

**THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY: TOWARDS MORE  
COOPERATION OR JUST A MEHTER STEP?**

**By**

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COOPERATION OR JUST A MEHTER STEP?

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY: TOWARDS MORE COOPERATION OR JUST A MEHTER STEP?**

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When the Eastern Enlargement took place in 2004, the EU Member States were aware that the enlargement would ultimately change the shape of the EU's political and economic relations with other parts of the world because it brought up the borders of the union to a new geography that introduced new security problems and other issues like identity and culture. In order to develop a lasting solution to the enlargement fatigue that the Union found itself in and to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors as well as to strengthen the security, stability and prosperity in the region, the EU first with Wider Europe in 2003 and then with Strategy Paper in 2004 introduced the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The policy is then enriched with different initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in Paris in 2008, the Black Sea Synergy launched in Kiev in 2008 and the Eastern Partnership launched in Prague in 2009. However, the Neighborhood policy that was created with big ambitions faced serious problems concerning its implementation and its structure due to the diverging aims and preferences of the member states over different initiatives as well as varying levels of attachment of the partners due to the lack of incentives. The ENP was insufficient to bring the necessary reforms and to prepare the effective harmonization agenda to its partners. It rather remained as a paper action and a wishful thinking.

## ÖZET

### AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ KOMŞULUK POLİTİKASI: DAHA FAZLA İŞBİRLİĞİ YA DA SADECE BİR MEHTER ADIMI

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Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Komşuluk Politikası, Doğu Genişlemesi, Hükümetlerarasıcılık, Akdeniz Ortaklığı, Karadeniz Sinerjisi, Doğu Ortaklığı.

2004 yılında Doğu Genişlemesi gerçekleştiğinde, Avrupa Birliği bu genişlemenin dünyadaki diğer ülkelerle olan siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkilerini değiştireceğinin farkındaydı. Çünkü genişleme birliğin sınırlarını yeni güvenlik, kimlik ve kültür sorunlarını beraberinde getiren yepyeni bir coğrafyaya taşıdı. Avrupa Birliği, bu duruma kalıcı bir çözüm getirmek, genişleyen Avrupa Birliği ve komşuları arasında doğabilecek yeni ayırımları önlemek ve bölgede güvenlik, istikrar ve refahı güçlendirmek amacıyla önce 2003'te Daha Geniş Avrupa daha sonrada 2004'te Strateji Belgesiyle Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasını oluşturdu. Bu politika daha sonra 2008'de Paris'te Akdeniz Ortaklığı, yine 2008'de Kiev'de Karadeniz Sinerjisi ve son olarakta 2009'da Prag'da Doğu Ortaklığı ile geliştirildi. Ancak, büyük hırs ve azimle doğan bu politika üye devletlerin ortaklıklar üzerinde değişen hedef ve çıkarları yüzünden ve ortakları daha çok işbirliğine yöneltecek teşvik unsurlarının eksikliği nedeniyle uygulama ve altyapıda önemli sorunlarla karşı karşıya kaldı. Başka bir deyişle, komşuluk politikası kendisine ortak olan ülkelerde gerekli reformları gerçekleştirmedi ve etkin bir düzenleme gündemi hazırlamada yetersiz kaldı.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>CACR:</b>	Central Asia and the Caspian Region
<b>CARDS:</b>	Community assistance for reconstruction, development and Stabilization
<b>CEEC:</b>	Central and Eastern European Countries
<b>CFSP:</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>CSDP:</b>	Common Security and Defense Policy
<b>DCFTA:</b>	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
<b>EaP:</b>	Eastern Partnership
<b>EMP:</b>	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
<b>ENP:</b>	European Neighborhood Policy
<b>ENPI:</b>	European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
<b>EPC:</b>	European Political Cooperation
<b>EU:</b>	European Union
<b>EUMM:</b>	European Union Monitoring Mission
<b>IEA:</b>	International Energy Agency
<b>INTERREG:</b>	Community programme aiming to stimulate inter-regional Cooperation within the EU
<b>NATO:</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<b>PCA:</b>	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
<b>PHARE:</b>	Community assistance programme for the Central European Candidate Countries
<b>UN:</b>	United Nations
<b>WTO:</b>	World Trade Organisation

## **INTRODUCTION**

When the Rome Treaty was signed in 1957 by the six states founding the European Economic Community, the future of the European integration as a continent-wide project was not foreseen. Since its inception, the European Union went for enlargement several times in order to widen its big European project. The enlargements that took place between 1973- 1995 were decided according to the Article 237 of the Rome Treaty which states that any European State may apply to become a member of the Community and the admission is subject to an agreement between the Member States and the applicant (EU Website, Treaty of Rome). However, the conditions offered by the article were very elusive and were raising important questions concerning the definition of Europe as well as the European identity itself. That is to say, after some time, the member states realized that the Rome Treaty's Article 237 was not a sufficient criteria anymore. This was coupled with the wave of applications for membership from different parts of Europe in the post-Cold war period. As a result, in 1993, the EU adopted the Copenhagen criteria which included a stable democracy, rule of law, protection of minorities as well as a fully functioning market economy dealing with the competitive pressure and the adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire* for membership. This need is actually emerged out of the big wave of application coming mainly from the Central Eastern European Countries after the end of the Cold War. Although for some, it was obvious that the CEEC enlargement has more costs than its benefits for the Union, because of the reasons related to security, identity and the so called 'kinship based duty', the EU went for an enlargement in 2004 by including 10 new member states, namely, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. However, with the 2004 enlargement the Union found itself in a new region having different dynamics and conflicts within itself.

The EU members were aware that the enlargement would ultimately change the shape of the EU's political and economic relations with other parts of the world. Because it was undeniable that there is some kind of interdependence to the neighborhood and that the neighboring countries were the essential partners of the EU

to secure economic growth, external trade and to provide political stability and functioning rule of law (European Commission, 2003). As it is stated in the Wider Europe, the EU, with this enlargement, was aiming to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union. It also aimed at enchaning its relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Southern Mediterranean countries (European Commission, 2003). So, in order to avoid the emergence of the new dividing lines between the member states and to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security in the region, the EU in 2004 developed the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The Commission first outlined this policy in its document called Wider Europe on 11 March 2003, and then with its Strategy Paper published in 12 May 2004. The policy framework is proposed to the 16 of EU's closest neighbours namely: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine (ENP Website).

The ENP at first aimed at building up bilateral relations between the EU and each of these partner countries. In order to achieve this goal, the policy included Action Plans specific to each of the 16 countries concerning a time period ranging from 3 to 5 years. When we look at the current situation, we can see that the ENP could not fully activated yet, mainly because in some countries like Algeria, Syria, Belarus and Libya, these action plans are not yet agreed upon,. Nonetheless, the ENP is also enriched with the regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives such as the Eastern Parternship ( launched in May 2009), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (launched in July 2008) and the Black Sea Synergy ( launched in February 2008).

Overall, when the larger picture is observed, it can be seen that this enlargement introduced new security problems and other issues related to identity and culture for the EU 27 and it pushed the Union to develop new ties and new tools in order to continue in deepening the project. In addition, it is possible to claim that Turkey, being candidate country that wants to be included to this European project, can have a very important role here. Thanks to its geopolitical position and its natural presence of the European system with its membership to Customs Union, NATO and the Council of Europe, Turkey is located at the heart of this newly formed ENP. Even more importantly, it has deep historical roots with the countries involved in the region. Thus if the enlargement

is considered to be a security strategy for the Union, Turkey's full inclusion can help the EU to increase its security and to achieve its European Neighborhood Policy.

In short, this thesis argues that after the Eastern Enlargement, the Union went through a dramatical transformation in order to adapt itself to conflicts and challenges coming from the new neighbors. In order to focus more on the problems that the EU had been facing in the region and also to observe the solutions that it had developed, the thesis explores the European Neighborhood Policy in detail. Accordingly, the main research question in this thesis is: "Taking into consideration the path that the ENP had followed starting from its first launch in 2004, what explains the discrepancy between its goals and its outcomes?" The thesis investigates this question in three different parts. In the first part, the emphasis will be given to the reasons for going through an Eastern Enlargement in 2004, its significance for the future of the Union and the existing course of conduct of the Member States towards maintaining a common foreign policy basing especially on the intergovernmentalist logic to understand the dynamics behind the formation of the European Neighborhood Policy. In the second part, beginning with the formation of the European Neighborhood Policy with the joint letter written by the High Representative for CFSP at the time Javier Solana and then Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten in 2002 and the Communication on Wider Europe that proposed a new framework for relations with the Eastern and Southern Neighbors in 2003, the emphasis will be given to the evolution of this new policy within and outside the EU. While making such an analysis, different initiatives introduced by the EU such the Eastern Partnership launched in Prague in 2009, the Union for the Mediterranean countries launched in Paris in 2008 and the Black Sea Synergy launched in Kiev in 2008 will be analyzed in detail. This part in the thesis will discuss the recent developments in the European neighborhood and the future of the policy. Last, in the third part, three different case studies will be examined by choosing and examining a country that had the most strategic role and importance within each initiative. In this context, those countries will be Ukraine for the Eastern Partnership, Russia for the Black Sea Synergy and Libya for the Union for the Mediterranean. These three countries will enable us to assess the relative degree of success for the EU's ENP and assess whether those countries having different level of importance for the partnerships concerned lead to the same conclusion. To start with Ukraine, the main reason for its selection is due to its close relationship, its gradual

economic integration and its deepening political co-operation with the EU. At the same time, Ukraine is the country with the highest interest in becoming an EU member and therefore it shows a promising case for success concerning the ENP by its active partnership among the other Eastern Partners. The main rationale for the selection for Russia on the other hand, is different. Russia is very important country involved in the Black Sea Synergy because it is radically different from other associated countries, and it is relatively large and has no interest in joining the EU. In addition, Russia also possesses the capacity to influence the dynamics and the relations between the EU and the other partners in the region. And lastly Libya, concerning the Union for the Mediterranean, is selected because it seems to be the most problematic country among the EU partners. Libya also is problematic case in terms of the continued problems in its action plan.

The main contribution of this thesis to the literature will be to provide an analysis to the limits of the ENP through the three case studies selected and to show that the ENP is today facing problems concerning its implementation and its structure although its existence is very crucial for the union to deal with the opportunities and challenges related to geographical proximity, prosperity and poverty. Together with the partner countries subject to different initiatives, the EU needs to renew itself and to bring the necessary arrangements within the policy to make it more efficient for the future of the Union because only after the full achievement of the ENP that the EU would be able to benefit fully from trade and investment and it would be able to resolve problems arising due to political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies as well as other issues trans-border dimension of environmental and nuclear hazards, illegal immigration organized crime or terrorist networks (European Commission, 2003).

The main argument that makes the ENP problematic and that will be discussed in the thesis will be the intergovernmental framework of the policy that diverge the focus given to different partnerships according to the interests and preferences of the member states on the regions and thus prevents the Union to talk in a single voice. In other words, the ENP is shaped by the national institutions and can be said to have a goal to give the member states the opportunity to better control their territories and to better manage their borders (Dimitrovova, 2010, p.5). That is to say, the changing dynamics and the interests of the core member states on different initiatives introduced

by the Union, the ENP instead of being a common policy, starting from its launch in 2004 up to now, had remained a weak instrument to respond the needs of the Union effectively. For example, especially France is showing considerable efforts to give an impetus to the Mediterranean by building a common home across the two shores of the Mediterranean to make the region an area of development, culture and peace (Ansamed, 01/09/2011). In response to France, countries like Sweden and Poland with the support of UK, Germany and Netherlands launched the Eastern Partnership to show their interest on the Black Sea Region (Belarus Digest Website). In addition to that, the partners also creates different types of challenges that impacts the effectiveness of the policy in a negative way. In southern neighborhood, The ENP is not yet fully ‘activated’ for Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria since those have not agreed Action Plans. So, they are not responsive to the Union’s soft more of action and they are convinced for its attractiveness. Different from this, when the Black Sea region is concerned, although the asymmetric relations with the partners allow the EU to impose its rule, this does not include Russia being the most powerful and the biggest country in the region to this category and thus create a big challenge for the Union. The EU tried to deepen its relations with the other partners in the region especially for diversifying its energy supply in order to decrease its dependence on Russia within the Eastern partnership, the Russia stayed as a powerful actor blocking the success of this initiative.

Taking base from these facts, the thesis will conclude that when the period between 2004 and 2011 is observed, the ENP was insufficient to bring the necessary reforms and to prepare the effective harmonization agenda to its partners. It rather remained as a paper action and a wishful thinking. The recent conflicts in the south so called “Arab Spring” and the fragility in the Middle East are a good evidence of it. Therefore, it can be argued that it lacked credibility and was a placebo (Emerson, 2004, p.17). So, the EU needs to renew itself and to bring the necessary arrangements within the policy to make it more efficient for the future of the Union because only after the full achievement of the ENP that the EU would be able to benefit fully from trade and investment and it would be able to resolve problems arising due to political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies as well as other issues trans-border dimension of environmental and nuclear hazards, illegal imigration organized crime or terrorist networks (European Commission, 2003). As for the last communication that is



prepared in order to give a new response to a changing Neighborhood, it is still questionable whether it would be able to resolve the existing puzzle or not.

## **CHAPTER 1- EASTERN ENLARGEMENT: THE ROAD TO THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY**

This chapter analyses the EU's enlargement policy and the formulation of the European neighborhood policy. These two policies are interconnected as foreign policy tools of the EU. The chapter provides an analysis of the EU's Eastern Enlargement of 2004 and how this enlargement created the momentum to establish a new foreign policy tool, namely the European neighborhood policy. But before that, in order to understand the dynamics of the Eastern Enlargement and the European Neighborhood Policy as a new foreign policy tool, it is important to observe the foreign policy framework that the EU is possessing in the same time interval.

### **The EU and the European Foreign Policy**

To begin with, since the European integration first began, integration in the area of foreign policy was very problematic for the EU because any compromise given in this domain was always considered to be a loss of competency at the national level. The integration moved only forward when member states shared common interests and believed that the gains that would be obtained from the integration are much more than the costs it would bring. For this reason the integration since the beginning of the 1950s in this area was very slow and stayed intergovernmental (Müftüler Baç, 2007, p.3).

