist and anarchist currents and militancy, the Ottoman state aimed to influence European governments by referring to the subversive programs of these movements. The Ottoman state also tried to learn to combat anarchism from the methods and strategies of the European governments.\textsuperscript{855} Regular information was conveyed by the embassies such as the passing of new bills to combat anarchism\textsuperscript{856} and the pursuit of anarchists of various countries.\textsuperscript{857}

\textsuperscript{853} Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2004; Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Rus İlişkileri, 3 volumes, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2006.


\textsuperscript{855} For the report dispatched from the embassy to London on cooperation between the Armenians and the Russian nihilists based in London, see BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 19/13, 1311 B. 5.

\textsuperscript{856} For the dispatch informing the amendment made to the Italian penal code to combat anarchism, see BOA, HR.SYS 1760/6, 7 July 1894.

\textsuperscript{857} For the Russian policing of the activities of the nihilists in the United States, see BOA, HR.SYS 1760/2, 21 October 1883.
The Russian revolutionaries were also followed and reported. Anarchism among Italian workers in Istanbul was monitored as well.

The Foreign Ministry was alarmed by the “anarchist international”. It pursued not only those who posed a threat to the empire but also those who might present a danger to the other empires and states. This was the undertaking of a responsible state showing solidarity with its fellow states. A certain Alexandre Mikolovich (in French spelling), a Serb by nationality, had left Istanbul for Copenhagen with two bombs for a task he undertook for the Polish revolutionary committee. Due to a request made by the Danish Foreign Ministry to the Ottoman consul general in Copenhagen in early May 1885, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry investigated the activities and connections of the aforementioned revolutionary in Istanbul for two weeks. The investigation concluded that Mikolovich resided in Istanbul at the Hotel Britannia. The Ministry deepened the investigation by requesting the Ottoman legations in Vienna and Budapest to investigate and report on the activities of Mikolovich while he stayed in Vienna. This case was just one of the examples of the investigation of suspicious anarchists and revolutionaries by the Ottoman Empire, not for its immediate interest and police activities, but for its imperial reflexes and imperial solidarity. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire rightfully expected the other European states to inform Istanbul regarding the Ottoman dissidents and revolutionaries and take action when necessary. The Foreign Ministry investigated various suspicious individuals who were assumed to pose a threat to the public and political order of the Empire. Many Greek nationals and other individuals holding Balkan nationality fell into this category.

The Ottoman establishment was cognizant of the anarchist dispositions of the Armenian revolutionary committees and their links to the anarchist currents in Europe. This dimension facilitated Ottoman demands on the European powers regarding the surveillance of Armenian revolutionaries. Legations abroad were in pursuit of informants to access intelligence. Although there were several irrelevant intelligence reports provided by informants not in the interest of the empire, many other informants notified the Ottoman

858 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 24/30, 1313 Za. 6.
859 BOA, HR.SYS 1759/3 (correspondences 22 June 1898 to 18 April 1899).
860 BOA, HR.SYS 1822/8, 22 May 1885.
representatives regarding the activities of the Armenian revolutionaries abroad.\textsuperscript{861} For example the Ottoman embassy to Washington conveyed that Ali Ferruh Bey was informed that a certain Vartan Bulguryan, aged thirty-five, departed New York for Moersina with dynamite, arms, and money.\textsuperscript{862} Another move of Armenian revolutionaries was dispatched from Tblisi. According to the consul in Tblisi, Essad Bey, four Armenian exiled revolutionaries arrived in Tblisi.\textsuperscript{863} Every small move of the Armenians was meticulously followed.\textsuperscript{864} These accounts display the modern individualist anarchist aspects of the Armenian revolutionaries besides their rural origins and motivations, coming as they did from the poor localities of Ottoman Armenia.

The Ministry was involved extensively in the investigation of the failed assassination of Abdülhamid by a Belgian anarchist in the service of the Armenian revolutionary committees by activating its channels of international communication. The investigation was conducted by requesting the Ottoman legations in various countries, as well as the European embassies in Istanbul, to provide extensive information on the persons involved in or related to the failed assassination. The final report was prepared in light of these communications and information-gathering by a commission and later published as a separate book in 1905.\textsuperscript{865}

With the reign of Mahmud II and the Tanzimat, we encounter the emergence of the “rhetoric of tolerance”. The Ottoman imperial system of managing religious and confessional groups began to be consecrated as “tolerance”, and this concept, which is a very historicized notion, became eternalized and adapted to the classical age of the Ottoman Empire although it was only after 1856 that the non-Muslims were admitted (reluctantly or not) into the political nation. Needless to say, the “rhetoric of tolerance”

\textsuperscript{861} For a depiction of an Armenian informant visiting the Ottoman embassy to London, see Paker, Esat Cemal, \textit{Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları}, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1952, pp. 21-22.

\textsuperscript{862} BOA, HR-SYS 1760/18, 20 July 1898.

\textsuperscript{863} BOA, HR-SYS 1760/19, 21 July 1898.

\textsuperscript{864} Also see the documents collected in the aforementioned three-volume \textit{Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Rus İlişkileri}.

\textsuperscript{865} The final report is to be found in the Prime Ministry archives at BOA, HR SYS. 1823/1, 30 September 1905.
was an imperial discourse. It also implies that the maintenance of tolerance is conditioned on the Armenian community’s tacit consent to the hierarchy between the millets. “Tolerance” is a contract not signed by two equal and legitimate parties but imposed on one of the parties. The Armenian revolutionary organizations had challenged this tacit consent. The conceptualization of the Armenian militarized organizations is also interesting. Rather than being nationalists, they were perceived and indicted for being anarchists and corrupters. Moreover, they were socialists. As has been suggested previously, the rhetoric that was employed by the state described Balkan nationalist movements not as free agents, but as pawns of foreign powers (especially Russia), and not as serving the aspirations of nationhood, but as supporting anarchy and chaos.\footnote{866 For similar language being used for the Balkan nationalists, see Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, \textit{Mir‘at-i Hakikat}, İstanbul: Bereket Yayinevi, 1983.}

Ottoman officialdom denied that nationalism was the motivation of the Armenian organizations. This discourse was careful to differentiate between the corrupting minority of Armenians and the majority of Armenians, who were innocent and loyal subjects of the sultan but who could potentially be led by the corrupting minority due to their naivety (and ignorance). Reproducing the Islamic legal notions of order, peace and war, because the Armenian militant organizations had rebelled against the legitimate order and, therefore, against peace, any violence inflicted on them was perceived as legitimate and even necessary. Within this perception, the Ottoman administrators did not feel that they transgressed the boundaries of legitimacy when they employed undue violence not only on the militants, but also on those who were influenced by them.\footnote{867 For the “annihilationist mentality” of the Tanzimat, see James Reid, \textit{Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878}, Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2000.}

The ministry got notifications of the latest activities of the Armenian nationalist organizations from the local governmental offices written in this language and vocabulary. The ministry was supposed to use this information to respond to the international pressure regarding the “oppression of the Armenians.” As expressed above, the reports and dispatches of the Ministry were self-assured of their righteousness and regarded the problems as a matter of discipline and order within a very Islamic and imperial conceptualization. For Abdülhak Hamid, all the articles published under titles such as
“massacres in Anatolia and Roumelia” (perpetuated by Turks) were outright blatant libels and only the writers of these articles believed in these lies.\textsuperscript{868} What the Ministry tried to do in its efforts to whitewash the Ottoman policies was the merging of the very traditional discourse imposed by the Islamic legacy and the modern (and European) discourse of rights and liberties. In one regard, the Ministry polished and reinvigorated the very Ottoman discourse and rendered it politically correct and compatible with the modern political discourses of legitimacy. Nevertheless, this was not a distortion, but a rearticulation of the concerns of the Ottoman officialdom in a language more communicable to the European discourses of legitimacy. The Ministry seemed to agree with the premises of these reports sent from the provinces given the fervor expressed in the intra-ministry dispatches against the European interference to the Ottoman Empire and their abuse of the conditions of the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the disagreement between the Ottoman officials and the Westerners’ indictments derived from different perceptions of state, violence, and legitimacy structures. Furthermore, such an encounter is a site where the rhetoric of confrontation was produced and reproduced.\textsuperscript{869}

In short, the international dimensions of the Armenian issue display the centrality of the Armenian factor in the constitution of Turkish nationalism. It should also be said that extreme alarm can not be regarded as a symptom of paranoia given what had already happened (the loss of Bulgaria which is another episode constitutive of Turkish nationalism) and what would happen (in the Balkan wars, the loss of Crete, et cetera). Another impact the Armenian events had generated was the frustration the Ottoman officials experienced. Ottoman officialdom regretted the fact that the Westerners only listened to the “other side” and had to surrender to the anti-Ottoman agitation instigated by public opinion. This sentiment of frustration resulted in a gradual rise in anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism throughout the Hamidian era before it became a clear aspect of the

\textsuperscript{868} Abdülhak Hamid… pp. 245-46.
\textsuperscript{869} For a more open account of the distrust of an Ottoman diplomat towards Britain, France, and Russia in their double-dealing and their support and encouragement of militant Armenian nationalism, see the report on the Armenian problem prepared by Münir Süreyya Bey, Münir Süreyya Bey, \textit{Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasi Tarihi}, Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2001. Also see Salih Münir Pasha, \textit{La Politique Orientale de la Russie}, Istanbul: Isis, 2000.
The Armenian factor is decisive in the constitution of Turkish nationalism not only due to the sedition and attacks of the Armenian militants and nationalists against the Ottoman center, but also due to its internationalizing dynamic.

During the Tanzimat, the “enemy” was Russia as it had been for the previous century and a half. Apparently, this enmity had a long history. The Tanzimat maintained the traditional concerns, fears, and anxieties of the Ottomans which were primarily based on the possibility of an attack from the neighbor to the north. What we observe with the Hamidian era is the alteration of the modes of enmities and the emergence of an unprecedented mode of enmity. First of all, this novel mode of enmity was deracinated, diffused, and unspecified. It did not have a particular, attainable, and identifiable focus. It was rather a perpetuated perception of immediate threat from anywhere and everywhere. Constant caution and vigilance had to be maintained to face this new mode of enmity. The principal object of this enmity was the emerging and rising threat and perceived threat from the non-Muslims and their economic advancement. The hostilities perpetrated by the non-Muslim brigands and the unruliness of the non-Muslim populace were not new. The methods to subdue these disturbances were not new, either. However, the intensification, politicization, and internationalization of these unrests created a completely novel situation which triggered an intense fear and panic on the side of the Ottoman center. Friendly Britain, a country adored in the Tanzimat, revoked its support of the Ottoman polity and its reform program. This development encouraged the non-Muslim militants and activists. It also created an intense disappointment and frustration for the Ottomans. The tension

870 For a strong dose of anti-imperialism already apparent in the Hamidian era in two diplomats serving in the London embassy, see Halil Halid, The Crescent Versus the Cross, London, 1907. For the anti-imperialism of Abdülhak Hamid, see his play “Finten”, and particularly the introduction he wrote for “Finten”, published in Servet-i Fünün for the first time in 1898. For the introduction to his play, see Abdülhak Hamid Tarhan, Tiyatrolari 3, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1998, pp. 156-59.

871 For a study written by an eminent diplomat that reconstructs the course of the history of Tanzimat diplomacy as the Ottoman efforts to resist Russian maneuvers by means of diplomacy, reform, and military force; Salih Münir Pasha, La Politique Orientale De La Russie, Istanbul: Isis, 2000 (originally published in Lausanne in 1918). In line with his contemporaries, Salih Münir Pasha does not develop a particular antipathy towards Britain and France. For him, the Russians were the chief enemy of the Ottomans and were behind the internal unrest within the Empire.
between the Ottomans and Britain was not similar to the hostility between the Ottomans and Russia. This hostility was not limited to the military realm. The traditional modes of enmity as had existed between the Ottomans and the despicable Russians were no longer applicable in this new world. Domestic policy and foreign policy were no longer separate. Foreign policy could no longer be isolated. In these circumstances, a deep mistrust developed towards the outer world as the only genuine concern of the Ottoman center was to hold on to what it already had, and the outer world seemed not to sympathize with the defensive concerns of the Ottoman Empire. Nobody was a “friend” of the Ottomans, and no one was to be trusted. On the domestic scene, no Christian (and in later stages no non-Turk) was to be trusted or relied upon for cooperation. Therefore, the Hamidian era gave birth to a constant fear, the perception of an imminent threat, and the demonization of the outer world. Apparently, it was the diplomats who experienced this frustration personally.

5.5. The Dusty Desk of the Weberian Bureaucrat?

Unsurprisingly, the most detailed, meticulous and informative political reports were dispatched from the London embassy. This was obviously due to the fact that Britain was the most important country regarding European affairs in general and Ottoman affairs in particular. These regular dispatches were also superior in their content and in their level of analysis. They were longer as well. They were also prepared not to report recent developments or incidents, but to pen down on regular basis summaries of all the latest developments and debates worth considering. In that regard, they were much more professional, informative, and routinized. Other evidence indicating the level of professionalism was the absence of any press sources. Presenting numerous journal articles, which was an important preoccupation of the Ottoman diplomatic service, was a sign of lack of substantive sources and the capacity to develop an analysis of its own. These reports surveyed British politics, regularly reporting the latest political developments, and were centered on the parliament. It is also noteworthy of mention that
the British reports concentrated much more on parliamentary politics, rather than the execution of cabinet policies.872

The alignments in the parliament made up a significant portion of the political reports. The two parties and their policies were carefully examined as the Ottoman diplomatic corps were attentive to the shift in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Different predispositions of the two parties were observed with maximum attention. Of course, Gladstone, whose name had been associated with the anti-Turkish campaign he launched during the Russo-Turkish War in 1876-77, thereby gaining notoriety in the eyes of the Ottoman state elite, had created policies with enduring ramifications for the Ottomans. From then on, his stance became a principle reference for liberal politics with very negative connotations. The efforts of Armenian committees based in London to contact him and attempt to engage him in their campaign against the Ottoman state were followed with disquiet.873 In the 1880s, the Irish problem triggered a division within the liberal ranks as the liberals who were against “Home Rule” left the party to form a liberal unionist group. This group was more sympathetic to the Ottoman cause. This arduous conflict was carefully noted by the London embassy.874 The dispatches display an overt sympathy towards the Conservative Party as opposed to the Liberal Party, and the electoral and parliamentary successes of the Liberals were relayed with unease.

Apparently, the delicacies of British politics had a prominent impact on British foreign policy. The intricate and multi-dimensional issues had been well scrutinized and analyzed by the embassy reports which were masterfully prepared in a manner far superior to the reporting of any other embassy. In these reports, domestic political developments and foreign policy orientations were analyzed in tandem. It is a question to what extent the diplomats and administrators of the Ottoman Empire could analyze the impact of domestic politics and party politics in the making of foreign policy. Given that, Abdülhamid was

872 Nevertheless, the quality of political reports of the Ottoman embassy is disappointing vis-a-vis the European political reports dispatched to their capitals. See the description of the Austria-Hungarian embassy in London in Bridge, F.R. Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972, p. 22.
873 BOA, Y.PRK.ESÂ 12/70, 1308 C. 1; 12/73, 1308 C. 6.
874 See the political report; BOA, HR.SYS 582/19, 1 December 1891.
nominating the prime ministers considering the attitudes and dispositions of the foreign powers; this dimension should have been realized to a certain extent although dynamics of party politics and authoritarian polities are apparently very different.

Strictly technical analyses were employed by the embassies. An exception to the cold-bloodedness of the reports was a report dispatched after the passing of the Home Rule Bill in the House of Commons in 1893. The dispatch regarded this new bill as, “a formidable and dangerous innovation leveled against the English ‘ancient constitution’”. The dispatch suggested that this bill would probably be vetoed by the House of Lords. The dispatch also noted the hostile attitude of the “Gladstonians” during the parliamentary sessions against the opponents of the bill. After summarizing the content of the bill, the dispatch ended with the analysis that Gladstone and the radicals leaned on the newly emerging and developing class of laborers and the lower orders. It was noted that the role of this class was so significant that it had the power to shape the composition of the House of Commons. Apparently developing a class perspective, the embassy observed the transformation of British politics due to its democratization, which was alarming for the Ottoman Empire. In the dispatch, the fervent anti-Gladstonianism which will be a recurring theme in Ottoman intellectual formation, was very strong, seeing Gladstone as the figure who was responsible for the collapse of the traditional British-Ottoman common understanding. Furthermore, the new radicals (many of them from the free professions and not from the “landed interests”) who were transforming the traditional Whig character of the Liberal Party were followed with unease. The Ottoman diplomatic service knew well that they could speak and compromise with people coming from a similar social and cultural background.

One remarkable aspect of the nature of the political reports of the embassies was their “mechanisticism”. By “mechanisticism”, we mean the dull and technical accounting of the highly politically sensitive and even precarious matters. The routine follow-up of the St. Petersburg embassy of Pan-Slavism or the routine follow-up of the Dreyfus Affair by the Paris embassy display such a remarkable “dullness”. Reading the political reports, it is as if

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875 BOA, HR.SYS 582/40, 22 April 1893.
876 Also see the views and remarks of Abdülhak Hamid, a diplomat with a very long tenure in the Ottoman embassy to London. Abdülhak Hamid… p. 250.
the Pan-Slavs were not agitated Russian expansionist warmongers yearning for Russian
domination over the Ottomans and as if the Dreyfus affair had not divided France into two
over a very hard-edged and emotional dispute. Loads of dispatches reporting the Pan-
Slavist meetings and organizations and Pan-Slavists’ articles published in the prominent
newspapers and journals of Russia (with the copies of the articles included in the files as an
appendix) were blithely penned down as mere informative accounts. Likewise, issues
such as the Irish problem in Britain were recounted constantly as if it had no Ottoman
repercussions, as if it were only a matter of technical dispute between the conservatives
and liberals, and, within the liberal party, among the radical and liberal unionist factions.
These observations would lead us to assume that the Ottoman diplomats were cold-blooded
technical experts, not moved by national interests of any sort. These dispassionate and
boring reports that contained only factual information without any passionate comments
exemplify the deskwork of a Weberian bureaucrat. The reports were predominantly fact-
based. That is to say, the reports were composed to convey the latest developments without
making pretentious judgments. This is a distinction between a bureaucrat and a politician.
The bureaucrat leaves the assessment to the reader of the report, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs. The same observation can be made also for the reporting of the provincial
administrators who developed a new language towards their “subjects”. The 19th century
Ottoman bureaucratic language endorsed the dispassionate language of its European
counterparts which indicates a radical break from their predecessors. However, in light of
the extra-documentary information we have, we must assume otherwise. How to assess
this striking contradiction?

As has been suggested, the same observation can be made for military officers as well.
The professionalism of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha was already discussed. His field work

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877 See political reports dispatched from the St. Petersburg embassy, BOA, HR.SYS 1184/1
to 63; BOA, HR.SYS 1185/1 to 72.
878 For example the regular articles Samipaşazade Sezai wrote in the Paris-based Young
Turk journal Şuray-ı Ümmet after he joined Young Turks in Paris in 1901 are clearly in
contrast to the dispassionate ambassadorial reports he sent from Madrid after 1908. His
Şuray-ı Ümmet articles were heavily loaded with Turkish nationalism and abhorrence
towards the “hypocrisy” of the “West”.

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was to suppress any rising against the imperial order. The military officers, who were passionate and fervent nationalists by definition, also displayed an impressive professionalism and disinterested documentation of events. They had the habit of documenting everything they deemed necessary and elaborated on them to render their arguments explicable. In short, these military officers were professionals not only in their deskwork, but also in their memoir writings. Kazım Karabekir is arguably the first name to be mentioned in this category. His well-documented massive output goes along with his fervent and aggressive nationalism and militarism. His output epitomizes the meticulous nature of the deskwork of the military bureaucrats as well as the civil bureaucrats, regardless of their ideological orientations.

879 Another impressive account of a military officer was written by Ahmed Îzizet Pasha. Ahmed İzizet Pasha is an interesting figure who had been trusted enough by the Unionists to be appointed as the joint chief of staff, minister of war, and eventually prime minister after the flight of the Unionists in 1918, yet still a man belonging to the age of Abdülhamid. Ahmed İzizet Pasha, who came from the Albanian nobility, epitomizes the value-system of the Hamidian state elite with his liberal, elitist, and conservative attributes, which neither contradict nor restrain each other. Ahmed İzizet Pasha, as he portrays himself in his memoirs, is a hard-working and thoughtful soldier loyal to his state and the values his state represents. Moreover, he is a professional and disciplined (Prussianized) officer who is at the same time a man of the old times as well as a man open and eager for adaptation to new times. His memoirs reflect the world of a soldier who grew up loyal to the old values which he integrated with the values of the new times. In short, the memoirs of Ahmed İzizet Pasha are another impressive account reflecting the professionalism of his generation, which coexisted with the value-system of the Tanzimat and Hamidian world. Ahmed İzizet Pasha, Feryadım, İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992-93 (2 volumes) For Ahmed İzizet Pasha, also see Mahmud Kemal İnan, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1950, p. 1973-2028. Mahmud Şevket Pasha may be another figure who exemplifies another curious character although he is much more “modern” and “Prussianized” in comparison to his generation. See Swanson, Glen W. Mahmud Şevket Pasha and the Defense of the Ottoman Empire, unpublished dissertation, Indiana University, 1970.

880 Kazım Karabekir’s works make up more than thirty volumes. However, his output is remarkable not in its gigantic size but in his tidiness and his delicate documentation of the material he covers. Kazım Karabekir may be regarded as a militarist who believed in an autarchic Turkey dedicated to the well-being of Turks, as can be deduced from his works. However, regardless of his ideological predispositions, he exemplifies a hard-working and disciplinized Weberian officer. A similar observation can be made for other military officers as well. Nutuk is another masterpiece of a Weberian military bureaucrat.
At a time when a written text was perceived as semi-sacred and seen as having the power to reveal the truth and only the truth, writing was a serious and intense activity, very different from the experience of writing one century later. Writing had an authoritative quality. Likewise, “writing” as a formal activity was a “serious” task to be undertaken accordingly. Its significance diminished drastically in an age of informality and relativization of truth. A text had an unprecedented authoritative power in the 19th century before its diminution in the 20th century.

The aesthetics of handwriting was also a very important concern for the quality of the document. Elegance and mastery in handwriting were not seen as technicalities of secondary importance, but were perceived as skills of primary importance, worthy of being acquired. The aesthetics and quality of their handwriting was an important asset for young diplomats seeking promotion. The young diplomats were assisted by their mentors in developing their handwriting styles and the language used in their dispatches. Bismarck’s imposition on the German diplomatic service of stringent standards for meticulous handwriting is well-known. “A diplomat who wanted to make an impression on the chancellor would also do well to have a scribe whose handwriting pleased him. Even the color of ink and the quality of letterheads fell under the chancellor’s scrutiny.” Of course, it was not only handwriting that mattered to Bismarck. He was very concerned about the straightforwardness, literary quality, and elegance of the communiqués.

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881 The very relation between writing, modernity, and bureaucracy is viewed by Herzfeld as follows: “Writing occupies a pivotal position in this symbolic constellation. The symbol, as well as the instrument of all bureaucratic power, it is, above all, the key to the reification of personal identity. Rather than being asked for a personal name as such, one is just as likely to be asked-especially in formal contexts- pos ghrafe se (“how are you written”). Writing, too, is the instrument of fate’s irrevocable decrees.” Herzfeld, Michael. The Social Production of Indifference, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 139. Apparently, writing no longer possesses the power it used to have in the 19th century.

882 Urbach, Karina, Bismarck’s Favourite Englishman: Lord Odo Russell’s Mission to Berlin, London: I.B. Tauris, 1999, p. 25. The young diplomat Odo Russell was grateful to his mentors, Layard and Hammond, for their assistance and suggestions in developing his writing style.

Formalism was an important concern of the 19th century bureaucrat. The form was considered as important as its content. A fine document had to be perfectly written and correctly constructed in its form. The form itself was important and great care needed to be exercised to perfect its formalism. The form was irrelevant to its content, and it was equally important for the form to be proper for the future careers of the officials and their promotions. The painful process of drafting and then revising the text to perfection through several additional drafts was one of the most tiring and crucial preoccupations of Ottoman officials in all the governmental offices, including the Foreign Ministry.\footnote{See Veled Çelebi, \textit{Hatıralar: Tekke’den Meclis’e}, İstanbul: Tişş, 2009, p. 28.}

In short, passion and professionalism are not mutually exclusive. A passionate clerk may pen a dispassionate and formal text. This was how he was trained. The Weberian bureaucrat is not necessarily the soulless desk worker who detaches himself from his passions and identities, but what he tries to imitate is the fictive soulless bureaucrat, the imaginary role model of the 19th century bureaucratic. The reason why the Weberian ideal-type was taken for granted until being questioned recently is that the written evidence and archival documents left to us forces us to assume bureaucratic pretensions as reality. Likewise, the alleged contrast between the deeds and deskwork of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucrat was not a contradiction, but a matter of different modes of expression.

The Ottoman diplomats, who were only a few generations removed from the “scribes”, were naturally skilled and learned in the aesthetics of handwriting. The Tanzimat was not a sharp break in which the old ways of conducting statecraft gave way to a new and modern way of conducting statecraft. On the contrary, it took several decades and a few generations for a transition from the traditional scribe to the modern official.\footnote{The examination made by the state to recruit the graduates of the rüştiyes of Süleymaniye and Sultan Ahmed to recruit them in various \textit{kalems}, as accounted by Aşçı İbrahim Dede, was to measure the level of knowledge of the students and to see the elegance of their handwriting. For Aşçı İbrahim Dede, the students of Süleymaniye were better in terms of knowledge and the students of Sultan Ahmed were better in terms of their elegant handwriting. One exception among the students of Süleymaniye was Ziya (the future Ziya Pasha), who had an impressive handwriting. Aşçı İbrahim Dede, \textit{Aşçı Dede’nin Hatıraları}, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2008, v. I, p. 183. Aşçı Dede İbrahim was recruited to the military as a civil official after this examination.} The traditional Ottoman \textit{a’dab} (refinement) with the genteel culture of the Tanzimat was

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integrated into the making of the Ottoman diplomats’ culture of conduct in their work. The Tanzimat was not a renunciation of the *ancien régime*, but a refashioning of it even in its maturity, not only in an ideological sense, but also evident in the bureaucrats’ work and in the culture of bureaucracy.

5.6. The World of the Ancien régime Aristocracy: A Shared World

Another point to be underlined in the ambassadorial reports is the depiction of political matters at a technical level. The reports did not display the subjectivity, complexity, and intricacy of political matters. The reports were penned down as if there was no room imagined for the “political”. This may be seen as unsurprising for an Ottoman official given there was no political space permitted or imagined within the worlds of the Ottoman political imagination. Though, lack of political space in the Ottoman Empire did not prevent any official from making political assessments. As has been suggested previously, this is not simply because no democratic space was permitted by the state. The opponents of the regime did not themselves develop a sense of politics for reasons previously elaborated. The opponents had a non-political political vision in which the deficiency of the Ottoman state derived merely from Hamidian corruption and despotism, and it was believed the situation would be ameliorated once an appropriate and learned policy program was implemented. Such a background rendered the conceptualization of such political notions as “public opinion”, “democratic legitimacy”, “pressure groups” abstractions, instead of vivid realities. As a conclusion, we may suggest that, this deficit caused the Ottoman Empire to fail to grasp political situations and therefore hindered the development of a realistic and plausible policy in response to the maneuvers of these powers. Parliamentary debates made up an important portion of the reports. Although the ferocious debates in the Ottoman parliament back in 1876-77 were not to be forgotten, the presentation of the parliamentary debates related in the reports seemed like technicalities (maybe analogous to the meetings of Şuray-i Devlet and other administrative

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886 For the first Ottoman parliament convened in 1876, see Devereux, Robert, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963.
and legal commissions of the Ottoman Empire), rather than political debates with flesh and bone.

Another issue which is overlooked in these reports is economics. Nevertheless, this does not show any deficiency of the Ottoman diplomatic establishment vis-a-vis the European diplomatic services. Indifference to and disregard of economics was a common attitude of the pre-WW I diplomatic establishments, contrary to the Marxian argument that diplomacy was an instrument of the economic interests.\(^{887}\) The diplomats had no considerable knowledge of economic matters. However, more importantly, they had no comprehension of the role of economics in international politics. The aristocratic upbringing of the diplomats infused them with disdain towards “moneyed interests”. For them, it was not respectable to consider pecuniary matters. This attitude enhanced with the rise of the middle-classes to prominence in the political scene in the nineteenth century. In the culture of diplomats, high politics was only a matter of state politics, and economics had no place in it. Therefore, they had no interest in commercial matters.\(^{888}\) The interrelation between politics and economics was yet to be recognized. State affairs and economic affairs were (and should be) two different and unrelated realms, and the former was deemed respectable whereas the later was regarded as embarrassing. “Curiously


enough, this anti-commercial bias was possibly strongest in Britain.889 Even the British consuls, who were to protect the British communities overseas and safeguard/promote British commerce, were appointed not based on their merits and skills regarding commerce, but on patronage and connections. Therefore they failed to provide efficient services to the “moneyed interests”. For the consuls and their superiors in London, the chief tasks of the consuls were administrative and judicial matters.890 “British businessmen saw, or thought they saw, a more wholehearted promotion of trading interests by the consuls of their foreign rivals, especially the Germans and Americans, and they demanded the same treatment from their own. For many years British Government resisted any suggestion that its officers should become actively engaged in the promotion of British trade.”891 The consular service in the eyes of a contemporary critic in 1903 was a “harbour of refuge for retired army officers and for failures whose only recommendation is aristocratic, official or personal influences, or an easy source of reward for persons to whom the Government of the day is in some way indebted.”892 One exception to the contempt of diplomatic establishments towards “moneyed interests” was the Netherlands. “(T)he pressure was so strong that between 1825 and 1850 the diplomatic missions were downgraded, the consular service augmented and the Ministry staff increased to handle commercial rather than political affairs.” Though, the Dutch exception had its apparent reasons and it was the exception that proves the rule. “The reduction of the Netherlands after 1830 to a third-class power meant a diminished interest in power politics and favored a sustained shift of attention to economic and colonial affairs(.)”893 In other words, the

891 Platt, D.C.M. ibid, p. 107.
892 Quoted in Platt, D.C.M. ibid, p. 22.
marginalization and exclusion of the Netherlands from the diplomatic scene and European politics caused its diplomatic establishment to prioritize economic interests.

