EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
AND TURKEY
FROM A RATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIST OUTLOOK

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ABSTRACT

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Since the starting of accession talks in 3 October 2005, Turkey’s bid to the European Union has been a long contested debate. This thesis analyzes the European Union’s CFSP and Turkey’s relations with the EU from a rational institutionalist perspective. What is known as the European Union today has come a long way from being merely trade club to an economic and political entity on its own right. Within this respect, the research question in this thesis demonstrates that, the European Union started out with an administrative body to manage the common market on steel and coal, and in less than a half-century turned out to be a complex network of institutions where member states transferred some of their competences to this supranational level. In the EU’s urge to form a more robust common foreign and security policy, a possible inclusion of Turkey in the EU will bring strategic benefits as well as possible costs linked with it. In other words, the Turkish accession to the EU will bring substantial material benefits to European security and this acts as a factor influencing member state preferences, and to a certain extent the public’s view towards Turkey.
ÖZET

RASYONEL KURUMSALCI BİR BAKİŞ AÇISINDAN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ORTAK DIŞ VE GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASI VE TÜRKİYE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
Outline of the Thesis and the Research Question....................................................... 1

Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework: Rational-Institutionalist Analysis of European Integration
Introduction.................................................................................................................. 3
1.1. Neofunctionalism................................................................................................... 4
1.2. Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Rational State Behavior, Two-Level Game Model and International Bargaining................................................................. 5
1.3. Why Pool or Delegate Sovereignty?: The Institutional Choice......................... 11
1.4. How Does the Theoretical Framework Fit into the Thesis?............................... 12
1.5. Concluding Remarks.......................................................................................... 14

Chapter 2: Evolution of Security Dimension in the European Union...................... 15
2.1. From EDS to EPC.............................................................................................. 16
2.2. Common Foreign and Security Policy............................................................... 18
2.3. Concluding Remarks......................................................................................... 29

Chapter 3: National Preferences and Public Opinion in the EU Member States on Common Foreign and Security Policy 30
3.1. National Preferences of Member States on CFSP and ESDP......................... 30
3.1.1. The United Kingdom...................................................................................... 32
3.1.2. France............................................................................................................ 33
3.1.3. Germany........................................................................................................ 34
3.1.4. Austria.......................................................................................................... 36
3.1.5. The Netherlands............................................................................................ 37
3.1.6. Spain............................................................................................................. 37
3.1.7. Poland........................................................................................................... 38
3.3. Concluding Remarks....................................................................................... 46

Chapter 4: Turkey’s Role in Common European Security and Defense Policy...... 47
4.1. A Brief History of Turkey and European Relations........................................ 47
4.2. The EU’s CESDP and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era............................... 50
4.3. Turkey’s Prospective Contributions and Costs to CESDP........................... 55
4.3.1. Turkey’s Geostrategic Importance and Military Strength in the Post-Cold War Era ................................................................. 55
4.3.2. Turkey as a Credible Partner in Enhancing the European Union’s Soft Power ........................................................................... 59
4.4. Turkey’s Membership in European Eyes ......................................................... 60
4.5. Analyses of EU Member States (France, the United Kingdom, Austria) on Turkey’s Accession to the EU ................................................................. 64
  4.5.1. France ............................................................................................. 64
  4.5.2. The United Kingdom ........................................................................ 68
  4.5.3. Austria ............................................................................................. 69
4.6. State Preferences and Public Opinion: Converge or Diverge? ..................... 71
4.7. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................. 73
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 74
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... 76
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 1. The Liberal Intergovernmentalist Framework of Analysis.......................19
Table 3.1. Public Support for a CFSP and Further Enlargement...............................50
Table 3.2. Selected EU Member States’ Public Support on CFSP, ESDP, Further Enlargement and Turkish Membership.................................................................53
Table 4.1. Turkey’s Potential Contributions and Costs to European Security............68
Table 4.2. Support for Turkish membership once it has complied with all the conditions fixed by the European Union...............................................................71
INTRODUCTION

Security has always been a decisive element in world politics that led the states to form alliances against what they constituted as threats to their national security. In this respect, the EU’s CFSP or second pillar is fundamental for the reason that such a formation constitutes the peak of integration among the territorially divided Member States. Frequently debated in Turkey, possible inclusion of Turkey is analyzed giving insight to the country’s further contributions to the EU and its CFSP from a rational institutionalist perspective.

Theoretically, the principle motive for further integration in the EU is the convergence of member states’ national preferences that are formulated through a cost/benefit analysis of material interests. In this sense, heads of national states and governments in member states are central to the European decision-making and further integration. For instance, Gaullist era of French foreign policy throughout the 1960s was evident to dramatic changes such as ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ in European integration under the nationalist French president Charles de Gaulles.

Within this context, it is crucial to understand Europe’s foreign policy aspects and its evolution in order to analyze Turkey’s potential contributions to this specific policy area. In the next section, the outline of the thesis and the research question will be helpful to identify the key arguments of the thesis.

Outline of the Thesis and the Research Question

In the first chapter Andrew Moravcsik’s works on rational institutionalism will be cited and much appreciated, but it should be noted that the prior focus will be on Moravcsik’s analysis on preference formation in the domestic level and this will be discussed in detail later. In accordance with the rational institutionalist logic explained in the first chapter, secondly the evolution of Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy will be analyzed focusing on the influence of the ‘big three’—the United Kingdom, France and Germany—in the course of security and defense integration. In doing so, emphasis will be on the major intergovernmental bargains and statements from national chiefs of governments and foreign ministers of the member states in the process of European integration.

Thirdly, the member states’ national preference formation and public opinion on foreign and security policy will be scrutinized. White Papers, strategy documents, statements and speeches from heads of states and governments and foreign ministers will provide useful tools in explaining determinants of security and defense integration.
Furthermore, public opinion analysis on foreign and security policy and defense component will be given based on the empirical data from Eurobarometer 69 report in 2008. In this sense, seven member states—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland are selected as case studies. The UK, France and Germany are chosen because they are the three strongest states in the Union. The Netherlands is in the middle, Spain is chosen due to its closeness to Euro-Med and its role in the Barcelona Process. Lastly, as one of the new member states Poland is chosen as a case study.

In the fourth chapter, initially a brief history on Europe-Turkey relations in Turkey’s bid to the EU and Turkey’s role in Europe’s foreign and security policy and defense integration in the post-Cold War era will be mentioned. Subsequently, Turkey’s possible material costs and likely contributions to the European Union’s common foreign and security policy will be analyzed in accordance with the logic that convergence of material interests plays an important role in further integration and enlargement. In this sense, Turkey, as a candidate country can contribute to Europe’s security and defense component with its military strength and geo-strategic position. Furthermore, possible Turkish accession will enhance the Union’s credibility as an institutional power among its neighbors improving its success in enlargement policy.

Since the starting of accession talks in 3 October 2005, Turkey’s bid to the European Union has been a long contested debate. The ‘stop and go’ character of the negotiation process resembles a tough bargaining nature and in this context, Turkish membership in European eyes constitutes another determinant factor in explaining Turkish accession to the EU. Thus, public support for Turkish accession among EU member citizens is scrutinized with the empirical data from Eurobarometer 69 report. Consequently, intensive analyses of selected member states—France, the United Kingdom and Austria—on Turkey’s accession to the European Union will be given, again within the rational institutionalist logic.

These analyses aim to answer the question whether there is a correlation between these member states’ preferences on foreign and security policy and defense and their general attitudes towards Turkish accession to the EU. It is argued that member states which value foreign policy and security more will have stronger support to Turkish accession due to Turkey’s possible contributions to the EU. On the other hand, a neutral country such as Austria, and a Europeanist state such as France oppose Turkish membership. To this end, the research question requires a thorough research on
national preference formation and public opinion of these selected member states and
cost-benefit analysis of prospective membership of Turkey to the EU.

Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework: Rational-Institutionalist Analysis of
European Integration

Introduction
Since its inception, there have been many theoretical efforts to theorize the
European integration process and as they have emerged from political science and
international relations theories. Especially in the early years of the process, the debate
was largely dominated by neofunctionalists and later on by intergovernmentalists after
1966. It can be argued that the European integration process is characterized by the
ongoing debates on supranationalist vs. intergovernmentalist logic. Neofunctionalism
emphasized the integration process by which power is gradually transferred to
institutions as integration in some areas makes it more necessary therefore making it
self-sustaining. Supranationalists stress the role of international officials who initiate,
mediate and mobilize societal groups around international agreements. The
Commission, The Court and Parliament empower supranational political entrepreneurs.
For example, there were notable technocrats who became influential in European
integration such as Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors.

On the other hand, intergovernmentalists emphasized more on the crucial role of
national governments in pursuing such further integration. For them, interstate
bargaining outcomes are shaped by nation-states and relative power among states is
shaped above all by asymmetrical interdependence, which dictates the relative value of
agreement to different governments.

This chapter aims to focus on rational institutionalism, also known as liberal
intergovernmentalism as a theoretical framework of the thesis. Firstly, Andrew
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism will be thoroughly examined with its three
aspects of national preference formation, intergovernmental theory of bargaining and
credible commitments. Last part of this chapter examines the appropriateness of rational
institutionalism to be the theoretical framework of the thesis. Before proceeding with
the logic of liberal intergovernmentalism, it is useful to utter on basic principles of
neofunctionalism in order to understand why liberal intergovernmentalism emerged as a
response or a counter-theory to this ‘grand theory’.
1.1. Neofunctionalism

The central argument of neofunctionalism is basically European integration started with limited economic cooperation spilled over to other policy areas in time achieving to forming a common foreign policy and security with a complete transfer of competences and national sovereignties to the supranational level. Supranationalism, as developed by Ernst Haas, Joseph Nye and Leon Lindberg described European integration as a process. Haas, for instance, defined political integration as a “process “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.” In other words, political actors would be willing to transfer their loyalties to the supranational institution as an end result of positive effects of integration.

As evident in the works of David Mitrany, a universal approach to European integration posits that the route to peace passes through creating an order where war is materially impossible. In this sense, as Mitrany argues, transferring sovereignty and political authority from national to supranational authorities, namely ‘High institutions’ such as Postal Union, Customs Union, air trafficking, food distribution etc., where the decision-making process is left to technocratic and bureaucratic elite. Thus, with a state like an artichoke where individuals tied to one another in a territory is united with function and giving up layers of competence to other separate authorities, the end point in the future would be a world community.

Neofunctionalism is frequently identified with the ‘it-word’ ‘spillover’. Lindberg described spillover as “…a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth.” In other words, once states begin to cooperate, starting from the lowest layer and slowly to the inside. Thus, success in one area of integration would create the incentive to a second area. Emergence of new areas of common interests pushes the spillover further.

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2 Ben Rosamond, “The Uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: revisiting the neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas, Journal of European Public Policy. 12:2 (April 2005), pg.244
In addition to this ‘functional’ theory, neofunctionalists argued that increasing transfer of authority from national to supranational levels in time may lead into the foundation of a central federal state. However, after later developments in European integration, neofunctionalists decided that the ‘invisible hand’ of integration, spillover, was neither automatic, nor inevitable but depended also on national and political authorities as well as the Community, the Parliament and the Court of Justice. Despite functionalists could not provide a political theory to win over the political elite, neofunctionalists admitted the need for political authority in further integration. The role and importance of politicians were discussed in future theories of integration, such as intergovernmentalism. To this end, we now move on to the logic and necessity of intergovernmentalism as an opposing theory to neofunctionalism.

1.2. Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Rational State Behavior, Two-Level Game Model and International Bargaining

The intergovernmental approach to European integration defends that integration only moves forward when member states have common perceived interests that the potential gains of integration are greater than the costs of lost sovereignty. For instance, in the mid-1960s, a turning point for European integration came with the adoption of “Luxembourg Compromise”; French government under Charles de Gaulle put a de facto national veto on legislation of the decisions because it was not in its interest to allow the strengthening of the European Commission or the increased use of majority voting. The stance of European integration has received a serious blow with this Luxembourg Compromise.

Due to the failure of supranationalism in 1960s, intergovernmentalism, which was firstly seen in Stanley Hoffmann’s work (1966), emerged as a challenging theory to neofunctionalism. Hoffmann’s state-centric approach basically argued that states were not created solely to meet certain functions and were not easy to replace. Therefore, contrary to the neofunctionalist claim, nation-states were obstinate, rather than obsolete. Moreover, Hoffmann criticized the Monnet method of integration where he demonstrated that further integration can be achieved only if it “[h]ad sufficient potency to promise an excess of gains over losses… Theoretically, this may be true of economic

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integration. It is not true of political integration (in the sense of ‘high politics’). In this context; Hoffmann illustrated the short-comings of neofunctionalism and opened the road for Moravcsik.

In explaining European integration Moravcsik’s starting point is the rational state behavior that provides a general framework for the analysis which argues that the cost and benefits of economic interdependence are the primary determinants of national preferences, while the relative intensity of national preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions and the opportunity for issue linkages provide the basis for an intergovernmental analysis of the solution of distributional conflicts. Moravcsik’s liberal theory of national preference formation is drawn from Robert Putnam’s two-level games and the idea constitutes a metaphor for the relationship between the domestic politics and international relations of a state. Putnam conceives many of international negotiations as outcomes of a two-level game. In Level I, the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests while pressuring the government to adopt policies that best suit their interests. Politicians on the other hand, seek power through forming coalitions among these interest groups. In Level II, the international level, national governments work toward maximizing their performance to cope with domestic pressures while aiming to minimize the costs in the bargaining process. Therefore, national governments seek to achieve the best possible outcome through tough bargaining in order to minimize the likely costs of negotiations while satisfying the demands of domestic interest groups.

One of the earlier examines of the course of European integration and policy-making is of Simon Bulmer’s. He proclaims that the European Community policy-making should be examined in the same way as domestic politics in which political parties, interest groups, parliaments are involved. In this sense, Bulmer argues that national governments are central to the EC policy-making and further integration

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4 Stanley Hoffmann (1966), “Obstinate or Obsolete: the Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe” Daedalus, 95(2), pp. 862-915
6 Ben Rosamond, Theories of Integration, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, p.136
between member states is related to their national preferences where a mutual interdependence exists among them. It should be noted that international monetary stability, oil supply and pricing matters are outside the control of the individual EC member states or interest.9

At this point, it is plausible to state that in order to explain European integration, Moravcsik, in crafting his analysis, put forward a two-level game that is composed of national preference formation drawn from the liberal theories of IR and an intergovernmentalist analysis of strategic bargaining between states that is shaped by preferences of the member states and material interests such as security or economy.

Before jumping on to the two-level games, it is necessary to mention the essence of geopolitical explanations for national preferences concerning economic cooperation lies in the linkage between economic policies and underlying politic and military goals. It is also logical to add that foreign economic policy is driven by indirect consequences for national security, namely ‘security externalities’ which argues that economic integration is not an end in itself but a means to manipulate “high politics”.10 Whether the goals of high politics or geopolitical goals are such as military defense against any threat to territorial integrity or when these threats endanger national identity.

Under these circumstances, the core element is always the same: governments are more likely to cooperate economically with those states with which they are “allied” in pursuit of a particular geopolitical goal.11 This way of thinking is consistent with the notion that the international system is an anarchic and potentially dangerous place, therefore threats to security and sovereignty remain at the top of a hierarchy of state motives even when negotiating on economic interests. On the other hand, Moravcsik’s theory is liberal because deals with individuals in which material interests and bargaining between multiple interest groups constitute as the key elements.