The most important chance for the union to build a Common Foreign and Security Policy come about the end of the Cold War in 1989 that opened the way of political integration for the reconstruction of the European Order (Müftüler Baç, 2007, p.3). So, because of the European governments' fear of losing sovereignty in foreign policy neglected the debate to a loose intergovernmental process with European Political Cooperation (EPC). However, the Maastricht treaty that came in 1992 as a solution to this problem, was also remained as a symbolic step in this area due to unimportance given by the national interests and preferences of the member states

(Moravcsik, 1998, p.33). It did not have a significant impact on European foreign policy cohesion but was useful in the sense to offer a stage in which the Member states had the chance to discuss international affairs and seek consensus among themselves. However, reaching consensus among the members were not easy because there were few events in which the perceived benefits of the member states exceeded the perceived costs of lost sovereignty (Moravcsik, 1998, p.160). In addition to that, the Maastricht Treaty created also some ambiguities over the CFSP. For example, The CFSP covered many areas from economic aid to military interventions. So, this created debates on how much and in which prospects the CFSP was successful because the CFSP while being highly effective in trade and foreign aid, it seemed to be less successful in responding to crisis as well as diplomatic and military interventions. Different from this, although the aim of all the member states was to strengthen the CFSP, there was no real understanding of it. That is to say, there was no clear definition of the progress. And, there was also question about the normative judgement of the policy. The CFSP have different merits and drawbacks and the integration will be affected by different actors who will make different assessments over their interests on this specific policy (Moravcsik, 1998, p.168).

From what was mentioned above, it can be understood that after the Maastricht Treaty, within the CFSP, concerns like intelligence collection and analysis were still a national responsibility. So, in order to reassess and strengthen the CFSP, the Amsterdam Summit made institutional and legal changes in many areas. One of the most important changes was the creation of the new post of the high representative for the common foreign and security policy. But this was also subject to debates. The Member states having a less integrationist tendency like Britain feared that such an independent figure could limit the capacity of the member states to control. In addition to that, the smaller members opposed to the position due to the fear that the high representative would always come from a big member state. The Commission, on the other hand, wanted to preserve its responsibility to represent the Union abroad. However, the high representative was not created to do harm any member state or institution. In theory, it was designed to provide cooperation, continuity, and visibility to the leadership of the CFSP and as long as the member states reserve the right to decide nationally, this position will have limited room for maneuver and little credibility (Moravcsik, 1998, p.177).

So, within the Union, it was seen that because the gains of common action in the area of foreign policy cannot always be determined from the beginning, the member states choose to cooperate when their national interests and preferences converge and when the potential risks are low. What is more, the end of the cold war ceased the existence of a common enemy and two bloc system in the world. This situation relatively can cause differentiation of interests between the member states when compared to the past (Moravcsik, 1998, p.182). In addition to that, even if there would be a convergence of interests between the member states, this could not be sufficient to realize the foreign policy integration because with the twenty seven member states, the union will be subject to different foreign policy traditions, cultures and relationships. So, with time, they can achieve common thinking, but the change will take place very slowly (.Moravcsik, 1998, p.183).

As for the enlargement that took place within such a foreign policy understanding, Moravcsik argues that it sharpened the conflict within the EU because of the distributional implications. Accession requires from all the member states to support the process with unanimity. However, concerning the eastern enlargement, the member states like Germany, Austria and Scandinavian countries were highly supportive of the accession of the eastern countries because of the advantages like trade and investment in the region as well as the inclusion of the east into the Western economic markets and the possibility of democratization. On the other hand, other member states such as France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece were sceptical towards widening, due to the fear of increased competition in price-sensitive manufactures and the scarcity in the EU subsidies that will be spent on the poorer regions(Moravcsik, 1998, p.38). For this reason, enlargement and the greater diversity it brings can be said to place strains on the integrity of the existing policies including CFSP. But, in general the leaders of the EU members wanted inclusion of the eastern countries in the EU because they consider this development to be in their long term economic and geopolitical interests. As for the ones who oppose the enlargement, as it is stated above, they are against it because they believe that they will get a disproportional share in the short term. In other words, the countries who gain most advantages by engaging in close cooperation with those countries are more willing to compromise for reaching an agreement (Moravcsik, 2003, p.44). Moravcsik underlines this argument with these words:

Since the beginning, this same pattern has characterized EU bargaining over enlargement. Specific interstate concessions and compromises have tended to reflect the priorities of the EU's core countries, and disproportionately the most powerful among them, even as more peripheral countries benefit as much or more overall (Moravcsik, 2003, p.45).

Moravcsik emphasizes that the idealism behind the support to eastern enlargement was national interest and power. He argues that through the enlargement the EU has a potential to gain about 10 billion euros in the long term. What is more, it would also provide geopolitical stabilization and economic revitalization that would make the nationalist conflict and illegal immigration more controllable (Moravcsik, 2003, p.50).

In contrast to this intergovernmentalist approach to the EU foreign policy and eastern enlargement, sociological institutionalism offers a very different understanding to explain the factors underlying behind this development. As one of the most important founders of this theory, Frank Schimmelfenning argues that there is no single factor that could explain the member states enlargement preferences. This argument is actually against to Moravcsik who explains the problematic side of the EU foreign policy and the reason to go for an eastern enlargement by the cost-benefit calculations as well as member state preferences and their relative power. That is to say, together with the economic conditions, it could be possible that the geopolitical or ideological interests play a crucial role (Schimmelfening, 2001, p.53). And Schimmelfening adds that whereas according to the rationalist perspective, in the absence of the economic benefits, having common values and norms are not sufficient to widen the organization, according to the sociological perspective they are both necessary and sufficient to led the eastern countries to come in (Schimmelfening, 2001, p.61). He defends the argument that this enlargement was considered to be a return of the eastern european countries to the community they had always belonged. He says that although the rational institutionalism explain the actor preferences, it does not account for the collective decision for enlargement. As a response to this problem, he introduces rhetorical action that is the strategic use of norm-based arguments. According to Schimmelfenning, the rhetorical action will provide the missing link between the member states preferences and the norm-conforming outcome and it will offer the chance of the supporters of

enlargement to justify their arguments with the common European norms and values against the “brakemen” of the enlargement. And if the state actors use the community identity, values or norms for their self interest and fall into the community trap, they could be forced to honor identity and their commitment to the values to ensure their credibility (Schimmelfening, 2001, p.76).

In conclusion, the EU’s foreign policy from its inception was problematic due to the reliance on member states’ preferences and interests. For this reason, it took a considerable time and effort to build a common foreign and security policy in which they would give up some part of their national sovereignty in such a high politics area. Even after its launch in the Maastricht Treaty, the still going impact of the national preferences and the impact of the slow pace of change, there was no deepened commitment. Only with the Amsterdam Treaty that created, for example, the post of the High Representative that provided the chance of the Union to speak in a single voice opened the way to strengthen this specific policy. Nevertheless, the preferences and the interests of the members were still there. Having this in mind, the aim in the rest of this project will be to analyze the emergence and the development of the European Neighborhood Policy in such dynamics with including examples of case studies. But, it is highly probable that the different initiatives introduced by the Union within the ENP will be subject to different member states and preferences because of the still continuing intergovernmentalist logic that will affect the future development of each of them in different ways.

## **The EU’s Enlargement Policy**

### ***The EU membership and the rules of accession***

Having analyzed the foreign policy approach that the EU followed starting from especially after the end of the Cold War, it is also important to observe the enlargement procedure that the Union had set within the same framework.

The rules of accession to the EU are shaped by the 1957 Rome Treaty and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Article 237 of the Rome Treaty stipulates that any European country which is democracy and has a free market economy could apply to become an EC member. The Maastricht Treaty—the Treaty establishing the European Union, states

in its Article 49, for a country to become a member of the EU, the applicant must at first be recognized as a European state. The accession process, however, is shaped by the 1993 Copenhagen criteria and it is decided that an applicant state could only become a member when it fulfills the Copenhagen Criteria that includes the existence of a stable democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, protection of minorities as well as a fully functioning market economy.

Enlargement policy is an important tool for the EU to formulate its foreign policy. The critical role of enlargement could be seen right after the end of the Cold War with the Central and Eastern European countries breaking away from the Soviet rule. These countries wanted to come back to Europe and for that purpose applied to all the European institutions, one of which was the EU. The EU, on the other hand, used its enlargement policy to stabilize its borders. So, with the Eastern Enlargement, being the biggest enlargement in the history of the EU that brought up the borders of the Union to new neighbors on the one hand facing serious conflicts whereas on the other possessing important opportunities that could work in the benefit of the EU. The foreign policy that the Union followed had tremendously changed.

### ***Background of the Eastern Enlargement***

In order to underline the significance of the Eastern Enlargement and to understand the way it leads to the formation of the European Neighborhood Policy, it is first important to give a general background of this process of Enlargement and the dynamics it had created within the Union.

To start with, the Central and Eastern European countries applied for membership in the EU in the first half of the 1990s and the idea for further enlargement is expressed by then Commission President Jacques Santer in 1995. Santer declared in 1995 that

Enlargement is one of the most important and exhilarating issues the Union will have to address in the next few years — not only because the reunification of Europe, our most cherished hope for decades, is now within our grasp, but also because the prospect brings into play our vision of Europe and our ideas about the

architecture required to ensure the continent's stability, security and prosperity”

and he adds that

“...And if we are not careful in this matter, we may upset once and for all the fine balances we have taken great pains to achieve among us; if on the contrary we act with the generosity and attention to detail needed, our efforts will open up for this greater Europe a vast field of action much to the advantage of all (CVCE Website).

In other words, Santer in this declaration stated that enlargement is an important component of the EU's future as a secure and stable entity. He argued that a detailed and well planned enlargement could provide stability, security and prosperity in Europe and would work in the advantage of all. He also underlined that the EU is opening its doors to the Eastern Europe and is waiting to being reunited because those countries are already in the European family. He emphasizes that whatever cost that this enlargement brings to the community and the Member States, the Union must focus on the benefits that could be derived (CVCE Website).

Following this statement, in July 1997, after the Treaty of Amsterdam, Santer presented the Agenda 2000 to the European Parliament to strengthen and to widen the EU. Agenda 2000 was designed to provide growth, competitiveness and employment, to modernise the policies and to extend the borders of the Union (EU Website, Agenda 2000 Overview). In other words, it is prepared to offer a clear vision of the EU in the 21st century. It aimed to reinforce the policies of the Union and to enable further enlargement within a strict financial framework. The Agenda 2000 was important for bringing effectiveness to the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund that will guarantee concentrated structural assistance in terms geography and object of assistance. In addition to that, in the external domain, the strategy is designed to make the EU a global player that will have a strong presence in the world. Furthermore, one of the main reasons of the reforms that is planned under the Agenda 2000 was to fight against the challenges of a big enlargement that would include Central and Eastern Europe and the Cyprus. The Agenda suggested to prepare recommendations in order to



accelerate the compliance of the applicant countries to the EU acquis through multiannual programmes, documents including specific commitments, national programmes as well as funding because it was a fact that the candidate countries needed to make investments in areas like environmental protection, transport, energy, industrial restructuring and agricultural infrastructure due to the economic differences (EU Website, Agenda 2000 For a Stronger and Wider Europe).

As for the existing level of progress of the applicant countries prior to accession, the Commission's evaluations of the applicants in 1997 based on the Copenhagen criteria reveal that in the domain of democracy and the rule of law, all applicants except Slovakia met the minimum conditions. This did not mean that there was no need for progress in the practice of democracy in the candidate countries. Despite the continued need for political reform, most of the applicant countries were meeting political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria. As for the economic aspects of the Copenhagen criteria- a fully functioning market economy and the ability to deal with competitive pressures and market forces-, none of the countries complied with the EU requirement, at least in 1997. However, first Hungary and Poland and then the Czech Republic and Slovenia were close to meet the conditions whereas Estonia and Slovakia needed to do more. As for the capacity to adopt the Acquis Communautaire, the applicant countries began to adopt EU legislation and amend their national laws accordingly, but there was a question on the administrative and judicial capacity of the countries to apply and enforce the acquis (EU Website, Agenda 2000 Overview).

### **The Eastern Enlargement**

As it is stated above, the eastern enlargement of the EU was signifying the reunification of a Europe that had been divided for half a century by the Iron Curtain and the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was the turning point of this process and from this time on, the EU and the candidate countries by signing bilateral accession partnerships set their priorities and determined timetables to complete the obligations for full membership. In this way, between 1987 and 1996, thirteen countries applied to join the EU. Those countries were Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey. Turkey does not belong to the group. In the Luxembourg European Council that is held on 1997, the Commission declared that each country will be evaluated according

to its own level of preparation. So, the negotiations had first started in 31 March 1998 with Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia being the most prepared countries and in 15 February 2000 it continued with the rest of the applicants except Turkey. The candidacy status was given to those who fulfilled the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria and accession negotiations would begin when all political aspects were fulfilled. This green light was given by the European Commission. As it is stated in the Luxembourg Council, because the countries had different levels of process, the length of the negotiations were changing accordingly and to show the existing level of success, starting from 1998, the Commission began to publish regular reports for each country. These were like the roadmaps that the countries specifically follow to comply with the EU acquis. At the end, the Copenhagen European Council of 2002, it is agreed the ten candidate countries, namely Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia, fulfilled the requirements of the membership and therefore signed the Accession Treaty in 16 April 2003 in Athens and they officially became members after the completion of the ratification procedures in 1 May 2004 (EU Website, Agenda 2000 For a Stronger and Wider Europe).

### ***The Challenges of the Eastern Enlargement***

Having summarized this transformation, it can first be said that this was a threshold for the Union for the simple reason that, very different from other enlargements, there had never been an enlargement of this magnitude and the new members that joined in 2004 were not sharing a western-style democracy and they were lacking an organisational system to fulfill the obligations of the membership. Moreover, they were poor, economically weak and passing through a process of economic transition. In the mean time, the EU was not also the same community that it was in 1957. In 1990s, especially after signing the Maastricht Treaty, it has become a complex organisation with a single market, monetary union and deepened internal and external policies. For this reason, the *acquis communautaire* that those eastern countries had to comply was much more complex and larger than the former enlargements (Gower and Redmond, 2000, p.1). The turning point for these countries was the Copenhagen Council of 1993 in which the union decided to open the doors of accession to the

countries in central and eastern Europe that fulfill the economic and political requirements.