This state-centric vision of international politics only slightly began to erode in the decade preceding the World War I with the reformation and partial democratization of the foreign offices.\(^{894}\) The financialization of international economics and extra-Europeanization of international affairs and state interests in the late nineteenth century was another factor that rendered economics a matter of concern in the eyes of policymakers although staunch resistance to this process never ceased in the foreign offices.\(^{895}\) Until the “opening of the state” with democratization, the state was claimed only by those who perceived themselves as part of the state and perceived the state as theirs; namely by the aristocracy which historically and originally meant the entourage of the kings and emperors. Industrialists, merchants, and professionals were seen as outside the realm of the state. Furthermore, they were seen as within the realm of markets which were juxtaposed against the interests of the realm of the state.

One scholar of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy observed; “(w)hat reports often lacked, however, was detailed analyses of economic issues. Aside from tariff problems, these questions simply did not get much scrutiny. This weakness reflected the general failure within the Habsburg leadership to recognize until too late the potential of economic tools for political purposes.”\(^{896}\) The Habsburg Empire lacked the economic means to obtain


\(^{895}\) The consulates operating principally to assist and protect merchants abroad were not only secondary-level posts, but also the European diplomatic service was established on the complete separation of these two services. The separation between the two services ended only with reforms beginning on the eve of World War I but was not completed until World War II. Cecil, Lamar. *The German Diplomatic Service 1871-1914*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 18; Maisel, Ephraim, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1919-1926*, Sussex Academic Press, 1994, p. 24. For the British consulates abroad and their inferior positions, see Platt, D.C.M., *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls Since 1825*, New York: Longman, 1971.

political gains except through some modest economic initiatives in the Balkans. Economic tools were at the disposal of the British, French, and German foreign offices, and they employed them to force countries to certain decisions, but the foreign offices were aloof to economics and economic diplomacy. As late as the interwar period, the deficiencies pointed out above regarding the ambassadorial reporting of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic services were observable. In this period, this deficiency was observable in all the diplomatic services. In the United States, ‘political reporting, so far as it was influenced by old school diplomats, tended to deal with leading figures of government rather than deep social and economic forces(,)”

In this regard, the failure of the Ottoman diplomatic service to regard economics as an indispensable component of international politics should not be perceived as a sign of its backwardness in statecraft. On the contrary, the Ottoman diplomatic service pursued the 19th century European pattern in its ideological and cultural make up.

In the ambassadorial reports, esteem and reverence for royalty were expressed very delicately. Esteem and respect were observed for non-royal offices as well. The prime ministers, presidents of states, and military generals were addressed with due respect as the Ottoman Empire and its ruling elite were integrated into the established order and the family of the national nobilities of Europe. This was not only limited to the honoring of the persons in question with proper forms of address. While reporting on political developments, an important part of the dispatches was devoted to ceremonies. The

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“acceptance speeches” of the new prime ministers\textsuperscript{899}, the speeches of the prime minister in the parliament to honor visiting royal figures, and the inauguration speeches read at the beginning of the parliamentary year by the kings were all meticulously reported in detail.\textsuperscript{900} These concerns and perceptions are a further indication of the transformation of Ottoman political culture (to be destroyed and reversed by the end of the empire and replaced by the republic’s own political culture) and its integration into the “European royal family”.\textsuperscript{901}

Reception of the ambassadors and “\textit{corps consulaire}” were also regarded as worth reporting to Istanbul. From the dispatch of the 27th of February in 1891, we learn that the “\textit{corps consulaire}” in Venice had been received by “\textit{son Altesse Royale le Dine de Genes}”, the prince. Not unexpectedly, the reception was described in very respectful language. Soghadis Bey, the Ottoman consul in Venice, presented his homage to “\textit{L’Auguste Frére de la Reine d’Italie}” via the royal palace of Venice. The prince, who recently visited Istanbul, drew attention to the increasing commercial relations between Venice and the ports of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{902} Many such reports narrating these ceremonies were to be found in the dispatch folders.

Naturally, international relations made up an important part of the reports. In these reports, the foreign policies of the governments were taken as “cabinet policies”. This contrasts with the approach of assuming foreign policy orientations to be state policies rather than deliberations by the cabinets. The reports were very much cabinet-centered. The parliamentary debates also amounted to a significant portion of the reports. The permanent governmental institutions did not find much place in the reports. The Ottoman embassy reports did not assume the existence of a permanent state interest to take precedence over the subjectivity and temporariness of the cabinets and the intentions of the

\textsuperscript{899} For example see BOA, HR.SYS 778/6, 14 February 1891.

\textsuperscript{900} See the account of the inauguration speech of Queen Victoria addressing the parliament, BOA,HR.SYS 582/3, 15 September 1890. A copy of the brochure of the inauguration speech is enclosed in the dispatch.

\textsuperscript{901} For a study on the role and impact of the kings and other royals on the diplomacy (predominantly as appeasers and problem resolvers), see McLean, Roderick R. \textit{Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe 1890-1914}, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2007.

\textsuperscript{902} BOA, HR.SYS, 778/9, 27 February 1891.
prime ministers and foreign ministers. The reports did not reflect the state-centric assumption that politics was a sham when it comes to the making of foreign policy. On the contrary, the cabinets were treated as having free hands in the making of foreign policy. Thus, cabinets comprised of politicians from parties more sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire were desired to be established and cabinets perceived as antagonistic to the interests of the Ottoman Empire were desired to be dissolved.

We may argue that this perception disappeared with the coming to power of the Young Turks. The ultimate western-skeptic and anti-imperialist Young Turks (very much like

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903 Although this we can say only based on embassy reports. Abdülhak Hamid (although in 1923) writes as follows: “(In London) there exists one certain Foreign Office. The ruler changes, the cabinets change, parties change and evolve but Foreign Office is always what it was and what it will be. The essence of politics is pursuit of interests. Foreign Office rules over the palace, the House of Lords, the House of Commons, trade and even navy and the dominions. It rules England.” Abdülhak Hamid… p. 184. It has to be noted that from ambassadorial dispatches, no such view can be inferred. The same is true for Sami Paşazade Sezai whose articles in Şuray-ı Ümmet reflect views poles apart from his ambassadorial dispatches.

904 The genre of “diplomatic history” is very much a product of the 19th century unlike other genres of history (social history, history of mentalities, economic history, et cetera). The standard diplomatic history narrative also lacks the assumption of the “permanence of state interests” which are superior to the orientation of cabinets. The analysis of “permanence of state interests” will appear with the domination of a full-blown materialistic and deterministic perspective over the social sciences with the twentieth century. Likewise, the classical diplomatic history fails to recognize any domestic or extra-political sources in the making of foreign policy. Primat der Aussenpolitik is the basic assumption of the classical diplomatic history. It is curious to see that this perspective is congruent with the logic of the makers of foreign policy in the nineteenth century. For the first classics of diplomatic history at its best, see Temperley, Harold, England and the Near East: The Crimea, London: Longmans, Green and co., 1936; Temperley, Harold, The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827, G. Bell and sons, 1925; Gooch, G.P, Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy, London: Longmans, Green and co., 1938, Gooch G.P, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft, London: Longmans, Green and co., 1942; Webster, Charles, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-1822, G. Bell, 1925; Webster, Charles, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841, London: G. Bell, 1951.; Mowat R.B, A History of European Diplomacy 1815-1914, London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1927; Crawley, C.W, The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1930.

905 For the escalation of the rhetoric of anti-imperialism of the Young Turks in their last years of opposition, see Hanioğlu. Şükrü, Preparation for a Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 302-305.
the distrustful sultan Abdülhamid II) denied any significant role to politics as they were sure that the Western powers were inherently Turcophobe and imperialist. For them, political discourses were mere facades to deceive the naive old school diplomats. The magical word “imperialism” rendered diplomatic and political maneuvers, dexterities, and compromises meaningless as the ultimate end of diplomacy was merely the implementation of imperialism. Moreover, politics was also unnecessary as imperialism is (a la Lenin) one single program to be activated and no small adjustment, alteration, or variation of it possible. Diplomacy was a zero sum game. In the world of imperialism, it meant zero for the underdog and one for the imperialist. It is also a fact that as World War I approached, the compression of the international situation and tightening of the alliances left no free space for political and diplomatic flexibility and maneuver. The complexities of the age of imperialism also made the makers of foreign policy incapable of deciding the track of foreign policy independently. Moreover, the “political” lost its centrality in a time when economic and financial interests begin to play a significant role in interstate relations. By then, the magnificent days of the masters of diplomacy such as Canning and Castlereagh were long gone, especially after the deposition of Bismarck. The Hamidian Ottoman diplomatic service was cognizant of this transformation of the style and conduct of foreign policy albeit with some delay and ambivalence.

Writing in 1910, Hayreddin Nedim’s acclaim of the art of diplomacy reflects the education of a diplomat having the 19th century upbringing with his favorite, inspiring themes such as the genius of Bismarck. Writing in a new age in which the delicacies of


diplomacy were abandoned, Hayreddin Nedim praises Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha, but above all the legendary Mustafa Reşid Pasha for their genius in diplomacy.\textsuperscript{909} He exemplifies a salon gentleman of yesterday with his accumulation of knowledge and his mental framework, all imported from the 19th century diplomatic/aristocratic culturalization and intellectual formation and the arsenal of knowledge it nurtured. It would not be wrong to argue that the Hamidian diplomatic service observed and exercised the novelties and alterations of the political world after some delay.

To conclude, the ambassadorial reports which reflected less the personal opinions of the ambassadors and the ambassadorial scribes than the reiteration of the official discourse present us some vistas of a vision of a particular socialization and cultural formation. The dispassionate reports were produced not in Weberian bureaucratic offices, but in a personalized habitus. The content and priorities of the reports also manifested a worldview subsuming and amalgamating political and personal concerns. This cultural formation was constituted within an intimate relation established with a state that was in retreat and that had to be saved in order to maintain the moral universe the authors of the reports subscribed to. This world was a bygone age by 1908 in some regards but was also constitutive of its after life in other aspects.

\textsuperscript{909} Hayreddin Nedim, ibid, vol. II, p. 90.
CHAPTER VI

THE MENTALITIES AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

An appraisal of the nineteenth century Ottoman “bureaucratic mind” has been presented in the previous chapters. The mind of the nineteenth century diplomatic service was the epitome of the Ottoman bureaucratic mind. Moreover, it constituted one of the pillars of the Ottoman bureaucratic establishment and therefore bears the constitutive characteristics of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind at its best. The Ottoman bureaucratic mind of the nineteenth century may be divided into four variants developed and based on the preoccupations and tasks assigned. The military, the civil administration, the diplomatic service and the technical offices, such as the agricultural, forestry, and public construction offices, reflect varieties of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind. Modernization, security, and incorporation into the “civilized world” were the coexisting preoccupations and concerns of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind. All these bureaucratic offices prioritized some of these coexisting preoccupations and concerns due to their areas of responsibility and their daily encounters. Nonetheless, disregarding their immediate tasks, in their intellectual formations and socializations they shared the same ethos and same worldview with nuances and variations developed due to their professional encounters and obligations. Nonetheless, as a whole, these variations of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic mind complement each other and constitute a meaningful overarching structure of mentality. Thus we have to perceive the ideological/intellectual/cultural formations of the Ottoman diplomatic establishment as a particular manifestation of the ideological/intellectual/cultural formation of the 19th century Ottoman bureaucratic establishment.

Apparently, the structures of mentalities do not come out of a vacuum. They developed within a certain international political context. As has been stated, the zenith of
the power and influence of the Ottoman diplomatic service was the early Tanzimat era. In these particular decades, an optimism regarding the future of the Ottoman realm led the Ottoman state to prioritize diplomacy as the crucial and decisive pursuit of the state. The Ottoman reforms were undertaken with the support and assurance of Britain although the British interference hindered it as much as encouraged it.\(^{910}\) International diplomacy, reformism, reorganization of the administration, and the suppression of local militarized powerhouses were four complementary preoccupations which cannot be separated from each other.\(^{911}\) The Tanzimat reformism was derived and encouraged by prospects envisaged by the Ottoman leadership in the international scene.\(^{912}\) Thus, the alliance during the Crimean War generated further optimism. However, after the disastrous 1877-78 Russian War, it became clear to Abdülhamid II and many Ottoman statesmen that it was seemingly impossible to keep the empire intact by only peaceful means and reformism. Though Abdülhamid II was mastering the complex webs of diplomacy, a fatal threat loomed, and diplomacy was no more a guarantee for the survival and integrity of the Empire. Moreover, the early optimism regarding the administrative reforms conducted by the local and province-level offices failed. On the contrary, these efforts produced unexpected and detrimental outcomes. The Ottoman state could not accommodate the rising non-Muslim unrests and nationalisms that were prompted by the Tanzimat

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\(^{911}\) Of course, one should not underestimate the role of the military and violence in Tanzimat in avoiding all kinds of mutiny and unrest and eradicating local militarized powerhouses in all parts of the Empire (first and foremost in Kurdistan) to be able to implement the Tanzimat.

reformism. The limits of the Tanzimat reformism convinced the non-Muslims to rebuff the Ottoman alternative and seek the promotion of their national/communal interests. In the eyes of the larger segments of non-Muslim communities, the Ottoman Empire promised no future (if it ever did in the eyes of these communities).

Due to the changing realities within the Ottoman territories and the international scene, new reflexes developed to encounter the changing (gloomy) conditions. Although diplomacy was at the very center of the Hamidian polity, diplomacy was relegated to a technical business. It ceased to be perceived as redemptive. In the reign of Abdülhamid II, diplomatic service was no more on the forefront of Ottoman statecraft. Abdülhamid personally took over the “diplomatic front”. During the reign of Abdülhamid II, the sultan did not elevate men of diplomatic origins to loftier political posts. The statesmen he supported and preferred in his appointments were predominantly from non-diplomatic offices such as governors, officers, and fiscal administrators. Men from his personal retinue, such as Said Pasha and Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, also rose to prominence in the Hamidian era. Abdülhamid’s neglect of the diplomatic service was so great that he appointed military men to most of the ambassadorial posts in the 1890s. His long-time ambassadors in Berlin (Tevfik Pasha), in St. Petersburg (Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha), in Stockholm (Şerif Pasha), in Belgrade (İbrahim Fethi Pasha), in Cetinje (Ahmed Fevzi Pasha), and in Madrid (İzzet Pasha) were of military origin. Although the appointment of military officers to posts at Cetinje, Belgrade, and St. Petersburgh are partially understandable, appointments of officers to posts in Stockholm and Madrid are hardly understandable. Appointment of an officer to Berlin leads us to assume that Abdülhamid’s assessment of his cooperation with Germany was predominantly a military one.


914 For the ambassadors assigned to various post in the late Ottoman Empire, see Kuneralp, Sinan, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricali (1839-1922): Proposografik Rehber, Istanbul: Isis, 1999.
Furthermore, appointing people with a deep knowledge of military matters, rather than diplomacy, reveals what kind of skills and expertise Abdülhamid expected from the men whom he selected as his main providers of information. In short, Abdülhamid’s preference for military officers displayed his prioritization of military over diplomatic affairs and the creeping militarization of diplomacy. Although classical diplomacy was pursued, Abdülhamid was aware that diplomacy not supported by a substantial military power with assets to be employed and manipulated in diplomatic bargaining was ineffective and futile. Thus, Abdülhamid switched to a Realpolitik diplomacy from a post-Metternich-Castlereagh diplomacy in the age of Bismarck. More evidence that Abdülhamid did not respect the professional diplomatic service is that from the 1890s until his overthrow in 1908, he retained the ambassadors giving them tenures of fifteen years. Most of the ambassadors he appointed in the 1890s kept their posts until the Revolution of 1908. Mehmed Rifat Bey in Athens served from 1897 to 1908. Ibrahim Fethi Pasha served as ambassador to Belgrade from 1897 to 1908. The list of the other long-serving Hamidian ambassadors with their years of service is as follows: Ahmed Tevik Pasha in Berlin, from 1897 to 1908; Hüseyin Kazım Bey in Bucharest from 1896 to 1908, Ahmed Fevzi Pasha in Cetinje from 1891 to 1908, Salih Münir Pasha in Paris from 1896 to 1908; Mustafa Reşid Pasha in Rome from 1896 to 1908, Şerif Pasha in Stockholm from 1898 to 1908; Mahmud Nedim Pasha in Vienna from 1896 to 1908. It is highly unreasonable to assume that Abdülhamid’s confidence in them was based on merit. Seemingly, he appointed them because of their loyalty to him, and he did not risk appointing new representatives who might have been less loyal. He personalized his relations with the ambassadors. Long tenures might also have helped the development of a mutual confidence between the


appointee and the appointer. At least, this was what Abdülhamid might have calculated. In short, we may argue that he sacrificed competent and dynamic diplomacy in favor of stability and confidence in his bureaucrats. In his personalized diplomacy, ambassadors began to write directly to the palace instead of addressing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The sultan gathered all the necessary information both from the embassies abroad and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then he formulated and implemented his complex foreign policies and maneuvers. From the flow of information coming from embassies and ministry, as observed previously, it seems that domestic concerns were very significant in the making of foreign policy. The threat of domestic instability and separatist agitation was a matter of primary concern. However, it has to be noted that Abdülhamid’s militarized diplomacy was less his personal preference than his reluctance to adapt to changing circumstances and respond to them.

The diplomatic service was no longer at the forefront of Ottoman reformism and modernization, either. By the Hamidian era, the early efforts to establish the modern governmental infrastructure had developed considerably. Modern forms of administration to regulate forests, agriculture, and metallurgy were all in the process of reaching maturity. All the relevant offices were able to improve themselves in communication with the West without needing any external assistance. It was the military ventures and military efforts to modernize the army that had engendered, forced, and prompted Ottoman modernity, technology transfer, and importation of modern knowledge. The dramatic development of military technology and the new horizons in military organization in Europe after the 1870s were to be imported by the Ottoman Empire. It was no

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917 For the information provided to the sultan from the embassies and the ministry, see BOA, Y.PRK.HR, BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA.
coincidence that the Young Turks, who made progress in the Hamidian era captured the “mission civilisatrice” of the Ottoman Empire after 1908. The “military modern” of the late 19th century was to replace the “19th century modern”.

However, this does not mean that the military had grabbed the role of pioneer of modernization and transformed it. On the contrary, it was the changing and evolving perception of modernity that engaged the military. It was not the takeover of the Ottoman military that had modified the track of Ottoman modernization, but it was the modification of the Ottoman modernizing mind that had put the military in the driver’s seat as far as statecraft was concerned. Partially, it was a response to the international alignments and the rise of military superpowers, such as Germany and Russia (and Japan in the East). It was Abdülhamid who had endeavored and spent enormously to strengthen the Ottoman military and ironically as a reward for his efforts, he was toppled by the military he had built up. The military did not seize control as much as have it bestowed upon them. It was a change in the times that had enforced a transforming “modernizing ideal” which was not simply an Ottoman phenomenon, but a continent-wide phenomenon. Thus, a shift in the minds of the diplomats was observed as well. As we will observe below, the Ottoman diplomatic service also lost its confidence in the 19th century “concert of Europe” of Metternich, Castlereagh, and “reformism”.

921 For the Hamidian military reorganization, see Griffiths, Merwin Albert. The Reorganization of the Ottoman Army Under Abdülhamid (1880-1897), unpublished dissertation, University of California, 1968. It is interesting to compare the Hamidian and Tanzimat approaches to the military. It was the era of Abdülhamid that had given birth to the modern Ottoman/Turkish military after the relatively poor record of the Tanzimat regarding the modernization of the Ottoman army.

6.1. “Official Mind”?

Although embassy reports and dispatches were very bureaucratic and impersonal, still they may tell us something about the “official mind” of the ministry and Ottoman statecraft in general. The dullness and colorlessness of the reports lead us to think that the dispatches tried their best to reproduce the “official mind” and never failed to accommodate the official mind. They were skillfully penned down not to divert from or contradict the “official mind”. Doing what was to be expected and not doing what was not to be expected would be the most appropriate act of an official in order not to be discarded, but instead promoted and considered for higher office. Here, we do not mean that there existed an “official mind” decided somewhere or that this “official mind” was an impersonal entity. On the contrary, what I mean by “official mind” is its commonsense nature. It was produced not by a limited number of high-ranking officials, but by the entire Ottoman bureaucratic cadre anonymously. It was impersonal in the sense that it was produced by the Ottoman bureaucracy as a whole. But the “bureaucracy as a whole” is not a supra-personal category. It is constituted by individuals. Furthermore, it was not a static entity. The official mind was reproduced and reconstituted every time a new dispatch was penned down. The reiteration of it was not a mere procedure. Every time it was enhanced and when it was not reiterated consistently, it lost its lucidity, pervasiveness, and persuasiveness. It may be also dubbed as “state wisdom”. The “Ottoman” official mind involved caution, risk-aversion, reluctance to take action, and extreme reluctance to take instant action. It consisted of profound admiration, contempt, and enmity towards the European powers. The ambivalent attitudes taken vis-a-vis the European powers were crafted within this prism.

The diplomatic reports were how they were supposed to be. However, the authors of the reports were not mere passive duplicators. We may argue that, they each contributed to the making of this anonymous “official mind”, and therefore they were manufacturers of the official mind while they were replicating the schemes to which they were supposed to adhere. They were simultaneously captives and masters of the “official mind”. The reports provide us the opportunity to survey and scrutinize the official view of the Ottoman polity’s approach to liberals, anarchists, parliamentary elections, Britain, budget deficits, et
cetera. These reports were also transformative of the Ottoman official mind because they contained new knowledge of different sorts. The reports were also transmitting knowledge without being aware of the repercussions of these transmitting activities. The gathered knowledge was significant in the making and remaking of the modern Ottoman mind. In this regard, we can suggest that, the making of the Ottoman mental set is constituted as a response to the intense reception of a novel, alarming, and disturbing accumulation of knowledge.

A similar observation regarding this institutional thinking is made by Jill Pellew, a scholar studying the British Home Office. Pellew writes; “The interesting thing to the historian of an institution is that the institution itself is an entity –almost a persona- over and above those individuals who constitute its personnel at any given moment. Its ethos is derived from its designated functions, its historical development, its effectiveness and the extent of its influence, to which the accumulated actions and interactions of those who have worked in it have contributed. While, to a greater or lesser degree this ethos may be given a shift in direction by one generation of individuals passing through it, they in their turn are to some extent influenced by the institution itself.”923 Regarding the Ottoman diplomatic establishment, here it is argued that the institution was an “idea” as much as it was “substance”. Therefore, its imposing power on the individual serving within the institution was less in comparison to its Western counterparts. That is to say, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not a dispassionate machine limited to the undertaking of its assigned tasks. It was not merely a supra-individual bureaucratic organization. It was created in the image of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite in an age of turbulence. The individuals and the institution are mutually reconstituting each other. It was the institutionalization of a certain mode of thinking transformed into the “official mind”. Via this process, we observed the impressiveness and capabilities of the Ottoman official mind in surviving and prospering against all odds.

Reports of the Ottoman embassy to Teheran may illustrate some tiny bits and aspects of the Ottoman “official mind”. The political environment and realities of late 19th century

Persia were quiet similar to the Ottoman Empire regarding her relations with the Western powers. Persia in the 19th century was a clear example of the struggle of competing imperialisms over a nominally independent but economically dependent state. Particularly, the military aggressiveness of the Russians was creating increasing concern in Persia. Russophobia was prevalent both among the public and the ruling elite. It would be interesting to observe the correspondence of the Ottoman diplomatic representations dispatched from a Muslim country sharing similar concerns with the Ottomans although in incomparably more severe conditions.

Not very unexpectedly, the amount of the deskwork dedicated to conducting relations with Persia was very limited. Much of the deskwork of the embassy was devoted to scrutinizing and accommodating the activities of Great Britain in Persia. For instance, the navigation rights on Shatt-al Arab comprised a significant portion of the deskwork of the embassy. The embassy tried to avoid the emergence of a possible disagreement and a crisis with Great Britain. The pursuit of Russian involvement in Persia was another major concern of the embassy. Although coordination with Russia was a rather insignificant agenda item for the embassy, communication with Russia was maintained to accommodate the interests of the Ottoman Empire to the Russian interests and to avoid any severe crisis with Russia.

Correspondence on relations with Persia was limited to technical matters. One exception to these technicalities was a report concerning the local Kurdish disturbances near the Ottoman-Persian border, the movement of Kurdish bands across the border, and disagreements over the border drawn in 1847. In short, the correspondence from the embassy to Teheran reveals to us the world of competing imperialism in which Ottomans were spectators anxious not to be entangled within the webs of this struggle. They were not trying to benefit from the Western powers economic and military drives, but were only concerned about avoiding any loss or retreat. The typically cautious and low-profile diplomacy and statecraft of the Ottomans were also visible in the Persian context. They

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925 For the dispatches from the embassy to Teheran, see BOA, HR.SYS 682 to HR.SYS 686.
were pragmatists. They knew the world in which they were trying to maneuver and played the game following the rules of the game.

This world came to an end in 1906 in Persia. Expectedly, the Persian Revolution in 1906 drastically changed the picture we have drawn above. The contents and concerns of the reports changed dramatically after the Revolution. As the political situation became more complex and multifaceted, the reports began to reflect these novel realities. The reports after 1906 were more political and interpretive in contrast to the technical dullness of the earlier reports. We observe the “emergence of politics” in these reports. For the first time, the Persian government emerged as a serious counterpart of the embassy. Persia was now perceived as an actor herself although to a very limited extent. Russia’s hostile attitude to the Revolution and the growing resentment of Russia among the governing circles, parliament, and the people in general became a concern. With 1906, the reports began to become less technical and more political in the age of imperialism, the clash of imperialisms, and rising reactions to imperialism. This was the time when the Ottoman Empire evolved into an imperialist power as well. In Selim Deringil’s “borrowed terminology”, this was “borrowed imperialism”. This was “enforced imperialism”, as well. In the Persian context, remembering how the Unionist governments practiced diplomacy and international politics follows the general pattern. The Ottoman representation in Persia accepts it as a given that Persians do not possess any power to influence Persian affairs, influenced by the views of the Great Power diplomatic establishments. Paul Gordon Lauren summarizes the perception of the nineteenth century diplomatic establishments of the Great Powers. “(F)oreign affairs were confined essentially to those relations among European states. Bureaus to manage American, Far Eastern, Southeast Asian, or African affairs remained either non-existent or subject to a confused and unstable development. Furthermore, these divisions demonstrate the fact that, under this classical system, a very real distinction existed between the Great Powers and those of secondary importance, or the Small Powers. The smaller or weaker states lived as victims, subjects, or pawns in the great chess game of diplomacy. Major decisions were made and enforced by that club of the elite: France, Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. All other states could be used, divided, treated, or sold.” Lauren, Paul Gordon, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p.12. This nineteenth century perception collapsed at the turn of the twentieth century. Of course, it was not only Persia but also the Ottomans who wanted and tried to be influential actors in the wake of the World War I.

Deringil, Selim. “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’: Perceptions of Provincial Imperialism in the Late Ottoman Empire”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 2, 2003, p. 312.
imperialist politics and visions over Persia, it is interesting to observe how the cautious
Ottomans became active aggressors, and subsequently became entangled in the Persian
web. Nevertheless, Ottoman firmness did not wait for the Young Turks to come to power.
“Under the pretext of policing the border, Turkish forces in autumn 1905 occupied a strip
of land from ten to fifty kilometer wide between the frontier line and Lake Urmieye(1).”928
The Turkish occupation lasted until the evacuation in 1912 followed by another invasion
during World War I.

