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Abstract: The normative role that the EU plays has been one of the critical aspects of the debate concerning Turkey’s accession. Turkey’s membership negotiations are critical in terms of the future of the European integration process, specifically with respect to the EU’s role as a global actor. This paper focuses on the Turkish perceptions of the EU’s role as a global actor and in particular on the conception of the EU as a ‘normative’ power. How Turkey perceives the EU’s CFSP is critical in assessing Turkey’s potential role in the larger integration process, as well as the future development of the EU’s international role. The article investigates whether there are wide differences among the Turkish public vis-à-vis the EU’s CFSP and to what extent these differences are visible in Turkey’s negotiation talks with the EU. The paper explores the extent to which, and how, Turkey’s membership would impact the normative power of the EU.


**Introduction**

The European Union is a *sui generis* organization that goes beyond an intergovernmental organization but is not yet a state. This unique character shapes the study of the EU’s foreign policy making and its role as an international actor. Since 1980s, with Bull’s (1982) and Duchene’s (1973) writings on the European Community’s civilian power, a scholarly debate emerged on the EU’s role in international politics. The European Union is traditionally seen as a civilian power with relatively limited capacity in exerting military power. In addition, its civilian power capabilities were greatly shaped by the political will of the member states for the creation of a common and coordinated foreign policy. This is also why the emergence of the common foreign and security policy since the 1970s has been particularly slow compared to the pace of economic integration which in turn led analysts to be wary about the EU’s foreign policy. (Smith 2004; Hill 2003; Muftuler-Bac 2007) In the post Cold War period, a number of ground breaking developments had changed this perception with the adoption of the CFSP (1992), the enlargement policy (1993), and the emergence of the CESDP (1999). As a result, the EU’s foreign policy has been largely a tool in promoting and enhancing the EU’s normative power.

The evolution of a common European level foreign policy since the 1970s led to a harmonization of foreign policy making strategies among the EU member states. The EU governments’ perceptions on foreign policy decision-making, whether these are decisions that are the responsibility of the national centers or to be jointly decided at a European level, have changed through a socialization and harmonization process. This is an interesting outcome of the European integration process with the member states attempting to go beyond their national self-interests to make joint foreign policy decisions. “Europeanization” is increasingly used to denote a domestic adaptation process in the area of foreign policy making with two different angles; one angle refers to an harmonization of decision-making procedures across EU members on foreign policy and the other refers to the emergence of European wide norms on foreign policy principles, or more specifically a European collective identity formation.

In consequence, one can approach the EU’s impact on foreign policy making in two interrelated ways, through a norm diffusion process and through a structural change in the member states in foreign policy making. Within this general framework, this paper poses the following questions: (i) Does the EU’s enlargement policy as a foreign policy tool impact the diffusion of European norms into the acceding countries? (ii) Does the European Union’s foreign policy making strategies diffuse into the future members of the EU through the negotiations process? This paper elaborates on these questions by focusing on the Turkish accession to the EU and Turkey’s adoption of European norms, specifically with respect to common foreign and security policy.

The opening of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU on October 3 2005 is an important step in the EU’s foreign policy making. Since a substantive portion of the EU’s foreign policy making depends to a large extent on its enlargement policy,
Turkey’s accession negotiations carry great weight in assessing the strength of the EU’s normative power. In addition, the analysis of the Turkish accession negotiations would enable us to assess the impact of the EU’s normative power and its ability to induce change in an acceding country. There are two components of this impact, first the diffusion of European norms to Turkey in line with the Turkish adaptation to the EU conditionality; and second, the success of the EU’s normative power in bringing about a harmonization of foreign policy making in Turkey to the EU norms and standards, specifically through a change in the perceptions of the Turkish public and the elite on foreign policy. This paper focuses on the norm diffusion—i.e., the salience of the EU’s normative power—by analyzing the Turkish perceptions on the EU’s CFSP and by the changes in Turkish politics in the area of foreign policy making. The main body of this analysis will concentrate on the changing Turkish perceptions and positions on two key areas: the EU’s common foreign and security policy and the foreign policy making process.

In terms of the impact of the EU on Turkish foreign policy making, there are a number of key concerns on which this paper focuses. First, the paper argues that through the negotiations process, there is a change in the civil-military relations in Turkey and this change influences Turkish foreign policy making as the military has traditionally been a critical actor in shaping Turkish foreign policy. Second, since the EU’s foreign policy making has involved the emergence of a European wide norm on making joint decisions, the extent to which the Turkish public and policy makers share that norm is an important indicator of the Turkish socialization process into the European practices on foreign policy making.

Thus, a major proposition of the paper is that the EU’s normative power is felt in Turkish foreign policy by the challenges it poses to the central role played by the military as well as the dominant views on how foreign policy should be conducted. Equally important, the membership process has stimulated a major change in Turkish politics which is analyzed in the study of Turkish political transformation since 1999. (Onis 2007; Muftuler-Bac 2003, 2005) However, the scope of the political transformation in Turkey is very wide and falls beyond the scope of this paper. One should, nonetheless, note that the impact of the EU’s normative power is increasingly felt in Turkey ever since 1999 in bringing about political reforms and changes, most notably with the political reform packages adopted since 2002. This paper focuses on the Turkish perceptions of the CFSP and the Europeanization of foreign policy making in Turkey specifically in terms of the role of the military in foreign policy choices such as the Turkish intervention in Iraq in 2008.

The European Union and Its CFSP

The conceptualization of the EU’s foreign policy is framed by the various scholarly debates on the European Union’s role as an international actor. These debates revolve around the projection of European power onto international politics in two distinct realms; first as a hard power and with respect to its military capabilities and second, as a civilian power with significant emphasis on the expansion of norms and rules which the
EU symbolizes. These are the interlinked realms with the military capabilities enhancing the role of the EU in diffusing its norms to its periphery.

In this framework, the EU’s enlargement policy is particularly important in increasing the credibility of the EU as a civilian power which could be explained from utility or norm based approaches. The EU’s power in the norm-based approaches could be perceived as a power of ideas and norms whose expansion is driven by the EU’s conditionality. (Diez, et al. 2006) What needs to be noted here is that the EU’s ability to diffuse its norms into third parties is largely dependent on the package of material gains that the EU has at its disposal. In other words, the ideational power of the EU enables an expansion of the values and norms that the EU has come to symbolize. However, this is shaped to a large extent by the material gains the EU is able to grant to countries in its periphery or by the withholding of such favours. This is particularly important for the EU’s neighbours and would-be members. This is why such tools as Association Agreements, financial aid packages, free trade agreements and finally the prospect of membership are the main tools which are material in their application but on which the EU’s ideational and normative power depends upon. One should note here that there is a significant correlation between the EU’s normative power and utility-based calculations.

The EU’s normative power depends ultimately on the emergence of a common European international identity. (Manners 2002) This is an important area of scientific inquiry as one could argue that such a collective identity formation in Europe would be driven by the self-interested, rational players, i.e., the member states of the EU. In this fashion, the logic of expected consequences and utility driven calculations of the EU member states would still prevail over the logic of appropriateness, the norm-based approaches. In other words, utility-based calculations of European foreign policy would be essential in shaping the normative basis of the EU’s foreign policy. On the other side of the coin, it is possible to argue that the EU’s international identity and its dominant norms act as a boundary setting area where the utility-based calculations are then made by the member states. This is analytically important if one considers that when the logic of expected consequences prevails, the state-centric vision of the EU becomes theoretically more important whereas when the logic of appropriates prevails, it is the EU as a supranational entity and its collective identity that becomes the dominant factor shaping the member states’ preferences and interests. (Schimmelfennig 2001)

The basis for the EU’s normative power lies in its adherence to the supremacy of democratic principles, respect for human rights and minority rights, the superiority of rule of law, gender equality, individual liberties and the supremacy of a liberal, secular order. These norms have evolved over time in terms of their strength, and have been codified in the EU law with the 1957 Rome Treaty, the 1991 Treaty on the European Union, 1993 Copenhagen criteria, and the 2000 Charter for Fundamental Rights. These norms are essential in determining the future of the EU as a polity. The EU’s political destiny is shaped by the extent to which it could enable to generate a legitimate basis for its rule and there is a significant correlation between the salience of its norms and its legitimacy in the eyes of the European public.
Interestingly, the credibility of the EU’s norms decrease when there is a marked difference in the internal and external norms, when there is a problem of consistency. For such countries as Turkey which are currently negotiating for EU accession, this is a critical point. (Lerch and Schwellnus 2006) The mechanism that enables norm diffusion is Manners’ conceptualization of cultural filter, where it is defined as “the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of a social and political identity by the subject of norm diffusion”. (Manners 2002:245) There is an ongoing process of norm adaptation for acceding countries where the negotiations process leads to a diffusion of EU norms in all aspects of the EU acquis to the acceding country. This is also central in enhancing the EU’s normative power. However, when the norms are not complied with inside the EU, this in turn decreases the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of the acceding country.

