THE OTTOMAN SAYS: “TO HELL WITH THE SERBS”: TROUBLESOME COEXISTENCE IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY BELGRADE THROUGH THE EYES OF TWO CONTEMPORARIES

BELGRÂDÎ RÂŞID AND NIKOLA HRISTIĆ AS SPOKESMEN FOR RESPECTIVE SIDES

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ABSTRACT

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The present study introduces the work of Belgrâdî Râşid, an Ottoman Muslim author writing in 19th-century Belgrade. His chronicle Ta'rih-i Vaq'a-i Hayretnîmâ-i Belgrad ve Sirbistân (the second volume) represents a unique source for the history of mid-century Belgrade and the paşalîk a decade prior to the final departure of the Ottomans from the city in 1867. Its value becomes even more evident once we acknowledge the fact that the work espouses an Ottoman viewpoint of events which eventually led the Empire to the opposite of a conquest, the abandonment of the city to the Serbs. As a counterpart and a challenge to Râşid’s narrative, the “Memoirs” of yet another beholder of the time, the Serbian official Nikola Hristić, will be brought in. The possibility to inspect two accounts written by two people, who lived in the same city in the same period, but on opposite sides, renders our task even more appealing.

I have divided this study into three chapters. The first chapter, separated into three sections, will acquaint the reader with the subject matter, Râşid’s and Hristić’s backgrounds, and will provide a (short) literature survey on the topic in question. With a view to providing a better understanding of the period, the second chapter will relate the relevant background information. It aims at summarizing the major political developments of the first four decades of the 19th century and at illustrating aspects of everyday life in Belgrade during that period. Finally, the history of the agitated 1850s in
Belgrade, as seen through the eyes of Belgradī Rāṣīd and Nikola Hristić, will be illustrated in the last, the third chapter. The emphasis will be put on his depiction of the Muslim-Serbian relations and its repercussions on the everyday life in this period when the roles viable by this time had started changing.

Müslüman ve Sırlar arasındaki ilişkilere ve bu ilişkilerin o zamana deťın süregelen toplumsal rollerin değişmeye başladığı bir dönemde günlük hayata nasıl yansıdığını vurgu yapılacaktır.
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To Istanbul: “ever thine, ever mine, ever ours”
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INTRODUCTION

One kind of history is the history of opinions; but this is little more than a compilation of human errors."  
Voltaire

In an attempt to define the Alltagsgeschichte- the history of everyday life- Alf Lüdtke states: “In doing the history of everyday life, attention is focused not just on the deeds (and misdeeds) and pageantry of the great, the masters of the church and the state. Rather, central to the thrust of everyday historical analysis is the life and survival of those who have remained largely anonymous in history- the “nameless” multitudes in their workaday trials and tribulations, their occasional outbursts or dépenses.” In other words, as the author asserts, in this kind of scrutiny “the individual emerges as actors on the social stage” with all his/her loves and hates, quarrels and mutual cooperation, memories, anxieties and hopes for the future. Lüdtke underlines that the scope of microhistory encompasses case studies, these being the investigations of individual biographies, or, rather often individual local context (villages, city neighbourhoods).

When applied to our case study this formulation of everyday life history puts our Râşid and Nikola on the stage as individuals who are writing a narrative based on their memories, loves, hates and hopes for the future. And indeed, despite the fact that they were not exactly the “nameless” entities but enjoyed certain privileges on their respective sides, these main two sources to be used in this study, depict rather vividly the society they lived in. Those perspectives include both their individual biographies


3 Ibid., p.3-4.

and the personal imprint in the “local context.” Regardless of their opposite standpoints, they provide us with the background of the prevailing affairs in Belgrade at the period. It is up to those who read the narratives to inquire about and get acquainted with their backgrounds as well as the special conditions and circumstances that produced their different outlooks.

Yet another scholar writing on everyday life history, Edward Muir, puts forward the following questions:

“By what criteria are names to be picked out and how representative of broader social trends and collective mentalities are the subjects’ activities and thoughts? What can few tell about many and how can historians concerned with trifles avoid producing trivial history?”

By way of answering the abovementioned questions, it should be pointed out that the two sources at our disposal are, to the best of our knowledge, the only primary sources of the kind for the period in question. It is not news that Belgrade was a city of frequent turmoil in the mid-nineteenth century.

“Belgrade was the [Ottoman] empire martial, crenellated, bastioned, violent: so that as late as 1848, when a German visitor crossed the Danube his first impression of the city was of the castle, in a state of serious disrepair, but still garrisoned by Turks, though the whole country around was self-governing Serbia.”

The passage above briefly summarizes the essence of the period under investigation with all its complexity. Still an Ottoman city, mid-nineteenth-century Belgrade was the stage for the events that were indicative of ever-growing Ottoman decline. But it is Râşid’s and Nikola’s interpretation of this “violent castle in a state of serious disrepair”

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that helps us to obtain an insight into everyday life in the city, especially concerning the Ottoman-Serbian relations at the time, which is the focus of this work.

Yet, without getting familiar with their backgrounds, as already mentioned, no serious inspection of the sources is possible. Taking into consideration their positions in the city, and assuming their interest in writing the account properly might aid us to grasp to what extent they as a “few” can tell us about “many.” Simply put, was Râşid’s animosity towards Serbs a feeling shared by the whole Muslim community? Or, as a state official, does Hristić’s apprehension of certain issues reflect the viewpoint of the ordinary/common Serb, or simply a state policy?

The so-called history of attitudes has been, as Suraiya Faroqhi asserts, an important aspect “in the reinvigoration of European cultural history and involves searching for traces of those people who seldom wrote.”\(^7\) In the realm of Ottoman history, as Faroqhi asserts, this process is especially beneficial from the late seventeenth century.\(^8\) The most common topics in this regard are, as she claims, cultural conflicts and social tensions. The same is valid for the present accounts as well. The question is in what manner does the picture of the Muslim-Christian (or Jewish or any other) relations in the previous centuries differ from that of the nineteenth century suggested by Râşid and Hristić? That being said,

“Stereotypes present distorted and inaccurate pictures of Ottoman subjects living in sharply divided, mutually impenetrable, religious communities called millets that date back to the fifteenth century. In this incorrect view, each community lived apart, in isolation from one another, adjacent but separate. And supposedly implacable hatreds prevailed: Muslims hated Christians who hated Jews who hated Christians who hated Muslims. Recent scholarship shows this view to be fundamentally wrong on almost every score. To begin with, the term millet as a designator


\(^8\) Ibid., p.11.
for Ottoman non-Muslims is not ancient but
dates from the reign of Sultan Mahmut II.”

During the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839), it is important to acknowledge, many
significant events took place in Serbia: from the Revolution(s) to semi-independence in
the year of 1830. The Serbs started to obtain international support and privileges while
the Ottomans’ supremacy was at stake. And it is this change that stands out as a major
facet of these new conditions when compared to the previous centuries when the
Ottomans were the absolute authority. The joint life, therefore, could not have remained
the same. Thus, in Râşid’s view, the Serbs were damnable people who incessantly
performed misdeeds in order to harm the Muslim population. For Hristić, the “Turks”
were supposed to obey; pașas were to accept the change in power. The “Turks” seem to
be doing neither of these things.

In what follows, both accounts will be inspected in terms of the issue of mutual life
in the city of Belgrade in the 1850s. That they are biased is somewhat expected due to
specific circumstances of the epoch. As much as we regard both accounts as “the
compilation of human errors” for their being purely histories of opinion, their value as
unique sources for the period cannot be denied.

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9 Quataert, Donald., The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922., Cambridge University Press.,
Chapter I

How Does “Mel’anet” Translate?

1.1. Approaching the topic: “Tell the truth and substantiate it”

The prominent Ottoman historian of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Naima, had specified seven principles as an ideal of how history should be written. It seems that Râşid had failed at applying the very first one of these. He wrote his work as a dialog between two brothers, Akil and Nakil Beys, not accepting any other responsibility but that of being a simple notary, listening and writing down the stories he had been told.

There is no doubt, as Râşid’s interlocutor Akil Bey asserts in the preface of the first volume, that all the events of the period in question will be written down by other people as well. However, he continues, those people will make use of the official documents; thereby the real truth will be hidden behind the curtain of gifts and flattering. In the introduction of the second volume, in the same manner Râşid underlines the value and importance of the history of Akil and Nakil Bey, for it had been recounted straightforwardly and with no fear.

Nonetheless, the question of why does Râşid write his history in dialogue and why, for that matter, does he choose the names Akil and Nakil Bey for his interlocutors can be raised. Definite answers cannot be undoubtedly determined, but some arguments, nevertheless, could be offered.

Selim Aslantaş asserts that “the structure of the work follows a common form used in classical Eastern literature and is based on the conversations of imaginary

characters in the form of questions and answers.” Moreover, having that while writing his work Râşid puts forward some issues rather bluntly, it might be that by introducing the two brothers, he wanted to fend himself off from any possible trouble this kind of conduct could have caused to him. In addition, on many occasions he talks about “Râşid Bey” and praises his deeds. The easiest way for that, it seems, was to put the words in the mouth of some other people.

As far as the names are concerned, the meanings of both Akil and Nakil Bey when looked up at the dictionary bring about no special clues in this regard. “Akil” stands for “rational, intelligent”, and this is, let us be reminded, the brother asking the questions. “Nakil”, furthermore, means “conductor/ narrator/ translator/ adapter/ transport(ing)/ transfer(ring). This brother’s answers, therefore, are to be regarded as a transfer of information, a narrative, to provide us with necessary data. It would be only speculation to go beyond this assumption.

“The real truth is hard to reach,” affirms Serbian official Nikola Hristić in the introduction of “The Memoirs.” As a spokesman of the Serbian authorities and someone who had an opportunity to take part in resolving many disputes among the population of Belgrade at the time, he decided upon “recording some events of the period of his service.”

Understanding Râşid’s “truth” is conditioned by, firstly, recognizing the very circumstances he was living under and, secondly, by seizing the “mission” he had undertaken by writing the work proper. I will deal with these issues in the second and the third chapters, respectively.

A multiethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious empire, for which the Ottoman Empire was an excellent example, seemed not to stand a chance to confront properly the challenges posed by modernity. The enlightenment, rising nation states and revolutions in Europe, along with the Balkan nationalisms, forced the Ottomans to fight internal and external pressures during the entire nineteenth century. As Bernard Lewis summarizes: "Fundamentally, the Ottoman Empire had remained or reverted to a medieval state, with

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a medieval mentality and a medieval economy -- but with the added burden of a bureaucracy and a standing army which no medieval state had ever had to bear. In a world of rapidly modernizing states it had little chance of survival." 13 This is reflected in the international treaties already from the late 17th century: Carlowitz 1699 (the first time the Ottomans sign a treaty as the defeated power), Passarovitz 1718 (first concessions of territory), Küçük Kaynarca 1774 (first concession of Muslim-majority territory). Moreover, the rise of derebeys in Anatolia at the beginning of the 18th century and the rise of ayans in the Balkans as an increasingly independent nobility indicated the imminence of the changes needed to lead the Empire on its way to modernization. Despite the fact that some reforms were attempted already in the eighteenth century, the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire continued throughout the entire nineteenth century. The “Serbian Question” was yet another challenge for the already weakened Ottoman Empire to deal with. From the beginning of the century it kept the Ottomans “busy” resisting the Serbs’ challenges to the authority of the Empire. Thus, it may come as no surprise that one Ottoman Muslim, living in Belgrade at the time when Serbia was rebelling against the Empire, speaks about the Serbs with so much hatred.

Consequently, in an effort to reveal Râşid’s “mission” the starting point could be the basic assumption that his only aim would had been to leave in writing a proof of the Serbs’ “mel’anets.” The feeling of victimization on the one side and a depiction of the “me’lun” enemy on the other might have been his way to win at losing.

1.2 Bringing Râşid and Nikola in: “Disregard the False Tales Current Among the Common Folk”

Râşid and Nikola, as our spokesmen, are to be introduced in this section of the chapter. Disregarding the false tales current among the common folk, in our case, is not an easy task to pursue. Although both of them enjoyed certain privileges on the respective sides and were not exactly the members of the “common folk” (Râşid close to a paşa, Hristić the chief of police), their stories are equally biased.

The translator of the first volume, Čohadžić writes:

“On the cover of this (note) book and at the end of the conversation between Akil and Nakil Bey, it is indicated that this is the first volume. I have been searching for the second one, but with no success. In summer 1892, when I was consul in Thessaloniki, I met the German consul Mr. Mordtmann, an expert on the Turkish literature. One day, as we were talking on that topic, he showed me this very book of Râşid’s, saying that, being a Serb, I would be interested in reading it. After telling him that I have already translated the book into Serbian, I complained about not being able to find the second volume. Then he told me that the other one has not been published and advised me not to waste my time looking for it. Also, Yusuf Ağa, the attorney in Thessaloniki, a man very knowledgeable, asserted me that the writer did not hand out the second volume. Since I have been confidently informed that Râşid Bey died in Istanbul a several years ago, it is getting less likely that his other book on the recent Serbian history, if he had written it at all, will ever see the world.”

And yet, we do have the second volume in our hands. After one hundred and sixteen years of waiting, Râşid finally has a chance to be heard again.