Another random sample to be taken is the embassy to Athens. The embassy to Athens
may exemplify the ministry’s attitude towards a small neighboring country. Feridun Bey,
the ambassador to Athens, is regarded as a fairly hard-working bureaucrat. His regular
reports were meticulous and informative. His reports were heavily concentrated on the
parliamentary affairs and informed Istanbul on the parliamentary debates, where fervent
discussions regarding the Ottoman Empire and the relations of Greece with the Ottoman
Empire were held. For example, in one of his reports summarizing parliamentary debates,
he recounted the accusation by the parliament that the cabinet was Turcophile.929
Nevertheless, in his “rapports particulair”, he informed the ministry on subjects like the
“medical society of Athens930”, the University of Athens931, and railway construction in
Greece932. It is probable that such information on the technical and institutional
development of Greece was demanded (or expected) from Feridun Bey. In one sense, they
resemble the seferatnames of the early 19th century.933 However, the purpose here is
probably not learning from Greece but tracking the level of development and the
advancement of one of the Ottoman Empire’s immediate enemies. Not surprisingly, the
diplomatic moves and relations of Greece with greater powers and small regional powers

928 Kuneralp, Sinan, “The Turco-Iranian Persian Border Problem In Azerbaijan 1905-
1912”, in Kuneralp, Sinan (ed.), Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History, vol IV, p. 73.
929 BOA, HR.SYS 1645/8, 22 November 1887.
930 BOA, HR.SYS 1645/3, 23 March 1887.
931 BOA, HR:SYS 1645/5, 3 June 1887.
932 BOA, HR SYS1645/7, 19 August 1887.
933 For the seferatnames of early 19th century, see Unat, Faik Reşit, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve

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were followed and reported. One report investigated the anti-governmental speech of Papamikhalopoulo, which was full of allusions to the glorious history of Greece and inspired the “grande idée Hellenique”. Papamikhalopoulo noted that the issue of Greeks in Eastern Roumelia was emerging as an issue after the takeover of Eastern Roumelia by the Kingdom (sic) of Bulgaria. The Greek government, given its limited financial sources, looked for individuals to support the Greeks of Eastern Roumelia, who had to be protected against the Bulgarian administration.\textsuperscript{934} After Feridun Bey and following the acting ambassadorship of Mehmed Şemseddin (in 1887), Rıza Bey (in 1988) was appointed to the post of ambassador to Athens. Mehmed Şemseddin left us only a tiny number of documents during his tenure. It has to be said that Rıza Bey’s reports lacked the quality of the reports of Feridun Bey. They were shorter, less legible, and much less meticulous. His dispatches were event-oriented rather than providing comprehensive and informative documentation. Rıza Bey’s appointment also coincided with the escalation of Greek domestic politics and the rise of Greek expansionist passion and irredentism. The changing circumstances of Greece might have played a role in the replacement of Feridun Bey with Rıza Bey.

The dispatches from the embassy to Belgrade were extremely disappointing in comparison to the dispatches from Athens. Moreover, the dispatches were limited only to overt political moves by the Serbians, and they especially concentrated on Serbia’s special relation with Russia and its diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. We may say that the post in Serbia was much less important in the eyes of Istanbul. In 1890, Feridun Bey whom we already met at his post in Athens, was appointed to the embassy to Belgrade. We observe an improvement in the style and quality of the reports with the coming of Feridun Bey. The reports also expanded in size and in the information they contained. Furthermore, Feridun Bey’s reports were written in a more legible handwriting. As an observation, it has to be said that Feridun Bey’s dispatches were much better in quality although still incomparably weak vis-a-vis his previous reports and the dispatches he sent from Athens. Furthermore, he limited himself to political affairs. This was obviously due to the fact that Serbia played a much less significant role in the eyes of Istanbul, and the extra-political developments of

\textsuperscript{934} BOA, HR.SYS 1645/15, 15 June 1888.
Serbia were of no interest. The reports were written only to relay concrete matters of concern, and we do not see many reports sent in the absence of such a necessity.

To conclude, these dispatches are far from exposing a certain and consistent ideological/intellectual/cultural formation. However, this does not mean that they are unworthy. On the contrary, they display the basic premises of an “official mind”. They are not mere facades. They establish their own reality. Nonetheless, other sources tell us more about the formations of the members of the diplomatic service. In this regard, a very valuable source we may turn to is Galip Kemali’s (Söylemezoğlu) immense account.

6.2. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu: A Liminal Diplomat

Galip Kemali was a complex figure embodying all the ambivalences and contradictions (from our point of view with a century of hindsight) of his time. He was a liminal character reflecting the interconnectedness of nationalism, modernism, elitism, and Ottoman imperialism. In his mental framework, all these dispositions overlapped and coexisted. His memoirs are arguably one of the best primary sources reflecting the structures of mentalities of his time. This is not only in terms of the memoirs’ massiveness, but also in terms of their quality, profoundness, and multilayered nature.

Galip Kemali came from a local notable family, whose forefathers had moved to Istanbul after serving in the provincial administration in Trabzon as the protégés of Halil Rifat Pasha when he was the governor of Trabzon. Galip Kemali was born in 1873 and joined the diplomatic service in 1892 after his graduation from the Mekteb-i Sultani. His father, Ali Kemali Pasha, served as the governor of Konya and can therefore be regarded as a high-ranking bureaucrat. Arguably, Ali Kemali Pasha’s career path resembled the pre-Tanzimat pattern of career advancement before the formalization and regularization of the bureaucracy which ceased to exist with the generation of Galip Kemali after the development and consolidation of training and merit-based recruitment and promotion. His uncle, İbrahim Edhem Pertev Pasha, served in various high positions, including Assistant Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose career in various postings in

935 For the dispatches of Feridun Bey and others, see BOA, HR.SYS 1420.
different governmental offices was also resembling the premodern and pre-Tanzimat pattern of career.936

Having grown up in an atmosphere of parvenu aristocracy (local notables slightly in process of integrating into the imperial Tanzimat aristocracy), it seems that Galip Kemali endorsed the aristocratic culture he encountered in Istanbul emphatically. Although he belonged to the first generation of the family in terms of having a sound, formal education unlike his autodidact father and uncle, he was a staunch defender of aristocratic exclusivism throughout his career and was uncompromising in his criticism of the failure to follow the aristocratic code of conduct in diplomacy. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu kept reminding his readers that diplomacy was not simply a matter of settling disputes and implementing policies, but is also a style and art. Therefore, only those who possessed special qualities could be genuine diplomats. He was also very strict regarding upholding the standards of professionalism. For example, he was very disturbed by the dilettantism, impatience, and crude patriotism of the Unionists. Conceding that they were sincere patriots, Galip Kemali argued that they destroyed the Empire with their empty rhetoric.937 He was particularly disappointed with the obstruction of the Turco-Greek alliance he attempted to launch while he was ambassador to Athens to counter the Slavic threat from the North by the Unionists because of their obsession over Crete and their empty nationalist fervor. After the negotiations between Greece and the Ottomans collapsed, Greece aligned with the Balkan states, and apparently this alliance cost the Ottomans severely in the Balkan Wars. For Galip Kemali, the Young Turks and their lack of insight into diplomacy were the chief culprits in this fiasco. Very critical of the nationalist arrogance of the Unionists and their obstruction of diplomatic pragmatism, he himself was not less nationalist or Turkist than the Unionists as will be shown in the coming few pages.

He was no less critical of the Republican establishment. Writing his memoirs in the 1940s, Galip Kemali criticized the Kemalist Republic explicitly but “politely”. One of his criticisms was with regard to the Republic’s abandonment of official uniforms. Pointing

936 For a biography of Ibrahim Edhem, Galip Kemali’s uncle, see Gürel, Naz Rana, İbrahim Edhem Pertev Pasha, İstanbul: Berikan, 2004. Ibrahim Edhem also briefly served as a secretary in the embassy to Berlin.

out that even Bolshevik Russia reestablished official uniforms, particularly for the diplomatic service; it was not only necessary but an imperative for Turkey to reestablish official uniforms for the diplomatic service.\textsuperscript{938} He suggested that “even the most democratic” countries were following the rituals of official clothing and bestowing and accepting badges. Apparently, what democratic meant for Galip Kemali was Republicanism and the prevalence of the culture of egalitarianism over aristocratic exclusivism. For Galip Kemali, aristocratic formalities and codes of conduct were the very basis of diplomacy, and it was untenable to conduct diplomacy in their absence.\textsuperscript{939}

Though he was a staunch advocate of the 19th century European code of conduct, his Islamic upbringing and socialization also showed itself at some moments. One remarkable episode worth mentioning is the transformation of Galip Kemali’s approaches to “fez” and “hat” as depicted in his memoirs. Before his first appointment abroad as secretary in the embassy to Bucharest, he was nervous. He wrote; “Until that time, I was instinctually disgusted with the hat. Like any other Turkish and Muslim child, my ears were ringing with the rhymes of ‘whoever wears a hat, God forbid, becomes an infidel’”. Fortunately, before his departure to Bucharest, his pious father advised him that “if you wear hat out of necessity, it is permissible. It is impermissible only if you wear a hat as an imitation of the Westerners.” Although convinced by the argument of his father, on the first day he wore a hat while presenting himself to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Romanian diplomatic establishment, and he was very much embarrassed and distressed.\textsuperscript{940} But over time, he began to feel more comfortable without a fez on his head. He notes that before 1908, the fez was an indispensable part of the Ottoman official uniforms, but after 1908, he preferred not to don a fez and left his head uncovered while he was in official garb. Moreover, while ambassador to Athens, he encouraged and convinced a colleague of his to take his fez off and wear a hat while socializing in Athens, assuring him that it is no


\textsuperscript{939} Interestingly, the annal of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 1964-65 provides detailed information on the Ottoman insignia, medallions and forms of addressing which is contradicting with the official line of the culture of the republican bureaucracy. See Aral, Hamid (ed.), \textit{Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yılığı (1964-1965)}, Ankara, Dışişleri Bakanlığı.

\textsuperscript{940} Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, ibid, pp. 78-9.
sin to wear a hat. Söylemezoğlu advised him that, “one has to follow the culture of foreigners when he is in their environment.”

We observe the transformation of Galip Kemali into a proud defender of the hat during his tenure in the diplomatic service. He began to attribute to the hat a symbolic (and positive) meaning in reaction to resilient antagonism towards the hat which Galip Kemali perceives as baseless superstition.

Apparently, the fez was a sensitive issue. It symbolized the very mark of the Muslim identity while wearing Western suit. It is the threshold of Muslimness. The astonishing resilience in defense of the fez and dislike towards the hat displays the seeming contradictions and ambiguities which are consistent and totally explicable for their protagonists. The fez and hat duality conveys the liminality of the group we are investigating. The fez is a sign of authenticity within a full-fledged Westernization. It is also associated with notions like honor and decency. The fez acquires an intense and resolute meaning irrelevant to its own reality and in wearing it, a value system which is felt to be lost, is regained.

According to Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Ziya Gökalp, “public consciousness” guarantees that no one can dare to wear a hat in public. Living in European countries, the diplomats faced the challenge of the “hat”, and they ended up wearing hats and normalizing what had previously appeared to be taboo (and subsequently turning into open or shy defenders of the hat and again finding in it an intense symbolism unassociated with the realities of the fez and hat).


942 İbrahim Hakkı Pasha was another staunch defender of the hat. According to İbnülemin, he proudly defended wearing a hat in his Berlin tenure while he was the Grand Vizier. İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, Son Sadrazamlar, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, v. IV, p. 1798. For the depiction of the unusually Westernized habits and lifestyle of İbrahim Hakkı Pasha, see Findley, Carter, Ottoman Civil Officialdom, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 195-200.


944 The irritation to the hat can only be compared with the uneasiness shown towards the pigs. For the symbolism of dirtiness (mekruh) and the anthropology of aversion to pigs and hats, See Douglas, Mary, Purity and Danger, London; New York: Routledge & K. Paul, 1965.

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Apparently as a general observation, Islam turned out to be a private matter in the minds and perceptions of the diplomats and other bureaucrats by the end of the Empire. İbrahim Hakkı Pasha perfectly illustrated this privatized and individualized understanding of Islam and faith. For İbrahim Hakkı; “Beş vakt de nemaz kılamıyorum...Kim senin hakkını gash etmiyorum.Üstümde kul hakkı yokdur. Allah, kendi hakkını afv buyurur emma kulan hakkını afv etmez...İman kalbedir. Müslümanlık keline-ı şehadetten ibaret tir...Esas budur, ibadat ve taat bunun füru’udır.”945 (I don’t pray five times (per day)...I do not infringe anybody else’s right. God forgives those committed against himself but does not forgive infringements of the rights of his subjects. Faith is in the heart. Islam is a matter of believing in the Almighty. This is its essence; rituals and obedience (to God) are means to that.) The members of the Hamidian diplomatic service were the first generation who retained and upheld their Islamic heritage but adjusted and rationalized it.946 As will be shown in the coming pages, the next generation was indifferent to religion, preferred to disregard it, and did not take it as a reference system.

Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu’s proposals to reform and restructure the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomacy are also worth mentioning. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu suggested recruiting diplomats from the privileged families as it was done in Europe. In his memorandum on the “Reform of Diplomatic Service” in 1909, he noted that “like the other countries, the diplomats who will be appointed to the embassies have to be from prosperous families.” He recommended that, those graduates of Mülkiye who want to serve in the Ministry should be employed as Ottoman representatives abroad without being paid any salary or allowance for one year. After completing one year in the embassies without any salary, they should be entitled to be third secretaries. However, for one year they were to be paid only salary, but not an allowance.947 Apparently, this policy prevalent in European diplomatic services was a mechanism to eliminate those who could not support themselves and privilege those with financial means.

945 Quoted in İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, ibid, pp. 1796-99.
946 Also for the “liberal” interpretation of Mehmet Rıfat Pasha with regard to veiling and education of women, see Muhammed Ferid, Mısır Mısırlılarındır, İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2007, p. 90.
For Galip Kemali, diplomats have to be familiar with the European social codes (adab-ı muaşaret) and with the codes of conduct of the European higher classes with whom they will be in contact throughout their diplomatic careers. For Galip Kemali, this was another reason why the diplomats had to come from families of respectability. Only people from reputable families can easily socialize with the European refined classes. Abdülhak Hamid was in concurrence with Galip Kemali on this point. He wrote “an ambassador has to be from the high classes of the society which he is supposed to represent and has to be a career diplomat. If an ambassador lacks these qualities, there would be a loss of prestige….There had been several cases in which ambassadors of secondary ranks were more respected and taken into consideration by the aristocracies, rulers, and governments to which they were appointed.” For Abdülhak Hamid, “those ambassadors who lack social prestige are doomed to be failures. An ambassador has to be respected not only by the governments, but also by the social circles in which he is socializing. Otherwise, he will be unsuccessful (as a diplomat).” Thus, “an official in an embassy either should come from aristocratic background or should maintain aristocratic attitudes and outlook.”

Refinement and sociability were the unwritten requirements of diplomacy. The otherwise disappointing and unimpressive memoirs of Esad Cemal Paker seem to be written for the purpose of convincing the reader that he lived the life of a bon vivant and that he drank best wines. Apparently, the diplomatic establishment was associated with a “Westernized” lifestyle. This established prejudice had both positive and negative connotations. The diplomats were particularly targeted by the Islamists. Derviş Vahdeti in his journal Volkan targeted diplomats exemplifying the prevalent perceptions within the Islamic and Islamist milieus regarding the diplomats. For him; “(a)mbassadors had taken Christians wives, had many children, and educated them in the mother’s western European way. They learned European languages and were educated in Islamic beliefs and morals

948 Abdülhak Hamid, Abdülhak Hamid’ın Hatıraları, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, p. 64.
949 Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, p. 64.
950 Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, p. 387.
951 Paker, Esat Cemal, ibid.
only by Governesses and teachers of other religions.”

They were preys for the populist discourses, as well. Fazıl Arif Bey, a parliamentarian representing Amasya in the parliament of 1908, was outraged with the diplomats whom he regarded as those “who are bringing governesses and courtesans from Europe” and living in luxury while the Ottoman populace was in poverty. While this imagery was to be abused in the hands of populists, it made the diplomats objects of emulation for others. Feridun Cemal Erkin, one of the doyens of the Republican diplomatic service, is illustrative. His childhood memories vividly display the image of the “superwesternized” Ottoman diplomat. In his memoirs, Erkin writes that when he was a kid, his father, who was a civil servant of prominence, was visited by two men. One of them was sporting a goatee and a white moustache, the other wearing a glass monocle. Impressed by their elegance and courtliness, Feridun asked who these visitors were. When his father responded that they were “sefir-i kebirs”, the impressed young Feridun, as he recalls after more than half a century, decided to be a sefir-i kebir like them. At least this is how Feridun Cemal Erkin explains why he wanted to be a diplomat. Abdülhak Hamid argued that the ambassadorial officials and military attachés not only have to be presentable, but should also be “good-looking”. “Even a rich diplomat should not be poor in his physical appearance.” He recalled “that once an Ottoman foreign minister refrained from sending a son of a Pasha as an ambassador because of the son's poor appearance.” For Abdülhak Hamid, “especially the members of the demi-monde are superficial (so that they pay attention to physical appearance very much)” and they had to be impressed accordingly. In short, these accounts should be a disclaimer to Marcel Proust who in his “In Search of Lost Time” portrayed the Turkish ambassador

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953 MMZC, 1909, V. III, p. 50.


956 Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, p. 246.

957 Abdülhak Hamid, ibid, p. 246.
and his wife as superfluous Orientals alien to the refinement and elegance of the aristocratic European culture and the diplomatic establishment.

Apparently, for Galip Kemali (and Abdülhak Hamid), the training of diplomats was also a major consideration. He resented the unsatisfactory level of training of the diplomats. After noting that the principal source of recruits for the diplomatic service was Mekteb-i Sultani, Galip Kemali argued that a higher college was necessary for the graduates of Mekteb-i Sultani for further study to be eligible to be recruited into the diplomatic service. What was in the mind of Galip Kemali was a part-time college of political science (ulum-i siyasi). In the plan suggested by Galip Kemali, these youths were to begin to work in the ministry while attending the college until noon. They also had to be taught English or German as their second foreign language in their advanced studies. Galip Kemali did not ignore the practicalities either. These youths also had to be introduced to the European diplomats in Istanbul, so that they would not feel ignorant of the European code of conduct.

In short, Galip Kemali emphasized “refinement” and “civility”. However, he was also very strict regarding the necessity of fostering the erudition of the diplomatic service. Apparently, he was disappointed with the miserable level of the erudition of the Ottoman diplomatic service. Nevertheless, concluding his memorandum, Galip Kemali was optimistic. He believed that by training prospective diplomats in a distinguished college with an intense curriculum, teaching them the basics of politics, and integrating them into the European world of culture and more, their skills and erudition would be enhanced. Thus, the quality of the performance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be satisfactory.

Galip Kemali’s memorandum was consistent with the self-portrait he drew in his memoirs. He depicted himself throughout his tomes as a professional-aristocrat. That is to say, in his self-representation, he was simultaneously very sensitive on the refined and socially exclusivist nature of the craft of diplomacy and on the intellectually demanding aspect of the profession. He was a professional in the sense that for him one needed to be hard-working, working diligently days and nights when necessary.

Interestingly, his memorandum resembles the reform of the British and French Foreign Offices undertaken in the first decade of the twentieth century in some ways and
contradicts them in other ways. The similar themes were maximizing bureaucratic rationality and efficiency. Nevertheless, Galip Kemali also suggests retaining a culture of elitism and social exclusion, which the European reformist programs sought to diminish or eliminate. Galip Kemali, on the contrary, wanted to formalize what was de facto practiced and maintained and avoid “democratic currents”. What has been revealed here so far regarding Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu is a portrait of an aristocratic diplomat decorated with codes of courtliness. Yet, Galip Kemali is a staunch Turkish nationalist on the fringes of xenophobia.

Galip Kemali’s propaganda publication in French, “L’Assasinat d’un Peuple”, written for the purpose of defending the rights of Turkey under occupation, displays an amalgamation of different discourses: anti-imperialism, civilizationism, and Turkism. The pamphlet addresses Westerners and was written to unmask the hypocrisy of the West. He criticized the West for glorifying civilization and styling itself as the very embodiment of civilization, but ignoring the requirements of civilization when it comes to actual policy decisions. Galip Kemali criticizes the prevailing view of Turks in the West as barbarians and argues that the reality is just the opposite. He reminds the Western reader of the murdered, mutilated, and expelled Muslim civilian populace of Thrace and the atrocities committed by Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians. Galip Kemali develops the idea that European powers have a particular problem with Turkey. The Europeans’ unjustified actions and attitudes towards Turkey were distinctive and could not be explained by the imperatives of Realpolitik alone. However, Galip Kemali refrains from revealing the motivations of Europeans in their mean attitude towards Turkey. He refrains from presenting the European great powers’ aggression as a crusade against the banner of Islam.


like many others although he seems to perceive this aggression as a crusade.\textsuperscript{960} He also refrains from presenting the case against the “Turks”. He appeals to the conscience of the European audience and evokes the notion of Western civilization to convince his European audience. Nevertheless, it is not very hard to detect his “unspoken assumptions”. Apparently, underneath the text we observe that he shared the “commonsense perception” and hearsay knowledge that for “certain reasons”, Europeans cultivated an uncompromising enmity towards Turks. This enmity did not originate from Realpolitik reasons. It derived from historical animosities and was therefore a timeless and an eternalized antagonism that was not expected to be easily resolved.

He is more explicit in his memoirs given that here he addresses a Turkish audience rather than the conscience of the Westerners. In his memoirs and correspondence after the publication of his propaganda pamphlet, he revealed that his disgust and abhorrence of the Western powers was immense. He writes in a style influenced heavily by the Unionist rhetoric.\textsuperscript{961} In these texts, Galip Kemali, the elegant aristocratic and imperial patriot, apparently surrendered to a vulgar nationalist rhetoric (with sycophantic praise of Mustafa Kemal). For example, he wrote; “\textit{Mondros müzarekesinin devamı müddetince hak namına kılıçlarını çektiğimiz beri bütün aleme haykırımı olan muzaffer devletler tarafından en mukaddes haklarımız kahpece ayaklar altına alındı...Yedi yüz senelik koca bir devletin, ezeldenberi hür yaşamış, asrlarca dünyaya meydana okumuş yüce Türk milletinin yalnız istiklal değil mevcudiyeti bile sarsıldı. Kendine yakışan bir coşkunluk ile, koca Türk, kalbindeki milli imanı, ruhundaki irsi celadeti göstermemiş, onun nelere kadir olduğunu keşfederek tam vaktinde başına geçecek bir Dahi çıkmamış ve nihayet

\textsuperscript{960} The rhetoric of the “crusading instincts of the West” can be observed in the Young Turk press in the Hamidian era. For an article expounding on the crusading instincts by Mizancı Murad in Mechveret, see Emil, Birol, \textit{Mizancı Murad Bey}, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2009, pp. 137-38.

\textsuperscript{961} See Süleymezoğlu, Galip Kemali, \textit{Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene: IV.}, Maarif Basmevi, 1955. For the level of degradation of the once courtly high-ranking diplomatic corps by 1921, see a “poem” written by the ex-ministry of foreign affairs Asım as quoted by Süleymezoğlu. “\textit{Dünya değişirde Türk değişmez/Bak vakti hazerde bir kebuter !...Yareb bu necibi Aliosman.../Ölsun mu yarin esiri Yunan ?/Sönsün mü ocağı şanlı Türkün/Ölsun mu o nam karini nisyan}” Süleymezoğlu, Galip Kemali, ibid, p. 7-8.
memleketin en temiz evlatları, bir nur gibi gökten inen, bu ümit şiraresi etrafında büyük bir feragati nefis ile toplanmamış olsaydı, maazallah !”

Yet, the making of a crude nationalist out of Galip Kemali was neither exceptional nor idiosyncratic. The recurring military and political defeats created a fear that fomented a blatant and unapologetic nationalism. The change of the political elite also forced the old timers to accommodate themselves. For example, Sami Paşazade Sezai, who had served in the ministry since 1885, had been a staunch defender and promoter of the “West” and “Western values”, and had supported the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the “Concert of Europe” (which he called a “Peaceful Conquest” -feth-i sulhperveri-) also lost his enthusiasm for “Western civilization” during his ambassadorship in Madrid between 1914 and 1921 and after observing the occupation of Turkey in 1918. For him, after observing the policies of Britain in the World War I, the “West” began to be associated with hypocrisy and imperialist Britain was the embodiment of this hypocritical West. Although he was also critical of the Christian prejudice and double standards of the West previously, for him these were side issues not eclipsing the superiority of Western values and political culture. Abdülhak Hamid, the elegant aristocrat of the 19th century Ottoman world, wrote in a strong anti-imperialist and anti-Christian jargon in 1924. “The ones who share most responsibility (for the decline of humanity and civility) are those who acquired most territories in the Great War. Yes, those plunderers and pirates….. This cannibalistic personality wants to swim in the blood of Muslims. He enjoys eating Muslim flesh and even Muslim carcasses. In his eyes, no nation can have its own state and patrie except himself. Whenever he sees independence, freedom, and survival, he thinks of

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annihilating it and plundering it, destroying whatever the nation has.” In his anti-Western and anti-Christian tirade quoted above, he went as far as calling the personalized European imperialism as “dünyadaki vatanların en kahbe haini” (the most whorish traitor of the fatherlands of the world). The Christian West as the eternal foe of the Muslim Turk emerged as an invented image prevalent not only in the Young Turk generation, but also in the elder generation. Nonetheless, this imagery was much more profound in the next generation of the diplomatic service. The next generation of the Ottoman diplomatic service introduced young nationalist poets and men of letters. Müftüoğlu Ahmet Hikmet and Enis Behiç (Koryürek) were two gifts of the diplomatic service to the nationalist literature.

6.3. The New Generation and Cumulative Radicalization

Ahmet Hikmet was born in 1870 with a background typical of the bulk of the diplomat service (a middle-level bureaucrat father serving in the provincial administration, a respectable genealogy going back to the Peloponnesus, and himself born in Istanbul) and was a graduate of Mekteb-i Sultani, like most of his colleagues. He got his first appointments to Marseilles, Piraeus, and Poti in the Hamidian era. In his later career, he was appointed ambassador to Budapest in 1916, apparently to fulfill his Turkist and Turanist ambitions. He was active in Turkist activities in his tenure in Budapest, participating in the Hungarian Turanian circles and academic clubs enthusiastically. He died while serving as the ministerial undersecretary in 1926. Like Abdülhak Hamid, today, 

he is not known and remembered for his remarkable diplomatic career but for his literary output and his contribution to the nationalist literature.⁹⁶⁷

Enis Behiç belonged to a later generation.⁹⁶⁸ Born in 1892, like Ahmet Hikmet, he possessed the attributes of the social and cultural background of a “typical” diplomat. He has the three attributes of the average diplomat. He was fathered by a military doctor (a civil servant), was born in Istanbul, and was a graduate of Müülkiye. He entered the diplomatic service in 1913. Serving in mediocre posts abroad and in Istanbul, he is remembered better for his extremely nationalist poems. His poem “Kırmızı Şezlong” (Red Chair) was an outrageous anti-Semitic poem recounting the lives of a greedy Jewish speculator, Mişon, and his lustful wife, Rebeka, who was deceiving her husband, and is a masterpiece of anti-Semitism, portraying the Jewish characters as nasty, corrupt, and disgusting rascals. The motives for writing such a poem remain conspicuous given that no full-fledged anti-Semitism developed in the Ottoman Empire and that such enmities were reserved for Christian groups within the Ottoman Empire. The anti-Semitism in this poem is a perfect illustration of the anti-Semitic themes prevalent in Germany and France at the time. Probably, Enis Behiç was influenced by European/French anti-Semite discourses of the time. Enis Behiç’s poems are sharply divided into two: very individualistic poems reflecting the loneliness, failed aspirations, and melancholy of the modern individual and extremely nationalist poems depicting war scenes in which victorious Turkish soldiers are seeking Turan or are about to reconquer the lost Roumelia up to Budapest. Enis Behiç was definitely a “salon Turanist”. By this time, in the third generation of the Tanzimat, we meet a “modern” individual in the personality of Enis Behiç, with whom we share the same sensibilities and for whom we feel empathy. He was at the same time a Turkish nationalist as a product of his own times.⁹⁶⁹ His nationalism is explicitly and blatantly secular. There

⁹⁶⁷ For a biography of Ahmed Hikmet Müftüoğlu, see Tevetoğlu, Fethi, Büyük Türkçü Müftüoğlu Ahmed Hikmet, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1951.

⁹⁶⁸ For a biography of Enis Behiç Koryürek written by Fethi Tevetoğlu, see Koryürek, Enis Behiç. Miras ve Güneşin Ölümü, İstanbul: Güneş Matbaacılık T.A.O., 1951.

⁹⁶⁹ The same observation is equally valid for Ahmet Hikmet. While half of his literary works are elaborations of Turkist themes with crude nationalism, such as Gönül Hanım and Çağlayanlar, the other half of his works elaborate themes of very personal angst and quests reflecting the sensitivities of the modern urban individual, such as his short stories
is no aspect of religion in his poems whether they are nationalist or individualist. His poems display how, in three generations, religion had gradually retreated and then vanished from the worldview of the cosmology of the Ottoman bureaucrats. As suggested previously, secularization as relativization and decline of the individual faith does not soften or terminate the anti-Western rhetoric. On the contrary, like many other modernists nationalists of their time, famous names like Ömer Seyfeddin and diplomats like Enis Behiç and ambassador Galip Kemali were increasingly becoming anti-Westernist and xenophobic. In fact, in Galip Kemali’s case (as with any other member of his generation), such xenophobia was enhanced by secularization. As monotheist universalism and morality had disappeared or been marginalized into the private realm; the nation and national ethics/morality emerged as the only reference points. The extreme nationalism of two close friends of Halid Ziya, Reşid Safvet and Safveti Ziya, should also be mentioned as two other exempla of the third generation of Tanzimat and the third generation of Tanzimat diplomats.

