

**A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE VIEWS OF
REPUBLICAN AND ISLAMIC WOMEN'S CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
IN TURKEY:
DIVERGING CLAIMS AND CONTENDING TRADITIONS**

**by
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and
for my mother*

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ABSTRACT

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Symbolic Justice, community, tradition

This study attempts to explain diverging claims of justice generating from two major movements within women’s civil society, namely republican and Islamic women’s activism. Given that purpose, empirical data obtained from semi-structured interviews and secondary sources is analyzed under the light of social justice literature which is marked by socioeconomic justice - symbolic justice dichotomy and liberalism – communitarianism debate.

The results of the study suggest that although both movements intend to formulate their own claims of justice within a liberal perspective, the impact of Kemalism and Islam on republican and Islamic civil society organizations is decisive. The power of Islam and Kemalism against liberalism can particularly be better observed in the arguments which they formulate for opposing the claims of other groups.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’DEKİ CUMHURİYETÇİ VE İSLAMİ KADIN SİVİL TOPLUM ÖRGÜTLERİNİN SOSYAL ADALET GÖRÜŞLERİNİN TEORİK ANALİZİ: FARKLI TALEPLER VE RAKİP GELENEKLER

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Adalet, Sivil Toplum Örgütleri, Sosyoekonomik Adalet, Sembolik Adalet, topluluk, gelenek

Bu çalışma, kadın sivil toplumunda yer alan iki büyük hareketin – cumhuriyetçi ve İslami kadın sivil toplum örgütlerinin - birbirinden farklılık gösteren adalet taleplerini açıklamayı hedefler. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlardan ve ikincil kaynaklardan edinilen veriler, sosyoekonomik adalet – sembolik adalet ihtilafı ve liberalizm – toplulukçuluk tartışması doğrultusunda şekillenmiş olan sosyal adalet literatürü ışığında incelenmektedir.

Çalışmanın sonucunda, her iki grubun da kendi taleplerini ifade ederken liberal perspektiften faydalanma isteklerine karşın, Kemalizm’in ve İslam’ın bu gruplar üzerindeki etkisinin belirleyici olduğu öneriliyor. Özellikle, Kemalizm’in ve İslam’ın liberalizm karşısındaki gücü, cumhuriyetçi ve İslami sivil toplum kuruluşlarının, başka grupların taleplerine karşı çıkarken öne sürdükleri argümanlarda belirgin biçimde ortaya çıkmaktadır.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKDER	Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneđi (Women's Rights Organization against Discrimination)
CKD	Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneđi (Association of Republican Women)
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
İKKB	İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliđi (İstanbul Union of Women's Organizations)
GİKAP	Gökkuşaađı İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu (Rainbow İstanbul Women Organizations' Platform)
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
TÜKD	Türk Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneđi (Association of Turkish University Women)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Scope and Aim of the Study

In the aftermath of 1980 military coup, Turkey has witnessed the emergence of an active and vibrant civil society. In particular, women's organizations have not only increased in number but also have undergone an intensive diversification. The major causes of this diversification were on the one hand the rise of a feminist stance which has never been that strong before, on the other hand the emergence of an Islamic women's activism out of the male-dominated Islamic milieu which was revitalized by the new Islamist movement. From 1990s onwards, in line with that diversification, it is possible to talk about a fragmentation due to the deep divergence among the world view adopted by women's movements which generate three separate groups¹ within women's civil society: first, republican/Kemalist civil society organizations as the successors of a sort of 'state feminism' which focuses on the emancipation of women in parallel with the modernization and the westernization of Turkish society; second, Islamic civil society organizations which argue that a rightly-understood Islamic way of life would guarantee the happiness of women; third, feminist women's movements in general, which particularly focus on the gender question.

All of these abovementioned groups agree that women are victims of several injustices; however the priorities emphasized in their claims diverge significantly. Particularly, while republican CSOs seem to focus on the betterment of women's status in socioeconomic sphere and underline the importance of women's participation and

¹ İlkkaracan describes them as 'three conflicting wings'. (İlkkaracan, 1997, p. 8)

representation in public sphere; Islamic CSOs usually underline that a large group of women suffer from the ban on Islamic headscarf in public institutions and such limitations cause an injury to them. At first sight, the difference between these claims seems to be generating from two different parameters; first one is about the gender distribution of income and power, the second one which cannot be understood in socioeconomic terms, requires a non-material approach to social justice. Besides, in political theory literature, these two different sorts of claims are often elaborated separately.

Since 1970s, social justice has been a hot topic in political theory. Under “the dominance of Marxism in Europe, and the widespread influence of Rawls in the USA” redistribution -in other words socioeconomic justice- was what people mostly understand from ‘social justice’ concept until late 1980s. (Honneth, 2001, p. 43) Then, the priorities of social justice in political theory started to shift from socioeconomic inequalities to identity claims, which are calling for ‘recognition’. (Benhabib, 2002) Some brilliant works such as Will Kymlicka's *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Kymlicka, 1989) and Charles Taylor's *The Politics of Recognition* (Taylor, 1992) became the forerunners of a mainstream recognition literature and they dominated political philosophy field, as John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* did throughout 1970s.

Towards the end of 1990s, some political philosophers started to dwell upon both material sufferings and symbolic injuries, in order to overcome the theoretical schism between the theories of socioeconomic and symbolic justice. Nancy Fraser was one of the most important thinkers who underlined the importance of the equal consideration for ‘recognition’ and ‘redistribution’, and she pointed out that this was particularly necessary for the analysis of complex injustices which stem from both socioeconomic inequalities and sociocultural injuries. According to Fraser, the injustices generating from gender and race are of that sort. (Fraser, 1997)

In this study, I intend to use contemporary social justice literature, which I summarized above, in order to understand how the question of social justice is treated by two women’s movements, with reference to republican CSOs and Islamic CSOs,

which have an open conflict regarding the headscarf controversy². Based on a detailed analysis of social justice literature, on the one hand I will elaborate the way in which these movements respond to the question of social justice in general, by focusing on both their own claims of justice and their responses to the claims of other groups; on the other hand I will try to make a tentative explanation in order to understand the major factors which shape the justice views of both groups. Although it seems as if republican women's CSOs merely focus on socioeconomic injustice and ignore symbolic injustices, and Islamic women's CSOs emphasize the symbolic injustice generating from the ban on headscarf without any consideration for welfare distribution; I will give equal importance to socioeconomic and symbolic justice views of both groups in order to avoid shortcuts which would hinder a satisfactory analysis representing the reality as fully as possible.

1.2. Constructing an Appropriate Research Design under the Light of Previous Studies

The rapid growth and diversification of women's civil society has been a curious topic for social scientists in Turkey. Majority of the studies conducted since late 1980s can be grouped under two groups; first those which intend to analyze the women's civil society in general, (Sirman, 1989) (Kandiyoti, 1991) (Tekeli, 1995) (İlkkaracan, 1997) second those which focus on the particularities of each movement. (Arat Y. , 1991) (Arat Z. F., 1994) (İlyasoğlu, 1994) (Saktanber, 1994) (Çayır, 1997) (Durakbaşa, 2000) (Kadioğlu, 2005) Given the purpose of the study, time constraints, and financial restrictions; focusing on peculiarities within two distinct movements is an impossible target. Therefore, the study was designed in a way that it reveals the common characteristics which reveal the mainstream social justice view of each movement.

² Republican/Kemalist CSOs respond very negatively to the claims about the lift of the ban on headscarf, which actually is topping the agenda of Islamic women's CSOs.

1.3. Research Questions

As previously mentioned, the broad research question of the study is: How do republican and Islamic women's civil society organizations assess the question of social justice in general, and how can their social justice views be interpreted regarding the contemporary social justice literature? However the broad research question is linked to the following sub-questions, the answering of which would provide a solid ground for the development of the study:

- What are the major networks and platforms which republican and Islamic women's civil society organizations are affiliated with?
- What are the major issues and priorities emphasized by republican and Islamic women's movement in general?
- Do they cooperate with actors and organizations outside the women's movement?
- What are their propositions for struggle against injustices which women face?
- How do they respond to the question of socioeconomic justice?
- How do they respond to the question of symbolic justice?
- What kind of activities do they suggest and run in order to struggle against injustice?
- How do they respond to the claims of other groups?
- What do they refer to in their objections against the claims of others?

1.4. Research Methodology

As previously mentioned, republican and Islamic women's civil societies are not actually monolithic. As Seçkinelgin puts it clearly with reference to Bora, it is possible to distinguish republican civil society organizations into two groups: traditional CSOs which are built on the Kemalist ideals and newer CSOs which are formed to defend

Kemalist ideals. (Seçkinelgin, 2006, p. 760) On the otherhand, Göle explains the contrast within Islamic movement as the dichotomy between traditionalism and radicalism, while Özdalga and Kadioğlu refer to the tension between community orientation and liberalism. (Göle, 1996) (Özdalga & Persson, 1999) (Kadioğlu, 2005) Although this study does not aim at an elaborate analysis of the diversity within each movement due to the constraints indicated above, it is intended to avoid any sort of misrepresentation by taking following measures:

- The study focuses on the activities of two umbrella organizations which unite the CSOs within each group. While *İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği* (İKKB) - İstanbul Union of Women's Organizations unite republican CSOs and works as a transmission channel for the common messages and activities of member organizations, *Gökkuşacağı İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu* (GİKAP) - Rainbow Istanbul Women Organizations' Platform has a quite similar role and it organizes common activities and disseminates messages which member CSOs agree upon.
- Besides as platforms did not provide enough representation for the interviews, additional interviews were held. However, selection of the participants for the supplementary interviews was performed in a way that represents the diversity as much as possible. *Türk Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneği* (TÜKD) Association of Turkish University Women which was founded in 1949 is one of the oldest organizations can be taken as an example of traditional republican women's CSOs built on the Kemalist ideals, while *Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği* (CKD) Association of Republican Women which was founded in 1997, in the aftermath of a large protest called 'Women against Sharia' is a typical example of the women's CSOs founded for the protection of the Kemalist order. In Islamic Women's movement *Başak Grubu* - Başak Group is a group which intends to foster solidarity among women, predominantly housewives; *Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği* (AKDER) Women's Rights Association Against Discrimination is a highly politicized group which actively struggles for the lift of ban on headscarf.

The bulk of data for the assessment of republican and Islamic women's movements' views of social justice is generated from three main sources. First, semi-structured interviews³ held with the representatives of organizations indicated above; second, activity reports, publications, press releases, web pages, and bulletins of umbrella organizations and member CSOs; third, previous studies in the field a part of which was indicated previously. Despite my preference for using primary sources, it is important to note that bibliography available on both republican and Islamic women's movements was very helpful to enrich the analysis and to support the data generated from interviews.

1.5. Design of the Study

In line with the purpose of the study, the following chapter will be a thorough analysis of contemporary social justice literature. Given the fact that the literature of social justice is a vast one, the present review focuses on the major works of post-Rawlsian theories. However, selected theories and approaches will provide enough ground for the empirical analysis of social justice views of republican and Islamic women's movements, regarding the dichotomy of socioeconomic justice and symbolic justice. Moreover, these theories will be useful for the theoretical interpretation of empirical findings in the following chapter.

Chapter Three is built on three sections. The first one includes a general presentation of İKKB and GİKAP, in terms of their function, members, and major activities. The second one is the empirical analysis of republican and Islamic movements' social justice views. Finally, the third one proposes a tentative explanation for the predominant social justice views of each movement in line with MacIntyre's emphasis on 'tradition' as the major source of normativity according to which individuals and groups construct their point of view of justice.

³ Interviewees: Representatives of İKKB (1) and GİKAP (1); Representatives of member CSOs: TÜKD (1), CKD (2), Başak Grubu (1), AKDER (1).

Finally, Chapter Four is the conclusion which ties the present study to the existing literature on women's movements in Turkey, in terms of its findings and propositions for further research.

CHAPTER 2

CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE: REDISTRIBUTION, RECOGNITION, AND BEYOND

Quest for justice has always been one of the perennial questions for normative systems, and from religion to law, each normative system introduces a justice view in order to regulate individuals' behaviors and interactions. Apart from conventional normative systems and debates on them, justice has been one of the focal points of political philosophy as well. Although we may trace theoretical inquiries about justice back to major works of classical Greek philosophers, such as Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, our present effort requires us to focus on a very specific portion of this huge literature. Given the objectives of this study which intends to observe diverging discourses of justice in a contemporary democratic society, classical and modern theories of justice will fall short of providing a satisfactory theoretical framework. In that sense, the present literature review will consist of post-Rawlsian justice theories. This limitation is legitimate in two ways. On the one hand Rawls' "justice as fairness" which has provoked many critiques and reactions from various political theoreticians opened up a new justice debate that has gone on uninterruptedly since the first publication of 'A Theory of Justice' in 1971, on the other hand a serious analysis of post-Rawlsian literature succeeds in reflecting the major questions of social justice in contemporary liberal democratic societies.

The literature to be covered in this chapter will be presented under three headings: first, Rawls' distributive justice and reactions to it; second, recognition theories which deal with symbolic injustice; third, different attempts to overcome redistribution-recognition schism in social justice literature. The latter has a particular importance for the following sections of this study, as it will provide us an insight for

understanding how two justice approaches -namely, socioeconomic and symbolic justice views- can be accommodated in a single perspective focusing on gender injustice.

2.1. Rawlsian Socioeconomic Justice and Critiques Against Distributive Justice

Distributive justice aims at laying the essential rules for arranging the fruits and burdens of economic activity at society level, and this is the main objective of Rawls' 'justice as fairness' as well. Rawls, adopting major assumptions of liberalism, embraces distributive concerns for socioeconomic justice within mainstream liberal literature. A Theory of Justice, which triggered the ongoing justice debate since its first publication in 1971, has received many critiques from different traditions of political theory. In this part, not only fundamental ideas asserted by Rawls, but also major critiques against his theory will be presented. These critiques are grouped under two main headings: first, those generated from libertarianism; second, those which are introduced by communitarian theoreticians.

2.1.1. Rawlsian Distributive Justice: Justice as Fairness

According to Rawls, justice is essentially about the basic structure of the society, more precisely, "about the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation." (Rawls, 1999, p. 6) Setting forth an original justice theory, he defines where his theory can be placed in the whole literature. Rawls associates himself with the social contract tradition, and he attempts to derive principles of justice by using social contract as the major theoretical instrument for the construction of a universal theory of justice.

"My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant... [T]he guiding idea, is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are object of the original agreement." (Rawls, 1999, p. 10)

More precisely, social contract is a theoretical instrument to imagine a hypothetical and

rational deliberation process, which is expected to provide the basic rules for a just society. Rawls thoroughly describes the circumstances of this hypothetical decision process which he calls 'original position':

“In justice as fairness, the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of social contract. This original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conceptions of justice [...] The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. The principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 10)

Rawls builds the backbone of his theory on this very idea of original position, which is an 'initial choice situation' (Rawls, 1999, p. 16) bringing rational individuals together who leave all personal contingencies behind the 'veil of ignorance'. By this means, he intends to “nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 118) Therefore, the first purpose of introducing veil of ignorance is overcoming people's egoism by abstaining them from all information which defines who they actually are. By the same token, he seeks to attain a fair decision procedure, where he takes pure procedural justice as model, among equally free rational beings, in order to eliminate all influence that would prevent people's free deliberation on justice in case they were cognizant of the identity of their collocutor during original position. Apart from maintaining favorable conditions for the debate, he intends to reveal universal precepts of justice which everyone would comply with at the end. (Rawls, 1999, p. 119) As it is the case for many other liberal theories, universality of decisions requires neutrality, and in 'justice as fairness' it is attained by the anonymity of the participants during this hypothetical decision-making process.

Rawls admits that his theoretical formula, which combines social contract with veil of ignorance, is a Kantian inspiration, and he proposes “veil of ignorance” in order to elucidate Kant's obscurity, giving references to his discussion of the topic of practical judgment in the Critique of Practical Reason:

“The veil of ignorance is so natural a condition that something like it must have occurred to many. The formulation in the text is implicit, in Kant's doctrine of the categorical imperative, both in the way this procedural criterion is defined and the use Kant makes of it. Thus when Kant tells us to test our maxim by

considering what would be the case were it a universal law of nature, he must suppose that we do not know our place within this imagined system of nature.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 118)

In that sense, “original position” can be conceived as a laboratory which elucidates the way in which a fully rational account of justice can be determined.

Rawls' contact with literature is not limited to Kantian social contract theory. Apart from associating himself with the latter, he wants to contrast his theory vis-à-vis two intellectual traditions, namely utilitarianism and intuitionism, both of which had a considerable impact on justice literature since 19th century. In this critical endeavor, Rawls prefers focusing on the main assumptions and propositions of each philosophical perspective, rather than making a thorough analysis of particular texts. His major critique against classical utilitarianism is about its lack of consideration for different perceptions of good life, which leads to a severe problem while evaluating justice demands of individuals having diverse conceptions of utility. Regarding intuitionism, he points out its incapability for providing solid theoretical criteria to determine and sort principles of justice that it proposes.⁴

Rawls defines the fundamental aim of utilitarian justice as to attain a properly arranged society with institutions maximizing the net balance of satisfaction, (Rawls, 1999, p. 21), then he elucidates that he is to “understand the principle of utility in its classical form as defining the good as the satisfaction of desire, or perhaps better, as the satisfaction of rational desire.” (Rawls, 1999, pp. 22-23). As these theories are built on the idea of satisfaction of desire, they tend to focus on the way in which the desires of people are arranged and filtered, in order to suggest a view on justice. At this point, utilitarianism assumes an impartial spectator figure, a sort of referee to decide on the basic rules of justice which set the boundaries for satisfaction of desire.

“[T]he spectator who is conceived as carrying out the required organization of the desires of all persons into one coherent system of desire; it is by this construction that many persons are fused into one. Endowed with ideal powers of sympathy and imagination, the impartial spectator is the perfectly rational individual who identifies with and experiences the desires of others as if these desires were his own [...]The nature of this decision made by the ideal legislator

⁴ Rawls refers to some major works of utilitarian and intuitionist justice theories in his critique. (Barry, 1965) (Brandt, 1959) (Sidgwick, 1907) (Mill, 1863)

is not, therefore, materially different from that of an entrepreneur deciding how to maximize his profit by producing this or that commodity, or that of a consumer deciding how to maximize his satisfaction by the purchase of this or that collection of goods.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 24)

This intellectual process, which is conceived to be undertaken by the impartial and sympathetic spectator, seeks to lay the ground rules of just and coherent system of desire. In that sense, the outcome of this imaginative act assumed to be performed by one person, extends to society and becomes a final rule binding everyone. According to Rawls, utilitarianism is not individualistic at all, because by “conflating all systems of desires, it applies to society the principle of choice for one man.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 26) Hence, the blindness of utilitarianism regarding the plurality of ends that one might be interested in pursuing may well end up with some sort of a tyrannical convention on the principles of social justice.

“In utilitarianism the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself which must be taken into account in deciding what is right. In calculating the greatest balance of satisfaction it does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires are for. We are to arrange institutions so as to obtain the greatest sum of satisfactions; we ask no questions about their source or quality but only how their satisfaction would affect the total of well-being. Social welfare depends directly and solely upon the levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of individuals. Thus if men take a certain pleasure in discriminating against one another, in subjecting others to a lesser liberty as a means of enhancing their self-respect, then the satisfaction of these desires must be weighed in our deliberations according to their intensity, or whatever, along with other desires. If society decides to deny them fulfillment, or to suppress them, it is because they tend to be socially destructive and a greater welfare can be achieved in other ways.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 26)

Rawls, arguing for utilitarianism’s inadequacy for preventing possible harms that might occur in the name of promoting the overall satisfaction, reveals a major shortcoming that utilitarians fail to perceive. Utilitarianism is unable to guarantee rights for everyone due to its extreme emphasis on aggregate satisfaction which prioritizes ‘good’ over ‘right’. Following these critiques, Rawls describes major characteristics of his own theory, which he formulates in response to utilitarianism.

“We can express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good [...] This priority of the right over the good in justice as fairness turns out to be a central feature of the conception.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 27)

As a result, Rawls intends to overcome major flaws that a merely utilitarian justice theory would have: on the one hand by adopting contractarian ‘original position’ as opposed to utilitarian ‘impartial spectator’ which ignores diversity of systems of desires,

on the other hand by recognizing the priority of ‘right’ over ‘good’⁵ in order to avoid limitations of individuals’ freedom under the pretext of attaining overall satisfaction.

Even though Rawls recognizes a limited impact of intuitionism⁶ in his own theory of justice⁷, he underlines that purely intuitionist theories “consist of a plurality of first principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in particular types of cases; and second, they include no explicit method, no priority rules, for weighing these principles against one another: we are simply to strike a balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 30) Therefore, without any consideration for justifying origins and methods of a justice theory, intuitionism falls short of a satisfactory endeavor towards providing a substantive theoretical framework. More an intellectual inquiry makes use of intuitions, less it pertains to the understanding of the third party, hence it falls into obscurity.

Rawls, distancing himself from two traditions of thought, namely utilitarianism and intuitionism, seeks to build an open and rational theory of justice which recognizes the priority of rights. Precepts of Rawlsian justice theory are acquired through a meditation on the hypothetical initial choice situation called ‘original position’⁸, in other words they are the expected outcome of a deliberation on justice among individuals leaving all self-knowledge behind the ‘veil of ignorance’, and the definitive formulations of these principles are as follows:

⁵ Rawls elaborates the differences between a right-based and a good-based justice theory thoroughly in the following sections of ‘A Theory of Justice’. (p. 393 – 396) This distinction will be covered in the empirical analysis of our case.

⁶ “No doubt any conception of justice will have to rely on intuition to some degree. [...] In justice as fairness the role of intuition is limited in several ways.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 36)

⁷ Some philosophers emphasize that A Theory of Justice is more intuitionistic than Rawls assumes. “I also argue, in the second part of the essay, that Rawls’ theory, in one of its most important parts, is itself intuitionistic, for it provides no method for weighing distinct principles of justice, and the ‘natural duties’ they impose, in certain contexts of conflict in ‘nonideal world’” (Feinberg, 1989, p. 108) However, these critiques are beyond the scope of this review, which seeks to cover only major axes of contemporary social justice literature.

⁸ Major characteristics and theoretical background of ‘original position’ have already been presented earlier in this chapter.

“FIRST PRINCIPLE

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

SECOND PRINCIPLE

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

- (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
- (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 266)

Rawls, by these principles, on the one hand intends to establish a scheme of social structure where every individual is entitled to equal rights with everyone; on the other hand supports sustainable and tolerable inequality which is to the benefit of the least advantaged members of the society. The most remarkable point about the way in which these principles are presented is a clear and hierarchical distinction between the first and second principle. The former has a priority over the latter and this ranking has been justified on the basis of liberal assumption about the primacy of rights.

Second principle of justice aims at betterment of the worst-off. This objective is a direct outcome of the deliberation held behind the veil of ignorance. According to Rawls, people who have no idea about their present and future belongings and circumstances which they may fall into, tend to be risk averse, because it is possible for everyone to be in the position of the worst-off. As a result, they are expected to go for a social deal which maximizes what the least advantaged gets. This choice rule based on the assumption of risk aversion is called ‘maximin rule’. (Rawls, 1999, pp. 132-133) According to Rawls, fair distribution gives the maximum possible to the least advantaged regardless its relative value to what better-off gets. In that sense, ‘unequal distribution of wealth’ becomes a crucial component of socioeconomic aspect of justice as fairness.⁹ However, Rawls’ favorable approach to socioeconomic inequalities is not unsupported. ‘Just savings principle’ which is closely linked to ‘difference principle’ has a crucial role in the justification of ‘difference’.

⁹ Difference principle which opposes strict egalitarianism has received many harsh criticisms, especially from left-leaning theoreticians. Although these criticisms are beyond the scope of the present literature review, it is important to note that criticisms are not limited to those. For instance, Crocker criticizes Rawlsian maximin rule for not considering solidarity dispositions, which might provoke a more egalitarian sense of justice than ‘justice as fairness’ does. (Crocker, 1977)

Rawls underlines that participants of original position do not have a snapshot view for justice, in other words they do not merely focus on the distribution at a particular moment. Social cooperation and interaction among individuals are dynamic, so an elaborate justice theory is expected to take ‘intergenerational differences’ into account as well. Fair distribution of wealth should be maintained for all generations, and that is possible by a social pre-commitment which sets the rules for just savings. (Rawls, 1999, pp. 253-255) In that sense, ‘just savings principle’ provides a structure for a fair course of wealth accumulation. Through a well-established and institutionalized accumulation process, socioeconomic differences are justified but their negative effects are kept under control.

