A Question of Genocide
Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire

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In Tribute to One Who Built Bridges

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social woes of the empire during its waning decades affected all subjects, however, especially non-Muslim peoples in Anatolia; the state provided support to true Kurdish tribal leaders and resettled Balkan muhacirs, Muslim deportees from the Balkans, in the region.

There is no question that the two Balkan wars preceding World War I, and the imperialistic machinations of the Great Powers, including the use of the Armenian pleas for intervention to their benefit, pushed the CUP leadership in a more dictatorial, nationalist, and state-based direction, away from any concerns for social and economic reforms that might benefit the Armenian element.36

Inherent in the Armenian parties' position was a paradox. Reform being the "nonnegotiable" component of their programs, often at the expense of ideology, they were able to make compromises and reach out to the Young Turks. That same logic led them to ask for assistance from the Great Powers when the state was unwilling to deliver on such reforms, promised many times. Yet, the Great Powers were the same instruments that threatened the Ottoman state and the "survival of Turkey" as imagined by the leaders of the state. In brief, the problems collided but the solutions did not meet. The exchange between Khurshid Bey and Paramaz cited above constitutes a most telling testimony to two phenomena: the historical depth of the two histories ensconced in the current debates, as well as the missed opportunities.

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Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–1913

Fikret Adanı

The Balkan War of 1912/13 was a traumatic experience for late Ottoman society. The debacle entailed the loss of practically all of "European Turkey" and laid the groundwork for a CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) coup and the establishment of a single-party dictatorship under the tutelage of the military that was to last until the end of World War I.1 Ottomanism, which had aimed to transform a premodern empire comprising multiple religious denominations into a secular multiethnic state, was abandoned for all intents and purposes, to be replaced by a vindictive nationalism that aspired to a new mobilization along Turkish-Islamic lines.2 This ideological reorientation within Unionist circles was paralleled by an equally momentous shift in the attitude of the Armenian political leadership toward the Ottoman state. Already by 1911 the relations of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) with the CUP were no longer based on mutual trust.3 The failed attempts at forming a new electoral alliance in early 1912 deepened the rift further.4 Impressed by the Ottoman collapse in the Balkan War, the opinion among Armenians favored once again seeking Great Power intervention, as this seemed to promise a better chance of solving the Armenian Question.5 Once World War I broke out and the Ottoman Empire aligned itself with the Central Powers, a constellation emerged that hardly boded well for the future.6 The imminent participation in a war against a coalition of powers that seemed in the recent past to have consistently supported the Armenian national cause gave rise to strong doubts in the minds of the Unionist leaders as to the sincerity of the loyalty professed by the Ottoman Armenian community.7

In the following I depart from the view that Ottoman military considerations in the early phase of World War I affected the fate of various population
groups in Asia Minor in a significant way. As one author accurately observed, the “designation of the Armenians residing in the command-and-control zone of the IIIRD Army as a dangerous internal foe was the defining moment of the World War I Armenian genocide. It was the alpha and omega of the plea of ‘military necessity’ put forth by the High Command of the Turkish army.” Distrust pervaded the minds of Ottoman decision-makers. Their fear that Armenian citizens might betray the empire entailed not only detaching the Armenian recruits from the active units and putting them into special “labor battalions,” but also a countrywide campaign of disarming the cadres of a would-be Armenian militia. This chapter analyzes the conditions under which Armenians as non-Muslims came to serve in the Ottoman army in the first place. Second, it offers a description of how the non-Muslim recruits in the army were blamed for having caused the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–13. Finally, it shows how the outcome of that war created an ideological climate that proved conducive to ethnic homogenization policies in Asia Minor that foreshadowed the course of the events leading to mass persecution and massacre of Armenians in 1915 and thereafter.

Conventional wisdom sees the Ottoman armies marching against Christian Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as composed of warriors pledged to Islamic jihad. But research has shown that the importance formerly ascribed to religious zeal call for reconsideration. Apparently, the empire had had from early on a military tradition of Muslims and non-Muslims serving side by side. Not only the Christian sipahi, who belonged to the Ottoman military (askeri) in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but also the Christian martos from a more modest social background had been armed, either serving in border fortresses or policing the Balkan rural areas. The Catholic tribes of northern Albania boasted of their heroic deeds in the wars of the Porte against Christian powers as late as 1877–1878. In the fleet it was common practice to have Christian sailors serve with Muslims; the crews of Ottoman warships were traditionally recruited from Muslim as well as Christian populations of Asia Minor and the Aegean islands.