However, as it is stated above, this enlargement was also raised important questions to be resolved before those countries full join the EU. At first, they will affect the institutions and decision making process, because the size of the EU and the balance between the small and large Member States will tremendously change. If the Union does not take the necessary measures, the size of the Commission and the Parliament could grow in an uncontrollable manner which would block the decision making process unless the qualified majority voting is implemented. Different from this, they will have financial and economic implications, they will raise political and security issues and they will impact the direction of the European Integration in the post-enlargement period (Gower and Redmond, 2000, p.5). In order to solve such problems, before the enlargement took place, the EU at the end of the Intergovernmental Conference in 2000 signed the Treaty of Nice. This treaty facilitated the functioning of the EU 25 by establishing enhanced cooperation like the overthrow of the right of veto except the field of foreign policy ( so that the decision making process would not be blocked) and the extension of the scope of the common foreign and security policy (EU Website, Treaty of Nice). In addition to that, the treaty contributed to the adoption of a common position in the distribution of seats at the European Parliament, the weighting of votes in the Council, the composition of the Economic and Social Committee and the composition of the Committee of the Regions will correspond to the following tables for a Union of 27 Member States. So, having signed the Nice Treaty, the EU completed the institutional changes necessary for the accession of all the members (Treaty of Nice, 2001/C 80/01). However, the institutional problem was not the only challenge that the EU faced while passing through the enlargement process. The enlargement created especially new political problems for the EU. The inclusion of ten new member states would bring up the borders of the union into a new geography subject to constant conflicts like terrorism, migration and environment. Although the Union had to deal with such problems anyway, its full presence through enlargement would require concrete actions and quicker conflict resolution processes. What is more, this process would also impact the foreign policy games turning within the community. As it is seen in the analysis above, the foreign policy of the EU has an intergovernmental framework changing according to the interests and preferences of the member states. So, it can be

argued that the accession of new members having different regional aims and goals would create further difficulties for the Union to talk in a single voice. And when the pre-accession period is observed, it could be seen that in contrast to the institutional changes, the EU did not take the necessary measures to strengthen its common foreign and security policy within EU 25.

Having said those, the Eastern Enlargement is without doubt an important event that has an enormous impact on the EU and the continent politics. The enlargement offered a major political and economic opportunity to the Union that provided the chance to expand its single market and make a more powerful actor on the political scene and in the world market.

### **The Eastern Enlargement and the ENP**

The Enlargement policy is directly connected to the further tools the EU adopts such as the European Neighborhood Policy because the inclusion of these ten member states, influenced tremendously the future development of the EU external policy. That is to say, while affecting the position of the EU on the world stage in economic and political terms, the enlargement also shaped the expectations of the third countries. Even in the Agenda 2000, it is stated that the EU wants to go “far beyond the new frontiers of an enlarged Europe” and to “give Europe new neighbors and form Europe into an area of unity and stability” (Cremona, 2003, p.197). In this way, the 2004 enlargement had the role to shape the political evolution of Europe that would continue in the decades to come. For example, enlargement created new important neighbors like Russia and Ukraine and new specific interests like Polish and Baltic States’ interests on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, or Bulgarian interests in the Balkans and the Black Sea Region. So, in some respects this enlargement, rather than focusing on a distant region, opened the EU’s eyes towards its geographically closer neighbors such as the Mediterranean States within the Barcelona Process or Partnership and Cooperation states in the East (Cremona, 2003, p.200). However, enlargement did not only take place to serve the specific priorities of the new members. The aim was at the same time to reshape Europe as a whole and to redefine the borders that will not create a new dividing line. The Western Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Eastern States that were the main neighbouring groups at the time of the enlargement, were designed in a way to

have different objectives and different paths to follow in order to create a free trade area and to promote democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Here, the EU is acting like a model for conflict resolution, prevention and reconciliation with its focus on its own regional neighborhood (Cremona, 2003, p.205). But this position will require without doubt a more systematic approach towards external policy. So, the greatest challenge of the enlargement is the need to reshape the Union policy to the rest of the world and the immediate neighbors. After this time on, the Union will not have the time to first “put its own house in order” and then to turn to the restructuring of the political and economic relations. It is essential that it immediately contribute to the wider global debate and be an important actor in the reconstruction of non EU Europe (Cremona, 2003, p.208). And the response of EU to this challenge will be the European Neighborhood Policy.

### **From Enlargement to ENP- A New Foreign Policy Tool for the EU**

The ENP has a different scope than enlargement, it is different from the perspective of potential membership and instead of membership, ENP offers a privileged relationship that is based on “mutual commitment to common values”. And within this framework the more a country adopt the EU values, the more chance it has to cooperate with the EU. And when the enlargement and the structure of the ENP are taken into consideration, it can be argued that the EU modelled the ENP on the enlargement process. At first, the ENP was a result of the combination of policy learning and adaptation from the enlargement experience to develop a solution that the problems in the post-enlargement period. For example, in terms of adaptation, the action plans under the ENP that were prepared for each country were similar to the association agreements that were used as the basis for accession with a simple difference that the action plans were not official. In terms of learning, the ENP by learning from the enlargement experience, did not implemented one-size-fits all approach. At this point, the differentiation came to be an advantage for the policy because the countries signing the action plans could be optimistic about the progress of their relations with the EU without having to wait others. In addition to that, the policy is also shaped by the path dependency that was the eastern enlargement. The last enlargement of union brought up

the borders to countries such as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and thus raised questions concerning immigration, security, politics and economy (Kelley, 2006, p.34).

However, the most important challenge in the ENP is the lack of the membership perspective. As the Commission President Romano Prodi declared in 2002 the ENP is designed to offer everything but institutions. That is to say, the ENP is designed to offer to its partners something more than partnership but less than membership. Prodi, during his talk in the Sixth ECSA-World Conference, this position with the following words:

A proximity policy would not start with the promise of membership and it would not exclude eventual membership. This would do away with the problem of having to say "yes" or "no" to a country applying for membership at too early a stage (EU Website, SPEECH/02/619).

With this argument Romano Prodi underlines that the lack of the membership perspective does not exclude the possibility of developing a new structure with the neighbours at a later stage according to the progress in the bilateral relations (EU Website, SPEECH/02/619). That is to say, this only gives incentives to the partners and this is not sufficient to motivate the partners to take up the necessary domestic reforms. Because the ENP is not about enlargement and the EU will always have neighbors. Moreover, compared to the countries of the eastern enlargement, the ENP partners are at much lower points in issues concerning democracy, human rights, law and order. And although the Union tried to raise such issues in the neighboring countries, it was ineffective. So, this brings the question of whether the ENP have the same conditionality as the enlargement policy.

It is known that the main elements of conditionality are the incentive structures, the credibility of the conditions, the underlying power asymmetry and the adoption costs (Sasse, 2008, p.10). Having this in mind, as it is largely discussed above, the ENP is designed by taking base from the enlargement process. For this reason, it was also the case for the pre-accession conditionality instruments and practices. When the pre-accession conditionality is observed, it can be said that there are six main deficiencies. First, there was a low threshold of meeting the Copenhagen criteria concerning democracy and the rule of law. Second, there was a lack of clarity about what is actually

expected from the candidate countries willing to join the EU. That is to say, there was lack of standards, of democracy and the rule of law. Third, as a result of this fact, the Commission could not provide a quality assessment. Fourth, there is no benchmark for the EU and the candidate countries to judge whether the Copenhagen criteria are met. Fifth, despite the lack of serious analysis, standards and benchmarks, the Commission remained faithful to its principle of conditionality. However, it differentiated the countries according to its criteria. And consequently, there was no connection between the actual pre-accession prospects and their pre-accession performance (Kochenov, 2008, pp.7-10). That is to say, although the pre-accession conditionality in the eastern enlargement was designed to predict the way the enlargement would be conducted in practice, it can be argued that it failed. So, considering the conditionality that took place at the pre-accession stage, is it possible to argue the same for the ENP?

The ENP is designed to frame a new stage in EU's external governance, in EU's conditionality that goes beyond membership and a modernization strategy. But, once the ENP is established, it created problems of credibility in each of these domains (Sasse, 2008, p.6). It was seen that the main problem of pre-accession conditionality was the issue the democracy and the rule of law. However, although the differences in the treatment for the candidate countries was against the main idea of conditionality in the enlargement, when the ENP is concerned, these differences in the treatment does not create the same kind of problem. When compared to the pre-accession, the main problem in the ENP is the lack of strong rewards for the partners showing progress. In addition to the lack of incentives, again in contrast to the full accession that requires the approval of all the member states, the ENP in this case suffers from the inability of the Union to keep the promises it gave to its partners because of the specific interests and preferences of the member states as well as inter-institutional rivalries. The differences and the disagreements between the Member States could block easily the entry into force of the incentives. For this reason, it can be argued that the threshold that the EU determined for meeting the Copenhagen Criteria in the process of the Eastern Enlargement was now much lower when the ENP is concerned. Especially as for the Action Plans, they lack coherence and clarity as well as reform vision to be offered to the partners (Kochenov, 2008, p.12). Different from the pre-accession strategy, the ENP also offers poor incentives insufficient to interest the partners and to result in a big change. In other words, compared to the enlargement context, the incentives and the

structures designed under the ENP are more vague for both the EU and its partners. The Union does not have a concrete understanding on how to react against a partner that shows progress in energy, environment or competition policy, but lacks democracy (Kelley, 2006, p.34). This limits the scope of effectiveness of the policy, it politicizes the nature of the conditions themselves and it opens the policy to the influence of different actors and constellations like France in the Mediterranean boosting or in reverse like Russia in the Black Sea limiting the partnership. And as a result, the southern and eastern dimensions of the ENP pull in different directions. In response to this fact, although the Commission tried to improve the system of instruments and incentives through communications that it published like the strategy paper or the new ENP instrument that will be largely discussed below, the incentives still remained inadequate. In order to succeed, the incentives must become more attractive and more credible (Kochenov, 2008, p.15). And the EU needs to develop a flexible conceptualization and to frame the conditionality as a process (Sasse, 2008, p.3).



## **CHAPTER 2- THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?**

### **The Security Dimension- The Need for ENP**

The Eastern Enlargement was a very important development for the EU, because first by increasing the number of member states it changed dramatically the way the union works internally and second by including the countries in the Eastern Europe it extended its geographic scope.

That is to say, the process created a profound impact on the way the Union functions internally and the way it interacts with its neighbours and the world. It can be said that the enlargement gave a new dimension to the foreign policy of the EU that is mainly driven by the member states interests due to the new member states having different interests than older ones. What is more, they also brought “new urgency” to “old questions” and therefore created new agenda on the EU. In addition to that, by including ten new member states the EU urgently began to think about the policies that will be used to deal with the countries at the new borders.

As a result of these dynamics that came into being after the eastern enlargement and the weight given to the interests of member state preferences, the EU created the ENP as its new foreign policy tool in order to deal with these problems and to eliminate the red line between the accession and the non-accession (Lynch, 2005, p.33).

But in parallel to the general foreign policy approach that the EU has followed in the previous years, the ENP had also important security challenges. At first, it is undeniable that the EU is surviving an interdependent world system and the EU’s

security starts at its borders and thus requires a solid security strategy. Second, as for the scope of this security, it is ranged from challenges like organised crime, international terrorism to CFSP issues like weapons of mass destruction, conflict settlement and sustainable development. So, these different problems require from the union to establish cross pillar coordination. Third, after facing those challenges the EU must achieve to build the balance between opening and closing its borders. On the one hand, it must control the flow of goods and people; on the other hand it must build close ties to make wide range of exchanges. Forth, when the union provided this balance towards its neighbours, it would also be the case that not all the members would be enthusiastic to build close ties with the EU. At that time, the EU must work to engage those countries in different ways. Lastly, the credibility of the EU plays a very important role in this process because the ENP itself would be a challenge for the EU. Especially, the lack of clarity about the future relations with some of the eastern neighbours may weaken the EU's impact to make reforms in those countries as well as the financial perspective (Lynch, 2005, p.35).

To put it more correctly, the EU must to take the necessary actions in order to realize its aims to play an active role in the security sector area that passes by healthy security sector governance in conflict prevention and stability in the neighbours.

Since the foreign policy is still fragile in the EU, the ENP and the policy of wider Europe could be a way for progress concerning the foreign, security and defence policies following the Iraq war (Emerson, 2003, p.3). Although the ENP was not a revolution it could be considered as a gradual and cooperative approach towards neighbours. But, the key challenge here as it is stated above, is to develop a foreign policy that would stabilize the neighbourhood without the prospect of accession. This goes into conflict with some of the countries' expectations to belong to the union. As it will largely be discussed below, the Wider Europe and the ENP communications that will be presented are designed because of the insecure environment in Western Europe that is imported from the neighbours. And this left the Union in such a situation that the cost of inaction is high (Euractiv, 22/01/2008). So, taking this into consideration this chapter, by especially focusing on the communications prepared by the Commission and the different initiatives by the Union, the aim will be to elaborate the formation and the evolution of the European Neighbourhood Policy

## What is European Neighborhood Policy?

The European Neighborhood Policy is created to share the benefits of the eastern enlargement and to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors by strengthening stability, prosperity as well as shared values and the rules of law for the security. The policy is designed to offer the neighbors the chance to participate in EU activities by cooperating in political, economic and cultural terms.

**Map 1: The ENP Partner Countries (European Commission, 2007c)**



The idea to create such a policy is first launched in August 2002 with a joint letter prepared by the High Representative Javier Solana and the Commissioner Christopher Patten. The letter expressed the reason and the need to form a policy towards the neighborhood with the following words:

In no other neighbouring region will enlargement have such immediate consequences. While there are important opportunities to explore closer ties with these countries, there are also challenges in areas like illegal migration, trafficking and spill over from local or regional crises (Patten and Solana Joint Letter, 2002).

In other words, the letter underlined that the enlargement is a chance to develop the relations with the new neighbors which will not depend on a fixed approach. That is to say, the pace and the scope of the process will be flexible and be dependent on the level of the existing relationship with the individual countries. The letter also called for a shared set of political and economic values, regional stability and cooperation as well as closer trade links, harmonization of legislation and progressive extension of the EU policies (Patten and Solana Joint Letter, 2002).