Both volumes have been little utilised and worked on. To the best of my knowledge, only Čohadžić’s translation of the first volume, one (unpretentious) transliteration of the second volume (neither with any interpretation) and two articles (one in Serbian and one in English) present the only literature we have on Belgradî Râşid. The rest of the bibliography consists primarily of the sources that only mention his Hayretnûmâ with no special references to the work itself.

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The list of the bibliography on Râşid’s work is best assessed by Professor Selim Aslantaş, on the website: The Historians of the Ottoman Empire. To that list a several references more should be added.

(2) Ta’rîhce-i İbretnûma Manuscript: (1) Istanbul Atatürk Library, Muallim Cevdet O-3; 22 fols. (52 numbered pages), 25 lines, talik.

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1. Prime Minister’s Archives (Istanbul) [Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA)], A. MKT. UM, 414/100, 417/49, 521/41. BOA, İrade, Dahiliye, 50784.
Unpublished PhD Dissertation (Hacettepe University, 2005).
10. Rhoads Murphey: “The city of Belgrade in the early years of Ottoman-Serbian self-rule and dual administration with the Ottomans: Vignettes from Râşid’s history illuminating the transformation of a Muslim metropolis of the Balkans.”

11. The Historians of the Ottoman Empire (online database) : www.ottomanhistorians.com

The first volume of Hayretnûma encompasses the events from the period between 1217-65/1802-49, and the second volume deals with the period between 1265-77/1848-61. The work also includes an addendum entitled Ta’rihçe-i İbretnûma written in 1288/1871-72. Both editions are written, as already mentioned, in a form of a dialogue between the two brothers, Akil and Nakil Beys. One of them, namely Akil Bey, anticipating the “unfortunate” destiny of Belgrade, leaves for Cairo in the year 1825 entrusting his property to his brother. Some decades later, probably between 1862 and 1867, Nakil Bey joins his brother in Cairo and starts recounting to Akil Bey all the events that had happened in Belgrade from his departure hitherto.

Information on Râşid’s life is scarce, but still sufficient for us to grasp his posture and position in the city of Belgrade at the time. Even though Selim Aslantaş asserts that Râşid Bey was of Bosnian origin, Novaković states that we cannot know with certainty if he belonged to a “real Ottoman family” or was to a “converted Slavic one.” Despite the fact that genealogy of Râşid’s family is well known, it does not help us to establish, Novaković continues, if they were of “Turkish” or a “Slavic” blood. “There were many of those Christians who accepted the Muslim faith only for the material convenience, thereby betraying their (Christian) faith.” What is certain, however, is that he had a family in Bosnia which he had been supporting as much as he could.

Râşid Bey was not a wealthy man, but he did live better than “all the other Turks in Belgrade”, Novaković affirms. He owned a big mansion, a “real Turkish konak”, with a

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6. The Poster (from the beneficial balo in 1861 representing (among the others) the amount of Râşid’s donation to the Serbian hospital).
17 Selim Aslantaş., on Râşid at: The Historians of the Ottoman Empire. www.ottomanhistorians.com
18 For all the data on Râşid’s life available, see: Aslantaş (online) and Stojan Novaković, “O ovoj knjizi i pisci njenu.” (Introduction, V-IX).
huge library filled with “the Serbian and the Turkish books”. Râşid was “one of those rare people in Belgrade who wore the cloths of the European, Istanbul fashion.” He was literate and interested in making maps. Nikola Hristić mentions him in “The Memoirs” as “a simple citizen” who lived on his own income and as a person very close to the paşa.”

Râşid served as fiscal director and accountant under the command of the wardens of Belgrade and used to partake in managing disputes between Serbs and Muslims. In 1852, Râşid left his family in Belgrade and moved to Bosnia to serve the paşa and returned to Belgrade 1858. In 1860 Belgradî Râşid was invited to Istanbul to participate in sessions of the Council of Reforms (Meclis-i Tanzimat) regarding the çiftliks in Bosnia.

It is also very well known, as Novaković underlines, that he was resentful towards Miloš Obrenović and the whole Obrenović dynasty, but was considered a friend of the Knez Aleksandar Karadjordjević and well accepted in his circle (this may be the case due to the fact that policies Aleksandar pursued were in many regards “turkophilic”).

When in 1862 the Muslim population left the city of Belgrade leaving only the soldiers there, Râşid Bey had left too. He joined his friend Osman Paşa in Sarajevo, where he kept on following the developments in Belgrade “with all the hatred as he did before.”

Belgradî Râşid died in Istanbul ca. 1882-83. He held the rank of paşa and earned a Mecidiye medal of the third degree.

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19 Novaković, p. VI
20 Ibid., p. VI
21 Hristić, p.439.
22 Aslantaş, The Historians of the Ottoman Empire.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Novaković, p. VIII.
26 Aslantaş, The Historians of the Ottoman Empire.
“His complex sentences did not make my job any easier,” admits Čohadžić and continues: “Sometimes I would ask my friends in Istanbul and Thessaloniki to help me unthread certain points, but very often they could not manage it either. In such instances I would feel like giving it up, but then again, it would occur to me what a pity it would be to let this source of our recent history remain unknown.”

And indeed, the same is valid for the second volume. Not only Râşid’s complex sentences, but the flashbacks and digressions, as well as the fact that the years/dates are seldom specified renders the reading of this source a great challenge to undertake. Moreover, the lack of sources, at least to a certain extent similar to Hayretnûma, leaves us no possibility to make any comparison in an attempt to resolve the contradictions or unclear sections.

In addition to his failure to present all the events methodologically, Râşid did not divide his work into definite/specific topics either. In an effort to differentiate the issues which Râşid addressed in his narrative at least roughly, it might be said that there are four main subject matters. One of them would be his perception of the Russian interference regarding the Balkans, especially the Serbian question. To this effect, of a certain concern to Râşid is also the manner in which rest of Europe intervened into this issue. Furthermore, the internal turmoil among the Serbian officials and dynastic struggles as one of the main features of the period in question keep Râşid busy throughout a significant portion of his work. The third point that Râşid paid considerable attention to is the period of time which he spent in Bosnia, and the policies of Bosnian pașas which they implemented (mostly) regarding the land tenures (çiftlik). The forth issue is of the main interest to our study, that being the joint life of the Muslims and Serbs in Belgrade at the time. Since the topics are mutually intertwined, it is not possible to make even a short summary of the work. Rather, reading, understanding, and analysing Râşid’s account would resemble putting the puzzle together.

As historians, we ought to listen to all sides involved. Râşid’s work is far from dispassionate and that should be kept in mind. Undoubtedly we can “disregard the false tales” within his work. He recorded many details as a witness of the changes that he, as a member of a Muslim population, went through until he was finally forced to leave the

27 Novaković., p. VI.
city he had been living in. By examining his descriptions, we will obtain a somewhat distinct dimension of the events that will certainly supplement the knowledge on the topic we have had hitherto.

At the end of the introduction in the first volume, Stojan Novaković wrote:

“... Râşid would be surprised to see that, while there is a little interest for his work in Turkey, it is being published by those against whom it was written with so much hatred...
And that would be our revenge to him!”

To that effect, we pay respect to Râşid by giving this study the title that best reflects the essence of his Hayretnûmâ. And “mel’anet” translates as a “damnable act” or “büyük kötülük.” It seems to be our duty to acknowledge it and remain faithful to Râşid’s work.

“The Memoirs” of Nikola Hristić, as we have already mentioned, represent a unique source from yet another witness of the period. He was born in 1818 in Sremska Mitrovica, on the Austrian military border. Hristić did not receive much education and, after having spent several years working as a clerk, he came in 1839 to live in Serbia. He was appointed Governor of Belgrade Varoş and later on became the Minister of internal affairs. As the chief of police, he had a chance to negotiate disputes between the Muslims and the Serbs and therefore was able to provide many records of those conflicts. Hristić did not idealize the Serbian administration apparatus of the time; on the contrary, he would often point out their incompetence and inefficiency, and denigrate the police officers as biased and self-willed. Yet, in interpreting his memoirs we have to keep in mind that he exercised authority under few governments and might as well have been driven by political interests in conducting his policies. Knez Mihaïlo had pursued active politics in the Balkans, but with the Muslims still present in the fortress and even in the varoş, Hristić was his follower and, at the same time, responsible for solving the issues with this very same Muslim population. To us, as already pointed out, his interpretations of the events at the time served as a main counterpart to Râşid’s story.

28 Ibid. p. IX.
1.3 Some Remarks on the Accessible Literature: “Not to be a partisan, regardless of its own view”

Before addressing the literature in Serbian, we should discuss some of the most relevant works on Serbian history in foreign languages.

The best literary survey of the available scholarship on Serbian history has been provided by Prof. Selim Aslantaş. In his work *Osmanlılarda Sırp İşıyanı – 19. Yüzyılın Şafağında Balkanlar*, he offers a very extensive list of the literature (mostly) on the first half of the century.


Needless to say, not all Serbian historians and histories for that matter conform to this principle of Naima. In order “Not to be a partisan, regardless of its own view,” one must, basically, deprive themselves from being biased. As is the case with many other countries of the Balkans, a process of a nation-building generated many histories written by means of applying the “what ‘they’ did to ‘us’” model. It is a truism that a nationalist outlook prevails in most cases and one should engage in close inspection of the source before deciding to use it. Yet, there are some rather valuable sources for the period in question.

Vladimir Stojančević’s “History of the Serbian people” and the “History of Belgrade” edited by Vasa Ćubrilović represent yet two more important books. While the former provides a chronological narrative on the history of Serbia and

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Montenegro, the latter aids us with a very detailed history of the city. Moreover, Slobodan Jovanović’s “Constitution defenders and their government” is a comprehensive study of the period of Constitution Defenders.30

Documents from the archives provide a vast variety of reports on everyday life in Belgrade and Serbia. Starting from Muslim-Christian relations (and others, for example Serbs and Jews), institutions (city and state administration, abuse of power, etc.), politics, economy (trade and esnafs, taxes, etc.), culture (school, urbanization, etc.), all the way to “marginal behaviors”, balls, prostitution and thefts, these collections introduce us to the life in the city great detail, thereby enabling us to follow the changes and developments in the city proper. The best collections are the following: Rajko Veselinović, Gradja za istoriju Beograda od 1806. do 1867 [The materials for the history of Belgrade 1806-1867], Branko Peruničić, “Uprava varoši Beograda 1820-1912,” [The Government of Belgrade varoš] and the six volume edition “Živeti u Beograd.” 31

A very important work of the prominent Serbian historian and diplomat of the nineteenth century, Mihailo Gavrilović, composed of a three volume work entitled “Miloš Obrenović,” might be the best synthesis of the period of Miloš’s rule. In addition, Belgrade in the Works of European Travel Writers, issued by the Serbian


Academy of Sciences and Arts, provides an overview of the considerable number of travel accounts primarily in German, Russian, and English.  

32 Gavrilović, Mihailo., Miloš Obrenović, ( 1,2,3 Vol.), Slovo ljubve, Belgrade, 1992; Belgrade in the works of European Travel Writers, Serbian Academy for Sciences and Art, Institute for Balkan Studies ( Special Editions 80), Belgrade, 2003.
Chapter II

Setting the Stage: The City of Belgrade between 1800 and 1850

The beginning of the nineteenth century saw Belgrade as a turbulent and chaotic city, host to a constant and hostile opposition – a result of prevalent conditions and influences. The chain of events triggered by the harsh rule of the dahiş had set in motion what for the Ottoman centre would be a “domino effect”, resulting at first in a limited autonomy for the paşalık of Belgrade and eventually in independence in the decades to follow.

“Semlin, March 10 (1807). The fortress of Belgrade is, at this moment, a den of brigands and assassins. On the 6th, Czerni Georges returned to Belgrade and gave orders that no person should be permitted to enter it. On the 7th, he caused it to be intimated to the former Pasha, to quit the place with his people and an escort of 500 Servians was offered for his protection... Scarcely had the unfortunate Turks marched a league from Belgrade, when the Servian escort fell upon them, and massacred them in most inhumane way...” 33

The report from the London Times cited above is just one example of “bloody scenes between the Christians and the Turks”34 in this then little-known part of “Turkey in Europe”.

The history of Ottoman Belgrade begins in 1521 with the conquest of the fortress held by the Hungarians. In the course of the next couple of decades a typically Ottoman town emerges at the confluence of the Danube and Sava rivers. After the

33 *The Times* (London), 17 April 1807. p.3.

34 *The Times* (London), 09 August 1806. p.2.
Ottoman defeat before Vienna, the Austrians conquered Belgrade in September 1688. When the Ottomans regained the city in 1690, Belgrade assumed a new position as a border town with Habsburg Hungary, with a short intermezzo of Habsburg rule from 1717 to 1739. Situated on this important intersection, Belgrade's economic expansion was at its peak around the middle of the seventeenth century, precisely at the time when Evliya Çelebi paid a visit to the city. Having been fascinated with what he had seen, Evliya called Belgrade the “Cairo of Rumeli.”

Already in the late 18th century, a time when practically all over the empire local elements assumed a stronger role in governance and the capital was more distant than ever, conflict arose between the representatives of the Ottoman centre and the local janissary troops, supported by Pasvandoğlu Osman Pasha, who had successfully established himself as the local strongman in the important Danubian fortress of Vidin. In Belgrade this period is known as the rule of the dayis and was experienced by the population as a rule of terror. The Ottoman vali of Belgrade, Haci Mustafa Pasha, who was rather popular with the local (Serbian) population, went so far as to arm the local peasants to help him overthrow the tyrannical dayis. This was the beginning of what came to be known as the First Serbian Uprising.

