

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATIZATION:
TRANSITIONS IN TURKEY AND GREECE IN 1983 AND 1974


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
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
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To my mother, father and sister/ Anneme, Babama ve Ablama

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INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATIZATION:
TRANSITIONS IN TURKEY AND GREECE IN 1983 AND 1974

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Abstract

This thesis attempts to explain the impact of international forces on the democratization processes of Turkey and Greece after the most recent overt military interventions in those countries. The International Community imposed harsh sanctions on the Greek junta and contributed to delegitimization of the military regime, whereas Turkish generals experienced a relatively more lenient international response. Preservation of legitimacy by the Turkish military adversely affected the consolidation process by securing institutional prerogatives for the military. In the consolidation phase, distrust between civilian and military elites, the failure of the international community to assure military elites that their interests will be protected after democratization, and its failure to utilize credible political conditionality precluded Turkey from consolidating its democracy. In Greece, however, international actors were effective in the socialization of anti system parties and used political conditionality effectively in order to strengthen democracy.

DEMOKRATİKLEŞMENİN ULUSLARARASI BAĞLAMI:

TÜRKİYE'DE VE YUNANİSTAN'DA 1983 VE 1974'TE DEMOKRASİYE GEÇİŞ

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Avrupa Çalışmaları, M.A., Tez, 2009

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokratikleşme, Demokratik Koşullama, Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye ve Yunanistan

ÖZ

Bu tez uluslararası faktörlerin demokratikleşmeye katkısını, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın sırasıyla 1983 ve 1974'te gerçekleştirdikleri demokrasiye geçiş üzerinden, incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Uluslararası topluluk Yunanistan'daki askeri rejime görece daha sert yaptırımlar uygulayıp rejimin meşruiyetini kaybetmesinde rol oynarken, Türkiye'deki askeri yönetimin daha hoşgörülü bir uluslararası tutumla karşılandığı söylenebilir. Diğer nedenlerle birlikte, Türk askerinin siyasette geçirdiği üç yıldan sonra meşruiyetini koruması, askerinin siyasetteki yerini pekiştirmiş ve demokrasinin güçlenmesi sürecini zorlaştırmıştır. Demokrasinin yerleşmesi sürecinde, asker ve sivil liderler arasındaki güvensizlik, uluslararası topluluğun askeri liderleri tam demokratikleşmeden sonra çıkarlarının korunacağı konusunda iknada başarısızlığı ve uluslararası demokratik koşullanmanın yetersiz ve temelsiz uygulanması Türkiye'de demokrasinin geleceği açısından yapıcı olmamıştır. Diğer yandan, Yunanistan'da uluslararası faktörler elitlere demokrasiye geçiş sonrası çıkarlarının korunacağına dair güvence vererek ve demokratik koşullanmanın etkin kullanımıyla Yunanistan'da demokrasinin güçlenmesine katkıda bulunmuştur.

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0. INTRODUCTION

In the mid-twentieth century, the fall of the German Weimar Republic and the establishment of successive totalitarian and authoritarian regimes evoked interest among political scientists in regime breakdowns and re-democratization (Daalder, 1993, pp.14-15). Since then, the most distinguished scholars of the field set forth various useful explanations on democracy and democratization (See for example Dahl, 1998; Schmitter and Karl, 1996; Lijphart, 1999; Diamond, 1996; Linz, 1978; Huntington, 1996; Rustow, 1970). Huntington, for instance, claims that culture can preclude or be conducive to democratization. On the other hand, Bermeo (1992) refutes that culture, *per se*, can be determinant of democracy while simultaneously asserting that the political learning of elites from authoritarian past is a determining factor for democratization. As opposed to Huntington and Bermeo, Rustow (1970) contends that no matter in which culture, democratization is a deliberate decision which is taken by the elites of the country. In support of Rustow, Burton, Gunther and Highley (1992) affirm that in the process of democratization *elite consensual unity* is the basic engine of democratization attempts. That is, elites of the country shall come into consensus on democracy in order to realize successful democratization. Nonetheless, disagreeing with cultural and elite explanations to democratization, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) argue that democracy transpires via class struggle in the society. Indeed, when the labor class gets stronger, it would demand democratic rights from upper classes and eventually upper classes would be obliged to consent to democratization.

Whereas there is a remarkable scholarly debate on domestic sources of democratization, the literature on the international context of democratization remains limited. Although, it is commonly acknowledged that international actors are significant players in the democratization process of a country (Huntington, 1996), their role and importance are usually neglected. This might be partly attributed to the fact that the impact of external sources on democratization is less visible and empirically less measurable (Pridham, 1991, p.2).

However, explanations on process of democratization without reference to international actors would remain incomplete. They would be disregarding a significant variable which might have considerable impact on the process of democratization in

interaction with domestic factors. Elite political learning and elite socialization, for instance, can be stimulated by the international legitimization of pro-democratic elites at home. International actors can be effective in supporting elite consensual unity by encouraging domestic elites to give a deliberate decision in favor of democracy by providing credible incentives. Transnational party links, on the other hand, might be an engine in creating class consciousness among the working class at home. Therefore, the impact of international forces on democratization requires to be assessed by scholarly attention in order to provide explanations beyond those speculations. Analysis and scholarly assessment of international context of democratization would be contributing to the understanding of democratization in general.

Acknowledging the significance of domestic explanations, this thesis intends to analyze the impact of the international forces on democratization. It poses the question: *How do international forces affect the process of democratization in a country?* In order to answer this question, throughout this thesis, I will focus on the mechanisms linking international forces to democratization; the tools that are used by international actors in order to affect the process of democratization; and the scope and limits of their impact.

I will argue that international actors can stimulate collapse of authoritarian regimes and encourage the transition to democracy by diplomatically isolating the regime, imposing economic sanctions upon it, supporting and legitimizing the pro-democratic domestic opposition, and finally, by fertilizing democratic culture via elite socialization and the agency of media. I will conclude that even if all those means might be effective in the process of transition, elite socialization possesses prime importance for establishing a democratic regime in the country. In addition to elite socialization, international actors might deprive the existing authoritarian regime of legitimacy during the phase of transition which prepares a more conducive setting for consolidation of democracy. During the consolidation phase, international actors might support democracy by assuring key elites that democratization will be in their interest, and through elite socialization and membership conditionality. I will argue that those mechanisms are ultimately interrelated while failure to ensure one would be reducing the impact of the other. Finally, I will contend that international factors function strictly in relation to domestic factors and it might be misleading to ignore the interaction between these two sets of variables.

Cases: Turkish and Greek Democratization in 1983 and in 1974, respectively

In order to respond to questions, concerning the impact of international forces on democratization, I will comparatively analyze the Turkish and Greek democratization cases in 1983 and in 1974 respectively for three reasons. First, the Turkish and Greek cases represent plain examples of external impact on democratization. Both Turkey and Greece, at the time of their democratization, were largely integrated in the international system. Moreover, in both cases, international institutions of which they were members were interested in and supportive of democratization in those countries. Second, an analysis of two cases facilitates analyzing the impact of the international forces on democratization by allowing extensive control of the dependent variable. In other words, the Turkish and Greek cases vary in terms of their transition path and consolidation attempts while most of the other variables could be held constant to a large extent. Indeed, Greece and Turkey are located in the common geography of Mediterranean, have passed through similar historical and modernization processes and still possess similar domestic political patterns. Moreover, Turkey and Greece experienced democratization in similar time periods, in 1983 and in 1974, respectively and under similar international influences as the associate members of the European Community, NATO allies and members to the Council of Europe, OSCE, and OECD. Thirdly, Turkey and Greece both completed their transition periods in a relatively short time period. However, their democracies evolved in different directions and Greece consolidated its democracy in the mid-1980s whereas Turkey is still on the path of consolidation. Therefore, these cases are helpful in order to measure the impact of international forces on democratic consolidation.

Concepts: Democracy, Transition, and Democratic Consolidation

Before further deepening analysis, it is crucial to define what the international forces are, and to clarify the concepts of democracy, democratic transition and consolidation. First of all, borrowing from Pridham (1995) the independent variable that is international factors in this thesis will refer to “outside actors- international organizations, foreign governments, transnational nongovernmental actors” (Pridham,

1995, p.171). External influence is the substance and direction of those actors' impact on transition. That is, an actor might facilitate or hinder democratization by inserting influence on a country and do so to a varying degree. This thesis aims to investigate both the direction and degree of this external influence with respect to relevant actors.

Evidently, it is hard to reach clear cut generalizations about actors in each particular case. For instance, democratization processes of Turkey and Greece in 1983 and 1974 respectively could not be explained without reference to the European Community; whereas, while explaining democratization processes of Central and Eastern European countries, one cannot neglect the impact of the Soviet Union in addition to other relevant actors and external influence. Moreover, list of foreign governments, included in transition cannot be exhaustive; since, impact of some countries is aggregated in the general stance of an international organization such as Council of Europe or the European Community, which claim to be representing member states. Neither is it possible to name constant actors for each and every democratization case. Hence, it might be challenging to name those relevant actors for a particular case.

Therefore, in order to include an actor, capacity to insert influence with the purpose of affecting transition will be considered. In order to consider an actor, I will examine three factors: first interest of the international actor in democratization in the country- otherwise it would be unwilling to affect the process, second, its relative impact and significance in the foreign policy formation of the country- otherwise the impact would be too insignificant to include, and third, receptiveness of the country towards this impact- otherwise the country would not respond to pressure. By utilizing the above mentioned criteria, those actors will be named for the Turkish and Greek democratization cases in the relevant chapters.

Secondly, the dependent variable, democratization, requires the clarity of concepts like democracy, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation. With respect to democracy, for the purposes of this thesis, Robert Dahl's investigation of defining features of a democratic system is useful. Dahl (1998, p.84) assumes that none of the actual democracies in the world could achieve ultimate implementation of the ideal of democracy. Hence instead of 'democracy,' he prefers the term *polyarchy*. Polyarchies have six identifying features: significant political offices are occupied by *elected officials*, *free and fair elections* are held in reasonable time intervals, *freedom of*

expression concerning political matters is established and protected, citizens have *access to different sources of information*, citizens enjoy *associational autonomy* which implies their right to form associations including political parties in order to seek their interest at the political level and finally, *inclusive citizenship* allows all adults in a country to formally enjoy the above mentioned rights (Dahl, 1998, p. 85).

Philippe Schmitter and Lynn Karl (1996, pp.50-55) complement Dahl's polyarchy model. They accept six features that Dahl counts. However they criticize him for equating democracy with formal electoral institutions- what they call 'electoralism'. In order to fulfill the gap between electoralism and real life definition of democracy; they bring two more criteria to define a democratic system. The first one is absence of tutelary control over the government by a non- elected body, i.e. armed forces. The second one is independence from any other political system, i.e. absence of "neocolonial arrangements". (Karl and Schmitter, 1996, p.55) Since under the control of any other political system or under the tutelage of a non-elected body, free and fair elections and offices to be held by elected representatives as the result of those elections would not be meaningful and they would be restricted to formalities.

In this thesis, borrowing from Dahl, and Karl and Schmitter, the term democracy will refer to a system where officials are elected to political posts by free and fair elections in which virtually all adults participate as candidates and/or voters, and rights such as associational autonomy, right to reach different sources of information, and freedom of expression are respected and protected. In addition, the democratic system must remain free from the direct impact of any other political system and any non-elected bodies, including the military. In order to consider a case democracy, the military must not exercise tutelary control over elected officials.

Democracy and democratic systems are not static phenomena. Democracies might collapse, be reestablished and for certain cases be stiffened following reestablishment. Reestablishment or establishment of above-mentioned institutions, rights and features of democracy is named *democratic transition*. In fact, according to Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros (1995, p.3), "Transition begins with the breakdown of the former authoritarian regime and ends with the establishment of relatively stable configuration of political institutions within a democratic regime". On the other hand, democratic consolidation implies strengthening of those institutions and can be defined

as "...the achievement of substantial attitudinal support for and behavioral compliance with the new democratic institutions and the rules of the game which they establish" (Gunther et al., 1995, p. 3). As they are fundamentally different phenomena and refer to different stages of democratization, I will analyze two stages of democratization separately in this thesis.

The definition of democratic consolidation, however, requires further clarifications. The first question is whose attitudinal support is necessary for consolidation. Gunther et al. (1995, p.7) contends that it is mainly the politically significant groups which they define as "powerful elites". However, they acknowledge the ability of the masses to challenge legitimacy of the system, as well. In this sense, masses present a negative force. They can be organized in the axis of an anti-system movement and be capable of hindering democracy. Yet, they do not possess sufficient capability to establish democratic consolidation. (Gunther et al., 1995, p. 7) Second question is how the attitudinal support can be defined. According to Gunther et al. (1995, p.15), "absence of serious conflict among politically significant groups over the acceptability of basic framework for political contestation" points attitudinal support for the regime. However, as Gunther et al. (1995, p.15), affirm, attitudinal support does not refer to abstract concepts of political culture or civic traditions¹. Rather, it implies legitimacy and basic acceptance of those political institutions among political actors. In this thesis, attitudinal support in relation to democratic consolidation will be used in reference to this interpretation.

In summary, we can define transition as the collapse of the previous authoritarian regime and the establishment of relatively stable democratic institutions such as free and fair elections and universal suffrage. Consolidation, on the other hand, refers to the acceptance and sustainability of those institutions. Following chapters of this thesis will discuss the impact of the international actors on these two stages of democratization. The first chapter will be devoted to the impact of external actors on transition to democracy in Turkey and in Greece in 1983 and 1974 respectively. The second chapter will dwell upon the international context of democratic consolidation in these two cases. In the final chapter, I will conclude by summing up theoretical

¹ For discussion on political culture and civic tradition, see Almond (1980) and Lane (1992).

generalizations about the impact of international forces on democratization, derived from the democratization cases of Turkey and Greece in 1983 and in 1974 respectively.

I. Explaining External Influence on Transition to Democracy in Turkey and in Greece: *Socializing National Elites into Democracy*

Regimes determine who rules on what basis and concomitantly alter all state-society relations, societal formation, and civil institutional design. Hence, at the macro level, regimes determine the relevant political power holders, tools and mechanisms of their power, as well as bilateral relations between the individual, collectivity, and the state. In this respect, regime question is of crucial importance for every single citizen and one of the principal topics of inquiry for students of political science. Regime change ultimately leads to wholesale alternation of all those relations within a polity and has attracted substantial attention from various scholars.

Linz (1978, pp.51-53), for instance, concerns with the underlying reasons of breakdown of democratic regimes into authoritarianism and asserts that what causes breakdown is inability of elites to find a solution to crisis situations within the political system. On the reverse side of regime breakdown, Rustow (1970, pp.350-361) engages in with the question of transition to democracy and sorts out four steps of transition to democracy: political unity of citizens as a background condition, emergence of an unsolvable conflict in the preparatory phase, deliberate solution to that conflict in favor of democracy by elites in the decision phase, and habituation phase. That is, citizens of a political unity which do not possess secessionist aspirations and agree to be belonging to the same political community might be divided among themselves due to an unsolvable problem, for example, extension of universal suffrage to newly mobilized groups, and eventually elites, among themselves, might decide to solve this problem by channelizing it through democratic institutions and making a deliberate decision in favor of establishing democracy. In the habituation phase, democracy turns into well-rooted habit- which indeed points consolidation of the regime. On the contrary to elite-based explanations of Rustow and Linz; Huntington (1996, pp.24-25) and other modernization theorists emphasize the level of socio-economic development as the determinant of establishing a democratic regime. To put it differently, level of socio-economic development is positively correlated with the probability of establishing a democratic regime according to modernization theorists. Agreeing with Huntington on the significance of the level of economic development, Rueschemeyer, Stevens, and Stevens (1992) affirm that transition to democracy is rendered possible with capitalist

development, which alters relative class power and ability of working class to challenge the status quo.

International Factors and Transition to Democracy: What is in the literature?