Having presented the key concepts and arguments which constitute the backbone of ‘justice as fairness’, it is now possible to outline the way in which Rawlsian justice theory describes the operationalization of distribution. According to Rawls a fair scheme of distribution necessitates the implementation of suitable political and legal institutions. (Rawls, 1999, p. 243) His emphasis on the importance of institutions carries Rawlsian theory of justice beyond the limits of its idealistic framework. More precisely, leaving purely hypothetical setting which gave birth to the principles of justice, Rawls begins to provide even some basic concerns about the governmental structure which would be responsible for the just distribution. He defines four major functions that a government should perform. These functions are performed by four branches of government¹⁰, namely allocation, stabilization, transfer and distribution. The first one focuses on keeping “the price system workably competitive and to prevent the formation of unreasonable market power.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 244), The second one “strives to bring about reasonably full employment in the sense that those who want work can find it and the free choice of occupation and the deployment of finance are supported by strong effective demand.” (Rawls, 1999, p. 244) In that sense these two branches together control the fairness and efficiency of the market economy, therefore they keep the exchange process intact, and in case no other mechanism of redistribution is implemented, people get what they could get in these economic interactions. Hence, it is up to remaining two branches to maintain the fairness of the distribution.

¹⁰ Rawls underlines that these branches do not overlap with the usual organization of governments.

‘Transfer branch’ determines and guarantees the social minimum, as market does not take needs into account. After attributing different weights to basic needs, this branch provides for these basic needs. However, the function which this branch performs requires resources to be used for its purpose. The major task of ‘distributive’ branch is to secure for the transfer branch. In other words it yields funding for social justice. Distributive branch provides funding by means of taxation. Rawls takes taxation as the fundamental tool for his socioeconomic justice and he defines two different roles for distributive branch. On the one hand, in line with what we said so far about providing funding for social needs, “it raises revenues that justice requires” (Rawls, 1999, p. 246), on the other hand “it imposes a number of inheritance and gift taxes, and sets restrictions on the rights of bequest” (Rawls, 1999, p. 245). While the former is closely linked with the second principle of justice obviously, the latter should be read together with the first principle of justice because taxation is intended to maintain the equal distribution of rights.

To sum up, Rawls’ theory of justice is a milestone which brought the question of distributive justice in mainstream liberal literature. In terms of theoretical assumptions, it is clearly in line with liberalism, because ‘justice as fairness’ is built on the primacy of rights and individuality. Besides, the need for socioeconomic justice, although its consequences such as taxation receives harsh criticisms from other liberal thinkers and especially from libertarians, stems from the general assumptions of liberalism such as rationality and risk aversion as well.

2.1.2 Nozick’s Libertarian Critique Against Redistributive Justice

Nozick’s *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (Nozick, 1974) had a serious impact both in political theory literature and in global politics. (Harvey, 2005). In fact, Nozick does not intend to build a justice theory and his major purpose is to argue for a particular state theory, namely for a minimal state, clearly presented right at the beginning of his book.

"Our main conclusions about the state are that a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that the minimal state is inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implications are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some

citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.” (Nozick, 1974, p. ix)

Obviously, Nozick is against distributive justice views, as ‘getting some citizens to aid others’ is well beyond the functions of the minimal state which he argues for. In other words, a scheme of distributive justice is clearly not compatible with his understanding of state. Although *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* is not a book of justice; Nozick on the one hand responds to Rawlsian distributive justice, on the other hand explicates the way in which a justice concern can be accommodated within his state theory.

Nozick’s major criticisms towards ‘justice as fairness’ can be grouped under three headings: first its assumptions, second its focal point, and third its propositions. According to Nozick, ‘distributive justice’ theories are not neutral at all and they are built on some false perceptions of the reality. He claims that there is no central distribution that can be observed, interpreted or rectified.

“[I]t is an open question, at least, whether redistribution should take place; whether we should do again what has already been done once, though poorly. However, we are not in the position of children who have been given portions of pie by someone who now makes last minute adjustments to rectify careless cutting. There is no *central* distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out.” (Nozick, 1974, p. 149)

Therefore, any attempt for distributive justice is a manipulative intervention to free society. Nozick underlines that this false assumption is related to another one. Distributive justice claims stem from the idea of social cooperation. Nozick admits that there exists a social cooperation but the outcome of that cooperation, namely benefits generated by social cooperation, is not indivisible at all.

“[E]ach person works singly to transform some input he receives, contracting with others who further transform or transport his product until it reaches its ultimate consumer. People cooperate in making things but they work separately; each person is miniature firm. The products of each person are easily identifiable, and exchanges are made in open markets with prices set competitively, given informational constraints, and so forth. In such a system of social cooperation, what is the task of a theory of justice? [T]herefore the task of a theory of justice is to set criteria for ‘fair prices’.” (Nozick, 1974, p. 186)

As a result, distributive justice theories misread the market, which is mere aggregation of exchanges between individuals indeed. Justice in the market, having no central distribution scheme, can only be obtained by laying ground rules for fair pricing.

Nozick claims that incorrect assumptions of ‘justice as fairness’, go in line with a wrong way of thinking about justice. Distributive justice theories in general, by focusing merely on the outcome of economic interactions among individuals, fail to follow how the outcome they consider to be unjust occurs. Every distributive justice view is interested to see who takes how much in a society, and in particular Rawls is attracted to provide the highest share for the worst-off. In that sense, distributive justice theories lean on ‘end-result principles’ and according to Nozick they tend to ignore the processes themselves which the end-results do actually stem from. In Nozick’s view, a plausible theory of justice should focus on the processes, and such theories are to be built on ‘historical principles’. These principles do not seek justice with reference to income differences or welfare distribution among individuals, because they “hold that past circumstances or actions can create differential entitlements or differential deserts to things.” (Nozick, 1974, p. 155) According to Nozick, apart from ‘end-result principles’, distributive justice theories fall into another trap, which he calls ‘patterning’. Patterned theories of justice define a specific criterion –or a complex system of multiple criteria- for distribution and all distribution in the society is expected to be performed accordingly. Nozick underlines that distribution patterns may vary from ‘intelligence’ to ‘usefulness to society’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 156); however efficient application of these patterns brings a serious question about the individual liberty. Even we take for granted that a distribution pattern was embraced by all individuals at a given time, in other words each and every member of the society gave his/her consent on the very same system of distribution; maintenance of that distribution would require ‘continuous interference with people’s life’. (Nozick, 1974, p. 163) Nozick tries to support his claim by using two different examples, in the first one he takes a sports celebrity, Wilt Chamberlain, who is agreed to be paid 25 cents for each ticket sold throughout season. In case one million spectators attend home games in one year, Chamberlain receives 250.000 dollars. Obviously this is a high income which no distributive system can support, however individuals who go to see the game “chose to give 25 cents of their money to Chamberlain”. (Nozick, 1974, p. 161) In that sense personal liberty to spend one’s money as one wishes and maintenance of the distributive pattern do not go together. The second example Nozick gives which is about socialist societies. Socialist societies, in order to protect their distributive patterns are bound “to forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults.” (Nozick, 1974, p. 163) Having

elucidated the reasons why patterned distributive justice structures would contradict with individual rights, Nozick attempts to avoid all criticisms which would assert that individuals might have consented to refrain from actions that risk impairing the pattern. For Nozick such a presumption is not realistic at all, as it is even absurd to think about a society where all individuals would want to maintain the distributive pattern more than anything else. Besides, not everyone can have the required information about what kind of actions can upset the pattern.

When talking particularly about propositions of Rawls' justice theory, Nozick's arguments focus on two major kinds of shortcomings, first those which are related to unrealistic interpretations of social life, second those which intervene to individual liberties. For instance, according to Nozick, 'difference principle' which is the backbone of Rawlsian socioeconomic distribution is totally unrealistic. He underlines that individuals who constitute a social unity, do not accept to devote their resources to maximizing the position of the least well-off and the opposite is unthinkable even for families.

“... [I]ts (difference principle's) inappropriateness as a governing principle even within a family of individuals who love one another. Should a family devote its resources to maximizing the position of its least well off and least talented child, holding back the other children or using resources for their education and development only if they will follow a policy through their life-times of maximizing the position of their least fortunate sibling? Surely no. How then can this even be considered as the appropriate policy for enforcement in the wider policy?” (Nozick, 1974, p. 167)

Besides, taxation which is considered to be a legitimate tool for supplying funds to redistributive system is against individual liberties, especially taxation of earnings from labor, for Nozick, is on a par with forced labor. (Nozick, 1974, p. 168)

As presented so far, Nozick is against all sort of distributive justice view, Rawlsian 'justice as fairness' included. On the other hand, he proposes a minimal justice view which complies with his 'minimal state theory'. According to him, justice is about the way in which exchanges take place among free individuals (Nozick, 1974, p. 150), and it is so simple to check if justice is intact. He calls his theory as "theory of justice in holdings" and it is built on three principles which are formulated rather intuitively. First is about the ways in which things that were not previously possessed by anyone can be acquired, second is about the legitimate transfer of possessions among different parties,

and the last one is about the necessity to rectify injustices that occur due to violation of the terms laid down by the first two principles. Then Nozick adds, “if each person's holdings are just, then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just.” (Nozick, 1974, p. 150) However, a detailed explanation of these principles and criticisms towards them will not be presented in our present study. The key point here is the reduction of justice issue to inter-individual actions, hence to micro level. In post-Rawlsian era, Nozick’s view had a significant impact on the champions of libertarianism, who intend to minimize macro-level interventions for the sake of individual freedoms.

2.1.3 Communitarian Critiques of Liberal Justice

Political theory literature encompasses many different views pointing out the shortcomings of the liberal theory, which is assumed to represent the mentality of world order, or even provide rational justifications for it. From 1980s onwards, these criticisms had a change in character. Amy Gutmann describes the change that anti-liberal critiques underwent as follows:

“Whereas the earlier critics were inspired by Marx, the recent critics are inspired by Aristotle and Hegel. The Aristotelian idea that justice is rooted in "a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that community" explicitly informs Alasdair MacIntyre in his criticism of John Rawls and Robert Nozick for their neglect of desert; I and Charles Taylor in his attack on "atomistic" liberals who "try to defend ... the priority of the individual and his rights over society.” (Gutmann, 1985, p. 308)

Regarding the change presented above, this section has a twin-foci: on the one hand a compact review of communitarian critiques against liberal justice theories; on the other hand a brief presentation of an alternative distributive justice theory which is well aware of the major communitarian critiques directed to preceding liberal distributive justice theories. The former will be built on the writings of MacIntyre and Sandel, two protagonists of communitarian camp in liberal-communitarian camp; while the latter will denote the key points of Walzer’s idea of ‘complex equality’.

2.1.3.1 Alasdair MacIntyre

MacIntyre’s critique of liberal justice theories can be presented in two sections: first one is about what these theories neglect, and second one is about what they fall

short of realizing despite their objectives. According to MacIntyre, both Rawls' and Nozick's theories represent and reproduce two views which we can hear from opponents of a fiscal debate in our daily lives. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 249) In that sense these theories reflect the mentality of two different citizens having two different justice views in line with their life plans. The first one, who is expected to go for Nozick's justice theory is described as follows:

“A, who may own a store or be a police officer or a construction worker, has struggled to save enough from his earnings to buy a small house, to send his children to the local college, to pay for some special type of medical care for his parents. He now finds all of his projects threatened by raising taxes. He regards this threat to his projects as *unjust*, he claims to have a right to what he has earned and that nobody else has a right to take away what he acquired legitimately and to which he has a just title.” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 244)

The second one, B, whom Nozick considers to be defender of Rawls' 'justice as fairness' is probably a social worker or someone with inherited wealth and he is assumed to be struck by the inequalities in the distribution of wealth, income and opportunity. Besides, he is particularly worried about the poor, who is unable to take actions to overcome the hardships that they face due to this unjust distribution. As a result,

“He believes more generally that all inequality stands in need of justification and that the only possible justification for inequality is to improve the condition of the poor and the deprived – by, for example, fostering economic growth. He draws the conclusion that in present circumstances redistributive taxation which will finance welfare and the social services is what justice demands.” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 245)

According to MacIntyre, present pluralist cultures are devoid of any rational criterion for deciding between these two claims. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 246) What Rawls and Nozick do is merely reproducing these incompatible views of justice through some internally consistent theories and therefore they fail to provide a legitimate justification for what they propose to be preferred over any other view. Their common failure is the fact that they refuse to make any reference to desert¹¹ in their account of justice.

¹¹ “Nonetheless there is something important, if negative, which Rawls's account shares with Nozick's. Neither of them make any reference to *desert* in their account of justice, nor could they consistently do so. [...] What A complains of on his own behalf is not merely that he is entitled to what he has earned, but that he *deserves* it in virtue of his life of hard work, what B complains of on behalf of the poor and deprived is that their poverty and deprivation is *undeserved* and therefore unwarranted.” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 249)

However, MacIntyre underlines that A and B's justice claims do actually stem from specific understandings of desert and no theory can bridge the gap between such claims of justice which diverge substantially, in case it does not take into account the moral foundations which they originate from. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 249)

MacIntyre emphasizes that common assumptions and premises of both Nozick's and Rawls' theories are related to a particular conception of 'society'. In both accounts, society is considered merely as the aggregation of individuals. Despite some differences about the way in which the attributes of 'individual' affect the outcome of their theories –the basis for Nozick is a set of basic rights, while it is prudent rationality for Rawls– individual's role in the making of both Nozick's and Rawls' theory of justice is clearly prioritized over the impact of society.

“Individuals are thus in both accounts primary and society secondary, and the identification of individual interests is prior to, and independent of, the construction of any moral or social bonds between them. But we have already seen that the notion desert is at home only in the context of a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for man and of the good of that community and where individuals identify their primary interests with reference to goods.” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 250)

MacIntyre states that individualism which is at the heart of liberal theories such as Nozick's and Rawls' theories of justice is carried out by an established tradition of thought, which dates back to Hobbes', Locke's and Machiavelli's writings. This tradition is built on the refusal of 'community' and it is not only an intellectual but also a quite practical choice. Despite his strong criticisms to Marxism, MacIntyre agrees with Marx who argues that modern societies are built on conflict. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 253) According to MacIntyre, rejection of 'community' in modern liberal theories and their contemporary successors has been an attempt to control the conflict between communities and their moral traditions. Liberal modern state, in line with these theories, is built on the idea of conflict and it adopts the function of appeasement, to reduce conflict. For instance, institutions like Supreme Court were implemented to sustain peace within the society, which may fall apart due to incompatible principles arising from disparate moral traditions.

MacIntyre, in his magnum opus *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, carries his critical analysis of liberalism one step further and asserts that although liberalism aims

at reducing social tension by replacing the value loaded traditions with its value neutral understanding of society, it turns itself into a tradition as well. (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 346) However the details of this critique will be elaborated in the last chapter, as they will provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the social justice claims in women's civil society in Turkey.

2.1.3.2 Michael Sandel

Sandel's criticisms to 'justice as fairness' are in line with those of MacIntyre, and they can be read in his general analysis of liberalism. Although he believes that a serious critique of liberalism is necessary, he underlines that it is a vision that we all live by despite its philosophical failure. (Sandel, 1984a) In that sense, his critique on liberal justice theories is built on both accounts; on the one hand their theoretical drawbacks, on the other hand their compatibility with the present political system which leads to a paradoxical perception about daily politics.¹²

According to Sandel, Rawlsian theory of justice takes the question of justice out of emotional ties which are assumed to bind the individuals in a society and places it at the heart of Kantian deontological ethic. He argues that this is -at first sight- a 'liberating project' which proposes a 'disenchanted world' devoid of inherent meanings which could possibly have decisive impact on the moral judgments of men. (Sandel, 1984b, p. 168) In that universe, man is left free of any moral premises and he is expected to produce his moral principles by his own practical reason. In other words he is to determine the rules of social justice only by his own constitutive powers. As Sandel clearly puts, "the notion of a universe empty of intrinsic meaning does not, on the deontological view, imply a world wholly ungoverned by regulative principles, but rather a moral universe inhabited by subjects capable of constituting meaning on their own." (Sandel, 1984b, p. 169) However, he argues that deontological self is not simply

¹² "On the one hand, increasing number of citizens view the state as an overly intrusive presence, more likely to frustrate their purposes than advance them. And yet, despite its unprecedented role in the economy and society, the modern state seems itself disempowered, unable effectively to control the domestic economy, to respond to persisting social ills, or to work America's will in the world." (Sandel, 1984a, p. 92)

liberated, but also disempowered to the point that it is no more able to construct or choose its moral premises.

“What goes behind the veil of ignorance is not a contract or an agreement but if anything a kind of discovery; and what goes on in ‘purely preferential choice’ is less a choosing of ends than a matching of pre-existing desires, undifferentiated as to worth, with the best available means of satisfying them. For the parties of original position, as for the parties to ordinary deliberative rationality, the liberating moment fades before it arrives; the sovereign subject is left at sea in the circumstances it was thought to command.” (Sandel, 1984b, pp. 170-171)

Deontological self, as described above, according to Sandel is left in a state of helplessness, which stems from a conception of self, devoid of constitutive attachments such as being members of a family or community or nation or people, bearers of a history, sons and daughters of a revolution, and citizens of a republic. “To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth.” (Sandel, 1984b, p. 172)

Sandel elucidates the crisis of deontological self, under the concept of ‘unencumbered self’ as well. He denotes that individuals are considered to be members of community in the cooperative sense, which is more or less taken as a membership in a voluntary association. (Sandel, 1984a, p. 86) In that context, constitutive aspect of community is totally ignored for the sake of deontological liberation which seeks the complete control of rational individual during his choice-based decision of justice, prioritizing rights over any kind of good dictated by community itself. Sandel takes it as an exhilarating but improbable promise. (Sandel, 1984a, p. 87) Then he once again goes back to Rawls’ theory of justice. Sandel claims that difference principle which justifies the unequal distribution of wealth and income on the one hand, and asks for the maximum possible for the worst-off on the other hand, cannot be supported by a merely cooperative conception of community where unencumbered individuals hang together without any sense of identity. This problem which Rawlsian liberal justice faces leads to a dilemma, because;

“What the difference principle requires, but cannot provide, is some way of identifying those among whom the assets I bear are properly regarded as common, some way of seeing ourselves as mutually indebted and morally engaged to begin with. But as we have seen, the constitutive alms and attachments that would save and situate the difference principle are precisely the ones denied to the liberal self; the moral encumbrances and antecedent

obligations they imply would undercut the priority of right.” (Sandel, 1984a, p. 90)

For Sandel, the liberal vision is not morally self-sufficient but parasitic on a notion of community, namely its constitutive aspect, which it officially rejects. (Sandel, 1984a, p. 91)

Sandel wants to go one step further and claims that a similar problem can be observed in the practical extension of liberal vision as well. At that point Sandel analyzes American politics, which he considers to be the operationalization of liberal vision. He underlines that the project of ‘national republic’, which united liberalism with the national idea, has failed and this failure can be traced back to the mid-twentieth century. Therefore, American public philosophy has shifted from the quest for common purposes at nation level, to a scheme of fair procedures; from a politics of good to a politics of right; in general to a ‘procedural republic’. (Sandel, 1984a, p. 93) Now American politics, Sandel argues, should be perceived as a vast machine run by judiciary and bureaucracy which focuses on the protection of rights of the citizens, whose choices are prioritized but cannot be reflected in political arena, due to the ineffectiveness of legislatures and political parties. In other words, institutions and mechanisms, which are responsible for the maintenance of individual rights, do not leave enough room for the exercise of political will generating from the bearers of these cherished rights.

“As bearers of rights, where rights are trumps, we think of ourselves as freely choosing, individual selves, unbound by obligations antecedent to rights, or to the agreements we make. And yet, as citizens of the procedural republic that secures these rights, we find ourselves implicated willy-nilly in a formidable array of dependencies and expectations we did not choose and increasingly reject.” (Sandel, 1984a, p. 94)

In that sense, Sandel claims that politics retreats from its major role which is the quest for good in common, (Sandel, 1984b, p. 176) due to disempowerment of citizens in procedural democracy, which can be read in line with the one which we observe in the main assumptions of liberal theory, fully adopted by Rawlsian theory of justice.

2.1.3.3 Michael Walzer: Reconsidering distribution with respect to communitarian criticisms

Walzer's theory of justice bridges the gap between distributive justice concerns and communitarian critiques against them. In other words, Walzer's "Spheres of Justice" is an attempt to converge the legitimate claims of both liberal and communitarian camp on question of distributive justice. Regarding our present effort, it is necessary to reveal how 'community' finds place in Walzer's account of justice; and to present the major propositions of his distributive justice which is built on an equal concern for 'equality' and 'plurality'.

Walzer's theory of justice, which is to be called as 'spherical justice' from now on, takes communitarian critiques of liberalism although Walzer himself considers himself as a liberal theoretician. (Walzer, 1990) Therefore, claiming a liberal standpoint he wants to analyze communitarian arguments in order to foster a liberal response which is aware of the legitimate concerns that lead to these criticisms. To this end he builds the backbone of his analysis on two major arguments which seem to contradict with each other despite some plausible observations that they stem from. The first one emphasizes that liberalism due to its conception of society –aggregation of rational rights bearers having no common tradition or perception of good life- leads to a fragmentation, creating "an artificial and ahistorical union out of a multitude of isolated selves" in practice (Walzer, 1990, p. 9) The second one argues that society is not what liberal theory assumes at all, and it provides us with a false representation of reality.

"Liberal theory distorts this reality and, insofar as we adopt the theory, deprives us of any ready access to our own experience of communal embeddedness.[...] The assumption here is that we are in fact persons and that we are in fact bound together." (Walzer, 1990, p. 10)

In order to elucidate these arguments, the question that Walzer directs to communitarians can be summarized as follows: Does liberalism succeed in representing the nature of social connections which he argues for, or does it misrepresent the way in which persons attain social connections among themselves in reality? According to Walzer, answering both questions in the affirmative would be inconsistent. However

Walzer argues that both criticisms are partially right and in case they are treated correctly they can extend the horizon of liberal vision. This is what he calls 'communitarian correction of liberalism'.

“Liberalism is a self-subverting doctrine; for that reason, it really does require periodic communitarian correction. But it is not a particularly helpful form of correction to suggest that liberalism is literally incoherent or that it can be replaced by some preliberal or antiliberal community waiting somehow just beneath the surface or just beyond the horizon. Nothing is waiting; American communitarians have to recognize that there is no one out there but separated, rights-bearing, voluntarily associating, freely speaking, liberal selves. It would be a good thing, though, if we could teach those selves to know themselves as social beings, the historical products of, and in part the embodiments of, liberal values. For the communitarian correction of liberalism cannot be anything other than a selective reinforcement of those same values or, to appropriate the well-known phrase of Michael Oakeshott, a pursuit of the intimations of community within them.” (Walzer, 1990, p. 15)

As a result, Walzer aims to embrace legitimate claims for the notion of 'community' in a liberal context. How does then Walzer accommodate 'community' in liberal societies? There, he refers to Rawls' account of 'social union'. “At its best, the liberal society is the social union of social unions that John Rawls described: a pluralism of groups bonded by shared ideas of toleration and democracy.” (Walzer, 1990, p. 16) The idea of social unions, uniting individuals in a much stronger sense than the liberal society does, in terms of loyalties and common conceptions of 'good', has a crucial importance for Walzer's spherical justice. Because Walzer succeeds in bridging the gap between liberalism and communitarianism by revitalizing 'communal embeddedness' in a liberal context by referring to Rawlsian 'social union'.

According to Walzer, preceding distributive justice theories were built on some hypothetical scenarios in which people were taken as ideally rational men and they were forced to choose universal precepts of social justice. Nevertheless, this method, Walzer argues, is quite problematic, and it is not because this hypothetical deliberation which seeks a common charter of justice is inconceivable to ordinary people. What people are really interested is to find out what would individuals like them choose, who are situated as they are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing. (Walzer, 1983, p. 5) In that sense Walzer, underlines that 'justice' is a human construction and it is not only conceived and applied differently from one social context to another, but also goods, values attributed to them, and mechanisms of distribution are various. As

Walzer's perspective assumes a wide array of goods that differ from 'land' to 'a beautiful sunset', he reckons plurality of distribution mechanisms and criteria of distribution as well. Given the circumstances of distribution, a realistic quest for justice should not be blind to plurality as a fact of social life. Thus, Walzer adopts pluralism as an intrinsic component of 'spherical justice'.