The first stage theorizes the demand for further European integration and its outcomes. ‘The demand side’ includes national preference formation that is shaped by national chiefs of government’s (COGs) domestic and national interests. Moravcsik draws attention to the fact that foreign policies of states are largely determined by the

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9 Ibid. Pg. 351
11 Ibid. p.27
changes in their domestic policies that are pursued through political institutions in the international system. He states that,

“National interests are, therefore, neither invariant nor unimportant, but emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions form and new policy alternatives are recognized by governments. An understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis of the strategic interaction among states.”

Below Figure 1.1 illustrates the liberal intergovernmentalist approach to how the preference formation and international bargaining works. It is assumed that the national preferences of a government are shaped by three factors: the magnitude of benefits to be gained from cooperation; the certainty of costs and benefits; and the relative influence (differential mobilization) of producer groups on policy formation (sharp or blunt). These factors determine the range of policy preferences as well as how flexible government can be in the negotiations.

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12 Moravcsik (1993), pg. 481
13 Moravcsik, (1993), The figure is retrieved from pg. 482
In the second stage that constitutes ‘the supply side’, once the interests are formulated, national governments of each Member State bring their preferences into the bargaining table in Brussels and negotiate their way in to agreements which reflect their relative power. Also, in general, national governments have little flexibility in making concessions beyond their own objective interests, driving EC agreements toward ‘the lowest common denominator’.\(^\text{15}\)

However, it is in the interest of the government to compromise rather than vetoing an agreement.\(^\text{16}\) In this process, as Moravcsik argues, supranational organizations such as the European Commission have less influence. Therefore, discretion to make concessions does not come from the actions of supranational leaders, but from the extent to which governments have autonomy from domestic interest groups.\(^\text{17}\) Moreover, Moravcsik argues that the outcome of international negotiations may depend on the strategy of statesman chooses to influence his own and his counterpart’s domestic policies. This image of the executive is often illustrated as

\(^{15}\) Ibid
\(^{16}\) Moravcsik (1993), p. 501
\(^{17}\) Moravcsik (1993), p. 491
“Janus-faced” because he/she is forced to balance international and domestic concerns in a process of “double-edged” diplomacy.\textsuperscript{18}

It should be noted that at the core of Moravcsik’s argument is the significance of state rationality that is shared with realism of International Relations, but it is distinct in a way that rational state behavior and national preferences are domestically generated, not emerged from fixed preferences that is driven with security concerns in the international system.

In Moravcsik’s point of view, intergovernmental theory suggests that the demand for cooperation imposes a binding constraint on negotiations and efficiency is relatively unproblematic since governments are able to act as their own political entrepreneurs. Negotiators focus on distribution of benefits that are shaped by relative power of the state understood in terms of asymmetrical interdependence.\textsuperscript{19}

Moravcsik depicts international bargaining environment in the EU as a situation in which states volunteer in a non-coercive manner since the crucial decisions are taken by unanimity rather than qualified majority voting.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, national governments are provided with further information by the EC about technicalities of the EU policy-making, therefore making them aware of the preferences and constraints of other states. Lastly, the transaction costs of the bargaining process in the EU are low due to the longevity of negotiations and possibility of trade-offs and sub-bargains.\textsuperscript{21}

To exemplify his assumption, Moravcsik argues that major intergovernmental bargains such as the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty were not achieved by supranational entrepreneurs or unintended spillovers, but rather by the convergence of preferences among the powerful Member States and through tough bargaining among themselves.\textsuperscript{22} After the international bargaining process reluctant smaller Member States had to content themselves with side-payments from larger states.

For Moravcsik, institutions do matter in a way that they provide information to Member States and reduce transaction costs without any necessity to transfer the authority from nation-states to a ‘new center’ as the neofunctionalists claimed. Instead,

\textsuperscript{19} Moravcsik (1998), p.52
\textsuperscript{20} Rosamond (2000), pg. 137-38
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. Pg. 138
this led the national chiefs of governments to enjoy their seats and gain a certain privilege in Brussels negotiating table. As Moravcsik puts it:

“The primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office… this requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose views are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and practices of political representation. Through this process emerges the set of national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations.”

1.3. Why Pool or Delegate Sovereignty? : The Institutional Choice

Moravcsik, in his outstanding book The Choice for Europe, elaborates on his original model of liberal intergovernmentalism, while at the same time bringing it closer to the rational-choice institutionalism by adding a solid theory of institutional choice as a third step in the model. To explain international cooperation, he sets up a ‘rationalist framework’—rather than a theory or a model—“to designate a set of assumptions that permit us to disaggregate a phenomenon we seek to explain – in this case, successive rounds of international negotiations – into elements each of which can be treated separately. More focused theories—each of course consistent with the assumptions of the overall rationalist framework—are employed to explain each element. The elements are then aggregated to create a multi-causal explanation of a large complex outcome such as a major multilateral agreement.”

Within this rationalist framework, Moravcsik deploys three theories in the case of European integration. First two are, as mentioned earlier, national preference formation and intergovernmental bargaining whereas the third one is an additional level of institutional choice in which Moravcsik tries to find an answer to the question why the member-states choose to pool or delegate sovereignty to supranational institutions.

Moravcsik’s answers evolve around three reasons to why governments might pool and delegate sovereignty. Firstly, the commitment to the ideology of European federalism supported especially by Germany and Benelux countries. Second is the need to centralize economic planning and here the role of technocratic information is negligible. Thirdly, Moravcsik favors the explanation that governments pursue to constrain and control one another to enhance the credibility of commitments.

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24 Pollack (2001), pg. 232
26 Pollack (2001) pg. 233
International institutions are viewed as devices to manipulate information in order to promote compliance with common rules. For instance, De Gaulle’s France was the least committed to supranational institutions and imposed them on federalist governments. Therefore, governments are “likely to accept pooling and delegation as a means to assure that other governments will accept agreed legislation and enforcement to signal their own credibility, or to lock in future decisions against domestic opposition”.\(^27\)

As a final point to explain better pooling and delegating sovereignty, Moravcsik highlights the uncertainty of the future and the need to solve the problem of ‘incomplete contracting’ that arises when Member State share a broad goal but find it too costly or impossible to specify all the technicalities of the legislation of those goals. Therefore, governments seek efficient ways and means to commit to various smaller decisions that will be beneficial for each of them in the long-run.\(^28\)

### 1.4. How Does the Theoretical Framework Fit into the Thesis?

In this thesis, liberal intergovernmentalism or rational institutionalism is the central theory to analyze the adoption of common policies such as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or the emergence of European Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) for the reason that they all occurred as a result of convergence of interests between the member states in the European Union. In other words, in the last 50 years or so, further integration in foreign and security architecture in the EU was an outcome of convergence of material interests of the member states. Common Foreign and Security Policy was created as an intergovernmental pillar with the Treaty on European Union (TEU) following the intergovernmental Maastricht Summit of 1991.

According to intergovernmental logic, the final outcome of bargaining process—such as the Single European Act (1986) or Maastricht Treaty (1992)—to deepen integration among member states is determined by individual preferences, distribution of power and negotiating capabilities of member states. Moravcsik states that “[f]rom the signing of the Treaty of Rome to the making of Maastricht, the EC has developed through a serious of celebrated intergovernmental bargains, each of which set the agenda for an intervening period of consolidation. The most fundamental task facing a theoretical account of European integration is to explain these bargains.”\(^29\)

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\(^{27}\) Moravcsik (1998), pg.8-9

\(^{28}\) Ibid. Pg. 73

\(^{29}\) Moravcsik (1993), pg. 473
For instance, the outcome of both negotiation and ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty was a tough bargain among the member states which formed their national preferences according to their interdependence on one another. Likewise, actualization of Common European Security and Defense Policy was after ‘Atlanticist’ Britain’s ‘green light’ to an independent European security and defense framework in St. Malo Declaration in 1998. Such developments in the European Union’s common policies or security and defense component prove the idea that national preferences and domestic politics of member states do play a crucial role in interstate negotiations.

It is necessary to clarify that in this thesis the main focus will be on Moravcsik’s analysis on the domestic level, or ‘Level I’ where national preferences are shaped by public pressures. In this respect, national preferences and public opinion of selected 7 member states will be emphasized accordingly. It should be noted that an analysis of bargaining and negotiation between states of CFSP and Turkish membership is outside the scope of this research.
1.5. Concluding Remarks

Over the last two decades, both International Relations and the European Union studies witnessed the ongoing debate between the neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists. In this chapter, the main focus has been to explain all aspects and some versions of intergovernmentalism (which emphasized on national interests and bargaining in further integration) initially providing information on neofunctionalism, as opposed to intergovernmentalism, which is the theoretical framework of my analysis.

With the aim of explaining European integration, remarkable views and works of Andrew Moravcsik have much been appreciated and cited throughout this chapter. Due to the necessity in placing a theoretical framework for this thesis, the core elements and focal points of rational institutionalism; rational state behavior, national preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining and credible commitments have been thoroughly emphasized and elaborated.

Rational institutionalism is central to this thesis because it stresses the importance and influence of domestic politics in national preference formation and proclaims that the outcomes of intergovernmental bargains are affected by the nature of the relation between these two elements. In this context, rational institutionalism is a useful theoretical approach to explain Turkish accession to the European Union and Turkey’s likely contributions and possible costs to the EU’s foreign and security policy and defense architecture.
Chapter 2: Evolution of Security Dimension in the European Union

This chapter is essential for providing a useful framework for assessing Turkey’s potential contribution to the Common European Security and Defense Policy. In this respect, national state preferences of selective seven member states will be examined in accordance with their emphasis on security, whether they are states which value security and European defense more, whether they are neutral or in the middle. Consequently, a correlation can be made between these member states’ preferences and stances on Turkey’s accession and their national preferences on whether they value security and European defense or not. It is useful to remind the reader that it is argued that Turkey can as well be a part of European Union for the reason that the EU is a complex network where fundamental decisions are taken unanimously by the national leaders and governments of the Member States and the convergence of material interests of Member States plays the leading role in this process.

Since the convergence of material interests played and likely will play an important role in the history and in the future of security integration in the EU, the claim here is that Turkey can contribute the EU’s CFSP in numerous ways. Further detail will be given and more emphasis will be provided in the following chapters. In this chapter a brief summary of the evolution of CFSP/CESDP that started with baby-steps after the Second World War is provided. The main focus will be on post-Cold War era and the influence of the ‘Big Three’ namely The United Kingdom, France and Germany. A slight touch of information on NATO deserves mention here, for the reason that CFSP and ESDI have roots and links to this organization. Then, the chapter proceeds to the analysis of emergence of CFSP and the need to have a common security and defense policy due to systemic changes in the world especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. To cut short, the first part of this chapter dwells upon the evolution of CFSP/CESDP within the previously examined rational institutionalist framework.

In the Cold War era, Western European security was pretty much provided under the NATO umbrella. The bipolar nature of the international system caused the countries to gather around two poles: the United States and the Soviet Union. As for Europe, the most important security threat in the Continent, in the Cold War years, was a reborn Germany. Fearing the threat of a Soviet expansionism in Central and Eastern Europe, West European countries urged the negotiations for a mutual military treaty. Formerly isolationist USA found itself forced to make a strong, lasting and significant commitment to Western European security in the form of North Atlantic Treaty in April
1949. NATO, under Article V provides for the collective self-defense of all of its members by declaring that an attack on any one of them will be construed as an attack on them all. Within this framework, NATO shaped the Western security system during the Cold War, providing collective protection to its members against the Soviet bloc. Therefore, it is plausible to say that Western security was largely dominated and protected by the US during the Cold War. What this meant is that the Europeans were relatively uninvolved in security matters.

2.1. From EDS to EPC

In the 1950s, West Europeans were concerned about an issue other than the Soviet threat, which was a rearmed Germany. In France’s opposition to a rearmed Germany, allied powers of Western Europe suggested a creation of European Defense Community (EDC) to control and safely reintegrate West Germany to the West European security. However, the Pleven Plan (1950), as it was known, aimed to abolish all independent armies to a common army, was rejected by its own French national assembly in 1954 although West Germany approved the proposed Pleven Plan. As a result, the first attempt to establish a European collective security has failed and showed that integration in foreign and security policy was the hardest to achieve. To this end, European security and defense arena was largely dominated by NATO for the next forty years.

With lessons learned from the EDC’s failure, Britain put forth an idea on integrating Germany to the West European security system. In the 1954 Paris Conference, Britain suggested to expand 1948 Brussels Treaty by including Italy and Germany and together establish a Western European Union (WEU) for a “European-only” type of security action. Its main aim was to integrate Germany into the West European security framework and later when Germany became a NATO member in 1955, the WEU’s task was accomplished and the WEU became useless under the dominance of NATO. In other words, with the US leadership in NATO, the WEU had no reason to play an independent role; therefore NATO was the principal mechanism of security and defense in Europe.

In the 1960s, the further attempts to integrate security and defense were of de Gaulle’s. French President de Gaulle introduced the so-called ‘Fouchet Plan’ proposing the establishment of a political community of the EC member states dominated by the

national governments instead of a supranational character. Fouchet Plan excluded Britain and it was rejected by Benelux countries especially for not feeling secure under a Franco-German axis by excluding Britain out of the picture. Also France’s proposition was against the supranational character of the integration process that started with 1957 Treaty of Rome. Therefore, security and defense integration in the Community level failed.

After the end of the Gaullist era throughout the late 1960s, Britain, Denmark and Ireland’s membership brought along a forward integration in CFSP. Member States launched EPC in the Hague Summit of 1969 to deepen European integration in case of future enlargement may weaken the EC politically since it would be widened.\(^{31}\) This led to the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process which was formalized in the Single European Act of 1987. The EPC not only provided coordination among the member states of the EC, but also offered the chance to allow arrangements and coordinate policies toward the Central and Eastern European states and the Soviet Union, that would protect their national preferences. As stated in the Luxembourg Report of 1970 and the Copenhagen Report of 1973 put forth four levels of political cooperation among the member states through meetings of the heads of state and government, meetings of foreign ministers, the Political Committee and working groups.\(^{32}\)

The emergence of EPC gave the European integration an intergovernmental character since the meetings were organized and implemented by heads of governments and states.\(^{33}\) However, EPC was tested in terms of its ability to act internationally and found inadequate in sudden crises such as the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in December 1979. Furthermore, EPC emphasized more on foreign policy whereas security and defense which were handled by NATO were left out.

At this point it is plausible to mention the “abandonment-entrapment dilemma”\(^{34}\) of the European leaders. European countries felt insecure for the reason that their voices were not heard due to the current US-USSR bipolarity in the international arena.

\(^{31}\) Dinan Desmond, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 1999, pg. 510
\(^{32}\) Ibid. 511
\(^{34}\) Aybet, pg. 133
especially in issues concerning nuclear arms control negotiations. (The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) Within this context, the WEU was rejuvenated in 1984 under the Rome Declaration attempting to create a permanent, independent and comprehensive ‘European defense identity’ in the NATO framework. So, the WEU was reinitiated by the French and brought back to life as some kind of a European pillar of NATO which constituted as a European forum for affairs concerning security and defense matters. The WEU was enlarged in 1990 with the accession of Spain and Portugal.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the European security and defense faced a major turning point and triggered the development of a new dimension in the EU/EC’s security and defense. The systemic changes that came with the downfall of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the ‘iron curtain’ in Central and Eastern Europe caused NATO’s raison d’etre to be questioned that was providing collective security to the Western Europe. Especially France claimed that NATO would fade away and limit its scope of collective defense function under Article V. It was agreed that European security needed a new dimension that should evolve independently from USA.