Scholars have studied the relation between domestic factors such as socio-economic development level, class structure, and elite strategic choices and transition to democracy. Yet, the impact of the international factors on transition is usually acknowledged as an additional variable, if not neglected as having marginal effect on democratization². Nevertheless, this prejudice against impact of international factors seems to be eased with recent studies. In explaining the third wave of democratization, for instance, Huntington (1996, p.7) states ‘snowball effect’, implying that democratization wave started in a country or region, especially with geographical proximity, will have positive effects on democratization of its neighbors. Moreover, Huntington (1991, p.5) acknowledges the importance of the European Community in democratization processes of Southern European countries, namely democratizations of Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the mid 1970s and early 1980s.

There are more recent studies which do not merely mention external factors as an additional variable but exclusively focus on them. One of the recent attempts is Anastassia Obydenkova’s statistical analysis of the assumed correlation between democratization and geographical proximity and/or communication and cooperation between the European Union (EU) and different regions of Russia (Obydenkova, 2007, pp.473-475). Through her case study, she concludes that geographical proximity has no significant impact on democratization, whilst cooperation and communication with the EU is positively correlated with democratization (pp.488-489). Obydenkova analyzes solely the impact of the EU on democratization to test the correlation between cooperation and communication and democratization. Indeed, there seems to be a consensus in the literature on the significance of the EU on democratization. Whitehead (1996, p.19), as well, points to the importance of the EU in the region and explains that level of economic and political integration the EU possesses help the organization to

² See, for instance, Schmitter(1992,p.5) who basically claims that transition to democracy can be explained through domestic factors and international context presents only a marginal role which can be ignored due to its insignificance.

encourage regime transition by offering significant economic and political benefits to the neighboring countries. Furthermore, Pridham (1995, pp.179-180) argues that high level of political and economic integration enables the EU to penetrate into domestic politics and hence to have greater impact on democratization. Agreeing with Whitehead and Pridham, Kubicek (2003, pp.212- 214) asserts that EU conditionality is vital in encouraging regime transition in favor of democracy in countries in the zone of EU's impact.

All those scholars refer to democratization as if it is one compact phenomenon. Yet, failing to distinguish between transition to democracy and democratic consolidation and defining them broadly under the umbrella of the term democratization may lead to certain theoretical and practical problems since two terms refer to different processes. Theoretically, transition to democracy refers to the immediate collapse of the authoritarian regime and adoption of a 'democracy-likely' one with the minimum consideration of necessary institutionalization, while democratic consolidation refers to stiffening of those democratic institutions. To put it differently, transition refers to a negative process which is essentially the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, while consolidation is a positive process which embraces strengthening of democracy as the legitimate regime of the polity. Practically, as the definition of transition urges, in the collapse of the existing authoritarian regime and in encouragement of a democratic one, international actors other than the European Union might be effective. Institutions such as Council of Europe, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), OSCE (Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe), and OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development), IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the World Bank might be effective in de-legitimization of the authoritarian regime and they might encourage transition without penetrating into domestic politics as much as the European Union does. For democratic consolidation, on the other hand, high levels of political and economic integration might be required so as to allow high level of penetration into domestic politics. Therefore, focusing solely on the impact of the European Union and analyzing two stages of democratization at once may be misleading.

Theorizing the International Impact on Transition to Democracy

Distinguishing between transition to democracy and democratic consolidation, Pridham (1991, p.214), contends that the impact of external forces, including the European Union (but certainly not limited to it), starts at the pre-transition period. International factors might foster liberalization within the existing regime; hence, they might facilitate transition. Liberalization attempts might not always aim at eventual democratization and might be even defensive in its character. They might be geared towards the survival of the regime or realization of pre-defined authoritarian objectives. Still, by guaranteeing a certain degree of regime opening, liberalization might help to prepare the basis for transition to democracy. In order to open up the regime, international actors might put pressure to the existing regime via hostile attitude, championing democratic values or by more credible political attempts. Those attempts signify the mechanisms and tools, used by the external actors in order to facilitate democratization and can be grouped under three general sub-headings.

First one is diplomatic isolation (Pridham, 1991, p.215). International institutions and foreign governments can freeze their diplomatic ties with an authoritarian regime, refuse membership to certain international organizations such as Council of Europe, the European Community, OSCE, and OECD or deprive it from already-existing membership rights fully or partially. Diplomatic isolation might be highly effective via its two components. First, it delegitimizes the existing regime at home in the public eye. Second, the fact that the authoritarian regime is not accepted as legitimate by the international actors strengthens the opposition's hand in gaining support of masses for democratization and simultaneously weakens the political basis of the regime at home.

The second tool that international actors might use is economic sanctions. Diplomatic isolation might be accompanied by abandonment of economic relations, which aggregates the impact of de-legitimization by bringing extra economic burdens on the authoritarian regime. It leads to de-legitimization of the existing regime in the public eye by lowering its economic performance, and hence, negatively affects the sustainability of the regime. In addition, economic sanctions sometimes facilitate greater political influence. To put it differently, concrete economic sanctions provide credibility to the political stance of the international actors and their manifest support for democracy. Economic sanctions possess two components. First, international institutions and foreign governments might provide/deprive the country from direct

loans. Authoritarian regime is deprived of this kind of aid; this creates a negative impact on macro economic variables of the country by upsetting budgetary balance. The second one is freezing up of bilateral trade relations. This would deprive the authoritarian regime of welfare-enhancing feature of trade. In other words, it would cut its export revenues (Pridham, 1991, p.215).

Third, in addition to indirect support via delegitimizing the current regime, external forces might directly support the opposition at home. First, transnational links that are established between the opposition and the international institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and/or foreign governments might provide legitimacy to the opposing forces against the authoritarian regime (Pridham, 1991, p.218). It is important to note that already-established legitimacy of the international actor in the country is a precondition for this mechanism to work. Otherwise, its support might even hinder legitimacy of the opposition. Second, external actors might "...protect the opposition from harassment by the authorities" (Latemendia, p.15 in Pridham, 1991, p.218). Since the existing regime knows that the opposition elites have certain allies abroad and support of those allies might be invoked in case of serious harassment, it might hesitate to seriously impeach certain rights and freedoms in the country. The current regime might bear the fear that already existing sanctions could be accelerated by the external forces. For instance, even though freedom of expression might be restricted by the authoritarian regime, some opposing newspapers might continue to be circulated due to external pressure in favor of the opposition. Third, transnational links between the external actors and opposing forces might "allow political parties or groups to prepare more effectively for the resumption of democratic politics" (Pridham, 1991, p.218). The readiness of an opposition is an essential component of democracy. Larry Diamond (1996, pp.119-120) states that democracies are the systems which are designed to channel competing interests that are inherently in conflict. Protection against arbitrary policies of the authoritarian system and increasing credibility of the opposition guarantees smoother transition and better democratic mechanisms in the later stages.

Finally, democratic culture can be fertilized and/or strengthened via transnational links. External actors can be effective in transmitting democratic values under authoritarian regime (Pridham, 1991, p.219). Through their critical stance of the existing regime and by manifesting their opinion in favor of democracy, foreign

governments, international institutions, transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGO) might facilitate fertilization and/or nurture of democratic values at home. In other words, democratic values are celebrated by those actors while domestic actors are socialized into desirability of this regime. By capitalizing on transnational links, domestic actors sustain the ideal of democracy and facilitate diffusion of this ideal to the masses. Defining transition to democracy as the collapse of the previous authoritarian regime and the establishment of a democratic configuration, this ideal provides an alternative vision to be implemented once the regime collapses.

Additionally, democratic culture is transmitted through the agency of media (Pridham, 1991, p.219). Media is the major tool, if nurturing democratic values is the goal. In service of this goal, media's agency is double sided. First, it informs public opinion about criticisms directed to the authoritarian regime by those external actors and about the support for the opposition. Second, the opposition can utilize channels of media in order to invoke support for its cause and to inform the international community about human rights violations and/or political harassments of the authorities within the country.

In this chapter, having defined transition to democracy as the collapse of the previous authoritarian regime and the establishment of relatively stable democratic configuration, I will, firstly, attempt to explain international influence in transition to democracy in Turkey and Greece in 1983 and 1974 respectively. I will test if diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, support for the opposition offered by the international actors, and fertilization of democratic culture via external links and agency of media were effective in encouraging transition to democracy in these two cases. I will argue that the first three are implemented on the military regime in Turkey (1980-1983) with less intensity, compared to the Greek case. Despite the pressure of international actors, the Greek colonels' regime came to end due to an extra-ordinary event- the Cyprus war (Karakatsanis, 2001, p.157). Thus, ironically, international pressure was more successful in encouraging voluntary disengagement of the Turkish military in a shorter time period in 1983. I will contend that this can be attributed to relevant interaction between domestic factors and the international forces in Turkey and in Greece. While the Turkish generals were highly receptive to the Western opinion and values, Greek colonels remained indifferent to pressures. I will conclude by stating that the difference

in attitude of the international actors had significant consequences with respect to further democratization processes in Turkey and Greece.

Historical Backgrounds of Regime Breakdowns in Turkey and Greece

The Turkish Case:

Turkish democracy broke down with the military's intervention in politics on 12 September 1980. Major crises, leading to the coup d'état could be summed up under five sub-headings. First, prior to the coup political and ideological polarization and violence between the right and the left were at their height, causing high number of casualties on the streets from both sides. Second, in 1980, the Turkish National Assembly was unable to elect its new president to replace retired president Fahri Korutürk (1973-1980) even after 100 successive rounds of balloting. Third, the politicians were unable to comprise and cooperate not only on electing president but also virtually on almost all topics. It was because, as Harris (1988, p.192) puts it, they were more concerned with maintaining their deputies in party line (when parliamentarians change parties frequently), than providing effective administration and sound political judgments. Fourth, perhaps equally significant, Turkey was undergoing major economic crisis due to increase in oil prices and decreased demand for Turkish export goods in the international market. Finally, the National Salvation Party, which was represented in the Parliament with the 8 per cent of all seats was involved in certain activities which were perceived as anti-secularist by the military, such as not attending to August 30 Victory Day (*30 Ağustos Zafer Bayramı*) and keeping silent during the play of national anthem in a party gathering (Harris, 1988, p.192).

Under this climate, in 1980, the Turkish military conducted the takeover with exceptional degree of professionalism and by preserving its unity. The takeover was well-planned by the Chief of General Staff in consultation with the field commanders. Even division of labor for special tasks among individual specialists was designated prior to the coup. Moreover, institutional design, constitutional principles, and mechanisms for use of executive power were determined before the coup was staged (Karpas, 1988, p.150). Finally, when it was 4.00 a.m. on September 12, the military announced that the Turkish Armed Forces seized power.

In reference to the above mentioned major crises, the Turkish military legitimized the coup on the grounds of civilian politicians' inability to protect the country against internal and external threats due to ideological and political fragmentation, which marked the civilian politics throughout the 1970s (Evin, 1988, pp.203-204). In his first public speech following the coup, the Chief of General Staff, Kenan Evren, explained that the Turkish Armed Forces seized the power in order to "put democracy into its right track since it is unable to function on its own"³ (Ünlü, 2005). Planning of the coup and its legitimization demonstrates that the Turkish military had perceived itself as the guardian of the state and national interest and that it had deeply distrusted civilians. In fact, the Chief of General Staff, Kenan Evren, in his speech following the coup, condemned "the politicians for their ineptitude and their disregard for the national interest" (Karpat, 1988, p.150). Now, the military was there in order to protect the national interest.

The military, with the coup, aimed to accomplish four pre-designed tasks which they believed the civilians failed to accomplish: "firstly, to suppress terrorism; secondly, to restore economic growth and stability; thirdly, to introduce a new constitution and legal arrangements which, it was hoped, would prevent another lapse into anarchy; and, fourthly, to work out effective arrangements with the civilian politicians" (Hale, 1988, p.166). In order to carry out its tasks, military members of the National Security Council⁴ (NSC) took over the power. The Turkish Grand National Assembly was abolished while the major two political parties as well as others were dissolved a year after the coup due to their uncooperative attitude and speeches and activities, detrimental to the national interest, as it was put by the military officers. Martial law was declared, and retired admiral Bülent Ulusu became the prime minister. "Ulusu announced his cabinet on 21 September: it contained 27 members, of whom six were retired Generals and the remainder were neutral bureaucrats or academics" (Hale, 1988, p.168). The Cabinet was exclusively responsible to the NSC which held far-reaching power in its hands. Indeed, all the political posts were occupied by the members of the military.

³ *My translation from Turkish.*

⁴ National Security Council was established following the 1960 coup with the article 112 of the 1961 constitution, prepared by the military officers who were in power then. It was composed of the president of the Republic, prime minister, four field commanders, and the Chief of General Staff.

During its rule, the military was relatively more successful compared to the previous civilian governments in controlling the economic crisis and performed better with respect to macro economic variables. It established law and order again, reducing the number of casualties in the streets substantially. Accomplishing their third task, the military officers also prepared a new constitution. In 1981, a Consultative Assembly consisted of 160 members from different occupations and backgrounds drafted a new constitution. Following close scrutiny by the NSC, the constitution was put into referendum in 1982 together with the referendum on the succession of the Chief of General Staff to presidency. Both the constitution and presidency of Evren were approved by the Turkish public with more than 90 per cent of votes. In the same year, convinced that their task was accomplished, the Turkish generals announced a timetable for returning to democratic rule and the transition was completed by the November 1983 democratic elections. These elections were held as scheduled albeit under substantial restrictions, which were imposed by the NSC on parties that ran in the elections and candidates that were proposed by those parties (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2009, p.1).

The Greek Case:

In Greece, the democratic regime broke down on 21 April 1967. The Greek colonels took over the government in order to exclude the newly-mobilized leftist forces from governmental power, and hence, to protect the interests of the extreme right against the leftist threat. During the 1960s, Greece was undergoing high level of economic growth and industrialization and concomitant to that, high levels of urbanization and expansion of the working class. Urbanization and newly-developed consciousness of the workers made the inequalities more visible in the social scene while found its reflection in the political arena, as well. George Papandreou came to power by gaining the support of those societal forces by promising greater equality and significant social and economic reforms. In fact, the Center Union of Papandreou was able to secure parliamentary majority over the rightist National Radical Union (ERE) in the November 1963 elections (Karakatsanis, 2001, pp.3-4). Under this climate, the right felt threatened by the left and suspected that it would conduct a communist revolution. The first prime minister of the junta regime, Kollias stated that the military takeover in

Greece was “not a revolution but a counter revolution... to prevent a communist revolution which was imminent” (Cited in Roufos, 1972, p.148).

Similar to its Turkish counterpart, when it came to power, the Greek military banned all political parties and declared martial law. The press and media were silenced under heavy censorship rules during junta regime (Yannopoulos, 1972, p.164). Yet, despite the terror and harsh restrictions of the junta, opposition groups still developed. It goes without saying that the majority of these groups were organized by the leftist groups and some pro-democratic liberals. Indeed, the left got strengthened during the junta period to such an extent that Yannopoulos (1972, p.164) calls it as the new-orientation of Greek politics. It might be seen as a result of Greek public discontent to the colonels’ regime. In fact, unlike its Turkish counterpart, the Greek military lacked legitimacy in public and the international scene during its seven years of rule (Verney & Couloumbis, 1991, p.107). On 17 November 1973, the protest of students of the Athens Polytechnic University against the junta regime was suppressed brutally, leaving 24 civilian casualties, most of whom were university students. The event diminished internal and external legitimacy of the colonels even further. On 25 November, Ioannides overthrew Papadopoulos- former leader of the coup and the first president of the regime by accusing him of betraying the principles of the coup (Veremis, 1997, p.167). It can be seen as an attempt to renew legitimacy of the junta after November 17 events in order to stay in power.

Colonels, indeed, were solely motivated by their desire to remain in power. Contrary to the Turkish military, Greek junta in 1967 did not have any consistent ideology, plan, or even future vision for the country. They justified the coup on the grounds of leftist threat. Yet, once they came in power, their agenda seemed to be unclear. Soon after the coup, they adopted the vague rhetoric of “Hellenic-Christian civilization” implying that religious and nationalist sentiments would be dominant in the new polity (Veremis, 1997, p.159). In August 1967, the junta prepared its own constitution and put into referendum under the strict martial law rules. The constitution was approved with 92 per cent of votes by the Greek public. Indeed, the constitution seemed to be designed in order to justify the presence of military in power and to give extraordinary authority to the military members such as all ministries except for premiership, Constitutional Court membership, and the other key political posts. Besides significant political posts, seven years of rule was marked by clientalism and

nepotism for the military members who were below in the chain of command (Veremis, 1997, p.163).