The situation changed, however, with the commencement of national liberation movements in the Balkans in the first half of the nineteenth century. Until then the Porte had been quite willing to arm local Christian peasants when it served the interests of public order, as was the case during the kircali disturbances in the 1790s or the first phase of the Serbian uprising in 1804–07. But the experience of the Greek Revolution (1821–1829), which was “above all a religious revolt” (M. S. Anderson), led to disillusionment in this regard. This explains why the polarization of society along religious divides gained ground, although Ottoman officials were bent on achieving civic equality irrespective of religious affiliation—something they believed was essential for military modernization and consequently the survival of the empire. Thus Mahmud II (1808–1839) understood perfectly well the need for universal conscription if the empire was to survive the challenge of ethnoreligious separatism. Even though the abolition of the Janissary Corps (the household troops of the sultan) in 1826 was followed by the establishment of a modern army under the designation “Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad” and the subsequent war against Russia was opened by a declaration of jihad, the emerging modern army was in no way purely Muslim: the new cavalry units of 1826 comprised not only Tatar and Turkish horsemen, but also Christian Cossacks including their chaplains in the payroll of the Ottoman state, and by 1832 Christian Armenians were being recruited to serve in the engineer corps.

The reform Edict of Gülhane (1839) officially ushered in the era of Christian-Muslim equality, thereby also implying equal military service for all. The years of the Crimean War (1853–1856) especially saw some successful attempts toward the recruitment of Christians for the Ottoman armed forces. As Roderic H. Davison has emphasized, however, it “soon became obvious that the Christians would rather continue to pay than serve,” while the Muslims “balked at giving the Christians equal opportunity for promotion to the officer corps.” And finally, the developments during the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 bore witness to the rather delusory character of the whole project: When the issue of military service for non-Muslims was discussed in the Ottoman parliament on June 2, 1877, it transpired that “the average Ottoman Christian was quite content not to have to endure the rigors of army life and risk the chance of death on a battlefield.” Given these conditions, carrying arms continued to be regarded as a Muslim privilege and the exclusion of the non-Muslim subjects of the sultan from recruitment a result of religious distrust.

During the long reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) the issue was shelved. But the period witnessed new developments that anticipated some major traits of future Turkish nationalism. It produced the first examples of an ethiisti interpretation of “national economy” that implied in the long run the elimination of non-Muslim intermediary groups, the so-called comprador bourgeoisie. Perhaps more significant in this context was the emergence of a new awareness of the strategic importance of certain regions as well as of the overall demographic realities of the empire. At the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, the sultan was surprised to learn that the approaches to his capital, the plain of Eastern Thrace and the Straits region, were populated by non-Muslim groups who likely sympathized with the enemy. Therefore, he demanded a new policy geared to changing the demographic situation in those areas. And from the 1880s onward, special
commissions toured Asia Minor in search of suitable areas for the settlement of Muslim refugees, but again with a view to changing the demographic structure of strategic localities.26

With the oppositional Young Turk movement gaining momentum since the 1890s, the question of equal rights and duties for all citizens found renewed urgency.27 The idea of general conscription, which was an important point in the CUP’s program of 1908, was not welcomed, however, in every quarter.28 As might be expected, opposition came mostly from the Greek-Orthodox clergy. The archbishop of Drama, for example, demanded that Christians only be expected to serve in the Ottoman Army after a preparatory phase of five years and even then only in separate units commanded by Christian officers. Furthermore, their flag should show a cross, since it was impossible for a Christian to go into battle “with the Crescent as his banner.”29 At this stage, the Porte had its own reasons for not insisting on general conscription, especially since the armed forces entertained serious doubts about the loyalty of some population groups, for example, the Greeks. The army general staff was prepared to grant the “privilege” of military service at first only to Armenians and Bulgarians and then only under the condition that they be ready to serve in religiously mixed units.30

The “counterrevolutionary” movement of spring 1909 gave the political organizations of the non-Muslim groups the first opportunity to demonstrate their goodwill toward the Young Turk regime. The CUP’s appeal to all political forces to participate in a revolutionary “Army of Action” (Hareket Ordusu), which would march on the capital in order to suppress the reactionary movement, received an enthusiastic response, especially from former guerrilla groups in Macedonia. Hundreds registered as volunteers, and with the exception of the adherents of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, who showed some sympathy for the counterrevolutionary movement, the representatives of the Macedonian Slavs cooperated closely with the CUP.31 Thus Mahmud Şevket Pasha’s motley forces, which appeared at the gates of Istanbul on April 23, 1909, included about 1,200 Macedonians under the leadership of Yane Sandanski. Dressed in Ottoman uniforms, they participated in the street fighting against regiments professing loyalty to Abdulhamid II.32 The presence of “Albanians and Bulgars of the wildest type,” who patrolled the streets of Constantinople, attracted the attention of many foreign observers.33 Already on May 16, 1909, the British military attaché could report that in anticipation of the passing of a law permitting the enrollment of non-Muslims in the Ottoman army 49 Greeks and 37 Armenians in Bandırma alone had volunteered, Mahmud Şevket Pasha himself, the new military chief in the Ottoman capital, being “strongly in favor of the enrollment of non-Mussulmans.”34