2.2. Common Foreign and Security Policy

An intergovernmental summit in Maastricht of 1991 and the following Treaty of the European Union in 1992 constituted a new measure in European foreign and security policy and defense. The treaty introduced two new pillars to the Community: Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. The CFSP although it was initially seeded with the foundation of EPC throughout the 1970s, it intended to generate and support common positions to establish systematic cooperation on a day-by-day basis between the member states through unanimity. Furthermore, the CFSP moved from policy-making to policy implementation with the introducing of ‘joint action’ which allowed member states to act together in concrete ways based on a Council decision.  

What is important here is that CFSP occupied an intergovernmental pillar in the EU where European Court of Justice had no jurisdiction over CFSP and the European Community had no exclusive right to submit proposals to the work of CFSP. Moreover,

35 Dinan (1999), pg. 513
Maastricht advocated that the cooperation in security should not only relate to economic aspects but to all aspects of foreign policy. However, CFSP drew a line between the role of the CFSP and the WEU by distinguishing the foreign security policy and direct military action that is in line with NATO framework. In the Treaty, CFSP “shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework”\(^{36}\). Also, in the Treaty it was indicated that CFSP was open to future developments by stating “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense,”\(^{37}\)

That future development came with the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 that defined the role and organizational structure of the WEU. The so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ involved humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis-management and peacemaking which would be first type of operations led by the WEU. The task step was taken by the WEU, not NATO and this constituted an important step in organizational development of European security and defense.

At this point, a small pause is necessary because despite all the talks, the outbreak of Gulf crisis in 1990 raised the argument that a common European foreign policy with a defense component was the hardest to achieve due to a great divergence of opinion among the member states on the worthwhile ness of using force in Iraq. For instance, Britain supported the US whereas France took a unilateral diplomatic stance on the crisis. Spain on the other hand, had a strong support for military action in the area and Germany had a constitutional ban on sending troops outside NATO’s defined areas of action and finally Ireland was concerned about the limits of its neutrality.

It is also worth mentioning the importance of Atlanticist/Europeanist divide where the ‘Atlanticists’ such as Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal are solid NATO supporters which are reluctant to take any initiatives that may weaken the Atlantic Alliance. On the other side, the ‘Europeanists’ dominated by France, seeks a stronger European pillar and with the end of the Cold War, Europeanists argued that the EU should develop an independent defense arm because the United States would quickly


\(^{37}\) Maastrich, Title V, Article J.4-1
reduce its military involvement thereby weakening the collective security in the Continent.38

Coupled with a marked divergence of opinions among the member states, the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995 showed the EU’s inability to be active in sudden international crises. Bosnian War demonstrated the military weakness of the EU and its dependence on USA especially in sea and air lift, communications, satellite intelligence and power projection. As a counter-argument, one can argue that a common foreign policy in the EU was not created for solving the international problems; on the contrary it was created in order to prevent international problems from disrupting the EU and to a lesser extent, to make sure that a common European voice was heard in international affairs.39

On the other hand, this does not change the fact that the threat of wars such as in the former Yugoslavia could spill over into Western Europe.40 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that there had been more outbreaks of violence on the European continent than on the Asian continent in 1993.41 Moreover, the European Union will sooner or later involve in international issues in the broader Middle East.

In short, the WEU needed NATO assets. In this respect, in 1992 the Petersberg Declaration was extended with the addition of the ‘Document on Associate Membership’ that offered non-EU members of the NATO, including Turkey, Iceland and Norway, to be associate members of the WEU. These associate members would participate in the meetings but could not vote on the decisions. In the same year, a new ‘observer’ status was developed for the EU members who were neutral and did not participate in NATO. In 1994, with the ‘Kirchberg Declaration’ a final group of ‘associate partners’ was created which were neither EU nor NATO members such as Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia.42 Also, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became associate members in 1999 after they joined the EU.

38 Dinan (1999), pg. 515
41 Haydon, “War on the Rise in Europe, Down in Asia” Reuters, 16 June 1994
In the NATO summit of January 1994, European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was created by the unanimous approval of 16 member states. The main aim of ESDI was to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, the WEU, thus take more responsibility on security and defense affairs of Europe. ESDI introduced ‘Combined Joint Task Force’ (CJTF) that was developed for operations where NATO does not take action but lets the WEU use its assets. The CJTF framework included borrowing assets from NATO such as infrastructure, satellite intelligence, logistics and communications. Thus, a new venue of cooperation with NATO occurred and the WEU and NATO began to move together finding tools that would use resources in Europe effectively.

Developments and further integration in the EU’s CFSP came with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty negotiations. The Treaty of Amsterdam was an important step in modifying issues concerning CFSP and the ESDI which were absent in the existing treaties. Firstly, a new status of ‘constructive abstention’ was introduced and it meant that a member state may abstain from an operation by remaining out, while not vetoing others. In other words, this new status allowed the member states a third option aside from either an approval or a veto. Further, in the area of CFSP a ‘High Representative’ position was chosen under Article 26, to be created in order to give ‘a name and a face’ to European policy making. The High Representative aimed to manage the second pillar and provide continuity in the foreign policy. The Treaty also added a third tool to the existing ‘common positions’ and ‘joint action’ to CFSP which were adopted in the Maastricht Treaty; common strategies. This instrument allowed member states to take decisions on common strategies in areas where they have common interests. As stated above, these practical changes aimed to enhance the capabilities and effectiveness of CFSP.

On the other hand, the norms and rules that were brought by the Treaty of Amsterdam also had consequences for the development of a military muscle in the EU. Clearly, the Treaty stated that “The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide.” This meant a formal inclusion of Petersberg tasks into Article V of the EU Treaty. It is also important that the EU, for the

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43 Muftuler-Bac, pg. 10
first time was mentioned as a territorial entity whose integrity was under the protection of WEU. This may be considered as a step taken to a federal state.

In case of Petersberg tasks, Article 17 (3) of the Amsterdam Treaty states that: “[…] all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-making in the WEU.” Therefore, with the Treaty, the entire Petersberg tasks had been incorporated into new structures of the European Union.

Lastly, the Amsterdam Treaty sought to harmonize the presidencies of the EU and the WEU while the neutral states (Austria, Finland and Sweden) were respected with an exemption. This tool was a new step to solve the question of which member state would be in charge of the WEU. Further, the role of CFSP was deepened by giving power in decisions concerning defense. However in the Maastricht Treaty, foreign policy and defense were to be handled separately. In the Amsterdam Treaty it is stated that “the European Council shall define the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defense implications.”

This statement is an important connotation for merging the WEU to the EU’s second pillar.

In December 1998 St. Malo Declaration, Britain and France announced the need for a European army to deal with the Petersberg Tasks. The declaration stated that,

“The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage… This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defense policy in the framework of CFSP. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”

This marked a solid change in the traditional hesitation of Britain in creating an independent ESDI; on the contrary it paved the way for future developments in security policy of the EU. St. Malo Declaration can be demonstrated as a symbol for dramatic changes on the course of security integration in the European Union. As Howorth argues, the UK unblocked its 50-year old veto on discussing defense matters in the

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45 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.3.1.
46 St.Malo Declaration from website http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html
European institutions, EEC/EC/EU. Furthermore, France’s continuous attempts for an independent European defense and security framework since 1945 have been fruitful at last. Thus, the European Union would emerge as an autonomous security actor which would take decisions politically and implement them militarily.\textsuperscript{47} After Britain’s green light to further integration, in June 1999 the Council meeting stated that “the necessary means and capabilities necessary to assume its responsibilities regarding a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP).”\textsuperscript{48} Thus, a new impetus was given to the security integration and the European Union assumed the responsibilities the tasks of the WEU.

Another major turning point in development of a more autonomous European security framework was the NATO Summit in April 1999. In the Summit, NATO issued the so-called “Berlin-Plus Arrangements” that had been made for sharing NATO assets and intelligence, capabilities and command structures with the WEU. However, it was determined that the sharing of assets would be on a case-by-case basis through the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in order to preserve the rights and voices of the non-EU members in NATO, including Turkey, Iceland, Norway and Central and Eastern European states.

In December 1999, the European Council meeting in Helsinki marked a ‘Headline Goal’ to achieve the deployment of an army for EU-led missions in situations of international crises. It was agreed that, “cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersburg Tasks.”\textsuperscript{49} The so-called European ‘Rapid Reaction Forces’ (RRF) would be actualized with the achievement of this ‘Headline Goal’. This development should not be underestimated because the completion of the headline goal would finally result in a fully independent military muscle of the EU to be used in missions outside the NATO context. However, in Helsinki it was made clear that this further

\textsuperscript{48} Declaration of the European Council on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence, press release \textit{Brussels (03-06-1999)}, from website http://www.basicint.org/europe/ESDP/0699-PR_EUdefpol.htm
\textsuperscript{49} Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, II-28.
development did not aim to jeopardize the collaboration between the EU and the NATO.

The Council meeting in December 2000 in Nice introduced new bodies to coordinate CESDP: Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and European Union Military Staff (EUMS).\(^{50}\) PSC was in charge of all aspects of CFSP and CESDP especially those related to the EU response to international crises. EUMC was composed of the military representatives of member states named under the Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) and their tasks included giving advice to PSC and controlling EUMS. EUMS, on the other hand, was chosen from the military ranks of member states and this body was responsible for analyzing the global situation, planning the Petersburg Tasks and implementing the orders of EUMC. These united bodies of the CESDP helped to form a full-range of integrated multi-national military planning capabilities for Petersburg Tasks.

The fruits of further development in security integration were given when the EU launched its first military operation in March 2003 under the code name ‘Concordia’ to the mission in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fyROM) while making use of NATO assets as agreed in ‘Berlin-plus’. EUFOR Concordia was composed of 350 troops from thirteen EU countries and fourteen non-EU states. At first, the mission had a six-month mandate to oversee the political reforms and to monitor the security situation, but then the operation was succeeded by a police operation EUPOL.\(^{51}\)

Prior to Concordia it was agreed in 2002 in the Copenhagen European Council meeting that the EU was willing to take part in SFOR (Security Force) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and fyROM. As decided at the NATO Istanbul Summit at the end of June 2004, NATO handed over command of the former SFOR mission to the EU. Thus, the first robust and sizeable ESDP operation, ‘Althea’ with 7,000 troops started in December 2004 and was replaced with the outgoing NATO’s SFOR.\(^{52}\) As far as Turkey concerned, the Istanbul Summit of June 2004 let Turkey take part in the strategic partnership of EU and NATO. The operation EUFOR-ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina

\(^{50}\) Presidency Conclusions Nice European Council Meeting, 7,8,9 December 2000 from website http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/004000-r1.920ann.en0.htm


\(^{52}\) Ibid. Pg. 48
was supported also by Turkey and the operation has been contributing to the peace and security of this country.\(^{53}\)

The globalization of EU and NATO missions had a spreading effect on the continuity of EU-led missions, for instance, in June 2003 under the code name ‘Artemis’ the EU launched its first off continent operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in which France acted as the framework nation for the operation. Fully 1800 troops, most of them French, were sent to the north-eastern Congolese region of Ituri to stop fighting and atrocities, to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and of the humanitarian situations.\(^{54}\) The operations also aimed to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, and to protect the internally displaced persons. In short, EU-led operations, whether using NATO assets or not, had a humanitarian character and the missions, as identified under Petersberg tasks, were handled through ‘soft security’.

Despite all the attempts of West Europeans to develop an independent security and defense component outside the NATO forces, just as the during the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 divided the EU member states into two distinct poles and demonstrated the fragility of the CFSP.\(^{55}\) On the issue of sending troops to Iraq, the former Eastern bloc and soon-to-be members of the European Union backed up the United States as staunch NATO supporters whereas France and Germany criticized US foreign policy.

In reaction to France and Germany, US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld said that the United States could ignore “old Europe” because new Europe was on their side.\(^{56}\) Furthermore, France, Germany and Belgium vetoed Turkey’s invocation of NATO’s Article IV and requesting aid in case of an imminent attack from Iraq. The three declined Turkey’s request as a sign of their displeasure with US foreign policy.\(^{57}\)

It can be argued that relations between the United States and the European Union

\(^{53}\)IV. European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P) from website http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iv_-_european-security-and-defence-identity_policy-esdi_p_en.mfa

\(^{54}\) Hauser (2006), pg.53


\(^{56}\) Quoted in “Outrage at ‘Old Euope’ Remarks” BBC News, 23 January 2003 from website http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm

\(^{57}\) Anderson (2008), pg. 89
resembled a jigsaw puzzle during US invasion of Iraq and in this context; Europe needed a clarification on identifying the key threats to its own security.

In this respect, “The European Security Strategy” (ESS) approved in the Brussels Council meeting of December 2003 constitutes a milestone in filling the gap between CFSP and ESDP. The document was written by the High Representative Javier Solana and it aimed to identify the new security threats Europe faced today. As one EU minister said that “This is Europe’s answer to the Americans…. This is about how we combine all our ‘soft power’—the diplomatic, economic, trade and security instruments—and, at the very end, the threat of the use of force. That is some achievement for the Europeans to agree on.”

According to the ESS the key threats to the EU security were terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime which included drugs, arms and people trafficking. The article also states that ‘The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU make us more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.’

On the other hand, the document also underlined that these new challenges were not only to be handled by military means, on the contrary the Union must try to establish a balance between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures to enhance satisfactory solutions to the challenges that European security faced today. In the article it is stated that ‘none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means…The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multifaceted situations.’ Therefore, the ESS is an important development regarding the operationalization of foreign and security policy goals of the EU and also the ESS became a vital tool in creating a European security identity.

As Europe faced new security threats, this situation led the Europeans to find new tools such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in order to cope with the challenges that were mentioned in the Strategy Document. The ENP was first outlined in the Commission in March 2003 and it was built to stabilize European borders both in

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58 As quoted in Judy Dempsey’s article “Words of War” Financial Times, December 5, 2003
60 Solana, pg. 8
the East and the Mediterranean and its objectives included to bring economic and
security benefits to countries in the periphery of the EU without a membership
perspective. Thus, it meant that the EU relied upon its economic power to pursue its
interests concerning security issues. The Commission stated that “The ENP is a
differentiated policy, offering bilateral incentives and opportunities, in addition to the
multilateral nature of the Barcelona Process e.g. where Barcelona envisages trade
integration focusing on tariff issues, the ENP goes beyond to offer economic
integration, inclusion in networks.”61 Within this context, the ENP constitutes an
important tool for common foreign and security policy of the EU and providing stability
and security to Europe.

The European Union’s approach to use of military tools as a means to fulfill
humanitarian tasks such as peacekeeping, peacemaking etc. under ‘soft security’
objectives may raise the question of the ‘Capability-Expectations Gap’. As Anne
Deighton remarked, “The EU has neither the means nor the political will to create an
autonomous foreign policy with military capabilities.”62 Does the EU seem to lack the
means to follow through its ambitions? Referring to the military capabilities, the EU is
often resembled as a ‘flabby giant’ with no muscle and unable to do anything when
trouble comes upon it.63 More simply, many member states are reluctant to invest in the
military hardware needed to project the EU’s strength globally.