The efforts to building up a European Neighborhood Policy continued with the document Wider Europe- Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors that is published in March 2003. The document stated that the neighboring countries are the EU's essential partners and the EU together with its citizens and its new members, it had also duties and responsibilities towards its present and future neighbors to guarantee social cohesion and economic dynamism. To achieve this aim, the document focused on the need to create a clear vision that will help to the development of closer and coherent long or medium term relations with neighbors. However, it is also highlighted that by offering the same opportunities, the EU must keep the principles of differentiation and progressivity as the basis of the policy that will be established by country or regional Action Plans together with benchmarks that will include clear and public objectives ensuring consistent approach and progress between countries. Lastly, the document envisages dialogue in the form of Association and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, another progressive document showing the objectives, benchmarks and a timetable for their achievement

with each country and also an annual review of progress in implementing the action plan (European Commission, 2003).

As it is stated in the Wider Europe, the ENP is developed as a consequence of the eastern enlargement. The communication on Paving the way for a New Neighborhood Instrument published in July 2003 following the Wider Europe aimed to give a new impetus to the union to make inhabitants closer to the external land and seas of the new borders. After the Wider Europe Communication, The General Affairs and External Relations Council in June 2003 invited the Commission to present another Communication for a new Neighbourhood Instrument and for the development of measures to improve interoperability between the different instruments. With this communication, the Commission proposed a two step approach in which the first stage that will take place between 2004-2006 and will focus on the improvement in coordination between various financing instruments like INTERREG, PHARE Crossborder Co-operation Programme, Tacis Cross-border Co-operation Programme, CARDS and Media, within the existing legislative whereas in the second stage after 2006, there will be a new legal instrument that will address to the common challenges underlined in the Wider Europe Communication. To explain in another way, those existing frameworks and procedures in 2004 created a number of difficulties arising from diverging systems of financial management, different roles and responsibilities dedicated to different level of authorities. This situation also limited the cooperation because there were difference in the mismatched levels of funding, the programming process, project selection, project implementation and project monitoring. For this reason, the new Neighborhood Instrument presented in the communication aims to develop a single approach to co-operation across the external borders of the Union. However, this new instrument raises also some questions related to the separation between external and internal funding sources. As it is stated above, because this cannot be resolved in a short term, the new perspective will place in two stages and the solution that is the new Neighborhood Instrument will take place from 2007 onwards after the assessment of legal and budgetary issues. Such an Instrument would provide a more complete approach towards cross-border and regional co-operation activities that will be developed around the external border and it would address to the restrictions on where and how funding can be used. This instrument will be linked to various external

agendas and different regional priorities by combining both external policy objectives and economic and social cohesion which will offer continuity.

The outlined policy in a Commission Communication on Wider Europe and Communication on creating a Neighborhood Policy Instrument is then developed by a Strategy Paper on the European Neighborhood Policy published in May 2004. The strategy extended the terms presented in Wider Europe and it made clear the ways how the EU could work more closely with these countries. To go into further detail, the Action Plans that will be prepared by each and every country or region will be based on a common set of rules but will be differentiated according to the relations, capacities and common interests between the EU and that country or region. That is to say, the Action Plans do not impose a pre-determined set of priorities to the neighbors but will be defined by common consent. They are designed to promote commitment to shared values, to strengthen the political dialogue, to ensure appropriate coordination with the International Financial institutions, to drive benefits from the provisions on trade, to facilitate legitimate movements and to connect the neighborhood especially on some areas like energy, transport, environment, information society and research and innovation (European Commission, 2004).

In order to go further, this strategy paper underlines that the ENP would contribute to the EU in many different aspects such as supporting the EU's foreign policy objectives, moving towards a significant degree of integration, upgrading the political cooperation, encouraging the reforms that lead to economic and social benefits, providing support to partners for meeting EU norms and standards and building up new contractual links in the form of European Neighborhood Agreements (European Commission, 2004). So, the aim of this communication was to go beyond cooperation that will lead to political and economic integration and as for the Action Plans, they are the major steps to be taken in this way that will enable the EU and its partners to build up long term goals (European Commission, 2004).

Following the Strategy Paper, the European Neighborhood Policy began continued to take a considerable shape with the Regulation establishing a European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument published in October in 2006. This instrument is the financial instrument of the ENP and the Regulation is created to help

neighboring countries to achieve their objectives and to promote cooperation between the Member States under a single policy driven instrument that will offer a single management mechanism with single set of procedures and it also defines the basic principles, its scope and its programming of assistance. It is established by taking base from the previous experiences and the communications presented above between 2004-2006 and it is prepared by the EU institutions for the period 2007-2013. For example, the Article 7 states that concerning the country or multi-country programmes, there is a need to adopt strategy papers that would reflect the policy framework, the action plans and the consistency with the EU policies. The strategy papers should also include indicative multi-annual financial allocations and priority objectives for each country or region as well as a review at mid-term or whenever necessary ( European Parliament and Council of Europe, 2006). So, in general through this regulation the ENPI supports political , economic and social reforms, sectoral cooperation, regional and local development, regional integration and participation in Community programmes and agencies. That is to say, with this instrument the ENPI, while guaranteeing the protection of the Community's financial interests, it wants also to ensure the external assistance, consistency and compability with EU policies (EU Website, The European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument).

In addition to the Regulation above, the communication on the general approach to enable ENP partner countries to participate in Community agencies and Community programmes is published in December 2006 in order to make a review of existing agencies and programmes to consider the opportunities for progress in these areas. It puts emphasis on the participation in Community agencies and in Community programmes which would help the strengthening of the European Neighborhood Policy. It suggests that such participation could contribute to the development of strategies in line with relevant reform and transition and it could provide for the EU the chance to gain greater visibility towards third countries. Concerning this communication, the Commission will intensify contact with all ENP partners and identify their potential for participating in Community agencies and through the dialogue established under the Partnership and Cooperation or Association Agreements, those ENP partner countries will be encouraged to identify their interests and their capacity to work with those agencies. However, on the other hand, the existing Partnership and Cooperation or Association Agreements with the ENP partners do not include any relation to the

Community programme. For this reason, the Communication underlines that the EU needs to conclude protocols that will lay down general terms and conditions for ENP partner participation to these agreements for the compliance to the Community programmes that have different interest and utility to ENP partner countries and the Community. It is also important to note that this communication differentiates the method that will be used in the implementation process of these agencies and programmes. The participation of ENP partners in agencies will take place on a bilateral basis. That is to say, for each partner and agency, the agreements will be developed individually and separately. However, the Community programmes different from agencies, follow the framework approach that requires the establishment of the general principles for participation with each of the ENP partners. This approach is opening the way of amendment or establishment of technical and administrative conditions for ENP partners to participate in specific programmes without longstanding processes (European Commission, 2006a).

Following the Communication about the general approach to the ENP, the Commission also prepared another document to make proposals to improve the impact of the ENP. Because although most of the neighbouring countries have made progress in economic and political terms and some of them put the action plans even at the center of their domestic reform, problems such as poverty, unemployment, mixed economic performance, corruption and weak governance continue to exist. So, the EU needed to strengthen its ENP in order to offer its partners improved trade and investment prospects, to make people-to-people contacts and to open more possibilities to mobilise funding. The document states that the ENP is powerful in areas concerning integration with its single and clear framework that covers all the neighborhood and the action plans provide an active cooperation between the individual parties and the EU. In addition, the policy is very efficient with its being a joint ownership, its concreteness and its use of funds. However, although this is the case, there are other areas that the communication called for further progress. For example, in terms of trade and economic integration, the EU must offer both to the East and South, a much more clear perspective in this domain and it must improve the access to areas of economic potential and interest. In addition to that, in terms of mobility and migration, the ENP must show a progress on the movement of partner country citizens to the EU. Lastly, as for the conflicts in the region, the ENP did not give an effective support. So, there is a need to a



more active policy and more active presence in conflict resolution, peace monitoring or peace keeping processes. In order to find a solution to those problems and to strengthen the ENP, in the communication proposed deeper economic integration with the ENP partners that goes beyond free trade in goods and services. This can be in the form of non-tariff barriers or convergence in trade and regulatory areas. The Action Plans especially in regulatory areas could be the most important instrument that could lead to such deep and comprehensive free trade agreements. Different from this, in order to facilitate mobility and manage the migration the Union can make some arrangements concerning the visa facilitation and the removal of obstacles to legitimate travel. What is more, the Union should also cooperate with its partners in fighting illegal immigration and effective and efficient border management. In addition to the mobility and migration, the EU and specifically the ENP should create more opportunities to the citizens to learn about each others' culture by interaction. This interaction can be in the form of educational and youth exchanges or exchanges within the regional and local authorities. At this point, the internalization of the ENP objectives in citizens' own internal and external activities would also contribute to the strengthening of the ENP. What is more, the ENP still needs to further enhance multilateral and bilateral dialogue with its partners in key sectors like energy and transport and to extend the networks and the multilateral agreements in these areas. Lastly, the communication also underlines clearly the need to the ENP to go into further political cooperation through more active efforts in conflict resolution and more diplomatic presence; further regional cooperation through the formation of the Black Sea Synergy or the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; and further financial cooperation through instruments like Neighborhood Investment Fund (European Commission, 2006b).

The efforts to strengthen the ENP continued with the communication prepared by the Commission on a Strong Neighbourhood Policy in 2007. It is clearly underlined that the ENP is designed to offer 'more for more'. That is to say, as the relations with the partner gets deeper, it leads to more cooperation in political, economic and technical terms and like that the individual partnership become different from one another. Although the policy can be considered to be successful to a certain extent, as it is stated above there is need to further action to make it effective. The most problematic issue is the need for political, social and economic reform in most ENP partner countries. So, the communication suggests that the both parties must give their focus to

the implementation of the commitments. Deeper free trade agreements and reduced non-tariff barriers are the most important instruments of the economic integration with the partners. Some important steps have already been taken but more determined efforts is required from all parties. Especially the Union in addition to the financial and technical assistance should give more incentives. There must also be much more efforts to conclude the negotiations successfully. Again, in areas concerning the mobility, migration and prevention of conflicts specifically the EU should do more. In short, sustained efforts in the areas mentioned in the previous communication is required in order to meet the expectations of the partners and therefore to strengthen the policy. To realize this aim, the communication addresses to EU institutions and governments to provide the environment of cooperation between the Commission, Council, European Parliament (European Commission, 2007a).

<b>Table 1: The Evolution of the European Neighborhood Policy</b>
7.8. 2002- Letter by the High Representative Javier Solana and the Commissioner Christopher Patten
11.3.2003- Communication on Wider Europe- Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors Brussels, COM(2003) 104 final
1.7.2003- Communication on Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument Brussels, COM(2003) 393 final
12.5.2004- Communication on European Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper Brussels, COM(2004) 373 final
24.10.2006- Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
4.12.2006- Communication on the general approach to enable ENP partner countries to participate in Community agencies and Community programmes Brussels, COM(2006) 724 final
4.12.2006- Communication on Strengthening of the European Neighborhood Policy Brussels, COM(2006)726 final
5.12.2007- A Strong Neighborhood Policy Brussels, COM(2007) 774 final

From all of the communications prepared by the Commission starting from the Wider Europe in 2003 and also from the introduction of a Regulation concerning the


policy that can be seen in the Table 1, the aim of the ENP was to turn into reality the goal to prevent new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and the new neighbors. That is to say, being very different from the process of enlargement, in order for the ENP to be successful, it needs the successful implementation of the mutually agreed reforms by each partners through the Action Plans that will bring them closer to the Union. However, there is much to be done in economic, political and commercial terms. Although each domain seems to have a certain cost, this cost is significantly less than the cost of inaction. Taking these basic ideas, the rest of the chapter will aim to deal with the public opinion towards these developments and the measures that the Union began to take from 2006 onwards.

### **The Role of Public Opinion in the EU towards ENP**

Taking into consideration the developments in the EU, it can be seen that after the 2004 enlargement, the relations with the neighbors was the EU's main external priority. The ENP was created for mutual prosperity, stability and security both in the EU and the neighbouring countries. The European Neighbourhood Policy was therefore developed with the objective of increasing mutual prosperity, stability and security of the EU and its neighbouring countries. In 2006, in order to assess how the citizens of the EU perceive or see the European Neighborhood policy. the European Commission launched a poll for the first time in 2006. According to the survey of the Eurobarometer of 2006, the EU citizens seem to be aware of the countries outside the EU. This awareness is influenced by factors like geographical proximity, immigration and tourism. Almost three quarters of the EU citizens agree with further enlargement that would happen in a flexible time period. Different from this, the citizens believe the importance of cooperation between neighbors in areas concerning the economic development, energy, environment, democracy, education, training, research and innovation and immigration as well as fighting terrorism and organised crime. In other words, although 60 % of the EU citizens believe that they don't share the same values with the neighbors, as it can be seen from the figure below, they believe that cooperation in such areas could bring benefits to both parties. The development of the policy in the eyes of the citizens could extend peace and democracy beyond the borders,


it could reduce immigration, increase mutual prosperity and could open new markets in both regions.

**Figure 1: The Public Opinion About Helping the Partners (European Commission, 2007b)**



In general, if it is expressed with statistics in 2006, it can be said that only one fifth of the EU citizens have heard of the ENP. Nevertheless, they support the development of specific relationships with these countries because of the expected economic and social benefits that would compensate the ‘investment’ costs (European Commission, 2006c). As for the 2007, after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the new budgetary period allocated more resources for the ENP and the European Commission made another survey in order to determine the evolution of the public opinion especially for the launch of a cooperation initiative in the Black Sea area. When compared to the survey of 2006, it can be observed that the outcome is almost similar. That is to say, the citizen awareness remained at the same level. This shows that the citizens want the governments to continue in the same direction and cooperate with the new neighbors in the areas mentioned above. However, although there is a belief for the mutual benefits of cooperation, a considerable majority worries about the differences between the values. The figure below expresses the interest of the public on the ENP.

**Figure 2: The Public Interest on the ENP (European Commission, 2007b)**



So, this survey confirmed the one made in 2006 and underlined the need for the EU to link its relations with its partners to their willingness of showing progress through reforms (European Commission, 2007c) Although the public does not play a direct role on the achievement of the initiatives, it impact the dynamics within and outside of the country and these results can an evidence that the public sphere and the public opinion that are necessary to prevent the demoratic deficit, give their support to the government in the way of establishing closer ties with the neighbors.

### **The ENP towards more cooperation?**

As it can be observed from the anaylsis above the ENP up to 2008 was generally a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner. In order to go much further starting mainly from 2008, it is enriched with regional and multi-lateral co-operation initiatives. The aim of this part will mainly be to explain those initiatives and by selecting a country from each of them to show the current level of succes of the policy.