The crushing of the opposition secured for the CUP decisive influence in the government; as part of feverish legislative activity, preparations for a new law on the general mandatory conscription were sped up.35 However, the issue continued to be viewed, especially within the Greek community, as a step toward Turkification of the empire. It was Greek susceptibilities which provoked the British military attaché to make the following comments:

It is evident that the desire of the Greek clerical and educated party is to be a nation within a nation. The Greeks are to remain Greeks, are to speak Greek, associate only with Greeks, and be led by Greeks, when they would be prepared to serve in the Ottoman army, almost, one would say, as allies! Not a very reassuring prospect for the stability of the Ottoman Empire [. . .] The Armenian is much more capable of living in harmony with the Turks than is the Greek. Mixed regiments of Turks and Armenians will get along with a minimum of friction. They would, of course, require their priests and the recognition of certain fêtes and holidays. But they put forward no absurd demand for separate regiments as do the Greeks.36

Despite all protests by the Greeks, the law on general conscription was passed in July 1909, and a circular was sent to the vilayets in early August announcing that all men eligible for military service that year would draw lots and that no exemption tax would be exacted from the non-Muslims henceforth.37 Attaché reports from Constantinople indicated that the law was generally well received and that military authorities were making no difficulties “as to freedom in the exercise of religion or observances of fasts.”38 For example, Christians were allowed to perform their oath of loyalty on the Bible, the Jews on the Pentateuch, and the Muslims on the Koran respectively.39 The problem of exemptions also seemed, at least on paper, to have been resolved.40 Thus the dispatch of the first group of non-Muslim recruits from Salonika to the Ottoman capital in March 1910, altogether 1,600 men including 42 Jews, and the distribution of another group of over 2,000 Christian recruits among various units of the First Army Corps in Istanbul in April of the same year, were perceived as encouraging signs.41

Nevertheless, the new conscription law encountered innumerable difficulties in everyday life. Especially ominous was the tendency demonstrated by young Greeks of the Aegean islands to simply refuse to appear for their medical examination in the local recruiting offices. Many local leaders would plead that it was their commune’s vested right not to send their youth to the army. Some would openly threaten that official insistence on the conscription would compel many a young man to emigrate or to apply for Greek citizenship.42 Equally discouraging protests came from some Jewish communities. For example, the chief rabbi David Papo of Baghdad practically bragged about the fact that enlistment was unpopular among the local
population. Only about 1,000 persons out of his community of 50,000 were ready to serve under the colors. He himself entertained serious reservations as to the possibility of observing the kosher practices in the barracks. Moreover, he did not believe in the ideal of a Jewish-Muslim fraternization; on the contrary, he was convinced that the new liberty promised by the Young Turks was hardly going to translate into real equality.41

Neither did the neighboring Balkan countries, especially Greece and Serbia, view the new direction toward more equality among religions and races in the Ottoman Empire with any favor. When the Chimirottes, the inhabitants of a mountainous region in the Epirus, protested against conscription in early 1910, they received unequivocal support from Athens. The Greek government even tried to persuade Great Britain to intervene at the Porte on behalf of those Christian mountaineers, the minister for foreign affairs expressing “his gravest misgivings” in face of “the Turkish policy of disregarding ancient customs and privileges and attempting to enforce a dead uniformity throughout the Empire.”42 Even more remarkable were the views of Milovan Milovanović—the Serbian foreign minister in 1908-1912, the prime minister of Serbia in 1911-1912, and an architect of the Balkan Alliance of 1912—regarding the prospects of the Young Turk regime, expressed in early 1910 in an interview with the British ambassador in Vienna:

For him that “régime” is an eccentricity imported from Europe and grafted on the surface of the complicated Ottoman national life; it is not due to a reviving spirit which has sprung from the inner Turkish life and therefore has sunk no roots into the vital parts of the Turkish race. . . . Dr. Milovanovitch observed that there was only one source of vitality still left in the Ottoman dominions, and that lay in the old Turks who were held together by faith in their religion and who would never admit that the Christian races were on a level with themselves. The Young Turk ideal that all the races who live on Turkish soil can be welded together into one nation by a sense of patriotism is a dream.43