Reşid Safvet did not get impressive promotions. His highest positions were first secretariat in the embassies of Bucharest, Washington, Madrid, and Teheran. He participated in the Lausanne Conference as the general secretary of the Turkish delegation. He became a member of parliament in 1927, serving for two terms. However, his major achievement was arguably his foundation of TURING (Touring Club Turc) in 1923. Reşid Safvet was an impressive personality with various interests and talents. Halid Ziya remembers him as a young man, a minor official in the Regie, who was about to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and whose sole interest was reading books. Halid Ziya tells us that Reşid Safvet lived in an apartment in Akaretler, which was so full of books and his many notebooks that there was only enough empty space for his writing desk. According to

collected in *Haristan*. Nevertheless, some of his stories collected in Haristan and published after 1908 contain themes such as West versus East with their mutually exclusive attributes and the equating of Westernized cosmopolitism with decadence and corruption emerges.

970 The cosmopolitan Halid Ziya is hardly free of nationalist instincts. His memoirs reveal how the clashes and contradictions between Turks and non-Muslims are decisive in the formation of his political opinions. Experiencing the social worlds of İzmir and the intellectual milieu of Istanbul, he assumes a nationalist outlook. See Uşaklıgil, Halid Ziya, *Kırk Yıl*, Istanbul: Matbaacılık ve Neşriyat, 1936, pp. 114-19.
Halid Ziya, he read whatever he found on history, sociology, philosophy, politics, and religion (but never literature). He never went out, slept little, and showed up in the office exhausted but ahead of his colleagues.\textsuperscript{971} In short, Reşid Safvet was a man of his times, driven to learn and discover the whole new world in front of him. He displays the new intellectual of the third generation of Tanzimat who established for himself a completely new world and severed himself from the past explicitly, a move that is striking taken in this generation. He was a third generation Tanzimat figure like many others, fascinated with the enormity of Western knowledge and science. The encyclopedic curiosity of this new generation is embodied in the person of Reşid Safvet as well.

Reşid Safvet produced numerous books in French in later life, defending Turkey and Turks before the international public in such works as “Turcs et Arménians Devant l’histoire: Nouveaux Témoignages Russes et Turcs sur les Atrocités”.\textsuperscript{972} These publications demonstrated the outstanding contributions of Turks to world civilization\textsuperscript{973} and defended the Turkish Historical Thesis adamantly in the heyday of the Kemalist regime. Reşid Safvet displays the contrast between the conspicuous Westernism in his life style and hatred towards the West. Reşid Safvet adopted a fervent nationalist outlook, not unlike that of his colleagues Ahmet Hikmet and Enis Behiç. Yet, Reşid Safvet was also a bon vivant and loved the good life. Coming from a rich family and married to the granddaughter of Rıza Pasha, Abdülhamid’s chief of staff, he provided the demimonde in the marginalized and déclassé Istanbul of the Republic with various entertainments mimicking the grandeur of the Istanbul of yesteryear during the Empire\textsuperscript{974}. Yet, his hedonism did not hinder or soften his rhetoric of extreme and obsessive Turkism. He also volunteered to be an apparatchik of the Republican regime in Ankara. Nevertheless, the

\textsuperscript{971} Uşakligil, Halid Ziya, ibid, vol.V, pp. 177-184.
Idiosyncratic playboy of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to have his counterparts in other European diplomatic services. For Vladimir Lamsdorff, a diplomat serving the Russian Foreign Ministry, “the court had ‘the character of a café’, the Yacht Club was a ‘temple of idleness’ and much of the aristocracy was ‘...a clique of which the court and the circle of profligates and idlers called ‘society’...the Foreign Ministry was indeed not only the focus of Lamsdorff’s professional skills and energies but also his home and his ‘fatherland’, whence he drew most of his personal friendships…”

Safveti Ziya was one of the major figures of the Edebiyat-ı Cedide (New Literature) influenced from French poetry and literature of the late 19th century. A man of exquisite manners and elegance, Halid Ziya describes his artistic and bohemian worlds and circles. Coming from a respectable Istanbul family which sent many of his members to the privileged offices in the government, for Safveti Ziya, life meant good food, good clothing, spending money, and all kinds of luxury. In the account of Halid Ziya, he was well-known for frequenting the most trendy venues in Pera in order to be close to beautiful women. He danced the best, spoke the most fluent French and English, and was the most handsome. In short, for Halid Ziya, Safveti Ziya was a prototypical dandy. Nevertheless, his eccentric life style did not obstruct his successful career. At his sudden death (aged 54 in 1929), he had just been appointed as ambassador to Czechoslovakia after serving as the director of protocol of the ministry. He died during a party at the Yacht Club in Principio. Safveti Ziya lived well, dined well, and died well. Apparently, he belonged not to the Tanzimat generation, but to a new generation with different socialization and mores.

He was, like his other colleagues, a passionate Turkist and Westernist. His novel “Salon Köşelerinde” was a novel originally “published in...Servet-i Fünun, told the story of a ‘Europeanized’ Ottoman man who socialized in the foreign quarters of Istanbul and tried to prove by waltzing like a European that he was ‘civilized’ to an English girl with whom he had fallen in love. The protagonist of the novel writes that, ‘....I changed my plan of action, thinking that it would be necessary to prove to an English girl and an English family that Turkishness within a society is not an example of barbarity, but an adornment, and that the Turks too are a civilized nation.’ Even in this non-political,
romantic novel, the Europeanized character, who was ready to accommodate to European culture, exhibited a reactionary attitude to the European perception of the Turk and fought against this ‘misperception’ by dancing. In the beginning of the novel, the author voices his regrets at Turks’ failure to dance elegantly and hopes that one day Turks will master European dances. Safveti Ziya was encouraged to write such a book by Ahmet Hikmet, who opined, “how great it would be if you account for your experiences in the salons and high society with regard to our nationality. No such work has been yet written.” Apparently, both Safveti Ziya and Ahmet Hikmet perceived personal encounters with Westerners within a political prism. The politicization of every sphere of private life was an aspect of the third generation of Tanzimat. Whereas politics, Westernization, and the expression of Westernization were limited to public display and the political sphere while preserving the distinctly traditional lifestyles in the private sphere in the first and second generations of the Tanzimat, with the third generation of Tanzimat, there was a Westernization of every sphere of life, and every sphere became a contested zone of nationalism in which national displays and national enmities became prevalent. Safveti Ziya, like many of his generation, defined Turkishness with reference to their individual attributes and developed a Turkish nationalism to challenge and outdo the Europeans. Safveti Ziya’s book “Adab-ı Muasıret Hasbihalleri” (Conversations on

978 Safveti Ziya, Salon Köşelerinde, p. 11. (in his preface to the novel)
979 Ömer Seyfeddin’s short stories were also a good demonstration of “the politicization of the personal” and “the politicization of every sphere of life”. For example, see his Fon Sadriştayn’in Karısı, (Bütün Eserler, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1999, V. II, pp. 191-202), Nakarat (V. III, pp. 17-34), Bir Çocuk Aleko (V. IV, pp. 310-327).
980 The outward Westernization was not accompanied by the Westernization of the private lives of the Ottoman upper classes. For a vivid portrayal of the intimate lives and family relations of Ottoman dignitaries, see Melek Hanım, Haremden Mahrem Anılar, İstanbul: Oğlak Yayıncılık, 1996.
Good Manners) published in 1927 was another exposure of the prioritization of the national identity over daily social interactions. Safveti Ziya encouraged Turkish youth to participate in the rebirth of the Turkish nation by adopting the code of conduct of civilized societies and nations.\footnote{Safveti Ziya, Adab-ı Muşeret Hasbihalleri, Ankara: Türk Oçağı Merkez Heyeti, 1927, p. 3.} In his “guide book”, Safveti Ziya particularly gives importance to the role of women within polite society. For him, respect towards women was an important sign of the degree of the civilized nature of a nation. For him, the code of good conduct and politeness was first and foremost a matter of national dignity. The subsuming of the personal manners and codes of conduct of the individuals was an extreme example of the politicization and nationalization of individual lives.

Definitely, these men had different mores and a different reference system than their predecessors. We observe the emergence and development of a new intellectual/cultural formation subsuming a particular national imaginary, a secularized worldview, and a militarized political imagination.

\section*{6.4. Accommodating the New Times}

Galip Kemali’s aforementioned pamphlet in defense of the nation under attack was not unique. Two years earlier, Alfred Rüstem Bey, another senior Ottoman diplomat, published a tract in Bern in French to counter the Armenian allegations and address Western public opinion regarding the Armenian massacres.\footnote{Ahmed Rustem Bey, La Guerre Mondiale et La Question Turco-Arménienne, Bern, 1918.} The text was conspicuous in the sense that its author, although a Turkish diplomat born in Turkey, was of Polish origins whose father was also a diplomat who converted to Islam after emigrating to the Ottoman Empire from Poland in Russian occupation. Ahmed (Alfred) Rüstem Bey was acquainted with Western knowledge and Western intellectual erudition thanks to his Polish origins. After denying the accusations regarding the Armenians, Ahmed Rüstem pointed to the hypocrisy of the West. He especially recounted the atrocities Britain perpetrated in her colonies. Not
restricting himself to conventional anti-imperialist rhetoric, he also exposed the British brutality in Ireland and condemned the British policies in Ireland. Not unexpectedly, he did not fail to mention the brutality of imperial Russia in Poland. Questioning the credibility of those who were themselves perpetrators of unspeakable crimes, he related the allegations regarding Armenians to the perpetual hatred of the Turks. Regarding the Armenian events, Ahmed Rüstem acknowledges the tragedy Armenians had suffered during World War I, but he subsequently pleaded with Europeans to acknowledge the great suffering Turks had experienced during World War I as well. Moreover, the cause of this tragedy was the militant activity of Armenian revolutionary committees, who tried to mobilize the innocent Armenian masses against Turkish rule.

Ahmed Rüstem represents a complex but characteristic exemplar of post-Unionist Turkish nationalism. The text was in some ways very emblematic of the Turkish nationalism of his time. On the other hand, some aspects were idiosyncratic and reflected his European origins. But it is striking to observe how his Polish Russophobia had easily rendered him a sincere Turkish nationalist resenting the hypocrisy of Europeans and European liberalism. He arrived at an anti-imperialist position more sophisticated than the average Unionist anti-imperialist or even Galip Kemali’s anti-imperialism. His anti-imperialism was compatible with the European political language and vocabulary. Unlike many Unionist or quasi-Unionist texts and pamphlets, Ahmed Rüstem never abandoned the rhetoric of rights and liberties. On the contrary, he repeatedly reiterated his allegiance to humanitarian values. He claimed that his criticism was directed to those who were hypocritical and insincere in defending rights and liberties and did not abandon 19th century liberalism. Nevertheless, one can easily observe that his disillusionment with the West caused an alteration in his belief in rights and liberties as well. The development of his anti-imperialistic views was arguably very much prompted by the Russian expansionism towards Poland, the support the British gave to the Russians in the war, and the atrocities Russian committed against Polish civilians during World War I; this background enabled him to endorse and internalize the Turkist and Islamic anti-imperialism of the Unionists. The Polish aristocrat was forced to speak the language of a Roumelian upstart.
As suggested above, the years Galip Kemali and Ahmed Rüstem composed their French propaganda texts were traumatic. It was the time when the last bastion of Turkishness was occupied and humiliated. A similar propaganda text was composed by Ahmed Rıza, a figure who distanced himself from the Unionists after 1908 and displayed the same traits. Ahmed Rıza, the arch-secularist depicted the current situation as a part of the eternal struggle between Islam (and Turks as the banner of Islam) and the treacherous, barbaric West.\footnote{Ahmed Riza, \textit{La Faillite Morale de la Politique Occidentale en Orient}, Paris: Librarie Picart, 1922.}

The deterioration of the once-gentlemanly Ottoman civil officialdom, which was a product and unique composite of the Westernization and the classical Ottoman efendi tradition, was dramatic. Nevertheless, names who became prominent political figures after 1908 and before the Young Turks assumed direct control of cabinets, such as Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, and İbrahim Hakkı Pasha kept their distance from the new radicals of the time. They were the last ones to defend and uphold the \textit{Bab-i Ali} tradition. Lütfi Simavi’s memoirs, which we will scrutinize in the coming pages, also reflect such a contemptuous attitude towards the Young Turks.\footnote{Lütfi Simavi, \textit{Sultan Mehmed Resad Hann ve Halifenin Sarayında Gördüklerim}, Dersaadet: Kanaat Kütübhanesi, 1340, p. 159.}

6.5. Voices From the Tomb?

Hayreddin Nedim Bey’s book on diplomacy published in 1910 reflected the 19th century diplomatic socialization and its intellectual/mental build up as it coalesced with Tanzimat’s official discourse at its best. Hayreddin Nedim’s account of the 19th century Tanzimat diplomacy was laudatory. His praise of Tanzimat was not limited to its achievements in diplomacy. For Hayreddin Nedim, Mustafa Reşid Pasha was a man of extraordinary gifts and any Ottoman should be grateful to him.\footnote{Hayreddin Bey, \textit{Vesaik-i Tarihiyye ve Siyasiyye}, 1326, vol. I, p. 94.} This was especially so because he managed to introduce the Ottomans into the concert of Europe as a reputable

\footnote{Hayreddin Bey, \textit{Vesaik-i Tarihiyye ve Siyasiyye}, 1326, vol. I, p. 94.}
member of the club. Reviewing the close relations the Tanzimat statesmen developed with France and Britain to balance against the Russian danger, he noted that diplomacy and the diplomatic skills of the statesmen were crucial in the making of international politics and that the Tanzimat statesmen and diplomacy did an excellent job in upholding the Ottoman Empire via diplomacy. He emphasized that the conduct of diplomacy was settled predominantly by personal skills and qualities. Thus, Hayreddin Nedim regretted that the Ottoman diplomats and statesmen did not write their memoirs like the European diplomats and statesmen. He was impressed with the careers and accomplishments of prominent European diplomats who mastered their craft and inspired diplomats such as himself, who had studied them by reading their memoirs or the memoirs of their colleagues. Apparently, Hayreddin Nedim saw himself and his fellow Ottoman diplomats and statesmen as a part of the post-Vienna Congress European diplomatic family. In short, the intellectual cosmos of Hayreddin Nedim illustrates the emblematical Tanzimat diplomat loyal to the premises and principles of the Tanzimat and trying to invigorate the Ottoman Empire within the concert of Europe of the 19th century Europe. That is, in Hayreddin Nedim, the Congress of Vienna went hand in hand with the Tanzimat as if they complement each other. He was a believer in the ideal of a peaceful Europe in which an enlightened Ottoman Empire participated as an equal member. His ideal coincided with the ideals of the British, French, and Austrian diplomatic establishments as well. In fact, as already indicated, his (and the Tanzimat ideals in general) were partially taken from the 19th century European order and ancien régime ideals.

In another book of his on the Crimean War which he published in the same year, he regretted the collapse of the British/French alliance with the Ottomans, which was forged during the Crimean War and sealed in the Paris Treaty. Surprisingly, Hayreddin Nedim put the blame on both sides instead of indicting Britain unilaterally as his Ottoman contemporaries did. He criticized the Ottoman party for not fulfilling the commitments and reforms it had promised and criticized the British/French for their indifference and negligence towards the injustices the Ottomans and the Muslim population had suffered since then. Another surprising commentary developed by Hayreddin Nedim was with

987 Hayreddin Bey, op.cit., vol I, pp. 11-12.
988 Hayreddin Bey, ibid, vol I, p. 6.
regard to Ottoman-Russian relations. Observing the Russian aggression towards the Ottomans, he claimed that the best interests of these two “great nations” were an alliance and peace.  

Salih Münir Pasha, one of the most reputable (or notorious in the eyes of the Young Turks) diplomats of the Hamidian ancien régime, in his book on Russian foreign policy published in Lausanne in 1918 while he was in exile, reconstructs the course of the history of Tanzimat as the lethal struggle between hostile and expansionist Russia and the defending Ottomans. Whereas all the internal disorders of the Ottoman Empire perpetrated by Christian groups were either instigated or manipulated by the Russians, all the Tanzimat polices whether they may be international diplomacy, administrative reform or military action were undertaken to encounter this many-headed threat. In Salih Münir Pasha’s account, Britain and France appear as bystanders in the Russian aggression. Although they also advance their interests in the Ottoman Empire and espouse the causes of the “oppressed Christians” of the Ottoman Empire (mainly because of the pressure of public opinion and Christian prejudice), their role remains secondary in contrast to the Russian menace. Salih Münir’s approach to international relations is within the framework of international diplomacy and within the world of the post-Bismarckian European order. He perceives the Russian policy of the “Eastern Question” as “expansion” (rather than imperialism) and sees the “Eastern Question” primarily as a diplomatic phenomenon.

Lütfi Simavi, a diplomat who served in various posts as the Ottoman consul and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul before his appointment as the Lord High Chamberlain of Mehmed Reşad (and was appointed as the undersecretary of the embassy to St. Petersburg and before his appointment as the Lord High Chamberlain) was another voice from the tomb. Appointed to the palace chamberlainship, he was distressed to move

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989 Hayreddin Bey, 1270 Kurum Muharebesinin Tarih-i Siyasi, Dersaadet: Ahmet İhsan ve Şürekasi Matbaacılık, 1326. For similar remarks regarding Ottoman-Russian relations, see Lütfi Simavi… v. II, pp. 44-47.

990 Salih Münir Pasha, La Politique Orientale de la Russie, Istanbul: Isis, 2000 (original publication in 1918 in Lausanne)

991 Salih Münir Pasha, ibid, p. 66.

992 Lütfi Simavi…, p. 10 (1)
from Europe to an archaic court and palace. In fact, what was expected from his was to modernize the imperial rituals and adapt them to European court ceremonial. What Lütfi Simavi did, according to his memoirs and his account, was to blend the traditional Ottoman rituals and the modern European court ceremonial and invent an Ottoman imperial pageantry. He administered Mehmed Reşad’s public and ceremonial appearances. For this task, he benefited from his immense knowledge of European imperial and official ceremonies and the code of conduct, knowledge of which he was extremely proud. In Mehmed Reşad, Lütfi Simavi attempted to invent an Ottoman imperial pomp and pageantry in line with and in competition with the European imperial pomp and rituals. The low profile character and modesty of Mehmed Reşad was suitable for this newly defined and appropriated role.

Although in Lütfi Simavi, Ottomanism encompassed the non-Muslims, the Muslim and Turkish character of Ottoman imperialism was not to be marginalized, sidelined, or obscured. On the contrary, its Muslim/Turkish character was blatantly expressed within the refashioned imperial ritualism. The new manifestation of the Ottoman imperium was to include non-Muslims, but not to renounce its Islamic heritage completely, and it was to render the overt Muslim/Turkish character not disturbing and threatening in the eyes of non-Muslim Ottomans. For Lütfi Simavi, the new imperial display should proudly reflect the heritage and magnificence of the classical age of the Ottoman Empire. In short, Lütfi Simavi tried to invent the Ottoman imperium as the very symbol and embodiment of an

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993 Lütfi Simavi… p. 11, 72, 83 (2).
994 Lütfi Simavi… p. 6, 68, 83 (2).
996 For example, see Lütfi Simavi… p. 10 (2), 11-12 (2), 50 (2), 64 (2).
Ottoman patriotism, to be endorsed by non-Muslims and to be esteemed and glorified by the Muslims/Turks.998

Lütfi Simavi was critical to the developments that commenced with 1908. He was not only distanced from the vigilance and nationalism of the Unionists, whose socializations and culturalizations were alien to him. He had legal reservations about the post-1908 politics as well. He was critical of the appointment of members of parliament to ministries.999 He pointed out the technical problems thus created. He argued that the Ottoman Empire moved from absolute monarchy to absolute parliamentarianism, which rendered parliament omnipotent. This was due to the habit of imitating the French. He notes that absolute parliamentarianism was the French practice. Lütfi Simavi argues that the French model was one of various alternatives and certainly not a suitable one in the Ottoman context. In this system, the ministers and prime ministers were to be elected from the parliament. The principal problem with the appointment of members of parliament to ministries and the prime ministry was mainly that most members of parliament did not possess any prominent official titles. However, in the Ottoman tradition and political culture, the Ottoman ministers and prime ministers had to possess titles and had to come from a socially privileged background. They were to be addressed with deference and held in high esteem. If they were to be given a title because of the importance of the prime ministry, then still it would not be appropriate because the title would have to be revoked after the holder no longer held office. It would be inappropriate for an ex-prime minister not to carry a lofty title, and, moreover, it would be embarrassing for an ex-prime minister to have to work to make his living, e.g., to work as a lawyer and live as a humble man. He wrote that in France neither the presidents of the state nor the prime ministers were bestowed with any titles. Presidents of the state were not even officially entitled

998 Fujitani interprets the transformation of Japanese imperial ritualism along the same lines. For Fujitani, the Japanese monarchy turned into a symbol of the nation and the Japanese political community in the making. In the image of the emperor “the leaders of the Meiji regime (aimed to channel) the longings of the people for a better world and the inchoate and scattered sense of identity as a people in the direction of modern nationalism.” Fujitani, T, ibid, p. 9. For Carol Gluck’s analysis of the image of the emperor, see Gluck, Carol, Japan’s Modern Myths, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 73-101.

999 Lütfi Simavi… pp. 81-84.
“Excellency” although he was addressed as “Excellency” out of respect. If prime ministers were to be elected from among members of parliament, this would create a problem of authority and respect. In short, for Lütfi Simavi the Republicanism of the French political system was not to be replicated in a political organization completely alien to it. Apparently, the concerns and priorities of Lütfi Simavi were alien to the Young Turks, who had much different concerns and priorities. Thus, Lütfi Simavi, who came from a reputable family\textsuperscript{1000}, is an example of a loyalist and liberal/conservative imperial aristocrat whose loyalty was not to the monarchy per se, but to the idea the monarchy represents or should represent in a constitutional monarchy. He also entertained a strong civilizationist discourse.\textsuperscript{1001} He was distant from the Unionists, but not entirely opposed to them. In this regard, he was highly representative of a certain social cluster.

Nevertheless, the traditional nature and characteristics of the diplomatic service as a “voice from the tomb”, the survival of the 19th century European gentlemanly statesman ideal lived on in the names of Ahmet Tevfik Pasha and Mehmet Rifat Pasha, the ambassadors to London and Paris in the Unionist government. The appointment of Mehmed Rifat Pasha as the minister of foreign affairs after serving one year as the ambassador to London was welcomed by the British as “the only safeguard for the dubious British orientation of the new Cabinet.” But it was noted by Lowther that, “his capacity to cope with the CUP was also in doubt.” In his reply, Hardinge concurred. The new regime was “gradually tending to a military despotism of a nationalist and chauvinistic character.”\textsuperscript{1002} Mehmed Rifat served for two years as the minister of foreign affairs without much say in foreign policy decisions. After his appointment as ambassador to Paris in 1911, he continued to be neglected by the Unionist leadership like Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, the ambassador to London. Mallett, the British ambassador, just after the beginning of World War I related that, “‘(i)f Tewfik had had control of Turkish policy, there would be no war with Turkey now(.)’ But Tewfik was poorly regarded by the Young Turks, as was

\textsuperscript{1000} For Lütfi Simavi’s pedigree, see Gökman, Muzaffer, Sedat Simavi: Hayati ve Eserleri, İstanbul: Apa Ofset Başmevi, 1970, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{1001} Lütfi Simavi... pp. 26-27, 37-38.

Rifat in Paris, and during most of October he obtained no replies to the numerous letters in which he had urged the Porte to abandon its policy, which as he had told Nicolson “must inevitably end in disaster for the country.”

Ahmed Reşid (Rey) also agreed with the observation made by the British embassy. In the homage he wrote after the death of Rıfat Pasha in Servet-i Fünun in 1925, he pointed out the resentment of Rıfat Paşa towards Enver and his cronies. Apparently, it was no coincidence that the Unionists preferred to appoint aged, pro-Entente (Anglophile and Francophile), and very experienced diplomats to these capitals. While the Young Turk leadership pursued its own agenda in sympathy with revisionist and adventurist Germany, these ambassadors tried to co-opt and conciliate the traditional powerhouses of Europe. However, by 1914 their efforts turned out to be futile and irrelevant as the pro-German orientation of the Young Turks progressed.

6.6. The Unionist Generation

It is legitimate to question if these idiosyncratic personalities were representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a whole. Some anecdotal evidence may also be gathered from otherwise unknown officials of the lower ranks, such as the comment of Mehmed Ali Bey, the secretary of the Bern embassy in 1917, who made a racist remark regarding the Armenians to his German counterpart. A cumulative radicalization was not limited to the diplomatic service, but was observable in the other Ottoman government offices as well. In short, we may observe that there was an apparent radicalization of diplomats

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1003 Heller, Joseph, ibid, pp. 153-54.
1005 For Mehmet Rifat’s pro-Entente credentials, also see the remarks of Mahmud Şevket Pasha in his memoirs. Mahmut Şevket Pasha, Sadrazam ve Harbiye Nazırı Mahmud Şevket Pasha’nın Günlüğü, İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1988, p. 48.
1006 Quoted in Kieser, Hans-Lukas, Türklüğe İhtida, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008, p. 78.
1007 For the cumulative radicalization of the military officers throughout the Hamidian era, see Akmeşe, Handan Nezir, The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the
with the coming of the third generation of Tanzimat in line with the pattern observable for the Ottoman political, intellectual, and bureaucratic elite in general. These third generation diplomats did not share much with their elder colleagues. The radicalization had three manifestations: nationalism, secularism, and modernism. These three traits of radicalization complemented and consolidated each other. Nevertheless, a resistance to the radicalization within the ministry was observable. The ministry, like its counterparts in Europe, was one of the most conservative and elitist offices within the Ottoman bureaucracy. Of course, they were not in a position to influence the decision-making process, except by providing the flow of information from European capitals and providing legal and technical support. The old guard diplomats were contemptuous of the amateurishness and crudeness of the Young Turks. Moreover as an institutional instinct, the ministry had to be cautious and avoid any tensions. However, it must be said that the resistance was limited to the shifting mentalities and orientation of foreign policy. Disillusionment with long-trusted Britain was a significant factor in this process. This was also due to the fact that the radicalization derived not from particularistic developments within the Ottoman Muslim elite, but derived from a radicalization of the state of mind in Europe. It was a generational phenomenon as well. The younger diplomats socialized in a milieu which forced them to maintain radical political stances. Thus, instead of speaking of a Unionist political leadership or ideological disposition, we may speak of a quasi-Unionist generation capturing the minds and souls of a particular generation.

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1008 Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali, *Atina Sefareti*, pp. 82-83; Lütfi Simavi… p. 159; Abdülhak Hamid… p. 352.
1010 For the aggressive nationalist literature prevalent after the Balkan Wars, some written by authors with clear Unionist sympathies but others written by authors aloof from the
process was not a distinctly Ottoman evolution but a manifestation of the global forces enhancing the radicalization of minds and ideologies.¹⁰¹¹

Recently, conventional assumptions of the discipline of international relations have been criticized.¹⁰¹² International relations’ isolation from the other disciplines of social science came to an end, and it was integrated into the larger framework of social sciences. Critical of the conventional paradigms of international relations and rejecting approaching states as “black boxes”, constructivists in international relations argued “(1) that the structures of human association are determined by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”¹⁰¹³ Therefore, within the constructivist paradigm, foreign policy orientations and international alignment preferences are determined not merely by Realpolitik and the “supreme interests of the nation” but by ideologies and


perceptions determined by social, cultural, and other factors.\textsuperscript{1014} Foreign policy considerations are (to a certain extent) reflections of struggles within elites and between different social amalgamations.

In the case of the pre-World War I Ottoman priorities, we clearly observe that the difference regarding the foreign policy orientations derived from diverging class origins and mentality structures. The upstart and radical revolutionary Young Turks detested the status quo, and they found an alignment with the revisionist Germany, relating their efforts to crash the Ottoman establishment’s status quo with Germany’s drive to demolish the European conservative status quo designed by Britain and France. Needless to say, Young Turk ideological dispositions (and those of the Young Turk generation as a whole) were compatible with the German radical/militarized modernist vision (especially prevalent in the German general chiefs of staff) which was on the eve of World War I in the process of escalation.\textsuperscript{1015} In contrast, the Hamidian old guard, having faith in the 19th century conservative optimism in order and progress, remained aloof from Germany’s revisionism and felt close to the conservative international order of Britain. They also kept their faith in resolving of matters with diplomacy, a view not only not shared but detested by the Young Turks. The Hamidian establishment was defensive within the changing circumstances, resisting the rising new generation with its different agenda and social background. It was in their interests to stick to an order in which they could safeguard themselves. The old world was a world they knew and a world in which they felt secure and content.