Although goods are distributed, with respect to their significance in different social groups, and in accordance with rules anticipated by different mechanisms and criteria of distribution, that plurality has been violated systematically throughout history. (Walzer, 1983, p. 10) Violation occurs in two levels: on the one hand in goods to be distributed, on the other hand in agents of distribution. According to Walzer, if a good becomes convertible to many others, and if a group of individuals seizes the control of the distribution of this convertible good, that is to be perceived as a threat to plurality of agents of distribution. Under these circumstances, convertible good is a 'dominant good', and the group which seized control of dominant good is a monopoly. Walzer, referring to Marx, stresses that distribution is what social conflict is all about; and a just society can be maintained if and only if these violations of plurality are avoided. (Walzer, 1983, p. 11)

'Spherical justice' proposes 'complex equality'¹³ as the surest way for the protection of plurality. (Walzer, 1983, p. 17) In that perspective, it is important to avoid dominance and keep plurality of good intact by reinforcing distinct spheres of justice where every good is distributed according to rules laid by particular social unions. History has been the scene of many attempts of monopoly and several groups managed to seize the control of fundamental distribution mechanisms illegitimately, albeit temporarily. For instance, in feudal era 'land' became the dominant good, hence landlords tried to perpetuate the dominance of 'land' in order to maintain their unjust power over other groups. Ideologies, which provide justification for the perseverance of particular patterns of unjust distribution, are the most important tools which monopolies having the control of dominant good use over those who cannot intervene to the process

¹³ Concept of complex equality is proposed by Walzer, in response to 'simple equality', which seeks equal distribution of goods among individuals, by avoiding monopolies. Walzer argues that in case 'dominance' is not impeded, any good is susceptible to become a dominant good, and any group is prone to acquire monopoly through imposition of some good as 'the dominant good'.

of distribution. In other words, ideologies are legitimizers of dominance, which Walzer considers to be the source of distributive injustices.

Walzer's fundamental thesis for distributive justice does not require the equal distribution of social goods within their respective spheres, but these spheres of distribution should be kept autonomous, so that the inequality that exists within each should not be allowed to translate itself into inequalities within the others. For instance, if we take academia as a sphere of distribution having its own rules of distribution, and its own criteria for distribution –such as desert or merit- its internal dynamics require non-intervention of another sphere, such as market built on free exchange.

To conclude, what we see in Walzer's 'spherical justice' is a community-sensitive distributive justice account. As presented previously 'community-sensitiveness' of this theory is not the result of a solitary meditation performed by Walzer, the impact of communitarian criticisms against preceding liberal justice theories is decisive. Moreover, this impact is not limited to that. The following section, where the propositions about politics of recognition are presented, will show another contribution of the 'community debate' to mainstream justice literature.

2.2. Embracing 'Recognition' in Mainstream Justice Literature

History of man is history of injustices; therefore it has also been a scene for various claims of justice. Different communities, uniting individuals sharing the same identities, were subject to perpetuated injustices bolstered by various practices of humiliation, exclusion or simply indifference either planned and executed by political authority, or justified and carried out by some other individuals who do not belong to these communities. However it is important to note that not all these injustices can be perceived or avoided by merely focusing on socioeconomic inequalities. In that sense, the burden of stigmatized identities has been critically evaluated in different disciplines such as philosophy, literature and psychoanalysis. As the scope of the present study requires us to focus on a particular literature, namely contemporary political theory on social justice, we will try to present the way in which 'identity' and 'recognition' is

initiated to the mainstream social justice literature. Given that purpose, forthcoming section is built on major ideas presented by Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka who brought the concerns for ‘recognition’ to social justice debate.

2.2.1 Politics of Recognition: Bringing ‘identity’ to mainstream political theory

Charles Taylor is one of the most influential thinkers who try to give a satisfactory meaning to identity question, with his analyses which do not only focus on the social dimension of the issue, but also consider intimate dimension of the identity or in other words of “self”. Taylor's magnum opus is ‘Sources of the Self’ where he presents evolution and formation of modern identity through major changes, which occurred -mostly- due to the impact of some great minds of Western civilization. According to Taylor, modern individual has acquired an independence from moral strains that tied people to the moral obligations of the medieval or antique society. Three sources of the modern self, namely inwardness, affirmation of ordinary life and voice of nature,¹⁴ point out on the one hand the collapse of the ancient system of transcendence, on the other hand the emergence of individual identity. (Taylor, 1989)

That great change, which Western societies underwent, had a significant outcome which made modern preoccupation with identity and recognition inevitable and that can be explained in two levels. First, social hierarchies of ancient regime, defining people’s status in society on the basis of honor, collapses; which means that ready-made identities which people born into have no intrinsic value anymore. The system of honor is replaced by the notion of ‘dignity’ which envisages equal recognition of human beings regardless of any hierarchical order. (Taylor, 1992, p. 26) Second, in line with the emergence of universal dignity, ‘individualized identity’ becomes an

¹⁴ ‘Inwardness’ refers to an introspection for finding out the meaning of life. Montaigne's and Descartes' works which underline the individuality are taken as the most significant examples for the emergence of the idea of inwardness. ‘Affirmation of ordinary life’ is about a significant shift within the society and it is closely related to the Christian Reformation, that emphasized the importance of profane dimensions of human life, such as work and marriage. Personal life, which was conceived as a fringe issue, became one of the most important concerns of modern individuals. ‘Voice of nature’ is discovery of an internal voice that guides the acts of individuals. Individual's expressions and acts now have a value in themselves regardless of their contact with transcendence.

important asset. Individualized identity pushes modern individual to a quest for authenticity, to be understood as a search for an inner voice, which is expected to define and determine what the identity of each individual is to be. (Taylor, 1992, p. 31) Although this process seems to be a mere introspection, a solitary journey, which does not require any contact with the outside, more precisely ‘others’, Taylor underlines that identity itself has a dialogical character which does not leave the others outside at all. (Taylor, 1992, p. 32) He defends this idea of dialogue by considering even the most extreme cases: “In the case of the hermit, interlocutor is God.” (Taylor, 1992, p. 34) Then he concludes:

“Thus my discovering my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others. That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new importance to recognition. My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.” (Taylor, 1992, p. 34)

As indicated above, ‘recognition’ is a question of great importance in the modern era of individualized identities, because individualized identities do not enjoy the recognition a priori. They have to win it through exchange, and they can fail. (Taylor, 1991, p. 48) However, on the social plane¹⁵, equal recognition is not only appropriate for a healthy democratic society, but necessary.

“Its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it, according to a widespread modern view [...] The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, and to the extent the image is internalized. Not only contemporary feminism but also race relations and discussions of multiculturalism are undergirded by the premise that the withholding can be a form of oppression.” (Taylor, 1992, p. 36)

Charles Taylor, elaborates further on the content and the scope of recognition claims. Social aspect of ‘recognition’ is built on a ‘principle of fairness’, in order to respond equally to demands for everyone to develop their own identity. In that sense, claims regarding gender, race, culture and sexual orientation can all be evaluated on the basis of universal recognition of difference. (Taylor, 1991, p. 50) Moreover, not only claims but also administrative practices responding to such claims are subject to theoretical

¹⁵ According to Charles Taylor, recognition takes place in two levels, on the one hand in ‘intimate level’ which is characterized by interpersonal relations, more specifically love relations; on the other hand in ‘social level’ which gives recognition a social and political dimension.

debate. Especially administrative practices which show that these claims go beyond the writings of the critical or feminist writers trigger a lively debate in mainstream political theory as well. In order to analyze the ideas in opposition to the wave of recognition, Charles Taylor utilizes some real life examples such as the legislation for the survival of the French-speaking community in Quebec¹⁶, and the debates on multicultural curricula¹⁷.

According to Taylor, administrative measures taken by government of Quebec are not compatible at all with the assumptions of the liberal theory, which strictly prioritizes individual rights. In order to provide substantial evidence showing how mainstream liberalism –which he calls ‘difference-blind’ liberalism later on- would oppose to the decisions of government of Quebec, Taylor refers to Dworkin:

“Dworkin claims that a liberal society is one that as a society adopts no particular substantive view about the ends of life. [...] A liberal society must remain neutral, on the good life, and restrict itself to ensuring that however they see things, citizens deal with each other and the state deals equally with all. [...] But a society with collective goals like Quebec’s violates this model. It is axiomatic for Quebec governments that the survival and flourishing of French culture in Quebec is a good. [...] Policies aimed at survival actively seek to *create* members of the community, for instance, in their assuring that future generations continue to identify as French-speakers.” (Taylor, 1992, pp. 56-59)

Taylor’s arguments against this neutralist liberalism can be gathered under three headings. First, a society with strong collective goals can be liberal in case it respects diversity, allowing those who do not share the common goals adequate safeguards for

¹⁶ “For instance, Quebec has passed a number of laws in the field of language. One regulates who can send their children to English-language schools (not francophones or immigrants); another requires that businesses with more than fifty employees be run in French; a third outlaws commercial signage in any language other than French. In other words, restrictions have been placed on Quebecers by their government, in the name of their collective goal of survival, which in other Canadian communities might easily disallowed by the virtue of the Charter. [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]” (Taylor, 1992, pp. 52-53)

¹⁷ “The main locus of this debate is the world of education in a broad sense. One important focus is university humanities departments, where demands are made to alter, enlarge, or scrap the “canon” of accredited authors on the grounds the one presently favored consists almost entirely of “dead white males.” A greater place ought to be made for women, and for people of non-European races and cultures. A second focus is the secondary schools, where an attempt is being made, for instance, to develop Afrocentric curricula for pupils in mainly black schools.” (Taylor, 1992, p. 65)

the enjoyment of basic rights. Even though pursuit of these objectives together, may cause tension, it is not impossible at all. (Taylor, 1992, p. 59) Second, neutrality of ‘difference-blind’ liberalism can be contested on the one hand due to its limited capacity to accommodate diverse cultures, on the other hand its historical origins that are directly linked to Christian social heritage.¹⁸ Third, shortcomings of the purely procedural justice which liberalism finds sufficient for overcoming injustices require us to take supplementary measures. As the last argument about procedural justice is firmly related to our present inquiry, it is better to put an emphasis on it.

Taylor underlines that procedural justice is overrated by liberal theory, in order to build the whole liberal social system on the basis of rights, and to preclude the notion of common good. From a liberal perspective, existence of a common good itself is considered as a threat to equal recognition of individualized identities.

“Indeed, it might even be argued that any political society based on some strong notion of the common good will of itself by this very fact endorse the lives of some people (those who support its notion of the common good) over others (those who seek other forms of good), and thereby deny equal recognition. Something like this, we saw, is the fundamental premiss of a liberalism of neutrality, which has many supporters today.” (Taylor, 1991, p. 51)

However, what liberalism proposes by limiting its account of recognition within procedural justice fails to support the ‘equality’ aspect of ‘equal recognition’. Liberalism, even it gives up its insistence on difference-blindness, cannot fully provide necessary conditions for recognition. Neutrality of liberalism can only ‘accommodate’ or ‘tolerate’ differences. Therewith Taylor argues that uniting differences requires some properties which are of value, such as a horizon of significance shared by everyone.

¹⁸ “For mainstream Islam, there is no question of separating politics and religion the way we have come to expect in Western liberal society. Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges. Moreover, as many Muslims are well aware, Western liberalism is not so much an expression of the postreligious outlook that happens to be popular among liberal intellectuals as a more organic outgrowth of Christianity – at least as seen from the alternative vantage point of Islam. The division of church and state goes back to the earliest days of Christian civilization. The early forms of the separation were very different from ours, but the basis was laid for modern developments. The very term *secular* was originally part of the Christian vocabulary.” (Taylor, 1992, p. 62)

Apart from difference-blind liberalism or liberalism of neutrality, Charles Taylor tries to defend his proposition of 'equal recognition' from the 'enemies of multiculturalism'. (Taylor, 1992, p. 71) The major question of the enemies of multiculturalism is the scope of equal recognition, more precisely, the limits of 'equal recognition' with respect to a yardstick according to which the cultures to be embraced are evaluated. This question becomes more concrete in terms of academic standards, while facing the debate on curricular changes in order to embrace cultural diversity and to overcome existing Eurocentrism. Taylor concludes that the only plausible solution is presumption of equal worth, because there can be no concrete measures independent of the standards of any culture. He emphasizes that this presumption can be morally justified, without need for any complementary reasoning.

Charles Taylor's account on politics of recognition stems from a very rich philosophical analysis on modern identity. Taking recognition as a crucial need due to dialogical character of the identity, but not for the sake of 'community' itself, he adds a new dimension to intellectual debate between liberals and communitarians. According to Taylor merely procedural justice account of difference-blind liberalism, falls short of providing enough room for plausible recognition claims. In that sense, he argues that multiculturalism, which guarantees equal worth for every identity and community, and basic individual liberties provide a good alternative to Western liberal societies.

2.2.2. Will Kymlicka: An inquiry into the liberal justification for recognition

Kymlicka's theoretical account for the question of group rights is related to his discomfort about the divergence between communitarians and liberals. While the latter respond to claims about collective rights, indifferently or even hostilely, the former direct their criticisms to liberalism in general which, according to Kymlicka, can accommodate legitimate claims for recognition. In that sense, Kymlicka tries to stay within the liberal paradigm, by taking communitarian considerations for group rights into account. Therefore, on the one hand he seeks to attain a 'rightly-understood' liberalism; on the other hand he reformulates claims about group rights so as to be compatible with liberal perspective.

The groups which Kymlicka deal with the most are cultural groups, in the context of cultural diversity. He divides these groups into two, first those which arise from the incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures united in a larger society - which he calls 'national minorities', second those which arise from individual and familial immigration, which he calls 'ethnic groups'. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 11) He clearly distinguishes these groups from 'new social movements', such as associations on movements of gays, women, the poor, the disabled, which are often marginalized by national societies or ethnic groups.¹⁹

Given his aim to articulate claims for recognition in liberal paradigm, Kymlicka considers political aspect of the issue in terms of rights. As a result, he classifies group differentiated rights under three headings: self-government rights, polyethnic rights²⁰, and special representations rights. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 31) Although claims of cultural groups can be accepted in a liberal society through their reformulation in the context of rights as indicated above, liberals mostly tend to ignore claims for group rights, as they think that individual rights provided by liberal societies, such as freedom to associate with others, suffice to overcome injustices related to group identity and leave enough room for the survival of cultural groups.²¹ Besides, they claim that any state intervention

¹⁹ Although he focuses on the rights of the 'cultural groups' in general, he is not blind to the demands of 'new social movements' in order to guarantee the freedom that they ask for and which is necessary for his liberal account of group rights. His concerns about 'new social movements' are related to the concept of 'internal restrictions' which is an indispensable component of his theory in order to accommodate group rights in a liberal setting.

²⁰ Kymlicka pays a particular attention to 'polyethnic rights' as he thinks that these rights are those which can be defended for majority of cultural groups without facing significant challenge from the champions of contemporary liberalism, because these rights usually intend to promote integration of cultural groups in liberal society. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 31)

²¹ "Many liberals believe that people's interest in cultural membership is adequately protected by the common rights of citizenship, and that any further measures to protect this interest are illegitimate. They argue that a system of universal individual rights accommodates cultural differences, by allowing each person the freedom to associate with others in the pursuit of shared religious or ethnic practices. Freedom of association enables people from different backgrounds to pursue their distinctive ways of life without interference. Every individual is free to create, or join various associations, and to seek new adherents from them, in the 'cultural marketplace'. Every way of life is free to attract adherents, and if same ways of life are unable to

to ‘cultural marketplace’ is illegitimate and it contradicts with the tenets of liberalism which do not give state any right to intervene to citizens’ cultural preferences or their views of good life. However Kymlicka argues that this view is not only mistaken but actually incoherent, because;

“Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethnic and national groups. The state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others.” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 108)

Besides, after claiming that individual autonomy and self identity are tied to membership in one’s societal culture, Kymlicka underlines the necessity for developing a theory of the rights of minority cultures as a task of any liberal theory. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 128) Then, how come liberals prefer to ignore claims of cultural groups? Kymlicka gives quite a number of explanations about this neglect. Nevertheless, it would suffice to mention the most critical ones under two headings.

First, Kymlicka relates the liberal insularity towards group rights to a “recent illiberal deviation from long-established liberal practices”. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 50) According to Kymlicka, this deviation can be traced back to the World War II. Before the World War I and during the interwar period, minority rights topped the liberal agenda, but the “optimistic liberal view did not survive World War II” because of the security deficit that they provoke or might provoke in the future. (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 213) This deviation seems to be perpetuated since then and “when contemporary liberals have addressed these issues –often in brief pronouncements or parentheticals asides – they have tended to recite simplistic formulas about ‘non-discrimination’ or ‘benign neglect’ that cannot do justice to the complexities involved.” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 49)

Second, criticisms against liberalism fostered a false image for liberalism, which depicted it as an inevitably difference-blind theory. Especially, communitarian criticisms

maintain or gain the voluntary adherence of people that may be unfortunate, but it is not unfair. On this view, giving political recognition or support to particular cultural practices or associations is unnecessary and unfair. It is unnecessary, because a valuable way of life will have no difficulty attracting adherents. And it is unfair, because it subsidizes some people’s choices at the expense of others.” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 107)

of liberalism take the liberal tradition as the inheritor of a 'hollow' understanding of self, which does not pay attention to the role of community and culture which indeed have a decisive role in the formation of individuals' identity. Kymlicka in order to argue against this critique, which he considers illegitimate, refers to Rawlsian justice theory. Rawls, with his emphasis on plurality of 'good life' opens up a horizon which does not only tolerate but also encourage different ways of acquiring it. (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 34) Although Rawls' theory of justice does not really entail to minority rights immediately, Kymlicka does not consider Rawls' position as an intentional indifference. 'Misplaced criticisms' about the liberal account of neutrality fail to distinguish or obfuscate the hypothetical and normative aspects of liberal theories. Kymlicka once again refers to Rawls, and he tries to interpret Rawls' "original position" -which is a hypothetical condition of discussion and bargaining to find out basic principles of justice among individuals who leave all their intentions, identities, knowledge about their socioeconomic status...etc- and points out the instrumental character of this concept. Kymlicka argues that Rawls' need for leaving all self-knowledge aside, behind the veil of ignorance, proves that what is hidden behind does actually matter in determining one's preferences and position on social issues. Liberal theories which seem to be mingling with impossible idealistic designs, do not actually trivialize individuals' identities and cultures. On the contrary, they are well aware of their importance.

Apart from these reasons which indicate that liberalism –theoretically- can accommodate considerations for special group rights, Kymlicka emphasizes that a liberal minority rights approach provides liberal theory with two possible advantage against challenging paradigms: on the one hand, liberalism will prove that it is capable of producing a theoretical linkage between 'individual' and 'community', on the other hand it will avoid the risk of losing out in case of a trade-off between liberalism and minority rights. (Kymlicka, 1989)

Kymlicka evaluates collective aspect of minority rights with respect to problem of justice. An individual's cultural membership is an arbitrary fact of birth. For instance, being an Inuit in Canada defines the circumstances into which a person is born, and if that person faces a set of socioeconomic inconveniences due to his cultural membership, which is often the case, liberalism should intervene to overcome these inconveniences through affirmative action programs. (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 182) Thus, in order to

minimize the injustice that occurs due to being a member of a disadvantaged cultural group in the society, collective minority rights can be granted to the communities that are oppressed by the severe inequality.

Kymlicka underlines that culture and wealth are not commensurable. (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 193) Therefore an efficient intervention against severe inequality does not require a trade-off between culture and welfare. Collective cultural rights can be perceived as a kind of insurance to avoid culture-related injustices. In case of threat, minority communities can be authorized to impose limited restrictions on the individuals who are not members. For example, indigenous groups in Canada can impose restrictions on the free property right of ‘outsiders’ in their own territory, in order to protect their traditional system of territory management which is officially recognized by the state of Canada, because this system is regarded as a legitimate mechanism enabling these groups against injustices which they suffer. However, these special rights, as given in the example, trigger a crucial question which requires an answer to determine their compatibility with liberalism. To what extent special group rights can override individual rights, which are indispensable to liberal theory?

Kymlicka classifies special group rights with respect to duties they generate: those which bind the individuals within the group impose ‘internal restrictions’, those which seek the protection of cultural groups from the impact of external decisions of the larger society require ‘external protection’. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 35) According to Kymlicka, the former interest the liberal perspective the most, because they arouse concerns about the members of group whose role can be reduced to reluctant obedience by the impositions of group. At that point Kymlicka underlines that special group rights cannot be accommodated in a liberal theory unconditionally.

“I have argued that they must respect two constraints: minority rights should not allow one group to dominate other groups; and they should not enable a group to oppress its own members. In other words, liberals should seek to ensure that there is equality *between* groups, and freedom and equality *within* groups. Within these limits, minority rights can play a valuable role within a broader theory of liberal justice.” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 194)

Kymlicka argues that his account on difference sensitive liberal justice does not only broaden the perspective of liberal theory, by embracing the justice claims of cultural groups, but also provides a large array of rights recognizing the individual freedoms for

all citizens in addition to cultural rights. According to Kymlicka a non-liberal account of multiculturalism, assuming that cultural communities are monolithic, such as the ‘millet system’ in Ottoman Empire, will fail to grasp the contemporary questions of justice. However in case a multicultural theory does not care about individual freedoms, it leaves individuals disadvantaged in intra-group controversies. Hence it is indispensable to guarantee the liberty rights of individuals within the groups which tend to marginalize²² those who do not adopt the ‘good life’ accepted by the majority of the members.

2.3. Social Justice Reunited:

Overcoming gender-blindness and dichotomy of redistribution and recognition

In the preceding sections, I tried to present the development of mainstream social justice literature in two different dimensions, namely socioeconomic and symbolic or non-material justice. However, in order to evaluate this literature on women’s claims for justice, it is necessary to be aware of its limits and weaknesses in terms of gender question. Besides, the conceptual gap between socioeconomic and symbolic justice approaches which marked two decades of political theory, requires a reunification to be able to respond to gender-related injustices which occur both on socioeconomic and cultural planes. In that sense, first, I will briefly present feminist critiques on the inadequacy of social justice debate between liberals and communitarians regarding women’s oppression and I will continue with an overview of ‘socialist-feminist’ literature, which considers socioeconomic and symbolic injustices of equal importance. Then, I will present Nancy Fraser’s gender-sensitive attempt for bridging the gap between redistributive and symbolic justice claims, staying within the limits of mainstream literature. Finally, I will conclude with a crucial question which contemporary social justice literature leaves us with: the tension between conflicting

²² Kymlicka’s liberal account of cultural recognition, with an emphasis on internal restrictions, tries to protect the claims of ‘new social movements’, which struggle for freedom of the individuals who suffer injustices in their cultural groups due to their different preferences or life choices.

claims of symbolic justice, which mostly leads to a deadlock or a trade-off between cultural group rights and remedies against gender injustices.

2.3.1. A Feminist Response to Mainstream Social Justice Debate

As indicated above, feminist response to contemporary social justice debate can be presented under two headings, on the one hand critiques of mainstream justice literature; on the other hand genuine contributions from feminist perspective. It is important to note that there is no unique perspective that can be treated as *the voice* of feminism on social justice, and feminist literature actually offers a vast array of perspectives. (Tong, 1989) In that sense, the review of genuine contributions will be a quite selective one, and I will merely focus on ‘socialist feminism’ due to the purpose of this study. Socialist feminism, intends to hold both symbolic and socioeconomic aspects of gender injustice, thus it is well beyond the dichotomy of redistribution and recognition which divides the mainstream social justice literature into two camps.

2.3.1.1. Social justice literature: an influential but gender-blind tradition

According to Susan Moller Okin, major theories of social justice do not take the gender injustice into account, as they fail to discover the gendered character of the society, which can be followed into the patterns of familial relations. (Okin, 1989, p. 8) Okin underlines that this neglect occurs due to the fact that most theories assume the traditional gender structured family, without discussing it. Leaving family beyond the scope of justice theories is the direct outcome of social thought tradition which is built on the distinction between private and public. Although Okin criticizes the convention on private-public distinction as the major cause of gender-blind social justice theories, she emphasizes that one of the reasons for the neglect of gender was the fact that feminist energy in the 1980, to a great extent, argued that ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ were masculinist ways of thinking about the morality. (Okin, 1989, p. 15) Given these evaluations about the literature in general, Okin analyzes the major contributions in social justice and points out the severe problems that they face as well.