Eventually, the colonels' regime came to an end with the defeat of the Greek armed forces in the Cyprus war against the Turkish army in 1974 following the *enosis* attempt of the Greek Colonels. The Colonels planned a coup on the island against the President Makarios in order to integrate Cyprus to Greece. In response to this attempt, on 20 July 1974, the Turkish army started to deploy its armed forces on the island. Greek Colonels were so much divided politically and ideologically after seven years in political power and far from professionalism due to clientalistic and nepotistic behavior in rule that they could not react to the Turkish military campaign in Cyprus. Veremis (1997, p.167) explains that "...junta had either to declare war and risk the consequences, or back down and face public humiliation" and adds that "Unable or unwilling to choose the former, it preferred to step down in favor of the politicians". As its incapability of protecting the country against an external threat was revealed; in the aftermath of the defeat, it was impossible for the Greek military to sustain its political position (Karakatsanis, 2001, p.157). On 23 July 1974, the junta period in Greece officially ended and Constantine Karamanlis who was the former prime minister of Greece and the leader of ERE was called back from his self-imposed exile in Paris to hold premiership.

International Responses to Democratic Breakdowns in Turkey and Greece

Diplomatic Isolation

The European Community, Council of Europe, IMF, World Bank, United States, and several Western European countries were particularly effective in the transition periods in Turkey and in Greece. Some of them positively contributed to the process via threatening those countries with diplomatic isolation or via actual enforcement of that threat. For Greece, the situation can be seen as more immense, compared to Turkey, in terms of diplomatic sanctions. Xydis (1972, p.195) defines the extent of diplomatic isolation that Greek junta faced by stating that the country "...was put by Western European countries into a sort of quarantine or, at best, on probation". The Council of Europe expelled Greece from membership on 12 December 1969 due to junta's

undemocratic practices such as harsh censorship on media and human rights violations (Xydis, 1972, p. 195). In addition to Council of Europe, the European Community unilaterally froze its associational agreement with Greece which was signed in 1962. Moreover, "... the firm attitude of the Commission, supported by the continual pressure from the European Parliament, made it clear that no improvement in Greek-EC relations was to be expected while Greece remained under military rule" (Verney & Couloumbis, 1991, p.109). Scandinavian countries such as Norway, Iceland, and Denmark, Benelux countries, and Germany, Canada and Italy problematized Greece's participation in NATO due to democratic breakdown in the country. Those criticisms were countered by the United States by emphasizing the Cold War context and geostrategic position of Greece. The country preserved its position in NATO. It was, however, "a fact that Greece was morally and politically isolated from her natural friends and allies in Western Europe" (Xydis, 1972, p.198). One after another, Western European governments froze their diplomatic relations with Greece. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark closed their embassies in Athens and were represented solely by *chargés d'affaires* in Greece; whilst Greek ambassadors in those countries and in Belgium were called back. Germany refused to accredit a military officer as ambassador and retained the previous civil ambassador in Bonn (Xydis, 1972, p.198).

Diplomatic isolation and its damaged international image discomforted the Greek junta. With a futile attempt to recover its international image and to establish new alliances, it tried to improve its bilateral relations with some of the Arab and North African countries such as Egypt and Libya. Moreover, the Colonels' regime attempted to have good relations with Eastern European countries and even with the Soviet Russia even though domestically the communists were pointed as the number one enemies of the state and the motherland (Xydis, 1972, pp.199-201). This demonstrates that the authoritarian regime was highly affected by diplomatic sanctions. Thus, it searched for remedies against its diplomatic isolation by attempting to ally with new states instead of those Western ones.

Furthermore, being discredited by the international institutions and the Western European governments put further constraints on the legitimacy of the junta at home. It shall be reminded that from the beginning the Colonels' regime was not entertained with high level of legitimacy in the Greek public eye. Yannopoulos (1972, p.176) notes that there was a mass public demonstration against the regime and in favor of

democracy in George Papandreou's funeral on 3 November 1968. The protest demonstrated the extent of the opposition to authoritarianism in Greece. However, foreign manifestations of hostility towards the regime arouse public discontent even further and encouraged it against the junta (Xydis, 1972, p.197). In addition to encouragement, foreign critique supported and fostered public resistance. The burden of legitimacy was doubled by internal and external pressure on the Greek junta, which are mutually-reinforcing and reducing the regime's sustainability.

Contrary to the Greek case, in Turkey, transition occurred on the backdrop of a different domestic political setting. The Turkish military, unlike its Greek counterpart, did not lose its political legitimacy when it was in power. This might be attributed to the relatively short seizure of power by the military and its rush in announcing the timetable for returning back to democracy just one year after the coup. Success of the military in the economic realm and restoring law and order in the country by successfully tackling with internal security problems of the country such as separatist and ideological terror incidents also contributed to the legitimacy of the authoritarian rule. Moreover, initial position of the military was in favor of re-establishing democracy following a short interim period. Western governments and international institutions were already assured of this intention prior to the coup (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, p.5- p.14). Hence, in international opinion, and in Turkish public opinion alike, the military was not perceived as an anti-democratic force, if not a pro-democratic one.

Under this climate, initially, the European Commission and the European Council stated that they understood domestic strains in Turkey which were used to justify the coup by the Turkish military. They called upon the military to guide the country to democracy the soonest possible. Yet, it might be claimed that the European Parliament and the Council of Europe assumed a slightly more critical stance in its rhetoric compared to the Commission and the Council towards the military regime in Turkey. Contrary to those institutions, NATO and the United States emphasized strategic importance of Turkey as a crucial Western ally and evaded condemnation of the regime (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, pp. 32-36). Therefore, early on, Turkey did not experience diplomatic isolation as immense as Greece.

In the beginning of 1981, the human rights situation in the country deteriorated. Arbitrary political arrestments were conducted and those detainees were kept very long

period of custody (45 days) without any charge by the martial law officers. Moreover, torture incidents under arrestment started to be reported. Suppression of the opposition turned harsher. Bülent Ecevit, prominent politician prior to the coup and an eminent opposition figure⁵ was arrested three times and served in jail because of his critical stance against the military regime. During junta period, 300.000 Turkish citizens demanded asylum due to political reasons from various European countries (Ünlü, 2005). As the human right abuses accelerated and the Western European institutions and governments were informed about those abuses through refugees and the channels of media, the rhetoric of Council of Europe and the European Community was transformed into a more critical one. Concrete sanctions, such as diplomatic isolation and economic sanctioning, came into agenda (Gürsoy and Aydın-Düzgit, 2008, pp.37-38). Similar to the Greek case, the EC froze its aid to Turkey (Karaosmanoğlu, 1991, p. 162). Moreover, the rhetoric of the European institutions turned harsher as well. “The EU proved to be an extremely active and vocal source of criticism of the military regime...” after 1981 (Öniş, 1999, p.128). Council of Europe threatened the country with expulsion. Similar to the Greek case, this put an extra burden of legitimacy on the Turkish military regime, precipitating the military to announce the timetable for democratic transition (Aydın-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008; Öniş, 1999; Karaosmanoğlu, 1991).

With respect to the Turkish and Greek cases, it can be concluded that NATO adopted a more pragmatic stance towards the authoritarian regimes. This might stem from the fact that NATO has been first and foremost a collective security organization. From the beginning, democracy did not present a moral postulate for the organization. However, it can be speculated that if foreign policies of Turkish and Greek military regimes were to deviate from the alliance due to regime change, NATO’s initial reaction could have been different. Then (in 1983) the CIA president, Stanfield Turner, states that in the Cold War context, “we did not care if the one in charge was a good person. What was important was that it was *our* person” (Ünlü, 2005).

⁵ Bülent Ecevit was the leader of the Republican Peoples Party, one of the significant parliamentary groups together with the Justice Party and National Salvation Party prior to the coup. He voiced his criticisms of the military regime through a journal, he edited, called *Arayış* (Search). The journal was banned in May 1982. Bülent Ecevit was arrested in November 1982 due to the accusation of violating the decree, that prohibited the former politicians to express their opinion on political or legal system of Turkey (Hale, 1994, p.169).

In contrast to NATO, the European Community institutions were more supportive of democracy both in the Turkish and Greek regime breakdowns. The European Commission, as well as the European Parliament and the Council, emphasized the significance of a quick return to democracy. Nonetheless, their reaction to the Turkish and the Greek juntas were disparate. While harsher economic and political sanctions were put into effect against the Greek junta such as freezing of the association agreement with the country and expulsion from Council of Europe, they remained slightly more understanding towards the regime in Turkey⁶. This might be attributed to the initial justification and purpose of the coup in Turkey. Additionally, due to its self-declared duty of Westernizing and modernizing the country, Western allies of Turkey were convinced that the military would eventually guide the country to democracy. Yet, pro-democratic and critical stance of the European institutions and Western governments helped to speed the transition process up while encouraging the military officers to return back to democratic regime as soon as possible in Turkey. Compared to the Turkish case, political opinion of the European institutions and Western governments attempted to innervate democracy in Greece through a different tool- diplomatic isolation and external and internal de-legitimization.

Economic Sanctions

Political impact of the international actors on transition is compounded by their ability to impose economic conditionality. Since material benefits proved to be strong incentives for countries to conduct political change, through economic incentives, they are able to have more credible impact on the direction of the democratization. Fully-aware of this fact, for instance, the European Community, following the regime breakdowns both in Greece and Turkey, suspended its economic aid, stemming from the association agreement of those countries. Especially, in Greek case, it had vital consequences. The junta was already passing through a disastrous economic crisis which was worsened by the suspension of the EC aid (Verney & Couloumbis, 1991, p. 108). Moreover, “the EC was Greece’s main trading partner, in 1972 providing 47 per

⁶ Turkey already froze its Association Agreement with the European Community in 1978, unilaterally. The difference between the responses of the Community to Turkish and Greek case can also be attributed to the fact that the EC lacked a tool in the Turkish case which it possessed in the Greek regime breakdown.

cent of its imports and taking over 48 per cent of its exports” (Verney & Coulombis, 1991, p.109). Hence, the suspension of economic relations between the EC and Greece had adverse economic consequences for the Greek junta. Deepened economic difficulties raised popular discontent which decreased the legitimacy of the regime even further. Together with contributing to de-legitimization of the military rule, the EC’s economic incentives played a crucial role in the decision of establishing democratic rule. As Huntington (1996, p.5) suggests following the transition “in Greece... the establishment of democracy was seen necessary to secure the economic benefits of EC membership...” In other words, the prospect of material benefits hoped to be gained through membership to the EC secured the necessary motive for the transition to democracy in Greece.

In the Turkish case, suspension of the EC aid was certainly undesirable from the military’s point of view. The EC, following the coup, blocked aid which was the extension of Fourth Financial Protocol (Dağı, 2001, p.24). Yet, since, the Turkish military regime lasted for a shorter period; it did not have equivalent consequences on the Turkish military. Moreover, the military rule in Turkey was an economic recovery period compared to the civilian rule prior to the coup. Hence, in connection with other domestic circumstances, the blocking of aid did not have the same effect that it did in Greece. Nevertheless, economic sanctions in the form of cutting the direct loans might have been conducive for the Turkish military to retract from power in a shorter period than it might have otherwise desired.

Although the European Community utilized economic sanctions in order to encourage democratization both in Greece and in Turkey, it is hard to claim the same for other Western institutions. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank during the military regime did not suspend their aid to Turkey. The World Bank, in April 1981, endorsed a structural loan worth 304.5 million dollars, while the IMF sanctioned 75 million dollars in 1983 (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, p.24). Much more significant than those aids in quantity, the United States (US) provided economic and military aid to Turkey, worth 2.253 billion dollars during the military regime years (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, p.23). Similarly, Yannopoulos (1972, p.174) names the United States as one of the “power basis of the regime” in Greece, effective in sustaining the colonels in power with the military, economic, and moral support it offered. Furthermore, some scholars speculate that the military takeover in Greece in

1967 was realized via the US support due its concerns about the leftist threat in the country (Verney & Couloumbis, 1991, p.106; Veremis, 1997, pp.155-156). Even if it is hard to detect if there was direct involvement of the United States in the regime breakdown, it is certain that it offered its support to the junta militarily and economically. Moreover, as a part of the moral support, "...American diplomats in Europe were actively- and unsuccessfully- lobbying against a condemnation of Greece by the Council of Europe" (Goldbloom, 1972, p.248) while American state officials were emphasizing significance of Greece for the Eastern Mediterranean flank of NATO (Yannopoulos, 1972, p.174). In Turkish case, as well, the American ministries paid frequent visits to Turkey and declared their understanding of internal situation in Turkey and importance of the country as a Western ally while relentlessly aiming to counter European criticisms towards Turkey by Council of Europe, the European Community institutions, and the Western governments (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, p.26).

Why did the United States, NATO, IMF and World Bank acted in support of the military regimes in Greece and in Turkey as opposed to the European institutions and European governments? For Greece, Yannopoulos (1972, p.174) explains that the US approached to regime question through its strategic and security concerns and adds that "the Colonels have proved completely docile: they never raised any problem concerning the use of bases and they even agreed... to the establishment of a nuclear submarine base in the Western Peloponnese". It should be added that prior to the coup, an alternative government in Greece was the center-left who might have been harder to cooperate for American security objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean. For Turkey, Aydin-Düzgit and Gürsoy (2008, p.18) suggest that "a strong and stable Turkey was in the strategic interests of the US and NATO and Western officials were relieved when the Turkish military, which was pro-Western and pro-NATO seized power in September 1980". An American National Security official claims that "The military takeover in Turkey was welcomed by the National Security officials. They said 'Boys in Ankara did it'" (Ünlü, 2005). Moreover, the highest assurances of both Greek and Turkish officials concerning the commitment of their countries to NATO and to the friendship with the US were effective in the US's particular attitude. Then (in 1983) the CIA president, Stanfield Turner states that "Maintaining good, friendly relations in the

context of the Cold War was more important” for the US “than human rights or the form of government” in an allied country (Ünlü, 2005).

With respect to the divergence between the Europeans and Americans, Treholt (1972, pp.220-222) affirms that the Europeans were occupied with long-term considerations while Americans prioritized short term security benefits. Europeans were aware that cooperation and friendly relations with non-democracies were much harder to sustain in the long term. Furthermore, as the public opinion started to assert higher pressure on their governments in Western Europe, the option of standing favorable to the military regimes became unaffordable. Therefore, for the Greek and Turkish cases, we might contend that Americans acted in line with short-term strategic and pragmatic considerations while Europeans, under the pressure of public opinion, took a more long-term oriented moral objection to the military regimes.

Support for and Legitimization of the Opposition

In addition to the demand for moral condemnation of the military regimes, public opinion pressure in Western Europe was concrete with regards to the protection of human rights under the military regimes both in Turkey and in Greece. The European Community as well as Council of Europe and some Western European countries paid particular attention to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms during the authoritarian regime as well as throughout the transition period. For instance, on March 1968, the Scandinavian countries brought a case in front of the European Commission of Human Rights and demanded expulsion of Greece from the Council of Europe due to extensive use of torture by the Greek junta (Treholt, 1972, p.214). In 1969, the country was expelled from the institution due to human rights abuses.

Even though the Council of Europe did not expel Turkey, it “...sent delegations...to undertake ‘fact finding missions’” in order to investigate human rights situation “and then report their findings to the Assembly in relation to Turkey’s membership” (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2008, p.44). As the human rights situation deteriorated in the country, possibility of expulsion came into agenda and was voiced by some officials of the institution. In addition to Council of Europe, the European Parliament presented a vocal point of criticism against human rights abuses, use of

torture, and restrictions on freedom of speech both in Turkey (Dağı, 2001, p.20) and in Greece during authoritarian rule.