Apparently, in terms of domestic politics, Germany embodied the conservative order as portrayed by Wehler, Mommsen, and many others. However with regard to international

\textsuperscript{1014} For the role of the perception of threat determined by the ideological backgrounds and dispositions of the foreign policy decision-making elite, see Haas, Mark L, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics 1789-1989, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

\textsuperscript{1015} For example, for an interesting text exalting the German social and political order of Germany during World War I written by the General Director of Secondary Schools after visiting Germany as quoted in Gencer, Mustafa, Jöntürk Modernizmi ve “Alman Ruhu”, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003, pp. 114-15, see (Taylan) Muslihiddin Adil. Alman Hayat-ı İrfan, İstanbul, 1333. For other pamphlets exalting the achievements of Prussianism and Germany’s military preparedness just before World War I, see Aksakal, Mustafa, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 31,33. For Enver’s admiration of Germany, Trumpener, Ulrich, Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 18.
politics, German militarism was the revolutionary/revisionist dynamic threatening the conservative order and the status quo. It was Great Britain that was desperate to defend the international order and resist change. That is to say, the political regime of Germany was contradicted by its international aspirations. Nevertheless, this does not mean that political stances and international visions contradict each other ideologically. On the contrary, they manifest an affinity. The expansionism of the conservative Germany had led the political regime to transform itself to a radical and revolutionary position in two decades. This is not to say that this transformation was inherent in the Prussian order, but it is an example how interactions between the level of international politics and domestic politics influence and shape each other.\textsuperscript{1016} The revisionist zeal in terms of international politics restructured Germany as a militarized autocracy in which the military and the newly rising classes were in the ascendancy by 1914.\textsuperscript{1017}

It is equally true for the Ottomans. The revisionism of the Young Turks on the international level led them to endorse a radical and modernist agenda and policy program. Such a comprehensive vision was quiet different from the dispositions of those who were not pursuing territorial revisionism and who were eager to accommodate the international order. Therefore whereas the Young Turks allied with Germany (although this was not the original intention), others looked to side with Britain and France even after the break-up after World War I in Europe. Apparently, the Young Turks’ association with Germany was not limited to a political alliance. It was the German vision with which they were

\textsuperscript{1016} This is not the place to discuss the multifaceted and controversial historiography of late imperial Germany. Nevertheless, the approaches of Wehler and Mommsen were previously criticized. Some studies listed above are valuable readings to attest the transformation of the German political regime within. Eley, Geoff, \textit{Reshaping the German Right}, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990; Chichering, Roger, \textit{We Who Feel Most German}, London; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984; Fritzsche, Peter, \textit{A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination}, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992; Repp, K, Reformers, \textit{Critics and the Paths of German Modernity}, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000.

\textsuperscript{1017} Responsibility for the outbreak of World War I is a subject which has preoccupied scholars since 1914. For a review of the question of German responsibility for the outbreak of World War I, see Mombauer, Annika, \textit{The Origins of the First World War. Controversies and Consensus}, New York: Longman, 2002.
fascinated. The same was equally true for the pro-English and pro-French old guard and the opponents of the Unionists (as well as pro-British and pro-French Unionists such as the liberal Minister of Finance Cavid Bey), who were pursuing a moderate political stance (arguably both for their class interests and due to their political socializations).

Although such orientations may derive from formations that developed based on class backgrounds, aspirations, and identities, once they are developed, they surpass social differences and socializations. The sons of old Istanbuliots and diplomats of the new generation who came from socially exclusive backgrounds were also heavily influenced and shaped by the new radicalism. As argued in the previous chapters and in this chapter, this was a generational phenomenon determined by interacting complex dynamics (surpassing class interests). As the new intellectual historians and new cultural historians have shown, patterns and structures of mentalities were formed, constructed, and developed within certain milieus, and subsequently these structures of mentalities also stimulate their surroundings and transform them.

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1018 For the impact of German militarism and effective governance, see Gencer, Mustafa, Jöntürk Modernizmi ve “Alman Ruhu”, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003.
CHAPTER VII

THE EUROPEAN PATTERNS AND THE OTTOMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

7.1. The End of the Old Order and the Old Diplomacy

Regretting the decline of the influence of the Foreign Office over policymaking and criticizing the ignorance of the political elite of Britain regarding international affairs, Permanent Undersecretary Hardinge wrote to Buchanan, the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, in 1917: “We have two diplomacies—one the Foreign Office and the other ‘amateur,’ running side by side.” Harold Nicolson, one of the foremost historians and scholars of diplomacy and himself a prominent diplomat in the service of the Foreign Office, narrates several witty anecdotes reflecting the amateurishness of the leaders participating in the Paris Peace Conference. One of them is as follows: “Addressing the House of Commons on April 16, 1919, he (Lloyd George-DG) made the following frank, modest, and eminently reasonable statement: ‘How many members have ever heard of Teschen? I do not mind saying I had never heard of it.’ Obviously, no more than seven members of the House of Commons could ever have heard of that remote and miserable duchy, yet Mr. Lloyd George’s admission of that fact struck horror into the heart of those specialists, such as Mr. Wickham Steed, who had been familiar with the Teschen problem for many years.” Nicolson was evidently emphasizing the ignorance of Lloyd George but nevertheless shared the apprehensions of Wickham Steed, who reacted to the self-exposure of Lloyd George’s ignorance as follows: “The cry was raised at once. ‘Lloyd George knows nothing of the problems which he is attempting to solve. From his own lips, we

learn it. The whole British Delegation in Paris, the whole Conference in fact, are ignorant and unprepared. Disaster is upon us.”

Ironically, the Cassandran prophecy of Wickham Steed turned out to be correct. The Paris Peace Conference failed to maintain a peaceful Europe. Instead, it sowed the seeds of future conflicts. The snobbish amateurishness of Lloyd George became even more marked in its mismanagement of Turkish affairs to the opposition and resentment of the British Foreign Office, and the Turkish-Greek war ended up as a disaster for Britain.

Nicolson, in his book on the Paris Peace Conference, from which the above excerpts are taken, makes his points clear. He did not see the political leaders as personally responsible for this failure. “Given the atmosphere of the time, given the passions aroused in all democracies by four years of war, it would have been impossible even for supermen to devise a peace consisting of moderation and righteousness. The task of the Paris negotiators was, however, complicated by special circumstances of confusion. The ideals to which they had been pledged by President Wilson were not only impracticable in and of themselves but necessitated for their execution the intimate and unceasing collaboration of the United States. ...It was thus the endeavor of men like Clemenceau and Lloyd George to find a middle way between the desires of their democracies and the more moderate dictates of their own experience, as well as a middle way between the theology of President Wilson


1022 For Wickham Steed, see Macmillan, Margaret, *Peacemakers*, John Murray, 2003, p. 123-125. Wickham Steed was not a member of the “old school” like Harold Nicolson. Originally a journalist, in the course of World War I, he subscribed to the cause of the Slavs. A Germanophobe, he advocated the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and supported the dissidents of the Habsburg Empire from various non-German nationalities. His views became very influential in the higher echelons of Foreign Office at the end of the war.


and the practical needs of a distracted Europe.” Nicolson situates the shortcomings of the Peace Conference within a wider framework. “I have tried to deal with the transitional phase between pre-war and post-war diplomacy and give some picture of the Paris Peace Conference.” For him, the diplomacy of Peace Conference reflected the changing times and milieu. For him, in the new world of the post-war, no effective and constructive diplomacy could be pursued. He clearly sympathized with the “old diplomacy,” the world he had known from his childhood, from his career in the Foreign Office and from his father, who was also a prominent diplomat in the Foreign Office and served as the undersecretary of the Foreign Office between 1910 and 1916. Nicolson wrote, “Diplomacy essentially is the organized system of negotiation between sovereign states. The most important factor in such organization is the element of representation—the essential necessity in any negotiator that he should be fully representative of his own sovereign at home... in other words, it is the incidence of sovereignty which has gradually shifted and not the essential principles by which efficient diplomacy should be conducted.” In these lines, he was clear. Post-war diplomacy represented interests other than those of the 19th century diplomatic services.

Arno Mayer contrasts the participants of the Paris Peace Conference with the participants of the Congress of Vienna a century earlier. “In 1814-15, the peace was negotiated ‘in elegant and ceremonious privacy.... (by) a group of Aristocrats life-trained

1026 Nicolson, Harold, ibid, p.5.
1027 Nicolson, Harold, ibid, p.4.
1028 Almost all the diplomatic participants of the Paris Peace Conference had the image of the Congress of Vienna in their minds. For example Sir James Headlam-Morley, who initially worked in the Propaganda Department during World War I and joined the British Delegation at the Conference, wrote in his diaries, “It is very interesting and amusing here. On the whole, I am coming to have much higher respect for the Congress of Vienna than I used to have.” (Sir James Headlam-Morley, A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972, p.17) Also see the introduction of Harold Nicolson to his book on the Congress of Vienna; Nicolson, Harold. The Congress of Vienna, London: Constable & Co Ltd, 1946. Evidently, the Congress of Vienna, the triumph of the “party of order” against the revolutionary tide symbolized an impressive illustration of the old school gentlemanly diplomacy which established the peace and order for the upcoming half a century before the rise of Prussia in the 1860s. The experience of the Paris Peace Conference hardly accomplished such enduring peaceful results.
as statesmen or diplomats’ who considered themselves responsible to crowned sovereigns and barely worried about partisan pressures. The situation was not so serene a century later when seasoned party politicians of petit-bourgeois background - two professors, a journalist, a solicitor- gathered around the conference table. The Big Four were responsible to parliaments, and they never seriously considered insulating themselves from the political parties, pressure groups, mass media, and mass electorates, which were highly agitated over the peace question. To be sure, compared to Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand, the Big Four were “amateur” diplomats.”

Arno Mayer developed an impressive interpretation of the logic of the Paris Peace Conference. For Arno Mayer, it was the last stand of the “party of order” to reestablish and impose the status quo, which had been severely crushed. Mayer notes that, in 1917-18, during the heat of war, the “parties of movement” were in a strong position. With the end of the war and the treaties concluding war, the “party of order” reclaimed its supremacy. However, this victory remained only on paper. The good old days of the party of order were already gone. For him, the Paris Peace Conference was the last stand of the party of order.

The Italian Prime Minister Francesco Nitti wrote in his memoirs, “Europe was happy and prosperous, while now, after the terrible World War, she is threatened with a decline and a reversion to brutality, which suggests the fall of the Roman Empire.” World War I was certainly a watershed for the “old regime” and “ruling elites.” There were few republics in Europe in 1914. The end of the war brought the collapse of four monarchies and declarations of numerous republics, big and small and continent wide. At the end of the war, the first socialist state of the world was calling for a world revolution. Democratic


and revolutionary currents were on the rise. The world of 19th-century Victorian conservative values was gone forever. The red scare of the postwar era was to be accompanied by the fascist scare at its zenith in the 1930s. Socialism, fascism, and liberalism were all challenging the status quo in their own unique ways. Although they diverged in their political visions, with regard to the threat they exerted on the conservative orders and the milieu in which they were fostered, they were different manifestations of the same phenomenon. They were all the products of the post-1918 milieu and the consequences of the collapse of the old order.

In that sense, 1918 was a landmark year. It sealed the end of the Old Regime. Many old guards like Harold Nicolson lamented the passing of the good old times in which diplomacy was not a quarrel (and not philanthropy in the Wilsonian sense) but a gentlemen’s discussion. The vision of diplomacy and statecraft imagined and presented in the earliest scholarly studies on diplomacy perceived the “art of diplomacy” likewise. Diplomacy in the 19th century cannot be reduced to the staunch defense of state interests. It was also never a matter of principles, beliefs and commitments. It was not Realpolitik either. Realpolitik was yet to be invented in its Morgenthauen definition. These premises of the “old diplomacy” began to change gradually in the last three decades of the 19th century as the alliances system replaced the conventional concert of Europe. The rise of Germany triggered the conclusion of bilateral agreements and alliances between the Great Powers.

However, others were not enthusiasts of “old diplomacy.” For them, “old diplomacy” was the epitome of the decayed aristocratic order. “In the immediate aftermath of the Great War, impelled by revulsion at the carnage of that conflict, generations of historians identified ‘old’ or ‘secret diplomacy’ as a major factor leading to war. The pre-1914 Foreign Office, in particular, appeared to be the quintessence of ’old diplomacy’.”

Mistrust of the Foreign Office and its dealings were already suspect in the eyes of the parliamentary “Foreign Affairs Group” of the Liberal Party, which consisted of radicals who were...

heavily critical of the mandarin-like organization of the Foreign Office. Another issue of the parliamentary group that was critical was the Foreign Office’s defiance in giving information to the parliament on its conduct of foreign affairs. In their eyes, “old diplomacy” was another name for political conspiring and corruption. Thus, in the age of democracy, such an attitude and old diplomacy were relics of the old bigotry and had to be eliminated.

Old diplomacy ended with World War I, by which time it had become completely discredited. However, it has recently been acknowledged that the transformation from “old diplomacy” to “new diplomacy” was a myth exaggerated by the champions of new diplomacy, who were trying to legitimize their exercise of diplomacy by discrediting the old corrupt style of diplomacy. The Bolsheviks’ revelation of the secret treaties was the final blow to the defenders and makers of the old diplomacy. These revelations exposed the level of corruption and insincerity of the old diplomacy. The idealists, journalists, and radicals were advocating “new diplomacy,” which was supposed to be “open” rather than “secret” and “corrupt,” “internationalist” rather than “national,” and “democratic” rather than “aristocratic.” The League of Nations was an embodiment of this new ideal. In fact, the rhetoric of “new diplomacy” was a sign of the changing class character of the makers

1034 For an insider’s account, see Ponsonby, Arthur, Democracy and Diplomacy. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1915. The book is a severe criticism of what will be known as “old diplomacy.” Ponsonby, who is best known for his frequently quoted sentence “when war is declared, truth is the first casualty” and a sincere believer in this phrase, opposed World War I from the beginning and blamed the diplomacy of a minority for sealing the fate of millions in the war. Also see, Ponsonby, Arthur, Falsehood in War-Time, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928.


1036 For the parliamentary and intellectual opposition to “secrecy in the making of foreign policy” in World War I, see Swartz, Marvin, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.

of foreign policies. Middle class radicals were now replacing aristocrats, both as makers of foreign policy and as opinion leaders with regard to foreign policy. The 1920s epitomized the development of a new style of diplomacy in Versailles, in Genoa, and in the routine conduct of diplomacy. However, the new style of diplomacy collapsed in the hollow decade of the 1930s, when democracies were uncertain as to how to respond to the rise of fascist and authoritarian regimes. Vansittart, the last “old diplomat,” failed in the face of the opposition of the political elites to pursue the “aesthetics” of old diplomacy. Arguably, one of the reasons why Vansittart was one of the British elitists who was most alarmed by the ascent of fascism and was concerned with opposing Hitler was his “old diplomat” background. Nevertheless, the democratic world of politics and the active involvement of party politicians did not allow him to pursue a 19th century diplomatic game, which had been more efficient and had a more problem-solving orientation in its understanding of conflict resolution. The diplomacy of the post-World War II era, dominated by the ruthless realities of the Cold War and the rise of Realpolitik, was a world apart from the pre-1914 diplomacy. In short, the 19th century diplomatic world, with its class character and social culturalization, was gone and had turned into a curiosity for historians to study.

We have to situate the Ottoman Foreign Ministry within this framework. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry is a world lost to us as well. A similar and simultaneous transformation was observable with the coming of the republic. The Ankara government, with the habit (out of necessity and concern for the urgency of international bargaining and compromises that are not possible within the practice of routine diplomacy) it gained during the War of Independence, appointed several non-career diplomats (such as army generals) to

1039 For the diplomacy of the 1930s, see Steiner, Zara, The Lights That Failed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
important positions. They were trustees and de facto personal representatives of Mustafa Kemal. They functioned as persons in the service of Mustafa Kemal and the political authority in Ankara rather than as functionaries performing regular and professional diplomatic craft. Several of them retained their diplomatic careers after the end of the War of Independence War thanks to the prominence they acquired through the partial shift of the political and bureaucratic elite. Nevertheless, the displacement in the diplomatic establishment was fairly limited, - being limited to some ambassadorial posts\textsuperscript{1042}. The rank and file of the ministry retained their posts. What changed was the style and aesthetics of diplomacy. The diplomacy of a nation-state was apparently different from the diplomacy of a retreating empire. The diplomacy of the latter was “old diplomacy,” which had its own logic, whereas the diplomacy of the former entailed an interest-maximizing strategy of the nation state.

7.2. The Aristocratic Worlds of the Hamidian Foreign Ministry

One of the significant signs of the transformation of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century was its changing perception of the European powers. The European powers came to be seen as equals and counterparts rather than as eternal foes of the empire. This was more a discursive transformative than a real one given that it was a de facto acknowledgement on the part of the Ottoman Empire. The European powers were also considered to have legitimate claims to power and authority. Moreover as fellow monarchies (or fellow republics as republics also had their legal personalities), they were regarded as “venerable.”\textsuperscript{1043} The principle of reciprocity was also established. The representatives of the foreign states (ambassadors, consuls, et cetera) were welcomed with due respect.

\textsuperscript{1042} The best source on the Kemalist diplomatic service and the making of diplomats by decree is Şimşir Bilal, \textit{Bizim Diplomatlar}, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1996.

The annals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflect this emphasis on respect. In the first annal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published in 1885, the chapter “Düvel-i Ecnebiye” introduced the emperors, kings, and sultans with the biography of the reigning monarchs and names and titles of their honorable wives, sons, and brothers. The only other detail provided with regard to these monarchies was the official religion of each monarchy. Thus, we are provided with ample information on the monarchs of Hawaii, Ethiopia, and Wurttemberg. The following chapter was entitled “Cumhuriyyetle İdare Olunan Memalik-i Ecnebiye” (States governed as Republics). It is interesting to observe that, at least theoretically, according to this categorization, the republics were not recognized as states proper given that whereas monarchies were introduced in the chapter “Düvel-i Ecnebiye”, the republics were introduced in a separate chapter titled as “those governed by Republics” as if they are states needing an extra adjective (Cumhuriyetle İdare Olunan). At the very least, they were not seen as equal to those states which were monarchies. In this chapter, only the name of the presidents and the year of their election were listed. For example, what we learn about republic of Argentina is that its president was General Julio Roca and that he was elected on 12 October 1880. The same limited information was provided for republics such as France, the United States, Peru, and Haiti. Although considerable space was allocated to monarchies, the information provided for republics is conspicuously small. The next chapter listed the prime ministers and certain ministers of the states regardless of whether they were monarchies or republics. Therefore, here, an equality of republics and monarchies was acknowledged. Thus, although republics and monarchies were deemed as equal in introducing their administrative organization, in terms of their legal personality they were not. Nevertheless, in the Ottoman diplomatic jargon, while the emperors and kings were majestically addressed formally as “Son Altesse Impériale” and “Son Altesse Royale,” the presidents of

1044 Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1301/1885), pp. 342-396.
1045 Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1301/1885), pp. 397-404.
1046 Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1301/1885), pp. 405-428.
the republics were merely addressed as “Notre très cher ami et allié.” The French presidents of the republic were specifically addressed as “Notre Grand et Bon Ami.”

The next chapter listed the former representatives of the states in the Ottoman Empire as well as the actual personnel of the legations from ambassadors to minor scribes. In short, the annals of the Foreign Ministry were formalistic texts and clear manifestations of the Ottoman claim to be a part of the concert of Europe.

More significantly, the annals were very meticulous in their observations of ranks and formalities of aristocracy – so much so that a page was allocated for the definitions and explanations of the European aristocratic titles (“Avrupa’da asılzadegana mahsus unvanlar”) such as baron, cardinal, and marquis. The decorations of European orders, insignia, and merits were also seen as very prestigious and thus worth mentioning. The biographies of the high-ranking members of the Ottoman diplomatic service listed the merits and orders granted by the European states. The listing of the decorations of European titles was also mentioned in the biographies of the prominent Ottoman diplomats and statesmen provided in the Foreign Ministry annals. It was also one of the five questions asked in the questionnaire of the Ministry kept in the personal files in Sicil-i Ahval. In fact, the awarding of decorations was a mechanism employed exhaustively by Abdülhamid to maintain the loyalty of his civil servants and to monitor them. This strategy, as well as “inventing a loyalist Hamidian state aristocracy” was one of the pillars of the Hamidian regime. While Esat Cemal Paker mocked the absurdity and ridiculousness of the exhaustive decorations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for

1048 Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1301/1885), pp. 429-490.
1049 Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1301/1885), pp. 547.
1051 Paker, Esat Cemal, Kirk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıralarım, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000, p. 17.
Galip Kemali (Söylemezoğlu)\textsuperscript{1052} and Hayreddin Nedim,\textsuperscript{1053} decorations were a primary institution of diplomacy and governance. In his memoirs, Galip Kemali seriously and meticulously listed the decorations he was awarded, as well as those given to others. We may conclude by arguing that while the Hamidian regime sanctioned and endorsed the contemporary European formalities, codes of conduct, and procedures, the sultan made use of them to maintain and reestablish a traditional loyalty alongside a new mode of loyalty established based on these new codes of conduct. In this regard, the Hamidian imperium was arguably an idiosyncratic blend of these two diverse political traditions. This was not different from the other 19\textsuperscript{th} century Ottoman institutions that integrated traditions imported from Europe and those derived from the pre-modern Ottoman past and appropriated for 19\textsuperscript{th} century usage.

The annals of the Foreign Ministry allocated numerous pages to the exaltation of the glamour of the Ottoman Empire at its zenith and during its post-classical age. The annals began with a long tribute to the sultans. The sultans were listed with their illustrious titles in due respect, reverence, and exaltation. Obviously, what was implied in these acclaims was that the glorious 19\textsuperscript{th} century Ottoman Empire of Tanzimat owed its magnificence to the exploits and the splendor of the Ottoman Empire of the previous centuries.\textsuperscript{1054} The next entry in the annals provided brief information regarding the full names and the definitions of the prominent Ottoman titles beginning from the highest ranks (rütbe-i vezaret ve müşirîyyet) to the lowest titles (hacegan rütbesi-yüzbaşılık rütbesi).\textsuperscript{1055} The entry “Rüteb-i Resmiyye-i Saltanat-i Seniyye’nin Suret ve Keyfiyyet Te’sissine Da’îr İzahat-i Mahsusa” informs us that the “modern” system of titles and its regulation was introduced in 1836.\textsuperscript{1056} The annals also listed how the bearers of certain ranks and titles were formally addressed.


\textsuperscript{1054} For the periodization of Ottoman history by 19th century Ottoman historians, see Demiryürek, Mehmet, \textit{Tanzimat’тан Cumhuriyete Bir Osmanlı Aydını: Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi}, İstanbul: Phoneix, 2003.

\textsuperscript{1055} \textit{Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889)}, p. 30.

It was clear that addressing individuals in a culture of hierarchy and ranks was not a simple procedure and was a matter of formality. First and foremost, everybody was to be addressed differently according to their own ranks and titles. Forms of address revealed the relations between the one who was addressed and the one who was addressing. Therefore, the forms of address also changed according to the position of the person doing the addressing. Moreover, when a bearer of a certain title was cited, out of respect, his title had to be used along with appropriate phrases. For example, the ulema had to address a former prime minister as “ma’lum-ı da’ileridir ki” whereas members of the civil service had to address a former prime minister “ma’rüz-ı çakerleridir ki.” When the name of a former prime minister was cited in a speech, he had to be addressed “übbehetlü devletlü .... Paşa hazretleri.” The use of forms of address in a culture of aristocracy and hierarchy was not a technicality. On the contrary, it was one of the founding pillars of the polity. The superiority of the superiors was reproduced and reinforced every time they were addressed with the respect they were to be afforded. It was one of the constitutive parts of the hierarchical political order. In that regard, cultures of aristocracies including the Ottomans were no different than the Malaysian cockfights noted by Geertz and the theater state of Negara.

The next entry in the annals describes the regulations governing the priority of the title-holders. Here, we learn who precedes whom in a ceremony. The entry continued with the listing of names and descriptions of the four decorations of the Ottoman imperium: Nişan-ı imtiyaz, osmani, mecidi and şefkat. Of course, all these decorations have several degrees from first degree to fourth or fifth degree. In short, the annals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were books of protocol observing the codes of respect between fellow monarchies and states and reflected the “official discourse” of the empire.

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1057 For the list of the formal addresses, see age, pp. 31-33.
1060 age, pp. 31-32.
The appropriate and formal addressing of foreign emperors, presidents of the states, and other holders of various prestigious titles was crucial. Hüseyin Agah’s pamphlet was written to instruct the young diplomats in the European protocol and formality of the diplomacy. The author was an official employed in the Translation Office of the Foreign Ministry. In his tables, he provided the Turkish and French versions of the principal forms of address. For example, he noted that the French “Son Excellence” was the translation of the Ottoman title “devletlu, atufetlu, saadetu, asaletlu efendim hazretleri.” The French “Impériale Votre Majesté” was the Ottoman “zat-i hazreti mülükhaneleri.” It is interesting to observe the assimilation of the classical Ottoman titles and addresses into the European titles and addresses. In this adaptation process, the long Ottoman titles and addresses were shortened and specified. Room for authenticity was also maintained. The adjective of “imperial” was Ottomanized and absorbed into the Ottoman political culture. While “zat-i Şahane” was employed for the emperor sultan, the term “şahane” was also employed to establish the exaltedness of the imperial institutions such as Mülkiye-i Şahane and Tibbiye-i Şahane. The empire was begun to be called Memalik-i Mahruse-i Şahane as an alternative to the conventional “Devlet-i Aliyye.” The word seniyye” was also employed as the Ottoman counterpart of imperial as in saltanat-i seniyye. The Ottoman embassies abroad were known as “sefaret-i seniyye”s, translated into French in official documents as “Ambassade Imperiale Ottomane.” The more traditional imperial titles were also retained and used for various and ancient institutions as in Hassa-i Hümayun and Mabeyn-i Hümayun-u Hazret-i Mülükane. With localization of the European terminology, the empire created an authenticity for itself within its accommodation to the European universalism. In this way, the original conventional Ottoman contents and their idiosyncratic senses of grandeur remained unchanged. The standardization and concretization of the traditional titles and addresses was also part of the process of the

1061 Hüseyin Agah Bey, Diplomasi Usul-i Kitabeti, Konstantiniyye: Matbaa-i Ebuzziya, 1308, p. 15.
adaptation of the Ottoman statecraft to modernity and modern governance. However, the Ottoman forms of addresses continued to be longer (and loftier) than their European counterparts and the Ottoman distinctiveness was articulated in these formulations. Yet, it was apparent that there was an attempt at an accommodation of Ottoman political culture to European political culture.

In short, the contents of these annals demonstrate an aspiration on the part of the Ottoman polity to be recognized as a part of the Concert of Europe. The Hamidian and Tanzimat Ottoman Empire was the continuation of the splendid empire of the Suleiman I and Mehmed II. This emphasis continued to be the principal legitimacy for the maintenance and advancement of the 19th century Ottoman Empire. Although, the Tanzimat was perceived as the birth of a new political entity replacing the obsolete structure (an *ancien régime*) in terms of administration, the magnificence of the previous Ottoman centuries was to be hailed. The regression and degeneration of the Empire two centuries before the Tanzimat separated the Tanzimat-state from the glorious era of the Empire. However, the imperium was refashioned not as a military superpower with militarist fervor but an empire of cultivation and civility as a part of the empires international (as opposed to the republics and republican international).

The de facto aristocratic nature of the Ottoman Empire was not new, but its formalization and its open recognition, affirmation, and articulation was novel. It is also

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1063 For the changes in the texts and discourses of the official documents of the Ottoman Empire with Tanzimat, see Akyıldız, Ali, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004, pp. 103-116.

1064 The historiography of the Tanzimat divided Ottoman history into various parts. *Devr-i istila* (Age of Expansion) covered the years between the conquest of Istanbul and the death of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, although the exact years change in different accounts. The following era was named in different accounts as “*devr-i tevakkuf ve inhitat, teşettüat, devr-i vukuf, devr-i inhitat*” (Age of Stagnation, Contraction, Decline). In these accounts, with the beginning of the reign of Selim III in 1789 and subsequently with Tanzimat in 1839, the Ottomans entered into the Age of Reorganization, Progress, and Regeneration (*devr-i teceddüd, devr-i teceddüd ve inkilap, devr-i teceddüd ve tanzimat, teceddüdat ve terakkıyat*). For Ahmed Vefik Pasha, as he wrote in his *Fezleke-i Tarih-i Osmani*, with Tanzimat, “*fasl-i sadiste yine teceddi-ı usul-ı hukumete karar vererek mihir-i saltanat tekrar kesb-i fer ve şevket eyledi...*” Demiryürek, Mehmet, *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Bir Osmanlı Aydını: Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi (1853-1925)*, İstanbul: Phoenix, 2003, pp. 156-161.
significant that although republics and presidents of republics had been included in the first annals published in 1885, in the second annals, published in 1889, there was no mention of them. Instead, the table included the Pope, the king of Saxony, the prince of Monaco, and the grand duke of Hesse with an entry in the table showing the dynasties to which these monarchs and princes belonged.