In the summer of the same year, the Serbian foreign minister was reported as having said that personally “he did not believe that the Young Turkish régime had any great vitality in itself. He thought it would fail because it was not a real Mahometan movement.”44

There were other internal as well as external factors that worked against a systematic implementation of the conscription law, or of any reform measure during this last phase of Ottoman rule. Secessionist aspirations put their mark on politics. The CUP-dominated government did not hesitate to implement authoritarian measures, suppressing civic liberties and even manipulating elections.45 Protracted uprisings in Albania and Yemen since 1910 further undermined any faith in the future of the multiethnic empire. Politically discredited and socially alienated from the masses, the CUP was totally deprived of its influence by the time the Italians invaded Ottoman Tripoli (Libya) in 1911.

From May 1911, when the last CUP member resigned from the cabinet, until Enver Bey’s coup in January 1913, the Unionists were not only marginalized politically but also persecuted by the police. On May 18, 1911, for example, their newspaper Tanin was banned. However, the cabinets of Said Pasha (September 30, 1911-July 16, 1912) and Ahmed Muhtar Pasha (July 22, 1912-October 29, 1912) had their hands full with attending to the most elementary business in order to keep the various parts of the dissolving empire together and could hardly contemplate implementing any significantly new policy, except perhaps that the rather pronounced centralism of their Unionist predecessors was now replaced by a more conciliatory approach to local demands for autonomy. For example, the new minister of foreign affairs in the cabinet of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, Gabriel Noraduni- hian Efendi, assured the German ambassador on July 27, 1912, that his government was determined to satisfy all Albanian wishes regarding autonomy in a very generous way and that the same would apply afterward to Macedonia and perhaps Arabia.46

Contemporary observers were unanimous in their opinion that the Porte was very much worried about a confrontation in the Balkans in the summer of 1912. Ironically, it was perhaps this readiness to grant autonomy to an Albania that would also have encompassed the Kosovo and parts of the Yarina vilayet that prompted the Balkan states to go into action.48 Already in March 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria had reached an agreement on their respective zones of influence in Ottoman Macedonia, and on July 2 of the same year these two Balkan states signed a military convention directed against the Ottoman Empire. By August, the Ottoman general staff was aware that Bulgaria and Serbia had started to reinforce their border units, but consciously waived the necessary countermeasures lest Bulgaria get irritated.49 On September 21, the cabinet in Istanbul held an extraordinary meeting to discuss urgent reports arriving from the envoy in Sofia who warned that the Balkan states were going to create a military fait accompli within the next few days. Yet, the Porte decided to remain calm, and no preparations were to be undertaken, as the German ambassador reported to Berlin.50

This astonishing immobility had to do with the desolate military situation of the empire.52 Major Tyrrell, the British military attaché in Istanbul, diagnosed the Ottoman plight two weeks before the beginning of hostilities in Thrace with remarkable precision: The Ottomans were finally compelled to issue orders for a general mobilization (October 1). All classes of reserves, including mustaflıfiz (men up to 45 years of age), in the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th Redif Inspections, in other words, in the whole empire except Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, were summoned to the colors. Since the regular,
that is, the nizam infantry in Europe was numerically weak, ten reserve (redif) divisions of the 2nd Class were assembling, “but these have had little training, are very short of officers, and their quality may be taken as poor.” In his opinion,

the Turkish position in Thrace, which would probably be the scene of the main operations, is [ . . . ] by no means an enviable one to be in when the country is on the brink of war [ . . . ] Abdullah Pasha, who will command the main army on this side, is very despondent. He told me that he sincerely hoped that war might yet be averted; that owing to the dismissal of so many men recently, and to the hopeless dislocation of the forces by the formation of the Smyrna and Dardanelles armies and by the expeditions to Albania, they were in an impossible situation; the battalions were mostly not more than 300 strong, and that it was impossible to mobilise or concentrate in time.11

Could the Ottoman High Command count on the loyalty of the non-Muslim recruits, who made up one-fourth of the whole mobilized army, in the approaching war with the Christian Balkan states?26 Aram Andonian, whose daily description of the course of the war appeared in an Istanbul paper during 1912–1913, maintained that it would be too much to expect the Greeks, the Bulgarians, and the Serbs to fight enthusiastically against their comatars and that, therefore, only the Armenians and the Jews would serve loyally.27 The Ottoman High Command agreed, but it had other worries as well. For example, the employees on the railroad lines in European Turkey were mostly of Bulgarian or Greek descent—would they not try to sabotage the Ottoman mobilization efforts?28 This question received no satisfactory answer throughout the war, especially since the railway in Thrace had deteriorated by October into an unserviceable state. The director of the operating company pointed out that defeated soldiers and especially officers in flight had forced their way to the trains at stations, demanding immediate departure under threat of arms. No wonder that the entire personnel had disappeared.29