Sensitivity of the Western European governments and the European institutions with respect to human rights until the authoritarian regime collapsed in Greece helped the protection of the opposition from harassment by the authorities, aided transition to democracy by diminishing the legitimacy of power-holders, and by assuring the opening up of the regime. For instance, the Colonels' regime arrested some members of Democratic Greek Resistance Movement (DEKA) which aimed at overthrowing the existing regime in Greece and replacing it with a democratic one. Even though this group did not attempt to realize their aims by any violent action, the colonels were intolerant of any opinion against the regime. Yet, under the international pressure, the Greek colonels were forced to grant amnesty to some of those political detainees in December 1967 which assured the release of most of DEKA members (Yannopoulos, 1972, p.179). In some cases, international pressure directly intervened in order to protect the opposition such as saving Alexander Panagoulis⁷ and Lady Fleming⁸ from death sentence. On 7 October 1971, some American intellectuals appealed to Greek authorities for not conducting capital punishment. International public opinion raised for both resistance members prevented junta from executing the sentence.

In addition to protection of human rights during transition period, and perhaps more importantly, external sources provide legitimacy to the opposition, encouraging them against the existing regime and for the resumption of democracy. For instance, Mikis Theodorakis, a famous composer and a well-known figure of opposition as the Chairman of Patriotic Front (PAM), held a conference in Paris in April 1970, under the auspices of the French government, where he manifested his outline for the unification of the opposition. In July, in the same year, Greek intellectuals prepared a book called 'eighteen texts', embracing short stories, poems and essays. External actors were quick to congratulate the book (Roufos, 1972, p. 159). Colonels' regime hesitated to take any

⁷ Alexander Panagoulis attempted to assassinate George Papadopoulos, the leader of the Greek junta between the years 1967 and 1973 and had been charged with death sentence which was never conducted.

⁸ Lady Fleming was Greek-born widow of Sir Alexander Fleming and a political activist in the resistance movement during the authoritarian rule in Greece and died on 27 February 1986 as a PASOK deputy (New York Times, 1982).

action against those intellectuals in order not to harm its international image further. In addition to intellectual movements, certain other political opposition groups were established in several Western European countries and continued to oppose the regime from abroad, such as “Anexartiti Aristera (Independent Left- based in Italy, Revolutionary Socialist Groups (based in Paris and London), Revolutionary Greek Communist Party (based in Germany), International Greek Workers’ Movement (Trotskyite- based in London and Germany)” (Yannopoulos, 1972, pp.172- 173).

Evidently, external actors were effective in legitimizing the opposition in Greece. Nevertheless, it is hard to claim that external actors entailed similar legitimacy to the Turkish opposition groups. Although, the Council of Europe, the European Community institutions were critical of the human rights violations in Turkey and their initial forgiving attitude towards the regime was altered by the human right abuses of the military authorities, such as, they did not directly contact with any opposition group, neither legitimized it. Aydin-Düzgit and Gürsoy (2008, p. 14-17) suggests that the Turkish military was already believed to be pro-democratic by the Western sources and the opposition to the junta consisted of radical left or right groups, which had resorted to terror prior to the coup. Therefore, there was no pro-democratic opposition to be supported by external forces in order to aid the transition to democracy in Turkey. The Greek case stands out disparate to the Turkish case in this respect. The Greek junta had no initial aim of democratizing the country while the opposition was firmly in favor of democracy.

Fertilization of Democratic Culture

Elite Socialization

External actors might aid transition to democracy in a country by fertilizing and/or strengthening democratic culture. One component of fertilization of democratic culture is democratic socialization of elites. It is important to note that elite socialization refers to informing the domestic elites concerning the importance of democracy for the external actors and to reproducing this idea through interaction with those elites or

through the agency of media. Also, democratic culture is used strictly in relation to the vision and establishment of democracy in the country by the elites.⁹

For the Greek and Turkish cases, democratic socialization under the influence of external actors occurred through different groups of domestic elites. For the Turkish case, it was the military whose commitment to democracy was riveted through its interaction with the West¹⁰. The Turkish military, starting from the late Ottoman period and during the Republican era, has been a modernizing and Westernizing force in Turkish politics. (Rustow, 1994; Hale, 1994; Karaosmanoğlu; 1994) The military's commitment to the Western style government which implies institutionalization of minimum democratic requirements is one of the essential components of its Westernization bid. Inter alia, this commitment can be seen as a result of the increased interaction between the Western world and the Turkish military since the 19th century.

In the Republican era, Western world have had flesh and bonds through the European Community and the Council of Europe for Turkey. The Turkish military, as a component of its ideological world view, prioritized Turkey's relations with those institutions. Due to the self-declared role of the Turkish military for modernizing and Westernizing the country, the military members were highly receptive to the Western values and opinion. Therefore, between the years 1980 to 1983, the Western opinion in favor of democracy was significant in quick voluntary retraction of the military. Öniş (1999, p.128) states that "...external pressures associated with the EU linkage have ...been a variable considerable significance in limiting the durability and intensity of military rule in Turkey" and speculates that "...in the absence of direct and vocal EU pressure, the military regime would have installed itself and institutionalized its rule for a longer period before returning to democratic rule". As a proof of what has been claimed by Öniş, for instance, Muhsin Batur, the Air Force Commander prior to the

⁹ For discussion concerning civic culture, see Almond and Verba (1980). Civic culture discussions, in a nut shell, refer to the assumed positive correlation between civic culture and stable democracy. In this chapter, by democratic culture, I do not refer to stability of democratic institutions but to the willingness of domestic elites in the country.

¹⁰It should be kept in mind that in this thesis I analyzed only the official rhetoric of the members of the military and of the institution. Analysis on concrete actions of the Turkish Armed Forces might lead to different conclusion by different researchers.

coup, in response to a question regarding the possibility of a longer- lasting military regime in Turkey, stated that:

“The Western World cannot accept this sort of system and procedure. It is just not good enough to say ‘if they don’t accept it, then so be it’. If we give way (i.e. adopt the proposed plan) we’ll get support from the Eastern bloc and Red China, but that would be a disaster for Turkey” (Cited in Hale, 1988, p.162).

Hence, the elite political socialization for a genuine commitment of avoiding a long-lasting military rule and for establishing civilian government apace in Turkey has been realized, on the one hand, through the military elites’ long-lasting interaction with the Western world in general, with the EC and Council of Europe in particular. On the other hand, those institutions and the Western governments reproduced this effect through maintaining democratic values and informing the elites on the significance of them at the European level.

Compared to the Turkish case, the Greek elites’ socialization occurred through a different mechanism. Firstly, it was the civilian elites rather than the military ones who were drawn into the ideal of democracy or consolidated their beliefs in democracy as a result of getting into contact with the European elites. For instance, Karamanlis had been living in Paris. Many other Greek political elites, such as C. Mitsotakis, A. Papandreou, M. Theodorakis, H. Vlachos, ex- King Constantine and M. Mercouri (Verney & Coulombis, 1991, p.110) were in exile in Europe, too; and, like Karamanlis, had constant contact with the European elites. Greek political elites might be claimed to be inevitably affected by this connection on the virtue of democracy. Secondly, the very power holder of the regime, the Greek Colonels were not inclined to transform the regime into democracy unlike the Turkish military. Hence, it might be claimed that the European Community was effective in political socialization of civilian elites in Greece while in the Turkish case, it was the military itself.

Media

Although diverging in critical points, the Turkish and Greek authoritarian regimes, in the period of 1980-1983 and 1967-1974 had several common points. Both of them restricted freedom of speech harshly, implemented strict censorship rules on media and aimed to increase their own propaganda newspapers, television and radio

channels. During the authoritarian period, access of the opposition to media tools was restricted in both countries. Nevertheless, foreign broadcasting and newspapers turned to be effectively used by the opposition groups. Moreover, Western governments as well as Western institutions used the sources of media in order to voice their criticism concerning the existing regimes and their opinion on the virtue of democracy.

In Turkey, during the authoritarian rule, the military adopted the rhetoric of 'state of siege' and pointed at the pre-coup media as one of 'betrayers' who were responsible for provoking the political crisis in the country. Subsequently, the junta passed laws and amended the constitution's clauses which were related to freedom of speech. Indeed, these restricted the exercise of the right to a great extent. Under these circumstances, the media was transformed and some of the newspapers turned towards mere commercial ventures. Yet, there were some, like Cumhuriyet which retained its political line, but they encountered severe intimidation by the military regime (Groc, 1994, pp. 201- 203). Therefore, the use of media by the Turkish opposition remained limited. As a bold attempt, former prime minister, Bülent Ecevit returned to his early career of journalism, by editing the magazine Search (Arayış). However, Ecevit was removed from editorship on 2 June 1981, while the magazine, itself, was closed by the junta in March 1982 (Hale, 1988, p.169).

Public opinion was informed about the criticisms directed to the Turkish military regime about the human rights violations by the Council of Europe and European Community institutions. For instance, the Turkish media covered closely the visit of Council of Europe rapporteur on a fact finding mission about human rights and democracy and informed the Turkish public about the Assembly's opinion, stating that "only states, respecting democratic principles can maintain their membership of the Council of Europe" (Dağı, 1998, p.132). The critical stance of the European Parliament and the case which was brought by several Western European government such as France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in order to expel Turkey from the Council of Europe due to human rights violations were generally held by the Turkish as well as foreign press. Although there is no sufficient evidence to claim that this reduced the legitimacy of the military regime in Turkish public, publication of criticisms by the Western institutions in Turkish and foreign media put further pressure on the military to return to barracks and to leave the power to the civilian politicians.

In lieu of ‘state of siege’ rhetoric of the Turkish military, the Greek junta adopted the discourse of goodness of ‘state and motherland’. Strict censorship on media was justified on the grounds of protecting sacred interests of the Greek state and motherland. In a memorable speech, Colonel Ladas, the minister of order in the junta regime, declared that “Good art is that which is good for the Motherland. Bad art is that which is bad for the Motherland” (Cited in Roufos, 1972, p. 153). Evidently what is good or bad for the Motherland was decided by the Colonels’ regime. Under the strict inspection by the regime, Greek intellectuals and artists refused to publish their work during the early years of junta. Roufos (1972, p.136) names this as the ‘silent strike of the intellectuals’. Under this climate, foreign media was crucial in aiding the opposition’s voice to be heard. Even though there were stringent rules governing the Greek media, foreign newspapers such as *Le Monde* and the *Guardian* were in circulation and foreign broadcasting was allowed to relay. These foreign media channels were continuously publishing criticisms directed at the Junta by the Western institutions, foreign governments, and the opposition in exile. For instance, protest of George Seferis¹¹ against the regime was circulated in the foreign newspapers and broadcasted in foreign channels, informing the Greek public about the opposition movement; and, hence, aiding the resistance movement by publicizing it. As discussed earlier, legitimization of the opposition and publicizing the criticisms directed at the junta regime reduced the sustainability of regime by diminishing its public legitimacy.

Repercussions of Different International Contexts of Transition in Turkey and Greece

International response to the Greek and Turkish military regimes differed fundamentally with respect to type and intensity of diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and gravity of human rights criticisms directed at the regime. Therefore, these two cases demonstrate that the international mechanism throughout transition to democracy may not necessarily work in the same way. Type of the authoritarian regime, nature of the transition, and foreign policy choices of the junta during authoritarian regime affect international reactions to the regime. The Turkish military’s pro-

¹¹ George Seferis was a Nobel Prize winner poet and career diplomat in Greek Foreign Service. He has become one of the symbols of the resistance against the Junta with his “memeorable statement of protest against the dictatorship” (Roufos, 1972, p.157).

democratic stance and justification of the coup by the economic and political crises was effective in producing lenient attitude by the international community. Moreover, the military's rush in announcing the timetable for transition to democracy was another factor, which ensured the international actors that the military intended to return to democracy. However, the Greek colonels seized power for an indefinite period and attempted to stiffen its rule during the seven years of authoritarian regime. Indeed, ambition of colonels to remain in power exalted the degree of criticism and hostile attitude of the international actors towards the regime.

The Greek regime collapsed due to the military defeat in Cyprus war against the Turkish armed forces, not due to above mentioned tools and mechanisms of international pressure. As Karakatsanis (2001, p.127) puts it, humiliating defeat in Cyprus discredited the existing Colonels' regime and forced the junta to retract from power. Although it was the fact that internal factor pressured the colonels' regime and forced it for liberalization as the evidence set forth, they did not bring the regime down, per se. On the other hand, in the Turkish case, all those mechanisms worked with less intensity. The international community did not pressure Turkish generals as much those Greek colonels. Economic sanctions were relatively less intense, while diplomatic isolation cannot be seen as equal to that of Greek junta. Yet, the result was voluntary disengagement of the Turkish military and many scholars point that one of the reasons was the international pressure which facilitated this quick delegation of power to civilians (Öniş, 1999; Dağı, 2001; Karaosmanoğlu, 1991; Aydın-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2009).

Indeed, the Greek and Turkish cases stand very demonstrative in this sense. It might be claimed that contrary to the common belief in the literature, it is not the defined mechanisms and tools of the international actors which lead to successful collapse of the authoritarian regimes. Ironically, none of the two authoritarian regimes collapsed due to international pressure on the junta. As the Turkish case showed, even if those sanctions are implemented to a lesser degree the outcome could be voluntary disengagement of the military, while harsh sanctioning may not always lead to collapse of the regime as the Greek case demonstrated. Ultimately, interaction and relation between domestic actors and the international opinion determine the success of transition to democracy. That is to say, the Turkish Generals highly prioritized the Western opinion on the country's regime and condemnation against junta and

encouragement for democratic regime were effective in quick retraction of the generals from power. Contrary to the Turkish case, the Greek colonels had already isolated themselves from the Western allies. Hence, they were not in a position to respond to those sanctions even if they were highly affected. To sum up, for the international community to influence transition in a positive direction, the very power-holders in the country with the authoritarian regime shall prioritize the international view and respond to it.

| | Greece | Turkey |
|---|--|---|
| Diplomatic Isolation | <p><i>*Expelled from the Council of Europe</i></p> <p><i>*EC Association Agreement was frozen</i></p> <p><i>*Scandinavian countries, Germany, Canada, Italy and Benelux countries applied for expulsion from NATO</i></p> <p><i>*Sweden, Norway, Denmark closed their embassies in Athens</i></p> <p><i>*European Commission, European Parliament, Council of Ministers directed harsh criticism to the regime</i></p> | <p><i>*Threatened to expelled from the Council of Europe</i></p> <p><i>*Threatened to freeze up the Association Agreement</i></p> <p><i>*No application was made for expulsion from NATO</i></p> <p><i>*No country closed its embassy in Ankara due to regime breakdown</i></p> <p><i>*EC institutions expressed their grave concerns and called the generals for return to democracy quickly</i></p> |
| Economic Sanctions | <p><i>*EC aid was frozen immediately after the breakdown</i></p> <p><i>*IMF, World Bank, and the US aid was continued to be supplemented</i></p> <p><i>*OECD aid was blocked</i></p> | <p><i>*The EC, first, threatened with freezing up its aid. After two years, the aid was blocked.</i></p> <p><i>*IMF, World Bank, and the US aid continued to be supplemented</i></p> |
| Support for and Legitimization of the Opposition | <p><i>*Support for the opposition groups (such as DEKA, PAM), individuals (such as Alexander Panagouli), and for intellectuals by Western governments</i></p> <p><i>*Protection of Clandestine opposition organizations in</i></p> | <p><i>*No support or legitimization of the opposition except for Bülent Ecevit and condemnation of human rights violations of opposition groups</i></p> |

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| | <i>different parts of Europe</i> | |
| <p>Fertilization of Democratic Culture</p> <p>a. Elite Socialization</p> <p>b. Foreign Media</p> | <p><i>*Not the Colonels who but Karamanlis and other political elites in exile socialized into democratic ideas.</i></p> <p><i>*Foreign media was critical</i></p> | <p><i>*The Turkish Military/ Generals favored Western type of government before the coup</i></p> <p><i>*Foreign media was critical</i></p> |

Table 1- Responses of the International Community to the Authoritarian Regimes in Turkey and Greece in 1983 and in 1974 respectively

Different stances, adopted by international actors towards the Greek and Turkish authoritarian regimes (see Table 1) had further consequences. The Turkish military did not lose its legitimacy at home, partly, due to the lenient attitude of the international actors. Rather, it strengthened its role as the protector of democracy domestically- a role which was partially justified by the understanding rhetoric adopted by some international actors such as the European Commission. Kenan Evren, the Chief of General Staff during the military takeover and the first president of the post-junta period, claims that “Our allies (allies of Turkey) were happy that we (the Turkish military) took over”¹². The Turkish generals were convinced that their attempt to “to put democracy into the right track” as Evren, himself, puts it, were welcomed by external forces, as well as the Turkish public (Ünlü, 2005). This stiffened the belief of the military as the guardian of the state.