The second annals published in 1889 allocated a chapter to the decorations granted after the publication of the first annals. In other words, the list was refreshed. It included the names of the diplomats who were decorated and the insignias that had been granted. Another list showed the members of the diplomatic service who had been granted insignias by other states. For example, we learn that the former Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs was granted the insignia of the “Red Eagle” from the state of Germany. As expected, the list begins with the highest-ranking officials who had been honored with decorations. They were also given to low-ranking officials such as Galib Beyefendi, an assistant in the Office of Ceremonies in the Foreign Ministry who was decorated with a second-level Vasa insignia from the state of Sweden. States ranging from Montenegro to Italy had decorated several Ottoman officials, although the two countries which decorated the Ottoman officials the most were Iran and Romania.

The symbolism and meaning of the institutionalization of nişans has been analyzed by Edhem Eldem. He has demonstrated the gradual transformation of the aesthetics and the style of the nişans from the first insignia in 1831 (or 1832) to the end of the empire. Although Mustafa Reşid Bey (the future Mustafa Reşid Pasha) suggested that the institutionalization of an insignia system would increase the prestige of the empire, it did not happen that way because the Westerners did not feel honored by the decoration of the insignia by the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, they felt that it was a degradation to be granted an insignia by a state of low prestige. It was only in the later few decades that the Europeans began to be “honored” by being awarded an Ottoman insignia. For Eldem,

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1065 Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), pp. 157212-143.
1068 Eldem, Edhem, İftihar ve İmtiyaz, İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkez, 2004, pp. 117-121.
the crucial decade for the institutionalization of the system was the 1850s. This was due especially to the endorsement of a cosmopolitan discourse created by the implications of the Crimean War and the coalition with Great Britain and France. Nevertheless, the Crimean War only reinforced this process. The modernization of insignias began as early as 1852 with the appearance of the Mecidiye insignia in 1852 prior to the Crimean coalition. By the 1850s, the more traditional designs and scripts of the insignia alluding to the classical age of Ottomans were replaced by more “modern” designs and scripts in terms of the messages conveyed.1069 While the insignia of the early Tanzimat reflected a blend of the traditional discourses of the pre-modern Ottoman Empire and the modern self-images of the 19th century, in time this transitional phase was superseded by the complete endorsement of 19th century imperial discourses. We may argue that, by the 1850s, the Ottoman Empire had managed to enter the family of fellow European monarchies in the symbolic realm.

A significant part of the operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was dedicated to ceremonies. The ministry was responsible for celebrating and congratulating the “days” of the monarchs, which included birthdays, anniversaries of their accessions to the throne, and weddings. Of course, national holidays were also commemorated. The greetings of the fellow monarchs on the anniversaries of the enthronement of Abdülhamid and the religious holidays were received and dispatched to the palace.1070 The follow-up and conduct of this procedure was one of the tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In short, Ottoman officialdom endeavored to be incorporated into the European family. This was not a matter of symbolism. On the contrary, the empire’s primary concern in its pursuit to be admitted into the European family was to secure its territorial integrity. Ottoman officialdom believed that the perpetual threat of partition and annihilation would be avoided by inclusion into the European family. Tanzimat statesmen thought that they had achieved this in 1856. “Finally, the Ottomans had succeeded in gaining admission, however qualified, to the European club of powers. The Paris Treaty of 1856, which

1069 Eldem, Edhem, ibid., p. 169.
1070 For congratulations on the birthdays of the monarchs, see BOA, HR.SYS 222-101, for the anniversaries of their weddings, see BOA, HR.SYS 212/98. For the congratulations of the monarchs on the anniversary of the accession to the throne of Abdülhamid and the religious holidays, BOA, HR.SYS 211/91.
provided an unprecedented guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state, made
the empire, in effect, a member of the European concert. From the Ottoman perspective,
this was a more important result than the Russian surrender of southern Bessarabia or even
the neutralization of the Black Sea (.) Nevertheless, the hopes and expectations of the
Ottoman statesmen were not to be realized. Equal terms between the Ottomans and the
European powers could not be established for apparent reasons. Realpolitik and
Machtpolitik were better means to secure territorial integrity and Ottoman attempts at
Europeanization and synchronization of its self-imagination and self-portrayal remained
futile.

7.3. Transitions to the Cultures of Bureaucracy

A glance at the salaries of the members of the diplomatic service also gives some
inking as to the aristocratic and patriarchal nature of the Ottoman culture of
officialdom. The disparity between the highest-paid officials and the lower echelons of
the bureaucracy is striking. From the annals, we learn that the Foreign Minister was
(supposed to be) paid 360,000 guruses per year according to the 1889 yearbook. The
undersecretary, the highest-paid employee of the ministry, was paid 288,000 guruses. The
second highest-paid employees were the ambassadors to London, Berlin, Paris, St.
Petersburg, and Vienna, who enjoyed an annual income of 246,000 guruses. They were
also entitled to stipends of 186,000 guruses each. Although the Ottoman representatives in
Rome and Teheran also held the title of “büyükelçi”s, they were entitled a more modest
salary of 120,000 guruses per year (with a stipend of another 120,000 guruses), which was
considerably lower than the salaries paid to the holders of other more prestigious
ambassadorships. Regarding the staff in the embassies, we observe a dramatic decrease for
the lower posts including the salaries of the undersecretaries of the embassies. The

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1071 Şükrü Hanoğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, p. 82.
of the pashas and the officials was a prominent feature of the Hamidian regime. See
Georgeon, Francois… p. 177.
undersecretary in London was granted only 48,000 guruşes a year. The secretaries of the first rank, the second rank, and the third rank were entitled to an average of 20 to 35 thousand guruşes a year. The translator of the embassy in Teheran, who was not part of the regular staff of the diplomatic corps in the embassy, was paid 18,000 guruşes. When it came to the porters, the salaries were even less. The porters serving in Istanbul were paid a maximum of 350 guruşes and a minimum of 150 guruşes a year. That meant that the ministerial undersecretary was paid almost two hundred times more than the lowest paid worker, which was a conspicuous and manifest demonstration of the aristocratic/patriarchal nature of the Ottoman polity. The salary scheme of the Ministry (with regard to diplomats) was like a steep pyramid in which the few highest ranking diplomats were paid enormously in comparison to the modest income levels of the low-ranking diplomats.

On the one hand, the 19th century Ottoman Empire resembled a bureaucratic state in which the level of incomes was determined by state fiat. On the other hand, it retained the vestiges of the pre-modern mode of wealth distribution in which there was no concern for egalitarianism and scales of wealth accumulation were determined by personalized, decentralized, arbitrary, and irregular dynamics. Moreover, the lack of finances of the state meant that modestly paid officials were more likely to have their salaries curbed, something that is reminiscent of an inegalitarian mode of wealth distribution based on

1073 Of course, these were the salaries as indicated in the yearbooks. That does not mean that these salaries were paid on time or in full. As is well known, the state frequently failed to pay the salaries on time and in full. As mentioned previously, many ambassadors complained that their salaries were not paid for months and even for years.


1075 The hierarchy between the workers was also apparent. The “head of the hademes” (chief porter) was paid 1,000 guruşes whereas the assistant to the head of the hademes was paid 500 guruşes. In short, in the Ottoman arrangement of payments, access to reasonably high income was endowed to the “heads.” The “head,” the paternal position was prestigious and privileged. This posture reflects the prevalence of paternalistic and hierarchical thought. For a classic study on the pre-modern hierarchical and paternalist mind, see Laslett, Peter, The World We Have Lost, London; New York: Routledge, 2000.


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prestige and power. Furthermore, they were financially more vulnerable in case of non-payment of salaries.

The aristocratic and patriarchal nature of Ottoman officialdom can also be deduced from the table of salaries in Findley’s work on the social history of the Ottoman officialdom.\textsuperscript{1077} In Findley’s scheme, the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were divided into three: non-Muslims, “modernist Muslims”, and “traditional Muslims. In his table, the “modernist Muslims” were paid the best whereas the non-Muslims came second. The “traditional Muslims” were paid very modestly and were predominantly employed in low-ranking posts. Considering that in Findley’s categorization, “modernist Muslims” were those who were educated in westernized (and therefore the best) schools, they occupied the highest and most prestigious positions for which non-Muslims were discriminated against unless their competence was indispensable, like the non-Muslim officials in the Office of Legal Counsellorship. This table clearly demonstrates that a good education secured considerably higher incomes. It also reflects the discriminatory nature of the Ministry in favor of Muslims. Although the non-Muslims on average had better education and skills, they were denied equal opportunity of advancement in ranks and income.

One of the radical moves of the Tanzimat was the inauguration in 1838 of a salary system that replaced the old structure in which no distinction between “public” and “private” had been made.\textsuperscript{1078} Obviously, the pre-Tanzimat rewarding of the public officials privileged the high-ranking officials who had better connections and occupied better positions. However, it was ironic that the “salary system” of the Tanzimat “while (it) intended to do the opposite, (it)... heightened officials’ economic worries.”\textsuperscript{1079} due to its evasion of arbitrary and irregular sources of extra income. Although, the new Weberian/rational system of payment seemed to serve as a relative equalizer between officials in public officialdom, “a vast gap between highest and lowest salaries remained a


\textsuperscript{1078} See Kırlı, Cengiz, “Yolsuzluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi,” \textit{Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yakla\text白沙lar}, 4, Güz 2006, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{1079} Findley, Carter Vaughn, ibid., p. 296.
hallmark of the Ottoman official salary system, even if the gap narrowed with time.”

In this regard, the Ottoman understanding of merit was a typical corollary of the aristocratic culture, albeit an aristocratic culture in which state was at the center and determined aristocratic credentials. The emerging bureaucratic state of the Tanzimat retained several features of the pre-modern state, especially in its structures of redistribution of wealth. Throughout the Tanzimat, (for Muslims) the state continued to be the foremost provider of wealth, which reproduced the principal attributes of a pre-modern polity. Although the Tanzimat acquired many features of the modern bureaucratic state and the Hamidian era witnessed the enormous growth of a bureaucracy with the number of civil servants employed in state service reaching one hundred thousand by 1900, the facets of modern and pre-modern structures coexisted before most of the pre-modern remnants were gradually abandoned (culminating in the Hamidian era and progressing thereafter). The substantial steps to standardize and formalize salaries and their regular distribution were taken in the early reign of Abdülhamid II. One significant development was the 1881 Decree on the Promotion and Retirement of Civil Officials (Memurin-i Mülkiye Terakki ve Tekaüd Kararnamesi), which was superseded by another decree in 1884. The decree of 1881 “was divided into two sections, of which the first dealt summarily with conditions of appointment and promotion, while the second dealt with the creation of a modern kind of Retirement Fund (Tekaüd Sandığı), to be financed by the deductions from the salaries.”

The foundation of the Mülkiye was another major step in the recruitment of officials endowed with sufficient skills and knowledge regarding administration and (modern European) law. The new recruits were provided with much better opportunities, rewards, and assurances compared to their older colleagues. The conditions of employment were also standardized and regularized. “To govern the workings of the personnel records

1080 Findley, ibid, p. 296.

1081 Georgeon, Francois… p. 177. During the Hamidian era, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also expanded enormously. The number of the officials employed in the departments of the ministry in Istanbul more than doubled in fifteen years. Compare the lists in the annals of 1902 and 1889. Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1320 /1902), p. 70-100; Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye (1306/1889), pp. 485-630.

1082 Findley, ibid., p. 273.

1083 Findley, ibid., p. 273.
system, there were two sets of instructions, the first being issued in 1879, the second in 1887.”

It was the porters and the lower-ranking officials, not members of highest-ranking officialdom of the state, that benefited from the newly emerging Weberian regulation of public officials in which the disparity between the salaries of the higher and lower echelons of the bureaucracy gradually narrowed. Although the Hamidian bureaucratic reforms established a predominantly bureaucratic state, the higher echelons remained privileged and remained intact, insulated from bureaucratic modernization and development of a culture of (Weberian) bureaucracy. This duality lessened with the 1908 and subsequent purges (tensikat). The “tensikat” of 1909 severely reduced the salaries and benefits of high-ranking bureaucrats. Against the motions of the parliament, the ministers had to defend the reasonableness of the level of salaries of the high-ranking bureaucrats, including those in the diplomatic service, suggesting that with the salaries proposed by the parliament, no one would want to work in the Foreign Ministry. The motion prepared by the committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was rejected by the parliament, so the committee had to

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1084 Findley, ibid., p. 271. Transition to a fully standardized and salary-based system in Europe occurred in the early 19th century. In the consular system of Britain, consuls earned their income through the fees they charged for their services, their personal talents, connections, and commercial activities. There was an attempt to replace this early modern system, which was highly corrupt, inefficient, and incompatible with the premises of an imperial modern-state, with a rational and standardized system in early 19th century. The reforms of Canning in 1825 intended to transform consuls into “salaried, full-time state servants drawing a fixed income by the Parliament.” Nevertheless, it took half a century to implement the goals of the reform. Platt, D.C.M, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825, New York: Longman, 1971, p. 68.

1085 Akarlı, Engin Deniz, “The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization—an Overview,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 26.3 (2006), p. 363. It also has to be said that such a duality developed with the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II. The highly developed bureaucracy and the Kaiser’s entourage coexisted and annoyed the civil bureaucracy and middle classes. Therefore the Hamidian duality cannot be viewed as a remnant of the past to be inevitably crushed, but a variation of the 19th century constructions of bureaucratic states. See “Introduction,” in Mombauer, Annika & Deist, Wilhelm, The Kaiser, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 2-3. Also see the article in the aforementioned volume, “The Kaiser’s Elite? Wilhelm II and the Berlin Administration, 1890-1914” by Katharine A. Lerman.

prepare a second motion regarding the salaries and reorganization of the ministry to satisfy the concerns of the critical parliamentarians. The scale of disparities of incomes and the gradual narrowing of these discrepancies in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was an indication of the development and evolution of the modern bureaucracy and state. As observed, this was not a linear and smooth process in which the former was repudiated and the new was endorsed but rather an evolution in which distinctions were retained and reproduced.

The rationalization and professionalization of the diplomatic service, as well as other governmental offices, progressed without a definite deadline. Nevertheless, 1908, and arguably to a lesser extent 1923, were two key turning points in this inevitable process. The move of the capital from Istanbul to Ankara protected Mustafa Kemal from the predatory elite of the Old Order. Therefore, instead of surrendering to them, he could demolish all the established strongholds of the aristocratic and imperial order. What the relatively rationalized and impersonalized bureaucracy replaced was not a pre-modern and unprofessional bureaucracy, but an institutional culture of its own which had retained its own intimate and personalized socialization. An institutional culture replaced another although the culture of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was retained to a considerably extent in the republican Foreign Office in Sıhhıye.

There were apparent continuities in the transition from the Empire to the Republic. Nonetheless, the foundation of a republic also meant dramatic changes in various areas. The relations established between the state and its privileged servants were one of the distinctions between a Republic and an Empire. Klinghardt, writing in 1924, just one year after the proclamation of the republic, puts the main difference between the old times and new times as the austerity and plainness of the style and aesthetics of the new regime compared to the ostentation of the old regime. He contrasts these two “spirits” not with regard to architecture and ideology but predominantly with regard to the aesthetics of governmental offices and office habits. For Klinghardt, the new state in Ankara

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1087 Tural, Erkan… p. 58.
1088 Klinghardt, Karl, *Ankara-İstanbul Arası İktidar Kavgası*, İstanbul: Profil, 2007, pp. 100-104. For the plain modernism of the republic in architecture, see Bozdoğan, Sibel,
managed to halt the flamboyance and impudence of the imperial civil servants and imposed the authority of a modern and effective state. Klinghardt contrasts the toughness of the “new men” with the elegance and effeminate-like courtliness and empty pageantry of the imperial establishment. Klinghardt was mesmerized with the end of the cosmopolitan world in Istanbul smashed by the Prussian and egalitarian Ankara representing genuine Anatolian Turkishness. For him, Ankara symbolized a new style of aesthetics not a world apart from the communist aesthetics of the Bolsheviks and the European fascist aesthetics of later years. One thing was for sure: The Ottoman pageantry, its distinct culture, and the ethos imbued in the imperium had vanished for good or bad.

7.4. The Aristocratic Worlds of European Diplomatic Services

The pre-1914 diplomatic service was the most aristocratic of all the civil services throughout Europe. “The atmosphere within the Habsburg foreign service was distinctly international and aristocratic. Only 3 percent of the seventy-two senior diplomats posted outside Austria-Hungary had no noble title. At the Balhausplatz, a prince, ten counts, twenty-four barons, and thirty-two with simple noble predicates controlled the bulk of the senior positions. Aristocrats, whether Austrian or Hungarian, held the top diplomatic posts abroad and usually represented decades of familial service to the Habsburg dynasty.”

Russian diplomats “in line with general European practice, were from much grander social backgrounds than any of the domestic civil servants.” “Members of the Swedish foreign service were consequently recruited almost exclusively from the high nobility of the


country.”1091 “In Belgium, ‘(o)f the 169 diplomats that can be accounted for in the period between 1830 and 1850, 120 were noblemen.”1092 The dominance of aristocracy in the diplomatic service prevailed throughout Europe until 1914 with the relative exception of France, where diplomatic service was bourgeoisified to a certain extent throughout the Third Republic, thanks to the conscious policies of Third Republican politicians.1093 The pre-World War I years were the years of talk of “reform” to reorganize and “modernize” the foreign offices and end the aristocratic institutional culture since aristocratic cultures of diplomatic services were not suitable for the complexities of the international politics of the age. Although “talk of reform” was in the air, the implementation of reforms remained fairly limited1094 and foreign offices successfully resisted the efforts of the political elites to reform the foreign offices1095. Nevertheless, after World War I, diplomacy lost its blatantly aristocratic character in all Europe to the lament of aristocrat diplomats, including a sad Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu writing in 1940s.1096

The typical 19th century diplomat did not perceive his occupation as a profession but rather as an aristocratic pastime activity. The workload was far from being heavy and

1093 Hayne, M.B, Ibid., p. 9-10.
1095 For David Vincent, because the Foreign Office was the most elitist office comprised of the members of the traditional ruling class, it was the one that resisted the professionalization and the Act of Nortcote-Trevelyan most. Vincent, David, The Culture of Secrecy in Britain, 1832-1898, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 79.
“there was time for friends and visitors.”

In other words, diplomacy was a part of the aristocratic way of life. It was not seen as a profession practiced for income and material reward but as an activity performed for prestige, glamour, and family reputation. Naturally, given that such an understanding of diplomacy prevailed in the foreign ministries, the organizations of foreign ministries remained backward in the nineteenth century in terms of their professionalism, organizational structures, and bureaucratic efficiencies in comparison to the other “reforming” governmental offices. In the heyday of the Concert of Europe, diplomacy was seen as a culture of aristocratic socialization.

As the Concert of Europe unraveled and the complexities of international affairs became more sophisticated, an attempt at professionalization and “disciplining” of the foreign offices was undertaken. However, by the outbreak of World War I, as suggested above, the reforms had been only partially successful.

In the British Foreign Office, diplomats and Foreign Office officials were strictly separated. “Diplomacy was recognized as elitist service... By 1914, career diplomatists numbered 150, forming a closed, gilded circle, staffed in the main by the sons of peers, landowners, and aspiring gentry, and drawn primarily from the prestige public schools and

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1097 Steiner, Zara, *The Foreign Office*… p. 16. It was not different in the Ottoman embassies. See Abdülhak Hamid… p. 351.

1098 For the intimate world of the British Office, see Henry Drummond Wolf’s introduction of his colleagues in the Foreign Office. He introduces most of his colleagues with reference to their fathers, mothers, and uncles whom he personally knows and expects the reader to know due to their public prominence. Drummond Wolf, Henry, *Rambling Recollections*, London: Macmillan and Co., 1908, pp. 61-65.

Oxbridge colleges.” In contrast, Foreign Office officials were less aristocratic than the diplomats. The reasons were obvious. The expenses abroad were difficult to afford, especially bearing in mind that their salaries were comparably modest and they were paid no salary in the first two years of their service. Apparently, such a material difficulty for the recruits was established to discourage those who lacked means of self-financing and favored those who were financially privileged. There was a sharp criticism leveled against this discriminatory practice. Both services cultivated prejudices against each other. “The Foreign Office... tended to regard diplomatists as dilettantes and social butterflies. Quite naturally, a degree of competition, if not latent hostility, developed between the two services... continued until 1919 when formal amalgamation took place.” A transition between these two services was an exception, and such a move was not seen as laudable nor was it encouraged. For a Foreign Office official, a transfer to a diplomatic post meant degradation. For a diplomat, a post in the Foreign Office meant deterioration in social standing.

The idea that diplomacy is not a source of income was well established in the French and German Foreign Offices as well. “No requirement was so carefully observed, as the rule formally in effect until 1908, that candidates had to have independent incomes...The Wilhelmstrasse had first insisted in the 1880s that candidates give evidence of private wealth, with the annual figure set at 6,000 marks.” In Austria, “admission to the foreign office was not in the first place decided by the obligatory diplomatic examination but by social status; for a leading position in the Foreign Service, proof of a fixed income, which


1101 Moreover, for a candidate to be admitted as a diplomat, he had to have a yearly income of € 400. See “Steiner, Zara, “The Foreign Office Reforms 1919-1921,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar., 1974), p. 137. The conditions were not different in czarist Russia. “It was not easy to meet the expenses of diplomatic life in a major European capital without some addition to one’s official salary.” Lieven, Dominic, Ibid., p.196.

1102 ibid., p. 30

1103 Cecil, Lamar, ibid., p. 39.
made it possible to fulfill the duties of representation, was also required.”

In Italy, “the candidate had to be ‘possessed of sufficient financial means to maintain the volunteer in the Italian consulates abroad and, for a diplomatic career, a compulsory income of 6,000 lire’; this last figure was fairly high so as to ensure that the number of candidates was limited.”

In the Quai d’Orsay, “(u)ntil 1894 candidates (applying for the Foreign Office) had to have a private income of 6,000 francs.”

The French Foreign Office was an island of aristocracy in the sea of republicanism. “French governments (of the Third Republic) were prone to send aristocrats of great standing to important posts. Moreover, even if a Republican represented the French government, he usually made a clear distinction between internal and international politics…(R)epublicanism was simply not an export commodity. Like his aristocratic counterpart, the new Republican diplomat also found parliamentary politics thoroughly repugnant.”

In an effort to make the Quai d’Orsay more bourgeois, “the Republic had attempted to upgrade salaries in the hope of attracting permanent officials of bourgeois Republican persuasion.”

This policy did not work out primarily because the social costs of expenses of diplomatic corps were not affordable for a state official dependent on a salary. Although in the Ottoman Empire there was no strict separation of diplomatic posts and Foreign Office posts and diplomats were assigned to both tracks, these two tracks had their autonomies. The diplomatic posts were filled by men of comparably higher social origins and respectability.

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1105 ibid., p. 39.


1107 Hayne, M.B, ibid, p. 8.

1108 ibid., p. 10.

1109 ibid., p. 20.

1110 For the necessity of appointing diplomats coming from prosperous and respectable families to the post of ambassador in the Ottoman Empire, see Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali… p. 286.

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In reaction to the rising popularity of social and economical history and the thesis of “Der Primat der Innenpolitik,” Zara Steiner argued that the making of the British foreign policy and the road to World War I was decided primarily by the independent exploits of the Foreign Ministry. For Steiner, although several concerns might play a role in the making and implementation of foreign policy, the determining force was the closed world of diplomacy. “They operated in a closed circuit and tended mainly to hear each other’s voices.”

Denying a prominent role to social and economic forces in determining foreign policy orientations, Steiner maintains that states and “official minds” had an immense power to shape foreign policy orientations. Moreover, the world of diplomacy was a socially exclusive world closed to the worlds and minds of the non-official elites (such as industrialists) and, therefore, the secluded “diplomatic mind” strictly hindered other


alternative visions and perspectives from contributing to the molding of foreign policy, avoiding any external influence of any sort.

Apparently, the diplomats shared a common educational background besides a common social background. A comparison between education systems and universities of various countries is illuminating. Britain was the country where institutions of education were most strictly exclusive to non-aristocracy. In fact, Oxbridge functioned to sustain the social, political, and cultural superiority of the aristocracy. The Oxbridge and public schools were strictly nonegalitarian, class conscious, and class-based. The Prussian gymnasiums were state institutions launched to recruit and educate future knowledgeable bureaucrats trained in a Humboldtian neo-humanist culture and imbue them with Bildung. In gymnasiums, nobles and non-nobles were trained together without discrimination, especially in the late 19th century. In Russia, in contrast, education was overtly non-aristocratic. It was the sons of the poor, the lower middle classes, and the non-privileged who crowded the best universities in St. Petersburg and Moscow and cultivated contempt and hatred against the philistine, indolent, and unproductive aristocracy during their education. Lieven notes that in the Russian universities (and in the Moscow University in particular), it was the scions of aristocracy who were discriminated against. In contrast to the Prussian case, the Russian state failed to absorb and assimilate the university students. As a result, a grave and insurmountable social


contradiction emerged between the aristocracy and the new class of razhnochintsy. The Hamidian graduates of the Ottoman Empire demonstrated a similar pattern in which the state’s establishment of a modern and fine education system created an undesired outcome. As the education system paved the way to a communist takeover in Russia with the alienation of the university graduate intellectuals, the egalitarian and relatively non-class conscious Ottoman education system facilitated a Young Turk takeover against which the Hamidian establishment and aristocracy remained helpless. The constructions of the education systems were significant factors in determining the evolution of national paths. In the Ottoman and Russian cases, they became dysfunctional and worked against the establishment. The Hamidian graduates of imperial colleges became adversaries of the system (although unlike their Russian peers, they were employed within the state administration and thus perceived their prospects in the state). Most of the upstarts cultivated resentment towards the beneficiaries of the “unproductive” establishment and were in favor of a more efficient, productive, and meritocratic one.

Evidently, the diplomats in all the Great Powers of Europe were graduated from privileged and secluded schools of aristocracy and officialdom. The typical educational background of a British diplomat was schooling in Eton and university training in Oxford. A few graduates of Cambridge at the university level and graduates of other prestigious aristocratic public schools besides Eton such as Harrow, Rugby, and Wellington at the high school level were also observable. Career in diplomacy was certainly closed to any outsider. In France, recruitment favored elite schools. Austro-Hungarian diplomats were predominantly graduates of Theresianum, the school founded by Maria Theresa as a

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1120 For the lists and tables, see Steiner, Zara, ibid, pp. 217-221.
1121 Hayne, M.B, ibid., p. 22. For the elite schools in France training middle class youth (as well as the promising youth of lower classes) and preparing them for state service, see Bourdieu, Pierre, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1998.
center of patriotic imperial officialdom. In a republic with strong anti-aristocratic prejudices, over 60 percent of the diplomats of the United States in the late 19th century were graduates of Harvard, Yale, or Princeton.

In the Ottoman Empire, given that there were only a few university level institutions, apparently the diplomats came predominantly from Mülkiye and Mekteb-i Sultanı. We observe that the graduates of Mülkiye and Mekteb-i Sultanı who opted for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came from relatively conformist backgrounds in comparison with those graduates who opted for other governmental offices. According to the list prepared by Ali Çankaya, 8 percent (124 men) of the graduates of the Mülkiye joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This minority was comprised of the privileged graduates of Mülkiye. As pointed out previously, this was seemingly due to the costliness of the life of a diplomat.

7.5. The End of the World of Aristocracy and Gentlemanly Diplomacy

The aristocratic culture of public administration enabled the 19th century configuration of the foreign offices to prevail, creating very limited friction until World War I. In France, prior to World War I, new recruits who were dubbed “Young Turks” reacted to the conservative style of conduct of diplomacy. The French Young Turks were nationalists and Germanophobes. Whereas the ambassadorial elite, comprised of men of aristocratic

1122 Williamson Jr., Samuel R., ibid., p. 39.
1123 Ilchman, Warren Frederick, Professional Diplomacy in the United States 1779-1939, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, p. 78. This educational elitism was retained after the early 20th century reform. See p. 95.
1126 Hayne, ibid., p. 199. For the rise of anti-German sentiment in the British Foreign Office, see Corp, Edward T, “Sir Charles Hardinge and the Question of Intervention in the
background, held on to the alliances system to maintain peace, the Young Turks advocated an aggressive policy toward Germany and were willing to risk a war if necessary. The disagreements between the ambassadorial elite consisted of the ambassadors appointed to St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, and other old guards who advocated pursuing delicate diplomatic negotiations and Young Turks in the Centrale, who advocated a tougher and uncompromising stance and created mischief in the Moroccan Crisis in 1909. The crisis was finally resolved with a Franco-German agreement thanks to the workings of the old guard.\textsuperscript{1127} The Austrian historian Fritz Fellner argued that “the unleashing of the war (World War I-DG) could be attributed in no small part to the activities of younger diplomats in the Viennese foreign office.”\textsuperscript{1128} The “old diplomacy,” which not only referred to the method and conduct of the craft of diplomacy, but also to the aristocratic culture, paved the way to a new culture of diplomacy determined by competing nationalisms and unilateralist postures in contrast to the premises of the old diplomacy. The old diplomacy was based on a mutual understanding of the shared interests of the aristocratic ruling classes.\textsuperscript{1129}

“However self-enclosed or socially exclusive, this was a professional elite whose interests went beyond national borders. Because, with few exceptions, the same kind of men staffed the departments of all the states, they understood each other, they spoke the same language, read the same books. Members of the diplomatic establishment were the multinationals of their time. William Tyrell, Sir Edward Grey’s pre-war private secretary spent his vacations from 1900 to 1910 at the home of Prince Hugo von Radolin, the German ambassador in Paris, whose mother-in-law was in turn a Talleyrand. Members of the profession, despite the occasional chauvinist, thought of themselves as members of a cosmopolitan, culturally homogenous,

\textsuperscript{1127} Hayne, ibid., p. 143.