It seems, indeed, that the nineteenth century could not have begun any other way in the pashalik of Belgrade. Even Râşid Bey, who disparages the Serbs as “the devil’s people, never loyal to the Sultan, who had constantly been looking for the convenient time to raise the weapons against the Government and had always listened to Russia” agrees that the First Serbian Uprising was unavoidable. Be it Serb or Muslim, in the first years of the century everyone was at the dayis’ mercy. It is a mistake to think, as the prominent Serbian writer Vasa Ćubrilović clarifies, that those dayis were only cruel bullies, ignorant, uneducated plain individuals and simple outlaws of the Sublime

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Porte. They knew that it was possible to maintain the abusive system they imposed on the population only by implementing terror, the first measure of which was the killing of Serbian knezes. The dayis did not want to take any risks; they had prepared a list of suspect opponents and acted quickly, according to preconceived plans. This murderous act served as the catalyst for the rebellion. The issue of a possibly nationalistic agenda at the core of the matter must be put aside at this point. That the socio-economic hardship of the Belgrade population triggered the insurrection is a truism worth repeating, as well as the fact that the First and Second Serbian Uprisings in the pašalik of Belgrade brought about first major “gains” and “losses” to the Serbs and the Muslims respectively. The supreme leader of the Serbs was Karadjordje, who convened the other leaders for assemblies when required, while another permanent body, the Praviteljstvujući sovjet naroda srpskog (Administrative Council of the Serbian People), was introduced (1804) and retained its functions during the Uprising. When the Serbs captured the city of Belgrade sometime between the end of the year of 1806 and the beginning of 1807, not only did they acquire authority over one part of Belgrade varoš (namely the Sava mahalesi), but they also caused the emigration of the Muslim population to such an extent that they became a minority, whereas until then they had been clearly the majority. Consequently, the ownership of abandoned Muslim land and real estate became a hotly debated issue in the subsequent decades.

About fifty elementary schools were opened, apart from the traditional schools in monasteries, and the Great School (the embryo of the Gymnasium) of Belgrade was established in 1808. Serbs from Hungary, among them Dositej Obradović, made an enormous contribution and came to teach. The first fifteen years of the century, the period of the First and Second Serbian Uprisings, were the years of continued combat with no permanent winner. To that effect, when the Ottomans established their rule

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39 Čubrilović, p.34.

40 Ćirković, p.181.

41 Ibid., p.181.
again in 1813, the previously abandoned *timar* system was re-imposed on the peasants. This “Turkish feudal order” ended in 1833, but it was only in 1838, with the so-called “Turkish Constitution” that the Serbian peasant was freed from all the (feudal) bonds towards the Principality itself, thereby becoming the owner of the land/property, for the first time in its history.

The war period of the Serbian Revolution came to an end with the verbal agreement between knez Miloš Obrenović and Maraşlı Ali Paşa in 1815, with the Serbs being granted some concessions. This provided for dues to be collected by Serb elders, for trials of Serbs to be attended by Serb knezes, for the establishment of a National Office in Belgrade consisting of 12 knezes, and for villages to remain inaccessible to sipahi except for the collection of the tithe. The two foes had to live together, at close quarters, supposedly at peace which each other. Although Maraşlı Ali Paşa’s intention was to achieve that goal, already in 1816 some important Serbian officials were killed, yet again as a proof of the unfavourable status of non-Muslim population. The Turks were now supposed to put the limit on their exercising mastery and handle (at least psychologically) the upswing of the Serbs, being lead by knez Miloš Obrenović. These changes were not carried out immediately and certainly not with apparent ease. One example would be that the Belgrade voyvoda and kadi were reluctant to permit the Serbian authorities the scope of duties they now claimed. Those authorities, however, already sometime from around 1818, did succeed in convincing its people to start solving its disputes only in the Serbian courts, thus leaving the Muslims in charge of only lawsuits where both the Muslims and the Serbs were involved. Even though all the changes generated by the Uprising(s) had not taken root right away, the very fact that they did happen and portended of even greater ones may be considered one of the major accomplishments of the period. The Serbs now had Russian support and Miloš was determined to lead the way. The Muslims had to find a way to cope with these developments.

By no means was Miloš Obrenović (1817-1839) the kind of ruler whom the Serbs supported unconditionally. He was an absolutist ruler for whom “national” interest

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42 Ćirković., p. 183.

43 Ćubrilović, p. 83.
equated with his own personal interest. The rebellions took place and the Constitution was promulgated to limit his power in the 1820s. The prominent Serbian state official of the time, Nikola Hristić, in his memoirs wrote: “Miloš had no respect for other people’s families, or people’s right of selfhood. Many had become victims of his passions, especially those with some higher aspirations.”

Râşid Bey talks about him with immense hatred, blaming him for all the evils that had happened to the Muslims in Belgrade. Nevertheless, Miloš was successful in conducting his policies by means of buying positions for his friends among the Ottomans, thereby providing himself the network of reliable people to inform him on the issues that concerned the Serbs in Belgrade and Serbia in general. The tradition proved to be of great importance to him in 1820 when the “friend of the Serbs”, the sipahi Mustafa Bey, warned him of the vizier’s intention to kill him during Miloš’s next visit to Belgrade. This “politics of bribing”, however, secured Obrenović’s influence even over high Ottoman officials, including the Belgrade vizier himself. To this effect, in 1823 Miloš succeeded in convincing Maraşlı Ali Paşa to give the rank of alaybey to Miloš’s friend Halid Bey, instead of giving it to another candidate who offered an even larger sum of money. On how other Muslims in Belgrade, sworn enemies of the Serbs, reacted to these developments Râşid Bey illustrates in his writing. Halid Bey was a traitor, who accepted “the fake Serbian fate” and could not possibly be of any good to the Empire and the Ottomans. There is, however, no doubt that some aspects of life of the Muslims in Belgrade depended on Miloš’s policies, this also being emphasized in Râşid’s work. He points out how Miloš, once he began feeling mighty, ordered peasants not to give one oka of kaymak and one cart of wood and hay to the holders of timars and ziamets, as was every household’s obligation prior to this time. This is, at the same time, one more proof that these were times when the general living conditions for the Muslims began to worsen, the period when afflictions of ordinary life had its bearing on the Muslims too. This shift of sentiment was obvious in the first years of the 1820s, when the Philiki Hetairia’s

45 Čubrilović,  p.87.
46 Râşid,  p.7-8.
47 Čubrilović,  p. 87-88.
uprising in Wallachia, later in Greece too, made a great impression on the Belgrade Muslims. And, under the rule of knez Milos, the Serbs were in possession of arms and thus seen as a threat. In a document written by three of knez Miloš’s appointees in 1821, we read how “the Turk (yerli) has gotten scared of the potential Serbian attack on the varoš, therefore, he went to the Grand Vizier, told him about those suspicions and, after his rejecting such an option, they were told to go back to their homes and look after their own business.”\textsuperscript{48} Mutual mistrust and everlasting antagonism did not contribute to achieving a peaceful environment to live in. Not only the “Serbian Question”, but all the other neighbouring circumstances that shook the Empire at the time created some new possible threats to Ottoman rule in the city as well. Greeks, as mentioned above, had some higher political aspirations.\textsuperscript{49}

Yet, the Muslims had all the threads in their hands. Being politically most influential, they imposed many orders and rules on other groups, thereby directly affecting their lives proper. They decided about the locality and size of the Christians' houses, issuing bans on use of swine fat, on carrying weapons and decisions, for example, on how the Christians will dress so that they differ from the Muslims. Every confessional group had its allotted social and economic category; it was explicitly known what occupation was “Serb”, which one was “Jewish”, and which “Greek”. In this period the majority of Serb craftsmen were organised in esnaf. The merchants represented the second most important social and economic group. But it is in this period, from the 1820s onwards, when the importance of Belgrade became greater owing primarily to the vizier’s stay in the city. Not only was Belgrade the largest varoš, but also the richest one for almost all imports went through Belgrade. However, not until 1827 did Miloš aim at the complete abolishment of Ottoman rule in Belgrade. The Porte did not seem to be interested in giving the Serbs the varoš nor was the fortress for it a necessary market for the Ottoman garrisons situated there. Miloš, therefore, was ready to bribe the high officials in Istanbul by giving them a half of million guruş in order to acquire the city. At the end of the negotiations, Belgrade varoš was given to the Serbs under their full authority. The 1820s were the years of the Akkerman Convention


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, p.88.
(1826), Peace of Edirne (1829), and the first Hatti sherif (1829) which paved the way for even greater Serbian autonomy.

In 1830 church bells could ring again. Documents from around this period and of considerable importance are the Hatt-i sherifs of 1829, 1830, and 1833. The first two granted Serbia religious freedom, an administration headed by a prince, with the title being handed down through Miloš’s family, and the right to maintain its own army and institutions such as hospitals, printing houses, a postal service, and an independent judiciary.\(^\text{50}\) It was decreed that the Turks would not interfere in domestic affairs and would leave Serbia, except for garrisons in the old imperial fortified towns of Belgrade, Šabac, Smederevo, Užice, Soko, and Kladovo.\(^\text{51}\) The Porte did let the Serbs have the varoş and the Muslims had to move out selling their property to the Serbs. After only three days all the Muslim houses in the city and the other assets in the surroundings were sold to the Christians. “The eviction of the Turks provided the conditions for peasants to become owners of the land that they worked. This process occurred in stages. Ownership was acknowledged only for those holding the tapu (deed), which served as a basis on which they worked the land. Some peasants did not have deeds, so it was decided that their land should be surveyed and entered in the land registry. The Turks left behind vast complexes of abandoned villages with land in between. This land became state property and was leased to the villages and often used to house new settlers in the principality.”\(^\text{52}\) Nonetheless, the Ottomans still did not hurry to evacuate; what is more, they were claiming their property back. The Serbs, of course, did not show much interest in complying, thus forcing the Sublime Porte to ask Russia for help, for it had been the protector of the Serbs and their autonomy. Only after three years of constant hassle did the Russian Tsar Nicholas I give permission to the Ottomans to stay in the varoş, letting them engage in free trade the same way the Serbs could. Hatti-sherif of 1833 allowed the Turks to live in the varoş, but in all other cities they were given a five year limit to withdraw from the fortifications. It was still not the capital city, but only due to the inopportune political circumstances. The presence of the

\(^{50}\) Ćirković., p. 191.

\(^{51}\) Ibid. p.191.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., p.191.
Turkish government in the fortress as well as the city’s vicinity to Austria left Miloš in the dark on this issue. Belgrade was culturally and economically a highly developed city, especially after 1835 when the foreign consulates started opening there. This made Belgrade even more politically relevant, in preference to Kragujevac to become the capital, but it is only in the years after Miloš depart from Serbia in 1841 that it was finally declared so.

In 1835 Serbia got its first constitution, which, however, did not last for more than two weeks. Russia regarded the constitution as too liberal and not applicable to the Serbian case. The constitution was the outcome of the rebellion against Miloš, but it was more important for proclaiming civil rights and the principle of separation of powers than for the degree to which it restricted the prince. The so-called “Turkish” constitution was promulgated in 1838, confirming all the most important socio-economic and political achievements hitherto; abolishment of timars, free trade, confirmation of the Principality’s autonomy. No changes could be made to constitution without the Sultan’s consent. Miloš was forced to share power with members of the Council which was very soon transformed into the rule of oligarchy. The Constitution Defenders accelerated their struggle against the knez. Belgrade was the core of the opposition against the Miloš. The clergy was against him as were the clerks of the municipality (the majority of whom were from Austria), and Belgrade Russophiles. The ministers and 17 Council members, appointed by Miloš himself, took over legislative power in April 1839, leading Miloš to abdicate in June and leave the country. At the time of the struggles between the Constitution Defenders and Obrenovićs, the international political situation was most obvious in Belgrade. Not only did the population suffer from difficulties caused by sharing everyday life with the Muslims, but the Belgrade population encountered many obstacles put forward by Austria, which had almost all the islands under its control. In addition, Serbia’s vassal position meant

53 Ibid., p.195.

54 Ibid., p.196.

more expenditure for Belgrade too, primarily seen in the Serbian population’s being forced to financially support the vizier. For both, the Serbian and the Ottoman authority, Belgrade was of great significance. The Serbs aimed at making it the capital city, for the Ottomans it was still the niche of their authority.

The main division of the city was into two parts, varoš and the fortress, the former surrounded by the trench (Šanac), which will play an important role in the struggle for the domain of authority in the decades to follow, as will be explained in the following chapter. This division is well illustrated in the account of Archibald Paton:

“The fortress of Belgrade, jutting out exactly at the point of confluence of the rivers, has the town behind it. The Servian, or principal quarter, slopes down to the Save; the Turkish quarter to the Danube. I might compare Belgrade to a sea-turtle, the head of which is represented by the fortress, the back of the neck by the esplanade or Kalai Meidan, the right flank by the Turkish quarter, the left by the Servian, and the ridge of the back by the street running from the esplanade to the gate of Constantinople.”

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the years 1815-1830, each of the larger ethnic and confessional groups in Belgrade resided in a separate part of the city. The majority of the Belgrade population consisted mostly of the Muslims. Along with the Muslims and the Serbs as the most numerous Christian group, the Jewish community, those of Vlachs and Greeks, and also Gypsies were the most populous ones. The Jews were the second economically most influential party, followed by the “Turks”. The Gypsies of both Muslim and Christian confessions lived separately, in so called Gypsy mahalles.