The mobilization was from the outset a failure. No enthusiasm for the war could be discerned anywhere in the empire. A German officer, who happened to be in Syria in the fall of 1912, noted that Christian Arabs were being urged by their clergy and community elders not to enter the army. The overwhelming majority thus either bought themselves free or fled.30 Disturbing news also arrived from Ma‘mūratūd‘-Aziz viyáyet, where men of military age were fleeing to North America.31 In Cilicia, too, the military preparations made slow progress, as was reported to the German embassy. Whoever could, tried to evade the conscription. The local branch of the Deutsche Orientbank was approached by many for an advance of about 40 pounds, the exact amount needed to buy exemption from service. The port of Mersin was placed under police cordon with a view to hindering desertion. Yet many young men managed to escape to Cyprus by sailboat via the port of Silifke.32

Ottoman authorities took some precautionary measures against treason. Directors and teachers of the Bulgarian schools in the vilayet of Edirne were summarily arrested and deported to Istanbul, where they were detained in the Selimiye barracks. The Bulgarian exarch pleaded their innocence, reminding the authorities that while he was not against the punishment of traitors, these people as well as the detained priests and notables in Macedonia were loyal citizens, their wives and children left behind in a wretched and precarious situation.33 From an answer of the general staff to an inquiry of the Ministry of Interior regarding this question, it becomes clear that this group of “suspicious persons” (gubheli ephas) arrested in Edirne comprised 105 Bulgarians and one Muslim.34 But many others were also arrested and deported (to Diyarbakır, Sinop, and Kastamonu, among other places). Some Greeks, whose whereabouts were a mystery as late as May 1913, were detained one night while observing with flashlights in hand the passage of Ottoman artillery near Edirne. The Ministry of War answered an inquiry by the Ministry of Interior in this connection by pointing out that such arrests had been carried out under express orders from the Ministry of Interior and that the Ministry of War did not possess any information on the missing persons. On the other hand, it was quite possible that they belonged to that group of people arrested under political charges and then transferred to various localities in Asia Minor; in that case, it was utterly impossible to supply information about them.35

Some Bulgarians and Greeks deported to İzmit were later exchanged against Ottoman civil servants in Edirne, who were exposed to retaliation after the town had been occupied by the Bulgarian army (March 26, 1913) on account of their presumed role in the arrest of Bulgarians during the mobilization.36 Also interesting is the case of some peasants, 22 men and 18 women, all reapers (orakçı) in a farm near Büyük Çekmece, who had been detained, evidently on account of the proximity of their location to Çatalca, and then deported all the way to Sinop on the Black Sea. Even after peace had been concluded (July 10, 1913), nobody seemed to miss them. It was the mutasarrıf of Sinop who applied on September 29, 1913, for their return, arguing that since the war was over there was no serious reason to keep this people away from their homes, not forgetting to add that feeding them was a burden on the local treasury, each receiving five piastres per diem by way of public support.37

The hostilities along the Bulgarian-Ottoman border in Thrace began on October 22, 1912. As predicted by the experts, it was immediately clear that the Ottoman army was not prepared for this war. A German officer in Ottoman service, who had taken part in these frontline operations, put it:
Men, demoralized by bad weather, inadequate clothing, especially the miserable footwear, since days without rations, without officers who could do something. [...] I had already at the outset run out of ammunition on account of shooting erratically. Since no new ammunition was coming in, a battalion had started to retreat, dragging along the other, advancing columns as well. Nothing was lost yet, apparently the enemy had not noticed anything.65

Who was responsible for such panic? From the start, observers were preoccupied with this question. Colonel Tupshchoeski, who had participated in the battle near Vize in Thrace, described the situation of the Ottoman army in rather optimistic terms. In his opinion the regular troops were fighting well. The redifs were causing recurrent panic, and it was a great mistake of the Turks to have employed them in the front lines of the army anyway. He insinuated that the pro-Entente faction around Kamil Pasha in Istanbul, as well as the local Russians and Greeks, should be held responsible for the all-pervasive defeatism.67