One could argue that the EU’s normative power is essentially felt in its foreign policy, specifically in its enlargement policy. (Smith 2004) This is, of course, due to the fact that the material spoils at the disposal of the EU are highest during the negotiations process. In other words, the negotiating countries have a high incentive to adopt the EU’s norms because of the expected material gains that the EU membership will eventually bring. This also begs the question as to whether a collective identity at the European level exist which in turn shapes and influences European foreign policy making. The process of Europeanization is also investigated from the perspective of identity building and builds on the definition of national collective identity and identifies the changes a polity passes through the theoretical lenses of Europeanization. (Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2001; Knill, 2001)

The evolution of the EU’s foreign policy since the 1970s first within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and then since 1992 within the confines of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) could be evaluated in line with the above question as these two institutional developments provided the incentive for the EU members to harmonize their foreign policies. Accordingly, both the EPC and CFSP are treated as the keys to the emergence of a ‘Europeanization’ in foreign policy making by the development of a ‘coordination reflex’. (de Schoutheete 1980) The development of this reflex is central to the Europeanization process as the member states would basically adapt common norms, principles and decision-making procedures on foreign policy. This coordination reflex most notably developed within the framework of 2nd pillar integration.

The end of the Cold War provided the European community members with an incentive to deepen their political integration and accordingly, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was devised as a 2nd pillar of the EU with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. However, a significant weakness of the CFSP was its lack of a military capability and the uncertainties surrounding how the rhetoric that exists at the European level on possible defence operations would translate into action. This is also partly why Article J. 4 of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 declared the WEU to be ‘an integral part of the development of the European Union’ and WEU could “elaborate and implement EU decisions and actions which have defence implications” if the Council by unanimity
would authorize the WEU to do so. Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 defined and declared the WEU’s role in European security through specific tasks, i.e. humanitarian, rescue missions, peacekeeping operations and crisis management- the Petersberg tasks. There were, however, new modalities designed to allow non-EU European members of NATO to become involved with the WEU under a new category of ‘associate membership’ created in 1992 to establish closer links between NATO’s European flank and the WEU. Turkey became along with Norway and Iceland, as non-EU European members of NATO- associate members of the WEU. This associate membership gave these countries the right to fully participate in WEU-led operations in they choose to do so. Despite these positive beginnings, the CFSP’s future operability was still questionable in the early 1990s as illustrated by European Union’s failures in Bosnia in 1992 and in Kosovo in 1998. These shortcomings were illustrated by the St.Malo declaration of 1998:

The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible, military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises….while acting in conformity with our respective obligations to NATO. (“Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense”)

An important matter in the EU’s CFSP was to sort out the modalities of cooperation between NATO and the EU. The European Council in its 1999 Cologne summit stated that “the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence.” (Presidency Conclusions 1999a) At the December 1999 Helsinki summit, the European Council adopted a number of measures to advance the CESDP-Common European Security and Defence Policy- stating its “determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and where, NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct, EU-led military operations in response to international crisis.” (Presidency Conclusions 1999b) That is why, in the 1999 Helsinki summit, the European Council created the Rapid Reaction Force-RRF, a force of 60 000 troops to carry out the Petersberg tasks. As a result, new institutional arrangements were made, with the establishment of a Political and Security Committee- the ambassadors of the EU members-, EU Military Committee-chief defence officials in member states and their delegates, and the EU Military Staff-responsible for advice on the conduct of EU-led operations and planning under the Petersberg tasks. These steps on the EU front necessitated a new understanding for NATO-EU cooperation.

In NATO’s Washington summit of April 1999, all NATO members unanimously approved that the EU would have access to NATO’s assets on a case-by-case basis. Since all the non-EU European members of NATO had full voting rights in the NAC, this decision would guarantee an acceptable modus operandi for all the concerned parties. Trouble emerged when the EU began to demand for automatic access to NATO assets and its planning facilities in EU-led operations without the NATO Council approval. This is why from 1999 to 2002; NATO and the EU began to work on modalities of
Cooperation in an attempt to address the concerns and sensitivities. The main problems for the operationalisation of the EU’s CFSP came from the non-EU European members of NATO, namely Norway, Turkey, Iceland and Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. These European NATO members were concerned that under the new modalities the decisions taken in the Washington summit of NATO in April 1999 would become void.

CESDP reflects the will of the Union to develop as a credible international actor, matching its economic and commercial stature in the field of international diplomacy and security. It is therefore about identity and credibility, and will no doubt give a new expression to the "European pillar" which has been in vogue in NATO circles for a decade. While we all agree that CESDP should develop without weakening or duplicating NATO, the result, in the long run, will be the emergence of new European security architecture. Whether all members of the EU will participate or not, remains an open question. (Estrella 2000)

The institutional barriers to EU-led operations were removed by the decisions of the 2002 Copenhagen European Council that gave the EU assured access to NATO assets in EU-led operations and kept the EU members that are not involved in NATO’s security arrangements out of the NATO-EU strategic cooperation. It was also to be expected that the most important showdown of the EU would be in the Balkans once it was able to put its defence aspirations into practice. In the June 2002 Seville European Council, the European Union members adopted a new position on the security policies “embracing all Union policies, including by developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy-CFSP-and by making the European Security and Defence Policy-ESDP-operational”. More importantly, the European Council expanded the Petersberg tasks by declaring that “CFSP can play an important role in countering this threat to our security.” (Presidency Conclusions 2002b) The Seville European Council, therefore, was a first step in taking 2nd pillar integration beyond the narrowly defined Petersberg tasks.

For that purpose, in the EU’s Capabilities Conference in May 2003, there was a request to increase contributions from the member governments and/or to modernize their military in order to cope with the new challenges. In June 2003, at the Thessaloniki European Council, the EU decided to set up a European Defence Agency for the purpose of coordinating armaments bodies and enable the ECAP goals to be adopted. Within the auspices of the European Capability Action Plan, the EU decided to create battlefield groups of 1,500 troops based on the leadership provided by France, Germany and the UK in 2004. The adoption of the ECAP and the European Battle Groups also indicated that the EU was on the road of adopting new capability building mechanisms.

The Turkish perceptions and positions on the EU’s CFSP and CESDP are important in assessing the degree to which there is a harmonization between Turkey and the EU in the area of foreign policy. The Turkish position from 1999 to 2002 has been effective in the adoption of the deal between NATO and the EU as it was Turkey that had the highest level of objection to the EU’s automatic access to NATO assets. (Muftuler-Bac 2000)
In addition, since a major factor behind Turkey’s inclusion into the European order in the post World War II period was Turkey’s role in European security, it is important to analyze the possible changes in that area. It is through the critical role that Turkey played in the operationalisation of the CESDP that one needs to assess the degree to which Turkey has been experiencing a ‘Europeanization’ of its foreign policy. This is also important to evaluate the impact of the EU in diffusing its foreign policy norms and procedures to an acceding country.