56 For the plan of Belgrade at the time and the images of the city gates see :Appendix: Fig. 1-4.

That the life in such a multiethnic city, with its dual Muslim-Christian administration, was described as clearly complex was reflected in the documents of the Belgrade Archives. Not only the common street fights, quarrels in the pubs and mutual frequent robberies between the Muslims and the Serbs illustrate this, but the documents about the Jewish man complaining about the Serbian authorities’ treatment and the other examples of the Jewish communities' objection to the shutting down of their stores on Christian holidays, all contribute to the understanding of that complexity.

Of all the issues that these documents embrace, one report on the conflict among the “Serbian and the Turkish children” in a vicinity of a drinking-fountain, brings about a certain peculiarity. It differs from the rest of the material not only in a simple fact that here the conflicting parties regarding the “confessional intolerance” were the children, but stands out for the usage of the term “nation” instead of the term “people” or “folk,” whose usage at the time had been the common occurrence. The cause of the children’s fight, in the lack of any other proper explanation, the “Turkish side” ascribes to “national hatred.” The awareness of the existence of the Serbian “nation”, therefore, had existed already at this time, for the document in question dates from the year of 1842.

During the period investigated in this chapter, Belgrade was still an oriental varoš. Dirty courtyards, houses with no chimneys, narrow sokaks, outworn kaldırmas and neglected public taps, all were indicators of the omnipresent Ottoman style of life. A clearer picture of the living conditions in Belgrade could be obtained after looking at the publication on the prohibition of meandering swines who were digging up Muslim graves and, on the other hand, the complaint against the wandering Muslim cattle along the streets of the varoš. English travellers passing through Belgrade in the middle of 1830s describe the city as follows:

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59 Ibid., p.270.

60 Ibid., p.218.

61 Ibid., p. 222.

62 Peruničić, Uprava, p. 177.
“Most of the travelers were anxious to see the fortress of Belgrade. "During the whole day", writes Miss Pardoe," we were earnestly talking of Belgrade-the far famed fortress of Belgrade-which we were anxious to reach before dusk. It was, however, 8 o'clock before we were abreast of this last stronghold of the Turks in Europe". The disappointment at the contrast between the formidable aspect of the fortress and its decrepit state was general. "Seen from the water," writes Elliott who visited it,” the fortress wears rather a commanding aspect... but on close inspection the effect is different; all is decay, and dirt, and misery." Miss Pardoe, who also visited the fortress, had this to say: “The citadel had much the appearance of a barn, weather-stained and neglected, with broken windows and swinging shutters.”

In the 1840s, the confessional structure of the Belgrade population tallied the ethnic one in such a way that eleven *camis* and four *tekkes* represented the Muslim, two Orthodox Christian churches the Serbian and Vlach population, with the one Synagogue for the Jews. The same ethnic differentiation reflected in the educational-cultural sphere; ten Muslim primary schools, one Jewish and one Greek, three Serbian, along with a Gymnasium, the school of commerce, a Lyceum and a Theologian seminary (1836).1

The first Serbian urbanist, Emilijan Josimović had made a plan for the reconstruction of the old varoš in the trench in 1867, suggesting many modifications, the main one being a reconstruction of the network of winding, one-way narrow streets, considered to be a feature of the Oriental culture, into a more organized pattern. A very important event for the Belgrade varoš was the building of the *Saborna Crkva church* from 1837-1845. Churches like this were not built in the rest of the Ottoman

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64 Čubrilović., p.526.

65 Ibid., p. 307-308.
Balkans until the 1860s! It shows to which extent the centre would grant certain privileges to Miloš. It is indicative of the situation that the church was built outside the walled city. Miloš wanted to undertake the task of building a “new Belgrade” and already from the end of the 1820s, remodelling of the Serbian part of the city was well under way. The knez began the construction of his residence in Topčider in the 1829, to continue in the year of 1834 with building of the other important edifices in its proximity, such as the Grand military barracks and the Belgrade national court building. Those buildings, however, were still shaped in the old, traditional Balkan, profane architectural style.

It is of interest for our subject matter to comment on a rather rare piece of evidence of the period in question, the so called the “Turkish plan” of Belgrade from around the middle of the century. Until 1941, it had been kept in the National Library in Belgrade, to be published a few years before the war by one of the most important Serbian scholars in the field, Gligorije Elezović, who reproduced the plan and translated the names of the localities formerly written with the Arabic letters in Ottoman. The question of who the author of the Plan was, and the answer offered by one Serbian writer, namely Ljubomir Nikić, demands our attention since there is a strong likelihood that the author of the Plan was Râşid himself. The arguments which Nikić provides are numerous, starting from those elements that had been encompassed in the Plan itself: The fact that its origins go as far back as the end of the 1850s-early 60s and that the Plan was made not only according to various objects situated in the varoş and the fortress, but also according to the detailed plan of the houses, marked as the “Turkish”, “Serbian” or “Jewish”. It is then beyond doubt that the person who had drawn the Plan was very well acquainted with the city and its political conditions. Furthermore, the Plan was not done in the professional topographer/ surveyor’s kind of way, for the

66 Ibid., p. 302.
67 for “the Plan” see Appendix: Fig.5.
69 Ibid., p.153.
streets were presented in straight lines instead of the winding pattern as we already mentioned as being one of the main traits of the city. Nikić asserts, moreover, that the Plan must have ended up in the National Library by means of repurchase or as a gift since, otherwise, if it had reached the hands of the Serbian authorities, it would have been bestowed to the State Archives. Here the author consults Râşid Bey’s first volume and makes the following conclusions: the Plan was made at the time when Râşid Bey was still the “citizen” of Belgrade. In the political struggle between the Muslims and the Serbs during the period in question, specially reflected in the mutual contest for Belgrade, Nikić emphasizes the not so negligible role that Râşid had in that regard. He reminds that the Bey was the leader of the fraction composed of those who were sworn enemies of the Serbs, therefore in touch with all the Muslim official authorities, serving them in many (confidential) matters. To that effect, the author elaborates the time when Yusuf Paşa, just upon his arrival to Belgrade, acting according to the “verbal order he had previously received in Carigrad”, appoints one engineer whom he had brought with him to Belgrade to, together with Râşid, make the maps of the city and the cost estimates for its repair.\(^\text{70}\) Moreover, when during the rule of knez Mihailo Muslim-Serbian disputes over some land and meadows emerged in the region around the city of Pirot, the Paşa of Belgrade sent Râşid Bey to investigate the case, who later on submitted not only the proposal for the solution, but also “one map in colour.” Stojan Novaković, in the introduction of the first volume, wrote how he asked one of the elder people in Belgrade to collect any data possible on Râşid’s life. In this way Novaković was able to state that Râşid Bey “was pretty literate and liked making maps.”\(^\text{71}\)

The Plan provides data on the ethnic structure of the city in the middle of the century. The white coloured squares represent the “land for the gardens;” the darker ones the Serbian, the lighter the Jewish and the squares in the stripes, the Turkish houses. The map could be seen in the Belgrade Municipality Newspapers of the year 1837.\(^\text{72}\)

\(^\text{70}\) Ibid., p.154.

\(^\text{71}\) Novaković, Stojan., “O svoj knjizi i pisci njenu. “., (introduction) p. VI

\(^\text{72}\) Gliša Elezović-Pera Popović, “Dva Turska Plana Beograđa,(Two Turkish Plans of Belgrade)”, Beogradske Opštinske Novine LV, 1937, 1-3, 64-68.
“The Serbian Revolution” became the Serbian nation only at the end of the 1830s. During the period known as the era of the Constitution Defenders, the first traces of nationalism began to enter Serbian politics. The politics that Miloš conducted hitherto certainly did serve the cause, but his personal aspirations, interests, and wish for aggrandizement seem not to have left any space for the higher national initiative. Yet, by means of obtaining from the Sultan a decree recognizing the internal autonomy of the Serbian Church, the Serbian Patriarch’s elevation to second rank in the hierarchy of the Eastern Church (from the twelfth rank it previously held), and the substitution of the Greek language with Old Slavonic, Miloš did facilitate the reintroduction of Orthodoxy as an integral part of Serbian identity. All this had been achieved during the 1830s. It is, however, only from the early 1840s onwards that the ground was laid for the progression from a religious to a secular national agenda by learned men coming from the Hapsburg lands. Those Serbian intellectuals from Vojvodina were concentrated in Buda, Novi Sad and Pest, where they founded the Matica Srpska (Central Serbian Cultural and Publishing Society) already in 1826. They were not always very welcome among the fellow brothers in the Principality, even often unkindly called “nemačkari” (from the word nemči, i.e. Germans). To bridge the gap between the two groups was the goal of the Serbian nationalist agenda. One of those intellectuals, namely Ilija Garašanin wrote his famous Načertanihe (The Draft) in 1844, the program of a national unification of the Ottoman Slavs in an larger Serbian state. According to the Serbian historian Čedomir Antić, however, the main pattern for unification was not an independent and parliamentary state, but a Viceroyalty, shaped after the pattern of Mehmed Ali’s Egypt. This is one of the Ottoman influences, Antić argues, that can be

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75 Ibid., p.444.

76 Antić, Čedomir., “The Formative Years of the Principality of Serbia (1804-1856): Ottoman influences”., in Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflict,
recognized in Serbian proto-nationality. Despite the fact that the Serbian Revolution (1804-35) had been a direct manifestation of a definite change of the relations between the Serbs from the Belgrade pasalik and the Ottoman authorities, the state ideology, the state apparatus and the perception of the Serbian future were not immediately entirely Westernized. Another example of Ottoman influence that Antić provides is that exercised by the Ottoman state administration on the Principality of Serbia under the Constitutionalists by way of the office of voyvoda (the Commander of the Army), which had been granted in 1844 to Toma Vučić-Perišić, one of the key figures of the period in question. As opposed to Serbian historians and jurists who usually interpreted the post as some kind of honorary office, the British Consul General in Belgrade, Thomas Grenier de Fonblanque argued that even though the office of Grand Duke was not mentioned in the Constitution of 1838, it was a Serbian version of the highest Egyptian post. While internal reforms brought Serbia closer to Western European models, this re-Ottomanisation of the Principality of Serbia, the Serbian historian Antić states, caused permanent political instability and dissatisfaction among the entire young generation of Serbian officials and intellectuals, thereby evoking expeditious reforms in the period from 1858 to 1869.

With the Constitution of 1838 the power of the knez was limited by the Council (Sovjet), within which the above-mentioned Toma Vučić-Perišić, as well as Mateja Nenadović, Milutin Garašanin etc. emerged as the political figures of the period. Miloš, not being satisfied with the changes that the Constitution brought about, abdicated in the year 1839 leaving the throne to his son Milan who died only a few months later. The regency consisting of the Miloš’s main enemies, the Constitution Defenders, governed the Principality until Mihajlo, his other son, acceded to the throne. Having obtained the support of the Ottoman Empire that rendered Mihajlo’s politics too contiguous to that of Russia, Vučić-Perišić organized a riot in 1842 in order to overthrow the Obrenović


77 Ibid., p.243.
78 Ibid., p.248.
79 Ibid., p.248.
dynasty. Mihajlo, having no choice, left Serbia and by the fall of the same year, Aleksandar Karadjordjević, the son of Karadjordje, had been chosen Prince of Serbia.
Chapter III

“Go and See the World, There is No More Excelling View than That of Belgrade”

3.1: One Vignette from Everyday Life: Innocent Until Proven Guilty - But by Whom?

With respect to the administration in the city of Belgrade, the 1850s were, in fact, the years when many of the conflicts originated in the struggle over domain of jurisdiction between the Muslim and the Serbian authorities, thereby inevitably influencing the lives and provoking conflicts among the ordinary people as well. In 1845 a clash occurred between the Muslim nizam and a Serbian pandur (policeman), the repercussions of which aggravated the already vast cleavage existing between the two parties. This segment of the chapter will look at the nature of this kind of incident and the consequences it could have brought about.

The incident happened, as Râşid affirms from the outset, because the Serbs resented the asakir-i nizamiyye and were always “greatly desirous to provoke more and more disturbance”. For that reason, when the çavuş was passing next to the church with one of the askers, mel’un Serbian pandur pulled his gun and fired at the çavuş, wounding him in the arm. The bullet, however, hit another Serb standing in the vicinity and killed him. The wounded çavuş escaped to the karakol-hane and the paşa was informed about the event.

Thereupon, the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Garašanin and his interpreter came to the fortress and claimed that the çavuş was responsible for the incident and the

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81 Hayretnûmâ., p.4.
murder of the other Serb. This, Râşid underlines, he used as a pretext to demand the removal of the *askers* from the city gates and the *karakol-hane* (!).  

Nevertheless, the answer he was given did not please Garašanin. When he was told that, as being known to everyone, the *asakir-i nizamiyye* do not carry guns (*tabanca*), Garašanin went furious and refused that justification, replying that he might as well have had a pistol (*piştovi*) in his pocket, shot the Serb, and then escaped to the *karakol-hane*.  

Since there is no gun mentioned in the police report, it is not likely that the *nizam* could have had one with him, Garašanin was assured. Moreover, the question followed: who would be, in that case, guilty for injuring the *çavuş*?  