The British military attaché, a keen observer, offered the following explanation: I now find that when the mobilization took place the men, who had already been under arms, including those who had just been dismissed from their nizam service (two classes), were for the most part unwilling to come out again, saying that it was now their neighbours turn, etc. The Government did not feel able to deal with this sort of thing. There was already enough discontent in the country on account of the continual calls to arms, as has been shown by various cases of insubordination and mutiny which had arisen among troops clamouring to be dismissed. The Constitution has taught even the Anatolian peasant to exact his legal rights, and he is no longer the passive instrument of orders given by superior authority that he was in the old days.68

What role did the non-Muslim recruits play in this debacle? Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, the minister of the navy and the son of the grand vezir, was the commander-in-chief on the right flank of the front to Thrace. Writing immediately after the war, he tried to counter the impression that the Ottoman army was demoralized primarily by the lack of patriotism of its non-Muslim soldiers. It was true that many Christians had changed sides already during the first encounters with the enemy. But what about the subsequent defeats? One could hardly attribute them to the “treason” of some Christian recruits, for already “in the second battle... there was no Christian soldier left in our ranks.”69 Obviously, this was not a statement conducive to the clarification of the question.

There were contemporaries who were more straightforward in their appraisals. The Austro-Hungarian consul Herzfeld, who experienced the siege of Edirne (Adrianople) from within the fortress, openly blamed Ottoman Christians, specifically the Bulgarians and Greeks, for having contributed to the catastrophic defeat: “As soldiers they often went over to the enemy, or they deserted; as peasants they destroyed railway tracks, blew up bridges and cut telegraph lines, as irregulars they served virtually as ersatz until the Bulgarian troops arrived.”70

Lt. Colonel Bernard Boucaubelle intimated that the non-Muslim recruits had exercised at best a negative influence on their Muslim comrades.71 According to Richard von Mach, a prolific journalist of the period, however, the Ottomans had resorted to most foolish means: Statements by prisoners indicated that Christians, even elderly men of over 40 who had never served before, had been goaded together in order to fill the ranks.72

The assessment by another prominent military journalist of the period reads like a virtual apologia for the army of Abdülhamid. It was true that the Hamidian army was not well trained in comparison with its counterparts in Europe, but it had preserved its religious unity; only Muslims were allowed to serve in it.73 Interviews that Leon Trotsky conducted as a war correspondent in Bulgaria support this remarkable impression. Trotsky concluded that the enlistment of Christians was bound to undermine the conviction that Islam was the only moral tie between the state and the armed forces, something that contributed to the demoralization of the simple-minded Muslim soldier.74 Especially ill-boding for the future was the report of yet another foreign observer who quoted a Turkish officer lying wounded in the Gülhane Hospital in Istanbul as having told him that “all the disasters had been caused by the Christians in the army and the Bulgarian Komitadjs within Turkish lines. He manifestly believed the statement, and a similar conviction, even more forcibly expressed, exists amongst the lower classes.”75

The prevailing opinion among the European observers of the theaters of war crystallized the conviction that the non-Muslim recruits, mostly Greeks and Bulgarians, had “made common cause with their co-nationals and thereby introduced the first germs of confusion into the Turkish lines.”76 Modern research has mostly neglected the question delineated above. Thus, Glen W. Swanson, in an otherwise interesting article, simply points out that “while most Muslims accepted their military duties, non-Muslims and other formerly exempt citizens usually shrugged off their opportunity to be equal to the Muslim Anatolian peasant in military service.”77 In a more recent study we find again the claim that “the army could hardly rely on the numerous Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs residing within the empire to fight loyally against their co-nationals.”78 It is evidently in full conformity with this general trend, when the author of a publication authorized by the Turkish general staff, while admitting that the causes of the Ottoman failure were manifold, nevertheless claims that one of them was surely the participation of Christian and Jewish recruits in the first battles.79
How did the Ottomans react in the wake of such a traumatic defeat? At the outset, there was a wave of official persecution and punishment of traitors. For example, a certain Nicholas and four of his comrades, who, although Ottoman subjects, had fought against the Ottoman troops during the Greek occupation of Lesbos, were condemned to death by the military tribunal of İzmir. Persons who had "molested" the Muslim population in the vilayets of Aydın, Edirne, and Çeşme-i Bahr-i Şefid (Aegean Islands) were arrested and condemned to heavy penalties by the military tribunals of İzmir and Adrianople. And there was an inquiry into the property of a certain Lefter Efendi, the former surgeon on board the Ottoman destroyer Yurhisar, who had deserted to Greece. But many reported cases of treason were to remain uninvestigated, since the next great war was just around the corner.