Okin starts with Rawls' theory of justice and argues that it –quite superficially– assumes that families are just, and they are 'private institutions', to which it is not appropriate to apply standards of justice. (Okin, 1989) However, Okin states that gender injustice takes place in family. Women are considered to be the only responsible for unpaid house works and child rearing, and this responsibility is justified with conventional gendered morality, which Rawls does not discover or question. Moreover, neglect of familial injustice impairs the whole theory. For instance, participants of 'original position' are considered to be 'stakeholders' in income distribution, which is never the case in reality, due to gendered division of labor, which excludes women from the process of social distribution. (Okin, 1987, p. 50)

As previously shown in the communitarian critiques of liberal justice theories, Rawls has been severely criticized due to his idealistic approach which ignores the importance of social contexts, community, and moral significance. Therefore, communitarians formulate their theories of justice in response to liberalism, by interpreting traditions and values which are rooted in communities. Okin emphasizes that rediscovery of 'context' in social justice literature has interested many feminist theorists and attracted them to communitarian analysis, which later on turned into an alliance against masculinist abstraction of liberalism. (Okin, 1989, p. 43) However, for Okin, this alliance is merely built on a methodological affinity and political implications of a communitarian theory of justice that would not be to the advantage of women. (Okin, 1989, p. 44) Because, the traditions and myths which communitarians refer to are 'basic building blocks of male domination'. (Okin, 1989, p. 46) For instance;

“Indeed as I shall show, the tradition that, according to MacIntyre, provides us with the best account of justice and rationality compounds the misogyny and sexism of the traditions in Western culture that have been most hostile to the full humanity of women.” (Okin, 1989, p. 46)

Just one year after Okin's analysis of mainstream social justice literature, Iris Marion Young builds an elaborate theory of justice, which stems from the shortcomings of contemporary theories of justice. According to Young, social justice literature is dominated by the distributive paradigm, which tends to focus on the possession of material goods and social positions. However, this account of justice is quite problematic. On the one hand it often assumes particular institutions and practices as given, so accepts them as unavoidable and immutable. On the other hand, it extends the

distributive paradigm and intends to deal with non-material goods, such as self-respect, power, and honor in the way they do with material goods.²³ As a result, theories of distribution fail to provide a satisfactory account of justice. Nevertheless, communitarian theories of justice built on the critics of the liberalism and welfare bureaucracy often associated with redistributive justice paradigm, do not succeed in avoiding the failures of distributive paradigm. That perspective, which stems from the ideal of community as an alternative vision of social life, argues for the need of mutual recognition and identification which can only be fulfilled by a public life with shared values. However, Young, in line with Kymlicka's reserves on the community-based justifications of identity politics, emphasizes that the ideal of community also suppresses difference among subjects and groups, because "the impulse to community often coincides with a desire to preserve identity and in practice excludes others who threaten that sense of identity." (Young, 1990 , pp. 12-13)

Given these criticisms, Young underlines that a full account of justice is possible neither in distributive paradigm, nor in communitarian perspective. Moreover, she builds an original theory of justice that seeks the elimination of institutionalized domination and oppression, by paying equal attention to the claims of socioeconomic and injustices relating to identity. (Young, 1990 , p. 15) However, she moves beyond the horizon of mainstream social justice theories, and associates herself with critical social theory.²⁴

²³ "But this, in my view, is the main problem with the distributive paradigm: it does not recognize the limits to the application of a logic of distribution[...] Applying a logic of distribution to such goods produces a misleading conception of the issues of justice involved. It reifies aspects of social life that are better understood as a function of rules and relations than as things." (Young, 1990 , pp. 24-25)

²⁴ Briefly, a group is oppressed when one or more of the following conditions occurs to all or a large portion of its members: (1) the benefits of their work or energy go to others without those others reciprocally benefiting them (exploitation); (2) they are excluded from participation in major social activities , which in our society means primarily a workplace (marginalization); (3) they live and work under the authority of others, and have little work autonomy and authority over others themselves (powerlessness); (4) as a group they are stereotyped at the same that their experience and situation is invisible in the society in general, and they have little opportunity and little audience for the expression of their experience and perspective on social events (cultural imperialism); (5) group members suffer random violence and harassment motivated by group hatred or fear." (Young, 1997, p. 262)

Okin and Young's critiques against contemporary social justice literature overlap in terms of their point on its failure to provide a sustainable basis for a gender-sensitive theory of justice. Redistributive and communitarian justice paradigms, due to their theoretical divergence in general, and insensitivity towards the question of gender in particular fall short of realizing their initial purpose. As a result, an account of social justice, necessitates re-elaboration of mainstream justice literature. Nancy Fraser's quest for bridging the gap between redistribution and recognition, which I will present towards the end of this chapter stems from this necessity pointed out by Okin and Young.

2.3.1.2. Socialist feminism: gender division of labor and patriarchy

Socialist feminism has mostly been accused of ambivalence by the champions of class struggle and feminists who ignore the impact of socioeconomic injustice in gender question.²⁵ However, according to socialist feminists, this 'ambivalence' is not about the character of their perspective, but about the social reality itself; because women's oppression stems from the combination of patriarchy and capitalism. (Hartmann, 1979, p. 165) In that sense combination of Marxist analysis and feminist analysis is considered to be inevitable.

“While Marxist analysis provides essential insight into the laws of historical development, and those of capital in particular, the categories of Marxism sex-blind. Only a specifically feminist analysis reveals the systemic character of relations between men and women.” (Hartmann, 1979, pp. 165-166)

Although it is possible to talk about a consensus among socialist feminist theoreticians on the necessity of analyzing both socioeconomic and cultural aspects of women's oppression, the ways in which they evaluate two dimensions of gender oppression differ

²⁵ “It is possible to add up Marxism and feminism and call the sum "socialist feminism." In fact, this is probably how most socialist feminists most of the time--as a kind of hybrid, pushing our feminism in socialist circles, our socialism in feminist circles. One trouble with leaving things like that, though, is that it keeps people wondering "Well, what is she really?" or demanding of us "What is the principal contradiction." These kinds of questions, which sound so compelling and authoritative, often stop us in our tracks: "Make a choice!" "Be one or another!" But we know that there is a political consistency to socialist feminist. We are not hybrids or fencesitters.” (Ehrenreich, 1976)

drastically. While Juliette Mitchell underlines ideological character of patriarchy referring to psychoanalysis, Heidi Hartmann opposes to Mitchell's attempt to take the question of patriarchy beyond the scope of Marxist materialism, which she thinks causes inconsistency.²⁶ Hence, Hartmann insists on the necessity for the study of both patriarchy and capitalism with respect to social dynamics.

“We can usefully define patriarchy as a set of social relations between men, which have a material base, and which, though hierarchical, establish or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to dominate women.” (Hartmann, 1979, p. 175)

In that perspective, social aspect of patriarchy can be observed in two practices, first exclusion of women from ‘essential productive resources’, such as jobs that pay living wages, second restrictions of women’s sexuality. (Hartmann, 1979, p. 176) Even though Hartmann intends to keep the conceptual distinction between capitalism and patriarchy, she emphasizes that their partnership can be read in particular social practices, such as sexual division of labor, which is to the profit of male supremacy and capitalist economic sphere. For instance, both capitalism and patriarchy support the survival of the family, where women are primarily responsible for housework, and are dependent on family as an unavoidable income-pooling unit. In that sense, although capitalism and patriarchy require an analytical distinction, they are intertwined in the perpetuation of gendered injustice.

To sum up, socialist feminism claiming that women’s oppression has a multidimensional character regarding socioeconomic and social injustices, can be seen as the forerunner of Nancy Fraser’s point about the need for bridging the divide in social justice theory. However, it is important to note that Fraser’s account is not limited to the question of gender.

2.3.2. Bridging the ‘Redistribution’ – ‘Recognition’ Gap

Nancy Fraser’s proposition about equal consideration for redistribution and recognition is built on two interrelated purposes; first, reuniting the contemporary

²⁶ “Although Mitchell discusses their interpretation, her failure to give patriarchy a material base in the relation between women’s and men’s labor power, and her similar failure to note the material aspects of the process of personality formation and gender creation, limits the usefulness of her analysis.” (Hartmann, 1979, p. 173)

justice literature separately built on the socioeconomic and symbolic aspects of the issue, second, providing a better and fuller representation of social phenomena in political thought. Therefore, Fraser's account on social justice on the one hand is tied to post-Rawlsian justice literature which I summarized in the previous sections; on the other hand connects this theoretical schism to the reality, in terms of justice perspectives present in contemporary societies.

2.3.2.1. Dealing with the theoretical incompatibility

Fraser points out that theories of redistribution and recognition stem from two different orders of normativity. (Fraser, 2001) While the former can be traced back to Kantian morality, the latter usually refer to Hegelian ethics.²⁷ Redistributive theories, seeking a more just allocation of resources, tend to promote equality; on the other hand recognition theories, aiming a world where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price of equal respect, intend to justify social differences. In that sense, redistributive theories observe status-related injustices and try to avoid inequalities generating from socioeconomic distribution; and recognition theories focus on identities or good life choices of different groups, and try to maintain the diversity. Given the incompatibility of these paradigms with respect to their philosophical heritage and focal points, Fraser intends to integrate socioeconomic and symbolic accounts of justice without succumbing to schizophrenia.

According to Fraser, recognition theories usually take recognition as a question of self-realization.

“This is the view of both Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, the two most prominent contemporary theorists of recognition. For both Taylor and Honneth, being recognized by another subject is a necessary condition for attaining full, undistorted subjectivity. Thus, both these theorists construe misrecognition in terms of impaired subjectivity and damaged self-identity. And both understand the injury in ethical terms, as stunting the subject's capacity for achieving a

²⁷ “I began by noting that, as philosophical categories, redistribution and recognition have widely divergent provenances. As we saw, distribution comes from the Anglo-American liberal tradition and is often associated with Kantian *Moralität*. Recognition, in contrast, comes from the phenomenological tradition and is usually associated with Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*. It is not surprising, therefore, that the two categories are often held to be conceptually incompatible.” (Fraser, 2003, p. 28)

"good life." For Taylor and Honneth, therefore, recognition concerns self-realization." (Fraser, 2003, p. 28)

In that sense, Fraser underlines that 'recognition', in case it is interpreted merely as an issue of self-realization, does not fit in justice literature. Moreover, identity based recognition theories, taking group identity as the object of recognition, risk the weakening of trans-group interaction and denying in-group heterogeneity. As a result, these theories may well justify repressive forms of communitarianism.²⁸ Fraser's solution is to treat recognition as an issue of social status. (Fraser, 2003, p. 29) Therefore, she intends to carry 'recognition' away to a purely justice-centered context. In other words, Fraser's 'status model of recognition', translates the question of recognition from the language of ethics to the language of morality.

2.3.2.2. Traces of theoretical dichotomy in society

According to Fraser, dichotomy of redistribution and recognition is not only theoretical and it can be read in social analyses as well. Redistribution and recognition, as 'folk paradigms', are often associated with specific social movements. While the former is considered in line with class politics, the latter is considered within the limits of identity politics, such as struggles over gender, sexuality, nationality, ethnicity, and race. Fraser summarizes that division on four essential points: first, redistribution claims focus on the injustices on the socio-economic plane and trace the roots of them in the economic structure of the society, whilst recognition claims deal with injustices on the cultural plane and seek the origins of these injustices in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication. Second, they are both in the quest of justice only in the dimension where they assume that the injustice takes place, in other words redistribution claims intend to find a remedy²⁹ in economic structure and recognition claims search the remedy in cultural patterns of society. Third, groups that these paradigms consider as the victims of injustices differ in terms of their conceptual

²⁸ It is important to note that Kymlicka's liberal account of recognition, which I presented previously, is well aware of that risk, and that is the reason why Kymlicka evaluates group rights under the umbrella of liberalism.

²⁹ Fraser analyzes the remedies of each paradigm thoroughly, and makes a distinction between affirmative and transformative remedies. I will treat this distinction in the following section.

differences. The redistribution paradigm *often* refers to ‘classes’, and even though some claims are not directly formulated within Marxist terminology, they all converge in taking socioeconomic stratification as the indicator of injustice. On the other hand the recognition paradigm focuses on groups which suffer from lesser respect, esteem and prestige than other groups in the society enjoy. Lastly, they assume different conceptions of group differences. While the champions of socioeconomic justice paradigm intend to eradicate group differences, which they take as the socially constructed outcomes of ill-functioning economy; majority of the defenders of symbolic justice intend to ‘revalue’, therefore reinforce, devalued identities, which means the protection of group difference. (Fraser, 2001, pp. 13-15)

According to Fraser, such a divided interpretation fails to grasp the question of justice fully, although these concerns seem to succeed in evaluating injustice which working class and gays suffer³⁰. She argues that, some groups, especially those which are discriminated on the basis of gender and ‘race’ do face a two-dimensional injustice. Concepts such as ‘pink collar’ which represents ‘womanly work’ with a low income, and ‘feminine’ which signify gender stereotypes are evidences for the injustice which women suffer both in redistribution and recognition paradigms.

“Gender, in sum, is a two-dimensional social differentiation. It combines a class-like dimension, which brings it within the ambit of redistribution, with a status dimension, which brings it simultaneously within the ambit of recognition. It is an open question whether the two dimensions are of equal weight. But, redressing gender injustice, in any case, requires changing both the economic structure and the status order of society.” (Fraser, 2001, p. 21)

As a result, bridging the gap between redistribution and recognition is necessary not only for overcoming the schism in the social justice literature, but also for a better understanding of social phenomena.

³⁰ “Matters are thus fairly straightforward at the two extremes of our conceptual spectrum. When we deal with social groups that approach the ideal type of the exploited working class, we face distributive injustices requiring redistributive remedies. What is needed is a politics of redistribution. When we deal with social groups that approach the ideal type of the despised sexuality, in contrast, we face injustices of misrecognition. What is needed *here* is a politics of recognition.” (Fraser, 2001, p. 19)

2.3.2.3. Fraser's vision of equal consideration: 'Parity of participation'

Nancy Fraser's account of equal consideration for socioeconomic and symbolic injustices produces the concept of 'parity of participation' and it represents the core requirement for a just society. The norm of 'parity of participation'³¹ anticipates "social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers". (Fraser, 2001, p. 36) Fraser argues that this norm requires the satisfaction of two conditions. First one is about socioeconomic injustices, and it necessitates that distribution of material conditions should not hinder individuals' participation to social interaction.³² Second one is directly linked to the status model of recognition which I summarized previously, and it is envisaged that institutionalized patterns of cultural value provide equal respect for every individual and guarantee equal opportunity for acquiring social esteem.³³

Fraser's 'parity of participation' is a response to other theoreticians who face incompatibility of redistribution and recognition paradigms, but who proposed different

³¹ It is important to note that earlier contributions of Fraser, fall short of uniting her concerns for redistribution and recognition theoretically. (Fraser, 1997) In her previous articles, although she underlines that social justice literature fails to provide an account on equal consideration of socioeconomic and symbolic injustices, she maintains redistribution and recognition distinction analytically.

³² "First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' independence and "voice." This I shall call the *objective condition* of participatory parity. It precludes forms and levels of economic dependence and inequality that impede parity of participation. Precluded, therefore, are social arrangements that institutionalize deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth, income, and leisure time, thereby denying some people the means and opportunities to interact with others as peers." (Fraser, 2001, p. 36)

³³ "In contrast, the second condition requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem. This I shall call the *intersubjective condition* of participatory parity. It precludes institutionalized norms that systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities associated with them. Precluded, therefore, are institutionalized value patterns that deny some people the status of full partners in interaction - whether by burdening them with excessive ascribed "difference" or by failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness." (Fraser, 2001, p. 36)

solutions to it. Taking recognition away from the limits of identity politics and relating it to a status-based view of morality is crucially important for gaining grounds against those who are skeptical about ‘recognition claims’³⁴ and those who try to reformulate every quest for justice within the limits of a single paradigm³⁵. First, Fraser shows that recognition claims are as important as redistributions claims and a full account on justice requires the inclusion of question of symbolic injustice as well, because some cases are invisible from a merely redistribution perspective.

“To be sure, many distributive theorists appreciate the importance of status over and above material well-being and seek to accommodate it in their accounts. But the results are not wholly satisfactory. Most such theorists assume a reductive economic-cum-legalistic view of status, supposing that a just distribution of resources and rights is sufficient to preclude misrecognition. In fact, however, as we saw, not all misrecognition is a by-product of maldistribution, nor of maldistribution plus legal discrimination. Witness the case of the African-American Wall Street banker who cannot get a taxi to pick him up. To handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond the distribution of rights and goods to examine institutionalized patterns of cultural value; it must ask whether such patterns impede parity of participation in social life.” (Fraser, 2001, p. 34)

Regarding the example given above, it is obvious that theories which are limited with social justice claims on the socioeconomic plane, cause the neglect of symbolic injustices. Second, attempts at reformulating all claims of justice within cultural paradigm fail to provide grounds for purely socioeconomic injustices.

“Witness the case of the skilled white male industrial worker who becomes unemployed due to a factory closing resulting from a speculative corporate merger. In that case, the injustice of maldistribution has little to do with misrecognition. It is rather a consequence of imperatives intrinsic to an order of specialized economic relations whose *raison d’etre* is the accumulation of

³⁴ “I think that if the left had continued to try to eliminate prejudice by emphasising such commonalities, rather than emphasising cultural differences, it might have been able to effect the same cultural revolution as in fact occurred. I doubt that the term “culture” added much weight or force to efforts to get people to treat previously despised groups as fellow-humans.” (Rorty, 2000, p. 15)

³⁵ “In my view, rules of distribution cannot simply be derived from the relations of production, but are rather to be seen as the institutional expression of a sociocultural dispositive that determines in what esteem particular activities are held at a specific point in time; conflicts over distribution, as long as they are not merely concerned with just the application of institutionalized rules are always symbolic struggles over the legitimacy of the sociocultural dispositive that determines the value of activities, attributes and contributions. In this way, struggles over distribution, contrary to Nancy Fraser’s assumption are themselves locked into a struggle for recognition.” (Honneth, 2001, p. 54)

profits. To handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond cultural value patterns to examine the structure of capitalism.” (Fraser, 2001, p. 35)

After defending the need for a two-dimension justice view, Fraser argues that contemporary dilemma of social justice is not limited to a divergence between theories which prioritize redistribution over recognition, or vice versa, and remedies that claims and theories of justice propose vary as well. She divides remedies of justice into two, namely ‘affirmation’ and ‘transformation’. (Fraser, 1997, p. 23) Affirmative remedies aim at correcting the outcomes of social arrangements, but they preserve the structure where the injustice originates from. On the other hand, transformative remedies deal with the unjust outcomes, by directly restructuring the underlying framework. In that sense, regarding symbolic injustices, affirmative remedies tend to ‘revalue’ unjustly ‘devalued’ group identities, leaving intact the identities and the group differentiations which underlie them; whilst transformative remedies are associated with deconstruction of identities, categorizations and differences which unjust patterns are built on. As for socioeconomic injustices, affirmative remedies require redistribution in favor of disadvantaged groups, but they maintain the differences across socioeconomic strata. Fraser, finds affirmative redistribution remedies problematic, as they emphasize the fact that these disadvantaged groups are in need. Hence, they “can stigmatize the disadvantaged, adding the insult of misrecognition to the injury of deprivation.” (Fraser, 1997, p. 26) As a result, affirmative redistribution remedies, despite the intention of avoiding socioeconomic injustice, generate symbolic injustice. Fraser elucidates how severe outcomes affirmative remedies generate in the context of gender.

“This scenario is problematic. Affirmative redistribution fails to engage the deep level at which the political economy is gendered. Aimed primarily at combating attitudinal discrimination, it does not attack the gendered division of paid and unpaid labor, nor the gendered division of masculine and feminine occupations within paid labor. Leaving intact the deep structures that generate gender disadvantage, it must make surface reallocations again and again. The result is not only to underline gender differentiation. It is also to mark women as deficient and insatiable, as always needing more and more.” (Fraser, 1997, p. 29)

Regarding this additional negative image that would affirmative redistribution give to women, recognition claims formulated in a gender-sensitive language risk rejection. Fraser underlines that these claims are more likely to “have the effect of pouring oil onto the flames of resentment against affirmative action”. (Fraser, 1997, p. 29) In that sense, Fraser underlines that she prefers transformative remedies to affirmative due to

critical problems that would latter cause.

Fraser's endeavor, which I tried to summarize, is built on the awareness of the gap between redistribution and recognition not only in social justice literature, but also in the claims of justice within contemporary societies. Gender, as a two-dimensional social differentiation, requires remedies in both socioeconomic and cultural level. However, given the redistribution-recognition dichotomy, different social actors and activists can formulate their claims only in redistribution paradigm or recognition paradigm.

2.3.3. Multiplicity of Differences: Claims of Gender Equality vs. Claims of Culture

It is important to underline that plurality of differences shaping women's claims for justice cannot be reflected on a two-by-two table, which only indicates the socioeconomic and gender aspects of the injustice. Culture, which communitarian ethics associate with 'identity' or 'good life', has a significant impact both in literature and society. Even from a feminist perspective, the role of culture matters, as it defines the context in which the gender injustice occurs.³⁶ Moreover, in reality some women activists support or join movements struggling for full recognition of cultural rights, even if the latter would seem to limit the freedom which they enjoy as 'individuals' in a liberal society. In that sense, the trade-off between cultural rights and individual freedom is at the heart of gendered social justice literature. Cultural rights of Muslim immigrants in liberal Western societies are one of the most debated cases and two of the theoreticians whose contributions to the social justice literature were presented above, namely Okin and Fraser, attempted to interpret Islamic scarf controversy in France.

2.3.3.1. Okin's liberal account on cultural group rights

Before presenting Okin's point on cultural group rights, it is important to underline that she finds gender as the most crucial factor on the injustice which women

³⁶ "The wife of a Carrington ("Dynasty") does not experience patriarchy in the same way as an Edith Bunker ("All in the Family") or a Claire Huxtable ("The Bill Cosby Show")." (Tong, 1989, p. 182)

face:

“Some feminists have been criticized for theories of gender that do not take sufficient account of difference among women, especially race, class, religion and ethnicity. While such critiques should always inform our research and improve our arguments, it would be a mistake to allow them to detract our attention from gender itself as a factor of significance.” (Okin, 1989, p. 6)

Besides, Okin is overtly skeptical about the ‘cultural group rights’ which she considers to be threatening the freedom which women can have in a liberal society.

“Most cultures are suffused with practices and ideologies concerning gender. Suppose, then, that a culture endorses and facilitates the control of men over women in various ways (even if informally, in the private sphere of domestic life). Suppose, too, that there are fairly clear disparities of power between the sexes, such that the more powerful, male members are those who are generally in a position to determine and articulate the group's beliefs, practices, and interests. Under such conditions, group rights are potentially, and in many cases actually, antifeminist. They substantially limit the capacities of women and girls of that culture to live with human dignity equal to that of men and boys, and to live as freely chosen lives as they can.” (Okin, 1997)

According to Okin, even defenders of group rights with quite liberal motives fail to take into account how recognition of cultural group rights would impair individual freedoms of women. Because, they tend to treat cultural groups as monoliths, and hence they fail to perceive that these groups are gendered as well and women are mostly oppressed or dominated by men within cultural community. Besides, even theoreticians such as Kymlicka, who intend to protect individuals at risk, facing pressure within the community, do not pay attention to private sphere, where woman sexuality is kept under control. Although Okin admits that women are dominated by men even in liberal Western societies, she emphasizes that they are legally guaranteed many of the same freedoms and opportunities as men. As a result, Okin opposes to cultural group rights for the sake of the preservation of individual rights.

2.3.3.2. ‘Parity of participation’ and cultural rights

‘Parity of participation’, as presented earlier in this chapter, is Fraser’s key criterion for evaluating legitimacy of cultural rights. Regarding the Islamic scarf controversy, which stems from the prohibition of Islamic scarf in French public schools, Fraser provides two justifications for the lift of the ban. (Fraser, 2001, p. 16) First, the ban on the scarf can be interpreted as an unjust majority communitarianism, which

denies educational parity to Muslim girls; second, an alternative application permitting headscarf would not exacerbate subordination in Muslim communities or in French society in general. At that point, Fraser proposes French state to treat Islamic scarf as ‘a symbol of Muslim identity in transition’. In that sense, permitting headscarf can be perceived as a catalyst for the integration of Muslim immigrants to French society, by maximizing the opportunities for education.

In this chapter, I tried to present a general overview of a vast literature on social justice which marked the last four decades of political theory. Although I attempted to cover major contributions of feminist theoreticians in the field as well, I preferred to keep the focus on the mainstream literature. It is necessary to note that this was a pragmatic selection. Because mainstream women’s civil society organizations which are analyzed in the present study, build their claims of justice neither on a strong critique of ‘gender’, nor on a Marxist account of class struggle. Therefore, mainstream social justice literature, especially redistribution-recognition dichotomy and liberalism-communitarianism divide will be key to understand the way in which their positions diverge.

CHAPTER 3

REPUBLICAN AND ISLAMIC WOMEN’S CSOs ON SOCIAL JUSTICE: CLASH OF TWO COMPETING TRADITIONS

As presented in the previous chapter, contemporary social justice literature is shaped by two different paradigms, on the one hand theories of socioeconomic justice, on the other hand theories of symbolic justice. While the former seeks to overcome injustices related to existing welfare and income distribution, the latter copes with unjust evaluations of identities which cause injury to the bearers of these identities. However, as Nancy Fraser puts it frankly, such a theoretical schism fails to grasp the claims of justice completely and in reality, groups which are disadvantaged on the basis of race and gender, due to bilateral character of the injustice which they face are expected to formulate claims both in socioeconomic and symbolic level. The present chapter will be an empirical analysis regarding the double-character of claims of justice in mainstream women’s civil society in Turkey. Regarding the purpose and the characteristics of this study stated in the first chapter, I will focus on two women’s civil society platforms which dominate the mainstream women’s activism in Istanbul, namely *İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği* (İKKB) - Istanbul Union of Women’s Organizations - and *Gökkuşáđı İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu* (GİKAP) - Rainbow Istanbul Women Organizations’ Platform. First, I will briefly present these two platforms in terms of their members, purposes, and major actions. Second, I will focus on the way in which they take the question of social justice regarding redistribution – recognition dichotomy. Finally, I will analyze the divergence between their positions regarding the crucial difference between Kemalist and Islamic traditions which has a significant impact on their present views of social justice.