As Anderson argues, the ‘capability-expectations gap’ can be explained through
country-building and this gap exists because of the sensitivity of member states’
politicians to the people’s wishes.64 It is argued that, public support for the ESDP is
strong in particular but it is also extremely idealist: people want to see the European
Union with a common security and defense policy and want the EU to be a strong and
militarily capable superpower as the United States. However, the politicians also run the
risk of losing public support if they spend much money to military. In this respect,
Anderson suggests that by making capability contributions on a voluntary basis, the cost
of the force would be lesser.65

61 Muftuler-Bac, pg.12
62 Anne Deighton, The European Security and Defense Policy, JCMS, 2002, Volume
40, Number 4, pp-719-41
International, 17 June 2003
64 Anderson (2008), pg. 149
65 Ibid. Pg. 148
Furthermore, missions should be chosen on a case-by-case basis that all the member states approve. Thus, possible success of missions, though small or big, if they are chosen carefully, would increase people’s belief in the choice for Europe. 66 This demonstration can be related to Turkey’s contribution to the security architecture of the European Union because Turkey has a lot to offer in minimizing the ‘capability-expectations gap’ through its military strength. Moreover, selection of future missions on a case-by-case basis would suit Turkey’s national security interests. In this context, the next chapter examines the EU member states’ national preferences and public opinion in foreign and security policy and defense. It is essential to compare and contrast the national preference formation and the role of public support with the member states’ approach to Turkey’s accession.

66 Ibid. Pg.149
2.2. Concluding Remarks:

To sum up, it is necessary to point out to the fact that the major developments and further integration in foreign and security policy coincide with the systemic changes occurred in 1991, end of the Cold War, and in 2001, the 9/11. Member states signed treaties, published declarations or approved joint military actions, all with the general aim of either securing themselves from the potential security risks surrounding them or just to have a common voice in international affairs. Whatever the reasons may be, the consequence is the fifty-year process of European foreign and security policy with roadblocks and contributions caused by the internal and external dynamics of the member states. Within this context, the role of the member states preferences and internal dynamics cannot be undermined and now it is safe to move on to the national preferences of several chosen member states regarding the foreign and security policy.
Chapter 3. National Preferences and Public Opinion in the EU Member States on Common Foreign and Security Policy

3.1. National Preferences of Member States on CFSP and ESDP

The third chapter of the thesis examines the national preferences of 7 member states on foreign and security policy as well as their stances in the multilateral system. Elaboration of member states preferences is in line with the rationalist political theory because as mentioned earlier (see chapter 1) states are rational actors and their decisions on high politics issues such as foreign and security policy depend on the cost-benefit analysis of their national interests where each nation pursue their interests at a minimum cost. Within this context, a group of member states are chosen to take a close look at their national preferences by focusing on the government officials’ statements and the public opinion of these member states. As a resource for the public opinion in the EU, the 2008 report of Eurobarometer had been used in order to find out whether their public is supportive of the European common foreign and security policy.

When Henry Kissinger, in 1970s, raised an interesting question asking “If I want to call Europe, what phone number do I use?” This question drew attention to the complexity of having a single voice in foreign policy. Despite the difficulty of having one voice on foreign and security policy where each member state intends to speak on behalf of their constituencies, it should not be undermined that the European common foreign and security policy has come a long way since the end of the Second World War when the European states urged the need to protect themselves from external threats to their territorial integrity.

It is true that having a single voice in the EU is difficult to achieve but actually it is quite possible to create a common ground among the varying preferences of member states. About this issue, Caporaso argues that the main dilemma posed by CFSP has to do with states acting on the basis of national interest or acting to promote a common foreign policy and pursuit of one’s own goals would soon conflict with those of others and undermine the success of independent policymaking. On the other hand, he also states that member states may either dilute one’s objectives by blending them into common positions or pursue goals independently but at the cost of a common voice and effectiveness. The greater interdependence, the less the chance of successfully pursuing one’s own goals in isolation from others, and the more states will rely on multilateral
solutions. Thus, member states are more inclined to integrate further in foreign and security policy when they are interdependent to one another.

While the history of European foreign policy and security integration has witnessed a fitful of starts and stops, the EU has come a long way and began to form a solid framework of CESDP. Despite these developments, not all actors share the same views on security as their national interests. On the contrary, each member state has its own national security and defense preferences concerning CFSP. Currently, it is safe to say that Europe is a broad range of connected ideas or events where there are the ‘Atlanticists’, represented by the UK, the ‘Europeanists’, led by France and the other member states which are somewhere in between these two approaches. To clarify the concepts, the term ‘Atlanticist’ refers to those who support a US-led American-European coalition that would continue to dominate the world scene whereas the Europeanist describes those who wish to develop a more balanced world in which a unified Europe and an integrated European Union can play a more independent role in international affairs.

Now that the EU has now enlarged to 27 member states, the leading actors in European security and defense policy are limited with the big three: The United Kingdom, France and Germany. Therefore main focus will be on the national preferences of these member states and their contribution to the development of CESDP. Austria, as a constitutionally neutral actor also needs a close examination for its negative stance in Turkey’s membership whether it is related with Austria’s neutrality. The Netherlands, since located in midst of the major European powers and strongly in favor of an independent European security and defense identity is worthy of scrutinizing for its preference of multilateralism. Spain will be inspected for its closeness to EUROMED and its character of moving back and forth between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists due to the change of political parties and leaders. Lastly, Poland is selected for being a new member state and its political stance on the development of European common foreign and security policy will be questioned.

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3.1.1. The United Kingdom:

The United Kingdom joined the EU in 1973 due to its choice of staying out of the original European Economic Community and rather approaching to EFTA. Also the French opposition to British membership in the Gaullist era in 1960s played another role. Furthermore, geographically speaking, the UK is separated from the Continent by twenty miles and this geographic isolation contributed to a feeling of isolation from the Continent. However, in today’s technology twenty miles meant little in terms of transportation and communication, in fact, there was a lot of history of conflict, war and separation that created this isolation.

In this sense, the UK as a traditional ally of the United States is more inclined to the ‘Atlanticist’ line in matters concerning European foreign and security policy than the rest of the member states. The US and the UK engage in cooperation including intelligence sharing, joint procurement, military basing and nuclear weapons assistance and maintenance. Among the UK’s national concerns, including and maintaining the American support and existence in European security and defense serve an important role. As a result, the British are in more favor of NATO rather than ESDI. However, Franco-British St. Malo Declaration in 1998 showed that Britain and France could cooperate in building a stronger ESDI by the creation of Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF).

Specifically, the United Kingdom sought to keep strong ties with the US with its leading role in NATO that dominated the European security and defense. Therefore, Britain has generally preferred a weak ESDI that would not replace NATO’s power. British Ministry of Defense states “Multinational Defense Cooperation should be pursued when it…is compatible with, and does not threaten, our links with the US and NATO.”\(^\text{68}\) In the aspect of security and defense, Britain is a status quo power who benefits the most from the American dominance in European security. For Britain, the leading US role in European security would counterbalance any emergence of threats coming from Russia or Germany as major powers in the region.

On the other hand, Europe’s inability to act in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the approval of ESDI, Berlin-plus arrangement of 1994 and NATO summits in 1996 brought Britain closer to support an independent European security and defense framework. Also, the United States’ lack of substantial commitment to European security forced Britain to cooperate with France and Germany by playing the leading

role in developing Europe’s security and defense. The joint Anglo-French St. Malo
declaration in 1998 is an example to such a change in Britain’s national preference. In
St. Malo, Britain agreed to the creation of an independent ESDI within the EU and the
RRF to deal with Petersberg Tasks.

3.1.2. France:

Contrary to the United Kingdom, France has been the strongest supporter of
creation of an independent European security and defense initiative. France has
traditionally been in the Europeanist camp and favored multilateralism with the aim of
curbing out the United States’ hegemonic ambitions. The reasons behind France’s
strong support for a ‘European-only’ security and defense framework may be firstly to
lessen potential threat coming from Germans by bringing Germany more close to
European order and secondly to develop the EU in every aspect as a counter-balance to
the United States’ hegemony.

In the post-Cold War unipolar international system, France chose to prioritize
international law, multilateralism and strong international bodies such as the UN.
Former president Chirac stated “In an open world, no one can live in isolation, no one
can act alone in the name of all, and no one can accept the anarchy of a society without
rules. There is no alternative to United Nations…Multilateralism is the key.” Through
multilateralism France aims to tie the United States into international norms, rules and
procedures.

France’s strong support for an independent European security and defense
framework does not fully aim to replace NATO with ESDI at the moment. On the other
hand, some in Europe including Britain reckon that ultimately France will replace
NATO with an independent ESDI and erase the US out of the picture. Therefore, this
lack of trust between the two states resulted in divergence in defining the major terms of
the EU’s ESDP. As mentioned before, France and Britain stood side-by-side in St. Malo
Declaration in 1998, but this short period of convergence turned into divergence with
two nations’ differing preferences in Iraq War. On the Iraq War resolution at the UN in
March 2003, Chirac stated that “My position is that whatever the circumstances, France
will vote no because it considers there is no reason to go to war to achieve the objective
we have fixed, which is the disarmament of Iraq.” However, this resolution could not
stop Americans from going into war in Iraq.

Recently, French Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy unveiled a new security
strategy in 17th June 2008. In this new security strategy doctrine, Sarkozy revealed a
shift away from French ‘exceptionalism’ in the favor of a more independent European security and defense framework. In line with this ambition, the paper stresses the role of importance of the ‘headline goal’ that had been agreed in 2003 Helsinki Summit aiming deployment of 60,000 Rapid Reaction Forces to strengthen the EU’s role in missions outside the NATO framework.\(^6^9\)

Furthermore, Sarkozy saw the EU and NATO as complementary forces with one another, contrary to former PM Jacques Chirac. He depicted a ‘parallel progress’ in NATO and ESDI which would allow the EU to carry out missions outside the NATO framework. In the new security strategy paper Sarkozy said that “I want the Alliance to be more European, and how can we have a more European alliance without France?”\(^7^0\)

To round up, France’s national preference on security vision evolves around the supremacy of multilateralism and serving as a balancing power to American hegemony by improving the EU’s independent capability in security and defense. The French has always sought to develop Europe as a superpower where France takes the lead along with other European member states. The questions to be asked is, is the EU’s ESDP alone sufficient in EU-27 and what can be done in order to adapt to the realities of today? With inclusion of new Eastern member states some of whom have strong ties with the US and NATO, France should take into consideration of ways to adapt to realities of today’s EU.

### 3.1.3. Germany:

In the security and defense framework of the EU, Germany holds a unique place among the member states due to its former aggression in World War I and II when it was ruled by Hitler and the Nazi Party and consequently Germany’s involvement in the Holocaust resulted in both Germans and the other Europeans to take precautions for that never to happen again. To this end, after World War II, Germany was de-militarized constitutionally, German Basic Law of 1949 writes that: “Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relationships between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional.”\(^7^1\)

Besides from its threat of aggression, Germany is one of the world’s largest economies and the Continent’s great industrial powerhouse and might as well be a

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\(^7^0\) ibid

\(^7^1\) Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 26, 1. from website [http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm](http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm)
dominant power in Europe; however Germany is quite willing to bind itself to the West European dominance and prevent itself from ever becoming a regional threat again. Thus, among Germany’s national preferences two objectives stand out: Abstaining from the use of military force and having multilateralism as the key. Therefore, the element of continuity in Germany’s security policy lies in the continued emphasis on multilateralism.

Germany’s integration to the European community began with its inclusion to European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) in 1952. The Western Allies’ ambitioned to control (West) Germany, while simultaneously integrating it into the international community of democratic nations, and after a debated remilitarization Germany joined NATO in 1955. German unification in October 1990 did not change German leadership’s support for NATO, emphasizing its role as a defensive military alliance.

Unlike Britain and France, Germany never aimed to become a nuclear power and chose to remain under the American ‘nuclear umbrella’ to guarantee its security. On the other hand, in the post-Cold War, Germany began to take a more active role in international affairs with its economic power and showed commitment to institutions such as the UN by requesting a permanent seat in UN Security Council.

In 2002, Germany’s strategic military planning was revised to have an active role in international crisis management and join the ‘out-of-area’ missions of Petersberg Tasks where Germany participated to missions from SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina to ISAF in Afghanistan. The 2003 German defense policy aimed the deployment of German military forces to RRF to be used in Petersberg Tasks. All of these developments meant that Germany chose to go with reshaping its military in line with the EU objectives to deal with post-Cold War uncertainties.

In the European scale of security and defense, Germany falls some where in the middle of Britain and France with its commitment to developing a stronger and a more Europeanized NATO and improving an independent European military capability to work in cooperation with NATO.

In May 6th 2008, Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) published a paper calling for the creation of a national security council; and for fewer limits on the

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deployment of armed forces at home and abroad. As the Economist writes, German government suggests doing more on sending troops as multinational response to international crises without an approval from the parliament.\(^73\) The CDU draws attention to new threats such as terrorism and climate change that blurred the distinction between domestic and foreign security and the new Security Council would analyze these new threats and co-ordinate responses. However, Ms. Merkel promised that a new council will not be formed under the current parliament. Further, Guerot and Korski draws attention to the uselessness of a National Security Strategy while member states are interdependent; thus, any threats to Germany such as terrorism and climate change are also serious threats to its neighbors. Therefore, Germany should work together with its allies among the EU-27.\(^74\)

3.1.4. Austria:

Since its rebirth in 1955, Austria’s security policy based on neutrality although this has been revised in recent years. After the dissolution of Warsaw Pact in 1991, European neutrals started committing themselves in multinational military cooperation through NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and Austria’s accession to the EU on January 1, 1995, and to the NATO Partnership for Peace in May 1995, Austrian security and political situation has changed significantly and today it is directly linked with developments in the European Union and NATO.\(^75\)

In 2001 Security and Defense Doctrine, Austria’s international status was defined as ‘non-aligned’. Along with the lines of neutrality, Austrian chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel declared that “classical all-round neutrality must give way to common solidarity within the European family”\(^76\) This meant that Austria has been legally able to contribute to Petersberg Tasks in international crisis prevention and management in support of CFSP and ESDP. On the other hand, neutrality still enjoys high popularity among the Austrian population. According to various polls, two thirds


of majority of Austrian population still favors neutrality.\textsuperscript{77} In this respect, Austria therefore strongly supports the EU on the way of enhancing conflict prevention as an essential part of its external policy.

3.1.5. The Netherlands:

The Netherlands being a medium-sized European state centered among the ‘Big Three’, major European powers the UK, France and Germany. In this sense, the Netherlands favors multilateralism and the rule of law. Accordingly, the Netherlands was a strong supporter of European integration and was one of the members of the Original Six. Therefore, the Dutch automatically becomes a strong proponent in developing an independent European security and defense framework, but not in expense of NATO. The Dutch aim to enhance the influence of the EU in transatlantic cooperation in order to bring more balance to NATO.\textsuperscript{78} In line with the transatlantic cooperation, the Dutch participated in numerous multinational military operations including the joint UK/NL Amphibious Landing Force.

On the other hand, overspending money to defense is increasingly becoming a burden to the Dutch economy. In 2003 ‘mini-defense summit’ in Brussels, the Dutch foreign minister reacted to the decisions and declared that “he cannot imagine a world order built against the United States”\textsuperscript{79}. Therefore, the Dutch preferences on security and defense are to contribute to development of CFSP and ESDP while bringing them to equal level with NATO.

3.1.6. Spain:

After its long-time dictatorship under General Franco, Spain’s ‘returning to Europe’ occurred with his death in 1975 and Spain rejoined Western Europe in 1986 and to NATO in 1982. In general, Spain’s support to developing an independent ESDI differed according to the political parties in power. To admit, Spain is not one of the major European military powers, although it has the capacity of the EU’s fifth most military capable military. Before 1996, in general Spain had a Europeanist outlook to the security and defense framework evolving around Franco-German axis. However,

\textsuperscript{77} Hauser, pg.54
\textsuperscript{79} “Undermining NATO?,” \textit{The Economist}, May 1, 2003.
after the election of Jose Maria Aznar and his People’s Party in 1996, Spain’s national preferences on foreign policy witnessed a shift towards the Atlanticist approach. Aznar reoriented Spanish foreign and security policy in line with British, the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe and the United States. Under Aznar, Spain established a privileged relationship with the US while keeping a distance between the EU and integration, most interestingly provided support for the US in Iraq War.