As indicated in the beginning, however, historically crucial was the fact that the Balkan War of 1912–13 marked the end of Ottomanism as a multicultural project. Muslim intellectuals in a now diminished empire tried to draw lessons from the catastrophe. The general tenor of their discussions was that the humiliation of the defeat meant simultaneously the chance for a "national rebirth," as expressed—at a time when the cannonade at Çatalca could be heard in Constantinople—by Köprülüزة Fuad, one of the distinguished personalities of the future Turkish republic.

The atmosphere of national humiliation enabled the CUP to return to power by a military coup in early 1913, establishing a virtual dictatorship. Under the new conditions, a more effective mobilization was feasible, the chief ideological proponents of which were Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) and Yusuf Akçura (1878–1935). An adherent of solidaristic corporatism à la Durkheim, Gökalp regarded free market economy and representative parliamentary democracy—fundamental goals of Young Ottoman liberalism since the 1860s—as anachronistic institutions, aspiring instead to a tripartite synthesis of cultural Turkism, ethical Islamism, and Durkheimian solidarism. This predicated a restructuring of the political system according to the principle of occupational representation and a "national economy" in the interest of (Muslim) small-producers, the latter goal being championed by Akçura, the founder of the journal Türk Yarısı, who had already written off multicultural Ottomanism as a viable policy in 1904 in favor of a Pan-Turkist ethnic nationalism. Of special interest in the context of this chapter is Akçura's Darwinist perception of society, which seemed to justify his characterization of "the native Jews, Greeks, and Armenians" in 1916 as "the agents and middlemen of European capitalism" and his belief that "if the Turks fail to produce among themselves a bourgeois class [. . .], the chances of survival of a Turkish society composed only of peasants and officials will be very slim."
Armenian problem by the Patriarchate, in the Treaty of San Stefano—"reforms in the Armenian provinces"—was diluted in the Treaty of Berlin, under the form of "reforms in the Eastern provinces" of the Ottoman Empire.

23. Libaridian, Modern Armenia, 73–85.

24. Kitur, Patmutian, 35.

25. Drosnak, no. 3, 1892.

26. Kristator Mikayelian, one of the three founders of the Dashnaktsutiun, and its leading figure, had proposed the idea in 1904 to the Third World Congress of the party, and had been assigned the task. He died in 1905 while testing the time bomb, in Bulgaria.


28. Libaridian, Modern Armenia, ch. 5.

29. Dzragir of the HSDP.

30. Drosnak, no. 4, 1893.


32. As reported in Kitur, Patmutian, 386–87.

33. Ibid., 387–388.

34. Inviting the intervention of the Great Powers was not a new strategy; Patriarch Nerses Varjadian first adopted it, with the support of some of his National Council, in anticipation of Russian victory in the 1877–78 war with the Ottoman Empire.

35. The value of the internationalization of the Armenian Question is still debated in Armenian political literature.

36. Much has been written, with justification, regarding the role of the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia, in the determination of positions regarding the "Armenian Question." Russian interference has often been pointed out as a possible cause for the rise of the Armenian revolutionary movement. Two points need to be made here. Russian interest in territorial expansion did play an indirect role in promoting the interest of Eastern Armenians in the fate of their brethren in the Ottoman Empire. But that does not diminish the significance of the social and economic factors in the rise of the movement. Second, Russian authorities were equally concerned about the revolutionary aspects of the Armenian movement. After all, Russia was an empire, too, opposed to popular and socialist movements.

CHAPTER 5


7. There is a substantial body of literature characterized by numerous controversies over the causes, the attendant circumstances, and the consequences of the Armenian deportations of 1915/16. Some recent contributions are Donald Blashow, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005); Tanner Akçam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). It is not the purpose of this chapter to enter that discussion. However, one point must be emphasized: There is an (understandable) tendency to focus on the short period of 1914–1916, which is virtually the “zero-hour” of modern Armenian history, whereas developments that preceded that decisive moment are rather neglected.


19. For an analysis of discussions over the issue of universal conscription in the 1830s and 1840s, see Heine Zellmer, Heiliger Kampf oder Landesverteidigung, 279–301.


29. Lieutenant-Colonel Bonham to Lowther, Drama, Sept. 9, 1908, No. 77, enclosure in Lowther to Grey, Therapia, Sept. 16, 1908, No. 577, Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/559/32616.

30. Professor Mortiz, director of the Khedivial Library in Cairo, reporting on his talks in Istanbul with "his old friend" and the present Chief of the General Staff of the Ottoman Army Izzet Pasha, 22 October 1908, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (PPAA), Türeli 142, Bd. 27, A. 18825.