3.1. İKKB and GİKAP: Two Platforms to Represent Two Separate Communities

İKKB and GİKAP were both founded in 1995, in order to unite women's organizations in Istanbul. It is important to note that foundation of provincial platforms was proposed by a public institution, *Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü* (KSSGM), General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women³⁷ in 1993. According to the law 5253 enacted in 2004, platforms are defined as temporary associations which assemble civil society organizations, charitable foundations and trade unions with common purposes. However they are not legal entities. (Resmi Gazete, 2004) The underlying cause for the foundation of two separate platforms in Istanbul can be traced back to polarization between Kemalist/secular organizations and Islamic organizations, which I will elaborate as a decisive factor about their divergence on the question of social justice.

3.1.1. İKKB : Organizations Gathered Around Secularism, Equality, and Democracy

Constitutive protocol of İKKB, which was signed by first member organizations on February 17, 1995 clearly states that secularism, equality, and democracy are the common principles which unite them. Majority of the member organizations, can be grouped under following headings:

- a. Women's associations founded in the early republican era, such as *Türk Kadınlar Birliği İstanbul ve Adalar Şubeler*, (TKB) Association of Turkish Women's Union (Istanbul and Adalar Branches), *Türk Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneği* (TÜKD) Association of Turkish University Women, and *Kadın Haklarını Koruma Derneği* (KHKD) Association for the Protection of Women's Rights...etc

³⁷ Since March 2004, this institution has been affiliated to the Prime Ministry as *Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü* (KSGM), Directorate General on the Status of Women.

- b. Alumni associations such as *Notre Dame de Sion'lular Derneđi* - Association of Notre Dame de Sion French High School for Girls Alumni, *Fatih Kız Liseliler Derneđi* – Association of Fatih High School for Girls Alumni;
- c. Women's branches of political parties such as *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) Republican People's Party, *Sosyal Demokrat Halk Partisi* (SHP) Social Democratic People's Party, *İşçi Partisi* (İP) Worker's Party.

Although member organizations work and act according to their particular objectives and purposes separately, İKKB coordinates major activities which bring them together. These activities are mostly panels or conferences held on the anniversaries of historical events which they consider to be the major steps towards women's emancipation in Turkey.³⁸ Besides, İKKB serves as a channel for the transmission of joint messages which carry the common reaction of these organizations regarding major developments in politics. In that sense, İKKB's agenda is shaped by daily politics as well.

Given the secular character of mainstream women's movement which can be traced back to 1980s (Sirman, 1989) (Arat Y. , 1991) (İlkkaracan, 1997), İKKB has become a significant stakeholder in republican civil society and has been the member of *Ulusal Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Birliđi* (USTKB)³⁹ National Civil Society Organizations Union since 2006. İKKB has a representative among the consultants of USTKB Executive Board. Apart from these partnerships, İKKB has been actively involved in major political debates in recent years. Çađlayan Rally in 2007 and

³⁸ “For example, ratification of Republican civil law on February 17, which was a great achievement that extended women's rights, our revolutionary law; March 8; two emblematic dates in Turkish secularization February 5 and April 10; signing of Treaty of Lausanne, July 24; Stop Violence against women, third week of November; and the week of October 29 for the proclamation of republic.” (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010)

³⁹ USTKB is the union of republican civil society organizations, whose objective is “the protection and the betterment of Turkish Republic's constitutive properties which define the existential philosophy of Turkish nation, and the formation of a public opinion and public consciousness in line with this purpose.” The motive of the union is stated in USTKB executive plan as “the need for building a civil movement, independent of political parties, in order to enable Turkish Republic with the means of self protection against global and regional threats.” (USTKB, 2006)

conferences against lift of ban on headscarf in 2008 have been the major recent actions of İKKB.

3.1.1.1. Çağlayan rally: Republican women's movement as the catalyst of anti-AKP protest

In spring 2007, presidential elections topped the political agenda in Turkey. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) – Justice and Development Party was in power for four years and despite party's self identification as 'conservative democrat', secular opinion leaders and politicians were questioning the Islamic roots of the party. Key figures of the party, party leader R. Tayyip Erdogan included, had become actively involved in politics in pro-Islamic Welfare Party, which was banned in 1998, in the aftermath of one-year government in coalition ended by a military memorandum emphasizing the constitutive principles and secular character of Turkish Republic. (Morris, 1998) Given the political roots of these actors, and the secular opposition calling for the protection of Kemalist republic against a possible Islamic threat, presidential elections were to be held under pressure which had started even before the nomination of AKP's candidate for presidency. According to secular opposition, lead by CHP, nomination of a candidate with a political Islam past, would impair the secular character of Turkish Republic. Under these circumstances, civil society organizations with Kemalist, republican and social democratic tendencies organized a series of demonstrations in order to force AKP first to nominate a secular candidate, then to call for early elections, which would reflect people's actual choices and which was expected to change the present distribution of seats in the parliament, where AKP had 351 seats of 550 in total. The first rally was held in Ankara on April 14, 2007, before the nomination of Abdullah Gül on April 20, 2007. The second rally, held in İstanbul on April 27, was organized by a civil society initiative, headed by Necla Arat, director of *Kadın Araştırmaları Derneği* – Association of Women's Studies, one of the members of İKKB. (Yetkin, 2009) (NTV, 2007) (Milliyet, 2007) One of the representatives of İKKB refers to Çağlayan Rally as follows:

“Women's movement grew in strength with its response to political incidents and it remade its agenda regarding political developments. I am talking about Republican protests. As you know, Republican rally in Çağlayan was organized

almost entirely by İKKB. As a result, our names are mentioned in indictments. We are accused of having dangerous views which threaten the integrity of Turkey [...] As you know, women's rights are not important at all in countries ruled by religious precepts. Such a change in Turkey obliged us to take these actions.” (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010)

Given the example of Çağlayan rally, İKKB does not refrain from shaping its agenda regarding political debates, and positions itself as a stakeholder in mainstream political debates as well.

3.1.1.2. İKKB and the lift of ban on headscarf in universities

In 2008, another political debate marked İKKB's agenda, lift of ban on headscarf in universities. Ruling AKP, securing the parliamentary majority in the elections held in 2007, and *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (MHP) Nationalist Movement Party agreed upon a package of constitutional amendments, which would pave the way for a regulation allowing the entrance of students wearing headscarf to universities. On February 11, 2008, the amendment was accepted by more than the two-thirds of the members of the parliament, and sent to President Abdullah Gül, whose candidacy for presidency had aggravated the tension between AKP and secular-republicans. (NTV, 2008) İKKB, in line with its reserves and sensitivity for the protection of Kemalist secular order, which united it with other republican political actors and civil organizations, struggled against the lift of the ban. Under these circumstances, İKKB's response can be observed in three dimensions. First, it implemented its own agenda for arguing against the lift of the ban; second, it sought partnership with other republican CSOs; third, it tried to defend its pro-ban position with its partners in international arena.

As previously indicated, March 8, International Women's Day is one of the most important dates of İKKB's agenda. In that sense, İKKB organized three conferences about the question of headscarf.⁴⁰ Besides, it announced its rigorous opposition to the lift of ban in its regular press releases for the anniversary of appropriation of secularism

⁴⁰ *Türban Sarmalında Laik Hukuk ve Laik Eğitim*, “Question of Turban, Secular Law and Secular Education”, held on March 1, 2008; *Türklerde Örtüne*, “Veiling in Turkish society”, held on March 6, 2008; *İslam ve Kadın*, “Islam and Woman”, held on March 8, 2008.

(Moroğlu, N.; İKKB Koodinatörü, 2008a), and for the celebration of the ratification of the first civil law of republican era (Moroğlu, N.; İKKB Koordinatörü, 2008b). In the former, İKKB coordinator argued that the problem was not simply about ‘turban’⁴¹, but it was the politicization of religion in general. Moreover she invited all women, both those who cover-up and those who do not, to stand against the legislation which had to be understood as a step for the realization of a non-secular, ‘moderate’ Islamic regime. In the latter, she claimed that political parties were acting as if the turban was the only problem that women face; and avowed her discomfort about this amendment by reference to religion. She added that the reforms which government argued for seemed to pave the way to ancient regime, which would turn the bond of citizenship to serfdom.

On March 2, İKKB presented a press release with USTKB and *Türkiye Barolar Birliği* (TBB) Union of Bar Associations of Turkey. (Özok, Moroğlu, & Tuskan, 2008) They argued that the major issues which should be topping the agenda of Turkish politics were sustainable growth, welfare and modernism, and the question of turban could only be the part of an artificial agenda. However they underlined that they were sure that Turkish people would not let the reenactment of religious rules, including the lift of ban on headscarf in university.

On August 5, 2008 İKKB, as a member of USTKB, took part in the transmission of a message which aimed to justify the ban on headscarf in university in the eyes of Western intellectuals writing on Turkey.⁴² The backbone of the text was the peculiarity of the Turkish secularism, which stemmed from the special social circumstances. It was emphasized that secularism was a pre-requisite for democracy in Turkey, and once Turkey’s secular foundations were demolished, its democratic structure would soon collapse as well. Moreover it was argued that Islamic fundamentalism was not a home grown reality but it was imported from Middle Eastern countries, which tried to export their version of Islam. In that sense, headscarf issue was manufactured by Islamic movement in Turkey which was described as follows:

“Religious publishing companies started popping up and Islamic publications

⁴¹ ‘Turban’ is a pejorative term widely used by Kemalist/republican actors who intend to underline the political character of veiling, in distinction with ‘örtü’ or ‘başörtüsü’ which refers to traditional headscarf of the elders and peasants.

⁴² The complete text is available online on USTKB’s website. (USTKB, 2008)

multiplied. Mosques began to be built everywhere and soon turned into centers for enforcing Islamic lifestyle. Women were trained in and sent to every household to influence and instruct other women. Koranic courses were organized to brainwash children at an early age and high school and university students were financially and unconditionally supported. Public demonstrations were staged demanding female students to enter university with Islamic attire, including the headscarves. The religious press stressed that women should also cover up all of their body parts. Most of the militant female university students were well paid and insisted to attend classes dressed in chador (a dark traditional garment that covers head to toe.) They were supported by Islamic extremist male school mates and lawyers.”

According to that description, wearing headscarf in public institutions was neither a genuine problem of Turkish society, nor a sincere demand of Turkish women. It was merely an imposition of an Islamic way of living, which had nothing to see with the genuine interpretations of Turkish version of Islam. In that sense, the question of women’s status in Turkey was required to be removed from religious realm completely. As a result, the readers, EU representatives and opinion leaders in the West, were invited to acquire a deeper understanding of secularism, democracy and Islam in Turkey.

The constitutional amendment which envisioned the lift of ban on headscarf in universities, was discussed throughout spring 2008. The debate ended with Supreme Court’s decision to annul the amendment in June 2008. (BBC News, 2008)

As presented above, İKKB has taken part in recent political debates, as the common voice of republican women’s movements in Turkey. Given the sensitivity for the protection of Kemalist secular order, which is accepted to be the common feature of the member organizations, İKKB had close partnerships beyond the women’s movements. However in recent years, the focus of İKKB activities has been shifted from the protection of secularism to the question of violence against women. (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010) Regarding government’s emphasis on struggle against domestic violence, İKKB runs education programs for children and parents, with the partnership of Ministry of National Education.

Moreover, İKKB continues its struggle for the empowerment of women in politics, and calls for the necessity of affirmative action. However, İKKB abstains from cooperation with *Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği* (KA-DER) Association for the

Support and Training of Women Candidates, which is the major civil society organization supporting the nomination of as many women candidates as possible by all political parties. KA-DER has a negative image on representatives of İKKB, due to, on the one hand the politics of neutrality regarding the support KA-DER provides for all women candidates, on the other hand the negative impact of EU fundings, which is considered to degenerate independent character of Turkish civil society.⁴³ As a result, İKKB obviously seeks to cooperate with other CSOs, having a well-defined secular character, and progressivist political orientations, in line with its member political parties.

3.1.2. GİKAP : Consensus on Essential Values, for the Protection of Family and Women

GİKAP members are required to sign an agreement contract which defines the principles of platform and the rules for the operation of the organization. Platform's major objectives are empowerment of women in family, in economic, social and cultural life; proliferation of basic rights in society; supporting member CSO's in order to improve their efficiency and extend the scope of projects and programs run by them. Besides, platform aims at the protection of 'essential values', and their promotion both at domestic and global level. In that sense, participants are expected to share these essential values. However, according to the contract, GİKAP endorses the preservation of original and independent structures and identities of member organizations, and welcomes the diversity.

The number of member organizations is 52, and the majority of the groups can be grouped as follows;

- a. Charitable organizations and foundations: *Birlik Vakfı Kadın Komisyonu* - Women's Commission of Unity Foundation, *Dayanışma Vakfı Kadın*

⁴³ "KA-DER was working quite well at the beginning. I have doubts about the European Union Fundings. I realized that they intend to reveal ethnic and religious differences. I think KA-DER is under the influence of that trend" (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) "For instance, there are those who state that they have equal distance to every political party, KA-DER is such an organization. For example they support AKP candidates as well. Therefore, if they do not share our precommitments –such as secularism- we do not cooperate with them." (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010)

Komisyonu - Women's Commission of Solidarity Foundation, *Hanımlar Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı* (HEKVA) Ladies Education and Culture Foundation, *Şefkat Vakfı* – Compassion Foundation, *Türk Gençlik Vakfı* (TGV) Turkish Youth Foundation...

- b. Professional associations: *Kadın Sağlıkçılar Derneği* (KASAD-D) Woman Health Officials Solidarity Group, *Sinema Televizyon İletişim Mezunları Derneği* (SİTEMDER) Association of Cinema Television and Communication Graduates...
- c. Associations for the protection of family and children: *Aileyi Koruma Derneği* (AKODER) Association for the Protection of the Family, *Başak Grubu*, *Ev Kadınları Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği* (EVKAD) Housewives Culture and Solidarity Association...
- d. Associations on Education, Rights and Culture: *Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği* (AKDER) Women's Rights Association Against Discrimination, *Hazar Eğitim Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği* – Hazar Education Culture and Solidarity Association...

According to the rules indicated in the contract, political parties and their women's branches are not admitted to membership. Representatives of GİKAP emphasize that exclusion of political parties is more than necessary for preserving 'civil society' character of the initiative. (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010) (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSO on Social Justice, 2010) In that sense, GİKAP positions itself as a channel of communication among associations with common values, religious sensitivities; but it abstains from taking a political position due to the heterogeneity of the participants despite Islamic roots which define the common characteristics of GİKAP members.⁴⁴ GİKAP member AKDER's campaign calling for the lift of ban on headscarf, which united many civil society organizations, political parties, and opinion leaders from a wide array of political affiliations is an example which demonstrates diversity within GİKAP.

⁴⁴ This heterogeneity will be elaborated later in the analysis of the ways in which the question of social justice is treated by different women's civil society organizations, however it is important to note that the diversity within Islamic civil society was previously observed by Özdalga and Kadioğlu. (Kadioğlu, 2005) (Özdalga & Persson, 1999). According to Özdalga, this diversity causes a rope-pulling game between community orientation and liberalism within Islamic movement. (Özdalga & Persson, 1999, p. 102)

3.1.2.1. AKDER's campaign for the lift of ban: 'February 28 cannot last a thousand years'

As previously mentioned, in 1997 pro-Islamic Welfare Party left power in the aftermath of a military memorandum on the secular character of Turkish Republic. However, the political, legal and social impacts of the military memorandum, dated February 28, have been discussed for years. Particularly, February 28 process has been considered as a trauma for Islamic civil society organizations and pro-Islamic politics. One of the interviewees comments that February 28 was a shock for Islamic women's movements as well and many activists had to suspend their actions due to political unease and personal worries. (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010) Under these circumstances, Islamic women's movements tried to argue for the unfairness of the measures taken during the process both in local and in international level. AKDER, as one of the major stakeholders of the question of headscarf ban in civil society, publishes many reports and argues that ban had no justification and aggravated the injustice that women in Turkey suffer. (Akbulut, 2008) (Benli, 2008) (Benli, 2010) In one of the reports which is prepared by a civil society initiative which unite 71 NGOs and presented to Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women affiliated to United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, the process of February 28 is presented as a milestone for the ban on headscarf:

“On 13 March 1997 a briefing was given by senior army officials and retired senior colonels of the National Security Council (MGK), to university rectors not to accept students with headscarf to study at the university to protect laicism. Afterwards, students with a headscarf were not allowed to enter their schools' territories including cafes. The rectors who did not apply the ban were removed from their offices or forced to resign. The judges of the administrative court who decided that educational rights cannot be restricted without a law clearly relating to were sent exile. The bans swiftly multiplied following the 28 February military intervention, producing an entirely arbitrary designation of “public space” within which women with headscarf were not allowed to appear. This space supposedly includes all state-allied or state-regulated institutions, and requires that women with headscarf are excluded from all state and private training and education institutions. The ban applies not only to teaching staff or students, but also cleaning staff, and covers all the territory of such institutions. In order to ensure the prohibition is strictly applied, security officials, cabins and turnstiles were placed at the main entrances of the institutions.” (Benli, 2010, p. 8)

In February 2010, AKDER implemented a nationwide campaign, called ‘February 28 cannot last a thousand years’ arguing for the lift of the ban. The message of the campaign had no reference to Islamic precepts, and tried to justify the freedom of headscarf in terms of basic human rights. “We invite everyone who opposes the abuse, seizure of rights, and insults that women can face due to their attire to speak up and to struggle without reservations.” (AKDER, 2010) It was an open call which received a great support, including pop stars, liberal opinion leaders, pro-Kurdish politicians, dancers, scholars on the one hand; Islamic NGOs, a leftist party, an LGBT association and a feminist academy on the other hand.⁴⁵ Although AKDER could get the support of a diverse group, GİKAP abstained from signing the declaration, due to the lack of the unanimous support of all members. The representative of GİKAP explains the situation with reference to the diversity within the platform. She underlines that the religious sensitivities of the member organizations do not cause a monolithic Islamic civil society, both individuals and organizations taking part in GİKAP diverge in terms of their humanitarian, political, and legal concerns. (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010)

As seen in the example of the campaign for the removal of ban on headscarf, GİKAP stays away from becoming a prominent actor in political debates, due to both the diversity of the member organizations and preserving its own agenda insulated from the impact of political debates. In that sense, GİKAP prefers to function as an information network among member organizations and works for the cooperation of common projects which are in line with common values of participants.

3.1.2.2. GİKAP’s agenda: Protection of family and youth, an alternative information channel for Islamic CSOs

Preservation of traditional family values has topped GİKAP’s agenda since its foundation. Given that objective, GİKAP is a member of Advisory Board of Directorate General for Family and Social Studies affiliated to the Prime Ministry (ASAGEM) and

⁴⁵ Controversies of the participation of Kaos GL, one of the major LGBT associations in Turkey, will be elaborated in the following section on Islamic CSOs and symbolic justice.

ASAGEM's Family Council⁴⁶ is one of the major events for the presentation of GİKAP's views on the protection of family. The paper presented by GİKAP's founder Gülsen Ataseven in the Third Family Council held in 1998 argues that the protection of traditional family is necessary to avoid a 'social breakdown' which had a catastrophic impact on western societies. (Ataseven, 1998) Ataseven relates the rise in contemporary diseases and divorce rate to the sexual revolution of 1960s, with reference to popular thinker Patrick Dixon's study on the cost of sexual revolution to British economy and society. (Dixon, 1995) The remedy which Ataseven proposes is empowerment of family and reinterpretation of the traditions, which are impaired due to adoption of heretical practices such as honor killings and domestic violence, as a component of traditional Turkish family. However, traditional Turkish family, for Ataseven, is in need of the universal moral values proposed by Islam and according to genuine Turkish-Islamic tradition the relations between spouses are to be arranged on the basis of justice, but not on the basis of 'democratic equality between sexes'. Ataseven claims that the norms of democracy and the family are not compatible at all, as "democracy, in its contemporary sense, is built on an assumption according to which society is made up of equal and free individuals, while family rests upon unequal relations among man, woman, children and servants." (Ataseven, 1998)

Given that perspective which prioritizes the traditional family rightly understood, GİKAP's major activities can be grouped under two categories: education of women, children and youth to promote solidarity among them, struggle against threats to family and women such as drug addiction and poverty. (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010) For the first one, GİKAP is actively involved in the formation of a commission for children which intends to generate a similar platform for civil society organizations working on children; and organizes education programs to disseminate the know-how which platform and member organizations has acquired in civil society. Regarding the second one, platform has organized a seminar series, called UYMA! Project for the Protection of Family and Youth from Substance Dependence- on drug addiction in 2007, and ran a project for the foundation of a marketplace for women's handicrafts with the cooperation of Municipality of Üsküdar.

⁴⁶ ASAGEM Advisory Board meets every year and ASAGEM Aile Şurası is held every four years.

Apart from common projects, GİKAP serves as an alternative communication channel for Islamic women's organizations, which enables participants to disseminate their own voices, which they consider to be dominated in larger platforms uniting women with different concerns, such as Kemalist and feminist women. Moreover they think that GİKAP is a means for the preservation of an original agenda shaped by their common values and sensitivities. (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010) (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010)

3.2. Republican and Islamic Women's Civil Society on Social Justice: Empirical Findings

It is important to note that neither İKKB nor GİKAP have a particular interest on the question of social justice, however the representatives of both platforms emphasized that it is one of the major problems which should be topping the political agenda in Turkey. Despite differences⁴⁷ in terms of the evaluation of the question of social justice by member organizations and interviewees, women are considered to be among the major victims of social injustice. Besides, as foreseen in the introduction, none of the participants referred to a class based approach or to gender division of labor which had a significant impact on Marxist, socialist or liberal feminists whose main ideas were summarized in the previous chapter.

In this section, I will elaborate the views and propositions of the activists and organizations. As previously indicated in the introduction, the data on which the analysis is based is driven from the interviews performed with the representatives of civil society and publications of civil society organizations. The empirical findings of the study will be presented with two major headings, in line with theoretical framework summarized in the preceding chapter. In that sense, I will analyze the position of İKKB and GİKAP first on socioeconomic justice; then on symbolic justice. AKDER's standpoint, despite its membership to GİKAP, will be presented separately in both parts, due to its distinct position vis-à-vis question of social justice.

⁴⁷ The origin of the sharp divergence between republican and Islamic CSOs will be interpreted in the following section.

3.2.1. Republican and Islamic Women's Organizations on Socioeconomic Justice

Although republican and Islamic women's organizations agree upon the view that women suffer from poverty a lot more than men, the way in which they interpret the question of socioeconomic justice diverge since they usually use different units of analysis in their activities and projects. While republican women affiliated to İKKB usually treat the question of socioeconomic justice in individual level, Islamic women organizations united under GİKAP tend to observe and struggle with poverty in household level. Moreover, apart from common strategies such as giving scholarships, and charity, they diverge in the priorities considered in large-scale projects. Therefore, I will focus on large-scale projects in the evaluation of difference between republican and Islamic CSOs.

3.2.1.1. Republican women's CSOs on socioeconomic justice

All of the representatives of republican CSOs focused on active participation of women in economy, while evaluating feminine poverty. (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) (Interviewee2-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010) (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) In that perspective, they emphasize that they worry about the fall in women's employment in recent economic crisis. Besides, they argue that women's presence in professional life is not only necessary to avoid the socioeconomic injustice that women face, but also to give women an active role in modern society. In that sense, they prefer women to work out-of-home. Under these circumstances, republican CSOs and activists intend to run projects which encourage women to take part in formal sector.