### ***Euro Mediterranean Partnership***

The Mediterranean Countries are very important for the EU because they are the suppliers of natural resources such as gas and petroleum and they are crucial for the EU exports. The EU is also interested with the political stability of the region because what happens in there has important repercussions on other parts of the sea. In addition to that, the presence of the strategic locations like the Suez Canal and the Straits of

Gibraltar increases the significance of the region militarily and commercially (Hermann and Tausch, 2005, p.37). So, the initiative, the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership that was launched in order to deepen the ties with the neighboring countries in the south, was not actually new to the EU. It was formerly known as the Barcelona Process. It is only re-launched in Paris in July 2008. This re-launch was a very important opportunity for the policy to build concrete and visible regional and sub-regional projects that will return as a benefit in terms of economy, environment, health, migration and culture (EEAS Website, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). However, in order to analyze the partnership in detail it is crucial first to determine what the Barcelona Process was meaning for EU and why it had been changed.

The Barcelona Declaration is adopted at the Euro- Mediterranean Conference that took place in 27-28 November 1995. It covered almost all states bordering southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The Mediterranean partners were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The exception was Libya because it was under a UN sanctions regime and not invited to participate in this newly formed partnership (Cardwell, 2011, p.225). This declaration is published in order to give a new dimension to neighborhood based on cooperation and solidarity. It is created to give a single response to common challenges and to establish a lasting framework of relations. In other words, the aim was to turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation. In this way, the region could have a strengthened democracy, sustainable and balanced economy and greater understanding between cultures (EU Website, Barcelona Declaration). However, the inability for the Middle East to go into peace process especially with the Netanyahu period between 1996-1999 and the violent confrontations between Israel and Palestinians since September 2000 affected the EMP in a negative way. At the same time, the signing of the Mediterranean Charter for peace and stability also failed. So, this showed that for confidence building and stabilization in the region, there was at first need to a peace process or a political solution to the conflicts in the Middle East (Jünemann, 2004, p.174).

**Map 2: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EU Website)**



The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, relaunched in 2008, demonstrates that the understanding of the Mediterranean had changed tremendously in the EU policy making since the Barcelona Process. At first, following the 2004 enlargement, Cyprus and Malta, are transferred from being a partner to a full membership and eight central and eastern new EU members became the additional partners to the this EuroMed formation. What is more, the relations with Libya is progressed and the door of accession to the EuroMed is opened to Libyan Authorities with the condition of fulfilling the requirements of the Barcelona acquis. But the problem for the so called Barcelona Acquis, in contrast to the EU enlargement acquis determined by the Copenhagen criteria, was that it was vague and relying only on the acceptance of the participation of all partners (Cardwell, 2011, p.226). However, in the tenth anniversary of EuroMed, the EU launched ENP to create a new framework of relations and this provided for the

EuroMed partners the chance to be covered by this new policy. The only EuroMed country who won't be involved was Turkey due to its starting accession negotiations.

At this point, it is important to underline that the ENP was not launched to replace EuroMed but to complement it for the simple reason that the Barcelona Process was the key to relations between the EU and the southern Mediterranean. The ENP reinforced the importance of EuroMed and aimed to provide further co-operation and to build concrete projects including justice and home affairs and migration. And both the original and the renewed forms of EuroMed demonstrate EU's willingness to build region-based frameworks (Cardwell, 2011, p.231). The most important problem that needed to be resolved was the lack of regional stability that caused the postponement of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. Especially the events in Gaza that took place in the early 2009 slowed the process of building up the relations after the Paris Summit. Different from this, the initial goal to form a free trade area in the Barcelona Process was less and less likely because of restrictions in agricultural goods and lack of regional integration.

What is more, it can be said that the initiative was subject to an intergovernmental game that is turning around the EU's common foreign and security policy. Among the member states, the most important country that supports this partnership is France. But France's interest on the region is not new. Especially, starting from the treaty of Rome that enabled France to keep special relations with Morocco and Tunisia through a special protocol, France developed its interests in the region. And when we look at the current position in the Euromed, it can be seen that together with France, the member states like Spain, Italy and Malta depend on Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Egypt on issues related to the prevention of immigration, trade liberalisation, and stability and prevention of Islamic radicalism (EUobserver, 14/01/11). Therefore, these countries give weight for the development of this specific partnership more than others and this opens ways to inequality between the partnerships and therefore shakes the balance of the ENP itself.

Due to the impact of the problems and the interests of the key member states on the region, the EU within this initiative wanted to build more concrete and more visible relations with its partners with the help of new regional and sub-regional projects



addressing to areas such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration and culture. What is more, in order to show the importance it attached to this partnership, the EU as of September 2010, dedicated a functional secretariat, a secretary general and six deputy secretary generals to the initiative (EEAS Website, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership).

However, the conflicts surrounding the region had been needing much more effort. The huge wave of change that surrounded the North and the Middle East in 2011 from Morocco and Algeria to Bahrain and Yemen destroyed the existing regimes in the region. When the revolts settled down, it was observed that regimes and leaders felled down in days or weeks and to build a new order was the most important challenge to deal. This was first the duty of the Mediterranean countries to meet these challenges. But, because of the critical position of the EU in terms of the status quo and the geographical proximity, it was necessary for the EU to contribute to the process as well (Paltelegraph, 27/03/2011). Although this crisis does not require the reinvention of the policy towards the Mediterranean, it underlines the need to put into practice the objectives determined on the paper. When it is compared to the Barcelona Process, the ENP offers more funds, more trade and more cooperation with the region. Again, it puts more emphasis on democracy, human rights and sustainable development. However, despite to such a sound instruments, much of the policy was never implemented. For example, the EU committed to offer its partners “everything but institutions” (Paltelegraph, 27/03/2011).

In order to find a lasting solution, the EU very recently, prepared communication on a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean in March 2011. This communication addressed the short-term consequences of the recent events in North Africa and also underlined the need to a change in the EU’s approach to the region in terms of differentiation, conditionality and partnership as a response to the changing political landscape in the Southern Mediterranean. The aim of the communication was to strengthen the relations with the neighbourhood by building and consolidating healthy democracies, pursuing sustainable economic growth and managing cross-border links. To get into detail, this new approach aims to encourage the partners to build deep democracy that includes free speech, competing political parties, independent judges, accountable police and army forces as well as civil and

human rights such as the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In addition to that, the approach supports economic development that would bring more cooperation on trade and investment, would reduce social and regional inequalities and would create jobs and higher standards of living. Lastly, the approach clearly underlined the need to strengthen the regional dimensions between east and south so that they could be consistent in areas like trade, energy, transport and migration. With this new approach, the EU aims to keep its channels of dialogue open with governments, civil society and other stakeholders in line with the principle of mutual accountability (PR Newswire, 25/05/2011).

By taking an active role, the EU must support the people in the region to enjoy the same freedoms taking base from its own experience of democratic transition that was previously effective in the transition from the autocratic regimes that took place in the South and in Central and Eastern Europe because of the shared interest of the Union in a democratic, stable prosperous and peaceful Southern Mediterranean. So, as an immediate response to this challenge through this communication the EU decided to give humanitarian aid, to facilitate joint cooperation and evacuation, to make joint operations, to increase the EU External Borders Fund and European Refugee Fund, to organize visits to Tunisia and Egypt that will be held by the High Representative and to support the democratic transition. However, in order to adopt this approach to its partners, the EU needs also to review and adjust its Neighborhood Policy, to advance the status of the Association Agreements and to enhance political dialogue. In addition to that, the EU needs to give a considerable support for democracy and institution building by expanding support to civil society, by establishing a Civil Society Neighborhood Facility and supporting Social Dialogue Forum. Different from this, it must tackle the challenges of mobility, promote inclusive economic development, ensure maximum impact of trade and investment, enhance sectoral cooperation and provide additional financial assistance (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011).

Taking base from what was mentioned above, when it is compared to the history of the Mediterranean, it can be observed that the dynamics in the region today is changing more rapidly than ever and the progress in the peace process is vital. Especially, the revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that began in Tunisia and Egypt and then spread to partners of the EU in the region like Libya, Syria, Yemen,

Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and many other countries strictly underlined the need to a concrete action by the EU more than ever for a peaceful settlement. What is more, those events are critical for the EU because the huge wave of change has a potential to impact its own members. For this reason, the EU should work to make more cooperation with its partners in political and social terms and this would most probably pass by forming a new approach that would bring together the positive elements of the Barcelona Process and the Union for Mediterranean that would focus on sectors that bring benefits to the Union like environment, energy, transport, trade and social dialogue (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011).

### ***The Black Sea Synergy***

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU tried to develop its relations with its neighbors through different agreements. For example, it created the Northern Dimension for the Baltic States, the Barcelona Process that is discussed above for the Mediterranean countries and the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe for the Balkans. It seemed that the only missing piece of the puzzle was the Black Sea. Although the Black Sea countries had developed willingness to cooperate with the EU, because of the unresolved conflicts in the region and because of the problems concerning mixed ethnic groups, enforced migration, economic deprivation, widespread unemployment, authoritarian regimes and bad governance, the EU was skeptical about building closer relations with the Black Sea. The EU decided to engage in the region only in the aftermath of the Cold War through Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. The important point to note here is that the EU instead of perceiving the Black Sea as a region, at that time it preferred to sign bilateral agreements with some of the Black Sea countries to support their efforts towards democratization, market transition and trade and to provide the necessary environment of cooperation in different areas. That is to say, it wanted to internalize all-in-one basket model including all the former Soviet Republics (Balcer, 2011, p.11). In the same time interval, the Black Sea countries also benefited from regional assistance programs funded by TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States launched in 1991), TRACECA (Transport

Corridor for Europe-Caucasus-Asia launched in 1993), and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation launched in 1995).

**Map 3: The Black Sea (European Commission, 2008)**



The idea to develop a regional approach towards the Black Sea is first pronounced in 1997 by the adoption of the Communication on Regional Cooperation in the Black sea Region that includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova in the west, Ukraine and Russia in the north, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the east and Turkey in the south in order to build transport, energy, trade and telecommunication networks and to develop justice and home affairs. What is more, the Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation is listed by the Commission. But, due to the importance and focus given to other initiatives that were considered to be vital for the enlargement process of the Union, the Black Sea lost its priority (Balcer, 2011, p.12). Even the ENP have not succeed in creating a regional vision for the Black Sea (Balcer, 2011, p.13).

The turning point for the Black Sea was the 2007 enlargement. Following the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the region became one of the most important challenges of the EU. So, the EU developed the Black Sea Synergy to focus political

attention, to deepen its relations and to create areas of cooperation with the countries in the region.

The Black Sea Synergy is launched in 2008 with a joint statement in Kiev including the countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. The statement underlined the challenges and the opportunities of the Black Sea Area and it emphasized that the involvement of the EU and the launch of such a Black Sea Synergy can increase the potential of cooperation in the region and can be used according to mutual interests of the participating countries. Different from this, the Black Sea Synergy is aimed to develop relations in areas concerning especially transport, energy and communication infrastructure that will increase trade, investment, traffic and information flows between the partners. In other words, with such an initiative, the EU especially in the energy sector, could have a chance to secure its energy supply by diversifying its resources and could ensure environmental sustainability. In addition to that, the synergy will support the regional transport cooperation and therefore will improve efficiency, safety and security. What is more, it will provide a framework for combating climate change, natural or man-made disasters, organized crime and for making improvements in the field of migration, law enforcement and other areas like trade, science, technology, research, culture, education, employment and social affairs in the region (EEAS Website, Joint Statement).

Following the launch of the initiative, the Commission published a report on the first year of the Black Sea Synergy to describe the progress achieved in implementing the tasks set by the 2007 Communication. The report at first is considering the Black Sea Synergy Initiative not only complementary to the European Neighbourhood Policy, but also to the enlargement policy for Turkey and the Strategic Partnership with the Russian Federation. Different from this, in the field of environment, the Commission will launch a climate change technical assistance project that will include the Black Sea region. In Maritime policy and fisheries, the Commission is encouraging for better cooperation between national authorities with the creation of an integrated network of maritime surveillance system. What is more, the Commission will prepare a Road Map to facilitate the development of maritime spatial planning and will work for the establishment of regional fisheries management cooperation. In the Energy field, the region showed success in mobilising existing instruments and resources. The

Commission sponsored a feasibility study the transformation options for the natural gas. In the field of Transport, the Commission showed considerable efforts like the exploratory talks with the countries of the region concerning the extension of the trans-European transport networks and the implementation of the Motorways of the Sea in the region. It gave also start to the works on the extension of the Common Aviation Area. For the field of security, the EU planned to establish a platform that will bring together Member States, EU agencies, countries bordering the Black Sea and regional organisations that will provide further cooperation between the countries. In Research, science and education networks field, the Commission supported the institutional cooperation and structural reforms in higher education through Tempus and Erasmus Mundus Programmes as well as scientific cooperation through projects that started in 2008. In employment and social affairs field, the developments recently started on specific issues or larger subjects concerning the region. In Trade, the EU supported Black Sea regional trade liberalisation. And lastly, in the field of democracy, respect for human rights and good governance, seminar is organised on human rights issues in which recommendations on the freedom of expression has adopted . In addition to all these developments, the Commission through the Black Sea regional framework tried to take an active role in confidence building in a wider regional context.

Taking base from all of the developments and future plans, the commission concluded in its reports that the launch phase of the initiative has been completed and the implementation has begun. However, the establishment of a regional cooperation in the Black Sea and the continued progress requires consistent and active involvement from the Member States and Black Sea partners.

### ***The Eastern Partnership***

Following the Black Sea Synergy, the Eastern Partnership initiative is launched in May 2009 to deepen the relations through political and economic integration with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This initiative was born out of the continued enlargements that brought up the borders of these countries to the EU and therefore they seriously affected the security, stability and prosperity both in the

region and the Union. Although these countries showed their willingness to become closer to the EU with the reforms they made in political, social and economic terms, the conflict that took place in Georgia in 2008 was a good evidence that the EU's security was beginning outside its borders and that it was needing more than what the Black Sea Synergy offered. For this reason, the European Commission, in order to enhance its relations with those countries, decided to sign deeper free trade agreements that will offer the partners to go to a deeper engagement and integration with the EU and they will provide crucial opportunities like strengthened democracy, good governance, environment protection, stability, social and economic development as well as easier travel through gradual visa liberalization (EEAS Website, Eastern Partnership).