In 2004, the victory of the Socialist Party under Luis Rodriguez Zapatero changed the whole situation into opposite direction. Zapatero saw this opportunity as a ‘return to Europe’ and embraced the Franco-German axis once again. Zapatero immediately withdrew Spanish forces from Iraq and re-fixed the Spanish foreign and security policy in the EU focus. Therefore, at the moment Spanish national interests are in convergence with the EU objectives and Spain continues to contribute to European security.

3.1.7. Poland:

In May 2002, Jack Straw announced the funeral of the Cold War following an agreement on cooperation between NATO and Russia.\textsuperscript{80} The agreement constituted one of the most concrete examples of the impact of 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA. In this context, countries like Poland, desperate for the security benefits of the NATO membership, could have found itself in an unintentional alliance with its most serious historical threat, Russia. Therefore, it is not surprising that Poland supported USA on the war in Iraq, in opposition to key NATO members and West European powers and Russia.

To this end, Poland’s foreign policy options can be framed in the following way: 1) to choose the American side as the rift within NATO deepened, 2) to support NATO as represented by France and Germany, 3) to be on the side that Russia was not—a consideration that should not be taken lightly, given Polish history.\textsuperscript{81} Moreover, Poland’s NATO membership signified a disappearance of the division in Europe and integration of Poland into European security architecture would help it to shed its ‘eastern’ status. Accordingly, Poland signed bilateral treaties in 1990s with its neighbors including Belarus and Ukraine. Further, Poland prioritized promoting the security interests of its eastern neighbors, Lithuania and Ukraine that had historic ties with it.

\textsuperscript{80} Taras Ray, Poland- Breaking Multiple Barriers in the book \textit{European Union Today,} pg. 464
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid. Pg. 465
When Russia became a strategic partner of NATO in 2002, Polish foreign minister Cimoszewicz declared “Keeping Russia at a distance from NATO makes no sense from either the perspective of security threats or the security of current NATO members. The world is changing and one would have to be blind and stupid not to realize that the decision is a sign of the new geopolitical realities”. 82 To this end, according to 2003 National Security Strategy of Poland, Polish security policy,

“gives emphasis to the need to strengthen international cooperation, as well as the role of international law and multilateral institutions. International institutions are presently adjusting their ways of action to new challenges. The adaptation of the North Atlantic Alliance to missions required for global stability, while sustaining its classical defense capabilities, is of particular significance to Poland's security. The international institutions' efficiency and ability to address new challenges will have a beneficial impact on our security.”83

This statement identifies the basic Polish interests in security and defense which gave emphasis on pro-NATO stance. Therefore, it can be derived that Poland can only contribute in developing an independent European security capability in terms of its strict Atlanticist and pro-NATO character.

3.2. Public Opinion Dimension: Support for a Common Foreign and Security Policy and Further Enlargement

What about public opinion, then? Do Europeans in general appreciate the need for a common European foreign policy? In other words, do Europeans accept that issues like security, defense and foreign policy are transferred from the national to the European level? Table 3.1, shown below lists the old 15 EU member states and the 12 new member states with respect to public support for a common foreign and security policy and further enlargement in the EU in 2008. Support for further enlargement is added to the table by the author for the necessity to analyze a possible correlation between the member states’ willingness to play an active role in world politics. Clearly, it may indicate that support for a common European foreign policy—and perhaps support for an active EU in world politics as well—correlates with respondents’ general attitudes towards the EU. This, in turn might arguably be seen as an outcome of actual experience with European integration.

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82 Ibid. Pg. 466
83 National Security Strategy of Republic of Poland, 2003
Concerning the support for a common foreign policy, a rather diverse picture seems to emerge, at first glance. The UK stands out the least supportive member state in the survey, with 49 per cent in favor for a common foreign policy and 56 per cent for a common defense and security. The Nordic countries—Sweden, Denmark, and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Common Foreign Policy</th>
<th>Common Security and Defense</th>
<th>Further Enlargement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 69 2008
Finland—score high on the Eurosceptical dimension as well. Still, a majority—68 per cent of the respondents in EU-27 are in fact in favor of a common foreign policy. Among the core EU countries-- France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries—the percentages in favor range between 63 and 82 per cent. (Table 3.1) It should also be noted that the average support for a common foreign policy has increased since 1999 (64%), although the share of critical respondents has increased somewhat. (From 14% to 17%)⁸⁴.

Also in the new EU member states, the majority of citizens (78%) are in favor of a common EU foreign policy. However, there are significant cross-national differences in Malta (55%), the Czech Republic (66%) and Romania (66%) compared to Slovakia (79%) and Slovenia (82%). Not surprisingly, the corresponding figure in Greek Cypriot citizens is 86%.

All in all, a majority of all respondents support the idea of a common EU foreign policy, in the old as well as in the new EU member states, but there are marked differences between the countries. We find that hesitation regarding a European foreign policy is most common in countries that are generally Eurosceptical—Finland, Denmark, Sweden and the UK who are found in non-continental Europe. Conversely, ‘pro-common-foreign-policy’ attitudes seem to be combined with a general pro-EU stance.

Can the same thing be said about the new EU member states? Arguably, yes. The most Eurosceptical countries among the new member states—Malta, Romania, Czech Republic and Estonia are found at the higher end of the ‘against-the-common-foreign-policy’ continuum in Table 2.1. All things considered, the outcome is not inconsistent with the notion that support for a Union speaking and acting as one in world affairs seems to be closely related to general support for the EU as such.

As for the support for a common defense and security policy (ESDP), one might think that it is the most sensitive part of CFSP for EU citizens since security and defense have traditionally been the core function of the nation-state. Thus, it is not surprising that the ESDP is a latecomer on the Union agenda. A short notice on the earlier mentioned process, security cooperation within the European integration process

⁸⁴ Eurobarometer 69 (September 2008) pg. 21 The full question reads: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.- A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, towards other countries - % EU
has been of secondary importance until fairly recently. The reason is that NATO has been the primary mechanism of military cooperation in Europe.

Thus, when looked at Table 2.1, the overall picture is clear: 79% of the European citizens support the notion of a common European defense and security policy. At first, this may seem surprising when compared to support for a common foreign policy (%68), but there are several rather evident explanations for it: owing to NATO and its convincing military capacity, military cooperation across the continent is seen as ‘normal’ and the role of the EU still appears significant. Therefore, it can be said that EU citizens are rather supportive of ESDP due to their consuetude to collective defense.

Specifically, once again, the UK (56%) has the lowest level of support among the EU member states. It should also be noted that the neutral countries are the least enthusiastic about a common defense and security: Ireland (61%), Austria (61%), Sweden (62%) and Finland (65%). Since these countries have a long tradition of neutrality/non-alignment, which clearly has made their citizens critical about giving away their independent military decision-making power.

On the other hand, in the generally Eurofriendly countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovakia, very few critical voices is found. Furthermore, despite being one of the most Eurofriendly countries within the Union today, only 60% of the Irish respondents are in favor of a common European defense policy.\(^85\) Also, fewer than 6 out of ten respondents in Portugal and Malta (59% and 58% respectively) are in favor of a CSDP, but the number of people who did not answer this question is high in these countries. (19% in Portugal and 26% in Malta, compared with a European average of 9%)\(^86\)

Based on the empirical data retrieved from the public opinion report, namely Eurobarometer 69, it is found that support for the idea of a common EU foreign policy correlates with respondents’ general attitudes towards the EU. Does this correlation also exist within respondents’ opinion on further enlargement? More specifically, is the


\(^86\) Eurobarometer 69 (September 2008) pg. 23 The full question reads: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.- A common defence and security policy among EU Member States
support for further enlargement toward the EU candidates determined by the respondents’ general support for CFSP/CESDP? To this end, it is also necessary to look at European citizens’ opinion for Turkey to become an EU member. In Table 3.2 shown below, the seven selected member states—the UK, France, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Spain and Poland—indicate the figures for public support for further enlargement in the EU.

Table 3.2: Selected EU member states’ public support on CFSP, ESDP, further enlargement and Turkish membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Member States</th>
<th>Common Foreign Policy</th>
<th>Common Security and Defense</th>
<th>Further Enlargement</th>
<th>YES to Turkey’s membership once it complies with all the conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 69 2008

In Table 3.2, the author summarized attitudes towards a CFSP and the further enlargement of the EU in the selected member states. The fourth column is based on the respondents’ attitudes towards Turkey’s membership once Turkey complies with all the conditions. However, before we turn to public opinion analysis, it is useful to guide through some information about enlargement in the EU.

As mentioned before, the breakdown of both communism and the Soviet Union changed the political map of Europe profoundly. In a bold move designed to bridge the gap between East and West, the EU responded by opening its doors to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Candidate countries were all deemed to meet the Copenhagen Criteria that is having democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of minorities, a functioning market economy and a basic readiness to adopt EU legislation.\(^87\)

\(^87\) Copenhagen Criteria from the website http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm
With the May 2004 enlargement—being the largest enlargement in the EU history—five decades of European integration process was one step close to live in a United Europe. On the other hand, enlargement also meant new problems to the agenda of the EU. Every new country joining the EU altered the borders of the EU and brought new problematic neighbors such as Croatia and Ukraine, some of whom had questionable democratic credentials. Relationships with neighboring countries remained one of the primary concerns of the member states about the candidate countries. In this respect, inclusion of Turkey will no matter what bring possible costs as well as some benefits. I will put more emphasis on this issue in the upcoming chapter. Instead, now it is plausible to review briefly European citizens’ views about further enlargement and membership of Turkey.

In general fewer than half of the Europeans are in favor of further enlargement in future years. (%47) Compared to 15 old European member states, the counties who had joined the EU in years 2004-2007 are more supportive of further enlargement. As seen in Table 2.2, Poland as a new member is one of the countries which favor the most, after the Netherlands, compared to the other 5 states shown in the table.

The least enthusiastic respondents in Table 3.2 are found in Austria (27%), France (31%) and Germany (33%). Here, overall Euroscepticism and Eurofriendliness may fall inadequate to explain the cross-national differences. In fact, Eurosceptics often hold positive attitudes towards enlargement. The reason is that Eurosceptics in Scandinavia may think that the enlargement of the Union will work as an obstacle to deepening of integration. On the contrary, the large share of negative respondents in Germany, Austria and France, could be interpreted as a wish to deepen integration within a more narrowly defined European Union. Another factor could be a matter of tradition and fear of losing influence within the Union.

On the other hand, there is one other dimension as well. Germany and Austria are bordering countries with the old ‘Eastern Europe’ and enlargement has been perceived by many as a potential threat to social welfare. This may pretty much explain why citizens in these countries where social welfare and its benefits matter the most, fear of losing their jobs as a result of immigrant flows from post-communist Europe and Turkey. Especially in the 15 old member states’ citizens feared that the enlarged EU would entail ‘the transfer of jobs to other member countries which have lower

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88 Eurobarometer 69 pg.25
production costs’. Possible threats to social welfare are just one dimension in this respect.

As seen, member states’ have divergent preferences on foreign policy, security and defense for different reasons. Member states also remain divided on the issue of Turkish accession in the EU. In this sense, the next chapter deals with Turkey’s potential role in EU’s CFSP and public support for Turkey’s accession to the EU.

3.3. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, the role of selected member states’ national preferences as well as the public opinion in the given states was analyzed. In accordance with this aim, national preferences and public support on CFSP and ESDP of the UK, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland were scrutinized carefully based on the empirical data from Eurobarometer survey 69 in 2008, statements from government officials and published security strategy papers.

Can a conclusion be derived from the 15 old member states’ views on new member states and further enlargement? Though not explicitly stated, the empirical data may indicate that Turkey as well as the Balkan countries and Orthodox Eastern Europe are not obvious members of the European Family in the eyes of West European citizens. However, facing the realities and changes in today’s Europe, a ‘European-only’ centered security and defense framework may not be sufficient all by itself. Instead, Europe must find alternative ways in multinational military cooperation, such as inclusion of Turkey into the European security architecture though it has potential costs along with potential benefits. Therefore, the main focus of the next chapter will be on explaining the contributions and stumble blocks in Turkish membership.
Chapter 4: Turkey’s Role in Common European Security and Defense Policy

This chapter aims to analyze Turkey’s potential role in European security and defense framework. It is argued that Turkey’s accession to the European Union will bring material interests to Europe’s security environment and since further integration in areas concerning ‘high politics’ such as Common Foreign Security and Defense, can only be pursued through convergence of material interests on a possible least common denominator where member states are heavily divergent on this specific matter. In this context, firstly a brief history on relations between Turkey and Europe from the Ottoman era to modern times will be examined with close emphasis on Turkey’s role in European security. After the end of Cold War, European security faced incremental changes and the meaning of collective security in the absence of a Soviet threat began to be questioned. Accordingly, Turkey’s geopolitical significance to European security was also criticized.

On the other hand, it is demonstrated that Turkey has consequential material benefits to European security, especially new security threats such as transnational terrorism, emerged after 9/11 and it requires a collective action from member states to deal with these new issues. In this context, Turkey’s prospective contributions to European security will be analyzed.

In the case of Turkish accession, European public’s view holds an important place for the reason that public opinion is a determinant factor in domestic politics of member states’ and their national preference formation. Last, but not least, the three selected member states’ (France, the UK and Austria) analyses on Turkey’s accession to the EU will be provided. In addition, it is questioned whether public opinion and state preferences towards Turkish inclusion are convergent or divergent to one another.

4.1. A Brief History of Turkey and European Relations

Turkey’s relations with Europe have a long and complex history since the Ottoman era, while Turkey played a crucial role in European security architecture as a balancing power among the Great Power alliances in the Continental Europe throughout the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. Starting with the Kemalist era in the early 1920s, Turkish aims and interests were directed towards the way of ‘joining the club’. These objectives were finally fulfilled when Turkey joined the Council of Europe in 1949 and North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952 and later became an associate member of the European Economic Community in 1963 with the Ankara Agreement.
Turkey has always pursued to locate itself in the western framework of political activity. To this end, Turkey has been partially successful in its attempts for the reason that Turkey’s joining to OECC (European Economic Cooperation) in 1948 and NATO in 1952 were seen as a continuation of Truman Doctrine adopted by the US that aimed to keep both Turkey and Greece in the western orbit against the Soviet threat and Warsaw Pact. Further, Turkey applied for EEC membership in the early 1960s, and it was seen as a political effort rather than economic or financial reasons with the aim of enhancing Turkey’s ‘westernization’ in the road of ‘Europeanization’.

In the Cold War years, the intergovernmental character of NATO membership, and the existence of a common enemy and the realization of Turkey’s strategic importance for European security interests enabled the Europeans to think Turkey as part of Europe’s ‘self’ rather than Europe’s ‘other’. However, making Turkey an integral part of west European security through NATO probably had more to do with the necessities of the Cold War conjuncture rather than identity politics.

On the other hand, one should not underestimate the contributions Turkey made in the Cold War years to European security by having the second largest military in NATO and the largest military in the European continent. Most importantly, Turkey’s geostrategic position safeguarded the Soviet Black Sea and the greater Mediterranean and prevented the Soviet Union from moving forward to the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, Turkey served as a robust southern flank to NATO throughout the Cold War years.