After Garašanin’s assertion that the above-mentioned *asker*, in actual fact, was not wounded at all, they proved him wrong by showing the injuries; embarrassed, Garašanin with his *tercüman*, left the place and *sütü dökmüş kediye döndüler*.  

In order to determine the truth, a committee was established with members representing the two parties. After 27 days of investigation no evidence had surfaced to prove the *çavuş* guilty. And when the *pandur* in question was about to be registered in the official protocol as the responsible one, the act of admonition was left to the Serbian Ministry (*Emaret*), only to be discovered afterwards that no punishment was awaiting the *pandur* and that he was soon appointed to the same post.  

This much of attention would not have been devoted to Râşid’s interpretation of the event had it not been for the fact that not only did Nikola Hristić write in his “Memoirs” about the event, but provided an interpretation diametrically opposed to that of Râşid.

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82 Ibid., p.5.  
83 Ibid., p.5.  
84 Ibid., p.5.  
85 Ibid., p.6.
According to Hristić, two “Turkish” nizams passing by the church, stopped and started urinating publicly, just next to the entrance.\footnote{Hristić, p. 107.} The Serbian pandur warned them several times, but not only did they refuse to obey but triggered a dispute, attacking the pandur with some hardware. A crowd of annoyed Serbs and students of theology present in the church gathered, and when the pandur pulled a gun in self-defense, one of the two nizams hit him on the hand, as a result of which the gun fell to the ground. One nizam picked it up and aimed at the pandur, shooting but missing the target. One of the students, however, was hit by the bullet and died on the spot.\footnote{Ibid., p.107.}

The angry crowd reacted and insisted on the “execution of the murderers” who right after the conflict escaped to their karakol-hane. The chief of the Serbian police assured the mass that the event would be investigated accordingly. The angry group would not stop yelling, however, and requested punishment. Therefore, the “Turkish” official was forced to let the nizams and pandurs escort the accused nizams to the “Turkish” police.\footnote{Ibid., p.108.}

The paşa defended the two askers. He argued that the pandur had fired the arms and killed the student. Upon the request of the Porte, a committee was formed. Hristić concludes by saying that the investigation and interrogation of witnesses from both sides (each side blamed the other one), lasted six to seven days (!), the outcome of which was that the nizam was sent to the “Military Court in Turkey”!\footnote{Ibid., p.109.}

Having no apparent evidence to establish the veracity of either of the two stories told, we may at least, firstly, recognize the fact that both writers had found the issue worth remembering and being written down in detail, and secondly, may pose the question of why did they feel the need to do so. It is important to note that both of the authors lay claim to being involved in the event.

\footnote{Hristić, p. 107.}
\footnote{Ibid., p.107.}
\footnote{Ibid., p.108.}
\footnote{Ibid., p.109.}
Râşid did, let us be reminded, indicate from the outset that the Serbs always were looking for an opportunity to harm Muslims. It might be assumed that by means of introducing the reader to the event and informing him of the inconsistency of the Serbian government - for it was not ready to pursue justice but – secretly – allow the pandur to return to his position with no repercussions, Râşid wanted to imply, once again that justice could not ever have been expected on the part of the Serbs.

Hristić, moreover, on many occasions emphasizes the “strife with the “Turks”, especially with respect to “the Turkish paşa’s constant initiative to extend the zone of influence over areas where he had no right to do so.” 90 To that effect, the Serbian policeman adds details on how the “Turkish” nizams would “snatch” from the Serbian pandurs the Christians coming from Turkey while passing through the city gates, to have them submitted to the Serbian police for arbitration regarding any offense they might have been charged with.

Furthermore, the Jewish population paying taxes to the Serbs hitherto, now started refusing to obey, since the “Turkish paşa explained to them that they are not supposed to comply with the Serbian commands for their (the Jews) being “Turkish subjects.” The Serbian authorities in such cases tried to use force, but the Jews would run away to the fortress where they would enjoy the paşa’s protection. Only a small portion of the Jewish population, merchants and craftsmen, who possessed shops among the Serbs, would remain loyal to the Serbian side.91

The incident in question certainly was not a unique case. It is beyond doubt, however, that these two contrasting interpretations illustrate everyday life in Belgrade pretty faithfully: conflicts, angry crowds, scramble for more authority, complex issues (to be solved) and even more perplexed outcomes. But more importantly, the very existences of such opposite views do indicate that one must be rather vigilant in an attempt to determine the actual situation at the time. This was certainly one of the features of the power conflict between the two parties. Very soon the Serbs started to substitute pandurs with the soldiers. The Paşa, as Hristić asserts, felt threatened and

90 Ibid., p. 181.

91 Ibid., p.182.
argues against it. After the government explained to him that these soldiers are only police servants dressed in military dress and with no hidden intentions, he was appeased.

3.2: Serbia and the Rest: “Sırp Kraliyeti Tohumu Ekmiş Oldu”

The Serbian Newspapers “Srbske Novine,” in the edition published in Belgrade on January 5, 1851, expressed their “hope for a more prosperous year, after all the misfortune that the Serbian people had gone through in the previous three years. We had been promised many things, and none of them have been implemented.”

This section will look at Râşid’s perception of the impact the Great Powers had on the functioning of the Serbian “ufak ufak hükümet” (and) in its decision making which then as a matter of course had its repercussions on the Muslim-Serbian relations in the city.

When Austria renounced territory on the borderland in favor of the Hungarians in 1848, the Serbs living in those areas, Srem, the Banat, and Bačka, rebelled against the new state of affairs. These Serbs felt that “the Hungarians would aim at destroying their “nationality” (narodnost)”. Thus, help from “Serbia” was requested.

As a precaution for the peace and order to be maintained, the city of Belgrade at the time of revolution increased the number of pandurs. Yet, the lack of consistent policy regarding the possible aid to the Serbs across the border and clash between, on

94 Hristić, p. 119.
95 Ibid., p. 119.
96 Čubrilović, p.133.
the one side Vučić-Perišić arguing against, and the knez’s followers bolstering the intervention of Serbia on the other, soon evolved into an anti-regime movement.\(^97\)

While Russia and the Ottoman Empire insisted on Serbia’s neutrality, volunteers were heading across the river Sava to help the rebellious Serbs. It was a good opportunity for the Obrenović family to attempt to get back on the scene, for they now had even Vučić-Perišić’s support. The Ottoman Empire supported the Hungarians in their combat against Vienna and requested that the Serbian government stop providing help to Vojvodina. The Serbian government, nevertheless, granted the Serbs in the region considerable financial support.

Interestingly enough, the turmoil in Belgrade was, in actual fact, triggered by yet another incident whose partakers were nizams situated on the Varoş kapusu and the Serbian merchants. Although Râşid and Hristić both elaborate on this event too, their foci are not the same. While Râşid’s analysis of the underlying factors of the event occupies him from the end of the first volume all the way to the first several pages of the second, Hristić provides no more than a simple description of the conflict, with only one bit of information beyond the narrative, just to, as it turns out, confirm Râşid’s statement.\(^98\)

This time, both authors agree on the cause of the incident’s inception: after some quarreling, a nizam wounded a Serb whereupon a large group of angry Serbs gathered in front of Vučić’s house demanding the execution of the Muslim soldier. Not being pleased with the answer they received from Vučić, who merely appealed to people to be patient assuring them that the nizam would be punished in an appropriate, way -- the ability to address the crowds in a demagogic manner was what made the uneducated man’s success possible in the first place -- the angry mass went to the house of the president of the Council, Stojan Simić until they finally dispersed, again with the help of Vučić’s ability of persuasion.\(^99\)

At this point, the two stories take opposite directions. While Hristić asserts that Simić was already at Vučić’s house when the crowd first gathered; after they were

\(^97\) Ibid., p.143.


\(^99\) Hristić., p.110.
insulted by Simić, they became even more furious, heading directly to Stojan’s house, which they were ready to burn down.100

Râşid, on the other hand, states with confidence that, once the people gathered in front of Vučić’s house, the paşa gave the order for the cannons to be recharged, sending Râşid Bey (!) to tell Vučić that the Serbs should disperse or cannons will be fired. Having seen that the “Turks were only waiting for the paşa’s sign,” the Serbs proceeded to the house of Simić, arguing against the government (!). Moreover, “Aleksandar Bey, realizing that there was a danger of that crowd’s harming his position, decided to send the regular army to disperse the mass.” At the very end of the first volume, Akil Bey asks his brother “what was the real, vicious purpose of the crowd since, as appears to him, there were some hidden intentions.”101

The answer Râşid provides, to put it in the nutshell, claims that Vučić’s “mel’anetler” intended to take advantage of the event and gathered the crowd in order to overthrow Knez Aleksandar, and Vucic would thereby become the “Bey of Sırbistan.”102

It is beyond doubt that a fraction among the Serbian officials made the turmoil imminent, but it gained its impetus only after this incident, which became directed entirely against the regime soon after its beginning.103

Hristić does not put forward any possible implications of the conflict, but he does say that “there were some young clerks seen in the crowd, who were later on brought to court for having been accused of agitation against Simić and held responsible for gathering the people in front of his house.”104

It is noteworthy how events of this kind, having started as a simple quarrel between the Muslim and the Serb very often over some trivial issue, could have developed into a

100 Ibid., p.110.
101 Hayretnumâ., p.79.
102 Râşid (Vol 2.), p. 1.
103 Čubrilović., p.134.
104 Hristić., p. 110.
much more complex matter. As if one “wrong” look was enough to provoke a major incident.

It is also apparent how those from “above” would use this kind of conflict for their own purposes - be it the authorities of both sides, or, according to Râşid, even the Great Power(s).

To that extent and with respect to the event in question, when the Serbs clustered around the Varoş kapusu, Рâşid elaborates:

“The Russian consul, in order to straighten his politics, intervened into the issue. He went to see the paşa and demanded from him to kill the nizam. Thereupon the paşa asked him: “Where did you get the right to request such a thing and on what law do you base your demand for the execution of the soldier who wounded the Serb before the committee is generated to determine the real state of affairs? Neither am I obliged to issue such a law nor is your request humane. The consul then decisively replied that not only will the angry mass still be malcontent unless he do so, but an even greater chaos will occur. And the consul repeated his demand. The paşa responded: I would say, and you will agree, as well one else for that matter, that the Serbs are the only ones responsible for the conflict, thus the issue should be discussed between both governments. If, by any chance, the Serbs want to engage in a fight, I may as well start it this very minute; I am ready to answer their vehemence with the vehemence myself. The Turks of Belgrade are eager to clash with the Serbs, for they are rather mad at them. The only reason for their [the Turks’] putting up with the Serbs until now is the fact that they did not want to go against the Sultan’s will. But today, they are only waiting for my wink and blood will be spilled. Since the Serbian government did not find it necessary to break up the crowd, it can only
mean that this event was a piece of their work.”  

According to Râşid, furthermore, Vučić was the one who persuaded both the Serbs and the consuls regarding these actions, hoping to benefit from the situation and destroy the government, so that the blame could not have possibly be put on him.\textsuperscript{106} What Vučić certainly did not do is to support the knez and his disciples with regard to the aid issue for the rebellious Serbs in Vojvodina.

At the time of the rampage of the macar millet, as Râşid asserts, the Serbian emaret designated as the primary task of its politics the unification of the people from this side with those on the other side of the Sava River, in Austria and Croatia, including around two million Serbs.\textsuperscript{107} This is what he later on refers to as the “Isla meselesi.” Its only aim would be to bring about a Serbian Kingdom. Using the Hungarian actions against the Serbs as a pretext, fifteen thousand volunteers were sent from Serbia, who fought in several regions and who were defeated harshly.\textsuperscript{108}

When the Hungarians intensified the combat against the Serbs, as Râşid points out, many families from Temeşvar and Banat eyelets escaped to Serbia.\textsuperscript{109} Thereupon, the Hungarians advanced and seized Pančevo (Panscova), an independent town on the Habsburg military frontier situated on Danube River in close proximity to Belgrade. The Hungarians sought allies to engage in commerce with, and since “the Serbs were not brave enough”, as Râşid points out, the Muslim population seems to have been.\textsuperscript{110}

To that effect, Râşid, however, admits that this kind of exchange along the borderland was forbidden, but points out that the paşa of Belgrade did allow the Muslim ahali to, in that case, “Use the ships to reach the banks of the Danube and, without

\textsuperscript{105} Hayretnümâ., Vol 1., p.78.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p.79.

\textsuperscript{107} Hayretnümâ. (From this point on, only the second volume will be cited)., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p.8.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p.11.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p.11.
stepping on the soil, actualize the exchange.” Many among the ahali belonged to the ehl-i servet, and the Hungarians were addressing them as karındaş.

Among the Serbian archival documents, we can find some confirming the illegitimate goods exchange. The Muslims trading with the Hungarians had been avoiding paying taxes at gümrük, and, moreover, started to insult every gümrükçü who would ask for the teskere. Thus in order to prevent this kind of practice to persist, the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a proclamation according to which ten guardians on the boat would take care of the order along the banks of Danube. Yet another possible source of conflict had been generated.

The repercussions of the revolution in Austria certainly were not limited to the trade between the Muslims and Hungarians, but it was certainly of considerable importance. That being said, the Hungarians who arrived in Belgrade even requested from the Ottomans to sell them, although secretly, the guns (tüfenk) initially collected from the Serbs and stored in the anbars. The Hungarians were ready to pay, as Râşid asserts, four hundred kuruş per gun. Nevertheless, Devlet-i Aliyye and the Belgrade muhâfiz Hasan Paşa as its representative refused their offer stating that the Ottomans could not consent to sell weapons and distribute to the other side of the river even if they had offered a thousand kuruş for each.