In 1997, Association of Women's Studies, an active member of İKKB, initiated a project in order to provide professional education for women who are not qualified for working out-of-home. Moreover, the project aimed to foster 'citizenship consciousness' and to accelerate the integration of the participants to urban life. The education program was shaped regarding the demands of employment market, and professional training was given on the utilization of machinery in textile. Besides, participants were informed

on hygiene, nutrition, marriage, birth control, human rights, women's rights and acquisitions of citizens from republican revolution. (İstanbul Üniversitesi Kadın Sorunları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi, 2008) The courses were held at İstanbul Üniversitesi, in order to take women out of their homes and give them a chance to experience the university atmosphere. However, as Rectorate of İstanbul University did not permit the entrance of participants wearing headscarf, enlarging the scope of the ban on headscarf for the students, the program has been moved to disadvantaged neighborhoods. The project is still active in Avcılar. (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010)

Republican CSOs keep their focus on the need of professional education. For instance, another member of İKKB, TÜKD Kadıköy Branch has been working on a project for educating women on textile production in the poor settlements in the outskirts of Ataşehir. At the end of the basic education, participants will be encouraged for sewing fabric bags, which will be commercialized in marketplaces in Kadıköy, where the utilization of nylon bags is prohibited by the municipality. The project is planned to be executed in 2011, regarding the decision on the funding request of TÜKD.⁴⁸

As a result, although republican CSOs keep giving scholarships and working on charity campaigns⁴⁹ as well, they perceive their efforts on providing professional education for unqualified women as their major contribution for the struggle against socioeconomic justice which women suffer. Besides, they support nationwide campaigns which intend to increase and bolster schooling for girls, and argue for the

⁴⁸ It is important to note that İKKB has decided to urge its members not to apply for European Union fundings, which are considered to bring in external interventions from EU advisory board. Some of the interviewees underlined that it is necessary to question the essential purpose of EU support in Turkish CSO's projects. (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010) (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010)

⁴⁹ Although they keep working on charity campaigns, some of the participants tend to question the efficiency of charity as a way of coping with poverty. "I think, charity perpetuates the culture of dependence. Particularly in the eastern territories, people were accustomed to sit and wait for the arrival of aid. However, I feel that things are changing, we receive tons of messages from women who cry out loud that they want to work." (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010)

benefit of them for avoiding socioeconomic in justice in long term.⁵⁰

3.2.1.2 Islamic women's CSOs on socioeconomic justice

As indicated in the previous section, charitable organizations constitute a great group among the members of GİKAP. In that sense, one of the major projects of GİKAP is about the fair and efficient distribution of social aids and charities. Besides, GİKAP intends to create alternative opportunities for evaluating women's household production. In that perspective, they cooperate with municipalities for opening handicraft markets, where women sell accessories, garments, laces, patchworks which they produce at home by traditional methods. It is important to emphasize that activists, organizations and projects mostly refer to familial poverty in their analyses on social justice. The emphasis on familial poverty is common to all Islamic CSOs⁵¹, and regarding GİKAP, significance of 'family' is reflected in both the agenda of member associations as shown in the preceding section, and the cooperation between government and GİKAP on the basis of ASAGEM, which does not focus on particularly on women but on family in

⁵⁰ Some of the participants argued that Kurdish question can be solved in socioeconomic plane as well, therefore in case these remedies which are proposed for struggle against socioeconomic justice are applied intensively in eastern provinces where Kurdish population is high, Kurd's claims for group rights would diminish. In that sense they tend to reinterpret a question of symbolic justice in terms of socioeconomic injustice. (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee2-CKD, 2010)

⁵¹ Islamic organizations which do not work on women are beyond the scope of the present study, however it is necessary to note that familial poverty has a key importance in the activity of Islamic charity organizations in general. Besides, some of the participants, who I contacted with, referred to the campaigns of these organizations, such as Kimse Yok Mu?, which means 'Is anybody there?' in Turkish. (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSOs on Social Justice, 2010) (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010) Apart from pooling financial support for aids, 'Kimse Yok Mu?' establishes solidarity bonds between poor and affluent families. The campaign is presented by the organization as follows: "We invite you to have a sister family to feel the purest love. We invite you to be the mother of a child you haven't met before, to be the father of a girl and take her to school. We invite you to become a sister family, because we know that nobody can bear his/her sister/brother being in difficulty. S/he immediately wants to help him/her. So, do you have a sister/brother?" (Kimse Yok Mu? Dayanışma ve Yardım Derneği, 2006)

general.⁵²

Given the importance of charity for the members of GİKAP, fair distribution of charity and social aids is a question of social justice and this is not possible unless public institutions and CSOs cooperate on the definition, and determination of poverty in national scale. (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010) Hence, GİKAP proposes a scheme of cooperation which includes developing a poverty map, according to which both actors will support the disadvantaged.

“As an economic and social problem, poverty can be defined in several different ways, however, as the most general definition, it can be described as the condition in which individuals and families cannot afford the basic needs of life. According to the statistics by TUIK, in 2005, 14.681000 people cannot afford food and other basic needs. While the struggle against poverty is defined as the duty of the state, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) carry out very important activities in the field. Being charity oriented and with the starting point of benevolence, these organizations have contributed a great deal of raising social consciousness and empathy for charity work. However, it is not possible to mention about any coordination among NGOs and governmental organizations serving for the same purpose. In order to have effective fight against poverty, it is necessary to develop a strategic approach leading to integration and coordination among the organizations and institutions. In this context, 'A National Database Study' under public control and responsibility will be an important step to cover this need. This database will contribute to effective planning in the field of social service activities, preventing double or repeated charity aids, building and accountable and sustainable, result oriented work basis and sharing knowledge, experience and information.” (Çitil & Akyol, 2010)

The principal motive for handicraft marketplaces stemmed from the assumption that the formal sector does not prefer to employ women. Besides, selling homemade products was a challenge for women at home. As indicated in the presentation of project, “providing women an income in return for their household production, does not improve only women’s status but also supports families in poverty.” The project intends to create not only chances for retail sales in markets, but also opportunities for receiving wholesale demands from formal sector which increase the volume of household

⁵² The motives of GİKAP for preparing a database of poverty for the fair distribution of social aids and charity and for the establishment of handicraft marketplaces are in line with the ASAGEM Family Council Commission Reports prepared in the aftermath of 4th Family Council held under the heading of ‘Poverty and Family’ in 2004. (T.C. Başbakanlık Aile ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Genel Müdürlüğü, 2004)

production, hence enhance the revenue of women who work at home. The project, called KÜP, was implemented in 2004, with the cooperation of the Municipality of Üsküdar. A similar project is about to be launched in Çekmeköy, in summer 2010. (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010) (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSO on Social Justice, 2010) (HEKVA, 2008)

3.2.1.3. AKDER and feminine poverty: Impact of ban on headscarf on socioeconomic injustice

Although AKDER is a member of GİKAP, it diverges from it in terms of the evaluation of socioeconomic injustice which women face. As I have tried to show above, KÜP is an attempt to bypass the unwillingness of formal sector to employ women, by promoting household production and creating opportunities for marketing. On the other hand, AKDER claims that the question does not simply generate from the 'unwillingness'. AKDER argues that low level of women's employment in Turkey is partially related to the ban on headscarf. Despite the fact that AKDER published a report on the negative impact of the ban on Turkey's performance in the Gender Gap Index of World Economic Forum⁵³, the magnitude of the impact is not analyzed and explained with significant statistical evidence.⁵⁴ However, it is indicated that 15 thousand women lost their jobs in public institutions between 1998 and 2002, due to the strict application of ban in the aftermath of February 28 and thousands of others were discriminated or exposed to a trade off between their headscarf and jobs in private sector. (Benli, 2008, pp. 7-9) Despite the lack of statistical support for the phenomenon, AKDER's claims about the socioeconomic injustice which women wearing headscarf face will require a particular evaluation in the following section where the differences between the position of republican and Islamic women's CSOs will be interpreted in regards to social justice literature.

⁵³ In 2007, Turkey was ranked number 121 out of 128 countries in total. The index is built on the difference between sexes in terms of economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. (World Economic Forum, 2007)

⁵⁴ In AKDER's report it is argued that the number of cases regarding the discharge of employees in private sector due to headscarf cannot be calculated as the employees abstain from reporting the incidents to human rights organizations.

3.2.2. Republican and Islamic Women’s Organizations on Symbolic Justice

The question of symbolic justice is of controversy for both republican and Islamic civil society organizations. However the nature of controversy is different for each group. Republican civil society organizations seem to have a significant unease regarding the claims of recognition generating from religious and ethnic groups in general, and they try to provide as much justification as possible to back up their concerns. In particular, all of the interviewees converge on the socioeconomic solutions for the Kurdish question. (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010) (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) Although Islamic women’s organizations take the ban on headscarf as symbolic injustice, they do not have precise and common diagnosis or remedies regarding the demands of other religious and ethnic groups. In terms of symbolic injustice, they seem to have a strong reserve on claims of gays and lesbians – which is similar to Republican participants’ standpoint vis-à-vis ethnic group rights. (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010) (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSO on Social Justice, 2010) Once again AKDER seems to be an outlier within GİKAP, due to its contacts with other groups who feel stigmatized in terms of symbolic injustices. (AKDER, 2010)

3.2.2.1 Symbolic Justice from the Perspective of Republican CSOs: Approval of women’s claims as ‘individuals’ and denial of groups’ claims

In general, participants from republican CSOs tend to support the need for symbolic justice on women’s questions. In case they are expected to respond to the claims of ethnic and religious groups they argue that the claims of the parties should be limited only to non-discrimination (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010), and further demands should be disregarded in order to protect women within ethnic and religious communities. (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010) Particularly, they tend to evaluate Kurdish question at socioeconomic level, and propose redistributive remedies as the best solution. (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010)

All of the participants agree that an effective response require a lot more than socioeconomic equality with men and empowerment of women in politics is a prerequisite. It is necessary to underline that İKKB has been one of the major supporters of affirmative action in politics, and place it at the top of their agenda. In many occasions they call for the need of women's quota⁵⁵ in national and regional parliaments, and contact with political parties directly, in the eve of party congresses to pressure them on a significant change to reinforce women's representation in their parties.⁵⁶ Although the representative of İKKB underlined that it is too early for an affirmative action request in employment⁵⁷, the participant of TÜKD emphasized the need for and the difficulty of a large scale survey to show the way in which women employees are treated in both private and public sector. Moreover she argued that being educated and active in professional life is not enough for changing people's perception of women, in that sense she stated that the impact of the rise in socioeconomic status of women on the question of gender in Turkish society is limited. (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010)

Despite the fact that republican CSOs are fierce defenders of gender equality in politics and society, it is necessary to underline that they do not share a common horizon on the gender relations within family. They emphasize that spouses must share every responsibility and benefits equally⁵⁸ but they do not converge on radical transformation

⁵⁵ They argue that political parties should reserve at least 30% of their seats in both political party organs and in their representations at regional and national levels. (Moroğlu, N.-İKKB Koordinatörü, 2008c)

⁵⁶ On December 16, 2008, İKKB Coordinator sent a message to the leader of Republican People's Party to change party regulations in a way that they guarantee 33% of women's representation in party commissions, and 50% in the parliament. (Moroğlu, N. -İKKB Koordinatörü, 2008d)

⁵⁷ "This is something still debated even in Norway, so it seems that we will keep waiting for a while." (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010)

⁵⁸ All of the participants from republican CSOs referred to the new Civil Law enacted in 2001, which changed marital property regime from 'division of property' to 'community property', which requires equal division of most property aquired during marriage between spouses upon divorce or annulment. (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010) (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) (Interviewee2-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee2-CKD, 2010) (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 2001)

of marital roles. For instance while one of the major opinion leaders in CKD argues that women should have a precise role within the family, as a housewife and a child bearer, due to ‘innate properties’ of women; another participant from the very same CSO defended that the younger generations –fortunately, she added- do not accept the burden of traditional roles on women which were adopted by earlier generations without hesitation. (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) In line with the divergence within the same organization, republican CSOs do have a limited agenda in terms of gender-based symbolic injustice in private sphere⁵⁹ and focus on the empowerment of women in public sphere and especially in politics, as they think that an increase in women’s participation would lead to the betterment of women’s status in general.

Although republican CSOs tend to agree on the fact that women in Turkey need remedies in terms of symbolic justice, they oppose the claims of symbolic justice originating from ethnic and religious groups. In order to defend their position they provide as many justifications as possible.

Argument 1:

In many occasions, İKKB has emphasized that both the ban on headscarf and the claims on Kurdish identity are overrated by politicians, in order to change the political agenda which require urgent attention such as economic development and welfare.⁶⁰ In that sense, İKKB has commented that such claims were trivial in comparison to ‘real problems’.

Argument 2:

⁵⁹ Major topic on women’s problem in private sphere which tops the agenda of İKKB is violence against women. İKKB has an extensive informative campaign on domestic violence, which seeks to generate a public consciousness on the issue.

⁶⁰ As presented in the previous section, İKKB has opposed to the constitutional amendments which intend to lift of ban on headscarf. İKKB coordinator used the following expression in two different press releases which revealed general tendency of member organizations regarding the debate on the lift of the ban. “Headscarf is treated as if it is the only problem of women.” (Moroğlu, N.; İKKB Koodinatörü, 2008a) (Moroğlu, N.; İKKB Koodinatörü, 2008b) On the other hand, İKKB coordinator joined the debate on the Kurdish opening, which government tried to meet some of the claims of Kurds with a similar objection. “Democratic openings are topping the political agenda, but noone is talking about the genuine opening...Women’s equal representation is a question of democracy above all.” (BİA Haber Merkezi, 2009)

Extending the impact of religion and ethnic cultures in social life will exacerbate the status of women living in communities where ethnicity and religion matter. Because women can never be free under the pressure of such communities. In line with these arguments, some of the participants have referred to honor killings (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010) and the hardships of being a woman in a Kurdish community in the southeastern provinces of Turkey. (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010) In that sense, one of the participants argued that women should be emancipated from impositions of misinterpreted religion⁶¹ and oppressive communities.

Argument 3:

Positive responses to these claims will threaten the secular republican system. According to republican CSOs, precepts of Atatürk's principles –secularism in particular- and republican values which generate from them are the guarantee of women's rights, and compromises such as the lift of ban on headscarf may entail further claims asking for more compromise. (Moroğlu, N.; İKKB Koordinatörü, 2008b) For some participants, claims on ethnic identities are equally dangerous for the national unity which is necessary for the integrity of the country.⁶² (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee2-CKD, 2010) In line with that argument, republican women's CSOs prefer to cooperate with other republican CSOs, as shown in the case of republican rallies which I presented in the previous section.

3.2.2.2 Symbolic justice from the perspective of Islamic CSOs: Claims of headscarf, reserve on gay and lesbian rights

Limitation on headscarf in public sphere is the major question for Islamic CSOs regarding symbolic injustice, and they take the ban as a question of human rights at

⁶¹ She emphasized that Islam rightly understood does not oblige women to wear headscarf and Turkish society is in need of the enlightened interpretation of Islam, which will clear away such heresies. (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010)

⁶² “We are the successor of a huge empire. Now we say that we have a republic which changed our conception of society, from ummah to nation. We have to prioritize national identity and respect them. If not we fall apart. However, for instance the man in Black Sea provinces speak his local language. I travelled along Anatolia and have never seen any pressure on them. Their ethnic identities have already been respected. I feel that this trend generates under the influence of European Union.” (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010)

individual level. In that sense they argue that, ‘headscarf’ as a matter of personal preference cannot be banned with reference to liberal precepts. However, apart from these liberal justifications they tend to support their claims on the basis of religious rules and conventions as well. Although they tend to underline the headscarf issue as an injury on Muslim women in Turkey, they have strong reserves on gay and lesbian rights. These reserves can be traced both in the process of AKDER’s campaign - *February 28 process cannot last a thousand years*- which I summarized earlier in this chapter, and in the interviews performed for the present study. AKDER, despite its membership to GİKAP, holds an exceptional position regarding the reserves of other member organizations vis-à-vis LGBT people which can be read as a conservative homophobia, generating from the major purpose of these CSOs, which is the protection of traditional family.

All of the participants converge on the view that headscarf ban is a limitation on individual’s personal decisions about what to wear and the lift of ban can be taken as a question of individual liberty. (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010) (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSO on Social Justice, 2010) (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010) Moreover, they argue that their preference for wearing headscarf causes not only exclusion from public institutions and services – due to the strict application of legal framework and institutional regulations, but also discrimination in public sphere. For the latter, every participant gave examples of how members of republican CSOs react to the representatives of Islamic CSOs wearing headscarf.⁶³ Besides, the representative of GİKAP who does not wear headscarf argued that they suffer from the ossified images and stereotypes which intensify the discrimination, for instance she stated that she was questioned about her role in GİKAP by the representatives of Republican CSOs several times.⁶⁴ Although they all claim that women wearing headscarf are stigmatized, none of

⁶³ “In nationwide meetings and women’s councils, there were even women who left the meeting rooms after we entered in.” (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010) “Many of my friends were refused to enter the meeting halls due to their attire. And some of these meetings were not held in public institution.” (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSOs on Social Justice, 2010)

⁶⁴ “There were even those who questioned me about my existence in GİKAP. What do you do with them? You do not even wear headscarf and so on.” (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010)

the interviewees referred to a particular Muslim woman identity⁶⁵ and preferred to defend their position on the basis of individual rights and preferences. The representative of GİKAP repeated their concerns about the claims of identity on the question of affirmative action:

“Our view on affirmative action, as a platform, is that it is dangerous. Receiving extra rights on an identity which we did not choose is meaningless. However, we argue that women should be supported in areas where we are disadvantaged.” (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010)

Although they defend the headscarf as an individual right, they do not hide the religious bases of wearing headscarf. In that perspective they often refer to the Islamic scripture.⁶⁶ One of the representatives even argued that her preference of wearing headscarf is actually a choice despite her corporal desires.

“I put on headscarf and wear dresses which cover my body. Even during summer. Don't I have a desire to expose my body to sun and enjoy the breeze? But I decided not to. This is what my belief requires.” (Interviewee-Başak, 2010)

Despite their struggle for the freedom of headscarf, Islamic CSOs are not tolerant to the demands of other groups and in particular, they tend to oppose gay rights. A recent debate triggered by a member of the present government is an indicator of the intolerance for homosexuals among some of the Islamic CSOs. In March 2010, the state minister responsible for the affairs of women and families Aliye Kavaf declared that she did not have a positive opinion for gay marriage, as she believed that homosexuality is a biological disorder or a disease which needs to be treated. (Daily News, 2010) After Kavaf's avowal, Turkish public opinion was divided into two and another member of the the cabinet, minister of health was obliged to express a counter opinion regarding the lack of scientific evidence which indicates that homosexuality has a biological disorder, in order to end the debate by showing that Kavaf's comment was not the official view of the government. A group of Islamic CSOs, including the members of GİKAP such as Birlik Vakfı, AKODER and Hayat Vakfı, announced their support to Aliye Kavaf with a common press release. (Mazlumder ve Destekçi STK'lar, 2010)

⁶⁵ However, some Islamic CSOs which were not included in the present study, refer to a particular Muslim woman identity which is rendered visible by headscarf. e.g. “Headscarf is our identity” (Özgür-Der, 2007)

⁶⁶ AKDER and Hazar Group, both members of GİKAP, refer to Quran and the interpretations of Islamic scholars, such as the fatwa of the General Directorate of Religious Affairs of Turkish Republic. (Demirci, 2009) (Öğüt, 2010)

Although they emphasize that Islam is a religion of tolerance, they argued that any attempt to legalize or legitimize homosexuality should be avoided.

In sum, it is important to note that the arguments of Islamic CSOs, to oppose the rights of homosexuals are formulated in a similar way as the arguments of republican CSOs for the denial of ethnic and religious groups' rights.

Argument 1:

Some of the representatives of CSOs claim that the question of gender, gay rights included, are trivial issues. One of the representatives argued that claims of gender are not as important as other questions, such as the ban on headscarf, which require urgent solutions.

“I see your point, gender... Such claims, including gay and lesbian marriage, in contrast to legitimate and more important demands, I do not agree with them. It is as if some is asking for raspberry cheesecake, while the others are starving. I think homosexuality might be generating from a lack of information before marriage.” (Interviewee-Başak, Women's CSO on Social Justice, 2010)

Argument 2:

Emphasizing gay rights can threaten the family and future generation. This argument was one of the major ideas provided in the press release transmitted for supporting Aliye Kavaf's negative views on homosexuality.

“Legitimization of this abnormal situation in various forms and media, pervades these practices, and degenerates family values and leads to annihilation of future generations.” (Mazlumder ve Destekçi STK'lar, 2010)

In line with this comment, one of the participants argued that she has the right to protect her children from the ‘overemphasized’ and ‘overpublicized’ image of gays and transsexuals. However she argued that she could only tolerate private practices of homosexuality, in case they are not publicly visible. She added that images of overt and exaggerated homosexuality provoke moral contamination. (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010)

Argument 3:

Positive responses to these claims are in conflict with religious precepts and morality. Prohibition of homosexuality by Islam and all other monotheistic religions is one of the major causes for the denial of gay and lesbian rights.

“All of the monotheistic religions consider homosexuality as a corrupted, erratic and immoral practice and condemn it as a sinful activity which conflicts with the law of nature. In many Islamic countries homosexuality is forbidden in order to protect the future generations of human race and to avoid the proliferation of

homosexuality. According to holy books, societies where such perversions are widespread perished on account of their sins.” (Mazlumder ve Destekçi STK'lar, 2010)

As presented above, majority of Islamic CSOs tend to protest against the claims of gays and lesbians. Although they try to demarcate their opposition vis-à-vis gay rights from discrimination, participation of an LGBT association, Kaos GL, to AKDER’s ‘February 28 cannot last a thousand years’ campaign, generated tension within the Islamic civil society. Some of the signatories of the campaign informed AKDER about their unease for having their names on the same page with an LGBT organization. Although AKDER did not ask Kaos GL to retract from the campaign, Kaos GL decided to retract its name from the list of supporting organizations and participated to the campaign at individual level. This question was made publicly known by Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, one of the major opinion leaders of Islamic women’s movement and the stepback forced by the conservative Islamic organizations was confirmed by both AKDER and Kaos GL. However, Kaos GL announced that they agreed upon to cooperate with AKDER on a future project. (Tuksal, 2010a) (Tuksal, 2010b) (Kaos GL, 2010)

This campaign was one of the major events which I referred to during the interviews. While GİKAP participant explained their reason for not participating to the campaign by referring to humane and legal concerns of some member organization, participant of AKDER stated in the interview that they try to cooperate with everyone without discrimination in case they find a common horizon.⁶⁷ (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010) (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010)

Before starting the theoretical analysis of the empirical findings presented in this chapter, it is better to summarize the position of republican and Islamic women’s civil society organizations as follows:

- In terms of socioeconomic injustice, republican CSOs try to focus on

⁶⁷ Participant of AKDER emphasized that they are ready to cooperate with other women’s organizations as well. For instance, she argued that they try to back up affirmative action claims of feminist and republican CSOs during common councils. In that sense, they established close relationships with KADER. Regarding their support for affirmative action, they clearly diverge from GİKAP’s reserves on affirmative action. (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010)

individuals as unit of analysis and emphasize that women are those who suffer the most. They evaluate their projects of professional education as an efficient way of dealing with feminine poverty and they utilize these projects for generating a citizenship consciousness and for the betterment of women's status in society. On the other hand Islamic CSOs are more prone to take the question of socioeconomic injustice in terms of familial poverty. In that sense they try to provide housewives with means to trade the goods generating from household production. Besides, due to the significant number of charitable organizations within Islamic movement, they aim at the fair and efficient organization of social aids and charities.

- Regarding symbolic injustice, republican CSOs underline that women's problems cannot be limited to socioeconomic injustice. In that sense, they claim that they try to struggle with gender discrimination. However, as they do not have a common incentive to interrogate gender roles in private sphere their efforts mostly focus on public sphere. Islamic CSOs particularly focus on ban the on headscarf, and they tend to formulate their claims regarding the lift of ban on the basis of individual rights, although they do not hesitate to use essentialist arguments which refer to religious precepts either.

Despite both republican CSOs and Islamic CSOs underline the need of symbolic justice vis-à-vis the key issues topping their agenda, gender equality for the former and freedom for wearing headscarf in public, they tend to undermine some other claims. While republican CSOs have reserves regarding claims generating from ethnic and religious groups, Islamic CSOs strongly oppose to gay and lesbian rights. In general they use common strategies while refuting the claims they disapprove:

1. They try to trivialize them by arguing that there are many other problems waiting for solution.
2. They claim that the rights which these groups are asking for would raise crucial problems –related to 'women' for republicans, and 'family' for Islamic organizations.
3. They strongly assert that responding to these claims would contradict with or violate the precepts of a pre-existing system, which is secular republic for republicans, and religious morality for Islamic organizations.

However, one of the CSOs analyzed in that study, AKDER does not fit in the

empirical analysis summarized above, hence it should be considered as an outlier within GİKAP, the platform which unites Islamic women's CSOs in Istanbul. Theoretical analysis of these findings will provide us with the end result of the present study.

3.3. Diverging Social Justice Views: Impact of Kemalism and Islam(ism) on Republican and Islamic CSOs as Competing Traditions

When I asked one of the participants of Islamic CSOs about İKKB, she told me that despite her limited knowledge about that platform, she already knew that AKDER could have no place there. Then she added that GİKAP actually was founded with a motivation which generated from the sense of exclusion from such 'mainstream' civil society organizations. (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010) On the other hand, when I posed a similar question to a republican CSO about GİKAP, she preferred to respond 'off the record'. (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010) These experiences do not seem to fit in Şirin Tekeli's following remarks about civil society in Turkey.