In addition, Turkey was asked by the US and the EU, to play the ‘big brother role’ and ‘role model’ in the Muslim world to constitute an example of a democratic Muslim country that played an active role and went on taking foreign policy measures toward stabilizing the Muslim-dominated former Soviet countries. This became an important avenue of foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. In this respect, the creation of Black Sea Cooperative Council and extension of diplomatic, economic and financial assistance to Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan show that Turkey has

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90 Adam Bronstone European Security into the Twenty-first Century, Ashgate, USA, 2000, pg. 188
taken this role seriously. Furthermore, the then Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stated that ‘it is in Europe’s interests to see that a modern, secular and democratic Turkey is seen as a role model for the ex-communist countries in the region.’ In the post-Cold War era, one can then claim that Turkey’s role for European security was enhanced, which was not quite as expected.

With the advent of post-Cold War era, Turkey’s place in Europe went through a significant transformation. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, Turkey’s bordering countries in the Balkans doubled and this caused new challenges and opportunities for Turkey. To this end, Turkey had to take a more active role in its foreign policy in the Balkans, Mediterranean and the Caucasus in line with the US and Western Europe interests.

As post-Cold War Europe faced new changes in its security framework, the idea of “Europeanness” was defined in terms of membership of the European Union and Turkey was left outside of the European project and integration. In the absence of the Soviet threat, Turkey’s significance as a security provider in Europe decreased when compared to its strategic role during the Cold War years. Accordingly, Turkey’s European identity and its place in the European system were harshly questioned. In the European security architecture, Turkey could not play a central role anymore, and was left in the periphery as a non-EU member state. Despite Turkey’s attempts to become an EU member, the member states were highly critical in this specific issue. Although there might be several economic, political, social and cultural reasons for such attitude, the main emphasis of this chapter is on the security-related and geopolitical ones.

Keeping this in mind, Turkey no longer had a significant role in post-Cold War security arena. Furthermore, Turkey was not an integral part of Europe; instead it was seen as a remnant of the Cold War Europe to be neither rejected nor embraced by the Europeans. Although Turkey was accepted as an official candidate for the EU in 1999 and its value as an ally in security matters has somewhat increased in post-9/11 era, Turkey’s candidacy was seen as a fruit of Turkish and American pressures reminding Turkey’s geostrategic importance in the region. It can be said that general discourse on both European and Turkish sides were pretty much along the lines of convergence or divergence of material interests and national preferences of member states in security-related issues. In this context, it is essential to emphasize and analyze the role of Turkey.

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93 Bronstone (2000), pg.194
94 Bronstone (2000) pg.188
in the development of Europe’s CFSP before moving on to the possible contributions of Turkey to this field.

4.2. The EU’s CESDP and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era

In the previous chapters, the evolution of common foreign and security policy of the European Union had been thoroughly analyzed giving emphasis on the importance of intergovernmental summits, statements from head of governments and states and especially the role of the most influential states—The United Kingdom, France and Germany—in development of the ESDP of the EU. With the advent of post-Cold War era, Europe’s understanding of collective security has changed accordingly with the transformation from a bipolar to a unipolar international system. With the Maastricht Summit, this later on has been known as the Treaty on European Union enabled the meaning of European to be associated with a membership necessity. Eastern bloc countries celebrated their ‘return to Europe’ with the 2004 expansion in the EU.

Turkey on the other hand, found itself isolated from the development of a European security and defense identity outside of NATO which took place in the post-Cold War era. With the merger of the WEU to the EU in Amsterdam Treaty, Turkey, as an associate member to the WEU and enjoyed some rights such as attending meetings, giving advices but Turkey was excluded in the decision-making process. Given its strategic proximity to regions such as the broader Middle East and the Mediterranean, Turkey has national interests in European security framework. However, as mentioned earlier, Turkey has no right to vote for decisions taken for issues which Turkey has converging interests. This does not mean that Turkey seeks to replace or dismiss NATO in expense of ESDI; on the contrary, Turkey seeks to contribute to a NATO-oriented development of ESDI which does not aim to compete with NATO. Further, NATO should be the main mechanism in the ESDI and the WEU should serve as a bridge between the ESDI and NATO.

Turkey supported the creation of ESDI in NATO in Berlin Summit in 1996 and has been an associate member of the WEU in 1995. Missirolı explains that Turkey had privileged access and generous participation rights in WEU activities, but those arrangements were not treaty-based and never went as far as to give the associate members shared political control.95 Turkey was already enjoying full rights in NATO and saw its associate membership in the WEU as a limited role that may change into a

more active one and have a voice in the decision-making process in the emerging European security and defense identity.

However, the proceeding developments in an independent ESDI deepened Turkey’s exclusion from security and defense integration in the EU. There was a great disagreement among the member states in developing an independent security and defense identity to be merged into the second pillar of the EU. The disputes to a greater extent settled when member states signed the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and later on Britain supported France in St. Malo Declaration in 1998 for an independent security and defense capability.

At this point, it is worth mentioning the significance of NATO’s Washington Summit Communiqué of April 24, 1999, which made an important contribution to Turkish interests. The Summit stresses the importance of “ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU.”96 The American influence led the EU member states to accept the proposition that NATO assets in the EU should be used on a case-by-case basis and through a vote from North Atlantic Council (NAC). Furthermore, the EU at the time could not decide on how to operationalize the decisions taken in St. Malo, so the USA’s proposal was agreed on instantly. The Washington Summit is essential to Turkey for securing its national and regional security interests in the emerging European security and defense framework and refrained Turkey from the negative impacts of being marginalized from the process to a further extent.

Nevertheless, in the Cologne and Helsinki Summit in 1999 following the Franco-British St. Malo agreement, European Security and Defense Initiative became a ‘policy’ and to be taken more seriously by the European leaders. It was stated in the ESDP that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”97 Together with this development, Turkey’s feeling of exclusion from both the EU project itself and the security and defense process has deepened to a greater extent. As Turkey saw it, being left out from the development of EDSP and its the decision-making

96 Washington Summit Communique, Art. 9-d retrieved from website http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm
97 European Defense and Security Policy retrieved from website http://www.basicint.org/europe/ESDP/0699-PR_EUdefpol.htm
process as a non-European NATO member was unfair to whom had been involved in the European security architecture throughout the Cold War era whereas neutral countries such as Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden had more eminent roles in the decision-making that came with the EU membership.

One should also not undermine the fact that the lack of political ability to have a voice in the decision-making process EU-led Petersberg Task operations might as well result in Turkey’s having less say on its own security. Petersberg Tasks executed in areas that are proximate to Turkey and contain Turkey’s security interests. For instance, any dispute concerning the Balkans, the Aegean Sea or Cyprus, Turkey could have no right to decide on the specific issue resulting in inability to defend its security interests in the specific area if Turkey had no voice in the decision-making.

Despite the given potential threat perceptions, Turkey accepted the decision on Turkey’s EU candidacy taken in Helsinki Summit of 1999 that coincides with the time when the EU was elaborating to deepen integration on security and defense and Turkey’s strategic value and potential contribution to the process was given emphasis by the Europeans. However, Turkey’s potential participation in the EU’s ESDP has been one of the most problematic issues in Turkish-EU relations. For Turkey, preserving of security in Europe should not only be an institutional mechanism; in fact it is indivisible and requires a concerted approach that should involve all of the important actors.\(^\text{98}\) Further, Turkey stresses that the ESDP attempt must not be limited by the institutional boundaries of the EU but rather has to be embracing all the interested actors in the European security environment who are willing to make a contribution.\(^\text{99}\)

After the Feira Summit of June 2000, Turkey stated that the decisions taken at the Feira Summit regarding the participation of non-EU European Allies to CESDP, including crisis-management were not satisfactory and Turkey's main objection was on the issue of the EU is trying to associate its relations with Turkey solely on the basis of crisis-management, not on decisions regarding the preservation of WEU acquis.\(^\text{100}\) As


\(^{99}\) Ibid. Pg. 90

\(^{100}\) See Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website http://mfa.gov.tr for the The Information Note on Turkish Views Regarding the Decision Adopted by the North
Turkey pushed for a compromise on use of NATO assets in EU-led operations should be decided on a case-by-case basis and voted in NAC—so that Turkey could have a right to veto—the EU rejected Turkey’s position in this view and instead pushed for a vote-free access to NATO assets. At the NATO meeting in Brussels in December 2000, Turkey came to a point that it blocked the NAC to allow the EU to have access to NATO assets in planning capabilities such as SHAPE.

The 9/11 attacks in 2001 urged NATO and the EU to take immediate precautions on working out a solution on the operational management between NATO and the EU that would suit Turkey’s interests. The so-called Ankara Document was a British-US joint proposal that would eventually lead to the removal of the Turkish veto of EU access to NATO assets. Turkey’s interests in the Aegean were guaranteed by the US and the UK and furthermore, bilateral issues between NATO members would not be a concern of ESDP.\(^{101}\) The document gave emphasis on and stressed the importance of Turkey’s national interests in areas concerning its geographic proximity; however, it does not contain further development in the decision-making mechanism of the EU.

Despite the favorable consequences of the agreement, the outcomes of the agreement could only materialize after such a long time due to Greece’s reservations since Greece was opposed to the Ankara Document as a whole. Since all 2\(^{nd}\) pillar issues are decided by unanimity, the Greek not effectively stopped the process. Greece stressed the existence of any discriminatory manner towards a non-EU ally in NATO and the decision-making necessity in the EU should be prioritized. Furthermore, Greece demanded the same guarantees that were given to Turkey and Turkey should reassure not to use the given rights to impact negatively the inner decision-making function of the ESDP. Thus, ESDP could not operationalize because of the Greek vetoes in Laeken in 2001 and Sevilla European Council in 2002.\(^{102}\)

The Ankara Document’s provisions were finally put into effect in December 2002 European Council meeting declaring that “the Berlin-plus arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU member states which are also either NATO members or parties to the ‘Partnerships for Peace’ and which have consequently

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Atlantic Council on 17 July 2000 on European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP)

101 Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Turkey’s Triple-Trouble: ESDP, Cyprus and Northern Iraq”, *Insight Turkey* (vol.4, no.1, January-March 2002) pp. 52

102 Bağcı and Yıldız (2004), pg. 93-94
concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO.”\textsuperscript{103} In this respect, Cyprus, as well as Malta, neither NATO members, nor parties to the PfP program were kept out of the EU military operations conducted with NATO assets.

As seen from the complexity of Turkish-Greece ‘never-seem-to-end’ dispute and NATO stalemate, Turkey and the EU went through an intensive bargaining process to finally worked out a deal and removed the both Turkish and Greek veto. In exchange for security guarantees Turkey removed its blockage of sharing NATO assets within EU-led operations. After the dispute had been settled, the EU had its first independent mission in March 2003 that was called EUFOR Concordia whereas Cyprus and Malta were excluded from the second pillar of the EU since they were not parties to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

In realization of ESDP, the NATO-EU stalemate showed that compromise and further integration on security matters is more difficult to achieve when the parties rationally seek to comfort their national interests. Agreement on the dispute could only be achieved after intense and tough bargaining of Turkey, the EU and the US in implementation of ESDP. In Turkey’s NATO assets blockage case, the reaction of Turkey was to the sense of exclusion from the development of the emerging European security and defense agenda and Turkey’s inability to decide upon issues in areas such as the Aegean Sea and Cyprus where it had national security concerns. Thus, Turkey used its veto card in NATO’s NAC and blocked using of NATO assets in EU-led operations in order to better protect its national security and to be included in the emerging European security and defense framework.

Despite the Ankara Document owed much to Turkish national security interests, Turkey plays a critical role since Cyprus, a divided island, became an EU member on 1 May 2004 even though the Cyprus dispute between Turkey and Greece has not been settled. Therefore, Cyprus problem became an international and more specifically an EU problem. Prior to Cyprus’ accession to the EU, the UN plan, also known as the Annan Plan, for the unification of the island, which the Turkish Cypriots approved, and Greek Cypriots rejected the plan in a referendum.\textsuperscript{104} Cyprus problem is not only a roadblock for Turkey’s accession to European Defense Agency as an associate member,

\textsuperscript{103} From website http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
\textsuperscript{104} Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “The European Union’s Accession Negotiations with Turkey from a Foreign Policy Perspective”, European Integration (Vol. 30, No.1), March 2008, pg. 73
but also an obstacle for Cyprus’ inclusion to strategic operations handled by the EU using NATO assets because Cyprus is neither a NATO member nor a party to PfP program.105

Turkey’s possible inclusion to the EU may have its prospective effects on Turkey and the EU’s close cooperation on security and defense matters. A major breakthrough in Euro-Turkish relations came when the European Council unanimously and officially opened accession negotiations with Turkey in 3 October 2005. For many, this improvement was seen as a giant step for the EU’s foreign policy by starting negotiations with a Muslim country that is more populous than most of the member states. It should be noted that the accession of Turkey to the EU might as well be counted as an achievement of European foreign policy and enlargement process. However, internal divisions among the EU member states cause the negotiation process to resemble a vicious circle. In this respect, public opinion of EU member state citizens holds a significant place in assessing Turkey’s accession to the EU. The next section will dwell upon public support for Turkey’s inclusion to the EU and after a detailed analysis of Turkey’s potential contributions and costs to the EU, the selected three member states’—France, the United Kingdom and Austria—political and public positions will be analyzed.

4.3. Turkey’s Prospective Contributions and Costs to CESDP

As one of the main security providers of Europe in the Cold War era with its NATO membership, Turkey’s geostrategic significance and military strength in the post-Cold War era will be the main emphasis of this section. Currently, Turkey not only contributes to Europe’s ‘hard power’, but also constitutes as a credible partner of the EU in conducting a successful foreign policy in the Middle East, Caucasus and the Mediterranean. However, Turkish inclusion to the EU might as well bring possible costs among with material benefits and these issues will be scrutinized accordingly.

4.3.1. Turkey’s Geostrategic Importance and Military Strength in the Post-Cold War Era:

Post-Cold War era witnessed a restructuring process in the European security architecture. In this conjuncture, Turkey is located in an environment that is volatile and close to hot spots that are inclined to an outbreak of conflicts that can affect European

105 Ibid. Pg.74
security. Also, the gravity of the threats affecting European security has shifted from the center to the periphery after years following the end of the Cold War. Thus, it is argued that Turkey’s strategic position can be considered as more unique and complex as far as European security is concerned.\textsuperscript{106}

As a trans-regional actor and a medium power, Turkey’s incorporation to the European security and defense framework would be in the EU’s benefit as it would allow the Union to play a more comprehensive role in the Balkans, the Caspian, the Middle East and Central Asia. However, it is often debated that a possible inclusion of Turkey to the EU would bring security problems arising from bordering with unstable areas such as Iraq, Syria and the Caucasus. On the other hand Turkey’s inclusion may as well be an opportunity for Europe to pursue its Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) that has worked well in Central and Eastern Europe. A possible expansion towards the Middle East certainly has opportunities as well as costs because of the political uncertainties and instability of the region.

Another contribution of Turkey’s integration to ESDP is its role as an energy corridor for the EU. Turkey’s crucial role in securing energy supplies for the EU was enhanced in July 2006 when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline became operational. Furthermore, the Nabucco project, planned to be operational in 2013, would help to decrease Europe’s dependency on Russian oil and gas. On the other hand, the EU has troubles in convincing Turkmenistan to use the pipeline and Turkey might be a useful tool to soften relations with the country.\textsuperscript{107} Also, the construction of another pipeline complementary to BTC pipeline from Ceyhan to Samsun will also play an important role in enhancing Turkey’s critical role in energy security and reduction of dependency on Russia constituting significant objectives of the European Union’s foreign policy.

The war in Iraq has urged the security analysts to draw attention on the areas of critical importance where Turkey is situated. Turkey will play an enhancing role in European security in the arrangement and security of traditional boundaries and it is stated in the White Book of Ministry of Defense that “The goals of maintenance of the European security in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Middle East and the Caucasus and

\textsuperscript{107} Muftuler-Baç (2008), pg. 71
strengthening of peace and cooperation can only be realized by the participation and concrete contribution of Turkey.”