Preservation of legitimacy when it was in power allowed the Turkish military to assure institutional prerogatives for itself following the transition and those institutional guarantees were justified through the role of the Turkish military as the guardian of democracy in Turkey. Unlike the Turkish army, domestic legitimacy of the Greek

¹² *My translation from Turkish.*

colonels, among other things, was weakened by the hostile attitude of the international actors which were harsher towards the junta, compared to the Turkish case. In order to deprive the junta of legitimacy, the international actors adopted a more critical and harsher rhetoric while imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions were imposed. Moreover, domestic opposition towards the regime was encouraged and fostered by the international forces. Hence, the Greek colonels unlike the Turkish counterpart could not preserve any institutional guarantees for themselves, following its retraction from power.

Inter alia, those different attitudes, adopted by the international actors towards Turkish and Greek military regimes would have further consequences on democratic consolidation phases of those two countries. Preserved legitimacy of the Turkish military proved to be detrimental for consolidation, while the Greek military's deprivation of legitimacy could be seen more conducive to democracy. Together with the impact of different attitudes that were adopted by the international actors during the authoritarian period, international context of democratic consolidation in Greece and in Turkey will be discussed in the following chapter.

II. International Factors and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey and Greece: *Convincing the National Elites to Democratize*

Turkey and Greece successfully completed their transitions in 1983 and in 1975, respectively. In Turkey it was the military which voluntarily disengaged and opened the path of transition, while in Greece, Constantine Karamanlis and his party New Democracy guided the country to democracy. Now, their regimes would be faced with a new challenge. They had to gain support and compliance of all significantly political groups (including the ones who initiated the transition) with the democratic rules of the game. In other words, they had to consolidate their democracies.

Defining Democratic Consolidation

Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle (1995, p.3) contend that "...transition results in creation of a new regime; consolidation results in the stability and persistence of that regime..." In order to ensure persistence and stability, according to Linz and Stepan (1995, p.5), "democracy should be the only game in town" which means all the actors, groups, and institutions shall accept and internalize democratic rules. In line with Linz's conclusions, according to Gunther et al (1995, p.3) democratic consolidation, as a concept, refers to a democratic system in which none of the politically significant groups challenge or attempt to challenge democracy with their actions; while, common consensus on acceptability and legitimacy of those institutions underlines domestic politics. In other words, politically significant groups, including masses, offer their behavioral compliance and attitudinal support for democratic establishment in a consolidated democracy (Gunther et al., 1995, p.3).

Borrowing from Linz and Gunther et al., in this thesis, democratic consolidation will refer to the condition that all the rules and procedures of democracy are complied and seen as legitimate by all politically significant groups within the polity. Additionally, trust among the actors that the others also will be offering their genuine support for democracy will be referred as another feature of consolidated democracies.

Since, in the absence of trust, legitimacy of democratic institutions would diminish and actors would hesitate to play the democratic game¹³.

With respect to this definition, in this thesis, Turkey will be classified as an unconsolidated democracy due to its failure to ensure attitudinal support and behavioral compliance of all politically significant groups in Turkish politics. It will be argued that reluctance of the military to fully submit to the democratic rules of the game due to its deep distrust to civilian politicians and the role of the military in domestic politics stand as an obstacle in front of consolidation in Turkey. On the other hand, as it is commonly acknowledged, Greece will be referred as a consolidated democracy since there is no significant group, actor or institution who challenges or attempt to undermine democratic establishment (Karakatsanis, 2001; Pridham, 1995; Linz, Stepan & Gunther, 1995; Gunther, Puhle & Diamandouros, 1995).

In this chapter, I will analyze the international context of consolidation processes of Greek and Turkish democracies. I will delve into the role of the external actors in encouraging democratic consolidation in the post-transition polities in Turkey and Greece. Firstly, I will argue that the failure of the international community to delegitimize the Turkish military during the transition period secured its place in domestic politics and proved to be detrimental to consolidation in the country. On the other hand, one of the factors, contributing to the Greek consolidation process was delegitimization of the Greek Armed Forces in the post-transition period. Secondly, I will discuss three mechanisms that encourage consolidation internationally with respect to the Turkish and Greek cases. Those three mechanisms are as follows: assuring the key elites that democracy will not harm their interests, elite socialization or legitimization of pro-democratic elites, and membership conditionality. I will conclude by arguing that among other mechanisms, providing credible guarantees to elites concerning protection of their interest in the post-transition period following transition is the most effective way of supporting consolidation internationally as the Greek and the Turkish cases demonstrate.

International Legitimacy, Military, and Democratic Consolidation

¹³ Yaprak Gursoy, *Pols 514: Politics of Southern Europe Lecture Notes*. Istanbul: Sabancı University, 2009

Calvert (2002, pp.290-291) asserts that all militaries have the capability to intervene into civilian politics, yet they do not always hold disposition. In consolidated democracies, militaries do not pose threat of intervention. On the contrary, they submit to the authority of elected officials and legitimize the democratic system by offering their attitudinal support. To put it differently, unless the military accepts the legitimacy of democratic institutions, a significant actor would be defecting from democratic rules of the game and threat of intervention would prevent the democratic regime to consolidate.

In the literature, particular transition path is commonly acknowledged to be related to the role of military in the post-transition polity and consolidation. On the relationship between further democratization and particular transition path to democracy, Agüero (1995, p.30) affirms that transition to democracy following *voluntary disengagement* of the military is not as conducive to democratic establishment as the regime *transition by collapse*. Moreover, military guidance to democracy, according to Agüero (1995, p.30), is not as encouraging for further democratization as civilian control of transition. Since, in case of voluntary retraction and military guidance, it is highly possible that the military will guarantee certain prerogatives for itself in domestic politics following the transition. (Agüero, 1995, p.31) Those prerogatives are expected to stand as obstacles to establishing civilian supremacy on the military in the further steps of democratization.

As stated in the first chapter, the Turkish military retained its legitimacy at the end of the transition period, while the Greek army was completely delegitimized due to diplomatic and economic sanctions of the international community and due to its defeat in Cyprus war. At the end of the transition, the Greek colonels were convinced about detrimental consequences of the military regime and were not in a position to guide the transition (Karakatsanis, 2001, p.157). Instead, a civilian, Constantine Karamanlis, guided the transition to democracy in the country. On the other hand, the Turkish generals believed that the Western allies of the country as well as the Turkish public backed the coup d'état in 1980. Contrary to the Greek case, the Turkish military was not deprived of power but retracted voluntarily in 1983. Under this climate, it was able to guide the transition to democracy in the aftermath of its retraction (Gürsoy, 2009).

Verifying Agüero's conclusions, the Turkish transition path proved to be less conducive to democratic establishment. At the end of the transition period, the Turkish military was able to secure massive institutional prerogatives for itself. Ergun Özbudun (2007, p.193) contends that 1982 constitution¹⁴ "provided strong 'exit guarantees' for the departing military, one of the most important of which is found in Article 118, regulating the National Security Council (NSC)". In fact, with the 1982 constitution, the Turkish military increased the power of the NSC¹⁵ and thereby secured its place in domestic politics for the post-transition period (Gürsoy, 2009, pp. 27-28; Özbudun, 2007, p.193). In addition to increased power of NSC, ability of the military to control post-transition politics was impressive. November 1983 elections were held under the strict control of the Turkish military. The former politicians were banned to stand as candidates in the elections as the provisional Article 4 of the Constitution urged. Additionally, via party law, NSC determined which parties could run for the elections, as well as holding the exclusive power of vetoing candidates and members of the newly-established political parties (Hale, 1988, p.170; Karpat, 1988, p.155).

¹⁴ 1982 constitution was prepared by the National Security Council and came into force after being put into referendum in November 1982 . For further discussion on constitution-making process, see chapter 2.

¹⁵ While the Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution states that "National Security Council submits to the Council of Ministers the necessary basic views in order to assist in taking decisions on national security and security coordination", original Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution reads as follows: "The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, determination, and implementation of the national security policy of the State. The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society." Evidently, 1982 constitution put additional emphasis on competences of the NSC in formulating national security policies and concomitant to that, it increased the role of the military in Turkish politics. (Özbudun, 2007,p.193)

In 2003, the article 118 of the constitution was amended so as to harmonize Turkish laws and rules with the EU as a part of democratization attempts. As amended, the article 118 reads as follows: "The National Security Council submits to the Council of Ministers its advisory decisions and its views on ensuring the necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, determination, and implementation of the national security policy of the state". It can be concluded new version of the article 118 emphasize advisory character of the NSC decisions and 'priority consideration' to be given by the Council of Ministers to those decision is dropped.

The Greek transition, on the other hand, was marked by the ability of civilians to insert influence on the post-transition polity. Until the first post-junta elections, scheduled on 17 November 1974, Karamanlis issued amnesty to political prisoners and legalized the Communist Party. In December of 1974, with the popular vote of Greek public, the monarch was abolished (Karakatsanis, 2001, p.5). These were significant steps towards democratization and presented a major break with the authoritarian past. Since the Communist Party and communism were the number one enemies of the colonels and the monarchy was the symbol of extreme right prior to the coup. As the Greek regime was getting civilianized rapidly, it is hard to claim the same for post-transition regime in Turkey. It was not until 1987 that the ban on the public speeches of former politicians was lifted and partial amnesty to detainees of DISK trial was issued (Dağı, 2001, p.23).

On 17 November 1974, Greece held its first post-junta elections, unlike the Turkish case, without any restriction on participation of political parties and without military oversight. Nea Demokratia (New Democracy), Karamanlis' brand-new party won 54.5 per cent of all votes and assumed office for the new electoral period. The echelon members of the Colonels' regime were trialed and charged with death sentence which Karamanlis changed into life imprisonment later. Contrary to the Greek case, in Turkey, none of the military members affiliated with the coup was trialed. Also, in Greece, civilians drafted the constitution after transition. With his close advisers, Papakonstantinou, Stefanakis, and Tsatsos, Karamanlis, prepared the new constitution (Karakatsanis, 2001, pp.58-60). Finally, unlike the 1982 Constitution, 1975 Constitution of Greece did not envisage many institutional prerogatives for the military (Verney, 1990, p.204).

International Factors and Democratic Consolidation

In addition to indirect impact of international response to regime breakdowns, international actors might be effective in encouraging democratic consolidation in a polity directly. In the literature, three interrelated mechanisms of encouraging consolidation externally are defined. First, international actors might assure key elite groups by providing credible guarantees that democratization will not harm their interests (Pevehouse, 2002, pp.525-530, Pridham, 1991, p.225). For instance, the

European Union might assure the business (economic) elites that their economic interests will be protected against the risk of command economy. This is particularly significant for countries where there is significant leftist threat (Pridham, 1991, p.225; Pevehouse, 2002, p.525).

On the other side of the political spectrum, international institutions can assure socialist parties that their representation will not be hindered or that they will not be deprived of governmental power forcefully by extreme rightist groups. Once faced with a military coup, this is significant for the socialist parties to offer their attitudinal support for democracy and see the democratic game as legitimate. In this respect, theoretically, Council of Europe, the European Union (EU), and Organization of Security and Cooperation (OSCE) assure the leftist political groups on the sustainability of democratic institutions through their membership conditionality and by providing an extra-layer of protection to democratic institutions. Council of Europe, for instance, monitors the elections, human rights situation, and implementation of rule of law, and democracy in its member states, such as Russia, Georgia, and Turkey¹⁶. On the other hand, OSCE has the mission of promoting “democratic development, human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, and rule of law”¹⁷ (OSCE, 2009) as well as mission of election observation. In theory, membership to those international institutions might assuage the fears of socialists concerning an overthrow of the democratic system.

In addition to socialist and economic elites, external actors might persuade the military elites that in case of their submission to civilian rule, their corporate interests will be protected. Pevehouse (2002, p.527) states that NATO, for instance, requires the allied countries to keep their military expenditures high. Therefore, NATO membership can be an extra guarantee for the protection of military corporate interests. Moreover, by providing collective security to its members, NATO might ensure the military elites that they do not need to step into politics due to an external threat.

The second mechanism through which the international actors encourage democratization is elite socialization at home (Pridham, 1995, p.180). Under the general

¹⁶ Council of Europe monitoring reports can be accessed via official website of the institution: http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/monitoring_en.asp

¹⁷ Further information on democratization activities of OSCE, one may refer to the official website of the institution: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/>

heading of elite socialization, Pevehouse (2002, p.525) and McLaren (2008, p.235) emphasize socialization processes of military elites. They contend that engagement in intense contact with their colleagues in various collective security organizations might persuade domestic military elites on the role of the military as the security provider and help them to abandon their role in domestic politics. Pridham (1995, p.180), on the other hand, affirms that socialization of domestic political elites is equally significant. He argues that mechanics and tools of decision-making in the international institutions and integration of elites into this system will socialize them into the ideal and practice of democracy. Assuming their seats in various organs of those institutions would ensure domestic elites to undergo a process of elite political learning on democracy and democratic decision-making.

Pridham's explanation of elites drowning into an abstract ideal of democracy via engagement with international leaders, however, does not seem quite convincing. Since, it is more probable that domestic leaders are well-aware of democratic procedures and tools. Yet, prior to consolidation, they are reluctant to comply with those rules and legitimize them as 'the only game in town'. In the process of elite socialization, there must be concrete reasons for elites to support democracy in relation to the international forces. To illustrate, elite socialization might occur when the elites are convinced that the only way of attaining international legitimacy is to be pro-democratic. Also the process that international institutions assure the elites that democratization will be in their interest can be referred as a learning process.

Third mechanism could be named as conditionality of the international institutions (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.159). By setting certain membership conditionality, international institutions such as Council of Europe, the European Union, the OSCE, and the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) may encourage the states which are aspiring for membership to conduct democratization reforms. Through material benefits such as security and/or economic benefits, offered through membership, international actors might render their support for democracy more credible. Those material benefits might be used as a tool of sanctioning, in case of failure to comply, while they might be a reward when the actors adjust to democratic rules (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.159, Öniş, 1999, p.121).

It is important to note that those three mechanisms are ultimately interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Elite socialization, for instance, might be fostered when the elites perceive their interest in democratization with the encouragement of external actors. Conditionality, on the other hand, might provide credibility to elite socialization and make the material benefits concrete that were promised while assuring the key elites about democratization. Moreover, conditionality can be seen as a tool more than a mechanism which fortifies the impact of the former two mechanisms on democratization. Indeed, the Turkish and Greek consolidation attempts are helpful to demonstrate the complex and interrelated mechanisms encouraging consolidation internationally.

International Forces and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey and Greece

Assuring Key Elite Groups

a) Economic Elites

In the post transition period, the European Community (EC) was effective in ensuring the Greek as well as Turkish economic elites that democratization would be in their interest albeit through different mechanisms. As noted earlier, the Greek military took over the government against a serious leftist threat in the country in 1967. In the pre-coup period, communism and communist movements were remarkably strong in Greece and electoral victory of socialist parties was perceived as a threat to capitalist economy. Therefore, economic elites were highly hesitant to offer their attitudinal support for democratization. Nevertheless, the EC membership was effective in ensuring an extra layer of protection to the free market economy against those mobilized leftist sources. Economic integration and adoption of *Acquis* were seen as irrevocable guarantees for capitalist economy (Verney, 1990, p.206). Proving this point, “the Confederation of Greek Industries”, for instance, “was consistently in favor of EC membership as a security against radical economic policy changes associated with the rapid electoral rise of PASOK in the later 1970s” (Pridham, 1991, p.225). As those property-owners and business interest groups are acknowledged to be powerful domestic actors, their support for democratization is significant.

