Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: monotonic rules

Abstract

We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). On our extended domain, we analyze the implications of two central properties which, on the Nash domain, are known to be incompatible: strong monotonicity (Kalai, 1977) and scale invariance (Nash, 1950). We first show that a class of monotone path rules uniquely satisfy strong monotonicity, scale invariance, weak Pareto optimality, and “continuity”. We also show that dropping scale invariance from this list characterizes the whole class of monotone path rules. We then introduce a symmetric monotone path rule that we call the Cardinal Egalitarian rule and show that it is weakly Pareto optimal, strongly monotonic, scale invariant, symmetric and that it is the only rule to satisfy these properties on a class of two-agent problems.

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• Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: monotonic rules. (deposited 11 Sep 2008 09:46)
  • Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: monotonic rules. (deposited 10 Sep 2009 11:24) [Currently Displayed]
    • Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: monotonic rules. (deposited 07 Jun 2010 20:48)