However, Turkey’s proximity to Iraq, Syria and the Caucasus would be a nest of security problems in which the EU does not want to involve, but while it is easier to ignore issues in distant countries, it is not much easier to ignore crises when they would occur in Europe’s borders such as in Eastern Europe. Further, Turkey as a Muslim country has ties with the Muslim population living in the Balkans and the Caucasus that makes Turkey an important actor in these areas. In short, Turkey’s accession to the EU will bring costs and a number of foreign policy issues such as the Iraqi crisis, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Kurdish question that the EU will have to deal. However, the EU will have to deal with these issues anyway; with or without Turkey, but with Turkey as a member it is argued that it will be easier to solve foreign policy issues.

Turkey’s military strength is another important asset in contribution to the EU’s ESDP as a security producer role. Turkey is the second largest military force in NATO after US and takes active part in NATO and UN operations. Given the high level of military spending, $12.155 billion (2003) which is equal to 5.3% (2003) of GDP, Turkey is one of the largest national spenders on defense among the world states. Moreover, with a long experience of asymmetric warfare, namely PKK, Turkey’s military experience suits the low-intensity warfare of an EU-led crisis operation. Also, the existence of a large young population is another valuable asset as compared to Europe’s old population whereas young population can contribute both to labor force and to infantry.

It is demonstrated that with the positive aspects of a military muscle, Turkey’s incorporation to the ESDP could contribute to the success of the EU-led operations. However, one should not underestimate the fact that the EU exercises ‘soft power’ to ensure its security through non-military measures such as ‘soft governance’, conflict prevention and resolution, economic links and trade. In this context, as argued by Bilgin, Turkey should stress the role it can play in constituting a multi-cultural Europe

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109 Aerospace and Defense Country Profiles of the new EU Member States and Candidate Countries: Turkey (2005)
110 Pınar Bilgin, Turkey & the EU: Yesterday’s Answers to Tomorrow’s Security Problems?, EU Civilian Crisis Management Conflict Studies Research Centre, May 2001, pg.45
that is not anti-Muslim and the importance of use of non-military tools of security policy-making.  

Below, Table 4.1. summarizes Turkey’s prospective contributions and costs to European security which are discussed in this section. Despite the differing views on whether Turkey should contribute as a soft or a hard power, as a country largely oriented around the Cold War logic of “hard power” it is therefore concluded that, Turkey’s geostrategic value together with its strong military capabilities makes Turkey a ‘security producer’ against the threats brought by the post-Cold War era. In addition, Turkey is a significant as a credible partner in conducting Europe’s foreign policy tools such as its civilian power. Thus, the next section dwells upon Turkey’s role in the European Union’s civilian power.

**Table 4.1. Turkey’s Potential Contributions and Costs to European Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributions</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Geostrategic role as a transnational actor in Balkans, ME, Caucasus, Central Asia, Mediterranean</td>
<td>*Conflicts with Greece and Cyprus as obstacles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Help EU to play an active role in ME</td>
<td>*Bring security problems if borders with Syria, Iraq, Caucasus (potential conflict with Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Turkey’s role in securing EU’s energy needs in Caspian and Central Asian region</td>
<td>*Increase conflict with Russia over its interests in Caucasus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Bring regional security to Balkans&amp;Caucasus</td>
<td>*Inclusion of Turkey can export these threats(drugs, people trafficking, terrorism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*To help tackle new security threats identified in ESS</td>
<td>*EU’s prior focus on soft security tools such as Petersberg Tasks rather than hard security means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Use of significant military capabilities in the EU’s Petersberg tasks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.2. Turkey as a Credible Partner in Enhancing the European Union’s Soft Power

As a candidate country that is a member of NATO, the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) and the Council of Europe, Turkey’s membership to the EU might be useful in constructing a bridge between the Muslim East and Christian West civilizations. For pro-European Arab countries in the Middle East, Turkey sets as an example with a predominantly Muslim population and a functioning secular democracy by law. Such an inclusion of Turkey to the EU can prove wrong the famous notion of Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilization’ which subjects the Western civilization versus the Islamic civilization.

The European Union’s attempts to solve its security problems through soft security measures have been evident in the Union’s adopting such tools as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995 and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. These attempts aimed elimination of causes of conflict against the necessity to use hard power mechanisms.112 Especially after 9/11, terrorism rooted from Islamic fundamentalism became one of the most important security threats both in the EU and the world. In this context, the EU is aiming to preserve its security using civilian power. As mentioned earlier, Solana’s 2003 Security Strategy Document draws attention to new security risks and suggests stabilizing the regions on Europe’s periphery. (See chapter 2) Thus, Turkey’s accession to the EU would increase the EU’s credibility in the volatile regions where Turkey is located.

Also, in enhancing the European Union’s civilian power, as stated above, Turkey’s contribution to securing gas and oil pipelines pass through Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan holds an important place; especially Turkey’s critical position in the region will contribute to regional stability and welfare which is an important objective of the ENP. In conclusion, Turkey’s inclusion into the EU, thus to the ESDP will not only provide a robust military arm to the EU, but also will intensify its civilian power by using Turkey as a credible partner in instable regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. After an assessment of Turkey’s possible contributions and costs to the EU, now it is essential to analyze the European public views on Turkey’s membership.

112 Müftüler-Baç (2008), pg.66
4.4. Turkey’s Membership in European Eyes

Is there a correlation between Turkey’s stances in European security architecture and European states’ willingness to except Turkey as a member? The latter can be found in surveys such as Eurobarometer that asked European citizens about Turkey’s becoming part of Europe in the future, whereas the former will be dealt in the next chapter. According to Eurobarometer 69 public opinion report published in November 2008, at the moment Turkey is the least desired country when compared to other candidate countries: Only 31% approve. However, Europeans remain divided on the question of the country’s membership once it has complied with all the conditions fixed by the European Union: in this case, 45% of respondents are in favor of Turkey joining the EU, while a like proportion remains opposed to Turkish membership.\(^{113}\) It should also be noted that number of people against Turkey’s inclusion even if Turkey complies with all of the conditions has fallen by 3% since the last survey in 2006. Furthermore, there is a significant increase in the percentage of people in favor of Turkey’s membership since 2006. (39% in 2006 and now it is 45%)

As shown in Table 4.2. below, Turkish membership is supported by around 14 member states in the EU, including 71% of Swedish citizens, 67% in the Netherlands, two-thirds of Romanians (64%) and six out of ten Danes (59%).\(^{114}\) On the other hand, Austrians are the least enthusiastic in Turkish membership with 16%. Luxembourg (32%) and France and Germany with 35% follow them. Another interesting point is, some EU countries support Turkey’s membership more than Turkey itself. While 55% of Turkish citizens approve joining the EU, respondents in Poland (57%), Denmark (59%) and the Netherlands (67%) are more supportive of Turkey’s membership.

\(^{113}\) Eurobarometer 69, 2008, pg.29
\(^{114}\) Ibid. Pg.30
Table 4.2.: Support for Turkish membership once it has complied with all the conditions fixed by the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>In favor</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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Source: Eurobarometer 69 2008

In the light of empirical data from Eurobarometer 69 public opinion survey, Table 3.2 was composed in order to compare and contrast the views of selected
countries (the UK, France, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Spain and Poland) on foreign policy, security and defense and further enlargement as mentioned in the previous chapter. The fourth columns states public opinion support for Turkey’s membership once Turkey complies with all of the conditions.

In this respect, the United Kingdom is the least enthusiastic country on European foreign policy and security integration. On the other hand, British citizens’ support for Turkey’s membership (42%) is higher than their support for further enlargement in general. (%36) It should be noted that Britain remains as a strong supporter of Turkey in the EU membership path. UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband stated in September 2007, that the EU "needs, as a clear goal, the inclusion of Turkey as a full member." Economic gains from Turkish membership also plays an important role since Turkey is a significant trading partner with the UK and in 2002, Britain was Turkey's third largest export destination and sixth largest import source.

In France, the results are not surprising. Deployed in the ‘Europeanist’ camp and being a member of ‘the original Six’, France champions a strong support to ‘European-only’ security and defense. French support for a common European foreign policy remains at 64% and support for a common European security and defense is 79%. Since France is traditionally ‘Europeanist’, its unwillingness to accept new member states including Turkey is quite expected. Therefore, in France a 31% proportion of respondents approves further enlargement and 35% of citizens say ‘yes’ to Turkish membership. Germany more or less, follows the same path with France in Europeanist approach and attitudes toward further enlargement and Turkey’s inclusion, only a slight difference in higher support for CESDP. It is worth reminding the reader that this analysis is only based upon the findings from Eurobarometer survey.

In the Austrian case, the empirical data should be analyzed carefully remembering the fact that from its rebirth as an independent and sovereign republic in 1955, permanent neutrality has been evident in Austrian foreign policy although this has changed recently since Austria accepted to cooperate with NATO through Partnership for Peace program in 1995. Derived from these facts, Austria remains in the middle when it comes to approve common European foreign and security policy.

In Austria, support for CFSP is 65% and 61% for common security and defense; both below the EU-27 average (68% and 76%). This can be related to Austria’s

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116 ibid
traditional neutrality and non-alignment, but its strong opposition to further enlargement (only 27% approve) and Turkey’s membership (16%) holds Austria as the most critical opponent to these elements. Can Austria’s opposition to further enlargement be explained only in terms of neutrality and non-alignment or are there other elements influencing the situation? Austrians’ opposition to Turkish membership can be explained in socio-historical context, but support for foreign policy and security framework has little impact on this specific matter. A more detailed analysis of Austria will be provided in the next chapter.

In the security and defense framework, the Netherlands falls in between with its commitment to developing an independent ESDI, however does not undermine the importance of NATO capabilities. In this respect, though respondents in the Netherlands tend to favor security and defense (%82) compared to common foreign policy (68%), the results are both above and on the average. On further enlargement, 50% of the Dutch citizens agree upon inclusion of new member states. Furthermore, after Sweden—with 71% in favor—has the second highest number of respondents in favor of Turkish membership with 67%. This may indicate that, although the Netherlands favor multilateralism and the rule of law and an independent ESDI, it still lacks the military capability that has been resourced by NATO. In this context, Turkey is an important security provider in NATO since it became a member in 1952. Therefore, the Dutch may have convergence of interests in Turkey’s membership.

Eurobarometer 69 public opinion survey shows that the Spanish respondents are in favor for both common foreign policy and security and defense with 74 and 78 percent each. The Spanish are also in favor of further enlargement in the EU, but the number of respondents supporting Turkish membership remains at 55%. However, a large number of “don’t knows” (20%) should also be taken into consideration. Lastly, Poland as a new member state is in favor of all of four components that take place in the author’s research: 74% of Polish respondents are in favor of common foreign policy, a large proportion of 84% support a European common defense and security, and has 74% support for further enlargement. In Turkish membership, the Polish respondents are in favor of the idea with 57%. As Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Meller said in April 2006 when he visited Ankara that Poland has supported and will continue to support Turkey's bid to join the European Union.117 So, the analysis of the public’s

117 www.english.peopledaily.com.cn/200604/14/eng20060414_258301.html
views and perceptions in these member states shows mixed feelings towards Turkey’s accession.

4.5. Analyses of EU Member States (France, the United Kingdom, Austria) on Turkey’s Accession to the EU among Security

The empirical data from Eurobarometer 69 indicate that these selected seven member states have differentiated views on Turkey’s accession to the EU. Accordingly, this section aims to provide a specific analysis of three member states on Turkish accession: France, the United Kingdom and Austria. This section emphasizes on the correlation between these states’ preferences and public opinion and support for Turkey’s accession to the EU.

4.5.1. France:

Turkey’s accession to the EU is one of the major challenges to the EU’s foreign policy due to distinct views on Turkey’s inclusion among the member states. Possible inclusion of Turkey would urge the member states to take new foreign policy measures on issues concerning the broader Middle East, the Kurdish problem, the war in Iraq and the unstable Caucasus. In case of Turkey’s membership, the European Union’s borders will expand to Iraq, Syria and Caucasus where the EU would be endangered by the risks and conflicts arising from these regions and that would mean forcing the limits of further expansion in the EU. Would such an expansion be too costly, as stated by the French Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy claimed that “Turkey was a country of 100 million inhabitants who were not in Europe but in Asia Minor, and that he wouldn't want to be the one who was going to explain to French pupils that Europe's borders were with Syria”.(November 2007)

Although former French President Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) was in favor of Turkey’s accession, 2007 elections when Nicolas Sarkozy who has been a vocal supporter of Turkey’s association with the Union rather than its accession, tensions rose between France and Turkey. Prior to Sarkozy’s position as an obstacle in Turkey’s accession talks, relationships between France and Turkey were already fragile to a certain extent. The existence of substantial issues dated back to 2001, such as the official recognition of the Armenian genocide, and the possible criminalization of its negation under French laws, the disagreement over the judicial treatment of PKK

118 http://www.eubusiness.com/Turkey/1194961621.57/
activists, the Cyprus dispute; and the ESDP issue shows the fragility of bilateral relationship of Turkey and France.\textsuperscript{119}

Previously, French public position on Turkey’s accession was analyzed in detail and a conclusion was reached that even if Turkey meets all of the accession criteria, namely the Copenhagen Criteria; it is evident that most of the French citizens oppose the idea. This constitutes a great danger for Turkey’s inclusion to the EU even if it complies with all of the criteria and there is a risk that Turkey might not be a member. The reason is, on March 1\textsuperscript{st} 2005 taking advantage of a Constitutional revision to allow for the future adoption of the EU Treaty (the one that was rejected on May 29), Jacques Chirac inserted new wording in articles 88-5 and 60 mandating the President of the Republic to put any new enlargement of the EU to a vote, through a referendum.\textsuperscript{120} This revision of the French constitution runs the risk of Turkey’s rejection by a referendum after years of negotiations.

In assessing France’s position on Turkish accession, Nicolas Sarkozy’s approach prior to his election and after he had been elected as the president, holds a significant place. Sarkozy’s main opposition to Turkey had three major components: 1) geographic dimension of Turkey’s being not European whereas most of Turkish soil is in the Asian minor, 2) emphasis on European \textit{puissance} that may eventually be harmed due to difficulties in decision-making in case of further expansion, and 3) role of Islam and Turkey’s being a predominantly Muslim country and integrating the Muslim immigrants would be difficult in an environment, namely the EU is seen as a ‘community of values’. Sarkozy quoted that “the European construction is not only what our American friends think it is, namely a large free market, it is also a community of values to build a power”.\textsuperscript{121}

Although Nicolas Sarkozy’s strict views on opposition to Turkey’s accession have been more flexible after he had been elected in 2007, it is difficult to tell what the


\textsuperscript{121} Vaisse (2008), pg. 14
future holds. In his speech after he was elected in 2007, Sarkozy stated that “If the 27 undertake this crucial discussion about the future of our Union, France will not object to new chapters in the negotiations between the Union and Turkey... I don't want to be a hypocrite. Everybody knows I'm only favorable to an association.”.\(^\text{122}\) As seen, not a U-turn, but a more flexible approach has been evident in Sarkozy view on Turkish accession, but this does not solve the problems or wither away the possibility of ending negotiation talks with Turkey. Opposition coming from the French public plays a significant role in the future of Turkey’s inclusion.

There are plenty of reasons for French citizens’ opposition to Turkey in the EU and it is quite difficult to sort out and prioritize them as these reasons operate on different levels. On one hand, for most people, enlargement-related fears hold a significant place in case of fear of losing jobs, the threat of terrorism, the weakening of national culture.'\(^\text{123}\) On the other hand, those who support Turkey’s accession, the French elite focus on the benefits such as future economic growth, a stronger EU foreign policy and energy security.