In Turkey, however, the argument that the EC membership was seen as a guarantee against socialist policies is not valid. Since, in Turkey, there has never been a strong organized leftist or communist movement, capable of challenging the regime, neither before nor after the transition. Yet, the business circles in Turkey such as TÜSİAD (Chamber of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen) too have been wholehearted supporters of the European Union membership of Turkey. For the Turkish case, it might be claimed that the EU membership is seen as the guarantor of economic liberalization and reduction in state intervention in the economy¹⁸. Economic aspect of the accession criteria compels the existence of functioning free market economy in Turkey. Hence, due to the prospects of increased trade and profit and as the guarantee against state intervention in the economy, Turkish property-owning conservative classes offered their support for the closer relations with the EC and hence, for the democratization. In fact, in a conference, conducted by Galatasaray University, then the president of TÜSİAD, Ömer Sabancı (2004) emphasized this point with the following words: “we observed that consolidation of free market economy in Turkey could be rendered possible only through a participatory and pluralist democratic political system”¹⁹ and referred frequently to European Union membership bid of Turkey for the achievement of such a political system.

b) Socialist Parties

In Greece, while the right was afraid of democratization due to the leftist threat, leftist forces were initially reluctant to accept democratic institutions as legitimate due to a coup possibility. In 1967, when the colonels took over the government, the leftist opposition forces supported democratization. Nevertheless, legitimacy of those institutions was diminished substantially with actual experiment of a military takeover. Moreover, Karamanlis, himself, was a former ERE (National Radical Union)²⁰ member.

¹⁸ For further discussion on the statist policies and relations of Turkey with the EU, see Uğur (2004).

¹⁹ Retrieved from [http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad_cms.nsf/LHome/E87CB2C4972E63CEC2257353002E5C26/\\$FILE/OmerSabanci27EkimAB.pdf](http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad_cms.nsf/LHome/E87CB2C4972E63CEC2257353002E5C26/$FILE/OmerSabanci27EkimAB.pdf) (My translation from Turkish)

²⁰ ERE was a conservative right wing party, known to be supportive of monarchy and armed forces in the pre-coup period. After the transition, instead of re-assuming presidency of ERE, Karamanlis founded Nea Demokratia (New Democracy). The party placed itself in the center right and abandoned any extremist policies or rhetoric. Verney

Democratic institutions, established under the guidance of a former conservative politician did not initially invoke support for democracy among the leftist parties. In other words, at the end of the transition, leftist forces did not trust that democratic institutions would function orderly.

The European Union was effective in ensuring PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party) and other political groups on the durability and sustainability of democratic institutions. According to Verney (1990, p.207), in the post-transition period, it was common to assume that “EC membership would lock Greece into particular institutional pattern, closely resembling that of the West European liberal democracies.” Moreover, Greek political actors largely held the belief that once the Western style democratic institutions are established, no major deviation either towards left or towards right would be expected thanks to the integration with the European Community (Verney, 1990, p.208). It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss if this was realistic but what is significant is that it generated trust in democratic institutions in Greece. Indeed, at the beginning of 1980s, Andreas Papandreou changed his anti-system rhetoric and offered its support for democracy. However, for the Greek case, there is no concrete evidence, pointing that the Council of Europe and OSCE played the role of guarantor of democratic establishment.

Contrary to the Greek case, there has never been a strong and institutionalized socialist movement in Turkey. Prior to the coup, there were some outlawed leftist groups which resorted to terror. Nevertheless, they were unable to resist to the junta and insert influence by mobilizing civil society during the transition period. This can be attributed to the fact that their membership base was very restricted and they were ideologically divided among themselves (Aydin-Düzgit & Gürsoy, 2009, p.15). Moreover, restrictive nature of the 1982 Constitutions which put extra-ordinary limitations on associational autonomy and freedom of expression can be seen as detrimental to the leftist movement in the post-coup period. It can be assumed that democratization attempts would abolish those restrictions and broaden the fundamental rights. However, there is no sufficient evidence to claim that leftist forces in Turkey saw the international institutions as a guarantee for their political representation. It might be

(1990, p.208) contends that choice of title for the party symbolizes Karamanlis’ willingness to identify his new party with democracy.

attributed to the fact that the leftist movement did not have any considerable organized impact during and after the transition.

c) Military Elites

Pevehouse (2002) and McLaren (2008) assume that membership to collective security organizations would guarantee that the corporate interest of the military will be protected. Hence, fear of the military will be assuaged and its behavioral compliance and attitudinal support for democratic establishment would be gained. Even though ensuring the military that democratization will not harm its interest is very important, it is hard to claim that the Turkish and Greek democratizations verify Pevehouse's and McLaren's conclusions.

Greek Military:

Greece became NATO member in 1952. In the Cold War context, NATO was *the* Western security organization to which Greece proved to be a loyal ally. However, following the transition, Greece withdrew from the military flank of NATO. Indeed, Greek policy-makers, including Karamanlis, himself, put the blame on the United States for tolerating the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and were doubtful of NATO's ability to provide security to the country. The fact that NATO remained silent in case of aggressiveness by another NATO ally towards Greece raised huge doubts on the usefulness of NATO for the external security of the country (Veremis, 1991, p.71; Verney, 1990, p.206). Despite the absence of NATO anchor, at the end of the consolidation process, the Greek military was submitted to civilian supremacy and offered not only its behavioral compliance but also its attitudinal support (Karakatsanis, 2001, p.5). This can be explained by careful dealing of the civilians with the military rather than external anchor.

Following the collapse of the military regime, Karamanlis was always cautious towards the military and hesitant to harm its corporate interests. With this rationale, in the post-transition period, he kept judicial trial of the military officers, limited to those high ranking ones and kept the military spending high. Indeed, Featherstone (1990, p.184) notes that "Greece devoted the highest proportion of its GNP of any NATO member to military expenditure" in the aftermath of the transition. Karamanlis justified high level of military expenditure and his policies via the Turkish threat. Turkey was

believed to be threatening independence of the country. Hence, there was a need for strong military and high security expenditures (Karakatsanis, 2001, p.153). This strategy proved to be effective for consolidation of democracy. The Greek military was appeased by the civilians and was assigned the task of protecting the country against a prospective Turkish attack, while the military abandoned its political aspirations through the course of time.

Similar to Karamanlis' New Democracy, PASOK, too, when it was in office, was hesitant to harm corporate interests of the military and justified the constant high expenditure and the privileges granted to the military on the grounds of the Turkish threat (Karakatsanis, 2001, pp.164-167). Indeed, in spring 1987, when the leader of PASOK, Andreas Papandreou, threatened Turkey with war if it initiated mineral tests in Greek territorial waters, he, in reality, reassured civilian supremacy over military, while simultaneously appeasing the institution (Featherstone, 1990, p.184). To put it differently, he was demonstrating that it is the responsibility of the civilian leader to detect and determine security threats and declare war, if necessary. Simultaneously, he was reassuring the military on its significance for the national defense. In other words, international factors in the name of Turkish threat and the appeasing strategy of civilians were effective in consolidating democracy in Greece by helping to ease the military threat to the democratic establishment and clarifying division of labor between the military and civilians. However, it is hard to claim that membership to international security organizations played any role in this process.

Turkish Military:

Ironically, unlike its Greek counterpart, the Turkish military, during and after the transition period, have remained in NATO. Moreover, as it was discussed in the first chapter, during the military regime, good relations between NATO and Turkey were sustained. Nevertheless, high military expenditures, as the natural consequence of being a NATO member, were not sufficient to assure the Turkish military on forgoing its political role and hence on full democratization. This can be attributed to the specific domestic political pattern in Turkey.

As referred in the first chapter, the Turkish military conducted the coup d'état in 1980 due to its belief that democracy did not function properly. Moreover, in the eyes of the military, civilian politicians could not protect the country against external and

internal threats. In the aftermath of the transition, through the National Security Council, the Turkish generals have continued to determine security threats to the country. This led to the emergence of two-sided democratization problems for Turkish politics. First, even if the Turkish military might perceive itself as a democratizing force, its very presence in politics is an obstacle to full-democratization by definition. Second, the presence and weight of the military does not allow further democratization in Turkey. The military is highly sensitive on two topics, religious reactionism and separatism and continuously points them as the major threats to the Turkish state in the security agenda since 1980s (Cizre, 2008, p.139). Interestingly enough, democratic problems of the country are listed as fundamental restriction on freedom of speech, failure to ensure full protection to minority rights, and frequent party closures which are closely related to the areas where the military is highly sensitive (Müftüleri-Baç, 2000, p.168). In addition, with a closer look, it can be detected that parties which were closed by the Constitutional Court between the years 1990 and 2000 could be grouped under two major political movements: Kurdish separatist movement and Islamic fundamentalism.

The European Union has been highly critical on the role of the military in politics, restrictions on freedom of speech, failure to ensure extensive minority rights, and party closures in all the progress reports, issued since 1990s. However, it might be safe to claim that unless the international forces can provide the necessary guarantees to the Turkish military that territorial integrity and internal security of the country will be protected, it is hardly likely that the military will offer its full support for democracy even if it is strongly anchored to NATO or any other security organizations. Together with the credibility of the EU criticisms, this point on democratization will be discussed in the conditionality section.

In sum, both the Turkish and Greek cases demonstrate that to assuage the fear of the military concerning democratization is of crucial importance. It is necessary to guarantee that democratic reforms will not challenge its interests. Nevertheless, the only interest of the military is not to keep the military expenditures high but is strictly defined in relation to domestic political dynamics as the Turkish case shows. Additionally, collective security organizations should have the credibility to assure the military against an external threat, as the Greek case demonstrates, in order to be able to encourage democratization.

Elite Socialization

Greek Elites:

As referred earlier, in the aftermath of the transition, PASOK and its leader Andreas Papandreou assumed an anti-system stance. The party denounced the democratic system for being another great power game on Greece. Verney (1990, p.209) notes that “Andreas Papandreou declared that he had founded PASOK not as a political party operating within a democratic polity, but as a national liberation movement struggling to free Greece from imperialist control”.

Nevertheless, PASOK seemed to change its domestic and foreign policy line throughout the late 1970s and the beginning of 1980s. Together with assurances granted by the international community on the durability and sustainability on democratic institutions, PASOK’s behavioral change can be explained through *elite convergence model*. According to Burton, Gunther, and Highley’s (1995, p.20) elite convergence model, during consolidation phase, firstly, those democratic elites win the elections and hold office while anti-system parties might be prevented from competing or be reluctant to compete in the elections. In the second stage, those anti-system parties would realize that the only way of holding power is the democratic game and would eventually adopt relatively more modest stance, compared to their initial agenda and would stop posing a threat to democracy. In Greece, initially, it was Karamanlis, who held the office for consequent terms and PASOK was left in opposition until 1981. Nevertheless, the PASOK elites soon realized that they might hold power if they adopted a more moderate and truly democratic stance. In line with elite consensual unity rationale, “between the 1977 and 1981 elections, PASOK and its leader continued to move away from an initial image as a Marxism-based, class-oriented party” (Gallant, 2001, p.209).

International forces can foster elite consensual unity. International forces might support pro-democratic elites by legitimizing them at home and hence encourage the other group of elites to comply with the democratic rules of the game. In Greek democratic consolidation phase, Karamanlis was supported and legitimized by the United States and the European forces as pro-democratic elite which favored him in his

contest against Papandreou. This might be seen as one of the factors, encouraging Papandreou to be willing to play democratic game. Perhaps more important than that, towards the end of 1970s, PASOK abandoned its anti-EC and anti- NATO stance (Veremis, 1991, p.72). Its new attitude contributed to its perception as a genuine democratic party by Greek voters. In other words, favorable stance of PASOK towards the EC and NATO baptized it as a pro-democratic force. 1981 elections resulted in PASOK's victory with the 48.1% of all votes and 174 seats in the Parliament (Featherstone, 1990, p.181). Among other things, change in rhetoric of PASOK was effective in this electoral victory. However, together with its ambition to hold power and socialization of PASOK elites, guarantees that the democratic system would not favor the right or any other external power were equally significant in evoking attitudinal support of PASOK.

Most scholars agree that Greece consolidated its democracy in 1985 with the second term of PASOK in office; when the party and its leader adopted a relatively more moderate rhetoric, compared to its initial stance such as leaving NATO (Veremis, 1991, p.71). Additionally, the military offered its behavioral compliance with the democratic setting when the military accepted a socialist party in power without threatening to overthrow the government. There were still aborted coups in 1982 and 1983. Yet, 1985 onwards, it might be said that all politically significant groups in Greece, including the Greek military and PASOK offered their behavioral compliance and attitudinal support for democracy. (Karakatsanis, 2001; Pridham, 1995; Linz, Stepan & Gunther, 1995; Gunther, Puhle & Diamandouros, 1995).

Turkish Elites:

In Turkish case, elite socialization can be evaluated as a more complicated phenomenon, compared to the Greek case. Both the military and political elites²¹ in

²¹ Evin (1988, p.213) contends that 1980 coup formed a new cleavage between *state elites and political elites* as an extension of the cleavage between state and government. This was caused by separation of realms of state and politics after the 1980 coup. This was the new formula, invented by the military to deal with civilians (Karpas, 1988, p.154). According to the formula, *State* would remain as a separate realm and would be represented by the President. *Government* and day-to-day politics would be endorsed to the elected civilians and as the 1982 constitution envisaged would be subject to tutelary

Turkey passed through elite socialization through different paths. The result of their socialization was contradictory in terms of consolidation of democracy in the country. First, as noted in the first chapter, historically, the Turkish military has been a modernizing and Westernizing source in Turkish politics since the late Ottoman periods. Socialization of Ottoman elites into the Western values and Western style of government initiated a well-established legacy among elites which continued in the Republican era, as well. During the Republican period, as a part of its self-declared role, the military has always been supportive of Western institutions. Ironically, 1980 coup was partly the result of this commitment. In 1980, the Turkish generals intervened into politics in order to “save democracy from itself”, as Harris (1988, p.1983) puts it. Since, for the members of the military, “...the enemies of democracy were politicians themselves...” (Evin, 1988, p.208). Its own ideological view and international pressure on the military would preclude a long-lasting authoritarian regime. However, the Turkish military was unable to fully commit to democracy due to its deep distrust for politicians.

On the backdrop of omnipresence of the military in Turkish politics, Demirel (2003, p.17) contends that Turkish civilian elites adopted two distinct techniques to deal with the military: either, they attempt to establish civilian oversight over the military, or, they prefer inclusion of it in daily politics or even resort to the military on certain issues such as protection of secularism in public policy. Concerning the reasons for civilian demand for involvement of the military in politics, Demirel (2003, p.20) points to the weakness of the civilians and their involuntary acceptance of the omnipresence of the military in Turkish politics. Those who adopt the strategy of including the military or refraining from challenging its role in politics, in reality, aim at protecting their own interest in politics.

Yet, there could be seen particular examples of civilians challenging the place of the military and attempt to submit it into civilian control. Turgut Özal (1983-1987), for instance, most possibly by depending on his electoral success and popular support, he enjoyed, conducted civilian overview of the military budget. This was a clear move to

control of the state. (Evin, 1988, p. 27) In this chapter, it might be safe to refer the state elites as the members of military, since Evin (1988, p.213) contends that during 1980 coup, state elites were solely represented by the military.

restrict the autonomy of the military. Moreover, Özal proposed to subordinate the military to the ministry of defense (Gürsoy, 2009, p.30; Demirel, 2003, p.8).

The military, however, intervened into politics whenever it felt that the basic principles it defends such as secularism were under threat. On 28 February 1997, the military intervened into politics and forced the government to resign due to Islamic tendencies of the ruling party- Welfare Party²² (Heper & Güney, 2000, pp.640- 642). After 28 February intervention, on 27 April 2007, the Turkish Armed Forces issued a memorandum in the official website of the Chief of General Staff, in just couple of hours following the first round of presidential elections (Cizre, 2008, p.159). In the elections, former Foreign minister of the Justice and Development Party²³ government, Abdullah Gül stood as the only candidate. Evidently, the military held suspicion on the commitment of the candidate to the principle of secularism and on the memorandum it was stated that “the Turkish Armed Forces maintains its firm determination to carry out its legally specified duties.... It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces is a side in this debate and a staunch defender of secularism”. (Cited in Cizre, 2008, p.160)

However, as a result of their socialization process, it is observable that Turkish civilian politicians have frequently resorted to the international ties of the country in order to undermine the role of the military in politics. Especially the European institutions constitute a focal point of attention for the civilians. It might be claimed that the European Community was thought to strengthen the civilians’ hands to conduct costly democratization reforms by providing a scapegoat for the civilian politicians. To put it differently, by utilizing the European Community link, civilians have calculated to pass laws restricting autonomy of the military and have aimed at establishing civilian supremacy over the armed forces without engaging in an overt conflict with the

²² Welfare Party was closed by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of contradicting with the secularist principles of the Republic as the Article 68, paragraph 4 of the Constitution urged (Heper & Güney, 2000, pp.640).