**Map 4: The Eastern Partnership (EEAS Website, Eastern Partnership)**



As it is stated above, following the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the EU's role and importance in the region had tremendously changed. The EU became a significant security actor with the French Presidency's efforts to ceasefire and its active

participation in the Geneva Talks. After the war, the EU had also started to the Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in October 2008 and it appointed a special representative for the crisis in Georgia for the conflict resolution. And then it formally launched the Eastern Partnership Initiative at its Prague summit on 7 May 2009 within the framework of its Neighborhood Policy. But, the Initiative was subject to different reactions from different institutions and countries. For example, from the European Commission, Benita Ferrero- Waldner took attention to the possible overlap with the Black Sea Synergy. Among the Member States, Bulgaria and Romania feared that the Black Sea Synergy will lose ground and Spain and Italy expressed their commitments to the Southern Dimension. From another point of view Ukraine appreciated the initiative but emphasized its willingness of a membership perspective. And lastly, very different from others, Russia by criticizing the plan wanted that the relations continue on an individual basis within the framework of the EU (Nasshoven, 2008).

According to the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, the participants agreed that the Eastern Partnership will take its base from international law and fundamental values that includes democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms together with sustainable development and good governance. It is decided that the initiative will be build on the existing bilateral contracts and will develop according to the future relations of the partners with the EU. The basic principles will be differentiation and conditionality and the main goal is the acceleration of the political association and further economic integration. In this way the initiative will support political, social and economic reforms in the partner countries and will provide stability, security and prosperity in the EU and in the region. And lastly, the multilateral framework of the Eastern Partnership will enable open and free dialogue that provide partners the opportunity to take decisions jointly, to share information and experience and to facilitate the development of common positions (Council of the European Union, 2009).

It can be said that the Eastern Partnership is the most advanced initiative in the Eastern Neighborhood. But, although this was the case, it didn't overcome its weaknesses. The Eastern Partnership Countries generally have weak state institutions, post-communist economic transformation, authoritarian regimes and high poverty levels. And because they have different foreign policy goals and different economic ties



with the world, compared to the other regions that the EU is interested, it is very difficult to cooperate in a regional scale. For example, Belarus is strongly integrated with Russia whereas Moldova is strongly integrated with the EU; and Ukraine with both EU and Russia. And very differently, Georgia and Azerbaijan have a Western Orientation (Balcer, 2011, p.96). As a result, they have different position towards EU accession and therefore they create different dynamics within the Partnership. Whereas Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are ambitious about being candidate and therefore the most important supporters of the Eastern Partnership, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus are not interested with the accession and for this reason they have low expectations from the initiative (Balcer, 2011, p.97). What is more, the willingness of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to be a part of the EU is in a sense blocked by the lack of membership perspective that leads to a vicious circle because the lack of such a prospect does not create any kind of motivation to make reforms and to go for a structural integration. So, the EU must find ways to compensate this greater demand of these countries to engage in the Union.

In order to comment on the success or the failure of the Eastern Partnership, it is important to note the strong and weak points of the initiative. To start with the strong points and the areas in which this partnership added to the ENP, it can be first said that it is the most progressive democratization agenda that is on the principle of conditionality. The Eastern Partnership differentiated the Eastern Neighbors from the Southern Ones and it recognized the importance of the East for the ENP. More importantly, by building bilateral relations with the eastern partners, it established for the first time the most comprehensive multilateral network. It is at the same time, the first initiative that included Belarus in multilateral dimension therefore it opened new areas of cooperation (Balcer, 2011, p.113).

However, despite these important achievements, the Eastern Partnership remained weak in many aspects. At first, as it is stated above there is no long term European Perspective in the agenda of the initiative. For this reason, there is no force to create a momentum that will push the Partnership towards deeper cooperation. What the EU needs in this partnership not only individual success of the partners in economic, political or social terms but a more comprehensive progress in all spheres. Different from this, for the full integration of the Eastern Partnership to the EU, the EU needs

more than economic integration that would be complemented with a political agenda. Again concerning the economic dimension, the EU had also problems in the implementation of the association agreements. Most of the agreements signed with the Eastern Partners are derived from the ones signed with the Western Balkan ones that impose obligations to the Eastern Countries with smaller EU financial and political commitment. In addition to that, another important weakness of the initiative is the lack of commitment from the EU to open its markets to products coming from the partners. And lastly, concerning the frozen conflicts, the partnership avoided to address the conflicts in the region.

To sum up, in general because the Eastern partners desire to be a full member, the EU must develop the ways to not to close the doors of enlargement due to the fact that it plays as a demotivating factor for the partners to be effectively involved in this neighborhood project. It must also facilitate mobility with visa-liberalization and must keep its promises it signed on paper. What is more important, there is a problem of clarity between the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. The Black Sea Synergy overlaps the various dimension of the Eastern Partnership. Although the commission argues that the two initiatives are complementing each other, this creates blurred lines. So, the EU must eliminate this line and must reconsider the overlapping areas in order to differentiate the tasks assigned to each initiative. As for the Eastern Partnership countries must focus on the democratic reform process and must for an effective conflict resolution in the region (Balcer, 2011, p.22). Nevertheless, it is believed that the year 2011, will be the year of the Eastern Partnership because the two presidencies, Hungary and Poland, who are deeply involved in this initiative will take the lead. What is more, the Enlargement Commissioner, Stefan Füle understands the meaning of the Partnership. In this line, the most important problem that the Partnership will face is the money. The EU is planning the increase the financial assistance dedicated to the initiative from €450 million in 2008 to €785 million in 2013. But besides that, the EU also should ensure that the money is spent efficiently. In the meantime, Poland during its presidency needs to convince Russia that this is not an anti-Russian Project (Euroactiv, 07/12/2010).

	<b>Table 2: The ENP Action Plans and The Existing Level of Relations with the Partners<sup>1</sup></b>
<b>Algeria</b>	No Action Plan- The EU and Algeria are only bound in the form of Association Agreement that entered into force in 1 September 2005. The trade and the development of cooperation remain important subject of relations.
<b>Armenia</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted on 14 November 2006. In July 2010, the EU and Armenia started negotiations on an Association Agreement to deepen political association and economic integration with the EU. A Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) is also intended, when relevant conditions are met.
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted on 14 November 2006. The EU and Azerbaijan are currently negotiating an Association Agreement that would significantly deepen Azerbaijan's political association and economic integration with the EU.
<b>Belarus</b>	No Action Plan- In order to build mutual understanding and to create opportunities to address issues of concern, in November 2009 the Council welcomed increased high-level EU–Belarus political dialogue, the establishment of an EU Belarus Human Rights Dialogue, the intensified technical cooperation and the active participation of Belarus in the Eastern Partnership.
<b>Egypt</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted on 6 March 2007. Trade and Financial Co-operation remain important subjects of relations.
<b>Georgia</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted on 14 November 2006. The EU aims to establish closer relations with Georgia as well as a significant degree of economic integration and deepening the political co-operation.
<b>Israel</b>	The Action Plan was adopted on April 2005. The Action Plan helped to give focus to EU-Israel relations aiming to integrate Israel into European policies and programs.
<b>Jordan</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted on January 2005. The relationship emphasizes close cooperation on democratic reform and economic modernization.
<b>Lebanon</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted in 2002 and entered into force on 1 April 2006. The Action Plan gave a new impetus to the bilateral relations that provided a framework for political dialogue, co-operation in economic policy as well as close co-operation in the social field and a better understanding amongst cultures. The Country is also one of the main Mediterranean beneficiaries of community assistance and various EU instruments.
<b>Libya</b>	No Action Plan- As of 2010, both parties agreed on a program of financial and technical cooperation under the ENPI. The EU-Libya co-operation was concentrated on two areas namely migration and HIV-AIDS. On 28 February 2011, the EU imposed new restrictive measures against Libya.
<b>Moldova</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted in February 2005. In addition to the Action Plan, the EU-Republic of Moldova signed visa facilitation and readmission agreements that entered into force in January 2008 as well as wider Mobility Partnership in June 2008. In June 2010 a visa dialogue opened and also since 2010, the Republic of Moldova became a full member of the Energy Community Treaty.
<b>Morocco</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted on 25 July 2005. Trade and the development cooperation remained important subject of relations.
<b>Occupied</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted on May 2005.

<sup>1</sup> The table is prepared by taking base the information about each partner presented in the official page of the European Neighborhood Policy. [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm)

<b>Palestinian Territory</b>	The EU is the biggest donor of financial assistance to the Palestinians. The Community continues to give support with the new PEGASE mechanism, replacing the Temporary International Mechanism.
<b>Syria</b>	No Action Plan- The Relations are governed by the Cooperation Agreement signed in 1977. Following the violent repression of anti-government protests in March 2011, the EU imposed an embargo on arms and equipment that can be used for internal repression and targeted sanctions against the ones who are responsible for the repression. In addition to these developments, in May 2011, the bilateral cooperation programmes between two parties also suspended.
<b>Tunisia</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted on 4 July 2005. Trade and development cooperation remain important subject of relations.
<b>Ukraine</b>	The ENP Action Plan was adopted on February 2005. The Action Plan then was replaced by EU-Ukraine Association Agenda in November 2009. The Action Plan will prepare the country for and facilitate the entry into force of the new Agreement. For 2011-2012, Ukraine and the EU agreed on a list of 90 priorities for action.

Taking base from what was mentioned above concerning the partnership initiatives and the table that presents the existing level of bilateral relations, it can be seen that the EU needs to work more to develop its relations with its partners and to go into deep cooperation. In the addition to that the example of Turkey show that the EU could strengthen its position on the neighborhood by developing alternative solutions like building closer ties with Turkey which will offer the EU the chance to diversify its supply and decrease its dependence on Russia in the Black Sea. In order to elaborate more on the problems of the ENP, the last chapter will focus on different countries having different problems within this policy.

### **CHAPTER 3- THE ENP BY CASE STUDIES**

In the previous chapter, the formation and the evolution of the ENP is analyzed by mainly taking base from the communications presented by the Commission. Then the attention is given to the different initiatives launched by the Union starting from 2007. It is seen that the each initiative has challenges specific to its own and their success is more or less based on the interests of the member states on the initiative subject to attention. But overall, it can be argued that even if the ENP showed futher attempts to deepen its relations with is partners through the different initiatives, it remained insufficient to change the faith of the EU in the neighborhood and failed to create a credible European presence. In order to support this argument, this chapter will analyze one country influencing the dynamics of the each initiative and question whether it leads to the same conclusion reached in the second chapter.

#### **Ukraine**

The country that will be analyzed under the Eastern Partnership in order to comment about its existing level of success will be Ukraine. The main reason behind this choice is its close relationship as well as its gradual economic integration and its deepening political co-operation with the EU. It is the largest Eastern European country after Russia, it has borders to fours of the EU members namely Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia and it is located on the Black Sea with the port city Sevastopol that makes it geopolitically important (Drescher, 2009). At the same time, Ukraine is the country having the highest interest in becoming an EU member and therefore it shows a promising case for success concerning the ENP by its active partnership among the other Eastern Partners. For this reason, the level of achievement of this specific country can give an idea about how far the Eastern partnership have gone starting from

its first launch. So, the analysis on Ukraine can show whether the ENP works according to its aims. Other partner countries could not give such a concrete response to this question because concerning the policy, they are either passive like Belarus, or minor importance like Moldova or they are focused on specific areas of cooperation like energy and conflict resolution like Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia (Gawrich and Melnykovska and Schweickert, 2010, p.1211).

Relations between the EU and Ukraine are based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), entered into force in 1998. Under the ENP, this relationship is renewed and the EU offered an action plan to Ukraine in 2005. This action plan in contrast to the Cooperation and Partnership Agreement put more emphasis on democracy and upgraded the political cooperation. In other words, it set priorities for Action within and beyond the scope of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that includes further strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, ensuring the democratic conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections in the country that guarantee respect for the freedom of the media and freedom of expression and gradual approximation of Ukrainian legislation, norms and standards with those of the European Union meaning further reinforcement of administrative and judicial capacity. The Action Plan together with the compliance to European legislation, norms and standards, at the same time, encourages further integration into the European system in social and economic terms as well because it will lead economic growth and social cohesion, will raise the living standards and will contribute to the protection of the environment (EU Website, EU-Ukraine Action Plan).

In a way, the Action Plan provided the legal framework for EU-Ukraine relations. What is more, the events that took place in Ukraine in 2004 like the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and further enlargement accelerated the rapprochement between two parties. These created more willingness to cooperate towards economic integration and to deepen the political association. For this reason, in 2007 negotiations had started to form a new agreement that include the establishment of a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU after the Ukraine's accession to the WTO in May 2008. What is more, in the annual EU-Ukraine Summit of September 2008, Ukraine was recognized as a country sharing a common history and common values with the other

countries in the EU. It is underlined that the new Association Agreement would deepen the relations in all areas and strengthen political association and economic integration (EEAS Website, EU-Ukraine Association Agreement). Since then thirteen rounds of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) negotiations have been conducted and joint reports on the progress in agreement negotiations were published in 2007, 2008 and 2009. And from the 2009 onwards, as it is stated in the 4th Joint Progress Report of 2010, both parties had been agreed on the Institutional Provisions of the Agreement. They closed almost all matters related to the chapters on Political Dialogue and Reform, Political association and Cooperation and Convergence in the Field of Foreign and Security Policy. In addition to that the chapter on Justice, Freedom and Security is close to final agreement as well as others like as customs and trade facilitation, public procurement and intellectual property rights. The remaining issues are the visa-free travel regime and judicial cooperation on civil matters. So, it can be understood that both parties are subject to a constructive engagement on the Agreement and there remained only a few areas waiting at the later stage (EEAS Website, 4<sup>th</sup> Joint Progress Report).

From the Ukraine side, until the signing of the new agreement, it can be argued that the ENP was not an attractive type of cooperation, because the ENP was considered to be a policy diminishing the Ukraine's partner status for the simple reason that it puts the country among less reformed countries that are less interested to be a part of the European project. In addition to that, when the implementation of the action plan is observed, it can be seen that although some legislative framework is developed, the laws were still inefficient. The financial and economic difficulties were preventing the implementation of some other items of the plan and there were no real structural and administrative reforms. What is more, Ukraine needed to work how to make the judiciary independent and efficient. And lastly, when this kind of situation coincided with the political crises in 2006 and 2007, it became difficult for Ukraine to accelerate reforms and implement the action plan fully. So, at that time, there were no favourable conditions for the country to initiate the ENP in a progressive manner (Derhachov, 2007, p.3).