From a foreign and security policy perspective, French concerns on the overall influence of France on the EU institutions might be jeopardized through further expansion causing the decision-making to be terribly difficult and thus disabling the well-functioning the EU as a supranational institution. Further decline of French influence on EU institutions would result in weakening of European political cohesion (European puissance) and place a burden on EU budget i.e. in Common Agricultural Policy. As Anne-Marie Le Gloannec writes,

“…the elites distrust an enlarged Europe which is less and less amenable to French influence compared to the smaller Europe of the past. The public dread a larger Europe which will not protect them against what they perceive as the nefarious consequences of globalization”.\(^\text{124}\)

French concerns over Turkey’s accession to the EU can be categorized in four aspects. First category contains reservations on French and European identity and their

\(^\text{123}\) Katinka Barysch, *What Europeans Think of Turkey and Why*, Centre for European Reform Briefing Note
compatibility with Muslim Turkey’s identity. Evident xenophobia in French culture plays an important role and point out the question of how to integrate Muslims in Turkey when there are already enough Muslims in France itself. Nicolas Sarkozy stated in 2006 that “[…] because we do have a problem of integration, which points to the question of Islam in Europe. To pretend that it is not a problem would be to hide reality. If you take in 100 million Muslim Turks, what will happen?” However, this argument relates to the Muslim population in France in general because it is estimated that the number of Turkish immigrants living in France is 400,000 that may not have impacts on Turkey’s prospects.

The second factor that plays a role in French concerns is the economic fears arising from the possibility of loss of jobs in case of immigration from a possible member Turkey. There is a correlation between people’s support on further enlargement and the level of unemployment in that country because citizens are threatened that they would lose their jobs. Since France has a high unemployment rate (between 8% and 10%) it is another factor that explains the reluctance of French people to accept Turkey.

The third factor for French opposition to Turkish case is the question whether Turkey is politically ready to be included into the EU. This has much to do with negative views on the overall image or the ‘brand’ of Turkey that is criticized as a country with an incomplete democracy that relies heavily upon influence of military in politics and cannot solve its internal disputes such as the Kurdish problem, further, it runs the risks of a takeover by the Islamists. Fourthly, Turkey is seen as a threat to a united and politically cohesive Europe and a possible inclusion of Turkey means a serious blow to traditional Europeanist ideals of the French who sought integration as ‘deepening before enlarging.’ However, this argument has more to do with the general European Union project than Turkey itself. On the contrary, those who view the EU as an international organization, Eurosceptics, may be in favor of adding Turkey to the EU because it would enhance EU’s resources and capabilities and prevent transferring further sovereignty to the supranational institution. In this respect, the

125 Vaisse (2008) pg. 8
126 Ibid. Pg.9
127 Vaisse (2008), pg. 15
128 Ibid. Pg. 13
United Kingdom is the next country to be assessed in this section for its strong support to Turkey’s accession and its position in the ‘Atlanticist’ camp.

4.5.2. The United Kingdom:

As a traditional leader of the Atlanticist divide in the EU, since coming to power in 1997, the British government has been enthusiastic for EU enlargement. It can be argued that Tony Blair ‘normalized’ the British government’s attitude towards enlargement and deepening of EU integration compared to Thatcher and Major governments since 1970s. As mentioned earlier, the UK contributed to development of an independent security and defense framework through the Franco-British joint St. Malo Declaration in 1998. Furthermore, the UK government welcomed the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and this would be the same for Turkey’s accession.

Britain’s official stance on Turkish inclusion to the EU can be summarized by a recent statement of the former Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, stating “No one is in any doubt that Turkey must meet all the requirements and obligations of membership before joining the European Union. But as this House has consistently agreed, a European Union with Turkey as a member will be stronger, richer and more secure.” Further, a similar statement of the current Foreign Minister David Miliband saying “If Turkey can play a role as a member of the European Union, engaged in shared projects, promoting shared values, the prize for Turkey, for Britain and for Europe as a whole is immense: to witness an age where the world is not only more connected, and more interdependent, but also more at ease with the different identities that Turkey bridges, and, as a result, more secure.”, defines British views on Turkish accession.

More importantly, it is often viewed in the UK’s governmental defense community that Turkish membership of the EU as a positive incident and a strong contribution to strengthening the capabilities of the ESDP, which has been a key UK policy objective. As Whitman demonstrates, Turkish accession to the EU is not a much-debated issue in British politics and has not been a cause of ‘bureaucratic

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129 Richard G. Whitman, *The United Kingdom and Turkish Accession: The Enlargement Instinct Prevails*, a IAI-Tepav report edited by Nathalie Tocci, English Series No. 9, July 2007, pg. 120
130 Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, ‘Statement to the House of Commons’, 2006, London
131 Meltem Müftüler-Baç, 2008, pg.71
132 Whitman (2007), pg. 121
politics’, but the predominant view is that Turkey is complementary to the EU as long as it fulfills the obligations of becoming a member.133

In analyzing British views toward Turkish prospective inclusion, the United Kingdom has been a strong supporter of the idea for the reason that it favors the supremacy of the Atlantic Alliance and it has national interests for what Turkey offers or can contribute to the ESDP of the Union. Another reason is the UK’s traditional Euroscepticism: the UK has been outside the core of European integration and the Blair government also pursued this policy by not seeking UK membership to the single currency. In a security aspect, as mentioned in the previous chapters, Britain had its strong ties with the US and cooperation in sharing intelligence and military basing etc. Therefore, the UK preferred a weaker ESDI and gave emphasis on the importance of NATO in security matters. Although this was not the case in St. Malo declaration, the UK backed the US in Iraq war and shared pretty much the same interests as the US did. In this context, the United Kingdom government supports Turkish accession for the reasons stated above.

Public opinion of the UK has been previously analyzed in the light of empirical data collected from Eurobarometer 69 report and it is seen that 42% of British respondents are in favor of Turkish accession. It can be demonstrated that there is a slight disposition toward supporting Turkish membership but only a relatively small margin and in a context in which the issue has not been widely debated. Lastly, it is argued that the current Prime Minister Gordon Brown supports the new member states and further enlargement stating “he admired the EU for its enlargement policy to date and for its success in promoting peace in Europe”.134

4.5.3. Austria:

Austria is an interesting case with regard to its cultural approaches to issues, such as Austria’s widely expressed opposition to Turkish possible membership. Firstly, together with France, Greece and Greek Cypriots, Austria has been a stumbling block in Turkey’s bid to EU membership with its initial attempt to delay, prevent and stop opening of negotiation talks with Turkey in 2005. Secondly, Austria backed Greeks when Turkey in 2006 refused to implement the protocol of the Customs Union to Cyprus. Also in 2008, Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik stated that “I have

133 Ibid. Pg. 122
134 Ibid. Pg. 128
made it clear that for us (membership) negotiations with Turkey ... should be open-ended,” adding that accession talks should not guarantee automatic membership.\footnote{“Austrian FM says no automatic EU membership for Turkey” from website http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1208776620.17/}

In case of Austria, the low level of both public and political support for Turkish accession can be explained and analyzed in a historical or a cultural narrative which is outside the scope of our argument and research on a possible correlation between the EU member states’ national preferences on security and their support for Turkey’s inclusion. Austria’s strategic, political and economical interests lie in the Western Balkan region and it was strongly supportive of Balkan states to be included in the EU. Thus, Austria pursues the stability of this region, considering its given proximity to the Balkans Austria perceives itself as the historical center of the old Habsburg Empire.\footnote{Cengiz Günay, Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations: A View from Austria, a IAI-Tepav report edited by Nathalie Tocci, English Series No. 9, July 2007, pg. 48} Therefore, Austrian policy-makers and politicians have favored the ‘privileged partnership’ idea instead of a full membership of Turkey to the EU.

Austria, together with its traditional non-alignment and neutrality since its rebirth in 1955 and its emphasis on social stability, Austrians have certain prejudice against the negative impacts from economic integration with the cheaper ‘Eastern’ states. Given its historical narrative, Catholic Austria’s struggle against ‘the East’, represented by the Turks, it is not surprising that the debates on Turkey’s accession evolved around the questioning of Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’ arguing that Turkey is not European and it is perceived as the Europe’s ‘other’.\footnote{Cengiz Günay (2007), pg. 50} Furthermore, in Austria, Turkey’s shortcomings on democracy, human rights, rights of minorities and women are often explained in cultural or religious terms.

In public opinion aspect, given that Turkish membership is not supported by any political, cultural, intellectual or business lobby, the debates on the issue are far from neutral or objective, instead in xenophobic and rightwing views. In this context, it would be naive to expect even a medium level of public support in Austria and earlier it has been seen that public support for Turkish membership is 16% and 27% for further enlargement. (See chapter 3) There is also the importance of the factor that Turks are the largest groups of immigrants in Austria and they are not seen as a part of Austrian or European society for their low degree of integration to the society. Accordingly, there is
a fear among Austrians that a possible EU member Turkey may not integrate into the European Union either.

The above stated research and findings show that Austria’s approach to Turkish accession can be explained in historical and cultural terms instead of a security and defense framework. It is a fact that Austria is by law a neutral European state, but it is also supportive of development of European foreign and security policy (63% of public support and Austria is legally able to contribute to Petersberg Tasks) and it perceives conflict prevention and execution of humanitarian tasks as an essential part of its external policy. In this respect, Turkey’s possible contributions to European security would fall in deaf ears of both the Austrian public and government.

4.6. State Preferences and Public Opinion: Converge or Diverge?

One should not undermine the fact that public’s view holds an important place in state preference formation. Derived from liberal theories of international relations, individuals and societal groups’ demands are prior to politics in a ‘bottom-up’ view and Moravcsik argues that, “socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through political exchange and collective action.”\(^ {138}\) Moreover, pressures coming from individual groups lead the politicians to pursue policies that satisfy individual groups’ interests. According to Moravcsik, government policy is “[…] therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences.”\(^ {139}\) Thus, public’s view on issues that are concerned with material interests, serves as a significant determinant in EU member states’ national preference formation.

In the Turkish case, it is hard to define the causality whether public support or state preferences influences the other more; in fact it resembles the “chicken or the egg” causality dilemma that is commonly stated as “which came first, chicken or the egg?” However, deciding which one is superior to the other is not among our primary concerns, on the contrary, it is aimed to draw attention to mutual interactions among these two factors: do state preferences and public’s view converge or diverge in member states? Specifically, in the United Kingdom, public support for Turkey’s accession is in

\(^{139}\) Moravcsik, ibid. Pg. 518
line with the UK government’s political stance in terms of Turkey’s accession. On the other hand, it is also evident that British public is not as supportive when compared to the British government. As stated above, British government officials are very supportive of Turkey’s accession to the European Union. On the other hand British public support for Turkey is 42%. Furthermore, neither public nor government support for Common Foreign and Security Policy are among the highest levels in the EU-27. In this thesis, the research question demonstrated that member states which are supportive of CFSP will also be supportive of Turkey’s accession. However, it is found that there is no such correlation among these states and France, Germany and Austria are perfect examples for that: France (72%), Germany (85%) and Austria (61%) are in favor of CFSP where as they are against Turkey’s accession. Therefore, empirical evidence between support to CFSP and Turkish accession does not hold whereas France, Austria and Germany cases do not illustrate any such correlation.

In France, the current government is skeptical about Turkey’s “Europeanness” and favors a privileged partnership instead of full membership to the EU. Consequently, French public is also skeptical on Turkish membership (only 35% approve). However, there are also cases in which government’s position is consistent with public’s position: Sweden (71%), Netherlands (67%), Denmark (59%), Spain (55%) and Portugal (51%) are in favor of Turkish accession and so are the governments. (See Chapter 2, Table 2.3)

Lastly, the answer to the ‘chicken-egg question’ is the evident low level of both public and political support on Turkey’s accession shows that public opinion and state preferences are mutually interacting and have a converging nature but in some cases public opinion does not have any effect on government’s position as seen in the British case. It is found that there is no 100% match between public opinion and government preferences and this finding can be counted as a contribution to Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist framework which depicts that government policies in the domestic level are shaped by public and interest groups’ pressures.
4.7. Concluding Remarks:

In this chapter, initially a brief history of Turkish-EU relations was emphasized in order to better understand the possible contributions and likely costs in Turkey’s prospective membership. Material impacts of Turkey to the EU’s ESDP had been demonstrated (military capabilities and geostrategic value of Turkey), as well as Turkey’s asset being a credible partner to the EU in pursuing its civilian power. Later on, the level of public support among European citizens to Turkey’s accession had been analyzed in the light of empirical data from Eurobarometer 69 report. In this respect, analyses of some key member states that play an important role in Turkey’s bid to the EU (France, the United Kingdom and Austria) had been thoroughly examined. It is concluded that in opposition or support to Turkey’s membership in these member states, convergence or divergence of material interests play a significant role in France and Britain, but in Austria case, the influence of the historic/cultural divide is the determining factor in explaining public and political opposition to Turkey’s accession. Most significantly, it had been found that public opinion and government position on specific matters such as Turkey’s accession are not always consistent as seen in British case. In addition, France, Germany and Austria are in favor of CFSP whereas they are against Turkish inclusion.
CONCLUSION

In the post-Cold War era, the world has faces incremental changes with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Dissolution of the Soviet Union caused the transformation of the world system from a bipolar to a unipolar one leaving it to the United States’ hegemony. Accordingly, the meaning of collective security and defense for West Europeans has also changed: NATO’s raison d’être was beginning to be questioned and the possibility of withdrawal of the United States’ forces from Europe urged the Member States to develop their own European security and defense component independent from NATO.

In this respect, attempts to strengthen the CFSP pillar with a military component have been elucidated in previous chapters. The important thing is, Europe’s present reliance on soft security as a means may not be sufficient for a sustainable CFSP in the future. Especially, with the emerging of new security threats, as Javier Solana identified them in the European Strategy Document, Europe should go in the way of enhancing its military capabilities. At this point, Turkey’s potential contributions to CFSP can be considered as useful tools to achieve foreign policy with ‘hard security’ means.

One can also draw attention to the notion that Turkey’s accession to the EU would bring potential costs, as well as benefits, not to mention the high rate of negative attitude of European citizens towards Turkey’s accession to the EU. However, cultural aspect of Turkish membership falls outside the scope of this thesis. Public opinion analysis was necessary in order to understand public support’s role in national preference formation of member states for they have a significant effect on heads of states and governments policies.

In addition, it is argued that further integration in areas concerning ‘high politics’ is hard to achieve, but deriving from the fact that convergence of material interests between member states’ preferences is the key element in further integration, Turkey’s accession to the European Union would not only enhance Europe’s military muscle but also enable the EU to be a credible partner in world politics with success in its enlargement policy.

The most important finding of this research demonstrates that the empirical data between member states’ position on CFSP and Turkey’s accession shows that there is no correlation between these two components. The main argument was member states which are in favor of CFSP would also be in favor of Turkey’s accession for its valuable potential contributions to CFSP. These findings are evident in Austrian,
German and French cases in which these states are strong supporters of an independent Common Foreign and Security Policy, but there is a low level of both government and public support for Turkey’s accession.

The other significant finding of this research is an answer to the previously mentioned ‘chicken and egg question’ which illustrates the causality dilemma between public opinion and government policy formation and which one is prior to the other. Moravcsik argues that pressures coming from individual groups lead the politicians to pursue policies that satisfy individual groups’ interests, but the empirical evidence shows that there is no match between the government’s position and public opinion. This constitutes as an addition and contribution to Moravscik’s argument.
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