²³ *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party) was founded in 2000, following the schism between traditionalists and reformists in the pro-Islam Welfare Party which was dissolved by the Constitutional Court on 16 January 1998 on the grounds of being a “centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism”. Hence, reformists established Justice and Development Party while traditionalists are represented by Felicity (Fazilet) Party (Güney & Karatekelioğlu, 2005).

institution. This can also be attributed to the fact that the civilian elites started to see their interest in democratization in their struggle against the military. The support and legitimization of the domestic elites and heavy criticisms directed to the military by the European Union in this process stiffened belief of civilians in democracy and democratization.

In sum, Turkish elite socialization, unlike the Greek case, does not possess clear cut example of the theory. In Turkey, both the military and civilians have been well aware that their legitimization to a large extent depends on their commitment to Western institutions and democratic establishment. Their socialization process, however, seems to contradict and present another challenge in front of democratization. The military is committed to Westernization of the country and accuse the politicians for not being democratic enough. On the other hand, civilians attempt to justify their position and power struggle with the military by democratization. However, they accuse the military for discouraging further democratization. It might be claimed that what is missing in the Turkish case is mutual trust that the other would comply with the rules of the democratic game.

Another significant point is that even if the Justice and Development Party seem to be pro-EU, it fails to gain trust of the military on its commitment to democracy. Discussions if Justice and Development Party is a genuinely democratic party or has a hidden Islamic agenda fall beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, it is evident that unlike PASOK, Justice and Development Party was unable to assure the other actors that it is not an anti- system party. In this respect, Güney and Tekelioğlu (2005, p.) contend that distrust of the military is not completely baseless. By pointing the historical evidence, they assert that civilian elites had a significant share in provoking the military to interfere in politics by their irresponsible behavior in the past. They, further, assert that as long as separatist tendencies and political Islam remain as the threats to the Turkish Republic, it is hardly conceivable to establish civilian supremacy over the military establishment and finalize Turkey's democratic consolidation struggle. To put it differently, together with proved civilian ability of tackling with ethnic separatism, Justice and Development party convince the military on its commitment to democracy. However, it is evident that being pro-EU is not sufficient for the Turkish generals.

To conclude, the Greek case shows that even if in some cases, legitimization of pro-democratic forces and encouraging the anti-system parties to comply with the rule might work. International forces were highly effective in changing initial anti-system stance of PASOK. However, the Turkish case indicates that unless there is mutual trust among the groups, legitimization of pro-democratic forces may initiate a complicated process where actors put the blame of hedging and being detrimental to democratization on each other. This point clarifies the significance of assuring elites that democracy will not harm their interest. However, those assurances shall be supported by credible material benefits. The next section will discuss provision of those benefits and conditionality.

Democratic Conditionality

Membership conditionality seems to be one of the most effective tools in fostering democratization externally. In this respect, the European Union has been a significant actor in encouraging democratic consolidation in Turkey and Greece. First, both countries were aspiring for membership which multiplied the impact of the EU conditionality on those countries. (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.159) Second, political and economic integration of the Union and its multiple tools have been effective in encouraging democratization. Some of those tools can be counted as pre-accession aid, technical assistance and monitoring through annual progress reports²⁴. Both countries have been willing to receive those material benefits, provided by the EU. Third, by institutionalization of its accession criteria, the EU has been able to foster democratization prior to the full membership. Indeed, the Copenhagen criteria²⁵

²⁴ Progress Report is a comprehensive document, annually issued by the European Commission. It delves into political and economic situation, setbacks and progress in terms of internalizing the Acquis Communautaire in the candidate countries. In this respect, it sets progress and challenges in terms of democratization in detail.

²⁵ Copenhagen criteria was declared in 1993 Copenhagen Summit and finalized in 1995 Madrid Summit by the Council of Ministers and read as follows: “political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities; economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; the capacity to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to political, economic and monetary objectives; creation of the conditions for integration through the adjustment of

determine the conditions that candidate countries have to comply with before their accession to the Union. The criteria envisage complete democratization and strengthening of democratic institutions such as guaranteeing submission of military to civilian control, protection of human rights and minority rights.

Turkey and the EU conditionality:

It might be safe to claim that the EU conditionality was effective in inducing democratization in Turkey through particular reward and sanctioning mechanisms. Moreover, the conditionality of the EU was credible since the country was aspiring for membership and mostly remained dedicated to the goal of accession after transition²⁶. For instance, one of the priorities of the first post-transition governments was to reactivate the Association Agreement and normalize relations with the European Community. For this sake, Foreign Minister of the first Özal cabinet (1983-1987), Halefoğlu, paid a visit to the European Commission in January 1984 after few month following resumption of his office and asserted willingness of Turkey to improve its relations with the Community (Dağı, 2001, p.19). The response of the Community was to restate that normalization of relations is contingent upon the improvement of human rights records of the country and full democratization. Illustrating powerful impact of the EU conditionality on the country, Özal took immediate steps in this direction of democratization by lifting the ban on the public speeches of former politicians, declaring partial amnesty to detainees of DISK trial, and stopping the ratification of death sentences by the Parliament in order to normalize its relations with the EC (Dağı, 2001, p.23). With the hope that its progress would be recognized, the Özal government applied for full membership to the community on 14 April 1987. The response of the European Commission was negative. However, in 1988, the relations between the EC and Turkey were resumed.

administrative and institutional structures guaranteeing effective implementation of the *acquis*". (See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm)

²⁶ Turkey applied to the European Community in 1959 and signed an associational agreement (Ankara agreement) in 1963. The Additional Protocol, expanding the area of cooperation came into force in 1971. However, the scope of this chapter is limited to the EU anchor after transition. For further discussion on the history of relations between Turkey and the EU, see Müftüler-Baç (2000).

It is observable that the criticisms directed at the Turkish government became harsher in the second half of the 1980s (Dağı, 2001, p. 23). In this period, Balfe report²⁷ which fiercely criticized the human right situation in Turkey raised resentment in Turkey. (Dağı, 2001, p.22; 164) However, as an attempt to better relations with the EC, in 1995, the Turkish Parliament passed a constitutional amendment package, extending associational rights, granting greater freedom to functioning of political parties, and allowing the university staff to be member to associations, in line with European expectations (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.166). As a part of rewarding, in 1995, Turkey signed customs union agreement with the EC and was declared an official candidate in 1999 in Helsinki summit.

Although gradual progress in terms of democratization was induced by the EU in the post-transition period like 1987 and 1995 reforms, an impressive reform package was passed by the Turkish Parliament in July 2003 thanks to the EU conditionality. As mentioned earlier several times, the Turkish military has a well-established role in Turkish politics and enjoy high degree of autonomy. In 2003, the Justice and Development Party conducted substantial reforms in the direction of reducing the autonomy of the military and to cut its role in Turkish politics. The government amended the law on the NSC and the General Secretariat of the NSC in order to harmonize Turkish rules and laws with the European Union. The package turned the National Security Council into a mere advisory body, diminishing its executive power, and reduced the frequency of meetings of the Council from monthly to once in two months. Additionally, the number of civilian members was increased so as to outnumber the military members. The authority of the Secretary-General was cut to a great extent while the possibility of electing a civilian member to the post was increased by the amendments (Cizre, 2008, p.137).

Moreover, the additional reforms, which were conducted during 2002 and 2003, extended freedom of expression and lifted the ban on education and broadcasting in Kurdish language. Those reforms in the area of minority rights were unthinkable before

²⁷ Balfe Report was issued in 1985 by the European Parliament on the human rights situation in Turkey and “arrived at the conclusion that Turkey’s human rights practice was still far from ‘complying with the most elementary standards’ and recommended a further suspension of the setting up of a Turkey-Community Joint Parliamentary Committee (Dağı, 2001, p.22).

2002 due to military veto²⁸. The Progress Reports of 2003 and 2004 acknowledged the progress Turkey conducted on the road of consolidating its democracy and encouraged civilians for further involvement in preparing National Security Strategy (Cizre, 2008, p.139). However, in addition to acknowledgment of progress, Turkish government was rushing to open negotiations with the European Union. As reward for the reforms conducted, negotiations between Turkey and the Union were started in October 2005.

In addition to the rewards, in the process of consolidation, the EU has sometimes used the mechanism of sanctioning as well. For instance, in rhetoric, criticisms, directed to the regime by the European Parliament were harsh during the second half of the 1980s. The resolutions of the European Union, issued in this period, emphasized human rights abuses, such as use of torture, trials in the military courts, and restrictions on freedom of expression (Dağı, 2001, p.20). In contradiction to its relatively lenient attitude towards the military regime, the European Commission, as well, seemed to disfavor the prospect of full membership and adopted a critical stance towards the democratic deficiencies of the country (Dağı, 2001, p.20). In addition to rhetoric, the Community institutions adopted some economic sanctions as well in order to induce democratization. For instance, in 1996, the European Parliament froze all financial aid to Turkey, except for the aid to be used in promotion of democratization due to the failure to improve the human rights situation in the country (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.165).

Although it is evident that the conditionality and anchor of the EU encouraged reforms for further democratization in Turkey, it might be claimed that sanctions imposed on civilian governments had some adverse effects due to particular civil military relations in the country. As noted earlier, the military present an obvious challenge to democratization with its presence in politics and with its veto on the conduct of some reforms. In their power struggle with the military, some Turkish political elites have frequently resorted to the international ties of the country in order to hinder the role of the military in politics. It might be fair to claim that, the European institutions could not grasp the sensitivity of the position of the civilian government in many sanctioning cases. As Dağı (2001, p.19-20) suggests, the civilian government was willing to improve the human rights situations in Turkey. However, in the existing

²⁸ See the first section on assuring key elite groups, Turkish military.

balance of power with the military, it was unable to do so. Imposing further sanctions on Turkey led to the weakening of the government, and hence democratization attempts. In other words, the Europeans strategy of sanctioning in order to put pressure for improvement backfired in certain cases.

Another crucial point that the Turkish case illustrated was the necessity of full membership or credible prospect of it in order conditionality to be effective on democratization. Öniş (1999, p.131) states that reforms required for integration are very costly for the domestic governments. Unless, there is credible prospect of membership, cost of reforms exceeds the benefits. In the Turkish case, the ability of the government to challenge the place and significance of the military in Turkish politics as well as conducting other democratization reforms such as in the field of minority rights or freedom of expression, to a large extent depended on this prospect.

Membership prospect of Turkey remains blurred. There are three points of discussions with respect to Turkey's membership. First, many scholars and some European politicians contend that European integration depends on common European identity which is not compatible with the identity and culture of Turkey²⁹. Furthermore, they point that due to its predominantly Muslim population and Ottoman legacy, Turkey is the historical 'other' of the European Union which render integration of the country impossible (Verney, 2007, p.309). This discussion implies that there are criteria beyond those defined in Copenhagen in 1993. This reduces credibility of the EU conditionality substantially. Second, opposition of some member states such as France, Austria, and Germany to membership of Turkey have continued to discourage the Turkish government in conducting necessary democratization reforms. (Patton, 2007, p.345) Since, accession of a new country is decided unanimously in the Council of Ministers, no vote of any member state would hinder membership of Turkey. In addition, those countries have offered special relationship, falling short of membership between Turkey and the EU which deteriorated the relations even further. Third, additional criteria of absorption capacity³⁰ of the Union played a significant role in diminishing early

²⁹ For further discussion on Europeanness of Turkey, see Müftüler-Baç (2008) and Stivachtis (2008).

³⁰ Absorption capacity refers to the ability of the EU to integrate new members. As the European Commission puts it in order to enlarge further the EU "needs to ensure that its institutions and decision-making processes remain effective and accountable; it needs to be in a position, as it enlarges, to continue developing and implementing

euphoria about democratization reforms in Turkey. It gives the impression that as Turkey approximates to fulfill the accession criteria, new ones will be added. In fact, Müftüler-Baç (2008) explains that “Turkey perceives that the EU is using a double standard towards its accession” and adds that “The view from Ankara is that the EU is not sincere in its policy towards Turkish accession and presents Turkey with unfeasible demands that go beyond the EU’s Copenhagen criteria and its *Acquis*”. We can conclude that conditionality is one of the most significant tools that the external actors possess. However, for it to remain effective, it shall be used in accordance with the preset criteria and by assuring that once the conditions are fulfilled material benefits will follow.

Those setbacks led to the emergence of what some scholars call reform fatigue in the Justice and Development party government in the aftermath of 2005 (Patton, 2007). It implies that after impressive democratization reforms in 2002 and 2003, new reforms have not been conducted. Cizre (2008, p.156) prefers to call it the “*fall of the EU project*” and contends that it created a snowball effect after 2005, weakening the hands of civilians vis-à-vis the military establishment and led to relapse into traditionalist-nationalist line in domestic politics of the country. Civilians were trying to utilize the EU linkage for democratization. Lack of credible promises led to the weakening of civilian elites and concomitantly reduced their commitment to democratization. In other words, the European forces, particularly the European Union, failed to apprehend the significance of credible EU membership prospect in upsetting the current balance of power between the military and civilians and could not preclude a democratic reversal in terms of civil military relations.

In addition to failure of the EU to grand credible prospect of membership to Turkey, the Turkish military was another factor which slowed down the reform process and contributed the so-called reform fatigue of the Justice and Development Party. It can be claimed that due to 2003 reform package, the military felt that its institutional prerogatives and its associational autonomy it enjoys currently were under threat. Hence, the military started to insert more pressure on the government and impose its weight in politics. (Patton, 2007, p.353) Nevertheless, many scholars acknowledge that

common policies in all areas; and it needs to be in a position to continue financing its policies in a sustainable manner” (European Commission, 2009). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm.

- as it was already mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis- the Turkish military has historically been a Westernizing and modernizing source in Turkish politics (Evin, 1988: Hale, 1988; Müftüler-Baç, 2000, Harris, 1988, Güney and Tekelioğlu, 2005; Heper and Güney, 2000). The European Union membership is usually pointed as the ultimate realization of this century old goal of Westernizing Turkey. Therefore, why shall the Turkish military resist to a process, leading to its self-declared mission?

Indeed, the Turkish military does not oppose to the EU membership of Turkey. On the contrary, it has offered its full support for membership bid of Turkey since the application of Turkey to the European Community in 1959. In fact, “the Office of the Chief of General Staff established an EU working Group in early 2000 to plan the military’s actions during the harmonization process with the EU” (Güney and Tekelioğlu, 2005, p.453). Nevertheless, the EU working group under the Chief of General Staff points an additional fact besides the support of the military for the EU membership. As the newly-established working group, *raison d’être* of the 1983 coup and the transition process have proved, the military deeply distrusts the civilian politicians. Hence, it might resent or even resist to the reforms, conducted by the civilian governments in this respect if it decides that ultimate interests of the Turkish Republic are at stake even if those reforms are conducted in order to harmonize the country with the EU laws. To put it differently, the Turkish military wants Turkey to be a democratic, Westernized, and modern country; yet, it mostly suspects that civilians have the capability of protecting the country against internal and external threats. Therefore, this lack of trust stands as the main obstacle in front of democratization reforms.

Although, explaining specific domestic patterns of Turkish politics and civilian behavior is not the main focus of this thesis, *inter alia*, it might be said that absence of credible support to the civilian elites contribute to the contradictory behavior of them *vis-à-vis* the military establishment. Deterioration of the earlier commitment of Justice and Development Party to the democratization reforms and the EU membership can be seen as an illustration of this point. Also, later reform fatigue and retraction from reforms demonstrate that democratic consolidation attempt continues to be an irregular struggle between civil and military establishments. While the civilians, actively have sought for international support and utilized those links, failure to grand power to the former through credible promises, weakened the process.