The EU’s common foreign policies and Turkey: An Analysis of the Turkish Public Perceptions

When Turkey officially became a candidate country for EU membership in the European Council’s Helsinki Summit in 1999, this constituted the main turning point in enhancing the EU’s power on Turkey in inducing political change. Six years later when the accession negotiations began with Turkey in October 2005, the EU’s impact on the Turkish political structures and norms was enhanced by the EU’s conditionality. It is through the perspective of EU membership that Turkey approved series of political reforms in this six-year period. The EU’s political conditionality and the Turkish desire to fulfill these political criteria in order for accession negotiations to begin became critical in triggering a vast political transformation in Turkey which in turn impacted the collective identity formation in Turkey. This is not to say that the EU has no impact on Turkey prior to 1999. On the contrary, Turkey and the EU have a long relationship since the signing of the Association Agreement in 1963 and the establishment of a customs union in 1995. However, it was not before the 1999 Summit and the promise of full membership that the EU became an anchor for Turkey’s political liberalization and reform process. (Hale 2000; Muftuler-Bac 1997; Onis 2000, 2001; Muftuler-Bac and McLaren 2003)

An important aspect of the EU’s impact on expanding its norms to the countries in its periphery, external salience of norms, is with respect to the changing perceptions and practices of decision-making in foreign policy. The EU’s common foreign and security policy is expected to change the member state governments’ decision-making in foreign policy issues from relying solely on national governments to a supranational platform. This is the so-called coordination reflex which in turn has constituted the key in the Europeanization of foreign policy. It is then expected that in acceding countries such as Turkey, one would see a Europeanization of foreign policy defined in this manner.

In consequence, the following pages analyze the Turkish perceptions of the EU’s role in foreign policy and the EU’s CFSP and the CESDP. The results from the Eurobarometers 67(2007) and 68(2007) are particularly indicative of the wide differences between the Turkish public and other European publics in terms of the perceived role that the EU plays in foreign and security policies and key concerns such as terrorism. The analysis of the Turkish foreign policy makers’ -the government, the military and the foreign ministry-, positions demonstrate that the elite positions in Turkey towards the EU’s common foreign and security role matches that of the Turkish public. The analysis
of these perceptions is particularly telling in illustrating the limits and constraints on the
diffusion of ‘Europeanization’ norm and the ‘coordination reflex’ in foreign policy
making to Turkey.

In order to assess this possible impact, one needs to note and analyze the Turkish
position on the EU’s foreign policy in general and the CFSP in particular. This is no easy
task, as there are a number of groups in Turkey with highly differing attitudes towards
Turkey’s accession and the EU’s CFSP. This is also why this section focuses on the
Turkish perceptions of the EU’s role as a global actor and in particular on the conception
of the EU as a ‘normative’ power. How Turkey perceives the EU’s CFSP is critical in
assessing Turkey’s potential role in the larger integration process, as well as the future
development of the EU’s international role. This section investigates whether there are
wide differences among the Turkish public vis-à-vis the EU’s CFSP and to what extent
these differences are visible in Turkey’s negotiation talks with the EU.

One should note that especially in terms of foreign policy making and collective
decisions on foreign policy issues, Turkey shows a marked difference compared to EU
members on this issue. This is particularly important because the EU’s norm diffusion in
foreign policy making depends on the emergence of the coordination reflex and
Europeanization. One manifestation of the coordination reflex could be seen in the
European public’s perceptions about the role of the national governments versus the EU
in the fight against terrorism. According to Eurobarometer 68 of July 2007, in terms of
decisions relating to defense against terrorism, 53% of the Turkish public said that this is
a decision that should be left to the national government, and only 43% of the Turkish
public agreed that this should be a joint EU decision. These are by far the highest
percentages among all the EU members and candidates since for the EU in general, an
absolute majority of respondents (81%), answered that the decision to fight terrorism
should be made jointly at EU level. For a comparison of these answers, see Table 1. One
could argue that Turkey has been struggling against terrorism since 1984 and the general
perception is largely formulated by this historical experience of armed struggle. In most
EU member states, terrorism is not an everyday occurrence to the extent to which it is in
Turkey. Thus, one could evaluate the below figure accordingly, the Turkish self-interest
and the threats it faces to its survival shape the relevant norms with respect to the fight
against terrorism. The general Turkish public perception is that in this foreign policy
issue, the Turkish national government should act alone rather than jointly with the EU.
Table 1
For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly within the European Union?

Fighting Terrorism

If the Turkish public perceives that the EU is not an actor that should be relied upon or involved in such key decisions on terrorism, then a relevant question to pose here is whether the Turkish public perceives the EU to have a role in other foreign policy issues. Specifically important are two key policies of the EU, the extent to which the Turkish public supports the EU’s CFSP and CESDP and the extent to which the Turkish public supports further enlargement of the EU. Table 2 gives a summary and a comparison of the Turkish and the general EU perceptions with respect to these questions.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 27: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it?</th>
<th>Fall 2006 EU 25</th>
<th>Fall 2006 Turkey</th>
<th>Spring 2007 EU 27</th>
<th>Spring 2007 Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QA27.2: A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, towards other countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Favour</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA 27.3: Support for a common defence and security policy among the EU member states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Favour</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA27.4: Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in the future years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Favour</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 68, December 2007 Turkey National Report. Question 27, p.25

When we look at the country specific distribution of the support to these three questions, the difference between Turkey and the rest of the EU becomes even clearer. Particularly interesting in these answers is the sharp difference between the Turkish public and the general EU public in the Don’t Know answers. The Turkish Don’t knows in all the three questions are twice the percentage of the Don’t Knows in the EU public. The reason for such a high percentage of Don’t Knows in the Turkish public could be traced to the absence of a public debate in the Turkish media and politics on the possible implications of the Turkish accession to its foreign policy making. The public’s lack of
## Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>QA27.2 (CFSP) FOR %</th>
<th>QA27.3 (CESDP) FOR %</th>
<th>QA27.4 (enlargement) FOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 27</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Eurobarometer 67, field work: April-May 2007, publication November 2007, pp. 146-151.
knowledge might be a result of the absence of political cues from the opinion leaders in Turkey on this critical issue. Equally important, the low levels of public awareness on the EU’s CFSP and its ramifications might demonstrate the absence of democratic decision-making procedures in terms of foreign policy making in Turkey. Since most of the major foreign policy decisions in Turkey are made behind closed doors with the elites, the military, the foreign ministry and the government officials, bargaining with one another, the public might not be at all informed on these issues. The almost absent discussion of the EU’s common foreign, security and defence policies in the Turkish media is also illustrative of the situation and lack of interest on the public’s behalf on the EU’s CFSP.

The results from the above analysis are striking in terms of demonstrating the sharp difference between Turkey and the EU-25 and EU-27 in terms of the EU’s CFSP and CESDP. In both of these policies, the citizens of the EU members are in favour of common foreign and security as well as common defence policies with a predominant majority. Almost ¾ of the respondents in the EU member states are in favour of CFSP and the CESDP whereas only 40% of the Turkish public are in favour and the opposition is very high to these common policies compared with the opposition from the EU-25 and EU-27. However, when the issue is over the policy of enlargement, Turkish public is in favour of enlargement and the opposition is very low whereas the EU public’s opposition to further enlargement is pretty high.

Thus, from these public opinion results, it seems that the Turkish public, in general, has the highest level of support to enlargement as a foreign policy issue while there is a less enthusiastic outlook towards the CFSP and CESDP, when compared to the EU members’ results. In addition, the above percentages also indicate a number of key concerns, among those member states where threat perception is high, support to the common foreign, security and defence policies are also high. Cyprus provides us with such an example. Cyprus is not a member of NATO or NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program. As discussed above, this is how the modalities of cooperation between the EU and NATO were solved when with the 2002 Copenhagen deal on the EU-NATO cooperation, Cyprus was kept out of the EU’s 2nd pillar integration. What is more, Cyprus feels threatened by Turkey, which explains the 91% support in Cyprus towards a common defence policy. There is also a similar result among the Central and Eastern European countries; even though all of them are now NATO members, the publics in these member states also support both the CFSP and CESDP with very high percentages and this is most likely due to their historical experience with the Soviet Union. Among member states where there is no such past experience with the USSR and who were among the founding members of NATO such as the UK, support to common foreign and defence policies under the EU umbrella are lower. Support to both CFSP and CESDP are pretty low among the neutral counties such as Finland, Austria, Sweden and Ireland.