The Serbs in Austria, as Râşid asserts, appealed to the Ottoman Empire for patronage. Not only did they ask for protection from Hungarians, but also offered to

111 Ibid., p.11.
112 Ibid., p.11.
113 Peruničić., p. 226.
114 Ibid., p.226.
115 Râşîd., p.12.
116 Ibid., p.12.
117 Ibid., p.6-7.: “... ve vakt-i mezkarde Macarlular çend def’a Devlet-i Aliyye’nin hamilligini resmen ilimâs mayâninda bulundular ise de cânib-i Devlet-i Aliyye’den hiç bir vakitte mugâyir-i müşârûn-ileyhanın öyle bir vakit za ‘fiyyetinde ilimâs ve ricaları kabûl olunmadiği gibi yine devlet-i müşârûn-ileyhâ tebea’sından mezkar’ul-mikdar Sırblular bu kere daha Devlet-i Aliyye’nin himayesine girmek ve hatta bu taraf
renounce some of the concessions that rested in their hands, be it in the fortifications and fortresses or in a fixed lump of the revenue. The Austrian Serbs were not the only ones finding themselves appealing for Ottomans protection [iltimas], the Hungarians did the same. Nevertheless, the answer they both received from the Porte was a negative one. Akil Bey, at this point, asks his brother the following:

“It is surprising [garaîb] that the population of around three and a half million Hungarians and two million Serbs asking for the asylum [iltica] and protection [hamillik] with the Ottomans were not taken into consideration. Especially having in mind that according to the Tanzimat, every millet has the right to be free and the part (subject) of Empire if it wishes so. On what grounds then was this rejection based.”

At the core of Nakil Bey’s answer, in brief, lies the issue known to us as the Eastern question. The Ottoman Empire was now weak (za’fiyyet vaktinde) and had to find a way to cope with the conditions which came to impair its hitherto supremacy. To that effect, Râşid emphasize the fact that the parties interested in the partition of the Empire were now hard to confront, especially when there was no Great Power on the Ottoman side. In order to defend the state against the attacks, to save it from the segmentation and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{118}}\text{Ibid., p.7.}: \text{“... Devlet-1 Aliyve itlicâ ve hamílliği itlimâs ve niyâzında bulunup cânîb-i Devlet-1 Aliyve’den itlimâslarına sem’i itibâr olunmamasi ve bâ-husus her bir mahâlde Tanzimat-1 hayriye càrî olup Tanzimat’un icâbi ise her millet serbest olup ve dileği devletin teb’ahlâklarına girmeye müsait bulunmuşken acaba ne sebebe mebni bu itlimâslarına müsaade buyurulmadi...”}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{119}}\text{Ibid., p.7.}\]
obtain strength for the time ahead, Mustafa Reşid Paşa accepts and applies the *usûl-i Tanzimat*.\(^{120}\)

Nonetheless, even though it (the *Tanzimat*) seemed to be a bracing stage in regard to the survival of the Empire in the long run, it became a burden for the Ottoman statesmen when it came to its implementation. \(^{121}\) This became evident, according to Râşid, when the Egyptian affair happened, proving that it was not convenient and suitable for the glorious *devlet* to provide protection and govern the population of another state any more (*artık bu ittifâkin üzerine diğer bir devletin tebasını himaye ve kûmândasına olmak münâsbî olamaz ve şân-u düveleye yâkışmaz.*).

Before addressing Râşid’s interpretation of the Egyptian issue, we should relate the main features of the reform period referred to in Râşid’s narrative.

The *Tanzimat* reforms were actually an attempt to cut the ground from under the feet of those who aimed at taking a piece of the ever weakening Empire. Râşid thus makes no mistake in interpreting the reforms, as indeed they were initially considered, the watershed of the transformation of the Ottoman Empire. Militarily weakened and challenged by the rising Balkan nationalisms, the Ottomans acknowledged the fact that some efforts at Westernization/modernization must be exerted. The Ottoman bureaucrats who had received some Western education and had traveled in Europe were the first to understand this need and undertake the task of implementing the innovations.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., p.8.: “... ve ma’lûm olduğu vechile her ne sebebe mebnî ise cânîb-i Devlet-i Aliyye’den mukaddemâ oraya [sic] ittifâkına dâhî olmakla râgef bénéficulunmadığının üzerine anlar dahî her tarafı Devlet-i Aliyye ülkesine mühâcime mübâseret ve her ne kadar müdâfâa da bulunmuş ise de tamâmîyle muvâfakat edilmesi gayr-ı mümkin olduğundan başka nihâyeti bütün bütünle fenâliga netice vereceği melhz olup ve bundan dolayi ülke-yi Osmaniye’nin mühâkemesi husûsda devletler miyânında der-miyân ve müzâkereye konulduغا ve böyle beş altı devlete karşu durulmak bu dahi mümkin ve mansûr olmamızdan ve dâhî-i ittifâk bulunmayan ve Devlet-i Aliyye politikastyla birleșecek başka devlet dahi bi-taraf kalmamış olduğu bı ÎnâÎ bu müzâkerenin önünü kesmek ve Devlet-i Aliyye böyle mühâcime ve ülkesini mühâkemeden kurtarmak ve mevcudunu mühâfaza ve ilerûde kuvvet ksb eylemek üzere sadr-i eshak Mustafa Reşid Paşa usûl-i Tanzimat kabûl ve Devlet-i Aliyye ittifâk-i mezkûreye ithal eyledi.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., p.8.: “...iste, bu ise memâlik-i şâhâneye tâze cân verilmiş mesâbesinde ilerîye bekasına dair bir hizmet fevkalâde oldûysa da bunun teferruâtî ícrâya gelecek memûrun-i devlete pek büyük bir gâ’île daht birakılmış oldu. Bunun semere-i muhasenâtî çarchabuk olarak MISIR-I KAHIRE keyfiyetinden ciimleye ma’lûm ve anlaşılmış olduğuna artîk bu ittîfâkın üzerine diğer bir devletin tebasını himaye ve kûmûndasına olmak münâsbî olamaz ve şân-u düveleye yâkışmaz.”
Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, just as Râşid emphasized, was one of the key figures of the period, for he issued the *Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane* in the year 1839. What comes next, let us be reminded, is “Ottomanism”, the idea of unifying different peoples in the Ottoman Empire and guaranteeing the equal rights of life, property and honour to all Ottoman subjects, whether Muslim or Non-Muslim, which was of prime importance. By the same token, it is the failure of this very principle what Râşid implied in the above-mentioned passage when he said that the implementation of the *Tanzimat* eventually became the burden. The reason for that was, basically put, the fact that not only was the Muslim population not eager to see the non-Muslims granted equal rights, but the Greek *millet*, for instance, did not embrace the novelties with so much enthusiasm, since its fulfilment would hinder them from enjoying the privileges they had had as a *millet* hitherto.

Consequently, in a situation where the Great Powers were endangering the Empire from the outside and with the problems accumulating within, Râşid’s understanding of the state of affairs could be seen as plausible: The Empire, to put it simply, was in no position to provide protection and/or any kind of help to the subjects of other states. More importantly, the Ottomans’ (possible) interest in interfering in such issues was, as Râşid perceives it, limited by the intervention of the Great Powers themselves. On that point, he elaborates:

“In the Hungarian affair, the Russian state sent to the Austrians help consisting of a hundred and twenty thousand soldiers with exquisite arms. The soldiers were spread against the Hungarians and on their departure from the Hungary, they abandoned to Austrians the fortresses and the surroundings they had conquered.”  

Furthermore, as Râşid states, the entering of Austria by Russian soldiers was no more than an attempt to spread the idea of unification among the Serbs on that side of

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122 Ibid., p.8.
the river. This way the seed of *Surp Kralliyeti* was sown. Since the Serbs in Austria now might have another agenda and even if they, while on the one side asking the Ottomans for asylum, opt to enter into a secret alliance with the Russians in regard to the *Islav meselesi*, Russia’s standpoint was well known. Hence, one more reason emerged for the Empire to refuse their requests.\(^{123}\)

The Egyptian crisis was yet another sign of the Empire’s inability to cope successfully with the prevailing state of affairs. Mehmed Ali of Egypt arose as a powerful ruler who already in 1834 thought of proclaiming independence.\(^{124}\) The reforms he had previously implemented in Egypt served as the example to Sultan Mahmud II. In the presence of the threat reflected in the personality of Mehmed Ali, Reşid Paşa was looking for outside help. In order to obtain any kind of help, the Empire itself was conditioned by request to resemble a state willing to reform and became as liberal as Mehmed Ali of Egypt.\(^{125}\) On that account Reşid Paşa proclaimed the *Tanzimat Fermanı*.

According to Râşid, in order to take Egypt and its surroundings from Mehmed Ali and put it again under Ottoman control, the Empire employed the politics of intense negotiation with other countries. (Actually Reşid Paşa was sent on a special mission to Vienna, Berlin, Paris and London in an attempt to obtain the support of the powers against Ali).\(^{126}\)

In the interest of preserving the *status quo*, however, Mehmed Ali sent thirty six thousand *kese* to London to be delivered to Reşid Paşa (!).\(^{127}\) Having been offered this

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\(^{123}\) Ibid., p.8.


\(^{126}\) Anderson., p. 95.

\(^{127}\) Hayretnümâ., p.8-9.: “... Şöyle ki, müşârun-ileyî sadr-i esbak Reşîd Mustafa Pâşâ bu derece sadık-i devlet ve millet olduğunu pek çok kimse bilüp hakkında gün går gün ta'n ederler bu ise Misir ve havâlsını Mehmed Ali Pâşâ'dan alımp yine Devlet-i Aliyye'ye terk olunmak derecesine kadar politika yürütüp dâvel-i sâireye ibrâm ettirikde bunun alîhâle terk edilmesi bâbında otîz altî bin kese müşârun-ileyî Reşîd Pâşâ'ya verilmek üzere Misir vâlîsi müşârun-ileyî tarafından (Londra'da) bûlûnân tarafına havâle olunup ol-dahi meblağ-î mezûr kendisine teklif edildikte ber-vechile kabûl
sum of money Reşid Paşa categorically rejected receiving it and asserted that he would *Misir-i Kahireyi alip Devlet-i Aliyye'ye red ettireceğim.* Upon receiving this answer, Mehmed Ali was, as Râşid asserts, rather surprised, not knowing what to do. As a result, with the help of the foreign protégées, he was left “only” with the chance of obtaining the hereditary right, along with the revenue to be paid to the Ottomans.\(^{128}\)

At the time of the Crimean War (1853-1856) Russia sent an offer to Serbia inviting it (secretly) to join Russia against the Ottoman Empire.\(^{129}\) Knez Aleksandar, according to Râşid, in answering this proposal, refers to his father Karadjordje’s insurrection when, as he points out, Russia failed to distribute all the *mühimmat, top* and *edevât-i sâire* initially promised, but sent only a few soldiers, who in actual fact, stood more on the sidelines than fighting on behalf of the Serbs. Despite the fact that Aleksandar acknowledged Russia’s efforts to gain concessions for the Serbs, he claims that no one among the Serbs can possibly interfere in this issue (*Sırbistan áhalísinden bir ferd bu işe karışmaz*). Giving the answer to Russia Aleksandar moreover points out, as Râşid conveys to us, that the engagement on the part of the Serbs could not possibly accelerate the development of the *Islav meselesi* either.\(^{130}\) It is not beneficial for the *millet* with *ufak ufak* government such as that of the Serbs, he asserts, to cherish the aspiration to become part of the *Rusya memâlik* and to *Avrupa’yi tamamiyla zahb etmek*, as it would only risk the *servet* (fortune) and *rahat* (comfort) that they have been hitherto enjoying under the auspices of the *Devlet-i Aliyye*.\(^{131}\)


Nevertheless, Raşid affirms that Serbia was already at large advocating politics processing on account of bringing this idea (initiated as the Islav meselesi) to its final triumph. To that effect Raşid elaborates on the existence of the map, plotted by the Serbs and spread around by the Sırbistan mekteb-i harbiye ve basmahaneler. 132

It is impossible to describe the extent to which the Serbs are damned people, says Raşid. 133 He then provides a detailed portrayal of the map in question.134 The branches cut off from the big tree under whose truck stand the Serbian prominent people along with Karadjordje and Miloš are all equipped with weapons and dressed in the Serbian clothes with çarıkş 135 on their feet. Alongside a depiction of the meeting in which the possible solution for the realization of the Sırp Kralliyeti was discussed, the map portrays them united, accomplishing the wanted aim by the use of weapons. The old crown of the Serbian King is hung over the branches as well.136

Raşid’s interpretation of the map is as follows: The concessions they obtained represented by the cut branches open the way for the new branches to grow, thereby symbolizing the new beginning for the Serbs. The crown is, according to Raşid, an

\[\text{Ibid., p. 45.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 45. “...Sırp milleti ise ne mel’anette olduğu cümlelenin ma’lûmudur, her ne kadar vafş edilmiş olsa tariﬁ gayr-ı mümkindir, neşr eyledikleri haritalarda bile bir mel’anet ve rımtızat nakş olunup kăffe-i Sırp milleltini bir efkâra düşürmek zâyi’şini icrâ eylemişlerdir.”}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 45. “...Şöyle ki harita-i mezbûrûn kenârdında budakları kesilmiş bir büyük ağaç küttûğü resm olunup ve altında Sırp elbiseleri ve ayaklarında Çarık ve esliha ile mükemmel donanmış cûnd-i nefer Sırp rûesâ ve merkum Kara Yorgi ve Miloşun resimleri nakş olunmuş ve başları üzerinde yani küttûğün budakları altında meşveret ve tuğyân elemekle Sırp Kralliyetini ne süretle meydana çîkarmaklî mümkün olur mûzakere ve ittifâk ederek nihayet silaha mûracaatla bu intîyâzi kazandıklarını imâ eyledikleri ve ol küttûğün saq sol taraflarına bir mikdâr dal budak gösterilîp bunun altında atîk Sırp Kralımın täcî asîlmuş ve bu dâllar bir mikdâr göülge edîp onlar dâhi sayesinde oturup niye meşveret etmekde deyî resm-i mezkûrâda göstermişlerdir.”}\]

\[\text{Çarıkş = Opanci, Serbian national footwear.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 45.}\]
indication of the necessity of the Serbs to find a forerunner, a leader worthy of wearing that crown.  