“While we were approaching the end of the decade it appeared that, perhaps for the first time in history, a 'civil society' was coming into existence, made out of divergent groups of conflicting interests which nonetheless formed a common block opposed to the state. Though all of these divergent groups aimed at influencing the state, there was a growing consensus of mutual recognition of their co-existence. Hence interest groups which barely accepted the legitimacy of their counterparts came onto common ground where they valued 'recognition and consensus' and acquired democratic guarantees from the state.” (Tekeli, 1995, p. 7)

Regarding the position of the analyzed civil society organizations on the question of social justice, it can be asserted that the deep divergence, which can be read in their preference for founding distinct platforms for republican and Islamic civil society organizations, is reflected both on *their propositions and activities to avoid the injustices which they struggle against* and on *their objections to the claims of others*. In the final step of this study, I will try to interpret the difference which avoids them from having a common horizon –or at least a broader cooperation for struggling against

injustices inflicting damage on them as ‘women’.⁶⁸

3.3.1. Ambivalent Claims of ‘Social Justice’: Between Liberalism and Tradition

Although participants from both republican and Islamic CSOs tend to justify their claims on the basis of ‘individual rights’ and ‘preferences’ in line with the liberal understanding of social justice, they do not abstain from referring to the values which they borrow from a particular interpretation of ‘good’. Moreover, the impact of the intellectual and valuational framework on their understanding of justice becomes more overt and decisive when they oppose to the claims of groups which they consider to be threatening. The reference points of each group, which tie both of them to a ‘tradition’, are mentioned even in the constitutive protocols of the platforms; while republican women united under İKKB refer to the triad of ‘secularism, equality, and democracy’, Islamic women who got together under GİKAP emphasize the ‘essential values’ as their moral cement. Before starting the analysis of the relation between the social justice views and intellectual traditions which these groups adopt, it is necessary to refer to MacIntyre’s account of ‘tradition’ for a better understanding of the linkage between ‘tradition’ and social justice:

“A living tradition then is a historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition. Hence the individual’s search for his or her good is generally and characteristically conducted within a context defined by those traditions of which the individual’s life is a part, and this is true both of those goods which are internal to practices and of the goods of a single life.” (MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 144-145)

Despite this reference to MacIntyre’s proposition -about the impact of tradition on social justice views of individuals or groups- which opens a horizon for the present evaluation regarding the social justice views of republican and Islamic CSOs, I abstain from furthering this analysis to provide a reality check aiming at the justification of MacIntyre’s criticisms against liberalism and ‘constructive enterprises of justice’ which try to arrive at a universal understanding of justice independent of the impact of pre-

⁶⁸ In some occasions republican and Islamic women’s organizations come together, such as large scale meetings of the advisory boards of governmental institutions.(e.g. ASAGEM and KSGM meetings) In these meetings, they agree upon some basic principles such as ‘denial of domestic violence’, and ‘the condemnation of separatist terrorism’. (Milliyet, 2007) (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010)

existing moralities.⁶⁹ However, it is an effective key to interpret the divergence between republican and Islamic women's groups. Regarding the scope of the present study, I will not try to argue for the idiosyncrasy or universal validity of a theoretical account which prioritizes and emphasizes the effect of tradition and community on the social justice views of individuals.

Apart from this limitation about the theoretical aspect of the analysis, I want to underline that the empirical aspect of this analysis will be built on the major characteristics of each group, and an extensive analysis regarding the differences within both republican and Islamic civil societies will be avoided, since this would require a much more detailed, extensive fieldwork which would take a number of years. Hence, this thesis aims at revealing certain tips of the iceberg-like topic of study.

3.3.2. Republican CSOs : Kemalist Revolution and Identity Construction

The impact of Kemalism on women's movements has been one of the curious subjects since 1980s. The connection between Kemalism and women's activism can be examined with reference to two different stages of republican history. First, after the proclamation of Republic in 1923, Kemalist elites implemented a series of reforms which aimed at the westernization of Turkish society. Some of these reforms, in particular⁷⁰, changed women's legal status, and a new identity of 'Turkish woman' was constructed⁷¹. (Arat Z. F., 1994) (Durakbaşa, 2000) (Arat Z. F., 2000) Second, in the

⁶⁹ "The evidence for the failure of Kant's heirs in these constructive enterprises is contained in the reviews of the books expounding them in the professional philosophical journals. The book review pages of these journals are the graveyards of constructive academic philosophy." (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 334)

⁷⁰ A new civil code which prohibited polygamy and introduced civil marriage was enacted in 1926. State secularism was proclaimed in 1928. Women's suffrage was adopted in 1934.

⁷¹ In line with the ideals of Westernization of Kemalism, women were emancipated and transformed into socially active citizens and they were encouraged to have education and to participate in economy. However, Kemalist revolution did not seek at a complete revolution of women, and proposed an eclectic formula for the solution of woman question. Modernizing ideology was combined with a conservative puritan morality, which envisaged the protection of woman not by Islamic veiling, but by the creation of a new women's identity which recommended the 'daughters of republic'

aftermath of 1980 military coup, a brand new feminist movement independent of any existing male dominated political ideologies emerged. At the beginning, new feminist movement had a close partnership with republican women's civil society organizations which can be traced back to the early years of Republican era, due to their common belief in the need for a secular system for women's emancipation. (Sirman, 1989) In that sense, although Kemalism has never been an ideology which anticipates a gender revolution, has a significant impact on women's movements due to its strong emphasis on state secularism and its desire to attain a westernized liberal society where women are socially active, even after a real feminist movement was born in 1980s. (Arat Y. , 1991) Despite the fact that feminist women's movement had a completely distinct character from 1990s onwards, as focusing on 'gender' has never been a concern for Kemalism⁷², the impact of the latter on women's activism remained. For instance, the majority of the members of İKKB and İKKB as a platform in general express their devotion to Kemalism.

The empirical analysis in the previous section clearly shows that social justice views of republican women's CSOs tend to generate from Kemalism, both as a tradition which gave birth to a particular women's identity and as a state doctrine which is considered to guarantee the enjoyment of women's rights. In order to show how Kemalism shapes the general outline of republican women's account of social justice, I will follow the same order as in the empirical analysis and begin with socioeconomic justice.

In many analyses, Kemalist movement is considered to be an effort for changing superstructure independent of the economic structure. (Göle, 1996, p. 73) However, as Şerif Mardin states that Kemalism triggered a change in socioeconomic system, which he describes as follows:

to preserve their modesty. (Durakbaşa, 2000)

⁷² Although some of the scholars such as Deniz Kandiyoti and Şirin Tekeli interpret women's emancipation in the early years of Kemalist revolution as a 'state feminism', Zehra Arat underlines that she abstains from calling any ideology with no reference to 'gender' as 'feminism'. In line with Arat's concerns, and the need for demarcating republican women's movements from feminist organizations, I will not use the expressions of 'state feminism' or 'Kemalist feminism'. (Tekeli, 1988, p. 315) (Kandiyoti, 1991) (Arat Z. F., 1994, p. 74)

“The concept of ‘opportunity space’ as the totality of the areas that one may use to improve or raise one’s economic status is used here because many economic areas that were ‘open’ in Western Europe were ‘closed’ in the Ottoman Empire. An example may be provided from property relations. In many ways private property was controlled and restricted in the Ottoman Empire. Granting full property rights as they appeared in Western law codes opened up a whole new area of economic transactions to Turks. This expansion of new opportunities occurred in a number of economic spheres, beginning with the nineteenth century, even though the income distribution pattern might not have changed. When this expansion occurred, the expansion itself was a positive move that deflected the attention of some economic strata from their situation of economic subordination to the brand-new opportunities that had been opened up for them.” (Mardin, 2006, p. 65)

Yeşim Arat, with reference to Mardin’s concept of ‘opportunity space’, emphasizes that Kemalist socioeconomic system was enabling individuals with the chance to raise their socioeconomic status, and women were given the opportunity to take part in economic activity as well. Regarding the rise of ‘a group of well-educated, urban and rights bearer women’, education was considered to be the catalyst of socioeconomic growth at individual level. (Arat Y. , 1991, p. 9) Besides, the link between economy and education was underlined at the Economic Congress, held in Izmir. (Arat Z. F., 2000) In that sense, education was at the top of the Kemalist agenda both for socioeconomic betterment of individuals, and for the development of the country. Republican women’s emphasis on the triad of education, development, and social justice little differ from the Kemalist perspective of the early years of the republican era.

Although Kemalism created room for a ‘socially active woman’, it is important to note that Kemalism established a modern gendered society in place of the ancient one which was built on the strict separation of men and women in both public and private. (Durakbaşa, 2000) (Arat Z. F., 2000) However, due to the fact that Kemalism left intact the gender division of labor within the family⁷³, it did not provide the contemporary republican women’s movement with a common horizon for formulating an extensive

⁷³ “Although women’s social recognition in the public domain did not challenge the direct male/female relations in the private domain and even narrowed their power there, women’s domestic duties took on a new character with the ‘rationalization’ of housework and the advent of the science of home-economics. Information about hygiene, scientific upbringing of children, housework technology, and homemaking were instructed through the family and women’s magazines and courses taught at schools, and adult education programs offered courses on those subjects.” (Durakbaşa, 2000, p. 144)

interrogation of gender. As presented in the previous section, symbolic justice claims of republican women's CSOs are still mostly interested in attaining the gender equality in the public sphere, and in terms of a gender justice within family they are far from having a consensus on the transformation of women's role in present as 'the housewife' and 'the child bearer'. In that sense, major claims of these groups for overcoming the symbolic injustice which women face are about the furthering of women's rights and the protection of women's gains generating from legal and social reforms of Kemalist revolution. In line with the empirical findings presented in the previous section, Zehra F. Arat defines republican women's position as a legalistic approach, due to their emphasis on the legal rights of women. Besides, the answers of the participants to the question about women's history in Turkey show that republican women in Turkey tend to think that Kemalist revolution is the milestone which changed the destiny of Turkish women completely. (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010) (Interviewee1-CKD, 2010) (Interviewee-TÜKD, 2010)

Finally, when we look at the concerns of republican CSOs vis-à-vis claims of religious and ethnic groups, it is quite clear that they formulate their arguments in line with the Kemalist state doctrine, which is built on immutable pillars such as state secularism and nation state. In particular, they put an accent on the preservation of Kemalist republic during their partnerships with other republican CSOs under the umbrella of USTKB. (USTKB, 2008) However, it is important to note that during the interviews majority of the participants expressed their sensitivity about the protection of woman who they consider to be suffering under the authoritarian rules of male-dominated ethnic and religious groups. In that sense, they get close to Okin's liberal feminist point of view which argues that women are prone to be oppressed in case the ethnic and religious groups' rights are recognized due to the patriarchal character of these cultures. (Okin, 1997)

3.3.3. Islamic CSOs : Revival of Religious Morality as the Precursor of Society

Although Kemalist revolution aimed at the gradual secularization of society by adopting state secularism, from 1980s onwards, in urban Turkey, Islam gained a new

visibility with the covering of women.⁷⁴ As Göle, İlyasoğlu and Saktanber show, this phenomenon was about the identity construction of an alternative normativity, which stemmed from the regeneration of Islam accelerated by a political movement. (Göle, 1996) (İlyasoğlu, 1994) (Saktanber, 1994) Later on in 1990s, the representative of the political Islam, pro-Islamic Welfare Party had a nationwide success, thanks to its grassroots organizations where women were actively involved in the dissemination of party's message. (Arat Y. , 1999) (Arat Y. , 2005) However, women who were considered to be the bearers of new Islamic woman identity, did not limit their activity by staying in the women's branches of pro-Islamic parties. For some, revitalization of Islam was assumed to be an ideology appropriate for generating a women's activism, which was arguing for an alternative woman identity in contrast to the new Turkish woman image fostered by Kemalism as a part of its ideals for building a westernized liberal society. For instance, in the mid-1980s, Cihan Aktaş, one of the most prominent Islamist woman critics in Turkey, argued for a gender sensitive interpretation of the new Islamic message.⁷⁵ In that sense, the impact of the revitalized Islam was not limited to the politics and it had a decisive influence on the formation of an Islamic women's civil society. (İlkkaracan, 1997)

Although that history, which I summarized quite shortly with reference to the common findings of earlier studies carried out in the field, it is important to underline that we actually do not face a monolithic Islamic women's society. While Göle explains the diversity within Islamic women's movement by the tension between traditionalism and radicalism, Kadioğlu and Özdalga refer to a tradeoff between liberalism and community orientation. (Göle, 1996, pp. 88-89) (Kadioğlu, 2005, p. 26) However, due to the limited scope of the present study, I will refer to Islamic tradition as a common horizon of normativity which affects the basic ideas of Islamic CSOs on the question of

⁷⁴ "Women wearing long, loose overcoats and headscarves tightly framing their faces and covering their necks and bosoms are now a familiar part of the urban scene, as well as of university campuses." (Saktanber, 1994, p. 99)

⁷⁵ "Cihan Aktaş, perhaps the most prominent Islamist woman critic, believed that westernization meant adoption of superficial, if not immoral modes of behavior that were accompanied with women's victimization through demeaning, low-paying jobs in the labor market. Aktaş argued that 'some privileges granted to some women as rights, could mean injustice to others'." (Arat Y. , 2005, s. 22)

social justice.

As indicated in the empirical analysis, Islamic women's movements aim to organize social aids and charities in a way that the distribution of them provides a contribution to everyone who struggle with poverty. However, it is necessary to underline the distinction between liberal justifications of redistribution and the efficient distribution of aids and charity. As shown at the beginning of this chapter, charitable organizations constitute a significant number of members of GİKAP, and they are mostly Islamic *wakıfs*,⁷⁶ which do not merely focus on what and how much the supported people receive. The position of the giver, who has the duty to help *people in need* as a believer, is equally important. In that sense helping those who *really* suffer is essential. Regarding the handicraft markets which intend to provide housewives with an alternative channel for evaluating their household production, the impact of ban on headscarf which avoids the employment of a large group of women in formal sector cannot be underestimated. However, as previously referred to Aktaş's criticisms regarding the victimization of women in professional life, it is necessary to underline the influence of an ideal Islamic way of life which preserves the traditional gender division of labor. (Hazar, Eğitim, Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, 2004) In that sense, promotion of household production by Islamic women's CSOs stems from on the one hand legal and social restrictions which they cannot control, on the other hand gender division of labor which is an important component of Islamic way of life.

Lift of the ban on headscarf is the major claim of Islamic women's CSOs regarding symbolic justice. This claim should be read in line with Saktanber's analysis about the ambivalence of Muslim women identity, dialogically constructed by the sense of pride born out of being close to 'traditional' and 'unspoiled' on the one hand, and the sense of injury which stems from not receiving full recognition in the public realm on the other.⁷⁷ (Saktanber, 1994, p. 105) As shown in the empirical analysis, this

⁷⁶ One of the member CSOs of GİKAP, Birlik Vakfi explains their mission as a vakıf as follows: "We aim to serve humankind and perform our duties as servants of God, to bring everyone the goods generating from him, and in line with man's natural dispositions put him on the right way of goodness, as he is inclined to badness as well." (Birlik Vakfi, 2005)

⁷⁷ Kenan Çayır refers to an old pamphlet of GİKAP in his master's thesis on GİKAP

ambivalence generates two different sorts of arguments for the lift of ban on headscarf, while the first one intends to take the ban as a question of human rights –in line with the sense of injury; the second one emphasizes the religious precepts and the requirements of Muslim identity –in line with the sense of pride. As a result, claims for the ban on headscarf are ambivalent: its connection to human rights gives it a liberal character; while its emphasis on the Islamic tradition reveals its communitarian basis.

In particular, the opposition of Islamic women’s CSOs towards gay and lesbian rights has an overtly illiberal character, as their arguments⁷⁸ do not refer to liberty of individuals or the protection of them. In that sense, Islam is still the prominent tradition which defines the normativity under which Islamic women’s movement tends to formulate its own claims of justice and its opposition about the ‘controversial’ claims of other groups.

At the end of the analysis, it is important to note that both republican and Islamic women’s CSOs tend to stay within liberal paradigm, if and only if the liberalism is capable of defending their particular position which is shaped by the tradition which provides them with a system of normativity. Especially, the primacy of Kemalism and Islam for republican and Islamic CSOs consecutively is obvious in their arguments for opposing the ‘inconvenient’ claims of other groups. While the republican CSOs do not refrain from emphasizing the preservation of the Kemalist system, in order to protect it from the future damages which might occur in case claims of ethnic and religious groups are accepted; Islamic CSOs refer to scriptures about the exhaustion of sinful communities, in their arguments against gay and lesbian rights. In that sense, liberalism and concepts which born out of it, do only accompany social justice views of both group, but fall short of guiding them.

“After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim women in Turkey kept themselves on the periphery since they were told that they had no place in modern life. When they rarely entered public places they were confronted with the possibility of legal proceedings. They kept themselves out of sight because they were told that everything which symbolized their identity was in conflict with social progress.” (Çayır, 1997)

⁷⁸ As shown in the previous section, their major motive for opposing the gay rights is the preservation of the family and the religious morality which they consider to be prohibiting homosexual practices.

But then, how are we to understand the dialogue between AKDER and Kaos GL? A complete explanation of this cooperation is well beyond the scope of the present study, however I will try to seek a limited and tentative explanation in the concluding remarks which will be presented in the last chapter.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

The major purpose of this study was to examine the way in which republican and Islamic women's movements assess the question of social justice. Arguing that the mainstream social justice literature would provide a firm grounding for the evaluation of diverging claims of social justice generated by both groups, on the one hand the propositions of each movement were analyzed with respect to the socioeconomic justice – symbolic justice dichotomy; on the other hand despite their sharp divergence in terms of arguments and claims, republican and Islamic groups' social justice views were explained with reference to MacIntyre's theory of justice, which emphasize the impact of tradition on justice views of individuals and groups. However, as previously indicated in the last section, this study does not intend to justify MacIntyre's criticisms against liberalism, which he argues to be a misleading ideology which overshadows the effect of community and tradition on the formation of social justice claims of individuals.

The findings of the study suggest that Kemalism and Islam are preeminent traditions which define the contours of social justice views supported by republican and Islamic CSOs consecutively, although both republican and Islamic women's movements tend to refer to a liberal account of justice which assumes the priority of liberties and aims at the extension of rights in their own claims of justice. However, the impact of Kemalism and Islam on these movements is quite evident in their opposition against the rights of other groups. While republican women's CSOs tend to oppose the claims of ethnic and religious groups with reference to Kemalist state doctrine, especially when they cooperate with other male-dominated republican CSOs; Islamic women's CSOs refer to scriptures while they protest against the gay rights. In that sense, in line with

Karacan's evaluation about the impact of political ideologies on the fragmentation in women's civil society in Turkey, this study argues that the impact of Kemalist and Islamic traditions are not limited to the determination of priorities vis-à-vis women's questions, but they are decisive for the formation of diverging views of social justice which stem from conflicting traditions.⁷⁹

Given the evolution of social justice literature, it might seem inappropriate to use MacIntyre's theory for the explanation of contemporary women's movements' positions on the question of social justice. However, tradition is still the major factor which shape Islamic and republican women's CSOs' social justice views. In that sense these views fall short of embracing recent debates and theories which focus on gender and class related oppression, or those which intend to justify the concerns of justice with respect to the assumptions and objectives of liberalism. Neither Fraser's nor Young's critical contributions, nor Kymlicka's liberal intervention help to understand the way in which Islamic and republican women's CSOs treat the question of social justice. In both of these movements, where the influence of male-dominated traditions is still intact, major categories of social justice question, such as gender and class, are overshadowed.

General findings of this study lead us to two interrelated questions which require further research. How can women activists with distinct traditions can communicate and cooperate? How can we interpret AKDER's position when it establishes a dialogue with Kaos GL despite the other Islamic associations' strong opposition against gay rights?

MacIntyre has a quite pessimistic interpretation about mutually exclusive traditions, and argues that even dialogue between the bearers of rival tradition is not quite possible:

A social universe composed exclusively of rival traditions, so it may seem, will be one in which there are a number of contending, incompatible, but only

⁷⁹ "At the beginning of the 90's, the women's movement in Turkey appeared to have lost its initial power of activism and influence in the restructuring of Turkish society. This is the result of several factors. For a start, the main discourses of the nineteenth century, namely Modernism, which formed the foundation of Kemalism during the twentieth century, Islamism and Nationalism are still present. The women's movement has not yet managed to free itself from these discourses and to form its own discourse. Hence, it has been unable to develop a critical approach to all of them as elements of the patriarchal system." (İlkaracan, 1997, p. 8)

partially and inadequately communicating, overall views of that universe, each tradition within which is unable to justify its claims over against those of its rivals except to those who already accept them. (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 348)

For instance, in line with that statement, some of the participants admitted that they do not think that any sort of dialogue between republican and Islamic CSOs would change anything regarding the headscarf controversy; neither about the present position of each group, nor about the solution of the issue at the political level. (Interviewee-İKKB, 2010) (Interviewee-GİKAP, 2010) On the other hand, if the situation is so desperate how come an LGBT organization could give public support to the campaign run by an Islamic women's CSO, which aims at the lift of ban on headscarf?

The representative of Kaos GL, stated that they participated in the campaign although they think that Islamic veiling is an external control mechanism over women's body and it would never be supported by them. However, their major motive was responding to the discrimination and exclusion which women face after they decide to wear the headscarf. Besides, they argued that they could have the chance to get to know each other with the members of AKDER in common projects and conferences, and they found out that some of the members of AKDER –as individuals- act against the discrimination of homosexuals, although their attitude has not provoke a change in the institutional policy of AKDER yet. On the other hand, a representative of AKDER emphasized in the interview that they are trying to extend their cooperation as much as possible. She added that although they are aware of the fact that they cannot have complete agreement on any issue with anyone, making coalitions with sharing common concerns is crucial for them. (Kaos GL, 2010) (Interviewee-AKDER, 2010)

Similar endeavors seem to require a thorough analysis in order to find out what really makes people from so different communities, who actually do not share the values of each other at all, come together, in an effort to understand the power of contending and incompatible traditions generating fragmented social universes such as the women's civil society in Turkey. Is it the 'similitude' beyond differences as Göle argues⁸⁰, or knowing differences better by the experience of diversity as Young claims? (Young, 1997, pp. 264-265)

⁸⁰ "There exists a possibility for recognition of difference only when one finds similitude with the other." (Göle, 2003, p. 28)

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. *Kısaca kendinizi tanıtır mısınız? / Could you present yourself briefly?*
2. *Kişisel sivil toplum geçmişinizden bahseder misiniz? / Could you please present your personal history in civil society?*
3. *Dernek/Platform/Birlik olarak başlıca amaç ve etkinlikleriniz nelerdir? / What are the major objectives and activities of your association/platform/union?*
4. *Sizce, Türkiye’de sosyal adaletsizlik sorununda mağdur olan başlıca gruplar hangileridir? / According to you, what are the major groups which are victimized by social injustice?*
5. *Sizce, özellikle hangi kadınlar mağdur oluyor? / According to you, which women are victimized particularly?*
6. *Sizce, kadınların sosyal adalet ekseninde karşılaştığı başlıca sorunlar nelerdir? / According to you, what are the major problems which women face in terms of social justice?*
7. *Genel olarak, kadınların sosyal adalet sorununa dair ne gibi önerilerde bulunabilirsiniz? / In general, what are your propositions on the question of social justice?*
8. *Kadınlar içinde özellikle mağdur olduğunuzu söylediğiniz gruplar için ne gibi önerilerde bulunabilirsiniz? / What are your propositions, regarding the women who you consider to be victimized in particular?*
9. *‘Dağılımsal adalet’ hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? / What do you think about distributive justice? (İlgili kavramlar: Sosyal devlet, eşitsiz gelir dağılımı, sosyal hizmetler, tam istihdam...vs / Related concepts: Welfare state, unequal income distribution, social services, full employment...etc)*
10. *‘Sembolik adalet’ hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? / What do you think about symbolic justice? (İlgili kavramlar: Ayrımcılık, önyargı, etnik ve dinsel kimlikler, cinsiyet, cinsel yönelim...vs / Related concepts: Discrimination, prejudice, ethnic and religious identities, sex-gender, sexual orientation...etc)*

11. *Haklar ve sosyal adalet sorunu arasında nasıl bir bağlantı görüyorsunuz? / In your opinion, what is the relationship between rights and social justice?*
12. *Türkiye tarihine baktığınızda kadınların karşılaştığı toplumsal adaletsizliğin giderilmesine yönelik en önemli adım/olay nedir? / What was the major step / event against the social injustice which women face in Turkey?*
13. *Derneğinizin sosyal adalet sorununa dair yürüttüğü faaliyetler nelerdir? / What sort of activities does Organization engage in, regarding the question of social justice?*
14. *Derneğinizin/platformunuzun ilişki içinde bulunduğu diğer dernekler/sendikalar/siyasi partiler hangileri? / What other CSOs / trade unions / political parties do you cooperate with?*
15. *Diğer organizasyonlarla birlikte sosyal adalet sorununa dair ortak çalışmalarda buldunuz mu? / Have you ever realized any activity or project with other organizations which you cooperate with?*

APPENDIX B

İSTANBUL KADIN KURULUŞLARI BİRLİĞİ (İKKB) Kuruluşu: 17 Şubat 1995 PROTOKOLU

Biz, aşağıda imzası bulunan kuruluşlar, 1990 yılından beri İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları adı altında birlikte çeşitli eylem ve etkinlikler gerçekleştirdik.