A further analysis of the Turkish perception and the EU-27’s perceptions on the CESDP and CFSP demonstrates these key differences especially with regards to the creation of a post for foreign minister at the EU level and autonomy from the USA. The ongoing differences between the American and European perspectives on global security
are important in understanding the key issues of contention and the future of NATO. Since NATO has significantly changed in the post Cold War period and in the post 9/11 period, the answers to the question on independence from the USA actually point out to public support to NATO in the future. Thus, the EU members and the Turkish responses on that question is important to assess the level of support to NATO among the European public. This analysis is provided in Table 4. A country by country analysis on these questions also reveal important points, this analysis is provided in Table 5.

Table 4: Question A39: Evaluations on the EU’s Common Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QA39.1: The EU should have its own foreign minister who can be the spokesperson for a common EU position</th>
<th>EU 27</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Agree</td>
<td>%69</td>
<td>%50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Disagree</td>
<td>%18</td>
<td>%12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>%13</td>
<td>%38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA39.2: The EU’s Foreign policy should be independent from the USA’s foreign policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to agree</td>
<td>%80</td>
<td>%49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to disagree</td>
<td>%10</td>
<td>%14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>%10</td>
<td>%37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA39.3: The EU should have a common immigration policy towards people from outside the EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Agree</td>
<td>%75</td>
<td>%43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to Disagree</td>
<td>%14</td>
<td>%17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>%11</td>
<td>%40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 68, 2007 Turkey National Report. Question 39, p.28

As seen in Tables 4 and 5, there is a marked difference on these answers between the EU-27 and Turkey, specifically with respect to the relative perceptions of the EU-USA relations. The EU citizens predominantly, by 80%, would like to see an independent and autonomous EU foreign policy from the USA. The main implication of that result is with respect to the prospective role that NATO will play in the European security. On the other hand, the Turkish public only by 49% agree to this division between the EU and USA which most probably reflects the dominance of the USA in Turkey’s foreign policy and the central role NATO has played in shaping the Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War years.
### Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Question QA39.1 (Foreign Minister) FOR %</th>
<th>QA 39.2 (Independence from the USA) FOR %</th>
<th>QA 39.3 (common immigration policy) FOR %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 27</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition, it is highly interesting that Greece and Cyprus have the highest percentages on the question on the EU’s independence from the USA. This is most probably a result of the Greek perceptions that the USA is more inclined towards protecting Turkish interests in the areas of conflict on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea disputes. This also fits well with the Greek foreign policy objectives of Europeanizing these conflicts and to find a solution more conducive to Greek positions as Greece and
Cyprus are EU members while Turkey is not. An important note here than would be that the national self interests of the players would shape to a large extent their perceptions on the CFPS and CESDP rather than the socialization into an EU specific norm. The fact that Cyprus which only became a member in 2004 but has the highest level of support to the EU’s foreign policy and the independence from USA would be indicative of the relative weight of utility versus norm-based explanations on the European foreign policy.

The relative perceptions of the European publics and the Turkish public on the EU’s common foreign and security policies shape their perceptions of the role that the EU would play in international politics in fifty years from now. This analysis is provided in Table 6.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 38: For every item below, the European Union fifty years onwards will………?</th>
<th>EU-27 Spring 2007</th>
<th>Turkey Spring 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, most probably</td>
<td>No, not probably</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a more valuable currency than the US dollar with the Euro?</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Become one of the leading diplomatic powers?</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have its own Army?</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a President elected by European Citizens?</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only become a secondary economic power?</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 68, 2007 Turkey National Report. Question 38, p.27

The above table is important in assessing the relative weight of the EU’s normative power versus its hard power. The EU public apparently feels that the EU’s will become a leading diplomatic power which is an endorsement of its normative power elements. The military aspects of the EU have a lower support which is of course expected given the reluctance among the EU public towards a militarization in Europe.
If we could deduce the Turkish public’s general views and attitudes towards the EU’s common foreign, security and defence policies from the Eurobarometers, then a relevant question here is the extent to which the Turkish public at large and the Turkish foreign policy makers, specifically the government, the foreign ministry as well as the Turkish military, are sharing the same views. In other words, does the Turkish elite support the emergence of a common foreign policy and a common security and defence policy at the EU level? Do the Turkish foreign policy makers support an EU-led only foreign policy independent of the USA and therefore NATO? In order to answer these questions, we need to look into the relevant positions of the Turkish foreign policy actors on the EU’s foreign policy role.

The EU’s Common Foreign Policy and Turkey: An Analysis of the Turkish Elite Perceptions

The Turkish foreign policy making as a process has been mostly shaped by the key actors in Turkey, the government, the ministry of foreign affairs and the military. What sets the Turkish case apart from other EU members is the central role played by the military in Turkish politics, as a result this role is also important in Turkish foreign policy decisions.

According to the European Commission, even though “the basic features of democracy exist in Turkey” (Muftuler-Bac 2004:433), there are still continued problems with regards to consolidation of the regime and raising attitudinal support. Especially problematic is the civilian control of the military. The military is a key actor in foreign policy formulation in Turkey and has an integral part in the decision-making procedures. This is, of course, seen as an anomaly by the European Union. A central question is whether there has been a change in the military’s role in Turkish foreign policy making and related to that, does the military’s position to the EU’s CFSP and CESDP reflect that of the Turkish public. Similarly, the Turkish government’s positions on these issues are key to understand the Turkish elite’s perceptions on the EU’s CFSP.

The Turkish positions towards the EU’s CFSP and the CESDP has been mostly determined by the changing dynamics of European security in the post-Cold War era. When the EU began to move towards a common defence policy in 1999 with the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, an important issue arose over the NATO-EU cooperation. The non-EU European members of NATO, most importantly Turkey, insisted on the application of the Berlin-plus arrangement and the 1999 NATO summit decisions towards the NATO-EU cooperation. (Muftuler-Bac 2000, 2007) The crux of the matter lies in the final approval in NATO if the EU conducts an operation using NATO assets. On this issue, both the Turkish foreign ministry and the Turkish military are highly sensitive. The final turning point in that respect was reached in December 2002 in the Copenhagen summit of the European Council when the Council agreed that “the Berlin-plus arrangements and the implementation of the Berlin-plus arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU member states which are also either NATO members or parties to the ‘Partnerships for Peace’ and which have consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with
This decision is important for the operationalization of the EU’s CESDP and addressed the key concerns that Turkey had. As a result, Turkey as an equal partner— as NATO member and associate member of the WEU— contributed and participated to all the EU-led operations that were held since 2003.

Turkey actively participated in all EU-led operations and in addition has pledged to contribute to the EU’s Headline Goal for 2010 with 6,000 troops, aircraft and ships to the force, this contribution made Turkey the fifth-largest contributor to the EU force of 60,000. A key turning point arrived in 2007 when Turkey withdrew its contribution to the Headline Goal. General Yılmaz Oguz, Turkey’s Representative to NATO’s Military Command, communicated that decision to the Council of the EU in May 2007 based on the Turkish concern that “Turkey’s expectations are not fulfilled and its concerns are not addressed”. (“NATO does not give support to PKK”) These expectations could be seen as the nature of the NATO-EU cooperation and the application of the Berlin-plus and Copenhagen arrangements, and the specific role that Cyprus would have under the 2nd pillar policies of the EU.