European family...They were the defenders of the same institutions, national and international. They were conscious of the common lines that kept the peace between them and had a vested interest in their preservation. There were unspoken assumptions about the way diplomacy should be conducted that influenced behavior at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{1130}

In old diplomacy, the diplomats met not to maximize their own party’s interest to the disfavor of the other party, but to reach a compromise on common ground to protect and advance their shared class-based interests. “Europe’s elite was more closely tied by culture and concrete interests to an international class than to the classes below them.”\textsuperscript{1131} It was so much so that the Danish foreign minister Christian Bernstorff, who was an ethnic German like most of the Danish diplomats\textsuperscript{1132} and whose father was a Danish foreign minister as well, was transferred to Prussia as the new Prussian foreign minister to serve from 1818 to 1832\textsuperscript{1133}. This class-based multilateralism under the tutorship of Great Britain became unfeasible after the rise of Germany and emergence of rival alliances and camps in the last decades of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.

The responsibility for World War I is a matter of controversy, both as a political issue and as an academic debate. Fischer, in the 1960s, argued that Germany bore the sole responsibility for World War I.\textsuperscript{1134} Moreover, for Fisher it was not the German Foreign Office but the Chiefs of Staff that intentionally opted for a war. According to Fisher, it was the deliberate calculation of the militarist elite that had instigated the Armageddon.\textsuperscript{1135}


\textsuperscript{1134} Fischer, Fritz, \textit{Germany’s Aims in the First World War}, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 (original German publication 1961)

\textsuperscript{1135} For such an interpretation also see Geiss, Imanuel, \textit{German Foreign Policy 1871-1914}, London; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976; Berghahn, Volker, \textit{Germany and the Approach of War in 1914}, London: St. Martin’s Press, 1973. For a recent critique of the
However, others questioned the argument for the sole responsibility of Germany and suggested that the escalation of tensions, the irreconcilable nature of the Great Power aggressions and many other structural factors rendered a great war possible if not inevitable. Examining the change of attitudes, perceptions and the ideologies within the foreign offices of Britain and France as well as Germany supports such a claim.\(^{1136}\) The new cadres of diplomats were more nationalistic (even chauvinistic), and they were eager to demolish the international gentlemanly diplomacy.\(^{1137}\) Realpolitik and national interest became the catchwords of the new generation of the diplomatic service. These catchwords replaced the hegemonic discourses of “balance of powers” and reciprocity.\(^{1138}\) Furthermore, every single incident and clash of interests began to be taken as ends in themselves instead of being seen as parts of a whole. Therefore, trying to maximize

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\(^{1136}\) With regard to Italy, C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari note that the right was able to determine the course of foreign policy thanks to the right-wing nature of the diplomatic corps. See Lowe, C.J. & Marzari, F, *Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940*, London; New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 8. They also note that the lack of any substantial ideas on the part of the Italian left with regard to foreign policy (with the exception of Crispi) facilitated the control of foreign policy by the right-wing diplomatic establishment.

\(^{1137}\) For a parallel observation regarding the shift of the making of the Russian foreign policy, Lieven D.C.B, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*, London: Macmillan, 1984, p. 64. For the depiction of the Russian diplomatic corps, see Lieven, Ibid., pp. 84-102. Also see the pro-German disposition in the makers of Russian foreign policy originated from an ideological position defending authoritarianism as an ideology, see Lieven, D.C.B, “Pro-Germans and Russian Foreign Policy 1890-1914,” *International History Review*, 11 (1980).

national interest on every occasion naturally triggered the escalation of tensions and the irreconcilability of interests.

It was also the beginning of the 20th century when ideology and politics made their way into the Foreign Offices. Ideological and political preferences and inclinations began to influence and shape the advising and implementation of the foreign policy there. At this particular time, national and ideological orientations became decisive in the making of foreign policy as the old cosmopolitan and aristocratic cultures of the foreign offices were collapsing. The rising antipathy towards Germany in the British Foreign Office, which was a manifestation of these nationalistic and conservative inclinations, was a remarkable factor in the making of the anti-German alliances with France and Russia, which prepared the ground for World War I. Although the issue of responsibility for the outbreak of the war has been a controversy since 1914 and the culpability of Germany has been maintained by many scholars. This group of scholars includes not only Fritz Fisher and his followers (Immanuel Geiss, Berghahn), but also other respected scholars, such as Albertini in 1940s, and Taylor, Steiner, and Lieven since then. However, it seems more accurate to argue for common guilt with different levels of culpability. In an era of ideological escalation, the outbreak of World War I cannot be regarded as an accident or a consequence of the overreaching of one of the parties.

7.6. Institutionalization, Modernization and Bureaucratization of Foreign Offices

The British Foreign Office evolved from being a small bureau predominantly preoccupied with the deskwork of diplomacy to a sophisticated office responsible not only for the coordination and conduct but also the making of foreign policy throughout the second half of the 19th century, albeit very gradually. It was only on the eve of World War I that the Foreign Office was acknowledged as the primary office responsible for foreign policy. In the 19th century, foreign policy was mainly the domain of the foreign minister. “Castlereagh completely ignored his staff, Canning did all his own drafting... Palmerston wrote all important dispatches himself and left only minor administrative details to his clerks. He wanted abstracts made, dispatches copied, queries answered and
papers properly circulated, but he did not wish for or seek advice.” 1139 The Foreign Office grew in size and in its tasks throughout the second half of the century. The number of dispatches handled by the Foreign Office increased steadily (6,000 in 1829; 30,000 in 1849, 111,000 in 1905), but on the eve of World War I, the staff of the Foreign Office numbered only 176, including doorkeepers and cleaners. 1140

In this era, a crucial development was the rise of the permanent under-secretary. The traditional duties and responsibilities of the permanent undersecretary (writing first drafts, preparing abstracts of incoming dispatches, and even copying and ciphering) were replaced by the advising and active coordination of the implementation and conduct of foreign policy. 1141 By the turn of 20th century, the permanent undersecretary was perceived and regarded as the primary expert regarding international politics and the most prominent counselor in the conduct of foreign policy. Nevertheless, this transformation was not a linear and smooth process. On the contrary, many Foreign Office staff, including permanent under-secretaries, resisted the imperatives of the modernization of the Foreign Office. The conventional perception of the task of the Foreign Office was sustained in the minds of the officials. Many permanent undersecretaries avoided assuming political powers. 1142 In short, the Foreign Office lagged behind the other governmental offices in assuming the responsibilities of a modern bureaucratic state, predominantly due to its aristocratic character.

The reforms of 1905 determined the character of the modern Foreign Office and signaled the end of the old order. 1143 While many continued to question as late as the Cold War if the British Foreign Office had ever been reformed to adapt to the needs of 20th century, it became a nostalgic icon for those who remembered it at a later time within a

1140 Steiner, Zara, ibid., p. 4
1141 Steiner, Zara, ibid, p.7
1142 Steiner, Zara, ibid, pp. 4-10.
much more professionalized profession of diplomacy.\(^{1144}\) The 1907 reforms in Quai d’Orsay were less drastic and radical given that its aristocratic character had already been considerably effaced\(^{1145}\). However, the most radical reform, which was in fact no less than a revolution, was undertaken by Schüler just after World War I in Weimar Germany. The German foreign office was also Weimarized/republicanized by the eradication of its aristocratic heritage and its commercialization and bourgeoisification under the supervision of Schüler.\(^{1146}\) These reforms, which were undertaken in all major European countries, significantly curtailed the cultural characteristics and distinctions of foreign offices. Although all the foreign offices continued to retain their own cultures and characteristics,\(^{1147}\) they began to look alike more than ever and transformed (at least) into semi-Weberian bureaucracies. It was the strange death of the Old Order.

It is also striking to observe that such a small number of people played such a fundamental and determinative role in the making of world politics, especially regarding the advent of World War I. “Ministries remained tight organizations right until the First World War. Russia was the outstanding exception (.) Elsewhere, few foreign offices, even among the great powers, employed more than 50 officials at mid-century, or between 100 and 150 men on the eve of the Great War. The French, for instance, increased the number of their officials from 80 in 1870 to 170 (excluding doorkkeepers, typists, etc.) in 1914. The Danish Foreign Ministry increased from nine officials in 1848 to 21 in 1914, the Dutch


\(^{1145}\) Hayne, M.B, ibid, p. 170.


It is also striking to observe how limited the level of professionalism was in offices which had immensely influenced, shaped, and designed the modern world. The secluded worlds of Foreign Offices led the course of history. Given the smallness of these offices, the role these individuals and small groups of men played in the shaping of the modern world order is striking.

7.7. The Bismarckian and Wilhelmine German Foreign Office

Among the Foreign offices throughout Europe, the German Foreign Office was arguably the one that resembled the Hamidian Foreign Office most in terms of its incorporation of loyalty, subservience to the throne, and high level of professionalism. The German foreign office was the foreign office with the least institutional autonomy vis-à-vis its political superiors, compared to its British and French counterparts. During the chancellorship of Bismarck, the foreign office was completely subservient to him. Bismarck controlled the ministry via his son, whom he appointed as the foreign minister. The subservience of the foreign office prevailed after the downfall of Bismarck. In spite of his disregard of the diplomatic service, Bismarck was held in esteem by the diplomatic service, whose exceptional level of knowledge of international affairs, skill in conducting foreign relations, and political genius were acknowledged and revered. “Under Bismarck, if diplomats were allowed only a limited initiative, they could at last be confident that they were serving Europe’s preeminent statesman and the policies they would be expected to implement would be reasoned and coherent.”1149 In contrast, Wilhelm II was seen as a reckless and unreliable amateur, if not a charlatan. However, although the destructive intrusions of the Kaiser were resented by the diplomats and his damage to the professionalism of the diplomatic service infuriated them, from 1890 to 1914, there was not a single resignation from the service in reaction to these arbitrary and coarse

1149 Cecil, Lamar …p. 256
intrusions.\textsuperscript{1150} Apparently, in the clash between professionalism and aristocratic loyalties, the aristocratic loyalties determined the deeds of the officials. In fact, these two attributes do not necessarily contradict. They may coexist. Nonetheless, what we observe is that aristocratic ethics came first since professionalism was an aptitude to be acquired and practiced whereas the culture of aristocracy was a habitus, a code of conduct, and a merit.

The only exception to the total subservience of the foreign office was the immense control Holstein exerted over the ministry during his tenure as the senior counselor of the Political Division.\textsuperscript{1151} Holstein was a figure that Bismarck had to take into consideration during his chancellorship; but Holstein’s power reached its zenith during the ministry of Caprivi, who was inexperienced in foreign affairs and, therefore, in this period, Holstein reigned over the ministry de facto. With the exception of Holstein, the highest-ranking positions lacked prominence and never played major roles in policy making. “The undersecretary was completely subservient to the state secretary, and it was, therefore, a post to be avoided”\textsuperscript{1152} for the German diplomats.

The German diplomatic service was one of the clearest examples of the European-wide practice of diplomacy as a game involving gentlemen. It was strictly elitist. The German diplomatic service was predominantly Protestant. Only a few Jews ever served in the office.\textsuperscript{1153} Sixty-nine percent of the Foreign Ministry officers bore titles of nobility.\textsuperscript{1154} Moreover, most of these officials came from certain families which were closely related and affiliated with others operating within a closed circle.\textsuperscript{1155} It is not surprising that for Bismarck what a diplomat should know and do best was socialize in aristocratic salons and

\textsuperscript{1150} Cecil, Lamar.... p. 256.


\textsuperscript{1152} Cecil, Lamar, ibid, p. 158.


\textsuperscript{1154} Cecil, Lamar, ibid, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{1155} For the prominent families who recruited their scions into diplomacy and their political and social connections, see Cecil, Lamar, ibid, p. 67.
Nevertheless, the aristocratic nature of German diplomacy went hand-in-hand with an aggressive and fervent foreign policy conducted both by Bismarck and Wilhelm II. German diplomatic aristocratic culture did not hinder the uncompromising tone of German foreign policy which, in the end, destroyed “Old Europe” and its political order. On the contrary, it perceived aggression as a manifestation of the ethos of the aristocratic culture and upbringing of its members. Apparently, aristocratic distinctions in the original medieval era were distinguished by military vigilance and maintained with military honor. What the Wilhelmine German aristocratic culture did was uphold this militarized ethos and exercise it within modern militarist politics and culture. Together with the fact that Germany was seeking a place under the sun, German aristocratic culture did not become a bastion of order and status quo in the international arena but an anti-status quo force that was forced in the end to bow to the non-aristocratic radicals. This is not surprising given the fact that the German old regime had developed its own “peculiarities” and had not followed the path of the liberal/conservative credo of the British old regime. No two old regimes resemble each other. In that regard, the Ottoman Hamidian Foreign Ministry oscillated between subterranean radicalism and anti-status quo intentions, and pro-status quo conservatism. In time, it gravitated from the latter to the former as the “ancien régime” generation passed away and international developments increasingly obliged it to change.

7.8. The Hamidian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Comparative Perspective

The political division of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was formed after the Revolution of 1908. The institution of the political division was a sign of the relative

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1156 Cecil, Lamar, ibid, pp. 238-239.
“autonomization” and institutionalization of the ministry after the Hamidian yoke had been lifted and a further step toward professionalization, distancing itself from its aristocratic culture. Nevertheless, the workings of the “political divisions” in Britain and Germany show that the political divisions work not within a Weberian bureaucratic ethos but within an aristocratic ethos and worldview. The “myth of professionalism” does not apply to these bureaus. The bureaus based on geographical specialization were formed only after the proclamation of the republic. This was one more step toward professionalization, institutionalization, and bureaucratization in the Weberian sense. Interestingly, geographical bureaus based on geographical specialization were formed in the Western foreign offices after World War I at the same time as their Turkish counterpart as one of the reforms undertaken to professionalize these offices.\footnote{1158}

To recap, as a continent-wide trend, foreign offices reached the zenith of their institutional power on the eve of World War I. This period was characterized by the meteoric expansion of bureaucracy and the development of bureaucratic professionalism. It was followed by the advent of the democratization of politics and governments following the devastating world war. The democratization and the middle-class takeover of the governments and administrations would bring about the imposition of political infringement on the bureaucracy.\footnote{1159} The bureaucracy and the political elites no longer came from the same cultural and social class. The change of the class character of the political elites destroyed the coherence of the bureaucracy and political decision-makers in favor of the new political elites. The antipathy and distrust of Lloyd George towards the diplomatic service is well known. The liberal Lloyd George, who liked to expose his lower

\footnote{1158}{For the postbellum introduction of the regional bureaus in the French and German foreign offices, see Lauren, Paul Gordon, \textit{Diplomats and Bureaucrats}, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p. 93, p. 128.}

class origins on various occasions, disdained the snobbery of the diplomatic service and made foreign policy decisions with minimal coordination with the Foreign Office. While he ignored the Foreign Office, he made his decisions in consultation with his informal “garden cabinet.” From the prime ministry of Lloyd George onwards, the British Foreign Office was sidelined and lost its centrality in the decision-making process. Its monopoly in shaping foreign policy was taken away, and some of the components of the foreign policy-making process were distributed to various governmental offices. This process destroyed the self-perception of the exceptionalism that the privileged foreign policy establishment enjoyed and the idea that foreign policy had to be conducted and implemented behind closed doors by knowledgeable experts, thus rendering the political elites’ position stronger vis-à-vis the bureaucratic establishment.

The reign of Vansittart in the British Foreign Office (and his failure to lead foreign policy due to the opposition of the political elite) was the last case of the éminence grises and a swan’s song, thus bringing to a close the generation of the great diplomats that had begun in early 20th century. The “golden age of the diplomats” contained such impressive names as Holstein and Schüler in Germany, and Hardinge, Eyre, and Crowe in Britain. These “grey eminences,” who exerted immense power and controlled the implementation and making of foreign policy from the back of desks owing to their professionalism, erudition and respectability, were the product of a particular and idiosyncratic era. With the end of the “old order” in diplomacy, enigmatic and thundering grey eminences disappeared and gave the floor to the dreary Weberian desk worker bureaucrats. The “old diplomacy” in which personal skills and interpersonal relations were decisive and which was part of the conduct of business gave way to a depersonalized diplomacy in which personalities mattered less. The new mode of diplomacy hindered and limited the role of individuals in favor of the preponderance of the structural and political dynamics. Regarding the


Ottoman/Turkish case, a similar pattern is observable with one difference. The zenith of the institutional power of the ministry, not in terms of exerting influence on the making of foreign policy but in terms of developing an institutionalized role in the conduct of coordination of foreign policy and establishing its institutional autonomy, was reached (after the collapse of “old diplomacy” and in the age of Weberian bureaucratization) by the 1950s just after the end of the single party rule\textsuperscript{1162}. However, this institutional power was a legacy of a process of decades. One figure that may be seen as the master architect of the institutional power of the ministry during the single party regime was Numan Menemencioğlu, the general secretary of the Ministry between 1933 and 1942 and the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1942 and 1944, a figure who is comparable to the grey eminences of the pre-World War I of European diplomacies and embodying the institutional power of the ministry in his persona. Apparently, this process was related with the development of the institutionalization of bureaucracy in general. In Turkey, the democratization of the political scene (not only in terms of the emergence of an electoral democracy but also) in terms of the background of the politicians was observed in 1950s which brought an end to the parliaments and cabinets composed of ex-bureaucrats and weakened the institutional powers of the bureaucratic offices.\textsuperscript{1163} Although, in Turkey, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained its institutional culture, privilege and relative autonomy due to the peculiarities of Turkey, the post-1950 was a new era for the Turkish diplomatic service as well\textsuperscript{1164}.

\textsuperscript{1162} The Ministry of Foreign Affairs became much more influential in the making of foreign policy during the rule of Democrat Party (1950-1960) than the Kemalist single party period in which the presidents (Atatürk and then İnönü) were decisive in the making of the foreign policy. During the rule of Democrat Party, the inexperienced Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Minister of Foreign Affairs Faud Köprülü ensued the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to shape the foreign policy. See Uzgel, İihan, “TDP’nin Oluşturulması”, in Oran, Baskın (ed.), \textit{Türk Dış Politikası}, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, v. I, p. 74, pp. 76-77.

\textsuperscript{1163} For the social portrait of the Kemalist single-party period political elite, see Frey, Frederick W., \textit{The Turkish Political Elite}, Cambridge, Mass. : M.I.T. Press, 1965.

\textsuperscript{1164} The democratically elected governments continued to acknowledge a considerable autonomy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeing the international affairs as supra-political and conducted by the imperatives of state interests. However, the transformation
There is no evidence that the structuring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was consciously modeled on any European example. “There is no documentary evidence that the officials of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry made any close study of the organization of the corresponding agencies of European governments before 1908.” Yet, to conclude, we observe a similar/parallel pattern and trajectory regarding the evolutions and transformations of the Ottoman/Turkish Foreign Office and its Western counterparts. This is not due to emulation but due to the fact that Ottoman 19th century bureaucratic culture demonstrated a similar path of evolution and transformation sharing the same premises and externalities. One major difference is the time lag within which change occurred in the Turkish Foreign Office. The institutional zenith of bureaucracy in Turkey was reached with the Kemalist regime, building upon the institutional reforms already undertaken during the Hamidian and post-Hamidian eras and the premises taken from the Hamidian establishment.

of the social character of the political elites had an impact on the relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the political authorities.

Findley, Carter E, ibid, p. 262.
POSTSCRIPT: PASSAGES OF THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE FROM THE EMPIRE TO THE REPUBLIC

From 1908 onwards, the pace of change accelerated. The “new men” came to power with an entirely new political agenda, vision of politics, and social order. This transformation was not unique to the Ottoman framework. A similar transition and transformation was visible in the European scene as Europe approached World War I. The European mental structures were evolving in a direction in which ideologies such as fascism, communism, and Republicanism would later be able to flourish. This was not the world of Metternich, Castlereagh, or Bismarck anymore. This was not the world of Âli Pasha, Fuad Pasha, or Abdülhamid II either. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry which mastered the “balance of power politics” became out of fashion in the new world of Machtpolitik. The Ministry was less at home and therefore less influential in the coordination of policymaking in the post-1908 world of Machtpolitik. The aging diplomats belonging to the age of Metternich-Castlereagh in Europe, who had faith in the traditional order and inclined towards France and Britain (i.e., Europe), were alienated and marginalized although they were also partially capable of adapting to the new cultural and intellectual milieu and radicalizing in pursuit of the “spirit of the times”.\(^\text{1166}\)

Given that Ministry of Foreign Affairs was part of the Tanzimat/Hamidian bureaucracy and its informal culture, it cannot be separated and isolated from the attitudes and culture of the Tanzimat bureaucracy in general. This elite encountered an unprecedented crisis with the 1908 Revolution. The Kamil Pasha government which assumed office after the Revolution due to the lack of experience of the Young Turks may be regarded as the “last

\(^{1166}\) For an insight and comparison, see the observation of Lieven on the gradual alteration of the making of foreign policy from the pragmatic style of the “established elite” towards the ideologically committed (nationalist, panslav, rightist) new generation. Apparently, this was not a linear shift from one style to another but a constant struggle between different dispositions. Lieven, D.C.B, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*, London: Macmillan, 1984, p. 64. Apparently, a similar vista is observable for the Ottoman context.
stand of the old/established Tanzimat bureaucracy. The Kamil Pasha Cabinet was ousted from office by the Unionist parliament after a tense period during which parliament, seeing itself as the representative of “new forces” against the ancien régime (devr-i sabık), clashed on various occasions severely with the Kamil Pasha cabinet. Kamil Pasha’s cabinet was ousted by the parliament with a vote of no confidence\textsuperscript{1167}, the first in the Ottoman constitutional period.

The expectation of the Tanzimat bureaucracy in the first years of the Second Constitutional Period was that it would regain the position it had largely lost during the Hamidian era. This expectation did not materialize. On the contrary, with 1908 it lost its power and influence forever. This was true for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well. The ministerial staff was scrutinized harshly by a skeptical parliament. The salaries of its personnel were curtailed.\textsuperscript{1168} Many were dismissed from office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the conclusion of tensikat (purge). Many parliamentarians expressed their dissatisfaction with the diplomats and questioned their skills. The parliament was apparently distrustful of the Ministry, seeing it as a hub of ancien régime corruption and decadence.\textsuperscript{1169}

If the conventional assumption that the Ottoman 19th century was characterized by the rule of the state is true, then the Foreign Ministry like all the other imperial offices should had been satisfied with the conduct of state affairs. The idea that raison d’état was the decisive motivation for Ottoman statecraft is simplistic and conceals the complex dynamics and particular interests that pushed the 19th century transformation. Governance, underneath its claims to objectivity and dispassionate appraisal, is never free of ideological/political dimensions. There is inevitably always room for ideological preferences. The conducting of state affairs was never a technocratic and professional business even in non-representative authoritarian regimes. There was certainly room for ideology at the high tides of both the Tanzimat and the Hamidian eras. Nevertheless, their

\textsuperscript{1167} Tural, Erkan, \textit{Son Dönem Osmanlı Bürokrasisi: II Meşrutiyet Dönemi’nde Bürokratlar, İttihatçılar ve Parlamenterler}, İstanbul: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 2009, p. 34, pp. 130-147.

\textsuperscript{1168} Tural, Erkan, ibid, p. 58,68.

\textsuperscript{1169} MMZC, 1909, v. III, pp. 47-50.
ideological disposition was state-centered and unless it was adamantly opposed, there was no self-recognition of its ideological nature. Its ideological attributes became manifest only when it was attacked by the Unionists at a time when Unionist ideology was powerful enough to take control of the state and cleanse the imperial offices from the traditional imperial powerhouses.

The post-1908 era was the transitional period from an imperial language to a “national” one although this transition was not a linear and inevitable path with the discourse of the nation replacing the failed discourse of Empire. It may be formulated that, in many aspects “the Empire was already national and the Nation still imperial.”1170 The Young Turks, although they were ardent Turkish nationalists, did not denounce the Empire and the imperial idea. On the contrary, they aimed to build their nationalist project on the top of the imperial grandeur. Rather than abandoning Ottomanism, they Turkified Ottomanism. They tried to retain and even strengthen the imperial idea while trying to enact their national(ist) project. They had to reconstitute the Empire along with their worldview and render the imperial and national discourses compatible.

However, it has to be said that there was no one identifiable and concrete Young Turk worldview.1171 It is even hard to argue that any individual “Young Turk” had a consciously developed, proper, consistent, and comprehensive worldview. The era can be characterized by a huge cloud of ambivalence. The acts and moves of the Young Turks developed spontaneously. It is clear that the Young Turk era and its disruption set the ground for the Kemalists to take over. The Kemalists managed to assume the control of the state thanks to the Young Turks’ purge of the Tanzimat bureaucracy (or rical-i Tanzimat). The continuity was an ideological one as well. We can establish a link from the Young Turks to the Kemalists, especially in terms of constructing a nationhood. But there were very strong discontinuities between the two as well. In a sense, Kemalism was closer to the Hamidian view in its glorification and sacralization of the state than the Young Turks’ attempt to

1170 For a book demonstrating the imperial characteristics of Republican Turkey and Turkish nationalism, see Meeker, Michael, A Nation of Empire, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

ideologize the state. Kemalism reestablished the “primacy of the state” which had been destroyed by the Young Turk zealots.

As the Ottoman government in Istanbul was abolished by the leadership of the War of Independence on 1 November 1922, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was also abolished. With that decision, hundreds of officials serving in the Ministry became unemployed. In two weeks time, all the foreign representations of the Ottoman Empire were assigned to Ahmed Ferid (Tek), the Paris representative of the Ankara government. Ahmed Ferid sent circulars to the undersecretaries or other assigned officials to take over the administration of the relevant embassies and representations. For example, the man in charge in the London embassy was no longer Mustafa Reşid Paşa, but Şefik Bey. In Stockholm, the head of the representation became Esad Bey replacing the ambassador Galip Kemalı (Söylemezoğlu). However, decisions with regard to other heads of representations were not unambiguous. Although Ahmed Ferid Bey assigned the second secretary, Numan Rifat Bey (Menemencioğlu), in place of the head official, Reşat Nuri Bey, he informed Reşat Nuri Bey that this decision was temporary and that he should stay in Berne and take a rest while waiting for the final decision. It seems that some prominent diplomats with connections and affiliations with the ancien régime were eliminated and others who were not associated with the ancien régime were retained.

Before the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, like all other Ministries, the Foreign Ministry in Ankara took over the responsibilities of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry although a representation in Istanbul continued to function until 1927. The transfer of the Ministry to Ankara was completed by 1928 with the opening of the new building of the Foreign Ministry at Sıhiye. We do not observe a Republican policy of purging the cadres. The ones who were eager to move to Ankara from their comfortable houses and mansions in Istanbul were all welcome to continue their careers with the exception of the ones who were thought to have been disloyal to the National Struggle during the War of

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1172 I thank Gül İnanç for drawing my attention to the process of establishment and of the Republican Ministry of Foreign Ministry in November 1922.
1173 For this process, see Şimşir, Bilal, ibid, pp. 166-170.
Independence.\textsuperscript{1175} That was not an ideological purge, but a retribution for misdeeds. It is true that the Republic recruited many of its ambassadors from the Kemalist loyalists who had committed themselves to the Kemalist cause during the War of Independence.\textsuperscript{1176} Many military officers turned into career diplomats. Although some of the military officers terminated their diplomatic careers after one posting, others became professional diplomats serving the Republic for some two decades like Ahmed Ferid (Tek) and Hürev Gerede (who was ironically the son-in-law of Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, whose career was terminated by the Republic due to his service to the Istanbul government during the War of Independence) or more than one decade like Kemalettin Sami Paşa. However, the transplantation of the loyalists into the diplomatic service occurred only at the ambassadorial level. The cadres below the ambassadorial posts continued to serve as Republican loyalists who were promoted to more prominent posts in time. Although in the first ten years of the Republic, the Republican Ministry of Foreign Ministry, reluctant to fill the diplomatic posts with the sympathizers of Britain, France, and imperial loyalists found difficulty in recruiting qualified younger people due to the unattractiveness of Ankara and the limited prospects such a career promised, the Foreign Ministry reacquired

\textsuperscript{1175} For the purge of those who opposed the National Struggle, see Koçak, Cemil, \textit{Heyet-i Mahsusalar}, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005. The purge was not an ideological cleansing, but only retribution against those individuals who did not act “appropriately” during the War of Independence. The purges punished individual misbehaviour. It may be useful to compare/contrast the Republican handling of the incumbent bureaucracy with the actions spurred by French 19th century regime changes.