Kadın erkek eşitliği konusundaki duyarlılığımızı topluma yansıtmaya çalıştık. Laiklik, eşitlik ve demokrasi ortak paydamız oldu. Kadının insan haklarının çiğnendiği her durumda tepkimizi büyük bir uyum içinde medyaya ve ilgililere ulaştırdık.

Bu işbirliğini, bundan böyle (17 Şubat 1995) daha da yoğun biçimde “İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği (İKKB)” adı altında sürdürmeye kararlıyız.

İstanbul’daki tüm kadın kuruluşları ve kadın ağırlıklı sivil toplum örgütleriyle şubeleri bu Birliğin doğal üyeleridir.

Birliğin Yürütme Kurulu her yıl dönüşümlü olarak değişen yedi veya dokuz kuruluş başkanından oluşur. Birliğin yürütme kurulu, iletişimi ve etkinlikleri tüm derneklerle, vakıflarla işbirliği içinde sürdürmek üzere görevli ve yetkilidir. Birliğin işleyişini kolaylaştırmak üzere bir koordinatör (başkan) seçilir.

İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği partiler üstü bir topluluktur. Ancak, kadın politikası yapar ve siyasi partilerin kadın komisyonları başkanlarını da doğal üye olarak içerir.

Kuruluş adı:

Başkan:

Temsilci:

Adres:

Tel-faks:

e-posta:

APPENDIX C

GÖKKUŞAĞI İSTANBUL KADIN KURULUŞLARI PLATFORMU (GİKAP) MUTABAKAT TUTANAĞI

Madde 1. Kuruluşun Adı ve Merkezi

Kuruluşun Adı: Gökkuşığı İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu

Kısa Adı: GİKAP

İngilizce Adı: Rainbow Istanbul Women Organizations' Platform

Kuruluş Tarihi: 5 Mayıs 1995

Merkezi: İstanbul

Madde 2. GİKAP'ın Dayanağı

5253 sayılı Dernekler Kanununun 25. maddesinde “Dernekler, amaçları ile ilgisi bulunan ve kanunlarla yasaklanmayan alanlarda, kendi aralarında veya vakıf, sendika ve benzeri sivil toplum kuruluşlarıyla ortak bir amacı gerçekleştirmek üzere ve yetkili organlarının kararı ile platformlar oluşturabilirler” ifadesi yer almaktadır.

T.C.Başbakanlık Kadın Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü (K.S.G.M) “**İl ve Bölge Danışma Platformlarını**, kadın örgütlenmesinde “**yeni bir örgüt kimliği**” olarak tanımlamaktadır. “Bu yapılanmayı, resmi olmayan ama gerçek gücünü bağımsız birimlerin bir araya gelme isteğinden alan yerel/toplumsal bir potansiyeli temsil eden **açık bir örgütlenme düzeyidir, ara örgütlenme birimidir**” şeklinde tarif etmektedir.⁸¹

Madde 3. GİKAP'ın Vizyonu

Toplumsal değişim süreci çerçevesinde, ülkemizde ve dünyada etkileri açısından yaygın ve önemli sosyal problemler yaşanmaktadır.

Vizyonumuz; **gönüllü kadın kuruluşlarının öncelikle kadın ve aile eksenli olmak üzere ortak paydalar çerçevesinde**, proje ve politikaların üretim süreçlerinde aktif rol oynamalarını sağlamak, kadından topluma kadın bakış açısıyla **küresel düşünüp yerel ve özgün çözümler üretmektir.**

⁸¹ İl ve Bölge Danışma Platformlarının **kuruluş amacı, T.C.Hükümeti ile B.M. Kalkınma Programı** çerçevesinde imzalanan bir anlaşma gereği **18.02.1993 tarihli Resmi Gazetede** yayınlanmıştır.

Madde 4. GİKAP'ın Misyonu ve Stratejisi

Platformumuzun **misyonu; kadın, aile ve GİKAP katılımcısı gönüllü kadın kuruluşlarının statüsünü yükseltmektir.** Bu amaçla farklı sahalarda çalışan ve farklı birikimlere sahip **gönüllü kadın kuruluşlarını** periyodik süreçlerde **bir araya getirerek;**

- a. Kadınların aile içinde, ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel hayatta üretken bireyler olmalarını desteklemek,
- b. Temel hak ve özgürlüklerin toplumda yaygınlaşmasını sağlamak,
- c. Yaşam boyu eğitimi teşvik etmek,
- d. Çeşitli sebeplerle aile kurumu dışında kalmış bireylerin (huzurevi, yetiştirme yurdu, sığınma evi vb.) yaşam koşullarını iyileştirmek,
- e. Aile destek hizmetlerini toplumda yaygınlaştırmak,
- f. Kadın ve aileyle ilgili olarak hayatı anlamlandıran her konuyu (sağlık, hukuk, çevre, sanat, spor, medya, etik değerler vb.) çalışma sahası içinde kabul etmek,
- g. Kadın STK'ları desteklemek ve verimliliği artırmaya yönelik proje ve programlar uygulamak,
- h. Özdeğerlerimizi muhafaza etmek, ulusal ve uluslararası platformlarda tanıtmak amacıyla çalışmalar yürütmektir.

Madde 5. GİKAP'ın Yapılanma İlkeleri

- a. Platform çalışmalarını, Mutabakat Tutanağı ve İçyönetmelik çerçevesinde yapmak,
- b. Katılımcıları arzuları dışında herhangi bir göreve zorlamamak,
- c. Katılımcıların bağımsız, özgün yapılarını ve kimliklerini zenginlik kaynağı olarak kabul etmek,
- d. Bireysel ve kurumsal dayatmalardan, otoriter tutumlardan uzak durmak, katılımcılar arasında eşitlik prensibiyle hareket etmek, demokratik kurullarla çalışmak,
- e. Sevgi, saygı ve hoşgörü ortamını muhafaza etmek.

Madde 6. GİKAP'ın Çalışma Biçimi:

Vizyonu ve misyonu doğrultusunda,

- a. Katılımcı kuruluş temsilcilerini aylık düzenli toplantılarla bir araya getirerek istişare zemini hazırlamak, yurt içi ve yurt dışı iletişim ve bilgi akışı sağlamak,
- b. Ortak çalışmalar kapsamında Alt Çalışma Grupları, Komisyonlar ve Koordinasyon Kurulları oluşturmak,
- c. Programlar (eğitim programları, konferans, panel, sergi, gezi, sempozyum vb.) düzenlemek,

- d. Bilgi ve belge arşivi oluşturmak, çalışmalarını bülten, yıllık katalog, internet vb. aracılığı ile ilgililere duyurmak,
- e. **Ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde,**
- Platformun “Ortak Görüş” belgelerini temsilciler veya iletişim kanalları aracılığıyla sunmak,
 - Yönetim Grubu’nun GİKAP adına destek kararı aldığı ve ortak çalışma kabul ettiği projeleri, sorumluluk alan kuruluşları belirterek ulusal ve uluslararası düzeye taşımak,
 - Mutabakat Tutanağında belirlenmiş ilkeler çerçevesinde çatı örgütlerde yer almak,
 - Düzenlenen etkinliklere katılmak,
 - Savunuculuk yapmak.

Madde 7. GİKAP’a Katılım

Amaç ve ilkeleri **GİKAP’ın vizyon ve misyonuna uygun kadın sivil toplum kuruluşları** (dernek, vakıf, girişim grubu, meslek grupları, dernek ve vakıfların kadın kol, komite ve komisyonları, federasyon, konfederasyon, platform, sendika, kooperatif vb.), **GİKAP** katılımcıları **arasında yer alabilirler.**

GİKAP Katılımcısı Olma Prosedürü

- a. Kuruluşlar “GİKAP Katılımcı Başvuru Formu”nu doldurur. Formda belirtilen belgeleri GİKAP sekreterine teslim eder. Eksiklikler tamamlanmaya kadar katılım başvurusu Yönetim Grubunun gündemine girmez.
- b. Belgelerin tamamlanmasını takiben ilk Platform Meclisi toplantısında katılımcı başvurusu görüşülür, Yönetim Grubunun $\frac{3}{4}$ oyçokluğu ile karara bağlanır. Başvuru talebi en geç üç ay içinde cevaplanır. Bu cevap, olumlu veya olumsuz olabileceği gibi, katılım talebinde bulunan kuruluşun tanınmasına yönelik bir süreci de kapsayabilir.

Madde 8. GİKAP Yapılanması/Organları

- 1) GİKAP Katılımcıları/Katılımcı Temsilcileri/Platform Meclisi
 - i. Yönetim Grubu
 - ii. Haber Ağı Grubu
- 2) Alt Çalışma Grubu
- 3) Komisyon
- 4) Koordinasyon Kurulu

Madde 8.1. GİKAP Katılımcıları/GİKAP Katılımcı Kuruluş Temsilcileri/Platform Meclisi

GİKAP Katılımcıları, **katılım prosedürünü** yerine getirmiş olan gönüllü kadın kuruluşlarıdır. Bu kuruluşlar tarafından belirlenen kişiler, kurumlarını GİKAP’ta

Yönetim Grubu veya Haber Ağı Grubu statüsünde temsil ederler. Platform Meclisi, katılımcı temsilcilerinin tümünden oluşur.

GİKAP Katılımcı Kuruluşlarının Görev ve Sorumlulukları:

- a. Katılımcı statüsü devam ettiği sürece GİKAP Mutabakat Tutanağı ve içtüzüğünü dikkate almak,
- b. Temsilcilerinin, “Yönetim Grubu” veya “Haber Ağı Grubu”nda yer almasına karar vermek,
- c. Katılım prosedürünü eksiksiz yerine getirmek,
- d. GİKAP Katılımcısı olmanın kadın STK'lara kazandırdığı ulusal ve uluslararası statünün bilinciyle temsilcilerini seçmek, katılımı devamlılığı sağlamak, temsilci değişikliğini bildirmek,
- e. GİKAP'tan gelen rapor ve belgeleri gelen evrak statüsünde kaydetmek, kuruluşunun yetkili ve ilgili organlarını bilgilendirmek,
- f. İçinde yer aldığı ulusal ve uluslararası GİKAP ortak etkinliklerini -talep ettiği takdirde- kendi kuruluşunun faaliyetleri arasında zikretmek,
- g. GİKAP'ın düzenlediği faaliyetleri kurumsal olarak desteklemek,
- h. GİKAP web sayfasında iletişim bilgileri ve faaliyetleriyle yer almak,
- i. GİKAP adı zikredilerek yapılması planlanan ve katılımcı kuruluşlardan onay⁸² istenen konularda (bildiri, yürüyüş, basın toplantısı vb. kritik etkinlikler), yetkili kurulunun görüşünü güncelliği kaybetmeden ivedilikle GİKAP'a bildirmek,
- j. Yetki verildiği konular dışında GİKAP adına sözlü-yazılı beyanat vermemek, etkinlik düzenlememek.

Katılımcı Kuruluş Temsilcilerinin Görev ve Sorumlulukları:

- a. Aylık Platform Meclisi toplantılarına temsilcisi olduğu kuruluş adına düzenli olarak katılmak⁸³,
- b. GİKAP'ta sunulan rapor ve belgeleri gelen evrak statüsünde kuruluşuna iletmek, GİKAP çalışmaları hakkında kurumunu düzenli olarak bilgilendirmek,
- c. Yönetim Grubu tarafından verilen ve kendisinin de onayladığı görevleri yerine getirmek,
- d. Platform giderlerine Yönetim Grubu kararları doğrultusunda katkıda bulunmak,
- e. GİKAP'ı yazılı ve ortak metinler üzerinden tanıtmak, GİKAP ortak etkinliklerini desteklemek ve duyurmak,
- f. GİKAP Mutabakat Tutanağı veya İçyönetmeliğine aykırı davranışlarda bulunmamak ve yetki verilmediği konularda GİKAP adının zikredildiği sözlü-yazılı beyanat vermemek ve etkinlik düzenlememek,
- g. GİKAP merkezinde bulunan “STK Kütüphanesinden” ve “GİKAP Arşivinden” belirlenmiş ilkeler çerçevesinde yararlanmak.

⁸² Bkz Mutabakat Tutanağı Madde 10

⁸³ Temsilcilerin –mazeretleri dışında- bir yılda gerçekleşen Platform Meclisi Toplantılarının 2/3'ne katılması gerekir. Ayrıca bkz Madde 8.1.b.f

Madde 8.1.i. GİKAP Yönetim Grubu

GİKAP'ın en yetkili karar organıdır. Mutabakat Tutanağı ve İcra Yönetmelik çerçevesinde çalışır. Yönetim Grubuna katılma talebi onaylanan kadın kuruluşlarının temsilcilerinden (bir asil ve bir yedek) oluşur. Asil ve yedek iki temsilci Platform Meclisine **birlikte veya tek olarak yer alabilirler, ancak asil üyelerin oy hakkı bulunur.**

Yönetim Grubunda Karar Alma

- a. Yönetim Grubu, kararın niteliğine göre salt çoğunluk, oyçokluğu veya oy birliği ile karar alır.
 - Salt Çoğunluk: Yönetim Grubu hazirununun⁸⁴ yarısından bir fazlasının oylarını ifade eder. Platform Meclisi toplantısı (gündeminin onayı, toplantı gün, yer ve saatinin değişimi vb.), Platform Meclisi binası, sekreteryanın işleyişi, sosyo-kültürel etkinlikler vb. konularda salt çoğunluk aranır.
 - Oyçokluğu: Yönetim Grubunun $\frac{3}{4}$ ünün onayını ifade eder. “Genel Koordinatör”, “Genel Koordinatör Vekili”, “Genel Koordinatörlük İstişare Grubu”, GİKAP Danışmanları, temsilci belirlenmesi, yeni katılımcı kabulü, projelerin GİKAP adına desteklenmesi ve işbirliği kararı, disiplin ve prosedür ihlalleri vb. durumlarda oyçokluğu aranır.
 - Oy birliği: **Hem Yönetim Grubunda yer alan üyelerin hem de temsilcisi oldukları kurumların yetkili organlarının** tümünün onayını ifade eder. GİKAP adı zikredilerek yapılacak, bildiri yayınlama, basın toplantısı düzenleme gibi çok önemli kritik kararların oylanmasında aranır.
- b. Aksine bir karar alınmadıkça oylamalar açık usulle yapılır.
- c. Kararlarda çekimser kalanlar veya kararları onaylamayanlar muhalefet şerhlerini belirtirler.
- d. **Arka arkaya iki toplantıya mazeretsiz olarak katılmayan Yönetim Grubu üyelerinin alınan kararları onaylandığı kabul edilir.**

Madde 8.1.ii. GİKAP Haber Ağı Grubu

Haber Ağı Grubuna katılma talebi onaylanan kadın kuruluşlarının temsilcilerinden (bir asil ve bir yedek) oluşur. Mutabakat Tutanağı ve İcra Yönetmelik çerçevesinde çalışır. Asil ve yedek iki temsilci Platform Meclisine **birlikte veya tek olarak katılabilirler. Haber Ağı Grubu, tüm GİKAP çalışmalarında Yönetim Grubu ile eşit söz hakkına sahiptir, ancak oylamalara katılmazlar.**

Haber Ağı Grubu statüsündeki Girişim Grupları, “GİKAP Girişim Grupları Merkez (GİKAP GGM)’ini adres olarak kullanabilir; telefon ve faksını iletişim bilgileri olarak gösterebilirler. Bu durumda giderlere katkı sağlarlar. **Talep ettikleri durumda prosedür doğrultusunda GİKAP Yönetim Grubuna geçiş yapabilirler.**

⁸⁴ Platform Meclisi Toplantı gününde hazır olanlar

Madde 8.2. Alt Çalışma Grupları⁸⁵

Yönetim Grubu tarafından GİKAP adına desteklenmesi kararı alınmış bir proje veya konu çerçevesinde en az iki GİKAP katılımcısının bir araya gelerek sorumluluk almasıyla oluşur.

Madde 8.3. Komisyonlar⁸⁶

GİKAP Ana Komisyonları:

- a. Aile Komisyonu
- b. Kadın Komisyonu
- c. Çocuk Komisyonu
- d. Genç Komisyonu
- e. Yaşlı Komisyonu
- f. Özürlü Komisyonu
- g. Sosyo-Kültürel Etkinlikler Komisyonu
- h. Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Komisyonu
- i. Uluslararası İlişkiler Komisyonu'dur.

Gereği halinde Yönetim Grubu kararı ile farklı konu başlıklarında geçici veya devamlı komisyonlar oluşturulabilir.⁸⁷

Madde 8.4. Koordinasyon Kurulu

Koordinasyon Kurulları **makro projelerde, GİKAP katılımcıları ile GİKAP dışı kurum ve kişiler** (kamu kurum ve kuruluşları, yerel yönetimler, üniversiteler, akademisyenler, uzmanlar, aynı sahada çalışan STK'lar vb.) **arasında işbirliği ve koordinasyon** sağlar. Gereği halinde Yönetim Grubu kararı ile geçici veya devamlı Koordinasyon Kurulları oluşturulabilir.

Madde 9. GİKAP' da Görev Alan Yetkililer

- 1) Genel Koordinatör/Vekili
- 2) Genel Koordinatörlük İstişare Grubu
- 3) Sekreter
- 4) GİKAP Gözlemcisi
- 5) GİKAP Temsilcisi
- 6) Danışman

⁸⁵ Bkz İçyönetmelik Madde 4

⁸⁶ Bkz İçyöneymelik Madde 5

⁸⁷ İçyönetmelik, Madde 5

Madde 9.1. Genel Koordinatör/Vekili⁸⁸

GİKAP'ı temsil eden en yetkili kişidir. Ulusal ve uluslararası etkinliklerde başkanlık statüsü arandığında GİKAP'ı bu konumda temsil eder. Mutabakat Tutanağı ve İyönetmeliğe bağlı olarak çalışır. Yönetim Grubuna karşı sorumludur. GİKAP Organları arasında koordinasyonu sağlar. Kamu kurumları, üniversiteler, yerel yönetimler, STK'lar vb. kurum ve kişilerle GİKAP arasındaki bağlantıyı kurar. Yönetim Grubunun $\frac{3}{4}$ oyçokluğu ile iki yıl süre için seçilir. Genel Koordinatör olmadığı durumlarda Genel Koordinatör Vekili aynı yetki ve sorumlulukla görev yapar.

Madde 9.2. Genel Koordinatörlük İstişare Grubu

“Genel Koordinatörlük İstişare Grubu”; GİKAP çalışmalarında bilgi ve tecrübe sahibi üç kişiden oluşur. İhtiyaç duyulan durumlarda Genel Koordinatörün istişare edeceği gruptur. Yönetim Grubu tarafından bir yıl süre için seçilir. **İstişare edilecek konular**; Mutabakat Tutanağı ve İktüzük bağlamında veya Yönetim Grubunun belirleyeceği spesifik başlıklar çerçevesinde gerçekleşir. Grubun önerileri tavsiye niteliğindedir.

Madde 9.3. Sekreter⁸⁹

GİKAP Sekreteri Genel Koordinatörün teklifi ve/veya Platform Meclisi hazirununun salt çoğunluğunun onayı ile görevlendirilir. Sekreter, Genel Koordinatöre bağlı olarak çalışır. Görevlendirme doğrultusunda kayıt, dosyalama, iletişim vb. çalışmaları yürütür, GİKAP etkinliklerinde aktif görev alır.

Madde 9.4 GİKAP Gözlemcisi

Yönetim Grubu veya Genel Koordinatör tarafından görevlendirilir. Etkinliklere, GİKAP adına gözlemci/dinleyici olarak iştirak eder, raporlarını Genel Koordinatöre iletir. GİKAP Katılımcısı olma şartı yoktur Platformun onaylanmış metinleri dışında fikir beyan edemez.

Madde 9.5. GİKAP Temsilcisi

GİKAP Mutabakat Tutanağında doğrultusunda Platform Meclisi'nin ‘ortak metinleri’ ve ortak görüşünden hareketle, temsil görevi yapar. GİKAP Katılımcısı olma şartı yoktur. GİKAP Yönetim Grubu hazirununun oyçokluğu ile seçilir. Üstlendiği göreve ait bilgileri Genel Koordinatöre raporlar. Görevi GİKAP Yönetim Grubu kararları doğrultusunda sürekli veya konu/zamanla sınırlıdır.

Madde 9.6. GİKAP Danışmanı

Gerekli görülen konu başlıklarında GİKAP çalışmalarına danışmanlık hizmeti veren uzman kişidir. GİKAP Yönetim Grubunun $\frac{3}{4}$ oyçokluğuyla belirlenir. Danışmanlık hizmeti kapsamında yapılan görüşme ve çalışmalar Genel Koordinatör tarafından aylık raporlarla sunulur. Görevi GİKAP Yönetim Grubu kararları doğrultusunda sürekli veya

⁸⁸ İyönetmelik Madde 6

⁸⁹ Bkz İyönetmelik Madde 7

konu/zamanla sınırlıdır.

Madde 10. GİKAP Adına Bildiri Yayınlanması/Basın Toplantısı Düzenlenmesi

GİKAP adı zikredilerek yapılması düşünülen ve katılımcıları **olumsuz yönde etkileme** ihtimali olan faaliyetlerde (bildiri yayınlamak, basın toplantısı, yürüyüş vb.) tüm Yönetim Grubunun mensup olduğu STK'ların yetkili organlarının onayı gerekir. Ortak metin veya faaliyetin hazırlanması ve onaylanması sürecinde GİKAP ve GİKAP katılımcılarının güncelliği kaybetmeden hızlı hareket etmeleri beklenir. Bu etkinliklerde onay vermeyen tek bir katılımcı kuruluş bile olsa GİKAP adı kullanılamaz ve yapılan etkinlik yalnızca onaylayan kuruluşların isimleriyle gerçekleşir.

Madde 11. GİKAP Giderlerinin Karşlanması ve Gelir Kaynakları

Giderler; sponsorlar tarafından karşılanır. Gerekğinde Yönetim Grubu kararıyla temsilcilerin katkı payı belirlenir.

Madde 12. Mutabakat Tutanağı ve İçyönetmeliğinin Değiştirilmesi

Değişiklikler, Yönetim Grubunun $\frac{3}{4}$ oyçokluğuyla yapılır.

Madde 13. GİKAP'tan Çıkma/Çıkarılma/Uyarı

Her Katılımcı kuruluş; bağlı bulunduğu Yönetim Kurulu veya yetkili organının yazılı bildirimini ile GİKAP'tan ayrılma hakkına sahiptir. Dilekçesi Genel Koordinatöre ulaştığı anda çıkış işlemleri sonuçlanmış sayılır.

GİKAP Mutabakat Tutanağı/İçyönetmeliğe aykırı davranışlarda bulunan, yetki verilmediği halde GİKAP adına sözlü-yazılı beyanat veren, bir yıl içinde görev ve sorumluluğunu yerine getirmeyen katılımcı temsilcileri ve kuruluşları; Yönetim Grubunun $\frac{3}{4}$ oyçokluğu ile sözlü/yazılı uyarılır veya GİKAP'tan çıkarılma kararı alınabilir.

Ayrıca **mevcut yöneticileri/atadıkları temsilciler kanun dışı, ayırıcı, bölücü, yıkıcı vb. faaliyetlerden hüküm giymiş STK'ların ve temsilcilerinin GİKAP'la ilişkisi kesilir.**

Madde14. Platformun Feshi

GİKAP Yönetim Grubunun $\frac{3}{4}$ oyçokluğunun kararı ile Platform feshedilir.

Madde 15. Yürürlüğe Girme Tarihi

GİKAP Mutabakat Tutanağı Mart 2009 itibariyle yürürlüğe girmiştir.

Geçici Madde

Mutabakat Tutanağı yürürlüğe girmeden önce GİKAP'ta katılımcı statüsünde bulunurlar, Mart 2009'dan itibaren Yönetim veya Haber Ağı Grubuna dâhil olmadıkları durumlarda, aylık Platform Meclisi toplantılarına dinleyici olarak katılabilirler.

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