The turning point in the Turkish elite perceptions’ towards the EU’s CFSP came in Spring 2007 over the possibility of a EU-led operation in Kosovo that would take over from the NATO mission in Kosovo. A key concern here was that in June 2007, the EU began to plan its operation in Kosovo that would be a ‘civil initiative’, but the main problem arose from the fact that the EU decided to use NATO facilities and at the same time allow for arrangements that would include Cyprus in this operation. Since Cyprus is effectively kept out of the EU-led operations using NATO assets based on the 2002 Copenhagen decision, the Turkish government saw this as a violation of the Berlin-plus arrangements. Thus, there was a consensus among the military and the Turkish foreign ministry on the withdrawal decision as illustrated by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Abdullah Gul who declared:

Parameters were already set in 2002. You shouldn't expect further flexibility from Turkey, a country that has introduced major contributions to NATO as an ally, on this issue. It shouldn't solely be Turkey that is expected to be flexible. Like NATO does in these kinds of situations, the EU should find a solution to this issue itself, without using its form of a decision mechanism as an excuse.

(Simsek 2007)

However, the NATO-EU cooperation in Kosovo has also complicated Turkey’s relations with NATO and the EU. The European Union mission is underway with plans to take it over from the NATO mission in 2008, however, the EU wants to use the NATO assets already in Kosovo. Since the EU defines the mission as a civilian operative -EUlex-, it aims to include Cyprus which would have been excluded if this were a military operation. The Turkish position is that since the operation is using NATO assets, whether it is civilian or not would not matter, and that Cyprus cannot participate according to the Berlin-plus and 2002 Copenhagen arrangements. The EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn claimed that the ongoing impasse needs to be overcome because
“this is a problem for Europe and it hurts the EU, and its troops.” (“AB Komisyonu Uyesi Olli Rehn’den İlerleme Çağrısı”)

A crisis situation is now at bay when the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's attempted to hold an unofficial meeting in March 2008 between the EU and NATO on Kosovo and the Turkish military reacted to that meeting arguing that this goes against the general rules and practices of NATO, “since NATO functions on a consensus basis. We have not given our consent to such a meeting. Had it taken place it would have been a first in NATO's history.” (Inanc 2008) Even though the meeting was cancelled, the immediate impact of the crisis was felt between the Turkish government and the military. The Turkish military does not approve of the Kosovo mission while using NATO assets to include Cyprus and protested on these grounds. The Turkish position is that if Cyprus is included in the operation, NATO assets cannot be used, and if NATO assets and facilities are used, then Cyprus cannot participate since Cyprus is out of Berlin-plus and the Copenhagen arrangements on NATO-EU cooperation.

However, the Turkish government decided that Turkey would contribute to the Kosovo mission, overlooking the objections of the military and the foreign ministry in March 2008. Thus, on this key issue, the Turkish participation to an EU-led operation, the Turkish government and the military differed tremendously. This is important to note because it reflects on the emerging dynamics of foreign policy making in Turkey; the government is now taking steps that are opposed by the military on foreign policy issues specifically with respect to European foreign policy. This brings us to the analysis of the normative impact of the EU on transforming the civil-military relations in Turkey in general and in terms of foreign policy formulations in particular.

The role of the Turkish military in foreign policy making and the EU

Democracy is one of the main norms that the European Union diffuses in the international sphere. Civilian oversight of the military is a necessary component of the liberal democracy that the EU transmits as a core norm. Highly autonomous military institutions that have the power to shape, determine, and veto foreign and domestic policies are against what the EU considers as the normal way that a democratic regime functions. Indeed, in ideal type democracies, no unelected group (such as the military, monarchy, judiciary, or bureaucracy) can hold reserve or tutelary powers that can obstruct policy making capabilities of the elected officials. (Linz 1975:182-183, Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995:78) If, in the political system, the military has reserve domains that “remove specific areas of government authority and substantive policy making from the purview of elected officials”, then democratic procedures are disturbed. (Valenzuela 1992: 64-65) Similarly, in consolidated liberal democracies, the armed forces cannot have tutelary powers that are exercised by military controlled institutions or by the military’s self-defined role as the guarantor of the constitution.

Foreign policy cannot be determined exclusively by an institution -military or bureaucratic- that is not accountable to the voters in regular national elections. In European democracies, foreign policy is usually determined by the government, after
consultation and discussion in the parliament. The diplomats and bureaucrats of the ministry of foreign affairs are responsible from the implementation of the policies, which could be subject to parliamentary oversight. Similarly, in ideal-type democracies, the armed forces are accountable to “a single, civilian-directed defense ministry”. (Pion-Berlin 1992:89) Some of the responsibilities of the ministry of defense are to arbitrate between the demands of the government and the military, to determine the roles and missions of the armed forces, and to increase the performance of the armed forces in accomplishing its tasks. (Bruneau and Goetze 2006:71-92) Thus, if the military will be deployed in a foreign mission, this decision is, first, made by the elected government and the parliament. Then, it is the responsibility of the ministry of defense, in consultation with the cabinet and the military, to determine how the mission will take place.

In Turkey, these democratic procedures on foreign policy decisions are not followed. The primary decision-makers are the foreign ministry and the military. Since the Ottoman times, the ministry of foreign affairs is “an elite within an elite… [with an] ethos… as a center of bureaucratic excellence”. (Robins 2003: 72) Especially during times of governmental crises or weak coalition cabinets, the ministry increases its force in determining and shaping Turkish foreign policy. In addition, the bureaucracy dominates decisions unless there is a strong civilian leader with specific foreign policy goals, like Turgut Ozal between 1983 and 1991 as prime minister and later president. For instance, during the coalition government of 1991-1993, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel let the minister of foreign affairs, Hikmet Cetin, and his undersecretary, Ozdem Sanberk, to manage foreign affairs. This team continued during Tansu Ciller’s prime ministry as well because she could not find the time to deal with foreign policy “owing to the necessities of constant maneuvering at the domestic political level”. (Robins 2003: 63)

The ministry of foreign affairs is staffed with bureaucrats, who are usually graduates of the Ankara University and who have to pass through an entrance exam in order to be recruited. The common background of the bureaucrats and the difficulty of the employment exam increase the status and esteem of the staff. In addition, the ministry personnel share the same values and norms on foreign policy matters. The origins of this hard-line approach to foreign policy go back to the treaty of Sevres, which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious powers of the First World War. This treaty envisioned the division of Anatolian territories in present day Turkey among European states and the creation of an independent Armenian and Kurdish states in the east and southeast respectively. The Sevres treaty was rejected by the national assembly which convened in Ankara in 1920. The Turkish forces, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, managed to prevent the enforcement of the Sevres conditions in what became the Turkish War of National Independence. With the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in July 1923, the treaty of Sevres was permanently shelved and most of the current borders of the Turkish state were determined. (Soysal 2004: 41) However, among the ministry of foreign affairs staff, the memory of Sevres is still vivid. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs described the effects of the 1920 treaty as follows:

Ours is a Jacobin republic. Longer lasting than any other kind. The history is behind it, the philosophy of its founders… We all have a Sevres obsession. All of us… in the foreign ministry…, from our elementary school education, we
have been introduced to the Sevres map. We can never forget that map. (quoted in Candar 2004: 57)

The Sevres syndrome leads to a foreign policy guided by security concerns and focused on the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. During the Cold-War era, such principles were followed within the NATO framework. However, during the uncertainty of the 1990s, the Sevres syndrome in the ministry of foreign affairs led to an increased attention to the Kurdish question. Fearful that Turkey’s southeast borders might change with the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, the hard-line foreign policy decision-makers focused on the Kurdish question in Turkey’s bilateral relations with Europe, the USA, and the Middle East countries. The ministry interpreted the European Union’s calls for increasing minority and Kurdish rights as an infringement on Turkish sovereignty. It was perceived that European powers are trying to weaken and carve up Turkish territory by creating an autonomous state in southeast Turkey, like they attempted in 1920 with the Sevres treaty.

The other major player in Turkish foreign policy, the military, shares this hard-line approach of the ministry of foreign affairs. Similar to the bureaucracy, the powers of the military in foreign policy seem to increase when civilian governments are weak and fragmented. Strong leaders, such as President Turgut Ozal, were able to bypass the military under certain rare circumstances. However, usually the military retains important reserve powers in foreign policy matters. The prerogatives of the armed forces emanate from two interrelated sources.