\textsuperscript{1176} For example, Fahreddin Reşad, who served in diplomatic posts such as charge d’affaires in St. Petersburg, ambassador to Cetinje, undersecretary of the embassy to Berlin, and who participated in the Şura-\textit{yi Saltanat} ratifying the Treaty of Sevrés in 1920 representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was listed among the “hundred and fiftiers” and exiled in 1923. Çankaya, Ali, ibid, p. 276. Some others were examined before their transfer from the administration to the new administration in Ankara. Although Mehmed Şefik was temporarily discharged from the Ministry of Foreign Ministry on 1 November 1922 with the abolition of the government in Istanbul, the investigation concluded that he did not participate in any anti-national activity and he continued his diplomatic career in the Republican Foreign Ministry. Çankaya, Ali, ibid, p. 448. Mehmed Kadri was also temporarily discharged from office with the end of the Istanbul government. The investigation concluded that he did not participate in any anti-national activity, and he continued his diplomatic career. Çankaya, Ali, ibid, p. 780. The investigations conducted after the abolition of the government in Istanbul enabled the members of the Istanbul bureaucracy to continue their careers in Ankara.
its earlier prestige and became a niche of prestige and high esteem, attracting the descendants of the aristocratic/imperial families of Istanbul and the sons of high-ranking bureaucrats and the new political elite in Ankara.\textsuperscript{1177} With the appointment of Numan Menemencioglu as the general secretary of the Ministry, the Ministry became professionalized and “admission to the Ministry was now conditional on the candidate passing an entrance examination.”\textsuperscript{1178} The internationalization of politics, the escalation of tensions in Europe, and diplomacy’s increase in importance from the early 1930s onwards should have played a role in the professionalization of the Ministry. In short, the Republic took over the imperial cadres and the Ministry became one of the most prestigious offices of the Republic following ten years of negligence.

However, this does not mean that the Republic continued with conventional policies. On the contrary, the Republican leadership was at a distance with the traditional Ottoman diplomacy. The Republic had a clear change of policy in foreign relations. It rejected the old style of “balance of power,”\textsuperscript{1179} politics and turned to isolationism.\textsuperscript{1180} The Republic and the republican historiography demonized the Tanzimat declaring it a sellout of the Empire. It was also highly critical of the Tanzimat diplomacy. The Tanzimat was associated with capitulation and submission to the Western powers. It was perceived as


\textsuperscript{1179} It has to be said that “balance of power politics” was discredited continent wide. The old-style “balance of power” was heavily criticized, and the alleged “new diplomacy” was introduced. Although, the “New Europe” group in Britain had aspired for “open diplomacy” and “Wilsonism”, the Republic opted for isolationism, which was seen as a viable alternative after observing the successful Soviet example. It was such an environment that made the Kemalist reformulation of foreign policy orientation possible. It is meaningless to assess the Kemalist foreign policy within a noncomparative historiography.

effeminate and naïve in contrast to the vigilance and Spartan nature of the Republic. The Republic took Turkey away from the predatory webs of European diplomacy. The Republic consciously disowned Tanzimat diplomacy. The resistance and delay by foreign diplomatic legations in Istanbul in moving to Ankara was symbolic in the sense that they symbolically resisted the change of the Turkish government’s new diplomatic course and abandonment of the Ottoman “old diplomacy”. The Republican Foreign Ministry declined any request by an ambassador to meet with the foreign minister because such moves were reminiscent of the Tanzimat diplomacy in which the ambassadors were acting like semi-colonial governors.

The good news was that the Republic did not have a heavy workload (before the 1930s). The European powers were not interested in Turkey and the “Eastern Question” anymore. The “Eastern Question” had expired with the post-1918 settlement in the Middle East and Anatolia in which every party was forced to accept its share. Every country had its own problems at home to which they all had to turn. From being the hub of international diplomacy and the venue of military espionage and battles for world domination before World War I, the strategic assets of Turkey deteriorated, and Turkey became a remote land on the margins of world diplomacy after 1923 (to the satisfaction of the Republican elite). The British representatives’ spare correspondence and remaining classified files (predominantly limited to technical and commercial matters rather than political concerns) sent from Turkey in the second half of the 1920s and the early 1930s in contrast to the heavy files containing extensive correspondence and reports before 1914 illustrates a drastic contraction in the diplomatic involvement and a distinct lack of interest.

The number of Turkish representatives abroad and foreign representations in Turkey shrank


1183 The correspondence from the embassy to Ankara (and earlier to Istanbul from the 1906) are kept in the British archives under the catalogue PRO, FO 371.
drastically disregarding the new representations opened in the post-1918 new independent states.\textsuperscript{1184} This was the end of the age of diplomacy (and age of imperialism) in which the Ottoman Empire was a grand chessboard for the diplomats and on which the Ottoman Empire was always in a defense position. Instead of being entangled and trapped in the niceties of international diplomacy and forced to make new “concessions” every time, the Republic, in the aftermath of the collapse of the old “European order,” could manage to break with the past and Europe.\textsuperscript{1185} Hence, the Treaty of Lausanne was rendered mythical, the very symbol of being freed from former bonds and the founding moment of the revival/resurgence emerging from a disgraceful legacy.

In fact, in spite of the republican claim to disown the diplomacy of the ancien régime, continuity was also visible with regard to the conduct of foreign policy. The Republican stubbornness of the Republican/Kemalist foreign policy establishment observable during the negotiations in Lausanne, in the conduct of foreign policy throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and in the resilient neutrality of Turkey in World War II\textsuperscript{1186} was inherited from the Tanzimat and Hamidian way of conducting foreign policy. The Republican foreign policy’s pragmatism, conservative attitudes with regard to the protection of status quo, and low profile diplomacy were also retained from the Tanzimat and Hamidian conduct of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{1187}

The Republic willingly renounced any claim to grandeur. Instead, the Republic happily espoused the role of being a small nation-state, not interested in what was

\textsuperscript{1184} See Girgin, Kemal, ibid, pp. 123-27.

\textsuperscript{1185} Temperley, one of the doyens of the history of diplomacy, wrote just one year after the Treaty of Lausanne that this treaty “seemed destined, in all human probability, to inaugurate a more lasting settlement, not only than the Treaty of Sèvres, but than the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly.” Temperley’s prediction turned out to be impressively accurate. Quoted in Anderson, M.S, The Eastern Question, London; Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1972, p. 376.

\textsuperscript{1186} For the “active neutrality” of Turkey in the World War II, see Deringil, Selim, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An “Active” Neutrality, Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 1989.

happening beyond its borders.\textsuperscript{1188} Lost territories were gone. It was not the time to weep for what had been lost. Macedonian melodies and the memories of lost Macedonia saddened Republican cadres, but they never dreamed of regaining what had been lost, even though it had been the homeland of many. They educated themselves to come to terms with this loss forever. They endorsed non-revisionism in international politics. Anatolia was the new Macedonia, the new El Dorado. It was the site where the Republic aimed to build its utopia. “Peace at home, peace in the world” was the motto of the new understanding of international politics. Turkey did not interfere with foreign developments and expected the same attitude from the other countries regarding its “resolution” of domestic problems. Suppressing the Kurdish insurgency from the 1920s to 1938 was an easy job because, especially after the settlement of the Mosoul problem, no one in Europe was interested in these policing maneuvers, unlike the “Armenian problem” of the 1890s. Apparently, no one cared as well.

The Republic consciously denied imperialism whether in the Islamist or Turkist form. Many of the formal symbols of legitimacy of the Empire were abandoned.\textsuperscript{1189} The new discourse of legitimacy was constructed through a very different language. Turkishness became the only source of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{1190} This perception was in many ways a complete reversal of the Ottoman self-representation. However, all these were one side of the coin. The Republic retained and reformulated many practices and mental structures of the Empire. Arguably, the new Empire was in Ankara, and Turkishness was the new source of legitimacy functionalized to establish the imperial tradition in Republican/national garb. Many features and peculiarities of the Empire were retained in the Republic. Its political cosmology and its vision of social order were taken over from the imperial legacy. Its

\textsuperscript{1188} For the outline and vision of foreign policy of the Republic, see Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet, \textit{Yeni Türkiye Devletinin Harici Siyaseti}, İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1934.

\textsuperscript{1189} For example (with the exception of İstiklal Madalyası), as a reaction to the imperial flamboyance of the Ottoman imperial culture, the Republic did not designate any insignia or medallions. The introduction of insignia and medallions came only after the military coup of 1980, and they were predominantly given only to foreigners and in a very limited fashion. Eldem, Edhem, \textit{İftihar ve İmtiyaz: Osmanlı Nişan ve Madalyaları Tarihi}, İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2004, p. 491.

imagination of the “people” was arguably more imperial rather than nationalist in many aspects. The relation it established with its citizens also retained the Ottoman pattern. The state retained its mythical and supra-social attributes. It continued to be elitist. Its assimilative nationalism was also partially inherited from the Empire and Ottomanism.\footnote{For a general assessment and overview of “a nation of Empire” argument, see Meeker, Michael, \textit{A Nation of Empire}, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002} As shown by recent studies, it was assimilationist and inclusive as long as its premises were endorsed and internalized.\footnote{For the assimilationist nationalism of the Kemalist Republic, see Yeğen, Mesut, \textit{Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu}, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006; Yeğen, Mesut, \textit{Müstakbel Vatandaş'tan Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler}, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006; Yıldız, Ahmet, \textit{Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene}, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004. Bali, Rıfat, \textit{Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştime Serüveni (1923-1945)}, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999; Aktar, Ayhan, \textit{Varlık Vergisi ve “Türkleştime” Politikaları}, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000.} It was exclusivist otherwise.

A valid question to be posed is with regard to the level of the endorsement of the new Republican line by the imperial diplomats. In the absence of archival sources, we cannot make any conclusive observation. However, it is safe to observe that many Ottoman intellectuals and diplomats became sycophants of the Kemalist regime throughout the 1920s in the absence of any alternative political center. We do not observe any significant ideological opposition or criticism leveled against the regime leveled by the imperial and bureaucratic elites. On the contrary, many turned into Kemalist Republicans overnight. Some preferred to stay silent in their later life in Istanbul, but almost none of them leveled an ideological assault on the Republic even after 1950. Their criticisms remained mild, and they were respectful of the “achievements” of the Republic.

What is interesting is that the Republic developed its isolationist “new course” with the “old cadres”. The experiences, frustrations, and disillusionments of the imperial diplomats may have reoriented their political and ideological outlooks. The pupils of the Republic, who studied in the Republican Mülkiye (in İstanbul and later in Ankara) instead of the imperial Mülkiye in İstanbul,\footnote{It should be borne in mind that the Republic could intervene and reshape higher education much later than 1923. The critical moment for this move was the “University Reform” of 1933, which had purged many undesired professors of \textit{Darüşşün}.} started to take office in the Foreign Ministry by the 1930s. Interestingly, the generation trained by the Republic began to take high office by the late
1940s as the Republican isolationist policy gave way to a new internationalism within the alignments of the Cold War. Ironically, the first generation of Republican-trained cadres had, from the late 1940s onwards, established and directed the pro-Western policy, which was a divergence from the isolationist Republican foreign policy.

Taking over the imperial legacy, the Republic tried to establish its distinct and not-so-distinct ideology. It adopted various tenets of the imperial ideology and modified some others. In many ways, the Empire had already established a “nation-state ideology” through a process that began in the early 19th century and escalated in the Unionist imperialism. As argued above, Ottomanism in its various practices and manifestations resembled the prospective Kemalist nationalism of the Republic. In that regard, staying away from romanticizing Empires (as opposed to the cruelties of the 20th century nation-states), we may argue that the Ottoman Empire may not be seen as an Empire in the universal sense if any of the other Empires (British, Habsburg, Russian) may be seen as such although it also has to be said that the Ottoman Empire took its Ottomanism and its claim to universalism seriously. The course of the late Ottoman Empire can be seen as the process of gradual transformation into a nation-state in the form of an Empire. On the other hand, the Republic took over and retained many facets of the imperial ideology.

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1195 The continuity of the ideological discourse has been studied both in a theoretical framework and within a local setting and has been discussed and shown by Michael Meeker. See Meeker, Michael, A Nation of Empire, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

The Republic tried to establish the primacy of the state and raison d’État against the primacy of “politics” and “ideology” which brought about the destruction of the Empire at the hands of the Unionists. In this regard, Kemalist nationalism differed from Unionist nationalism. Kemalism was the domination of raison d’État and suppression of the “political” in the aftermath of 1908 and its costly consequences. The Republic tried to create loyalty to the state by consecrating the state as the embodiment of the nation and rendering the nation subservient to the state. The “Republic” repressed the non-official alternative interpretations of the “nation”. It rendered “nation” subordinate to the state and defined it only in its submissive relation to the state. This perception was also a derivative of the imperial ideology.1197

The working assumption here is that Kemalism can be interpreted as statism (or nation-statism) rather than “nationalism proper”. This derived from the heritage it had received from the culture of Empire. In other words, as has been demonstrated in many other studies, there was a visible continuity from the Empire to the Republic. The transition was rather a step function. The considerably smooth adaptation and transition of political, intellectual, cultural, and bureaucratic elites to the new environment, and their impressive capacity and eagerness to adapt to the new ideological formations and the new ideological milieu is illustrative. The Republican bureaucracy which was crucial in the establishment, institutionalization, and consolidation of the Republic was taken over from the Empire. Even prominent men of the late Ottoman Empire who were sidelined and lost their positions in the Republic never leveled ideological criticism. They acquiesced in their retirement days in their mansions in Istanbul. This was partially due to the surveillance of

1197 Russian czardom’s blend of monarchism and national principle which gave birth to the “official nationality” resembles both the Ottoman “official nationality” and the Republican idea of nationhood and thus arguably illustrates the linkage between the Ottoman background and the Republican notion of Nation in a comparative perspective. Richard Wortman, one of the foremost authorities on 19th century czarist Russia, writes; “After 1825, nationality was identified with absolutism, ‘autocracy’ in the official lexicon. Russian nationality was presented as a nationality of consensual subordination, in contrast to egalitarian Western concepts. The monarchical narrative of the nation described the Russian people as voluntarily surrendering power to their Westernized rulers.” Wortman, Richard, Scenarios of Power, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, v. II, p. 12.
the Republican authorities. However, it may be argued that it was more due to the culture of loyalty and the (emotional) relations they had established with the intimitized state. Therefore, it was easier for the old cadres to switch their loyalties without contradicting themselves. It was the state upon which they bestowed their allegiance, regardless of the specific ideological dispositions of the state to which they adhere. Thus, the Republican transition may be dubbed as a quiet revolution in which the old culture and habitus was retained and rehabilitated.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry with its radical Westernism and nationalism was an ideal place where we can observe this cooptation. Here it can be argued that the Turkish Foreign Ministry as an institution exemplifies the Kemalist vision at its best. Moreover, it may be argued that Turkish Foreign Ministry is the quintessential prototype of institutionalized Kemalism. Kemalism was not nationalism in its conventional sense (nationalism with a reference to ethnicity) but was a discourse of elitism that utilized the nationalist rhetoric to serve other ends. The nation was defined in the image of the habitus and culture of the elite. The national attributes and qualities were imagined and defined in line with the culture and socialization of this class. The nation was supposed to be secular, modern, and pure as a replica and extension of the “cultural intimacy” of the late Ottoman and Republican bureaucratic elite which was constituted based on the absorption of a shared ethos and cultural intimacy.

A very prominent and universally accepted axiom of the Turkish diplomatic establishment is that foreign policy is a supra-political issue not to be interfered with by amateurish and irresponsible politicians. This was also a dictum arguably retained from the Ottoman pre-political world in which the state was the chief object of allegiance and politics was not seen as legitimate, but viewed as corrupting (fitna). Thus, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ elitism and its culture of detachment from the outside world were also arguably derivations/remnants of the imperial heritage it holds onto.

1198 This perception is not peculiar to Turkey. David Vincent writes that, in 19th century Britain, because the diplomatic service was the most elitist one and it had most access to the state secrets, it was perceived as most privileged (and most associated with the supreme interests of the state) office and thus, it was the office most resilient to reform and democratization of civil service. It was the service which was most disturbed from interference from outside. Vincent, David, *The Culture of Secrecy in Britain, 1832-1898*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 79.
The social portrait and characteristics of the Republican diplomatic service are also worth an assessment. With its élitist background, it continued to constitute a Bourdieueian state nobility.\footnote{See Bourdieu, Pierre, State Nobility, Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1998. Also see Suleiman, Ezra, Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, Suleiman, Ezra, Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. Also see a more sophisticated discourse on the emergence of the Egyptian modern bureaucracy and the modern bureaucratic mind in, Mitchell, Timothy, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.} We may argue that, it retained the old Ottoman premise of the complete separation of the masses from the ruling class (askeri versus reaya) and developed its own askeri class (based on assimilation into its value system as well as genealogical continuity) with distinct qualities. The Tanzimat’s new bureaucratic class’s peculiarities rendered this separation even more tenable. Coming from distinctive and privileged backgrounds (education in Mekteb-i Sultani and the imperial high schools), experiencing their political and cultural socializations in their habitus, and cultivated as a la franga, they developed an exclusivist perception of the people. This elite also reserved the state their privilege and continued to intimitize it. In other words, they owned it rather than vice versa.

The persistence of the diplomatic establishment and its elitist characteristics can also be observed examining the biographical data of the diplomatic service as of 1967. By 1967, Istanbul continued to be the main source for recruiting diplomats. Of the 474 career diplomats serving as of 1967\footnote{See Tamkoç, Metin, The Warrior Diplomats, Salt Lake City: Utah University Press, 1976, pp. 256-8.}, 191 were born in Istanbul\footnote{Ergun Sav, who joined the diplomatic service in 1962, finds it necessary to emphasize that he was born and grew up in Ankara (as opposed to being born and growing up in Istanbul). “Don’t think when I joined the diplomatic service, I was imprisoned in the circle of diplomats. I am a native of the capital, Ankara. I had social contacts in Ankara. I was not from the Galatasaray-Mülkiye line.” Sav, Ergun, Cumhuriyet Bebeleri, Ankara: Bilgi Yaynevi, 1998, pp. 9-10.}. 52 diplomats were born in Ankara, 19 were born in Izmir, and 24 were born in foreign countries, including the lost territories of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, 265 of the 474 career diplomats graduated from high schools in Istanbul. Given that 47 of the career diplomats graduated from high schools abroad and 94 of the career diplomats graduated from high schools in Ankara (84)
or Izmir (10), only 56 of the career diplomats graduated from provincial high schools. Not surprisingly, forty percent of the diplomats graduated from a French-language school such as Galatasaray (the Ottoman Mekteb-i Sultani), Saint-Benoit, and Saint Joseph. Around fifteen percent of the diplomats were graduates of both Galatasaray and Mülkiye. These statistics display the portrait of a “typical” Turkish diplomat. It also has to be remembered that Mülkiye moved to Ankara only in 1937, and before the Republican purge of the faculty of the University of Istanbul in 1933, literally the Ottoman Mülkiye continued to provide diplomats to the Republic.

In this study, the Foreign Ministry was not only taken as a governmental body, but also as a manifestation of the making of the modern Turkish state elite. Given that the Ministry assumed an unprecedented, prominent role in the turbulent (and long) Ottoman 19th century, it is hoped that this study of the Ministry reveals that in the development of the discourse of modern Turkishness, modernity and nationalism were intertwined and inseparable from each other. The case of the Ottoman/Turkish Foreign Ministry provides us some insights concerning how Turkish Euroskeptic nationalism was an inherent part of the Turkish modernization project itself and how Turkish modernization, contrary to the established Kemalist and pseudo-Kemalist discourse, was not an attempt to renounce the “old”, but instead was an endeavor to revive and restore it in a brave new world. The study has tried to highlight that the very discourse from Mahmud II onwards had a lasting impact on the 20th century official/private Turkish discourse.

In his book, Yücel Bozdağhoğlu evaluates Turkish foreign policy from a constructivist perspective and argues that Turkish foreign policy is a function of the identity and identity politics of the Kemalist elite. Taking Kemalism as “Westernism” and the ideology of Westernization, he argues that Turkish foreign policy priorities are determined by Turkey’s effort to be involved within “Western civilization”. He takes Turkey’s Cold War

\[1202\] Data on 12 career diplomats are unavailable.

\[1203\] According to Mahmut Dikerdem, until the end of the World War II, only “sons of Istanbuliot families, especially those who were graduates of Galatasaray and the American College, could dare to take the entrance examination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” Dikerdem, Mahmut, Hariciye Çarkı, İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1989, p. 74.

\[1204\] Bozdağhoğlu, Yücel, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity, London; New York: Routledge, 2003.
diplomacy and alignments as Kemalist foreign policy orientation per se. However, I would argue that Kemalism is something very different from Westernism. Though Westernism is an indispensable and pivotal component of it, Kemalism is a much more complex amalgam. Contrary to Bozdağoğlu’s assumption, here Kemalism’s basic premise is taken as nation-statism, which is understood as isolationism and a rejection of any Western (international) interference along with an intense distrust of the “West”. Here, it is argued that, Bozdağoğlu fails to take Kemalism in its complexity and in its ambivalence. Furthermore, he overlooks the complex build up of Kemalism and merges the Kemalism of the single-party period and the Kemalism that had been reformulated, softened, and rendered compatible with democracy and the Cold War environment (and therefore reinvented) with the collapse of the single-party regime. In fact, Kemalism was reinvented with the collapse of the single-party regime. Taking Kemalism as an evolution of the late Ottoman souveranisme, this study has tried to establish that Kemalism fits into the mindset of the late Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and the Ottoman bureaucracy as a whole). This also explains the conservatism of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its perception of the dynamics of globalization and the process of accession to the European Union (especially before the Summit of Copenhagen in 2002) in the post-Cold War world and its becoming trapped in the arguably insoluble issues of Cyprus and coming to terms with the Armenian massacres in 1915.

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Another book on Turkish foreign policy written by one of the eminent scholars of the foreign policy of contemporary Turkey that may be considered as “constructivist” and suffers from the same bias is William Hale’s study on the Ottoman/Turkish foreign policy from the late 18th century onwards. One of the principal premises of this book with regard to Kemalism underestimates the very complexities of the nature of the Ottoman/Turkish modernity and the Republican ideology. William Hale argues that “in foreign policy, their (Republican elite –DG) primary aim was to see their country recognized as a respected European power” and “to raise Turkey to the ‘level of contemporary civilisation’ besides “safeguard the hard-won security which they had achieved in 1923”. Hale, William, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, London; Portland: Frank Cass, 2000, p. 57. However,
That is, observing the continuity of a certain discourse espoused by the Ministry not only from the Empire to the Republic, but also from the early 19th century to the 21st century, may open vistas in reinterpreting the ideological and mental structures of contemporary Turkey, and the crises faced by Turkey as manifested in its perceptions of the EU, Cyprus, the United States, and global liberalism. It is crucial to observe how this perpetual discourse of souverainisme was created at a time of imperial retreat and dissolution and was perpetuated and transmitted to the Turkish nation-state which continued to live with Sevrophobia as if time was frozen at a particular moment of the course of history.

We also should bear in mind that Sevrophobia does not simply refer to the Treaty of Sevrés signed in 1920 which rendered Turkey a small state confined to the interior of Anatolia and which delivered vast territories with Turkish populations to Armenians and Greeks. Sevrophobia goes back in time before the Republic and before the Sevrés Treaty. It is as much about St. Stephanos, the Balkan War treaties, and the other humiliating treaties the Ottomans had to sign as it is about Sevrés. Nevertheless, it may be argued that Sevrésphobia or the Sevrés syndrome, a concept introduced by liberal political scientists1208 to define a certain attitude, perception, and reflex is an apt label given that the Republic also strove to obliterate the pre-Republican traumas, subsumed the previous disillusionments under the bogeyman of Sevrés (republicanization of the traumas), and established a dichotomy between Lausanne and Sevrés. Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that the trauma of Sevrés was not generated by Sevrés. On the contrary, the traumatic perception towards Sevrés was constructed upon the previous memories and experiences such as the loss of Crete, the unkept promises of the Western powers after the Balkan Wars, et cetera. What Sevrés did was to eternalize and transcendentize the

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mundane and *Realpolitik*, transmit them to the realm of universals, and amalgamate several traumatic experiences into one single overarching and encompassing traumatic experience which subsumed and reinforced all the others. With such disillusionment, it was the transcendentalized imagery of the state which the elite always turned to and espoused. The transcendental state was not only a haven against external attacks, but also a shelter from the ignorant masses that had to be reeducated, civilized, and incorporated into the habitus and cultural intimacy of the state elite.

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1209 For some memoirs written by prominent Turkish diplomats exposing such a relation established with the state, see Gürün, Kamuran, *Fırtınalı Yıllar: Dışişleri Müsteşarlığı Hatıraları*, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 19995; Yavuzalp, Kamuran, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996; İnan, Kamran, *Cenevre Yılları*, İstanbul: Timağ, 2002.
CONCLUSION

This study investigates the cultural, intellectual, and ideological formations of the Ottoman diplomatic service in the late Ottoman Empire with an emphasis on the Hamidian era. The study attempts to describe the basic contours and premises of the culture of the late Ottoman bureaucratic culture (culture in its “thick description”) as well as the social origins of the late Ottoman state elite by examining the diplomatic service as a microcosm of the late Ottoman bureaucratic elite. The study also aims to highlight the prominent role the late Ottoman bureaucratic establishment played in the development of the modern Turkish national identity and Turkish nationalism as well as the ideological premises of the republic.

The Ottoman diplomatic service was the most elitist governmental office of the late Ottoman Empire. This elitism becomes even more apparent in the social backgrounds of the ambassadors. The elitist nature of the diplomatic service was not peculiar to the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, this was a European continent-wide pattern. It has been argued that the Tanzimat was an era of the consolidation of a state elite or nobility. In contrast to the European nobilities, the late Ottoman nobility was constructed on its relation to the state and based on serving in the state bureaucracy (which had some resemblance to the Russian nobility which was based on both blood lines and service to the state). The Ottoman state elite was welded around the state and developed a loyalty to the state which also served the self-interest of this class cluster. The Tanzimat elite was an amalgamation of different elites. It was consolidated by the marriage of the aristocracies of the center and the elite resident in Istanbul. It has been argued that the late Ottoman diplomatic service is a good place to observe the recruitment patterns, structures of loyalty, and other prominent characteristics and peculiarities of the ancien régime of the late Ottoman Empire because it is where we can observe the sons of grand viziers, ulema, and lower-ranking officials working alongside the sons of Kurdish mirs, Turcoman tribal
chieftains, and Turkish, Caucasian, Albanian, and Arab provincial dignitaries as well as the sons of the elites within the non-Muslim communities. The Ottoman diplomatic service was an amalgamation of modern, meritocratic professionalism with the traditional aristocratic service. This world of the Ottoman ancien régime came to an end with the Revolution of 1908. As education became a prominent factor in advancement in career and the accumulation of material and social capital, a new political and bureaucratic elite emerged. The new Unionist generation, predominantly coming from lower middle-class backgrounds and the families of lower-ranking civil servants, curtailed the privileged world of the Ottoman ancien régime. The mental and ideological structures of the ancien régime were abandoned in favor of a new radical stance. This was not only the end of the Ottoman ancien régime and the emergence of the Turkish nouvelle régime, but also the end of the Metternichian-Castlereaghian Concert of Europe and Bismarckian diplomacy and therefore the end of the late Ottoman diplomats and their diplomatic culture. Nevertheless, the Ottoman ancien régime, its culture, and its ideological underpinnings were constitutive in the Young Turk and Republican nouvelle régimes in terms of their cultural and ideological structures as well as their elite recruitment.

The continuities (as well as modifications and changes) from the Empire to the Republic are also emphasized. It has been argued that the notion of “Nation” in the Republic was very much influenced by the image of “Nation” created and developed by the Ottoman imperial center, which imagined “Nation” in a subservient relation to itself. Although it is a very complicated process, studying the dispatches sent from the Ottoman embassies and legations to European and Balkan capitals, it had been suggested that the self-identity of the Ottoman imperial elite was constituted in the process of encountering (and opposing) perceived threats. These threats, unlike the perceived threats of earlier centuries, were diffuse and abstract, which rendered them not only less predictable but also more threatening. They were not clearly identifiable; thus, they were not only more dangerous, but also more treacherous. These enemies, as observed in the correspondence from European and Balkan capitals, included seditious non-Muslims, the expansionist and imperial aims of the Great Powers, ambitious, small Balkan powers, and other unreliable elements and ideas. Furthermore, these threats were envisaged as potentially acting in concert and coordination with each other. These perceived constant threats and dangers
ensued the emergence of a defensive and reactive statism. Within this environment, it has been argued that an intimate relation with the state was forged. It was the state and the imagery of the state that was aggressively protected, and simultaneously it was this state where these people could take refuge in the midst of constant danger.

It has been proposed that over time non-Muslim communities and eventually even Muslim ethnic groups (such as Albanians, Arabs) would come to be seen as unreliable and disloyal to the imagery of the imperial center, leaving only those of Turkish ethnicity as a reliable force. Thus, although an interest in Turkish ethnicity emerged, this derived less from ethnic awareness and more from the concerns of the state and the imperial center. As pointed out above, this nation was defined with regard to the (subservient) relation it established with the state. Nevertheless, what was radical and novel in the nouvelle regime was the renunciation of the multiple objects of loyalty in the Empire and the monopolization of one single object of loyalty, the Nation.
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