31. The British consul-general in Salonica remarked: "The Macedono-Bulgarian leaders express great satisfaction at the realization of their desire to see their compatriots at last wearing the Ottoman uniform and shouldering their rifles in the ranks of the Ottoman army." Lamb to Lowther, Salonica, Apr. 24, 1909, No. 52, PRO, FO 371/772/18457. On Greek reservations toward the Young Turks, see Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914," in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, 1:405–18 (New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1982).


33. Lowther to Grey, Pera, Apr. 28, 1909, No. 303, PRO, FO 371/771/16537.


36. Colonel Surtees to Lowther, Constantiople, June 20, 1909, No. 73, PRO, FO 371/776/23991.


39. For the text of the Ottoman soldiers’ oath of loyalty, see Günsöy, Osmanlı gayrimişliklерinin askerî serüveni, 187–88.

40. Although the law prescribed military service for all male subjects, the well-to-do, Muslim or non-Muslim, could arrange for their regiment to the reserve after having performed six months’ service by paying the considerable sum of 50 Ottoman gold pounds. See H. Bowen, “Bedel,” Encyclopedia of Islam, new ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960), 1:855. Under these conditions, the majority of the recruits continued to come from lower classes. Cf. Friedrich Immanuel, Der Balkankrieg 1912 (Berlin: Mittler, 1913), 55.

42. See Gülsoy, Osmanlı gayrimüslimlerinin askerlik serüveniri, 141–48.

43. German Consulate Baghdad, Oct. 11, 1909, No. 64, PAAA, Türkiye 142/28/18171.

44. Elliott to Grey, Athens, May 12, 1910, No. 73, PRO, FO 371/1009/17734.


51. Wangenheim’s Cipher Tel. of Sept. 22, 1912, No. 297, PAAA Türkiye 203/1/16334.

52. For a severe critic of the Ottoman government for remaining inactive during this decisive period and for trusting the Great Powers who had promised to protect the Ottoman territorial integrity, see Aram Andonian, Balkan Harbi Tarihi [The History of the Balkan War], trans. from Armenian by Zaven Bilzerian (Istanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1975), 196ff.


54. See Gülsoy, Osmanlı gayrimüslimlerinin askerlik serüveniri, 162. Immune names 40,000 as the number of the non-Muslim recruits in the Ottomans army, see Der Balkankrieg, 60ff.

55. See Andonian, Balkan Harbi tarihi, 224.

56. 25 Şevval 1330 (Oct. 7, 1912), BOA, DH-SYS 112-7/A/7-4.


58. Hans Rohde, Meine Erlebnisse im Balkankrieg und kleine Skizzen aus dem türkischen Soldatenleben (Charlottenburg: Baumann, 1913), 7.

59. 1 Zulkade 1330 (Oct. 12, 1912), BOA, DH-SYS 112-1/1-2.


63. 4 Cemaziyetahir 1331 (May 10, 1913), BOA, DH-SYS 112-13/16-9.

64. May 18, 1913, BOA, DH-SYS 112-13/16-9.

65. Mutesarriflik of Sinop to the Ministry of Interior, Cipher Tel., 12 Eyül 1329 (Sept. 25, 1913), BOA, DH-SYS 112-13/16-6.


67. Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, Nov. 4, 1912, No. 486, Cipher Tel., PAAA Türkiye 203/7/19365.

68. Tyrrell to Lowther, Constantinople, Nov. 9, 1912, No. 88, PRO, FO 371/1506/48795.

69. Mahmoud Muhtar Pascha, Meine Führung im Balkankriege 1912 (Berlin: Mittler, 1913), 164.


73. Colin Ross, Im Balkankrieg (München: Mörkès, 1913), 112.


78. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913, 18.


80. Apr. 16, 1913, DH-SYS 112-22/51.


82. Sept. 26, 1913, DH-SYS 112-78/7-53.

83. Y. Hikmet Bayur, Türk inşaatı tarihi, 2:17ff. For a persuasive analysis of Ottoman expectations and frustrations during this period, see Eyal Ginio, “Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream,” War in History 12 (2005): 156–77.


91. In the coastal districts, some of which had a predominantly Greek population before 1914, practically no Greek was left by 1917. See Engin Berber, Sancı yıldar: İzmir 1918–1922. Mütareke ve Yunan içları döndemi Izmir Sancıları [The Peaceful Years: Izmir 1918–1922; The Sanjak of Izmir during the Armistice and the Greek Occupation] (Ankara: Ayrıca Yayın, 1997), 57–72; F. Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi, 225–48.


CHAPTER 6


The edition Dr. Reşid Bey’in Hâtları; “Sürgünden İnîhara,” by A. Mehmetefendioglu (Istanbul: Arba, 1993), contrary to Bilgi’s edition, only gives the censored versions