First, the military in Turkey has always played an important role in domestic politics. The Turkish Republic was established by the military, which did not accept the partition of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War by European powers. It was Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a military officer and later the first president of the Republic, who commanded the armed forces during the War of Independence and founded the Republic based on principles of secularism, nationalism, and republicanism. The Republican People’s Party, which was founded in September 1923, brought together the military and civilian leadership of the War and implemented Ataturk’s principles. The influence of the military continued after the transition to democracy in 1950. The Turkish Armed Forces intervened in politics in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The military argued in each intervention that it was its duty to protect the nation when democratic procedures produced threatening circumstances. Accordingly, each intervention lasted only for a brief period of time and the armed forces ultimately guided transitions back to democracy.

This influence of the armed forces in Turkish politics leads to the perception that the military is the creator and savior of the independent Turkish nation. Since the end of the Cold War, the armed forces guard the boundaries of the Turkish state from Kurdish terrorist activities. Because of this role of the military and the fact that there was a return to democracy after each military coup, significant numbers of Turkish citizens and the politicians regard the military as a trustworthy institution that can protect Turkey from external and internal enemies. As a result, there is no unity among the elites and the public against the political influence of the generals. (Demirel 2004: 134-143)
The second reason why the Turkish military holds reserve powers in foreign policy matters is because constitutionally the armed forces have this right. After each military intervention, the armed forces increased their power and privileges. The National Security Council (NSC) is a by-product of these coups. The NSC is an institution that brings together the representatives of the civilian cabinet, the chief of the general staff, and the four commanders of the military. The Council was first integrated into the constitution after the 1960 military intervention, but its powers were increased with each subsequent coup. After the 1980 intervention, the NSC became “the most decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision making, the other leg being the council of ministers”. (Cizre Sakallioglu 1997: 158) The 1982 constitution obligated the civilian cabinet to “give priority consideration” to the decisions of the NSC, which pertain to “the formulation, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the state”. The NSC prepares the National Security Policy Document, which determines the necessary actions that must be taken against main security threats. The recommendations of the NSC on foreign policy are almost always implemented by the civilian cabinet, giving considerable powers to the armed forces. (Robins 2003: 76-77)

In addition to the role of the military in the NSC, the Turkish Armed Forces are not constitutionally responsible to the ministry of defense since the 1960 coup. In contrast to the European democratic norms, the ministry of defense does not determine defense policy, military budget and promotions, purchase of arms, and manufacturing of weapons. (Cizre Sakallioglu 1997:159-160) Since these are the responsibilities of the Chief of the General Staff, the military can act independently in the implementation of foreign missions.

The dominance of the military in foreign policy making does not fit the European liberal democratic model. However, after 1999, the European Union started to affect the powers of the military in Turkish democracy. The primary way the EU influenced Turkish politics was through the prospect of EU membership and enlargement negotiations —what Ian Manners calls the “procedural diffusion” of EU norms. (2002:244) In Turkey, this procedural diffusion took place through changing the balance of power between hard-liners and liberals especially on the issue of civil-military relations in domestic and foreign policy.

As argued above, the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs and the military share the Sevres syndrome in foreign policy making. However, since the mid-1980s, this hard-line approach has been challenged by a more liberal faction in Turkish politics. The liberals believe that the dominant state ideology ignores individual beliefs and rights, places the state above society, and does not accept different religious and ethnic identities. In contrast, the liberals perceive “society… as an entity separate from the state, characterized by its highly pluralistic structure consisting of competing groups with divergent interests.” (Ayata 2004:253) Liberals focus on the rights of the groups that are excluded by the state ideology, such as the Kurdish minority.
The hard-line approach advocates a military solution to the Kurdish question. According to this view, the problem in Turkey does not originate from the Kurdish minority per se, but it is a predicament caused by the terrorist organization, PKK. The problem is aggravated because the international community and the European states support the PKK. In addition, the creation of the northern no-flight zone in Iraq after the Gulf War strengthened the PKK and allowed it to establish bases across the border. The hard-line approach believes that, for any viable solution in southeast Turkey, the military must first defeat the PKK. After terrorism is eliminated, “economic and social programs associated with the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) would resolve the problems of the region.” (Kirisci 2004:283) The Turkish military and the ministry of foreign affairs advocate this view.

The liberals diverge from the hard-line approach and argue that “in essence, the Kurdish problem is a product of increasing demands by Kurds to express their cultural and ethnic identity and the inability of Turkey to adjust to these demands”. (Kirisci 2004:287) The liberals believe that the problem could be solved by recognizing the cultural, ethnic, and political rights of the Kurds in Turkey. Thereby, the moderates in the Kurdish movement could be won and support for PKK terrorism could be diminished. At the beginning of the 1990s, on occasion, several Turkish politicians, such as Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel, and Erdal Inonu, advocated a liberal solution to the Kurdish problem. However, partly because of the continuation of PKK terrorism, the hard-liners kept the upper hand in Turkish foreign policy with regards to the Kurdish problem. Yet, even though the liberal approach never increased its power vis-à-vis the hard-line style of foreign policy, it survived among some parliamentarians and civil society organizations.

The balance of power between the hard-liners and liberals changed at the end of the 1990s. The European Union played an important role in strengthening the liberal approach in Turkey. Two domestic factors precipitated the influence of the European Union. First, by 1999 the hard-line approach had succeeded in decreasing the power of the PKK. In 1995, the Turkish military carried out a six-week operation in northern Iraq with 35,000 troops. In 1996, with the cooperation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in northern Iraq, the Turkish armed forces attacked PKK bases. In 1998, one of the leading figures of the PKK was captured by the Turkish forces. The same year the Turkish military and government started to pressure Syria to cease supporting the PKK. The Turkish armed forces started to prepare an overt attack on Syria while the Chief of the General Staff, Huseyin Kivrikoglu, argued that “there actually was an undeclared war going on between Turkey and Syria” for several years. (Kirisci 2004:295) In the end, Syria had to give in and deport Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK. After Ocalan fled to Italy, Turkey exerted considerable pressure to its NATO ally and to this member of the EU. With the perception that a European power was again attacking Turkish sovereignty (reminiscent of the Sevres treaty), diplomatic, political, and even economic relations between Italy and Turkey were severed. Ocalan was finally deported from Italy and captured in the Greek embassy in Kenya. After his arrest, Ocalan called a cease-fire, which effectively ended PKK terrorism for three years. By 1999, the hard-line approach of the military had paid off.
The success of the hard-line Turkish foreign policy on the Kurdish problem was followed by another, second, domestic development. In February 1997, the Islamic political movement in Turkey faced a serious blow. On 28 February 1997, during the National Security Council meeting, the military recommended to the coalition government that was led by the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) to suppress Islamic groups. Following the military’s pressure, several series of briefings were held with the participation of secular civil society groups. In June 1997, the leader of the WP and prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, resigned from office. In 1998, the WP was closed down and Erbakan was restricted from political activities by a decision of the constitutional court. (Howe 2000:114-147) In 2001, the heir of the WP, the Virtue Party was also closed down by the Turkish judiciary. Two new Islamic parties were established from the ashes of the Welfare and Virtue Parties. One of them, the Felicity Party, continued to represent political Islam in line with the WP tradition. The other, Justice and Development Party (JDP), started to represent a moderate version of political Islam. In the 2002 and 2007 elections, the JDP won the majority of the seats in the parliament, coming to power on its own.

The foreign policy of political Islam in Turkey, before the rise of JDP, followed neither the hard-line nor the liberal approach. According to the Islamists, Turkish society had regressed because of Western imperialism and corrupt European and American culture. According to this view, because Western economic and political system adversely affected the traditions and values of Muslim societies, Turkey should not pursue EU membership and give up its membership in NATO. Instead, Turkey should seek closer cooperation with its Middle Eastern neighbours and Arab nations.