Not only did the Serbs try to impose this idea upon the other Ottoman subjects, Raşid emphasizes, expecting them to engage in combat on behalf of the Serbs if need be, but the European countries turned a blind eye in this direction, Russia being a key figure, especially in regard to its interference, and sent help to the Serbs in Hungary.  

Yet, as the article from the “Serbian Newspapers” asserts in the beginning of this section, this “Hungarian issue” did not bring about any of the promised results. “All the fight of the Serbs was in vain” says Nikola Hristić. Those who made this promise [Austria], as he asserts, acted in such a way because they were anxious about their own welfare.  

Still, Austria as well as Russia continually kept track of the developments in the city. To that effect, Raşid elaborates on the visit of the Austrian emperor.  

Once he arrived in Zemun, the Austrian emperor requested the Austrian consul in Belgrade to ask the muhafız to issue the ferman on the demeanor during his visit. This kind of visit, Raşid emphasizes, the visit of one imperator to the borderland, had not happened often in the past; there was one such visit during the assignment of Maraşlı Ali Paşa. Even if attention is paid to the register of that visit, it is more than clear, he continues, that it does not tally anymore with the needs of the epoch, and even if it did, it is certain that it would not be carried out. Thus, the ferman given allowed the civil wardrobe (“düüz siyah elbiseler”) and only requested the kind of behaviour that will reflect the respect towards the (paşa’s) status and called for a record of the conversations made.  

The arrival of the Emperor was retold in many details. The fire of twenty cannons was a sign that the Emperor had arrived at Zemun and the following day, asakir-i nizamiyye welcomed him in Belgrade with music and, again, with the “fire of twenty cannons.” Then the invitation was sent to Hurşid Paşa, the veli of Belgrade, to come and

137 Ibid., p. 46.  
138 Ibid., p. 46.  
139 Hristić., p. 124.  
140 Ibid., p.27.
pay him a visit. Once he entered the room, Hurşid Paşa’a attention was captured by the _frank_ style of the way the room was furnished.\textsuperscript{141} When the Emperor saw him coming in, he stood up and removed the cap showing his most sincere respect.

Just after Hurşid Paşa left the Emperor, Aleksandar came along with four clerks and several more _rüesa_, all dressed in the official suit wearing the _fes_, only Aleksandar having the _nişan_ embodied in his _fes_. The minute they entered the room, they all removed the _feses_. It is well known, as Raşid asserts, that even if it is common in Europe for any general (_paşa_) to take off the garment, the _fes_ of _Devlet-i Aliyye_ is not to be removed during any official visit. This group’s rudeness and insolence and the fact that they are not familiar with the rules of their own country, as Raşid asserts, made them look in the eyes of the others no more than an amusement.\textsuperscript{142} He does not, however, perceive this behaviour of Aleksandar’s as his possible objection to recognizing an Ottoman custom as his own any more, thereby promoting Serbia as an independent state to be.

The Emperor, after having spent some time visiting synagogues, churches and the Serbian _anbars_ filled with weapons, went around visiting the surroundings, the small villages, _kasabsas_, very often changing the initially announced route and appearing at some places unexpectedly in order to learn the real living conditions of the population, especially those of the Ottoman subjects'.\textsuperscript{143}

It was the time of Hurşid Paşa’s assignment and everyone was pleased with his rule, Raşid points out. How it is possible then, the Austrian Emperor poses the question

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p.29. “...Mişârûn-îleyh Mehmed Hûrşîd Paşa maiyyeti bulunan zevâtlâ İmparatorun olduğu odaya girdiklerinde bir büyük salon yeni arz odasının derûmunda bir kebîr masa ve önünde tûlân sekiz ve arzan üç zirâ’ mikdarında bir aded frenk halîsî yani kilimi ferş olunmuş ve etrâfi kanape ve sandalye ve aynalar ile müzeyyen ve mezkûr kilimin baş tarafında İmparatorî mişârûn-îleyh ayak üzere bulunup ve başında hamâîl şekilde tûylü ve belinde kılıç ve ayağında çizmeler ve üzerinde beyaz çuha pantalon kurşuni renginde setre ve setrenin üzerine yine pek az sırmı işlenesi olup fakat goğşüne envâ’î nişanları ta’lík edilmiş olduğu görüldü.”

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p. 33.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., p.30.
to the *paşa* that the Muslim population seeks to emigrate from Belgrade.\textsuperscript{144} Peace prevails here, the Emperor continues, and everyone conforms for the sake of that peace; the āhalī obeys the words of the muhafızs, and the Serbs are in any case obliged to conform (*mecburen riâyette bulunuyorlar*).\textsuperscript{145}

The *paşa*’s answer was rather explicit: “In less than ten years, the Muslim population in Belgrade will be forced to emigrate and that is what the Serbian politics currently being conducted brings about as imminence.\textsuperscript{146} The situation precipitates into not only the absolute expulsion of the Muslims, but that being done in a pretty merciless way: *bir el önde bir el arkada.*

And the muhafızlar, as he continues, whether appointed to Belgrade or to any other of the fortresses in Serbia, by refraining from providing resistance to the Serbs saying “*aman benim zamanında bir şey vuku' bulmasın ve ta'n altında kalmayayım*” (let’s nothing happen during my rule so that I do not be resented), agree to every request of theirs, thereby putting at stake all the Muslim property.\textsuperscript{147} Along with the *emlâk hane ve akârat*, which had been handed over to the Serbs in 1829 or rented to them for a certain amount of money, now the rest of it is likely to be lost to them, this time with no compensation of any kind ( *Ön tekerlek hangi yola giderse arka tekerleği dahi ol yola gider*).\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., p.34. “...Niçin dâima Belgrâd-dan hicret etmek emelinde bulunuyorsunuz halbuki burada olan rahatlığı başka yerde bulunmaz ve hususiyle burada hatırına her kimesne tarafından riâyet edilmeyüp ve gelmekte olan memürün ve muhafızlar her bir umûr -i mühimmeye mahrem-i esrâr ederek başkaca iltifat dâhi ediyorlar ahâli ise kâffeten reyini kabul ve sözünü red etmiyorlar. Sırblulara gelince anlar dahi mecbûren riâyette bulunuyorlar.”

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p.34.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p. 34. “...Bu memleketlerin ileride bekâsunı görmiyorum ve bu hâl ile daha on sene gider gitmez bu âhalî -i İslâmi mecbûren hicret ettirirler faktat şöyle bir hâl ile hicret ve terk-i vatan ettirerek bir el önde bir el arkada darb-i misâli gibi...ve ol hâl ile nihayeti vukû' bulacağı rûşen-i hâl ve ceryan eden Sırplu’nun politikaları göstermektedir.”

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p.32.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., p. 32.
Therefore, as Hurşid Paşa asserts, when this expatriation occurs the fortress will be immediately delivered into Serbian hands (yüzümüze bakmayıp). Thus, before all this happens and while the Muslim population of Belgrade still has some strength, he finds as a more appropriate for them to start leaving the fortress beforehand. Even though no one among the âhalî has had the courage to acknowledge this truth, he admits to be the one taking this responsibility.149

3.3: “Belgrâd’ın istihkâmı ise artık tamamiyle Sırbı yedine geçti”: Losing Property, Losing Authority

This section will look at the issue of the Muslim property in Belgrade. This question, beyond doubt, was a significant point in the relationship between the two parties prior to the departure of the Muslims from the city. A few indicators of declining Muslim authority have already been pointed out in the previous chapters. This part will introduce the reader to Râşid’s own interpretation of the events within the walls of the fortress and his perception of the impact that all the losses had on the ahali-i Islam.

In 1829, as elaborated in the second chapter, the Muslim population in Belgrade and its surroundings was forced to abandon their emlâk, arâzî and çiftlik in favour of the Serbs. Akil Bey inquires about the amount of money for which, if permission was given, the emlâk, hâne, dükkân, hân and arâzî in the Muslim possession, would now be sold.

According to Nakil Bey’s answer, the lump sum for the akarâtî in Muslim hands, in case of its sale, would be more than seventy, eighty thousand kese of akçe.150 Because, as Râşid continues, the emlâk in the interior of Belgrade varoş among the ahâli was sold for five hundred kuruş, but now was being sold to the Serbs for forty five thousand kuruş; in time the value increased. As far as the ahâli’s hâne and emlâklar in the fortress are concerned, Râşid emphasizes, the initially made estimates of twenty

149 Ibid., p. 33.

150 Hayretmûmâ., p. 20.
thousand *kese* were actually much higher. It is not possible, as Râşid asserts, to know the real value; *akçe yani sermayesini* can hardly be completely ascertained by anyone since the *variety denilen şeyi bilmek mümkün değildir*. Fakat, bu olsun tahminler kendilerinin saltanat ve meydanda olan servetleri üzerine bir tahmindir.\(^{151}\)

In an attempt to interpret Râşid’s narrative on property values, it is necessary to remember the dual administration in Belgrade and acknowledge its importance with regard to the possessions of both, the Serbian and the Muslim population. To begin with, the *varoş* was surrounded with the trench (\(Šanac\)) which was a “negotiable property” in itself. As Hristić points out:

“We would often find ourselves engaged in disputes with the Turks because of the “\(Šanac\) varoški” (city trench). Our authorities were supporting our people to take hold of the border next to the trench which would eventually result in its gradual disappearance. The Turkish authorities noticed this and objected to it for they consider that area to be their own property.

... In addition, we considered all the empty areas in the city that do belong neither to individuals nor to the state are the property of the Serbian Municipality (Srpska Opština) and it should be preserved.”\(^{152}\)

These illustrations, moreover, contribute to our perception of the slow but definite change of roles that was taking place in Belgrade during the 1850s. Akil Bey, at one point, asks his brother why the Serbs always feel the need to infringe on the *Varoş Kapusu* and attack the soldiers at the *karakolhane*.\(^ {153}\) The major reason, according to the

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\(^{151}\) Ibid., p.21.

\(^{152}\) Hristić., p. 192.

\(^{153}\) Hayretnümâ., p. 9.
answer his brother provides him with, is the fact that Karadjordje held the city by force for too long (It is interesting to mention, in this regard, that Karadjordje confiscated the house of Mula Yusuf, a notorious dayı, when he first took over the city in 1806). The Serbs even now, Râşid continues, felt quite secure; around the kale and the karakolhane and even in their surroundings, there were no Muslim houses (hanes), shops (dükkân), or coffee houses (kahvehane) left. Only the asâkir-i nizamiyye were situated in the fortress.

154 Yet, the Serbs still did not have complete control. Hristić’s elaboration on the “tezkere issue” depicts a situation fundamental for understanding the “Turkish” unwillingness to acknowledge Serbian authority and the Serbian dislike of Muslim behaviour.

The custom was introduced for the Serbian police to send teskeres collected from the passengers from “Turkey” to the paşa in the fortress.155 The authorities approved of this, but only verbally.

“I personally did not like this. It looked to me as if I had some kind of duties towards the paşa. Thus, I issued a command that teskeres are to be kept in the police station and only if the passenger wishes, he may as well request them back and take them to the paşa in order to obtain the visa for return to Turkey.”

156

When paşa found out about this, he sent a voyvoda 157 to inform Hristić that tezkeres had to be sent to him because these people are from “Turkey”. Hristić’s response, however, was that the Serbian police were responsible for the “non-Turkish” passengers from “Turkey”. 158

154 Ibid., p. 9.
155 Hristić, p.193.
156 Ibid., p. 193.
157 Voyvoda: A (Muslim) person responsible for the nizams in the fortress.
158 Ibid., p. 194.
On the banks of the Sava River, where the ships were docked, there were two “Turkish” cafes (kafana), a few Turkish shops and a mosque. Paşa was now sending his man, situated in one of the cafes, to collect the tezkeres from all the new arrivals. For some time this was conducted without attracting much attention, since passengers were issued an order from their authorities to hand out tezkeres to the paşa’s man immediately upon debarkation.\textsuperscript{159}

One day a Serbian policeman arrested a person for a certain crime and wanted to bring him to the police station in the city. When they arrived at the Stambol-gate (Stambol kapija) where the “Turkish” guards were situated, the criminal refused to move any further with the policeman. The Serb began exerting force to make him proceed, when the “Turkish” nizams reacted by taking the criminal from the policeman and sending him to the paşa.