As specifically for the Eastern Partnership that is formally launched in March 2009 and the dynamics with Ukraine within the initiative, it can be said that it was

against the Ukraine's expectations. That is to say, Ukraine was dreaming to be a part of a partnership that will help it later for its full accession to the union. On this specific initiative Bohdan Danylyshyn, Ukraine's minister for economy in May 2008 said

Any initiative that is being proposed should be grounded in the unity of the European institutions and the organic role of Ukraine in the EU (Parliament, 26/05/2008).

He also adds that

Ukraine at the moment is integrating in a highly accelerated manner into the EU and ... is looking for fully fledged membership of the EU. We see ourselves as part of Europe and we believe Europeans feel the same. Year on year Ukraine persistently demonstrates that it is a part of Europe and its European aspirations (Parliament, 26/05/2008).

Danylyshyn, by stressing on the interests of Ukraine to become part of the EU, also underlined that it is not in the interests of the EU to prolong this process because Ukraine has a huge potential to become an area for European Investment and the expansion in trade could be a real achievement for the creation of a free trade zone (Parliament, 26/05/2008). But, the way the EU was considering the Eastern Partnership was very different and was aiming to avoid the accession of the eastern neighbours. For this reason, the declaration on this new type of partnership that only offered visa facilitation agreements but no future hope of EU membership disappointed Ukraine (Korduban, 2009). It seems that the EU wants to integrate with Ukraine in some policy areas but denies to give the country the "golden carrot" membership, despite the participation of Ukraine in every kind of EU initiative to emphasize the importance it gives to accession (Drescher, 2009, p.17). So, this makes questionable the fact that the newly formed eastern partnership will improve the relations. Because in terms of politics Ukraine has problems in developing common and long- term solutions due to the changes that took place after the Orange Revolution that left the country with neither a presidential nor a parliamentary system (Drescher, 2009, p.19). In addition to that, for many years concerning the energy sector, Ukraine had some problems in being a reluctant partner to the EU because of the 2006 and 2009 crisis in which it showed that it could not guarantee the delivery of gas



and oil into Europe and its national consumers (Drescher, 2009, p.22). So, although Ukraine is independent and sovereign, it has close ties with Russia.

So, keeping this existing situation in Ukraine in mind, it can be argued that the Eastern Partnership will not probably be a threshold for the EU-Ukraine relations. At first, the Eastern Partnership remains weak due to lack of support from the members. This is an evidence for the problematic side of the EU foreign policy that is driven by the member states preferences. Second, the partnership aims to create a regional perspective. But the partner countries have different goals and interests. Although the Commissioner Stefan Füle underlines that the initiative is still in its infancy and that perceives it as normal and healthy, this affects the level of progress (ENPI Website). Third, the public support for EU in Ukraine tends to decrease because there was no improvement in the process of visa facilitation and there were no visible EU projects in the country (Drescher, 2009, p.26).

Taking into consideration what was mentioned above; it can be argued that the lack of a membership perspective is playing like a de-motivating factor for Ukraine. But, one must keep in mind that there are also other ways to keep Ukraine's motivation higher for deeper integration until the membership question is answered which take place in the form of widening the linkages and improving direct financial support (Gawrich and Melnykovska and Schweickert, 2010, p.1230). Perhaps the best that can be done for the moment, as one of the EU diplomatic contact had mentioned, is to keep the momentum going toward the DCFTA and the AA. Because it is for the time the only "window of opportunity" and the EU must focus next year elections in Russia and in Ukraine after which everything would be put on the shelf (EUobserver, 22/06/2011).

As it is stated above the concepts like democracy and respect for human rights are often used by the EU for Ukraine. However, the situation of democracy and human rights is getting worse and shows no sign of improvement. If Ukraine follows this way because of the ongoing negotiations on the Association Agreement and DCFTA that will finish up in a short period of time, it will get more by doing less. So, in this case, the EU will have to compromise from its principles. But if so, then what are the EU motivations for Ukraine? The answer is passing from the different preferences of the EU officials. On the one hand, some of them believe that Ukraine will hugely impact other countries in the region, so it is important to keep it close. On the other hand,

others see the association agreement with Ukraine only necessary for its internal politics (Eastern Partnership Community Website, 30/06/2011). If this is the case, then what the EU should do? What is more, in order to maintain the credibility of the ENP, the EU must first underline what the Ukraine must do in order to show its commitment to European values and standards. Second, it must insist Ukraine to fulfil the requirements of the IMF programme. And third, it must encourage the country for examine all the politically motivated criminal cases. Although these steps would not be sufficient to resolve the difficulties between the two parties, they could be a guideline for Ukraine in its reform process and could ensure the EU's commitment to principles defined under the ENP (Kiev Ukraine News Blog, 03/07/2011).

## **Russia**

Russia is a very important country to be observed when the neighbors of the EU are concerned. It is too big and it has no interest in joining the EU. For this reason, Russia is also possessing the tendency to influence the dynamics and the relations between the EU and the other partners in the region.

Starting from 2000s and especially after the EU-Russian Summit that took place in St. Petersburg in 2003, both agreed on working to strengthen cooperation especially in spaces concerning the economy, freedom, security and justice, external security, research and education (129<sup>th</sup> Bergedof Round Table, 2004, p.77).

To make it clear, in order to provide security, stability and prosperity in the neighborhood, the EU needs at first stability from this giant neighbor because of its geographic proximity and economic importance especially concerning the energy sector. Moreover, the EU needs also to Russia for the resolution of the conflicts in the Balkans and the Middle East as well as to fight with terrorism (129<sup>th</sup> Bergedof Round Table, 2004, p.79). However, from the other side of the coin, because of the eastern enlargement that voided the bilateral treaties signed with the eastern european countries, Russia fears being encircled and failed to move in an effective partnership with the EU (129<sup>th</sup> Bergedof Round Table, 2004, p.81). The important point about the eastern enlargement for the EU and Russia is that the enlargement brought the borders of the EU to neighbors that have weak political and economic structures. Thus, they are open to influence. If the EU misses this chance, Russia by using especially its energy power

would fill the gap. What the EU must pay attention is to offer equal treatment to its eastern neighbors through common projects for example.

As it is stated above, when the Black Sea Synergy is concerned, the most important partner for the EU in this region due its size and power is Russia. In the past, both parties have difficulties in developing their relations. The EU was busy to settle its internal dynamics and the Russia was dealing to solve its internal problems. Today, although still the both countries have long way to go, the Black Sea Synergy could be an opportunity to find ways of cooperation. There are areas of difference , but the both parties have willingness to develop common solutions to common problems like missile defence and other issues (Euractiv, 09/04/2008).

It is hardly known that the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU is mainly based on the energy sector. The map below from 2007 is showing how much the EU is dependent on the energy supply imported by Russia. Although the EU developed its relations with Russia in the last years, especially the problems in the energy sector, forced the Union to reshape its relationship with Russia and also to find alternative ways of securing its energy supply with a scenario which will not include this giant neighbour. Especially when the field of energy is concerned, it is clearly seen that Russia is considering itself as a world power and wants also to be treated as such because the statistics obtained from the IEA 2010 underlines that if the current policies and measures that the EU follows continues in the same way, the EU's dependence on Russia on its imports of natural gas will increase in the years to come (Onchmann, 2009).

**Map 5: The European Dependence on Natural Gas (Lngpedia, 27/06/2009)**



What is more, the EU is impacted on a high degree from the energy crisis broke down due to Russia in the region. For example, the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 had also a huge impact on Europe. Although the dispute over the price of gas was not directly involving Europe, when Gazprom temporarily shut off the supply of Gas to Ukraine, the gas supply of Europe travelling from the same pipeline, was temporarily interrupted and the European gas supplies were in risk. However, this crisis was not the last. In the half of 2008, the parties again faced difficulties on the sales-purchase price. At the end of December 2008, negotiations broke down and the Russia accused Ukrainian president and prime minister of being internally divided. At the end, Gazprom again cut off all gas flowing to Ukraine and Europe especially to Romania, Bulgaria and the Balkans. Although after three weeks of crisis, the two sides signed agreements, this event clearly showed that Russia was ready to use its energy resources as an instrument of state power and as a way to achieve their political goals (Pascual and Elkind, 2008). For the EU, The Russia-Ukraine crisis that took place in 2006 and 2009 was seen as a wakeup call which exposed Europe's energy security vulnerability even to unintended supply disruptions and it also raised questions such as whether Russia is a reliable partner and whether Moscow would use its energy power as a political weapon. So, what the Ukraine gas crisis did was to set into motion a new sense of urgency for action on an EU energy policy. It can be seen that although the EU took measures presented above to secure its energy, they were not sufficient to prevent the damages of the Russia-Ukraine crisis of 2008. What the EU really needs is to develop strong partnerships with energy producing countries and transit regions other than Russia. What is more, it is very crucial for the EU to learn to utilize the existing

indigenous energy resources and to establish an internal system to provide secure energy supplies to Europe. And in order to achieve this goal, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership in 2009.

From the 2009 onwards, when the dynamics between the EU and Russia is concerned, in order to keep close ties, the EU is trying to go for a new partnership and Cooperation agreement with Russia. At the same time, it aims also to develop its relations with the other states of the Soviet Union through the Eastern Partnership. As for the co-existence of these two approaches, it is actually questionable because of the parallel interest of Russia in the Region. Nevertheless, it can be said that, As Fraser Cameron who is the director of the EU-Russia Centre expressed, Russia supports the EU in the way to strengthen and reform the multilateral institutions. But Cameron adds that EU must try to find more areas of cooperation like terrorism and environment. What is more, it can be said that the countries are in many ways interdependent. For example, the EU is dependent almost solely on Russia in its imports of natural gas. But with this dependency, Gazprom gets over 70 per cent of its profits from the EU markets. In addition to that, in order to protect its place in the Energy sector and to diversify its economy, the Russia needs to look towards EU for technology, investment and know-how (Euractiv, 09/04/2008). On this interdependency Vladimir Putin, the Russian Prime Minister said

Let's face it, both Russia and the EU have proved quite vulnerable economically, and the crisis showed that clearly. Russia still depends strongly on its raw material exports, and the European Union, after many years of deindustrialization, is facing a real threat of losing its positions on the industrial and high-tech markets. It is obvious that we are lagging behind in certain areas of education and scientific research and development (Al-Jazeera Info, 25/10/2010).

He also added that

Changing this situation requires using the tangible advantages and opportunities that both Russia and the EU have. That would be a truly harmonious synergy of two economies: the classic,

well-established economy of the EU and the emerging, developing economy of Russia, with growth factors that complement each other (Al-Jazeera Info, 25/10/2010).

Very recently, in order to deepen the relations, in 2010, the both parties launched a Partnership for modernization to cooperate on issues like socio- economic development, fight against corruption and enhancing dialogue with civil society (Balcer, 2011, p.19). This new partnership will establish a flexible framework for “promoting reform, enhancing growth and raising competitiveness, and will build on results achieved so far in the context of the four European Union” that is to say the common spaces. And the dialogues concerning the sector will be the key implementation instrument that will be used in this way. Both the EU and Russia will encourage the implementation of specific projects and the partnership will be subject to continuous monitoring and exchanges at all levels of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2010).

One year after the implementation of this new partnership, it can be observed that it gave positive results. At the EU-Russia Summit in Nizhny Novgorod 9-10 June 2011, it is noted that good progress is made in the implementation of the partnership and that this will give an additional momentum to the Dialogues under the Common Spaces. In addition to that, the economic ties between the two parties have grown compared to the previous years. For this reason, Russia continued to be the EU’s single supplier of energy products. However, the Russia’s economy also showed dependence to the export of energy raw material to the EU. As for the financial cooperation, it continues on the principle of co-financing by the two countries. Especially Russia is co-financing Cross Border Cooperation programmes as well as Erasmus Mundus and Tempus supporting mobility of students and teaching staff and also the Nuclear Safety Instrument (EC Press Release, Memo/11/389).

It can be seen that very different from the 1999s, the EU-Russia relations showed considerable improvements in the recent years. However, Russia with the block it puts to the achievement of the Eastern partnership due to the fear of losing its most important energy market, namely the EU, continues to be an important challenge for the EU to deal in the region. In other words, Because of the objectives of EU to minimize

the dependence on natural gas imports Russia by diversifying its supply, Russia is facing a serious threat. It is hardly known that Russia is using the energy dependency issue as an instrument of foreign and securities as well as geopolitical interests. So, the issue of energy from the Russian side is defensive and reactive (Balcer, 2011, p.69). Especially, the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, proved to the EU that there was a need for an alternative cooperation with CACR and Black Sea States. However, in order to develop the relations, Russia must pay attention to not to see the EU as an actor preventing the realization of its national policies concerning the region. It must develop more willingness towards cooperation for the benefit of all (Balcer, 2011, p.23).

## **Libya**

Concerning the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership the case study will focus on Libya for its being the most problematic relations with the EU. Although the EU and Libya in the past passed from a very difficult period, starting from 2003, with the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy, both parties show willingness to take important steps and to normalize the relations. However, the way going towards an effective cooperation in the region is still debatable.

To start with the history of the EU- Libya, the turning point for the two countries was the year 1973 with the impact of the friendly links of Egypt with the US that opened the way of stagnation of the EU- Libya relations. Beginning in 1981, the relations became hostile because of US determination to end radicalism and Libya's support for radical organizations using violence. In addition to that, Qaddafi's interest in weapons of mass destruction and its willingness to gain the capability of nuclear weapons to compete with Israel increased the tension. Different from this, the events like the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in Berlin in 1986, the Lockerbie crash in 1988 and the Benghazi Epidemic in 1998 worsened the existing situation (Szabo, 2006, p.13).

The so called new era for the two countries started in 1999 after the UN Security Council decision to suspend the sanctions imposed on Libya in 1992 and 1993. The same year, the EU has also decided to give an observer status to Libya in its Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Following this development, Libya declared its

renouncement of the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2003 that is especially welcomed by France and Britain and Qaddafi made on official visit to Brussels in 2004 (CNN, 20/12/2003).