After the February 1997 process and closure of the Welfare and Virtue Parties, a faction of the political Islamists changed their stance on foreign policy. Faced with the constant danger that their parties might be closed down and repressed by the military, the moderates started to advocate European democratic principles of pluralism, freedoms, and civil society. The democratic norms of the EU, especially on civil-military relations, match with the interests of the political Islamists and the Justice and Development Party. “In its efforts to prevent military encroachment, the [JDP] consider[ed] the EU, which as part of the accession criteria insists on the civilian control over the military, as a major ally” (Ayata 2004:272) The weakening of the military’s influence in the political system would mean the elimination of an important force that could restrict the activities of the JDP. Thus, in an effort to further legitimize political Islam, the Justice and Development party started to advocate EU membership. As a result of this foreign policy goal, the JDP also moved closer to the liberal foreign policy approach. Both the anti-Western foreign policy of the earlier Islamic movement and the hard-line approach were rejected by the JDP. Similar to the liberals, the party began to advocate fulfilling the EU criteria and increasing democratic freedoms -both for themselves and for other groups, including the Kurdish minority. (Ayata 2004:268-274)

These two domestic changes –i.e. the rise of liberal Islam and the success of the military in eliminating PKK terrorism- marked the weakening of the hard-line approach, Sevres syndrome, and the influence of the military and ministry of foreign affairs in
Turkish foreign policy. At this crucial juncture, the EU also played an important role. As mentioned above, in 1999, the EU declared Turkey as one of the candidate countries. Turkey had to carry out necessary reforms until 2004, which were prioritized in the Accession Partnership Document in November 2000. The prospect of EU membership brought about a reconsideration of the Sevres syndrome. The view that the European states were demanding reforms in Turkey because they wanted to damage Turkish sovereignty lost its significance with the official promise of eventual membership. This was an important setback for the hard-line claims that giving in to European demands would produce results against Turkish national interests. Thus, by recognizing Turkey as a candidate country, the EU became an important anchor that strengthened the hands of the liberals.

Not surprisingly, after 1999, Turkish foreign and domestic policy changed significantly in its treatment of the Kurdish problem and the military’s role in politics. Following EU’s decision to grant candidate status, the Turkish parliament ratified nine harmonization packages in order to start accession talks with the EU. From 2001 to 2004, “more than one-third of the original text of the Constitution was amended” in accordance with the Accession Partnership Document. (Ozbudun 2007:195) Even though the reform process started earlier, after the JDP came to power on its own in 2002, the liberal project was put into action more forcefully. The military’s power in foreign policy also declined. This was due in part to the existence of a stable government after a long period of coalition governments (as mentioned above, the military and ministry of foreign affairs have traditionally played more significant roles when there was no strong civilian leadership of government). But EU conditionality, decline in the activities of PKK, and the strengthening of the liberals also positively influenced the reform process.

The reforms pertained to important democratic norms, including freedoms of expression, organization, press, and assembly. (Hale 2003:110-118, Muftuler-Bac 2005: 21-29, Ozbudun 2007:179-196) However, important steps were also taken with regards to foreign policy and the Kurdish problem. In August 2002, broadcasting and education became possible in Kurdish. Also in the same year, death penalty in Turkey was abolished. Even though rejecting death penalty was a significant application of an EU norm in itself, it was also a major development because it resolved the question of whether or not the captured leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was going to be executed. The abolition of the death penalty was another success for the liberals and failure for the hard-line approach with regards to the Kurdish problem. After the November 2002 elections, the newly elected Justice and Development Party (JDP) accelerated the reform process and strengthened the liberal approach further by enacting six additional constitutional packages and revising the penal code. These amendments, among others, put into operation the previously ratified reforms. As a result, the Turkish Radio and Television started to show some Kurdish programs; at least four Kurdish TV and radio stations in the east began broadcasting; and in several primary schools, children were able to learn the language. (Grigoriadis 2006:449, Commission of the European Communities 2007:22)
The reforms also affected the role of the military in foreign and domestic foreign policy. The 2001 reform package amended the 1982 constitution so that the NSC would now only “advise” to the council of ministers and the latter would only “evaluate” the decisions of the NSC. (Ozbudun 2007:193-194, Ozbudun 2002: 27-28) In July 2003, the JDP government introduced several other changes. The secretary general of the NSC, who had previously been a military officer, was now replaced by a civilian and his powers were reduced. The number of civilians working in the under-secretariat was increased relative to the military officers. The regular meetings of the NSC were reduced from once a month to once every two months. Apart from these changes in the NSC, the military also lost some of its powers due to other seemingly unrelated reforms. For instance, the State Security Courts were revised in 1999 and the seat of the military judge was eliminated. In 2004, the State Security Courts were abolished all together. Similarly, the 2004 Ninth Constitutional Package changed the composition of the Council of Higher Education and eliminated the seat that was held by a military officer. (Heper 2005: 37, Jenkins 2007: 346-347, Turan 2007: 331-332, Ozbudun 2007: 193-195) These reforms reduced the powers of the military in Turkish politics, and thereby, affected the influence of the armed forces in foreign policy.

Thus, from 1999 until 2004, EU norms on democracy, and especially on civil-military relations and bureaucratic dominance in foreign policy making, seemed to have gradually diffused to Turkey. However, most of these amendments were made in legal terms and they were not yet put to test in practice. Except for the recognition of several Kurdish rights, there were no major setbacks to the hard-line approach in dealing with significant foreign policy matters. In fact, the liberal approach was put to test in 2008 with renewed military operations in northern Iraq. And it became clear that the hard-line approach and the dominance of the military in foreign policy decision-making was far from over.

The February 2008 military operation against PKK bases in northern Iraq highlights the importance of the European Union commitment in diffusing democratic norms in Turkey and other domestic factors mentioned earlier. Democratic norms were adopted in Turkey until 2004 because of a combination of factors: decline in the activities of the PKK, rise of liberal Islam, and European Union commitment to Turkish membership. In 2007, almost all of these conditions changed, bringing about a return of the hard-line approach in foreign policy making and increasing role of the military.

In 2004, the PKK resumed its activities and carried out several destructive attacks against the Turkish armed forces and the civilian population in the southeast. The most violent attack against the security forces occurred in October 2007, in Hakkari, Daglıca and the biggest assault against civilians (killing two high school students and several other civilians) took place in 3 January 2008 in Diyarbakır. (“Gozler Hukumette”, “Cocuklari da Vurdular”) Two different developments were perceived as the causes of PKK’s renewed activities, both supporting the hard-line approach. First, the war in Iraq was seen as increasing the chances of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq. The relaxation of authority in the region allowed PKK fighters to cross the border to Turkey more frequently. The situation in Iraq was seen as the fault of foreign nations, mostly the
United States. This marked the return to the Sevres syndrome, with its belief that the Kurdish problem in Turkey was generated by foreign powers who try to damage Turkish sovereignty. The second cause for the resumption of PKK activities was seen as the liberal approach itself. The reforms that gave rights to the Kurdish minority and reduced the power of the military and the NSC led to assertions that “EU-induced reform laws have weakened the Turkish state, made it impossible to effectively fight terrorism and encouraged Kurdish separatism.” (Patton 2007:346) As a result of increasing terrorist activities, the liberal approach to foreign policy started to lose ground.

These domestic developments were coupled by a reversal of EU commitment to Turkish candidacy. The European Council decided in December 2006 that negotiation talks will not begin on eight chapters and other chapters will not be provisionally closed until Turkey fully executes the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement. Currently Turkey does not apply the Additional Protocol to the Greek controlled Republic of Cyprus. According to the decision of the EC, Turkey must resolve its conflict with the Greek Cypriots and Greece before it becomes a member of the EU. This EC resolution was interpreted in Turkey as evidence that the EU is not sincere in Turkish candidacy and that it would prevent its membership until Turkey gives concessions on important foreign policy interests, such as Cyprus.