“I was frustrated because of this event. I felt humiliated, for the Turkish guards took the criminal from my policeman. Thus, I sent one of my men to the knez so that he can explain what happened and ask for the criminal to be handed back to us and for the guards to be punished. The voyvoda went to the fortress and on his return sent one of his men with a message from the paşa, who promised to punish the guilty, if I tell him what he had previously done. I refused to give him an answer but did, however, think of a plan how to appease myself.”\textsuperscript{160}

Firstly, he sent off a couple of guards with message for the peasants who were dragging wood to the city, ordering them not to give out any wood to the “Turkish” nizams. In case they try to take it by force, the order was to defy, relying on the help of the Serbian police if the things got complicated. And that is exactly what happened; the guards were trying to take the wood, peasants were resisting and the police were helping

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 194.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p.196.
Moreover, on the Serbian side of the trench, the “Turks” appointed nizams, without weapons, only with “tesaka”. “I was against this”, Hristić adds, “and was determined to do something about it.”

The narrative continues with Hristić pointing out the most trivial details of a dispute and “negotiating” between the duke, Hristić himself, and the paša.

One more important event in this regard deserves to be mentioned. Near the Sava Gate there were some 15-20 rather poorly built houses that belonged mostly to fishermen and poor peasants. Earlier, these houses belonged to the “Turks” who sold them to the Serbs. Nikola Smiljanić, a Serb, bought one of these houses, and since the house was in a very poor condition, he decided to demolish it and build a new one. The house itself was not large, due to the limited space he owned, but the material he was using was of a high quality. When the paša learned this, the nizams were sent to hinder him from continuing with construction. Smiljanić complained about this to Hristić who reacted by sending a message to a voyvoda, telling him to leave Smiljanić alone and let him keep working. The response he received from a knez was that the house, since it was situated near the fortress, was a strong building that could be used as a small fortification, hence, the prohibition.

Smiljanić showed Hristić the paperwork confirming that he is the lawful owner of the place. The documents were issued by the Turkish authorities. Thus, Hristić allowed the Serb to build the house. Nevertheless, nizams came again and not only did they start forcing the workers to leave the building, but also to demolish part of the construction. After having received this news, Hristić instructed one of the policemen to pick ten soldiers and place them around Smiljanić’s house. In case the nizams came back, he emphasized, the policemen were allowed to shoot at them. Thus, when the workers started to work again, nizams came to stop them. Policemen stepped in front of them saying that the soldiers will start shooting unless they left the place. Having seen

161 Ibid., p.196.
162 Ibid., p.196.
163 Ibid., p.214.
164 Ibid., p.214.
that the Serbs’ intentions were serious after they fired a few blank shots, the nizams left and let the workers continue with the work.\textsuperscript{165}

Apart from being an example of an attempt by both sides to outflank each other, its importance lies in the fact that one of our two authors, namely Hristić, mentions the other one.

Paşa sent a voyvoda to visit Hristić together with Râşid Bey in order to complain about Serbian soldiers shooting at his nizams.

“Smiljanić has all the paperwork and he has got every right to build his house there. That was a house that he was building, not a fort. It is our police’s duty to protect Smiljanić’s rights,” said Hristić.

“But the nizams could have got killed by your soldiers” responded Râşid Bey. The Serb answered that the “soldiers had been given the order to protect Smiljanić’s construction, hence the use of guns. Yet, against the outlaws, not the nizams.”

Despite the paşa’s complaint and request for the Serbian soldiers to be punished, the matter ended and Smiljanić finished building his house.\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., op.215.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., p.219.
By Way of Conclusion

*If you have nothing to say other than to tell us that one barbarian succeeded another barbarian on the bank of the Oxus and the Jaxartes, what use are you to the public?*  
Voltaire

The joint life of the Muslims and the Serbs during the last decade of Ottoman rule in Belgrade could be described, basically, as an incessant struggle for power. Constant disputes occurred among both the common people and the representatives of authority. Even the rest of the population, as seen in the example of the Jews, depended on the mutual (dis)agreement between these two main agents.

Yet, the troublesome coexistence in Belgrade during the 1850s was not due only to the tensions and conflicts among the major two (confessional) groups in the city, namely Christians (or rather Serbs) and Muslims, but also to the internal disputes among Serbian statesmen. What we have in this decade in Belgrade is the ever growing political insecurity caused by disputes among the Constitution Defenders and the knez. What is more, those who were supporters of Miloš Obrenović and advocated his return into power had (secretly) plotted the conspiracy against Aleksandar. The situation culminated in the year of 1858 when the knez’s escaped to the inner fortress, which was under paşa’s surveillance. Both Râşid and Nikola make comment on this matter.

“The inconstant Aleksandar is not a matter of pleasure and not a matter of peace to people, the majority of whom are Serbs and Muslims. What we have in this decade in Belgrade is an ever growing political insecurity caused by disputes among the Constitution Defenders and the knez. What is more, those who were supporters of Miloš Obrenović and advocated his return into power had (secretly) plotted the conspiracy against Aleksandar. The situation culminated in the year of 1858 when the knez’s escaped to the inner fortress, which was under paşa’s surveillance. Both Râşid and Nikola make comment on this matter.

167 Voltaire., p. 333.

168 Ibid., p. 63.
eventually coalesced into a single aim: to overthrow the knez. Left with no other choice, Aleksandar chooses to ask the paša for a refuge.

Nikola records the event in his “Memoirs” as follows:

“On the day of Saint Andreja in the year of 1806 Karadjordje, with the assistance of the Serbian people prosecutes the Turks and enters the Belgrade fortress as a winner. Whereas his son, knez Aleksandar, on the same day in 1858 calls for the assembly gathering and then escapes from them to the Turks in the fortress to seek for their protection. What a strange game in a human destiny!”

Râşid writes how Aleksandar lost all support and “familiası hiddetlenip...hatta Aleksandri’nin yüzüne tükürip: yazık sen Kara Yorke’nin oglu olup da böyle ürkek ve cesaretsiz olasin.” His getaway to the Muslim side, however, was regarded as a betrayal by the Serbian statesmen and the stage for Miloš’s accedance therefore had been set.

Both accounts report in detail about the “other” side’s misdeeds. Yet, Hristić seems to be somewhat more temperate in his addressing the “Turks”. Raşid, as emphasized in the title of this work, insists on the antagonism and the evil nature of the “neighbours.” Yet, in the list (Spisak) provided in the Appendix, we can see that Raşid Bey was one of those who donated the highest amount of money to the Serbian hospital, after an organized balo. This list dates from the year 1861, only one year before the notorious event at Čukur çesma when a Serbian boy was hurt in a fight as a consequence of which turmoil emerged in the city, followed by the Muslim shelling of the city from the fortress in the same year. This event, moreover, prompted knez Mihajlo to request from the Great Powers the final and absolute evacuation of the “Turks” out of Belgrade.

169 Hristić., p. 277.
170 Râşid., p.78.
171 For “the Poster” see Appendix: Fig.6.
Taking into consideration that this was the period of the “Eastern Question,” Raşid’s inclination to connect all the actions of the Serbs to the possible fulfillment of “their biggest dream”, the establishment of the Sirp Kraliyeti, does not come as a surprise. It was the time when the Ottoman Empire was threatened by the Great Powers as well as by internal factors, such as Mehmed Ali. It is important to note that Raşid, even though living in Belgrade (and later Bosnia) relates to the events in Egypt offering even detailed descriptions. On many occasions he elaborates on Russia’s interference and their support of the Serbians. Raşid very often complains about the Muslims of Belgrade not having the support of the European countries, thereby being left to cope with the new situation on their own.

Interestingly enough, both of the authors fail to demonstrate or depict a cultural upheaval/downfall of the other group. Raşid’s only concern (rightly?!) was the property issue. Neither of the two narratives would be good material for the study of urban development of the city which, beyond doubt, underwent many changes in this period. If we consider the works limited in that regard, we certainly cannot assert the same when it comes to the depiction of Belgrade’s everyday life. The emphasis was put mostly on the constant disputes, fights and struggles for authority and that was truly a reality of the period. It was now the “Turkish” side who had to comply with the Serbian authorities and close their shops on Sundays, as the Christians did. This was one of the indicators that the troublesome coexistence in Belgrade in the 1850s would bring about several years later the end of the world, as the population of the city knew it.

What is then-to answer Voltaire’s question on behalf of our two authors-the utterance they wanted to convey to the public? Of what use to us is the information on the constant quarrels among the population as if there had not been any dispute in the earlier times? The answer might be provided by raising a yet another question: To whom (or rather for whom), in actual fact, did they write their histories? Who is the public they were addressing? If Hristić left his “Memoirs” to the new generations of, at the time, the ever rising Serbian state with no Ottomans within it, then at whom was Raşid aiming? Would it be possible to look for something beyond the hatred he expressed in his writing towards the Serbs (as maybe the circumstances at the time entailed) and assume that he left his narrative, along with the considerable amount of money he donated to the Serbian hospital, as a gesture of affection for his hometown and a expression of sorrow for having lost it?
Appendix:

Fig.1: Vidin kapusu (in., Zamolo, Djurić Divna., Belgrade as an Oriental varoš 1521-1867., Muzej Grada Beograda, 1977., Belgrade).

Fig.2: Stanbol kapusu (Zamolo., 1977.)
Fig.3: Plan of Belgrade (in Deroko, Aleksandar, *Narodno Neimarstvo*, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Belgrade, 1968.)
БЕОГРАД ОКО 1867. ГОД.

Капије на ширио око стари и врхови. Ове су капије порушене, углаци, 1862. год., док је Стамбол-капија срушена 1866. год.

I. Саба-капија, II. Варош-капија, III. Стамбол-капија и IV. Винди-капија
1. — Место на Калемегдану где је извршена преглађа градова кнезу Михаилу.
2. — Капија Карла VI (саграђена у првој половини XVIII века).
3. — Унутрашње војно пристанште у Доњем граду.
4. — Цамија у Доњем граду (срушена после 1918. год.)
5. — Хамам у Доњем граду.
6. — Капија из времена Агиста Стефана Лазаревића (из јачетка XV века).
7. — Лазарин конак у Горњем граду (срушена после 1918. год.)
8. — Паша-дворац у Доњем граду (срушена после 1842. год.)
9. — Пространште на Дунаву.
10. — „Вуковић“ (саграђена 1835, срушена после 1918. год.)
11. — Саборна црква (саграђена 1837—1845. год.)
12. — Митрополија (саграђена 1837—1840. год., срушена после 1918. год.)
13. — „Празни конак“ (саграђена 1831. године)
14. — Хоча „Ход Јелена“ (саграђена 1844, срушена после 1918. год.)
15. — Здравница, у време бомбардовања Београда 1862. година била српска жандармерија, делио је Радовка.
16. — „Пиринцама“, остаци резиденција принца Александра Виртембершког (саграђена почетком XVIII века, срушена 1870. год.)
17. — Барут-капија.
18. — Јачана кућа (саграђена 1825, срушена 1936. год.)
19. — Делићева кућа.
20. — Турска кућа, од 1808. године, на Светењев лице.
21. — Капетан-Мишићева знамјена (саграђена 1833, године)
22. — Архиепископска кућа.
23. — Цукер чесма.
24. — Капетан-Мишићева знамјена (саграђена 1833, године)
25. — Диван-чесма.
26. — Турска кућа (саграђена 1860. год., срушена за време II светског рата).
27. — Турска кућа (саграђена 1860. год.)
28. — Капелан-Мишићева знамјена (саграђена 1835, год., срушена после 1915. год.)
30. — Макаров училиште, у време бомбардовања Београда 1862. година била српска жандармерија, делио је Радовка.
31. — Погонисте, у време бомбардовања Београда 1862. година била српска жандармерија, делио је Радовка.
32. — Капелан-Мишићева знамјена (саграђена 1833, год.)
33. — Кућа Стојана Симића (саграђена 1842. год., срушена после 1915. године)
34. — Кућа Стојана Симића (саграђена 1842. год., срушена после 1915. године)
35. — Кућа Стојана Симића (саграђена 1842. год., срушена после 1915. године)
36. — Кућа Стојана Симића (саграђена 1842. год., срушена после 1915. године)
37. — Кућа Стојана Симића (саграђена 1842. год., срушена после 1915. године)

ВЕОГРАД ВЕРС 1867

I, II, III, IV — Portes des remparts qui entouraient la ville du temps des Turcs
Porterisse basse
Porterisse haute
Port sur le Danube
Port sur la Sava
Eglise (1837—1845)
Koška de la princesse Ljubica (1831)
Maison de l'Esco (1825)
Maison du premier lycée (vers 1800)
Place — aujourdhui Place de la République
Place — aujourdhui Terazije
Hôpital (1865)
Cour royale (1830)
Eglise (1832)
Koška du prince Miloš (1829—1836)
Cathédrale (1832)
Eglise (1832)
Académie militaire (1830)
Fig. 5: The Turkish Plan of Belgrade (in Elezović Gliša -Pera Popović, “Dva Turska Plana Beograda”, (Two Turkish Plans of Belgrade), Beogradske Opštinske Novine LV, 1937.).
Fig. 6: The Poster (in the Historical Archives of Belgrade, ИАБ, УГБ, К. 590, Ф. IX, 190/1861).
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