Greece and the EC Conditionality:

Contrary to the Turkish case, the EC provided credible promises to Greece on the road to democracy. Greece formally submitted its full membership application right after transition to democracy in September 1975 and was declared official candidate on February 1976 while concluding its accession negotiations in 1979 and acceding into the Community in January 1981³¹ (Verney, 2007, p.310). Being integrated into the Community promptly, on the contrary to the Turkish case, the European Community might be claimed to play an encouraging role for consolidation of Greek democracy. In fact, most scholars agree that the most striking impact of the EC setting on democratization proved to be strengthening of fragile democracies (Pridham, 1991, Öniş, 1999, Dağı, 2001). As the Southern European democracies such as Spain, Portugal, and particularly Greece during 1970s and 1980s demonstrated the EC integration might provide the necessary political and economic anchor for further democratization on the long path of democratic consolidation while preventing any reversals (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p.166). Öniş (1999, p.121) states that the immense economic benefits, in addition to security and stability benefits, provided by the EC, renders “any democratic reversal, which would naturally lead to loss of those benefits... inconceivable”. The EC provides those incentives either through the full membership to the Community or the credible prospect of it. Öniş (1999, p.121) states that:

The prospect of full membership during the first stage, followed by a graduation to full membership itself after a period of transition and adjustment, creates a vicious circle, whereby economic and political factors interact to produce a durable democracy over a comparatively short period of time.

In line with Öniş’s conclusions, security, economic, and stability benefits that the EC provided were significant in consolidation of Greek democracy. In the immediate post-transition period, external relations of Greece were to a large extent restrained due to diplomatic isolation, imposed by the international community on the Colonels’ regime. The country was highly dependent on the United States and had few options of diversifying its balancing strategies due to deprivation of membership of the

³¹ Similar to the Turkish case, Greece applied for Community membership in 1959 and signed an association agreement (Athens Agreement) with the EC in 1962. However, the pre-transition relations between the EC and Greece falls beyond the scope of this thesis. For further discussion on and comparison between the relations between Greece and the EC and Turkey-Eu relations, see Verney (2008).

international institutions such as Council of Europe and restrained relations with the European governments. In 1975, when Karamanlis was applying for full membership to the Community, one of his motives was to reduce dependency of the country on the USA and other powers by “introducing a Western filter between Greece and the rest of the world” (Verney & Coloumbis, 1991, p.118). Indeed, Greek policy-makers, including Karamanlis, himself, were highly resentful to the US for supporting the authoritarian regime and due to its silence in Cyprus war (Verney, 1990, p.208). Under this climate, the European Community membership seemed the most viable option, fostering commitment of Karamanlis and other policy-makers to conduct the necessary reforms in the country for further democratization- a precondition for full membership to the Community. Once Greece conducted the necessary reforms, the country enjoyed those security benefits and increased its soft power via being integrated to the Community.

Furthermore, the European Community was particularly effective in stiffening stability domestically during the consolidation phase in Greece. Pridham (1991, pp.225) suggests that the European Community membership is usually seen as a guarantee against the possibility of command economy by the leftist forces. The EC guarantee might be claimed to ease the tension between the property-owning classes and leftist groups. Already, when PASOK rose to power following 1985 elections, there was no active attempt of undermining PASOK government by either the military or economic elites. This can partly be attributed to extra-layer of guarantee, granted to the free market economy by the European Community membership.

Secondly, thanks to the EC membership, Greek government was able to conduct costly political and economic reforms without generating any significant popular discontent during consolidation phase, which actively contributed to the domestic stability in the country. For instance, Pridham (1995, p.186) notes the stringent conditions, imposed on Greek government by the EC in order to reduce inflation rate. Those conditions required expansion of tax base of the government, reduction in the number of public employees, and government borrowing. Those heavy economic precautions did not lead any remarkable public unrest. Since, it was seen as a part of the EC integration process by the Greek people.

Thirdly, following its accession to the European Community, Greece was endorsed with generous EC structural funds in addition to receiving loans designed for 'Mediterranean Europe' and agricultural subsidies (Pridham, 1995, p.184). Those direct loans stimulated investment and subsequently further economic growth in the country. Apostolides (1992, p.87) notes that while current revenue of the Greek economy was 590.8 in 1981, it was 823.5 in 1982, a significant part of which arrived through EC funds. By the time of its entry, the smallest economy of the Community, those loans were quite appealing for Greece. Moreover, in addition to stimulating economic boom and bust, Karabelias (1999, p.78) suggests that "massive inflow of EC funds into Greece from 1980 to 1995 appeared to benefit significant parts of the social strata", thus further contributing to social stability and support for democratic institutions in Greece. In conclusion, the European Community's impact on the strengthening fragile Greek democracy cannot be neglected. It provided economic, security, and stability benefits which rendered a democratic reversal impossible while increasing commitment to democracy among various societal groups.

The most striking difference in terms of EU conditionality in Turkish and Greek democratization cases was the absence of credible material benefits to the Turkish state whereas Greece was promptly integrated into the Community and received the material benefits of membership. In relation to other factors such as the rift and lack of trust between civilians and the military, lack of credible promises and failure to grant material benefits reduced the impact of the EU conditionality on the democratization process of Turkey.

Conclusion

The international actors were highly effective in different outcomes of democratization processes in Turkey and Greece. Firstly, relatively lenient attitude of international actors during the transition period contributed to post-transition legitimacy of the military, via which it secured institutional prerogatives for itself and continued to influence politics. It might be claimed that this hindered democratization attempts in Turkey in consolidation phase to a large extent. The international community- although it cannot be seen as monolithic, in general- was much harsher towards the Greek junta which actively reduced regime sustainability and legitimacy of the military.

Consequently, the Greek military was not able to secure any tutelary control in politics for itself, following the transition.

In addition to de-legitimization of the outgoing military regime, in the literature it is commonly referred that the international actors might encourage democracy through three mechanisms: ensuring the key elites that democratization will be in their interest, elite socialization in favor of democracy, and membership conditionality. In this chapter I contended that international actors were effective in ensuring Greek and Turkish business elites in addition to Greek socialist parties on democratization. However, it is hard to claim the same for military elites. Indeed, ironically, the Turkish military is feeling more threatened by democracy even if it is much more integrated to the international system compared to the Greek military at the time of transition.

The fear of the Turkish military on democratization can be explained by deep distrust of the military for civilian politicians and Kurdish separatism and Islamic reactionism in the country. Contrary to the elite socialization theory in the literature, socialization of the Turkish military convinced the institution that it was the only guardian and the protector of Western type of government. On the other hand, socialization of some political elites pointed that they might gain legitimization and might challenge the position of the military by resorting to the international ties of the country. In this respect, they have supported democratization of the country rigorously. While a contradictory process of elite socialization unfolded in Turkey, the process seemed to be more orderly in Greece. Attitudinal support and behavioral compliance of PASOK was generated through the socialization of the party elites. PASOK elites recognized that in case that they gain legitimization of the international institutions by adopting democratic rhetoric such as the EC and NATO, they can hold power. In fact, together with elite socialization, assurance granted to PASOK by the international actors on sustainability of the democratic institutions was effective in generating support for democracy.

Finally, different attitude of the EU in terms of conditionality in two cases was significant for democratization attempts of Greece and Turkey. Although the Union applied both reward and sanctioning mechanism as an extension of its conditionality, it failed to grasp the particular civil military relations dynamics in Turkey. While civilians, relentlessly, attempted to utilize the external ties of the country which are seen

as pro-democratic by the government, by harshening its critical stance on the grounds of human rights abuses against the government, Europeans could not strengthen the hand of civilians vis-à-vis the military establishment.

On the other hand, Greece was integrated to the European Community and became full member in 1981. Membership to the Community was considerably effective in consolidating democracy. Since the economic, security, and stability benefits, provided by the European Community rendered a democratic reversal impossible in Greece. However, in the Turkish case, full membership prospect was never clear which led to the inability of civilians to conduct costly-democratization reforms which would undermine the autonomy of the military and ensure its behavioral compliance with democratic institutions.

To sum up, the Greek and Turkish consolidation cases were illustrative in terms of apprehending the significance and the role of international actors in democratization. They demonstrated certain theoretical and practical conclusions on this impact. Together with transition to democracy, conclusions, derived from the Turkish and Greek democratization cases, will be discussed in the final chapter.

IV. Concluding Remarks

In this thesis, I attempted to investigate international context of democratization with respect to its tools, mechanisms, scope, and limits via Turkish and Greek democratization cases in 1983 and in 1974 respectively. Apprehending international influence on democratization is exceptionally significant by the time that many governments and international institutions declare supporting democratization as a foreign policy objective. Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe officially declares that it supports and brings democracies together in the axis of common goal of security. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development affirms that membership is exclusive to democracies, while the organization secures budget for supporting democracies. Similarly, the European Union has the self-declared mission of spreading democracy, rule of law, and human rights in its neighborhood. However, without correctly assessing features of international context of democratization, policy-objectives as well as democratization attempts of those countries might be at least adversely affected, if not hindered.

What do the Turkish and Greek democratizations say?

Evidently, comparison between two cases has its limits in terms of deriving theoretical generalizations concerning the international influence on democratization. Nevertheless, analysis of the Turkish and Greek democratizations in 1983 and in 1974 respectively were helpful in terms of refining the theory, discovering limits of the existing literature, and providing inspiration for further research. These two cases demonstrated that international forces are significant and ignoring this variable leaves any explanation of democratization incomplete. Mechanisms and tools of the international pressure for transition such as diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, fertilization of democratic culture, and support for and legitimization of opposition at home have significant impacts on the authoritarian regimes that their presence cannot be neglected. On the other hand, international actors might contribute to consolidation of democracy by assuring key elites that democracy will benefit them, by legitimizing pro-democratic actors and by offering material benefits in the name of security, domestic stability, or direct economic benefits in order to encourage stiffening of democracy in a country.

In the first chapter, I argued that the international community utilized those mechanisms and tools in order to bring the existing authoritarian regime down in Turkey and in Greece and to support democratization. Both Turkey and Greece were threatened with diplomatic isolation while the case might be seen more imminent for Greece. Additionally, they were imposed economic sanctions by the European Community and by several foreign governments in order to deprive junta from legitimacy and reduce regime sustainability. In Greece, Western European governments and European institutions supported the pro-democratic opposition, while, both for Turkey and Greece, they turned to vocal points of criticisms concerning human rights violations of the opposition. Those international actors used the agency of media in order to voice their criticisms against the junta and their support for democracy.

In addition to demonstrating the fact that the international actors can have influence on transition, the Turkish and Greek cases indicated that those mechanisms and tools could be effective only in relation with domestic factors. Indeed, in the Turkish case, diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions were not as harsh as the Greek case. Moreover, the external factors did not provide support for the opposition at home in Turkey in transition period, while, the opposition in Greece was actively supported. Nevertheless, Greek junta did not collapse because of international pressure in the direction of democratization but due to the Cyprus war. Contrary to its Greek counterpart, the Turkish military retracted from power by prioritizing the external view on the regime, as the generals themselves stated on certain occasions. Therefore, it can be concluded that the international community was successful in encouraging voluntary disengagement of the military and quick return to democracy in Turkey. It is ironic that it failed to do so in Greece even if it implemented harsher sanctions in order to support democratization.

This can be attributed to the different paths and subjects of elite socialization in the Turkish and Greek cases. In the Turkish case, the very power-holders of the regime socialized into Western values and Western type of government. The Turkish military, as its historical role of Westernizing and modernizing the country urged, overrated the Western European opinion. This importance attached to the European opinion made the threat of expulsion from the Council of Europe so effective and convinced the generals to delegate the authority to the civilians as soon as possible. The Greek colonels, on the contrary, were indifferent to international pressure and once they were isolated from

their Western allies, they attempted to search for legitimization by allying themselves with the Eastern European and the Middle Eastern countries. It can loosely be concluded that socialization of power holders concerning Western type of government might be more effective than diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed on authoritarian regimes although impact of these mechanisms cannot be neglected.

In the second chapter, I contended that the Turkish and Greek consolidation paths stand distinct. One of the differences was the impact of different international context of transition. Borrowing from Agüero, I claimed that transition path might affect democratization process. Following that, I argued that the lenient attitude of the international forces on the Turkish military regime had negative impact on consolidation process. By failing to delegitimize the military regime, if not legitimized it, the international community contributed to the ability of the military to secure institutional prerogatives following the transition. It is worth-mentioning that harsher sanctions on the Greek military did not lead to voluntary disengagement like the Turkish case. However, it was more conducive for democratization and demilitarization of the regime by depriving the junta of legitimacy.

Turkish and Greek cases, also, varied in terms of the international context of democratic consolidation attempts. The European Union successfully supported Greek democratic consolidation by offering security, economic, and stability benefits to the country which were significant enough to render a democratic reversal unthinkable and by legitimizing democratic forces so as to stimulate democratic compliance of all the politically significant groups. On the other hand, in the Turkish case, the European Union did not offer full membership in order to strengthen fragile Turkish democracy as it was the case in Greek consolidation phase. Moreover, in the Turkish case, the prospect of full membership has remained blurred even after the country was declared as an official candidate. Although, the Union has legitimized pro-democratic efforts and groups in Turkey and has criticized the role of the armed forces in politics, it failed to support the civilian pro-democratic elites so as to stiffen their position vis-à-vis the military establishment. Moreover, it has imposed further economic and political sanctions on the civilian governments which substantially weakened their attempts to capitalize on the international links for further democratization.

Finally, the Greek and the Turkish consolidation cases reinforced the thesis that democratization unfolds in relation to both external and internal dynamics. It would be quiet misleading to assume that polities stand in isolation in the international system. Yet, it would be equally wrong to analyze impact of international forces on democratization without considering domestic factors. In increasingly interdependent world, external and internal factors are blended to a large extent and focusing on one of them would leave the explanation on democratization incomplete.

Existing Literature and Further Study

This study demonstrated that the literature remains limited on the international context of democratization both in quantity and quality. The number of studies on the topic is scarce, while the existing ones solely focus on the tools and mechanisms of the international actors and external influence on democratization. This leaves the interaction between those international forces and domestic dynamics under shadow which shall be indeed the main point of analyses. As the common wisdom would urge, every country is not expected to react in the same way to the same external influence. For instance, despite relatively lenient attitude of the international actors while sanctioning the authoritarian regime in Turkey, the military voluntarily disengaged due to the international pressure, while the colonels' regime did not come to an end due to harsh sanctions. Similarly, while economic and political sanctions might be effective in supporting democratization in different cases, it failed to assure consolidation of Turkish democracy due to relevant civil military relations. In this aspect, as many scholars acknowledge, there is a need for a parsimonious theory concerning the interaction between the international forces and domestic dynamics in the literature (See for instance, Magen, 2009; Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004).

A deliberate theory would require further study on different cases by expanding the sample. For instance, those cases where the international forces failed to bring democratization despite utilization of all those mechanisms such as Russia and the Central Asian Republics, countries which are in transition but not fully democratic such as Ukraine, and possibly the champion example of authoritarianism the Middle East countries as well as successful cases of the Central and Eastern European countries

could be studied in comparative perspective in order to grasp the impact of international forces on democratization.

Moreover, the literature tends to focus on the European Union as the sole actor which supports transition to democracy and democratic consolidation. Explanations regarding the sole inclusion of the EU seem to be tentative and emphasis on the role of the EU hinders possibility of theoretical generalizations. It might be useful to figure out the underlying reasons of the EU's ability to support democratization. This would contribute to the theory and demonstrativeness of the literature on the international context of democratization.

In addition to pro-democratic international pressure, negative international influence on democratization might be studied. In the end, the literature is unable to answer to the question if the international context always encourages democratization. In this study, the US, for instance, seems to present a negative force in terms of democratization both in Turkey and in Greece, in 1983 and in 1974 respectively. It provided aid to the authoritarian regimes and attempted to ensure international acceptability of them. However, it was hard to fit the attitude of the US in the theory. Therefore, with different case studies, systematic tools and mechanisms of anti-democratic international forces and the underlying reasons of support for authoritarian regimes might be studied.

In the end, the international context of democratization stands as a field, open to further improvements with more scholarly debate and case studies. This thesis aimed to discover the limits of the literature by applying the theory to two cases, the Turkish and Greek democratization attempts in 1983 and in 1974 respectively. Although, it demonstrated some theoretical conclusions about the international influence on democracy and democratization, there is still a lot more to say and criticize about what has been said.

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