Bargaining with nanonymous disagreement: nondecomposable rules

Kıbrıs, Özgür and Gürsel Tapkı, İpek (2006) Bargaining with nanonymous disagreement: nondecomposable rules. (Submitted)

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We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payos from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). We first show that this domain extension creates a very large number of new rules that could not have been analyzed under the standard domain. Particularly, the rules associated with the Nash domain constitute a nowhere dense subset of all possible rules. Next, we analyze monotone path rules on our domain and show that they are characterized by a set of properties that are not jointly compatible on the Nash domain. We also analyze and characterize a Proportional rule on our domain.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:disagreement matrix; axiomatic; dense; monotone path rule; proportional rule.
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
ID Code:22
Deposited By:Özgür Kıbrıs
Deposited On:19 Sep 2006 03:00
Last Modified:13 Apr 2009 15:01

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