Increasing anti-Turkish sentiments in the EU provided evidence to the Turkish claims that the Europeans have never been genuine about Turkish membership. In 2005, several French and Dutch politicians used Turkish candidacy to the EU in their propaganda against the EU constitution. French President Nicolas Sarkozy continued this type of propaganda during his campaign and declared that, instead of membership to the EU, Turkey should be part of a Mediterranean Union. In addition, intolerance to Islam seemed to be on the rise in several European countries as evidenced by the Danish cartoons crisis and several Christian Democratic politicians’ arguments that the EU’s doors are closed to a Muslim country. (Patton 2007:345)

These developments within the European Union eroded the basis of the liberals in Turkey, including the Justice and Development Party. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, the National Action Party (NAP), which represents the hard-line approach in foreign policy, increased its share of the votes. While the party could not gain any seats in the parliament five years ago, it pooled 14.3 percent of the votes and 70 seats in 2007. Threatened by the prospect of NAP’s return, the JDP also started abandon the liberal approach and advocate a hard-line policy.

The results of this policy change were witnessed in Turkey’s response to the Kurdish problem. Even though on occasion the government continued to resist the decisions of the military and the ministry of foreign affairs on other issues (like on the decision of Turkey’s contribution to the Kosovo mission), some of the liberal gains on the Kurdish problem were gradually reversed. Education in Kurdish was banned and several court cases were opened against producers that broadcasted in Kurdish. In June 2007, the Council of State dismissed the mayor of a district in Diyarbakir and closed down the Municipality Council because public services were also carried out in Kurdish.
Indeed, no language other than Turkish was permitted in public areas. Several charges were also made to Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) for being involved with PKK terrorism. In November 2007 the Attorney General appealed to the Constitutional Court to close down the party. (“DTP’ye Kapatma Istemi”) One month later, the chairman of the DSP was arrested because he avoided serving in the military by obtaining a fabricated health report. (All male Turkish citizens at a certain age must be conscripted for various months. For the arrest of Nurettin Demirtas, see “Demirtas’a Ucak Korugunde Gozalti”)

The Justice and Development Party also reversed its attacks on the military’s role in foreign policy issues. In November 2007, the Turkish parliament and the JDP government gave the permission to the Turkish Armed Forces to carry out operations in northern Iraq against PKK camps. In February 2008, the Turkish military crossed the border and attacked PKK bases for eight days. The operation marked the abandonment of liberal foreign policy approaches and a return to hard-line policies, which put the military at the center stage. The JDP endorsed this process and let the military carry out its mission. When the return of Turkish troops increased controversy over why the operations did not last longer, the Chief of the General Staff, Yasar Buyukanit, declared that no one asked the operations to be terminated. Even though Buyukanit was replying to claims that the USA pressured the Turkish Armed Forces to end the operations, he also implied that there was no internal political pressure to stop the mission. This is significant evidence that the JDP government endorsed the hard-line approach and the military’s mission in northern Iraq. Buyukanit’s declaration gives the impression that the government did not get involved in how the military carried out the operation. In the same speech, Buyukanit warned that a political solution in the southeast would strengthen the PKK. In addition, he argued that the terrorist organization recruits members in Turkey mainly because of economic difficulties. (“Uniformami Cikaririm”) This is a restatement of the foreign policy that Turkey followed in the 1990s and marks the waning of the liberal approach.

The European Union norms on democracy, civil-military relations, and foreign policy making seemed to have lost ground by 2008. From 1999 to 2004, several important steps were taken on these issues. The procedural diffusion of EU norms in Turkey took place after the EU officially declared Turkey as a candidate country. This commitment occurred at the same time with the weakening of the PKK and changes in the policies of the Islamic party. These developments strengthened the liberal approach in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of the military. This was evidenced in March 2008 when the civilian government decided to participate in the Kosovo mission with EU member states contrary to the military’s decision. However, reversal of the liberal gains especially on the Kurdish issue signifies the fragility of these norms and their vulnerable diffusion in Turkey. When the European states started to question Turkey’s candidacy, the advocates of the hard-line approach in foreign policy and the military legitimizd their earlier positions. The liberals in Turkey can find better chances to adopt and implement European democratic norms only with continued EU support for Turkish candidacy.
Conclusion

This paper analyzed how much the EU’s enlargement policy as a foreign policy tool impacted the diffusion of European norms into Turkey and how much Turkey was influenced by the European Union’s foreign policy decision-making norms. These questions were answered by looking at three different processes. The paper first examined the penetration of the European norm of making joint foreign, security and defense decisions into the Turkish public. Second, the acceptance of the same norm among the Turkish elites was analyzed. The final section of the paper scrutinized the changes in the Turkish civil-military relations on foreign policy making.

One conclusion that can be drawn out of these three lines of inquiry is that norm diffusion from the EU into Turkey on foreign and security policy has been weak. First, a comparison of Eurobarometer survey results between the European member states and Turkey indicates that the Turkish public either does not know the role the EU plays in foreign and security policy or is not supportive of further 2nd pillar European integration. Second, Turkish foreign policy decision-makers, such as the ministry of foreign affairs and the military, are ambivalent about EU common foreign policy, similar to the Turkish public. There have been several important steps on this issue that suggests the diffusion of EU norms. For example, Turkey participated in all of the EU-led operations after 2003 and initially contributed troops and material to the EU’s RFF. However, Turkish elites have been skeptical of NATO-EU strategic cooperation. Problems arose when it became possible for Cyprus to access NATO assets in Kosovo. Turkey withdrew from the Headline Goal as a response. This demonstrates the fragility of the joint decision-making norm on foreign and security matters among the Turkish elites. Finally, the diffusion of democratic foreign policy decision-making into Turkey has been weak. Turkish civil-military relations changed especially until 2004, demonstrating the adoption of EU norms. However, when Kurdish terrorism increased, there was a return to hard-line policies and increasing role of the military. Thus, even though Turkish foreign policy making has been influenced by EU norms, this diffusion is tenuous.

A second conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that norm diffusion becomes problematic when there is a conflict between what is considered as national interests and EU norms. This is evident in the reactions of the Turkish public on EU cooperation in terrorism. Since Turkey is threatened by terrorism, the public is reluctant to support joint decision-making on this issue. Similarly, the key foreign policy decision-makers in Turkey, the military and the ministry of foreign affairs, fear that Kurdish terrorism would disintegrate Turkish territory. They advocate a hard-line approach to protect Turkish national interests, rather than the adoption of more liberal solutions in accordance with the EU norms. When the threat of Kurdish terrorism declined, Turkish elites were more willing to accept EU norms. However, when the threat increased, some of the EU norms were abandoned. Similarly, when Cyprus was not involved in EU-NATO operations, Turkey was a willing participant, adopting the EU norms on joint action. However, when the threat that Cyprus might gain access to NATO assets increased, Turkey abandoned this norm. Thus, there is a significant correlation between
the EU’s normative power on Turkey and interest-based calculations among the Turkish elites.

A final conclusion is that EU’s enlargement policy impacts the diffusion of European norms, only when the prospect of membership is seen credible in the recipient country. This is in line with the argument that norms diffuse better when they positively correlate with utility-based calculations. The Turkish public is supportive of EU enlargement more than further integration in the 2nd pillar because Turkey is expected to gain more with EU membership. Common defense and security policy in the EU, without Turkish membership, would not necessarily bring about the same benefits to Turkey. Similar calculations are also evident in EU-NATO cooperation. This issue would not be a problem if Turkey was a member of both NATO and the EU. The applicability of EU norms within Turkey depends on the possibility of Turkish membership to the EU. Turkish liberals gain the upper hand on foreign policy issues vis-à-vis the military and ministry of foreign affairs when EU member states commit to Turkish membership. When there are mixed signals from the European states, liberals lose ground and hard-liners argue that adopting EU liberal norms would weaken Turkish sovereignty. According to the hard-liners, without the gains of membership, Turkey becomes vulnerable to possible threats against its national integrity. Thus, the Turkish case demonstrates that EU’s normative power must be matched with material gains in order for the EU to influence normative change in its periphery.

Notes
A democracy is considered to be “consolidated when all politically significant groups”, provide attitudinal support, perceive the institutions of that regime as the only possible political structure for policy making, and when these groups cannot imagine acting outside of the regime’s institutions. (Gunther, Diamandouros, Puhle 1995:6-7)

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