But why Libya has importance for the EU? Libya is very important for the EU both in political and economic terms. This country in these three domains, is offering the community major opportunities as well as considerable costs. From the economic side, it is known that the EU is dependent on Russia in its import of natural gas and on Middle East in its imports of oil. From this perspective, Libya could be an important partner for the EU because it has important oil and natural gas reserves. In addition to that, Libya could also be an important trade partner. As for the political dimension, with being an effective partner in the region, Libya could help the EU to secure the external borders and can control the migration flows through its territory. What is more, the building up of an effective partnership would not only work in the benefit of the EU, but will also offer important opportunities to Libya as well. Such cooperation could provide the chance to maintain internal political order and to secure the goodwill of its external allies (Szabo, 2006, p.16). However, although this was the case, when this country is concerned the EU faces certain risks like the human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

When the Barcelona process was launched in 1995, Libya was not invited to join the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. However, as it is stated above, after the UN Security Council decision to lift the sanctions on Libya, Libya is granted the observer status and it made its application to be a full member of the Barcelona Process. Although it achieved to meet the first condition in 2003, it was unsuccessful to fulfil the second one. And currently, Libya is still at the observer stage and it had not started the negotiations for the Association Agreement. The main reason behind the sceptic approach of Libya towards being part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is political. The political requirements that underline the need to act especially in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are very different from the direct democracy in the region and it is against the internal political structure of Libya (Szabo, 2006, p.24).

On the other hand, Libya is recognized as one of the partners of the European Neighbourhood Policy that is launched in 2004. But they are not linked by contractual



terms and their relations within the ENP have not been activated yet (EU4Journalists, C80 269). The main reason behind this issue is that the political cooperation that Libya wants to build with the EU is informal and a loose one (Szabo, 2006, p.27). More important than that, there is also the fact that the bargaining position of Libya towards the EU is stronger than any other Euro-Mediterranean partner. That is to say, the most crucial factor behind the non-participation of Libya in the ENP is the lack of power asymmetry between the two parties. So, it can be argued that the EU are not power enough to impose instruments of conditionality on Libya and the ENP rests insufficient to formalize the relations (Saliba,2009). So, in order to change this attitude, the EU must take considerable action and it must follow a specific policy towards this country. At first the EU for example could develop a joint immigration policy with Libya and adopt a joint action plan for cooperation on immigration issues.

When the today's relations are concerned, it can be said that Libya still remains to be a problem for the EU. Very recently, civilians in Libya inspiring by the events in Tunisia and Egypt protested against the Gaddafi regime that later turned into a bloody battle between government and the rebelling population, especially in the eastern port of Benghazi (BBC, 16/08/2011). As a response to this crisis, in 26 February 2011, after expressing its position about the situation unfolding in Libya by condemning the violence and the use of force against civilians and by calling to address immediately the demands of the population, the EU adopted a decision implementing the UN Security Council Resolution on Libya in 26 February 2011 as well as additional restrictive measures for the ones who are responsible for the violence on the civilian population. According to the decision, the EU agreed to ban the supply of arms, ammunition and related material to the country. Different from this, the trade with Libya was also another area that was prohibited due to the fear internal repression (Council of the European Union, 2011b). But, the EU needed to take actions in order to find an effective solution to this problem. It was an important challenge for the EU to deal in the region. The Britain's Foreign Secretary said that this was "...an historic test for the European Union" and he added that if the union "can succeed in bringing both more democracy and more stability to North Africa and to the wide Middle East then that would be the greatest achievement of the European Union since the enlargement of the EU " and if it did not succeed in that "then the dangers to the European Union of instability or extremism on" the frontiers will be immense because for example recently,

Gaddafi warned the EU that they must stop the cooperation that is agreed between Libya to eliminate illegal immigration from North Africa (BBC, 22/02/2011).

For this aim, the EU leaders had met in Brussels in March 2011 to examine all necessary options to protect the civilians in Libya. However, the ongoing debate over the issue was subject to questions because of the existing foreign policy in the EU that is still driven by the member states preferences. In the meeting especially Britain and France called for a preparation of plans to help the Libyan Rebellion. One of the measures that are offered was the possibility of a no-fly zone. But the problem was that many leaders were not on the same opinion over issue. For example, whereas the German Chancellor Angela Merkel was sceptical a military intervention and a no-fly zone in Libya, French president Nicolas Sarkozy was considering the military intervention as a chance for Europe to send a message to Libya (BBC, 21/03/2011). Then, France, Britain and Italy sent military trainers to Libya in order to help the opposition against the Gaddafi regime.

At this point the EU is important for Libya to get help in the transitional period like the organisation of elections and the drafting of a new constitution. For this aim, the EU decided to open an office in Benghazi and to give support for humanitarian assistance. Then, the foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton made an official visit to the place and she touched upon important concerns like border management and security reform, the economy, health, education and the building up of a civil society (Voice of America, 22/05/2011). Nevertheless, as the Polish president said, although Europe could offer to its North African neighbours and especially to Libya financial support, advice and training, the region needs to learn to stand on its own feet on the way going to freedom and success (EUobserver, 19/05/2011).

Lastly, according to the council conclusions on Libya that is adopted in the Foreign Affairs council meeting of 20 June 2011, the EU specifically underlined that it condemns the violations of human rights and it called the remaining followers of the regime to alienate them from committing such crimes. In addition to that, it is mentioned that the humanitarian organisations must have access to Libya and if it is required by the UN, the EU would conduct a CSDP operation called EUFOR Libya to support the humanitarian assistance. The Union in this report touched upon the disruptive impact of this crisis on all the Euro-Mediterranean partners. So, it must work

for more cooperation with these neighbouring countries on humanitarian, social, economic and security challenges to diminish the impact of the instable environment in Libya. And finally, the Union is also declared its commitment to support the building of democracy, the establishment of human rights standards, the rule of law as well as good governance principles in Libya (Council of the European Union, 2011a). As a response to this fact, Al-Mahmoudi the Libyan prime minister recently stated that they are ready to negotiate unconditionally and he expressed that they want to stop the bombardments so that it could be possible to talk in a serene atmosphere. If this does not take place Europe and especially France having huge contracts with Libya will continue to lose economically (The Tripoli Post, 12/07/2011). For this reason, Al-Mahmoudi by addressing mostly France about their relations said

My message to France is: Libya is a small peaceful country, we are also your neighbours and we want to live in peace and security with you, in the Mediterranean... I wish to tell France as a friend, a friend with whom we have maintained good relations: countries do not grow with war. You don't create democracy under bombs... it doesn't work like that (The Tripoli Post, 12/07/2011).

So, this can be an evidence that the position that the EU has taken and the differentiation between the member states preferences makes questionable the fact that the EU succeeded to pass this test and it seems that Libya will continue to be a problem for the Union in the region as long as the EU does not take considerable measures.

## **CONCLUSION**

This thesis aimed to analyze the ENP starting from its first launch in 2004 up to today and questioned whether it was successful in creating a credible European presence. The conclusion to be drawn from this thesis on a general framework is that the European Neighbourhood Policy that is created with big ambitions to provide peace, stability and prosperity in the European Borders and to strengthen the position of the EU both in the region and in the world remained very weak due to the country specific conditions that impacts the success of the policy.

In order to support this argument, the first chapter focused on the link between the Eastern Enlargement and the ENP. The Eastern Enlargement that included ten new members to the community having different interests and goals as well as borders subject constant conflicts, showed that the ENP was born as a result of the enlargement fatigue that took place after the Eastern Enlargement in 2004 and then the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania as an alternative way to deepen relations with the neighbours. In order to continue strengthening its presence in the region and on the other hand to find an alternative scenario to the actual membership, the EU introduced the ENP as its new foreign policy tool in the existing foreign policy framework that was already intergovernmental in its nature. So, the Eastern Enlargement was very important for the evolution of the ENP, because first the conditions and the dynamics it created within the union gave way to the launch of the policy and second, it gave the ENP its model. That is to say, through learning and adaptation from the enlargement process, this new policy developed its own solutions to the problems of the post-enlargement period towards its neighbours.

Being the new foreign policy tool of the EU, the ENP was born as a result of the convergence of the member states interests and preferences first in the process of

eastern enlargement that is believed to work in the long term economic and geopolitical interests of all and then in the evolution of the ENP itself that would bring the EU and its surroundings peace, stability and prosperity. However, the case in the ENP was similar to the case in the eastern enlargement in which whereas the member states like Germany, Austria and Scandinavian countries were highly supportive of the accession due to the advantages that they would bring to the region in terms of trade and investment, the member states like France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece were sceptical towards widening due to the fear of increased competition and scarcity in the EU subsidies. That is to say, like enlargement, the ENP was driven by the strategic interests of the member states. For example, concerning their geographical proximity to the region as well as their potential to get into trade relations and investment, France and Spain had been supporting the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership whereas again for the same reasons countries like Sweden and Poland had been working for the development of the Eastern Partnership. This shows that the foreign policy tradition that the EU followed since the empty chair crisis of 1965 in a way continue to exist within the dynamics of its neighbourhood policy. Because the member states and their interests are here to stay, this makes it difficult for the union to speak in a single voice.

From another angle, it is also seen that the ENP presents some other challenges for the union. It is stated that The ENP at first by the action plans signed by each partner had the goal to eliminate new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. This policy was then deepened by the different regional cooperation initiatives after 2007 namely the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. Although these initiatives are designed according to the characteristics, the challenges and the specific relations of the countries in the region with the EU, it remained insufficient to meet the expectations. The ENP especially concerning the principle of conditionality showed clear differences from the enlargement process. The most important difference of the ENP from the enlargement and at the same time its most important challenge is the lack of the membership perspective. It is designed to offer more than partnership and less than membership. This lack of strong rewards to the partners makes it difficult for the EU to deepen its relations with the partners and be a credible actor in the region. Although the

Commission showed considerable efforts to improve the system, the incentives still remain inadequate and must become attractive and more credible.

In the second chapter, the subject of attention was the evolution of the ENP by giving weight to the communications, regulations and instruments developed by the Union and then the different initiatives launched in different regions are analyzed in depth. The most important conclusion to be drawn from this section was that the ENP, like the foreign policy framework of the EU that is driven by member state interests and preferences, is shaped by the key member having strategic interests over the region. In a way, the chapter was the evidence for the intergovernmental character of the ENP that is offered as an argument in the first chapter. From the analysis, it can be seen that in addition to the strategic interest of the core members on different initiatives, the policy is also influenced by the interests of the external actors like Russia being the most powerful and the biggest country in the region. It is observed that in order to preserve its dominance in the region, the country affects the developments that could work in the benefit of the EU like the Eastern Partnership and ready to use its power especially in the energy sector pursuing its own political interests. On the other hand, as it is stated above, although the EU could not create unity within itself, it remains insufficient to shape the developments in the area. So, this factor creates problems in the credibility of the EU towards its partners. Because the Union cannot talk in a single voice over its neighbourhood policy and because the member states favouring one or the other initiative that is close to its preferences, there is lack of systemization and the policy is left open to the political influence on issues related to the incentives to be offered to the partners like funding.

Lastly, the third chapter in order to observe the ENP much closer analyzed one country from each partnership. The selected countries are basically chosen according to either their importance in the specific partnership concerned. These different choices touched upon different problematic dimensions of the ENP. To start with Ukraine, although Ukraine was the country having most interested in joining the EU and therefore showing more attempts to cooperate with the EU, the lack of membership perspective de-motivated and slowed down the process between the EU and Ukraine in the Eastern Partnership. As for Russia, it is the most big and powerful country in the region. It is seen that this power was affecting the EU-Russian relations in a negative

way. Although the relations between the two countries are strengthened compared to the following years, Russia's ambitions over dominating the energy sector in the region caused the country to use its power on the energy field for its political aims and to block the development of new formations in the Black Sea like the Eastern Partnership. Lastly, Libya being the most problematic country in the Mediterranean showed that although the country is very important for the EU in political and economic terms, the lack of contractual terms and the willingness of Libya to build informal and a loose cooperation hardens the relations. This can be an evidence that the EU must work more on this region in order to strengthen the ties and the beginning could be to activate the action plans with Libya and Syria so that the focus could be given to work more on cooperation.

About the future of the ENP it can be said that recent events shows that expectations are high and the EU needs to be clear about what it can offer to its partners and what will ask them in return. It always underlines the importance of shared values but it is in a way shy to express what they are as well as the importance of good governance and political reform for the community.

As it is underlined above, especially the unexpected events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya created a debate on the way to approach to the neighbours. The debate became more active when the events on North Africa emphasized the need for more active foreign policy in the neighbourhood. The opinions for the future of the ENP widely vary. So, the commission had difficulties to prepare a communiqué that will satisfy all the members. Generally it can be observed that the Mediterranean members supports the strengthening of the EU involvement in North Africa whereas the Central European countries favours the balancing the Southern and Eastern dimensions that keep the intergovernmental move in the game. To get into more detail, France, Spain, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta favours the North African countries in their transition to new political, economic and social models. Those six countries sent a letter to Catherine Ashton in which they wanted the revision of non-ENPI instruments like the instrument for stability, the European instrument for democracy and human rights and the development cooperation Instrument. The letter also calls for reinforced political dialogue and more visits by the High Representative to the region. In addition to that, they wanted the creation of a macro-regional strategy that would enable coordinated

actions and would help to export the EU internal policies to the Mediterranean countries as well as the allocation of more funds to the region and the redefinition of Union for Mediterranean Secretariat's mandate to deal with the emerging social challenges.

However, in contrast to these 6 states, the Germany favoured neither the East nor the South and opposed to the increase in funds for the South. Germany argues the financial assistance should only be given to the countries fulfilling the necessary conditions. But on the other hand, it favoured increasing the trade relations with the neighbours and instead of given aid to neighbours through seven years programmes, it emphasized that the attention must be given to increase the capability of their institutions, parliaments and judiciary.

So, between these conflicted interest and proposals, the EU must achieve to develop an effective toolbox to deal with the crises in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. If it could succeed to assist those countries in their transition to democracy, it could also be successful in the East. The community taking base from the past events in the eastern neighbourhood like the 2008 war in Georgia and the anti-governmental protests in Armenia should be aware that this region is still very fragile. For this reason, the EU must give attention to compromise east for the south (Eastern Partnership Community Website, 28/02/2011). But, within the existing dynamics the ENP is lacking credibility and is still a placebo. In order to solve this problem, the EU must renew itself and bring the necessary arrangements within the policy to make it more efficient for the future of the Union because only after the full achievement of the ENP that the EU would be able to benefit fully from trade and investment and to resolve problems arising due to political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies and other issues.



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